Lavers, Gregory (2009) Benacerraf's Dilemma and Informal Mathematics. The Review of Symbolic Logic, 2 (4). pp. 769785. ISSN 17550203

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Abstract
This paper puts forward and defends an account of mathematical truth, and in particular an account of the truth of mathematical axioms. The proposal attempts to be completely nonrevisionist. In this connection, it seeks to satisfy simultaneously both horns of Benacerraf’s dilemma. The account builds upon Georg Kreisel’s work on informal rigour. Kreisel defends the view that axioms are arrived at by a rigorous examination of our informal notions, as opposed to being stipulated or arrived at by trial and error. This view is then supplemented by a Fregean account
of the objectivity and our knowledge of abstract objects. It is then argued that the resulting view faces no insurmountable metaphysical or epistemic obstacles.
Divisions:  Concordia University > Faculty of Arts and Science > Philosophy 

Item Type:  Article 
Refereed:  Yes 
Authors:  Lavers, Gregory 
Journal or Publication:  The Review of Symbolic Logic 
Date:  December 2009 
Keywords:  Benacerraf's Dilemma; Frege; Kreisel; Abstract Objects 
ID Code:  6466 
Deposited By:  GREGORY LAVERS 
Deposited On:  11 Jan 2010 21:41 
Last Modified:  04 Nov 2016 22:56 
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