

*Perception, Truth and Christ as the Causal Exemplar:
A Metaphysical and Ontological Speculation of the Human Soul*

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ABSTRACT The thesis is a systematic study comparing the ordinary human soul to the human soul of Jesus Christ as the model. Since the time of the pre-Chalcedon controversies, the tension arising from the relation of the human *being* of Jesus with the divine *Being* of the Son of God is the subject of intense debates. One aspect of the debate questions the relation of the human soul of the historic Jesus with his pre-resurrected human flesh and his resurrected body. In answer to this tension, the thesis claims that the divine Christ and his human soul enact an essential unity with the ordinary human soul. The thesis develops a Thomistic definition of the human soul and argues that Jesus' human soul is the causal exemplar of the ordinary human soul.

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PREFACE

To assist the reader I have copiously employed footnotes to explain the technical arguments of the thesis. For the person unaccustomed to the works of Thomas Aquinas (1225 – 1274) the sections on *The Metaphysical Construction Blocks of the Thesis* and the *Summa theologiae*, Chapter 2, may be of assistance.

INTRODUCTION

I propose that the introduction of the paired FOX P2 gene into chromosome 7 of the human DNA double-helix molecule approximately 200,000 years ago was a miraculous event.¹ The paired FOX P2 gene is fundamental to the emergence of the rational animal named *homo sapiens sapiens* that in an evolutionary heartbeat would express itself as planet Earth's dominant species. Human inquisitors have always posed the question: "What takes place *after* the breath of one's life ceases to function?" The responses to this question, and a multitude of other similarly framed queries, have laid the foundation of how we understand and form relationships between the human rational soul, the physical human body, and, a divine Creator. Instead of directly responding to this ancient question in my thesis, I regard its mirror image – what takes place well *before* the breath of one's life begins to function? The answer to the latter question lays the foundational direction of my thesis. Very succinctly my question is: What role does the human soul of Jesus Christ play in the creation of the human soul? In this work I follow the theological and

¹ I prefer the punctuated theory of evolution rather than the gradual theory as the punctuation events frequently are caused by environmental incidences that mark critical changes in the evolutionary directions of species. I claim that a miraculous event occurred for the insertion of the FOX P2 gene into chromosome 7 for several reasons. The first regards the unlikely probability that such an event could occur through natural selection without some external input. The chromosome 7 molecule is very stable and not prone to mutation of the order of inserting a new gene. In order to be successful the expression of the gene must be found in the copulating male and female of the human species in order for it to be functional. As well, the FOX P2 gene is responsible for cognition and language skills hitherto unknown on planet Earth.

metaphysical discipline inherent in the methodology of the Scholastic theologian Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274).

The notion of a rational soul finds its source in the reasoned thought of the ancient Hellenist/Greek philosophers. The Greeks employed the term *psyche/psuche* which was later translated by Latin scholars as *anima* to describe what we call today the *soul*. In some measure there is little distinction between the Scholastic soul and the modern conception of the human mind. The diversity of the ancient understanding of the human soul and its relationships are with us today.

Modern philosophers, scientists and theologians, understand the existence and structure of the human soul not much differently than did the ancient pagan philosophers and early Christian thinkers. Modern theological thought still contains the dualistic concepts that God transcends the world as Creator to a created reality, and, that a distinction and separation between the body and soul exists whereby the body is seen as a corpse being dragged around by the soul.² On the other hand are those who follow the philosophy posed by the ancient monists who are loosely divided into two camps, idealist monism, and, materialist monism. Idealist monism resembles neo-Platonism and the *hylomorphism* of Aristotelian philosophies, whereas materialist monism denies a distinction between body and soul.³ The dualist philosophy of Plato dominated Christian dogma until Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) not only resurrected the philosophical teaching of Aristotle, but transformed it into a foundation of a Christian understanding of the

² Tad Brennan, "Stoic Souls in Stoic Corpses," in *Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy*, ed. Dorothea Frede and Burkhard Reis, 390. (New York: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co., 2009). I will refer to the human soul in the neuter gender since the human soul as a principle of being is asexual.

³ Catholic Encyclopedia, *Monism* <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10483a.htm> (accessed 12 May 2011).

Triune God. I intend in my thesis to employ the Aristotelian-Thomistic *hylomorphic* philosophy to construct my interpretation of relation between the ordinary human soul and the human soul of Jesus Christ.

I have formulated three hypotheses that assist me to determine the scope of what I consider is a fresh approach to apprehending the relation between the human soul and Jesus Christ's human soul. The proofs relating to my arguments are elaborated in Chapters 2 and 3. Briefly, the two core hypotheses for Chapter 2 are: That the ordinary or fallen human soul suffers an additional potency due to its separation from God which is analogically recorded in Genesis 3:21 as the *garments of the skin of the animal*.⁴ I propose that the pre-lapsarian human matter-soul relations are different than the fallen human matter-soul relations. The differences are one of degrees of potency as a consequence of original sin. An immediate question is therefore: Should the human matter that the human soul informs be seen as potency or an added substance that entangles actuality with potency? Thomas Aquinas, and, in a brief but critical illumination, Duns Scotus, (c.1265-1308) provide some relief to this dilemma.⁵ Aquinas understands the relation of

⁴ Michael. D Coogan, ed., *The New Oxford Annotated Bible* 3rd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 16. Please note that all biblical references are from this edition.

⁵ R. P. Phillips, *Modern Thomistic Philosophy: An Explanation for Students* (Westminster, Maryland: The Newman Press. 1959), vol. 1. 154. Duns Scotus was keenly interested in the notion of individuation as a perfecting principle and developed a comprehensive philosophy based on the ancient notion of '*haecceitas*' or thisness. Although the thesis does not completely agree with Scotus' interpretation of the haecceitic principle as the "source of individuation is ... by a formal distinction... the *ultima realitas entis* [the final form of being]." The source of individuation in Scotus' world is the consequence of original sin and that my conception of over-burden of the flesh of the animal viz. Genesis 3:21 necessitates animal matter (perception through the senses) for individuation which is contrary to Aquinas as found in *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 84. A7. Additionally the three Persons of the Holy Trinity Who are differentiated through their Personhood and not through their substance and as such are a community of self-communicating Persons. I argue that humanity, created in the *imago Dei*, is also meant to be a *community of persons* with a necessary self-communicating principle which is negated due to the individuating *thisness* of fallen human

the human soul to the human body as “the substantial form of a physically organized body”⁶ which describes the present human condition accurately. However, I diverge in one critical aspect of Thomas’s metaphysical construction of the human person as a *hylomorphic* composite of body and soul. I hypothesize that my understanding of the Aristotelian composition of the person differs from Aquinas’ interpretation of the relation between the matter (potency) of the body and the actualizing principle of the body, the human soul. My sense is that Thomas understands the human soul as an entity that is substandard due to original sin. Instead, I take the position that it is the human soul’s *relation* with its body, a body now burdened with an added potency that now hides the soul from its own gaze. In other words this added potency degrades the human soul’s ability to properly correspond with, *and*, be fully aware of the natural order and God. My notion seems to be in contradiction to Scripture as God queries how the Adamic couple knew they were naked. My counterpoint here is that the added potency of animality, the garments of skin of animals, hides or has extinguished the luminosity of the properly actualized pre-lapsarian body. The *hypo-added* potency I ascribe to the matter of the body renders the common human soul to the corporeal realm more so than the pre-lapsarian couple and the earthly Jesus who enjoy a fullness of reality.⁷ In my scheme the ordinary

flesh. I also argue that a community of persons is a necessary condition of the original human soul and of the Christ human soul. I develop this hypothesis further in Chapter 2 and complete it in Chapter 3.

⁶ Thomas Aquinas, *De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas*. Translated as *On the Uniqueness of Intellect Against Averroists* by www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/8246/, <http://dhsprory.org/thomas/DeUnitateIntellectus.htm> (accessed 04 April 2011).

⁷ I do not contend that the human soul is devoid of the ability to be aware, however, two issues are of concern. The first is that, as Thomas Aquinas and others teach, closeness to God requires an exemplar moral behaviour. The second is that mystics exist. Saints such as Brother St. Andre of Montreal seem to function with an awareness of the presence of God, or the nature of a poor soul’s illness that requires healing, not

soul's abilities are extrinsically and apparently diminished, thus reducing its power to obtain knowledge either of the world or of spiritual beings. Thomas states that "In the present state of life in which the soul is united to a passible (*sic*) body, it is impossible ... to understand anything actually except by turning to the phantasms."⁸ I hypothesise that the necessity of turning to the phantasms is a consequence of the added potency to the human matter and therefore the proper or original human cogitative process is not through the phantasms. Finally, the Schoolmen proposed that the distinction of identity is through the *haecceitic* principle which I suggest is a consequence attributed to the ordinary human soul separated from God. Instead I propose that the fallen human signet-matter is dependent on the *haecceitic* nature of the clothes of the skin of the animal, a divinely imposed privation, and not a principle. Therefore such privation is not proper to the human soul.

The third hypothesis is presented and argued in Chapter 3 and is the most difficult to address. Contrary to Thomas Aquinas' assertion that "two beings fully in act cannot form an essential unity" I hope to demonstrate that in the specific realm of the human soul such a unity is possible, even a necessary component of a proper teleological being. If I interpret Thomas Aquinas' teaching on this subject correctly, then by necessity the human soul of Jesus Christ, fully in act, forms an essential unity with the divine nature of the Second Person of the Trinity and with his human body. Therefore, I claim that the Mystical Body of Christ is not an aggregate of human rational souls as citizens of a country

unlike Jesus' healing of the leper, or the cripple – the healing of the body being a signification of the healing of the soul. It seems our power to be aware is severely curtailed however. Note that potency is the 'negative' of actuality and therefore to add to potency is to make it less, therefore the prefix 'hypo-'.

⁸ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 84. A7, *respondeo*.

known through the natural order, but are formed as an essential unity known through the intentional order of existence. Although the essential unity of the two beings proposal is an overall aim of the thesis, many minute steps are to be taken, each with its own gratifying nourishment for the human intellect. The demonstration of, or, at a minimum providing new insights for the above three hypotheses, is what I term the *illumination of the ordinary human soul by the human soul of Jesus Christ*. The success of the thesis therefore depends on effectively arguing for these hypotheses.

As seen from the above the subject matter of the thesis is decidedly conceptual and therefore cannot be written in a linear or chronological fashion; nor is it concise.

The Purpose and the Problem

The purpose of the thesis is to present a metaphysical and ontological speculation of the ordinary human rational soul⁹ *illuminated* by the human soul of Jesus Christ. Thomas Aquinas asserts that “an acquaintance with the soul would seem to help much in acquiring all truth, especially about the natural world; for it is, as it were, the principle of living things.”¹⁰

The ultimate ability to know the universality of being¹¹ for the human soul is to be aware of separated and simple substances. The Thomistic notion that a human soul,

⁹ The term, ‘rational soul’ is the Scholastic term employed to generally depict the human mind. The term ‘ordinary’ refers to the fallen human soul/person of Genesis 3:23 which is the human being’s present state.

¹⁰ Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle’s de Anima*, trans. Foster, Kenelm O.P. and Humphries, Sylvester O.P. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951), html edition by Joseph Kenny, O.P. <http://dhsprory.org/thomas/DeAnima.htm#11> (accessed 02 February 2011).

¹¹ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q.13. A11, *repondeo*. Aquinas clearly lays the foundation for how we should consider the universality of being. In God, who is pure universality the notion of form is incoherent since God is “being itself.” Aquinas agrees that there are degrees of universality and that “our

separated from the unity of its body, is not fully human is fundamental to Aquinas' Aristotelian philosophy, otherwise it would be Platonism. Intertwined with such thinking is the age-old Scholastic question of how to reconcile truth, unity and being. Placing the Scholastic reconciliation issue within the subject of the thesis, the object of the thesis is to demonstrate how the individual human composite may be reconciled with the belief of the unity of the Body of Christ.¹² The object of the thesis takes place in the crafting of a metaphysical understanding of Christ's human soul's role in the creation of the human soul. Aquinas points to me the correct general direction.

"On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that there is the same disposition of things in being and in truth." Summa theologiae Ia Q. 16 A3 sed contra.

However, Scripture tells us that Jesus is the "the Way, the Truth and the Life..." (John 4:16) Is Jesus speaking symbolically, or does a substantial reality associated with Jesus' *viaticum* exist?¹³ Thomas responds to the *sed contra*:

*"As good has the aspect of what is desirable, so truth is related to knowledge. Now everything, in as far as it has being, is to that extent knowable. Therefore it is said in the book on the Soul that "the soul is in some manner all things," through the senses and the intellect. And therefore, as good is convertible with being, so is the true. But as good adds to being the notion of desirable, so the true adds relation to the intellect."*¹⁴

intellect cannot know the essence of God itself in this life." Therefore the human soul is created with attributes that provide for such knowledge.

¹² Many will view that the Body of Christ is an aggregate of human souls/persons which is a universal such as the term 'humanity' that is in essence an aggregate of individuals. Such a notion is based on the Nominalist philosophy. The thesis takes the Realist stance in that there is a real unicity amongst the members with Christ. John 17: 22-23.

¹³ The literal translation of *viaticum* is 'food or provisions for a journey'.

¹⁴ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q.16. A3. *respondeo*.

By concluding that true adds relation to the intellect Thomas is also stating that the intellect is endowed with an *intentional* attribute or power. However, Thomas cautions us:

“But a difference is to be observed in this, that some are many absolutely, and one in a particular respect, while with others it is the reverse. Now *one* is predicated as the same way as *being*. And substance is being absolutely, while accident or being of reason is a being only in certain respect. And so those things that are one in substance are one absolutely, though many in a certain respect. And so those things that are one in substance are one absolutely, though many in a certain respect. Thus, in the genus substance, the whole composed of its integral or essential parts, is one absolutely, because the whole is being and substance absolutely, and the parts are beings and substances in the whole. But those things which are distinct in substance, and one according to an accident, are distinct absolutely, and one in a certain respect. Thus many [humans] are one people, and many stones are one heap, which is unity of composition or order. In like manner also many individuals that are one in genus or species are many absolutely, and one in a certain respect, since to be one in genus or species is to be one according to the consideration of the reason.”¹⁵

In the above passage Thomas asserts that a tripartite mode of expressing the convertibility of being exists.¹⁶ The first mode refers to being (*ens*) absolutely, in other words, being that is substantial in its own right, such as a dog or cat. For now I exclude human beings because of the arguments I am developing regarding the human soul. Animals, for example, have a unity of being (singular, individual). It is not possible with present scientific knowledge and instruments to force two substantial beings together arriving at one composite.¹⁷ The second mode concerns unity *per accidens*. Particular dogs

¹⁵ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia-IIae Q. 17. A4, *sed contra*.

¹⁶ Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, *Of Being and Unity, (De Ente et Uno)* trans. Victor Michael Hamm (edition by Joseph H. Peterson 2001), <http://www.esotericarchives.com/pico/beinguni.htm> (accessed 20 June 2011). Pico provides an informative and comprehensive treatment, including the historicity, of the notion of the convertibility of ‘one’ and ‘being’; ‘truth’ and ‘goodness’ as viewed from the 15th century perspective looking back to Thomas Aquinas’ work.

¹⁷ The thesis recognizes that it is possible to bombard certain elements with neutrons, for example, and create new elements which may be considered as O¹⁸ which is O¹⁶ and two neutrons that may be considered

and particular cats may enjoy accidental unity if they have the same colour of fur. Accidents such as colour enjoy intra-species, intra-genera etc., unity since the accident is a being that is contingent on the substantial being (*entia*) but unified with all similar congruent accidents. However, the canine and feline species are essentially distinct.

Therefore, a problem the thesis faces is that one could reason that the divine species and the human species are so distinct that they are unable to form an essential unity which is contrary to the Chalcedon formula in the case of the divine and human natures of Jesus Christ.

The final mode concerns a *unity of essentia* (nature) which is understood as a unity of logic or reasoning.¹⁸ We can abstract the *animal-ity* from the nature of the cat and dog, just as we can abstract the *triangular-ity* of isosceles and equilateral triangles. Under this mode of reasoning, Aquinas would deny that there is a real unity, a unity of the first degree between the Christ-soul and the human soul since it violates his notion of the integrity of the composite being; such a unity would make all who enjoy such a union identical to the being (*ens*) of Christ. In other words, according to Aquinas' thinking, all Christians are unified and convertible to the being (*ens*) of the Body of Christ, just as all human beings are members of the *homo sapiens sapiens* species, or as citizens of a country, which is a nominalist view of reality.

Thomas' thought presents a tension with my scheme as it may not be possible to demonstrate unity-of-being of individual human beings as the Body of Christ without

as two beings fully in act that form an essential unity. However, the creation of a new animal fully cat and fully dog is not possible.

¹⁸ The thesis employs the term 'final teaching' broadly since within the mentioned quotation there are certainly more than three lessons from Aquinas.

elevating such human members to be Gods (*sic*). Thomas would state that human beings as the Body of Christ constitute an *accident-to-substance* relation with Christ's soul just as the colour of fur of a dog constitutes the same relation. The illumination of the ordinary human soul by the human soul of Jesus Christ, the thesis' *raison d'être*, will be achieved if I can demonstrate that there is a true unity between the human soul and the human soul of Jesus Christ.

Two centuries after Thomas Aquinas' untimely death, the question of unity was still being debated. The Italian Dominican philosopher Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463 – 1494) replied to Angelo Poliziano (1454 – 1494) regarding a conversation the latter had with the Florentine Lorenzo de' Medici (1449 – 1492). The treatise, *Of Being and Unity*, most eloquently sets the structure of the problem I am addressing.

“And if our unity is purchased by the enslavement of a reason submitted to the rule of the law of the members, that will be a false unity, since thus we shall not be true. For we are called and appear to be men, that is, animate beings living by reason; and yet we will be brutes, having for law only sensual appetite. We will be performing a juggling trick to those who see us, and among whom we live. *The image will not conform to its exemplar*. For we are made in the likeness of God, and God is spirit (John 4:24) but we are not yet spirits, to use St. Paul's words, (1 Corinthians 2: 14; 15:46) but animals. If, on the contrary, by grace of truth, we do not fall beneath our model, we have only to move towards Him who is our model, through goodness, in order to be united with Him in the after-world.”¹⁹ (emphasis added)

Pico's work previews my Christ-exemplar concept that is vivified in the upper chamber encounter between Thomas the Apostle and the Risen Christ. The coincidence of Thomas and Jesus supports my concept that the ordinary human soul may apprehend a separated

¹⁹ Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, *Of Being and Unity, (De Ente et Uno)* trans. Victor Michael Hamm (Edition by Joseph H. Peterson 2001), Chapter X, (edition by Joseph H. Peterson 2001), <http://www.esotericarchives.com/pico/beinguni.htm> (accessed 20 June 2011).

substance while still in its present state, that is, the human soul is united to a corruptible body. In order to counter Aquinas' thinking on this subject I propose the following scheme.

The pre-resurrected Jesus was aware of the intimacies of all ordinary human souls thus by-passing the garment of the flesh of their bodies. In the Thomas-Christ event Thomas reciprocated Jesus' call by *being aware* of Christ's dual, but unified natures. The exchange between Christ and Thomas demonstrates how truth knowledge may be acquired, unity formed with individuated substances, and, how separated beings may be aware of each other. Following once again Aquinas who commences his teaching on this subject with a quotation from Augustine of Hippo, "our mind acquires the knowledge of incorporeal things by itself" leans to the notion that the human mind, that is, the human rational soul, may acquire knowledge *aphantasmically*.²⁰

Methodology and Scope of Research

The primary methodology of the thesis is grounded in the metaphysics and theology of Thomas Aquinas. The process required to unpack and develop the concepts presented within the thesis is complex. The pertinent concepts were extracted from the literature and in some instances re-employed in a speculative manner employing Thomas'

²⁰ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 89. A2, *respondeo*, The mind does have the power to acquire knowledge. However, without assistance it does not have the power to discern absolute nor in many instances perceptive truth, which was lost during original sin. The thesis employs the following definitions: Perceptive truth is truth acquired through the senses – the soul does not have the power to separate form from matter, that is, in regards to the human soul, it is not aware of separate substances; knowledge truth is therefore defined as knowledge of material substance but is incomplete or termed 'general truth'; awareness truth is knowledge of immaterial substances. These notions are further developed in Chapter 2.

metaphysical methodology and teachings.²¹ The re-employed concepts are prepared using specific teachings from Thomas Aquinas, primarily from his *Summa theologiae*. Other concepts are interpreted by the author of the thesis with assistance through the secondary literature from other theologians and philosophers. Still other concepts are presented in a new, but perhaps, controversial light. Modern commentators frequently detract from the objective and subjective nature of Scholastic metaphysical inquiry. Rather than detracting from such inquiry, I consider Thomas's *Summa theologiae* not only an invaluable source, but also a rigorous theological and metaphysical methodology. Thomas employs both "*a priori* and *a posteriori* [reasoning], and the latter both in the objective and the subjective sense."²² I am of the opinion that the exegetical skill of Thomas Aquinas surpasses not only his contemporaries but many who follow as well, even to the present.

Thomas clearly states his rationale and structure of the *Summa theologiae* in the initial prologue to the Prima Pars, the First Part, and in the prologue to question 2 of this same section, respectively.

"The teacher of catholic *truth* [my emphasis] [...] [and] the purpose of this book [is] to treat of whatever belongs to the Christian religion in a way that is suited to the instruction of beginners."

And, the prologue to question 2 states:

²¹ I find the work of two Thomist philosophers, Lawrence Dewan O.P., and W. Norris Clarke S.J., particularly appealing and therefore I follow their philosophies.

²² Catholic Encyclopedia, s.v. "Metaphysics," <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10226a.htm> (accessed 18 May 2011).

“in our endeavour to expound this science, we shall treat: (1) Of God. (2) Of the rationale creature’s movement towards God (Part II). (3) Of Christ, Who as man, is our way to God (Part III).”

The scope of the thesis is considerably less adventurous than the above prologues entail. The Gospel of John 4:16 records that Jesus informs his disciples that he is “*the Way, the Truth and the Life.*” I will therefore concentrate on the metaphysical relation between ‘truth’ and ‘Truth’ whereby truth is that which human beings perceive through their sensory apparatus, and Truth, which *is* the Incarnated Word, is not necessarily perceived through the senses. The notion that Jesus, as Truth, cannot be perceived by the ordinary human soul requires a complex and elaborate analysis.

Thomas Aquinas teaches that being, goodness and truth are convertible. That is, each may refer to the other and still maintain the same meaning and metaphysical intent. The object of the thesis is to more fully understand how, or if, ordinary human beings are sufficiently aware to know truth or a truth-value, between one relation and another given that humanity’s fallen condition prevents the human soul from being fully aware of God and each other. The dichotomy between the ordinary human soul’s sensory acquisition of knowledge and truth, and, the Christ-soul, that acquires knowledge and truth in an apperceptive mode, (*c.f.* n. 93) must be resolved if I am to succeed in demonstrating their proper relations.

The second quotation above introduces the thesis’ second limiting factor; the thesis is Christological in its foundational belief. Through Thomas’ methodology I attempt to apprehend a new relation between the ordinary human soul and the human soul of

Jesus Christ with the Christ-soul as the instrumental causal exemplar to the ordinary human soul.

The section titled *The Metaphysical Construction Blocks of the Thesis* provides an overview of the thesis's metaphysical foundation. However, many who read through my enterprise may consider that Thomas Aquinas²³ is a theologian who strictly projects the dogma of the medieval Roman Church. As such, readers may also consider that my thesis is steeped in Roman Catholicism. Although elements of Catholicism are inherent in the thesis, my major arguments are based on a catholic theological nature and a medieval metaphysical foundation. Thomas starts the section *Treatise on Man* in the *Summa theologiae* with an introduction that brings to light his and my theological philosophy.

“Having treated of the spiritual and of the corporeal creature, we now proceed to treat of man, who is composed of a spiritual and of a corporeal substance. We shall treat first of the nature of man, and secondly his origin.”²⁴

In the prologue to the third part, *Treatise on the Incarnation* Thomas states:

“Because our Saviour the Lord Jesus Christ, in order to *save His people from their sins* (Matt. 1, 21), as the angel announced, showed to us in His own Person the way of truth, whereby we may attain the bliss of eternal life by rising again ...”²⁵

The metaphysical thought of Thomas provides a rich methodology and a fertile ground to secure an understanding of the relation between the soul of the ordinary human person and the Trinity through the human Christ. The philosophical thought of Thomas Aquinas also provides a solid foundation to build an apprehension of humanity's

²³ An interesting point the author of the thesis found in Thomas's references to *Catholicism* is that he frequently employed the term 'catholic', meaning universal.

²⁴ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 75.

²⁵ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* IIIa.

relationships. Finally, Thomas Aquinas' theology conforms to the dogma of the Chalcedon Definition which explains the unity of Person and duality of natures of Jesus Christ as follows:²⁶

“The person or hypostasis of Christ can be viewed in two ways. First as it is in itself, and thus it is altogether simple, even as the Nature of the Word. Secondly, in the aspect of person or hypostasis to which it pertains to subsist in a nature; and from this point of view the Person of Christ subsists in two natures. Hence, though there is one subsisting being in Him, yet there are different aspects of subsistence, and hence He is said to be a composite person, in so far as one being subsists in two.”²⁷

The thesis is divided into three chapters and is portrayed within the framework of a Christocentric theology. In Chapter 1 I elaborate on the thesis statement and introduce the metaphysic background. In Chapter 2 I describe the metaphysical construction of the ordinary human soul as portrayed by Thomas Aquinas. In order to limit the scope of the thesis, I present only two metaphysical criteria which form the core of my arguments. The core attributes revolve around the mode in which the human soul acts as the forming principle of the human composite. I examine Thomas Aquinas' understanding of how the human soul individuates itself, and, once individuated, what is the mode of acquisition of knowledge (through sensory perception) from its environment. The second part of Chapter 2 is divided into four sections that present the thesis' metaphysical view of:

- *The essence of the soul and its relation to its first act and to truth;*
- *The Origin of the Rational Soul,*
- *Original Sin, and,*

²⁶ The Council of Chalcedon (451) answered the questions arising from the heresies of Arius, Nestorius, Apollinaris and the Eutychian controversy etc. The Council determined that the divine and human natures of Jesus Christ are united in a single person. A critical claim of the Council is that the “each nature being preserved and being united in one Person and *subsistence*.” (emphasis added) It is also the thesis' intent to adhere to the Chalcedonian teachings. http://www.earlychurchtexts.com/main/chalcedon/chalcedonian_definition.shtml (accessed 02 June 2011).

²⁷ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* IIIa Q. 2. A 4, *respondeo*.

- *The Metaphysical Consequences of Original Sin.*

The third hypothesis is presented and argued in Chapter 3 and is the most difficult to address. Contrary to Thomas Aquinas' assertion that "two beings fully in act cannot form an essential unity" is a necessary consequence for human beings as proper teleological creations of God. If I interpret Thomas Aquinas' teaching on this subject correctly, then by necessity the human soul of Jesus Christ, fully in act, is in an essential unity with the divine nature of the Second Person of the Trinity in the person of the Son of God. I prepared a vast literature base which immediately follows, in order to ensure a complete view is attained.

Literature Cited

The concepts, claims and conclusions made in the thesis are fresh, somewhat speculative and perhaps controversial to the point that few theologians have dealt the subject matter in the same manner as the thesis. However, many modern thinkers have re-visited the dogma and proclamations promulgated from the Council of Chalcedon (451) and the ramifications of the two natures of Christ. I have adapted many ideas extracted from the work of modern thinkers to fit into the arguments of my thesis.

Aaron Riches examines the difficulty of the Chalcedon Father's to resolve the dyothelite wills of Jesus, while Richard Cross, Josuha Bohannon, and Ivor Davidson, look to the metaphysic of the Incarnation concerning the issues that faced the Chalcedon framers. The primary question the Council of Chalcedon faced concerns the definition of the Person of Jesus Christ to be fully Divine and fully man. The quandary facing the Council members, and most interested theologians and philosophers of yesterday and

today, concerns the mode by which an Infinite Being could be unified with a finite man without falling into all the vagaries (*sic*) such a union would entail. Instead, I compare like with like; I compare the perfect soul of Jesus with the perfectly created but fallen-from-grace-soul of the ordinary human person. However, most thinkers study the Incarnated Jesus in isolation from the ordinary human soul. I propose to the reader that one may be able to apprehend much from understanding such a separation and the unity the human soul once enjoyed with the perfected human soul of the Christ.

I employ, throughout the thesis, the methodology and the principles that have been most carefully argued, articulated and presented with the utmost integrity by Thomas Aquinas. As such Aquinas provides a toolbox of finely honed instruments for manipulating the metaphysical construction materials to explain or even to contradict dogma. The works of W. Norris Clarke, Lawrence Dewan, Anthony Kenny, R. P. Philips, Robert Pasnau, and John Wippel have provided invaluable insight into the mechanics and relevance of Thomas Aquinas' metaphysics in present day thought. Still, the interest in the subject material, steeped in Scholastic metaphysics, is not popular outside of Catholic circles and therefore there is little in the literature that specifically relates to the thesis' direction. For example, few in the modern world believe primary matter exists. Primary matter that which is fully potential and is responsible for the underlying constancy of identity during change, is not only a difficult concept to conceive, but most *artisans* outside the realm of metaphysics doubt primary matter's existence. Therefore as readers contemplate my speculative philosophical concepts, such as, the concept of memory, that is, memory of 'what it is to be human', which, according to Augustine and Thomas resides

in the *suppositum* of God, and, since I compare such memory to primary matter, the reader must overcome an incredibly difficult hurdle.²⁸

My secondary support draws upon and develops the works of modern scholars such as Mortimer Adler for his ideas on *intentionality*, Boris Bobrinsky who articulates the unique Pauline notion of *morphê* “though he [Christ] was in the form (*en morphê*) of God”;²⁹ Sheldon Cohen assists by explaining how sensible forms are received in the passive intellect; Gregory Doolan unpacks the notion of the Divine exemplar cause;³⁰ Jason Eberl discusses the notion of the nature of human beings in the *hylemorphic* sense as opposed to the dualist version; Orestes Gonzales teaches on the *act of being* (*actus essendi*) of the soul; Aloys Grillmeier provides historical background for the relevant parts of the thesis; John Haldane argues for the integrity of Thomas Aquinas’ works, and, sheds new light on Aquinas’ employment of the *active intellect*, and finally, William Walton provides insight as to the awareness of one’s own being (*ens*).

Although the works of many ancient and modern scholars are considered, the foundation of the thesis relies on the works of Thomas Aquinas, especially his *Summa theologiae*. Although rarely, I also draw upon such works as: *De Anima*, *Summa Contre de*

²⁸ There may be attributes that are common between primary matter and the memory of what it is to be human residing in the *suppositum* of God which could advance the cause of Thomism. An immediate point that comes to mind is that primary matter as pure potency and if we conceive of unactualized memory as pure potency of the human entity, how is this tension resolved since God is pure act? The miracle of the creation of the universe is that a Being, that is pure act, creates entities inherently in potency to their act of being. Furthermore, primary matter being a constancy in change one can argue that the memory of what it is to be human also provides such constancy.

²⁹ Boris Bobrinsky, *The Mystery of the Trinity Trinitarian Experience and Vision in the Biblical and Patristic Tradition*, trans. Anthony P. Gythiel (Crestwood, New York, USA: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1999), 122.

³⁰ Gregory Doolan, *Aquinas on the Divine Ideas as Exemplar Causes*. (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2008).

Gentiles, De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas, Quaestiones disputatae, De Anima, De memoria et reminiscencia, Quaestiones disputatae veritate which are employed sparingly to provide me with deeper insights.

I concentrate on two sections of the *Summa theologiae*. The first concerns Thomas's *Treatise on Man*³¹ questions 75 to 89. The particular questions relative to the thesis are: Q. 75, *Of Man, Who is Composed of a Spiritual and a Corporeal Substance; and First, What Pertains to the Essence of the Soul*; Q. 76, *Of the Union of Body and Soul*; Q. 77, *Of the Things which Belong to Powers of the Soul in General*; Q. 78, *Of the Powers of the Soul in Particular*; Q. 79, *Of the Soul's Intellective Powers*; Q. 82, *Of the Will*; Q. 84, *How the Soul While United to a Body Understands Corporeal Things Beneath It*, and, Q. 87, *How the Intellectual Soul Knows Itself and all within Itself*.

I gain much insight from Aquinas' *Treatise on the Incarnation, Summa theologiae* Ila IIIae. The particular questions employed are: Q. 2, *Of the Mode of Union of the Word Incarnate*; Q. 3 *Of the Mode of Union of the Of the Mode of Union on the Part of the Person Assuming*, Q. 4 *Of the Mode of Union On the Part of the Human Nature Assumed*, Q. 5 *Of the Manner of Union with Regards to the Parts of Human Nature*, Q. 7 *Of the Grace of Christ as an Individual Man*, Q. 9 *Of Christ's Knowledge in General*, Q. 10 *Of the Beatific Knowledge of Christ's Soul*, Q. 11 *Of the Knowledge Imprinted or Infused In the Soul of Christ*, Q. 13 *Of the Power of Christ's Soul*, Q. 15 *Of the Defects of Soul Assumed By Christ*, and Q. 17 *Of What Pertains to Christ's Unity from the Standpoint of Being*. I only reference Thomas' work in the *Summa theologiae* regarding the Incarnation and I have

³¹ I recognize that it is preferable to employ the more inclusive term 'human being' however in order to accurately refer to Thomas Aquinas' work's his notations are transcribed as he wrote them.

not developed the full structure as produced in Chapter 2 on the human soul. My intent here is not to continue Thomas' thinking. Instead I wish to develop my own philosophy based on the hypo-potency of the clothes of the skin of the animal worn by the ordinary human. I have considered employing Thomas' Incarnation treatises but this would change the form of my thesis from an ontological speculation into a dialectical oeuvre.

The literature cited reflects Thomas' impact on today's world of theology and philosophy. I explain my background reasoning and interpretations in the footnotes. I trust that you find reading my thesis to be an enjoyable journey.

CHAPTER 1 PROLEGOMENA TO A THEORY CONCERNING CHRIST'S HUMAN SOUL

The purpose of this section is to introduce of three contextual aspects of the thesis as it relates to the ancient and Scholastic thinkers. As such it is written to provide the reader a basic historical framework of the thesis' content intertwined with its metaphysics and a conceptualization of the metaphysical undertones.

The first aspect regards the controversies regarding the unity of being of the Second Person of the Trinity during the Apostolic and Patristic periods. The second provides an introduction to the metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas. The third provides the reader with a sense of the metaphysical issues that were prevalent during the thirteenth century Scholastic era.

The controversies regarding the unity of being of the Second Person of the Trinity commenced approximately 350 years after Plato introduced to the ancient world his creation philosophy and model of the human soul found in the *Timaeus* as developed in the philosophy of the Jewish theologian Philo of Alexandria (c. 20 BCE – 40 CE), also known as Judaeus Philo. Philo generated pivotal Platonically oriented commentaries to the biblical narratives which then form the foundation for dualist-type Christian thinking concerning the human soul's relation to its body.³²

³² David T. Runia, *Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato* (Leiden: The Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1986), 3. I start with Philo for several reasons. The first is his proximity to Jesus' earthly existence. The second is due to his influence on the early and later Christian thinkers. Philo introduced Platonic notions to Christian apologetics and exegesis. His writings on the Logos are attributed to have influenced the writing of the Gospel of John. Philo provides excellent exegesis regarding the Jewish term *eucharistia*, in other words 'to give thanks' as it relates to God and the cosmological aspect of creation, especially humanity. *Eucharistic Christology the unity between YAHWEH and humanity* (David T. Runia, "Philo in Early Christian Literature: A Survey" in *Compendia Rerum Iudaicarum as Novum Testamentum* Section III, ed. Y. Aschkenasy *et al.* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 78.). Thirdly, the dogma of Philo provides a foundation for future projects by the thesis' author.

“This mind, divine and immortal, is an additional and differentiating part of the human soul which animates man just like the souls of animals which are devoid of mind. The notion of God’s existence is thus imprinted in our mind that needs only some illumination to have a direct vision of God (*Abr.* 79-80; *Det.* 86-87; LA 1.38).”³³

The events surrounding the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ turned the Philonic harmony of pagan metaphysical distinctions of Creation and the soul, by the Demiurge, with the Pentateuch into a new play that fundamentally changed the way Christian thinkers consider humanity’s relation to God.³⁴

Philo is attributed with providing the foundation for the Christian understanding of the doctrine of the Logos as it applies to Jesus Christ, the Incarnated Son of God.³⁵ Philo’s fusion of Greek philosophy and Hebrew faith comprehends the *Logos* as distinct from

³³ *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (updated April 21, 2005), s.v. “Philo of Alexandria” by Marion Hillary. <http://www.iep.utm.edu/philo/> (accessed 11 July 2010).

³⁴ Andreas Schule, “Transformed into the Image of Christ: Identity, Personality, and Resurrection,” in *Resurrection, Theological and Scientific Assessments*, ed. Ted Peters, Robert John Russell, and Michael Welker, 224. (Michigan: WM. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2002). The notion of resurrection is complex, and is frequently biased through the culture inherent in one’s personal faith. Within this chapter Andreas Schule presents a notion of Wolfgang Pannenberg’s that “the problem of *identity* as the crucial issue of a theological account of resurrection.” The gist of the essay is that the concept of pre-resurrection-identity is divided into two camps. The first regards memory of the deceased that lives on in the community only. The second notion regards one’s identity that is not only immortalized in the community but also is retained in a separated and immortal soul. The thesis employs the latter distinction. The thesis presents an argument (Chapter 2) that the memory of what it is to be human (a *scaffold* that structures human nature) is posited in an eternal *suppositum* and that the memory of personal identity gained through life’s experiences are supra-imposed on the human scaffold and are retained for eternity as noted in *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 69. A8 “But as the intellectual act resides chiefly and formally in the intellect itself, whilst it resides materially and dispositively in the inferior powers, the same distinction is to be applied to habit. Knowledge, therefore, acquired in the present life does not remain in the separated soul, as regards what belongs to the sensitive powers; but as regards what belongs to the intellect itself, it must remain; because, as the Philosopher says (*De Long. et Brev. Vitae* ii), a form may be corrupted in two ways; first, directly, when corrupted by its contrary, as heat, by cold; and secondly, indirectly, when its subject is corrupted. Now it is evident that human knowledge is not corrupted through corruption of the subject, for the intellect is an incorruptible faculty”.

³⁵ *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (updated April 21, 2005), s.v. “Philo of Alexandria” by Marion Hillary. Available at: <http://www.iep.utm.edu/philo/> (accessed 11 July 2010).

God.³⁶ One may also surmise that the reading of Genesis 3:21 “*And the Lord God made garments of skins for the man and for his wife, and clothed them*” may be interpreted as a natural distinction between the human body and its soul that is not unique to Greek philosophy.³⁷

There are myriad philosophies that may be chosen to further one’s understanding of the human soul. The triptych of dualism, ideal monism and material monism is particularly relevant since the individual panels differ sufficiently to complicate our understanding of the manner in which the human soul of Christ moves towards the ordinary human soul. Philo’s illumination of the Pentateuch with Platonic philosophy initiated a dialogue that influenced the work of early Christian thinkers such as “Clement of Alexandria, Christian Apologists like Athenagoras, Theophilus, Justin Martyr, Tertullian³⁸, and Origen.”³⁹ Their dialogue centered on the two natures of Jesus Christ as God and man as one person.

³⁶ Aloys Grillmeier, S.J., *Christ in Christian Tradition: From Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451)* trans. John Bowden (Atlanta USA: John Knox Press, 1975), 30.

³⁷ The Platonic notion of the relation between the human body and soul is an extrinsic relation. The clothes of animal flesh for human beings is not the extrinsic distinction as considered by most, but is an added potency due to the separation of humanity from God. The separation necessitates a *haecceitic* individuation of the human composite which is absent in the human Christ.

³⁸ Jonathan Barnes, “Anima Christiana,” in *Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy*, ed. Dorothea Frede and Burkhard Reis, 448. (New York: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co., 2009). Jonathan Barnes picks apart Tertullian’s work *On the Soul*, written circa 210-213 CE, due to Tertullian’s lack of academic rigor. However, Tertullian argued that the soul is corporeal in its substance, which, at least with respect to its corporeality, resembles the Stoic view (he was not shy to employ pagan philosophies when it suited his needs even though he may have twisted them to suit his purpose). Many modern day philosophers and scientists who expound an atheist understanding of human nature also hold this same Tertullian understanding of the corporeity of the soul. Barnes also remarks that Tertullian’s work “is typical of early Christian philosophizing.” The point I am making here is that such work, and similar discourses by others, introduced a complex dialogue that complicated early Christian comprehension of the relation and substance of the human and Christ soul that continue to present day.

The five centuries after Christ's resurrection are marked with varying understandings of the unity of the *two Christ beings*⁴⁰ – the *sarx*, denoting the earthly Jesus, and the Logos, denoting the divine Word. The distinction initiated by Philo between the *sarx* and the Logos, although intended for another purpose, would divide the early church. Ignatius of Antioch (c. 50 – 98-117), an Apostolic Father, brings to light the tension regarding “the unity of the two kinds of beings in Christ, Logos and *sarx*.”⁴¹ Ignatius' apologetics foresaw the heretical divisions about to occupy the early church. Attempts by the Fathers of the Church, such as Athanasius, Irenaeus, Justin Martyr, Cyril of Alexandria, Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa and Augustine of Hippo (to name a few) to understand the relations of the Triune God, the Logos, the Logos-*sarx*, and the *sarx*, the Christ *flesh*, launched, in opposition, manifold philosophies and theologies from thinkers such as Apollinaris, Arius, Eutyches, and Nestorius (again to name a few). The tensions between these camps regarding the unity and distinction of the natures/person(s) of Jesus Christ as man and God shaped the agendas of Councils, Episcopates and Roman Emperors including the Council of Chalcedon (451) whereby the person of Jesus Christ defined as fully human and fully divine was formulated.⁴²

³⁹ *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (updated April 21, 2005), s.v. “Philo of Alexandria” by Marion Hillary. <http://www.iep.utm.edu/philo/> (accessed 12 May 2011).

⁴⁰ I am employing the term ‘two Christ beings’ in order to differentiate from the Chalcedon formula of two natures in on person. My intent is to show that metaphysically it is possible to demonstrate the union and intimate relation between the human Christ and the Word.

⁴¹ Aloys Grillmeier, S.J., *Christ in Christian Tradition: From Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451)* trans. John Bowden (Atlanta USA: John Knox Press, 1975), 87.

⁴² The Council of Chalcedon (451) controversies related to the manner in which the formalization of the distinction between the divine hypostasis and the human nature of the Second Person of the Trinity and the

Apollinaris, Arius and the authors of other heresies are placed to one side while I briefly touch upon the Nestorius heresy since it is more relevant to the arguments of the thesis and also to today's hermeneutics. I argue for a concept of the human body that if applied to Jesus *could* be confused with a Nestorian heresy. The relation between the present human body, conceived as the flesh of the animal (*cf.* Genesis 3:21), although claimed by Thomistic thinkers as Aristotelian in its unity to the soul, instead, *could* be construed in a dualist body-soul philosophical mode. Furthermore, many of today's Protestant faith traditions deny the notion of Mary as *Theotokos* which then introduces a Nestorian separation in the Incarnated Son between his divine and human natures. Finally, Aquinas cautions his readers against the subtle traps of employing analogies that unwittingly introduce such heresy.⁴³

Returning to Philo, David T. Runia unfolds a critical aspect of Philo's philosophy. According to Runia Philo pays considerable attention to "the relation between the *structure* of the cosmic soul and the nature of the heavenly movements."⁴⁴ Through Runia's research we apprehend that "man's reason is not so much a fragment of the cosmic soul, but rather, for those who follow Moses in their philosophizing, *an imprint of*

person of Jesus Christ was argued. Apollinaris argued for a soulless Christ while Nestorius argued for the lack of unity between Christ's two natures and so on.

⁴³ Nestorius is attributed with the notion that there is a separation between the two natures of Christ resulting in two persons which challenges the claims of the thesis. The key issues are that there are multiform avenues which unwittingly promote separation of natures. Aquinas for example brings forward the notion of the *habitus* or Christ assuming human nature as a garment and he shows that this concept is another form of the Nestorius heresy in *Summa theologiae* IIIa Q. 2. a6.

⁴⁴ David T. Runia, *Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato* (Leiden: The Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1986), 200.

the divine image, i.e. the Logos.”⁴⁵ (emphasis added) Runia continues to analyze Philo’s commentary on the *Timaeus* and Plato’s understanding of the divine Logos as “the cosmic soul being ‘stretched’ by the demiurge so that it completely envelops the cosmos’s body and at the same time wholly permeates it.”⁴⁶ Philo’s cosmic soul in this instance is uncharacteristically un-Platonic and, although a stretch arguably provides some ground for the thesis’s hypothesis that *creatio ex nihilo* and therefore the creation of the human soul is an intentional act,⁴⁷ which as such is a creative act stretching forth divinized through the Creator and mediated for humanity through the soulful act of the Logos.⁴⁸

Jean LaPorte furthers our understanding of the very early church via his treatise on Philo’s understanding of *Eucharistia* and its relation to the Christian Eucharist.⁴⁹ I mention

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 204. Although Philo nor others suggest that it is only Christ who is the imago Dei, the human soul of Jesus is the exemplar image through which all of humankind are imaged in the likeness of the Triune God. The Christ-soul, as the exemplar, allows for a particularly intimate unity between his human and divine natures while at the same time provides a degree of distancing which prevents all of humanity from being divinely incarnated. These concepts are more fully developed further in the thesis.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 204.

⁴⁷ I believe that the creation of the universe and the human soul are one act of the Creator. Can we envisage a scenario whereby the universe is created through the Word, but also with the human optic kept in mind? That is, the created universe is made through the lens of humanity, the human soul in order for the universe to have the properties benevolent to human life? “Hence the soul of Christ has a speculative knowledge of creation (for it knows how God creates), but it has no practical knowledge of this mode...” *ST IIIa Q. 13. A2, adversus 3*. In *ST Ia Q. 29. A2, respondeo* Aquinas teaches that “According to the Philosopher substance is spoken of in two ways. In one sense it means the *quiddity* of a thing; in this sense substance is called... essence. In another sense substance means a subject or *suppositum*, which subsists in the genus of substance. To this, taken in a general sense, can be applied a name expressive of an intention; and thus it is called the *suppositum*.” However, my reading of *creatio ex nihilo* is that it demonstrates Aquinas, as I am, an essentialist in philosophy. I make my case as follows. The case of the word *nihilo* is the Latin ablative case. The rationale for employing the ablative case is to define a movement from a source.

⁴⁸ The writing of Philo is the earliest reference to the Logos in Christological contexts that the author of the thesis could find and as such are foundational to understanding ancient Christ-centered theology and related philosophies.

⁴⁹ Jean LaPorte *Eucharistia in Philo* (Lewiston, New York: USA: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1983), 1.

Philo's work for two reasons; Philo provided the foundation for much of early Christian philosophy as founded on Jewish faith and Greek, primarily Platonic, philosophy, and, for articulating "the world's vocation of praise and thanksgiving."⁵⁰ Later in the thesis I develop a critical metaphysical entity, the principle of reciprocation, that although is independent of Philo's articulation nevertheless one can see through Philo's work the germination of such notions. I develop the principle of reciprocation in Chapter 3 as the acknowledgement, by the Second Person of the Trinity to his Father as his only begotten Son. Accordingly, the world's vocation of praise and thanksgiving is rooted in the Son's act of reciprocation.

The early Christian apologists grappled with their understanding of the human soul of Christ and its relation to the *sarx*, the flesh of his body. The Patristic dialogues concerning the *sarx*-Christ-soul unity bring into sharp relief ideas that fractured the early Church with each faction vying to impregnate the dogma of the Church with its particular understanding of the nature and relationships of the historical Christ as the *sarx*-Logos, particularly the degree of unity. The interpretations of such relations dominate the discourses of the Apostolic and Patristic thinkers who produced a multitude of ideas concerning the relation and nature of the human soul of Christ to his divine nature. From the beginning of the Council of Ephesus (431) to the Council of Chalcedon (451), we see a shift in emphasis from that of understanding and defining the human and divine

⁵⁰ *Ibid* 107.

expressions of Jesus, to “the *manner* of the union.”⁵¹ According to Aloys Grillmeier, Cyril of Alexandria promotes the unity of Christ while Nestorius the distinction, “without wishing to deny the unity.”⁵² The relation between the human body of Jesus and his soul is more intimately unified than that of the ordinary person which has implications regarding Jesus’ self-identity, the independence of his will and the unity it enjoys with the divine substance. The metaphysical methodology necessary to advance the logic of these relations was not available until the twelfth and thirteenth centuries when the Arabian translations and commentary of Aristotle’s work were discovered by Scholastic theologians. I have decided to employ the same metaphysical methodology in my thesis in order to provide a fresh view on the important elements concerning the relation between the human soul of Christ, as a truth-event in the creation of the human soul, and, his soul’s relation to his divine nature.

A predominant theme of the neo-Platonist Christian theologians was to secure a unity between the Christ as man and the Divine Christ in order to set the Chalcedon formula. The dualist philosophy would dominate Christian thinking until the arrival of the Scholastic theologians and philosophers such as Albert the Great, (c. 1193/1206 – 1280), Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, (c. 1265 – 1308) a Franciscan who leaned towards Plato in his philosophy, Henry of Ghent, (c. 1217 – 1293) Godfrey of Fontaines, (prior c. 1250 – c. 1306 – 1309) and Averroists such as Boethius of Dacia, (flourished in the 13th century) and Siger of Brabant (c. 1240 – post c. 1280).

⁵¹ Aloys Grillmeier, S.J., *Christ in Christian Tradition: From Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451)* trans. John Bowden (Atlanta USA: John Knox Press, 1975), 445.

⁵² *Ibid.*

Thomas Aquinas reconciled Aristotle's metaphysics with Christian faith and established a new means of analyzing and understanding Scripture through a metaphysical method that is grounded in Trinitarian dogma. My interest is in the metaphysical logic by which Thomas comprehends the origin and relations of human beings. As such, Thomas' thinking was nurtured by his contemporaries of Scholastic philosophy, or metaphysics, who were also keenly interested in the properties of *being qua being*; the conflict between individual and universal; the procession of the divine Persons, the unity or lack of unity between the two natures of Christ, and, the fundamental origin of humankind. These aforementioned interests are with us today and the underlying foundation of the thesis' subject matter also touches many of the same Scholastic queries. However, as convincing as many of the Scholastic theologians were, I prefer the metaphysical thought of the 13th century theologian Thomas Aquinas primarily due to his treatment of the human soul's relations and the rigor of his commentaries on the works of other thinkers.

The Aristotelian/Thomistic human soul is so structured that inherent in its being is the ability to form *unities*.⁵³ For example, the human soul and the matter of the body, termed 'signet-matter' by Aquinas, form a unity called the *hylomorphic* composite.⁵⁴ The

⁵³ I am playing on Aristotle's three classical unities, action, place and time which are also metaphysical elements.

⁵⁴ The term 'composite' finds its source in Aristotle and refers to the union between the human body and soul. The composite of body and soul may be loosely regarded as 'person'. The *composition* comes about by the human soul, which is the first act of being, *in-forming* human matter. The human soul is the forming principle of human matter and as such forms a unity which is the person. The unity of the soul to its signet matter is intrinsically ordered. In order for the soul to act on the matter of the body the body must be in potency to the act. In a sense it is a blank slate on which human existence is written. Aquinas and other Thomistic thinkers frequently employ the analogy of the seed which is in potential to a tree. Potency and act are modes of being. The seed is potentially a tree. A tree is a seed fully in act. If we reduce the notion of

inherent ability of the human soul to form unities is part of its formation as *imago Dei* which includes the interrelations and unity of the divine Persons of the Trinity. The Trinity forms relations amongst themselves only through unities since as such they exist with the same hypostasis. Since human beings are crafted in the *imago Dei*, I demonstrate the metaphysical steps required to show how the human soul forms its unifying relation. To more fully apprehend how the human soul forms its unifying relation I employ the notion of the human soul of Jesus Christ as the instrumental exemplar cause⁵⁵ elucidating Christ's causal act by employing the genre of ontological speculation.⁵⁶ Thomas Aquinas' methodology implies a foundation for the dogma of Trinitarian theology which is contrary to the notion of "individual". However, the Scholastic understanding of the individual, that is, a unit within a species, looms large in the arguments presented below.⁵⁷ The method

the seed further still we see that the seed is also potency, or primary matter, and act. At this most fundamental level the primary matter has the ability to contain all the potential of a tree and so for living beings, especially human beings, Thomas signifies such matter as signet-matter. Prior to the seed being formed by the parent tree, it is in potency to physical existence and therefore the parent tree inheres the principle of its vegetative soul.

⁵⁵ The metaphysical concept of the human soul of Jesus as the instrumental cause is complex and controversial. The foundation for this notion is more fully developed later in the thesis. For the time being the line of thought is as follows. It is the human soul of Christ that is the exemplar after which all other souls are made in the *imago Dei*. The human soul of Jesus Christ therefore is the instrumental cause of all human souls due to a particular principle of the human soul and that is the principle of reciprocation of personhood, which I claim is the proper mode of identity and individuation.

⁵⁶ Klaus Otte, "Speculative Theology," in *The Encyclopedia of Christianity* Vol. 5, 2008. "Ontological speculation sets ideal and material being in an original relationship and relates the subject of consciousness to its object." The thesis topic is the illumination of the ordinary human soul by the human soul of Jesus Christ and therefore fits neatly into Otte's *genre*. As well, the thesis is not purely metaphysically ordered. The metaphysics, as it was with Thomas Aquinas, supports the foundation of the theology of the thesis.

⁵⁷ R. P. Phillips, *Modern Thomistic Philosophy: An Explanation for Students* (Westminster, Maryland: The Newman Press, 1959) Vol. 1. 155. Phillips emphasizes that the notion of the individual is critical to one's understanding of Thomas Aquinas's metaphysical methodology and philosophy. Although Phillips' insights are taken from his 1959 published book, Chapter 12, this pertinent chapter 'The Individual' may be read from the following internet link: <http://www.logicmuseum.com/authors/other/phillips-individuation.htm>. I recommend reading this concise chapter as it will aid the reader to more fully understand the thesis's

by which I develop the metaphysical concept of an “essential unity” and the ensuing conclusions brings my arguments, that the relation between the ordinary human soul and its body is an imposed and improper relation, into tension with the various Scholastic understandings of human nature.⁵⁸

The Scholastic discussions that involve the notion of the individual are attempts to unpack the properties of an entity that may be similar to, or different from another entity of the same, or for that matter of a different species. In the thought of Thomas Aquinas the principle of individuation is the potency of matter and its relation to the soul as the forming principle. From a biblical and metaphysical view, as will be seen later in the thesis, I employ an understanding of the fallen human being that stretches Thomas Aquinas’ teaching on the subject.⁵⁹

Thomas teaches that the proper object of the human intellect and therefore the soul, that is, what the human soul naturally tends towards, is “the quiddity or nature

arguments. The Scholastic notion of ‘individual’ or ‘individuation’ is explored in Chapter 1 to set the terms of the ordinary human soul that forms a *determinate* individual, that is, a composite extended in space-time. The thesis concludes, in Chapter 3, with a startling metaphysical twist that the human soul of Christ contains a property (“... person adds to hypostasis something in which the union can take place, this something is nothing else than a property pertaining to dignity” (*Summa theologiae* IIIa Q2. A3) that builds a relation between his soul and glorified body of *un-terminated* dimensions.

⁵⁸ An issue that is critical to my line of argument regards the definition of an essential unity? I define an essential unity as that which as a *hylomorphic* composite, of form and matter, forms a self-sustaining entity. Therefore Michelangelo’s marble statue of David is an essential unity. A dog composed of animal soul and matter is an essential unity. However I claim that the ordinary human person is not a visibly apparent essential unity. The clothes of animal flesh imposed by God at the separation of humanity from divine presence in Genesis 3:21 necessarily impedes, or hides the ordinary human souls forming ability to form an essential unity. In other words the animal flesh of the ordinary human is the potency implied by original sin.

⁵⁹ Briefly, original sin is signified through the narrative found in Genesis 3:21 and apprehends the “garments of skins” metaphysically as Aristotelian potency and theologically as separation from God. These notions are further developed in the thesis.

existing in corporeal matter.”⁶⁰ Thomas also teaches that “In the present state of life in which the soul is united to a passable body, it is impossible for our intellect to understand anything actually except by turning to the phantasms.”⁶¹ Duns Scotus agrees:

“Our intellect understands in this present state only things whose species are displayed in the phantasm. This is so either because of the punishment of original sin, or because of a natural correspondence in operation between the soul’s powers, in virtue of which we see that a higher power operates on the same thing that a lower power operates on.”⁶²

Scotus presents an opportunity at this point for a peek into the latter sections of the thesis. I claim, along with Duns Scotus, that the imposition of the clothes of the skin of the animal prevents the human soul from its proper object as a consequence of original sin. In other words the human soul suffers an added potency that prevents the human soul to fully actualize the human composite which is absent in the historical Jesus.⁶³ According to Aquinas the acquisition of knowledge by the ordinary human being is through the phantasms which link the material aspect of the mind, the brain, with the immaterial aspect of the mind, the soul. Ordinary human knowledge is acquired through sensory perception. The earthly Jesus did not acquire knowledge uniquely through the phantasms. Through Adam humanity chose to acquire knowledge through the tree of knowledge of good and evil. Jesus did not. “*Where did this man get this wisdom and these deeds of*

⁶⁰ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 84. A7, respondeo.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² Robert Pasnau, “Cognition,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus*, ed. Thomas Williams, 295 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

⁶³ The thought that Jesus Christ being fully human by wearing the same fleshy clothes of the ordinary human would amount to a Nestorian type heresy and therefore is rejected by the thesis.

power?” (Matthew 13:54) Jesus’ acquisition of knowledge is through his heavenly Father. Metaphysically the mode by which Jesus acquires knowledge is crucial to understanding his independence from his unity with his divine nature without falling into the popular heresies of Nestorianism or contrarily Apollinarianism. Furthermore I argue for the notion that all relations enjoyed by the pre-lapsarian humans were with and through their Father-Creator and as such enjoyed the same knowledge acquisition venue as Jesus. The sinless human being did not relate with the world and each other through the power of God, nor his essence, but in a sense through his *eyes*.⁶⁴ As such sinless humanity was endowed with a gift of clarity that enabled the human rational soul to fully actualize the human *esse* as “the perfection of perfections.”⁶⁵ However such is not the situation with ordinary human beings who, through Adam, choose the perceptive-sensory path of the tree of knowledge of good and evil. On the surface it seems the perceptive-sensory path of knowledge acquisition allows the ordinary human soul to follow a sub-energetic venue (*esse naturale*) as opposed to the energetic venue (*esse intentionale*) of God.

According to Aquinas and Scotus, the ordinary human soul functions to the lowest common denominator which in Scholastic terms refers to the present state of the human composite, the powers of the soul, which operate the body, do so by employing the least *energetic* powers. I contend that the Scholastic interpretation is a *mirage*. Whether it is a higher or lower power employed by the human soul to enact a bodily operation, the human soul is impotent to offset the separation from God caused by original sin. The

⁶⁴ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q.14. A1, *adversus* 1. “Hence knowledge is not a quality in God, nor a habit, but substance and pure act.”

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, Ia Q. 4. A1, *adversus* 3.

potency of separation is not an added privation to the human soul but rather an added potency to human matter. *The notion of added potency or hypo-potency of matter*⁶⁶ in its relation to the human soul is crucial to understanding the mode in which I employ the Aristotelian-Thomistic hylemorphic philosophy. In these instances therefore, *hypo-potency human matter*, which is joined to the soul in the act of creating the ordinary human person, as such does not allow human matter to strictly obey the ordinary soul. The soul's impotence to overcome God's imposition of the clothes of the skin of the animal therefore requires the unique mode of sensory perception for the human soul to identify and individuate itself which implies a dominance of the human body over the soul. The ordinary human being therefore has put on the *animality* of the animals that were to be dominated.⁶⁷ The shift in consciousness or reality for the human soul therefore is from a mode regarding the *esse intentionale* realm to the *esse naturale* realm. In other words the shift entails the means by which the human person distinguishes or individuates her/himself.

The common Thomistic metaphysical understanding of individuation concerns the relation between the soul and body. This relation defines how the human composite is individuated or, from a modern perspective, how the person achieves self-identity. In this understanding, the body's corporeal senses control that which the human soul apprehends. Yes, the present human body functions as described by Thomas Aquinas and

⁶⁶ I employ hypo-potency as an increased potency since increasing negative quantities is more negation and the term *hypo-* signifies 'sub-'.

⁶⁷ I employ the term 'dominated' in a charitable fashion in that the Latin root is from *dominus, domini* which implies to command which therefore requires a responsibility 'to care for'.

Duns Scotus; however, such was not always the case. The original human persons did not acquire knowledge solely through the matter of the ordinary human body since it is not the proper object of the human soul. “for God created us for incorruption, (*sic*) and made us in the image of his own eternity.” (Wisdom of Solomon 2:23) We were made to dominate matter, not to be dominated by it. Bluntly put, the human soul’s proper object, which brings with it questions regarding individual identity and awareness, and, at the same time its ability to know the universality of being (*ens*),⁶⁸ is to know immaterial entities such as God, angels and human souls. The aims of such a complex metaphysical analysis of the ordinary human soul therefore must be coherent and comprehensive. In Chapter 2, I concentrate on the Thomas Aquinas’ treatise on human nature as it concerns the body/soul relation.

Chapter 2 commences with an understanding of how Thomas Aquinas views the ordinary human soul and its relations. Following Aquinas’ teaching is a difficult and tedious journey and prone to varying interpretations. The first leg retraces the pertinent questions of the *Summa theologiae* emphasizing the relation between the soul’s act of being and its *esse* as it relates to truth, and the potency of *signet-matter*. The second leg requires that we travel back to the source of the soul’s origin, that is, “...human nature began to be in an eternally pre-existing *suppositum* of the Divine Nature.”⁶⁹ We then

⁶⁸ The term ‘universal’ employed here is contingent on the degree of perfection. The more inadequate an intellect is the less it can apprehend and comprehend concepts (universals) and therefore must rely on individual examples. Because *fallen* human beings perceive through the senses, the ability to be aware of the universal is limited. The thesis places awareness of the human soul by another in the latter category. The sinless soul of Christ, however, is aware of another’s soulful condition. For more on this topic the reader is referred to the *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 89. A1.

⁶⁹ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* IIIa Q. 16. A6, *ad* 1.

climb our way up to the creation of the human person as found in Genesis 1:26, 27 and 3:21 respectively, and then we slide down the rocky and twisting path through the darkness of humanity's first sin. Finally, we crawl through the maze of the metaphysical consequences to human nature of original sin.

In order to comprehend the metaphysical construction and nature of the human soul involves however the dismantling of two metaphysical barriers. Dismantling the first barrier provides the reader with the metaphysical apprehension of the ordinary human soul's relation with the extra-mental realm as understood by Thomas Aquinas. The second dismantling sheds light on the metaphysical impact original sin holds over the ordinary human soul and by extension over the ordinary human person. Overcoming the second barrier prepares the reader for Chapter 3 in which the metaphysical category of relation, as it pertains to the intimacy within the Divine Persons, is developed as a model for the human soul of Christ to illuminate the ordinary human soul.

A metaphysical understanding of the ordinary human soul is critical to the coherence and comprehension of the thesis. In Chapter 2 I rely on several ancient and Scholastic metaphysical concepts of the ordinary human soul by comparing the Thomas ordinary human soul with the thesis' interpretation and construction of what is arguably the *proper nature* of the human soul. I take the position that the proper human body is exemplified in the pre-resurrected and sinless *Adamic* person of Jesus Christ. As such, I favour Aquinas' claim that Adam was created with "a supernatural endowment of

grace”⁷⁰ (emphasis added) *cf.*, Genesis 1. My own sense is that humanity, as supernaturally endowed *of* grace is more intimately related to the Trinity than mere participation in the divine Being. My aim in Chapter 2 is to bring us to the realization of what humanity has lost through original sin and metaphysically re-construct the human soul along the priestly prayer of Jesus. (John 17:12-26)

We shall see in Chapter 3 that the divine endowment of grace in the creation of the human soul infuses a special kinship⁷¹ with the Divine. As such, I claim that human souls are created to be endowed of grace. Specifically, the human soul, as the human composite’s forming principle, inheres kinship with the Divine as part of the soul’s very essence.

Chapter 3 is a systematic depiction of the divine relationship of Father and Son and the reception of God the Father’s gift of generation by the Son and his reciprocating acknowledgment as Son.⁷² Chapter 3 also unpacks a metaphysical understanding of the generation, reception and reciprocation between Father and Son which is necessary to apprehend the relation between the human soul, endowed of grace, and the Triune God through the causal exemplar illumination by the Son. Furthermore, unpacking the relation between the divine and human natures inherent in the person of the Incarnated Word

⁷⁰ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 95. A1, *respondeo*.

⁷¹ Lawrence Dewan, O.P. *St. Thomas and Form as Something Divine in Things* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2007), 39

⁷² The thesis employs the notion of the Holy Spirit as the Bearer of Gifts between the Son and Father, which are the Gifts of Reception and Reciprocation which is developed in Chapter 3.

provides some appreciation to my arguments for a new understanding of the human soul which is based on a unique principle inherent in the human soul of Christ.

“Divine Nature is said to be incarnate because “It is united to flesh personally,” and not that It is changed into the nature of flesh [...] its [flesh] *natural* properties remaining.”⁷³ [emphasis added]

The unicity between the divine and human natures is not without controversy. Richard Cross unleashes a serious apologetic regarding the metaphysical contortions the Schoolmen contrived, starting with Thomas Aquinas and finishing with Duns Scotus to comprehend the divine-human union.⁷⁴ I interpret Richard Cross’ reading of Thomas’ and Scotus’ metaphysical arguments as leaning towards Aquinas. I also rely primarily on Thomas’ teachings but with some enlightenment from Scotus.

Following the notions presented in the previous paragraphs, the atypical nature of how I understand the human soul’s nature and its relations, reside in how I understand the composition of the human body and soul. I claim that the *distinction* between body and soul is as potency is to act, and therefore I do not subscribe to the Platonic notion that the body is in an extrinsic relation to the soul. Furthermore I contend that Aristotle’s *hylomorphic* pattern of form and matter is the proper mode of understanding the relation between the human body and soul.

The Schoolmen who followed the Aristotelian-Thomistic *hylomorphic* philosophy maintained that the main operational power of the human soul functions to obtain

⁷³ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* IIIa Q. 2. A 1, *ad* 3.

⁷⁴ Richard Cross, *The Metaphysics of the Incarnation Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus* (Oxford University Press: Oxford UK, 2002). Cross for the most part agrees with the metaphysics of Aquinas. Furthermore the thesis is following much of the conclusions of Cross.

sensible knowledge and form it into concepts called *intelligible species* which then can be manipulated through the *agent intellect* (the will) or stored in the *passive intellect* (memory). Though I am not in complete disagreement with the Scholastic mode of cognition, based on my interpretation of Jesus earthly role, the seemingly divine attributes inherent in saintly souls, I suggest that a prior and primitive function of the ordinary human soul is the awareness of the truth-knowledge inherent in another human being's soul.⁷⁵ The human soul's inherent yet unavailable ability to be aware of another is not the same operation as that which is required to acquire sensible knowledge; such sensible knowledge is acquired through the tree of knowledge of good and evil. To know truth absolutely through the senses is not possible since ordinary human knowledge acquisition is incomplete, acquired in the past and distorted by these very same human senses. This notion, which is based on the work of Aristotle, is summarized by St. Augustine of Hippo. "[P]ure (*sincera*) truth shouldn't be sought from the bodily senses." Augustine's work is analyzed in a treatise written by Henry of Ghent.⁷⁶ Ghent's treatise suggests that all of the Scholastic masters from St. Bonaventure (1217-1274) to the successors of Henry of Ghent adhered to this concept. Further to this rationale, Augustine also argued that the ordinary human soul only knows the image of the other which is

⁷⁵ An important aspect or use of the notion of 'truth-knowledge' with regards to its employment in the thesis is how one's soul may recognize or apprehend or be aware of, the identity, the *esse* and *essentia* of another human soul.

⁷⁶ Henry of Ghent, "Can a Human Being Know Anything without Divine Illumination?" in *The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts* Vol. 3, ed. Robert Pasnau, 94-95 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Sensory acquired truth contains an infinite series of regressions which inherently contain error. Regardless of the temporal accuracy of a truth-event, it cannot be measured with enough precision to ascertain the absoluteness of its truth-event.

congruent to Philo's assertion that man's reason is an imprint of the divine image.⁷⁷ In other words, the ordinary human soul perceives only an image of the true human person and is unable to be aware of its fullness of being. How could the human soul of Jesus Christ perceive physical and spiritual realities? Is the human soul of Jesus similar in construction to the ordinary human soul? What is the distinction between the Christ-soul, pre-resurrection, and the ordinary human soul that allowed Jesus to perform miracles seemingly at will?

Scholastic thinkers constructed a difference in the relation between the ordinary human soul and its body, and the Christ-soul and its corporeal body. Such a rationale suggests a distinction in *type* regarding the *corpus Christi* and the ordinary human body. I claim such a distinction exists. Because of his sinless nature Jesus' earthly body was not confined by the clothes of the skin of the animal (Genesis 3:21) which I claim is an added potency, a negation to the ordinary human body-soul composite. The added potency causes a distinction of personhood that conflicts with the biblical record of *imago Dei*. (Genesis 1:26, 27)

The concept of personhood amongst the Schoolmen concerns the relation between the living human body, which is perceived as an individual, and its imperceptible human soul (mind) that conceptualizes in a universal type mode. Notably the most famous theologian of the Scholastic era, Thomas Aquinas, taught that

“... the proper object of the human intellect, which is united to a body, is a *quiddity* or nature existing in corporeal matter, and through such nature of visible things it rises even to some knowledge of things invisible. Now it belongs

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 95.

to such a nature to exist in an individual, and this cannot be apart from corporal matter.”⁷⁸

In the same article of the *Summa theologiae*, Thomas claims that the human intellect is midway between the sensitive soul, that which allows human beings to perceive the natural world, and the intellect of the angels who perceive the immaterial and the material world immaterially – “the human intellect holds a middle place”.⁷⁹ Thomas also teaches in article 7 that human nature exists in corporeal matter.⁸⁰

The Scholastics conceptualized the matter of the body as potency that is reduced into actuality by the human soul. Thomas also teaches that the human intellect holds a middle place between brute animals and the angels in composition and intellect. However, and I put this forward to demonstrate the direction of the thesis, humanity was created as the *steward* of the natural (*esse naturale*) universe. Considering humanity’s stewardship and the Divine Second Person of the Trinity’s union with humanity through his Incarnation, one would consider that the proper human soul⁸¹ is somewhat more

⁷⁸ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 84. A7, *respondeo*.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ Thomas Aquinas and all Scholastics including modern day Thomistic thinkers view *matter* as that which individuates, and that the human soul knows the created world through the *phantasms*. Human matter is that which perceives the natural world and therefore according to my argument there is potency imbedded in human perception. Designated matter is another but conveys more accurately the Thomistic term for *human matter* through which human beings perceive in the sensible world but also limits the act of the form. The human body further limits the forming act of the human soul due to the skin of the animal given to humanity in Genesis 3:21 imparted by God after the fall. The human body increases the potency of the pre-lapsarian human matter and therefore the human soul is unable to overcome this added potency. Although perhaps controversial, one could interpret John 9: 1-41 as Jesus *signifying* through the potency of mud his dominance over both created matter and the sightlessness of human perception which is analogous to humanity’s inability to see Truth/awareness. This argument is developed later in the thesis. The term ‘brute’ is Aristotle’s name for non-rational desire.

⁸¹ For ease of reference the thesis will employ the term ‘proper human soul’ as univocal to the original Adamic soul and except for the union with divine essence, enjoys common attributes with the human soul of Jesus Christ.

dynamic than midway between brutes and angels. Brute animals cannot offend God because of the absence of free-will, and the angels have chosen not to offend. Furthermore, humanity has been given a second chance but not through the immediate return to the pre-fallen human body.

Humanity's second chance carries with it the unenviable distinction of an *epi-union* with the brutes.⁸² Employing Philo's thinking the epi-union of soul to body is nothing more than the dualist notion of separated states of being whereby the matter of the body is that which will be discarded at death and thusly free the human soul. Or, one may surmise the body-soul epi-union as humanity's divinely imposed garment of the animal skin and therefore argue that the same state existed with the body and soul of the earthly Jesus. Such an attribution of separated matter in relation to the Christ-soul is certainly a Nestorian-based heresy. In contrast to the dualist-type heresy, Thomas Aquinas finds the source of his philosophy from the thought of Aristotle that is grounded in a unity between body and soul which, for the ordinary human, the garment of animal skin. Instead of this specific Aristotelian-Thomistic *hylomorphic* union I ground my thesis in the concept that ordinary human beings have a bipartite *hylomorphic* union; body, soul but also a negation, an added potency, which is the garment of the skin of the animal.

⁸² I employ the term 'epi-union' to denote the additional potency, a potency that *floats* above the natural human potency which is received at humanity's act of creation, of the clothes of the skin of the animal that habits humanity after the fall. (Genesis 3:21) Clothes by design 'float' above the person wearing them and although depict the shape (the form) of the person are not inherently natural to the person and hinder one's perception of the enrobed being. I take the term epi-union from the scientific term 'epi-genetic' that refers to an enzyme or genetic peptide that 'floats' above the gene that performs the expression of its nature and varies its function.

The Aristotelian *hylomorphism* of Thomas Aquinas finds its expression in a particularly critical facet of Aristotle's teaching. Contrary to Plato, who separated the divine Idea, the perfect form from matter, Aristotle envisaged matter participating in the divine form. Thomas encapsulates for us his thinking on Aristotle's insight:

"... form is something divine and best, as object of appetite. It is divine, because every form is something of a participation by likeness if the divine act of being '*divini esse*' which 'divine act of being' is pure act: for, each thing just to this extent is actually '*est in actu*', that is, inasmuch as it *has form*. It is something best, because act is the act of perfection of potency and good ..." ⁸³

In order to maintain the Aristotelian unity of being, Thomas crafted his treatises on humanity as though it is the proper state of humanity's being which is contrary to my interpretation. From my analysis of Genesis 3:21 I conclude that the human soul-body relation suffers the additional potency of the clothes of the skin of the animal. In other words, the epi-union of the clothes of the animal, the brute, distorts the image of humanity.⁸⁴ Contrary to my thinking Aquinas treats the present state of the human body as its proper state. In my view the added potency, which may also be understood as a further distancing from God, necessitates the human soul to acquire assistance from matter to individuate itself. Aquinas believed that it is natural for the human soul to be individuated by its matter. In tension with Aquinas I claim that the original human soul, having a higher degree of governance over the body, would not have relied solely on the relation with the body for identity nor to individuate itself since "the body was entirely

⁸³ Lawrence Dewan, O.P. *St. Thomas and Form as Something Divine in Things* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press 2007) 12, citing Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 1.15 (7 [135]).

⁸⁴ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 94. A2 "a corruptible body that" is a load upon the soul," as is written [in] Wisdom 9:15" refers neatly to the thesis' argument of added potency.

subject to the soul.”⁸⁵ Therefore the supra-imposed potency forces the human soul to enact a mode of actualization for which it was not formed to enact perfectly. Instead, the original individuation mode of the human soul is through the act of the will, an act of intentionality, which is of the same ontological construction as the act of creation by the Creator, since human beings are created in the image and likeness of God. Genesis 1:26, 27.

“On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xi, 4,8,9) that “the intention of the will unites the sight to the object seen; and the images retained in the memory, to the penetrating gaze of the soul's inner thought.” Therefore intention is an act of the will.”⁸⁶

By extending Augustine’s scheme to Jesus’ sinless human soul we are in a better position apprehend the nature of humanity. For such an apprehension we must determine the *type* of relation the human soul of Christ engenders with being, unity, and truth, and, with the ordinary human soul.

Thomas Aquinas teaches that the nature of the human soul of the pre-lapsarian humans is not dissimilar than the soul of present day humans. We see from Genesis 1 that the initial relation between human beings and the Creator was meant to be a long-term stewardship of the Creator’s physical creation which includes immaterial modes of communication. With humanity’s fall from grace the ordinary human soul acquires knowledge through the senses. In its fallen condition, the ability of the human soul to

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, *respondeo*.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, Ia-IIae Q. 12. A1, *sed contra*. Although Thomas is referring to human beings in this passage, an analysis of Thomas’ reading of Augustine of Hippo’s insight into intentionality provides a solid foundation for the thesis’ argument that the creative acts of God are intentional in their construction. Furthermore one can, without difficulty, apprehend the relations inherent in the act of intentionality.

perceive truth is curtailed. The human soul is separated from God in a manner that reduces the soul's ability to be absolutely aware of not only itself, and, the souls of other human beings, but of separated substances as well.⁸⁷ Therefore humanity's proper state of being is univocal with the human nature of the pre-resurrected Jesus Christ. Jesus' human soul did not suffer the overburden of the potency of the flesh of the animal. In fact Jesus' human soul enjoys priority through its unity with his divine nature. As we shall see in Chapter 3, since Jesus did not taste of the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, his knowledge acquisition process does not follow the same operating principle as the ordinary human soul. In other words, the human soul of the earthly Jesus was not subject to the errors inherent in the ordinary human sensory perception process. The earthly Jesus acquired his knowledge of the world through the divine or intentional mode of knowledge. Jesus acquired such knowledge through the eyes of his Father:

"I answer that, In God there exists the most perfect knowledge. ... the intelligent being is naturally adapted to have also the form of some other thing; *for the idea of the thing known is in the knower*. [...] Since therefore God is in the highest degree of immateriality as stated above (Q[7], A[1]), it follows that He occupies the highest place in knowledge."⁸⁸ (emphasis added)

Understanding the metaphysical differences between the ordinary human soul and the Christ soul may resolve the dichotomy of the two soul's knowledge acquisition processes and therefore provide the illumination of the ordinary human soul I seek. Let us recap the preceding entailment.

⁸⁷ Separated substances are subsistent spiritual entities such as angels, the human soul no longer in union with the body. Although some may consider that God is a separated substance the thesis does not for the simple reason that God's very Being is His Existence.

⁸⁸ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 14. A1, *respondeo*.

Thomas and other Schoolmen studied the human person in its present fallen state as the *proper mode of being*.⁸⁹ In tension with this understanding, I maintain that humanity's proper mode of being is a union of the sinless human soul and its designated matter which enjoys attributes that have not been nullified by the ordinary human soul's fall from Grace. The degrading potency of the epi-union of the clothes of the animal skin imposed by God prior to humanity's expulsion from the Garden, causes a diminution of the soul's powers due to the *epi-layer* of potency, and not from a degradation of the soul's inherent principles and powers. Humanity's animal-skin garment prevents the proper and full reduction of the potency of matter which was to be more fully actualized in the fullness of the *imago Dei*. In a similar but more adventurous vein, I claim that the relation between the human soul of Jesus necessitates an absolute *awareness* of the souls of whom he ministered during his earthly presence since he did not suffer the distancing potency of the clothes of animal skin.⁹⁰

⁸⁹ I refer to the term 'mode of being' as the degree of potency inherent in the human matter. The prefix 'epi-' denotes an added potency or lack of actualization by the human soul. The individuating principle of *haecceitism* as understood by Aquinas and championed by Duns Scotus, is the manifestation of the added degree of potency. This notion of degreeable (*sic*) potency seems to be at odds with the Thomist theologian Lawrence Dewan, O. P. and in agreement with his mentor Etienne Gilson. The thesis is congruent with Dewan's view in that the human soul inheres only one *hylemorphic* unity which is with the originally created human beings. I take the biblical description of the clothes of the skin of the animal to be foreign to true nature.

⁹⁰ To emphasize, the animal skin is analogous to the distancing of the human soul from God. If one regards creation as an ontological continuum, with pure potency (primary matter) on the left and angels on the right, the human condition was shifted at the fall from being more on the left side of this continuum to being more on the right. We read in Genesis 2:7 "... the LORD GOD formed man from the dust of the ground..." which can be analogically interpreted as being formed by the same matter-foundation as the totality of the earth itself which in metaphysical terms is fully actualized. I conclude therefore in this creation mode the matter-foundation of humanity is a perfected substance that completely yields to the forming act of the human soul.

Thomas asserts that the main purpose of the human intellect is to know or understand that which human beings sense. However, Jesus was quite able to acquire knowledge of the things invisible, such as the state of the soul of the Samaritan woman. What are the attributes of his human soul that provided such awareness? Contrary to Jesus' human soul being the primary actor, most would propose that the divine Second Person commands Jesus' *act of being aware* by communicating His commands to the passive human nature of Jesus. Rather, I take the stand that Jesus' soul functions in an active mode of intra-soul awareness. The act-of-being-aware is the normal or proper actualization attribute of not only Jesus' human soul, but is an attribute of all human souls. The difference being that human souls subjected to the consequences of original sin are entombed in the garment of the skin of the animal thus voiding the ability of being aware of spiritual beings. The act-of-being-aware, such as Jesus' ability to be absolutely aware of his or other human souls, necessitates a special relation with the Trinity. In contrast to the ordinary human composite, which is individuated through the relation of body and soul, the human soul of Christ is, by necessity, in a formal relation with the Trinity and, is in a *causal* exemplar relation with the ordinary human soul.⁹¹ I claim that the human soul of Christ is the instrumental cause of the *exemplar* metaphysical

⁹¹ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, Ia Q. 14. A8. "On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xv), "Not because they are, does God know all creatures spiritual and temporal, but because He knows them, therefore they are." We can apprehend from St. Augustine's teaching, which St. Thomas agrees with, that God employs his intellect to create. What is important to the theme of the thesis is that there is a priority of events. The knowledge of 'what it is to be human' lies within God's intellect. This knowledge once united with his will creates the essential unity called a human being. However, as will be shown further in the thesis, there is a principle that is primary to the Divine Son and that is the principle of *reciprocating love*. It is the principle of reciprocation that forms essential unities between beings that are fully in act and it is the Son Who is primary in the reciprocating principle as the causal exemplar for humanity to reciprocate the act of love of being created. I demonstrate in Chapter 3 that it is the human nature of Jesus that is the instrumental cause of reciprocation in the human soul.

operation that allowed the human soul of Christ to be fully aware of the soul of another with the Son being the *primary exemplar cause*,⁹² not in a direct hand-to-instrument fashion, but, in a general-to-specific mode. The reciprocating and exemplar relations employed by Christ are unpacked in Chapter 3.⁹³ We will see, starting in Chapter 2, the mode of cognition of the ordinary human soul by unpacking the Schoolmen's understanding of cognition theory as is clearly expounded by Thomas Aquinas and compared to the thesis's hypothesis of the additional potency imputed to the human soul at the fall.

The Metaphysical Construction Blocks of the Thesis

The main arguments of the thesis are sufficiently complex that they require a skeletal frame onto which to grow the flesh of the thesis. Therefore, this section provides the reader with an overview of the metaphysical chromosomes that I employ to construct the thesis' ontological speculative aspects. This section consists of five parts that do not necessarily follow a logical sequence as they are intertwined to the extent that if one part of the frame is missing the whole skeletal foundation becomes incoherent.

⁹² Hart, Charles A. *Thomistic Metaphysics: An Inquiry into the Act of Existing* (Englewood Cliffs N. J. Prentice-Hall: 1959), 321. Citing Aquinas from *De Veritate*, q. 3, a.1: "Aquinas defines exemplar cause as a *form (idea) in imitation of which* something comes into being from the intention of the agent that determines its end for itself."

⁹³ Gregory Doolan, *Aquinas on the Divine Ideas as Exemplar Causes* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2008), 2. Gregory Doolan determines that a critical theme of exemplarism is the notion of similitude between the origin of the created being and the degree of likeness of the image to which the created being enjoys. According to Doolan Aquinas states that proper exemplarism is that it acts as a principle. Therefore the first exemplar is the principle by which the images are made, as in several photographic prints of the same negative. The prints are images and not exemplars. Therefore there is only one exemplar for one idea. The critical element for the thesis is that the human soul of Jesus Christ is the exemplar of the divine Son, and for the believing Christian, the ordinary human soul is an image of the Christ-soul.

Firstly, I introduce the reader to the grounding pillars of metaphysics regarding the inter- and intra-relations of simple and composite rationale beings. I also introduce the reader to the origin of the human rational soul and the rational human composite. An overall theme of the first part of this section is the unicity of the relations and their degrees of reality. Essentially Thomas Aquinas defines reality as the degree to which a thing can be distinct. I formulate metaphysical construction blocks that prepares the reader to appreciate the mode by which the human soul participates in its own act of being and therefore its relation with its Creator.

Secondly, I present the mode of intertwined relations of the intentional and natural realm whereby simple and composite beings exist. The apprehension of the intentional and natural realm of existence provides the means for the reader to discover the notions of distinction, individuation and personhood. I follow the Aristotelian-Thomistic teaching that the human soul is the principle of the first act of being and therefore has specific relations both in the created realm, the realm of corporeality, which requires the employment of perception to gain knowledge and to be aware of one's surroundings, and, the spiritual realm, which requires *apperceptive*⁹⁴ relations. These

⁹⁴ Immanuel Kant expressed the notion of *transcendental apperception* which makes experience possible and it is where the mind and the world come together which is not unlike Franz Brentano's concept of intentional inexistence. However, the thesis employs the term 'apperception' as not employing the perceptive senses as one would use the word *apolitical* to denote *non political* but as "fully conscious perception: *an immediate apperception of a unity lying beyond*" (Oxford Dictionary, Ninth Edition, 59) that in this instance is NOT employing the senses. Furthermore the above-mentioned quotation from Paul's Letter to the Ephesians 1:17, the 'spirit of perception' may be interpreted as *apperceptive awareness*, or to borrow from Kant, a *transcendental apperception* of a different order. Apperceptive awareness which, with regards to the human soul of Christ, is that property that allows his human soul to be fully and directly aware of the ordinary human soul. It is the apperceptive operation that explains Jesus' ability to be aware of the condition of the soul of the Samaritan woman. (John 4:18) This critical aspect is more fully developed in Chapter 3.

realities in Thomism, which are linked in the human mind and are extensions of the first two, is *esse naturale*, the world to be perceived and its partner *esse intentionale*, the realm of the mind that perceives the world. The unicity of these metaphysical realities and substances with regards to the human composite do not enjoy the same ‘oneness’ or harmony as the human nature of Jesus Christ. Therefore I examine the degree of distinction in the third section in order to appreciate the metaphysical substratum supporting these concepts.

Thirdly, I analyze the intentional and real modes of distinction. Specifically I compare the realities of the mind with the realities of the brain. Here I bring together the seemingly diverse metaphysical construction blocks to better understand the human soul’s relations and modes of reality. I employ the modern terms *de re* and *de dictum* modes of reality to demonstrate the separation between the intentional and natural realms of existence.⁹⁵ I also introduce the notion of the unifying relations inherent in the Christ soul which is consistent with his divine nature and is imaged into the ordinary human soul at its creation. I ground my arguments in Thomism to formulate a fresh understanding of the unifying power of the Christ soul on the reciprocating principle of identity and love inherent in the Second Person of the Trinity. The principles of identity are then imaged into the human soul during its act of being. Citing Aquinas, the human soul of Christ, and ordinary human souls are created in the image of the Trinity.

“An image of the Trinity is found in the soul not only with respect to the soul’s powers, but also with respect to its essence; for the one essence of the three

⁹⁵ Thomas Aquinas looks at truth as a relation between the object and the intellect. *De re* and *de dictum* mode of existence may be considered as the *thing* and the *word* wherein the *thing* is the object perceived and *de dictum* is a Thomistic mental word.

persons is represented in the soul, although in a very imperfect way. Moreover, if the soul were its powers, its powers would differ from each other in name only. Consequently the distinction between the Persons which is found in God, is not adequately represented [in the soul].”⁹⁶

Fourthly, I develop, in an analogous fashion, the notion of the exemplar act the artist employs in creating an *objet d’art*, as a means to demonstrate how the divine-soul fusion is unified through the notion of divine exemplarism as it relates through the Father, as the Divine Artist, and the Son as the Exemplar cause of humanity’s act of being. In this part I crudely develop the concept that primary matter and an immaterial form of memory have sufficient common attributes that in the creative act of the human soul they are not only convertible but necessarily interchangeable.

Fifthly, I prepare the reader for Chapter 3 which is the most difficult exercise in the thesis. In Chapter 3 I analyze and re-formulate Thomas Aquinas’ logic regarding the relation between truth, goodness and being, which according to Aquinas are convertible to each other. Aristotle, Augustine and others, contend that the human soul’s perception of truth is distorted due to the potency of the body impeding the perceiving principles of the soul. I take this notion further by demonstrating that it is the added potency of the clothes fashioned from the skin of the animal that impedes the soul’s ability to fully actualize the body. Therefore the sensory perception apparatus of the fallen human dominates and limits the human soul’s powers more so than for an unblemished soul. As stated in footnote 93 above, Immanuel Kant’s notions of perception and *transcendental apperception* that regard the mental-physical relations along the same lines as Franz

⁹⁶ Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones Disputate de Anima* Q. 2 a12 ad. 6, trans. John Patrick Rowan (St. Louis & London: B. Herder Book Company, 1949). Html edition by Joseph Kenny, O.P., and, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 77. A1; Q. 54. A3. <http://dhspriority.org/thomas/QDdeAnima.htm#2> (accessed 30 May 2011).

Brentano's intentional inexistence are not in line with my thinking. Instead, I define the human soul's power of apperception as an unimpeded awareness of the human soul. I adapt Kant's concepts of transcendental apperception by concluding that the 'spirit of perception' (St. Paul's Letter to the Ephesians 1:17) is in effect an *apperceptive awareness*. Instead of perceiving through the distorting lenses of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, the perfect soul perceives through the spirit of perception, the eye of God. The Christ-soul enjoys the proper human soul's power of apperceptive awareness. Human souls that are able to perceive through the spirit require a different metaphysical understanding than the present Thomistic view of the human soul. Apperceptive awareness is the property that allows the human soul to be fully and directly aware of other human souls *and* of its origin and Creator. It is this awareness operation that explains Jesus' ability to be conscious of the condition of the soul of the Samaritan woman. Let us now turn to the metaphysical construction blocks of the thesis.

Metaphysics is the intellectual inquiry that animates theology, the science of God. Metaphysics is the study of origins, cosmology, and, the study of *being qua being*, in other words, ontology. Human beings are creatures with two origins. The first progresses out of eternity for "human nature began to be in an eternally pre-existing *suppositum* of Divine Nature" (*Summa theologiae* III Q. 16. A6, *adversus* 1).⁹⁷ The second origin regards humanity's corporeal nature at the creation of the physical universe. The human soul

⁹⁷ Richard Cross, *The Metaphysics of the Incarnation Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus* (Oxford University Press: Oxford UK, 2002), 277. A change in the *suppositum* cannot change the nature of an existent. The nature of the existent assumes the *suppositum* – this is the image and likeness humanity enjoys with God.

straddles the two realms of reality; the human soul is the mode through which eternity and the finite are united.

Thomistic philosophers and theologians are realists in their view of the world. The term 'real' is another word for 'actual' that provides Thomistic thinkers with the *hylomorphic* view that existence is the actualizing of primary matter. Thomism views the creation of the universe as a *creatio ex nihilo* event.⁹⁸ I interpret the biblical account of creation in Genesis 1 as the Divine Being willing Himself as an intentional self-communication of His goodness.⁹⁹ The miracle of the creation of the universe is the creation of a dimensioned entity from the dimensionless existence of eternity.¹⁰⁰ Metaphysically the creation miracle may be appreciated as a Being of pure Act Who produces a creation that includes potency which is contrary to the Being's essence. At the very instance of creation the infinitesimally small universe seems to be in an inherently contradictory mode of being. One may imagine the initial and unformed universe being in a state of almost complete potency, yet in another sense seems to be fully actualized.

The universe is *becoming*.¹⁰¹ One might imagine the Creator taking a miniscule piece of eternity (which is impossible but is employed metaphorically) and crafting it into

⁹⁸ The literal translation is 'out of nothing'. However, this does not mean that the universe was created with nothing, but prior to the creation of the universe nothing existed, which fits well with the Inflationary Big Bang theory. Prior to the existence of the universe there was simply nonexistence. We see from the Latin *ex nihilo* the preposition 'ex' requires the ablative which I understand as the ablative of source.

⁹⁹ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 19. A2, *respondeo*.

¹⁰⁰ The thesis defines eternity as a reality without limits; neither temporal nor spatial.

¹⁰¹ The term 'becoming' refers to the notion that created beings progress along their natural paths towards their proper terminus.

space-time. During the initial 10^{-43} to 10^{-34} of a second, the universe expanded with a velocity beyond imagination. In other words one could postulate that at such a velocity time has not yet been created. As the expansion of creation slowed, the universe's mass grew until it reached the relation we now know as space-time with its light-speed limit on velocity, yet contains non-local properties.¹⁰² In an analogical sense one can visualize the enormous velocity during the inflationary expansion of the universe as 'eternity velocity' hitting the brakes of corporeal existence and slowing to time-limited reality. In our world reality¹⁰³ is determined through the human soul's ability to perceive the anteriority of beings. Concrete beings are distinguished by and are related to others by their situation in four-dimensional space-time. However, the souls of human beings are created in eternity where anteriority and concreteness are non-existent. Therefore, the relation between eternity and the eternally grounded creation of corporeal existence is an *intentional relation* since the universe is in a necessary relation with its Creator.¹⁰⁴

The intentional relation then is a relation between eternity and corporeity, which may be seen as a relation between *de re* and *de dictum* modes of existence, or, in regards

¹⁰² Bell's Theorem accessed 21 July 2010. Recently scientists at CERN tentatively believe they have moved a subatomic particle faster than the speed of light.
<http://www.upscale.utoronto.ca/PVB/Harrison/BellsTheorem/BellsTheorem.html>.

¹⁰³ I am taking a narrow approach regarding reality due to the scope of my thesis. The modes of reality by which Thomists view truth, existence and so on, defines their underlying philosophy. As will be seen in Chapter 3 I argue for 'truth' to exist in the soul as part of its forming principle not only in things.

¹⁰⁴ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 19. A3, *respondeo*. That is, one of the ten Aristotle categories which contains the notion of being towards another or from the Latin *intendere*, 'to stretch forth'. The thesis claims that it is a necessary condition of God's Being that He must self-communicate his goodness, which is equivalent to 'being' which is convertible to 'true'. *De Veritate*, Q. 1, a. 1 and ad 4 cited by John F. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: from Finite Being to Uncreated Being* (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 471.

to the person, a relation between the brain and the mind, or, in general Thomistic metaphysical terms between *esse intentionale* and *esse naturale*. We can therefore state unequivocally that both the divine Creator and the created exist in intentional and natural dimensions; the Creator and created are in relation to the created order by *supposition* and to eternity by *necessity*. I also assert that the relation between the two realities of *esse intentionale* and *esse naturale* is the purview of human beings; it is the mode of stewardship of humanity on behalf of the Creator.

“I answer that, there are two ways in which a thing is said to be necessary, namely, absolutely, and by supposition. We judge a thing to be absolutely necessary from the relation of the terms, as when the predicate forms part of the definition of the subject: [...] Accordingly as to things willed by God, we must observe that He wills something of absolute necessity, but this is not true of all that He wills. For the divine will has a necessary relation to the divine goodness, since that is its proper object. Hence God wills His own goodness necessarily, even as we will our own happiness necessarily, and as any other faculty has necessary relation to its proper and principal object [...] But God wills things apart from Himself in so far as they are ordered to His own goodness as their end. ... Hence, since the goodness of God is perfect, and can exist without other things since no perfection can accrue to Him from them, it follows that His willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary. Yet it can be necessary by supposition...”¹⁰⁵

And from Genesis 1: 26:

“[...] and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the wild animals of the earth,^b and over every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth.”

A footnote to the Genesis 1:26 passage remarks that the notion of image, likeness and dominion is a democratization of the power of God: “humanity appears godlike [which]

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

equips humans for godlike rule over the fish, birds and animals.”¹⁰⁶ We shall return to this shortly as it lays a biblical foundation for the thesis’ assertion that the clothes made of the skin of the animal is an added potency, or if you will, an added substance, that overburdens the actualizing power of the human soul. In regards to the natural order, Aquinas reasons that substance is the limiting principle to the actualization act of the forming principle.

Substance is one of the ten Aristotelian categories, for example, quantity, describe such limitations.

“Now the contraction of the form comes from the matter. Hence, as we have said above (Question [7], Article [1]) forms according as they are the more immaterial, approach more nearly to a kind of infinity.”¹⁰⁷

With these words Thomas describes a crucial property of forms, such as, the human soul. Unfettered by human matter, the human soul as form can stretch to limitless possibilities. In a sense the human soul as the forming principle of the human composite, is at home in eternity. Proper matter, the signet-matter of the human person, may be converted into glorification. The unpacking of this notion however is best left for Chapter 3.

As mentioned previously, eternity is existence with neither spatial nor temporal limits. Therefore, that which differentiates one eternal being from another can only be the relation and the priority of relation between eternal beings. Because the two divine beings, the Father and Son are hypostatically univocal “in God the substance contains the

¹⁰⁶ Michael. D Coogan, ed. *The New Oxford Annotated Bible*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 12. The implications to the act: potency relation of the human composite of soul: body is obvious.

¹⁰⁷ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 14. A1, *respondeo*.

unity; and relation multiplies the trinity,¹⁰⁸ it is relation that *personifies* God the Father as being prior in being to the Son. The Son, by being posterior to His Father necessitates a reception of divine Being (*Ens*). The love of reception of Being necessitates the reciprocation from the Son of His Sonship. By acknowledging His reception of Being (*Ens*), the Son inheres and therefore personifies his own and unique principle of reciprocation. In this manner the individuation and personification of both divine beings are acknowledged. The unique reciprocating principle inherent in the Sonship of the Second Person also plays a role in humanity's fall from grace. The first humans failed to reciprocate the covenant of their existence by denying the right of God to be humanity's source of all knowledge.

However, the Second Person of the Trinity is not just God, but God-man. The unity and complimentary of the two natures of Jesus under the aspect of one person, an aspect of faith for believers, invites significant challenges as to how one understands the unity of the two natures into one hypostasis,¹⁰⁹ that is, "the real distinction between essence and existence [*esse*]."¹¹⁰ Modern thinkers have converted this scholastic

¹⁰⁸ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 28. A3, *sed contra*. Citing Boethius (*De Trin.*)

¹⁰⁹ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* IIIa Q. 2. A3, *ad 2*. "Hypostasis signifies a particular substance, not in every way, but as it is in its complement. Yet as it is in union with something more complete, it is not said to be a hypostasis, as for instance a hand or foot. So likewise the human nature in Christ, although it is a particular substance, nevertheless cannot be called a hypostasis or *suppositum* because it is in union with a completed thing—namely the whole Christ, as he is God and man." The thesis claims that the ordinary human hypostasis is of a 'particular' substance and this substance is the memory of what it is to be human that resides in the *suppositum* of God.

¹¹⁰ Anthony Kenny, *Aquinas on Being* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 34. The question reduces to the age old question of how does one define the individual Christ and his universal humanity; his individual Person and his universal divinity? The ordinary human person enjoys his or her human nature, a universal (after Aristotle) through the forming act of the soul and particularizes him- or herself through the union of the soul with the matter of the body yielding a human composite of rationality and *animality*.

distinction into the distinction between *de dictum* and *de re*.¹¹¹ *De dictum* relates to *intentional*, and *de re* relates to the term *intensional*, 'a belief' respectively.¹¹² Instead I follow Thomas Aquinas's meaning of intentional, that is, 'to stretch forth'.¹¹³ Employing the *de dictum/de re* terminology presents the notion that the ordinary human person *adheres* most attributes in a *de dictum* mode (that is they are accidental because of the

¹¹¹ The translation of *de re* literally means 'of the thing' and *de dictum* means literally 'of the word'. The scholastic notional concept refers to whether or not a mental word, that is a concept, is instantiated. One can conceive of the essence or nature of an imaginary animal such as a griffin but its existence is doubtful. Similarly one can symbolize or conceive of the essence of Christ as the Eucharist without his Eucharistic existence being determined. Furthermore one understands the concept of the universal term 'humanity' but humanity as such resides as the essence, the nature of individual human beings. The idea of a 'mental word' employed by Aquinas plays into the relations of 'intention' or 'intentionality' which come from the Latin verb *intendere* – 'to stretch forth' and is a relation to the external world. From a divine perspective the term 'intentionality' may be understood as a *pantheistic* ("God is in all things; not, indeed, as part of their essence, nor as an accident, but as an agent is present to that upon which it works." *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 8. A1, *respondeo*) attribute of the Divine presence in the world.

¹¹² Andrzej Cieśluk, "De Re/De Dicto Distinctions (Syntactic, Semantic and Pragmatic Interpretation)" *Studies In Logic, Grammar And Rhetoric* 22 (35) 2010, 86. "A sentence is syntactically *de re* just in case it contains a pronoun or free variable within the scope of an opacity verb that is anaphoric on or bound by a singular term or quantifier outside the scope of that verb. Otherwise, it is *syntactically de dicto*". For a metaphysical interpretation of the *de re/de dictum* distinction: "An attribution is metaphysically *de re* with respect to an object *o* just in case it directly attributes a property to *o*. It is metaphysically *de dicto* with respect to *o*, if it indirectly involves *o*, and independent of *o* if it doesn't" (McKay, Nelson, 2005).

¹¹³ Thomas Aquinas employs considerable effort developing and employing the term 'intentionality' as it denotes a special relation in the mind (*mens*). I am particularly interested in Thomas' doctrine of intentionality because it relates to the identity of the knower and the person being known. Thomas teaches in *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 14. A1, *respondeo* "for the species of the thing known is in the knower" which is the relation between the physical and the mental realms; it is Thomas' initiation of the term 'mental word' that denotes for him the conclusion of the cognition process. We must recall that for Thomas the process of acquiring knowledge is a process of change from more potency to less potency, or, to more actuality. I employ Thomas' understanding of intentionality to demonstrate the mode of the relation between the Christ soul and the soul of Thomas the Apostle during their encounter in the upper chamber. I therefore infer that this relation is available to all ordinary human souls. The ordinary human soul's encounter with the Christ soul may also be apprehended as an actualizing change, an annihilation of the negation of original sin's potency. In regards to the Second Person of the Trinity, the generating act of the Father for his Son is reciprocated by the Son as an act that acknowledges the Father's Fatherhood and is an intentional act as well. These two intentional acts generate or more accurately allow to process from these intentional acts a life-Being – the Holy Spirit.

clothes divinely made from the skin of the animal).¹¹⁴ In contrast to the ordinary human being, the pre-resurrected Christ person inheres his attributes in a *de re* mode (that is they are essential since Jesus was born without sin) and inheres all attributes in a *de re* mode post-resurrection, that is, in his glorified body state.¹¹⁵ Bluntly put, I assert that there are attributes to the ordinary human person, such as the *haecceitic* property, that are foreign to the pre-lapsarian being and the Christ human person.¹¹⁶ Even more bluntly, the separation of humankind from God has its dire consequences. The overburdening of the ordinary human soul by the flesh of animality causes the dynamism of the soul to be insufficient to fully actualize itself in both the *de re* and *de dictum* modes. The overburden prevents the soul from enjoying an apperceptive awareness of the essential natures of other human persons and prevents it from forming proper essential unities; the human soul is not only separated from God, but also from other separated spiritual

¹¹⁴ The thesis employs the term ‘ordinary human person’ to denote the Scholastic *hylomorphic* concept of the human person is a composite of body and soul. The soul is the forming, or active principle, and the body is the matter, or potency which is informed or actuated by the soul. Matter is *primary matter* which is pure potency that has been actualized by the form. There is disagreement within Thomism whether or not matter can be partially activated. Etienne Gilson for example follows the partial potency of matter view and Lawrence Dewan O. P., his student, holds the view that “actuality and potentiality exclude each other.” (*St. Thomas and Forms as Something Divine in Things*, (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2007), 32. The thesis follows the latter interpretation.

¹¹⁵ We note from Scripture that the pre-resurrected Jesus was *aware* of the Samaritan woman’s infidelities and could in a sense see her soul, read her mind. (John 4:18) We also read in John 2: 24-25: “But Jesus on his part would not entrust himself to them, because he knew all people and needed no one to testify about anyone, for he himself knew *what was in everyone*.” (emphasis added) The awareness by Jesus of the Samaritan woman’s inner thoughts (soul) is a *de re* mode of apprehending whereby Jesus is NOT just conversing sensibly, employing the *phantasma*, with the woman, but also in an *aphantasma* mode. The employment by the thesis of the *de re/de dictum* philosophical distinction is based on a belief of a biblical account of what Jesus was being aware of is a true and may be written as a *de re* proposition: “The woman at the well who is a sinner had five husbands.”

¹¹⁶ Please reference footnotes 30 and 31 above. It would be intrinsically impossible for Christ’s human person to be individuated to the extent that he is unable to be in union with his Divine Nature.

beings due to the individuating *thisness* or *haecceitic* privation acquired from the potency of the *animality* of ordinary human matter. In contrast to the ordinary human soul, the human-Divine union inherent in the person of Jesus Christ is defined as a perfect unity according to the Council of Chalcedon (451).¹¹⁷

Relations between ordinary human persons involve the individuating properties of matter. The proper Thomistic understanding of the ordinary human person is that the human “person signifies what is most perfect in all nature – that is, a subsistent individual of a rational nature.”¹¹⁸ Gylua Klima proposes that two modes of distinctions for extended beings (persons). The first mode is that of an instantiated body in space-time. The second pertains to life. Whether or not the human soul is separated from the body it shares the genera of a *life-being*. The human soul shares with all intellectual substances the genera of rational. The Trinity identifies themselves through their personhood which is related to intentionality, which is related to will and to love since intention and love are acts of the will. The intentional act of generation by God the Father to the Son and the intentional act of *Eucharistia* by the Son’s reciprocation processes from this union a life-Being. I claim that this same model, although imperfect and necessitates graciousness from the Trinity, functions for the perfected human soul as well. The separated human

¹¹⁷ I recognize that the relation between the two natures of Christ have been the subject of centuries of debate and although I believe in the Chalcedon (451) definition in the interest of academic integrity I will present a balanced view regarding the metaphysical comprehension of the relations between the Christ soul and other beings, including his Father. Richard Cross has written an excellent treatise on the metaphysics of the Incarnation. (Cf. Note 96 above.)

¹¹⁸ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 29. A3, *respondeo*. In this passage Thomas Aquinas refers to the Divine Persons. However, one can easily argue, because of its likeness to God, the human soul *anagogically* partakes in the same *perfection*.

soul must also identify itself through personhood since the individuation of matter is no longer present. The human soul of Christ, which generates a glorified body, identifies itself through its personhood as well.

“The humanity of Christ is the instrument of the Godhead--not, indeed, an inanimate instrument, which nowise acts, but is merely acted upon; but an instrument animated by a rational soul, which is so acted upon as to act.”¹¹⁹

In contrast to divine beings, the ordinary human person, as a created creature individuates and identifies him/herself through the individuating potency of signet-matter inherent in a physically organized body. A consequence of original sin is an increase in potency and therefore the physicality of *this* matter dominates. The relation of the soul to God recedes from its natural relation to one that is contingent on the soul’s free-will as dominated by matter more so than prior to humanity’s first sin.

Borrowing from John Wippel’s understanding of Thomas’ teaching on the relation between the ‘true’ and the ‘good’ Wippel emphasises that the “[t]rue perfects ... its species, whereas goodness ... in terms of the existence it enjoys in reality.”¹²⁰ Humanity’s fall through original sin did not cause an imperfection in our *intelligible species*, the human soul, but instead adversely impacted on the perfection of our existence. Prior to original sin the actualizing power of the human soul dominated the proper union of body and soul; matter did not limit the actualizing power of the soul to the same extent as it does post original sin.

¹¹⁹ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* IIIa Q. 7. A1, ad 3.

¹²⁰ John F. Wippel, “Truth in Aquinas, Part II,” *The Review of Metaphysics* Vol. 43, no. 3 (March 1990): 543.

The human intelligible species however is wounded in a certain manner since it knows and understands reality through the distortion of the now overburdened material senses. The ordinary human sensory knowledge acquisition process necessitates the employment of the phantasms to know and understand the created order. The hypo-potency generated by the fall necessitates the human soul to individuate itself through the privation of *haecceitic (this)* matter. The human soul, in its present state relates its matter imperfectly, which is in a hypo-potency state relative to its state prior to the fall, and therefore requires matter to individuate itself. In order for matter to be individuated requires an individuating principle termed “the *haecceitic* ‘thisness’ principle.”¹²¹ Due to the overburdening of matter, the human mind requires the material human brain that employs the phantasms to acquire knowledge of the world.

By individuating and communicating with the external world through the thisness of *haecceitism* and the *phantasms* of the brain respectively, human beings also identify themselves through these very same modes. *Haecceitism* and the *phantasms* work in conjunction with the human soul instantiating or extending itself in space-time through the potency of the matter of the body. The following discussion is critical to understanding the aims of the thesis and it regards employing an analogy based on the inter- and intra-relations and personal identity of the Trinity.

Thomas teaches that identity within a species follows a univocal predication. Human beings in the present state of existence identify themselves through the

¹²¹ *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*, 2nd edition, s.v. “Haecceity.” Duns Scotus invented the concept and fully developed it. Thomas Aquinas also employed *haecceity* as a “positive perfection that serves as a primitive existence and individuation principle for concrete existents.”

individuating relation of the soul to matter. In contrast, the identity of each of the Persons within the community of the Trinity is one of univocal predication. Because of their simple form the members of the Trinity are known through their distinctive personhood which is an *intentional distinction* as elaborated through Richard Cross's understanding and the comprehension of certain Scholastics such as the Franciscan's Richard of Middleton (c. 1249 – 1302) and William of Ware (unknown, he flourished 1270 – 1300).¹²² Cross concludes that Duns Scotus views intentional distinction as relating the mental and extra-mental realities, which within eternity are realized through priority of being (*ens*).

The metaphysical concept of intentional reality and intentional distinction inscribe a tension. The intellectual soul may consider being (*ens*) in three modes of existence. The first is a being that exists in reality and in the intellectual soul. The second is being that exists mentally only, such as when a Scholastic student contemplates the being (*ens*) of a chimera. Chimeras may exist in reality, but likely not. Chimeras are beings of the mind. The third mode regards logical concepts such as mathematical operators; '2+4=6'.

A problem that my thesis encounters concerns the second mode of existence. The notion of God as pure Act, totally simple and therefore an intentional Being, requires an act of faith to move the concept from *ens rationis* to *ens reale*, the realm of reality. The connector between these two realms, according to my viewpoint, is due to a particular truth-aspect, found during the creation of corporeity.

¹²² Richard Cross, *The Metaphysics of the Incarnation Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus* (Oxford University Press: Oxford UK, 2002), 277. The Triune God's act of *intentionality* is the act of divine will stretching forth into creation.

“Now a thing understood may be in relation to an intellect either essentially or accidentally. It is related essentially to an intellect on which it depends as regards its being ...”¹²³

As we have already seen, the Creator creates through an *intentional* act of the will and as an intentional act, is the cause of distinction in *all* created rational beings. The intentional power of the proper human intellectual soul is what differentiates it in eternity and in corporeal reality from other rational beings. The connector between the two beings of *intentionne* and *reale* is the act of existence that all human souls provide through their intentional acts of existing. This connection or relation, which is unique to human souls, has its point of initiation *in* the Word of God.

The relation of the Word, unified to his human nature, and, the instrumentality of the human soul of Jesus is further developed in Chapter 3. However, it is advantageous to the reader that I address these concepts in more detail here. The specific metaphysical concept of interest is that of exemplar causality which brings to light the third aim of the thesis. I hold the view, which is contrary to Thomas Aquinas’s teaching, that two beings fully in act under certain conditions can form an essential unity. In order to demonstrate my viewpoint I must also re-interpret the common agreement within Thomism regarding the state of the *phantasms* and those who follow *haecceitism* as an individuating principle.

The hypotheses that knowledge can be obtained without employing the *phantasma*, and, that *haecceitism* is not a perfecting principle in matter, are related to my argument concerning two being fully in act may form an essential unity. In order to

¹²³ Thomas Aquinas *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 16. A1, *respondeo*. I follow Thomas Aquinas’ assertion that God subsists the created order which is not dissimilar to the modern notion that God is *panentheistically* related to the universe. Truth being convertible with being is a concept I employ in the creation of the human soul.

demonstrate the metaphysical relation of an essential unity with the human soul, I develop theological, metaphysical and persuasive arguments regarding my concept of Christ as the causal exemplar *for humanity*.¹²⁴

I speculate that the *haecceitic* dysfunction is a consequence of original sin since *God created us for incorruption, (sic) and made us in the image of his own eternity.*" (Wisdom of Solomon 2:23) Instead of employing a perfected human being in his *Treatise of Man* it seems to me that Thomas Aquinas employed the metaphysics of the imperfected (*sic*) relation of human body to human soul to develop many arguments in the *Summa theologiae*, for example, Ia, Q 76, and, IIIa Q. 2. A1, *respondeo*. Earlier I made the case that it is not the imperfection of the human soul that is the consequence of original sin, but the relation of the soul to existence. Instead it is the soul's relation to *esse naturale* and *esse intentionale* that are impacted by original sin.

The human soul is made to actualize a specific degree of potency just as a particular type of engine is manufactured to fly a jet aeroplane. An engine made to operate a sub-compact car, although proper to this particular car is impotent to properly move a jumbo jet. So to it is with the human soul and its present body. I interpret the human body-soul relation imperfection, not as degradation in the nature of the soul, but in the increased degree of potential in the signet-matter of the individual human body.

¹²⁴ The term 'causal Exemplar' is uniquely attributed to God the Father Who is the Generator of all life. The thesis develops in the second chapter the metaphysical relations necessary to demonstrate that the Son and the human Christ are causal exemplars as well; the Son is the Primary Cause and the human soul of Christ the instrumental cause. For an excellent treatment of the notion of causal exemplarism see Gregory Doolan's book, *Aquinas on the Divine Ideas as Exemplar Causes* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2008).

The human soul is incapable of perfecting the added jumbo-weight of its present body. As such, this imperfection may be seen as a degradation of the relation between the ordinary human soul and the perfection of its body. My notion of the human soul of Christ as the being fully in act and the ordinary human soul as being in potency is supported by John 20:19 whereby Jesus appears to the apostles passing through solid doors and walls. Quoting Origen, expressed for a different purpose, “And so, what is *corruptible* in us must be clothed in holiness and *incorruptibility*; and what is *mortal* must be clothed, now that death has been conquered, in the Father’s *immortality*”.¹²⁵(emphasis added) Origen’s wisdom clearly demonstrates the mode of being that the ordinary human soul-body unity lost by tasting the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil. The ordinary human soul does not suffer in itself any material corruption. Instead, the human soul suffers in its relations with and through the *esse naturale* and *esse intentionale* realms. We know from Thomas Aquinas that “... spiritual immutation [change] takes place by the form of the immuter being received, according to a spiritual mode of existence.”¹²⁶ The exchange between the immuter and receptor is distorted because the exchange flows through the imperfect perceptive apparatus of the ordinary human being. However, what is a spiritual change?

Spiritual change may be considered in two modes. The first is through Thomas’ process of cognition; the phantasms acquire sensible knowledge and the intelligible

¹²⁵ Origen, “On Prayer,” *The Liturgy of the Hours* v. IV (New York: Catholic Book Publishing Corporation, 1975), 577.

¹²⁶ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 78. A3, *respondeo*. The thesis defines the verb ‘to immute’, as, ‘to change’.

species abstract the form of the object being perceived. The second manner, which is of interest here, is as Christ who spiritually changes the sinning soul by mediating for us to move from the shadow of the tree of good and evil towards the illuminating love of our Father. If we return to the Thomas-Christ event of the upper chamber, Christ is the immuter and it is the form of the Christ-soul that enacts the immuting function by avoiding the tree of knowledge of good and evil and proceeding through the knowledge source of his heavenly Father. Continuing along this theme, the Thomas-Christ coincidence may be considered as the Glorified Christ informing the communicant's soul, in this instance St. Thomas the Apostle, through an exemplar act.¹²⁷ John F. Wippel, in commenting on Aquinas' proof's of God's existence, argues the following"

"[N]othing is moved except insofar as it is in potency to that which it is moved. But something moves insofar as it is in actuality, since to move is nothing else but to reduce something from potency to act. And something can be reduced from potency to act only by some being in actuality. [I]t is not possible for the same thing to be in act and in potency at the same time and in the same respect but only in different respects."¹²⁸

Wippel's logical entailment presents an interesting entry for my arguments. Thomas Aquinas asserts that if the potencies of two beings are dissimilar, the being more in act may actualize the lesser. In order for one human soul to actualize another human soul that is also in perfect unity with its own signet-matter, and for it to also actualize human matter, requires not only a distinction¹²⁹ between the potencies of the two beings, but, at

¹²⁷ The notion of the Exemplar Christ is developed in Chapter 3 and related to the relation-reciprocating act between the Divine Beings.

¹²⁸ John F. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: from Finite Being to Uncreated Being* (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 444.

¹²⁹ Richard Cross, *The Metaphysics of the Incarnation Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus* (Oxford University Press: Oxford UK, 2002), 35-36, notes 28, 30 and 31. Cross concludes distinction in that the human soul of

least one of the souls necessarily must enjoy access to the Trinity and thusly avoid the vagaries arising from the tree of knowledge of good and evil. Further development of this tantalizing gem must be left to Chapter 3. However, before we leave this section another query must be answered. How does the Christ-soul, as a causal exemplar inform another soul?

I respectfully request the reader to maintain the event of Thomas the Apostle 'entering' the wounds of the Glorified Christ as a binate image; one being moving towards the other from blindness to awareness and the other moving a being from potency to act. The movement of Christ towards Thomas is an apt image that provides an introduction for my notion that the Father as the Divine Exemplar Artist, the Son is the exemplar cause for human creation, and the human Christ is the instrumental exemplar. The *individuation* of the ordinary human soul and its *separation* from the Creator due to the fall is removed by the act of the Son through the instrument of his own human soul. Aquinas clearly portrays his notion of God as the Divine Artist.

"The knowledge of God is the cause of things. For the knowledge of God is to all creatures what the knowledge of the artificer is to things made by his art. Now the knowledge of the artificer is the cause of the things made by his art from the fact that the artificer works by his intellect. Hence the form of the intellect must be the principle of action; as heat is the principle of heating."¹³⁰

By substituting the human soul for the art of the artificer, Aquinas crafts a very specific picture regarding his concept of where the human soul resides before it is created. The knowledge of the human soul, and the knowledge of how to create a subsistent human

Jesus is a truth-maker and that his soul's substance communicates existence to his accidents and I contend to the human souls who seek him as well.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, Ia Q. 14. A8, *respondeo*.

soul, is in the intellect of the Artist. The composition or blueprint of the uncreated idea of the soul is in the mind of the artist as the idea or the plan of an *objet d'art*.¹³¹ In a similar vein the human soul is co-artist with the divine Artist because the human soul informs the potency of the matter of the body through the *hylemorphic* union as its first act of being. The human soul, as the forming principle, actualizes. That is, the soul brings into existence the essence of the human composite or in modern terms, the 'person'. In created entities real distinctions exist between the *esse* and essence. The distinction attributes of the glorified body I argue is an intentional distinction which is imputed in the soul as our likeness to God. My concept of intentional distinction requires that an inequality exists to Godfrey of Fontaines' axiom that "whatever happens to one [act] happens to the other [potency] or existence and essence."¹³² I hold that Godfrey's notion of potency-act equality is incoherent since the ordinary human composite functions in its present state of reality employing the clothes of the skin of the animal. Although the purpose of the thesis is not to demonstrate how, metaphysically, the Glorified Christ's Body is instantiated in space and time and also resides in the eternal realm such a Body requires a different mode of distinction¹³³ than that of the ordinary human body. The Evangelist

¹³¹ Gregory T. Doolan, *Aquinas on the Divine Ideas as Exemplar Causes* (The Catholic University Press, 2008), 3. "Thomas...more frequently reserves the term 'exemplar' for the form that is in the *mind* of the *artisan*."

¹³² John F. Wipple *The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines: A Study in Late-Thirteenth Century Philosophy* (The Catholic University of America Press 1981), 90.

¹³³ Gylua Klima of Fordham University proposes two modes of distinction, that of an instantiated body in space-time and that which pertains to life. Two very broad genera that the human species shares with other entities is presented in Klima's understanding of Thomistic metaphysics. Klima's point is that the matter of corporally bound human beings is the genera of all matter whether or not it is informed as a *living* being. So too for the genera of living entities in that all living beings share in the genera of life. Human beings share in the genera of all living substances whether or not matter is included, which of course includes separated (spiritual) beings such as angels, but not rocks. The separated soul enjoys in the genera of life, but not fully

John enlightens us: “*What has come into being in him was life, and the life was the light of all people.*” John 1:3b, 4. This distinction is the fullness of the life-Being of Christ. Thomas Aquinas adheres to the Aristotelian philosophy that it is the relation of the human soul to the body that individuates or in Godfrey’s thinking distinguishes it. However the human soul, as the human composite’s forming principle, stretches from within eternity into corporeal reality. The human soul is a similitude of God himself especially during his creative act. (Genesis 1:26, 27) We see from John that all life flows through the Second Person of the Trinity, which includes Jesus’ human soul. This similitude is life and human life is the light of Christ. The paradigm of Christ being the source of humanity’s life and humanity demonstrating the Christ-life as light brings us to a crucial apex of how I will craft, in Chapter 3, the human soul’s relation with the human soul of Jesus Christ. I put forward the thought that the potency, human matter, in unity with the human soul is disproportionate as finite entities are with eternal beings. The human soul after all is gifted through the Father with eternal life. If we are to believe that Jesus Christ has

since its glorified body is not as yet formed. Employing Klima’s ideas then, I propose that a glorified body must enjoy a forming principle that is either in addition to, or common to, but negated (humanity’s *haecceitic* individuation for instance) in the fallen human soul. Perhaps we could envisage this forming principle of the *illuminated* (pre-lapsarian) soul in a special mode that enables it to be a reciprocating receptacle of God’s Graciousness. Thomistic philosophy holds the view that the human soul shares in its own act of creation as its first *actus essendi*. Therefore, the forming principle of the *illuminated* human person that has *fallen asleep* enjoys the metaphysical principle of reciprocation (through Christ). Once it is risen, the *perfected* human soul intends, individuates and instantiates its own glorified body. Note that such a being would have left its corporeally bound human life without sinning, just as Mary the mother of Jesus did. However, in a contrarian view to Gylua’s understanding of intentional verbs such as ‘to wish’, ‘to believe’ etc., which seems to follow Franz Brentano’s understanding, the thesis relies on Aquinas’ definition which, from the Latin verb *intendere* means ‘to stretch forth’. The critical notion here is that stretching forth may be apprehended in a relational mode of existence which seems, to the author of the thesis, is analogous to the personal relations inherent in the Trinity. The difference between Gylua’s understanding (and others) of intentional verbs and the thesis’s is that Gylua understands the object as being not only not necessarily, that is, contingently true, but are *entia rationis* only. The sinless soul of Christ instantiates his glorified body through the willful power of intentionality as defined by Thomas Aquinas. This complex notion is further developed in Chapter 3.

conquered death then we must conclude that there is an inequality to Godfrey's axiom. The inequality resides in the life Christ offers as opposed to the present life we now project through the lens of the garment of the flesh of the animal. The life offered by Christ is more than the pre-lapsarian existence of our first parents and if this is so then the human soul must be crafted with the attributes that will accept this life to be. Contrary to the glorified Christ's knowledge acquisition which is directly through his eternal Father, the present human composite is not spiritually aware of its eternal grounding. Our life experiences are through the sensory perception of the tree of knowledge of good and evil and therefore there is a total eclipse of the light shining directly from the Father through his Son to the human people. Citing question 4, article 1 of the *Summa theologiae*, and by expanding on Thomas Aquinas' teaching that "there is an infinity which pertains to form as such, an infinity standing on the side of perfection [...] in contrast to the infinity pertaining to matter and imperfection", Lawrence Dewan characterizes the human soul as that which enjoys certain types of eternal relations.¹³⁴ Dewan continues his analysis by emphasizing that existence is the most perfect or metaphysically, the most formal mode of any being.

One may envisage from Dewan's and Aquinas' analysis three modes of formality. The first is God as pure *esse subsistens*; the second regards the human soul that shares or participates with God in its own act of being and though imperfectly, the human soul also enjoys *esse subsistens*, and, the third regards artifacts, such as a statue that is sculpted by

¹³⁴ Lawrence Dewan, O.P. *St. Thomas and Form as Something Divine in Things* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2007), 47.

an artist and such beings do not enjoy the same type of *esse subsistens*. The differences in the three modes are their degrees of actuality and the degrees of freedom in the deployment of the will. The deployment of the will, the Scholastic *active agent* and a principle and a power of the human soul necessitates a similitude to the creative intentional act of God.

The active agent functions through its power of *intentione*. According to Aquinas the human soul has the power of intention:

“For the operation of *sense* requires a *spiritual change*, by which an *intention* of a sensible form comes to exist in a sense organ.”¹³⁵ (emphasis added)

The etymology of the word intention is critical in order for us to appreciate its full understanding. Intention finds its source in the Latin verb *intendere*, ‘to stretch forth’. Intentionality is a subset of the *will* which is a power of the soul. The term ‘intention’ (n.) is a mental concept, an object of knowledge. However, Aquinas teaches that the divine Being knows through his own Essence and therefore the creative act is an intentional act, a stretching forth of the divine Will, which also requires a relation with the *object* in the divine memory which is *in* the form of the human entity to be actualized. The human soul however, as a similitude of God, at one time enjoyed the intentional existence of not only

¹³⁵ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 78. A3, *respondeo*. “Now, immutation is of two kinds, one natural, and the other spiritual. [Modern Thomism tends to replace the term ‘spiritual change’ with ‘intentional change’. The thesis will not conform to the common usage of ‘intention’ since *intentionality* is employed by the thesis as a specific referent and therefore may cause confusion. A spiritual change therefore is opposed to a physical change; the change is in the mind.] Natural immutation takes place by the form of the immuter being received according to its natural existence, into the thing immuted, as heat is received into the thing heated. Whereas spiritual immutation takes place by the form of the immuter being received, according to a spiritual mode of existence, into the thing immuted, as the form of color is received into the pupil that does not thereby become colored. Regarding the operation of the senses, a spiritual (i.e., immaterial) immutation is required, whereby an intention of the sensible form is effected in the sensile organ. Otherwise, if natural immutation alone sufficed for the sense's action, all natural bodies would feel when they undergo alteration.”

sensible entities but purely simple entities as well, such as God and the angels. Employing intentional objects in my arguments brings with it the difficulty in the metaphysical concept of individuating, or, distinguishing between intentional objects. It is not possible for another ordinary human being to distinguish an individual's mentally bound intentional states without applying to the powers of the senses.

Previously I identified the problem of the inability of the human soul to be *spiritually aware* of another human soul because of the supra-added potency caused by original sin. The redactor of 1 John 3:2 agrees: "when he [Jesus] appears we shall be like him, for *we shall see him as he is.*" (emphasis added) Furthermore, Thomas Aquinas differentiates the notion of "ideas as exemplars and as likenesses [which] makes it possible to solve the problem whether there are ideas in God of genera, species and individuals."¹³⁶ Drawing on Leo Elder's analysis of Aquinas' teaching it is evident that *ideas* in Thomas' teaching are acquired knowledge as opposed to divine ideas as *exemplars* which are the divine Artist's principle of creating individuals. We know from Genesis 2: 19 that the Creator endowed "the man" (*sic*) with the power to name all the creatures of the earth. The naming of the creatures necessitates a knowledge and awareness that demonstrates a sharing in the creative act. It also denotes humanity's stewardship of the earth. Stewardship inheres a relation. A steward is in a trust and true relation with the master and that which belongs to the master. I demonstrate in Chapter 3 that the Son, because of his relation as Son to the Father is the principle of exemplar causality for humanity and that the human soul of Christ is the instrumental exemplar cause for

¹³⁶ Leo Elders, *The Philosophical Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1990), 245.

humanity is the model for the divine Creator's steward. However, if I am to demonstrate that Christ's human soul is the instrumental cause for humanity then the pure potency of primary matter must be considered.

Primary matter presents a difficulty for my arguments. Primary matter is that which exists prior to being formed and which is constant through change of all created beings. If primary matter is the unique underlying potency for creation of the composite of body and soul, then the relation of humanity to Creator, in the act of creation, is more distant than what is generally proposed by Aquinas.

“Existence in nature does not belong to primary matter, which is a potentiality, unless it is reduced to act by a form. Now our possible intellect has the same relation to intelligible objects as primary matter has to natural things; for it is in potentiality as regards intelligible objects, just as primary matter is to natural things. Hence our passive intellect can be exercised concerning intelligible objects only so far as it is perfected by the intelligible species of something; and in that way it understands itself by an intelligible species, as it understands other things: for it is manifest that by knowing the intelligible object it understands also its own act of understanding, and by this act knows the intellectual faculty. But God is a pure act in the order of existence, as also in the order of intelligible objects; therefore He understands Himself through Himself.”¹³⁷

An analysis of this quotation allows me to claim that there is a relation or perhaps more clearly a similitude of potentiality between *memory* and *primary matter*. Thomas teaches that in the ordinary human soul there is a forward-looking relation between the passive intellect and the object to be known that is similar to the soul's relation to primary matter. Aquinas conceives primary matter as pure potency to natural things. In other words, primary matter has the potential to become whatever it is actualized into, either by the soul, or, by nature. The possible intellect in Scholastic terminology is the

¹³⁷ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 14. A2, *adversus* 3.

storehouse of concepts as opposed to the passive intellect which is the storehouse of past events. Memory waits passively to acquire, through the phantasms, the intelligible species, which is the sensory perception of the thing perceived. Therefore, until the passive intellect is actualized by the thing perceived it is in potency to it as primary matter is in potency until it is actualized into being (*esse*). Employing this same rational I claim that the possible intellect performs in a similar but nobler¹³⁸ manner. The possible intellect, which is the imagination is immaterial in its substance and therefore resides as part of the human soul. I am not arguing for now that the possible intellect or primary matter is univocal or even equivocal as concepts but instead that they share similar aspects. Their similarity is grounded in a particular *type* of memory that I claim is immaterial and is pure potency, and, is constant to the point whereby it may be in certain aspects, analogous to primary matter. Earlier I quoted Aquinas that "...human nature began to be in an eternally pre-existing *suppositum* of the Divine Nature."¹³⁹ Can we claim that in an analogous sense God conceptualizes the *quiddity* of human beings in his *suppositum*? And, that this concept or idea of what it is to be human is accessed by those human souls who have not been touched by the tree of knowledge of good and evil so that they can maintain their intimate kinship with God. How can this be?

We know from Aristotle and Aquinas that form is prior to both matter and the composite of form and matter. Form actualizes the potency of signet-matter which is matter that can be sufficiently actualized that it can be reduced from the pure potency of

¹³⁸ The term noble is Aquinas' term for meaning a higher good or being closer to God.

¹³⁹ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* IIIa Q. 16. A6, *ad* 1.

primary matter¹⁴⁰ into an individuated human composite. The human composite requires a spiritual (the immaterial soul) form, and signet-matter to form the human person. The human forming principle and the signet-matter that will become the individuated human body, require a special *type of memory*. That *type*, which is a universal, is such that it is what-it-is-to-be human or the *quiddity* (the *whatness*) of humanity. This particular type is the memory of what it is to be human that resides in the *suppositum* of God. Instead of being a forward-looking relation this type is a prior-, or posterior-looking relation. In other words this relation looks back to the true *quiddity* of humanity as it resides in the *suppositum* of God. This memory of what it is to be human is an exemplar for the creation of all human souls and the perfection of their *esse*.

The justification for these relations is through the analogy of this type of memory being actualized into individual human beings. I rely on the Thomistic philosopher Lawrence Dewan O. P., to unpack the relation of “*kinship* between form and act of being within the creature.”¹⁴¹

However before I continue, another controversy regarding the use of intention (v.tr.) must be considered. Thomas Aquinas teaches that in the present state it is the relation between matter and form that individuates the composite being. How would a

¹⁴⁰ Matter in Aristotelian terms is that which is actualized, that is, that which comes into existence. Matter therefore has a four dimensional quality to it; three dimensions of space and one of time. Primary matter is that which is pure potency and does not exist. Primary matter is that which is constant through change during the actualization process. In an analogous sense the memory of what it is to be human that resides in the immateriality of the human soul is in pure potency until the soul actualizes it into the composite of the body and soul. The purpose of this analogy is purely to demonstrate that the thesis suggests there is a different type of memory than that to which we are accustomed.

¹⁴¹ Lawrence Dewan, O.P. *St. Thomas and Form as Something Divine in Things* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2007), 39.

separated soul or glorified body individuate itself? Building on the previously mentioned exemplar causality I am arguing that the aforementioned specific type of memory that grounds the nature of the human soul is as an *intelligible-exemplar* from Christ which is inherent in the soul's first act of being that images its likeness to God through the Artistry of the *Divine exemplar*.¹⁴² The Divine *intentional* (stretching forth) *acts*, which in Christ, as the Word, Who expresses the will of God in the created order, as an *exemplar-unity*, is therefore a *necessary* condition for the forming operations of the ordinary human soul.¹⁴³

“Now the primordial principle of the production of things is the Son of God, as it says in John (1:3): “All things were made through him.” He is, therefore, the primordial exemplar, which all creatures imitate as the true and perfect image of God. Hence it says in Col (1:15); “He is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of every creature, for in him all things were created.” But in a special way He is the exemplar of spiritual graces, with which spiritual creatures are endowed, as is said to the Son in Ps 110 (v. 3): “In the splendors of the saints before the morning star I begot you,” namely, because He was begotten before every creature through resplendent grace, having in Himself as exemplar the splendors of all the saints. But this exemplar of God has been very remote from us at first, as it says in Ec (2:12); “What is man that he could follow the king, his Maker?” And therefore He willed to become man, that He might offer humans a human exemplar. And therefore He willed to become man, that He might offer humans a human exemplar.”¹⁴⁴

Aquinas concludes that Christ is the exemplar of spiritual graces. He asserts that it is the form of the object that is received not the object itself such as when colour is received in the eye the eye does not acquire the colour. The exclamation by Thomas the Apostle “My

¹⁴² Gregory T. Doolan, *Aquinas on the Divine Ideas as Exemplar Causes* (The Catholic University Press, 2008), 3. “Thomas...more frequently reserves the term ‘exemplar’ for the form that is in the *mind* of the *artisan*.”

¹⁴³ Lawrence Dewan, O.P. *St. Thomas and Form as Something Divine in Things* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2007), 39. Dewan, Doolan and others discuss Aquinas's notion of exemplar causality “to be seen stretching from God”. The thesis claims that the *intentional Divine Act* (stretching forth) as an exemplar causality is by definition an *intentional unity* or in Christological terms a *Christ-unity*.

¹⁴⁴ Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary On the First Epistle to the Corinthians*, trans. Fabian Larcher, O.P. HTML-edited by Joseph Kenny, O.P. <http://dhsprory.org/thomas/SS1Cor.htm#111>, (accessed 10 March 2010).

Lord and my God” is received by Thomas from Christ not as the form of the object Christ but as the *forming exemplar* of spiritual grace. I base my reasoning on Thomas Aquinas’ teaching that “spiritual immutation takes place by the form of the immuter being received”.¹⁴⁵ During Thomas the Apostle’s encounter with Christ, the Glorified Christ’s essence becomes apperceptively transparent to Thomas. My concept of Christ being the exemplar cause and Thomas the Apostle’s exclamation necessitates an acquisition of a truth, not the acquisition of an intelligible species such as colour. In this instance Thomas does not perceive Christ through the lens of the tree of knowledge of good and evil but through the primal acquisition process inherent in all human souls. In this instance the Apostle’s soul is re-united with the mode of its original access to God’s memory of what it is to be human. Thomas is changed by the reception of the form of the Christ-soul to the point whereby he knows, absolutely, that Jesus Christ is the Incarnated Word. The human soul is the forming principle as the first act of being and it is this *act* that participates in the human creation act of God. Furthermore, Aquinas teaches that truth is conformity and that it cannot be known through the senses and therefore the Thomas-Christ coincidence is particularly illuminating:

“Augustine says that ‘we cannot expect to learn the fullness of truth from the senses of the body’. First, because ‘whatever the bodily senses reach, is continually being changed; and whatever is never the same cannot be perceived’.”¹⁴⁶

Therefore understanding the ontological relation between the transmittal and reception of truth is of particular importance to the validity of my arguments.

¹⁴⁵ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q 78. A3, *respondeo*.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, Ia Q 84. A6.

Leo Elders, cites Thomas Aquinas: “[t]ruth must be the ultimate end of the universe [extends this notion to] truth is the summit of reality, for it is being come to awareness and conscious possession of itself.”¹⁴⁷ Both Aristotle and Aquinas assert that there is a specific relation between what is known and the knower.

"For knowledge occurs according to the thing known is known in the knower. But the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Hence the knowledge of every knower is according to the mode of its own nature. If therefore the mode of anything's being exceeds the mode of the nature of the knower, it must result that the knowledge of that thing is above the nature of the knower."¹⁴⁸

The proper and perfected functioning of the human soul requires that the soul conforms to truth. Aquinas teaches that “truth is defined by the conformity of intellect and thing, and hence to know this conformity is to know truth.”¹⁴⁹ As the knowledge of truth embeds the human soul through the intentional act of the intelligible species, the stretching forth of the mind seeking truth, enters into a relation with the truth it seeks once that particular truth is known as being true.¹⁵⁰ Aquinas teaches that a thing can be named only to the limit that it is known.¹⁵¹ Following Thomas's agreement with Aristotle, an entity is known to the degree by which its principles are known.¹⁵² Knowing the principles of a substantial entity speaks to knowing the being's innermost self. The human

¹⁴⁷ Leo Elders, *The Philosophical Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1990), 246.

¹⁴⁸ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 12. A4, *respondeo*. See also: Q. 86. A1, *sed contra* and *respondeo*.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, Ia Q. 16. A2, *sed contra*.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, Ia Q. 16. A3, *sed contra*.

¹⁵¹ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 13. A1.

¹⁵² Richard Lee, “The Analogies of Being in St. Thomas Aquinas,” *Thomist; a Speculative Quarterly Review*, 58:3 (July 1994): 472.

person's first principle is the soul. Knowing the principle of an entity via an abstraction process¹⁵³ of its sensible properties leads to an incomplete understanding the entity's nature. Such a process leads only to a limited physical awareness and an even more limited spiritual or absolute awareness. To properly know or to be spiritually aware of the principle of a substantial entity requires a different cognition process. The acquisition of the knowledge of the principle of a substantial entity is what I term the *spiritual* or *apperceptive awareness* of the human soul; it is a truth-event and follows a different cognition path than that of the ordinary human being. Aquinas also teaches that what is sensible cannot be perceived as truth.¹⁵⁴ I argue that the sensible cannot be perceived as truth because of a temporal separation between the sensitive stimuli being received in the past only, and the rational human soul existing in the ever-present reality of the divine Being. The gap between the temporally bound substance of the body and the immaterial nature of the human soul prevents the ordinary human soul from acquiring the spiritual awareness of another human soul and other spiritual substances such as angels. The earthly Jesus on the other hand did not acquire knowledge solely through the sensory cognition apparatus of the human body since he was without original sin. Jesus' knowledge acquisition apparatus by-passed the spatial-temporal mode which is necessary for the ordinary human soul due to the tasting of the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil.

¹⁵³ The abstraction process is the Scholastic term for human judging and understanding.

¹⁵⁴ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 84. A6.

The remainder of the journey is to bring us to a more complete apprehension of the relation the human soul has with itself, its body and Creator.

Prefatory to Chapter 2.

"I answer that, "To think" ... is more strictly taken for that consideration of the intellect, which is accompanied by some kind of inquiry, and which precedes the intellect's arrival at the stage of perfection that comes with the certitude of sight. On this sense Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 16) that "the Son of God is not called the Thought, but the Word of God. When our thought realizes what we know and takes form there from, it becomes our word. Hence the Word of God must be understood without any thinking on the part of God, for there is nothing there that can take form, or be unformed." In this way thought is, properly speaking, the movement of the mind while yet deliberating, and not yet perfected by the clear sight of truth. Since, however, such a movement of the mind may be one of deliberation either about universal notions, which belongs to the intellectual faculty, or about particular matters, which belongs to the sensitive part, hence it is that "to think" is taken secondly for an act of the deliberating intellect, and thirdly for an act of the cogitative power."¹⁵⁵ (emphasis added)

Without admitting to an overly prideful stance of the place of humanity in the order of the Divine creation, I claim a personal stand regarding the intellect of angels and the intellect of the stewards of God's temporal creation, the human being. I believe that the intellects of these two created and rational beings are created for differing purposes and therefore cannot be properly compared. Humanity was created with the ability to be the Master's stewards in caring for the temporal order; angels are God's messengers. In order to be faithful stewards humanity required intellectual powers that allowed for humanity to freely follow the will of the Creator. The structure and essence of the angel-being is such that acquiring knowledge is an instantaneous event and I claim as messengers so structured as to be unwavering in the discourse. The structure and essence of the initially created human being was such that acquiring knowledge and communicating that knowledge was also an instantaneous event, but with the object that

¹⁵⁵ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* IIa-IIae Q. 1. A10, *respondeo*. Cited as well by Robert Pasnau *Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, A Philosophical Study of Summa theologiae* Ia 75-89 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 169.

humanity was to steward the natural order. Both beings require such instantaneity in order to know and fulfill the will of God. Humanity, in breaking its covenant with the Master was separated from the divine Being in such a manner that the intellectual soul was prevented to enact its ability to be naturally aware of the Creator, and, to be naturally *aware* of all created beings. Instead humanity requires the employment of the *phantasms* to acquire knowledge and to communicate. *Phantasmal* operations also require a corporeity, the human brain that individuates the human person, which, once again, is a *haecceitic* separation of humankind from the Creator.

As cited above, acquired knowledge of individuals is gained or actualized through the powers of the sensitive soul which is an added potency due to humanity's original sin. Humanity's original sin blotted out its natural memory of the source of its *quiddity*, the source of where the initial essence of human nature resides. I conclude the prefatory to the chapter leaving a final yet conflicting word to Thomas:

"But the human intellect, which is the lowest in the order of intelligence and most remote from the perfection of the Divine intellect, is in potentiality with regard to things intelligible, and is at first "like a clean tablet on which nothing is written," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4). This is made clear from the fact, that at first we are only in potentiality to understand, and afterwards we are made to understand actually. And so it is evident that with us to understand is "in a way to be passive"; taking passion in the third sense. And consequently the intellect is a passive power."¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, Ia Q. 79. A2, *respondeo*.

CHAPTER 2 THE HUMAN SOUL

And then God said, "Let us make humankind in our image, according to our likeness and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the wild animals of the earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth. (Genesis 1: 26)

He [Adam] said, "I heard the sound of you in the garden, and I was afraid, because I was naked; and I hid myself;" (Genesis 3: 10)

And the LORD GOD made garments of skins for the man and for his wife, and clothed them. (Genesis 3: 21)

The three biblical passages noted above encapsulate the journey of the human soul from beings endowed with dominion to beings fearful and hiding from God, to beings whose souls are entombed in the garment of the flesh of the animal. The human soul, separated from God, fell from a spiritually endowed being to that which is weakened and individuated by the corporeal garment. A plausible understanding of Genesis 3:10 is that the *pre-lapsarian* entities of Adam and Eve were sufficiently dynamic to represent themselves as visible beings formed with luminous bodies.¹⁵⁷ With their expulsion from the Garden, the illumination of the first human bodies was, so-to-speak, extinguished. The extinguished state of the illuminated human bodies is the foundation for Thomas Aquinas' understanding of the present state of human beings:

"[S]oul, flesh, and bone belong to the notion of man."
(*Summa theologiae* Ia. Q. 29. A3, ad 3)

He then defines the human soul citing Aristotle:

¹⁵⁷ Philoponus, *On Aristotle's "On the Soul 1.3.5,"* trans. Philip J. van der Eijk (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 135 n. 162.

“For he writes, “We have now given a general answer to the question, What is soul? It is substance in the sense which corresponds to the account of a thing.” (412a8-12), that is, the substantial form of a physically organized body.”¹⁵⁸

Thomas elaborates:

“The soul is that by which we first live, feel, move and understand...”¹⁵⁹

With these three quotations Thomas Aquinas brings into sharp focus the composition of human beings and the role of the rational human soul. The next quotation however picks up where the Hebrew bible ended.

“I am the Way, the Truth and the Life.” (John 14:16)

Jesus as Truth strikes at the heart of my aims for the thesis. My aim is to demonstrate, metaphysically, how the human soul of Jesus Christ illuminates the ordinary human soul. Therefore, the purpose of Chapter 2 is to provide a common understanding of the nature and relations of the ordinary human soul by primarily applying the metaphysical thought of Thomas Aquinas as found in the *Summa theologiae*.

I commence with modern and philosophically grounded definitions of the human soul. In the next section I provide a synopsis of the relevant sections of the *Summa theologiae* which permits the reader to obtain an apprehension of the rational soul’s construction. Following Thomas’ understanding of the human soul I then provide a relatively in-depth and complex treatment of the essence of the soul and its relation to its first act. Also, I point to tangents of the human soul’s relation with the Christ-soul in anticipation of Chapter 3. In order to appreciate that the human soul is burdened with

¹⁵⁸ Thomas Aquinas, *De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas*. Translated as *On the Uniqueness of Intellect Against Averroist* by www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/8246/http://dhsprory.org/thomas/DeUnitateIntellectus.htm (accessed 20 May 2011).

¹⁵⁹ Thomas Aquinas, *De Anima* II, 2, 414, a 12.

the added potential of the clothes of the animal, I briefly elaborate on the origin of the human soul, original sin and the metaphysical consequences of original sin. I conclude Chapter 2 by suggesting a fresh understanding of the human soul as is supported by the Augustinian and Thomistic notion that the memory of what it is to be human resides in the divine *suppositum*. We now turn to the pertinent questions of the *Summa theologiae*.¹⁶⁰

The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines the soul as “the spiritual or immaterial part of a human being or animal, often regarded as immortal.”¹⁶¹ *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy* defines the soul as “an entity supposed to be present only in living things.”¹⁶² And, the *Encyclopedia of Theology, The Concise Sacramentum Mundi* considers the soul as “the constitutive element by which human existence is capable, by nature, of attaining selfhood...it is one of his principles of being.”¹⁶³ The first two definitions present the concept that there is a real possibility that the human soul is subjected to a temporal framework. In other words, as death fatally corrupts the physical body, so ends the existence of the human soul.

Contrary to the finite view, I take the stand that the human soul is the principle of being and therefore is grounded in eternity. Specifically, Aquinas asserts that the soul is

¹⁶⁰ The synopsis on Aquinas’ teaching of the human soul is very rudimentary. For those who are familiar with Thomas’ work this section may be passed over except for the introduction to Question 77 which discusses a parting from Thomas’ thinking. For a more complete treatise on the soul I suggest Aquinas’ *Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima* found at: <http://dhspriority.org/thomas/DeAnima.htm#11>.

¹⁶¹ *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English*, 9th edition, s.v. “Soul.”

¹⁶² *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*, 2nd edition, s.v. “Soul.”

¹⁶³ *Encyclopedia of Theology: The Concise Sacramentum Mundi*, 1975 edition, s.v. “Soul.”

the *first act of being*. That is, the human soul gives *esse* or existence to the human composite of human signet-matter and soul. In this vein the human soul, as the principle of being, and, subsequent to its first act, initiates the intellect to think, the body to act, and the mind to love. Citing Dionysius, (*Coel. Hier. xi*) Aquinas assigns three criteria to the human soul as “divided into essence, power, and operation.”¹⁶⁴ The human rational soul has three minor principles: the receptive agent, called memory; the active agent, the will, and, inherent in the will, love, which is perfected by divine grace. The human soul is also subsistent; “as we say that those things subsist which exist in themselves, and not in another.”¹⁶⁵ Therefore the Thomistic human soul is an image and similitude of God. Unlike God the human soul requires the union with its body in order to fully define its nature, its personhood and its essence¹⁶⁶. However, before I unpack the contents of the chapter, it is advantageous to lay a common foundation of the structure of the human soul as taught by Thomas Aquinas.

Synopsis of the Summa Theologiae Pertinent to the Thesis, Prima Pars, ‘Treatise on Human Nature’.

Introduction to the Section

The work of Thomas Aquinas is vast and extremely complex to the point whereby all who attempt to apprehend and comprehend his thinking frequently arrive at differing

¹⁶⁴ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 77. A1, *respondeo*.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, Ia Q. 29. A2, *respondeo*.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, Ia Q. 39. A2, *ad. 3*. Thomas teaches that the word essence has its root in *essendo*, that is, being. As will be seen shortly, the essence of what it is to be human resides in the *actus essendi* of the human form as “the power of memory” as Augustine says in *Confessions* Book X, XXV, 36.

interpretations. My aim in this section is to provide the reader with a clear understanding of the construction and relations of the ordinary human soul as taught by Thomas Aquinas. In order to achieve this aim the following section provides the reader with a peek into questions applicable to the ordinary human soul found in Thomas' *magnum opus*, the *Summa theologiae*. After a brief and general introduction I follow the order Thomas employs starting with question 75 and ending with question 87. My method in this section is to abstract the pertinent arguments, provide commentary, and then introduce my own or others' interpretations of Thomas' thinking.¹⁶⁷

The Aristotelian – Thomistic understanding of the ordinary human soul has been minimally popular with theologians and philosophers alike. Scientists and the ever impressionable public have concluded that the atomists of ancient Greece are correct after all; the human soul is material in its nature and succumbs to the same fate at the body at death, that is, nonexistence.¹⁶⁸

In tension with the dualists and the materialists, the pivotal argument for the thesis is based on two metaphysical foundations that rely on an immaterial soul. The first is with regards to how philosophers since Plato and Aristotle have employed the notion of

¹⁶⁷ In much of Thomas' work he leaves considerable latitude for conflicting interpretations. On my part perhaps the conflict has more to do with an ignorance of the totality of Thomas' work. However, Thomas' philosophy seemed to have evolved over the thirty years he produced his insights. Unfortunately his untimely death at 49/50 years old left us without the clarity he would have produced had he lived longer. I could have chosen another method of presenting the thought of Aquinas and that is by choosing the pertinent points of discussion and then providing a view from Thomas based on all of his works. The method chosen has the advantage for the reader to learn in the order Thomas teaches and this is of great benefit. As a professor Thomas followed a method termed *Quaestiones desputate*, that is, to discuss or to argue the merits of a question.

¹⁶⁸ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 19. A2.

individuation¹⁶⁹ as articulated by Duns Scotus as the *haecceitic* principle. The second is with regards to the *phantasma* and Thomas Aquinas' assertion that all knowledge is received by the rational soul through the *phantasma*. These metaphysical notions are improperly employed by ancient and medieval philosophers due to a lack of comprehension of the nature of the created order. Without a proper understanding of these notions an understanding of the human soul's relations is incomplete, even erroneous. It is therefore imperative that I lay a common foundation of terms and logic as modern philosophy has corrupted many Scholastic definitions.

Following Thomas's teachings, the human soul is composed of three intrinsic *souls*; the rational soul, the animal soul and the vegetative soul. Each of the souls is essentially present in the whole soul. However, the animal and vegetative souls do not function after the destruction of the body. We will therefore concentrate our efforts on the human rational soul, its principles, its powers and its operations. The first critical principles of the soul are its *being (ens)* and *essence*;¹⁷⁰ the principles of the soul cause the powers, which reside in the brain, to function which in turn cause the body to operate. The operations of the soul cause the movement of the limbs, allows the mind to see, and causes the eye to perceive and so on through all the human composite's sensible operations.

The first aspect of *being* is of particular importance to my arguments since it relates to the ontological reality of the human person. Thomas teaches that being can be understood in two ways. The first is through Aristotle's ten categories, substance (primary

¹⁶⁹ Mary Margaret McCabe, *Plato's Individuals* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 3.

¹⁷⁰ I highly recommend Thomas Aquinas' work *On Being and Essence (DE ENTE et ESSENTIA)*. <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/aquinas-esse.html>.

i.e., individual, not secondary, i.e., universal), quantity, qualification, relation and so on. The categories support truth in propositions, which is the second way. For example, consider the phrase 'Socrates is white' which functions with a dual purpose for the apprehension of the two aspects of being. The first regards the object of this sentence as we see that white, and by inference the other Aristotelian categories, are accidental (contingent) in their own nature. The existence or being (*ens*) of the ten categories is dependent on the existence of a substantial being such as a chair, or a cat or a person. The difference between these two beings is that the first exists extra-mentally while the second exists mentally or intentionally. Essence therefore is the common foundation to a genera or species. Whereas Socrates' essence or his form is derived by the perception process employing the ten categories only, the intentional being is created in the imagination and does not exist in reality *per se* but in the spiritual realm of the mind. In this manner then all beings of the same species enjoy something (their essence) that is common to all members of that species. However, and this is the fundamental attribute of essence, being (*ens*) is actualized into existence by essence, the entity's form. Therefore in this manner existence is also termed *esse, to be*. Finally, and this concept is employed further in the chapter, essence, as the form of the entity, also *conveys truth* because of its convertibility to being (*ens*).¹⁷¹ Nevertheless the soul's power to be fully aware of truth is curtailed as a consequence of original sin.

In concluding the introduction to this section, I emphasize that Thomas asserts that matter, by employing principles of potency, limits the acts of the human soul and this

¹⁷¹ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 16. A3, ad 1.

includes the *actus essendi* (act of being) and its “principle of identity.”¹⁷² We know from Genesis 3:10-21 that the first human beings enjoyed a more intimate and dynamic relation with God, and each other, due to a special mutual awareness through the principle of identity. After the imposition of the *fleshy garments* and the attainment of the knowledge of good and evil, all relations changed. Through the pre-lapsarian couple’s choice to acquire knowledge through the tree of good and evil, humanity lost its intimate and natural mode of community with the Triune God. As I show later, the individual members of the Trinity are known through their personhood yet are hypostatic in nature. Instead of a relationship with the Creator’s community, humanity chose to allow the Serpent to introduce a mode of individuation that is subjected to the vagaries of the natural order and is foreign to humanity’s proper mode of being. Contrary to the fallen Adam and Eve, the earthly Jesus who was also *born* without sin, had a keen awareness of himself, others and dominance over creation. The *fleshy garments* of the ordinary human being limit one’s ability to ascertain truth and Truth and therefore properly participate in the communal life of the Trinity. Jesus enjoyed the original human body as did Adam and Eve who initially enjoyed and knew their original bodies – “... flesh of my flesh ...” (Genesis 2:23) and naturally knew God. We now turn to the pertinent questions of the *Summa theologiae* for Thomas Aquinas’ understanding of the human being.

¹⁷² Charles A. Hart, *Thomistic Metaphysics: An Inquiry into the Act of Existing* (Englewood Cliffs N. J. Prentice-Hall, 1959), 173. The thesis will employ the principle of identity, the first human named the animals for example, and therefore the principle of identity is employed in the thesis as an individuating principle. However, it must be joined with the will, specifically, intentionality to be fully enacted. Referring to the parable of the Good Shepherd, John 10, Jesus knows his sheep by name and they know him.

Question 75: The Nature of the Human Soul

In Ia. Q. 75 Thomas examines the nature, essence or *quiddity* (the *whatness*) of the soul: He defines the human soul as the first act of being or principle of life which means that the soul's first purpose is to participate in the creation of the human being. In a converse manner Aquinas states that "the act of a body [is] having life potentially."¹⁷³ He also teaches that "life is shown principally by two actions, knowledge and movement" and that these actions are incorporeal or immaterial in their source which is the soul. The fundamental treatise for Thomas is that the soul is "an act of the body" or the soul initiates movement by the body, whether it is physical movement, such as moving the limbs, or, immaterial movement, such as acquiring knowledge. Movement in Thomas' metaphysical realm is to move from potential to actual. As it is with the angels, the construction of the human soul is "divided into substance, power, and operation."¹⁷⁴

Thomas continues by stating that the human soul is that which initiates movement in the human brain and because it is a principle of movement it must also be subsistent. In other words the soul can exist on its own as a separated substance or as a part of the composite of the human person comprising body and soul. In this sense Thomas likens the soul to the intellect or mind. Therefore, contrary to Platonism Thomas asserts that the rational soul is insufficient without the human body. However, he does make a distinction between an individual person, such as Socrates, and that *signet matter* (common matter that has been individuated or formed into a human being) is that which individuates one

¹⁷³ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 77. A1, *respondeo*.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, Ia Q. 54. A3, *sed contra* and Ia Q. 77. A1, *sed contra*.

person from another. The human soul signifies or informs the matter into the human person. Therefore according to Aquinas the relation between body and soul distinguishes or individuates the person. Thomas' particular mode of distinguishing the individual human composite of body and soul is founded on the theology arising out of the tree of good and evil. I argue that this mode is not the proper mode of individuation of the human composite. A metaphor is necessary to better understand my argument.

Thomas employs the example of a signet-ring forming a seal on softened wax that signifies or represents a king, or, for that matter, any person. The ring images the softened wax. The ring changes the un-formed or potentiality of the 'lump of wax' into a 'being', in one instance an intentional being, that causes movement and imparts knowledge to those who recognize the significance of the seal. In the other instance the seal is also a natural being; it exists in space-time. As a natural being it does not enjoy the same power as the intentional being. It is in this sense then that Thomas states that the soul is the form of a physically organized body. It is in this sense that we may understand the proper human soul as the seal of the Creator in the created universe as the Creator's stewards.

Unlike the wax employed in the above example, the signet-ring, comparatively speaking, is indestructible and incorruptible. The human soul, as the signet-ring of the body, is incorruptible and indestructible. Finally, an important aspect of incorruptibility is that the proper human soul, the proper human intellect, conforms to truth. Thomas makes a startling comment in answering the objections of article 2. He states that the human soul has the ability to "know the natures of all corporeal things." He qualifies his

statement with “whatever knows certain things cannot have any of them in its own nature” which suggests that human beings cannot know the true nature of other human beings which seems to be contradictory.¹⁷⁵ On this point I part company with Thomas’ conclusions. The Adamic couple, Mary the mother of Jesus, and, the human Jesus himself seemed to know, or be aware of the true nature of the other. Thomas conclusion is that the human mind or human intellect knows its own corporeal nature because the mind is immaterial and is not per se part of the body; it is however, united to it, which brings us to another difficulty.

According to Aquinas, by its very nature the human soul cannot know other human intellects directly but only indirectly through the human body’s accidents. If we turn to Scripture the redactor of the Gospel of John informs us that Jesus knows his sheep as his Father knows him (John 10: 14-15) suggests that the human soul of Jesus is aware or knows the substantial form of the individuals of his flock through the eyes of his heavenly Father. Is Jesus’ human soul different than the ordinary human soul? Or, is it the imposed accidental properties of the original sin that prevents the ordinary human soul to be more fully aware of its own essence and that of others? The answers to these questions and the relation of the Christ soul to the ordinary human soul are more completely developed in Chapter 3.

The next important question concerns the relation of the soul to the body.

¹⁷⁵ If we could know the true nature of human beings then quite possibly human disease could be eradicated.

Question 76: The union of body and soul

The mode by which the body and soul are unified in Thomas Aquinas' metaphysic is what differentiates Thomism from all other philosophies.¹⁷⁶ My interpretation of the mode of the body-soul union is the point that introduces the most tension concerning Thomas' teachings. Thomism is founded on the Aristotelian philosophy that the proper composition of the human person is that of a *hylomorphic* union of *corporeal body* and immaterial soul. In this union Thomas and Aristotle refer to the corporeal body which is, in my interpretation, the matter signified as the garment of the flesh of the animal worn by fallen human entities. Humanity's imposed garment camouflages the true aspect of human nature.

Thomas commences Question 76 with an assertion that the intellectual principle is the form of man and is united to it. According to Aristotle human beings understand because the intellectual principle is their form and as such equates soul with the intellectual principle. The intellectual principle initiates the operation of the intellect. Aquinas continues by adding that "knowledge is a form of the soul" and draws a logical inference; nothing can move unless it is in act,¹⁷⁷ that is, it is not in potency. By definition the soul is the principle of act of the body. The soul is a substantial form that not only

¹⁷⁶ Gyula Klima, *Thomas of Sutton on the Nature of the Intellective Soul and the Thomistic Theory of Being*. <http://www.fordham.edu/gsas/phil/klima/TS.htm> (accessed 04 May 2011). The Thomist theory of the unicity of substantial form strikes at the heart of Thomas' teaching on the unicity of being and essence. However his teaching on this subject is considered by many as being incoherent. Contrary to Henry of Ghent and others, the thesis is in agreement with Thomas' theory. The thesis' arguments may even help to clarify Thomas' teachings on the subject.

¹⁷⁷ The term 'act' refers to moving from more potency to less potency or to more actuality. For example, a person who is ignorant of mathematical operators, such as $2+2 = 4$, is in a potential state of knowledge. By learning the basis of this operator, the student moves to an actual state of knowledge.

subsists in itself, but also gives subsistence to the signet-matter of the body. Therefore the soul is the primary principle of everything the body accomplishes especially understanding. He then adds that as the form of the body, a requirement of the soul is to be conscious of being aware that one is aware of one's own awareness. He concludes that because one understands and one senses, then "in some way [the soul] is united to the body." Thomas explains that the union of the immaterial soul is united to the body through the intelligible species, which reside in the possible intellect – the store-house of ideas, concepts but not memories. Memories, the record, in this instance, of past events, are stored in the passive intellect which is also linked to the phantasms which reside in the corporeity of the brain.

A crucial aspect of Thomas' cognition theory is relevant for my thesis.

" [...] knowing beings are distinguished from non-knowing beings [animals, therefore the animal soul] in that the latter possess only their own form, while the knowing being is naturally adapted to have also the form of some other thing; for the species [idea, concept] of the thing known is in the knower."¹⁷⁸

In other words Thomas states that the human mind abstracts, from the object perceived, an intelligible species of that object. Abstracted species resemble universals in their mental composition. However, in the present state the human soul can only abstract sensible objects and not immaterial substances. In tension with Aquinas I claim that the soul is created to be naturally aware of soulful-type substances, but are hidden from view by the clothes of the flesh of the animal. This notion, which is a consequence of original sin, is further unpacked at the end of this chapter.

¹⁷⁸ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 14. A1, *respondeo*.

Following Aristotle again, Thomas assigns the same logic to the nature of human beings. We know the nature of an entity by what it does. Tigers are carnivores because they hunt for meat; human beings are human beings because their proper operation is to understand, to be rational. Entities (species) take their natures or essences as their form and the proper form of human beings is the rational soul. In comparing the human being species to the feline species as an example, the more a species is removed from the matter (potency) of its body, the more “noble” it is, which means the closer to God it is. Again, a consequence of original sin is the reduction in the nobility of human nature is also investigated at the end of the chapter.

Question 77: The Powers of the Soul

The powers of the soul are those powers that direct the operation of the soul to move the human body and are distinguished into five categories: "the vegetative, the sensitive, the appetitive, the movement according to place, and the intellectual."¹⁷⁹ It is the intellectual power that is of interest for it is also termed ‘soul’ which does not, according to Thomas, reside in matter but is united to it. The essence or nature of the human intellectual or rational soul is to act, which is the rationale for Thomas to assert that the first act of the soul is to cause the reduction of matter from potentiality to actuality. Act implies movement and Thomas looks to the four dimensional existence of the created world to define the matrix within which the human soul *is*.¹⁸⁰ The powers of the soul are as numerous and as varied as there are operations of the human body. The

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, Ia Q. 78. A1, *sed contra*.

¹⁸⁰ I do not to infer that the human soul *is not* within the realm of eternity once separated after the destruction of the body. A valid argument can be made that due to the origin of the human soul the soul straddles the dimensionless and dimensioned realities.

most obvious operations are seeing, hearing and tasting. The less obvious are, for example, digestion, endocrinal activities and hepatic functions.

Although I follow Thomas regarding the general direction of the movement of the human composite, that is, towards ultimate happiness which is found in God, Thomas and I are not as congruent as to which powers enact such movement. Thomas understands the soul's intentional nature as the will's power of thrusting forth into the dimensioned universe. (Note that the term 'will' represents a principle of the soul, but can also be employed as a power of the soul as well. The will and intellect have the unique relation of joining the immaterial with the material.) I take a more adventurous stand and look to the Thomistic power of intentionality as a relation that is not only inherent in the very essence of the soul, but is also anchored in the *suppositum* of God where the origin of humanity resides. Perhaps I have elevated the notion of intentionality, a subset of the will, to a principle over and above what it is metaphysically capable of performing. However, I claim that it is the divine intentional act that stretches forth in the creation of the universe. The human soul, as a similitude and steward of God, is endowed through and with and in God, with this bi-directional intentional attribute. To peek further into my development of the human soul, and with regards to the human soul's origin, one could say that the soul requires a firm launch pad and divine fuel (divine grace in the act of creation) to thrust itself forward. The human soul's launch pad is the memory of what it is to be human and in this manner the relation of will and intellect are joined into the human reality. With the terms of this question established let us return to Question 77.

Question 77 starts with the concept that the powers of the human soul are not of the same order as the soul's essence since power and act are not of the same genus. With regards to the soul, *its act is its substance*. Act denotes a portion of potentiality. In other words, as the soul actualizes matter, a movement from potential to act, and since matter's essence is pure potential, it is in the soul's essence to reduce the matter of the body from potential to act. Knowledge and love are essentially inherent in the soul and therefore the human soul employs these two principles in its act. The soul's power, which is directed to its specific act by the will, is not only known by the relation of its act with the object of the act, but also through an intentional relation inherent in the act with the object as enacted by the totality of the intellective soul. The ultimate end of the intellective soul is 'truth'. The veracity of these relations are Thomas' mode of determining truth in the act; truth in Thomistic terms is conformity of subject to object being understood as being the same; *Socrates is white*, for example.¹⁸¹ The perception of truth however is of another matter since the intellect as a principle acts through the powers of the soul, which are contingent on the corporeity of the body, which has a certain degree of potential, which may equate to error. Aquinas asserts that "substantial forms ... are unknown to us, but are known by their accidents"¹⁸² which I claim is a consequence of original sin thus diminishing the nobility of human nature. An example of a noble feature of the human soul is to perceive truth. Although the perceived truth that Socrates *is white* on the surface seems to be known truthfully, what is not known is

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, Ia Q. 16. A1.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, Ia Q. 77. A1, ad 7.

Socrates inner truthfulness. What is not known for certainty, as an example, is his rationale to choose death. Socrates' inner nature is camouflaged by the garment of the skin of the animal he so willingly discarded. The concept of truth inherent in the human soul is further investigated at the end of the chapter.

Aquinas then establishes his notion that the separated soul does not enjoy all its powers as it does in being united to its body. Some powers are shared with the sensitive nature of the soul and therefore function solely in the composite of body and soul. The separated soul cannot taste for example. However all of the principles that are essential to the human composite are inherent in the human soul. For example, the blind person can see only potentially because the principle of seeing is in the human soul but the operation to see is in the eye. Aquinas makes a distinction between the soul as a sentient being that feels, something rough or smooth, which is through the body versus the mindful act of feeling happy or sad which reside in the soul. The powers of the soul, that are solely of the soul, such as feeling happy or sad, "belong to the soul alone as their subject; as the intelligence and the will", which the soul retains even after being separated from the body which occurs after death. The sensory feeling of roughness or smoothness is perceived through the body's perceptive senses and pass through the phantasm to the brain from which the human rational soul or mind may extract the acquired knowledge for future use.

Question 78: Preamble to the Intellect

Question 78 prepares Thomas' students for the more complex question 79. Aquinas has divided question 78 into two main sections. The first provides an

understanding of the corporeal powers and the second prepares the reader to better understand Thomas' teaching regarding incorporeal powers. Thomas establishes the distinction between an extrinsically oriented intention and an intrinsically oriented intention as that which requires the brain-mind relation for the former, and a mind-only-property for the latter. It is in the latter that my argument becomes speculative.

In question 78 Thomas presents the transcendental¹⁸³ nature of the intellectual soul which is based on his understanding of cognitive process of intentionality in corporeal experiences. The main feature of question 78 is to assist in the apprehension of intentionality as it relates to the immaterial world of the mental and divine. As Thomas has demonstrated elsewhere, corporeity or matter is to the soul as potency is to actuality. As we proceed through question 78, it becomes evident that two distinctive intrinsic understandings¹⁸⁴ of the term 'intentional' emerge.

As mentioned previously, the human soul is immaterial and a subsistent being. All three Aristotelian souls harmoniously subjugate the matter of the body to their powers. These souls also provide a causal relation between the intrinsic and extrinsic principles as efficient causes are to instrumental causes which, for example, provides for self-locomotion. Citing Avicenna Thomas distinguishes five interior powers that are inherent

¹⁸³ The common understanding of the term 'transcendental' includes the notion of 'going beyond', which insinuates a super- or beyond the natural inclination of the subject. With regards to the human soul I take the stand that an inherent property of the human soul is that it is designed to bridge the finite and eternal realm. A task of the human soul is to provide the rationality as the steward of the created order for the eternal Master. Therefore by definition the human soul must be able to be 'at home' both in the natural and intentional order; the finite and the infinite respectively.

¹⁸⁴ Question 78 regards principally the extrinsic or externally directed aim of intention, but again Thomas employs the technique of proceeding from the visible to the invisible in his teaching.

to the sensitive soul "common sense, phantasy, imagination, and the estimative and memorative powers."

Situating question 78 within the context of the thesis, and, although more adventurously than Thomas' view, a proper intentional and intrinsic function of the human soul is to form an awareness of another human soul.¹⁸⁵ "For the intellect, as we have seen above (Question 78, Article 1), has an operation extending to universal being."¹⁸⁶ The human soul was not created with the intent to acquire knowledge through the tree of knowledge of good and evil. The human soul is designed to communicate with and through God. The present matter of the ordinary human composite limits the human soul's natural ability to be aware of the other soul's presence because it is rooted in the individuation principle rising out of the tree of knowledge. Thomas teaches that a relation between the mind and an external, four-dimensional object truly exists; he also teaches that an awareness of a mind-to-mind as a subject-object entity that is not only immaterial, but exists only as two unconnected intellectual souls. In tension with Thomas' teaching I argue that the perfected or proper human soul could enjoy an awareness of other intellectual souls. Such awareness would be acquired through God and the harmonious and unifying gifts of the Holy Spirit as did the earthly Jesus and the pre-lapsarian Adam and Eve.

¹⁸⁵ To refresh the reader's memory, the purpose of Chapter 2 is to lay a common, yet proper foundation of the human soul. The human intellect does not only function in the corporeal world but also necessarily must have the property to be aware of separated substances, otherwise we could not know God. In question 78 A1 Thomas shows that the human soul has the power to extend to the universal being which, once again, infers an intentional act.

¹⁸⁶ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 78. A1. Thomas shows that the human soul has the power to extend to the universal being which, once again, the thesis takes to infer an intentional act.

Returning to the specifics of question 78, according to Thomas the human sensitive soul is rudimentary in its operation and he compares most of the sensitive soul's powers to that of other mammals. Interestingly he asserts that animals have the ability to know intentions of other animals, not through the senses, but perceived by the estimative power; sheep naturally know the intention of a wolf. Such intentions in human beings are stored in the memorative power faculty of the sensitive soul, where the memory, the abstracted form of past events reside. The animal and human being mode of intentional behaviour differ because such intentional abilities, in the animal, are natural to its being. In contrast human beings construct a coalition of ideas to understand the intention of the other. Human beings think by combining processes of the physical brain with the processes of the immaterial mind to form concepts. The intentional thinking of another being *and* memories that reside in that particular being's brain are stored by the memorative power and the formed intention is shared by the brain and mind. We can place Thomas' teaching into a more modern framework.

Certain aspects of an animal's DNA/RNA structure provide animals with the ability to determine the intentions of another, although experience in the animal's environment is also required. Science has shown us that with regards to all animals, including human beings, the memory of what it is to be that particular animal or human resides in the DNA/RNA structure. The DNA/RNA structure is nature's means to transfer natural knowledge from parent to child. In metaphysical parlance the origin of knowledge for the child resides potentially in the parents and then actually in the child, who then is potentially the origin for the next generation and so on. In an anthropological sense

human generation is a similitude of the creative act of God as Father. Residing within the *suppositum* of the parents is the corporeal memory of what it is to be human. The mental or soulful intention of the parents, in their generative capacity, is to stretch forth as a survival technique of the species, or for a believer, to fulfill the goodness of having children. (Genesis 1: 28) The concept of intention in this specific case is different than the formerly defined meaning of intention as one who is logically apprehending another being's intentions, or, the modern understanding of one who intends to drink a glass of water. Instead, I prefer the meaning of the term 'intention' as employed by the Scholastics, that is, *to stretch forth*. The term intention is characterized as a metaphysical relation between potency and actuality and not the movement from one physical position to another. Therefore the concept of intentionality is that which is primarily directed from the mind towards an immaterial entity.

The ultimate happiness for the believing Christian is the Triune God through Christ as mediator. The inference here is that the intentional act is one of relation. Thomas Aquinas and other Scholastic thinkers consider intention as a stretching forward of the intellectual soul. In order for there to be a proper relation with any intentional act it must be rooted in the past so that its forward stretching mode is done so with certainty.

Mortimer Adler states that "it is the immateriality of the power of conceptual thought that must be posited in order to explain the mental acts that cannot be adequately explained in neurological terms alone."¹⁸⁷ Adler proceeds to demonstrate quite forcefully that Thomas Aquinas differentiates between intentional acts that are in

¹⁸⁷ Mortimer Adler, "Immateriality and Intentionality" *The New Scholasticism*, vol. 41, no. 2 (Spring 1967): 327.

the brain-physical world and intentional acts that reside solely in the mind but extend into the physical world immaterially. The former are the 'intentional' acts of perceiving, memorizing and imagining, whereas the latter are intellectual intentional acts such as conceptual reasoning, judging and logical reasoning.

Question 79: The Intellectual Powers

Thomas starts this strategic question by affirming that the human soul's intellect is a power and not its essence. As such the act of learning or acquiring knowledge is not immediate either for the corporeal bound human soul or for the separated soul. The distinction of the intellect as a power demonstrates that there are activities within the human soul that are initiated by the differing genera within the soul, such as the appetitive soul and the intellectual soul. Each of these souls perform their own function but in harmony, theoretically, with each other.

Although question 79 regards the intellectual power of the human soul, there are critical metaphysical assertions that Thomas presents to the reader. In his *respondeo* to article 2 Thomas describes the nature of being (*ens*) as being passive with regards to the intellect.

“First, in its most strict sense, when from a thing is taken something which belongs to it by virtue either of its nature, or of its proper inclination, as when water loses coolness by heating [...]

Secondly, less strictly, a thing is said to be passive when something, *whether suitable or unsuitable, is taken away from it.*

Thirdly, in a wide sense a thing is said to be passive, from the very fact that what is in potency to something receives that to which it was in potency without being deprived of anything. And accordingly, whatever passes from potency to act, may be said to be passive, even when it is perfected. And thus with us to understand is to be passive. This is clear from the following reason. For *the intellect*, as we have seen above (Question 78, Article 1), *has an operation*

extending to universal being. We may therefore see whether the intellect be in act or potency by observing first of all the nature of the relation of the intellect to universal being. For we find an intellect whose relation to universal being is that of the act of all being, and such is the Divine intellect, which is the Essence of God, in which originally and virtually, all being pre-exists as in its first cause.” (emphasis added)

Aquinas advocates that the human soul inheres the specific ability or power to determine whether it should act in a passive or active mode of learning. The degree of passivity is a function of the source of the knowledge. The intellectual soul, because in its present state acquires knowledge through the tree of good and evil, is primarily passive in its learning mode. The intellectual soul absorbs the stimuli presented to it through the phantasms. In the more perfect realm of the sinless soul, acquisition of knowledge I conclude is in an active mode. The sinless soul sees through the eyes of God; it is therefore actively seeking or perhaps more accurately turning towards God for knowledge.

In his response to the objections Thomas describes a property of the human soul that is rarely discussed. Thomas' intent in this article is to articulate the inferences and meaning of an entity, a thing, that is passive. In modern terms, for the most part *passivity* refers to being 'receptive'. The property that Thomas describes in article 2 illuminates how the human soul suffers additional potency and vice versa enjoys additional degrees of actuality depending on its relation to the Divine intellect. Two aspects regarding the human soul's nature must be considered.

The first and most crucial aspect as it pertains to my arguments is that it is possible for the *nature* of the 'thing' to be altered either negatively or positively; the soul may be affected by more potentiality, or by more actuality. In its present state the ordinary human soul does not enjoy the constancy of the Triune God but instead is rooted in the

vagarities of the tree of knowledge. The soul that moves closer to God, gains in actuality, and the converse is also true. The second refers to the suitability of the act. In other words the act of taking something away is irrelevant to merit or demerit. The removal may refer to removing something negative like blindness or the contrary, taking away sightedness. However, most fundamental to my argument is the relation the soul has with the Divine Being. The original sin of humanity changed the nature of the relation of the human soul with its body. The nature of the human soul does not change. Rather it is the soul's power to form relations and to actualize entities with added degrees of potency, or, potencies that are immune to the acting principles of the human soul. I further develop at the end of this chapter my thoughts regarding the impact on the soul's power to be fully endowed with its proper being as a consequence of original sin.

The next teaching of Thomas is again particularly difficult and vast. Therefore I will follow a strictly narrow and specific teaching of Thomas. The cognitive process of the soul to acquire knowledge, to understand what is acquired and to store the understood species is at the heart of Thomism. Firstly, the species that is received into the passive intellect is received in "the mode of the recipient."¹⁸⁸ The cognitive process is a series of potencies and acts until understood. Thomas' reasoning is that until a perceived object is understood it not only is in potency to its full actualization of being understood, but until it is understood and for only "retaining species [ideas which are universals]"¹⁸⁹ it cannot be part of the intellect. Furthermore, Thomas teaches that if included in the definition of

¹⁸⁸ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 79. A6, *respondeo*. The mode of the recipient refers to varying degrees of being intelligent with angels being more so and human beings varying as per individual talents.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

memory are past events, then it is not possible for memory to be part of the intellective soul because in this instance past events are set in concrete and are therefore considered as individuals. The mode of acquiring knowledge of individuals is through the *phantasms*.

The *phantasms*, according to Aquinas, “are actual images of certain species, but are immaterial in potentiality.”¹⁹⁰ Thomas’ employment of the term ‘certain species’ refers solely to that which the senses can perceive. The role of the *phantasm* is to abstract the form of the perceived object and store it in the passive intellect (memory). The passive intellect resides in the sensitive soul – the Schoolmen’s term for a part of the human brain. Therefore, quite brilliantly, Thomas asserts that the memorized or abstracted form of the entity is materially stored but is immaterially available (potentially) for the intellective (intellectual) soul, the human mind, to actualize through the agent intellect (the will). The abstraction process is only feasible with *sensible* or in Thomistic terms, ‘individual species’. The actualization of the in-potency immaterial abstracted form is the universalization of the individual into a universal entity. An example may clarify.

During the human sensory process of perceiving an animal, such as a horse, the image of the horse is stored in the brain’s capacity for memory. The image is quite specific, but prone to error or more accurately inaccurate recall. In order to employ the stored image of the horse the human mind logically re-constructs a mental image from the universal nature of *horseness*. The image of the re-constructed horse is in effect all horses and in this manner the human intellect can then manipulate, or, re-interpret, or, re-create the memorized object as required by the particular situation. For instance, an

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, Ia Q. 79. A4, ad 4.

artist will paint an equivocal image of the horse emphasizing those aspects of the horse the artist wishes to portray.

Thomas' teaching on this subject is unpacked primarily in Chapter 3. However, in anticipation, the encounter with Thomas the Apostle with the risen Christ in the upper chamber (John 20:19) serves as a biblical lesson applicable to this particular abstraction process of Thomas Aquinas and furthers my argument regarding Jesus' apperceptive mode of awareness of human souls. The Apostle encountered or perceived Christ as one who *is*. I propose that at least initially Thomas perceived the risen Christ through his own lens of the tree of knowledge. In this sense, Christ was perceived as an individual in space-time which, according to Thomas Aquinas necessitates retention of the species of Christ in the memorative power which is not in the rational soul. Yet Thomas the Apostle instantly knew or more accurately was *aware* that Jesus *is* Divine, which is a universal concept or species and resides in the intellective soul. Aquinas clearly states that reception is in the mode of the knower. The Apostle's instantaneous understanding of the Divinity of Jesus is, according to Aquinas, for the soul to "apprehend intelligible truth."¹⁹¹ If we consider the degree of potency differential between the Christ soul and the Thomas soul, and, employ Aquinas' Aristotelian teaching "Now nothing is reduced from potency to act except by something in act." (Ia. Q. 79, A3. *respondeo*) we may be in a better position to more fully apprehend the metaphysical and real relation between the two souls. At the fall of humanity, God added a degree of potency and thus the ordinary human soul's power to actualize is insufficient. During his encounter with the risen Christ, the added

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, Ia Q. 79. A8, *respondeo*. The Apostle's apprehension of Jesus' divinity is as that of the angels, immediate which is atypical for human beings.

potency of the fallen signet-matter of Thomas the Apostle's body, fell away or was bypassed by a *communicatio Christi*. In other words Thomas was necessarily unified with Christ to see as Jesus sees, to hear as Jesus hears and to know truth as Jesus knows Truth. The potency of the garment of the skin of the animal was discarded, at least momentarily, so that Thomas could perceive without employing the *phantasm*. In Thomas' truth-exchange with Christ Thomas' knowledge acquisition was through God and not through the tree of knowledge of good and evil.

Thomas the Apostle knew both the universality and individuality of the God-man and such a quandary requires faith to reconcile at the personal level. Metaphysically though, perhaps there is some illumination and therefore reconciling the seeming contradiction to Aquinas' teaching is a daunting task and is left to Chapter 3.

Question 82: The Will

The underlying purpose of the act of the human will is to seek happiness. According to Thomas, the human will is intentioned to seek God as the end of its desires. Obviously the atheist does not agree with Thomas. The *atheist soul* may consider as its primary happiness an ethical and moral approach to the human condition. Contrary to the atheist, some Christian souls may seek personal comfort as their primary happiness. Thomas differentiates the two approaches to happiness. The first is the will as acting necessarily, and the second is the will as acting contingently. The key to understanding Thomas' teaching on the will is whether or not the particular act of the will enjoys "connection with first principles."¹⁹²

¹⁹² Anthony Kenny, *Aquinas on Mind* (New York: Routledge, 1996), 68-69.

The human soul's first principles are in a causal relation with the soul's first act of being which inherently, or perhaps out of necessity, have a relation with truth. The act of existence is a truth-kind, or, a truth-event. The act of existence therefore establishes a hierarchy of operations that determine under which circumstances the act of the will is superior to the intellect and vice versa.

The act of human existence is a two part causal event joining the agent of the cause and the beneficiary of the effect of the cause. Lawrence Dewan O. P. treats the relation between the cause and effect of human creation as a "relation between the creature's substantial form and the divine act of being."¹⁹³ Dewan continues:

"we must exhibit the *kinship* between form and act of being within the creature. There is a continuity, to be seen stretching from God as the subsisting act of being *both* to the creaturely form and to creaturely act of being."¹⁹⁴

Independently Anthony Kenny, paraphrasing Aquinas, is of the same mind as Dewan and notes that the "activity of the will is the will's tending towards the extramental (*sic*) reality *as it is* in itself."¹⁹⁵ Dewan's and Kenny's thinking regarding the employment of the divine will and the creature's will follow a common scheme. Both wills stretch forward; as both wills tend towards something, each are true to their essences; both wills exhibit a feature of continuity between the mind and the extramental; both wills are related as artist to the

¹⁹³ Lawrence Dewan, O.P. *St. Thomas and Form as Something Divine in Things* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2007), 39.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.* We will see further in the thesis that the act of being is complex and involves many principles so that the form may perform its proper act. For instance, the form would have a principle of identity. Furthermore, since the act of being is also a truth-act it follows that there is a *de re* (literally of the thing) relation in that the soul informs the matter of the proper body. We acknowledge therefore that the *de dictum* relation is the relation of the soul informing the matter of the body through the Word.

¹⁹⁵ Anthony Kenny, *Aquinas on Mind* (New York: Routledge, 1996), 72.

art, the divine Artist being the causal exemplar of the art. Consequently, the human soul must choose between that which is nobler and that which is less so. The distance from God the human soul chooses is proportional to the degree the human soul is able to enact the proper use of its will. If the object of desire is nobler than the human soul then it is better to enact the will, than the intellect, since love is an act of the will and not the intellect. The converse is also true. The causal exemplar relation between God the Father, the Son and the human soul of Christ, and, the ordinary human soul as it pertains to the intentional nature of the act of will is further addressed in Chapter 3.

Question 84: How the Soul Understands Corporeal Things Beneath It.

In Question 84 Thomas considers the operation of the soul through the human body, specifically the relation of the human soul to the phantasms through which the soul is in relation to the external world. The substance of question 84 is complex especially due to the issues it raises concerning Thomas Aquinas' cognitive process of employing the phantasms. Aquinas is correct in his teaching regarding the employment of the phantasms which today we would call images for the ordinary human composite. *Phantasma* are more than just images; they are the carriers of sensory perception and *present the* perceived image to the intellect. The intellect then causes the phantasm to be intelligible. The phantasm functions between the sensory and mental realms of the human composite of body and soul. The phantasm is also the contact with the tree of knowledge. However, instead of focusing primarily on question 84, I intend to employ support from question Ia Q. 14. A13 of the *Summa theologiae* which demonstrates a possible knowledge acquisition process of sinless human beings. Previously I introduced the notion of *de re/de*

dictum distinction as a modern understanding of the Scholastic modes of reality to demonstrate the separation between natural and the intentional realms of existence. Question 14 addresses, in part this distinction. The relation of *de re* and *de dictum* propositions and understanding the Scholastic use of these terms and how it relates the perception or certainty of truth are necessary to my arguments concerning the human soul's relations. If I am to remove the process of acquiring knowledge through the perceiving lens of the tree of knowledge, I must replace it with a credible and coherent philosophy. However, prior to diving into these complex relations, we will start with a synopsis of question 84 and the pertinent articles.

Knowledge acquired by the body "is immaterial, universal, and necessary."¹⁹⁶ Citing Aristotle, Thomas speaks of the newly created soul as "a tablet on which nothing is written."¹⁹⁷ And, citing Augustine, Thomas concludes that the soul cannot be aware of itself through the senses. The soul is ignorant of itself since it is not possible for it to know or be aware of any thing that is in potency; that part which is in potency is non-existent. Furthermore in article 3 Thomas asserts that the human soul is in potency "to all such species." Augustine states that "we cannot expect to learn the fullness of truth from the senses of the body."¹⁹⁸ To apprehend Thomas' inference that the human soul is in potency regarding knowledge of material entities, one must dive into the heart of question 84, which is article 7. Thomas brings to light a critical aspect of his cognition

¹⁹⁶ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 84. A1, *respondeo*.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, Ia Q. 84. A3, *sed contra*.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, Ia Q. 84. A6, *ad 1*.

theory. “In the present state of life ... it is impossible for our intellect to understand anything actually except by turning to the phantasms ... [which] is the likeness of an individual thing.”¹⁹⁹

Phantasms are inherent to the cognition process of Thomas and accordingly provide two essential cognition services. Firstly, the phantasms acquire the perceived external stimuli for the human soul. Secondly, the phantasms make the received stimuli available for the intellect to transform the stimuli into information that can be understood which is

“the proper object of the human intellect [...] a *quiddity* existing in corporeal matter. [W]e apprehend the individual through the senses and the imagination. And, therefore, for the intellect to understand [...] it must turn [...] to the phantasms in order to examine the *universal* nature existing in the individual.”

Furthermore, trying to understand, but not completely succeeding, the intellect “forms certain phantasms to serve him *by way of examples*.”²⁰⁰ (emphasis added) Thomas’ enlightenment of intellectualizing by way of examples provides the student with the foundation for the next step of learning by which he describes the rationale for using the phantasms. In order to apprehend through the operation of understanding, the human intellect *abstracts* the *quiddity* or nature of individual being from the phantasm.²⁰¹ The nature of an individual thing, that which it is, is its *quiddity*. In this sense then the *quiddity* is not stored as an individual entity, but as a universal species which can then be employed to construct complex notions. Universal concepts are not stored in the

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, Ia Q. 84. A7, ad 2.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, Ia Q. 84. A7, *respondeo*.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, Ia Q. 85. A1, ad 5.

corporeal part of the human but instead these types of phantasms reside in the immaterial part of the soul-body composite; it is stored in the *phantasia*, the Scholastic term for 'imagination'. The human soul acquires specific knowledge through the physical phantasms, stores and manipulates these specific episodes and individual beings, either in the passive intellect, the memory power of the brain, and stores the abstracted universals in the *phantasia*, the imagination center of the mind. From these storage houses, the agent intellect, the thinking part of the soul, abstracts the intelligible species, or idea, from the passive intellect and/or the *phantasia* to think. In the metaphysical relation between the ordinary human soul and the Christ soul, I believe that in certain events, such as the encounter Thomas the Apostle had with the risen Christ, and, the earth-bound Christ had with the Samaritan woman (John 4:7-26) employment of the phantasms is not contingent on the action of the sensible soul. In these instances the Christ soul, before and after rising from the dead, knows not through perception but through his relation with his divine Father just as the first humans communicated with God before they tasted the fruit of the tree of knowledge.

"Hence what is known by us must be necessary, even as it is in itself [...] Whereas what is known by God must be necessary according to the mode in which they are subject to the divine knowledge [...] but not absolutely as considered in their own causes. Hence also this proposition, "Everything known by God must necessarily be," is usually distinguished; for this may refer to the thing [*de re*], or to the saying [*de dictum*]. If it refers to the thing, it is divided and false; for the sense is, "Everything which God knows is necessary." If understood of the saying, it is composite and true; for the sense is, "This proposition, 'that which is known by God is' is necessary."

The issue Thomas faces in the above discourse is that a *de re* proposition of a composite, such as the composite of the body and soul of human beings, is inherently false.

Knowledge gained through the phantasms, as has been previously stated, is also inherently false. We know from the Gospel narrative of John that Jesus knew the *truth* hidden in the composite of body and soul of the Samaritan woman. We know from Genesis that God *knows* Adam and Eve, and, Adam and Eve *knew* God, naturally. Neither God nor Adam and Eve acquired such knowledge through the tree of knowledge of good and evil. Aquinas would distinguish between a *de re* being and a *de dictum* being as “with forms that are separable...” which I understand to include forms that are contingently or potentially separable.

““Everything known by God must necessarily be,” is usually distinguished, for this may refer to the thing, or to the saying [...] [T]his distinction holds good with regard to forms that are separable from the subject; [...] in forms that are inseparable from the subject, this distinction does not hold, for instance, if I said, "A black crow can be white"; for in both senses it is false. Now to be known by God is inseparable from the thing; for what is known by God cannot be not known. This objection, however, would hold if these words "that which is known" implied any disposition inherent to the subject; but since they import an act of the knower, something can be attributed to the thing known, in itself (even if it always be known), which is not attributed to it in so far as it stands under actual knowledge; thus material being is attributed to a stone in itself, which is not attributed to it according as it is known.”²⁰²

Scholastic metaphysical thinkers employ *de re* distinction in a real mode and in logical propositions. C. J. F. Williams comments that the former interpretation is foreign to modern semantic or epistemic philosophy. Theologically speaking however, there is a case for *de re* knowledge to be truthful if one bases this supposition on biblical narratives.²⁰³

²⁰² Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 14. A13, ad 3 cited by Williams, C. J. F. “God and Logical Necessity,” *The Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 11, no. 45 (October 1961): 356. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2216540> (accessed 31 July 2011). Williams makes the point that Aquinas understands the distinction between *de re/de dictum* propositions.

²⁰³ As part of Ia Q. 87 the thesis explores the principle of identity that is enjoyed by the human soul. As the divine Creator’s stewards, humanity was given the right and obligation to name the animals etc. We also know from the First Testament that Jesus knew his sheep by name. (John 10: 14-15)

In the above reply to objection 3 regarding the falsity of knowledge from the reality of the composite, the human soul has taken a backward step due to original sin and now must interpret reality through the tree of knowledge of good and evil.

Furthermore, prior to their disobedience the *pre-lapsarian* humans named the animals and therefore contrary to the teaching of Thomas and the Philosopher, the natural state of the newly created human being is not a blank slate but acquires knowledge through a veil of potency that blinds the human soul. In a seeming reversal of his teaching, again building on Augustine's work, Thomas affirms that "the intellectual soul knows all true things in the eternal types."²⁰⁴

My concept of added potency of the garments of the skin of the animal *is* the present reality of humanity. The added potency is, in a sense foreign to the original human soul, and unpacking this concept in Chapter 3 may provide a metaphysical and spiritual apprehension that provides a more meaningful relation with God.

Question 87: How the intellectual soul knows itself and all within itself

The fundamental understanding of question 87 is that the human soul does not know itself through its own essence. The human soul understands itself as it understands corporeal substances, that is, through the Aristotelian principle of likeness-knows-likeness. In order for the soul to know likeness, the object must be in act, and therefore, as being, it is also true. Thomas makes the point that the human soul cannot know primary matter (which is matter in pure potency) unless it has received form, i.e., the act

²⁰⁴ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 84. A5, *sed contra*.

of being. Thomas teaches that intellectual beings know themselves by their essence, but in the order of intellectual species there is a hierarchy of being, essences and understanding through a being's essence.

God knows himself and all others through his Essence perfectly; angels know themselves through their own essence perfectly and others as well but imperfectly; the human intellect, directed towards substance, that is matter, is in potency to "the genus of intelligible beings."²⁰⁵ Therefore the human soul knows itself only through its act. However, as stewards and having been given the power to name animals and to know God, an underlying principle of identity must exist in the human soul which is unique amongst all creatures. The principle of identity is not only a participation in God through our created likeness, but is necessary for human beings to function as God's stewards. The soul's principle of identity, as with many other soulful principles, is somewhat impotent against the added layer of impotency imparted at the fall by God. The added potency not only prevents us from direct communication with God, but also prevents us from being truly aware of the quiddity of all beings which I assert is fundamental in humanity's stewardship role. Although we still have the right of naming, we do so in a handicapped fashion.

Recall that 'act' of the human soul is a process of abstracting a species or idea from a sensible object during the sensible process of perceiving, which are stored as phantasms and then through the agent intellect is actuated, made to exist, in the possible intellect, the imagination, which is that part of the mind that actualizes i.e., understands.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, Ia Q. 87. A1, *respondeo*.

The rational soul knows itself according to a causal instrumentality of the abstracted idea or intelligible species which are necessary to light-up the possible intellect, i.e., the imagination of the mind since we no longer acquire divine knowledge directly to light-up the possible intellect. The agent intellect, the will, employs the *phantasma*, not the specific phantasm, but the process of *phantasy*, to act as a causal instrument for understanding.

“And in this phantasm the intellectual impression shines forth as an exemplar in the thing exemplified, or as in an image.”²⁰⁶

The act of perceiving we may therefore apprehend as being joined with the exemplar, the intentional principles, and, power which is brought into operation through the sensory apparatus of seeing, hearing, touching and tasting. Stimuli are always received by the brain as knowledge from the past. In other words, scientifically speaking, all stimuli, received by the senses in the operation of perception, promulgates as a wave function. And, since there is a duration, for the wave to travel from the object to the perceiving organ and then to the brain and then to the totality of the mind, even if it is infinitesimally small, the object is known only in the past tense. The operative power of perception is a critical metaphysical notion for my thesis. Thomas Aquinas followed Aristotelian orthodoxy that perception is the abstraction of the whole, that is, the universal through the *phantasia*. The *haecceitically* impeded soul being instantiated locally apprehends primarily through the material and immaterial *phantasms* and *phantasy*. The human soul

²⁰⁶ H. Carr, *The Function Of The Phantasm In St. Thomas Aquinas*.
http://www.archive.org/stream/functionofphanta00carruoft/functionofphanta00carruoft_djvu.txt
(accessed 26 July 2011).

is not necessarily instantiated nor extended locally, but may operate in a nonlocal but extended determination. We know from biblical accounts of Jesus' glorified body that there is the possibility of a purely locally extended instantiation. John Wippel provides powerful interpretations on Aquinas' rendering of indeterminate and determinate dimensions with regards to individuation.²⁰⁷

"Thomas never changed his mind concerning the kind of dimensions involved in individuation. [H]e defends designated matter as considered under determined dimensions [and] he just as clearly allows this function to be fulfilled by matter ... at least under indeterminate dimensions."²⁰⁸

Wippel continues. Later in his life Thomas concluded that matter is individuated solely under determinate, that is space-time, dimensions. Although the thesis is in tension with Thomas on this point, the critical underpinning of Thomas' theory of designated or signet-matter is that it is a partner in the individuation of the entity. Once signet-matter has been informed by the soul, it follows the informing principle of the soul. As previously stated, glorified bodies seem to enjoy the principle of indeterminate and determinate dimensional ability.²⁰⁹ Let us then delve deeper into the nature of the human soul.

²⁰⁷ John F. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: from Finite Being to Uncreated Being* (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 371.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁹ Bell's Theorem <http://www.upscale.utoronto.ca/PVB/Harrison/BellsTheorem/BellsTheorem.html> (accessed 21 July 2010). The thesis argues, with the benefit of modern and sophisticated experiments, and contrary to Thomas Aquinas and others, that the recent scientific discoveries of non local beings provides a foundation for *indeterminate dimensioned individuation* which the thesis suggests is a property of a glorified body. Furthermore, Jesus' spiritual ability to *know* the sins of penitents brings with it the potential for insightful metaphysical construction.

The Essence of the Soul, its Relation to its First Act and to Truth.

Now that Thomas Aquinas' view of the human soul is completed, in order to set the stage for the remainder of Chapter 2 I now introduce a very complex treatise on how Thomas understands the distinction between essence, *quiddity*, and *esse*, that is, *actus essendi* for created beings. I claim that it is at the level of humanity's very being and essence that humanity's soul was 'punished' by God after humanity's original sin. For clarity I am not stating that the nature of the human soul was altered but that its relation to matter, truth and knowledge was altered in order to fit the choice of the Adamic couple. The mode of acquiring knowledge in the sensible world is such that it is somewhat foreign to the human soul. Thomas attacks the Aristotelian problem of the interchangeability of truth and being by relating truth and being to God at the very beginning of the *Summa theologiae*. Thomas writes:

"On the contrary, Hilary says (Trin. vii): "In God existence is not an accidental quality, but subsisting truth." Therefore what subsists in God is His existence."²¹⁰

Since truth and being are interchangeable, existence cannot be an accidental factor in the substance of the subsisting uncreated nor created rational entity. We learned in the previous section that being and truth, as it relates to existence, are interchangeable in the metaphysical theology of Thomas Aquinas. We also learned that the human soul cannot know the truth of being except through the senses. We also know that the pre-resurrected Jesus Christ had an ability to be aware of the soul of another human being. One may argue that it is the proximity or unity or overburdening of Christ's divine nature over his human nature that provided the necessary powers for Jesus' human soul to be aware of soulful type substances. However, if such is the case then any rationale for the

²¹⁰ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q3. A4, *sed contra*.

human Jesus to be the mediator for humanity to the Father is incoherent.²¹¹ Metaphysically Jesus' human soul enjoys *de re*, i.e., direct, relations with the ordinary human soul just as he enjoys a direct relation with the Second Person of the Trinity. Contrary to Jesus, and because of humanity's fallen nature, the ordinary human soul relates to other human souls and the Trinity is a *de dicto*, i.e., indirect but dependent mode. We are in relations to others through the soul's perceptive powers.

Perhaps an analogy is in order to more fully comprehend Thomas' point. We know and understand that the sun at noontime and the sun at dusk is the same existing object. We may acquire this knowledge first hand, *de re*, by seeing the sun traverse through the sky. Or, we may believe the testimony of one who has witnessed, *de dicto*, the day-long event. Or, we may logically determine that the noon day and latter day sun is the same being. From Thomas' teaching above we can assert that the sun possesses the truth of its own being; the sun at dawn is the sun at dusk. The issue that faces the perceiving human being is that what is perceived at noontime does not seem to be the same object perceived at dusk. The copula, the sun *is* yellow versus the sun *is* red does not denote the same *be-ing*. There is an ambiguity here – three human beings, one perceiving the sun at noontime and the other at dusk, another throughout the day, may differ in their apperception²¹² of the truth-kind. One has a direct relation, *de re* and the other an

²¹¹ The human Jesus of necessity had to enjoy the freedom of his human will.

²¹² I employ the term apperception as opposed to perception in this instance because the act required to judge whether or not the noon day sun and the sun at dusk are the same object requires two basic acts, perceiving and the conscious assimilation of information to form a conclusion.

indirect relation, *de dicto*.²¹³ Regardless, the perceiving human souls are *fooled* because of their relation to the potency of their own matter.

“Truth therefore may be in the senses, or in the intellect knowing "what a thing is," as in anything that is true; yet not as the thing known in the knower, which is implied by the word "truth"; for the perfection of the intellect is truth as known. Therefore, properly speaking, *truth resides in the intellect composing and dividing; and not in the senses; nor in the intellect knowing "what a thing is."*²¹⁴ (emphasis added)

Metaphorically speaking, the bright, life-giving sun at noontime is the sinless human soul exemplified by the human Jesus. The cooler, less life-giving sun of dusk exemplifies the fallen human soul. The substance, that is, the substantial form of the souls of the two beings is identical. However the human soul lacks the dynamism to pierce through the added layers of earth’s atmosphere which is analogous to the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and therefore perceives the red and bloated evening sun. Based on the previous analogy, we now turn to a being that is animated.

As one observes other human beings one apprehends, although subconsciously perhaps, several obvious but relative truths: regardless of colour, or size or shape we are of the same species, some are male, and some female, some with grey hair, and others may enjoy highlighted hair. Truth obtained from one’s observations depends on one’s perspective. The abstraction of *who another is* from the visual observation necessitates a second order operation. In other words the human mind or in Thomistic parlance the intellectual soul performs the conscious determination to judge, formulate concepts and

²¹³ I particularly favour the relation of witnessing and *dicto* (word) since it metaphysically attributes the Gospel and the Son as the Word to a relation with humanity. Due to original sin I suggest that the human soul lost its *de re* or direct relation with God.

²¹⁴ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 16. A2, *respondeo*.

arrive at a conclusion of the *quiddity* of the perceived individual. Irrespective as to how acutely one observes another, it is not possible for the human mind to be fully aware of other human beings let alone the particularity of their human minds.²¹⁵ The ordinary human soul employs its imaginative power to judge and understand that which is ‘the other’. According to Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, what we see in the first instance, we see truly. The received stimulus is a spiritual reception of a material form as a “spiritual change”²¹⁶ in the human soul. Aquinas teaches that the operation of perceiving requires a physical change taking place in the sense-organ, and a mental event taking place in the rational soul. Aquinas is guided by Aristotle’s notion that corporeal activity cannot affect the incorporeal soul except through the composite of body and soul. Although this is basically true, some tensions face this interpretation.

Notably, all sensory perception occurs in the past – what we see, hear, taste and feel has occurred – the received stimuli did not occur in the present. In one sense past perception of stimuli is a true reality. However, by the time the human brain receives and records the stimuli and re-interprets the data time has passed and the reality has changed. Not only does the sensation take time to reach the human sensory apparatus, but human beings do not have the ability, as many other animals do, to see in the ultraviolet, to hear in the ultrasound and to sense minutely present odours. Therefore human beings miss much of what the physical world offers. In other words human perceptive abilities cause incompleteness in the ability of the soul to form relations.

²¹⁵ The thesis employs a narrow definition of the human mind to be synonymous with that of the Scholastic notion of the rational human soul.

²¹⁶ Sheldon M. Cohen, “St. Thomas Aquinas: On the Immaterial Reception of Sensible Forms,” *The Philosophical Review*, XCI, no. 2 (April 1982): 245.

The human soul logically connects the received stimuli and the stored memory through the agent intellect to form a species i.e., a concept. In opposition to the perceiving act, whatever human beings contemplate in the mind occurs only in the present.²¹⁷ Human beings can think about the past and dream about the future but human thoughts are forever in the present. Extending this concept to awareness of one's being, awareness of one's environment and awareness of another human being's intrinsic essence, human beings are aware-of-their-own-awareness, solely in the present tense; human beings are unaware of the awareness of other human beings. Thomas Aquinas addresses these two modes of truth and the gap between true truth and less-true truth.

The distinction between the two is complex, and, is present in the words of Jean-Paul II:

"The words "I was afraid, because I was naked, and I hid myself" (Gn 3:10), witness to a radical change in this relationship [God and humanity]. In a way, *man loses the original certainty of the image of God, expressed in his body.*²¹⁸ He also loses to some extent the *sense of his right to participate in the perception of the world*, which he enjoyed in the mystery of creation. This right had its foundation in man's inner self, in the fact that he himself participated in the divine vision of the world and of his own humanity."²¹⁹ (emphasis added)

The absence of the original gift of participating in the true perception of the world also prevents the human soul from the awareness of not only the truth of nonhuman entities, but more seriously the inability of the human soul to be aware of one's own substantial

²¹⁷ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q.13. A11, *respondeo*. "for it signifies being in the present." An attribute Aquinas signifies in God is his ever-present reality. I claim that because the human soul is created in the likeness of God it also shares, though to a lesser degree, in such ever-present reality.

²¹⁸ "My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?" Matthew 27:46; Mark 15:34 and Psalms 22:1. The thesis suggests that Matthew and Mark's narratives demonstrate that Jesus' human soul is now shielded from his divine nature and humanity's 'original certainty' is also absent. Jesus is at this moment in time an image of the original human soul.

²¹⁹ Pope Jean Paul II, *Real Significance of Original Nakedness* General Audience of 14 May 1980. <http://www.ewtn.com/library/papaldoc/jp2tb26.htm> (accessed 22 February 2010).

form and the form of other subsistent beings.²²⁰ Generally Thomistic thinkers rely on the following determination of Aquinas to describe the proper mode of human knowledge acquisition.

“human souls differ from superior substances inasmuch as the human soul’s intellective power, by its very nature, must acquire its immaterial knowledge from the knowledge of material things attained through the senses.”²²¹

My response to Thomas’ view of this matter is as follows. The human soul is designed to communicate with its Creator, which is evident throughout the opening verses of Genesis. As such I claim that the human soul must have the ability or soulful principle to be able to acquire non-sensible, that is, divine knowledge. I believe that it is only in this manner that the Adamic couple could communicate with God, and unfortunately with the Serpent. Even after the betrayal the first human sinners still could properly dialogue with God. This communicating ability brings with it the power to properly abstract essences which are not prevented due to humanity’s covering of the garments of the skin of the animal. Although one may think one has abstracted the essence of another human being as Thomas claims, one can only do so only partially. One cannot abstract another’s own self-awareness and therefore is left with an incomplete notion or even a falsity of who the other person is. One’s own self-awareness resides in the immaterial soul where the ever

²²⁰ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 77. A5, *sed contra*. The thesis agrees to an extent with the Philosopher and Thomas, however, due to original sin there is now a dominance of the potency of matter suppressing the act of the soul.

²²¹ Thomas Aquinas *Quaestiones Disputate de Anima* Q. 1 a1 *respondeo*, trans., John Patrick Rowan (St. Louis & London: B. Herder Book Company, 1949). HTML edition by Joseph Kenny, O.P., and, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 77. A1; Q. 54. A3. <http://dhspriority.org/thomas/QDdeAnima.htm#2> (accessed 29 December 2011).

present reality of the passive intellect intermingles with the active intellect. Thomas, citing Aristotle brings into play the notion that the human soul, specifically in this reference, the human intellect, is as a blank slate: "On the contrary, The Philosopher, speaking of the intellect, says (De Anima iii, 4) that it is like "a tablet on which nothing is written."²²² Aquinas makes the argument that the human intellect learns through sensory experiences only. Sensory experiences, which are transcribed to the passive intellect through the *phantasms*, are in the worst case inherently erroneous, or incomplete and prone to interpretive falsity. Acquiring knowledge through the phantasms prevents the natural ability of the human soul to be aware of immaterial entities whether it is mentally, psychologically, or physically sourced, as was shown in Chapter 2. The perception of another person, according to Aquinas, is the perception of a rational person, an individual who is understood as a composite of body and soul, which is also defined as a substance. Therefore, human beings are presented with a difficulty in obtaining truth; it is not possible to be aware of another human being's self-awareness which resides in the human rational soul. As metaphysics is the study of *being as being*, it also entails *awareness as awareness*; human beings are aware that they are aware. However, from an epistemological stance there is a falsity imbedded in our awareness of the other. An ontological falsity is inherent in our ability to be aware of our own and other's *being qua being*. The ordinary human soul is unable to be fully aware of another because we are extrinsically broken; we are clothed in the flesh of the animal and are separated from God.

²²² Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 84. A3, *sed contra*.

Humanity's original mode of participation in the perception of the world grounds the foundation of the thesis: God created the human soul to be in communion and to communicate intimately with him. The design of the human soul is such that as God's stewards it perceives the natural order most truthfully through the Divine's lenses. Human souls that are unfettered by the limiting power of original sin enjoy a perception of creation different than the souls bound by original sin. Contrary to the sinless soul the ordinary soul's bloated distance from God, caused by original sin, alienates humanity from God which, at least partially, limits the human soul's ability to properly and consistently discern between right and wrong, truth and falsity.²²³ The soul's vehicle to acquire knowledge and therefore its ability to discern, to understand and to judge requires one internal and one external metaphysical power. The first power is inherent to the human soul and powers the human sensory apparatus but is created to acquire knowledge through its intimate relation with its Creator. The second is external to the soul and this power is inherent in *esse naturale* and drives the tree of knowledge of good and evil through which error-prone knowledge is transmitted. Even though these metaphysical powers are contained in the same knowledge acquiring system, one receiving the other transmitting, their functionality is distinct. A temporal gap exists between the reception of knowledge and its transmission. Furthermore, the human sensory process of knowledge acquisition and the tree of knowledge's process of transmission inheres another gap. Both the sensory acquisition and the tree of knowledge's knowledge transmission relate solely to individual or specific knowledge whereas the human soul functions with the universal.

²²³ Robert Merrihew Adams, "Original Sin: A Study in the Interaction of Philosophy and Theology," in *A Reader in Contemporary Philosophical Theology*, ed. Oliver Crisp, 235 and 248 (New York: T&T Clark, 2009).

The gap or distinction between how the ordinary human mind functions with the brain results in the ordinary human being cognitively functioning in error.

Thomas Aquinas teaches that with regards to the intellect, the power of the soul to acquire knowledge and therefore truth, necessitate two modes of cognition to properly function.

“...because sense has *singular things* for its object, and intellect has the *universal* for its object, it follows that our knowledge of the former comes before our knowledge of the latter. Secondly, we must consider that our intellect proceeds from a state of potentiality to a state of act. But everything which proceeds from potency to act comes first to an incomplete act, which is midway between potency and act, before achieving the perfect act.”²²⁴
(emphasis added)

The process by which the ordinary human intellect (soul) proceeds from potency to act takes time, needs to be experienced and is error prone. The human intellect by acquiring knowledge via the tree of knowledge is unable to acquire knowledge through the Divine knowledge of the created order. Therefore, as the human soul apprehends, it can only proceed through varying degrees of potentiality which consists of the procession from a total lack of truth (an unknown) to truth as far as the human soul may achieve truth. Truth may be understood in two ways. Truth may be apprehended either as it resides formally and inherently in substantive entities, or, truth may be conceptualized intellectually or logically. Thomas teaches that the former concept inheres in a creature's being and in its *esse*, and therefore is intrinsic to the individual. In this sense, truth, good, and, being are convertible.

“The true resides in things and in the intellect, as said before (A.1). But the true that is in things is convertible with being as to substance, while the true that is

²²⁴ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 85. A3, *respondeo*.

in the intellect is convertible with being as that which manifests with what is manifested; for this belongs to the nature of truth, as has been said already (*ibid.*). It may, however, be said that being also is in things and in the intellect, as is the true; although truth is primarily in things; and this is so because truth and being differ in idea."²²⁵

And, from Article 4 of the same question,

"On the contrary, What is in more things is prior logically. But the true is in some things wherein good is not, as, for instance, in mathematics. Therefore the true is prior to good.

I answer that, Although the good and the true are convertible with being, as to suppositum, yet they differ logically. And in this manner the true, speaking absolutely, is prior to good, as appears from two reasons. First, because the true is more closely related to being than is good. For the true regards being itself simply and immediately; while the nature of good follows being in so far as being is in some way perfect; for thus it is desirable. Secondly, it is evident from the fact that knowledge naturally precedes appetite. Hence, since the true regards knowledge, but the good regards the appetite [*original righteousness*], the true must be prior in idea to the good."²²⁶

Thomas presents notions, such as God is not contained by any limiting factors, and then extends his thinking to human composites in which, as Aristotle defined substance is a limiting principle to the actualizing act of the human soul. Aristotle's ten categories, for example, quantity, quality and relation, describe these limitations. However, the pre-lapsarian humans were not limited in the same manner or to the same extent as ordinary human souls are bounded. Adam and Eve were created with an incorruptible body as is narrated in Genesis 2:17 "*but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat, for in the day that you eat of it you shall die*" and "*God created us for incorruption, (sic) and made us in the image of his own eternity.*" (Wisdom of Solomon 2:23) Certainly accidents such as quality and relation would not have limited the pre-lapsarian beings as

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, Ia Q. 16. A3, ad 1.

²²⁶ *Ibid* A4, *sed contra; respondeo.*

ordinary human beings are limited. Therefore, the first humans enjoyed a proper human body; a body that was devoid of all sin; a body, because of its closeness to God, enjoyed an original righteousness and did not suffer the same effects of disease etc., nor were they naturally attracted to concupiscence.²²⁷ The *pre-lapsarian* body, because of its closeness to God had the power to self-illuminate; that is, it had dominion over its environment which included an innate awareness of the essences of other beings. True stewardship necessitates the attribute of self-illumination. The pre-lapsarian awareness of another being's essence would not have been the same universal awareness as ordinary human souls. No, the pre-lapsarian soul would know specifically the other.

“Hence it is manifest that the nature of a non-intelligent being is more contracted and limited; whereas the nature of intelligent beings has a greater amplitude and extension; therefore the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that "the soul is in a sense all things." Now the contraction of the form comes from the matter. Hence, as we have said above (Question [7], Article [1]) forms according as they are the more immaterial, approach more nearly to a kind of infinity.”²²⁸

In Thomistic terminology matter is the potency that is to be actualized through the actualizing principle of the human soul. I demonstrate in Chapter 3 that the human soul requires the causal exemplar act of the Son through the instrumental cause of the human soul of Christ to enact the human soul to sufficiently reduce the potency into a fully actualized human person. I also point out that according to Aristotle “the soul is in a sense all things.” Giovanni Pico della Mirandola employs

²²⁷ Robert Merrihew Adams, “Original Sin: A Study in the Interaction of Philosophy and Theology,” in *A Reader in Contemporary Philosophical Theology*, ed. Oliver Crisp, (New York: T&T Clark, 2009), 235.

²²⁸ Thomas Aquinas *Summa theologiae* Ia. Q. 14. A1, *respondeo*.

Aristotle's insight and summarizes how the human person processes and understands acquired knowledge.

“And if our unity is purchased by the enslavement of a reason submitted to the rule of the law of the members, that will be a false unity, since thus we shall not be true. For we are called and appear to be men, that is, animate beings living by reason; and yet we will be brutes, having for law only sensual appetite. We will be performing a juggling trick to those who see us, and among whom we live. The image will not conform to its exemplar. For we are made in the likeness of God, and God is spirit (John 4:24) but we are not yet spirits, to use St. Paul's words, (1 Corinthians 2: 14; 15:46) but animals. If, on the contrary, by grace of truth, we do not fall beneath our model, we have only to move towards Him who is our model, through goodness, in order to be united with Him in the afterworld (*sic*).”²²⁹

“And so, what is corruptible in us must be clothed in holiness and incorruptibility; and what is mortal must be clothed, now that death has been conquered, in the Father's immortality.”²³⁰

The Origin of the Rational Soul

“[...] Adam, who is *a type* of the one who was to come.” (emphasis added) Romans 5: 14b.

Citing Aquinas who cites Augustine,

“Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8) that, "As the type, according to which the creature is fashioned, is in the Word of God before the creature which is fashioned, so the knowledge of the same type exists first in the intellectual creature, and is afterwards the very fashioning of the creature.”²³¹

Thomas Aquinas, citing Augustine of Hippo, defines with great elegance the thought and soul of the thesis and specifically an aim of this chapter. We cannot understand the construction of the human soul without understanding its origin. Just as St. Paul writes that Adam is a type of the Jesus, so too are all human beings.

²²⁹ Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, *Of Being and Unity, (De Ente et Uno)* trans. Victor Michael Hamm (edition by Joseph H. Peterson 2001), <http://www.esotericarchives.com/pico/beinguni.htm> (accessed 20 June 2011).

²³⁰ Origen, “On Prayer,” *The Liturgy of the Hours* v. IV (New York: Catholic Book Publishing Corporation, 1975), 577.

²³¹ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 55. A2.

Approximately one thousand years prior to Johannes Gutenberg inventing the type that would image the verbal word, Augustine proclaimed that humanity is typed after, through and in the Word made visible. The exemplar image of the Christ forms first the human soul and then, in the moulding of the clay, forms the matter of the body. However, the matter of the pre-lapsarian and Jesus-like bodies differs from ordinary humanity, as Aquinas noted above, that the former's appetite seeks the good, rather than concupiscence. Human beings enjoy an innate desire to acquire knowledge. How does my scheme that the ordinary human soul's inability to absolutely seek the good, since truth is veiled in the shadow of the tree of good and evil, play out with Aquinas' metaphysical methodology?

Thomas strictly follows the order and analogy of being, such as, Aristotle's axiom regarding the analogy of proportion, analogy between common concepts and analogy of proportionality; form is prior to matter; principles are prior to powers and powers are prior to operations; the priority of substance over accident; potency is reducible through act; univocal is more substantive than equivocal, and in the order of acquiring knowledge, sense is prior to *phantasy* and *phantasy* is prior memory and memory is prior to imagination which is prior to the will. And, stretching between the immaterial (mental) and physical worlds, in likeness to its Creator, *is* the intentional nature of the human will. Thomas' cognitive process just described is void of the modern concept of awareness of the self or being inherently aware of the other.

Thomas affirms the inability of the human soul to be fully aware in the *Summa theologiae* IIa-IIae Q 8. A1, *respondeo*:

“Now there are many kinds of things that are hidden within, to find which human knowledge has to penetrate *within* so to speak. Thus, under the accidents *lies hidden* the nature of the substantial thing; ... *under likenesses and figures the truth they denote lies hidden* (because intelligible things is enclosed within as compared with the sensible world, which is perceived externally), and effects lie hidden in their causes, and vice versa.” (emphasis added)

The human soul is created to be aware of that which is hidden within. I claim that the caching of the human soul Thomas affirms above is the free-choice of humanity to perceive the sensible world through the tree of knowledge of good and evil. In order to perceive such a mode necessitates the garment of the skin of the animal, a gift from God, otherwise humanity would be blind and lost not only spiritually but naturally as well. Humanity’s spiritual salvation, for the believing Christian, flows from the Incarnation of the Word who is also the *Type* that forms the human soul.

Augustine’s *inclusio* cited at the beginning of this section describes four images and/or acts regarding the term ‘type’.²³² The first mention refers to the model that names or fashions the creature.²³³ The second regards the type or exemplar that is *in* the Word prior to the creation of the creature; the type therefore exists from eternity and *is the substance of the Word*. The third acknowledges that the imprint or the similitude of the knowledge or the pattern is *in* the intellectual soul. And, finally, it is the soul that forms the creature. What definitively is the type and where is it in regards to the human soul?

²³² The literary form of *inclusio* notifies the reader that a truth is being emphasized.

²³³ The quandary here is which is real? The thesis faces the age-old conflict of the nominalist versus realist notion of existence. However, Augustine seems to have joined the two terms by uniting the name and the form and so as the Word speaks the divine Truth so as the Word He is the divine Son. Thomas teaches: “Since according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), words are signs of ideas, and ideas the similitude of things, it is evident that words relate to the meaning of things signified through the medium “of the intellectual conception.”” *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 13. A1, *respondeo*.

“Mortal, raise a lamentation over the King of Tyre, and say to him, Thus says the Lord GOD: You were the signet of perfection, full of wisdom and perfect in beauty. You were in Eden, the garden of God;” (Ezekiel 28: 12, 13a)

Ezekiel acquaints us with the notion that the divine Being signifies creatures with gifts as a signet-ring signifies the ring-bearer. The transfer of the gift of being follows the same signet-ring mode of operation. Humanity, as the signet-ring of God, is fashioned through the form or type of the Christ-soul. What would be the most precious gift a divine Being could give? It is *esse, to be*.

Aquinas determines after Aristotle, that

“being is innermost in each thing and most fundamentally inherent in all things since it is formal in respect of everything found in a thing, as was shown above (Question 7, Article 1).”²³⁴

Furthermore, referring back to the Augustinian citation, Thomas presents a clearer apprehension as to how created intelligence functions.

*“I answer that, The word intellectus (understanding) implies an innermost knowledge, for intelligere (to understand) is the same as intus legere (to read inwardly). This is clear to anyone who considers the difference between intellect and sense, ... while intellectual knowledge penetrates into the very essence of a thing, because “the object of the intellect is what a thing is,” as stated in the book on the Soul.”*²³⁵

Continuing therefore on this theme we apprehend that in some manner the human soul inheres in the intelligible species of the divine Being and it is the Word that *types* or *signets* the creature. The *signature (sic)* of the Word is in an analogous relation to the *de dictum* mode of reality as the Word stretching forth to and imprinting the Word’s image on the *de re* mode of reality specifically the human soul. Lawrence Dewan’s analysis of the

²³⁴ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 8. A1, *respondeo*. Cited by Lawrence Dewan, O.P. *St. Thomas and Form as Something Divine in Things* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2007), note 85.

²³⁵ *Ibid.*, IIa-IIae Q. 8. A1, *respondeo*. Cited by Lawrence Dewan, O.P. *St. Thomas and Form as Something Divine in Things* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2007), note 86.

kinship between the form and the act of being, regarding the human soul and its relation to reality, sheds light on how we may better apprehend the origin of the soul.

Lawrence Dewan O.P. reinforces several of Thomas Aquinas' teachings: in creatures the substantial form and act of being (*esse*) are different; there is a relation between the created substantial form and the act of being of the creator; the creature's act of being is the most formal and most interior act it can perform, and, since the act is an interior act, it is an act of the intellect. Dewan asserts that in the act of creation, the divine being creates through a causal exemplar relation that stretches forth or intends from the mind of God to the creature's form and to the creature's act of being (*esse*). We know from Elder's reading of Thomas that the divine ideas are in two modes, one as knowledge and the other as exemplar. The creature's form is inherent in the Creator's essence, the source of divine ideas as knowledge and extends forth from the Creator during the intentional and exemplar act of causing the creature's act of existence, its act of being. Furthermore, as has been noted earlier:

"Likewise every form whereby each thing is constituted in its own species, is a perfection; and thus all things pre-exist in God, not only as regards what is common to all, but also as regards what distinguishes one thing from another."²³⁶

The distinction between individuals pre-exists in God as well. For there to be distinction there must be degrees of potency, and in God, since there is no potency, the distinction resides in the intentional nature of the divine's individuating act of creation. Dewan then

²³⁶ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 14. A6, *respondeo*.

concludes that “the form has the ontological status of potency relative to the *esse*.”²³⁷ Potency in this sense means prior – the form actualizes or causes *esse*. The form pre-exists in God as Aquinas asserts that “the nature proper to each thing consists in some degree of participation in the divine perfection.”²³⁸ Participation in the divine perfection can only be in the Creator’s creative act of existence of the creature. Therefore the form is nobler than the effect which is the *esse* (existence) of the entity. The form is the intellectual part where the sin of sensibly acquired knowledge occurred. Because the human form is anchored in the divine *suppositum* it is the soul’s free existence that is impounded and the intellectual soul is imprisoned in the realm of sensory perception.

We can now answer the question posed above regarding the definition of the type and its *whereabouts*. The type is the immaterial intellect and it is placed as an identity principle in the human soul modeled after the person of Jesus Christ. Furthermore Augustine continues to provide guidance:

“Great is the power of memory, an awe-inspiring mystery, my God, a power of profound and infinite multiplicity. And this thing is the mind, and this am I myself [...] So great is the force of memory, so great is the force of life, even in the mortal life of man.” “this thing is the mind, and this I am myself”.²³⁹ Augustine concludes “[...] so you [Christ] are not the mind itself. For you are the Lord God of the mind.”²⁴⁰

²³⁷ Lawrence Dewan, O. P. *St. Thomas and Forms as Something Divine in Things*, (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2007), 41.

²³⁸ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 14. A6, *respondeo*.

²³⁹ Augustine of Hippo, *Confessions* X. XVII 26.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, Book X, XXV, 36.

Aquinas follows with:

“[...] human nature began to be in an eternally pre-existing *suppositum* of the Divine Nature.”²⁴¹

And,

“Likewise every form whereby each thing is constituted in its own species, is a perfection; and thus all things pre-exist in God, not only as regards what is common to all [in the case of the human beings it is human nature that is common to all; the soul is what makes human beings what they are.], but also as] regards what distinguishes one thing from another.”²⁴²

The entailment I envisage from Augustine’s and Thomas’ rationale is that it is the original human body, the human signet-matter, and not the garment of the skin of the animal that is primordially unified with the soul. As such, the human soul is imperfectly adapted to the divinely imposed potency of the garment of the skin of the animal. Since the soul is a perfection it is incongruent in its relation with the human body veiled with such added potency. The original human body that God created, that “was very good” (Genesis 1:31) is no longer visible to the ordinary human eye. This visual negation requires a new mode to distinguish one human being from another; the new mode is through the *haecceitic* attribute that follows God’s gift to humanity of the garment of the skin of the animals. Coupled to the *haecceitic* individuation mode, which is also a separation from God, is the sensory acquisition of knowledge through the *phantasms*. Let us then turn to the origin of humanity’s ill-conceived mode of knowledge acquisition through the tree of knowledge of good and evil.

²⁴¹ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* IIIa. Q. 16. A6, *adversus* 1.

²⁴² *Ibid.*, Ia Q. 14. A6, *respondeo*.

Original Sin

The Roman Catholic doctrine of original sin is found in the canons and decrees of the Fifth Council of Trent celebrated in June of 1546.²⁴³ The Tridentine doctrine concludes that through the failure of the first human beings, humanity, with obvious exceptions, is devoid of a natural relation with God. The Council asserts that the “guilt of original sin is remitted” through the Sacrament of Baptism. However, some of the consequences, such as the soul being bound to a corporeal body, and that in the “baptized there remains concupiscence, [which according to the thesis is the separation from God via the flesh of the animal] or an incentive [to sin].”²⁴⁴ Robert Adams provides an excellent comparison and understandings of the Catholic, Reformation and Kantian view of original sin. The Reformers and Kantian theologians and philosophers differ from the Catholic understanding; however, their views are not without merit but cannot be treated here.²⁴⁵

Original sin can be understood in a metaphysical context according to several Catholic thinkers. Scripture tells us in Genesis 3 that humankind’s sin was a breaking of a covenant with the Creator; Adam and Eve were not to eat of the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil. The relation of the first humans to their Creator prior to tasting of the fruit of the tree of knowledge falls upon their responsibility as stewards of the garden. The unique aspect of the first humans as stewards, since they were in a

²⁴³ The Council of Trent: The Fifth Session: *The canons and decrees of the sacred and oecumenical Council of Trent*, trans. J. Waterworth (London: Dolman, 1848), 21-29. <http://history.hanover.edu/texts/trent/ct05.html> (accessed 31 March 2011).

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, Section 5. p. 23.

²⁴⁵ Robert Merrihew Adams “Original Sin: A Study in the Interaction of Philosophy and Theology,” in *A Reader in Contemporary Philosophical Theology*, ed. Oliver Crisp, 229-253 (New York: T&T Clark, 2009).

natural relation with the Master of the garden, would not toil by the sweat of their brows. Instead, their stewardship work is of an intentional nature. Intention in this sense is in similitude to the Creator's intentional act of creation, that is, the act of stretching forth. The act of intention is therefore the mode through which the immaterial soul meets the physicality of the corporeal world and forms relations with it. Inherent to the human soul, due to its likeness to God, is its ability to steward God's creation through the mental or the soul's intentional power. Instead, we see in Genesis 3:17 that upon the fall God willed that "*in toil you shall eat of it all the days of your life.*" The first human's sin is in a sense a sin of self-idolatry; they would be like God. And since their relation with God is one of stewardship of the physical order, the punishment is designed to fit the crime. The punishment, as Jean Paul II rightly points out, is a loss of humankind's *sense of his (sic) right to participate in the true perception of the world*. Humanity obtained what it wished for and now human beings acquire knowledge and relate primarily through the distortion of sensory perception, and, tame the earth through the sweat of the brow.

Metaphysical Consequences of Original Sin

"And the man and his wife were both naked and were not ashamed." (Genesis 2:25)

"But the body of the first man was not a burden upon his soul, for the body was not corruptible."²⁴⁶

These two quotations, the first from Genesis and the second from Thomas Aquinas support the metaphysical speculation of the thesis. The first speaks to the relation between human beings, and the human soul's relation with the Creator as well.

²⁴⁶ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 94. A2.

Metaphysically the nakedness and lack of shame of the pre-lapsarian couple points to an awareness and innocence that is justified as being true.

The second quotation supports the first: the pre-fallen soul enjoys a body that is in such harmony with the soul that in relation to the soul the body does not harbour burdensome potency.

Throughout biblical history one may find three presentations of the human soul and in a sense three degrees of corporeal potency: the first is the pre-lapsarian persons of Adam and Eve, with, as suggested by John Philoponus, illuminated bodies;²⁴⁷ the second is the fallen or corporeal body of the present human person that suffers the most potency, and finally the glorified body of Jesus Christ that enjoys the fullness of act and signet-matter with the least degree of potency.²⁴⁸

Philosopher Lawrence Dewan provides insightful commentary on the inner *kinship* the soul must enjoy to be fully personified.²⁴⁹ Dewan teaches that the student of the metaphysical thought of Thomas Aquinas should look for being (*ens*) in the “faces ... as regards its most evident appearance to us ... in sensible, generable and corruptible

²⁴⁷ Philoponus, *On Aristotle's "On the Soul 1.3.5,"* trans. Philip J. van der Eijk (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 135 n. 162. There is a French translation version by Pascale Mueller.

²⁴⁸ Only God exists without any potency and therefore is fully in act. For the purpose of the thesis however, the definition of a glorified body as a being fully in act is equivocally analogous to God's actualization. See *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 77. A4, *adversī* 1-4. In these four 'Replies to the Objections' Thomas articulates the relation of the human soul, as the forming principle of the body, and the primary matter of the 'body' that is actualized or reduced into act by the soul. Here we also learn, especially in *adversus 4*, how the human soul participates with God in its first act, that is, its act of existence, and, the apprehension of what Thomas understands of the relation between potency and act.

²⁴⁹ Lawrence Dewan, O. P., *St. Thomas and Forms as Something Divine in Things*, (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2007), 39. Personification also denotes the identification of the individual.

substances."²⁵⁰ Dewan presents several quotes, notably three from the *Summa theologiae*, Ia Q. 88. A1 and A3, and, Ia Q. 84. A1 which seem to contradict the direction of the thesis. We shall look at Q. 88. A3 and leave it to the reader to reference the others including those noted by Aquinas below as each follows the same vein.

Since the human intellect in the present state of life cannot understand even immaterial created substances (1), much less can it understand the essence of the uncreated substance. Hence it must be said simply that God is not the first object of our knowledge. Rather do we know God through creatures, according to the Apostle (Romans 1:20), "the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made": while the first object of our knowledge in this life is the "quiddity of a material thing," which is the proper object of our intellect, as appears above in many passages." (84, 7; 85, 8; 87, 2, ad 2)

Aquinas clearly asserts in the above passage, and those referenced by him, that the proper object of the intellect is to understand material things. The term proper refers to the most fitting or most ideal form or function of the human intellect. My argument with Thomas on this point is that I believe the proper object of all human souls is, as stewards of the Master's physical creation, is to reciprocate, through responsible stewardship, to God for being created. Furthermore, I believe I have a valid point in stating that humanity's fall does not eliminate the original proper object as stewards; it is just more difficult to perform. Let us turn to the following entailment to elucidate my thinking.

Arguably the redactor to the Acts of the Apostle would have concluded that the Apostles understood something of the Spirit of God after the first Pentecost. Mary the mother of Jesus would have understood something about the Spirit of God. After the visit of the angel Gabriel, Mary's first object would have been the Incarnated God she bore.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 38.

Mary, born without sin, one could say enjoyed the same human existence as the first parents who fell so quickly into sin. In most respects my arguments are congruent with Aquinas and Dewan. However, an added degree of potency is layered onto the faces which hinder the truth-of-being as a consequence of original sin. The epi-layer of potency forms impediments onto the human soul. It is the added potency we see in the faces of other human beings and it is this added potency I claim is that which prevents human beings from a true clarity of abstracting the essence of immaterial and material entities. However, given the additional potency, Dewan's insights regarding the kinship relations of the human soul are still pertinent and valuable to my argument. Therefore it is advantageous to unpack his work.

The fallen state of the ordinary human soul limits its intentional behaviour; the fallen human soul is incapable of truthful perception and awareness, and, it is also a being without sufficient dynamism to be a "being fully in act."²⁵¹ The ordinary human soul's incapacity, imparted by God on the first beings as His response to their disobedience, requires that the fallen or ordinary human soul interact with the created universe in a perceptive or sensible mode. Once again, let us return briefly to the words of Jean Paul II regarding the consequences original sin.

"He also loses to some extent the *sense of his right to participate in the perception of the world*, which he enjoyed in the mystery of creation. This right

²⁵¹ John F. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: from Finite Being to Uncreated Being* (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 119. Thomas Aquinas defines a being fully in act as that which has fully received its nature. Although the author of the thesis agrees with Aquinas, there is an additional necessity required and that is the fullness of the relational and intentional principle of reciprocity.

had its foundation in man's inner self, in the fact that he himself participated in the divine vision of the world and of his own humanity."²⁵² (emphasis added)

The human soul's powers are hindered by the additional potency of matter in two ways. The first involves the lag of perceptive stimuli being received and the ensuing inability for human beings to know truth with certainty. The second, since truth is convertible with being, (*ens*) humankind loses a degree of self- and other awareness, including God. In a very unfortunate limitation due to humanity's first sin, the human soul is unable to perceive the unity enjoyed and inherent in the created and eternal dimensions. The soul is unable to *apperceive* the essential unities formed by beings fully in act. The human soul, not being sufficiently dynamic to overcome the burden of original sin, can only form an essential unity with its own signet-matter, which is the principle of its individuation and alienation.

In metaphysical parlance the divinely imposed incapacity in effect prevents the human soul from reaching the fullness of its actualization. The potency-act relation with regards to human beings is the vehicle by which the corporeally bound intellect may differentiate between change, perception, and non-change and truth as self-awareness of being.

Jean Paul II notes in the above quotation that humankind's proper perception of the world is grounded in the human soul. The ordinary human or sensible perception is the purview of the matter of the body through the venue of the tree of knowledge of good and evil. Jean Paul II is also presenting the notion that the human soul proper

²⁵² Pope Jean Paul II, *Real Significance of Original Nakedness*. General Audience of 14 May 1980. <http://www.ewtn.com/library/papaldoc/jp2tb26.htm> (accessed 22 February 2010).

perceptive vehicle is through the eyes of God and that this soulful attribute is present during the creation of each and every human soul. Shortly I will show that it is a truth-event through the divine Logos that is the Exemplar of the human soul's acknowledging act.

The term matter in Thomism is defined as not containing any degree of actualization until it is actualized by the form. We can visualize the actualizing of matter through an example of an artist sculpturing a statue out of stone. The stone, in relation to the completed statue is in a state of pure potency. It is in effect just a piece of unformed rock. The artist, prior to commencing the work, creates an image of the completed object in his/her mind. In this example the image of the statue in the mind of the sculptor is the exemplar of the statue and the mind of the sculptor is the causal exemplar and his/her hand with the chisel is the instrumental cause. The finely crafted sculpture was then placed in an exquisite garden for all to admire. Then, because of a disagreement the sculptor enrobed the sculpture in a sack-cloth hiding its beauty. The analogy with creation of humanity and the subsequent fall is obvious. Let us examine this analogy of the fall of the human illuminated body in metaphysical terms.

The first act of the human soul is *to be*. Thomas states that the "human soul contains the body."²⁵³ Therefore the perfecting act of the human soul is, *to be, esse*, which is in an essential relation with the corporeal body. To be, as a perfecting act, cannot be made intrinsically less actual. Matter, as potency, limits the forming act to be of the ordinary human soul, not a defect in the human soul. Matter is more distant, and to

²⁵³ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 8. A1, ad 2.

employ Dewan's thinking, in my scheme the present soul/body relation is in a less proximate kinship; the relation has fallen from parent child to first cousins. Just as the relation between cousins is less ordered than between siblings, the fallen matter of the human person is less ordered as well and functions in a more chaotic fashion. The ordinary corporeal body is an effect from a divinely imposed distancing from God which increases the proportion of non-being relative to the being in act.

"The more a creature approaches in likeness to God the more it has of being, [esse] and the more it recedes from God the more it has on non-being."²⁵⁴

The metaphysical factors limiting the fallen human soul are three-fold: the first is the proper non-being or limiting function of essence as a proportional yet positive perfection of the firstly created human composite which is represented by an illuminated body. The second regards essence as potency which limits humanity as finite beings which, again is represented by an illuminated body. These two essences are intrinsic relations and are proper to the *pre-lapsarian* or illuminated body and the corporeal body. However, following Genesis 3: 21, the Divinely imposed limitation of the non-being of the skin of the animal now entombs the soul of the fallen illuminated person. And, as an extrinsic potency, and as a distancing from God, increases the human composite's non being properties. The extrinsic non being may be seen as being extrinsic in the sense that it belongs to the Triune God to expunge the ordinary human soul's fallen status in order for it to be freed from the imposed potency of the corporeal flesh. Thomas comments that the soul contains the body.

²⁵⁴ Charles A. Hart, *Thomistic Metaphysics: An Inquiry into the Act of Existing* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1959), 90.

“Although corporeal things are said to be in another as in that which contains them, nevertheless, spiritual things contain those things in which they are; as the soul contains the body. Hence also God is in things containing them; nevertheless, by a certain similitude to corporeal things, it is said that all things are in God; inasmuch as they are contained by Him.”²⁵⁵

The supra-imposed extrinsic non being of the human composite may also be apprehended as the ordinary human soul is incapable of knowing extrinsic truth either ontologically or epistemologically.²⁵⁶ The human soul is partially alienated. The aid to the human soul’s extrinsic alienation is the placing on the human mind the band-aid of the *phantasms* in the ordinary human cognition process. This is not to conclude that the original humans did not employ the phantasms, but rather, their use of the phantasms was in support of the true kinship the human soul had with its Creator. I ask that you consider this question. Did the Glorified Body of the risen Christ employ the *phantasms* during his earthly presence? Thomas Aquinas and Augustine of Hippo teach us (Ia Q. 89. A2) that “when the soul is separated from the body it understands no longer by turning to the phantasms but by turning to simply intelligible objects – the soul apart from the body has perfect knowledge of other separated souls.”²⁵⁷ In this scheme Aquinas clearly follows the

²⁵⁵ Thomas Aquinas *Summa theologiae* 1a. Q. 8.A1 ad2

²⁵⁶ Charles A. Hart, *Thomistic Metaphysics: An Inquiry into the Act of Existing* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1959), 79. The notion that the senses deceive the human soul was first proposed by Parmenides of Elea (circa 540 BCE). However, as it is elaborated by Charles Hart, the thrust of Parmenides’ argument is that “Being is the source of sameness” and therefore necessitates a monist philosophy since under this theory “[i]t is impossible for a multitude of beings to exist.” Instead of a monist view I argue for a multiplicity of beings and it is the act of perception that prevents the human soul to absolutely know truth including its own self-awareness.

²⁵⁷ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 89. A1. “Whether the separated soul can understand anything? ... the superior intellectual substances understand by means of a number of species, which nevertheless are fewer and more universal and bestow a deeper comprehension of things... whereas the inferior intellectual natures possess a greater number of species, which are less universal, and bestow a lower degree of comprehension, in proportion as they recede from the intellectual power of the higher natures. If ... God had willed souls to understand in the same way as separate substances, it would follow that human

Aristotelian concept of spiritual formation and in which my schemata also entails *in-formation*, the forming of an essential unity. In order for an ordinary person to perceive the immaterial or spiritual aspect of the form it must be received through the phantasms and must reside in the passive intellect. Such a reception however is through the veil of the tree of knowledge of good and evil not through the clarity of the eyes of God. Thomas describes the act of receiving the sensible form in his Summa theologiae Ia Q.78. A3.

“[...] immutation is of two kinds, one natural, the other spiritual. Natural immutation takes place by the form of the immuter being received according to its natural existence, into the thing immuted, as heat is received into the thing heated. Whereas spiritual immutation takes place by the form of the immuter being received, according to a spiritual mode of existence, into the thing immuted, as the form of color is received into the pupil which does not thereby become colored. Now, for the operation of the senses, a spiritual immutation is required, whereby an intention of the sensible form is effected in the sensible organ.”²⁵⁸

This entailment clearly places Thomas and I at odds to each other. Instead, I conclude that all human souls are created in such a manner that *aphantasmal* knowledge acquisition is the human soul’s proper mode.

knowledge, so far from being perfect, would be confused... Therefore to make it possible for human souls to possess perfect and proper knowledge, they were so made that their nature required them to be joined to bodies...It is clear then that it was for the soul's good that it was united to a body, and that it understands by turning to the phantasms. Nevertheless it is possible for it to exist apart from the body, and also to understand in another way.”

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, Ia Q. 78. A3, *respondeo*.

Conclusion to the Chapter

“Augustine argues that [...] the soul animates the body not by being spatially diffused in it, but by a certain *vivifying intention (quadam vitali)*.”²⁵⁹ (emphasis added)

Augustine, so clear in his own conversion, generates for us a vivid image as to the mode of animation of the human body; it is a vivifying intention.

Chapter 2 provided the apprehension that the Creator and created relate in a mode of ontological continuity. God and humankind stretch their beings from the inner sanctum their minds to the reality of God’s Creation. Human beings are not Gods, but were given primordial gifts as godlike. Humanity has squandered its right to employ these gifts. Because humanity has squandered its gifts, Aquinas admits that “it is easy for us to be deceived by the *phantasma*.”²⁶⁰ The thesis therefore turns the page to the next chapter whereby, quoting St. Paul who realizes

“that he was the result of the Lord’s building from within [and] we are the ones who speak from without, but he [Jesus] builds from within. We notice the fact that you are listening, but he [Jesus] sees our thoughts. He [Jesus] ... opens the mind, and bends the perceptions to the act of belief”

brings us to the apprehension that we require an action from Christ to once again enjoy our lost godlike powers.²⁶¹

²⁵⁹ Ludger Hölscher, *The Reality of the Mind: Augustine’s Philosophical Arguments for the Human Soul as a Spiritual Substance* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), 38.

²⁶⁰ John F. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: from Finite Being to Uncreated Being* (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 383.

²⁶¹ Augustine of Hippo, *Jesus Christ, the true Solomon – The Liturgy of the Hours According to the Roman Rite V. III* (New York: Catholic Book Publishing Corp., 1975), 478.

CHAPTER 3

THE HUMAN SOUL OF JESUS CHRIST

“I did not say that the Son was one (person) and God the Word another; I said that God the Word was *by nature* one and the temple *by nature* another, one Son by conjunction.”²⁶²

Introduction to the Chapter

The common understanding of Nestorianism is that the two natures of Christ are not unified in one person. The above quotation, attributed to Nestorius, brings the thesis full circle to the beginning where I described how Philo of Alexandria introduces the notion that the Logos is *distinct* from God. The conversations regarding the unity of the Christ-natures or their distinction between Nestorius and other Patriarchs of the time are complex and perhaps conclusions were erroneously attributed. Aloys Grillmeier, SJ concludes that perhaps Nestorius was misunderstood. Grillmeier continues to quote Nestorius.

“Even before the incarnation the God-Logos was Son and God and together with the Father, but in the last times he took the form of a servant; but as already previously he was a Son both in name and in nature, he cannot be called a separate Son after taking this form, otherwise we would be decreeing two sons.”²⁶³

Attempting to reconciling eternal existence with temporal reality, or, attempting to describe, metaphysically, the unity between the Infinite and the finite natures of the Second Person of the Trinity, may lead to considerable difficulties since semantics tend to confuse how one may interpret not only the definitions of the Infinite and finite persons

²⁶² Aloys Grillmeier, S.J., *Christ in Christian Tradition: From Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451)* trans. John Bowden. (Atlanta USA: John Knox Press, 1975), 455.

²⁶³ *Ibid.*

of Jesus Christ, but also the relation between his two natures. Modern scholars comment that prior to the Nestorian controversies Cyril of Alexandria also grappled with the Logos-sarx unity or lack thereof, due to difficulties in finding appropriate language and conflicting biblical exegesis regarding the divine-human relation of Jesus' human soul. The gap between the notion of a divine Son and a human Christ, a notion that is so prominent in Greek mythologies and fostered by Philo of Alexandria, was narrowed through the work of Athanasius who asserted that "the divine and human meet only because of a free act of a loving God."²⁶⁴ Just as Cyril, Nestorius and others seem to have difficulties in defining the unity of the two natures of Christ in one person, so may the thesis suffer the same difficulty in defining, in precise metaphysical terms, such a complex unity. It is best therefore to start and end at the origin of the meeting place of divinity and humanity.

A general aim of Chapter 3 is to reconcile, metaphysically, the seeming incongruence of unity between the Christ soul and the human being's soul. Clearly the unifying relation between the Son and the ordinary human soul of which the thesis is about to explore, is not intended to elevate humanity into Gods, but rather to better apprehend that the first humans were, in a manner of speaking, gods created in the *imago Dei*.

To digress briefly, unity requires relation which requires a reciprocating principle in order for it to function fully. Previously I have argued that the Holy Spirit as the *Bearer of Gifts*, accounts for the perfected relation between not only the Divine Persons but humanity's relation with God.

²⁶⁴ Lawrence J. Welch, *Christology and Eucharist in the Early Thought of Cyril of Alexandria* (San Francisco: Catholic Scholars Press, 1994), 56.

The term relation is one of Aristotle's ten metaphysical categories. The majority of metaphysicians, agreeing with Aristotle's original concept of relation, attribute relation as an accident in the priority of being since accidents are contingent on their underlying substance and are apprehended through an immediate abstraction by the *phantasma* converting the stimuli through a second order mental operation – "relation is a distinct additional accidental entity, a reality outside the mind."²⁶⁵ Instead, I propose that the category of relation is more than just an additional accidental entity, a reality *outside* the mind; I propose that there is a relation-type that is an essential component of the human soul and is therefore necessary, and being necessary, is primal in its order of being. In this particular instance the relation-type is not an accident/substance relation. The dependency of the accidents on substance is, for the human composite, a consequence of the increased distance from God the human soul suffers due to original sin. Just as relation defines the Persons of the Triune God, the proper relation between created truth and divine Truth determines the mode of not only existence of the human composite, but also the degree of intimacy with God. Shortly I develop my concept regarding the nature of truth and its relation with Being and Truth.

The specific purpose of Chapter 3 is to construct a metaphysical relation between the Christ human soul and the ordinary human soul that enhances our understanding of the ordinary human soul. If I am to formulate conclusions to the thesis' hypotheses I must develop a coherent understanding of the metaphysical relation between truth and Truth

²⁶⁵ Charles A. Hart, *Thomistic Metaphysics: An Inquiry into the Act of Existing* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1959), 233.

as it relates to the human soul of Jesus Christ in his primal act as participating in the exemplar cause on the human soul's act of existence.

The remaining body of Chapter 3 is divided into five sections as follows:

- Eternal/temporal relations, the Word and *sarx* as a unifying factor, John 1:1; 5:36; 17.
- The unity between the *dyothelite* wills of the Incarnated Second Person of the Trinity.
- Sense-perception, awareness and truth.
- Relative truth, sense perception and absolute truth.
- Truth-exchange and the Christ-soul as the causal exemplar.

In order to respond to the hypotheses of the thesis we must evaluate and apprehend the Aristotelian – Thomism view of the relation between eternal and universal Beings, and, beings that commence in eternity, reside for a time in the created universe as individual beings and then return to eternity. Both of these entities, one as Creator, the other created, share attributes or in Thomistic terms, share *genera*.

The shared genera of each of the above mentioned beings are termed 'rational', 'intelligible' and 'subsistent', although in varying modes. But then there are distinctions such as; the One is Intelligence Itself; the others have intelligence. The One is one; the others are individuated, yet many. The One is Being; the others are created beings. The One is Truth; the others necessitate truth in the act of their own creation. Attempting to compare between a Being that is Eternal and beings that are finite and yet have the attributes to participate in eternity is not an easy task. The remaining sections of the thesis are in a sense a journey from the temporal frame to the eternal dimension of existence.

Eternal/temporal Relations, the Word and Sarx as Unifying Factors, John 1:1; 5:36; 17

The metaphysician John McTaggart (1866 – 1925) expressed the relation between eternity and time as such: “the relation of Eternity to Time is very simple. It is simply the relation of a truth to the subject-matter of the truth.”²⁶⁶ Eternity is not timelessness, nor is it defined as infinite. I define eternity as that which does not yield to limits; eternity is an ever present reality, *esse in praesenti*. However, the controversies and abundant literature regarding the philosophy of time and the relation of time to eternity are vast and although relevant to the subject matter of the thesis, require a simple stand. Therefore I am taking the position that the relation between time (creation) and Eternity (God) is the relation of Truth, as Christ, to the subject-matter of that Truth, the human Jesus, and, by a special relation to humanity. My thesis therefore avoids, not in a cowardly fashion, the controversies that lie in the various theories of eternity. We are, after all, regulated for the time being to temporality and can only conjecture as to the attributes of eternity. Just as Thomas Aquinas cautions us with regards to the existence of

²⁶⁶ John Ellis MacTaggart, “The Relation of Time and Eternity,” *Mind, New Series*, vol. 18, no. 71 (July 1909): 344. “... it is used of the timelessness of existences. Existence is, I think, like Time, too ultimate to admit of definition. But it is not difficult to determine the denotation of the word. In so far as substances, or the qualities and relations of substances, are real at all, they exist. In so far as events are real, they exist. On the other hand, if truths, and the ideas which are the constituent parts of truths, have any independent reality, it is not a reality of existence-though of course our perceptions of such truths exist, since they are psychical events.” MacTaggart is making the point that an event situated in the dimension of time becomes eternal once situated. He then posits the relation to the event’s subject-matter which resides in time. He then relates the two, object and subject as eternity is to time. MacTaggart’s relation is an advance on Thomas Aquinas’ teaching that truth is conformity to the object residing in the intellect which is a passage or spiritual change from the materiality of the subject to the immateriality of the object stored in the passive intellect.

God "...that God exists is not self-evident."²⁶⁷ I propose that in a similar manner that an eternal realm exists is also not self-evident.

The sole mode of understanding the properties of reality within eternity is through the relations within the Triune God. Although an analogy employing relations between finite beings is not the most plausible means to understand the relations with the three Persons of the Trinity, it does present a credible image sufficient to assist in the comprehension of the next argument in the thesis which is to demonstrate relations between God and human beings.

To set our understanding for the analogy of being within eternity I assert that priority of being (*ens*) is known through the category of relation, not in an accident/subsistence relation but in an entitative mode. The Son proceeds from the Father. The Holy Spirit proceeds from Father due to the union of love between the Father and Son.²⁶⁸

"Procession [...] is to be understood by way of an intelligible emanation, for example, of the intelligible word which proceeds from the speaker, yet remains in him."²⁶⁹

Thomas continues his argument by asserting that an external procession necessitates a distinction from the source of the procession, but contrarily, an internal procession is univocal. Therefore one can argue that the internal procession is the common hypostasis of the Triune Persons, and the external procession includes the attributes of each of the

²⁶⁷ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 2. A2, *sed contra*. However, the Inflationary Model of the Big Bang Theory provides some support for the notion that prior to space-time there is a possibility for non-time or timelessness or eternal existence.

²⁶⁸ *Symbolum Nicaenum*, first ecumenical council, Nicea 325.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, Ia Q. 27. A1, *respondeo*.

Persons *and* also the unity of relation with creation, specifically human beings. Let us now turn to the analogy.

Similar to the relations of the Trinity, but only equivocally and imperfectly in the present state, human relations are also determined in two modes, internally and externally intentioned. The first mode regards changes in the motion²⁷⁰ of things and is associated with *esse naturale*. The second mode regards relations that are associated with *esse intentionale* which are relations inherent in the intentionality of the human soul.

The first property to apprehend of the *esse naturale* mode is that relations initiated from the temporal world can become entrenched in eternity. The children of parents are always the children of their parents. Of course human parental relations are different than the paternal-filial relation of God the Father and God the Son. The relation of the human parent to child is indeterminate of the will of the child. The parent's status as parent is indeterminate of the wishes of the child.²⁷¹ The parent-child relation is also independent whether or not love is a factor in the relation. The corporeal human relation, *esse naturale* of parent-child is dependent on the pro-creative act of the parents. Parents do not beget their children. Corporeally they are in an extrinsic relation with them.

²⁷⁰ The term 'motion' in Thomist metaphysics refers to the change from potentiality to actuality not from one place to another. Human beings therefore move from the potency of a lack of knowledge to the actuality of knowing through the sensible acquisition of stimuli and abstracted by the phantasms and actualized through the act of the active intellect.

²⁷¹ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 29. A1. Thomas Aquinas states that "in a more special and perfect way, the particular and the individual are found in the rational substances which have dominion over their own actions; and which are not only made to act, like others; but which can act of themselves; for actions belong to singulars. Therefore also the individuals of the rational nature have a special name even among other substances; and this name is 'person'."

However, the parent-child relation is also an intrinsic relation, an *esse intentionale* relation.²⁷²

The concept of parent-child relation as an *esse intentionale* relation may be considered in two modes. The first mode regards the parent-child relation as an intelligible relation that is a real relation and in this sense the parent-child relation is not distinct since they are of the parent-child genus. For example, five members of the *Smith* family are, at this level of knowledge, indistinguishable. We do not know if both parents are included, or if the grandparents are also members or how many siblings are included. On the other hand, once the members have been *personified* the relations become intelligible and from an external view the relations within the family are regarded as real *and* distinct. To this extent the analogy is reasonably proportionate to the relations within the Trinity but falters on two points.

The first misstep concerns the reception and reciprocation of substance and personhood. The reception and reciprocation of Being and Personhood of the Son requires a complex discourse and is presented later in the thesis. The second regards the hypostatic union of the persons of the Trinity. Human offspring share the same *substance* as their parents since they are in a general mode hypostatically united with their parents, but they do not share in the same unity. The underlying substance the children share with their parents is the DNA of the parents. The children are more intrinsically unified to their parents than the parents are to each other. The parents are not hypostatically unified but are unified through their intentional act of parenting and relational being as parents. Nor

²⁷² The modern philosopher may consider the dual relations of *esse naturale* and *esse intentionale* parent-child as a *de re-de dictum* relation, respectively.

is the human soul created with the same substance as God. Thomas defines his concept of substance as follows.

According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v), substance is spoken of in two ways. In one sense it means the quiddity of a thing, signified by its definition, [...] [it] means the substance of a thing; in this sense substance is called by the Greeks (*οὐσία*), which we may call essence. In another sense substance means a subject or suppositum, which subsists in the genus of substance. To this, taken in a general sense, can be applied a name expressive of an intention; and thus it is called the suppositum. It is also called by three names signifying a reality – that is, "a thing of nature," "subsistence," and "hypostasis," according to a threefold consideration of the substance thus named. As it underlies some common nature, it is called a thing of nature; as, for instance, this particular man is a human natural thing. [...] As it underlies the accidents, it is called hypostasis, or substance. What these three names signify in common to the whole genus of substances, this name person signifies in the genus of rational substances.²⁷³

The unity inherent in the Trinity is due to the complete lack of potency whereas within the present human hypostasis potency, and therefore disunity abounds. I previously argued that the hypo-potency of the human substance separates and overburdens the human soul's power to form relations in its initial and in its ongoing act of existence. However, at the level of the human soul, a unity common to all rational beings exists. Human children participate in the genes of the two parents, but the human soul of the child is unique to that child *and* to the Creator of that child's soul. The relation of the act of being of the human soul is primarily between the Trinity as Creator and the human soul as receptor of its act of existence, and secondarily, through its participation in the parental genes, in the act of becoming.²⁷⁴ Therefore, contrary to the relations of the Trinity, the human parent-

²⁷³ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 29. A2, *respondeo*.

²⁷⁴ Lawrence Dewan, O.P. *St. Thomas and Form as Something Divine in Things* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2007), 41. As will be seen shortly the thesis argues that it is not only the Father that is the Creative force but the completeness of the Trinity which in a particular mode of unity includes the Christ-soul.

child relation is not a receptive relation. Father Norris Clarke SJ brings some light to this concept in reference to the Trinity:

“[...] receptivity is a positive ontological perfection. [that describes] [...] the inner interpersonal life of the Trinity, where we find that giving and receiving are integral and inseparable aspects of the very fullness of perfection in the loving communion of persons within the unity of one divine nature [...]”²⁷⁵

The created human soul is finite and not in perfect unity with divine nature, as is Christ’s human soul, but it still *proceeds* from the Trinity in a particularly unique act of creation. Thomas teaches that “[w]hatever proceeds by way of outward procession is necessarily distinct from the source [...]”²⁷⁶ The metaphysical separation between the source and the created thing creates sufficient distinction between God and the human soul that the human soul cannot be hypostatically one with the Trinity. Still, there is a relation between the Source and the finite being.

The relation between the Creator and the created human being may be apprehended as an outward procession that emanates into creation through an intentional act of the divine will. “So what proceeds in God by way of love, [an act of the will] does not proceed as begotten, or as son, but proceeds rather as spirit.”²⁷⁷ Just as children inherit the likenesses of their parents in the act of becoming, the human soul inherits a likeness from God in the soul’s act of being.²⁷⁸ Aquinas argues, quite convincingly, that “likeness [...] belongs to love, not as though love itself were a likeness,

²⁷⁵ W. Norris Clarke, S. J. *The Compatibility of Receptivity and Pure Act: Reply to Steven Long*. <http://www.anthoniflood.com/clarkereceptivitypureact.htm> (accessed 15 February 2011).

²⁷⁶ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 27. A1, ad 2.

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, Ia Q. 27. A2, *respondeo*. Genesis 1 records the *spiration* of the human being resulting in life.

²⁷⁸ Genesis 1:26.

but because likeness is the principle of loving. [T]he one begotten [the Son] is the principle of love.”²⁷⁹ Returning to Thomas’ definition of substance he concludes that substance is an expression of an intention. Divine intentions regarding humankind, or in my jargon, that the memory of what it is to be human, the quiddity or the essence of humanity, resides in the *suppositum* of the One Who is Triune. Before proceeding to the role in the human act of being that the Son plays, we must more fully apprehend the concept of principle of love and its place in creation.

The term ‘principle’ in Scholastic comprehension is that which initiates. The human soul, as the principle of the human composite, is the first act of being as demonstrated in Chapters 1 and 2. The human soul is that which initiates existence of the human person. God the Father is He Who initiates the generation of the Son, which is an act of love. Thomas differentiates the divine act of generation from the divine act of love. Generation of the Son is a procession of the very Being of His Father. The procession of love is the procession of the Father as the Holy Spirit. In order for the procession of the Holy Spirit to be, the Son must receive the Being of His Father, as cited by Norris Clarke above. However, and contrary to human parent-child relations, the Son, as the principle of receiving love, *must* reciprocate the received love of His Father in order to identify or to acknowledge His Personhood as Son.²⁸⁰

The Second Person of the Trinity, to be the Son, necessitates reciprocation [after Clarke, which is not a distinction because of cause and effect but “the very fullness of

²⁷⁹ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 27. A4, ad 2.

²⁸⁰ We see in the behavior of the earthly Jesus acknowledging his heavenly Father and giving thanks prior to each miracle.

being itself as Persons-in-communion”] to the love of His Father. Aquinas teaches that like reciprocates to like. Through His unique principle of reciprocation, the Word is the model for our act of existence. The Word, Who is fully in act, and fully unified with His human soul and enjoying the communion of divine substance necessitates a single Source but dual channels of existence from the Source. The Source of the divine Son is the Being of the Father; the source of the human soul united to the Son is the human substance that resides intentionally in the *suppositum* of the Triune God as the memory of what it is to be human. The relation between the essence of being human and its existence in the *suppositum* of God speaks to a reality that is a power and an awareness of oneself. As Augustine makes clear...

“Great is the *power of memory*, an awe-inspiring mystery, my God, a power of profound and infinite multiplicity. And *this thing is the mind*, and *this am I myself* [...] So great is the force of memory, so great is the *force of life*, even in the mortal life of man [...] this thing is *the mind*, and this *I am myself*.”²⁸¹
(emphasis added)

The Augustinian term *power of memory* is an awareness of ‘what it is to be human’. We also see that the power of memory is a force of life which is of the intentional order of being that allows for a stretching forth thus forming intrinsic relations. Returning to the analogy of the parent-child relation, even though one enjoys self-awareness, albeit incomplete, awareness of the essence of the other as truth is effectively nonexistent due to limitations imposed through the potency inherent in the matter of the ordinary human being imposed because of original sin. In the previous chapter the popular or dogmatic understanding of the effect of original sin on the human soul was described as the deterioration the soul’s *esse* which accounts for an imperfect relation with God. The

²⁸¹ Augustine of Hippo, *Confessions* X. XVII 26.

deterioration of the soul's relation with God it is not due to a degradation of the soul's *esse*, but, is due to the added potency of fallen human signet-matter of the body. The relation of the ordinary human soul to its present body prevents the soul from enacting its proper *esse*. The deterioration of the soul's relations prevents it from properly uniting with, or to be intimately aware of, not only other human souls, but the Trinity as well. As such, I conclude that it is the soul's essence, its quiddity that was not inherently degraded by the original sin of disobedience. Furthermore, free-will, an attribute of the act of the will, is a principle of the soul and therefore was not altered either.²⁸² The enjoyment of a free will necessitates a response; in order for the human soul to be fully aware it must properly reciprocate the Father's self-communication. In this instance ordinary human beings cannot reciprocate properly except through Christ and in the human soul's present state Christ provides only a *texture* to humanity's existence and nature. In this life, even with an invitation by Christ, it is not possible for the human person to acquire the fullness of the divine experience.

The invitation by Jesus to Thomas the Apostle to join his body – to enter into it – resembles an intentional existence /intentional being.²⁸³ This Thomas-Christ event is an *esse intentionale* as an intentional act of the Glorified Jesus stretching forth and Thomas completing the act by reciprocating Jesus' call causing a joining of the two, which, the

²⁸² Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 83.

²⁸³ *Ibid.*, Ia Q. 67, A3 and Ia Q. 76, A2, *respondeo* 3.

thesis suggests, is a description of the Body of Christ.²⁸⁴ But sense images (*phantasms*), since they are likenesses of individuals and exist in corporeal organs, do not have the same mode of existence as do, for instance, conceptual images residing in the human intellect."²⁸⁵ The difficulty arises for Aquinas at the next level: what effect does the *phantasm* produce in the intellect?

And the LORD GOD made garments of skins for the man and for his wife, and clothed them.

The passage from Genesis 3:21 describes the entombment of the human soul and points to a limited corporeal life – clothes become soiled, worn, require mending and cleaning and eventually are discarded. The clothes given to humanity by our heavenly Father limit the true and dynamic nature of the human soul. This limitation is the separation from God as humanity chose to reciprocate the call of the serpent instead of abiding by the covenant God and the first man and first woman contracted between them. Humanity's separation from God requires a new order of individuation and the imposed *haecceity* rather than a "perfection of concrete existents" as the divinely imposed couture is an *imperfection of concrete individuals*.

The Unity between the Dyothelite Wills of the Incarnated Second Person of the Trinity.

The purpose of this section is to briefly examine the nature of the relation between the *dyothelite* wills of the Incarnated Word. The overwhelming concept that is proposed regards the notion that the divine mind of the Second Person overpowers or

²⁸⁴ The phantasm is a likeness or similitude (Ia Q. 84. A8, *adversus* 2), and a likeness is a likeness because it shares a form with the thing of which it is a likeness (cf. Ia. Q. 4. A3) whether or not it is in the corporeal or spiritual realm.

²⁸⁵ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 85. A1, *adversus* 3.

diminishes the mind of the human Jesus to the extent that Jesus' human mind is insignificant. If Jesus' mind was impotent in its relation to his divine mind such a relation could fracture the arguments presented in the thesis. Furthermore such a concept could lead to an Apollinarian heresy. Or, one may conclude that there is insufficient unity between the two minds which leads to a Nestorian heresy. Therefore, this section attempts to disarm the possibility of such fractures.

Recently, thinkers such as Richard Cross, Ivor Davidson, Robert Pasnau and Aaron Riches have returned to the Council of Chalcedon's controversies and the "political manoeuvring" of the framers regarding the two natures of the Second Person of the Trinity.²⁸⁶ Their consensus of the Chalcedon formula is that there exists confusion in its understanding of the relation between the human and divine wills of Christ. The main argument promoted by most independent commentators on the Chalcedon formula, including those mentioned above, is that a finite human will must be passive, or completely impotent to the dominance of an infinite and divine mind. To counter the divine dominance many look to Jesus as being actively obedient to the will of his Father, or, by some ontological mystery "the human freedom of Christ consists concretely in the history of the nature assumed by the Word into the personal centre of who he is."²⁸⁷

However, I am taking a view that is coherent with Chalcedon and finds its foundation in the primal command from God in Genesis 1 whereby humankind is given

²⁸⁶ Ivor J. Davidson, "Not My Will but Yours be Done: The Ontological Dynamics of Incarnational Intention," *International Journal of Systematic Theology* (Vol. 7:2 April 2005): 178.

²⁸⁷ Aaron Riches, "After Chalcedon: The Oneness of Christ and the Dyothelite Mediation of His Theandric Unity," *Modern Theology* 24:2 (April 2008): 204.

stewardship over God's creation. The human Christ, as the second Adam, is the steward of the created order and most specifically humankind. Therefore in his role as steward Jesus would have general mandates to, for example, convert all nations.

“And Jesus came and said to them, “All authority in heaven and on earth has been given to me. Go therefore and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.” Matthew 28: 18-19

The specific means as to how the general instruction is to be engendered remains with the human Christ. The human Jesus chose the twelve, he could have chosen eleven. He could have chosen Saul over Simon. Chapter 24 of the Gospel attributed to Matthew presents two parables regarding similitudes of heaven whereby the servant, who is entrusted with treasure, seems to be provided only with general guidelines. I believe that the underlying message in these parables demonstrates that a fundamental trust between the Master and the servant exists.

Trust necessitates awareness of the other and is based on a truth-relation. Trust necessitates bi-directional relations but also necessitates a certain degree of interpretation in the mode of execution by the steward as long as the principles of the master are maintained. Therefore under this truth-relation the human and divine wills of the Incarnated Word functions in the same mode of relation. Later in the chapter the thesis argues that the human soul of Jesus functions as the instrumental exemplar cause during the ordinary human soul's act of being. Within the element of trust however, resides the principle of truth. It is in the vein of truth that the middle section of the chapter takes place.

Sense-perception, Awareness and Truth

“CHALCEDONIAN ORTHODOXY: Perception has two natures, which are inseparable and irreducible, related to each other as matter to form: it is neither a purely material change nor a purely formal one, but rather 'a logos in matter'.”²⁸⁸

We know from Scripture that the earthly Christ enjoyed *awareness* inherent in another human being.²⁸⁹ We may also agree that the resurrected human Christ is a being fully in act to the limit a human soul can be actualized and therefore the order of apprehension described immediately above by Aquinas is not only inappropriate, but perhaps is inaccurate. The gist of my thinking is that a priority in the knowledge acquisition process of the Glorified Christ, and the pre-resurrected Jesus is non-existent. Contrary to this mode ordinary human beings must prioritize their knowledge acquisition. The abstraction of singular knowledge is coincidental with the abstraction of universal knowledge for the human soul of Christ which allows for the ability, or soulful power, to be fully aware of the other. What is the metaphysical construction that provides for instantaneous knowledge?²⁹⁰ What is the Truth-truth relation that could provide for a more illuminated human soul?

²⁸⁸ Victor Caston, “Spirit and the Letter: Aristotle on Perception,” in *Metaphysics, Soul, and Ethics in Ancient Thought Themes from the Work of Richard Sorabji*, ed. Ricardo Salles, 254 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

²⁸⁹ The passage in John 4: 3-42 records the earthly Jesus’ awareness of the soul of the Samaritan woman to name just one instance of many already recorded in the thesis.

²⁹⁰ A particularly favourite concept of the author of the thesis is that the universe inheres a non-local attribute with regards to the instantaneous effect of an event throughout the universe. Recall that the human soul of Jesus did not acquire earthly knowledge through the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil which requires a temporal expansion.

The doctrine of the hypostatic union that inheres in the Trinity provides for the notion that the divine Persons are fully aware of each other. Trinitarian theology provides rich and fertile ground to more fully apprehend the relations amongst ourselves and with the divine Beings.

If we accept the hypothesis that a characteristic of eternity is its limitlessness and therefore references such as prior and posterior, up and down or the bi-directional series '1, 2, 3, ...10, 9, 8...', and analogical (non-proportionality)²⁹¹ terms are meaningless, then we must assert that relations are the primary characteristic that distinguishes and individuates eternal beings. Thomas Aquinas cites Boëthius on this point, "relation multiplies the Trinity."²⁹² The relation between Father – Son and Son – Father are particularly relevant. W. Norris Clarke tells us why.

"For just as the Father's whole personality as Father consists in his communicating, giving, the entire divine nature that is his own to the Son, his eternal Word, so reciprocally the Son's whole personality as Son consists in receiving, eternally and fully, with loving gratitude, this identical divine nature from his Father. The Son, as distinct from the Father, is subsistent Receiver, so to speak."²⁹³

However, I believe that in Norris Clarke's thinking there is an act by the Son that is absent, but alluded to, from the entailment described above. The received gift of Sonship

²⁹¹ John F. Wippel, "Truth in *Thomas Aquinas*," *Review of Metaphysics*, 43:2 (Dec. 1989): 304. Wippel clearly notes that Aquinas provides for the employment of analogy in 'truth' when comparing God to created beings, for example such names as 'truth' may be seen as analogical both in God and in creatures but to a lesser degree of perfection. The thesis makes the point, based on Wippel's analysis of Aquinas' teaching, that truth being a perfection can be a relation through each beings' *esse*. The Creator is Truth inherently, and, the created through its first act of being shares that truth with the Creator.

²⁹² Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 39. A1, *respondeo*.

²⁹³ W. Norris Clarke, S. J. *The Compatibility of Receptivity and Pure Act: Reply to Steven Long*. <http://www.anthonyflood.com/clarkereceptivitypureact.htm> (accessed 15 February 2011).

requires, between equal and free-willed Beings, an acknowledgement or reciprocity²⁹⁴ by the Son of his very Sonship. The Son acknowledges to his Father his Gift of being Son which is transpired through the Holy Spirit as the Bearer of Gifts back to the Father.

“At that time Jesus said, “I praise you, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, [...] All things have been committed to me by my Father. No one knows the Son except the Father, and no one knows the Father except the Son and those to whom the Son chooses to reveal him.”

Let us now consider this question. Did the Glorified Body of the risen Christ employ the *phantasms* during his earthly presence? Thomas Aquinas and Augustine of Hippo teach us (Ia Q.89. A2) that

“when the soul is separated from the body it understands no longer by turning to the phantasms but by turning to simply intelligible objects – the soul apart from the body has perfect knowledge of other separated souls.”²⁹⁵

The encounter of Thomas the Apostle and the risen Christ, fully in act with his glorified body, in the upper chamber seems to demonstrate a supra-awareness of each other: Thomas was called by Christ to believe therefore Jesus was aware of the depth of his unbelief. Thomas not only received the call but reciprocated Jesus’ intentional act of love

²⁹⁴ I am claiming that reciprocity in this Christological frame is termed as a principle, that is, it initiates an act in this instance of the human soul. I also claim that the origin of the reciprocity principle is through the divine Son reciprocating the generation of his Sonship by acknowledging his Father’s Fatherhood.

²⁹⁵ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 89. A1. Whether the separated soul can understand anything? “... the superior intellectual substances understand by means of a number of species, which nevertheless are fewer and more universal and bestow a deeper comprehension of things... whereas the inferior intellectual natures possess a greater number of species, which are less universal, and bestow a lower degree of comprehension, in proportion as they recede from the intellectual power of the higher natures. If ... God had willed souls to understand in the same way as separate substances, it would follow that human knowledge, so far from being perfect, would be confused... Therefore to make it possible for human souls to possess perfect and proper knowledge, they were so made that their nature required them to be joined to bodies...It is clear then that it was for the soul's good that it was united to a body, and that it understands by turning to the phantasms. Nevertheless it is possible for it to exist apart from the body, and also to understand in another way.”

and exclaimed “My Lord and my God!” Thomas became fully aware of Christ’s divine nature. Thomas and Jesus, Jesus and Thomas exchanged *truths* – a *communicatio Christi*. Perhaps the thesis is jumping ahead here but could the truth-exchange between Thomas and Jesus may be understood as an effect from an act of an exemplar cause imparted by Jesus?

Relative truth, Sense Perception and Absolute Truth

Truth in Thomism also entails relations. The difficulty the rational human soul suffers in its attempt to know truth is due to its inability to enact the reciprocal principle of love.²⁹⁶ The ordinary human soul is prevented to *know* Uncreated Truth or created truth since human initiated relations are burdened by the falsity apparent in extrinsically ordered sense perception. I argue in this section that such falsity is not inherent in the relation the Christ-soul enjoys with his perceiving senses, either pre- or post-resurrection.

Therefore the purpose of this section is twofold. The first is to develop a more complete understanding of Uncreated Truth, created truth, and, their interrelations. The second is to prepare for the final section by providing how Truth is intrinsically employed in the act of creation of the human person.

Thomas Aquinas has taken great pains to develop the concept of truth and its relations. Earlier we learned from Aquinas that truth is conformity of being. We also learned that:

“Augustine says that ‘we cannot expect to learn the fullness of truth from the senses of the body’. First, because ‘whatever the bodily senses reach, is

²⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, Ia Q. 27. A4, *respondeo*.

continually being changed; and whatever is never the same cannot be perceived'.²⁹⁷

The manner in which Thomas addresses this quandary is elegant yet complex.

Thomas identifies two broad categories regarding the term 'truth'. The first category is *truth of being*, that is, as seen earlier, that which exists must enjoy truth. To know or understand truth of being or, 'ontological truth' requires that the truth is abstracted from the essence of an existing thing. I have already argued that it is in the abstraction process that the inherent error of perception is found. However, I have also shown that the earthly Jesus could truthfully abstract the truth of essence from the ordinary human person. Therefore, examining the truth abstraction process as it pertains to the earthly Jesus may shed some light onto the metaphysical reality of Jesus' human soul. The exchange between the risen Christ and his two disciples on the road to Emmaus (Luke 24: 13-35) on the first Easter Sunday two thousand years ago provides some insight into the truth abstraction process as it relates to Jesus' human soul and the two ordinary human souls of his disciples.

The redactor to the Gospel of Luke records that the two disciples did not recognize the risen Christ until "*he took bread, blessed it and broke it, and gave it to them. Then their eyes were opened and they recognized him [...]*" (Luke 24: 30:31) Clearly the ordinary souls of the two disciples were unable to *read* the risen Word until they shared in the Eucharistic banquet. Their inability to see the true Christ is analogous to the inability of the ordinary human eye to perceive red-coloured words while wearing red-tinted spectacles which filter out reddened words written on a school blackboard. The red-tinted

²⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, Ia Q. 84. A6.

lenses of the glasses are analogous to the hypo-potency of matter that burdens the ordinary human soul and prevents the true Christ from being perceived and therefore known. Knowing the true Christ is the reception of Christ.

In the order of being, the act of being is the soul's first act since it allows for the reception of the act to be. The structure of the human soul is such that at this level truth is intimately inherent in the soul's act and furthermore, since God is the cause of the human soul's existence, the creative power of God is intimately present to the soul. We see from the Thomas-Christ event in the upper chamber and the exchange between the risen Christ and the two disciples on the road to Emmaus that it seems to be trivial for Christ to remove the hypo-potency of the skin of the clothes of the animal. Such a disrobing of human potency allows the disciples to be truly receptive. Thomas has shown in the *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 16, A3 that in God Being and Truth are convertible. Therefore at the soul's very instant of creation, truth and Truth are in such intimacy that the Uncreated and created are *one* with the human soul. In their encounter with the risen Christ, the ordinary human souls of the disciples are also in an intimate relation such that they are one with Christ. In contrast to the ordinary human soul, Jesus' human soul enjoys the intimacy with Truth and truth that is unwavering. Throughout his earthly existence Jesus' soul bathed in the illumination of divine light. Augustine illuminates these concepts for us:

“And I turned to the nature of the mind, but the false notion which I had of spiritual things let me not see the truth. Yet the force of truth did of itself flash

into mine eyes [...] and in that unity, I conceived the rational soul, and the nature of truth and of the chief good to consist.”²⁹⁸

Augustine clearly lays the foundation for the metaphysical composition of the relation between the soul, the nature of truth, and, God as chief good. Augustine’s reference to the *false notion* is the concupiscence he presents as a consequence of original sin.

Returning briefly to the sections in Chapter 2 on original sin and the metaphysical consequences to original sin, and, referencing the *Summa theologiae, Prima Pars*, question 16, article 3, Aquinas states that “good has the nature of what is desirable, so truth is related to knowledge.” The Adamic human soul, by tasting the fruit of knowledge from the tree of good and evil, broke its bond with God as the Augustinian unity between Truth and truth inherent in its soul; this same bond intimately unites the Christ-soul with his divine nature and for him to know the will of his Father. Throughout the thesis the notion of intentionality has been employed as a stretching forth of the will of God and an attribute of the human soul. The intentional act of the soul is, through the force of memory, a stretching backwards²⁹⁹ to the source of its origin, back to the *quiddity* of humanity entrenched in the *suppositum* of God. As such, it is a force of life.

²⁹⁸ Augustine of Hippo, *Confessions* IV.xv.24. Augustine pleads the case of the ordinary mind which is impeded by the hypo-potency of the body.

²⁹⁹ Commentators on the intentionality theme who employ the concept of intentionality as a stretching forth of the human soul consider only the forward movement of the intentional act. The proper nature of the human soul’s intentional act is bi-directional. In other words the human soul is designed to reference or acknowledge the source of the forthcoming act of the will in order to move word in truth and goodness. The perfection of the soul’s bi-directionality is however hindered through the clothes of the flesh of the animal which requires employment of the phantasms to interact with the sensible world. The human soul of Jesus, who is not clothed similarly as the human soul, enjoys the intentional perfection of being continually in communication with the source of his humanity through the divine Persons.

"[...] the intention of the will unites the sight to the object seen; and the images retained in the memory, to the penetrating gaze of the soul's inner thought."³⁰⁰

And,

"So great is the force of memory, so great is the force of life, even in the mortal life of man."³⁰¹

The Christ-soul union with its divine nature and the original human-soul union with the Creator at its act of creation still necessitate a process of thinking for the human person. Human beings were not created to be robotic doers of God's will but to wilfully determine the acts necessary for the completion of the divine plan of Creation.

We should divide the process of thinking into two fundamental spheres. The first regards the Aristotelian-Thomistic model, or, the ordinary human cognition model, which describes the acquisition of knowledge and the process to employ such knowledge as is presented in Chapter 2. The second regards the acquisition of truth and the process to employ *acquired* truth by the soul unaccustomed to original sin, such as the Christ-soul. The ordinary soul's process of thinking as it regards the acquisition of knowledge and its relation to truth is more completely developed in comparison to the Christ-soul model further in this section. Rather, it is the Christ-soul model that is of immediate interest.

The process of thinking for the person enjoying a soul continually unified, through the absence of the original sin, with the divine *suppositum* commences with a head-start. The original human soul had, and, the Christ-soul had, during their earthly presence, a

³⁰⁰ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia-IIae Q. 12. A1, *sed contra*. Although Thomas is referring to human beings in this passage, an analysis of Thomas' reading of Augustine of Hippo's insight into intentionality provides a solid foundation for the thesis' argument that the creative acts of God are intentional in their construction. Furthermore one can, without difficulty, apprehend the relations inherent in the act of intentionality.

³⁰¹ Augustine of Hippo, *Confessions* Book X, XXV, 36.

reference point, canonicity for it to refer to during acts of the will, thus avoiding sin.³⁰² Since each soul's human essence resides in the *suppositum* of God, it enjoys, actually, natural communication with the divine nature. It had so-to-speak access to Truth. In other words the original rational human soul is able to bring into the passive intellect that which it perceives but with the added grace of knowing truth through the *eyes* of God. Once in the passive intellect whatever is present is predicative for the agent intellect to employ. The agent intellect is the mode of operation of the will. Therefore, the awareness, the truth of another is predicative through the eyes of God. The human soul of Jesus, being more perfectly united to the Triune God through the Second Person is the exemplar of the image of God that illuminates the human intellect to see truth. How does this happen?

We know that the substantial form in created beings is the first *actus essendi* which allows for the reception of the *act to be*. Therefore the degree of intentionality – the ability or inability of the mind to stretch back and forth and the soul's degree of truth-relation with God determines the mode of individuation as a principle of the human composite and the degree to which sensory perception is necessary. At one extreme is the individuation as determined through signet-matter, the Aristotelian – Thomistic model. At the other extreme is my Christ-soul exemplar model, whereby individuation is determined through the intentional act of the soul and its awareness of its source of what it is to be human, which is grounded in the Augustinian force-of-memory model.

The relation the proper human soul inheres with truth may be conceived in three modes. Firstly, truth exists as extra-mental objects that exist in their own right. The

³⁰² The fall of the first beings required the craftiest of the evil spirits. (Genesis 3:1)

second mode refers to concepts that exist only in the mind, such as fictitious characters in a novel, or entities of a dream, or logically constructed concepts such as a golden mountain. And, finally the third mode relates to universals and time which requires the employment of the cognition process as is initiated by the intellectual soul. The latter is the most relevant for it assists in apprehending the mode by which the human soul functions in order to understand the relation between universal and individuals, and, the concept and actuality of truth.³⁰³

“[K]nowing beings are distinguished from non-knowing beings in that the latter possess only their own form, while the knowing being is naturally adapted to have also the form of some other thing; for the species of the thing known is in the knower [...] Therefore it is clear that the immateriality of a thing is the reason why it is cognitive; and according to the mode of immateriality is the mode of knowledge.”³⁰⁴

Thomas highlights three aspects of knowing to consider. Firstly, it is the human soul that has the ability to conform itself to the thing known which according to Thomas is defined as truth, as we have seen before.³⁰⁵ Secondly, it is the thing known that can be conformed to the intellectual soul through an immaterial abstraction process. Thirdly, the more immaterial the object to be known is, the more *knowledgeable* the cognition process must be. Therefore, the rational soul’s cognition process, which is based on sensible perception, reduces the human composite to be subjugated by the material order, which is contrary to humanity’s original mode of acquiring knowledge. We see that

³⁰³ John F. Wippel, “Truth in Thomas Aquinas, Part II” *The Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. 43, no. 3 (March 1990): 543-567. In order to present the subject of truth as clearly and as accurately as possible, in this section the thesis relies on the work of John Wippel.

³⁰⁴ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 14. A1.

³⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, Ia Q. 16. A2, *sed contra*. Recall that my argument that falsity exists in the perception of the senses.

the Apostles questioned “What sort of man is this, that even the winds and the sea obey him?” (Matthew 8:27) According to the redactor of Matthew, Jesus, the second Adam, seems to have possessed Adam’s original power to have dominion over the created order. (Genesis 1: 26) Furthermore, such immaterially ordered knowledge addresses the relation between rational beings.

Why would God create human beings with an rational soul that cannot communicate with other intellectual beings such as angels? We know from Genesis 3 that the soul enjoys a natural communicating ability with spiritual substances. However, if the ordinary human soul is unable to or prevented from participating in direct spiritual communication, then upon its separation from the body the soul would not be able to know God unless He acts at the moment of separation to impart this skill, which is incoherent.

To conclude this section and to draw the strings of the thesis together, the thesis draws upon the analytical technique of Lawrence Dewan O. P. Dewan compares two of Thomas Aquinas’ works regarding the concept of truth as presented in the *De veritate* and the pertinent questions in the *Summa theologiae*. Dewan points out that which seems to be an incongruence between these works regarding Aquinas’ concept of truth. Since *De veritate* was written prior to *Summa theologiae* one may conclude the arguments presented in *Summa theologiae* matured if not evolved and migrated away from the former work. According to Dewan *De veritate* contains errors that have been corrected in

Summa theologiae.³⁰⁶ The errors affect the outcome of the thesis. Following Dewan through the maze of his analytical metaphysical process lends significant illumination to my argument regarding the proper structure of the human soul. Bluntly put, the incongruence centers upon whether or not truth is part of the forming principle of the human soul. If not, then truth resides in *things*, which includes the human body which at separation becomes corruptible. I argue therefore that truth is part of the formation of the human soul; my understanding of Dewan's analysis is that he concludes that Aquinas states it is not.

As we advance through the analysis, I respectfully request that the reader retain the following four aspects of the thesis' arguments. The first aspect regards the human soul, which at the time of its creation is in an intimate and unified relation with its Creator. The second aspect regards the Christ-soul and its relation to his corporeal body, which enjoys the original actuality of the Adamic soul, and, therefore was not affected by the added potency of the skin of the animal. Building on the latter, the third aspect suggests that Christ's soul did not include the *haecceitic* privation or separation from God. Finally, the fourth aspect builds on the second as well and regards the attribute of Jesus to acquire knowledge without turning to the phantasms.

According to Dewan's analysis, Aquinas himself grappled with the proper determination of truth. The question Thomas proposed in both his works is whether or

³⁰⁶ Although Lawrence Dewan's conclusions are lucid and seemingly without fault the thesis does not agree with his rationale for two reasons. The first involves the thesis' argument regarding the hypo-potency of the matter of the fallen human person. Dewan may disagree with the argument as well since he takes issue with his friend and thesis director Etienne Gilson regarding degrees of potency. The second regards another of the thesis argument which relates to the first and that is the degree of intimacy the proper human soul *did* enjoy with its Creator which adds a dimension to the ordinary human soul may not have been considered by Lawrence.

not truth resides in the being (*ens*) of things or in the mind. If truth resides in the thing then the question of how to identify the truth of the thing, since things are particulars and the truth to be understood is a universal, becomes front-and-center in the mindful conflict. If truth resides only in the mind, then perhaps we are dealing with Platonism. Citing Jacques Maritan, Lawrence Dewan records that the consensus of thinkers within Thomism understands truth to be inherent in the form of things since it is “related to the doctrine of the transcendental properties of being.”³⁰⁷ Aquinas’ account of truth as it is told in *De veritate* is that truth is “prior to and the cause of knowledge.” Truth, as the source of knowledge, is absent in the *Summa theologiae* which provides a clue that Thomas is downgrading the role of truth as part of a forming principle. Aquinas does assert that knowledge is a source of truth. Finally, Aquinas asserts that good is in the thing.³⁰⁸ Therefore the knowledge of the good is through the acquisition of the similitude of the thing by the intellectual soul. Error, or sin, or evil, comes through the potency of the rational soul’s misalignment with the good of creation. Dewan cites Aquinas:

“[...] the agreement of being with appetite is expressed by the word “good”
[...] the agreement of being with intellect is expressed by the word “true””

Dewan continues to interpret Aquinas by concluding that the appetitive soul tends towards things and the intellectual soul tends towards truth. Dewan’s and Aquinas’ emphasis requires agreement between what is perceived and what is assimilated, since as

³⁰⁷ Lawrence Dewan, O.P., “Is Truth a Transcendental for St. Thomas Aquinas?” *Nova et Vetera*, English Edition, Vol. 2, no. 1 (2004): 2.

³⁰⁸ Genesis 1: 9 “And God saw that it [referring to creation] was good.”

we have seen earlier,³⁰⁹ Aquinas' cognition theories, to be coherent, require a similitude of what is known in the knower in the mode of the knower. The exactitude of the agreement is known as truth; an inexact relation is known as a falsity.

The role of truth in the formation of the human soul as it is portrayed in the Christ-soul function is critical to the success of the arguments in the thesis. The role of truth in my arguments is somewhat dissimilar to Thomas' employment of truth. The following point is crucial. Thomas' treatises on truth, whether in *De veritate* or the *Summa theologiae* point towards truth in the human composite's relation with the created realm, or regarding Truth as it inheres in God. On the other hand I am interested in truth as it is employed in the divine creation of the human soul, the role truth plays in the formation of the human soul as a likeness of God, and, in reference to, or mensurate with Jesus as he is Truth.

Let us summarize three of the arguments already presented in the thesis to arrive at some conclusion to the tensions presented above. The first argument rests on the biblical account of the creation and fall of humankind. Prior to the fall the first beings enjoyed a natural relation to God. The first humans were ignorant of the knowledge inherent in the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil. Metaphysically, their separation from God after the fall is an increase in potency due to the divinely imposed clothes of the skin of the animal. Finally, human existence is adversely impacted through this potency, not the forming principle of the human composite.

³⁰⁹ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 12. A4, *respondeo*. See also: Ia Q. 86. A1, *sed contra* and *respondeo*.

Thomas Aquinas asserts that being, truth and goodness are convertible. For human beings to gain knowledge requires an operation of acquisition either through the senses as asserted by Thomas or, as in the case of Jesus through a divine illumination due to a natural union of his un-fallen soul with God. God is Truth, One in Being and Goodness Himself. God understands, so-to-speak, all knowledge. But, He is not knowledge.

Earlier in the thesis I presented the Augustinian notion of the power of memory and drew the conclusion that the quiddity of humanity resides in the *suppositum* of God. One may argue that the memory of what it is to be human or humanity's quiddity is either knowledge, or being (*ens*) but not both. Now, God creates through the intentional act of His will. Thomism views creation as a *terminus* of the Triune God; it is an attribute of divine love to self-communicate. The most necessary terminus of God is for Him to express His goodness. His goodness is "spread abroad" through His intentional will.³¹⁰ The created entity can only receive God's goodness to the limit of its perfection, with the human soul of Jesus as the most perfect receptor. Within created things therefore, there is a potential for imperfection or badness. Inherent in the creation of the ordinary human being is more imperfection or metaphysically, more potency than there exists in Jesus. We read in Genesis 1:31 that for human beings the original level of goodness was very good, that is, "*God saw all that He had made and it was very good.*" With few exceptions, all human composites of soul and body since the fall, suffer through the body an added potency. To add this potency to the human signet-matter of the body necessitated a particular act to introduce very specific type of badness into human existence. The trap of

³¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Ia Q. 19. A2, *respondeo*.

the Serpent was not to introduce badness into the good of creation, but to introduce falsity into the relation of the created human with the divine Creator. The role of the serpent was to weaken, if not destroy, the true.

“As good has the aspect of what is desirable, so truth is related to knowledge ... the soul is in some manner all things. [And] [...] as good adds to the being the notion of desirable, so the true adds relation to the intellect.”³¹¹

The Serpent set the trap by presenting the notion of what is desirable. The order of being is knowledge, the good, the true, which adds relation to the intellect, and, in the mind of God, in His Intellect, as the divine Artist, resides the plan or exemplar or memory of the quiddity of humanity, which He then wills into creation.

The act of the Serpent, aided by humans, was designed to strike at the suppositum of God through the forming truth of the quiddity of humanity, the human soul, which is the first act of being for the human composite.

“[...] the good and the true are convertible with being, as to suppositum [...] yet true is more closely related to being, which is prior, than is good.”³¹²

And,

“in the order of things desirable [e.g., the knowledge of the tree of life] good stands as the universal, and the true as the particular [e.g., the union of the soul with God]; but in the order of intelligible things the converse is the case.”³¹³

Humanity’s complicity in the assault on God’s Being by the Serpent necessitated punishment through one of two means. The first punishment could have been directly on the soul “because the true is more closely related to being.”³¹⁴ Punishment directed to

³¹¹ *Ibid.*, Ia Q. 16. A3, *respondeo*.

³¹² *Ibid.*, Ia Q. 16. A5, *respondeo*.

³¹³ *Ibid.*, Ia Q. 16. A3, *ad 1*.

³¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Ia Q. 16. A4, *respondeo*.

the soul could only be through the annihilation of the soul since existence, the soul's first act, is prior to all other acts. The second punishment is directed to the mode of relation through which the soul interacts with Creator and created. Punishing by non-existence is evidently not the mode of punishment God choose. Therefore it is the latter punishment that remains as has been previously noted in the thesis. However, in God's mercy there is a remedy.

The remedy for the punishment is *in* the following words of Jesus:

"I am the Way and the Truth and the Life [...] If you really know me, you will know my Father as well." (John 14:6, and, cited by Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia q. 16, a5 *sed contra*)

Note the priority in Jesus' message. The Way, the Truth and the Life are the means to know the Father. The order of the message is the reverse of Aristotle's and Thomas' order of being. Jesus is the terminus for humanity to know the Father. We see in Jesus' message a direct countering to the Serpent's assault and an illuminated path back to the Father. However, in what manner or mode of being was the earthly Jesus so fully aware of himself and others?

The true is comprehended in the metaphysical category of a universal and the good in the category of a particular. Ordinary human beings perceive and abstract the essence (universal) through the intellectualive soul's powers of dividing and composing as has been shown in Chapter 2. I have clearly demonstrated that the ordinary human soul cannot break through the added potency of its signet-matter and therefore cannot be fully aware of the particular. I also demonstrated that Jesus did not taste of the fruit of

the tree of knowledge. Therefore he enjoys a different access to knowledge, an *aphantasmal* access to knowledge.

“ [...] knowing beings are distinguished from non-knowing beings [animals, therefore the animal soul] in that the latter possess only their own form, while the knowing being is naturally adapted to have also the form of some other thing; for the species [idea, concept] of the thing known is in the knower.”³¹⁵

The essence of Jesus' soul and souls of all human beings is to know God which is impossible through the natural and perceptive mode of the ordinary human cognition processes. The human rational soul primarily acquires knowledge through sensory perception, the phantasmal mode, which is the mode of the tree of knowledge. The ordinary human soul's garment of the skin of the animal is specifically adapted to acquire knowledge through the natural order. However, Jesus' rational soul has not been adapted to the fallen mode of perception to acquire knowledge and therefore knows through the forming principle of truth inherent in God. "... [A]n effect is conformed to the agent according to its form."³¹⁶ Jesus' soul is aware of the particulars of the ordinary human soul through the soul's natural structure of awareness and acquisition of knowledge through and of and from God.

The human soul of Jesus enjoys the continued presence of the quiddity of his own nature by his human union with the *suppositum* of God, the very center of the attack of the Serpent. The *absolute* point of reference for Jesus' purpose is the 'true'.

"If you love me, keep my commands. And I will ask the Father, and he will give you another advocate to help you and be with you forever— *the Spirit of truth*."

³¹⁵ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia Q. 14. A1, *respondeo*.

³¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Ia Q. 19. A6, *respondeo*. Cited by Lawrence Dewan O.P., *St. Thomas and Form as Something Divine in Things* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2007), 48.

The world cannot accept him, because it neither sees him nor knows him. But you know him, for he lives with you and will be in you.” (emphasis added)

My conclusion is that the human soul was designed to know Absolute Truth and not only the relative *truth* presently acquired through sensory perception. What is the mechanism and structure of the human soul that provides for it to know Absolute truth and the true absolutely?

Truth-exchange and the Christ-soul as the Causal Exemplar

“[...] the closer the intellectual content of the principle is to the act of being, the stronger the truth it expresses.”³¹⁷

The above quotation attributes to Thomas Aquinas the notion that truth is an inherent principle in the human soul’s *esse*. Reflecting on the content of the previous section we may well apprehend that the created human soul is designed to enjoy a certain intimate union with its Creator. If we take a moment to contemplate the encounter Thomas the Apostle had with the risen Christ whereby he expressed, absolutely, “*My Lord and my God*”, (John 20:28) an Absolute Truth, perhaps there is some agreement with the claim that an inherent component or principle of the human soul is that of the true, or trueness.³¹⁸ And perhaps there is some agreement that in order to communicate such truth, Christ communicated *aphantasmically* with Thomas. In Thomas’ encounter with Christ, Thomas is entitatively subordinated to Jesus. Thomas’ very being is re-formed by the informing act of the Christ-soul Incarnated with the Word. What is the

³¹⁷ Orestes J. Gonzales, “The Apprehension of the Act of Being in Aquinas,” *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. LXVII, no. 4 (1994): 483.

³¹⁸ Prior to Jesus’ death Peter enjoyed his own epiphany and exchange of truths. “Simon Peter answered, “You are the Messiah, the Son of the living God.” Jesus answered him, “Blessed are you, Simon son of Jonah! For flesh and blood has not revealed this to you, but my Father in heaven. (Matthew 16: 16)

metaphysical structure of Thomas the Apostle's re-formation? Simply put, it is a truth-exchange. Jesus is exchanging the place where the knowledge from the tree of knowledge of good and evil resides and exchanging it with the Spirit of truth.³¹⁹ Let us examine how the truth-exchange might take place.

Thomas the Apostle's encounter with the Risen Christ is a spiritual relation. *Anagogically* one may conclude that the relation is similar to the relation the Christ-soul enjoys with his divine nature. As noted by the quotation at the beginning of the section, the truth content of a relation depends on its proximity to its act of being. The unity between the human soul of Jesus and the divine nature of the Word dictates perfectly ordered truth-content since the human soul of Jesus is united with the divine nature at the very *being (esse)* of the Christ-soul. In other words Jesus' human intellect and His divine Intellect enjoy one could say a symbiotic relation; a relation that is beneficial to both natures. The human soul of Jesus enjoys to its fullest extent the divine Wisdom, Companionship and Love. The divine nature in return enjoys a visible exemplar in the personage of the Son who is able to be known by all creation in order that the terminus of the Father may be realized. There is a particularly intimate unity to this ontological being, that is, the signification of *exemplar-unity*,³²⁰ as the character of *truth*. In His wisdom God

³¹⁹ More accurately since Thomas' encounter is prior to Pentecost Thomas' soul is being readied for Pentecost.

³²⁰ Referencing footnote 59 above the relation between the Son as Second Person of the Trinity and the son as son of humankind necessitates a unity as per the Chalcedon (451) dogma. Therefore the exemplar cause and the exemplar effect are in such similitude that there is a perfect relation or exemplar-unity between the two. The exemplar-unity describes the Chalcedon Definition unity in metaphysical terms. Further to the unity within the Person of Jesus I extend this unity to all created souls through the Body of Christ.

maintained the similitude of the divine intellect in the intellect of the created rational but fallen being:

“And in this phantasm the intellectual impression shines forth as an exemplar in the thing exemplified, or as in an image.”³²¹

Regarding the event with Thomas, Thomas’ soul is intimately joined to the Christ-soul through the instrumental yet causal power of the exemplar-unity character and Thomas’ soul is primed such that the falsity of the Serpent is replaced with the Spirit of truth at Pentecost. The falsity-truth exchange not only takes place in Thomas’ eternal soul, but in his soul’s relation to the Trinity as well.

Earlier in the chapter several aspects of eternity and the relations between the Persons of the Trinity were presented. The notion of God the Creator as the Divine Artist and Exemplar Cause was introduced. Furthermore the unique reciprocating act of the Son to the Father has been well developed. Finally I have examined in detail the truth-relation the Christ-soul enjoys with Triune God. To conclude the chapter one final aspect to unpack is necessary. This unpacking regards a more complete understanding of the human soul of Jesus Christ as the instrumental causal exemplar.³²²

My understanding of the personhood of the Triune God is such that each Person of the Trinity dominates within their Personhood. The Father creates, the Son is the Word and the Holy Spirit is the Bearer of Gifts. Each Person plays a role in the act of the

³²¹ H. Carr, *The Function Of The Phantasm In St. Thomas Aquinas*.
http://www.archive.org/stream/functionofphanta00carruoft/functionofphanta00carruoft_djvu.txt
(accessed 26 July 2011).

³²² Charles A. Hart, *Thomistic Metaphysics: An Inquiry into the Act of Existing* (Englewood Cliffs N. J. Prentice-Hall: 1959), 321. Citing Aquinas from *De Veritate*, q. 3, a.1: “Aquinas defines exemplar cause as *a form (idea) in imitation of which* something comes into being from the intention of the agent that determines its end for itself.”

exemplar cause as well. Thomas Aquinas' example of the signet-ring as a means to transfer from master to steward not only knowledge but also authority is particularly relevant. Also, the reciprocating principle as it is inherent in the Second Person of the Trinity plays an important role in the Truth-identity relation of the human soul to God. A unique role of the Second Person of the Trinity is the reciprocating principle of identity and therefore truth. Jesus has claimed that he is "the Way, the Truth and the Life."

The human soul of Jesus, who is the exemplar of the divine Second Person, also enjoys the reciprocating principle of identity and truth, but in an instrumental causal exemplar mode. Aquinas teaches that there is only reciprocity between beings that are alike. Dewan, citing Aquinas, comments that "forms or natures ... are seen as *measures* of creaturely participation in the divine nature."³²³ The human soul functions in two modes of being. The first is as a principle, more exactly, a forming principle, which is interpreted as that which initiates the act of being. The second is the immediate terminus of the soul's first act which is the human soul as the form of the human composite of body and soul. Aquinas proposes that there are two types of forms. The first is the universal form which relates to the divine will. The second is the particular form which causes the existence of the individual.³²⁴ It is the latter which is of interest at this moment.

In the act of creation of the human soul and then the human composite, one can imagine the Creator, reaching into his *suppositum*, His very nature, and as the Divine Artist causing to come into existence the human soul. I propose that the rational soul's

³²³ Lawrence Dewan, O.P., *St. Thomas and Form as Something Divine in Things* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2007), 48.

³²⁴ *Ibid.*

coming into existence consists of three parts. The first is its essence, stamped not only in the image and likeness of Himself, but also in the image of the Son, Who by reciprocating the very Being of the Divine Artist acknowledges not only the Paternity of the Father but the filial relation of humankind as well. The Son is the Exemplar of the Father and the human soul of Christ is stamped in the likeness not only of the Father but in the image of the Son Who reciprocates the Father's communication of His Love through the Bearer of Gifts. As such the Second Person and the human soul of Jesus through their unity personify the principle of reciprocation in generated and created beings. Continuing with the reciprocation theme, the second part of the human soul that is impacted is the truth-relation it enjoys as part of its being (*ens*). Recall that the Serpent targeted the truth-relation the original human soul enjoyed with God. The human soul of Jesus, the Christ-soul, causes, through his own exemplar form, the reciprocation formation of the human soul. In creating the human soul the Creator employs the essence of what it is to be human which includes the exemplar of the human soul of Jesus who reciprocates the love of the Father. In other words the proper human soul enjoys an inherent ability to reciprocate the gift of creation of the Father as recorded in the Gospel of John.

“After Jesus had spoken these words, he looked up to heaven and said: “Father, the hour has come; glorify your Son, so that the Son may glorify you, since you have given him authority over all people, to give eternal life to all whom you have given him. And this is eternal life, that they may know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom you have sent.” (John 17: 1-3)

The human act of reciprocating the gift of creation is to acknowledge the Father: “[*i*]n all your ways acknowledge him, and he will make straight your paths” (Proverbs 3:6) and to

love the other and oneself.³²⁵ Finally, through the Personhood of the Son and again in unity with his human nature, the ordinary human soul receives its identity principle, which is inherent to the soul through the unity it enjoys with the Creator while being created. The universal form of the human soul which is necessarily caused to exist by divine will, finds its individual identity in its relation with Truth which is convertible to the good and to being (*ens*) through the prayerful incantations of Jesus to his heavenly Father.

“They do not belong to the world, just as I do not belong to the world. Sanctify them in the truth; your word is truth. As you have sent me into the world, so I have sent them into the world. And for their sakes I sanctify myself, so that they may be sanctified in truth.

I ask not only on behalf of these, but also on behalf of those who will believe in me through their word, that they may all be one. As you, Father, are in me, and I am in you, may they also be in us, so that the world may believe that you sent me. The glory that you have given me, I have given them, so that they may be one, as we are one, I in them, and you in me, that they may become completely one, so that the world may know that you have sent me and have loved them, even as you have loved me. Father, I desire that those also, whom you have given me, may be with me where I am, to see my glory, which you have given me because you loved me before the foundation of the world. Righteous Father, the world does not know you, but I know you; and these know that you have sent me. I made your name known to them, and will make it known, so that the love with which you have loved me may be in them, and I in them.” (John 17: 16-26)

³²⁵ The Gospel of Matthew: 22:37-39: “[Jesus] said to him, ‘You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with your soul, and with all your mind.’ This is the greatest and first commandment. And a second is like it: ‘You shall love your neighbor as yourself.’”

CONCLUSION

I have attempted to provide a metaphysical and ontological speculation of the ordinary human soul as illuminated by the human soul of Jesus Christ. The main difficulties within the thesis were to arrive at plausible modes of comparison between corporeity and eternity; between natural being and intentional being, and, defining the role of the human soul of Jesus Christ in the act of creation of the ordinary human soul.

The foundation of the thesis is three hypotheses. The first hypothesis is the notion of added or hypo-potency imparted to the body/soul composite by God as the clothes of the flesh of the animal which is apprehended as a second overriding layer of potency, that is, the animal matter layer overrides the original signet-matter of the human body.

The second hypothesis concerns the first. The consequences of original sin reduce the proper awareness and truth acquisition the original human soul once enjoyed. One aspect of lowered awareness requires thinkers to invoke the *haecceitic* principle as a metaphysical principle for individuation. Furthermore, the aspect of lowered truth acquisition powers required the employment of the phantasms for the ordinary human soul to perceive the world.

The third hypothesis regards the human soul of Jesus Christ. The thesis concurs with the Chalcedon (451) dogma that the human soul of Jesus is in an essential unity with the divine nature of the Second Person of the Trinity. From these three hypotheses I formulated three claims.

The first claim regards the *ahaecceitic* nature of Jesus Christ. *Haecceitism* is the individuating principle termed by scholastic scholars to explain the ‘thisness’ of entities. Because of Jesus’ human soul’s natural communion with the Trinity, he defines his individuality through the intentional act of his personage.

The second claim is that the human soul of Jesus acquires knowledge without necessarily employing the phantasms. In other words the human soul is created, through its relation with the Trinity, to acquire knowledge through the spiritual/intentional order of reality. In contrast the sinful human soul acquires knowledge primarily through the natural order and therefore necessarily employs the phantasms.

The third claim regards the unity of beings. Thomas Aquinas asserted that two beings fully in act cannot form an essential unity which may be interpreted as contrary to the Chalcedon formula regarding the two natures of Jesus Christ unified as one person. Through metaphysical rationale I extended the divine-human essential unity notion to include the ordinary human soul without yielding another God-person.

The metaphysical genre and general arguments of the thesis, an overview of the main structure of the human soul and its metaphysical construction blocks were presented. The metaphysical understanding of the thesis’ biblical foundations that rest on particular aspects of Genesis 1 and Genesis 3 were developed. A metaphysical foundation was prepared that provided an understanding between the natural and intentional order of being, and, I related these concepts to the modern notion of *de re* and *de dictum* modes of reality. Inherent in the modes of reality are the distinctions between the Christ-soul’s awareness and the ordinary human soul’s awareness of the temporal and eternal

realms. Then I re-interpret the Thomistic notion that it is matter that individuates by proposing that, with regards to the original or proper human soul, it is the relation of the human soul to God that identifies its personage.

We saw in Chapter 2 a detailed examination of the ordinary human soul's metaphysical construction, its source in the *suppositum* of God and its fall due to original sin. I then presented my interpretation of the metaphysical structure of original sin as a trap by the Serpent on the truth (*sic*) nature of the human soul. I continued on the metaphysical theme to provide an understanding of the ordinary human soul's relation with the Triune God.

I then presented the triptych of metaphysical relations inherent in the Incarnated Word with regards to his human nature, the Trinity and the ordinary human soul.

In the latter sections of Chapter 3, we saw, from an ontological speculation perspective, a comparison of the ordinary human soul against the ideal of the human soul of Jesus Christ. In order to substantiate the human-soul-Christ-soul relation I demonstrated that the Second Person of the Trinity is the unique principle of reciprocation since it is he alone who acknowledges His personhood to the Father as Son. I then concluded that the Son's principle of reciprocation is employed as a divine exemplar cause who transcribes His attributes to the human soul of Jesus Christ, who in turn is the instrumental exemplar in the act of creation of the ordinary human soul. I then provided a fresh and innovative metaphysical formula that describes the relation between the human soul of Christ, his divine nature and the role both his divine and human natures played in the creation of the human soul. I term this relation an 'exemplar-unity'.

I also concluded that the trap of the Serpent was an attack at the nature of God through the essence of the human soul that is grounded in the *suppositum* of God. The consequence of this attack is that humankind lost the right to enjoy a true perspective of the created order and a natural communion with God. I then argued that the human soul of Jesus did not taste of the fruit of the tree of knowledge and therefore acquires knowledge *aphantasmally*. Finally, I claim that a possible salvation-mode for humanity is via the mode of a relation with the Christ-soul as an exemplar-unity that forms an ontological being between the Christ human soul and the ordinary human soul.

I conclude by stating that the human soul of Christ, unified with his divine person, is the ordinary human soul's *measure*, its, canonicity, its formal unity with the Triune God through the inherent unity of the Body of Christ.³²⁶

³²⁶ The official definition holds that the Body of Christ are "members of the Church [who] are bound together by a supernatural life communicated to them by Christ through the sacraments." <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10663a.htm> (accessed 12 July 2010).

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