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UMI
REVISITING DEMOCRACY:
CANADA'S QUEST FOR A MORE
PARTICIPATORY FORM OF
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

BY

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A THESIS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

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ABSTRACT

REVISITING DEMOCRACY: CANADA’S QUEST FOR A MORE PARTICIPATORY FORM OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

RONALD A. KNYSZYNISKI

This treatise is a political exploration of Canadian legislative and representational institutions and why they are not performing in the way they should be. In an effort to promote a citizen based democracy and avoid the further deterioration in relations between government and the citizens they claim to represent, four institutional and legislative reforms are suggested in an effort to reconcile basic democratic principles with realities of Canadian political life. These reforms are: 1) recall, 2) loosening party discipline and introducing more votes, 3) referendums, and 4) electoral reform. Although it is hypothesized that all four reforms would provide Canadians with a more participatory form of representative government. empirical and qualitative evidence reveals that these hopes are certainly delusive and must be re-examined. Instead, it is concluded that loosening party discipline and introducing more votes coupled with reforming the electoral system have the greatest chance of creating a more vibrant democracy in which governments would still exert necessary leadership on policy issues while citizens would be given necessary opportunities to participate in the political process. Unfortunately, as positive as this form of inclusionary politics sounds, reality dictates that unless both sides adopt different attitudes as to the true meaning of representative democracy, Canada’s quest for a more participatory form of representative government will fail.
DEDICATION

THIS THESIS IS DEDICATED TO THE LOVING MEMORY OF MY FATHER ELIASZ (ALEX) Whose COURAGE AND PERSEVERANCE IN THE FACE OF ILLNESS SERVE AS A BEACON OF LIGHT EACH DAY OF MY LIFE
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PREFACE

NO ONE PRETENDS THAT DEMOCRACY IS PERFECT OR ALL-WISE. INDEED, IT HAS BEEN SAID THAT DEMOCRACY IS THE WORST FORM OF GOVERNMENT, EXCEPT FOR THOSE OTHER FORMS THAT HAVE BEEN TRIED FROM TIME TO TIME.

-- WINSTON CHURCHILL

IT IS IN VAIN TO SUMMON A PEOPLE, WHO HAVE BEEN RENDERED SO DEPENDENT ON THE CENTRAL POWER, TO CHOOSE FROM TIME TO TIME THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THAT POWER; THIS RARE AND BRIEF EXERCISE OF THEIR FREE CHOICE, HOWEVER IMPORTANT IT MAY BE, WILL NOT PREVENT THEM FROM GRADUALLY LOSING THE FACULTIES OF THINKING, FEELING, AND ACTING FOR THEMSELVES, AND THUS GRADUALLY FALLING BELOW THE LEVEL OF HUMANITY.

-- ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE

THERE ARE PERHAPS FEW MEN WHO CAN FOR ANY GREAT LENGTH OF TIME ENJOY OFFICE AND POWER, WITHOUT BEING MORE OR LESS UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF FEELINGS UNFAVOURABLE TO THE FAITHFUL DISCHARGE OF THEIR PUBLIC DUTIES. THEIR INTEGRITY MAY BE PROOF AGAINST IMPROPER CONSIDERATIONS IMMEDIATELY ADDRESSED TO THEMSELVES; BUT THEY ARE APT TO ACQUIRE A HABIT OF LOOKING WITH INDIFFERENCE UPON THE PUBLIC INTERESTS, AND OF TOLERATING CONDUCT FROM WHICH AN UNPRACTICED MAN WOULD REVOLT. OFFICE IS CONSIDERED AS A SPECIES OF PROPERTY; AND GOVERNMENT RATHER AS A MEANS OF PROMOTING INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS THAN AS AN INSTRUMENT CREATED SOLELY FOR THE SERVICE OF THE PEOPLE. CORRUPTION IN SOME AND IN OTHERS A PERVERSION OF CORRECT FEELINGS AND PRINCIPLES DIVERT GOVERNMENT FROM ITS LEGITIMATE ENDS, AND MAKE IT AN ENGINE FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE FEW AT THE EXPENSE OF THE MANY.

-- ANDREW JACKSON

IN EVERY GOVERNMENT ON EARTH IS SOME TRACE OF HUMAN WEAKNESS, SOME GERM OF CORRUPTION AND DEGENERACY, WHICH CUNNING WILL DISCOVER, WICKEDNESS INSENSIBLY OPEN, CULTIVATE, AND IMPROVE. EVERY GOVERNMENT DEGENERATES WHEN TRUSTED TO THE RULERS OF THE PEOPLE ALONE.

-- THOMAS JEFFERSON

I KNOW OF NO SAFE DEPOSITORY OF THE ULTIMATE POWER OF THE SOCIETY BUT THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, AND IF WE THINK THEM NOT ENLIGHTENED ENOUGH TO EXERCISE THEIR CONTROL WITH A WHOLESOME DISCRETION, THE REMEDY IS NOT TO TAKE IT FROM THEM, BUT TO INFORM THEIR DISCRETION.

-- THOMAS JEFFERSON

THE MAJORITY OF THE PLAIN PEOPLE WILL DAY IN AND DAY OUT MAKE FEWER MISTAKES IN GOVERNING THEMSELVES THAN ANY SMALLER BODY OF MEN WILL MAKE IN TRYING TO GOVERN THEM.

-- THEODORE ROOSEVELT
INTRODUCTION

As Canadians enter the 21st Century, they are increasingly facing a crisis in their democracy and representative institutions. This gradual deterioration of Canadian democracy and consequent rise of citizen disenchchantment and disillusionment have led some critics to call for an overhaul of Canada’s democratic institutions with the specific intent of eliminating its democratic deficit. Increased levels of alienation and cynicism necessitate a concerted effort to bring Canadian political institutions down to the lowest level, that of the citizen. It is this grassroots approach which remains central to the battle against Canada’s on-going malaise of institutional inertia.

Looking back at recent Canadian history reveals that several events have occurred which have contributed to Canada’s crisis of political legitimacy. Part of the reason why Canada finds itself at a democratic crossroads is that successive administrations have chosen policy routes which conflict with both their own parties as well as the country as a whole. Examples of these policies are but are not limited to: the introduction of the Free Trade Agreement (F.T.A.), the Goods and Services Tax (G.S.T.), Meech Lake, the Charlottetown Accord, and the recent Hepatitis C controversy. What these policies and constitutional attempts revealed was that the Canadian public was either against the ideas or was not sufficiently informed about the policy intentions of the government of the day. By not being central cogs in the decision-making process, disempowered Canadians will continue to feel disconnected from an exclusionary political process. This exclusion in the form of an executive dominance must be arrested lest we remain a stunted democracy with little or no hopes of fostering a sense of civic pride and/or citizenship.
The United Nations has called Canada one of the best nations in the world in terms of overall standard of living. As an established democratic nation, Canada is frequently asked to monitor elections in newly emerging democracies. At this point, one might wonder about the ironic twist that as much as we appear to be democratic in our outlook, closer investigation reveals an institutional paralysis that has essentially stifled our forward progress in providing adequate representation for citizens. Canadians must become introspective to realize that their political institutions are not supplying representative government to them. More specifically, due to our antiquated electoral system, Canadian elections have been reduced to a farcical attempt at reflecting public opinion of the day. In an effort to redress these representational concerns and reduce citizen alienation, this thesis will explore four institutional reforms that have been given the most attention in the literature.

Canadian institutions are in need of reform to better reflect democratic values. No comment sums up Canada's current state of democratic despair better than the one which posits that

"Behind the familiar and reassuring façade of the Parliament buildings in Ottawa lie an unfair system of election, an inefficient legislature, an autocratic and secretive cabinet, a frustrated Opposition, and a couple of reminders of our colonial and undemocratic past. We can and must devise a better system of government if we hope to preserve democracy (Westell 39)."

If one transposes the above argument onto Canada's current political situation, the argument continues to resonate true. No greater evidence exists to support this contention than the plethora of academics and scholars within the political literature devoted to the study of finding ways to improve Canadian democracy.
If Canada has indeed entered a state of flux vis-à-vis its representative institutions, four reforms exist that at least in theory, have the greatest chance of ameliorating Canada's current problems.

In search for a truly deliberative brand of democracy and notwithstanding the uncertainties Canada faces, the literature focuses on two reforms that are of a direct democracy nature and two reforms which focus more on actual conventions and legislative frameworks. The four reforms hypothesized to improve the functioning of Canadian democracy are: 1) recall, 2) loosening party discipline and the related introduction of more free votes, 3) referendums, and 4) electoral reform. It is these reforms that have been given the greatest attention in the literature. As such, it is these reforms which merit closer investigation as potential solutions to what ails Canada's body politic.

In brief, recall allows constituents of a specific constituency or riding to sign a petition in an effort to remove their respective MP or MLA. Loosening party discipline and introducing more free votes would attempt to alter long standing parliamentary conventions in an effort to give power back to the people by allowing them to have more power over their respective MPs and MLAs. More referendums have the potential of isolating issues that are deemed to be of national importance and in turn submitting them to the public for popular ratification. Reforming the electoral system would correct distortions that currently exist between a party's percentage of the popular vote and its respective allocation of seats. In all, what these reforms seek to do is to bring government down to the lowest common denominator, more specifically the Canadian populace.
When assessing and evaluating the significance of all four sets of reform proposals, it remains necessary for one to start from the premise that all four can make a significant contribution to the current state of Canadian democracy. However, based on empirical evidence and qualitative research, one is forced to rollback one’s enthusiasm in that the two direct democracy devices become overly problematic when seriously considering their usefulness on a grander scale. However, despite the fact that many of Canada’s conventions and representational practices have stood the test of time, other reforms could be implemented which would be in-keeping with Canada’s traditions of parliamentary and responsible government.

A loosening of party discipline and introducing more free votes coupled with a reforming of the electoral system would provide Canadians in no uncertain terms with the ingredients needed to initiate the requisite changes within the political system. The above institutional reforms should not be viewed as incompatible with our Westminster traditions and practices inherited from Great Britain but rather as necessary pre-conditions for the emergence of a more participatory form of representative government. This new kind of radical yet sensible democracy within our institutional and legislative frameworks could be perceived as radical not so much in the negative sense of being extremist but rather as a progressive reaction to the times. It is this progressive reaction to the times that possesses revolutionary appeal in fundamentally overhauling an excessively rigid political system.
CHAPTER ONE

THEORIES OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY

Before analyzing the merits and drawbacks of each individual reform proposal, what remains important is to place the four reform proposals alluded to in the introduction within the context of specific operating principles of democracy. Although specific operating principles of what constitutes a democratic system of governance are contentious issues and can vary in terms of one’s perception of their significance, several overriding theoretical characteristics will be explored in an effort to determine if the democratic reforms violate any or all of the theoretical principles. By doing so, a better perspective can be attained as to whether the democratic reforms can have a positive impact on Canadian democracy. However, one must insert the caveat that any violation of democratic precepts on the part of any individual reform should not necessarily be judged as such a gross violation so as to exclude it permanently from the political lexicon of the day. Instead, the individual reform should be judged on their overall suitability in an effort to decide whether it should be considered as a short-term or long-term solutions for Canada.

Although some pundits might agree with Churchill’s thoughts that democracy possesses flaws in its theoretical foundations, most observers would support the claim that it nonetheless offers more freedoms than any other ideology or system of governance. For the purposes of this piece, three major operating principles of democracy along with their specific characteristics will be both presented and eventually superimposed all or in part on the aforementioned institutional reforms. By doing, so, an attempt will be made to determine whether those specific institutional reforms respect the
guiding principles of what a democracy should be. The three interrelated principles that underpin any democracy are: 1) majority rule with respect for minority rights, 2) equality of political rights in the form of representation by population, and 3) fairness of political participation in the form of popular sovereignty.

**MAJORITY RULE**

In any democracy, majority rule is regarded as a necessary pre-condition to ensure the continued legitimacy of the political system. As the term suggests, decision-making is supposed to be guided by the principle that the will of the majority should be respected in the formation of public policies. Notwithstanding this implied respect for the wishes of the majority, the second part of the principle requires that necessary steps be taken to ensure that minority rights not be trampled upon when considering policies. As a result, majority rule becomes a qualified principle in that considerations must be given to the other segment of society. When proper consideration is not given to ethnic, linguistic or regional groups to name a few, society risks a tyranny of the majority. Majoritarian tyranny at the expense of minority rights can become a dangerous concept because majorities can be apt to forget that in another context, they might constitute a minority (Arblaster 1994, 71). By recognizing their respective positions on an issue, both majority and minority opinions can be taken into account in an effort to decide on a given issue.

On the surface, Canada violates the principle of majority rule by consistently electing governments with less than 50% of the vote. With a system that witnesses a greater percentage of the population preferring and voting for parties not in power, little wonder how political legitimacy is lost in the eyes of a public yearning to have their voices heard in the corridors of power. Although efforts are made to introduce different
types of majorities for different issues, the fact remains that especially with regards to the electoral system, Canada turns the majority principle on its head by enduring a form of minority rule with little or no respect for majority rights.

Although appeals based on the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provide a legal recourse for citizens to protect their rights, the cumbersome process remains both a disincentive and barrier to achieving further progress. Furthermore, efforts could be made to emulate other nations’ majority requirements (concurrent majorities as in Australia or qualified majorities as in the United States) so as to restore some of the lost legitimacy. Unfortunately, it seems that these possibilities are not considered seriously. Tolerating inaction will only serve to entrench a government based on minority rule. This problematic scenario cannot be countenanced too much in a system that seeks to balance parliamentary sovereignty with demands for popular sovereignty.

POLITICAL EQUALITY

The second principle that should underpin any democracy concerns the need for political equality. In Canada, that political equality is sought through the enshrined doctrine of representation by population. By dividing legislative seats in proportion to population, governments attempt to provide citizens equal opportunities to “advance proposals for public decision” (Johnston and Pocklington 9). Within the electoral arena, political equality is equated with the aphorism of ‘one person, one vote’. In theory, the votes of every individual should carry the same weight. Unfortunately, as will be shown, Canadian elections violate consistently this ideal by adhering to its now distinct first-past-the-post electoral system. This fact is lamented by British political philosopher and theorist John Stuart Mill when he concluded that
In a really equal democracy every or any section would be represented, not disproportionately, but proportionately. A majority of the electors would always have a majority of the representatives, but a minority of electors would always have a minority of the representatives ... Unless they are, there is not equal government, but a government of inequality and privilege: one part of the people rule over the rest; there is a part whose fair and equal share of influence in the representation is withheld from them (Mill 103-104).

Updating Mill’s argument, one acknowledges that notwithstanding the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms that is designed to protect equality rights in Section 15, Canadian society has built inequality and privilege into the representational system. When an archaic electoral system is combined with moneyed and special interests groups, not only is graft a likely result but any hope for relative equality of power falls by the way side. Similar to the interrelated principle of majority rule, if relative political equality is stripped away from the public, the integrity and legitimacy of the political system, assuming that it still exists, will be drastically reduced. If any citizen would respect the canons of social equality in one’s interpersonal relationships, he/she should have no doubt that “a more than narrowly political or formal equality must be one of our goals” (Arbalster 1994, 78). As a result, instead of resting on historical laurels, increased focus should be placed on measures that would promote equality within Canada’s institutional and legislative frameworks.

**POLITICAL PARTICIPATION**

The final democratic principle surrounds the notion of fairness in political participation. More specifically, every democracy attempts to provide avenues for all groups of society to partake in the administration of government. Short of adopting the American version of popular sovereignty, Canadian political tradition endeavours to wed concerns for direct, personal participation with established practices of parliamentary
government. The concern for and importance of maximum citizen participation was
carried out by Mill when he stated that

It is evident that the only government which can fully satisfy all the exigencies of
the social state is one in which the whole people participate; that any
participation, even in the smallest public function, is useful; that the participation
should everywhere be as great as the general degree of improvement of the
community will allow; and that nothing less can be ultimately desirable than the
admission of all to a share in the sovereign power of the state (quoted in
Arblaster 1994, 61).

Acknowledging the premium placed on participation should sensitize one to the
importance of finding those necessary measures to incorporate all groups who have been
historically discriminated against.

When considering the extent of fairness in political participation within the
Canadian political context, evidence reveals that the system is rife with examples of
unfairness and limited opportunities for political participation. Examining these criteria at
the federal level reveals substantial inequities in Aboriginal (defined as Indian, Inuit, and
Metis), visible minority, and female representation. Short of creating separate Aboriginal
electoral districts (AEDs), the nearly one million Aboriginals will continue their uphill
battle in search of a representational voice at all levels of government. Visible minorities
face an even more uncertain future, especially considering that unlike their Aboriginal
counterparts, they do not possess as many concrete constitutional and legislative
guarantees.

Women have been chronically underrepresented since Confederation (Jackson
and Jackson 1998, 464). This reality is especially troubling considering that since women
make up approximately half of the population, their levels of participation should come
as close as possible to mirroring the above fact. Unfortunately, statistics reveal that
Despite the fact that female representation in the House of Commons has risen consistently since 1980 (Jackson and Jackson 1998, 464), female underrepresentation continues.

At present, women comprise approximately 21% of the House of Commons. While some observers would be encouraged by that progress, especially considering that for the majority of the 20th Century, the number of women never exceeded double digits (Jackson and Jackson 1998, 464), comparative statistics show Canada lags behind the majority of industrialized nations. Moreover, when compared to Scandinavian countries, Canada’s record fares even worse (Studlar 1999, 129).

Taking all the facts and statistics about discriminated groups into account leads one to the hopeful conclusion that they will not be sustained in the long-term. Like the principles of socialism that fail once they progress beyond human nature, an argument can likewise be made that the principles of technocracy will eventually fail once they progress beyond the creation of a fundamentally different political system. It is the goal here to find that fundamentally different political system that can allow democratic dialogue and political participation to flourish.

In all, it is apparent that the political system has failed to accommodate the various interests of the different groups. By not articulating those interests, governments clinging to the brokerage politics model of governing will eventually burn the bridges between themselves and the disaffected groups. The fact that fairness in political participation has become so problematic is no reason to cast it aside in hopes that it will solve itself. For this reason, one realizes how important fairness in political participation is as a theoretical concept for a country as diverse as Canada.
Pervasive and systemic discrimination will continue unabated unless Canada shifts to an inclusionary form of parliamentary government that stresses listening to and involving people in government (Deverell and Vezina 102). Hopefully, with a form of radical yet sensible democracy, that form of parliamentary government can become a populist one bent on achieving all that its citizens expect of it.
CHAPTER TWO

RECALL

The recall tends to produce in every official a nervous condition of irresolution as to whether he should do what he thinks he ought to do in the interest of the public, or should withhold from doing anything, or should do as little as possible, in order to avoid any discussion at all.

-- William Howard Taft, 1913

The value of the recall as an instrument of genuinely democratic government has not been sufficiently appreciated ... Above all else a democratic government must be kept closely in touch with public opinion. The recall makes it more possible ... without any necessary sacrifice of efficiency.

-- Herbert Croly, 1914

The first institutional device designed to supplement our representative institutions is the recall device. Simply put, recall is a corrective procedure that allows a group of voters to "call their representatives to account before the end of their normal term" (McCormick 1992, 26). Recall is based on the delegate view of representation. More specifically, representatives are supposed to follow the wishes of their constituents (Loenen 1997, 99). This point is buttressed by the argument that

A representative person is one who will act in a given situation in much the same way as those he represents would act in that same situation. In short, he must be of their kind ... Election is only one part of representation. It becomes full representation only if the elected person speaks with the authentic accents of those who elected him ... he should share their values; that is, be in touch with their realities (Bevan 35, quoted in Arblaster 1994, 81).

Thus, in theory, popular sovereignty is exercised through the citizens' ability to in effect "de-elect their representatives in the legislature" (Marquis 7). If this ability is exercised, voters demonstrate their practical utility as the "fountainhead of sovereign political power" (Zimmerman 1997, 1, 151) who have delegated their authority to public representatives yet reserve the right to cast judgments on their merits. The ability to cast
judgment is designed to “weaken the link between representative and party, and to strengthen the link between representative and electors” (Loenen 1997, 99). By strengthening the link between representative and electors, the possibility of recall is designed at least in theory to act as a deterrent to keep MPs and MLAs from “submitting to excessive party discipline” (Loenen 1997, 101).

Although viewed in a more favourable light in the United States, the Canadian version of recall has been seldom used, possesses few advocates, and like its international counterpart, suffers from a paucity of scholarly analysis. Consequently, little wonder that to many, the concept of recall has been “alien to the Canadian political system” (Varzeliotis and Varzeliotis 82). Nonetheless, if one is to make a definitive claim either way, it is necessary to present both sides of the argument in an effort to determine the stronger case. This is exactly what will be attempted in upcoming sections.

Before presenting a brief historical background of recall in North America and more specifically in Canada, the reader should understand the three basic stages in the recall process. They are: 1) a petition is circulated that must gain the signatures of a required number of eligible voters in the district in question, 2) a recall election, in which voters support or oppose the proposition that the representative in question should be recalled and the seat declared vacant, and 3) a by-election to select a new member of Parliament to serve out the balance of the legislative term (McCormick 1992, 26). With this theoretical process in mind, the groundwork is set for a closer evaluation of the merits and drawbacks of recall as well as its feasibility to be employed as one of several reforms to Canadian democracy.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Before broaching the pros and cons of recall as a device of direct democracy, let us begin our analysis with its historical roots. Although practical applications of recall in the United States are outside the scope of this review, any analysis of recall must begin with its birth in the late 19th Century and early 20th Century. The demand for recall was made by populists, socialist labour parties, and progressive reformers in the rural areas of the Midwest, South, and West (Cronin 130). Although the American constitution possessed provisions for impeaching elected officials, reformers deemed them inadequate based on their contention that "impeachment punishes only malfeasance in office, not misfeasance or nonfeasance, and graft is hard to prove" (Cronin 130).

By having to prove a crime was committed, many reformers became disillusioned because of the obvious difficulty of pinning anything concrete on elected officials. Although no constitutional or legislative mechanisms allowed for recall at the federal level (Boyer 1992a, 29), recall became more attractive to reformers because they could petition for an officials' removal based on anything from alleged corruption, unrepresentativeness, and/or indifference. Thus, having recall at least at the state and municipal levels was viewed as a positive step forward on the road to direct democracy. Overall, the most important point to extract from the early days was that power was brought down to the citizens' level. Legislative sovereignty or supremacy was being overridden by popular sovereignty. For many, the possibility of empowerment was long in coming.

While middle of the road parties and officials viewed recall as extreme, its advocates did not view recall as a substitute to America's revered principles of
representative government (Canada – Lortie Royal Commission 1991a, 242). Instead, they hoped recall would simply complement existing governmental structures in addition to hopefully making representatives more responsive and honest (Cronin 131). The desire for increased responsiveness and honesty stemmed from the fact that recall in the United States originated during a time of corrupt political machines as well as increased influence for privileged interests (Dickerson and Flanagan 193).

The recall of state-wide politicians was first used in Oregon in 1908 and currently exists in fifteen states, the District of Columbia, Guam, and the Virgin Islands. In addition, evidence reveals that “at least thirty-six states permit the recall of various local politicians” (Canada – Lortie Royal Commission 1991a, 242). However, by not gaining enough signatures, most recall elections fail to remove the incumbent who in essence replaces himself or herself. Thus, although many were “convinced that the existence of the recall would be a sufficient deterrent to unrepresentative behaviour” (Zimmerman 1986, 106), little wonder that recall has been successful only a handful of times (Cronin 127). Further, one should remember that the recall procedure has never extended to the President, members of the Cabinet, senators, and members of the House of Representatives.

Notwithstanding the above arguments, what deserves closest attention is to assess the potential of recall in Canada. Although Canadian populists borrowed the recall from their neighbours to the south, many different specific problems exist which warrant additional scrutiny if one is to whole-heartedly advocate recall as one of several solutions to Canada’s flawed democratic system.
RECALL IN CANADA – HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS

After the end of the First World War, many farmers’ organizations in the Prairie provinces became sympathetic to the populist cause and like their American counterparts, began clamouring for some form of recall procedure for members of Parliament. Essentially, recall became a popular rallying cry in the Canadian West due to a blossoming of anti-old party sentiment (Laycock 241).

In response to the anti-old party sentiment, Progressive candidates began contesting elections at both the federal and provincial levels. With the Progressives winning enough seats in the 1921 federal election (65 seats) to form the official opposition coupled with the United Farmers of Alberta (UFA) forming the provincial government in the same year, much fertile ground existed for recall to finally make its mark in Canadian politics. However, as we shall soon see, this enthusiasm was to be short-lived.

At the federal level, Progressive MPs were requested by their constituency associations to sign undated resignations so that their constituents could recall them by dating and publishing the document (Canada – Lortie Royal Commission 1991a, 243). This request was prohibited thanks to a quick amendment of the Dominion Elections Act which forbade any member to sign an advanced resignation (Canada – Lortie Royal Commission 1991a, 243). At the provincial level, one witnessed an about-face in the policies of the United Farmers of Alberta.

Favouring recall before and during the election campaign, the United Farmers of Alberta “soon tempered their view of this device: they were themselves facing the possibility of recall” (Boyer 1992a, 31). By rejecting the instrument of recall as a way to
improve accountability, it seems that the United Farmers of Alberta became more of an opportunistic party who initially rode the wave of citizen disenchantment only to succumb to one of politics’ greatest attractions and trappings, that of power. Indeed, what this case demonstrated was the old adage that although power may not always corrupt, it does have the tendency to. Therefore, as a result of the changing mood, enthusiasm for recall “faded as a consequence” (Boyer 1992a, 31). It is interesting to note that aside from the United Farmers of Alberta, Canadian history has shown that “populist parties that promised direct democracy have invariably retracted, weakened, or conveniently forgotten their bold promises upon attaining power” (Loenen 1997, 101, McCormick 1991, 274, Canada - Lortie Royal Commission 230-233). Ironically, recall would only make its next resurgence in Alberta in 1935.

In 1935, the Social Credit Party of Alberta defeated the United Farmers of Alberta. Under Premier William Aberhart, the zeal for recall returned as he pledged to introduce it as part of an overall reform package. Holding true to its word, the Aberhart government proposed and the Alberta legislature passed in April 1936 an act “providing for the recall of members of the Legislative Assembly” (Adamson 53). Although procedures for recall were quite formal and strict as evidenced by a high signature requirement (two-thirds of the voters enumerated in a given riding), it seemed that some form of direct democracy was finally taking hold and making inroads in society. Unfortunately, the initial enthusiasm would soon be dashed again.

The short-lived experience with recall in Alberta ended in 1937. Recall was ended as a result of the efforts of the voters in Aberhart’s home riding of Okotoks-High River. Although the signature requirement was almost triple the normal American requirements
(McCormick - Royal Commission 1991, 275), the riding’s constituents were well on their way to meeting the requirement to recall Aberhart himself. The ease with which signatures were amassed was due in large part to the general opposition to Aberhart. This opposition came from big business, old-line parties, powerful oil lobbies, the press and for a time, from his own backbenchers (McCormick 1992, 27). This is supported by the assertion that recall was “related to the Social Credit’s proposed fiscal policies, a perceived disregard for traditional rights and liberties, a backbenchers’ revolt against the premier etc.” (Government of the Northwest Territories 12).

Although noble in its intentions, recall in Alberta proved to be a “political boomerang” (Boyer 1992, 178) for Aberhart. By the fall of 1937, Aberhart’s riding had the “66.66 percent of the voters supporting the recall petition” (Elliot and Miller 273). As the intended victim, Aberhart struck back quickly by repealing the Recall Act “retroactive to the day it had received Royal Assent” (Marquis 8). As a result, all “pending proceedings in connection with the recall of any members were declared null and void” (Adamson 53). In defending his actions, Aberhart charged that the recall petition was circulated by oil companies and other business interests who supposedly used intimidation to gather signatures. However, there is no firm evidence to support Aberhart’s claim (McCormick – Royal Commission 1991, 276). Instead, one can argue that it was Aberhart’s “high-handed treatment of those he purported to represent” (McCormick – Royal Commission 1991, 276) and his “rather brusque approach toward constituency service” (McCormick 1994, 11) that forced the citizens’ hand and subsequent inauspicious end to the recall experiment.
Although the instrument of recall “vanished from Alberta and from Canadian politics” (Adamson 53) after the Aberhart fiasco, some lessons were learned. These lessons were: 1) there are special problems to “using the recall in a parliamentary as opposed to a congressional system, given the vulnerability of individual Cabinet ministers in terms of their dual roles as representative of their constituents as well as members of Parliament or legislative assembly” (Boyer 1982, 22), and 2) any recall provision must be “constitutional rather than legislative in form, or else the threatened government will close the door before the damage can be done” (McCormick 1992, 27). Although the above lessons will be evaluated in the section on the drawbacks of recall, let us turn to the merits of recall and whether it can be an effective tool in ameliorating what one observer called Canada’s “timid democracy” (Boyer 1992, 9).

ASSESSING THE RECALL – ARGUMENTS FOR

In assessing the feasibility of recall for Canada, the principle argument used in favour of its adoption is the increased level of citizen disengagement coupled with the loss of faith in politicians. This citizen disconnection from their governments is supported by the contention that “people feel they have no leverage, that things are out of control. People have become cynical about the political process” (Gibson 1978, 27). Therefore, if recall is implemented, it would be a positive step forward since the line of reasoning would be that our governmental process would become more responsive and sensitive to people’s needs, thus enhancing the citizen’s view of his or her place in the governance of our country.

As evidenced by an 81% vote in the 1991 British Columbia referendum (Varzeliotis and Varzeliotis 15) and 74% support in a 1994 nationwide gapp poll (Seidle
1994, 77), recall's strength lies in its ability to provide continuous accountability. This continuous accountability enables voters not to have to wait four to five years to remove an official who fails to meet "established standards for public office" (Boyer 1992a, 36). This argument based on democratic principles is undeniably a strength since citizens not only become more interested and better informed on public issues but acquire more popular control of government, something sorely missing in the eyes of many today.

By maintaining "direct, explicit, and continuous control over elected officials" (Cronin 133), citizens would benefit greatly from recall and would eliminate the perception that people's only power is to elect leaders at stated intervals. By shedding this image, citizens may "have an additional reason to become better informed of political issues" (Boyer 1992a, 36). This empowerment on the part of citizens is important since they could finally articulate their general will in the way that only famed French political philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau may have envisioned.

In referring to the citizens of England, Rousseau argued that they are free only "when they are electing members of Parliament. Once the election has been completed, they revert to a condition of slavery: they are nothing" (Pitkin 1969, 69, Birch 1971, 34). Although one should not stretch the analogy too far, Canadian citizens would be far from nothing if they had recourse to recall. By having their general will expressed in a clear and unequivocal way, citizens would gain political efficacy. This political efficacy or increased awareness can only serve to improve Canadian representative democracy because for once, the playing field would be leveled as the balance of power shifts from the top-down. Overall, citizens would move towards "involvement and activism and away from frustration, demoralization, and dependency" (Cronin 134).
Other strengths of recall as cited by the literature are: 1) it helps check undue influence by narrow special interests, 2) it encourages the electorate to accept longer terms of office, and 3) it offers a “safety valve mechanism for intense feelings” (McCormick – Royal Commission 1991, 280). Although the issue of narrow special interests will be argued to be a drawback of recall, one can argue that at least in theory, officials are forced to respond to the will of their constituents first before any “mutual backscratching begins to take place” (Cronin 134). Unfortunately, this power to supposedly consider broader long-term interests stems only from recall’s potential rather than its practical implementation. Nonetheless, one must view the above at least as a qualified advantage in lieu of the constant fear of and potential for corruption.

With respect to longer terms in office, an argument can be made that since citizens have the power of recall, officials can be trusted to remain in office longer, gain more experience, and hopefully implement necessary policy and/or program changes. Moreover, somewhat related to the previous idea is a potential savings for taxpayers when it comes to election costs. Although perhaps more of an ancillary benefit, the idea of longer terms and money saved should not be ignored. The last potential merit of the recall is the notion that it offers an opportunity to settle conflicts that “might otherwise have intensified and caused even greater polarization” (Cronin 134). This advantage of increased stability in the long-run is supposed to outweigh the obvious short-term disadvantages of friction and factionalization which might result from a recall election (Cronin 134).

According to Canadian Reform leader Preston Manning, recall should be viewed as a “reflection of the cynicism and mistrust of our institutions and an attempt to do
something to correct it” (Hansard - House of Commons Debates -February 7, 1994, 1019). In his view, recall offers that correction by decreasing voters’ alienation and frustration for the “four years of distant autocracy that in the Canadian system separates brief moments of voter supremacy” (McCormick 1992, 28). The result is increased political effectiveness.

The increased political effectiveness is crucial for Canadian representative democracy because “only at our peril do we expose ourselves and our political system to the corrosive cynicism and boiling anger generated by voter helplessness” (McCormick 1992, 28). This helplessness can be remedied if voters could be trusted to make the correct decisions. Indeed, in the eyes of one scholar,

How sad that our politics should reduce to larger than life leaders and faceless ciphers who simply march in step. How much richer and more effective a democracy where individual members count, where voters are treated more seriously because they can make an immediate difference (McCormick 1992, 29).

Although some may view recall as “more placebo than panacea, more promise than performance” (McCormick 1992, 29), Canadian democracy and politics could be modified in a way that voters would never again feel the “powerlessness that is now the rational conclusion from an assessment of the available alternatives” (McCormick 1992, 29). Certainly, in the eyes of many reformers, recall should be counted on to perform the above tasks. All that remains is for the device to be used.

Advocates of recall conclude that if democracy is viewed as voter power, why not take a chance and adopt recall on a larger scale in an effort to re-invigorate Canadian democracy. Further, if the assumption is that voters cannot be trusted to behave responsibly, the “knife cuts much deeper than the recall” (McCormick 1992, 28). What a strange commentary if take a chance on democracy has somehow become a controversial
or dubious statement. Democracy should be treasured and valued, not taken for granted. It is precisely for these reasons that proponents of recall feel that citizens should be given all the opportunities to manifest greater levels of civic pride. Recall could be the appropriate vehicle for the achievement of that goal. These views are summarized well by one scholar who concluded that “it may well be that the periodic power to overturn governments every few years is the steak and the power occasionally to recall distant or unresponsive individual members is just the sizzle but if we do not offer the voters both, they may simply lose confidence in the restaurant” (McCormick 1992, 29).

Since we would not want Canadians to lose more confidence in their governments, the question which remains is: does recall possess enough positive characteristics to remedy what ails Canadian public life? The answer to this question will hopefully appear once one acknowledges the obvious drawbacks linked to an adoption of recall in Canada. Once these disadvantages are put forth, the reader will realize that while recall possesses undeniable advantages, it is not the democratic cure-all envisioned by many reformers in general and Western Canadians in particular. Instead, scholarly evidence will demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that recall’s ancillary benefits are greatly overshadowed by its negative characteristics.

**ASSESSING THE RECALL – ARGUMENT AGAINST**

Although recall possesses some favourable traits in the pursuit of a more effective democracy, a sound argument can be made that its unfavourable characteristics far outweigh its positive ones which lead to a conclusion that if adopted, recall would largely be a negative phenomenon on the Canadian political scene. Notwithstanding several arguments against the recall device, the overriding threats that recall poses are to the
fabric and practices of representative government and parliamentary democracy. While
the issue will be presented in an upcoming section, suffice to say that unlike its American
counterpart who has the potential to use recall more often in its presidential/congressional
system, Canada’s political system is different. It is these differences in political systems
that should preclude the adoption of a Canadian version of recall.

The Canadian parliamentary system is based on the principle of responsible
government. Simply stated, the government of the day is held responsible for the
effective governance of the country. As long as the government commands a majority in
the House of Commons, it has a “full term to live up to its promises” (Duhamel and Best
45). If government and individual members live up to advanced billing, they stand a good
chance of getting re-elected. However, as we shall see, this is where the potential
problem of recall legislation comes into play.

Based on democratic principles, the very premise of recall is antagonistic to
representative principles and responsible government, especially to the idea of electing
good lawmakers, allowing them a chance to govern until the next election, and then
judging them based on the package of their accomplishments (McCormick – Royal
officials would be unable to fulfill their theoretical roles of delegate, mandate, and
trusteeship. Simply put, elected officials have the unenviable tasks of: 1) representing the
interests and views of the people who sent them there, 2) trying to represent and carry out
the mandate they got from those constituents who sent them there, and 3) acting as a
trustee by representing their own views and their own judgments that they bring to bear
on public issues (Hansard- House of Commons Debates – February 7, 1994, 1019,
Government of the Northwest Territories 12, Manning 1994, 2). Unfortunately, premised on threat, recall is antagonistic to the above republican principles in that it would strip lawmakers of any independence they would otherwise have in a representative form of government.

In Canada as in many other countries, members of Parliament are expected to balance the national interests with the views of their constituents. If a member of Parliament supports a bill that was opposed in his/her home riding, that member could face the possibility of being recalled. Indeed, this possibility is a negative consequence of the recall process since officials would be encouraged to consider more narrow interests instead of risking a period of unpopularity for the sake of longer-term national interests. Although an American source, the above thoughts are buttressed by the assertion that

Recall weakens the fabric and the practice of representative government, encouraging short-term over long-term thinking; officials would act only according to what seemed acceptable to the public at the time ... The recall takes away the probability of independence and courage of official action in the servants of the people (Cronin 136).

This assertion is complemented by a Canadian view that

The introduction of recall legislation would fundamentally alter the nature of parliamentary democracy in Canada. The current system encourages members of Parliament to consider both the immediate interests of their constituents and the longer-term interests of the nation as a whole. The threat of recall would tip that balance of interests in favour of the short-term and the parochial at the expense of the broader interests of the country (Duhamel and Best 46).

Thus, by encouraging a zero risk or overly timid neutrality in elected officials (Cronin 243), one realizes that the implementation of recall would run contrary to the possibility of an enriched democracy where citizens and politicians could work together to both “re-invent democracy and its institutional framework” (Manning 1994, 5).
By handcuffing members of Parliament, the recall device would preclude necessary actions so as to “avoid conflict or controversy” (Boyer 1992, 179). As a result, the threat of recall could easily discourage and restrain energetic, innovative, and qualified individuals from seeking public office. If an official faces the constant threat of being recalled, one can argue that he/she might think twice before taking a side on an issue. Unfortunately, whichever side one takes on an issue is bound to offend the other side. Consequently, if this “other side” in the form of a well-organized and well-financed special interest group wants to take action, a recall petition could be easily circulated. In the above respects, recall “assumes the representative is a delegate, whose duty consists in giving effect to the prevalent opinion of his district, instead of a public servant charged to exercise his own judgment on the evidence brought before him” (Cronin 136).

By removing elected officials for potentially petty or transient reasons, the result is “recall in haste, repent at leisure” (McCormick – Royal Commission 1991, 280). Indeed, Canadians need only look at the United States of the 1980s. As evidenced by the final report of the Lortie Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, the increased use of the recall in the 1980s can be attributed in part to the “rise of special-interest groups that are highly critical of politicians” (Canada - Lortie Royal Commission 1991a, 243).

When special interest groups are combined with the recall device, an argument can be made that they “debase the representation process in a manner indistinguishable from the current partisan political process” (Sollows and Sumathipala 26). Current political realities dictate that MPs and MLAs tow the party line. This is supported by the fact that “as things now stand, the heavy hand of party discipline keeps members from
voting their considered, conscientious views” (Sollows and Sumathipala 26). Whether one agrees with the idea of strict party discipline or not (to be discussed later) should not obscure the fact that it is the political party that acts essentially as the lobby group.

Supporters of recall come to its defence by arguing that its implementation could “release the members from the influence of the party lobby” (Sollows and Sumathipala 26). In spite of this positive potential, critics are quick to point out that the only thing that changes is the lobby itself. More specifically, the freedom gained from the party is more often than not given right back to lobbies within respective constituencies. Consequently, representation does not necessarily improve because the MP in question is forced to consider once again the short-term or parochial interests perhaps at the expense of long-term or broader national interests. All these thoughts are summed up by the claim that “at best, mandatory recall would simply change the hands on the strings of the puppet. At its worst, it would multiply the number of puppeteers mercilessly, to the point that representation was impossible” (Sollows and Sumathipala 26).

Although one would hope to extract the most out of members by cutting the strings that bind them to special interests (party and private), the fact remains that special interests, powerful lobby groups and the specter of money will in all likelihood prevent any concrete manifestation of effective representation. It is this unfortunate possibility which must be remedied if Canada is to move forward on the path to democracy. Clearly, recall possesses pitfalls that must be addressed at best or recognized and subsequently discarded as a tool to ameliorate our structural defects at worst.

Unlike the American congressional system where recall has “found a home and where recall of an individual member has little effect on a particular government”
(Varzeliotis and Varzeliotis 83), the Canadian parliamentary system poses more problems for recall. More specifically, the recall of a few members could defeat a government with a small majority. Although an argument can be made that the same could occur due to "by-elections or influenza epidemics or unusually icy streets" (McCormick 1992, 28), one must realize that recall legislation is not designed to defeat governments, but to remove individual members. However, one would be naïve to think that an opportunistic opposition party would not attempt a vote of non-confidence and subsequent early elections. This is supported by the comment that such misuse of recall would be "particularly tempting to an opposition bent on removing a prime minister or premier" (Loenen 1997, 100).

Taking the above thoughts a step further, one could argue that if recall elections did occur, the governing party would "likely offer specific benefits (more bluntly, bribes) to constituencies holding recall elections to try to maintain support for members of the governing party" (Mintz 44). Although one can claim that the above potentialities would not be in the general public interest, the fact remains that they have been and will always be part of the Canadian political landscape. Clearly, citizens' desire for a rich democracy should not be encouraged at the expense of system stability. There should be ways to achieve both goals.

Advocates of recall maintain that arguments concerning recall and the defeat of a government should be viewed as "unnecessary scaremongering" (Loenen 1997, 100) on the part of its detractors. More specifically, they argue that observers should not worry because of the fact that recall has rarely been used in Canadian history. However, as one opponent of recall correctly notes, recall could be used more frequently if the threshold
was lowered (Loenen 1997, 100). Nonetheless, the potential for recall to "be rigged so as to come into force rarely, say once every eighty years, is a curious way of recommending it" (Loenen 1997, 100).

Another problem associated with recall in the Canadian context stems from the particular vulnerability of the Prime Minister and individual Cabinet ministers. This potential becomes more ominous when one remembers that unlike the American system that separates the executive from the legislature, our parliamentary system fuses the two branches together. When considering the representative basis of Cabinet ministers, the previous fact presents an easy opportunity for recall to be misapplied (Loenen 1997, 99).

In our parliamentary system of government, Cabinet ministers fill two roles. These dual roles consist of being both a local representative hopefully beholden to one's constituents as well as being a national, provincial or territorial official (Government of the Northwest Territories 14). More specifically and as alluded to earlier, Cabinet ministers are required to act as elected agents for their local voters while at the same time, they must honour their appointed commitment to the Crown and serve the "wider national or provincial interest in a disinterested and nonpartisan way" (Loenen 1997, 99). At least in theory, recall was designed to test the representative's first role, but in practice can be "used to pronounce judgment on performance in the second role" (Loenen 1997, 100). With this in mind, one realizes that besides using recall for ideological or partisan reasons, special interest groups could once again come into play by using the recall to fulfill the related goals of testing the representative's second role by simply harassing conscientious office holders. The overall effect of abusing these tactics by using them
frequently could be to “impair the possibility of responsible government” (Loenen 1997, 100).

With their dual roles, Cabinet ministers would be more vulnerable because some may become unhappy with their actions and/or decisions as a minister as well as an individual member of Parliament. In addition, Cabinet ministers would be at a “disadvantage in defending their actions in cases where they may not have personally agreed with a Cabinet decision; the conventions of Cabinet solidarity and confidentiality would preclude members from divulging what took place” (Duhamel and Best 46).

Building on the aforementioned notions of Cabinet solidarity and confidentiality, one acknowledges that in our parliamentary system of government, the Cabinet is responsible to the House of Commons. Further, it is the Cabinet and not individual members of legislative bodies that is responsible for “developing and implementing laws and policies” (Mintz 44). When this fact is coupled with the strict party discipline that we have grown accustomed to, one can argue that recall is not “useful to hold individual representatives accountable for the actions or inactions of the government” (Mintz 44). Moreover, if one acknowledges that Cabinet has a collective responsibility to provide effective leadership, the recall of a Cabinet member “challenges the idea that the cabinet is collectively responsible for the good of the country as a whole” (Mintz 44).

By potentially undermining any semblance of Cabinet solidarity, the recall device becomes counter-productive. Besides, if Cabinet members face the potential of being recalled, it makes sense that they become “even more tempted than under the current system to direct benefits to their own constituency” (Mintz 44). This potential does not
bode well for our democracy especially considering the growing cynicism amongst citizens that government is simply not executing the mandate entrusted to them.

Although citizens want their MPs and MLAs to keep in closer touch with their respective constituencies, some insulation and trust should exist so that officials can concentrate on formulating and enacting public policies. Further, one must accept that Prime Ministers and Cabinet ministers have different and at times special responsibilities which extend beyond their individual constituencies. It is these responsibilities which force them to “consider the national interest when formulating public policies” (Canada - Lortie Royal Commission 1991a, 246). However, by sanctioning the ability of special interest groups to recall for their own specific ends, constituents are the ones who lose power because groups who are not part of the individual constituency could exert an inordinate amount of pressure on the office holders and local constituents (Lortie Royal Commission 1991a, 246). As a result, the “value of recall would be stripped away from constituents” (Canada - Lortie Royal Commission 1991a, 246). One need only recall the previous case of Premier Aberhart as vivid illustration of the above points.

Another problem endemic to Canada and linked to this treatise is the related presence of a multi-party system and a single-member plurality electoral system. While the intention here is not to discredit the two institutional characteristics, the violation of democratic principles cannot be overlooked. Although much more discussion will appear in the sections on electoral systems and democracy, suffice to say that the majority of Canadian governments and individual MPs and MLAs are elected with less than a majority of votes in the country and constituencies respectively. While winning a mere plurality of the vote should not in any way “impair the ability of an MP to be a credible
and effective representative of the constituency” (Canada – Lortie Royal Commission 1991a, 246), the introduction of recall legislation would completely contradict those principles of the electoral process.

With a multi-party system, a candidate can win election with approximately one-third of the vote. Although the only major piece of recent recall legislation was defeated at second reading on November 1st, 1994 (Deborah Grey’s – Reform – Private Member Bill, C-210), opinion would concur that for a recall petition to be successful, members of Parliament would be required to sustain the support of a majority of voters in their respective constituencies. For now, this likelihood is a “requisite far beyond what the MP had to satisfy in a highly competitive election” (Canada – Royal Commission 1991, 246).

Thus, any member who failed to win an outright majority of votes in his/her constituency would be vulnerable to recall by all the others who did not vote for and elect him or her.

Unless a transformation occurs in the party system (fewer parties – unlikely) or electoral system (proportional representation – forthcoming analysis – maybe), the criteria and standards for elections and recalls would remain inconsistent. This apparent inconsistency led the Lortie Royal Commission to conclude that “the presence of both a recall and a single-member plurality system would lead to conflicting democratic principles in the electoral process, principles that could not easily be reconciled” (Canada – Lortie Royal Commission 1991a, 246).

Realizing that Canadians “already have a form of recall – it is called an election” (Duhamel and Best 46), another argument against recall elections is that they can further magnify the divisiveness and increase the polarization between communities in general and individuals in particular. These facts are supported by the comment that recall
“appeals to the emotional instinct voters have to administer swift justice - the mob-rule side of democracy” (“total recall” B5). With bitterly contested national elections already an inescapable fact of Canadian political life, do Canadian citizens want more emotional confrontations that often degenerate into personal attacks, smear campaigns and threats of retaliation? In aspiring for laudable goals of working together and promoting constituency unity, the obvious answer would be no. However, realizing that constituents may not necessarily be the only players in the recall game, one acknowledges both the complexity and eventual problems that could ensue from a recall petition.

Once the recall ball is set in motion, it is difficult to stop it from snowballing and ultimately disrupting the everyday life of a specific constituency. It is these undesired consequences which must be avoided if people are to live in harmony and in turn continue their search for a more perfect democracy. Nonetheless, if people are looking to force their MPs, MLAs, and governments to respond to their needs, recall robs them of any semblance of a united front in their quest to make the aforementioned parties more accountable. Although the premise of threat could force MPs, MLAs, and governments to respond more often, the result does not necessarily guarantee better government. Thus, it is becoming clearer that recall is simply “the wrong remedy for what ails Canadian public life” (Seidle 1994, 77).

The final unintended but undeniable flaw with recall elections is the obvious cost of conducting special elections. Costs would include verification of thousands of addresses and signatures. If the previous petition verification is deemed successful, citizens of the respective constituency would have to organize and fund a by-election (Duhamel and Best 46). Although every constituency differs in population and size, it
would be “reasonable to assume that the direct costs of holding a by-election would be well in excess of $500,000” (Duhamel and Best 46-47). Although the Reform Party would argue that the cost is cheap in comparison to the need for increased democratization, the previous arguments should at least caution those unalloyed advocates who feel recall is the way to go.

In the end, one has to ask the question: “is recall really worth the high price tag”? (Duhamel and Best 47). Indeed, if Canadians are willing to spend large amounts of money on a democratic device that seems to cause more problems than it solves, surely they can be educated to realize that there might be better ways to spend the money in hopes of bringing government down to the lowest level. Few would question the desire to hold government accountable during its term of up to five years. By eschewing all legal channels of protest, Canada’s somewhat struggling democracy risks slipping into a form of benevolent dictatorship. However, recall is not the solution to articulating people’s concerns. It is the purpose in this piece to find those alternative ways since recall does not seem to be the solution.

**OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF RECALL**

In arguing that recall is a reflection of public cynicism and mistrust of our institutions, Preston Manning and the Reform Party suggested certain safeguards to improve upon older versions of recall. In their efforts to modernize and attempt to make recall workable, Reform’s safeguards included: 1) a high signature threshold to force a by-election (50% +1), 2) recall should not be available to electors until eighteen months after a general election, and 3) recall could only be used once in a riding during the term of a Parliament (Hansard – House of Commons Debates 1994, 1018). Although noble in
their intentions, one remembers that Reform MP Deborah Grey’s Private Member Bill (C-210) was defeated. When this defeat is coupled with the negative historical precedent of Alberta’s Social Credit Party, numerous arguments against, and current backlash against the device, little wonder why so many on Parliament Hill are in no hurry to resurrect the ghosts of recall.

Advocates of recall often cite Switzerland as an example of decentralized democracy where recall functions well. Indeed, these supporters including the Reform Party argue that “Canadians would be following other countries that have brought in legislation on recall and which have proved subsequently that it works well” (Duhamel and Best 45). However, one must remember that the Swiss political system and its political culture are very different from Canada’s. According to MP Ted McWhinney, member for Vancouver Quadra who lived in Switzerland for a time, Swiss cantons have evolved “on a human scale and come much closer to the ideal of face-to-face democracy than our system” (Duhamel and Best 45).

Instead of enhancing human scale democracy like in Switzerland, one could argue that all a Canadian version of recall would do is add a “number of particularly bitter petition and election campaigns to the political landscape” (Duhamel and Best 47). Understanding how divisive and costly more elections could be, recall would not help Canadians in the governance of their country. Elite control of the public agenda would continue at the expense of the citizenry. For those who seek more input, this likely result is unacceptable.

Given the present nature of our country and the problems facing Canadian democracy, recall is not the answer and should not be given any priority. Indeed, to date,
recall has proven to be a “fragile seed on the barren ground of a Canadian political culture dedicated to the stolid precepts of peace order and good government” (Boyer 1992a, 37). Although many Western Canadians speak favourably about recall, closer investigation reveals that it should be viewed only as a long-term possibility with too many shortcomings to be implemented any time soon.

One of those major shortcomings of recall centers around its inconsistent position vis-à-vis modern practices of parliamentary government. As alluded to in previous sections, recall poses special problems in a parliamentary form of government. These problems include but are not limited to: loss of Cabinet solidarity, potential loss of a majority government and subsequent defeat, and consideration of narrow interests at the expense of broader national goals. Accepting these problems leads one to the assumption that “given the realities of modern parliamentary government, the recall mechanism is more an opportunity to embarrass a government than an exercise in holding one’s representative accountable” (Mintz 44). In addition, when the above problems are coupled with the lingering presence of well-financed and well-organized interest groups, much support exists in the literature that recall petitions are simply instruments for those well-positioned groups who have “a particular axe to grind” (Mintz 44). Any novice political observer should realize that the above shortcomings cannot be endured long-term so as to bring the entire political process into disrepute. Instead of looking outwardly, we must look within ourselves to find grassroots’ solutions to our problems so as to be a model for other countries to emulate.

As discussed previously, there are those who support renowned Anglo-Irish Parliamentarian and conservative philosopher Edmund Burke when he argued that an MP
is a trustee who should rely on his/her personal judgment. In support of his paternalistic, elitist position and in rejection of delegate and mandate theories of representation, Burke made the often-quoted remark which ironically echoes part of Rousseau’s argument.

More specifically, Burke asserted that

Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion. Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests … but a deliberative assembly of one interest, that of the whole — where nor local purposes, nor local prejudices ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole (quoted in Arblaster 1994, 80).

Unfortunately, the fact remains that if voters are unhappy with their representative who uses his/her own judgment in deciding on the public good, the potential to recall him/her remains “superficially attractive” (Mintz 44).

An argument can be made that today’s political climate leans towards a more accurate reflection of the wishes of constituents and the less deferential attitudes of the electorate (Mintz 44). This contemporary perspective is instructive because it demonstrates the desire for increased public input as well as an attempt to bring policy-making out of the backrooms and into the living rooms of Canadians. If citizens desire an end to the politics of “exclusion, insiders, privilege and influence” (Deverell and Vezina 102-103), evidence has revealed that recall would be of dubious merit. Other methods to diffuse power must be found to satisfy all concerned.

The recall device is referred to sometimes as the “gun behind the door that keeps officials responsive, yet in practice, the gun is heavy, complicated, and requires countless people to aim and fire it. And like a gun, it occasionally backfires” (Cronin 157). Notwithstanding some of recall’s advantages such as attempting to hold officials more accountable, its disadvantages outweigh them and contribute to a conclusion that recall is
a largely negative phenomenon in our search for greater levels of democracy. All one should do is consider the answer to this question: do we want bland politicians who are afraid of taking sides for fear of losing their jobs? If so, recall is the solution. However, one would hope that our politicians are able to see the larger picture and weigh all competing interests of country versus constituency. Recall would eliminate that possibility and as a result, it would transform the way one looks at government and its members.

Although the reader should be cautioned that the Canadian experience was and is markedly different (parliamentary government, political culture, socio-economic cleavages etc), a leading American expert concluded that although innate to the American experience, the recall device has

not significantly improved direct communication between leaders and led and has not ended corruption in politics. Neither has it produced better-qualified officeholders or noticeably enriched the quality of citizenship or democracy in those places permitting it. Whether it has strengthened representative government in any measurable way seems doubtful (Cronin 155).

The above comment is supported by a Canadian view that although in theory, American recall seemed revolutionary in its appearance and potential to grant voters control over elected officials, recall in practice is typically a "damp squib of infrequent use and limited direct impact" (McCormick – Royal Commission 1991, 270). If recall was designed to improve communication between constituents and their MPs or MLAs, its introduction on a larger scale in Canada would arguably be met with cautious skepticism at best or assailed as un-Canadian at worst.

Proponents of recall argue that Canadians have few opportunities to hold their MPs or MLAs accountable (Canada – Lortie Royal Commission 1991a, 245). This is
supported by the somewhat exaggerated view that our system of government is an “elective dictatorship in which governments are only infrequently accountable to the electorate” (Mintz 44). The above contention is “dubious when assessed against Canada’s recent electoral history” (Canada – Lortie Royal Commission 1991a, 245). Since 1945, Canadians have gone to the polls in seventeen general elections. The results have created eleven majority and six minority governments. Only three times have governments been re-elected to two consecutive majorities (Louis St. Laurent - 1949,1953, Brian Mulroney – 1984,1988, Jean Chretien – 1993,1997). Further, during this period since 1945 and without resorting to precise math, the average term of a Parliament has been approximately 3.5 years.

The other related Canadian phenomenon discounting the need for recall is the fact that Canada, in comparison to the United States, has a much higher legislative turnover. At the federal level, one concedes that “from 1974 to 1988 ... on average 24.9 per cent of MPs seeking re-election were defeated. The comparable figure for the United States House of Representative was 6 per cent” (Canada – Lortie Royal Commission 1991a, 245). The 1993 federal election saw 131 members of Parliament defeated and a total of 205 new members elected to the House of Commons (Duhamel and Best 47).

In lieu of the backlash against out-going former Prime Minster Mulroney, one could argue that the 1993 election was an aberration. Notwithstanding this potential aberration in 1993, one acknowledges that the 1997 federal election produced just as resounding a turnover with 40 incumbent members of Parliament defeated and a total of 90 new members elected to the House of Commons (adapted from the The Montreal Gazette - June 4th, 1997, A12 and A13). What one can extract from these statistics is that
when dissatisfied with their MPs and MLAs, Canadians do use their vote to hold them accountable. Thus, once again, more evidence exists to support the claim that recall may not be the necessary democratic tool to democratically empower Canadians.

Although the maximum five-year term for a Parliament is arguably too long, it seems clear that elections have performed their role reasonably well in giving citizens the chance to ‘throw the rascals out’. This is supported by critics’ argument that Canada is better off with the discipline of regular elections, where “punishment, though it may come late, will likely be more just” (“total recall” B5). However, even assuming that one agrees with the previous assertions should in no way eliminate suspicions that all elections will continue to do is offer more ‘rascals’ (Loenen 1997, 103). When this probable outcome is coupled with the inescapable realities of party discipline and Canada’s flawed electoral system, little wonder that skeptics do not feel that recall is the solution to the structural problems of the Canadian political system.

Recall is not the proper solution for Canada because it fails to live up to its promise by treating the symptoms and not the causes (Loenen 1997, 101). More specifically, by focusing on the relationship between constituents and their representatives, recall attempts to independently improve and where necessary, solve the at times strained relationship between the two. However, so long as the structural factors remain in place and unchanged (party discipline, electoral system), accountability and genuine choice as coveted by the electorate will remain elusive goals that will not be easily reconciled by the introduction of recall on a grander scale.

Clearly, political parties and the machinery of government possess too much power for if the role of an election continues to be one of electing a government, the role
of the local candidate remains negligible. Hence, much logic exists in the remark that “since we vote for people without any reason to think they have merit, what point is there in recalling them when they turn out to have no merit” (quoted in Loenen 1997, 102). Unless structural defects are altered, specific aspects of our democracy will not receive the much needed stimulus they require. Moreover, it stands to reason that recall would not even be broached as a democratic reform if the House of Commons and provincial legislatures were actually more deliberative bodies where ideas could be exchanged and competing interests heard. Since one can argue that they are not, little wonder that voices are heard from the hustings demanding a more inclusionary political process. As a result of this feeling, a reincarnated Burke might then posit that “I owe you not just my diligence but decisions which are based both on my opinions and upon your properly and scientifically collected views. You are owed nothing less than a true, transparent and direct democracy” (Flemming 15).

Given more education and information on certain important issues coupled with increased opportunities to participate, citizens can strike back at power and incumbent arrogance. Rather than “prescribing recall as a democratic cure-all” (Duhamel and Best 47), government would be well advised to build opportunities into the political system. By doing so, citizens would not have to wait up to five years between elections to inject some much needed enthusiasm and originality into the Canadian political scene. It is the goal of this piece to eventually propose a more participatory form of representative government where citizen input and participation are at a premium. Given recall’s “somewhat checkered history in Canadian politics” (Dobell and Berry 1992b, 19), other
practical steps must be found which could be implemented as adequate short-term solutions or realistic long-term goals.

If one acknowledges that the Canadian electorate is well-informed, all the more reason not to have a crude democratic tool like recall. One must be wary of not getting “caught up in the craziness of recall of members of Parliament, a seductively simple idea of scant practical utility, except for misleading audiences” (Simpson 1997c, A14).

Moreover, would it not be a tragedy if we made it more difficult for politicians to make unpopular but necessary and correct decisions? (Dosanjh and Hammell 13).

Unfortunately, we continue to battle the view that “recall is nothing but the logical outcome of the proposition … that government must follow the course of popular passion and momentary expression of the people without deliberation and without opportunity for full information” (former American President William H. Taft, as quoted in Cronin 137).

This thought is supported by the overall argument that

Recall seemed so democratic at first blush. But special-interests’ abuse of the process, and recall legislation itself, is turning out to be just another way to frighten good people away from running for public office – potentially leaving politics to the narrow-issue zealots, and even scoundrels (Todd K11).

We must seek to overcome the above negative yet true interpretations of recall and what constitutes representative government for fear that if we do not, we risk sliding further down the ladder of what constitutes a participatory and representative democracy.

As difficult as it may be to reconcile the polar opposites of direct and representative democracy, we must continue to emphasize flexibility and responsiveness over stagnation and the status quo. The time has come to act.

N.B.-- In the process of writing this section, a historic attempt was made in early February 1998 to recall two politicians in British Columbia, including a senior cabinet
minister. Armed with a 1994 law passed by the New Democratic government, MLAs can be recalled if at least 40% of voters in a constituency sign a petition demanding it. Since both recall petitions failed to reach the required number of signatures, both politicians survived the challenge. Nonetheless, many individuals involved in the process agreed that it was a “refreshing exercise in democracy” (Sutherland A9). Nonetheless, evidence revealed that both recall campaigns raised bitter feelings on both sides. Further, opponents of recall argued that both politicians were targeted by “right-wing diehards trying to refight the last election, not for anything they had done wrong” (Sutherland A9). The potential for ‘sore losers’ who were unsuccessful at election time to resort to recall is simply not an appropriate way to utilize a potentially destabilizing device.

Another example of recall being used inappropriately occurred in February 1999 when once again, a coalition of citizens’ groups in British Columbia came together in a “recall blitz targeting all 40 constituencies held by New Democrats” (B.C. bid to recall A17). Although Glen Clark’s NDP government managed to survive three recall attempts, this most recent attempt dubbed “Total Recall” (B.C. bid to recall A17) was the most wide ranging and serious attempt to undoe the 1996 election and unseat the governing NDP. Although the attempt to garner the required number of signatures coupled with raising enough money failed, the coalition of citizens achieved their ultimate goal when in the summer of 1999, Clark was forced to resign amid internal Cabinet pressure brought upon by numerous scandals and conflicts of interest. Consequently, an argument could be made that British Columbians were perhaps not as eager to impose the draconian device of recall on a premier and government that were in all likelihood going to fall in a short period of time anyway.
Similar to previous efforts to recall MLAs, opponents of recall argued that the “Total Recall” campaign was nothing more than a partisan attack from the far right of the political spectrum. This is supported by the assertion that since the Concerned Citizens of British Columbia were unable to accept that the government was elected in a democratic manner, they resorted to a “shotgun approach, believing if they fire off a multitude of guns a sufficient number in the government will be wounded so as to require an election” (Ursuliak A13). Regardless of motive and notwithstanding the resignation of Clark, this recall effort will do nothing more than further destabilize an already fragile government. With three resignations in the last ten years fresh on the minds of many citizens (Bill Vander Zalm-Social Credit, Mike Harcourt-NDP, and Clark), resorting to recall too often is for now an extreme and perhaps unnecessary method of compelling MPs to comply with the demands of constituents. Politicians in British Columbia seem to be having a hard enough time governing without the specter of recall looming over their heads. The court of public opinion coupled with potentially disastrous consequences at election time seem to be holding politicians in check.
CHAPTER THREE

PARTY DISCIPLINE AND FREE VOTES

Building on the preceding analysis of the merits and drawbacks of recall, the related topics of party discipline, votes of confidence, and free votes deserve closer attention as alternative areas where improvements can be made in an effort to offer Canadians a richer and more fulfilling democracy. In lieu of the arguments that recall fails to offer Canadians perceptible advantages, it bears discovering whether relaxing our strict conventions of party discipline would make a difference. This difference would consist of introducing more free votes and offering a clearer understanding of what constitutes a major vote of confidence in the House of Commons or in any respective legislature. In addition, a better understanding would have to be sought with regards to which occasions the government would have to “recognize defeat as the loss of the confidence of the assembly” (Mensch 8).

As discussed in the previous chapter on recall, the recall device succeeds in loosening the relationship between party and representative. However, this loosening of the bond is off-set by the strengthening of ties between MP and his/her constituents. While on the surface, this possibility sounds like a positive step forward, closer examination has revealed that the individual MP can be put at the mercy of his/her constituents with no proper recourse. By reinforcing the delegate theory of representation, the other two main theories, those of fulfilling one’s mandate as well as sometimes acting as a trustee by using one’s best judgment, fall by the way side.

By relaxing party discipline and introducing more free votes in the House of Commons and respective provincial legislatures, the above theories of representation can
be effectively grouped under one umbrella. More specifically, MPs would have a greater chance of representing their constituents’ views while at the same time carrying out their mandate. As well, they could even on occasion be able to act independently on more spontaneous issues. By having the freedom to act as an elected representative while at the same time possessing the freedom to follow the wishes of those in one’s home riding, it would appear that all sides could benefit.

It will be shown that unlike recall, relaxing party discipline and introducing more free votes can offer Canadians concrete results where other institutional reforms simply could not. However, at present, relaxing party discipline and introducing more free votes does not seem to be within the purview of or within reasonable limits for all levels of government. Instead, the force of inertia in the form of adhering to historical and inherited British practices stands as a solid obstacle to implementing any sort of reform.

**HISTORICAL ORIGIN OF PARTY DISCIPLINE**

Similar to other features borrowed from our British ancestors, party discipline has its roots in the notion of responsible government. The majority of scholarly attention devoted to party discipline shares the view that party discipline can be defined as a “mechanism political parties use to keep their members functioning as a cohesive group rather than as a collection of disparate individuals” (Flavelle and Kaye 6). During Canada’s early years, MPs in the House of Commons were more independent minded with the main goal of being on the winning side of an issue so that they could “secure as many benefits as they could for their constituents” (Flavelle and Kaye 6). This independence on the part of the majority of MPs prompted then Prime Minister John A. Macdonald to refer to them as “loose fish” (Flavelle and Kaye 6).
Unfortunately for Macdonald, the independence of his MPs came at a costly price. Since Macdonald could not rely on support through party discipline, he was forced to rely on patronage as evidenced by the comment that "Macdonald had to buy caucus loyalty with government largesse" (Loenen 1997, 77). Patronage in the form of financial compensation "greased the wheels of Parliament" (Loenen 1997, 77) but had the detrimental effect of bringing Macdonald’s grand transcontinental railroad vision to the "brink of bankruptcy" (Loenen 1997, 77).

A vision as great as that of the Canadian Pacific Railroad would not encounter any impediments in today’s political environment since it is apparent that party discipline has "replaced patronage, and emasculated Parliament" (Loenen 1997, 77). Certainly, a Parliament that fosters an environment where its elected members are in former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s words "nobody" or in the words of former Progressive Conservative leader George Drew "trained seals" is not an environment conducive to democratic procedure. More specifically, by being "contemptuous of democracy" (Loenen 1997, 77), party discipline hinders democratic thought and eliminates any reasonable chance for compromise and cooperation.

As Canada developed as a country, so too did their political institutions. More specifically, evidence reveals that the development of party discipline in Canada coincided with the expansion of the electorate and changes in electoral practices. These political realities of the time are supported by the assertion that

Until 1878, the open ballot meant that voters had to publicly declare their support of a candidate; elections were non-simultaneous and the government could schedule difficult constituency elections to take place after those in "safe" constituencies, so as to make use of bandwagon effects, and the government could gerrymander constituency boundaries to minimize opposition voting strength. Changes in these electoral practices encouraged the development of a disciplined
party system. In order to fulfil election promises to newly enfranchised groups, parties needed individuals who would act in concert with their party colleagues (quoted in Mensch 3).

These changes which witnessed the emergence of party discipline have remained constant and act as a central tenet of what we understand to be part of our version of responsible government.

**ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF PARTY DISCIPLINE**

When arguing for the maintenance of party discipline, political elites and historical purists point to several advantages. One of the main advantages cited by advocates is the potential for party discipline to cast a unified look for the party in question. More specifically, the electorate would be presented with a cohesive party bloc with "clear alternatives delineated by party platform" (Mensch 12). In other words, The demand for internal party discipline, requiring that Members of Parliament follow the party line on all major issues brought to a vote, reinforces the consistency of each party's position with respect to issues ... The voter has for his guidance in formulating opinions the example of the party which he supports (quoted in Kaye 1984, 4).

With clear policy alternatives, voters would be able to more easily pass judgment on the positions of parties and cast their votes accordingly. This point is supported by the argument that to permit Members to vote anyway they please when they choose is only an attempt to escape the onus of responsibility our system places on them. Under our system of responsible government, the public at an election has great power to make decisions. If the electorate does not like the government, it knows how to vote effectively; if it does not like a policy, it knows how to vote effectively; if it does not like a leader, it knows how to vote effectively, and if it does not like the local Member, it knows how to vote effectively (Reid 4).

The above ability to vote effectively is supposed to result from our inherited traditions of party discipline.
Assuming a legislative majority, another advantage of maintaining party
discipline is the guarantee that the party in power will be able to pass whatever bill or
program it wants thus ensuring system stability. By postponing or removing the supposed
dreaded possibility of frequent elections (an average of one every 3.5 years), the
collective benefit of the party would be promoted at the expense of individual
achievement. This argument is developed by the logic that if the entire whole benefits,
the sum of its parts will all eventually bear the fruits of the success.

Advocates of party discipline point to the importance of voting predictability as
an argument for passing legislative programs intact and avoiding the “very unnerving
experience of not knowing the fate of their bills” (Kaye 1984, 2). This predictability is
deemed to be crucial under a minority government for

With a minority government, once one of the opposition parties has indicated its
support for the bill, the minister can relax. He might be forced to yield on certain
amendments that the government would rather resist, but the bill itself remains
quite certain of passage. In contrast, during a free vote, the situation is constantly
in flux; the minister can never really relax ... voting decisions become, at least in
part, individual decisions instead of party decisions (quoted in Kaye 1984, 2).

It is this “team sport” (Reid 2) mentality which has sustained the Canadian parliamentary
system for decades and will in all likelihood continue to do so unless marked changes are
implemented.

With party whips ensuring compliance coupled with the “psychological reaction to
letting down the team” (Reid 3), disciplined political parties “mean that every vote is a
foregone conclusion” (McCormick 1991, 289). This foregone conclusion is strengthened
by the fact that if an MP or MLA faces threats of not being given coveted committee
and/or cabinet portfolios, loss of seniority or even expulsion from one’s party, the
individual member stands to lose a great deal by exhibiting vociferous opposition to
his/her party. This thought is reinforced by the comment that “you cannot vote in response to your own drummer and expect the members of your caucus, who must pick up the extra burden you have placed on them, to look on kindly and applaud your action” (Reid 3). It is this very real possibility of alienation which usually precludes individual members from adopting cavalier or maverick attitudes towards the “smooth functioning of the modern administrative state” (Flavelle and Kaye 7).

Although notable exceptions to party discipline exist (John Nunziata opposing the Liberal budget along with Alex Kindy and David Kilgour voting against the GST in 1990), toeing the party line remains the norm. In both of the above cases, all three men were expelled from their parties. Hence, by toeing the party line, advocates of party discipline argue that policy predictability allows the government to “get on with the business of governing” (Flavelle and Kaye 7) by remaining focused on goals common to all. By getting on with the business of governing, governing elites would attempt to show citizens that they are sticking to their party principles and platforms (mandate theory of representation). By doing so, parliamentary government in general and the party system in particular could gain more legitimacy in the eyes of the electorate.

A final argument in favour of party discipline is the threat that if it was relaxed significantly, the public policy process could be hijacked by special interest groups or powerful lobbies. Although one cannot help but acknowledge the role of special interest groups and powerful lobbies, the risk remains that facilitating their operation could generate a political climate more similar in nature to our neighbour to the south. By allowing lobby groups an easier avenue of access to the political establishment,
proponents of party discipline maintain that Canada risks a “move in the direction of a congressional system” (Flavelle and Kaye 7).

Few political observers would disagree with the contentions that not only are special interest and lobby groups in the United States influential but indeed, they are more influential than their Canadian counterparts. With more freedom to consider policy issues, members of Congress are both free to make deals amongst themselves as well as contemplate offers from different groups. At present, these possibilities do not exist in Canada because of the party solidarity factor.

A related argument to the previous thought centers around organizational concerns. More specifically, an argument could be made that if party discipline was relaxed, considerable time and effort would have to be spent to identify the positions of individual members. This argument is supported by the observation that

Proponents of the relaxation of party discipline have generally acknowledged the reluctance of governments (and opposition parties as potential governments) to relinquish their hold on backbench votes. They have completely ignored, however, the organizational implications of their suggestions ... If the extra organizational effort can be avoided simply by continuing to rely on party discipline, then this only provides one more reason for not accepting proposals to relax discipline (Pothier 94).

Consequently, according to supporters of our parliamentary democracy, the above facts are part of the reasons why our system of government is able to function. Further, by enforcing party discipline, advocates argue that clear lines of accountability remain as MPs and MLAs remain answerable to the electorate and are not hostages of potentially narrow and parochial interest and lobby groups.

Party discipline can vest power in the electorate to check any undue influences on MPs or MLAs. By maintaining some sort of power, the argument would proceed that at
least in theory, the electorate would be able to impart its desires for its elected representatives to reconcile and represent different conflicting demands (Manning 1992 321). By doing so, the country as a whole would hopefully continue adhering to its unique Anglo history and traditions. By diverging from these roots and significantly relaxing party discipline in conjunction with other reforms, supporters of the system would undoubtedly begin to recall the words of the late Canadian political philosopher George Grant who cautioned against a drift towards American beliefs and values. It is this fear of Americanization which would, at least in this case, arrest any temptation to gravitate towards American ways of governance.

**ARGUMENTS AGAINST PARTY DISCIPLINE AND FOR MORE FREE VOTES**

As compelling as some of the arguments might be for the maintenance of party discipline, one cannot overlook the other side of the argument. Acknowledging the amount of voter cynicism and alienation that already exists, loosening the corrosive effects of party discipline could mitigate that cynicism by demonstrating to voters that legislative bodies would no longer simply rubber stamp decisions made by Cabinet. Unfortunately, as things currently stand,

The imposition of party discipline in the House of Commons has eroded the value of the institution. It has turned intelligent, vigorous, creative members into eunuchs. It has depreciated the value of the standing committees. It has permitted cabinet to arrogate all meaningful policy development. Worse, it has permitted the Prime Minister’s Office to emasculate even cabinet (Johnston 1986, 263).

If the political establishment does not want all its political structures to fall further into ignominy, it must realize that loosening party discipline in the form of a relaxed confidence convention coupled with more free votes is the way to go.
By being able to consider both sides of an issue, individual MPs and MLAs would have a greater chance of fulfilling the complementary roles of delegate, mandate, and trustee. For once, those same individual MPs and MLAs would have the opportunity to represent the interests of his/her constituents or vote one’s conscience instead of being “useless cogs in a party machine trampled by party discipline” (Bragg A19). Clearly, the ability to act more independently would allow MPs and MLAs at least the opportunity to avoid unnecessary conflicts with those they purport to represent. By reinforcing party discipline, MPs and MLAs change from “community activists into compliant followers when they take their seats in Parliament” (Szirt A8). Likewise, in the case of federal MPs, the public will increasingly view them as MPs from Ottawa instead of MPs to Ottawa.

It stands to reason that if government stipulated that not every vote be considered one of confidence, more effective public policy could be initiated. By increasing the status of backbenchers, a loosening of party discipline in the form of either tolerating backbench dissent in general or specifically allowing more free votes could foster a climate which would witness occasional bipartisan support for bills that were in the best interests of the country. This potential is supported by the assertion that “coalitions composed of members from all parties could exist for the purposes of working together on matters of common regional or other concerns” (Kilgour and Kirsner 11).

By espousing a more cooperative and spirited form of government where all members could play a “more direct role in the business of governing” (Mensch 10), confrontational politics could be decreased which would have an undeniable positive effect on a public clamouring for change. As a result, government could be viewed by its citizens as an inclusive one which while not abandoning its responsibility to govern,
remained open and willing to reform itself when and where necessary. Unfortunately, in
practice, any loosening of party discipline especially in the form of a free vote has
occurred only on issues of morality such as abortion, capital punishment, and the flag
debate etc. These issues are "alleged to be above partisan politics" (Kaye 1984, 4).

By loosening party discipline in the form of allowing members to debate the
merits and drawbacks of certain issues without the specter of party retaliation to worry
about, Parliament could witness an increase in its perceived legitimacy. By being able to
consider different viewpoints more freely, Parliament would "experience enhanced
credibility, and it would be perceived as a more effective instrument of accountability to
the electorate" (Flavelle and Kaye 8). If the above is not attempted, the political process
risks the further reinforcement of the fact that

Our parliamentary system has become so distorted by party discipline, so
narrowly focused on achieving and retaining power that all other interests are
swept aside in favour of party interests as perceived by the PMO. In the end, the
interests of small groups, such as aboriginals, large and often powerful minorities
such as francophones, and even majority interests as those of women, go
unanswered, as do those of outer provinces, when they do not agree exactly with
governing party interests (Brown 15).

Scholarly evidence and simple political observation should make one realize that indeed
party interests have become "so paramount and discipline so great, that no new light can
get in" (Brown 15). Do we as Canadians want a democracy where "party interest holds
hostage all other interests"? (Brown 15). One would hope that a majority of Canadians
would say no as a springboard to initiate a move to bring government down to the lowest
level. No recent case illustrates the above problem better than the controversy stemming
from the 1998 Hepatitis C compensation package.
In the spring of 1998, the federal government agreed to offer $1.1 billion to 20,000 Canadians who were infected with Hepatitis C between 1986 and 1990. The Reform Party tabled a motion that called on the Liberals to compensate all Canadians who contracted Hepatitis C through tainted blood. Unfortunately, Chretien decided to turn the issue into a matter of confidence in his government. Many backbench Liberals protested on the grounds that the compensation package left out 25,000 to 60,000 other Canadians. Undeterred, the federal government moved forward and like the trained seals they have become, all Liberal members voted for the package.

Clearly, the above case illustrates the growing impotence of MPs as their influence on shaping public policy has become virtually non-existent. Facing the likelihood of being blacklisted like in the case of Nunziata, many Liberal backbenchers were forced to vote against their consciences and in some cases the will of their constituents. It should not take much to realize that this case was an example of a “Soviet-style, Havana-style democracy” (Toulin 10) where the leader wields immense power and his troops face the equivalent of the political death penalty if they fail to comply.

In the case of Canada, the political death penalty could be but is not limited to: alienation within the party, relegation to the backbenches forever with no hope of achieving Cabinet status, refusal of the Prime Minister to sign one’s nomination papers or outright expulsion from the party. Do these measures suit a democratic country such as Canada’s? Since the answer should be an obvious one, this case makes a persuasive argument for a relaxation of party discipline in the form of fewer votes of non-confidence on non-budgetary matters. Further, governments at both levels should introduce more
free votes so that MPs and MLAs can have more of an impact on the formulation and eventual implementation of legislation. These reforms would undoubtedly increase the waning prestige of Parliament as a house of democratic deliberation rather than reinforce the growing feeling amongst Canadians that their MPs and MLAs are nothing more than like-minded Orwellian robots cast in the role of subservient subjects to the all-mighty 'Big Brother'. In the case of Canada, those 'Big Brothers' are the federal and provincial governments.

OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF PARTY DISCIPLINE AND FREE VOTES

Changes in our form of representative government (both federally and provincially) must be initiated lest we remain a nation dominated by political parties and by a party discipline believed by many to be the "tightest in the democratic world" (Kilgour and Kirsner 10). We cannot sit idly by resigned to the fact that party discipline should be forced upon elected MPs and MLAs with no appropriate recourse. Those same elected members and especially government backbenchers should work in concert with their party leaders, cabinets, and constituents to find an alternative way to formulate public policy.

Socialized behaviour and perpetuating a party should not be allowed to exist unfettered and without a response. The response should be to level the playing field by loosening the reigns of the party and allowing a certain kind of creativity in the form of free votes on a variety of issues. Although this creativity could be somewhat circumscribed or muted by the political establishment, Canadians must nonetheless exert pressure for a more participatory form of representative government whereby their input matters and their influence on their local MP or MLA counts.
Although one should not steadfastly stick to the apparent illusion that change will occur, one hopes that the above roadblocks can be overcome if we seek a more synergetic and participatory democracy. While many would see a relaxation of party discipline and the introduction of more free votes as a obvious departure from established political conventions and practices, perhaps it is time to shed the thick skin we seem to have when it comes to modernizing our administration and machinery of government. The push for some type of political change should supercede outdated political institutions and outmoded methods of practicing daily government. Taking the previous thought a step further, one should be sensitized to the fact that “rigid party discipline is hardly compatible with the philosophy of a democratic political party, and reasonable latitude consistent with loyalty to the party should be permitted the individual member of any party” (Mallory 1991, 195).

As the situation currently stands, it is difficult to argue with the contention that “private members are weaker in Canada than in most other parliamentary systems. In large part this weakness is due to the short-term, transient and amateur characteristics of MPs and their political careers” (Franks 1997, 36). However, few observers would disagree with any attempt to strengthen the positions of both federal and provincial backbenchers. Loosening party discipline and introducing more free votes at best or even tolerating more dissent within Parliament and legislative assemblies at worst would undoubtedly empower MPs and MLAs. The effects of these potentialities would be positive for it would “enable the House to become more vital and significant in influencing policy than it has been in a long time and a more accurate reflection of
Canadian public opinion” (Mallory 1991, 195). Surely, reformers would not want to
overlook these advantageous possibilities of enhancing democracy.

With the above thoughts in mind, critics should not fall into the short-sighted trap
of accusing reformers of wanting to undermine the “whole concept of Cabinet
responsibility and responsible government” (Manning 1994, 3). Loosening party
discipline and introducing more free votes would not eliminate the realities of political
life, namely the government’s responsibility to govern, the identity and raison d’etre of
political parties, and established doctrines of parliamentary government. Nonetheless, if
the above reforms were introduced together with a new flexible understanding of the
confidence convention whereby not every vote would be construed as a vote of
confidence in the government (i.e. Trudeau 1972-1974), much democratic insight could
be gained.

A new flexible understanding of the confidence convention could be taken a step
further in that where a vote of non-confidence does indeed occur, that vote would be
deemed a constructive one whereby a replacement government would be prepared to step
in immediately and form the government. By adopting this type of approach, one could
argue that parties would not necessarily rush to precipitate a vote of non-confidence and
subsequent election. Indeed, by doing so, parties risk angering the electorate. This is
supported by the argument that “few politicians relish elections, and nor does public
opinion. A party that precipitates an early election without a clear, strong reason of public
policy is unlikely to be treated well by the electorate” (Kent 1989a, 44).

The only caveat to be inserted at this juncture pertains to the question of which
bills and votes would be considered major and which ones would be considered minor
and not significant to the continued survival of the government. Perhaps confidence votes related to a government's survival could be limited to for instance the annual budget.

This task of determining the importance of different bills is crucial to the future of party discipline and free votes for in the words of former Progressive Conservative leader Robert Stanfield,

... if we could reach the point where we only had a party line vote when the government indicated it was a vote of confidence, this would increase the dignity of the backbenches both on the government side and in the opposition – there would be free votes in the opposition too. A member would then feel less like a number, less like a cipher. It would be good therefore for both government and opposition backbenches and it would be good too for the perception of members of Parliament by the public. It would make them look bigger, more independent, more important, more self-reliant (quoted in Kaye 1984, 5).

Although Stanfield's quote sounds good in theory, political reality dictates otherwise.

Building on Stanfield's thoughts, one is reminded that the issue of determining which bills and votes be construed as central to government policy depends on the "largesse of government" (Lemco and Regenstreif 33). Unfortunately, the fact remains that all federal or provincial parties would have to adopt a policy of relaxed discipline simultaneously. The importance of this is reflected in the comment that "the timing of the relaxation of party discipline would ... be imperative; all parties in the House would have to relax their reins at the same time or the change could be particularly chaotic" (Mensch 13). The potential for chaos is understood quite clearly from the idea that what is to stop one of the parties from "scoring political points by adhering to the present tradition of rigid discipline and voting en bloc, no matter the merits of the legislation under debate?" (Lemco and Regenstreif 33). For a looser form of party discipline in the form of a modified confidence convention to take hold, self-serving ideas must be relegated to the
backburner lest we return to the "tyranny of the status quo" (Brown 16) in the form of confrontational politics that we have grown accustomed to.

Realizing the optimistic arguments with regards to party discipline should not preclude one from realizing that it would be naïve to think that loosening party discipline and introducing more free votes would be sufficient conditions to achieve a more empowered and participatory form of democracy. In spite of that, the linkage of looser party discipline, free votes, and the necessary amendments in the confidence convention in conjunction with other potential reforms, offers Canadians the chance of forging a lasting partnership with its political elite.

Taking the previous thought a step further, an argument could be made that an elected Senate would be "a long term counter force to the myopia of unchallenged party discipline" (Brown 16). However, in lieu of the fact that Senate reform does not appear anywhere on the political horizon, one would be myopic in his/her own right to think that party discipline should be loosened without any commensurate changes in the form of fundamental structural reforms. Therefore, if significant efforts to at least modify the current system are not made, Canada risks taking another step back on the road to an enriched and vibrant democracy. This thought is supported by the contention that

Rigid discipline is a significant barrier to the expression of the wide variety of interests and opinions which is at the foundation of a dynamic parliamentary system. Most importantly, it can serve to stifle effective representation of important regions. As a result, voters may turn to provincial governments or third parties to serve their interests (Flavelle and Kaye 9).

Although the previous comment is somewhat dated (1986), an updated version of it would reveal that indeed certain regions feel stifled in the form of inadequate representation of their needs. Consequently, Canada witnessed the emergence of a multi-
party system in the form of five political parties who are winning seats in the House of Commons.

While one could argue that our federal five-party system may have redressed some regional concerns (Bloc Quebecois in Quebec, Reform in the West), an argument can likewise be made that Canadians remain nonetheless dissatisfied with the status quo of politics as usual. Besides the aforementioned multi-party system at the federal level, all one has to do is look at the provincial level where only one Liberal government is in power out of a possible ten (Newfoundland). Although several province-specific reasons exist, one would be foolish to think that disenchantment with an Ontario based Liberal majority has nothing to do with it. Citizens want their grievances heard and if parties at the federal level cannot redress those grievances, provincial parties offer another outlet. Clearly, it seems that this is the route many Canadians have chosen to take.

After weighing both sides of the argument and given the nature of the country, an argument can be made that loosening party discipline in the form of a relaxed confidence convention and increased free votes have much to offer Canadians. Idealists would love to advance the thought that “Canadian democracy itself would benefit if we put our present mind-numbing party discipline where it belongs – in the history books” (Kilgour and Kirsner 11). Unfortunately, the fact remains that the troublesome existence of insular special interest groups coupled with a razor thin Liberal majority of approximately six seats does not bode well for reformers who covet change. Further, one cannot ignore the time honoured tradition of opposition parties preaching reforms yet upon assuming power, somehow forgetting their past positions. Clearly, opposition parties realize that they are for all intents and purposes a government in waiting which will one day have to
govern (Mallory 1991, 200). Consequently, opposition parties will in all likelihood be just as hesitant to reform what some reformers view as a procedural defect in the governing system.

Even though party discipline in the form of a relaxed confidence convention and more free votes should be viewed as priorities that could be accomplished in the short-term, reality dictates that centralization of decision-making power will in all likelihood prevent any concrete manifestation of an American congressional type system. Taking the previous thought a step further should make one realize that ingrained parliamentary traditions coupled with a reluctance to change the rules of the game are hurdles that will in all likelihood remain difficult to overcome. In summarizing the above positions, one is drawn to the following argument which succinctly conveys the problem Canada faces with regards to party discipline and the lack of free votes. More specifically, one realizes that

Cohesive party politics and party discipline in voting have helped shield national legislation, in terms relative to a congress, from the divisive influence of special interests; but they have also, to an extent, stifled flexibility in policy-making, rendering democracy, its critics charge with some justification, a once-every -four-to-five-years thing. Parliament’s inflexibility arguably has also engendered regional favouritism and, ironically, empowered select special interests (Hare 71).

As a result, Canadian democracy at least with regards to the maintenance of party discipline and the introduction of free votes appears to be in a catch-22 situation. However, instead of living either with the status quo or an American styled congressional alternative, a middle ground must be sought which would encompass the best of both worlds. It is up to citizens and legislators alike to find that middle ground in the best interests of both the country and its democratic renewal.
Our job as Canadians is to sensitize our governments to our needs in an effort to overhaul an archaic system of governance and replace it with a more participatory form of representative government where citizens are the main cogs in the political engine, not the governing elites. Unfortunately, as a concluding thought, one is reminded that at least concerning the subject of party discipline, Canadians are a complex lot. This thought is supported by the observation that

They [Canadians] say they want politicians to listen to the people who elected them and they applaud the courage of MPs who defy their leaders. But in the next breath, they call for leadership and demand that parties deliver on their promises once elected, all of which implies a modicum of party discipline. Moreover, voters scorn parties whose leaders are unable to rally their own troops around a cohesive vision (Bryden A1).

Since some form of party discipline is rooted in our system of government, one is reminded that as good as all the preceding ideas sound, the fickle nature of the average Canadian will in all likelihood make reformers wary of any sort of overhaul of the system. In addition, the innate conservatism of politicians in power should make reformers realize that massive changes in the processes of representation and decision-making in the parliamentary system will in all likelihood not occur. This resistance on the part of elites in power, with reference to a loosening of party discipline and the introduction of more votes, demonstrates unequivocally that Canada has been “the most static and slow to reform of the major Westminster-style democracies” (Franks 1997, 36). Unfortunately, further evidence will reveal that Canada has been slow to reform in many other political and representational areas.

Unless Canadians involve themselves more in overcoming the institutional inertia of party discipline and limited free votes, representational paralysis will continue unabated. If the dictum that absolute power has the potential of corrupting absolutely
remains valid, we as quasi-concerned citizens have much reflection to do lest we remain
an immature democracy that allows its MPs and MLAs to rule with limited to no
opposition. While not intending to sound fatalistic about the future of Canadian
democracy, it remains nonetheless imperative for all concerned to demonstrate both
interest in and zeal for making a substantive difference in how our representative
democracy functions.
CHAPTER FOUR

REFERENDUMS

The full and complete definition of a citizen is confined to those who participate in the governing power.

-- Aristotle, 4th Century B.C.

They are serial ideas which are represented through my vote but they are not my ideas. The institutions have ... split me apart ... who am I in the end? ... Who is voting? I do not recognize myself any more.

-- Jean-Paul Sartre, 1977

If one is to translate Jean-Paul Sartre's views onto today's Canadian society of increasing public cynicism and distrust towards government, much stock exists in trying to achieve Aristotle's hopes for an empowered citizen. For many in the academic community who are concerned about Canadian democracy, this Aristotalean empowerment could exist in the form of referendums. As another institutional device, this populist instrument remains vivid in the minds of most, especially considering the recent failure of the 1992 referendum on the Charlottetown Accord. Nonetheless, unlike recall, referendums have had a more favourable history in this country, especially at the municipal and provincial levels (i.e. prohibition, daylight savings time). However, for the purposes of this analysis, referendums will be evaluated only at the federal level in an effort to offer all Canadians a vehicle or outlet for their perspectives on issues.

Like the sections on recall, the upcoming sections on referendums will follow similar patterns. After examining the historical and Canadian origins of referendums, the investigation will attempt to provide a balanced picture of the advantages and disadvantages of resorting to referendums. As an overriding theme, the argument will be made that in spite of its several ancillary advantages, referendums will be shown to be at
best, a qualified failure in the quest for a more participatory form of representative
government. Although advocated by many pro-direct democracy theorists, widespread
use of referendums should be viewed as generally unsuitable for the resolution of both
constitutional and/or sundry issues.

While many reasons will be presented in the case against widespread use of
referendums, the strongest argument probably lies in the traditional acceptance of
representative government in general and Canadian parliamentary supremacy in
particular. Unless fundamental value changes occur in how Canadians view their
respective governments, resorting to American styles of governance and Rosseeuian
popular sovereignty will be exceedingly difficult. What the reader should try to extract is
that like recall, referendums, if used at all, should be kept to an absolute minimum. In
moderation, referendums can provide advantages. However, as will be demonstrated,
these advantages tend to be overshadowed by drawbacks which on the whole contribute
to referendums being potentially negative phenomenons on the Canadian political
landscape.

**REFERENDUMS – DEFINITIONS AND HISTORICAL ROOTS**

Before attacking the issue of the history of referendums in Canada, let us briefly
examine the definitions and foundations of this seemingly popular populist instrument.

Although discussion will center exclusively around the concept of referendums, a
distinction exists in the literature between referendums and plebiscites. While some in the
literature use the two terms interchangeably, plebiscites are taken to constitute “an
expression of opinion by the people on a general course of action proposed by the
government. The vote is not legally binding although there may be a political and moral
obligation to respect the result” (Boyer 1982, 12). Unlike plebiscites, referendums are interpreted as binding verdicts of the people that “must be reflected in a law or action by the government” (Boyer 1992a, 24). More specifically and in contrast to a system of representative democracy, referendums constitute methods of “referring a question or set of questions to the people directly as opposed to allowing them to be settled by the people’s representatives in the legislature” (quoted in Marquis 10). Notwithstanding the different interpretations, the term referendum is the one employed by the majority of the literature as well as in practical application. Consequently, it is the term which will be referred to throughout this chapter.

Briefly, the word plebiscite originated in Roman Law around the Fourth Century B.C. and described a situation where the Plebians or common people would vote on actions or decisions made by the leader or Plebian magistrate (Theoret 1978, 2). Conversely, the term referendum has its origins as early as the Thirteenth Century in Switzerland where elected representatives would make decisions that would subsequently be referred to the people for final ratification (Theoret 1978, 2). This origin of referendums is supported by the view that

In a strict sense, a referendum would be a vote whereby the people approve a decision by their representatives and give it force of law, elected assemblies ruling only ‘ad referendum`. A referendum would then enable the people to be associated with the drafting and application of laws. This is the type of referendum found in Switzerland (Cote 1992, 4).

Although use of referendums in Switzerland grew in frequency and importance in the middle of the 19th Century, what became more important was the export of the referendum experience to the United States and eventually Canada. Indeed, Switzerland provided the model on which American and other countries including Canada based their
cases at the end of the 19th Century and beginning of the 20th Century (Dunsmuir 28).

Although slightly outside the scope of this analysis, suffice to say that more referendums are held in Switzerland and American states than in all other jurisdictions combined (Canada – Lortie Royal Commission 1991a, 237).

Combining elements of Rousseau’s philosophy of the general will and theme of popular sovereignty, little wonder that support grew in Switzerland and the United States for “direct rule by face-to-face assemblies of all the citizens” (Butler and Ranney 1978, 26). Indeed, for proponents of direct democracy, referendums were the best and most effective ways to achieve the above goals. This feeling is buttressed by C.D. Sharp who purported in a 1911 Fabian Society tract that

Historically the Referendum is the offspring by unbroken descent of the primitive mass meeting of self-governing citizens. Both in Switzerland and the United States, the only countries where it flourishes today, the whole body of citizens were from the earliest times (in the Swiss cantons from the thirteenth century, and in the American colonies from their foundation) accustomed to exercise all the functions of government for themselves in open assembly. This direct control over the affairs of State was never entirely surrendered, and when the assemblies of all the citizens became impracticable and more and more powers had to be delegated to representative councils, the Referendum came into being gradually and naturally, not as an accession of popular power, but as a mere retention by the sovereign people of certain important powers in their own hands (Sharp 3).

This argument for more individual control and less power for intermediary organizations carried great weight in the two countries in light of the fact that the role of the individual citizen was the foremost concern of the governing process (Canada – Lortie Royal Commission 1991a, 237). Nonetheless, for present purposes, it was these guiding principles which fueled the Progressive movement in Canada and specifically in the West during the 1890s and 1900s.
REFERENDUMS IN CANADA – HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS

Borrowing from its Populist and Progressive sisters in the United States, Canadian protest movements and political parties began to emerge at the end of the 19th Century. Although the experience of direct legislation was viewed as an “American import into Canada” (Adamson 50), it was becoming increasingly clear that problems faced by Americans were not confined within their borders. More specifically, as Canada advanced and progressed after Confederation, it began to encounter the “cumulative effects of the evils and abuses of industrialism” (Boyer 1992a, 46). Although these so-called evils and abuses existed in the United States as well, certain other influences manifested themselves which were endemic to Canada. These influences, which fueled the fires for reform were the impact of immigration, the defeat of reciprocity, and the eventual election of the Conservative government under Robert Borden in 1911 (Adamson 50).

Facing the above socio-economic and political problems, Canadians, especially in the West, sought alternatives. The two alternatives considered were the creation of a third party in conjunction with the desire for some form of direct legislation. These alternatives were deemed essential if Canadians and particularly Western Canadians were to emerge from their malaise which stemmed from the above socio-economic and political problems. The lack of a sense of human efficacy coupled with the desire for some form of direct legislation was summarized aptly by R.C. Henders, President of the Manitoba Grain Growers Association, in 1912:

The sovereign people have … no direct control. They are sovereign de jure but not de facto, except at election time. The actual powers experienced by the people consist chiefly in the periodic choice of another set of masters who make laws to suit themselves and enforce them until their term of office expires, regardless of
the will of the people. We are governed by an elective aristocracy of wealth. Behind the government and legislatures are the corporations and the trusts … behind the political monopolists are the industrial monopolists … the principal remedy is direct legislation (Adamson 51).

It was the loss of direct control that precipitated the rise of the Progressives, the United Farmers of Alberta and Ontario, and eventually the Social Credit Party.

Campaigning on platforms of bringing government down to the people, the aforementioned parties were committed to collective interests. By promoting the public will over the private interest, Progressives and Populists sought to eradicate such well-known problems as: child labour, sweat shops, alcohol, concentration of economic power, maldistribution of wealth, limited voting rights, bribery, corruption of public officials and many more (Boyer 1992a, 46). In their view, the continuation of these problems could be arrested by proposing reforms which would “increase ordinary citizens’ participation in and power over governmental decisions” (Butler and Ranney 1978, 27). Since the individual’s will would most likely emerge distorted if left to intermediary organizations, it was becoming clear that Canada was ripe for the introduction and use of direct legislation in the form of referendums. David Butler and Austin Ranney articulate the need for a form of popular empowerment when they argue that the Progressives believed that

Truly democratic government consists of all the John and Jane Q. Publics observing, discussing, pondering, deciding, and finally, voting. The public interest is discovered by their discussions and ponderings, and it is served by the measures which majorities of them adopt when the deliberations have run their course (Butler and Ranney 1979, 28).

Further, if any intermediary organization intends on coming between the people and government, the result would be a subversion of democracy and the public interest.
Buoyed by increasing visibility and solidarity of its increasing membership, little wonder that the Progressive and Populist movements were able to table democratic reforms which would give citizens a voice by forcing governments to act. Straddling the fence was becoming a thing of the past. Direct democracy was taking shape in Canada and referendums were becoming the means to achieve the ends of socio-economic and political reforms. Indeed, as one author concluded:

The concept of direct legislation appealed to those who had a special case to advance – a class interest, a moral reform such as temperance, or a grand idea to remedy the West's problems. The Canadian advocates of referendum politics today are in many respects the rightful heirs of the devotees of direct legislation in 1911 (Adamson 51).

The questions which remain are: how successful were referendums in Canada and regardless of the success rate, what are the merits and drawbacks to its continued usage in this country.

**CANADA'S EXPERIENCE WITH REFERENDUMS**

**1898 PLEBISCITE ON PROHIBITION**

Notwithstanding a few critical provincial referendums (Newfoundland and Confederation 1948, Quebec and sovereignty 1980, 1995), historical analysis will focus on Canada's three non-binding or consultative referendums since Confederation.

Although not much scholarly evidence exists for analysis, the first referendum (technically a plebiscite) was in 1898 on the issue of prohibition of sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages. In this case, the government of Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier used the referendum device due to their inability to solve the problem through legislative channels or even the creation of a royal commission (MacDonald 309). Although prohibition was a polarizing issue that cut across and divided parties and religions, the
resulting referendum was unable to attract a majority of the populace. With only a 44% turnout, a “scant 51% of Canadians approved the proposal while his (Laurier) home province of Quebec overwhelmingly rejected it” (Jeffrey 95). More specifically, Quebec rejected prohibition with an approximate 83% vote (Dunsmuir 3, Boyer 1992, 25). Overall, only 23% of the total electorate supported prohibition (Spence 251) which is hardly a resounding approval.

Facing inconclusive results that split the country, Laurier concluded no “absolute and unmistakably clear mandate” (Billingsley 1995, 58). As a result, Laurier decided to “leave the matter of prohibition to provincial government jurisdiction” (Boyer 1992b, 5). While the 1898 plebiscite divided the country along geo-linguistic lines, it also revealed the “inequity that could come about if the results of a referendum approved by less than one-quarter of the eligible electorate were imposed on a province that had rejected it by a measure of almost 5 to 1” (Dunsmuir 3). Moreover, with only 44% of eligible voters casting a ballot, Laurier and his government decided to “defer to those who had chosen not to express an opinion rather than to heed the opinion of those who had actually voted” (Billinglsey 1995, 58). This is supported by the historical view that

The government based its refusal to grant prohibition on the ground of the smallness of the prohibition vote. They had promised to obey the mandate of the people; now they declared they must obey the mandate of those who had given no mandate. The opinion of the people was to be respected; that is to say the opinion of those who had not expressed their opinion (Spence 252).

In the end, with English/French battle lines drawn, Laurier and his government stood pat allowing the issue to be dealt with at a provincial and/or local level.
1942 PLEBISCITE ON CONSCRIPTION

Canada’s second plebiscite, which created a “deep schism in the Canadian population” (Cote 1992, 21), was held in 1942 on the issue of conscription for overseas military service. Prime Minister Mackenzie King held the referendum in an effort to overturn a previous election pledge not to use conscription. Accordingly, Canadian voters were asked: “are you in favour of releasing the government from any obligation arising out of any past commitments restricting the methods of raising men for military service?” (Lemieux 135, Hansard - House of Commons Debates – February 25, 1942, 823).

Conscription in Canada was not a new issue. Despite opposition, former Prime Minister Borden introduced conscription in 1917. This opposition was spearheaded by opposition Liberal leader Wilfrid Laurier. Perhaps sensing the eventual increase in animosity between English and French Canada, Laurier, with the support of La Presse, Le Devoir, Quebec nationalist Henri Bourassa, and even Mackenzie King himself, suggested a referendum be used. Laurier saw the referendum as a “possible way out of the pending collision between English-speaking Canada and Quebec over conscription for military service in World War I” (Boyer 1982, 52). Unfortunately. Laurier’s recommendations were ignored and Borden’s Conservative government proceeded with conscription (MacDonald 309). Nonetheless, Laurier’s arguments would leave an indelible mark and have a profound influence on King when he decided to turn to a referendum as an “intended means of extricating his Liberal Party and his Government, from the conscription crisis” (Boyer 1982, 52). More specifically, King argued that his government did not possess the “moral authority to proceed with conscription without a
plebiscite” (Billingsley 1995, 64-65). To support his claim, King made the following
often cited argument in the House of Commons:

There is a distinction to be made between the legal powers which the government
has and the moral authority which it possesses. With respect to the legal power,
there can be no question whatever that this Parliament has full power to do
whatever it may decide to do with respect to the management of matters
pertaining to the war. The one limitation which exists on that power so far as this
Parliament is concerned is not a legal limitation but a moral obligation ... To say
that the Parliament of Canada, which derives its powers from the people, after a
solemn pledge has been given to the people on a matter which is of deep concern
to them, is released from this pledge the moment the people have elected it, is
simply for Parliament itself to create a precedent which would be subversive of
parliamentary institutions (Hansard - House of Commons Debates - February 25,
1942, 823).

Armed with this persuasive argument, King was able to conduct a plebiscite to better
gauge public opinion on a historically controversial issue.

Facing increasing opposition from his own Cabinet, party, and Arthur Meighen’s
Conservative opposition, King used the referendum option as a way to shift the blame
onto the voters if an undesired vote occurred. The results of the 1942 referendum
resembled those of 1898 but in even starker terms (Johnston et al. 1996, 257).

Approximately 65% of Canadians and 80% outside Quebec voted to release King’s
government from its promise not to institute a draft (Jackson and Jackson 1998, 422).

However, once again, approximately 70% of Quebecers and 85% of French-Canadians
voted no (Taylor 1995, 124). Quebecers felt betrayed by the King government,
especially considering that they felt that King’s election promise of no conscription was
made specifically to their province. Instead, King resorted to the slogan of “conscription
if necessary, but not necessarily conscription” (Cote 1992, 16).

While King was a skilled politician who constantly tried to placate both sides, one
can argue that the referendum results “exacerbated, rather than mitigated, the divisive
nature of the conscription issue” (Dunsmuir 3). Although King was able to postpone conscription and did not implement it until 1944, the damage was already done. Even though conscripts were never used in battle and some would even argue that national unity was maintained and crisis averted as in 1917, the issue served to divide the two solitudes even further and inflame Quebec nationalism for decades to come. This argument is taken a step further by noted Canadian historian J.L. Granatstein who commented that in lieu of the 1942 conscription issue, a plebiscite was a “dangerous weapon ... If French and English Canada can be brought to vote together then the Government is home free, able to do what it chooses. But if Quebec votes one way and the rest of the country the other, then the difficulties are compounded and multiplied” (quoted in Boyer 1982, 47). This argument has stood the test of time especially when one considers current constitutional battles between Quebec and the rest of Canada.

**OTHER HISTORICAL EXPERIENCES WITH REFERENDUMS**

Before moving on to a discussion of the last national referendum in 1992, the 1970s and 1980s witnessed other movements and unsuccessful attempts to introduce legislation to regulate referendums. In April 1978, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau introduced Bill C-40 which eventually became Bill C-9. Known as the Canada Referendum Act, Trudeau initiated the legislation primarily in response to Quebec’s 1978 Referendum Act and as a way to threaten the provinces that he was “prepared to act unilaterally to patriate the constitution by appealing over their heads if necessary” (Taylor 1995, 124). When Parliament was dissolved for a general election in 1979, Bill C-9 died.

In the constitutional discussions of 1980-1981, Trudeau proposed once again the possibility of a referendum in case of a federal-provincial deadlock (Clarkson and McCall
Like the eventual Charlottetown Accord, Trudeau’s proposed amendment had to be passed by each province as well as a national majority. Facing increasing opposition from several provincial governments along with some key Cabinet ministers (Chretien and Marc Lalonde), Trudeau was forced to drop the referendum formula. Although Trudeau referred to his defeat as his “everlasting regret” (Clarkson and McCall 383), political scientist Alan C. Cairns points to a different contributing factor to the rejection when he stated that

The long history of Canadian efforts to eliminate the United Kingdom’s role was dominated by the issue of the relative roles of the two orders of government in the purely domestic arrangement that would replace it … When the debate was raised, concerns of federalism dominated, because a discourse of intergovernmental competition blanketed the debate (Cairns 1992, 71).

After this defeat, Trudeau’s only other reference to a potential referendum occurred in 1981 when he suggested a referendum on the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as well as the 7/50 amending formula. When that discussion eventually died down, the subject of referendums, at least for a time, died with it.

After Trudeau’s brief flirtation with referendums, little concrete discussion surrounded its potential use. Perhaps with the exception of Progressive Conservative MP Patrick Boyer who tabled several referendum bills and wrote numerous articles and books, the issue remained dormant in the House of Commons until arguably the emergence of the Reform Party. As a populist party, little wonder that the Reform Party advocated measures of direct democracy. In advocating direct democracy through the referendum, Reform gave the issue of referendums greater currency and forced other parties to re-examine whether it had a legitimate place in the Canadian policy-making process as an alternative or supplement to the traditional institutions of representative
government (MacDonald 311). Not only did Reform stimulate debate amongst political elites but it was able to attract the attention of academics and scholars alike.

Taking the position of the Reform Party a step further, one began to notice increased discussion in a myriad of arenas. These arenas included various committees, task forces, and the well-known royal commissions. Although slightly beyond the scope of this discussion, suffice to say that discussion on the subject of referendums occurred in but was not limited to: 1) the 1979 Pepin-Robarts Task Force, 2) the 1991 Beaudoin-Edwards Committee, 3) the 1991 Spicer Commission, 4) the 1991 Lortie Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, and 5) the 1992 Beaudoin-Dobbie Committee.

All of the above bodies recommended the idea of non-binding referendums or more specifically plebiscites for the resolution of constitutional or other issues. By way of closure, all that Canada has at the moment by way of referendum legislation is a 1992 act entitled ‘An Act to Provide for Referendums on the Constitution of Canada’, also known as Bill C-81 (Cote 1992, 8). Although the Act was set up before the Charlottetown Accord, it does not facilitate or preclude the government from holding a referendum but rather “provides the legal and administrative framework for conducting such a national referendum if the federal government decides to hold one” (Marquis 12). The decision to hold a referendum would soon occur in 1992.

**1992 REFERENDUM ON THE CHARLOTTETOWN ACCORD**

Since the 1992 referendum on the Charlottetown Accord remains fresh in the minds of most, analysis will be kept to a minimum. The 1992 referendum, like its 1898 and 1942 predecessors, was once again initiated by the government of the day and not necessarily in response to populist pressures or in order to appease “widespread populist
demands for direct democracy” (MacDonald 309). The feeling of the day was that if the normal legislative processes could not arrive at a proper constitutional solution, recourse to a referendum might be the only option.

Although pressure was mounting to solve seemingly intractable constitutional problems, it appears that using a referendum was not considered. One can point to the lack of inclusion of the referendum option in the 1991 federal package of proposals. ‘Shaping Canada’s Future Together’ and the fact that “none of the suggestions were implemented in the final Charlottetown text” (Taylor 1995, 125). However, as time went on, then Prime Minister Mulroney seemed to change his mind at least publicly. This change is supported by his comment on October 21st, 1992 that with respect to referendums, “I’ve come to recognize that in a modern, pluralistic society like ours, people do indeed require a much greater degree of participation ... and that indeed there should be public consultation and the ultimate in that is a referendum” (Boyer 1993, 88). Consequently, the vacillating position adopted by Mulroney’s government was now one in which “a national referendum, while risky, was a way … to avoid the repercussions of the closed legislative ratification process of Meech Lake” (Taylor 1995, 125).

Unfortunately, as will be shown, Mulroney’s fence-sitting on the feasibility of a constitutional referendum eventually cost him dearly with Canadians.

The idea that a referendum may be risky brings us to Mulroney’s private feelings about referendums. Although arguments against the nature of referendums were strong, one can argue that Mulroney remembered the historical occurrences of referendums. More specifically, the 1942 conscription issue and even the 1980 provincial referendum on Quebec sovereignty were disruptive issues that worsened relations between Quebec
and English Canada. As a result, “for many of the Quebec members of Mulroney’s
government, the very concept of a national referendum was anathema. In their view, it
could serve only to re-create long-standing divisions and risk further alienation” (Jeffrey
96). With these feelings in mind, a strong argument can be made that Mulroney did not
intend to use a referendum unless absolutely necessary (Russell 207, Jeffrey 95-101).

In the end, the Charlottetown Accord was defeated in all but four provinces. The
Accord was approved only in Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, New-Brunswick,
and Ontario. Nationally, approximately 55% voted no while 45% voted yes. Although the
Accord was defeated in both Quebec and English Canada, different reasons existed for
the respective defeats. While many Quebeckers voted against the Accord out of pique
that it offered them too little, English Canada voted against the Accord exactly because
they felt it offered Quebeckers too much (Marquis 11). Further, one can argue that the
Accord was doomed from the start in that for it to be passed, it had to “receive a majority
vote in each and every province as well as in the country as a whole” (Jackson and
Jackson 1998, 424). This unanimity requirement is a dubious one when assessed against
the fact that “opponents need only focus on one or two of the regional or provincial
jurisdictions to ensure defeat” (Jeffrey 98). Since the proverbial chain was only as strong
as its weakest link, the Accord failed. By doing so, it placed Canada back into its
constitutional quagmire which to date, it has not been able to extricate itself from.

When examining the referendum option and the events surrounding the 1992
Charlottetown Accord, one acknowledges that the referendum device itself was not used
properly. More specifically, events point to the fact that since the Mulroney government
was not committed to and did not seem to have much confidence in holding a referendum
at all, executive federalism reared its ugly head. More specifically, as one noted constitutional scholar observed

The real problem with the Mulroney government’s late conversion to a constitutional referendum was that the development of constitutional proposals was completely detached from the referendum process. The politicians, officials, and experts closeted together negotiating the constitution through the spring early summer of 1992 were not consciously working towards a referendum. The product of their labours – an agreement containing some sixty clauses sprinkled with asterisks marking unfinished business to be settled by more negotiations in the future – was not a document designed for popular ratification by the people. An agreement fashioned in this process was treated by its drafters as a contract between heads of government and organizations that expected to have a final say on the matter. The penalty of pursuing a two-track approach to constitutional revision – elite negotiations and popular ratification – was that they came too late to provide the foundation for a real social contract (Russell 207-208).

By keeping negotiations about the constitutional package largely secret from the public, the textbook example of executive federalism and obvious elite arrogance superceded any honest attempt at referendum democracy. No comment sums up the situation better than the one that

Brian Mulroney talked as if the country could still make constitutions the way the Fathers of Confederation had – in private, in profanity, plied with liquor. In Charlottetown, the boys arrived in a ship - and spent a long time in places other than the library. This is the way it was done (quoted in Taylor 1995, 117).

Once again, the chance for the referendum device to be used properly was sabotaged by a government not whole-heartedly committed to it. What Mulroney wanted to avoid with the fiasco of Meech Lake re-occurred again in Charlottetown. With the history of referendums presented, it is now necessary to explore both sides of the referendum debate in an effort to assess its feasibility as an instrument or correction for the “perceived weaknesses of representative democracy” (MacDonald 311).
ASSESSING REFERENDUMS – ARGUMENTS FOR

In assessing the arguments for referendums as useful supplements to representative institutions, the first major point in its favour surrounds the notion of maximum legitimacy. More specifically, by giving voters more opportunities to play active roles in the policy-making process, referendums succeed in both making decisions public and bringing them closer to the people. By doing so, public confidence increases in the democratic process. This idea is supported by former American President Thomas Jefferson, who in his arguments for strong self-government, purported that “making every citizen an acting member of the government, and in the offices nearest and most interesting to him, will attach him by his strongest feelings to the independence of his country, and its republican constitution” (quoted in Barber 261).

Although an American perspective, Jefferson’s view is a telling rejoinder of what direct democracy in general and perhaps referendums in particular could accomplish for people. From a Canadian point of view, Jefferson’s perspective is instructive and certainly possesses an upside as revealed by a supporting comment that referendums could “promote a greater sense of attachment, on the part of Canadians, to the central institutions of the country, as well as a stronger feeling of participation in the decisions that concern us all” (Lemieux 139).

By supposedly bringing government closer to home, referendums, if used properly, can express popular will in a way that elected officials could not. This idea of popular will being accurately expressed has a historical supporter in Rousseau who maintained that

Sovereignty cannot be represented for the same reason that it cannot be alienated; its essence is the general will, and will cannot be represented – either it is the
general will or it is something else; there is no intermediate possibility. Thus, the people's deputies are not, and could not be, its representatives; they are merely its agents; and they cannot decide anything finally. Any law which the people has not ratified in person is void; it is not law at all (quoted in Kobach 64).

The above comment that true representation might be a fallacy strengthens the case for referendums as a way to end alienation and distortion of opinions.

With direct votes made by the people, political efficacy could increase which would allow democracy to take a positive step forward. Overall, all the above views are summarized neatly by Butler and Ranney who maintain that

People may or may not trust legislators, cabinets, and prime ministers but they certainly trust themselves most of all. Hence a decision in which all have participated (or at least had a full opportunity to participate) is more legitimate in their eyes than one in which they have not participated. Moreover, decisions in which popular participation is direct and unmediated by others, as in referendums, produce more accurate expressions of their will than do decisions in which they participate only by electing others who make the decisions for them, as in acts of parliaments and cabinets (Butler and Ranney 1978, 25).

With this commentary in mind, one begins to acknowledge the argument that there exists a considerable force in the case for referendums as "a means of popular democratic control" (Johnson 1981, 26).

Another argument in favour of referendums and linked to the notion of maximum legitimacy is education through maximum participation. If citizens know that their opinions count for something, an argument can be made that they will want to participate on all issues deemed important. If as some political theorists argue that political participation is central to a functioning democracy, one can argue that by holding referendums, a greater potential exists to maximize one's civic virtue (Butler and Ranney 1994, 15).
Maximizing one’s civic virtue would not only curtail apathy initiated by special interest groups, lobby groups, political parties, and legislatures but change Canadians from “passive spectators into active participants” (Boyer 1992b, 5). This notion of a politics of engagement is supported by the argument that

Only direct political participation - activity that is explicitly public - is a completely successful form of civic education for democracy. The politically edifying influence of participation has been noted a thousand times since first Rousseau and then Mill and de Tocqueville suggested that democracy was best taught by practicing it ... Of course, when participation is neutered by being separated from power, then civic action will be only a game and its rewards will seem childish to women and men of the world; they will prefer to spend their time in the real pursuit of private interests (Barber 235,236).

With the above comments in mind, one must acknowledge the benefits of referendums in their ability to educate the masses which can in turn maximize human potentials. It is this maximization of human potentials in the form of referendum voting which is a sure sign of political good health (Butler and Ranney 1994, 15). This is supported by the comment that referendums would be the “ideal instruments of civic education” (Barber - quoted in Rourke et al. 19).

Instead of focusing on the quality of the citizen, critics should realize that by being treated as outsiders and passive observers of government, citizens might give off the impression of being incapable of governing or legislating. As a result, if the masses are not given the chance to participate more often in the policy-making process, one can argue that this is “an unmistakable symptom of political sickness” (Butler and Ranney 1994, 15). Thus, in refuting the arguments against referendums based on citizen ignorance, lack of expertise and laziness, Benjamin Barber argues that instead of looking at the “political quality of the citizenry” (Rourke et al. 18), one should realize that
Even if Americans sometimes seem unfit to legislate, it may be because they have for so long been passive observers of government. The remedy is not to exclude them from governing, but to provide practical and active forms of civic education that will make them more fit than they were ... Referendum processes are ideal instruments of civic education; paradoxically, the more truth there is to the charge that the people are not fit to govern, the greater is the need to involve them in government (Barber - quoted in Rourke et al. 18-19).

The value choice of whether or not to include citizens in the governing process is up to the people to decide in conjunction with those who govern them.

Taking Barber’s arguments a step further, one can point to the theoretical context of positive liberty as further supporting the case for referendums. More specifically, the concept of positive liberty stems from an essay written by Sir Isaiah Berlin entitled “Two Concepts of Liberty”. Positive liberty “derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master” (Berlin 1969, 131). By focusing on the individual, positive liberty has as its goal the self-actualization of the individual through participation which in turn increases one’s potential. By being “rationally self-directed” (Rourke et al. 17), the individual is motivated to learn and participate more.

With respect to positive liberty and referendums, Barber is clearly pro-referendum. For Barber, referendums are positive instruments of democracy because they are a “means of participation that educate citizens about how to take control of their own lives and develop as human beings” (Rourke et al. 19). As such, referendums are an indispensable part of what Barber calls a “strong democracy” (Barber 1984). This strong democracy is designed to encompass all of individual life and make for a more autonomous individual. Through increased participation, this more autonomous individual has a better chance of achieving the ‘end’ of a more sustainable democracy.

Although referendums are not a sufficient pre-requisite for a complete
participatory democracy, Barber and other advocates of referendums make a strong case that they are indeed a necessary pre-condition for its existence. Permitting opportunities for self-government is important enough that it made former American President Woodrow Wilson declare that “for 20 years I preached to the students of Princeton that the referendum … was bosh … I have since investigated and I want to apologize to those students. It is the safeguard of politics. It takes power from the boss and places it in the hands of the people” (quoted in Cronin 38).

Other arguments extolling the virtues of referendums are the related ideas that all issues are squarely faced coupled with the advantages of asking a question in a clear and straightforward manner. More specifically, there may come a time where a government or political party decides to “suppress unusually hot and divisive issues” (Butler and Ranney 1978, 29). However, if citizens are given the right to sign petitions thus initiating a referendum, “any issue, however novel or divisive or offensive to those in power, can be put on the law-making agenda” (Butler and Ranney 1978, 29-30).

By removing issues out of the backroom (i.e. executive federalism) and putting them on the public agenda, confidence in government could increase which would be beneficial to the entire political process. These thoughts are supported by a Reform Party brief to the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing which stated that:

The process of resolution of an issue is too often an accommodation to a particular region, pressure group or an attempt to gain the favour of a province. Referenda ensure that the resolution of an issue is public. The debate over issues is subject to the cleansing agent of public scrutiny. The doubts and concerns that many Canadians feel about the process of government would be allayed by a referendum or plebiscite (Reform Party of Canada 1990, 6 - quoted in MacDonald 329, Boyer 1982, 49).
By being able to articulate their concerns, citizens can loosen the shackles of elite and party dominance at their expense. This possibility would strengthen our democracy.

Unlike elections where many issues and factors must be addressed, a referendum can be beneficial in isolating an issue of perhaps transcending national importance. Although a problem may arise as to determining the criteria for choosing an issue of transcending national importance, it can be done if citizens work together with their governments. Although the likelihood of disagreement increases (Marquis 15), one cannot dispute the increase in public involvement. As long as discussion proceeds on a level playing field, an issue can hopefully be isolated. If so, the job of the voters could be facilitated insofar as they could take a side on an issue and eventually vote based on their positions.

Although Canada has not yet witnessed a citizen initiated referendum, an argument can be made that if it existed, politicians would no longer be able to skirt issues as easily. Facing all relevant issues could well achieve a more genuine democracy in Canada. Once again, Barber summarizes the above issues well in his argument that democracy and referendums are inseparable. Indeed, he contends that

In the end, in fact, the real issue at stake ... is whether or not America believes in democracy, and believes it can afford the risks that go with democratic life. All of the objections to it are so many different ways of saying the people are not to be trusted – a skepticism which, it is perfectly true, can be traced back to the realism and cynical elitism of a significant group of constitutional fathers. But there is really no democratic alternative to such trust: if the American people are not capable of self-government, our democracy will perish – whether or not elites keep them from initiating legislation (Barber - quoted in Rourke et al. 18).

Transposing the above argument onto the Canadian scene, one acknowledges that notwithstanding the somewhat extreme perspective on the future of democracy, much work needs to be done to achieve an improved form of participatory democracy.
The above arguments provide food for thought for advocates of direct democracy who seek the somewhat elusive goals of accountable and responsive government. Now that the positive attributes of referendums have been presented, we must determine if they are sufficient as well as resilient in lieu of the negative consequences of referendums. Unfortunately, to the dismay of referendum and direct democracy advocates, the negative arguments seem to outweigh the positive ones enough for referendums to be labeled by some as a conservative device more for “blocking elite initiative than for unlocking it” (Johnston 1997, P8).

**ASSESSING REFERENDUMS – ARGUMENTS AGAINST**

While one cannot deny all the aforementioned advantages of referendums, the literature is filled with a plethora of negative arguments on the subject which when combined together, may force some to reconsider any widespread adoption of referendums. On the whole, arguments against referendums are a defence of representative government. More specifically, one argument posits that referendums should not be used simply because citizens do not have the time or knowledge to make the proper decisions. This elitist position is supported by the contention that it is “unreasonable to ask relatively uninformed citizens to make decisions especially on technical or legal matters, since they have neither the time nor the expertise to evaluate complex issues” (Jackson and Jackson 1998, 422).

When assessing the above arguments, one has to make value judgments as to the ability of the average citizen as well as the importance of direct democracy. In other words, “the choice of whether to continue elite decision-making with minimal public involvement or to broaden citizen access to the policy-making process” (Hahn and
Kamieniecki 24) is one which can colour one’s position towards the useful impact referendums could have as supplements to representative government.

For present purposes, this author acknowledges that “referendum voters, however ignorant and unsophisticated they may seem when measured against the theorists’ ideal citizen, seem nevertheless to be better informed and more sophisticated” (Butler and Ranney 1994, 18-19). Nonetheless, accepting this argument at face value cannot obscure the somewhat “anti-democratic instinct” (Boyer 1992a, 52) that elected representatives are probably better qualified to make decisions on complex issues. This assumption is based on the theory that elected representatives are not necessarily more intelligent than their fellow citizens but because they are “paid to spend full time on government affairs” (quoted in Boyer 1992a, 53). Besides, it becomes increasingly difficult and a strain on the political process if citizens are to be consulted on every issue deemed fundamental to the policy-making and political process.

Another argument against referendums surrounds the issue that it forces decisions instead of seeking compromises. For some, the democratic process is not a vote which identifies how many citizens support each of two irreconcilable alternatives but rather a “consensus, a sense of the meeting, a general agreement that a particular course of action is the best way of promoting the interests of all the citizens” (Butler and Ranney 1978). Discussion is necessary as a means to voice all one’s concerns. The above views are supported by a somewhat dated but insightful argument that

Discussion is not only like a war; it is also like love. It is not only a battle of ideas; it is also a marriage of minds. If a majority engages in discussion with a minority, and if that discussion is conducted in a spirit of giving and taking, the result will be that the ideas of the majority are widened to include some of the ideas of the minority which have established their truth in the give and take of debate. When this happens, the will of the majority will not be the abstract or
isolated will of a mere majority, considered in itself and as standing by itself in opposition to the similar will of a mere minority. Some fusion will have taken place; some accommodation will have been attained (Barker 67).

Bearing this comment in mind, can referendums realistically achieve all these goals?

In lieu of the theoretical foundations of what a democratic process should be, referendums cannot be expected to achieve the aforementioned goals. Indeed, referendums “do not allow for defining the best way of dealing with a problem or for continuing discussion on alternative solutions or methods of reaching a compromise” (Marquis 18). One reason referendums fail to do so is because like elections, they set up an adversarial arena between two groups. Moreover, by extracting a potentially controversial and/or divisive issue (i.e. conscription, Quebec secession), one can argue that a simple yes or no answer is impossible.

Instead of supposedly expressing the popular will, referendums possess the negative characteristic of dividing an issue simplistically into two camps: pro and con, yes or no (Boyer 1992a 53). If one stops to consider Canada’s lingering constitutional problems, it becomes more apparent that a simple yes or no answer does not seem appropriate. Although it may pass for singular issues, one should be leery that to “ask the people to pass judgment in one word is no better than placing a seamless web before eleven legislatures” (Taylor 1995, 129). Overall, the main point to extract is that by setting up a “confrontation between supporters and opponents of a proposition” (Zimmerman 1986, 57), referendums fail the democratic process by not searching for a compromise which would draw the widest public acceptance.

Taking the previous thoughts a step further, one realizes that a simply worded question on a potentially emotional issue can have the reverse effect of leading to “much
anger and frustration ... among voters who feel there is no scope for the proper reflection of their views on the question” (Boyer 1982, 46). Facing a divisive issue, governments cannot assume that a simply worded question will solve the problem. This view is buttressed by the argument that even an advisory plebiscite,

While it may make it possible for a government to gain time and thus perhaps avoid a party split or the loss of substantial electoral support, does not enable it to escape entirely from an awkward situation arising from being subjected to strong conflicting pressures (quoted in Boyer 1982, 46).

Since these conflicting pressures were evident in Canada’s two best-known referendums, much credence exists in comments made by Granatstein. Citing the incessant problems between English and French Canada, Granatstein feels that in a bicultural country like Canada, referendums serve only to divide the country more. More specifically, he believes that the referendum, “far from freeing the government from its problems, seemed increasingly likely to make problems worse” (quoted in Theoret 1978a, 30).

Forcing a decision is not the way to move forward in our democracy. Instead of asking citizens to simply approve or reject a measure, a middle ground should be sought which would better satisfy the two sides involved. It is clear that a “straight yes/no decision ... may oversimplify complex political problems and make subsequent compromise difficult” (Jackson and Jackson 1998, 422). Unless ways are found to temper the disunifying effects of referendums, it will be hard to discredit one of Butler and Ranney’s conclusions that “referendums by their very nature set up confrontations rather than encourage compromises. They divide the populace into victors and vanquished. They force decisions often before the discussion process has had a chance to work itself out fully. Surely this is a great deficiency” (Butler and Ranney 1978, 226). If Canada wants to prove that the deficiency can be remedied with increased consultation, it is clear
that changes in approach and the overall political mind-set must occur. Otherwise, Canadian democracy runs the risk of a prolonged political malaise which will consistently handicap it from ever achieving the aspirations of the participationist political thinkers (Barber, Franklin, Jefferson, Roosevelt, and Rousseau).

Related to the issue of a forced decision versus consensus, referendums can be argued to pose a clear and present danger to minorities. Although majority rule is a central and sacred tenet in any theoretical discussion of democracy, one should not overlook the needs of a minority lest De Tocqueville’s tyranny of the majority will rear its ugly head again. More specifically, if government words a referendum question in search of a clear answer, as was the case during the conscription crisis, minority rights can be abridged easily which leads one to believe that under such conditions, minorities will always lose out. Once again Sharp is instructive in this case in his argument that governments “do not reach a decision by simply following the line of the majority, but by listening to both sides and reaching a compromise” (quoted in Theoret 1978, 8). This point is expanded further by him when he asserted that

Under a system of majority rule, the only right possessed by a minority is that of complete submission. A system of government by consent, on the other hand, recognizes the claim of any minority to be granted all such rights as do not seriously conflict with rights of an equally important nature of the majority (Sharp 9 – quoted in Theoret 1978, 8).

What one should extract from Sharp’s comments is that governments can incorporate different views into a coherent set of policies. If a coherent set of policies can ensue based on consent and compromise, the result can be a “more equitable balancing of interests” (Marquis 18).
In theory, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was designed to protect any assault on minority rights such as for example minority language education rights found in Section 23 of the Charter. As well, one must acknowledge the possibility of politicians themselves “legislating against minority rights on occasion” (Hanly 20). In spite of the above safeguard which could be overridden by constitutional amendment and/or invoking the notwithstanding clause (Section 33 of the Charter), why give politicians and governments another way to trample on minority rights. Clearly, the “final and uncompromising nature of a referendum” (Jackson and Jackson 1998, 422) coupled with the inflexibility of a post-facto modification after submission to the people, can have disastrous effects. In a diverse and heterogeneous country like Canada, it is fair to say that whether one discusses ethnic, linguistic, or religious divisions, referendums coupled with their basic anti-majoritarian principles should not be viewed as being in the best interests of the nation in general and the minorities in question in particular.

In conjunction with the majority/minority theme is the issue of relative intensities of feeling. More specifically, voting could reveal an indifferent or passive majority versus an emotional and/or passionate minority. Thus, the argument would be that the intensity of feeling amongst the vociferous minority should perhaps supercede simple numerical majority votes. Referendums are flawed in that they fail to measure the necessary levels of popular intensities. Clearly, the conscription crisis was an example where French-Canadians, while mathematically inferior in the actual vote, displayed obvious emotion in their beliefs that English-Canada along with the King government had betrayed them. No referendum could have accurately portrayed these ill-feelings.
Another area of contention related to the issue minority rights surrounds the question of whether referendums are a conservative device or a vehicle for change. Although arguably more relevant for socio-economic issues, a sound argument can be made that if Canadians had to vote on capital punishment, they would probably vote in favour. Another historical example is compulsory education insofar as not only did it take time to be accepted but it stands to reason that had people been allowed to vote on the subject, the vote would probably have been to reject the measure (Theoret 1978, 7). Further support could be found in the United States where citizen referendums have eschewed laws passed by legislatures on such matters as discrimination against African-Americans and women (Butler and Ranney 1978, 36). In addition, on the European front, more referendums could signal "such actions as the restoration and extension of the death penalty, the restriction of immigration by blacks and Asians, and limits on the level and redistributive quality of taxes" (Butler and Ranney 1994, 36). Thus, not only could referendums abridge minority rights and fail to measure intensities of belief but they could become barriers to social change and tolerance. Canada faces enough socio-economic and political problems that it does not need something which could potentially magnify or hyperbolize the issues.

Another important point linked to the majority/minority theme along with the notion of relative intensities is that of sheer divisiveness. On the one hand, Boyer argues that Canada should not be afraid of division for a "rift revealed is really a national expression of honesty" (Taylor 1995, 128). For example, throughout his articles and books, he maintained that the conscription referendum did not create or foster division, it merely recorded it (Boyer 1992, 251, Boyer 1992a, 183). Although King delayed
implementation of conscription for two years, the supposed reality check of the vote can be argued to have worsened the already fragile climate of relations between English and French.

Recent memory will remind us that in the early 1980s, then Justice Minister Chretien opposed Prime Minister Trudeau’s inclusion of referendums in the amending formula because of the “way in which families, towns and cities were divided” (Taylor 1995, 128) by the 1980 Quebec referendum. Even if one jumps forward to the 1992 Charlottetown referendum or the 1995 Quebec referendum on sovereignty, much credible evidence exists that the already wide gulf between the English and the French widened even further. Thus, in contrast to Boyer’s view that referendums do not create divisions, one must acknowledge that “when immensely important and in some cases personal issues are brought to a vote, the psychological impact regardless of the outcome cannot be ignored” (Taylor 1995, 128-129). This thought is taken a step further by the related argument that “frequent resort to direct votes will almost certainly open wounds, as the core logic of referendums is self-consciously hostile to minority-oriented policy. Advocates and opponents of referendums both usually know this, even if they rarely admit it” (Johnston 1997, P8). Thus, for all these reasons, referendums as a tool for achieving a more participatory form of representative government are cast in a negative light.

Another concern voiced by critics of referendums is that of representative government and leadership. More specifically, if referendums become more commonplace with almost all issues considered of some transcending national importance, would there be any manifestation of concrete leadership, or would leaders, if
in doubt, defer to referendums? An argument can be made that if voters send their
delegates to represent them and lead the country, how can they perform their duties with
the specter of referendums looming over them.

In spite of the fact that allowing elected officials a free hand on all matters is not
conducive to increased citizen input, one must realize that increased use of referendums
is not the answer because it threatens to usurp the power of elected officials over the long
term (Marquis 18). An interesting comment which sums up both sides of the argument
suggests that “to assert that a group of elected persons is permanently, and on main
issues, wiser than the whole people is to move from democracy towards party
dictatorship, but to deny them, at every stage, the power of decision on particular laws is
to move towards anarchy” (Stewart 1959, 217). What one should extract from the
argument is that notwithstanding the democratic value inherent in referendums as a
potential mouthpiece for citizens, the building blocks of our country in the form of
representative government are put at greater risk by the continued usage of referendums.

Fearing a recalcitrant public, recourse to referendums can make politicians
reluctant decision-makers. Moreover, when government faces a potentially controversial
or divisive issue, they may resort to a referendum as a way to “shirk their decision-
making responsibility” (Marquis 19). By by-passing elected officials and/or encouraging
them to pass the proverbial buck to voters in a referendum, democracy would suffer from
an abdication of leadership. By weakening the authority and prestige of representatives
and representative government, referendums are deficient because as has been suggested,
“rather than provide for direction or leadership on controversial or volatile issues,
governments may use referendums to obfuscate or shun responsibility” (Canada – Lortie Royal Commission 1991a, 238).

By subverting the authority and diminishing the prestige of legislatures, cabinets, and executive heads of governments (Butler and Ranney 1994, 20), referendums are not true supplements to representative democracy. Instead, resorting to referendums will witness Canadians paying a heavy price in the form of a “grave weakening of representative government” (Butler and Ranney 1978, 37). Further, the above authors conclude that

As legislatures lose power, they will lose popular respect, and outstanding citizens will be less inclined to seek public office. Even those who remain in office are likely to behave less responsibly, for their behavior is bound to be adversely affected by the knowledge that anything they do, good or bad, may be overridden by a referendum (Butler and Ranney 1978, 37).

Are we prepared to pay that potentially high price? Certainly after Canada’s most recent constitutional debacles, any future potential solutions will probably have to be brought before the people in a referendum. If so, one can argue that any power originally bestowed upon elected officials will be stripped away. Is government by proxy the way to go? Our answer should be no.

On a different front, one acknowledges that while elections witness elected officials being held accountable for their records in office, referendum voting offers no citizen accountability. This is supported by the remark that “the electorate is completely unaccountable to others for its preferences and biases and its commitment to a consistent and fair course of conduct can be neither measured nor questioned” (Marquis 19). Facing unaccountable voters makes the job of elected authorities that much more difficult. For instance, if Parliament passes any kind of resolution, what would happen if that measure
was defeated by the people? By rejecting Parliament’s proposal, should government “resign or should it continue to govern incapable of implementing its policies?” (Theoret 1978, 7). Regardless of the answer, one is forced to avow that referendum voting can lead to “democracy without responsibility” (MacDonald 320). Thus, what one should consider is whether we want a democracy with no government accountability and/or citizen responsibility. Moreover, must we reduce some aspects of political leadership and policy-making to a “gallup-poll approach to public policy?” (Cronin 194). Answers to these questions will determine one’s position on referendums and their roles as true supplements to representative government.

While searching for an answer to the above question strikes at the heart of what we understand as responsible government, it is clear that governing by referendum could have the adverse effect of hamstringing those who are supposed to find solutions. Nonetheless, what remains important to understand is that referendums should be viewed as flawed because they violate our principles of parliamentary sovereignty. By appealing directly to voters, referendums can bypass Parliament thus detracting from its understood sovereignty and downgrading its importance as a sovereign law-making body (Jackson and Jackson 1998, 422). Acknowledging this potential and realizing how much we should strive for a more participatory form of representative government, one begins to wonder again if the price is too high. It certainly seems that way.

When considering a recourse to referendums, one would be foolish to ignore our Westminster model of government inherited from Great Britain. As well, we cannot ignore the constitutional principle that sovereignty is vested in the Monarch and exercised through Parliament. Although the British have used the referendum device on a few
occasions (1973 – Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom, 1975 - EEC membership, 1979 – devolution for Scotland and Wales, 1998 – Northern Ireland treaty), it seems that for the most part, the topic has not attracted great attention. It has not received great attention for the simple historical fact that it remains “incompatible with the British parliamentary tradition of representative democracy” (Jeffrey 98). It was these feelings which have been exported to Canada and have remained part of our political mind-set.

Unlike the American model of popular sovereignty where power resides in the people, Canadian parliamentary sovereignty, for all its anti-populist and anti-plebiscitarian tendencies, possesses several advantages. Part of the advantage lies in the fact that in a system where Parliament is supreme, legislatures and not citizens are allowed to make laws (Johnson 1981, 23). By doing, so, parliamentary supremacy is protected. Moreover, when ascertaining the value of a legislature in comparison to a referendum, certain mitigating circumstances exist which differentiate it from a cruder reflection of public opinion. These thoughts are summed up by Butler and Ranney when they declare that

Representative assemblies are far from perfect, but they have several crucial advantages over referendums: Those advantages are: members meet face to face regularly, they do not immediately or necessarily vote up or down every measure that comes before them, they discuss, refer, study, delay, amend, give, and take. Their decisions only occasionally approach unanimity, but their discussions approach the small-group ideal far more closely then the discussions preceding referendums. Even in national legislatures, votes are mainly expedients to get decisions when the time available for discussion has run out. In referendums, votes are the very essence of the decision process (Butler and Ranney 1978, 36).

Overall, one would be myopic in failing to acknowledge the value of legislatures in their “institutional capacity to blend local and minority interests into national
compromises through the intermediation of parties and strong political executives” (MacDonald 307). Based on these achievements, referendums would be subversive to representative government and would undermine the “constitutional right of Cabinet to design and present legislation based on its majority support in the House of Commons” (MacDonald 307). By way of closure on this specific subject of parliamentary sovereignty and referendums, no comment succeeds in illuminating the negative impact of referendums more than the assertion that the “constitutionalization or regularization of referenda in Canada would be the final blow to legislative supremacy, the pillar on which Confederation, and the Westminster model on which it draws, was founded” (Taylor 1995, 126). As Canadians, we should seek alternative solutions for our decreasing confidence in the political system. Recourse to referendums should not be viewed as the short or long-term solution.

Another often cited criticism of referendums centers around its projected cost. Although virtually everyone would admit that referendums are costly, its advocates point to the fact that the largest component of all the costs is the preparation and revision of the voters’ list (Boyer 1992b, 6). This argument forms the basis of the demand for a permanent voters’ list. This permanent voters’ list would be advantageous in that it would permit shorter general election campaigns. Further, referendum advocates point to other expenditures allocated for other modes of public consultation (Spicer Commission, regional conferences, travelling parliamentary committees) as proof that money is better spent on a referendum where genuine dialogue is engendered and everyone is consulted. It is argued that the above halfway houses of democracy (Boyer 1992b, 7) are insufficient insofar as they cater to a privileged few and fail to represent the majority of Canadians.
By contrast, direct democracy advocates point to referendums as positive tools because it is possible to consult everyone at once.

Accepting the aforementioned positive remarks should not preclude one from acknowledging that notwithstanding the political engagement of all citizens, the cost of a "permanent bureaucracy for maintaining a permanent voters' list would be greater than the cost of our current system" (Van Loon and Whittington 277). This problem is compounded by the related difficulty of even maintaining such a voters' list in as large a country with such a transient population (Marquis 20). Further, one can argue that the above public forums of consultation tend to attract those who are "genuinely interested in an issue, while participation in a referendum may not extend beyond the ballot box" (Marquis 20). Any further speculation should be tempered by Canada's short-lived experiment with a permanent voters' list from 1934 to 1938. Evidence reveals that it "proved less satisfactory than our current system" (Marquis 20). Besides, all one has to do is consider our recent history and whether the $150,000,000 price tag for the inconclusive Charlottetown referendum was really worth it. While citizen empowerment is laudable, hindsight makes one realize that the answer is no. Other methods must be found to empower citizens.

Another set of concerns about referendums surrounds its potential unpredictability coupled with its risk of an inconclusive outcome. Not only do referendums represent an alternative solution that could threaten the established political order but in certain cases, the outcome cannot be guaranteed. In terms of unpredictability, much of the literature points to international examples such as Norway and its bid to join the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1972. By voting against joining the EEC, Norwegians’
opinions not only ran counter to those who held public office but succeeded in splitting the major political parties, forced the governing Labour Party to resign, and “may well have led to a permanent reordering of the Norwegian party spectrum” (Boyer 1982, 8). Another good example of the unpredictability of referendums occurred during the 1992 French vote to approve the Maastricht Treaty. Instead of following the lead of other European nations in easily ratifying the treaty, French voters surprised many by narrowly approving the treaty by less than 1% of the vote. In both cases, levels of anxiety and unpredictability were heightened.

On the home front, one need look no further than the 1948 Newfoundland referendum on joining Canada and the 1995 Quebec referendum on sovereignty as examples of both unpredictable and perhaps inconclusive outcomes. In the case of Newfoundland, voters were asked to choose between commission government for a five-year period, confederation with Canada, or responsible government as it existed before 1933 (Lemieux 132). Although the British government stipulated that a clear majority for one of the options was required, no majority was reached on the first ballot. While the Confederation option eventually won out in the second ballot (52%-48%), this supposedly non-binding referendum served to reflect the ambiguities within Newfoundland society.

In the case of Quebec, not much needs to be repeated with reference to the narrow victory of the federalist forces. Nonetheless, the outcome was both unpredictable and certainly in the eyes of sovereignists inconclusive. While determining the requirements of a majority is another subject entirely, the mixed results of the 1995 referendum succeeded in revealing once again the deep schisms within Quebec society. Moreover, in
terms of the further usefulness of the referendum device, it bears mentioning that "our history reveals that, in referring matters to voters in a plebiscite, not just once or twice but even three times, complex issues that cannot be resolved in a speedy, clear-cut fashion, can eventually just become worn out" (Boyer 1992a, 52). Perhaps the above comment is something for sovereignists to consider when potentially tabling their next referendum.

Although the referendum device is arguably not to blame for the inconclusive results in Quebec, it certainly failed to provide the necessary solution demanded by both sides. Conversely, one could argue that general elections have the same potential of producing unpredictable or inconclusive results (i.e. minority government). Nonetheless, the fact remains that regardless of results, we will always require elections as a means to elect our representatives who are supposed to govern. As a result, one can argue that elections are a necessary pre-requisite for our democracy to function. By contrast, we do not necessarily need referendums as a means to promote democracy or as a necessary pre-condition for its survival. As such, referendums can be shown to be of dubious merit in comparison to the normal channels of representative government.

Like the recall device, referendums, if left without an appropriate framework for its use, have the potential to be captured or dominated by special interest and lobby groups. Through the "adroit use of money and the media" (MacDonald 320), these special interest and lobby groups could easily mobilize popular support. With popular support in hand, these now wealthier interest and lobby groups could use the referendum process as a means to capture "a host of narrow and competing policies" (MacDonald 320). This potential could have a negative impact on the policy-making process since it should never be exclusive interest and lobby groups who set our policy-making agenda
but rather an inclusive discussion between elites and citizens. One might label this view idealtistic and short-sighted but harsh realities dictate that every effort must be made to encourage cooperation and eliminate sources of conflict. Once again, referendums seem to fail that test.

Building on the above arguments, another argument in the case against referendums centers around the role of the mass media. Proponents of referendums maintain that a referendum is a positive tool for it provides a “direct link between the people and government, a modern-day equivalent of the town meeting, where all citizens gather to discuss and resolve public policy” (Boyer 1982, 11). However, in today’s socio-economic and political climates, it is logistically impossible for all voters to meet face to face. Consequently, much of the discussion between government and its people takes place in the media and through opinion polls. These facts dilute the importance of referendums. This minimization of referendums exists because of the fact that there remains an intermediary between government and its people.

Instead of the usual dose of bureaucracy and politicians, the go-between in a referendum campaign ends up to be, in many instances, the mass media. With a mediocracy in the middle, democracy suffers because of the filtration of ideas which do not always accurately convey the feelings and thoughts of the people. Surely, this is yet another drawback of the referendum as a supposed adjunct to our system of representative government.

**COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW OF REFERENDUMS**

Although partially outside the scope of our analysis, a short summary of referendums in the international arena sheds light on its potential usefulness elsewhere.
By way of generalization, evidence reveals that referendums around the world are not widely used as instruments of decision-making (Canada – Lortie Royal Commission 1991a, 237). Moreover, referendums seem to be used most often at the state and local/municipal levels (MacDonald 315). Some countries have never even held a nationwide referendum (India, Israel, Japan, Netherlands, and the United States).

As mentioned previously, Switzerland and some American states have been the greatest exponents of referendums. Much of the practicality of referendums depends on the specific political culture of the country or state. More specifically, one should differentiate between countries where referendums are initiated by elected officials (Canada, France, and Great Britain) as opposed to those initiated by citizens (Switzerland). In addition, some countries are constitutionally required to hold mandatory referendums for any constitutional amendments. These countries include: Austria, Australia, Ireland, and Japan (Canada – Lortie Royal Commission 1991a, 236). Since Canadian referendums are initiated by elected officials the question that remains is: should citizen-initiated referendums like those found in Switzerland or variants thereof become more common place in Canada? The answer is at best a problematic one.

When one looks for an international perspective on referendums, few would deny that the majority of the literature points to Switzerland as the leading example. Switzerland conducts referendums nationally as well as at the canton or local level. If 100,000 electors sign a petition, the legislature must submit the legislation for popular ratification in a referendum (Canada – Lortie Royal Commission 1991a, 236). Indeed, statistics reveal that Switzerland is the leading advocate of referendums as evidenced by its over 400 referendums since its birth in 1848 (Butler and Ranney 1994, 5).
Notwithstanding the fact that most citizen-initiated referendums are rejected and
government ones accepted, Switzerland is viewed by the literature as a nation whose
political culture allows direct democracy to run smoothly and unfettered. These views are
buttressed by the general comment that

Switzerland, then is the home of the referendum. It is the country that has used
referendums most. It has made referendums an integral part of its political life. It
has shown that, at least in a small, sophisticated country, direct democracy can
work with almost none of the ill consequences which have been ascribed to it in
political argument elsewhere. Switzerland provided the model on which American
and other evangelists for direct democracy based their cases in the 1890s and
1900s. And the Swiss can claim that the original continues to work better than its
imitators (Dunsmuir 28).

It is the question of how well referendums work in imitating nations like Canada which
will form our focus in the last section on the overall assessment of the feasibility of
referendums.

Although other countries (especially Western Europe) utilize referendums,
statistics reveal that they do not approach the levels in Switzerland (Butler and Ranney
1994. 5). While most western democracies have used referendums at least once since the
Second World War, Switzerland stands alone as a champion of referendum democracy
and one where the “role of the individual citizen is the foremost concern of the governing
process” (Sigg 25).

Notwithstanding the positive attributes of referendums in Switzerland, negative
arguments exist which should not be glossed over by Canadian reformers. Firstly,
decreasing turnout rates (approaching 35%) indicate that the Swiss are growing tired of
constant referendums (MacDonald 317). Decreasing turnouts in Switzerland have been
linked to a related problem of low levels of political efficacy on the part of non-voters.
Although the increasing political helplessness appears anomalous in a country like
Switzerland (Canada –Lortie Royal Commission 1991a, 237), the fact remains that citizens have become disillusioned. While further explanation of this apparent disillusionment is beyond the scope of this analysis, suffice to say that a combination of weak political parties and highly organized interest groups have contributed to this sort of political malaise (Canada –Lortie Royal Commission 1991a, 237-238). Consequently, one should be careful in prescribing Swiss direct democracy for Canada.

In spite of the different cultures and at least the qualified successes of referendums in Switzerland, much debate should continue on the subject because the referendum device “does not appear to be an exportable commodity” (Dunsmuir 28) to Canada as some reformers might lead us to believe. Moreover, Quebec sovereignists should be wary of an infatuation with referendums to achieve their desired goals because as evidenced by the Swiss case, perpetual recourse to referendums can lead to decreasing turnouts and undeniable citizen disenchantment and/or disillusionment with their respective governments.

**OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF REFERENDUMS**

In his argument for direct democracy. Preston Manning maintains that referendums can be beneficial as a form of checks and balances against the use and potential abuse of power by elected representatives. In his book, Manning “cautions readers to seek a middle ground between the Swiss infatuation with referenda and Canada’s historical allergy to them” (Laycock 240). Manning’s support for referendums is illustrated by his feeling that direct democracy in general could provide a complement to parliamentary democracy, to make the government more representative and responsible than at present. The aim is to achieve a better balance and to ensure that one set of abuses (the constant ignoring of majority opinion by elected officials and special interests) is not replaced by another set of
abuses (the use of referendum votes by majorities to run roughshod over minority rights or special interests) (Manning 1992, 326).

With Manning's comments in mind, one must gauge whether direct democracy in the form of referendums could co-exist with representative democracy, and lead in turn to a form of "politics of engagement – where the Canadian people themselves are engaged in the risk and consequences of deciding issues" (Boyer 1992b, 4). This question must be addressed if we are to determine what the future holds for Canadian democracy.

As these sections on referendums have demonstrated, Canadian experiences with them have been for the most part circumscribed to a few issues which were deemed of transcending national importance. As such, Canada's referendum experience does not "reflect any particular ideological view of direct democracy, but instead demonstrates a somewhat ad hoc, reluctant use of direct voting measures to further political objectives" (Billingsley 1995, 117).

As mentioned previously, referendum democracy necessitates making a value judgment as to whether to broaden citizen access to the policy-making process or to simply continue elite decision-making with limited public involvement. In assessing the advantages and disadvantages of referendums as a direct democratic tool, citizens are forced to make subjective rather than objective observations. In other words, the answer to the question of more or less referendums in our democracy lies in the "strength of one's democratic values" (Billingsley 1995, 146). More specifically,

While an evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the referendum can help increase knowledge about the device, it alone cannot be relied upon to reach a final position on the adoption of the referendum. It makes no sense, for instance, to count the number of benefits and costs and form an opinion based on the overall total. Similarly, no mathematical formula exists to calculate precisely the appropriateness of the referendum by considering the importance of each strength and weakness. Such assessments are subjective and are likely to differ markedly
among individuals. Rather, the arguments most often heard in favour of or in opposition to the referendum are actually rooted in normative considerations that lie at the heart of democratic theory. Fundamentally, political scientists must consider the extent to which public input is desirable in a democracy (Hahn and Kamieniecki 23-24).

While this author’s opinions rest on the former view of broadening citizen access to the policy-making process, current political realities coupled with inherent deficiencies in the referendum device itself dictate otherwise and make it more difficult to endorse referendums outright. Although Canadians require a form of democratic renewal, referendum democracy is “not so much a panacea as a pinata filled with problems for the unwary electorate” (Adamson 54).

To be fair, referendums, unlike recall’s checkered history and perception as alien to the Canadian political scene, have more of a chance of being accepted as a means to counter Canadians’ lower levels of political efficacy. In theory, this acceptance of referendums would have to occur within a mixed system of direct and representative democracy. Advocates of such a system laud its potential by arguing that

> Individuals should not be bound by law they did not help make or participate in making. In other words, the individual, all individuals, must be consulted in the making of laws which will affect them. If they are not consulted, the law is invalid ... This is again an attempt to make the representative more responsive to the wishes of constituents and, in a broader sense, to bring the whole representative system more in line with the ideals of direct democracy (Sargent 51).

Although direct citizen participation coupled with political representation is an ideal worth striving for, one cannot overlook inherited British parliamentary practices. Short of jettisoning those inherited British parliamentary practices, Canadian political culture and ingrained representative principles preclude the baptism of referendums as our sacred
child that will solve all our ethnic, linguistic, regional, and above all constitutional problems.

In lieu of Canada's two recent failed attempts at constitutional renewal, few would deny the need for "mass public consultations" (Marquis 21) if new constitutional discussions begin again in earnest. Although support might exist for the right to hold one referendum per mandate on an issue of transcending national importance, all the previous analysis of academic skepticism towards referendums should force reformers to at least rethink the alternative and accord it the necessary scrutiny it deserves. Besides, holding a referendum on one issue opens the door for other issues to be considered for a referendum. As well, issues of transcending national importance can easily differ from one individual to another. For these reasons, any move to referendum democracy in Canada will be a problematic one.

Negative arguments aside, one would be foolish not to completely acknowledge the value of referendums. Proponents of the device maintain that referendums mean that "issues are squarely faced; public decisions are publicly arrived at; popular will is accurately expressed; apathy and alienation are reduced; and people have a greater voice in major political decisions" (Boyer 1992a, 56). In addition, Butler and Ranney, while acknowledging the confrontational nature of referendums, are nonetheless inclined to point out its advantages. More specifically, they maintain that

In every polity there are times and circumstances when some decision is better than no decision, when continuing delay is itself disruptive of consensus and good temper, when the likelihood of working out a just compromise that will please everyone is slim or non-existent. In such a situation the referendum has at least one great virtue: not only will it produce a decision, but the decision it produces is, in this democratic age, more likely to be regarded as legitimate and therefore acceptable than is a decision produced indirectly by elected officials (Butler and Ranney 1978, 226).
When the above possibilities are combined with referendums' abilities to set aside issues "too hot for representative bodies to handle" (Butler and Ranney 1978, 226), one realizes that referendums do have the potential to legitimize the policy-making process. It is this potential which must be harnessed if referendums are to serve as a valuable accessory to representative democracy.

With the effort to paint an objective portrait done, even those reformers imbued with a deep faith in Canadian democracy cannot overlook the deficiencies in the referendum process which on the whole, make the device a negative phenomenon on the Canadian political landscape. Although many politicians regard the referendum device as a "rubber life raft into which we may all have to climb" (Butler and Ranney 1994, 260) at one point or another, Canadian experience since Confederation makes a persuasive case against its general use as a substitute for representative assemblies. Indeed, one can argue that all three Canadian referendums contributed to increased levels of resentment between groups and in some cases exacerbated rather than attenuated seemingly intractable problems (English-French issues, constitution).

In the late 19th Century, political theorist Albert Venn Dicey wrote that "I have not the remotest doubt that under the present condition of things, sham parliamentary government means a very vicious form of government by party, and from this I believe the referendum may partially save us" (quoted in Conacher 184). As we enter the 21st Century, Canadian parliamentary government, while flawed in certain ways, provides a more effective vehicle than referendums to attain substantive public policies. Socio-political realities in Canada strengthen the opposing argument that referendum democracy would be a sham whereby parliamentary government would be the solution.
Although it would be hard to deny that referendums are "gaining credibility and have gained the force of law in some parts of the country" (Marquis 23), it is somewhat of a self-evident proposition that the "use of referendums on any considerable scale would inevitably weaken and demoralize the scheme of parliamentary government which Canada has inherited and developed" (Boyer 1992a, 41). Moreover, using the metaphor of a horse and buggy, it would be "impossible to drive in double harness responsible government and plebiscites of any sort without getting ditched, for a minority cannot serve two masters – the legislative body insisting on one thing and the electorate requiring something different" (quoted in Boyer 1992a, 41).

Referendums are a "pernicious and unparliamentary device" (Boyer 1988-1989, 4) because if issues are decided by citizens over the heads of those that purport to represent them, the accountability and governability of Parliament is nullified. Governability is nullified because instead of using public opinion polls and the "widespread dissemination of information in the news media" (Boyer 1992a, 42) to mold and if necessary alter policies, government remains handcuffed and a prisoner to the people. Surely, all would applaud moving towards a form of quasi-popular sovereignty but at what cost? In this case, "grafting the plebiscite technique onto the Canadian law-making system" (Boyer 1992a, 42) should be viewed as too high a price to pay.

Accepting the fact that referendums are probably going to remain part of the Canadian political scene is one thing, but jumping on the direct democracy bandwagon as an "unalloyed advocate" (Butler and Ranney 1994, 263) is another more dangerous tactic which could further damage our search for an enriched democracy. Our quest for an
enriched participatory democracy is difficult enough that we do not need additional roadblocks to overcome. Referendums would provide those additional roadblocks.

Building on the notion that referendums damage Parliament’s ability to govern, referendums are not viable alternatives because they offer only a simplistic yes or no answer to potentially complex issues. A “one-shot decision by voters” (Hatfield 23) is not the way to solve issues of supposed transcending national importance. While people do have a say on the issues, their participation is more muted and superficial than meaningful. This casual participation is compounded by the problem that political parties and the government of the day are not sincere since in most cases, they shift responsibility to the voters which in turn allows them the flexibility to approve or reject the measure in question. This idea of not being bound to a specific issue is supported by the contention that “the referendum is the Pontius Pilate of … politics. It permits and was intended to permit a party to take two wholly incompatible views and in the meantime allow government to stand back and wash its hands of the entire issue” (Adamson 54).

For democracy to function more effectively, the above behaviour cannot continue to exist. Instead, government and its people must work together to accommodate the varying needs of both sides. Although theoretically sound but practically more difficult to attain, one has hopefully realized that referendums are not the universal remedies that many have hoped for. Moreover, it is clear that all the above characteristics of the referendum are ominous for a country such as Canada. A fundamentally homogeneous nation might be able to accommodate the polarizing tendencies of the referendum system because these are offset by many factors unifying its people. In Canada, we must continually compromise to survive. We must seek out consensus and accommodate our minorities. We cannot afford a system which emphasizes on a regular basis the divisions that do exist. We should cherish, rather, the
parliamentary system of representative and responsible government, a system unequalled in its ability to reconcile the clashing elements of society and to reconcile the necessity of government with the freedom of society (Hatfield 23). Taking Hatfield’s comments at face value should force even eternal optimists of direct democracy to at least question the compatibility of referendums with representative parliamentary government. Conversely, unrelenting critics and pundits (including this author), while acknowledging increased usage of referendums around the world, find much support in Hatfield’s closing comments.

While deficiencies in our political system necessitate change, the mixed experiences of referendums cast a shadow over its desirability and suitability for Canada. Although debate on the subject should continue, it is clear from this piece that alternative avenues should be pursued which could lead to “more active participation by the people, thereby alleviating some of the shortcomings of representative democracy” (Cote 1992, 46). Therefore, if referendums cannot enhance representative democracy, what instrument can? Hopefully, we will find solutions to this key question.

Given the present nature of our country, referendums should not be viewed as short-term or long-term solutions to what ails the Canadian body politic. Instead, according to past experience, referendums have proven “not to be truly a part of our political practices” (Cote 1992, 45). By failing to accurately measure the intensity of feelings, referendums run the risk of substituting a vociferous and outspoken minority for a potentially neutral or passive majority. Thus, even though referendums adhere to the democratic principle of majority rule, this adherence must be tempered by the fact that the supposed respect for minority rights can become suspect.
In spite of the fact that referendums grant people a voice, they weaken the power of governments and on contentious issues, one can argue that they damage the cohesiveness and social fabric of our bilingual country. There is little doubt that in a country with so many ethnic, linguistic, and regional cleavages, referendums as "supplements or substitutes for the central government" (Lemieux 139) will encounter obstacles at best or will eventually be eliminated as an option at worst. Indeed, other more effective and less expensive ways need to be found to correct what some observers view as "legislative sins of commission" (Magleby 1985, 52).

Realizing the plethora of differences on so many issues should make one appreciate the reconciling advantages of parliaments. In a somewhat dated but still relevant article, former New-Brunswick Premier Richard Hatfield makes a persuasive case for the parliamentary system and against referendums. In his conclusion Hatfield remarked that

The parliamentary system encourages compromise, conciliation, and consensus; it pays heed to minorities and individuals; it retains its responsiveness. The referendum system encourages a series of polarizations on different issues. Each new matter is dealt with in isolation, starting from scratch, and there is no incentive for communities to coalesce (Hatfield 23).

What this piece is attempting to do is take Hatfield's remark and improve upon it. More specifically, while many representationists accuse participationists of being naïve about their expectations and acknowledge the modern realities of government, ways must be found to ensure that Hatfield's conclusion becomes a fact of life.

At the moment, Parliament seems to have remained entrenched in the workings of executive federalism. Lately, it has tried to shed this image (Charlottetown, promises regarding future constitutional discussions). Nonetheless, Parliament does not encourage
compromise, conciliation, and consensus. Further, by eschewing methods of cooperation while at the same time displaying token gestures for minorities and individuals, our governments have exhibited a clear lack of responsiveness required of governments bent on providing for its citizens. While it seems that referendum democracy is not the solution, governments must remember that

Canadians seek more than just a stable government and buoyant economy; they desire a more adequate democracy. Canadians desire a democracy which allows greater participation. They desire a democracy that no longer excludes certain groups from their rightful place in our rich heritage and society. They desire a democracy that is centered upon a belief in equality, justice and co-operation (Canada – Citizen’s Forum – Spicer Commission 106).

Building on the above remark, one is reminded that although it remains important to allow the citizenry a voice to “express a collective verdict” (Boyer 1992b, 17), the referendum option does not successfully incorporate the necessary pre-conditions of cooperation, equality, and justice. Citizens must be cognizant of this fact because

In this age in which the public agenda is too often set by a small political elite, a coterie of senior public servants, opinion pollsters, media gurus, special interest groups and paid lobbyists, extra efforts must be made to rescue the public agenda. When the political classes can operate within a cozy and intellectually incestuous relationship, an occasional reality check with the citizens of the country is not a bad idea (Boyer 1992b 17).

Unfortunately, as has been argued, the referendum is not a suitable device to successfully rescue the public agenda. Rather, it seems that the relaxation of party discipline coupled with the introduction of more free votes have a better and arguably cheaper chance of spawning a Canadian democracy that would restore to citizens their legislative sovereignty as well as rightful role as political players in an understandably complex political environment. When this potentiality is combined with a reformed electoral
system. Canadians would then be privy to an appreciably improved system of
government than they otherwise have at the moment.

It is time to pursue a new path and realize that while our outdated conventions
may have served us well in the 19th and early 20th Centuries, times have changed and they
should no longer figure in the mechanics of government but for perhaps historical
conjecture. As the balance of this treatise will demonstrate, a more participatory form of
representative government can be achieved if one combines the aforementioned
relaxation of party discipline and free votes with an alternative electoral system. Indeed,
hope should not be lost in search for a form of communitarian democracy where all could
enjoy Rousseau’s aspirations for greater levels of popular sovereignty. Indeed, if these
goals were achieved, Canada would come closer to achieving the somewhat lofty yet
attainable goals and objectives of what a participatory democracy should be.
CHAPTER FIVE

ELECTORAL SYSTEM

Our habit of treating the voice of a majority as equivalent to the voice of all is so deeply engrained that we hardly think it has a history.

-- Maitland

Ultimately any form of democratic government must stand or fall not so much by its perfect subservience to majorities as by its just treatment of minorities -- a far more difficult condition to fulfil. That minorities must not rule is only the first canon of good government; the second is that they must not be ignored.

-- Sharp 1911

Few would question the claim that one of the most salient characteristics of democratic theory and liberal democracy today is the role of elections. Often recognized as the basis of democratic legitimacy, competitive political elections can be defined as a formal expression of preferences by the governed, which are then aggregated and transformed into a collective decision about who will govern -- who should stay in office, who should be thrown out, who should replace those who have been thrown out (Harrop and Miller 2).

Further, within democratic theory, the centrality of elections is fairly obvious as illustrated by the remark that

Democracy, then cannot mean the rule of the majority or the rule of the masses ... Democracy is not a way of governing, whether by majority or otherwise, but primarily a way of determining who shall govern by referring the question to public opinion and accepting on each occasion the verdict of the polls (MacIver 148).

Therefore, if one is concerned with the functioning of a democratic system of government, elections can be thought of as the defining moment in that form of government (O'Neal 1).

Unlike many non-democratic nations, Canadian elections provide a way of changing leaders without resorting to bloodshed. Every five years, the ensconced
government must call an election. Every election becomes a sort of 'snap shot' of the people's moods and feelings as well as an effort to reveal "trends in underlying social, economic and political processes" (Harrop and Miller 10). For many, elections are important because they may be the only opportunities they have to participate in the political process. As a result, one hopes that the electorate's wishes are respected at the ballot box.

By attempting to maintain order, ensure system stability, and preserve basic fundamentals of democracy, elections are simply tools to achieve these ends.

Nonetheless, for elections to proceed, an electoral system is a vital institutional component that is necessary to provide a means of tabulating the vote and subsequently converting it into legislative representation. More accurately, the electoral system can be defined as the "rules that govern the processes by which electoral preferences are articulated as votes and by which these votes are translated into distributions of governmental authority (typically parliamentary seats) among the competing political parties" (Seidle 1989, 249). This definition is supported by a more specific thought that

In a representative democracy, the electoral system serves as the key constitutional mechanism whereby the citizenry chooses - either reaffirms or replaces - its representatives, grants them the authority to act on its behalf, and keeps the representatives accountable for their decisions and actions (Hyson 1988, 26).

It is the electoral system that will serve as our third institutional device which if redesigned, can hopefully enhance existing democratic procedures by opening more avenues for citizen participation.

Since its birth, Canada has witnessed a plurality system, otherwise known as the first-past-the-post system. By way of short historical lesson, the plurality system is an
inheritance from Great Britain where elected representation began in 1265 (Seidle 1996, 283). The plurality principle was formalized by an act in 1430 and took root in the British colonies once elected assemblies were established, beginning with Nova Scotia in 1758 (Seidle 1989, 250). The somewhat strange reference to the electoral system as first-past-the-post stems from the fact that the British have historically loved horseracing so by extension, the winner of any race has always been the first past the post.

The plurality system stipulates that in a single-member constituency, the candidate with a plurality of the vote is declared the winner of that district. Although this plurality system has existed without alterations on the federal level, an increase in governmental instability in the late 1970s and early 1980s prompted many scholars to propose reforms to the Canadian electoral system. Although the push for reform died down somewhat during the majority governments of the Mulroney era, one has witnessed a resurgence in the debate in light of the two most recent federal elections. In the elections of 1993 and 1997, Chretien and the Liberals won majority governments without coming close to winning a majority of the vote. Although more analysis on the elections is forthcoming, suffice to say that many electoral discrepancies occurred which in some cases exaggerated a party’s position while in other cases severely crippled the party (i.e. 1993 Progressive Conservative Party collecting over two million votes but only two seats in the House of Commons).

Notwithstanding the sprinkling of discussion on the electoral system in years past, the federal elections of 1979 and 1980 demonstrated glaring weaknesses in the electoral system. Although the literature points to a variety of flaws in the electoral system, David Elton and Roger Gibbins of the Canada West Foundation specify four critical defects,
which will serve as part of the framework from which further inquiry can be made as to possible reforms. The four defects include: 1) the electoral system damages national unity by fostering identification of particular parties with regions or provinces, 2) the electoral system accentuates regional cleavages within the House of Commons, 3) the electoral system fails to impartially translate votes into seats, and 4) the electoral system favours regionally concentrated parties (i.e. Social Credit, Reform, Bloc Quebecois) and discriminates against parties that receive broad national support (i.e. NDP, Progressive Conservatives) (Elton and Gibbins 1-2). This last defect can also be referred to as over-amplification.

Before moving on, one must remember that upcoming sections are attempting to determine the effect of the electoral system on Canadian democracy. As such, one could interpret the aforementioned four defects as ones which impede democracy and violate democratic principles mentioned in the theoretical introduction at the outset of this piece. While a repetition of the theoretical underpinnings of democracy is not necessary, the above defects in democratic values are arguably enough to make one realize that the electoral system is not fair and especially in light of the last two elections, failing to fulfill public expectations. Simply stated, if left unaltered, the above four defects can become malignant which would place Canadian democracy at serious risk.

Although many different aspects of the relationship between the electoral system and democracy will be touched upon, one of the main underlying themes for investigation surrounds the problem of regional polarization. More specifically, by accentuating regional imbalances and conflict, the Canadian electoral system may be viewed as a divisive factor because it weakens national unity and creates the possibility that the
government in power will not be representative of the diversity of Canadian interests. In spite of the argument that a reformed Senate could provide equal representation in government and thus end any potential need for electoral reform, this hope seems far away from ever being realized. Nonetheless, what one must realize is that the Canadian electoral system is in dire need of reform to not only address the four defects alluded to earlier but to rectify the democratic deficit we are facing.

To improve the electoral system and strengthen participatory democracy, the goal should be to introduce some form of proportional representation (also labeled as PR) which could complement and/or co-exist with the existing plurality system. While the credibility of these reform proposals will be presented in the evaluative section of this chapter, the first task of this piece consists of illuminating key theoretical characteristics of both major electoral systems and how they impact on the functioning of democracy. Secondly, an assessment of the key theoretical characteristics in relation to the above four problems will be presented. By doing so, a better evaluation can be made as to the effects a mixed/hybrid electoral system would have in promoting an improved participatory democracy in general as well as the strengths of first-past-the-post and proportional representation in particular.

In attempting to answer the question of which electoral system is best for Canada, one must recognize that each electoral system is effective in promoting certain specific societal interests. It will be argued that while proportional representation is advantageous for democracy and democratic principles of representation for all, the plurality formula, in the eyes of its advocates, is designed to supposedly ensure more governmental stability and responsible government by encouraging a two-party system and furnishing one-party
dominance in power. Unfortunately, the theoretical idea of a plurality electoral system leading to a two-party system has been dashed by the two most recent elections that witnessed a regionalized multi-party system that split the vote five ways and almost led to a minority government in 1997. Moreover, since stability is a subjective term that could relate to either Cabinet or regime stability, it is a problematic term that is compounded even further by the potential for a minority government to get elected.

It will be argued that due to the characteristics of its present electoral system, Canada has failed the democracy and stability tests. When inadequate regional representation is compounded by an historical occurrence of minority government, the result is a supposed lack of legitimacy for the government of the day. Since these problems have plagued Canada for years, democratic reforms must be proposed which could hopefully balance the see-saw of democracy and stability and provide Canadians with the opportunity to effect changes which could bring about a democratic renewal in the country. Unless some sort of reform package is introduced and hopefully implemented, Canada will continue failing the democracy and stability tests which does not bode well for a country seeking to move forward.

THEORY OF PLURALITY/FIRST PAST THE POST ELECTORAL SYSTEM

The plurality formula of election has been argued by many scholars to favour a stable two-party system. Regarding the political world as essentially divided into two opposing camps, the majority of the literature concurs on the fact that plurality electoral systems reinforce the dualism of two parties while electoral systems of proportional representation undermine dualism by multiplying political parties and political choices (Taagepera and Shugart 50, Duverger 217).
In arguing that the plurality system “tends to lead to a two-party system” (Grofman and Lijphart 70), credence is given to the logic that governmental stability and responsible government will result in systems that polarize into two combative groups. In addition, these two groups create the possibility of stable one-party government. These arguments are buttressed by the proponents of the plurality formula who argue that “its great advantage is that it produces firm government … Their line of reasoning is that the plurality method, by discriminating against small parties, encourages a two-party system which in turn makes stable one-party government possible” (Lijphart and Grofman 5). According to Lijphart, government will be stable because “it will be a cohesive entity consisting of a single party, the majority party, instead of a coalition of parties with divergent interests” (Lijphart 1984, 108).

Although the plurality formula possesses advantages such as the promotion of stability and its relative voting simplicity in the eyes of the electorate, there are those who refute the alleged benefits of the formula. Firstly, plurality systems generally witness voting split between two opposing candidates and parties at the expense of a third candidate and party. Notwithstanding the most recent elections of 1993 and 1997 that witnessed a multi-party system with five parties splitting the vote, the usual consequence of such a plurality method of election is a “majoritarian bulldozer that crushes all small parties” (Lijphart and Grofman 36). With two main parties competing and especially five parties, most electoral victories are a plurality victory and not a majority one.

By not attaining 50% plus one in an election, the winning candidate or party benefits from a manufactured majority which serves in essence as a “mechanism of disproportional representation” (Bogdanor and Butler 30). This manufactured majority
witnesses a party win less than a majority of the popular vote but is still able to win a majority of seats in the legislature. As a result, there is little doubt that other parties are correspondingly disadvantaged by the plurality formula. As Canadian political scientist William P. Irvine explains, “all plurality systems tend to exaggerate the parliamentary representation of the strongest party, to penalize the second party and to devastate third parties whose support is thinly spread across the breadth of the country” (Irvine 1979, 11). The corollary is that by exaggerating the strength of the government party, plurality systems can produce weak and ineffective oppositions (Cairns 1968, 57). Consequently, a question to be posed is: are the above potentialities democratic? Although the above realities have for the most part been accepted as part of Canadian political life, the overall assessment would be that the above potentialities are not democratic because they violate the principle of majority rule, a rule which is central to our theoretical discussion of democracy.

One of the greatest arguments for plurality systems impeding democracy is that representation is not well served by this kind of electoral system. Discouraged from electoral participation, small groups holding seemingly extreme positions may be prompted to resort to other non-democratic means to achieve their ends (O’Neal 15). As well, due to the fact that plurality systems can distort outcomes by favouring stronger parties who may be regionally concentrated at the expense of underrepresenting weaker or smaller parties, it is clear that the wishes of most voters are often not reflected in electoral outcomes.

As mentioned previously, elections can be viewed as the “only tangible evidence of what it means to be a citizen in a democratic society” (O’Neal 2). As such, elections
and their electoral systems must be perceived as fair and fulfilling public expectations
(O’Neal 2). Unless elections and their electoral systems allow citizens an opportunity to
participate as well as some commensurate form of parliamentary representation,
democracy is jeopardized. Regarding our plurality electoral system, one scholar summed
it up well when she remarked that

> It cannot be relied upon, either to give Parliament reflecting all the main trends of
opinion, or to place in power a government backed by the majority of the
electorate, or even by the largest single body of voters. It ... frequently excludes
... from parliament men and women whose contributions to it would be most
valuable. It ... cannot be relied upon, either to give one party power to govern
unhindered according to its own ideas, or on the other hand to produce
government by consent (Lakeman 1974, 57).

For all its theoretical abilities to produce stable governments (i.e. not subject to defeat in
votes of confidence and more apt to complete its legislative term), the plurality system is
far from being an ideal system because of its failure to focus adequately on the
democratic representation side of the debate.

**PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION (PR) ELECTORAL SYSTEM**

In fearing the potential outcomes of plurality electoral systems, proportional
representation was advocated in an attempt to satisfy democratic ideals and allow for all
opinions to be expressed. By doing so, proportional representation would thus adhere
better to the pure idea of democracy which posits that government is “of the people, by
the whole people, equally represented” (Mill 53).

While the plurality electoral system is supposed to favour stability in the form of
one-party government in power, the electoral system of proportional representation tends
to lean towards and give more weight to a more exact mathematical representation of the
electorate’s views. Unlike the plurality method, proportional representation comprises
multi-member constituencies that attempt to represent a broad spectrum of interests in a particular constituency. Further, by allocating seats in direct proportion to votes cast, every vote counts and unlike the plurality electoral system, there are no wasted votes. Thus, by espousing democratic objectives, electoral systems of proportional representation arguably possess characteristics that could benefit a Canadian electoral system that seems to lack them.

Another important advantage offered by electoral systems of proportional representation is that unlike plurality electoral systems, minority views are not marginalized as much. In other words, “political discourse and political participation are enlivened in PR systems” (O’Neal 19). Thus, unlike plurality electoral systems, electoral systems of proportional representation encourage the emergence of extreme or more generally non-mainstream views which though quite often based on “short-lived opinions of the day, are given a certain longevity and enhanced legitimacy through access to parliamentary representation” (O’Neal 19). While one hopes that society is able to recognize extreme or non-mainstream views and subsequently marginalize them from political discourse if necessary, it remains important to hear all views so as to not become close minded. Finally, it bears mentioning that statistics prove the above points insofar as voter turnouts are consistently higher in electoral systems of proportional representation as opposed to plurality electoral systems (O’Neal 19). Voter turnout in Canada supports the above claim as evidenced by turnout percentages of 67%, 70%, 75%, and 75% in the four most recent federal elections starting from the most recent in 1997 (McArthur A9, Lavoie 1998-1999, 25).
In contrast to positive arguments supporting electoral systems of proportional representation, arguments against proportional representation can be just as compelling. As such, Canadian reformers should be leery of an outright adoption of a pure electoral system of proportional representation. Electoral systems of proportional representation have been argued to cause a lack of stability and a corresponding inadequate level of responsible government. This is argued on the basis that single party majority government is difficult to attain and coalition government is usually the norm (Dickerson and Flanagan 314). Thus, according to one scholar, “when casting their ballots in a PR system, voters are not electing a government. Governments under PR are typically formed after elections … Voters, in effect, have little direct say regarding the complexion of their government” (O’Neal 20). In addition, one can argue that coalition government can make accommodation and compromise more difficult to the point of being almost impossible to attain (Dickerson and Flanagan 314).

By promoting coalitions, electoral systems of proportional representation can balkanize the party structure by further militating against governmental stability. However, a caveat must be inserted. This caveat concerns the issue of majority versus minority government. While the issue will be broached in greater detail in upcoming sections surrounding reform proposals, suffice to mention that Canada has witnessed numerous minority governments that have survived minority status anywhere from nine months (Joe Clark - 1979-1980) to over five years spread out over two mandates (Lester Pearson - 1963-1968).

Although some European countries have survived quite well with stable coalition governments (Austria, Germany and the Nordic countries), Canada has only witnessed
coalition government twice in its history. The first experience occurred during the attempts to establish Confederation. At that time, history reveals that all the constituent units except Canada East witnessed the formation of coalitions. The most notable coalition was between John A. Macdonald and George Brown in Canada West. The second coalition occurred during the Union Government of 1917 that joined the governing Conservatives under Borden with the English-speaking Liberals. Its principal objective was to introduce conscription on a reluctant French-speaking rural population. In spite of these two attempts at coalition formation, Canada has not developed a tradition of coalition government. Instead, the party with a plurality of seats has formed the government.

With the above facts in mind, what needs to be addressed is whether governmental stability and democracy in general are sacrificed when a party wins a minority government. More specifically, is it necessarily a negative consequence if the governing minority party faces the possibility of losing a non-confidence vote and having to resign? While the short non-mainstream answer is that minority government is not necessarily a negative phenomenon, this question along with several other ones concerning the issues of democracy and stability will be analyzed in an effort to determine the severity of Canada’s electoral problems. However, before entering such controversial waters, one must be reminded of Canada’s historical experiences with electoral reform in general and forms of proportional representation in particular.

**THE HISTORY OF ELECTORAL REFORM IN CANADA**

Although present-day Canada uses the first-past-past post electoral method for elections at all levels (federal, provincial, and municipal), historical examples exist of
electoral reform being attempted in Western Canada. Undoubtedly buoyed by the rise of the Progressive Party after the First World War, a small push for proportional representation at the federal level occurred in the mid-1920s but eventually faded off the political screen in response to increased "resistance from vested interests and fear of extremism" (Loenen 1997, 155). While proportional representation has never been implemented at the federal level, the municipal level witnessed many major western cities adopt proportional representation. Examples of cities that used versions of proportional representation included: Vancouver, Victoria, Calgary, Edmonton, Regina, Saskatoon, and Winnipeg (Medvedev 79). Unfortunately, the experiment with proportional representation did not last long with an average of two or three elections per city (Loenen 1997, 154). The reasons for the short-lived experiments were "the alleged complexity of the system, fears that extremists might be elected, and interference from political machines that jealously guarded their interests from the encroachment of too much democracy" (Loenen 1997, 154).

At the provincial level, three provinces employed proportional representation. Both Alberta and Manitoba utilized proportional representation for over thirty years (1926-1955 and 1924-1955 respectively) while British Columbia used proportional representation from 1952-1953 (Medvedev 79, Elton and Gibbins 15). In the cases of Alberta and Manitoba, the old plurality electoral system was replaced by two specific forms of proportional representation. An alternative or preferential ballot (also labeled as AV) was used in smaller rural constituencies while a single transferable vote was used in larger multi-seat urban constituencies. In the case of British Columbia, the alternative/preferential ballot was used for their short-lived electoral experiment. In brief,
an alternative/preferential ballot "permits voters to rank candidates according to their individual preference" (Elton and Gibbins 16) with those receiving the lowest amount of votes eliminated so that second choices could be transferred to other candidates. This transfer of ballots guaranteed that each MLA was being elected by a majority of his/her constituents.

By contrast, a single transferable vote (also labeled as STV) is similar to the alternative or preferential ballot except that it "provides for the election of a number of the most preferred candidates from among a long list of candidates" (Elton and Gibbins 16-17). Once again, voters would rank candidates in multi-member constituencies and the candidate with the lowest amount of votes would be eliminated and his/her votes would be transferred to the next choice until candidates achieved a simple quota. The simple quota was calculated as the number of eligible voters divided by the number of seats in the constituency plus one.

Alternative or preferential ballots coupled with the single transferable vote were lauded as positive steps forward because they provided voters with maximum freedom in choosing amongst candidates and ensured that party preferences of the electorate were reflected in the makeup of the respective legislature (Elton and Gibbins 17). Unfortunately, both electoral methods possessed weaknesses which exist even today in the few countries that still use them.

Before summarizing the drawbacks of the alternative/preferential ballot as well as the single transferable vote, one is reminded that in the end, the two voting procedures slipped into political obscurity seemingly forever when they were abandoned in favour of the old plurality/first-past-the-post electoral system. The main reason for the
abandonment of the voting methods in all three provinces was that it was to the “partisan advantage of the governing party to do so” (Elton and Gibbins 23). No case better illustrates this fact than the aforementioned short-lived experiment in British Columbia in 1952-1953.

In 1952, with the support of the opposition Conservatives, the governing Liberals in British Columbia decided to change the established plurality electoral system to an alternative/preferential ballot. The literature concurs on the fact that the main reason for the sudden alteration in the electoral system was to “allow the Liberals and Conservatives to stop the CCF from gaining a plurality in constituencies where the two older parties saw their support splitting” (Medvedev 79). Evidently, the Liberals and Conservatives perceived the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) as a threat to the establishment and wanted to ensure the “election of a free-enterprise government” (Elton and Gibbins 21). Clearly, by forcing CCF candidates to gain a majority of the vote in the respective constituencies, logic dictated that the move seemed destined to succeed.

To the surprise of both the governing Liberals and opposition Conservatives, the newly created Social Credit Party turned the new electoral system on its head. By undoubtedly striking a chord with voters dissatisfied with status quo politics, the Social Credit Party was able to channel the dissatisfaction into a surprise election victory. Another election was held the following year (1953) and once again, buoyed by what some saw as a multiple-choice type of voting system that tended to “legitimize dark horses” (Rayner A19), the Social Credit Party was able to win the election and form the government. However, as is often the case with parties in power, the Social Credit Party under Premier W.A.C. Bennett sensed a partisan advantage in returning to the old
plurality electoral system. This feeling is supported by the contention that “the ability of the party to obtain a plurality in a larger number of constituencies than which it could obtain a majority was undoubtedly reason enough to convince Mr. Bennett to abolish preferential voting and return to the single candidate plurality system” (Elton and Gibbins 23). What one should extract as a lesson from this historical aside is that manipulation of institutional devices such as the electoral system which are to the partisan advantage of a party should be avoided lest that party risks damaging their own credibility as well as the legitimacy of the entire political process.

Returning to the analysis of the weaknesses of the alternative/preferential ballot and the single transferable vote, one acknowledges that notwithstanding the democratic appeal of giving voters maximum choice, the two voting methods can foster increased intra-party competition. More specifically, the likelihood exists that candidates would seek to out-perform fellow party members in an effort to achieve higher preferences amongst voters which would in turn translate into a “greater aura of legitimacy” (Deverell and Vezina 97). As well, the sheer complexity of the ballot procedures can arguably make the whole election process more difficult than it was designed to be. More specifically, how would the average voter feel if he/she had to “choose and rank candidates for perhaps five to ten seats in a multi-member constituency” (Flanagan 87) and that “depending on the number of parties in the race, this could mean looking at as many as 50 names” (Flanagan 87).

A more complicated ballot procedure could lead to more spoiled ballots than one would find in plurality elections which would in turn lead to more voters being disenfranchised (Elton and Gibbins 20,23). Although this objection was valid fifty years
ago, a balanced argument reveals that the computer age could make this problem a thing of the past. Another criticism levied on the two voting methods concerns the sheer size of Canada. More specifically, if one excludes the larger metropolitan cities, the rural areas are both immense and thinly settled. As such, “the multi-member rural ridings demanded by STV would range from large to huge, which would make adoption politically difficult” (Flanagan 87).

Finally, the literature seems to concur on the fact that by encouraging vote splitting which would undoubtedly discriminate against smaller parties, alternative/preferential ballots coupled with the single transferable vote would make majority governments more difficult to attain. Once again, this possibility necessitates making a value judgment as to the importance of majority government versus the often criticized potential of being governed by a coalition at best or minority government at worst. We will return to the subject of majority versus minority government in forthcoming evaluative sections on concerns surrounding the issue and its impact on any implementation of electoral reform.

Overall, it stands to reason that if Canadians are dissatisfied with the undemocratic nature of election results, introducing a much more complicated voting system which ostensibly increases the democratic result will eventually be shunned by an intelligent yet undeniably aggravated electorate who will seek democratic yet relatively simple voting procedures. Perhaps these thoughts are contributing factors to the reason why very few countries adopted these methods of electing members to their respective parliaments. Although Mill favoured the voting methods, it seems to have remained a solid alternative only in theory. Evidence of this is that only Australia
(alternative/preferential) and Ireland (single transferable vote) are cited as countries that use these democratic yet flawed methods of electing their legislative members.

**ISSUE OF LACK OF DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES IN CANADA**

Shifting gears, one acknowledges that although opinions may vary on the feasibility of specific electoral reforms, one can argue that opinions have run concurrently regarding the weaknesses in the electoral system. These weaknesses center around regional cleavages that are produced by a distortion of the popular vote. Up until the Progressive Conservative electoral resurgence in 1984, one witnessed a continuous trend of both major parties being underrepresented in certain parts of the country. In addition, one acknowledges that in our current multi-party system, the New Democratic and Reform parties are underrepresented as well. The only exception to this phenomenon is the Bloc Quebecois for the simple reason that the party does not run candidates outside of its Quebec bastion.

When one examines Canada’s two oldest parties, one observes that representation for the Progressive Conservatives has historically been weak in Quebec while Liberals have shown a similar ineptitude in its Western Canada representation. Since 1921, the percentages of total parliamentary strength have rarely exceeded 20% for the Progressive Conservatives in Quebec (Cairns 1968, 61) or for the Liberals in Western Canada (Dickerson and Flanagan 315). The above problems were summed up well by Cairns when he remarked that:

The electoral system has made a major contribution to the identification of particular sections/provinces with particular parties. It has undervalued the partisan diversity within each section/province. By doing so, it has rendered the parliamentary composition of each party less representative of the sectional interests in the political system than is the party electorate from which that representation is derived (Cairns 1968, 62).
Although the above problems were muted somewhat by the more broad based majorities in 1984 and 1988, the 1993 and 1997 elections witnessed parties not receiving their fair representation in many provinces.

By way of some examples that demonstrate the fact that parties did not receive their fair share of the vote, one notices that in 1993: 1) the Progressive Conservatives averaged approximately 28% of the vote in the Atlantic provinces yet won zero seats, 2) the Progressive Conservatives won 14% of the vote in Quebec yet won only one seat, 3) Reform won 20% of the vote in Ontario yet won only one seat, and 4) the NDP averaged 16% of the vote in the four western provinces yet won only eight seats (Archer et al. 367). In 1997, the patterns continued as evidenced by: 1) Reform and the Progressive Conservatives each won 19% of the vote in Ontario yet won zero and one seat respectively, 2) the Progressive Conservatives won 22% of the vote in Quebec yet won only five seats, 3) the Progressive Conservatives averaged approximately 12% of the vote in the four western provinces yet won only one seat 4) the Liberals averaged approximately 28% of the vote in the four western provinces yet won only fifteen seats out of a possible eighty-eight, and 5) the NDP averaged approximately 20% of the vote in the four western provinces yet won only twelve seats (Weaver 1997, 5).

While one should not discount the importance of other vote to seat discrepancies or the fact that parties did not run candidates in every constituency, one still realizes the extent of the first defect cited by Elton and Gibbins, that being the positive affiliation of particular parties with particular provinces and/or regions as well as the related consequence of a damaging of national unity. In today’s multi-party system, those
affiliations include 1) Liberals in Ontario, 2) Bloc Quebecois in Quebec, and 3) Reform in British Columbia and Alberta.

At the moment, it is difficult to make an argument for the Progressive Conservative Party since their electoral devastation in 1993 left them in the political wilderness with virtually no representation anywhere (two seats). Although the party rebuilt its electoral position somewhat by increasing its legislative representation to twenty seats in 1997, one cannot make sweeping generalizations like before when the ‘big blue machine’ was essentially the only realistic option besides the Liberals. Nonetheless, for our purposes, the above shortcomings should be labeled as “artifacts of the electoral system” (Elton and Gibbins 2) that are disadvantageous for the workings of democracy.

Putting the demise of the Progressive Conservative Party aside, the historic ability of Canada’s two oldest parties to garner between 20-30% of the vote in their supposedly weak areas demonstrated that the electoral system succeeded in distorting results. The fact that three other parties can easily suffer from this problem only serves to accentuate the glaring deficiencies with the present electoral system. These deficiencies are problematic for the simple reason that they can “emasculate regional representation in the national government, deprive national government of regional spokesmen while they heighten regional conflict and identification” (Elton and Gibbins 2). Clearly, representative democracy is being impeded in place of the seemingly flawed view that the current system has been in place for over a century coupled with the inability or lack of initiative to change the underlying foundations of our system.
By exacerbating regional cleavages and tensions, governmental legitimacy is undermined, national alienation increases and democratic ideals of fair and equitable representation disappear. These realities are perhaps part of the reason why voter turnout in 1997 dropped to its lowest levels since 1925 (McArthur A9, Lavoie 1998-1999, 25). Voter turnout aside, the occurrence of the above results are sustained by statements that the Canadian electoral system produces “absurd results” (Fox 1987, 418, Fox 1991, 345) and that elections “shrink parties into weird shapes” (Courtney 1980, 429).

Canadians seem to be ill-served by an electoral system that is “unfair, undemocratic and downright dangerous” (Courtney 1980, 429). However, one must qualify these remarks by acknowledging that the electorate is most likely aware of the electoral system that serves them. Qualification aside, our current legislative landscape emphasizes regional imbalances and as a result, parties tend to tailor campaign policies and strategies to areas of greatest likely reward. By doing so, the government of the day inevitably becomes “insensitive to regional perspectives, and lacks the elected representatives to effectively explain and justify its policies across all regions of the country” (Elton and Gibbins 6). The result is a perpetuation and reinforcement of sectional divisions within Canada (Lovink 1970, 498).

Unfortunately, the most recent election of 1997 failed to patch our fractured system. Instead, it once again magnified an already divisive and polarized nation and strengthened the respective lairs of our two regional parties (Bloc Quebecois and Reform) along with our one quasi-regional party (Liberals). With these facts in mind, one realizes the merit in the second defect cited by Elton and Gibbins, that being the accentuation of regional cleavages within the House of Commons. Although the defects are evident, one
can argue that Canadians are aware of them. Unless changes are suggested, Canadians will be forced to tolerate the discrepancies and injustices manufactured by the electoral system. If some Canadians perceive the above problems as not sufficiently important, they are mistaken. The status quo that has existed for years cannot continue. Instead, Canadians must take another road on the path towards a hands-on democracy.

If democracy is indeed an ideal, an "abstraction which often assumes concrete dimensions for the vast majority of people through the electoral system" (O'Neal 2), one must realize that the electoral system is not performing the job required of it. No comment succeeds in illustrating these thoughts more than those made by Cairns in his seminal article on the electoral system and party system in Canada. Although somewhat dated, Cairns makes a resounding yet troubling remark which has stood the test of time and continues to hold great currency in our society. More specifically, he maintained that the "habituation of Canadians to the existing system renders policy-oriented research on the comparative merit of different electoral systems a fruitless exercise" (Cairns 1968, 56).

It should not take regionally lopsided elections for Canadians to clamour for reform and for academics to cry foul. Rather, as concerned citizens, we must speak out for if we choose not to, the electoral system will continue failing us and will remain an impediment to Canadian democracy. If one cares about the operation of one’s government along with one’s influence and position in it, electoral reform can become an on-going concern. In spite of the fact that if electoral reform is advanced more often, one can argue that it is a sure sign of political activism. Canadians will end their habituation to the old system and academics and politicians can pursue solutions which have a
realistic chance of being supported and approved. This is what democracy should be all about.

**THE 1979 AND 1980 ELECTIONS AND OTHER DEFECTS OF THE SYSTEM**

A strong argument can be made that it was the 1979 and 1980 elections which catapulted the subject of electoral reform onto the academic map. In these two elections, the problems of regional fragmentation were amplified. The regional diversity of the popular vote was felt by the Progressive Conservatives in Quebec who won only two seats in 1979 and one seat in 1980 (Thorburn 1991, 526). The identical situation existed for the Liberals in Western Canada when they received only three seats in 1979 and only two seats in 1980 (Elton and Gibbins 30-31). Although the Progressive Conservatives received 13% and 12% of the vote respectively in Quebec while the Liberals received 23% of the vote both times (Dickerson and Flanagan 315), one acknowledges that with few exceptions (Progressive Conservatives in 1984 and 1988, Liberals in 1968), proportionality between the popular vote and seats has never been close.

The above trend over time in Canadian electoral politics was noticed by Irvine when he commented that “the fact that the votes are not translated into seats, however, makes it inevitable that all parties will be needlessly insensitive to certain currents of feeling – needless, literally, because the views could have been present within the party but for the operation of the electoral system” (Irvine 1979, 37). Further, the last two elections have done nothing to disprove the above statistical theory. As detailed in previous sections, almost all parties have suffered at the hands of the skewed electoral system.
By not receiving seats in closer proportion to their popular vote, parties are captive to an electoral system that intensifies regional concentration. By distorting the electoral preferences of the voters and shutting parties out of certain provinces, the electoral system can confer a “spurious image of unanimity on provinces” (Irvine 1979, 14). Consequently, one witnesses the playing out of the third defect cited by Elton and Gibbins, that being the failure of the electoral system to impartially translate votes into seats.

As an historical aside, the inability to translate votes into legislative representation prompted then Prime Minister Trudeau to remark that proportional representation should be considered. Indeed, in November 1979, Trudeau observed that:

We have to change our electoral procedures in order to ensure that the government in Ottawa is more clearly identified with all regions. And I think it’s a failure, it’s sad that the government in Ottawa doesn’t have more representation in Quebec, just as it was sad that our government when we were in power didn’t have more representation in the West … And, not only is this sad from a partisan point of view but it’s sad for Canada because we had in office a government which, though it had almost one-third of the votes in the West, had practically no members and therefore when it governed, it didn’t hear the voice of the West, just as Mr. Clark’s government now, when it governs, can’t hear the voice of Quebec because it only has a couple of members from Quebec (Treusch 1980a, 9).

Although one could argue that Trudeau was ‘sour grapes’ over his election loss of 1979, his complaints should nonetheless resonate with anyone who seeks electoral fairness and greater mathematical accuracy when converting the popular vote into parliamentary seats. In spite of Trudeau’s observations on the potential merits of proportional representation, the fact remains that the literature does not seem to have any recorded documentation of Trudeau commenting further on the subject after he won re-election in 1980.

More recently in 1993, one witnessed former Prime Minister Kim Campbell lament that her Progressive Conservative Party was devastated by the workings of the
electoral system. Campbell seemed justified in her complaints in that her party won 16% of the popular vote on 2.1 million votes yet won only two seats. By comparison, the Bloc Quebecois and Reform Party won 1.8 million and 2.5 million votes respectively which translated into fifty-four and fifty-two seats respectively (Campbell A19).

In 1997 and in lieu of his party's somewhat disappointing efforts to break through and win more seats nationally, Jean Charest referred favourably to the mixed electoral system of Germany. Although it will be discussed at greater length in the sections on reform proposals, suffice to say that the electoral system elects half its members from single-member constituencies while the other half is nominated from party lists based on a party's total proportion of the vote. Overall, it makes political sense for politicians to endorse a voting system that might benefit a party more than the existing system. Nonetheless, one seems to never hear anyone complain about the electoral system when it benefits the individual and his/her own party.

By undercutting governmental legitimacy and strength, the historical parallels of the Progressive Conservatives in Quebec and Liberals in the West reinforced the need for discussion on some type of electoral reform. The weaknesses exhibited by both parties prompted Irvine to comment that one would have to be a "masochist" to campaign as a Liberal in the West or a Progressive Conservative in Quebec (Irvine 1980, 21). Although the Tories overcame their problems in 1984 and 1988, the last two elections have demonstrated that the introduction of some sort of proportional representation is still needed in order to distribute seats according to the share of votes. By doing so, neither major party could take opposition votes for granted by assuming that they would have no effect on the outcome of the election (Courtney 1980, 439). As well, the other two
national parties (NDP and Reform) would not take votes for granted either since under a form of proportional representation, the two parties could finally make in-roads in areas historically unheard of for them (NDP in Quebec, Reform in Ontario and Atlantic Canada).

One of the potential results of the above is that a candidate would no longer be viewed as a "masochist" if he/she tailored political campaigns, once considered fruitless, in areas of historical dominance of another party. Although the party system altered dramatically after the 1993 election, the main point to remember is that unless the present plurality electoral system is modified, Canada will continue in its faulty ways of not reconciling voting behaviour with democratic procedures.

Related somewhat to the third defect of inaccurate vote to seat ratios for the Liberals and Progressive Conservatives and more recently the NDP and Reform is the fourth defect cited by Elton and Gibbins, that being the issue of regionally concentrated parties versus diffuse national parties. The 1993 and 1997 elections typified this defect well with two regionally concentrated parties (Bloc Quebecois and Reform), one more broad based national party (NDP), one quasi-regional party (Liberals in Ontario), and to a new extent the beleaguered Progressive Conservatives. Most followers of the political scene remember and understand the recent domination of regional parties in the House of Commons that extensive analysis is not needed. Nonetheless, if the current domination by regional parties as opposed to diffuse national parties continues in our rainbow Parliament, scholars might be able to construct a solid historical argument. What one may not know is that in terms of the above defect, the majority of the literature points to the historical battle for representation between Social Credit and the NDP. Although both
parties were and are considered minor parties, the electoral system has historically favoured Social Credit because it was regionally concentrated. In striking similarity to the present day Bloc Quebecois, Social Credit focused its entire campaign in Quebec.

In spite of the fact that Social Credit disappeared from the federal electoral scene in the early 1980s, statistics reveal that from 1945 to 1980, Social Credit, in comparison to the NDP, received consistently less of the popular vote (Van Loon and Whittington 1987, 394). However, buoyed by a regionally biased electoral system, Social Credit was able to average 13 seats on 6% of the vote (Van Loon and Whittington 1987, 394). Thus, until its demise, Social Credit was “treated with relative generosity by the electoral system” (Irvine 1979, 11). In contrast to Social Credit, the NDP averaged 22 seats on 14.9% of the vote (Van Loon and Whittington 1987, 394). Thus, what one can conclude from the data is that while Social Credit achieved almost direct proportionality between seats and votes, the NDP suffered a perpetual electoral malaise that witnessed the party rarely receiving more than 10% of the seats in the House of Commons (Dickerson and Flanagan 316). What further underscores the woes of the NDP is the fact that if one extends the NDP argument over the last four elections, one realizes that the NDP averaged 14% of the vote which translated to an average of 26 seats (Van Loon and Whittington 1987, 394, Thorburn 1991, 533).

While the above statistics are unfortunate for the NDP, one can argue that they could have been worse considering that from 1980 until 1993, Canada was essentially a three-party system which in essence gave the NDP a greater share of the popular vote as well as more seats. However, with the emergence and likely continuation of our five-party system, the only legitimate voice of the left will probably continue its meager
showings at the polls. Although NDP representation has historically been centered in areas of Ontario and the West (exception in 1997 with 8 seats in Atlantic Canada), the electoral system is largely to blame for causing the discrepancies in their democratic representation. Unless some form of proportional representation is adopted to reflect more accurately a party’s true accomplishments, parties like the NDP will languish at the bottom of the seat count with no hopes of resurrecting its past glories. With the loss of official party status in 1993 fresh in their minds, the NDP would benefit greatly from a reformed electoral system that would award them more seats thus allaying any future concern about its coveted position as official party. Time will tell whether their hopes can become reality.

**EFFECTS OF THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM ON CANADIAN REGIONALISM**

The literature concurs on the fact that the electoral system is to blame for both the emergence of deep sectional cleavages (defined as the same as regional cleavages) along with the exaggeration of partisan discrepancies amongst regions. It was Cairns who summarized the situation well when he observed that:

Sectionalism has been rendered highly visible because the electoral system makes it a fruitful basis on which to organize electoral support. Divisions cutting through sections, particularly those based on the class system, have been much less salient because the possibility of payoffs in terms of representation has been minimal (Cairns 1968, 64).

In proving his point further that the electoral system is to blame for the creation of sectional politics, Cairns concluded his study by arguing that national unity is undermined because the electoral system has encouraged a “politics of opportunism based on sectional appeals and conditioned by one party bastions where the opposition is
tempted to give up the battle and pursue success in more appealing areas” (Cairns 1968, 75).

With previous sectional biases lighting the match that ignited the fire, the 1979 and 1980 elections succeeded in causing the eventual explosion for electoral reform. In desiring to protect Canadian federalism and national unity, one began noticing more direct attacks on the electoral effects of regionalism. These attacks were initiated by a variety of analysts, commissions, and politicians (Van Loon and Whittington 1987, 395). Although its results were prepared before the explosive elections of 1979 and 1980, the Pepin-Robarts Task Force on Canadian Unity foresaw the eventual problem when it remarked in the late 1970s that:

Our research of experience in other federations indicates that when party membership in the central Parliament becomes concentrated in regional blocks, it is an advance signal of eventual disintegration. The regional polarization of federal political parties corrodes federal unity. Because we see developing signs of such a situation in Canada, we have come to the conclusion that electoral reform is urgent and of very high priority (Pepin-Robarts Task Force, 105).

Although Canada faced the problems of regionalism within its electoral system before, the 1979 and 1980 elections magnified them to the point where they could no longer be overlooked or interpreted as aberrations of the system. Indeed, much support existed in defence of what the Task Force outlined before the elections. This support could be summarized by comments made by the Canada West Foundation in their piece on electoral reform. In stressing the need for reform due in part to the reinforcement of regional cleavages, the Foundation argued that

Regional imbalances in both the West and Quebec have now reached alarming proportions in our party system and have created serious political problems. Regional tensions are intensified as provincial politicians defend regional interests that are not represented within the national government. As a consequence, the
legitimacy and strength of the national government is undercut (Elton and Gibbins 6).

Although somewhat dated, these remarks strike a resounding chord in today’s political scene. When the electoral system is coupled with a central government that has historically catered to Central Canada at the expense of its peripheral regions, little wonder that regionalism has become one of the most glaring defects of our democratic system.

By acknowledging the problems of representative democracy and in its desire to redress regional discrimination, the Pepin-Robarts Task Force and the Canada West Foundation put forth proposals (to be discussed later) of instituting degrees of proportional representation which would complement the entrenched single-member constituency system. With an overview of the regional violation of democracy, it is necessary to shift gears somewhat and investigate why the Canadian electoral system succeeds also in violating fundamental principles of governmental stability.

THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND THE ISSUE OF ITS LACK OF STABILITY

While few could deny the democratic problems created by regional divisiveness of the electoral system, the literature attempts to point to strengths in the Canadian electoral system. The main strengths of the system are assumed to lie with the provision of majority governments and subsequent governmental stability. However, upon closer examination, this supposed strength can be interpreted to be yet another glaring weakness of the Canadian electoral system. If one accepts the theoretical argument that plurality electoral systems help establish one-party majority governments, the performance of the Canadian electoral system has been at best mediocre (Cairns 1968, 56).
Although the last five elections have provided majority governments, the line of reasoning remains that the system is stable because the winning party who gains a plurality of the vote wins a larger percentage of seats than its share of votes (Van Loon and Whittington 1987, 393). However, due to these possibilities, critics argue that the overall contribution to one-party majorities has been weak. This assumption is supported by the fact that since the demise of the Progressive Party in 1930, the electoral system has transformed a minority of votes into a stable majority of seats on only nine of nineteen occasions, and it has occasionally reduced an opposition with a fair amount of public support to numerical ineffectiveness in the House of Commons” (adapted from Jackson and Jackson 1999, 262). Further, the most recent election of 1997 casts further doubt as to whether majority governments can be expected regularly. Notwithstanding our newly developed multi-party system and five consecutive majority governments, one of the main points to remember in terms of our troubled democracy is that the Canadian electoral system has failed for the most part to uphold its traditional defence, that being electoral majorities and governmental stability.

If one takes the above theories a step further, one acknowledges yet another related risk with our plurality electoral system. This risk occurs when a party wins a majority of the vote. As evidenced in several elections, the majority of the vote can reward and grossly exaggerate the vote to seat ratio. This exaggeration or bonus in seats can have the effect of reducing the opposition parties to “such a small percentage of the House that they have difficulty being effective” (Weaver 1997a, 479).

Although the criteria for leaving the size of the opposition is arbitrary and can range from one-third to one-fourth of the House of Commons (Cairns 1968, 5, Wiseman
1991, 266), election results have demonstrated that the electoral system has occasionally produced Official Opposition parties whose memberships are extremely small. Notable examples include 1958 (49 seats for the Liberals), 1984 (40 seats for the Liberals), 1993 (54 seats for the Bloc Quebecois), and 1997 (60 seats for Reform) (Weaver 1997a, 480).

Although one can argue that any sized majority and especially a large one could produce stability, one historical example stands out that will prove that the electoral system is seriously flawed. This historical example drawn from New-Brunswick, which will appear in upcoming sections on statistical anomalies, makes a strong case that if the present electoral system remains unchecked and some form of electoral reform does not occur, Canadian democracy may have difficulty recovering any credibility and/or legitimacy that government seeks for it.

Returning to the topic of the size of the opposition, if one adds the above theory of an appropriate sized opposition to the principle of majority government, statistics are just as depressing. In updating Cairns’ and J.A.A. Lovink’s data, Richard Van Loon and Michael S. Whittington make the claim that in “fourteen of the last twenty-two elections, the electoral system has either not produced a majority government or has left the opposition ineffectually small” (Van Loon and Whittington 1987, 393). Therefore, while Cairns and Lovink concluded that the electoral system failed on 67% and 71% of the times respectively, adapted and updated findings of Van Loon and Whittington to 1997 do not reflect much of a deviation with a failure rate of 67% (sixteen out of twenty-four elections) (Jackson and Jackson 1999, 262).
Taking the previous comments concerning majority government and stability a step further, Cairns expands and supports the arguments when he posits that his analysis was designed to suggest that

A defence of the electoral system on the grounds of its artificial creation of one-party majorities is seriously undermined by the frequency of minority government when a majority of votes was not given to one party. A 50 per cent success rate only provides modified support for the existing electoral system (Cairns 1970, 519).

Due to these electoral violations, the anti-majoritarian electoral system has demonstrated a need for a major electoral face-lift. With proper reforms, it could recapture the lost democratic credibility that it perhaps deserves while at the same time providing for the necessary stability that many critics of reform seem to worry about.

THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND STATISTICAL ANOMALIES

Before moving on to the subject of majority versus minority government and their related benefits, other statistical anomalies exist that are important in revealing the extent of the defects in the electoral system and why some reformers complain about the potential for unstable government or prolonged periods of cabinet instability. The first of these irregularities is the potential for a party to win the most votes but fail to win the most seats. While the majority of Canadians may have trouble recalling the elections of 1896 and 1925, recent electoral results reveal that the above aberration occurred in 1957, 1962, and 1979 when the Liberals defeated the Progressive Conservatives by two, less than one, and four percentage points respectively but lost by seven, sixteen, and twenty-two seats respectively (Thorburn 1991, 533, Jackson and Jackson 1999, 262-263).

Even at the provincial level, one has witnessed the playing out of the above unfortunate possibility several times in recent memory. In the 1996 provincial election in
British Columbia, Glen Clark and the NDP won the election despite the fact that Gordon Campbell and the Liberals won more votes. Duplicating electoral anomalies of 1944 and 1966, the 1998 provincial election in Quebec witnessed Lucien Bouchard and the Bloc Quebecois win the election despite the fact that Jean Charest and the Liberals won more votes. Most recently, in the Fall of 1999, Saskatchewan Premier Roy Romanow and the NDP won re-election and formed a minority government despite the fact that Elwin Hermanson and his two-year old Saskatchewan Party won more votes.

The previous statistical abnormalities succeed in reinforcing the obvious fact that the Canadian electoral system, both at the federal and provincial levels is seriously flawed and harmful to the continued manifestation of Canadian democracy. Clearly, something needs to be done to reform our out-dated and old-fashioned methods of electing MPs and MLAs if we desire to achieve the cabinet and regime stability that could increase the perceived integrity and legitimacy of the political system.

In addition to the 1896, 1925, 1957, 1962, and 1979 electoral controversies, Canada has consistently witnessed a combined opposition vote of over 50%. From 1921 to 1968, the opposition average was 55.4% (Cairns 1970, 520). If one computes the averages from 1968-1988, one realizes that they remained constant, and if anything, increased slightly in the elections of 1968-1988 (Van Loon and Whittington 1987, 394, Globe and Mail June 4, 1997 – A6). The last two elections have witnessed opposition votes of 59% and 62% (Globe and Mail June 4, 1997 – A6). Taking the above statistics a step further, additional statistics reveal that only three times since 1921 has the winning party received 50% or more of the total popular vote (1940, 1958, 1984). Hence, what one can conclude is that with a higher opposition average than government average, the
elected government almost always comes to power with more people voting against it than for it. Once again, these facts should make one wonder about the long-term significance of maintaining our electoral system.

Other examples of an electoral system gone wrong were the 1989 and 1993 provincial elections in Prince Edward Island as well as the 1973 provincial election in Quebec. In the case of Prince Edward Island, statistics reveal that in the aforementioned two election years, the Liberals won 61% and 55% of the popular vote which translated into 30 and 31 seats respectively out of a possible 32 seats in the legislature (Heard 210). Unfortunately, the Progressive Conservatives mirrored their 1993 federal election horror show by winning 35.8% and 39.5% of the vote in both elections but winning only the few remaining seats (Heard 210).

In the case of Quebec, Robert Bourassa and his governing Liberals defeated Rene Levesque and the Parti Quebecois by winning 55% of the popular vote which somehow translated into an astonishing 93% of seats in the National Assembly (Lachapelle et al. 109-110). Placed virtually in the political wilderness, little wonder that an opportunistic Parti Quebecois sought immediately to place the issue of electoral reform on the political agenda. However, upon assuming power in 1976, the Parti Quebecois’ interest in electoral reform faded undoubtedly due to their new found appreciation for the trappings of political power and their pursuit of sovereignty. Thus, in comparison to Prince Edward Island’s election results, one avows that even though one may discount the importance of election results by focusing on the smallness of the province, the fact remains that the electoral system can distort election results regardless of jurisdiction.
The final historical example that many critics and reformers cite as undeniable proof that the electoral system is flawed is the “horrible example” (Hyson 1988, 25) of the 1987 provincial election in New-Brunswick. In that year, Frank McKenna and the Liberals ended years of Progressive Conservative domination by winning 60% of the popular vote. To the amazement of all political observers including McKenna himself, the Liberals managed to shut out the opposition and win all 58 legislative seats. Although the Progressive Conservatives, NDP, and various independents garnered 40% of the vote, the single-member plurality electoral system distorted the translation of popular votes into legislative seats. With no recourse available until the next election, unrepresented parties were supposed to be “consoled by McKenna’s decision to allow opposition parties to send written questions into the legislature” (Deverell and Vezina 39). It is this extreme miscarriage of justice which should sound off alarm bells in the minds of those in the halls of power.

By “insulting common sense” (Hyson 1990, 25), the electoral system failed to represent a large segment of the New-Brunswick population thereby losing any semblance of legitimacy it may have otherwise had. One of the conclusions of this case which extends to Canada as a whole is that the plurality electoral system is too crude, and dated, a mechanism to provide representative democracy in modern society. There is a glaring need for an electoral system that is more sensitive to societal forces, and which will provide a more accurate reflection of public preferences – a PR electoral system (Hyson 1988, 27).

Unfortunately, over a decade has passed and nothing at either level of government has been done to rectify this gross violation of democratic representation.

For a variety of reasons that will be broached in upcoming sections on the likelihood of implementing a new electoral system, proportional representation, while a
sound theoretical idea, is unlikely to be implemented anytime soon. While federal and/or provincial governments could adopt a new electoral system, evidence at least from the lopsided New-Brunswick election reveals that the idea is probably “not even on the horizon of thought” (Hyson 1988, 27). Although the previous comment is more than a decade old, it seems to have stood the test of time in that political elites do not seem to be rushing any faster to adopt any significant electoral reform.

**THE ISSUE OF ELECTORAL REFORM AND VOTER EQUALITY**

When pondering the suitability of electoral reform in general and some form of proportional representation in particular, one cannot overlook the polemical issue of whether or not the current electoral system misrepresents equality or not. Simple empirical observation reveals that indeed, Canada’s electoral system violates both Sections 3 and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. These sections focus on Canadians’ rights to vote in elections and to be equal under the law respectively.

Ideally, an argument can be made that Canadians and electoral reformers alike would prefer a shift in the direction of the American model of strict voter parity. Unfortunately, election results confirm the disturbing trend away from the above hope by revealing that Canada’s electoral system violates Canadians’ equality of legislative power in their efforts to have their votes count equally across all constituencies.

Federal elections in Canada have always found a way to distort the vote to seat ratios. While not intending to downplay the significance of previous elections, focus will be limited to Canada’s last two elections. Since political memory with regards to statistics can be limited at times, Canada’s two most recent federal elections are sufficiently instructive in revealing the extent of the voter equality problem.
Statistics from both elections reveal that not every vote was weighted equally. For example, the 1993 election witnessed the following vote to seat ratios: 1) to elect one Liberal - 31,730 votes, 2) to elect one Bloc Quebecois – 34,185 votes, 3) to elect one Reform – 49,216 votes, 4) to elect one New Democrat – 104,397, and 5) to elect one Progressive Conservative – 1,093,211 votes (Ovenden 1997a). To reinforce the previous statistics, the 1997 election witnessed the following vote to seat ratios: 1) to elect one Liberal – 31,817 votes, 2) to elect one Reform – 41,501 votes, 3) to elect one Bloc Quebecois – 31,233 votes, 4) to elect one New Democrat – 67,733 votes, and 5) to elect one Progressive Conservative – 121,287 votes (MacGregor A6). Are these vote to seat ratios fair? Do the votes of all Canadians count the same? Unfortunately, the answer is a resounding no.

When looking at the above elections statistics, it is difficult to look beyond Canada’s electoral system as the main culprit in the equality issue. Moreover, when one recalls the fact that nearly all Canadian governments get elected with a minority of the popular vote, little wonder how the equality slogan falls by the way side. Further, when the government’s power to redraw electoral boundaries is coupled with a constituency deviation quotient of plus or minus 25%, much room exists for gerrymandering and malapportionment.

Before moving on to a closer examination of the above consequences of voter equality, it bears explaining that the Canadian deviation quotient is a coefficient that "allows a 25 per cent fluctuation in the population of any riding from a provincial quotient before boundary changes are considered" (quoted in Medvedev 91). Further, that quotient is "found by dividing the total population of a province by the number of federal
ridings” (quoted in Medvedev 91). By extension, the provincial deviation quotient is calculated by dividing the total population of the province by the number of seats eligible for election. In comparison to other countries (Australia and the United States), the Canadian deviation quotient is one of the most lenient (Medvedev 92) and is supported by the argument that it is necessary to protect “sensitivities such as large rural areas with sectional identities and little population” (quoted in Medvedev 92). It is these sensitivities which would lie at the heart of several legal battles to alter those prevailing beliefs.

As lamentable as the previous facts were, little could be done to change these electoral realities. However, with the adoption of the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, constitutional basis was given for legal challenges to the equality principle in general and the potential of governmental gerrymandering and malapportionment in particular. Eventually, four Charter-based cases laid the foundation for how Canada looks at voter equality and electoral redistribution. Three of the four cases occurred at the provincial level in British Columbia (Dixon case - 1989), Saskatchewan (Constitutional Boundary Reference Case - 1991), and Alberta (Constitutional Boundary Reference Case - 1992). The fourth case was a Supreme Court appeal of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal’s decision. It is this landmark Supreme Court ruling that warrants closer investigation as it pertains to voting equality in collaboration with any future relationship with a reformed electoral system.

While the Supreme Court acknowledged in Carter v. Saskatchewan Attorney General (Bailie and Johnson 1992, Britton, 1991, Courtney et al. 1992, Roach 1991, 1992) the importance of making “each citizen’s portion of sovereign power equal” (Loenen 1997, 63), it maintained nonetheless that it was a practical impossibility. Instead
of reaffirming that Section 3 of the Charter protected equality of voting per se, the Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision, ruled that the purpose of the right to vote enshrined in Section 3 of the Charter was "effective representation to be achieved by relative parity of voting power" (Landes 1998, 341). By overturning the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal's decision, the Supreme Court's anti-majoritarian judgment contended that Saskatchewan's electoral boundaries did not violate Section 3 of the Charter.

In taking Saskatchewan and Canada as a whole further away from the principle of 'one person, one vote', the Supreme Court cited the discrepancies between rural and urban ridings along with northern and southern constituencies as factors influencing their decision. In supporting their case for a departure from "strict mathematical equality" (Loenen 1997, 64), Justice Beverley McLachlin, who wrote the majority opinion, cited Factors like geography, history, community interests and minority representation may need to be taken into account to ensure that our legislative assemblies effectively represent the diversity of our social mosaic. These are but examples of considerations which may justify departure from absolute voter parity in the pursuit of more effective representation (quoted in Fritz 72, Richards and Irvine 59, Roach 1991, 63).

By outlining the primary goals of effective representation within electoral redistributions and why they deserve to be safeguarded, the Supreme Court made it clear that any future plans of provincial and federal legislatures to bring about electoral boundary reforms would in all likelihood be "subject to both the Charter and to possible judicial review by the Supreme Court of Canada" (Landes 1998, 342).

As eager as one would be to initiate reforms to satisfy equality concerns, one is reminded not to become overzealous in one's goals, especially considering that arguably the final arbiter of Canadian public policy, the Supreme Court, has ruled essentially against the pure equality principle of 'one person, one vote'. By maintaining that straight
equality of any electoral system or for that matter any electoral reform must be “tempered with consideration of demographic realities” (Britton 3). the Supreme Court argued that the realities of parliamentary democracy dictate against the coveted and noble ideals of our neighbour to the south.

As much as any reform proposal strives for strict voter equality, it remains circumscribed by the alternative and legally entrenched idea of effective representation that is premised on the relative parity of voting power. Moreover, in examining the Charter cases, it stands to reason that short of accepting the status quo in general or not altering the 25% deviation between constituencies in particular, some form of proportional representation should be countenanced lest we remain with our flawed method of electing our representatives. It is this flawed method which will hopefully be remedied in upcoming sections on electoral reform because if the same electoral method persists unencumbered, legal and legislative remedies will fall on deaf ears, especially considering that the Supreme Court has already handed down its landmark ruling.

Unlike the equality provisions found in Section 15 of the Charter, the voting provisions found in Section 3 of the Charter cannot be subject to Section 33 of the Charter, namely the notwithstanding clause. These non-disputable facts should sensitize reformers to the fact that since the current electoral system seems beyond the purview of legal and legislative recourse, more serious institutional and electoral reforms need to be undertaken to redress the representational deficit Canadians face. Even with the passage of time coupled with new judges on the bench, reformers should not count on the Supreme Court to overturn itself thus opening the door for other constitutional challenges to the principle of ‘one person, one vote’.
For now, it is the concept of effective representation that serves as the guide for Charter-based attacks. However, as it relates to the potential for electoral reform, one should be cognizant of the fact that the concept of effective representation and Charter cases led one scholar to remark that “the Trojan Horse of the argument for proportional representation may be buried in these cases” (Loenen 1997, 61).

**THE ISSUE OF MAJORITY VERSUS MINORITY GOVERNMENT**

Related to the equality argument and building on several of Cairns’ arguments, one of the most important issues that has the potential of continuously dividing analysts and scholars alike on the subject of electoral reform is the issue of majority versus minority government. More specifically, one must ask himself/herself what form of government is more suitable for Canada. On the one hand, Canada could be governed by a one-party government with a strong majority of seats. Conversely, Canada could be governed also by one party who might not command a majority of seats but nonetheless has an informal agreement with another party concerning support for legislation and necessary voting for it. By providing support for the governing party, a third party recognizes that “in exchange for its support, it can expect favourable policy accommodation from the government” (Hyson 1998-1999, 13). This type of informal understanding has occurred in Canada before as witnessed by the NDP supporting some of Pearson’s minority government policies in the 1960s as well as subsequent policies of Trudeau during his minority government of 1972-1974 (Geller-Schwartz 1979).

In the majority of electoral reform proposals and especially with Irvine’s, the controversial issue of majority versus minority government becomes once again a hot topic of discussion. When assessing both sides of the argument in relation to the
feasibility of introducing electoral reform, one has to decide what one's priorities are in designing an electoral system. Although slightly beyond the scope of this piece, this author acknowledges the strength of current conventional wisdom, that being if majority government can be attained, a government should strive to achieve it in an effort to convey stability to the people. Moreover, majority government would preclude opposition parties from resorting to votes of non-confidence in an effort to topple the government of the day. Theoretically, a majority government would possess the necessary mandate to enact policies and complete its legislative term. However and for the purposes of this piece, one is reminded of the idea stemming from the previous chapter on referendums. More specifically, one has to determine to what extent public input is desirable in our form of representative government. It is this normative consideration which will continuously lie at the heart of any debate concerning democratic reform.

In contrast to the perceived advantages of majority government, one concedes that both government officials and Canadians have a visceral reaction against coalition or minority governments (Irvine 1979, 73). Concern is sparked because for many, perpetual minority governments are viewed as potentially destabilizing because the government of the day could fall at any time. Further, coalitions are not looked upon favourably because as mentioned much earlier in this piece, they are for the most part looked upon as distinctly un-Canadian. This point is buttressed by the fact that although Canada has possessed a multi-party system for the majority of the 20th Century, Canadian federal parties have "consistently shunned the formation of coalition governments" (Stewart 1980, 453).
Acknowledging the above facts should not close the door on the possibility that under a newly designed electoral system, whether proportional or not, the frequency and occurrence of “minority governments would become accepted as a fact of life – unlikely to be changed by clever manoeuvring” (Irvine 1985, 99). Moreover, if an opposition party initiated a vote of non-confidence for partisan reasons such as early dissolution or simply just for the sake of doing it, odds are that once the public gets wind of it, it is not likely to be overly supportive. Unless the instigating party voices legitimate public policy concerns, the public will in all likelihood view their actions as simply attempts to cause trouble for absolutely no reason.

As some of the more proportional electoral reforms will demonstrate, the likelihood of minority government will increase dramatically. Ergo, should Canadians tolerate a minority government that could fall any day from a vote of non-confidence just for the sake of achieving a more proportional and representative outcome? Although the preceding question possesses negative overtones, careful observation should sensitize individuals to the fact that although the last five federal elections have produced majority governments, Canadian minority governments have also contributed much in the public policy domain.

Not only have minority governments succeeded in producing reflective mirrors of society but they should also be heralded as having enacted progressive social legislation. As a result, little wonder that for some, minority government is “held to be better because it is more socially conscious” (Wiseman 1991, 267). Besides, allowing a minority of the vote to govern a country is tantamount to abrogating the fundamentals of democratic theory by allowing the tail to wag the democratic dog (Francis 1997, 21). In this case, it is
time that the Canadian dog gets fed a new diet of electoral reform if it seeks to cultivate a new image and continue to grow well into old age.

Putting the last five federal elections aside for a moment, empirical evidence supports Cairns' claim that minority governments have occurred more frequently both at the federal and provincial levels since the late 1950s (Hyson 1998-1999, 13).

Unfortunately, with several majority federal governments fresh in the minds of most voters, the possibility for a minority government is almost akin to a political disaster of sorts. However, by maintaining that minority government would be "a calamity beyond description" (Elton and McCormick 1997, A17), critics of proportional representation in general and minority government in particular display a short-sighted understanding of the situation. This feeling is buttressed by the argument that the above calamity argument is a curious one because

The most important function of an electoral system, these people seem to be saying, is to protect majority governments from the voting preferences of the very people they claim to represent. And we as voters suddenly demonstrate a truly bizarre paralysis of imagination. Between elections, we complain about our system as four years of an "elected dictatorship" when the Prime Minister can do whatever he pleases so long as his party holds together. But during elections we tremble in fear of a minority government, which would mean that our votes had failed to elect a strong new dictator with enough seats in Parliament to ignore us until the next election (Elton and McCormick 1997, A17).

Keeping our multi-party system in mind and remembering that our last federal election produced a razor-thin Liberal majority, one need not be overly imaginative to realize that upcoming federal elections have a great chance of producing minority governments. It is this increased chance of minority governments which justifies more analysis of the concept of minority government in general and its effects on public policy in particular.

One of the main arguments against minority government found in the literature centers around the efficiency argument. More specifically, the argument is made that
since majority government is perceived as the norm and as more stable, effective public policy can be initiated. To support this claim, one respected parliamentary scholar noted that

The arguments are often made that majority government is not only natural and proper, but also the most efficient, and that the lines of responsibility and accountability in minority parliaments are blurred because smaller parties have an undue influence (Franks 1987, 48).

However, one is reminded that efficiency and stability are problematic terms in that their existence and success depend largely on “the ability of elected representatives to govern properly and responsibly” (Caron 21).

As alluded to previously, were Mulroney’s governments any more efficient and stable because they implemented or rather rammed through controversial policies such as the Free Trade Agreement (F.T.A.) and the Goods and Services Tax (G.S.T.)? While the answer to this question might hinge upon one’s political convictions or party leanings, it is difficult to deny the fact that if one examines the historical record, the efficiency and stability arguments are both unsubstantiated and qualitatively weak. Clearly, the issue of legislative performance is much more complex and cannot (and should not) be reduced to the efficiency and stability criteria alone.

When examining Canada’s history of minority governments, the record reveals both successful and unsuccessful experiences. Since the Second World War, Canada has been governed by six different minority governments lasting anywhere from seven months to three years. By being forced to “devote more time to legislative debate in order to accommodate opposing views” (Hyson 1998-1999, 14), the argument would follow that at least in theory, those governments should have encountered numerous problems in initiating and implementing policy legislation. However, contrary to conventional
wisdom, the policy record reflects several bold and creative initiatives that lend support to those who maintain that minority government can indeed be efficient and progressive.

Although critics may dispute the impact of certain policies, evidence reveals that minority governments of the 1960s and 1970s witnessed the creation and implementation of several policies that exist today. These policies were: 1) a new Canadian flag, 2) universal medicare insurance, 3) Canada Pension Plan, 4) Canada Assistance Plan, 5) guaranteed income supplement for old age pensions, 6) the creation of Petro-Canada, and 7) the creation of the Foreign Investment Review Agency (Branswell A5, Deverell and Vezina 80). Since the preceding policies were popular at least during the time they were introduced, support is given to the assertion that “minorities have tended to be more creative in policy innovation than ensconced, self-satisfied majorities” (Wiseman 1997, 17).

With minority government in Canada, citizens, MPs, and MLAs alike would benefit. Canadian democracy would improve because “when every vote counts, so does every MP” (Branswell A5). Parliamentary committees would be used more often to ascertain the mood of MPs, MLAs, and by extension their constituents. Moreover, if every MP and MLA counted in the governing party caucus, the democratic trickle down effect would make the average citizen feel more included in the political process. MPs and MLAs would be forced to fulfill their roles as delegates in that they would have to take the views of their constituents into account when formulating their opinions on policy issues.

As difficult as it is to achieve the ideals of direct democracy, minority government could foster a political society which would emphasize cooperation, debate and
consensus driven policies over the zero-sum thinking, rhetorical overkill amongst politicians, and partisan driven policies of a majority government. As a result, one reaches the conclusion that

Minority governments are therefore not as horrific as some might suggest, in that a policy of bipartite cooperation born out of compromise is much more likely to meet the aspirations of the public than is a policy of arrogance on the part of a majority government (Caron 21).

With recent negative experience fresh in the minds of most Canadians, the possibility of less adversarial minority governments brokering interests, especially if some sort of electoral reform is implemented, should not be lost on political parties attempting to embrace institutional changes. It is the challenge to embrace institutional changes which lie at the heart of Canada’s quest for a more participatory form of representative government where citizens can express their views and their representatives can in turn debate those ideas in the “open forum provided by the legislature” (Hyson 1998-1999, 14). By doing so, governmental responsiveness can be increased especially in the area of specific regional concerns.

If minority government becomes accepted as a Canadian way of life, a greater chance exists for the diversity of views to be taken into account when formulating and eventually implementing public policies. However, given the present nature of our country, does minority government as a political option have a chance of being accepted as a future way of life? While the answer to this question depends largely on one’s attitudes and faith in the political system, one must concede nonetheless that it will be an uphill battle to alter existing norms and values. This guarded optimism is reflected by the opinion that
Minority government to succeed thus requires a change in attitude on the part of all those involved. This is easier said than achieved because the existing norms of legislative behaviour held by politicians are firmly entrenched and were developed in the context of majority government (Hyson 1998-99, 14).

Clearly, for changes to occur, reformers must focus on those existing norms of legislative behaviour for if they can be tweaked just a little bit, citizens would be rewarded with a more participatory form of representative government. Minority government would be only one piece to that more responsive government.

Assuming Canada's multi-party system remains intact, one must be realistic in acknowledging the caveat that if minority government is to take hold as a viable option on the Canadian political landscape, it has the potential of undermining another important institutional defect which was presented earlier. More specifically, if minority government becomes more widely accepted by governing elites as a way to connect more effectively with their constituents, the likelihood is that those same governing elites will seek to enforce even stricter party discipline in an effort to keep their already slim caucus on side.

Critics might argue that a minority government might "avoid initiatives that are regionally sensitive and they might exhibit greater responsiveness to shifting currents of public opinion" (Thomas 1991, 246). Further, with potentially weaker regional representation, a minority government might also be "weakened in their dealings with assertive provincial governments" (Thomas 1991, 246). While these arguments have some prima facie value, one would be hard pressed to argue that Canada's recent minority governments suffered parliamentary paralysis in undertaking policies that would proceed to affect the entire nation. If anything, Canada's recent minority governments were high spending ones (Branswell A5). Moreover, even though the Clark and Trudeau
minority governments suffered from regional lopsidedness, future minority or even coalition governments elected by some form of proportional representation could arrest this disturbing and potentially dangerous trend by providing for regionally balanced caucuses based on party lists.

The acceptance of a minority government is likely to follow only once a proportional electoral reform gets implemented and produces that minority government. With this in mind, the fact remains that parties will increasingly face a catch-22 situation in that progress on one front will in all likelihood curtail any positive movement on the second front. Since no political observer will admit that governing is easy, we as citizens should expect our governing elites to find compromises in an effort to improve Canadian democracy. Since all recent majority governments have succeeded in somehow lowering the political thermostat in relations between government and citizens, why not seek a fresh approach to governing.

Minority government does not necessarily have to be a “problem but an opportunity, not a threat but a promise” (Forsey 11). Assuming for a moment that a proportional electoral reform occurs and minority government is the result, one should not approach the democratic occurrence with skepticism. Rather, one should remember the words of Trudeau on the subject when he wrote in his memoirs that with respect to minority government,

They were exciting times, akin to canoeing through seething rapids. A leader learned how to live dangerously, how to savour the pleasures of running risks and overcoming perils ... If you can’t do that when you are in a minority government, you shouldn’t be in politics (quoted in Milner 1999a, 42).
If Canada aspires to find the cliched yellow brick road to its own form of participatory democracy, minority government should not stand in the way, especially as it pertains to the possible implementation of electoral reform.  

What one should extract from any balanced overview of the prospects of minority government can be borrowed from Eugene Forsey’s seminal article on the issue of minority government. Writing during the 1960s when minority governments were more or less the norm, Forsey began his scholarly support for minority government by reminding readers that the Liberals in 1963 tended to depict minority government as “a nameless, faceless horror, the political fate that is worse than death” (Forsey 1). However, by winning a minority government, those same Liberals had to contend with “three deeply rooted popular notions on the subject” (Forsey 1). Those three deeply rooted popular notions on the subject have been arguably carried over to today’s political discourse in attempts to sway people from the merits of and dispel negative feelings about minority government. More specifically, these assumptions were and have remained as: 1) minority governments are abnormal, exceptional, and almost unheard of, 2) minority governments are necessarily bad, incompetent, indecisive, and weak and 3) minority governments cannot last (Forsey 1-2).  

What the preceding analysis has laboured to accomplish is that the above three assumptions are just that – assumptions. Indeed, empirical and qualitative analysis has demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that the assumptions are baseless. By refuting the assumptions, scholarly evidence has hopefully revealed that at the end of the day, if minority government does occur again in Canada, it should be seen only as a necessary pre-condition for the emergence of a more democratic and legitimate legislative arena.
If majority government remains the accepted mode of government then fine. However, minority government should be given or is worthy of consideration as an alternative form of governing. With a minority government elected the current way or by proportional representation, Canadians would benefit because the system would “provide the checks and balances which are woefully missing from majority governments elected with a plurality instead of a majority of the vote” (Stefaniuk B2). Moreover, elites must recognize the fact that

Elections are not picnics. They should take place only for serious reasons of public policy and this principle should operate with special force in a country where the existence of ten provincial legislatures means a large number of elections even in the ordinary course (Forsey 5-6).

If elites are able to recognize the above fact, it should sensitize them to the practical realization that

The notion that a Ministry which cannot command a majority in the House of Commons ... is invested with the right to demand a dissolution is as subversive of constitutional usage, as it would ... be pernicious to the general and paramount interests of the nation at large (quoted in Forsey 6).

Since the above thoughts have serious consequences, elites must reconsider their positions. Once again, like other potential reforms, time will tell if elites are willing to compromise on an issue that has the potential of providing better government for its citizens.

**COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW OF ELECTORAL REFORM**

Before moving on to an analysis of different electoral reform proposals that could enhance Canadian democracy, a brief comparative summary of countries who have reformed their electoral systems is in order. If Canada wants to look abroad, much instructive evidence exists in other countries such as France, New-Zealand, and Italy
where the electoral systems were recently changed. In the case of France, the 1986 experiment with proportional representation backfired on socialist President Francois Mitterrand when he was forced to endure three years of cohabitation government with conservative Prime Minister Jacques Chirac. Although the experiment with proportional representation ended in 1988 when Mitterrand reverted back to the old electoral system requiring a majority through a double ballot/runoff system, the political damage was irreparable as any semblance of credibility and legitimacy in the system was lost.

With striking similarities to Canada, New-Zealand voters became gradually disillusioned with the politics as usual approach of successive administrations in the 1980s and 1990s. Although governments alternated in power, similar economic and social policies continued unabated and were “driven through Parliament by majority governments” (Simpson 1997a, A16). These policies were compounded by two statistically anomalous elections in 1978 and 1981 where the victorious National Party formed successive governments even though the opposition Labour Party won a larger share of the popular vote (Aimer 147-148). When one combines the lack of policy originality and the two stolen elections, little wonder that citizens voted in a 1993 referendum to change their electoral system to the German version of mixed-member proportional (MMP).

While a more specific discussion of the workings of the mixed member proportional electoral system (MMP) will follow in upcoming evaluative sections, let us briefly summarize its workings in the New-Zealand case. The size of Parliament was increased from 99 to 120 seats with 65 constituency seats (5 Maori/New-Zealand Aboriginal included) combined with 55 list seats. As a result, voters were given two
votes: the first vote was to elect constituency MPs while the second vote was to select a party list on a compensatory basis to “rectify the inequalities that typically result from the election of the constituency MPs by FPTP” (Arseneau 1999, 137). To be eligible for the party list vote, a party had to either win one constituency seat or pass a 5% threshold (Arseneau 1999, 137). As discussed previously, the list seats were designed to correct for vote/seat disparities by bringing a party’s overall seat share in proportion to their actual percentage of the vote.

Unfortunately, although New-Zealand’s first election under rules of proportional representation occurred in 1996, recent evidence and surveys reveal that “most of the public now regret it. Some are outraged by the antics of some list MPs and MLAs and that a small party is exerting disproportionate influence on the government’s direction” (Wiseman 1997, 18). Like France, the possibility seems to exist that if citizens become more disenchanted with the workings of their electoral system, the governing National Party may be forced to retreat and revert back to its old electoral rules. Otherwise, the governing elites face the real possibility of being turfed out of office at the next election scheduled approximately every three years.

In the case of Italy, a country besieged by incessant political instability in the form of over 50 governments since the Second World War and before electoral reform in 1994, a move away from proportional representation and towards plurality was viewed as an attempt to search for more governmental stability. Amid growing political corruption scandals and a discredited political system, electoral reforms were sought as a way to end the increasing fragmentation of power amongst several major political parties. As a result, citizens voted in a 1993 referendum to elect the vast majority of MPs in single-
member districts. This move was approved by Italy’s Parliament and the 1994 elections were fought under Canadian type plurality rules with a modest form of proportional representation mixed in. More specifically, 155 of the 630 members of the Italian Chamber of Deputies were elected by list proportional representation. This proportional component of approximately 25% is used only to “complement rather than to correct the distribution produced by FPTP” (Leduc 1999, 67). Time will tell whether the alternative electoral system will have the desired effects in impacting the prevailing political culture positively or whether it is the embedded political culture that will invariably remain as the root cause or determinant for any or all of the country’s problems.

REFORM PROPOSALS TO THE CANADIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM

If one is interested in enhancing Canadian electoral democracy, one must map the electoral reform jungle. With the existence of a myriad of electoral reform balloons, these more evaluative sections will focus on two non-proportional, three proportional, and one quasi-majoritarian alternative to our current electoral system that have been given the most currency in the political literature. Although Irvine contends that “designing electoral systems has become a cottage industry” (Irvine 1980, 22), the key point remains that if a form of proportional representation is introduced, democracy and stability could be served more effectively in Canada’s multi-party system. Moreover, if this occurs, our democratic system of government would not become a “meaningless gamble” (Underhill 33) but a forum for consensus driven policies and effective debate.

THE SMILEY PROPOSAL

The first proposal that deserves attention is that proposed by the late Canadian political scientist Donald V. Smiley. In 1977-1978, Smiley suggested a non-proportional
electoral reform that would have increased the House of Commons by 100 seats. These extra seats would be allocated proportionate to population amongst provinces and awarded to candidates who “received the highest proportion of popular votes to the winning candidates” (Irvine 1985, 91). With a slight improvement on representation of regional interests coupled with increased competitiveness, Smiley’s proposal would water down the plurality formula because it would no longer be a case of “first past the post, but also who placed second and was edged out by a nose” (Elton and Gibbins 42).

Democratic notions of representation would improve because parties would no longer “monopolize parliamentary representation from a region by winning a plurality or a small majority of the vote” (McCormick et al 1981, 55). Instead, parties would receive seats in provinces where they were underrepresented. With a more equitable cross section of members, the result would be increased legitimacy and greater representativeness in caucuses and/or cabinet. With this in hand, parties can act with greater sensitivity with respect to regional concerns. By providing for increased regional input, parties could finally act as the vehicles of national integration. Surely, this prospect would improve and unify our democracy.

Notwithstanding the advantages of this type of electoral reform, Smiley’s proposal can be criticized on at least two points. Firstly, governments would be weakened because second-place finishers would most probably come from non-governing parties (Irvine 1985, 92). In spite of the fact that minority governments have been shown not to be necessarily as bad as some critics would lead us to believe, the above potential would nonetheless tend to “generate more minority governments because the combined opposition will win more of the additional seats than will the government party” (Irvine
1985, 99). This moderate chance for increased minority government is born out by the fact that in 1980, the Progressive Conservatives would have won 25 out of 27 additional seats in Quebec because they finished second in the races (Irvine 1985, 92). As a result, the Liberal government would have been eleven seats short of a majority in the House of Commons (Irvine 1985, 92).

Although electing a minority government was demonstrated to possess certain advantageous traits, an argument can be made that even a reformed electoral system should not necessarily go completely out of its way to facilitate a minority government if a majority government could be attained. Further, by institutionalizing the fact that the highest second-place finishers become MPs, the Smiley proposal eliminates any chance for effective political participation of disadvantaged groups. By discriminating against the possibility of having more Aboriginals, visible minorities, and women, the proposal’s overt unfairness casts a shadow over its suitability for Canada.

More recently and without getting into specific statistics, it is conceivable that when the Liberals’ four seat majority victory in the 1997 election is coupled with Smiley’s electoral reform, the result could have been a minority government. All one has to consider is all the extra seats that the Progressive Conservatives or Reform would have won in Ontario in lieu of the fact that the Liberals won all but two of the seats. Consequently, one acknowledges that despite the possibility of achieving greater equality for all non-governing parties as evidenced by statistics on the variability of vote to seat distributions (Irvine 1985, 94-95), the fact remains that the equality variable cannot be guaranteed across the board. As such, the wasted vote theory remains strong which further decreases the attraction of the proposal. Therefore, based on the criteria of
producing proportional results to the vote, the legitimacy of the Smiley proposal is dubious.

Another criticism levied on the Smiley reform could focus on the perception of provincial seat runners up as “second class MPs and MLAs who could hardly be considered as potential cabinet material to boost weak regional representation” (Neilson and MacPherson 94). With two different MPs and MLAs from the same constituency, an argument can be made that while they may have de jure the same official standing in the House of Commons, they would be de facto different in the eyes of other members as well as their respective constituents. This feeling is supported by the somewhat sarcastic comment of an MP who when asked about the possibility of two classes of MPs responded that “we will have loges off the galleries for honourable members. They shall be those proportionally elected members … They will be up there floating, not having had to fight in the constituencies” (quoted in Seidle 1996, 295).

At this point, it is only fair to insert a caveat that the House of Commons “routinely contains within its ranks members who can be differentiated on a number of significant criteria” (McCormick et al. 1981, 55). These criteria include but are not limited to: government versus opposition members, frontbenchers versus backbenchers, elected members versus by-elected members, large majority winners versus narrow plurality winners, and larger constituency and population MPs and MLAs versus smaller constituency and population MPs and MLAs (McCormick et al. 1981, 55). Further, since all sitting members would cast equal and not weighted votes, an argument can be made that the addition of another way to distinguish one group of MPs and MLAs from another is “hardly a preemptive concern” (McCormick et al. 1981, 55).
The above concerns aside, one must remember that the notion of perception is important. More specifically, if a voter recognizes an MP as the winning candidate who represents his/her riding, it becomes more difficult to accept the runner-up as a legitimate second option who will also represent that respective constituency. Reality might preclude the second MP from exercising any real power in the community because voters (hopefully a majority) would want to identify with the winning MP.

The MP-voter link is a crucial one insofar as the second MP could decide to free himself/herself from performing any constituency work. By doing so, the second MP would be able to focus on broader, more national issues. Notwithstanding that importance, voters have come to expect that their individual representative is supposed to represent their views while at the same time attempting to maintain a broader perspective and focus on the country as a whole. Although these dual roles have become increasingly more difficult to attain, the addition of another local MP would only serve to complicate matters further, thus stifling any progress that might otherwise have been achieved in the individual constituency. Moreover, when the increased chance for minority government is coupled with second class MPs and MLAs, one realizes that the proposal is asymmetrical in its effects and is marred by a certain capriciousness in choosing amongst candidates who finished second in their respective constituencies (Irvine 1985, 93). Once again, one is reminded that it is the methods for arriving at minority government and the way second class MPs and MLAs are chosen which are problematic and not necessarily the principles themselves. Accordingly, even if the Smiley proposal is a small step in the right direction, closer examination has revealed that its faults outweigh its benefits, thus not contributing to a marked improvement in the electoral system.
THE COURTNEY PROPOSAL

In 1980, Canadian political scientist John C. Courtney proposed another non-proportional electoral reform when he suggested doubling the size of the House of Commons which would in turn halve the size of individual constituencies. Courtney modelled his proposal on the 630-member British House of Commons. Courtney hinted that doubling the size of the House of Commons could potentially reduce the power of party whips, relax party discipline, and provide greater independence for backbenchers (Courtney 1980, 456). In addition, Courtney felt that the larger the House of Commons, the “closer its number of seats approximates the number of voters” (Courtney 1980, 457). Overall, the proposal sought to “represent in Parliament the variety of political views in the Canadian community” (Irvine 1985, 89). However, like Smiley’s proposal, the Courtney proposal suffers from both conceptual and physical constraints.

The first problem with Courtney’s proposal is fitting so many members in a newly enlarged House of Commons. As well, the proposal is not a cost-effective response to the problem of electoral reform. Many Canadians would have reservations about having a larger government since recent trends have been to shrink government in an effort to both increase efficiency while at the same time to save money.

Although doubling the size of the House of Commons might score well in the area of political participation and fairness by providing greater representation for different views (i.e. Aboriginals, visible minorities, and women), one can argue that it would not necessarily correct current electoral imbalances. More specifically, the likelihood exists that by simply doubling whatever representation already existed, Courtney’s proposal would remain neutral with respect to majority versus minority government as well as the
related issues of majority rule and equality of voting rights. These facts do not lend themselves well to an adequate solution regarding the recurring problematic issue of Canadian regionalism. Despite the possibility that Courtney’s proposal might help represent sparsely populated northern ridings and may succeed in providing more people to undertake larger and more complex legislative tasks, it does not offer the kind of solutions which would make the electoral system any more democratic.

**THE IRVINE PROPOSAL**

In his well known book on the Canadian electoral system (1979), Irvine proposed a mixed electoral system that was similar in nature to that of Germany’s. Irvine suggested increasing the House of Commons from 282 to 354 seats, reducing the constituencies to 188, and adding 166 PR seats on the basis of representation by population (Irvine 1979, 53). Political parties would prepare a rank-ordered list of candidates in case the party won fewer constituency seats than its share of the popular vote (Seidle 1996, 293-294). The result would be that a number of candidates from the party’s list would be declared elected in order to make up the entitlement (Irvine 1979, 53-54). As a result, democratic notions of representation would be satisfied by the fact that after constituency seats are tabulated, PR seats could be assigned in a fashion that “each party’s total share of seats (constituency and proportional) would approximate its share of the provincial popular vote” (Elton and Gibbins 39). Thus, by offering a form of checks and balances whereby a party’s poor performance on the constituency side could be more than offset by its performance on the at-large seat side, the Irvine proposal should not be overlooked.

In spite of the fact that Irvine’s proposal would succeed more than any other in assuring improved regional representation for traditionally weaker parties, it decreases
substantially the likelihood of majority government and increases the possibility of minority government and/or coalition formation (Elton and Gibbins 40). Nonetheless, Irvine contends that minority government or coalition formation would be desirable developments since more broad based governments would take a wider spectrum of opinions into account when enacting legislative programs (Seidle 1989, 262). For Irvine, minority government or coalition formation would be desirable developments in Canada because

A large measure of the current alienation from the federal government comes from the fact that its formal power exceeds its real social power. Governments act. and must act, on behalf of the whole country but they do not have support from a majority of the voters, nor do they have caucus representation from large segments of the society. Coalition governments would be more broadly based ... This would certainly increase the difficulties of government formation, but Canada is a difficult country to govern and it is unwise to mask this artificially. It is worth complicating the bargaining process if the bargains are thereby more acceptable (Irvine 1979, 77).

Acknowledging this difficulty, Irvine contends that initial complications in the bargaining process could eventually lead to more publicly acceptable policies. More publicly acceptable policies could decrease political alienation while increasing democratic representativeness and system legitimacy. Indeed, these consequences would be noble pursuits to strive for in any democracy.

To prove that Irvine's electoral reform proposal is potentially ground breaking, one acknowledges that it would have changed majority governments in 1974 and 1980 into minority ones (Elton and Gibbins 40). Instead of the Liberals winning 53% and 52% of the seats respectively, Irvine's proposal would have cut the percentages to 43% and 45% respectively (Irvine 1979, 55, Irvine 1980, 23). As a result, if one couples the new 1974 and 1980 election results with the likewise chance for a minority government in
1968, a smaller minority government in 1972, and an outright Liberal victory in 1979, one realizes the extent of the proposal’s ability to change election results. For many reform critics, the Irvine proposal would have contributed to well over a decade of perpetual governmental instability in the form of no single party majority government. For advocates of stable one-party majority government, this fact alone makes the proposal unpalatable. However, for advocates of minority and/or coalition government, this proposal possesses revolutionary appeal as it attempts to dramatically overhaul Canada’s malfunctioning current electoral system.

When assessing the Irvine reform or for that matter any other reform, one must remember that each political system is unique. Consequently, just because the German electoral system is lauded as the world’s most successful, it does not necessarily follow that Canada would benefit from the adoption of the same system. Caution should be exercised with the Irvine proposal since it can be argued to be completely not in-keeping with Canada’s political culture, socio-political cleavages, and historical traditions. Courtney reminds us that the German system was designed to deal with a particular postwar situation and a set of problems quite removed from the kind Canada is currently facing (Courtney 1980, 454). On this basis, cross-national comparative references are sometimes of limited political and/or practical value (Courtney 1980, 454).

Notwithstanding attempts at cross-national comparisons, the Irvine proposal cannot be completely discarded especially as it pertains to its relationship to democratic theory. More specifically, by introducing the largest number of compensatory list seats, the Irvine proposal would score well on the fairness and representativeness side by cultivating a political environment that would encourage more Aboriginals, visible
minorities, and women to join the political fray. In addition, by coming closer than any competing proposal to the revered principle of ‘one person, one vote’, the Irvine proposal scores well on the equality side by attempting to ensure that every vote counts and that no votes are wasted. Finally, depending once again upon one’s political convictions, the Irvine proposal, by in essence violating the principle of majority rule in leaning towards a more exact approximation of votes to seats, would dramatically increase the chance for minority government. By producing a legislature that “matches the profile of the electorate” (Aucoin and Smith 1997, 31), the Irvine proposal is for the most part immune from criticism at least with respect to the democratic tenets outlined at the outset of this piece. Unfortunately, like other well thought out institutional reforms, the Irvine proposal would have difficulty sustaining the prolonged scrutiny it could expect from traditional thinkers who would prefer not to deviate from prevailing norms and values.

Despite the fact that previous sections revealed that minority government does indeed possess positive attributes and should not be completely discarded as a desirable election outcome, the fact remains that if political elites can manage to win a majority government with all its perks, they will strive to do so. When a lack of strong popular demand for perpetual minority government is combined with a reluctance on the part of governing elites to “support a potentially threatening change in the rules of the game” (Lovink 1998, 47), it is difficult to envision how the Irvine proposal would succeed. As arguably the most radical yet democratically sound departure from our current electoral system, the Irvine proposal would in all likelihood face the most bureaucratic inertia and be labeled as distinctly un-Canadian.
THE PEPIN-ROBARTS TASK FORCE ON CANADIAN UNITY PROPOSAL

In 1979, Jean-Luc Pepin and John Robarts submitted the Pepin-Robarts Task Force proposal which suggested that due to the essential link between MP and voter, the present single-member constituency system should be maintained (Pepin-Robarts Task Force, 105). However, to remove what the Pepin-Robarts Task Force believed to be the "corrosive effect of the plurality system" (Pepin-Robarts Task Force, 105), it suggested the addition of 60 extra seats to the House of Commons based on provincial party lists of candidates prepared by the parties in advance of a general election. The 60 extra seats would be distributed on the basis of the party's share of the national popular vote (Pepin-Robarts Task Force, 105). After the extra seats are determined, they would be distributed amongst the provinces, proportional to each party's underrepresentation in each province (Seidle 1996, 292). By doing so, the Pepin-Robarts Task Force proposal hoped to lessen Canadians' sense of alienation and exclusion from power (Pepin-Robarts Task Force, 106).

With a modest form of supplementary proportional representation, one can point to several strengths in this proposal. Once again, depending upon one's stance on the issue, chief amongst the strengths as cited by the proposal's advocates would be that the likelihood of minority government would be moderately reduced (Pepin-Robarts Task Force, 106). This is supported by calculations that in spite of the fact that no minority governments would have been avoided, only the slim majorities of 1945 and 1997 (author's calculations) would have become minority governments. In both cases, the Liberals would have been short by three seats. The above developments would be complemented by the democratic use of the 60 seats to correct the "most severe instances
of party underrepresentation” (Irvine 1980, 25). This point is supported by the observation that the Pepin-Robarts proposal “focused on reinforcing parties in those provinces where the plurality system exacts its sternest penalties” (Seidle 1989, 261).

Borrowing from the majority of the literature, if one takes the poor representation of the 1980 election as an example, the Pepin-Robarts Task Force formula would have increased Quebec Progressive Conservatives by eleven seats and Western Liberals by twenty seats respectively (Irvine 1980, 23, Irvine 1985, 87). Although the Pepin-Robarts Task Force proposal would not correct regional imbalances of representation as much as Irvine’s proposal, statistics at the time revealed that despite the proposal’s relative neutrality in producing a government based on a majority of the popular vote, it nonetheless possessed a greater than average probability of producing majority governments (Irvine 1980, 23).

Shifting gears to the most recent federal election of 1997, one acknowledges that the Pepin-Robarts Task Force proposal would have produced more representative results. More specifically, based on actual returns, extra seats would have been apportioned as follows: Liberals - 23, Reform - 11, Progressive Conservatives - 11, NDP - 7, Bloc Quebecois - 7. However, by receiving more seats than their percentage of the popular vote would allow, the Bloc Quebecois would have been over-represented by the electoral system. Consequently, their remaining seats would be divided between the other parties who were underrepresented in all provinces. With this modest form of supplementary proportional representation, all parties could have received additional seats in weaker areas (Liberals – Western Canada, Reform – Ontario, Progressive Conservatives – Quebec, Ontario, Alberta, NDP – Ontario).
The above occurrences would score well in the areas of voter equality and perceived legitimacy. By having lower vote to seat ratios, the proposal would come closer to meeting the Supreme Court's requirements for a degree of effective representation. This argument is supported by empirical evidence that with the exception of the Irvine proposal, the Pepin-Robarts Task Force proposal scored best in terms of the variability of vote to seat distributions (Irvine 1985, 94-95). Furthermore, increased legitimacy would be achieved by a new political configuration which would enable all parties to "have a more national leadership, better representative of the distribution of party voters across the country and ... sizable cadre of MPs in each province to organize the party across the country" (Irvine 1985, 89).

In spite of the numerous positive arguments in favour of the Pepin-Robarts Task Force proposal, criticisms abound. As with every add-on proportional system, detractors point to the often cited drawbacks of: party power in compiling provincial lists and the perception of and potential for two classes of MPs and MLAs. The issue of two classes of MPs and MLAs was discussed previously with the central argument dismissing its validity being that we already have a system that entrenches two classes of MPs and MLAs. Further, the problem of provincial lists could be mitigated by either announcing the lists before the election or having established rules as to how parties should fill the lists with special consideration for Aboriginals, visible minorities, and women etc. This potential could bode well for reformers who clamour for increased fairness and representativeness in the electoral and political participation processes. Although some conservatives might oppose this form of electoral affirmative action, an argument can be
made that Canada has not gone far enough to ensure that the aforementioned groups are represented in an appropriate manner.

The one potential disadvantage unique to the Pepin-Robarts proposal is the constitutional consequence of maintaining the principle of representation by population (Sections 51 and 52 of the 1867 British North America Act (BNA) and Section 42 of the 1982 Constitution Act). The Pepin-Robarts proposal departs from other proposals by not fixing the number of provincial seats in advance. Some scholars like Irvine would argue that the “balance among provinces be preserved and not subject to change on the basis of each election’s outcome” (Treusch 1980a, 9).

Under the Pepin-Robarts Task Force proposal, a constitutional problem could occur because “the number of additional seats assigned the various provinces would vary from one election to another” (Seidle 1989, 261) as a function of the “degree of misrepresentation of the aggregate distribution of voter preferences, in the seats electing members by the simple plurality system” (Irvine 1985, 104). With no fixed number of seats coupled with the fact that the “exact mechanism employed should be left to Parliament in consultation with experts” (Treusch 1980a, 7), the door remains ajar for variations to occur which would depart from set percentages sought in the 1867 British North America Act (BNA). More specifically, beyond its specific recommendations outlined in its conclusion, the Pepin-Robarts Task Force proposal possesses little substance as to the method of seat distribution as well as a more precise definition of the distribution of the 60 MPs and MLAs amongst the provinces and regions (Elton and Gibbins 38).
Like so many of its imperfect sister proposals, one cannot help but acknowledge some of the proposal’s technical, theoretical and/or practical faults. Nonetheless, these faults should not overshadow the fact that statistics reveal the redistribution of seats would not “constitute such a departure from the principle of representation by population as to constitute a new regime and hence require a constitutional amendment that would require support from seven provinces” (Irvine 1985, 104). Besides, Sections 51 and 52 of the 1867 British North America Act (BNA) and Section 42 of the 1982 Constitution Act have been amended on numerous occasions by the House of Commons to the point where one could argue that any future amendment would not entail any considerable danger to the foundation and principles of Canadian parliamentary government.

Small discrepancies in representation should be accepted even by purists so as to not provoke an avalanche of political and constitutional haggling over its desired effects. If one re-examines the results of the 1997 federal election and without getting into specific statistics, the changes should be viewed as acceptable ones that would improve a party’s provincial representation without significantly distorting or infringing upon Canada’s coveted constitutional principle of representation by population. Certainly in light of all the constitutional and/or political problems Canada faces, a small tweaking of the constitution is not beyond the purview of the government and the House of Commons.

Notwithstanding some conceptual stumbling blocks which could be overcome in the Pepin-Robarts Task Force proposal, it remains one of the best at balancing the seesaw of democracy and stability. In courageously stating that the Task Force proposal was “the best candidate for electoral reform” (Irvine 1985, 106), Irvine provides sound
arguments and statistics that address its consequences as well as its potential pitfalls (Irvine 1985, 98-107). Clearly, if one couples the democracy and stability advantages of the proposal, one gets a distinct amelioration of the present electoral system. With a plethora of favourable points, the Task Force’s 1979 recommendation concluded as follows:

An analysis of how our proposal might have worked in each federal election since 1945 suggests that the combined electoral system we are proposing, with about 280 single-member constituencies plus 60 additional seats to make representation more proportionate, would not only have produced a more broadly based representation within each party in the Commons but would not have significantly increased the incidence of minority government over that period (Pepin-Robarts Task Force, 106).

By correcting potential governmental instability as well as electoral inequity, this proposal goes extremely far in attempting to preserve the best of the plurality world while at the same time extracting the most from the world of proportional representation. For these reasons, the Pepin-Robarts Task Force proposal or a variant thereof should be strongly considered for Canada.

For a more recent rehashing of the Pepin-Robarts Task Force proposal, one should examine studies by former NDP MP and Lortie Royal Commission staff member Michael Cassidy who echoed the Task Force’s proposal. Cassidy recommended a mixed system where 80% of MPs would continue to be elected from single-member constituencies while the remaining 20% would be elected from party lists drawn up for each province (Cassidy 1992, 3-27, Seidle 1996, 296-297, Weaver 1997a, 486-487). The proposal differs slightly from the Pepin-Robarts Task Force proposal since the total number of seats remains the same with the party list seats included within the formula and not in addition to the existing seats. Clearly, all votes would carry more weight and
be treated more equally. Levels of political participation and fairness would improve by giving Aboriginals, visible minorities, and women more of a chance to take part in the process of governing. With the Cassidy proposal, the probability of attaining single party majority government would be “substantially reduced if compensation seats comprised a modest 20 per cent of the total” (Weaver 1997a, 486). While it has been established that this occurrence should not be viewed as an impediment to implementing this type of reform, the fact remains that unless attitudes change, the increased potential for minority government will in all likelihood be frowned upon by those wielding the levers of power. Overall, one cannot help but concede that the proposal possesses advantages not to be overlooked by reformers intent on fashioning a new electoral system.

The final and most recent reform proposal which borrows from the Pepin-Robarts Task Force proposal yet differentiates itself slightly from the Cassidy proposal is that of a foreigner. American political scientist Kent Weaver attempted to extract a little from all proposals in an effort to “marry the Westminster-style parliamentary system’s concern for stable single-party majority government with the representational concerns of more proportional systems” (Weaver 1997, 3). More specifically, Weaver suggested increasing the number of seats in the House of Commons by 10% with “each province’s share of those seats increasing proportionate to its population” (Weaver 1997a, 493). Further, like other similar proposals, the Weaver proposal awards compensation seats based on party lists established before the election.

Echoing other proportional schemes, all votes would carry more weight and be treated more equally under the Weaver proposal. However, since the number of compensation seats is more limited than the Cassidy or the Pepin-Robarts Task Force
proposals, the effect on “underrepresentation of women, aboriginals, and visible minorities is most difficult to predict” (Weaver 1997, 5). By positing a “modest, but not insignificant increase in representation of these groups” (Weaver 1997, 5), the Weaver proposal does not perform that badly. Finally, unlike the Cassidy proposal, statistics of the Weaver proposal (Weaver 1997a, 494-512) reveal that the “prospects for majority government are decreased only modestly” (Weaver 1997a, 494) with only the Liberal government of 1980 reduced to a minority.

Even though it has been argued that minority government possesses unquestionable advantages, the Weaver proposal might strike a chord with elites who might eventually want electoral reform but would not want to deviate too much from the existing electoral system. By limiting compensatory seats yet leaving the door open slightly for minority government, the Weaver proposal goes far in attempting to assuage the concerns of both elites and the public. Accordingly, it seems logical to posit that the Weaver proposal, at least in comparison to the Cassidy proposal, has more of a chance of being considered as an alternative electoral system for Canada.

**THE CANADA WEST FOUNDATION PROPOSAL**

In their 1982 report entitled *Electoral Reform: The Time is Pressing, The Need is Now*, David Elton and Roger Gibbins suggested an alternative electoral system which in their views offered regional correctives to the electoral system. These regional correctives were needed because at that time, they felt that “regional imbalances in both the West and Quebec have now reached alarming proportions in our party system and have created serious political problems” (Elton and Gibbins 6). To alleviate the regional tensions and reflect the existing diversity in the popular vote, they suggested an electoral reform
whose implementation would hopefully result in minimal disruptions to the existing electoral system by in part maintaining the traditional linkages between MPs, MLAs, and their constituents (Elton and Gibbins 24,25).

The Elton-Gibbins mixed proposal called for the reduction of single-member constituencies from the then 282 to 255, and for the addition of 75 new MPs and MLAs to be elected from party lists on the basis of a party’s share of the vote in each province (Elton and Gibbins 25). As a result, 77% of the seats would be filled under the current electoral system while the balance would be allocated based on rules of proportional representation.

In terms of electing the 75 new provincial representatives, all parties would nominate lists of candidates equal to the number of provincial representatives. Further, unlike the current electoral system, voters would be given two ballots. While the first ballot would remain identical to the existing ballot in its election of a constituency MP, the second ballot would offer the voter the freedom to choose the party of his or her choice. With two ballots, one can argue that more strategic voting could occur as voters would be given more political freedom to vote for the man/woman of their choice as well as perhaps a different party of their choice. The 75 new provincial MPs and MLAs would be allocated somewhat arbitrarily (15 each to Ontario and Quebec, eight to Alberta and British Columbia, and five each to all the other provinces except Prince Edward Island who would receive four (Irvine 1985, 78).

Before moving on to the advantages and disadvantages of this proposal, it bears mentioning that if this proposal would be implemented in today’s larger House of Commons and keeping in mind the statistical breakdowns, Canada would contain
approximately 270 single-member constituencies. When the 270 single-member constituencies are added to the 75 new compensatory seats, the new House of Commons would have approximately 345 MPs. As a result, 78% of the seats would be filled under the current electoral system while the balance would be allocated based on rules of proportional representation.

The Canada West Foundation proposal possesses several advantages. By adding a modest form of proportional representation, its advocates point to the increased possibility that parties would no longer be shut out in any province. By adding a "regional core for each of the parties" (Elton and Gibbins 27), the proposal attempts to ensure that national governments are just that – national in scope. By maintaining the traditional MP/voter link, the proposal offers the greater likelihood that governments become more sensitized to regional concerns. Further, political parties would have additional incentive and motivation to conduct truly national campaigns and not tailor their campaigns to areas of greatest likely reward. These characteristics are buttressed by conclusions that the existing strengths of political parties would not drastically change since the proposal would both improve upon and widen the regional balance within party caucuses by providing political parties with regional enclaves. More specifically, the authors maintain that

The electoral reforms we propose would not totally remove regional imbalances from the party system. Over the long run, only sustained effort by the parties themselves can accomplish this goal. Electoral reform will provide the political parties with crucial toeholds, and with incentives to mount a strong and potentially rewarding electoral campaign in all regions of the country (Elton and Gibbins 28-29).

In addition to the above balanced view, those people who stress the need for majority government are rewarded with the statistically proven fact that the likelihood of
minority government would not increase (Elton and Gibbins 28). Although once again, if it is deemed necessary to avoid the institutionalization of minority government, the proposal's advantages would allow it to rest on solid ground in the eyes of elites. Nonetheless, notwithstanding the proposal's noble intentions, one must insert the obvious caveats that success can depend largely on one's position on the majority/minority government issue. As well, one cannot disregard the hypothesis that it cannot be assumed that parties and voters would have behaved the same way had the electoral rules of the game been different (Elton and Gibbins 28).

Like other well-known proposals (Pepin-Robarts and Irvine), the Canada West proposal, in the eyes of its detractors, is not immune from the above proposal's problems. Once again, critics point to party power in compiling provincial lists. By being able to compile party lists, what these critics seem to be acknowledging is that the list system would work essentially as an insurance policy for those individuals located at the top of the list that might have otherwise encountered problems in a straight plurality system. However, similar to the Pepin-Robarts proposal, it bears repeating that once again, the problem of provincial lists could be mitigated by either announcing the lists before the election or having established rules as to how parties should fill the lists with special consideration for Aboriginals, visible minorities, and women etc. This potential could bode well for reformers who clamour for increased fairness and representativeness in the electoral and political participation processes. When this supposed drawback is coupled with the flawed theory of creating two classes of MPs and MLAs, this reform, like others before it, deserves to have at least some of its criticisms muted.
Building on the aforementioned deficiencies, the proposal suffers from other potential flaws somewhat unique to itself. The first possible disadvantage is the two-ballot process. At the risk of sounding elitist, an argument can be made that the two ballots may impart undue complexity on the electoral process. It is this complexity which would not be desired by the public or the political establishment especially if this process leads to an increase in spoiled ballots. In theory, this argument makes sense. However, unless implemented, debate will rage on as to what may result.

Another technical problem with the Canada West proposal centers around the one constituency MP allowed for in Prince Edward Island. This occurrence creates province-wide constituencies for all representatives and offers little justification for “shielding that one seat from proportional allocation” (Irvine 1985, 79). Further, with regards to the compensatory capacity of the proposal, one acknowledges the obvious arbitrariness of seat allocations. Based on the proposed seat breakdowns, the Canada West proposal gives “maximum capacity to the Atlantic provinces and to the western provinces” (Irvine 1985, 79). Once again, it seems possible that parties that have been historically underrepresented in certain areas may continue their disturbing trends. Present-day examples could include: NDP, Progressive Conservative, and Reform in Ontario, Liberal and Progressive Conservative in the West, Progressive Conservative in Quebec. This potential is born out by statistics that the proposal has the potential of finishing closer to the bottom of all eligible proposals when it comes to the variability of vote to seat distributions (Irvine 1985, 94-95). With this in mind, the proposal cannot fare as well as others when it comes to equality concerns in general and efforts to achieve effective representation in particular.
An assumption can be made that the odds are that with two ballots, voting behaviour would not remain the same (Seidle 1989, 261). Therefore, perhaps Canada would be better off with a similar system of proportional representation that utilized a stronger element of proportional representation to correct obvious regional disparities. For some reformers, that stronger element could be the aforementioned Irvine proposal.

**MAJORITY RUNOFF/TWO ROUND/Doubles BALLOT PROPOSAL**

The final electoral reform that warrants attention is both a simple one to understand yet is used by very few nations. The majority two-round or double ballot electoral system builds upon the first-past-the-post electoral system in that for a candidate to be elected, he/she must obtain a majority of the popular vote. More specifically, if a candidate receives an absolute majority of the vote on the first ballot, he/she is declared elected. However, if no candidate receives an absolute majority of the vote, a second ballot is used to determine a majority winner. At this point, one witnesses two small variations of the electoral system.

In the first variation with the most well-known example being France, any candidate who receives 12.5% of the vote on the first ballot can run in the second election usually held no more than two weeks after the first election. In the second election, the winner is the one who simply collects the most votes. As such, this electoral system is “not truly majoritarian” (Milner 1999, 190). Although theoretically, several candidates can contest the second round of French elections, practice has revealed that the second ballot focuses more on competing coalitions rather than individual candidates and political parties (Blais 1993, 127). This bipolarization and resulting coalition formation, which has remained endemic to French politics in the Fifth Republic while not yet
achieving any status in Canada, witnesses two grand coalitions fighting for legislative representation, one on the left and one on the right.

The second variation, which is currently used for elections in the Ukraine, differs from the French version in that the second round of elections is a “straight run-off contest between the two highest vote-winners from the first round” (Milner 1999, 190). Ergo, the major difference between the two electoral variations is that the second one is truly a majoritarian formula because it requires the candidate to achieve an absolute majority of the vote. As a result, it would appear that at least on the surface, the second variation of the two-round system as used in the Ukraine is the more democratic choice that would differ the most from our existing plurality electoral system.

With respect to the idea of majority/runoff double ballot elections for Canada, one should not be so quick to dismiss its potential usefulness. More specifically, the majority/runoff double ballot system would maintain Canada’s unique features such as single-member constituencies and the all important MP/voter link while at the same time providing for increased democratic credibility by forcing candidates to win more than just a plurality of the vote. This occurrence would have the resulting effect of dramatically increasing the likelihood that a party with a majority of seats would also win a majority of the national vote. With these thoughts in mind, little wonder that some scholars feel that the majority/runoff double ballot electoral system would succeed because of its ability to combine both the virtues of plurality and proportional representation (Blais 1993, Lovink 1998).

By combining the supposed virtues of accountability and responsiveness, the majority/runoff double ballot electoral system should be considered for Canada.
Although coalitions, unlike minority governments, have been for the most part alien to the Canadian political landscape, they could in time become an accepted and appreciated fact of life. Although political and social cleavages differ in French and Ukrainian political cultures, coalition formation in a multi-party Canada could become more open and taken away from party elites in backroom negotiations. As a result, little wonder that some analysts refer to the majority electoral system as a ‘maximin’ solution. More specifically, it is felt that the majority electoral system is the “option that provides the best minimal outcome, or best prevents the worst outcomes” (Blais 1993, 129).

Notwithstanding the preceding positive description of the majority/runoff double ballot electoral system, one is reminded that like many other electoral reforms, one must insert the caveat that as good as the electoral reform sounds in theory, one must assume that electoral behaviour would not remain the same. Although in comparison to proportional electoral schemes the majority electoral system represents a “less radical change and may be more acceptable” (Blais 1993, 129) to a greater number of people, the potential still exists for voting behaviour to alter significantly and especially on the second ballot. It is this potential which must not be forgotten if and when the time comes that electoral reform does indeed occur.

With a majority double-ballot electoral system, voters would be given a greater role in choosing both winning candidates and coalitions in the second round of elections which would certainly be a breath of fresh air in an otherwise stale environment of electoral status-quo. Moreover, with two rounds of elections, voters would be given the right to reconsider their first vote. This potential for strategic voting could create a
resulting benefit in which citizens would feel more included in the political process and as a result more interested in how the country is governed.

In bolstering the argument for majority runoff elections, what better support could one point to than the often overlooked fact that “Canadian parties are accustomed to runoff elections (with multiple ballots), which they use for the selection of party leaders as well as candidates in the ridings” (Blais 1993. 129). If Canadian parties can use majority runoff elections for their internal party nominations, why not provide Canadians with the same chance by adopting the same electoral formula for general elections? This oversight on the part of government elites would seem to be a curious one, especially considering the fact that little has been made of the possibility of implementing majority runoff elections for Canada. More strangely, when examining the literature on the subject, two-round elections have received even less scholarly attention than other fancier proportional schemes.

Although the majority/runoff double ballot electoral system possesses numerous democratic advantages over its plurality cousin, one should not forget some of its disadvantages. Even though arguments could be made that coalition formation and government are eventualities that could be gotten used to, the fact remains that they have remained foreign to the Canadian political landscape and may be opposed by those who control the levers of power. Moreover, from a democratic theory point of view, the possibility exists that more alliances and coalitions could compromise the principles of political participation and fairness. More specifically, with alliances and coalitions being formed on the second ballot, a greater chance exists for the reinforcement of what the
Lortie Commission called the "persistent underrepresentation of certain groups" (Canada 1991b, 115).

As alluded to in other electoral reform proposals, Canada’s current electoral system discriminates against Aboriginals, visible minorities and women (Megyery 1991, Megyery 1991a, Milen 1991). Unfortunately, short of implementing major structural changes such as creating Aboriginal electoral districts (AEDs) or ensuring greater minority and gender parity, the current electoral system in concert with political parties will continue to function as “gatekeepers of access to candidacy” (Canada 1991b, 115). Whereas other more list-based proportional schemes might encourage greater group representation by entrenching its significance, the double ballot electoral reform could simply superimpose itself on the existing electoral system by restricting the same group representation.

By having the potential especially on the second ballot to lean towards the established boys club of male Anglo-Saxons when it comes to political representation, the majority/runoff double-ballot electoral system does possess the risk of curtailing any advances that the aforementioned groups would seek to make by advocating electoral reform. More specifically, without specific guarantees to those disadvantaged groups, the majority/runoff double ballot electoral system offers little protection against party elites choosing mainstream candidates who they feel would better represent individual constituencies. In spite of the fact that these views could be difficult to eradicate from our system of elections and government, one must remain suspicious of an electoral reform that could strengthen a system’s resolve to further discriminate against groups who have simply sought and fought for their proper representation.
Another somewhat elitist but realistic drawback to the majority/runoff double ballot electoral system centers around the assumption that even though coalition formation would take place in a more open environment, two rounds of elections could foster a more complex electioneering process. It is this more complex electioneering process that has the potential of confusing what some elitists may regard as a great majority of the ambivalent and disinterested citizenry. Indeed, this potential has an even greater chance of manifesting itself if Canada witnesses a proliferation of political parties entering the political scene and seeking coalitions on the second ballot. While more parties may allow citizens to better voice their regional concerns, it can have the boomerang effect of complicating an election procedure which until now, has been relatively easy to comprehend and follow.

A final criticism of the majority double-ballot electoral system focuses on the economic aspect. More specifically, it is estimated that at the federal level, a second round of elections would cost an extra $40-50 million (Lovink 1998, 47). Although supporters of the electoral system would argue that the additional cost is “only 25-30 percent of the present cost of running a (single-ballot) federal general election” (Lovink 1998, 47), it is difficult to overlook the extra allocation of money. The extra allocation of money can be deemed punitive especially for those who feel that it is earmarked for a process that some would argue can be achieved with only one round of elections.

Taking all the strengths and weaknesses of the majority/runoff double ballot electoral system together, one must acknowledge that overall, it would be a mostly positive reform. Although once again, one must remember that voting behaviour could change with a new electoral system, a hypothetical scenario simulating the 1997 federal
election reveals that the outcome would not have changed that much. The Liberals would have gone from a four seat majority to a thirteen seat majority. Reform and the Progressive Conservatives would have gained five and four seats respectively, and only 38 constituencies would have chosen a different MP (Lovink 1998, 46).

While the forging of solid left-wing and right-wing coalitions as in France could be a difficult task at first, especially considering the make-up of Canada’s party system, political advantage could be accrued by joining forces on the second ballot. While voters may have misgivings about voting for a so-called non-preferred party, those misgivings could be appeased by parties willing to work together towards a common goal. Quick observation would indicate that the Progressive Conservatives and Reform could stand to gain the most by finding a way to cement their seemingly fragile United Alternative or Canadian Alliance. Conversely, the Bloc Quebecois would gain the least since no party would ever consider joining forces with the Bloc lest they risk political suicide.

Although an argument could be made that runoff elections could “reduce the representation of minor parties without a strong regional base and perpetuate the gaps between party vote and seat percentages in each region” (Lovink 1998, 47), important advantages remain. The fact remains that the above weaknesses are more than offset by important improvements that would successfully depart from the existing electoral system. More specifically and especially with the Ukrainian variation in mind, runoff elections would secure greater voter equality for citizens based on the fact that a majority of seats would in all likelihood correspond to a majority of the popular vote. Thus, by adhering more closely to democratic principles of equality and majority rule and in reducing wasted votes, the House of Commons would “certainly gain a great deal in
democratic standing, as a legislature made up entirely of people chosen by a majority of their voting constituents” (Lovink 1998, 47). However, by potentially forestalling democratic and representational advances for Aboriginals, visible minorities, and women, one is forced to be at least cautiously optimistic about the proposal’s likely implementation and practicality in a country that is becoming more and more multicultural and multiethnic.

**ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF ELECTORAL REFORM PROPOSALS**

Even now, is it not a great grievance that in every Parliament a very numerous portion of the electors, willing and anxious to be represented, have no member in the House for whom they have voted? ... The electors who are on a different side in party politics from the local majority are unrepresented. Of those who are on the same side, a proportion are misrepresented, having been obliged to accept the man who had the greatest number of supporters in their political party, though his opinions may differ from theirs on every other point.

-- John Stuart Mill, 1861

With Mill’s obviously dated but painfully relevant critique in mind, few observers would question the fact that the present electoral system possesses anti-majoritarian traits that impede our quest for a more participatory form of representative government. Moreover, by exaggerating moderate oscillations in vote shares into at times spectacular fluctuations in legislative seat shares, our electoral rules of the game prevent realistic attempts to develop a more creative trans-sectional and class-based politics in Canada. Although proportional representation is “not a panacea” (Stewart 1973, 249), a modest form of it, as advocated by the Pepin-Robarts Task Force proposal or even a watered down version of Irvine’s proposal would go a long way to curing several of Canada’s democratic ills.

In spite of the fact that the 1984, 1988, and 1993 elections undercut somewhat the movement for proportional representation, the 1997 election has hopefully revived
interest in the subject. Notwithstanding the consecutive majority governments we have witnessed, it would be unwise to assume that all is well to the point that we could “relegate the recent debate on the electoral system to an historical footnote” (Seidle 1989, 265). While not intending to minimize the electoral nightmares or tribulations endured by other major political parties, all one has to do is look at the fate of one of Canada’s original parties - the Progressive Conservatives. In 1993, the party garnered 2.1 million votes based on 16% of the popular vote yet won only two seats. In 1997, the party fared a little better by winning 2.4 million votes based on 19% of the popular vote yet this time, it obtained twenty seats. Although an electoral system of pure proportional representation is not recommended in this piece, suffice to say that the Progressive Conservatives would have elected 47 and 57 members respectively in both elections under such a purely proportional electoral system. These results are unacceptable and should undermine the continued full usage of the current plurality electoral system.

Unless alternatives are attempted, nobody will ever know what potential benefits could be accrued from the adoption of a new electoral system. However, an important qualification must be made that a reformed electoral system may cause people to vote differently. With a modified form of proportional representation where every vote counts, voters could become attracted even more to regional or extreme parties. Moreover, if the electoral system gives voters two ballots as recommended in the Canada West Foundation proposal, strategic voting is likely to ensue. This strategic voting would fundamentally alter party campaigns as well as potentially skew eventual results. Although these potentialities are not necessarily negative occurrences, they must be acknowledged as consequences of a reformed electoral system.
Electoral rules of the game must be modified to suit changing political realities in this country. At the moment, the Canadian electoral system favours territorial over popular representation, a fact that seems quite detrimental to democracy. Unfortunately, for now, debates on electoral reform usually go nowhere. Debates go nowhere because it is never in the interests of a governing party to tinker with and/or reform the electoral system (Campbell A19). This is conveyed well by a remark made by Mulroney after his 1988 election victory. In rejoicing over his 57% of House of Commons seats on 43% of the popular vote, Mulroney remarked that “ya dance with the one who brung ya” (Campbell A19). An obvious reference to the electoral system that benefitted him and his party. why would Mulroney ever consider changing the formulas which brought him unparalleled success for a Progressive Conservative Prime Minister.

Taking the previous perspective a step further, one acknowledges the shared view of many scholars who believe that tinkering with our entrenched electoral system “would be viewed as political suicide by the major parties” (Leduc 1987, 351). Tinkering with our entrenched electoral system would be viewed as political suicide by the major parties largely because political elites fear the political unknown which make them reluctant to support a “potentially threatening change in the rules of the game” (Lovink 1998, 47). Unfortunately, these fears are reinforced by government sponsored commissions who seem to tailor their findings to what the government of the day wants to hear. Therefore, little wonder how electoral reform was cast as an unnecessary evil by the Macdonald Commission and was completely shunned by the Lortie Commission but for a few generalizations.
No comment sums up the exaggerated yet guiding philosophy of electoral reform better than the Macdonald Commission’s view that “a movement to full PR, whatever the system employed, would introduce unpredictable, but potentially far-reaching changes into our party system and the functioning of responsible government” (Canada – MacDoanld Commission 85). Indeed, reality dictates that no electoral reform stands a chance of being implemented if it does not conform to the preferences of Canadian political elites to maintain the current majoritarian structure of the electoral system. Rather than “step into the dark” (Seidle 1996, 295) and shift to an electoral system in which minority or coalition governments would be the norm at best or at least acknowledged as a legitimate option at worse (Weaver 1997a, 482), elites seem resigned to toe the proverbial party line as echoed by the aforementioned remark made by Mulroney.

Although this piece has laboured to prove that coalition and/or minority governments may not necessarily be negative occurrences, one can argue that political elites have grown accustomed to think that the only legitimate form of governance is single-party majority government. As a result of this form of brainwashing, these same political elites have shunned the notions of coalition and/or minority government as undesirable consequences of a reformed electoral system.

By feeling that single-party majority government should be the norm, political elites will in all likelihood continue their hesitation in forwarding electoral reform legislation. This escewing of potentially progressive legislation coupled with negligible public interest will in no unceratain terms cripple future chances of Canada achieving a more broad-based participatory democracy. As a result, the above political inertia,
reinforced by the absence of any strong popular demand for electoral reform must be halted and reversed if Canada is to decrease its democratic deficit and produce tangible results in the form of some sort of citizen empowerment. Otherwise, Canada risks limping along as a nation that boasts about its democratic ideals yet in reality makes little effort to bring these ideals to fruition.

Although the subject of electoral systems and its possible reform might be “dry as dust to some and arcane to many” (O’Neal 1), increased public interest could necessitate its removal from the backburner and its return to the political agenda. As mentioned previously, it should not have to take another lopsided regional representation within a governing majority party for the debate to renew. Indeed, “in no region of the country does more than a bare majority find the workings of the present system acceptable” (Blais and Gidengil 79). Unfortunately, as good as electoral reform might sound in theory, practically speaking, the words “electoral reform are guaranteed to put even the most passionate political animal to sleep” (“The right way: Electoral reform …” O4)

Concerned citizens must realize that electoral perfection will in all likelihood never take place. However, accepting this reality should not preclude government from introducing reforms which could have the following beneficial effects on democracy: 1) a slight decrease in the likelihood of single-party majority government (in hopes of increasing moderately the chance of minority government), 2) a more equitable translation of votes into seats in the House of Commons, 3) a decreased probability that the party that wins the most votes will fail to win the most seats (1896, 1925, 1957, 1962, 1979), 4) a lessening of the probability that a governing party will have virtually no representation in a given region, 5) a weakening of the electoral system bias
in favour of regionally concentrated parties, 6) a lessening of the dominance of members of Parliament from a single region or province in the governing party caucus (Liberals – Ontario), 7) the promotion of an Official Opposition of sufficient size to be effective, and 8) the increased representation of Aboriginals, visible minorities, and women (Weaver 1997a, 473).

While an argument can be made that a reformed electoral system has the potential of addressing most if not all of the above objectives, evidence has revealed that Canada’s current electoral system has stood the test of time because it has suited the self-serving needs of our political leadership. Thus, given the present nature of our country, it is highly unlikely that the subject of electoral reform or the lack thereof will be broached in a serious manner any time soon.

Although electoral reform should be viewed as a short-term goal to improve Canadian representative democracy, it remains an elusive and at best long-term project that will continuously encounter bumps and obstacles along the way to any successful implementation. Even though electoral reform could be easily accomplished by the party in power and be heralded as a giant leap forward by all reformers genuinely concerned with implementing marked improvements, history has demonstrated that it has not yet become a priority goal to be accomplished in the short-term.

It seems likely that any sort of electoral reform, if implemented at all, will remain a long-term priority within the hothouses of proportional representation as well as amongst governing elites. While lamentable, the negligible chances for substantial advancements in the area of electoral reform remain a fact of life unlikely to be altered, especially by those outside the halls of power. Conventional elite thinkers, intoxicated by
power, will in all likelihood continue their tunnel vision thinking. By doing so, elites will effectively kill any chance of democratic transformation for Canada.

If one remains uncertain about the value of the argument concerning a politician’s insatiable appetite for power, he/she would be wise to recall Chretien’s 1984 campaign for the Liberal leadership and his speech in Brandon, Manitoba. In that speech, Chretien promised in no other uncertain terms to introduce a form of proportional representation whereby extra seats would be allocated based on population. Further, those seats were supposed to be filled by those runners-up who garnered the highest percentages of the vote without being elected (Boyer 1994, A9). Despite the scholarly support (Smiley’s proposal), did Canadians hear about a reformed electoral system after Chretien was elected or for that matter at any juncture during his near decade in power? Since the answer to this rhetorical question is an obvious one, one realizes the extent of deceit that Canadians face when attempting to initiate any sort of representational reform.

Realizing the above potential benefits of a reformed electoral system, political elites must acknowledge that Canadian democracy will continue to suffer if the electoral system remains untouched. If government officials are leery of an outright adoption of some form of proportional representation, they could institute some form of sunset clause. This sunset clause would stipulate that if the reformed electoral system does not perform its intended purposes or is not supported by government and citizens, the subsequent election could be contested under the old rules.

Regardless of which country one chooses to look at, powerful lessons exist if Canada is to seriously consider the possibility of tinkering with its electoral system. For example and by way of caveat, reconsider New-Zealand’s efforts at electoral reform in
general and its mixed-member proportional (MMP) system in particular. More specifically, as good as the electoral reform sounds in theory and even though several academics and political scholars recommend some form of it for Canada (Milner 1999), one must remember the obvious differences in political structures. New-Zealand has one of the world’s most centralized democratic regimes. Its unitary form of government possesses no upper house or form of Senate, no charter of rights, and no federal characteristics. By comparison, Canada is almost “at the other extreme – a Senate with real power (although seldom used because the body is appointed); a Charter of Rights with an activist judiciary regularly telling Parliament where to get off, and a federation with extremely powerful and usually disputatious premiers” (Simpson 1997c. A16). It is these differences in political structures which should at least temper an outright adoption of the mixed-member proportional (MMP) electoral system for Canada.

Comparative analysis aside, Canada should remain undaunted in its pursuit of a more practical and grassroots democracy. Feasible options exist within the academic community. It remains for political elites to study them and offer citizens something concrete. Understanding that “no electoral system, no government, no citizen is perfect” (Wiseman 1997, 18) should in no way deter those who wield power from attempting to effect practical and reasonable changes within the political environment.

Few would deny the claim that if one electoral system was ideal, there would be an international stampede to adopt it (Wiseman 1997, 18). This claim aside, Canadian political elites should possess the requisite courage to admit failings in the electoral system and concede that notwithstanding some costs that cannot be accurately or precisely determined beforehand, some “added proportionality in our system may be
beneficial" (Wiseman 1997, 18). Some added proportionality would be beneficial in our continued battle to reduce regional imbalances amongst parliamentary parties. Certainly, one should not delude himself/herself to think that our first-past-the-post/plurality electoral system is sacrosanct to the point where reforms could not or should not be envisioned.

As alluded to earlier, Canada’s regional imbalances, which are “both acute and longstanding, exacerbate regional conflict, weaken the ability of the political parties to act as vehicles of national integration, and weaken the national government in its political interaction with the provincial governments” (Elton and Gibbins 37). As things currently stand and proven by empirical evidence, Canada has become a quartered nation with different parties dominating Atlantic Canada, Ontario, Quebec, and the West respectively.

Albeit the label of our Parliament as a rainbow Parliament is an accurate one, it need not be a negative one. However, the electoral situation can rapidly become a negative one if changes are not made to reconcile a party’s votes and seats. Even if Canada remains far away from degenerating to an Israeli type kaleidoscope of fringe parties, it nonetheless possesses its own brand of nation specific problems that must be addressed soon. The problem with this thought is the time frame that one must point to. Unfortunately, as revolutionary as some of the reform proposals sound, odds are that they will be perceived as alien and radical to the Canadian political landscape. Once again, it is up to average Canadians to prove that they are willing to wrest control of their democracy away from political elites in an effort to promote the Rousseauian ideals of a
more citizen based community where deliberation and equality become cherished values instead of forgotten memories.

In spite of the fact that Elton and Gibbins argue that electoral reform would encounter bumps and obstacles along the way, they maintain that it would not drastically disrupt the balance of party forces in Canada nor the existing relationships between MPs, MLAs, and their respective constituents (Elton and Gibbins 37). Whereas their piece was written at a time of some cabinet and regime instability (late 1970s – early 1980s), their slogan continues to reverberate today. Therefore, to borrow from their rationale and super-impose it onto today’s political environment, one realizes that “the spectre of regional and national disintegration requires electoral reform. The need is pressing, the time is now” (Elton and Gibbins 37).

Considering that almost all major liberal democracies use some form of proportional representation for electing their main legislative assembly (exceptions – Canada, United States, Great Britain), does Canada have anything to lose at this point? It is difficult to envision any modest form of proportional representation being any worse than our present plurality electoral system. Indeed, even Canada’s mother country is in the process of considering major changes to its electoral system. More specifically, Labour Prime Minster Tony Blair has put aside his hesitations, bowed to members of his Cabinet and party and set up the Jenkins Commission to “examine and propose alternative voting systems for Westminster itself” (Milner 1997a, 9). Not surprisingly, the Jenkins Commission advocated a move away from the first-past-the-post electoral system. Instead, it recommended a “semi-proportional mix of majority vote constituencies and compensatory lists” (Reynolds 1999, 177) where approximately 80-
85% of the House of Commons would be elected by the alternative vote while the remaining 15-20% would be filled on a “corrective basis from PR lists allocated within small “top-up” areas based on existing counties and metropolitan districts” (Reynolds 1999, 177).

Besides the Jenkins Commission, the skeptical Blair took the bold step of authorizing the introduction of a bill to bring proportional representation to British elections to the European Parliament in 1999. Further, Blair endorsed the devolution of power to proportional representation based parliaments in Scotland and Wales. This positive step forward was sanctioned by the Scots and Welsh when they voted in referendums to both devolve power and set up their parliaments with members to be elected in 1999 through means of proportional representation. Both nationally and regionally, one cannot help but acknowledge the unprecedented steps taken by a country known for its deference to the status quo. Therefore, if a country as steeped in history and traditions such as Great Britain is willing to shed its conservative image and contemplate changes to its electoral system, one would hope that reformist enthusiasm could spill over into Canada so that it does remain out-of-step.

In bolstering the need for a form of proportional representation, one acknowledges the comment that

The need for proportional representation is not a quest for power by fringe parties. It is a recognition that a diversity of ideas presented at the highest levels of government is more likely to enhance the capabilities of Canada to meet the challenges the world is presenting us. The present electoral system only reinforces an inadvisable protection of the status quo (Canada 1991, Volume 3, 56).

Instead of preserving the status quo, one must realize that from a policy-making perspective,
Proportional representation will give a government antennae in all regions of a country and will make the government sensitive to varying regional perspectives on government policy. From the perspective of the citizens, proportional representation affords everyone an equal weight in political calculation and will prevent any group from being mechanically excluded from the policy process (Irvine 1988, 26).

To remedy the situation, reconcile Canadian political culture and traditions, and most importantly remove one of many impediments to Canadian democracy, Canada should understand the results, listen to the reformist scholars, and introduce some form of electoral reform. This electoral reform dressed in proportional representation should be and can be in-keeping with our representative structures as well as in-line with public expectations.

Although the hope that proportional representation will put an “end to the country’s current political malaise is most certainly delusive” (Kam 30), Canadian democracy stands to gain even with a modest form of it. As long as Canadians realize that achieving a more genuine democracy takes time, expectations will hopefully not become overly inflated. Maintaining a progressive mind-set is instrumental in trying to achieve substantive changes. However, in our quest for a more participatory democracy, one would be both short-sighted and foolish not to realize what politics is really about - ambition, power, and self-interest (Kam 30). Understanding these realities will sensitize one to appreciate the harsh realities of the political game for even wholesale changes of our political institutions (proportional representation included) cannot alter this fundamental truth (Kam 30).

Taking the above ideas a step further, one realizes that the Canadian political situation in the 21st Century is a markedly different one from what it was for a great majority of the 20th Century. When more complex issues are coupled with a multi-party
system, it stands to reason that representative institutions must adapt to changing times.

For now, it seems that Canadian representative institutions have lagged behind the

demands of society. This instructive thought possesses even more serious overtones,
especially with respect to Canada's antiquated electoral system since

Electoral systems do not arise from a vacuum but from political debate and
struggle. They mirror the politics of the time of their creation and are altered
when politics change to the point where the existing electoral system becomes
too restrictive. While they last ... electoral systems do shape politics (Taagepera
and Shugart 234).

When Canada was born, one can argue that its representative institutions

including its two-party system suited the needs of the nation. However, today's Canada

with its larger population obliges a rethinking of how to govern a more diverse and

pluralistic nation. A reformed and more equality based electoral system that would

represent more people while at the same time allowing for greater inclusion of
disadvantaged and discriminated groups would certainly mirror the politics of our time

and confer greater legitimacy on the political system as a whole.

By way of closure and at the risk of sounding a cautionary tone, one is reminded

that like other individual institutional reforms, electoral reform, if ever accomplished,
remains a necessary but not sufficient pre-requisite for Canada's new vision of a more

participatory form of representative government. This assumption is born out by the

reasoning that

To single out the electoral system for exclusive attention at the expense of other
topics potentially more relevant to representation in Canada would be a mistake.
Further debates over the electoral system will be incomplete if they fail to take
into account the wider context within which representation occurs (Courtney 1980
453-454).
As true as the previous statements might be, the onus is on government and reformers alike to examine that wider context of representation in an effort to place electoral reform on the political agenda and eventually within some form of revamped representational design.

Of all the institutional and representational reforms suggested in this treatise, electoral reform possesses the most upside in successfully blending all salient principles of what a parliamentary democracy should be. Combined with a loosening of party discipline and introduction of more free votes, electoral reform has the potential of metamorphosing a political system that is longing for change. However, this thirst for change must be accompanied by a consequent change in attitudes on the part of all segments of political society towards what constitutes a truly representational system of government. Unfortunately, at this point in Canada's political development, there is insufficient concurrence on the part of government and its citizens as to how to effect meaningful changes in the domain of electoral reform.

As much as Canadians would benefit from electoral reform, the future remains bleak in this area. Electoral systems cannot simply be “pulled out of a drawer in the way that one might choose a cooking recipe” (Gladdish 54). Unfortunately, on the issue of electoral reform, if the same circular rhetoric continues to move at a snails pace, Canada will in all likelihood remain mired in its representational quagmire as its quest for true democracy lingers on.

“A sound polity can salvage a defective electoral system, while no electoral system can save a polity bent on self-destruction” (Taagepera and Shugart 235). These words are instructive at least for those interested in rescuing our dysfunctional democracy.
from the perils that Churchill alluded to in the preface. Accordingly, in an effort to not lobotomize further the representational system, the overriding goal as Canada moves forward must be to reform a poisonous electoral system in an attempt to
discourage the pathological promiscuity and unreliability of our political parties, and end what has proved to be a disastrous tradition of powerful, aimless, secretive one-party governments ruling without majority popular support (Deverell and Vezina 23).

Research has shown that it can be done.
CONCLUSION

As the technological revolution progresses in Canada, evidence has revealed that it seems to be occurring at the expense of a much needed revolution within Canada’s representative institutions. The intent here is not to sound off alarm bells that Canada is approaching the status of a Third World country but rather to focus debate on the urgency that exists for Canada to implement a new form of participatory democracy within its institutional and legislative frameworks. Since “interests are inevitable and will always be” (Hare 72), a concerted effort on the part of those wielding power must be made to unite Canadians in an effort to give back to them the power they seem to have lost. As a result, little wonder that

Institutional reform seems the only alternative: radical reform, to channel interests along new pathways designed to serve the ends of governance, representation, and stability; but conservative reform, too, to preserve and enhance the essentials of what the cabinet system of parliamentary government is supposed to be (Hare 72).

If the above interests are not channeled in an appropriate manner, public governance will eventually be damaged beyond repair.

To borrow from former Prime Minister Kim Campbell, since Canadian government and its representative institutions cannot run on autopilot, those same Canadian leaders cannot continue to fashionably ignore reform proposals that would offer marked improvements over the current system of representative government. Instead, leadership must be exerted as a way to reassure Canadians that their parliaments will “reflect and give expression to the public’s verdicts” (Deverell and Vezina 132).

It is becoming apparent that in view of citizen’s increased demands for change, elites have the tendency to seek preservation of the status quo. As a result of this
behaviour, Canada falls victim to the dilemma whereby the "sense of alienation and disillusionment of those advocating change is mirrored by the desperate defensiveness and perplexion of those party members frightened by ... the unorthodox behaviour of alternative challengers" (Lawson and Merkl 587). It is this dilemma which places Canada at a democratic crossroads and which must be remedied by institutional reforms to Canada's representative governments.

By simply citing those democratic theorists (like Burke) who dismiss institutional reforms and direct democracy as incompatible with the "parliamentary system, the Westminster tradition, executive federalism, a multiethnic community, and responsible government" (Mendelsohn 449-450), political elites hope that the demand for reform recedes and the issues become relegated to the backburner. However, as long as Canadians voice their displeasures by demanding that government reflect the principles of democratic theory, namely majority rule with respect for minority rights, equality of political rights, and fairness in levels of political participation, political elites will be forced to respond.

If government leaders choose to vacillate or not respond to the demands of its citizens, they risk the further loss of faith and trust on the part of a disconnected population that has come to feel that their government of the day has failed to reflect the values and will of the people. If the widening gap between government pursuits and citizen expectations is not remedied in an appropriate manner, Canada's self-image as a parliamentary democracy that eschews citizen participation will increasingly become both an accurate and accepted depiction of political reality.
In response to the on-going malaise of institutional and representational inertia, Canadians cannot sit idly by and continue to be over-governed and drowned by several layers of government. Instead, reforms must be sought that would be palatable to both political elites and the citizens they claim to represent. As a result, in an effort to unshackle Canadians from the Rousseauian bonds of slavery between elections, this treatise has endeavored to present a balanced yet critical reflection of what ails the Canadian body politic.

In an effort to forge a stronger relationship between government and its people, four institutional reforms within Canada’s legislative framework were presented and evaluated as to their usefulness and continued suitability for Canada. These reforms were: 1) recall of elected MPs and MLAs, 2) loosening party discipline and introducing more free votes, 3) referendums, and 4) electoral reform. In assessing potential reforms, one is frequently reminded about arguments made in the literature that devices of direct democracy possess the greatest chance of influencing representative government. This is supported by noted Canadian historian Michael Bliss’ contention that “the devices of direct democracy are not foreign to the Canadian political tradition. They are only foreign to a reactionary, elitist doctrine of parliamentary politics enunciated in Great Britain some 200 years ago by Edmund Burke” (quoted in Deverell and Vezina 101).

Taking the previous thoughts at face value would seem to insinuate that Canada would be wise to consider utilizing recall and referendums on a grander scale. However, after a balanced examination of the facts surrounding recall and referendums, those same thoughts are certainly delusive and remain possible only in an “imaginary village” (Johnston and Pocklington 9). As such, they should be discarded as realistic options for
Canada. Instead, reformers would be wise to focus their energies on party discipline and electoral reform as pragmatic options which can dually satisfy the concerns of democratic principles as well as provide for an appreciably improved representational system of government.

Although the recall device attempts to provide a more responsive governmental process by granting citizens the power to provide continuous accountability in its relations with MPs and MLAs, the fact remains that the device itself remains foreign to the Canadian political landscape. Other strengths of recall are supposed to be that it helps check undue influence by narrow special interests, encourages the electorate to accept longer terms of office, and offers a safety valve mechanism for intense feelings.

When assessing the merits and drawbacks of the recall device, it becomes clear after closer investigation that the latter outstrips the former. Although any casual observer would argue that citizens should have greater powers between elections, recall is simply not the answer for it ends up doing more harm than good. By fostering a potentially explosive political climate, recall is a glorified election that can be initiated on a whim. Clearly, the administration and functioning of government cannot be held hostage to the self-serving needs of individuals or groups who seek immediate justice for perceived injustices committed against them. The intent here is not to discount the importance of voicing legitimate concerns about those who govern but rather to find ways to create appropriate channels to voice those concerns. For these reasons, Canada leans towards periodic elections and not sporadic attempts to unseat potentially benevolent MPs and MLAs.
Another major concern for those advocating the recall device should center around its conflict with established norms and values of parliamentary government. Government survival in general and Cabinet solidarity in particular would be adversely affected by the implementation of recall. Scare tactics are not the way to hold governments accountable. Instead, to paraphrase Jefferson, if citizens think government is not displaying the necessary leadership, the solution is not to derogate them potentially at the beginning of their mandate but rather to advise them of their missteps and suggest piecemeal solutions to improve the situation.

Related to the issue of displaying national leadership, recall has the potential to force governments to consider short-term parochial interests at the expense of long-term broader interests. This inherent possibility can poison the political system by allowing narrow and well positioned special interests the opportunity to hijack and obfuscate the political agenda for partisan reasons. For the political system to maintain any sort of legitimacy, limitations must be placed on both government and its citizens lest tyranny and civil disobedience may result. With these criticisms in mind, little wonder how the instrument of recall falls into disfavour when put under closer scrutiny. For these reasons, recall has no future and should be dismissed as a potential reform to Canadian democracy.

Despite Canada’s limited use of national direct votes to isolate issues deemed to be of transcending national importance, the referendum device has the most resonance amongst Canadians. Since political memories are short, one cannot soon forget Canada’s referendum on the Charlottetown Accord along with Quebec’s two referendums on sovereignty. On the surface, referendum democracy appears positive by promoting ideals
of majority rule and equality of political rights. However, closer investigation reveals that those same ideals are achieved at the expense of too many other objectives that one would seek to safeguard when considering an alternative or supplement to the traditional institutions of representative government.

Reform advocates who push for increased use of referendums cite several advantages. More specifically, by bringing policy issues out of the backrooms and into the living rooms of Canadians, referendums confer upon those issues and the process in general the necessary legitimacy that they otherwise would not have achieved had only political elites negotiated and Parliament rubber-stamped. When increased legitimacy for publicly arrived decisions is combined with the resulting increase in citizen’s popular sovereignty, apathy and alienation are reduced. With a voice in the undertakings of government, empowered citizens in theory will seek to participate more in the administration and functioning of government. Unfortunately, this open door to participation is overshadowed by the true confrontational nature of referendums which render them unsuitable for a litigious country such as Canada’s that possesses, at least on some issues, diametrically opposing views.

In a country with so many differing perspectives on issues, referendums succeed in sharpening those polar notions on a regular basis. By heightening tensions between groups, referendums promote increased resentment that can in turn lead to open clashes within society. Since this occurrence cannot be avoided with the zero-sum thinking of referendums, it is up to parliaments to reconcile those differing needs in an attempt to seek a middle road that above all promotes compromise.
Divisions in society will always exist. The key is to harness those divisions within the system before they become intractable and spill over outside the realm of government in the form of extra-parliamentary alliances or formation of socio-political movements. By appealing directly to the people, referendums strip away power from representative institutions. This usurpation of power departs from what parliamentary democracy is supposed to be by damaging Parliament’s ability and jeopardizing its future effectiveness.

This reality is supported by the view that

It may be considered as an objection inherent in the principle, that as every appeal to the People would carry an implication of some defect in the Government, frequent appeals would, in great measure, deprive the Government of that veneration which time bestows on everything, and without which perhaps the wisest and freest Governments would not possess the requisite stability (quoted in Kobach 66).

Surely, other ways can be found to reconcile differing points of view than to simply demand a simplistic yes or no answer to potentially complex issues. By doing so, true intensity of feelings can be documented so that the cohesiveness and social fabric of the country can be preserved.

Referendums allow governments the ability to abdicate leadership. By doing so, MPs and MLAs are unable to fulfill the complementary roles of delegate, mandate, and trustee. Unlike more referendum friendly jurisdictions that swear by the referendum device (i.e. Switzerland and California), Canada’s parliamentary institutions conflict with referendums since the foundation of the country rests on the accountability and governability of Parliament. Referendums conflict with these inherited traditions which lead many conventional thinkers to label referendums as distinctly un-Canadian and for the purposes of this study not suitable as a cure for Canada’s democratic woes.
Unlike the direct democracy devices of recall and referendums, the conventions of party discipline and free votes have more potential in bringing to an end what Canadian sociologist Reginald Bibby refers to as the “confrontational politics that have characterized our federal and provincial governments” (Bibby 200). As things currently stand, party discipline is no closer to being relaxed. The magnitude of this problem is reflected by the observation that

In the Westminster model, while the government may be responsive to the assembly, system dynamics and party discipline ensure that individual deputies are constrained in their behaviour and have little policy influence. Parliament itself is primarily a law-passing rather than a law-making body since the Cabinet sets public policy. The focus increasingly is on the personalities of the Prime Minister and the leader of the Opposition rather than on party policies per se. The Prime Minster is a dominant figure, and indeed the power of the executive is extensive and essentially unbridled (quoted in Deverell and Vezina 79).

This assumption is compounded by the problem that “the longer a government is in office the more every vote is maybe not a vote of confidence but a vote of reputation, which is close to confidence, and therefore you have to have uniformity” (quoted in Deverell and Vezina 135). As ensconced as the preceding principles are and as difficult as it may be to alter one’s mind-set vis-à-vis the confidence convention, too many advantages to relaxing party discipline exist that cannot be overlooked.

By freeing the individual MP or MLA from stifling party discipline, he/she has a greater chance of fulfilling their complementary roles of delegate, mandate, and trustee. By not considering every bill or policy as a matter of confidence, opportunity exists for elected members to consider their own views on a particular issue. Finally, by allowing for a greater number of free votes that extend beyond the reach of party whips and party discipline, historically supine MPs and MLAs can make a difference.
By taking into account the views of their constituents, MPs and MLAs have the greatest chance of bridging the ever widening representational gap between government and the people they purport to represent. With more openness in policy formulation, the end result would be a gradual reduction in the "hegemony of the Prime Minster and the tradition of secret deals between Cabinet ministers, top bureaucrats, lobbyists and provincial premiers" (Deverell and Vezina 23). Certainly, the reduction in the monopolization of power is a goal that every Canadian should want to strive for. Accordingly, a loosening of the bonds of party discipline in tandem with the introduction of more free votes possess the required characteristics to improve Canadian representative democracy.

The final and arguably best institutional prescription for what ails Canadian democracy centers around a reformed electoral system. While there is little doubt that something has gone awry with the Canadian political system, debate seems to always linger as to how best to fix the problems. Nowhere is that idea better in evidence than in the subject of Canada's electoral system. By distorting the popular vote in relation to legislative seats, the electoral system has effectively ghettoized Canadian politics making regional appeals the preferred tactic of political parties. Since these facts are decidedly inimical to the continued integrity of the political system, more than a few academics and scholars have proposed reforms to the electoral system.

More so than any structure in Canada's representative democracy, the electoral system seems to fly in the face of all the major democratic principles it is designed to protect. With elections resembling a lottery instead of being based on equity of the popular vote, governments tend to get elected with less than a majority of the popular
vote. This fact is even more troubling when one considers that turnout in federal elections has been decreasing steadily over the last fifteen years. As a result, governments are elected by even fewer Canadians. A case in point that serves as an interesting thought experiment is the 1997 federal election. In that election, the Liberals received 41% of the popular vote based on a turnout of 67% of the population. Assuming a total population of approximately thirty million would lead to the conclusion that in essence, the Liberals were elected with the support of 41% of twenty million people.

Taking into account those ineligible to vote (children under eighteen, homeless, newly landed immigrants, prison inmates etc.) should not obscure the fact that Chretien’s Liberals rode to power with approximately 30% support of Canadians. Even if one rejects the one-party majority government theme as one which fails to truly reflect the wishes of Canadians, one cannot ignore the realization that this meager support level does not bode well for the continued legitimacy and well-being of the political system as a whole.

For the political system in general and representational institutions in particular to regain any lost legitimacy, electoral reform must be placed at the top of the political agenda. However, despite the positive contributions that most electoral reforms would make, discussion of the subject usually goes nowhere. As alluded to previously, discussion usually goes nowhere because no party in power will seek to alter electoral rules of the game that could be damaging to their future success. This partisan inclination on the part of all parties is damaging to democracy because if that sort of behavioural pattern persists, Canadians of all walks of life will be further deprived of meaningful political representation. Since ways must be found to counter alienation and apathy, electoral reform is the best solution to empower an increasingly cynical public.
What this piece has attempted to prove is that if political elites are able to shed their thick skin when it comes to reforming the electoral system, a myriad of well-reasoned reform proposals exist which could serve as the necessary link between government and its citizens. Depending on the importance one places on democratic values, the Irvine and more moderate Pepin-Robarts Task Force proposals possess the greatest number of advantages as proportional systems. By offering compensatory list seats in varying degrees in addition to the existing constituency seats, both proposals attempt to establish a closer relationship between the percentage of the popular vote and the number of seats a party receives. By doing so, both proposals successfully reconcile the related democratic principles of political equality and fairness of political participation.

The area of greatest contention concerns the issue of majority rule. With the provision of compensatory seats, the likelihood of majority government decreases and in the case of the Irvine proposal becomes virtually impossible to attain. However, as was argued in the sections on majority versus minority government, attitudes have come full circle to the point where single-party majority government is no longer extolled as the greatest virtue to achieve. Instead, the qualities of minority government should be applauded since they promote greater bipartisan cooperation in search for policies that will command the support of the greatest number of Canadians. Proof of this assertion lies in the minority governments of the 1960s and 1970s which demonstrated a unique ability to merge diverging demands in the creation and formulation of public policies.

In its quest for a more participatory form of representative government within its institutional and legislative frameworks, the above electoral reforms or variants thereof
should serve as the starting points from which additional reforms could then be launched and hopefully implemented. Clearly, if the Irvine or Pepin-Robarts Task Force proposals were combined with a relaxation of party discipline and the introduction of more votes, a greater insight would be gained as to how a representative democracy could work.

Shifting gears, if one wants to reform the electoral system yet maintain as close a relationship as possible to the old electoral system, the French/Ukrainian system of majority double ballot/runoff elections is the answer. By maintaining the majority of the current electoral system's characteristics intact, the greatest advantage of the majority double ballot/runoff electoral system is the guarantee that the governing party has the support of the majority of the voters. Ensuring a cardinal rule of democratic theory confers upon the majority double ballot/runoff electoral system the necessary legitimacy that the present electoral system lost a long time ago. Overall, whether one chooses the more proportional reforms or the more traditional French/Ukrainian versions, one can rest assured that appreciable improvements would occur within the political system. It is time for Canada to give these proposals serious consideration and implement one of them.

At the end of the day, is there a light at the end of the proverbial democratic tunnel? More specifically, can Canadians in conjunction with their elected representatives find ways to liberate themselves from the representational straightjacket they seem to have been forced to wear. Since the answer to this question remains shrouded in uncertainty, it is incumbent upon governments to acknowledge the flaws in the system and pursue proposals that would "improve both the quality and quantity of public participation" (MacIvor 1999, 17). After examining various opinions and policy alternatives, it is evident that in order for Canadians to gain a greater sense of political
efficacy. A form of participatory democracy within its institutional and legislative frameworks must be substituted for the current system of unrepresentative government.

Although Aristotle’s transplanted dreams of an Athenian democracy could occur in a form of “cybergovernment of the people, by the people, and for the people” (Flemming 14), reality dictates otherwise. Notwithstanding technological advancements such as town hall meetings, Canadian representational democracy will in all likelihood continue unfettered with an elected autocrat at the helm. Acknowledging this likeliness should in no way dissuade reformers from staying the course in the fight to provide Canada with the democratic face-lift it so desperately needs. The potential to close the democratic gap between governments and its citizens is one which could combine the virtues of both direct and representative democracy. Indeed, since much credence exists in the maxim that “between a face-to-face democracy and a large scale democratic system, their is a huge, yawning gap” (Sartori 1987, 15), a concerted effort must be made to unite the clashing approaches to democracy.

It has been established that in spite of some advantages, the direct democracy devices of recall and referendums possess too many shortcomings to be considered as serious short-term solutions for Canada. As it stands now, Canadian representative institutions violate core democratic principles of majority rule, political equality, and fairness in political participation. As a result, it seems that the best form of participatory democracy within Canada’s institutional and legislative frameworks is one which respected those same core democratic principles while at the same time being able to countenance a loosening of the reigns of party discipline, an introduction of more free votes in legislatures, and a reform of the electoral system.
As urgent as the synchronization of the system with the needs of Canadians is, the fact remains that significant reform is likely to be met with increased cynicism. Political elites attempt to couch their skepticism in the argument that significant reform must be reconciled with the traditions of representative and responsible government in Canada. Unfortunately, what political elites tend to overlook is the fact that those same traditions of representative and responsible government have fallen into disrepute.

Lost integrity within Canada’s representative institutions has spawned the development of a form of change that is more or less radical in the very area of political institutions and conventions where the principle of democracy is allowed and claimed to be operative (Arblaster 1994, 102). At the moment, due to institutional inertia, the principle of democracy is failing to manufacture significant opportunities for meaningful participation by individual Canadians. As a result of this democratic and representational quandary, Canadians in concert with their elected representatives must find ways to create a fully democratic society. No comment better exemplifies this need than the one that

To speak today of the defence of democracy as if we are defending something which we knew and had possessed for many decades or many centuries is self-deception and sham … The criterion must be sought not in the survival of traditional institutions, but in the question where power resides and how it is exercised. In this respect democracy is a matter of degree. Some countries today are more democratic than others. But none is perhaps very democratic, if any high standard of democracy is applied. Mass democracy is a difficult and hitherto largely uncharted territory; and we should be nearer the mark, and should have a far more convincing slogan, if we spoke of the need, not to defend democracy, but to create it (Carr 76, quoted in Arblaster 1994, 103).

It has been the main goal of this thesis to find the means necessary to create a new form of participatory democracy where all participants would benefit. As successful as the quest appears to be in substantiating what De Tocqueville, Jackson, Jefferson, and
Roosevelt had to say at the outset of this treatise regarding democratic government, skeptical reflection forces one off his/her pedestal in the realization that implementation of any sort does not seem to be on the political horizon. For reform to take place, Canadians can no longer take the functioning of their democracy for granted. Further, they cannot remain self-satisfied and complacent. Instead, they must spend more time assessing and trying to understand it (Kilgour 1987, 24).

If one remain unsure of this prospect, one would be sagacious to recall the words of famed Italian political statesman and theorist Niccolo Machiavelli which will provide closure to this thesis. Although Machiavelli’s writings in his famous novel ‘The Prince’ focus on politics in Italian city-states, he speculated about the creation of a new system of governing within those anarchical city-states. In his speculation, Machiavelli was forced to concede that in the pursuit of a new system of governing.

There is nothing more difficult to plan, more dubious of success nor more dangerous to manage than the creation of a new system. For the initiator has the enmity of all who would profit by the preservation of the old institutions and merely lukewarm defenders in those who would gain by the new ones (Machiavelli 49-50).

Transposing the above argument onto the Canadian political scene, one recognizes how difficult the journey can be in search for a more participatory form of representative government within Canada’s institutional and legislative frameworks.

Facing countless opponents who prefer maintaining the political status quo, reformers’ quest for democratic salvation will be an arduous one. However, if intellectual resources are pooled and those same lukewarm defenders become ardent supporters of a new system, old institutions will no longer have to be preserved and proper changes could be effectuated. As precarious a position that Canadian democracy seems to be in,
one only hopes that necessary steps are taken sooner rather than later. Otherwise, all efforts to achieve a more participatory form of representative government will fall down that axiomatic slippery slope with little or no hopes of recovery. Time will tell whether Canada can avoid that fate and properly revisit its democracy.
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