Learning amongst Experts and Politicians: An Analysis from Canadian Pension Policy

Christopher A. Cooper

A Thesis in the Department of Political Science

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of
Master of Arts (Public Policy and Public Administration),
at
Concordia University
Montreal, Quebec, Canada

CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY

School of Graduate Studies

This is to certify that the thesis prepared by Christopher A. Cooper entitled *Learning amongst Experts and Politicians: An Analysis from Canadian Pension Policy*, and submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts (Public Policy and Public Administration) complies with the regulations of the University and meets the accepted standards with respect to the originality and quality.

Signed by the Final Examining Committee:

_____Chair

Jean-François Mayer

_____Examiner

Francesca Scala

_____Supervisor

Patrik Marier

Approved by:_____

Chair of Department or Graduate Program Director

_____ _____

Dean of Faculty Date

Abstract.

Learning amongst Experts and Politicians: An Analysis from Canadian Pension Policy

By Christopher A. Cooper

The Royal Commission on the Status of Pensions in Ontario (Haley commission) and the Parliamentary Task Force on Pension Reform (Frith committee) were both established during the Great Pension Debate (1977-1984) to study the Canadian pension system and to develop proposals for reform. Yet despite studying pensions in the same country and era, the two inquiries developed fundamentally different solutions. Whereas the Haley commission recommended incremental adjustments to programs, the Frith committee reframed pensions as an issue intrinsically tied to and perpetuating gender biases in society.

Using Peter Hall's systematic process analysis, this thesis finds that the different recommendations of these two public inquiries are largely the result of: (a) the varying types of information used by the inquiries (specifically expert versus non-expert information); and (b) the social learning amongst women's groups in the period between the two inquiries. The combination of an inquiry open to using non-expert information alongside an increased number of women's groups presenting specific proposals for reform, led to the Frith committee's fundamental reframing of pensions.

Dedication

…for Charles, Emilie and Geneviève.

Financial assistance received from the *Fonds de Recherche du Québec - Société et Culture* and the *Social Science Humanities Research Council of Canada*.

Table of Contents

List of Figures vii
List of Tables viii
List of Abbreviations ix
Chapter One: Introduction 1
The puzzle 1
Chapter Two: The Great Pension Debate 6
The Great Pension Debate 6
Reframing core goals – the Frith committee 8
Incremental adjustments – the Haley commission 9
Conclusion 12
Chapter Three: Literature Review Learning by Individuals and Policy Reviews 14
What is policy learning? 14
How individuals learn 16
The role of policy reviews in learning 21
Royal commissions 22
Parliamentary committees 27
Conclusion 28
Chapter Four: Research Design, Methods and Pension Policy in Canada 30
Methodological debates and the Systematic Process Analysis 30
The policy core of Canadian pension policy 31
History of the Canadian pension system 32
Conclusion 35
Chapter Five: The Royal Commission on the Status of Pensions in Ontario and the Parliamentary Task Force on Pension Reform 36
The Royal Commission on the Status of Pensions in Ontario 36
The Parliamentary Task Force on Pension Reform 47
Conclusion 57
Chapter Six: Learning by Experts and Politicians 60
Two components of problem solving 60
Haley commission 64

Frith committee 72
Conclusion 79
Chapter Seven: Social Learning amongst Women's Groups 81
Introduction 81
Three means to gender equality 82
Increase in size 83
Increase in research and analysis 92
Federalism, time and social learning: specification and consensus for a homemaker pension 94
Conclusion 102
Chapter Eight: Conclusion 103
Key findings 103
Causes of incremental and radical learning 106
Federalism, time and social learning 107
References 109
Appendix I: Consulted Actors – Haley Commission and Frith Committee 120

List of Figures

Figure 1: Referenced Information – The Haley Commission and Frith Committee 63

Figure 2: Referenced Information – Dissenting Opinion 63

Figure 3: Referenced Sources by Women's Groups, Frith Public Hearings 96

Figure 4: Support for a Homemaker Pension 100

Figure 5: Programmatic Proposals for a Homemaker Pension (groups indicating official support) 101

List of Tables

Table 1: Provincial and Federal Pension Policy Reviews, 1977-1988 7

Table 2: Key Recommendations of the Haley and Frith Inquiry..... 10

Table 3: Pension Policy Core in Canada, 1926-1977 34

Table 4: Pension Policy Goals and Corresponding Programs 35

Table 5: Structure of Haley Commission and Frith Committee 59

Table 6: Ideal Typology of Problem Solving for Politicians and Experts..... 61

Table 7: Three Feminisms of the Second Wave in Canada 83

Table 8: Secretary of State Expenditure on Women's Groups, 1976 -1982 (Constant $ 1975, in 1000s)..... 85

Table 9: National Welfare Grants Expenditure (Grants for Voluntary Organizations).... 86

Table 10: National Welfare Grants Targeted Research Activities..... 86

Table 11: Number (and Percentage) of Submissions Received by the Inquiries..... 88

Table 12: Women's Groups Submissions and Presentations..... 88

Table 13: Women and Pensions Literature 93

List of Abbreviations

CACSW – Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women

CIA – Canadian Institute of Actuaries

CPP – Canada Pension Plan

DB – Defined-benefit

DC – Defined-contribution

GIS – Guaranteed Income Supplement

NAC – National Action Committee on the Status of Women

NPC – National Pensions Conference

OAS – Old Age Security

PAYGO – Pay-As-You-Go

PURS – Provincial Universal Retirement System

QPP – Quebec Pension Plan

RCSW – Royal Commission on the Status of Women

RRP – Registered Retirement Plan

RRSP – Registered Retirement Savings Program

SPA – Systematic Process Analysis

YMPE – Years Maximum Pensionable Earnings

Chapter One: Introduction

> The work of commissions of inquiry, both through their hearings and reports, have brought new thinking into the public consciousness; expanded the vocabulary of politics, education and social science; and added to the furniture that we now expect in Canada's storefront of ideas. [Commissions of inquiry] supplement the traditional machinery of government, by bringing to bear the resources of time, objectivity, expertise and by offering a forum for the expression of public opinion.
>
> - Thomas Berger, *Canadian Commissions of Inquiry: An Insider's Perspectives* (2003, 14).

The puzzle

Between 1977 and 1984 the viability of the Canadian pension system was in question. Years of high inflation, growing government deficits, changing structures of gender (i.e. increasing participation of women in the labour force and higher levels of divorce), and fears of an impending aging population, led citizens and governments across Canada to study the pension system. Of particular concern was the system's ability to protect seniors against abject poverty, and whether the system adequately encouraged, and protected, financial contributions from individuals towards their retirement income.

Federal and provincial governments undertook various policy reviews – ranging from departmental reviews to royal commissions – to identify the key problems and possible solutions with respect to the pension system in Canada. Yet despite being created in reaction to the same events (for example, inflation and government debt), and being established in the same country during the same era of debate, the recommendations of these various policy reviews were vastly different. This thesis looks at the recommendations of the Royal Commission on the Status of Pensions in Ontario

(hereafter the Haley commission after Chairperson Donna Haley) and the Parliamentary Task Force on Pension Reform[1] (hereafter the Frith committee after Chairperson Douglas Frith) established by the Federal government.

The Haley commission sat for three years and undertook an extensive gathering of information through public hearings as well as independent research studies. The members of the commission were drawn from outside the government and also had professional experience with, and knowledge of, pensions. The final recommendations of the Haley commission however, were limited to making adjustments of contemporary programs, such as alterations in regulations overseeing the vesting and portability of benefits. The core framing of pensions as an issue tied to retirement, and more specifically a policy whose primary goals were to provide seniors residual protection from poverty and encourage individuals to contribute towards their retirement, was left untouched by the commission.

In contrast, the learning by the Frith committee was innovative and radical. The committee challenged the traditional view of pensions as an issue tied to retirement income, and reframed the issue as a way of recognizing the economic value of (often women's) domestic labour (Statistics Canada 2012). The committee saw pensions as a means to address gender biases in Canada's economic and social institutions. This was accomplished by advocating for a "homemaker pension," where adults staying in the

[1] Although officially a "parliamentary task force", this inquiry shared the features of a "parliamentary committee" according to Trebilcock's (1982) classification of policy reviews. First, like parliamentary committees, the members of the Frith committee were politicians and not experts outside the government, as would be the case of a task force. Secondly, reflecting traits of a parliamentary committee, the Frith committee was given a shorter time period to make its report to the government. Thirdly, the Frith committee was instructed to review the proposals of a green paper, a unique feature of parliamentary committees. Finally during the public hearings members of the inquiry also repeatedly referred to the inquiry as a committee and not a task force (for example, Frith 1983, Public Hearings, 1: 20).

home to conduct work for their spouse, or any dependent individual under the age of 18, would accumulate pension benefits within the C/QPP equal to half the Years Maximum Pensionable Earnings (YMPE). The committee's new framing of pensions however, took place despite its shorter time period, smaller research staff, and members who were politicians.

The diverse recommendations of these two inquiries are puzzling however, considering understandings of public inquiries and Canadian political parties provided from the political science literature. Some analysts (for example, Bradford 1998; Jenson 1994; Inwood 2005) note that the learning produced by royal commissions is generally more innovative than other public inquiries such as parliamentary committees. When compared with other forms of inquiry, the innovative nature of commissions is seen as stemming from their greater human, financial and temporal resources, as well as their independence from government.

Furthermore, according to "brokerage theory" (for example, Carty and Cross 2010; Meisel 1974; Clarke et al. 1996) politicians wish to appeal to the broadest sectors of the electorate. Avoiding radical ideas and seeking moderate positions thus leads to incremental recommendations. Yet despite these trends outlined in the literature, the opposite outcomes are observed in the Frith committee and the Haley commission.

Drawing upon works from the policy sciences, cognitive psychology and organization theory, this thesis argues that differences in the recommendations of these two inquiries are largely the result of two factors: (a) differences in preferences over the types of information used to make decisions (specifically expert versus non-expert

information); and (b) the social learning amongst women's groups in their production and dissemination of information, especially proposals for a homemaker pension.

Due to the increased number of organizations and studies conducting a gendered analysis of pensions, when the Frith committee sat just two years after the publication of the Haley commission's report, the positions of women's groups had grown more specific. The increased development of women's groups combined with the Frith committee's openness to non-expert information, created the conditions that led to a radical reframing of pensions as an issue of gender equity.

Recognizing the potential of case studies to identify causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005), this thesis follows the learning process of each inquiry using a "systematic process analysis" (SPA) method (Hall 2003). Simply, SPA is a directed process tracing that formulates hypotheses to explain causality, and tests these hypotheses by following the causal processes as they actually occurred (Hall 2003, 395).

The findings of this thesis will be of interest to different audiences. This work first provides better understanding of how governments learn, by focusing on how preferences for different types of information affect what proposals are eventually made. This work is also unique by providing a rare glimpse into the actions of a parliamentary committee, a public inquiry which has not previously received much attention in empirical case studies. To better understand the factors affecting whether incremental adjustments or innovative solutions are proposed this thesis also undertakes a rare comparison between two public inquiries. This work thus contributes to the debate in the public inquiry literature over whether the learning of royal commissions are generally

incremental (for example, Ransley 1994; Simeon 1987; Sulzner 1971; Wilson 1971), or whether they lead to innovative solutions (for example, Bradford 1998; Inwood 2005; Jenson 1994; Berger 2003, 14; Iacobucci 1990, 24; Marchildon 2007). Lastly, this work documents how a federal structure can encourage social learning amongst societal groups by providing extended opportunities to produce, gather, and discuss issues over a period of time in a plurality of venues.

The thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter two provides an overview of the puzzle and the context of the Great Pension Debate. Situated in the policy learning literature, chapter three provides a review on the role of individuals in studying problems and developing solutions and also reviews the literature on public inquiries and social learning. Chapter four outlines the research design and methodology, while providing a brief synopsis of the Canadian pension system. Chapter five describes the structure and process of the Haley commission and the Frith committee. Chapter six explores whether the experts of the Haley commission and the politicians of the Frith committee sought to use different types of information, while chapter seven explores whether the increased interest, and body of information held amongst women's groups towards pensions, impacted their capacity to participate in each inquiry. The final chapter offers some concluding remarks of the factors affecting the potential of public inquiries to generate innovative learning, as well as how a federal structure can foster learning amongst groups in society.

Chapter Two: The Great Pension Debate

The Great Pension Debate

The seven years spanning from 1977 to 1984 were an active period in the study of pensions in Canada. High inflation, government debt, changing societal structures of gender (increasing participation of women in the labour force and high levels of divorce), fears of an impending aging population, and poverty amongst seniors, led to growing concern over the adequacy of the pension system (Desjardins 1988; Ascah 1984). Due to the high level of public, government and academic attention on the issue of pensions during this period, this era has since become known as the "Great Pension Debate" (Béland and Myles 2005, 252).

With the viability of the pension system in question, provincial and federal governments from across Canada began to search for a policy fix. No less than fourteen studies were created in this seven year period (Table 1). These studies spanned from intradepartmental reviews such as Alberta's and Saskatchewan's Ministry of Labour's *Proposal for Improving the Effectiveness of the Private Sector Pension System in Alberta* and *Reform of Canada's Retirement Income System – A Saskatchewan View* to the federal government's interdepartmental steering committee, *The Retirement Income System in Canada: Problems and Alternatives for Reform*, to parliamentary committees such as the *Parliamentary Task Force on Pension Reform* and the appointment of royal commissions such as the *Nova Scotia Royal Commission on Pensions* and the *Ontario Royal Commissions on the Status of Pensions*.

Table 1: Provincial and Federal Pension Policy Reviews, 1977-1988

Jurisdiction	Year	Name
Ontario	**1977**	**The Royal Commission on the Status of Pensions in Ontario**
Quebec	1977	Comité d'étude sur le financement du régime de rentes du Québec et sur les régimes supplémentaires de rentes [Cofirentes +]. "La sécurité financière des personnes âgées au Québec."
Ontario	1979	"Issues in Pension Policy: Economics of Financing National Pension Plans: Financing of Public and Private Pension Plans: An Analysis From Two Perspectives"
Canada	1979	Task Force on Retirement Income Policy "The Retirement Income System in Canada: Problems and Alternatives for Reform"
Canada	1980	Special Senate Committee on Retirement Age Policies "Retirement Without Tears"
Sask.	1981	"Reform of Canada's Retirement Income System – A Saskatchewan View" Ministry of Labour
Ontario	1982	Select Committee on Pensions "Report of the Select Committee of the Ontario Legislature on Pensions"
BC	1982	"Developing a pension policy for the future" Ministry of Provincial Secretary and Government
Canada	**1983**	**Parliamentary Task Force on Pension Reform**
NS	1983	Nova Scotia Royal Commission on Pensions
Man.	1983	Pension Commission of Manitoba. "Proposals for Amendments to the Pension Benefits Act"
Ontario	1984	"Ontario Proposals for Pension Reform." Treasurer of Ontario
Alberta	1984	Proposal for Improving the Effectiveness of the Private Sector Pension System in Alberta. Ministry of Labour
Canada	1984	Action Plan for Pension Reform

Discussions of pensions by these reviews generally remained within the confines of a standard scope. There was a great deal of consensus that pensions were an instrument

to prevent poverty amongst seniors, and encourage individuals to contribute to their retirement to achieve an adequate replacement income (Béland and Myles 2005, 257). Points of disagreement within these reviews commonly included whether inadequacies of the present system were better addressed through the expansion of the public system (i.e. C/QPP) or by changes in government regulations overseeing private mechanisms (Registered Retirement Plans) (Ascah 1984, 416).

This consensus over the primary functions of pensions during the Great Pension Debate reflects the historical legacy of pension policy in Canada (recounted in chapter four), as having the dual functions of: (a) ensuring minimum protection against abject poverty; and (b) encouraging individuals to contribute to their retirement to achieve an adequate level of income replacement.

Reframing core goals – the Frith committee

While the recommendations of the policy reviews appointed during the Great Pension Debate generally emphasized the traditional dual objectives of the pension system, the solutions advocated by the Frith committee were remarkably distinct. Specifically, the committee deviated from its mandated terms of reference to address what it perceived as a novel, but necessary, reframing of pensions as a means to pursue gender equality. As the committee stated:

> In carrying out our task we ranged somewhat outside the proposals of the Green Paper. To arrive at a coherent set of reform proposals we had to examine broader issues and problems mentioned by witnesses appearing before us. (Frith 1983, 2)

The definition of pensions was reframed by the Frith Committee as an institutional structure that both reflected and contributed to gender biases in society. Pensions were no longer an issue associated with retirement, but instead became viewed as a means to recognize women's work that has historically been unrecognized in a patriarchal market economy. As stated by the committee:

> ...the problem of pensions for women is not simply a problem of ensuring better pensions for low earners in the labour force. *It is a problem of acknowledging and adequately providing for the work women do*, both inside and outside the labour force, and of identifying the institutions and arrangements, including pension arrangements, that must be changed in order to make this possible. (emphasis added Frith 1983, 74)

Considering that the Frith committee studied the same questions surrounding the adequacy of the Canadian pension system, and took place in the same era of national debate, its radical reframing of pension policy is intriguing. The innovative solution put forth by the Frith committee is all the more perplexing considering the greater resources in both time and research capacity held by other policy reviews of the Great Pension Debate, and in particular possessed by the Haley commission.

Incremental adjustments – the Haley commission

The Haley commission was the most extensive policy review of pensions during the Great Pension Debate. It sat for three years, undertook public hearings in eight cities, and conducted 13 independent research studies within six different disciplines as well as a public opinion survey. The final recommendations of the Haley commission were compiled in a comprehensive eight volume report, along with two additional volumes containing background papers and independent studies. Unlike the radical

recommendations of the Frith committee however, the recommendations of the Haley commission were limited to incremental solutions to existing policy instruments (summarized in Table 2). These included alterations in the regulations overseeing the vesting and portability of benefits, minimum survivor benefits for the widowed, as well as minimum employee and employer contribution levels.

The Haley commission's reflection of the standard approach to pensions is best exemplified in its recommendation for the establishment of a provincially run, mandatory, defined-contribution plan with immediate vesting and complete portability, under the name of the Provincial Universal Retirement System (PURS). In short, the Haley commission explicitly reaffirmed the traditional policy goals of pensions to protect against abject poverty and encourage individuals to contribute for their retirement.

Table 2: Key Recommendations of the Haley and Frith Inquiry

	Solution
Frith Committee	Homemaker Pension: C/QPP contributions equal to half the years maximum pensionable earnings
Haley Commission	Resist attempts to increase universal Benefits of OAS. Provincially administered DC plan

Speaking to the objectives of pension policy, the commission perfectly mirrors the standard policy core of pensions:

> In concluding that Ontario should seek a system of retirement income provision for its residents the Commission believes that government should design social programs to achieve two goals:
>
> - to guarantee a minimum level of retirement income below which no person`s income is permitted to fall;
>
> - to replace a measure of pre-retirement earnings in retirement.
>
> A system designed to meet these objectives need not and should not deny the responsibility of the individual to use his or her own best efforts to provide for the retirement years…The Commission sees a positive social value in preserving and, where possible, enlarging the area of individual discretion for retirement. Accordingly, it is desirable that government use its power to extend certain incentives and opportunities for individuals to save and thereby allow them to take responsibility for part of their post-retirement living standard. (Haley 1980, Volume X, 2)

Importantly, the incremental nature of the commission's recommendations cannot be attributed to it being assigned a limited mandate. As noted by others (Desjardins 1988, 140; Baldwin 1981), the commission was given a broad mandate to study the Canadian pension system in any way it deemed appropriate to uncover the most pressing inadequacies in the social and economic components of the Canadian pension system. Ontario Premier William G. Davis told the commission at its establishment:

> pensions involve social, political and economic issues which are as complex as they are significant. The importance and complexity of the issues involved require the establishment of a commission. (Haley 1980, Volume I, xi)

The broad and sweeping statement to study "social and economic aspects" has also been found in other public inquiries in Canada such as the Mackenzie Pipeline Inquiry (also called the Berger inquiry) told to consider the "social, environmental, and economic impact regionally of the construction, operation, and subsequent abandonment of the proposed pipeline" (Berger 1986: 93; as cited in Althaus 1994, 191).

Differences in the nature of the recommendations advanced by the Haley and Frith inquiries are even more perplexing considering works frequently linking commissions and experts to innovative learning due to their operations outside of government and bureaucratic routines, as well as their larger resources to conduct research and hold public consultations (for example, Jenson 1994; Bradford 1998; Inwood 2005). Conversely, due to their closer relationships with government and lack of resources, parliamentary committees and politicians have been associated with incremental learning (Wilson 1971; Jenson 1994; Marchildon 2007; Hodgetts 1968).

Conclusion

Between 1977 and 1984, governments across Canada reacted to growing concerns over the ability of the pension system to protect seniors against poverty and encourage individuals to adequately contribute to their retirement, by establishing policy reviews to study the pension system and recommend solutions.

The parameters of these reviews generally reflected the traditional goals embedded in Canadian pension policy. Such was the case for the Haley commission, whose members were experts drawn from outside government, and had been given extensive resources to conduct public hearings and independent research over a period of three years.

Developing a radically new approach to pensions however, was the Frith committee. Despite being exclusively composed of politicians, having a smaller research capacity and sitting for a shorter period of time than the Haley commission, the Frith

committee reframed the core goals and problems associated with pensions as an issue related to gender equality.

Differences between the recommendations of the two inquiries are puzzling however, as understandings of politicians and experts as well as parliamentary committees and royal commissions generally point to different learning outcomes. To better understand why the recommendations of these two inquiries are so different, the next chapter provides an overview of the public inquiry literature focusing on how such bodies study problems, as well as theoretical distinctions between how experts and politicians learn.

Chapter Three: Literature Review Learning by Individuals and Policy Reviews

What is policy learning?

In *Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden*, Hugh Heclo (1974) first provided an alternative interpretation for the development of policy. No longer was policy exclusively viewed as a product of political struggles; rather, policy was depicted as an outcome of collective problem-solving. In the words of Heclo, "governments not only 'power'...they also puzzle" (1974, 305). Alongside increased recognition in the use of information in the development of policy, a body of literature has since developed under the rubric of "policy learning". Interested in how governments use information and knowledge to solve problems and develop policy (Dunlop and James 2007, 406), policy learning continues to receive academic attention.

Alongside such interest however, discontent has also grown over the literature's lack of theoretical progress (Crossan et al. 1999; Oliver and Lodge 2003), and inability to specify how learning takes place (Radaelli 2009; Zito and Schout 2009). Such frustrations grow in part from research failing to define learning (for example, Bray et al. 2011), as well as differences in terminology. Terms used include: "lesson drawing" (Rose 1991); "policy-oriented learning" (Sabatier 1988); and "government learning" (Etheredge and Short 1983). Furthermore, at a rudimentary level, contention also exists over what exactly learning is. Huber (1991) and Nilsson (2006, 229), maintain that policy learning does not require policy change; instead, learning requires the use of information in decision-making, even if the end result is the maintenance of the status quo. Others however, hold that learning only occurs when such information is used to actually change

policy (Bennett and Howlett 1992). In explaining variation between the Haley commission and the Frith committee, this thesis defines learning as the use of new information in making a decision and not necessarily a decision leading to policy change. Consequently, as ad hoc bodies initiated by governments to study problems and develop solutions, public inquiries, such as royal commissions and parliamentary committees, are fait accompli, an example of policy learning. Accordingly, studying public inquiries automatically allows researchers to go beyond determining whether learning occurs, and instead begins from a position focusing on how learning takes place.

Nonetheless, some general agreement does exist in the learning literature. For instance, a frequent distinction is often made between 'incremental' and 'radical' learning (for example, Argyris and Schon 1978; March 1991; May 1992). Incremental learning is generally defined as minor adjustments to policy instruments, while radical learning is defined as axiomatic changes in the core policy goals and problem definitions themselves.

Concurring with the distinction between incremental and radical forms of learning, a more specific division is provided by Peter A. Hall (1993), who further distinguishes between two degrees of incremental learning. The most incremental form of learning, called "first order change" is a refinement in the degree to which present programs are implemented. The second form of incremental change, ("second order" change), is an alteration of the policy instruments used to achieve policy goals (1993, 281-283). Standing in contrast to incremental learning is radical learning ("third order" change) where the core goals and problem definitions of policy are reframed.

Due to the inability of policy learning to specify causal relationships, it is instead better to use policy learning as an approach emphasizing the role of knowledge in the development of policy. Policy learning could then be complemented with other theories and models to explain the relationship between knowledge and the development of policy. This thesis does such, by developing an ideal typology exploring whether different actors solve problems in different ways.

How individuals learn

For some, learning is an action exclusive to individuals (Levy 1994; Mahler 1997). For these methodological individualists, the literature follows the salient streams of thought within decision-making studies: the rational individual and the individual of bounded-rationality.

Also called Bayesian learning, rational learning studies view learning as a process of updating beliefs, where knowledge is understood in terms of probabilities that the information believed to be true is empirically accurate (Dobbin et al. 2007, 460). Although rational accounts of learning assume that all individuals adhere to the principles of internal consistency and utility maximization, this does not necessitate that all actors move together towards the same policies. Gilardi (2010, 651) for instance, shows that when different individuals update their beliefs from the same new information, their actions vary depending on the nature of the perennial beliefs being updated. In other words, where we come from determines where we are going.

Others believe that the cognitive and psychological limitations of humans are too salient to be ignored. For these proponents of bounded rationality, learning is not solely based on increased accuracy of new information; rather, because humans rely on routines and heuristics to overcome limitations in gathering and analyzing information, learning also entails improvements in the routines and heuristics themselves (for example, Busenberg 2001; Weyland 2005).

Cognitive psychology also looks at how individuals' perennial beliefs and heuristics affect the way they interpret information. It is theorized that when presented with new information individuals inescapably use "mental models" (Johnson-Laird 1983; Held et al. 2006) to interpret new information. Simply put, a mental model is a conceptualization of any phenomenon. How mental models are constructed is a function of past understandings of the world. The educational training and professional environments of individuals have been noted as key factors determining the mental models of individuals (Seel 2006).

Organization theory also recognizes the link between one's professional and educational background and how problems are solved. The likelihood of individual actors possessing similar educational background and working in the same organization approaching problems with the same "logic of appropriateness" (March 1994), is a recognized problem facing organizations especially in times when innovation is required. One solution to the above is to incorporate new persons with different backgrounds into the organization in hopes of distilling fresh ideas (March 1991).

Others distinguish amongst ways different decision-makers solve problems. Velblen (as cited in Merton 1957) speaks of the "trained incapacity" developed by civil servants from relying on organizational routines when solving problems which generally result in minor adjustments to current policies and programs (also see Downs 1967). Petchey et al. (2008) and Vigoda (2002) however, argue that street-level bureaucrats in touch with citizens' realities use flexibility in implementing regulations in more innovative ways, while Bradford (2003) claims that the ability of these bureaucrats to voice the opinions of the citizen's results in new ideas.

Two other important actors in the policy process are experts and politicians. While differences exist over what constitutes an expert (for example, Turner 2001), one definition used here is that experts possess specific cognitive (knowledge about a subject), technical (the skills to analyze and make sense of information), and social dimensions (recognition of their expertise) (Collins and Evans 2002; Fischer 1999). Frequently, experts attain all three dimensions through their educational background and the eventual practice within their field (Collins and Evans 2002). In this manner, politicians could not be experts of a specific field, unless they possessed the relevant cognitive, technical and social dimensions.[2]

Expert knowledge is therefore defined as information generated according to professional standards by individuals recognized as experts (van Kerkhoff and Lebel 2006 as cited in Weible 2008). Therefore, while expertise is discipline-specific, a policy issue may involve more than one discipline. For instance, while only an economist can be

[2] For a discussion of the ways politicians are experts see Marier 2008. See Fischer 1999, for a discussion of how experts can be non-experts on issues of social judgments.

considered an expert in economics, with regards to pension policy, economists, lawyers, accountants and actuaries are all relevant experts.

Due to their specific educational background and professional experience, it is here theorized that experts have a unique way of approaching problems and making decisions. Several researchers note that experts analyze information according to the standards of their disciplines (for example, Hirschman 1970; Radaelli 2005; Garvin 2001). Garvin (2001) holds that these "analytical paradigms", by which actors interpret information, are developed through their educational and professional background. Furthermore, when experts make decisions they generally focus on probabilities of outcomes as determined by scientific methods.

Differences between experts and other actors such as politicians are also noted by those studying the technocratization of policy (Jasanoff and Wynne 1998). Again, stemming from their different professional and educational backgrounds, experts are depicted as focusing on information adhering to scientifically recognized methods, at the expense of information generated from the public (for example, Jasanoff and Wynne 1998; Mody and Kaiser 2008; Skogstad 2010). Fischer (1999, 299), notes that such methods are predominantly used to generate universal laws at the expense of more contextually-based information such as that based on personal experiences. This can result in generalizing problems, while ignoring the contextual uniqueness of any given situation (see Garvin 2001, 450).

Works have also theorized over how politicians solve problems. According to Garvin (2001) politicians live in a world where objective and scientific information may

explain why something is, but cannot prescribe what policy actions should actually be made. Politicians are also more likely to consider any social and political consequences of decisions that scientific information may not make obvious (Garvin 2001, 452). This idea is also supported by Marier (2008, 518) who notes that politicians will equally focus on the technical 'programmatic' side of problems (i.e. answers provided by evidence) as well as the 'political' component concerning judgments over social values (i.e. answers wrapped up in considerations of 'justice', and the 'public will') (also see, Majone 1989). The political components of problems may not be greatly aided by the production of scientific information, but instead may be better understood through the use of non-scientific information such as anecdote or tacit knowledge from the lived experience of individuals (Dobell and Zussman 1981).

A view of the politician is also provided through Radaelli's "logics of action" (2005). Here, politicians seek to mediate problems amongst the citizenry through the negotiation of opposing positions. Therefore, while Garvin sees politicians as making decisions in consideration of social judgments, Radaelli concurs, but sees the basis of these judgments as mediated positions amongst opposing interests.

Radaelli's model of problem-solving by politicians also reflects the general principles of the "brokerage theory" within the Canadian political science literature (for example, Carty and Cross 2010; Meisel 1974; Clarke et al. 1996), which holds that politicians strive to develop solutions with the broadest base of public support. Finding the middle ground amongst opposing interests often leads to the elimination of drastic solutions, and the types of solutions developed are thus often close to the status quo.

These preferences for different types of information have been supported through empirical works studying royal commissions. Bulmer's (1981) review of public inquiries notes that the use of information by such bodies is increasingly one of public information versus expert research. One either uses information gathered from the public or one uses expert research studies. Furthermore, Bulmer maintains the background of the commissioners is an important factor determining what types of information are used (1981, 359).

Recent work from Canada has also documented how preferences for specific types of information can impact final recommendations. In her analysis of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, Scala (2008, 109-111), describes how the preference for evidence-based information of commissioner Patricia Braid, an expert in medical genetics, in part led to the marginalization of alternative sources including information gathered through public hearings. Furthermore, in his analysis of the Macdonald commission, Inwood (2005) found that commissioners with greater expertise were more interested in technical evidence, and skeptical of information produced through public consultations, which they viewed as being politically skewed.

The role of policy reviews in learning

In *The Choice of Governing Instrument*, Trebilcock et al. (1982), use the term "public inquiry" to describe government forums of investigation, such as royal commissions, tasks forces, parliamentary committees and departmental reviews. However, in this thesis I use the term "policy review" to refer to government initiated bodies studying an issue and developing solutions, while the term "public inquiry" is

used to refer to government initiated bodies studying an issue and developing solutions that involve the public through hearings and submissions.

Functions common to all public inquiries are the ability of governments to demonstrate their concern for an issue without having to take any further actions in the near future (Trebilcock et al. 1982); develop consensus amongst opposing interests; and inform the public (Trebilcock et al. 1982). Most important of all however, is that all public inquiries study problems and develop solutions. In this manner, the various motives of governments behind the establishment of an inquiry does not detract from the latters' function to solve problems (Marier 2009, 1206-1207).

Some scholars argue that differences amongst policy reviews are too great to warrant generalizations amongst types (Chapman 1973; Stutz 2008; Prasser 1994). Others however, rightly maintain that significant differences in the structure of policy reviews do exist, which can have an important impact on the character of their final recommendations.[3] Of particular interest are distinctions made between royal commissions and parliamentary committees.

Royal commissions

Within the public inquiry literature, royal commissions are the most frequently examined. Royal commissions are commonly distinguished by their legal enactment as an ad hoc body without previous organizational routines. At the federal level, commissions are enacted through the Federal Inquiries Act, while similar legislation also exists at the

[3] Trebilcock et al. (1982) identify five types of policy reviews; royal commissions, task forces, parliamentary committees, departmental studies, and advisory agencies.

provincial level (Centa and Macklem 2003, 88). Royal commissions are also noted for their independence from the government, their capacity to conduct independent research, their longer time period to study issues, as well as their inclusion of the public through hearings and submissions (Trebilcock et al. 1982). Another defining feature of commissions is the frequent appointment of experts from outside government to sit as commissioners. The autonomy which royal commissions possess is demonstrated by their frequency to work beyond their mandated time periods and their terms of reference (Centa and Macklem 2003; Chapman 1973, 179; D'Ombrain 1997; Drache and Cameron 1985; Jenson 1994).

Focusing on the work of royal commissions in Canada, and noting their attributes outlined above, some claim that these bodies possess the capacity to generate innovative ideas (Centa and Macklem 2003; Jenson 1994; Timpson 2003; D'Ombrain 1997; Iacobucci 1990; Marchildon 2007; Inwood 2005; Gosnell 1934; Berger 2003, 14). For instance, Neil Bradford (1994; 1998) claims that royal commissions have been *the* predominate institution generating novel policy ideas in Canada. A review of the Canadian literature identifies no less than nine royal commissions associated with fundamental shifts in how issues are conceived and problems defined.[4]

One characteristic of royal commissions associated with the generation of innovative ideas is their public dimension. Expanding the range of actors participating in

[4] These Commissions are the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations (Rowell-Sirois Commission); Ontario Royal Commission on Worker's Compensation (Meredith Commission); Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry (although a task force it is generally treated as a commission); Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects (Gordon Commission); Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada (MacDonald Commission); Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences (Massey Commission); Royal Commission on Taxation (Carter Commission); Royal Commission on Health Services (Hall Commission); Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (Dunton and Laurendeau Commission).

policy deliberations allows alternative ideas to challenge the status quo (Inwood 2005, 47; Jenson 1994; Phillips 1994; Salter 2007). Royal commissions thus provide a "window of opportunity" (Kingdon 2011) for new actors to reframe the nature of issues and present new policies and programs. For example, Timpson (2003) claims that Commissioner Bird (a journalist for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation) of the Royal Commission of the Status of Women, encouraged women appearing before the commission to draw upon their lived experiences. The new information relayed in these narratives led to a shift in the discussions of the commission from the direction it was established to take.

Yet not all research agrees that royal commissions possess a potential for innovative learning. In his analysis of the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada (the Macdonald commission), Simeon (1987) claims that being created by governments and made up of elites, commissions develop incremental solutions. Simeon's claim however is based upon his one observation of the Macdonald commission. Others, such as Salter (1990) have therefore rightly criticized Simeon, noting that royal commissions instead contain a potential for radical learning, but a potential that they often fail to realize (1990, 181-182).

According to Salter (2007) one factor explaining the innovative potential of public inquiries is their different conceptions of the public. While all inquiries formally involve the public, important differences exist in how they conceptualize the public and incorporate their views. Salter proposes six[5] different notions of the public, each fundamentally affecting the way information from the public is used.

[5] These are: public as interest groups, public as disaffected, public as about discourse, public as expert, public as non-expert-layperson, and public as public opinion.

Three of the most distinct conceptions Salter outlines are "public as expert," "public as non-expert" and "public as public opinion". Inquiries viewing the public as non-expert are likely to use information generated by experts, while also using the inquiry as a means to educate society. Where the public is viewed as being experts, information from the public is considered to be relevant in understanding issues and can therefore influence the final recommendations (best exemplified by the Berger inquiry see Salter 2007). When inquiries view the public as public opinion however, the public is not seen as providing important insight into issues but instead, public information is seen as merely indicating the general preferences of society.

Another possible factor explaining the potential of public inquiries to incorporate public information or generate innovative learning is the character of the ideas themselves and their familiarity amongst the policy community (consisting of politicians, civil servants, and other interested actors). According to Kingdon (2011, 127), there is a great deal of resistance to new ideas and prior to the acceptance of a new idea, there must be a degree of "softening up" amongst the policy community over time (also see Frantz and Sato 2005; Mätzke and Ostner 2010).

Kingdon's insight into the temporal dimension of ideas is important, yet too much emphasis on the substance of an idea overlooks other important dimensions. The recipient of the idea may affect the success of an idea more than its character. For example, experts may be more open to an idea outlining mechanisms of programs expressed in scientific language, whereas politicians may be less concerned about program details and more open to information based upon non-scientific methods. Kingdon is therefore partially correct when he states that the technical feasibility of an

idea explains its viability, but his claim requires a qualification that the technical feasibility of an idea may be more important for some actors than others.

Providing an impetus for groups to participate in policy, some scholars claim that measuring the influence of public inquiries solely by their final recommendations is restricted (for example, Scala 2002, 37). Instead, it is maintained that to better measure the complete influence of a public inquiry considerations should be given to the 'social learning' (Jenson 1994) taking place amongst members of society participating in the public inquiry.

Just as it is possible to speak of learning within an individual, or within the larger collectivity of an organization such as a public inquiry, it is also possible to conceptualize learning amongst larger networks of actors (such as women's or seniors groups). Using past experience and information to analyze issues, social learning is defined as the use of knowledge amongst actors within society to develop positions on policy (Knoepfel and Kissling-Naf 1998). By bringing attention to an issue and providing an opportunity to participate, public inquiries can encourage groups to reflect upon issues and develop policy positions. Therefore, in cases where the participation of specific groups was not reflected in the recommendations of a particular public inquiry, the opportunity to participate in the inquiry has nonetheless been noted as leading to social learning for those groups (for examples see Scala 2002, 38-40).

Parliamentary committees

Parliamentary committees are another form of public inquiry. While less studied than royal commissions, parliamentary committees have been theorized as less likely to generate innovative learning than royal commissions (Wilson 1971; Marchildon 2007; Hodgetts 1968).[6] One important characteristic of parliamentary committees is that their members are exclusively politicians (Trebilcock et al. 1982), which has been noted to constrain their ability to develop novel solutions (Aucoin 1990). Even if not towing the party line, politicians are likely to sympathize with the policies and programs proposed by their party (Courtney 1969).

Stemming from their shorter time period and limited research resources, another limiting characteristic of parliamentary committees is their inability to develop extensive searches for alternative solutions. Parliamentary committees can however conduct public hearings, but again, the scope of these is generally smaller than those of royal commissions (Trebilcock et al. 1982). Parliamentary committees also have more specific mandates than royal commissions. In some cases, the mandate may be to review a prospective bill after its second reading, and in such cases the recommendations put forth are normally incremental (Mills 1994). A committee can also be given a broader mandate to review the proposals set out in a government Green or White Paper (Trebilcock et al. 1982), but even in these situations, the mandated scope of issues which parliamentary committees study is more focused than the broad mandates given to commissions. For all

[6] Two types of parliamentary committees exist: standing parliamentary committees, whose duration is indefinite, and select committees, which are temporary and ad hoc. Subsequent mention of parliamentary committees referrers exclusively to select committees.

of these reasons, parliamentary committees have been categorized as developing more incremental recommendations than those proposed by royal commissions.

Conclusion

In light of the above review, learning is defined as the use of information in developing solutions to identified problems. As such, the recommendations in the final reports of policy reviews are an example of this definition of learning. To remain coherent with the broader literature, this thesis uses Hall's distinction between three degrees of learning. Examples, of the three degrees in pension policy could include; for first order change (degree of implementation), altering the period of time before benefits are vested; for second degree learning (policy instruments), developing a new public pension plan program to encourage savings; and for third degree learning (goals and problem definitions) moving beyond viewing pensions as an instrument associated with income security in retirement. For example, pensions could be viewed as a means to remedy the patriarchal biases towards women in society (for example, Collins 1978).

Not all actors learn in the same manner however, and important differences may exist between how experts and politicians solve problems, specifically in regards to the criteria used to judge information. Such differences can be expected to manifest themselves in the outcomes of public inquiries.

Through a review of the literature studying royal commissions and parliamentary committees, the former has been noted for its larger research capacity, including public consultation and independent research, longer time period of study and membership

drawn from outside the government. Noting the greater independence from the government and assortment of resources, some have noted that the recommendations of commissions can generate innovative ideas. Furthermore, although rarely studied in empirical case studies, parliamentary committees are often associated with incremental learning. The cases of this thesis however, point in the opposite direction. This thesis thus seeks to better understand why some public inquiries lead to innovative recommendations while others put forth incremental adjustments. The next chapter outlines the research design and methods used in this thesis and also outlines pension policy in Canada.

Chapter Four: Research Design, Methods and Pension Policy in Canada

Methodological debates and the Systematic Process Analysis

Within the social sciences a clear debate has persisted over the best method to study causal relationships. While frequently cast in terms of qualitative versus quantitative studies, this description of the debate does not capture a more fundamental epistemological divide. Instead, it is better to distinguish between 'correlational-deductivists' (for example, King et al. 1994; Przeworski and Teune 1970; Popper 1970) on one hand, and 'mechanism-inductivists' (for example, Tarrow 2004; George and Bennett 2005) on the other hand. For correlational-deductivists, understanding causality is attained when observations match expected outcomes as hypothesized according to theories (McKeown 1999, 163). For example, if theory 'A' is correct, then when X has a value of Xi, Y will have a value of Yi).

For mechanism-inductivists however, causal relationships are understood by identifying the causal mechanisms of phenomenon. This is done by tracing processes of how one, or a conjuncture, of variables, impacts the outcome under study. Noting the respective merits of both the correlational-deductivists and the mechanism-inductivists, a group of scholars have called for bridging the two sides in a "mixed-method approach" (for example, Lieberman 2005).

This work uses Peter A. Hall's "systematic process analysis" (SPA) (Hall 2003) to explain the different recommendations of the Haley commission and the Frith committee. As a mixed-method approach, SPA is both correlational-deductivist, (beginning with theory and hypothesizing expected outcomes), and mechanism-

inductivist (testing these hypotheses by tracing how causal mechanisms actually unfold. According to Hall, the goal of SPA is not to provide a comprehensive account of every factor explaining the outcome under study, but instead to focus on what is likely a few of the most important variables to better understand the phenomenon understudy (2008, 306).

Apart from their express designation to study issues and identify solutions, public inquiries are an excellent opportunity to study how learning takes place due to their public record. This thesis therefore uses several different sources to trace how issues were addressed and decisions were made. These sources include: the inquiries' final reports and background documents, transcripts and recordings of the public hearings, public submissions, primary media coverage, as well as secondary sources written by observers and participants of the two inquiries. Data was primarily collected through the Ontario Archives in Toronto, and various university libraries throughout Canada. Before presenting the cases, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of the pension system in Canada.

The policy core of Canadian pension policy

Within every policy issue it is possible to speak of an embedded policy core. This core is defined as the axiomatic principles that provide understanding and meaning for a particular issue. While a reality can be said to exist, there is also an inherent subjectivity in the way humans make sense of their world. What components of reality become the primary focus, and what aspects are ignored, are part of the inherent subjectivity of human understanding.

Insight into this "struggle over meaning" (McKeen 2001, 38) has been used by scholars to understand how different framings of issues affect the design of policy (Bacchi 1999; Schneider and Ingram 1993). Following methods from policy framing (Schmidt 2002), the policy core of pensions is identified by distinguishing between the objectives of the policy, the problem definitions, and those solutions best able to address such problems.

History of the Canadian pension system

The history of pensions in Canada does not vary greatly from the history of social welfare. From the first settlements, until the time of the First World War, there was little state-provided welfare. A strong belief in the responsibility of the individual to provide for his or herself was the norm, and any financial hardship encountered were seen as stemming from a degenerate and idle character. Private charity and family were the primary avenues for to someone in need, after which government run poorhouses were the last refuge (Dennis 1999). This was frequently the case of older persons when they could no longer work or became viewed by their employers as unproductive (Gee and McDonald 1991). For these reasons, Canada has been noted as a "liberal welfare regime" (Esping-Andersen 1999; Béland and Shinkawa 2007).

The first government pension policy – the Canadian Government Annuities Act of 1908 (Morton and McCallum 1988) – reflected the belief in individual responsibility by encouraging persons to purchase a life annuity. The idea of a state operated pension however remained antithetical to the liberal foundation of the Canadian welfare state. As then Prime Minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier stated in 1907:

> To ask purely and simply that there should be an old age pension whether a man has been thrifty or the reverse, whether he has been sober or not, whether he has been a good citizen or a bad citizen, is going farther than I would be disposed to go (as cited in Morton and McCallum 1988, 9).

Partly due to the establishment of the Civil Service Pension and Soldier Insurance program, greater acceptance for government involvement in providing welfare began to emerge in late 1920s (Orloff 1993). However, the distinction between the deserving and undeserving poor remained, and the Old Age Pensions Act of 1927 was limited to a residual benefit for those persons able to demonstrate their need through means-testing (Bryden 1974).

Things changed at the end of the Second World War, with the belief that all seniors should be protected against the perils of destitute poverty. The Old Age Security Act (OAS) replaced the Old Age Pensions Act of 1927, which now provided persons 70 years and older a minimum benefit without means-testing. The benefit was deliberately low however, so as to not detract from the responsibility of the individual (National Union 2007). To further protect against poverty, the OAS was complemented with the introduction in 1967 of the Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS).

In 1966 a major change occurred with the establishment of the Canada Pension Plan (CPP) and the Quebec Pension Plan (QPP). The C/QPP was designed as a mandatory earnings-related Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGO) public plan, with contributions from employers and employees. However, in contrast to other countries where the average replacement ratio of a mandatory public pension system can be 50% (Marier 2010, 6), in Canada the public component deliberately provided a low replacement level.

According to Gee and McDonald (1991), the low replacement levels of the OAS and the CPP was again a reflection of the preference for individual's to retain responsibility in overseeing their retirement income. In fact, according to Allan MacEachen – the Minister of National Health and Welfare who oversaw the introduction of the CPP – the low replacement ratio of the public pension arrangements was intentional to encourage growth of private sector pensions (stated by Monique Bégin, Frith 1983, Public Hearings, 1:21). The policy core for pensions and its corresponding policy instruments are outlined below in Table 3 and Table 4.

Table 3: Pension Policy Core in Canada, 1926-1977

Policy Goal	Avoid abject poverty and encourage individuals to secure an adequate replacement ratio.
Problem Definition	Economic and administrative threats to individual's saving.
Legitimate Actors	Government: minimum protection against abject poverty; encourage and protect personal savings. Individuals: contribute to retirement income.

Table 4: Pension Policy Goals and Corresponding Programs

*Policy Objective**	*Policy Instrument*
Incentives for Individual Savings	RRSP, Private Pension Regulations.
Protect Private Savings	RRP Regulations.
Reduce Poverty	OAS, GIS.

*Other policy objectives have been noted within the literature (See Béland 2006 for a discussions of encouraging provincial economies; McDaniel 1997 for a discussion of intergenerational transfers; Simeon 1972, 257 for income redistribution). Nonetheless pensions have not been thought of as a policy associated with gender equity.

Conclusion

Historically, the pension system in Canada has had two main objectives. The first has been to ensure protection for the elderly against poverty, and the second has been to encourage individuals to contribute to their retirement and achieve an adequate income in retirement.

Beginning in the 1970s however, changing economic and demographic circumstances, brought into question the ability of the pension system to successfully realize these two objectives. The next chapter looks at the formation, structure and recommendations of two public inquiries appointed to study the Canadian pension system during this period of unrest.

Chapter Five: The Royal Commission on the Status of Pensions in Ontario and the Parliamentary Task Force on Pension Reform

The Royal Commission on the Status of Pensions in Ontario

On April 20, 1977, amidst growing public concern over the inadequacy of the pension system in Canada, the Ontario Progressive Conservative government of Premier William G. Davis established what would be the most extensive public inquiry during the Great Pension Debate (Haley 1980, Volume I, x). The timing of the Royal Commission on the Status of Pensions in Ontario (the Haley commission) is consistent with studies examining the political functions of public inquiries (Sulzner 1971; Wilson, 1971; Trebilcock et al. 1982). Less than two weeks after the appointment of the commission, Davis' government would be dissolved on a vote of non-confidence, and 50 days after the announcement of the commission, Ontarians would go to the polls and re-elect Davis for the third consecutive time (Whitcomb 2007, 70). Not wanting to take a position that could upset the electorate, yet desiring to do something, the establishment of the Haley commission thus allowed Davis to signal his concern for pensions in a politically safe manner.

Another reason for the appointment of the commission was to develop consensus amongst opposing interests, specifically between business, labour and retirees. As is frequently the case of commissions attempting to resolve conflicts (Trebilcock et al. 1982), the five members appointed to the commission included representatives from these interested groups (Haley 1980, Volume I, vii).

Donna Haley, a lawyer who had sat as the Chair of the Pension Commission of Ontario for the previous three years, was appointed Chairperson. Alongside Haley, four other commissioners were appointed: Donald Coxe, a lawyer and vice-president of an investment firm as well as former member of the Canada Pension Plan Advisory Committee; Alfred Cordell, a chartered accountant and former chief finical officer of a large corporation, as well as a member of the Financial Executives Institute on Pensions; Charles McDonald, president of the National Pensioners and Senior Citizens Federation, and past Director of the Retired Workers and Community Service department of the United Auto Workers Union; and Walter Upshall, owner of an investment business, former credit manager of a major corporation, and member of the Ontario Advisory Council of Senior Citizens (Haley 1980, Volume X, v).

Despite including individuals representing interests from business, labour and the retired, these commission members also all shared a familiarity with the Canadian pension system. In the words of the commission "[i]ts members also brought to bear certain relevant financial, legal and social skills. This combination of experience and perspective was indispensable to the Commission's understanding of pension issues" (Haley 1980, Volume I, vii). In short, the appointment of members professionally involved in the practice of pensions, created a commission whose membership was knowledgeable of pension policy.

Noting the connection between pensions and the economy as well as other public policies (Haley 1980, Volume I, xi), Premier Davis gave the commission a broad mandate in three points:

1. To study the impact on the economy of different systems of financing retirement pension plans and arrangements including Ontario's financing and investment role in the Canadian Pension Plan.

2. To examine the terms and conditions of existing retirement pension plans and arrangements, to evaluate their effectiveness in terms of present social and economic circumstances, and to study the interrelationships among the private sector plans, the Canadian Pension Plan, and employee pension plans.

3. To make such recommendations in relation to the above as the Commission deems appropriate. (Haley 1980, Volume I, vi)

The second and third points were particularly wide-ranging, and allowed the commission to establish its own direction. As the commission prepared to gather information, it first sought an "analytical framework" (Haley 1980, Volume I, xi) through which to guide its analysis; eventually deciding to look beyond pensions and examine the broader concept of retirement as a whole.

To direct its analysis of retirement, the commission further decided upon examining the actions of individuals, government and employers towards retirement (Haley 1980). The commission also sought to judge proposals for reform on empirical evidence with a specific focus on their costs and benefits (Haley 1980, Volume 1, 6), thus privileging the place of such analysis in the work of the commission.

The desire for empirical evidence reflects a trend of royal commissions since the Second World War to use social science in its investigations (Bulmer 1981). This research was conducted by its own permanent research staff and independent researchers contracted by the commission. Research assistance was also received from various government bodies, including federal and provincial ministries and agencies, and

professionals from the pension industry (Appendix I provides a comprehensive list of those involved).

The permanent staff of the commission consisted of two researchers, two editorial and production workers, two employees for word processing and production, one short hand reporter, one librarian, one executive secretary, one legal counsellor, one editor and two individuals serving as research directors responsible for the actuarial research (Haley 1980, Volume I, vi-ix). Members of the staff were experts in pensions drawn from outside government. These included Marie Corbett (legal counsel) – an esteemed pension lawyer (Shilton 2011, 98) – who oversaw and coordinated the endeavours of the commission (Haley 1980, Volume I, ix), and Gordon Milling (editor) – an expert in labour policy and former director of research for the Ontario Federation of Labour (Shilton 2011, 156).

Overseeing the expert actuarial research on behalf of the commission were two actuaries: Laurence Coward and Keith Cooper (Haley Commission 1980, Volume I, ix; Cooper et al. 1981, 720. Both Coward and Cooper were prominent actuaries within the field of pensions. Coward had been Chairperson of the Pension Commission of Ontario (1963-1965), President of the Canadian Institute of Actuaries (1969-1970) (Duchense and Frenken 1993), and had also been the research director for the Ontario Committee on Portable Pensions in 1960 (Brown 1999, 30). Importantly, the research directors had a preference for studies using quantitative data, and accordingly Coward and Cooper directed some of the studies to use such quantitative data and cost benefit modeling in their analysis (Balcher and Shin 1984). The opportunity to conduct research was also

used by the directors to fill gaps in the body of pension research on pensions. Exploratory studies thus pursued answering questions that had not yet been examined.

These independent studies conducted on behalf of the commission were organized during the early phases while preparations were underway for public hearings and a public opinion poll. A total of 13 original studies were conducted, drawing from six disciplines: actuarial science (four researchers), accounting (three researchers), economics (two researchers), mathematics (two researchers), statistics (one researcher) and sociology (one researcher). Research was conducted by pension experts, mathematicians and civil servants (Haley 1980 Volume IX). The research was of a high quality, some of which was subsequently published in scientific journals (for example, Balcer and Sahin 1982; 1984).

The research of the Haley commission was generated alongside the public hearings of the commission. Therefore, while the research of other royal commissions has taken place without much communication between the research staff and the commissioners (Simeon 1987; Inwood 2005), this was not the case for the Haley commission. One reason why there was ongoing communication between the research staff and the commissioners was due to the reliance on these expert studies to clarify issues and provide facts when requested. Explaining how it undertook its task, the commission stated:

> As work progressed it became necessary to add certain subjects to the original research program, usually in order to seek clarification of facts where public submissions revealed sharp differences in perception of important occurrences and trends. At several stages the Commission used the services of actuaries and accountants in the execution of technical tasks, such as the testing of alternative benefit arrangements. (Haley 1980, Volume I, xiii)

Commissioners thus consulted the research staff to provide clear answers. Additional projects were added and ongoing studies were altered. Such work included actuarial studies and economic modeling that tested alternative pension arrangements seen as possessing the methodological strengths necessary to reveal more accurate and neutral answers (Haley 1980, Volume I, xiii).

In seeking to undertake analysis that would fill gaps in the present body of knowledge, the commission also sought to identify the opinions of the public in a more accurate means than through public hearings. As stated by the commission, "[t]his approach required, in addition to research projects and hearings, an effort to elicit from the public information and opinions that might not otherwise come to light" (Haley 1980, Volume I, xii). The commission thus took the unorthodox action for a public inquiry (Hauser 1998) to conduct an opinion poll. This job was contracted out to Southam Marketing Research Services, who alongside the commissioners developed the questionnaire.

Using a stratified sampling method to ensure representation of all Ontarians, the opinion poll was seen as a superior way to identify the views of Ontarians than the public hearings, subsequently viewed as a forum dominated by "interested parties" (Haley 1980, Volume XIII, 24). Furthermore, by conducting an opinion poll, the commission seemingly entrenched the view of the public in terms of public opinion. This occurrence is supported by theoretical works. According to Salter (2007), commissions that view the public primarily in terms of a sum of opinions, have a tendency to view hearings as a poor means to measure the general attitudes of society. Specifically, these inquiries often:

> [fall] into the trap of seeing the people who choose to appear in its public hearings as being representative of everyone else. Once the fallacy of 'those who show up are representative' is exposed, cynicism sets in. Everyone who does show up becomes 'a special interest'. (2007, 307)

Alongside the use of an opinion poll, the commission also conducted public hearings. These were held in eight cities across Ontario that included seven weeks in Toronto (Haley 1980, Volume I, xii).[7] As early as September 1977, five months before the beginning of the scheduled hearings, the commission placed advertisements in all the daily newspapers in Ontario. These ads requested that briefs be prepared and submitted within three months (Public Announcement in The Globe and Mail September 8, 1977, B16). Groups with little previous knowledge of pensions thus rushed to develop a public submission (Haley 1978, Public Hearings, 17). Although the details relayed in these ads varied over time, at the beginning they openly requested that any "interested individuals and organizations" provide their "opinions, comments and information" (Public Announcement in The Globe and Mail September 8, 1977, B16).

The result was a total of 391 written submissions and 170 appearances before the commission (Haley 1980, Volume I, xii). The commission also directly contacted groups and individuals with a known interest in pension policy to hear their opinions. However, while the public advertisements for the hearings indiscriminately asked for actors to submit their "opinions, comments and information", in this call for information the commission had a different standard. As stated by the commission in its guidelines for briefs:

[7] The cities are Timmins, Thunder Bay, London, Windsor, Hamilton, Sudbury, Ottawa and Toronto.

> We are very much concerned that we use to best advantage the information and thought that go into the making of a brief. Briefs which no more than touch the problems or which provide solutions which do not fit into the overall picture are a waste of resources. Therefore the Commission would appreciate receiving proposals based on good data (data which could be made available to the commission on request) and detailed information on specific problems which are particularly within your knowledge or expertise. (Ontario Royal Commission on the Status of Pensions in Ontario 1977, 1-2)

During the time the commission sat, its report became highly anticipated. In the words of one expert, "...the entire process of pension reform seemed to be brought to an entire standstill while people eagerly awaited the Royal Commission's report" (Baldwin 1981, 61). Once released, its final report and background studies generated much discussion amongst interest groups (the National Action Committee on the Status of Women 1982; The Ontario Status of Women Council 1983), governments (Saskatchewan Labour 1981) and experts (Brown 1982).

In the end, the output of the commission reflected its extensive research capacity. The final report was comprised of ten volumes (eight volumes of recommendations and two volumes of background papers) and totalled more than 2,000 pages. The commission's recommendations were reached by the members with a significant degree of consensus. Of the 163 total recommendations, only two points – inflation tax credits (Haley 1980, Volume II, 245) and the use of unisex mortality tables for calculating benefits from money purchase plans and RRSPs (Haley 1980, Volume III, 126) – did not receive unanimous support by its members (Baldwin 1981).

Importantly, the learning by the commission stayed close to the status quo of the policy core. The main functions of pensions identified by the commission were to; (a) provide a bare minimum living standard, referred to by the commission as the "anti-

poverty" function (Haley 1980, Volume I, 1); and (b) encourage individuals to save for their retirement (Haley 1980, Volume 10, 2). The primary focus of the commission however, was to encourage individual savings. This emphasis on individual responsibility is found throughout the commission's recommendations, and at times is explicitly stated:

> There is general agreement that retirement is an individual matter and that ultimately the individual is responsible for his or her own retirement. The Commission places the prime responsibility for providing retirement income on the individual. Individual needs and desires require flexibility, which cannot be given by group programs or universal social programs. Secondly, the Commission thinks that self-reliance should be encouraged and rewarded….Our society should not reach a stage of social "over-insurance" where individual effort seems futile or unrewarding. There should be real economic value to work, and to work and save should have greater value than not working and not saving. (Haley 1980, Volume I, 18)

Accordingly, the main problem identified with the present system was impediments discouraging individuals from contributing towards their retirement. The solutions developed to address these problems also strongly reflected the standard approach. As the commission stated:

> In the Commission's opinion the answer to these difficulties is a change in the philosophy underlying employment pension design and the use of government authority for the protection of all workers in Ontario. The necessary change in approach is away from group responsibility and toward individual responsibility in the provision of retirement income through employment pensions. This shift would reflect not only Individualism but a recognition that cost subsidies among members of a group are no longer as acceptable as they were in the 1960s. (Haley 1980, Volume II, 305)

This emphasis on the individual was also recognized by observers. As stated by the Financial Post:

> The Haley Commission has thus taken a giant step away from the welfare state drift in pension policy. The fully-funded portable PURS, to be supervised by the

> individual would invest these savings to best advantage in capital markets, financing industrial expansion and fixed asset creation (The Financial Post, August 23, 1981).

As the policy core of pensions already strongly reflected a preference for individual responsibility, the notion that the underlying "philosophy" of pensions needed to be changed to place greater emphasis on individual responsibility is not a change in kind, but instead one of degree as the preference for individual responsibility was already prevalent within pension policy.

This standard approach to pensions is apparent in all of the commission's recommendations and especially its recommendation for the Provincial Universal Retirement System (PURS). The commission envisioned the establishment of the PURS as a mandatory defined-contribution plan with contributions from employers at two percent, and increasing levels of employee contributions from one to two percent as they moved closer to retirement. It was also recommended that the PURS have immediate vesting and complete portability. The objective of the PURS was to improve the replacement ratio of individuals by helping them contribute to their retirement through a savings program (Halel 1980, Volume II, 309). The PURS thus reflected Hall's second order learning: the core goals and standard problem definitions remained, while a new policy instrument was proposed to address present challenges.

Disappointed with these recommendations, those challenging the status quo criticized the commission for various reasons. Some critiques were based on the means by which the conclusions were reached. The findings of the consulted background studies, as well as the opinion survey, were claimed to have had serious limitations. For

instance, the basis for favouring the DC funded method of the PURS over the PAYGO method of the C/QPP was in part based on public opinion data gathered by the consumer survey (Haley 1980, Volume II, 318-319). However, according to some, relying on this quantitative survey method to gage public opinion was flawed due to the way in which the questions were asked (Baldwin 1981, 41).

Others noted that the scope of the debate failed to include those traditionally marginalized in pension discussions. While the positions of retirees, business and labour were all accounted for, the concerns of women were ignored. By only focusing on wage earners in the paid labour force, the commission's examination of pensions from a gendered perspective was seen as inadequate (Donnelly 1993).

As one of the concerns that led to the Great Pension Debate (Ascah 1984), it is not surprising that the issue of women and pensions received some attention by the Haley commission, including its own specific analysis (see, "Women and the Provision of Retirement Income", Volume III; and "Issues Relating the Benefit Features: the Unpaid Worker", Volume V). The commission addressed several issues pursuant to women including employment pensions, part-time work, the CPP and OAS, survivor benefits, anti-discrimination laws, and the issue of homemakers. However, as with other issues addressed by the commission, the problem of women and pensions was interpreted within the standard policy core by emphasizing the earnings-related nature of pensions. This incrementalism stands in stark contrast to the recommendations of the Parliamentary Task Force on Pension Reform established just two years after the publication of the Haley commission's report.

The Parliamentary Task Force on Pension Reform

In 1982 the federal Liberal government of Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau established its own study of the Canadian pension system, in what it hoped would be the final step before policy change. As stated by the chair of the committee before conducting public consultations, "this is it; this is the final study. Recommendations and probably legislation will come next, so you would be best advised to make your views known to us" (Provencher 1983a).

The inquiry was the third move in the study of pensions by a government committed to making pensions one of its policy priorities, but had remained vague over specific proposals for reform (Desjardins 1988; Rusk 1982). The first move by the Liberal government came two years before, between March 31st and April 2nd, 1981, with the organization of the National Pensions Conference (NPC) in Ottawa. The NPC's objective was to raise awareness of the problems facing the pension system and to discuss ideas for change. In doing so it brought together an array of actors including representatives from: federal and provincial governments, the pension industry, businesses, labour, as well as seniors and social welfare groups (Paltiel 1982). Women's groups also participated, including the National Council of Women of Canada, and the NAC, as well as prominent researchers such as, Louise Dulude, Kevin Collins (Women and Pensions 1978) and Monica Townson (National Pensions Conference 1981).

The NPC was organized around the common issues receiving attention during the Great Pension Debate (including the Haley commission). These issues were: adequate coverage of the employed, inflation, portability and vesting, and barriers to women in attaining pension coverage (National Pensions Conference 1981a).

Some however critiqued the NPC for its shallow discussion of the issues (Slocum 1981), while others criticized the weak representation of women despite the availability of public grants from the federal government to encourage their participation (National Conference Proceedings 1981, 104; Paltiel 1982). This lack of female representation led Monica Townson, a researcher at the Economic Council of Canada, to call for greater involvement of women through the establishment and funding of regional conferences, something the government would later do in September 1981.

After the NPC, the second step of the Trudeau government was to compile and release a Green Paper on pension reform in December 1982 – *Better Pensions for Canadians*. The main aspects of pensions which had received attention throughout the Great Pension Debate were addressed in the Green Paper (Canada, Department of Finance 1982). The positions in the Green Paper reflected the negotiated positions of the internally divided government towards pension reform at this time (Wolfson 1988, 224). Reflecting Graham Allison's (1969) "Bureaucratic Politics" (Model III), conflict existed between the department of National Health and Welfare (advocating for an increased role of the public sector) and the Department of Finance (favouring private solutions) over the best means to address pensions (Desjardins 1988, 165). The Liberal government was not entirely in disagreement however, as the idea of a homemaker pension, advocated by some women's groups, was unanimously rejected amongst members of the party (Wolfson 1988, 224). As with the Haley commission, the plight of women and pensions was interpreted in terms of the traditional approach to pensions by focusing on how adjustments to the earnings-related programs (for example, shorter vesting periods or

increased survivor benefits) could improve the condition of women (Canada, Department of Finance, 1982).

While the Green Paper was built on negotiated positions within the Liberal party and participants at the NPC, it was still clear that within the broader community, consensus over appropriate solutions had yet to be achieved. With the objective of developing such consensus it was decided that a parliamentary committee would be established to study the proposals of the Green Paper (The Globe and Mail, October 18, 1982). The Trudeau government thus took its third step on pension reform on March 1, 1983, and established the Parliamentary Task Force on Pension Reform. As with the Haley commission, the primary objective of the Parliamentary Task Force on Pension Reform was to generate consensus amongst opposing interests. Accordingly the committee's membership contained representatives from all political parties within the legislature.

From the Liberal party, Douglas Frith was appointed Chairperson. Frith – a pharmacist before being elected to Parliament – was a rising star within the Liberal party, and his appointment to head the committee was seen as a test prior to receiving a Cabinet portfolio. Also from the Liberal party was Louis Desmarais (Vive-Chairperson), Therese Killens, Russell MacLellan and David Weatherhead. Progressive Conservatives included Vincent Dantzer (Vice-Chairperson), John Reid and Flora MacDonald. Ted Miller from the New Democratic Party was also appointed.

Unlike the Haley commission whose members were familiar with the technical properties of pensions, the members of the Frith committee lacked such previous

knowledge (Frith 1981). Recognizing the committee members' lack of familiarity with pensions, several briefing sessions were held to explain the details and debates of the Canadian pension system (Rusk 1983; Provencher 1983a). These sessions included retreats to study problems in other countries (the United States), and were conducted by the committee's permanent staff as well as by experts from society (Provencher 1983a).

Also reflecting the trend of parliamentary committee's (Trebilcock et al. 1982) the Frith committee's mandate was more focused than that of the Haley commission. Its Order of Reference told the committee to: "examine and report upon the proposals for reform of the Canadian retirement income system contained in the Government's paper *Better Pensions for Canadians*". The committee was asked to pay particular attention to:

> Protecting benefits under occupational pension plans; against inflation; modifying survivor benefits under the Canadian and Quebec Pension Plans; expanding mandatory pension arrangements; financing the Canadian Pension Plan; and overcoming the special pension problems facing women, including home makers, under the current pension system. (Frith 1983, 2)

The Firth committee did not mirror every trait of parliamentary committees, however. Generally, the activities of parliamentary committees are noted for being more private than royal commissions, whose actions and final reports become public information (Trebilcock et al. 1982). This private characteristic of committees was not the case with the Frith committee, which conducted public hearings, made transcripts public information, received attention in the media, and presented its recommendations in a public report.

The public nature of the Frith committee was not part of its original design. In an effort to reduce costs, the Trudeau government decided to refrain from making public the recordings or transcripts of the hearings. Receiving criticisms from opposition parties and the media for this move that would negate the public nature of the inquiry, the government reversed its decision, and made the committee's events public information (The Globe and Mail 1983a). This controversy actually served to further increase the public attention the committee received, and even before the committee began its work, it had already received a fair amount of public attention (for example, The Globe and Mail 1983b). In terms of its public dimension, the Frith committee was thus very similar to the Haley commission.

The committee was formed during a gloomier economic climate than preceding studies of the Great Pension Debate. A severe recession beginning in 1981 had a formidable influence on its approach to developing solutions. A particular concern of the committee was to make recommendations that were both politically viable and economically realistic. As stated by Frith during the public hearings and at pension conferences before industry officials, "we are in a severe recession and it is as good a time as any to take a realistic approach to pension reform" (Galt 1983; also see Rusk 1983 December 16, for an example by other committee members). Concerns with the practicality of recommendations were not limited to the Liberal members of the committee; being confident that they would form the next government, members from the Progressive Conservatives were also concerned that the solutions developed be politically and technically feasible (The Globe and Mail 1984, March 8).

The committee's need to report within ten months limited its ability to conduct extensive independent research, despite being granted the powers to use "expert, professional, technical and clerical staff as may be deemed necessary" (Frith 1983, iv, 2). Due to its focus on reconciling differences, the committee shied away from undertaking new analysis of the Canadian pension system. It was felt that enough analytical research was already available, and thus the research generated by the committee primarily used past studies (Frith 1983, 2-6). Whereas the longer time frame of the Haley commission allowed it to undertake studies providing new analysis, the Frith committee lacked such original studies. Instead, the research provided a synopsis of the existing material highlighting common points of agreements and differences. As suggested by Jenson (1994, 55), differences in the nature of the research generated for inquiries can influence how problems are studied and solutions develop. Elaborated further in chapter six, the nature of the research contributed to the committee's hesitation to exclusively use scientific works.

Like the Haley commission, the Frith committee also consulted actors from think tanks, universities, and the civil service to provide information; some of who were also used by the Haley commission, such as Harvey Lazar (Appendix I). The committee's research staff was drawn from the civil service, as well as the bureaus of each represented party. While the background of this research staff was different, the size of the full-time research staff was similar to the Haley commission. The committee had two staff members for the analysis of evidence, one researcher from each of the political parties' research bureau (in the effort to limit partisanship) (Frith 1983, viii), as well as two

administrators overseeing the committee's logistics, administration and media relations (Provencher 1983b).

The research director of the Frith committee was A. Rodney Dobell (Frith 1983). In respect to his understanding of economics and mathematics, Dobell had a similar background as the research directors of the Haley commission. Before working for the Frith committee, Dobell had been an Assistant Professor in economics at Harvard University where he was involved in developing longitudinal micro simulation models used in social policy analysis (Dobell nd). However, Dobell also had experience inside government as a high ranking civil servant within the Treasury Board Secretariat and the Department of Finance (Dobell nd).

Dobell's experience as an administrator and an academic led him to hold a broad view as to what types of information were pertinent in policy analysis. For instance, in an article discussing policy analysis published just before the establishment of the Frith committee, Dobell states:

> The same sort of limits [of knowledge] apply when it comes to what we can know about government programs. The motive which led to the social indicators movement was simple: economic indicators could not account for growing unrest in a time of rising material well-being, and the search for measures which better captured perceptions of the quality of life spread. But this search encountered inevitable confrontation with the limits on human knowledge: as the indicators demanded became ever more comprehensive and general, the ability to link them with any specific program or action or decision by government faded entirely.
>
> So too with evaluation in government. The motive which led to this work was simple and laudable: those who make decisions on behalf of the community need relevant information on which to base those decisions. *But inevitably, the unavoidable natural limits are encountered: as the size of the community grows, and the scale of the decisions expands, the scope of the relevant information broadens to embrace all human experience* (emphasis added, Dobell and Zussman 1981, 425).

According to Dobell, the very economic models he spent his academic career developing, were useful to understand an issue, but should not be the only source of information used to make policy decisions. Decisions should instead use information drawn from a variety of human experiences (1981, 425). Dobell's broad definition as to what types of information were relevant in policy analysis thus likely complemented the same openness to non-expert information held by members of the Frith committee.

As with the Haley commission, there was frequent communication between research staff and committee members. Research was generated alongside the public hearings, and was used to clarify issues emerging during the public hearings. The committee's research staff actively participated at the public hearings by clarifying points and asking questions (for example, Frith 1983, Public Hearings 11:77; 31:31; 36:38; 37:89).

The public hearings of the Frith committee were extensive and held across the country in twelve cities. The sum of these hearings (523 written briefs and oral presentations) was slightly larger than that received by the Haley commission, and included submissions from the pension industry, businesses, labour, as well as seniors and women's groups.

In December, 1983, ten months after the Frith committee was established, it presented its final report totalling 168 pages, and 64 recommendations. In many respects the report followed the Green Paper by suggesting incremental adjustments to programs already in place, such as increases in the GIS, and modifications to regulations

overseeing RRPs. Despite these incremental recommendations, the committee made a major divergence from the standard approach to pensions. While addressing each of the main issues focused on throughout the Great Pension Debate; the issue of women and pensions received the most attention. Of the 64 recommendations, 18 addressed the issue of women and pensions. In essence, women and pensions was viewed as the prominent issue of pension reform (Frith 1983, 73). Not only did women and pensions receive extensive attention, but the committee challenged the predominant view of pensions as an instrument associated with retirement income. Instead, pension policy was framed as an issue of gender equity, where the pension system was seen as an institution perpetuating the subordinate role of women in society. As stated by the committee of the character of the problems facing the Canadian pension system:

> It is a problem of acknowledging and adequately providing for the work women do, both inside and outside the labour force, and of identifying the institutions and arrangements, including pension arrangements, that must be change to make this possible. (Frith 1983, 74)

The committee put forth the idea of a "homemaker pension", where any person working within the home and caring for a spouse or a dependent, would receive benefits credited to the CPP based on half of the YMPE. Benefits would be funded by general tax revenues and contributions from other income earners within the home (Frith 1983, 25-26). Providing a pension for domestic work, as opposed to merely splitting pension credits, was seen as recognizing the labour done within the home, historically predominantly done by women.

This was a radical divergence from how the issue of women and pensions had been previously treated during the Great Pension Debate. Prior to the Frith committee, concerns over women and pensions were addressed by focusing on increasing the opportunity to participate in earnings-related plans. By insisting on the integrity of the private mechanisms of pensions, the problem of women and pensions was defined in terms of access to the labour market. Gender biases embedded within social institutions, including policy programs and the economy, were not a part of such discussions.

This radical reframing of pensions was a conscious act acknowledged by the committee:

> In carrying out our task we ranged somewhat outside the proposals of the Green Paper. To arrive at a coherent set of reform proposals we had to examine broader issues and problems mentioned by witnesses appearing before us. (Frith 1983, 2)

Therefore, while past studies have shown that the mandates of commissions can be altered or even ignored by commissioners (Jenson 1994), little has been documented showing the same actions by parliamentary committees. Instead, when parliamentary committees do receive attention they are frequently cast as likely to generate learning following the political party's agenda (for example, Wilson 1971; Hodgetts 1968). The Frith committee however, went beyond what was party policy at the time (Desjardins 1988; Canada, Department of Finance 1982; Minister Responsible for the Status of Women; Frith 1983, Public Hearings: 15:14), and put forth radical solutions to address problems it had not been mandated to examine.

According to Hall's classification of learning, the committee's recommendations exemplify third order learning. The fundamental goals and problems associated with

pension policy were reframed. However, in an attempt to make its recommendations easily turned into actual policy (Frith 1983, 5), no new program was suggested. It was instead recommended that the C/QPP move beyond its earnings-related nature. This observation thus indicates that in times where the core objectives and problems are reframed, the previously existing programs need not also be completely overhauled to function within the new policy core. In short, third order learning does not necessitate that the policy instruments also be changed.

Despite attempts at consensus, the committee's final recommendations only reflected the views of eight members. Ted Miller from the New Democratic Party provided a dissenting opinion alongside the committee's report. While Miller disagreed with many of the committee's recommendations, including a homemaker pension, he also recognized gender biases in the pension system and concurred with the principle of recognizing the economic value of domestic labour (Frith 1983, 149), albeit in a different manner than proposed by the committee.

Conclusion

The Haley commission was the first and largest policy review to study pensions during the Great Pension Debate. Made up of pension experts, the commission was given a broad mandate and an assortment of resources to study pensions over three years. Two expert actuaries were appointed to oversee those background studies with an actuarial nature. This opportunity to generate research was thus used to produce studies delivering novel insight that could fill gaps in the present body of knowledge. By possessing original studies the commission felt that it held information which was superior to that

produced by previous works. These expert studies were thus used to clarify questions emerging from the public hearings and therefore done alongside the other activities of the commission.

The commission also took the unorthodox step of involving the public via an opinion poll. This too however was seen as offering superior insight into the opinions of the public, and also led the commission to view the public hearings as dominated by 'interested parties". Shown in the next chapter, appointing two actuarial experts to oversee research, and possessing studies and opinion polls seen as providing new and superior information, would complement the commission member's preference for expert information.

Despite its vast resources the final recommendations of the commission reflected the standard approach of pensions by focusing on improving the arrangements for individuals to contribute to their retirement income. The national debate surrounding pensions continued after the Haley commission, and two years after the commission's final report was published the Federal government established the Parliamentary Task Force on Pension Reform.

The Frith committee varied from the Haley commission in some important respects. First, the committee's membership was made up of politicians. The committee was also given a more specific mandate to review the proposals outlined in a Green Paper in the span of ten months. Another difference was a research director preferring to make decisions using information based on a range of experiences including non-expert methods. The nature of the research generated for the Frith committee was also different.

Whereas the Haley commission possessed original exploratory research, the Frith committee lacked such novel studies. Instead, the research staff provided synthesis of the body of works already produced, highlighting common conflicts and debates. As shown in the next chapter, being presented with such research furthered the Frith committee's hesitation to exclusively use scientific works in its analysis.

Both inquiries however, also shared some commonalities (see Table 5). With the intention to develop consensus amongst a variety of interests, both inquiries contained a medium amount of members. Both inquiries also conducted public hearings over an extended period of time in several locations, which resulted in submissions from business, labour, seniors and women's groups. In the end however, the Frith committee's recommendations reframed pensions from an issue concerned with retirement income and the prevention of poverty, into an issue of gender equity.

Table 5: Structure of Haley Commission and Frith Committee

	Haley Commission	**Frith Committee**
Members	5 members	9 members
Research Director	Actuaries	Civil servant/expert
Research Staff	Outside civil service	Inside civil service
Relationship Between Staff	Participatory and ongoing	Participatory and ongoing
Independent Research	Original projects	Reliance on past studies
Temporal Period	36 Months	10 months
Public Participation	Public invitation and private requests	Public invitation and private requests

Chapter Six: Learning by Experts and Politicians

Two components of problem solving

Can the differing recommendations of the Haley commission and the Frith committee be explained by variances in how experts and politicians solve problems? If so, what observable implications are expected?

To better discriminate between how experts and politicians solve problems, I distinguish between: (a) the types of information used to study an issue; and (b) how conclusions are drawn from such information (Table 6). It is first hypothesized that experts prefer information developed by the standards of their discipline, whereas politicians will make greater use of non-expert information.

H1) *Experts will primarily use scientific information*.

H2) *Politicians will be make greater use of non-scientific information*.

Secondly, it is hypothesized that politicians will draw conclusions by negotiating amongst opposing interests. It is also expected that when making decisions politicians will explicitly consider the normative dimensions of issues. As for experts, it is hypothesized that they will base their conclusions exclusively on expert data. If the conclusions from non-expert information conflicts with the conclusions provided by experts, the former should be discarded so as to make the 'right'.

H3) *Politicians will draw conclusions by mediating amongst opposing interests*.

H4) *Politicians will draw conclusions in consideration of social values*.

H5) *Conclusions drawn from experts will reflect the conclusions provided in scientific studies rather than those from non-expert sources*.

Table 6: Ideal Typology of Problem Solving for Politicians and Experts

Actors	Drawing Conclusions	Types of Information
Experts	Facts according to discipline	Expert
Politicians	Negotiation/Social Values	Beyond expert

(Inspired by Garvin 2001 and Radaelli 2005)

Following the methods used by Inwood (2005), the first set of hypotheses is tested by counting and categorizing the referenced information in the final reports of the two inquiries. The categories are divided into groups of public consultations, submissions by the public, policy reviews, government information (such as departmental reports), academic works (peer-reviewed journals or edited books), and independent research (research conducted on behalf of the inquiry). Noting the strong use of regulations as a policy instrument in pension policy (Brown 1999), the additional category of law has also been added, which includes references to acts, judgements, and other judicial writings.

It is difficult to develop a classification of information that is mutually exclusive. For instance, a government document could contain content from public consultations and opinions. In those cases where a source could fall into more than one category, I have

categorized them according to their authorship. This method is congruent with the social dimension of expertise defined in this work. Despite this limitation, this method allows for the general tendency of preferences for different types of information to be identified.

As shown in Figure 1, the findings confirm the first set of hypotheses. Nearly half of the Frith committee's references were to information provided by the public. The committee also made little use of independent research and academic sources, but did frequently use policy reviews (36 percent). The high use of policy reviews is explained by its frequent reference to the Green Paper (75 percent of the references to policy reviews), done to explain how the committee's recommendations varied from the proposals of the Green Paper.

The dissenting opinion of Ted Miller provides another opportunity to test the hypothesis. If the politicians of the Frith committee had a specific preference for non-expert information, then the same outcome should again be observed. As shown in Figure 2, this is the case as public consultations and submissions accounted for over 81 percent of Miller's references.

Figure 1: Referenced Information – The Haley Commission and Frith Committee



(Haley N = 983; Frith N =122)

Figure 2: Referenced Information – Dissenting Opinion



(N = 27)

The findings also confirm the expectations of the Haley commission. Totaling 16 percent of the citations, the commission's reliance on public information is approximately three times less than the Frith committee's. Instead, the Haley commission made more use of expert information. This expert information was not academic studies however, but was the independent research conducted on the commission's behalf (19 percent). The commission also made a high use of judicial writings (20 percent) providing legal interpretations of regulations and statutes. In sum, the members of the Haley commission and the Frith committee did vary in the types of information used to study pensions and develop solutions.

The second difference hypothesized to exist between the experts of the Haley commission and politicians of the Frith committee concerns how conclusions are drawn from information. This is tested by tracing the reasons behind specific decisions, through an analysis of the final reports and proceedings of the inquiries.

Haley commission

The Haley commission's recommendations show a clear preference for drawing conclusions from empirical data adhering to scientific standards, especially the independent research generated on its behalf. Information obtained through public consultation was not however completely ignored. Instead, the commission used public submissions as an important means to scan for alternative solutions of reform. In the words of the commission, input from the public established a "…useful point of departure for a more detailed examination" (Haley 1980, Volume I, 4).

While useful to identify alternative proposals of reform, the information provided from the public was not used to draw conclusions. As the passage quoted above continues to say, "[public input] does not, by itself, establish a clear-cut philosophical basis for predictions about the future or prescriptions for government action" (Haley 1980, Volume I, 4). What did provide a prescriptive means to draw conclusions however, were empirical scientific studies, especially actuarial and economic based models. In the face of conflicting evidence from the public, the independent research frequently served as the deciding factor letting the facts speak for themselves.

The inability to use information provided by the public was related to its political nature, and methodological shortcomings (for example, Haley 1978, Public Hearings, Cassette 17). Explaining how it made its final recommendations, the commission repeatedly mentioned problems with evidence presented from the public, specifically, irresolvable conflicts. In such circumstances, the neutral character of the expert work was viewed as offering a reliable answer. For example, the Haley commission states that it "found no sound basis in principle for choosing one level of adequacy from among the levels proposed [through public consultations]. It therefore turned to the empirical evidence it received [conducted by scientific experts]" (Haley 1980, Volume I, 174, also see 168).

Importantly, the empirical evidence was largely economic modeling using cost/benefit analysis. As stated by the commission explaining how alternative proposals were judged:

> Proposals for pension reform accordingly should be assessed against a range of economic scenarios; techniques that promise the best results in the widest variety of economic

> conditions clearly are to be favoured over those that rely on heavily on the most optimistic or pessimistic economic predictions. (Haley 1980, Volume I, 7)

Furthermore, when the conclusions from these expert studies challenged the evidence gathered from the public, the former was preferred. As stated by the commission:

> Some briefs to the Commission have called for indexing government programs to wages so that recipients will share in the productivity gains made by the economy after their assumed withdrawal from the work force. The commission would not favour such a change. We have seen [through economic modeling prepared on behalf of the commission, (Haley 1980, Volume 5, Appendix F)] how indexing to the CPI affects the cost of the OAS and the CPP, and to move to wage indexing would be even more costly. (Haley 1980, Volume I, 164)

The appeal of disciplines which can provide seemingly conclusive answers reflects similar findings by Inwood (2005) and Simeon (1987) that a defining reason for the recommendations of the Macdonald commission was the ability of economists to provide answers to questions with a degree of consensus, and not just present a body of conflicting evidence. Providing conclusive answers, actuarial studies were thus an important source of information for the Haley commission. Accordingly, the appointment of two actuaries to oversee some of the research of the commission, who took the opportunity to produce novel studies seeking conclusive answers to fill gaps in the body of knowledge on the Canadian pension system, complemented the desire of the commissioners to use the best possible scientific information in making decisions.

The same preference for using cost/benefit analysis in making decisions was emphasized by the Canadian Institute of Actuaries (CIA) in their submission to the Haley commission, and expressed to commission members at the CIA annual general meeting

which they attended (CIA 1978). Providing an "actuarial perspective" (CIA 1978, i), the CIA also stressed the need to move beyond a limited analysis of pensions and take a broader analysis of all retirement arrangements. In doing so it was further recommended that the commission focus on the role and responsibility of individuals, governments and employers (CIA 1978). As the previous President of the CIA, and now overseeing the independent research generated on behalf of the commission, it seems that research director Laurence Coward and the commissioners were sympathetic to the views of these pension experts. As shown in chapter five, the Haley commission adopted an analytical framework to guide its research that studied all retirement arrangements with a focus on the role and responsibility of individuals, governments and employers.

The influence of expert studies on the Haley commission is made clear by tracing the decision-making process of specific recommendations. With a total of 163 recommendations, examining each is beyond the scope of this work. Instead, focus is placed on two of the most pertinent recommendations: the creation of the Provincial Universal Retirement System (PURS), (and to provide a comparison with the Frith committee), the recommendations concerning women and pensions.

The main recommendation of the Haley commission was the establishment of the PURS, and encompasses many of the smaller findings by the expert studies, such as those concerning plan membership, portability and indexing. Moreover, the findings of these studies led to conclusions reaffirming the efficiency of an approach to pensions with a strong reliance on personal responsibility. Justifying the structure of the PURS, the commission states:

> The necessary change in approach is away from group responsibility and toward individual responsibility in the provision of retirement income through employment pensions. This shift would reflect not only individualism but *a recognition that cost subsidies among members of a group are no longer as acceptable as they were in the 1960s, perhaps because of an increased awareness of the long-term effects of such subsidies*. (Haley 1980, Volume II, 305-306)

These costs identified by the commission were highlighted in expert studies. Works showed greater costs for plans with PAYGO funding methods and DB plan structures. The preference for a DC plan structure – where the benefits received by the retiree are directly tied to his or her own contributions, contributions on behalf of the employer, as well as growth on the invested contributions – were founded on the conclusions of the commission's independent studies (Baldwin 1981, 42). Specifically, the structure of the PURS was based on the findings of the research produced by Balcer and Sahin (1982; 1984) modeling the outcomes of various plan arrangements against a number of different economic and demographic conditions (Haley 1980, Volume II, 38-43, 92-95). Furthermore, the identification of this "increased awareness of the long-terms effects" mentioned by the commission was based on the statistical opinion polling (Haley 1980, Volume II, 319)

How relying on expert studies impacted the commission's recommendations is apparent in its study of women and pensions, due to the differing descriptions of the issues and the problems relayed by experts and women's groups. Women's groups emphasized the inherent gendered biases within society and the need to recognize the economic value of work done within the home (for example Haley 1978, Public Hearings Cassette 17 side B; YWCA Metropolitan Toronto Cassette 16, and Brief page 6). It was maintained that addressing the issue of women and pensions by increasing participation

in the labour force would fail to address the root of the problem: gender-biases over the definition of work. Examples of the above include claims by the Ontario Status of Women Council:

> *Because society has not generally accepted the principle that the costs of perpetuating this society should be shared by everyone*, society has allowed women to bear the economic burden for child rearing, especially in cases where there is marriage breakdown, widowhood or divorce. (emphasis added, 1977, 3)

However, the commission's preference to use information generated according to the standards of economics and actuarial science created an "expertise barrier" (Parthasarathy 2010) obstructing women's groups not using such methods from meaningfully participating in such deliberations.

In the end, the proposal for a homemaker pension as suggested by some women's groups was rejected on the basis that the facts of the independent research studies could not be ignored:

> At first blush the proposal [for the inclusion of homemakers in the CPP][8] is attractive and apparently forward-looking; *but if one examines the ramifications of such a move*, *there are some aspects which could actually undermine the present effectiveness of the CPP*. (Haley 1980, Volume V, 112-113)

Such 'ramifications' were identified by the actuarial costing of the expert studies. More than being concerned with the efficiency of including homemakers into the earnings-related CPP, the expert studies (in particular those by Daniel Kubat and Harry Weitz), using demographic forecasting, concluded that the issue of women and pensions

[8] The commission rejects the inclusion of homemakers through voluntary contributions as well as through general tax revenues.

was no longer a pressing concern due to the increasing participation of women in the labour force (Haley 1980, Volume V, 113). It was thus decided that the concerns of women and pensions could be addressed within the traditional earnings-related approach by making incremental adjustments to regulations overseeing RRPs (Haley 1980, Volume III, 118).

Furthermore, input from the public on this issue was limited to the opinions gathered through the opinion survey (Haley 1980, Volume III, 118). However, the closed-ended format of the survey did not allow women to discuss their concerns, in an open dialogue that may have highlighted issues and concerns unbeknown to the commissioner. Instead, the survey asked respondents to provide the response most reflecting their view amongst a predetermined set of answers. Therefore, when it was noted that one of the key findings of the opinion survey was the different working patterns of women, any discussion of these different patterns, including underlying structural impediments, or the implications of these patterns on the lives of women or their retirement, was left unaddressed (Haley 1980, Volume XIII, 70-71). Evidence from women suggesting that increased participation would not adequately address the most embedded aspects of problems facing women was thus not recognized by the commission. Ultimately, the commission failed to recognize the structural problems within the pension system highlighted by women's groups.

The preoccupation with expert information is also evidenced in the outline for briefs and submissions created by the commission (quoted at length in chapter five):

> We are very much concerned that we use to best advantage the information and thought that go into the making of a brief…Therefore the Commission would appreciate receiving

> proposals based on good data…and detailed information on specific problems which are particularly within your knowledge or expertise. (Ontario Royal Commission on the Status of Pensions in Ontario 1977, 1-2)

This preference for 'good data' was sustained during the public hearings. The commission expressed interest in any technical information groups based their positions upon. Such information was diligently analyzed by the commissioners, and long periods of the hearings were spent questioning the methods and findings of submissions (for example, Haley 1978, Public Hearings, Cassette 14). In some cases, groups presenting statistical, actuarial and economic based research were asked to appear again before the commission to further discuss their findings (Haley 1978, Public Hearings, Cassette 14). Such invitations were not extended to groups presenting positions based on methods outside these methods however, although the commission did state its interest in receiving any statistical information mentioned by groups but not included in their written submissions (Haley 1978, Public Hearings, Cassette 17, Cassette 18).

Generally however, the commission did not think highly of the information gathered from the public. Instead, the commission was so "disturbed to learn that few people understand even the basic arrangements used in Ontario to provide income in retirement" (Haley 1980 Volume IV, i) that it prepared a pamphlet outlining retirement arrangements to better educate the public.

Due to its limited view as to the types of information relevant in policy analysis, the commission felt that there was little to be learned from the non-expert public information.

Frith committee

Analysis of how the Frith committee drew its conclusions confirms some of the hypothesized expectations concerning the decision-making style of politicians, while other aspects are rejected. Members of the Frith committee were preoccupied with developing conclusions according to consensus, although it eventually became recognized that doing so was as an impossible task. Instead, the committee viewed the body of scientific evidence as conflicting in nature, and viewed the ability of actuarial forecasting to accurately predict the future as less than desirable. A contributing factor to this view was the nature of the research the committee received (Frith 1983, 2-4), as well as the background of its research director.

Recognizing conflicts amongst the body of scientific works, the members of the committee chose to base decisions on non-expert information gathered from the public. In many cases groups did not outline technical details, and instead focused on the principles upon which programs should be based. Basing decisions on social values, contrasts with the Haley commission's actions to base decisions on the conclusions of empirical scientific studies. Each of these points is elaborated below.

In undertaking their study of pensions, the politicians sitting on the Frith committee explicitly embraced their professional identity as representative members of the public. This identity strongly affected how members approached their task. As stated by the committee in its final report:

> We are not pension experts. We have not second-guessed pension fund managers and their investment decisions…We do not pretend to provide superior technical expertise on the basis of which government can tell industry how to run the pension business. Our role is a

> different one – that of striking a balance between contending views, a balance that is coherent, responsive to real needs, and sensitive to the economic climate. (Frith 1983, 5)

The committee also frequently identified with the information presented by the public through their experiences as politicians. While the experts of the Haley commission judged information presented according to scientific merits, the politicians of the Frith committee used their professional experiences to make-sense of the information from the public. For example, as one committee member told a witness:

> I feel very much at home, particularly listening to your testimony Mrs. Bell, and listening to the points that you describe about people around the bay having problems in getting to Newfoundland. *I know what it is like, because in my own constituency not only people going into hospital but relatives, if they are going to visit them, have to take the train…And Nancy, I can certainly identify with you, because I am still learning [about pensions] and I have been on this for weeks and months*. (emphasis added, Frith 1983, Public Hearings, 30:92)

Reflecting hypothesized expectations, the members of the committee did seek to make decisions according to negotiation and consensus. When speaking to umbrella organizations representing a diversity of groups, the committee was eager to identify whether a degree of consensus amongst the groups had been achieved (for example, Frith 1983, Public Hearings, 11:66; 30:97; 34:18; 34:20). Members were also interested in developing agreement amongst groups with opposing interests, and asked whether differing groups had engaged in dialogue amongst themselves, and encouraged such discussions if they had not taken place (for example, Frith 1983, Public Hearings, 11:66; 30:97).

As the work of the committee progressed however, it was concluded that achieving such consensus was not possible (for example, Frith 1983, Public Hearings,

11:85; 9:47; 16:20; 23:132). Differences amongst groups over the goals of pension policy, as well as methodological assumptions used in generating information, became identified by the committee as an irresolvable component of pension policy (Frith 1983, 15).

For example, in one session of the public hearings Chairperson Frith noted that there was a good deal of consensus between the actuarial studies produced by the Business Committee on Pension Policy, and the background reports of the government's Green Paper. Yet through the discussion, it became clear that substantial disagreements existed. The Chair goes on to say:

> I am not so sure that overall…what I said at the beginning [that consensus exists], Mr. Baird, I think stands true…Therefore, evidently we have a severe difference of opinion though on the pre-reform cost. Right? I am not sure I want to get bogged down on this technical detail, because I think we are not going to see the forest for the trees again if we do. (28: 13)

The committee thus concluded that decisions could not be based on scientific findings alone:

> [concerns over] the difficulty of forecasting events in an uncertain world; the danger that large numbers of employees cashing out pension credits might jeopardize basically sound pension plans; and the sheer cost of moving from one policy or regulatory regime to another. *These realities and constraints are why the Task Force relied on a process of consultation rather than on an exercise in pure analysis*. (emphasis added, Frith 1983, 5)

Therefore, whereas the Haley commission viewed expert studies as able to provide conclusive answers to the mix of views presented from the public, the members

of the Frith committee placed less confidence in such scientific studies (Frith 1983, 15).[9] Instead, committee members turned to non-expert information from the public. Relying on different sources of information emphasized different aspects of the problems surrounding pensions and impacted the types of decisions made.

One difference in the nature of public information was that it had a greater emphasis on the principles of policy and social values than found in expert studies. As stated by one group appearing before the Haley commission:

> Commission member: Have you done any research on how that could be quantified?
>
> YWCA: I must say that we have worked in terms of the time limit. This is a very, very complicated subject and we have worked with different groups and we have tried to take advantage, and what we have tried more tonight *is in principle*, to establish some of the things that we believe are vital. We do believe that the commission should examine these things [the technical details]…it is complicated and it would mean that we would have to again ourselves have to go again and hire and spend. It would be years [before the completion of the study]…So we are looking to the commission to take some of these suggestions that are in principle, that we have not had the money, or the time to explore, and *hope*, that you will on the basis of the principle explore it. (emphasis in the original, Haley 1980, Public Hearings, Cassette 18)

The same focus on principles rather than technicalities was mentioned by groups appearing before the Frith committee:

> Far be it from us to say that there would not be [technical] problems connected with it, but we feel they are surmountable. Why should so many women in Canada who are homemakers not be able to have a pension in their own right just because there are a few problems? Surely we can overcome these, as we have overcome other problems. (Public Hearings, 30:27)

[9] The committee also notes in its final report that, "predicting events over the intervals relevant to pension policy – periods of decades at least – is highly uncertain. Experience suggests that predictions will almost certainly be wrong" (Frith 1983, 15).

> Most of these things can be solved mathematically; after all, getting to the moon was simply a mathematical solution. We feel that it can be done. Once it is recognized as a priority, it can be worked out. (Public Hearings, 11: 68)

The non-technical information provided by the public was viewed as an important source of information by the Frith committee, and the fact that politicians did not dismiss information that failed to outline programmatic specifics, challenges Kingdon's claim that more specific ideas are more likely to be accepted (see Kingdon 2011, 116). Instead, politicians were open to broad ideas, encouraging groups lacking technical knowledge to share their insight, and expressing confidence that if the principles were correct, the details could later be resolved. Note, for example, Frith's statement to the University Women's Club of Edmonton:

> I know you mentioned that because of your lack of statistical and financial background you could only enunciate the principles of the homemakers pension. I can say, on behalf of the committee, that we have access to the statistical background and to the financial background. (Frith 1983, Public Hearings, 25:42)

Committee members were also comfortable using information that openly discussed the principles of policy. Rather than only making technical decisions, politicians believed that making judgements that openly considered social values was congruent with their professional identity. The reliance on public information thus complemented their concern with how decisions would reflect upon social values. As the committee states:

> A decade of debate has brought the subject of pension reform to a stage where most of the issues have been clarified, the problems posed, and the available evidence assembled. Agreement has not been reached. More discussion will not help views to converge. *It is our job, in the light of testimony and advice we have received, to suggest how to adapt present*

> *institutions to significant social, cultural and economic changes. To do this we have to make political judgements*…(emphasis added, Frith 1983, 4)
>
> The job of politicians is to interpret the public will, to look ahead to goals appropriate for the future, and – in the face of conflicting advice and contending interests to make judgements as to what is now acceptable and feasible to move towards these goals. That was our approach to examining Canada's retirement income system and to this report. (Frith 1983, 9)

For the Frith committee the public hearings were thus the primary means to attain this important information from the public. In contrast to the Haley commission, the Frith committee viewed the public hearings as representative of the public itself, and not merely "interested parties". Committee members repeatedly spoke of the important function that the public hearings and the participation of grass-roots organizations played in identifying the concerns of Canadians (Frith 1983, Public Hearings, 31:82-83; 31: 131; 31:85; 34:11):

> I just want to say that we know that many groups in this country who have given presentations to the task force have a lot of resources at their command…As committee members, we appreciate the work that goes into this when you do not have the kind of resource back-up. Believe you me…their work in a very significant way gives us the grass-roots input into pension reform which is necessary if we are to come up with a good political judgement on the issues. (Frith Committee Hearings 34: 20)

Further evidence comes from the public hearings when a committee member tells representatives of an interest group that "…our role is not to advance ahead of public opinion, but we have to have *your public opinion*, *your comments, so we know what the people out there are thinking*" (emphasis added, Frith 1983, Public Hearings, 31:82). The association with the public hearings as a means to identify the interests of the public reflects findings of Petry (2007) that politicians view personal meetings as a primary

means to identify the concerns of the public as opposed to other methods such as opinion polls.

Committee members were also interested in identifying the opinions of individuals based on their lived experiences (for example, Frith 1983, Public Hearings, 28:24; 11:68; 16:11; 29:69; 11:79; 16:16; 25:47-48). The individuals representing interest groups were not only viewed as representatives of organizations, but as persons whose life experiences revealed important insight. These personal experiences were as sought after by the committee as was the statistical evidence presented by groups during the Haley commission. How the Frith committee drew conclusions can be better identified by examining the decision-making process of specific recommendations. The recommendation for a homemaker pension has been selected due to the committee's focus on the issue of women and pensions.

A key difference between the Frith committee and the Haley commission is the different descriptions over the nature of the problem pursuant to women and pensions. Whereas the expert studies of the Haley commission concluded that increasing participation of women in the labour force would negate gender inequalities, the information provided by women's groups themselves led to different conclusions. Women's groups highlighted the cultural, social and economic biases concerning gendered divisions of labour that continued to affect women even as they increasingly participated in the labour market. The issue of women and pensions thus required addressing the fundamental structures within the institutions of society. Speaking to the issue of women and pensions the committee stated:

> To explain these facts [the exclusion of women to pensions], *witnesses pointed to the psychological, social and institutional biases that still govern women's choices about how they lead their lives*…They point to what they see as biases in the pension system: the earnings-related nature of the C/QPP, which ignores the work women do outside the paid labour force… (emphasis added, Frith 1983, 73)

Relying on these forms of information the committee eventually concluded:

> We do not think that the role of women as homemakers will soon disappear. It may change, but it will remain, and it will continue to impose constraints on the ability of women to enter the paid labour force…
>
> …It is a problem of acknowledging and adequately providing for the work women do, both inside and outside the labour force, and of identifying the institutions and arrangements, including pension arrangements, that must be changed in order to make this possible. (Frith 1983, 74)

Conclusion

By categorizing the sources of information referenced in their final reports, and tracing the decision-making processes of the inquiries by examining their background studies, public hearings, media coverage, and secondary studies, it was shown that the experts of the Haley commission and politicians of the Frith committee solved problems in different ways. Seeking to identify the 'right' answer, the Haley commission preferred using expert studies. These studies were seen as providing neutral information through reliable methods, and when compared to the conflicting evidence gathered from public consultations, provided more conclusive answers. The Frith committee however was more wary about relying on expert studies and instead made greater use of non-expert information, also seen as providing insight not documented in expert studies.

In each case however, the preferences for varying types of information was complemented by other features of the inquiry. Most importantly, these were the background of the research directors and the nature of the research generated for the inquiry. These findings confirm Jenson's (1994) claim that together, the types of research generated for a public inquiry, the background of the research director and the world-view of the commissioners, shape the final recommendations eventually adopted. How these factors impacted the final recommendations was especially apparent concerning the issue of women and pensions.

Relying on different types of information fundamentally affected the committee's recommendations. Focusing on the issue of women and pensions, it was shown that using non-expert information led to greater focus on the structural biases within society facing women that went unacknowledged by the Haley commission. Without presenting their evidence through economic modeling, the information presented by women's groups was labelled as outside the definition of 'good data'. The restricted criteria by which the Haley commission judged information thus served as the ultimate "gate keeper" (Jenson 1994), limiting the participation of non-experts.

Due to the Frith committee's reliance on non-expert information from the public, it is not surprising that the actions of actors within society are another factor explaining its final recommendations. With respect to recommendations for a homemaker pension, the next chapter focuses on the social learning amongst women's groups during the period between the Haley commission and the Frith committee.

Chapter Seven: Social Learning amongst Women's Groups

Introduction

The Frith committee's reliance on non-expert information gave public groups an enhanced opportunity to meaningfully participate in policy discussions. Providing an opportunity however, is far from securing that one's participation will influence the final recommendations. Another key factor leading to the Frith committee's reframing of pensions as an issue of gender equity was the social learning amongst women's groups across Canada during the Great Pension Debate. Developments included: a greater number of women's groups studying the issue; an increased volume of information from a gendered perspective; better specified positions for reform; and a greater degree of consensus around such proposals.

These changes amongst women's groups can be traced to the character of the Great Pension Debate. The federal nature of debate provided a stream of opportunities for groups to participate in policy discussions in an assortment of public inquiries, seminars and conferences, established by federal and provincial governments. Women's groups built upon the information developed at consecutive venues and were better prepared for each ensuing round of discussions. In this sense the Haley commission and the Frith committee were two microcosms of learning at opposing temporal ends (see Table 1 page 8) of a period of macro social learning. To better understand the learning amongst women's groups during this time, a brief overview of the women's movement in Canada is provided.

Three means to gender equality

The women's movement in Canada is recognised as occurring in two waves; the first beginning in 1880 (Phillips 1991) and the second emerging in the 1960s (for a more detailed discussion see, Black 1993; Adamson et al. 1988). Although rooted in concerns of gender inequalities, the second wave contained three factions diverging in the policy instruments seen as best addressing gender inequality. Vickers et al. (1993) refer to these blocs as "feminisms of equality", "feminisms of difference" and "feminisms of androgyny" (outlined in Table 7) (see Adamson et al. 1988, 30-31 for a differing classification).

As shown in Table 7, feminisms of equality and feminisms of androgyny shared a common belief in the equality of women to men and a focus on changing societal institutions. For feminisms of difference however, women and men were fundamentally distinct, and the structures most in need of reform were the gender construction of the male and the patriarchal family. The federal nature of the Great Pension Debate provided continuous opportunities for these factions to discuss pensions, eventually leading to greater consensus around specific programs for reform.

Table 7: Three Feminisms of the Second Wave in Canada

	Feminisms of Equality	Feminisms of Difference	Feminisms of Androgyny
Gender Beliefs	Equality of Women to Men	Men and Women are Different	Equality of Women to Men
Policy Objectives	Institutions, Socio-economic Attitudes	Men, Capitalism, the Family	Institutions and Cultural Values

(Based on the typology outlined in Vickers et al. 1993, 250)

Increase in size

The first inclination that women's groups had become more developed in the period between the Haley commission and the Frith committee is noted in a discussion between committee member Flora Macdonald and the Minister of National Health and Welfare, Monique Bégin:

> Bégin: Well, it is not bad that there is a parliamentary committee today [as opposed to earlier]…Lots of work has been done, and you [the committee] have benefited from that work that was been done by others in the sense that people are ready to come to the committee with briefs now; many, many groups. There is not a women's group in the country that does not have a committee on pensions now.
>
> Macdonald: Well I recognize that the minister must have been speaking to many different groups than I have been speaking to, because those groups, those women's groups, were ready three years ago and a lot of them were ready to go.
>
> Bégin: *Oh that is not true. Not three years ago. There was not a women's group ready on pensions, I am sorry*.
>
> MacDonald: I want to tell the minister that indeed they were, and I have been talking to them just as much as the minister.
>
> Bégin: I should provide you with the list of moneys we paid to women's groups in the country, and the dates; *a little money to have seminars, get organized, obtain consultants,*

> *to help them understand what it is all about, because we never discussed that [i.e. pensions] before in women's groups*…(emphasis added, Frith 1983, Public Hearings, 1:33-34)

The dispute over whether the preceding three years had seen increased capacity of women's groups to participate in formal discussions on pension reform is an empirical question, and can be examined in three ways. First, did the federal government increase expenditure on women's groups? Secondly, did many of the women's groups presenting before the Frith committee emerge after the Haley Commission? Thirdly, was there an increase in the production of knowledge by women's groups?

Findings indicate that between 1977 and 1982, there was a small increase in government funding for women's groups. Funding was primarily provided by programs created in the 1970s designed for furthering women's interests, referred to by Stetson and Mazur (1995) as "state feminism". Within Canada these structures included: the Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women (established in 1973), and the Minister Responsible for the Status of Women (established in 1971) (Findlay 1987).[10] Programs administered by these bodies included the Women's Program (established in 1974 under the Department of Secretary of State) and the National Welfare Grants Program (established in 1952 under the Department of National Health and Welfare) (Office of the Auditor General of Canada 1982).

[10] The establishment of state feminism in Canada should not be equated with a government that was more sympathetic to adopt policies reflecting the concerns of women. Instead, despite the establishment of these programs and funding agencies, the concerns of women continued to face opposition and be ignored by the federal government. This is evidenced in the Liberal Party's opposition to recommendations made by the CACSW and the NAC (Frith 1983, Public Hearings, 23:123), as well as comments made by the Minister Responsible for the Status of Women (Judy Erola), stating the independence of these bodies as well as her own reservations over their specific positions on pension reform (Frith 1983, Public Hearings, 15:4). For an overview of such resistance by the government also see Sue Findlay 1987; Louise Chappell 2005.

In particular, the Women's Program funded federal, provincial and municipal non-governmental groups to organize and to study social policy from a gendered perspective (Findlay 1987, 37-39; Geller-Schwartz 1995, 45). Using expenditures published in the government's public accounts, Table 8 shows that expenditure under the Secretary of State via the Status of Women and the Advisory Council on the Status of Women did increase from 1977 to 1982. In constant 1975 dollars, total funding in the fiscal year of 1976-77 was $889 000, while five years later in 1982-83, funding increased to $1 870 000.

Table 8: Secretary of State Expenditure on Women's Groups, 1976 -1982 (Constant $ 1975, in 1000s)

	Status of Women/ Advisory Council on Status of Women
1975-76	-
1976-77	(889)*
1977-78	(1110)*
1978-79	523/530 (1 053)
1979-80	488/556 (1 044)
1980-81	724/941 (1 665)
1981-82	667/958 (1 625)
1982-83	712/ 1 158 (1 870)

* Status of Women and the Advisory Council on the Status of Women were listed as the same budgetary item.
(Source: Public Accounts 1975/76 - 1982/83).

The objective of the National Welfare Grants Program was to fund projects by public organizations and academic researchers studying social welfare. While studying issues related to gender was not the exclusive purpose of the program, it did nonetheless fund such projects. Unfortunately, official public accounts do not specify spending on the National Welfare Grants Program and instead expenditures are identified through the

annual reports of the Department of National Health and Welfare. Although reports are not available for the years 1980-1983, the data indicates no increases in funding (Table 9).

Table 9: National Welfare Grants Expenditure (Grants for Voluntary Organizations)

Years	Constant $1975
1975-76	3 739 843 (831 000)
1976-77	3 759 869 (789 673)
1977-78	3 814 146 (938 170)
1978-79	2 622 461 (861 960)
1979-80	2 489 846 (901 025)
1980-81	NA
1981-82	NA

(Source: Department of National Health and Welfare Annual Reports 1975-1982).

The same annual reports however, indicate that projects with a gendered perspective became increasingly targeted for funding in the latter half of the 1970s (Table 10, emphasized by the use of bold).

Table 10: National Welfare Grants Targeted Research Activities

Year	Targeted Issues
1975-76	Private child care, foster parent motivation, nuclear family in English and French milieu, **changing role of women**.
1976-77	Aged, separation counselling, social service manpower and rehabilitation manpower.

1977-78	Child abuse, child and family welfare, the effects of welfare retrenchment, family violence
1978-79	The aged, **single parent families**, family life, **unmarried mothers**, the handicapped, child welfare, **the changing role of women, teaching homemakers, teen families**.
1979-80	The aged evaluation of programs, the handicapped, development of new policy instruments, family relations, family networks, **child care systems**, **single parenthood**, **sole support mothers**, **assisting national conferences on the family and programs for women.**

(Source: Department of National Health and Welfare Annual Reports 1975-1982).

What is more, this government funding is traced to the formation of women's groups appearing before the Frith committee. During the public hearings, many groups acknowledged that they had only recently begun studying pensions within the last two years, in part facilitated by federal grants used to organize pension seminars (for example, Frith 1983, Public Hearings, 25:37; 9:32). For instance, during one session the Chair noted that the issue of women and pensions appeared to be discussed more than any other subject (Frith 1983, Public Hearings, 29:66). This comment proceeded statements from the Women's Bureau of the Canadian Labour Congress that the protracted nature of discussions over the last few years had "made it possible to clear up a number of questions and it has given some people the opportunity to express themselves on this matter" (Frith 1983, Public Hearings, 29:65). This effect is further indicated in Table 11, showing an increase in number of women's groups appearing at the Frith committee than at the Haley commission. Furthermore, Table 12 shows that at least ten

organizations appearing before the Frith committee were founded after the establishment of the Haley commission (indicated by the use of bold). In sum, the number of organizations and individuals studying pensions from a gendered perspective did increase between Haley commission and the Frith committee.

Table 11: Number (and Percentage) of Submissions Received by the Inquiries

	Frith Committee	Haley Commission
Business	69 (.13)	29 (.07)
Labour	72 (.14)	47 (.12)
Government	27 (.05)	3 (.01)
Experts	41 (.08)	21 (.05)
Plan Sponsor	6 (.01)	5 (.01)
Senior/Pensioner	40 (.08)	6 (.01)
Women's Groups	**69 (.13)**	**11 (.03)**
Individuals	172 (.33)	263 (.65)
Other	27 (.05)	15 (.04)
Total	**523 (1.0)**	**399 (1.0)**

Table 12: Women's Groups Submissions and Presentations

	Haley Commission	Frith Committee	Established
Association of Women Executives	X		1976
Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women	X	X	1973
Business and Professional Women's Clubs of Ontario	X	X	1930
Canadian Federation of University Women	X	X	1920
Ontario Committee on the Status of Women	X	X	1971
Ontario Status of Women	X	X	1973

Council			
Y.W.C.A. of Metropolitan Toronto	X	X	1873
Association des Femmes Collaboratrices		**X**	**1980**
Association Feminine d'Education Sociale		X	1966
Business and Professional Women's Clubs of BC and Yukon		X	1930
Canadian Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs		X	1930
Canadian Research Institute for the Advancement of Women		X	1976
Congress of Black Women of Canada		**X**	**1980**
Congress of Canadian Women		X	1950
Canadian Federation of University Women		X	1919
Canadian Labour Congress, Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Women Committee		X	1976
Catholic Women's League of Canada		X	1920
Corner Brook Status of Women Council		X	1975
Federal PC Women's Caucus of Winnipeg		**X**	**1980**
Federated Women's Institutes		X	1919
Federation de femmes du Quebec		X	1966
Federation of Women Teachers'		X	1888

Association		
Manitoba Action Committee on the Status of Women	X	1967
Manitoba Advisory Council on the status of Women	**X**	**1980**
Montreal Council of Women	X	1893
National Action Committee on the Status of Women	X	1971
Nanaimo Council of Women	X	1919
National Association of Women and the Law	X	1975
National Council of Women of Canada	X	1893
National Women's Liberal Commission	X	1928
Native Women's Association of the NWT	X	1974
NB advocacy council on the Status of Women	**X**	**1977**
NS advisory council on the status of women	**X**	**1977**
Ottawa Business & Professional Women's Club	X	1933
PEI Advisory Council on the Status of Women	X	1975
Provincial Advisory Council of the Status of Women NL	**X**	**1980**
Regina Business and Professional Women's club	X	1933
Regina Women's Network	**X**	**1981**

St. Andrews West Parish Catholic Women's League	X	1962
YWCA (Winnipeg)	X	1886
YWCA (Halifax)	X	1874
Saskatchewan Coalition for Women's Pensions	**X**	**1979**
Sudbury Women's Action Committee on Pension Reform	**X**	**1980**
Sudbury Business and Professional Women's Club	X	1945
Toronto Area Caucus of Women and Law	X	1970
Federation des associations des famillies monoparentales de Quebec	X	1974
University of Calgary, Status of Women Committee	X	1976
University Women's Club of Edmonton	**X**	**1982**
University Women's Club of Etobicoke	X	1952
University Women's Club of North York	X	1951
University Women's Club of South Delta	X	1966
University Women's Club of Vancouver	X	1907
University Women's Club of Winnipeg	X	1909
ZONTA International	X	1919
ZONTA club of Halifax	X	1919
Vancouver Status of Women	X	1972

(Only those groups whose date of origins could be verified are displayed)

Increase in research and analysis

While funding was associated with an increase in the number of women's groups studying pensions, this did not equate with the ability of every group to conduct a technical analysis of pensions. As mentioned in chapter six, discussions of pensions by women's groups during both the Haley commission and the Frith committee were generally limited to non-technical matters. During the Frith committee a total of 22 women's groups explicitly mentioned that a lack of resources or technical understanding had hindered their participation. For example, the Vancouver Status of Women stated:

> One of the problems with coming before the task force is that we are not actuarial accountants, and to develop a brief means that most of us have to study this at length. It is quite an intimidating topic, taking on pensions, even listening to the proceedings of the task force is intimidating. So what I think will happen is that you will probably not be hearing from many women's organizations who have definite opinions on the subject, because they do not feel themselves confident enough to prepare a brief or to sit before the task force. I know it was a major undertaking for our organization to decide to do it and then to sit down and teach ourselves the complexities of pensions and alternatives. Frankly, there are parts of the green paper that are still incomprehensible to me. They are in English, but I do not know quite what they are saying. (Frith Committee Hearings 24:45)

However, the inability to produce technical information was not a trait of all women's groups. For some larger organizations in existence before the Haley commission, the period between 1977 and 1982, resulted in increased technical research. Such analysis used economic, statistical, actuarial, and legal information to complement insights drawn from lived experiences.

Using several databases, including the Canadian Research Index, Canadian Public Policy Collection, Google Scholar and government search engines, Table 13, identifies the number of documents addressing pensions in Canada from a gendered perspective.

Noting mentions by some organizations during the public hearings to forthcoming studies not yet published, the span of the search is extended to include works published in 1983. The results show that between 1979 and 1983 the number of studies examining pensions from a gendered perspective increased by more than 300 percent.

Table 13: Women and Pensions Literature

	Canadian Research Index/Canadian Public Policy Collection	Social Citation Index (Web of Knowledge)	Academic Search Complete	TOTAL
Prior to 1979	2	11	2	**15**
1979-1983	11	20	20	**51**

(Terms searched: Women* AND Pension*; Pension* AND Homemaker*).

Two organizations producing these technical studies were the National Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC), and the Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women (CACSW). Examples of the most prominent works included the CACSW's "Pension Reform with Women in Mind" (1981) prepared by Louise Dulude, and the NAC's "Women and Pensions" (1981).

These studies examined the gendered assumptions within the structures of pension policy, the economy, and society more generally, while outlining possible alternatives of reforms. Recognizing the technical nature of pension discussions, these documents were also designed to increase the participation of women in such discussions. As stated in 1981 by the CACSW (produced by Louise Dulude):

> Until now, few of these issues [the inadequacies of the pension system] have been intelligently discussed in Canada because women have not yet fully entered the pension debate. One of the main barriers to their doing so has been that discussions of these subjects are too often obscured by impenetrable jargon. It is very difficult to keep in mind that pension reform is primarily a women's issue when the most knowledgeable people in the field are actuaries and economists (almost all male) who speak a language that is unintelligible to all but the most faithful readers of financial pages. The goal of the present report is to feminize the Great Canadian Pension Debate. (1981, 2)

Armed with these reports bringing together economic, statistical and actuarial analysis, alongside knowledge from the lived experiences of women, the NAC and the CACSW eventually became recognized during the early 1980s as serious pension policy analysts by actors inside and outside the women's movement (McKeen 2001, 49).[11]

Federalism, time and social learning: specification and consensus for a homemaker pension

Alongside growth in the number of studies and groups studying pensions from a gendered perspective, the period between 1977 and 1982 also led to greater specification and consensus around programs of reform, and in particular around the idea of a homemaker pension. The ongoing creation by federal and provincial governments of public forums provided the opportunity for women's groups to organize, develop, diffuse and reflect upon research. Women's groups thus developed more specified proposals for reform, and worked to develop consensus amongst the different positions held by groups adhering to principles of feminisms of difference and feminisms of equality.

[11] According to an interview with Robert Baldwin who participated in the NPC in 1981, as well as the Frith committee, it was during the NPC that the NAC and the CACSW came to be viewed as serious policy analysts.

One reason why the federalist character of the Great Pension Debate led to more specified positions with great consensus was the ability of groups to build upon past studies produced during previous events of the Great Pension Debate. Figure 3 displays the sources of information referenced by women's groups during Frith committee's public hearings. The findings show that studies recently produced by women's groups were frequently used to develop present proposals. The work of the NAC was of particular importance, whose submission to the committee was so familiar it was simply called the "Pink Paper" by those within and outside the women's movement (for example, Frith 1983, Public Hearings, 29:63). Other important works commonly cited during the hearings was research produced by the Canadian Labour Congress, Monica Townson and Louise Dulude.

How women's groups used past studies created during the first half of the Great Pension Debate to better prepare their positions is also identified during the public hearings of the Frith committee. For example, when asked a technical question on pension plan funding, a representative of the Provincial Advisory Council on the Status of Women in Newfoundland and Labrador stated that: "We have not done an analysis of it [the true economic costs of plan contributions], because we do not have the expertise, but we have read the research material" (Frith Committee Hearings 30:94).

Figure 3: Referenced Sources by Women's Groups, Frith Public Hearings



In contrast to being able to use these studies prepared during the Great Pension Debate, during the Haley commission, groups lacked such information. By being one of the first forums calling attention to pensions during this era, women's groups had little previous studies to rely upon and only three months from the call for proposals until submissions were due. Women's groups before the commission thus frequently presented

preliminary findings drawn from ongoing studies only begun once the Haley commission was established (for example, Haley 1981, Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, Cassette 38).

The plurality of venues during the Great Pension Debate also contributed to the increased specification of proposals for reform. How the policy ideas amongst women's groups became better specified is identified by examining some of the most frequently cited studies by women's groups. Two documents saliently referred to by groups before the Frith committee, "Pension Reform with Women in Mind" (1981) authored by Louise Dulude and commissioned by the CACSW and "Women and Pensions" (1981) prepared by the NAC. These documents provide detailed analysis of the final reports of past policy reviews of the Great Pension Debate (including the Haley commission),[12] both criticizing their proposed recommendations and pointing out alternatives for future reforms.

Benefiting from the ability to learn from the past, Dulude's (1981) report outlines the most common proposals for reform that had been presented by women's groups. Within these discussions the idea of a homemaker pension was noted as an increasingly important issue and a likely solution that would be acceptable to several differing groups (1981, 67-94):

> 'Pensions for Housewives' has been a popular rallying cry in the last few years and an increasingly 'hot' issue among women's groups. Except for the general principle that homemakers deserve some personal financial recognition in old age, however, there is as yet no consensus on the form such pensions should take. (1981, 59)

[12] Dulude discusses the findings of the Haley commission at length; this is also discussed by the CACSW (1981, Appendix 7, 1-4; also see NAC 1981, 1-4),

Activities fostering dialogue amongst different women's groups also took place in public forums, including the National Pensions Conference (NPC), in the spring of 1981. According to Freda Paltiel, a head member of the Status of Women Canada during the 1970s and early 1980s, the establishment of the NPC helped foster interest in the subject of pensions by women's groups. Paltiel identifies no less than 37 seminars bringing together over 3 000 women in the follow-up to the NPC (1982, 342). In fact, during the Frith committee's public hearings many women's groups identified the NAC's discussions as the place where their positions on pensions were developed, including the idea a homemaker pension (for example, Frith 1983, Public Hearings, 36:27; 34:19; 5:36; 30:87; 23:123; 25:42; 9:32; 9:44). In this manner, the ongoing public venues between 1977 and 1982 served to create the conditions where the idea of a homemaker pension was 'softened-up' (Kingdon 2011) amongst women's groups.

How the concept of a homemaker pension developed from a vague concept on the periphery of discussions into a more specific proposal is evidenced in discussions within the National Action Committee on the Status of Women – the largest umbrella organization within the Canadian women's movement. When the NAC first debated the idea of a homemaker pension in 1976, many groups remained uncertain over their specific position (for examples of such uncertainty during the Haley commission see the Ontario Committee on the Status of Women in Haley 1978, Public Hearings, Cassette 6; Advisory Council on the Status of Women, Cassette 38). Of the 27 delegates participating in the final vote on the issue, three voted in favour, six opposed and eighteen reserved from taking a position (Vickers 1993, 261).

As the pension discussions continued to unfold however, the idea of a homemaker pension, and the idea of 'wages for housework' more broadly, continued to be discussed and debated within the NAC (Vickers et al. 1993, 107, 258). Disagreements persisted between some groups who felt that awarding pension benefits to homemakers was a regressive move that would encourage women to remain within the home, and others who maintained that domestic work possessed economic value that ought to be recognized. An example of the latter view was articulated by Dulude in 1981:

> If women ruled the world, Canada's pensions would certainly be very different from what they are today. For example, we could have a system where important work such as child care, education and social services gave entitlement to government pensions, while more frivolous activities such as making widgets and money did not. (1981, 41)

As discussions continued, points of difference became better identified, as did possible alternatives for compromise. Increasingly, a homemaker pension was identified by a majority of groups as one viable policy alternative for reform. While differences over the ideal vision of gender equality persisted, the proposal for a homemaker pension became agreed upon for differing reasons. For some, a homemaker pension was a means to recognize the economic value of domestic labour. For others, although a homemaker pension was seen as preventing the emancipation of women from the private sphere, the idea became accepted as a means to help women nearing retirement without any accrued benefits (Vickers et al. 1993, 261). Accordingly, at the NAC's general meeting in 1980, a resolution was adopted in favour of a homemaker pension (Vickers et al. 1993, 261).

The increased specification and consensus for a homemaker pension during the Great Pension Debate is lastly measured by comparing the percentage of women's groups

advocating for a homemaker pension appearing before the Haley commission and the Frith committee. Figure 4 shows that a larger percentage of the organizations appearing before the Frith committee supported the idea of a homemaker pension than during the Haley commission.

During the Haley commission four of seven groups (57 percent) were in favour of a homemaker pension, whereas during the Frith committee 15 of 23 (65 percent) officially expressed their support for the idea.[13]

Figure 4: Support for a Homemaker Pension



(Haley N = 7; Frith N = 23)

Furthermore, amongst those groups supporting the idea of a homemaker pension, there was a greater degree of consensus over specific proposals for reform during the Frith committee than during the Haley commission. Shown in Figure 5, 50 percent of

[13] The Frith committee's results are a conservative measurement. Some groups mentioned their support for the idea during the public hearings, yet refrained from making their support official, due to what they considered were difficulties of implementing such ideas during the ongoing economic recession (Frith 1983, Public Hearings, 5:36, 39-42).

groups supporting a homemaker pension at the Haley commission did not have any specific idea as to how such an idea could be implemented (also see Haley 1978, Public Hearings, Cassette 6).

In contrast, during the Frith committee, 66 percent of groups agreed on specific mechanisms of reform, i.e. CPP contributions generated from a mix of general tax revenues and other home income earners.

Figure 5: Programmatic Proposals for a Homemaker Pension (groups indicating official support)



Women's groups during the Frith committee were thus more familiar with the concept of a homemaker pension. Familiarity with the different technical proposals for a homemaker pension was also held amongst groups not supporting the idea. During the

committee, many women's groups discussed the idea of a homemaker pension by comparing their positions against those of others. As stated by an economist from Université du Québec à Montréal and representative of the Fédération des Associations des Familles Monoparentales du Québec during the committee's hearings:

> I think most of the women's groups think something must be done for homemakers. But this is a relatively new issue…This question on homemakers' pensions has been discussed for about two years now; therefore there are a number of proposals on the table. Different women's groups have different opinions. (36:56)

Conclusion

Between 1977 and 1982 there was an increased interest amongst women's groups in pension policy. When the Frith committee sat just two years after the final report of the Haley commission, the number of women's groups studying pensions was larger, better resourced, and possessed more articulate positions. An important factor contributing to the social learning of these groups was the federal character of the Great Pension Debate. By creating a succession of public venues for debate women's groups were able to build upon recent findings and discussions. This led to better specified positions and greater consensus for reform around the idea of a homemaker pension. In short, while some have noted that a unitary public inquiry can encourage learning amongst the public (for example, Iacobucci 1990), the federal nature of the Great Pension Debate created a period of amplified social learning.

Chapter Eight: Conclusion

Key findings

The origin of this work began with a desire to better understand the factors affecting how governments learn. Noting the use of policy reviews to study problems and develop solutions, this work focused on explaining the differing recommendations of two public inquiries studying the same issue, within the same country and during the same time period.

By examining the final reports, background papers, public hearings, media coverage and secondary sources written by persons involved in the two inquiries, the variation in the recommendations were explained by: (a) the types of information used by the members of the inquiries; and (b) the social learning amongst women's groups in the period between the two inquiries.

Members of the Haley commission preferred expert information, especially actuarial and economic studies. This data was seen as providing neutral and reliable findings, and hence the best source upon which to draw recommendations. Lacking the methods necessary to generate 'good data', information from the public went unused. Conversely, the politicians of the Frith committee were more open to use non-expert information.

Furthermore, whereas the limited view of what was considered policy relevant knowledge held by the Haley commission led commissioners to be dismayed with the quality of the public's information, for the Frith committee, such information provided

important insight into issues not highlighted by expert studies, including the values and principles embedded in policy.

It was also found that the preferences for different types of information held by the each inquiry were complemented by structural factors, specifically, the background of the research directors, and the types of information these directors generated.

For the Haley commission, two actuarial experts – Laurence Coward and Keith Cooper – were appointed as research directors. Coward, had also been responsible for the research conducted for a royal commission on pensions within Ontario in 1960, past President of the Canadian Institute of Actuaries, and former chair of the Ontario Pension Commission (the same position Commissioner Donna Haley had also held). Appointing actuarial experts to oversee the research led to the production of studies that used quantitative methods, and furthermore, were used to fill gaps in the existing body of literature. The nature of this research was thus a second component complementing the commissioner's preference to use expert information. By providing novel findings and using advanced methods, these studies were seen as providing superior information than previous research.

In the same manner, the generation of an opinion poll to identify public opinion was also seen as providing new insight (via a statistically representative sample) of the public's opinions. However, by identifying public opinion via a survey, the commission embedded within itself a view of the public as merely a sum of opinions. Moreover, the public hearings became seen as a forum dominated by special interests and hence information gathered through this medium was seen as being politically skewed. The

expert studies were thus all the more desirable due to their independence and lack of political ambitions, as much as their use of sound methods.

The background of the research director and the types of research generated for the inquiry were also important factors that complemented the preference for non-expert information held by members of the Frith committee. Drawing upon his experience from academia and the civil service, research director Dobell, thought that policy analysis should include a range of information based on a variety of human experiences.

Also complementing the committee's use of non-expert information was the nature of the research conducted on its behalf. Background studies relied on the body of research already produced. Whereas the original research for the Haley commission examining answers to specific questions pointed to one conclusive answer, the reliance on previous studies thus led to studies of synthesis that highlighted ongoing points of differences amongst works studying pensions. This research thus complemented the committee's view that expert studies were characterized by unresolvable conflicts, and contributed towards its greater acceptance to use non-expert information.

The final element complementing the Frith committee's use of non-expert information was the perception that the public hearings were a means for the public, and not special interests, to participate in policy discussions. Seeing those appearing at the hearings as representatives of the public, the Frith committee had a greater respect for information gathered at such hearings, than was the case of the Haley commission.

The varying ways the two inquiries incorporated information from the public thus supports Salter's (2007) claim that how inquiries' view the public varies, and that such

conceptions can affect the final recommendations. Policy makers using public inquiries as a means of increasing the participation of the public should be aware of factors likely affecting different conceptions of the public. Conducting public opinion polls alongside public hearings could cause public information to be viewed as politically skewed especially vis-à-vis the results of statistically representative polling.

Causes of incremental and radical learning

The findings of this thesis contribute to debates within the public inquiry literature over whether public inquiries generally led to radical or incremental learning. A primary finding has been that the radical learning of the Frith committee was due to the opening of policy discussions to non-experts with little previous meaningful participation. Conversely, by continuing to limit meaningful participation to those able to generate expert information (i.e. accountants, actuaries and lawyers) the Haley commission perpetuated the standard approach to pension policy.

By expanding the range of actors participating in discussions the Frith committee realized the potential inquiries possess to generate innovative ideas. The Frith committee thus became a battleground of meaning where alternative framings of issues contented for domination (Jenson 1994; Phillips 1994). Therefore, while this work supports research theorizing that politicians are more likely to broaden the range of actors in deliberations due to their openness to non-expert information (Garvin 2001; Radaelli 2005; Jasanoff and Wynne 1998), it is possible for either politicians or experts to be associated with innovative learning if their participation works to expand the range of actors and views in policy deliberations.

For instance, if a policy domain is dominated by specific discipline, then these experts could be associated with innovative ideas if there is either a paradigm shift within their respective field (thus expanding the range of ideas) (Hall 1993), or if the policy discussions are opened to experts from other disciplines (thus expanding the range of ideas by expanding the range of actors).

Debates over the ability of public inquiries to generate innovative ideas, would thus be improved by focusing on whether its features, such as the background of the members, the research conducted on its behalf and the directors overseeing such research, serve to either expand or constrain the range of interests and ideas in policy discussions.

Federalism, time and social learning

Another key variable explaining the Frith committee's recommendations was the social learning amongst women's groups during the Great Pension Debate. The federal character of the debate provided a succession of venues where women's groups could expand their study of pensions by continuing to organize, produce and distribute information.

When more public venues were established after the Haley commission, women's groups were able to further distribute their most recent analysis and discuss alternative proposals for reform. This led to an enhanced understanding of pensions, and better specified positions. Eventually, a majority of women's groups embraced the idea of a homemaker pension as a viable proposal for reform.

In the end, the increased presence of groups articulating the need for a homemaker pension, coupled with decision-makers open to using non-expert information, led to the reframing of pension policy by the Frith committee as an issue of gender equity.

References

Adamson, Nancy, Linda Briskin, and Margaret McPhail. 1988. *Feminist Organizing for Change: The Contemporary Women's Movement in Canada*. Toronto: Oxford University Press.

Allison, Graham T. 1969. "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis." *The American Political Science Review* 63 (3): 689-718.

Almond, Gabriel and Stephen J. Genco. 1977. "Clouds, Clocks and the Study of Politics." *World Politics* 2 (4): 489-522.

Althaus, Catherine. 1994. "Legitimation and Agenda-Setting: Development and the Environment in Australia and Canada's North." In *Royal Commissions and the Making of Public Policy*, edited by P. Weller. South Melbourne: Macmillan Education Australia.

Argyris, Chris, and Donald A. Schon. 1996. *Organizational Learning II*. New York: Addisson-Wesley.

Ascah, Louis. 1984. "Recent Pension Reports in Canada: A Survey." *Canadian Public Policy* 10 (4): 415-428.

Aucoin, Peter. 1990. "Contributions of Commissions of Inquiry to Policy Analysis: An Evaluation." In *Commissions of Inquiry*, edited by A. P. Pross, I. Christie and J. A. Yogis. Toronto: Carswell.

Bacchi, C.L. 1999. *Women, Policy and Politics: The Construction of Politics*. London: Sage.

Balcer, Yves, and Izzet Sahin. 1982. "Modeling the Impact of Pension Reform: A Case Study." *The Journal of Risk and Insurance* 49 (2): 158-192.

- . 1984. "Dynamics of Pension Reform: The Case of Ontario." *The Journal of Risk and Insurance* 51 (4): 652-686.

Baldwin, Robert. 1981. (Untitled). In *Commentaries on the Haley Report on Pensions*. Toronto: Ontario Economic Council.

Béland, Daniel. 2006. "The Politics of Social Learning: Finance, Institutions, and Pension Reform in the United States and Canada." *Governance* 19 (4): 559-583.

Béland, Daniel, and John Myles. 2005. "Stasis Amidst Change: Canadian Pension Reform in an Age of Retrenchment." In *Ageing and Pension Reform Around the World*, edited by G. Bonoli and T. Shinkawa. Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar.

Béland, Daniel, and Toshimitsu Shinkawa. 2007. "Public and Private Policy Change: Pension Reform in Four Countries." *Policy Studies Journal* 35 (3): 349-371.

Bennett, Colin J., and Michael Howlett. 1992. "The Lessons of Learning: Reconciling Theories of Policy Learning." *Policy Sciences* 25 (3): 275-294.

Berger, Thomas. 2003. *Canadian Commissions of Inquiry: An Insider's Perspectives*. In Commissions of Inquiry: Praise or Reappraise, edited by A. Manson and D. Mullan. Toronto: Irwin Law.

Black, Naomi. 1993. "The Canadian Women's Movement: The Second Wave." In *Changing Patterns: Women in Canada*, edited by L. C. a. L. D. Sandra Burt. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart.

Bradford, Neil. 1994. "Ideas, Institutions, and Innovation: Economic Policy in Canada and Sweden." In *The Political Influence of Ideas: Policy Communities and the Social Sciences*. Westport, Connectitcut: Praeger.

- . 1998. *Commissioning Ideas*. Toronto: Oxford University Press.

- . 2003. *Cities and Communities that Work: Innovative Practices, Enabling Policies*. Canadian Policy Research Networks. Discussion Paper F32, Family Network.

Bray, David J., Michael A. P. Taylor, and Derek Scrafton. 2011. "Transport Policy in Australia-Evolution, Learning and Policy Transfer." *Transport Policy* 18 (3): 522-532.

Brown, Robert L. 1982. "Actuarial Aspects of the Changing Canadian Demographic Profile." *Transactions of Society of Actuaries* 34: 373-390.

Brown, M. David. 1999. "The Public Role of Actuaries In Private Pensions In Canada." *North American Actuarial Journal* 3 (4): 28-33.

Bulmer, Martin. 1981. "Applied Social Research? The Use and Non-Use of Empirical Social Inquiry by British and American Governmental Commissions." *Journal of Public Policy* 1 (3): 353-380.

Busenberg, George J. 2001. "Learning in Organizations and Public Policy." *Journal of Public Policy* 21 (2): 173-189.

Bryden, Kenneth. 1974. *Old-age Pensions and Policy-making in Canada*. Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press.

Canada. 1982. *Better Pensions for Canadians*. Ottawa: Department of Finance.

Chapman, Richard A. 1973. "Commissions in Policy-making." In *The Role of Commissions in Policy-making*, edited by R. A. Chapman. Plymouth: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.

Chappell, Louise. 2005. "Working From Within: A Comparison of Feminist Intervention in the Bureaucracy in Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom." In *Women in Society: Achievements, Risks, and Challenges*, edited by M. E. Thorne. New York: Nova Science Publishers.

Canadian Institute of Actuaries. 1978. "Brief to the Royal Commission on the Status of Pensions in Ontario" Toronto: Canadian Institute of Actuaries

Carty, R. Kenneth, and William Cross. 2010. "Political Parties and the Practice of Brokerage Politics." In *The Oxford Handbook of Canadian Politics*, edited by J. C. Courtney and D. E. Smith. Toronto: University of Oxford Press.

Centa, Robert, and Patrick Macklem. "Securing Accountability through Commissions of Inquiry: A Role for the Law Commission of Canada." In *Commissions of Inquiry: Praise or Reappraise?*, edited by Allan Manson and David Mullan, 79-125. Toronto: Irwin Law, 2003.

Clarke, Harlod D., Jane Jenson, Lawrence LeDuc, and John H. Pammett. 1996. *Absent Mandate*. Vancouver: Gage.

Collins, H.M., and Robert Evans. 2002. The Third Wave of Science Studies: Studies of Expertise and Experience. *Social Studies of Science* 32 (2): 235-296.

Collins, Kevin. 1978. "Women and Pensions." Ottawa: The Canadian Council on Social Development.

Courtney, John C. 1969. "In Defence of Royal Commissions." *Canadian Public Administration* 12 (2): 198-212.

Cooper, Keith, Preston Bassett, Donna Haley, Dallas Salisbury. 1981. "National Policy On Retirement In The United States And Canada." *Record of Society of Actuaries* 7 (2): 713-727.

Crossan, Mary M., Henry W. Lane, and Roderick E. White. 1999. "An Organizational Learning Framework: From Intuition to Institution." *The Academy of Management Review* 24 (3): 522-537.

Dennis, Guest. 1999. *The Emergence of Social Security in Canada*. Third edition. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.

Desjardins, Marc. 1988. The Politics of Pensions in Canada. Doctoral Thesis. Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia, Victoria.

Dobell, Rodney A. *Alan Rodney Dobell Professor of Public Policy*. http://web.uvic.ca/~rdobell/assets/cvs/short_cv.pdf (Accessed June 13, 2012).

Dobell, Rodney, and David Zussman. 1981. "An Evaluation System For Government: If Politics Is Theatre, Then Evaluation Is (Mostly) Art." *Canadian Public Administration* 24 (3): 404-427.

Dobbin, Frank, Beth Simmons, and Geoffrey Garrett. 2007. "The Global Diffusion of Public Policies: Social Construction, Coercion, Competition, or Learning?" *Annual Review of Sociology* 33 (1): 449-472.

D'Ombrain, Nicholas. 1997. "Public Inquiries in Canada." *Canadian Public Administration* 40 (1): 86-107.

Donnelly, Maureen. 1993. “The Disparate Impact of Pension Reform on Women.” *Canadian Journal of Women & the Law* 6 (2): 419-454.

Duchense, Doreen and Hubert Frenken. 1993. “An Interview with Laurence E. Coward.” *Perspectives* 5 (4): Article 4.

Downs, Anthony. 1967. *Inside Bureaucracy*. Boston: Little Brown and Company.

Drache, Daniel, and Duncan Cameron, eds. 1985. *The Other Macdonald Report: The Consensus on Canada's Future That The Macdonald Commission Left Out*. Toronto: J. Lorimer.

Dulude, Louise. 1981. *Pension Reform With Women In Mind*. Ottawa: Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women.

Dunlop, Claire A., and Oliver James. 2007. “Principal-Agent Modelling and Learning.” *Public Policy and Administration* 22 (4): 403-422.

Esping-Anderson, Gosta. 1999. *The Social Foundations of Postindustrial Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Etheredge, Lloyd S., and James Short. 1983. “Thinking About Government Learning.” *Journal of Management Studies* 20 (1): 41-58.

Findlay, Sue. 1987. “Facing the State: The Politics of the Women's Movement Reconsidered.” In *Feminism and Political Economy: Women’s Work, Women’s Struggles*, edited by H. J. Maroney and M. Luxton. Toronto Methuen.

Fischer, Frank. 1999. “Technological Deliberation in a Democratic Society: the Case for Participatory Inquiry.” *Science and Public Policy* 26 (5): 294-302.

Frantz, Janet E., and Hajime Sato. 2005. “The Fertile Soil for Policy Learning.” *Policy Sciences* 38 (2/3): 159-176.

Frith, Douglas C. 1983. “Report of the Parliamentary Task Force on Pension Reform” Ottawa: House of Commons.

- 1983. *Public Hearings*.

Galt, Virginia. 1983. “Pension Reform Report Will Focus On The Possible.” *The Globe and Mail*, B.1.

Garvin, Theresa. 2001. “Analytical Paradigms: The Epistemological Distances Between Scientists, Policy Makers, and the Public.” *Risk Analysis* 21 (3): 443-456.

Gee, Ellen M. and Susan A. McDonald. 1991. “Pension Politics and Challenges: Retirement Policy Implications.” *Canadian Public Policy* 17 (4): 465-472.

George, Alexander, and Andrew Bennett. 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.

Gilardi, Fabrizio. 2010. "Who Learns from What in Policy Diffusion Processes?" *American Journal of Political Science* 54 (3): 650-666.

Gosnell, Harold F. 1934. "British Royal Commissions of Inquiry." *Political Science Quarterly* 49 (1): 84-118.

Haley, Donna. 1978. Public Hearings of the Royal Commission on the Status of Pensions in Ontario. Retrieved from the Archives of Ontario, January 2012.

Haley, Donna J. 1980. "Report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Pensions in Ontario" Toronto: Government of Ontario.

- 1978. Public Hearings. Retrieved from the Archives of Ontario.

Hall, Peter A. 1993. "Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economy Policymaking in Britain." *Comparative Politics* 25 (3): 275-296.

- . 2003. "Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Politics." In *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*. New York: Cambridge University Press. edited by J. M. a. D. Rueschemeyer.

Hauser, Gerald. A. 1998. "Vernacular Dialogue and the Rhetoricality of Public Opinion." *Communication Monographs* 65: 83-107.

Heclo, Hugh. 1974. *Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Held, Carsten , Markus Knauff, and Gottfried Vosgerau. 2006. "General Introduction: Current Developments in Cognitive Psychology, Neuroscience, and the Philosophy of Mind." In *Mental Models and the Mind*, edited by C. Held, M. Knauff and G. Vosgerau. New York: Elsevier.

Hirschman, Alberto O. 1970. "The Search for Paradigms as a Hindrance to Understanding." *World Politics* 22 (3): 329-343.

Hodgetts, J.E. 1968. "Public Power and Ivory Power." In *Agenda 1970: Proposals for a Creative Politics*, edited by Trevor Lloyd and Jack McLeod. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Huber, George P. 1991. "Organizational Learning: The Contributing Processes and the Literatures." *Organization Science* 2 (1): 88-115.

Iacobucci, Frank. 1990. *Commissions of Inquiry and Public Policy in Canada*. In Commissions of Inquiry, edited by A. P. Pross, I. Christie and J. A. Yogis. Toronto: Carswell.

Inwood, Gregory J. 2005. *Continentalizing Canada: The Politics and Legacy of the MacDonald Royal Commission*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Jasanoff, Sheila, and Brian Wynne. 1998. “Science and Decisionmaking.” In *Human Choice and Climate Change*, edited by S. Rayner and E. Malone. Columbus: Battelle Press.

Jenson, Jane. 1994. “Commissioning Ideas: Representation and Royal Commissions.” In *How Ottawa Spends 1994-1995: Making Change*, edited by S. D. Phillips. Ottawa: Carleton University Press.

Johnson-Laird, Philip Nicholas. 1983. *Mental Models: Towards a Cognitive Science of Language*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sydney Verba. 1994. *Designing Social Inquiry*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kingdon, John W. 2011. *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policy*. Toronto: Pearson.

Knoepfel, Peter, and Ingrid Kissling-Naf. 1998. “Social Learning in Policy Networks.” *Policy and Politics* 26 (3): 343-367.

Levy, JS. 1994. “Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield.” *International Organization* 48: 279 – 312.

Lieberman, Evan S. 2005. “Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research.” *American Political Science Review* 99 (3): 435-452.

Mahler, Julianne. 1997. “Influences of Organizational Culture on Learning in Public Agencies.” *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 7 (4): 519-540.

Majone, Giandomenico. 1989. *Evidence, Argument, and Persuasion in the Policy Process*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

March, James G. 1991. “Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning.” *Organization Science* 2 (1): 71-87.

- . 1994. *A Primer on Decision Making: How Decisions Happen*. New York: The Free Press.

Marchildon, Gregory P. 2007. “Royal Commissions and the Policy Cycle in Canada: The Case of Health Care.” In *Political Leadership and Representation in Canada*: edited by H. J. Michelmann, D. C. Story and J. S. Steeves. Toronto: University of Toronto.

Marier, Patrik. 2008. “Empowering Epistemic Communities: Specialised Politicians, Policy Experts and Policy Reform.” *West European Politics* 31 (3): 513-533.

- . 2009. The Power of Institutionalized Learning: The Uses and Practices of Commissions to Generate Policy Change. Journal of European Public Policy 16 (8): 1204-1223.

- . 2010. “Improving Canada’s Pension System: Lessons From Abroad Ideas from Home.” *IRPP Choices* 9.

Mätzke, Margitta, and Ilona Ostner. 2010. “The Role of Old Ideas in the New German Family Policy Agenda.” *German Policy Studies* 6 (3): 119-162.

May, Peter J. 1992. “Policy Learning and Failure.” *Journal of Public Policy* 12 (4): 331-354.

McDaniel, Susan A. 1997. “Intergenerational Transfers, Social Solidarity, and Social Policy: Unanswered Questions and Policy Challenges.” *Canadian Public Policy* 23 (Special Joint Issue: Aging): 1-21.

McKeen, Wendy. 2001. “The Shaping of Political Agency: Feminism and the National Social Policy Debate, the 1970s and early 1980s.” *Studies in Political Economy* 66:3 7-58.

McKeown, Timothy J. 1999. “Case Studies and the Statistical Worldview: Review of King, Keohane, and Verba's Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research.” *International Organization* 53 (1): 161-190.

Meisel, John. 1974. *Cleavages, Parties and Values in Canada*. London Sage Publications.

Merton, Robert K. 1957. “Bureaucratic Structure and Personality.” pp 195-206 in *Social Theory and Social Structure*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

Mills, Richard. 1994. “The Resource Assessment Commission: Policy Advice and Who to Believe.” Pp. 163-85 in *Royal Commissions and the Making of Public Policy*, edited by Patrick Weller. South Melbourne: Macmillan Education Australia.

Mody, Cyrus C. M., and David Kaiser. 2008. “Scientific Training and the Creation of Scientific Knowledge.” In *The Handbook of Science and Technology Studies*, edited by E. J. Hackett, O. Amsterdamska, M. Lynch and J. Wajcman. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

Morton, Desmond and Margaret McCallum. 1988. “Supperannuation to Indexation: Employment pensions in Public and Private Sector in Canada, 1870-1970” 1-42. *Task Force on Inflation Protection For Employment Pension Plans*. Toronto: Queen’s Printer For Ontario.

National Action Committee on the Status of Women. 1981. *Women and Pensions*. National Action Committee on the Status of Women. Toronto: National Action Committee on the Status of Women.

National Pensions Conference. 1981. Proceedings of the National Pensions Conference March 31, April 1 and 2, 1981, Ottawa. edited by D. o. N. H. a. Welfare. Ottawa.

National Union. 2007. “A Brief History of Pensions in Canada” Pensions Backgrounder No. 2.

Nilsson, Måns. 2006. The Role of Assessments and Institutions for Policy Learning: A Study on Swedish Climate and Nuclear Policy Formation. *Policy Sciences* 38 (4): 225-249.

Office of the Auditor General of Canada. 1982. *Report of the Auditor General of Canada 1982*. Ottawa: Auditor General of Canada.

Oliver, James, and Martin Lodge. 2003. "The Limitations of 'Policy Transfer' and 'Lesson Drawing' for Public Policy Research." *Political Studies Review* 1 (2): 179-193.

Ontario Royal Commission on the Status of Pensions in Ontario. 1977. *Guidelines for Briefs-Ontario Royal Commission on the Status of Pensions in Ontario*. Toronto: Ontario Royal Commission on the Status of Pensions in Ontario.

Ontario Status of Women Council. 1977. *Brief to the Royal Commission on the Status of Pensions*.

Orloff, Ann Shola. 1993. *The Politics of Pensions: A Comparative Analysis of Britain, Canada, and the United States, 1880-1940*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Parthasarathy, Shobita. 2010. "Breaking the Expertise Barrier: Understanding Activist Strategies in Science and Technology Policy Domains." *Science and Public Policy* 37 (5): 355-367.

Paltiel, Freda L. 1982. "Women and Pensions in Canada." *International Social Security Review* 35 (3): 333-344.

Petchey, Roland, Jacky Williams, and Yvonne H. Carter. 2008. "From Street-level Bureaucrats to Street-level Policy Entrepreneurs? Central Policy and Local Action in Lottery-funded Community Cancer Care." *Social Policy & Administration* 42 (1): 59-76.

Petry, Francois. 2007. "How Policy Makers View Public Opinion." In *Policy Analysis in Canada*, edited by M. H. Laurent Dobuzinskis, David Laycock, . Toronto: University of Toronto.

Phillips, Susan D. 1991. "Meaning and Structure in Social Movements: Mapping the Network of National Canadian Women's Organizations." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 24 (4): 755-782.

- . 1994. "New Social Movements and Routes to Representation: Science versus Politics." In *The Political Influence of Ideas: Policy Communities and the Social Sciences*, edited by S. Brooks and A.-G. Gagnon. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger.

Popper, Karl R. 1970. "Normal Science and Its Dangers." *In Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, London, 1965* edited by I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Prasser, Scott. 1994. “Royal Commissions and Public Inquiries: Scope and Uses.” Pp. 1-21 in *Royal Commissions and the Making of Public Policy*, edited by Patrick Weller. South Melbourne: Macmillan Education Australia.

Provencher, Norman. 1983a. *Pension Industry Told Current Study is Final*. The Globe and Mail, R.8.

- . 1983b. *First Steps to Reform Pension System Near*. The Globe and Mail, May 30 1983.

Przeworski, Adam , and Henry Teune. 1970. *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry*. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

Radaelli, Claudio M. 2005. “Diffusion Without Convergence: How Political Context Shapes the Adoption of Regulatory Impact Assessment.” *Journal of European Public Policy* 12 (5): 924-943.

- . 2009. “Measuring Policy Learning: Regulatory Impact Assessment in Europe.” *Journal of European Public Policy* 16 (8):1145-1164.

Ransley, Janet. 1994. “The Powers of Royal Commissions and Controls Over Them.” Pp. 22-31 in *Royal Commissions and the Making of Public Policy*, edited by Patrick Weller. South Melbourne: Macmillan Education Australia.

Rose, Richard. 1993. *Lesson-Drawing in Public Policy: A Guide to Learning Across Time and Space*. Chatham: Chatham House.

Rusk, James. 1982. “Little Expected from Pension Reform Paper.” *The Globe and Mail*, P.12.

- . 1983. “Tough Job on Pension Reform Will Make or Break Rookie MP.” *The Globe and Mail*, P.10

Sabatier, Paul A., and Hank Jenkins-Smith. 1988. “An Advocacy Coalition Model of Policy Change and the Role of Policy Orientated Learning Therein.” *Policy Sciences* 21: 129-68.

Salter, Liora. 1990. “The Two Contradictions in Public Inquiries.” In *Commissions of Inquiry*, edited by A. Paul Pross, Innis Christie, and John A. Yogis. Toronto: Carswell.

- 2007. “The Public of Public Inquiries.” In *Policy Analysis in Canada*, edited by M. H. Lauren Dobuzinskis, David Laycock, . Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Saskatchewan Labour. 1981. *Reform of Canada's Retirement Income System: A Saskatchewan View*. Regina: Saskatchewan Labour.

Scala, Francesca. 2002. *Experts, Non-experts, And Policy Discourse: A case Study of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies*. Ph.D., Carleton University.

- . 2008. "Feminist Ideals Versus Bureaucratic Norms: The Case of Feminist Researchers and the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies." In *Gendering the Nation-State* edited by Yasmeen Abu-Laban, 97-119. Toronto: University of British Columbia Press.

Schmidt, Vivien A. 2002. *The Futures of European Capitalism*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Schneider, Anne, and Helen Ingram. 1993. "Social Construction of Target Populations: Implications for Politics and Policy." *The American Political Science Review* 87 (2): 334-347.

Seel, Norbert M. 2006. "Mental Models in Learning Situations." In *Mental Models and the Mind: Current Developments in Cognitive Psychology, Neuroscience and the Philosophy of Mind*, edited by C. Held, M. Knauff and G. Vosgerau. New York: Elsevier.

Shilton, Elizabeth J. 2011. Gifts or Rights?: A Legal History of Employment Pension Plans in Canada. Doctoral Thesis, University of Toronto.

Simeon, Richard.1972. *Federal-Provincial Diplomacy: The Making of Recent Policy in Canada*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

- . 1987. "Inside the MacDonald Commission." *Studies in Political Economy* 22: 167-179.

Skogstad, Grace. 2010. "Science and Technology: Politicians and the Public." In *The Oxford Handbook of Canadian Politics*, edited by J. C. Courtney and D. E. Smith. Toronto: Oxford University Press.

Slocum, Dennis. 1981. "Author Feels Pension Conference was Limited in Scope." *The Globe and Mail*, B.19.

Statistics Canada. 2012. *Average Time Spent on Housework for Late Baby Boomers, Generation X and Generation Y at Ages 20 to 29, by Sex*. (Accessed March 13, 2012). http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/11-008-x/2011002/t/11520/tbl004-eng.htm

Stetson, Dorothy McBride, and Amy G. Mazur. 1995. "Introduction." In *Comparative State Feminism*, edited by D. M. Stetson and A. G. Mazur. London: Sage.

Stutz, Jeffrey R. 2008. "What Gets Done and Why: Implementing the Recommendations of Public Inquiries." *Canadian Public Administration* 51 (3): 501-521.

Sulzner, George T. 1971. "The Policy Process and the Uses of National Governmental Study Commissions." *The Western Political Quarterly* 24 (3): 438-448.

Tarrow, Sidney. 2004. *Bridging the Quantitative-Qualitative Divide. In Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*, edited by H. E. Brady and D. Collier.

The Globe and Mail. 1983a. "Mulroney Gets Word Hot Off Presses," P.11.

The Globe and Mail. 1983b. The Ottawa Scene: Munro bones up on French. P.11.

Timpson, Annis May 2003. "Challenging Policy Paradigms: Women, Royal Commissions, and the Public-Private Divide." Pp. 229-45 in *Commissions of Inquiry: Praise or Reappraise*, edited by Allan Manson and David Mullan. Toronto: Irwin Law.

Trebilcock, Michael J., Hartle G. Douglas, J. Robert S. Prichard, and Donald N. Dewees. 1982. *The Choice of Governing Instrument*. Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada.

Turner, Stephen. 2001. "What is the Problem with Experts?" *Social Studies of Science* 31 (1): 123-149.

Vickers, Jill, Pauline Rankin, and Christine Appelle. 1993. *Politics as if Women Mattered: A Political Analysis of the National Action Committee on the Status of Women*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Vigoda, Eran. 2002. "From Responsiveness to Collaboration: Governance, Citizens and the Next Generation of Public Administration" *Public Administration Review* 62: 527-40.

Weyland, K. 2005. "Theories of Policy Diffusion: Lessons from Latin American Pension Reform." *World Politics* 57 (January): 262-295.

Weible, Christopher M. 2008. "Expert-Based Information and Policy Subsystems: A Review and Synthesis." *Policy Studies Journal* 36 (4): 615-635.

Whitcomb, Ed. 2007. *A Short History of Ontario*. Ottawa: From Sea to Sea Enterprises.

Wilson, V. Seymour. 1971. "The Role of Royal Commissions and Task Forces." Pp. 113-29 in *The Structures of Policy-Making in Canada*, edited by G. Bruce Doern and Peter Aucoin. Toronto: Bryant Press.

Wolfson, Michael C. 1988. "Homemaker Pensions and Lifetime Redistribution." *Review of Income and Wealth* 34 (3): 221-250.

Zito, Anthony R., and Adriaan Schout. 2009. "Learning Theory Reconsidered: EU Integration Theories and Learning." *Journal of European Public Policy* 16 (8): 1103-1123.

Appendix I: Consulted Actors – Haley Commission and Frith Committee

Haley Commission	**Frith Committee**
Ministry of Treasury and Economics	Department of Finance
Ministry of Labour	Ministry of State for Social Development
Superintendent of Pensions for Ontario	Department of Insurance
Ministry of the Attorney General	Department of National Health and Welfare
Ministry of Revenue	Louise Dulude
Geoffry Calvert, R. A. Field	Status of Women
Canadian Life Insurance Association	James L. Clare
Ontario Advisory Council on Senior Citizens	Robert Baldwin
Canadian Federation of Independent Businesses	Ian H.D. Bovey
Department of Justice (Harvey Lazar)	Harvey Lazar
Economic Council of Canada	Economic Council of Canada
Department of National Health and Welfare	James E. Pesando
Statistics Canada	J.C. Weldon
Dudley Funnel	Anthony Wohfarth
Canadian Labour Congress	Monica Townson
Maryin E. Segal Company (Actuarial and Consulting services)	Committees and Private Legislation Directorate
Superintendent of Insurance (Richard Humphrys)	Privy Council Office, Task Force on Pension Reform
Tomenson-Alexander Associates	
Ross Archibald, University of Western Ontario	
Watt Company, D.D. Ezra	
James P. Marshall Inc.	
Kevin Collins	
United Auto Workers	
Trust Companies Association of Canada	
Clarkson Gordon	
Benefits Policy Branch of the Civil Service Commission Ontario	
Wayne G. Beach, (Tax lawyer, consultant)	