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An Emergent Paradigm for Propaganda Analysis
Resulting from a Comparative Study of the
Allied Re-education Projects with German Prisoners of War

Susan Muckenfuss Caldwell

A Thesis
in
The Humanities Doctoral Programme

Presented in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at
Concordia University
Montréal, Québec, Canada

22 September 2000

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Abstract

An Emergent Paradigm for Propaganda Analysis Resulting from a Comparative Study of the Allied Re-education Projects with German Prisoners of War

Susan Muckenfuss Caldwell, Ph.D.
Concordia University, 2000

Between 1942 and 1949, the Soviet Union, United States and British military conducted re-education projects with the German prisoners of war in their custody. This dissertation, by examining these Allied political re-education projects, develops the ground for a more comprehensive approach to the interpretive frameworks – the paradigms and perspectives – operating within the fields of propaganda analysis and curriculum development. These re-education projects do not easily fall within conventional academic areas of inquiry and therefore compel us to look further and develop new ideas or hybrids of theory. Historically, the seven-year period of 1942-49 covered the shift from the WWII alliance of the capitalist governments of the British Empire and the U.S. with the communist Soviet Union to the beginning of the categorical anti-communism of the Cold War, with Germany as a central arena of the action. The political re-education projects with the German prisoners of war reflected this changing dynamic.

Re-education is a mixture of propaganda and education. Thus the interpretive frameworks in these two disciplines are summarised and compared. Doing so highlights the role of ideology to both the philosophy of science and to the concepts underlying an Enlightenment rationalist approach to representative government. This dissertation proposes the use of Wolf's⁴ ethnography based definition as the most appropriate for a social science analysis. Multiple competing ideologies are understood to exist within each society, impacting
both the education and propaganda created at the various levels of societal power, from individual to the national levels. National myths are seen to play a critical role in both the curriculum of humanities and social science education and governmental propaganda. A critical analysis of the concept of brainwashing is used to elucidate the logical limits of the concept of propaganda as exclusively external manipulation.

A description of the Allied re-education projects emphasizes the complex considerations of governments regarding propaganda towards foreign nationals, temporarily detained in a conflict situation, as well as the limited achievements of such projects. These projects are analysed using the interpretive frameworks from both propaganda analysis and curriculum development in education. A lacuna is noted in the propaganda paradigm and this dissertation provides a new hybrid – an Existentialist propaganda paradigm. These inter-related assumptions concerning the nature of ideology, the functioning of multiple ideologies within each society, and the role of the individual free choice within the propaganda situation provide the basis for a more comprehensive framework for the analysis of both propaganda and education.

1 Wolf, Eric R. Envisioning Power: Ideologies of Dominance and Crisis. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. Wolf defines ideology as “a complex of ideas selected to underwrite and represent a particular project of installing, maintaining, and aggrandising power in social relationships”. Such ideologies are the product of particular social groupings and individuals.
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Within the Humanities Doctoral Programme, the first acknowledgement must go to one's committee members who volunteer to supervise one's project from the beginning stage through to the dissertation. I have been very lucky in having on my committee of three very insightful scholars: Dr. Dennis Murphy, my supervisor, Dr. William Knitter and Dr. John Laffey. Dr. Murphy has continually offered new ways to look at propaganda and communication. Dr. Knitter taught me to understand and theorize about my own twenty-year experience within education. Dr. Laffey showed me how to develop a full political understanding of history. I would also like to thank Dr. Richard DiuBaldo who replaced Dr. Laffey for the defence of the dissertation.

I would like to acknowledge the help of Eric Wesselow, R.C.A., whose knew Wing Commander F.C. Hitch personally, offered me a letter written by W/C Hitch to him in answer to Mr. Wesselow’s own queries about the British re-education projects. This is a treasure to any researcher but especially to one new at the profession. He followed my progress until his death in 1998.

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Further acknowledgment goes to Dr. James D. Cockcroft, my companion, without whose support this dissertation would never have been written. I want to thank Peter Deslauriers, my colleague at Dawson College, who read the history section and pointed out errors that reflected my U.S. origins.

And finally, I want to acknowledge the importance of the support of Omar K. Bickell, my son. His belief in me continually challenges me to accomplish my dreams, including getting a doctorate just for my own intellectual interest.
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Chapter 1 Overview

This dissertation, by examining the Allied political re-education projects with German prisoners of war in the 1942-49 period, develops the ground for a more comprehensive approach to the interpretive frameworks – the paradigms and perspectives – operating within the fields of propaganda analysis and curriculum development.

Re-education is an aggregate of the concepts of propaganda and education. Chapter 2 establishes the philosophical foundation, based in Enlightenment rationalism, for a social science approach to the analysis of propaganda, education, and history. First is an exploration of the philosophy of science, specifically as it relates to the nature of proof and the establishment of truth. This leads to the necessary recognition of the ‘theory-laden’ nature of perception, even within the physical sciences. Heeding the central role of the concept of ideology in all criticism of propaganda and education, the history of the concept of ideology is presented. Wolf’s concept of ideology as “a complex of ideas selected to underwrite and represent a particular project of installing, maintaining, and aggrandising power in social relationships” is presented as complementing the “theory-laden perception” thesis of post-Kuhnian developments in the philosophy of science. These ideologies operate at, and are expressed through, the various power relationships in a society. Within Wolf’s ethnological framework, these power relationships are summarized as involving four types: 1) personal presence; 2) interpersonal power; 3) tactical or organisational power; and 4) structural power or governance. The structural power or governance level is normally thought of as operating within a society but may be usefully applied to governance situations between societies. One important expression of an ideology is the national myths operating within each society. The

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3 As power relationships are always based within groups of people and individuals, the geographic location and distribution of these groups is an important linked issue, especially at the governance level.
Allied political re-education projects highlight this role in the unusual situation of government-based persuasive communication with captured foreign nationals.

A summary of the interpretive frameworks within the academic fields concerned with propaganda analysis and curriculum development within education follows. Chapter 3 presents the five propaganda paradigms analysed in this dissertation. These are the 'positivist attitude change' approach, the 'historical sociological' approach, the 'American humanist propaganda analysis' approach, a neo-marxist feminist rhetoric critique and the 'comparative rhetoric critique'. All propaganda paradigms assume an oppositional relationship between the source and audience of propaganda. The oppositional nature is expressed at different levels of power. Most theorists are especially concerned about the role of government propaganda in the 'manufacture of consent' within electoral democracies, that is, at the Wolf's 4th level (governance). Some propaganda paradigms include formal education as a related form of persuasive communication while others exclude education, assuming a benefit, not a detriment, to the recipient.

Critical use is made of the concept of brainwashing, a uniquely U.S. contribution to propaganda analysis, in part due to its subsequent application to the case of U.S. prisoners of war in the Korean War. Brainwashing is a concept that assumes that a person’s belief-system can be modified by external manipulation that overwhelsms their capacity to use their free-will to make choices. Critical analysis shows that: 1) the U.S. constitutionally guaranteed right of freedom of belief is a presupposition to this concept, 2) such free choice, however, is seen as a fundamental tenet of democracies, based on the Enlightenment separation of church and state; and 3) that the content of the belief system cannot be the basis for exclusion from constitutional protection under the freedom of belief doctrine. This elucidates the autonomous role of a belief system within Enlightenment rationalism's presuppositions about secular government.
Individuals must be recognised as active agents freely seeking out and choosing their own belief-systems (usually spiritual or religious). Belief systems can be seen as formalised components of ideology in the Wolfian sense. Under these conditions, the analytical utility of the brainwashing concept is rejected due to lack of empirical evidence for a shift of belief-systems resulting from external manipulation alone. The classic cases used to support the brainwashing concept demonstrate little effect (less than 20% influenced and no conversions) and even that effect is explained as the result of internal (personality) factors rather than external manipulation. This issue of external manipulation versus internal motivation reappears as central to propaganda paradigms and curriculum perspectives.

Following Reid\(^4\), Chapter 4 looks at four curriculum perspectives – the Systematizers, Radicals, Existentialists and Deliberators. Education is the socially accepted form of persuasive communication, mainly directed at youth as preparation for their adult roles. The curriculum perspectives differ with respect to who they propose to be the appropriate source of curriculum. The Systematizers and Radicals assume a central role for the government in order to maintain or transform the status quo. The Deliberators see curriculum as a considered compromise among all those immediately concerned – the teachers, parents, students, administration and discipline experts. The Existentialist curriculum perspective limits curriculum to what the student actively takes from the educational situation, rather than the prescribed or intended outcome.

Chapter 5 presents a comparison of the presuppositions underlying the propaganda paradigms and curriculum perspectives and demonstrates the common concerns about the effects of persuasive communication. An analysis of the intended purpose and use of

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propaganda paradigms and curriculum perspectives is presented, as well as their differing
concerns with the various power relationships existing within a society.

Specific attention is given to the role of a national myth within both the social science
curriculum in education (specifically history and political science) and well as its use during war
and post-war propaganda. The Allied political re-education projects offer specific examples of
multiple competing ideologies, as the national myth of each Allied country was inherently in
conflict with the national myth of the German prisoners of war, itself the result of multiple
competing ideologies.

Chapter 6 presents the historical context for these Allied political re-education projects,
emphasizing three specific components: 1) the national myth of each country, 2) global
competition based on each country’s self-perceived role in the global community, and 3) the
rivalry between communist and capitalist systems. One theme throughout this historical
description is the role of anti-communism in the West in the period following Russian
Revolution. This description looks at the impact of this Western anti-communism on global
and domestic diplomacy in both the war and post-war periods. Specifically, discussion of the
origin of the Cold War situates changes in these re-education projects within that developing
dynamic.

Chapter 7 presents an extensive description of the three Allied political re-education
projects, presented in chronological order - those of the Soviet Union, the U.S. and the British.
The military history of WWII and the Geneva Convention of 1929 provide the necessary
background to these political re-education projects with German prisoners of war. The Soviet
Unions political re-education projects, begun in 1942, included the establishment of the
Nationalkomitee "Freies Deutschland" and the Bund Deutscher Offiziere as both propaganda
and re-education projects and the development of the extensive Antifa Schools. The U.S.
political re-education projects, begun within the last year of the war, included the Intellectual Diversion programme directed at all prisoners of war and the Special Schools and Fort Eustis projects for selected prisoners of war. The British political re-education projects, essentially during the post-war period, included a general re-education project for all prisoners of war and the development of the special Youth Camp and Wilton Park Training Centre. In each case the link between involvement in a re-education project and the German prisoner of war's experience after repatriation is discussed.

Chapter 8 presents a discussion of these three political re-education projects in terms of which propaganda paradigms and curriculum perspectives reflect the thinking of the authorities involved in developing and running these projects. Important differences between the Soviet Union, the U.S. and the British projects are presented. For example, grounded in a Radical curriculum perspective and a modified Positivist Attitude Change propaganda paradigm, the war-time and post-war Soviet Union re-education projects were overt, rather than covert, in nature. In part this overt nature was based on the political power of the German émigrés involved and the organisational framework of a KPD, the German Communist Party, a party which would continue to function in a post-war Germany. Thus many of the organisers of the re-education projects, as well as the prisoners of war, would be subject to repatriation. This was not true for either the U.S. or British re-education projects. Using a version of historical materialism, the Soviet Union modified the German national myth to emphasise the aberration that the Nazi regime represented and the possibility of a return to a more normal German functioning. This political framework functioned well for both propaganda and educational purposes, incorporating aspects of the Soviet national myth.

By contrast, U.S. re-education projects, begun only the last year of the war and terminating in April 1946, were based on the Academic Rationalism curriculum perspective
with some involvement of the Positivist Attitude Change propaganda paradigm. These re-
education projects were developed by academic personnel from the Humanities, rather than
social science, disciplines. The explicit contrast between the national myths of the U.S. and
Germany was a fundamental aspect of these re-education projects. The limited duration of the
re-education projects and the lack of integration of the graduates within governance carried out
by the U.S. occupation forces of Germany are noted.

The post-war British re-education projects used a Positivist Attitude Change
propaganda paradigm, based on a moral, rather than political, interpretation of the cause of
Nazism. The British re-education projects appropriated the diplomatic concept of the
‘collective guilt’ of the citizens of a country, used as justification for reparations, and changed
this concept to imply the moral responsibility of each prisoner of war. This collective guilt
framework implied the need for a shift in moral attitude that became a goal of the re-education
projects. These projects were also based on an explicit contrast between the national myth of
Nazi Germany and a British ‘social science’ account of German history, base on the British
national myth. As well an appeal was made to the common history (and thus identity) of
England and Germany as support for a favourable future trade relationship between these two
countries. All projects sought to create co-operative personnel for the post-war occupation
forces but only the Soviet Union gave an organisational structure to this with the recruitment
to the KPD.

Building on both the review of the literature and the analysis of the Allied political re-
education projects with German prisoners of war, Chapter 9 presents conclusions about the

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5 Kocka, discussing the discipline of history, offers this insight as to the limits of seeing history as a social science: Systematic
comparison was alien to the historicist paradigm which dominated historical research and literature in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. Particularly in Germany. Anyone trying to reconstruct historical phenomena as individual events, study
them under the aspect of ‘development’ and understand them in their context would not be interested in systematic
identification of similarities and differences or in their explanation. **Narrative and comparison were and are opposite.**
Without conceptual explanations and theoretical input, historical comparison is not possible. Kocka, Jürgen. "German History
differing but overlapping natures of the concepts of propaganda and education as understood within a social science approach. These include their different purposes and thus time frames, as well as perception of voluntary or imposed nature, appropriate forms of training and hence forms of proof. Propaganda assumes an oppositional relationship between source and audience. In contrast, education assumes a community-sanctioned basis for its curriculum. These assumptions form a key distinction between propaganda and education. For the Allied re-education projects, this contradiction was structurally imposed by doing ‘voluntary’ re-education within a prison set-up.

These conclusions underscore a lacuna in propaganda paradigms with respect to curriculum perspectives in the presumed motivation of the participants. Within the social science analysis of education, only the Existentialist curriculum perspective includes the individual’s internal motivation as central to the functioning of the persuasive communication involved. A critical analysis of the concept of brainwashing demonstrates the advantage of acknowledging the active role of the individual in the persuasive communication event. The demonstrated effectiveness of propaganda could be better explained by the development of an Existentialist propaganda paradigm that recognises the contribution of an individual’s internal motivation.

Within a social science based approach to propaganda and curriculum development, there has to be a recognition of the role of competing multiple ideologies operating within all societies. Wolf’s concept of multiple ideologies is offered as a corrective, providing a basis for a more comprehensive comparative social-historical analysis. Recognition of multiple ideologies would also argue for the presence of political ideologies in both the presuppositions and practical applications of all propaganda paradigms and curriculum perspectives. The national

myth also plays a key role in all government propaganda as well as within the humanities and social science disciplines.

This comparative study of the Allied re-education projects with German prisoners of war in the 1942-49 period highlights the importance of situating an analysis in its historical context and the utility of adopting an ethnography-based definition of ideology while acknowledging the multiple ideologies operating within a society. Also these political re-education projects showed the central role of the national myth in international diplomacy.

Methodology

This interdisciplinary dissertation presents a comparative case study of Allied re-education projects with German prisoners of war conducted between 1943-48. For the Allied re-education projects, this research used both archival data and secondary sources, including articles and books written by those involved in the re-education projects, as well as previous research conducted on these projects. The historical context and interpretive framework are based on material written both during and after WWII. The overall analytical framework of propaganda and curriculum development is based on a critical reading of the relevant literature. Using methodologies from the three fields of communication studies, history and education, this dissertation focuses on identifying the interpretive frameworks used by the ‘producers’ of the Allied re-education projects within their historically specific pre- to post-WWII period. For propaganda, the propaganda premises are identified. While for education, this material was analysed for the curriculum assumptions and choices made by those in charge of the re-education projects.
This dissertation uses a qualitative content analysis\(^6\) approach to the archival data relevant to the U.S. and British re-education projects while depending on secondary sources for the Soviet project. A comparative case study of the Allied approaches is made, including their respective interpretative frameworks of German mentality, politics and history and Germany's appropriate future status.\(^7\)

The government archives of England, the Public Records Office (PRO), and of the US, the National Archives and Research Administration (NARA), have been the main repositories and sources of the relevant primary data. The most relevant secondary data about the U.S. and British re-education projects comes from the following sources: the study done by George McCracken for the US Army\(^8\) on the U.S. re-education program, the thesis by Cummins E. Speakman\(^9\) based on his personal experience in the "intellectual diversion" programme in the U.S. Army, the book by Ron Robin\(^10\) on the U.S. re-education projects, the book by Henry Faulk\(^11\), a participant in the British re-education projects, and the book by Arthur Lee Smith Jr.\(^12\) on all three Allied projects. In addition, a number of theses have looked as the U.S. experience with German prisoners of war including those by Robert E. McFadden\(^13\), Charles S. Muskiet III\(^14\), Alfred H. Paddock, Jr.\(^15\) and J. Barrie Williams.\(^16\) Data

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\(^6\) The covert nature of these re-education projects makes a quantitative content analysis next-to-impossible since there was little reporting of the projects in the public media until late in their existence. Measuring the column inches in the different camp newspapers devoted to socialist or communist or any other political party activity is limited by the material available in the archives: most issues of the camp newspapers were not preserved. Therefore specific examples of differences in the U.S. and British approaches can be cited, but no quantitative content analysis can be usefully done with the material available.

\(^7\) The future options discussed for Germany ranged from the Morgenthau Plan to reduce post-war Germany to an agricultural society to the Marshall Plan which provided for the re-industrialisation of Germany.

\(^8\) NARA: RG AMHC, Vol. / George McCracken - The Prisoner of War Re-education Program in the Years 1943 - 1946 (through April 47) compiled by John Mewha, 1-Feb-53.


\(^13\) McFadden, Robert E. "Der Ruf your future is in your hands: the role of German POWs in reeducation." MA, Miami University, 1997.
for the Soviet Union's re-education projects used exclusively secondary data, mainly the work by Arthur Lee Smith Jr.\textsuperscript{17} and Kai P. Schoenhals\textsuperscript{18}, with cross reference to NARA and PRO archival material where available.

\textsuperscript{16} Williams, J. Barrie. "Re-education of German prisoners of war in the United States during World War II." MA, College of William and Mary, 1993.
Chapter 2 Presuppositions in Propaganda and Education Analysis

In 1943, the Soviet Union began a re-education project with their German prisoners of war, promoting an anti-fascist perspective, and arguing that Hitler and Nazism were destroying Germany. In early 1945, with the military situation heavily favouring an imminent Allied victory, the U.S. began a re-education project with their German prisoners of war to teach them that democracy was a superior form of government. In late 1945 and early 1946, the British re-instituted their re-education efforts with the German prisoners of war then in their custody, focusing on the democratic way of life as preferable to the authoritarian, leader dominated, strong state which the British saw as the German model. In all cases, the recipients of these re-education projects were German prisoners of war who legitimately expected ultimate repatriation to their homeland — either as the victors or loser of the war. To what extent can re-education be seen as education or were these projects simply the political indoctrination of a captive audience?

Both education and propaganda are held responsible for the formation, maintenance and transformation of our beliefs and knowledge. Education is the publicly sanctioned transmission of what is deemed to be useful knowledge. That ‘useful knowledge’ becomes the curriculum of the school. Within the last three centuries, public education has been seen as necessary for the functioning of an increasingly industrialised society. While the existence of propaganda as a phenomenon is perhaps universally acknowledged, the concept has changed with historical eras, based on the shifts in concepts of governance and the nature of truth. This has created a distinction between education and propaganda. The core concept of propaganda became identified with the persuasive communication of an ideology in contrast to education as the communication of objective ‘facts’. But how legitimate is such a distinction? Can an
absolute distinction be made between propaganda and education that would allow a conclusive judgement on the nature of these Allied re-education projects?

In order to understand that nature of propaganda and curriculum, the assumptions underlying these concepts – about the nature of governance, truth, and persuasive purpose – must be unravelled. After situating the common historical origin of propaganda and education, the historical and philosophical shifts in the family of concepts related to both propaganda and education will be examined. Doing this reveals the key roles of the concept of proof within science and the nature of ideology to our understanding of both propaganda and education.

Background to Propaganda Analysis and Education

Propaganda as a concept was originally used by the Catholic Church, which in 1622, established the *Sacra Congregatio Christiano Nomini Propaganda*, commonly known as the *Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide* whose task it was to carry the faith to the New World and to revive and strengthen Catholicism in Europe in the face of the challenge posed by the Protestant Reformation. The Catholic Church at that time ran the educational institutions as well as the religious institutions for much of Europe. From within the Catholic Church, ‘truth’ was based on the divine texts along with the appropriate interpretation by sanctioned professionals – the hierarchical clergy with the Pope as the ultimate arbiter. Thus there was no conflict between propaganda and education: they were one and the same, with even non-religious academic courses requiring the sanction of the Catholic Church. Divine right, as sanctioned by the same Christian church, was a basic tenet of the hierarchical feudal relations of power during this era.

The current approaches to propaganda reflect the dismantling of this unified vision of propaganda and education, along with the unified form of proof, and a shift in the philosophy of governance to being fundamentally based on the ‘consent of the governed’. This change is
most directly linked to the philosophy of the Enlightenment, itself linked with the revolutionary upheavals of the late 18th century with the American and then French revolutions, and the development of the mass media\textsuperscript{19} (print at this time), along with the educational needs of the growing industrial revolution. The French revolution, leading as it did to a democracy and fitting with the Enlightenment demands for rational explanation, led to the establishment of a secular school system, with a curriculum outside of the control of the Catholic church. The curriculum for the secular school systems that developed in many European countries and in some of their former colonies carried on the responsibility for educating the populace about governance. Within democracies based on the Enlightenment ideology, the curriculum was not only to train the future citizens with job related skills but also, equally important, with the skills and character needed to carry out their civic responsibilities. The emphasis upon the civic responsibilities made the liberal curriculum distinct from simply skill training which was carried out within an apprenticeship programme.

A key component of this change was the Enlightenment distinction between rational knowledge and belief systems. Rationality was seen as counterpoised to the obscurantism inherent in religious belief. ‘Truth’ therefore was the result of rational thought not blinded by the distortions of (religious) ‘ideology’. This clearly called for a secular educational system to train future generations. Truth became increasingly associated with proof by empirical verification as emulating the development of the physical sciences. Those physical sciences were playing key roles in the industrial revolution and the expansion of commerce. Governance was to be by the ‘consent of the governed’, usually in the form of a democratically elected representative body. This did not mean universal sufferance, as various restrictions meant that the majority of the population could not vote. A part of the developing secular

education was citizenship training in civic responsibility. The developing distinction between propaganda and education thus carried the historical link of propaganda as the promotion of an ideology outside of the ‘rational’ educational institutions. These two key concepts – the nature of proof being outside of an ideology and the need for the consent of the governed – form the central problematic for the current use of the concept of propaganda. As the issue of Truth plays a critical role in the family of concepts linked to propaganda, with science now proposed as holding truth in its grasp, a brief review of recent developments in the philosophy of science demonstrates the limits on the possibility of maintaining a clear distinction between education and propaganda.

*Philosophical Issues Related to Propaganda and Education*

Within the western European tradition, all modern concepts of propaganda invoke an objective form of truth, incompatible with the bias that ideology is seen to introduce. However, the objective sciences (including the social or human sciences) that are the legacy of the Enlightenment have themselves been challenged by recent developments in the philosophy of science. This challenge is based on the distinction between ideology and empirical fact that the Enlightenment insisted upon. Science was assumed, unlike other approaches, to rely on objective fact, unbiased by opinion, religious belief, or ideology. This popular view corresponds to the *positivist* image of science, an approach that claims an inherently self-correcting mode of functioning, which leads to a steadily increasing, cumulative body of knowledge. This view proposes that scientific information grows steadily, tested against the material world, which as a feedback system to modify – or reject – the theory or hypothesis that generated the research. This is in contrast to the presumed self-justifying system operating within an ideology.

In the positivist’s view, observations, to function correctly, must be free from contamination or restrictions that would prejudice their corrective role. Harold I. Brown, in an
epistemological analysis of this key capacity, challenges the possibility of such purity for the
data. Knowledge of the "mind-independent material world"20 is ultimately a sensory event
within the personal experience of the researcher. The empiricist view assumes that all humans
would perceive the same thing given the same data and thus that knowledge of the data – i.e.
the observation or perception of the data – is equivalent to the sensory input. Brown first notes
that all sensory data does not result in gaining our attention and that only those parts that have
some significance to us will actually be consciously perceived by the viewer. Significant
perception, as opposed to sensation, is meaningful and that meaning comes from what the
viewer already knows, believes, or expects in the situation. The meaning of the perception thus
comes from this previous knowledge context. The same role for meaning must hold true for
the observations in science as well. The context of the scientist’s observation is the theory that
generated the hypothesis, or prediction involved in the research, and thus the observation is
theory-laden. The "meaningful-ness" of perceptions is even more critical to the recognition of
anomalous data or counter instances – the central components of the self-correcting feature of
the scientific method. Only by having a theory generated meaning against which this data is
compared, or an expectation of what ought to exist in this situation, can any data be recognised
as not fitting within that theory.

Scientists normally operate within a system of theories (also called paradigms or
research programs) that define the observational categories, the meaning of key terms and the
correct means to carry out the observations and thus guide research, propose solutions to
problems, and provide the context for the interpretation of the data. These theories include
webs of presuppositions, both explicit and implicit. In analysing the nature of these
presuppositions, Brown determines that they are neither analytical, nor empirical in the

traditional philosophical sense, but rather constitute a separate form he refers to as paradigms or presuppositions. Presuppositions are thus seen as both necessary components of a scientific theory and as a source of possible distortion in the interpreting and the perception of sensory data.

The core presuppositions about the nature of reality by the positivist approach are neatly summarised by Macmillan and Garrison as minimally including these five points:

1. An assumption that at the very least, nature is uniform, i.e., that the objects of investigation are consistent in their existence and behaviour...

2. The principle of causality is also assumed to hold— at least as far as believing that it is possible to give causal explanation of the phenomena under investigation, at most of believing that all events are caused.

3. A belief that our knowledge of the natural world must ultimately (and perhaps proximately) depend upon our experience of the world, as apart from "rationally" determined laws.

4. An assumption that the number of circumstances that pertain to the causation of particular natural phenomena is limited and knowable.

Finally,

5. that only phenomena that admit of quantification (or better still, measurement) are fit for scientific inquiry. (Macmillan & Garrison 1984, p.257)

It is point three from this summary that is directly challenged by Brown's conclusion that observations are by their very nature theory-laden, that is, not separate from "rationally determined laws".

In summary, if observation (experience) is subservient to theory (rationally determined laws), then observation cannot be an objective source of truth. Observation cannot serve as the consummate corrective leading to a progressive accumulation of improved knowledge of the

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"real world". Scientific truth and knowledge are thus recognised to be fallible, no longer having
the protection of recourse to an external standard guaranteeing infallibility. This also means
that the hope of a scientifically pure operational definition of propaganda (in the negative sense
of 'lies') as contrasted with education (as truth) is logically unattainable.

Donmoyer\textsuperscript{24} identifies three orders of mistakes that can occur in the rational
judgement of different theories. The first order is when the data simply doesn't support the
theory – the level that positivistic science posited as the critical one. The second level is when
the language or concepts no longer correctly frame the problem. This would imply the
necessity for a shift in the presuppositions or theories. The third level is when the purpose of
the research program is no longer accepted as correct by the scientific community within that
discipline. Various social science-based concepts of the nature of propaganda have been
redefined based on challenges at each of these levels.

The ability of the scientific community to act in the appropriate way, to rationally judge
competing theories based simply on observational outcomes, is strongly questioned by Thomas
Kuhn\textsuperscript{25}. In the strongest form of his argument, he referred to competing theories as
incommensurable, that is, the presuppositions of each theory generate forms of observations
that are not recognised by the other theory.\textsuperscript{26} Elaborating further, Gholson and Barker note
that

Laodan also recognised a class of metaphysical propositions that are uniquely
associated with a research tradition at any given time. Although the
metaphysical commitments may change as a research program develops
(Laudan, 1977, pp. 102-103), they direct research by stimulating the
construction of theories that articulate a particular ontology as they inhibit the

September (1982): 92-111. See also Donmoyer, Robert. "The Rescue From Relativism: Two Failed Attempts and an
\textsuperscript{22} Kuhn, Thomas. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962.
\textsuperscript{23} Petric investigates the potentially greater problem that differing presuppositions play in attempts at interdisciplinary research in
"'Do You See What I See?' The Epistemology of Interdisciplinary Inquiry". Petric, Hugh. "Do You See What I See? The
construction of theories that are incompatible with that ontology. These principles need not be explicitly stated; indeed, they may come to light only after prolonged (philosophical) analysis. (Gholson & Barker 1985, p.762)\textsuperscript{27}

In contrast to the image of science as reflecting an objective, unadulterated, view of the real world, this implies that scientists function with ideological commitments that have a direct impact on their research and choice of theories.

While much of the analysis behind the development of the new philosophy of science has been based on the history of physics and psychology, disciplines that emphasize experimental research, the importance of presuppositions touches all areas of research. For instance, the presuppositions in the academic discipline of education are generally based on metaphors for intellectual growth. These metaphors about the teacher-child relationship range from images about "sculptors" and "moulding clay" through organic, often flowering plant-based metaphors,\textsuperscript{28} to semi-mechanical metaphors of the role of impression, insight, and rule recognition models of teaching\textsuperscript{29}. These presuppositions have had serious distorting effects on the formulation of research in the discipline of education, research that affects the justification for changes in curriculum in schools. In propaganda analysis, the dominant presuppositions include the opposing interests of the source and audience of propaganda and a view of the belief-systems of individual as readily malleable from the outside.

This new philosophy of science, with its understanding of theory-laden perception, based on both conscious and unconscious paradigmatic presuppositions, further complicates the concept of propaganda grounded in the social sciences. This concept of theory-laden perception allows for the recognition that the Enlightenment philosophy operates as an


ideology itself. Thus science is unable to claim an epistemologically distinct status from other ideologies, including religion.

While the concept of propaganda began as being equated with ‘truth’, the modern use equates propaganda with ‘lies’ – usually referring to ideological distortions, not simply mistaken facts. The attempt to create an objective, ideology-neutral, definition of propaganda led to the effort to create a sharp distinction between propaganda and other forms of persuasive communication. This distinction was usually based on the conscious intent of, and power relationships between, the source and audience of propaganda. Therefore, before presenting the current propaganda analysis paradigms operating today, the key concepts of ideology and power need to be clarified.

_Ideology as a Social Science Concept_

Brown’s critique of the existing philosophy of science focused its examples upon the physical sciences. Starting from an anthropological point of view, Wolf \(^{30}\) traces the historical development of his field showing the political relevance of philosophical ideas and how their presuppositions framed the modern ethnographic concepts. He thus conducts an analysis of the paradigmatic presuppositions of anthropological research.\(^{31}\) While respecting the problematic raised by Brown, Wolf maintains the value of a comparative approach for ethnology and anthropology including a recognition that all societies function with ideologies, none being able to lay claim to an absolute truth standard. He includes Enlightenment based western societies on an equal level with non-western societies whose ideologies have an explicit religious component. Noting that there are always multiple ideologies operating in any society, Wolf seeks to identify how one ideology becomes dominant. He defines ideology as:

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... a complex of ideas selected to underwrite and represent a particular project of installing, maintaining, and aggrandizing power in social relationships. (Wolf 1999, p.55)

Making an historical-political analysis, Wolf delineates the presuppositions of Enlightenment philosophy and how they altered the concept of ideology. These philosophical ideas function as paradigmatic presuppositions for modern propaganda analysis, either implicitly or explicitly. The central assumption was about human nature and the possibility of change. Wolf summarizes this Enlightenment view as:

In contrast to earlier views that understood the human condition as tainted by “original sin,” the Enlighteners saw human as neither good nor bad but as perfectible. They spoke in favor of rationalism and empiricism, and they subjected social and political arrangements to skeptical analysis where they appeared to fall short of these ideals. To improve humanity, they advocated new forms of non-theological learning as avenues of reform. (Wolf 1999, p. 23)

This meant, in practice, that the Enlighteners believed that humans could, and would, now break through the limits erected by cultural tradition and political domination and could confront the world rationally, choosing the most efficient means to achieve posited ends. But viewed within the perspective of the Enlightenment as an ideology competing with other ideologies within the specific historical period, the Enlightenment also represented the rise of the bourgeoisie as a class challenging the dominance of the aristocratic class for governance. Thus

The appeal to reason, however, entailed consequences. One must not forget to ask who is using reason, rationality, logic, and emotional neutrality to do what to whom. As states and enterprises around the world incorporated the Enlightenment appeal to reason to enhance their managerial efficiency, the application of instrumental logic often exacted an exorbitant price. Rule by reason appealed most directly to state managers and private entrepreneurs and to scientists and intellectuals. Adopted by these strata, it invested them with a professional sense of superiority, which they could direct at the unenlightened

31 “A use of terms without attention to the theoretical assumptions and historical contexts that underlie them can lead us to adopt unanalyzed concepts and drag along their mystifying connotations into further work. Tracing out a history of our concepts can also make us aware of the extent to which they incorporate intellectual and political efforts that still reverberate in the present.” Wolf
obduracy of others.... They have advocated industrialization, specialization, secularization, and rational bureaucratic allocation as reasoned options superior to unreasoned reliance on tradition. (Wolf 1999, p. 25)

The nature and rise of capitalism was analysed in the middle and late nineteenth century by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels and their concepts play a key role within the paradigms of both propaganda and education. While several of the major theorists explicitly identify themselves as marxist, even those that oppose this perspective argue assuming a capitalist mode of production and use concepts from within this analysis. The key issue with respect to propaganda and education was the changing conception of the nature of ideology. Wolf well summarises these changes within the writing of Marx and Engels. Thus

(Marx and Engels) followed the Enlightenment in the conviction that reason could unmask falsehood and proclaim truth. They believed that employing reason would help uncover the sources of human misery, which — like many conservatives of their time — they located in the emergence of individuals disconnected from any web of mutual rights and obligations through the breakdown of older communal ways of life. They further held that humans could reach a greater realm of freedom through reliance on their own efforts, including the use of reason, without invoking the consolations of religion. (Wolf 1999, p. 30)

Marx and Engels analysed capitalist relationships as involving the struggle between two main classes — the proletariat and the bourgeois. With the Enclosure Acts in Britain providing greater grazing area for the elite classes, the peasantry was dispossessed of their rights to their land and thus their means of production (and even subsistence level reproduction), and thus they become the proletariat, the ‘free workers’ who have nothing to sell but their labour power. But this social change, with its loss of the feudal rights and obligations, had to be explained. These explanations were clearly self-serving for the elite that produced them. This led to a modification of the concept to ideology.

Under these circumstances, the dispossessed were forced to hire themselves out to members of another class who benefited from this transfer of labor, and who developed rationalizations purporting to explain why this state of affairs
was to the advantage of possessors and dispossessed alike. Marx and Engels were to call these rationalizations “ideology”. (Wolf 1999, p. 30-31)

Marx and Engels went on to explain the necessity, rather than arbitrary nature, of these rationalizations and the creation of a coherent ideology.

Class society fostered illusions precisely because it was riven by the social polarization into the many who labor and the few who dominate the productive process. To deny or veil the resulting tensions, such a society produced ideology as “a particular, distorted kind of consciousness which conceals contradictions” (Larrain 1979, 50). (Wolf 1999, p. 32)

Ideology has thus shifted from a positive term to one of denunciation, associated with deliberate and conscious obfuscation. This shift is both similar and related to the shift in the meaning of propaganda from the promotion of ‘truth’ to the dissemination of lies.

Marx further argues that the ideology of the ruling class will be the ruling ideas in every epoch and thus the ‘natural’ curriculum in educational institutions. This idea of an inherent bias in the dominant ideas (to the benefit of a minority of the population) remains a touchstone for propaganda analysis. As Wolf demonstrates, Marx himself modified his view of ideology to shift away from a necessarily conscious rationalisation by the dominant class. The purpose of ideology remained the same – to disguise the true nature of commodity production within capitalism. However, people’s analysis of their own experience would provide the basis for a rational understanding of their social relationships. As Wolf states,

Mastery of the world through labor, together with the capacity for language developed in the course of laboring together with their fellows, would multiply human knowledge and expand the human grasp upon the world. Practical engagement with the world would produce realistic thought and an “increasing clarity of consciousness, power of abstraction and of judgement” (Engels 1972, 255) while driving out “fantasies” that took no tangible object and only filled the mind with apprehension and fear. (Wolf 1999, p 31-32)

This latter view, based in the Enlightenment but adding a role for practical experience, remains the basis for what is today a humanist and liberal approach to propaganda analysis. Thus this
confidence in the cognitive capacity of humans, to understand their world and be able to sort out the ‘truth from the lies’ based on the data of their own experience, is the basis of ‘critical thinking’ programmes within curriculum. It is also the basis of the ‘how to identify propaganda’ programmes, such as those developed by the Institute for Propaganda Analysis in 1937 in the U.S., or Herman and Chomsky’s comparative content analysis approach to the reporting of U.S. foreign policy.

However, this view retains the Enlightenment presupposition of a reality separate from an interpretive framework which, while critical of specifically religious ideology, denied its own ideological basis.

Marx, drawing on the concept of fetishism from the anthropological based studies of religion, developed the concept of the ‘fetishism of commodities’, which then allows for the “distortions” of ideology to result from the social relations of capitalism rather than conscious deception or rationalisation practised by the ruling class. This is summarised by Wolf as:

Thus animate human labor, which is a physical and cognitive attribute of people, and inanimate commodities produced by that labor are treated as if they belonged to the same category.... The merging of these qualitatively different entities, according to Marx, masks the real social relations that govern the way people are harnessed to the production process. Moreover, when worker-producers of commodities and buyers of commodities are equated, the social relations among workers, employers, and buyers are all made to look like relations among the commodities themselves.... This notion does not rely on a model of ideology as distortions and errors promulgated by a ruling class, rather, it traces the source of deception to a particular kind of social reality, that of capitalism. That reality mixes what is real with fictions; as a result, the participants in the transactions are deceived about the reality of capitalist social relations. (Wolf 1999, p.31-32)

Thus, for Marx, ideology was no longer to be understood as just a rhetorical trick by the ruling class but as a function of the social relations of the capitalist mode of production, usually

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referred to as the fetishism of commodities. For subsequent marxists, the concept of ‘false
consciousness’ results from the contradiction between the apparent material interests of the
people based on the prima facia logic of capitalism verses their material interests based on a
class analysis that an understanding of the fetishism of commodities provides. For self-avowed
marxists from V. I. Lenin to Kwame Nkrumah\textsuperscript{34}, propaganda meant to teach the ‘truth’ based
on exposing the error inherent in the fetishism of the commodities, etc. Marx assumed a
universal applicability of his class analysis based on just such an economic structural analysis, a
position based within Enlightenment logic and subject to the same criticisms. As with critiques
of marxist propaganda, education, which is grounded on a social science justification, is subject
to the critique of denying its ideological basis in a secular Enlightenment philosophy.

\textit{Propaganda and Power}

While an analysis of the relationship of the concepts of ideology and propaganda
provides the basis for exploring the presuppositions involved in the various propaganda
analysis and education paradigms, another critically related concept is that of power. As noted
earlier, the attempt to provide an ideology-free, or at least ideology neutral, objective basis for
identifying propaganda has led to seeing propaganda as simply one form of persuasive
communication. Thus some propaganda theorists see all advertising as propaganda but attempt
to distinguish between acceptable persuasive communication and propaganda based on the
intent of the source party.\textsuperscript{35} The underlying issue is the power relationship between the source
and audience of the persuasive communication. If one defines ideology as “unified schemes or
configurations developed to underwrite or manifest power”\textsuperscript{36} then the meaning of power must

\textsuperscript{33} Herman, Edward S. \textit{Beyond Hypocrisy: Decoding the News in an Age of Propaganda including a Doublepeak Dictionary for the 1990s.}
1968.
be defined. Wolf offers a four level analysis of power. His levels relate well to the different concerns for those involved in propaganda analysis or education.

One is the power of potency or capability that is seen to inhere in an individual. Power in this Nietzschean sense draws attention to how persons enter into a play of power, but it does not address what that play is about.

A second kind of power is manifested in interactions and transactions among people and refers to the ability of an ego to impose its will in social action upon an alter (the Weberian view). Left unspecified is the nature of the arenas in which these interactions go forward.37

A third modality is power that controls the contexts in which people exhibit their capabilities and interact with others. This sense calls attention to the instrumentalities through which individuals or groups direct or circumscribe the action of others within determinate settings. I refer to this mode as tactical or organizational power.

But there is still a fourth modality of power, which I want to focus on in the present inquiry: structural power. By this I mean the power manifest in relationships that not only operates within settings and domains but also organizes and orchestrates the settings themselves, and that specifies the direction and distribution of energy flows. In Marxist terms, this refers to the power to deploy and allocate social labor. It is also the modality of power addressed by Michel Foucault when he spoke of “governance,” to mean the exercise of “action upon action”... (Wolf 1999, p. 5)

While the focus of this dissertation is mainly on the fourth modality related to governance, each propaganda paradigm addresses its concerns to one or more of these power levels. Likewise, the different curriculum perspectives pose different power levels as central to their approach. Using Wolf’s concept of 4 levels of power relationships helped in the task of identifying the presuppositions involved in these interpretive frameworks.

*Internal versus External Propaganda*

While obvious with respect to curriculum in education, one remaining presupposition permeates all the paradigms of propaganda analysis: the key concern of most propaganda theorists is the propaganda, both inside and outside educational institutions, directed towards

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37 While Wolf does not give names to the first two forms of power, for the purposes of this dissertation I will refer to the first form as *personal presence* and to the second form as *interpersonal power*. I retain Wolf’s names the third mode as *tactical or organizational power* and the fourth as *structural power*. 
the internal population (within the national or state boundaries), and its role with respect to the appropriate functioning of that state. External propaganda by the state toward other nations or states seems to rest on the assumption of inherent competition, with rarely negotiated co-operation. This is most clearly expressed when writing about propaganda during periods of war where effective propaganda is seen as a tool of war, reducing casualties on both sides. Thus in the context of war, all forms of deception, lies and trickery are acceptable for the greater good of preventing loss of life in battle. As this research is based on just such a relationship between the nationals of different countries, it requires application of these propaganda and educational paradigms to unaccustomed situations.

Likewise, what constitutes ‘internal’ versus ‘external’ is a historically and politically shifting notion. Thus during WWII, the Soviet Union was ‘internal’ to the Allied side which logically required some defence of the soviet system of government, at least in the Russian context. Within two years of VE Day, the Soviet Union became clearly ‘external’ and the direct object of demonization within the Cold War framework. The U.S. and British re-education projects occur during the transition of categorizing Germany as ‘external’ and ‘the enemy’ to seeing Germany as ‘internal’ to an anti-communist, capitalist West.

The political units on an international or global basis, presenting no simple geo-political reference, offer even greater complexity for defining the internal and external forms of propaganda. However the concept of ideology as a composite of ideas selected to underwrite and represent a particular project of installing, maintaining, and aggrandising power in social relationships remains applicable when the effort is made to identify of the source unit (nation-state, class, corporation, ethnic group, religion, etc.) With respect to any political unit, the internal group generally corresponds to those who actions can be legally censored, restrictions
that are clearly harder to impose on external groups. The presuppositions of an internal versus external group and the role of censorship remain useful to propaganda analysis.
Chapter 3 Propaganda Analysis as an Academic Concern

The first step in the constitution of any academic subject is to provide a definition that distinguishes the object of interest from other similar objects. The problems with providing such a definition for propaganda illustrate the inherently conflicting history of the term propaganda. Thus a sample of definitions, credible within both the fields of communication studies and rhetoric, would include:38

Institute for Propaganda Analysis, 1937: Propaganda is the expression of opinions or actions by individuals or groups deliberately designed to influence opinions or actions of other individuals or groups with reference to predetermined ends.... A characteristic of propaganda is that an attempt is often made to have a view accepted not on its own merits but by appealing to other motives - for example, by playing upon emotional attitudes and feelings. Another characteristic is that propaganda is often a one-sided - as opposed to a two-sided - effort to gain acceptance of a particular view. 39

Qualter in Propaganda and Psychological Warfare: The deliberate attempt by some individual or group to form, control or alter attitudes of other groups by the use of the instruments of communication, with the intention that in any given situation the reaction of those so influenced will be that desired by the propagandist.

Childs: To propagandize is merely to propagate ideas or doctrines... to attempt to deliberately influence the minds of others.

Leonard Doob: Propaganda can be called the attempt to affect personalities and to control behaviour of individuals towards ends considered unscientific or of doubtful value in a society at a particular time.

Harold Laswell: Propaganda is the control of opinion by significant symbols, or so to speak, more concretely and less accurately by stories, rumours, reports, pictures, and other forms of social communication. There is a need for a word which means the making of deliberately one-sided statements to a mass audience. Let us choose "propaganda" as such a word.

Martin: Propaganda offers ready-made opinions for the unthinking herd.

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38 This collection comes from a course on propaganda conducted by Dr. Dennis Murphy in 1995.
39 The Institute also provided a checklist of seven propaganda devices - whose presence defined a message as propaganda. These included Name calling device: giving an idea a bad label; Glittering generality device: associating something with a "virtue word."; Transfer device: carrying the authority, sanction and prestige of something respected and revered over to something else in order to make the latter acceptable; Testimonial device: having some respected or hated person say that a given idea or program or person is good or bad; Plain folks device: the method by which a speaker attempts to convince his audience that he and his ideas are good because they are "of the people" - the "plain folks"; Card stacking device: involves the selection and use of facts or falsehoods, illustrations or distractions, and logical or illogical statements, in order to give the best or the worst possible case for an idea, program, person, or product; Band wagon device: here the theme is "Everybody - at least all of us - is doing it." These devices formed the basis for teaching critical thinking in schools. Lee, Alfred McClung. How to understand propaganda. New York: Rinehart, 1952.
Frederick Lumley: Propaganda is promotion which is veiled in one way or another as to 1) its origins or sources, 2) the interests involved, 3) the methods employed, 4) the content spread, and 5) the results accruing to the victims. - any one, any two, any three, any four, or all five.

Maxwell Garrett: We may define propaganda as any organized effort to make people think of something - whether concrete or abstract, simple or complex - otherwise than it would be thought of by a perfectly impartial person aware of all the relevant facts.

Bernays: Propaganda is the consistent, enduring effort to create or shape events to influence the relations of the public to an enterprise, idea, or group.

Or simply -

Charles A. Stepmann: Propaganda is organized persuasion.

As the variations in the definitions suggest, while most research on propaganda is encompassed within – or split between – the disciplines of "communication studies" and "rhetorical criticism" within speech communication departments, interest and work on the phenomenon is not limited to these fields. In part due to the fact that propaganda, by all definitions, involves minimally the individual (usually as audience), the organisations and institutions of society (usually as source), the mass media (means), and persuasive communication (intent), concepts from the fields of psychology, sociology, political science and rhetoric impinge upon its analysis. This concern within propaganda analysis for Source, Audience, Means, Message and Intent constitute a set of commonplaces for both the social science and rhetoric frameworks.

Rhetoric as academic subject matter dates from the classical Greek era of Plato and Aristotle and was seen as a necessary skill for the educated elite. With the rise of the Enlightenment and the development of the mass media in the 17th and 18th century, rhetoric as the means for the explanation of political control loses ground to the developing social science. Propaganda, as persuasive (as opposed to informative) communication from an institutional source rarely has a public mandate similar to that for curriculum within schools with the exception of cases where public health and safety are concerned. Even in these cases it is often
challenged when there exist different societal values. The split between the rhetoric, within humanities and often situated within the speech communication field within English departments, and explanation, from a social science basis, is reproduced in the history of propaganda analysis within academia.

Propaganda Paradigms

In the post-WWII period, this split between a humanities based concern for propaganda (rhetoric) and a social science based concern, situated within a separate communication studies department, is one axis for understanding the development and concerns of the different propaganda paradigms. The humanities concern for philosophical justification is counterpoised by the empirical justification required of the social science based forms of propaganda analysis. A second axis within propaganda analysis is whether the purpose of the analysis is to challenge or maintain the dominant ideology, as currently represented by the liberal democratic social philosophy underlying capitalism. Challenge to the dominant ideology is usually represented by the appropriation of a more or less modified form of marxist ideology.

The five paradigms analysed in this dissertation are the 'positivist attitude change' approach as represented by Jowett and O'Donnell and Pratkanis, the 'historical sociological'

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For instance the attempts to introduce 'safe sex' (the use of condoms) within the framework of the AIDS epidemic.


Other challenges come from feminist theory, systems theory, etc. I have focused on the marxist variation as this current is represented in both the propaganda analysis and education perspectives. Often the feminist challenge has been incorporated with the marxist variation as in the 'Radical' perspective within curriculum analysis. This feminist critique is less important for this dissertation as the Allied re-education projects dealt almost exclusively with male German prisoners of war.

These are my labels and my classification. There seems to be only a limited recognition of separate 'schools' or paradigms operating within and between communication studies and rhetorical criticism. Therefore there is no consistent labelling of the various approaches. These are not the only perspectives offered for propaganda analysis. The choice has been made for the purposes of this research. When only one reference has been cited here, it is deemed to be the single best source of the perspective. For instance, Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman have written many books together and separately on the subject, almost any of which could serve the purpose of this expose.


approach as represented by Ellul\textsuperscript{46}, the 'American humanist propaganda analysis' approach represented by Sproule\textsuperscript{47}, a neo-marxist feminist rhetoric critique as represented by McKerrow\textsuperscript{48} and the 'comparative rhetoric critique' of Herman and Chomsky\textsuperscript{49}. Although these may be the central paradigms, they do not exhaust the field and are chosen in part because they have consciously recognised the existence and credibility of other paradigms and offer some response, often by including aspects of the other paradigm within their own. In each case, the key concepts, the underlying disciplines and presuppositions, as well as relevant assumptions about governance will be presented.

\textit{Positivist Attitude Change Paradigm}

As the historically dominant paradigm for propaganda research in the United States, the positivist attitude change paradigm reflects the effective hegemony of the positivist philosophy that influenced most social science research in the decades of and following the Second World War. Coming from a rhetorical criticism background, Jowett and O'Donnell offer this definition:

\begin{quote}
Propaganda is the deliberate and systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist.
\end{quote}

Further, propaganda seeks to contain information in a specific area, and responses to propaganda are manipulated in an attempt to keep them in the contained area. The recipient of the propaganda message is discouraged from asking about anything outside the contained area. (Jowett & O'Donnell 1986, p. 16)

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Propaganda is proposed as a subset of communications, something that can be 'objectively' defined, thus skirting the issue of an inherent value judgement. The task then is to treat propaganda as if it were an object whose qualities can be scientifically studied.

A communication approach to the study of propaganda enables us to isolate its communicative variables, to determine the relationship of message to context, to examine the responses and responsibilities of the audience, and to trace the development of propagandistic communication as a process. We believe that there is a need to evaluate propaganda in a modern context free of value-laden definitions. (Jowett & O'Donnell 1986, p. 14)

However, the negative ethical value of the concept of propaganda is recaptured in the contrast with persuasion such that

Propaganda is a form of communication that is different from persuasion because it attempts to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist. Persuasion is interactive and attempts to satisfy the needs of both persuader and persuadee. (Jowett & O'Donnell 1986, p. 13)

Persuasion is a reciprocal process in which both parties are dependent upon one another. It is a situation of interactive dependency. (Jowett & O'Donnell 1986, p. 25)

The analysis of propaganda must be made within a social psychology model of communication that focuses on

Communication as a convergence process. The communication elements that enable convergence to occur are (1) a communicator, (2) a message, (3) a channel, and (4) an audience. Other important aspects are (5) feedback and (6) effects of the message. All of these elements must be examined in light of the context in which they occur, both in a specific and immediate sense and in the social-cultural framework of the times. (Jowett & O'Donnell 1986, p. 14)

One key aspect of all approaches to propaganda is their attitude towards "informative communication", either by the mass media (especially the role of news) or the educational system. Jowett and O'Donnell, while accepting that all advertising, no matter how 'informative', is propaganda, and that much of the news also reflects an implicit "ideological
bias", still hold that education, in democratic societies, is a form of persuasion, not propaganda, as the ends are for the student's benefit and must be voluntarily accepted by her/him. Thus

(Persuasion) is response shaping. This is similar to learning, wherein the persuader is a teacher and the audience is a pupil. A persuader may attempt to shape the response of an audience by teaching it how to behave and offer positive reinforcement for learning. If audience responses favorable to the persuader's purpose are reinforced by rewards to the audience, positive attitudes are developed toward what is learned. The audience has a need for positive reinforcement filled, and the persuader has a need for a desired response from the audience filled. (Jowett & O'Donnell 1986, p. 25)

The quote also demonstrates the behaviourist paradigm from psychology that underpins this approach. The unit of analysis is the individual who is assumed to be basically receptive in response to the communication messages involved, accepting or rejecting them due to their ability to tap into the emotional 'anchors' of her/his understanding of the world. Thus the impact of propaganda is measured by 'attitude change' research, which on a mass survey basis is 'public opinion' research. The assumption is that the purpose of propaganda is attitude change and thus the key research tools are the procedures by which this can be measured, such as the Likert and Thurstone scales. To access the relative efficacy of techniques by which attitude change may be accomplished, laboratory research is conducted using the classic experimental method. This laboratory focus includes attempts to look at the impact of the media on the individual, the most publicly known being that of the impact of TV violence on children.

While recognising the institutional sources of propaganda and the fact of possible political ideological content, no attempt is made to analyse these levels, nor the societal role that propaganda might play. The individual is assumed to be a unique, autonomous, consciously functioning decision maker, within the context of an awareness of multiple

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50 Ideological is used to mean 'supporting a specific political ideology", most often seen to be liberal capitalism versus communism.
choices. This itself reflects a liberal political ideology. The standard context for an analysis of propaganda is assumed to be a democracy like that in the United States and implicit within this concept is that the public in a democracy can and should control the actions of the societies’ institutions by their own individual actions. Thus the Positivist Attitude Change propaganda paradigm reflects concern for Wolf’s fourth level – structural power, while its defence of education engages the third level – institutional power. Jowett and O’Donnell conclude their book with:

This brief examination of propaganda has, we hope, made you more aware of how much this activity has shaped our lives, and helped to form the attitudes we have on so many subjects. Propaganda by itself is a natural outgrowth of the development of sophisticated media of communications; it will always be with us, in one form or another, and, we, as individuals can accept or reject it as we wish. We should not fear propaganda, for in a free society, somewhere, somehow, alternate message systems always appear. As long as people care, propaganda’s powers are controlled; if we give up our rights to free speech, for whatever reason, then we lose control to those who control the propaganda systems. In the long run, freedom of speech in a free, open society is the greatest deterrent to the misuse of propaganda. (Jowett & O’Donnell 1986, p. 217)

Jowett and O’Donnell attempt to combine a concern for rhetorical analysis with integration into the social sciences. Pratkanis and Aronson focus almost exclusively on the social psychological methods and research on attitude change.51 Noting the pervasiveness of persuasive communication through the mass media, especially through television, they reduce the analysis of propaganda to the psychological impact of different forms of rhetorical devices,52 expanding those used by the Institute of Propaganda Analysis for whom mass media was radio and the print media. Their central metaphor is the advertisement or selling of ideas as if they were products. This in part is due to the shift in advertisement to that based on life-style images rather than on the quality of product. So now, propaganda promoting government

policies or political lifestyle is indistinguishable from advertising. The assumption is that the audience becomes cynical with this barrage of news in the same format as advertising and thus the ‘attitude change’ is less effective and the product credibility reduced. Thus to the ‘marketplace of ideas’ within a democracy, Pratkanis and Aronson add the cynicism that may develop towards the marketplace itself. Like Jowett and O’Donnell they believe that education about the propaganda devices can make one a critical consumer, but they offer no alternative. This represents an exclusive focus on the impact of ‘structural power’ on the individual.

The Historical-Sociological Approach

In sharp contrast to this paradigm, Ellul\(^{54}\) approaches propaganda as a sociological phenomenon, which subsumes psychological action, psychological warfare, re-education and brainwashing, and, more controversially, public and human relations because “they seek to adapt the individual to a society, to a living standard, to an activity. They serve to make him conform, which is the aim of all propaganda.” (Ellul 1965, p. xiii)

Propaganda itself is defined as:

a set of methods employed by an organized group that wants to bring about the active or passive participation in its actions of a mass of individuals, psychologically unified through psychological manipulations and incorporated in an organization. (Ellul 1965, p. 61)

This represents a fundamental difference in the perceived purpose of propaganda; for Ellul the goal is not attitude change but attitude maintenance, to reinforce the individual in his pre-existing attitudes, which themselves are the results of ‘pre-propaganda’, which encompasses the educational system and all other forms of integration propaganda. This pre-propaganda he defines as

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\(^{52}\) see footnote 39 above.
the conditioning of minds with vast amounts of incoherent information, already dispensed for ulterior purposes and posing as "facts" and as "education". (Ellul 1965, p. vi)

The distinction between integration (of the individual into the society) verses agitation (eliciting some behaviour) propaganda is key to his analysis. As a sociological phenomenon, propaganda, basically by the nation state, is necessary for the integration of the individual into his proper place within an advanced technological society. For Ellul, the ‘audience’ for propaganda is the alienated individual who in the plural form is the ‘masses’. His state of alienation is the natural by-product of the technological society. The ‘masses’ as the plural form of the individual is in specific contrast to the collective forms of functioning that existed in the villages of the pre-industrial world. Propaganda is thus the means for offering him a ‘collective identity’ without the reality of a truly collective human grouping. Thus Ellul says

Modern propaganda reaches individuals enclosed in the mass and as participants in that mass, yet it also aims at a crowd, but only as a body composed of individuals. (Ellul 1965, p.6)... Conversely, when propaganda is addressed to a crowd, it must touch each individual in that crowd, in that whole group. To be effective, it must give the impression of being personal, for we must never forget that the mass is composed of individuals, and is in fact nothing but assembled individuals. (Ellul 1965, p.7-8)... Thus all modern propaganda profits from the structure of the mass, but exploits the individual’s need for self affirmation,... (Ellul 1965, p.7)

For the state, the goal and necessity of propaganda is summarised as:

In the midst of increasing mechanization and technological organization, propaganda is simply the means used to prevent these things from being felt as too oppressive and to persuade man to submit with good grace. (Ellul 1965, p. xviii)

Since it is the technological nature of a society that calls forth the necessity for the state to use propaganda, the state’s use of, and dependence upon, propaganda is the same regardless of the political system involved. As Ellul says

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Propaganda as a phenomenon is essentially the same in China or the Soviet Union or the United States or Algeria. (p. xiv)

Ellul’s concern is with the impact of this all-pervasive propaganda on the individual’s total personality, regardless of the social or political system involved.

However, he specifically rejects the centrality of the discipline of psychology for understanding of the nature of propaganda. Ellul asserts that propagandists will use whatever results psychological research might produce but propaganda itself is not determined by those results.

To study propaganda we must turn not to the psychologist, but to the propagandist; we must examine not a test group, but a whole nation subjected to real and effective propaganda. Of course this excludes all so-called scientific (that is, statistical) types of study, but at least we shall have respected the object of our study – unlike many present-day specialists who establish a rigorous method of observation, but, in order to apply it, lose the object to be studied. (Ellul 1965, p. xii-xiii)

He notes that the major systems of propaganda, which, in 1965, he identifies as the American, Soviet Union and Chinese Maoist, have used different theories of psychology while effectively using the same propaganda techniques.

... Stalinist propaganda was in great measure founded on Pavlov’s theory of the conditioned reflex. Hitlerian propaganda was in great measure founded on Freud’s theory of repression and libido. American propaganda is founded in great measure on Dewey’s theory of teaching. (Ellul 1965, p.5)

For Ellul, propaganda is a total system, encompassing all institutions and systems within a state. In contrast with the ‘positivist attitude change’ paradigm, he holds that

Education and training are inevitably taken over, as the Napoleonic empire demonstrated for the first time. No contrast can be tolerated between teaching and propaganda, between the critical spirit formed by higher education and the exclusion of independent thought. One must utilize the education of the young to condition them to what comes later. (Ellul 1965, p.13)

It is this ‘total’ aspect, the fact that propaganda pervades all of our lives and is essentially inescapable, that creates the negative psychological impact of producing the ‘totalitarianized
man'. This label includes psychological crystallisation, alienation, dissociation, mithridatization (to ignore the content while still being addicted to the presence of propaganda) and sensibilization (addiction to the excitement that propaganda provides). 55

As noted by Konrad Kellen, who translated and wrote the introduction to Ellul's book,

Ellul never relies on statistics or quantification, which he heartily disdains, but on observation and logic. His treatise is a fully integrated structure of thought in which every piece fits in with all others... (Ellul 1965, p. vii)

Although for Ellul the propagandist is solely driven by the need to be effective, he also asserts that there is no useful way to measure this effectiveness, due both to the difficulty of the subject and the inadequacy of the methods. Since, for the propagandist, there will usually be multiple objectives for his campaign, measuring any one of them is pointless and measuring all of them impossible, in part due to their different time frames for impact. It is also impossible to disassociate the impact of this specific campaign (in the attempt to measure its effectiveness) from other things going on in society at that moment, from external (to the campaign) historical events over which the propagandist has no control or from the residual impact of a previous campaign or education in general. His rejection of empirical methodology is based on the presuppositions of science which include:

The removal of the fact to be quantified from its psychological, religious, sentimental, historic contexts and its removal from the individual's Weltanschauung as a whole.

The reduction of the phenomenon to its simplest state, by elimination of all complexities and subsidiary aspects – which may actually be the most important.

Consideration of the external phenomena only, though they may be merely extensions of more important, different factors. But quantification must restrict itself to external aspects, behavior, visible attitudes, and so on. (Ellul 1965, p.275)

Ellul's conclusion is distinctly more pessimistic than Jowett and O'Donnell while sharing with them the sense of propaganda's pervasiveness.

The only truly serious attitude — serious because of the danger of man's destruction by propaganda is serious, serious because no other attitude is truly responsible and serious — is to show people the extreme effectiveness of the weapon used against them, to rouse them to defend themselves by making them aware of their frailty and their vulnerability, instead of soothing them with the worst illusion, that of a security that neither man's nature nor the techniques of propaganda permit him to possess. It is merely convenient to realize that the side of freedom and truth for man has not yet lost, but that it may well lose — and that in this game, propaganda is undoubtedly the most formidable power, acting in only one direction (towards the destruction of truth and freedom), no matter what the good intentions or the good will may be of those who manipulate it. (Ellul 1965, p.257)

Several presuppositions underlie Ellul's theory on the psychological and political science levels. Implicit in his critique of propaganda is the idea there is some form of truth outside the society's system of propaganda that could inform humans in the development of their consciousness. This truth would have a source of validation other than from within the propaganda based information and educational system. This is never identified, although his profession as a theologian suggests religious revelation as the alternative. Even his last plea is more a call for the need for awareness of our 'propagandized state' than an alternative methodology for avoiding it. Also implicit within his discussion is the necessity, and thus normalcy, of the state prerogative to structure and have control over lives of the citizens. He offers nothing equivalent to Jowett and O'Donnell's belief in the control that the masses have over the government and thus the power to effectively limit its activities.

Jowett and O'Donnell are aware of Ellul's work but essentially dismiss it, stating

Although respectful of the work of Jacques Ellul, we could not incorporate many of his ideas within the text of this book. We aimed to clarify and distinguish propaganda as a form of communication, but found that we could not do so with Ellul's view of the pervasiveness of propaganda. (Jowett & O'Donnell 1986, p. 11)
However, others, such as Cunningham\textsuperscript{56} and Christians\textsuperscript{57} and Fedorowicz\textsuperscript{58} have specifically adopted and applied Ellul's concepts to North America. His emphasis on the complexity of the propaganda situation and his rejection of positivist empirical methods have had a broader echo, especially in France, and references to his work appear in many modern studies of propaganda -- and not simply to dismiss it as Jowett and O'Donnell do.

\textit{Humanist Propaganda Analysis}

A recent challenge to the positivist attitude change paradigm comes from a call for the revival of the humanist propaganda analysis paradigm, which was based on rhetorical analysis, and historically preceded the positivist approach. Sproule \textsuperscript{59} demonstrated that the succeeding positivist approach had falsely maligned this paradigm, claiming it was based on the easily dismissed 'magic bullet' supposition. His historical approach to the analysis of propaganda in the United States recovered this paradigm, which, being native to the U.S., is also counter posed to various 'European' approaches, including both Ellul and marxism. In his interesting 1987 article, "Propaganda Studies in American Social Science: the Rise and Fall of the Critical Paradigm", he traces the complex interaction of reformist, scientific, economic, and governmental interests in the process by which a paradigm gains advocates and wins converts. (Sproule 1987, p.60)


Sproule outlines the resulting split of propaganda studies into opposing camps situated in speech communication (maintaining rhetorical analysis) and communication 'scientists' (using a statistical-experimental methodology) 60.

In a subsequent article, Sproule 61 summaries his argument and begins to identify some of the key concepts of the humanist propaganda analysis paradigm as follows:

The standard account of the beginnings of American mass communication research holds that the propaganda critic between the world wars adopted the European concept of the mass audience, treating messages as "magic bullets" directly and powerfully infused into passive receivers. Such a mythical account overlooks the progressive reformist mission of propaganda analysis to help an essentially competent public against the new co-option of communication channels by powerful institutions. The magic bullet myth emerged after 1940 when social scientists turned from domestic to extra-hemispheric threats to democracy and sought a consensus that propaganda was democracy's servant against fascism and communism. (Sproule 1989a, p.225)

This paradigm historically came out of the growing concern for the developing impact of the mass media (newspapers originally) on the process of democracy in the United States. Explicitly launched in reaction to the knowledge of the manipulation of information carried out by George Creel62 and the Committee on Public Information, an official federal agency of mass persuasion during World War I, the key concern was for how citizens could make informed decisions about political problems when their information was being biased by the very elites the citizens were supposed to control. Both the incredible loss of life and the subsequent failure of President Wilson's Fourteen Point peace plan gave a political opening to a critique of how the American public could have been 'sold' on entry into the war. The critique came explicitly from a humanist perspective and included philosopher and educator

62 George Creel was interviewed in 1948 for his opinions concerning propaganda in the two wars. NARA: RG 218, Vol. / 6, Interviews ... George Creel, 24-Oct-48.
John Dewey. Former war journalist Walter Lippman in 1922 wrote the first book that developed the theory that became the basis for propaganda analysis. The basic assumption was that the means of mass communication offered the potential for the development of modern propaganda where there could be no popular control on the accuracy of the information provided. This clearly jeopardised the possibility for the population of citizens to play their necessary role. The main methodology used in propaganda studies was a rhetorical analysis of the distortions and biases in press coverage both during and subsequent to World War I. The belief was that if the population could be made aware of these distortions and could be taught techniques for identifying propaganda, then they could regain their capacity to make intelligent decisions. The population would then rationally evaluate, rather than emotionally react to, the competing claims of all sources and thus perform their necessary role within a democracy. As the government had been the source of the clearest propaganda campaign during World War I, government agencies, along with the newspapers, were a prime target for this analysis. The methodology was rhetorical analysis and the solution was training in just this process. As Sproule notes,

The movement culminated in the formation of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis in 1937. The Institute widely diffused antipropaganda thinking from higher education to the public schools and to the reading public. Propaganda analysis declined during the 1940s and 1950s, decades more concerned with national security than social self criticism. (Sproule 1989a, 1989, p.11)

It is, however, in a 1991 article that Sproule explicitly posits the recovery of this paradigm as useful to modern propaganda critics. In the abstract to that article, he states:

Since 1900, different schools of thought have emerged in the United States concerning the implications of propaganda for the rational-democratic society. The conversation among progressive propaganda critics, communication practitioners, rationalists, communication scientists, conservative humanists,

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and political polemicists reveals the panorama of American experience with 
and interpretation of mass persuasion. Although selectively remembered today, 
this dialectic provides an ideological critique that is not only powerful, but 
historically grounded in the vicissitudes of American culture. When fully 
recovered, the long-standing American dialogue on propaganda supplies a 
useful alternative vocabulary to Marxism for analyzing the diffusion of ideology 
through such ostensibly neutral channels of public communication as news, 
entertainment, government agencies, religion, and education. (Sproule 1991, 
p.211)

While the positivist attitude change paradigm has explicitly denied or overlooked the 
ideological content and the usefulness of a rhetorical analysis of the media, postulating, as 
Jowett and O'Donnell do, a fundamentally neutral role for it, the post-Vietnam war period 
spawned a critical approach to the media that found theoretical basis in such marxist thinkers 
as Antonio Gramsci, Stuart Hall, Louis Althusser, members of the German Frankfurt school, 
Hans Engensberger and others. It is specifically as an alternative to these approaches, which 
Sproule sees as based on concepts more appropriate to the European context, that the 
necessity of an alternative specifically progressive critique is proposed. Thus Sproule states, 

If Americans are to conceptualize and respond to the communication industry 
successfully, it will help if they understand the complex issues in terms 
applicable to American experience, history, social organization, and criticism. 
The idea that social influence proceeds by means of large economic classes 
employing stable ideological apparatuses is not consistent with fundamental 
American experience. More familiar to Americans is the idea of tactical 
propaganda battles waged between and among shifting alliances of 
organizations, factions, and leaders. The importance of competition in arenas 
of propaganda is underscored by commentators who fault the Frankfurt school 
for giving undue weight to forces that attempt to stabilize society. (Sproule 
1991, p.232)

The fundamental unity of all propaganda by the state, as seen by Ellul, is denied. While Sproule 
adopts that the continuing debate within the field reflects the fact that "the United States has
not fully come to grips with the social role of its media of communication," it is within the specifically American based paradigms that the solution should be sought.

While in quasi-explicit contrast to Ellul’s view (which unfortunately is never mentioned), Sproule’s approach has received specific acceptance by some from the positivist attitude change paradigm. Thus Jowett in a commentary on Sproule’s article clearly welcomes his approach and in a moment of implicit self criticism for the positivist tradition states that

One unfortunate result of this selective interpretation of history was to relegate all previous (nonempirical) communications research into some sort of subjective limbo reserved for social or political commentary, rather than to see it as a serious early form of cultural analysis. (Jowett 1991, p.240)

It is unclear from this article whether Jowett is fully ready to embrace the essentially anti-empirical assumptions underlying progressive propaganda analysis, or simply hopes that this will provide an alternative to the ‘threat’ of a marxist take-over of the field. He does provide an interesting summary of a specifically American consensus on the role of the media from both those who see it as potentially harmful and those who see it as neutral.

Effectively this underlines one of the key assumptions underlying this paradigm – the specificity of the American experience. Whether its full development would generate a schema which could be generalized to other countries (as the positivist attitude change paradigm was) remains to be seen. As currently proposed it recognises the importance of the historical,

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66 Thus Jowett writes: “It is, however, possible to identify three universal concerns stemming from both groups. The first centered on the effects of the new media on existing institutions, such as the school, the church, politics, and other activities such as reading and other recreational forms; the second was the question of changing values, and last, overshadowing everything else, was the concern for children.” He further notes that “This is a quite different agenda from that suggested by the various Marxist critiques, although, with some manipulation, one could show parallel concerns.” and continues with “America was a vast country with a difficult mission, an almost impossible attempt to create a single nation while at the same time preserving certain regional identities.” Jowett, Garth S. "Propaganda Critique: The Forgotten History of American Communication Studies." In Communication Yearbook, ed. James A. Anderson, 14, 239-248. Newbury Park CA: SAGE, 1991.
political and ideological analysis for propaganda studies while denying a marxist sociological perspective.

**Neo-Marxist Feminist Rhetoric Critique Paradigm**

Another paradigm, neo-marxist feminist rhetoric critique, has two distinct differences from the previous ones: it is based explicitly on the centrality of an ideological analysis, and its goal is to identify ways in which the existing capitalist order might be challenged. As noted above, the American war in Vietnam launched the questioning that led to the development of this paradigm. Variants of a marxist based paradigm have gained wide acceptance, generating what may become a separate discipline of cultural studies. Thus Jowett writes,

> In the last decade, we have witnessed a bewildering shift in the dominant methodologies (paradigms) of communication studies in American universities. Where only a decade ago there was almost complete domination by a largely statistically based empiricism, in the decade of the 1980s new, humanistically based methodologies emerged to provide a serious challenge to this hegemony.... In fact critical studies’ (the more generic term for marxist based analysis) strongest supporters have as their stated aim the displacement of so-called objective empirical research from its lofty perch by a more socially and politically aware hybrid combination of empiricism and critical research (Grossberg, 1987) (Jowett 1991, p.239)

Central to this approach is an acceptance of qualitative methodologies. McKerrow proposes a methodology centered on a rhetorical critique of ideology. She 67 summarises the approach in the abstract of her article:

This essay sets forth a theoretical rationale for a critical rhetoric and presents eight "principles" which, taken together, orient the critic toward the act of criticism. The theoretical rationale encompasses two forms of critique, styled as a critique of domination and as a critique of freedom. Both have in common an analysis of the discourse of power as it serves in the first case to maintain the privilege of the elite and, in the second, to maintain social relations across a broad spectrum of human activities. The principles articulate an orientation that sees critique as a transformative practice rather than as a method, recognizes the materiality of discourse, reconceptualizes rhetoric as doxastic as contrasted to epistemic, and as nominalistic as contrasted to universalistic,

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captures rhetoric as "influential" as contrasted to "causal", recognizes the importance of absence as well as presence, perceives the potential for polysemic as opposed to monosemic interpretation, and as an activity that is "performed".... In practice, a critical rhetoric seeks to unmask or demystify the discourse of power. The aim is to understand the integration of power/knowledge in society — what possibilities for change the integration invites or inhibits and what intervention strategies might be considered appropriate to effect social change. (McKerrow 1989, p.91)

This clearly goes beyond the simple class based sociological analysis of traditional marxism, incorporating features from feminism (the analysis of dominance and the importance of all social relations) and some forms of post-modernism (the concept of discourse) and possibly post-Kuhnian philosophy of science (the emphasis on "influential" rather than "causal" explanations).

While clearly only one of the many approaches based on some form of marxist critique, McKerrow was chosen to represent this paradigm as she has provided an explicit contrast of this paradigm with the humanist propaganda approach. The contrast with the positivist attitude change paradigm is practically complete, operating as it does in almost completely different domains. This is a rejection of experimental laboratory based methods. No quantification is sought, and the object of analysis (propaganda and its effects) is approached from the standpoint of seeking change rather than assuming permanence. No mention is made of the historical-sociological paradigm or of Ellul, perhaps because his position of 'no alternative' to the necessity of propaganda to the modern technological state and thus the 'totalitarianization' of man is antithetical to a paradigm whose basic premise is the possibility of change and the necessity of seeking out its means. However, Ellul's analysis of the multiple forms of propaganda, with its total invasion of public and private life, is compatible with this approach.
In contrasting critical rhetoric and propaganda studies in commentary on Sproule’s article, McKerrow states the initial fundamental distinction between criticism and critique to be based on the fact that

As a criteriological mode of inquiry, criticism entails an implicit commitment to Platonic ideals of universal truth. Critique, on the other hand, abstains from universalist appeals to unchanging standards of judgement.... This is not to say that both do not participate in "demystification" of the discourse of power, but it is to say that they do so with different ends in view, and with different rationales underlying their respective pursuits. Criticism operates from an acceptance of the tenets of rational democracy, while critique offers the possibility of challenging those tenets. (McKerrow 1991a, p.250)

Following on this is the contrast based on the relative permanence or change implied in each approach.

... (C)riticism yields an evaluation that ultimately serves the interest of the dominant ideology.... (C)riticism of the kind practiced by the propaganda critics of the early twentieth century was not interested in altering the social order. The goal of those critics, laudable as it may be, was to preserve democracy by ferreting out those who would seek to undermine its most basic strengths.

Critique, on the other hand, does not privilege rational democracy, or the present social order, above other possible organizational matrices that might be put into place. (McKerrow 1991a, p.251)

Both paradigms, McKerrow asserts, allow for the action of an agent to effect change, although Sproule’s reading of the "negativity of Marxists" (seeing the individual as being simply subjected to hegemonic forces) leads him to deny this aspect. This latter point is likewise linked to the question of indeterminacy versus overdetermination as reflected in Sproule’s analysis of the marxist paradigm. By concentrating on state power as the locus of hegemony, Sproule reads into the marxist approach an overdeterminacy that precludes the individual as agent. McKerrow counters with the importance of a broader conception of domination. Looking at the question of the changing definition of ‘liberty’ within rational democratic discourse, she states.

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What is "hegemonic" in this context is the dominance of a particular perspective on liberty – a perspective that legitimates state control or particular social relations as being in the interests of the people. Implicit in this review of changing definitions is the indeterminacy principle: There is no absolute or fixed sense in which liberty is to be defined, nor is there any privileged position given to the concept such that it cannot be altered in the future. (McKerrrow 1991a, p.254)

This particular critic would also distinguish this paradigm from that of Ellul, as his key assumption is the essentially unchanging demands for propaganda to integrate people into an unjust system that a technological society will place on its members. Finally, McKerrrow summarises these fundamental points underlying a marxist approach:

First, as noted above, a Marxist critique exists in order to suggest potential interventionist strategies. It is openly teleological, while holding its own goals open to future critique. Second, the "overdetermination" thesis, which would reduce analysis to the causal forces of modes of production or the hegemony of a dominant class, has lost its hold.... third, other subjects have come to the fore in the analysis of an "indeterminate" set of social relations. The interaction of power and knowledge, irrespective of its source, is a central focus of contemporary study. (McKerrrow 1991a, p.255)

Other versions of this approach are represented by Burnett 69 and Szanto70. Burnett makes the case for the necessity to analyse ideology within propaganda, while Szanto demonstrates the importance of dramatic persona in propaganda and thus the propaganda nature of 'entertainment' programs on TV.

Comparative Rhetoric Critique

Perhaps the most well known model of propaganda analysis is that of Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky.71 Beginning from a marxist analysis of the nature of capitalism and the state's role in protecting the interests of big business, Herman and Chomsky focus on

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the role of the mass media in distorting the news. They counterpoise the necessity of a critical comparative historical case study approach to the analysis of the media. The presuppositions for their approach are universalistic application of models from the social sciences of history, political science, economics, and anthropology. The comparative case study method, demanding the same assumptions and expectations be applied to both cases, constitutes the centre of their programme of critical thinking about the media. Thus, Herman and Chomsky note the difference in media attention given and deliberate distortions created in the reporting of government troop massacres of civilian populations when they occur in a country that is an 'enemy' of the U.S. (the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia) and when they occur in a country that is an 'ally' (the Indonesian governments attacks in East Timor). Within the logic of rational equal treatment, if government troop massacres of civilian populations are abhorrent and serve as the basis for shifts in U.S. foreign policy, those shifts should be based on the massacre itself, not on whether this is a friendly or enemy government. Noting the different form of control that dictatorships have through government censorship, their concern is to show the mechanisms for the same level of censorship or distortion in liberal democracies. They follow the liberal democratic assumptions of governance as being based on the citizenry’s control of the government through knowledge of its actions. Thus the media distortion negates the possibility of the mechanism operating correctly. While they hold a more radical political perspective, their basic argument repeats that of Walter Lippman’s concept of ‘manufacturing consent’, which is the name of both their book and the documentary on Noam Chomsky’s political work.

Their propaganda model of the media is based on five filters that influence the reporting of an event. These are:

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1. "The enormous size, very restricted ownership and profit orientation of the mass media"\textsuperscript{73} means that very few divergent points of view reach a mass audience. Thus the 'free marketplace of ideas' is negated by the cost of entry into the marketplace, giving one set of ideas dominance for financial rather than rational reasons.

2. "The advertising license to do business"\textsuperscript{74} asserts that the cost of the mass media is paid through advertisers, not subscribers. Thus the advertisers have the power to control what is presented by withdrawing, or threatening to withdraw, their advertising dollar from a media source that produces a report that displeases them by criticism of either their company or other political issues the owners support.

3. "Sourcing mass-media news"\textsuperscript{75} discusses the greater access and credibility of government sources for reporters over most oppositional forces, a problem when the role of the media, and its constitutional protection, is based on being a critical control mechanism for government actions and policy.

4. "Flak and the enforcers"\textsuperscript{76} analyse the cost to media companies of challenges to their published positions. Flak as negative responses to the company by individuals has little cost; but when the negative responses, including possible and real court challenges, come from a well-funded group or institution the cost can be prohibitive. To avoid these costs, news management regularly filters any statement or report that could be the basis for flak from these institutions – including the government. Again, this weakens the ability of the media to play its corrective role.


5. "Anticommunism as a control mechanism" challenges the impact of the Cold War ideology that created the image of communism as the ultimate evil. Communism does threaten the class position and superior status of the propertied elites but not of the vast majority of people who do not own the 'means of production'. If the concept of a 'free market place of ideas' is central to an adequate democracy, then the ideological exclusion of all but the dominant ideology subverts that possible functioning. Their critique of the media is not a defence of communism as an alternate ideology but rather a critique of the exclusion and distortion that the anticommunist filter plays on the reporting of news from communist countries, parties or proposals that are seen to challenge the capitalist ideology. Herman and Chomsky conclude:

The five filters narrow the range of news that passes through the gates, and even more sharply limit what can become "big news," subject to sustained new campaigns. By definition, news from primary establishment sources meets one major filter requirement and is readily accommodated by the mass media. Messages from and about dissidents and weak, unorganized individuals and groups, domestic and foreign, are at an initial disadvantage in sourcing costs and credibility, and they often do not comport with the ideology or interests of the gatekeepers and other powerful parties that influence the filtering process.

Herman and Chomsky argue that a propaganda approach to media coverage suggests a systematic and highly political dichotomization in news coverage based on the serviceability of the story to important domestic power interests. If correct, the impact of these five filters would be observable in dichotomized choices of story and in the volume and quality of coverage.

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This analysis of ideology and the role it plays with respect to the dominant powers in society is also central to both the humanist American propaganda analysis and the marxist rhetoric critique paradigms. They differ essentially on their political views of the nature of the state and the political purpose of propaganda analysis. They also recognise the importance of the psychological level of analysis but none are linked to a single specific psychological paradigm. The marxist rhetoric critique is linked to the critical paradigm within sociology while the humanist propaganda analysis (only recently elaborated) has no specific base in another social science discipline.

These propaganda paradigms will contribute to the analysis of the Allied re-education projects with German prisoners of war. The organisers of these re-education projects may not have deliberately based their choices on any of these paradigms, yet, with the passage of time, the consequences of these efforts can be discussed in terms of these paradigms. For example, given that the Soviet, U.S. and British re-education projects were developed before the writings of Ellul, McKerrow or Herman and Chomsky, those responsible for initiating and maintaining the re-education projects can be understood as functioning under the humanist propaganda analysis or attitude change frameworks, forms of which were operating in the 1930s in both countries.

Before initiating this analysis, and before surveying specific curriculum perspectives (Chapter 4), a number of recent phenomena associated with the study of propaganda need to be mentioned. For the purpose of this dissertation, these topics include the Korean War, the observation of cults, and the role of national security organisations, such as the CIA. Each of these phenomena, to one degree or another, is associated with the concept of brainwashing.
Brainwashing

While this research focuses on the experience of German prisoners from WWII with re-education projects, the subsequent experience of U.S. prisoners of war during the Korean conflict impacts current understanding. It was during this military period that the concept of ‘brainwashing’ was first introduced. Brainwashing is seen as the most extreme form of propaganda. Given the similarity of political education with prisoners of war, a review of the literature on brainwashing is relevant.

Korean Conflict

While the issue of prisoners of war played a secondary role for the victors of WWII, subsequent limited wars raised their status to a central feature of negotiations. Support for war traditionally invokes high ideals in a Manichean universe. The U.S. government presented World War II as a fight against the absolute evil of fascism. By the time of the Korean conflict, the Cold War argued for the concept of Red Totalitarianism led by godless Communists as an even more pervasive evil than Nazism had been. Because in the popular opinion the U.S. fought for survival and virtue, unrelated to a serious diplomatic analysis, there was little room for negotiation. WWII had demanded ‘unconditional surrender’ and that became the standard. If war is a contest between good and evil, then a negotiated settlement compromises virtue.

Although the public had a simple understanding of the Korean conflict, U.S. government policy was tempered by a recognition that U.S. interests in the Korean peninsula were limited. Political planners would cut their loses if the outcome of the military conflict undermined a global preponderance of power. There was little support for another World War less than a decade after the last, not to mention the risk of a nuclear exchange when the news that the Soviet Union had detonated an atomic bomb became public.
The Korean conflict began with the North Korean attack on South Korea on 25 June 1949, included various periods of cease-fire, and ended with an Armistice on 27 July 1953. In Korea, the process of negotiation and compromise meant that the prisoners of war became the main sticking point during seemingly interminable negotiations. They also became a major propaganda theme of both sides. For the U.S., limited military success led to the search for a ‘substitute for victory’\(^8\). For the Communist side, a propaganda campaign of U.S. prisoners of war criticizing U.S. involvement in the war and accusations of the use of germ warfare were the central elements. For the U.S. side, the superiority of the West would be demonstrated if large numbers of enemy (Korean and especially Chinese) prisoners of war refused to return to their communist controlled countries. Thus, as a condition of peace, the U.S. introduced the concept of ‘voluntary repatriation’.\(^8\) This novel interpretation of the Geneva Convention on the repatriation of prisoners of war argued that individuals who chose not to go home did not have to be repatriated. The choice was actually restricted to being invited by other countries, which effectively meant repatriation to Taiwan or South Korea for those enemy prisoners of war held by the UN forces. Given the importance of this propaganda campaign to the UN forces, nationalists from Taiwan (who could speak Chinese while most UN personnel could not) were brought in to organise resistance to repatriation. An indoctrination campaign began as well, which included the translation of nearly 400 American films into Chinese to demonstrate the superiority of the “American way of life”. In reporting on the UN prisoner of war camps, the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, which was charged with

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determining prisoners’ preferences, complained that no prisoner of war dared to ask for repatriation [to China].

The end of the Korean war for the U.S. was not marked with a declaration of victory, but rather when the last prisoner of war got off the boat. Their use for propaganda purposes and the lack of heroic escapes made the prisoners of war an easy target for popular frustration over the ‘lost victory’. The public conflict between a part of the military represented by General Douglas MacArthur and President Truman fed this idea. Media reports focused on the high death rates, reports of collaboration and apathy of the U.S. prisoners of war. Collaboration with the enemy has always been a problem for prisoners of war and was generally recognised as being a normal result of physical coercion or torture. Denying the physical coercion aspect of prisoner of war camp life, collaboration by the U.S. prisoners of war was seen to be the result of psychological coercion that should have been resistible if there had been adequate moral commitment. The collaboration was thus ascribed by the press to moral cowardice.

The propaganda broadcasts made the former prisoners of war the target of investigations by the various branches of the military that resulted in court-martial trials for treason. As Young (1998) notes

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84 This view that the prisoners of war in the Korean conflict were particularly prone to collaboration was debunked as early as 1963 by a Pentagon consultant, Albert Biderman in his book March to Calumny: The Story of American POW’s in the Korean War, New York Biderman, Albert. March to Calumny: The Story of American POW’s in the Korean War. New York, 1963. This book was a reply to the ‘prisoners-were-traitors’ theme in Eugene Kinkead, In Every War But Ours, New York, 1959.
Out of 4428 POWs returned, the conduct of 565 was seriously questioned. Most cases were dropped; others were sanctioned non-judicially with discharges, loss of rank or reprimands. Only 14 ever went to trial, though they were so publicized that they strengthened the perception of completely shattered discipline. The men prosecuted were a staple of newspaper reports and editorials for several years. Their faces and stories made more impression than the scores of anonymous men allowed to go their way.  

There were two inter-related responses to this uncomfortable reality. One was to place the blame on the lack of moral fibre of the individual, caused by a slackness at the national level, and a call for the recommitment of the U.S. to traditional values. This fit well within the Cold War rhetoric of a two-camp world of good and evil and had the support of the military, the government and most religious organisations. The churches, especially the Catholic Church, had been a major source of support for the Cold War. The churches role in moral training, in providing the sort of training necessary to resist, was a key component of this campaign. Exemplary of this approach was Major Charles Mayer, a military psychiatrist, who gave talks and interviews into the 1960s. Mayer used the example of the prisoners of war as a call for moral rearmament indicting the U.S. society for its failures with allegations such as ‘One third of prisoners lacked faith in America’; ‘the American educational system is failing miserably’; ‘we should develop more toughness’; and responsibility lay with ‘people who raise and teach children’. While popular opinion originally supported this view, the continued publicity around the court-martial trials created a backlash that supported the prisoners of war, seeing them as being subjected to a second victimisation by their own government after having been

victimised while prisoners in Korea. The second explanation, promoted by the CIA, was to ascribe collaboration to the results of a new psychological technique of brainwashing supposedly of an irresistible nature. However, research conducted with the repatriates by psychiatrist Robert Jay Lifton concluded that ‘virtually all prisoners’ gravitated back towards their old belief systems after returning home with no permanent change in beliefs. A U.S. Army survey concluded that the Communist re-education projects had mostly functioned using repetition, harassment, and humiliation as the principal coercive techniques. Once removed from the camps, however, the prisoners no longer had cause to recite the dogma. Prisoners of war had been a useful source for maintaining the Cold War rhetoric in the aftermath of a military stalemate. Brainwashing was the next stage in this Cold War campaign, ascribing preternatural capacities to the Communist side of a good-evil duality.

**CIA and Brainwashing**

Brainwashing is generally understood to mean the forced removal of old ways of thinking and their replacement with new ideas as a result of an outside agent acting against the wishes of the individuals. The victims of brainwashing are not simply obedient; they become true believers in the new system. The popular use of the term began in 1951 with the writings of Edward Hunter, a journalist who was secretly employed by the CIA as an expert on ideological warfare. This was part of a CIA propaganda campaign to reinterpret the collaboration with their captors of Western prisoners of war during the Korean war. Hunter's

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description of brainwashing actually came from the CIA's own research which sought to produce turncoat deployable agents loyal to their new master. He described brainwashing as resulting from a combination of hypnosis and conditioning procedures, having little to do with any physical coercion. Allen Dulles, director of the CIA at the time, used the word brainwashing in a 1953 speech, describing the Communists, of course, not the research by his own organisation. The link to the Communists was real in the sense that both the U.S. intelligence services and the Nazis had been impressed with the confessions of the Moscow Trials of the 1930s and had sought to find the methodology that produced these results. Brainwashing thus echoed with this historic past.

The CIA, working with social scientists in a variety of academic disciplines and universities, conducted research programmes explicitly designed to achieve scientifically based interrogation methods and the capacity to create deployable agents. The means included hypnosis, conditioning, sensory deprivation, hallucinogenic drugs, etc. with dismal results – both in terms of success and in terms of impact on the involuntary subjects of these experiments. While hallucinogenic drugs did produce confusion about traditional values, the person was useless for any intelligence work. Lifton's findings about the transient nature of the effects of political re-education were confirmed. One author writes

By the time the MKULTRA program ended in 1963, Agency (CIA) researchers had found no foolproof way to brainwash another person. "All experiments beyond a certain point always failed," says the MKULTRA veteran, "because the subject jerked himself back for some reason or the subject got amnesiac or catatonic." Agency officials found through work like Cameron's that they could create "vegetables," but such people served no operational use. People could be tortured into saying anything, but no science could guarantee that they would tell the truth. (Marks 1980, p. 144-145)

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The CIA eventually ceased funding the research. No support had been found for a scientifically reproducible method of psycho-political re-education, leaving only physical torture as the means for eliciting co-operation.95

Cult Conversion

Brainwashing as a concept of political utility for Cold War rhetoric continued into the 1960s, best expressed by John Frankenheimer's movie *The Manchurian Candidate* (United Artists, US, 1962), but interest in the Korean war was dying out. But the 1960s also brought the advent of new religions and a rejection of traditional political views. The new cults shocked public opinion and led to accusations of brainwashing. It was within this context that brainwashing became associated with religious conversion rather than political re-education. Psychologists, psychiatrists and other social scientists were called upon to explain this rejection of traditional values by a visible – and highly publicized – segment of the U.S. youth.96 Parents claimed that their children had been kidnapped and sought the right to legally remove them from the religious cults and then subject them to 'deprogramming' – a counter-brainwashing to return them to 'normal'. Sensational books such as *Snapping: America's Epidemic of Sudden Personality Change* made direct reference to the brainwashing explanation for the Korean prisoners of war experience. The subsequent controversy lead to a continuing series of legal battles which subjected the concept of brainwashing to a legal as well as scientific challenge. One argument was that the person's individual will had been overwhelmed by the indoctrination of the cult.

To support this claim, professional psychologists or sociologists were sought as expert witnesses on brainwashing. However, the use of expert witnesses within the U.S. legal system is

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based on the Frye principle that requires that the science that is the source of the expertise “must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs”. The legal battle resulted in a clarification of the underlying scientific framework of the brainwashing concept in the public area of court as amicus curiae (friend of the court) briefs presented by both the American Psychological Association and the American Sociological Association.

For brainwashing to be the basis of legal action, proof must be offered that the individual’s free will was negated by the actions of an external agent. As argued by Anthony (1996) a distinction must be made between the brainwashing as the result of external manipulation and Totalism that accounts for conversion to totalistic ideologies due to internal factors and therefore is an expression of the individual’s free will. The concept of brainwashing based on the U.S. prisoners of war experience is one of external manipulation. There was a presumption that no rational person would choose to support communism of his or her own free will. However, following the logic of Adorno’s research on ‘authoritarian personality structure’, an individual could have an internal propensity to totalistic views. Anthony explains this distinction between external manipulation and internal motivation, as the source of conversion to religious cults, as follows:

The brainwashing paradigm is a theory of extrinsic influence. It maintains that people convert to totalistic movements and ideologies because of manipulative external influence which overwhelms their inner preferences at the time of their conversions. Personality structures, developmental histories, and depth psychological analysis of individual differences from a psychoanalytic frame of reference are irrelevant to the brainwashing account of the process of totalitarian conversion.

The totalism idea, which was developed first by Erik Erikson, is on the other hand a theory of intrinsic influence. According to Erikson, totalistic conversions result because of predispositions to respond favorably to totalitarian ideology which develop first in childhood. The theory was applied by Robert Lifton to explain why only two of his

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forty subjects responded favorable to totalistic influence in Chinese thought reform Prisons. (Even these subjects did not convert to Communism, but they did become somewhat more sympathetic to Communist ideology.) According to Lifton, his other subjects didn’t respond favorably to totalistic influence because unlike these 2 subjects they did not have totalistic personalities which had developed during their childhoods. (Anthony 1996, p. 221-222)

The first of these models – brainwashing by external means – receives no support of the associated professional associations and thus fails the Frye requirement. The second approach based on internal predispositions is generally accepted but offers no support for the charge that something has been done against the free will of the individual. While traditional established religious organizations may not approve of the new cults, their own religious practices include rituals that are similar in form, if not content, with those of the cults. There are simply no scientifically meaningful criteria for drawing the line between totalitarian influence and normal social influence.

While brainwashing, as an irresistible force that causes permanent political conversion against the free will of the individual, has no scientific support, this did not stop its usefulness as part of the Cold War anti-communist rhetoric. Likewise, a belief in brainwashing underlies much of the current scepticism that individuals might freely choose to enter irrational, and bizarre by traditional standards, religious cults.
Chapter 4 Perspectives in Curriculum Development

Unlike propaganda analysis, with its emphasis on informal learning through the various mass media, curriculum is concerned with the nature and place of formal learning in our society. Changes in conceptions of curriculum result more from shifts in philosophy, based on historical events, than the development of the social sciences. Thus with the European context, curriculum was controlled by the state church, Catholic or Protestant, until the French Revolution created the political basis for secular education. Curriculum remains a contested arena as schools are expected to serve the purpose of moral and political education. The development of Enlightenment philosophy in France argued for a presumed universal rationality as the basis for curriculum, counterpoised to the ‘superstition’ based ideology of the Christian church. Thus the Enlightenment philosophy was the basis for the concept of a secular ‘liberal education’. Liberal education was to prepare the populous for the exercise of their citizenship by the inclusion within the curriculum of training for ‘civic responsibility’. What constituted ‘civic responsibility’ varied with the social or political philosophy of the state. The development of the Industrial Revolution had expanded the demand for literacy to the non-elite and the working class. The curriculum for skilled workers and managers expanded to include a wider range of natural science subjects. The conflict over control of the curriculum was often around concepts that were seen to challenge the moral and political basis of society. Thus, while Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution was part of the developing natural sciences, opposition to its adoption was based on the implication that it challenged the stable, hierarchical nature of a class-based society, as well as its challenge to the creation myth within Christianity. With the expansion of a tax-based system of public education, the direct role of the dominant churches in curriculum choices declined to their own parochial schools in most of Europe and North America. In the U.S., the separation of church and state forms part of
the Constitution. In Britain the role of the Anglican Church is advisory, not controlling. Canada followed this same pattern, with the exception of the province of Québec where the Catholic Church retained a central role in the education of the majority French speaking population until 1967. The field of curriculum studies within this dominantly Anglo-Saxon tradition assumes a secular public tax funded state based schooling system.

**Perspectives within Curriculum Development**

Curriculum development as a field within education looks at the practice of the ‘what, when, where, how, and who’ in schooling. That is, curriculum development is concerned with what constitutes the appropriate subject matter, the duration of courses, the physical and social milieu, the schooling and teaching methods, and who are the students and teachers for state-funded education within a society. Curriculum is concerned with a *socially mandated* activity, seen as beneficial to both the society as a whole and the students involved. Formal schooling being a public activity, curriculum development takes place in a public arena, often specified within the formal structures of both the governmental (ministry of education, elected school boards) and academic institutions (regents at colleges and universities). Theories of curriculum development attempt to ascertain what this curriculum practice is and prescribes how it should be done. Curriculum practice exists at both the policy level of establishing what should be taught and at the classroom level of how these decisions should be effected. The various perspectives within the field of curriculum development link these two levels, ascribing a direct link between a specific practice in the classroom and one or another perspective at the policy level. While various categorizations are possible, the one used by Reid provides a useful framework to the concerns here.

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100 The Catholic Church, and other Judeo-Christian denominations, retained their right to operate state-recognised schools, often funded in part by public taxes, while including specific religion based courses *in addition* to the core state-defined curriculum in many countries.

Curriculum, as a practice, must be distinguished from associated concepts of learning, teaching, schooling and education. Curriculum shares with those concepts the commonplaces of subject matter, student, teacher, and milieu but constitutes a practical reflection upon these commonplaces resulting in policy decisions. While formal education is a publicly mandated activity, attitude towards the educational institution along with the existence of an a priori 'great idea' constitute a set of axes for understanding current curriculum perspectives. Other useful dichotomies for describing curriculum perspectives include conservative – progressive, and humanist – behaviouralist, not as sub-categories but reflecting the impact of both political practice and philosophy. Reid identifies four perspectives within curriculum studies: Systematizers, Radicals, Existentialists and Deliberators. The Systematizers see curriculum as Plan, Radicals emphasises the role of education in the cultural reproduction of a socially differentiated and unjust society, the Existentialists see curriculum as the personal experience of the student, and the Deliberators see curriculum as a practical art, needing to be tailored to the specific local situation. Briefly stated, the Systematizer and Radical perspectives operate from a position of a priori 'great ideas', albeit different, while neither the Existentialists nor the Deliberators do this. Concerning attitude to the institution, the Systematizers and Deliberators share a positive attitude while the Radical and Existentialist perspectives see largely negative impacts of the educational institution on students. Examining how each perspective formulates the problem facing the curriculum committee, the means by which the policy should be decided, how the impact should be evaluated and thus who is the expert to answer this

103 The utility of a humanist – behaviouralist dichotomy is my appreciation. Reid proposes the conservative – progressive and tough minded – tender-minded dichotomies.
104 Reid refers to the cultural reproduction perspective as 'the radicals'. Maintaining the importance of the conservative – progressive dichotomy as useful and relatively autonomous from the 4 perspectives, this use of the term radical may seem confusing. Reid is conscious of this problem (see footnote 1) Reid, William A. *The Pursuit of Curriculum: Schooling and the Public Interest*. Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1992.
question, and what social philosophy underlies each will help clarify their differences as well as
where they overlap.

The Systematizers: Curriculum as Plan

Generally beginning from an appreciation and acceptance of the societal status quo,
Systematizers are concerned with the development of a comprehensive and detailed curriculum
plan that can be applied in all relevant schools. While not specifically committed to any set
subject matter, Systematizers assume that the curricular task is to specify in as much detail as
possible what is desired along with the techniques deemed appropriate to its actualisation, that
is, the logical translation of theory to practice. For Systematizers, it is the responsibility of the
curriculum committee to set the policy, for the teachers to apply the policy and for the students
to absorb what they are given. The goal of a 'teacher-proof' curriculum reflects this approach.
The student is to receive the education, absorbing fully whatever is given, not challenging
either the content or the form.\footnote{Both the 'historical sociological' (Ellul) and neo-marxist feminist rhetoric critique (McKerrow) in propaganda analysis would agree with this.} As Reid notes, an engineering metaphor operates: "if we get
the parts right, the system will run efficiently and do its job. Breakdowns will be due to
breakdown of one of the parts."\footnote{Given the behaviour assumptions, positivist attitude change propaganda paradigm (Jowett and O'Donnell) best fits the Systematizer perspective.} For the Systematizers, problems arise from reports that the
plan is not being appropriately applied in one place or another, or that the students are failing
to absorb the material as demonstrated by exam scores. Problems may also arise from changes
in the desired skills upon completion of schooling, requiring re-writing the plan. For
Systematizers the curriculum is a set of material resources that can be modified and combined
in such a way as to achieve the desired outcome. Policy decisions are best left in the hands of
experts from the appropriate fields – education, psychology, educational management, etc. –

\footnote{Reid, William A. "Curriculum, Community, and Liberal Education; A Response to The Practical 4." \textit{Curriculum Inquiry} 14, no. 1 (1984): 103-111., p. 28.}
and evaluation of effectiveness is often left to the same 'outside' professionals using various empirical methods.

The social philosophy underlying this perspective is usually 'quasi-commercial' (education as training for the workplace) and thus reflects little critique of the demands upon the curriculum from economic special interests. In ideological terms, they seek to apply the dominant ideology as effectively as possible. They assume correctness of the current form of structural power and often for the linked sub-ordinate forms, such as gender relationships. Thus they tend to fall on the conservative rather than progressive end of that dichotomy, while often responsive to specific technical changes. Behaviourism, as a paradigm within psychology, calls for a strict specification of the behaviour to be modified, the contingent rewards and punishments, and pertinent situations, reflecting a mechanistic metaphor for human learning. The behaviouralist approach fits easily with this perspective, best represented perhaps by Ralph Tyler and his objectives based teaching. Management theory often shares the same 'management by objectives' approach. The Enlightenment philosophy of rational understanding and control and the linked assumption of the expertise of the social sciences underlie the Systematizer approach. This approach is seen as best suited for monolithic or totalitarian governments. Thus in the U.S. critical views of the Systematizers refer to their functioning as being like 'orders from Moscow', not based on an analysis of the Soviet school systems, but rather reflecting the Cold War view of communism.

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108 Reid, William A. "Curriculum, Community, and Liberal Education; A Response to The Practical 4." Curriculum Inquiry 14, no. 1 (1984): 103-111. This is not to say that Ralph Tyler would agree with all these propositions but rather that Systematizers find Tyler's work the most amenable to their purpose. See Tyler, Ralph. Basic Principles of Curriculum Development and Instruction. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1950.
This approach has been subject to criticism from a number of areas in the last 30 years as political movements have questioned the bias and rationality of the 'logic' used in the development and application of the Plan. One of the most extensive critiques has come from the feminist perspective, noting the implicit masculinist and chauvinist aspects of traditional curriculum. Thus Jane Roland Martin remarks in her presidential address at the Thirty-Seventh Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society:

In sum, the intellectual disciplines into which a person must be initiated to become an educated person exclude women and their works, construct the female to the male image of her and deny the truly feminine qualities she does possess. (Martin 1981, p. 101)

While such feminist criticisms are relevant to current curriculum development analysis, the Allied re-education projects involved only men during the period under study. Thus for the Allied re-education projects, as products of military structures, the monolithic, single "truth" character of this Systematic perspective would clearly suit the government institutions, whether Soviet, U.S. or British.

Radicals: Curriculum as Cultural Reproduction

Based on the democratic ideal of universal equality, the Radical perspective argues that the educational institutions are intimately involved in maintaining an unjust system of gender, class and race discrimination, and that curricular choices reflect the bias against these oppressed groups, a situation that can be changed by making different curriculum choices. Unlike the Systematizers or the Deliberators, the Radical's perspective sees the educational institution as having a negative impact on the majority of the student population but as potentially useful to create a more just society. Problems are constituted within the Radicals perspective by comparative empirical research that shows differential success rates and changes in success rates over time in courses linked to the gender, race or class of the student. When the course material is deemed relevant and necessary for all students and linked to future success in the
job marker, this differential success rate must be of concern. Student failures are seen as the result of the oppressive nature of schools, with students implicitly recognising this unjust nature of the schools and actively or passively refusing to participate. The goal for this perspective is that student choices and success rates would simply reflect individual abilities and desires, assumed to be the relatively same regardless of gender, race or class. Thus when research shows such a differential success rate based on gender, race or class, the Radical perspective would argue for curriculum modifications, including remedial efforts to bring everyone up to the same standard. The social philosophy underlying this approach involves a critique of the current economic system as inherently unjust and contributing to the creation of an unjust society. Thus they are opposed to the quasi-commercial role for education, that is, education as primarily training for the workplace. The Radicals support the view that education involves a commitment to a broader civic responsibility.

Those who hold the Radical view often differ from the Deliberators in understanding what that civic responsibility entails, specifically whether or not civic responsibility involves a commitment to correct perceived social injustices through local curriculum changes. Deliberators are often committed to a form of liberal education that sees civic responsibility as engagement in a democratic electoral process, perceived as the means for the correction of social injustices. The Radicals effectively represent an ideological challenge to the dominant capitalist liberal ideology. They are thus concerned with the structural power level as it is reproduced in the curriculum. The Radical perspective is often at the extreme progressive end of the progressive-conservative dichotomy. While not theoretically averse to behaviouralism, many people operating within this perspective share the humanist philosophy.
Existentialists: Curriculum as Experience

Existentialists begin with a specifically student-focused centre. The real curriculum is not what is in a plan or observed from the outside but what constitutes the phenomenological experience of the student. Education for the Existentialists is what is happening with each student, how they experience the educational institutions, the multiple aspects of what they retain from their courses. Noting that ‘what is learned is not the same as what is taught’, the Existentialist perspective takes this as their focus rather than constitutive of the problem — the view of the Systematizers. Most often based on a humanist philosophy, the assumption is that learning is the natural state of human existence so that failure (in school) is the result of forcing students to follow a prescribed set of courses rather than allowing them to follow their own interests. Given this assumption, the students are the ultimate experts on curriculum since only the students know why they did or did not do well in a subject. Professional researchers, if used at all, are put to devising questionnaires to identify the problems as seen by the student. The curricular goal is to offer students what they want and will use for their own further education, providing as wide a range of choices as possible. Given the current state of educational institutions, Existentialists see them as harmful for the most part both due to the restricted choices that result from an application of a single plan to all schools (the Systematizer’s goal) and because most classroom milieus and pedagogical practices demand that the students conform rather than be allowed to pursue their own interests. The social philosophy underlying the Existentialists perspective falls within the liberal education view of civic responsibility with the addendum that a fully self-aware, self-confident, self-governing people make the best citizens. The experience of choosing one’s own curriculum is seen as a virtue and an appropriate basis for the development of just such a citizen. Existentialists are opposed to the Great Idea from either the Systematizer or the Radical perspectives because it reflects a denial
of individual differences, the essential rationale for the Existentialists perspective. They accuse Systematizers of viewing students only as objects of a plan and the Radical perspective of being more concerned about using student data to support their social theory rather than what the individual student might desire. Existentialists may fall anywhere within conservative – progressive dichotomy but will reject the behaviouralist approach in preference to the humanist one. Behaviouralistic reliance on external manipulation and control is antithetical to the Existentialist emphasis on the centrality of internal, phenomenological reality in shaping choices and behaviour. The Existentialist’s focus is exclusively on the individual level of power.

The Deliberators: Curriculum as Indigenous Deliberation

Deliberators focus on the process of curriculum development itself as the crucial element. Seeing curriculum as a practical art as opposed to a scientifically solvable problem, they are opposed to the reduction of curriculum to the single concern represented by the Systematizer and the Radical perspectives. A problem for the Deliberator perspective is when curriculum is distorted by a simplistic application of scientific concepts (from the social sciences) or when a curriculum policy has little relationship to the academic outcome. Unlike the Existentialist perspective, the Deliberator approach intends to give equal weight to all four commonplaces – subject matter, teacher, student and milieu – in arriving at the appropriate curriculum for a given educational institution. Rather than focusing on individual differences between students, Deliberators focus on the differences between educational institutions based on their historical, cultural, geographical and sociological specificity, seeking to create an indigenous curriculum appropriate to the specific school. Therefore, like the Existentialists,

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109 The writings of Joseph J. Schwab are the key reference for this perspective. He differentiates practical situations whose outcomes are decisions that are presumed to be applicable to only the immediate situation from the theoretic (scientific) situations whose outcomes are formulas etc. assumed to be universally applicable to similar situation. His most important writings on curriculum development have been collected into a single volume, edited by Ian Westbury and Neil J. Wilkof. Westbury, Ian, and Neil J Wilkof, eds. Science, Curriculum, and Liberal Education: Selected Essays of Joseph J. Schwab. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978.
they oppose the Systematizer’s goal of a single plan for everyone. Rather, the Deliberators call for a deliberative approach to curriculum development, involving a greater appreciation of the limits, as well as benefits, of the application of knowledge and techniques from the social sciences to the educational situation. They also support a collective approach with representatives from at least all of the commonplaces (student, teacher, administrator and professional in the subject matter) as providing the best basis for a curricular policy decision that will actually function in the classroom. As noted above, this requires specific attention to the similarities and differences between the different educational situations. Likewise, given the emphasis on the local situation, curriculum committees should be developed on a fairly local basis and the representatives from the various commonplaces (student, teacher, administrator, professional in the subject matter and representatives from the community) constitute the experts who know best which curriculum is appropriate.

Critics accuse Deliberators of arriving at a curriculum based more on opportunistic pragmatism — of doing whatever is in favour with the most powerful local pressure group, whether this is the business community, the parents, the teachers or the government — than collective mutual understanding.

Deliberators view the educational institution as positive but reject the limitations of the great ideas perspective. The social philosophy underlying this approach is the Enlightenment conception of liberal education centered on the development of civic responsibility for the best functioning of a democratic society. This commitment to the ideal of a liberal education leads them to oppose the quasi-commercial view of education as little more than job training for the workplace. Other than on this point, the conservative – progressive dichotomy is irrelevant to the perspective as such since the curriculum choices will be made by local committees interpreting ministerial objectives within their own political frameworks.
The humanist–behaviourist dichotomy is more relevant to the Deliberator perspective. Fitting within a humanist philosophy, committed to an Enlightenment vision of education, Deliberators emphasise the necessity to look at the curriculum's impact on character formation (expressed in the terms of virtues, vices and privations).\textsuperscript{110} Thus curriculum concerns are not limited to the communication of subject matter (the concern of the Systematizer and Radical perspectives), nor just the individual's personal development (the Existentialists) but to the development of the necessary virtues for both full participation in the subject matter and as a citizen in a representative democracy.

This concern with the development of character related to democratic government as an aspect of education provides a relevant starting point for analysing the curriculum at the U.S. and British re-education projects whose purpose was to teach democracy to German prisoners of war.

Other Issues in Curriculum Development

While Reid provides a useful approach to curriculum studies for the 1990s, in the U.S. curriculum concerns have varied with historical era. Eisner (1992) and Kliebard (1992)\textsuperscript{111} describe these shifts in curriculum concerns in this century linked to changes in social-economic and political situation. The impact of rapid industrialisation, linked with expanded schooling, led to a new focus on finding principles for curriculum choices, rather than just a continuation of the traditional practice. Domestic and international political changes led to shifts in both the content and form of education such as the use of the schools to promote support of U.S. involvement in WWI (the work of the Creel Commission) to a reaction against

that programme with the development of anti-propaganda education in the schools in the 1930s.

Writing in 1974 and reflecting the slightly different concerns of the 60s and 70s in the U.S., Eisner describes five orientations operating within curriculum planners:

1) development of the cognitive processes; 2) curriculum as technology; 3) self-actualisation or curriculum as consummatory experience; 4) social reconstruction-relevance; and 5) academic rationalism. Academic rationalism (the orientation not reflected in Reid’s categories) asserted that to become educated meant to be able to read and understand the great works that Western Civilisation had produced, mainly in philosophy, literature and the humanities, the traditional canon of a liberal arts education. While the social reconstruction-relevance orientation is similar to the Radicals, Eisner uses this category for those educators who responded to the demands for making the course content relevant to the current historical-political situation in unmistakable contrast to those supporting academic rationalism. By the 1990s, making course content material relevant to current affairs was integrated into all perspectives while academic rationalism, as an expression of the traditional canon, was losing ground. Liberal arts had come under attack for its restriction of the canon of “valuable lessons of humanity” simply to the products of the Western Judeo-Christian civilisation.

In the 1960s, with the increasing recognition of the multicultural nature of most industrialised societies, some of the specific Western Judeo-Christian assumptions came under fire by curriculum specialists. While no one contested the link between morality and civic duty and the continuing responsibility of schools for citizenship education, the existence of specific religious courses was questioned. Thus the deconfessionalisation of schools raised the question

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of whether there could be a culture-neutral form of moral education. Many theorists questioned whether specific courses on morality should even be taught in public schools. The debate continues with positions ranging from moral education with all references to religious belief removed to survey of world religion courses as moral training. Civic responsibility is often consigned to the national history courses. However, operating in the 1940s, the academics who devised the U.S. and British re-education projects would have found Academic Rationalism and the traditional canon, with its Western Judeo-Christian definition of civilization, to be the dominant viewpoint within the humanities.

Lincoln (1992) and Peshkin (1992)\textsuperscript{113} offer useful insights into changes in curriculum concerns with specific political movements. Lincoln, in reviewing the Humanistic tradition in curriculum studies notes the successive impacts of political analysts, phenomenologist and feminist theory and pressure on both the theoretical elaboration and practical content of curriculum. Peshkin discusses the increased concern for cultural differences counterpoised to the traditional canon, which is criticized for reflecting WASP values, including an English language bias. This dynamic between what is common to all cultures and specific interpretations and values is echoed in the growing impact of Christian religious organisations on the curriculum of public schools in the U.S. The U.S. Constitutional separation of church and state conflicts with the democratic power of local or state school boards to control curriculum. These reflect in part the shifting domestic political landscape of the U.S.

Some of the re-education projects that are the subject of this dissertation had a double purpose – promoting the political system of the relevant Allied power and creating co-


operative personnel who were capable of handling technical tasks for the relevant occupying military authority. Kennedy (1988)\textsuperscript{114} provides another set of curriculum categories when she looks at professional training. Based on different views of what expertise professional training demands, she offers four approaches: 1) expertise as technical skills; 2) expertise as the application of theory or general principles; 3) expertise as critical analysis; and 4) expertise as deliberative action. Expertise as technical skills assumes that any decisions other than the application of the rule will be made by someone else and probably reflects a prominent form of military training. Within a strict hierarchical system, such as the military, training of the lowest level personnel is restricted to the skills they need to carry out tasks chosen by higher authorities.\textsuperscript{115} Expertise as the application of theory of general principles adds the recognition of the decision-making role to the skill training and promotes the principles that guide those decisions. This latter approach works best when there are clearly elaborated, relevant to the work situation, and coherent general principles.\textsuperscript{116} When there are multiple, somewhat exclusive principles, choosing which principle to apply to which situation required something more and created the third approach of expertise as critical analysis. The fourth approach of expertise as deliberative action adds an interactive feedback mechanism for the actions taken to both redefine the problem and to re-evaluate the outcome. Both the expertise as technical skills and expertise as application of general principles provide useful frameworks for understanding components of the Allied re-education projects.

One curricular issue that is ignored by most theorists, but plays a major role in the Allied re-education projects, is the presence of a single language shared by the teachers and


\textsuperscript{115} The Special Schools for police officers and administration workers within the U.S. re-education projects reflect this type of training. The problem they faced was keeping up-to-date with the changing regulations of the military government in the U.S. zone.
students. The assumption is inappropriate for these re-education projects by Soviet (Russian speakers) or U.S. and British (English speakers) authorities for their German-speaking prisoners of war. Yet the importance of learning the captor’s language as a measure of ‘degree of co-operation’ is similar to the concerns express by Met (1992)\textsuperscript{117} when she discusses the issue of foreign language use and education within the U.S. curriculum. But the reverse is also true as she notes: use of language is intimately related to the valuing of the ‘culture of origin’. Research with foreign language students, with English language instructors, shows a negative impact on the perceived credibility of the subject content and on the aspirations of the student. The importance of the language spoken for the teacher-student relationship with foreign language students echoes the divergent results of the Allied re-education projects. Both the British and the U.S. predominantly used English as the language instruction in their re-education projects while the Soviet projects predominately used German. All Allied re-education projects included courses in the captor’s language.

Like language, the national myth functions as a presupposition for the curriculum theorists examined. The national myth is an inherent part of the content of the humanities, especially the discipline of history. The extent to which that national myth is by definition parochial becomes apparent when the students of the education project are foreigners with allegiance to a different national myth.

\textsuperscript{116} The Antifa schools conducted as part of the Soviet re-education projects seem to use this approach with a marxist-leninist analysis providing the theory and principles for the interpretation of all political situations.

Before discussing the historical context leading up to the implementation of the specific prisoner of war re-education camps in this dissertation, the previous conceptual base for the assessment of propaganda paradigms and curriculum perspectives will be made explicit.
Chapter 5 A Comparison of Propaganda and Curriculum Models

How the Propaganda Paradigms and Curriculum Perspectives Accord

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Propaganda Paradigm</th>
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<tr>
<td>Positivist Attitude Change</td>
<td>Systematizers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Historical Sociological</td>
<td>Radicals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanist Propaganda Analysis</td>
<td>Deliberators (commitment to liberal view)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neo-Marxist Feminist Rhetoric Critique</td>
<td>Radicals, Existentialists</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comparative Rhetoric Critique</td>
<td>Radicals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Systematizers** sense no contradiction about imposing a view on others, based on the status quo, and an authoritative mandate for the curriculum. **Positivist attitude change** demonstrates a ‘scientific’ mechanism for achieving the desired results. The obvious manipulation is not seen as bad, even in a democracy, because of the creditation of the curriculum by those who are mandated to make these decisions. **Systematizers** are most amenable to a hierarchical mode of functioning since decisions are to be made by those in authority with the goal being a ‘teacher-proof’ curriculum, i.e. not modifiable by the lower ranks. The mechanical engineering model or metaphor fits well with the army and governmental institutions that also are structurally hierarchical, with the assumption of greater intelligence etc. as one goes up the hierarchy. However, this is not a political judgement:

**Systematizers** work equally well for the Stalinist party model of communism in place during the period of these re-education projects. By contrast, the **Deliberators** would be the choice for the ideal Leninist model of the communist cadre organisation whose members were already leaders in their respective fields of political work. This is similar to the Deliberators who value each member of the curriculum committee because she or he represents expertise on the functioning of their particular area.
The historical sociological propaganda paradigm would agree with the Radicals on the role of educational institutions as intimately involved in maintaining an unjust system of gender, class and race discrimination with curricular choices reflecting the bias against these oppressed groups. The historical sociological paradigm would disagree with the Radicals in believing that this could be changed by making different curricular decisions.

The U.S. humanist propaganda analysis would agree with the Deliberators on the value of a liberal capitalist economic system and representative democracy being the best form of government. Both frameworks see the limits of the social-economic system as being correctable with the application of critical analysis and/or rational deliberation. Neither sees social injustice as being inherent in the system but rather a problem of the application of the system. For both, the model is the Greek polis of equal citizens deliberating collectively and critically to make the best decision among the options available with a commitment to the equality inherent in the ideal democratic model. These are the people who would have the greatest ‘cognitive dissonance’ with consciously engaging in a single nation-state (nationalist) propaganda, although would readily accept propaganda for ‘universal goods’. To the extent that representative democracy is seen as one of these goods, U.S. humanist propaganda analysis and Deliberators would encourage the promotion of democracy, seeing themselves as engaging in a ‘discussion between equals’ in presenting this idea to others.118 Neither is inherently critical of the presentation, within their national myths, of both the U.S. and Britain as inherently progressive societies because they are liberal democracies.

The neo-marxist feminist rhetoric critique propaganda paradigms and the Radical curriculum perspective would agree on the oppressive role of educational institutions. Both see
these institutions as intimately involved in maintaining an unjust system of gender, class and race discrimination with curricular choices reflecting the bias against these oppressed groups. They would also agree on the possibility of change being effected by changes in the curriculum. Where the neo-marxist feminist rhetoric critique and the Radicals would disagree would be on the governing role of a ‘great idea’ with the neo-marxist feminist rhetoric critique insisting on a case by case analysis similar to the Deliberators. The neo-marxist feminist rhetoric critique, like the Existentialists, focuses on the experience of people as a key basis for decision making, but unlike the Existentialists, the neo-marxist feminist rhetoric critique focuses on groups, rather than individuals. The power relationships among the various categories – women, gay, black, Hispanic, men, straight, etc. – constitute the basis of their analysis.

The historical sociological, the comparative rhetoric critique and the neo-marxist feminist rhetoric critique propaganda paradigms all include an understanding of ideology “as a complex of ideas selected to underwrite and represent a particular project of installing, maintaining, and aggrandising power in social relationships”\textsuperscript{119}. Wolf makes explicit and extends Ellul’s critique of Enlightenment Rationalism as an example of such an ideology. While Ellul assumes the attractiveness of advanced industrial societies for all peoples, Wolf recognises that this mode of production has been imposed on most ‘primitive’ societies, not voluntarily chosen even as a result of massive propaganda campaigns.\textsuperscript{120} Ellul and Wolf would agree that all present-day societies include multiple competing ideologies, with Ellul

\textsuperscript{120} Likewise they would disagree on the preferred ideological model, with Ellul taking a reactionary stance of returning to the feudal community and Wolf – as an anthropologist – having no illusions about either the nature of many of these societies nor the merits of the political and economic power of the current dominant capitalist mode.
representing a minority religious view. However, the writings of McKerrow, Herman and Chomsky more easily mesh with Wolf's multiple ideologies argument.

Propaganda Paradigms and Curriculum Perspectives and Modes of Power

A further comparison of propaganda paradigms and curriculum perspectives can be offered by reference to Wolf's modes of power. Each interpretive framework has one or more of these modes of power as the centre of their concern. Wolf defines four modes of power:

1. **Personal presence** draws attention to how persons enter into a play of power
2. **Interpersonal power** refers to the ability of an ego to impose its will in social action upon another
3. **Tactical or organisational power** calls attention to the instrumentalities through which individuals or groups direct or circumscribe the action of others within determinate settings
4. **Structural power / governance** refers to the power to deploy and allocate social labour

**Propaganda Paradigm**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positivist Attitude Change</th>
<th>interpersonal power (2)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Historical Sociological</td>
<td>structural power (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanist Propaganda Analysis</td>
<td>structural power (4) and tactical power (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neo-Marxist Feminist Rhetoric Critique</td>
<td>flexible to all four levels (1, 2, 3, 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparative Rhetoric Critique</td>
<td>structural power (4) and tactical power (3)</td>
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**Curriculum Perspective**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Systematizers</th>
<th>tactical or organisational power (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radicals</td>
<td>structural power (4) and tactical power (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existentialists</td>
<td>personal presence (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliberators</td>
<td>tactical or organisational power (3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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121 Ellul was a Protestant theological in a nominally Catholic – and Rationalist – France.
122 See page 25 for the presentation of Wolf's work.
Only the Positivist Attitude Change propaganda paradigm focuses primarily on the interpersonal power level due to the focus on the psychological interaction involved. Their description of education with a democracy assumes an interpersonal negotiation happening in the classroom between the teacher and the student – even if it is on a non-verbal or unconscious level. Only the Existentialist curriculum perspective sees the individual experience, including the individual's own sense of self and personal presence, as the essence of what creates curriculum. The other propaganda paradigms are concerned with governance or structural power in their critique of the mass media and its influence on the capacity of citizens to function in a democracy. Most curriculum perspectives are concerned with tactical or organisational power in the development of the means to provide the necessary training for each generation to assume their adult roles. The Radicals include concern for structural power, as is reflected in their critique of curriculum as reproducing the unequal power relations in society.

The Allied re-education projects, while defined by a concern for structural power in promoting a specific form of governance (representative democracy or communism), are shaped by concerns for the interpersonal level (the use of group identity to modify attitudes) and certainly for tactical and organisational power in their role as captors controlling the lives of the German prisoners of war.

*Role of National Myth*

Educational curriculum is always posed in terms of one's own nationals, and not as directed to foreign nationals except in colonial situations. This restriction applies to the humanities rather than the sciences as there is no such limit on teaching the physical sciences to nationals of other countries – other than restrictions set up for 'national security' reasons. One reason for this restriction is the central role of the national myth, with the associated historical
narrative and value system, to the humanities curriculum. For example, in the 1980s German
‘historistreit’, the arguments were specifically about the role of history in creating a national
identity as opposed to history as an ‘objective’ social science. The same historical narrative,
within any nation’s curriculum, would likely be seen as propaganda about that country by
foreign nationals.

The content of the social sciences courses is developed within the context of the
national myth, the ideology of that nation-state. This is not a great problem for curriculum
development as curriculum committees are normally within a nation state and thus what is
taught ‘naturally’ falls within the allowable interpretive frameworks. There is always a range of
opinion that is acceptable, often reflecting regional, ethnic, class or religious differences. What
would normally be excluded would be a textbook that didn’t focus on the domestic nation-
state as the central character. Likewise, a history textbook that demonstrated an uncorrected
‘evil’ as inherent to the national society would not be acceptable — unless there was an activist
political movement demanding that interpretation. Certainly it would be deemed inappropriate
to use a textbook that diminished the role of the domestic nation-state to the benefit of
another state. Liberal education requires the ‘preparation of the citizen for civic duty’ assumed
to be within a specific nation-state. Thus there is a central role for the discipline of history in
creating the national myth and a central role of the national myth in the political system. Thus
domestic accountability, including with respect to educational curriculum development, is
embedded in the logic of a liberal education for representative democracy. Liberal education is
based on the concept of ‘self-determination’ with representative democracy seen as the best
expression of this at the governmental level.

Because they dealt with the citizens of a foreign nation, the re-education projects in the
U.S. and Britain did not fit the image of liberal education as a form of self-determination. Both
projects were originally covert, for fear of appearing to be political indoctrination. Especially in the U.S., the covert status changes mainly due to a post-victory political situation in which there is a public demand for the repudiation of the Nazi national myth. The continued commitment to self-determination was expressed through the constant use of the refrain of 'not trying to make the Germans accept the U.S. (or British) way'. Rather, the educators were just 'showing them the clear advantages of the U.S. (or British) political system' based on the educators own belief in their respective national myth. These phrases also reflect some awareness of the self-serving nature of national myths and therefore their inherent conflict with other national myths. The central role of the national myth for historical or political educational purposes was demonstrated by the fact that all Allied re-education projects included attempts to re-write the German national myth to a version more amenable to the tastes of the captor government. It was precisely the inter-national nature of these re-education projects that highlighted the role of the national myth in the history curriculum within all education.
Chapter 6 Historical Context

The third component or field in this Humanities dissertation is historical analysis. Among other historical phenomena, this dissertation will examine the role of elections in the post-WWII period, the national myths of the Soviet Union, the British and the Americans and their perception of the nationalism of other countries, especially Germany, and the role of class antagonisms – capitalism versus communism – both domestically and in international diplomacy. Each of these historical perspectives played a role in the changing curriculum of the re-education projects and propaganda in this 1942-48 period. The developers of these re-education projects were influenced by both their respective national myth and by their view of communism both domestically and internationally. This implies that each country’s re-education projects reflected therefore their country’s changing relationship to the other countries involved. The review of the literature of the relevant history is divided into two main sections: 1) pre-war, war-time and post-war history, with special emphasis on British and U.S. domestic politics and foreign policies, both as they relate specifically to Germany and to post-revolutionary Russia within this global diplomatic framework; and 2) the link between Western anti-communism and the Soviet Union in this period. As both the Soviet and British re-education projects continue in the post-war period, the arguments about the origin of the Cold War will be explored. This study will argue that the curriculum of the Western Allied re-education projects is best understood as being part of intra-Allied negotiations, whose focus shifted from denazification to anticommunism, while that of the Soviet Union maintains a denazification (as anti-fascism) focus – as understood through their version of an historical-materialist class analysis. The following chapter will deal with the aspects of the military history of WWII that are necessary to understand where and when German prisoners of war were captured.
20th Century Global Politics – Britain, the U.S., the Soviet Union and Germany

Entering the twentieth century, the world economic system was structured by global capitalism based on European, U.S. and Japanese imperialism. Each nation’s imperialism was driven by both the need for primary resources, which varied depending on the natural resources of the country, and for markets for the manufactured goods of the imperialist power. This imperialism was justified in each country’s national myth, i.e. the ‘civilising role’ of the British Empire and the ‘manifest destiny’ of the U.S. Rivalry for both the resources and markets developed between the imperialist countries, while they simultaneously remained each other’s major markets. Trade agreements and tariffs were the main means by which each state protected its national bourgeoisie and established its relationships with other countries. Treaties thus reflected the protection of the economic interests as well as security from the military threats posed by competition.

The period leading up to 1914 had been dominated by empire building by all the imperialist countries. While there were tensions and serious incidents, Europe, as a whole, had not suffered a major war since the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. International and bi-national relationships were controlled by treaty agreements between the major powers within a “balance of power diplomacy” framework. Therefore, most armies of the imperialist countries had been engaged only in local wars in foreign lands, in order to subjugate populations for inclusion in their respective empires. While most imperialist powers had some form of representative government, the power of limited franchise parliamentary bodies varied greatly depending on the presence and continued power of the traditional monarchy and aristocracy. For example, while the U.S. and France were full republics with no monarchy, and Britain and Japan had “reigning monarchs who did not rule”, much of the rest of Europe had more nominal parliaments with power remaining in the hands of monarchs and aristocrats.
This period also witnessed a rise in working class organisation, including unions and political parties based on unions and even international organisations. Within Britain, the U.S. and Germany there were mass union struggles and the development of political party formations, the Labour Party in Britain, the Populist or People’s Party in the U.S. and the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) in Germany. It was this latter party that had the greatest strength, both in terms of union organisation and parliamentary representation.

By 1914, Britain, a territorially expansive nation with an empire that circled the world, was the dominant power in global politics. But Germany was the dominant industrial power in Europe, and the U.S. was a rising industrial and financial power that already outstripped its rivals in productive capacity. Japan was a rising capitalist power which was establishing its own empire and was increasingly viewed as a threat by both British and U.S. imperialism in the Pacific. In 1914, navies were the key to maintaining an empire. The inter-war period saw the development of Naval treaties, establishing agreed-upon budget limits to ship building, and reflecting an attempt to control the cost of inter-imperialist rivalry.

*World War I*

World War I expressed these inter-imperialist rivalries. Europe, by various treaties, had been divided into two major alliances, each seeking a more advantageous position in the aftermath of what was expected to be a short war. The Triple Alliance of Germany and Austria-Hungary, with Turkey and Bulgaria joining later, sought dominance of central Europe including domination of Poland, around a German core. The Triple Entente of Britain, France and Russia, with Italy and Romania joining later, sought to prevent that dominance and constrain German influence.

At the war’s outset in 1914, the U.S., while selling to both sides, became a creditor nation loaning close to 14 million dollars to the “Allied” (Triple Entente) side. Diplomatically,
however, the U.S. remained isolationist and “neutral” with respect to military involvement.

Within a year, there was a military stalemate, reflected by the essentially stable trench line warfare through France and Belgium. Both sides attempted to use a naval blockade to restrict supplies to the other side, a tactic meant to undermine the ability to supply the armies and the domestic population. Naval blockades were especially dangerous to island nations like Britain whose imports arrived exclusively by ship. U.S. shipping was also vulnerable to these mutual blockades. The British Navy searched, restricted and sometimes confiscated U.S. shipping.

From the summer 1916, the German naval forces, dependent on their U-boats, were an even greater threat since the U-boats destroyed the ships, killing passengers in the process. Because the American and other suppliers to the Allied side used deceptive flags and markings, as well as passenger liners to ship goods into Britain, U-boat action turned against passenger liners (e.g., the sinking of the Lusitania, 1915). Responding to pressure from Britain, false propaganda about German atrocities\(^2\), and the idea of “solidarity” with other democratic countries, the U.S. entered the war on the Allied side in 1917. This proved to be the critical factor in the outcome of the war, as both sides had suffered drastic human losses and heavy financial burdens in the maintenance of the war for four years. The new supplies and armies that the U.S. brought to the Allied side tipped the war in its favour. In November 1918, recognising the inevitability of defeat, the German generals surrendered while the fighting was still outside German territory, thus preserving the industrial base of their economy.

Britain had entered the war as the dominant sea power and effectively used her navies both to protect supplies and to win naval battles. However, focusing on German targets led to weakening control of trade between both her colonies and other nations in the Pacific, creating an opening for Japanese imperialism. Japan increased trade and became a creditor nation with

\(^2\) In part, this was the work of the Creel Commission, mentioned in Chapter 3.
respect to loans and foreign investment. A consequent three-way competition between Britain, the U.S. and Japan in the Pacific would lead to a naval treaty at the Washington Conferences of 1921-22, which established limits on the three fleets at a 5:5:3 basis, with the Japanese having the lowest. The treaty restricted both total tonnage and weapons. However, as Japan was still functioning almost exclusively in the Pacific, while both Britain and the U.S. functioned globally, this was viewed by the British as more restrictive of their interests than those of the Japanese. In any case, due to financial problems, the British were prevented from reaching its maximum limits.

Two key events affected the working class organisations of the time. Firstly, in 1914, even while recognising the inter-imperialist nature of the war, the SPD in Germany voted war credits in the Reichstag. This demonstrated a “national” loyalty above the SPD’s claims to international working class solidarity that should characterise all major working class organisations once a war was posed. Secondly, and more significantly, was the development of the Russian Revolution in 1917. With the slogan of “Bread, Land and Peace”, and through the process of two governmental crises in February and then October 1917, the Bolshevik socialist party in Russia seized power and sued for peace with the Triple Alliance. This led to the harsh peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918, one effect of which was to confirm U.S. President Woodrow Wilson’s negative view of German intentions, which helped validate his earlier decision to join the Allied side. For those subsequently involved in the Allied re-education projects, the conclusion of WWI confirmed their national myths, with Britain ascribing the cause of the war to the militaristic traditions of Germany. However, the most important conclusion to be drawn by the English and U.S. governments was that the deprivations of war could help generate revolutions. Lenin and the Bolsheviks in the new Soviet Union agreed with the conclusion but with the opposite goal. For the Germans, a belief in the power of
propaganda was based on the accomplishments of the Creel Commission in getting the U.S. on
the side of Britain.

Immediate Post-World War I Results

After Germany's surrender, negotiations resulted in the Versailles Treaty of 1919. The
"negotiations" were victor-dictated and presented to the German delegation in June as a "fait
accompli", allowing for comment but not serious compromise as to the terms. While this was
similar to the approach the Germans had taken with the Russians at Brest-Litovsk, it was
widely resented by the Germans (as it had been by the Russians!) and Germany would use the
nature of these negotiations as a justification for rejection of elements of the treaty in the next
two decades.

By this time, all European countries that had participated in the war were physically
and financially exhausted. Business interests in the U.S., besides profiting from selling war
materials to both sides, now held well over 20 million dollars in debts from the other Allied
countries. Payments on these debts to the U.S. served as a key element in the political
instability of both France and Germany. The key innovation of the Versailles Treaty was the
inclusion of a Guilt Clause, with Germany and her allies accepting exclusive guilt for the war.
Reparations—the idea that the loser had to "pay the victor for the damages suffered"—was
based on this clause. This was a new concept based on capitalist ideas of contract rather than
tribute (territorial occupation or actual removal of property, which had been the main form of
"spoils to the victor" in previous wars). Reparations were set at 6,600 million pounds to be
paid by Germany, mainly to Britain and France. Germany was still the strongest economic
power, and reparations were seen both as a way to ease the financial burden that the Allies had
suffered with the war and, from France's point of view at least, a way of keeping Germany
from having the money to develop its military might and threaten other countries again. France
hoped to weaken Germany permanently. France obtained the return of Alsace-Lorraine and had the Saar administered by the League of Nations, while granting France use of its coal mines. Germany's African and Asian colonies were taken away and granted as mandates to other Allied powers. Union between Germany and Austria was forbidden. While agreeing with reparations, Britain wanted a dynamic economy in Germany as a market for its goods. The U.S. demanded no reparations but did demand the repayment of the loans from the Allies - which is what really underlay and fuelled the need for reparations from Germany, especially in the case of France. This concept of reparations would be expanded in the aftermath of WWII to include the labour of the German prisoners of war, which was the reason the Soviet and British re-education projects could continue till 1948, three years after the end of that war.

Through Woodrow Wilson, the U.S. asserted its right to world leadership with the inclusion in the Versailles Treaty of the League of Nations and the concept of self-determination. Self-determination was viewed by a segment\textsuperscript{124} of the U.S. ruling class as a means of breaking up European style "feudal" empires, like the Austro-Hungarian one, whose "petty" old rivalries had provoked the war. Self-determination included a restructuring of the German Reichstag to give more power to the lower elected chamber. The SPD won the largest block of seats on the first election, a result not particularly welcomed by the U.S. government.

With the end of the fighting in Europe, the Allied countries, including Canada, sent armies to intervene in the civil war in Russia in order to reverse the communist take-over. However, the Bolsheviks were able to create a Red Army that ended by defeating the White reactionary forces, in part because of popular resentment of the use of "foreign" troops on Russian soil. The Soviet Union was consolidated with strict restrictions on capitalist direct

\textsuperscript{124} The U.S. Senate's rejection of Wilson's proposals for a League of Nations demonstrated the segmented interests of the U.S. ruling class.
investments. Control of the economy rested in the hands of a Bolshevik government intent on introducing communism. For both the U.S. and British ruling classes, this type of government with its total control over foreign trade and investment remained anathema to them, while, in the search for markets for their goods, they were still willing to trade with the Soviet Union.

Germany, in January 1919, with Friedrich Ebert of the SPD as chancellor, witnessed the Spartacist uprising in January—an attempt to reproduce the revolution in Russia. This was put down by the SPD-led government, in part by using the Freikorps (Free Corps), an anti-communist, volunteer brigade led by officers of the old imperial army. The Freikorps murdered the revolutionary leaders Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, both former SPD delegates. This suppression of the Spartacist uprising also led to the deep distrust that would develop between the socialist and communist parties. The conflicts between socialist and communist parties was a part of the British domestic and foreign policy while no such distinction was made by the U.S. The Soviet Union would remember the Allied intervention in their Civil War and would remain suspicious of Western intentions.

Inter-war Period to 1939: Domestic Situation

The domestic situation for both Britain and the U.S. was one of economic boom and then bust, accompanied by significant working class insurgency. The countries differed significantly in the mechanisms developed to stabilize the situation but both feared “communism”. This is the most formative period for those who created the curriculum for the re-education projects in all three countries.

Britain

In Britain this period witnessed the rise of working class actions in both strikes and the development of the Labour Party which, while never having a clear majority, formed the government on several occasions. Working class action began in 1919 with demonstrations
opposing the preference being given to the upper class interests in the demobilisation of the army. The demonstrations led to a policy of “first in, first out”. Even with a relative boom economy, there was a strike in the Clydeside shipbuilding docks in February-March of 1919, which was broken by the arrest of the leaders. This was immediately followed by miners’ strikes in March and April that threatened to become a general strike. The government responded with the promise of a commission. The general strike did not happen as the “Triple Alliance” of unions fell apart. However, membership in the union-based Labour Party increased such that by the elections in 1922, while the Conservatives were the majority, Labour had a significant presence in Parliament. With the 1924 elections, Labour formed the government with the support of the Liberals. This was short lived however.\textsuperscript{125}

Perhaps the most significant event was the 1926 general strike, based again in the coal industry. British coal faced stiff competition from German and Polish imports that were cheaper, in part because of the mechanisation of the pits. Conservative Prime Minister Baldwin saw the general strike as a challenge to the constitution and used the military to unload boats, protect shipments, etc. The situation became volatile and was seen by some as a pre-revolutionary situation. The Trade Union Council in charge of the strike sought to find a compromise by proposing to call off the strike in order to settle on the unofficial Samuel Memorandum. In the end the Council lost its demands. In response to the strikes, the government in 1927 passed the Trades Disputes Acts which, among other things, made “sympathy strikes” illegal. While trade union membership decreased in the aftermath of this coal strike, Labour Party support increased with most of the working class channelling their

\textsuperscript{125} Labour Attorney-General refused to prosecute the Campbell Case - an editor of the Workers' Weekly who was arrested and charged with mutiny for calling on the men in the military not to fire on their brothers in the unions. This and the “Zinoviev Letter”, purporting to tell members of the British Communist Party how to carry out a revolution, led to the downfall of the government but the Labour Party kept its presence in Parliament. This also reflected the assumed strong link between socialist and communist sympathies and the idea that domestic communist parties were simply carrying out the foreign policy of the Soviet government.
demands through the Labour Party—since extra-parliamentary action was blocked. Because the Labour Party accepted the framework of parliamentary functioning, the bourgeoisie concluded that the democratic framework could contain revolutionary working class insurgency by inclusion of a class-based party in Parliament.

The financial crash of 1929 and the subsequent depression resulted in mass unemployment. However, there was partial recovery from the effects of the depression by 1936—except in old industrial areas where industries had not been modernised. As with other countries, “full” employment (i.e., a return to “acceptable” levels of unemployment) returned only through the process of rearmament. The British national myth, used in their re-education projects, retained pride in the Empire but added a recognition of the rights of the working class to a party, with sharp debate in parliament but with a goal of compromise.

The U.S.

In the U.S., the pattern was both similar and different. The United States emerged from World War I as the dominant world power economically. President Woodrow Wilson attempted to assert its right to world leadership. Conservative forces in the U.S. bourgeoisie, however, recognised that the role proposed for the U.S. in the League of Nations would commit the government to much greater defence spending with no apparent territorial gain. With the election of a Republican majority to Congress in 1918, the U.S. Congress refused to ratify the Versailles Treaty and thus refused participation in the League of Nations. The U.S. effectively returned to an “isolationist” foreign policy with respect to Europe. The United States’ financially based empire building continued unabated.

Viewing the Russian Revolution with alarm, the U.S. bourgeoisie supported the crushing of the rising labour unions in the U.S. This was accomplished through the Palmer raids of 1919 and the crippling of the International Workers of the World through mass
jailings, deportations and exorbitant fines. Meanwhile, the government's policy through the conservative presidencies of Coolidge and Harding was strictly laissez-faire with respect to the economy, calling for no government intervention even in recessionary periods. From 1922 on, U.S. industry was protected by the Fordney-McCumber tariff that imposed a general 10% rate on most foreign imported goods. Meanwhile, the Europeans often could not afford U.S. goods and couldn't compete in the U.S. markets for the profits needed to pay the debts they owed to U.S. banks. The stock market crash of 1929 with the ensuing depression did not significantly change the conservative bourgeois wing's laissez-faire point of view and indeed led to its adamant demand in 1931 for Germany's repayment of short term loans granted under the 1924 Dawes Plan (see below)—regardless of the impact on the German domestic situation.

A shift happened in 1932 with the election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR). Roosevelt's policy was one of government intervention in the economy in order to preserve the capitalist system as a whole by controlling the worst effects of the capitalist overproduction crisis. This would lead to the regulation and incorporation of labour unions through the Wagner Act of 1935 and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 in response to the development of the CIO. FDR successfully co-opted, defused and defeated more left-wing options such as the Communist and Trotskyist Parties. Thus from the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, through the NRA, PWA, CCC, WPA, Social Security Act of 1935 and the establishment of the TVA, FDR attempted to use the federal government to directly intervene in the economy. He was consistently opposed by the majority of the conservative capitalists throughout this period, with important legislation declared unconstitutional by the conservative Supreme Court. FDR had progressive support, beyond just that of the Democratic Party.

Eventually, rearmament and production for war in Europe, supported by the lend-lease policy with the Allied forces before the U.S. entry into the war, pulled the economy out of the
depression. The experience of the FDR presidency was incorporated in the U.S. national myth as demonstrating that a democracy works through forcing compromises on both big business and labour.

As can be seen, the dominant currents in the ruling classes in the two countries drew different conclusions from the domestic experiences of this period. In Britain the unions and Labour Party were accepted as legitimate representatives of the working class within the political arena—as long as they remained within the framework of parliamentary functioning. In the U.S. there was never a recognition of any working class based union or party organisation as legitimate within the political arena. Unions were accepted as the legitimate representatives of restricted parts of the working class strictly for economic bargaining, the process of which remained controlled and circumscribed by the state and the bourgeoisie. No third party developed with significant representation in Congress. While both countries were committed to representative democracies as a means for defusing working class insurgency, only Britain accepted working class based political parties as being a normal part of this process. These were essential components in the national myths present to the German prisoners of war in the Western re-education projects.

Inter-war Period to 1939: External Situation

The external situation at the time was also cause for bourgeois alarm about the stability of the capitalist world order. The Spanish Civil War evinced a fierce “anti-communist” response from the bourgeoisie of both the U.S. and Britain. Meanwhile, France presented a picture of polarisation to the right and left and shifts in governments that reflected this. France, a victor in World War I, was nevertheless in a poor economic situation in its aftermath. On the whole France had a less industrialised economy than her competitors and thus needed the terms of the Versailles Treaty to strengthen her position. She had an enormous debt to the U.S.
that required the reparation payments from Germany even during periods of relative economic
boom. When Germany defaulted in 1922, France occupied the industrial Ruhr to get what she
could—since she was still required to pay off the U.S. loans. Although right-wing governments
usually ruled, left-wing coalitions formed the government in the National Assembly for a three-
month period in 1924, then again in 1932-34, with the most radical one, the Front Populaire,
including the French Communist Party, in power from 1936 to 1938. When left-wing
governments were in power, big business tried to discredit them by withdrawing capital from
the economy and investing it abroad, which led to a fall in the value of the franc (from 70 to
250 to the British pound) during the 1932-34 period of the Cartel des Gauches. Right-wing
conservative parties and groups were openly pro-fascist, which played a part in the rapid
collapse of France before the Nazi invasion in 1940. For the U.S., but especially for Britain, the
role of the Communist Party was viewed with alarm and would influence their attitude towards
Charles de Gaulle and the Free French Forces in WWII.

In Germany, the situation was even more volatile. Germany was still the largest
industrial power in Europe. Its ruling class was formed of an alliance between the land based
aristocratic Junkers in Prussia and the industrialists of the Ruhr. In the context of a history of a
"strong state" created by Bismarck in the previous century, the Kaiser and chancellor
controlled defence and foreign policy. The aristocrats staffed the military, the foreign service,
and the top echelon of the vast state bureaucracy. Prior to World War I, the elected lower
house of the Reichstag, where the SPD could participate, had little power other than to refuse
to pass the budget. Only through the defeat in WWI and the imposed conditions of the
Versailles Treaty was the Reichstag restructured, giving the democratically elected lower house

126 This ability to vote on the budget was the basis for the view by Lenin and others of the SPD's betrayal of the revolutionary
cause when the SPD voted on the war credits for German participation in WWI against the principle of working-class
solidarity in the face of an inter-imperialist war.
a major say in government policy. The Junkers and the big industrialists had little or no 
commitment to the maintenance of this democratic government – the Weimar Republic. As 
Balfour (1992) has observed: “They regarded the new regime as something alien to German 
traditions and unsuited to German conditions which was being imposed at the behest of their 
enemies”127.

Events were often chaotic. Following the January 1919 Spartacist uprising and the 
élection of the SPD as the largest party in the Reichstag of the Weimar Republic, there 
ocurred the right-wing Kapp Putsch in March 1920. Only through the intervention of the 
working class in Berlin was the Weimar Republic preserved. The polarisation of the right and 
left continued with the development of large private militias. During the recession in 1922 
Germany was unable to pay reparations. Germany entered into the Rapallo Treaty with Russia 
at Easter of that year, which allowed German industrialists to build factories in Russia, 
producing airplanes and ammunitions prohibited by the Versailles Treaty, and allowed German 
officers to train in Russia, bending if not breaking the limitation on the size of the German 
army set by the Versailles Treaty. When the French occupied the Ruhr district of Germany in 
January of 1923, Britain, unlike the U.S., expressed sharp disapproval, as it needed a stable and 
economically healthy Germany as a market for its exports. The Weimar Republic called for a 
response of passive resistance by the German working class. No longer having the benefits of 
the Ruhr’s industrial production, the German economy broke down. By July the situation was 
one of a total collapse of the German mark and uncontrolled inflation. Even though Hitler’s 
Munich Beer Hall Putsch failed in November of 1923, right-wing support for the nascent Nazi 
party rose.

Arguing that a strong economy was the key to controlling working class insurgency as well as to paying the reparations, Gustav Stresemann of the SPD negotiated the Dawes Plan in 1924. Named after the American general who headed it, this plan arranged for a 800 million dollar loan to Germany—in part to pay German reparations to France, who thereby could pay her loan to the U.S. bankers. The Dawes Plan conceded to Germany a “pay when you can” policy. It was followed in 1929 by the Young Plan, named for the American banker who headed it, that reduced the total reparations from £6,600 million to £2,000 million and provided an extended payment schedule spread out over the next 59 years. However, the 1929 crash followed and the depression hit Germany. In 1931, U.S. bankers demanded repayment of short-term loans to Germany, further exacerbating a bad situation. By 1933, Hitler was named chancellor, as the conservative bourgeoisie backed the Nazis, seeking a solution to the economic crisis through this explicitly anti-communist party with its record of repression of working class organisations.

From the perspective of the ruling classes in Britain and the U.S., the rise of fascism was not viewed with undue alarm. In Britain there was a small fascist party, which technically legitimated fascism as an option. In both countries, the rise of left-wing labour organisations was viewed as a greater problem than fascism. For U.S. industrialists and bankers, the rise of Nazism did not affect business investments in Germany and also had the added advantage of “disciplining” the German working class. In the U.S. no significant actions were taken against the rise of anti-Semitism with Father Coughlin, or racism in the rise of the KKK, while the Communist Party continued to be harassed. This inter-war period played a crucial role in the formation of the thinking of those who would go on to create the Allied re-education projects and knowledge of this racism was well known in Germany. Those running the U.S. re-

128 The same logic would become part of the basis for the Marshall Plan following WWII.
education projects were confronted by challenges to the similarity between the Nazi racist ideology and U.S. racist practice.

Thus, while there were differences between Britain and the U.S. in terms of the legitimacy of working class organisations domestically, generally similar policies were followed in terms of foreign policies towards Germany. Within the framework of a world economic crisis, with the capitalists in each country attempting to preserve their ruling rights, Hitler as chancellor and then dictator of Germany pulled off a series of diplomatic coups. While the U.S. continued in its formal isolationist policy, Britain effectively accepted, sometimes applauded, sometimes criticized, but always acceded to Hitler's acts. This included the 1934 German non-aggression pact with Poland; the return of the Saar district in 1935; the withdrawal of Germany from the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference in 1935 since "the other countries had not disarmed"; the subsequent Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935, which set a limit for the German navy at 35% of the size of the British navy; the 1936 Rome-Berlin Axis; the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan and later Italy; German support for Franco in Spain while Britain, the U.S. and France refused to intervene on the side of the Republic; the 1938 Anschluss with Austria (specifically prohibited by the Versailles Treaty); and finally the September 1938 Munich Conference that gave the Sudetenland to Germany, which led to the subsequent subjugation of Czechoslovakia. In all of these developments, Hitler acted in the interests of the German bourgeoisie and was recognised as doing so by the English and U.S. bourgeoisies. They accepted the Nazi regime's destruction of working class organisations and left-wing parties in Germany and its creation of concentration camps for such "recidivist" elements. Britain was more concerned with the maintenance of her Empire and favourable trade with Germany. The U.S. retained a vocal isolationist foreign policy, as exemplified by Charles Lindbergh's proposal for 'Fortress America' as a security
from all foreign powers, but with no greater critique of Nazi Germany than other European
countries. For those involved with the Western Allied re-education projects, the conclusions
were specific. The U.S., due to its formal isolationism, did not need to justify a former support
of Hitler. For Britain, the task became to rewrite history to show the reasonableness of Britain,
pushed too far by Hitler and the Nazis, themselves a reflected of German habits of
authoritarian and militaristic traditions. The anti-communism behind the U.S. and British
support of Hitler was down-played during the war but would reappear in the post-war period.

*World War II*

By 1938, Hitler was proposing a “new world order”, based on German domination of
a “Fortress Europe”; “friendship” with Britain, with the assumption that Britain would retain
her Empire and a leading position globally and continue the mutual trade relations between
Britain and Germany; and a general appeal to the “Anglo-Saxon” right to dominate “lesser”
people. Hitler expected the U.S. to remain isolationist, dominating its own hemisphere and
trading with everyone. Germany’s relation with Italy and Japan was one of mutual support
within an explicitly anti-communist framework.

However, Britain could not accept a German domination of Europe. The U.S.
bourgeoisie sought its own leadership role internationally and understood the real possibility of
a Fortress Europe raising tariffs that would impede U.S. trade. On 1 September 1939, a week
after signing a mutual non-aggression pact with Soviet Russia¹²⁹, Germany invaded Poland
resulting in Britain and France declaring war on Germany. After the November-through-
March Russian-Finnish war and the division of Poland between Germany and Soviet Russia,
there followed a six-month lull (deemed the Phoney War). In April 1940 Hitler began the take-

¹²⁹ This was seen as opportunistic by both parties, based on the previous Rapello Treaty. Hitler and the Nazis did not, however,
renounce their anti-communism.
over of the rest of Europe with the relatively bloodless invasions of Norway and Denmark and the short blitzkrieg in May in Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg and France. By the end of June 1940 France had fallen to the invading German army, in part due to the support of the right wing in France, which led to the immediate creation of the Vichy regime. Italy had invaded Albania in 1940 and attempted a similar invasion of Greece. Only with the support of the German Wehrmacht was Greece conquered. In May 1940, Churchill became prime minister in Britain. With rest of Europe conquered, on 10 July 1940 serious bombing of Britain began with the Battle of Britain. Escalating through August and lasting till the end of September, Britain was able to fend off this prelude to an invasion. By the end of 1940, while Britain was undefeated, it was the only country in the west of European continent that was non-occupied, neutral or allied with the Axis powers. At the beginning of 1941, FDR pushed through Congress the lend-lease arrangement with Britain and the other allies, with its passage by Congress on 11 March. Reversing his 1939 pact with Stalin, Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa on 22 June 1941, bringing in the Soviet Union on the side of the Allies. In response to Germany's aggression, Stalin called on all Communist Parties to fight the Nazi regime, leading to the resistance movements in most European countries being led by communists. Five months later on 7 December 1941, Japan bombed Pearl Harbor, which brought the U.S. into World War II on the side of the Allies.

Even before Pearl Harbor, FDR had sought to support the Allied side. Beyond the Lend-Lease law of March, FDR and Churchill signed the Atlantic Charter in Newfoundland on 12 August 1941, stressing the importance of defending Britain but without committing the U.S. to military action. The Lend-Lease agreement that provided both military and non-military materials to Britain was applied also to the Soviet Union after the beginning of Operation Barbarossa. This new and sudden Grand Alliance between Britain, the U.S. and the Soviet
Union was viewed by each as a necessity of war. Both Britain and the U.S. needed the Soviet
Union to hold off Germany's expansionism. For Britain the attack on the Soviet Union
removed the pressure of an imminent invasion of Britain. Practically the full weight of the
Wehrmacht was directed against the Soviet Union for the two years from 1941-43. From 1940,
the British had been fighting the Italians in North Africa, continuing the fighting in 1941
against the Germans who replaced the Italians. Allied bombing campaigns began in 1942. The
U.S. and British operations in North Africa and then Italy in 1943 were the first major front
opened in the west. It was three years from the beginning of Operation Barbarossa before
there was the creation of the promised Western front, with the June 1944 D-Day invasion in
Normandy, France by the Western Allies. Thus even while benefiting from the Land-Lease
deal, Stalin believed that his Allied partners were hoping that the two "evils" of nazism and
communism would mutually destroy each other - an opinion that was directly expressed in
some newspapers in both Britain and the U.S. This wartime history affected the creators of the
Western Allied re-education projects mainly in terms of the popular respect for the Soviet
Union in fighting and subsequently winning against the previously undefeated Wehrmacht.

Intra-Allied Summit Meetings

Intra-Allied relations were defined through a series of summit meetings as well as
through other diplomatic channels. The frameworks established by these summit meetings
controlled the content of the re-education projects, and especially the focus on elections in the
Western projects. With both Roosevelt and Churchill committed to the Atlantic War, as well as
in the war in the Pacific where the British Empire holdings were crumbling before the Japanese
assault, there was little military help they could offer the Soviet Union. Thus negotiations
between the Allies revolved around their mutual commitment to an "unconditional surrender"
from the Nazi Regime, rather than the possibility of negotiating a "separate peace" by any one
of the Grand Alliance. Given the hard-pressed status of the Soviet Union, this commitment on Stalin’s part to ‘no separate peace’ in early 1943 was of critical significance. Throughout the summits, the three leaders operated with some autonomy from their respective governments – a situation that would later lead to accusations of selling out. Roosevelt clearly felt that, representing the most powerful country, he had the right to override Churchill when there was a disagreement. Churchill meanwhile felt that Roosevelt was too weak with Stalin, given to unnecessary compromise. Roosevelt disagreed with Churchill on Britain’s post-war ambitions of regaining its lost empire, believing instead in the right of nations to self-determination. Roosevelt also felt that, given the vastly greater economic power of the U.S. and Stalin’s agreement to disband the Comintern (the Communist International), a long-term working relationship was possible.

By the end of 1943, victory for the Allied side was likely. Therefore the summit meetings focused more on determining the political terrain of the post-war period and the issue of reparations. During the Teheran Conference of November -December 1943, the Western Allies finally made a commitment to the Soviet Union for a second front in France in the spring 1944. They also agreed that post-war Germany would be divided temporarily into occupation zones and that a permanent demilitarization, as well as denazification, would be imposed on Germany. This denazification was important to the Soviet Union given the violent anti-communism of the Nazi regime. It was agreed that the Soviet Union could retain its new western lands acquired during the Hitler-Stalin pact but that Poland would receive new lands from Germany to compensate for this loss of territory. Russia agreed to enter the Asian conflict following victory in Europe. This latter commitment by Russia was deemed critical by

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130 This included the infamous ‘Commissar order’ effective on the Eastern front ordering the Wehrmacht soldiers to immediately kill the political officers in the captured Russian territory.
Roosevelt, which led him to compromise on the question of Poland. However Roosevelt was also committed to self-determination of the occupied European countries as well as those of the previous parts of various European Empires. The means for this self-determination was to be through democratic elections – although in the intervening period between liberation and elections, the personnel to run the governments would be chosen by the Allied victors. This led to extensive sharp negotiations about who and which political parties would be allowed – inasmuch as the commitment to de-nazification excluded those political groups who had collaborated with the Nazi regime.

By the time the Yalta Conference was held, 4-11 February 1945, both the Western Allies’ armies and the Red Army were deep in Germany territory and rapidly moving to occupy all of Germany. The occupation of Germany would more or less correspond to where the various armies had reached by the point of final surrender. Again, a major discussion was the parties and personnel to form the government of liberated countries. Stalin, for both security and economic reasons, wanted a Soviet sphere of influence around Russia. His essential condition was that small neighbouring states accept Soviet diplomatic hegemony. The Czech government-in-exile in London accepted this, proposing diplomatic agreements that accepted Soviet international leadership in exchange for internal freedom. When the Red Army liberated Czechoslovakia, it passed control over to this government, which proceeded to recreate a parliamentary democracy. Stalin applied this ‘Czech model’ to his peace treaty with Finland. Even when the dominant force in the liberated country was already an autonomous communist party, as in Yugoslavia, Stalin wanted political leadership. Often this meant using remnants of those countries’ communist parties that were loyal to him as the proposed government – as with Poland and East Germany, and refusing recognition of the various governments-in-exile if he viewed them as hostile. Likewise, Churchill and Roosevelt promoted
those who were seen as sympathetic to the west with links to the previous ruling classes.

Through all this, elections were proposed as the democratic means for confirming the self-
determination of each country as formulated in the Declaration on Liberated Europe.

Roosevelt foresaw the U.S. playing the dominant role internationally in the aftermath
of WWII. With the only major industrial base untouched by the destruction of the war, the
U.S. future would best be assured by the restoration of an international economy based on free
trade and a stable financial system geared for global economic expansion. This project had
been put in place with the Bretton Woods agreement and the establishment of the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. For Roosevelt, international security was to
be guaranteed by the creation of the United Nations with the ‘Four Policemen’ Security
Council of the U.S., Britain, USSR and (non-communist) China. 131

On 12 April 1945, Roosevelt died. Hitler committed suicide two weeks later (30 April),
clearing the way for an immediate surrender and the declaration of victory in Europe on 8 May
1945. Vice-president Harry S. Truman, who had little international diplomatic experience and a
deep distrust of communism, replaced Roosevelt. Thus by the time of the Potsdam
Conference in 17 July - 2 Aug. 1945 the key question had shifted to military victory in the
Asian theatre. While Roosevelt had felt the importance of the involvement of the Red Army,
Truman, with knowledge of the successful testing of the atom bomb, felt less willing to
negotiate any compromise. Churchill attended the beginning of the conference but as his
Conservative Party was defeated in elections in Britain, he was replaced by Atlee, prime
minister for the Labour Party. Victory in Japan came on 14 August 1945, 6 days after Soviet
Russia entered the Asian war on the Allied side – true to Stalin’s promise at Yalta.

End of World War II

At the end of the war, the U.S. was the single dominant power globally. A crucial feature of the view of the conservative wing of the bourgeoisie behind Truman was the refusal to make any distinction between social democracy, socialism and communism. No political expression of the working class was accepted, and even unions as the expression of economic views were not particularly desired. This led to the exclusion of the remaining New Deal progressives, from the Roosevelt era, from most policy levels in the State Department. This was the beginning of the loyalty check in the U.S. government, including of those involved in their re-education projects with the German prisoners of war.\(^{132}\) Many of these individuals had played central roles in the OSS and Office of War Information during the war. Some were temporarily retained for the specific role of helping in the establishment of the military occupation government in Germany and the preparation of the Nuremberg Trials, especially in the aftermath of the widespread publicity about the Nazi concentration camps. These New Deal progressives sincerely hoped that the wartime alliance of “conservative” capitalist U.S. with “radical” communist Russia would produce a progressive, social-democratic capitalist alternative—at least for Europe.

Britain ended the war with the Labour Party in power, but their relations with the U.S. were no longer those of equal partners. Britain was rather a junior partner in any collective decision-making. This proved to be critical for the future of Germany since the Labour Party supported the social democratic option as the proper future for European countries, but the United States did not. The Soviet Union ended the war militarily powerful and determined to protect itself.

By 1945 there was a significant divergence in the domestic political reality of Britain and the U.S. In Britain in 1945, Churchill's Conservative Party lost the majority in the elections to Atlee's Labour Party, which had promised sweeping economic reforms and new social policies for the post-war period. The Labour Party reforms included such socialist policies as the nationalisation of key industries, comprehensive health care at state expense, guaranteed assistance to all in need of food and shelter and an ambitious program of state-constructed low-cost housing. These were costly programmes and the Labour Party changed the tax law so that taxes went up on businesses and income tax rates rose for the well-to-do. Meanwhile rationing remained in effect until 1947, and controls on currency exchange until the early 50s, to ensure that goods in short supply were fairly distributed. In the U.S. Truman was carrying through much of FDR's economic policy. In response to the 1946 wave of labour strikes, the Taft-Hartley Bill was passed in 1947, both limiting labour action and institutionalising trade unions. The U.S. economy was the single dominant economic force. This dominance would be reflected in the dominant role of the U.S., among the Western Allies, in the occupation of Germany after the war. The British were constantly confronted with the U.S. acting in a unilateral way, including the disfavouring of the German Socialist Party with its links to the Labour Party in power in Britain. For those involved in the British re-education projects, these different histories of the U.S. and Britain affected their curriculum choices.

**War-Time Propaganda**

Some recognition of the overall wartime propaganda efforts of the nations involved is needed. While the U.S. and British re-education projects occur after the end of WWII, they are a continuation of the war-time propaganda efforts of each country and thus, while initially

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secret, were associated with the ‘all’s fair in love and war’ public attitude of acceptance towards
war-time propaganda. But this poses the question of why a war-time activity was conducted in
the post-war period. The British especially expressed concern about the role of Germany as the
cause of war in Europe due to her militaristic and authoritarian traditions\textsuperscript{134}. However, another
part of the answer involves a direct link between the war-time situation and the post-war
agenda – otherwise there would be little justification for these clearly indoctrination-type
projects. That link was the role of ‘free elections’ in countries formerly occupied by the
Wehrmacht and now occupied by the Allied forces, including Germany itself. In contrast, the
re-education project conducted by the Soviet Union in 1942-43 with German prisoners of war
from Operation Barbarossa, including the creation of the German Officers Bund, had the
active defeat of the Nazi regime as a goal. The Soviet Union did institute and continue into the
post-war period another re-education project known as the ‘anti-fascist schools’, seen as part of
the Allied project of the de-nazification of Germany.\textsuperscript{135} The post-war perspective for the U.S.
and British re-education projects was usually founded on the idea of ‘winning the peace’ –
instituting a stable system for inter-European country relations. However, the propaganda
projects also benefited the institutional sources – the Soviet Red Army, the German KPD and
the Comintern for the Soviet Union, the British Foreign Office, especially for the Wilton Park
project, and the State Department and Provost Marshall General Office for the U.S. The
propaganda message of each project, as expressed in the curriculum, focused on a view of
Germany’s past and desired future relations with each country.

\textsuperscript{134} See PRO: RG FO371, Foreign Office - Political, Vol. 46864 / Memo on The Mentality of the German Officer/ paper on
The German Character, 1945., PRO: RG FO371, Foreign Office - Political, Vol. 2635 / British post war attitude to
Germany, 1941., PRO: RG FO371, Foreign Office - Political, Vol. 39216 / Problems arising from control of Germany after
1918, 1944, and PRO: RG FO1049, Foreign Office - Control Commission in Germany, Vol. 532 / Re-education of POWs -
Berlin 1945, 1946. among others.

\textsuperscript{135} Smith Jr., Arthur Lec. \textit{The war for the German mind: Re-educating Hitler’s soldiers}. Providence: Berghahn Books, 1996. and
In light of the prevalence of high rates of literacy, as well as improved means of mass communication, international diplomacy for any nation is the product of the relationship between foreign diplomacy and domestic politics. While this is true for all forms of government of national states, it is especially true for electoral democracies where the official government must submit to popular opinion as expressed through the electoral process. The more universal the suffrage and the higher the voter participation in elections, the greater the impact of domestic public opinion on domestic politics and foreign policy. For the government, this leads to a greater need for propaganda in order to create support for its policies. This is the key concern of Chomsky, Lippman, et al in propaganda analysis.

These re-education projects were part of the external propaganda (for citizens of other nations) rather than domestic propaganda and therefore fit within the foreign policy aims of their countries. There is an important distinction to make between the message within a country’s external propaganda and the actual diplomatic manoeuvring by the source government. For instance, during the war a major contradiction developed between the anti-fascist propaganda of the U.S. Office of War directed towards France and the diplomatic treaty signed with Vichy France after the successful Allied campaign in North Africa.\textsuperscript{136} The conjunctural propaganda goals thus form part of the historic framework for the Allied re-education projects. However, these conjunctural goals must be situated within the broader historical framework of the post-war period.

1945-49 Origins of the Cold War

The historical frameworks for the different Allied re-education projects are linked to the alternate post-war frameworks for global diplomacy as promoted by the respective governments. The critical issue was the different consequences of the war-time alliance

between Britain, the U.S. and the Soviet Union after the previous twenty years of a general antagonism following the Bolshevik revolution in 1917. The archive records in NARA (U.S.) and the PRO (Britain) do not presage the coming Cold War in any consistent way. The records in the PRO especially seem to anticipate a social-democratic government form as a continuation of the compromise between capitalism and communism\textsuperscript{137} while continuing to worry about a communist victory\textsuperscript{138}. This hostility by the U.S. and British governments towards the Soviet Union was based largely on the economic model it represented internationally as well as the relationship the Soviet government had to the domestic Communist parties in the U.S. and in Britain. Communist parties sought to influence labour unions, with the undesirable potential, from the government's point of view, for creating labour 'unrest'. The central tension between Britain and the U.S. on one side and the Soviet Union on the other was ascribed to either this inherent ideological contradiction of capitalist systems and communist systems or to the conviction each had of the other's expansionist goals.\textsuperscript{139}

Briefly put, the post-war global diplomatic frameworks can be summarised as: 1) continuation of the 'spheres of influence' model that had dominated the previous century of empire building, with each side recognising and accepting the prerogatives of the other; 2) containment of the USSR by a tough negotiating stance, backed by the military might of the U.S.;\textsuperscript{140} 3) a continuation of the war-time Grand Alliance through a social-democratisation of


\textsuperscript{138} PRO: RG FO371, Foreign Office - Political, Vol. 39211 / Possibility of Germany Going Communist, 1944.

\textsuperscript{139} While each side saw the expansion of their system of government as positive for other nations, each saw the other as fundamentally retrograde. Some left-wing authors equate the two sides - the U.S. and USSR - as equally engaged in oppressive empire building. See Zinn, Howard. A People's History of the United States. New York: Harper Perennial, 1980.

Europe; and 4) an aggressive anti-communist stance on behalf of liberal democracy, identified with the Truman Doctrine and the Cold War. It is the latter, the Cold War, which came to dominate global politics from 1948-49. The various arguments for the origin of the Cold War will be presented in so far as they relate to the context in which the decisions to carry out the post-war Allied re-education projects and their curricula were made.

Explanations for the origins of the Cold War diplomatic framework include global, national, and domestic reasons. At the global level, interpretations include the part played by economic issues, including the economic importance of continuing the military-industrial complex in the U.S. developed during the war, security concerns for the central Allied nations, as well as the importance of ‘peripheral’ countries (Iran, Greece and Turkey and various Pacific nations) or other European nations. Likewise, the role of specific personalities – Roosevelt, Truman, Churchill and Stalin primarily – provides another rationale. The importance of individuals included also those key diplomatic personnel from each nation who framed the foreign policy of their countries, including Byrnes, Kennan and Acheson for the U.S. Clearly all accept the argument that the diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Britain and the USSR during the inter-war period, that is anti-communism, form the background to

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142 This research does not attempt a comprehensive explanation of the origins of the Cold War. There is an extensive literature on this topic – which continues to expand. See Flaherty, Patrick. "Origins of the cold war: new evidence." Monthly Review 48, no. 5 (1996): 35-47. or James, Harold, and Marzenna James. "The origins of the cold war: some new documents." The Historical Journal 37, no. 3 (1994): 615-622. for example. The references cited are generally ones that relate to some of the issues, institutions or personnel linked to the re-education projects.


the acceptance of the Cold War framework. Domestic issues seen to affect the U.S.
advancement of the Cold War perspective include the role of the press and the voting patterns
of specific ethnic and religious groups as well as the unions and their aspirations.

U.S. Launches the Cold War

The U.S. sought the creation of independent capitalist states in Eastern Europe. Stalin,
with the intention of surrounding the Soviet Union with states that he could control, sought
the creation of communist governments in these countries. George Kennan, the leading
diplomat in the U.S. embassy in Moscow, formulated the concept of “containment” with
respect to the Soviet Union. It was based on an absolute opposition to the expansion of
Russian influence, first by diplomatic means backed by force, to be followed by negotiations
only when the Soviet Union was prepared to make concessions. Kennan’s proposal of
“containment” was sent as a telegram to the U.S. government in early 1946 and was
transformed into a more aggressive anti-communist policy reflecting the political view of
President Truman. Also, with its atom bomb, the U.S. saw itself as militarily in the dominant
role. The Soviet Union’s wartime destruction created the need to shift from a wartime
economy to one based on the restoration of the domestic economy. Domestically in the U.S.,
immigrants, from countries that would now come under communist rule, both pressured the
government and organised to have an impact on the 1948 elections. The American Catholic
Church, afraid of losing both power and property in countries of Eastern Europe, returned to
its campaign against ‘atheistic’ communists145. On 5 March 1946, former prime minister
Winston Churchill, now speaking as a private citizen, expressed the same sentiments of the
conservative wing of the bourgeoisie in Britain, in his “iron curtain” speech in Fulton,
Missouri\textsuperscript{146}. This was given widespread publicity in the U.S. as reflecting the supposed agreement of the other major ally from World War II for an anti-communist framework for international diplomacy.

Those left-wing intellectuals who were most attuned to the European situation, as well as trade-unionists in the U.S., imagined a continuation of the Grand Alliance leading to a social democratic framework for European countries, without the return of the old politics that had led to both economic depression and war.\textsuperscript{147} This option had no broad support domestically in the U.S. but did enjoy some favour in Britain. Even when this social democratic option was not the issue, recognition of Soviet Russia’s justifiable fear of her European neighbours and thus the desire for a ‘security zone’ of ‘friendly governments’ was reflected even in the conservative press.\textsuperscript{148} While the Labour government of Britain may have supported a social democratic future for Germany, its foreign policy remained dominantly anti-communist.\textsuperscript{149}

In March 1947, the Truman Doctrine was officially announced. It said that only democratic, capitalist governments were acceptable to the U.S., and the U.S. reserved the right to intervene wherever in the world it chose to enforce this doctrine. The Truman Doctrine was backed up by the Marshall Plan, a massive U.S. state intervention into the European economies accepting its terms. This was a tacit statement that viable capitalist economies in all countries were the necessary basis for preventing working class insurgency and best for maintaining U.S. prosperity. This new advocacy of intervention abroad by the U.S. bourgeoisie was a reversal of the previous dominant isolationist positions.


In response, the Soviet Union launched the Cominform in 1947 and then the economic mutual aid structure, the Comecon. By 1948, there was the attempted blockage of Berlin, resulting in the Berlin air-lift, and a communist take-over of Czechoslovakia, one of the eastern block countries that had considered applying for Marshall Plan aid. 1949 witnessed the creation of the permanent mutual defence organisation of NATO and the division of Germany into two separate states, the German Federal Republic (West Germany) and the German Democratic Republic (East Germany). Only the British and Soviet Union re-education projects were continuing during this period. The British curriculum became more reflective of this development with a shift from a political to a moral analysis of Nazism.


With the unconditional surrender of the Wehrmacht on 8 May 1945, Germany became an occupied country. The division of German territory was based fundamentally on territory already occupied by the Red Army versus that occupied by the western Allied forces. There was an agreement for the French to become part of the occupying authority in territory held by the British and U.S. troops. Thus a tripartite division was formed on the western side, dominated by the Americans headed by General Lucius Clay. All overall policies affecting Germany as a whole were to be settled by joint decision of all four Allied Parties. By the end of 1945 there were clear tensions among the western allies and between them and the Soviet Union with respect to Germany. The U.S. wanted a clear private enterprise type of capitalism with little or no nationalisation of industries while the British and French supported various plans for a more “mixed” economy. Having suffered the greatest losses in terms of both population and property destruction of any of the allies, the Soviet Union wanted a communist government strictly in line with its own interests. In the end, the western allies, dominated by

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143 Deighton, Anne. _The impossible peace: Britain, the division of Germany and the origins of the cold war_, 1990.
the Americans who were willing to operate on their own if they could not get rapid agreement from their western partners, followed the “containment” policy with respect to the Soviet Union with little concern for serious negotiation or compromise on anything so far as Germany’s future was concerned.

The tensions between the western allies were based in part on the unwillingness of the Americans to make any distinction between socialism and communism and blatant U.S. opposition to allowing either to develop within “their” zone. Both the British and the French supported the social democratic parties and allowed for the communist parties to exist, for a while at least. Within the dynamic of U.S. dominance, the logic of the Cold War increasingly defined the relationship between the western allies and the Soviet Union and was played out in increasingly open Cold War confrontation in occupied Germany.

There was, however, a brief spell of co-operation between all sides in the preparations for the Nuremberg Tribunal of Nazi war criminals in 1946 and 1947\(^{150}\), and a fair amount of co-operation in the denazification plan, that is, the removal from civil authority of former Nazis. In the western zones, both the U.S. desire to prevent “pink” elements from gaining any authority, and the need for co-operative conservative administrators, led to the effective end of the denazification programmes by 1948\(^{151}\). The ‘enemy’ shifted from the Nazi to the recalcitrant and demanding Communist. The decision to economically unify the western zones took place in 1947, deliberately excluding the “non-co-operative” Soviet zone. The object was to create a new German state, in direct disregard of the wartime agreements on the occupation of Germany. The decision by the western zones to introduce a currency reform without Soviet agreement led to the Soviet decision to block ground access to Berlin. The western allies

\(^{150}\) Following the Nuremberg trials was an important part of the continuing British and Soviet Union re-education projects.
answered with the Berlin air-lift, supplying the western zones by air from June 1948 to May 1949, when the Soviets opened the ground routes again. By August 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG - West Germany) was established, followed in October by the creation of the German Democratic Republic (GDR - East Germany).

Both Britain and the U.S. promoted electoral democracy in Germany for ideological and political reasons. On a practical political basis, after thirteen years of a Nazi regime that banned left-wing parties, killed their members, and silenced their ideologies, early elections at the local levels in Germany would insure that, even if the socialist and communist parties were allowed to run, they would not win the elections and would remain a minority. The conservative parties, including the Catholic Centre party, had not been decimated in this way. They were more easily resurrected as the Christian Democratic Union. In many areas of Germany, new forms of local government organisations had developed after the war, based on neighbourhood committees deciding on allocations of rooms, food, work etc. These “anti-fascist leagues” were often under the leadership of more radical, left-wing Germans. By reintroducing the government structures from the Weimar Republic period and holding early local elections to fill the structures, the western Allies were undermining and replacing these new forms of left-wing dominated organisations. Thus, electoral democracy served to legitimize traditional government structures and rendered alternative forms “unnecessary”152.

Within the framework of U.S. support for free enterprise capitalism, opposition to nationalisation of industries, and effective control of the western zones, the promotion of early elections served to bring in a conservative German government, which would thus have the added legitimacy of having been elected.

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The U.S. and British re-education projects for German prisoners of war, teaching them “democracy”, were a small but revealing part of this overall policy, including the U.S. and British differences in approach. The Soviet Union re-education projects, with their direct recruitment of the German prisoners of war to the KPD, played a more direct role in the local structuring of the government is the Soviet zone of occupation.\textsuperscript{153}


\textsuperscript{153} See Chapter 6, Soviet Union Re-education Projects, Repatriation for further discussion of this point.
Chapter 7 Allied Re-education Projects for the German Prisoners of War

Geneva Convention of 1929

In WWII, prisoners of war had distinct rights under the Geneva Convention of 1929 that recognized a military to military relationship. Prisoners of war were military personnel briefly in custody of the holding authority. The basic premise was that the military structure and responsibilities were to be maintained in prisoner of war camps. Military rank, regulations and dress remained in force along with the appropriate privileges. The convention required that soldiers from different armies be kept separate and called for separate quarters for Navy personnel as well. Thus different prisoner of war camps were established for the German, Italian and Japanese military personnel in captivity. Prisoners of war had the civic rights and responsibilities of their country of origin, in contrast to the restrictions on civic rights placed on criminal prisoners. This included the right to send and receive mail, although clearly this mail was subject to censorship by the holding authority. During war there was always the possibility of an exchange of prisoners, most often of wounded personnel who could never return to

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combatant status. The assumption was that after war the prisoners of war would be repatriated as part of a peace treaty, returning to civilian life in their home countries.

The Geneva Convention also set forth standards with respect to health and food, immunity from torture, etc. The International Red Cross was mandated to inspect all prisoner of war camps through arrangements with the holding authority. Most often a neutral country was given the right to act for the belligerent in these arrangements. Switzerland played this role with respect to Nazi Germany during World War II. Actual treatment of prisoners of war varied considerably from strict adherence to the terms of the Geneva Convention to privation and brutality severe enough to result in the death of approximately 5 million of the estimated 35 million military personnel in captivity before the last prisoners were repatriated. While no international regulations could control the spontaneous anger of a soldier towards recently captured enemy soldiers, each country had policies that altered the treatment of prisoners of war based on their country of origin. Sometimes these policies were officially sanctioned by explicit military directives and sometimes they were the result of public outrage\(^\text{156}\) at the atrocities ascribed to that country.\(^\text{157}\)

The Geneva Convention stated that all but officers could be required to work to support the cost of their upkeep, as long as this work was not in war-related industries. Since work to feed and house the prisoners was not considered war-related, agricultural work, including forestry, was the main use of prisoner of war labour. Thus German prisoners of war, as a source of cheap labour, became an increasingly desirable commodity during WWII as more men were called up for military service. While the outside contractor paid the Army for the services of the prisoners of war, the prisoners who participated had the right to some

\(^{156}\) Both the U.S. and Britain temporarily reduced the food rations given German prisoners of war in May-June 1945, post VE day, due to public reaction to the discovery of the concentration camps in April 1945.
additional income due to their labour. Most prisoners of war voluntarily participated, both for the additional pay and to break the boredom of prison life. Given the fact that officers were not required to work, non-commissioned officers (NCOs – the equivalent of sergeants and corporals) were in charge of these work groups. Within the German Wehrmacht, the NCO ranks were the most committed to the Nazi regime and ideology. The Nazis had forced the traditional officer corps to accept a greater upward mobility of Party members, at least into these non-commissioned ranks.

The Geneva Convention also stated that prisoners should be encouraged to engage in educational activities and other forms of ‘intellectual diversion’158, within what was feasible for the holding power. These educational activities were seen as part of the civic rights of prisoners of war. They were also generally understood to be self-organised, most often involving training programs leading to certificates that would recognised by the prisoners’ home countries. Many prisoner of war officers were teachers or skilled workers who could train and test men for certificates useful for their future jobs in the home country. But this often meant using course material from the home country, that is, the recognition and use of the Nazi curriculum within the German prisoner of war camps.159 Educational activities also included recognised courses from local holding authority educational institutions.

‘Intellectual diversions’ included cultural activities and the publication of camp newspapers within the limitations of censorship by the holding military authority. As the prisoners remained ‘the enemy’ from the point of view of the holding authority, there was a definite ideological component (‘fighting fascism’) to what cultural materials were provided or

158 Article 17 of the Geneva Convention states "So far as possible, belligerents shall encourage intellectual diversions and sports organized by prisoners of war".
allowed. For the holding authorities, this censorship of the camp newspapers and mail
provided a measure of the changing attitudes of the Germans during the war and immediate
post-war period.

Before the beginning of the re-education projects, the censorship of newspapers and
films available to the prisoners of war eliminated direct Nazi publications. The main issue
concerned what German language newspapers, magazines and books were made available,
whether published in the holding country or in Germany. No German films were available or
shown. In the U.S., even Hollywood films were in limited supply, not through censorship but
because of preference given to the civilian population.

The assumption within the Geneva Convention was that these education activities and
intellectual diversions were to be organized by the prisoners themselves, with the clear
implication but not explicit statement that they should not be used as a cover for political
indoctrination.161 All re-education projects during WWII were publicly defended as being of a
voluntary nature — or for some other reason not to be in violation of this assumption161.

The military structure of the prisoner of war camps meant that the holding authority
needed only a camp commander, his administrative personnel, and camp guards. Normal
functioning within the camp was under the authority of the senior German military personnel.
While the designated German officer could be removed from one camp to another camp, the
Allied holding authorities were not allowed to arbitrarily choose the most cooperative officer as
Camp Leader. Any cooperation beyond the strictly administrative subjected the prisoner to the
accusation by other prisoners of collaboration with the enemy and thus being a traitor to the
home country. Such prisoners of war were potentially subject to military court-martial when

159 By late 1944 -1945 with the school system in Germany disrupted, the accusation was that the only place where Nazi ideology
(in terms of history courses) was still being taught was in the U.S. prisoner of war camps!
repatriated to their home country. From the point of view of the prisoners of war, the degree and purpose of cooperation with the enemy was important. Cooperation with the holding authority for the benefit of all prisoners of war was generally accepted. Cooperation for personal benefit was less acceptable and led to individual harassment. Cooperation detrimental to fellow prisoners was clearly unacceptable. All this was critical to the willingness of prisoners of war to participate in the voluntary re-education projects.

There were specific problems with German prisoners of war. Maintaining the military structure within the camps meant that the largely Nazi NCOs had the greatest influence. In the U.S. and Britain, this led to incidents of kangaroo courts for German political opponents of Nazism, including cases of their execution.\textsuperscript{162} This in turn eventually led both the U.S.\textsuperscript{163} and the British\textsuperscript{164} authorities to create a form of political segregation for the safety of anti-Nazi German prisoners. This political segregation had the additional advantage of increasing the ease of indoctrination on the ‘advantages of democracy’ by removing the Nazi cadres who could and did argue for the Nazi interpretation of German history, (that is, the Nazi version of the German national myth), including the concept of the foreign imposition of the democratic form on Germany by the Allied powers in the aftermath of World War I.\textsuperscript{165}

\textsuperscript{160} Britain had been one of the countries opposed to the introduction of a specific clause prohibiting indoctrination in the 1929 negotiations. The Soviet Union had never signed the Convention.

\textsuperscript{161} NARA: RG 389, Vol. 459A / 1603, Indoctrination of German Prisoners of war, 2-Mar-44.


\textsuperscript{163} See NARA: RG 218, Vol. / 6, Guide for political interrogation of POWs, 29-May-42., NARA: RG 389, Vol. 459A / 1638, 383.6 Screening and Segregation...Key to the evaluation of Questionnaires, among many others.

\textsuperscript{164} See PRO: RG FO1049, Foreign Office - Control Commission in Germany, Vol. 74 / Prisoners of war - screening and re-education, 1945. among others.

\textsuperscript{165} NARA: RG 218, Vol. / 6, Guide for political interrogation of POWs, 29-May-42., NARA: RG 389, Vol. 459A / 1160, 040 Dept. of State General...Indoctrination of German Prisoners of War, 2-Mar-44.
Source of Prisoners of War: Brief Relevant Military History of WWII

All enemy personnel captured in battle became prisoners of war. The vast majority resulted from land campaigns by ground army forces. The history of the re-education of German prisoners of war only began when the Allied forces began winning land battles against the Axis forces, thus capturing significant numbers of prisoners of war. Since the front line changed daily, prisoners of war were generally removed as far as possible behind the lines in order to prevent escape and possible return to combatant status. Prisoner of war camps were generally within the borders of the holding authority.

From the beginning of 1939, British prisoner of war camps were established in Britain or elsewhere and operated for eighteen months before the decision was made to ship most prisoners of war to Canada or the US and thus camps in Britain were reduced basically to transit camps. From 1940 on, Britain was being bombed. As an island nation, all imported supplies were subject to attack by submarines, etc. making supplying the civilian population plus Allied military personnel difficult enough. Until late 1944, prisoners of war captured by the British, and later joint British and U.S., forces were shipped to camps in Canada and the U.S. In 1940-41, Britain had waged a campaign against the Italians in North Africa, generating some Italian prisoners of war, generally sent to camps in India. By the end 1941, the whole of continental Europe was either under Nazi control, neutral or part of the Axis forces.

The first significant number of German prisoners of war was the result of the Soviet Union resistance to the Wehrmacht’s Operation Barbarossa, which began on 22 May 1941. Originally resulting in massive number of Russian prisoners of war in German hands, by the end of 1942 and the Battle of Stalingrad, large numbers of German prisoners of war were in
Russian hands. Thus the Soviet Union was the first Allied country to conduct a re-education project, originally focused mainly on weakening the attacking Wehrmacht. The Battle of Stalingrad ended with a victory by the Soviet Union in the summer of 1943 after a massive loss of life and destruction of property. The Red Army began to drive the retreating Wehrmacht westward.167 During the whole of the war, 60% of all German soldiers fought on this eastern front, rather than the later western front.168 The Soviet Union began capturing German soldiers by the end of 1941. Thereafter, increasing number of German prisoners of war were held in camps both near the front and further removed into the Russian interior. Thus the Soviet Union held large numbers of German prisoners of war from 1943 onwards.

From 1939 till late 1942 there were no German prisoners of war in the United States. After the U.S. joined the war at the end of 1941, the first western Allied land campaign was in North Africa against the Germans from 8 November 1942 to 13 June 1943. This led to an increase in German prisoners of war in U.S. from 2,146 (30 April 1943) to 22,110 (31 May 1943). This was followed by the invasion of mainland Italy through Sicily beginning in July 1943, creating numerous Italian prisoners of war but few Germans. After the surrender of the Italian Fascist army in 1943, German troops occupied much of northern Italy and military engagements continued for the next two years as a minor front. Thus by the end of 1943 with the Russian victory and the surrender of the Italians, an Allied military victory in Europe was more or less assured. A British document dated 21 June 1944 states that “at the beginning of

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167 The history of WWII from 1939 to 1942 was one of the Wehrmacht being successful in its land battles. The timetable of when each Allied country held significant number of prisoners of war reflected the change in fortunes of the Wehrmacht. In 1940-1941, there was a successful British campaign in North Africa against Italian troops resulting in prisoners of war who were sent to prisoner of war camps in India, Canada and the U.S.

168 Bartov, Omer. Hitler’s Army. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. Bartov makes a convincing argument for the banalisation of the Wehrmacht soldier on the Eastern Front due to both the ‘Commissar Order’ that demanded the killing of captured Russian soldiers who were communists and their involvement with the wholesale massacre of local Jewry and partisan sympathizers. Given the nature of that battle, few of those Wehrmacht troops would have been shifted to the Western fronts and thus subsequently, as prisoners of war, become part of the Wilton Park or Fort Eustis re-education projects.
June, there were approximately 2,000 German prisoners of war in the United Kingdom, 10,000 in the Middle East, 1,500 in Australia, 20,000 in Canada and 133,000 in the United States. The main influx of German prisoners of war for the western Allies follows the D-Day invasion of Normandy beginning 6 June 1944. Thus 60,000 German soldiers trapped in Argentan-Falaise pocket on 21 August 1944 became prisoners of war. This is followed by the Battle of the Bulge beginning 16 January 1945, followed by the offensive to reach the Rhine beginning 8 February 1945. Given the destruction that Britain had suffered from German bombing and thus the limited agricultural resources for feeding prisoners of war, most prisoners of war captured on the western front continued to be shipped to the U.S. or Canada. This also put maximum distance between them and ongoing fighting. By February 1945 there were over 300,000 German prisoners of war in the U.S. U.S. troops entered Dachau concentration camp, liberating more than 32,000 prisoners on 29 April 1945. This was a critical event as the newsreels of the concentration camps were the most powerful piece of propaganda that the Allies had with respect to the German prisoners of war. With the surrender of the German Wehrmacht and VE Day on 8 May 1945, prisoner of war camps were established in France and reopened in Britain drastically reducing the necessity for their trans-shipment to the U.S. and Canada.

The U.S. made the decision to divest itself of the German prisoners of war soon after the end of the war, as the partial demobilisation of its European army resulted in returning soldiers available for the work that had been done by the prisoners of war. The Soviet Union, Britain and France retained German prisoners of war until 1948-49, relying on their labour power to supplement that available from their own populations. Thus most of the German prisoners of war shipped from the U.S. prisoner of war camps were not immediately

169 PRO: RG FO939, Foreign Office - German Section, Vol. 445 / German PWs re-education, 1944.
repatriated to Germany but rather transferred to camps in Britain and France. As an armistice but no peace treaty was signed with Germany, this was actually legal. The Nuremberg Trials, taking place from 20 November 1945 to 1 October 1946, occur while many German men were in Allied prisoner of war camps.

With the Allied demand for unconditional surrender, Hitler's suicide and the subsequent collapse of the Nazi regime, a cease-fire was signed but no peace treaty was drawn up. This meant that there was no absolute requirement for the imminent repatriation of German prisoners of war. An agreement in 1945 at the Yalta Summit among the Allied victors led to the decision that reparations by Germany would include the labour of German prisoners of war currently being held by the Allies. A legal basis for this was in the new diplomatic concept of 'collective guilt' ascribed to Germany through the Stuttgart Declaration of 1945.170

Thus, while the U.S. divested itself of all German prisoners of war by April 1946, the Soviet Union, Britain and France171 retained German soldiers working from prisoner of war camps till 1948-9. The re-education projects of the U.S. and Britain were primarily post-war events,172 unlike those of the Soviet Union which began in 1942.

171 While French forces captured relatively few German prisoners of war, an inter-Allied agreement allowed the transfer of German prisoners of war from the US to France, as well as to Britain. Similarly, the French Occupation Zone in Germany was a gift from the British and U.S. holdings. For French attitudes toward German prisoners of war, see France, D'affaires étrangère: RG EU4460, Europe 1944-1960, Vol. 22 / [allemande] Prisonniers de guerre, avant 1944 -1946., France, D'affaires étrangère: RG EU4460, Europe 1944-1960, Vol. 7 / Mentalité d'Allemagne, Oct.44 - oct 47., among others. For the French generally negative attitude towards the British re-education projects, see France, D'affaires étrangère: RG EU4460, Europe 1944-1960, Vol. 80 / [allemande] Politique Britannique Mai en Allemagne, 1945 - oct 47 and France, D'affaires étrangère: RG EU4460, Europe 1944-1960, Vol. 81 / [allemande] Politique britannique, nov 47 - mai 49.
Soviet Union Re-education Projects

The re-education programme of the Soviet Union was the first re-education programme conducted by an Allied country – with the full awareness of the others. It provides a useful comparison with the U.S. and British projects.

Background for the Soviet re-education projects includes the betrayal by the Germans of the Soviet non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany and the viciousness with which the Wehrmacht dealt with Russian prisoners of war. This was expressed by two notorious Wehrmacht directives – the Barbarossa Directive of 13 May 1941, which allowed the shooting of civilians engaged in any ‘criminal activity’ without serious restriction or questioning and the Commissar Order of 6 June 1941, which instructed the soldiers to shoot all political commissars of the Red Army upon capture. The anti-Slav racial policy of the Nazis also contributed to the high death rate among Russian prisoners of war.

The Soviet re-education project had one major difference from the subsequent Allied projects – the central responsibility of German émigrés. The re-education projects were conducted for the most part in German rather than in the language of the holding authority.

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175 By contrast, see Streit for the Wehrmacht's treatment of U.S. and British prisoners of war. Streit.

The responsible émigrés were members of the German Communist Party (KPD) in exile who had fled Germany in the face of sure death at the hands of the Nazis. Their goal was to return to Germany and continue with their project of creating a communist government—a project supported by the Soviet Union. Led by Walter Ulbricht and Wilhelm Pieck, their task was always twofold: propaganda against the Wehrmacht and Germany calling for the overthrow of the Nazi Regime, and the creation of cadres for the post-war reconstruction of Germany. These German émigrés began their work with the German prisoners of war in October 1941.

The Soviet Union’s approach to German prisoners of war was also twofold—for immediate propaganda purposes and for longer range post-war reconstruction of Germany. The first political task was to convince the soldiers that Hitler and the Nazi regime were going to destroy Germany and to call upon their nationalist sentiments to act against the regime. This led to the creation of a prisoner of war Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland (NKFD) on 12-13 July 1943. The NKFD was made up of soldiers calling for a Free Germany. They engaged in front-line propaganda against the Wehrmacht and recruited other prisoners of war in the camps. The NKFD activity was reinforced by the creation of antifascist schools, known as

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177 Both leading members of the KPD in Germany before its banning, Pieck had been a member since 1918, a friend and colleague of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht and a Reichstag deputy. Smith Jr., Arthur Lee. The war for the German mind: Re-educating Hitler’s soldiers. Providence: Berghahn Books, 1996.
178 The British were aware of this development in 1941. See PRO: RG FO371, Foreign Office - Political, Vol. 26559 / Formation of a Free German Movement, 1941. and PRO: RG FO371, Foreign Office - Political, Vol. 26597 / German Anti-Nazi movements, 1941.
179 A 1943 article in the U.S. Time magazine pointed out the ‘German face’ to the whole project with slogans in German, appeals made by Germans to Germans, and the call not being for support for the Allied side but rather to ‘save’ Germany from the Nazis. The idea of the Nationalkomitee "Freies Deutschland" originated with Paul Merker in Mexico with the attempt to create such committees in German émigré communities there and, by extension, around the globe. See Smith Jr., Arthur Lee. The war for the German mind: Re-educating Hitler’s soldiers. Providence: Berghahn Books, 1996. That was why the NKFD prisoner of war committee in Russia could claim links to other committees in New York, London, etc., which in turn sought to publicize the activity of the Russian committee. While the Soviet Union did not control these other committees, the international linkage served well the propaganda project of the Soviet Union.
Antifa schools, in May 1942, under the direction of a Russian Philosophy professor named Nikolai Janzen, who had three German officers on his staff.\textsuperscript{180}

While the NKFD was open to all German prisoners of war, on the nationalist basis of serving Germany by fighting against the Nazi regime, the Antifa schools taught the principles of Marxist-Leninist analysis, presumably for the creation of cooperative personnel for the reconstruction of Germany after the war. Still, one did not have to become a communist to attend the schools. Records showed a ratio of 25% Communist, 25% Social Democrat, 10% Catholic, 10% Liberal and 30% mixed Conservatives in attendance\textsuperscript{181}. The Antifa schools also served to train the NKFD prisoners of war for their work in the propaganda within the camps and with the radio programming and NKFD newspaper (Freies Deutschland) directed towards Germany. The courses were generally four to six months long, although shorter workshops also occurred for specific projects. The prisoner of war re-education projects in the Soviet Union were always overt, not covert, in their political intentions.\textsuperscript{182}

\textit{General Re-education Project – NKFD and the Bund Deutscher Offiziere}

In October 1942, a year after Ulbricht and Pieck began, 158 mainly rank and file prisoners of war attended the ‘First Conference of German Prisoners of War in the Soviet Union’. This conference laid the basis for the establishment of the NKFD a year later. Arguing the need to save Germany from the Nazis, the German émigrés were able to convince leading German officers – General Walter von Seydlitz-Kurzbach, Field Marshall Paulus,


\textsuperscript{181} Smith Jr., Arthur Lee. \textit{The war for the German mind: Re-educating Hitler's soldiers}. Providence: Berghahn Books, 1996. It is interesting to note that the Russians seemed to have accepted the self-definition of the soldier in term of political commitment to recognised German parties. Both the U.S. and Britain devised their own definition of political attitude, related to the prisoners of war commitment to Nazi beliefs. The Russians did use a screening questionnaire before admission to the Antifa school but the questionnaire seemed to be focused on assessing the sincerity of the applicant.
Colonel Luitpold Steidle, among others – to form the Bund Deutscher Offiziere on 11-12 September 1943. The two committees, the NKFD and the Bund Deutscher Offiziere, effectively merged giving much greater credibility to the work of the NKFD. For propaganda and re-education purposes, the use of the German soldier’s respect for rank was unique to the Soviet Union prisoner of war projects. Timing helped. In 1943, German high-ranking officers could believe that they might be included in a post-war government. The U.S. and British projects, on the other hand, occurred after the unconditional surrender of the Wehrmacht and the decision for the Allied occupation of Germany. In addition, the U.S. was committed to a ‘democratic’ army with no special privileges for high rank.\(^\text{183}\)

\textit{Antifa Schools}

While both the NKFD and the Bund Deutscher Offiziere\(^\text{184}\) ceased existence within several months after VE day, 8 March 1945, the Antifa schools continued to operate through 1949. The central school was at Kranogorsk, although there were up to 50 regional schools at other sites, including prisoner of war camp-based schools offering month long courses. The standard course at the central and regional Antifa schools was four months long, or "96 academic days, six hours of work a day with teachers and four hours a day independent work, for a total of 10 academic hours per day."\(^\text{185}\) While there were periodic exams, the course ended with a final week devoted to written and oral exams. The core focus was on Marxism-Leninism and USSR history with a wide range of other issues, including philosophy and

\(^{183}\) In November 1946, the British had a report on the Anti-Fascist Training course from a prisoner. He had attended the 3-week, 25 person course, beginning on 15 June 1946 in a former Schloss in Bergen as a pre-requisite for being considered for a scholarship to enable him to study law at a University. He said that while it presented communist, socialist and liberal political points of view, criticizing the latter, there was no direct anti-Anglo or anti-American material. PRO: RG FO1049, Foreign Office - Control Commission in Germany, Vol. 533 / 1946.


\(^{185}\) Smith Jr., Arthur Lee. \textit{The war for the German mind: Re-educating Hitler's soldiers}. Providence: Berghahn Books, 1996. In early 1945 at least 50% of all captive officers belonged to the Bund Deutscher Offiziere and supported the NKFD.

literature. A third of the curriculum was devoted to basic dialectical and historical materialism, with the rest concentrated on political economy, German history, Soviet history, political relations between nations and current events. While the Nazi racial theory was examined and criticized in detail, fascism (and thus Nazism) was explained as the logical outcome of capitalism and imperialism. Thus, these de-nazification courses had an anti-capitalist framework. The post-war curriculum maintained the Marxist-Leninist core but shifted from an emphasis against Hitler to a heightened critique of Western imperialism, with discussion of the Marshall Plan, the removal of zonal barriers in Germany, and Soviet foreign policy.

Repatriation

These courses were meant to create the cadres who would return to Germany, support the KPD, and provide the nucleus for the administration of the Russian controlled sector of occupied Germany. Estimates vary, but counting only the post-war years when better records were kept, over 85,000 German prisoners of war attended one or another Antifa school. Through selection of their best graduates and the creation of ‘old Antifa school’ networks under the NKFD label, the German émigrés were able to quickly establish their presence in Germany. Thus even before the war’s end, when the U.S. soldiers entered Leipzig on 19 April 1945, they found that there were already 38 local NKFD committees operating with 4,500 members, including Social Democrats and other political groups. The U.S. immediately labelled such activity a violation of its policy and banned further efforts by the NKFD. Perhaps most astonishing was the outcome in terms of the German émigrés’ involvement with the

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reconstruction of Germany, or specifically the construction of the Deutshe Demokratische Republik (DDR; English GDR – German Democratic Republic or East Germany). As Smith (1996) notes:

A survey by the SED in 1951 found that 7,500 men living in the GDR identified themselves as [Antifa] central school graduates, 5,776 of whom were employed in relatively important jobs throughout the government and public institutions.188

The Soviet Union re-education projects were characterized, therefore, by the central role of German émigrés, who would be returning to post-war Germany and sharing the fate of their charges. Thus the instructors in the re-education projects appeared as ‘insiders’, rather than ‘outside reformers who knew little of German reality’. The projects were openly political with two distinct goals: winning the war through propaganda aimed at breaking the German people from the Nazi regime and creating the conditions for a functioning organization (the KPD – Kommunist Partei Deutschland) in post-war Germany. The former led to a distinction between the German people and the Nazi Party and regime, something that would not be as apparent among the Western Allies who equated Germans with the Nazis. The vast majority of the re-education courses were conducted in German, with relatively little emphasis placed on learning Russian, although there were Russian language courses. Overt rather than covert in political intentions, the Soviet re-education projects made no distinction between propaganda and education since Germans were talking to Germans, rather than the holding authority talking to prisoners of war. This did not mean that there was no recognition of the ‘benefit to the Soviet Union’ of either the propaganda or re-education campaigns. But the appeal to and responsibility given the German prisoners of war for the reconstruction of their own country (within the real limits set by the occupying Red Army) operated against accusations of covert propaganda intentions. What was clear was that the KPD, the most direct organizational
outcome of the Antifa schools, would remain a member of a Communist International organization, with direct loyalty to and obvious control by the Soviet Union. This was not seen as a secret since the logic of the communist movement internationally was not only the creation of new communist governments but also the absolute defence of the Soviet Union as the only ‘really existing workers state’.

**U.S. Re-education Projects**

Re-education programmes in the U.S. began in 1944\(^{189}\) the last year of the war, when victory over the Axis forces was probable. There were two related plans. The first was a broad Intellectual Diversion program aimed at breaking the Nazi ideological control of the German prisoners of war. The second plan sought to produce ‘cooperative personnel’ for the U.S. occupation forces after victory over Germany. The motivation for the two projects had very different sources. While the creation of cooperative personnel in an occupation situation was obvious to the military authorities, the Intellectual Diversion project was created as a response to public pressure, resulting from newspaper articles in 1943-44\(^{190}\) about the Nazi control of the prisoner of war camps.

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\(^{189}\) Popular interest in the topic of German prisoners of war in the U.S. remains. A 1995 article in *Smithsonian* included pictures of the re-education classes. See Fincher, Jack. "By Convention, the enemy within never did without." *Smithsonian*, June 1995, 126-143.

During the November 1942 to June 1943 Allied invasion of North Africa, the U.S. took large numbers of German prisoners of war. The total rose from 2,146 on 30 April 1943 to 22,110 a month later. By the end of the war, over 200 prisoner of war camps had been established in the U.S. to house close to 200,000 prisoners. Prisoner of war camps in the U.S. were run by the Provost Marshal General Office as an extension of their role as the military police. The right of the Wehrmacht to run the internal functioning of the camps was respected by the Camp Commanders. Only when reports of politically motivated murders of individual German prisoners of war by other German prisoners appeared in newspapers was there any questioning of this system. In all cases, the murdered prisoner of war was tried in a kangaroo court for being a traitor to Nazism, often simply by having been a member of a left wing party in Germany.\textsuperscript{191} Given the enemy status of all prisoners, one group killing another did not necessarily evoke moral outrage in either the Army or the public. Military control of the camps and working efficiency was what counted. This increase in the number of prisoners of war led to the first consideration of the potential for re-education projects. As early as March 1943, Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy and Brig. Gen. F. H. Osborn, Director Special Services, Army Service Forces, discussed the idea of a re-education project for German prisoners of war and asked the Army’s Judge Advocate General for an opinion on its legality. The Judge Advocate stated that with respect to the 1929 Geneva Convention, there was no legal problem as long as prisoner participation was strictly voluntary. A proposal was presented in mid-April 1943 to Gen. Allen W. Guillian, chief of the Provost Marshal General Office (PMGO).\textsuperscript{192} In June 1943, Gen. Guillian rejected the proposed program for eight reasons,

\textsuperscript{191} See previous footnote.  
\textsuperscript{192} McCloy had contacted Lt. Gen. Brehon Somervell, Commanding General Army Service Forces about the plan who authorized Gen. Osborn to draw up a proposal for a re-education project directed at German prisoners of war. Gen. Osborn assigned Lt. Col. S. L. A. Marshall, Officer in Charge of the Orientation and Publication Section of the Special Services Division to draw up the plan. The Special Services Division was vested with the development of democratic indoctrination of soldiers within the U.S. Army. The relations of one bureaucracy to another were maintained.
including the fear that this would lead the Nazi's to increase their indoctrination of Allied prisoners of war. Also, the Nazis might accuse the U.S. of violating the 1929 Geneva Convention.\textsuperscript{193} The plan was shelved but some of the people involved, such as Dr. Edward Davison\textsuperscript{194}, would be involved in the subsequent re-education projects.\textsuperscript{195}

The U.S. view of Germany had several components. Editorial cartoons often called for the mutual destruction of the Nazis and the Communists on the Eastern front of the European Theatre. Secretary of Treasury Henry Morgenthau believed in the militarist nature of Germans when they had an industrial base and thus proposed a post-war plan that essentially made Germany an agrarian economy. What underlay most of these views was the belief, from WWI of an “old Europe, set in her petty ways” that held little interest for the U.S. other than as a market. This isolationist view gave little support to understanding German history but rather suggested that the U.S. had the solution to “old Europe’s” problems with the creation of its tripartite form of representative democracy. Some, such as Franz Neumann\textsuperscript{196}, whose book Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism was published in 1944, offered a more complex view, analysing the causes of the rise of Nazi regime in the social and economic aftermath of World War I. Neumann stressed the social and political role of the Junkers and the Prussian militarist elite.

Knowledge of the re-education projects being carried out in the Soviet Union and the creation of the Nationalkomitee "Freies Deutschland" led to a number of articles in 1943-44 published in both national and local U.S. newspapers calling for the authorities to conduct a

\textsuperscript{193} This rationale was the basis, in 1944 and 1943, for the 'Secret' classification of the re-education programs.
\textsuperscript{194} Edward Davison was Professor of English at the University of Colorado and had been responsible for the curriculum aspect of the proposal.
\textsuperscript{195} This pattern of rejection of a plan at the point in the war when victory was uncertain and subsequent adoption involving some of the same personnel later when victory was more likely was repeated by the British with Dr. Heinz Koepppler in the same situation as Dr. Davison.
similar project for teaching democracy to the German prisoners of war. Meanwhile, by May 1943, in the prisoner of war camps, the German prisoners of war had organized their own educational programmes with textbooks either provided by the Reich Ministry of Education, by the International Red Cross, or by other agencies involved with aid to German prisoners of war. Depending on the local Camp Commander, the educational programmes included courses offered by local educational institutions, the most frequent being English language courses.

In March 1944, Secretary of State Cordell Hull wrote to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson recommending a reorientation program for German prisoners of war. At that point there were over 133,000 German prisoners of war on U.S. soil. By this time in the war, the Soviet Red Army was driving the Wehrmacht westward and final plans were in place for the June D-Day invasion of Normandy.

U.S. Propaganda Institutions Linked to Re-education Projects

In the United States prisoners of war were under the authority of the Provost Marshal General Office (PMGO) commanded by Maj. Gen. Archer L. Lerch, who was in charge of all military police functions. The re-education program, when it was finally established in September 1944, was run by the Special Projects Division (SPD) of Provost Marshal General Office, which coordinated with the Office of War Information (OWI) for materials. A re-education project had been rejected by the previous Provost Marshal General Allen Gullion in 1943 as cumbersome, unfeasible, illegal and likely to interfere with the work demands on the

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197 On 17 April 1943, for example, The New York Times published a letter from H. Landsberg of Chicago with the title "Education against Fascism" – the first article in the press on the concept of re-educating German prisoners of war.


prisoners of war. U.S. governmental records show that the idea for the new project resulted from a discussion between Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Secretary of State Cordell Hull in March 1944. There was no direct link to the State Department after its establishment.

Roosevelt established a number of intelligence and propaganda organizations for the U.S.'s entry into WWII. Beginning in 1939 with the Office of Emergency Management (OEM), an umbrella organization for war-related executive agencies, to the 1940 establishment of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA) for propaganda to Latin America. Domestically, in May 1941, the Office of Civilian Defense (OCD) for morale, public opinion and civil defence was established; in July the Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI) was established with Colonel William Donovan as a foreign intelligence agency that would become the Office of Special Services (OSS) spy agency and in the post-war period the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In August 1941 the Foreign Information Service (FIS) was established, originally as a branch of the COI, to provide propaganda to foreign countries as well as to collect information abroad. In October the Office of Facts and Figures (OFF) was created to evaluate public opinion and serve as the propaganda arm of the federal government. In June 1942, the Office of War Information (OWI) was established to coordinate the full range of domestic and foreign propaganda services, including films, the press, and radio – all mass media was to be directed towards the war effort. The OWI was responsible for Voice of America, the main radio tool for propaganda to foreign countries. The U.S. re-education

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200 Prior to the WWII, the U.S. had no permanent military authority responsible for prisoners of war. When established in July 1941, President Roosevelt appointed the judge advocate general, Major General Allen Gullion as provost marshal general.


projects coordinated with the OWI for films and information. At the same time the COI was transformed into the OSS with various operational branches including Research and Analysis (R&A), Secret Intelligence (SI) and Morale Operations (MO) – all involved with intelligence gathering and interpretation, spying and subversive activities. While all these agencies recruited their personnel from academic institutions, the German section of the Research and Analysis Branch was renowned for having the use of the elite from the Frankfurt School\textsuperscript{203} – a left wing socialist institution. Colonel Donovan, as head of the OSS, was unique among the agencies in his ability to use and defend the use of left-wing personnel within the highest levels of government. While there was no direct connection with the German prisoners of war working at the Idea Factory, all information from interviews with German prisoners of war and the work of the Idea Factory was evaluated by the Research and Analysis Branch. In addition, each branch of the military had its own propaganda agency with two tasks: propaganda towards the enemy at the front and propaganda towards the domestic audience. This latter task was achieved by censoring news from reporters, within the service, and by providing their own versions of the events. The U.S. re-education projects, although a part of the Army, did not coordinate their activities though the Army’s own intelligence service (the Office of Psychological Warfare for instance) but rather with the OWI in both its domestic and foreign components.

\textit{Intellectual Diversion Program}  

On 23 August 1944, the Intellectual Diversion program\textsuperscript{204} was proposed, under the control of the Army’s Provost Marshal General.\textsuperscript{205} The stated aim was to “create and foster

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\textsuperscript{204} This name came from the language of Article 17 of the Geneva Convention, which stated that "So far as possible, belligerents shall encourage intellectual diversions and sports organized by prisoners of war". It was this last part, "organized by prisoners of war" that clearly was not the case here but the legality of the program was argued on its voluntary nature.
any spontaneous reaction on the part of German prisoners of war which would encourage a favorable respect on their part for American institutions”. The project was to be kept strictly secret. This resulted in the creation of the Prisoner of War Division Special Projects Branch under the PMGO in September 1944. Major Edward Davison, who had worked on the previous plan, was placed in charge. Davison was an academic, with no previous administrative experience, nor any direct involvement with prisoners of war. A former professor of English, he had little knowledge of Germany or the German language — in stark contrast to those in charge of the Soviet and British programmes. Seven officers were originally assigned to the Branch whose headquarters was established at 50 Broadway in New York City in order to have immediate access to the Office of War Information (OWI) there, movie distributors, and other related media sources.

The Intellectual Diversion program was a fairly ambitious propaganda project. It focused on both providing appropriate information in the German prisoner of war camps and on controlling the media input. This was to be achieved through the recruitment and assigning of ‘company grade officers’

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205 On 22 July 1943, Maj. Gen. Archer L. Lerch replaced Gen. Guillon as the Provost Marshal General. The shift in personnel was important as Gen. Lerch was more amenable to the re-education project. On 4 April 1944, Secretary of War Stimson established an Inter-Departmental Board on Prisoners of War that included the Assistant Chief of Staff G-1 (Intelligence), the Departments of State, Justice, Navy and War and the Provost Marshal General Archer L. Lerch.
206 Later this became the Special Projects Division and thus carried the acronym of SPD.
208 The Office of War Information (OWI) was established as one of the central propaganda agencies by the government in WWII. Not directly linked to a specific branch of the military, it was in charge of foreign language broadcasts. An interesting view of the functioning and contradictions of the OWI is presented by Holly Shulman (Shulman, Holly C. The Voice of America: Propaganda and Democracy 1941 - 1945. Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin, 1990.) whose father worked in the French section.
209 The Army job description was for officers who spoke “German fluently, have a college education, preferably in liberal arts, and should possess imagination and good judgement.” NARA
210 In the U.S. Army and Air Corps ‘company grade’ meant the rank of Captain, the third lowest rank of commissioned officers. Given the fact that all prisoner of war camp commanders had higher rank, this presented a problem when there was a conflict. In addition to the need to run an efficient camp, many camp commanders suspected the AEOs of being sent to report on the functioning of the camps to the Army.
encourage appreciation and respect for American ways. While the requirements for becoming an AEO included speaking German, this requirement was relaxed, as there were too few military personnel fluent in German who were not already assigned to other tasks. Consequently the vast majority of the re-education projects in the U.S. were conducted in English. There was no consideration of using German émigrés for this purpose, in part because the projects were secret.

By the end of October 1944, a camp for specially selected prisoners of war was established at Fort Van Etten, near Elmira, New York, as a direct link to the NYC headquarters of the Special Projects Branch. Generally known as the Idea Factory, it was the central source of materials for the Intellectual Diversion program, including its screening of all materials to be used in the program, translation of materials, screening of camp newspapers, production of the national prisoner of war paper *Der Raj,* and liaison with the OWI.

The Intellectual Diversion program planned to use films, radio and chaplains to reinforce the ideas of ‘democracy and the American way of life’ in the minds of the German prisoners of war. After a brief period of training in New York, an AEO was to be sent to each camp. The AEO was charged with both carrying out the Intellectual Diversion program and keeping it secret. He was to work with the Morale Officer of the prisoner of war camp to begin to break the hold of the Nazis. Each AEO attempted to set up an area of camp for the distribution of pro-democracy material and to distribute the national prisoner of war newspaper, *Der Raj,* when it began to appear in March 1945. He was to control what movies were shown and to institute, if they did not already exist, 4 to 6 week English language classes with material provided by the Idea Factory.

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211 One of the first acts was to restrict the showing of the popular gangster films as these did not portray the best aspects of the U.S.
AEOs were to promote non-Nazi control of the camp. This led, however, to direct conflict with the Camp Commander when the AEO would request the transfer of a Nazi NCO who politically dominated a camp. Nazi NCOs were the same men who were responsible for the smooth functioning of the prisoner of war camp and of the work teams contracted out to the private sector, mainly in agriculture and forestry. The working efficiency of the prisoners of war was of primary interest to the Camp Commander and the Nazi NCOs were the best work team managers. As the Camp Commander outranked the AEO, his decision prevailed. Thus non-cooperation, if not active opposition, was the frequent state of affairs between the AEO and the Camp Commander. \(^{213}\)

For the period in which the Intellectual Diversion program functioned – from September 1944 till April 1946 – success was dependent on both the capacity of the AEO and the cooperation of the Camp Commander. The results were measured through the ‘pro-democracy’ political content of the local camp newspapers. The main result was that no significant change was noted in the camp papers until after the defeat of the Wehrmacht, with the clear collapse of the Nazi regime but not necessarily of the Nazi ideology.

**Special Schools**

By February 1945, the Army recognised that there would be a need for German personnel to aid the U.S. military in the post-war occupation of Germany. Therefore in a meeting at the Idea Factory (Camp Van Etten) between the Special Projects Division of the PMGO, the Civil Affairs Division, Army Service Forces, and 12 prisoners from the Idea

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\(^{212}\) Only 26 issues of *Der Ruf* were produced. They are available in NARA. They have also produced on Master Thesis: McFadden, Robert E. "Der Ruf: your future is in your hands: the role of German POWs in reeducation." MA, Miami University, 1997.

\(^{213}\) The same was true in Britain. Air Commander Groves in 1944 reported "Furthermore, since they (the Camp Commandants) were primarily concerned in maintaining good order and discipline in prisoner of war camps, they naturally saw no objection to the employment of the more extreme Nazis as camp leaders, particularly as these men were usually senior N.C.Os. and good disciplinarians". PRO: RG FO939, Foreign Office - German Section, Vol. 390 / F. C. Hitch - Correspondence, 1943-45.
Factory, a special project was developed to train administrative and technical personnel to work with the future Military Government and in the German civil administration. This created an Administrative School (known as Project II) at Fort Kearney, Rhode Island, and a Police School (known as Project III) at Fort Wetherill, Rhode Island. Both were planned to host two month long sessions. Dr. Davison added a few German-speaking civilian educators to his staff\textsuperscript{214}, over the objections of the War Department due to the secret nature of the project. The two key additions were Dr. William Moulton, a linguist who already worked in military training courses and taught German at Yale University\textsuperscript{215} and Dr. Henry W. Ehrmann\textsuperscript{216}, a native-born German and recent arrival in the U.S. To make best use of all their personnel, the Idea Factory had been moved to Fort Kearney so that installations were now in walking distance of each other.

Approval of these plans came in March 1945. The first experimental Administration School occurred from 7 May - 7 July 1945 at Fort Kearney, Rhode Island. It included 101 prisoners in two sections. Selection for the school was based on recommendation from the AEOs and the Camp Commanders of the various prisoner of war camps, after a classification screening for Nazi sympathies resulting in a ‘black’, ‘gray’ or ‘white’ designation denoting decreasing pro-Nazi links. On 6 July 1945, 73 of the original 101 prisoners of war received certificates, the remaining having withdrawn or transferred for a variety of reasons.

President Franklin Roosevelt died on 12 April 1945, and Vice President Harry S. Truman became President. On 23 April, the Soviet Red Army began the assault on Berlin with the U.S. and Soviet troops meeting two days later at the Elbe River. By 29 April, German

\textsuperscript{214} Dr. Moulton was inducted into the Army with the rank of Captain. Dr. Ehrmann remained a civilian.


\textsuperscript{216} Dr. Henry W. Ehrmann's papers are now held by the Library at the State University of New York at Albany. He had written an article in 1943 about Germany future for \textit{The New Republic}, NARA: RG Vol. / Our Plan for Germany by H.W. Ehrmann in The New Republic, 3-May-43, and wrote about his experience again after the war. Ehrmann]
forces had surrendered in Italy and on 30 April, Adolph Hitler committed suicide. U.S. troops had entered Dachau concentration camp on 29 April, documenting the reality through film and pictures. The Wehrmacht in Berlin surrendered to the Soviet forces on 1 May and the final formal surrender was on 7 May, making 8 May 1945 Victory in Europe Day for the Allied forces. Given the personal loyalty oath to Hitler that every German soldier had made, the Provost Marshal General Office had worried about possible suicides at the news of Hitler’s death. This was unfounded, as were worries about the news of the surrender a week later.

As the Allied personnel previously held by the Germans were now in Allied hands, fear of reciprocity vis-à-vis the treatment of the German prisoners of war decreased. With the revelations of the concentration camps, there was a public outcry against the ‘coddling’ of German prisoners of war and for the first time, rations were deliberately decreased below the level established by the 1929 Geneva Convention as a form of punishment. This was viewed as unfair by the German prisoners of war who felt they had no individual responsibility for the concentration camps, having been simply soldiers doing their duty. While cooperation with the holding authority would still result in harassment from other prisoners, because the war was over, the German prisoner of war no longer faced the possibility of court-martial on his return to Germany.

From 19 July to 15 December, 816 German prisoners of war went through the Administrative School (now held at nearby Fort Getty\textsuperscript{217}) and 2895 went through the Police School (Fort Wetherill) in a series of six to eight week-long sessions. These sessions were conducted mostly in English by a staff of 58 officers, 115 enlisted men and 12 civilian employees regardless of the English language skills of their prisoner of war audience.

\textsuperscript{217} The Administrative School was shifted to Fort Getty from Fort Kearney to provide more space. This facility was still within walking distance of the others and the facilities were collectively called the Army Training Center.
Sometimes English-speaking German prisoners of war were used to aid in the discussions. But this lack of German-speaking staff resulted in complaints both by the staff of feeling like ‘it was a case of the near-blind leading the blind’ and on the part of the prisoners of war for not being treated properly. Classes in the English language played a large part in the curriculum due to this fact. Each two month session had a large part of its curriculum devoted to technical material on the regulations in use by the Military government as well as classes on U.S. history and institutions and Germany history. The German prisoners of war were from all ranks, both enlisted and officer, but the usual protocol of separation by rank was dispensed with as an example of “democratic” functioning. In the English language classes, enlisted men sometimes did better than their officer “superiors”, an experience designed to break the “militarism” and “respect for rank” of the “German mentality”. Even visiting U.S. officers were treated as equals by the personnel conducting the course, to the evident surprise of the German prisoners of war.

Meanwhile, the German prisoners of war working at the Idea Factory were responsible for the publication of the national prisoner of war newspaper Der Ruf. The first issue appeared on 6 March 1945, only two months before surrender. Published monthly, Der Ruf had fourteen issues before its cessation in April 1946. It was published in a run of 11,000 copies and sold for 5 cents a copy. The first several issues were frequently destroyed by the German prisoners of war before distribution in the camp, but after VE Day this no longer happened. The Idea Factory also produced a clipsheet of articles from the news services for use by the local camp newspapers. This was called Die Auslese, published in a run of 2000 copies, providing 10 copies for each camp.

The Intellectual Diversion program continued in all prisoner of war camps with the first overt lectures on democracy being held in the summer of 1945. Also by the end of the
summer, all Nazi textbooks and course materials had been purged from the courses offered by the prisoners of war themselves and movies were increasingly screened for appropriate content. By November, the film part of Intellectual Diversion program included 115 feature films, 115 shorts and 28 two-reelers. One compulsory viewing for all German prisoners of war was the film made of the concentration camps by the U.S. Army. The prisoner reaction was noted both by observation and by questionnaire. All prisoners of war were deeply shocked by the film and when questioned, less than 10%, the most fanatic Nazis, denied its validity.

Victory over Japan came on 14 August 1945, bringing the war to a close. While a peace treaty was signed with Japan, no peace treaty was signed with Germany. The Summit meeting between Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin in Teheran at the end of November and beginning of December 1943 laid out the temporary division of Germany into military occupied zones (after Germany's unconditional surrender). The Teheran Summit also established policies of demilitarization, denazification and reparation payments imposed on the German population. The Teheran Conference, and subsequent summit meetings, had agreed that part of the reparations from Germany could be from prisoners of war labour – after the end of the war.

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218 NARA: RG 389, Vol. 439A / 40, Movies Shown to German POWs.
219 This film was preceded by this statement (Translated into German)
   "You are about to see a documentary film compiled from actual Signal Corps footage, photographed on the spot in German concentration camps in which thousands of political and "racial" victims of Nazi terror were tortured, mutilated and murdered".

Many of you have seen parts of this film before. This documentary with German-language sound track, is shown you for the purpose of refreshing your minds about the Allies' case against the Nazi war criminals who are at this very moment on trial for their lives.

No doubt many of your are following in the newspapers the progress of this greatest of historical criminal cases against systematic brutality and the inhumanity of man against his fellow man. In this trial, for the first time since the establishment of international law, aggression is itself a crime against humanity; that no government which considers itself to be acceptable into the Commonwealth of Nations has the right to turn on a defenseless minority of its own citizens for the purpose of brutalization and annihilation.

The case of the Allies is the case of the conscience of mankind, against Nazi terror. This is the trial of mankind versus Fascism.

220 One claim was that the film really showed German prisoners of war in Russian camps.
But with U.S. soldiers returning from the European Theatre and more expected from the Pacific Theatre, the demand for prisoners of war labour was expected to decline. Therefore, the U.S. decided to turn over its prisoners of war held in Europe to French authorities and that all prisoners held in U.S. would be shipped out by 31 March 1946.

*Fort Eustis Project*

One last re-education project was developed, perhaps the most ambitious. On 9 November 1945, the proposal was made to establish a brief six-day pre-embarkation program at Fort Eustis for the most cooperative German prisoners of war to teach them the essentials of democracy before repatriation to Germany. Two weeks later the proposal was approved and screening began for the selection of 25,000 cooperative German prisoners of war to participate. Two thousand at a time came to Fort Eustis, near Hampton Roads, Virginia, chosen as being the nearest facility to their embarkation port. Twelve cycles of the six-day sessions ran for the weeks from 4 January through 5 April 1946. Even at this late date, this

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221 A Special School was established by (by now) Colonel Edward Davison and Captain Schoenstedt in an old chateau at Queneville, near Cherbourg, France to train German POWs in camps in Europe as administrative personnel. This school did not have much support from military personnel and with the transfer of prisoners of war to French authority lost further support. Smith Jr., Arthur Lee. *The war for the German mind: Re-educating Hitler's soldiers.* Providence: Bergahn Books, 1996. and NARA: RG 389, Vol. 439A / 41, Historical Monograph: Re-education of Enemy Prisoners of War, Eustis Project, 4-Apr-46.

222 Trade unions in the U.S. had originally opposed the use of prisoners of war, agreeing to their use only as a wartime necessity, and were thus expected to oppose the continued use in the post-war period.

223 While the French Free Forces under Charles de Gaulle were part of the Allied offensive after D-Day, they had captured relatively few prisoners of war. However during the war, the Nazi regime had demanded forced labour from French citizens, transporting them to work in Germany, and thus the French argued that it was only fair to claim reciprocity for building their economy from the German prisoners of war. Thus the U.S. agreed to transfer a number of German prisoners of war to their authority. See For French view on the German prisoners of war, see France, D'affaires etrangers: RG EU4460, Europe 1944-1960, Vol. 22 / [allemande] Prisoniers de guerre, aout 1944 -août 1946., France, D'affaires etrangeres: RG EU4460, Europe 1944-1960, Vol. 23 / Prisoniers de guerre, sept 46 - sept 47., France, D'affaires etrangeres: RG Y4449, Internationale, Vol. 46 / Prisoniers de guerre dec 43 - juin 45, 1944-49., and France, D'affaires etrangeres: RG Y4449, Internationale, Vol. 47 / Prisoniers de guerre juillet -45 - fevrier 1949, 1944-49.. See also NARA: RG 389, Vol. 459A / 1596, 000.7 General ...Effects of Press Reports of POW transfer to France on POW morale, 17-Sep-45. for the German prisoners of war reaction to being sent to France. William Shirer wrote on the change for the prisoners of war. See NARA: RG 389, Vol. 459A / 1596, William Shirer on American treatment of German POWs in France, 6-Feb-45.

224 Selection was made on the recommendation of the Camp Commanders based on the 'black', 'grey' and 'white' categories. Most of those chosen qualified as 'white' or close to it. There was some fear of a Nazi resistance to Allied occupation in Germany and thus the argument was for repatriating 'white' prisoners of war first. Robin
re-education project was originally secret, with the War Department only issuing a press release on the Fort Eustis Project on 25 February 1946, half-way through the project.

The staff included most of the faculty and selected prisoners from the two previous special projects (II and III), eleven veteran prisoners from the Idea Factory, and SPD personnel. Mr. Henry Ehrmann lectured on German history and Captain William G. Moulton taught U.S. civilisation courses, thus offering a component in German. The curriculum focused on three topics: democracy, a new history and future for Germany, and U.S. institutions. Beyond the lectures each morning and afternoon, films in the evening reinforced the key ideas. The aims were to present a positive portrayal of U.S. society as a political model and a new option for Germany's political future. As part of the democratic functioning, prisoners of war were required to remove all insignia of military rank and association. The core of U.S. democracy was presented as the acceptance of compromise between the naturally occurring multiple opinions of free people. The faculty had developed a new version of German history that attempted to emphasize the good aspects of a little known German past rather than direct confrontation with the Nazi regime's version. At the same time, Germany's failures were blamed upon a citizenry that placed a low priority on freedom and democracy. A positive future for Germany would result from her citizens valuing freedom and democracy within a global community committed to the idea of mutual compromise within liberal democracy.²²⁶

The opening lecture of the six-day session was "The Democratic Way of Life", followed by two more lectures on the U.S. Constitution and political party system. The emphasis was on the mechanism of compromise necessary for the functioning of the tri-partite

²²⁵ In the end, 23,142 prisoners of war attended Fort Eustis. Robin argues that the "negative associational ties" (not having been a member of a Nazi organization) led to the rejection of everyone except marginal men — those who were "either economically marginal, undereducated, or socially detached." Robin, Ron. *The Earled Wire College: Reeducating German POWs in the United States During World War II*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995.

system and in the development of two parties with no serious differences. The film *Abe Lincoln* (RKO, 1940) was used to show the strength of this democracy even in the face of a civil war. Two more lectures as examples of U.S. democratic institutions discussed public education and economic life. Here the movie *An American Romance* (MGM, 1943), a rags to riches story of an unskilled Czech immigrant becoming the head of a automobile company, emphasized the equal opportunity of all – plus labour and management both compromising in order to work together. Next came lectures on U.S. military government in Germany, followed by the section on Germany. Here the emphasis was on the unsung democratic traditions in Germany, the rise and fall of the Weimar Republic and the collective guilt of all Germans for failing to stand up to a totalitarian government. The movie version of the German novel by Anna Segger *The Seventh Cross* (MGM, 1943), whose central theme was the impact of an ordinary citizen in making the moral decision to help others escape from a concentration camp, was meant to drive home the lesson. The final lessons portrayed a positive future for a democratic Germany within the global community. From Wendell Willkie’s 1943 book, *One World*, the analogy was to the original thirteen states. Germany must make compromises with her neighbours just as these thirteen had compromised in order to create the U.S. federal government. A final commencement ceremony each week always included Steven Vincent Benét’s poem “A Prayer for United Nations”. 227 These selected prisoners of war were repatriated directly to Germany in the following days.

*Repatriation*

Each prisoner of war who completed the Administrative course at Fort Kearney, or the Police Course at Fort Wetherill, or the six-day course at Fort Eustis, was given a certificate certifying him as a graduate. The intent of the Special Projects Branch was to provide

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cooperative personnel to the U.S. occupying forces in Germany. For the prisoners of war themselves, the stigma of 'collaborating' with the former enemy would be compensated by being employed upon return, an important compensation in an economy that had been destroyed.

The reality turned out differently. With rare exceptions, the U.S. authorities in Germany never recognised the validity of the certificates. The re-education projects, having been secret, were poorly known even within the military. Also because of the haphazard communication and the inherent confusion of establishing new governing institutions, there was no way to verify the validity of the prisoners of war claims, and the possibility and frequency of counterfeited certificates were apparent.

More importantly, the Allied forces had agreed to the denazification of Germany as part of the occupation policy. The revelations of the concentration camps with the gas chambers and German policies leading to industrialized murder of close to twelve million civilians reinforced this intention. Bureaucratically interpreted, this meant that anyone who had been a member of a Nazi organization was not allowed to be part of the public service at any level, from teaching and health services to administrative services. Many of the prisoners of war who had been part of the re-education projects had formerly been members of one of the Nazi Party organizations. For the U.S. military authorities governing in Germany, this fact and not the prisoners of war subsequent involvement in a little known re-education project was what counted. Thus, while some individuals, especially those who had been part of the select group
of prisoners of war making up the Idea Factory, had played a significant role in the post-war
Bundesrepublik Deutschland (BRD, in English FRG Federal Republic of German – West
Germany), there was no direct link with the re-education project.

In June 1947, Dr. William G. Moulton reported on a follow-up study conducted on the
political attitudes and activities of former German prisoners of war who had been a part of any
of the U.S. re-education projects. Dr. Moulton had taught the English classes at Forts Kearney
and Getty. Using addresses provided by the Office of Military Government United States
(OMGUS) as well as ones he and colleagues had from maintaining correspondence with
former prisoners of war, he spent a month in Germany seeking out these individuals. His
report, putting the best face on a difficult situation, found that while many of the individuals
still had fond memories of their experience in the re-education projects in the U.S., their main
concern was finding a job and basic economic survival, not proselytizing for democracy.

British Re-education Projects

British Institutions Linked to Re-education Projects

For the British, authority for prisoners of war was held by the Prisoner of War Division
under the War Department. The propaganda efforts, however, were run by the Political
Intelligence Department (PID) of the Political Warfare Executive (PWE) within the Foreign

228 Walter Hallstein who was part of the Factory at Ft. Getty founded the American Institute as part of the university at
Frankfurt am Main and became President of the European Common Market. Hans Werner Richter, last editor of Der Ruf and
Alfred Andersch also from Ft. Getty formed the literary movement “Group 47” with Walter Kolbenhoff, Theodor Plievier,
Wolfgang Borchert and Heinrich Böll, “who would dominate German literature for the next two decades”. See NARA: RG
389, Vol. 441 / 695, Names of some former special prisoners of war with more important positions from Report on Special
Projects of the Office of the Theater Provost Marshal ETO - 30 Dec 45 - 1 July 46, , and Smith Jr., Arthur Lee. The war for the

229 NARA: RG 389, Vol. 459A / 40, PW Education Program ... Former Special Prisoners of War, 26-Jun-47. And NARA: RG
59, Vol. / 206, Prisoner of War Reorientation ... Report and Recommendations on Special Projects Program in the European
Theater, 10-May-46. See also NARA: RG 59, Vol. / 204, Report to the Dept of State of the USIE Survey Mission on the
OMGUS Reorientation Program in Germany, 21-Jul-49.
Office. Military authority rested with the respective branches of the services. The Wilton Park re-education programme was conducted in the British Army prisoner of war Camp 300, Wilton Park Training Centre, Beaconsfield, Buckinghamshire, southeast of London. The camp commander was Army Colonel Grondona while the civilian head of the re-education project was Dr. Heinz Koeppler. The central person responsible for the re-education project within the PWE was Wing Commander F. C. Hitch.

The British Political Re-education Projects

Although Britain had entered World War II in 1939 and had some Italian prisoners of war from the 1940-1941 North African campaigns, they maintained few permanent prisoner of war camps on British soil until the end of the war. Given the German bombing and the fact that Britain, as an island nation, had to import goods by vulnerable shipping, prisoners of war were transferred to Canada and the U.S. Therefore, prisoner of war camps on British soil were mainly temporary transit facilities.

There had been an “anti-fascist” re-education project begun with the Italian prisoners of war in India but this ended early. Only after the Normandy invasion were there significant numbers of German prisoners of war and hence a new discussion of re-education projects. By December 1945, almost 200,000 German prisoners of war were in Britain, representing slightly

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less than half of the total 400,000. The remainder were German prisoners of war held in Canada and the U.S. who were shipped to Britain in the first six months of 1946. 235

In September 1944, a re-education project initiated by the Political Intelligence Department (PID) of the Foreign Office (FO) was approved by the War Cabinet. For the British, this decision flowed from the 27 January 1944 inter-Allied decision on the necessity for the “re-education of Germany, including de-nazification”. Similar to the U.S. and Soviet Union initiatives, there was both a general re-education project directed at all German prisoners of war and special re-education projects including a youth camp and a school established at Camp 300, Beaconsfield, known as Wilton Park.

Like the U.S. versions, the British version was initially a covert operation, secret to the British public and supposedly to the German prisoners of war. As the re-education projects only began in late 1944, they must be seen as mainly post-war events. Under the War Office, the Army was in charge of the prisoners of war and, in the post-war period, saw its primary obligation as providing efficient labour for the contracting businesses. The PID (which later became the Prisoner of War Department – POWD) met with resistance to its re-education projects until it was able to show that “camps in which an active re-educational movement set the tone had up to double the productivity of other camps around them”. 236

Each camp was under the military authority of the British Camp Commandant but was run internally by the Germans following the military structure, with generally the highest ranking officer designated as Camp Leader. As in the U.S., success of the re-education projects


varied with the support and enthusiasm of the Camp Commandant.\textsuperscript{237} PID/POWD personnel were responsible for screening the prisoners of war into the political categories of Black, Grey and White (based on adherence to Nazi ideology and involvement in Nazi organizations). POWD Training Advisers were responsible for the re-education programmes within the prisoner of war camps. Wing Commander F. C. Hitch, Controller of the POWD, was responsible for the whole re-education effort for the duration of its existence. Col. Henry Faulk was central to the re-education projects in the camps and the functioning of the Segregation Officers and Training Advisors. The Wilton Park programme was directly under the authority of POWD Controller F. C. Hitch. However, local operations were under the authority of Dr. Heinz Koepple, a civilian hired to be Principal, and the Camp Commandant Grondona.

Before the end of the war, British opinion about Germany split along political lines. The majority liberal opinion made the distinction between the German people and the Nazi regime, with the war seen as the result of fascism, while a minority conservative opinion regarded Hitler and the Nazi regime as simply carrying out the will of the militaristic, authoritarian, nationalist German populace.\textsuperscript{238} But the April 1945 discovery of the concentration camps shocked and horrified the British public leading to moral outrage that conflated all Germans with Nazism. Although the Labour Party swept to power in the July 1945 elections, the liberal view of a political cause to the war (fascism) was often overwhelmed

\textsuperscript{237} Faulk reports that about 10% of the Camp Commandants fully understood and supported the re-education projects but that another 10% deliberately hindered the work. The middle 80% were passively cooperative, mainly because the projects had organisation authority. Faulk, Henry. Group Captives: The Re-education of German Prisoners of War in Great Britain. London: Chatto & Windus, 1977.

by a moral interpretation of a supposedly innate German militaristic and authoritarian
character as the cause.

The Allied victors worked out more details on reparations at the Yalta Summit in
February 1945. They decided to retain German prisoners of war for a period of time after
Germany’s unconditional surrender to work as cheap labour. In Britain, three-quarters of the
work was in agriculture, and the rest in various other industries. This ‘in kind’ form of
reparations represented a divergence from the WWI Versailles Treaty reparation arrangements.
A legal basis for not rapidly repatriating German prisoners of war was linked to the new
diplomatic concept of ‘collective guilt’. Collective guilt, ascribed to Germany through the
Stuttgart Declaration of 1945, among other acts, justified the retention of German prisoners of
war, and their continued employment under the same conditions, as part of reparation
payments. The Nuremberg Trials conducted from 20 November 1945 to 1 October 1946
focused world attention on Nazi “crimes against humanity”, another new concept with a clear
moral essence. The perception of National Socialism among German prisoners of war was
summarized as follows:

For the mass of German POW National Socialism was a way of life, a system of group
attitudes, which supported the individual in his concept of himself as a German, and
was seen through a projection of personal honesty. It was identified with racial virtues,
patriotism, courage, comradeship, fidelity, self-sacrifice, honour and efficiency.
Politically it was seen as a movement of reform toward a classless society, social justice
and the betterment of the unprivileged. The mass never outgrew a bewildered
incomprehension that the world was blind to ‘the good side’ of National Socialism, as
they phrased it. Later, the staunch adherents solved their dilemma by maintaining that
National Socialism had been ‘a good idea’ that was ‘badly carried out’ or ‘betrayed’ by
the leaders. (Faulk 1977, p. 59)

The combination of the prisoner of war’s perception of unfairness at being retained after the
end of the war for labour purposes and their rejection of guilt for the concentration camps

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239 PRO: RG FO371, Foreign Office - Political, Vol. 46864 / Memo on The Mentality of the German Officer/ paper on The
German Character, 1945.
provided a permanent source of tension in prisoner of war camps. The German prisoners of war argued for a legal, individual interpretation of guilt, rejecting the "collective guilt" form on the basis of their lack of individual involvement in the concentration camps or their active opposition to the Nazi regime. Nevertheless, the diplomatic concept of 'collective guilt' became the basis for a moral categorization of all Germans as guilty in most of the public's consciousness.

General Re-education Project for All Prisoners of War

In May 1944, the PID launched a re-education project aimed at all German prisoners of war in the major work camps. The project consisted of the establishment of an Information Room at each camp, lectures followed by open discussion, the German language prisoner of war newspaper *Wochenpost*, English language courses and appropriate films. The central focus was on the discussion groups creating a non-Nazi tone for the functioning of the camp. The Information Room offered books, newspapers and photographs, promoting the British way of life and providing information about the current situation in Germany. The PID Training Advisers brought in lecturers. The POWD published a newspaper, *Die Wochenpost*, that carried articles by prisoners of war as well as generally accurate news about the wartime situation (during the war) and the situation in Germany after the war – including reporting about the Nuremberg Trials. English language courses were established where possible with teachers who were mainly volunteers from the local Army personnel or local educational institutions. Pro-democracy prisoners of war led discussions in the expectation that a new non-Nazi social group norm could be established.

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242 While this appears similar to the U.S. Intellectual Diversion Project, the British did not know that much about the U.S. re-education projects due to the secrecy.
The stated goals for the re-education projects varied slightly as the war drew to a close. Thus a 26 May 1944 document stated:

There are two important aims to be achieved by the re-education of German prisoners of war. The first, which may be described as the short-term aim is to assist the Allied war effort by using converts, or partial converts, as instruments of political warfare;... The second - the long-term aim - is to ensure that as many as possible of the prisoners shall return to Germany or Austria after the War as pro-Allied advocates of democratic ideals.243

A month later, 21 June 1944, the Foreign Office made a further statement, elaborating three goals:

There were three separate aspects of the re-education of German prisoners of war which interested the Foreign Office; First, they desired to see individual German prisoners of war re-educated to the extent that they were susceptible to such treatment; secondly, it was most important to avoid the spread of Nazi doctrine amongst personnel in prisoner of war camps, which might result in the return to Germany after the war of a solid phalanx of extreme Nazis... Thirdly, in view of our declared policy of establishing an independent Austria, it was desirable to segregate Austrian from German prisoners of war.244

In September 1944, the War Cabinet made the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office responsible for segregation and re-education of the German prisoners of war. Their document stated:

"The general aims of P.I.D. are as follows:
1. To eradicate from the minds of the prisoners belief in the German military tradition and the National Socialist ideology, of which the basis is that might is right and that the necessity of the state knows no law.
2. To impart to the prisoners an accurate understanding and a just appreciation of the principles of democratic government and their implications for the conduct of men and nations: in particular, to encourage the application of democratic principles to German conditions as a basis for the peaceful reabsorption of Germany into the European community, which is a vital British interest.
3. To present the British commonwealth of Nations as an example of a democratic community in action, while avoiding the projection of Britain as a model to be slavishly copied.
4. To remove German misconceptions about European history of the last 50 years and especially about the origin, conduct and results of the two world wars."245

243 PRO: RG FO938, Foreign Office - German Section, Vol. 445 / German PWs re-education, 1944.
Colonel Henry Faulk, who helped develop the re-education projects, stated the goals somewhat differently, with a greater emphasis upon the importance of social group identity and the moral beliefs of the German prisoners of war. Thus he wrote:

Either one considered the German to be a normal people whose weaknesses allowed them to be misled by propaganda and social pressure, or one regarded National Socialism and its leadership as a unity, a reflection of the whole German people, accurately representing the culmination of their culture, attitudes and desires.

If one favoured the first viewpoint, it was a plausible conclusion that men, who were not 'real' Nazis, would be glad, after so long a period of intellectual isolation, to welcome again a free flow of information on politics and history. The re-educational aim, therefore, of this essentially political point of view was the provision of information and contacts, to enable the individual POW to make comparisons and come to personal conclusions.

Most observers of the German POW camps commented on the lack of empathy of the POW in respect to non-Germans, noting that this was particularly characteristic of the younger men.

Basically it was the lack of a concept of humanity, of men simply as people. Their thinking was circumscribed by the concept of Groups; they inhabited a world of living labels. Until the group blinkers had been removed and it became possible to achieve a moral perspective based on a concept of humanity and not solely of conformity to the group habits, it was difficult to establish an intellectual common ground for any kind of social or political discussion. On the other hand, once the moral basis was established, re-education had attained its aim and the political aspect was of little import. (Faulk 1977, pp. 59-61)

Screening Officers were responsible for identifying likely candidates for re-education and Training Advisers worked with the prisoner of war volunteers to establish a consistent programme of speakers, films, etc. as the basis for group discussion to reinforce the above mentioned goals. The newsreels showing the liberation of the concentration camps were included. The prisoners of war discussion leaders were not relieved from their work responsibilities and received no reward for their participation in the re-education projects but clearly hoped for early repatriation – the goal of all prisoners of war in the post-war period.

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246 This fit well with the project for the 'moral rearmament of Germany', see PRO: RG FO371, Foreign Office - Political, Vol. 70607 / Moral rearmament Group work in Germany, 1948.

The PID relied on both reports from the Segregation Officers and frequent use of questionnaires to determine the political attitudes of prisoners of war. Their experience with the re-education project led them to the conclusion that prisoner of war social groups normally formed on an age basis, linked to memory or not of a pre-Nazi Germany, rather than on the basis of political commitment. The youth, deemed an important target for the future of Germany, were often categorized as Black, having been exclusively educated under the Nazi system, and kept in the segregated camps. Also, the pro-democracy volunteer discussion leader often had little actual knowledge of British democratic ideals or information of the world outside Germany. In order to be more effective, the discussion leaders needed more training. In response, PID established two specialized prisoner of war camps, one for the Youth and the other a Training Centre at Wilton Park for the discussion leaders.

Special Youth Camp

Holding 1300 men, the Youth Camp (Camp 180) opened in June 1946 and was similar to all other working prisoner of war camps except for the age restriction and the fact that one day a week was spent in classes for which the prisoners of war were paid the equivalent of one day salary. Youth were defined as being between 17 and 26 years old and thus had grown up exclusively under the Nazi period in Germany. While the POWD could keep any prisoner of war for a longer period, the plan was for a three month stay at the Youth camp, and thus a set of 12 days of classes. Approximately 200 men attended classes each day. The original staff consisted of a specially chosen Camp Commandant, Major F. Woodnot, an Interpreter, and 242 experienced ‘white’ volunteer German prisoners of war accustomed to dealing with ‘black’ youth. The experience of parliamentary democracy was seen as critical and therefore the Camp was encouraged to elect a Camp Parliament, under German prisoners of war control, to make
decisions about the camp's functioning. In practice the Camp Parliament was transformed into a Camp Council. The power and limits of this elected Council were described as:

Every hut elects one member. The council has
1. no executive power.
2. the right to call the German Camp Staff to account in any matter concerning the camp.
3. the right to put questions to the British Camp Staff on any question affecting the camp.
4. the right and the duty to bring to public attention the details of any complaint or proposal which, in the opinion of the camp, has been insufficiently considered.

The Council has had four sittings. The Commandant appeared twice, the Quartermaster once. Many excellent proposals have already been accepted and the reason for some regulations the camp inmates did not like have been explained.”

Still the main way for measuring success was through attitude questionnaires and reports from the Training Advisors on the tone of the camp. These results showed that at the beginning of each three month session, the youth generally were at the ‘blackest’ end of the range while by the end, their scores had the same distribution as other camps, that is with the majority grey, a few white and about an equal percentage black. There were also fewer discipline problems and a greater willingness to do extra voluntary work such as the construction of a camp chapel. The long-term results were never measured.

Wilton Park Training Centre

By contrast, the Training Centre at Wilton Park, designed to have 300 men, was a six-week full-time programme, which began in January 1946. Formally designated as prisoner of war Camp 300, the Training Centre was located at Wilton Park, in Beaconsfield, Buckinghamshire, between London and Oxford. The location and terrain were meant to

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250 On 27 March 1946 a major report by PdD on German re-education claimed success with a reduction of prisoners of war classified as Black from 60% to 25%, with no more than 5% being fanatical Nazis, and “where once there was a general fear and hatred of Britain, there is now respect and a desire for cooperation.” PRO: RG FO371, Foreign Office - Political, Vol. 55691 / Re-education of the German people and of German POWs: Allied Policy, 1946.
suggest more a residential university than a prisoner of war camp, emphasized by the fact that the tutors wore academic gowns and the head was referred to as the Principal. Selection for the first session was carried out in December 1945\textsuperscript{251} with the guidelines including the criteria that the prisoners of war should be of ‘white’ status, of an intelligence capable of academic courses, have homes in the British Zone of Occupation in Germany, preferably be young, and selected with no respect for rank. They also had to be voluntary since they were still covered by the 1929 Geneva Convention. The German residence requirement reflected the need for creating future cooperation with Britain and not just concern about training the prisoners of war for return to do re-education in their work camps. Given these guidelines, there were always more officers than enlisted men and most graduates of Wilton Park felt that no one without at least an elementary education would have profited due to the academic level of the courses. Given the six to eight week schedule and the 300 person capacity, between the first session in January 1946 and the last one for prisoners of war in 1948, approximately 4,500 Germans took part in this re-education project.

Opening with a speech in German by the Director General and Head of the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office, Major General Kenneth Strong, on 17 January 1946, Wilton Park was seen by POWD as their most important project. In this opening speech, Gen. Strong acknowledged the actuality of their prisoner of war status and described the project in these terms:

The fundamental fact can not of course be changed: namely, that you are Prisoners of War in Britain, but, above this fact, the spirit which will pervade Wilton Park lies in your own attitude. We have set up this Training Centre on the model of the British Residential Colleges, establishments where people pursuing collective intellectual studies live and work together. The art of creating a free community is that of living together and working together in harmony, without the indiscipline of irresponsible

individualism... You will have an opportunity to do this at Wilton Park, for our experiment demands your constant and active cooperation.\textsuperscript{252}

Dr. Heinz Koepppler was selected to be the head (called the Principal after the Oxford tradition) of the re-education programme. A German émigré who had gained British citizenship, he was a strong and dominant personality who would lead the Wilton Park re-education project for its duration and then oversee its transformation into an international centre. While several of his key assistants\textsuperscript{253} also spoke German, most of the initial fifteen tutors did not and thus had to rely on interpreters – often German émigrés. Wilton Park employed the tutorial method with a student-teacher ratio of about 20 to one, which, while expensive, allowed for an atmosphere that encouraged discussion and mutual understanding. Lectures were given by Koepppler, his teachers, prestigious guests, other selected German prisoners and people from all walks of British life, with the necessity of translation from English to German most of the time. But it was the student participation, in class and in discussions, that was perceived as critical for the desired change in attitude.

There were 15 classes operating each day at Wilton Park, each with two or three units of work and study. Each 90-minute period generally included a lecture (no more than 40 minutes) followed by a question and answer period and discussion. The day was divided into five periods with one free and not more than three classes required. Two periods each week were for sports and exercise. The courses included German history, British politics and life, international relations, current events such as the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials, comparative democracies, the Weimar Republic, economics and English language courses. The guest lectures were on both political and cultural questions and were almost exclusively in English. This meant that German prisoners of war with a good command of English were more likely to attend these events. Under the supervision of the staff, the prisoners of war also published a

camp newspaper called *Die Brücke*, which had no distribution beyond the camp and often functioned as an end of session publication of comments by the “students”.

As the sessions at Wilton Park began only in January of 1946, the lectures and discussion on democracy and current events, including the Nuremberg Trials, were frequently centered on the changing status of the various European countries and the relations between the Allied powers. On 18 January 1947 a report by Camp Commandant Grondona, who was also an economist and lecturer at the camp, complained of the difficulty caused by Lady Astor’s address to the German students on 13 January 1947 where she castigated Catholicism and Russia. Colonel Grondona saw this as a reinforcement of the Nazi ideology of anti-communism and thus in support of National Socialism as a whole among the German prisoners of war.254 In the spring of 1948, because of the political situation in Czechoslovakia, an article by the Dean of Wilton Park, Alex Glasfurd, in *Die Brücke*, warned that accepting communism as a legitimate political opponent was very dangerous.255 This anti-communism echoed for many German prisoners of war a central tenet of the Nazi ideology and reinforced their arguments with their captors about the weakness of democracy as a political system as it offered the potential for an electoral victory of the Communist Party.256

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253 Waldemar von Knörringen, second in command to Koeppler, and Fritz Borinski among others. Smith
256 In June 1970, Henry Kissinger, chief of National Security told the White House “Committee of 40”, which he headed, that should Allende win Chile’s elections “I don’t see why we need to stand by and watch a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people.” On September 16, 1970, Kissinger told a group of editors that Allende’s Chile could become a “contagious example” that “would infect” NATO allies in southern Europe. An ex-aide of Kissinger’s later observed: “Henry thought Allende might lead an anti-U.S. movement in Latin America more effectively than Castro, just because it was the democratic path to power.” See Smith Jr., Arthur Lee. *The war for the German mind: Re-educating Hitler’s soldiers*. Providence: Berghahn Books, 1996.
Repatriation and Beyond

Unlike the Soviet and U.S. re-education projects, the British never stated that participation would lead to jobs with the British occupation government. This meant that neither the frustration and confusion of the U.S. repatriated prisoners of war situation nor the deliberate organization of the Soviet prisoners of war happened. However, there was a desire on the part of the graduates of Wilton Park to create an association of ‘Wiltonians’ upon repatriation to Germany. While this was often encouraged by the tutors at Wilton Park, the British authorities both officially discouraged their creation and refused to give any special privileges to the members. However a number of such associations were created and functioned briefly as cultural or social clubs for the former prisoners of war. Thus in 1948 a German newspaper reported on meetings initiated by former Wilton Park participants where “German and invited English guests were debating important issues vital to Germany in a refreshing manner of equality, each being permitted to voice opinions and defend position in an atmosphere of complete tolerance.”

In 1947 the British began to repatriate their German prisoners of war and to contemplate the end of these re-education projects. W/C F.C. Hitch, Dr. Heinz Koeppler, Col. Henry Faulk and others insisted upon the value of Wilton Park for the general re-education of Germans and argued for inviting German civilians from the British Occupation Zone in Germany to participate in these courses. The decision to include civilians was taken in January 1947. The June 1948 session was the last to include prisoners of war.

Wilton Park Centre continued with its programme in 1948, having replaced the prisoners of war with German civilians from the British Sector while maintaining the structure and much of the curriculum with a shift in focus to the history and future of British-German

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relations. This Anglo-German focus was sustained until 1956 when the Wilton Park training
centre was transformed into an International Conference Centre, still linked to the Foreign
Office. The Centre offered an OECD-wide focus to replace the earlier Anglo-German
focus.259 Transformed again in 1972, the Wilton Park International Conference Centre
continues260 to conduct conferences with a global perspective and still receives some of its
money from the Foreign Office, although it enjoys other financial sources and more
autonomy.261

259 Welch, David. "Citizenship and politics: The legacy of Wilton Park for post-war reconstruction." Contemporary European
260 The Web site for these conferences is www.wiltonparkorganisation.uk.
Chapter 8 Analysis of the Re-education Projects in Terms of Propaganda Paradigms and Curriculum Perspectives

This chapter discusses the Allied re-education projects from the viewpoint of the propaganda paradigms and curriculum perspectives used. Each re-education project will be situated within the relevant, rapidly changing historical context of WWII. Respecting the chronology of events, the Soviet re-education projects will be presented first, followed by those of the U.S. and Britain. A profile for each Allied re-education project is created by choosing which of the propaganda paradigms and which of the curriculum perspectives best describes the actions and thoughts of the originators of each of the different projects within a country's overall re-education project. As no re-education project was explicitly developed as an example of one or another of the contemporary propaganda paradigms or curriculum perspectives, the designation depends on the presumed reasoning of all those involved in the re-education projects. Explicitly, for example, frequent expressions of concern about changing attitudes or the measurement of attitudes, in the archival or secondary sources, suggested the Positivist Attitude Change propaganda paradigm while concern using the projects to transform society would be ascribed to the Radical curriculum perspective. As demonstrated in the previous comparison of propaganda paradigms and curriculum perspectives, there is a wide range of overlapping concerns within the interpretive frameworks. This means that the designation depends more on interpretation than empirical data that could definitively distinguish one approach from all others. With these limits in mind, this chapter presents a profile of each country's projects as an imperfect exemplar of the relevant propaganda paradigms and curriculum perspectives.

362 See How the Propaganda Paradigms and Curriculum Perspectives Accord, page 78.
Recall that propaganda paradigms focus on the source, the audience, the message, the specific rhetorical techniques, the means (media forms) and the intent of the originator, based on the presumption of an oppositional stance. The five propaganda paradigms used are the 'positivist attitude change', the 'historical sociological', the 'American humanist propaganda analysis', a neo-marxist feminist rhetoric critique and the 'comparative rhetoric critique'. Briefly, the Positivist Attitude Change paradigm emphasises external manipulation that leads to a shift in a single attitude. The Historical Sociological paradigm sees propaganda as necessary for the state functioning in industrial societies in order to integrate people into a structurally unjust society. The American Humanist Propaganda Analysis paradigm believes that people can be immunized to the effects of propaganda by training in the techniques of propaganda analysis. The Neo-marxist Feminist Rhetoric Critique approach seeks a radical critique of all unequal power relations in society. The Comparative Rhetoric Critique paradigm asserts the manufacture of consent, mainly through the role of the mass media.

In contrast, curriculum perspectives focus on the role of the student, the teacher, the school and the courses given. The four perspectives within curriculum studies presented were the Systematizers, Radicals, Existentialists and Deliberators. The Systematizers see curriculum as The Plan to be applied everywhere, in all circumstances. The Radicals emphasises the possibility of education playing a role in a social transformation towards a more just society. Existentialists see curriculum as the personal experience of the students, thus dependant on their internal motivation more than the external input from teachers. The Deliberators see curriculum as a practical art for the development of a plan appropriate to the specific local school system, arrived at through extensive discussion among all concerned.

363 See the Propaganda Paradigms, beginning page 30.
Two further distinctions between propaganda and education provide additional considerations for the designation of the appropriate interpretive frameworks for these Allied political re-education projects. One is the time frame involved. The other is the overt or covert nature of the source of the message. The accustomed time frame for curriculum perspectives is lengthy, with the minimum being an academic year and ordinarily inclusive of the years from kindergarten through high school, university or other formal educational institutions. The presumed time frame for propaganda campaigns varies from a single day’s treatment of a content to longer term campaigns. In some cases, for particular actions, propaganda campaigns can cover generations. In the case of propaganda, the time frame is determined by the historic event involved rather than the academic calendar. Secondly, the overt or covert status of the source often distinguishes propaganda from education. Propaganda may be overt or covert with respect to the source. The originator decides on the overt or covert status of the source of the propaganda based on the likely effectiveness of the campaign if the true source is known. By contrast, education is an open, publicly sanctioned activity from a known source. These considerations play a role in the choice of which interpretive framework is most appropriate for the various Allied re-education projects. The projects are presented in their chronological order.

Soviet Union Re-education Projects

From their beginning in 1942-43, the Soviet Union’s re-education projects were overt. Recruitment of the German prisoners of war to either the NKFD or the Bund Deutscher Offiziere was openly for propaganda campaigns aimed ultimately toward the German soldiers and citizens. Those prisoners of war joining knew that they would be expected to participate in front-line propaganda encouraging surrender by the soldiers of the Wehrmacht and the overthrow of the Nazi regime by German citizens. The Antifa schools had the dual purpose of
training the members of the NKFD and the Bund Deutscher Offiziere both for further
recruitment in the prisoner of war camps and for participation as cooperative personnel in the
future occupied Germany.

Historical Context

The Soviet Union’s re-education projects began when the Soviet Union was still being
defeated by the Wehrmacht and so related to that military situation. The re-education projects
thus began as specifically relating to the propaganda purposes of the Red Army. However, the
NKFD and Bund Deutscher Offiziere propaganda campaigns continued until the end of the
war. The Antifa Schools expanded as the military situation improved, a situation that
engendered the prospect of a future Allied victory and occupation of Germany. All Soviet re-
education projects grew larger to the extent that they served an increasingly likely prospect of a
German defeat followed by a military occupation of a Germany by the Allied armies.

The NKFD and Bund Deutscher Offiziere

The Soviet Union’s propaganda campaigns were distinctive in a number of ways. The
benefit to the Soviet source was obvious: the more Wehrmacht soldiers who surrendered, the
greater the chance of Soviet Union victory. Likewise, if the Nazi regime was overthrown, the
assumption was that a rapid peace process between Germany and the Allies could end the war
in Europe. The benefit to the German Wehrmacht audience was also explicit: the death rate on
the Eastern front was high and, unlike the earlier history of Blitzkrieg successes, this Eastern
battle was draining Germany’s resources and augured the possibility of greater and greater
destruction of the German homeland.

The means for recruitment to the NKFD and Bund Deutscher Offiziere were person-
to-person contact, leaflets, and meetings held originally by German émigrés, members of the
KPD. Thus, language was not a barrier. Nor was the recruiter-teacher’s credibility in terms of
knowledge of the real situation in Germany as these German émigrés had fled after the installation of the Nazi regime and were intent on returning to Germany. The propaganda message was the need to 'save Germany from the Nazi regime', with the subtext for the Bund Deutscher Offiziere of potential involvement in a future government should they be successful. The Soviet intent was to build a public anti-Nazi campaign at the same time as lending credibility to the Soviet national myth of being a peace-loving nation unfairly attacked.

With this intent, the functioning of the Nationalkomitee "Freies Deutschland" and Bund Deutscher Offiziere was most similar to the Positivist Attitude Change paradigm for propaganda analysis in its focus on the desired change in a single political attitude. However, reliance on covert manipulation of the situation as the key means to achieve this goal was absent. Instead, persuasion was emphatically based on a rational argument by a clearly identified source. Logically this follows Nkrumah's definition of propaganda as 'telling the truth'. None of the current propaganda paradigms deal fully or clearly with this approach as all include the presupposition of an oppositional relationship between source and audience.

The Antifa Schools

The four-month-long Antifa Schools were conducted in both central and regional schools, parallel to the spread of prisoner of war camps throughout the Soviet Union in the 1943-47 period. The teachers were mainly the German émigré population or German speaking Russian political commissars, including university professors. The curriculum focused on a core of Marxist-Leninist political analysis and the revolutionary history of the Soviet Union. The Marxist-Leninist political analysis presented as an extension of the dialectical and historical materialist philosophy well known within Germany. Prisoners of war of all academic

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264 It is worth noting that the most famous attempt on Hitler's life was by high-ranking members of the officer corps - the 20th of July plot in 1944. No link was ever established between these conspirators and the Bund Deutscher Offiziere. However, this action does demonstrate the attraction of the argument of 'saving Germany by getting rid of Hitler'.
backgrounds were accepted, although the material was presented at a fairly high academic level. The dialogic question and answer method was used for group discussions. The dialogic question and answer method sometimes degenerated into providing rote answers to the communist catechism. However there were also many reports that these courses provided new vistas, even to university graduates. The academic goal was the understanding and the ability to apply a Marxist-Leninist analysis to German and European history as well as to current events. An equally important goal was the technical training for leaflet and newspaper production and radio broadcasts. While not a requirement for completion of the session, there was an intense effort by the German émigrés to recruit the prisoners of war to the German Communist Party with its project for rebuilding German society in the aftermath of the war.

In terms of curriculum perspectives, the Antifa schools incorporated the transformation of society concerns of the Radical perspective along with the Academic Rationalism’s concern with promoting the canon of what was deemed to be the best of human achievement. For the Soviet Union this meant including philosophy and literature courses along with the core achievement of the Soviet explanation of the causes of WW II and the desired future role of German-Soviet relations. While the technical training was equivalent to that of the U.S. Special Administrative and Police Schools, recruitment to a political party where these skills would be useful in the future played no role in either the U.S. or British re-education projects. Another distinctive feature was that the German émigré teachers would be returning to Germany, facing the same future that the students would know. This mimics a presupposition of educational curriculum perspectives that the teacher and student are both participants in the same national society — a presupposition that was contradicted in the staffing of the other Allied re-education projects.

265 The name Antifa Schools comes from curriculum being specifically anti-fascist.
U.S. Re-education Projects

Begun in late 1944, the re-education projects in the U.S. included the Intellectual Diversion project, the Special Schools and the Fort Eustis project. All were developed and controlled by the Special Projects Division, with Maj. Edward Davison in charge. While under the same general rubric, each project had a distinct purpose, shifting with the changing historical context.

Historical Context

The re-education projects began when Allied victory was probable if not assured. The Soviet Union's Red Army was beginning to drive the German Wehrmacht from Russian territory, an event greeted with admiration by the U.S. public after two years of reports of the massive devastation and courage of the Soviet people during the prolonged fighting. The major role of the Soviet ally in the fighting in the European theatre promoted popular acceptance of the Communist regime for Russia. Hollywood movies promoted this benign view of the Soviet system. Although Germany was exclusively portrayed as the enemy in the media, the U.S. diplomatic elite recognised the importance of future relations between the U.S. and Germany. The U.S. re-education projects concentrated on this presumed future. At the same time, the current enemy status of Germany required secrecy for the projects as military officials feared reprisals by the Nazi regime against American prisoners of war.

Intellectual Diversion Project

The Intellectual Diversion project, running from September 1944 until April 1946, had as its stated goal to "create and foster any spontaneous reaction on the part of German prisoners of war which would encourage a favorable respect on their part for American
institutions. This re-education project came about as the result of negative news reports of murders, forced suicides and beatings of German prisoners of war by Nazi German prisoners of war. This situation of political murders reflected the effective control of the prisoner of war camps by the Nazi element within the Wehrmacht, especially the NCOs. The Intellectual Diversion re-education project had two goals: to break this control and to combat the German attitude that saw the U.S. as inferior. The Nazi regime described the U.S. as a cultural backwater that was the result of the “mongrel nature” of an immigrant-based society. This Nazi view of the U.S. oddly reciprocated the U.S. negative attitude towards ‘old Europe’, which was seen as always being engaged in petty infighting, based on parochial national identities. Even Nazism was originally understood is the U.S. as only the latest variation of German hyper-nationalism. The propaganda intent of the Intellectual Diversion project was to change the negative German opinion of the U.S. to one that respected U.S. institutions and society. The potential benefit to the American source was a greater ease in the future military occupation of Germany. As well, a long-term goal was ‘winning the peace’, to be accomplished by having Germany follow the U.S. model in becoming a liberal democracy.

As a propaganda campaign, the source – the U.S. Army – was never in doubt to the German prisoners of war, regardless of the secret status of the project to the citizens of the U.S. The German prisoners of war understood that everything that happened in the camps was controlled by the U.S. military. The American military view of the German prisoners of war audience was also simple: while formally the U.S. Army recognised that different political opinions existed within the Wehrmacht, the Army command acted on the assumption that all prisoners of war were Nazis. Therefore the Intellectual Diversion project was directed at the

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whole of the prisoner of war population. Even for anti-Nazi prisoners of war, who were likely
to be social-democrats or communists, the promotion of the U.S. model of liberal democracy
was not inappropriate from the American source’s point of view.

The propaganda message was that the U.S. represented a new and superior model, one
based on a process of compromise between the legitimate interests of varied segments of the
society, as expressed through a democratic electoral system. This reflected the U.S. national
myth that democratic structures had solved, or were in the process of solving, all social
problems, including racism against black citizens.

As noted earlier, censorship is the constant corollary of propaganda. With the
beginning of the Intellectual Diversion project, films showing the ‘seamy side of the U.S.’ were
now censored. These films were replaced by those with success stories, emphasising the
strength of the U.S. society. Also books in the prisoner of war camps’ libraries were screened
to remove those with a clear Nazi viewpoint, replaced by books with pro-democratic or
positive stories. The local camp newspapers were supplied with stories having an anti-Nazi
slant written by the members of the Idea Factory at Fort Van Etten. The national prisoner of
war newspaper Der Ruf ran stories by anti-Nazi writers. Due to the lack of real knowledge
about the target audience by the U.S. personnel in charge, this propaganda campaign
incorporated specially selected German prisoners of war into the staff of the Idea Factory.
These specially selected German prisoners of war modified some of the material but were not
truly part of the creation of the purpose or intent of the propaganda project. The Academic
Rationalism curriculum perspective was reflected in the choice of articles for Der Ruf, which

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268 NARA: RG 389, Vol. 439A / 40, Movies Shown to German POWs,.

269 This is in contrast with the Soviet Union re-education projects where the members of the German Communist Party in exile
were at least junior partners if not fully determinant of the propaganda campaign within the prisoner of war camps.
tended toward the literary rather than journalist tone. This reflected the goal of attracting the intellectual elite to the new democratic perspective.

The Positivist Attitude Change propaganda paradigm best reflects this approach of identifying a specific goal and arranging circumstances in an attempt to force the outcome. During a wartime situation, where victory for the U.S. side was probable, there was little hesitation about engaging in this type of campaign by both those undertaking the project and the broad public – at least as reflected in the U.S. newspapers of the time. Hesitation and even open opposition came mainly from two sources within the U.S. government itself – those in the military who worried about reciprocal treatment of U.S. prisoners of war in enemy camps and the prisoner of war camp commanders who were seeking to provide an efficient labour supply to the civilian contractors. The same Nazi NCOs who were responsible for the murders and deaths were also key in disciplining the German troops to be an efficient work form. Thus the camp commanders were often loath to allow interference with the existing system. In the end, changes in the Nazi control of the prisoner of war camps came only via the transfers of undesirable personnel, not from a genuine change in attitude on the part of the prisoners of war even after the Wehrmacht's defeat.

_Special Schools and Fort Eustis Project_

The Special Schools began shortly after the end of the war in Europe within the historical context of the decision to divide Germany into military occupation zones. Occupying armies have to face both the normal problems of government and the possibility of resentment by the inhabitants at their presence. The U.S. had a draft army with the U.S. population expecting rapid demobilisation of their family members after the war. In addition, the U.S. economy was booming and military pay was less than what the average worker could expect. But a military occupation of Germany required adequate personnel to deal with day-to-day
administrative tasks. If the training of prisoners of war could take place before their repatriation, this was a clear advantage to the U.S. government in providing German personnel to do administrative tasks for OMGUS (the Office of Military Government United States).

Running from May through December 1945, the Special Schools sought to prepare administrative and police personnel to assist the U.S. occupying forces in Germany. On the one hand, the schools represented a propaganda campaign focused upon revising the German national myth and promoting the U.S. model of democracy. On the other hand, they represented an educational curriculum with courses pertaining to U.S. military occupation regulations and police procedures. The propaganda aspects included an appeal to a common European civilisation, where a comparison was made between a revised German national myth and the U.S. democratic institutions, with the emphasis on a German past that included democratic structures. The 'German problem' was identified as an over-reliance upon 'principles' rather than a recognition of the value of compromise. Courses on the U.S. government presented a version of the U.S. national myth that promised a non-class-divided nation through the process of the recognition of divergent points of view leading, through discussion, to compromise. This process was contrasted with the U.S. version of the German national myth of Germany being a country where the population segments held rigidly to principled positions rather than seeking compromise for the greater good of the whole.

Unlike the Intellectual Diversion project, the Special Schools had a definite two-month time frame with an explicit curriculum. The main classroom techniques used in the Special Schools were lectures and group discussions. The students were specially selected prisoners of war, not the prisoner of war population as a whole. The hope was that the German prisoners of war would be the opinion leaders in their communities upon their repatriation. The teachers
were both U.S. military personnel and some of the prisoners of war from the Idea Factory.²⁷⁰

None of the U.S. teachers were career Army. Rather, they were drafted teachers who reflected
the attitudes and concerns of their academic roles in civilian life.²⁷¹

The schools took place in special prisoner of war camps without the usual restrictions
of all other prisoner of war camps, such as respect for military rank. This non-respect for rank
was further developed in the classes where generals could be taught by sergeants and enlisted
personnel could know the answers before the officers could. This classroom procedure was to
be an active demonstration of supposed U.S.-style democracy and equality, specifically
countering the authoritarian and militaristic German tradition. This American disrespect for
rank and status is in sharp contrast to the Soviet decision to accept German status concern by
formulating two separate propaganda campaigns, one directed at the officers (the Bund
Deutscher Offiziere) and one directed at all military personal (the Nationalkomitee "Freies
Deutschland").

The textbooks for the Special Schools were either written by the Idea Factory
personnel or by the Army itself with translation provided by those who spoke German. Most
of the U.S. personnel were not fluent in German, the language of the students. The pressure
was for the German prisoners of war to learn English, not vice versa. This lack of German
language capacity of the personnel contributed to a sense by the prisoners of war of non-
respect for the German society, countering the argument for true equality between the German
prisoners of war and U.S. personnel.

²⁷⁰ It should be noted that even in the post-war context, cooperation by the German prisoners of war with the (former) enemy
still carried the potential for accusations of having been a traitor. The risk for the German prisoners with the Idea Factory of
being accused of being a traitor was reduced by the fact that only 'white' prisoners of war had been selected for the Special
Schools. Also the fact that these German prisoners of war had volunteered for these Special Schools meant that their
behaviour could also be construed as having cooperated with the 'enemy'.
In terms of curriculum perspectives, the Special Schools in the U.S. re-education project reflected the concerns of the Radical and the Academic Rationalism approaches. As in the Radical perspective, these projects sought to use the curriculum to make a significant change, creating a different future for German society. But as in the Academic Rationalist approach, the appeal also was to the common ideals of an idealized Western Culture. Specifically the emphasis on compromise based on reason and rationality formed an important part of the curriculum.

The Fort Eustis project, conducted during the first three months of 1946, returned to a more propagandistic campaign format. While still being directed at selected prisoners of war rather than the whole prisoner of war population, the six-day framework with a pro-democracy content reverted almost entirely to the Positivist Attitude Change paradigm where the purpose was simply to promote pro-U.S. attitudes.

**British Re-education Projects**

Beginning in late 1945 and 1946, the stated purpose of the British general re-education projects was to prevent future wars by instilling in the Germans a respect for democratic institutions and a correct understanding of the past fifty years of European history, including the causes and results of the two world wars. The British presuppositions included a view of Britain as the epitome of civilisation with a global responsibility as represented by the British Empire. Part of the British national myth included the role of the bourgeois revolution in creating the democratic parliamentary form of government. One view held that Germany's history of non-democratic government was the result of the lack of a bourgeois revolution where the power of the aristocracy was replaced by democratic parliamentary forms.\(^{272}\) At the same time Germany and England shared a common past and historic links through royalty.

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The use of a revisionist version of the German national myth, while promoting the British national myth as a model, was similar to the U.S. scheme.

*Historical Context*

The British re-education projects began after the D-Day 1944 invasion when increasing numbers of German prisoners of war were kept on the continent or within Britain. The projects continued until 1948, covering the period of time of degenerating relations with the Soviet Union and the development of the Cold War. The focus during this period began with post-war considerations of de-nazification but was subsequently replaced by an emphasis upon reinforcing British-German links within the Western capitalist side of the Cold War. The retention of German prisoners of war after VE day was based on an inter-Allied agreement concerning reparations. As no peace treaty was ever signed with Germany, the legal basis for the immediate repatriation of German prisoners of war was left open. In effect, part of the post-war reparations was the labour of the German prisoners of war at low wages in several Allied countries. The British re-education projects were mainly developed within this post-war context.

*General Re-education Project*

As the British re-education projects developed in the 1945-47 period, the description of the problem of Nazism shifted from a political one to a moral one. A British goal of re-education projects was a change in moral attitude in the German prisoners of war. The Nazi moral system was seen as having valued violence and identity with the nation. The British sought to replace this attitude with one emphasizing a moral appreciation of the full humanity of all people. An attitudinal shift was expected to result from the group discussion leaders’ providing a model of correct moral behaviour, pointing out the problems in the Nazi approach
that had stressed the rights of the collective over individual rights.\textsuperscript{273} This general re-education project was directed at all German prisoners of war. Lectures and various information and reading material were also provided, including the publication of a national prisoner of war newspaper called \textit{Die Wochenpost}. Even this written material was seen to only be effective if its content became part of personal self-evaluation and discussion within a group identity-forming dynamic.

Because the British instituted segregation of prisoners of war by political tendency and operated for the most part after the defeat of the Nazi regime, they faced fewer problems of Nazi control of the camps than did the United States. The consequent benefit to the British included higher prisoner morale with fewer work problems, which became the motivation the PID used to get the prisoner of war camp commandant’s cooperation.

The use of a moral approach also fit with the popular, though not the legal, sense of German “collective guilt,” a concept given great play after the extensive exposure of the horrifying Nazi death camps. If each individual German shouldered his share of the collective guilt, then the individual prisoner of war’s low-paid labour contribution to war reparations was justified.\textsuperscript{274}

The British general re-education project fits the Positivist Attitude Change propaganda paradigm with the identification of a specific attitude as the problem, the creation of a different moral attitude as the solution, and the manipulation of group dynamics as the means.

\textsuperscript{273} Most interesting is Faulk’s explicit denial of a political or economic analysis having any role to play, any validity for the re-education projects. Faulk argues for a moral lack that the Nazi ideology engendered based on an overemphasis of the group and an underplaying of the individual and therefore a reduction of empathy and sympathy between individuals. So the attitude change he promoted in the prisoner of war re-education projects was a ‘group ethos’ based on individualism and empathetic identity with other individuals. Only this group ethos – and not the one that identifies with the nation – was deemed acceptable for the Germans. Faulk sees this as consonant with British national group ethos approaches. He admits to the stereotyping used by both sides – by the British civilians and the German prisoners of war – but he sees no possible inherent problem in the British group ethos of ‘individualism’, which needs no modification whatsoever. There is no mention of the racism inherent in the British “group ethos” with respect to India, Africa, or other parts of the British empire, or their nationals residing inside Britain. In fact, Faulk makes no mention of either British imperialism or of British history at all.
The Youth Camp

The Youth Camp extended this propaganda campaign while incorporating aspects of curricular concerns. The young German prisoners of war constituted a specific audience with a distinctive Nazi educational background that needed challenging. The young German Nazis also were presumed to be particularly subject to the moral failure deemed to be the source of Nazism. The main curriculum problem for the British authorities was identified as the Nazi distortion of history, which was to be corrected by a revision of the German national myth. This revision of the German national myth focused on what would be required of Germany for it to have the right to rejoin the ‘community of nations’. Britain was presented as a model of a successful bourgeois revolution with its transition from an aristocracy to a democracy. Like the U.S. version of democracy, the British emphasized sharp debate of representatives of different segments of the population resolved by mutual compromise – and a beer together in the pub afterwards. With the Labour Party in power, the right of the various segments of the populations included a recognition of the working class as one of these ‘segments’. Occurring both during and after the Nuremberg trials, the British curriculum for the German prisoners of war voiced a concern for relevance. In the Youth Camp, the re-education project aimed at having an impact on general attitudes towards a broad range of political issues, as well as addressing the perceived moral failure of de-valuing the individual with respect to the collective.

The Youth School classes were meant to mimic something of the liberal education that was part of the British curriculum for its own high-school-age youth. The classes were also structured to provide a critical analysis of the distortions the Nazis had introduced into their

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274 Faulk, a major authority in the administration of the British re-education projects who later wrote a book about them, notes that this moral concept of collective guilt was never generally accepted by the German people. Faulk
account of German history. Additionally, the use of elections for the camp officers\textsuperscript{275} was integral to the curriculum. The view of youth as not yet fully formed, still malleable to become responsible future citizens, formed the basis of the Youth Camp. Attitude surveys had shown that the younger German prisoners of war were generally more pro-Nazi in their attitudes than the older ones. The means to change this was a structured series of lectures with the same emphasis on group discussion and group dynamics as in the general re-education project. The presumed benefits were the same with the additional educational outcome of a body of youth who had experienced an embryonic form of democratic functioning.

In terms of propaganda paradigms, the Youth Camp re-education project fit the Humanist Propaganda Analysis model by teaching a critical approach to German history and the Nazi distortion techniques. The project also fit a Positivist Attitude Change model by deliberately using group identity and group dynamics in its approach.

In terms of curriculum perspectives, the Youth camp fit the Radical model since the curriculum sought to redress a specific social historical situation. The curriculum also reflected some of the Existentialists' concern for individual experience in its emphasis on the centrality of elections and thereby the POWs' ability to control part of camp life and rewrite the camp constitution.

\textit{Wilton Park}

Wilton Park was the longest and most elaborate British re-education project. Begun in February 1946, it involved German prisoners of war until 1948, after which German civilians became students in the programme. By the end of the prisoner of war era, the curriculum was

\textsuperscript{275} Recall that normally the German officer in charge within a prisoner of war camp was simply the highest-ranking officer that was acceptable to the hold authority. Thus they were appointed and not elected. Neither the British nor the German army had any history of electing officers and the prisoners of war were legally still seen as members of the military in temporary custody of the enemy forces.
already shifting to reflect the intensifying Cold War diplomacy, while trying to avoid any reinforcement of the Nazi version of the anti-Bolshevik principle. The curriculum increasingly focused on British-German relations until the transformation of Wilton Park into a conference centre in 1948, still funded primarily by the British Foreign Office. The Conference Centre expanded its mandate from Anglo-German relations to the Europe Community and finally to the global perspective with which it currently functions.

The purpose of the Wilton Park re-education project was the creation of cooperative personnel for use in both the general re-education project in the other prisoner of war camps and use by the British occupational forces in Germany when repatriation began in 1947. There was an attempt to give participation in the Wilton Park re-education project a positive status in the eyes of the German prisoners of war. The students at Wilton Park were self-selected German prisoners of war who volunteered for this programme. Each prisoner of war required the recommendation of their current camp commandant as a means to screen out those who had volunteered out of opportunist hopes for early repatriation. The teachers included German speaking British citizens and German émigrés. A naturalized British citizen of German origin, Heinz Koeppler, was the Principal. However, most lectures were still conducted in English with translation provided by both the staff and cooperative German prisoners of war. Also, while the school facilities at Wilton Park were standard army Quonset huts, there were fewer guards and fewer constraints than at regular prisoner of war camps. This was a conscious attempt to mimic a residential British college. For instance, regulations allowed the prisoners of war to wear uniforms without rank insignia and even civilian clothes when on field trips to town. The Principal and other staff often wore academic gowns as if they were at Oxford, again creating the atmosphere of a privileged educational institution rather than a prisoner of war camp.
The curriculum focused on British history and institutions, a revision of the German national myth, English classes, and current events — all leading to open discussion and debate. Mock elections were held until the German prisoners of war started taking them seriously in political party terms. All lectures, including those by invited speakers, were followed by discussion groups with the intent of encouraging critical thinking but arriving at an agreeable compromise.

Wilton Park fit the Social Reconstruction — Relevance curriculum perspective in seeing the active discussion of relevant topics as leading to the future transformation of German society. It also fit the Academic Rationalism perspective in the somewhat didactic approach to rewriting the Germany national myth, with its appeal to a common cultural history and the role of reason.

As pedagogical as the approach was, an argument could be made for the Wilton Park re-education project's being a propaganda campaign because of the greater benefit to the British Foreign Office source. Likewise the continuation of the project with non-prisoners of war, funded by the Foreign Office, reinforces the view of Wilton Park as part of the external propaganda of the British government with respect to its future relations with Germany. Within that propaganda context, an expansion of the Historical Sociological paradigm to a supra-national level would best capture the sense of the project. Ellul argues for the permanent necessity of propaganda by the state for the maintenance of unequal power relations. Seen as a British attempt to set the framework originally for Anglo-German relations, then inter-European and presently global relationships, the Wilton Park conferences formed an aspect of the British government's propaganda campaign to strengthen its role at these various diplomatic levels.
Summary

In summary we see the role of the Positivist Attitude Change propaganda paradigm in all the Allied re-education projects. The Soviet Union and the U.S. focused on a change in political attitude, with the Soviet Union concerned about developing and anti-Nazi attitude and the U.S. concerned with creating pro-U.S. and pro-political compromise attitudes. The British attempted to alter a moral attitude that valued the collective over the individual. The American Humanist Propaganda Analysis paradigm operated to a certain extent in the British Youth Camp the emphasis on developing a critical analysis of propaganda techniques that were part of the Nazi distortion of the German national myth. Also the Historical Sociological propaganda paradigm is useful for explaining the continuation of the British Wilton Park re-education project after the repatriation of the German prisoners of war, with its transformation into an conference centre originally funded by the British Foreign Office.

In all the Allied re-education projects, we see the focus on the respective national myths as central to a Radical curriculum perspective approach. The Soviet Union integrates its national myth into the Marxist-Leninist political philosophy of the Antifa schools. Their analysis of German history confronts the German prisoners of war with their political choice of supporting or rejecting the Nazi regime, posing membership in the KPD, the German Communist Party, as an alternative. Both the U.S. and British re-education projects proposed revisions of German history, making a liberal democracy the logical choice for a new Germany interested in reintegration into the ‘community of nations’. All three directly challenged the Nazi version of the German national myth that sought to justify an authoritarian, dictatorship as the true expression of the German spirit. This demonstrates the central role of the national myth within the Radical curriculum perspective. However the combination of this Radical curriculum perspective with the Academic Rationalist curriculum perspective implies the
implicit role of the national myth within the Academic Rationalist approach. The Radicals
normally seek to transform the national myth while the Academic Rationalist confirms the
existing national myth of the domestic population. The application of these two curriculum
perspectives to a non-domestic student body that highlights this inherent role of the national
myth.

Alternately, the restricted use of the Existentialist curriculum perspective implies the
oppositional status of the Allied authorities towards the German prisoners of war as a student
population. The use of election of camp officers in the British Youth Camps and the mock-
elections at Wilton Park are the most obvious example of Existentialist’s belief that it is the
student’s individual experience that is the basis of the real curriculum within a school. Within
the Youth Camps, these elections were quite popular. However, given the limited role of the
German camp officers with respect to their prison situation, the elections did not provide the
‘democratic experience of sharp argument leading to compromise’ idealized in the lectures. In
the Wilton Park re-education project, the elections were discontinued after the German
prisoners of war began to take them seriously, with the KPD winning the elections in one
case.276

The Existentialist curriculum perspective’s concern with the internal motivation of the
student raises a different aspect in the Soviet Union’s re-education projects. Those working in
these re-education projects sought to recruit the German prisoners of war to the KPD, the
German Communist Party, in anticipation of their eventual repatriation to Germany. The
recruitment was optional and didn’t reflect significantly on their privileges or restrictions while
they remained prisoners of war. Thus, individual German prisoners of war joining the KPD
must reflect their internal motivation, whether one assumes a 'true believer' or an opportunist motivation, rather than external coercion. Likewise remaining a member of the KPD after repatriation, when they were no longer prisoners of war, must reflect either a true commitment or at least continued opportunism on the part of the individual. Either way, the decision is based on the internal motivation of the individual German. While the Existentialist curriculum perspective addresses this issue, the oppositional presupposition of propaganda paradigm precludes this option. Yet these Soviet re-education projects were explicitly propagandistic.

This disparity between the propaganda paradigm and curriculum perspective will be addressed in the next chapter by a proposal for an Existentialist propaganda paradigm that acknowledges the role of internal motivation in the propaganda situation.

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Keezer refers to this event as a joke the German prisoners of war were playing on their wardens. The PRO records indicate a more serious intent behind these elections with censored mail revealing discussions of the issues with party members of the respective socialist and communist parties in Germany. See Keezer, Dexter M. *A Unique Contribution to International Relations: The Story of Wilton Park*. London: McGraw-Hill, 1973; see also PRO: RG FO939, Foreign Office - German Section, Vol. 214 / Political Re-education Reports, 1945-48.
Chapter 9 Conclusion: An Equitable Approach to the Analysis of Propaganda and Education

What can the re-education projects conducted by the Soviet Union, the U.S. and Britain with German prisoners of war tell us about the nature of propaganda and education? As these projects do not readily fit within the normal concerns of propaganda analysis or curriculum analysis within education, an understanding of their source, nature and purpose offers useful insights into the natures of these two forms of persuasive communication.

This chapter presents the conclusions developed from the preceding analysis of the propaganda paradigms, the curriculum perspectives, and the Allied political re-education projects. These conclusions include: an appreciation of the complex interaction between the historical context and a government’s propaganda, with special reference to the role of the national myth. Secondly, comparison of the premises and reasoning behind propaganda paradigms and curriculum perspectives clarifies the distinctions between, as well as the similarity of, these two forms of persuasive communication. This latter comparison leads to the proposal of the addition of an Existentialist propaganda paradigm.

Importance of the historical interpretive framework

These Allied political re-education projects were the product of and explicitly linked to their historical context. The Soviet Union’s re-education projects began as little more than the front-line propaganda of an army in a poor military situation. The subsequent development of the international Free Germany Movement reflected the traditional political approach of the Communist Party in seeking to create an agitational movement in other countries to support the Soviet Union. Likewise, the overt use of KPD members for propaganda purposes fit with the normal functioning of the Comintern. Both Socialist Parties and Communist Parties were openly organised on an international basis with national parties being members. This a feature
that the liberal democratic parties existing in the U.S. and Britain lacked. Thus the Soviet Union
was the only one of the Allies that offered, or could guarantee, a direct link between
cooperation in their re-education projects and a future organisation operating in Germany after
repatriation. While individual German prisoners of war, who worked with U.S.\textsuperscript{277} and British
authorities, were subsequently integrated into the West German government, there was no
general policy of integration.

In all three cases, the re-education projects sought to create 'cooperative personnel'
because of the decision to militarily occupy Germany after defeat. The British re-education
projects would never have happened if reparations had not included the use of German
prisoner of war labour. Normally, soldiers are repatriated as soon as they present no future
military threat, i.e. after a peace treaty has been signed.

Perhaps the most striking historical feature is the changing emphasis in the British re-
education projects from an emphasis on denazification based on a reworking of the German
national myth to a denazification based on a shift in the individual morality of each German
soldier.\textsuperscript{278} This shift allowed the British to sidestep a political analysis of the problem of
Nazism, substituting a moral analysis. The anti-communism of the Nazi programme echoed
the anti-communism of the developing Cold War - something the Nazi prisoners of war did
not miss.\textsuperscript{279}

\textit{The Role of the National Myth}

The central role of the national myth for historical or political educational purposes
was demonstrated by the fact that all Allied re-education projects included attempts to re-write

\textsuperscript{277} See NARA: RG 389, Vol. 441 / 695, Names of some former special prisoners of war with more important positions from
\textsuperscript{278} See the discussion about collective guilt above. See also Faulk, Henry. \textit{Group Captives: The Re-education of German Prisoners of War\n in Great Britain}. London: Chatto & Windus, 1977.
\textsuperscript{279} See PRO: RG FO371, Foreign Office - Political, Vol. 39160 / The National Socialist Creed: FORD paper, 1944. and PRO:
the German national myth to a version more amenable to the tastes of the captor government. It was precisely the inter-national nature of these re-education projects that highlights the role of the national myth for both propaganda and education. A national myth is created for and responds to the current history of a country. The Nazi national myth portrayed Germany as wronged by the other nations of Europe in the aftermath of WWI, justifying the aggression against neighbouring countries. It also proposed the ‘natural right’ of Germany to lead all for Europe and therefore the logical creation of “Fortress Europe”. Each Allied country modified this myth to fit with their own national myth. Thus the national myth is shown to be a good example of ideology as Wolf defines it, but, in this case, operating between nations.

*Competing Multiple Ideologies within the Historic Context*

National myths played a central role for the creators of the Allied political re-education projects. Each national myth sought to account for both the current circumstances of the national state involved and its presumed rights and responsibilities. Each re-education project endeavoured to present its state’s national myth as a model while attempting the re-write the presumed German national myth. All national myths were based on the dominant interpretive framework within the discipline of history within that country. Each historical interpretive framework was based on the public ideology of the country. Thus, ideology as an *analytical category* for the socio-political analysis of societies provides a basis for a comparison of academic paradigms within the discipline of history. Wolf argues for the presence of multiple ideologies within any society, representing the struggles for position of the various segments of the populace. Recognition of the role of multiple competing ideologies offers a useful addition to historical analysis.

But multiple ideologies operate at three different levels within the discipline of history, as the Allied propaganda efforts illustrate. First is at the level of paradigms or perspectives
operating within the history discipline itself. The U.S. and British re-education projects differed from that of the Soviet Union in part based on different government ideologies that underlay their historical analysis – the liberal democratic versus the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Secondly, each of the states involved, the Soviet Union, the U.S., Britain and Germany, were operating within an acceptance of their own national myth as true and as the standard for judging the national myths of the other countries. The concept of competing national state ideologies is useful in explaining the different revisions of the German national myth presented to the prisoners of war in the Allied re-education projects. Each national myth included ideas about that nation's self-defined rights and responsibilities in the global 'community of nations'.

The U.S. was in the process of consolidating its global economic strength and assuming hegemonic global political leadership, based on that economic strength. Thus the American national myth presented to the German prisoners of war was based on the democratic form as a necessary correlate for capitalist economic development. Britain was moving from a world leadership based on its Empire to secondary status to the United States while still seeking to manipulate allegiances within Europe. The British national myth presented to the German prisoners of war thus focused not on its Empire but on its historical connections with Germany. The Soviet Union was moving from a marginalized country to a world leader through the creation of satellite countries, the economic cooperation of the COMECOM, and so on. The Soviet national myth claimed Germany had nothing to fear from the Soviet Union, which sought economic cooperation and not imperialist conquest of its neighbour like the capitalist countries. However, these national myths fit within different and competing economic ideologies.

While Wolf's definition of ideology contributes to a greater appreciation of any specific society, the word ideology has generally been used to refer to the different political economic
systems of communism, socialism and capitalism. These economic ideologies were seen as
global in application and as antithetical to each other. Certainly the creators of the Allied re-
education projects operated within this use of the term ideology. The U.S. and British re-
education projects existed at a time when, on the international level, there was a shift from the
pre-war anti-communism to war-time cooperation with the Soviet Union to the post-war anti-
communism of the U.S. conceived Cold War. The military agreement with the Soviet Union
never eradicated the anti-communist ideology of the governments of U.S. and Britain, nor the
anti-capitalism of the Soviet Union. Given the military reality that only the Soviet Army was
fighting the Nazi Wehrmacht in Europe from 1941-43, wartime propaganda in the other Allied
countries was constrained in its criticisms of communism. However in the U.S., even before
the end of the war, anti-socialist or communist loyalty investigations had begun, including
investigations of the Special Projects Division re-education personnel.\footnote{See NARA: RG 389, Vol. 459A / 1638, 383.6 General ... American born status of personnel working in reorientation project for Arthur Winstead, House of Representatives, 10-May-45.}

\textit{History, Politics and Propaganda Paradigms}

The various propaganda paradigms were examined as to their ability to incorporate both
the role of historical \textbf{context} and the historical and political interpretive frameworks operating
within the \textbf{content} of the persuasive communication. Rhetorical criticism (in the Humanist
Propaganda Analysis) and Positivist Attitude Change paradigms within propaganda analysis,

\footnotetext{See NARA: RG 389, Vol. 459A / 1638, 383.6 General ... American born status of personnel working in reorientation project for Arthur Winstead, House of Representatives, 10-May-45.}
Attitude Change do recognise the potential impact of the form of communication itself – "the medium is the message. However, the rhetorical mechanisms of yelling 'fire' within a crowded theatre and on an open beach may be the same but the outcome in terms of human behaviour is quite different. Recognition of the historical context requires analysing the when, where and politically why this communication happened, as well as a recognition of a historical-political interpretive framework operating within the content.

This correction would be a fairly simple for these propaganda paradigms to make if there existed a single accepted paradigm for political functioning at various levels of political interactions from the local to the international level. But political analysis is a highly contested area even within the limited framework of academia. Such an analysis needs to start by identifying the interpretive frameworks which underlie the message. The Allied re-education projects suggest that central to this analysis would be the recognition of unquestioned national myths serving to construct the message both within and outside of the state in question.

The examination of the Allied re-education projects demonstrated that one difference between the U.S. and British projects and that of the Soviet Union was the national myth of the Soviet Union as the motherland of socialism and thus the reference point for communists in all countries. In the Antifa schools, this concept integrated well with both the academic fields of historical-political analysis and with the conjunctural foreign policy needs of the Soviet Union. Thus, the German émigrés, members of the German Communist Party (the KPD), presented a logically coherent framework for understanding the history of Germany and the role of German patriotism in ridding the country of Nazism which was combined with a loyalty to the Soviet Union. There was no equivalent unifying historical-political theme for the U.S. or British re-education projects. Each country presented itself as a potential model for democratic functioning and attempted to rewrite the German national myth to emphasize the
‘missed opportunity’ for democracy but could not claim that loyalty to the U.S. or England was logically integral to Germany’s future. The transformation into the new Cold War world order offered the basis for a loyalty requirement in the form of capitalism versus communism. However, this Cold War historical-political interpretive framework also required the splitting of Germany, something that remained unacceptable to the German national myth. By focusing exclusively on the mechanisms as the defining characteristic of what constitutes propaganda, Rhetorical criticism and the Positivist Attitude Change approaches fail to note the links between the content of the message and the social, historical political interpretive frameworks operating, weakening the explanatory power of these paradigms.

But there are also political frameworks operating as presuppositions within the propaganda paradigm themselves. Thus both the Humanist Propaganda Analysis (Sproule) and the Neo-marxist Feminist Rhetoric Critique (McKerrow) paradigms insist upon the need to historicize rhetoric analysis but have different political purposes for doing so. As McKerrow notes, Sproule is defending the liberal democracy status quo while the Neo-marxist Feminist Rhetoric Critique seeks to challenge all existing power hierarchies in society including the class-blind liberal democratic ideology. For McKerrow, this is a significant difference between these two paradigms. Integrating a recognition of the political ideology functioning as a presupposition to the propaganda paradigms aids in explaining the development of these competing explanatory frameworks.

History, Politics and Curriculum Development Perspectives

Unlike propaganda analysis, curriculum developers within education recognise discipline-based divisions in knowledge. Within each discipline, curriculum developers expressly recognise the operation of paradigms or interpretive frameworks and are potentially open to the

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recognition of multiple paradigms operating within a single discipline. Within each school system, the curriculum is sanctioned by a accredited institution within the community. The recognition of multiple-interpretive frameworks within a single discipline may come when there is a challenge to the dominant paradigm within a course. The challenge to schools that include sex education within the core curriculum based on an Enlightenment value system is contested in many places from a religious or 'family-values' interpretive frameworks.

Within the Allied re-education projects, especially the special schools projects, there was a respect for the dominant (within each country) historical political paradigms as the basis for the content of the courses. However, in the U.S. Intellectual Diversion project this concern for a 'comparative historical political analysis' was abridged to allowing only those films that presented the U.S. society in a positive light to be shown to the German prisoners of war. Similarly, the British focus on a moral lapses as the key problem with Nazi ideology avoided addressing directly the German national myth in historical-political terms.

Education's recognition of historical-political frameworks operating within the various disciplines is not always accompanied by a recognition of these frameworks operating within the curriculum perspectives themselves. Reid explicitly rejects a political analysis as the basis for creating useful categories for understanding curriculum and downplays the importance of political grouping around specific perspectives. Thus Reid²⁸² asserts that politically radical people may be as committed to a Systematizer perspective as the most conservative elements. Others, such as Anyon²⁸³, explicitly assert a political framework within their curriculum analysis. Thus curriculum developers within education recognise the existence of historical and

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political interpretive frameworks but their inclusion, as the basis of analysis, remains a contested area.

**Comparison of Propaganda Paradigms and Curriculum Perspectives**

Distinctions exist at the level of the functioning of the analytical frameworks represented by propaganda paradigms and curriculum perspectives. Distinctions also exist at the pragmatic level between propaganda and education. This section presents conclusions about these similarities and differences, beginning at the more analytical level.

The purpose of the propaganda paradigms is generally to describe the mechanisms operating at different levels of analysis. Given propaganda's negative connotation, the paradigms offer a critical analysis rather than a prescriptive format. The prescriptive form of propaganda analysis is renamed 'Public Relations' and is treated as a separate field of study. Both Positivist Attitude Change and Humanist Propaganda Analysis (in the work of the Propaganda Institute) focus on the individual level, identifying the mechanisms of persuasion seen as effective at this level. There is no apparent concern with the role of censorship as the historical associate of state propaganda. By contrast, the Historical Sociological, Neo-marxist Feminist Rhetoric Critique and Comparative Rhetoric Critique paradigms all focus on the societal level, looking for the mechanisms of persuasion and censorship as linked to institutions within societies. Ellul (Historical Sociological) does offer a psychoanalytic analysis of individual susceptibility to propaganda but this is not the purpose of his paradigm which rather demonstrates the state's need for propaganda. The Comparative Rhetoric Critique focuses on the mechanisms by which the bourgeois class is able to control the content of a nominally independent press, reinforcing Ellul's analysis of the state's need for propaganda by demonstrating the mechanism operating in states that use little direct censorship.
Approaches to curriculum perspectives historically served a prescriptive function of providing advice to educational practitioners on how to create curriculum. The Systematizer and Existentialist tended to focus on the practice at the classroom level, exemplified by the Systematizer's desire to create a 'teacher-proof' curriculum. The Deliberators focused at the level of being prescriptive of each individual school, while the Radicals focused on the city, region, or national school board levels. Schwab, the theoretical source of the Deliberator perspective, recognises this prescriptive role and suggests that the curriculum specialist might also want to influence political policy as related to education. Jackson\textsuperscript{284} notes that this is a shift from the traditional purpose of curriculum perspective in aiding educational practitioners to an attempt at political persuasion of non-practitioners as well.

An important distinction in terms of the purpose of the analysis exists between propaganda paradigms, which are concerned with political persuasion, and curriculum development, which is concerned with decisions about the institutionalization of competing ideologies into a specific historical framework. Propaganda paradigms are more aware of the political source of the persuasive communication. In popular usage, propaganda denotes persuasive communication from an oppositional source, while education or information is used to describe similar persuasive communication from a source congruent with the individuals' political views. Within curriculum development, Reid's designation of both the Radical and Systematizer curriculum perspectives as based on the 'great idea' category both recognises and confuses this political dimension as he notes that both the left and the right political projects could assume the same curriculum perspective (Systematizer). What Reid does not acknowledge is the liberal democratic political base of the Deliberators, while noting the political base of both the Systematizers (most likely conservative) and the Radicals (left-wing).

\textsuperscript{284} Jackson, Philip W. "Conceptions of Curriculum and Curriculum Specialists". In \textit{Handbook of Research on Curriculum}, ed. Philip
Is there a political base for the Existentialists? Clearly the Existentialists are fervent ‘individualists’. In the Existentialist perspective, this invitation to individualism is allowed to develop without restraint, regardless of the political implications for the liberal democracy project of restricting Individualism to its functioning within the liberal democratic understanding of Civic Responsibility.

**Pragmatic Differences between Propaganda and Education**

No operational definition of either propaganda or education exists that allows for a strict distinction between these two forms of persuasive communication. However common usage indicates a series of utilitarian factors that lead to a fairly consistent differentiation.

*Time Frame and Political Responsiveness*

As noted in the last chapter, a fundamental difference between education and propaganda is the **time frame** involved. The accustomed time frame for curricular concerns in education is lengthy. Curriculum normally denotes a cumulative process that covers the years of formal public education. The presumed time frame for propaganda campaigns varies from a single day’s treatment of a content to longer term campaigns. This different in time frame is linked to the role of each type of communication with respect to political institutions involved. Thus the immediate **responsiveness** to shifting political events represents a key component of propaganda. Domestic and international political factors determine the duration of a propaganda campaign in immediate, direct ways, while educational curricula only respond to political factors over a much longer, often generational, time frame. The Soviet Union’s use of German prisoners of war to leaflet, radio broadcast, or otherwise propagandize front-line German soldiers follows the pattern of propaganda’s short-term responsiveness to current events. The curriculum of the Antifa schools was less responsive to immediate battle outcomes and dealt with long-term perspectives for Germany thus matching education more. The U.S.

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re-education projects were shorter than those of the other two Allies due to shifting domestic political situations, such as the U.S. trade unions' increasing objections to the continued use of German prisoner of war labour. Therefore, the U.S. projects fit more easily within the propaganda framework rather than the educational curriculum framework. In Britain, the short term nature (usually 6 weeks or less) of the general and Youth re-education projects and the frequently changing curriculum of the recurring Wilton Park projects, with their responsiveness to new internal and external political factors, meant that all of Britain's re-education projects best fit the propaganda framework. Likewise, the covert source of these projects within the British Foreign Office reinforces their assignment to propaganda.

Voluntary versus Imposed

With an Enlightenment presupposition of personal free choice, any learning that an individual chooses to do is perceived as education. Thus persuasive communication linked to specific religious belief systems will be seen as education by adherents. With the separation of church and state, free choice includes choice of belief systems. The "irrationality" of a belief system, as judged by science, is thus not the basis for judging persuasive communication as education or propaganda. Enlightenment rationality is itself an ideology, a belief system associated with the promotion of scientists and managers within society. This does not imply an equality between all ideologies, as some belief systems are more adequate than others for specific purposes. However, learning processes associated with a given ideology or belief system tend to be seen as education by adherents while those associated with other antithetical belief systems tend to be perceived as propaganda. In addition, restriction of choice through censorship is a key characteristic of propaganda. This limitation on the choice of interpretive frameworks also operates within educational curriculum. For instance, Creationism as an interpretive framework for the explanation of the origin of species in Biology courses is
contested within the public schools systems in the U.S. Given this restriction, these different ideologies may be institutionalized into separate and private schools.

An aspect linked to the concept of free choice is the voluntary or imposed nature of the learning process. Those learning processes forced upon the individual will more likely be seen as propaganda. This oppositional character of propaganda is most clearly seen in wartime situations. Clearly, the prisoner status of the audience in the Allies’ re-education projects mitigated against any argument in favour of their voluntary nature. The structural relationships within a prison situation restrict the exercise of the prisoner’s free will as well as limit the range of possible choices involved. Film censorship as part of the U.S. Intellectual Diversion project, which restricted the prisoners’ access to previously available films, is typical of the power of prison control.

Role of training

Another difference between propaganda and education is the visibility of the professionalisation of the relevant productive staff. There is an accepted canon within each academic discipline, and future teachers must demonstrate an adequate proficiency with a given discipline’s material to be considered qualified. Only certified teachers are allowed to teach in the educational system. This certification acts as a socially approved restriction on the content presented within educational institutions. Propaganda, usually as ‘public relations’, has its own canons of training. The professionalisation of the propagandist is more in terms of the means and mechanisms rather than the content of the training. However unlike the teacher, the propagandist is rarely publicly identified as such. For the Soviet re-education projects, the Bund Deutscher Offiziere and Nationalkomitee "Freies Deutschland" involved German émigrés as staff with their membership in the KPD as the main qualification. The Antifa schools, however, had certified professors for much of the curriculum. In the U.S. re-education
projects, only those Army officers involved in the Idea Factory and the Special Schools had any academic qualifications. The Intellectual Diversion project recruitment was based almost exclusively on simple availability. The British re-education projects also reflected this combination with Wilton Park having the highest proportion of staff with an academic background. These pragmatic differences are the basis on which judgements of whether some persuasive communication constitutes propaganda or education are made.

**Contrasting natures of propaganda and education**

*Propaganda*

Perhaps the key assumption about propaganda is its **oppositional** nature with the benefit to the source rather than the audience of the persuasive communication. The goal of propaganda is conjunctural in nature, often linked to a specific action with respect to a specific event. This is what Ellul referred to as agitational propaganda, in contrast with his notion of integration propaganda. The goal of propaganda is often to provide an interpretive framework for the understanding of an event and the promotion of a specific attitude towards that event. Thus, the focus is on the **cognitive** as well as the emotional component of attitudes.

Stereotypes are cognitive categories, with emotional components, which provide for a rapid interpretation of interpersonal events by limiting the complexity of the situation. Stereotypes are de-individualized by nature, that is, not based on knowledge of the individual, offering either a positive or negative assessment of the person. The Allied re-education projects all operated with a stereotype of the German soldier based on the developers’ perception of the national myth. The Soviet Union’s political analysis of Germany’s development, along with the use of German nationals, resulted in a less stereotyped approach. The British use of a ‘collective guilt’ approach was a rationalisation for a stereotype-based approach. This British approach was highly ‘propagandistic’ in the sense that propaganda is concerned with the
Manipulation of the emotional more than the cognitive aspects of attitudes. Propaganda can be seen as a form of moral training, promoting the evaluation of something as good or bad. By contrast, the cognitive component of attitudes always implies some sort of comparative or impartial basis for validity.

An implicit assumption about the nature and role of propaganda comes from its historical background flowing out of the Enlightenment critique of the Catholic Church such that a ‘belief system’ was contrasted with ‘rationalism based on empirical evidence’. Thus, in modern usage, propaganda has come to mean persuasive communication based on a ‘belief system’, which omits if not specifically denies rational claims and contradictory empirical data. Even when the institutional source is the government and not a religious institution, a belief-system-based distorting effect is presumed to exist. This is the essence of the Herman and Chomsky argument for a comparative rhetorical analysis, calling for the same standard for judging the positive or negative values of all historical cases, to prevent the news from being distorted by the political interests of the U.S. or capitalist ruling class or for that matter of the bureaucratic castes in power elsewhere.

When attitude change is the goal of propaganda, measurement by questionnaires is the main measure of efficacy. This is clearly different from the measurement of achievement by exams within education. Rather than repetition (the general remedy within education for ‘wrong answers’), usually the propaganda is changed in an attempt to be more effective.

Education

In contrast with the conjunctural concerns of propaganda, the curriculum within education is understood as a developmental process. This developmental assumption is based on the need to train children to be functional in their future roles in adult society. From a
political economy analysis the role of education is the generational reproduction of labour power with the skills and attitudes appropriate to the myriad of necessary roles each society needs. Education is assumed to be non-oppositional because of its cultural role as an extension of the socialization of children. Given the role of education as preparation for adult roles, learning is assumed to be long-term, relatively holistic, linked to current (or future) personal experience, and thus not just the result of persuasive communication. This cultural social approval means that education, unlike propaganda, is always an overt rather than covert activity.

A key problem with seeing the Allied re-education projects as education is that they did not have this sanction of a German societal institution. Again, the Soviet Union’s project was something of the exception in its link to the KPD (the German Communist Party) as part of the institutions of established German society and the role of the German émigrés as teachers who, like the German prisoners of war, would be returning to live in Germany.

*Emerging Paradigm within Propaganda: Existentialist Dimension*

What this dissertation makes evident in the analysis of propaganda paradigms is an emerging equivalent to the Existentialist perspective within curriculum development – a self-motivating source for an individual’s adoption of belief systems. The oppositional presumption inherent in propaganda analysis creates a problem. The analyst assumes that the individual being propagandized is a passive object being manipulated. The analyst leaves out the individual’s consciously making choices about beliefs and actions. This judgement about the individual’s belief system is made from the outside by the propaganda analyst, who presumes to know what constitutes the ‘best interests’ of the individual.

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283 Schwab’s (and others) critique of scientists’ ‘commitments’ to the various components of their scientific theory affirms the role of belief systems in the functioning of science itself.
Individuals rarely believe that their own belief system is incorrect, the simple result of persuasive communication that is really to the benefit of someone else. All people are able to justify their belief systems, although few may use the forms of Enlightenment rationalism or science to do so. Similar to the nature of the ‘real curriculum’ for the Existentialist curriculum perspective, the justification for belief systems rests on the self-perceived authentic interests of the individual, most often linked to her or his own specific historical experiences.

This sense of ‘authenticity’ as a separate source of validation or truth is part of the Enlightenment-based culture’s response to the rift between explanation of human behaviour based on rational empirical science (dealing only with the repeatable and predictable) and the human experience which is always individually historical and highly various. Recognising the reality of the creation of desires and the psychological manipulation that reproduces an unequal power structure, the humanist therapeutic tradition within psychology\(^{286}\) promoted ‘authenticity’ as an individually defined, experiential, phenomenological-based form of truth. This is a form of truth-proof distinct from either empirical science or religious revelation – the two forms recognised by Ellul in his powerful but flawed analysis of propaganda.

The Existentialist curriculum perspective focuses explicitly on the experience of the student as the real definition of the valid curriculum – in specific contrast to the socially, governmentally prescribed curriculum. There is no equivalent within propaganda paradigms – as the very concept of propaganda implies manipulation from the outside, rather than the self-acting individual seeking explanation. Ellul is the only theorist who recognises that the individual seeks out propaganda, that propaganda is not just imposed from the outside. But for Ellul, the content of what the individual accepts as explanations is simply the outcome of previous manipulation, including the creation of false needs. In this analysis, he echoes the...
Marxist concept of 'false consciousness'. Ellul's use of a Freudian psychodynamic paradigm, based on an anti-social assumption about human motivation, reinforces the negativity of his analysis.

The cognitive paradigm within psychology would argue for a conscious problem-solving seeking after knowledge by the individual, a self-generated seeking after both confirmation of experience but also broader understanding of social events in the world. Cognitive research has shown that individuals develop strategies on how to solve problems, along with their inherent interpretive frameworks, not just the solutions to individual problems. The socialization of children within the family, as well as formal education in the schools, are both training of this type. It is the retarded child who, being unable to grasp the categorisation of problems as calling forth a common strategy for their solution, must be taught the solution of each problem separately.

A specific strain of research within cognitive psychology has been on moral development of the child as distinct from their logical or intellectual development. Jean Piaget’s work in the 1920s in Switzerland saw mathematical-logical development as intellectual development and moral development as simply a form of this logical development. This was extended by Lawrence Kohlberg in the U.S. By the 1970s, feminist research in the U.S. challenged this definition of morality suggesting that girls and boys had different value systems underlying their moral thinking, with girls valuing an inclusive caring ideal while boys valued a rule bound.

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286 The humanist therapeutic tradition in psychology is generally associated with Carl Rogers and his development of client-centered therapy.
competition ideal. Carol Gilligan's argument for extensive gender differences has been only partially confirmed, suggesting that the different moralities do not break down on gender lines. However this work has led to the idea of different moralities and thus the possibility of different developmental processes for each individual. Research about how the contents of these moralities are learned has led to the development of the model of their incorporation through memory of the literal voices of those people surrounding the child as part of the normal developmental process. Research finds children repeating, mimicking in tone and inflection, the moral statements of those adults surrounding them, regardless and evidently unaware of the logical contradictions inherent in the different statements. This fits well with Ellul's contention that most formal education is experienced as either illogical or more likely as compartmentalized knowledge that is not and never will be made part of a unified, coherent, logical interpretive framework for the adult thinker. Such a model also fits well with Wolf's thesis of the simultaneous operation of multiple ideologies with their different moral prescriptions. This 'internalisation of actual speech' model of moral development also provides a possible social-historical basis for the 'authenticity' that is the basis of the Existentialist curriculum perspective.

The other social science that deals with individual belief systems is religion (as distinct from theology which is the study of the meaning and canonized interpretation of specific sacred texts). Religion notes the almost universal empirical reality among humans of religious belief – religious belief as distinct from practical problem solving. Religious studies ascribe this to the human condition of awareness of self-death and thus the need to answer the existential questions of 'who am I and what is the purpose of my existence'. This logic provides a basis

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for the self-initiated, self motivated search for a belief system to provide such an answer – and the potential basis for an Existentialist propaganda paradigm analogous to the Existentialist curriculum perspective. Religious studies also notes the collective or social nature of a religious belief system as having been adopted by significant segments of the population. It is this social, collective nature of the belief system, rather than an idiosyncratic individual, that creates the credibility of the existential explanation.

An Existentialist propaganda paradigm would argue that all humans will develop a belief system in addition to whatever other cognitive problem-solving capacities, including moral problem-solving style or capacity, they might develop. Each of these cognitive frameworks (practical problem solving, morality, existential belief system, etc.) is relatively autonomous of the others – although clearly all religions include moral directives within their purview.

The Enlightenment Rational assumption is that the individual will adopt the belief system or ideology that best promotes his or her own self-interest. An individual’s recognition of the medium and long term social consequences of her or his actions, as opposed to possible immediate gain, is the basis of the ‘enlightened self-interest’ presupposition and its role within liberal democracy. The negativity associated with the concept of propaganda is hypothesized based on the assumption that the mass media (and sometimes educational institutions) operate to instill a belief system against the individual’s self-interest.

This leaves open to interpretation what constitutes the content of ‘self-interest’ which is clearly based on the choice of value systems. One of the strongest critiques, or at least most repeated critiques, of the mass media is that it indoctrinates the audience in a materialistic value system such that ‘he who has the most toys, wins’. All of the self-help popular psychology approaches today (which vie to replace traditional religious belief systems) include a ‘service to others and to the community’ as a key component because of their analysis that since only one
person can 'have the most toys', can 'win', and then only temporarily, within the materialist value system, this system creates only losers -- with the attendant depression and its other negative outcomes such as addictive behaviour, etc.

Adding an Existentialist propaganda paradigm fits within a multiple ideologies framework. This paradigm evokes the necessity of an analysis of the content of 'self-interest' as it functions within social relationships. This in turn requires a political analysis, as politics is the concept for the power relationship between individuals and various institutions within society. Herein lies the importance of Wolf's definition of ideology as the means and justification for the reproduction of an unequal power structure with some groups having both greater access to the goods and services of a society and the right to restrict and determine the work of others. Self-interest for those individuals in the bottom group would be to increase their access to the goods and services of the society -- without meaning that their actions necessarily operate to the decrease of the inequality itself. All hierarchical societies offer models where the most powerless may individually gain access to the elite status, at least theoretically. Only when a group or category -- as opposed to an individual -- seeks to redress the inequality is the structural basis of an ideology challenged.

An Existentialist propaganda paradigm would solicit and rely upon the individual's view of her or his belief system. One of the remarkable features of the Allied re-education projects was the extent to which there was a denial of the recognition of the individual German soldier's possibly seeing a positive value system inherent in the Nazi ideology and therefore a failure to engage the German prisoners of war at that level. The only aspect of the belief system directly attacked was the 'Führerprinzip', the belief that Germany's strength lay within an authoritarian strong state. Both the U.S. and the British challenged the denigration of the role of democracy
within the Nazi version of the German national myth. The Soviet Union’s Antifa schools offered a class analysis linked to a revolutionary project to replace the project of a Volk regime of the Nazis. The British re-education project, historically following the publicity about the Nazi death camps, assumed that Nazism was an extremely negative ideology that had no positive credibility and thus all those who accepted it suffered from an individual moral failing. This led to the British focus on the moral conversion of the individual German prisoner of war.

**General conclusions for modifying existing approaches**

Comparative analysis of the Allied re-education projects shows the utility of recognition of multiple ideologies operating simultaneously. Likewise, the utility of recognizing the role that an historical-political analysis can play within curriculum development has been presented, using the example of the German prisoner of war re-education projects to show a weakness in the supposed ahistoricism of curriculum perspectives in education. An historically specific presupposition (the national myth) played a critical role within both the curriculum of the Humanities departments from which the developers of the re-education projects came and in the development of the curriculum of the re-education projects. If the goal of an Enlightenment-based rationalist science is to allow comparability across national boundaries (increasingly the case in today’s global economy), then integrating a recognition of the role of national myth – with all the contradictions it creates – is useful.

Likewise, an argument has been presented for the need to insert an historical-political analysis into the rhetorical analysis propaganda paradigm, again using as an example the manipulations of the national myth within the re-education projects.

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290 Most, if not all, religions would argue that self-interest functions primarily in the relationship of the individual to a deity, and only secondarily in social relations with other humans and human communities.

Finally, it has been concluded that there is a need to adapt some of the Existentialist curriculum perspective to propaganda paradigms in order to fill a serious lacuna in the existing approaches to propaganda analysis.
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