Trudel, Yves (2004) Essays on closed-end funds. PhD thesis, Concordia University.
NR05722.pdf - Accepted Version
Despite the simplicity of their operations and the pricing of their underlying assets, closed-end funds are associated with some of the most puzzling anomalies in finance. Thus, the primary purpose of this thesis is to show why funds (especially closed-end funds) exist, why the variance of mutual fund returns can exceed the variance of the returns on their investment portfolios in a rational market, and how properly chosen remuneration schemes for fund managers lead to better fund pricing. Each of these topics constitutes a self-contained essay or chapter in the thesis. In the first essay, we demonstrate under which conditions closed-end mutual funds exist. In general, the time horizons of small investors must be in a range that eliminates the incentives for them to invest directly in investment projects while allowing managed investment fund managers to realize non-negative profits. The specific existence of closed-end mutual funds is related to the opportunity for some investors to liquidate their fund's shares before the termination of the fund and to the flexibility that open-end fund managers have to liquidate their assets under management. As the likelihood of "bank run" increases, so does the likelihood of issuing closed-end mutual funds. In the second essay, we challenge the current belief in finance that, if investors are rational, then the variance of the returns for the shares or units of a closed-end fund should equal the variance of the returns of the net asset value per share (NAVPS) of the portfolio of assets under management by the fund. We demonstrate that various factors lead to excess price variability, so that the ratio of price to NAVPS variances exceeds one in a rational market. These factors include a differential impact of the bid/ask bounce, potential fund liquidation, performance persistence, management fees, and payout policy. In the third essay, we demonstrate that well-chosen remuneration schemes can help investors to properly value the securities of closed-end funds in primary markets so as to better reflect the abilities of its managers. In contrast, the current compensation structures that are typically based on flat fees may induce good managers to exit the closed-end fund sector, and may leave this sector with managers that generate returns that are relatively low compared to their management fees. In turn, this may explain why such funds typically sell at a discount to their net asset value per share shortly after an initial public offering.
|Divisions:||Concordia University > John Molson School of Business|
|Item Type:||Thesis (PhD)|
|Pagination:||v, 102 leaves : ill. ; 29 cm.|
|Degree Name:||Ph. D.|
|Program:||John Molson School of Business|
|Thesis Supervisor(s):||Kryzanowski, Lawrence|
|Deposited By:||Concordia University Libraries|
|Deposited On:||18 Aug 2011 18:23|
|Last Modified:||05 Nov 2016 00:14|
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