

Citizen Discontent in the European Union: A General Phenomenon?

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## ABSTRACT

## Citizen Discontent in the European Union: A General Phenomenon?

The European Union (EU) through a series of treaties has gradually deepened its institutional powers within member states and widened its membership to 27. These changes were largely pushed forward by political elites relying on permissive consensus. Failed referenda on treaties and declining general support (beginning in 1993 with the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht) expose growing public discontent. Previous studies claim that when citizens voted against the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe and the substantively similar Treaty of Lisbon, they did so based not on opposition to the treaties themselves but to something else. Through evaluation of all 27 member states, I reveal that discontent is highest on the question of enlargement. Conclusions in the literature on what explains this opposition are also mixed. Replicating a study conducted by Gabel (1998), I compare the many integration support theories existing in the literature. Using survey responses from Eurobarometers and the European Values Study I establish that citizens are not homogeneous in what determines their views toward enlargement. Attitudes of individuals in original member states are influenced by their level of trust in governmental organizations. Members of the first enlargement base their opinion on the degree of Europeanization of their self-identity. And citizens from the most recent enlargements consider the EU in terms of their attitudes toward national governments.

Kerry Lynne Tannahill

## DEDICATION

First and foremost I dedicate this to my supervisor Dr. Axel Hülsemeyer; your confidence in me has led me to make decisions that have forever changed the course of my life, and for that I am grateful. To Dr. Mebs Kanji who has agreed to take me along the next phase of my journey, I eagerly anticipate what is to come. To my friends, I thank them for patiently listening and offering advice as I pushed through this project. And to my family whose unwavering support motivates me every day.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CHES	Chapel Hill Expert Surveys
CSDP	Common Security and Defense Policy
EB	Eurobarometer
EC	European Council
ECB	European Central Bank
ECJ	European Court of Justice
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EEAS	European External Action Service
EEC	European Economic Community
EMU	European Monetary Union
EP	European Parliament
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
EU	European Union
EVS	European Values Study
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HR	High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
IGC	Intergovernmental Conference
SEA	Single European Act
TCE	Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe
TEEC	Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community
TEU	Treaty on European Union
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the Union
TOL	Treaty of Lisbon
QMV	Qualified Majority Voting
UK	United Kingdom

## GLOSSARY

Charter of Rights	Guarantees fundamental human rights to member state citizens. Adopted by the Nice Treaty in December 2000. Elevated to the same legal status as EU treaties by the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009.
Convention on the Future of Europe	Set up at Laeken in December 2001. Composed of 105 members representing member state governments, national parliaments, the European Parliament and the European Commission. Presided over by Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. Drafts the Constitution and presents it to the European Council in June 2003.
Council of Ministers	Renamed from Council of the EU by the ToL, commonly referred to as "the Council." Composed of representative Ministers from every member state.
European Central Bank (ECB)	Manages the Euro and the Eurozone members' monetary policy. President is elected by the European Council. Presidents and CEOs of each of the central banks of the 17 Eurozone members sit on the board of the ECB. National banks execute decisions by the ECB.
European Commission	Consists of one representative from each of the 27 member states. Member governments nominate commissioners and they are approved by the EP. Serves as the executive body of the EU by administering and implementing EU policies and drafts proposals for new EU laws.
European Council (EC)	Composed of heads of state or government from each member state. Originally established in 1974 and made official by the SEA. Meets formally twice every six months in Brussels, for two days and is responsible for general policy making and treaty changes of the European Union. Treaty changes in the EC are adopted by unanimous voting. The ToL changed the EC's presidency from a rotating 6 month term to a permanent 2 ½ year term, renewable once.
European Court of Justice (ECJ)	Responsible for dispute settlement between members, with ToL gains judicial powers in the area of freedom, security and justice.
European Economic Community (EEC)	Established by the Treaty of Rome in 1957. Composed of the original six member states: Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Builds on the European Coal and Steel Community moving from a common market in coal and steel to a wider range of goods and services. Customs duties between members are removed and common agriculture and trade policies are established. Denmark, Ireland, and the UK join in 1973.

European External Action Service (EEAS)	Established by the ToL as responsible for development and foreign aid. Represented by the High Representative of Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Works in collaboration with member state diplomatic services.
European Monetary Union (EMU)	Negotiations began in 1988 for an economic and monetary union for all EU member states. Establishes the European Central Bank and provisions for monetary policy coordination with national central banks. Provisions are incorporated into the Treaty on European Union and were signed in Maastricht in 1992.
European Parliament (EP)	Established in 1979, consists of 736 members directly elected every five years by EU citizens. Is responsible for approval of legislation proposed by the European Commission.
European Union (EU)	Composed of 27 member states. Originated in 1951 with the European Coal and Steel Community and has evolved through a series of treaties to culminate now with the Treaty of Lisbon.
Eurozone	Consists of those member states that have signed the EMU and have adopted the Euro (single currency implemented by the ECB). Currently comprises 17 members.
High Representative of Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR)	Originally conceived in the Treaty of Amsterdam, replaced the High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and given greater executive power by the ToL in 2009. Is responsible for maintaining consistency and coherence in EU foreign and defense policy and representing the EU in all matters of foreign affairs and development. Assisted by the EEAS.
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC)	Procedure for the adoption of new treaties of the EU or the negotiation of existing ones. IGCs are called by the European Council and attended by representatives of each member state as well as the Commission and the EP.
Ratification	Process through which EU treaties are adopted by national parliaments. In general ratification requires majority votes by mainstream political parties in national parliaments; occasionally ratification will take the form of either consultative or binding referenda (depending on national constitutional requirements).

Schengen Agreement	Originally signed in 1985. Establishes the free movement of people across EU member states (within the so-called Schengen area) and characterized by greater police and judicial cooperation and common visa and asylum policy. Bulgaria, Cyprus, and Romania are not currently fully integrated into the Schengen area. The UK and Ireland currently have not signed on to all aspects of Schengen. Non-EU members who have also signed onto the Agreement are Norway and Switzerland.
Single European Act (SEA)	Signed in 1986 by 12 member states to create a single European market which provides for the free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor (the four freedoms). Entered into force in 1987.
Treaty of Rome: Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (TEEC)	Signed in 1957, formally named the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (TEEC). Builds on the existing common market in coal and steel by expanding to include a wider range of goods and services. Eliminates customs duties and implements common agricultural and trade policies across member states.
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE)	Also referred to as the Constitutional Treaty. Intended to replace all existing EU treaties and simplify EU legislation. Rejected in referenda in Netherlands and France and set aside in 2005.
Treaty of Amsterdam	Signed in 1997, entry into force in 1999. Incorporates the Schengen Agreement into treaty, making it EU law. Increases number of policy areas under qualified majority voting. Creates position of High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, later replaced in the ToL and given additional power through the EEAS. First use of flexible integration, where it becomes possible for member states to opt out of certain treaty provisions.
Treaty of Lisbon (ToL)	Also referred to as the Reform Treaty. Signed in 2007, entry into force in 2009. Amends existing EU treaties to the Treaty on the European Union, the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Institutional changes of the ToL resemble those of the TCE yet constitutional and legal terminology has been removed. “Laws” and “Framework Laws” are replaced by “regulations” and “directives.” No EU symbols are included in this treaty, hence the removal of reference to the EU flag and anthem.

Treaty of Maastricht: Treaty on European Union (TEU)	Popularly known as the Maastricht Treaty. Signed in 1992 with entry into force in 1993. Establishes the European Union and renames the EEC to the European Community (EC). Establishes increased intergovernmental cooperation and sets goals for all 12 member states: monetary union by 1999, European citizenship, and common policies both internal and foreign.
Treaty of Nice	Signed in 2001, entry into force in 2003. Further extends qualified majority voting. Increases powers of the European Commission and its president. Provides greater voting weight to members in the European Council with larger populations.
Treaty on the Functioning of the Union (TFEU)	Renamed from the Treaty Establishing the European Community in the ToL. Defines the EU's various policy objectives.
Qualified Majority Voting (QMV)	Under the Treaty of Nice, a qualified majority, and in turn a decision, is reached when member states representing 62 percent of the entire EU population vote in favor of the decision. Later modified by the ToL to begin in 2014, wherein a decision will pass if 55 percent of member states are in favor (15 of 27) representing 65 percent of the population. <sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> In 2011, this represents 326M of the 502M total citizens in the EU.

## COUNTRY GROUPINGS FOR ANALYSIS

EU6	Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands (1952)
EU9	Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom (1973), Greece (1981), Portugal, Spain (1986), Austria, Finland, Sweden (1995)
EU12	Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia (2004), Cyprus, Malta (2004), Bulgaria, Romania (2007)
North	Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden, United Kingdom (arbitrarily determined as countries with the majority of their territory north of the 47 <sup>th</sup> parallel) <sup>2</sup>
South	Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain (countries with the majority of their territory south of the 47 <sup>th</sup> parallel)
Small Welfare State <sup>3</sup>	Czech Republic, Estonia, Ireland, Slovakia (public social expenditures are less than 20 percent of GDP in 2005 and 2007)
Medium Welfare State	Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, United Kingdom (public social expenditures are between 20 and 25 percent of GDP in 2005 and 2007)
Large Welfare State	Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Sweden (public social expenditures are greater than 25 percent of GDP in 2005 and 2007)
Micro State	Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta (Population Size <sup>4</sup> arbitrarily determines this grouping of states based on common divisions of states in EU literature <sup>5</sup> as state with a population less than 1M citizens)
Small State	Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden (population between 1M and 30M)
Medium State	Poland, Spain (population between 30M and 50M)
Large State	France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom. (population greater than 50M)

<sup>2</sup> This specification is not used in the literature states are instead referred to as northern or southern without a systematic grouping method (OPTeM 2001).

<sup>3</sup> Data on total social expenditures from OECD are not available for the following countries: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, and Romania.

<sup>4</sup> (Lanzieri 2008)

<sup>5</sup> (Thorhallsson 2006)

Left	Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, France, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden (State classified based on an average expert score less than 5 using CHES 2006 <sup>6</sup> general political spectrum question where 0 is extreme left and 10 is extreme right)
Right	Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom (average expert score greater than 5 on CHES spectrum)
Net Contributor	Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom (Evaluated as net contributors based on Commission budget calculations of state payments to the total budget minus funds received from the EU)

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<sup>6</sup> Data for Cyprus, Luxembourg, and Malta are not available.



## CHAPTER 1– INTRODUCTION

This thesis investigates the rising discontent among citizens in the European Union (EU). Further EU building is currently underway with enlargement to include a new member state by 2013 and a new treaty delegating national control over fiscal policy to the EU level. This project clarifies the preferences of citizens in the context of similar EU building changes and offers insight into what influences public opinion. In this chapter I briefly explore the meaning of regional integration and the process of EU building. I present this project's research design and define my dependent variable citizen discontent. The chapter concludes with an overview of my contribution to the literature, the timeline of this study, the datasets being used, and an overview of the chapters to follow.

Regional integration consists of the signing of trade agreements between states. This process can take two forms. The first, geographical enlargement, also referred to as widening, consists of the growth of the Union's signatory states from the original six inner members to the current 27 countries. The second form, termed integration deepening, comprises the gradual shift of national decision-making on policy issues and control to the supranational EU level. Areas affected by this power shift range from management of the economy to national security and foreign affairs.

Ratification is the process by which national governments adopt these treaties signed at the supranational level. In general they require majority votes in national parliaments although occasionally ratification will take the form of binding referenda in which citizens vote directly on the treaty in question. Overall support for EU building was generally high until failed referenda on institutional deepening treaties, beginning in

1992 with the Treaty of Maastricht, revealed growing dissatisfaction among EU citizens. Opposition during more recent treaty referenda on the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE) and the Treaty of Lisbon (ToL) combined with public polling data on the EU also signal that citizen discontent is increasing. Existing studies conclude that, when citizens voted against deepening treaties in these referenda, they did so based on negative orientations toward some other EU-related change such as the implementation of a common currency (the Euro) or integration widening to include new Eastern European members and Turkey.

Prior research suggests that EU building in the past was led by political elites (leaders who sign the treaties and ratify them in national parliaments) that acted based on permissive consensus. This theory of representation suggests that elites vote on EU issues furthering integration, based on the assumption that citizens generally support the EU (that the EU is a good thing), while ignoring their preferences on individual policies (such as those contained in a treaty) or the inclusion of new member states. Further EU building is underway with a seventh enlargement to include membership of Croatia scheduled for 2013 and expected referenda on an EU-wide fiscal treaty (the European Stability Mechanism) with currently ongoing ratification in national parliaments. A determination of elite representation of citizen interests as well as the degree of citizen consensus on the EU therefore becomes necessary to predict the success of this future EU integration.

In the next section I present an overview of the types of treaties signed in the EU which advanced both deepening and widening to date. This overview provides the

necessary historical context to then examine the degree of support for these treaties among elites and citizens.

### **Integration Treaties**

Treaties for enlargement are called accession treaties and they are signed by all member states as well as the acceding candidate countries. A total of six such treaties have been signed to date, the first of which took place in 1973 when Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom joined the original inner six members Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Italy, France, and Germany (West) in the European Economic Community (EEC) previously the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Greece acceded in 1981 followed by Spain and Portugal in 1986. In 1995, Austria, Finland, and Sweden comprised the fourth round of enlargements. The largest expansion, which also inspired the greatest amount of contention, happened in 2004 when ten new states joined the Union: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia (McCormick 2008). The final wave of geographical widening occurred in 2007 with the accession of the remaining two eastern European countries Romania and Bulgaria.

Deepening treaties have gradually shifted the Union from a simple trade agreement to a supranational institution responsible for issues ranging from the elimination of trade, capital, and labor barriers between member states to the collaboration of members on foreign action policies. The Treaty of Rome, signed by ECSC members in 1957, built on the original trade agreement the Treaty of Paris.<sup>7</sup> The

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<sup>7</sup> The Treaty of Paris was originally signed by six states in 1951 that established the ECSC.

new treaty was formally named the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (TEEC). It expanded the existing common market in coal and steel to include a wider range of goods and services, eliminated customs duties, and instituted common agricultural and trade policies among member states. The Single European Act (SEA), signed in 1986 by the then twelve members, amended the EEC's founding treaty. The SEA deepened the Community's powers within member states by creating a single market, expanding on the TEEC to ensure unrestricted movement of goods and services and the free movement of capital and labor across borders.

In 1992, the same twelve members signed a new treaty in Maastricht changing the name of the common market from the EEC to simply the European Community. The treaty entered into force in 1993 and was named the Treaty on European Union (TEU). It established provisions for intergovernmental coordination between member states on common monetary policy, European citizenship, common foreign and security policies, and increased coordination in military, justice, and home affairs. Since Maastricht, the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999), the Treaty of Nice (2003), and finally the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) have further deepened these powers by shifting policies<sup>8</sup> that were formerly of national jurisdiction to the supranational level, including but not limited to enhanced cooperation on economic growth, employment, social welfare, security, and health.

The most recent act of integration deepening is the Treaty of Lisbon (ToL) which is a slightly reformed version of the failed Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE). Although some symbolic elements were removed, the substance of the ToL remains largely identical to the TCE and is therefore also referred to here as a

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
<sup>8</sup> For more details on policy areas and changes in voting powers see Finke (2010: 31-37)

constitutional treaty. The following provides an overview of the ToL while a more in depth description of the process of adoption is provided in Chapter 2 and details of the changes it enacted in Chapter 3. The changes are each linked to the questions in the datasets under investigation which allow me to evaluate citizen opposition.

The ToL's articles reform the TEU and the TEEC and rename the latter to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Treaty changes mainly affect the powers of the Union's institutions. These emerge through the abolishment of the treaty based pillar structure which divided each institution's powers according to policy area. The reform creates greater consistency in institutional powers across all old and new EU policy areas. The European Parliament (EP) composed of elected officials from each member state thus gains legislative power. The Council of the European Union, composed of Ministers from each member state, also acquires increased voting privileges. The European Commission, the executive institution of the EU, secures greater influence through the broader range of policies under EU jurisdiction as well as increased independence in the selection and appointment of commissioners responsible for their implementation. The European Court of Justice (ECJ), responsible for dispute settlement between members, expands judicial powers to include the areas of freedom (including free movement and asylum, commercial and civil rights), and security (including criminal matters and public safety).

## Research Questions

**Figure 1.1 – The Research**



In Figure 1.1, I outline the structure of this project including the research questions under investigation and the variables (factors) utilized to answer these questions. The project begins with a brief historical overview of the TCE and the subsequent Reform Treaty, the ToL. I explore the path to rejection of the TCE and the steps to ratification of the ToL. In this historical overview I identify the actors driving integration and the evidence of public opposition to it. While elites in the past have made decisions based on citizens' general support for the EU through permissive consensus, I expect based on anti-EU voting in referenda that general support is decreasing and that elites are failing to represent citizen preferences when ratifying these treaties. I investigate whether there is in fact a lack of representation of citizen interests during EU building and answer the first research question RQ<sub>1</sub>: What is the degree of permissive consensus in the EU? This first research question examines the state of permissive consensus through exploration of the degree of like-mindedness among elites on the recent TCE and ToL with a comparison to citizen opinion on the EU in general.

Through a presentation of the similarities in substance and differences in adoption between the TCE and the ToL, it becomes evident that opposition explicitly expressed to one should remain ever present in the other. While referenda were only held in one country, to verify whether citizens were actually in favor of the ToL I investigate RQ<sub>2</sub>: Is discontent with the ToL a general phenomenon across all member states? I investigate whether the *degree* of citizen discontent, my dependent variable (DV), expressed through citizen opposition in referenda in France, the Netherlands, and Ireland is a general phenomenon across all 27 member states.

Although failed referenda demonstrate discontent in the EU, I expect that dissatisfaction expressed through direct voting on an EU treaty is not necessarily based on opposition directly to that treaty. According to existing studies, citizens likely voted against some other issue. These issues include general EU support, elements included within the treaty but not the whole document, widening (i.e. inclusion of additional members), the Euro, and the expansion of EU authority (Ruiz-Jiménez and Torreblanca 2008, Aarts and van der Kolk 2006, Milner 2006). In other words, according to these authors, discontent with the TCE varied in *nature* and this phenomenon should also be the case in the context of the ToL. I will therefore expand on this research by comparing citizen opposition on each of these forms of integration and answer the third research question RQ<sub>3</sub>: What is the nature of citizen discontent in the EU? This question is exploratory and based on the lack of consensus in the literature I do not set out with any expectations.

Finally, there are several conclusions in the literature regarding which factors may be most important in driving citizen discontent. My work explores the multitude of possible integration support theories including: cognitive mobilization theory, political values theory, party affiliation, utilitarian theory, support for government, fear of threat to national culture, and the novel investigation of the role of individual values. These theories are used in my study to outline explanatory factors, also referred to here as independent variables (IVs). I briefly explain the effects of these factors below. Through multivariate analyses I create a hierarchy among the theories of support for integration and answer the final research question RQ<sub>4</sub>: What explains citizen discontent?



My investigation uses a widely cited model originally put forth by Gabel (1998) and reveals a hierarchy in these explanatory theories. I propose that popular assumptions such as the role of fear of other cultures, the level of financial and human capital driving utilitarian calculations, citizens' left-right political ideology, and the degree of support for national government may be less important than European identity and underlying individual values.

### **Contribution to the Literature**

Eichenberg and Dalton (2007) suggest that elites went ahead with the European Monetary Union despite an awareness of citizen opposition to the Euro and concern over the effect it might have on social programs. European elites, with little recourse to public opinion or consideration of citizen opposition, make unanimous decisions on treaty signature and subsequent ratification. Stimson (1995) and Sanchez Martinez (1996) suggest that elites are able to make such decisions because general EU support is high enough that the public will not oppose decisions made on their behalf. Investigation of the representation of public opinion by elites is limited to the context of older treaties prior to the TCE. Through this analysis I will build on insights of previous research to determine the degree of consensus among elites and among citizens in the more recent contexts of the ToL.

With only few exceptions (Papier 2008), most recent studies of citizen preferences in the EU have been conducted solely in the context of the TCE and earlier deepening treaties. I look at these earlier treaties only to determine whether general support has changed over EU building history. I build on previous research, however, by

exploring citizen preferences during the most recent and successful round of integration: ToL ratification.

In addition to the lack of recent studies of the elite-citizen gap in the context of the ToL, existing research of citizen opinion also focus mainly on the three countries where the TCE was rejected in referenda. My work will elaborate by establishing the generalizability of citizen discontent across *all* EU member states. Studies on the difference between questions of deepening versus widening are also scarce. Where studies compare these questions to each other, they are limited to simply support for a constitution versus support for enlargement in general (Ruiz-Jiménez and Torreblanca 2008). My research builds on this investigation by examining these same integration questions and further exploring opposition to individual treaty changes, attitudes toward the Euro, and support or accession of Turkey, Croatia, and Macedonia within enlargement.

Previous research centers mainly on the role of financial and human capital as utilitarian factors driving integration preferences (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007, McLaren 2002, Gabel 1998). Additionally, the level of analysis is usually either on state variations *or* individual differences. My thesis examines the various theories of support for integration and measures their influence at the individual level while also controlling for state-level differences identified by prior studies. I build on existing theories by incorporating an evaluation of the role of European identity and a novel investigation of the values that underlie identity and individual behavior. In combining an analysis of all these potentially significant factors, it is possible for me to establish a hierarchy of

explanations for citizen orientations and constitute which has the greatest explanatory power.

## **Research Design**

### *Defining Discontent (DV) as Opposition to Integration in any of its Forms*

In this project I define citizen opposition as ‘discontent’. Norris (2011: 37) emphasizes that it is important to separate attitudes from the behavior (actions) resulting from those attitudes, discontent in this sense is an attitude. The author explains that many scholars tend to combine the two concepts as equivalent measures. She claims, for example, that support for democracy is often defined as a “willingness to obey the law...to pay taxes... (or) to participate in civic affairs.” In other words, attitudes of support are usually measured through the evaluation of citizen actions.

Weßels (2007) uses the term discontent to describe those individuals who respond negatively to EU integration. Discontent is measured based on low support for specific authorities (political parties and ministers in the European Parliament), general authorities (the institutions of the EU), and the regime at the highest level (membership in the Union). In his study, the author uses “discontent” interchangeably with the terms “negative orientation,” “critical,” and “euroscepticism.” On the general support for the EU question (whether EU membership “is a good thing”) the author concludes discontent to exist when individuals provide survey responses such as “membership in the EU is a bad thing for my country”.

In this study, the behavior (actions) that I would expect to result from attitudes toward a particular integration change would only be measurable by examining direct

citizen votes on a treaty. However, voting on treaties only occurred in France, the Netherlands, Spain and Luxembourg on the TCE and in Ireland on the ToL. Discontent is therefore only expressed as a behavior in the three countries where citizens had the opportunity to vote and voted NO. I cannot measure actions across member states therefore, I will instead define attitudes as discontent in the same manner as Weßels. While he measures support for authorities, I observe discontent with EU building through integration (namely through ToL deepening changes, and future enlargement) as well as for the EU in general and the Euro. Discontent is measured through negative survey responses to specific questions relating to EU changes. Responses are “against” or “disagree” with a certain change, or the EU is “a bad thing” and my country has “no benefit” from membership. Questions are outlined in more detail in Chapters 3 and 4.

#### *Explanatory Factors (IVs), Models, and Controls*

Individual-level socio-economic and socio-cultural variables that influence support for integration are explained by several theories as listed above and make up the independent variables of this study. Cognitive mobilization suggests that high political awareness increases EU support. Political values theory proposes that materialist values such as economic and security concerns will lead to reduced support of the EU. Party affiliation concerns the role of one’s political ideology wherein more left-leaning individuals will also be less pro-EU. Utilitarian theory bases higher support on greater human and financial capital which allows citizens to more easily adapt to the competition in an open market created by the Union. Support for government theory purports that citizens who support national government are also in favor of the EU based on the high degree of pro-

EU decision-making by national governments and trust that they are acting in citizens' best interest. European identity is claimed to increase support for the EU based on socialization of the Union into citizens' concept of self. Finally, the inclusion of values is exploratory and the analysis proceeds with little expectation on the direction of value effects on EU support.

Building on the lack of individual-state level comparisons in the literature, my analysis sets out different models wherein I control for length of membership,<sup>9</sup> while also including controls<sup>10</sup> for the size of the state's welfare system, the state's North-South geographical location, population size, left-right political positioning, and budgetary contributions. Individual-level characteristics include control variables for age, gender, and employment modeled after Gabel (1998).

### *Timeline*

There are two considerations when choosing the timeline for this study. The first regards the dates when the TCE was rejected and when ToL negotiations and ratification took place. I observe these dates because the TCE is the first instance in the EU where citizens have directly voted on a treaty and managed to reject it. Additionally, the ToL represents the most recent round of integration and is yet to be observed in much detail by the literature. The dates under investigation are as follows: I briefly present general EU opinion data dating back to the first enlargement in 1973 through to most recently available survey data from 2011. This time series provides an overview of the shift in general support since the beginning of EU building in response to RQ<sub>1</sub>. I examine data in

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<sup>9</sup> Length of membership is based on enlargement groups outlined in Chapter 3 and in the Glossary.

<sup>10</sup> Controls are explained in Chapter 4.

more detail from 2006 after the TCE was abandoned until 2009 when the ToL entered into force.

The second consideration concerns the availability of public opinion data through the Eurobarometer (EB) surveys. EB datasets that pose the relevant questions for RQ<sub>2</sub>-RQ<sub>4</sub> exist only between September-October 2006 and June-July 2009. The main timeline for this study will thus be limited to these EB dates.

### *Datasets*

To determine ratification votes at the national parliamentary level on RQ<sub>1</sub>, I use data from the Robert Schuman Foundation (2009) and the Council of the European Union (Consilium 2011).

I draw data for the state-level controls and the different model specifications in this research from two sources. Population size, length of membership, and budgetary contributions are retrieved from the official European Union data published by the European Commission through [ec.europa.eu](http://ec.europa.eu). Data for states' left-right political positioning are retrieved from the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (CHES).<sup>11</sup>

Individual-level independent variables and individual-level control variables are drawn from the Eurobarometer and the European Values Study which are both available from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) and the GESIS data archives. There are several types of Eurobarometers, for the purpose of this

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<sup>11</sup> The CHES consists of a compilation of survey responses from multiple academics, experts on European political parties across four different years. I draw here on 2006 data only. This study surveyed a total of 528 academics in 2007, asking them about party positions in 2006. The survey had a response rate of 45 percent, representing 235 completed questionnaires. Luxembourg, Cyprus and Malta are excluded from all CHES survey waves (Hooghe et al. 2010).

study I will focus on the standard EBs<sup>12</sup> with some reference to Flash Eurobarometer reports. Flash EBs are conducted by EOS-Gallup Europe on behalf of the European Commission. They are usually administered in just one member state and are designed to observe very specific topics. For example, there were Flash EBs carried out in each of the five countries who held referenda on the TCE and ToL and questions related directly to these referenda. Standard EBs are conducted twice a year also by EOS-Gallup Europe. The questionnaires monitor the social and political attitudes of citizens from 31 countries including EU member countries, candidate countries, and Turkey. Although each EB explores a varying range of topics, each one also includes a list of standard questions posed in every survey wave. I will use the following EBs:

- 66.1 European Values and Societal Issues, Mobile Phone Use, and Farm Animal Welfare, September-October 2006
- 67.2 European Union Enlargement, Personal Data Privacy, the National Economy, and Scientific Research, April-May 2007
- 68.2 European Union Policy and Decision Making, Corruption, Civil Justice, E-Communications, Agriculture, and Environmental Protection, November 2007-January 2008
- 69.2 National and European Identity, European Elections, European Values, and Climate Change, March-May 2008
- 71.1 European Parliament and Elections, Economic Crisis, Climate Change, and Chemical Products, January-February 2009

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<sup>12</sup> On Flash Eurobarometers, the questions help to understand the “no” votes in France, the Netherlands, and Ireland, however, for treaty questions, they are limited to these three countries. Hence, a comparison with other EU members on questions of EU deepening is not possible with Flash EBs.

- 71.3 Globalization, Personal Values and Priorities, European Identity, Future of the European Union, Social Problems and Welfare, and European Elections, June-July, 2009

In order to investigate individual level variables that reflect the role of socio-cultural factors such as values and identity, I use the 2008 European Values Study. This survey monitors social and political attitudes of citizens and includes questions relating to beliefs, ideas and preferences as well. The survey was administered in 47 European countries and regions (only 27 of which are relevant here) to a total of 70,000 respondents (40,465 from EU member countries). Each survey evaluated in this project contains responses from on average over 30,000 respondents.

### *Chapters*

The current chapter has provided an introduction to the research questions under investigation in this project, a breakdown of EU building under investigation, and a roadmap of the data and explanatory factors being observed. The ensuing chapters follow the same sequence as my research questions. In Chapter 2 I present a historical overview of the TCE and the ToL with an explanation of the paths to rejection and adoption. I then provide a brief overview of the debate over the legitimacy of the EU and whether citizen preferences are reflected by elites. I detail the theory of permissive consensus and provide evidence of the declining general support for the EU since Maastricht in 1992 for a response to RQ<sub>1</sub>. Based on this decreasing support and discontent evidenced by failed referenda on the TCE treaties, I expect that had citizens been given the chance to vote on the ToL, there would have been a greater number of failed referenda. I thus set out to



answer RQ<sub>2</sub> by creating a multidimensional measure of citizen responses to changes implemented by the ToL and evaluate public opinion on this treaty.

As much of the literature suggests that citizens were opposed to something other than the treaty when voting against it, my analysis turns next to a qualification of citizen discontent. In Chapter 3, I begin with a description of the elements included in the ToL, a document substantively identical to the originally rejected TCE. I thus address RQ<sub>3</sub> by comparing these treaty changes rejected in a few countries, to other forms of integration. Through an overview of many of the popular conclusions made by EU scholars on general citizen opinion I present the variety of possible aspects of EU building to which citizens may be opposed, including the EU in general, the ToL in general, the Euro, or enlargement.

In Chapter 4, I provide a variety of theories used to explain citizen opinion and address RQ<sub>4</sub>. My analysis also includes an evaluation of values which are generally ignored by the literature. I use a method modeled after Gabel (1998) and, using his theories of public opinion complemented by additional factors also drawn from other sources, I create a hierarchy of explanatory theories. Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the findings of my research. I address the theoretical and practical implications of my research, outline caveats and propose further research.

## CHAPTER 2 – CITIZEN DISCONTENT AND THE END OF PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS

### **Introduction**

This chapter addresses the first two research questions of this project by examining the degree to which citizen EU preferences are represented by elites in national parliaments as well as the variation in citizen preferences across member states. In order to properly understand this dynamic, I first explore the process of adoption of the TCE versus the ToL. Through this overview I detail the actors involved in the process and briefly explain permissive consensus as a theory of representation in the EU. In response to RQ<sub>1</sub>, I analyze general citizen support for the EU compared to elite support for the ToL. I purport that if general support is high, elites can continue to rely on permissive consensus to push integration forward. However, if anti-EU sentiment is increasing future EU building may be threatened. Finally, based on anti-treaty voting in referenda on both integration deepening treaties in select countries, I set out to answer RQ<sub>2</sub> through empirical investigation of the degree of discontent with the ToL across all member states.

### **The Treaty Process**

#### *The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE)*

One of the most significant attempts at institutional deepening in the EU came about in the form of the TCE later replicated in the ToL. This document was designed to replace the treaties that came before it, to simplify the legislative language of the Union, and to make an ever growing Union more transparent and democratic, while strengthening the EU's institutional powers and extending its policy scope.

Negotiations of the TCE began with the European Council (EC) meeting in Laeken, Belgium on December 14-15, 2001 attended by heads of state and government from each member country. EC members of the then 15 member states decided to “increase the momentum of (the EU’s) integration” (European Council 2001: 1). The declaration called for a Convention on the Future of Europe which would set out to review the issues faced by the EU, including the “division and definition of competence,” the “simplification of the Union’s instruments,” the increase of “democracy, transparency and efficiency,” and the shift toward simplification of existing treaties in the form of a “Constitution for European citizens” (European Council 2001: 21-23). The Convention was presided over by the former French president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and attended by the Heads of State or Government of each of the member states as well as representatives from each member state and candidate country’s national parliaments, the European Parliament, and the European Commission.

The first meeting was held on February 28, 2002 and in 26 plenary sessions totaling 52 days of gatherings, the participants of the Convention deliberated over the future of the European Union and the issues brought forth by the Laeken Declaration. During this time, the representatives of each member state and accession state also received input from the public through committees, conferences, working groups, and online discussions (The European Convention 2003).

On July 18, 2003 the Convention submitted its draft of the TCE to the President of the European Council. The draft was then debated at the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) beginning October 4, 2003 by the Heads of State or Government and their Foreign Ministers, European Commission representatives, and Ministers of the

European Parliament. Negotiations were drawn out due to certain contentious issues such as the definition of qualified majority voting and the composition of the Commission (Europa.eu 2008) until finally, on June 18, 2004, European Council members agreed on the final text of the TCE. Each of the 25 member states at the time signed the TCE in Rome on October 29, 2004.

The treaty then underwent an unsuccessful ratification process. Generally, ratification was completed in national parliaments. However, due to the constitutional language of the TCE, a few individual state legislatures required that they take the treaty to referenda. Spain and Luxembourg each held referenda on May 29 and July 10, 2005 respectively, where citizens voted in favor. On April 1, the Netherlands also held a referendum and 61 percent of the voters said “no” to the Treaty. On May 29, French voters also rejected the Treaty with 55 percent against. Britain, Denmark, Ireland, and Portugal subsequently cancelled their referenda and the TCE was abandoned. Therefore, despite the involvement of citizens and their representatives in the drafting process, when given the opportunity Europeans ultimately rejected the TCE. At the European Council meeting held June 16 and 17, 2005, leaders of the member states declared the beginning of a “period of reflection” temporarily stalling integration.

### *The Treaty of Lisbon (ToL)*

Integration was not delayed for long despite public rejection and on June 23, 2007 the “period of reflection” came to an end with the announcement by the European Council of an IGC for the adoption of a new treaty. The treaty, initially entitled the “Reform Treaty,” unlike the TCE would not replace previous treaties but instead amend existing ones. The

reforms originally agreed upon during the previous IGC which concluded with the TCE were incorporated into the new Reform Treaty.

Amendments affected both the Treaty on European Union (TEU) (also called the Maastricht Treaty) and the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEEC) (also known as the Rome Treaty) renaming it the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). All constitutional terminology including terms such as “‘law’ and ‘framework law’ (were) abandoned, the existing denominations ‘regulations’, ‘directives’ and ‘decisions’ being retained”(European Council 2007). Finally, the Charter of Fundamental Rights was retained but not as part of the treaty itself, instead a clause was inserted in the Reform Treaty referring to the Charter.

The IGC began its work on July 23, 2007 in Lisbon. This conference proceeded in a similar manner to that of 2003-2004 with meetings of Heads of State or Government, the General Affairs and External Relations Council, a representative of the Commission and three representatives from the European Parliament of each of the now 27 member states. A few issues arose along the path to signature and ratification of the Reform Treaty. On October 5, 2007 the first draft of the Reform Treaty protocols were submitted to the IGC, these protocols included a “derogatory measure” for the United Kingdom and Poland which states that laws outlined in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights shall not supersede national laws in those countries (Fondation Robert Schuman 2009). A further measure was included in these 2007 protocols allowing for the United Kingdom and Ireland to opt-out of decisions made by qualified majority voting in the area of Freedom, Security and Justice, while other member states are automatically bound by these decisions (Brunsden 2007, Kurpas 2007).

On December 13, 2007 at the European Council meeting, leaders of each of the member states signed the treaty in Lisbon, Portugal giving the Reform Treaty the name ‘Treaty of Lisbon’ (ToL). The ToL, due to the removal of the constitutional language previously found in the TCE and the change in status to an ‘amending treaty’, was ratified in the most part through parliamentary votes. According to national laws in those countries which held referenda on the TCE, this process is required in order to ratify a new EU treaty. However, because the ToL does not replace existing treaties but instead amends them, a referendum was no longer legally required for ratification. In Ireland, a 1987 ruling from the Supreme Court guarantees that any major change to an existing EU treaty will in turn modify the Irish constitution and therefore requires a referendum. Two referenda were required before the document went through. Voters first rejected the ToL on June 12, 2008. Following a set of “guarantees” promised to the Irish government in June 2009 (Peers 2009), a second referendum was held on October 2, 2009. This time, Irish voters opted for ratification of the treaty.

The Czech Republic held out until November 2009 pending signature of the ToL by the Czech President. The President demanded that the Charter of Fundamental Rights not supersede Czech national law. In order to avoid another treaty failure, in October 2009 the Czech Republic was granted the same measures as were agreed upon for the UK and Poland with reference to the application of the Charter, wherein EU law cannot supersede national jurisdiction (Fondation Robert Schuman 2009). Despite a rocky road to ratification the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force on December 1, 2009.

## **Comparing Preferences – Are Citizens Represented in the EU?**

Although there were other actors involved in the process during the IGC and drafting stages of the TCE and the ToL, the ultimate decision on each of these treaties remained in the hands of member state leaders and parliaments who signed and ratified them. This was facilitated in the past by the broad general support for the EU among citizens. In this section I detail the theory of permissive consensus as a possible explanation for the form of representation in the EU. This theory was largely relied upon to explain the elite-driven decision-making throughout the history of EU-building. In response to RQ<sub>1</sub>, I evaluate whether elites continue to rely on permissive consensus to further integration. The state of permissive consensus is first evaluated through a figure that maps general support for the EU among citizens since the adoption of the 1<sup>st</sup> enlargement treaty in 1973. The analysis then turns to the comparison of elite consensus on the ToL versus general EU support among citizens.

### *Measuring Elite Legitimacy through Representation*

In both ratification contexts, the TCE and the ToL, despite unanimous signature by all EC members, the process differed drastically in the two cases. In the context of the TCE, citizens expressed an opposition to the document through referenda and ultimately voted it down. While on the ToL, opinions of citizens previously expressed in TCE referenda were avoided by slight changes in the document's wording, ensuring ratification at the national parliamentary level in all countries (except in Ireland) and nearly avoiding referenda altogether. During parliamentary votes, the majority of all national parliaments composed of member state governments and opposition parties approved the treaty. Such

actions inspire questions as to the representativeness of elite decision-making at the level of treaty ratification, especially where citizens in countries like the Netherlands and France outright rejected a treaty that was subsequently adopted with an approval rating in parliament of over 75 percent.

The mandate given to the IGC in 2007 by heads of state and government ensured that the Union, taking on more of the national state's powers, would do so in a way that was representative of public interests (Official Journal of the European Union 2007: 3). Title II of the ToL, the Provisions on Democratic Principles states in Article 10 that "the functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy."

Representation in the EU has been heavily debated by scholars since Maastricht (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2007). The main reason for this emergence in literature was the increase in institutionalization and the concern over a transfer of power from the member states to the supranational level and the resulting loss of representation of citizen interests by elected officials. As a result of the Single European Act debates abound over what democracy should look like in the EU. The adoption of many of the functions of the member states by these supranational institutions has led to criticisms of the Union and the lack of adequate measures to reflect public interest. Those who argue that the EU should function similarly to a nation state contend that the EU is undemocratic and assess the quality of democracy based on the representation of preferences communicated through direct participation in the form of voting (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2007: 2). They claim therefore that democracy is deficient in the EU context due to the inexistence of such mechanisms.




Considering the EU itself proposes to “enhance democratic legitimacy” it is necessary to establish a working definition of the term. Rehfeld (2005) broadly defines that a system may be democratic as long as government law-making is met with public approval. He states: “a legitimate government is one that has and maintains its people’s approval” (15). This definition ignores the institutional mechanisms such as elections and deliberation commonly associated with democracies. This can be applied to the government as a whole or to a specific law passed by government and can be measured by calculating the degree to which political leaders enact citizen preferences. Without the mechanisms that enable citizens to vote directly on decisions like the ToL, except occasional referenda, political decision-makers are required to rely on other sources to collect information on citizen preferences. Permissive consensus explains how elites have gone about making such decisions in the EU.

### *The Role of Permissive Consensus*

Authors have argued that the process of integration in the EU has been mostly pushed forward by political elites (Best et al. 2012, Haller 2008). First termed by Key (1961), “permissive consensus” is the concept that elites can drive decision-making thanks to a lack of public interest on a particular policy issue and where, as long as citizens’ general EU mood is positive, elites will interpret this as permission for greater integration. Although this was largely the case for most of the first three decades of the EU’s existence, anti-EU sentiment among citizens began to move to the forefront of European Union academic research after Maastricht and permissive consensus became increasingly questioned (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007, Gabel 1998, Sanchez Martinez 1996, Stimson

et al. 1995). Figure 2.1 illustrates the shift in general support among citizens since the 1<sup>st</sup> enlargement of 1973. Where general support is high, permissive consensus argues that elites could make decisions on behalf of citizens largely uncriticized.

**Figure 2.1 – Citizen Support for the EU in General (1973-2011)**




In Figure 2.1 I demonstrate that on the general EU support question: “Generally speaking, do you think that (your country’s) membership in the European Community (Common Market) is a good thing?” that support has declined substantially since 1993.<sup>13</sup> The graph illustrates a spike in pro-EU sentiment immediately prior to Maastricht followed by a steady decrease across all member states of the EU of nearly 25 percentage points. This indicates that permissive consensus may still have been in effect when elites ratified Maastricht. Between 2006 and 2009, however, when negotiations and ratifications were underway for the ToL as well as the final Eastern enlargement, general support declined by nearly 10 percent. This finding suggests that discontent with the EU in general is rising considerably and that elites are no longer acting in a manner that is representative of citizen overall support for the EU.

This phenomenon is confirmed by the increasing number of failed referenda since 1992 as well: one on the Treaty of Maastricht, one on the Treaty of Nice, two on the TCE, and one in Ireland. While Figure 2.1 provides evidence that general support is declining, proper evaluation of the representativeness of elites requires observation of the degree of elite support for further integration. Figure 2.2 illustrates the degree of like-mindedness among elites on the ToL. I rely on ratification votes in national parliaments for levels of political party support. The level of elite consensus is compared to citizens’ pro-EU sentiment as measured in Figure 2.1 across all member states. This evaluation serves to further verify whether elites are acting on permissive consent from citizens.

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<sup>13</sup> The date for the Treaty of Maastricht listed here is the date wherein the treaty entered into force.

Figure 2.2 – National Party Support for the ToL vs. Citizen EU Support in General



In Figure 2.2 data are organized according to the size of the gap between elites and citizens from small to large. I observe that while elites are 85 percent in favor of the ToL across all EU member states, citizen support for the EU in general<sup>14</sup> is only 57.6 percent. In all cases elite support is higher than citizens, except in the Netherlands where citizens are more pro-EU in general (by 1 percent) than elites are pro-ToL. The Figure suggests that, while permissive consensus requires general public support for further integration, citizens in Cyprus, the United Kingdom (UK), the Czech Republic, Sweden, Finland, Austria, Hungary, and Latvia are less than 50 percent pro-EU or less. The gap between the two groups reaches up to 58 percent. Had elites relied on this information to make EU-building decisions according to permissive consensus,, it is unlikely that the ToL would be ratified in parliament.

The figure shows that citizens were generally discontent with the EU while elites were generally in favor of ToL ratification regardless of this opposition. However, citizens were unable to express this opposition as they had in the TCE due to the lack of referenda held in each country. My next question thus investigates how much citizen support there was for the ToL specifically. I answer RQ2 and speculate if the ToL had been taken to a vote, whether it would have been accepted by citizens.

### **The Degree of Discontent with the ToL**

Eurobarometer public opinion data immediately prior to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon demonstrate that only 36 percent of all Europeans polled felt that things were

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<sup>14</sup> Based on the question in the Eurobarometer 67.2 European Union Enlargement, Personal Data Privacy, the National Economy, and Scientific Research, April-May 2007: “Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)'s membership of the European Union is a good thing/bad thing?”

going in the right direction in the European Union at that time indicating that the decisions being made by those in power were counter to the preferences of the electorate. Furthermore, when asked if they felt that EU membership was good or bad, only 53 percent responded that it was a good thing.<sup>15</sup> These data, as well as the failed TCE referenda, suggest that support among citizens for the EU's treaties was not as unanimous as it was among political elites.


Figure 2.3 provides the degree of pro-ToL consensus among citizens across member states. In the standard EB surveys there are no questions that, on their own, can adequately portray citizens' views regarding the ToL. Consequently, the multidimensional measure combines questions that capture responses to important individual changes made by the treaty into a single variable for ToL preferences. These changes are the same as those made by the TCE. I determine the degree of citizen discontent with the ToL using responses to this constructed multidimensional measure<sup>16</sup> across all member states. This measure provides an indication of what citizen support for the treaty would be assuming they were aware of the treaty's content. Chapter 3 further examines these changes and investigates the relationship between opinion on a treaty as a 'constitution' and attitudes toward the changes contained within it.

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<sup>15</sup> Based on the question in the Eurobarometer 71.3: Globalization, Personal Values and Priorities, European Identity, Future of the European Union, Social Problems and Welfare, and European Elections conducted from June-July, 2009: "At the present time, would you say that, in general, things are going in the right direction or in the wrong direction, in the European Union?" and "Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)'s membership of the European Union is a good thing/bad thing?"

<sup>16</sup> No EB contains questions that would adequately measure citizens' views on all ToL changes. Views are measurable through the responses to other key changes including increased involvement of the EU in foreign and security policy, defense, and the creation of the position of High Representative (called the Foreign Minister in the TCE).

**Figure 2.3– Citizen Support for the ToL**





Citizen opinion on this measure remains rather high and in general over 50 percent in favor. Nonetheless, in Sweden, Denmark, Finland and the UK, support ranges from 32 to 48 percent. Such low levels of support would have plausibly translated into failed referenda had the opportunity been provided. On the other hand, in countries where referenda were held on the TCE, approval of the ToL treaty changes is higher (55 percent in the Netherlands, and 65 percent in France). Even in Ireland, where citizens actually voted against the ToL in the first referendum, approval of its changes is at the rate of 66 percent.

On average, citizens' overall support is 64.5 percent. This is almost 10 percent above the average support for the EU in general. These findings suggest that, despite citizen discontent with the ToL in four countries and very low general support in eight countries, elites nonetheless drove the last integration treaty through with very little consideration of public opposition. Furthermore, the lower degree of support for the EU in general than for treaty changes, combined with support rates for the treaty that are inconsistent with referenda results, indicate that citizens who are discontent may be opposed to something other than the TCE or the ToL.

## **Conclusion**

A substantial body of European Union literature to date has explored the preferences of political elites and citizens separately. Only a small number of them have actually addressed the existence of a disconnection between the two groups, Hug and König (2002) are among these few. The authors draw on the Amsterdam Treaty talks to demonstrate that political elites, in this case Intergovernmental Conference attendees,

were aware of a disconnection with citizens and negotiated the document in such a way that would ensure ratification by avoiding opposition by domestic actors. Political elites responsible for the issues included in the draft Amsterdam Treaty removed elements from the final document that they deemed might be contentious for citizens.

By modifying the title of the TCE into the “Reform Treaty” while keeping most substantive elements intact, political elites guaranteed that the ToL would not require referenda for ratification in most member states. It may be possible to assume, therefore, that member state leaders purposefully drew up and signed the Treaty of Lisbon in such a way that would avoid opposition. These suspicions are further corroborated in a statement by the former French President, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing who presided over the first European Convention for the draft TCE: “Above all, (the Treaty of Lisbon) is to avoid having referendum thanks to the fact that the articles are spread out and constitutional vocabulary has been removed” (Spongenberg, 2007). In this chapter, I presented findings that showed that political elites who signed the ToL did so despite a lack of support by citizens from all EU member states on both ToL changes and especially on the EU in general.

National parliaments ratified the ToL in such a way that citizens were excluded from the process, short of the referenda in Ireland. Based on the results of support for the treaty by political elites compared to citizens, I find that elites acted in a way which was largely inconsistent with citizens’ interests. This chapter provided clarification of the first RQ by illustrating not only that elites are highly like-minded in their decision to ratify the ToL, but also they do so without a reliance on general permissiveness of citizens.

Without more detailed information<sup>17</sup> on how parties make their decisions it is not possible to further investigate why elites make such decisions and why opposition parties fail to monopolize on the discontent. However, I can conclude that elites no longer act through permissive consensus and as they continue to make decisions that are not reflective of public opinion, the general discontent in the EU continues to rise.

Discontent in the EU in general is in fact higher than discontent on the ToL measure. My response to RQ<sub>2</sub> is thus, discontent with the ToL is not a general phenomenon across member states. Anti-treaty sentiment may be high in some states but it remains low enough to speculate that had the ToL gone to referenda it may have succeeded in those countries that originally rejected the TCE. On the other hand, low general support and a failed referendum in a first round in Ireland, combined with a history of failed referenda on other treaties confirms that citizens are discontent. With further EU building currently underway it is unclear whether public opinion will continue to decline as it remains uncertain what the public are discontent with, the next chapter investigates this question.

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<sup>17</sup> A few studies investigate elite decision-making and a couple have accessible datasets. These include the Domestic Structures and European Integration, Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (CHES), and reports from the Assemblée Nationale (AN). These studies, however, do not examine the preferences of elites who voted on the ToL directly nor do they ask questions about the ToL specifically. Each of the analyses relies either solely on the opinions of experts (DOSEI and CHES) or testimonials of representatives from only a handful of member states (AN). Expert and government representative opinions may be useful as a proxy for actual political party and government support for the EU in general however, they are limited in scope and any conclusions can only be drawn with caution.

## CHAPTER 3 – THE NATURE OF DISCONTENT ACROSS MEMBER STATES

### **Introduction**

In this chapter, I explore the RQ<sub>3</sub>. This question arises from the phenomenon of failed referenda in France, the Netherlands, and Ireland on the two similar treaties as well as evidence on the declining general EU support as explained in Chapter 2. While the previous section compared elite voting on the ToL with citizen opinion on the EU in general and on the constructed ToL measure, this next analysis will build on the citizen dimension by exploring whether it is plausible that this opposition observed in referenda on the TCE and on the ToL was actually opposition to some other element of EU building. I begin with an overview of public opinion literature that investigates discontent in the EU. In this overview I identify what many authors have observed as the object of citizen opposition. Furthermore, I draw out the forms of integration that I will investigate in my analysis including support for the EU in general, the Euro, enlargement, the treaty as a whole (through the measure including the most important treaty changes), and individual treaty changes.

Prior to conducting the empirical analysis of citizen preferences I first provide details of the changes brought about by the ToL and the similarities it bears to the TCE. The illustration of the similarities further highlights the status of the ToL as no less than a constitution under another name. The likeness of the two treaties suggests that, had negative referenda on the TCE been based on opposition to the treaty itself, the ToL would surely have also been rejected had citizens been given a chance to vote on it. As I explore each change I provide the relevant survey questions from the Eurobarometers used in this project to test citizen support. I review the most significant of these changes

and explain my construction of the measure used to determine support for the ToL. I correlate the constructed measure with a support for the ‘constitution’ question to determine whether opposition expressed in referenda can be assumed to be influenced by knowledge of the content of the treaty. I then proceed with a comparison of countries that rejected the treaties and examine their attitudes toward the various forms of integration. I proceed then with the same comparison across all member states of the EU and conclude with an analysis of the trade-off between forms of integration to determine when citizens oppose a constitution, whether they are also opposed to some other EU building change.

### **Discontent with What? Understanding the Integration Question**

The disconnection between political elites and citizens on integration is clear based on the findings from Chapter 2 and referenda reveal that citizens are increasingly likely to oppose elite decision-making when given the chance. The question remains, however, “what are citizens opposed to?” Existing literature (European Commission 2008, Aarts and van der Kolk 2006, Milner 2006) that investigates this opposition in one or more of the three countries where the public voted, confirm that discontent among citizens exists.

A large amount of variation in European citizen responses to EB surveys on the EU in general and their tendency to oppose treaties in referenda can be attributed to their understanding of EU integration. Additionally, many of the disagreements that arise in the literature are based on the conclusions drawn as a result of what form of integration is being analyzed. Questions analyzed in the literature are usually geographical widening, institutional deepening, or support for the EU very generally.

On general EU support, using the Eurobarometer questions “is membership a good/bad thing” and “has your country benefitted from EU membership,” McLaren (2002) and Eichenberg and Dalton (2007) suggest that there are significant variations across member states. Other authors contend rather that issues related to EU deepening, such as views on the Euro and the European Monetary Union (EMU) are most contentious among citizens (Aarts and van der Kolk 2006).

OPTEM (2001) is a report created for the European Commission to raise awareness among policy makers and elites regarding the need to educate citizens on EU issues. The report combined findings that resulted from 86 group discussions with a total of 694 participants aged 25-60 from 24 EU members and candidate countries. The findings of this report indicate that variation in preferences exists across member states depending on whether the discussion focused on enlargement, on the general image of the EU, or on EU institutions.

Hurrelman (2007: 358) suggests that “it is increasingly doubtful whether it is possible at all to get a single constitutional document ratified in all 27 Member States, given that the expectations placed in an EU Constitution differ widely in the Union’s population.” This statement is grounded in the findings by other authors that citizens voted against the constitutional treaty for a variety of different reasons but also grounded in diverse interpretations of what the treaty actually stood for and the changes it proposed to make.

Aarts and van der Kolk (2006) conclude that the Dutch voted not against the constitution but against enlargement in general and also against the Euro. In France, there are varying opinions as to why the referendum on the TCE resulted in a NO majority.

According to Milner (2006), initially French voters were swayed by the utility of the constitution and were generally in favor. During the campaign, however, when the question “what kind of society do we want?” was introduced to the debate by anti-EU advocates, the direction of voters’ preferences changed and shifted the majority to a NO on the constitution. According to Milner, the NO vote was based on a “YES to union but NO to the constitution” as well as fear of expansion to include Turkey. He concludes, therefore, that the French voted against deepening through the TCE and against enlargement but not against the EU in general.

According to Flash Eurobarometer data from 2005, 75 percent of French believed the constitution to be indispensable “this proposal is supported by 90 percent of YES voters, but also by 66 percent of NO voters (European Commission 2009b: 22). In other words, although the French voted against the TCE, the majority of those who voted were not against the constitution itself. These data are entirely contradictory to Milner’s findings which suggest support for the union but *not* the constitution. Therefore, if opposition was not to the constitution and Milner claims citizens are supportive of the Union, then discontent which drove a NO at the French referendum should have been based on disagreement with something else entirely. Those that voted NO did so in large majority (76 percent) based on economic perceptions of the constitution, that it would have negative effects on the French economy or on employment.

In the Dutch case, the NO vote is claimed (Aarts and van der Kolk 2006) to be based on an opposition to enlargement and to the Euro. The post-referendum Flash Eurobarometer suggests on the other hand, that only 6 percent of those polled who voted NO did so based on opposition to future enlargement. A much larger percentage voted

against the treaty because of a lack of information (32 percent) and through a fear of loss of national sovereignty (19 percent). On whether the treaty was indispensable, where 75 percent of both YES and NO voters in France said the constitution was essential to European construction, only 41 percent of all Dutch voters agreed. Among those who voted in favor of the treaty, only 66 percent claimed it to be essential, while 25 percent of those who voted against the treaty also consider it indispensable despite their voting it down (European Commission 2005: 21).

According to the Irish post-referendum survey, YES votes were based on the benefits the EU provides to Ireland grounding decisions in whether the Union in general is good for Ireland and that the ToL specifically is “in Ireland’s best interest (32 percent of the reasons mentioned).” To a lesser extent, the Irish were pro-treaty based on the idea that the ToL would be economically beneficial for the country (European Commission 2009b: 18-19). The NO vote on the other hand was motivated by citizens’ feelings that they were not well enough informed on the changes made by the ToL (22 percent), a concern for the defense of Irish identity (12 percent), and objection to national political parties and government (six percent). These results seem to suggest that the Irish voted not on the Constitution necessarily. Opposition, however, is based on national discontent and would therefore not be reflected if looking specifically at Irish attitudes toward the EU. Support in Ireland appears to be based on a general support for the EU and its policies, regardless of the treaty in question. This finding is supported by Millward Brown IMS as reported by Quinlan wherein even citizens who voted against the treaty remain pro-EU in general (2009: 117).



As observed through evaluation of the literature on opposition to the newest integration initiatives and Flash Eurobarometers conducted in those countries that actually held referenda, opposition to the treaties themselves is not necessarily what citizens are expressing when voting NO to further integration. Therefore, to properly evaluate preferences in the EU it is necessary to analyze these inclinations toward specific questions, not only in the sense of general support for the European Union or solely for one or the other of either enlargement or deepening, but a comparison of each of these integration questions.

Ruiz-Jiménez and Torreblanca (2008) look at support for a constitution and support for enlargement and determine that there is little trade off in support for the two forms of integration. In other words: percentages of support for one are similar to percentages of support for the other. Their analysis reveals “in contrast to the past, when Germany always defended the compatibility of deepening and widening, it is now common to see leaders such as Angela Merkel making a negative linkage between deepening and widening, attributing the negative votes in France and the Netherlands to enlargement, calling for the EU to define its ‘final borders’ and making the case for a ‘No’ to Turkey’s accession” (9). The authors focus explicitly on the main dichotomy in integration, the preferences on widening versus those on deepening. They claim that much of the literature to date that explores the TCE vote, assigns blame for the failure of the Dutch and French referenda to the most recent enlargement of the EU.

The authors ask the question then whether there is a trade-off between enlargement and deepening. The findings of their study indicate that there are no variations in citizen opinion on deepening versus enlargement. I reproduce a similar

model in Figure 3.1 of this chapter while comparing support for the constitution to other forms of integration as well. This next section outlines the differences and similarities between the TCE and the ToL and details the datasets and questions used to determine the nature of citizen discontent. When identifying each question used to measure changes made by the treaty, I assign a variable name in brackets, for example the measure for support of increased Commission powers is labeled ‘Commission’.

### *The Euro – Deepening*

There are clear distinctions in the literature between support for the EU versus enlargement or the Euro (Aarts and van der Kolk 2006). As with the general EU support questions described below, the evaluation of attitudes toward the single currency through the European Monetary Union (EMU) is a standard question asked in Eurobarometers since the 1970s.

- The Euro: EB69.2 “What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it: A European Monetary Union with one single currency, the euro” (European Commission 2011a): ‘Euro’

### *Enlargement – Widening*

Questions in the Eurobarometers ask citizens in the current member states how they feel about membership of each of new candidate countries as well as enlargement in general.

Questions measuring membership of new countries in the Union are as follows:

- General enlargement: EB67.2 “What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it: Further enlargement of the EU to include other countries in future years” (European Commission 2012c): ‘Enlargement’
- Specific enlargement: EB69.2 “For each of the following countries and territories, would you be in favor or against it becoming part of the European Union in the future? Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Croatia, Turkey” (European Commission 2011a): ‘Macedonia’, ‘Croatia’, and ‘Turkey’

*The EU in General – Integration in General*

Measurements of preference in standard Eurobarometer surveys which allow for an evaluation of general EU support across all member states over time include questions related to the perception of benefit for one’s country, feelings that the EU is generally good or bad (already used in Chapter 2 for comparison to treaty support measure), satisfaction with the direction of the EU, and perception of the image of the EU, and one which is ignored by the literature the shift toward political union. The following will be analyzed:

- Benefit of EU membership: EB69.2 “Taking everything into account, would you say that (OUR COUNTRY) has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?” (European Commission 2011a): ‘Benefit’

- The EU is good: EB69.2 “Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)’s membership of the European Union would be...? A Good/Bad Thing” (European Commission 2011a): ‘Good’
- Satisfaction with the EU direction: EB69.2 “At the present time, would you say that, in general, things are going in the right direction or in the wrong direction, in the European Union?” (European Commission 2011a): ‘Direction’
- Image of the EU: EB69.2 “In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral fairly negative or very negative image?” (European Commission 2011a): ‘Image’
- Political Union: EB66.1 “Are you, yourself, for or against the development towards a European political union?” (European Commission 2012b): ‘Political’

### *On Treaty Changes (TCE vs. ToL) – Deepening*

So, is the ToL really so different from the TCE or was it simply changed in such a way to avoid the same issues with ratification? Details regarding these changes are necessary for this analysis in order to determine, if citizens were given the opportunity to vote on the ToL, and assuming knowledge of these changes, whether they would have accepted it or not. Furthermore, by providing details of the changes brought about by the ToL, I will demonstrate the degree to which the treaty shifts the EU and its institutions ever closer to a political union with fixed values. The following outlines the main changes made by the two treaties where they differ and the extent of their similarities.

### *Differences*

The most important difference between the TCE and the ToL is the form of these two documents. While many of the institutional changes proposed by the treaties are similar, the ToL simply amends existing treaties while the TCE was meant to replace the elaborate documents which came before it. The EU's stated intentions in the drafting of the Constitution and the subsequent ToL were to simplify the instruments used to guide its actions as well as improve transparency and efficiency of the Union.

The replacement of previous treaties with the TCE may have achieved this goal. However, in the case of the ToL the amending document contained 272 pages and applied modifications to the two main governing EU treaties, themselves totaling 331 pages. Critics of the document argue that the treaty is neither efficient nor transparent instead that it is lengthy and "Rather than simplify foreign policymaking, the Lisbon Treaty has created an institutional hydra with growing numbers of appendages responsible for different aspects of the foreign policy toolbox" (McNamara 2010: 2). No consolidated version was available until after all states had signed the treaty at the European Council, only then was the first version released in May of 2008. When the newly consolidated versions of the TEU and the TFEU treaties were released in March 2010, the document by no means simplified prior treaties but instead it contained 408 pages including annexes and protocols.<sup>18</sup>

The second distinction between the treaties is the removal of symbolic elements from the original document including removal of constitutional language and the title

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<sup>18</sup> This research will not examine whether complexity of the treaty was intended to confuse elites voting on the treaty in each member state, yet it should be kept in mind as a possible explanation for why elites had little difficulty pushing it through European Council, National Parliaments and a second referendum in Ireland.

‘constitution’. This facilitated the adoption of the treaty through parliamentary ratification rather than referenda. Furthermore, elements such as the mention of the EU flag and anthem were also excluded from the reform text.

These components, although they have no extensively legal importance to the treaty, were intended to create a European identity that would be entrenched in the legal documents of the Union. The exclusion of such elements suggests an aspect of the original form removed in order to ensure the success of the treaty’s adoption by all member states (Kurpas 2007, Van den Brink and van Keulen 2007). However, the deepening effects of the treaty remain intact; influence on national law-making and policy implementation are increased, preserving its essence as a constitution-like treaty.

### *Similarities*

Although the difference between the TCE and the ToL seem to have led to the successful adoption of the ToL (i.e. the term constitution), the similarities between the documents are more extensive. The two treaties when examined side by side display substantively the same changes with entire passages in the ToL taken directly from the TCE. These passages often have only a few words that have changed and in no way affect the substance of the treaties’ articles. The changes prescribed by the treaties are broad. Nonetheless, in this project I outline those with the greatest impact on institutional deepening of the EU prior to analyzing citizen support for each of them.

These changes can be grouped into seven categories as follows: the conferral of legal personality upon the EU; creation of the position of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (named Foreign Minister in the TCE); formation of a

new European External Action Service (EEAS); implementation of voting changes in the European Parliament (EP) and in the Council of the European Union; elevation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights to legal status; and creation of the position of permanent European Council President (Official Journal of the European Union 2007). Each category is explained followed by a listing of questions from the Eurobarometers that will be used to measure citizen support during negotiation and ratification of the ToL (i.e. 2007-2009).

### 1. Legal Personality

The EU is given legal personality, combining the European Community (under the TEEC renamed the TFEU by the ToL) with the European Union (under the TEU) as one entity. Previously the competences outlined in the TEEC and the TEU were separate, meaning that institutions functioned differently in different policy areas depending on which of the two treaties they were found in (Papier 2008). Under the ToL, increased competences of the European Union gives the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Commission increased powers in the area of justice and home affairs by 2014 (also known as freedom, security and justice). This change abolishes the original three pillars of the EU that were largely divided based on policy areas.

The first pillar involved those policy areas covered under the original TEEC, the European Monetary Union (EMU), the common market as well as policies such as employment, education, health, consumer protection, social policy, immigration, asylum, and border control (EU-Oplysningen 2012). The areas under this first pillar were previously the only areas under control at the EU level and any laws created at this level

were binding on member states. The second pillar included intergovernmental cooperation in the area of foreign and security policy and the third pillar, also related to intergovernmental cooperation, included police and judicial affairs (European Union Committee 2008). The abolishment of the pillar structure in essence means the EU, through both the ECJ and the Commission, has increased and more streamlined supranational involvement in more policy areas including employment, social rights, economic growth, organized crime, terrorism, and health.

In order to measure the support for assignment of legal personality to the EU, we must assume that individuals with greater trust for the Commission will faithfully accept that this institution be assigned more power and influence in the EU. In order to establish citizen support for the changes under this category, this study will evaluate attitudes as follows:

- Increased European Commission Power – Evaluated by examining the level of trust citizens feel for this institution: EB71.1 “For each of the following European bodies, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it: the European Commission” (European Commission 2011b): ‘Commission’
- Involvement in more policy areas: EB71.3 “For each of the following areas, please tell me if you believe that more decision-making should take place at a European level or on the contrary that less decision-making should take place at a European level?: Fighting unemployment, protecting social rights, ensuring economic growth, fighting organized crime, fighting terrorism, managing major health issues” (European Commission 2012c):



‘Employment’, ‘Social Rights’, ‘Economic Growth’, ‘Organized Crime’, ‘Terrorism’, and ‘Health’

## 2. High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

Creation of the position of High Representative (HR) for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (named Foreign Minister in the TCE). This individual is responsible for maintaining consistency and coherence in EU foreign and defense policy and representing the EU in all matters of foreign affairs. They work in collaboration with the permanent EC president and are assisted by the European External Action Service providing the EU with one voice on behalf of all member states in areas of foreign affairs. Furthermore, with the ToL the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) become the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).

This new policy is coordinated through the new HR and includes a broader range of common defense strategies than the previous ESDP. There are some concerns that a new position of HR “might lead to an ‘intergovernmentalisation’ of the Commission’s external competences, or – on the contrary – to the ‘communitarisation’ of the (CSDP)” (Kurpas 2007). In other words, the worry is that increased control over previously national policy areas will be delegated to the supranational level.

Citizen attitudes toward the creation of a position of HR are measured based on whether they agree or disagree with the following:

- Creation of position of High Representative: EB67.2 “The European Union should have its own Foreign Minister who can be the spokesperson for a

common European Union position” (European Commission 2009a): ‘Foreign Minister’

- Common policy: EB67.2 “What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it: A common defense and security policy among EU Member States” (European Commission 2009a): ‘Defense’

### 3. European External Action Service

The ToL commissions the formation of a new European External Action Service (EEAS) that works in collaboration with member state diplomatic services. The EEAS is responsible for development and foreign aid and the coordination of these policies between the member states of the EU. Represented by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the EEAS is also responsible for preparing policy proposals related to the EU’s external actions and implementing these policies once they are approved. This new institutional body is entrusted to act on behalf of and monitor the external actions of all member states.

According to the EEAS website: “The EU’s external policies, strategies, instruments and missions – overseen by the European External Action Service – have four key aims. They support stability, promote human rights and democracy, seek to spread prosperity, and support the enforcement of the rule of law and good governance. The policy mix is vast, ranging from bilateral agreements to guidelines and legislation” (Europa.eu 2012a). The implications of this change to the EU are increased EU control

over foreign policy, defense and security policy, as well as increased involvement in the promotion of democracy and peace outside its borders.

Citizen preferences for treaty changes in this category are based on responses to the following questions:

- Common policy: EB67.2 “What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it: A common foreign policy among the Member States of the EU, towards other countries” (European Commission 2009a): ‘Foreign’
- Promote democracy and peace: EB71.3 “For each of the following areas, please tell me if you believe that more decision-making should take place at a European level or on the contrary that less decision-making should take place at a European level? Promoting democracy and peace in the world” (European Commission 2012c): ‘Democracy’

#### 4. Voting – European Parliament and Council of the European Union

Implementation of voting changes in the European Parliament (EP) and in the Council of the European Union give the EP greater legislative power and the Council superior involvement in more policy areas. The European Parliament is directly elected by member state citizens since 1979. With the ToL, now 750 members are responsible to approve legislation proposed by the Commission. As a result of the ToL, the majority of laws within the EU are now subject to the ordinary legislative procedure through co-decision and qualified majority voting (QMV).

Previously under the Treaty of Nice, the QMV was reached when member states representing 62 percent of the EU population voted. According to the ToL, in October 2014 the new voting system will come into effect. This new system ensures that “The qualified majority can only be reached if it represents at least 55 percent of the States of the Union and 65 percent of the European population” (Europa.eu 2012b). Co-decision, also now expanded through the ordinary legislative procedure, entails that the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union have the same weight in the adoption of laws. Legislation under this procedure includes “economic governance, immigration, energy, transport, the environment and consumer protection” (European Parliament 2011).

The Council of the European Union is different from the European Council. Formerly named the Council of Ministers, it is commonly referred to as “the Council.” This institution is composed of Ministers from every member state who meet in different configurations based on the topic of the meeting. The Council maintains six month rotating presidencies in the various configurations except in Foreign Affairs which are now presided over by the High Representative. Decisions in the Council are also made by qualified majority. Changes in the voting system diminish the influence of member states with smaller populations and increase the influence of larger members. For instance, the UK will go from 8 percent to 12 percent of the share of the vote in the Council. Furthermore, European Parliament is given more power “as an equal co-legislator in many policy areas” (Kurpas 2007: 9).

Attitudes toward voting changes in the Council and the European Parliament are evaluated using a measure of citizen trust for the two institutions in general. The logical

step made here, as for the Commission, implies that individuals with greater trust for the Council or the EP will faithfully accept that these institutions more power and influence in the EU:

- Increased institutional power from voting changes – Evaluated by examining the level of trust citizens feel for these institution: EB69.2 “And, for each of them (European bodies), please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it: The European Parliament ‘Parliament’, The Council of the European Union” (European Commission 2011a): ‘Council’

### 5. Charter of Fundamental Rights

The Charter of Fundamental Rights in the ToL, although it is not entrenched in the treaty as it would have been in the TCE, is given the “same legal value as the Treaties,” namely as the TEU and the TFEU (Official Journal of the European Union 2007). Any violations of this Charter in any of the member states are therefore under the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (except where opt-outs were negotiated).

Support for the EU’s elevation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights to legal status is measured using citizen opinion on the role of the EU in promoting and protecting these rights, as would be ensured by the Charter:

- Charter of Fundamental Rights: EB68.2 “For each of the following areas, please tell me if you believe that more or less decision-making should take place at a European level: Promoting and protecting fundamental rights, including children’s rights” (European Commission 2010): ‘Charter’

### 6. Permanent European Council President

Since the ToL and the creation of a now “permanent” European Council President, the position is held for a two and a half year term which is renewable once and this person is elected by the European Council (EC) through qualified majority. Previously the presidency was held for a six months on a rotational basis. The EC was first established in 1974 and is composed of heads of state or government of each of the member states of the European Union. As a result of the ToL, the EC is, for the first time, considered an institution of the EU. The European Council meets twice every six months or more if convened by the president for a special session. The members are responsible for general policy making, where votes are made by qualified majority, and treaty changes, where decisions are made by unanimity. The EC President is responsible for moving issues forward in the EC, convening and chairing meetings. This person cannot hold national office while they are president.

The impact of making EC presidency “permanent” is greater consistency in the direction of decisions made through this institution. Criticisms include the concern that such a role was designed to push integration forward through the EC. Additionally, there are fears that the new presidency’s addresses to the EP will become more than just informative, that they will shift to influential normative claims over the direction the European Parliament “*should*” take. Finally, critics have argued that the new president will become the “face” of all member states in Foreign Affairs, perhaps even competing with the new role of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Kaczyński and ó Broin 2009).

Although this is an important change and for full recognition of the depth of integration created by the ToL it could not be left out of the treaty changes overview. Unfortunately, there are no questions in any of the Eurobarometers to measure support for a permanent European Council president.

### *The Treaty in General – Deepening*

As I have demonstrated, through review of Flash Eurobarometers and overview of the literature, although citizens may respond that they are in favor of the treaty, this statement is subject to substantial interpretation by the respondent on what is included in the treaty. The changes outlined above are inclusive of many different policy areas and EU institutions while a few of the most significant of these changes that result from points 2 and 3 above are those that deepen the powers of the union and shift the regional integration scheme ever closer to a political union. According to El-Agraa (1994), the political union “moves beyond economic union to supranational decision-making beyond purely economic; a political union is the ultimate goal of the movement toward European unity” (Gilpin 2001: 343), one that is materializing through the adoption of the ToL.

The most instrumental changes in this shift are the coordination at the supranational level of foreign policy ‘Foreign’, defense and security policy ‘Defense’, and the creation of a single public character and voice of the EU on foreign policy ‘Foreign Minister’. In the previous chapter, I used a constructed measure of support for the treaty based on these most significant changes. Opposition to the changes listed are combined for establishment of TCE and ToL support using data from EB63.4 and EB67.2. The formula for this measure is as follows: ‘Treaty’ = ‘Foreign’ + ‘Defense’ +

‘Foreign Minister’. Support for the treaty requires support for all three of the variables composing the measure. In other words, a pro-ToL response is observed when an individual is in favor of the creation of a common foreign policy, a common defense policy, and the creation of a position of Foreign Minister of the EU.

I also include the variable ‘constitution’ as an alternative measure of support for the ToL, the same indicator as Milner (2006) uses to evaluate support for the TCE. The questions I is:

- “What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it: A constitution for the European Union” (European Commission 2009a): ‘Constitution’

### **The Nature of Opposition – Analysis**

The most common distinction is along state lines, more specifically based on old versus new member states. These studies can take the form of comparing the six original member states (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands) to some or all of the newer states (Denmark, Greece, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Portugal, Finland, Sweden, Austria, Spain) forming the first fifteen members (McLaren 2002), these are called here EU6 and EU9. The final enlargement group is hereafter referred to as EU12 and consists of the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia that joined in 2004, and Bulgaria, and Romania that joined in 2007. The differences between state groupings along these lines are assumed to be grounded in the Europeanization of national traditions through extended exposure to the EU (Risse 2001). This ‘socialization’ of the EU (Hosli and



Arnold 2010, McLaren 2002) should thus result in greater support among older member states.<sup>19</sup>

Further state-level comparisons include shared borders<sup>20</sup> (McLaren 2002), the size of the welfare state (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007), the North-South geographical positioning of states, population size, political ideology, and the size of the state's contribution to the EU budget (OPTEM 2001). I will explain these additional state-level distinctions further in Chapter 4 as potential explanatory factors.

To establish the nature of citizens' discontent, I first examine the variation in responses to integration questions as defined above in France, the Netherlands and Ireland that experienced failed referenda on the TCE or the ToL. This allows me to confirm whether the literature that focused so heavily on why referenda failed in these countries is reflected in the Eurobarometer questions under investigation in this study. I use multiple Eurobarometers at various different time points from the period immediately following rejection of the TCE leading up to the ToL's entry into force in December 2009 in order to capture these various questions. Table 3.1 provides details on the citizen responses in the three countries. The values provided represent the average responses of individuals in favor of the integration change listed in the first column. Section totals

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<sup>19</sup> A comparison of means test in both the EB69.2 (2008) and EVS (2008) confirms that EU6 member states are significantly (with 95 percent confidence) more European than EU9 and EU12 members. This test demonstrates that individuals in original member states self-identify as European more so than in later enlargement groups.

<sup>20</sup> Review of Eurobarometer datasets revealed that EB31 used by Gabel (1998) contained a "frontier zone" variable. This variable is was since dropped from the EB coding schemes and it can only be assumed that McLaren later modeled the border variable in EB47.1 using cross reference to the variable "province." For the purpose of reproduction of Gabel and McLaren's study, it is not possible to draw on the border or province variables have now both been dropped from EB coding, replaced by a "region" variable which, according to the earliest EB of this study "(Region) may have changed compared to former Eurobarometer up to survey 61"(European Commission 2012a). These discrepancies in coding between each of the eight datasets of this study, makes the task of determining border regions outside the scope of this analysis.

represent the average degree of support for that type of integration change within each country.

**Table 3.1 – Variation in Nature of EU Support – Countries with Failed Referenda**

Variation in Nature of EU Support in Countries with Failed Referenda (on ToL and TCE)  
2006-2009 (during ToL Negotiation and Ratification)

		France (%)	The Netherlands (%)	Ireland (%)
Deepening Integration	<b>On Treaty Changes*</b>	<b>72.59</b>	<b>66.07</b>	<b>72.48</b>
	1. Legal Personality	72.48	62.39	72.60
	Commission	38.84	43.00	60.54
	Employment	67.33	59.21	56.67
	Social Rights	68.72	61.23	62.47
	Economic Growth	78.24	67.61	71.51
	Organized Crime	87.04	69.39	92.84
	Terrorism	89.65	74.00	91.33
	Health	77.52	62.26	72.83
	3. High Representative	84.15	78.32	80.18
	Foreign Minister	81.48	82.71	78.06
	Defence	86.81	73.93	82.29
	4. European External Action Service	82.55	78.20	74.78
	Foreign	76.25	81.51	70.44
	Democracy	88.84	74.89	79.12
	5. Voting Changes	44.67	57.13	55.96
	Parliament	50.48	63.05	59.27
Council	38.85	51.20	52.64	
6. Charter of Fundamental Rights	79.10	54.30	78.90	
Charter	79.10	54.30	78.90	
<b>The Treaty in General*</b>		<b>70.70</b>	<b>72.88</b>	<b>56.16</b>
Constitution	76.47	79.79	57.47	
Treaty	64.92	65.96	54.86	
<b>The Euro</b>		<b>70.48</b>	<b>86.85</b>	<b>78.67</b>
Euro	70.48	86.85	78.67	
Widening Integration	<b>Enlargement*</b>	<b>31.35</b>	<b>41.52</b>	<b>48.04</b>
	Enlargement	31.55	50.42	45.95
	Macedonia	32.60	40.44	51.39
	Croatia	43.37	46.51	57.35
	Turkey	17.88	28.69	37.46
Integration in General	<b>The EU in General*</b>	<b>44.58</b>	<b>63.97</b>	<b>55.84</b>
	Benefit	47.40	81.97	69.45
	Good	46.35	72.51	73.49
	Direction	33.08	46.02	44.19
	Image	47.50	65.44	42.08
Political	48.56	53.90	50.00	

Sources:

66.1 European Values and Societal Issues, Mobile Phone Use, and Farm Animal Welfare, September-October 2006 N=26,647

67.2 European Union Enlargement, Personal Data Privacy, the National Economy, and Scientific Research, April-May 2007 N=26,717

68.2 European Union Policy and Decision Making, Corruption, Civil Justice, E-Communications, Agriculture, and Environmental Protection, November 2007-January 2008 N=26,730

69.2 National and European Identity, European Elections, European Values, and Climate Change, March-May 2008 N=26,661

71.1 European Parliament and Elections, Economic Crisis, Climate Change, and Chemical Products, January-February 2009 N=26,718

71.3 Globalization, Personal Values and Priorities, European Identity, Future of the European Union, Social Problems and Welfare, and European Elections, June-July, 2009

\*Scores on each of these measures are calculated by averaging citizen responses on each of the individual variables contained within the category, within the country group.

Ruiz-Jiménez and Torreblanca (2008) conclude that in both the Netherlands and France, opposition was greater to enlargement than to the constitutional treaty. I examine here whether this is still the case for the ToL. Aarts and van der Kolk (2006) support this claim for the Netherlands and suggest opposition to the Euro is also higher than to the constitution. According to this table, in France support for the treaty is rather high across all the individual changes contained within it. The results demonstrate that French citizens are generally in favor of the creation of a legal personality of the Union, the implementation of a position of High Representative, creation of a European External Action Service, and promotion of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU to legal status. Citizens, however, are somewhat more skeptical of voting changes which would give greater powers to the European Parliament and to the Council of the European Union. This result is reflected in low levels of trust for these institutions (50.48 percent trust the EP, and 38.85 trusts the Council).

Within the category legal personality, although highly in favor of increased involvement of the EU in national policy areas, French citizens demonstrate low levels of trust for the European Commission. With low levels of trust for the Commission (38.84 percent) I assume that citizens will be less likely to support this institution acquiring greater power in the area of justice and home affairs. These results are supported by OPTEM (2001) report findings wherein citizen criticisms of the EU in France are largely due to the perception of an overinflated bureaucracy. When compared to enlargement, the findings of the literature on the TCE reiterated above are reaffirmed for the ToL. Citizens are on average only 31.35 percent in favor of enlargement. On the membership of Turkey in particular, the French are only 17.88 percent in favor.

Milner (2006) suggests rather, that French voters were not pro-Union but anti-Constitution and anti-Turkey. As presented, anti-enlargement sentiment in this country is rather high with the most enlargement opposition on the question of Turkey. With regard to a pro-Constitution versus pro-EU in general divide, in the ToL context, general Union support in France is very low. The average score on the five general support measures is 44.58 percent and below 50 percent for all composing questions, with the greatest skepticism found on the question of whether the EU is going generally in the right direction. In other words, citizens tend to feel that changes, perhaps such as the negotiation and signature of the ToL, are not moving in the direction of their choosing. This, however, could also be due to the enlargement skepticism as well. Thus a general question of EU direction cannot provide much in terms of conclusive understanding of the nature of discontent in France. Therefore, the results provided support the argument that a failed referendum on the TCE in France was not necessarily due to opposition to a constitution. This is further corroborated by the contradictory findings of the literature (i.e. Milner's "YES to the Union, NO to the Constitution" versus Ruiz-Jiménez's "no to enlargement, YES to the Constitution").

In France, support for the treaty on both my treaty measures (the 'constitution' and the constructed 'treaty' measure) averages 70.70 percent, and sits at 72.59 percent on the average support across all treaty changes. On the other hand, individual ToL changes demonstrate support as low as 38.84 percent on trust in the Commission, 38.85 percent on trust for the Council. I find similar results in the case of the Netherlands.

On the Euro, it seems that Aarts and van der Kolk's (2006) conclusion that the Dutch voted against the single currency rather than against the constitution does not hold

in the context of the ToL. This may be indicative of a rise in pro-Euro sentiment since the failed TCE referenda. Although I can reject Aarts and van der Kolk's findings on the Euro versus the constitution distinction, conclusions on anti-enlargement sentiment (Ruiz-Jiménez and Torreblanca 2008) remain valid. Although not as low as France, the Netherlands demonstrate 50.42 percent support for enlargement in general. When asked about specific countries this rate drops slightly, for Turkey it reaches as low as 28.69 percent pro-enlargement.

The Netherlands displays similar opposition as the French on individual treaty changes, yet on questions of institutional trust, where I deduce support for increased institutional powers, I find that the Dutch are less distrustful than the French on each the Commission (43 percent), the European Parliament (63.05 percent) and the Council (51.2 percent). Contrary to France, the Dutch are less supportive of EU involvement in employment policy (59.21) and the elevation of the charter to legal status (54.3). Finally, on the EU in general, the Dutch demonstrate high rates of support averaging 63.97 percent. Highest is the sense that EU membership has been beneficial for the Dutch. On the direction of the EU, citizens of the Netherlands like the French, seem disappointed with the steps being taken in building the Union. As with the French findings, it is difficult to qualify this result as the question is so general.

Finally, in the post-referendum survey for the Netherlands, the largest anti-Constitution votes were based on lack of knowledge of treaty changes and a fear for the loss of national sovereignty. According to this, I would expect that questions relating to the attribution of legal personality to the Union, increased power in policy areas, and

increased institutional powers, should have much lower Dutch support. The lowest support levels are found only on the Commission (under legal personality).

According to the Flash Eurobarometer conducted in Ireland following the first ToL referendum, the anti-treaty vote was based on opposition to political parties in Ireland at the time (European Commission 2009b). I would expect therefore, that support for constitutional changes and the EU in general should be rather high, especially considering the successful ratification of the treaty in the second referendum. The results of Table 3.2 confirm this expectation. On all treaty changes, where all changes, are supported by at least 50 percent. The lowest support is found on the increase in decision-making powers on social rights (56.67 percent) and trust in the Council (52.64 percent). Interestingly, the constitution and treaty measures are both quite low. Although general support for EU foreign and defense policy and the creation of position of High Representative are separately quite high, the constructed treaty measure indicates that individuals who are in favor of these changes are not in favor of all of them simultaneously. In essence, only 54.86 percent of citizens in Ireland would be simultaneously in favor of a common EU foreign policy, EU defense policy *and* the creation of the position of High Representative.

Findings vary considerably between studies based on the question under investigation and the way the question is measured, for instance studies of TCE support measure support for the constitution either through Flash Eurobarometer data (European Commission 2005), Standard Eurobarometer (Ruiz-Jiménez and Torreblanca 2008), or even on privately commissioned polls (Milner 2006). In order to investigate support for the very similar ToL, it is necessary to build on these variations by further qualifying the

nature of public support for different types of integration across member states. Table 3.2 provides the variation across the different forms of integration as presented in 3.1 for all EU members combined (EU27), and for the three main membership groups (EU6, EU9, EU12).



**Table 3.2 – Variation in Nature of EU Support – All Member States**

Variation in Nature of EU Support Across all Member States  
2006-2009 (during ToL Negotiation and Ratification)

		EU27 (%)	EU6 (%)	EU9 (%)	EU12 (%)
Deepening Integration	<b>On Treaty Changes</b>	<b>71.53</b>	<b>74.31</b>	<b>66.68</b>	<b>73.79</b>
	<i>1. Legal Personality</i>	71.54	74.20	66.25	74.17
	Commission	47.74	48.58	45.07	49.33
	Employment	65.56	67.71	58.41	69.85
	Social Rights	68.21	71.54	59.80	72.86
	Economic Growth	74.92	77.67	68.31	78.49
	Organized Crime	82.88	87.08	79.47	83.34
	Terrorism	86.18	88.15	82.00	88.33
	Health	75.26	78.66	70.70	76.98
	<i>3. High Representative</i>	81.12	83.79	73.42	85.56
	Foreign Minister	77.65	80.60	71.47	80.81
	Defence	84.59	86.99	75.36	90.31
	<i>4. European External Action Service</i>	82.12	82.89	77.52	85.18
	Foreign	79.26	79.94	73.02	83.60
	Democracy	84.98	85.84	82.02	86.76
	<i>5. Voting Changes</i>	51.91	51.99	49.23	53.87
	Parliament	56.42	56.95	54.70	57.44
	Council	47.40	47.02	43.76	50.30
	<i>6. Charter of Fundamental Rights</i>	70.99	78.67	66.98	70.15
	Charter	70.99	78.67	66.98	70.15
<b>The Treaty in General</b>		<b>69.88</b>	<b>71.77</b>	<b>61.08</b>	<b>75.52</b>
Constitution	75.26	77.26	66.51	80.81	
Treaty	64.50	66.27	55.66	70.24	
<b>The Euro</b>		<b>63.55</b>	<b>73.76</b>	<b>58.72</b>	<b>62.08</b>
Euro	63.55	73.76	58.72	62.08	
Widening Integration	<b>Enlargement</b>	<b>46.63</b>	<b>36.11</b>	<b>42.75</b>	<b>54.79</b>
	Enlargement	54.25	37.65	46.86	68.09
	Macedonia	44.61	36.39	41.62	50.96
	Croatia	55.66	45.85	52.01	63.29
	Turkey	31.99	24.53	30.51	36.83
Integration in General	<b>The EU in General</b>	<b>52.83</b>	<b>51.57</b>	<b>48.74</b>	<b>56.53</b>
	Benefit	60.06	57.46	58.45	62.57
	Good	52.81	59.20	50.81	51.11
	Direction	45.40	38.22	41.62	51.84
	Image	48.28	48.35	44.75	50.90
	Political	57.59	54.63	48.06	66.22

Eurobarometer Sources: 66.1 N=26,647; 67.2 N=26,717; 68.2 N=26,730; 69.2 N=26,661; 71.1 N=26,718; 71.3 N=26,830

The conclusions from Table 3.1 suggested that support for the treaty is highest in EU12 countries and lowest in EU9. This finding contradicts the literature that indicates highest support among original members. With this finding in mind, I turn to the evaluation of Table 3.2. The literature had proposed highest support among original EU members which was then contradicted in the data of Table 3.1. What is observed in these more precise data on the specific nature of discontent is in fact, when including all treaty changes, support is indeed highest among EU6 members (74.31 percent). This rate of support is very similar to that of EU12 members (73.79). The factors which divide slightly higher support in the EU6 versus EU12 countries are scores on the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Scores on Legal Personality, High Representative, European External Action Service, and voting changes are highest in EU12.

On the EU in general (56.53 percent) and enlargement (54.79 percent), newest member states demonstrate the highest support. Finally, on the Euro, the old versus new state grouping shows the greatest divisions, where support is highest for old member states (73.76 percent), 11 points higher than the newest members (62.08 percent) and almost 14 points greater than members of the original enlargements (58.72 percent). These data are consistent with Table 3.1 in exposing the highest degree of discontent on the question of future enlargement. Yet in order to draw any conclusions on the link between treaty rejection and this other integration question, I turn to one final analysis. Investigating the trade-off between opposition to the constitutional treaty and some of the main integration indicators I can plausibly attribute negative referendum voting to this opposition to enlargement.

The following graph illustrates the trade-off between support for a constitution and support for other forms of integration. Responses are measured using the ‘Constitution’ question in the Eurobarometer 67.2 (European Commission 2009a). Choosing this indicator ensures my evaluation is consistent with previous studies that investigate trade-offs between the various forms of integration (Ruiz-Jiménez and Torreblanca 2008, Aarts and van der Kolk 2006). The figure examines the tendency to support one form of integration when also in favor of a constitution. I modify the model used by Ruiz-Jiménez and Torreblanca by examining the tendencies of those opposed to the constitution, rather than in favor. Building on their analysis, I examine the relationship in the more recent ToL context and include more integration questions. While the authors investigated trade-off with enlargement, my measures are ‘Enlargement’, ‘Euro’, ‘Good’, and ‘Treaty’. Data are reported as percentages representing the average pro-integration response.

**Figure 3.1 – Citizen Preferences when Opposed to a Constitutional Treaty**




Figure 3.1 reveals that across all EU member states, citizens who are opposed to a constitution are also highly opposed to enlargement. This tendency is greater than on attitudes toward treaty changes, the Euro or the EU in general. I find that of those citizens who are against the constitution 64.3 percent are also opposed to enlargement, 57.5 percent are also opposed to the Euro, while on the EU in general and on individual treaty changes (according to the constructed measure), more than half are actually in favor. This finding helps to confirm that when citizens are voting against a constitution they may not actually be basing this vote on opposition to the treaty but rather to something else; in this case, enlargement. This final analysis combined with the results of Tables 3.1 and 3.2 provide clear evidence that enlargement is the form of integration where citizen discontent in the EU is the greatest, regardless of length of membership group.

### **Conclusion – Understanding Integration Preferences**

The analyses in this chapter demonstrate the variations across member states according to the nature of the EU question. I find that, regardless of the state grouping applied, enlargement is the greatest point of contention among member states. In response to previous work on the question of ‘whether there is a trade-off between deepening and widening’, I explore whether citizens who are anti-constitution are also anti-enlargement. The results of this analysis confirm that anti-constitution sentiment is not due to objection on the ToL and its content but instead it is most closely linked to anti-enlargement, rather than to attitudes on the treaty’s changes. I conclude thus that negative voting in referenda was likely due to this high level of opposition to new member states.

Much of the analysis so far has ignored the reasons why citizens are discontent in the EU and therefore in Chapter 4 I investigate the various individual factors that influence enlargement preferences. Much of the same literature analyzed above provides differing hypotheses for why the public are opposed to integration in its various forms. Milner (2006) states that in France the direction of public opinion is generally grounded in a subjective understanding of what benefits or costs would result from a European constitution. Across the EU, the literature explains that fear of other cultures underlies much of the opposition to the EU in general. The analysis in Chapter 4 provides an overview of all support for integration theories commonly discussed in the literature and offers an analysis that establishes which of these play the greatest role in determining preferences on the most contentious form of integration: EU enlargement.

## CHAPTER 4 – UNDERSTANDING CITIZEN OPPOSITION

### **Introduction**

The previous chapter revealed the need to examine declining public support in the EU in more detail and observe where support is waning. I found that in countries where the constitutional treaties were rejected, support for both a constitution and the most important changes included in it is quite high. This finding suggests that citizens voting against the deepening treaties were likely opposed to something else. I confirm this finding and discover that not only were citizens against enlargement but that opposition across the member states is highest on this enlargement question. I have compared these findings to the literature and observe that, although there are many similarities, there also exist discrepancies between my data and other authors' conclusions. These inconsistencies are mostly due to this difference in qualification of the integration question. In addition to contradictions in the literature based on the form of integration under investigation, this chapter will explore divergences in terms of what factors play the most important role in driving citizen discontent in the Union. I will present the common theories of citizen support for integration and through empirical analysis, answer RQ<sub>4</sub>.

I construct the models<sup>21</sup> by examining cases from only one Eurobarometer survey from 2008 as well as the European Values Study from the same year. In two separate analyses I compare theories of support for European integration while including the maximum number of explanatory factors drawn from the literature.

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<sup>21</sup> Using OLS regression in all cases with standardized beta coefficients, adjusted for heteroskedasticity using White corrected standard errors (robust). Standardized coefficients allow me to compare independent variables in my study regardless of the units on which these variables are measured.

Using the EB, I examine factors driving discontent with the EU in general, enlargement, EU institutions, and the treaty in general. Furthermore, using the EVS analysis, I focus the investigation on the question of EU enlargement, the most contentious of integration changes. I explore through a novel investigation of individual values, the role of socio-cultural characteristics on support for integration. Finally using these findings, I illustrate which theory of integration support has the greatest predictive power.

In reviewing the literature on European citizens and their responses to European integration a few trends emerge. The first is the level at which observations are made or analyses are conducted (state or individual), while the second is the description of the calculations assumed to be made by citizens which determine their preferences for European integration (utilitarian or socio-cultural). In the next section, I provide an overview of the literature which seeks to explain opinion in the EU. I then proceed to outline the factors that will be used in my final analyses to explain public support for the various forms of integration.

### **The Calculations Underlying Integration Support Theories**

Existing studies on citizen preferences regarding the European Union compare citizens based on a variety of factors. These analyses do this in order to determine which are the elements that most affect the decisions made by citizens generally in the case of voting for or against the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, on the EU in general, or on Union enlargement. Studies propose differences both at the state and the citizen level. At the state level, only length of membership is examined in Chapter 3. In this chapter I



draw on this factor and include several others identified by the literature as controls including population size, net EU budget contribution, state placement on the left-right political spectrum, welfare state size, and north-south geographical divide.

Hosli and Arnold (2010) do not establish a small versus large state cut-off; instead they use population size as an independent variable. I too will use population size to determine my models and use an arbitrarily determined cut-off for state size explained below based on points drawn from the literature. Thorhallson and Wivel (2006) argue that using such an arbitrary number to determine state size ignores other important elements such as the “quantifiable aspects of power” and the “perception of power” that may be considered to classify a state’s size both in terms of internal capabilities and externally in relation to other EU member states and beyond the Union. For the purpose of this analysis and comparability with previous studies, I use simply population size. Furthermore, I expect that much of the influence that may be exercised as both the quantifiable aspects and subjective perceptions of power will be captured through variables like the length of membership and the size of budget contributions to the Union.

Controlling for population size is important due to the decision-making structure of the Union, especially post-ToL where the qualified majority voting system (QMV) is now applied to more policy areas. “Under Lisbon population size will in turn become the primary basis for EU law-making, as in any State with a common citizenry” (Coughlan 2009). Therefore, any small state-specific interests that may become contentious at the EU, if not shared by several other small states or a few large states, will likely be left unrepresented. The primary purpose of controlling for population size is therefore to isolate any effect of citizens living in states with smaller veto power in the EU: “the

QMV method clearly favors the large states to a greater extent than the other two voting methods. The population of the large states accounts for more than 70 percent of the Union's population and therefore it is impossible to form a blocking minority without the participation of large states" (Thorhallsson and Wivel 2006: 661).

On left-right political placement of member states, left-leaning countries are expected to demonstrate lower support levels based on the same reasoning as at the individual level explained below (Gabel 1998). According to Hosli and Arnold (2010), state level position on the Laver and Benoit scale does not play a significant role in determining integration preferences; I will nonetheless include a control for left countries, according to the CHES experts' classification of states.

With regard to budget contributions, Hosli and Arnold (2010) find that greater contributors, with higher stakes in the EU economy, are more likely to desire more decision-making at the EU level to ensure greater control over the administration and redistribution of these funds at the supranational level. A logical counterargument to this reasoning, however, is grounded in the utilitarian theory of individual decision-making described below, wherein citizens in states who are net beneficiaries of EU funds will view their country as benefitting from membership and therefore be more likely to support further integration. I thus control for size of budget contributions so that I can observe the individual effects regardless of the states' financial stance with the EU.

The final state-level controls are welfare state size and north-south geographical location. McLaren (2002) proposes that individuals who benefit from a larger welfare state are less likely to support further integration out of fear that the conservative economic policies of the EU will infringe on national welfare policy. Eichenberg and

Dalton (2007) likewise propose that support for integration is higher in small welfare states. Finally, studies have drawn upon the north-south geographical divide to distinguish between preferences. No explanation is provided, however, as to why such an arbitrary distinction would affect public opinion (OPTTEM 2001).

At the individual level, variations are usually observed between citizens based on their socioeconomic status and demographic characteristics. These factors are easily quantified and have served as the most common explanatory elements for individual opinions on the European Union, regardless of the integration question. Gabel (1998), who was one of the original contributors to the evaluation of citizen preference studies in the EU, examined demographic factors such as age and gender, as well as socioeconomic factors like education level, income, and type of employment. He controlled for these in order to determine with more certainty which of the common theories of integration support were the most reliable in predicting citizen preferences in the EU. Gabel tests utilitarian theory against other possible theories including cognitive mobilization, support for government, political values, and class partisanship. The utilitarian hypothesis suggests that citizens are likely to support or oppose the European Union based on a cost-benefit analysis and determination of whether economic benefits can be acquired through membership.

Cognitive mobilization is grounded in “a high level of political awareness and well-developed skills in political communication” (Gabel 1998: 335) The theory was originally put forth by Ronald Inglehart (1970) who proposed that individuals with greater knowledge and understanding of EU issues will be more likely to support them. Gabel (1998: 342) operationalizes this hypothesis through measurement of responses to

the question: “when you get together with friends, would you say you discuss political matters, frequently occasionally, or never?” The findings of his study indicate that across all members, those who never discuss politics demonstrate lower levels of support for integration, while increased cognitive mobilization has a positive effect on integration attitudes only in original member states.

This is supported by findings of the post-referendum Flash Eurobarometers in the Netherlands and Ireland presented in Chapter 3, which suggested that those who voted NO to the TCE and ToL did so due to a lack of knowledge of the reforms brought about by these treaties. In Ireland, the NO vote also resulted from objection to national political parties and government (European Commission 2009b: 18-19). This finding relates to Gabel’s next theory of support for government and party affiliation.

On support for national government, Gabel briefly suggests that citizens may be voting due to support for the national government of the member state, rather than based on any particular EU issue (Gabel 1998: 339). Franklin et al. (1995) tie the outcome of referenda to the degree of popularity of the current government, suggesting that a population satisfied with government will be unlikely to express negative attitudes toward initiatives prompted by this government.

Party affiliation is similar but relates support to citizens voting based on left-right political placement and the typical EU stances of parties on this political spectrum. According to this left-right dichotomy, Left leaning citizens should be less supportive of integration than citizens with inclinations toward parties on the right of the political spectrum. This resistance on the Left is due to “perception that integration is a manifestation of capitalist forces” (Gabel 1998: 338). In other words, supporters of left

leaning parties will likely back their policies and see the EU as potentially infringing on the ability of national governments to maintain a strong welfare state.

Finally, the author tests political and economic value orientations to determine their role in defining public opinion. These are based on a classification of citizens on a materialist/post-materialist measure. Gabel concluded: “the utilitarian theory is the strongest and most robust predictor of support for integration. It is also worth noting that, in addition to having limited applicability, the cognitive mobilization and political values theories have a relatively small impact on support” (Gabel 1998: 352). The use of political and economic values here is limited in the sense that they provide a dichotomy based on responses to four possible questions: “maintaining order (a); giving people more say in important government decisions (b); fighting rising prices (c); protecting freedom of speech (d)” (342). Where responses were (a) or (c), respondents were considered materialists, while (b) and (d) were counted as post-materialists.

Although this use of values is beneficial for understanding the ideals underlying citizen calculations, the use of so few factors is rather limiting. Much of the debate in the literature concerning value diversity and political unity states in one way or another that “cultural homogeneity is...regarded as a prerequisite for political integration, which in turn is a prerequisite for political stability, especially in democracies”(Lijphart 1971: 5). The issues which arise thus are the definition of the link between culture and values, and the identification of which values are most important, or required for political unity.

The socio-cultural explanation of attitudes suggests that individuals’ preferences are shaped by the values acquired through their environment. This setting may be defined by the culture to which an individual is born wherein shared experience and interactions

create predispositions to certain preferences (Jacob 1964). Lijphart (1971: 14) establishes, through review of much of the values and cultural diversity literature, that some values may be detrimental to integration while others may not be. He does not provide any conclusive evidence as to *which* values play roles in promoting or disintegrating political unity. In his concluding remarks he states that further research should do more than evaluate cleavages based on simple value differences between groups. He proposes that the “depth and intensity” of these variations should be explored.

Bovenberg (2003: 418), through analysis of the European Values Study, also identifies the need for further examination of *which* values are more likely to influence support for European integration. He states: “The key question that arises...is which common core public values are required for successful European integration and in which areas the various countries and regions can retain and even strengthen their own specific cultural heritage.” As will be explained below, to a certain extent my work will do exactly this.

Several studies have reproduced and built upon Gabel’s findings to evaluate the role of various public support theories by incorporating additional explanatory variables. Eichenberg and Dalton (2007) do so by comparing the strong impact of utilitarian factors on different types of EU policies. By evaluating the preferences for EU involvement in policy areas, analysis sought to determine whether support for the EU was based on national traditions and the desire to protect social and health programs. The authors explain that following Maastricht in 1991, support for the EU began to decline. In France, as one of the larger welfare states, opposition to the EU was based on the perception of intrusion into social security and health policy. Therefore, as confirmed in the previous

chapter, the size of a welfare state determines preferences because of the desire by individuals to protect existing social programs. In other words, citizens of large welfare states are more likely to be fearful that further integration would endanger their current benefits, confirming the utilitarian hypothesis of integration support.

McLaren (2002) reproduces Gabel's study with more recent data and includes some questions on the nature of citizens' fears in the EU. She offers the hypothesis that through citizens' "fear of other cultures" and not economic self-interest, they are less likely to support further integration. This proposal was put forth as an alternative to Gabel's conclusion that citizen opinion is driven primarily by utilitarian calculations. She proposes that those who have less tolerance of other cultures are less supportive of integration.

McLaren's study provides a clear prediction of socio-demographic factors that would influence support for integration in *general* based on analysis of 15 member states prior to the 2004 enlargement. She argues that variations may be found within old versus young member states, for instance, citizens in France with higher education and income will be more supportive of integration. On the other hand, within the same country, manual workers demonstrate less support for further EU integration. According to her study, more support for integration is found among more highly educated populations, with higher incomes, or living in EU border regions.

Increased support will also be noted among professionals in older states and executives in younger states. In contrast to the utilitarian hypothesis, she proposes that EU opposition may be grounded in a "general fear of the degradation of one's culture and one's nation that leads some to be hostile toward the EU" (McLaren 2002: 559). In other

words, those who are generally intolerant of other cultures are more likely to be skeptical of the benefits of the EU, based on views that minorities either abuse social benefits or that their religious practices threaten the way of life of the majority. Her analysis concludes by stating that non-economic factors (herein called socio-cultural factors), such as the perception of threat to one's culture, are equally influential as socio-economic factors. Her study makes no distinction between types of integration. She employs the same variables as used in my previous chapter for support for the EU in general.

Ruiz-Jiménez and Torreblanca (2008) build on the perception of fears with regard to the loss of culture by including an examination of other perceived threats resulting from new incoming member citizens. The impact of enlargement is measured through examination of the effect on perceived functionality of an enlarged union, the potential for collapse of EU institutions, and the cost of integration in terms of trade, investments, budgetary contributions and job creation or loss. The authors contend that perceptions of cost at the individual level are based on self-interest and can be translated into certain quantifiable fears. These fears can include fear for the loss of jobs and labor declines, the increase in price competitions, increased state budgetary contributions, the loss of social benefits, loss of power for small states, and the fear of increased drug trafficking between member states. The authors demonstrate that French citizens, as part the older members of the EU, demonstrate fears for the transfer of jobs to cheaper labor countries, followed by fear of price competition on agriculture and increases in budgetary contributions to the EU.

Other research confirms this departure from the purely utilitarian hypothesis of integration support and through examination of the fear citizens' display in the face of



opening their borders to other cultures. Kehrberg (2007) examines economic factors that affect attitudes toward immigration in Western Europe and finds, much like attitudes toward general integration, the forces driving acceptance of integration with other cultures are grounded in values of tolerance.

Aarts and van der Kolk (2006) similarly diverge from the utilitarian theory of support by investigating whether citizens instead fear the loss of their own culture through further integration. In their analysis, they build on Gabel's findings of the influence of party affiliation and sought to explain whether this affiliation influenced the negative referendum outcome in the Netherlands. The authors demonstrate that rather than party affiliation, utilitarian calculations linked to the potential threat to Dutch jobs as well as claims of undervaluation of the Dutch guilder by the Euro were more influential. In addition to these factors, the authors also conclude that those who voted NO in the referendum were largely influenced by concern for the loss of the Dutch language and the potential threat to Dutch culture by incoming member states accustomed to lower labor standards, with divergent values, and traditions.

Data on values and value diversity that are measurable in the context of citizen preferences for regional integration are limited and therefore studies such as McLaren, Aarts and van der Kolk, and Ruiz-Jiménez and Torreblanca observe the effects through exploration of the perception of threat caused by the "other" (individuals with identities, religions, languages, traditions, and beliefs different from one's own). Where differing groups of values exist within the same community, it may lead to a lack of trust in others and in turn a degree of skepticism of large groups or government (Putnam 2007). The lack of trust between individuals resulting from value diversity is reflected to a degree in

the fear for loss of one's culture, or feelings of threat caused by other cultures. This question of perception of threat is therefore likely motivated by underlying value differences.

European identity has also emerged within the theme of socio-cultural factors which direct individual decision-making. A substantial body of literature accompanies this hypothesis suggesting that identity, constructed through feelings of belonging to a system with values common to one's own breed tendencies to support that system in acquiring additional power. Kaelberer (2004) argues that a common currency encourages the adoption of a European identity, which in turn reinforces the success of the Euro. The author concludes, through a rather simple review of existing literature that membership in the Eurozone is a determinant of citizen opinion and he attributes this support for the Euro to the adoption of a European identity. Other studies have also confirmed the influence of European identity as a factor promoting pro-EU sentiment. According to Weßels (2007), when compared to factors such as political interest and education, identity is the strongest buffer against EU skepticism. Thus, where European identity is high, we should expect that general support for the European Union will also be high.

More extensive value and identity based studies have been conducted on the European Union in order to determine the degree to which European identity has permeated member state mentalities, yet these investigations do little to relate individual value differences to variations in support for the EU at the individual level. This link has been investigated only in the context of elite preferences. Van der Veen (2005) uses frames to outline national elite interests in order to predict the interests that promote further integration. The author conducts an analysis of debates on EU enlargement in

lower chambers of parliament in Belgium, Ireland, and the Netherlands from 2000-2002. He applies frames to these debates which categorize discourse as typified by cultural identity through emphasis on the importance of history, norms, and traditions or qualified as a focus on security, geopolitics, and economics. He concludes that the emphasis on the economic aspects of integration in the literature is largely unfounded and instead, when discussing enlargement elites are far more interested in the role of history, norms and the ideals of solidarity with other cultures.

Risse (2010) also explores the role of identity construction at the level of the nation-state to determine the compatibility between national and European values for the future of integration. He conducts his analysis using the cases of Germany, Britain and France and evaluates the changes in political party discourse beginning with the 1950s and ending in the 90s. He concludes that European identity in Britain is highly contrasted to national identity. In Germany and France on the other hand, European and national identities are becoming increasingly intertwined.

Identity, according to Risse (2010) can be both a driver of integration preferences and a result of further integration. His findings are limited mainly to political party rhetoric and the evaluation of citizen identities as either national or European. The author alludes to the deconstruction of identity, acknowledging that there is more to an individual's self-proclaimed identity than simple association with the national or the supranational polity. The elements underlying Europeanness include liberal values, Christianity, association with a shared heritage, and mutual traditions. He posits that those who do not share in these values but instead associate with a national identity will

likely oppose future integration based on the desire to preserve purely national heritage and traditions.

He does not seek to measure these elements that make up the citizen's identity or to qualify them any further. Although in both these works Risse attempts to associate values with identity and subsequently identity with support for integration, he ignores the direct link between individual values and integration at the citizen level. European values are now defined by the ToL,<sup>22</sup> yet, according to Arts and Halman (2003), cultural differences between Europeans are diverse involving a confluence of varying values (Arts et al. 2003). It may thus be misleading to depend on a variable such as European identity to determine support for the EU as different individuals may define European identity differently. In Appendix A I present a table, exposing the values that are associated with a strong European identity. According to this analysis, European identity is likely found among individuals with low religiosity, high confidence in institutions, little fear of the EU, and favorability toward immigrants. I nonetheless include these values and an identity variable in my analysis in order to isolate if any of these values may be independently driving support or if identity remains the most important explanatory factor.

Bovenberg (2003) suggests that a degree of commonality in values is necessary for cooperation and the pursuit of a common goal, such as greater integration of the EU. These values include patience and trust, respect for the rule of law, property rights, and

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<sup>22</sup> Values of the European Union are incorporated into the text of the treaties in several ways. The following passage "drawing inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law" is added to the preamble of the two treaties. (Official Journal of the European Union 2007).

the rights of minorities (values similar to those outlined in the ToL as common to all Europeans). It is therefore plausible that citizen discontent with the ToL arises not only because of economic factors but due to a divergence in values among citizens within the Union. While European identity and perception of cultural threat may help understand this effect, the investigation of individual values takes the analysis a step further than existing studies. Therefore much would be gained by combining an in depth investigation into European value variations (not simply European identity) at the citizen level, with an analysis of support for European widening and deepening, with further attention to variations within deepening (such as support for the Euro, domestic policy convergence, and foreign policy involvement). For the purpose of this project and due to data limitations on value questions, I evaluate values in more detail on enlargement only as I have also demonstrated that this is the form of integration where opposition is highest.

The most significant of Gabel's conclusions (1998) for the purposes of my research and the implications for future integration, is the division of the five theories he sets out to test, into two categories. On the one hand, "the cognitive mobilization and political values theories posit that a citizen's support for integration is based on personal political characteristics that are generally immutable throughout adulthood" (Gabel 1998: 352). These characteristics are classified here as socio-cultural and built upon by adding measures of values and identity. On the other hand, utilitarian theory, partisanship, and support for government and included in the classification socio-economic factors.

This analysis, takes into account variations between citizens based on the calculations they make when considering integration. These calculations may be utilitarian in nature or socio-cultural based on national context. Utilitarian calculations

may be predicted based on individual socio-economic status (like education level, income, and type of employment) and national context is evaluated through association with political parties and government. Calculations based on individual values and identity are much more difficult to measure. Studies which explore values do so without necessarily naming them as such. Instead they use terms such as culture, identity, and values interchangeably.

Value based calculations in the literature are measured by observing survey questions that establish whether there is a fear for the loss of culture, language, or traditions. These analyses ignore the variation of values underlying these fears. As Lijphart suggests, my analysis will seek to examine in greater detail *which* values have the greatest impact on the sustainability and persistence of European integration. I expect, as suggested by Bovenberg, that values such as trust, respect for the rule of law, property rights, and the rights of minorities will have the greatest impact on citizen support for integration. I also include support for democracy, peace, and solidarity (to name a few) to ensure that other values which may be important to integration, are not ignored. The next section details the method that will be used, as well as the data that I draw upon.

## **Method**

I begin with the evaluation of which theories of support for integration drawn from the literature have the greatest explanatory power. I outlined the IVs used to test these explanations in the data section. In the first analysis (the EB Analysis), I use Eurobarometer 69.2: National and European Identity, European Elections, European Values, and Climate Change, March-May 2008 (European Commission 2011a), as this

particular survey has the most variables available across types of integration and theories of support. By choosing a dataset with the most relevant variables I am able to conduct the analysis at the individual level without losing any important variation that may be caused through the aggregation of data to the state level. I conduct multiple OLS regressions across the various models on the four dependent variable constructs for integration forms, as will also be delineated in the data section below. The findings of this analysis provide a hierarchy of factors that influence the different integration questions. Using Gabel's methodology, I then compare the "substantive significance" of the theories (1998: 350). This is explained further using the results from the first regression table.

In the EVS Analysis section I turn to a more detailed examination of the role of values, compared to other socio-cultural and socio-economic factors, on support for enlargement. To do so, I use the 2008 European Values Study (EVS 2011) which provides more detailed questions on individual citizen value placement. I conduct an exploratory factor analysis through which I construct a series of value dimensions. Each individual is assigned a score based on how they respond to the questions making up each dimension. The construction of these dimensions is explained in the data section. Using a regression analysis at the individual level, I compare all explanatory factors and observe which have the greatest impact on support for enlargement. Additionally, as with the EB analysis, I create a model that contrasts each of the theories of support for integration and conclude which has the greatest explanatory power.

## Data – Models and Variables

### *Models*

As in Chapter 3, length of membership is controlled for to limit the effect of socialization of the EU (Hosli and Arnold 2010, McLaren 2002). In the previous chapter, I observe that these country groupings are playing a role in the variation of citizen support depending on the integration question under investigation. I therefore construct the regression outlined above comparing across these national models. These models serve to isolate the individual-level factors regardless of the national context. Each individual-level factor will be observed within the country groupings EU27, EU6, EU9, and EU12. Other state-level factors employed in the literature will be used as controls in the models.

### *Control Variables*

In the first analysis section entitled EB Analysis, I include individual-level characteristics as control variables. These are age,<sup>23</sup> gender,<sup>24</sup> marital status,<sup>25</sup> and employment<sup>26</sup> modeled after Gabel. I add European identity ‘European’. Age is used to control for the possible “generational trend” on values, education, and employment type. I also control for gender and employment type for the purpose of consistency with Gabel’s model (Gabel 1998: 344).

State-level controls consist of dummy variables created for each of the 27 member states as well as population size (‘Micro’, ‘Small’, ‘Medium’, and ‘Large’ States), net EU

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<sup>23</sup> ‘Age’ is a continuous variable.

<sup>24</sup> Gender is converted to a dummy variable with the value of 1 for ‘Female’.

<sup>25</sup> Marital status is converted to a dummy variable with the value of 1 for ‘Married’.

<sup>26</sup> Employment controls are ‘Retired’, ‘Student’, ‘Farmer’, and ‘Homemaker’. It is not possible to control for “small business owner” as done by Gabel and McLaren as this option is no longer available in EB69.2. I do, however, use a dummy for entrepreneur under the utilitarian theory group of variables.



budget contribution ('Net Contributor'), state placement on the left-right political spectrum ('Left State'), welfare state size ('Small Welfare State' and 'Large Welfare State'), and north-south geographical divide ('North').<sup>27</sup>

In the section analysis section entitled EBS Analysis, I control for the same variables.<sup>28</sup> All of the demographic and socio-economic variables used for this analysis are the same as those used in the EB. These variables are used as controls rather than explanatory variables in the values analysis due to my interest in determining foremost which values play the greatest role in deciding integration preferences and evaluating these against theories of support for regional integration.

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<sup>27</sup> Micro State: Population Size arbitrarily determines this grouping of states based on common divisions of states in EU literature as state with a population less than 1M citizens

Small State: population between 1M and 30M citizens.

Medium State: population between 30M and 50M citizens.

Large State: population greater than 50M citizens.

Net Contributor: Evaluated as net contributors based on Commission budget calculations of state payments to the total budget minus funds received from the EU. The difference between payment and receipt of contributions is positive (and dummy coded as 1) where a country pays more to the EU than it receives.

Left: State classified based on an average expert score less than 5 using CHES 2006 general political spectrum question where 0 is extreme left and 10 is extreme right. Data for Cyprus, Luxembourg, and Malta are not available.

Small Welfare State: public social expenditures are less than 20 percent of GDP in 2005 and 2007. This specification is not used in the literature; states are referred to as northern or southern without a systematic grouping method (OPTEM 2001).

Large Welfare State: public social expenditures are greater than 25 percent of GDP in 2005 and 2007. Data on total social expenditures from OECD are not available for the following countries: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, and Romania.

North: arbitrarily determined as countries with the majority of their territory north of the 47th parallel.

<sup>28</sup> The EVS does not have a question which allows me to control for Farmer. This likely will have little effect on the outcome of the analysis based on the EB findings which demonstrate that the control is insignificant across all questions except general EU support (where significance is only observed among original member states).

### *Explanatory Variables*

#### ***Socio-Economic Calculations***

##### *Party Affiliation*

According to Gabel's predictions that the capitalist nature of the EU will infringe upon national welfare policies, I expect as previous studies have demonstrated, that left-leaning political supporters will be less supportive of integration. Rather than evaluate the individual parties for whom citizens demonstrate support, I examine their self-placement on the left right political scale according to the following question: "In political matters people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your views on this scale?" I divide this scale into 'Left', 'Center', and 'Right'.

##### *Utilitarian Theory*

Individual-level variables that I examine under the utilitarian theory are income and education. Income is expected to increase support based on the argument that financial capital allows citizens to "exploit the greater investment opportunities provided by more open financial markets" (Frieden 1991 in Gabel 1998: 337). Therefore, higher financial capital should be accompanied by higher support for integration. There are no questions in this Eurobarometer directly related to income therefore I use the following as a proxy: "Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statement: You have difficulties paying all your bills at the end of the month." Rather than coding this variable as income I transform it into dummy variables where "Totally Agree" is 'Low Financial Capital' and "Totally Disagree" represents 'High Financial Capital'. The same

question does not exist in the EVS; therefore a yearly household income indicator is used. This variable is on a scale and is not recoded. Rather the variable is renamed ‘High Financial Capital’ and can be interpreted in the regression as going from low financial capital to high financial capital.

Education contributes to human capital which “is a strong indicator of a citizen’s ability to adapt to the occupational competition introduced by a liberalized EU labor market” (Gabel 1998: 337). Higher education levels should therefore indicate higher support for integration. The variable will thus be coded as dummies for ‘High Education’, where respondents attended school beyond the age of 21. ‘Low Education’ reflects individuals who stopped their education at 15 years of age or younger. These same variables are created in both the EB and EVS analyses.

Expectations based on employment<sup>29</sup> status also fall under the assumption of human capital (Gabel 1998: 343), wherein the executives<sup>30</sup> and professionals should exhibit higher integration support than manual workers, as will the employed be more pro-EU than the unemployed. Gabel categorizes these variables as skilled (Professional) and unskilled occupations (Manual Workers and Unemployed). For the purpose of this analysis I will use the same categorization. I have added to the EB analysis a variable for ‘Entrepreneur’, expecting that fear of increased competition created by an open market in the EU will lead business owners “Owner of a shop, craftsmen, other self-employed person” or “Business proprietors, owner (full or partner) of a company” (European Commission 2011a) to be less likely to support integration. The question from the

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<sup>29</sup> Only ‘Unemployed’ is used in the EVS analysis.

<sup>30</sup> Job category “Executive” is not included in the Eurobarometer used here.

Eurobarometer: “What is your current occupation?” provides responses that are divided into dummy variables for ‘Professional’, ‘Manual Worker’, and ‘Unemployed’.

### *Support for Government*

Gabel evaluates this question based on which political party the respondent supports, if it is the party in power they are considered to support the governing party and thus show support for government. Without this information, I use the following question regarding direct support for the government through evaluation of the respondent’s trust in the national government: “I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it. The (NATIONALITY) Government” Trust in government is dummy coded as 1 and labeled ‘Support Governing Party’, the same question is found in the EVS. I expect, based on Gabel’s findings and the results of the Irish post-referendum Flash Eurobarometer, that support for government will correlate with higher support for integration.

### ***Socio-Cultural Explanations***

#### *Cognitive Mobilization Theory*

I evaluate cognitive mobilization using the same variable as Gabel: “When you get together with friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally, or never?” Dummies are created for ‘Never Discuss Politics’, and ‘Frequently Discuss Politics’. I expect from Gabel’s findings that as cognitive mobilization increases (through increased frequency of discussion of political issues) that

support for integration will also be higher. However, these findings are not constant across EU groups as later members show no distinction in support based on this measure.

Cognitive mobilization theory suggests that mobilization increases through increased discussion and awareness of political issues but it also requires a level of understanding of these issues. I therefore include an additional question for cognitive mobilization in my study: “For each of the following statements about the European Union could you please tell me whether you think it is true or false: The EU currently consists of fifteen Member States.” One dummy is created for ‘Low Knowledge’, where the respondent has incorrectly answered the question. The correct answer to this question is false, at the time of this study the EU consisted of 27 members. This question reflects very basic knowledge of the EU’s membership and a wrong answer would contribute to determination of low cognitive mobilization.

#### *Political Values Theory*

Again, I use the same question as the previous studies to determine materialist or post-materialist values. This distinction was also used by De Vreese (2004) to determine attitudes toward the constitution in Denmark and the Netherlands, an elaboration on Gabel and McLaren’s general support question. The expectation derived from the findings of each of these analyses is that post-materialist values should be associated with greater EU support. The question used for the measure is: “There is a lot of talk these days about what (OUR COUNTRY)’s goals should be for the next ten or fifteen years. On this card are listed some of the goals that different people say should be given top priority. Would you please say which one of them you, yourself, consider to be most

important in the long run?” Responses are coded as follows depending on the individual’s first choice: “Maintaining order in the country” ‘Materialist’, “Giving people more say in important Government decisions” ‘Post-Materialist’, “Fighting rising prices” ‘Materialist’, “Protecting freedom of speech” ‘Post-Materialist’.

### European Identity

European Identity: The identity variable is added and used in this analysis as an explanatory factor of integration support, rather than a resulting factor of greater integration. This variable was not used in either Gabel or McLaren’s studies and thus will contribute to the expansion of their analyses. I expect, based on the discussion of European identity above, that greater association with Europe will be linked with higher integration support. The question that I use is: “Thinking about this, to what extent do you personally feel you are...European,” coded as a dummy ‘European’ where respondent answers feeling European “to a great extent,” while ‘Not European’ reflects respondents who replied “not at all.”

### Values

EB Values: Due to the lack of previous research examining the role of values in determining EU support, I do not limit the values observed except through the data that are available. The purpose is to ensure that my analysis accounts for any possible variation that may be offered by values. The main values that are expected to positively influence integration as outlined by Bovenberg (2003) are patience and trust, respect for the rule of law, property rights, and the rights of minorities. Not all of these values are

available through the Eurobarometer under investigation, nor are they available in any other Eurobarometer conducted during the time period of this study.

I therefore examine values in the EB analysis from the following question: “And in the following list, which are three most important values for you personally? ‘The Rule of Law’, ‘Respect for Human Life’, ‘Human Rights’, ‘Individual Freedom’, ‘Democracy’, ‘Peace’, ‘Equality’, ‘Solidarity’, ‘Tolerance’, ‘Religion’, ‘Self-Fulfillment’, ‘Respect for Other Cultures’.” Although most can be considered largely liberal values, observing the relationship between these variables and support for integration allows me to establish, at least preliminarily, which values<sup>31</sup> are more important for increased support for integration. I expect, based on Bovenberg’s predictions, that higher support should be observed where respondents have selected Rule of Law, Individual Freedom, and Respect for Other Cultures.

EVS Values: The European Values Study provides a much more diverse range of values from which to select explanatory variables and the challenge here, rather than finding questions that properly evaluate underlying socio-cultural tendencies, is instead to determine which factors should be excluded. I have therefore, as Hagenaars, Halman, and Moors (2003) have done, created a series of value dimensions through principal component analysis (PCA) of the 300 EVS value questions. This form of analysis allows me to reduce the plethora of variables into to manageable categories, grouping indicators which are correlated with each other while ensuring that factors are not correlated across categories. Predictions can then be made based on these value categories, called factors.

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<sup>31</sup> An exploratory factor analysis of these variables revealed that eigenvalues, “reflecting the amount of variation in all the original variables” by any one component, were lower than 1 in all cases and therefore principal components could not be retained in this analysis for the creation of variable dimensions (See (Arts et al. 2003, 26).

The results of this analysis produce 40 factors with eigenvalues greater than 1, therefore, to determine which categories should be conserved; I produce a scree plot of the eigenvalues and observe the “point on the line connecting the plotted eigenvalues where the slope of the line changes from large to small” ( Hageaars et al. 2003).<sup>32</sup> Based on this technique, nine factors would be retained. Doing this combines many questions within a single component which seem logically unrelated to each other. I have, therefore, opted to use the Kaiser method (selecting factors based on their eigenvalues of more than 1) and further reduce the factors that also have a Cronbach’s alpha of greater than 0.6. “Cronbach’s alpha is a measure of internal consistency, that is, how closely related a set of items are as a group” (UCLA 2012). It is a measure of reliability and is used to determine whether the constructed measure created from the combination of variables that make up each factor dimension, correctly captures the variance of the composing indicators. I limit the analysis thus to 23 factors which can be further divided into eight categories. A grouping of questions included in each of these factors is displayed in Appendix C. The categories are the following: Religious Values, Orientations toward Institution, Orientations toward Work, Tolerance, Moral and Ethical Values, Family Values, Political Values, Postmodern Values.

To build on prior authors’ findings that perceived threat of EU construction promotes anti-EU sentiment, I also include a measure for EU fear, the questions making up this measure are “fear for loss of social security,” “national identity/culture,” “state loss of power,” “loss of jobs,” or that “the country pays more” (EVS 2011).

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<sup>32</sup> Displayed in Appendix B



### *Dependent Variables*

Based on the integration questions outlined in Chapter 3 and the availability of corresponding questions in a single Eurobarometer survey, I create four multidimensional measures for types of integration for the EB individual-level analyses and one outcome variable for the EVS analysis.

The first ‘Widening’ represents a measure for overall citizen support for EU enlargement. In the EB analysis it combines the responses to dichotomous variables ‘Macedonia’, ‘Croatia’, ‘Turkey’, and ‘Enlargement’. By combining these variables into a single measure, therefore, I produce a categorical variable with a broader range in variation. Possible scores on this scale range from 0 to 4 where I assume that an individual who scores 0 is against all enlargements, while a 4 would demonstrate pro-enlargement feelings, regardless of the candidate state in question.

In the EVS Analysis, there is only one integration question available for analysis. This measure examines individuals’ (EVS 2011) attitudes toward enlargement using the question: “Some say that the European Union enlargement should go further. Others say it has already gone too far. Using this card, which number best describes your position, where ‘1’ means “should go further,” and ‘10’ means “has already gone too far?” (EVS 2011) The benefit of this question is the range on which respondents may provide an answer. Through OLS regression with this variable, here also given the name ‘Widening’, I can evaluate the incremental effect of socio-economic and socio-cultural

factors on this form of integration. Thus the scale resembles the categorical scale created for the EB evaluation that combines several different enlargement variables into one.

‘Institutions’ is created from responses to the dichotomous variables ‘Parliament’, ‘Council’, and ‘Commission’. Positive responses to each of these questions have the value of 1. As with the widening measure, I create a categorical variable. The measure establishes trust in EU institutions with responses ranging from 0 to 3. A value of 0 signifies that an individual does not trust any of these institutions, while 3 indicates trust in all three.

‘Deepening’ combines responses to the two variables used in the Treaty measure (support for a foreign minister was not available in this dataset): ‘Defense’ and ‘Foreign’. The score ranges from 0 to 2, where 0 is no support for deepening and 2 is the highest support.

Finally, ‘General’ measures the degree of citizen support for the EU in general across the various measures used by the literature. These measures include ‘Benefit’, ‘Good’, ‘Direction’, and ‘Image’. Individuals who demonstrate the highest level of support for the EU in general will score 4 points on this constructed variable, while no support for the Union in general will be reflected by a score of 0.

## **Analysis**

### *EB Analysis – Testing Theories of Support for EU Integration*

Table 4.1 displays the OLS regression analysis of the six possible explanations for the degree of citizen discontent on the question of general EU widening. The control variables I use in this analysis are contained in a separate table in Appendix D and as they

are important here only to ensure that they are not confounding the predictions of my theories, I leave interpretation of their effects out of the discussion. Additionally regression analyses for the remaining three dependent variables (the EU in General, Institutions, and Deepening) are included in Appendices E to G. For interpretation of the regression results I refer mainly to the question of increased widening while drawing parallels with the findings of these analyses to support conclusions about the role of each factor on integration support.

In Figure 4.1, I display the factors influencing support for integration across integration questions. The discussion of the regression results proceeds by pointing out the general findings within each theory across state groups. The numbers reported are beta coefficients that have been standardized. Standardizing these coefficients allows me to compare the size of influence of each explanatory variable on the outcome variable. This means that instead of reporting coefficients as one unit change in the IV and the resulting change in the DV while holding all other IVs constant, I measure the variation in standard deviations. In other words, the coefficients mean little in terms of units but provide evidence of the size of the effect of the IVs on the DV and the direction of this effect, while also allowing for a comparison across IVs. This allows me to construct a hierarchy among explanatory factors. I draw only on coefficients for IVs that emerge as statistically significant in the models. I only report variables where I am 95 percent confident that a link between variables exists, these instances are denoted by at least one asterisk (\*): they are based on p-values of 0.05(\*) for 95 percent confidence, 0.01(\*\*) for 99 percent confidence, and 0.001(\*\*\*) for 99.9 percent confidence.

**Table 4.1 – EB Analysis – Explaining Citizen Discontent with EU Widening**

EB Analysis - Explaining Citizen Discontent with EU Widening Across Member States 2008 (during ToL Negotiation and Ratification)				
	EU27	EU6	EU9	EU12
<b>Socio-Economic Explanations</b>				
<i>Party Affiliation</i>				
Left	0.0968***	0.252***	0.114**	-0.0627
Right	-0.0847***	-0.0746	-0.179***	-0.00969
<i>Utilitarian Theory</i>				
Low Financial Capital	-0.156***	-0.0199	-0.253***	-0.155***
High Financial Capital	0.0721**	0.0789	0.0886*	0.0688
High Education	0.138***	0.183***	0.116*	0.133**
Low Education	-0.116***	-0.0907	-0.121**	-0.110*
Professional	-0.0133	0.0444	0.159	-0.132
Manual Worker	-0.0411	-0.0463	-0.0958	-0.00678
Unemployed	0.0355	-0.192*	-0.0108	0.179*
Entrepreneur	-0.0587	-0.0923	-0.148	0.0347
<i>Support for Government</i>				
Support Governing Party	0.309***	0.327***	0.325***	0.251***
<b>Socio-Cultural Explanations</b>				
<i>Cognitive Mobilization Theory</i>				
Never Discuss Politics	-0.156***	-0.0607	-0.251***	-0.0857*
Frequently Discuss Politics	-0.00489	0.148**	-0.0329	-0.0903*
Low Knowledge	0.163***	0.108*	0.137***	0.229***
<i>Political Values Theory</i>				
Materialist	-0.130***	-0.270***	-0.112*	0.119
Post Materialist	0.112***	-0.0153	0.220***	0.0657*
<b>Values</b>				
The Rule of Law	0.0497	0.0571	0.000673	0.0974*
Respect for Human Life	0.130***	0.172***	0.173***	0.0562
Human Rights	0.201***	0.215***	0.206***	0.183***
Individual Freedom	0.0969***	0.106	0.0456	0.142**
Democracy	0.142***	0.136**	0.121**	0.152**
Peace	0.101***	0.113*	0.0404	0.131**
Equality	0.153***	0.230***	0.102*	0.151**
Solidarity	0.237***	0.379***	0.192***	0.139*
Tolerance	0.178***	0.270***	0.223***	0.0864
Religion	0.0277	0.285**	-0.0356	-0.0165
Self Fulfilment	0.0573	0.171*	0.0567	0.0323
Respect for Other Cultures	0.366***	0.461***	0.380***	0.259***
<i>Identity</i>				
European	0.334***	0.513***	0.254***	0.261***
Not European	-0.525***	-0.474***	-0.615***	-0.431***
N	21,374	5,315	7,766	7,427
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.162	0.153	0.17	0.081

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001  
Source: Eurobarometer 69.2: National and European Identity, European Elections, European Values, and Climate Change, March-May 2008

To begin, I observe the validity of socio-economic theories. The first category of explanatory factors reveals that the left-right political spectrum argument which states that affiliation with left leaning parties is likely to produce less support for integration seems to be negated here in the context of the enlargement question only. Party affiliation seems only to positively affect pro-EU enlargement sentiment in EU6 and EU9 member groupings. More liberal individuals within those states are more pro-enlargement, likely due to their tendency to support liberal values of equality and the promotion of equality and individual rights. For this reason, left-wing citizens encourage the enlargement of the union to include member states that will be later bound by the EU's values to promote those ideals within new states.

On all other questions, deepening, the EU in General, and support for EU institutions, the expected relationship between party affiliation and pro-EU sentiment is observed. I anticipated that left-leaning individuals would be less pro-EU. This relationship, although significant, is very small compared to other factors. On the EU in general and support for institutions, left-wing placement is important in later members. The literature explains this phenomenon based on the capitalist nature of EU policies and the threat this poses to individuals who support a strong welfare state.

The utilitarian theory in this model plays an important role in determining support across EU27, and generally across all other EU groupings. The factor that effects support most across groups under the utilitarian theory is education. While financial capital is important, it is less so in original EU6 member states. On the question of increased deepening, education drives the utilitarian calculations in the original six.

Support for the governing party demonstrates a clear positive influence on integration, regardless of the integration question and consistent across all integration groups. As seen in Chapter 2, national governments are clearly pro-integrationist, regardless of the member state and like-mindedness runs very high across political parties as well. Therefore, any support for the governing party should automatically entail support for their policies, which are clearly pro-integration.

Consistent with previous studies, low cognitive mobilization decreases EU support in all groupings except EU12. Only among EU12 on the question of enlargement, does mobilization not predict support based on negative influence of both high and low mobilization variables. Both coefficients for frequent and infrequent discussion of political issues show a significant effect on enlargement yet the coefficient is very small, and in comparison to other factors has little influence. Knowledge of the EU in this case is a more reliable indicator of the link between cognitive mobilization and support for the EU, where frequency of discussion requires low knowledge of the EU in order to entail increased support for enlargement.

This is contradictory to findings of the Flash Eurobarometer in the Netherlands and Ireland following referenda that report that higher knowledge of EU issues should instead inspire greater support. The explanation of this discrepancy may be the measurement used for knowledge where the Flash EB asks individuals about their knowledge level yet this study uses a measure that is not affected by subjectivity of respondents' self-evaluation of their own knowledge.

Political values theory predicts less support for integration among individuals with materialists inclination. This is generally the case for the EU as a whole and state

level controls do not influence this finding. My results are consistent with Eichenberg and Dalton (2007) and support the claim that individuals concerned with materialist values such as fighting rising prices and maintaining order will be increasingly fearful of the effect of an enlarged union on the quality of the national welfare state and maintaining the benefits it currently offers.

European identity is positively correlated with higher support on all forms of integration. The coefficients for 'European' and 'Not European' are both significant across all models and are higher than all other coefficients. This finding is consistent with the studies previously reported confirming that identity is an important driving force of integration support.

On values there is more variation. Respect for other cultures is positively linked to integration across all country groups. Mostly, the other values are positively linked with integration across all groups and questions as well. In fact, none of the values are negatively correlated with integration preference. There are few discernable patterns that emerge and without more extensive value questions, the conclusions of this analysis on values are evocative at best. Those who value respect for human life, peace and self-fulfillment support general EU integration, and individuals displaying concern for the rule of law, respect for human life, peace and respect for other cultures are more likely to support more decision-making by EU institutions. This tendency supports the decision of EU leaders to incorporate these same values within the text of the newly adopted ToL, arguing that such values are the foundation on which the EU was built (Official Journal of the European Union 2007). I turn now to the evaluation of the substantive value of

each of the support for integration theories across integration questions and, in the EVS Analysis, further qualification of the role of values on support for enlargement.

Figure 4.1 illustrates the comparison of the explanatory power of each of the six theories of support on each integration question category. For the purpose of simplification, I do not compare these theories across country groupings but instead across forms of integration. Any state-specific variation is controlled for using the state-level control dummies and dummies for all other state-level factors. Using a technique similar to that of Gabel, I construct a measure for the explanatory power of each theory based on the maximum amount of variation explained by the variables included in that theory. I calculate the distance between significant coefficient values for variables in each theory group which are expected to demonstrate opposite effects on the dependent variable. This calculation enables me to compare the size of the effect of each theory on support for integration. For instance, on support for the EU in general, the size of explanatory power of the Cognitive Mobilization theory is measured by calculating the distance between the coefficients of “Never Discuss Politics” and “Frequently Discuss Politics” ( $0.0678+0.150=0.2178$ ), where individuals who report greater rates of cognitive mobilization demonstrate 0.2178 points higher support for the EU in general. On indicators that are expected to demonstrate opposing effects on the dependent variable yet both have the same effect, the theory is assumed to have no “substantive significance.”

To remain consistent with Gabel’s study, I exclude the coefficient for Low Knowledge from this calculation. On the dimension representing the Utilitarian theory explanation, there are four categories of variables, income, education, skilled occupation, and unskilled occupation. I calculate the difference between the dummy variables, where




applicable, and average the explanation provided by each category across the utilitarian theory.<sup>33</sup> For variables measuring the same tendency within the same category, such as Manual Worker and Unemployed, I take the average coefficient value.<sup>34</sup> Where coefficients are not significant, they are excluded.

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<sup>33</sup> On the EU in general, Low Financial Capital (0.249) + High Financial Capital (0.191) = 0.44, Low Education (0.159) + High Education (0.191) = 0.35. The average explanatory power of the utilitarian theory is therefore 0.3075. On the skilled- unskilled occupations counterpart variables, the coefficients are not significant and are therefore excluded.

<sup>34</sup> On the EU in general, the average for unskilled occupation would be  $(0.114+0.0853)/2=0.09965$

Figure 4.1 – EB Analysis - Explanatory Power of Integration Support Theories



As observed in the evaluation of regression results, identity plays the greatest role in determining support for integration across questions. On institutions and the EU in general, support for government is also a very strong predictor. This is likely due, as mentioned, to the high degree of clear like-mindedness across political elites wherein support for government can easily be taken hand in hand with support for the EU. On institutions, this may be reflective of an overarching tendency to have confidence in government and institutions in general.


In the case of cognitive mobilization it seems to stand up as a theory in the context of trust in institutions, suggesting greater political awareness leads to a greater likelihood to trust the EU and its governing bodies. The most common utilitarian theory visibly falls out as the leading factor in determining integration support here with liberal values, political values and party affiliation not trailing far behind. I suspect, due to the limitations of the EB data, that the types of values included in this analysis (i.e. largely liberal values) ignore much of the potential variation that is dominated by cultural differences between individuals (such as the diversity of values underlying European identity as reflected in Appendix A). I turn therefore to the EVS analysis which provides a more in-depth investigation of the role of value dimensions on enlargement, the form of integration with the greatest citizen opposition across member states.

#### *EVS Analysis – Adding Value*

Prior to drawing conclusions across datasets, it is necessary to compare whether the two different data sets are analogous. Figure 4.2 provides the comparison of the predictive

power of the theories in each dataset (as calculated in Figure 4.1), excluding value dimensions; the corresponding regression table can be found in Appendix H.<sup>35</sup>

**Figure 4.2 – Comparing the Datasets – EVS Analysis vs. EB Analysis**



According to this illustration, in both datasets, European identity still stands out as the strongest predictor of preferences for enlargement. In the EVS analysis, party affiliation is the second highest predictor as opposed to cognitive mobilization. However, this may be due to the party-affiliation question capturing more of the variation which would otherwise be attributed to the political values theory.<sup>36</sup> The EB reflects this finding with a coefficient for protection of freedom of speech higher than any of the other materialist/post-materialist indicators and with the same positive effect.

On the direction of the effects of each of these measures, the two datasets reveal almost identical results for all indicators including demographic factors such as age and country of residence. This is the case for all countries except Lithuania, which can be

<sup>35</sup> In this comparison analysis I exclude factors which are unique to a particular dataset.

<sup>36</sup> When run without the left-right indicator, the EVS study reveals that the post-materialist measure under political values theory, 'protecting freedom of speech' is significant in predicting enlargement attitudes.

explained by the enlargement question being used in the two analyses. In the case of Lithuania, citizens are anti-enlargement in general yet demonstrate significantly pro-enlargement tendencies on the widening measure, which includes attitudes toward inclusion of Turkey, Macedonia, and Croatia. This indicates that citizens in this country although they may be in favor of enlargement to include one of these countries, they are skeptical to accept enlargement in general (reflected by a positive correlation between all individual enlargement indicators but a negative response to enlargement in general). This Figure, along with a statistical test of variance on the same indicators, reveals that both datasets are representative<sup>37</sup> of the same population and variance is similar across all EU27 countries.

My investigation turns to the EVS dataset for investigation of the underlying role of values in determining support for further integration. Analysis on the types of values present in the European member states exist and are rather extensive. These value-based investigations do not relate differences to degrees of support for EU integration. Determining differences based on value variations across the EU contribute substantially to the understanding of preferences. In Table 4.2 and 4.3, I present the results of the regression analysis for all explanatory factors on enlargement preferences using the EVS dataset. The data presented are from the same regression but are split into two tables by socio-economic versus socio-cultural theories to improve readability. Control variables are placed in Appendix I. Coefficients are standardized as in the previous analyses and

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<sup>37</sup> A variance ratio test (F test) of the two datasets comparing the means, standard deviations and standard errors also reveals with 99 percent confidence that the variance of the two samples on the enlargement question are equal. Therefore, for the purpose of this analysis, based on similar wording of the enlargement question, similar findings on the predictions of each independent variable, and a confident rejection of the null that the two samples have unequal variance is sufficient to demonstrate that the samples and integration question are comparable.

are interpreted in the same way. I have specified models as in Table 4.1 for EU enlargement groups.

**Table 4.2 – EVS Analysis – Socio-Economic Explanation for Citizen Discontent**

EVS Analysis - Socio-Economic Explanation for Citizen Discontent with EU Widening Across Member States 2008 (during ToL Negotiation and Ratification)					
		EU27	EU6	EU9	EU12
<i>Socio-Economic Explanations</i>					
<b>Party Affiliation</b>					
	Left	0.189**	0.304*	0.168	-0.0315
	Right	-0.121	-0.0674	-0.351*	0.000291
<b>Utilitarian Theory</b>					
	High Financial Capital	-0.0307*	-0.0399	0.0138	-0.0624*
	High Education	-0.0802	0.119	-0.380**	0.00294
	Low Education	0.0138	-0.136	0.125	0.029
	Unemployed	-0.18	-0.213	0.0484	-0.277
<b>Support for Government</b>					
	Support Governing Party	0.218***	0.0469	0.220**	0.325***
<b>N</b>		11,169	3,070	3,105	4,994
<b>Adj. R<sup>2</sup></b>		0.211	0.2	0.223	0.176

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001  
Source: European Values Study 2008

**Table 4.3 – EVS Analysis – Socio-Cultural Explanation for Citizen Discontent**

EVS Analysis - Socio-Cultural Explanation for Citizen Discontent with EU Widening Across Member States 2008 (during ToL Negotiation and Ratification)					
	EU27	EU6	EU9	EU12	
<i>Socio-Cultural Explanations</i>					
<b>Cognitive Mobilization Theory</b>	Never Discuss Politics	-0.00121	0.155	0.197	-0.206*
	Frequently Discuss Politics	-0.0359	-0.106	0.105	-0.111
<b>Political Values Theory</b>	Materialist	-0.203	-0.338	-0.275	-0.00544
	Post Materialist	-0.0506	-0.259	-0.0263	0.0667
<b>EU Fears</b>	Fear about building the EU (not afraid)	0.229***	0.266***	0.242***	0.193***
<b>Religious values</b>	1. Outlooks toward religion (not important)	0.00517	0.027	-0.105	0.0794
	2. Orientations toward religious ceremonies (not important)	0.0488	-0.216	0.0848	0.103
	3. Orientations toward afterlife (do not believe)	-0.0629	0.114	0.0997	-0.221*
<b>Orientation toward Institutions</b>	4. Orientations toward institutions (not confident)	-0.0421	-0.357*	-0.0872	0.108
	5. Orientations toward government organizations (not confident)	-0.291***	-0.294***	-0.343***	-0.229***
<b>Orientations toward work</b>	7. Orientations toward work (not important)	-0.0756*	-0.0172	-0.0239	-0.188**
	8. Workplace motivations (not important)	-0.329***	0.00647	-0.506**	-0.285*
<b>Tolerance Values</b>	9. Orientations toward immigrants (accepting)	0.273***	0.318***	0.313***	0.211***
	10. Orientations toward marginalized groups (unconcerned)	0.0281	-0.0334	-0.056	0.136*
	11. Orientations toward neighbors (unconcerned)	-0.0699	-0.164*	0.0131	-0.0807
<b>Moral and Ethical Values</b>	12. Civil Permissiveness (permissive)	-0.0675**	0.0235	0.0197	-0.165***
	13. Moral Permissiveness (permissive)	0.0191	-0.0392	0.112**	-0.0046
	14. Orientations toward abortion (non-permissive)	-0.00593	-0.0255	-0.102	0.0757
<b>Family Values</b>	15. Orientations children (not important)	-0.157**	-0.00765	-0.293**	-0.148
	16. Sociocultural orientations toward marriage (heterogeneity)	0.133*	0.255*	-0.0118	0.143
	17. Interpersonal orientations toward marriage(non-reciprocal)	0.0406	0.0453	0.0525	0.022
	18. Orientations toward gender roles (inequality)	-0.0377	-0.181	0.209	-0.06
	19. Orientations toward women and work (women should work)	0.0596	-0.0385	0.155*	0.0689
<b>Political Values</b>	20. Orientations toward civil activism (never)	-0.0289	-0.151	0.220*	-0.0733
	21. Orientations toward Democracy (democracy works)	0.104**	0.0283	0.0568	0.162***
	22. Orientations toward politics (not important)	-0.0483	0.0233	-0.148*	-0.0132
<b>Postmodern Values</b>	23. Orientations toward leisure (not important)	-0.0773	-0.0999	-0.128	-0.0637
<b>Identity</b>	European	0.452***	0.278	0.946***	0.0855
N	11,169	3,070	3,105	4,994	
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.211	0.2	0.223	0.176	

\* p&lt;0.05, \*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\*\* p&lt;0.001

Source: European Values Study 2008

Through the incorporation of values in the analysis, I find that certain differences can be observed when compared to the EB analysis. Factors that were previously important in determining support for the EU are no longer significant. On party affiliation, the previous analysis revealed that left-wing citizens are more supportive of enlargement; this finding is confirmed here in original EU6 and EU9 countries.

Where education drove the utilitarian calculation for support of enlargement in EU6 states the power of the utilitarian theory is diminished in these groups by value effects. Utilitarian theory calculations based on financial capital remain important in EU12 members and on human capital in EU9. The clear effect of support for government theory is further corroborated by the EVS analysis, regardless of the addition of other explanatory factors. In EU6 only the support for government explanation falls out, it is replaced in these cases with values of confidence in institutions and acceptance of immigrants.

Cognitive mobilization was an important driving force, where individuals who discussed politics often were more likely to be aware of political integration in the EU and would therefore be more supportive of it. Previous research was confirmed by the EB analysis wherein greater cognitive mobilization had a positive effect on views of enlargement. Although this remains the case according to the EVS analysis, it is only a significant relationship in EU12 countries. Accordingly, citizens who never discuss politics are less likely to favor enlargement. In all other country groups other factors influence integration preferences.

Political values had proven to be largely insignificant compared to other indicators in the previous analysis which is also consistent with previous research.



Depending on the model, it was found that this factor either fell out completely or was among the least powerful explanations of EU support. According to the EVS analysis, I can further confirm that, on enlargement, citizens' materialist or post-materialist values are insignificant in predicting their attitudes toward the inclusion of additional member states in the EU.

Across all models there is a significant effect of fear about the building of the EU and this remains strong regardless of controlling for underlying values. Prior work had suggested this phenomenon and the findings of this analysis can confidently uphold these conclusions. While this fear is important, the values that underlie decision-making in every model remain significantly more powerful. Although it remains strong in a few of the models, only certain countries consider European identity more so than other factors such as those values that underlie this identity. In the cases of EU9, European identity is stronger than perceived threat caused by integration. In other country groupings, orientations toward government and institutions, orientations toward immigrants and values regarding the importance of work are significantly more powerful in driving these attitudes than both identity and the perception of threat.

Values have thus taken over much of the influence of other factors in this analysis where materialist and post-materialist considerations are likely replaced with orientations toward government and institutions, left-right political placement by orientations toward immigration and civil activism, and cognitive mobilization by orientations toward democracy and politics.


This analysis reveals that, in all cases, European identity, values of orientation toward institutions, or orientations toward immigration have the greatest effect on public

opinion toward European enlargement. For a clearer view of the power of each of these explanations, the next section compares all integration support theories based on the power of each of the indicators that make up those theories.

*A Hierarchical Model of Support for Integration across Member States*

Figure 4.3 provides a ranking of integration support theories similar to the model created in the EB analysis after Gabel demonstrating substantive significance. Although there are variations based on the specification of different models, interpretation of variation at the level of EU27 allows for further clarification of the conclusions drawn from the various EU studies from which this analysis was designed.


**Figure 4.3 – EVS Analysis - Integration Support Theories in EU27**



I can observe from Figure 4.3 that, as posited by McLaren (2002), there is more to citizen opinion in the EU than the utilitarian calculations commonly proposed in the literature. Although she rejected utilitarian concerns in favor of the influence of perceived cultural threat, I find on the contrary that European identity on its own is the driving force behind support for enlargement. This result further corroborates the findings displayed in Figure 4.1 of this chapter using different data and controlling for more factors.

In the previous analysis, when controlling for liberal values such as those entrenched in the ToL, support for government stands out as the second most influential factor to identity. In the current analysis, more diverse values are examined to capture both liberal and conservative orientations, inclinations toward marginalized groups and diverse areas such as moral and ethical tolerance and orientations toward work and family. I find when observing the aggregate of EU27 member states, that support for government loses much of its predictive power, replaced instead by values of tolerance and orientations toward institutions. Comparing the explanatory power of integration support theories at the aggregate level, although it offers a ‘big picture’ view of what may be most important in driving public preferences, it ignores the fluctuations across state groupings. Figure 4.4 illustrates the differences that can be observed between these groups.

Figure 4.4 – EVS Analysis - Integration Support Theories in EU6, EU9, and EU12



At the level of EU enlargement groups I find somewhat different results than at the aggregate level. Where European identity seems to be the most important driving factor of citizen preferences for EU27, Figure 4.4 reveals instead that identity is important only in EU9 countries. Due to recent membership of EU12 countries it is likely that citizens have yet to adopt a strong European identity and therefore attitudes to EU building are based on some other factor. In this grouping I find that support for government explains the most variation in public opinion on enlargement within the newest wave of widening. Accession to the EU is the most recent and visible form of integration that has occurred in these member states. In several cases, at the time of the survey used here, the governments that signed and ratified accession treaties are still in power. The strength of this factor therefore suggests that individuals that are satisfied with decisions made on their behalf by national governments are more likely to support ongoing decisions made by them.

In both EU9 and EU12 groupings although each exhibit at least ten significant explanations for attitudes toward enlargement, orientations toward work are the second most important determinant. To understand the reason for this tendency it is necessary to look at the variables that underlie the orientations toward work value dimension and the direction of its influence of EU support. According to this dimension, questions capture the factors that motivate individuals to be fulfilled by their work. According to the regression in Table 4.3, the less likely respondents are to seek out things that will improve their work life, the less supportive of EU building they are. This can be stated in reverse as well: the greater individual tendency to seek out fulfillment in work, the more pro-integration they will be. Those people are likely to see the EU as an opportunity to

achieve such fulfillment by benefitting from the increased standardization of labor and subsequently improved working conditions, as well as increased job opportunities resulting from freedom of labor movement in the Union.

EU6 member states reveal less diverse explanations for enlargement preferences. The driving factor is orientations toward institutions. Through reference again to the regression table and description of value dimensions, I can conclude that the link between orientations toward institutions and support for enlargement are influenced by overall confidence in governmental organizations, not limited only to the EU but including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations (UN) as well. This result would suggest that individuals in earlier member states have become accustomed to the institutionalization of supranational organizations in the nation state. Long term exposure to the effects of membership in such organizations should thus provide citizens with clear feelings on the ability their organizational effectiveness. This is measured through confidence in the organization, where increased confidence gives way to willingness to allow national powers to the supranational level through increased integration.

Finally in the EU6, party affiliation figures as second to trust in institutions. The result on this measure is driven by respondents who report a left-leaning ideology. This finding is corroborated by a consistently high result for the factor of fear of other cultures. Strong left-leaning ideology is associated with higher support for enlargement based on the underlying value of support for equal rights and inclusiveness of others commonly associated with leftist ideals. A lack of such a tendency toward inclusiveness

is reflected in the desire to protect national culture expressed through the fear of EU construction.

### **Conclusion**

In this chapter, I set out to answer the final research question of this thesis: What *explains* the degree of citizens' discontent? I conclude based on the findings of the analyses contained herein that there is far more to the integration question than the mainly socio-economic calculations traditionally used in EU literature. In an enlarged Union with varying cultures and individual values, common identity plays the greatest role in uniting citizens on all integration questions. The values underlying this identity may also be dividing the EU on the question of further enlargement.

I find that even when controlling for factors drawn from common support for integration theories, the main factors driving opposition to enlargement in the EU at the aggregate level are identity, fears of perceived threat to national culture, lack of trust in institutions and low tolerance of others. These values are potentially detrimental to the future of EU construction, at least insofar as the addition of new member states. On identity, I can conclude with confidence that it plays a leading role in deciding pro or anti-EU orientations, regardless of the question. Without additional data on values for other integration questions, I cannot make any conclusive assumptions on their role in promoting institutional deepening or the EU in general. I can conclude based on the similarities I establish between the predictive powers of factors between the EB and EVS datasets, that values likely play a key role in influencing public opinion on all forms of integration.



This tendency for identity to influence opinion on the other hand is determined mainly by member states in the EU9. In the original six members, confidence in government organizations in general outside of just the EU, explains the greatest variation in support for enlargement. In the most recent enlargement group, support for national government is the greatest motivating factor for enlargement support. Factors that are important at the aggregate level such as tolerance values remain significant but are less important than other factors in the models resulting from the time at which states joined the EU.

## CHAPTER 5 –IS DISCONTENT A GENERAL PHENOMENON?

Response to the general question of this thesis is divided into four research questions, the answers to which I display in Table 5.1 and discuss below:

**Table 5.1 – Research Findings**

Research Question	Findings
(RQ <sub>1</sub> ) What is the degree of permissive consensus in the EU?	General EU citizen support is declining (since the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993), indicating the end of permissive consensus.
(RQ <sub>2</sub> ) Is discontent with the ToL a general phenomenon across all member states?	Discontent with the ToL is present in Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and the UK but is <i>not</i> a general phenomenon across all member states (why discontent is higher in these countries remains unclear).
(RQ <sub>3</sub> ) What is the <i>nature</i> of citizen discontent?	While citizens are voting against deepening from 2006-2009, discontent is actually highest on the question of EU widening (enlargement).
(RQ <sub>4</sub> ) What <i>explains</i> citizen discontent?	My findings are divided by enlargement group as follows, listing only the most important integration support theory observed in each group. EU27: European identity EU6: Trust in intergovernmental organizations EU9: European identity EU12: Support for national government

### Findings

According to previous studies on permissive consensus, elites have successfully pushed integration forward in the EU thanks to a reliance on general public support for integration. Chapter 2 of this project reveals that this general support among citizens is on the decline. The trend began with the Maastricht Treaty and dropped from its all-time high of 71 percent immediately prior to the treaty in 1991 to 53 percent by 2009 when the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force. This offers empirical evidence that confirms speculations in the literature of declining permissive consensus, while extending the

timeline beyond the TCE. I conclude on RQ<sub>1</sub> that permissive consensus has come to an end.

RQ<sub>2</sub> measures whether negative voting on the TCE and the subsequent ToL reflects opposition to further integration in all 27 members or solely in those countries that experienced failed referenda. My findings reveal that only in Sweden, Denmark, Finland and the UK are citizens actually opposed to the elements contained in the TCE (and the substantively similar ToL). The remaining member states support the treaties' deepening changes at rates higher than 50 percent. I can conclude with confidence from this analysis that discontent with the ToL is *not* a general phenomenon across all member states. Rather it ranges from very low (21 percent opposition in Lithuania) to very high discontent (68 percent opposition in Sweden), the aggregate rate of support is 64.5 percent. I have not yet determined an explanation for the presence of these outliers among my empirical findings but will address this issue in future research.

In those countries that voted against the TCE or the ToL, I find that support in all cases is above 55 percent. Had citizens been voting on the *content* of the treaty in these countries they would not have encountered such ratification issues. I propose therefore that the rejection of these treaties was grounded in opposition to some other EU issue, which leads my analysis into the third question.

There are varying conclusions in the literature on the reasons why citizens rejected the TCE and ToL when given the chance to vote. My analysis thus seeks to determine, what citizens were discontent with when they opposed deepening. Chapter 3 evaluates the many possible forms of EU-building to which citizens may have been opposed and I find that greatest contention is on the question of future enlargement. For

all EU groups combined, support for enlargement is only 46.6 percent; lower than any other type of integration. Support for enlargement is lowest in EU6 (36.1 percent in favor) and EU9 (42.7 percent in favor) enlargement groups. This is further supported by calculating, for those citizens who are against an EU constitution, what else they oppose. Results reveal that discontent with the treaty is most likely affected by discontent with enlargement where 64.2 percent of those who are anti-constitutional treaty are also against EU widening. The answer to RQ<sub>3</sub> is therefore, that the nature of citizen discontent in the EU can be largely described as aversion to further widening.

Based on my finding that discontent is highest on EU enlargement, I sought to investigate what motivates such opposition. Most literature investigates discontent with the EU in *general* and therefore I set out to determine what underlies the formation of citizens' opinions on the various forms of integration. When comparing common theories of support for regional integration, I find that regardless of the type of integration, the level of European identity plays the most important role in influencing EU support. The finding calls into question the most common conclusion found in the literature which is that opinion is driven by utilitarian calculations based on levels of human and financial capital.

Although the analysis reveals that values and identity explain more variation in the degree of support than other factors (see Figure 4.1), it did not allow for investigation of which values are most important in driving opinion on integration. I reproduced the same investigation, therefore, using the European Values Study which offers a multitude of value dimensions from which to draw explanatory factors. Values are a novel explanation for public support for integration which has been mentioned by the literature

yet not ever empirically tested. I conduct the analysis on the question of enlargement which is the most contentious of integration forms. Doing so, I further confirm that public opinion, across all 27 member states and within the three enlargement groups, is not influenced foremost by utilitarian calculations.

In response to RQ<sub>4</sub> therefore, although there are large variations based on enlargement group (i.e. EU6, EU9, EU12, or EU27), I found that European identity at the aggregate level is the most important factor in determining attitudes toward EU enlargement, followed closely by trust in government (at the national and supranational levels), and values of tolerance (especially acceptance of immigrants). When enlargement groups are observed in isolation of each other I find that identity remains important in EU9 member states but is superseded in the EU12 by degree of support for national government and by orientations toward government organizations in EU6. I have thus successfully confirmed that the socio-cultural explanation of values underlying individual decision-making in the EU is an important alternative (see Figures 4.3 and 4.4) to popular theories of support for integration.

### **Implications**

This study has served to contest many of the varying findings on public opinion in the EU. The first of these is the tendency to focus solely on the EU in *general* when examining public opinion or to assume citizens were opposed to a constitution when voting against the TCE and ToL in referenda. Considering the findings of RQ3 that opposition in the Union is mainly to enlargement, implications are both theoretical and practical. The theoretical implication is to identify the gap in public opinion literature

where a distinction between different types of integration (i.e. deepening versus widening) is being largely overlooked. Practically, based on widespread opposition to enlargement, pro-EU elites may consider limiting the growth of the EU to encourage higher public support for deepening. In turn, it is plausible that the launch of accession talks with Macedonia in March 2012 and the scheduled membership of Croatia in 2013 will negatively impact public opinion even further in coming years.

In addition to an exhaustive study of all explanatory factors found in the literature, this research also investigates the role of values in forming public opinion on enlargement. The implications of this observation are again twofold. First, my findings build on existing theories of support for regional integration, suggesting that factors driving integration support are not socio-economic but socio-cultural in nature. Second, in practice in order for the Union to successfully endure it will be necessary for pro-EU elites to become more attentive to this diversity in values within the EU to in turn accommodate the varying preferences that emerge. Understanding the disparity in preferences is crucial in order for elites to make informed and representative decisions for the future deepening of European integration.

With increased value diversity, actions taken unanimously by pro-European elites are less likely to reflect the interests of all citizens. Decision-making should consider underlying socio-cultural characteristics of citizens by focusing on identity and trust at both the national and supranational levels.

### **Caveats and Future Research**

My first caveat is that this study limits the analysis to observations across enlargement groups (EU6, EU9, and EU12) commonly used in the literature, except where variation in support for the ToL was examined by country (Figures 2.2 and 2.3). Observation of variation within additional country groups and at the individual state level was not possible in this study as interpretations would be extensive and far beyond the scope of this work.

A more extensive study that will address my first caveat will include discussion of the variation in countries individually (e.g. why support for deepening is lowest in Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and the UK) and across groups (based on Eurozone membership, north-south geographical position, state left-right placement, population size, size of the welfare state, and EU budget contributions).

The second caveat of my research concerns my focus in the RQ<sub>4</sub> EVS Analysis on enlargement only. To establish generalizability of my findings across different types of integration (both enlargement and deepening), I would have to combine two datasets (i.e. the multiple EBs and the EVS). Doing so entails that my observations drop to only 27 cases which affects my ability to make predictions with any statistical significance.

In response to the second caveat, although I cannot collect additional data, it would be possible to conduct the analysis at the aggregate level by grouping variables based on their averages at the sub-regional level (i.e. component units within the member states) rather than at the state level. In doing so I could combine the Eurobarometer and European Values Study and replicate the RQ<sub>4</sub> analyses providing for the creation of a

hierarchy of factors that can also explain support for the EU in general and deepening (treaty changes and the Euro).

The third caveat to this study lies in the technique used for the creation of value dimensions (e.g. religious values, political values, etc.) and is problematic in two ways. First, the exploratory factor analysis creates value dimensions that are not grounded in theory, it solely groups values based on their propensity to vary with each other (for instance: within political values there is a tendency for individuals to respond similarly to both questions whether politics are important in their life and if they are interested in politics). The questions are not grouped together because intuitively it makes sense or because the literature has suggested that they are measuring similar things. Instead, the technique groups these items together through analysis of their common variation.

The second limitation of the exploratory factor analysis is that it ignores any tendency for value groupings to have interacting effects on support for integration. This interaction effect may not be captured by including all dimensions separately in the same regression. For instance there may be a link between orientations toward government organizations and orientations toward immigrants (e.g. it is plausible that lack of confidence in government organizations does not alone influence support for the EU but rather that individuals with low confidence in government organizations *and* low tolerance of immigration are less supportive of integration).

The two issues within the third caveat will also be remedied in future analysis. The first solution does not draw theoretical expectations from existing literature as very little research has been done to predict what kind of values contribute to greater integration support. Instead, I will strengthen my findings by repeating the same analysis



in different time periods (prior to and post 2006-2009), within and across country groups (single countries and groups such as Eurozone, net contributors, etc.), and in different contexts of regional integration (e.g. the North Atlantic Treaty Organization). Doing so will also contribute to the gap in the theoretical literature.

I will address the second limitation within caveat three in future analyses by conducting a log linear analysis. Such an analysis offers insight into the power of the interaction between independent variables when explaining variation on the dependent variable. The technique identifies what factors explain variation on the DV alone and which require the presence of a certain response on another variable to illicit variation in the DV (e.g. individual is pro-EU when pro-governmental organization alone or also tolerant of immigration). This will then permit me to create new variables accounting for the interaction between factors, in turn reducing the number of variables in the regression and contributing to greater parsimony.

The fourth caveat of this research is reliance solely on individual values rather than value differences between individuals. In other words, I investigate here the role of level of religiosity in determining support for the EU, rather than the role of simply having a different level of religiosity from someone else in the Union.

This will be addressed in future analysis by observing the distance between groups. Such an analysis will be conducted by establishing, for each survey respondent, the distance between their personal values on different dimensions and average citizen values on each of those same dimensions at different levels. For instance, new variables would be created by calculating the difference between one individual's score on their level of religiosity (e.g. highly religious) and the average score of all citizens in that

individual's country (e.g. overall not at all religious). The same comparison can be made between the individual and the average score of those in different country groups (EU6, large welfare states, etc.), and the average of all EU27 citizens.

The final caveat concerns the limitation of my timeline to the 2006-2009 timeline, (the context of the Treaty of Lisbon). I am interested in extending this timeline to determine whether my findings are generalizable across time, thus serving to improve the robustness of my conclusions and ultimately making a significant contribution to the integration support theory literature

I will address this final caveat by reproducing the same analyses from RQ<sub>3</sub> and RQ<sub>4</sub> in different contexts. For instance, a strong empirical test of the validity and strength of my conclusions will be to test the socio-cultural explanation in the context of a purely economic treaty (i.e. the European Stability Mechanism currently being ratified). This investigation will permit me to observe whether the socio-cultural explanation holds in a context where one would intuitively expect individual calculations to be entirely directed by economic factors along (such as human and financial capital).

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## APPENDICES

**Appendix A – Values that Define European Identity**

Explaining What it Means to be "European" Across Member States  
2008 (during ToL Negotiation and Ratification)


1. Outlooks toward religion (not important)	0.761***
2. Orientations toward religious ceremonies (not important)	-0.36
3. Orientations toward afterlife (do not believe)	-0.71
4. Orientations toward institutions (not confident)	-0.14
5. Orientations toward government organizations (not confident)	-0.502***
6. Orientations toward the EU (no fear)	0.0819**
7. Orientations toward work (not important)	0.112
8. Workplace motivations (not important)	-0.18
9. Orientations toward immigrants (permissive)	0.146***
10. Orientations toward marginalized groups (unconcerned)	0.117
11. Orientations toward neighbors (unconcerned)	-0.09
12. Civil Permissiveness (permissive)	0.0402
13. Moral Permissiveness (permissive)	0.00111
14. Orientations toward abortion (non-permissive)	0.0583
15. Orientations children (not important)	-0.01
16. Sociocultural orientations toward marriage (heterogeneity)	0.226
17. Interpersonal orientations toward marriage (non-reciprocal)	-0.08
18. Orientations toward gender roles (inequality)	-0.05
19. Orientations toward women and work (women should work)	-0.15
20. Orientations toward civil activism (never)	-0.15
21. Orientations toward Democracy (democracy works)	-0.004
22. Orientations toward politics (not important)	-0.19
23. Orientations toward leisure (not important)	-0.39

N 4,577

Chi2(23)=144.17 p<0.001

\*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Source: European Values Study 2008

**Appendix B – Scree Plot for Value Dimensions**

## Appendix C – EVS Questions for Value Dimensions

Value Dimensions of the 2008 European Values Study

<p><b>Religious values</b></p> <p><i>1. Outlooks toward religion (not important)</i></p> <p>v129 how important is God in your life (Q36) v132 how often do you pray to God outside religious services (Q39) v119 do you believe in: God (Q30A) v114 are you a religious person (Q28) v130 do you get comfort and strength from religion (Q37)</p> <p>v6 how important in your life: religion (Q1F) v120 do you believe in: life after death (Q30B) v109 how often attend religious services (Q25) v205 how much confidence in: church (Q63A) v125 which statement closest to your beliefs (Q32) v131 do you take moments of prayer/meditation (Q38) v123 do you believe in: sin (Q30E) v105 do you belong to a religious denomination (Q23) v128 only one true religion or no religion offers any truths (Q35) v127 how spiritual are you (Q34) v178 learn children at home: religious faith (Q52I)</p> <p><i>2. Orientations toward religious ceremonies (not important)</i></p> <p>v111 religious service important: birth (Q27A) v112 religious service important: marriage (Q27B) v113 religious service important: death (Q27C)</p> <p><i>3. Orientations toward afterlife (do not believe)</i></p> <p>v121 do you believe in: hell (Q30C) v122 do you believe in: heaven (Q30D)</p>	<p><b>Orientations toward work</b></p> <p><i>7. Orientations toward work (not important)</i></p> <p>v96 work comes always first (Q18E) v95 work is a duty towards society (Q18D) v94 people turn lazy not working (Q18C) v92 job needed to develop talents (Q18A) v93 humiliating receiving money without working (Q18B)</p> <p><i>8. Workplace motivations (not important)</i></p> <p>v74 important in a job: use initiative (Q14F) v82 important in a job: learning new skills (Q14N) v84 important in a job: have a say (Q14P) v76 important in a job: generous holidays (Q14H) v71 important in a job: not too much pressure (Q14C) v75 important in a job: useful for society (Q14G) v79 important in a job: responsible job (Q14K) v81 important in a job: meeting abilities (Q14M) v78 important in a job: achieving something (Q14J) v83 important in a job: family friendly (Q14O) v85 important in a job: people treated equally (Q14Q) v77 important in a job: meeting people (Q14I) v80 important in a job: interesting job (Q14L) v70 important in a job: pleasant people (Q14B)</p>
<p><b>Orientation toward Institutions</b></p> <p><i>4. Orientations toward institutions (not confident)</i></p> <p>v221 how much confidence in: political parties (Q63Q) v211 how much confidence in: parliament (Q63G) v222 how much confidence in: government (Q63R) v212 how much confidence in: civil service (Q63H) v218 how much confidence in: justice system (Q63N) v213 how much confidence in: social security system (Q63I) v217 how much confidence in: health care system (Q63M) v210 how much confidence in: the police (Q63F)</p> <p>v207 how much confidence in: education system (Q63C) v206 how much confidence in: armed forces (Q63B) v209 how much confidence in: trade unions (Q63E) v219 how much confidence in: major companies (Q63O) v220 how much confidence in: environmental organizations (Q63P) v208 how much confidence in: the press (Q63D)</p> <p><i>5. Orientations toward government organizations (not confident)</i></p> <p>v215 how much confidence in: NATO (Q63K) v216 how much confidence in: united nations organisation (Q63L) v214 how much confidence in: european union (Q63J)</p>	<p><b>Tolerance Values</b></p> <p><i>9. Orientations toward immigrants (permissive)</i></p> <p>v272 immigrants will become a threat to society (Q78E) v271 immigrants are a strain on welfare system (Q78D) v270 immigrants increase crime problems (Q78C) v268 immigrants take away jobs from [nationality] (Q78A) v269 immigrants undermine countrys cultural life (Q78B) v275 immigrants living in your country: there are too many (Q79B) v102 jobs are scarce: giving... (nation) priority (Q21A)</p> <p><i>10. Orientations toward marginalized groups (unconcerned)</i></p> <p>v293 are you concerned with living conditions of: sick and disabled (Q84D) v294 are you concerned with living conditions of: poor children (Q84E) v290 are you concerned with living conditions of: elderly people (Q84A)</p> <p>v291 are you concerned with living conditions of: unemployed people (Q84B) v292 are you concerned with living conditions of: immigrants (Q84C)</p> <p><i>11. Orientations toward neighbors (unconcerned)</i></p> <p>v286 are you concerned with living conditions of: people own region (Q83C) v287 are you concerned with living conditions of: fellow countrymen (Q83D) v288 are you concerned with living conditions of: europeans (Q83E) v285 are you concerned with living conditions of: people neighbourhood (Q83B)</p> <p>v289 are you concerned with living conditions of: humankind (Q83F)</p>

## Value Dimensions of the 2008 European Values Study continued...

Moral and Ethical Values	Political Values
<p><b>12. Civil Permissiveness (permissive)</b></p> <p>v234 do you justify: cheating on tax (Q68B) v238 do you justify: adultery (Q68F) v239 do you justify: accepting a bribe (Q68G) v245 do you justify: paying cash to avoid taxes (Q68M) v237 do you justify: lying in own interest (Q68E)</p> <p>v236 do you justify: taking soft drugs (Q68D) v247 do you justify: avoiding fare public transport (Q68O) v233 do you justify: claiming state benefits (Q68A) v235 do you justify: joyriding (Q68C)</p> <p><b>13. Moral Permissiveness (permissive)</b></p> <p>v240 do you justify: homosexuality (Q68H) v242 do you justify: divorce (Q68J) v243 do you justify: euthanasia (Q68K) v246 do you justify: having casual sex (Q68N) v251 do you justify: invitro fertilization (Q68S) v250 do you justify: manipulation food (Q68R) v252 do you justify: death penalty (Q68T) v249 do you justify: experiments human embryos (Q68Q) v248 do you justify: prostitution (Q68P) v244 do you justify: suicide (Q68L)</p> <p><b>14. Orientations toward abortion (non-permissive)</b></p> <p>v184 abortion if woman not married approve/disapprove (Q53A) v185 abortion if couple doesnt want more children approve/disapprove (Q53B) v241 do you justify: abortion (Q68I)</p>	<p><b>20. Orientations toward civil activism (never)</b></p> <p>v189 attending lawful demonstrations (Q55C) v190 joining unofficial strikes (Q55D) v188 joining in boycotts (Q55B) v187 signing a petition (Q55A) v191 occupying buildings/factories (Q55E)</p> <p><b>21. Orientations toward Democracy (democracy works)</b></p> <p>v231 democracy: is indecisive (Q67C) v232 democracy: cannot maintain order (Q67D) v230 democracy: causes bad economy (Q67B)</p> <p><b>22. Orientations toward politics (not important)</b></p> <p>v5 how important in your life: politics (Q1E) v186 how interested are you in politics (Q54)</p>
<p><b>Family Values</b></p> <p><b>15. Orientations children (not important)</b></p> <p>v152 men need children in order to be fulfilled (Q47A) v149 women need children in order to be fulfilled (Q44) v156 duty towards society to have children (Q47E) v153 long-term relationship necessary to be happy (Q47B) v145 important in marriage: children (Q42J) v158 It is child's duty to take care of ill parent (Q47G) v148 children need both parents to grow up happily (Q43)</p> <p><b>16. Sociocultural orientations toward marriage (heterogeneity)</b></p> <p>v139 important in marriage: shared religious beliefs (Q42D) v138 important in marriage: same social background (Q42C) v137 important in marriage: adequate income (Q42B) v140 important in marriage: good housing (Q42E) v141 important in marriage: agreement on politics (Q42F)</p> <p><b>17. Interpersonal orientations toward marriage (non-reciprocal)</b></p> <p>v143 important in marriage: happy sexual relationship (Q42H) v144 important in marriage: share household chores (Q42I) v146 important in marriage: discuss problems (Q42K) v142 important in marriage: live apart from in-laws (Q42G) v147 important in marriage: time for friends and personal hobbies (Q42L)</p> <p><b>18. Orientations toward gender roles (inequality)</b></p> <p>v166 men should take the same responsibility for home and children (Q48H) v165 fathers as well suited to look after children as mothers (Q48G) v164 husband+wife contribute to household income (Q48F) v159 working mother warm relationship with children (Q48A) v163 job best way for independence women (Q48E) v157 people should decide themselves to have children (Q47F)</p> <p><b>19. Orientations toward women and work (women should work)</b></p> <p>v160 pre-school child suffers with working mother (Q48B) v161 women really want home and children (Q48C) v162 being housewife as fulfilling as paid job (Q48D)</p>	<p><b>Postmodern Values</b></p> <p><b>23. Orientations toward leisure (not important)</b></p> <p>v98 leisure time: relaxing (Q19B) v100 leisure time: learning something new (Q19D) v99 leisure time: doing as I want (Q19C) v97 leisure time: meeting nice people (Q19A) v4 how important in your life: leisure time (Q1D)</p>

### Appendix D – EB Analysis for Integration Widening – Control Variables

EB Analysis - Explaining Citizen Discontent with EU Widening Across Member States					
2008 (during ToL Negotiation and Ratification)-Control Variables					
		Model 1			
		EU27	EU6	EU9	EU12
<i>Control Variables</i>					
	Age	-0.00540***	-0.00532**	-0.00677***	-0.00386*
	Female	-0.160***	-0.182***	-0.220***	-0.124***
	Retired	0.0114	0.25	0.0842	-0.137
	Student	0.0766	0.493***	0.19	-0.221*
	Farmer	-0.123	-0.199	-0.176	-0.0673
	Homemaker	-0.0119	0.204	0.132	-0.207
	Small Welfare State	-0.443***	-0.823***		
	Large Welfare State	-0.223**	0.663***	-0.0197	
	North	-0.284***	-0.0189	0.370***	
	Micro State	-0.713***			
	Small State	0.0164	0.566***		
	Medium State			0.505***	
	Large State	-0.236***	-0.427***		
	Left State	0.202**	1.182***	0.658***	
	Net Contributor	-0.723***	-0.707***	-0.194*	-0.370***
	Belgium	0.153			
	Germany	-0.279***	-1.200***		
	Greece	-1.078***			
	Finland	0.059	0.560***		
	Ireland	-0.345**			
	Italy	-0.271**			
	Netherlands	-0.737***			
	Austria	-0.485***			
	Portugal	-1.090***	-0.0336		
	Sweden	0.591***	1.039***		
	Cyprus	0.376***			
	Czech Republic	0.00863			
	Estonia				-0.117
	Hungary	0.074	-0.499***		
	Latvia	-0.347***	-0.905***		
	Lithuania	-0.114	-0.667***		
	Slovakia	0.167*			
	Slovenia	-0.14			
	Bulgaria				0.0857
	Romania	-0.1	0.0155		

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Source: Eurobarometer 69.2: National and European Identity, European Elections, European Values, and Climate Change, March-May 2008

## Appendix E – EB Analysis for EU in General

EB Analysis - Explaining Citizen Discontent with the EU in General 2008 (during ToL Negotiation and Ratification)				
	EU27	EU6	EU9	EU12
<b>Socio-Economic Explanations</b>				
<i>Party Affiliation</i>				
Left	-0.0202	0.0844*	-0.0061	-0.137***
Right	0.108***	0.0417	0.0914**	0.124***
<i>Utilitarian Theory</i>				
Low Financial Capital	-0.249***	-0.0937*	-0.235***	-0.330***
High Financial Capital	0.191***	0.190***	0.196***	0.187***
High Education	0.191***	0.178***	0.163***	0.221***
Low Education	-0.159***	-0.198***	-0.165***	-0.137***
Professional	0.00533	0.0362	0.125	-0.0875
Manual Worker	-0.114***	-0.182***	-0.0961*	-0.0678
Unemployed	-0.0853*	-0.234**	-0.153*	0.0337
Entrepreneur	-0.0109	-0.0442	-0.00531	0.0313
<i>Support for Government</i>				
Support Governing Party	0.663***	0.713***	0.699***	0.547***
<b>Socio-Cultural Explanations</b>				
<i>Cognitive Mobilization Theory</i>				
Never Discuss Politics	-0.150***	-0.133***	-0.168***	-0.148***
Frequently Discuss Politics	0.0678**	0.0692	0.0759*	0.0633
Low Knowledge	0.00511	0.0168	-0.0073	0.0299
<i>Political Values Theory</i>				
Materialist	0.00445	-0.012	0.0119	0.069
Post Materialist	0.0614***	0.0768*	0.0236	0.0539*
<b>Values</b>				
The Rule of Law	0.160***	0.135**	0.117**	0.241***
Respect for Human Life	0.0728***	0.0439	0.0978**	0.0773*
Human Rights	0.162***	0.131**	0.178***	0.182***
Individual Freedom	0.128***	0.128**	0.117**	0.159***
Democracy	0.207***	0.170***	0.205***	0.244***
Peace	0.0898***	0.0728	0.0762*	0.129***
Equality	0.0571*	0.00288	0.0761*	0.0803*
Solidarity	0.157***	0.224***	0.115**	0.171***
Tolerance	0.162***	0.142**	0.218***	0.169***
Religion	-0.00389	-0.00157	0.0453	-0.0237
Self Fulfilment	0.114***	0.144**	0.0931*	0.143**
Respect for Other Cultures	0.201***	0.148**	0.287***	0.172**
<i>Identity</i>				
European	0.484***	0.542***	0.497***	0.433***
Not European	-0.629***	-0.560***	-0.651***	-0.626***
N	21,374	5,315	7,766	7,427
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.285	0.275	0.315	0.265

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Source: Eurobarometer 69.2: National and European Identity, European Elections, European Values, and Climate Change, March'-May 2008

EB Analysis - Explaining Citizen Discontent with the EU in General  
2008 (during ToL Negotiation and Ratification)  
Control Variables

<i>Control Variables</i>	EU27	EU6	EU9	EU12
	Age	-0.00458***	-0.00252	-0.00316**
Female	-0.140***	-0.126***	-0.202***	-0.0897**
Retired	0.105	0.272*	0.113	0.043
Student	0.340***	0.564***	0.454***	0.154*
Farmer	0.236***	0.495*	0.194	0.172
Homemaker	0.219***	0.354***	0.285**	0.101
Small Welfare State	-0.257***	-0.293**		
Large Welfare State	-0.140*	0.140*	0.101	
North	-0.102**	0.379***	0.0962	
Micro State	-0.261***			
Small State	-0.130*	0.0361		
Medium State			0.841***	
Large State	-0.387***	-0.428***		
Left State	-0.158**	0.232**	0.494***	
Net Contributor	-0.182**	0.0897	-0.945***	-0.299***
Belgium	0.158*			
Germany	0.242***	-0.138		
Greece	0.0286			
Finland	-0.655***	0.00858		
Ireland	0.785***			
Italy	-0.0165			
Netherlands	-0.371***			
Austria	-0.667***			
Portugal	-0.106	-0.130*		
Sweden	-0.516***	0.145*		
Cyprus	-0.145			
Czech Republic	0.145			
Estonia				-0.0883
Hungary	-0.757***	-0.940***		
Latvia	-0.565***	-0.736***		
Lithuania	0.244***	0.0722		
Slovakia	0.118*			
Slovenia	-0.0617			
Bulgaria				0.039
Romania	-0.018	0.0296		

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Source: Eurobarometer 69.2: National and European Identity, European Elections, European Values, and Climate Change, March-May 2008

## Appendix F – EB Analysis for Institutions

EB Analysis - Explaining the Citizen Discontent with EU Institutions 2008 (during ToL Negotiation and Ratification)				
	EU27	EU6	EU9	EU12
<b>Socio-Economic Explanations</b>				
<i>Party Affiliation</i>				
Left	-0.0234	0.0679	-0.021	-0.0551
Right	0.0838***	0.0517	0.0491	0.0963**
<i>Utilitarian Theory</i>				
Low Financial Capital	-0.242***	-0.151**	-0.305***	-0.237***
High Financial Capital	0.0449*	0.0373	0.0303	0.0624
High Education	0.0781***	0.0966*	0.00801	0.114**
Low Education	-0.108***	-0.0739	-0.193***	-0.0784
Professional	0.0443	-0.0568	0.00994	0.0608
Manual Worker	-0.0754*	0.0742	-0.0505	-0.173***
Unemployed	-0.0466	-0.0987	0.0186	-0.0973
Entrepreneur	0.00236	-0.0244	0.0484	-0.0173
<i>Support for Government</i>				
Support Governing Party	0.701***	0.814***	0.791***	0.487***
<b>Socio-Cultural Explanations</b>				
<i>Cognitive Mobilization Theory</i>				
Never Discuss Politics	-0.223***	-0.162***	-0.222***	-0.281***
Frequently Discuss Politics	0.00538	-0.00778	-0.0111	0.0604
Low Knowledge	0.123***	0.189***	0.0978**	0.0838*
<i>Political Values Theory</i>				
Materialist	0.127***	0.205***	0.0473	0.180**
Post Materialist	0.111***	0.0779*	0.125***	0.0854**
<i>Values</i>				
The Rule of Law	0.143***	0.140*	0.0653	0.198***
Respect for Human Life	0.111***	0.144**	0.0666	0.124**
Human Rights	0.214***	0.201***	0.168***	0.281***
Individual Freedom	0.121***	0.0954	0.112**	0.142**
Democracy	0.238***	0.190***	0.192***	0.321***
Peace	0.120***	0.129**	0.0786*	0.140***
Equality	0.121***	0.138**	0.0896*	0.142**
Solidarity	0.121***	0.178***	0.0466	0.145**
Tolerance	0.158***	0.189***	0.146***	0.164***
Religion	-0.0136	0.0412	0.0301	-0.0418
Self Fulfilment	0.112***	0.134*	0.1	0.103
Respect for Other Cultures	0.161***	0.144*	0.160**	0.131*
<i>Identity</i>				
European	0.409***	0.443***	0.378***	0.406***
Not European	-0.573***	-0.554***	-0.605***	-0.554***
N	21,374	5,315	7,766	7,427
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.202	0.202	0.255	0.153

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Source: Eurobarometer 69.2: National and European Identity, European Elections, European Values, and Climate Change, March'-May 2008



EB Analysis - Explaining the Citizen Discontent with EU Institutions  
2008 (during ToL Negotiation and Ratification)  
Control Variables

<i>Control Variables</i>	EU27	EU6	EU9	EU12
	Age	-0.00236**	0.000486	-0.00103
Female	-0.0605***	-0.0229	-0.0770**	-0.0552
Retired	0.00308	0.0934	-0.0808	0.0643
Student	0.241***	0.464***	0.156	0.149
Farmer	0.0318	0.16	0.0234	-0.0293
Homemaker	0.0683	0.000809	-0.018	0.163
Small Welfare State	-0.0801	0.0134		
Large Welfare State	-0.112	0.411***	0.159**	
North	-0.408***	-0.0503	-0.125	
Micro State	-0.357***			
Small State	-0.0237	0.193*		
Medium State			0.634***	
Large State	-0.292***	-0.452***		
Left State	-0.488***	0.887***	0.0941	
Net Contributor	0.249**	-0.0771	-0.854***	0.230*
Belgium	0.197**			
Germany	0.268***	-1.088***		
Greece	0.457***			
Finland	-0.553***	0.0176		
Ireland	0.920***			
Italy	0.405***			
Netherlands	-0.0448			
Austria	-0.561***			
Portugal	0.566***	0.105		
Sweden	-0.584***	0.00662		
Cyprus	-0.0218			
Czech Republic	0.657***			
Estonia				-0.258***
Hungary	0.210**	-0.0429		
Latvia	-0.187*	-0.444***		
Lithuania	0.344***	0.0889		
Slovakia	0.286***			
Slovenia	-0.0741			
Bulgaria				0.0202
Romania	-0.274***	-0.227***		

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Source: Eurobarometer 69.2: National and European Identity, European Elections, European Values, and Climate Change, March-May 2008

## Appendix G – EB Analysis for Integration Deepening

EB Analysis - Explaining Citizen Discontent with EU Deepening 2008 (during ToL Negotiation and Ratification)				
	EU27	EU6	EU9	EU12
<b>Socio-Economic Explanations</b>				
<i>Party Affiliation</i>				
Left	-0.0645***	-0.0534**	-0.0444*	-0.0867***
Right	-0.0142	-0.0321	0.00177	-0.0265
<i>Utilitarian Theory</i>				
Low Financial Capital	-0.0859***	-0.0227	-0.132***	-0.0749***
High Financial Capital	0.0450***	0.0273	0.0744**	0.0304
High Education	0.0543***	0.113***	0.0286	0.0442*
Low Education	-0.0707***	-0.00397	-0.107***	-0.0740**
Professional	-0.00985	-0.051	0.0502	-0.0388
Manual Worker	-0.0298	-0.0277	-0.0176	-0.031
Unemployed	0.0354	-0.0601	0.0398	0.0692*
Entrepreneur	0.00551	0.0317	0.0111	-0.0183
<i>Support for Government</i>				
Support Governing Party	0.149***	0.108***	0.195***	0.108***
<b>Socio-Cultural Explanations</b>				
<i>Cognitive Mobilization Theory</i>				
Never Discuss Politics	-0.121***	-0.178***	-0.106***	-0.101***
Frequently Discuss Politics	-0.0187	0.00115	-0.0266	-0.0121
Low Knowledge	0.0349**	0.0386	0.0343	0.0331
<i>Political Values Theory</i>				
Materialist	0.0966***	0.0621*	0.119***	0.124***
Post Materialist	0.0416***	0.0629**	0.0469*	0.0157
<i>Values</i>				
The Rule of Law	0.155***	0.233***	0.125***	0.153***
Respect for Human Life	0.122***	0.146***	0.151***	0.0876***
Human Rights	0.154***	0.191***	0.162***	0.141***
Individual Freedom	0.151***	0.188***	0.174***	0.121***
Democracy	0.149***	0.209***	0.122***	0.154***
Peace	0.134***	0.198***	0.105***	0.127***
Equality	0.126***	0.184***	0.131***	0.0888***
Solidarity	0.0894***	0.161***	0.0499	0.0880**
Tolerance	0.149***	0.142***	0.184***	0.137***
Religion	0.0454*	0.0578	0.0784*	0.0284
Self Fulfilment	0.127***	0.173***	0.116***	0.116***
Respect for Other Cultures	0.168***	0.171***	0.240***	0.102**
<i>Identity</i>				
European	0.135***	0.104***	0.194***	0.106***
Not European	-0.404***	-0.431***	-0.442***	-0.326***
N	21,374	5,315	7,766	7,427
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.154	0.127	0.148	0.102
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001				
Source: Eurobarometer 69.2: National and European Identity, European Elections, European Values, and Climate Change, March'-May 2008				

EB Analysis - Explaining Citizen Discontent with EU Deepening  
2008 (during ToL Negotiation and Ratification)

Control Variables

<i>Control Variables</i>	EU27	EU6	EU9	EU12
	Age	-0.000218	0.00228*	-0.000508
Female	-0.0651***	-0.0639***	-0.0859***	-0.0420**
Retired	-0.0366	0.0262	-0.0324	-0.0618
Student	-0.0516	0.128*	-0.0429	-0.122**
Farmer	-0.0135	0.141	-0.0162	-0.0627
Homemaker	-0.0262	0.0497	-0.0408	-0.0335
Small Welfare State	-0.062	-0.441***		
Large Welfare State	-0.190***	0.125***	0.0173	
North	-0.0872***	-0.390***	0.339***	
Micro State	-0.429***			
Small State	-0.0354	0.476***		
Medium State			-0.0376	
Large State	-0.284***	-0.188***		
Left State	-0.459***	0.147**	-0.0137	
Net Contributor	0.348***	0.0962*	-0.122**	0.537***
Belgium	-0.077			
Germany	0.630***	0.00248		
Greece	0.506***			
Finland	-0.549***	-0.0977*		
Ireland	0.304***			
Italy	0.199***			
Netherlands	-0.111**			
Austria	-0.472***			
Portugal	-0.0154	-0.527***		
Sweden	-0.670***	-0.215***		
Cyprus	0.187***			
Czech Republic	0.492***			
Estonia				-0.109***
Hungary	0.0384	-0.482***		
Latvia	0.113**	-0.414***		
Lithuania	0.197***	-0.324***		
Slovakia	0.141***			
Slovenia	0.0784*			
Bulgaria				-0.110**
Romania	-0.173***	-0.263***		

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Source: Eurobarometer 69.2: National and European Identity, European Elections, European Values, and Climate Change, March'-May 2008

### Appendix H – Comparing Predictions of EB and EVS Analyses

Comparing Analyses - Examining the Comparability of the Eurobarometer and the European Values Study on EU Widening		
	EB Analysis	EVS Analysis
<i>Cognitive Mobilization Theory</i>		
Never Discuss Politics	-0.174***	-0.123**
Frequently Discuss Politics	-0.00658	0.100*
Low Knowledge	0.162***	
<i>Political Values Theory</i>		
Materialist	-0.137***	-0.138
Post Materialist	0.123***	0.125
<i>Party Affiliation</i>		
Left	0.108***	0.312***
Right	-0.101***	-0.232***
<i>Utilitarian Theory</i>		
Low Financial Capital	-0.155***	
High Financial Capital	0.0716**	0.0133
High Education	0.140***	0.249***
Low Education	-0.124***	-0.120**
Professional	-0.0184	
Manual Worker	-0.05	
Unemployed	0.0264	-0.180*
Entrepreneur	-0.0545	
<i>Support for Government</i>		
Support Governing Party	0.309***	0.431***
<i>Identity</i>		
European	0.341***	0.667***
Not European	-0.545***	
Cons	2.234***	5.032***
N	21,374	27,516
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.155	0.117

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Sources:  
 European Values Study 2008  
 Eurobarometer 69.2: National and European Identity, European Elections, European Values, and Climate Change, March-May 2008

### Appendix I – EVS Analysis of Integration Widening – Control Variables

EVS Analysis - Explaining the Degree of Citizen Discontent with EU Widening Across Member States  
2008 (during ToL Negotiation and Ratification) - Control Variables

Control Variables	EU27	Model 1		
		EU6	EU9	EU12
Age	-0.00972***	-0.00772	-0.0106*	-0.00961*
Female	-0.147**	-0.0168	-0.113	-0.262**
Retired	-0.00581	0.0627	-0.0274	0.00766
Student	0.165	0.171	0.504	0.00274
Homemaker	-0.152	-0.129	-0.538**	0.126
Small Welfare State	-0.0511	-0.890***		
Large Welfare State	-0.0118	-0.406*		
North	-0.288*	-0.887***	-0.598*	
Small State	0.576*	0.804***	0.243	0.173
Medium State	0.930***	0.765*		
Large State	0.340*			
Left State	-0.114	0.527*	0.208	0.967***
Net Contributor	-0.937***	0.667*		
Belgium	0.0709			
Germany	0.268	0.461		
Greece	-0.587*	0.399		
Finland	-0.543*			
France		0.506*		
Ireland	-1.488***			
Italy	0.0292			
Netherlands	-0.805***			
Austria	-0.115	0.286		
Portugal	-0.878**	0.00866		
Sweden	-0.0277	0.486**		
Cyprus	1.504***			
Czech Republic	0.068			
Estonia	-1.011***			
Hungary	-0.179	-0.105		
Latvia	-1.704***	-1.568***		
Lithuania	-0.114			
Malta				-0.624*
Slovakia				1.182***
Bulgaria	0.670**	0.486		
Romania	0.753***	0.685**		

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Source: European Values Study 2008