Forgotten Agents in a Forgotten Zone: German Women under French Occupation in Post-Nazi Germany, 1945-1949

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A Thesis
in
The Department
of
History

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Master of Arts (History) at
Concordia University
Montreal, Quebec, Canada

August 2013

CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY
School of Graduate Studies

This is to certify that the thesis prepared

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Entitled: Forgotten Agents in a Forgotten Zone: German Women under French Occupation in Post-Nazi Germany, 1945-1949

and submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts (History)

complies with the regulations of the University and meets the accepted standards with respect to originality and quality.

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ABSTRACT

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By the spring of 1945, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union and France commenced the difficult task of restoring order to a continent that had witnessed unprecedented death and destruction at the hands of the Nazis. This task proved to be most arduous in post-Nazi Germany, where aerial bombings, mass rape and endemic hunger created inherently gendered experiences of defeat and occupation for a civilian population in which women largely outnumbered men.

As the occupation took shape, the Soviet, British and American Military Governments granted German women in their Zones a relative degree of social and political agency by sanctioning women's activities and organizations. The French Zone, on the other hand, one that has come to be known as the 'forgotten Zone' in postwar historiography, did not follow suit.

The lack of French occupation policy toward German women disempowered them in the public sphere, where the failure of denazification and cultural imperialist policies and the absence of sanctioned women's agencies stripped women of their agency altogether. Postwar depopulation anxieties and Gaullist ambitions of French 'grandeur' soon led to reforms in post-Liberation family and immigration policy, furthermore. Designed to reconstruct the ideal 'French race' along the lines of race, gender and nationalism, the French Zone became the base of a contentious repatriation program that radically subverted German motherhood.

By charting the interaction between German women and French occupation policy- or often lack thereof- this dissertation charts the ways in which women under French occupation were socially and politically marginalized within the broader context of the other Allies' occupations policies. In other words, it excavates the lost narrative of forgotten agents in a forgotten Zone between 1945 and 1949.

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ACKNOWLEGEMENTS

From the moment I first stepped foot in Paris as an exchange student at age sixteen, I knew that Europe would always be a second home to me. Almost a decade later, I have come to the end of my journey as a Master's student and am about to begin my Ph.D. But before I begin this new chapter of my life, there are certain people who I must thank.

I would like to thank Professor Shannon McSheffrey, Professor Matthew Penney, Professor Barbara Lorenzkowski and Professor Norman Ingram for enriching my graduate student experience through their wonderful seminars. I would also like to express my deepest appreciation to my wonderful thesis committee, Professor Alison Rowley and Professor Max Bergholz, whose invaluable insight and expertise have provided me with numerous ideas for future scholarly elaboration while making my dissertation a pleasure to defend. A heartfelt thanks goes to Professor Nora Jaffary and Professor Ted McCormick for their unwavering support and guidance throughout the course of my M.A. I am also grateful to two professors who profoundly impacted me during my undergraduate years at McGill University. I would first like to thank Professor Peter Hoffmann for igniting my love of history during his unforgettable German history seminars. I would also like to send a heartfelt thanks to Professor Ricardo Castro for teaching me to never lose sight of my joie de vivre and passion for knowledge during his extraordinary summer course in Florence, Italy. I would also like to thank Professor David Howes, with whom I was extremely fortunate to work on the Concordia Sensoria Research Team; I will always be grateful for Professor Howes' mentorship and the role that it played in shaping the beginning of my graduate student career.

This dissertation is partially based on archival research at the Service historique de la Défense in Vincennes, France, the Ministère des Affaires étrangères et européennes at the Courneuve, France, and the Archiv der deutschen Frauenbewegung in Kassel, Germany. I am very grateful to Concordia International, the Office Franco-Québécois pour la Jeunesse, and the Department of History at Concordia University for making this research possible through their generous support. I would also like to express my deepest appreciation to M. Cyril Daydé at the Archives diplomatiques at La Courneuve and Frau Silke Mehrwalf, Frau Cornelia Wenzel and Dr. Kerstin Wolff of the Archiv der deutschen Frauenbewegung in Kassel for their guidance and expertise.

I must also thank my friend, mentor and MA supervisor, Professor Rosemarie Schade. Rosemarie's mentorship has pushed me above and beyond my capabilities and has made me strive toward goals that I had once thought were impossible to achieve. It has been a genuine privilege to work with such a dynamic and extraordinary lady, and I shall remain forever grateful for her guidance.

To my Mom and Dad, to whom I dedicate this dissertation: your endless encouragement, unwavering guidance and ultimate selflessness have made me accomplish more than I ever dreamed possible. Last but not least, thank you to my dog, Daphne, for the countless nights that she spent lying at my feet while I wrote.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AC	Direction générale des Affaires culturelles
AdF	Archiv der deutschen Frauenbewegung
AN	Alliance Nationale
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BEI	Bureau études et information
CDU	Christian Democratic Union
DFD	Demokratischer Frauenbund Deutschlands
DP	Displaced Person
EM	État-Major de l'Armée de Terre
GI	General Infantry
IRO	International Refugee Organization
KPD	Communist Party of Germany
MAEE	Ministère des Affaires étrangères et européenne
OMGUS	Office of Military Government for Germany, U.S.
PDR	Direction des Personnes déplacées et réfugiés
SED	Socialist Unity Party of Germany
SHAEF	Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force
SHD	Service historique de la Défense
SL	Service des missions de liaison
SMAD	Soviet Military Administration in Germany
SPD	Social Democratic Party of Germany
UFF	Union des Femmes Françaises
UNCSW	United Nations Commission on the Status of Women
UNRRA	United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
WIDF	Women's International Democratic Federation
WMM	World Movement of Mothers
YWCA	Young Women's Christian Association

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Introduction

By the spring of 1945, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union and France commenced the difficult task of restoring order to a continent that had witnessed unprecedented death and destruction at the hands of the Nazis. This task proved to be most arduous in post-Nazi Germany. Ravaged by aerial bombs, civilian displacement and massive food shortages, the German people were forced to face the harsh realities and "direct experiences of war and defeat."[1] It soon became evident, moreover, that the postwar experience was inherently gendered. By the spring of 1945, there were thirty six million German women to just twenty eight million German men.[2] While the victors designed social, political and economic programs to reconstruct the shattered German nation, German women were subjected to mass rape and endemic hunger, collective experiences that radically redefined their roles in the public sphere and at home.

[1] Atina Grossmann, "Trauma, Memory, and Motherhood: Germans and Jewish Displaced Persons in Post-Nazi Germany, 1945-1949", *Life After Death: Approaches to a Cultural and Social History of Europe during the 1940s and 1950s*, Richard Bessel and Dirk Schumann eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 94.

[2] Henry P. Pilgert, *Women in West Germany: With Special Reference to the Policies and Programs of the Women's Affairs Branch* (Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, 1952), 3-4, Archiv der deutschen Frauenbewegung (Hereafter referred to as AdF), Kassel, Germany.

The British, American and Soviet occupying powers each recognized that German women were central to their respective reconstruction programs and thus granted them relative degrees of agency by establishing women's branches and sanctioning social and political women's activities. The French occupiers, on the other hand, who administered what has come to be known as the 'forgotten Zone' of occupation in postwar historiography, chose not to factor German women into their reconstruction efforts. Unlike their British, American and Soviet counterparts, the French did not establish a women's branch in their occupation administration, nor did they sanction women's activities or authorize the formation of women's organizations. This reluctance to acknowledge the inherently gendered nature of occupation resulted in the absence of specific policy toward women in the French Zone that in turn limited their social and political agency.

The French Zone as the Forgotten Zone

German women's lack of agency under French occupation becomes clear when studied within the broader context of the other occupiers' policies toward women. Driven by particular objectives, the Allies and the Soviets divided Germany into four occupation zones that engendered the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) in 1949. By 1948, the American, British and Soviet Zones had each realized that providing German women with a relative degree of agency would advance their occupation objectives while reinforcing their respective capitalist and communist spheres of influence. In the German *Länder* (states) of Hesse, Bavaria and north

Baden-Württemberg, the American Military Government modeled its occupation program heavily upon the 'Four D's' of the Potsdam Agreement- demilitarization, denazification, democratization and decentralization- in order to denazify and democratize the German people while countering the threat of Communist expansion in the East.[3] In Hamburg, Hanover, Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony and North Rhine-Westphalia, the British Military Government sought to reconstruct German society through the reeducation of the population in order to reestablish continental order and pave the way for future economic cooperation.[4] In Thuringia, Saxony, Brandenburg and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, the Soviets began to establish a second world empire in which Communism would triumph over Nazism and Capitalism, one in which Stalin would attempt to exploit as many resources and technologies as possible while 'liberating' Germans through a systematic propaganda apparatus.[5] Conscious of the fact that German women largely outnumbered German men, the British, American and Soviet occupiers factored women into their occupation plans in an attempt to mobilize the entire population in their Zones in order to secure their respective occupation goals.

The French, however, did not follow suit. In the southwest *Länder* of Württemberg, Baden, the Pfalz and the Saar, the French Military Government exploited Germany's economic resources while exercising an ambitious cultural reeducation program that formed the very essence of Charles de Gaulle's vision of

[3] John Gimbel, *The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945-1949* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), xiii.
[4] Ian D. Turner, *Reconstruction in Post-War Germany: British Occupation Policy and the Western Zones, 1945-1955* (Oxford: Berg, 1989), 4, 218.
[5] Norman Naimark, *The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), 1-2.

French 'grandeur', one in which France would culturally, militarily and economically surpass the rest of Europe. Having not been invited to participate in the Yalta Conference or the Potsdam Conference, the French interpreted the 'Four D's' in a different manner from their Allies. They concentrated specifically on the decentralization of all agencies and institutions in their Zone, such as banks, trade unions and transportation systems, to counter the spread of Nazi ideology. This insistence on decentralization hindered the emergence of centralized women's agencies and organizations that were essential to the consolidation of women's place in postwar society. Since women did not factor into post-Liberation plans for French 'grandeur', as this dissertation will argue, the policies that governed the French Zone disempowered women in the social and political spheres while also subverting their traditional gender roles in the domestic sphere.

Despite elaborate occupation plans that were ultimately designed to transform France into a world power, the lack of scholarship on the French occupation of post-Nazi Germany reveals that the French Zone has become the 'forgotten Zone' of occupation in postwar historiography.[6] The terse relations between the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union and France during the Second World War and its immediate aftermath explain this trend. While it is generally acknowledged that British, American and Soviet skepticism vis-à-vis the creation of a French Zone sparked French resentment and made it difficult to bring about a uniform and coordinated German reconstruction program, scholars have yet

[6] Toby Thacker, *Music after Hitler*, *1945-1955* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007), 7.

to study the ripple effect that France's 'marginal status' had on the exclusion of German women from the postwar story.

The 'Big 3' were skeptical of the legitimacy of de Gaulle's French Provisional Government after the collapse of Pétain's Vichy Regime, not surprising considering that the Vichy collaborators had even fought against the Allies in North Africa in November 1942.[7] Although General Eisenhower had given credit to the Free French for having been "of inestimable value in the campaign" during the Liberation, a lack of political and military legitimacy excluded them from participating in the D-Day landings in June 1944.[8] Josef Stalin, who had entered into pacts with Hitler until Operation Barbarossa in 1941, was distrustful of the French Provisional Government and remarked that it was Pétain and not de Gaulle who symbolized "the real physical France."[9] Franklin Delano Roosevelt also remained wary of the exiled Free French and had little faith in France's ability to sustain the future occupation effort, even telling Churchill in February 1944 that he was "absolutely unwilling to police France" and that "France is [his] baby and will take a lot of nursing in order to bring it to the point of walking alone."[10]

Winston Churchill had been the one to defend French interests in the division of post-Nazi Germany. In a November 1944 telegram to Roosevelt, he expressed his disappointment about American reluctance to allow the French to occupy Germany

[7] Robert Paxton, *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 282.
[8] Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 296; Paxton, *Vichy France*, 90.
[9] Susan Butler, *My Dear Mr. Stalin: The Complete Correspondence between Franklin D. Roosevelt and Joseph V. Stalin* (Yale: Yale University Press, 2008), 188.
[10] Butler, *My Dear Mr. Stalin,* 188; Bianka J. Adams, *From Crusade to Hazard: The Denazification of Bremen Germany* (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2009), 3.

alongside the 'Big 3': "How will it be possible to hold down Western Germany beyond the present Russian occupation line?... All would therefore rapidly disintegrate as it did last time… I hope however that my fears are groundless. I put my faith in you."[11] Without the French Zone acting as a buffer between Soviet influence and the West, Churchill feared that it would prove impossible to maintain the balance of power on the continent. During the Yalta Conference in February 1945, Roosevelt announced that U.S. troops would withdraw from Germany after two years of occupation, causing Churchill to convince Roosevelt and Stalin to authorize the creation of a French Zone from carved out portions of the American Zone and the British Zone.[12] Although Stalin had made several attempts to exclude the French from joining the Allied Control Commission, the governing body of occupied Germany, the French nevertheless took their place amongst the Allies in the spring of 1945.[13]

Tensions between the 'Big 3 and France' became especially evident during the signing of the German Act of Capitulation in Berlin on May 8 in Marshall Zhukov's Karlshorst headquarters when General de Lattre, the French signatory, demanded that his interpreter hang the French flag next to those of the United Kingdom, the United States and Russia: [14]

> I required that France should be represented at this ceremony with her flag in a place of equality with those of her Allies. He seemed surprised and somewhat annoyed by my request, but undertook to pass it on to his chiefs... And in fact it was a business! A diplomatic

[11] Martin Gilbert, *Churchill and America* (New York: Free Press, 2005), 318.
[12] F. Roy Willis, *The French in Germany, 1945-1949* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), 8-9.
[13] Conrad Black, *Franklin Delano Roosevelt: Champion of Freedom* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2003), 1049-1050.
[14] The concept of the 'Big 3 and France' was coined in John Young's article, "The Foreign Office, the French and the Post-War Division of Germany, 1945-46", *Review of International Studies*, vol. 12, no. 3 (July 1986): 223-234.

> affair to start with, for everyone was not in agreement. A Brigadier-General, learning of my request, had even cried out 'And why not China!' It was a practical matter above all, for a French flag could nowhere be found. The Russians decided to make one, with a piece of red stuff taken from a former Hitlerite banner, a white sheet and a piece of blue serge cut out of an engineer's overalls… At last, at 20.00, our national emblem was placed between those of Great Britain and the United States in a cluster surmounted by the Soviet flag.[15]

De Gaulle recalls that even Hitler's War Minister, Field Marshall Wilhelm Keitel, was resentful of France's participation in Germany's unconditional surrender: "On May 9, General de Lattre took his place next to the military delegates of the Allied Powers, under a panoply under which the tricolor was next to their flags. During the final act of German capitulation, Field Marshall Keitel exclaimed, "What? The French too!"[16] These incidents reflect Allied skepticism toward France's place as a victor and occupier, an attitude that has led to the near-exclusion of the French Zone, the 'forgotten Zone', from the historiography on postwar Europe. In the masculine world of the victors, moreover, discussions about women in the postwar era were even more out of place than the hastily constructed French flag.

Forgotten Agents in a Forgotten Zone

Despite an abundance of studies on the Second World War and its immediate aftermath, the French occupation of Germany remains an under-researched topic. By extension, little is known about German women's experiences under French occupation. On the eve of the Second World War, the German *Länder* of Baden and Württemberg had a population of 6.3 million, a number that had decreased to 5.8 million by January 1946 due to the Holocaust, aerial bombings and civilian

[15] Marshal de Lattre de Tassigny, *The History of the First French Army* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1952), 517-518.
[16] Charles de Gaulle, *Mémoires de Guerre, Tome III, Le Salut, 1944-1946* (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1959), 187-188.

displacement.[17] Of this number, there were 3.3 million women to 2.5 million men.[18] By October 1946, the ratio of women to men in the French Zone was 128:100.[19] Since the postwar population was predominantly female, the lack of research about German women under French occupation suggests that a significant portion of the postwar civilian experience has been silenced.

This dissertation will first describe the immediate postwar German situation, particularly in the western Zones, to demonstrate that the inherently gendered experiences of rape, fraternization and hunger were especially harsh on women in the French Zone. Next, it will study the lack of French occupation policy toward German women within the broader context of British, American and Soviet cultural policy and denazification and democratization programs in order to demonstrate that the absence of women's agencies in the French Zone stripped women of their social and political agency altogether. Finally, this dissertation will chart the interaction between race, gender and nationalism in French post-Liberation family and immigration policy, an interplay that subverted German women's roles in the domestic sphere by having radical consequences on motherhood.

Since little has been documented about German women in the French Zone, and since relatively little is known about the French Zone more generally, the theoretical approach laid out in this dissertation will demonstrate that French occupation policy, or often lack thereof, created the conditions necessary to socially

[17] Willis, *The French in Germany*, 107.
[18] Willis, 107.
[19] Elizabeth D. Heineman, *What Difference does a Husband Make? Women and Marital Status in Nazi and Postwar Germany* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999), 317.

and politically disempower women in the French Zone of occupation.[20] In other words, it will investigate the reasons why German women became forgotten agents in a forgotten Zone between 1945 and 1949.



Figure 1: The Four Zones of Occupied Germany in July 1945.[21]

[20] This dissertation is partially based on archival research at the Service historique de la Défense (SHD) in Vincennes, France, the Ministère des Affaires étrangères et européennes (MAEE) at La Courneuve, France, and the Archiv der deutschen Frauenbewegung (AdF) in Kassel, Germany. It is important to note that German women are seldom mentioned in the otherwise extensive records at the SHD and the MAEE, an omission that reveals much about French attitudes toward women during the occupation of post-Nazi Germany. The overall lack of sources on women has encouraged me to focus on how French policy interacted (or failed to interact) with women en lieu of on German women's subjective experiences under occupation.

[21] "Bulletin d'Information No 28 du Détachement d'Armée de l'Atlantique," July 11, 1945, Bureau études et information, Service historique de la Défense (Hereafter referred to as EMAT/SHD), Vincennes, France, 10P 353.

Forgotten Agents:
An Historiographical Overview

The historiography on the quadripartite occupation of Germany, though dynamic and constantly in flux, focuses mainly on the Cold War, German reconstruction and European integration. While there is a fair degree of research on German women under British, Soviet and American occupation, there is substantially less known about German women's experiences in the French Zone, a major historiographical lacuna that obscures scholarly understanding of the postwar period altogether. Scholars have yet to produce a comprehensive study on the French occupation of Germany, and existing research on the French Zone focuses largely on Franco-German economic relations and on French cultural policy.

The first phase of historiography on the French Zone begins with Frank R. Willis' 1962 work *The French in Germany*, the only attempt at a comprehensive English language study on this subject to date. Following a near two decade lapse, the opening of the Archives de l'occupation française en Allemagne et en Autriche (The Archives of the French Occupation of Germany and Austria) in Colmar, France in the 1980s catalysed the second historiographical phase, resulting in a series of French and German conferences and subsequent publications.[22] Several important

[22] Such conference publications include Claus Scharf and Hans-Jürgen Schröder, *Die Deutschlandpolitik Frankreichs und die Französische Zone, 1945-1949: The Institute of European History* (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1983); The Institut Français de Stuttgart, *Die französische Deutschlandpolitik zwischen 1945 und 1949* (Tübingen, 1987); Rioux K. Manfrass, *France-Allemagne 1944-1947*, Cahier no. 13-14 de l'Institut d'histoire du temps présent, (déc. 1989).

contributions soon followed suit, including Klaus-Dietmar Henke's 1981 *Politische Säuberung unter französischer Besatzung*, an analysis of the purge of Nazi party members under French occupation, and Rainer Hudemann's 1988 *Sozialpolitik im deutschen Südwesten zwischen Tradition und Neuordnung, 1945-1953*, a study that argues that French occupation policy in south-western Germany oscillated between tradition and reform.[23]

The first phase of French historiography on the French occupation of Germany is of much narrower scope in that the former mostly centers on cultural policy. Jérôme Vaillant's 1981 work, *La dénazification par les vainqueurs: la politique culturelle des occupants en Allemagne, 1945-1949*, Corine Defrance's 1994 work, *La politique culturelle de la France sur la rive gauche du Rhin*, and Christophe Baginski's 1997 work, *La politique religieuse de la France en Allemagne occupée (1945-1949)*, all filter the French occupation through a socio-cultural lens.[24] Recent French and German works on the French occupation focus exclusively on cultural occupation policy as well and expose some of the major lacunae in the historiography on the French Zone. Laurence Thaisy's *La politique cinématographique de la France en Allemagne occupée (1945-1949)*, Corine Defrance's *Les Alliés occidentaux et les universités allemandes, 1945-1949*, Margarete Mehdorn's *Französische Kultur in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Politische Konzepte und Zivilgesellschaftliche Initiativen,*

[23] Klaus-Dietmar Henke, Politische Säuberung unter französischer Besatzung (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1981); Rainer Hudemann, Sozialpolitik im deutschen Südwesten zwischen Tradition und Neuordnung 1945-1953 (Mainz: Hase und Kohler Verlag, 1988).

[24] Jérôme Vaillant, La dénazification par les vainqueurs: la politique culturelle des occupants en Allemagne, 1945-1949 (Lille: Presses Universitaires Lille, 1981); Corine Defrance, La politique culturelle de la France sur la rive gauche du Rhin (Strasbourg: Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, 1994); Christophe Baginski, La politique religieuse de la France en Allemagne occupée (1945-1949) (Villeneuve-d'Ascq: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 1997).

1945-1970, and Stefanie Woite-Wehle's Zwischen *Kontrolle und Demokratisierung; Die Sportpolitik der französischen Besatzungsmacht in Südwestdeutschland 1945-1950* are fine examples of recent cultural historiography on the French occupation.[25] None of these works concentrate specifically on German women, however, and thus fail to reveal how the interaction between French occupation policy and German women shaped the social, cultural and political dynamics of the French Zone.

Scholars had pointed out as early as 1994 that the French occupation has been excluded almost entirely from postwar narratives. In "A New Perspective on the French-American Relations during the Occupation of Germany, 1945-1948", Heike Bungert observes that most scholars "either view the gradual evolution of the Federal Republic of Germany in terms of the Cold War or concentrate almost exclusively on the United States and Great Britain" and in doing so, "omit the French almost completely from accounts of the evolution of the Federal Republic of Germany."[26] This emphasis on the interaction between American and Soviet policy does, indeed, devalue the role that France played in engendering the division of Germany into East and West. John W. Young's 1986 article, "The Foreign Office, the French and the post-war division of Germany 1945-46", attempts to challenge this dominant Cold War narrative by arguing that the emergence of East and West Germany occurred because of French occupation policy instead of due to American

[25] Laurence Thaisy, La politique cinématographique de la France en Allemagne occupée (1945-1949) (Paris, Presses Universitaires Septentrion, 2006); Corine Defrance, Les Alliés occidentaux et les universités allemandes, 1945-1949 (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2000); Margarete Mehdorn, Französische Kultur in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Politische Konzepte und Zivilgesellschaftliche Initiativen, 1945-1970 (Weimar: Böhlau Verlag, 2009); Stefanie Woite-Wehle, Zwischen Kontrolle und Demokratisierung; Die Sportpolitik der französischen Besatzungsmacht in Südwestdeutschland 1945-1950 (Schorndorf: Karl Hoffman, 2001).

[26] Heike Bungert, "A New Perspective on the French-American Relations during the Occupation of Germany, 1945- 1948", *Diplomatic History*, vol. 18, iss. 3 (Summer 1994): 333-334.

or Soviet occupation objectives.[27] The French Military Government's stubborn insistence on decentralizing German agencies, including transport, industry and financial organizations, led to "zonal, allied administrations- rather than any central machinery... allowing Russia to 'Sovietize' its occupation zone unhindered, whilst radically different policies were pursued in the West."[28] Contrary to the Cold War paradigm, Rainer Hudemann's 1997 article, "L'occupation française après 1945 et les relations franco-allemandes", argues that French occupation policy was designed to facilitate Franco-German rapprochement.[29] Following the collapse of the Iron Curtain in 1989, Hudemann argues, the 'quasi-taboo' on the Nazi occupation of France was shattered and scholars began to study the impact of French cultural policy on the Federal Republic of Germany.[30] In this vein, scholars were now able to analyze the cultural policies that shaped what F. Roy Willis calls 'de-germanization' and 'francization' processes that were designed to denazify and reeducate the German population through rigorous exposure to cultural propaganda and high French culture.[31]

Although there has been a relative degree of research conducted on French cultural policy, little is known about the interaction between French policy and German women. Did policy toward German women in the French Zone follow a distinct trajectory from British, American and Soviet women's policy? If so, how were German women's experiences under French occupation distinct from the other

[27] Young, "The Foreign Office, the French and the post-war division of Germany 1945-46", 223.
[28] Young, 223.
[29] Rainer Hudemann, "L'occupation française après 1945 et les relations franco-allemandes", *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire*, no. 55 (juillet- septembre 1997): passim.
[30] Hudemann, "L'occupation française après 1945 et les relations franco-allemandes", 58-59.
[31] Willis, 95, 163.

Zones? Did these experiences facilitate their exclusion from the postwar narrative? These unanswered questions underscore some of the historical omissions that complicate our understanding of the events that shaped postwar Germany and, eventually, the Federal Republic of Germany.

Despite a fundamental lack of research on German women's experiences under French occupation, there is a fair amount of research on German women under British, American and Soviet occupation. Studies on the immediate postwar situation have sparked much interest amongst scholars and the general public at large, particularly with regard to recent controversies surrounding the aerial bombing of civilian centers, postwar expulsion and displacement and mass sexual violence toward women. Robert Moeller's research on the aerial bombing of cities during the Second World War challenges scholarly understanding of the victor-perpetrator paradigm, as the aerial bombings of cities such as Coventry, London, Rotterdam, Berlin, Essen, Cologne, Hamburg and Munich were not considered war crimes at Nuremberg.[32] Another major historiographical trend is the mass rape of German women by occupation soldiers, particularly by the Red Army. Norman Naimark's foundational research on the Russian occupation of post-Nazi Germany suggests that the half century that followed the Soviet occupation was characterized by a 'forced amnesia', one that did not allow East Germans to "dwell on the difficulties of this period" since this would have challenged the Red Army's self-depiction as 'liberators.'[33] Although the mass violence that trailed the Soviet

[32] Robert Moeller, "On the History of Man-Made Destruction: Loss, Death, Memory, and Germany in the Bombing War;" *History Workshop Journal*, vol. 61, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 107-108.
[33] Naimark, *The Russians in Germany*, 2.

occupation continued to haunt Germans long after the immediate postwar situation, contentious subjects such as the rape of German women only became serious topics of study after the collapse of the Iron Curtain.[34] This certainly accounts for recent interest in memoirs such as the anonymous diary *A Woman in Berlin*, popular histories like Antony Beevor's *The Fall of Berlin 1945*, and documentaries such as feminist filmmaker Helke Sander's controversial *Liberators Take Liberties*.

Studies on sexual violence against women in postwar Germany have also paved the way for investigations on the social and sexual dynamics between German women and Allied and Soviet occupation soldiers. Perry Biddiscombe's work, "Dangerous Liaisons: The Anti-Fraternization Movement in the U.S. Occupation Zones of Germany and Austria, 1945-1948", analyzes the often violent repercussions of fraternization between occupation soldiers and German and Austrian women, arguing that western civilization has typically characterized women as "vessels of sin, and in this case the sin was collaboration."[35] Atina Grossmann's *Jews, Germans, and Allies: Close Encounters in Occupied Germany* analyzes the ways in which U.S. occupation soldiers, German civilians and Jewish refugees interacted with one another to create an 'historic triangle' that totaled sixty percent of Berlin's population by May 1945.[36]

Aerial bombings, rape and fraternization are not the only themes that dominate the historiography on postwar women, however. Allied and Soviet family

[34] Naimark, 2.
[35] Perry Biddiscombe, "Dangerous Liaisons: The Anti-Fraternization Movement in the U.S. Occupation Zones of Germany and Austria, 1945-1948", *Journal of Social History*, vol. 34, no. 3 (Spring 2001): 612, 632.
[36] Atina Grossmann, *Jews, Germans, and Allies: Close Encounters in Occupied Germany* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 2.

policy in occupied Germany also forms a critical juncture. Robert Moeller's *Protecting Motherhood: Women and the Family in the Politics of Postwar West Germany* sheds light on the "perceived disequilibrium of gender relations" by studying the politicization of gender, its effect on postwar policymakers, and the familial and maternity reforms that formed the basis of West German reconstruction.[37] Hester Vaizey's *Surviving Hitler's War: Family Life in Germany, 1939-48* argues that the sexist undercurrents of Nazi family policy prevented German women from becoming liberated while German men were fighting during the Second World War.[38] Tara Zahra's *The Lost Children: Reconstructing Europe's Families After World War II* explores the plight of orphaned and displaced children after the Second World War and reveals the ways in which the Allies attempted to mediate this massive civilian crisis.[39]

Studies on Allied and Soviet cultural policy and propaganda have also carved a unique niche within postwar historiography, especially with regard to denazification and reeducation. Cora Sol Goldstein's *Capturing the German Eye: American Visual Propaganda in Occupied Germany* studies the role of "cultural policy as strategic propaganda" in the U.S. Zone, research that is central to our understanding of the psychological warfare that dominated the early phase of the Cold War.[40] Jennifer Fay's *Theaters of Occupation: Hollywood and the Reeducation of*

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[37] Robert Moeller, *Protecting Motherhood: Women and the Family in the Politics of Postwar West Germany* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 3.
[38] Hester Vaizey, *Surviving Hitler's War: Family Life in Germany, 1939-48* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
[39] Tara Zhara, *The Lost Children: Reconstructing Europe's Families after World War II* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011).
[40] Cora Goldstein, *Capturing the German Eye: American Visual Propaganda in Occupied Germany* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009), 1-2.

Postwar Germany suggests that the American use of Hollywood film as a vehicle of reeducation and cultural indoctrination was "part of a larger politico-cultural effort to remake Nazis into liberal democrats."[41] Konrad Jarausch's *After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1999* argues that the 'rupture of civilization' that followed the defeat of Nazism suspended German civilians between states of 'catastrophe' and 'tolerant civil society' while drawing on the difficulties of the postwar period.[42] Jaimey Fischer's *Disciplining Germany: Youth, Reeducation, and Reconstruction after the Second World War* posits that Allied emphasis on reeducating German youth in order to steer them away from the "now tainted Wilhelmine, Weimar, and Nazi periods" created a means of suppressing guilt, militant nationalism and gender tensions during the postwar period.[43] Finally, Konrad Jarausch and Michael Geyer's *Shattered Past: Reconstructing German Histories* offers insight into the contested legacies of Germans under Nazism; beginning with *Stunde Null* (Zero Hour) and ending with German Unification, Jarausch and Geyer trace the arc of German historiography while considering the ways in which the events of the first and second halves of the twentieth century have shaped historical interpretation.[44]

These historiographical trends expose a fundamental lack of literature on German women under French occupation in post-Nazi Germany, a lacuna that in turn silences the inherently gendered experiences of defeat and occupation in the

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[41] Jennifer Fay, *Theaters of Occupation: Hollywood and the Reeducation of Postwar Germany* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), ivx.
[42] Konrad Jarausch, *After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1999* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 4, 17.
[43] Jaimey Fischer, *Disciplining Germany: Youth, Reeducation, and Reconstruction after the Second World War* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2007), 2, 4-5.
[44] Konrad Jarausch and Michael Geyer, *Shattered Past: Reconstructing German Histories* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), viii-ix.

French Zone and obscure the ways in which French policy toward German women, or lack thereof, ultimately shaped West Germany. The absence of comprehensive scholarship on this subject also poses a particular challenge to our understanding of the French occupation administration's attitudes and policies toward women in their Zone. In this regard, analyzing women in the French Zone within the larger context of German women's experiences in each occupation Zone will allow us to assess the ways in which women under French occupation were socially and politically marginalized.

A Gendered Occupation:
German Women and the Immediate Postwar Situation

By May 1945, sixty percent of Berlin's total population of 2.6 million was composed of women, refugees and occupation soldiers.[45] Seventy million cubic meters of the city had been reduced to rubble and aerial bombing had destroyed over fifty percent of homes.[46] A January 10, 1945 Swedish newspaper article describes the shocking sight of war-torn Berlin: "We are struck by the sight of ruins upon returning to Berlin after one year of absence... sometimes it is impossible to find the houses in which we lived several years earlier. The walls are collapsing to the point where they falling into neighboring buildings... We ask ourselves if it will even be possible to rebuild the city in the future."[47] A February 1, 1945 BBC article conveys similar conditions, reporting that "the people of Berlin, already in a miserable state due to Allied aerial attacks, are trembling from cold and are hungry. They have not had coal since last Sunday and are lacking more and more bread and potatoes."[48]

Amidst heaps of bombed out infrastructure and empty promises of food rations, Germans anxiously awaited the arrival of occupation troops. Berlin was not

[45] Grossmann, *Jews, Germans, and Allies*, 2.
[46] Elise Julien, *Les Rapports Franco-Allemands à Berlin 1945- 1961* (Paris: Éditions L'Harmattan, 2000), 32-33.
[47] "Berlin en ruines", *StockholmsTidningen*, January 10, 1945, EMAT/SHD: 7P161.
[48] Norman Macdonald, "Life in Berlin with Refugees from the East," February 1, 1945, *BBC*, EMAT/SHD: 7P161.

just a defeated city, Konrad Jarausch explains, but a "rupture of civilization" rife with mass rape, aerial bombings and food shortages.[49] Fear and uncertainty saturated the postwar climate as each civilian attempted to come to terms with the consequences of defeat and the expectations of occupation: "Would the Germans be allowed to survive at all, or would their liberated neighbors exact a bloody revenge for the crimes that had been committed against them? How would the occupation powers deal with this defeated people… would they grant them a minimal sustenance so that they might live on somehow?"[50] It quickly became evident that German girls and women were to receive very different answers to these questions than their male counterparts.

The Rape of German Women by Occupation Soldiers

The harrowing experience of rape for German girls and women during the 'liberation' of Berlin in April 1945 reveals the inherently gendered nature of occupation, one that was not easily understood by the rest of the civilian population. Ernst Stecker, a Ruhr metalworker, recalls that "'The German soldier fought for six years, the German woman for only five minutes!' That's a fact from beginning to end. I was ashamed."[51] The anonymous diarist of *A Woman in Berlin* recalls the immediate postwar situation differently. She describes the horrors that accompanied Soviet shock troops as they ravaged their way through Berlin and raped the young, the pregnant, the elderly and the sick:

[49] Jarausch, *After Hitler*, 3-18.
[50] Jarausch, 4.
[51] Moeller, *Protecting Motherhood*, 67.

> One of them grabs hold of me and shoves me into the front room, pushing the window out of the way… No sound. Only an involuntary grinding of teeth when my underclothes are ripped apart. The last untorn ones I had… I open my eyes. A stranger's hands expertly pulling apart my jaws. Eye to eye. Then with great deliberation he drops a gob of gathered spit into my mouth… The corners of the mouth lift, tiny wrinkles radiate from the corners of his eyes. The man is smiling.[52]

As her account unfolds, the diarist recalls the ways in which women tried to avoid being raped, including disguising themselves as men and scaring and injuring themselves in order to seem unattractive. Some women hid on the highest floors of bombed out apartment buildings in hopes that soldiers would be too lazy to climb numerous flights of stairs during their nighttime rape sprees; others took refuge in hospitals that doctors and nurses had pretended were leprosy and tuberculosis wards.[53] These techniques seldom worked, however, and nearly two million German women were raped by May 1945.

Soviet hate propaganda played a key role in catalyzing these massive waves of Red Army violence. Ilya Ehrenburg, a widely read Soviet journalist, wrote: "If you have not killed a German a day, you have wasted that day... If you kill one German, kill another- there is nothing funnier for us than a pile of German corpses."[54] Signs erected along roads encouraged Red Army soldiers to avenge Wehrmacht atrocities during their advance on Berlin with phrases such as "Soldier: You are in Germany, take revenge on the Hitlerites!"[55] As Robert Moeller points out, the rape of German women by the Red Army symbolized "the rape of the German nation" and became a means of avenging a people whose regime had murdered millions in the Holocaust

[52] Anonymous. *A Woman in Berlin: Eight Weeks in a Conquered City, A Diary* (New York: Picador, 2005), 63-64.
[53] Anonymous, *A Woman in Berlin*, passim.
[54] Frederick Taylor, *Exorcising Hitler: The Occupation and Denazification of Germany* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2011), 51.
[55] Taylor, *Exorcising Hitler*, 51.

and on the Eastern Front. [56] Atina Grossmann, one of the first historians to break the silence on the Red Army rapes in the 1990s, suggests that the notorious Week of Mass Rapes in Berlin from April 24 to May 8, 1945 served as a vehicle of humiliation to demoralize the German people.[57] Frederick Taylor claims that Soviet propaganda encouraged the Red Army to rape German women who had "sat safe at home while the men of the Wehrmacht ravaged Belarus, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, the plains before Moscow."[58] Antony Beevor makes a different claim by arguing that the Red Army viewed German women as "sexual spoils of war" instead of as "substitutes for the Wehrmacht on which to vent their rage."[59] Perhaps the mass rape of German girls aged as young as nine and women as old as ninety can be viewed as the foundational stage of Soviet occupation policy, in that what began as the "forceful occupation of German women's bodies" soon became the occupation of an entire nation.[60]

Although the Red Army raped German women on mass scales, evidence suggests that there was mass sexual violence against women in the Western Zones as well. Scholars have yet to produce a comprehensive study on the rape of German women by French, American and British soldiers, however, and little is known about German women's experiences with rape during the early phase of Allied occupation. While rape figures for the British Zone are unknown, the U.S. Army's Judge Advocate Division dealt with a reported five hundred cases of rape each week from January to

[56] Moeller, 7.
[57] Grossmann, "Trauma, Memory, and Motherhood", 100.
[58] Taylor, 49.
[59] Antony Beevor, *The Fall of Berlin 1945* (New York: Penguin Books, 2003), 326.
[60] Robert G. Moeller, *War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany: War Stories* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 65.

April 1945.[61] Rape also seems to have been common in the French Army as the French advanced through western Germany during the final wartime offensive. Norman Naimark argues that of all the Western Zones, the "poor discipline and rapacity" of French occupation soldiers most closely paralleled the poor conduct of the Red Army during the initial phase of the occupation when "German women were subject to the same indiscriminate rampaging that they faced in the Eastern zone."[62] The sheer chaos that ensued the French occupation of German towns and villages may be a reason why the rape of civilians is poorly documented. Civilian evacuations and mass reprisals under General de Lattre de Tassigny, the Commander of the French Army, led to the displacement and expulsion of tens of thousands of German civilians- including 25,000 people from the towns of Reichenau, Gailingen am Rhein, Weichs and Randen- upheavals that likely left many people with no means of reporting crimes.[63] Despite an overall lack of rape figures, an April 10, 1945 Mandatory Directive Notice circulated throughout the French Army reveals that de Lattre was very much aware of frequent incidents of sexual violence against German women. Clause 9 of the Directive forbids French soldiers from circulating throughout occupied territory at night without justified cause, matter-of-factly stating that "these are the most efficient means of avoiding acts of violence against women."[64]

[61] Joanna Bourke, *Rape: Sex, Violence, History* (Berkeley: Shoemaker & Hoard, 2007), 361.
[62] Naimark, 106.
[63] Alexander Perry Biddiscombe, *Werwolf!: The History of the National Socialist Guerilla Movement, 1944-1946* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 261.
[64] "Note relative à l'occupation militaire en 'territoire allemand'", April 10, 1945, État-Major de l'Armée de Terre, Service historique de la Défense (Hereafter referred to as EM/SHD), Vincennes, France, 11P 130.

Overall rape figures for the French occupied territories remain unknown, however studies conducted by Marc Hillel, Manfred Bosch and Hermann Werner confirm that there were at least 385 rapes in Constance, 600 rapes in Bruchsal and 500 rapes in Freudenstadt by French occupation soldiers.[65] In Koblenz, the Regional President recorded that the number of "injury to persons through occupation" totaled three thousand civilians, of which the number of women is unknown; in Cochem an der Mosel, French occupation soldiers fathered twenty two babies through rape.[66] Yet of all these cases, the Stuttgart Rape Incident remains the most notorious.

In July 1945, a storm of controversy swept over the world after it was reported that French colonial occupation soldiers from Morocco under General Eisenhower's command had raped between two thousand and five thousand German women in the Stuttgart subway; the incident was later dismissed following a U.S. Senate hearing on July 17, 1945 on the grounds that there was no subway in Stuttgart at the time, and the accused soldiers were never court-martialed.[67] A July 7, 1945 *New York Times* article reports that the Stuttgart Inquiry found no evidence to support the rape accusations, although another article of August 11, 1945 titled "Rape Story Dispute Grows in Stuttgart" suggests that the notoriety of the case

[65] Biddiscombe, "Dangerous Liaisons", 635.
[66] Taylor, 147.
[67] The Stuttgart Rape Incident remains a point of contention amongst scholars, in that the incidents that transpired remain unclear. The U.S. Senate quickly dismissed the allegations during a hearing of July 17, 1945 by stating that there had not been a subway in Stuttgart at the time (United States Congress, *Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates*, vol. 91, part 6 (U.S. Government Printing Office: 1945), 7739). Karen Hagemann states that Moroccan soldiers raped 1,198 women and murdered four in the U-Bahn in Stuttgart but that the case was later disproved by U.S. and British authorities (Karen Hagemann, *Home/front: The Military, War, and Gender in Twentieth-Century Germany* (Oxford: Berg, 2002), 149). Norman Naimark makes a passing reference to the "mass rapes in Stuttgart" but does not comment on their authenticity (Naimark, 138).

intensified as the occupation began to take shape.[68] Although the inquiry was officially dismissed, the contentious legacies of the Stuttgart Rape Incident suggest that the backlash surrounding the rape of women by 'nonwhite' occupation soldiers was very much a continuation of the racist legacies of the Rhineland occupation following the First World War.

The legacies of sexual violence against women under occupation can be charted semantically. The German word *Fisimatenten,* for example, a term that derives from the French phrase "visitez ma tente" ("visit my tent"), sheds light on the dynamic between the occupier and the occupied. This phrase originates from the time of the Napoleonic Wars when French occupation forces courteously invited people into their tents; the term was later used by French occupation soldiers to coerce German women to engage in sexual activity.[69] Parenthetically, the violent legacies of the occupation of post-Fascist Italy by French colonial soldiers can also be traced through semantics. The rape of Italian women in Monte Cassino in May 1944 by *Goumiers,* Moroccan soldiers who fought in the French colonial army, led to the Italian word *marocchinate,* which is now synonymous with "an orgy of violence."[70] These terms reveal the way in which 'race' and 'gender' often intersect in postwar contexts. In the case of post-Nazi Germany, defeat was not simply accompanied by anxieties about occupation but also by anxieties about who would be doing the occupying.

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[68] "Rape Story Unsupported, 6th Army Group Says Stuttgart Inquiry Finds No Basis For It," *New York Times,* July 7, 1945, p. 4; "Rape Story Dispute Grows in Stuttgart," *New York Times,* August 11, 1945, p. 10.

[69] I would like to thank Frau Maria Grote, my German teacher at the Goethe-Institut Montreal, for bringing this interesting point to my attention. A more detailed, albeit brief, explanation of this term can be found in Herman H. Parret and Jacques Bouveresse, *Meaning and Understanding* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1981), 104.

[70] Taylor, 146.

The contentious legacies of the post-First World War occupation of the German Rhineland reinforced racist perceptions of colonial soldiers in the post-Nazi period. These attitudes reveal that German women's collective experience of rape was as much racialized as it was gendered. This was especially true of the Rhineland Occupation of 1919 to 1923, during which the presence of French colonial soldiers in the Triple Entente's occupation armies stirred much anxiety amongst the German population. The deployment of *La Force* Noire- French colonial troops from Morocco, Algeria and Senegal- into the Rhineland following the Great War was met by vehement criticism by the German population who then began a racist propaganda campaign called the 'Black Horror on the Rhine' to discredit the French in the eyes of their fellow victors.[71] During postwar negotiations between the Triple Entente and the Central Powers in Spa, Belgium in 1918, Marshall Ferdinand Foch, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Armies, refused to guarantee German delegates that the French would not deploy colonial soldiers into the Rhineland.[72] German Foreign Minister Wilhelm Solf had told his emissaries to discourage the use of French and American 'coloured troops' and had even asked the Swiss to mediate the issue in November 1918.[73] The German delegation restated their concern at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 by stating that "colored troops should not be made a part of the army of occupation."[74]

[71] Keith L. Nelson, "The 'Black Horror on the Rhine': Race as a Factor in post-World War I Diplomacy", *The Journal of Modern History,* vol. 42, no. 4 (Dec., 1970): 609.
[72] Reiner Pommerin, "The Fate of Mixed Blood Children in Germany", *German Studies Review*, vol. 5, no. 3 (Oct. 1982): 316.
[73] Nelson, "The 'Black Horror on the Rhine', 609.
[74] Nelson, 609.

These protests fell on deaf ears, and by the winter of 1919 there were 200,000 French occupation soldiers on the Rhine, 42,000 of whom were French North African.[75] Upon learning that the French were deploying colonial occupation troops into the Rhineland, Lord Derby, the British ambassador in Paris, remarked, "I cannot think of anything more calculated to irritate the Germans."[76] Further correspondence between Woodrow Wilson and Georges Clemenceau in the Council of Four at Versailles suggests that even Clemenceau had been wary of deploying colonial troops into the Rhineland:

Woodrow Wilson:	I have been told that the French government has the intention of sending Senegalese into the left bank. Is this true?
Georges Clemenceau:	There is exactly a battalion there now, but I plan to retire them, for I believe as you do that it would be a grave error to occupy the left bank with black troops.[77]

The French High Command treated colonial soldiers like "second-class citizens" to the point where "even the graves of black troops in French military cemeteries were segregated from those of white troops", an attitude that mirrored the German population's perception that "coloured races rightly occupied a lower level of civilization and culture than the white race."[78] To German civilians, the presence of colonial occupation troops was the ultimate symbol of total and humiliating defeat. Consequently, the German media began to circulate vicious propaganda against these 'nonwhite' soldiers in order to heighten fears about the potential spread of

[75] Ibid., 609.
[76] Sally Marks, "Black Watch on the Rhine: A Study in Propaganda, Prejudice and Prurience", *European Studies Review*, vol. 13, no. 3 (July 1983): 297.
[77] This memorandum is from the National Archives in Washington, D.C. and has been published in Nelson's article, "The 'Black Horror on the Rhine'", 609.
[78] Peter Collar, *The Propaganda War in the Rhineland: Weimar Germany, Race and Occupation after World War I* (London: I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2013), 105.

parasites, leprosy and venereal disease.[79] It soon became evident, however, that colonial soldiers seldom attacked German women during the occupation. Even Margarete Gärtner, the director of the *Rheinische Frauenliga* (Rhenish Women's League) and mastermind behind much of the racist propaganda that was in circulation during the Black Horror, admits that there had only been one hundred and thirty attacks against German girls and women during the occupation.[80] During a tour of the Rhineland in 1921, American writer Lewis Gannet recalls a conversation with a Rhenish police commissioner who informed him that colonial soldiers were peaceful and disciplined; it had been the white French troops, the commissioner pointed out, who had treated the German people poorly.[81]

The racist legacies of the Black Horror shaped civilian expectations of the postwar occupation of Germany in 1945, too. The unsolved mystery of the Stuttgart Subway Incident suggests that the episode may have been fabricated in an attempt to heighten racial anxieties or that the U.S. Army had anxiously concealed the violent crimes that had occurred under Eisenhower's command. A German pastor's recollection of the conduct of French colonial soldiers near Freiburg runs contrary to that of the Stuttgart allegations, however: "The first enemy troops who passed through the village (25 April) were Moroccans under the command of French officers. They descended the routes leading into Schauinsland in somewhat ragged order... the attitude of the men was in general correct, since the officers kept them

[79] Marks, "Black Watch on the Rhine", 301.
[80] Collar, *The Propaganda War in the Rhineland*, 105.
[81] Marks, 300.

under the strictest discipline."[82] Yet despite their disciplined conduct, biting propaganda similar to that of the Black Horror continued to circulate throughout the Western Zones. Nazi sympathizers and right wing Germans were at the forefront of perpetuating racist stereotypes about 'nonwhite' occupation soldiers. Members of *Werwolf,* the underground Nazi guerilla movement that operated in the Western Zones, spread rumours about the rape of German women by 'nonwhite' occupation soldiers in hopes that lingering Nazi ideology about 'racial purity' would encourage the occupied population to shift the blame for defeat onto French colonial and African American occupation soldiers.[83] In many ways, this can be viewed as a continuation of the nationalist myths and racial intolerance that drove the rise of National Socialism after the Great War.

Racial intolerance toward colonial soldiers was not just rampant amongst the German population, however. The strict manner by which the French Army disciplined its colonial troops reflects France's own struggle with conceptions of 'race' during the denouement of French imperialism. The decline of the Empire, which reinforced what Eric Jennings calls a "form of colonialism steeped in social-Darwinist determinism and rooted in a reductionist, organic understanding of other, usually 'primitive', societies and 'races'", had unacceptable consequences on interactions between German women and 'nonwhite' occupation soldiers from the perspectives of the U.S. and French Armies.[84] In the case of the U.S. occupation Army, which was a 'Jim Crow army' according to Heide Fehrenbach, racism and

[82] Taylor, 146.
[83] Biddiscombe, *Werwolf* !, 50, 260,
[84] Eric Jennings, *Vichy in the Tropics: Pétain's National Revolution in Madagascar, Guadeloupe, and Indochina, 1940-1944* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 1.

segregation affected the "social dynamics and perceptions of the American occupation, both among American soldiers and between American occupiers and Germans."[85] While there were many women who used Nazi racial hygiene to justify aborting the *artfremd* (alien offspring) that had been fathered by 'Negro' or 'North African' occupation soldiers, there were also many instances of cordial relations between 'nonwhite' soldiers and German women.[86] An October 1946 article in *Ebony,* a widely read African American magazine, reported that the eight hundred black GIs stationed in the American sector of Berlin found "more friendship and equality in Berlin than in Birmingham or on Broadway."[87] Similarly, a September 16, 1946 article in *Newsweek* recalls that "European's racial tolerance had posed a problem for Americans that will not be forgotten with the war or with the return of Negro soldiers from service overseas."[88] In the segregated bars and establishments of the U.S. Zone, for example, the alleged violation of German women by black GIs became a convenient means for white GIs to reinforce racial hatred and to physically assault, court-martial and even execute black GIs.[89] In a similar vein, German men were equally as racist toward 'nonwhite' occupation soldiers and resentful of the interracial relationships that developed, often labeling women who became involved with black occupation solders *Negerliebchen* (nigger lover).[90] Although

[85] Heide Fehrenbach, "Black Occupation Children and the Devolution of the Nazi Racial State," *After the Nazi Racial State: Difference and Democracy in Germany and Europe,* Rita Chin et al., eds. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2009), 33.
[86] Atina Grossmann, "A Question of Silence: The Rape of German Women by Occupation Soldiers," *West Germany under Construction: Politics, Society, and Culture in the Adenauer Era,* Robert Moeller, ed. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), 47.
[87] Petra Goedde, *GIs and Germans: Culture, Gender, and Foreign Relations, 1945-1949* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 108.
[88] Goedde, 110.
[89] Ibid., 109.
[90] Fehrenbach, "Black Occupation Children and the Devolution of the Nazi Racial State," 34.

evidence suggests that African American GIs and French colonial occupation soldiers seldom raped or physically attacked German women, white occupation soldiers viewed relations between 'nonwhite' soldiers and women as a threat to the racial hierarchy.

Although scholars have yet to produce a comprehensive study on the rape of German women by Allied soldiers, it becomes evident that sexual violence in the Western Zones often intersected with race and gender. While 'race' was de-categorized and was dropped from the contemporary German lexicon after the collapse of Nazism, as Rita Chin and Heide Fehrenbach point out, perceived threats toward the occupier and the occupied's conceptions of racial superiority meant that 'race' was deeply embedded within the structure of the occupation.[91] White soldiers likely justified sexual violence against women by relying on the pretense that they were simply "fighting the good fight" in an enemy land while targeting and persecuting 'nonwhite' occupation soldiers for alleged instances of rape.[92] German civilians, on the other hand, used racism to justify the shame and humiliation of defeat and occupation.

Many of these allegations were based on instances of fraternization between 'nonwhite' soldiers and German women, a subject that broaches the obscure division between consensual sex and postwar prostitution. As Robert Moeller remarks, fraternization between the victors and the defeated made it difficult to determine whether "women in the western zones had resisted too little or not at

[91] Rita Chin and Heide Fehrenbach, "Introduction: What's Race Got to Do With It? Postwar German History in Context," *After the Nazi Racial State: Difference and Democracy in Germany and Europe*, Rita Chin et al., eds. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2009), 5.
[92] Susan Brownmiller, *Against our Will: Men, Women and Rape* (New York: Bantam Books, 1975), 49, 65.

all."[93] He elaborates that "sympathy for the rape victims of British, French, and American soldiers [was] blurred with suspicion that women had succumbed to blandishments and material benefits offered by the victors."[94] The inherently gendered experience of occupation forced many women into difficult and often deadly predicaments. More often than not, fraternizing with occupation soldiers became the sole means of surviving the nightmarish realities of the postwar period.

Fraternization: An Allied Conundrum

The Allies had certain expectations "conditioned by deep-seated clichés" about the defeated people they encountered when they entered Germany: "While the French disliked the Wehrmacht's arrogance during the occupation, the British resented the random terror of the Luftwaffe, and the Russians suffered from the devastation of the genocidal war, the Americans had much less reason to hate because the fighting did not reach their shores and they had entered the conflict late."[95] German expectations of the occupiers also stemmed from clichés and stereotypes whose "prejudices against the sophisticated yet weak French, bumbling but gallant English, and childlike and vengeful Russians" set the stage for interactions between the victors and the vanquished, particularly regarding fraternization between German women and occupation soldiers.[96]

Wartime rape and fraternization are not mutually exclusive. Elisabeth Heineman argues that fraternization is "the putatively 'other', but frequently

[93] Moeller, *War Stories*, 67.
[94] Moeller, 67.
[95] Jarausch, *After Hitler*, 105.
[96] Jarausch, 105-106.

difficult-to-disentangle side of the rape story."[97] The often-transcendent boundary between forced sex and consensual sex within the context of occupation makes it difficult to distinguish between who is raped and who resorts to fraternization, often semi-willingly, in order to survive.[98] As recounted throughout *A Woman in Berlin*, many German women prostituted themselves in exchange for food, shelter and protection from gang rape and violence. Fraternizing with the occupier often marked an attempt to regain a relative degree of normalcy in the face of severe food and resource shortages: "They foraged for fresh food in the countryside... They sewed scraps, fixed worn clothes and shoes, searched for food and fuel... They struggled to keep control of children and teenagers in a city where boys frolicked in the ruins and girls quickly learned that a relationship with an occupier was the best way to support their mothers."[99]

Fraternization was not simply an exchange of sexual services for goods, however. The dynamic between occupation soldiers and women underwent a dramatic shift during the course of the occupation, one that Cora Goldstein describes as the 'feminization of fraternization':

> The image of the Trümmerfrau existed side by side with the more ambiguous one of the attractive and often deceptive young Fräulein in the American consciousness. Rather than punishing Germans for their atrocities during the war, American GIs became providers and protectors, first literally for the women they dated, and later figuratively for what they perceived to be an emasculated, starving population.[100]

Before the Second World War, fraternization had generally meant that people from different backgrounds, religions or social classes would come together amicably.

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[97] Atina Grossmann, "The 'Big Rape': Sex and Sexual Violence, War, and Occupation in Post-World War II Memory and Imagination", *Sexual Violence in Conflict Zones: From the Ancient World to the Era of Human Rights*, Elizabeth Heinemann, ed. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 147.
[98] Grossmann, *Jews, Germans, and Allies*, 70.
[99] Grossmann, 76.
[100] Goldstein, *Capturing the German Eye*, 81.

This changed when the Allies began to sympathize with the starving and predominately female postwar German population in 1945. By this time, the 'feminization of fraternization' had begun to facilitate "a shift from one traditionally male gender role- conqueror- to another- protector and provider", a process that victimized a former enemy people.[101]

Although Germans in the U.S. Zone were the most dramatically 'feminized', which led to higher incidents of fraternization in the American Zone than in the neighboring British and French Zones, German women's initial experiences under American occupation were quite difficult. A German reporter observes that "The Americans have demonstrated no compassion or pity toward our women or children... the population of the village, mostly composed of women and children, has been subjected to pillaging and abuse by American troops."[102] Early occurrences of fraternization between GIs and German women were viewed as physically and morally detrimental to U.S. troops, as General Lucius D. Clay, General Eisenhower's Deputy of German Affairs, recalls in his memoir:

> An early order prohibiting fraternization, required under our directives, prevented the normal "boy meets girl" process, and the soldier who could not be kept away from the opposite sex was forced to meet German girls in dark halls and alleys and under cover of darkness. Obviously only the lowest type of girl, the tramp, would meet with soldiers under such conditions. Drinking and venereal diseases increased. Our Allies experienced the same problem, and the fraternization rule was lifted by mutual agreement in the Allied Control Council in September 1945. Special Services then began to invite carefully screened German girls to the clubs provided for our soldiers. However, the reputation left by the tramps made attracting decent girls a difficult and slow process. Our regulations prohibited the serving of food to Germans in our military installations and hence the soldiers could offer the German girls only liquor. It was some time before clubs were provided where soldiers could take girls and obtain food and soft drinks for them.[103]

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[101] Goedde, 202.
[102] "L'attitude des américains dans les villages allemands qu'ils occupent," unknown newspaper, January 3, 1946, EM/SHD: 7P161.
[103] Lucius D. Clay, *Decisions in Germany* (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1950), 62.

The 'German tramp' is a reference to none other than the German *Fräulein*, a conniving, dangerous seductress who became a focal point of Allied propaganda in the early months of the occupation. An occupation primer distributed to the 3rd Armor Division Troops in May 1945 warns GIs of the dangers of fraternizing with *Fräuleins* in an attempt to keep troops 'healthy': "Your attitude toward women is wrong-- in Germany. You'll see a lot of good-looking babes on the make there. German women have been trained to seduce you. Is it worth a knife in the back?"[104]

Although fraternization was initially perceived as a dangerous threat to American occupation objectives, the fraternization ban was seldom enforced in the U.S. Zone and thus allowed GIs to romance and flirt with German women freely. An autobiography published during the occupation reveals that fraternization had been generally tolerated provided that GIs "sleep with 'em but don't shake hands" and that they "don't stay for breakfast."[105] Colonel John J. Koneazny recalls a similar process in his occupation diary: "We had forgiven the Germans, or at least their pretty Fräuleins, for their war crimes and soon became their lovers. We were members of the victorious army and it seems that we and the British and the French are the only people in the world that treat our enemies in accordance with the Geneva Convention."[106]

Fraternization was not unique to GIs, however. It occurred in the British Zone, too, though not to the same extent as in the U.S. Zone. A June 21, 1947 article

[104] 12th Army Group, German Occupation Booklet, "Don't Be a Sucker in Germany!", May 1945, 3rd Armored Division History Foundation.
[105] Heineman, *What Difference does a Husband Make?*, 147.
[106] Colonel John J. Koneazny, *Behind Friendly Lines: Tales from World War II* (Burnstown: General Store Publishing House, 2001), 145.

in *Der Abend* reveals that British soldiers and German women were fraternizing with one another long before the British Military Government formally lifted the fraternization ban in June 1947.[107] The dynamic between German civilians and the British Military Government was generally cordial. One German woman recalls that "on the part of the English soldiers there was not the slightest misconduct toward the German civilian population."[108] Severe food shortages and difficult living conditions in the British Zone made fraternizing with American soldiers much more appealing to German women, however, as GIs had more food and resources at their disposal with which to woo the objects of their affection.[109] One German man recalls that American soldiers "were easily able to meet their great demand for 'Frolleins' with cigarettes and chocolate, despite the official 'fraternization ban.'"[110] Another German man bitterly complains that "For six years we risked our lives for them and now they're running around with the Americans."[111] The use of degrading terms like *Schokoladenhure* (chocolate whore) to describe women who fraternized with occupation soldiers in exchange for commodities like chocolate bars reflects German men's interpretation of this process as a humiliating symbol of defeat.[112] Conversely, the American and British blends of fraternization were not echoed in the French Zone, where fraternization assumed a uniquely pervasive character.

[107] "Fraternisierungsverbot aufgehoben," June 21, 1947, *Der Abend,* Direction générale des Affaires culturelles, Ministère des Affaires étrangères et européennes, Centre des Archives diplomatiques. La Courneuve, France, 4/3 (Hereafter referred to as AC/MAEE).
[108] Jarausch, *After Hitler,* 106.
[109] Biddiscombe, "Dangerous Liaisons", 618.
[110] Jarausch, 106.
[111] Ibid., 32.
[112] Biddiscombe, 627.

The French encountered a new enemy when they occupied and demilitarized Nazi Germany during the spring of 1945. This enemy, the German woman, was not necessarily armed but morally threatening. Like in the British and American Zones, a fraternization ban had been put into effect as early as April 10, 1945.[113] A French occupation manual distributed to all French occupation soldiers served as a reminder of the dangers of fraternizing with the German people while in "an enemy country":

> FRENCH SOLDIER
>
> Every German, of every age, and every sex, is an enemy:
> - The child, the woman, the elderly who attract pity are Nazi agents.
> - The antifascists in prisons are Party agents, camouflaged and waiting for revenge...
> - The woman who smiles at you.
> - Your hatred and victor superiority stem from your attitude, but not excessively or violently, as pillage and rape are serious military misconducts punishable by death.[114]

Despite strict regulations that prohibited rape and fraternization, the dynamic between German women and French soldiers followed a distinct trajectory from those of the U.S. and British Zones. German civilians were expected to billet French occupation soldiers in their homes, which had dramatic consequences on social interactions between occupiers and occupied. One German man recalls developing a close friendship with the French civil servant he was billeting; the Frenchman had even looked after his children while the lady of the house had gone into labor, an example that journalist Rebecca West calls "fraternization with greater accuracy than the process known by that name in the British and American Zones, which

[113] "Note relative à l'occupation militaire en 'territoire allemand'", April 10, 1945, EM/SHD: 11P 130.
[114] "Memento of the French Military in Germany," date unknown, EM/SHD: 11P 130.

often seemed to have nothing to do with the Latin word for brother."[115] This seemingly cordial dynamic seems to have influenced the French's laissez-faire attitude toward fraternization altogether. Frederick Taylor argues that the "usual French common sense in sexual matters" meant that "very little official attention was paid to liaisons between their soldiers and German women."[116]

As one German journalist observed in 1947, fraternization in the French Zone became an entirely different phenomenon from its American counterpart:

> Fraternization of the Anglo-American brand does not exist. The 'Fraulein-poilu liaison' is not so much a public affair as the GI-Fraulein romance; moreover, it is not based on candies and cigarettes. The Frenchman and the German girl do not meet in the streets… Frenchmen marry Germans without much publicity. The French common sense wherever relations between the sexes are concerned prevented them from making fools of themselves.[117]

Unlike its neighboring zones, the French were discreet about their relationships with German women and the French Military Government often turned a blind eye from such affairs.[118] The lenient manner by which these liaisons were regarded stems from French attitudes toward sex and romance. The duality between love and sex in French society formed the basis of the "ideal of conjugal sexuality" during the pre-war Third Republic, Elizabeth Roudinesco argues: "The bourgeois generated his offspring in the heat of the marital bed, but he gave free reign to his instincts only with prostitutes. He mixed together hygiene with the defense of the race, loved pleasure, but dreaded its maladies; syphilis and hysteria struck at the very heart of his expectations of progress, his traditions, his hereditary patrimony."[119] Robert A. Nye posits that the perception of 'marital heterogenitality' became a 'cultural myth'

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[115] Rebecca West, *A Train of Powder* (E-Book edition: Open Road Media, 2010), chapter 3.
[116] Taylor, 147.
[117] This unnamed newspaper article has been borrowed from Biddiscombe's "Dangerous Liaisons", 638.
[118] Biddiscombe, 618.
[119] Elizabeth Roudinesco, *La Bataille de cent ans. Histoire de la psychanalyse en France*, vol. II (Paris: Ramsay, 1982), 47.

in interwar France, one that was reinforced by "two kinds of eroticism—the marital and the illicit."[120] In many ways, this public attitude toward love and sex shaped the French occupiers' attitudes toward German women. Although the French Military Government was very much concerned with reaffirming France's place as a world power by strengthening the 'French race', as this dissertation will later demonstrate, fraternization between soldiers and civilians was not perceived as a threat to the French occupation effort. Consequently, the French Military Government seldom enforced its non-fraternization policy, and those who were caught were rarely fined or punished.[121]

Despite lax anti-fraternization policy in the French Zone, liaisons between French soldiers and German women sparked a violent backlash by German civilians and returning Wehrmacht soldiers who often inflicted punitive measures upon these women. Lists of women who fraternized were circulated throughout the Zone, and many women who fraternized were violently attacked and made victim to the humiliating practice of haircutting.[122] Haircutting was by no means an innovation of post-Nazi Germany, however. It was also common in Liberation and post-Liberation France, where French civilians and returning prisoners of war engaged in haircutting rituals to publically humiliate Frenchwomen who had collaborated with Nazi Wehrmacht soldiers during the Occupation.[123] Haircutting was also a common form of punishment in Weimar Germany and Nazi Germany. It was widely carried

[120] Robert A. Nye, "Sexuality, Sex Difference and the Cult of Modern Love in the French Third Republic," *Historical Reflections/Réflexions Historiques*, vol. 20, no. 1 (Winter 1994): 73.
[121] Biddiscombe, 638.
[122] Ibid., 619.
[123] Ibid., 621.

out by German civilians during the Rhineland occupation in 1919 to discourage German girls and women from fraternizing with Entente occupation troops; it was also used to punish and humiliate German women who were involved with 'racially impure' male workers during the Third Reich.[124] Since fraternization became the ultimate symbol of German defeat, haircutting created a convenient means of expressing bitterness and shame.

As the occupation began to take shape, German women in the Western Zones fraternized with occupation soldiers in an attempt to transcend the harsh realities of defeat. Elizabeth Heineman argues that fraternization also became a key factor in distinguishing West German women's experiences from those of the East: "While rape became a metaphor for the Soviet Union's treatment of eastern Germany (at least in western accounts), fraternization symbolized the ambiguous appeal of western- especially U.S.- culture, financial support, and political models."[125] While German women willingly and semi-willingly fraternized with American GIs in exchange for food, shelter and protection, German women and French soldiers liaised more pervasively, which in turn attracted little attention from French occupation officials.

Fraternization motives become especially clear when studying the mass food shortages that submerged the postwar German population into desperate states of hunger. Formerly an enemy people, the German population now depended heavily on the victors for survival. This hunger proved to be most gnawing and

[124] Biddiscombe, 621.
[125] Heineman, 106.

demoralizing in the French Zone, however, and thus offers insight into the reasons why German women remained passive and marginal under French occupation.

The Hunger Crisis

The winter of 1946-1947 was synonymous with agonizing hunger. The British Director-General of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization had predicted a global food crisis as early as 1940: "We are only at the beginning of what looks like a long grim struggle, in which food may be, as it was in the last war, the decisive factor for victory."[126] The Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) set the official postwar German ration at 2,000 calories to match those of the Allied countries in anticipation of peacetime food shortages; sustaining this ration soon proved impossible, however, and the ration was reduced to 1,550 calories.[127] The harsh winter and lack of sufficient Allied preparation led to actual rations that were far below sustenance level. Zonal rations plummeted as temperatures dipped below freezing level, leading to rations of 950 calories in the American Zone, 850 calories in the British Zone and 450 calories in the French Zone.

The German winter of 1946-1947, one of the harshest on record, led to interruptions in shipping and food imports as well as devastating coal shortages that left people unable to heat the remnants of their bombed out homes. Many of the major waterways and ports, including the Rhine, the Main, the Neckar and the Elbe, were completely frozen with shipping capacities reduced to a mere forty-five

[126] Alice Weinreb, "'For the Hungry Have No Past nor Do They Belong to a Political Party': Debates over German Hunger after World War II", *Central European History*, vol. 45 (2012): 50.
[127] Atina Grossmann, "Grams, Calories, and Food: Languages of Victimization, Entitlement, and Human Rights in Occupied Germany, 1945-1949," *Central European History*, vol. 44 (2011): 122.

percent of their prewar levels.[128] In the major shipping hub of Hanover, for example, ninety percent of the city had no access to water, only twenty-five percent of houses had electricity, and sixty percent of infrastructure had been destroyed by aerial bombs.[129]

It is generally agreed that the hunger crisis was harshest in the British Zone, whose population was 113.5 percent higher than its prewar number due to an influx of prisoners of war, refugees and displaced persons.[130] With the largest population to administer, the British Military Government struggled to feed the Germans in its Zone who had once relied almost entirely on food imports; this task was especially cumbersome considering that the British could only provide each citizen with 400 calories from resources readily available in their Zone.[131] People in the British Zone were also freezing to death. In December 1946, one thousand Germans had been arrested for stealing coal from trains; by March 1947, this number had risen to seventeen thousand.[132] A nutritional survey conducted during the summer of 1946 by Sir Jack Drummond revealed that the official ration of 1,550 calories per day, half of what Britons were receiving in the United Kingdom, was producing symptoms of hunger edema, malnutrition and stunted infantile growth in the German population.[133] There had not been such appalling conditions since the Napoleonic Wars, noted Regional Commissioner Vaughan Berry in his January 1947 report.[134]

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[128] Patricia Meehan, *A Strange People: Germans under the British* (London: Peter Owen Publishers, 2001), 239.
[129] Adams, *From Crusade to Hazard*, 42.
[130] Vaizey, *Surviving Hitler's War,* 74.
[131] Adams, 42; Meehan, *A Strange People*, 244.
[132] Meehan, 240.
[133] Ibid., 244-245.
[134] Ibid., 239.

Despite that the British Nutrition Committee had officially recommended an absolute minimum of 1,500 calories to sustain life, Berry noted in May 1947 that the ration had plummeted to 850 calories, remarking that "the ration for one individual for one week can be comfortably contained on an ordinary dinner plate."[135]

The food situation was marginally better in the American Zone, though Germans were on the verge of starvation there, too. A 1947 survey revealed that seventy percent of Germans residing in the U.S. and British Zones believed that there were marked differences between American and British food policy; of this number, 92.4 percent favoured American food policies over those of the British.[136] By August 1945, the official ration of 1,550 calories could not be maintained and was officially lowered to 1,180 calories in May 1946.[137] This ration was seldom enforced, however, and only 950 calories were actually distributed to Germans by July 1945.[138] The British and American caloric allocations were less than half of what was recommended by nutritionists to prevent malnutrition and disease. The Allies were not prepared to mediate such a large-scale food crisis, General Clay recalls, one that proved to be a severe detriment to the German population and to the Allied reconstruction program:

> For three years the problem of food was to color every administrative action, and to keep the German people alive and able to work was our main concern. From the first I begged and argued for food because I did not believe that the American people wanted starvation and misery to accompany occupation, and I was certain that we could not arouse political interest for a democratic government in a hungry, apathetic population... The need to provide food and thus prevent disease and unrest in the population behind the battle lines was recognized throughout the war, and SHAEF had brought to Germany for this purpose

[135] Meehan, 246-247.
[136] Joseph Foschepoth, "German Reaction to Defeat and Occupation," *West Germany under Construction: Politics, Society, and Culture in the Adenauer Era*, Robert G. Moeller, ed. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), 83.
[137] Clay, *Decisions in Germany*, 264.
[138] Clay, 263-264.

> 600,000 tons of grain. This supply was not to be used lightly, because we did not know where and how more could be obtained for the forthcoming winter.[139]

Although the mass food shortage was as much a humanitarian crisis as a roadblock to reconstruction, Clay was concerned that a starving population in the Western Zones would give Germans no choice between "becoming a Communist on 1,500 calories and a believer in democracy on 1,000."[140] American public opinion seemed to agree. An article published in the *Stars and Stripes* on 15 April, 1946 called "Feed Germany or Move Out, 8 Editors Say" reported that "Germany must be sent more food if the U.S. is to continue the occupation and compete successfully with communism in postwar Germany."[141] As the situation deteriorated, the American Military Government divided their grain stock in November 1945, keeping 300,000 tons in their reserve while sending 250,000 tons to the British Zone and 15,000 tons to the French Zone; since Germans in the British and French Zones "were existing on a ration lower than in our zone", Clay recalls, "starving Germans wherever located would delay the accomplishment of our objectives."[142]

The food shortage was most dire in the French Zone, where the daily ration plummeted to 450 calories at the height of the crisis.[143] At less than half of American and British rations, the French ration was barely above starvation level. Mass food shortages had already become a concern for French administrators before the

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[139] Clay, 263.
[140] Ann Tusa, *The Last Division: A History of Berlin, 1945-1989* (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 16.
[141] "Feed Germany of Move Out, 8 Editors Say," *Stars and Stripes*, April 15, 1946, Service des missions de liaison, Ministère des Affaires étrangères et européennes (MAEE), Centre des Archives diplomatiques, La Courneuve, France (Hereafter referred to as SL/MAEE), 11/1.
[142] Clay, 264.
[143] James Bacque, *Crimes and Mercies: The Fate of German Civilians under Allied Occupation, 1944-1950* (Vancouver: Talon Books: 2007), 145; Weinreb, "'For the Hungry Have No Past nor Do They Belong to a Political Party'", 52.

arrival of winter, however. James Kerr Pollock, an advisor to the American Branch of the Central Control Council under General Clay, recalls a visit he received from two French officers and two German officials on July 1, 1946 who made "a moving appeal... on behalf of the starving Germans in the French Zone":

> They wondered why we could not send them from the American zone ten thousand tons of potatoes which were needed to maintain life in this benighted portion of the French zone of occupation. I assured the very sincere Germans that it was not because of any lack of humanity that such transfers from our zone to the French zone could not be allowed... I also told them that the responsibility for feeding the Germans in the French zone rested with the French Military Government and that we had worked consistently for the elimination of zonal boundaries, but had not secured the support of the French... It seemed a bit odd to me that the French should have brought their Germans over to us to beg for food.[144]

By 1947, conditions had become insufferable. An Information Bulletin to the Commander-in-Chief of the French Zone reports that during the winter of 1946-1947, the black market was expanding, fruit and vegetables were being picked long before they were ripe, and half of the coal en route to the French Zone never arrived because it had been stolen.[145] The severe drought and French Cereal Crisis that followed led to mass grain shortages in France, making it even more difficult to import food into the French Zone. The drought caused grain production to fall from 6.8 million tons in 1946 to 3.3 million tons in 1947; much of this grain was unsalvageable and fed to cattle, which led to a decrease in French bread rations from three hundred to two hundred grams per day.[146]

The French occupation administration's mismanagement of the food crisis stirred vehement criticism from its U.S. counterparts. Pollock foreshadows the plight of Germans in the French Zone in a diary entry dated October 22, 1945:

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[144] James Kerr Pollock, *Besatzung und Staatsaufbau Nach 1945: Occupation Diary and Private Correspondence, 1945-1948* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1994), 250.
[145] "Sujet de l'Allemagne occidentale", August 19, 1947, SL/MAEE: 11/1.
[146] John Killick, *The United States and European Reconstruction, 1945-1960* (Edinburgh, Keele University Press, 1997), 69.

> The French should never have been given territory on the east side of the Rhine in the first place... What they have done in their present zone is enough to show their inability. It is one thing to control German reconstruction in such a way as to prevent a revival of military strength. It is another thing to mistreat human beings on whom you must rely for a revival of responsible democratic government. Thousands will starve to death this winter in the French zone.[147]

Pollock's claim that the French had planned to intentionally starve civilians in their Zone provides a possible explanation about the reasons why the hunger crisis was especially devastating in the French Zone. Yet, there are also other causes to consider. Nazi economic and financial policies also played a role in engendering this crisis, Rainer Hudemann argues, as they likely caused the black market to expand dramatically in the final months of the war.[148] In addition, the French Military Government enforced policy to collect German goods and cattle and ship them to France in August 1945, quasi-reparation payments that likely further aggravated the food crisis.[149] The Morgenthau Plan also catalyzed the food crisis, James Bacque contends, in that its reduction of German fertilizer production from two million tons to eight hundred thousand tons crippled German agricultural production.[150] The postwar expulsion of fifteen million Germans from the Sudetenland and former eastern provinces also meant that twenty-five percent of fertile farming land was redistributed to Poland and the Soviet Union, as agreed at Potsdam.[151]

Little is known about the food crisis in the Soviet Zone, especially with regard to the way in which the Soviet occupation administration managed the crisis in relation to themselves. It is generally agreed that food was used as a mechanism of control, as Soviet "officials, intellectuals and manual labourers" received 2,485

[147] Pollock, *Besatzung und Staatsaufbau Nach 1945,* 112.
[148] Hudemann, L'occupation française après 1945 et les relations franco-allemandes", 64.
[149] Pollock, 74.
[150] Bacque, *Crimes and Mercies,* 96.
[151] Bacque, 96, 99-100; Killick, *The United States and European Reconstruction, 1945-1960*, 51.

calories a day while "those categorized as 'useless'- that is to say the old, the unemployed and the politically incorrect- were lucky to get 1,248."[152] Food distribution was administered less calculatedly in the American Zone, albeit that the American occupiers were better fed than the German population. German actress Anneliese Uhlig recalls that the GIs "had beautiful teeth, they were so healthy, clean, well fed"; another German recalls that one would not see "starved faces furrowed by strain and exertion anymore, but soldiers who appeared extraordinarily rested and well-cared for."[153] American attitudes toward food rationing in the U.S. Zone stirred much criticism from the Allies, especially from the French press, who disproved of the Americans' disproportionately generous treatment of German prisoners of war. An April 12, 1945 article in the *Associated Press* reports that American workers protested against German prisoners' five daily meals while they only received three, a complaint that caused the U.S. Army to eliminate snacks from in between meals and to reduce the number of sweets.[154] Even General Eisenhower publicly reprimanded American GIs for their "cordial treatment" of German POWs in May 1945, stating that such treatment was a direct violation of his orders.[155]

The extreme shortage of food and resources in the British Zone meant a less comfortable lifestyle for the British occupation administration. Here, dwindling coal and resources were cautiously safeguarded in anticipation for the coming winter while "ink froze in inkwells... an officer's cup of tea froze on his desk... thousands of

[152] Ann Tusa, *The Last Division*, 15.
[153] Goedde, 107.
[154] "Les prisonniers allemands sont trop bien traités aux États Unis", April 12, 1945, *Associated Press*, EMAT/SHD: 7P161.
[155] "Les Prisonniers allemands ne seront plus traités <<cordialement>>, May 14, 1945, *Associated Press*, EMAT/SHD: 7P161.

workers sat in idleness in cold dark homes on a food ration hardly adequate to sustain life."[156] The experiences of the British Military Government starkly contrast those of the French occupation administration. While the former often went without food and resources in order to feed the starving German population, Karen Adler argues that the French Ravitaillement Program allocated up to 3,600 calories per day to French administrators in Germany, a ration that was much higher than any in France where ration cards were in circulation until the end of 1949.[157]

French occupiers and German civilians lived seemingly parallel existences. The lavish lifestyles of the French Military Government first under General de Lattre and then under General Pierre-Marie Koenig were far removed from the hardships that plagued postwar German society.[158] De Lattre hosted elaborate soirées in his villa in Lindau and frequently brought the National Opera Company from Paris to give private performances during his eleven-week stay in the occupied territories. [159] Koenig had just as expensive tastes. Having established his headquarters in the charming spa town of Baden-Baden, whose "orchestra continued to play Waldteufel waltzes in the polished ballroom of the Casino, and its whole atmosphere of luxuriant repose was quite alien to the misery of bombed-out Ludwigshafen or Mainz, or, perhaps more pertinently, to the hardships remaining in Brest, Caen, or Rouen", the head of the French Military Government lived apart from the harsh realities of the postwar period.[160] This did not change when Koenig moved

[156] Meehan, 244.
[157] Karen H. Adler, "Selling France to the French: The French Zone of Occupation in Western Germany, 1945-c.1955", *Contemporary European History*, vol. 21, no. 4 (Nov: 2012): 584; Hudemann, 63.
[158] Willis, 79.
[159] Ibid., 74-75.
[160] Ibid., 77.

from Baden-Baden to a luxurious villa on the Rhine near Frankfurt in August 1947, which stirred heated criticism from leftist circles in Paris who were put off by similarities between Koenig's administration and Vichy, whose capital had also been in a spa town.[161]

French occupation personnel were also far removed from the hunger crisis. They were provided with special ration cards to shop for overpriced French-imported produce, alcohol, tobacco, clothing and household supplies in one of the four hundred *économats* shops across the Zone and in the French sector of Berlin, a shopping experience that Karen Adler calls "an ideological implantation of France in the midst of former enemy territory."[162] Despite the large number of *économats* in the French Zone, German civilians were forbidden from entering these shops and were forced to find other ways of dealing with the food crisis.[163]

A predominately female postwar population meant that the hunger crisis had specific ramifications on German women. The gendered nature of occupation meant that German women were often dealt the task of "negotiating the impossible food situation", Alice Weinreb argues, while mass hunger forced Germans to accept total defeat.[164] The harsh realities of the immediate postwar period also placed women in what Petra Goedde calls a "paradoxical position", in that they provided for their families while depending on occupation soldiers for basic necessities and foodstuffs.[165] Atina Grossmann argues that since women were often more negatively

[161] Edwin Hartrich, "Koenig, French Zone Chief, Will Reside Near Frankfurt," August 19, 1947, *New York Herald Tribune,* SL/MAEE: 11/1.
[162] Adler, "Selling France to the French," 582, 558.
[163] Adler, 582.
[164] Weinreb, 54, 52.
[165] Goedde, 108.

affected by the hunger crisis than men, the food crisis also became a convenient means of punishing women for their involvement in Nazi organizations; they were often given *Himmelsfahrkarte*, low level rations cards that were so meager they were nicknamed 'ticket to heaven' cards.[166]

The endemic hunger that swept through the Western Zones makes it evident why fraternization between German women and Allied soldiers became so commonplace during the immediate postwar period. For some women, resorting to prostitution in exchange for food, protection and shelter became the only means of transcending the harsh, gendered realities of defeat and occupation in which rape and starvation were seemingly inevitable. Amidst heaps of rubble and bombed out infrastructure, German women "queued for a handout of butter and dry sausage, while men emerged only to line up for an issue of schnapps", a reality Antony Beevor finds ironic following twelve years of sexist Nazi family policy.[167] By 1947, German anthropologist Hilde Thurnwald noted in her study of four hundred and ninety-eight Berlin families that "women have moved into the central position as providers."[168] A predominately female population meant that German women now assumed the roles of provider and protector in addition to those of mother and caretaker in an attempt to secure the welfare of children, the elderly and the sick in addition to themselves.

The near-starvation of Germans in the Western Zones posed a serious threat to Allied occupation objectives. Low food rations could very well undermine the

[166] Grossmann, "Grams, Calories, and Food", 123.

[167] Beevor, *The Fall of Berlin 1945*, 310-311.
[168] Moeller, *Protecting Motherhood,* 11.

Allied reeducation programs that were designed to denazify and democratize the German people. In the British, American and Soviet Zones, the gendered nature of occupation led to shifts in occupation policy that allowed German women to experience relative degrees of social and political agency through sanctioned women's associations and welfare programs. Yet, women's statuses did not shift in the French Zone, where postwar conditions appeared to be particularly harsh. That women were forced to rely on 450 calories a day, less than a third of the required 1,550 calories needed for survival, certainly did not create ideal conditions to socially and politically empower them. The absence of French reeducation policy toward German women caused women to remain as marginalized as ever before.



Voulez-vous bien manger ?

SOYEZ PRISONNIERS DES AMERICAINS

Voici le menu officiel pour les prisonniers de guerre, sur le front européen, du samedi 23 décembre 1944 :

PETIT DEJEUNER	DEJEUNER	DINER
Pêches cuites au citron	Tranche de viande	Bœuf braisé
Porridge	Fromage	Pommes de terre [bouillies
Lait	Pommes de terre à la [Lyonnaise	Choux de Bruxelles
Œufs brouillés	Tomates cuites	Pruneaux au citron
Lard	Pudding au raisin	Pain
Pain	Pain	Beurre
Marmelade	Beurre	Café
Café	Thé	

Le règlement précise que, conformément à la Convention de Genève, cette ration est la même que celle des soldats américains, et que les plats qui choqueraient le goût d'une nation seront remplacés par une ration équivalente.

Le moindre de ces repas serait, pour nos exilés, un menu extraordinaire pour une journée !

Figure 2: "Would you like to eat well? Become an American prisoner."
A French critique of American treatment of POWS (January 27, 1945).[169]

Ah ! qu'il est doux d'être prisonnier... des Anglo-Américains !

Bon appétit, Messieurs !... Les prisonniers qui, tranquillement, prennent leur repas, dans un camp de rassemblement, n'ont pas l'air misérable et, après les dangers de la bataille, peut-être pensent-ils : « Où est-on mieux que prisonniers des Anglo-Américains ? »

Photo Keystone.

Figure 3: "Ah! How nice it is to be a prisoner… of the Anglo-Americans!"
Another biting critique of American and British food policy.[170]

[169] "Voulez-vous bien manger? Soyez prisonniers des américains", January 27, 1945, unknown newspaper, EMAT/SHD: 7P161.

German Women under French Occupation

"**W**e missed a unique opportunity in 1945: had we become the head of Europe, Germany would have followed," stated an August 1947 French occupation report: "Instead of defense and security policies, we wanted to see ourselves practice 'grand European politics' and attempted to create a European community while paying little attention to our national borders (in reference to the Soviet Union)… This international angle makes certain measures... seem like errors that have been ultimately detrimental to France herself."[171] The 'grand European politics' (*la grande politique européenne*) to which this report is referring is no doubt a reference to the 'French Thesis', a set of French occupation objectives that roused much resentment from France's American, British and Soviet counterparts.[172] French social and political occupation objectives were threefold: first, they would "remold that section of the German people" by implementing a denazification program that was distinct from their Allies'; next, they would reeducate the German population through rigorous cultural indoctrination and exposure to high French culture; finally, they would democratize German society through the revival of

[170] "Ah! Qu'il est doux d'être prisonnier… des Anglo-Américains!", date unknown, *Presses Libres*, EMAT/SHD: 7P161.
[171] "Sujet de l'Allemagne occidentale", August 19, 1947, SL/MAEE: 11/1.
[172] Willis, 79; Patrick Major, *The Death of the KPD: Communism and Anti-Communism in West Germany, 1945-1956* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 231.

political life.[173] These occupation schemes, however ambitious, had entirely failed by 1949.

The 'French Thesis' also had unique consequences on German women. Its interpretation of the 'Four D's' laid down at Potsdam- demilitarization, decentralization, denazification and democratization- became central to German women's experiences under French occupation, in that the French interpretation of these principles created the conditions necessary to socially and politically disempower women in the public sphere.

The 'Big 3' and France

The French Military Government did not believe that Germans were capable of exercising democratic judgment or carrying out reconstruction. This skepticism necessitated a program to secure French economic and military interests in order to "lay down with an indestructible firmness the bases of a Franco-German rapprochement, which is indispensable for the reconstruction of Europe."[174] The 'French Thesis', first introduced to the Allies by French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault at the London Conference in September 1945, was designed to safeguard France from future German aggression and to secure French economic interests through the exploitation of German resources. In May 1945, Bidault announced at a San Francisco press conference that the French Army planned to occupy the Rhine from the Swiss border to Remagen to prevent future German aggression and also demanded that the coal-rich Saar be placed under French control and that the iron

[173] Willis, 147.
[174] Ibid., 78.

ore-rich Ruhr be internationalized.[175] By buffering the Rhine and placing German resources under French control, the French hoped to decentralize the German economy and to extract economic reparations from the French Zone to finance the occupation effort. France needed "to be assured that French forces will be stationed permanently from one end of the Rhine to the other," De Gaulle stated on January 25, 1945.[176] Like Georges Clemenceau before him, de Gaulle wished to make the left bank of the Rhine into a German buffer to prevent future hostilities. In many ways, the 'French Thesis' was a continuation of French foreign policy after the First World War.

Decentralization was to play a large role in determining the course of the French Military Government's German reconstruction program. The French began to veto Allied and Soviet proposals to establish centralized German agencies at the London Conference of Foreign Ministers in 1945, a strategy that sparked much hostility in the eyes of the 'Big 3.'[177] As Pollock explains in a diary entry of October 11, 1945, the lack of French cooperation during postwar planning deterred German recovery: "Are the French going to be allowed to stymie the reconstruction of Germany along the national lines laid down at the Potsdam Agreement? I have always thought it a mistake to make the French an equal controlling partner in the occupation of Germany, and what they are doing now both in their zone and on the Central Control Council lends support to my view."[178] General Clay shared a similar view, as he believed that French opposition toward Allied and Soviet proposals to

[175] Willis, 31.
[176] Ibid., 30.
[177] Young, 225.
[178] Pollock, 102.

centralize German agencies, such as transportation systems and banks, was a detriment to postwar reconstruction. He recalls a heated conversation at the London Conference between the French and Russian representatives on the Allied Control Council, General Koeltz and General Sokolovsky, following Koeltz's veto of a proposal to establish a central transportation system and authorize the formation of trade unions:

> *General Sokolovsky:* "Our governments agreed on this point at the Potsdam Conference... We must meet the creation of this Transport Department."
>
> *General Clay:* "I feel the problem right now is the fundamental principle of how we are going to govern Germany. If the Control Council isn't going to establish German administrative machinery it might as well fold up as a governing agency and become a negotiating agency.
>
> *General Koeltz:* "I am perfectly agreed that there should be an American, French, British, and Soviet Council (which was in fact what the Transport Directorate was) but I can't agree that the Germans should have anything to do with it... The objects of the administration of Germany will be the decentralization of political structure and the developing of local responsibilities. Thus trade unions are political structures and will be decentralized."[179]

French reluctance toward centralized agencies became a recurring theme in postwar negotiations. This became especially evident when Vyacheslav Molotov, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, opposed British and American support of returning the Saar to France in July 1946.[180] Koenig then vetoed an American proposal to fuse together British and American economic activity in August 1946 on the grounds that centralizing the economies would foster German militarism.[181]

French insistence on enforcing the decentralization provision paved the way for the emergence of four very separate occupation administrations, each of which was free to interpret and implement the Potsdam Provisions as they saw fit. In the

[179] Clay, 109-110.
[180] F. Roy Willis, *France, Germany, and the New Europe, 1945-1967* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), 35.
[181] Willis, *France, Germany, and the New Europe, 1945-1967*, 35.

French Zone, this would have serious repercussions on reeducation efforts. Composed jointly of a decentralized denazification apparatus and a benighted cultural program, these were initiatives in which German women played no part.

The Failures of Denazification

By 1948, British, American and French denazification initiatives had failed. A January 22, 1947 interview in *The Stars and Stripes* between Josef Stalin and Elliott Roosevelt, the son of the late President Roosevelt, confirms that Allied denazification policies had been unsuccessful:

> 12- QUESTION: "Does the failure, in the American and British zones of Occupied Germany, of carrying out the denazification program give serious cause for alarm to the government of the Soviet Union?"
>
> STALIN: "No, it has not been a cause for serious alarm, but of course, it is not pleasant to the Soviet Union that this part of our common program is not being put into effect."[182]

Denazification was a massive undertaking. The Military Governments had to determine the degree to which Germans had been active and passive perpetrators, an ambitious undertaking on which there was no precedent to rely. At Potsdam, the 'Big 3' had agreed that denazification would entail the total destruction of the National Socialist Party and its organizations, the repeal of all Nazi laws, the arrest and punishment of all war criminals, and the removal of all members of the Nazi party from public and semi-public office.[183] In keeping with Potsdam, the Allied Control Council passed Control Council Law No. 10 on December 20, 1945, which was also known as the Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes against

[182] Elliot Roosevelt, "Generalissimo Replies to Twelve Questions on Soviet Policy," January 22, 1947, *The Stars and Stripes*, SL/MAEE: 11/1.
[183] Willis, *The French in Germany*, 152-153.

Peace and against Humanity.[184] On October 12, 1946 the Council passed Directive No. 38 which established criteria for assessing five levels of German guilt: (1) major offenders; (2) offenders (activists, militarists and profiteers); (3) lesser offenders; (4) followers; (5) persons exonerated.[185] Denazification policies became quite unpopular in the Western Zones, as Patricia Meehan jests: "The Germans had a joke about Hitler's 'Thousand-Year Reich': twelve years of Nazism and 888 years of denazification."[186]

To the Allies, Nazism was not simply an ideology or a political affiliation. It was an inherently evil worldview generated by the decay of German civility and morality. An American occupation manual informs U.S. personnel that "there are only good and bad elements in the German character, the latter of which generally predominate."[187] Similar sentiments were echoed throughout the British Military Government. A memorandum by General Macready, Regional Commissioner of Hanover, reminds British staff that "Nazism is more than a political creed- it is designed to appeal to all the inherent German characteristics of militarism and domination... The next Hitler will not necessarily be a Nazi."[188]

American denazification policy was the most thorough and rigorous of all the Zones in that it was "more articulate, verbalized and legalistic than those of the other three Allies."[189] Each German was required to fill out a *Fragebogen*, a repetitive and notoriously unpopular questionnaire, before applying for

[184] Meehan, 68.
[185] Ibid., 68.
[186] Ibid., 108.
[187] Ibid., 91-92.
[188] Ibid.
[189] Willis, *The French in Germany*, 154.

employment; experts then carefully studied each questionnaire in order to distinguish between Nazis and non-Nazis.[190] By the end of 1945, the Public Safety Office had analyzed 1.7 million *Fragebogen* and had refused 300,000 Germans employment while deeming 100,000 of them to be Nazis.[191] These figures seem to contradict the day-to-day interactions between American GIs and German civilians, however. An article published in the *New York Herald Tribune* on April 27, 1946, called "Docile Germans and GI Morale: Occupation Policies Puzzle Soldiers Who Find Ex-Enemies Are Willing To Work for Them and Offer No Resistance", suggests that the dynamic between GIs and Germans was actually quite civil:

> GI Joe and his officer sit down to their meals, waited on by Germans, while a German orchestra plays dinner and supper music in almost every mess hall... Either by design or by accident, the German attitude of docility and the willingness to work- and to work harder for the American Army than the average soldier... is doing more ... to unconsciously persuade the military personnel that they have a small stake in remaining here. There is no feeling, generally, that the Germans are a menace.[192]

The British denazification program was less elaborate than its American counterpart. The British Military Government simply removed centralized institutions that could potentially spread Nazi ideology, including communication devices, school curricula and cinemas; they also distributed denazification questionnaires, though less lengthy than those in the U.S. Zone, which were then analyzed by the Public Safety Office.[193] In January 1946, the British created Denazification Panels and entrusted Germans with the task of carrying out

[190] Meehan, 102-103.
[191] Clay, 69.
[192] Edwin Hartrich, "Docile Germans and GI Morale: Occupation Policies Puzzle Soldiers Who Find Ex-Enemies Are Willing To Work for Them and Offer No Resistance", April 27, 1946, *New York Herald Tribune*, SL/MAEE: 11/1.
[193] Adams, 46, 48.

denazification themselves.[194]The American Military Government was skeptical of British denazification policy, as Pollock expresses in a June 11, 1948 Summary Report, in that it encouraged putting "men who had bad Nazi records… in prominent public positions." [195] These policy differences did not guarantee the success of the U.S. denazification program, however. Like its British counterpart, it failed by 1948.

The French approached denazification more leniently. French denazification policy diverged from that of its neighboring Zones, Rainier Hudemann argues, in that the French attempted to achieve "efficient democratization" by placing more emphasis on personal responsibility and less on ambiguous categories like "German guilt."[196] From 1945 to 1949, the French Military Government tried and convicted a small number of Nazis, surprising considering that the French had the smallest population to administer with the highest number of occupation personnel.[197] Initially, the French delegated the task of denazification to Germans, who reviewed 77,924 individuals and dismissed one third of this number from public office during the first six months of the occupation.[198] This approach proved to be especially effective in Württemberg-Hohenzollern when the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) proposed its own denazification program to the French Military Government in October 1945.[199] Spearheaded by SPD member Otto Kunzel, the program followed

[194] Adams, 48.
[195] Pollock, 365.
[196] Hudemann, 62.
[197] In the French Zone, there were eighteen occupation personnel per one thousand Germans compared to ten personnel per one thousand Germans in the British Zone and three personnel per one thousand Germans in the American zone. *See:* Edgar Wolfrum, "Die französische Politik im besetzten Deutschland: Neue Forschungen, alte Klischees, vernachlässigte Fragen," *Deutsche und Franzosen im zusammenwachsenden Europa 1945-2000,* Kurt Hochstuhl, ed. (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2003), 65.
[198] Jon Elster, *Retribution and Reparation in the Transition to Democracy,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 79.
[199] Elster, *Retribution and Reparation in the Transition to Democracy,* 79-80.

an administrative process that gave parties no right of appeal and eventually led to the removal of seventy-five percent of Germans from public office.[200] Although the success of this program inspired the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in Pfalz to carry out similar denazification initiatives, the French Military Government soon replaced it with the *Spruchkammerverfahren*, a tribunal process that heard a total of 669,068 cases.[201] Of these cases, Clemens Vollnhals estimates that there were only 13 sentenced 'major offenders', 938 'offenders', 12,826 'lesser offenders' and 298,789 'followers.'[202] The other half of the cases was dropped.

Although French denazification policy seemed lax in comparison to American and British programs, it is important to remember that post-Liberation France had its own war criminals to try. In fact, French *épuration* (purification) was the most thorough and extensive war crimes trial after Nuremberg.[203] Julian Jackson argues that the mass waves of violence that followed the Liberation in August 1944 and Victory Day in May 1945, periods that witnessed 2,400 and 5,000 deaths respectively, must be interpreted as "acts of war rather than examples of 'people's justice.'"[204] The violent purging of collaborators became part of a process that Jackson calls *épuration sauvage*, one that provided the French with a means of punishing war criminals in order to come to terms with the dark legacies of Vichy before de Gaulle established a legal framework to punish these offenders.[205] Yet, Germans in the French Zone did not easily accept the tenets of *épuration*. Elise Julien

[200] Elster, 79-80.
[201] Willis, 155-156; Clemens Vollnhals, *Entnazifizierung. Politische Säuberung und Rehabilitierung in den vier Besatzungszonen 1945-1949* (Munich, 1991), 34-42.
[202] Vollnhals, *Entnazifizierung*, 34-42.
[203] Elster, 79.
[204] Julian Jackson, *France: The Dark Years, 1940-1944* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 578-579.
[205] Jackson, *France: The Dark Years, 1940-1944*, 578-579.

points out that the French Military Government's denazification policies did not necessarily guarantee that punishing a 'lesser' or 'nominal' offender with a heavy fine and jail sentence would effectively denazify them.[206] Konrad Jarausch substantiates this claim by arguing that Germans who underwent a process of 'self-denazification' often did so out of shame and humiliation rather than out of a desire to acknowledge Nazi atrocities.[207]

The emphasis on what Willis calls the "French sense of individuality" and the willingness "to treat each case on its individual merits, rather than be bound by the tighter classifications of the American zone" may offer insight into the reason why French denazification efforts failed.[208] It is also possible that the French insistence on decentralizing German agencies led to the lack of a centralized denazification apparatus that in turn created a disconnect between the French administration and the population over which they attempted to exert control. The most compelling explanation for the failure of denazification, I argue, lies in cultural policy and the manner by which the French attempted to funnel their resources into arbitrating culture in their Zone. Yet, like the total failure of denazification, the overzealous cultural policies of the French Zone became another failed attempt to remold and reeducate the German people.

[206] Julien, *Les Rapports Franco-Allemands à Berlin 1945-1961*, 55-56.
[207] Jarausch, *After Hitler*, 46.
[208] Willis, 150.

Arbitrating Culture

The French, who had long seen themselves as the arbiters of high culture, found themselves in a peculiar position in 1945. Having "come within an ace of extinction," Robert Gildea explains, de Gaulle believed that "the way to restoring the honour and greatness of France lay through the participation in the final defeat of Germany."[209] Through their marginal status as a 'lesser occupier' in the eyes of their victors and the rise of two new world powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, France's self-perception as the "guardian of the Western tradition of *civilization"* was being thrown off-kilter.[210] Yet, the desire to safeguard western civilization remained as rampant as ever in the French occupation administration. While France began to gradually lose control over its colonies, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris crafted an elaborate cultural program called the *Mission Culturelle* (Cultural Mission) in an attempt to implant high French culture onto German soil. This marked an attempt to reestablish French global dominance by resorting to a policy of cultural imperialism, a strategy that distinguished France from the other occupiers. Cultural imperial policies were not only designed to triumph over German culture, however, but to surpass that of the European continent as a whole in pursuit of realizing Gaullist visions of French 'grandeur'.

It has been argued that the French occupation of Germany was a 'cultural occupation' as early as 1948 by British historian Percy W. Bidwell. The emphasis on culture in the French Zone, Bidwell argues, stems from a commitment made at

[209] Robert Gildea, *France since 1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 6.
[210] Richard Jobs, *Riding the New Wave : Youth and the Rejuvenation of France after the Second World War* (Stanford : Stanford University Press, 2007), 254.

Potsdam to reeducate Germans in order to "transform the outlook of life, the Weltanschauung of millions of adolescent and adult Germans, and if possible to convert aggressive nationalism into a spirit of peaceful cooperation."[211] In many ways, French cultural policy was "marked by a sincere belief that learning and culture can produce civilized men."[212] Cora Goldstein claims that the goal of French cultural policy was to "show that France was the cultural hegemon of Europe, and to attract Germans to the culture of Western Europe."[213] Initially supported by General de Lattre, the French Military Government had hoped that the *Mission Culturelle* would export high French culture to the French Zone in order to bring about a 'French Renaissance.'[214] These cultural policies intensified once de Lattre was replaced by General Koenig and his three associate generals, Associate General of Berlin Louis-Marie Koeltz, Commander of the Troops of Occupation Goislard de Monsabert, and Administrator General Emile Laffon, the latter whom was dismissed by Koenig due to his left-leaning sympathies and tendency to treat the 'German Question' more objectively.[215]

Cultural policy was by no means an innovation of the French Military Government, however. Cora Goldstein points out that "each military government attempted to project the cultural paradigms of its nation, and to offer credible and positive programs to guide German cultural rebirth."[216] In the Soviet Zone, the Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SMAD) declared that it would bring

[211] Percy W. Bidwell, "Emphasis on Culture in the French Zone", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 27, no. 1 (Oct. 1948): 78.
[212] Bidwell, "Emphasis on Culture in the French Zone", 78.
[213] Goldstein, 19-20.
[214] Willis, *The French in Germany*, 79.
[215] Willis, 79.
[216] Goldstein, 20.

about the "mobilization of art as part of the struggle against Fascism and of the re-education of the German people in the spirit of true democracy" in order to regenerate culture in the aftermath of Nazism.[217] The substitution of German art, museums, newspapers and music with Soviet culture set the stage for an inevitable clash between Communism and Capitalism, creating a formidable opposition against which western occupation policy would square. The reopening of the German Museum of Hygiene after its destruction in the bombing of Dresden in February 1945, for example, attracted 620,000 visitors and allowed Soviet occupiers to use "hygienic propaganda" to organize a public exhibit about typhus, dysentery and venereal disease.[218] Soviet cultural policy extended into the educational sphere as well, as the seizure of the Central Library Archives of Contemporary History meant that countless books, journals and photographs were now under Soviet control and could be censored accordingly.[219] Soviet-revised German history curricula replaced contemporary history in schools and universities and emphasized the Russian Revolution, Marxist doctrine and Socialist Party ideology; in addition, professors and lecturers who were hostile toward the Communist regime were barred entry from higher institutions and were required to pass a Soviet-administered exam before seeking employment.[220] The radical restructuring of cultural and social norms in the Soviet Zone catalyzed the mass reeducation of Germans in a more systematic fashion than the cultural policies of the Western Zones.

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[217] Willis, 76.
[218] «Musée allemand d'hygiène», October 7, 1947, Institut central d'hygiène publique, Dresden, AC/MAEE: 4/4.
[219] «A l'attention de Monsieur l'Attaché Culturel», June 27, 1947, Berlin, AC/MAEE: 4/4.
[220] Monsieur Henri Hoppenot à Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, May 22, 1947, Paris, AC/MAEE: 4/4.

In the American Zone, OMGUS commissioned a cultural program that indoctrinated western liberal ideology into the minds of Germans in order to counter the spread of communist ideology.[221] Between 1945 and 1949, twenty-eight 'America Houses' were established across the U.S. Zone, which housed public lecture rooms, film screenings and libraries.[222] The German youth were invited to participate in youth choirs, Christmas pageants and costume parties with American GIs, and universities in the U.S. Zone purged Nazi faculty members and organized guest lectures, conferences and reading groups.[223] The International Youth Book Exhibition organized in Stuttgart on September 27, 1946, for example, attracted 20,000 Germans, two-thirds of them twenty years old and younger, and the American Little Theatre of Berlin produced numerous plays in collaboration with the British Little Theatre of Berlin from 1945 to 1946.[224]

Cinema became a central component of American cultural policy. Jennifer Fay posits that the U.S. occupiers used American 'film culture' to "make a show of U.S. military and moral superiority and to offer American culture as a model for imitation"; by occupying German cinemas, furthermore, the Americans were able "to cast a population in a role commensurate with its defeat."[225] From August 1945 to August 1946, Germans purchased 10.5 million tickets for American movies in the U.S. sector of occupied Berlin; of this number, each Berliner watched an average of

[221] Goldstein, 18.
[222] Note concernant l'organisation et l'action culturelles britanniques et américaines en Allemagne, December 16, 1948, AC/MAEE : 4/3.
[223] Note de l'Attaché Culturel concernant les activités culturelles américaines et anglaise en Allemagne, December 5, 1946, AC/MAEE: 4/ 2b.
[224] Press Releases, OMGUS Public Relations Office, September 27, 1946 and September 23, 1946, AC/MAEE: 4/ 2b.
[225] Fay, *Theaters of Occupation*, ix.

three American films, and movie theatres in the U.S. Sector increased from four in August 1945 to fifty-six by October 1946.[226] Since Hollywood films took up two-thirds of total screen time in German movie theatres, it is evident that occupied Germany became "an outpost of Hollywood."[227] Film thus became a powerful means of cultural indoctrination, as the "experiential tropes, genres, structures of feeling, and images of democratic life" featured in Hollywood movies reflected the democratic worldview and modes of conduct that the U.S. occupiers hoped to stimulate in the German population.[228]

British cultural policy was less intrusive than that of the American and Soviet Zones. The British Foreign Office, which hoped to bring about a cultural rapprochement with Germans in their Zone, chose not to tamper too radically with German culture.[229] The British cultural program was composed of the Education Services Branch, which controlled German education, the Information Services Branch, which censored and controlled the press, radio, theatre and music through the Press Branch, the Press Production Branch, the Broadcasting Branch and the Cultural Relations Branch.[230] Cultural activities in the British Zone included 'Elizabethan Week', which took place from August 21 to September 5, 1948 in Allied-occupied Berlin, an event that showcased Elizabethan art exhibits, Renaissance theatre and sixteenth and seventeenth century musical

[226] OMGUS Press Release, October 1, 1946, AC/MAEE: 4/ 2b.
[227] Kristin Thompson and David Bordwell, *Film History: An Introduction* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2009), 325.
[228] Fay, xiv.
[229] Goldstein, 19.
[230] Note concernant l'organisation et l'action culturelles britanniques et américaines en Allemagne, December 16, 1948, AC/MAEE : 4/3,

performances.[231] The Sir Robert Mayer Concerts for Children Series, the opening of a Music Library in Hamburg, and the establishment of reading and conference rooms in Information Centres across the Zone also mark attempts to reeducate Germans under British occupation through cultural media.[232] In addition, a Book Selection Committee selected, translated and printed books for distribution to Germans throughout the British Zone, an initiative that was especially appreciated by the civilian population since the German prewar book production level had been one of the highest in the world in 1932.[233]

The French mobilized culture in a different fashion from their Allies. While the French occupation administration oversaw the Division of Public Education, which controlled school curricula and youth education, and the Division of Information, which controlled the press, publications, the cinema, propaganda and censuses, the *Mission Culturelle*, run by Félix Lusset, the French cultural attaché in Germany, became the largest reeducation effort in the Zone.[234] Rainer Hudemann argues that French cultural policy was far more advanced than its Allies' since the sudden influx of art exhibits, theatre productions, music festivals and scholarly publications allowed Germans to "reopen contact with the artistic, literary, and intellectual world that had been unavailable to them for more than a decade."[235]

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[231] M. J. Terbé de Saint-Hardouin à son Excellence Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, September 8, 1948, AC/MAEE: 4/3; Office of the Educational Adviser, Headquarters, Control Commission for Germany (British Element) to Monsieur Lusset, July 29, 1948, AC/MAEE: 4/3.
[232] "Music Library Opened in Hamburg", Control Commission for Germany (British Element) Press Branch, June 11, 1948, AC/MAEE: 4/3; "Sir Robert Mayer Concerts for Children", May 27, 1948, AC/MAEE: 4/3; "New Reading Room to be Opened in British Information Centre Berlin", May 14, 1948, AC/MAEE: 4/3.
[233] Reiner Pommerin, "Some Remarks on the Cultural History of the Federal Republic of Germany", *Culture in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1945-1995*, Reiner Pommerin, ed. (Oxford: Berg, 1996), 7.
[234] Julien, 57.
[235] Hudemann, 61.

Yet, these initiatives did not mark the first time the French attempted to project cultural superiority over the German people. The French had designed and implemented a similar cultural policy called *pénétration pacifique* to culturally indoctrinate the Rhenish people during the Rhineland Occupation following the First World War. The people of the Rhineland, Peter Collar argues, were being "flooded with French cultural propaganda of all kinds: theatre plays, films, art exhibitions, concerts, books and lecture courses."[236] Even a *Napoleonsfeier*, a festival that celebrated Napoleon's reign, had been organized as an ultimate demonstration of French culture, curious considering that Napoleon was one of the very reasons why German nationalism had developed in the first place.[237] The cultural policies of the French Zone can thus be seen as a continuation of the cultural policies of the Rhineland occupation. French cultural policy was not simply designed to reorder and reconstruct postwar German society; its ultimate goal was to bring about what F. Roy Willis calls a 'French Renaissance' to 'francize' Germans and turn them into Frenchmen.[238] By placing Molière, Claudel and Sartre above Hegel, Beethoven and Goethe, the *Mission Culturelle* attempted to overshadow German 'monoculture' with the French 'grande nation.'[239]

Like its American counterpart, French cultural policy attempted to use film to reeducate the German populace, an endeavor that quickly failed. Laurence Thaisy estimates that there were twice as many French film screenings than German film screenings in the French Zone in 1946; in turn, Germans purchased twice as many

[236] Collar, 105.
[237] Ibid., 105.
[238] Goldstein, 19-20.
[239] Julien, 57-58.

tickets for German films than French films, leading to 46,272 ticket sales in 44 days, a far cry from the 10.5 million tickets purchased for American movies between 1945 and 1946 in the U.S. Sector of Berlin.[240] Other French cultural initiatives proved to be equally unsuccessful. Between October 4 and December 29, 1947, there were nineteen conferences, presentations and public lectures in the French Zone on topics ranging from "French Evolution from 1918 to 1945" in the Berlin *Kulturbund* (Culture Association), "Major Trends in French Literature from 1900 to the Present" at the Zahlendorf *Volkshochschule* (Community School), and "French Medieval Architecture" in Grunewald.[241] Additionally, the *Mission Culturelle* commissioned two concerts and one theatre production each month in cities across the French Zone, including Baden-Baden, Freiberg, Tübingen, Sarrebrück, Koblenz and Mainz.[242] In October 1947, for example, there were twenty soloist and musical ensemble performances, fifteen Ballets des Champs Elysées performances, and thirty theatre performances of Musset and André del Sarte; in November, there were twenty violin performances, twenty performances of André Messager's operetta *Véronique*, and twenty performances of Alexandre Arnoux's play, *Huon de Bordeaux*.[243]

The *Mission Culturelle* also transformed German universities across the Zone. Although the British were the first to reopen German schools in Aachen on May 15,

[240] Laurence Thaisy, *La politique cinématographique de la France en Allemagne occupée (1945-1949)*, 164; OMGUS Press Release, October 1, 1946, AC/MAEE: 4/ 2b.
[241] "Activité de la Mission Culturelle Française en Allemagne pendant le dernier trimestre 1947 en ce qui concerne les conférences, causeries, exposés, émissions radiophoniques, participations à des cérémonies", date unknown, AC/MAEE: 2/ 2b.
[242] "Project des manifestations artistiques prévues pour la période du 15 septembre au 31 décembre 1947", July 10, 1947, Baden-Baden, AC/MAEE: 2/ 2b.
[243] "Project des manifestations artistiques…", AC/MAEE: 2/ 2b.

1945 and to reform German curricula using a total of nine Weimar-era books, de Gaulle had personally ordered the reopening of universities in Freiburg and Tübingen and the establishment of universities in Mainz and the Saar.[244] In addition, Lusset arranged visiting fellowships for professors and faculty lecturers at twelve universities, including in Berlin and Leipzig, and founded French language centers in Freiburg, Trier, Mainz and Tübingen.[245] Here, too, the French attempted to project cultural superiority over the German people. In October 1946, a public lecture by Pierre-Paul Sagave, a visiting professor from the Faculty of Letters at the University of Strasbourg, delivered a public lecture on "German Mentalities viewed by the French", which analyzed German mentalities toward racism, authoritarianism and political education in order to determine the interaction between the legacies of the French Revolution and German liberal humanism.[246] Sagave spoke in front of large audiences ranging from three hundred to nine hundred people in cities across the Western Zones, including Tübingen, Frankfurt and Cologne, in order to further the "spiritual and political reeducation" of the German population, an initiative that was met by "harsh criticism" from German civilians.[247] It soon became evident that the German people had great difficulty relating to French cultural policy and that the *Mission Culturelle* was on the verge of failing.

Like the French denazification program, the *Mission Culturelle* operated in a very decentralized manner. As Tony Judt points out, Lusset's objectives were more

[244] "Réouverture des écoles en Allemagne," May 15, 1945, unknown newspaper, EMAT/SHD: 7P161.
[245] "M. Lusset legt Zäune um," *Der Spiegel*.
[246] Pierre-Paul Sagave à M. le Directeur Général des Relations culturelles au Ministère des affaires étrangères, September 10, 1946, Paris, AC/MAEE: 2/ 2b.
[247] Pierre-Paul Sagave à M. le Directeur, AC/MAEE 2/ 2b.

closely aligned with those of Alexander Dymschitz, the Soviet Cultural Commissar, than with the other Zones since Lusset intended to establish a "cultural axis reaching from Paris to Berlin and on to Leningrad."[248] Lusset's objectives were also far removed from those of the French Military Government, as he discloses in an interview with *Der Spiegel* on April 17, 1948:

> No, he does not belong to the French military government. "We stand on the edge of the occupation and are independent"... The head of the mission is in the far north of Berlin, in the suburb of the Villengesegneten Frohnau forest. He is also deputy director of the Culture Department of the Foreign Ministry in Paris... In August 1946, the mission traveled from the Quai d'Orsay to Berlin... "What we do is still modest. But there may just be no Franco-German problem. I really believe that there is no longer so... I do not do propaganda, not really," he says with an ironic laugh. He attempts to 'only' tear down fences. In Germany, for France. In France, for Germany.[249]

Lusset's interview, spoken in articulate German, reveals that the *Mission Culturelle* resided outside the sphere of the occupation administration and thus lacked a centralized means of exerting cultural hegemony over Germans across the French Zone. Officials in Paris soon began to take issue with the manner by which the *Mission Culturelle* was being run, moreover, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Paris expressed to the French Ambassador in Berlin in a letter of December 6, 1947:

> If the organization's conference lecture tours abroad made any progress during the exercise of 1946-47, notably with regard to issues that interest men... our representatives are complaining in general about the excessive number of conference speakers who come to their region... The personality of the conference speakers and the topics they choose are also the subject of much criticism. It seems that excessive attention is placed on the Romantics, literary critics, and journal editors who treat subjects in a style that is much too obscure for the foreign public, in ways that seem designed for French and even Parisian audiences.[250]

French officials also realized that Germans were growing increasingly resentful of the French occupiers' self-proclaimed status as cultural arbiters and that this posed

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[248] Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (New York: Penguin, 2006), 225.
[249] "M. Lusset legt Zäune um," *Der Spiegel*, 16, April 17, 1948, accessed February 7, 2013, http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-44416489.html
[250] Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, letter to Monsieur l'Ambassadeur de France à Berlin, December 6, 1947, AC/MAEE 2/ 2b.

a serious threat to the reconstruction program as a whole. French attitudes toward Germans in their Zone "lacked judgment in… relations with the Germans, both as individuals and the general population," admits a French Liaison Officer in an August 1947 Report: "Although I recognize that our cultural propaganda has been the 'most thought out', its effectiveness has been neutralized by our general policies and our attitude in the occupied territories."[251]

Geography also played a role in engendering the failure of the *Mission Culturelle.* When the Foreign Ministry commissioned Lusset to begin the *Mission* in 1946, he established his headquarters in the forests north of the French Sector of Berlin.[252] This made it difficult to draw six million Germans from Baden, Württemberg, Pfalz and the Saar into the French cultural sphere of influence. Lusset made a grave error by failing to treat Berlin as a strategic focal point of cultural policy, expresses a French journalist in an October 1946 newspaper article: "Underneath a pretext to facilitate Rhenish policy and to oppose Prussian centralism, we have refused to acknowledge the evidence: despite its ruins and turpitude, Berlin remains the capital of Germany as much on the political map as on the cultural map."[253] Much like the ineffectiveness of the decentralized French denazification apparatus, the *Mission Culturelle*'s overly decentralized structure made reeducating the German people a near impossible feat.

As the occupation wore on, it became widely acknowledged that the *Mission Culturelle* had failed to meet its objectives, ultimately confirmed by Lusset's

[251] "Sujet de l'Allemagne occidentale", August 19, 1947, SL/MAEE: 11/1.
[252] Goldstein, 19-20; Judt, *Postwar*, 225.
[253] Jean Michelat, "Une grande partie va se jouer à Berlin", October 18, 1946, *Combat*, AC/MAEE: 4/1.

dismissal in 1948.[254] By October 22, 1948, the French occupation administration also acknowledged that French denazification and cultural reeducation initiatives had failed alongside British, American and Soviet efforts: "Today we can say that our reeducation attempts… have suffered a complete failure. The Anglo-Americans have officially recognized this, and the Russians and French also know this but only amongst themselves. The cultural action... and the myth of the reeducation of Germans under occupation... were both doomed to fail."[255] The *Mission Culturelle*'s failed attempts to import high French culture into the French Zone can be viewed as the failure of French cultural imperialism altogether. Lusset's grand plan to arbitrate culture and to realize the Gaullist aim of transforming France into a world power was overshadowed by the hegemonic influence of two emerging superpowers.

The total failure of Allied reeducation policy became especially clear once the Federal Republic of Germany was founded in 1949. The Allies' denazification and reeducation policies "did not establish collective identities that could bind West Germans together socially and politically", Robert Moeller argues, causing the new Republic to be "neither National Socialist nor Communist" nor "American, British, or French."[256] In the French Zone particularly, there were no denazification programs and cultural policies tailored specifically for German women, leaving German women to configure their own cultural identities throughout the course of the occupation. This overall lack of French policy toward German women ultimately

[254] Goldstein, 19-20; Judt, 225.
[255] "Note au sujet de l'action culturelle française en Allemagne", October 22, 1948, AC/MAEE 2/ 2a.
[256] Moeller, *War Stories*, 5, 49.

disempowered women in the public sphere, where the absence of sanctioned women's agencies stripped women of their social and political agency altogether.



Figure 4: A map of Allied-Occupied Berlin (August 1, 1945). Sector 1 is the French Zone, Sector 2 is the British Zone, Sector 3 is the U.S. Zone, and Sector 4 is the Russian Zone.[257]

[257] "Bulletin d'Information No 31 du Détachement d'Armée de l'Atlantique," August 1, 1945, Bureau études et information, Service historique de la Défense (SHD). Vincennes, France (Hereafter referred to as BEI/SHD), 10P 353.

Behind the 'Silk Curtain':
German Women in the Public Sphere

During the First International Women's Conference in Bad Reichenhall, Bavaria in September 1950, two hundred women from fifteen nations met to discuss the theme of "The Individual Responsibility of Women in Meeting the Critical Issues of Today":

> Certain overall aspects of women's role in society emerged from the Conference. First, it became quite clear to all present that a fundamental change has taken place concerning women's relation to society as a whole, a departure from the old idea of women's limited sphere to the recognition of a wider area of responsibility. Women today have a duty not only to their own families, but also to the outside world. The average woman, however, is not aware of her wider sphere. Only in proportion to the number of women who accept and make intelligent use of this new role will women realize their full potential contribution in the rebuilding of society.[258]

German women's roles had indeed begun to shift by the spring of 1945, when women rummaged the streets, foraged for food and built ersatz shelters to house children, the sick, the elderly, refugees and displaced persons. These women, whom Robert Moeller calls the *Trümmerfrauen* (women of the rubble), "cleared away the ruins of German cities to make way for a new beginning."[259] In many ways, the backbreaking work of the *Trümmerfrauen* marked the beginning of German women's social and political mobilization during the postwar period. By being bombed out of their homes, German women were literally forced out of the domestic sphere and into the public eye where they began the daunting task of

[258] Marjarie A. Yahraes, *International Women's Conference* (Bad Reichenhall, Germany), September 25-30, 1950, AdF.
[259] Moeller, *Protecting Motherhood*, 11.

reconstruction. The Soviet, British and American Military Governments acknowledged the instrumental role that German women played in the reconstruction effort by granting them relative degrees of social and political agency. The French, on the other hand, did not follow suit.

Of the 'Four D's' laid down at Potsdam, democratization was the only principle upon which the four occupying powers agreed. Democratization, the act of making Germans politically, civically and morally responsible, was the next step after denazification. Democratization was also the provision that was most loosely interpreted by the Allies, Jennifer Fay argues, as it was shaped by each occupier's 'political myths' and 'national heritage': "Because the Allies promoted themselves as democracies and encouraged Germans to imitate their example, 'democracy' became an elusive and always shifting abstraction that each of the Allies had to tether to other, more tangible concrete practices and systems of value."[260] The democratization of the German people was thus very much subject to interpretation.

Women in the New Postwar Order

The catastrophic state of postwar society made it difficult to put democratization policies into effect. As Peter Duignan points out, "the very infrastructure required for political life seemed shattered beyond repair- meeting halls and office buildings were in ruins, newspaper presses halted, funds scarce, Allied licenses required for all party work."[261] Despite the turmoil of the immediate

[260] Fay, xiv.
[261] Peter Duignan, *The Rebirth of the West: The Americanization of the Democratic World, 1945-1958* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1992), 240.

postwar situation, the Soviet Military Administration began to authorize Germans to mobilize into anti-fascist political parties in June 1945, which was followed by a similar course of action in the U.S. Zone in August 1945.[262] The British, who were initially skeptical about authorizing the revival of political activity in their Zone, also authorized the formation of political parties in September 1945, which soon led to the revival of social democratic and communist parties in the U.S. and British Zones.[263] Although these advancements by no means symbolized an attempt to empower German women, they nevertheless marked a key step forward in the democratization of the civilian population. The democratization of German women in the French Zone unfurled in a different manner, if at all. Four regime changes in six years meant that France had its own dark legacy to contend with.[264] Democratizing women under French occupation was also something of an anomaly considering that Frenchwomen had only been enfranchised in 1944.

Ironically, the Soviets were the first to 'democratize' German women despite the mass rape of women by the Red Army during the spring of 1945. After authorizing the *Trümmerfrauen* to assemble into anti-fascist groups, members of the *Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands* (Socialist Unity Party of Germany) rallied support from the Women's Branch of the Soviet administration in 1946, which eventually led to the establishment of the *Demokratischer Frauenbund Deutschlands* (Democratic Women's League) which boasted a membership of 484,075 by January

[262] Adams, 44.
[263] Ibid., 44.
[264] These regime changes are the Third Republic (1870-1940), the Vichy Regime (1940-1944), the Liberation and post-Liberation French Provisional Government (1944-1946), and the Fourth Republic (1946-1958).

1950.[265] Though the DFD was incorporated into the centralized Soviet apparatus in 1949, it made the 'housewife problem' central to its reeducation effort.[266] The first DFD Convention took place on International Women's Day in 1947 and boosted female attendance by distributing "extra rations of money, groceries, and cigarettes"; the Convention featured open discussions and public lectures about women's equality, women's role in rebuilding and denazifying society, and women's benefits as mothers and workers in the Soviet Zone.[267] In June and July of 1948, Dr. Anne-Marie Durand-Wever, the first leader of the DFD, organized a public exhibition that featured a public lecture on "The Voice of Women to the Questions of the Day", which addressed German women's issues concerning abortion and reproductive health, nutrition, public housing services, and services for children, prisoners of war and persons infected by disease.[268] These initiatives did not lead to dramatic advancements in German women's statuses, however. Norman Naimark points out that the "narrow views within the KPD and SED of the role of women in society and the party" stunted women's political growth.[269] In this regard, although the DFD may have secured the welfare of left-leaning German women, such measures ultimately served as a means of bolstering support for the Communist Party while keeping women marginal in relation to their male counterparts.

Democratization took on a unique character in the British Zone. Although Clement Atlee's Labour government made impressive reforms that engendered the

[265] Adams, 42-43.
[266] Heinemann, 183.
[267] Adams, 43.
[268] Annette F. Timm, *The Politics of Fertility in Twentieth-Century Berlin* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 241.
[269] Naimark, 131.

British welfare state, its stance on women remained relatively conservative. In fact, British women were the ones to initiate German women's social and political revival, not surprising considering that the United Kingdom had a long, successful history of feminist activism. In August 1946, the Townswomen's Guild and the National Federation of Women's Institutes petitioned the Labour Party to improve the status of German women in the British Zone; in November 1947, six British women's organizations, including the National Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs, the National Council of Women of Great Britain and the YWCA, wrote to Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin to ask that German women be included in the German reconstruction program.[270] Although their request was declined, a Women's Affairs Branch of the British Military Government was formed in 1947 whose personnel began to collaborate with the Relief Team of the British Red Cross to address women's issues.[271] Attempts to reeducate German women through civic education courses at the *Volkshochschulen* (community school) and to promote involvement in women's organizations such as the *Frauenring der Britische Zone* suggest that the British Military Government considered a democratized female population a crucial step toward German reconstruction.[272]

The Americans were next to acknowledge the importance of a democratized female population. Although American female journalists and politicians urged OMGUS to sanction women's associations in the U.S. Zone as early as 1946, the establishment of a Women's Section of the American occupation administration

[270] Meehan, 261-262.
[271] Denise Tscharntke, *Re-Educating German Women: The Work of the Women's Affairs Section of British Military Government, 1946-1951* (London: P. Lang, 2003), 123; Meehan, 261-262.
[272] Tscharntke, *Re-Educating German Women*, 230; Meehan, 261-262.

occurred later than it did in the Soviet and British Zones.[273] In November 1947, the Civil Administration Division of OMGUS asked the women of the Carrie Chapman Catt Memorial Fund, an organization that was founded in April 1947 to promote awareness about the workings of democracy, to establish a German women's organization in the U.S. Zone and to sponsor women's visits to the United States.[274] Following public pressure from female journalists in the *New York Times,* General Clay issued an order to establish a Women's Branch on January 23, 1948:

> The Women's Affairs Section is established within the Education and Religious Affairs Branch of the Internal Affairs and Communications Division, Headquarters, OMGUS, which... will advise and assist appropriate units, organizations and agencies of Military Government on all policies, programs and operations for fostering German women's affairs including but not limited to education and religious affairs, health, safety, and welfare; labor relations and standards; civil and political affairs.[275]

OMGUS' Women's Branch also sanctioned German women's participation in social and political affairs by authorizing the revival of women's magazines in 1946, many of which had been banned following Hitler's seizure of power in 1933. These magazines, including *Die Welt der Frau* (*The Woman's World*), celebrated German women's return into public life and even promoted women's participation in traditionally male-dominated jobs. Women's activities in the U.S. Zone were thus not just politically rooted, as they also created awareness about women's civic duties as mothers and workers.[276]

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[273] Detlef Junker et al. *The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945-1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 391.
[274] Helen Laville, *Cold War Women: The International Activities of American Women's Organizations* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), 76.
[275] Pilgert, *Women in West Germany*, 6-7, AdF.
[276] Junker et al., *The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945-1990*, 391.

Figure 5: German women doing 'men's jobs' (*Der Welt die Frau,* August 1946).[277]

Although Anglo-American feminist organizations initially drove the British and American Military Governments' efforts to democratize German women, there is no evidence to suggest that French feminist activists attempted to influence the democratization of German women in the generally anti-feminist climate of post-Liberation France. Women's changed postwar statuses can nevertheless be contextualized within the body of influential feminist texts that were being

[277] "Die Frau in Männerberufen," *Die Welt der Frau: Eine Monatsschrift für Kultur, Familie, Haus, Beruf* (Stuttgart, August 1946), 24, AdF.

published during this time. In 1946, sociologist Viola Klein, a Jewish Austrian refugee in Britain, published *The Feminine Character: History of an Ideology,* which argues that 'femininity' is determined sociologically and biologically; the 'feminine conflict' is contradictory, Klein posits, in that women are forced to occupy the domestic and business spheres while man is only expected to occupy the latter.[278] The publication of Simone de Beauvoir's *Le Deuxième Sexe* in Paris in 1949 shattered prewar rhetoric concerning women; since woman is depicted as the 'Other', she is "determined and differentiated in relation to man, while he is not in relation to her."[279] Women also lack the necessary means to assemble and occupy the political sphere due to their sexual and economic dependence on men, de Beauvoir argues, and consequently "have no past, no history, no religion of their own" with which to advance themselves.[280] American Anthropologist Margaret Mead's *Male and Female,* published in 1949, comparatively studied men and women on seven Pacific islands and men and women in postwar America to demonstrate that social and political divisions between the sexes are universally and culturally constructed.[281] Women's inequality and "envy of the male role" derive as much from "an undervaluation of the role of wife and mother as from an overvaluation of the public aspects of achievement that have been reserved for men."[282]

Public acknowledgement of women's shifting roles in the postwar era was not just theoretical, however. The United Nations Commission on the Status of

[278] Viola Klein, *The Feminine Character: History of an Ideology* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1975), 33.
[279] Simone de Beauvoir, *The Second Sex* (New York: Vintage Books, 2012), 6.
[280] De Beauvoir, *The Second Sex*, 8.
[281] Margaret Mead, *Male and Female: A Study of the Sexes in a Changing World* (New York: Dell, 1955),7.
[282] Mead, *Male and Female*, 7.

Women (UNCSW), established in 1946, became a central organism of the UN Economic and Social Council.[283] The UNCSW's first delegation, of which Eleanor Roosevelt was an ex-officio member, consisted of fifteen women including French delegate Marie-Hélène Lefaucheux, a key member of the Resistance, British delegate Mary Sutherland, and American delegate Dorothy Kenyon.[284] On June 21, 1946 the UNCSW mandated to protect "women's rights in political, economic, civil, social and educational fields" and to construct solutions for "urgent problems requiring immediate attention in the field of women's rights."[285] The ratification of the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms on December 10, 1948 marks a further watershed in the status of postwar women. By reaffirming "the dignity and worth of the human person" as well as the "equal rights of men and women", the Charter mandates the "recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family" by making a commitment to treat human beings in a lawful and dignified fashion.[286] British and American attempts to democratize German women led to a marginal improvement in women's statuses and reflect some of the fundamental principles of the UNCSW. The lack of policy toward women in the French Zone, on the other hand, created the

[283] Ann Winslow, *Women, Politics, and the United Nations* (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1995), 13.
[284] Winslow, *Women, Politics, and the United Nations,* 13.
[285] The Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, *Agreed Conclusions of the Commission on the Status of Women on the Critical Areas of Concern of the Beijing Platform for Action 1996-2009* (New York: United Nations, 2010), 1.
[286] Johannes Morsink, *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting and Intent* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 12; UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III), available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3712c.html [accessed 11 April 2013].

necessary means to socially and politically marginalize women, and thus paved the way for a stifled democracy.

A Stifled Democracy

Although the creation of Women's Branches in the Soviet, British and American Military Governments reflected a growing awareness about women's new positions in postwar society, the French Military Government did not formally recognize the need to democratize women in their Zone. Its insistence on decentralizing all activity during Allied postwar planning thwarted the possibility of inter-Allied democratization efforts. This proved to be especially true when the French vetoed an Anglo-American proposal to establish an inter-zonal passage for German civilians in December 1945, as well as when they vetoed another Allied proposal to allow German political parties to operate on a national basis.[287]

The relative degree to which the British and American Military Governments democratized German women becomes especially clear when analyzing the emergence of German women's organizations during the postwar period. Between 1945 and 1949, numerous women's organizations were founded and reestablished in the British and Americans Zones, of which many had existed during the German Empire and the Weimar Republic only to be banned during the Third Reich. Astonishingly, not a single of these organizations was founded or reestablished in the French Zone. The founding of the World Movement of Mothers- German Section

[287] Willis, *France, Germany, and the New Europe, 1945-1967*, 35, 27.

German Women's Organizations	Zone of Occupation	Year
Federation of German Catholic Women's Organizations	Cologne (British Zone, BZO)	Founded: 1946
Association for the Education of Girls and Women-Union of Teachers of all Types of Schools	Kiel (BZO)	Reestablished: 1947
Irenenring Association of Protestant Women	Stuttgart (American Zone, AZO)	Founded: 1947
Young German Women's Protestant Association Burckhardthaus (YWCA)	Gelnhausen (AZO)	Founded: 1949
Association of Professional Catholic Social Welfare Workers	Essen (BZO)	Reestablished: 1946
German Housewives' Association	Frankfurt/Main (AZO)	Reestablished: 1949
Union of German Catholic Youth	Altenberg (BZO)	Reorganized: 1947
Women's Auxiliary of German Cooperative Societies	Hamburg (BZO)	Founded: 1948
Trade Union of German Employees-Women's Section	Hamburg (BZO)	Founded: 1945
World Movement of Mothers- German Section	**Paris, France**	**Founded: 1947**
W.O.M.A.N. World Organization of Mothers of all Nations- German Section	Hamburg (BZO)	Founded: 1948
Association of German Catholic Women Teachers	Essen (BZO)	Reestablished: 1945
Protestant Women's Work in Germany	Frankfurt/Main (AZO)	Reestablished: 1945
Girls' Friendly Society	Stuttgart (AZO)	Reestablished: 1945
Association of German Red Cross Training Schools	Frankfurt/Main (AZO)	Reestablished: 1948
Federation of German Nurses' Associations	Hanover (BZO)	Founded: 1948
Association of Women Lawyers and Economists	Dortmund (BZO)	Founded: 1948
Association of Women Employees	Hanover (BZO)	Reestablished: 1949
Elly Heuss Knapp Foundation, German Mothers' Recreation Service	Stein near Nuremberg (AZO)	Founded: 1949
Gedok Association of German Women Artists and Patrons	Hamburg-Blankenese	Reestablished: 1947
Protestant Women's Aid Society in Germany-West Section	Münster/Westphalia	Founded: 1949
German Association of University Women	Hamburg (BZO)	Reestablished: 1949
German National Council of Women	Berlin-Charlottenburg (British Sector)	Founded: 1949

Information compiled from *Handbuch Deutscher Frauenorganisationen* (Bonn: Druckerei der Frankfurter Neuen Presse, 1952)

Figure 6: German Women's Associations founded and reestablished in the American and British Zones between 1945 and 1949.[288]

[288] This information has been compiled from Informationsdienst für Frauenfragen, *Handbuch Deutscher Frauenorganisationen* (Druck: Druckerei der Frankfurter Neuen Presse, 1952), AdF.

in Paris in 1947 is an exception to this observation. Founded as an international and apolitical non-profit organization by women from numerous nations, the World Movement of Mothers (WMM) passed the "The Mother's Charter" in 1947 that mandated to recognize the "fundamental equality between a man and a woman while recognizing their complementary nature."[289] Although the founding of the WMM certainly marked an integral step forward in reaffirming German women's postwar status, the WMM was by no means an initiative of German women under French occupation, nor is there any evidence to suggest that this organization operated in the French Zone. This suggests that German women were socially and politically disempowered to a much greater extent than their counterparts in the other Western Zones.

The magnitude to which German women were rendered passive in the French Zone becomes clearer within the context of German women's high degree of political involvement during the Weimar era. Having secured the vote in 1919, German women were amongst the most democratic and politically active of Western Europe. Between 1919 and 1933, Weimar Germany witnessed one hundred and eleven female politicians in parliament from centrist and left-leaning parties.[290] German women's political activism can be traced back to the late nineteenth century, when bourgeois women's movements and a dynamic youth movement,

[289] "The Mother's Charter", Mouvement Mondial des Mères, accessed 22 May 2013, http://www.mouvement-mondial-des-meres.org/en/about-us/50-the-mothers-charter.
[290] Matthew Stibbe, *Women in the Third Reich* (London: Aenold Publishlishers, 2003), 16.

often clashing in ideology, became two of the largest feminist movements in the years leading up to the Great War.[291]

West Germany also witnessed a great deal of political activism amongst German women. In 1949, 7.1 percent of the first West German *Bundestag* (parliament) was composed of women.[292] By 2012, fifty percent of Green Party and leftist party seats in the Bundestag belonged to female politicians, and gender quotas in social democratic parties require that forty percent of its members of parliament be female.[293] That German women occupied 33 percent of the Bundestag by 2012 becomes especially interesting when comparing their high degree of involvement to the lower percentages of female political activism in the former occupation countries: at the federal level, the rate of female participation is 27 percent in France, 22 percent in the United Kingdom, 17 percent in the United States, and 14 percent in Russia.[294] Since German women represent one of the highest rates of political involvement in any Western democracy, it is surprising to learn that they were once given limited degrees of agency in the Soviet, British and American Zones and no agency at all in the French Zone.

The total absence of sanctioned women's agencies in the French Zone can be explained more generally by French attitudes toward women, both in their

[291] *See* Rosemarie Schade, *Ein weibliches Utopia: Organisationen und Ideologien der Mädchen und Frauen in der bürgerlichen Jugendbewegung 1905-1933* (Witzenhausen, Archiv der Deutschen Jugendbewegung, 1996).
[292] Catherine E. Rymph, "Exporting Civic Womanhood: Gender and Nation Building," *Breaking the Wave: Women, Their Organizations, and Feminism, 1945-1985,* Kathleen A. Laughlin and Jacqueline L. Castledine, eds. (London: Routledge, 2011), 72.
[293] Melanie Kintz, "Recruitment to Leadership Positions in the German Bundestag- A Party Perspective" (paper presented at the ECPR Conference ("Parliaments in changing times"), Dublin, Ireland, June 25-27, 2012), 19.
[294] The World Bank. Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (%). Washington, D.C. 2013. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SG.GEN.PARL.ZS

occupation zone and at home. A set of provisional instructions from March 24, 1945 reveals that the French occupation administration itself was highly gendered:

> a) Male Personnel: Male personnel include administrative control personnel and Liaison Officers from Allied organisms. The personnel from these different categories are only distinguished by their functions. They may, if necessary, pass from one occupation to another through single mutation.
>
> b) Female Section: Female personnel (non-limited enumeration) may assume the following functions:
>
> - Interpreters
> - Editors, secretaries, accountants, archivists, stenographers, etc...
> - Transmissions operators, standardizers
> - Nurses, social assistants, dentists
> - Eventually, drivers.[295]

The division of administrative tasks into separate male and female spheres suggests that the French occupation administration was very much a man's world with little room for female advancement. The French Military Government's political and ideological stance on the 'Woman Question' likely shaped French occupiers' attitudes toward women. By 1945, France was home to the largest communist party in Western Europe. The French Communist Party, known as the "parti des 75,000 fusillés" for their vital role in the Resistance, occupied 148 seats in the National Assembly and was the largest faction of de Gaulle's French Provisional Government from 1944-1946.[296] Its influence grew as it occupied 146 seats in the tripartite Gouin government in 1946 and then 165 seats following the November 1946 elections.[297] By 1946, twenty-six seats belonged to Frenchwomen.[298] In addition, the

[295] "Instruction provisoire", March 24, 1945, SL/MAEE: 2/3.
[296] Richard Vinen, *Bourgeois Politics in France, 1945-1951* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 112; D. S. Bell and Byron Criddle, *The French Communist Party in the Fifth Republic* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 76.
[297] Vinen, *Bourgeois Politics in France, 1945-1951*, 112; Bell and Criddle, *The French Communist Party in the Fifth Republic*, 76.
[298] Claire Laubier, *The Condition of Women in France, 1945 to the Present. A Documentary Anthology* (London: Routledge, 1990), 1.

founding of the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF) in Paris in 1945 marked a tremendous step forward for women during the postwar era, in that it was established by the *Union des Femmes Françaises* (UFF), an organization composed mostly of socialist and communist female Resistance fighters.[299] Founded during a meeting in Paris on November 26, 1945 that was attended by eight hundred women from forty-one countries, the WIDF created a straightforward mandate: "(1) The eradication of all remnants of Fascism in every country in the world, and the maintenance of world peace; (2) The advance of women into full economic, political and legal status; and (3) The full protection of children in health, in education and the realization of their special talents and abilities."[300] These social and political advancements reflect a shift in women's postwar statuses, developments that in turn stirred anxiety amongst the French Military Government who feared a communist infiltration into their Zone.

To socialist and communist circles in Paris, General Koenig was a Vichyite and a mild fascist.[301] Criticism no doubt intensified when Koenig, a staunch Gaullist and social conservative, purged his occupation administration of West German Communists in 1947 and 1948.[302] As an "iron curtain descended across the Continent" and the Cold War alliance began to take shape, as famously coined in Churchill's Iron Curtain Speech of March 5, 1946, the postwar dynamic between the

[299] Harriet H. Alonso, *Peace as a Women's Issue: A History of the U.S. Movement for World Peace and Women's Rights* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1993), 185.
[300] Alonso, *Peace as a Women's Issue*, 185.
[301] Willis, *The French in Germany*, 78.
[302] Major, *The Death of the KPD*, 231.

Americans, the British and the French began to shift.[303] General Clay recalls that the French viewed the decentralization of Allied reconstruction efforts as a means of countering the spread of communism from the Soviet Zone, as French opposition to such proposals prevented the occupiers from "creating agencies which would have been vehicles for Communist expansion."[304] The French Military Government was so fearful of communist expansion that it sent the majority of Communists in its Zone into the British and American Zones, who soon housed ninety percent of West German Communists.[305] The British and American Military Governments even began to mock French attempts to "seal off her zone" from communists "behind what her western partners only half-jokingly dubbed the 'silk curtain.'"[306]

While the British and Americans gave a limited degree of agency to German women in their Zones, which in turn reinforced a Capitalist sphere of influence against which the Soviet sphere would contend, the French were simply not interested in mobilizing their predominantly female population against communist expansion. Conversely, the French did little to bring about German women's social and political regeneration, an attitude that reflects the disenfranchisement of Frenchwomen before 1944. When de Gaulle gave Frenchwomen the right to vote by general decree on April 25, 1944, he had intended to distance liberated France from the misogynist policies of the Vichy Regime while also hoping that the

[303] Winston Churchill, "Iron Curtain Speech" *The Cold War: A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts*, Jussi M. Hanhimäki and Odd Arne Westad, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 47.
[304] Clay, 39-40.
[305] Major, 231.
[306] Ibid., 231.

enfranchisement of women would limit popular support for the Communists.[307] Granting Frenchwomen the right to vote was also "long overdue", Patricia Prestwich argues, and the little public commentary it received symbolized "relief that France had now caught up with other western democracies."[308] Despite these reforms and advancements, however, women in the French Zone and in France remained socially and politically marginal, both in the public sphere and at home.

By 1948, the Soviet, British and American Military Governments each acknowledged German women's shifting roles in postwar society by establishing women's branches in their occupation administrations. The French, on the other hand, remained the only Zone without a women's branch. Furthermore, the British and American administrations granted German women a relative degree of social and political agency by authorizing them to form numerous women's associations between 1945 and 1949. Not a single women's association was established in the French Zone, however, which ultimately led to the creation of a stifled democracy.

German women's lack of agency in the public sphere had dire consequences on their traditional functions in the private sphere. Post-Liberation demographic anxieties and Gaullist immigration reforms drastically altered French occupation policy and radically subverted German motherhood in the process.

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[307] Laubier, *The Condition of Women in France, 1945 to the Present,* 192; Chrysttala Ellina, *Promoting Women's Rights: Politics of Gender in the European Union* (London: Routledge, 2003), 25.
[308] Patricia Prestwich, "Modernizing French Politics in the Fourth Republic: Women in the *Mouvement républicain populaire, 1944-1958*", *Crisis and Renewal in France: 1918-1962,* Martin S. Alexander and Kenneth Mourâe, eds. (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2002), 201.

Reconstructing the 'French Race':
Gender, Populationism, and Gaullist 'Grandeur'

The postwar German population was a nightmarish fusion of Holocaust victims, displaced persons, occupation soldiers and prisoners of war. Ironically, the "Aryan master race" now had to "transform itself into a welfare community made up of disabled veterans, widows, orphans, refugees, expellees, and the homeless", Konrad Jarausch points out.[309] The inherently gendered experiences of aerial bombing, rape and mass starvation meant that German women were now assuming the traditional male roles of protector and provider in addition to their functions of mother and nurturer. Their attempts to care for children, the elderly and the sick meant that "the sphere of domesticity expanded dramatically," Robert Moeller argues, in that the shift in traditional female roles caused "women's normally invisible work [to] became quite visible."[310]

Women's assumption of traditional male and female gender roles led to what Karen Hagemann calls the 're-gendering postwar society' across each occupation Zone.[311] Although this process usually entailed a relative degree of social and political advancement for women, it had an adverse effect on German women in the French Zone. Here, ambitious Gaullist reforms in family and immigration policy led to the radical subversion of German motherhood.

[309] Jarausch, *After Hitler*, 61.
[310] Moeller, *Protecting Motherhood*, 19.
[311] Hagemann, *Home/Front*, 1, 4.

The Demographic Crisis

The three basic objectives of de Gaulle's Provisional Government were to modernize the French public service, to nationalize industry and to reform family and immigration policies.[312] The third objective, reforming family and immigration policies, had a direct effect on German women in the French Zone. De Gaulle was fixated on strengthening the French demographic, a concern that had long been an obsession of the Left and Right, and sought ways to reconstruct the French population in order to secure French 'grandeur' in the new postwar order. In his state of the nation speech delivered during the spring 1945, de Gaulle told the French people that "since the French population would not multiply, and since the French nation could not be a bright light going out," France needed to produce "twelve million bonnie babies in ten years" by decreasing infant mortality rates and introducing new immigration schemes.[313] De Gaulle then alluded to a "grand plan" that would fix the demographic crisis, one that would "bring advantages for some and sacrifices for others so that every objective be met in order to bring about the vital and sacred result."[314]

The plan to which de Gaulle is referring is none other than the repatriation of displaced and orphaned German children of assumed French paternity to France. A shift from the pronatal policies that had long dominated French domestic policy, de Gaulle's Repatriation Program was strongly rooted in 'populationism', an ideology

[312] Karen H. Adler, *Jews and Gender in Liberation France* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 71.
[313] Raymond Ruffin, *La vie des Français au jour le jour: de la Libération à la victoire, 1944-1945* (Coudray-Macouard: Editions Cheminements, 2004), 188.
[314] Ruffin, *La vie des Français au jour le jour*, 188.

that Karen Adler argues attempted to reconstruct the French demographic through a highly selective process that revolved around "nation, race, ethnicity, and gender."[315]

Pronatal and populationist schemes were by no means an invention of the French Provisional Government. They were a continuation of western society's racist, sexist and nationalist traditions, where nations like Fascist Italy, Stalinist Russia, Vichy France and Nazi Germany experimented with ways to strengthen their populations through birthing incentives and eugenics programs. Benito Mussolini's unsuccessful pronatal policies were designed to act as a 'demographic jolt' and included bachelor taxes and harsh penalties for those who illegally underwent abortions.[316] Stalinist pronatal policies were designed in a similar vein and were also unsuccessful; the criminalization of abortion in 1936 and generous compensation for women who had six or more children marked attempts to increase the national birthrate.[317]

Nazi pronatal policies were the most radical of all. Designed to drive 'racially pure' German women into the domestic sphere, Nazi family policy encouraged women to produce as many 'racially pure' children as possible. German women formed the crux of what Jill Stephenson calls the tripartite ideal of Nazi society, in which women would populate the Reich with 'racially pure' babies while soldiers would secure more *Lebensraum* (living space) for the German people and farmers

[315] Adler, *Jews and Gender in Liberation France*, 72
[316] Simonetta Falasca-Zamponi, *Fascist Spectacle: The Aesthetics of Power in Mussolini's Italy* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, Ltd., 2000), 158; Carl Ipsen, *Dictating Demography: The Problem of Population in Fascist Italy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 73.
[317] Paul Ginsborg, "The Politics of the Family in Twentieth-Century Europe," *Contemporary European History*, vol. 9, no. 3 (2000): 414, 427; David L. Hoffman, "Mothers in the Motherland: Stalinist Pronatalism in its Pan-European Context," *Journal of Social History*, vol. 34, no. 1 (Autumn 2000): 41.

would fulfill Hitler's agrarian vision for the Reich.[318] Pronatal programs such as the Law for the Encouragement of Marriage (1933) and the Honour Cross of the German Mother (1938) worked in conjunction with harrowing, anti-Semitic antinatal policies, such as the Law for the Prevention of Genetically Diseased Offspring (1933) and the Nuremberg Laws (1935), policies that prevented millions of Jews, Jehovah's Witnesses, Roma people, members of left-leaning organizations and individuals who were deemed physically and psychologically impaired from having children. Nazi eugenics became even more radical during the Second World War when Himmler's *SS Lebensborn* program, established by the Race and Resettlement Office in 1940, became a breeding ground where German girls and women could become pregnant by 'racially pure' SS officers and give birth anonymously.[319] In many ways, it can be argued that Nazi family policy was intensely 'populationist', in that its pronatal and antinatal policies worked in tandem with one another to reconstruct the ideal German population along highly selective, racialized lines.

Demographic concerns plagued interwar France as well. Many French citizens moved from urban to rural areas in search of a better quality of life during the 'country-to-city' exodus, which was perceived as a grave danger to the French demographic by Jacques Bertillon in 1901, the founder of the *Alliance Nationale* (AN) pronatalist movement.[320] The criminalization of contraceptives in 1920, the introduction of harsher penalties for women who terminated their pregnancies, and the introduction of family allowances and financial compensation for childbirth

[318] Jill Stephenson, *The Nazi Organization of Women* (London: Redwood Burn Limited, 1981), 69.
[319] Stibbe, *Women in the Third Reich*, 156.
[320] Paul Dutton, *Origins of the French Welfare State: The Struggle for Social Reform in France, 1914-1947* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 175-176.

became components of French domestic policy after the First World War.[321] The low French birthrate was used as propaganda to justify *revanchisme* after France was defeated in the Franco-Prussian War in 1871, a national sentiment that was further intensified by Germanophobia and fear of German militarism following the horrors of the Great War which had left half of Frenchmen between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five dead by 1918.[322] The need to transcend the horrors of the First World War played a key role in reaffirming women's roles as mothers, moreover. Mary Louise Roberts argues that postwar French natalism movements stemmed from the need to "heal the wounds of war"; by portraying the French mother as "a cultural representation of this longing to heal and forget", the reaffirmation of "female domesticity" brought about the moral, cultural and social regeneration of France, a phenomenon Roberts believes was made possible by the "reassurance of bourgeois domesticity."[323] The domestication of postwar Frenchwomen revived traditional gender roles and allowed society to return to its prewar pace, one that was quick to forget the advancements that women made during the Great War.

The interwar French government also mobilized race in its struggle against depopulation. The government experimented with the immigration of workers and labourers from French North Africa, Southeast Asia, and Eastern and Southern Europe during the First World War and extended citizenship rights to many of these

[321] Hoffman, "Mothers in the Motherland", 39; Elisa Camiscioli, *Reproducing the French Race: Immigration, Intimacy, and Embodiment in the Early Twentieth Century* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009), 44.
[322] Camiscioli, *Reproducing the French Race*, 28.
[323] Mary Louise Roberts, *Civilization without Sexes: Reconstructing Gender in Postwar France, 1917-1927* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 149, 211.

individuals.[324] Yet 'race' soon became an issue for French pronatalists. French authorities had brought over 500,000 'nonwhite' colonial workers and soldiers to sustain the war effort during the First World War, which in turn stirred anxieties about the possibilities of 'miscegenation' and "the danger of love across the color line" between 'nonwhite' men and 'white' Frenchwomen.[325] The presence of 'nonwhites' on French soil thwarted demographers' and policy makers' attempts to engineer the 'ideal' French population. These racial anxieties set the precedent for Gaullist populationist initiatives during the post-Liberation period that formed the basis of the French Repatriation Program.

Demographic concerns continued to saturate the French Third Republic until the eve of the Second World War. Daladier's introduction of the *Code de la Famille* (Family Code) on July 29, 1939 included a set of pronatal laws that set the stage for many Vichyite and Gaullist natal policies. The *Code* made demography a mandatory subject in the French curriculum, included stricter penalties for abortion, and provided a bonus for every first-born child born within the first two years of marriage.[326] Various pronatal groups also echoed these demographic concerns. By 1939, the *Alliance Nationale pour l'Accroissement de la Population Française* had 25,335 members and was the largest pronatal movement in France; founded in

[324] Laura Levine Frader, *Breadwinners and Citizens: Gender in the Making of the French Social Model* (Duke: Duke University Press, 2008), 3.
[325] Tyler Stovall, "Love, Labor, and Race: Colonial Men and White Women in France during the Great War," *French Civilization and Its Discontents: Nationalism, Colonialism, Race,* Tyler Edward Stovall and Georges Van den Abbeele, eds. (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2003), 297.
[326] Kristen Stromberg Childers, *Fathers, Families, and the State in France, 1914-1945* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 40.

1896, the *Alliance* supported the taxation of unmarried individuals and legislation that would criminalize public information about birth control.[327]

From 1940 to 1944, the Vichy Regime took population anxieties to a new height. Abortion was made a capital offense in 1941.[328] Vichy familialism also created gendered social spheres in which women were expected to be nurturing mothers and dutiful housewives while men were to be patriarchs and providers.[329] Fernand Boverat, the leader of the *Alliance Nationale*, wrote to Pétain and insisted that in order to "defeat depopulation" it had to be acknowledged that "a family that produces only two children in each generation is condemned to disappear... The minimum family is the family of three children, and there is no more indispensable truth to be imposed on the minds of Frenchmen than this."[330] Demographic anxieties also led to Vichy eugenics programs. The Foundation for the Study of Human Problems, founded in November 1941 by Alexis Carrel, was allocated an annual budget of forty million franks to research the ways in which the French population could be physically and morally strengthened by encouraging the 'strongest' and 'fittest' people to procreate.[331] These contentious legacies carried on into the post-Liberation period as well. Boverat's ideas, for example, formed the ideological basis of postwar conservative pronatal groups, including the *Union Nationale des Associations Familiales* and its fight against abortion campaign in

[327] Camiscioli, 25; Dutton, *Origins of the French Welfare State*, 8; Anne Cova, *Féminismes et néo-malthusianismes sous la IIIe République: "La liberté de la maternité"* (Paris: Editions l'Harmattan, 2011), 34.
[328] Adler, *Jews and Gender in Liberation France*, 89.
[329] Childers, *Fathers, Families, and the State in France, 1914-1945*, 84.
[330] Childers, 168.
[331] Ibid., 125.

1947.[332] The replacement of the Ministry of Health by the Ministry of Population and Public Health in 1945 is also testimony to the fact that French demographic anxieties were as rampant as ever.[333]

Frenchwomen's marginal status during the post-Liberation period provided a space in which Gaullist population anxieties would flourish. Although de Gaulle enfranchised women in 1944, there remained limitations and contradictions in French family law that likely coloured French attitudes toward women in the French Zone as well.[334] Article 1 of the October 1946 Constitution states that "the law guarantees to women rights equal to men's in all spheres" and was complemented by the 'equal pay for equal work' law on June 20, 1946.[335] Yet, despite constitutional reforms, French policymakers did not alter the status of married women as prescribed in the Napoleonic Code, where the *droit de l'autorité paternelle* (Law of Paternal Authority) allowed a French husband, referred to as the *chef de famille* (head of the family), to refuse his wife the right to work or travel if such activities were deemed "contrary to the interest of the family."[336] This law also states that Frenchwomen are subject to the authority of their fathers and husbands regarding financial matters and guardianship over their children.[337]

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[332] Adler, *Jews and Gender in Liberation France,* 90.
[333] Adler, 72.
[334] Kenneth Mourâe and Martin S. Alexander, *Crisis and Renewal in France: 1918-1962* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2002), 201.
[335] Diana Holmes, *French Women's Writing, 1848-1994* (London: The Athlone Press, 1996), 119.
[336] Holmes, *French Women's Writing,* 119.
[337] Frenchwomen had to wait until 1965 to have the right to work without their husbands' permission as well as until 1970 for the concept of 'patriarchal authority' to be replaced by 'parental authority' in family law. *See:* Christiane Veauvy, *Les Femmes dans l'espace public: Itinéraires français et italiens* (Paris: Maison des sciences de l'homme, 2002), 156.

Depopulation anxieties had long saturated European family policies and led to pronatal and antinatal schemes, which were harrowingly murderous and anti-Semitic in the case of Nazi Germany. These policies can be viewed as a continuation of Western Europe's longstanding tradition of misogyny, in that they created the means necessary to disempower women in a manner that limited their agency as mothers and nurturers.

These demographic concerns took on a radically different connotation in post-Liberation France, however. Cast in the shadow of two emerging world powers while its own influence abroad was waning, the French Provisional Government introduced 'populationist' schemes that were designed to reconstruct the ideal 'French race' to make France a worthy contender on the world stage. These policies culminated in the repatriation of children of presumed French paternity in the French Zone, a program that had drastic consequences on the German women who were the mothers of such children.

Subverting German Motherhood: The Repatriation of 'Besatzungskinder'

In 1946, Pierre Pfimlin of the French Ministry of Public Health and Population stated that many of the orphaned and displaced children of occupied Germany had "French blood in their veins" and were a potential "blood transfusion" for the dwindling French population: "From a demographic point of view the child is the ideal immigrant because he constitutes a human asset whose value is all the more certain since his assimilation is guaranteed."[338] Pfimlin's ideology formed the

[338] Tara Zhara, *Lost Children*, 146.

basis of the 'transnational claims of kinship' that shaped French repatriation policy during the postwar period.[339] Such children, born under occupation or displaced and orphaned by war, quite literally became the lifeline of French nationhood.

By the beginning of the occupation, there were tens of thousands of displaced, orphaned and occupation children who created what Tony Judt calls the "human flotsam of war."[340] By 1949, it is estimated that there were 94,000 *Besatzungskinder* (children of occupation) in the Federal Republic of Germany, 3,000 of whom were black occupation children.[341] These figures do vary, however. A French newspaper from May 1946 reported that there were over 300,000 children born to French fathers in the French Zone.[342] In 1956, the Federal Bureau of Statistics in Wiesbaden estimated that 68,000 children were fathered by Allied occupation soldiers and raised by single mothers; of this figure, 37,261 children were fathered by American GIs, 3,137 by the Red Army, and 3,194 were conceived through rape, leaving us to assume that there were 24,418 children fathered by French and British occupation soldiers.[343]

It is generally agreed that the Red Army raped at least two million German women during the spring of 1945, giving us reason to suspect that the number of

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[339] Heide Fehrenbach, "War Orphans and Postfascist Families: Kinship and Belonging after 1945," *Histories of the Aftermath: The Legacies of the Second World War in Europe*, Frank Biess and Robert G. Moeller, eds. (New York: Berghahn Books 2010), 187.

[340] Judt, 21. There remains a fundamental lack of research on orphanages in postwar Germany, which were undoubtedly left in a catastrophic state. The SS and the Gestapo even raided orphanages during the Second World War, leading to the deportation of countless children to concentration camps. *See:* Patricia Heberer, *Children during the Holocaust* (Lanham : Rowman Altamira, 2011).

[341] Heide Fehrenbach, "Black Occupation Children and the Devolution of the Nazi Racial State," *After the Nazi Racial State: Difference and Democracy in Germany and Europe*, Rita Chin, Heide Fehrenbach, Geoff Eley and Atina Grossmann, eds. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2009), 31.

[342] Zahra, 156.

[343] Ebba D. Drolshagen, "*Besatzungskinder* and *Wehrmachtskinder:* Germany's War Children," *Children of World War II: The Hidden Enemy Legacy*, Kjersti Ericsson and Eva Simonsen, eds. (Oxford: Berg, 2005), 232.

children fathered by Red Army soldiers was much higher than that of the neighboring Western Zones. Tony Judt estimates that between 150,000 and 200,000 children were fathered by Red Army soldiers between 1945 and 1946.[344] Although abortion figures for the Western Zones remain unknown, abortion rates in the Soviet Zone were noticeably elevated. Since abortion was difficult to obtain under Brandenburg Law, in that an abortion was only legal if the victim reported the rape within two weeks of its occurrence, the absence of a German police force during the immediate postwar period suggests that many women were forced to undergo underground abortions.[345] For many women, becoming pregnant with a child of Russian paternity was the ultimate sign of shame and defeat. In many ways, the rape of German women was a racialized experience, as the dark legacies of Nazi ideology and 'racial purity' may have encouraged certain women to terminate their unwanted pregnancies. This racialized perspective did not necessarily translate onto other contexts, however. In many cases, German women chose to fraternize, marry, and even start families with African American GIs and French colonial occupation soldiers from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and French Indochina.[346]

Although the French Military Government considered occupation children in the French Zone an essential "blood transfusion", the other Allies and German civilians did not regard these children in the same way. To Germans, children fathered by French, American and British soldiers were 'illegitimate' and although they were granted German citizenship under the Nationality Law of 1913, these

[344] Judt, 20.
[345] Naimark, 123-124.
[346] Fehrenbach, "Black Occupation Children and the Devolution of the Nazi Racial State," 36-37.

children were a stark reminder of the ways in which German women had 'betrayed' their nation by fraternizing with the enemy occupier.[347]

In the Russian Zone, East German officials declared the *Russenkinder* (Russian children) to be 'fatherless children', in that they had denied the rape of German women in order to forget the humiliating defeat that followed the collapse of Nazism in 1945.[348] In the British and American Zones, children of Allied paternity were also considered illegitimate, as they were not recognized as British or American nationals and were therefore not eligible for state-sponsored assistance or government benefits.[349] In Bavaria, for example, German state officials had asked the American Military Government to grant American citizenship to occupation children who were fathered by GIs; although this request may have been partially motivated by lingering Nazi ideology concerning 'racial purity', these children were denied U.S. citizenship and were instead granted German citizenship.[350] The American Military Government also forbade officials from conducting censuses in the U.S. Zone designed to determine the official number of children fathered by U.S. occupation soldiers.[351] Attitudes toward *Besatzungskinder* were radically different in the French Zone, however, where occupation officials were more than willing to grant such children French citizenship.

The French occupation of post-Nazi Germany was not the first instance in which French authorities dealt with children of mixed French-German blood.

[347] Fehrenbach, "War Orphans and Postfascist Families", 187.
[348] Fehrenbach, 187.
[349] Zahra, 159.
[350] Heide Fehrenbach, "Rehabilitating Fatherland: Race and German Remasculinization," *Conflict, Catastrophe and Continuity: Essays on Modern German History*, Frank Biess, Mark Roseman, and Hanna Schissler, eds. (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2007), 343.
[351] Fehrenbach, "Rehabilitating Fatherland", 345.

Fabrice Virgili's groundbreaking research on French *Wehrmachtskinder* (Wehrmacht children) suggests that there were 200,000 children with German paternity by the end of the German occupation of France in 1944.[352] Although many of these children were called derogatory names such as "bâtards de Boches" (Boche bastards), "têtes carrées" (square heads), and "parasites", these children were not subject to harsh medical examinations and were not denied state benefits and French citizenship, thus suggesting that the French were not nearly as Germanophobic as they had been after the First World War.[353] The relatively civilized treatment of *Wehrmachtskinder* provides insight into French willingness to repatriate German children of assumed French paternity after the war. Yet, although these occupation children were well treated, it is certain that the French mothers of these children were subject to harsh punishment and public humiliation once the German occupation had ended, a reality similar to German women's situations once the French occupation began in 1945.

From 1945 to 1947, orphaned and displaced children of Allied parents were initially cared for by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) and were called "United Nations' nationals."[354] By April 1946, the UNRRA established fourteen children's centers in the British Zone, six in the American Zone and five in the French Zone.[355] The UNRRA was not mandated to aid orphaned and displaced German children, however. Deemed "enemy nationals", these children,

[352] Drolshagen, "*Besatzungskinder* and *Wehrmachtskinder*", 239; Jean-Paul Picaper and Ludwig Norz, *Enfants maudits: Ils sont 200,000. On les appelait les "enfants de Boches"* (Geneva: Editions des Syrtes, 2004), 25.
[353] Drolshagen, 239; Picaper and Norz, *Enfants maudits*, 25.
[354] Zhara, 8.
[355] Mark Wyman, *DPs: Europe's Displaced Persons, 1945-1951* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 99.

including approximately 1.5 million child expellees from the East, received little or no aid from the UN.[356] This humanitarian crisis marginally improved by July 1947 when the International Refugee Organization (IRO) replaced the UNRRA and aided 12,843 "unaccompanied children" under the age of sixteen who were by definition German and Austrian children without close family members.[357] In the French Zone particularly, the task of locating and caring for children was under the jurisdiction of the Direction of Displaced Persons. By December 1945, this task was transferred to the French Red Cross in Germany.[358]

Despite an absence of policy toward women in the French Zone, the French Military Government regarded the Repatriation Program as an utmost priority. General Koenig observed as early as March 1946 that repatriating children from the French Zone to France would form "the ideal solution" for the French demographic crisis in that it would avoid the need "to introduce young people in France who are already formed- or rather deformed" by instead repatriating children who are "easily assimilable."[359] The repatriation process began by placing children of assumed French paternity in *pouponnières* (nurseries) and *maisons d'enfants* (children's houses) across the French Zone. By March 8, 1948 there were four *pouponnières* and *maisons d'enfants*: one in Appenthal, one in Bad-Durkheim, one in Nordrach and one in Unterhausen.[360] Both the Ministry of Public Health and Population and the French Military Government instructed each nursery to "house

[356] Zhara, 8.
[357] Ibid., 8.
[358] "Project de convention entre la Direction des Personnes Déplacées et du Croix Rouge Française," December 13, 1945, Le Sous-Directeur des Personnes Déplacées, MAEE/PDR: 3/58.
[359] Zahra, 153.
[360] "Convention," March 8, 1948, Le Ministère de la Santé Publique et de la Population, MAEE/PDR : 3/58.

children who are up to and including fourteen years old, of French origin or presumably as such found in Germany, and are to be repatriated to France."[361]

Conditions in the *pouponnières* and *maisons d'enfants* were just as difficult as they were in the rest of the Zone. Although there were certainly instances in which children of assumed French paternity were given special treatment, as was the case in August 1947 when a "colony" of two hundred French children were reportedly receiving special fruit and vegetable rations while the majority of Germans did not receive "a single gram of fat", the majority of these children also suffered from grave food shortages and malnutrition.[362] The only *Pouponnière* in Berlin, for example, reported a desperate shortage of nursing staff, clothing, flour and milk in February 1947.[363] A French Red Cross worker in Berlin similarly reported that low food rations meant that children between one and six years of age received only half a liter of milk per day; many of these children, she adds, did not have suitable shoes and clothing.[364] A frustrating shortage of ambulances and medical supplies often prevented Red Cross workers from repatriating children in occupied Berlin, states a memo dated August 22, 1945, in that more ambulances were needed to "retrieve the French who are still hospitalized in German hospitals in the Russian Zone."[365] In this regard, a case can be made that the Repatriation Program was as much an attempt to relieve a grave humanitarian crisis as it was a scheme to bolster French 'grandeur'.

[361] "Convention," March 8, 1948, MAEE/PDR: 3/58.
[362] "Sujet de l'Allemagne occidentale", August 19, 1947, SL/MAEE: 11/1.
[363] Letter from J. Meillon to Madame Coppinger, February 22, 1947, MAEE/PDR: 3/81.
[364] Letter from Madame Smol to Monsieur le Commandant de Rosen, December 14, 1945, MAEE/PDR: 3/81.
[365] Letter from Monsieur le Commandant Rochau to Monsieur Juhel, August 22, 1945, MAEE/PDR: 3/81.

A November 25, 1947 notice from Koenig to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Paris states the conditions under which "French children or presumably such" were to be repatriated to France:

> The children in question are broken down into 3 categories:
>
> a) Children who have been indefinitely abandoned by their families or born to unknown French parents,
> b) A child who has at least one unknown or missing parent,
> c) Children for repatriation whose parent(s) have asked for an extended delay.
>
> Children in these last two categories must remain in nurseries until
>
> - The investigation is finished...
> - The families can collect them.[366]

The conditions by which "French children or presumably such" were chosen for repatriation were highly selective and thus suggest that de Gaulle's populationist policies were strongly correlated with racialized conceptions of French nationhood. The term 'repatriation' is in itself suggestive of one's rightful claim to French nationhood, and these ambiguous repatriation criteria suggest that the selection process was highly racialized and subjective. Georges Mauco, de Gaulle's leading French immigration expert, was notorious for racializing the postwar immigration process. He had created categories of 'preferred immigrants' as early as 1945, citing Germans, the English, Belgians, the Swiss and Scandinavians as ideal candidates for French citizenship.[367] Mauco believed that Mediterraneans were prone to 'criminal behavior' and that Armenians, Russians and Arabs lacked the capacity to be 'economically productive'; Jews, he believed, were physically and psychologically 'weakened' from their persecution in Nazi concentration camps and were therefore

[366] "Rapatriement d'enfants français ou présumés tels," Le Général d'Armée Koenig, November 25, 1947, MAEE/PDR: 3/58.
[367] Zhara, 151-152.

unsuitable candidates for repatriation.[368] Postwar French immigration policy even favoured Jewish children over Jewish adults because Jewish children were reportedly easier to assimilate into French society.[369]

It was not only impossible to establish the ethnicities of these children, especially in cases where children were too young to speak or recall their parents' names, but it was also difficult to determine the ages of these individuals. Many of these children were actually adolescents who appeared much younger due to "years of malnourishment" that had "robbed refugee children of inches and pounds."[370] A child's presumed nationality nevertheless became a decisive factor in the French repatriation selection process. By December 1945, the *pouponnières* in Tübingen and Bad Durkheim reportedly housed forty-seven French, fifteen Belgian, seven Russian, six Greek, five Polish and three Italian children between the ages of zero months and four years; the sub-director of the nursery stated that she could no longer accommodate "foreign children" because there were too many French children whose parents were missing or being detained and were consequently unable to collect their children.[371] Since it was not always possible to determine whether a displaced child, an orphaned child or a child of occupation was of French paternity, a case can be made that children who were of a certain physical

[368] Zhara, 152.
[369] Ibid., 151. For more information about the Allied Military Governments' policies toward Jewish DPs and Holocaust survivors, see: Arieh J. Kochavi, *Post-Holocaust Politics: Britain, the United States, and Jewish Refugees, 1945-1948* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Atina Grossmann, *Jews, Germans, and Allies: Close Encounters in Occupied Germany* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Avinoam J. Patt and Michael Berkowitz, *We Are Here: New Approaches to Jewish Displaced Persons in Postwar Germany* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2010).
[370] Zhara, 9.
[371] "Project de convention entre la Direction des Personnes Déplacées et du Croix Rouge Française," MAEE/PDR: 3/58.

appearance and 'racial' disposition were chosen to become members of the 'French race' while others were deemed unsuitable.

The dark legacies of Nazi racial policy also factored into repatriation motives. Tara Zhara argues that the nationalist pedagogues of the time alleged that children who were left with German foster families did not have "a clear sense of national identity" and were thus "doomed to become psychologically and morally defective adults."[372] These contentions remain groundless, however, in that the implications of the Repatriation Program and the effects that it had on German women and children have yet to be studied. A 1949 magazine poll discovered that 'mixed-blood' children were better cared for by German mothers than by English and Japanese mothers; while it was determined that English mothers often placed 'mixed-blood' children in orphanages and that Japanese mothers often resorted to infanticide, the poll revealed that "in Germany not only is infanticide unthinkable but even separation is rarely considered."[373]

German women did not always have authority over the children in their care, however. German law prescribed that children lacking a father or legal male guardian became the responsibility of the state and were therefore eligible to receive public support and benefits.[374] The gendered nature of defeat and occupation also dealt a cruel hand to German women who gave birth to children as a result of rape and fraternization. These children often angered and embittered German men after returning home from POW camps and the Eastern Front. To

[372] Tara Zhara, *Kidnapped Souls: National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the Bohemian Lands, 1900-1948* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2008), 261.
[373] Goedde, 111.
[374] Fehrenbach, "Rehabilitating Fatherland", 344.

German men, these *Besatzungskinder* were a humiliating symbol of defeat. It was not uncommon for a German husband to have "contested paternity and petitioned to be absolved of his legal and financial responsibilities", which in turn placed the mothers of these unwanted children in difficult predicaments.[375] It becomes evident, then, that German men played a key role in facilitating the repatriation of displaced, orphaned and occupation children. The dark, racist legacies of Hitler's ruthless Germanization policies that were carried out in Poland, Bohemia and the Sudetenland did not completely dissipate with the collapse of the Third Reich. Nazi racial ideology regarding children of 'mixed-blood' was still very much a part of certain Germans' worldviews, much to the detriment of these faceless children.

It can certainly be argued that the establishment of *pouponnières* and *maisons d'enfants* in the French Zone marked a large-scale humanitarian effort to clothe, feed and shelter displaced, orphaned and occupation children. Yet, it is difficult to ignore that this policy further disempowered German women. The mass hodgepodge of nameless children in postwar Germany provided French authorities with a convenient means of selecting 'ideal' candidates for repatriation in order to reconstruct a 'French race' worthy of realizing de Gaulle's grand vision of transforming France into a world power. In many ways, the Repatriation Program served as the ultimate 'francization' policy, in that it successfully transformed Germans into Frenchmen in ways that denazification and the *Mission Culturelle* failed to do. This scheme had grave consequences on German women's traditional social roles, moreover. The repatriation of children of assumed French paternity

[375] Fehrenbach, "Rehabilitating Fatherland", 344.

was a process by which "relationships between biological parents and child are ruptured abruptly, violently, or prematurely."[376] Already socially and politically marginal in a chaotic postwar order, German women's maternal agency was further undermined as race, gender and nationalism intersected to regenerate French nationhood.

[376] Fehrenbach, "War Orphans and Postfascist Families", 190.

Conclusion

On Armistice Day in 1942, Winston Churchill told the House of Commons that "the problems of victory are more agreeable than those of defeat, but they are no less difficult."[377] The catastrophic, war-ravaged state of post-Second World War Europe certainly confirmed Churchill's apprehensions. The immediate postwar situation was especially devastating in Germany, however, where aerial bombings, mass rape and severe food shortages created inherently gendered experiences of defeat and occupation for a predominately female population.

The rape of German women by Allied and Soviet soldiers during the spring of 1945 linked together race and gender, as both the occupiers and the occupied struggled to come to terms with the presence of 'nonwhite' occupation soldiers in their Zones. Rape and hunger soon engendered fraternization between German women and occupation soldiers, as women sought ways to transcend the difficult realities of defeat. The collective experience of defeat radically changed in the face of gnawing, demoralizing hunger, moreover, as the German population began to depend on the Allies for rations that were twice below the bare minimum of calories needed to survive. In the French Zone, whose food ration plummeted to 450 calories, the German population was forced to survive off half of what civilians received in the American and British Zones.

[377] Peter Tsouras, *The Book of Military Quotations* (St. Paul: Zenith Press, 2005), 465.

In the wake of mass violence and hunger, women's social roles began to shift. As the predominant portion of the postwar population, German women often assumed the traditional masculine roles of protector and provider in addition to those of mother and nurturer. Yet, the French Military Government did not design policy to reeducate women and to secure their social and political advancement, nor did it create an efficient denazification apparatus to reconstruct German society. Caught in the shadow of two emerging world powers, France instead sought to assert cultural hegemony over Germany through the *Mission Culturelle,* a form of cultural imperialism whose benighted policies only created a larger disconnect between the occupiers and the civilian population. In this regard, the failure of denazification and cultural policy led to the failure of reeducation in the French Zone altogether.

French efforts to democratize German women also failed. The Soviets, the British and the Americans each acknowledged women's changing positions in the new postwar order by granting German women relative degrees of agency through the establishment of women's branches and the authorization of women's organizations. The French, on the other hand, made no attempt to recognize the shifting status of women in their Zone, nor did they create the necessary policy to democratize German women. The absence of women's agencies and organizations in the French Zone created a stifled democracy that stripped women of their social and political agency altogether.

German women remained marginal in the domestic sphere as well. Longstanding demographic concerns engendered the creation of French family and

immigration policy designed to reconstruct the 'French race' through the interaction between gender, race and nationalism in order to fulfill de Gaulle's visions of French 'grandeur'. This occupation policy, which sought out and repatriated children of assumed French paternity to France, successfully transformed Germans into Frenchmen in ways that denazification and the *Mission Culturelle* did not. The reconceptualization of French 'nationhood' had devastating consequences on German women, however, whose lack of maternal agency left them as disempowered in the domestic sphere as they were in the public sphere.

This dissertation has demonstrated that the policies, and frequent lack thereof, that shaped German women's experiences under French occupation were radically different from their Allied counterparts. In doing so, this study has also exposed some of the historiographical lacunae that are in need of future scholarly elaboration. The interaction between gender, race, nationalism and occupation policy, for example, is an interplay that ought to be studied within the larger context of German reconstruction and European integration. Concepts of citizenship, nationhood and the postwar state need to be reconsidered as factors that shaped governmental and institutional attitudes toward civilians, reordered postwar society, and facilitated reconciliation between former belligerents during the early Cold War era. These topics are but several of the pertinent areas of research that have been excluded from significant historical scrutiny.

By examining the ways in which occupation policy disempowered German women in the French Zone, an occupation Zone that is in itself under-researched and marginal, this dissertation has begun to address the silence on German women's

experiences under French occupation. Perhaps we can now hope to get a clearer perspective of the role that the French occupation played in determining the emergence of East and West Germany, an historical watershed that continues to shape Europe today. By reasserting agency onto a people who have been omitted from the postwar narrative, we can now begin to excavate forgotten histories within the forgotten Zone.

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