Breadcrumb

 
 

Bodies, minds and materialism

Title:

Bodies, minds and materialism

Beggs, Noah Stewart (1998) Bodies, minds and materialism. Masters thesis, Concordia University.

[img]
Preview
PDF
4Mb

Abstract

It is common to describe subjective experience as a mental, and thus metaphysical, phenomenon. This core assumption is a central tenet of our intellectual history. How this bears on our ability to take seriously new theories of mind in light of progressive discovery is what is at issue in this paper. Herein, it is argued that because the idiom we use to speak about the mind is predisposed to countenance ontological dualism, it begs the question against alternative conceptions of mind. I will thus argue that subjectivity need not entail non-physical phenomena, pace the assumptions of the traditional dualist idiom.

Divisions:Concordia University > Faculty of Arts and Science > Philosophy
Item Type:Thesis (Masters)
Authors:Beggs, Noah Stewart
Pagination:v, 101 leaves ; 29 cm.
Institution:Concordia University
Degree Name:Theses (M.A.)
Program:Philosophy
Date:1998
Thesis Supervisor(s):Clarke, Murray
ID Code:615
Deposited By:Concordia University Libraries
Deposited On:27 Aug 2009 13:13
Last Modified:08 Dec 2010 10:15
Related URLs:
All items in Spectrum are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved. The use of items is governed by Spectrum's terms of access.

Repository Staff Only: item control page

Document Downloads

More statistics for this item...

Concordia University - Footer