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Quebec's Nonfrancophone Leaders:
Factors Associated With Their Mobilization
in Communal Movements.

Morvarid Saidi

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ABSTRACT

Quebec's Nonfrancophone Leaders: Factors Associated
with Their Mobilization in Communal Movements

Morvarid Saidi

This thesis has dealt with the defense of the interest
of Quebec's nonfrancophones in collective action by
communal nonfrancophone leaders. A resource mobilization
perspective was adopted to develop a path-analog log-linear
model tested on a sample of 527 leaders. It was found that
bilingualism and contacts with francophones are not
associated with membership in voluntary organizations. In
turn, bilingualism and membership in voluntary organizations
are associated with membership in political parties. None
of these except membership in voluntary organizations are
associated with a belief in the efficiency of collective
action to defend the interests of nonfrancophones. Finally,
it was found that no single factor, even belief in the
efficiency of collective action, had a strong direct effect
on the actual involvement of leaders in such collective
action. The findings suggest that various combinations of
the factors considered in this model could lead to leaders'
involvement in collective action for the defense of
nonfrancophone interests.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

LIST OF TABLES

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

The minority status of Quebec's nonfrancophone
population has become evident in the past two decades
through the withdrawal of the English language's official
status in Quebec and the passage of various language laws,
such as Bill 101. However, during this same period, there was
no united minority mobilization in Quebec on the part of its
nonfrancophones, mainly individual responses to their
minority situation could be observed with very dispersed and
diverse, collective attempts at representation (Fitzsimmons-
LeCavalier and LeCavalier, 1984). This creates a dilemma
from the theoretical point of view: the nonfrancophone
population of Québec possesses many of the characteristics
that are considered to encourage communal mobilization, that
is, a high level of organization and a high level of
segmentation from the francophone group. The language
legislation, which contributed to nonfrancophone minority
status also constitutes an open target for discontent
(Fitzsimmons-LeCavalier and LeCavalier, 1986). In the study
of social movements, communal segmentation is frequently
associated with communal conflict and mobilization. A high
level of segmentation refers to a structural arrangement in

which two or more communal groups are compartmentalized into analogous, parallel, noncomplementary institutions (Fitzsimmons-LeCavalier and LeCavalier, 1984). In other words, these communal groups possess their own sets of institutions. Thus, one would have expected that the conditions for mobilization--a high level of segmentation and organization--would have been met among the non-francophone population in Québec, but in actuality, this has not been the case: there was no concerted collective action by the non-francophones. This constitutes the mobilization dilemma of Quebec's nonfrancophone population.

The goal of this thesis will be to examine the factors associated with the mobilization of nonfrancophone leaders in Quebec. In other words, the present study will attempt to discover the factors which will hinder or facilitate their mobilization into communal movements.

Theoretical Perspective

Introduction

In this section of the paper, we will be discussing the theoretical background for the thesis. First, we will discuss the controversy around the mass society theory in order to give the base for the role of organization in mobilization. Second, we will look at the resource mobilization perspective and at the contributions that have been made by its different theorists. Oberschall's analysis of the concept of segmentation will be given special attention. We will also be examining the case of

2.

nonfrancophones in Quebec. And last, we will present some propositions developed from the literature. The above discussions should provide us with the theoretical framework for the specification of a model in the succeeding section.

Controversy around the Mass Society Theory

Mass society theory was often referred to in the study of mobilization in contemporary social sciences. This theory has been refuted in a series of recent empirical studies (Wood and Jackson, 1982). In the following chapters, a summary of the assumptions of mass society theory will be presented and the criticisms that have been made of this theory by various authors will also be examined. It will be demonstrated that the available (empirical) evidence contradicts mass society theory.

The theory of mass society is synthesized in detail by William Kornhauser (1959) and is representative of the tradition that argues that formal organization is not required for the development of social movements or that organizations may even impede the development of social movements (Wood and Jackson., 1982:70). Kornhauser defines mass society as a social system in which elites are readily accessible to influence by non-elites and non-elites are readily available for mobilization by elites. The accessibility of elites refers to the combination of high position and special responsibility whereas the availability of non-elites refers to the extent to which people are available for mass behavior when they lack attachments to

proximate objectives. Characteristics of mass society include: (1) the absence of a network of secondary organizations, (2) the absence of intermediate relations; primary groups are isolated from the larger society, and (3) the social alienation of individuals. Kornhauser basically argues that the lack of attachments to secondary organizations is conducive to participation in mass movement: the lack of a network of secondary organizations is seen to generate widespread social alienation among people and this makes likely recruits to mass or radical movements.

Kornhauser's argument has been rejected in a series of recent empirical studies. Critics argue that it is the attachment to secondary organizations ("the alienated secondary organization") and not the lack of it, which facilitates participation in social movements. This is the base of the controversy over mass society theory.

One of the critics of mass society theory is Maurice Pinard (1975). He was the first to propose an elaborate reformulation of mass society theory. According to Pinard, mass society does not prove useful in understanding the rise of the Social Credit party. This party had been particularly successful in rural areas, where community attachments are stronger. This contradicts the predictions of mass society model; the restraining effects of community attachments are questionned.

Besides the failure of mass society theory to support a mass analysis of the rise of the Social Credit, some

4

additional criticisms have also been made of this theory by

Pinard (1975). First of all, according to this author, the

generalization that the poor aren't easily recruited to new

movements, although they constitute one of the most atomized

segments of the population, suggests a reconsideration of

mass society theory. Second, mass theory suffers from

observational and theoretical biases: this theory seems to

be assuming that all groupings of a strong intermediate

structure would always act as important reference points for

their members, even in small rural communities. According

to Pinard, if restraining effects are to be ascribed to the

intermediate structure, primary groups and social networks

of small communities, rather than most associations and

organizations are the groupings to be considered, since they

are the more likely to act as reference points. Third, mass

society fails to recognize that secondary or intermediate

groups can also exert neutral or mobilizing functions (mass

theory claims that primary and secondary groups exert

restraining effects). The mobilizing potential of secondary

groups will be of particular interest to our study, as we

will see later on. Once again according to Pinard, whenever

preexisting primary and secondary groupings possess or

develop an ideology or simply subjective interests congruent

with that of a new movement, they will act as mobilizing

rather than restraining agents toward that movement.

Fourth, mass society theory disregards the accumulated

propositions of diffusion studies and some propositions of

conflict theory. Mass society theorists overlook the fact

5

that a social movement is a new item in a culture and that its adoption implies the process of diffusion; the higher the degree of social integration of potential adopters the more likely and sooner they will become actual adopters, and near isolates tend to be the last to adopt an innovation. The theory of community conflict contradicts mass theory insofar as processes of emergence of a conflict or of a social movement are concerned: conflict theory considers as crucial the communication and mobilizing effects of the intermediate structure. Coleman (1957), a researcher on community conflict says that more integrated people will be first to join conflict; this contradicts the propositions of mass society theory. Also, conflict theory distinguishes between attraction to a conflict and intensity of participation into it, whereas mass theory fails to make such a distinction. And last, mass society is a limited model, in the sense that it deals mainly with the potential effects of the intermediate structure and this is not a sufficient condition for the appearance of political movements; the role of strains is underestimated in mass theory. Strains will affect conduciveness, mobilization and social control potential of the intermediate structure. According to Pinard, under severe strains and given no other institutionalized channels for redress of grievances are available, conformist components of the intermediate structure can become elements which encourage, rather than limit, the growth of a new movement.

Thus, the available evidence examined so far

contradicts mass society theory: attachments to secondary
organizations seems to facilitate participation in social
movements.

Another author who has delete criticized mass society
theory is Anthony Oberschall (1973). He demonstrates that
the available evidence on the formation and growth of
extremist movements and bitter community conflict in the
U.S. fails to support mass society theory. First of all,
Oberschall shows that McCarthyism, a form of antidemocratic
extremism cannot be explained with reference to mass society
theory. It was found that "McCarthyism grew out of
conservative rural politics, the politics of rural,
conservative, local Republican elites, and not of mass
politics in any meaningful sense, and that most of those who
mobilized behind McCarthy at the national level were
conservative politicans and publicists, businessmen and
retired military leaders discontented with the New Deal, the
bureaucracy and with military policy..." (p. 104). Thus, it
was party affiliation which basically explained support for
McCarthyism and not some variables related to alienation and
massification or economic status, occupation, and
demographic attributes. Empirical evidence from another
important extremist movement, the Radical Right of the
1960's, also fails to support mass society theory. In-
formation on the socio-economic, demographic background and
group memberships of the participants of the "Anti-Communism
School" (one of the most prominent Radical organizations in
the U.S.) contradicts the explanations of mass society

7

theory. Crusaders of this organization were predominantly
from the upper strata, had above average incomes and had
high membership rates in all kinds of organizations.
"Therefore, they could not be called social isolates" (p.
105). Support for Radical Right organizations was found to
be associated with extreme conservative Republicanism,
religious fundamentalism, and an obsession with internal
subversion in regions where political party organizations
are weak and lack continuity (ex.: California and the
Southwest). Another example which Oberschall uses to
demonstrate the weakness of mass society theory are the
community controversies in the U.S., such as fluoridation
controversies. It has been found that the fluoridation
issue is associated with communities with a high level of
education, a dense network of voluntary organizations, and
high rates of citizen participation in civic and political
affairs. "It is not apathy and alienation, but
overparticipation in local community affairs that spells
trouble for the acceptance of fluoridation and fuels the
development of controversy" (Oberschall, 1973:105). Other
community conflict studies, such as Coleman's study of
community conflict (1957), and Gamson's study (1966) of
community controversies over schools, zoning, fluoridation,
and the like in New England, also support the fluoridation
study findings. Coleman's study had found that conflict
tended to take place in affluent suburbs with participatory
tradition and Gamson had found that the variable that
mainly explained conflicts in some communities was the

8

existence of a prior cleavage in the community over a
threatened shift in political control between two groups.
Gamson had also found that the variables which were expected
to produce an effect according to mass society theory, such
as the absence of solidary groups, economic strain, absence
of shared background, lack of organization membership and a
participatory political structure, had little explanatory
power. Another example from Oberschall, which also
contradicts mass society theory is the rise of the Nazis.
According to the author, Weimar Germany cannot be described
as a mass society. It was characterized by a high level of
participation in intermediate groups and superimposed
segmentation. As stated by Oberschall, Germany "... was a
highly organized class society in which however, communities
based on preindustrial divisions such as that between
Protestants and Catholics persisted and in which the
leadership of conservative Junkers in Prussia managed to
integrate lower-middle strata of small farmers with the
large landowners over the issue of agricultural
protectionism in the absence of an attractive agrarian
program offered by the Socialists" (p. 110). Also according
to the author, it was not the socially isolated and
uprooted, those weakly involved in intermediate relations
and previously apathetic people, who voted in
disproportionately large numbers for the Nazi party. The
Nazis were particularly strong in small towns and rural
areas where small independent farmers predominated. This
group was already highly organized and mobilized.

Dissatisfied with existing parties and agrarian programs, farmers were attracted to the Nazi party's program which proposed "to stop exploitation of farmers by taxation, wholesale trade and oppressive interest rates" (p. 111). It has been found that high participation in secondary organizations under conditions of superimposed segmentation provides for rapid mobilization into a protest movement where the people with deep-seated grievances are no longer hopeful of gaining relief through the existing political channels. Thus, it was shown that the mass society theory fails to explain adequately the growth of the Nazi movement in Germany. Through these various examples, Oberschall has demonstrated the failure of mass society theory to provide satisfactory explanations for extremist behavior and bitter community controversies.

Oberschall (1973) has also made some other criticisms of mass society theory. One of these has already been covered by Pinard: the mobilizing potential and mobilizing effects of intermediate groups are not adequately recognized in mass theory (Oberschall, 1973: 106). Oberschall also adds, just like Pinard that members of intermediate groups may be the early, not late joiners in the movement, much earlier than the atomized mass (contrary to mass society theory). Another criticism made by Oberschall, is based on Gusfield's (1962) critique of mass society and pluralist theories: mass society theory fails to distinguish between two types of social structures, both compatible with a dense network of intermediate groups and high rates of citizen participation

10

in them, that is between linked pluralism and superimposed

segmentation. Linked pluralism is a type of social

structure in which each individual is affiliated with

multiple groups but membership in any one intermediate group

cuts across memberships in others, and all members draw

their members from a variety of social groups, status

groups, or classes. Superimposed segmentation is a type of

social structure in which you have high rates of

participation in intermediate groups and many such groups

draw predominantly or exclusively from particular social

classes, strata or status groups (p. 107). Whereas in

linked pluralism, cross pressures act to moderate conflict

and prevent the division of society along lines of

superimposed cleavage, superimposed segmentation allows for

rapid mobilization of classes and strata against each other.

As it has already been mentioned, Weimar Germany was a good

example of a society characterized by a high degree of

superimposed segmentation and it is specifically this fact

which permitted the rapid mobilization of the Nazi movement.

Oberschall also criticizes mass society on the following

ground: it tends to ignore the importance of political

structures and institutions in the development of extremist

movements and community controversies.

Thus, this discussion on the controversy over mass

society theory gives us the base for the role of

organizations in the mobilization of social movements. It

has been demonstrated that attachments to secondary

organizations or intermediate groupings facilitate

11

participation in social movements. Members of such groups
or organizations will be the early joiners of a movement;
the more integrated individuals will be the first to join a
community conflict.

Resource Mobilization Perspective

Resource-Mobilization is the name of an emergent
approach to the study of social movements. According to
this perspective, for collective action to take place,
individuals must gain control over various resources, such
as time, money, expertise, and leadership. The major
assumption of its theorists is that individuals will engage
in collective action only when the value of the goods which
can be obtained through collective action outweigh the costs
involved in acting collectively.

In the resource mobilization approach, strains and
grievances (which had been stressed in the old models) are
accepted as important factors but incentives are considered
as being even more important motivations for collective
behavior to take place. After Olson (1965), Oberschall
(1973) introduced a discussion on incentives to the study of
social movements in society. Olson (1965) distinguishes
between two types of incentives or goods: collective and
selective incentives. Collective incentives are those goods
which the whole collectivity will benefit from if the social
movement achieves its goal(s), whether they have worked for
it or not. Selective incentives are those goods which are
only given to the participants of social movements, in

addition to the collective incentives. These range from
negative sanctions (ex.: penalties for noncompliance
in closed union shop agreements) to positive incentives (ex.:
insurance programs, discount buying plans, social rewards
such as prestige) (Jenkins, 1981). Selective incentives are
not available to free riders. The latter are those
individuals who do not feel the need to participate in
collective action, believing that they will eventually
benefit from the collective goods anyway. Such individuals
are numerous in society. An economic rationale is used by
these people: "Why should we provide any effort to
participate in a social movement or invest our time in it
(contribute resources), if we are going to profit from it
anyway, let others do it". However, this rationale is not
used by everyone, social movements are actually formed and
individuals do participate in them. Nonetheless, selective
incentives must be employed by organizations that pursue
collective goods, in order to attract free-riders or obtain
their contributions. The collective good by itself is not
sufficient to motivate contributions of resources from
individuals.

Just like Olson (1965), McCarthy and Zald (1973) stress
the role of selective incentives in mobilization for
collective action. According to these authors, to maintain
the supply of selective incentives for the leadership core,
outside resources from allies are also necessary. The
supply of outside resources or financial incentives reduces
a movement's mobilization costs and thus increases the

likelihood of collective action. McCarthy and Zald distinguish between the classical model and the professional movement model. The classical model makes a number of assumptions of the genesis and development of social movement organizations, these are: (1) the existence of a class, category, or group of people with common grievance(s), (2) communication among the members of the group is seen as crucial to later common effort, (3) environmental factors (ex.: residential patterns to the structure of working conditions) impinge upon the group, molding the possibilities for effective communication of common grievances and the possibilities for group action, (4) if communication is more or less effective, the group is more likely to take some concerted action to rectify the grievances, (5) in the early stages, we may expect ill-organized, random responses designed to redress grievances, (6) only after a well-defined leadership emerges do we find well-defined group action, (7) as emergent leaders confront the common problems of the group, they help to define them and devise explanations for their occurrences (ex.: they develop an ideology); the ideology helps to direct action toward specific targets and helps the leadership define legitimate organizational forms designed to make efficient use of the mass base, (8) the membership or mass base provides the resources--money, voluntary manpower and leadership--that allow the movement to survive and carry out its program, (9) the size and intensity of social movement organization is thought to reflect the existence or non-

existence of grievances that must be dealt with by the
political leadership of the society in question, (10) once
the problems that formed the initial basis for concerted
action have been solved, the mass base will be satiated, and
the movement may disappear since the grievances upon which
it was based have disappeared or it may be transformed and
become institutionalized; the psychological state of the
member or potential member (the support base) is a crucial
characteristic of the model prior to transformation and
institutionalization, (11) the leadership of the movement
must be sensitive to the membership's needs (p. 17). The
classical model is basically a motivation model: what pushes
people is deprivations. The size and intensity of social
movements is determined by the intensity and scope of
grievances. But there is the rise of a new type of social
movement, the professional social movement. This is a
common form among recent movements. Professional social
movements represent an organizational form based on movement
leaders who are social movement entrepreneurs. The
assumptions of the professional movement model may be
summarized as follows: (1) this approach does not deny the
existence of grievances, it stresses the structural
conditions that facilitate the expression of grievances, (2)
resources are increasingly coming from outside the movement
or outside self-interested memberships concerned with
personally held grievances, (3) the motivation of people in
this model is selective incentives rather than grievances as
in the classical model; this includes internal and external

incentives, internal motives in terms of self-interest and external incentives such as the prestige you get by giving money for causes or foundations, (4) mobilization takes place independently of state of grievances, (5) the role of the mass media is stressed in the mobilization of professional social movements, and this is done in three ways: as an implification effect, by carrying images of the aggrieved population to the authorities and by carrying the threat of greater mobilization if nothing is done. Therefore, professional social movements are characterized by: (1) a leadership that devotes itself full time to the movement; a large proportion of resources originating outside the aggrieved group that the movement claims to represent, (2) a very small or nonexistant membership base or a paper membership (membership implies little more than allowing name to be used upon membership rolls), (3) attempts to impart the image of "speaking for a potential constituency", (4) attempts to influence policy toward that same constituency (p. 20).

Tilly (1978) presents the most systematic statement of the resource mobilization perspective. He presents two models of collective action: the "mobilization model" and the "polity model". The former is an analytical model and corresponds to Smelser's (1963) "value-added scheme". The mobilization model describes the behavior of a single contender in terms of interest, organization, power, and other variables (Tilly, 1978:98). First, by "contender", Tilly refers to any group which, during some specified

period, applies pooled resources to influence the government. There are two types of contenders: challengers and members of the polity. "A member is any contender which has routine, low-cost access to resources controlled by the government; a challenger is any other contender" (p. 52). Interest refers to the shared advantages or disadvantages likely to accrue to a contender group for mobilization. This component was referred to as strains or deprivations in Smelser's model. Whereas Olson (1965) had stressed mainly selective incentives, Tilly here stresses collective incentives, that is the things a movement is trying to gain. Tilly's second determinant of collective action, "organization", refers to the degree of common identity and unifying structure among the individuals in the given population. Another important determinant of collective action is mobilization, that is of material and human resources. By this, Tilly refers to the extent of resources under collective contol of the contender. Although interests, organization and mobilization are the three major determinants of collective action, opportunity is also important. It refers to the relationship between the population's interests and the current state of the world around it. It has three major elements: power, repression/facilitation, and opportunity/threat. Power refers to the ability of a contender group to satisfy its interests. Repression describes any action by any other group which raises the contender's cost of collective action whereas facilitation refers to any action which lowers the

contender's cost. The more facilitation a group has, the
less costly it will be to engage in collective action.
Whereas opportunity refers to the extent to which other
groups become vulnerable to new claims made by the contender
group which would, if successful, enchance the contender's
realization of its interests, threats refer to the extent to
which other groups are threatening to make claims which if
successful, reduce the contender's realization of its
interests. An example of this would be the English
community facing the increasing threats in Quebec. The
last component of this mobilization model is collective
action. It is described as the extent of a contender's
joint action in pursuit of common ends. It basically
refers to the joint action itself. Tilly's second, model of
collective action is the "polity model". Its components
are: a population, a government, one or more contenders, a
polity, and one or more coalitions. Population is defined as
any population of interest. A government is described as
an organization which controls the principal concentrated
means of coercion within the population. The term
"contender" has been defined earlier. A polity consists of
the collective action of the members and the government. A
coalition represents the tendency of a set of contenders
and/or governments to coordinate their collective action.
The polity model describes the behavior of a group of
contenders in terms of changes in the resources controlled
by each contender and by the government, changes in the rates
at which the contenders and the government give and take

resources, and changes in the coalition structure add up to produce entries into the polity, and exits from it. It is basically an interest-group politics model; it stresses very much leadership rather than mass base. Some comments may be made about Tilly's models. In his "mobilization model", the relationship between each determinant is important. "Mobilization", which is created by other components, is a central theme of his model. The process from mobilization to collective action, which is Tilly's major concern, is an ongoing one. Contenders are constantly involved in collective action. Thus, collective action is constantly producing gains or losses and this affects mobilization and opportunities. Leaders are constantly mobilizing resources in order to produce collective action. We will summarize now in the following lines the similarities and differences of Tilly's perspective with that of other social movement theorists. First, interests are the most differentiating factor in this model. Whereas Tilly mainly stresses interests in mobilization for collective action, previous authors have stressed other elements: Olson (1965) has stressed selective incentives, just like McCarthy and Zald (1973), and Fireman and Gamson (1979) have stressed solidarity and principles in mobilization as we will see later on. Second, although organization is an important conducting factor in his model, conduciveness is not only represented by organization. There are other important factors such as mobilization, power, etc. Tilly maintains that all components of collective action interact with each

19

other. In this sense it is similar with Smelser's value-added scheme. Third, by "mobilization", Tilly refers to the mobilization of all kinds of resources, including outside resources. In this sense, his model is more complete than McCarthy and Zald's which mainly stresses outside resources. Fourth, some of the elements of the opportunity component in Tilly's mobilization model are new, some are old. There is nothing such as beliefs, ideologies, nothing which corresponds to the generalized belief in Smelser's model. Fifth, any model of deprivation is left out by Tilly: deprivations are completely left out. He mainly stresses interests. Strains and grievances have been stressed in old models and have been accepted as important by most resource mobilization theorists. And last, just like other resource mobilization theorists, Tilly assumes the rationality of collective action. People are constant rational actors, they are conscious of their interests and act on the basis of calculations of gains and losses. This contrasts with LeBon (1895), an early social movement theorist, who made strong assumption of irrationality of collective action. LeBon had described the ideology of crowds as one of inferior reasoning, lack of logic, and irrationality. Tilly claims his model is good for all types of collective action, institutionalized and non-institutionalized. However, he concentrates on non-institutionalized, conflictual behavior. Interests is the motivating factor in his model. He defines collective action as the ways people act together in the pursuit of their interests. Collective action results from

changing combinations of interests, mobilization, organization and opportunity.

Whereas Tilly (1978) has stressed collective incentives in mobilization for collective action, Oberschall (1973) stresses the type of structural arrangement between communal groups (segmentation/integration) and the degree of organization in a communal group. A special attention is given to Oberschall's structural arrangement because it relates directly with the major objectives of the thesis. The assumptions of Oberschall's theory are the following: (1) it takes for granted that a collectivity or quasi-group with common latent interests, already exists and that the members of this collectivity are dissatisfied and have grievances, and (2) this collectivity is fairly large and geographically concentrated so that communication between members exists or can be established. "The theory is concerned with substantial opposition movements and other forms of collective behavior such as riots and rebellion, and not with a sociology of sects, small deviant subcultures, and similar phenomena" (p. 119). The guiding ideas of Oberschall's theory will be presented in the following lines: the minimum conditions of collective protest are shared targets and objects of hostility held responsible for grievances, hardship and suffering, augmented in some cases by more deeply rooted sentiments of collective oppression, common interests and community of fate; the latter give rise to only short-term, localized, ephemeral outbursts and movements of protest such as riots;

21

for sustained resistance or protest, an organizational base and continuity of leadership are also necessary; this organizational base can be rooted in two different types of social structure, that is a collectivity might be integrated and organized along viable traditional lines based on community, with recognized leaders and networks of social relations extending to its boundaries or a collectivity might have a dense network of secondary groups based on occupational, religious, civic, economic and special interest associations with leaders based on prominent roles in these associations and networks of social relations following associational ties; these two types of social structure produce horizontal links and sentiments of solidarity with the collectivity that can be activated for the pursuit of collective goals and the formation of conflict groups; on a vertical dimension, the links between the collectivity and other collectivities in the society, especially those higher up in the stratification system, are very important, a structural feature facilitating mobilization into protest movements is obtained when the society is segmented (besides being stratified), that is under segmentation the collectivity whose potential for mobilization has few links and bonds other than perhaps through exploitative relationships, with the higher classes or other collectivities of the society; however, if in a stratified society there exists strong vertical social and political bonds between upper and lower classes,

mobilization into protest movements among the lower classes
is not likely to take place; in a modern context, a
vertically integrated yet highly stratified system exists
when the lower strata have access to power through their own
associations and special interest groups and wrest a
greater share of material resources through these
associations, the legitimacy of stratification is then based
on effective performance, the division of labor, and the
opportunity for social mobility (pp. 119-120). The above
ideas are elaborated in Figure 1-1. In this figure, the
relationship between social structure and collective
opposition is further clarified. It is presented as a means
for classifying collectivities within a society. The
dimensions on which this classification is based are derived
from theories of social change and social structure: the
horizontal dimension is based on the "Gemeinschaft-
Gesellschaft" distinction, and the vertical dimension is
based on the concept of "pluralism" in anthropological
theory. "The purpose of the figure is to facilitate the
discussion of whether or not conditions for conflict group
formation are present, the kind of leadership that conflict
groups will tend to have, and the organizational forms
that collective behavior will be expressed through"
(p. 121). Oberschall presents a series of hypotheses in
relation to each of the regions of Figure 1-1. These are:
(1) the minimum conditions for collective protest are more
likely to be present as the group or collectivity becomes
increasingly cut off from other strata in the society, for

	Horizontal dimension: links within the collectivity		
	Communal organization	Un-or weakly-organized	Associational organization
Vertical dimension: links between collectivities			
Integrated	A	B	C
Segmented	D	E	F

Figure 1-1. Collectivities Classified along Vertical and Horizontal Dimensions of Integration (Oberschall, 1973:120).

24

example as the collectivity is segmented, (2) leadership is more readily available from within if the collectivity is in a segmented rather than in an integrated social structure, since talented and ambitious individuals will tend to remain trapped within the collectivity with few prospects of upward mobility, (3) if a collectivity is a solidarity community under conditons of vertical integration (region A in Figure 1-1), collective protest is not likely to take place against upper-status groups, for the reason that the community has access to the problem-solving centers of the wider society through its own leadership for the redress of grievances, (4) under conditions of vertical integration but weak horizontal bonds within the collectivity (B), members of the lower class are internally divided, suspicious of each other, in competition with each other for prestige and material resources and not likely to form associations to protest their common class interest against landlords, since they are individually oriented for protection and advancement to local bosses and notables who monopolize local leadership position, (5) if a collectivity is both vertically integrated and has within it a dense network of associations (C), collective opposition outside of institutional channels isn't likely to take place, for the reason that its common interests already receive attention through political parties, trade unions, and other class-based organizations with an access to power, (6) in the case of a solidary communal group that is segmented or cut off from upper-status groups (D), we can expect an especially

25

rapid and intense defense of common interest by means of collective action, (7) as ties based on community weaken under the impact of social change and inasmuch as vertical integration breaks down as well (E), collective protests of an organized, short-lived but violent type emerges as the typical response to social dislocation and grievances, (8) if incipient associational ties are emerging in a previously disorganized collectivity (boundary region between E and F), the protest response will be more continuous, with more explicit leadership and the formulation of collective goals, (9) it is under conditions of strong associational ties and segmentation (F) that the possibility of the rapid spread of opposition movements on a continuous base exists once more with particular force (pp. 121-123). Again in relation to the different regions in Figure 1-1, Oberschall formulates some further hypotheses about mobilization and participants of mass movements and violent protests (Oberschall, 1973: 125-138):

(1) In a segmented context, the greater the number and variety of organizations in a collectivity, and the higher the participation of members in this network, the more rapidly and enduringly does mobilization into conflict groups occur, and the more likely it is that bloc recruitment, rather than individual recruitment, will take place.

(2) The more segmented a collectivity is from the rest of the society, and the more viable and

26

extensive the communal ties within it, the
more rapid and easier it is to mobilize
members of the collectivity into an opposition
movement.

(3) If a collectivity is disorganized or
unorganized along traditional communal lines
and not yet organized along associational
lines, collective protest is possible when
members share common sentiments of oppression and
targets for hostility. These sentiments
are more likely to develop if the collectivity
is segmented rather than vertically integrated
with other collectivities of the society.
Such protest will, however, tend to be short-
lived and more violent than movements based on
communal or associational organization.

(4) Participants in popular disturbances and
activists in organizations will be recruited
primarily from previously active and
relatively well-integrated individuals within
the collectivity, whereas socially isolated,
atomized, and uprooted individuals will be
underrepresented, at least until the movement
has become substantial.

Thus, Oberschall's theory stresses segmentation as a
favorable condition of mobilization. Segmentation leads to
more conflict for the following reasons: the lack of social
constraints and the lack of channels for the redress of

27

grievances. First, to the extent that lower ethnic groups
are segmented, they won't be subjected to social constraints
from upper groups to the extent that social constraints are
not effective, they will turn into a mobilization effect.
Second, to the extent social classes are segmented, they
will not have access to legitimate channels for the redress
of grievances, it is also under such a condition that there
will be emergence of a social movement. This theory also
implies that members of a collectivity are no longer
available for mobilization by elites outside of their
collectivity, while members of the collectivity no longer
seek out elites for the defense of their interests and for
solving their problems, and that it is to "inside"
leadership based on newly cemented associational ties, that
members of the collectivity look for leadership.

Oberschall also discusses leaders of opposition
movements and revolutions in terms of their motivations,
personality characteristics, socioeconomic background,
ability to actively shape and influence the course of a
movement and its existence, and the effectiveness of
different styles or types of leadership. "Leaders, in sum,
are the architects of organization, ideology, and
mobilization for the movement" (p. 146). He stresses that
much information is lacking regarding opposition and protest
leaders, particularly on their motivational and personality
attributes. Concerning the latter, different conceptions of
leaders have been expressed throughout the literature. For
instance, one traces leaders' behavior to pathological

28

traits or early experiences, often referred to as the marginality theory; another explains leaders' behavior as a result of the context of the situation as leaders of movements. According to Oberschall, the latter provides a more fruitful explanation for the sometimes erratic, irrational, or authoritarian behavior of leaders: the often unstable situations in which opposition leaders often live, the pressures and dilemmas associated with being a leader of uninstitutionalized movement, would lead any normal individual to exhibit confused or arbitrary behavior. The bulk of the data does not support the social marginality theory of opposition movement leaders; the upper and middle strata in society supply the bulk of opposition leaders to all manner of social movements, including political parties and other institutionalized groups that have access to political influence and decisionmaking. Oberschall uses a risk-reward approach to participation in his discussion of the likelihood that leaders and activists in a social movement are drawn from certain groups and social strata. Rewards refer to rewards of participation in a social movement relative to the rewards and satisfactions enjoyed in everyday life. These may be: social status, prestige, personal satisfaction, financial and economic rewards, etc. Risks refer to the risks which participation may entail. It includes: economic risks (ex.: loss of one's job), prosecution, imprisonment, loss of life and of limb of the participant, and even danger to his family and kin. The basic idea of Oberschall's approach is that assuming the

existence of some grievances, the lower the risk/reward
ratio, the more likely it is for an individual and members
of a group or social stratum, to become participants in
opposition movements. However, to individual differences in
personality, motivation, social support, etc., a certain
amount of variation in the response of groups members under
the same conditions of risk, reward, and intensity of
grievances, is to be expected. The ideas discussed above
are best illustrated in Figures 1-2a and 1-2b. These
figures shed some light on the participation of various
groups and individuals, and on the timing of their
participation. Oberschall presents some hypotheses in
relation to the different regions of Figures 1-2a and 1-2b.
They are: (1) when individuals and groups are subject to
high risks and relatively low rewards from participation in
a social movement, as it is the case in the upper left
corner in Fig. 1-2a, low rates of participation are
predicted, (2) when rewards are high and risks low, as they
are in the lower right region of Fig. 1-2a, he predicts high
rates of participation, (3) when there is an even balance
between risks and rewards, he predicts a rate that is in
between the two previous cases, (4) those who fall in the
lower right hand corner in Fig. 1-2a can be expected to be
early participants, and those in the upper left region, the
last to join, and (5) a high risk, low reward group might be
initially unresponsive to mobilization attempts, but as the
risks of participation become lower, and/or the rewards
higher, it moves into a region with a higher probability of

30

Figure 1-2a. The Likelihood of
Participation Associated with
Various Regions of the Risk/
Reward Field (Oberschall,
1973: 162).

Figure 1-2b. Time Path of
Participation Associated
with Changing Risk/Reward
Ratios: an Illustration
(Oberschall, 1973: 162).

participation (p. 163). Thus, the fastest way to produce high rates of social movement participation is to lower risks and increase rewards simultaneously. Figures 1-2a and and 1-2b also clarify the concept of loosening of.social control. The gradual relaxation of social control mechanisms will result in a slower emergence of opposition movements and, a greater capacity of the incumbents to contol it. The loosening of social control may be expressed in several ways: by opening up opportunities and channels of social and occupational ascent to able and ambitious individuals in potential opposition groups and by introducing greater freedom of expression, civil liberties, and tolerance for opposition. The major way in which governments and incumbents may lower the participation probability for opposition activity is by lowering the rewards of opposition relative to rewards and opportunities they are willing to provide through institutionalized means.

After Oberschall (1973), Breton (1978) stresses the degree of social organization of a communal group as an important factor for collective action to take place. Breton's essay offers a possible way of looking at the underlying dynamics of the transformations which are taking place in the structure of the relationship among the ethnolinguistic groups within Canadian society in recent years, and of the conflicts through which they occur or fail to occur. His discussion primarily deals with a broad class of characteristics of ethnic communities, which pertain to

the pattern of differentiation between ethnic communities: patterns of differentiation, its implications for ethnic stratification and for societal integration. Breton also makes some observations on a second broad set of characteristics of ethnic communities, which pertain to a group's capacity for concerted action. By patterns of differentiation, he refers to the extent to which ethnic communities have parallel social networks and institutions. This includes two aspects: (1) the degree of social enclosure between ethnic communities, and (2) the degree of compartmentalization between ethnic communities. The first one is related to the structure of social relations among members of a society: the existence of social boundaries between groups and mechanisms for the maintenance of these boundaries. The second one is related to the structure of institutions and organizations: the degree of institutional completeness. The degree of parallelism may vary in social networks and institutions, in range of areas of social life involved, and in individuals. For example, from the point of view of individuals involved, the greater the parallelism, the more a person's life can be lived in one of the ethnic communities without contact with individuals or organizations in the other. A high and low degree of parallelism have implications for the following aspects of stratification between groups: (1) the stratification of individuals or of organizations, (2) segmentation of labour markets, (3) race and language as compounding factors, and (4) the types of factors related to mobility. First, under

33

low parallelism, individuals are primarily being ranked within the institutional system, while under high segmentation, it is also organizations that are being ranked: the greater the degree of parallelism in a particular domain of activity, the more the issues of inequality will tend to involve the relative status of the organizations of each ethnic community and their position in the over-all institutional structure, and the lower the parallelism, the more the issues of inequality will have to do with the status of individuals in the society at large and in its institutions and with the conditions for individual participation and advancement in the institutions and with the conditions for individual participation and advancement in the institutional systems. Second, parallel ethnic labour markets may exist within their own set of institutions and networks through which information and influence flow but if parallelism is high, the cost of getting information about the access to certain opportunities is highly associated with one's ethnic identification and if parallelism is low, the costs tend to be associated almost exclusively with non-ethnic factors. Third, differences in physical character and language may reinforce the parallelism and its impact. And fourth, when parallelism is high, concern is with those factors affecting the status of organizations and organizational systems, and when it is low, it is with those affecting the status of individuals within an institutional system. Regarding the implications of patterns of differentiation for societal

34

integration, variations in the degree of parallelism among ethnic communities also affect the character of power and conflict interactions that occur among them. Breton's general hypothesis here is that the degree of parallelism has an impact on kinds of matters that become issues between ethnic communities and on the character of accompanying social bargaining processes taking place between them. He also mentions a few other hypotheses: (1) the greater the parallelism of an ethnic community, the more likely it is to represent a threat to other communities and the more the very existence of a parallel institutional system or the conditions necessary for its maintenance or expansion become objects of conflict between communities involved and an area for the exercise of power between them, and (2) the greater the degree of institutional parallelism, the more conflicts and exercise of power between the communities in contact will involve issues concerning the spheres of jurisdiction: delineation of respective domains of organizational activity, and (3) the greater the social and institutional ethnic parallelism in a society, the more the structure of the political system, especially the central one, become objects of controversy and power confrontation. Modes of incorporation of cohorts of individuals in societal institutions are not quite the same as that of an ethnic group that disposes of a formal political structure for corporate action. In the case of cohorts of individuals, societal integration is fostered through structures and mechanisms facilitating the participation of individuals of

different ethnic origins in social institutions and the attainment of their personal goals, whereas in the case of an ethnic group, societal integration is fostered through structural accommodations and exchanges that facilitate the existence and growth of institutional structures with which members of the ethnic communities are identified and in which they try to attain their goals in particular spheres of activity. And last, Breton distinguishes between two sets of factors which pertain to ethnic communities' capacity for concerted action: (1) the type and amount of resources at their disposal, and (2) factors pertaining to the social organization of the ethnic community. By resources, he refers to items such as demographic factors, material assets, solidarity, symbols of identification, and commitment to a cause. The most important factors pertaining to the social organization of the ethnic community are the following: (a) the first mechanisms for collective action which include mechanisms for collection and processing of information about the community, its population, its social, economic, and political situation, its resources; procedures for and organizational channels through which issues can be raised and various points of views expressed; procedures for reaching decisions and implementing them; and an appropriate network of communication, especially between the leadership and members of the community or segments of it, (b) the structure of authority, that is the set of roles, vested with the authority required to make the above mechanisms operational,

(c) the presence or absence of an institutionally differentiated political function, that is of specifically governmental organizations, (d) the ability to motivate and/or to constrain members of the community to participate and to provide the necessary inputs of effort, time and financial resources, (e) the degree in the organization of action, and (f) a certain consensus among the segments of the community about what constitutes a matter for collective action or about the definition and choice of alternatives as to what needs to be done (p. 156). All the above factors are important or necessary for collective action to take place. Thus, besides recognizing that resources are required for collective action to take place, Breton has stressed factors related to the social organization aspect of ethnic communities. In this sense, he is similar to Oberschall (1973).

Jenkins (1983) in his review draws on the debates stimulated by the resource mobilization perspective and recent empirical studies to outline the basic arguments of resource mobilization theory and to assess critically its contribution to some major issues in the field of social movements: the formation of movements, the process of mobilization, the organization of social movemnts, and the outcome of challenges. We will not need to go into Jenkins' analysis of these controversies for the purpose of the present literature review, we will simply state his model. Although Jenkins recognizes that an approach which

emphasized structural conflicts of interest has been more
useful than the classic "structural strain" theories of
grievance, he stresses that a multifactored approach to the
problem of movement formation would be more useful than
McCarthy and Zald's model. He basically criticized the
latter for putting exclusive emphasis on organizational
resources. It is also assessed as an interpretation of the
social movements of the 1960s-1970s. Thus, Jenkins advances
a multifactored model of social movement formation, which
emphasized resources, organization, and political
opportunities in addition to traditional discontent
hypotheses. The basic idea behind this model is that
movements are formed through diverse routes depending on the
elements absent in the pre-movement situation. Jenkins'
model is more complete than that of the other resource
mobilization theorists covered up to now in the sense that
he stresses a series of factors all together and not just
one type of factor. Although both Breton (1978) and Jenkins
(1983) have emphasized resources and organization, Jenkins
has also stressed that political opportunities are required
for social movements to form.

Whereas Jenkins (1983) has stressed discontent,
resources, organization, and political opportunities,
Fireman and Gamson (1979) have mainly stressed solidarity
and principles in mobilization for collective action.
First, Fireman and Gamson criticize Olson's (1965)
utilitarian logic of collective action for exaggerating the
role of self-interest in mobilization while obscuring the

role of solidarity and principles. "Solidarity is rooted in the configuration of relationships linking the members of a group to one another" (p. 21). Fireman and Gamson suggest five factors that constitute the basis for a person's solidarity with a group: friends and relatives, participation in organizations, design for living (set of techniques offered by a group to its members to handle the problems they encounter in their daily lives), subordinate and superordinate relations, and no exit (extent to which a person is readily identified and often treated as a member of a group, that his exit from it is difficult). These authors basically argue that the relationships just stated generate solidarity and the latter becomes an important basis for mobilization. By "principles", Fireman and Gamson refer to collective goods which may be perceived as an entitlement, as something deserved as matter of justice, equity or right. According to the authors, collective actors, that is the organizers of formal organizations whose primary purpose is to carry on struggles to bring about collective goods, frequently appeal to the principles of their constituents as a way of mobilizing support and mobilizing agents constantly look for ways to try to enchance the value of the collective good. A basic assumption made by Fireman and Gamson is that people who lack solidary relations and firm principles are unlikely to mobilize for collective action. Although the authors recognize the importance of selective incentives in bringing about collective action, they nonetheless argue that solidarity and principles are more

39

efficient ways of bringing about collective action. They also argue that selective incentives are dependent upon consciousness and solidarity.

The Case of Nonfrancophones in Quebec

According to Fitzsimmons-LeCavalier and LeCavalier (1984), although nonfrancophones have always been a numerical minority in Quebec, the minority situation of anglophones and their institutions has only become evident in the last two decades. However, there has not been any mobilization at the peak of the crisis. This lack of minority mobilization poses a challenge from the theoretical point of view: the non-francophone population possess many of the characteristics that are considered to encourage communal mobilization and protracted communal conflict, that is high levels of social and institutional segmentation (from the francophone group) and internal associational organization. In several approaches, segmentation has been associated with conflict, whereas recent studies emphasize the facility with which communal groups may organize to promote their interests under conditions of segmentation. As we have seen, Oberschall (1973) like others in the resource mobilization approach, stresses that considerable resources are required for mobilization to take place. According to this author, the likelihood that members will make significant resource donations to communal movements will vary with the degrees of segmentation, integration and organization with the communal group itself. Oberschall

stresses that communal groups exhibiting a high degree of
segmentation and internal organization are likely to be able
to make successful claims on their members' loyalty and
resources. In the resource mobilization approach, communal
segmentation is frequently associated with communal
conflict: such a social structure provides the ideal
structural conditions for the emergence of influential
movement leaders and the mass base for sustained collective
action promoting communal interests. Fitzsimmons-LeCavalier
and LeCavalier (1984) derive a number of theoretical points
from studies of other communal movements to try to explain
why the felicitous mobilization conditions created by high
levels of segmentation and internal organization did not
lead to a collective minority response among nonfranco-
phones. According to them, structural restrictions
on the interest, capacity and opportunity for non-
francopnones to act communally has created severe political
constraints on their mobilization potential for a collective
minority response. For example, the low interest that the
established nonfrancophone economic and political elites had
for leading and contributing their organizational resources
to a collective minority response created a major constraint
on the raising of a collective minority voice. The
nonfrancophone political and economic elites had low
incentives in leading a communal challenge and powerful
incentives in maintaining integration and moderating
conflict. Since the francophone and anglophone business
elites have common and divergent interest, and maintain

41

overall accommodative relations and an integrated stand, the established nonfrancophone elite were not interested in taking stands that could alienate the corresponding francophone elite on the affluent francophone market for goods. Secondly, the low capacity that nonfrancophones had to act communally also created a major constraint on their mobilization potential for a collective minority response. Institutional completeness and social solidarity are two important factors in assuring a group's capacity to act communally. Although there is a high level if institutional completeness in the nonfrancophone population, their political leaders were not in a position to use their political organizations or their influence to mobilize for communal representation. The latter had led to less well established political activists. Also, Quebec's non-francophones are not characterized by social or institutional solidarity, which is common to most communal groups: they have no set of common bonds, such as similar language, ethnic background, religious heritage and institutional base. Third, the low political oportunities that were available to nonfrancophones for exerting communal influence also created a major constraint on the group's mobilization potential for concerted collective action. In majoritarian electoral systems, communal minorities have little chance of exerting independent political influence and tend to be dependent on majority attitudes and political alliances with sections of the majority to gain political influence; therefore they are more likely to adopt

accommodative strategies. This is precisely the case of nonfrancopones in Québec; they did not have the political cleavage needed to mount a concerted collective action to defend their minority rights. According to Fitzsimmons-LeCavalier and LeCavalier (1984), the following factors have contributed to the sense of powerlessness of nonfrancophones, and thus discouraged mobilization for a collective response: (1) weak bargaining position of the minority in the majoritarian electoral system, (2) need for alliances with influential sections of the majority, and (3) limited potential for dissent when the elite accommodation process failed to satisfy sections of the minority. An opinions' survey of nonfrancophone leaders carried out by Fitzsimmons-LeCavalier and LeCavalier in Quebec also suggests that the political constraints that have been discussed have posed serious mobilization difficulties for communal action. In sum, Fitzsimmons-LeCavalier and LeCavalier have shown that although the nonfrancophones express a high degree of frustration and discontent over their minority status, and are a highly segmented and organized communal group, this has not led to any important mobilization for concerted collective action on their part. Other factors have been found to be important in contributing to this response of nonfrancophones. The severe political constraints created by structural restrictions on the interest, capacity, and opportunity for nonfrancophones to act communally hindered their mobilization potential for a collective minority response.

43

As we have shown, the established nonfrancophone economic
and political elites had a low interest, capacity, and
opportunity to act communally and this hindered their
mobilization potential for a collective minority response.
Thus, Fitzsimmons-LeCavalier and LeCavalier stress the
importance of structural conditions which provide powerful
incentives, capacity and opportunities in determining the
mobilization potential of a communal group, or facilitating
its mobilization for collective action.

Propositions Developed from the Literature

Oberschall's sociological theory of mobilization
(1973) stresses segmentation as a favorable condition of
mobilization. According to this theory, a highly segmented
society presents the ideal structural feature facilitating
mobilization into protest movements. Thus, according to
Oberschall, the level of segmentation in a society is
positively related to its potential for mobilization: a
highly segmented social structure encourages mobilization.
This depends as we will see in the next few lines when we
look at segmentation at the individual level, i.e.: that
of nonfrancophone leaders in Quebec. According to
Fitzsimmons-LeCavalier and LeCavalier (1984), although
Quebec society is segmented, there are different levels of
segmentation within the nonfrancophone leadership. The most
politically active nonfrancophone leaders will tend to be
bilingual and meet francophones. Therefore, the most
politicized nonfrancophone leaders are the least segmented

ones. Consequently, the least segmented nonfrancophone leaders are more likely to be in organizations with resources to mobilize (even though they may not do so, as in the case of nonfrancophone leaders in Quebec: mobilization dilemma of nonfrancophone leaders in Quebec). A first proposition which may be derived from the above discussion is that the least segmented nonfrancophone leaders would be more likely to mobilize for collective action than the most segmented ones.

Mass society theory claims that a society's intermediate structure exerts restraining effects on its members and prevents them from turning to mass behavior and mass movements. It also assumes that all the groupings of the intermediate structure are taken as reference points by its members. Pinard (1975) in his critique of mass society theory, claims that secondary groups may also exert neutral or mobilizing effects. He also claims that membership and attachment to secondary organizations does not make it necessary that these organizations will act as reference groups for these members; the intermediate structure is not necessarily a reference point. According to Pinard, whenever pre-existing primary and secondary groupings possess or develop an ideology or simply subjective interests congruent with that of a new movement, they will act as mobilizing rather than restraining agents toward that movement. He also stresses that the various elements of the intermediate structure (primary groups, communal ties, occupational groups, associations and groups) must be taken

45

as reference groups by their members, in order to exert any kind of normative effect (positive or negative). Therefore, some organizations may facilitate mobilization, others may hinder it. A second proposition which may be derived from this is that nonfrancophone leaders who participate the most in francophone organizations, compared to those who participate the least, will be more likely to mobilize for collective action. This proposition is basically a consequence of the first proposition: the least segmented nonfrancophone leaders compared to the more segmented ones, are indeed those who participate the most in francophone voluntary organizations.

Specification of a Model

The review of literature has shown that mobilization is a complex process. The present thesis will mainly focus on phenomenas linked with the idea of segmentation. The model which will be proposed in the following pages will be both causal and recursive as shown in Figure 1-3, and I will be following Goodman's (1973) strategy for the use of log-linear modelling as analog to path analysis. Also, the specification of concepts and reformulation of hypotheses will follow the order of the causal model presented in Figure 1-3.

The Main Concepts

In this study we shall examine the following concepts: segmentation, membership in voluntary organizations, belief in the efficiency of collective action, and collective

46

action. These concepts will be further defined in the
sections that will follow.

The Independent Variables

The independent variables for this study will be
segmentation and membership in voluntary organizations.
First, segmentation at the group level is conceptually
defined as a structural arrangement in which two or more
groups are compartmentalized into analogous, parallel,
complementary institutions (Fitzsimmons-LeCavalier and
LeCavalier, 1984). In other words, it is the degree to
which two or more communal groups have their own set of
institutions. In this thesis, we will take for granted that
segmentation exists to a high degree between the two
linguistic groups (English and French), and we will focus
on the differential level of segmentation experience among
the nonfrancophone leaders. In this perspective, we will be
examining two dimensions or types of segmentation:
linguistic segmentation and social segmentation. Linguistic
segmentation will include bilingualism and the use of the
French language, whereas social segmentation will simply
refer to the extent that one has social contacts with
members of the other communal group (francophones). These
variables will be operationalized in the methods section of
the paper. Membership in voluntary organizations will
include membership in political parties and in various other
types of voluntary organizations.

The Dependent Variables

The dependent variables for this study will be belief in the efficiency of collective action and involvement in collective action within groups defending the interests of nonfrancophones in Quebec. The latter will include membership and participation in organizations with such objectives.

The Hypotheses

Linguistic and social segmentation

The knowledge of French certainly facilitates contacts with francophones, but one could also say that having no or very few contacts with them will not help the learning of French. For that reason, no causal direction is proposed in the diagram of Figure 1-3. It is proposed and assumed (if any link exists) that linguistic and social segmentations influence and reinforce each other (hypothesis 1 in Fig. 1-3).

Segmentation, membership, participation in voluntary organizations and political parties

All nonfrancophone leaders are prominent members of some voluntary organization(s). Some of them are members of voluntary organizations which are always segmented and some are members of organizations which are less segmented. Therefore, there is no reason to believe that there is a direct relationship between segmentation and membership and participation in voluntary organizations (hypo.2).

Political parties are not segmented at the Provincial and Federal levels. Their membership is predominantly

francophone. It is proposed that the knowledge of French will facilitate participation in political parties at both Federal and Provincial levels, which are predominantly francophone. Thus, those leaders who are less segmented linguistically will be more likely to participate in political parties than the more segmented ones (hypo.3). Social contacts with francophones will also facilitate participation in political parties at the Federal and Provincial levels. Therefore, those nonfrancophone leaders who are more socially in contact with francophones (the less socially segmented) will hesitate less in participating in political parties, than those who have less social contacts with francophones (hypo.4). Also, the more a leader is member of voluntary organizations, the more likely he/she is to be solicitated for participation in political parties (hypo.5).

Membership, participation in political parties and belief in the efficiency of collective action

The most politically oriented nonfrancophone leaders in Quebec are encouraged to believe in collective action. Therefore, the leaders who are members and participate in political parties, will be more likely to believe in the efficiency of collective action (hypo.6).

Belief in the efficiency of collective action and collective action

Fitzsimmons-LeCavalier and LeCavalier (1984) maintain that structural restrictions on nonfrancophones' political opportunities to act communally have contributed to their

sense of powerlessness and thus discouraged their mobilization for a collective response. We may derive from this that a group's sense of powerlessness or absence of belief in the efficiency of collective action exerts an influence on their mobilization for collective action. We predict a positive relationship between belief in the efficiency of collective action and collective action itself. We hypothesize that leaders' belief in the efficiency of collective action encourages mobilization for a collective response, whereas the absence of this belief discourages mobilization (hypo. 7).

All the hypotheses put forward up to now refer to the associations between each brivariate relationship in the diagram illustrated in Fig. 1-3. These hypotheses lead the way for the presentation of the theoretical model illustrated in this figure.

Methods

Data Source

The data for the present study will come from LeCavalier's General Opinion Survey on Quebec's Non-Francophone Leaders, which was conducted in 1981.

A general description of the sample is found in LeCavalier, Fitzsimmons-LeCavalier and Hewitt (1982:1):

The research was carried out by interviewing a

Figure 1-3. A Theoretical Model.

51

a sample of 527 leaders or core participants in non-francophone associations, institutions or activities through the use of one-hour long, personal structural interviews. The list of core participants or leaders included representatives from a large number of associations connected with a cross-section of interest positions and institutional commitments. An important element in designating the range of institutions considered was ethnicity, a sub-communal population, particularly for those ethnic groups which maintain distinct and substantial institutional systems. Another important element was the consideration of the range of sectors around which segments of the nonfrancophone population have already organized. Core participants or leaders in cultural, political, union and professional associations, the health and welfare educational sectors as well as leaders overtly associated with general language and minority issues were taken into account.

Measurements

Collective action

In order to look at collective action in groups defending the interests of nonfrancophones in Quebec, two questions will be used. The first question was presented to respondents in the following way: "Here is a list of

different kinds of voluntary associations.   As I read the
list tell me if you personally belong to such associations."

Groups advocating the interests of non-
francophones in Quebec.

The other question was presented to the respondents in
the following manner: "Now since Bill 101, it has become
more difficult for non-francophones to receive provincial
government publications and services in English.   Have you
taken part in projects or activities to help people who do
not know French to receive adequate information for their
needs?"

Segmentation

In all, ten questions will be used to examine the
level of segmentation.   Five of these are related to the
level of linguistic segmentation and the other five
questions pertain to the level of social segmentation.

The five questions pertaining to the level of
linguistic segmentation were presented to respondents in the
following way:

"Can you speak French well enough to conduct a
conversation?

Which language do you speak most often at home
now?

Which language do you speak most often outside the
home?

IF FRENCH SPOKEN MOST OFTEN OUTSIDE THE HOME

Outside your home, how often do you speak French:

In other public places such as stores and

restaurants, how often, occasionally, rarely or
never?"

The five questions pertaining to the level of social
segmentation were presented to respondents in the following
manner: "I'd like to get some idea as to your contacts with
French-speaking Quebecers. I'll read a list of kinds of
people most of us come in contact with and would you please
tell me whether none, a few, about half or more than half
are French, speaking:

> Friends
>
> People in the stores when you shop
>
> People in organizations you are active in
>
> Neighbours
>
> People at social gatherings

Membership in voluntary organizations

In order to look at membership in voluntary
organizations, twelve questions will be used. These
questions pertain to group membership in political parties
and other organizations. These were presented to
respondents in the following manner: "Are you currently a
member of any political party?" ; "Are you a member of a
labor or white collar union, a trade association, a
professional association, a labor union and other
associations or professional and trade associations." and,

"Here is a list of different kinds of voluntary
associations. As I read the list tell me if you
personally belong to such associations.

54

Church (or synagogue) connected groups

Fraternal lodges

Business or civic groups

PTA or Home and School Association

Neighborhood clubs or centers

Ethnic Associations

Sport teams or groups

Self-Help Associations

Charitable groups

Municipal party or movement

Belief in the efficiency of collective action

Eight items or questions were selected to examine belief in the efficiency of collective action. These were presented to respondents in the following manner:

"Under certain circumstances, some possible ways to show their dissatisfaction with governmental policies and actions are more effective than others. As I read the following list, tell me whether you think each of the following methods are effective or not effective in defending the interests of non-francophones in Quebec.

Sending letters to newspapers

Presenting briefs to official bodies

Signing and circulating petitions

Delegating representatives to meet government officials directly

Organizing public meetings with officials,

interest groups and individuals

Organizing formal lobbying or pressure
groups

Filing law suits against government agencies

Holding marches, rallies and public demonstrations

Analytical Tools

Various statistical techniques will be used for
analyzing the data. Percentage distributions will be used
at times for making comparisons between different data
distributions. Cross-classification tables will be used to
assess the impact of an independent variable on a dependent.
variable. To further analyze the data, we will use a log-
linear modelling of contingency table data, which will then
be used as an analog to path analysis. For details see
Goodman (19,73) and Knoke and Burke (1980).

Outine of the Thesis

The first chapter of the thesis will consists in the
presentation of the theoretical perspective and
methodological aspects of the study. Chapter II will deal
with linguistic and social segmentation. Chapter III will
examine membership in voluntary organizations and its
relation to segmentation. Chapter IV will consist in a
log-linear analysis, and in an examination of the
relationship of the preceding factors with belief in the
efficiency of collective action and involvement in
collective action for the defense of nonfrancophone
interests. The last chapter will summarize the findings,

reexamine the hypotheses and reevaluate their theoretical

foundation.

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1. This sample is composed of communal leaders, that is, of
people who play a role in either English-speaking
institutions and political or community activities or in
ethnic organizations. The term communal generally refers to
ethnicity, language, religion and region, that is, to "groups
whose members share a complementarity of communication, that
is, whose members communicate more effectively and over a
wider range of subjects with one another than with
outsiders" (Deutsch, 1953). Although the leaders of this
sample form a heterogeneous body of individuals, in terms of
ethnic, religious or even linguistic background, they share
the experience of not being part of the communal francophone
milieu and to constitute, as a consequence, a remnant or
residual communal group. Heterogeneous communal groups are
not uncommon over linguistic issues in segmented societies.
This is, for instance, the case of the francophone communal
group in Belgium (see Fitzsimmons-LeCavalier, 1984; Zoldberg,
1977; Rudolph, 1982). Ethnic identities themselves are not
fixed realities. They "are forged and altered through
interactions within larger institutional systems which
establish the bases for cooperation and conflict". Ethnic
identity is as much a definition of who you are not as it is
of who you are" (Greenwood, 1977:82).

2. The expression social movements refers to non-
institutionalized activity characterized by "some degree of
group action and shared goals." They are non-
institutionalized in the sense that "their interests are not
met through the routine operation of society's established
institutions and conventions" (Fitzsimmons-LeCavalier &
LeCavalier, 1986: 560-61). However, in recent years, the
thrust of the field "has been to abandon sharp distinctions
between dramatic social movements and other political
organizations" (Fireman & Gamson, 1979: 8-9). This orientation
is partly due to the fact that the emphasis is put on the
rational rather than the irrational basis of social
movements. The field deals with the collective action which
can vary from more routinized types of activity, such as
interest groups, to less routinized types of activity, such
as movements using violence. As a consequence, what was
used to be treated as distinguished phenomena is more and
more treated as part of a continuum. This perspective leads
researchers to be concerned with the influence that the
access to resources from established organizations might
have on the repertoire of action, such as the use of
persuasive and lobbying tactics versus disruptive tactics or
mass mobilization.

CHAPTER II

LINGUISTIC AND SOCIAL SEGMENTATION

Introduction

The present chapter will deal with two types of segmentation, linguistic and social. The first section of the theoretical model illustrated in Figure 1-3 will be examined here. As we may recall, the hypothesis regarding linguistic and social segmentation was that these two types of segmentation mutually influence and reinforce each other.

Before examining the various indicators of linguistic segmentation, it would be interesting to have some general information about the background of leaders. Of the latter, 21 percent are of British, English or Scotish origin, 30 percent are of Canadian Québécois or English Québécois ethnic groups, while 43 percent belong to other national or ethnic groups (see Table A-1*). Also, of our 527 nonfrancophone leaders, most (73 percent) have English or Dutch-English as their mother tongue, 3 percent have French, and 24 percent have another language (see Table A-2).

Furthermore, most nonfrancophone leaders (78 percent) speak French well enough to conduct a conversation (see Table A-3). Of the leaders, 42 percent speak French often

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* The letter refers to an appendix, in this particular case Appendix A.

outside the home. Slightly over one-quarter speak it most often; one-quarter speak it occasionally; and 6 percent rarely speak it (see Table A-4). Also, 34 percent of the leaders speak French often in other public places (i.e. stores and restaurants), 29 percent speak it most often, 18 percent speak occasionally, 11 percent rarely, and 6 percent never (see Table A-5).

Most nonfrancophone leaders (80 percent) speak English always or most often at home while 10 percent speak another language besides English or French, 7 percent speak French, and 2 percent speak French and English (see Table A-6). It is interesting to note that of the 10 percent who speak just their mother tongue always or most often at home, 3 percent speak Italian and another 3 percent speak Greek. Also, only 1 percent of the nonfrancophone leaders speak their mother tongue in addition to French or/and English most often at home.

Over half of the leaders (68 percent) speak English always or most often outside the home, while 19 percent speak French, and 10 percent speak English and French (see Table A-7). Only 2 percent speak just their mother tongue (other language besides English or French) and another 2 percent speak their mother tongue in addition to French or/and English.

It would be interesting to compare nonfrancophone leaders with the nonfrancophone population in general in Quebec regarding general background and ratings on the various indicators of linguistic segmentation.

Nonfrancophones in Quebec constitute 18 percent of the general population, that is 1,120,630 persons in Quebec have English or a non-official language as their mother tongue (Statistics Canada, 1981, 1985). In 1981, English was the mother tongue of 11 percent of Quebecers while a non-official language was reported by 7 percent. While individuals with English mother tongue constitute 62 percent of Quebec's nonfrancophone population, those with other mother tongues represent 38 percent. There is a higher proportion of individuals with English mother tongue among leaders than among the general nonfrancophone population of Quebec (73% vs 62%). However, there are more people with a mother tongue other than English or French among the nonfrancophone population of Quebec compared to leaders (38% vs 24%).

While 13 percent of Quebecers speak English at home, 5 percent speak a non-official language.. Individuals who speak English most often at home constitute 73 percent of Quebec's general nonfrancophone population and those who speak other languages (besides French and English) represent 27 percent. There is a higher proportion of individuals who speak English most often at home among leaders than among the general nonfrancophone population (80% vs 72%). However, there are more people who speak another language besides French or English most often at home among Quebec's nonfrancophones compared to leaders (28% vs 10%). Furthermore, of the 425, 715 allophones in Quebec two-thirds use their mother tongue at home, about one quarter use

English, and only one-tenth use French. Quebec's anglophones always use English at home.

Bilingualism is increasing in Canada and the rate of bilingualism also increases with proximity to Quebec. A third of Quebec's population are bilingual and more than half of all bilingual Canadians live in Quebec. More than 50 percent of the anglophones in Quebec are bilingual. There has been an increase in the rate of bilingualism among the English mother tongue group in Quebec between 1971 to 1981: from 37% to 53%. Approximately two-thirds of Quebec's young anglophones are bilingual. This proportion is higher in Montreal and Ottawa - Hull compared to other provinces in Canada. Nearly half the allophones in Quebec are bilingual, 25 percent speak only English among the two official languages, about 16 percent speak only French and 10 percent cannot speak either French or English. About half (51%) of Quebec's nonfrancophone population is bilingual. There is a higher rate of bilingualism among leaders than among the general nonfrancophone population (78% vs. 51%).

In sum, we have found that most of the leaders have English as their mother tongue and are bilingual. Over half of them speak French often or most often outside the home and in other public places. The majority speak English most often at home and quite a few of them also speak English most often outside the home. When compared to the general nonfrancophone population in Quebec, we found that Quebec's nonfrancophone leaders are more bilingual and speak English more often at home. Among leaders, there are also more

individuals who have English as their mother tongue. Thus, nonfrancophone leaders in Quebec are less segmented than the general nonfrancophone population.

Relationships between the Various Indicators of Linguistic Segmentation

To determine whether we need to construct an index of linguistic segmentation, we should first examine the relationships between the various indicators of linguistic segmentation. To do this, we constructed bivariate tables between each of these indicators. All of the cross-classification tables between the various indicators of linguistic segmentation showed statistically significant associations (for details see tables in appendix B). The chi - squares for Tables 1, 3, 4, 5, 7 are statistically significant at the .0001 level. The chi - square for Table B-2 is statistically significant at the .0102 level of significance and the chi - squares for Table 6, 8, 9, and 10 are statistically significant at the 0 level. Thus, the various indicators of linguistic segmentation are associated among themselves.

However, the strength of the associations varied. The measures of association which have been used for comparing the strength of association between the various indicators of linguistic segmentation are shown in Table 2-1. Cramer's V and the symmetric version of the Uncertainty Coefficient were calculated for all the bivariate tables. Both are appropriate measures for the analysis of tables composed of two variables measured at the nominal level and may also be

applied to tables composed of variables measured at a higher level. Gamma was calculated only for the tables composed of two ordinal-level variables.

Table 2-1 shows that the highest value of Cramer's V (V = .61) is found for the relationship between one's ability to speak French well enough to conduct a conversation and how often one speaks French outside the home. Those who rarely speak French outside the home are more likely to be the ones who can not speak French well enough to conduct a conversation than are those who speak it occasionally, often, and nearly all the time (67.6% vs 0%, 0% and 0%). And those who speak French nearly all the time, often, and occasionally outside the home are more likely to have a good knowledge of French than are those who speak it rarely (100%, 99.5% and 80.6% vs 18.5%). Therefore, the strongest association is found between these two variables. Other strong relationships are also found among the language spoken most often outside the home and how often French is spoken outside the home (V = .49); how often French is spoken outside the home and how often it is spoken in other public places, such as stores and restaurants (V = .48); and the knowledge of French and how often French is spoken in other public places, such as stores and restaurants (V = .45). Table B-6 shows that those leaders who speak French occasionally or rarely outside the home are more likely to be the ones who speak English most often outside the home than are those who speak French often or nearly all the time (97.8% and 93.5% vs 54.5% and 6.3%). Also, those who speak

Table 2-1. Measures of Association for Bivariate Tables of the Various Indicators of Linguistic Segmentation

	Language spoken at home	Language spoken outside	Knowledge of French	How often French is spoken outside home	How often French is spoken in other places
Language spoken at home		V= .30 *U= .11	V= .11 U= .03	V= .23 U= .06	V= .18 U= .04
Language spoken outside			V= .22 U= .08	V= .49 U= .24	V= .33 U- .11
Knowledge of French				V= .61 U= .36 G= .97	V= .45 U= .19 G= .83
How often French is spoken outside home					V= .48 U= .25 G= .79

* Since there is no particular causal direction, the symmetric version of the uncertainty coefficient (U) was calculated.

French nearly all the time or often outside the home are more likely to be the ones who already speak French most often outside the home than are those who speak French rarely or occasionally outside the home (73.4% and 22.3% vs 1.9% and 0%). Those who speak French often or nearly all the time outside the home are more likely to be the ones who speak other languages most often outside the home than are those who speak it rarely or occasionally (23.2% and 20.3% vs 4.6% and 2.2%).

Table B-10 shows that those leaders who speak French rarely in other public places are more likely to be the ones who speak French rarely outside the home than are those who speak it occasionally, often or nearly all the time (71.4% vs 26.6%, 5.1% and 1.9%). Those who speak French often or nearly all the time in other public places are more likely to be the ones who speak French most often outside the home than are those who speak it occasionally or rarely (60.7% and 56.5% vs 18.1% and 8.2%).

Furthermore, those leaders who speak French nearly all the time or often in other public places are more likely to be the ones who can speak French well enough to conduct a conversation than are those who speak it occasionally or rarely (98.1% and 93.3% vs 62.8% and 34.7%). Similarly, those who speak French rarely in other public places are more likely to be the ones who do not have a good knowldege of French than those who speak it occasionally, often or nearly all the time (51% vs 17%, 2.2% and 1.3%). Thus, the knowledge of French is very much linked to its usage. The

lowest value of Cramer's V (.11) is found for the relationship between language spoken most often at home and knowledge of French. Therefore, the weakest association is found between these two variables. Other weak associations are also found between language spoken most often at home and how often French is spoken in other public places such as stores and restaurants, (V= .18), language spoken most often outside the home and knowledge of French (V= .22), and language spoken most often at home and how often French is spoken outside the home (V= .23). This indicates that the language spoken at home or outside the home is weakly linked to the knowledge of French, and that the language spoken most often at home is also weakly linked to the usage of French.

Table 2-1 also shows that the highest value of the uncertainty coefficient is also found for the relationship between knowledge of French and how often it is spoken outside the home (U= .36). This means there is a 36% reduction in uncertainty of predicting one variable by knowledge of the other variable.

All of the three values of gamma in Table 2-1 are very high, the highest being found for the bivariate distribution of knowledge of French by how often French is spoken outside the home. Gamma for this bivariate distribution is .97 indicating that the relationship is very strong, close to a perfect association, and that concordant pairs predominate -- people in the "low" category of the_variable how often French is spoken outside the home (those who speak French

rarely outside home) do not speak French well enough to conduct a conversation. Another way to interpret this would be that there is a 97% probability of correctly guessing the order of a pair of cases on one variable once the ordering on the other variable is known. The gammas for the bivariate distributions of knowledge of French by how often French is spoken in other public places, such as stores and restaurants, and of how often it is spoken in other public places are .83 and .79 respectively; indicating that the relationships are very strong and that concordant pairs predominate. High categories in one variable correspond to high categoreis in the other variable, whereas low categories in one variable correspond to low categories in the other. Thus, strong associations are found between knowledge of French and its usage outside the home, and between the usage of French outside the home and its usage in other public places.

We may not need to construct an index of linguistic segmentation after all. We will retain only knowledge of French as the main indicator of linguistic segmentation. The knowledge of French is what most distinguishes social segmentation from linguistic segmentation.

Social Segmentation by the Various Indicators Linguistic Segmentation

We will start here to test the left side of the causal path model illustrated in chapter one. To determine whether associations exist between social segmentation and the various indicators of linguistic segmentation, we

constructed bivariate tables between each of these

indicators and social segmentation. The measure of social

segmentation has already been tested in a previous thesis

(see social segmentation index in Hewit, 1985).

All of the bivariate tables between social

segmentation and the various indicators of linguistic

segmentation showed statistically significant associations

(see tables in Appendix C). Table 2-2 illustrates well the

relationships between the various indicators of linguistic

segmentation and social segmentation. The chi - squares for

all these bivariate tables are statistically significant at

the .0001 level. Therefore, social segmentation is

associated with each of the indicators of linguistic.

segmentation. However, the strength of these associations

vary. The strongest association is found between social

segmentation and how often French is spoken outside the

home. Those who speak French often or nearly all the time

ouside the home are more likely to have a low level of

social segmentation than are those who speak French rarely

or occasionally outside the home. Similarly, those who

speak French rarely or occasionally outside the home are

more likely to have a high level of social segmentation than

those who speak French often or nearly all the time outside

the home. One of the highest uncertainty coefficients was

also found for these two variables (social segmentation and

how often French is spoken outside the home), U= .10. It

indicates that there is a 10% reduction in uncertainty of

predicting one variable by knowledge of the other variable.

Table 2-2. Social Segmentation and the Various Indicators
of Linguistic Segmentation

	Level of Soc. Segment.			N	Coef.	P
	Lo	Med	Hi			
Language Most Often Spoken at Home						
- English	29%	36%	36%	(417)	V= .19	.0001
- French	73	27	0	(37)	U= .05	
- Other	39	31	31	(62)		
Language Most Often Spoken Outside Home						
- English	20	38	42	(352)	V= .31	.0001
- French	67	26	7	(94)	U= .10	
- Other	53	30	17	(70)		
Can You Speak French Well Enough...						
- No	15	27	58	(73)	V= .18	.0001
- Qualified answer	17	43	41	(42)	U= .04	
- Yes	38	35	27	(400)	G= -.44	
How Often French Is Spoken Outside Home						
- Rarely	13	27	60	(108)	V= .35	.0001
- Occasionally	17	39	43	(132)	U= .10	
- Often	41	41	19	(215)	G= -.57	
- Nearly all the time	75	17	8	(60)		
How Often French Spoken in Other Public Places						
- Rarely	12	28	60	(98)	V= .30	.0001
- Occasionally	19	32	48	(93)	U= .08	
- Often	33	43	24	(176)	G= -.50	
- Nearly all the time	55	32	14	(148)		

The highest value of gamma has also been found for this bivariate table (G= -.57). It indicates that the relationship is fairly strong and that discordant pairs predominate -- people in the "low" category of the variable "how often French is spoken outside the home" (those who rarely speak French outside the home) have a high level of social segmentation, and those who speak French nearly all the time outside the home have a low level of social segmentation.

Other fairly strong associations have also been found. Those who speak French most often outside the home are more likely to be lower on social segmentation than are those who speak other languages or English (67% vs 53% and 20%). Those who speak english most often outside the home are more likely to be higher on social segmentation than those who speak other languages or French most often outside the home. (42% vs 17% and 7%). The uncertainty coefficient for social segmentation and language spoken most often outside home is also .10, indicating that there is a 10% reduction in uncertainty of predicting one of these variables by knowledge of the other. Those who speak French nearly all the time in other public places, such as stores and restaurants are more likely to be lower on social segmentation than are those who speak it often, occasionally or rarely (55% vs 33%, 19% and 12%). Also, those who speak French rearely in other public places are more likely to be higher on social segmentation than are those who speak it occasionally, often or nearly all the time (60% vs 48%, 24%

and 14%).   The uncertainty coefficient here is .08,
indicating an 8% reduction in uncertainty of predicting one
variable by knowledge of the other variable (social
segmentation and how often French is spoken in public
places).   The value of gamma is -.50, indicating that the
relationship is fairly strong and that discordant pairs
predominate -- people in the "low" category of the variable
"how often French is spoken in other public places" (those
who rarely speak French in such places) have a high level of
social segmentation and those who speak French nearly all
the time in public places have a low level of social
segmentation.

The weakest association was found between social
segmentation and whether one can speak French well enough to
conduct a conversation (V= .18). Those who can handle
French are more likely to be lower on social segmentation
than are those who can't (38% vs 15%). Similarly, those who
can't handle French are more likely to be higher on social
segmentation than are those who can (58% vs 27%). The
lowest uncertainty coefficient was found here with U= .04.
This indicates that there is a 4 percent reduction in
uncertainty of predicting one variable by knowledge of the
other. The lowest of the three gamma values was found also
here, G= -.44, indicating nonetheless a fairly strong
association and that discordant pairs predominate -- people
in the "low" category of the variable "knowledge of French"
(those who can't handle French) have a low level of
segmentation.

Another weaker association (compared to the associations between social segmentation and other indicators of linguistic segmentation) was found between social segmentation and language spoken most often at home (V= -.19). Those who speak French most often at home are more likely to be lower on social segmentation than are those who speak other languages or English most often at home (73% vs 39% and 29%). Those who speak English most often at home are more likely to be higher on social segmentation than are those who speak other languages or French (36% vs 31% and 0%). The value of the uncertainty coefficient is .05, indicating only a 5% reduction in uncertainty of predicting one variable by knowledge of the other.

In sum, we have found that social segmentation is associated with the various indicators of linguistic segmentation. The strongest association was found between social segmentation and how often French is spoken outside the home rather than with the question of knowledge of French, although there is a correlation between social segmentation and knowledge of French. Other fairly strong associations have also been found between social segmentation and the following two variables: language spoken most often outside home and how often French is spoken in other public places. The weakest association was found between social segmentation and whether one can speak French well enough to conduct a conversation (knowledge of French). Another weak association was also found between

social segmentation and language spoken most often at home.
We may conclude that the usage and knowledge of French is
inversely linked to the level of social segmentation.

In the next chapter, we will examine how linguistic
and social segmentation are related to membership and
involvement in voluntary organizations, another "frequently
studied" factor of collective mobilization.

CHAPTER III

MEMBERSHIP IN VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS

Introduction

This chapter deals with the membership of
nonfrancophone leaders in voluntary organizations. The
relationship between membership in voluntary orgnizations
and segmentation is also examined. As we may recall, we had
hypothesized that there was no direct relationship between
segmentation, and membership and participation in voluntary
organizations. We had also hypothesized that segmentation,
and membership and participation in political parties were
negatively related to each other; and that membership and
participation in voluntary organizations, and membership and
participation in political parties were positively
associated with one another.

Membership in Voluntary Organizations

In order to get an idea of the kinds of voluntary
organizations to which nonfrancophone leaders belong, we
have looked at the percentage distribution of membership for
different types of voluntary organizations. Table 3-1
illustrates this well. Most leaders belong to a voluntary
organization of some kind. Over half of the leaders belong
to business or civic groups, neighborhood clubs or centers, (

Table 3-1. Percentage Distribution of Membership for Different Types of Voluntary Organizations

Type of Organization	Percentage (Yes)*
Labor unions	13
Professional and trade associations	49
Church (on synagogue) connected groups	47
Fraternal lodges	16
Business or civic groups	53
PTA or home and school associations	29
Neighborhood clubs or centers	53
Ethnic associations	38
Sport teams or groups	38
Self-help associations	35
Charitable groups	56
Municipal party or movement	26
Political party	44

* These percentages were calculated on 527 cases.

and charitable groups (53%, 53% and 56%). Not quite half of them belong to professional and trade associations, church (or synagogue) connected groups, ethnic associations, sport teams or groups, self-help associations and political parties (49%, 47%, 38%, 38%, 35% and 44%). A minority belong to labor unions, fraternal lodges, PTA or Home and School Associations, and municipal parties or movements (13%, 16%, 29% and 26%).

In order to reduce data to an easily manageable form by creating -- if possible -- indices for the test of the model with log-linear approaches, we examined the associations between the various types of voluntary organizations. To do this, we looked at the bivariate distributions between the various measures of membership in voluntary organizations. Statistically significant relationships were found between some of the measures of membership in voluntary organizations (see Table 3-2). Membership in municipal parties or movements, and membership in political parties are the most highly correlated variables. Other high correlations were also found between membership in fraternal lodges and membership in charitable groups; membership in business or civic groups, and membership in professional and trade associations; and membership in self-help associations and membership in charitable groups. Finally, the correlation between membership in business or civic groups and membership in neighborhood clubs or centers is the weakest of all the correlations.

Table 3-2. Matrix of Correlation Coefficients (Gs) between Eleven Measures of Membership, in voluntary Organizations

(Items)	Membership	330	331	332	333	334	335	336	337	338	339	346A	346B	419
330	Church (or synagogue) connected group		.52*	.28	.17	.22	.07	.21	.31*	.49*	.01	-.29	.16	.10
331	Fraternal lodges			.43*	-.05	.03	.42*	.17	.14	.58*	-.001	-.31	.37	.17
332	Business or civic groups				.27	.30*	.16	.39*	.15	.40*	.41*	-.26	.56*	.57*
333	PTA or home and school associations					.17	-.01	.26	.16	.06	.29	.16	.14	.11
334	Neighborhood clubs or centers						.24	.50*	.50*	.39*	.18	-.01	-.10	.06
335	Ethnic Associations							-.14	-.32*	-.37*	-.25	-.14	.07	-.06
336	Sport teams								.10	.28	.29	-.27	.24	.25
337	Self-help associations									.56*	.18	-.08	-.08	.08
338	Charitable groups										.06	-.33	.17	.20
339	Municipal party or movement											-.24	.03	.69*
346A	Labor unions												**	-.12
346B	Professional and trade associations													.28
419	Political party													

* Statistically significant at the .001 level of significance.
** There is no coefficient between 346A and 346B because they are both part of the same question and are, consequently, two attributes of the same variable.

77

To further analyze the data, we decided to use
smallest - space analysis (SSA). This will provide a clear
graphic representation of the associations between the
various measures of membership in voluntary organizations.
Smallest - space analysis is based on the correlations
between these variables. The diagram in Figure 3-1 would
satisfy our correlation matrix. Each of the mumbers in this
diagram represents a study variable, that is a measure of
membership in voluntary organizations. For further detail
on the value of each number, refer to Table 3-2. The
distance between two mumbers represents the inverse of
the correlation between the two variables. That is, if the
two variables are highly correlated, they will be connected
by a short line (they will be close together); if they are
weakly correlated, they will be connected by a longer line
(they will be farther apart). The lines have also been
labelled with the correlations between the pairs of
variables. An examination of the diagram will indicate that
the longest distance, business or civic groups and
neighborhood clubs or centers (332-334) corresponds to the
weakest correlation. The shortest distance, municipal party
or movement and political party (339-419) corresponds to the
strongest correlation. The same rule applies for all other
distances and correlations. The diagram may also be
interpreted in terms of the observed clustering of
variables. That is, we note that variables business or
civic groups, municipal party or movement, and political
party (332, 339, and 419) are closely clustered; church.

78

Figure 3-1. Smallest-Space Analysis Results.*

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* The problem of distance between variables was handled by adding period leaders. The actual distance corresponds to the full lines only.

(or synagogue) connected groups and fraternal lodges,
business or civic groups, neighborhood clubs or centers,
ethnic associations, sport teams, self-help associations
and charitable groups (330-331-332-334-335-336-337-338) forms
another cluster. Those numbers clustered together represent
variables that are relatively highly associated with one
another. Since the cluster business or civic groups,
municipal party or movement and political party (332-339-419)
is very much linked to membership in political parties, it
will be labelled political related membership. Being linked
with membership in other non-political types of voluntary
organizations, the cluster church (or synagogue) connected
groups, fraternal lodges, business or civic groups,
neighborhood clubs or centers, ethnic associations, sport
teams, self-help associations, and charitable groups (330-
331-332-334-335-336-337-338) will be labelled voluntary
organizations membership.

There are, then, two poles of membership in voluntary
organizations, and consequently two poles of leadership.
One is the leadership linked to politics and to the
organizations of businessmen. The other is the leadership
linked to voluntary organizations' activities, which seems
to be divorced from politics. We must also stress that
although membership in ethnic associations is included in the
"voluntary organizations membership" cluster, it is weakly
linked with the other voluntary organizations. This
indicates an ethnic association membership dissociated from
politics but weakly or marginally associated with other

80

voluntary associations.

We had hypothesized in chapter one that segmentation was negatively associated with membership and participation in political parties. Since those leaders who are less segmented linguistically and socially will be more likely to participate in political parties than the more segmented ones; the latter then, will be more likely to participate in voluntary organizations other than of the political type. From this, we may derive the following two hypotheses: (1) those leaders who are less segmented linguistically and socially will be more likely to belong to the political related membership than the more segmented ones, and (2) those leaders who are more segmented linguistically and socially will be more likely to belong to voluntary organizations membership than the less segmented ones.

Membership in Voluntary Organizations, and Social and Linguistic Segmentation

Social Segmentation

To determine whether associations exist between membership in voluntary organizations and social segmentation, we constructed bivariate tables between the political related membership and social segmentation; and the voluntary organizations membership and social segmentation. Table 3-3 illustrates the relationships between these variables. The relationship between political related membership and social segmentation was not statistically significant at the .001 level of significance. It was also found that the relationship between the

81

Table 3-3. Membership in Political Related and in Voluntary
Organizations by Social Segmentation

	Level of Social Segmentation			Coef.	P
	Low	Med	Hi		
Political Related Membership					
-in none of these org's	22%	30%	39%	G=-.19*	.001
-in 1 of these org's	30%	34%	28%		
-in 2 of these org's	31%	21%	23%		
-in all 3 of these org's	18%	15%	10%		
	(166)	(178)	(165)		
Voluntary Organizations Membership					
-in 2 or less such org's	27%	35%	40%	G=-.16*	.001
-in 3 such org's	21%	21%	20%		
-in 4 such org's	18%	13%	21%		
-in 5 or more such org's	35%	31%	20%		
	(170)	(179)	(164)		

* Not statistically significant at the .001 level of significance.

voluntary organizations membership and social segmentation
was not statistically significant. Therefore, membership in
voluntary organizations and social segmentation are not
associated with one another.

Our initial analysis indicated that the political
related membership and the voluntary organizations
membership were not related to each other. We decided to
apply a variation of the elaboration paradigm to this
original relationship of zero, to see if any relationships
appear in the partials (see Table 3-4). Social segmentation
was found to suppress the relationship between political
related membership and voluntary organizations membership.
When controlling for social segmentation, the partial
relationships are not all the same as the original one. This
is a case of specification: the elaboration model has
produced partial relationships that differ from each other.
The original relationship of zero only holds in the
following condition: among leaders with a medium level of
segmentation. Among leaders with a low and high level of
social segmentation, there is a relationship between the two
types of membership in voluntary organizations. However,
this relationship is stronger among leaders with a high
level of social segmentation with a gamma value of .48 vs
.34 for those with a low level of segmentation. Social
segmentation in this case is a suppressor variable,
concealing the relationship between political related
membership and voluntary organizations membership. Holding
social segmentation constant, then, we have found that

83

Table 3-4. Political Related Membership by Voluntary Organizations Membership and Social Segmentation

	Social Segmentation Level											
	Low				Medium				High			
Volunt. Org's Member.	Two or less	Three	Four	Five or more	Two or less	Three	Four	Five or more	Two or less	Three	Four	Five or more
Political Related Member.												
–none	42%	18%	23%	9%	47%	27%	29%	13%	60%	44%	16%	15%
–one	40	18	27	29	31	43	33	31	19	34	38	30
–two	9	36	40	40	16	16	25	29	17	19	38	24
–more	9	27	10	22	7	14	13	27	5	3	9	30
Total	(45)	(33)	(30)	(58)	(62)	(37)	(24)	(55)	(65)	(32)	(32)	(33)

Political Related Membership
and Voluntary Org's Membership

Social Seg.		G	p
Low	=	.34*	.001
Med.	=	.40	.001
High	=	.48*	.001

Political Related Membership
and Social Segmentation

Volunt. Org's:			p
Two or less	=	-.14	.001
Three	=	-.42	.001
Four	=	.02	.001
Five or more	=	-.03	.001

* Statistically significant at the .001 level of significance

84

political related membership and voluntary organizations

membership are positively related to each other, and that

this relationship is stronger in the higher level of social

segmentation. To verify which variable had more effect,

social segmentation or voluntary organizations membership,

we constructed some more partial tables using voluntary

organizations membership as a control variable this time.

None of the partial tables showed any significant

relationships. Thus, it is the social segmentation effect

which is important in the relationship between voluntary

organizations and political related memberships.

Linguistic Segmentation

To determine whether associations exist between

membership in voluntary organizations and linguistic

segmentation, we constructed bivariate tables between

political related membership and the indicator of

linguistic segmentation; and voluntary organizations

membership and the indicator of linguistic segmentation.

Table 3-5 illustrates the relationships between these

variables. The relationship between political related

membership and knowledge of French shows a statistically

significant positive association at the .001 level of

significance with a gamma value equalling to .31. Thus,

bilinguals (the less segmented linguistically) are more

likely to belong to political related organizations.

Therefore, linguistic segmentation and political related

membership are negatively related to each other. The

85

Table 3-5. Membership in Political Related and in Voluntary
Organizations by the Indicator of Linguistic Segmentation

	Indicator of Linguistic Segmentation Can you speak French Well Enough to Conduct a Conversation			Coef.	P
	No	Qualified	Yes		
Political Related Member.					
—None	59%	30%	26%	G= .31*	.001
—One	17	37	32		
—Two	14	14	28		
—More	10	19	15		
	(71)	(43)	(405)		
Voluntary Organizations Membership					
—Two or less	40%	33%	33%	G= .09	.001
—Three	21	22	20		
—Four	18	17	17		
—Five or more	22	29	30		
	(73)	(42)	(408)		

* Statistically significant at the .001 level of significance.

relationship between voluntary organizations membership and linguistic segmentation was not statistically significant. Therefore, these two variables are not related to each other.

Controlling for linguistic segmentation this time, we decided to reapply the variation of the elaboration model to the original relationship of zero between the political related membership and voluntary organizations membership (see Table 3-6). Linguistic segmentation was also found to suppress the relationship between political related membership and voluntary organizations membership. The original relationship of zero only holds for the value "qualified answer" of the indicator of linguistic segmentation (knowledge of French). Among leaders who have a knowledge of French as well as those who don't, there is a relationship between political related membership and voluntary organizations membership. However, this relationship is stronger among leaders who do not have a knowledge of French (those who are more segmented linguistically) with a gamma value of .53 vs .42 for those who have a knowledge of French (the less segmented linguistically). Thus, linguistic segmentation is also a suppressor variable, concealing the relationship between political related membership and voluntary organizations membership. Holding linguistic segmentation constant, then, we have again found that political related membership and voluntary organizations membership are positively related to each other and that this relationship is stronger in the

Table 3-6. Political Related Membership by Voluntary Organizations Membership and the Indicator of Linguistic Segmentation

Indicator of Linguistic Segmentation
Can You Speak French well enough to conduct a conversation

Volunt. Org's Member.	No				Qualified				Yes			
	Two or less	Three	Four	Five or more	Two or less	Three	Four	Five or more	Two or less	Three	Four	Five or more
Political Related Member.												
-none	89%	53%	23%	40%	50%	33%	29%	8%	44%	24%	21%	8%
-one	4	27	23	27	29	56	29	42	33	31	34	30
-two	0	7	46	20	14	11	14	8	17	28	36	36
-more	7	13	8	13	7	0	29	42	6	18	9	26
Total	(28)	(15)	(13)	(15)	(14)	(9)	(7)	(12)	(135)	(80)	(67)	(121)

Political Related Membership
and Voluntary Org's Membership

Ling. Seg.	G	P
No =	.53*	.001
Qualified =	.46	.001
Yes =	.42*	.001

Political Related Membership
and Linguistic Segmentation

Volunt. Org's:		
Two or less =	.50	.001
Three =	.43	.001
Four =	-.05	.001
Five or more =	.28	.001

* Statistically significant at the .001 level of significance.

88

category of higher linguistic segmentation. Again to verify which variable had more effect, linguistic segmentation or voluntary organizations membership, we constructed more conditionnal tables using voluntary organizations membership as a control variable. Here too, none of the partial tables showed any significant relationships. Thus, it is the linguistic segmentation effect which is also important in the relationship between voluntary organizations membership and political related membership.

In sum, we have not found any relationship between political related membership and social segmentation. Similarly, no relationship was found between voluntary organizations membership and social segmentation. While a negative association was found between political related membership and linguistic segmentation, no relationship was found between voluntary organizations membership and linguistic segmentation. It was also found that political related and voluntary organizations memberships were positively associated with one another. This relationship was basically due to the segmentation (social and linguistic) effect. Last, we have not been able to confirm the hypothesis that segmentation and voluntary organizations membership were positively related to one another. But we have partly confirmed our hypothesis that segmentation and political related membership are negatively related to each other. We found a negative association between linguistic segmentation and political related membership.

Discussion and Conclusion

The analysis conducted in this chapter, was to give us a better idea of the model which will follow in chapter four. We discovered that most of the leaders belong to some form of voluntary organization. Although correlations have been found between some types of membership in voluntary organizations, the correlations were not always strong. This may indicate that leaders have difficulty getting organized for collective action. As we know, organization for collective action is particularly possible through membership in political parties; the latter are organizations in which more resources are available for mobilization.

By doing smallest - space analysis, we discovered two clusters or poles of membership in voluntary organizations. Since one of these clusters is linked so much with membership in political parties, we could just use the variable membership in political parties in our model (instead of the political related membership variable). Therefore, we will exclude the political related membership variable, and retain membership in the political parties and voluntary organizations membership as variables for our model.

CHAPTER IV

LOG-LINEAR ANALYSIS

The Revised Model

In preparing for our analysis in chapter one, we had hypothesized that linguistic and social segmentation were positively associated with one another, and that there was no direct relationship between segmentation and membership and participation in voluntary organizations. We had also hypothesized that linguistic and social segmentation were negatively related to membership and participation in voluntary organizations. The analyses conducted in chapters two and three have given us some new information. We have found as expected that linguistic and social segmentation were positively related to each other. Two sets of membership in voluntary organizations were found, one which is strongly related with political organizations, and another set related among themselves but not with political organizations. These were respectively designated as "political related membership" and "voluntary organizations membership". Our elaboration model showed that these two types of membership in voluntary organizations were positively related to one another. It was also found that social segmentation was not associated with either the voluntary organizations membership or the political related

membership. Whereas linguistic segmentation was found to be negatively associated with the political related membership, there was no association between linguistic segmentation and the voluntary organizations membership.

As we may recall, the correlation coefficients for the political related membership variables were very high. Since the political related membership variables were so much linked with political parties, we decided to exclude it from the left side of our model (see Figure 1-3), in order to concentrate on the individual effects of voluntary organizations not associated with political parties. The political related membership variable was so highly related to political parties that it can be practically considered as the same variable.

The above findings and modifications are illustrated in the causal diagram which appears in Figure 4-1. A diagram of recursive effects is necessary to test models of causal relationships among the study variables, that is in order to conduct path analog log-linear analysis. In Table 4-1, an inventory of the variables used for the analysis is shown. In the next section, we will proceed step by step with the causal modelling.

The Causal Analysis

Starting at the left in the diagram (Fig. 4-1), we first formed the three-way table of linguistic segmentation by social segmentation by voluntary organizations membership and fitted a series of log-linear models to determine

Figure 4-1. Causal Model Diagram.

Table 4-1. Inventory of Variables for the Analysis

Variables	Categories
Linguistic segmentation	1. non-bilingual 2. bilingual
Social segmentation	1. low 2. medium 3. high
Voluntary organizations membership	1. two or less 2. three or more
Membership in political parties	1. non-member 2. member
Belief in the efficiency of collective action	1. non-belief 2. belief
Collective action	1. non-action 2. action

with greater parsimony than in the previous chapters,
how these three variables are related to each other.
The models that were tested here, are shown in Table 4-2.
The only model which fitted the data was the proposed
model [LS] [V] which has $L^2 = 6.87$ with df=5. Estimation
of parameters for model [LS] [V] appear in Table 4-3.
These values show that being high on linguistic
segmentation is negatively associated with being
low on social segmentation (-.368) and positively with being
high on social segmentation (.434). In other words, a low
level of social segmentation is linked with a low level of
linguistic segmentation, and a high level of social
segmentation is linked with a high level of linguistic
segmentation, While social segmentation and linguistic
segmentation are positively related to one another, neither
one of them is related to membership in voluntary
organizations. At this point, there are no modifications,
to bring to the left side of our causal diagram and no new
information is added to what previous chapters have already
shown.

The next step in finding the best - fitting causal
explanation was to analyze the four-way subtable formed by
linguistic segmentation, social segmentation and voluntary
organization membership, and the next variable in the
sequence, membership in political parties. At this point,
some cells were very small and two had zeros in them. The
problem of observed zero frequencies arise from two
stituations :(1) very small samples, particularly when

Table 4-2. Models Fitted to Three-Way Crosstabulation of Linguistic Segmentation, Social Segmentation, and Voluntary Organizations Membership

Model	Fitted Marginals	L^2	d.f.	p
1	[L] [S] [V]	33.09	7	.00
2	[LS] [V]	6.87	5	.23
3	[LV] / [S]	31.78	6	.00
4	[SV] [L]	26.99	5	.00

Table 4-3. Effect Parameters of Model [LS] [V]

		Lambda	Standard error	Standard Z value
	Social Segmentation			
[LS]	Low	-.368	.122	-3.025*
	Medium	-.066	.105	- .630
	High	.434	.093	4.645*

* Significant at .05 level (> ± 1.96)

97

several variables are crosstabulated, due to the small probabilities for some categories, or (2) the logical or fixed zero cell; that is even if the entire population is available, certain classifications have no empirical referents (Knoke and Burke, 1980). In our case, it is a realistic assumption to consider that there are empirical referents, that the zeros are mainly due to sample fluctuations and the size of sample. So, in order not to be faced with the problem of undefined logits with zeros in the denominators, we added a .5 constant. With this procedure, we follow Leo Goodman's (1970) recommendations to add a constant small value to every cell in the body of the table. The same procedure will be followed from now on.

Even though segmentation variables and voluntary organizations membership were found in the previous step to be independent, the logit model requires that the marginal table for all causal antecedent variables be controlled for all the subsequent steps. This means that the interaction between these three variables [LSV] will be present in the next step of the causal analysis. The models to be tested are those involving the relationship of membership in political parties with each of the three antecedents and their combination as shown in Table 4-4. Our choice of models to investigate was guided by theory and previous findings. Our strategy model also follows the approach which starts with the simplest model, such as one which fits only the one-variable marginal tables and successively adds increasingly complex association and interaction terms until

98

Table 4-4. Models Fitted to Four-Way Crosstabulation of
Linguistic Segmentation, Social Segmentation,
Voluntary Organizations Membership, and Membership
in Political parties

Model	Fitted Marginals				L^2	d.f.	p
5	[LSV]	[P]			32.64	11	.001
6	[LSV]	[LP]			24.76	10	.006
7	[LSV]	[SP]			30.54	9	.001
8	[LSV]	[VP]			18.76	10	.043
9	[LSV]	[LP]	[SP]		23.52	8	.003
10	[LSV]	[LP]	[VP]		11.70	9	.231
11	[LSV]	[SP]	[VP]		17.52	8	.025
12	[LSV]	[LP]	[SP]	[VP]	10.86	7	.145

an acceptable fit is obtained which cannot be significantly improved by adding further terms. This approach treats the simplest model as the starting point. Adding more complex relationships to simpler ones clearly reveals the hierarchical structure of log-linear models' (Knoke and Burke, 1980:38).

Since we have already designated membership in political parties as the dependent variable in the four-way variable cross tabulation, the first model to be tested is one in which none of the independent variables has a significant relationship with the dependent measure. This model as well as others to be tested are shown in Table 4-4. This table shows that only two models fit the data, models 10 and 12. Model 10 proposes a direct relationship between party membership and voluntary organizations membership as well as with linguistic segmentation, and model 12 proposes on top a direct relationship with social segmentation. The first step of our analysis of Table 4-4 is to see if there is any statistical difference between models 10 and 12:

	L^2	d.f.	p
Model 10	11.70	9	
Model 12	10.86	7	
	.84	2	n.s.

This difference is not statistically significant. Consequently, model 10 should be retained and the association [SP] does not bring anything worthwhile to consider. The model for this step is thus [LSV] [LP] [VP] and has L^2 =11.70 with df=9. Estimation of parameters for model [LSV] [LP] [VP] appear in Table 4-5. These values

Table 4-5. Effect Parameters (Lambda and Beta) of Model
[LSV] [LP] [VP]

	Estimated effects	Standard error	Standard Z value
[LSV]*	1) .047	.136	.346
	2) .006	.113	.055
	3) -.053	.101	-.527
[LP]**	1) .348	.166	4.188***
[VP]**	1) .346	.166	4.156***

* When looking at independent variables within themselves, lambda effects are used.

** When looking at associations between independent and dependent variables, beta is used; Lambda (λ) estimates are doubled to obtain the equivalent Beta (B) values (Knoke and Burke, 1980).

*** Significant at .05 level (> 1.96).

show significant positive associations between linguistic segmentation and membership in political parties, and voluntary organizations membership and membership in political parties. As expected the relationship between the former is slightly stronger than between the latter, but the effects are comparable. Thus, those who are bilingual are more likely to be members of political parties than those who are not bilingual (.348), and those who are members of voluntary organizations are also more likely to be members of political parties than non-members (.346). Membership in voluntary organizations encourages political participation, even if we exclude organizations which are linked to political parties. Those who are members of two or less organizations have less of a tendency to be members of political parties than those who are members of three or more organizations. The effect of membership in voluntary organizations is almost as strong as the effect of linguistic segmentation. Therefore, again up to this point, there are no modifications to bring to our causal diagram in Figure 4-1.

Next in the analysis sequence treats belief in the efficiency of collective action as the dependent measure. As before, the interaction components [LSVP] are kept constant. Table 4-6 shows the results from the series of possible models. All the considered models fit the data but some, obviously fit better than others. They are: models 16, 19, 20 and 22. They vary in terms of complexity. Model 16 keeps a single direct association, that is voluntary

Table 4-6. Models Fitted to Five-Way Crosstabulation of
Linguistic Segmentation, Social Segmentation,
Voluntary Organizations Membership, Membership
in Political Parties and Belief in the Efficiency
of Collective Action

Model	Fitted Marginals			L^2	d.f.	p
13	[LSVP]	[B]		26.87	23	.262
14	[LSVP]	[LB]		24.74	22	.309
15	[LSVP]	[SB]		25.92	21	.210
16	[LSVP]	[VB]		15.80	22	>.5
17	[LSVP]	[PB]		25.02	22	.296
18	[LSVP]	[LB]	[SB]	22.91	20	.293
19	[LSVP]	[LB]	[VB]	14.17	21	>.5
20	[LSVP]	[SB]	[VB]	14.03	20	>.5
21	[LSVP]	[SB]	[PB]	23.96	20	.244
22	[LSVP]	[PB]	[VB]	15.10	21	>.5

organizations membership and belief in the efficiency
of collective action [VB]; while the other models add one
other association to [VB]. The question here is whether
or not including another association brings about
a significant difference. So, comparisons are necessary:

	L^2	d.f.	p
Model 16	15.80	22	
Model 19	14.17	21	
	1.63	1	n.s.
Model 16	15.80	22	
Model 20	14.03	20	
	1.77	2	n.s
Model 16	15.80	22	
Model 22	15.10	21	
	70	1	n.s.

These differences are not statistically significant.
Consequently, model 16 should be retained. We see that
adding other associations would not significantly improve
the already adequate fit provided by [LSVP] [VB]. This
model has L^2 =15.80 with df=22. We conclude that belief
in the efficiency of collective action is not directly
related to the other variables considered in models
19, 20, and 22 but related in the causal model sequence.
Variables membership in political parties and belief in the
efficiency of collective action should not be connected
in the diagram by an arrow. Once again, we see the
importance of the voluntary organizations membership effect.
Parameter estimates for model [LSVP] [VB] appear in Table
4-7. These values show as expected a significant positive
association between voluntary organizations membership and
belief in the efficiency of collective action. Thus, those

Table 4-7.   Effect Parameters of Model [LSVP] [VB]

		Estimated effect	Standard error	Standard z value
[LSVP]	1)	-.001	.191	-.004
	2)	-.119	.159	-.745
	3)	.119	.169	-.708
[VB]	1)	.452	.246	3.688*

* Significant at .05 level (> 1.96).

who are members of three or more voluntary organizations are more likely to believe in the efficiency of collective action than those who belong to two or less voluntary organizations (.452). Although for leaders, membership in voluntary organizations has an effect on the belief in the efficiency of collective action, the effect of being member of a political party is not significant.

Finally, the fourth step in the analysis sequence treats collective action around the defense of nonfrancophones' interests as the dependent variable. Table 4-8 shows the results from the series of possible models. All proposed models fit the data including the model of independence [C]. The only model which fits better the data is model 26, but hardly. The level of significance between this model and the model of independence (23 [C]) is close to .05. This means that one could conclude that no strong direct relationship between engagement in collective action and the considered factors in this study seems to exist. The only factor which seems to be a little more related is linguistic segmentation. Being bilingual seems to be important for a leader to engage in collective action and this makes sense for someone to be vocal in a province where the majority are francophones. Since linguistic segmentation is a little more related to engagement in collective action than the other factors in this study, model [LSVPB] [LC] which has $L^2 = 49.09$ with df= 46 is the model retained for this step. Variables belief in the efficiency of collective action and collective action should not be

106

Table 4-8. Models Fitted to Six-Way Crosstabulation of
Linguistic Segmentation, Social Segmentation,
Voluntary Organizations Membership, Membership
in Political Parties, Belief in the Efficiency
of Collective Action and Collective Action

Model	Fitted Marginals			L^2	d.f.	p
23	[LSVPB]	[C]		52.60	47	.266
24	[LSVPB]	[BC]		52.39	46	.240
25	[LSVPB]	[PC]		52.45	46	.238
26	[LSVPB]	[LC]		49.09	46	.350
27	[LSVPB]	[SC]		52.32	45	.211
28	[LSVPB]	[VC]		52.42	46	.239
29	[LSVPB]	[BC]	[VC]	52.14	45	.216
30	[LSVPB]	[BC]	[SC]	52.12	44	.188
31	[LSVPB]	[BC]	[LC]	48.67	45	.327
32	[LSVPB]	[BC]	[PC]	52.23	45	.214

connected in the diagram by an arrow; instead we now have an arrow joining linguistic segmentation to collective action in the form of period leaders to illustrate the minimal independent effect of linguistic segmentation when all other independent factors are controlled for. Parameter estimates for model [LSVPB] [LC] appear in Table 4-9. These values show a positive association between linguistic segmentation and collective action. As expected, bilinguals are more likely to engage in collective action than non-bilinguals (.230).

At this point, we cummulate the results of the above analyses. The recursive causal model which best represents our data is the sum of the models for the successive three -, four - five -, and six - way crosstabulations. This model fits the marginal tables [LS] [V] [LP] [VP] [VB] [LC] and has $L^2 = (6.87 + 11.70 + 15.80 + 49.09) = 83.46$ with df= $(5 + 9 + 22 + 46) = 82$. The final causal diagram is shown in Figure 4-2. Thus we have found that bilinguals tend to have a lower level of social segmentation, while the levels of linguistic and social segmentations per se do not have an effect on membership in voluntary organizations. Those who are bilingual and those who belong to three or more voluntary organizations are more likely to belong to a political party. However, social segmentation does not have an effect on membership in political parties. Those who belong to three or more voluntary organizations are more likely to believe in the efficiency of collective action whereas neither type of segmentation nor membership in

Table 4-9.   Effect Parameters of Model [LSVPB] [LC]

		Estimated effect	Standard error	Standard z value
[LSVPB]	1)	-.025	.134	-.185
	2)	.159	.123	1.298
	3)	-.134	.127	-1.057
[LC]	1)	.230	.182	2.548*

* Significant at .05 level (> 1.96).

political parties per se has an effect on such belief. No single factor is strongly related to collective action except for linguistic segmentation which is a little more related than the other factors in this study. This leads us to say that bilinguals are more likely to engage in collective action.

What this study shows is that it is a complex relation of factors which might lead to collective action among leaders. Various scenarios or paths of causality are possible. These will be discussed in the conclusion chapter.

Figure 4-2. Final Causal Model.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Our study does not contradict the theoretical base, but the model which had been developed originally was partially confirmed. All leaders belong to some kind of voluntary organization; being segmented or not does not change much in terms of membership in voluntary organizations. We thought that social segmentation would have an effect on membership and participation in political parties but it actually did not. However, such a finding, afterall, is not really surprising. People who live in highly segmented areas are expected to have a motivation to have their views expressed in a political party as well as others. On the other hand, any potent leadership role in a Quebec party in Quebec requires some knowledge of French. It is not by accident that knowledge of French is then associated with membership in political parties among these leaders. Although in chapter three we had first found that there were no strong relationships between the voluntary organizations membership and the political related membership, when controlling for other factors in chapter three and through log-linear analysis, we found a positive association between voluntary organizations membership and political related membership. And next, it was found that

112

the only factor which is directly linked with belief in the efficiency of collective action is membership in voluntary organizations. The evidence shown in our data suggests that neither any type of segmentation nor membership in political parties is associated with any belief of that sort. Finally, we found that there was no single factor in the model which is strongly related to an engagement in collective action for the defense of interests of nonfrancophones in Quebec. One exception might be the knowledge of French but still its independent effect when all other factors are controlled for, remains minimal. Thus, it is a combination of factors which might lead to collective action among leaders. The testing of models with other factors besides those included in the present study, should be considered in future research on the mobilization of Quebec's nonfrancophone leaders in communal movements.

These findings seem to suggest that various scenarios or patterns of influence on such a collective action are realistically possible. One of them could be that leaders who are members in political parties are placed in a situation where a feeling of powerlessness is dominant. A provincial political party is above all a dominant French organization and any anglophone who believes in defending the cause of members of its group realizes that the only possible strategy would be through a series of compromises, such as the exchange of votes in the party to satisfy various factions in the party. On the other hand, either

out of some opportunity maybe to acquire a greater
visibility, a bilingual member might get into collective
action anyway. In that first scenario, it might play
various functions. One is to satisfy the constituency,
which has expectations of the leadership. He would tend to
get involved in collective action that was accommodative.
Leaders who have the most opportunities to be vocal in
Quebec and who have the resources to be so, that is, those
who are bilingual and participate in political parties, were
very accommodative. A review of the press would show that
this is indeed the case among political leaders.
Furthermore, groups defending the interests of anglophones,
tended to be accommodative when linked with, for instance,
the dominant parties, such as the provincial Liberal Party.
This is the case of groups like Alliance Quebec or Positive
Action Committee. For instance, these two groups used
strategies of due process like the presentation of briefs or
giving press conferences. They never used really tactics
of confrontation like the Freedom of Choice Movement or
Quebec For All advocacy group.

The other scenario is that membership in voluntary
organizations is the only factor directly linked with belief
in the efficiency of collective action when all factors are
controlled for. This suggests that some people who are just
linked to voluntary organizations might get involved in
collective action which are more extremist in form or based
on their beliefs, ideologies, etc. These people were
getting involved out of frustration of what they expected

114

from their representatives in political parties but who were consequently less prepared, less served by resources and constraints than the ones who belonged to political parties. They were probably the ones who were less likely to be credible vis-à-vis the established Quebec and federal institutions. Another indication of this is that people who got involved in the Freedom of Choice Movement and the Quebec For All advocacy group, were very militant and chose strategies of confrontation which were seen by francophones as too passionate and extremist. For example, boycotts, civil disobedience, and a march down St. Catherine Street were called for at the first meeting of the Quebec For All group in November 1981 (Scott, 1981). At this same meeting, Dr. Champagne of the Freedom of Choice Movement had called for a two-week boycott of companies such as Steinberg Inc. and Eaton which had removed English signs from their stores. The most credible activists in the defense of the interests of nonfrancophones were annoyed by these strategies and would not believe in the credibility of such actions. The more accommodative groups advocating non-francophone's interests in Quebec such as Alliance Quebec and Positive Action Committee tended to be more successful and gained more visibility than the more extremist advocacy groups like Quebec For All and Freedom of choice Movement. Thus, leaders who fit the first scenario have a greater chance of success than those who fit the second one.

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APPENDIX A

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION

OF THE

MAIN VARIABLES

Table A-1. Percentage Distribution by National or Ethnic Origin

Ethnic Group	Percentage
British, English, Scotish	21
Canadian, Québécois, English Quebecers	30*
Others	43**
No particular ethnic or national group	6
	(527)

* Canadian is given by most in this category (28.1%)
** No particular ethnic or national group stands out except Jewish (10%), Irish (7%) and Italian (7%).

Table A-2.   Percentage Distribution by Mother Tongue

Mother Tongue	Percentage
English	73
French	3
Other	24*
	(527)

* No particular mother tongue stands out except
Greek (5%) and Italian (8%).

Table A-3.　Percentage Distribution by Knowledge of French

Knowledge of French	Percentage
Yes	78
No	14
Qualified answer	8
No answer	--*
	(527)

* Less than 1%.

Table A-4.　Percentage Distribution by How Often French is
　　　　　　　Spoken Outside the Home

How Often French Is Spoken Outside Home	Percentage
Nearly all the time or most often	26
Often	42
Occasionally	25
Rarely	6
Never	--*
Depends, it varies	--
No answer	--
	(527)

* Less than 1%.

Table A-5. Percentage Distribution by How Often French is Spoken in Other Public Places (i.e.: stores and restaurants)

How Often French Is Spoken in Public Places	Percentage
Nearly all the time or most often	29
Often	34
Occasionally	18
Rarely	11
Never	6
Depends, it varies	2
No answer	*
	(527)

* Less than 1%.

Table A-6. Percentage Distribution by Language Spoken
Most Often at Home

Language Spoken Most Often at Home	Percentage
English	80
French	7
French and English	2
French, English and other	1
Other	10 *
	(527)

* No particular language stands out except Italian (3%)
and Greek (3%).

Table A-7:   Percentage Distribution by Language Spoken Most
            Often Outside the Home

Language Spoken Most Often Outside Home	Percentage
English	68
French	19
French and English	10
French, English and other	2
Other	2*
	(527)

*   No particular language stands out.

128

APPENDIX B

BIVARIATE TABLES

OF THE VARIOUS

INDICATORS OF

LINGUISTIC SEGMENTATION

Table B-1.   Language Spoken Most Often At Home by language
Spoken Most Often Outside Home·

Language Spoken Most Often At Home	Language Spoken Most Often Outside Home		
	English	French	Other
English	90.8	52.0	66.7
French	2.2	24.5	9.7
Other	7.0	23.5	23.6
	(357)	(98)	(72)

Raw Chi - Square = 93.82383 with 4 d.f., signif.= .0000
Cramer's V= .29836
Uncertainty Coefficient (symmetric)= .10684

Table B-2. Language Spoken Most Often At Home by Knowledge of French

| | Knowledge of French | | |
Language Spoken Most Often At Home	No	Qualified	Yes
English	83.6	90.7	78.5
French	0	0	9.5
Other	16.4	9.3	12.0
	(73)	(43)	(410)

Number of missing observations = 1

Raw Chi - Square = 13.23231 with 4 d.f., signif.= .0102
Cramer's V= .11215
Uncertainty Coefficient (symmetric)= .03148

Table B-3. Language Spoken Most Often At Home by How Often French is Spoken Outside the Home

Language Spoken Most Often At Home	How Often French is Spoken Outside the Home			
	Rarely	Occasionally	Often	Nearly All Time
English	87.0	91.0	77.7	54.7
French	0	.7	10.0	25.0
Other	13.0	8.2	12.3	20.3
	(108)	(134)	(220)	(64)

Number of missing observations = 1

Raw Chi - Square = 57.85168 with 6 d.f., signif.= .0000
Cramer's V= .23450
Uncertainty Coefficient (symmetric)= .06020

Table B-4. Language Spoken Most Often At Home by How Often
French is Spoken in Other Public Places
(i.e.: stores and restaurants)

Language Spoken Most Often At Home	How Often French is Spoken in Public Places			
	Rarely	Occasionally	Often	Nearly All Time
English	87.9	90.4	80.9	68.2
French	1.0	0	7.3	16.2
Other	11.1	9.6	11.8	15.6
	(99)	(94)	(178)	(154)

Number of missing observations = 2

Raw Chi - Square = 35.34029 with 6 d.f., signif.= .0000
Cramer's V= .18346
Uncertainty Coefficient (symmetric)= .03995

Table B-5.   Language Spoken Most Often Outside Home by Knowledge of French

Language Spoken Most Often Outside Home	Knowledge of French		
	No	Qualified	Yes
English	94.5	95.3	60.2
French	1.4	0	23.7
Other	4.1	4.7	16.1
	(73)	(43)	(410)

Number of missing observations = 1

Raw Chi - Square = 50.49681 with 4 d.f., signif.= .0000
Cramer's V= .21909
Uncertainty Coefficient (symmetric)= .08467

Table B-6. Language Spoken Most Often Outside Home by How Often French is Spoken Outside Home

How Often French is Spoken
Outside the Home

Language Spoken Most Often Outside Home	Rarely	Occasionally	Often	Nearly All Time
English	93.5	97.8	54.5	6.3
French	1.9	0	22.3	73.4
Other	4.6	2.2	23.2	20.3
	(108)	(134)	(220)	(64)

Number of missing observations = 1.

Raw Chi − Square = 251.73914 with 6 d.f., signif.= 0
Cramer's·V= .48918
Uncertainty Coefficient (symmetric)= .23971

Table B-7. Language Spoken Most Often Outside Home by How Often French is Spoken in Other Public Places (i.e. stores and restaurants)

Language Spoken Most Often Outside Home	How Often French is Spoken in Public Places			
	Rarely	Occasionally	Often	Nearly All Time
English	91.9	93.6	64.0	40.9
French	2.0	2.1	18.0	39.6
Other	6.1	4.3	18.0	19.5
	(99)	(94)	(178)	(154)

Number of missing observations = 2

Raw Chi - Square = 116.34011 with 6 d.f., signif.= .0000
Cramer's V= .33287
Uncertainty Coefficient (symmetric)= .11136

Table B-8. Knowledge of French by How Often French is
Spoken Outside the Home

| | How Often French is Spoken Outside the Home | | | |
Knowledge of French	Rarely	Occasionally	Often	Nearly All Time
No	67.6	0	0	0
Qualified	13.9	19.4	.5	0
Yes	18.5	80.6	99.5	100.0
	(108)	(134)	(219)	(64)

Number of missing observations = 2

Raw Chi - Square = 395.04480 with 6 d.f., signif.= 0
Cramer's V= .61338
Uncertainty Coefficient (symmetric)= .36305
Gamma = .97077

Table B-9. Knowledge of French by How Often French is
            Spoken in Public Places

| | How Often French is Spoken in Public Places | | | |
Knowledge of French	Rarely	Occasionally	Often	Nearly All Time
No	51.0	17.0	2.2	1.3
Qualified	14.3	20.2	4.5	.6
Yes	34.7	62.8	93.3	98.1
	(98)	(94)	(178)	(154)

Number of missing observations = 3

Raw Chi - Square = 209.23794 with 6 d.f., signif.= 0
Cramer's V= .44683
Uncertainty Coefficient (symmetric)= .18586
Gamma = .83249

Table B-10. How Often French is Spoken Outside the Home
by How Often French is Spoken in Public Places

| | How Often French is Spoken in Public Places | | | |
How often French is Spoken Outside Home	Rarely	Occasionally	Often	Nearly All Time
Rarely	71.4	26.6	5.1	1.9
Occasionally	18.4	52.1	29.8	8.4
Often	8.2	18.1	60.7	56.5
Nearly all time	2.0	3.2	4.5	33.1
	(98)	(94)	(178)	(154)

Number of missing observations = 3

Raw Chi - Square = 360.45778 with 9 d.f., signif.= 0
Cramer's V= .47885
Uncertainty Coefficient (symmetric)= .24802
Gamma = .78900

APPENDIX C

BIVARIATE TABLES OF

SOCIAL SEGMENTATION

BY THE VARIOUS INDICATORS

OF LINGUISTIC SEGMENTATION

Table C-1. Social Segmentation by Language Spoken Most Often at Home

Social Segmentation	Language Spoken Most Often At Home		
	English	French	Other
Low	28.5	73.0	38.7
Medium	36.0	27.0	30.6
High	35.5	0	30.6
	(417)	(37)	(62)

Number of missing observations = 11

Raw Chi - Square = 35.48618 with 4 d.f., signif.= .0000
Cramer's V= .18543
Uncertainty Coefficient (symmetric)= .04851

Table C-2. Social Segmentation by Language Spoken Most Often Outside Home

Social Segmentation	Language Spoken Most Often Outside Home		
	English	French	Other
Low	19.9	67.0	52.9
Medium	38.1	25.5	30.0
High	42.0	7.4	17.1
	(352)	(94)	(70)

Number of missing observations = 11

Raw Chi - Square = 96.88725 with 4 d.f., signif.= .0000.
Cramer's V= .30640
Uncertainty Coefficient symmetric)= .09940

Table C-3. Social Segmentation by Knowledge of French

Social Segmentation	Knowledge of French		
	No	Qualified	Yes
Low	15.1	16.7	38.0
Medium	27.4	42.9	35.0
High	57.5	40.5	27.0
	(73)	(42)	(400)

Number of missing observations = 12

Raw Chi - Square = 34.14021 with 4 d.f., signif.= .0000
Cramer's V= .18206
Uncertainty Coefficient (symmetric)= .03727
Gamma = -.44498

Table C-4.   Social Segmentation by How Often French is
              Spoken Outside the Home

	How Often French is Spoken Outside the Home			
Social Segmentation	Rarely	Occasionally	Often	Nearly All Time
Low	13.0	17.4	40.9	75.0
Medium	26.9	39.4	40.5	16.7
High	60.2	43.2	18.6	8.3
	(108)	(132)	(215)	(60)

Number of missing observations = 12

Raw Chi - Square = 123.25174 with 6 d.f., signif.= .0000
Cramer's V= .34592
Uncertainty Coefficient (symmetric)= .09991
Gamma = -.56989

Table C-5. Social Segmentation by How Often French is Spoken in Public Places

Social Segmentation	How Often French is Spoken in Public Places			
	Rarely	Occasionally	Often	Nearly All Time
Low	12.2	19.4	33.0	54.7
Medium	27.6	32.3	42.6	31.8
High	60.2	48.4	24.4	13.5
	(98)	(93)	(176)	(148)

Number of missing observations = 12

Raw Chi – Square = 94.99121 with 6 d.f., signif.= .0000
Cramer's V= .30368
Uncertainty Coefficient (symmetric)= .07568
Gamma = –.50029