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Abstract


Denise Boucher

This paper is a phenomenological inquiry into the notion of ‘heed’, posited by Gilbert Ryle as a ‘dispositional’ alternate to the traditional philosophical notions of the ‘Will’, and of ‘volition’. Ryle admits, however, that this notion is problematic in that, as a reference to an episodic ‘frame of mind’, it threatens to entail the illicit features of inaccessibility to observation, implicit dualism, and infinite regress, which his general refutation of Cartesian mind-body dualism in The Concept of Mind was intended to eliminate. By supplementing the Concept characterization of heed with statements drawn from other of Ryle’s essays in which the notion of heed is invoked, an illustration of the general nature of a heedful frame of mind will be presented, in order to address these problematic features. In turn, this will allow for an inquiry into the notion of ‘voluntariness’, whose characterization the Concept appears to be contradicted elsewhere in Ryle’s work. The reconciliation of these characterizations will invoke the question of that which underlies our sense of a situation as ‘moral’. Finally, the adequacy of the notion of ‘heed’ as an alternate to that of ‘volition’ will be evaluated.
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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Within its refutation of Cartesian mind-body dualism, *The Concept of Mind* includes Gilbert Ryle’s ‘official’ analysis of the mental-conduct concepts surrounding the traditional philosophical notion of the ‘Will’. Of the vocabulary which philosophers have traditionally viewed as intimating the presence of a causal or concomitant ‘volition’, or of an act or process of ‘willing’, Ryle states that it may be brought under the “useful because vague” heading of ‘minding’ or ‘heeding’ what one is doing. The vocabulary in question includes such ‘adverbial’ expressions as ‘intentionally’, ‘deliberately’, ‘carefully’, ‘with attention’, ‘scrupulously’, and the like. Ryle claims that, far from signifying the presence of ‘volition’ or ‘volitions’, these expressions do not denote the concomitance of anything whatever. On Ryle’s ‘dispositional’ account, expressions denoting heed are, rather, descriptive of the *manner* of a performance.

However, Ryle hastens to add that this notion appears to elicit problems similar to those associated with ‘volition(s)’, with these stemming, in the case of heed, from its ‘episodic’ nature. Specifically, as a reference to a particular ‘frame of mind’, the notion of heed is necessarily also a reference to a ‘mental occurrence’, and it therefore invokes some among the problematic features through which Ryle had illustrated the absurdity of dualist conceptions of the subject generally: namely, that of the inaccessible to observation of ‘mental’ processes or ‘mental acts’, supposed to be concomitant or concurrent to overt acts; and that of the threat of infinite regress entailed by this model of mind. In short, the notion of heed appears to entail an ‘internal’, and therefore
unwitnessable, secondary mental ‘act’.

Critical essays on Ryle’s analysis of the ‘Will’ are conspicuously rare, possibly as a result of its supposed ‘dissolution’ as a topic, via the general refutation of mind-body dualism. General commentaries on Ryle’s analyses address this particular topic through the ‘adverbial’ or dispositional account, without specifically examining the notion of ‘heed’. The few that do, address the notion of ‘heed’ as a general reference to the philosopher’s notion of ‘consciousness’, and therefore argue in favor of maintaining a dualist model of the thinking subject, on the basis of the conceptual ‘necessity’ of, or the author’s preference for, such a model. Moreover, where attempts are made to discern, within Ryle’s own analysis, some weakness or inconsistency within his ‘purely’ dispositional account of mental-conduct concepts, this tends to be restricted to statements drawn exclusively from the Concept.iii

The present analysis, in contrast, represents an attempt to explore the ‘Rylean’ notion of ‘heed’ on its own terms: that is, restricted to its treatment in Ryle’s own work, yet extended beyond the Concept analysis to its invocation in various other of Ryle’s essays. Accordingly, Chapter One will illustrate Ryle’s refutation of the notion of ‘volition’, his reinterpretation of the character of ‘voluntary’ acts through the notion of ‘heed’, and his recognition of the latter notion as problematic with respect to this character. Chapter Two will examine the nature of heed, both generally and with an eye to this ‘episodic’ nature, by invoking statements made by Ryle in the courses of his discussions of various other topics. Importantly, the topics whose discussion will be informative regarding the deployment of heed-concepts are, for the most part, ostensibly unrelated to those of the ‘Will’ and of voluntariness, thus illustrating what Ryle deems
the "polymorphous" nature of heed-concepts. I will extend my analysis in this way in response to two lines of questioning:

First, and as has been previously noted, Ryle himself admits that the special character or manner of a performance that is said to exhibit a 'heedful' frame of mind is problematic, in that it cannot be entirely explained through recourse to observable dispositions. Insight into this problematic aspect will, I believe, be derived from a general analysis of the logical behavior of heed concepts, as well as through what I will refer to as a 'phenomenological' illustration of the nature of heed. The latter is motivated by the tenet that given features of the logical behavior of language reflect, that is, have their correlative in, given features of the situations or phenomena being referred to.iv Correspondingly, though they may elude explanation within the confines of the project of the Concept, and perhaps even of those of the 'style' of ordinary language analysis generally, the problematic entailments of the 'episodic' nature of heed may be shown to be unavoidable, if it can be illustrated that a more-than-linguistic basis exists for our impression that heed concepts signify a concomitant act or process.

Second, a general illustration of the nature of heed may reveal grounds for reconciling what seems to constitute a discrepancy between Ryle's 'official' analysis of the word 'voluntary' in the Concept, and his deployment of this word elsewhere; this will be referred to as a seeming equivocation on Ryle's part. Specifically, Ryle maintains in the Concept analysis that 'voluntary' is a word ordinarily arising only in cases of blameworthy performances, despite its illicit application by philosophers to actions correctly or meritoriously performed. Moreover, Ryle states that 'voluntary' denotes an insufficiency of heed, in contrast to our common misemployment of the word to signify
the presence of some mental act or process, thought to stand in a causal relationship to a blameworthy action. Yet Ryle elsewhere characterizes as “pure voluntaries”, performances of a type specifically characterized by the presence of a heedful frame of mind and to which, in addition, moral appraisal is irrelevant. By generalizing the analysis of the polymorphous notion of heed concepts, to include instances of their employment in contexts other than those in which questions of voluntariness arise, I hope, in turn, to ultimately isolate some feature of the notion of heed that connects it specifically to voluntariness, and to provide possible grounds for a reconciliation of Ryle’s apparent equivocation. To this end I will draw from Ryle’s characterizations of reflection and of the notions of circumstance-emancipation and intention-parasitism.

Chapter Three will attempt to further specify these grounds for reconciliation, through a discussion of Ryle’s notion of an instruction-situation, and its relation both to an agent’s knowledge and to the form of a rule. Ryle posits instruction-situations, along with accusation-situations in which questions of moral responsibility are posed, as the instances in which heed-concepts are almost exclusively deployed. If heed is to replace the mythical notion of ‘volition’, which has tended (albeit confusedly) to itself be the subject of moral attribution, this raises the question of whether or at what point can heed, given its polymorphous nature, be considered a moral issue? I will attempt to address this question through an illustration of a reciprocal relation between a heedful frame of mind and an agent’s sense of moral responsibility. In connection with this, the problematic features associated with the ‘episodic’ nature of heed will be revisited.
I

Background

As is generally known, Ryle’s *The Concept of Mind* represents a destructive analysis of Cartesian mind-body dualism. Ryle refers to this bifurcation “with deliberate abusiveness, as ‘the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine’.”\(^{vi}\) This reference is to the depiction of the subject on the ‘para-mechanical model’: just as the human body is a field of causes and effects, so the mind must be another field of causes and effects; although these are not themselves of a mechanical nature *per se*, but rather of some indeterminate, ‘shadowy’ nature.\(^{vii}\) This constitutes what Ryle has defined as a ‘category-mistake’, consisting in the assimilation of certain facts of mental life to one logical type or category, when they actually belong to another. Ryle’s “destructive purpose” is to explode the Cartesian myth by rectifying the ‘logic’ of mental-conduct concepts, thereby exposing a ‘family’ of radical category-mistakes, which are reflected in and perpetuated by traditional philosophical language.\(^{viii}\) Ryle will expose the absurdities of what he calls the ‘double-life’ theory, which results in our positing some mental process, act, or entity, either concomitant or concurrent, but necessarily causal in some sense, to every observable performance.

The notion of ‘volition’ is an inevitable extension of the Cartesian model of the subject. According to the myth, bodily states and processes partake of one form of existence, while mental states and processes, notwithstanding their ‘analogous’ status on the para-mechanical model, partake of quite another form of existence. These being incommensurate, however, it follows that an occurrence in one form can never be numerically identical with an occurrence in the other.\(^{ix}\) Thus the postulation of a ‘go-
between’ process, capable of reconciling these incompatibles, presented itself as a logical necessity; the notion of ‘volition’ was devised to occupy this role.

Volitions have been postulated as special acts, or operations, ‘in the mind’, by means of which a mind gets its ideas translated into facts. I think of some state of affairs which I wish to come into existence in the physical world, but, as my thinking and wishing are unexecutive, they require the mediation of a further executive mental process. So I perform a volition which somehow puts my muscles into action. [In this way], [o]nly when a bodily movement has issued from such a volition can I merit praise or blame for what my hand or tongue has done. A

Importantly, the enactment of volitions is asserted by implication whenever appraisal-concepts are applied to overt actions. In fact, it may be that the notion of ‘volition’ has its origin in the employment of appraisal-concepts, in much the same way that the notion of a mental ‘act’ or ‘process’ originates in descriptions of performances qualified by mental-conduct concepts generally: both are misunderstood to signify the presence of something concurrent or concomitant to that performance, and in both cases, this attribution is subsequently extended to any and all performances, whether or not their descriptions are qualified by such concepts.

Ryle rejects the notion of ‘volition’ on several grounds; I will address only those which emerge as likewise problematic in Ryle’s account of ‘heeding’ or ‘minding’.

First, Ryle indicates that we can never witness volition of another, and that the notion of ‘volitions’ therefore contributes nothing to the accuracy of our moral appraisal of actions. “Even a confession by the agent, if such confessions were ever made, that he had executed a volition before his hand did the deed would not settle the question. The
pronouncement of the confession is only another overt muscular action." xi Second, and as a development upon the previous point, assuming that it could be determined that an agent had executed a volition just prior to an overt action, this would not prove, even to the agent himself, that any overt action of his own is the effect of a given volition. xii For example, we often ‘want’ or ‘wish’, without any action ensuing from this; thus the presence of some thought or feeling, even if perceived as representing the presence of ‘volition’, would merely beg the question of a causal relation between this ‘volition’ and an observable act. By extension, this relation threatens an infinite regress, as does the question of whether ‘volitions’ are themselves voluntary or involuntary acts. Thus third and finally, Ryle demonstrates through the strategy of reductio ad absurdum that attempts to address such questions end up exposing the notion of ‘volition’ as fraudulent.

In short, then, the doctrine of volitions is a causal hypothesis, adopted because it was wrongly supposed that the question ‘What makes a bodily movement voluntary?’ was a causal question. This supposition is, in fact, only a special twist of the general supposition that the question ‘How are mental-conduct concepts applicable to human behavior?’ is a question about the causation of that behavior. xiii

Voluntariness

Mental-conduct concepts, such as ‘on purpose’, ‘deliberately’, ‘intentionally’, and the like, are commonly employed in descriptions of (blameworthy) performances whose voluntariness is in question, and therefore figure into our attributions of praise and blame. The notion of ‘volition’ is an attempt to correlate our criteria for deciding questions about the voluntariness or involuntariness of actions, and about the resoluteness or
irresoluteness of agents, with hypothetical occurrences of a para-mechanical pattern. According to Ryle, the reason that this notion neither assists those appraisals, nor elucidates the logic of appraisal-concepts, is that the intelligent application of these antedates the invention of this causal hypothesis. For this reason, Ryle argues that refutation of this notion won’t invalidate the distinction we all properly draw when the question arises as to the voluntariness of a given act. At the same time, however, both the application of appraisal concepts and the circumstances in which the question of voluntariness arise merit specification, insofar as these are relevant to Ryle’s attempt to elucidate the ‘real’ meaning, that is, the use, of the terms ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’.

In their most ordinary employment ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ are used, with a few minor elasticities, as adjectives applying to actions which ought not to be done. We discuss whether someone’s action was voluntary or not only when the action seems to have been his fault... In the same way in ordinary life we raise questions of responsibility only when someone is charged...with an offense... In this ordinary use, then, it is absurd to discuss whether satisfactory, correct or admirable performances are voluntary or involuntary. Neither inculpation nor exculpation is in point. We neither confess to authorship nor adduce extenuating circumstances; neither plead ‘guilty’ nor plead ‘not guilty’; for we are not accused.

Ryle thus states, in accordance with one of the major tenets of ordinary language analysis, that the first aspect entering into the meaning of ‘voluntariness’ is the context in which it arises. As J.L. Austin states, illustrating the range of what is included in the notion of ‘offence’, we ask whether an action was voluntary “where someone is said to have done something which is bad, wrong, inept, unwelcome, or in some other of the numerous possible ways untoward.” The context may therefore be generally defined as
one characterized by lapse or error, or more generally still, as one in which some
abnormality or failure has occurred in the normal actualization of a task.\textsuperscript{xvi} This notion of
‘abnormality’, or of impediment to the normal actualization of a task will be developed at
length in the course of this paper. According to Ryle, in a case of lapse or error, we ask
whether the agent knew how to do the right thing, or was competent to do so. We
conclude that the lapse or error in question was voluntary, if 1) it is determined that the
agent did have the requisite knowledge or competence, and 2) that he was not impeded by
any circumstance beyond his power to modify. ‘Voluntary’ thus refers, on this analysis,
to a failure on the agent’s part to exercise a certain capacity or competence that he is
known to have, and whose exercise no feature of the surrounding context is judged to
have impeded. That is, \textit{he could have done otherwise}, and would have done so on this
occasion, \textit{if he had paid more heed to what he was doing}.\textsuperscript{xvii}

We therefore determine that a failure was voluntary if we satisfy ourselves that
the agent did not act ‘attentively’, with sufficient ‘concentration’, ‘care’ or ‘interest’,
‘scrupulously’, or ‘vigorously’, towards a project falling within the known range of his
competencies. (Given this characterization, it appears that the employment of expressions
such as ‘intentionally’ or ‘on purpose’, to denote presence of mind in a performance, is
inappropriate. The sense of ‘voluntary’ signified by these will be taken up in Chapter 3.)
In addition, Ryle has it that “voluntary?” or “involuntary?” is a question that is asked
exclusively of blameworthy actions. That is, \textit{contra} the philosopher’s extended
application of the word to actions which are correctly or admirably performed, questions
of voluntariness only arise in situations where a judgment of blameworthiness has already
been made.\textsuperscript{xviii} Both these aspects serve to illustrate Ryle’s claim that ‘voluntary’, on the
Concept analysis, is an implicit reference to certain features of the background or surrounding context, and does not signify the presence of something qualifying the performance itself; on the contrary, a ‘voluntary’ action is said to be characterized by an insufficiency of heed, relative to performative requirements or expectations.

Yet the question arises as to the context in which acting ‘attentively’ or ‘with care’ would be appropriate. Ryle notes that sometimes some more ‘positive’ sense of ‘voluntariness’ is believed to be implicated in our use of ordinary expressions such as ‘effort of will’, ‘strength of will’, ‘resolute’, and the like. In these cases, not only does the element of blameworthiness not present itself, as in the case of voluntariness, but these expressions constitute implicit attributions of praise. Yet here an ‘abnormality’ of sorts does nevertheless present itself. Description of the situations corresponding to these expressions invariably makes reference to a difficulty in, or obstacle to, the normal actualization of a task. It must be noted, however, that this takes the form of potential distractions or diversions, and thus a correlative reference is made to the ‘overcoming’ of these obstacles, not by the enactment of ‘volition’, but in the form of attention, concentration, and the like: in short, in the form of heeding or minding the task at hand.

It may be said that ‘voluntariness’ which, according to Ryle, refers to a situation characterized (in part) by insufficient heed on the agent’s part, is often mistakenly employed in association with the type of experience signified by expressions denoting some form of ‘willing’. The impression that an experience of this type of ‘effort’ signifies the presence of something concomitant, namely ‘volition’, in turn reinforces the misuse of the word ‘voluntary’ for performances that are successful without the overcoming of any abnormality. Thus the equivocation in question seems to center on the mythic word
‘volition’. If we accept Ryle’s characterization of voluntariness in the *Concept*, the equivocation amounts to our employing ‘voluntariness’ to signify both the case of an agent’s heeding, minding, or thinking what he was doing, as well as the contrary.

Yet if both cases are possible, then Ryle’s refutation of ‘volition’, and of ‘voluntariness’ as signifying its presence, does nothing to explain or explain away the nature of a heedful frame of mind, as the basis upon which Ryle will interpret our impression of ‘Will’. That is, even if ‘voluntariness’ is shown to signify an absence of heed, and is therefore misemployed in the description of performances characterized by its presence, this in no way invalidates the experience, or the impression this lends, of the presence of an ‘internal’, concomitant act or process. The nature of this experience, which ordinarily invokes expressions denoting ‘will’, will be illustrated by the ‘phenomenological’ inquiry in Chapter Two. In the process, the element of ‘abnormality’ in the actualization of a task will be developed within that chapter’s general inquiry into the notion of ‘heed’, and will emerge as a crucial element of the ‘episodic’ nature of a heedful frame of mind. At this point, however, I will introduce the relation of this abnormality to the secondary ‘act’ that the *notion* of heed seems to entail, through a brief description of the logic of our employment of heed-concepts.

II

*Abnormality and Process*

Ryle states that the notions of ‘volition’ and of ‘willing’ stem from a misunderstanding of certain descriptions, of someone as ‘concentrating’, ‘attending’, ‘minding’ what he is doing, or doing something ‘with care’, as signifying the occurrence
of some ‘internal’ deed, concomitant with the overt action qualified by them. In support of the claim that this is mistaken, Ryle indicates that, as a rule, English does not include regular verbs corresponding to these ‘adverbial’ verbs, adverbs, and nouns, for the simple reason that these would prove redundant.\textsuperscript{xix} This ‘grammatical’ fact is a correlate of the previously introduced feature of adverbial expressions denoting heed: that of their being apt only to descriptions of situations characterized by some element of difficulty or impediment to the normal actualization of a task. Ryle generalizes this limitation by suggesting that

\begin{quote}
...explicit talk about such things as heed, concentration, paying attention, care and so on occurs most commonly in instruction-situations and in accusation-situations, both of which are relatively small, though important, sections of discourse. Elsewhere, even when talking about human beings, we tend to make relatively few explicit mentions of these things, not because it would be irrelevant, but because it would be redundant to do so.\textsuperscript{xx}
\end{quote}

Regarding this last point, it may be provisionally noted that the absence of regular action verbs corresponding to adverbial phrases denoting heed is a reflection of their employment being appropriate only to the description of \textit{task} or \textit{process} verbs, and not to achievement or success verbs. There is a reason that it makes no sense to say “He won the footrace with concentration”: one \textit{runs} a race with concentration. That is, while some minimum of concentration may indeed be necessary to ‘winning’, yet by its very nature as an achievement verb, this element is presupposed by it. Achievement verbs are not references to one specific, identifiable action, but to some state of affairs obtaining, over and above, that which consists in the performance.\textsuperscript{xxi} Perhaps we may want to argue that it is perfectly acceptable to say “He won the race without even needing to concentrate” or
“effortlessly”, because, for example, his competitors proved no match for him. However, this scenario only emphasizes the relationship between the logical necessity of some element of difficulty relative to the invocation of an effort of ‘will’ (concentration). In this case, even the minimum of concentration was not required, a fact considered worthy of mention; yet in a normal race situation, where competitors are so more than in name only, while the question of a lack of concentration may enter into our appraisal of the non-winners, there is no such question to be asked regarding the winner. Likewise, one may invoke heed concepts in the qualifying of a search, but not in that of finding; in that of listening, but not of hearing. In another context, Ryle states that “verbs like ‘see’ and ‘hear’ do not... denote special experiences or mental happenings, with special causal antecedents; they denote achievements of tasks, or successes in undertakings.”\textsuperscript{xxii} Thus the grammatical fact illustrated here is a reflection of the effect, which a difficulty or other form of abnormality in actualization of a task has, of calling our attention to the task itself, that is, to the process of its (attempted) completion in the form of ‘effort’.

\textit{Heed Concepts Signify the Manner of Performance}

However, it must not be assumed that this characterization of heed carries with it what Ryle calls ‘double-life corollaries.’\textsuperscript{xxiii} To ‘mind’, care about, or ‘attend to’ what one is doing is not to do one thing in an observable place and another thing in a second, metaphorical place; nor does doing something ‘with care’ or ‘with concentration’ report the occurrence of two episodes. Ryle points out that it is quite idiomatic to replace these nouns and verbs by a heed adverb, thus transforming the description into one of something being done ‘mindfully’, ‘attentively’, or ‘carefully.’\textsuperscript{xxiv} This usage has the
merit of suggesting that these report the occurrence of one episode, but one of a very different character from that reported by descriptions of performances that are not so characterized, or those characterized as 'absent-minded' or 'inattentive', though the overt actions "might be photographically as similar as you please." xxv

When a person whistles as he works, he is doing two things at once, either of which he might interrupt without interrupting the other. But when we speak of a person minding his task, or what he is whistling, we are not saying that he is doing two things at once. If someone is described as reading 'attentively', or driving 'carefully', he cannot stop his reading, yet remain attentive to it, or hand over the controls of his car, while continuing to exercise care in driving. xxvi If minding were an 'extra' deed, it would be a separate deed, and in principle could go on by itself; but adverbs denoting heed concepts "require supplementation by the participle of a specific active verb". xxvii In other words, something must be done with heed. Thus Ryle states that a rejection of the intellectualist notion of 'shadow-acts' is perfectly compatible with a retention of the distinction marked by this special character, based on these considerations of the logical behavior of heed concepts: that their employment would, except under certain circumstances, be illogical, because redundant; and that they cannot stand on their own as verbs of action, but always qualify a verb of action. Both of these serve to illustrate that heeding, minding, or thinking what one is doing is not a concomitant act or process, and yet does characterize the manner of performances.

The Problem of the 'Episodic' Nature of Heed

Ryle admits, however, that the question of what this special character amounts to
is perplexing, "since the ways in which heed adverbs qualify the active verbs to which they are attached seem quite unlike the ways in which other adverbs qualify their verbs."

If someone is described as typing 'quickly' or eating 'sloppily', the character of her activity is amenable to observation. But when someone is described as reading 'attentively' or 'with concentration', the special character of his activity "seems to elude the observer, the camera and the dictaphone." While there may be observable behavior in the form of a fixed gaze or knitted brows, these can be simulated, or they can be purely habitual. "In any case, in describing him as applying his mind to his task, we do not mean that this is how he looks and sounds while engaged in it." Ryle attempts to explain this character by stating that in applying a heed concept to a person, we are saying that he did what he did in a specific frame of mind. Ryle compares this to a dispositional statement of the form "He would do such-and-such". This form is a reference to a frame of mind in which a person is able, ready or likely to act: a general 'preparedness'. Ryle describes heed in the following terms: "being in that frame of mind, he was prepared to do what he did, as well as, if required, lots of other things none of which he is said to have done."

Yet Ryle himself recognizes the problematic entailment of this reference to a 'frame of mind', namely that the manner invoked by the deployment of a heed concept can be only partially explained as a reference to disposition. Ryle concedes that this reference is equally to something episodic, and therefore unobservable: "a clockable [mental] occurrence." This refers to such reports of ourselves or others as "now engaged in this, as frequently undergoing that, as having spent several minutes in an activity, or as being quick or slow to achieve a result", where these occurrences are those
which exhibit qualities of character and intellect. Ryle considers such descriptions valid, and maintains that it is, "by an unfortunate linguistic fashion, quite another thing to say that there occur mental acts and mental processes." Nonetheless, Ryle admits that this does not eliminate the problems, akin to those regarding the notion of 'volitions', which are associated with the 'episodic' nature of a heedful frame of mind. For an observer, such a frame of mind can only be inferred from the overt performances that seem to constitute its observable 'effect', and it therefore invokes the interrelated questions of (1) its inaccessibility to observation, and of (2) the dualism, to which it reverts in the form of a distinction between a frame of mind and its manifestation. This dualism is likewise entailed by (3) the 'doubling' of attention, which the notion of 'heed' seems to imply, and which in turn threatens to regress infinitely when (4) questions of causality arise.

*The Relation of a Heedful Frame of Mind to Recalling*

With regard to these questions, it is an important aspect of heed that it follows from the description of a person as heeding or minding what she is doing that the *agent* can in turn tell herself or another, without research or conjecture, what she had been trying to accomplish. Ryle sees being able to tell about what one has been doing as one of the 'results' of the preparedness associated with a heedful frame of mind. Minding what one is doing prepares us, among other things, to satisfy subsequent tests, which is what to notice or attend to entails. Putting aside questions of deceit, this may seem a way out of the difficulty of inaccessibility to observation, in that such testimony qualifies as an overt behavior and thus provides, albeit in a strictly inferential form, 'evidence' of such a frame of mind. At the same time, however, this characterization seems to imply a 'causal'
relation of sorts, between the presence of such a frame of mind at the time of activity, and the subsequent ability to relate what one had been doing. This in turn may reinforce the impression that we must here be addressing a secondary act or process. Ryle himself puts forth the questions: If heeding is not a secondary occupation of observing, or a secondary act of attention, how can it entail "having at the tip of one's tongue the answers to certain theoretical questions about one's primary occupation"?; and "How can I have knowledge of what I have been non-absent-mindedly doing or feeling, unless doing or feeling with my mind on it at least incorporates some study of what I am doing or feeling? How could I now describe what I had not previously inspected?"  

Ryle will insist, however, that this phenomenon, of a relation between a heedful frame of mind and recalling, does not entail that heeding is a second-order process. The apparent dualism does seem to fall away where he states that "[i]n the case of a sudden, unpremeditated action, even an appropriate one, his being unprepared for it is not the effect or cause of his not knowing how he came to perform it; it is the same thing, differently expressed." However, this is seemingly contradicted by the statement that "Someone may be alive to what he is doing all the time that he is doing it, despite his attention being concentrated on his task..." The following statement, concerning the nature of memory, seems to re-emphasize a causal relation, where it purports to eliminate it: "The same account holds good of not-forgetting. Not-to-have-forgotten cannot be described in terms of the performance of actual reminiscences; on the contrary, reminiscences are only one kind of exercise of the condition of not-having-forgotten. Bearing in mind is not recalling; it is what makes recalling, among other things, possible." The nature of this relation between heeding what one is doing, and being
able to recall what one was doing, will be addressed in Chapter Two through the illustration of the episodic nature of a heedful frame of mind.

*Consciousness and Introspection as Retrospection*

Ryle rejects what he calls the 'phosphorescence theory' of consciousness and introspection, which he claims to be, in part, an attempt to construe concepts of frames of mind like 'prepared', 'ready', 'on the *qui vive*', 'expect', 'realize', and the like, as concepts of "special internal happenings". These frames of mind are consistent with the characterization of heeding, minding or thinking what one is doing; in turn, consciousness, or perhaps introspection, (since it is not supposed, like consciousness, to be a 'constant', but only sometimes 'brought about') might seem a likely candidate for a more familiar identification of this frame of mind. In attempting to address this non-dispositional aspect of heed as a frame of mind, Ryle asks: "What sort of rider are we adding when we say 'I did so-and-so and knew at the time that I was doing it'?" We do have the experience of resolving to do something and, seemingly concomitantly, the impression of 'observing' ourselves resolving. Ryle claims, however, that the "plain man" doesn't speak of consciousness or introspection, but of 'catching himself' doing X, whether X be dialing the phone, fidgeting, or saying something aloud or to himself. Ryle re-characterizes consciousness and introspection as forms of retrospection and, accordingly, the experiences of 'catching oneself' and of a 'divided attention' as, respectively, "swift, retrospective heed" and a "rapid-to-and-fro switch of attention" between objects of attention, neither of which entail a doubling of attention. Ryle considers retrospection, whether prompt or delayed, to be a genuine process, and "one
which is exempt from the troubles ensuing from the assumption of a multiply divided attention.»xxxix

At this point, given the characterization of the experience of ‘catching’ oneself as a form of retrospection, it is useful to note Ryle’s observation that what I recall is always in the form of ‘myself doing X’. xl Ryle would likely insist that this form does not warrant inference to a doubling of attention at the time of performance, despite its entailing the presence of a heedful frame of mind at that time. The experience, then, of “swift retrospection”, whether of a task or ‘between’ two tasks, lends the same impression in each case: that of ‘myself’, in the ‘form’ of what philosophers call ‘consciousness’. We may therefore want to say that both experiences amount, in some sense, to ‘catching oneself’. That is, the experience of a rapid to-and-fro switch of attention, like that of catching oneself, seems to require a distinct point of ‘observation’, from which multiple elements may be perceived as those between which one’s attention is directed. On this interpretation, the problem of regress is elicited, even where that of a secondary act or process has been refuted. The relation alluded to here, between a switch of attention and the sense of ‘myself’ involved in the experience that gives rise to the notion of consciousness, will be illustrated in more detail in Chapter Two.

It may be provisionally stated, however, that the experience corresponding to the notion of heed may in fact be akin to the notion of consciousness, albeit not as the latter is theorized through metaphors of ‘illumination’ and ‘seeing’. The source of any commonality between these notions is in the ‘form’ of the experience to which they refer. In support of this, I will refer in Chapter Two to the experience of conscience, which Ryle characterizes both as the ‘prototype’ of the philosopher’s notion of consciousness,
and as a species of heed. In characterizing a heedful frame of mind, two statements will emerge as crucial: "The concept of heed is not, save per accidens, a cognitive concept", and "[t]o avoid infinite regress, it will have to be allowed that some elements in mental processes are not themselves things we can be conscious of...and then 'conscious' could no longer be retained as part of the definition of the 'mental.'" The significance of these statements will become clear in Chapter Two, in the discussion of Ryle’s characterization of 'reflection' as an 'activity'-verb.
CHAPTER TWO

The Phenomenological Illustration of the Nature of a Heedful Frame of Mind

I have attempted the following illustration of the nature of heed, and characterized it as ‘phenomenological’, as a response to Ryle’s acknowledgement that it is more than a verbal point to say that the agent is in one fashion or another ‘minding’ what he is doing. That is, to pay heed to, or to mind what one is doing certainly reflects some quality or qualities of mind. Moreover, if the logical behavior of heed-concepts, namely that associated with the features of non-redundancy and attachment to verbs of action, is a reflection of some feature(s) of the actual contexts to which they refer, then the question arises of whether a second-order act or process, seemingly entailed by the notion of heed, doesn’t also have its correlative in the experience of a heedful frame of mind. Ryle claims that ‘to give one’s mind to’ is a ‘polymorphous’ notion; one purpose of this chapter is to illustrate this claim, in a more comprehensive manner than does Ryle. To this end, examples of situations whose descriptions invoke heed concepts will be drawn from the body of Ryle’s essays on other topics. Recall that in this way, the notion of heed may be abstracted from those contexts in which arise either questions of voluntariness, or expressions denoting ‘will’. Extending the analysis of heed concepts to their employment in varied contexts will serve to illustrate some features of the actual frame of mind to which they refer, in order to address the question of its ‘episodic’ nature.
This analysis will, in addition, serve to isolate some feature(s), which can be seen to form the basis of the particular relation between this frame of mind and the invocation of its absence or presence, in determinations of voluntariness and/or of ‘willing’. This will, ultimately, provide a means of addressing any seeming equivocations regarding the employment of ‘voluntary’. I begin with an exposition of what Ryle has to say about the notion of heeding within his essay on the topic of ‘Pleasure’. This analysis will emphasize, albeit by its absence, the previously introduced feature of heed concepts consisting in their being apt to the description of situations characterized by some abnormality in the actualization of a task.

_Pleasure (and Pain) as ‘Species’ of Heeding_

Ryle’s essay entitled ‘Pleasure’ has, ostensibly, little to say regarding pleasure _per se_, but much to offer concerning the topic of heed, the polymorphous notion of which he considers pleasure to be a ‘species’. He indicates that one could not enjoy X if one were totally oblivious or unaware of it; likewise, being distressed by a pain entails not being oblivious to it. Moreover, one could not even be indifferent to X, if it were the case that one were oblivious to it. It is important to note that this ‘could not’ is not a causal ‘could not’.\textsuperscript{xiv} “the reason why I cannot, in logic, enjoy what I am oblivious of is the same as the reason why I cannot, in logic, spray my current-bushes without gardening.”\textsuperscript{xiv} But what is at the source of this logical necessity? Or as Ryle puts it, “...just what is this connection between enjoying and attending, or between being oblivious and being undistressed?"

As a preliminary to answering this question, it may be useful to examine Ryle’s
view that, despite the employment of certain idiomatic expressions, pleasure is not a ‘feeling’, nor the result of a ‘feeling’. The first sense in which ‘pleasure’ may be construed as signifying the presence of a ‘feeling’ is in that of a bodily sensation or series of bodily sensations. However, Ryle would have us concede that, while we may ask in which arm an agreeable or disagreeable tingle had been felt, it makes no sense to ask in which arm the agreeableness or disagreeableness of it had been felt. As in the case of the notion of ‘volition’, a category-mistake is exposed. Nothing in particular corresponds to the word ‘pleasure’; that is, no observable location in which it can be said to ‘take place’, illustrating that this notion does not lend itself to the attribution of such properties and characteristics of a ‘feeling’ as a bodily sensation. Moreover, where ‘feeling’ is understood in the sense of ‘sensation’, Ryle illustrates the distinction between such a ‘feeling’, and pleasure and pain, which he bases specifically on the difference in their relation to the phenomenon of attention; this illustration is, for our purposes, instructive with regard to the phenomenon of attention itself.

Of a battery of unsolved conceptual questions about sensations, I want here to raise one in particular... We say that a man with... an aching head... can, in certain circumstances, forget his discomfort... Now if he does for a time forget his headache, should we say that his headache has stopped? Or that it has continued, but been for a time unfelt? Or that it has been felt all along, but has not for that time distressed him? We hardly want to say that the burning house across the road was an anodyne — indeed, if we did want to say this, we should not want to say that it caused the man to ‘forget’ his pain. In this use of ‘forget’, we can only forget discomforts that are still there. Nor could we well speak of the difficulty of distracting a person from his itches, if we did not think in some way the itches were in competition with the jokes or anecdotes with which we try to distract him.’ [In contradistinction] we are reluctant to speak either of unfelt pains, or of felt but unnoticed pains, (or of pains being both felt and noticed but (in this use) completely forgotten. xlvii
This illustrates that pleasure and pain cannot be feelings in the aforementioned sense of ‘sensation’, since sensation stands in a very different relation to our attention to it, than do pleasure and pain. Close attention to the employment, in the preceding quotation, of ‘discomfort’ or ‘pain’ as opposed to the ‘headache’ or ‘itches’ themselves, will testify to this. The reason it makes no sense to speak of ‘unfelt pains’ is not because pain is a feeling, but rather for the same reason that it makes no sense to speak of ‘unnoticed’ pains, and yet does make sense to speak of ‘unnoticed sensations’\footnote{\textsuperscript{xlvi}}: though the having of feelings (sensations) is sometimes involved in speaking of pain and pleasure, it is not a sufficient condition, for the former depends on our attending to those feelings, to which, conversely, we may grant a continued independent existence, despite any temporary distraction from, or ‘forgetting’ of them.

Ryle states that we may, alternately, attempt to characterize pleasure as a ‘non-bodily’ feeling in a sense ‘analogous’ to that of a bodily feeling. This is actually the sense in which pleasure as a ‘feeling’ is most likely to be meant. But if a ‘tingle’ may be agreeable, disagreeable or neutral, and enjoying and disliking were correctly co-classified with such ‘feelings’, then it would make sense to ask whether the person had enjoyed or disliked having the pleasure or dislike feeling. “Enjoying or disliking a tingle would be, on this showing, having one bodily feeling and one non-bodily feeling. Either, then, this non-bodily feeling is, in its turn, something that can be pleasant or unpleasant, which would require yet another, non-bodily feeling…”\footnote{\textsuperscript{xix}} Moreover, the analogy between pleasure and feeling continues to collapse with a request to describe, as one would a ‘tingle’, the enjoyment of the tingle. The attempted description of a tingle lends itself to
such similes as ‘like a tickle’, ‘like a series of mild electrical shocks’, or ‘like a shiver’.

Yet it is impossible to describe pleasure or enjoyment in the same way, not even in retrospect; and the impossibility of describing the pleasure or enjoyment is not due to the requisite switch of attention from the smell to the question. There simply is no phenomenon to describe, except the ‘tingle’.

A further idiomatic use of ‘feeling’, which is rejected in the attempt to thus characterize pleasure, is that in which moods or frames of mind are often called ‘feelings’. Given Ryle’s characterization of pleasure as a species of heed, and his claim that heed refers to a specific frame of mind, it may appear that his subsequent rejection of the characterization of pleasure as a frame of mind presents a contradiction. However, I interpret Ryle’s refutation as being limited to the attempt to characterize pleasure as a frame of mind, if a ‘frame of mind’ is construed as a ‘feeling’. What follows will therefore serve to reinforce Ryle’s illustration: that pleasure is neither a ‘feeling’ nor akin to a ‘feeling’, a characterization which would entail that ‘pleasure’ signifies the presence of something concomitant or concurrent, because independent of that which is enjoyed. Moreover, this refutation will illustrate that pleasure exhibits the logical behaviors associated with heed as outlined in Chapter One, thus serving to reinforce its identification as a species of heed.

Ryle states that though “a person in a cheerful or energetic mood is predisposed to enjoy, inter alia, any walk that he may take, what he enjoys is this particular walk. His enjoyment of it is not the fact that he is predisposed to enjoy any occupations or activities.” Enjoyment must always be of something to which one attends. “The enjoyment of a walk is not, however, a concomitant, e.g., introspectible effect of the
walking, such that there might be two histories, one the history of the walk, the other the
history of its agreeableness to the walker. Pleasure cannot outlast the attention paid to
the thing or activity; nor can one clock the duration of one's enjoyment against the
duration of the thing enjoyed. If pleasure were something concomitant or concurrent to an
activity, it would also be separate and could, in principle, go on 'by itself' in one or more
of the aforementioned ways. Pleasure cannot, therefore, be characterized as a mood or
frame of mind where these entail the double-life corollaries associated with 'feeling'; and
yet, the characterization of pleasure as a species of heeding does refer it, in turn, to a
frame of mind.

Thus the logical behavior of pleasure concepts illustrates the 'official' view that
enjoying is not a secondary act or process; yet at the same time, it elicits the problematic
feature of heeding generally, which consists in a seeming return to this impression in its
clearly signifying something both dispositional and episodic. Specifically, Ryle states that
"he enjoys his walk only while taking it, but he had felt cheerful or energetic, perhaps,
ever since he got out of bed. So enjoying something is not the same sort of thing as being
or feeling cheerful. On the contrary, the notion of being cheerful has to be explained in
terms of the notion of pleasure, since to be cheerful is to be easy to please." Thus just as
in the case of heeding generally, the dispositional nature of pleasure requires explanation via
its episodic nature. When we describe someone as enjoying or disliking, just as when we
describe them as 'attentive', 'careful', or 'scrupulous', whether we are describing
something of a limited duration or an aspect of his character generally, we make implicit
reference to a frame of mind of an episodic nature.

Why have I included this fairly detailed discussion of the notion of 'pleasure'? In
part, because the counterintuitive claim that pleasure is a species of heedings may have required some illustration; this, in turn, allowed for a recapitulation of both the logical behavior and the problematic aspects of heed concepts, as framed in Chapter One. However, the ultimate purpose of including this illustration of pleasure as a species of heed is to emphasize that the contexts in which questions of voluntariness, or references to ‘willing’ arise, can be distinguished from those in which pleasure concepts are employed, by some particular feature: that of some abnormality in the actualization of a task, which may or may not be overcome by some form of ‘heed’ to what one is doing. The reason that the characterization of pleasure as a species of heed may initially strike one as counterintuitive, is that our deployment of pleasure-concepts in descriptions of experience do not, as a rule, denote an element of heed; this element is presupposed by the notion of pleasure. This is a reflection of the fact that situations of enjoyment do not present us with any such element of impediment, in the form of potential distraction or diversion, which would make the employment of a heed concept non-redundant.

Consequently, the claim that pleasure is a species of heed allows us to perceive that, while attending itself is not something relegated to those situations whose descriptions invoke expressions denoting heed, some more-than-linguistic distinction underlies that invocation. The phenomenon in question may be stated thus: a heedful frame of mind can be said to ‘arise’ only when an impediment presents itself to the normal actualization of a task. I will now address this more-than-linguistic element, that is, the experience of heeding, which underlies our invocation of heed concepts. This will illustrate both the episodic nature of heed and, accordingly, how it is that we come to have the impression that minding what we’re doing involves a concomitant act.
'Acts' of Attention

"What", Ryle asks, "is there to be said about the notions of attention and oblivion themselves?" In attempting to answer this question, Ryle first examines the differences between the functions of various idioms denoting attention: "When excited or bored, I may not think what I am saying; but to say this is to say less than that I am talking recklessly. I may be interested in something when it would be too severe to say that I am concentrating on it; and I may concentrate on something which fails to capture my interest." (In fact, it is only to the degree that I am not interested in something, in the presence of a competing interest, that I would be aptly described as ‘concentrating’ on it (‘having’ to concentrate)). This demonstrates that heed-concepts exhibit a ‘range’, and that heed itself is therefore something admitting of ‘degrees’. Elsewhere, Ryle states that: "Attention is sometimes attracted, sometimes lent, sometimes paid and sometimes exacted." Otherwise stated, sometimes attending is easy, and sometimes it is difficult; and sometimes it is difficult, even impossible not to attend. This illustrates that that ‘against’ which degrees of heed are determined appears in the form of other, potentially distracting, objects of attention. We may generalize this phenomenon by returning to the logical behavior of heed concepts in the following way, returning for a moment to the context of ‘feelings’ (sensations). Ryle states that:

A competing excitement may totally absorb [the man with a headache]; or by an effort of will...he may concentrate his whole mind upon some other matter. The more acute his discomfort, the less likely he is to get or keep his mind on other things; his effort of will has to be the more strenuous or the countervailing excitement has to be the greater. It seems to be a tautology to say that, as his discomfort approaches torture, the difficulty of distracting his mind from it
Thus the ‘range’ of idioms denoting attention reflects the phenomenon that heeding or minding is something that not only admits of ‘degrees’ but that, if invoked, is necessarily an implicit reference to some element of the context representing a potential competition for attention. Attending is spoken of; that is, is non-redundant, only when an ‘act’ of attention has occurred; and ‘acts’ of attention occur only when attending is difficult.

When a person is actually bidden by someone else or by himself to attend, there is something which with some effort or reluctance he does. Where his attention had been wandering, it now settles...and this change he may bring about with a wrench. But the spectator at an exciting football match does not have to try to fasten or canalize his attention...His attention was fixed, but he went through no operations of fixing it.

But this is precisely why the spectator at the football match’s ‘attention’ “has a smell of unreality about it”. Recall Ryle’s claim that explicit, non-redundant talk about heed occurs most commonly in instruction-situations and accusation-situations. Mention of the spectator’s ‘attention’ is redundant in this context, since the spectator “is not taking pains to improve his wits, or dutifully abiding by any rules. He is attending, but not in either of these special modes of attention. Being excited or interested is not being sedulous; it is, more nearly, not-having-to-be-sedulous.” There are only ‘acts’ of attention; there are no ‘acts’ of interest. I suggest that pleasure-concepts and pain-concepts, and expressions denoting efforts of ‘will’ may, in effect, be seen as occupying the opposite extremes of the range in question. In support of this, Ryle’s point may be
invoked that, noticing the things he is doing, as part of the description of the agent
driving carefully, is a way of generalizing his taking pains to avoid collisions; whereas
noticing a strong smell, whether pleasant or unpleasant, does not involve taking pains at
all. Thus while attention cannot be said to be something that is 'present' only in
contexts characterized by an element of abnormality or difficulty (for sometimes
attending is easy), it is something which is manifest, and is at once noteworthy and
notable as an 'act', only in situations of impediment to the normal actualization of a task.
This point will become clearer with subsequent illustrations, in particular those of the
experiences of conscience and of reflection.

For the moment, we may ask the question of what, given that we apply
multifarious criteria in determining what constitutes one act, affords us the impression
that an 'act' of attention has occurred? One part of the answer to this question is to be
found within this cardinal feature of a difficulty or impediment, in the form of (potential)
distraction. The overcoming of this difficulty, in favor of the task in question, constitutes
the 'wrench' with which a switch in focus of attention, or a settling of attention, is felt. In
the case of a to-and-fro switch of attention, it seems that the objects between which one's
attention moves stand in a relation of reciprocal constitution with retrospectively
identifiable 'acts' of attention. Another part lies in the aspect, introduced in Chapter One,
of the agent's being able to later tell about what she was doing at the time of a particular
performance, which recollection is seen as 'evidence' that the agent was minding what
she was doing at that time. Recall the statement, illustrating one of the logical behaviors
of heed concepts, that we hesitate to speak of pains "being both felt and noticed but (in
this use) completely forgotten." Taken together, these aspects of heed may adequately
respond to the above question concerning ‘acts’ of attention, by relating it to the question of the episodic nature of heed.

The following illustrations will, perhaps, clarify this relation between impediment (here in the form of competition for attention), a heedful frame of mind, and the formation of an ‘act’ of attention. That is, the episodic nature of a heedful frame of mind is an experience that might be described as giving rise to a form of ‘spectatorship’, though Ryle would insist that this does not denote a separate or secondary act of inspecting or monitoring.\(^6\) However, it seems clear that for there to appear an ‘act’ of attention, which may in turn be recalled, and recalled in the form of ‘oneself doing X’, one must in some sense be the ‘spectator’, as well as the performer, of one’s own act(s).

Consider the following comments, regarding the metaphors of being ‘absorbed’ and ‘occupied’:

...when a child is absorbed in his game, he - every drop of him - is sucked up into the business of...His game is, for the moment, his whole world....Yet when we say that he is wholly absorbed in his game, we do not accept the entire parallel of the ink and the blotting-paper. For the blotting-paper had been one thing and the ink blot another. But the game which absorbs the child is nothing but the child himself, playing trains. He, the player, has, for the moment, sucked up, without resistance, every drop of himself that might have been on other businesses, or on no business at all.\(^6\)

And as to being occupied, in this case by what one is reading,

...here again the parallel is only fragmentary, since here both the citizens and the occupying troops are the reader himself. He is under control and he is the controller. It is his policy or his whim that directs and permits those doings of his which, if he were unoccupied would otherwise be without these directions and
In attempting to relate this passage to the notion of a form of ‘spectatorship’
entailed by a heedful frame of mind, the following question may be posed: When one has
been ‘absorbed’, how well is one able to relate what one had been doing? That is, to what
extent can this be clearly recounted in the form of a process, or a procession of discrete,
identifiable ‘acts’? In response to this, I would argue that to the extent that the word
‘absorbed’ is aptly employed, one should be unable to recall in a determinate manner
what one had been doing at such time. The concept of absorption, when applied
metaphorically to persons, presupposes that no other object or activity provided any
competition for the agent’s attention; in the absence of any effort through which one
would either transfer or fix one’s attention, or of the transference of one’s attention
between objects, there is a corresponding absence of a ‘spectator’ produced by the form
of the experience of heed. Though it may initially appear to be an ironic statement,
‘absorption’, properly speaking, excludes the presence of a heedful frame of mind. Being
‘occupied’, by contrast, signifies a ‘lesser’ degree of attention; yet for that reason, this
experience, as depicted above, entails, or at least allows for, the ‘spectatorship’
characteristic of a heedful frame of mind. This person would indeed recall more clearly
the process of his performance, precisely because the concept of ‘occupation’ entails the
presence of both an activity and an agent, and therefore the possibility of the agent’s
being both the author and spectator of his own performance.

It would appear that it is the ‘framing’ associated with the experience of heed that
allows for the emergence of ‘acts’ of attention. Moreover, a heedful frame of mind
seems, in distinction to attention, to be a condition of the injection of oneself into the experience of attending, and the correlative possibility of recollection. The following illustration of the experience of conscience will further clarify this point. It will moreover, introduce another aspect of the experience in question: note that the employment of ‘distraction’ is evaluative, relative to the implicit judgment that an object is one to which the agent ‘ought’ to be attending; it is therefore also an implicit reference to a rule.

The ‘Form’ of Heeding

The experience of ‘conscience’ is certainly not unrelated to the question of voluntariness, specifically in the case of one of the employments involved in the common equivocation introduced in Chapter One. This equivocation consisted in the employment of the word ‘voluntary’ to signify, in one respect, actions characterized by absent-mindedness on the part of the agent, as in the Concept analysis of that word; as well as those actions whose voluntariness is determined on the basis of the presence of a heedful frame of mind, perceived as ‘intent’ or ‘purpose’. Thus in the second case, the blameworthiness of the action is a reference, not merely to a lapse or error, ‘doing something wrong’, i.e., incorrectly, but to ‘doing something wrong’, i.e., an ‘immoral’ act. It is with respect to the latter case that we employ such expressions as ‘on purpose’, ‘deliberate’, and the like, to signify that the agent ‘knowingly’ or with ‘presence’ of mind did wrong.

Ryle characterizes conscience as “one species, among others, of scrupulousness”. Recall that ‘scrupulously’ was, in turn, included among those adverbs denoting heed.
Ryle defines scrupulousness as:

...the operative acceptance of a rule or principle which consists in the disposition to behave...in accordance with the rule. Scruples, whether of conscience or of any other species of scrupulousness, occur only when the normal actualisation of the disposition is impeded or balked. And they, too, are only a special way in which the disposition is actualised, viz. when it cannot be normally actualised.\[33]\n
Otherwise stated, conscience, like any other instance of heed, “is active or calls for attention when this disposition is balked by some contrary inclination”, in the form of temptation or interruption or hesitation. Corresponding to the feature of an element of abnormality in situations invoking a heedful frame of mind, Ryle states that conscience is ‘awake’ only in conflict:

The test for the existence of such a conflict is the occurrence of attention to the problem of what is to be done. Pangs or qualms of conscience can occur only when I am both disposed to act in one way and disposed to act in another and when one of these dispositions is an operative moral principle. (And this ‘can...only’ is logical and not causal.) Wondering what to do is a manifestation of a balked disposition to act; if it was not balked I would act as I am disposed to act for this is what ‘disposed’ means. Consulting my conscience entails attending introspectively to my conflicting dispositions to act.\[34]\n
One's knowledge or conviction of a principle is not an external censor but an internal competitor. This knowledge of how one should behave does not cause but is a nisus to one's behaving in that way; but it is a felt nisus only when it is impeded.\[35]\n
As a form of heed, then, scrupulousness is not felt until the actual occurrence of scruples, which in turn the agent would not feel unless she were dispositionally scrupulous, and on a given occasion had not been scrupulous enough; but her ordinary scrupulousness does not normally require the occurrence of actual scruples. “God would calculate (if at all)
with 100% scrupulousness and 0% scruples. Similarly, he would always do the right thing and never wonder what he ought to do. He would never consult his conscience and would never have pangs of conscience.\textsuperscript{bvi} On this analysis, dispositional ‘heedfulness’, like ordinary attentiveness, would go for the most part unnoticed, by both the agent and observers, because it would be associated with the normal actualization of tasks. Only the ‘episodic’ nature of a heedful frame of mind is noteworthy, that is, reflected in our employment of heed-concepts. Moreover, it can be said that only the noteworthy (abnormal) engenders this frame of mind.

Ryle also states that in a case of such conflict, the agent “will feel a tension because he is the two tendencies to act which are in conflict. ‘It goes against the grain.’ And these two tendencies, with their conflict, are visible on self-inspection or inferrible from what he can introspect.”\textsuperscript{bvi} Here we are presented with the impression of ‘oneself’, as characteristic of the form of the experience of a heedful frame of mind. Yet Ryle’s use of ‘introspect’ in this context is clearly not a reference to the ‘seeing’ or ‘inspection’ of a previously existing self, but to the production of this impression through the tension between competing objects of the agent’s attention. This element will be developed in the course of this chapter.

Thus ‘conscience’ is manifest only in the form of a crisis of conscience. The particular tension associated with conscience stems from one of the objects of the agent’s attention being a rule or principle, that is, a formulation of an operative disposition. However, it should be noted here that there are convictions of ‘rules’ other than ‘moral’ ones, and that these engender the same sort of commands and ‘nagings’.\textsuperscript{bvi} There are rules of prudence, to which ‘caution’ is an implicit reference; rules of etiquette, which
give rise to our sense of decorum; and rules of arithmetic, attention to which coincides with the detection of error. When we speak of ‘conscience’, as something purporting specifically to ‘moral’ rules, the form of the experience does not appear to distinguish itself in any way. How it is that we draw a distinction between the experience of attending to moral rules, as opposed to other kinds of rules, will be addressed in Chapter Three, as will the sense in which we seem to be referring to this state of mind when we speak of ‘voluntariness’ as signifying that conscience was consulted, and that the agent ‘purposefully’, ‘intentionally’, or ‘deliberately’ did wrong.

Recall that Ryle states that the philosophical notion of ‘consciousness’ is derived from that of ‘conscience’, insofar as pertains to the form of a particular frame of mind. Moreover, this form is that which characterizes Ryle’s conception of an instruction-situation’. As part of his view that all learning amounts to self-teaching, Ryle states that in learning, the agent “becomes a judge of his own performance...He learns how to teach himself and so to better his instructions.” To learn means to “double the roles of instructor and pupil; [the agent] learns to coach himself and to heed his own coaching, i.e. to suit his deeds to his own words.” With the latter part of this remark is emphasized the fact that under normal circumstances, the successful performance of a learned behavior is not coupled with any acts of theorizing or any self-persuasions. It is only the appearance of some difficulty or other abnormality in the actualization of a task that has the effect of calling attention to the task as a process, through a kind of ‘doubling’, not merely of attention, allowing the agent to become a ‘spectator’ to her own performance, but of ‘oneself’ in the form of distinct roles.

The introduction of the element of adherence to a rule or principle, signifies that
the ‘spectatorship’ in question is not by its nature passive, and that the employment of (self-)‘coaching’ or ‘teaching’ is far more apt to the description of this experience. For a heedful frame of mind at the time of a performance does more than allow us to tell about it later. Driving carefully reduces the risk of accidents, and being attentive to one’s speech reduces the risk of *faux pas*, as well as enabling the agent to subsequently answer questions about these activities. ‘Wondering what to do’ heralds the initiation of an instruction-situation; the extent to which the ‘preparedness’, with which heed is identified, is engendered, is the extent to which the agent is able to respond to this situation. I take the general ‘preparedness’ of a heedful frame of mind as an implicit reference to a range of various possible responses that might be appropriate, of the possible consequences of these courses of action, and the like. As such, however, it entails a ‘disengagement’, in order to produce the point of view from which such possibilities may be contemplated. I identify such disengagement, and therefore a heedful frame of mind itself, with the experience called ‘reflection’. By doing so, Ryle’s statements regarding the topic of reflection appear to clarify the nature of heed and, specifically, its relation to voluntariness. The topic of rules will be resumed in Chapter Three, with particular regard to this relation.

*Heed as Disengagement*

In the essay “Thinking and Reflecting”, Ryle sets out to understand what the difference is between these words. As is well known, Ryle takes the view that “the programme of identifying thinking with some procession or other is radically misguided”, and that one can be thinking what one is doing while engaged in an activity, as indicated
by our characterization of the agent or activity as ‘cautious’, ‘alert’, ‘resourceful’, ‘experimental’, ‘imaginative’, ‘cunning’, and so on. Ryle thus employs the example of a tennis player for the characterization of thinking, and that of Rodin’s *le Penseur* for that of ‘reflecting’.

The tennis-player is thinking what he is doing, and Rodin’s *le Penseur* is obviously thinking...But while [the tennis player] is engaged in the game, with his mind on the game, he looks and mostly is unreflective or unpensive... *le Penseur* is in some degree detached from what is going on around him; but the tennis-player’s thinking almost consists in his whole...attention being given to, *inter alia*, the flight of ball over the net, the position of his opponent, the strength of wind, and so on. Both are absorbed, but the tennis-player’s absorption is in his and his opponent’s momentary playing, while *le Penseur*’s absorption is in something detached from the rock-squatting that he is momentarily doing, and the rain-drops that are momentarily wetting him. His quick and appropriate responses to what occurs around him on the tennis-court show that the player is concentrating. His non-responses to what occurs around him show, or help to show, that *le Penseur* is concentrating.

It would seem at this point that the difference between thinking and reflecting might lie in a kind of inner *versus* outer, passive *versus* active distinction. However, Ryle chooses to reserve the verb ‘reflecting’ for the thus disengaged thinking of *le Penseur*, “with a good deal of arbitrariness and imprecision”, for “there will assuredly be some halfway-house cases of thinking which have some of the engagement of the tennis-player and some of the disengagement of *le Penseur*, i.e., someone doing something *fairly deliberately* may be in this halfway-house.” What is common to both the tennis player and to *le Penseur* in their respective activities is the state of ‘preparedness’ for indeterminate eventualities within a certain range, in the form of disengagement from what is presently at hand in the task. This is crucial to the illustration of the identification
of heed with reflection: as in the case of the ‘absorbed’ child, one can be thinking what one is doing without heed ‘arising’, because it is an engaged thinking; whereas an action performed in a heedful frame of mind, as in the case of the ‘occupied’ reader, seems also to denote some measure of disengagement vis-à-vis engaged thinking. That is, disengagement seems to be that which allows me to become the ‘spectator’ of my own act, as a form of ‘reflection’.

Recall from Chapter One that adverbial verbs are often mistaken for active verbs. Just as the employment of a noun, such as ‘care’, ‘attention’, or ‘concentration’, may mislead us into thinking that what is being signified is the presence of a mental ‘entity’, so we are often misled into thinking that “because a verb is an active, tensed verb, in a sentence the nominative to which designates a person, therefore the person is being said to be performing an action, or doing something.” ¹³ Olympic Those which exhibit the feature that any completed sentence containing such a verb could be paraphrased by a sentence containing a proper verb of doing, qualified by the corresponding adverb, are a special class (“a pretty fluffy-edged class”), of verbs. This class includes verbs that signify heeding, minding, or thinking what one is doing, such as ‘taking care’, ‘being vigilant’, ‘trying’, and the like. Other than this feature, the members of this class have little in common, save a certain negative thing: they are not autonomous doings, and they must attach themselves to a real action verb. In addition,

...if, unlike the absent-minded or delirious man, a person has been doing something, thinking what he was doing, usually he can, afterwards...tell us what he was trying to do...But to grant this is not to grant that to have been thinking what he was doing, X-ing, say, he must have been doing something else as well, Y-ing, say, e.g. telling himself in his head things in indicative, imperative and optative...or picturing things in his mind’s eye either. He may in fact have been
doing some bits of such Y-ing but it is not for these that he qualifies as having been thinking what he was doing.\textsuperscript{locv}

So when we say of someone that he is thinking, for example, what he is saying, we attribute a host of different things that he did, but none of these was an autonomous action or activity. On the contrary, Ryle states that "indeed it could be because he had been doing some such bits of Y-ing that he had not been thinking what he was doing, namely the X-ing - as the centipede found who tried to run while considering how to run,"\textsuperscript{locvi}, or Hamlet, who distracts himself from the business at hand by discoursing with himself.\textsuperscript{locvii}

Ryle attempts to explain why it is that we have the impression that ‘thinking what one is doing’ is an action or activity at all:

When we think in the abstract about thinking, it is usually reflecting, calculating, deliberating, etc. that we attend to...By the plural noun ‘thoughts’ we ordinarily refer to what le Penseur’s reflectings either incorporate or else are going to terminate in, if they prosper. Indeed, it is just because reflecting is what we start off by considering, that we later on feel a strong pressure to suppose that for the tennis-player to be thinking what he is doing, he must be sandwiching some fleeting stretches of reflecting between some stretches of running, racquet-swinging, and ball-watching. That is, because reflecting does, or does seem to, qualify as an autonomous activity, therefore such adverbial expressions as ‘on purpose’, ‘vigilantly’, ‘carefully’, ‘cunningly’, ‘tentatively’, ‘experimentally’, ‘resolutely’, etc., seem to need to be construed as signifying some extra-autonomous things that the tennis-player must be privily doing.\textsuperscript{locviii}

Ryle’s claim, then, is that the adverbial verb ‘to think’ is presupposed by the activity verb ‘to reflect’. Recall from Chapter One that Ryle does not consider ‘heed’ as signifying a cognitive concept, nor consciousness to be necessarily included as a ‘mental’
phenomenon. What Ryle aims to show is that "it is the notion of engaged thinking, like that of the tennis-player or the conversationalist, that is the basic notion, while that of disengaged thinking or reflecting, like that of le Penseur, is supervenient."\textsuperscript{11} That is, while there can be no disengaged thinking without engaged thinking, and the two sorts of thinking may be distinguished, disengaged thinking appears to be a condition of non-absentmindedness. In this respect, though, it must be noted that such disengagement may be 'neutral' \textit{vis-à-vis} thought, for clearly the tennis-player is minding what he is doing. At the same time, the sort of verbs which we are most likely to be associated with reflecting, such as pondering, calculating, and the like, are so associated because they entail such an element of disengagement: they can be done with greater or less care, attention, etc., but they cannot be done with a 'zero' degree.\textsuperscript{12}

In keeping with his view that 'intelligence' is directly exercised and exhibited as well in some practical as in some theoretical performances, and therefore need incorporate no 'shadow-action', Ryle states that "the notions of being pensive and having thoughts do not explain, but need to be explained via the notion of intelligently X-ing, where X is not a verb of thinking."\textsuperscript{13} Recall that Ryle referred to adverbs denoting heed as 'intelligence' adverbs; and with regard to what may constitute 'intelligence', or the manner signified by 'intelligently', it is significant that Ryle characterizes 'to reflect' as an 'activity'-verb. What Ryle has done is to refute both the equation of thinking with some internal act or process, and the characterization of reflection as some special form or manner of thinking. Moreover, Ryle has, in effect, reversed these: thinking is no longer an activity at all, but a qualifier of activities, while reflection represents an activity, albeit neutral with regard to cognition. Ryle is then entitled to state that "[we] are not always
thinking when we are internally or externally debating. We are not always debating [contra Plato] when we are reflecting. This is to say that debating can be done unthinkingly, i.e. badly, and that, while reflection is a condition of ratiocination if performed ‘thinkingly’, it is not synonymous with, nor limited to, such cognitive tasks.

In addition, recall Ryle’s claims that “[s]omeone may be alive to what he is doing all the time that he is doing it, despite his attention being concentrated on his task” and that “bearing-in-mind is what makes recalling [and thus being able to tell oneself or another what one had been trying to do], among other things, possible”. Ryle maintained that neither of these entailed a secondary act of observing or monitoring. A possible conciliation of these claims lies in this characterization of reflection as an ‘activity’ in the form of disengagement, and thus as a likely candidate for the condition of general ‘preparedness’, as the ‘manner’ in which Ryle characterizes ‘heeding’ or ‘minding’ what one is doing. ‘Thinking what one is doing’ is seen to denote doing something ‘thinkingly’, which has as its condition the actual activity of disengagement involved in reflection.

As has been previously noted, a heedful frame of mind may or may not itself be noted (as episodic) by the agent; thus the tennis player can be thinking what he is doing, and exhibit in his performance the kind of ‘preparedness’ in question, yet we would not want to describe him as doing anything ‘deliberately’. In turn, Ryle is clear that

...[as] detachedness or disengagedness, in strong contrast with the tennis-player’s engaged thinking, le Penseur’s reflecting itself, no less than tennis-playing, does require such adverbial things as trying, testing, experimenting, practising, initiative, avoidance or correction of lapses, resistance to distractions, interest, patience, self-coaching, etc. Whatever le Penseur is engaged in that qualifies him as reflecting, he cannot, any more than the tennis-player, be absent-mindedly or
deliriously or infantilely engaged in it...Both alike must be on the qui vive...*Le Penseur*...cannot not be thinking what he is doing, i.e. not be X-ing vigilantly, pertinaciously, etc. So even disengaged thinking, i.e. reflecting, is also, like tennis-playing, a species of engaged thinking.*

This seems to illustrate the reciprocal relationship that stands between a heedful frame of mind as a condition of thinking what one is doing, and the fact that *something* must always be done with heed. The fact that heed cannot go on by itself shows that, far from being a secondary act, it is not a separate act at all. In turn, though, a heedful frame of mind could not arise, as it does in a situation of impediment to the normal actualization of an specific task, unless one were thinking what one was doing; there can be no disengaged thinking without engaged thinking.

However, Ryle admits the difficulty of nominating any corresponding autonomous activity or activities such that *le Penseur* must be doing more or less exploratorily, tentatively, pertinaciously, pugnaciously, scrupulously or cannily. What is the activity that *le Penseur* is “non-absent-mindedly, non-somnolently or non-deliriously doing which, if done absent-mindedly or somnolently or deliriously would not then amount to pondering, calculating, etc.”? Ryle’s question may be answered by another question, one posed in the *Concept*: “what”, Ryle asks there,

...is the force of the word ‘as’, when we say that an agent does something as the action ordered or as a facsimile or as practice or as a means to an end or as a game; or, in general, as the execution of a specific programme? What is the difference between going merely mechanically through certain movements and trying to satisfy some specific requirement by going through, perhaps, perfectly similar movements?
Ryle claims that part of the answer lies in the notion of learned behavior. Recall
that for Ryle, learning is always in the form of self-teaching; in contradistinction to drill
or habituation, which dispenses with intelligence, education or training enlarges it.
“Learning is becoming capable of doing some correct or suitable thing in any situations
of certain general sorts. It is becoming prepared for variable calls within certain
ranges.”11 A parallel may be drawn on the basis of the previous statement, between a
learned behavior and heed, identified as a ‘ready’ frame of mind or as a general
‘preparedness’. It is, moreover, in connection with the topic of heed that the question was
posed regarding the force of the word ‘as’, insofar as actions so qualified involve some
degree of heed, “as instinctive and purely habitual reflex actions do not.”1111

Intention-parasitism and Circumstance-emancipation

To return to the essay in which it is posed, Ryle’s answer to the question, of what
le Penseur is doing that qualifies his activity as thinking what he is doing, is to be found
in the view that adverbial verbs may ‘pyramid’, in what he deems “concept-parasitism”.
“The notion of stealing is parasitic on the notion of owning; the notion of pretending to
steal is parasitic on the notion of stealing; and the notion of rebelliously pretending to
steal is parasitic upon the notion of pretending to steal. And so on.” From this, Ryle
makes the leap to the following statement: “When the intention with which an agent does
X is ancillary to the intention with which he will or would do Y, we can say that his X-ing
is an intention-parasite on his Y-ing.”1110 The grammatical fact of concept-parasitism
would thus appear to be a reflection of the phenomenon of intention-parasitism. The
example given is that of practicing golf, and Ryle emphasizes two points regarding the

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notion of ‘practice’:

[One] cannot be practicing without, in some way, having in mind the non-practice approach-shots of future live matches. The ‘thick’ description of what he is engaged in requires reference to his thoughts, in some sense, of future [will-be or may-be] non-practice approach-shots. That is what they are for. His activity of practicing approach-shots is parasitic on that of making match approach-shots.”

[Second], the practice-shots are in some degree detached or disengaged from the conditions under which match approach-shots have to be made. The practiser can play from where he likes; he can hit without having to wait for his turn; he need not even have a green to play for; a tree stump in a field would do. He need have only a mashie with him. Indeed, he might do without golf-balls and a mashie; dandelions and a walking-stick might serve his turn. As his circumstance-dependence and apparatus-dependence decrease, so his practice-actions approximate more and more closely to being pure ‘voluntaries’, that is, things the doing of which is within his absolute initiative and option. I suggest already that his partial detachment from the circumstances and the apparatus of golf-matches points up the road to le Penseur’s total or nearly total detachment from what exists and is going on around him.xx

I take this passage to provide, through the cardinal features of intention-parasitism and circumstance-emancipation, an illustration of the nature of heed as a general ‘preparedness’: “future will-be or may-be” shots is, like preparedness, a reference to a form of (re)contextualization, or to the frame of mind in which this is possible. Other activities that share these cardinal features include waiting, preparing, testing, trying, and the like. I have characterized heed along the lines of reflective disengagement on the basis that it seems to adequately represent the relation between a heedful frame of mind, and the ‘positive’ sense of voluntariness from the last passage. It does so, in part, by extending the significance of what it can mean that a task cannot be ‘normally’ actualized: for example, if I do not have my golf club, or an opponent, then the task of
playing golf cannot be normally actualized, in which case I may initiate a practice
(instruction) situation. What I have attempted to illustrate here is the relation between the
cardinal features of circumstance-emancipation and intention-parasitism, the activity of
reflection or disengagement (a heedful frame of mind), and now a form of
‘voluntariness’.

However, Ryle states that “[the practicer] does not need to have 100 per cent.
circumstance-emancipation in order to qualify as reflecting...His pensiveness does not
require total absence of visible or audible X-ing; but the X-ing must be very much his
own ad lib.” As was previously stated, there will assuredly be some halfway-house
cases of thinking which have some of the engagement of the tennis-player and some of
the disengagement of le Penseur, i.e., someone doing something fairly deliberately may
be in this halfway-house. Recall, also, the metaphor of being ‘occupied’, as opposed to
being ‘absorbed’. It would appear that heed occurs, by definition, exclusively in
‘halfway’ situations, given that something must be done with heed (engaged), and yet
some degree of disengagement is necessary in order to characterize an action as
‘voluntary’, that is, as one response among variable responses.

So we may begin to perceive in what sense one act might be more ‘voluntary’
than another, signifying the presence of a particular frame of mind, namely that which is
referred to by heed concepts. Yet the Concept analysis has it that ‘voluntary’ is properly
used to signify only blameworthy acts characterized by insufficient heed, relative to the
known capacities of the agent. This will be taken up in Chapter Three, as will the
common employment of the word to signify not only the presence of heedful frame of
mind, but this with particular regard to performances considered blameworthy, as the
practicing of golf shots does not appear to be.

Thus far we have seen that adverbs such as ‘deliberately’, ‘intentionally’, ‘on purpose’, and the like, which have traditionally been seen as signifying the presence of ‘volition’, in fact denote that the actions qualified by these adverbs were performed in a heedful frame of mind, as do other intelligence adverbs, such as carefully, vigilantly, attentively, scrupulously, and so on. The notion of heed, however, elicited similar problematic entailments as did that of ‘volitions’, namely those arising from the characterization of heed as a ‘frame of mind’. As such, heed concepts were seen to be a reference to a ‘mental’ phenomenon, yet one which is only partially dispositional. It is also necessarily ‘episodic’, emphasizing its inaccessibility to observation, and thereby connoting a dualistic model of mind, whereas it had been invoked as part of Ryle’s refutation of Cartesian dualism, and of the faculty of ‘Will’ as the logical entailment of this model.

Ryle maintained that the notion of heed does not entail any second-order process of inspecting or monitoring, yet admitted that the manner or character of actions performed in a heedful frame of mind is unavoidably perplexing, because of this ‘episodic’ nature and the ‘doubling’ of attention it seems to entail. The logical behavior of heed concepts illustrated that, since they require supplementation by the participle of a specific active verb, these do not signify the presence of a concomitant act or process; however, it also illustrated that the employment of heed adverbs is appropriate only in the description of task or process verbs. This grammatical fact was shown to be a reflection of a phenomenon whereby the appearance of an abnormality in the actualization of a task had the effect of calling attention to the task as a process. This phenomenon was
addressed as part of the ‘phenomenological’ illustration, in Chapter Two, of the general nature of a heedful frame of mind. Along with the notion of an instruction-situation, this emphasized the relationship between the feature of a situation in which a task cannot be ‘normally’ actualized, and the impression of a ‘doubling’ of attention in the experience of a heedful frame of mind.

The nature of an instruction-situation is one in which the agent becomes both pupil and teacher, thus constituting a ‘split’ which may be construed as lending the impression of a secondary act or process. With regard to the inference to a heedful frame of mind at the time of performance, based on the ability to relate what one had been trying to do, the nature of an instruction-situation may be likewise informative. It might be said that one relates only what involved ‘trying’, as a reference to both a process, and to the effort invoked by its impediment; by attending to the process of a task, an agent is able to quote what he has been trying to do, whereas under normal circumstances, i.e. unimpeded actualization or mastery, he would [merely] exhibit what he knows. An instruction-situation is therefore a response to a particular type of impediment: that which confronts an agent simply by virtue of her being a novice, relative to a given task.

Finally, the form of this experience illustrated the impression which underlies the fact that retrospection invariably takes the form of myself doing X. Like conscience, heed arises only in ‘conflict’, in the most general sense of that word, and a relationship seems to have emerged between the impression of oneself and the form of heed, whether as ‘conscience’, or as its secular cousin, ‘consciousness’, or as reflection. This may go some way toward an interpretation of the experience traditionally attributed to an act of ‘Will’.
CHAPTER THREE

Heed and Voluntariness

In this chapter, I will address anew, and in light of the nature of a heedful frame of mind as illustrated in Chapter Two, the notion of voluntariness, with particular regard to the two instances of equivocation introduced in Chapter One.

In the Concept of Mind, Ryle claimed that ‘voluntariness’ is used almost exclusively for actions constituting in some way a lapse or error, and therefore with respect to a heedful frame of mind, signifies its absence or insufficiency, rather than its presence. Thus, whatever is signified by ‘voluntariness’ is to be found in the surrounding context: the knowledge or capacity of the agent, coupled with the absence of any external impediment. These elements, taken together, amount to the judgment that the agent ‘could have done otherwise’. However, I want to (first) examine whether Ryle’s use of “pure voluntaries”, as it appears in the context of reflection, and as signifying something ‘positive’ (“up to 100%”), poses a discrepancy with regard to Ryle’s argument against philosophers’ extended application of that word to actions correctly or meritoriously done. In another vein (second), the form of the experience of conscience, again in contradistinction to the Concept view of voluntariness, is a reference to the presence of a heedful frame of mind to which the ascription of ‘voluntary’ often seems to refer, in our common employment of ‘deliberate’ or ‘intentional’ with respect to a wrongdoing. That is, we speak of a ‘voluntary’ wrongdoing where we determine that the agent acted after some degree of deliberation, minimally satisfied by the occurrence of scruples, upon which the untoward action was chosen over the more correct. Finally, the occurrence of
non-occurrence of scruples in morally 'neutral' contexts begs the question of when exactly a connection between a heedful frame of mind and moral responsibility arises.

*The Reference to Knowledge or Capacity*

A possible reconciliation between the *Concept* treatment of 'voluntary', and 'voluntary' as it re-appears in relation to the activity of reflection (disengagement), lies in drawing a parallel between what is entailed in the expression 'could have done otherwise', and the features of intention-parasitism and circumstance-emancipation. The feature of intention-parasitism entails the agent's uncoerced initiation and control of the agent's own bottom-level moves and motions, and it is the correlative of that complete or near-complete detachment from what external circumstances impose.\textsuperscript{exe} The 'otherwise' of the expression 'could have done otherwise' seems to entail a reference to these same features, albeit unexercised. Does the possibility of circumstance-emancipation and intention-parasitism, and the relation of these to 'voluntariness', stem from the agent's knowledge or capacity, as does the judgment that he 'could have done otherwise' referred to in the *Concept* analysis of voluntariness? I believe that it does, and the possibility that the notions of circumstance-emancipation and intention-parasitism have the knowledge or capacity of the agent as their implicit condition, may be reinforced by the nature of instruction-situations and their relation to a heedful frame of mind.

Recall that under normal circumstances, no 'doubling' of the kind associated with the form of an instruction-situation, such as self-coaching, chiding, chastisement, self-persuasions, and the like, occur: knowledge (like conviction) is an *operative* disposition. Recall also that learning was becoming capable of responding to variable eventualities
within certain ranges, and thus constitutes a form of circumstance-emancipation as (re)contextualization; in turn, then, the agent's knowledge or capacity is what allows for this range of responses, within whatever demands or limitations are imposed by eventualities in the form of the impediment(s). One can only practice golf shots, or pretend to do X, to the extent that one has mastered the skills involved in the situations to which these refer. Pretending to do X assumes that one knows how to 'really' do X, or how a real case of X would appear to an observer. Something similar holds true for practicing: for it to truly be practice, or truly useful as practice, the agent must conjure as many and as challenging eventualities, handicaps, moves by imaginary opponent(s) (where applicable), and so on, as will hone or raise his particular level of skill; in order to do so, the agent must play the parts of both novice and master, in the form of self-coaching. In rehearsing, the agent may play these parts, as well as that of the audience member(s.) The disengagement and 'spectatorship' characterizing the various instances of the form of an instruction-situation is what allows both for the intention-parasitism of certain motions, and for the circumstance-emancipation which is its correlative.

The theme that has run through the whole of this inquiry to this point is that of 'abnormality', in various forms, in the actualization of a task. It has been shown that this can be given a significance broad enough to include performances which do not include the feature of blameworthiness, and which are characterized by the presence of a heedful frame of mind, yet which Ryle nonetheless describes as 'voluntary'. Under normal circumstances, however, we would have no call to describe them as 'voluntary', for the question of voluntariness would not arise concerning a non-blameworthy performance; perhaps this is why Ryle places 'voluntaries' in scare-quotes. Nonetheless, if the frame of
mind associated with heed has been adequately illustrated by the discussion of reflective disengagement, then some relation, unavoidable notwithstanding the Concept analysis, can be seen between a heedful frame of mind, which only 'arises' when the normal course of action is challenged, and Ryle's description of performances as 'voluntaries'.

If we interpret intention-parasitism and circumstance-emancipation as conditional, not only upon reflective disengagement, but upon the agent's knowledge or capacity, then the seeming discrepancy between the two senses of 'voluntary' can be reconciled by viewing the question of voluntariness, in an accusation-situation, as a question concerning whether an instruction-situation arose during the performance. That the agent 'could have done otherwise' means that he 'knew' better, in two senses: first, that whatever external impediment to the normal actualization of a task or disposition was imposed, the agent's knowledge should have, but for his absent-mindedness, enabled him to recognize it as such, and thus given rise to the frame of mind characteristic of an instruction-situation; which disengagement would, secondly, allow for the range of responses to which his knowledge or capacity is said to enable him.

This relation, between voluntariness, and the agent's knowledge or capacity, whether exercised or not, may also serve to clarify the other equivocation in question: between the Concept analysis of the employment of 'voluntariness', and our common employment of this word to signify a blameworthy action performed after deliberation, or with intent or purpose; that is, to signify, as it would have, formerly, 'volition', the presence of a heedful frame of mind. It is the meaning of 'voluntary' that is intuitively associated with the experience of conscience, as this tends to be the means by which we signify our sense of 'right' and 'wrong'. Ryle's example of a voluntary error in the
Concept is of a boy tying a granny-knot, instead of a reef-knot as was required and for which he possessed the required competence. Although qualifying, simply by virtue of its being an error, as blameworthy, the application of that word in this context may strike one as an extended one. That is, when we normally ask and answer the question of voluntariness, it is more often in reference to actions that are blameworthy in that they constitute a clear transgression of some 'moral' standard.

However, recall from Chapter Two that what we call 'conscience' is just one species, among others, of scrupulousness, and one instance of an instruction-situation. As an extension of the aforementioned relation between the agent's knowledge and the voluntariness of his actions, I will attempt to illustrate that the form of an instruction-situation, and the impression of a second-order act of monitoring or observing, has to do with the invocation of rules, principles, or formulae. Because of its implicit relation to the experience of conscience, which provides a clear paradigm of an instruction-situation, the discussion of rules will be informed by references to this common employment of the word 'voluntary'. Subsequent to this discussion, I will return to Ryle's own differing employments of 'voluntary', employing the nature of instruction-situations and of circumstance-emancipation and intention-parasitism, as a means of reconciling these.

According to Ryle, rules, principles and formulae play no part in the normal exercise of knowledge or competence, but are consulted only under circumstances of abnormality. That is, as part of Ryle's refutation of traditional bifurcations sourced in mind-body dualism, the distinction between theory and practice has been eliminated in favor of the view of knowledge as dispositional, or operative. According to Ryle, "unwisdom in conduct cannot be defined in terms of the omission of any ratiocinations
and consequently... wisdom in conduct cannot be defined solely in terms of the
performance of any ratiocinations.\textsuperscript{xlv} Rules, reasons or principles are consulted only
when a present situation has posed a challenge to some dispositional knowledge on the
part of the agent. As in the case of conscience, the test of the existence of such a conflict
is attention to the question of what is to be done; under normal circumstances, no such
question is posed. Regarding the topic of conscience as an instance of an instruction-
situation, and of its relation to accusation-situations where the question of voluntariness
is a reference to motive, the following statement may be instructive:

People are frequently in doubt what to do; having considered alternative courses
of action, they then, sometimes, select or choose one of these courses. This
process of opting for one of a set of alternative courses of action is sometimes said
to be what is signified by ‘volition’. But this identification will not do, for most
voluntary actions do not issue out of conditions of indecision and are not therefore
the results of settlements of indecisions.\textsuperscript{xxv}

Moreover, and as the obverse of this, we often go through the internal operation
of persuading ourselves to do or not do certain things, of which we are ‘convinced’ in
some theoretical or academic way, yet without successful practical application to these
ends: I may or may not light this particular cigarette, which decision will have a great
bearing upon my ‘quitting’ smoking. Thus whatever crisis of conscience or deliberation
or self-persuasion may precede an action, this does not constitute the cause of the action,
nor should we believe that the voluntariness of the action is determined on the basis of
any of these, despite its indicating a heedful frame of mind at the time. The mis-
employment of ‘voluntary’, to denote blameworthy actions characterized by ‘presence of
mind’, deliberation, intent, and so on, may instead be seen, \textit{via} the following analysis of
rules, as a reference to the knowledge or competence of the agent, thus reconciling it with the *Concept* employment of that word. Moreover, as the basis for a determination of the voluntariness of an act, this reference to the knowledge of the agent relieves us of many difficulties ensuing from the (dualism) entailed by the notion of ‘intention’, which appears, in many instances of its employment, to be nothing other than ‘volition’, but by another name.

*Rules*

Ryle refutes the ‘intellectualist’ view that the exercise of knowledge or of intelligence involves thinking, and that thinking, in turn, involves internal acts of considering regulative propositions, i.e., rules, principles, or formulae. He claims that intelligent performance need incorporate no such ‘shadow-act’. Rules, reasons or principles are considered only in instruction-situations, that is, where the agent’s disposition cannot be normally exercised. As Ryle puts it, “we could not consider principles of method unless we or others already intelligently applied them in practice. Acknowledging the maxims of a practice presupposes knowing how to perform it. Rules, like birds, must live before they can be stuffed.” The form of an instruction-situation was previously invoked as a means of clarifying the impression that heeding or minding what one is doing entails a secondary act of observing or monitoring. This characterization may, at this point, be elaborated upon, with regard to the acknowledgement of rules or principles; or more precisely, with regard to the form of this acknowledgement. That is, the expression of principles invariably takes the imperative mood, or the form of an *ought*. Thus the experience of ‘spectatorship’, which was later
developed as that of (self-) coaching or teaching, may now be seen to involve an inner
‘dialogue’ where principles are expressed in what Ryle calls “the idiom of the
mentor.”

In this regard, however, our knowledge of (the difference between) right and
wrong is merely one kind of operative knowledge; that is, a ‘knowing-how’. Ryle’s
adherence to the view, that it is impossible to ‘knowingly’ do wrong, is incompatible with
our common employment of ‘voluntary’ with regard to a wrongdoing, which seems to
denote just that. However, Ryle’s claim is not that any wrongdoing must be an ‘innocent’
mistake. Rather, it is a reference to the knowledge of right and wrong as an operative
disposition, and not as a knowledge-that, which an agent might consult prior to
performance. Recall that conscience was defined strictly as a ‘crisis’ of conscience:
conscience, as a species of scrupulousness and an instance of an instruction-situation,
arises only in conflict, occurring because an operative disposition is balked by some
contrary inclination. Thus if an agent has no scruples at all in doing something, then she
cannot know that it is wrong; and if she momentarily experiences scruples, and
nonetheless ‘chooses’ the wrong course of action, she may perhaps only know that it is
‘wrong’, i.e., ‘wrong’ in others’ minds. There would therefore be a circle in the
attempted description of conscience as a faculty which issues imperatives; for an
imperative is a formula which gives a description or partial definition of what is known
when someone knows how to behave. Accordingly, just as the form of a heedful frame
of mind (instruction-situation) was seen to be constant, regardless of the ‘nature’ of the
context, so the expression of principles is of the same form whether it is a case of a
‘moral’ maxim, or that of the rules of a game, or that of a recipe. Thus the question arises,
to be dealt with further on, as to the basis upon which we determine a context, or the
behavior appropriate to it, as ‘moral’. For the moment, I wish to examine this sense of

According to the *Concept* analysis, voluntariness is determined on the basis that
the agent ‘could have done otherwise’, if he had paid more heed to what he was doing. In
contrast, in the case of the common employment of ‘voluntarily’ doing wrong, the
agent’s normal disposition is balked by some contrary inclination, and the ‘rule’
consulted, where it was not in the former case. Underlying the common way of thinking
of voluntariness, as associated with ‘premeditation’, the blameworthy action is said to be
voluntary on the basis of the fact that the agent did ‘heed’, in the limited sense of ‘noted’
or ‘attended to’, the rule of regarding how to behave, as part of the conflict between his
disposition and his inclination. The agent thus ‘knowingly’ and ‘willingly’ did wrong.
Yet the agent’s subsequent ‘choice’ to perform the blameworthy action entails that he did
not ‘heed’ the rule, in the full sense in which to ‘heed’ a rule means to obey it; that is, in
the sense that a rule is merely the formulation of an *operative* disposition. It is in the
former sense that the action is properly said to be ‘voluntary’. Voluntariness is based, as
in the case of the boy and his granny-knot *manqué*, on the agent’s dispositional
knowledge of how to properly *behave*, which he failed to exercise due to a failure to heed
what he was doing. While the boy may be at a loss to relate what he had been thinking at
the time of his performance, and while the ‘deliberating’ agent does so without difficulty,
this inner dialogue does not constitute his having been thinking what he was doing, nor is
the voluntariness of his action determined on the basis of it.

Here I will briefly consider some entailments of the common way of thinking
about voluntariness. It would appear that in our everyday moral appraisals of actions and behavior, the notion of ‘premeditated’ action represents what Ryle would call the “sheet-anchor” of the ‘system’ underlying our ultimate evaluations of actions. This is akin to the attempt to construe ‘volition’ as the basis of our moral attributions of praise or blame, on the basis of the characterization of the ‘volition’ itself as good or bad, meritorious or blameworthy. The tendency to base our determinations of the voluntariness of an action on the nature of the ‘intentions’ associated with its performance is akin to, and subject to lead to the same absurdities as does this tendency with regard to ‘volition’. It ignores the fact that the application of appraisal concepts not only antedates questions of voluntariness, it is the very thing that prompts them, i.e. blameworthy performances. If the Concept analysis of voluntariness is correct, then the issue of the consequences of this tendency must be raised: that is, it allows us to excuse (absolve the agent of responsibility for) a blameworthy action, on that very basis which is supposed to determine its voluntariness.

For example, it would not be uncommon for an agent to attempt to excuse, that is, depict as involuntary, an inconsiderate act on the grounds that she simply “wasn’t thinking” what she was doing. In addition to having been repudiated by the illustration of the relation between voluntariness, and a failure to pay sufficient heed to what one is doing, the absurdity of this excuse can be seen in the fact that ‘not thinking’ (of the other or of others) in doing what one is doing, is precisely what ‘inconsiderate’ means. The logical impossibility of meaning to make a mistake shows the absurdity of excusing a mistake on the basis of non-intent or absent-mindedness. That is, given the analysis of voluntariness thus far, it has become increasingly clear that blameworthy actions are not
the result of premeditation, or the presence of a ‘bad volition’; rather, they occur as the result of a lack of, or lapse in, thinking what one is doing.8 With this is introduced the ethical importance of this kind of ordinary language analysis, in that it shows the absurdity of the portrayal of a voluntary, blameworthy act as preceded by some form of inner dialogue in the form of ratiocinations, etc., and, more importantly, of the possible repercussions of excusing blameworthy acts based on their (determined or inferred) absence, regardless of the known capacity of the agent.

Alternately illustrated, it may be said on the basis of the Concept analysis, that ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ are not references to actions. That is, if I attempt something for which I do not possess the requisite know-how, my ‘fumblings’, relative to the standard of a correct performance, are nonetheless ‘voluntary’ bodily movements. Moreover, failure to produce a granny-knot may produce a perfectly good reef-knot, and thus the failure is a relative one. That is, only lapses, errors or failures are either voluntary or involuntary; but “voluntary or involuntary?” is an absurd question to ask of ‘acts’ themselves, with which these are identified. If it is properly describable as an ‘act’, it must, in Ryle’s analysis, necessarily be ‘voluntary’; for ‘involuntary’ seems properly applicable only to situations resulting from ‘external’ forces. For example, I may be carried out to sea, or someone may bump my elbow, thus ‘causing’ me to do damage. Ryle is clear that “what is involuntary, in this sense, is not describable as an act.”9

With this invocation of a relation between ‘seeing as’ and voluntariness, I return to the attempted conciliation of the Concept analysis of ‘voluntary’, with Ryle’s employment of the word ‘voluntaries’ in the essay ‘Thinking and Reflecting’. I have attempted to make the case for the important connection between the agent’s knowledge
and the voluntariness of his failure. However, a connection was also drawn between the notions of intention-parasitism and circumstance-emancipation, and the nature of an instruction-situation as engendering a state of disengagement necessary to providing a range of possible responses to the agent. I will therefore attempt, presently, to illustrate the ultimate basis of voluntariness as resting with whatever state is signified by the ‘frame’ of mind associated with disengaged reflection.

Note that, in the *Concept* analysis, Ryle makes reference to heeding “what he was doing”, and not to “his knowledge”; in the normal course of affairs, exercising knowledge does not consist in attending in any way to one’s knowledge or capacity in the form of procedural rules or principles. Therefore this reference to heed must be to (an Oxonian sense of) *general* preparedness, of which his knowledge is a condition, yet which is not a formulation of the principles of his knowledge. That is, the agent’s knowledge, as including the ability to respond to variable calls within certain range, could not be exercised unless some degree of disengagement enables her to recognize situations as of a certain kind. Thus if she were minding in a general way what she was doing, then there would likely have been a point at which her granny-knot began to turn into something else, and she would have noticed it; general scrupulousness leads to the actual occurrence of scruples. The normal actualization of the proscribed task being in this way impeded, she would have ‘consulted’ her knowledge for a ‘rule’, in the form of a step or steps in the process.

In an accusation-situation, then, what was required and went unfulfilled is a certain level of minding what one is doing at *any* given time. While knowledge or capacity would include the ability to recognize abnormality, this is conditional upon a
frame of mind from which a capable agent would be alerted that some ‘extra’ degree of care, concentration, or vigilance was required. Only a general preparedness, rather than a focus on the task, would elicit such recognition. Even if this frame of mind were in some way conditional upon the agent’s established dispositional knowledge of appropriate behavior in certain types of situations, it could not be limited to that knowledge, for it appears to itself represent a condition for the possibility of the exercise of knowledge, including the recognition of situations as of a particular type. Moreover, the frame of mind in question, by virtue of being a ‘broadening’ of attention to a range of possible responses, is necessarily a reference to a ‘regress’ in the form of disengagement. Thus, regardless of whatever restrictions we would put on the employment of ‘voluntary’, there must be a phenomenal correlate to the possibility of insufficient heed, which represents, in terms of mental ‘topology’, something corresponding to the disengagement of the golfer. Regardless, then, of the refutation of a facultative ‘Will’, or of the placing of ‘voluntaries’ in scare-quotes, this ‘something’ must be or provide the form of the experience, in which the agent can be simultaneously spectator, coach and/or teacher with regard to her own act, as well as that from which we derive our impression of ‘freedom’ in our courses of action, so commonly attributed to the ‘Will’.

As indicated above, though, this reference to a relative absence or presence of a heedful frame of mind is preliminary to asking the question concerning the basis of the employment of the word ‘moral’ to characterize certain situations and behaviors. Ryle’s two senses of ‘voluntary’ may be reconciled on the basis of circumstance-emancipation and intention parasitism, of which the agent’s knowledge or capacity is the condition. In doing so, however, we must be willing to question how we determine a situation as
‘moral’, for the following reason. As part of the characterization of knowledge as
operative, two important points were made to this end.

First, the form of a rule or principle was shown to be constant, that is, ‘do not kill’
is not a rule of a different form (imperative mood) than that which is expressed "'i'
before ‘e’, except after ‘c'". And second, the invocation of the rule whose transgression is
threatened has been shown to be a response to a contingent feature of the context
surrounding the performance (appearance of an abnormality), and not an integral part of
the exercise of knowledge under normal circumstances. Recall, moreover, that what we
call ‘crises of conscience’ are no different, for their moral ‘tenor’, from other instruction-
situations. It is significant, in this respect, that there are no strictly ‘moral’ words:
behavior can be ‘good’, as pie and art can be ‘good’. I believe that the source of the moral
‘tenor’ of certain acts and situations will itself have to do with the activity of
disengagement or reflection, giving rise to a sense of ‘responsibility’ which is not merely
retroactive and applicable only to failures. Rather, what might be perceived as ‘moral’ is
conditional upon the circumstance-emancipation and intention-parasitism of reflective
disengagement, and represents the obverse of the range of responses to which that state
enables the agent.

Response-ability and Responsibility

It was previously stated that Ryle emphasizes, as something of a logical truth, that
what is genuinely involuntary is not describable as an ‘act’. With regard to the question
of the basis of ‘moral’ behavior, I want to examine this implicit relation between
voluntariness and the determination of an act. Recall, from Chapter Two, the illustration
of the relation between a heedful frame of mind, an ‘act’ of attention, and the manner in which the object of attention is constituted by this act. Of significance is the fact that in certain cases, the agent’s own behavior is the object of her attention, thus demarcating a certain movement or series of movements as an ‘act’. Acts of attention occur only when attending is difficult; but as has been shown, the difficulty in the form of impediment to the normal actualization of a disposition needn’t be ‘external’, as evidenced by the case of conscience. In addition, the state of general preparedness of a heedful frame of mind, despite its relation to the agent’s knowledge in the form of the range of responses it allows (and disallows, as a ‘framing’), was argued to exhibit some independence from this knowledge, as a condition of this ability to respond to abnormality, manifest in instruction-situations.

Consequently, the question can be asked as to why, if an act of attention to the problem of ‘what is to be done’ engenders a state of disengagement or reflection, could the reverse not be the case? The general question of how to best or most appropriately behave would, in this case, be spontaneously initiated by a heedful frame of mind, within which such deliberation may in turn take place. As a correlate of this, this frame of mind would be one in which ‘acts’, for the agent performing them, and as opposed to ‘mere’ behavior, can occur. In this way the frame of mind, which constitutes the condition for the ‘response-ability’ of heed as a general preparedness, may be likewise seen as the condition of the agent’s sense of responsibility; that is, her perception of situations as being of a ‘moral tenor’.

Suggested here is that this state of general preparedness may not only be invoked independently of the of any particular task, but is a frame of mind which will affect the
manner of performance of any task whatever that may arise. This is a reference to the 'dispositional' aspect of heed; as previously noted, however, the dispositional is constituted by, and must therefore be explained *via*, the episodic. As a correlate to the range of responses arising between the agent’s knowledge and her frame of mind, the state corresponding to the question of 'how should I behave?' in any and every instruction-situation has an implicit source in the recognition of the range of possible *repercussions* of even the seemingly most banal action. Relative to these possible responses and repercussions, 'acts' may emerge. That is, recalling the relationship between a heedful frame of mind and the constitution of an 'act', reference to an 'act' is not to one previously existing as a possibility among others to which I may direct my attention in my deliberations, but to one whose constitution is coeval with the frame of mind within which such deliberations take place. Rather than saying that the act was the result of a choice of response on the agent's part, we may say that its status as an 'act' derives from its being an act 'of a kind'. Alternately stated, it would appear that the question of "how should I behave?" is a primary condition of overcoming *mere* behavior, in favor of the performance of 'acts'.

It is also possible to infer the claim, that the 'moral' is not an intrinsic property or quality of any situation, but rather conditional upon the presence of a particular frame of mind, from Ryle's statement to the effect that there is no such thing as moral mis-education, only non-education. With regard to the common but confused employment of 'voluntary' to signify performances preceded by or concurrent with some form of 'presence' of mind, we can see that the tendency to base our attributions of blame upon 'volitions' or 'intentions' as being founded upon the fallacious belief that 'wrong'
represents something other than a ‘deficiency’ of ‘right’, as an implicit reference to the agent’s knowledge. This does not seem to cause much confusion when it comes to morally ‘neutral’ tasks, such as tying a granny-knot; the absurdity is readily acknowledged, of asking whether someone was competent enough to do wrong.iii

However, when it comes to performances that possess a moral ‘tenor’, we are wont to give up the notions of ill and good intentions, as the basis of our attribution of, or excuse from, moral responsibility for blameworthy performances. The sense of ‘responsibility’, in reference to a frame of mind within which I am attempting to locate the source of an action as ‘moral’, is clarified by this claim that the ‘immoral’ does not constitute, of itself, a manner of performance, but signifies, in some sense, the absence of any manner or ‘framing’ whatever that would characterize the performance of the action as an ‘act’.

It would seem that the analysis has come far away from the phenomenological illustration of the experience corresponding to the notion of heed. However, as was outlined, Chapter Three would re-examine the notion of voluntariness in light of the illustration of the character of a heedful frame of mind. If the proper sense of ‘voluntary’ is as illustrated in the Concept analysis, there nonetheless remained a sense of ‘voluntariness’ open to analysis, namely that which would be misapplied to experiences corresponding to expressions denoting some form of ‘willing’. These were adequately interpreted as instances of a heedful frame of mind. Yet the illustration that heed does indeed entail the presence of a particular frame of mind warranted a re-evaluation of the notion of ‘voluntariness’, in particular reference to the seeming equivocation entailed by Ryle’s use of ‘pure voluntaries’, applied to non-blameworthy actions. These senses of ‘voluntary’, along with the ‘common’ sense as signifying the presence of intent or prior
deliberation, were reconciled on the basis of an extended interpretation of ‘abnormality’ in the actualization of a task, and on the invocation of the rules, principles, or formulae of procedure, which is its correlative. Both the Concept version of ‘voluntary’, as well as that signified by the common employment of the word, were seen to be references to the transgression of a rule, yet with the latter possessing a stronger ‘moral tenor’. This raised the question of that in which the attribution of ‘moral’ consists. An attempt was made at a speculative link between this attribution or recognition, and the same state of disengaged reflection with which a heedful frame of mind was identified, thus characterizing it as a form of inculcated appreciation or care.

Conclusions

Among the consequences of this speculation is a peculiar form of moral relativism. Ryle states that heeding does not, any more than does consciousness, “denote a peculiar conduit of cognitive certainties.” Given the characterization of heed presented here, quite the opposite would be the case: for in fact, the greater ‘degree’ of disengagement, the greater the range of apparent, possible responses, and the more apt the agent is to wonder what to do. Moreover, this characterization calls for a reassessment of the view that it is praiseworthy to be a ‘strong willed’ person, blameworthy to be a ‘weak willed’ one: for this characterization makes doubt and crisis of conscience with regard to an operative disposition the first stage in the possible ‘evolution’ of a sense of moral responsibility. There are, for example, cases in which one perceives a discrepancy between, say, being honest, an operative disposition, and doing what strikes one as the ‘right’ thing in a particular situation; or, alternately, a conflict between two operative
dispositions, for example, being honest and being loyal. This conflict, as well as the possibility of ‘overcoming’ operative dispositions, is crucial to such moral ‘evolution’ in both the personal and societal spheres. In addition, and related to the previous point, if what is considered blameworthy or immoral (wrong), with regard to the actions of others, represents a privation of what is right, then such judgments are relative to the priority of values of those in judgment.

Yet the inquiry into the nature of heed was undertaken primarily in order to explore its ‘episodic’ nature, and to examine whether the dualism that it seemed to entail could be eliminated or reinterpreted on the basis of something contributing to the (mere) impression of a doubling of attention. Certain characteristic features of a heedful frame of mind emerged in this regard. First, though we may attend to a task under normal circumstances, it would not enter into our description of a situation unless it entailed an implicit reference to some element of difficulty. Accordingly, it was illustrated that the varying degrees of attention denoted by different heed concepts was a reflection of the phenomenon, which consists in a heedful frame of mind being invoked only when an operative disposition cannot be normally actualized. In addition, Ryle posits the ability of the agent to relate what he was trying to do at the time of performance, as evidence of a heedful frame of mind at the time of the performance. However, this reference to what the agent was ‘trying’ to do merely emphasized the relation between a heedful frame of mind and the contextual feature of an element of ‘difficulty’ in some form or another. That is, while being ‘absorbed’ in a task denotes attention, the agent in question is unlikely to be able to give an account of the process of his performance, because no process is perceived in the successful, uninterrupted performance of task; a heedful frame
of mind is an instance of an instruction-situation.

In response to Ryle’s own query regarding the ‘doubling’ of attention that the notion of heed seems to entail, both generally and in its relation to recollecting, it was illustrated that the nature of the experience of a heedful frame of mind was indeed the source of such an impression, in the form of a ‘doubling’ of oneself, so to speak, or of ‘spectatorship’. This metaphor was later developed, with regard to the relation between the process of a performance and the invocation of rules, into that of ‘self-mentoring’, the correlative of instruction-situations. Though Ryle emphasizes that what is entailed in a heedful frame of mind is not attending twice at once, but rather the possibility of swift retrospection or rapid to-and-fro switch of attention, it seems nevertheless clear that either of these involves a reflexive act which lends the impression of a ‘further’ act of attending. While a dualism may be ‘merely’ an impression, it is certainly the result of a form of the feature of a regress. This regress is not ‘merely’ a logical regress to which the notion of cognitive acts or processes leads upon analysis, but one of the form of the genuine state of disengagement as reflection. With regard, then, to the problematic, interrelated features of inaccessibility to observation, implicit dualism, and the threat of infinite regress, which the notion of ‘heed’ appeared to entail, the inevitability of all three of these, entailed by the illustration of such a frame of mind and the context in which it arises, must be acknowledged. Ryle’s ‘contextualism’ with regard to a heedful frame of mind can be viewed as a form of ‘transcendentalism’ with regard to the ‘point of view’ entailed by it, which cannot be adequately addressed on a dispositional analysis.

Moreover, regarding the potentially problematic issue of reference to a frame of mind generally, there was shown to be a distinction between paying heed to what one is
doing, and the knowledge that is operative in what one is doing, the former of which enables one to detect and correct one’s own mistakes, or to overcome obstacles if and when they should arise. The preparedness associated with a heedful frame of mind is supervenient over, and therefore somewhat distinct from, knowledge, much as reflecting was said to be supervenient over thinking. Thus while Ryle claims that heeding what one is doing does not entail a second-order process of monitoring a first-order performance, it does make reference to a frame of mind ‘in’ which we are not invariably. Moreover, Ryle’s discussions of other topics betray (a phenomenal basis for) the inevitability of traditional language for ‘mental’ experiences: for example, the essay from which the characterization of conscience is drawn concerns the necessarily private nature of conscience; likewise, it is common for Ryle to employ such words as ‘introspectively’.

Thus Ryle’s turn to the notion of heed in the interpretation of certain experiences raises certain questions. The aspects of the distinctness and inconstancy of a heedful frame of mind may lead to as regressive a line of inquiry regarding the means of invoking this frame of mind, as does this same question, with regard to ‘volition’. Has Ryle eliminated, in effect, any of the problems that were associated with ‘volition’? He has, in principle, avoided the proliferation of metaphysical entities, but we are left with one operation of a special character, whose episodic nature nevertheless entails a form of regress and whose invocation makes problematic the question of moral inculcation. The reference to a heedful ‘manner’ is perhaps more credible than that of ‘volitions’, and the description of the contexts in which it arises, more convincing; yet the characterization of an effort of will as a directing of the mind in attention, as well as the converse, poses an obvious difficulty, in addition to begging the question of what ultimately makes the agent
able or unable to do so. Moreover, the point at which an ‘abnormality’ constitutes a ‘difficulty’ is itself relative to the agent’s resolve. Ryle’s consistency with regard to operative knowledge is useful, in particular for the elimination of inauthentic claims such as ‘willing’ to act, yet falling short of action, as ‘wishing’, ‘wanting’, and ‘hoping’ are often believed to entail. More importantly, given the relation between the ‘involuntary’ and situations resulting from ‘external’ forces, Ryle’s general refutation of Cartesian dualism represents an important check on the danger posed by a schism between mind and body, which allows our own ‘passions’ to become ‘external’ impediments to the exercise of an agent’s knowledge between right and wrong.

However, Ryle says too little regarding the ‘episodic’ nature of heed, a problem he has not managed to ‘dissolve’ by assimilating contexts of its mention to a dispositional interpretation. His admission that the episodic nature of heed is perplexing is appropriate. We have, in the work of Ryle, a general project aimed at overcoming the proliferation of ‘nouns’, through which the ghostly myth infiltrates philosophical, legal, and lay conceptions of mental-conduct concepts; this would occur in favor of a modal interpretation of these concepts. Yet, though perhaps addressed in some limited way here by the extension of its analysis, the notion of ‘heed’ ultimately eludes description within the confines of the philosophical ‘style’ of ordinary language analysis. Given the phenomena underlying the deployment of these concepts, however, it would be mistaken to characterize Ryle’s work, as is often done, as an attempt at ‘monism’, or as other than propaedeutic with regard to the ‘professional deformations’ of the topology surrounding the perennial problems of modern philosophical inquiry.
Notes

i For example, Ira Altman, *The Concept of Intelligence: A Philosophical Analysis* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1997)


iv This tenet of the Oxford School of ‘ordinary language’ analysis was made explicit in the work of its ‘methodologist’, J.L. Austin, and underlies his depiction of this type of analysis as “linguistic phenomenology”. See especially Austin’s ‘Excuses’, in *Philosophical Papers* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961) 130. At the outset of his career, Ryle considered himself a ‘phenomenologist’; his 1932 essay entitled ‘Phenomenology’, *Phenomenology, Goodness and Beauty. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume XI* (London: Harrison, 1932) 73, represents the beginning of his break with Husserlian Phenomenology.


vii Ibid., 19.

viii Ibid., 15.

ix Ibid., 19.

x Ibid., 63.

xi Ibid., 66.

xii Ibid.

xiii Ibid., 67.

xiv Ibid., 68.

xv Ibid., 69.


 xvii *The Concept of Mind*, op cit., 71. (italics mine)

 xviii It would appear that the topic of ‘voluntariness’ is a sub-class of what Austin discriminates as the topic of ‘excuses’. As he points out, there are two ways of defending conduct: in one, we accept
responsibility, but deny that the action was bad (or all that bad); in the other we admit that it was bad but
don't accept full, or even any, responsibility. The question of 'voluntariness' arises only within the latter
strategy.

Ryle states that "This is not quite true of the adverb 'voluntarily', since here philosophers have
coined the specific verb 'to will'. But this verb has no ingenious employment. If it was ever employed, it
would be a proper question to ask 'When we will, do we always, sometimes or ever will voluntarily?'
Attempts to answer this question would quickly get the verb relegated to its proper place, on the shelf
tenanted by 'phlogiston'." From "Knowing How and Knowing That," *Collected Papers*, op cit., 214.


*The Concept of Mind*, op cit., 150.


*The Concept of Mind*, op cit. 74.

Ibid., 138.

Ibid., 74.

Ibid., 138.

Ibid., 143.

Ibid., 138.

Ibid., 141.

Ibid., 140.

Ibid., 135.

Ibid., 139.

Ibid., 147.

Ibid., 177. (italics mine)

Ibid. (italics mine)

Ibid., 178. (italics mine)

Ibid.

Ibid., 174.

Ibid., 166.

Ibid., 167.

Ibid., 138, 163.
I have chosen the term ‘spectatorship’ provisionally, and as a general heading for Ryle’s description of the impression afforded us, or as entailed by the relation between a heedful frame of mind and the ability to recall, of a secondary ‘act’ of inspecting or monitoring.
Ibid., 190.

"Knowing How and Knowing That," op. cit. 224.

The Concept of Mind, op. cit., 148.


Ibid., 466.

Ibid. (italics mine)

Ibid., 466-7.

Ibid., 469.

Ibid.

The Concept of Mind, op. cit., 143.

"Thinking and Reflecting," op. cit., 470. (italics mine)

Ibid., 471.


The Concept of Mind, op. cit., 212.

"Thinking and Reflecting," op. cit., 471.

Ibid.

Ibid., 472-3.

Ibid., 473.

The Concept of Mind, op. cit., 145.

Ibid., 147.

Ibid., 144.

"Thinking and Reflecting," op. cit., 474. (italics mine)

Ibid., 474-5.

Ibid., 478.


"The Thinking of Thoughts: What is Le Penseur doing?," Collected Papers, op. cit., 489.
“Knowing How and Knowing That,” op. cit., 220.

The Concept of Mind, op. cit., 68.

“Knowing How and Knowing That,” op. cit., 221.

Ibid.


“Knowing How and Knowing That,” op. cit., 222.

Here the ‘phenomenal’ significance underlying the employment of the term ‘fault’ appears: literally, it signifies a ‘gap’ or absence in the midst of presence, as perhaps does not so readily escape us in the French ‘faillite’ (failure).

The Concept of Mind, op. cit., 74.

“On Forgetting the Difference Between Right and Wrong,” op. cit., 390.

The Concept of Mind, op. cit., 70.

Ibid., 158.

As in the quotation appearing on page 32 of this paper.
Bibliography


--------------- “Feelings”. Collected Papers. ibid.

--------------- “Knowing How and Knowing That”. Collected Papers. ibid.

--------------- “On Forgetting the Difference Between Right and Wrong”. Collected Papers. ibid.

--------------- “Pleasure”. Collected Papers. ibid.

--------------- “Sensation”. Collected Papers. ibid.

--------------- “Teaching and Training”. Collected Papers. ibid.

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