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UMI
Fort La Présentation and Its Time

Leszek Missala

A Thesis

in

The Department

of

Art History

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of The Requirements
for the Degree of Master of Arts at
Concordia University
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ABSTRACT

Fort La Présentation and Its Time

Leszek Missala

The history of Fort La Présentation is presented interwoven with the 18th century struggle between France and Great Britain. At stake was the domination of world trade and the political and military influence protecting it.

The double vocation - religious and military - of the fort-mission complex is investigated and its influence on the planning, construction and the selection of its location is discussed.

The evolution of the principle of the separation of two communities - European and autochthon - living inside quasi-independent fortified compounds, located side by side, is investigated.

The conclusion reached is that the politico-military aspect of the fort-mission complex of La Présentation was the main one and that its religious role, no matter how successful it was, served only as a cover-up.
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1. INTRODUCTION

It would be very difficult, if not impossible, to discuss seriously an architectural object without considering its historical background. Each building, whatever its proposed use and importance, is designed and built for a very specific purpose, rarely reproduced elsewhere.

This is the reason why this thesis includes an analysis of 18th century events which took place on both the European and American continents. They were interconnected and the result of this interaction influenced the history of Fort La Présentation and the action of its founder, Abbé François Picquet, a Sulpician priest.

The 18th century was a century of nearly continuous warfare in Europe, during which France and Great Britain were on opposite sides most of the time. The struggle in America was considered a "sideshow" of what was happening on the Old Continent, where both countries competed for predominance in the political and economic domains. All the decisions about America depended on what was happening in Europe. Clauses concerning North America included in the treaties at the end of European wars are the proof of that.

This situation changed in the second half of the 18th century when in 1758 William Pitt became Prime Minister of Great Britain. He was the man who understood the importance of the American colonies for both France and England and directed all British military might to defend them against French attacks and the policies of Nouvelle France. In France, authorities believed that the victory in
Europe would bring favorable solutions for French interests in North America. One of the few persons on the French side who understood the importance of the North American colonies for the French Crown was the Governor of Canada and Admiral of the French Navy, le Marquis de La Galissonière (1747-49). He attached much importance to his country's implementation of two basic goals concerning Canada. Both of them were in direct opposition to the English plans. The first one was the defence of the direct overland communication route between Canada in the north and Louisiana in the south. This could only be achieved by preventing English colonization of the territories of the Ohio and the Mississippi Rivers Valleys, located west of the Appalachian Mountains. The second one was the domination of a very lucrative fur trade coveted by both nations. Since most of the trapping was done in the territories located north of the Great Lakes, English expansion in that direction had to be prevented at all costs. This second goal could only be reached by control of the native populations.

This control of and good relationship with the natives was sought by both sides. It was practised by the mutually beneficial commercial contacts and work of the missionaries who were trying to convert them to Christianity.

One of the most successful French missionaries of that era was Abbé François Picquet, a Sulpician priest. The main tool and center of his activity was the Mission and Fort La Présentation, built on the south shore of the St. Lawrence River, roughly half way between Montreal and Lake Ontario, at the head of the St. Lawrence Rapids and the mouth of the Oswegatchie River, where the modern city of Ogdensburg,
New York, is located. Neither the mission nor the fort exists any longer.

During the archeological investigation by scientists from the State College of Arts and Sciences in Potsdam, N.Y. of the presumed fort site no vestiges of it were discovered. The only artifact found was a large cornerstone with the date of the founding and the name of F. Picquet. This is the only material proof of the fort's existence. It is presently displayed in Ogdensburg's modern city hall. Therefore, our research about the fort itself had to rely on graphic and written documents.

The maps of the 18th century are unreliable. Much of the information supplied by them is based on the hearsay of autochthons and of the coureurs de bois, or on very primitive surveys. Fig. 1 shows a modern map (ca 1913) of the territories on which the struggle between the French and English colonies took place. Geographical features are correctly represented and the sites and town locations are identified with their 18th century names given in English or French versions. Where it is not possible to do so, the modern names are used.

The names "Indians" and "sauvages" used in 18th century by the white settlers to define members of the First Nations of North America are considered prejudicial. They are superseded in this thesis by the terms "autochthon" or "native". The only exception is made for citations of the original 18th and 19th centuries texts.

At the end of this introduction, we wish to point out that this thesis is not 18th century Canadian history. It concerns itself only with the facts of the role François Picquet and Fort La Présentation played during a short period of time extending from 1749 to 1760, and to the general argument of this thesis.
2. ENGLISH AND FRENCH POPULATIONS OF AMERICA

Before an analysis of the struggle between the French and English colonies is attempted, a short analysis of their social structures should be made.

The English occupied a relatively small part of the continent, located between the shores of the Atlantic Ocean and the Appalachian Mountains, where a population of more than one million lived. France laid claim to much larger territories, extending west of the English possessions and limited in the West by the Rocky Mountains. This immense territory was occupied by a white population estimated at only 55,000 people. This included both Canada - the land around the St. Lawrence River - and Louisiana, located on the shores of the Gulf of Mexico.¹

The British possessions had been settled by a predominantly English-speaking population, mostly of Puritan stock.² These possessions were organized into thirteen independent colonies, each one governed by a governor, either appointed by the British Crown or elected by local legislative bodies. Virginia, located south of the territories today called New England, was governed by the scions of aristocratic British families. They brought with them their sense of social stratification, which they tried to maintain in the New World. All these colonies were very loyal to the British Crown, but at the same time very jealous of their local prerogatives and resentful of any outside intervention. They governed themselves according to the
British Common Law, supplemented by local laws.

The New Englanders were very industrious and enterprising people, always looking for new outlets for their commercial and industrial activities. All of them (except for Virginia) organized a public schooling system that resulted in a very high degree of literacy in their societies. Very often they disagreed among themselves on many issues, but were unanimous in their request for British military protection from French expansion.

The population of Nouvelle France was composed of peasants who came to Canada in order to escape the miserable conditions in Europe, constantly in a state of war, always very damaging to the peasantry. Also some of the soldiers of disbanded regiments (often of peasant stock themselves) chose to stay in Canada, a decision most certainly welcomed by the colony's government.

18th century France was a predominantly Catholic and rather intolerant country. The expulsion of the Huguenots, resulting from the revocation in 1685 of the Edict of Nantes (1598) which granted religious liberties, forced them to emigrate to Protestant countries, mostly Germany and Switzerland, with some choosing English America. The dominant French Roman Catholic clergy prevented their settlement in Canada since they wanted only Catholic settlers, an element easy for them to control. This attitude deprived Canada of badly needed cultured and educated people and of the qualified tradesmen who would help in the development of the colony.

This problem of the underpopulation of Canada had started to worry French
authorities already at the end of the 17th century. However, continuous wars weakened France and resulted in a considerable loss of its population. The emigration of Huguenots alone cost France at least 200,000 people. Several possible ways to remedy this situation were proposed. One of the men who understood the danger of the ever-growing English-speaking population was a great military engineer and builder of French fortifications, Maréchal Vauban. He suggested several solutions to the Minister of the Colonies and of the Navy. Some were utterly absurd. None of them was accepted by the Minister, who could not propose any of his own.  

Such an attitude shows how little attention was given by the French government to the problems of the colony. It did cost money, drained manpower needed in Europe and was considered in general a nuisance rather than an asset. Its political and economic long range importance was not well understood by an incompetent King and his court. No wonder that during its most critical years of existence, Nouvelle France was left alone and finally lost, in spite of those who believed in its importance to the mother country. This result was also hastened by the incompetent and corrupt colonial administration.

The dynamic society of New England had the full support of Great Britain in its endeavours. This was most evident when William Pitt became Prime Minister in 1758. Being of modest origin, close to the expanding middle class of merchants and manufacturers, he understood the potential of the North American colonies from the economic and political points of view.

When the Seven Years War expanded in 1756 to the American continent, Pitt
used all the available means of the United Kingdom to achieve his goal, the conquest of Nouvelle France. France did not have enough strength to support its North American colony. All calls for help were left without adequate answer. The French government believed that once European conflict would be brought to the satisfactory (victorious) end, so will be the conflict in North America.
3. THE STRUGGLE IN 18TH CENTURY EUROPE

The 18th century in Europe was a century of wars. They changed not only the borders but also resulted in the emergence of new powers on the European scene. Alliances changed nearly overnight and the allies of today became enemies a few years later. The main reasons for them were the dynastic and political interests of the ruling classes. Some of the participants had a broader outlook for they were building colonial empires overseas. Holland, Spain, England and France were the main actors on this world scene.

France and Great Britain were always on the opposite sides of any conflicts, for their national or dynastic interests opposed each other. Their victories and defeats on the European continent influenced, more often than not, victories and defeats on the world scene. The best illustration of this is the 18th century struggle between them on the North American continent.

Hereunder is the list of the major European conflicts that spilled over the North American continent:

1. The war of King William III of England against Louis XIV, King of France (1689 -1697), known as the War of the League of Augsburg; ended by the Treaty of Ryswick (1697) between France, England, Holland and Spain. The North-American colony of Massachusetts failed to conquer Quebec. Also the fortress of Louisbourg, captured by English in 1690, was returned
2. The Spanish Succession War (1701-1713); ended by the Treaty of Utrecht (1713). It was the war between France and Spain against Austria and England. An agreement between France and England about their possessions in North America delineated the "zones of influence" without establishing exact borders between them. This was one of the main reasons for the continuous struggle between Nouvelle France and the English colonies.

France ceded Newfoundland, Acadia and the Hudson Bay territory to Britain. The Louisiana territory was not included in this treaty and remained French. Fig. 2 shows the map of North America indicating the agreed "zones of influence" and the territories in dispute.

3. The War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748); ended by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748). This war was fought between France, allied to Spain, Bavaria, Saxony and Prussia, against Austria supported by England. Resulting from this Treaty, considered in France as very harmful to her interests, were many territorial changes in Europe but none in America. The problem of borders was not solved. Both France and England claimed rights of property to the same territories (Nova Scotia, the Ohio Valley and Cherokee country). Aix-la-Chapelle appointed an international commission to solve the problem of borders but it could not reach any agreement satisfactory to both countries.

In the meantime, New England's pressure on the Ohio Valley continued to
increase. The Ohio Valley Company was formed to promote settlements in this territory, and obtained from the British Crown a grant of half a million acres in the Upper Ohio River Valley claimed by France.

After the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, the situation in North America entered a state of continuous struggle carried on by both sides by political and military means. This condition -- very damaging to private citizens and the colonial interests of both antagonists -- never really changed.

Sometimes it even took the form of an undeclared war, in which both the French and English colonial governments were involved.

4. Again in 1756 another major conflict erupted in Europe. It is known in history as the Seven Years War which was terminated by the Treaty of Paris in 1763 and officially ended the existence of French Canada. French Louisiana, or whatever was left of it, survived for a few more years and was sold to the American Republic (USA) by Napoleon I, the French Emperor. As a result of this treaty, France renounced claims to all territories in North America, with the exception of the small islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon situated offshore of Newfoundland and of the Island of Orleans in the Gulf of Mexico. France also had to cede to Spain all the Louisiana territory situated west of the Mississippi River, but got it back in 1800 by the Treaty of San Ildefonso in exchange for the territorial gains in Parma, Italy. The Antilles - Martinique, Guadeloupe, Marie Galante, Belle Île and Ste-Lucia, Britain returned to France.
France and Britain were fighting not only in Europe but also in India and on all the oceans of the world. The events which happened in other locations influenced decisions concerning Canada. The disastrous Treaty of Utrecht signed at the insistence of an inept King Louis XV and his mistress, Madame Pompadour, continued to poison English-French relations in North America until the bitter end of the existence of Nouvelle France.

In spite of the fact that there were many nations at war and that alliances among them were dictated by temporary local interests, sometimes only the interests of the ruling families, France and England were always on opposite sides. This was a struggle for world domination, of which Canada was only one of many theatres. For Britain it was always a very important one, even if only as a convenient place to dispose of the undesired population such as puritans. France, on the other hand, did not wish to send her people away. Already in the 17th century Louis XIV said to his Prime Minister, Colbert, that he could not depopulate France to populate a colony.
4. THE STRUGGLE IN NORTH AMERICA

The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748 ended the War of Austrian Succession but did not solve any problems in North America left by the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713.

France needed this peace to recuperate the losses of population and to rebuild its worldwide commercial interests weakened by wars. England was in an expansionist mood and considered the peace detrimental to its interests. Its growing middle class of merchants wanted the restart of hostilities. It believed that after a total defeat France would be eliminated as a dangerous competitor on the world market.

The same mood prevailed in the North American colonies. Planters and land speculators in Virginia and Pennsylvania believed that very large profits could be expected from the colonization of the rich and underdeveloped lands, located west of the Appalachian Mountain watershed, along the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers. Land development companies, organized and financed by the colonial governments, planned to settle these lands with settlers recruited among their fast growing populations.

These projects were considered highly detrimental to the interests of the French Crown. The French considered these territories as their own, for they had explored them in the 17th century, and they did not want any foreign settlement there, hoping to colonize them with French-speaking people. Also, considered it very
important to maintain a direct overland communication route between Canada and Louisiana, an absolute requirement for the survival of French America.

The English occupied a narrow band of land between the Atlantic Ocean and the Appalachian Mountains. They had easy and safe communication with their mother country in Europe, protected by a strong Navy, more powerful than the French one (fig. 2). But, if the French were allowed to maintain control of the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers Valleys and build their forts at strategic points, they could use them not only to protect their communication in the southern direction, but also as bases of attack by their garrisons and autochthon war parties against the English settlements.

The center of French possessions in North America was the valley of the St. Lawrence River where most of the French settlements were located. It was a very good defensive position for most of its southern borders were protected by unexplored forests, almost totally impenetrable to the movements of regular armies. There were only three possible routes of invasion by future conquerors. All three of them were relatively easy to defend if adequate forces were available.

The most direct one was from the South along the Richelieu River - the Lake Champlain Valley. It was a nearly direct access route with only one portage from Albany and New York through the Hudson River.

The western access through Lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence Valley was defended by man-made fortifications at the St. Lawrence outlet from the lake and long and dangerous rapids, which could be rendered difficult to pass by relatively
small forces provided with artillery.

The third access coming from the East across the Gulf of St. Lawrence was defended, after the loss of Acadia and of the Louisbourg fortress, by the well located and strongly fortified City of Quebec.

However, in spite of all the advantages described above, Canada was very vulnerable. It had very difficult and unsecured communications with Europe because of the dominant British Navy which patrolled the Gulf of St. Lawrence and could cut it off from France very easily at any time.

The English colonies, with their large population of over one million, were able to muster much larger military forces than the French. Also, Canada depended in large measure on food supplies from France, since its own production was not sufficient. In return, it could contribute to the economy of the mother country only with the benefits of the fur trade and export of timber suitable for ship building.

Most of the financial expenses of its defence had to be supported by France, which needed that money for its own use in Europe. It is no wonder that it looked at Canada more as a liability than as an asset. This was, in our opinion, one of the reasons for the scarcity of help sent over to North America, in spite of many requests and warnings that such help was essential for the survival of Nouvelle France.

There is much proof that the government of the Colony informed Louis XV and his court about this situation using all possible, and not only official, channels of communication. 11 All these efforts did not influence the French metropolitan authorities enough to change their attitude and most of the requests were rejected as
The Marquis de La Galissonnière, an able French naval commander and the interim governor of Canada (1747-49), understood the threat represented by the westward expansion of British possessions, not only to the lines of communication with Louisiana but also to the survival of French Canada. Once the Ohio River (called by the French "La Belle Rivière") valley was lost, the connection with Louisiana would be severed and both French possessions definitely separated. To prevent this La Galissonnière proposed to the Minister of the Marine the construction of a series of forts along it, garrisoned by small regular army detachments. This would not only check the English traders’ infiltration but also would bring local autochthon tribes under French control.

Such an initiative would force the British to introduce counter measures in the form of a strong presence of the armed forces in North America, required to give support to local ineffective militias. Since these forces were needed in Europe, Canada would play the role of a fortress tying down large enemy forces and relieving source pressure from France in the European war theatre.

In order to investigate the importance of British infiltration west of the Appalachian Mountains and to show the flag on the disputed territories in 1749, La Galissonnière sent a fact-finding and flag-showing expedition under the command of an experienced Canadian-born officer, Pierre-Joseph de Céloron de Blainville. The expedition, fully supported by the Ministry of the Marine, was composed of fourteen French officers and cadets, one hundred and eighty Canadians and a band of
autochthons. Its composition indicated how much importance La Galissionière attached to the problem being faced.

Among the members of the expedition was Father Joseph-Pierre Bonnecamps, S.J., professor of hydrography at the Jesuit College in Quebec. He wrote an independent report on the expedition, giving the description of flora, fauna and general geography of the land. His notes were an excellent complement to the political report of Céloron.

Also among the members of the expedition was an officer of mixed blood (his father was French, his mother was Seneca), Philippe Chabert de Joncaire, who spoke his maternal tongue fluently, which was an important factor in dealing with the natives.

The objectives of Céloron's expedition were twofold. First, he had to show the flag to the autochthons and English alike and restore the prestige of France among the First Nations. Secondly, he had to persuade the former to stop dealing with English traders and to chase out those traders who established themselves in these territories. Also, he had to advise the Governor of the colony about the existing situation and propose countermeasures against English infiltration, and to indicate a way of securing safe communication between the two French possessions.

Céloron included in his luggage lead plates engraved in French with a statement proclaiming King Louis XV the lord of the region. These plates were to be buried in the ground along his route, under the trees marked by iron sheets with
the arms of the King. These ceremonal "burials" were to be performed in the presence of local autochthon chiefs and the population. There were six such ceremonies, each one duly noted by a notarial act, recorded for the occasion by a notary attached to the expedition.\(^{19}\)

The first one was held at the junction of the Rivière aux Boeufs with the Alleghany River. The sixth one was buried where the Miami River joins the Ohio River.\(^{20}\)

The route of the expedition is shown on fig. 3. It shows only the most important part of it between Lake Ontario (Fort Niagara) and Fort Detroit. The return of the expedition was made through Lakes Erie and Ontario and down the St. Lawrence River to Montreal. It started on June 15, 1749, and ended on November 7th of the same year and covered - according to Father Bonneccamps - 1,200 miles.

On his return, Céloron reported that the native population of the Ohio country was generally ill-disposed towards the French for they were influenced by the English traders who had infiltrated the territory.\(^{21}\)

It was understandable that the autochthons had their own policy with which they protected their own interests and their ownership of the land.\(^{22}\) Since they were completely ignored in the disputes and dealings among whites, they were always on the side of the stronger and winning party. They did not have any reason to feel unfriendly towards the traders coming from the East across the Appalachian Mountains.\(^{22}\) Their traders offered wares of better quality and asked fewer pelts for
them than the French did. Also, the autochthons were reluctant to act violently against the traders fearing strong reprisals from English authorities compelled to protect their own. All this was very well known to the French side and had been reported a long time ago to the Minister of the Colonies by the Marquis de Beaufharnais, the Governor of Canada (1726-46).  

Céloron avoided the use of violence in expelling the Englishmen he met. He treated them well and sent them home with all the pelts they had traded. He very often gave them letters addressed to their governors, expressing his astonishment that they allowed their own citizens to exercise such illegal activities as the fur trade on lands belonging to the French King, Louis XV.  

The British were aware of the reasons for the Céloron expedition and of the danger it represented to their trade with the natives and to the eventual colonization of these territories. Governor Clinton of New York, in his letter to the Lords of Trade dated October 17, 1749, informed their Lordships in London about the expedition and other French initiatives for interrupting British commercial activities in the territories which lay west of the Appalachian Mountains and south of Lake Ontario. He warned his government about the French intention of building a fort on the south side of Lake Ontario in order to intercept the trade of Oswego (a fort and trading post built in 1727 on the south shore of the lake, the main military and commercial British base in the Great Lakes region).

Clinton claimed that such an action on the part of the French would be illegal since it would be built "on lands belonging to the Five Nations, who by the Treaty of
Utrecht were declared subjects of Great Britain and who for further security have in solemn manner yielded and sold them to the King.\textsuperscript{25} Clinton ended his message with a warning that if such were the plans of the French, he would not be able to prevent their implementation.

Governor Clinton's letter (one of many writings on the subject exchanged between the colonies and the government in London) is very significant for two reasons. First, it cites the Treaty of Utrecht as the base of British claims, and second, it mentions that the Iroquis (Five Nations) in the "solemn manner" yielded their territory to them.

Despite this, French authorities knew that British infiltration into the Ohio River Valley represented a serious danger, not only to the existence of Canada but of Louisiana as well. They approved colonial initiatives to eliminate English influence among the autochthon nations of this region and to prevent the reoccurrence of it in the future.\textsuperscript{26}

However, they waited until 1752 to take action to eliminate the English trading center at Pickawillany on the Miami River by an expedition composed mostly of Ottawa natives. This was the nation of the mother of Canadian officer Charles Mouet de Langlade, who led the expedition. This was a serious blow to the British trade organization in this area.\textsuperscript{27}

The damage to French interests caused by Pickawillany was obvious to Céloron in 1749, when he visited it in the final days of his expedition. He tried,
without any success, to persuade the local natives to ignore English traders and to force them to leave. It was simply not in the interest of the natives to do so, for they could there obtain the wares they needed and sell the results of their trapping. French traders were absent in this area and their English counterparts had a completely free hand.  

The next problem the French authorities had to solve was the problem of the future penetration "en force" of English settlers. This could only be stopped, or at least slowed down considerably, by securing the fork of the Alleghany and the Monongahela Rivers where they unite and flow down to join the Mississippi, under the name of the Ohio River (fig. 3). Once this point was secured, it could effectively block the access routes from Pennsylvania, Virginia and Maryland.  

The French reaction to the English encroachment in the Ohio Valley came at a time when Anglo-Americans were already well established there and difficult to dislodge. To prevent further English infiltration, or at least to make it more difficult, Governor Duquesne sent an expedition in 1753 with orders to build Fort Presqu'Île on the shores of Lake Erie and Fort le Boeuf near the source of the Rivière aux Boeufs, and a few months later Fort Machault at the fork of the Rivière aux Boeufs and the Alleghany River (see fig. 1). Since it was late in the season, the construction of the fort at the fork of the Alleghany and Monongahela Rivers (fig. 3) was postponed until 1754.  

The Governor of Virginia, Dinwiddie, did not like what was happening on land
which, according to him, belonged to the British Crown. He sent one of his officers, George Washington, then 21 years old, with a letter to the commanding officer of Fort le Boeuf, asking him and his men to leave immediately. As could be expected by all concerned, the French not only did not obey the summons but increased their garrison there. Furthermore, in 1754 they sent a considerable force under experienced officers, l'Aide-Major Péan and Captain de Contrecoeur, to the Ohio Valley. On the way to his destination Contrecoeur destroyed a so-called Fort of "Captain" Trent, an English fur trader. This "fort", located on the Rivière aux Boeufs, thirty miles from the point where it joins the Alleghany River, was protected by a palisaded enclosure armed with four artillery pieces and manned by fifty men. A few days later, when Contrecoeur arrived at the junction of the Alleghany and Monongahela Rivers he started the construction of a fort, later called Fort Duquesne (where City of Pittsburgh is presently situated). Contrecoeur was aware of the strategic importance of this point and intended to secure it for the King of France.

So did the British. In May 1754, an English officer with colonial troops descended to the Monongahela River and reported seeing the French already building their fort. In his report he included the following statement about French domination of the Ohio River Valley: "In my opinion, France would gain more by conquering it, than by conquering the whole of Flanders."  

Governor Dinwiddie considered the action of Contrecoeur provocative and again sent Washington to prevent the construction of the fort. However, the French
were there first. So Washington, or rather the avant-garde of his detachment, could only establish a small fortification down the Ohio River from Fort Duquesne. It was demolished by Contrecoeur's men in a very short time, without too much opposition. Nevertheless, Washington and his expeditionary force continued their advance. On learning about this, Captain de Contrecoeur sent Lieutenant Coulon de Jumonville towards the advancing English, with a small escort of thirty-four men (French and Canadians) to meet Washington and to request that he leave the territory where, according to the French, he had no right to be without the authorization of the King of France or his representative. Unfortunately, the French were detected by the hostile autochthons and on May 18, 1754 their camp was surrounded by the Virginians and their allied natives. Jumonville and nine of his companions were killed and most of his party taken prisoner. Only a few men escaped. It is hard to understand what happened. Whether the Virginian militia, of which most of Washington's troops were composed, opened fire first without any justification, or whether the surprised French started to shoot first, is not known. The French made maximum propaganda out of this incident, while the English tried to justify themselves.

This incident ended the polite exchange of notes and summons between governments and the shooting war started in America, two full years before the official declaration of war in Europe by Great Britain in May 1756.

Washington, resigning himself to the impossibility of fortifying the site where
Fort Duquesne was situated, retreated south towards Virginia and built Fort Necessity (fig. 1), waiting there for the appropriate moment to resume his march up north.  

The British colonies, recognizing the gravity of Jumonville’s death, called a meeting at Orange (Albany) to discuss the problems of organization of a common front against the French offensive. They knew that most autochthons, normally allied to them, would change allegiance and support the French. This was the result of the usual native attitude to join the winning side.

To counter this, the Governor of New York invited the Chiefs of the Five Nations (Iroquois) to the meeting. They were presented there with the description of the Jumonville incident as a great English victory and invited to rejoin the English cause. After offering them many important gifts, he assured them they would have a free hand as far as their traditional way of making war was concerned.

The Chiefs appeared to accept the English proposals and kept their gifts, but immediately after the meeting went to the French stating that they did not want to be at war with France or to join the English side. This statement of neutrality, an outright rejection of the Orange meeting promises, was probably influenced by the news of what happened at Fort Necessity to which Washington had retreated from Fort Duquesne. On June 28, 1754 a military expedition sent by Captain de Countrecoeur, Commander of Fort Duquesne, conquered this fort and forced Washington to surrender. This was achieved without any unnecessary cruelty. In this way the area west of the Appalachian Mountains was cleared of any English.
military presence.

These early French military victories over the English colonial militia may be attributed to the fact that every French detachment was commanded by French professional officers and included several French regulars or Canadians trained by them. On the English side the colonial militias, consisting of part-time soldiers led by officers of the same calibre, were the backbone of British military might in North America.

Great Britain, seeing what was happening and worried about the security of its possessions, decided to act by sending a professional soldier, General Braddock, with two battalions of 500 men each. They sailed in November 1754 against the mild and polite protests of the French government, assuring the British King that such action was not called for since the British possessions were not in any danger of being attacked and that it was never France's intention to do so. 41

Maybe so! However, it was a fact that English westward expansion was momentarily stopped and the British decided to react. It must be noted that by the end of 1754 Britain and France were still at peace in Europe and that consequently Braddock's force was not considered an army by the British, but rather a colonial self-defence force against autochthon attacks.

Braddock's first task was the reconquest of Fort Duquesne. In July 1755, at the head of 2,200 men, composed of British regulars and colonial militias, he advanced towards the fort. The situation on the French side became serious and Picquet, using his prestige among natives friendly to Nouvelle France, invited them to
join the French. They obeyed and came in great numbers.

Braddock never had a chance to reach Duquesne. Inexperienced as he and his men were in frontier tactics, they were ambushed about ten miles from the fort by 200 French and Canadian soldiers supported by 600 autochthons and were destroyed as a fighting force. Braddock himself was killed. This battle is called the Battle of Monongahela from the name of the river banks on which it took place.

Large amounts of military equipment changed hands. The French captured 15 regimental flags, 20 guns, large quantities of other weapons and ammunition and, most importantly, Braddock’s papers. Among them was the plan of the conquest of Canada conceived in London. It was the first time that the intentions of direct control of the colonial war by the British government had been revealed. It consisted of a three-pronged attack from the west (taking Fort Frontenac and Niagara), south (through the Champlain-Richelieu route) and from the east where naval forces would bring a field army strong enough to conquer Quebec.

It was a plan of total war against Canada with the ultimate goal of the complete elimination of the French colonies from the North American continent.

The French victory of Monongahela clearly showed the value of French troops composed in a large part of Canadians accustomed to the forest and accomplished hunters, i.e. excellent sharpshooters. These were the qualities that won the battle. The terrifying autochton war yells most certainly helped win the victory for they were strange to the newly disembarked European soldiers.

In response to the reinforcement (Braddock) sent by Britain to America, in
April 1755 the French sent to the colony six army battalions - 3,150 men in total. Braving the British naval blockade of the French metropolitan ports and of the St. Lawrence Gulf, most of them reached Canada and considerably increased its defensive potential.\textsuperscript{43}

When in 1756 Great Britain officially declared war on France, the conflict in America became officially part of the worldwide struggle between these two rising super powers of the 18th century. This period of conflict is called by French historians "The War of Conquest" and will be discussed later in this thesis.

During the first two years it was very favourable for the French. The American-English colonies were not able to present a unified front to Nouvelle France which, being an authoritarian country governed by a governor appointed by the King, did not have to argue about funds and manpower mobilization with the local citizenry. Its troops, commanded by able and qualified French officers (some of them born in Canada), were more than a match for the New England militias. Further, each British colony had mostly its own interests in mind and cared very little about its neighbours. It took William Pitt to change this.

He well understood the importance of the North American struggle and was able to impose a unified strategy on the colonies, which were quarrelling and competing with each other. In his opinion, North America was not the secondary but the primary theatre of war and consequently he redirected the main effort to overseas.\textsuperscript{44}
During this period of conflict 1748-55, which in reality was undeclared war disguised in a series of border incidents often fought by the intermediary of autochthon warriors, both sides were anxious not to provoke all-out war. To direct such guerrilla activities, a leader who had the total unconditional confidence of the native population was needed. Canada was fortunate to have such a man in the person of Abbé Picquet.

As explained in the previous chapters, it was of utmost importance for the colonies to maintain good relations with the natives. Without them there was no way they could control the territories claimed by the European powers. The British tried to achieve this by maintaining good commercial relations with them. Since the traders were left most of the time without any military protection, it was essential for their survival that they did not antagonize their native partners. Otherwise they risked not only losing their goods but their lives as well. Occasional demonstrations of military might were intended to impress the locals with the power of foreign kings and to convince them that it would be dangerous to oppose it. In this way a fragile modus vivendi between the whites and the natives was established and maintained.

The French had the same problems, even to a larger degree because of their weaker numerical presence on the continent. They also traded pelts with the autochthons and treated them, generally speaking, well. But they had another very effective - at least they believed so - way to attach the natives to their cause, namely
their conversion to Christianity.

The best definition of this policy and of its goals was given by the French Minister of the Navy, Antoine-Louis Rouillé, Comte de Jouy, in his letter of March 4, 1749, addressed to the governor, Marquis de la Jonquière (1749-1752). He wrote:

"Un grand nombre d'Iroquois ayant déclaré qu'ils désiraient embrasser le christianisme, on a proposé d'établir une mission près du fort Frontenac, afin d'y attirer le plus grand nombre de ces sauvages. On a confié cette négociation à Abbé Picquet, un missionnaire zélé, qui semble être bien vu de ces nations".45

Further, in the same letter, he stated that if the establishment of a new mission (La Présentation) near Frontenac were successful,

"... il ne serait pas alors difficile de faire comprendre à ces sauvages que, pour mettre terme aux prétentions des Anglais sur eux et leur territoire, il faudrait détruire Chouaguen (Oswego) et leur enlever un poste établi principalement dans le but de le contrôler".

But Rouillé, knowing that England and France were at peace, suggested the utmost caution in dealings with the autochthons and the English in order to avoid any major incident. The existence of Oswego, the main English trading post on Lake Ontario, was very important to the autochthons. They could obtain there the wares they needed, often at a better price and of much better quality than what they could get from the French. Such a situation was obviously detrimental to French interests and to their dealings with the natives in the very lucrative fur trade.

Minister Rouillé also knew that the converted natives would be looked on in a
very unfriendly way by their pagan brothers, faithful to their traditional beliefs, and therefore in great need of French protection. In other words, he suggested in his letter the implementation of an old principle of the Roman Empire: "divide and rule", used for many centuries with great success.

Efforts to christianize the natives were made from the very beginning of the French presence in Canada. First the Jesuits in the 17th century and later the Sulpicians applied themselves to it. At the beginning, the Jesuits lived with the local population in their villages. This, however, proved to be a dangerous arrangement. Several of them perished together with their native communities during tribal wars which were frequent during the 17th and 18th centuries. The best example of such a tragedy is the death of Jean de Brébeuf, S.J., a missionary to the Huron nation.⁴⁶

To prevent a similar disaster, it became customary for missionaries from the middle of 17th century to live not in the villages but in the fortified settlements built next to the autochthon settlements. These settlements, fortified according to the European methods, were too strong to be conquered by autochthons armed with bows and arrows. The problem of building the fortified missions will be discussed in Chapter 6 of this thesis. One of these missions was the Mission La Présentation. Its founder, Abbé François Picquet, was one of the most successful missionaries and political agents working in the 18th century Canada.

Abbé François Picquet was born on December 6, 1708, in Bourg-en-Bresse, Burgundy, in the diocese of Lyon, France. Early in his life he discovered his vocation to become a priest. He studied theology in Paris and soon after his graduation he
joined the Congregation of St. Sulpice, an organization founded in France in 1641, and grouping secular priests. The main task of the Congregation was the schooling of new priests, which they did also in Canada. In addition, its members, enjoying a great degree of liberty, busied themselves with missionary work among the natives.

In 1734, Abbé François Picquet, known to superiors for his energy, went at their suggestion to Canada where he served as a priest among the natives.

After a stay of five years in Montreal, at the headquarters of the Congregation, he was sent in 1739 to the Mission of Deux Montagnes (present day Oka), located near the lake of the same name, a few miles west of Montreal. Its location was excellent since it was situated very close to the main route the autochthons living west of the city had to take in order to reach Montreal. These autochthons - Hurons, Algonquins and Nipissings - were frequent visitors to the city where they traded the pelts for French goods.

Abbé Picquet stayed at Deux Montagnes for ten years (1739-49). His ability as organizer and his devotion to his work were rapidly recognized by the authorities of Nouvelle France, both religious and civic.

Under his leadership the mission became very active, not only in Christianization. Picquet tried to introduce (as he later did at La Présentation) agronomy to the natives, wishing to improve their existence and to convince them of the superiority of the sedentary way of life over their old nomadic ways.

In order to better communicate with his converts, Abbé Picquet learned one of their languages - Iroquois. Always aware of possible assaults on his mission by
unfriendly natives, he built a stone fort on the mission grounds and fortified four autochthon villages situated nearby, each one settled by a different tribe.

The above description of his activities shows how close his religious mission and his politically motivated activities were to each other and how difficult it is to establish what his priorities were. Later in this chapter we shall discuss this duality of his actions, trying to elucidate this apparent riddle.

The European War of Austrian Succession was not going very well for Metropolitan France. However, in the spring of 1747, it was decided to send some help to Canada in the hope that it would succeed to cross the British naval blockade. On board of one of the ships was the Marquis de la Jonquières, Governor-Designate of Canada. Unfortunately, the French squadron was intercepted near Cap Finisterre and nearly completely destroyed. Jonquières was taken prisoner and was replaced in the interim by Marquis de La Galissonière, previously mentioned.

The situation of Nouvelle France was no better than that of her mother country. Acadia was invaded and the invasion of Quebec was greatly feared. The loyalty of the Iroquois became a problem of utmost importance. Abbé François Picquet was well aware of it and conscious of the volatility of autochthon sentiments.

In order to prevent any surprises he visited Quebec in the summer of 1747, bringing with him sixty Iroquois warriors to be presented to the new governor. They were very much impressed by the reception they received and assured the governor of their "eternal" fidelity to France.

Aside from his political work, Picquet was very faithful to his missionary
vocation and spent a lot of his time trying to make good Christians of his charges. Considering both Picquet's religious and political work very important, La Galissonière requested in a letter to the Minister of the Colonies that a pension of 600 to 800 livres per year be accorded to Abbé Picquet.\textsuperscript{49}

The new governor quickly realized that the main weakness of the colony was its very small French population. He continuously requested that at least 10,000 colonists be sent in order to occupy the lands claimed by both French and English but not settled by either of them.\textsuperscript{50} In this situation a good relationship with the native population was very important and had to be established and maintained by all possible means.

Therefore, La Galissonière accepted without any hesitation the offer of the Sulpicians to organize a new mission located between Montreal and Lake Ontario, at the point where the small river flowing from the south, called Souegatsi by the natives, later known as the Oswegatchie, joins the St. Lawrence. This navigable stream gave good access to the territories south of the St. Lawrence occupied by the Iroquois, but considered by the British as their own on the basis of an agreement included in the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713.

The site was explored by Picquet on November 21, 1748, and its strategic value recognized. Aside from being a nice place to settle at the head of the St. Lawrence rapids, it could also be an excellent point for gathering information about the activities of both the English and the Iroquois. The knowledge about events occurring was vital for the French for through this territory ran the shortest route.
between Canada and Louisiana.

With strong support from the governor, and after obtaining the approval of his religious superiors, Picquet organized an expedition consisting of twenty-five Frenchmen (soldiers and tradesmen) and four autochthons. He departed from Montreal in the spring of 1749. In his excellent report to Governor La Galissionière he demonstrated his intelligence, practical spirit and understanding of the importance of the St. Lawrence River as the route towards the interior of the colony. He proposed the construction of proper portages (and in one case even of a canal) around the most dangerous parts of the rapids. He described each of them in detail, suggesting the most appropriate solutions. He even proposed a way of financing these improvements by imposing tolls on the users of these improved passages. He believed that the money raised in this way would cover all the costs of the investment and that in the end it would cost nothing to the colonial treasury.  

Picquet returned on May 30, 1749 to the site of the future mission with a group of men, which included one carpenter and one mason. He started construction of the fort, cutting trees to make a place for it and for the fields in which, he hoped, the future converts would settle and plant corn and raise cattle, both meant not only as a means to provide food but also as a way to convince them to abandon their nomadic existence. He named his new mission "La Présentation" in honour of November 21, which is the day of the presentation of Virgin Mary at the Temple. It is also the day on which the priests of St. Sulpice solemnly renew their vows every year.
From the beginning Picquet made clear to the natives wishing to join the mission the conditions he required of them: they had to renounce the trade and abuse of alcohol and to live only with their legitimate wives. He warned them he would not tolerate that these conditions be disregarded. To prove this, he sent away several converts-to-be who did not observe the rules he tried to impose. In spite of Picquet's severity, he believed that his mission would be the most successful of all missions in the country and would attract many autochthons. In the letter of August 4, 1749 mentioned above he expressed his method of treating his converts which may be summed up as follows: patience and great firmness combined with utmost kindness. He believed that this was the only way to convert and to attract them to the mission and to induce them to a sedentary existence. 33

In choosing the location of his establishment, Picquet had to consider its safety during war with the English colonies, which he believed to be inevitable. He wrote in his letter addressed to La Galissonièrè that he did not expect any attack coming along the Oswegatchie River (called by him River of La Présentation) for he believed the "English do not have any real knowledge of it". But he added that if such an attack came, it would completely isolate Frontenac and Lake Ontario from the rest of Canada. 34

However, Picquet estimated that the English war raiders coming from Lake Ontario or from the south could be prevented from penetrating into Canada by arming La Présentation with a few guns which could easily protect these passages.

Further down in his report, Picquet discussed the merits of his site from
religious and political points of view. In his opinion, they were: (i) La Présentation, located far enough from Montreal, Fort Frontenac and Oswego, would protect the autochthons living at the mission from bad influences coming from these places; (ii) it would be at easy access for the natives which may increase the number of their conversions; (iii) abundance of food supplies (hunting and fishing) would contribute to making the mission attractive to the natives.

Also, always with an eye to the economic development of Canada, Picquet suggested a reform for navigation along the St. Lawrence, making La Présentation a point of transfer of merchandise from the small boats passing the rapids into larger lake-going ones or vice versa. This, according to him, would considerably reduce the cost and ensure a secure lodging for the sailors, who sometimes were unable to return to their homes before the winter.

Picquet also underlined the possibility of ship building, taking advantage of an ample supply of oak timber produced by the sawmill installed, with the royal consent of 1751, on the rapids of the Oswegatchie River.

The promontory on which the fort and the native village were to be located formed an excellent harbour, well protected from the violent current and having sufficient depth to allow the heavily-loaded boats to come close to the river bank, (fig. 25) and permitting easy handling of merchandise and boarding or landing of people.

At the end of his letter Abbé Picquet insisted on the importance of La
Présentation as the support point for the western forts of Frontenac and Niagara, as well as on its possible role as the base for future operations against prosperous Oswego, destruction of which should be, in his opinion, one of the main goals of the French colonial administration.

The activity of the mission had come to the attention of the English from the beginning of its existence. Colonel Sir William Johnson, the Commissioner for Indian Affairs and one of the leading military men in the British colonies, wrote the following about the mission in a letter addressed to Governor Clinton of New York, dated August 18, 1750:

"The next thing of consequence he (an Indian Sachem) told me was, that he had heard from several Indians that the Governor had given orders to the Priest who is now settled below Cadaraqui to use all means possible to induce the five Nations to settle there, for which end they have a large magazine of all kinds of clothing fitted for Indians as also Arms, Ammunition Provision & which they distribute very liberally."

Evidently the author refers in his letter to the governor of Canada, La Jonquière and to the priest Picquet.

It is obvious from the above letter that the English regarded Picquet's initiative as a very dangerous one for their interests. Guessing correctly that it was motivated more by the politico-military considerations than by the religious ones, they decided to act. And they did so, for the recently built fort was burned down by Iroquois, incited by some "unknown" instigators. The only part that was not destroyed was the little stone building in which Abbé Picquet was lodged.
The seriousness of the danger La Présentation created for English interests may be also judged by the fact that when a meeting of the Congress of Representatives from the English colonies was called to Albany (Orange) in June 1754 to discuss common defence against the French expansionist movements, the problem of La Présentation was included on the agenda. 61

As the news about the success of the mission spread throughout Nouvelle France, the Bishop of Quebec, Monseigneur de Pontbriand, decided to see it himself and visited it in May 1752. He and his followers spent five days there, preaching and celebrating marriages and administering the other sacraments. 62 He returned to Quebec City very satisfied with what he saw, for at the time of this visit the mission had already spread over several prosperous settlements numbering about 3,000 natives, located nearby and depending on La Présentation for their support and security. 63

In June 1751, considering that La Présentation was in good health, Picquet decided to explore Lake Ontario in search of prospective converts willing to settle at his mission. After leaving detailed instructions concerning the operation of the fort, he departed, accompanied by five Canadians and five autochthons. This expedition lasted from June 11 to July 21. He described it in the report prepared for his superiors as well as for the colonial authorities. 64 From this document one may conclude that he considered this expedition as the extension of his activities at La Présentation, defined by the instructions obtained from Governor La Galissonière
and Minister Rouillé, i.e. control of autochthons by means of their conversion to Christianity and by their settlement in French-controlled towns and villages. Picquet believed that if he succeeded with the Iroquois, he might well achieve the same result with the nations living around Lake Ontario, and distract them from the influence of the Oswego traders.

He started his voyage along the northern shore of the Lake until he reached Fort Niagara. The return trip along the southern shore brought him to the site of Oswego, which he observed without landing (fig. 1).

As usual, he commented not only on autochthon affairs but also reported his findings about the land he visited, its accessibility and suitability for settlements, believing most probably that some control over native trappers could be exercised by the establishment of missions similar to La Présentation.

The first post he visited was Fort Frontenac, located close to the outflow of the St. Lawrence River from Lake Ontario. He found it empty of autochthons, who preferred to trade their pelts at Oswego. This was due, in his opinion, to the outrageously high prices asked by the French for their trading goods. As an example of such practices, Picquet noted that the French asked ten beaver pelts for a silver bracelet, while a similar one, often of better quality, could be purchased from the English for only two pelts. No wonder that the natives and often even Canadian trappers preferred to deal "illegally" with Oswego than with Frontenac.

However, Picquet had to admit that he preferred French "eau-de-vie" to English brandy. The only place that he believed could compete with Oswego was
Fort Rouillé, built in 1748 at the site of the modern city of Toronto. It had a well-appointed warehouse full of good wares. However, Picquet did not mention the prices charged for them.

He was very well received by the authorities of this establishment and treated to an excellent feast. He reported on the occasion that the bread and wine were of an "excellent quality" compared to Frontenac's, where all he was offered was poor bread and lard.

It became obvious to him long before the end of his trip that Rouillé's policy did not work in "Upper Canada". The construction of forts on the portages as it was made on Niagara River in order to prevent the natives from reaching Oswego, was not an efficient way to implement it. Therefore, he examined every site he stopped at (he was forced to stop often as he was prevented from advancing by bad weather, very dangerous for his fragile bark embarkations) from the following points of view: (i) were they easy to defend; (ii) were they able to provide the natives living there with a sufficient amount of food in the form of game, fish and eventually farm products (corn, poultry, etc.); (iii) would it be easy for an enemy to isolate them from the rest of Canada in case of war. Picquet even suggested, as he did in his report about his exploratory travels from Montreal to the La Présentation site, some improvements which should be made to wharf facilities in some places (he strongly criticized wharfing installations at Niagara).

He even visited sites of failed missions, as he did with the Sulpician mission at Bay of Quiuté, which he qualified as a "charming site" but "bad land" (most probably
not good for farming). Along the way he tried to meet the local natives and to convince them about the advantages of moving to the La Présentation complex. Many of them promised to follow him later but others joined him right away. Picquet did not mention their number but they must have been numerous enough to alarm the English of Oswego. Understandably, they were troubled by this action for it undercut their pelt supply line and the fur trade which was a very important, if not the only, reason for being there.

Picquet's voyage was an implementation of French colonial policy towards the autochthons, i.e. to bring them to the French side. The English saw it that way and decided to act. When his party (and there were many more of them than in the two embarkations he started with) bivouacked at the mouth of the Gaskouchagou River discharging into Lake Ontario twenty-five leagues from Niagara (fig. 1), the English of Oswego sent a canoe full of liquor and offered it free of charge to the autochthons of his party. When he returned to the camp from his one-day exploration, he found all of them drunk and rebellious. As a result of this English "sabotage" many of the recruits refused to follow him any further on the way to his mission. Picquet admitted that he was very upset by this.

As he passed near Oswego, he examined its fortifications. He noted that the fort was dominated on two sides by plateaux suitable for the installation of artillery pieces. Once these positions were occupied by enemies, the fort could be easily destroyed. He estimated that two batteries of three twelve-pound guns would be sufficient to achieve this.
It is interesting to note that Abbé Picquet did not land at Oswego in order to please natives accompanying him, who insisted that he not do so. He does not give any explanation for this attitude in his report. Most probably they feared that the reception would not be too friendly, to put it mildly.

On his way home he visited Frontenac again and was very well received there by the French authorities and by "his" Algonquin and Nipissing nations who came from their settlements expressly to meet him. He was very touched by this gesture. It showed how successful his work was to win their friendship.

On Picquet's arrival at La Présentation on July 21st, the autochthons living there welcomed him back as if he were their father, long lost and recovered.

He ended his expedition report with an enumeration of the merits of his own actions and discussions of the importance of the fort he had built. This, in our opinion, was done in order to defend his ideas and the correctness of the selection of the site for his mission, against criticism of many badly-advised and jealous people from the colonial administration. It is worth noting at this moment, that while the construction cost of his mission was estimated at between 30,000 and 40,000 pounds, he built it for 3,485 pounds. This enormous discrepancy is a very clear indication of the poor state of the colonial administration. On one side, an honest and idealistic man, an excellent organizer and leader of men showed what can be done with little money and hard work. On the other hand, this discrepancy showed how greedy and dishonest were the people in the colonial government in Quebec City. In 1760, the Intendant Bigot and several of his cronies were arrested after their return to France.
judged and many condemned to terms in prison or very heavy fines for their dishonesty. No wonder that with such an administration Nouvelle France was always in deficit at the royal treasury.

From the above it can be seen that Picquet's way of implementing French colonial policies was well received by both the French and some natives, their allies. But how it was perceived by the people "on the other side of the hill", using Wellington's famous words, is worth noting.

Many English and American historians are full of admiration for Abbé Picquet for his ways of spreading Christianity and promoting the interests of his King. They also laud his courage as a soldier, demonstrated many times by following "his" natives on their raids against English settlements and military installations. But his influence on the autochthons was very much feared by his English contemporaries for it counteracted their own attempts to convince the natives to join their side. The expression of these fears is shown by the letter of Colonel Johnson to the Board of Trade dated August 28, 1756:

"The Onondagas and Oneidas are in the neighbourhood of Swegatchie a French settlement on the River St. Lawrence, whither members of those two Nations have of late years been debauched and gone to live. Tho' our Indians do not now resort to those places as frequently as they formerly did, yet some among them do occasionally visit there, when the French and the Indians in their interest poison the minds of ours with stories not only to the disadvantage of our good intentions towards them, but endeavour to frighten them with pompous accounts of the superior prowess
and martial abilities of the French.\textsuperscript{70}

The Marquis François-Pierre de Vaudreuil, Governor of Canada, in his letter to the Minister of Marine, François-Marie de Moras, dated February 16, 1756, argued that France could not survive without "La Belle Rivière" (French name for the Ohio River) for it was a direct natural route between Canada and Louisiana. The smallest concession granted by the King of France to the British in Ohio would actually cut this direct route between the two colonies which could not survive without the mutual support. Without it, Canada would be in a permanent state of hostilities even when there was an official state of peace between the French and the English, as was the case since the last war of 1744–48. Since then, Canada was constantly opposed to the expansionist ambitions of the English colonies.\textsuperscript{71}

The English point of view and intentions were defined by Colonel Johnson in a letter dated September 18, 1755, written to Captain Robert Orme, Aide-de-camp of the British General Braddock. Johnson stated that if the military land campaign were well synchronized with the British navy operations and progressed along the St. Lawrence River, he was certain that Canada could be conquered within one year, allowing the English to take over the extremely profitable fur commerce.\textsuperscript{72}

The political aspect of the upcoming conflict was expressed in the "New York Gazette" issue of December 29, 1755, which argued that if the French were satisfied with the development of the land situated north of the St. Lawrence River, they would never be opposed by New England, which rather would observe these efforts with sympathy. But if the French extended their ambitions to the land south of Lake
Ontario, the English colonies would consider it a threat to their security and would have to defend themselves, creating a permanent state of hostilities.\footnote{73}

While the conflict between France and Britain was growing, Abbé Picquet faced a new challenge. His problem was a side effect of the presence of the military personnel of the mission on the natives living around it. The coexistence of the natives and the French garrisons in the small communities of the forts and missions surrounded by autochthon villages was not working very well. Many of these communities were separated from the outside world and lived their own lives. Abbé Picquet was alarmed by the demoralizing influence of the soldiers on the natives. They introduced them to all the vices of garrison life, such as drunkenness and promiscuity and often ridiculed the religion, which Abbé Picquet tried to encourage the natives to accept. In his reports to the government on this subject, Picquet even proposed to demilitarize his mission, arguing that the English would not attack such a demilitarized establishment, for they were aware that autochthons were not very easy to surprise and would remember an attack for a very long time. This shows how flexible and pragmatic was his approach to his missionary work. However, his suggestions of demilitarization was rejected by the colonial authorities. This decision underlines the military importance attached to La Présentation by the government.

Another problem arising from this cohabitation was the nearly permanent conflict between the military and the missionaries about who was in command. Some of the military men incited the natives to disobey the orders of the superior military authorities in order to blame later the clergy for it.\footnote{74} One such conflict happened at
La Présentation and nearly destroyed the mission. This attitude by the military was partly provoked by jealousy on their part. For they observed many times that while they could not incite the autochthons by any means to stay neutral or not to fight against them, one word on the part of a missionary could make of them ardent allies.

However, the above does not mean that the autochthons always followed these indications. They were watchful for their own interests, which required them to be on the winning side of any conflict which was not theirs. In the first stages of the war of conquest when the French had the upper hand, they also had natives' enthusiastic support. But when with time that changed, so did their loyalties. They were not outrightly hostile, with some exceptions, but maintained a greater neutrality. Finally, in the last month of the war in 1760 French Canada stood alone against British assaults supported by its former allies.
6. THE RELIGIOUS MISSIONS OF CANADA

The process of Christianization of American autochthons started at the very beginning of the 17th century before the founding of Montreal in 1642, when French Canada consisted of only two settlements - Quebec and Trois-Rivières, and numbered less than three hundred white habitants of French origin. The territories situated west of these two settlements, which had grown quickly into the present Eastern Townships, were vigorously explored by the expeditions commissioned by governors of the colony, "coureurs de bois" and tradesmen, motivated by rapid and great benefits from the fur trade with local natives.

Soon it was discovered that the lands north of Lake Ontario and east of Georgian Bay on Lake Huron were populated by a sedentary native people - the Hurons. Champlain, who visited this territory in 1616, found it "very fine and fertile" and estimated the Huron population at 30,000 people. 77 Their occupations were beaver trapping, fishing, agriculture and trading.

Jesuits were not very far behind the explorers. They came to Huronia under the leadership of Father Jean de Brébeuf S.J. with the goal of introducing Christianity to this quiet and laborious people. They hoped to capitalize on the Huron sedentary way of life and on the apparent lack of leadership, and to transform them into a French-speaking native community which could eventually become a part of the French-Canadian society. 78 The missionaries settled at the beginning among the local
population in their own townships, considering this to be the most efficient way to carry on their work.

However, when Father Jerôme Lalemant S.J. took over the leadership of Jesuit missionary activities in Huronia in 1639, he realized the need for a central residence. It was to be used as the base from which the missionaries would travel to the native villages for a few days' stay. After preaching God's message, they would be able to retreat there to meditate, read, and pray, to prepare themselves for another period of their missionary work.

The idea of a strong central residence also had another important function: it was supposed to be the place where white persons living among autochthons (including missionaries) could seek protection during frequent local wars.

Unfortunately, not all of the priests took advantage of this opportunity; they decided to stay, whatever might happen, among their flocks and paid with their lives for dedication to their priestly duties. Some of them were surprised by the suddenness of assaults, as was the case of Fathers Jean de Brébeuf and Jerôme Lalemant who perished in 1649 during the Iroquois-Huron war in the village known presently as St. Ignace, located on the bend of the Sturgeon River, a tributary of Georgian Bay.

Archeological digs carried out in 1946 revealed the existence of an important fortified Huron village well protected by the river bend and palisade (fig. 4). The vestiges of a building with characteristics of European design were discovered there among typical Huron longhouses. The building is identified by No. 26 on the village
plan. Fig. 5 shows its form defined by the post moulds, still visible in the soil. Its dimensions 30 by 18 m. preclude the possibility of standard barrel roofing, typical for the autochthon dwellings, which had a maximum width of twenty feet. It was most probably provided with a peaked roof supported by three rows of posts dividing its interior into four equal parts. Additional partitions, separating four small rooms, were identified at its southern end. There were several entrances into it, all located on the side walls. The building was surrounded by a picket fence 4 feet distant from the walls. Judging by the small diameter of moulds (maximum four and a half inches), it was concluded that it could not be a defensive palisade, but only a simple enclosure providing some privacy to the building's occupants. The small diameters of all post moulds indicate that the building was built with the use of native technology based on stone tools, but according to a European layout.

Archeologists argue that the building was a combined church-residence. The priests and their white helpers needed to have some privacy to rest and pray and to be close to their converts at the same time. When compared with the accommodation the missionaries had in other Huron settlements, building No. 26 of St. Ignace was a real improvement, for others usually consisted of some separate niches inside autochthon longhouses, separated from the rest by some flimsy partitions.

The fence around building No. 26 may be considered an intermediary step towards the full separation of two communities living at the mission - a principle observed by all later missionary establishments of Nouvelle France. This evolution was really a rapid one, for already in 1649 the Jesuit missions of Huronia were
provided with a central, strongly fortified residence called Ste-Marie I. It was located on the shores of a navigable stream today called the Wye River, a tributary of Georgian Bay, about one mile distant from the mission.

The builders of Ste-Marie I realized that in case of an all-out Iroquois-Huron conflict they would be in the middle of it, without any hope of outside help from the closest French settlements, Quebec and Trois-Rivières, situated 450 miles away as the crow flies. This may explain why the mission became a real fortress protected by strong palisaded curtain walls and bastions, built according to European principles of fortification building.

One of the basic rules of planning, developed then and applied since, was the separation of local populations from the white missionaries to be as complete as possible. Each compound was supposed to live its own life with separate facilities for worship, meeting halls, cemeteries and dwellings. The European compounds were usually fortified with palisaded or stone straight-line enclosures reinforced by bastions of combined stone and wood construction. Native settlements were most of the time protected by enclosures built according to their traditional methods and with tools they had at their disposal. Fig. 6 shows such a fortified village.

Fig. 7 shows the plan and hypothetical reconstruction of Ste-Marie I based on the finding of modern archeological investigations. Fig. 8 shows the vestiges of the north-east part of the Ste-Marie's European compound. As each square of the grid represents a 5 by 5 ft area, the building may be used to define the dimensions of the whole settlement shown on fig. 7.
The originality of the plan adopted by builders of the mission is indicated by the double palisade around the autochthon compound. This most certainly enhanced its defensive value, but also allowed the separation of converts living inside the compound from pagan visitors lodged in the longhouses located between two palisades. From fig. 7 it can be seen that the European compound was built with a European type of dwelling, while the autochthons lived in their traditional bark-covered longhouses.

It is obvious that among the Jesuits were men aware of military engineering who used this knowledge, when they drew the masterplans and built the mission. The powerful fortifications of Ste-Marie I, not repeated in any other mission known to us, were dictated by the complete isolation of the mission, as well as by the ferocity of the tribal wars which ended in the nearly complete extermination of the Huron nation there.

In 1649 the surviving Hurons abandoned their fields and townships and retreated to the comparative safety of the Christian Island located in Georgian Bay, eight miles from the nearest shore. The missionaries, realizing that their work at Ste-Marie I had ended due to lack of people to convert, burned their residence and followed what was left of their flock to the island, where they started another mission called Ste-Marie II. Because of crop failure and impossibility of maintaining community life for both Europeans and autochthons, Ste-Marie II was abandoned in 1650 and both communities dispersed. That was the end of the Jesuits' mission in Huronia which itself ceased to exist. 82
As noted before, the principles guiding the organization of Ste-Marie I survived until the fall of Nouvelle France and were applied to all other missions. As an example, the Jesuit mission of St. Louis at Kahnawake may be cited. Fig. 9, dated 1720, shows clearly that the principle of two separate communities was maintained. However, the fortifications protecting the European compound were not as elaborate as those of Ste-Marie I, built nearly one century earlier in an isolated location. It was considered unnecessary to repeat at Kahnawake what was done at the Ste-Marie I because of the relative security the new mission enjoyed.

In 1657, in order to reduce Jesuit influence in Canada, the French metropolitan government started to support Messieurs of St. Sulpice of Paris, who were granted seigniorial rights over the Island of Montreal in 1663. When the Sulpicians started to organize their own missions they used Jesuit experiences. They maintained the principle of separated communities and the necessity of protection of the European compound by the fortified enclosures, around which they allowed establishment of one or several compounds (one per nation) for the native converts or converts to be. In what follows we shall discuss Sulpician missions located in the vicinity of Ville-Marie (also called Montreal) and how the estimated degree of danger influenced the design of their defences.

The first mission to be built was that of La Montagne, located on the southern slopes of the mountain, on the site of the present day Grand Seminaire of St-Sulpice and of the Collège de Montréal. It was built and fortified a few years after the grant of seigniorial rights over Montreal Island to the congregation.
Fortunately, the plan of it, dated 1694 and known as the plan of François Vachon de Belmont - superior of the congregation - has survived to our own time (fig. 10). Two stone towers protecting the southern curtain walls have also survived. One of them is shown on fig. 11.

The Belmont plan clearly shows the autochthon village located immediately next to the fort and protected by some kind of enclosure, most probably inferior to the stone wall protecting the European compound. The mission had two churches (another inheritance of Ste-Marie I). When compared to the Jesuit fort of Huronia, the defences of the Fort de La Montagne are less elaborate and much weaker, reflecting the relative security of the location. The round towers located at each corner of the perimeter were rather unusual features for the late 17th century fortifications, for they created areas that could not be covered by the flanking gun fire.

The plan shows the autochthon compound and the fire which destroyed it in 1694 and gave the congregation an excuse to move the native population of the mission to the other side of the mountain, farther from the demoralizing influences of the growing Ville-Marie, located on the south shores of the island. That new location, presently known as Sault-au-Recollet, was situated close to the Rivière des Prairies rapids.

The new mission was protected by a Fort de La Nouvelle-Lorette, enclosing the European compound. The transfer of natives, started in 1696, was completed in 1705.
The protection of converts from the bad influence of the European ways of life was a constant worry to the missionaries. Availability of alcohol was one of the greatest dangers threatening natives from both health and moral points of view. Apart from fire, this was the other reason for the displacement of the mission.

Fig. 12 shows the 18th-century map, preserved in the archives of St. Sulpice in Paris. The document also shows mills built ca 1725 on the dam across the Rivière des Prairies between the islands of Montreal and La Visitation. This allows us to establish that it was prepared when the mission of La Nouvelle-Lorette did not exist any longer. In 1722 its native population was already transferred to the mission of Deux Montagnes. Therefore fig. 12 shows only the fort.

Fig. 13, representing the reconstruction of the mission's European compound, is based on the document of fig. 12. Here again the principle of separate communities is maintained. The European compound, the only one shown by the plan, is divided into two parts: one for the monks and another for the nuns of the Congregation of Notre-Dame. From the above figures it is very difficult, if not impossible, to know whether the fortifications of La Nouvelle-Lorette were stronger or not than those of La Montagne, as it might be expected because of greater exposure to the possible attacks by raiding native parties moving unchecked along the river.

Contrary to the first fort of La Montagne, no vestiges of the fort of La Nouvelle-Lorette were found. Fortunately, other sources of information about it survived, in the form of construction contracts signed by Vachon de Belmont
himself.

The details of the fort are given by the description of works included in these formal contracts between the Congregation and the builder hired to do the work. Transcripts of these documents preserved in the Archives of the Seminary of St. Sulpice and in the National Archives of Quebec are presented in the Appendix. There are two separate contracts signed within a few days in 1691 - one for the construction of the fort itself, the second for the transport and preparation of building materials. The third one, for the construction of the chapel, was issued nine years later, in 1700. These documents give an excellent insight into the method of construction, dimensions of the fort and of the church as well as the quality and quantity of the material to be used. All three of them were signed in the presence of a notary of Ville-Marie (Montreal).

From these documents we know the dimensions of the fort (100 feet square) and of the chapel (60 feet by 22 feet). We also know that the piles for palisade had to be 17 feet long and squared to 14 inches. From the total length of timber to be supplied (7,000 linear feet) it can be estimated that the total number of piles would be over 400, allowing the construction of a palisade 480 ft. long, sufficient to enclose the stipulated surface of the compound.

The contract for the chapel indicates that it was to be provided with three windows of a size to be determined in the field and with the steeple like "...celui des Dames religieuses hôpitalières de cette ville (Ville-Marie)".

The mode of payment is also defined: partly in cash and partly in foodstuffs
(corn and flour).

It is worth noting the discrepancy between the stipulation of the contracts and the plan of the fort shown on fig. 12, drawn after 1725, which indicates a much larger installation then the one required by the contract signed in 1691.

The degree of security enjoyed by both the mission of La Montagne and of La Nouvelle-Lorette due to their location on the island of Montreal was not the same in the case of the mission of Deux Montagnes (Oka), which was located on the shore of a lake formed by the junction of the St. Lawrence and Ottawa Rivers. It was established on the path taken by natives coming from the territories located northwest of Montreal, on their way to the city. It could be expected that sooner or later it would be attacked by the hostile autochthon parties.

From the existing documents we may study the evolution of the concept of the new mission and the considerations that influenced its final form. These documents are plans prepared by different persons, with different ideas and priorities.

The oldest among them is the plan dated 1718 (fig. 14), authorized by Vachon de Belmont, superior of the mission of La Montagne. Its authorship is obvious when compared with the plan of La Montagne dated 1694, shown on fig 10. The similarity between them cannot be missed. Belmont adopted the same general layout, placing both European and autochthon compounds side by side. The European compound had a form of a square fort with four round towers, identical to the ones protecting Fort de La Montagne. It included a large church, a school for children, the council hall for autochthons and missionaries' lodgings. The plan also shows that the
unprotected native compounds did not have any separate place of worship, and it may be assumed that the natives were allowed access inside the fort during services, as well as that they were allowed to use the meeting hall adjacent to the church. The economy of the design is underlined by the fact that one of the curtain walls of the fort served as a wall of the church. It is not known whether it included windows as it was the case of the church of La Nouvelle-Lorette.

At the same time, in 1719, colonial authorities commissioned Lieutenant Chassegros de Léry, a military engineer, to propose an alternative project (fig. 15). From the military point of view Léry's plan is a great improvement. The square layout and inclusion of the church inside the fort is maintained. The round towers are replaced by 18th century bastions and the autochthon compound is fortified. The compounds of "habitants", i.e. white settlers, not taken into account by Belmont's plan (see fig. 14), are located on both sides of the fort and open towards the lake, but are separated from autochthons by a wall. The comparative sophistication of Léry's project is further underlined by the introduction of machicolations in the small towers protecting the curtain walls of the native compound.

Both projects, prepared within a year of each other, emphasize the difference of approach between the religious and political authorities of Canada. Belmont considered only the defence of lives and of the monastic property, leaving out all other aspects of the problem. Léry's project considered the defensive aspect of the whole community composed of religious, native and European secular compounds. It is worthy of note that for the first time the European secular compounds were
included in the planning of the mission. All three communities were protected by fortifications, of which the fort was a central and most powerful element. The obvious weakness of the proposal was a complete lack of any defence on the lakeshore side, leaving the "inhabitants' " compound completely open to sudden attacks. In times of war they were expected to seek protection inside the autochthon compound south of the fort (fig. 15).

This project was considered too costly by the Sulpicians and they refused to proceed with its construction, threatening to resign their seigniorial rights over the site, if forced to do so. The colonial government backed down and asked for their own proposal.  

Fig. 16, dated 1743 - the original of which is kept in the French archives - shows the plans of the fort built according to 18th-century rules and prescriptions of military architecture. According to A. Chagny (ref. 6), it was fortified by the palisaded curtain walls surrounded by moats. Four masonry bastions permitted the flanking musket fire along every part of its perimeter. Most probably, the plan was prepared by Robert de la Morandi ère who also supervised the construction, executed mostly by volunteers.  

It is worth mentioning that the fort was built in the period when Abbé Picquet directed the mission of Deux Montagnes. Therefore both men - Picquet et Morandi ère - who had a decisive influence on the project were also involved in the construction of the Fort La Présentation a few years later. This may explain the similarity of the plans and the execution of these two forts. The cost of the
construction of the Fort of Deux-Montagnes was covered by the French government. This and the fact that a military engineer was charged with the preparation of the plan and with the construction may be proof that the mission of Deux-Montagnes was also considered by the colonial authorities the most prone to attack of all religious institutions located around Montreal. Fig. 16 shows villages of different native nations located around the fort - another example of the application of an old Jesuit principle of the separation of European and native communities.

Most probably not everyone was satisfied with the degree of security provided by the fort of 1743, which left the autochthon villages completely unprotected against surprise attacks. In 1758 a new plan (fig. 17) giving some protection to natives as well as to "habitants" possesses communities were prepared.

According to this, the fort of 1743 was incorporated into the new proposed installation, protected by the curtain walls with towers at each corner. In addition, two artillery towers were foreseen on the northern approaches to the fort. Inside this very large and costly enceinte an additional bastioned enclosure was proposed. This was most probably meant to protect the European settlement already foreseen by the proposal of Léry (fig. 15), discussed previously.

The author of this plan is not known and most probably it was never followed. As in the 1758 the military situation of Canada deteriorated rapidly. Colony's limited resources would not permit the realization of such a grandiose project.

The policy of Sulpician fort-building started at the island of Montreal was followed when the mission of La Présentation was built. Located in an isolated place,
it was protected by strong defences built by an experienced military engineer according to the rules of the art. It was able to beat off expected autochthon assaults. Its design is another example of how necessity influenced human actions. La Présentation was adapted to the role it had to play during its ten short years of existence in the Anglo-French struggle in North America.

All establishments discussed in this chapter - with the exception of Ste-Marie I - were located at the heart of the colony and cannot be considered part of Canada's first line fortification system, protecting colony's borders. They played a very small role in the global defensive battles of Canada. Ste-Marie I was too far away and too far out of the way to be of importance during the brewing Franco-English conflict.

La Présentation, aside from its religious vocation, was an important part of the defence system of Canada. Its role will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter of this thesis.
7. **FORT LA PRÉSENTATION AND THE DEFENCE SYSTEM OF CANADA**

The 17th century French military engineer, Maréchal de Vauban, builder of French fortifications in Europe, was of the opinion that frontier defences should be designed as a system delaying the progress of invading enemies long enough to allow the field armies of the invaded country to concentrate and to attack the invaders weakened by losses sustained during the siege.

To achieve this he imagined the principle of the "grand carré". It consisted of a system of fortifications located at strategic points around the protected territory, defending the most vulnerable points through which any expected future invaders could penetrate. The colonial authorities responsible for the defence of Canada applied the same principle.

As was explained before, there were only three routes for a possible invasion to penetrate the heart of Nouvelle France, i.e. the St. Lawrence River Valley between Quebec City and the Great Lakes region. As can be seen from fig. 24, all of them were heavily fortified.

The 18th century fortifications of Canada were, with only a few exceptions of fortified cities such as Quebec, Louisbourg and Montreal, of the field type, i.e. built of earth, sod and timber with minimal use of stone and brick masonry. Such fortifications were in constant need of care. If abandoned without maintenance even for a short period of time, they deteriorated quickly under the influence of harsh North American weather conditions.
The first line forts were designed to withstand some artillery fire and were protected by earth ramparts, ditches and glacis. They were supported by the second line of posts, used as fortified warehouses for military supplies, as hospital facilities, as the support points for the troops passing through and for the protection of the weak points in lines of communication, such as portages and rapids. These second line installations were designed to give protection only against the small raiding parties lightly armed, without artillery. When threatened by larger forces armed with cannons, they were usually burned down by the defenders together with the supplies they contained, and abandoned. They were usually not protected by earthworks but by simple palisades or stone walls, providing adequate protection only against musket bullets.

Both types described above were built to enable defence with flanking musket fire. To do this, their builders used the system of bastions, i.e. of covered buildings or enclosures which protruded from the curtain wall lines (palisades or ramparts) and were designed to allow garrison soldiers to shoot in directions parallel to them, as well as to protect other bastions by direct fire. Usually, small forts in Canada were built on square or rectangular plans and had bastions at each corner. Fort La Présentation (fig. 30) and Fort St-Jean (fig. 31) are good examples of such fortifications. Since the range of an average musket shot in the 18th century was estimated at 120 toises, i.e. about 700 feet, this distance was the maximum used for the distance between bastions.

Nouvelle France always had to cope with a scarcity of resources and
manpower. It could not afford to maintain large garrisons everywhere all the time. The governor and his military advisers had to allot them to the points which, in their judgment, were most exposed. As an example of this practice let us cite the Fort La Présentation, whose garrison varied between three in 1749 and one hundred and fifty in 1759. The same may be said about maintenance work on the forts. Fort Niagara, one of the main defence posts in the West, may be cited as an example. In his report to Count d'Argenson, Minister of the Navy, dated October 5, 1755, Adjutant Malartic, a French officer, wrote that it was "in an advanced stage of disrepair", adding that the Béarn regiment could do something about it, instead of building "a useless fortified camp next to it". In the same letter Malartic was even more critical of Fort Frontenac, the main French naval base on Lake Ontario. It was, according to him, supposed to be the strongest in the country, but the terreplains of its ramparts were built of planks and masonry which were so inadequate that "when one of the guns on it discharges, the whole fort shakes". He did not blame this sad state of defence on the generals but on the governors of the colony who had neglected the forts for such a long time.

Two years after the fall of Oswego, Chevalier Le Mercier, an artillery officer, expressed a similar opinion about Frontenac in a letter to Vaudreuil, dated October 30, 1757, but added that the English would not be able to attack it as long as they did not reoccupy Oswego.

In the same report he mentioned that Fort Duquesne was not strong enough
to sustain a siege and that the King should order the construction of a stronger one, if he really wishes to secure the possession of the Ohio Valley.

He also noted that Montreal was entirely without guns and that its fortifications were good only against "coup de main" by small parties. However, he added that Niagara defences were in good shape and well provided with artillery. This is not surprising because Captain Pouchot, a military engineer and its commander, was sent in 1755-66 to rebuild the fort and it was most probably the new one that Le Mercier examined.\(^90\)

The fort-making policy described above was, in our opinion, a direct consequence of instructions received from the French government to build the defences at the lowest possible cost. Whether such a policy was correct is doubtful. Another element that most probably influenced the type of construction adopted in Canada was an acute shortage of qualified craftsmen. French stonemasons had enough work at home and were not eager to accept work in a country which was considered by most Frenchmen to have an unusually harsh climate. A supplementary effect could have been the corruption of the colonial administration, which overestimated costs of anything charged to the government in order to increase the profits of the members of the ruling oligarchy. The case of Fort La Présentation, discussed earlier in this thesis, is the best example of it.

Fig. 24 shows the defence system of Canada built to protect the central part of the colony, i.e. the St. Lawrence Valley, its access to the ocean and the overland route to Louisiana. The east approaches were defended by two heavily fortified cities,
Louisbourg on Cape Breton Island and Quebec City.

The Richelieu-Champlain Valley in the south was fortified with the front-line forts of Carillon and St. Frédéric, replaced later by Île aux Noix at the Richelieu River outfall from Lake Champlain. They were supported by Fort St-Jean and Fort Chambly protecting the communication route from Montreal.

The western approaches were defended by Forts Niagara and Frontenac, both on the shores of Lake Ontario. Fort La Présentation filled the logistic supporting role for both, and other western forts. In addition, the small Fort Du Portage near the falls accompanied Fort Niagara on the Niagara River (fig. 1).

Further out, Fort Duquesne protected the Ohio Valley, supported by secondary forts at Presqu'île, Le Boeuf and Machault. Forts Rouillé (Toronto - Lake Ontario), Detroit (Lake Erie) and Fort Michillimackinac guarding the strait between Lake Huron and Lake Michigan, completed the list of the colony defence installations (fig. 1.).

In 1759 when both Niagara and Frontenac were conquered by the English, Fort La Présentation became the first line defence installation. However, not having been built for that purpose, it was quickly dismantled and replaced by Fort Lévis, built on a small island located in the middle of St. Lawrence, called presently Chimney Island, about 6 miles from the mouth of the Oswegatchie River (fig. 23).

All the above-mentioned forts, whatever their role and type of construction, had one thing in common: they were all of the bastioned type. This system of defence construction was first used in Italy in the 16th century and became standard
fortification design in Europe and, in its simplified form, was also used in America. It was very well suited for colonial conditions since it was designed especially to be defended by musketry. The fort artillery was used mostly for counter-battery fire, trying to eliminate the enemy's cannons against which there was no effective protection. One of the reasons for such tactics was that artillery consumed large quantities of powder, a rare commodity in any besieged fort.

Fort La Présentation, aside from being a missionary establishment, was an important tool of French policy towards the autochthons living south of the St. Lawrence River.

The fort was built at the mouth of the Oswegatchie River flowing from the south into the St. Lawrence River. Oswegatchie was the shortest route south towards Iroquois country and through it to Albany, an important trading post located on the Hudson River and operated by Dutch settlers (see fig. 1). It will be discussed further in this chapter that there are some indications that even the natives living at La Présentation were in contact with them, in spite of all Picquet's efforts to prevent such an occurrence.

Fort La Présentation does not exist any longer. Its location is known only from the old maps. Due to the fact that its hypothetical site was used for many years as the dumping ground for the excavated material from other sites, neither the present land elevation nor the shore line of the promontory are the same as they used to be in 1749 - the year when the fort was built. We know its physical aspect from the existing plans and from the descriptions by visiting travellers. All these documents,
not always reliable, allow us to establish only the hypothetical characteristics of its construction and its location.

The oldest existing map, dating from 1749 and drawn by Chaussegros de Léry, passing through La Présentation on his way to Detroit, is shown on fig. 25. It shows the 18th-century form of the promontory, the position of the fort and the depth of the water in the mouth of the Oswegatchie - very important information for the 18th century, which relied on waterways for the transport of goods and people. The map based on data from 1813 shows the alleged position of the fort with reference to the city of Ogdensburg (ca 1860) - (fig. 26).

It is worthy of note that Léry's map (1749) does not show autochthon compounds next to the fort as is shown on the later map of fig. 28 (ca 1751) and fig. 29 (1752). The reasons for this omission may be twofold: (i) the autochthon compound did not exist yet in 1749 or (ii) as Léry's map was drawn for strictly military purposes, the native village was not considered important. The second eventuality would confirm that in the view of the colonial authorities, La Présentation was to be primarily a military establishment while appearing to be a religious mission.

Professor Cook of the State College of Arts and Science, Potsdam, N.Y., in his work on La Présentation, hypothetically established its location (fig. 27). He based his considerations on the available documentary evidence in the form of maps, two of which were prepared by 18th century cartographers (de Léry [1749] - fig. 25, and Paul La Brosse [1752] - fig. 29). Together with the 1860 map published in Lossing's 1868 "The Pictorial Fieldbook of the War of 1812" (fig. 26), drawn by the author with the
help of local informants, these sources are considered by Cook to be the most reliable.

After the fall of Nouvelle France in 1760, the British army used the vestiges of La Présentation to build its own fort for the same purpose - with the exception of evangelization of the natives - as the French did: as the base for gathering information about both natives and white settlers. The new fort, called Oswegatchie, was abandoned by the British in 1796 and was taken over by the early settlers at the site, who founded a new settlement which became in time the present-day city of Ogdensburg. So it is entirely possible that in 1860 there were some people who could remember the ruins of the old British fort.

All available documents indicate that the fort was located very close to the riverbank, at a distance of 18 to 30 feet (an estimate made by Cook on the basis of the non specified available documentation). The problem was that the modern riverbank is formed by an extensive fill towards the east, made to build the 19th century port facilities able to accommodate huge modern lakegoing ships. A comparison between the modern New York Department of Transport map of 1975 and the older maps, showing the land configuration before the fill was made, permitted the establishment of the location of the 18th century riverbank. During the 1988 digs carried out by Cook, three test holes were dug, all situated on the east side of the imaginary extension of Commerce Street (fig. 27). One of them revealed the inclined black earth strata, identified as 18th-century land surface descending to the level of the river and interpreted as 18th-century riverbank. This permitted the establishment of a
hypothetical location for the fort's east curtain. Another indication of the fort location was the cornerstone found in 1831 among the ruins of the former shipyard, which existed, in the 19th century on this site.

Since it could be assumed that the cornerstone was placed on the surface of the northeastern bastion which served both as the chapel and the lodging of the founder of the mission, this discovery permitted the establishment of the location of the northeast corner of the fort. Knowing from the documents that the fort was square and had sides 150 ft. long (fig. 29), it was relatively easy to establish a hypothetical area within which the fort was built. This area is 200-ft. square as shown on fig. 27 and the archeological investigations were carried on within its limits.

From the beginning this work was hampered by the conditions of the site. Old sewage contamination and the 19th- and 20th-century rockfill, often 3 to 8 feet thick, rendered fieldwork extremely difficult. Further, the requests of the site owner to limit the damage to the landscaping of his property had to be respected.

During the digs it was established that the promontory subsoil, on which the fort was built, is composed of glacial till overlaid by a layer of dark brown soil, one to three feet thick, formed by decomposed glacial clay mixed with some other elements brought by flooding, wind, decomposing vegetation, etc. The upper part of this stratum was disturbed by plowing, suggesting the existence of 18th-century agriculture. In some of the excavated locations this stratum contained 18th- and 19th-century artifacts, mixed at random in its lower parts with unspecified remains of 9000 B.C. This layer, called "black horizon" owing to its widespread presence, was
used as a reference.

Near the owner's house, standing near the northeastern corner of the hypothetical location of the fort, the "black horizon" layer is covered with approximately a 3-foot thick layer of 19th- and 20th-century fill (fig. 27). This fill was easy to date for it was full of pottery debris, bottles, and many other objects of various provenance, such as nails, pieces of construction wood, etc.

The excavations executed during field investigations are shown on fig. 27. They are composed of two long trenches and of several test pits. No archeological remains of the fort were discovered during this work. This is interpreted as being the result of heavy disturbance of the land by the work and excavation to which the promontory was subjected over a period of nearly 200 years, and to the restrictions imposed by the time limits and requests of the landowners. Cook believed that if it were possible to increase the extension of these excavations, there would be a good chance of revealing some fort vestiges other than the cornerstone mentioned above. The artifacts discovered were of the usual kind found on 18th-century North American sites: military buttons, shards of pottery and glassware, broken pipes, musket flints and bullets, discarded leather goods, etc. Two kinds of artifacts attracted our attention: clay pipes, of which over 300 fragments were found, and musket bullets of three different calibers.

The clay pipes were identified as being of the type produced in England by R. Tippet Co. They could be smoked by the autochthons even during the French regime and could be obtained by them only from the Dutch traders in Albany.
(Orange), New York. If such a supposition is true, it means that Picquet's autochthons were dealing, directly or indirectly, with the New England colonies, an activity Abbé Picquet wanted to prevent. It shows once more that the natives had their own policy, which they followed all the time, no matter what their alliances of the moment were. It is difficult, in our opinion, to believe that Picquet was ignorant of it. We suspect that he simply pretended to be so, knowing very well that some of the pelts were going the English way. Most probably that kind of commerce extended to goods other than the clay pipes coveted by the autochthons and unobtainable from the French.

The second intriguing artifacts discovered were musket bullets of three different calibers. According to Cook, the 18th-century English army used 68 to 69 caliber bullets, while the French were equipped with weapons using 59 to 63 caliber. The smallest caliber, 53 to 57, fitted light muskets called by Cook "Indian trade guns".

Considering that the range of a musket decreases with its caliber, one may conclude that the native braves armed with small caliber muskets were no match for the regular troops, both French and English. A question arising from the above, for which we do not have any answer at the present time, is what was the reason for providing the autochthons with less dangerous arms. Maybe it was the question of powder economy (smaller guns used less of it), or a precaution due to the lack of confidence in these native allies.

The archeological field campaigns did not reveal any clues about the physical aspects of the construction of the fort. In order to reconstruct its hypothetical
appearance we have to investigate existing documents and to compare it with other
better known installations of the same type and era.

The first surviving description of the fort is the one included in the report
from the travels of Pierre Céloron, who, accompanied by Father Bonneccamps, S.J.,
passed through La Présentation on June 25, 1749, when the construction of the fort
was just beginning. They both kept a journal on the expedition. Each one mentioned
the stay at La Présentation. Father Bonneccamps informs us in his report dated
October 17, 1750, that the fort of Abbé Picquet had a square plan of 70 by 70 ft. and
was built at the base of a little promontory, low and swampy. Bonneccamps did not
share Picquet's opinion that the land on which he had set his establishment was really
as good as he thought it was. According to him the native "village" consisted of two
men who joined the expedition.

Bonneccamps' report does not give any description of the physical aspect of the
fort, nor how advanced its construction was. Céloron, the commanding officer of the
expedition, is more explicit on the subject. His notes of June 25 indicate that the fort
was located on 60 acres of cleared land, but that

"His (Picquet's) stone fort eight feet high was not as
yet much advanced. The abbé Picquet lodged in a
bark cabin in the Indian fashion, and had lumber and
other materials prepared for his lodging." 

On their way back home Father Bonneccamps wrote, under November 7, 1749,
that the fort was burned down

"...par des Iroquois, envoyés dit-on, pour cet effet,
par des Anglois. À un angle du fort il (Picquet) a fait
construire une petite redoute dans le gout de celle du
Fort St-Jean. L'incendie l'avait épargné."97

In our opinion, this mention of the resemblance to Fort St-Jean on the
Richelieu is important. It gives a basis of comparison of La Présentation with a better
known similar installation, which will be used in the discussion of the hypothetical
construction of Abbé Picquet's fort.

After the destruction of his first fort, described above, Picquet sought and
obtained permission from the governor to build a permanent one, with the help of
Robert de la Morandière who drew up the plans and supervised its construction.98

The most elaborate description of the fort was given by Louis-Antoine de
Bougainville, Aide-de-camp to Montcalm, in his journal covering his voyages of 1756.

On July 26, passing through La Présentation, he described it as being a:

"......fort of squared posts, flanked by four strong
bastions, palisaded from without and with a water-
filled ditch. Beside the fort is a village of a hundred
fires, each that of an Iroquois chief, all warriors".99

On the same occasion he mentioned that the:

"King had forbidden any French post being built
above the Long Sault ... ...Abbé Picquet had to
obtain a special twelve arpent concession above la
Galette".100

Adjutant Malartic, passing through La Présentation with his regiment on the
way from Montreal to Frontenac, also described the fortification of La Présentation
(July 28, 1755):
"This fort consists of four buildings in the form of a bastion, the curtains whereof are palisades. There is a garrison of 30 men. The four buildings are occupied the first by the commander, the second by the garrison, the third by the missionary and the chapel, the fourth by the store and the guard."  

All the above descriptions of the fort were made by qualified people, some of whom were trained military men. They differ from each other in some details but they agree on the essentials, i.e. that the fort was built as a palisaded enclosure with four bastions. This is in complete agreement with all other visual documentation, such as maps and plans. Its size and form may be the subject of discussion. Bonnecamps said that the fort was 70 by 70 ft. This does not conform to the assessment of Cook, based on Paul La Brosse's plan (fig. 29), of 150 by 150 ft. A possible explanation of this riddle may be the following:

Father Bonnecamps saw the fort for the first time on June 25, 1749, on his way out with the Céloron expedition. On November 7, on his way back, he saw it destroyed. Considering the approach of winter, it seems reasonable to assume that the construction of the new one started in the spring of 1750, or later. The plan signed by Paul La Brosse, dated 1752, as well as the fort's plan (unsigned) also dated 1752 (fig. 30) show Fort La Présentation rebuilt possibly by Robert de la Morandièrè, demolished by Lévis' order in 1759. Morandièrè most probably considered the 70 by 70 ft. dimensions of the burned out fort too small and increased them to 150 by 150 ft. In other words, Picquet's fort of 1749 and Morandièrè's one are two different constructions.
The rendering of the most probable appearance of the eastern side of the fort is shown on fig. 29. The two bastions shown: (based on comparison with fig. 30) are the bastion in which resided the commander of the military force and the one used as the chapel and priest's lodging. Both are two story with the musket embrasures on the upper level and the larger openings on the ground floor, most probably adapted to the positioning of light artillery pieces.

The plan shown on fig. 28, also by an unknown author, is incorrect from the formal point of view. Neither is the St. Lawrence River presented correctly nor is the form of the bastions shown as in the La Brosse rendering. However, it furnishes some very important information. It confirms that the place was fortified with the palisade curtains and had four bastions located at the corners. It shows, in conformity with other sources, that the main fort entrance was located in the eastern curtain palisade facing the Oswegatchie River. What is important, is that the drawing shows a swampy area on the northern side of the enclosure, separated from it by a trench which has the appearance of a drainage ditch. This provides confirmation of written documents mentioning the water-laden promontory on which the fort was located. This ditch and excavated earth could be taken by some observers as the ramparts protecting the fort. Fig. 28 also shows the location of the autochthon village adjacent to the southern side of the fort and protected by a palisade from the land side. It also indicates the location of the saw mill outside the village on the Oswegatchie rapids. This proves that the rendering was made in 1751 or later, since permission for the construction of the mill was granted to Abbé Picquet only in 1750.
The promontory is shown free of trees. This supports the information from fig. 25, in which Léry also shows the promontory free of trees.

Both figures 28 and 29 show the native village located outside the fort's perimeter. This indicates that the principle of separate compounds for whites and natives, introduced to Canada by the Jesuits in the 17th century and used by the Sulpicians afterwards, was also respected at La Présentation.

At the same time, in 1748, another fort of a similar type and of the same vocation was built by Chaussegros de Léry at St-Jean, defending the rapids on the Richelieu River (fig 31). This fort is better known than La Présentation since during the 1980's some of its vestiges were discovered by the archeologists of Parks Canada. Fig. 32 shows the location of the fort and the vestiges of it unearthed during excavations. When comparing both installations, one can easily note many similarities between them. They were both in a square plan of similar dimensions (St-Jean 30 toises, equivalent to 180 ft., La Présentation 150 ft.). Both had palisaded curtains reinforced by corner bastions. They were both located very close to the river with the main gate on the side of the river. Both were built on swampy ground and provided drainage for the ground and surface (rain) waters (fig. 28 and fig 31). Both had the similar function of support for the first line frontier installations. But neither of them was built to resist a massive assault by a regular army with artillery. In case of such an assault their role was limited, at the most, to delaying the advances of unfriendly field armies for a few days only.

The archeological discoveries confirmed written information about certain
particularities which may or may not have been used in La Présentation. One of St-Jean's particularities was the double-rowed palisade on the riverside. This information, dating from 1749, was partly confirmed by the discovery of a palisade trench 90 cm wide, evidently sufficient for the two rows of stakes but, unfortunately, no molds of these stakes were found.

When figs. 29 and 31 are compared, it can be seen that the St-Jean's bastions are bigger, having three levels instead of two as at La Présentation.

There is one difference between the two forts which is known from literature. While all four La Présentation bastions were also used as different kinds of dwellings (lodging, chapel, store rooms, etc.), only two of them at St-Jean combined such a twofold role. Two others were only palisades allowing the flanking fire along the curtains, leaving room for free-standing buildings used for practical purposes such as quarters, or storage rooms for food, weapons, or commercial goods used for the autochthon trade.
8. FORT LA PRÉSENTATION
DURING THE WAR OF 1756-1760

With the declaration of war on France by Great Britain on May 17, 1756, the period of latent hostilities in North America, generally disguised as frontier incidents without consequence, ended. The importance of regular, well-trained armed forces led by qualified officers increased considerably. The role of guerrilla action was reduced to scouting and harassment of settlers, forcing their departure from lands claimed by the adversary. This was a cruel war in which peaceful, innocent people were hurt or killed and their properties destroyed. It was fought with the help of autochthon allies, loosely controlled by the colonial authorities, always afraid that they might switch sides or simply stay home. For that reason their (autochthon) traditional forms of warfare had to be tolerated. Scalping, torture and murder of prisoners were common occurrences.

These raids, often accompanied by the Sulpician himself, were carried out by small bands of up to 75 warriors. They had a double goal: to bring back information about English military intentions and troop movements and to discourage and terrorize the local white population. They succeeded in those two endeavours. The English side, annoyed by this war of terror and knowing the name of the instigator of these actions, put a price on Picquet’s head. This act on the part of his enemies showed how effective his actions were.

Lalande, Abbé Picquet’s contemporary biographer, reported that when the autochthons brought the English officer who made such a proposal to him and asked
to be allowed to put this man to death, he refused their request and liberated the man. One cannot keep thinking that he was rather flattered by this incident. He should have been so for two reasons: it demonstrated the efficacy of his actions against the English and the effect of his work among the natives, which gained him their friendship and loyalty.\textsuperscript{104}

The valour of an autochthon warrior and the respect he commanded from his people was commensurate with the number of scalps he brought with him returning home. Sometimes this custom, disgusting in itself for Europeans, took macabre forms. After the victorious siege of Fort William-Henry in 1757, native allies of French discovered graves of English settlers and soldiers victims of smallpox, a disease brought to America by the white man. Looking for scalps, they excavated the corpses and created an epidemic against which they were helpless.\textsuperscript{105} Smallpox was a common occurrence in those days. The poor sanitary conditions of ordinary colonists, disastrous in the autochthon settlements, favoured the spread of epidemics. One such epidemic occurred in 1755 in La Présentation, forcing absent Abbé Picquet to come back and to use all his energy to fight it. The victims were mostly the elderly, women and children. The natives did not understand what was happening to them, were petrified by the fever and refused to treat their sick.\textsuperscript{106}

However, no matter how successful these autochthon guerrillas were in annoying their adversaries, it was not the way to win the war. As was mentioned above, the English Oswego settlement on Lake Ontario was harmful to the interest of
Nouvelle France and had to be destroyed. Abbé Picquet had drawn attention to this problem many times in the past, but metropolitan France as well as the colonial authorities were not very eager to provoke an all-out war with Great Britain which would without any doubt have resulted from such an action. It was a different matter to destroy some frontier military posts than to attack and destroy a major (and very profitable) enemy establishment. But in 1756, when the war was officially on, these objections did not matter any longer. The destruction of Oswego was approved by the Governor of Canada, Vaudreuil, and was to be carried out by General Montcalm, commanding the regular French army and colonial troops, supported by native auxiliaries. The assault was planned and executed in 1756 - called by many historians the "Year of Oswego".

It was obvious that an enterprise such as the conquest or the defence of Oswego would need a lot of preparation and the mobilization of considerable forces. Vaudreuil and William Shirley, Governor of Massachusetts, understood this. Both considered themselves the commanders-in-chief of their military forces. However, Vaudreuil had an advantage over his opponent for he did not have to deal with the public opinion of different colonies as his adversary did.

The best example of this may be given by the reaction to the decision of the Conference of New York, held December 12-13, 1755, called to plan the 1756 campaign against Nouvelle France. Governor Shirley estimated that he would need at least 16,000 men from all the colonies. Pennsylvania and Virginia simply refused to participate in such an enterprise and were willing to limit themselves to the defence of
their own territories. Only the promise by the British Parliament to compensate them partially for their expenses changed their position. 107

Both Vaudreuil and Shirley expected to be relieved of their military duties by professional soldiers sent to North America from the capitals: Frenchmen by General Montcalm, the British by General Earl John Campbell Loudon. However, both men, taking advantage of the time they had left, planned the campaign for 1756. Vaudreuil wanted to eliminate the English presence in the Lake Ontario area. Shirley's intention was the conquest of forts Rouillé (Toronto), Niagara, and Frontenac in order to eliminate French presence in the same territory. 108

Knowing that the main military encounters in 1756 would take place in the territories south of the Lakes region, each side tried to assure neutrality of autochthons living there. Vaudreuil asked Abbé Picquet to send emissaries, selected among the most trustworthy residents of La Présentation, to persuade their friends to remain neutral. Colonel Sir William Johnson travelled to Onondaga, the capital of the Iroquois Confederacy located on the Chouaguen River, south of Oswego (fig. 1), to win those natives to the British cause. 109 He obtained the results he was hoping for after lengthy consultations and war councils. He had a hard time doing so, for the French victory over Braddock at Monongahela in July 1755 was still fresh in the memory of all and as usual the autochthons were very reluctant to join the losing side.

Johnson's mission was rendered more difficult by the fact that Pennsylvania and New Jersey wanted to declare an open war against the Delaware and Chaouanons
nations; however, this was postponed for a while, in order to give him a chance to solve these local conflicts (attacks on the settlers) by peaceful means.  

As can be seen from fig. 1, Oswego had excellent communications with Albany (Orange) through the Chouaguen, Mohawk, and Hudson Rivers. The only short portage (between the Mohawk and Chouaguen) was protected by two forts, Fort Bull on its northern end and Fort Williams to the south. Shirley understood the importance and fragility of this line of communication and built along the Mohawk River a series of forts and fortified warehouses protecting it at all sensitive points, such as waterfalls, bends, etc. These installations were also designed to serve as support points for the future movement of Five Nations warriors towards Oswego, where Shirley wanted to use them in his planned assaults against Niagara and Frontenac.  

It was equally important for the English to keep this line open as it was for the French to cut it off in order to prevent the flow of supplies and men towards Oswego. In order to achieve this, Vaudreuil organized and sent from La Présentation a raiding party under the command of Lieutenant de Léry with the mission of destroying the English Forts Bull and Williams.  

Lieutenant de Léry was a Canadian-born officer. Montcalm, generally very critical of Canadian military men, classified him as "bon". He was a very tough outdoorsman, competent cartographer and excellent leader. All these qualities were necessary to carry out his mission successfully.
According to the information received by Vaudreuil from the autochthon scouts, a continuous flow of supplies was moving up to Oswego through the portage between Forts Bull and Williams. Based on this information, it was judged very urgent to mount an expedition and to cut off this line of supply. Every day of its operation increased the power of Oswego, reputed to be a well-built, well-supplied and well-manned and commanded place.

Léry's expedition, composed of 15 officers, 83 soldiers, 166 Canadians and 103 natives, departed from La Présentation on March 7, 1756. The road they had to travel before reaching Fort Bull passed through uncharted land. They were forced to rely on local guides.

From Léry's journal, which included a topographical sketch (fig. 18) of his march, we know the road he and his companions took. Progress was very difficult. Men moved on foot carrying or pulling behind them all their supplies on some sort of toboggans. The expedition moved ahead completely undetected, one of the conditions of its success. Only six Onoyouts encountered accidentally in the forest provided some information which could be useful for the attack.

On March 25, the mass was celebrated in the open. The name of the celebrant is not known. No name of a priest is listed on the roll of Léry's detachment. However, it is possible that Abbé Piquet joined the expedition during its passage through La Présentation.

On March 26, the expedition camped along the trail of the portage without any fires, in the open and under heavy snowfall. That night was one more proof of the
endurance of both whites and natives. They suffered terribly but survived.

On March 27, a column of heavily loaded wagons was observed and attacked by autochthons in their masterly way. The surprise was complete. All the wagon drivers and soldiers of the escort were taken prisoners. According to them, Fort Williams was much stronger than Fort Bull, as it was armed with four guns and garrisoned by 150 men; 100 more were staying in the fortified camp on an island on the Mohawk River down the stream from the fort.

Fort Bull, according to the prisoners, was in reality a military fortified warehouse, guarded by fifty soldiers commanded by a captain. It was a more tempting object to subdue than the other stronger fort, since it was - according to the prisoners - full of supplies, munitions, food, clothes, all the things Léry's detachment needed very badly. So it was decided to attack it at first light in the morning.

The attackers were spotted only at a very short distance from the fort. The English commander of the fort answered Léry's summons to surrender by a musket shot. Finally, the attackers reached the palisades and through the embrasures started to fire inside the fort. When the main gate was forced, they penetrated to the interior. Seeing this, the fort commander ordered his men to surrender, but it was too late for that. All the garrison, with the exception of three men hidden and discovered after the battle, were killed. However, before dying someone set fire to a building next to the powder magazine. The resulting explosion destroyed all the merchandise in the warehouse, including food and munitions. The explosion also alarmed the Fort Williams garrison and the effect of surprise was lost. Since Léry did not think his
party to be strong enough to attack a well fortified and garrisoned place, he ordered a retreat in the direction of Niaouré Bay on the southern shore of Lake Ontario where they embarked on the waiting boats, and were brought back home to Frontenac and La Présentation (fig. 18).

Léry's party, even if it failed to conquer Fort Williams, achieved important results. It destroyed a supply depot serving Oswego and delayed an expected English offensive against the Niagara and Frontenac Forts, giving the French more time to prepare their own assault against Oswego.

In the meantime, the long expected reinforcements from France finally arrived. They were commanded by Captain Rigaud, brother of the governor. This was a very welcome event.\(^{114}\)

In order to keep an eye on the actions of the English, Vaudreuil sent a detachment under Captain Louis Coulon de Villiers with orders to establish an observation post at Niaouré Bay.\(^{115}\) While there, this detachment surprised an English flotilla consisting of one corvette and eight small boats sailing along the lakeshore near the Île au Galop. The French opened fire on it and when some of boats tried to save themselves by running away, they were pursued by native canoes. One of the boats was carrying supplies and its crew were taken prisoner. Others reached the protection of the corvette's guns. It is quite possible that Abbé Picquet took part in this battle since the autochthons of La Présentation were part of Villier's detachment and manned the canoes. Directly after this incident, he and "his" natives returned home to the mission.
Abbé Picquet, after his return to La Présentation, did not remain inactive. He organized and led autochthon raiding parties to pressure English settlers to abandon their properties and to retreat to safer ground behind the defence lines of Pennsylvania and Massachusetts (fig. 19). La Présentation became a major base supporting this guerrilla war. It served as the supply depot, hospital and transfer point of prisoners taken by the warriors. In order to decrease the horrors of this war, Picquet took care of small white children and the elderly persons whom the autochthons did not put to death, offering them to him as "gifts" instead. In other words, in spite of his ferocious reputation among the English adversaries, he did what he could to reduce the atrocities of war, which inevitably touched most those who were not combatants, the very young and the very old.

Shortly after the naval battle of Île au Galop, Abbé Picquet accompanied by twenty autochthons and two English prisoners, went to Montreal to discuss the situation with the authorities of Nouvelle France (Vaudreuil had moved his residence from Quebec City to Montreal in order to be closer to the "battle front"). He found Montreal changed, looking more like an armed camp that a civilian city. It was full of military personnel training, helping to build and repair city fortifications, or simply passing through on their way to the frontier where they were needed.

After a short visit, Picquet returned to La Présentation. Since he was so busy with matters of war, he relied on his two assistants, Messieurs Magon de Terlaye and Delagard - both Sulpicians - for the religious duties.  

Having departed from Brest, France on April 3, 1756, the long expected
commander of the army, the Marquis de Montcalm, finally arrived in Canada, bringing with him Brigadier Chevalier de Lévis, Colonel de Bourlamaque, Captain de Bougainville and two military engineers, Desandrouins and Combles.

The situation Montcalm faced was not very satisfactory from the military point of view. He was surprised and annoyed by Vaudreuil's initiatives, not really by what he had done, but because those actions were taken without consulting him. From the beginning this put his relationship with the governor on the wrong foot. However, recognizing the basic correctness of Vaudreuil's decisions, he did not revoke any one of them. These war preparations can be described as follows: (i) speeding up the construction of Fort Carillon, located at the southern end of Lake Champlain; (ii) establishment of the military camp at Niaouré Bay, Lake Ontario, in the vicinity of Oswego; (iii) establishment of observation posts on the Mohawk River to intercept all outgoing or incoming communications to Oswego; (iv) the issue of invitations to the Chiefs of the Five Nations to Montreal in order to keep them there as warrants of the neutrality of their nations. (See fig. 1 for these locations).

In 1755 the morale of the colony was low because of the French defeat at the southern border of the Champlain area, where General Dieskau was wounded and taken prisoner in the battle of Fort George (William Henry). Also, the supply situation of Nouvelle France was difficult. Warehouses were empty and the food shortage acute. The affairs of the colony were mismanaged, commercial activities at a standstill. According to A. Doreil - the colony commissary for the co-ordination of war affairs - the population was very dissatisfied by the conditions imposed on them.
by the war. The army was also in very bad shape and in need of supplies, weaponry, munitions and clothing. Governor Vaudreuil and the intendant of the colony, Bigot, were worried. It was the general belief that the attack against Oswego had to be postponed until the next year. Many French officers did not think that such an important operation could be made "à la Canadienne", i.e. without good planning and adequate supplies.

The only document about this strategic plan which has survived is a letter from Picquet, dated July 1756, addressed to Colonel Bourlamaque, explaining the main lines of the proposal obtained from Montcalm himself. They were as follows: to simulate the preparation of an attack against Lake George; the movement of troops in the direction of Oswego and the siege of the fortress. This was a difficult operation, requiring speed, discipline, secrecy and decision - all the trademarks of Montcalm's character and generalship. In the same letter, Picquet estimated the Oswego garrison as 900 to 1,000 men.

This direct exchange of letters between Abbé Picquet and leading military men of the colony clearly indicated how high the prestige was of the missionary among the upper strata of Canada's government.

Montcalm's plan insisted on the effect of surprise and for that reason he tried to convince Vaudreuil that it was necessary to execute it in 1756 instead of waiting until the next year as the hesitating governor wanted to do.

In the meantime, the preparations for the Oswego campaign progressed. Fort
Frontenac, planned to be the main supply base for the attacking forces and an eventual fall-back point in case of defeat, needed to be prepared to fulfill its role. Its fortifications, weak and neglected, were repaired and reinforced by the military engineer Desandrouins, brought from France by Montcalm.\(^{122}\) His task was hampered by lack of construction tools, materials and qualified workers. No wonder that progress was very slow. Frontenac did not have an artillery park (a facility to store, maintain and repair artillery pieces). Food was scarce and of bad quality (bread and salted meat). The problem of sufficient means of transportation between Frontenac and the approaches to Oswego had to be solved. In other words, the necessary preparations needed more time than expected.

Aside from running the continuous and effective native raids campaign and the operation of his mission, Picquet found the time to write to Montcalm and Vaudreuil suggesting a plan of assault on Oswego which would, in his opinion, save the lives of the attackers. He based his opinions on the observations he had made five years earlier during a trip around the lake.\(^{123}\) However, he most probably was ignorant that the land elevations dominating Oswego, on which he suggested in 1751 the installation of gun batteries, were presently fortified by the English. In writing, he expressed his opinion about the moral of the Oswego garrison. He believed it to be very low.\(^{124}\)

In spite of all the difficulties, the conditions for a successful surprise assault on Oswego were achieved. It was isolated from its main base in Albany. The native population was not very eager to help the English and the battle of Île au Galop
indicated to the French that the English naval domination of Lake Ontario might be victoriously challenged. The concentration of French forces at Frontenac was also completed with the arrival of one battalion of La Sarre under the command of Colonel de Boulamaque on July 1st.125

Considering there were enough supplies available at Frontenac (food and ammunition), Montcalm decided to implement his plan for the campaign. On June 27, 1756, he left Montreal for Fort Carillon on the Richelieu-Champlain border. He was accompanied by Brigadier Chevalier de Lévis and one battalion of the Royal Roussillon regiment newly arrived from France. This move was made to give the impression that he intended to attack in the southern direction leading directly to the heart of the New England colonies.

After a few weeks spent there, he quietly returned to Montreal leaving Chevalier de Lévis in command. After a short stay in Montreal, accompanied by his Aide-de-camp Captitain de Bougainville, he left for the Lake region. Passing through La Présentation, he conferred with Abbé Picquet and encouraged "his" natives to join him and his expedition. He arrived at Frontenac on July 29, 1756.126

The last preparations completed, Montcalm had under his command 2,700 men, including 1,500 regular French soldiers. The rest of the contingent consisted of autochthons and Canadian militia. To assure the transport of men and of the required supplies, the French had a flotilla of 150 boats.127 Aside from the above forces, Montcalm also had a troop of 600 commanded by Chevalier de Rigaud who relieved Louis Coulon de Villiers, stationed at the camp near Niaouré Bay.128
Oswego was composed of three separate forts (fig. 20), about 500 yards distant from each other. The most eastern of them, Fort Ontario, was located on the right bank of the Chouaguen River, on a large platform overlooking the estuary and the central fort called Old Oswego. It was constructed in a star-shaped plan and protected by a palisaded curtain walls, excellent protection against muskets and swivel gun fire, but completely ineffective against heavy guns.

The central Old Oswego fort (Fort Pepperell) was designed to repel an attack coming from the west. It was fortified with earthworks and armed with cannons. But it was completely defenceless from the east, for it was supposed to be protected from that direction by Fort Ontario. When at the beginning of the siege Fort Ontario was abandoned, the defenders of Old Oswego improvised protection against enemy fire by installing ramparts made of pork barrels, three deep and three high.

Further to the east was Fort New Oswego, a useless, unfinished palisaded work serving in peacetime as a cattle pen. This defensive complex was garrisoned by over 1,000 men, weakened by disease and disheartened. Aside from some regular soldiers, they were raw recruits, sailors, boatmen and labourers.

They were under constant pressure for more than a month from the French detachment at Niaouré Bay and from autochthon raids. Their own scouting around the fort was next to non-existent and they were completely unaware of the French presence until they discovered them installed and ready to attack in a small cove one and a half miles east of Oswego. Learning this, and completely cut off from his bases in Albany, the fort commander, Lieutenant Colonel James Mercer, realized that the
assault on his fort was imminent. Knowing the weakness of Fort Ontario and fearing not only the loss of this position but also the loss of its garrison, he ordered its evacuation, a manoeuvre executed at night under the noses of the French, who did not detect it. Soon after, seeing what had happened, they installed heavy gun batteries on the abandoned site ready to open fire on Old Oswego.\textsuperscript{131}

At the same time Rigaud crossed the Chouaguen River with 500 men and positioned himself around Fort New Oswego. Immediately, Colonel Mercer started to organize a counter attack on these new French positions. Unfortunately, he was killed by gunfire before he could achieve this task. His sudden death further undermined the confidence of the garrison. Mercer's second-in-command, Lieutenant Colonel Littlehales, judging the situation as hopeless, surrendered the fortress a few hours after the commander's death. The real siege of this important English installation lasted no more that three days. The French forces took 1,600 prisoners. They were all well treated as prisoners of war and protected from being massacred by the natives.\textsuperscript{132}

The quantities of the captured material are difficult to estimate for different authors gave different numbers. Parkman estimated them as follows: above one hundred pieces of artillery - mostly swivels and light guns - large quantities of powder, bullets and shells.\textsuperscript{133} Frégault adds to the list of spoils large quantities of food and other provisions.\textsuperscript{134} Chagny mentions also five flags, seven warships, two hundred barges and small arms.\textsuperscript{135} In contrast with these huge war spoils, losses in human life were astonishingly low. The English lost 152 wounded and dead, the French only 32
of the same. With the fall of Oswego an important battle was won, but not the war.

As observed before, English intelligence was inefficient, leaving the commander in the dark about the whereabouts and intentions of the enemy. But the same must be said about French information gathering. How otherwise can one explain the last minute hesitation and wondering of Montcalm which he had about the feasibility of the action against Oswego. Only thanks to the urging of his staff did he decide to take with him his powerful artillery, without which he most probably would not have been able to win. Originally he planned to leave it behind, with the exception of a few field guns, fearing its loss in case of an unsuccessful siege of the British fortress.

Once in the field, Montcalm proved himself to be a very competent commander. He made sure that no help from Albany or from anywhere else could reach the besieged. He did not use natives there where they would be exposed to artillery fire, which they were not used to. Instead, at their own demand, he asked them to scout for him and to make sure that not even a single messenger would come to, or get out of the fortress.

Since the French did not have any intention of permanently occupying the site and operating by themselves, they departed taking everything they needed and burned the rest, including buildings and ships. Abbé Picquet who was part of the expedition, blessed a cross erected on the ruins of Fort Ontario site before leaving.

The victory at Oswego marked the end of English domination of Lake
Ontario. This happened most probably to the great dissatisfaction of the autochthons who lost in Oswego a very good business partner and a center of supply of the goods they needed. The French were not able to satisfy their needs either in Niagara or in Frontenac, for both had rather a military than commercial character.

In the meantime, on the southern front in the Richelieu-Champlain Valley a new danger arose, indicating the offensive intentions of the British colonies towards Canada: the construction of Fort William Henry (Fort George) at the southern end of Lake George. This fort (fig. 21) was conceived as a base for an eventual attack on the St. Lawrence Valley from the south, one of the operations included in the master plan devised with the final goal of the elimination of Canada.

The fort was provided with naval construction facilities, an arsenal, warehouses for munitions, food and all the other supplies which a field army may need. It was defended by strong ramparts, armed with several artillery pieces and garrisoned with 2,400 men commanded by Colonel Monro.141

Fort William Henry presented a direct threat to the French Fort Carillon defending access to Lake Champlain and had to be eliminated.

An army of 8,000 men provided with artillery and ample supplies of ammunition and food, sufficient for a 6 month long campaign, left Montreal at the beginning of July 1757 in the direction of Lake George. The importance attached to this expedition by Canada may be judged by the fact that both leading French commanders of that era, Montcalm and Lévis, were at its head. The composition of the expeditionary force was rather unusual for the North American continent, since it
included - aside from the strong regular French army and militia units - 1,800 native warriors. Such a large number of them worried Abbé Picquet, who was invited by Governor Vaudreuil to accompany the army, most probably to help control those native allies.  

Picquet was worried for good reason. All the autochthon nations allied with France were invited to participate in this campaign and sent their braves to take part in it. The invitation was also issued to La Présentation but only three of its residents showed up. Picquet believed that the natives should be allowed to accompany any army only in relatively small numbers and only under the guidance of white officers (both French and Canadian), for scouting duties and ambushes.

His worries were intensified when he learned that most of natives were not Christians, whom he believed to be more civilized. The reality was even worse than he had foreseen in his worst suspicions. According to the chronicler accompanying the army, Picquet witnessed scenes of cannibalism and useless killings. The natives found a way to obtain some rum and often when drunk became uncontrollable.

The worst happened when Colonel Monro, losing hope of help coming from Fort Edward (Lydius) on the Rivière de Fer (fig. 1), surrendered the fort on August 9th and was granted free passage for all military and civilian personnel. These conditions were submitted to the autochthon elders and approved by them. However, when the march toward Lydius started, the English columns were attacked by a number of drunken natives. They had found rum in the abandoned military backpacks, went out of control and massacred many of the marchers, especially the
women, children and elderly.\textsuperscript{143} This incident shocked both the French and the English, and is remembered in history as the Fort William Henry massacre. Abbé Picquet was disgusted and mortified by this incident.

In July 1758, an attempt was made by the English to break through the southern Canadian defences along the Lake Champlain-Richelieu River Valley. It was protected by Fort Carillon situated at the southern end of the lake (fig. 22) which was supported by Fort Frédéric at Crown Point on the lakeshore and by forts St-Jean and Chambly on the rapids of the Richelieu River (fig. 24). The British Commander, Major General James Abercromby, commanding a corps of 7,000 English and Colonial troops was opposed by 3,500 French and Canadian forces commanded by General Montcalm.\textsuperscript{144}

According to Frégault, author of "Histoire de Nouvelle France" (ref. 14), the Battle of Carillon was a battle between two mediocre generals. Maybe so, but Montcalm was the lucky one. He took the position south of the fort on a small elevated platform, easy to defend against the frontal attack but at the same time very easy to outflank. Abercromby chose a frontal attack and suffered heavy losses in killed and wounded, estimated at 500 and over 1,100 respectively. French losses were much lighter and are estimated at 100 and 266 respectively.

The Battle of Carillon may be considered as one of the bloodiest encounters between French and English forces ever fought on the North American continent. It was the last important French victory over the British. But since then, the French military power started to weaken, while that of English America increased. The
British navy dominated the Atlantic and made the arrival of further help from France very problematic.

The Seven Years War was not going very well for France and in spite of several urgent requests for help, Canada was left alone. The emissaries sent by Vaudreuil to the metropolis returned empty-handed. The resulting weakness of the strategic and political positions of the colony was growing. Corruption became a way of life of the upper echelons of the administration and the dominant oligarchy. They were milking both the colonial treasury and private businesses for their own profits. The autochthons, cheated by the local commanders of the small military post and dishonest fur traders, were less and less friendly towards France. Vaudreuil saw it but was too weak to prevent it. His personal honesty was beyond doubt, but he was one of a few exceptions.

This situation was dramatically worsened by a very poor harvest in 1757. Canada always had problems with food production and relied heavily on supplies from the mother country. When this help was stopped by the British naval blockade and domestic production failed, the situation became tragic. There was not enough food either for the population or for the army which was forced, because of that, to reduce its effectives, already too small for defence of French possessions.

Victories at Oswego (1756), Fort William-Henry (1757) and Fort Carillon (1758) did not change the situation. The three-pronged assaults, foreseen already years ago became a reality. All that Nouvelle France could do as a counter measure was the guerrilla activity by small raiding parties composed of Canadians and natives.
But this was not enough because it could not damage the power base of British colonies. It was no longer a question of pushing back unwanted settlers and forcing them to return to where they came from. Now, when the total elimination of French possession from the American continent was decided upon, it became the problem of fighting off the regular army led by professional officers, and provided with unlimited supplies. This type of warfare could be opposed only by another well trained regular army.

In a few years the situation changed drastically. In his attack on Fort Duquesne, General Braddock relied on the regular army and lost the battle of Monongahela (1755), when attacked by French forces comprised of irregular Canadian militia and the autochthons, both familiar with guerrilla and forest battle tactics. Such forces could be used in 1757, and later on, only for scouting and to create a protective shield for the regular army, while it prepared itself for either assault or defence. In spite of all the miseries and privations, the French army of Canada maintained its battleworthiness. They were disciplined and their morale was high. It was obvious that they still did not lose faith in the arrival of substantial help from Europe and in a final victory.

English determination to finish, once and for all, with the "French menace" was growing for they were sure of the support coming from the old country. The new Prime Minister, William Pitt, who took power in 1758 (it was his second term in office), understood that the North American possessions are the cornerstone of British worldwide power. He realized that sending money to the colonies, to allow
them to raise more local militias, was not sufficient. What was really needed there was a professional regular army led by professional officers. Such an army would have the qualities the militia men did not: endurance and above all, discipline.

In order to enhance the combative spirit of the New Englanders, mostly of Puritan stock, Pitt maintained that the war in North America is a war against the "papists", introducing a religious war element to this struggle.\textsuperscript{146}

The English colonies prepared themselves very seriously for the upcoming battle not underestimating their adversaries. They knew from their unpleasant experiences of the past, that they were facing a very tough opponent. The original master plan of the three-pronged attack on the center of French possessions, the St. Lawrence Valley, was maintained. The forces at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in America, James Abercromby, who replaced in 1758 General Earl Loudon, were considerable. The first to be attacked were the border forts with the following forces: (i) Louisbourg (Isle Royal) - was to be attacked by the navy bringing with it an army of 16,000 men; (ii) Carillon (on Lake Champlain) - to be subdued by a corps of 10,000 men of the militia levied by New York, New Jersey and the New England states; (iii) Fort Duquesne (Ohio Valley) - to be conquered by a mixed corps of 5,000 Virginians assisted by 2,000 regular soldiers.\textsuperscript{147}

All that French Canada could muster against such power was 10,000 men including 4,000 regular French troops.\textsuperscript{148} It was obvious to everyone that with such small forces, especially in the face of the progressive desertion by the militia men and
by the autochthons, the defence of such a long perimeter passing through Louisbourg, Carillon, Duquesne and Detroit could not be successful. A new plan had to be devised. The main task of this new defensive strategy was the defence of Québec City and of the St. Lawrence Valley which, it was believed, could be achieved only with the help of the reinforcements coming from the home country.  

Therefore all available forces other than the garrisons of the frontier forts started to be concentrated there. Even Fort Île aux Noix (fig. 1) had to be abandoned after carrying on only a delaying battle.  

When the English assault began in 1758, the advanced posts started to fall or were evacuated. Louisbourg was the first to go after a 7-week siege on July 26, 1758; Frontenac was the second one on August 27 of the same year; Fort Duquesne, left without supplies, was evacuated without battle in winter on December 14, 1758. Its garrison consisting of 200 soldiers and militia men supported by 150 autochthons retreated to Fort Machault, where they spent the winter (fig. 1). They took with them all their artillery, munitions and their sick.  

Retreat on the southern front (Richelieu Valley) started by Colonel Bourlamaque's forces on July 26, 1759, with the abandonment of Carillon and of St. Frédéric on July 31. These retreating forces reached Île aux Noix later in the year, where strong fortifications had been prepared since May 1759. After the loss of Carillon, Île aux Noix became the main position defending access to the St. Lawrence Valley from the southern direction.  

The loss of Niagara in July 1759 isolated western Canadian forts from the
valley of the St. Lawrence. The forces grouped in Fort Detroit tried to organize help in order to reconquer this important position but they were beaten off. They retreated to their point of departure, taking with them the garrisons and burning all French forts they encountered in their retreat, i.e. Forts Machault, Rivière aux Bouefs and Illinois. In this way all of the valley of the Upper Ohio was lost.\footnote{151}

In September of 1759 the city of Quebec had surrendered to the army of General Wolfe, after the battle of the Plains of Abraham. In this battle, both Wolfe and Montcalm lost their lives.

The new French military commander, Lieutenant General Chevalier de Lévis, was in a desperate situation. The defensive system in the east was lost. The British army in the east was separated from Montreal by only a few hundred miles and controlled the St. Lawrence River, an excellent communication route, able to handle sea-going ships coming from England.

In the South the French commander, Colonel Boulamaque, wrote in his report that with his force of 3,000 men he could not defend effectively its position at Île aux Noix against the assaults of English forces. All he could do was only to delay their progress.

In the West, after the loss of Forts Frontenac and Niagara, the only obstacle to the British advance towards Montreal were the St. Lawrence rapids.

Fort La Présentation was not designed to resist an assault by regular forces. Since he knew this, Picquet found it advisable to move the autochthon villages situated on the promontory around the fort to Grand Isle (later called Isle Picquet)
situated in the middle of the St. Lawrence, a few miles from the mouth of the Oswegatchie River (fig. 1, insert).

The weakness of La Présentation was already signalled by Adjutant Malartic, a French officer, in a letter written on September 8, 1755, to Count d'Argenson, Minister of War. He gave a short description of the site and said that the fort "...is good against natives, but would be quite untenable against Regulars".

General Lévis visited the rapids and, agreeing with that opinion, ordered the construction of a new fort on the small island located in the middle of the St. Lawrence, 6 miles down the river from Oswegatchie, presently called "Chimney Island" (fig. 1 insert). The work started on August 30, 1759, under the direction of a military engineer, Jean-Nicolas Desandrouins, one of the French officers who came to Canada with Montcalm. By order of Vaudreuil the fort was called Fort Lévis, in recognition of General Lévis' excellent services to the colony. It was constructed in part from the material taken from the dismantled Fort La Présentation and armed with 12 guns Lévis brought from the ruins of Fort Frontenac destroyed and abandoned by the English.

Lévis did not believe that the new fort could stop the English advance. He even feared that the new fort could be bypassed by them. This would render it completely useless, for its main role was to delay the arrival in Montreal of Amherst's forces at the same time as the forces of General Haviland, progressing along the Richelieu Valley, and of those of General Murray, who took command of the assault.
from the east after the death of General Wolfe. If they were all arriving at different times, it would permit the French forces gathered around Montreal to deal with each one of them separately.\footnote{156}

On March 17, 1760, Captain Pierre Pouchot, former commander of Fort Niagara, replaced Desandrouins as officer in charge of Fort Lévis. He was assisted by Abbé Picquet, helping him to control the autochthons of La Présentation, who showed less and less willingness to support the French cause.

On his departure from Montreal Pouchot was promised a force of 1,200 men for his new command. He was most sceptical about it.\footnote{157} At the moment of the assault he commanded only 300 men, a mixture of militia and sailors manning four corvettes supporting the fort.\footnote{158}

Immediately after his arrival Pouchot, an engineer as was the man he replaced, continued the construction of the fort. His guns were directed up the river and protected by a solid rampart made of tree trunks and earth dredged from the river bed. The trees were dropped into the water in front of the ramparts in order to prevent barges carrying attacking soldiers from approaching the island.\footnote{159} Fig. 23 shows the plan of the fort as well as its location in the middle of the river.

On July 16 Pouchot received from Montreal a transport of food for the garrison, but not in the quantity he expected. Because of that he was forced to make a very hard decision to send sixty autochthon children, women and old people back to Montreal. There simply was not enough food available to feed them.
Abbé Picquet, knowing the situation in Montreal and the difficulties these helpless people could suffer there, left with them, hoping to help them to be accepted at another Sulpician mission he knew well - the Mission of Deux Montagnes (Oka). He never saw his beloved mission of La Présentation again. He left it for he was faithful to his missionary vocation and believed that he had to take care of his people to the very end.  

In the meantime, the English assault proceeded according to Amherst's timetable. The French lost initiative and could only react. On August 10, his army moved its camp at Oswego and twelve days later started the bombardment of Fort Lévis on August 23. Three days later Captain Pouchot raised the white flag and surrendered his command for the second time (the first was at Niagara over a year ago). The English and autochthon auxiliaries wanted to organize their usual massacre of prisoners but were prevented from doing so by Colonel William Johnson, an old adversary of Abbé Picquet. Feeling cheated, three-fourths of them took offence and went home.  

In the South the situation was also critical. Colonel Bougainville, commander of the Fort Île aux Noix, had under his orders slightly over 1,000 men, but little ammunition, could not practically shoot back. To make the situation even worse, the fort did not give much protection to his men against the artillery, since there were no shelters which could resist the heavy cannon fire.  

General Haviland, the English commander, reached the fort on August 14,
counting on the French to withdraw. However, Bougainville resisted for a week, in spite of the lack of supplies and the poor quality of the militia he had under his command, then he retreated to St-Jean and later, after burning the fort, to Montreal.  

The goal which the British Prime Minister, Pitt, and his Commander-in-Chief General Amherst, established for themselves was achieved. All three British field armies were at the same time concentrated around Montreal, the last great center of French Canada. Governor Vaudreuil did not see any point in resisting any longer and, under the protest of General Chevalier de Lévis, surrendered the city and Canada on September 10, 1760, to the British general, commander of 20,000 men. 

The surrender was complete and included all the French posts in the west. Vaudreuil issued orders to that effect on September 13, and these were carried to their destination by British officers.

After the surrender, the natives, faithful to their own customs, started their usual post-battle activities. Many acts of violence against the population were committed on the Island of Montreal and elsewhere. Some of the houses in Montreal were plundered before the new military commander could establish order.

As an ultimate protest against Amherst's refusal to grant the French garrison "war honours", General Lévis went to St. Helen's Island where he ceremoniously burned all the French army standards.

The army personnel was evacuated by the British fleet to their home country.
by September 13, 1760. Their number is estimated as being about 1,700 officers and men. A certain number of others preferred to stay in America for personal reasons. 167

Abbé Picquet was present in Montreal during the last tragic days of Nouvelle France. He was charged by Vaudreuil with the negotiations with the autochthons to keep them from deserting the French cause, but to no avail. However, faithful to his vow to never swear fidelity to the King of England, he decided to leave the colony, to the great regret of the English who hated him as an adversary, but at the same time respected his ability to deal with the natives. General Amherst, enquiring about his whereabouts, expressed the opinion that he was sure that Abbé Picquet could be convinced to render great services to the British crown. Picquet thought otherwise. 168

On September 8th, he left Montreal and Canada forever and started his retreat to Louisiana. Before his departure, he made sure that the people from his mission of La Présentation, who had come with him to Montreal were admitted to the mission of Deux Montagnes, and obtained permission for his departure from his ecclesiastical authorities. 169

Therefore, any accusations of desertion of his duties would be untruthful and damaging to his reputation. The autochthons themselves did not consider his departure a treason. They were very well aware of the new situation which resulted from the conquest, and were determined to make the best of it. Possibly they
themselves considered that Abbé Picquet had outlived his usefulness to their cause and that it would be good to deal in future with somebody else.

They provided him with an escort usually composed of two parts. One was used as bodyguard, the other, preceding him, advised the villages lying ahead about his arrival. At the borders of the territories belonging to other nations, they transferred him to the protection of their neighbours. These relays lasted until he reached the French controlled territory of Louisiana. During this voyage he was received everywhere with great respect and obtained all the help he needed.\textsuperscript{170}

The above shows that while Picquet could not gain autochthons' loyalty "à tout épreuve" to the King of France, he most certainly won deep respect and friendship for himself personally. The road which he and his party took is unclear. However, from what is known it may be deduced that he avoided the Upper Ohio Valley, dominated by the British. He possibly preferred to follow the route north of Lake Ontario, then through Lakes Huron and Michigan to the Mississippi River which took him to his destination. Along his route, he encountered several French posts which were not yet aware of what had happened in Montreal on September 10th. One of them, the Michillimackinac, situated in the strait between Lakes Huron and Michigan (fig. 1), was ordered by its commander to evacuate immediately for Louisiana.\textsuperscript{171}

It is not known where Abbé Picquet and his party spent the winter of 1760/61. We know that early in the spring of 1761 he started his descent on the Mississippi and arrived at his destination in July 1761. He spent 18 months there and
by the end of April 1763 he left for France, where he lived until his death in 1781 in
Verjon, at the age of 73. He was buried there.
9. CONCLUSION

In this thesis we have discussed the events of 1748-1760, the last years of the existence of Nouvelle France. They were the years of struggle for survival. Two political entities confronted each other in this battle, an integral part of the worldwide fight between the mother countries, Great Britain and France.

Their possessions on the North American continent were of unequal strength. Great Britain's colonies, modest in land surface but strong in population, estimated at over one million, opposed French-claimed lands populated by only fifty-five thousand French people, pretending to control all the territories between the Rockies in the West and the Appalachian Mountains in the East. Through these vast territories ran, along the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers, an overland communication route between the two parts of Nouvelle France - Louisiana and Canada. This immense land was coveted by the English, crowded along the seashore and in need of space for expansion.

Most of Canada's small population was grouped along the St. Lawrence Valley between Quebec City and Lake Ontario, an area with a harsh climate and a short growing season, hampering food production. The English enjoyed a much more moderate climate. They were also assured of unlimited access across the ocean, protected by the powerful Royal Navy, to their mother country. Canada, on the other hand, could be easily isolated from France and in its last years was.

The attitudes of the respective governments located in Europe were also
different. England, in her struggle with France, considered events in North America as an integral and important part of its fight with its French competitor for world domination. The French government considered Canada as a "side show" of the main battle fought in Europe. The French believed that their victory on the Old Continent will also mean victory in North America.

Due to the weakness resulting from the above-mentioned conditions, Nouvelle France was constantly on the defensive. Its actions were dictated by what the English did or by what it anticipated they would do. The French heavily fortified all three possible invasion routes to the heart of the colony, locating the defence points as far away from the St. Lawrence Valley as they could. They were counting on them either to delay the advances of the enemy's field armies, long enough for their own forces to concentrate, then, taking advantage of the possibly momentary numerical superiority, to defeat each one separately, while the other ones were still too far away to be of any help. Nouvelle France never planned any offensive action into the heart of enemy's territory leading to the destruction or at least to the serious weakening of their offensive capacity. The victories of Monongahela (1755), Oswego (1756), Fort George (William-Henry) (1757) and Carillon (1758), all discussed in this thesis, were of secondary importance for they in no way undermined the power core of the English colonies. The reasons for such a passive attitude could be twofold: the weakness of the human resources of Nouvelle France and the general attitude of the French metropolitan government considering such actions unnecessary due to the small (in their view) importance to the Canadian "front".
We believe that France never intended the complete elimination of English possessions from the North American continent. All France wanted to achieve was some equilibrium of forces warranting the security of the colony. This goal, in our opinion, was in the domain of possibility at the beginning of the 1748 conflict. It must be remembered that the governor of Canada could muster, in spite of the weakness of the colony's human resources, a considerable force composed of French regulars helped by local militia and autochthon warriors without seeking the approval of the population. Such a force could be commanded by qualified French officers, either sent from France or Canadian-born and trained by them. It seems to us that such a force, even numerically small, could be more than a match for any militia force raised by one or more of British colonies, with others often looking the other way. Only after 1758, when the new Prime Minister of Great Britain, William Pitt, imposed unity of action on all of them, did such French offensive actions become out of the question.

English intentions towards the French colonies were different. After the battle of Monongahela, when Braddock's papers were found, it was known that England was planning the total elimination of Nouvelle France. The concept of a three-pronged synchronized attack was revealed and, when it began to be implemented in 1759, the following events ended in the conquest of Nouvelle France. The loss of Louisbourg in 1758 was a defeat of the utmost strategic importance. The loss of Quebec City in 1759 left Canada's eastern approaches wide open. It was definitively isolated from France and no help in any form could reach it. The united
English colonies, supported by important regular military contingents from Europe commanded by professional experienced generals, attacked and won.

During the period discussed, Nouvelle France did what all weak countries always did, and still do: it fought back with guerrilla war, even when both mother countries were at peace in Europe. In this kind of war, Abbé Picquet and his autochthon friends were very useful, especially when the encroachments on French-claimed territories had to be checked. In this period, the French policy of friendly persuasion towards the natives, practised by Picquet, paid off. The harassment raids against commercial establishments and farms forced the English to take measures which diverted their resources from the main goal of the war, the elimination of Nouvelle France. In order to protect the English borders they built a line of small forts and blockhouses each manned by a garrison of twenty to thirty men. These fortified posts extended along the English territories’ border from New York to Virginia (fig. 19).

Canada being protected by natural "fortifications", such as forests, impenetrable for regular armies could concentrate on the defence of three possible invasion routes discussed in this thesis. However, due to the financial restrictions imposed by the French government, the lack of a qualified labour force and the dishonest administration, it could not do it well.

The French forts, protected by palisades or ramparts, had one great weakness - they could not protect either the garrison or any vital installation such as powder and supplies magazines from the enemy's artillery fire. They were designed and built to
resist enemies armed with muskets and light swivel guns, who would have to conquer them with a direct assault, as was the case of English Fort Bull taken by the Léry expedition in 1756. Not one of the French defence establishments, large or small, had artillery-resistant casemates able to protect men and stores. No wonder that Fort La Présentation was abandoned in 1759 and replaced by the much more powerful (but still without casemates) Fort Lévis situated on a small island in the middle of the river. However, even this fort had to surrender after only three days' siege, for it was very vulnerable to the fire of British guns positioned on both banks of the river. This is the reason why the fort failed in its task of slowing down the progress of General Amherst's corps in their march to Montreal.

In general, fortified religious missions did not contribute very much to the defence of Canada. They were not situated at strategically important points, but where they were needed for their religious vocation.

The La Présentation mission was an exception to this rule for it was established for the political purpose of implementation of French colonial policy towards the native populations. Its military role did not lie in the capacity to resist a siege, but as an intelligence-gathering point and as the base of guerilla war. Its religious activity was used as the cover-up for its real main vocation. In both of these roles the fort was very successful and served at the same time the native community and the colony.

In the final analysis of the last struggle of Nouvelle France, one has to reach the conclusion that the French defence establishment failed to save the colony. For
reasons discussed above, the fortifications were not up to the fire power of 18th century artillery, which rendered them useless after a few days of siege.

Much more effective was the guerilla war led by Abbé Picquet who with his activity - military and religious - could not save Canada, but he could and did raise the cost of its conquest. However dirty war, as all guerilla wars are, did not prevent him from showing his humanity and sensivity to human suffering, both military and civilian. Some of his actions described in this thesis prove that. He could not eliminate all cruelty generated by war, but at least he tried to alleviate it as much as possible.

His great failure, in our opinion, was the failure to win the loyalty of the autochthon nations for France in the time of need. Instead, he won their loyalty and respect towards his person, which they showed to the very end of his stay in North America. But they did not trust either the French or the English, and acted accordingly. They had their own politics of dealing with them, which they pursued with unchanging consequence all the time. Those consisted of always joining the winning side, no matter what their previous commitments had been. At the beginning of the Franco-English conflict they supported France who was on the winning side, whereas at the end of the conflict, when France needed their support the most, they remained neutral or outright hostile. They understood very well that with the French gone, they would have to live and deal with the English. Maybe they were "sauvages", but they were not fools. They understood that Picquet's usefulness for their cause ended with the fall of Montreal. They bid him a very friendly farewell
and escorted him out of the country.

Picquet's work was highly praised by the French and hated and feared, with equal force, by the British, who gave him the strongest possible proof of their sentiments towards him by putting a price on his head. It seems proper to end these conclusions with the opinions of two governors of Canada about the person and activities of this Sulpician missionary.

Governor Marquis de La Galissonière in his letter to the Minister of the Navy, Antoine-Louis Rouillé, dated October 18, 1747, wrote:

"Cet ecclésiastique est parfaitement désintéressé et il emploie une partie de son revenu pour l'exécution de son projet." 172

Governor Duquesne was even more explicit in his praise of Picquet's work. He wrote in 1783, two years after Picquet's death:

"Il a servi la religion et l'État avec un succès incroyable, pendant près de trente années; et il s'est acquis une grande réputation par les beaux établissements qu'il a formés pour le roi au Canada". 173

Duquesne's statement underlines the dual role - religious and military - Fort La Présentation played in the history of Nouvelle France. In our opinion, the establishment of Abbé Picquet was firstly a military installation using its religious vocation as a cover. All consulted literature emphasizes the important role it had in the military operations of the era. Its genesis itself was, in our opinion, politically motivated. The eagerness with which the colonial government approved the Sulpician project is the proof of that.
Contrary to other purely religious establishments discussed in this thesis, no
detailed plans of autochthon compounds around the fort were found. The only ones
that could be consulted are shown on figures 28 and 29. They do not provide much
information about either their internal organization or about their defences. Léry's
map (fig. 25) ignores them completely. However, we know from the documentary
evidence that the religious activities of La Présentation were also very successful. In
our opinion, this was due to the extraordinary energy of Abbé Picquet and his
devotion to the priesthood. In spite of his military and political activities described in
this thesis, he could find enough time to take care of what he considered "his
Indians". They knew that and repaid him with their respect and devotion.

This dual role of La Présentation makes it unique among all other Sulpician
establishments in Canada and has merited its investigation.
10. **End-Notes**

1. Ref. 14, p. 62

2. Ref. 25, p. 34

3. Ditto, p. 31

4. Ref. 30, pages 23 - 30. In the letter dated January 7, 1699 Vauban suggested to the Minister of the Colonies and of the Navy that the law should be introduced forcing all single women aged between 15 and 18, and men between 18 and 20 to marry and to have large families. In the same letter, he also suggested that six to seven batalions of French army were sent to Canada and the soldiers encouraged to marry and have children there. The Minister Maurepas answered (Jan. 31, 1699) that it would be preferable that the soldiers have their children in France.

5. All historical dates and information, unless specified otherwise, are taken from reference 19 - *Encyclopedia of World History*.

6. The Island Cape Breton remained French (see fig. 2).

7. Ref. 25, p. 98.


9. Ref. 13, p. 174

10. Ditto.

11. Ref. 21, p. 260. In this personal letter, dated Nov. 20, 1759, written to the ex-king of Poland, Duke of Lorraine and father-in-law of Louis XV, le Chevalier de Lévis implored him to convince his son-in-law about the need of help for Canada without which the colony will be lost.

12. Ref. 30, pages 30 - 36. In this letter, dated Jan. 7, 1699, the Minister Maurepas discusses Vauban's proposals and explains why his suggestions cannot be followed (elevated costs).


15. Ref. 5, p.89, end note 69.
16. Ref. 25, p. 46.

17. Ditto, p. 42.

18. Ref. 5, p. 30. The following statement was engraved on the plate:

"In the year 1749, in the reign of Louis the XV, King of France, we, Celeron, commander of the detachment sent by M. de la Galissonière, Governor-General of New France, to reestablish peace in some villages of these Cantons, have buried this plate at the confluence of the Ohio and the Kanaaiagon, the 29th of July, for a monument of the renewal of possession which we have taken of the said river Ohio, and of all those which fall into it, and of all the territories on both sides as far as the source of the said river, as the preceding Kings of France have possessed or should possess them, and as they are maintained therein by arms and by treaties, and especially by those of Riswick, Utrecht and of Aix la Chapelle; have moreover affixed to a tree the arms of the King. In testimony whereof, we have drawn up and signed the present written record. Made at the entrance of the Beautiful River, the 29th of July, 1749. All the officers signed".

19. Ref. 25, p. 45.

20. Ref. 5, p. 58.


22. Ditto, p. 46.

23. Ref. 5, p. 2.


25. Ditto, p. 11.


27. Ditto.


29. Ref. 5, p. 19.

30. Ditto.
31. Ref. 25, p. 104.
32. Ref. 6, p. 214.
33. Ditto.
35. Ref. 6, p. 214.
37. Ditto, p. 244.
38. Ditto, p. 216.
41. Ditto, p. 221.
42. Ditto, p. 227.
43. Ditto, p. 223.
44. Ref. 13, p. 174.
45. Ref. 28, p. 11.
46. Ref. 12, p. 78.
47. Ref. 15, p. 5.
49. Ditto, p. 9.
50. Ditto, p. 10.
52. Ref. 3, p. 4.
54. Ditto, p. 15.
55. Ditto, p. 16.

56. Ditto, p. 16.

57. Ditto, p. 14. This report reached Quebec after the departure of Marquis de La Galissonière from Canada. He never read it.


59. Ref. 5, p. 79.

60. Ref. 5, p. 79.

61. Ref. 16, p. 33.

62. Ref. 15, p. 17.

63. Ditto, p. 18.

64. Ref. 26, handwritten transcript of Picquet's Journal, dated 1751, 10 Juin, pages 229 - 258.

65. Ditto.

66. Ref. 15, p. 17.

67. Ref. 25, p. 616.

68. Ref. 28, p. 15.

69. Ditto, p. 16.

70. Ref. 23, p. 427.


72. Ditto, p. 156.

73. Ditto.

74. Ref. 28, p. 21.

75. Ditto, p. 22.

76. Ref. 14, p. 353.

77. Ref. 17, p. 11.
78. Ditto, p. 15.

79. Ditto.

80. Ditto, p. 18.

81. Ref. 12, p. 126.

82. Ref. 18, p. 13.

83. Ref. 34, p. 51.

84. Ref. 27, p. 8.

85. Ditto, p. 9

86. Ref. 6, p. 31.

87. Ref. 10, pages 52 - 53.

88. Ref. 24, p. 349.

89. Ditto, p. 656.

90. Ditto.

91. Ref. 11, p. 19.

92. Ref. 9, p. 20.

93. Ref. 3, p. 4 (insert).

94. Ref. 9, pages 22 - 30. Information about the results of the archeological investigations is based, unless otherwise specified, on the work by Prof. Cook.

95. Ref. 29, p. 154.

96. Ref. 5, p. 22.

97. Ref. 29, p. 194

98. Ref. 2, p. 2.

99. Ref. 1, p. 16.

100. Ditto.

101. Ref. 2, p. 3.
102. Ref. 8, p. 16.

103. Ref. 33; all data concerning Fort St-Jean, unless otherwise noted, are taken from this reference.

104. Ditto, p. 301.


108. Ditto.

109. Ditto, p. 278

110. Ditto, p. 279

111. Ref. 29, p. 279.


113. Ditto, p. 94.

114. Ref. 6, p. 254 (footnote 1).


116. Ref. 6, p. 259.


118. Ditto, p. 263.

119. Ditto, p. 264.

120. Ditto, p. 264.

121. Ditto, p. 265.

122. Ditto, p. 266.


125. Ditto, p. 266.
126. Ditto, p. 274.
128. Ditto.
129. Ref. 25, p. 291.
131. Ditto.
132. Ditto, p. 185.
133. Ref. 25, p. 293.
135. Ref. 6, p. 284.
136. Ditto.
138. Ditto.
139. Ref. 6, p. 276.
140. Ditto, p. 288.
141. Ditto, p. 341.
142. Ditto, p. 318.
143. Ditto, p. 364.
144. Ref. 14, p. 305.
145. Ref. 6, p. 407.
146. Ditto, p. 408.
147. Ditto, p. 409.
149. Ref. 7, p. 16.
150. Ditto, p. 20.
151. Ref. 6, p. 506.
152. Ditto, p. 507.
153. Ref. 24, p. 349.
154. Ref. 6, p. 519.
155. Ref. 22, p. 197.
156. Ref. 25, p. 606.
157. Ref. 6, p. 539.
158. Ditto, p. 540.
159. Ditto, p. 541.
162. Ditto.
166. Ditto.
167. Ditto, p. 582
168. Ref. 6, p. 585.
170. Ditto, p. 587.
171. Ditto, p. 588.
172. Ref. 15, p. 3.
173. Ditto.
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26. PICQUET (l'abbé), François, *Fort de La Présentation*; un recit de voyage concernant le 10 juin 1751 (around the Lake Ontario), handwritten transcript, Archives of the Messieurs de St-Sulpice, Montreal, pages 229 - 258.


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32. ETHNOSCOP (Soc.), *Le domaine des Messieurs de Saint-Sulpice (Bîj-6)*, synthèse et orientation en matière d'archéologie, Gouvernement du Québec, Ministère de la Culture et des Communications, Direction Régionale de Montréal, décembre 1994.


27 janvier 1691 — Marché pour faire un fort entre monsieur de Bélmont et Paillard et Lacroix. Charpentiers.

Par devant nous etc... furent présents Messire François Rochon de Bélmont prêtre et missionnaire de la mission des sauvages de la montagne... et Léonard Paillard et Jean de la Croix charpentiers demeurant au dit Ville Marie d'autre part...

promettent... de faire un fort à la rivière des prairies et des habitations des hoirs de défunt ... Meug dit la Fleur et à l'endroit où le dit Sieur de Bélmont leur indiquera en environ de la dite concession ou sur icelle, lequel fort sera construit de cent pieds sur toutes les quatre faces, de poteaux de 17 pieds de long de 14 pouces en carré sur chacune des 4 faces, desquels poteaux deux cent seront en terre des deux cotés de trois pouces de largeur sur quatre de profondeur lesquels poteaux seront distanciés autour du dit fort de 20 pieds en 20 pieds avec une garniture par dedans.

Savoir: une semelle de 10 pouces en carré de seize pieds de long au bout de la quelle il y aura un poteau de 10 pieds de long de même grosseur et un entre toise qui sera par dessus le poteau à tenon et mortaise et tous les dits trous percés seront assemblés au grand poteau à tenon et mortaise bien chevillé pour tenir tout le carré en
état. Tout le tour du dit fort seront armés de pièces sur pièces en tenon dans les dits poteaux qui seront chevillés de deux chevilles par chaque bout.

Toutes lesquelles pièces auront 10 pouces de hauteur jusqu'à la concurrence de 15 pieds de haut et outre la sablière seraboisée par dessus les poteaux bien chevillée, tous les poteaux seront de frène ou chêne et le surplus sera de bon bois comme frène, pruche, chêne, pin, épinette, plaine, par dessus laquelle sablière mettront un chaperon, à savoir, de 5 pieds en 5 pieds tout au tour du dit fort couverte de 5 planches, et le dit Sieur Belmont ne fournira que le clou. Plus feront les dits entrepreneurs une porte au dit fort de 3 pieds de large et 5 pieds de haut de bons madriers de chêne de trois pouces dépaisseur à doubles joints à deux avec une croix de St-André qui sera attachée au Bourdennou lequel sera attaché dans le lintot de la porte en telle façon quelle ne pourra se défaire.

Plus s'obligeront les dits entrepreneurs de faire au dit fort deux guérites de 2 pieds en carré chacune dans leurs un à chacun dans leurs coings séparés qui seront supportés par 5 livres qui seront emmanchés à tenon et mortaise aux poteaux du dit fort pour soutenir les guérites par dehors et par dedans il y au deux poteaux trainout avec un bon l'un par dessous, sur lequel s'établiront les quatre sablo dessus lesquelles seront établis des poteaux de 5 pieds de hauteur et neuf pouces en carré qui partiront de——— lesquels seront garnis de pins de bon bout ou madriers de chêne, frène ou pruche avec le comblo qu'îls couvriront de planches y mettant 8 petits clavons et à la sablière une
guérritte sera mise quatre livres à chacune de sorte que toutes les sablières et poteaux seront bien liés et que chaque poteau de gueritte aura deux livres, métant au futage de la ditte gueritte deux livres une chaque bout.

Lequel bout ils s'obligerent d'écourrer et généralement faire tout ce qui sera nécessaire pour rendre le dit ouvrage parfait... pour et moyennant le prix et somme de mille livres argent de ce pays et quatre minots de bled d'inde... savoir 250 livres lorsque le bois sera écarté et 250 livres quand tous les nécessaires sont prêts pour le fort. 250 livres restant à la fin de tous les dits ouvrages et les quatre minots bled d'inde deux au commencement de leur travail et les deux minots quand tous les dits bois seront trainés sur la dite place où sera fait le fort....

Fait et passé au dit villemarie en une des salles du Séminaire de la dite ville l'an 1691, le 22 janvier, après midi en présence des Sieurs Pierre Cabazie et Jean L'ory et de Sieur Belmont et Paillard et Lacroix...

(Tabellion, autre notaire) Adhemar

P.S. A la fin de cette transcription il y a une quittance pour un premier paiement et ceci a lieu le 11 mars 1691 devant Adhémar.
Greffe d'Antoine Adhémar, 10 fév. 1691
Marché pour trainer des pieux de bois
pour faire un fort à la rivière des
Prairies entre Paillard et Chauvin

Par devant les notaires de l'Isle de Montréal résident à
Villemarie soussigné furent présent en sa personne, Pierre Chauvin
demeurant en cette ville, lequel de gré a promis et s'est obligé de
traîner pour Léonard Paillard, charpentier faisant tant pour lui
que pour Jean de Lacroix à ce présent et acceptant tout le bois de
charpente et pieux escarris que le dit sieur Paillard et Lacroix
sont obligés de fournir pour le fort que M. de Belmont fait faire
à la Rivière des Prairies au nombre d'environ sept mil pieds de
bois; desquels le dit Chauvin promet et s'oblige de tairner in-
cessamment délivrer aussitôt escarris jusqu'à à l'endroit où le
dit fort sera dressé, que ledit Chauvin a dit bien scavoir et de
rendre tout ledit bois à pied d'oeuvre auparavant la fonte des nei-
ges, à peine de tous dépens dommages et intérêts, Ce marché fait et
moyennant le prix et somme de deux cents livres argent et monnaye
cours de ce pays, sur et tant moins de laquelle somme, le dit
Paillard baillera au dit Chauvin six minots de bled d'inde et un
minot de farine de bled froment, et de plus fera le dit Paillard
mestre un chantier sous les pièces de bois que le dit Chauvin
traisnera et fera éjardocher les chemins pour aller quérir les dites pièces de bois. Le dit bled d'inde et bled froment le dit Paillard baillera de jour en jour et le surplus à parfaire la ditte somme quand le dit bois sera livrer.

Car ainsy etc. fait et passé au dit ville marie en l'étude du dit notaire Adhémar le dixneufvième jour de fevrier mil six cent quatre vingt onze après midi le dit Chauvin sousigné avec le dit notaire, le dit Paillard a déclaré ne scavoir ecrire ny signe de ce interpellé suivant l'ordonnance.

Pierre Chauvin

R Pottier Adhémar
(167) 1er février 1700 — Marché de charpenterie par Monsieur Gay prêtre à Tyssureau et Dasny pour la chapelle Notre-Dame de Lorette.

Furent présent... Robert Gay... missionnaire de la mission des sauvages à Notre-Dame de Lorette... Anthoine Tyssureau et Jean Dasny charpentiers demeurant à la rivière Saint-Pierre etc... Pour faire une chapelle de 60 pieds de long et 27 pieds de large de dehors en dehors, le carré de 13 pieds de hauteur....

Item les dits entrepreneurs feront aux deux longs pans de la dite chapelle six fenêtres trois de chaque coté de la grandeur qu’on leur marquera, lesquelles fenêtres etc.

Comme aussi... de faire un clocher... comme est celui des Dames religieuses hospitalières de cette ville. Couvrir la dite chapelle et le clocher de planches, garnir les pignons de planches.

Et outre moyennant la somme de 850 livres argent cours du pays.

Adhemar
ATLANTIC OCEAN

Declared French and English Spheres of Interest After The Treaty of Utrecht, 1713. Beyond the palisades of the French and English forts, the Indians controlled all of the interior.

48. La région de l'Ohio au dix-huitième siècle (selon une carte de Washington en 1755).
(Archives du Séminaire de Québec, t. 220, no 24).

[Texte manuscrit de la carte avec annotations en italique]
PLAN OF SAINT-MARIE I

1. Dwelling
2. Chapel
3. Carpenter-shop
4. Blacksmith-shop
5. Cookhouse

6. Locks
7. Loading basin
8. Landing basin
9. East-west water channel

10. North-south water channel
11. Drinking water aqueduct
12. Aqueduct
13. Gateway

F. Dwelling
G. Dwelling
H. Huron longhouse
I. Huron longhouse
K. Huron longhouse
L. Huron longhouse
M. Huron longhouse
N. Algonquin dwelling
P. Algonquin dwelling

Timber construction
Stone construction
Palisade line

RECONSTRUCTION DRAWING OF SAINT-MARIE

fig. 7
MAP 6. Plan of the excavations, showing the arrangement of buildings and other features.
Plan de la mission des Jesuites du Sault-Saint-Louis vers 1720 tiré de *Pour le Christ et le Roi, sous la direction d'Yves Landry*, p. 179.
Fort de la Nouvelle-Lorette, au Sault-au-Récollet, où les sauvages de la montagne furent transférés en 1696.


† Signé de Char. Beaubrun 1898; C Sault-au-Récollet
Page 938
Ressemble beaucoup au dessin de 1702
de la Carte de Montréal de 1506-1702. (Arch. Sulpice)

fig.13
François Vachon de Belmont (1645–1732)
Fort du Lac des Deux Montagnes à situer
Environ a deux Lieues au dessus de l'île de Montreal sur la terre du nord dans
le détroit Et a La vîe du fort Senneville
dans L'Ad. isle de montreal  [1718]
Archives publiques du Canada, Ottawa
Plan d'un fort pour être construit
au bord du Lac des deux montagnes
a la côte du nord  1722
Duplicata d'un plan envoyé en France
le 14 novembre 1719
Archives publiques du Canada. Ottawa

fig.15
Plan de la mission du lac des Deux Montagnes en 1743
Carte
de la Route qui fait le détachement
Prattin quinquagésimme d'Octobre 1766
Inventé par M. le jg. de desery, commandant
ce détachement.

A. Fort la Présentation
B. Fort Williams
C. Fort Bull
D. Fort Chouéguen
E. Fort Ontario
F. Fort Frontenac
G. Fort Onneout
H. Village Kaskarorin
I. Village des Onontagués
K. Lac des Onneouts
L. R. des Onontagués
M. R. Chouéguen
N. Bays des Goyogouins
O. O. Marais
P. R. au Chicot
Q. R. petite Famine
V. R. Grande Famine
R. R. à la Planche
S. R. du Baril
T. R. au Sable
X. R. M. le comte
Y. Baye Niaheuré
Z. Bays de Toniata
U. Lac Tchikousagé
1. R. Chouegathy
2. R. Neahilougotha
3. Chute de 40 pieds
4. R. Upper

RENOVIS
5. Burnett field
6. Palatin
7. Fort Hunter
8. Chuttes
9. Rapides
10. Isles aux Chevreuils
11. Presqu'île de Niaheuré
12. La Galette
13. La grande Île
14. Toniata
15. Les Mile Îles
16. Isles Cochois
17. Isles Laforest
18. Isles aux Citrons
19. Isle de l'Enfant perdu
20. Les 3 Isles au Galop
21. Isle au Renard
22. Pays des 5 nations
23. Chutte
24. Côte de Toronto
25. Baye de Quinté
26. Isles de Quinté
27. R. de Quinté
28. Lac Ontario
0. Endoits où a couché le détachement.

fig.18
Carte des provinces de New-York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvanie, Maryland et Virginie, montrant la ligne des forts construits récemment sur les frontières de ces colonies et leur situation en regard des forts français de l'Ohio et du lac Érié, ainsi que la route d'Albany à Oswego avec les forts construits et projetés pour en assurer la sécurité. Dessin fait sur l'ordre de Son Excellence, le général Shirley, par William Alexander.

**Explications.**
1. 2, 3 représentent des blockhaus construits par la province de New-York et contenant environ 30 hommes chacun; 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, des blockhaus construits par la province du New-Jersey, contenant chacun 20 à 30 hommes; 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, 18 et 20, d'autres blockhaus. Les numéros 13, 16, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24 sont tous des forts construits par la Pennsylvanie.
2. 13 est appelé le fort Allen; 16, le fort Heney; 19, le fort Lebanon; 21, Comfor Castle; 22, le fort Granville; 23, le fort Shirley; 24, le fort Lyttelton. 25 est un petit fort érigé par le Maryland. 26 est le fort Cumberland. Le gouvernement virginien a construit 27, 28, 29, 30, 31; 27 s'appelle le fort Lewis et 31, le fort Dinwiddie. 32, 33, 34, 35 sont des forts bâtis par les habitants de la Virginie. La plupart des blockhaus abritent 20 à 30 hommes et les forts, 30 à 70 hommes.

**Explication des chiffres apparaissant sur la rivière Mohawk.**
37 est un fort érigé par le New-York dans le canton des Agiers en 1755. — 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44 ont été construits l'été dernier par le général Shirley; 38 et 39 sont à chaque bout du portage nécessaire par une chute de la rivière; 40 est un entrepôt fortifié; 41 et 43 sont à chaque extrémité du grand portage qui va de la Mohawk au Wood Creek. 43 est le fort Ontario et 44, le fort Oswego. 45, 46, 47 et 48 sont des forts dont la construction se fera le printemps prochain en vue d'augmenter la sécurité de la route d'Oswego.

**OUTLINE OF ENGLISH COLONIAL DEFENCES**

fig.19
fig.20
NORTHEASTERN NORTH AMERICA, 1755
ON THE EVE OF THE SEVEN YEARS WAR

Areas dominated by French
English settlements

fig.24
The excavations of the 1987 and 1988 seasons are here added to the map prepared by the author to summarize documentary research implications for the archaeological project.
PLAN DU FORT DE LAPRESENTATION
Plan du fort construit par de Léry. Ce plan est conservé au Dépôt des Fortifications des Colonies, Amérique septentrionale, 504 C.

fig.31
Approximate location of the French fort of 1748 showing the traces unearthed during the archeological excavations. Successive sketches of the river bank from 1825 to 1922. (Drawing by Robert Gagnon)