Dubois, Frédérique and Giraldeau, Luc‐Alain and Hamilton, Ian M. and Grant, James W.A. and Lefebvre, Louis
Distraction Sneakers Decrease the Expected Level of Aggression within Groups: A Game‐Theoretic Model.
The American Naturalist, 164
- Published Version
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/422199
Hawk‐dove games have been extensively used to predict the conditions under which group‐living animals should defend their resources against potential usurpers. Typically, game‐theoretic models on aggression consider that resource defense may entail energetic and injury costs. However, intruders may also take advantage of owners who are busy fighting to sneak access to unguarded resources, imposing thereby an additional cost on the use of the escalated hawk strategy. In this article we modify the two‐strategy hawk‐dove game into a three‐strategy hawk‐dove‐sneaker game that incorporates a distraction‐sneaking tactic, allowing us to explore its consequences on the expected level of aggression within groups. Our model predicts a lower proportion of hawks and hence lower frequencies of aggressive interactions within groups than do previous two‐strategy hawk‐dove games. The extent to which distraction sneakers decrease the frequency of aggression within groups, however, depends on whether they search only for opportunities to join resources uncovered by other group members or for both unchallenged resources and opportunities to usurp.
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