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Socialist Communitarianism and its Values for Contemporary Society

Urbain Morelli

A Thesis in

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Philosophy

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Concordia University

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ABSTRACT

Socialist Communitarianism and its Values for Contemporary Society

Urbain Morell

The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate how a socialist communitarian ethic, rather than a Western capitalist market ethic, provides the necessary foundations for the existence of democracy, freedom and equality, in contemporary society. In order to show this, I will use as my primary texts Karl Polanyi's *The Great Transformation* and Michael Walzer's *Spheres of Justice*. Taken together, these two books provide a rich backdrop against which democracy can be defended. Although Polanyi and Walzer reflect two quite different approaches and attitudes to questions concerning social and political philosophy, I will argue that Polanyi's version of socialism and Walzer's theory of communitarianism are not irreconcilable. When amalgamated, these two theories can be made into a solid socialist communitarian ethic that provides the necessary foundations for democracy.
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Introduction

The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate how a socialist communitarian ethic, rather than a Western capitalist market ethic, provides the necessary foundations for the existence of democracy¹ in present day North American complex market-welfare society². In order to show this, I will use as my primary texts Karl Polanyi's The Great Transformation and Michael Walzer's Spheres of

¹For the purposes of this thesis I will take a very general view of "democracy". "Democracy" then, is meant to describe not only a form of government, but to describe how well a society promotes freedom and equality. "Democracy" is therefore tied to the notions of freedom and equality and their just distributions.

²All further instances of the term "society", and the adjectives used to temporally locate it, such as "contemporary", "our", "modern", "bureaucratic", "welfare", "market", "economic", "recent", and "current" will all be meant to describe and reflect only present day North American complex market-welfare society. Although Polanyi is referring to "society" of the 1940's (and sometimes of a characteristic of "society" from the nineteenth century that has continued into the 1940's) and although Walzer is referring to "society" of the 1980's it is my contention that the problems of society, during the, albeit different, times in which Polanyi and Walzer wrote, still hold in the 1990's. I argue that the problems of society that Polanyi and Walzer identify still characterize present day North American complex market-welfare society. Furthermore, those instances in which the term "society" has a specific temporal reference, different from above, will be directly indicated in the text. As well, those instances in which the term "society" is to have the generic meanings of "a" society, "any" society, "some" society, "we", "one", etc. will remain untouched and I let the reader determine their meaning by way of their contextual reference.
Justice. Taken together, these two books provide a rich backdrop against which democracy can be defended. Although Polanyi and Walzer reflect two quite different approaches and attitudes to questions concerning social and political philosophy, I will argue that Polanyi's version of socialism and Walzer's theory of communitarianism are not irreconcilable. When amalgamated, these two theories can be made into a solid socialist communitarian ethic that provides the necessary foundations for democracy. Socialist communitarianism then, as I will use the term, simply refers to that combination of Polanyi's and Walzer's theories that produces a pluralistic account of the theory of goods and which is able to ensure and promote a political climate in which the opportunities for and occasions of power are shared equally among every citizen. This will become much clearer as this thesis is developed. The socialist communitarian ethic, by combining Polanyi's socialist changes and Walzer's theory of complex equality and distributive justice ensures that the social cohesiveness of society is protected so as to ensure that democracy properly exists in our society and that the appropriate, coherent, and non-arbitrary limits of freedom are properly addressed.

My thesis then, will be comprised of three chapters: the first on Polanyi's socialist ideal of society as an
alternative to capitalism, the second on Walzer's communitarian ideal of society as an alternative to capitalism, and the third on how a combination of the two can answer specific problems in social and political philosophy. Both the first and second chapters will follow similar outlines, each comprised of four sections. In chapter one I will set out to identify Polanyi's arguments against capitalism, describe his socialism, provide criticism of his theory, and demonstrate how his theory can be strengthened by Walzer. Similarly, in the second chapter, I will identify Walzer's arguments against capitalism, describe his communitarianism of complex equality and distributive justice, provide criticism of his theory, and demonstrate how his theory can be strengthened by Polanyi. Lastly, in the final chapter I will demonstrate how Polanyi and Walzer, taken together, form a socialist communitarian ethic that provides the necessary foundations for democracy. To do this, I will examine the social structures of the Teton or Lakota Sioux during the period from 1830 to 1870. Comparing the spheres of a) politics, b) family and kinship, c) security and welfare, and d) recognition of this Sioux society with Walzer's treatment of these spheres will show how the Sioux exemplify a working socialist communitarian ethic that ensures and promotes the kind of democracy that contemporary society lacks. This in
turn will enable me to demonstrate how the socialist communitarian ethic can resolve several philosophical problems concerning threats to democracy in contemporary society.

Before beginning this thesis some preliminary questions must be addressed in order to properly define the scope and direction that this thesis will take. Why do I use Polanyi and Walzer as my primary sources and not some other philosophers who discuss the problems of alienation? Although Polanyi wrote in the 1940's and Walzer in the 1980's, they share many similarities. Both Polanyi and Walzer, in their own ways, attempt to address the problem of dominance. Both want to ensure that society remains protected from abuses of power, and both want to ensure that democracy exists in contemporary society. Polanyi's and Walzer's works fit well together and seem to flow into one another. However, there is still a stronger reason for using both of them. The problems of society which concerned Polanyi and Walzer, in their respective times, still hold today in the 1990's. The problems created by the self-regulating market, the loss of social cohesion or connectedness with others, the way social goods serve as a means of domination, and so on still characterize present day North American society. Thus, Polanyi and Walzer
demonstrate the existence of such social problems and provide us with alternatives which can then be combined to form the socialist communitarian ethic.

Polanyi and Walzer are used instead of other writers who discuss alienation, such as Marx, Weber, etc., primarily because they make no attempt to label the social problems they identify, such as the loss of social cohesion or connectedness with others, as alienation. Although the problems of society identified by Polanyi and Walzer could be labeled as alienation, I believe that the term "alienation" does not reflect the spiritual dimension that is lost in contemporary society. By "spiritual dimension" I mean some sense of being connected in important ways with nature and with human beings. We have lost the sense of understanding, appreciating, and respecting the calmness and awesomeness of nature, and the value of human beings. For example, there is something that happens to people when they go out into the woods on a camping trip. It may take only a few hours and usually not more than a day, but when they are surrounded by the trees, the fresh air, the water, the clear sky, there is a certain calmness that comes over them and they begin to feel as though they are surrounded by a life greater than themselves. At this moment they feel the awesomeness and purity of nature. They are not thinking of
land as a commodity, as having a merely instrumental value, but are viewing land in a different way, as being a part of themselves and they a part of it. Nature provides for our needs and we must provide for its needs. We do not have to believe in any pantheistic relationship with nature, but we do have to realize that we are vitally linked with it, which is very different from the view of land as a commodity. The Sioux, as well as other Aboriginal peoples, seem to have experienced this spiritual connectedness very well. Among the Sioux for example, there was a spiritual connectedness to all that was around them; the land, the sky, the trees, the animals, every individual, the whole earth were all part of each other. The Sioux felt that they were somehow linked to all of nature. They had something that we do not have, a spiritual link to nature that was captured in their religion and integrated into their social practices. For example, the Sioux, when hunting, killed only what they needed to survive. They did not kill the first animal they saw, but thanked the Great Spirit for his plenitude and awaited the next animal. These sorts of things were not only done for religious or spiritual reasons, but were also a means of ensuring that there would be game in the future. Even when the Sioux did something as little as pick a plant from the ground, they would always leave an offering of tobacco in its place. Furthermore, their religion, with the Superior
gods; the Rock, the Earth, the Sky, and the Sun, for example, demonstrate their shared understanding of the importance of being connected to nature. The term "alienation" does not seem to capture the loss of this spiritual dimension and Polanyi and Walzer both produce analyses of the social problems of capitalist market society that reflect this more 'spiritual' concern for connection with nature (in Polanyi's work) and connection with other people (in Walzer's work).

Another question that must be addressed is why I use the Sioux as an example of the socialist communitarian ethic, rather than using pre-industrial European society which is closer to us culturally. I have used the Sioux rather than a pre-industrial European society that had social cohesion, such as medieval society, primarily because given the times in which we now live, when so many people are looking for answers to their problems: the loss of jobs, increased poverty, and social dislocation, it seems appropriate to look at the heritage of a group of people in North America who are struggling to have their voices heard by political leaders around the world, who are struggling for self-determination and who are seen by many as having a rich and meaningful culture and history. Furthermore, we are now witnessing Aboriginal people in North America
struggling to recover their values, to preserve, in a way that is compatible with twentieth century reality, the traditions, culture, and language which prevailed in the past. North American Aboriginal peoples have, I believe, many lessons to teach us, lessons that the early Europeans either did not see or completely ignored. They are "confreres", struggling to re-furbish their traditional values. They are trying to do what we need to try to do, namely to restore social cohesion and a sense of connection with the land and with other people. Finally, the Sioux, and other North American Aboriginal peoples are still here, trying to live with us, in the same world in which the rest of us live, whereas pre-industrial European societies no longer exist. Using the Sioux as a case study helps to ground the socialist communitarian ethic.

However, does using the Sioux present a problem since they do not really have any similarity to North American Western culture? No. The purpose of using the Sioux in this thesis is simply to illustrate that the socialist communitarian ethic is not some grand ideal that cannot be located anywhere in history. The Sioux serve as a case study to illustrate what a socialist communitarian society could look like. The Sioux work as a good case study because, as will be shown later on in this thesis, they were
able to organize their society in such a way that it was able to meet the demands of the socialist communitarian ethic, for instance being able to achieve social cohesion within their society and being able to ensure that social goods were properly distributed within each social sphere so as to prevent them from being used as a means of domination. However, using the Sioux in this way is by no means an attempt to argue for remodelling our own society into some form of a hunting and gathering society. Instead, I am arguing that we need to try to understand their reasons for distributing social goods in the ways they did, how they worked out the spheres of family and kinship, security and welfare, politics, recognition, etc., and attempt to incorporate those social understandings into our own society. Furthermore, the Sioux were able to ensure that there was complex equality and distributive justice within their society not because they were economically organized around hunting and gathering, but rather because they distributed social goods according to the demands of the socialist communitarian ethic and because they had certain understandings and values that we simply do not have.

The Sioux then, are used as a case study in order to ground the socialist communitarian ethic. Their understanding of the world, of social goods, and their
system of values all met the demands of the socialist communitarian ethic. Their understandings and values must be re-interpreted in contemporary society. As will be argued later on in this thesis, the welfare state attempts to provide for the needs of all its members, but is unsuccessful. The welfare state lacks the social understandings and social values that the Sioux had in their own social practices. We need to incorporate those understandings and those values into our own social practices.

Later on in this thesis when I discuss Polanyi's socialism it will be shown that one of the necessary changes to society is the removal of land, labor, and money in order to dismantle the self-regulating market. Therefore, some time should now be given to explain what is meant by the phrase "the removal of land, labor, and money" so that its context will be clearly understood when encountered in the main body of this thesis.

The phrase "the removal of land, labor, and money" is used by Polanyi, but it is never really clearly explained by him. On its own it seems to suggest a remover and this is problematic. However, I do not believe that this is
Polanyi's intent. Instead, I would suggest that "the removal of land, labor, and money" is to have a specialized use, that is, what needs to be changed in contemporary society is the attitude that people in contemporary society seem to have toward these entities, that is, we must abandon the idea that land, labor, and money are commodities. For instance, there may have to be definite rules and regulations governing these entities, but they do not have to be and cannot be governed by the structures of an impersonal self-regulating market system. In other words, the point Polanyi is trying to express by means of the term "removal" is simply that contemporary society needs to change its improper understandings of the value of land, labor, and money. We need to give up the idea that there is value in treating these entities as commodities and see that we are linked to nature and to others in ways that go beyond commodification. Therefore, throughout this thesis, "the removal of land, labor, and money" is to mean a shift of perspective with respect to the ways in which we commonly view land, labor, and money. Yet, in making such a change we will need something to replace those former understandings. I suggest that what we need is to regain the ideas and values of land, labor, and money that were present in pre-industrial societies, and in particular that were present in Sioux society. For example, the Sioux had
individually owned property and definite rights of property, but accumulation of more property than was needed was discouraged by the acclaim given to generous activities. For the Sioux, property was for use, not accumulation, and its chief use was bestowing it on others. Likewise the Sioux had a similar view with regard to land. The Sioux had their own land, their own hunting grounds, but it was part of their shared understandings of the value of land that the land belonged to no one and that land be shared with everyone. However, I am not suggesting that we need to distribute property or land in the same ways as the Sioux did. Other distributions more appropriate to our industrial society can be devised which are expressive of such a profound respect for nature and for human beings. Of course this will have to be defended more succinctly than it is here, but for now all that needs to be done is to make clear what is meant by the phrase "the removal of land, labor, and money".

Finally, the question of how such changes can be made to contemporary society must be addressed. Unfortunately, the scope of this thesis does not allow me to completely address and answer this question. However, a brief answer must suffice. There are currently several groups of people that are trying to revive these social values, such as
environmentalists, co-operative organizations, Aboriginal peoples, etc. Such individuals and organizations, as well as myself, are attempting to recover those shared understandings that allow for a respect for nature, land, animals, and human beings. The first step, I argue, is to recover the vocabulary. For instance, we can take the notion of respect that the Sioux had and try to incorporate this attitude into our own social and political structures. Only then can the theory of complex equality and distributive justice do what it is meant to do.
Chapter I

Karl Polanyi's *The Great Transformation* presents solid criticisms of capitalism and provides important insights into the necessary changes that must be made in contemporary society if our shared understanding of the value of democracy is to be protected and ensured. In this chapter I will present Polanyi's criticisms of capitalism and outline his arguments for socialist changes. As well, I will examine the effectiveness of Polanyi's theory by providing criticism of his theory and by analyzing the arguments of several of his critics. Furthermore, it will be shown that despite its limitations, Polanyi's theory can be strengthened by the ideas and concepts defended in Michael Walzer's *Spheres of Justice*.

At the beginning of his book Polanyi states that nineteenth century civilization has collapsed. His book is concerned with the political and economic origins of this event, as well as the great transformation which it ushered in. And what is this great transformation? Polanyi argues that nineteenth century civilization rested on four institutions:

The first was the balance-of-power system which for a century prevented the occurrence of any long and devastating war between the Great Powers. The second
was the international gold standard which symbolized a unique organization of world economy. The third was the self-regulating market which produced an unheard-of material welfare. The fourth was the liberal state. . . . Our thesis is that the idea of a self-adjusting market implied a stark utopia. Such an institution could not exist for any length of time without annihilating the human and natural substance of society (Polanyi, 1944: 3).

The result was the supplanting of a social system in which "exhaustively economic goals were made subservient to more important human and social purposes by a system in which society and its values were enslaved by the profit-motive working through the mechanism of a self-regulating market" (Hartnett, 1944: 203). Thus, according to Polanyi, nineteenth century society took measures to protect itself from the market, but these measures, while impairing the self-regulation of the market, also disorganized industrial life, and thus endangered society in yet another way. "It was this dilemma which forced the development of the market system into a definite groove and finally disrupted the social organization based upon it" (Polanyi, 1944: 4). The general problem for Polanyi then, concerns the interrelations of economic institutions on the one side and all other social institutions on the other. Furthermore, it must be mentioned that Polanyi is concerned with the effects of social change, not with who will make these changes. Having sketched the general theme and purpose of Polanyi's book we must now examine his theory in more detail.
One of Polanyi's central themes is the idea that with the development of the market economy of the nineteenth century, society became "lost to the market" as it became an exploitable commodity. "The reduction of man to labor and of nature to land under the impulsion of the market economy turns modern history into a high drama in which society, the chained protagonist, at last bursts its bonds" (Polanyi, 1944: ix). In other words, Polanyi's main argument against capitalism is that in order to allow the market to become self-regulating the cohesiveness of societal bonds had to be abolished. The automatic regulations of the market: free enterprise, balanced budgets, world commerce, currencies maintained at par, etc., could not guarantee democracy and equality. Polanyi argues that "society alone can guarantee it" (Polanyi, 1944: xi). Although Polanyi does not make it entirely clear what is meant by 'social cohesiveness', it may perhaps be interpreted as relating to human interdependence. That is, the importance of being connected to other members of society. For Polanyi, a 'society' is more than a collection of people or groups of people. A 'society' is defined by the identities of all those people together, of all those groups of people together. For instance, there is a huge difference between the social organization of tribal societies and the social organization of contemporary societies. In a tribal society, every
person must be connected to and responsible for everyone else so as to ensure not only the tribe's safety, but to ensure and protect its social identity. Without its unique social identity, the tribe could cease to exist as it had before. For example, if one person of a war party acts foolishly, that person could endanger the lives of all the other members of the war party. In a tribal society every individual has a specific role to play and these roles are all linked to one another. Because of the important role that each individual serves in tribal society, the loss of one individual could break up the cohesive structure of the tribe. For instance, a tribe may have been known for its great hunters, its diplomatic and fair leaders, etc. These individuals played a central role not only in the group's understanding of its social identity, but also in other tribes' understanding of that particular tribe's social identity. Great hunters were able to provide a large portion of food for the tribe's survival and great leaders were able to provide the tribe with the direction, security, and welfare that distinguished it from other tribes. If these individuals died, the group would suffer as a result. There would be a substantial loss of food or direction and the group would have to suffer the consequences. The importance of food, direction, individuals' generosity, individual roles and functions, etc. were essentially linked
to tribal identity. Thus, if one person died in a tribal society, their loss was felt by every other member of their society because of the importance each person had to the identity of the society as a whole. On the other hand, in contemporary society this connectedness or reliance on others is absent. Of course, contemporary society is much larger than a tribal society and it is impossible to know everyone, but very often we do not even know who our neighbors are. In contemporary society, people are isolated from each other by status, occupation, education, etc. People are valued for their position, their job, etc. They are not valued as being integral to the make-up and identity of the whole society. If a person dies in our society, that loss may be felt by the intellectual community, the familial community, the artistic community or whatever community you like, but that loss does not ultimately change the identity of the whole society. For example, the death of President John F. Kennedy was felt by almost every member of American society, but his death did not alter American social identity. Someone else took his place and American society continued as it had before. Thus, Polanyi is arguing, the self-regulating market economy of contemporary society has destroyed not only human interdependence, but also social identity and therefore society itself. As the market economy took on a life of its own, this "ideal system"
demanded "a ruthless abnegation of the social status of the human being" (Polanyi, 1944: x) by reducing the individual to a commodity called labor and thus enslaving the individual to the demands of the market economy itself. The major tragedy of the Industrial Revolution was not the greed and callousness of profit-seeking capitalists, rather it was the social devastation of this uncontrollable system: the self-regulating market economy.

In chapter 4, Polanyi argues that all economic systems up to the end of feudalism in Western Europe were organized on the principles of reciprocity (sharing food, clothes, etc. with other members of society ensures that they will be shared with you when you need them), redistribution (giving a portion of your supplies to an intermediary, usually a tribal chief, who will hold all supplies for the community and give out a portion at a later date, such as in the case of food shortages, potlatch, annual ceremonies, etc.), or householding (production for one's own use, such as the family's own use), or some combination of the three. Furthermore, Polanyi argues that, "if one conclusion stands out more clearly than another from the recent [early twentieth century] study of early societies it is the changelessness of man as a social being. . . . The outstanding discovery of recent historical and
anthropological research is that man's economy, as a rule, is submerged in his social relationships" (Polanyi, 1944: 46). Hence, before the Industrial Revolution, society was more cohesive and was therefore better able to remain intact while engaged in its economic activities of reciprocity, redistribution, and householding. Prior to the Industrial Revolution, the economy was a facet of human social relationships. For example, in tribal society "the premium set on generosity is so great when measured in terms of social prestige as to make any other behavior than that of utter self-forgetfulness simply not pay" (Polanyi, 1944: 46). Yet, as economic activity progressed into a self-regulating market, the cohesiveness of society could no longer remain of central importance. With the Industrial Revolution, the social values of previous societies were lost, and their social bonds submerged in the economic system.

Polanyi identifies a huge gap in thinking between tribal societies and industrial societies. It is not suggested here that people in tribal societies were any less selfish and egoistic than people in industrial societies, rather the point is that they simply had different perspectives when it came to economics. That is, prior to the nineteenth century, societies were organized along different economic lines. For instance, societies
economically organized by the principle of reciprocity were concerned not with material gain, but with social status. As Polanyi shows, among the Trobriand Islanders of Western Melanesia, the male provides for his sister and her family by giving the best of his produce to them. He receives little immediate material benefit for his actions, but he does earn the credit due to his good behavior. He is compensated for his acts of civic virtue; if he is slack, it is first and foremost his reputation that will suffer. Thus, "the broad principle of reciprocity helps to safeguard both production and family sustenance" (Polanyi, 1944: 48). Societies economically organized on the principle of redistribution function in much the same manner as those of reciprocity. Redistribution rewards civic virtue with good status, but it does tend "to ensure the economic system proper in social relationships. We find, as a rule, the process of redistribution forming part of the prevailing political regime" (Polanyi, 1944: 52). Furthermore, societies economically organized on householding also had a very different economic perspective than did industrial societies of the nineteenth century. As Polanyi states, "the practice of catering for the needs of one's household becomes a feature of economic life only on a more advanced level of agriculture; however, even then it has nothing in common with the motive of gain or with the institution of
markets. Its pattern is the closed group" (Polanyi, 1944: 53). The principle of householding was to produce and store goods for the satisfaction of the wants of the individual or the individual family group. The nature of the institutional nucleus was indifferent and so the need for trade or markets was no greater than in the case of reciprocity and redistribution. "As long as markets and money were mere accessories to an otherwise self-sufficient household, the principle of production for use [householding] could operate" (Polanyi, 1944: 54). Thus, only in industrial market society (as we have today) do we find separate and distinct institutions based on economic motives. Only in industrial market society do we find the motive of material gain. Hence, there is a huge change in economic perspectives as soon as industrial society concerns itself with production for the market.

In chapter 5 Polanyi attempts to outline the nature and origin of markets. He argues that "just as reciprocity is aided by a symmetrical pattern of organization, as redistribution is made easier by some measure of centralization, and householding must be based on autarchy, so also the principle of barter depends for its effectiveness on the market pattern" (Polanyi, 1944: 56). Thus, as the market pattern changes, so also does social control change. Yet, the market pattern, functioning under
the motive of barter, is unique in the fact that only it (the market pattern) is capable of exerting control over the economic system, and this means "no less than the running of society as an adjunct to the market" (Polanyi, 1944: 57). So, instead of the economy being embedded in social relations, social relations are embedded in the economic system and therefore society is shaped in such a way as to allow the market system to function according to its own laws.

We now live in a welfare state\(^1\) which attempts to provide for the needs of all its members, as they understand those needs. However, the effectiveness of the welfare state in this regard is impeded by the underlying structures of the capitalist market ethic functioning within that welfare system. Furthermore, while the welfare state has developed regulations and restrictions on certain kinds of market exchanges, like insider trading, selling people into slavery, etc., it does not enforce those regulations and restrictions in an effective manner. In fact, very often, they are haphazardly enforced. For instance, as a result of

\(^1\) For the purposes of this thesis the term "welfare state" is to be defined as a political community that attempts to provide for the needs of its members, as its members collectively understand those needs. As well, it is to be considered only with regard to its functionings in present day North American society.
their privileged economic position, many corporations are able to find legal loop-holes around such regulations and restrictions because they are able to pay for the best and most knowledgeable attorneys and accountants. These corporations are able to buy their way around such regulations and restrictions because of the underlying structures of the market economy implicit in the welfare state. Furthermore, the welfare state is unable to protect society members from being dominated by others and is unable to provide for the needs of all its members because of the bureaucratic control that is involved in the welfare state's regulations and restrictions. As Michael Ignatieff suggests in his *The Needs of Strangers*,

> the administrative good conscience of our time seems to consist in respecting individual's rights while demeaning them as persons. . . .The strangers at my door have welfare rights, but it is another question altogether whether they have the respect and consideration of the officials who administer these rights" (Ignatieff, 1984: 13).

Many individuals who find themselves relying on the welfare system for support are rendered dependent on and passive to the bureaucratic forms of control within that system. As Kathy Ferguson points out in her *The Feminist Case Against Bureaucracy*,

rules such as those requiring a thirty-day waiting period after application, regardless of the urgency of need, or the repeated trips to the welfare office to show the same papers to the same clerks in order to be "recertified," represent constant harassment to the
client (Ferguson, 1984: 145).

Thus, welfare programs demoralize and debilitate those in desperate need, creating conditions under which people become what they are already said to be. The welfare worker is faced with clients whose problems—lack of employment, education, medical care, housing, food—are complex and interconnected, but each worker can deal only with the specific problems assigned to her or him. As Ferguson shows, the bureaucracy involved in the welfare system creates a situation in which "the welfare worker is prohibited from interacting with the client as a whole person, and in any case the client's problems are so mammoth that the worker is in no position to solve them" (Ferguson, 1984: 140). Therefore, the bureaucracy involved in the welfare system affects both the welfare workers and the clients. The structural environment for the case worker is such that, "no matter what the individual's feelings are towards recipients, she/he is institutionally constrained in terms of actions" (Ferguson, 1984: 139). The client is inevitably caught up in and dragged down by the welfare worker's lack of control within the system and as a result is unable to adequately get his/her needs met.

Another important point raised in Polanyi's fifth chapter is that while most communities have had external
trade, such trade did not necessarily involve markets. External trade was, originally, "more in the nature of adventure, exploration, hunting, piracy and war than of barter" (Polanyi, 1944: 59). All of this changed when the state of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries adopted interventionist measures to manipulate the market. Polanyi argues that the "deliberate action of the state in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries foisted the mercantile system on the fiercely protectionist towns and principalities" (Polanyi, 1944: 65) and thus allowed mercantilism to destroy the particularism of local and intermunicipal trade by breaking down the barriers that once kept these two types of noncompetitive commerce apart, thus clearing the way for a national market economy. However, the effects of mercantilism were unintentional. As Polanyi explains, "what to the modern mind may easily appear as a shortsighted exclusion of competition [by the state] was in reality the means of safeguarding the functioning of markets under the given conditions" (Polanyi, 1944: 66). What theorists misunderstood was that as national markets were developed and regulated, more and more regulations would be needed to maintain such a market system. Hence, mercantilism freed trade from particularism, but at the same time it extended the scope of regulation thus allowing for
the development of one huge self-regulating market.

Polanyi describes the market economy as:

an economic system controlled, regulated, and directed by markets alone; order in the production and distribution of goods is entrusted to this self-regulating mechanism. An economy of this kind derives from the expectation that human beings behave in such a way as to achieve maximum money gains (Polanyi, 1944: 68).

From this description it is possible to understand how the market economy is able to develop a life of its own. As a self-regulating mechanism, the market is allowed to become an organizing power in the economic sphere. In other words, as price, supply, and demand are neither fixed nor regulated and as only such policies and measures are in order which help to ensure the market's self-regulation, the market ensures its monopoly and is therefore able to exert its dominance over the economic sphere. Furthermore, "a self-regulating market demands nothing less than the

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4 The term "monopoly" will be used throughout this thesis to mean the exclusive possession or control of social goods for the sole purpose of exploiting other members of society.

5 The term "dominance" will be used in this thesis to describe a way of using social goods that isn't limited by their intrinsic meanings or that shapes those meanings in its own image (Walzer, 1983: 11). Thus, it is to reflect an abuse of power, as in the case of individuals using the power of their position, wealth, kinship, occupation, etc. as a means of controlling and manipulating those without such power.
institutional separation of society into an economic and political sphere" (Polanyi, 1944: 71). Thus, since society is institutionally separated and since our lives are governed by economic effects, the self-regulating market is also able to exert its dominance in all other spheres of our lives. As Polanyi argues, "such an institutional pattern could not function unless society was subordinated to its requirements. A market economy can exist only in a market society" (Polanyi, 1944: 71). Thus, allowing the market system of an economic society to have a monopoly over the economic sphere ensures its dominance in all other areas of social life.

The dominance of the self-regulating market reveals a crucial point. Self-regulation implies that "all production is for sale on the market and that all incomes derive from such sales" (Polanyi, 1944: 69). However, in tribal societies like those of North American native peoples, production had nothing to do with markets. There were no incomes to be received from one's produce or from one's production. Instead, all of one's produce was shared among the whole tribe, with a portion being given up for emergencies, ceremonies, feasts, etc. Yet, in contemporary society all this is changed. The self-regulation of the market allows the areas of labor, land, and money to be
included within its economic boundaries, as their prices are converted respectively into wages, rent, and interest. To include the elements of labor, land, and money in the economic mechanism is a means of subordinating "the substance of society itself to the laws of the market" (Polanyi, 1944: 71) since labor and land are "no other than the human beings themselves of which every society consists and the natural surroundings in which it exists" (Polanyi, 1944: 71). In other words, when labor, land, and money are incorporated into the economic mechanism, human beings become part of the market system; they become an accessory to the system. As a commodity of the market system, human beings are thought to have no other worth than that of goods and can therefore be controlled through their productivity. Yet, this is not to suggest that human beings have no worth at all. One may have worth as a mother, as a leader of a community, as a teacher, etc., but within the market system, human beings are treated as goods whose labor can be bought and sold. For example, as was stated much earlier, in tribal societies the death of an individual can alter the social identity of the whole tribe, but in contemporary society the death of an individual has little effect on its whole social identity. Jobs can always be filled by other members of society and production can continue. In contemporary society, economic roles have
value based on the impact they have on production in the market and so individuals have worth on the market if they occupy one of these higher economic producing roles. So, in contemporary society, one's worth corresponds not to individual qualities, but to one's contribution to market productivity. Hence, the intrinsic worth of human beings qua human beings is devalued.

As a part of the market system, human beings must function according to the laws of the market and herein lies their subordination: subordination to the market and to those who control and regulate the markets, namely, elite patriarchal power groups. According to Polanyi, the control that the market has over labor, land, and money results in the demolition of contemporary society. For instance, labor power (human beings):

cannot be shoved about, used indiscriminately, or even left unused, without affecting also the human individual. . . In disposing of a man's labor power the system would, incidentally, dispose of the physical, psychological, and moral entity "man" ["human being"] attached to that tag. Robbed of the protective covering of cultural institutions, human beings would suffer from the effects of social exposure; they would die as the victims of acute social dislocation through vice, perversion, crime, and starvation (Polanyi, 1944: 73).

Perhaps Polanyi has exaggerated these effects, but if we look at city ghettos we do see that many of the poor attempt to alleviate their social dislocation through these means.
Thus, because of the social and moral devastation that the market exerts on individuals by controlling the value of productivity and hence their sense of self-worth, it is clear that the market must be controlled by other means than self-regulation.

The welfare state in which we live at present has attempted to construct regulations and restrictions to the market in order to protect all members of society from the domination of a self-regulating market economy. However, the welfare state does not protect members of society as it is unable to properly enforce its regulations and restrictions and as it is unable to avoid the domination exerted by bureaucratic power groups. The modern welfare state does attempt to satisfy a wide range of basic needs for food, shelter, clothing, warmth and medical care, but it does not provide for the protection of those things that we need in order to live a human life (fraternity, love, belonging, etc.). As Ignatieff states, "what we need in order to survive, and what we need in order to flourish are two different things. The aged poor on my street get just enough to survive" (Ignatieff, 1984: 10-11). The welfare state is unable to protect fraternity, love, belonging, dignity, and respect among members of society because it has lost its cohesive structures as a result of the capitalist
market economy. Ignatieff argues that we need such things because of "the connection, the rootedness, it gives us with others" (Ignatieff, 1984: 15). The welfare state enacts this need for solidarity, social cohesiveness, yet also ensures that those with resources and those in need remain strangers to each other. As was mentioned earlier, welfare workers, because of their limited control over the bureaucratic rules and regulations, are unable to interact with the client as a whole person. Ignatieff argues that "the bureaucratized transfer of income among strangers has freed each of us from the enslavement of gift relations. Yet if the welfare system does serve the needs of freedom, it does not serve the needs of solidarity. We remain a society of strangers" (Ignatieff, 1984: 18). Thus, Ignatieff suggests, we will have to dismantle the edifice of state welfare if we wish to cease being moral strangers to each other. And this, we will shortly see, is precisely Polanyi's point. Furthermore, by destroying social cohesiveness, the market economy is able to exert its dominance over the political and economic spheres of our life. Thus, the crucial point that Polanyi wants to make is that although labor, land, and money are essential elements of industry, essential to a vital part of the economic system, they "are obviously not commodities; the postulate that anything that is bought and sold must have been produced for sale is emphatically untrue.
in regard to them. . . . None of them is produced for sale. The commodity description of labor, land, and money is entirely fictitious" (Polanyi, 1944: 72). When man and nature are shared among all individuals, there is no need for price and sale, yet within a self-regulating market economy labor, land, and money have to be "transformed into commodities in order to keep production going" (Polanyi, 1944: 75). The dominance that the market economy has over virtually all spheres of human life within the welfare state can only remain as long as labor, land, and money are treated as commodities. Once we stop using these entities as commodities\(^6\), there is nothing left to exert a dominance over. For instance, once we give up the idea that there is value in treating labor, human beings, as a commodity, there remains no one left to exploit. This is the underlying principle behind worker strikes. Furthermore, Polanyi argues that of the three, labor stands out, as it is the technical term used for human beings. "As the organization of labor is only another word for the forms of life of the common people, this means that the development of the market

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\(^6\) This is precisely the kind of thing that I was talking about in the Introduction. For the purposes of this thesis, "the removal of land, labor, and money" is to mean a shift of perspective with respect to the ways in which we commonly view land, labor, and money. It is to express the need for changing the view that there is value in treating these entities as commodities. For a fuller explanation refer to the Introduction.
system would be accompanied by a change in the organization of society itself. All along the line, human society had become an accessory of the economic system" (Polanyi, 1944: 75). Thus, the welfare state is unable to protect society and its members from the domination exerted by the capitalist market ethic.

To review, Polanyi attempts to provide an analysis of the development of market economies over time. He begins with an analysis of market economies in pre-industrial hunting and gathering societies around the world and ends with an analysis of the self-regulating market economy in Europe and America, from the time of its earliest development in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries up to and including its developments in the nineteenth century. Originally, in all hunting and gathering societies, there was a link between the market and their society (or customs, religion, etc.), as in the gift-giving and trading of Aboriginal peoples. Later, during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the market economy took on a new face as attempts were made to develop a self-regulating market and as such, reciprocity, redistribution, and householding were no longer the basis on which the market economy was to be built. Instead, the push for a self-regulating market economy, which has continued well into this century, had
become uncontrollable, causing social values and social bonds to be lost or controlled by it. With mercantilism and feudalism, class divisions were established and the self-protection of society members became incompatible with the economic system; people were available for sale, nature was negotiated for a price, and currency was established. Thus, the false commodities of labor, land, and money were created.

However, by the nineteenth century there arose an immense movement which attempted to establish equality for all members of society. Yet, such advocates for equality as Jeremy Bentham, Herbert Spencer, Adam Smith, William Townsend, and many others ran into problems as they did not properly realize that equality and a self-regulating market economy were incompatible. As Polanyi states, "vital though such a countermovement was for the protection of society, in the last analysis it was incompatible with the self-regulation of the market, and thus with the market system itself" (Polanyi, 1944: 130). That is, these social theorists did not realize that nineteenth century society, the self-protection of society, and equality were inconsistent with the projects of the market economy (i.e. when human beings and nature are seen as commodities). They did not realize that a self-regulating market economy would
be able to establish a dominance over the economic and political spheres of nineteenth century social life and that the market system would not extend more freedom to the lower classes. As social theorists failed to realize the market system's extreme emphasis on productivity, members of society became valued by the amounts and kinds of production they were involved in and such differences resulted in the creation of greater inequalities between members of society. Hence, the equality wanted in the nineteenth century could not be achieved as the nature of the self-regulating market economy disallowed it.

Today, in the twentieth century, we have a welfare state that is supposed to protect society and individuals from the capitalist market by using regulations and restrictions such as blocked exchanges of power, money, etc. However, the problem is that the welfare state does not equally enforce its regulations and restrictions on all members of society. The welfare state allows some individuals, namely elite patriarchal power groups, to be free of its controls and to be able to engage in market exchanges that other individuals are prohibited from engaging in. Herbert Marcuse supports this claim in his One-Dimensional Man. Marcuse argues that,

the way in which a society organizes the life of its members involves an initial choice between historical
alternatives which are determined by the inherited level of the material and intellectual culture. The choice itself results from the play of the dominant interests. But once the project has become operative in the basic institutions and relations, it tends to become exclusive and to determine the development of the society as a whole (Marcuse, 1964: xvi).

Thus, the welfare state cannot effectively enforce its regulations and restrictions as long as it operates within a capitalist market ethic. As long as labor, land, and money are treated as commodities, as long as certain individuals are able to control other spheres of social life outside of their own spheres of authority, power, etc., as long as there is a capitalist market economy operative in contemporary society, the welfare state will be unable to ensure democracy, freedom and equality, for all. Therefore, we must now examine Polanyi's socialism in order to determine whether or not it can demonstrate a better way than the welfare state of protecting society and individuals from dominance and of ensuring democracy for all.

II

Polanyi's criticisms of capitalism are now clear, but where do we go from here? We must now explain Polanyi's socialism to determine what answers it provides for social change. Polanyi has concerned himself with the economic
process in modern civilization. He has shown how the development of the self-regulating market economy has destroyed the social cohesiveness of contemporary society and how social and political theorists failed to realize the import of cohesion on society. Polanyi argues for changes that will restore social bonds and society itself. What our age needs is "the reaffirmation, for its own conditions and for its own needs, of the essential values of human life" (Polanyi, 1944: x). What we need to do is reaffirm our commitment to ensuring democracy and equality for all. We need to regain the social cohesiveness that past societies shared. Although we cannot go back to some happier past, we must "rebuild society for ourselves, learning from the past what lessons and what warnings we are capable of learning" (Polanyi, 1944: x). We must not abandon the principle of individual freedom, but we must recreate it. Although Polanyi does not demonstrate how such social changes are to be made, he does identify in detail what social changes are needed to resolve the problems created by the self-regulating market. Polanyi's socialism then gives us a good start from which to regain social cohesion and from which to reassert the need for a stronger kind of democracy.

In his last chapter Polanyi attempts to argue for
changes that are needed to restore society. As well, he hopes to outline how society will function after such changes have been made. For Polanyi then, the dominance that the market system exerted over virtually all aspects of life resulted in the annihilation of social bonds and consequently destroyed the strength of contemporary society. "The true criticism of market society is not that it was based on economics . . . but that its economy was based on self-interest" (Polanyi, 1944: 249). Yet, how can things be changed? And what would be the effects of shifting industrial civilization to a new non-marketing basis? Would there be a loss of freedom?

Polanyi argues that society must change its improper understandings of the value of land, labor, and money. He argues that we need to give up the idea that there is value in treating these entities as commodities. Doing so has the effect of ensuring that the market system can no longer be self-regulating. Polanyi argues that such a change "may happen in a great variety of ways, democratic and aristocratic, constitutionalist and authoritarian, [or] perhaps even in a fashion yet utterly unforeseen" (Polanyi, 1944: 251). Thus, Polanyi seems to be unsure of how such changes will be made. Nevertheless, although he never specifies precisely who should make these changes, Polanyi
does seem to suggest that such changes will be political in form and therefore carried out by the state. He argues that a radical transformation occurs within the market system after changes to our common-held views about the value of labor are made. For instance, "the wage contract ceases to be a private contract except on subordinate and accessory points" (Polanyi, 1944: 251) as hours of work, modalities of contract, the basic wage itself, etc. are determined outside of the market. As regards changes to our common views about the value of land, Polanyi suggests that land be incorporated with definite institutions, such as the homestead, the co-operative, the factory, parks, etc. Yet, by changing the ways in which we commonly view these entities, that is, stop treating them as commodities, there will inevitably be much land available, but since land, labor, and money are no longer commodities for sale, land has once again no economic value. Therefore, he suggests that all land remain with its previous owner and that all land not previously owned be equally redistributed.

This is an ambitious project, but it does not seem to establish equality in agricultural societies since one may produce more food while others starve on their small tracts of land. Thus, Polanyi argues that there would have to be enforceable regulations in place. Nevertheless, while the
form that such changes will take is not discussed by Polanyi, it is suggested that the nature of property be changed and that members of society incorporate land with whatever institution they collectively agree will best meet the needs of the people and that will no longer allow "incomes from the title of property to grow without bounds, merely in order to ensure employment, production, and the use of resources in society"(Polanyi, 1944: 252). Yet, it must be remembered that although the self-regulating market system is to be eliminated, changing our common views that there is value in treating land, labor, and money as commodities does not mean that there will be no markets at all.

If the self-regulating market economy is to be eliminated, it may be asked whether freedom is then denied to certain members of society. Polanyi argues that the problem of freedom arises on two different levels: institutional and moral or religious. On the institutional level, regulation (made by the state) is said to both extend and restrict freedom. Initially, "there will have to be reduction in their [the upper class'] own leisure and security, and, consequently, their freedom so that the level of freedom throughout the land shall be raised"(Polanyi, 1944: 254). In effect, only "an extension to the others of
the vested freedom they themselves [the upper class] enjoy is intended" (Polanyi, 1944: 254). After all, this is precisely what the notions of freedom and equality are supposed to embody.

Polanyi argues that personal liberty can be protected and ensured so long as politically "we deliberately create new safeguards for its maintenance and, indeed, extension" (Polanyi, 1944: 255). Further, every move towards integration in society will therefore have to be "accompanied by an increase of freedom; moves towards planning should comprise the strengthening of the rights of the individual in society" (Polanyi, 1944: 255). For example, Polanyi argues that the right to nonconformity be institutionally protected. The individual must be free to follow his or her conscience and compulsion should never be absolute. For Polanyi then, there are specific rights that should accompany increases in personal freedom. However, he neither provides an exhaustive list of these rights, nor does he explain exactly how freedom is to be strengthened and safeguarded. Polanyi does identify the crucial changes that must be made to protect and ensure equal personal liberty for all members of society, but he gives no clear indication of who should make such changes and how the political regulations that protect it can be implemented.
On this point Polanyi seems deliberately vague. Nevertheless, clearly political regulations must be made to ensure that all members of society share the same freedoms as everyone else. In order to achieve these goals, Polanyi suggests that we protect individuals from bureaucratic abuses of power by politically creating "spheres of arbitrary freedom protected by unbreakable rules" (Polanyi, 1944: 255). Yet, this does sound remarkably similar to a kind of fascism. Hence, can Polanyi's regulations and restrictions be anything more than a fascist-like use of power and compulsion to effect a desired change?

Polanyi argues that the problem fascism poses for

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7 Polanyi does not precisely define what is meant here, but I have interpreted him as meaning something similar to Walzer's purpose of delineating the social spheres within our society. By doing so, we will be able to uncover our shared understandings of the particular spheres themselves and will then be able to control (for instance, by using blocked exchanges) the ways in which social goods are used, that is, to prevent individuals from using social goods as a means of domination. Furthermore, I think that Polanyi is trying to argue that once we have uncovered our shared understandings of the particular social goods, we must politically enforce those meanings.

8 For the purposes of this thesis the term "fascism" will mean a form of government in which the interests of the state supersede any individual's interests. The instances in which the terms "fascism" or "fascist-like" are used here serve as support for Polanyi's claim that nineteenth century liberals misunderstood the notion of freedom and likewise narrowly construed "fascism" as referring to any society that uses political power and compulsion.
freedom results from the liberal philosophy of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries which claims that power and compulsion are evil, that freedom demands their absence from a human community. However, Polanyi wants to argue that in any complex society the use of power and compulsion cannot be avoided. This leaves no alternative but "either to remain faithful to an illusionary idea of freedom and deny the reality of society, or to accept that reality and reject the idea of freedom" (Polanyi, 1944: 257). The first is the liberal's conclusion, the latter the fascist's. In other words, in a complex society there is a need for regulations to ensure and strengthen freedom, yet to make use of this power is contrary to freedom per se. Clearly, at the root of the dilemma there is the meaning of freedom itself. Polanyi's point is that the liberal economy gave a false direction to our ideals. Instead of concentrating our attention on the appropriate, coherent, and non-arbitrary limits of freedom, the liberal economy supported a view of freedom that did not and could not exist in a complex society. Liberals of the nineteenth century were afraid that if power and compulsion were incorporated into the definition of freedom, then individuals would be able to legitimately lay claim to fascist rule. Nevertheless, their illusionary idea of freedom failed to protect society anyway. Thus, for Polanyi, the liberal use of freedom in
contemporary society does not do what it is supposed to do.

Ignatieff describes the above situation quite well. To paraphrase, liberals believed that one could either have a society in which individuals are free to choose their needs as they see fit or one could choose a society which makes the determination and satisfaction of need a matter of collective social choice. In the first case there is little chance of much solidarity or social cohesion among members of society. In the second case there is a risk that individuals will cease to be free. Given these choices, liberals by and large have chosen liberty over solidarity. However, Polanyi has shown that liberal theorists of the nineteenth century had conceived of the notion of freedom much too narrowly. Polanyi, like other socialists, insists that the needs of liberty and solidarity are not in ultimate contradiction. Polanyi has shown that liberty and solidarity "can be reconciled, in which human beings can have needs for themselves and needs for the sake of others and satisfy both equally" (Ignatieff, 1984: 18). This will become more apparent, in the last chapter, once the socialist communitarian ethic is developed.

Polanyi has shown that "no society is possible in which
power and compulsion are absent, nor a world in which force has no function" (Polanyi, 1944: 257). Therefore, if freedom is to be the goal of our society we must do everything in our power to make it a reality. Yet, in order to do this, power and compulsion must be used. But in order for it to be used, members of society must first allow their freedoms to be restricted. This is not to say that individual freedom be restricted, rather that certain kinds of freedoms be restricted, such as allowing birth or blood or gender to be criteria for leadership, power, business, etc. For instance, vision was limited by the market system as it was wrongly believed that humans had freedom over the market. Ideas that "one derived his income "freely" from the market, the other spent it "freely" there" (Polanyi, 1944: 258) assisted in producing a false and confusing image of personal freedom. Such images and ideas made invisible the fact that "his [the human being's] lack of responsibility for them [these images and ideas] seemed so evident that he denied their reality in the name of his freedom" (Polanyi, 1944: 258).

Polanyi has correctly identified an important facet of social life: power and compulsion are part of all societies and result in a seemingly contradictory sense of the liberal conception of freedom. According to Polanyi, "the fascist
resigns himself to relinquishing freedom and glorifies power which is the reality of society, the socialist resigns himself to that reality and upholds the claim to freedom, in spite of it. Man becomes mature and able to exist as a human being in a complex society." (Polanyi, 1944: 258A). Although power and compulsion must exist in our society, if freedom is to be promoted and ensured, we need not focus our attention on this fact. We need only to focus on how that power is to be used. Polanyi believes that:

As long as he [the human being] is true to his task of creating more abundant freedom for all, he need not fear that either power or planning will turn against him and destroy the freedom he is building by their instrumentality. This is the meaning of freedom in a complex society; it gives us all the certainty that we need (Polanyi, 1944: 258B).

Power and compulsion have negative consequences when used to promote a 'freedom' that does not treat individuals as equal persons and that does not allow all individuals to enjoy that 'freedom'. To restrict the use of power and compulsion to ensure equal freedom for all cannot have the same consequences since the purpose of using it has been changed.

III

In sections I and II Polanyi's arguments against capitalism and his socialist changes of contemporary society
were discussed. It may now be useful to spend a little time evaluating his theory, as well as responding to several of his critics.

Polanyi has developed a strong socialist ethic, but there are some problems with his theory. Polanyi states that the market economy of the early twentieth century, in North America, Britain, and many European countries, has collapsed. He believes that "within the nations [during the 1940's] we are witnessing a development under which the economic system ceases to lay down the law to society and the primacy of society over that system is secured" (Polanyi, 1944: 251). This most certainly has not occurred and is unlikely to occur in the near future. In fact, as Ignatieff and Ferguson point out, the welfare state has not been able to protect individuals from the dominance of the market economy. We seem to be even more involved in market economics, as in the case of free trade and the increasing division between the rich and the poor. Nevertheless, this interpretation of early twentieth century world events is most likely the result of Polanyi's arbitrary use of terms and of his often exaggerated interpretations of events.

Abbott Usher, in his review of Polanyi, has raised
several questions about his theory. Usher suggests that Polanyi has failed to realize that although "there were tendencies toward the development of a self-regulating market, these tendencies were never allowed to dominate social organization" (Usher, 1944: 630-631). On this, Usher is clearly wrong. After all, Polanyi's main thesis has been to demonstrate how the market system annihilates social bonds and social values. The self-regulating market could not have done this without dominating social organization since once social bonds are dissolved there is nothing left to connect members of society to one another. Obviously, destroying social bonds will have a drastic effect on social organization.

Usher continues to argue that nineteenth century classical economists' society never really came into existence, but again he is wrong to suggest that Polanyi does not consider this fact. Polanyi has argued that these economists and social theorists were oblivious to the fact that as national markets were developed and regulated, more and more regulations were needed to maintain the use of such a market system. Furthermore, these economists were oblivious to the fact that a self-regulating market economy could no more ensure democracy than could political legislation of the market designed to protect the interests
of elite power groups. Thus, Polanyi does make it clear that the nineteenth century economists' society never really existed and could not exist because they themselves were unable to accurately predict the results of establishing such a market economy. However, Usher did give Polanyi credit for recognizing that "nineteenth-century societies were in fact moving toward goals that were profoundly different from the objectives conceived by the naive liberalism of the period . . . No magic of market structure could achieve the errorless objectivity that was presumed to be the outstanding merit of the free market" (Usher, 1944: 631). Polanyi then, has decisively and effectively presented his general thesis.

Robert Hartnett's review of Polanyi is not as forgiving as Usher's. Hartnett admits that few of us would disagree with Polanyi's basic assumption: "economic purposes must be subordinated, where possible and to the extent necessary, to the purposes of society as a whole" (Hartnett, 1944: 203). But the work as a whole, Hartnett argues, seems to fail its purpose. "It lacks a workable methodology. The evidence adduced really does not prove anything, because it has not been made part of a sufficiently systematic building up of the hypothesis the author is trying to verify" (Hartnett, 1944: 203). Hartnett identifies a major problem for
Polanyi: his lack of a methodology. Near the end of his book Polanyi asks whether freedom is an empty word or whether we can change society in ways that promote and ensure an equal distribution and stronger sense of freedom. He then suggests that an answer can be found in the spirit and content of his study, but although he states what social and political changes have to be made, he does not show us how to make such changes occur.

Yet, to say that Polanyi's theory does not support his hypothesis is wrong. Polanyi's hypothesis is that society, the social cohesiveness of society, is lost to the market economy. That is, the importance of being connected to other members of society, as was common in pre-industrial societies, has been devalued by the self-regulating market economy. Social bonds and social values, being a central part of the identity of a society, have been replaced by motives of self-interest and replaced by the values of a market economy. For example, the expanding bureaucratization of the polity, implicit in the welfare state's attempts to control the market economy, carries severe consequences for meaningful participation in public life for both men and women. As Ferguson demonstrates, members of bureaucratic society are subject to a "set of forces and pressures through which subordination is created
and maintained" (Ferguson, 1984: 83). For instance, welfare recipients do not receive the help they need but are even more entrenched in the bureaucratic system. Thus, welfare recipients often become worse off than when they first requested assistance. Yet, this situation is not limited to clients of bureaucracies. All participants in the bureaucracies of contemporary society are "embedded in a system that so automatizes, disindividualizes, and objectifies their activities and relationships that the power relations therein are synonymous with the activities themselves" (Ferguson, 1984: 88). Bureaucracy and society have become co-extensive and there is no room for deep and rich social connections. As Ferguson points out, "schools often minimize control and supervision over teachers, and construct ritual categories of activities and events "to avoid inspecting the actual instructional activities and outcome of schooling"" (Ferguson, 1984: 87). Schools can afford to exercise less obtrusive controls on teachers because, for organizational purposes, "it doesn't really matter what the teachers do; it matters only that the school offer the appropriate institutional linkages to other organizations and operate according to the required legitimating ideology" (Ferguson, 1984: 88). Thus, the focus on economic position and market productivity has devalued and almost entirely eliminated the importance and
possibility of social cohesiveness. Many people are unable to get the support they need from family, friends, community, government, etc. Those bonds simply are not there. Or, if they are, they are not as strong as they need to be. As a result, many people faced with few, if any, alternatives, become victims of crime, drugs, starvation, disease, welfare, and finally destitution. The welfare state is supposed to protect and help these individuals, but it cannot. None of the efforts to change the individual (enrolling them in drug treatment centers, encouraging them to get a high school equivalency, providing job training programs, etc.) can do anything about the shortage of jobs: "such programs do little to affect the structural problems that created the dependency in the first place" (Ferguson, 1984: 146). Thus, the welfare state has effectively disabled, by its bureaucracy, those individuals most in need as well as those working within the system. As to the contributing factors: the move away from the gold standard, the balance-of-power system, the liberal state, Polanyi may underestimate them. However, he has correctly asserted the import industrial capitalism, operating through the factory-system, urbanization, and the free labor market had on destroying social bonds.

Hartnett continues his judgement of Polanyi, arguing
that Polanyi is wrong to assert "the hypothesis that all of the ills which plague contemporary societies [during the 1940's] spring from an unregulated market economy" (Hartnett, 1944: 204). Yet, Polanyi does provide ample support for such a claim. After all, the biggest problems in contemporary society, according to Polanyi, are the loss of social cohesiveness and the increased inequality between members of society. And these are both shown to be the result of false conceptions about the saving grace of the market system. It is as a result of the loss of society, social cohesiveness, that the ills of contemporary society result. Thus, they can, in this way, be said to spring from the self-regulating market economy. At the same time, Polanyi does not seem to be suggesting that "all" of contemporary society's ills [during the 1940's] are the result of the self-regulating market, as Hartnett would have us believe. He does associate other factors with these ills, such as, the liberal state, industrial capitalism, etc., even if they are some what secondary contributing factors.

Polanyi spends a lot of time trying to prove that exchange is not natural to man, but according to Hartnett, "he never gets around to defining in sensible terms what he means by such an inclination being "natural" to
man" (Hartnett, 1944: 204). Hartnett is right to say that Polanyi has not sensibly made his definitions clear. Polanyi does not provide any definition of the term 'natural' until the last chapter of his book where he finally gives us a clear indication of what he means. He suggests that an economy based on self-interest is "entirely unnatural, in the strictly empirical sense of exceptional" (Polanyi, 1944: 249). Polanyi has assumed throughout his thesis that we would interpret the term 'natural' as meaning exceptional, but perhaps Polanyi is right to make such an assumption. For instance, Polanyi has tried to show that exchange for economic gain is not a 'natural' feature of economic life:

> The practice of catering for the needs of one's household becomes a feature of economic life only on a more advanced level of agriculture; however, even then it has nothing in common with the motive for gain or with the institution of markets (Polanyi, 1944: 53).

Furthermore, Polanyi does grant that some forms of exchange are natural (i.e. not exceptional), such as those that occur in societies economically organized on the basis of reciprocity, redistribution, and householding. However, Polanyi does not assert that there is no motive for gain in these societies. Rather his point is that the motive for gain is for higher status, not for profit. Thus, Polanyi has made a distinction between two different kinds of exchange motives: that for gain of higher status which is
common in all pre-industrial societies and that for gain of
profit which is common only in a market society. Therefore,
xchange for economic gain is not an exceptional feature of
economic life. Polanyi has not defined the term 'natural'
as clearly as he could have. However, his use of it to
distinguish between these two different exchange motives
seems to provide enough indication of its meaning to assume
that it did not need to be stated.

Lastly, Hartnett argues that Polanyi's position is too
one-sided. Hartnett argues that Polanyi "squeezes facts
into the straightjacket of his preconceptions and thereby
distorts his materials. He refuses to see the valuable
half-truths imbedded in the errors of liberalism" (Hartnett, 1944: 204). Admittedly, Polanyi often does have an
arbitrary use of terms, for instance, he does not clearly
specify what he means by society, social cohesiveness,
natural, etc., but his examples and his descriptions of
historical events do suggest a meaning for these terms. As
to missing the value of liberalism's half-truths, Polanyi is
guilty. Polanyi has not given credit to liberalism for
liberating people from the control of dogma, religion, the
state, etc. Yet, the liberal conception of freedom which
allowed this liberation was at the same time unable to
protect these same people from being controlled by elite
power groups under a self-regulating market economy.

IV

Now that Polanyi's theory has been evaluated we are able to see that there are a few minor problems with it, but these problems can be overcome. Therefore, we must now illustrate how the ideas and concepts raised in Michael Walzer's *Spheres of Justice* can strengthen Polanyi's theory.

Both Polanyi and Walzer attempt to provide theories that are able to solve the problems of dominance and monopoly in society. Walzer believes that dominance should be the primary focus since monopolies can always be changed and will always create a situation of dominance of one group over another. Polanyi, on the other hand, indirectly deals with dominance. He does not discuss its interworkings, but only shows how to avoid it. Walzer's theory provides critical support for Polanyi's ideas for removing dominance from contemporary society. Polanyi does not use the term "dominance", but by using Walzer's term one can label things to show where dominance is implied. Walzer then, gives us the terminology to apply to Polanyi's theory. For instance, as was stated earlier, Polanyi does not believe that the
problem with society is capitalism per se, but rather, the problem with society is that the market economy, from the time of the nineteenth century onwards, was allowed to become self-regulating. That is, as a self-regulating market economy is established, and protected by policies and measures that ensure its survival, the market is able to ensure its monopoly in society and is therefore able to exert its dominance over the economic sphere. Thus, since our lives are governed by economic effects, the self-regulating market is also able to exert its dominance over all other spheres of our lives and therefore is able to control people. Such control, Polanyi argues, resulted in the loss of society and social bonds. "The true criticism of market society is not that it was based on economics . . . but that its economy was based on self-interest" (Polanyi, 1944: 249). Thus, both Polanyi and Walzer make attempts to solve the problem of dominance in society.

Walzer, as we will shortly see, argues for the use of blocked exchanges (regulations and restrictions) of market power, money, and property rights and the entailments of ownership so as to prevent the dominance that these areas have in our lives. For Walzer, blocked exchanges help to allow everyone equal access to the market economy. Furthermore, Walzer argues that along with blocked exchanges
there is a need for a series of redistributions. Yet, Walzer cautiously notes that redistributions can never produce simple equality (where all members of society have the same and equal amounts of goods as everyone else), "not so long as money and commodities still exist, and there is some legitimate social space within which they can be exchanged--or, for that matter, given away" (Walzer, 1983: 123). Thus, Walzer's theory appears to support Polanyi's arguments for the need to change the view that there is value in treating land, labor, and money as commodities so as to prevent dominance in society and provide a re-establishment of equality for all. However, Walzer does not want to change the ways in which we commonly view these entities. Rather, he wants simply to change the capacity in which they are able to exert dominance. This concept will be dealt with at more length in the following chapter.

Polanyi has argued for a dismantling of the uniform market economy by changing our improper understandings of the value of land, labor, and money, that is, in giving up the idea that there is value in treating these entities as commodities. In so doing, the market economy has its self-regulating power taken away. Its control over the lives and affairs of the members of society is prevented and society can once again rebuild itself. But, what is to ensure that
things will remain changed? And how are those changes to be enforced? Perhaps this can only be done by adopting Walzer's theory of complex equality and distributive justice.

Walzer and Polanyi both notice the negative effects of money and the market; however, their treatment of these problems is quite different. Both Walzer and Polanyi have identified the problems of a self-regulating market economy and they both show how monopoly and dominance work in society. Thus, together, Walzer and Polanyi strengthen each other's arguments. Yet, there must be a system of regulations in place after changing the commonly accepted idea that there is value in treating land, labor, and money as commodities and it is here that Walzer seems to lend

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9 In Chapter III I will demonstrate the interworkings and complexity of the theory of complex equality and distributive justice, but for now the following explanation must serve as a provisional definition. The theory of complex equality is an attempt to consider "what it would mean to narrow the range within which particular social goods are convertible and to vindicate the autonomy of distributive spheres" (Walzer, 1983: 17). Walzer uses the theory of complex equality in order to attempt to critique dominance. In so doing, Walzer hopes to demonstrate a way of reshaping our understandings of social goods such that we can live with the actual complexity of distributions that will have to be made. In formal terms, complex equality means "that no citizen's standing in one sphere or with regard to one social good can be undercut by his standing in some other sphere, with regard to some other good" (Walzer, 1983: 19). Thus, complex equality involves the defense of boundaries and it works by differentiating social goods.
support. As Polanyi asserts, "every move towards integration in society should thus be accompanied by an increase of freedom; moves towards planning should comprise the strengthening of the rights of the individual in society. . . . The true answer to the threat of bureaucracy as a source of abuse of power is to create spheres of arbitrary freedom protected by unbreakable rules" (Polanyi, 1944: 255). Furthermore, Polanyi recognizes that "we cannot achieve the freedom we seek, unless we comprehend the true significance of freedom in a complex society" (Polanyi, 1944: 254). And these, as will be shown in the following chapter, are precisely Walzer's projects.

Both Walzer and Polanyi argue for ways to protect society from abuses of political power. However, Walzer goes further than Polanyi by detailing what should and should not be considered legitimate forms of power and compulsion. Yet, Polanyi is not suggesting that all types of power and compulsion are legitimate. Rather, he is suggesting that the only way to make the necessary changes in society a reality is through some medium of political power and compulsion that remains faithful to the idea of democracy and tries to promote democracy for all. And this, it will be shown, is what Walzer's theory of complex equality and distributive justice aims at.
In conclusion, Polanyi's theory lays the foundation for dismantling the self-regulating market economy and restoring social cohesiveness to society. Walzer's theory provides the underlying foundations on which to rebuild society and a way in which democracy can be fully expressed. Therefore, we must now look at Walzer's theory in more detail to understand its benefits and evaluate his arguments.
Chapter II

Michael Walzer's *Spheres of Justice* presents solid criticisms of capitalism and provides important insights into the changes that must be made in contemporary society if our shared understanding of the value of democracy is to be protected and ensured. In this chapter I will present Walzer's criticisms of capitalism and his arguments for communitarian changes. As well, I will examine the effectiveness of Walzer's theory by providing criticism of his theory and by analyzing the arguments of several of his critics. Furthermore, it will be shown that Walzer's theory can be strengthened by the ideas and concepts of Karl Polanyi previously outlined in chapter I.

In his first chapter Walzer provides the general framework of his theory. He argues that social theorists (Bentham, Mill, Marx, Rawls, etc.) have examined a multiplicity of goods as well as a multiplicity of distributive procedures, agents, and criteria. Thus, Walzer takes the following as his scope: "the goods and the distributions, in many different times and places" (Walzer, 1983: 4). Walzer holds that the principles of justice are
pluralistic in form and that different ways of understanding social goods and their particular distributions exist. That is to say, all the goods with which distributive justice is concerned are social goods. Walzer argues that they are not and cannot be idiosyncratically valued. He argues that there is no single set of primary or basic social goods. Social goods then, arise out of our shared understandings of the world in which we live. Social goods are such things as "membership, power, honor, ritual eminence, divine grace, kinship and love, knowledge, wealth, physical security, work and leisure, rewards and punishments, and a host of goods more narrowly and materially conceived--food, shelter, clothing, transportation, medical care, commodities of every sort, and all the odd things (paintings, rare books, postage stamps) that human beings collect" (Walzer, 1983: 4). Therefore,

\[10\] Walzer wants to argue against the notion that there is a single list of all the principles of justice (as John Rawls believed) and that there is a single legitimate kind of pluralism. Furthermore, he wants to argue against the notion that there is one, and only one, distributive system that philosophy can encompass. Walzer then, attempts to argue that justice is a human creation, and can therefore be made in more than one way. Walzer believes that different societies construct different principles of justice in order to govern the different social goods that each society uniquely values. In other words, the differences in one society's principles of justice and another society's principles of justice results from the different "understandings of the social goods themselves--the inevitable product of historical and cultural pluralism" (Walzer, 1983: 6).
Walzer wants to argue for a kind of historical and cultural pluralism.

Walzer believes that "people conceive and create goods, which they then distribute among themselves" (Walzer, 1983: 6) and as a result he wants to provide a pluralistic account of the theory of the goods that is restricted to its distributive possibilities. Walzer sums up this theory in six propositions:

1. All the goods with which distributive justice is concerned are social goods.
2. Men and women take on concrete identities because they conceive and create, and then possess and employ social goods.
3. There is no single set of primary or basic goods conceivable across all moral and material worlds.
4. But it is the meaning of goods that determines their movement.
5. Social meanings are historical in character; and so distributions, and just and unjust distributions, change over time.
6. Where meanings are distinct, distributions must be autonomous (Walzer, 1983: 7-10).

These six propositions seem to be clear enough and coincide with our everyday expectations. These propositions serve to support Walzer's claim for the plurality of different social goods in different times and places.

Walzer goes on to discuss the inter-workings of dominance and monopoly in society. In this discussion he identifies three movements that may arise in a society of
dominance and monopoly: 1. social conflict in which claims and/or action are taken to assert that the monopoly is unjust, 2. social conflict in which claims and/or action are taken to assert that the dominance is unjust, and 3. social conflict in which claims and/or action are taken to assert that both the monopoly and the dominance are unjust. It is with the first two that Walzer concerns himself. Yet, whichever monopoly is held should not be of primary concern since the monopoly, whatever it may be, will always create a situation of dominance of one group over another. For example, in the case of capitalism, elite patriarchal power groups override the interests of true democracy subjugating the interests and those below to a submissive and controlled position of subservience. Hence, it seems obvious why dominance should be Walzer's primary focus.

Walzer wants to eliminate the role that dominance plays in our lives and so attempts to develop an open-ended distributive principle that will assist in removing dominance from contemporary society. "No social good x should be distributed to men and women who possess some other good y merely because they possess y and without regard to the meaning of x" (Walzer, 1983: 20). Thus, it is since social goods are thought to have social meanings that we are, in the interpretation of those meanings, able to
develop a distributive justice.

Three criteria are identified by Walzer as meeting the requirements of the open-ended principle discussed above: free exchange, desert, and need. Walzer argues that "all three have real force, but none of them has force across the range of distributions" (Walzer, 1983: 21). Hence, Walzer's objective is to develop a theory that is able to get at the "deeper understandings of social goods which are not necessarily mirrored in the everyday practice of dominance and monopoly" (Walzer, 1983: 26). Thus, Walzer attempts to make a case for limiting his discussion to the political setting. He suggests that there are three reasons for doing so. First, he suggests that "sometimes political and historical communities don't coincide ... the sharing takes place in smaller units" (Walzer, 1983: 28-29) and thus we should try to adjust distributive decisions to the requirements of those units. However, this adjustment will have to be done on the political level. Second, Walzer suggests that "in a world of independent states, political power is a local monopoly" (Walzer, 1983: 29) and therefore, if the leaders of a society do not do what is expected of them they will face opposition, which in most cases will be political opposition. Lastly, community is said to be a good, "conceivably the most important good" (Walzer, 1983;
that gets distributed. However, community cannot be distributed without first taking people into it; people must be "physically admitted and politically received" (Walzer, 1983: 29) within a particular community before the good of community can be distributed. Thus, membership in a particular community depends upon an internal decision.

Throughout his book Walzer discusses the subject of tyranny. Social goods are said to have social meanings and it is through an interpretation of those meanings that we are to find justice. Walzer suggests that to disregard these principles is tyranny; that "the use of political power to gain access to other goods is a tyrannical use" (Walzer, 1983: 19). This seems to be an adequate description of tyranny and it does adequately portray many current social situations. For example, state interference in the private freedom of Aboriginal groups gives the state control over their land, money, etc. Tyranny is said to always be "a particular boundary crossing, a particular violation of social meaning" (Walzer, 1983: 80). Lastly, for Walzer, tyranny consists of situations where an individual or group tries to monopolize certain goods that are outside of their socially understood domain. However, since Walzer wants to limit his theory to the political setting, it may be of use to spend some time examining tyranny in the sphere of
political power. Yet, before doing so it may be beneficial to examine Walzer's discussion of money and commodities since our society centers around these and since most political decisions are made in response to them.

In chapter iv Walzer takes up the issue of money and commodities. With regard to money, he states, there are two questions that need to be asked: What can it buy? and, How is it distributed? To answer the first question Walzer suggests that we look at what money cannot buy, at blocked exchanges. Walzer gives us a definitive list of these blocked exchanges:

1. Human beings cannot be bought and sold.
2. Political power and influence cannot be bought and sold.
3. Criminal justice is not for sale.
5. Marriage and procreation rights are not for sale.
6. The right to leave the political community is not for sale.
7. And so, again, exemptions from military service, from jury duty, from any other communally imposed work cannot be sold by the government or bought by citizens.
8. Political offices cannot be bought.
9. Basic welfare services like police protection or primary and secondary schooling are purchasable only at the margins.
10. Desperate exchanges, "trades of last resort," are barred, though the meaning of desperation is always open to dispute.
11. Prizes and honors of many sorts, public and private, are not available for purchase.
12. Divine grace cannot be bought.
13. Love and friendship cannot be bought, not on our common understanding of what these two mean.
14. Finally, a long series of criminal sales are ruled out. (Walzer, 1983: 100-103).
Obviously at one point in time each and every one of these exchanges have been abused. The point Walzer is trying to make is that socially we agree that these are the kinds of things that money should not be able to buy and are the sorts of things that require political, legal, and moral restrictions if they are to remain blocked exchanges. But, why should they remain blocked? If they are not blocked exchanges, Walzer argues, we are unable to "set limits on the dominance of wealth" (Walzer, 1983: 100). Thus, we need certain blocked exchanges to prevent individuals from obtaining a position of dominance over others. For Walzer, blocked exchanges help to allow everyone equal opportunity and equal access to the market economy. What he seems to misunderstand is that these blocked exchanges are not the primary problem. What Walzer should address is the problem of a market economy that makes it necessary for there to be an abuse of these exchanges in order to be successful in that very market system. We, in North America, live in a welfare state that has developed regulations and restrictions to protect individuals from the dominance that the capitalist market ethic is able to exert over them. However, as was stated in Chapter 1, these regulations and restrictions are impeded by bureaucratic constraints and are often violated by individuals in high positions of power and influence. Very often multinational corporations are
excused from state controls because they are able to buy their way around them. Thus, Walzer has failed to realize that a capitalist market ethic is incompatible with the structures of a welfare state.

Walzer goes on to discuss the question of how money is distributed. Walzer argues that money is a means of establishing status and membership in a particular society or social organization. For this to occur individuals must become increasingly involved in consumption activities and these activities always involve money. Walzer argues against using money in this way and proposes an alternative to rectify the situation, which will be dealt with in the next section.

In chapter xii Walzer discusses the sphere of politics. His primary focus concerns the issues of sovereignty, political command, and authoritative decision making. Walzer argues that sovereignty is the most significant and dangerous form power can take:

For this is not simply one among the goods that men and women pursue; as state power, it is also the means by which all the different pursuits, including that of power itself, are regulated. It is the crucial agency of distributive justice; it guards the boundaries within which every social good is distributed and deployed (Walzer, 1983: 281).
Hence, power is a central part of politics. This power protects us from tyranny, but it can, at the same time, become tyrannical itself. Walzer argues that state power is itself tyrannical and its agents are tyrants in their own right. "They don't police the spheres of distribution but break into them; they don't defend social meanings but override them" (Walzer, 1983: 282). For instance, state power is able to govern many other social spheres. It regulates the authority of parents, decides how the army is to be recruited and used, defines the jurisdiction and curriculum of schools, etc. Walzer argues that in most countries most of the time, political rulers function, in fact, as agents of husbands and fathers, aristocratic families, degree holders, or capitalists. State power is colonized by wealth or talent or blood or gender; and once it is colonized, it is rarely limited (Walzer, 1983: 282).

Throughout most of human history, the sphere of politics has been dominated by a single person or elite groups who are devoted to making state power dominant not merely at the boundaries but across every distributive sphere. Thus, for Walzer, state power is, as in the past, tyrannical and out of control.

Precisely for this reason, Walzer suggests, political and intellectual energy has "gone into the effort to limit the convertibility of power and restrain its uses, to define
the blocked exchanges of the political sphere" (Walzer, 1983: 282). There are a lot of things that the state ought not do. If it does them then it is abusing its power and exerting an unjust force over the will of society members, and to do this is to commit an act of tyranny. Thus, Walzer identifies a list of state limits or political blocked exchanges. Such limits fix the boundaries of the state and of all the other spheres vis-a-vis sovereign power. Such limits are necessary for the protection of society; "for the overbearingness of officials is not only a threat to liberty, it is an affront to equality" (p. 284). Hence, given the reach of politics into all other spheres of our lives it is obvious that if a society is to be free and equal then it must protect itself from abuses of political power. How exactly this can be done will be dealt with shortly.

II

Having dealt with Walzer's criticisms of capitalism, his communitarianism of complex equality and distributive justice must now be explained in order to determine what suggestions it offers for social change. Walzer's

* For a list of Walzer's political blocked exchanges see pp. 283-284 in his *Spheres of Justice*. 73
communitarianism will provide the ways in which to rebuild society and to ensure that democracy can be more fully realized.

The socialist communitarian ethic relies heavily on the use of the theory of complex equality and distributive justice, but it has not yet been fully described. Thus, in this section, I will attempt to briefly examine and explain the detailed interworkings of the theory of complex equality and distributive justice. In so doing, it will later become clear how the socialist communitarian ethic can be successful in ensuring a better kind of democracy in contemporary society.

In his *Spheres of Justice* Walzer attempts to describe a society in which no social good serves or can serve as a means of domination. Walzer does not attempt to describe a utopia located nowhere nor a philosophical ideal applicable everywhere. Instead, Walzer attempts to construct a theory out of our shared understandings of social goods that allows for equality, or what he calls 'egalitarian justice'. As he states, "the aim of political egalitarianism is a society free from domination. This is the lively hope named by the word equality" (Walzer, 1983: xiii). In other words, Walzer
does not want to eliminate difference among individuals; we do not all have to be the same or have the same amounts of the same things. Rather, there needs to be equality for all persons with respect to being free from domination. According to Walzer, "men and women are one another's equals (for all important moral or philosophical purposes) when no one possesses or controls the means of domination" (Walzer, 1983: xiii). Walzer then, wants his theory to recognize the many different sorts and degrees of skill, strength, wisdom, courage, kindness, energy, and grace that distinguish one individual from another. Thus, he attempts to construct his theory in a way that addresses the complex social arrangements that follow from such differences and likenesses.

According to Walzer, domination is always mediated by some set of social goods and is differently constituted in different societies. For instance, birth and blood, landed wealth, capital, education, divine grace, state power, etc. have all served at one time or another to enable some people to dominate others. Thus, Walzer argues that the equality he seeks does not "require the repression of persons. We have to understand and control social goods; we do not have to stretch or shrink human beings" (Walzer, 1983: xiii). And this is precisely what Walzer's theory of complex equality
and distributive justice aims at. For example, the provision of uncontaminated milk to large urban populations requires extensive public control. Yet, as Walzer argues, the constraints of inspection, regulation, and enforcement as public activities are not of the highest value to all members of society (not to farmers or the middlemen of the dairy industry), but they "may be of the highest value for the rest of us" (Walzer, 1983: 81). Thus, Walzer wants to ensure that goods are distributed equally to all members of society in such a way that it benefits most the most vulnerable members of society. That is, there must be an extensive public control of all community goods in order to ensure that individuals with a particular set of social goods are unable to dominate those who do not have those goods.

Walzer believes that a society of equals lies within our reach and is to be found in our shared understandings of social goods. According to Walzer, in order to discover our shared understandings we must realize that:

the vision [of our shared understandings] is relevant to the social world in which it was developed; it is not relevant, or not necessarily, to all social worlds. It fits a certain conception of how human beings relate to one another and how they use the things they make to shape their relations (Walzer, 1983: xiv).

Walzer argues for his sort of 'egalitarianism' by reference
to many contemporary and historical examples, accounts of distributions in our own society and, by way of contrast, in a range of others. These examples are rough sketches, sometimes focused on the agents of distribution, sometimes on the procedures, sometimes on the criteria, and sometimes on the use and the meaning of the things we share, divide, and exchange. These examples aim to suggest the force of the things themselves or, rather, the force of our conceptions of the things. For according to Walzer, "we make the social world as much in our minds as with our hands, and the particular world that we have made lends itself to egalitarian interpretations" (Walzer, 1983: xiv-xv) which proscribe the use of things for the purposes of domination. Thus, a just or egalitarian society is hidden in our social concepts and categories and it remains for us to uncover it. Walzer then, attempts to describe the things we make and distribute one by one. He attempts to get at what security and welfare, money, office, education, political power, and so on, mean to us; how they figure in our lives; and how we might share, divide, and exchange them if we were free from every sort of domination. This is precisely what Walzer's theory of complex equality refers to and distributive justice is the way in which these spheres of social life are differentiated. Hence, the theory of complex equality and distributive justice respects social
meanings and recognizes that domination is ruled out "only if social goods are distributed for distinct and "internal" reasons" (Walzer, 1983: xv). Distributive justice is an art of differentiation within which each sphere of social life is governed and regulated. Distributive justice describes the limitations that are to be placed on individuals within each distinct sphere so as to eliminate domination of one individual or groups of individuals over other individuals or groups of individuals. And equality is simply the outcome of the art, of the things we make and distribute one by one. For example, the creation of blocked exchanges to political power, the purposes of locating ownership, expertise, religious knowledge, and so on in their proper places and establishing their autonomy, etc. ensures that complex equality is established within the sphere of politics. Such regulations and restrictions ensure not that power be shared, but that the opportunities and occasions of power be shared by every citizen so that they are able to be potential participants, potential politicians within the sphere of politics. Thus, distributive justice, within the sphere of politics, as well as all the other social spheres, eliminates the dominance that certain individuals are able to exert over others and hence, produces complex equality within society. Having generally outlined the interworkings of the theory of complex equality and distributive justice
we must now examine Walzer's communitarian changes to society in more detail.

Walzer objects to the way in which money is distributed in our market society, the way in which it is used to establish status and membership. He suggests that there should be a redistribution of money itself (through a negative income tax, for example). But to try to locate the particular things without which membership is devalued or lost and try to make them the objects of communal provision will not work. For the market will quickly turn up new things. If it is not one thing, it will be another, and advertisers will tell us that this is what we need now. Walzer argues that "the redistribution of money or jobs and income neutralizes the market. Henceforth, commodities have only their use value--or, symbolic values are radically individualized and can no longer play any significant public role" (Walzer, 1983: 107). Walzer believes that if money is redistributed then we will be able to judge other commodities on the basis of the use they really have for us. That is, the market will be unable to suggest what we need since only those things which we believe are important to life will hold a value for us. Yet, this seems to be an overly simplistic and narrow account of how money redistributions will affect the market. Walzer
underestimates the role of media and consumerism in contemporary society. Furthermore, if markets are to remain and if money is to remain a commodity in that sphere then there will have to be a continuous redistribution of wealth since over time there will inevitably arise new inequalities of wealth between individuals. Nevertheless, Walzer’s purpose is not to re-organize contemporary society, but to simply neutralize the market. Thus, he is able to argue that we need to tame "the inexorable dynamic of a money economy," to make money harmless—or, at least, to make sure that the harms experienced in the sphere of money are not mortal, not to life and not to social standing either. . . . And once we have blocked every wrongful exchange and controlled the sheer weight of money itself, we have no reason to worry about the answers the market provides (Walzer, 1983: 107).

The welfare state attempts to make money harmless by the use of blocked exchanges, but the welfare state has not enforced them equally among members of society. All of these blocked exchanges have been broken at one time or another. Thus, the only way to control the sheer weight of money itself is to do as Polanyi suggests, to completely give up the idea that there is a value in treating the entities of land, labor, and money as commodities.

An important point noticed by Walzer is that redistribution is beneficial to the petty bourgeoisie, but
there is a problem when we look at the situation from the side of the successful entrepreneur who turns herself into a woman of enormous wealth and power. There arise two problems: "First, the extraction not only of wealth but of prestige and influence from the market; second, the deployment of power within it" (Walzer, 1983: 110). Nevertheless, if freedom is to be an important value for society then the loss of some freedom by a small elite becomes necessary to ensure that everyone will be able to share equal freedom.

Walzer argues that there are three needed redistributions if society is to be restored: first, that of market power; second, that of money itself; and lastly, that of property rights and the entailments of ownership. These three redistributions are necessary if society is going to maintain a correct degree of freedom. For Walzer, "all three redistributions redraw the line between politics and economics, and they do so in ways that strengthen the sphere of politics--the hand of citizens, that is, not necessarily the power of the state" (Walzer, 1983: 122). Hence, redistribution can never produce simple equality, "not so long as money and commodities still exist, and there is some legitimate social space within which they can be exchanged--or, for that matter, given away" (Walzer, 1983: 123). Thus,
Walzer suggests that the way to re-establish equality for all is to prevent the dominance that money has over all other spheres of our lives. And as Polanyi shows, that can only be done by changing our improper understandings of land, labor, and money, that is, we need to completely give up the idea that there is value in treating these entities as commodities. Walzer's regulations and restrictions have essentially the same results as Polanyi's shift in perspectives, with respect to these entities. However, Walzer's blocked exchanges of money will not work as long as the capitalist market system is still allowed to operate alongside the welfare state. The regulations and restrictions will always be impeded by the structures of the market system and by the bureaucratic structures that accompany such regulations and restrictions.

Having looked at the dominance that money and other commodities exert over all other spheres of our lives we are able to see that something must be done to prevent that dominance. Walzer has suggested we invoke a system of redistributions, however, it is obvious that such a system could not be imposed without the help of the government. Thus, we must now return our attention to Walzer's treatment of the political sphere, in particular the proper and improper uses of political power.
Walzer attempts to identify who has ruled and now rules, why democracy is important, and who properly should rule. Walzer raises the question of who should possess and exercise state power. He argues that there are only two answers to this question: "first, that power should be possessed by those who best know how to use it; and second, that it should be possessed, or at least controlled, by those who most immediately experience its effects" (Walzer, 1983: 285). In other words, there are two arguments that answer the question of state power. First, there is the argument that knowledge of the good for society (whatever that may be) qualifies one as worthy of such political power. The second argument is that all members of society, since politics affects every aspect of their lives, should have a say and the opportunity to obtain such political power.

In discussing the first argument, Walzer points out that "all arguments for exclusive rule, all anti-democratic arguments, if they are serious, are arguments from special knowledge" (Walzer, 1983: 285). Hence, this first argument is precisely the idea that the person who should govern is the person with special knowledge of the good for society, obtained by special political training. This view however is undemocratic since it assumes that the political leader
is like a navigator of a ship. Yet, what it fails to realize is that like a navigator the political leader cannot take the ship of politics to any one particular destination without the consent of the passengers or in this case the members of society. Thus, as Walzer argues, "the crucial qualification for exercising some political power is not some special insight into human ends but some special relation to a particular set of human beings" (Walzer, 1983: 287). Knowledge makes for a kind of power that sovereignty cannot control. We have all been under the control of special knowledge at one time or another. For instance, having a PhD beside one's name gives that individual a sense of authoritative status. It is assumed that the individual has some kind of special knowledge that qualifies him/her as an expert or authority in comparison to those without it. Lorraine Code has shown several examples of this kind of thinking in her What Can She Know?. For example, when doctors of known expertise and authority testify in favor of something, for example the efficacy of vitamin C in curing or preventing colds, "the credibility index rises. Hearing the detractors, people want to know about their credentials, as indicators of how serious their claims to expertise can be taken" (Code, 1991: 182). Another example that Code discusses is from Alice Baumgart's observation of the conduct of lawyers during the 1984 Grange Inquiry into
infant deaths from cardiac arrest at Toronto's Hospital for Sick Children. Baumgart observes that

"when lawyers, who were mostly men, questioned doctors, the questions were phrased in terms of what they knew. When nurses were on the stand, the question was, 'Based on your experience . . .' Expertise in our society is considered second-class compared to knowledge. Nurses should not know" (Code, 1991: 222).

Therefore, Walzer argues, there must be rules to limit the way this knowledge is used over us. Thus, "special knowledge is not itself tyrannical" (Walzer, 1983: 290), but how it is used often is.

The second argument concerns the issue of ownership of power. Ownership is properly understood as a certain sort of power over things, but "ownership can also bring with it various sorts and degrees of power over people" (Walzer, 1983: 291). Sovereignty in the sphere of ownership creates even more serious problems as sovereignty entails a "sustained control over the destination and risks of other people" (Walzer, 1983: 291). Therefore, as Walzer asserts, ownership "constitutes a "private government", and the workers are its subjects" (Walzer, 1983: 293). In other words, to allow ownership to be the sole basis for determining who should govern does not assist in promoting freedom and equality. Once ownership is granted sovereign status, democracy is jeopardized. Hence, Walzer argues that
"once we have located ownership, expertise, religious knowledge, and so on in their proper places and established their autonomy, there is no alternative to democracy in the political sphere" (Walzer, 1983: 303). That is, the two arguments for who should govern are based on inequalities and therefore do not ensure and promote democracy, but rather subject citizens to abuses of political power. Therefore, Walzer sees that the only other alternative is a political order in which the citizens govern themselves.

Walzer argues that democracy is "a way of allocating power and legitimating its use--or better, it is the political way of allocating power. Every extrinsic reason is ruled out. What counts is argument among the citizens. . . . Citizens come into the forum with nothing but their arguments. All non-political goods must be deposited outside: weapons and wallets, titles and degrees" (Walzer, 1983: 304). Thus, for Walzer, democracy means that all citizens, based on their arguments, have the opportunity to be potential political leaders. Walzer's objective is to emphasize complex equality within the political sphere. That is, not that power is shared, but that the opportunities and occasions of power are shared. "The citizen must be ready and able, when his time comes, to deliberate with his fellows, listen and be listened to, take
responsibility for what he says and does" (Walzer, 1983: 310). For Walzer, this is the meaning of complex equality and the end of tyranny.

In his last chapter Walzer attempts to summarize the essential points and characteristics of a just society. In order for him to give a proper account of distributive justice he must look at its parts: the social goods and the spheres of distribution. Walzer argues that "a given society is just if its substantive life is lived in a certain way—that is, in a way faithful to the shared understandings of the members" (Walzer, 1983: 313). In other words, a society is just if its members respect each other's creations and accept that they are equals by virtue of the fact that they are culture-producing creatures.

Walzer's theory of justice is alert to difference and sensitive to boundaries. Hence, "the more scope justice has, the more certain it is that complex equality will be the form that justice takes" (Walzer, 1983: 315). Tyranny, on the other hand, does not allow for difference and boundaries. The crucial sign of tyranny is that it is "a continual grabbing of things that don't come naturally, an unrelenting struggle to rule outside one's own
company" (Walzer, 1983: 315). Thus, Walzer has been adamant in arguing for a theory of complex equality and distributive justice. Yet, equality cannot be the goal of our politics "unless we can describe it in a way that protects us against the modern tyranny of politics, against the domination of the party/state" (Walzer, 1983: 316). Therefore, Walzer develops the idea of spheres to create boundaries that are able to protect society from tyrannical abuses of power. Nevertheless, boundaries must be defended on both sides. The very problem with property/power is that "it already represents a violation of boundaries, a seizure of ground in the sphere of politics" (Walzer, 1983: 317). Thus, it appears that boundary conflict is endemic. "Social meanings and distributions are harmonious only in this respect; that when we see why one good has a certain form and is distributed in a certain way, we also see why another must be different" (Walzer, 1983: 318) and it is precisely because of these differences that boundary conflicts will arise. As Walzer states, "we never know exactly where to put the fences; they have no natural location. . . . Boundaries, then, are vulnerable to shifts in social meaning, and we have no choice but to live with the continual probes and incursions through which these shifts are worked out" (Walzer, 1983: 319). So, for Walzer then, all that one can hope for is that "the struggle might get a little easier
as men and women learn to live with the autonomy of distributions and to recognize that different outcomes for different people in different spheres makes a just society" (Walzer, 1983: 320).

To review, Walzer argues for a system of distribution that is just for all. He argues for changes to our current capitalistic system that eliminate tyranny and abuses of power. However, he does not argue against the market system. Rather he tries to show how present society could become more just and equal. Nevertheless, I think he fails to realize that it is the ideas behind capitalism (i.e. the self-regulating market economy) that obstruct the promotion of justice and equality. Walzer fails to realize that the welfare state is unable to enforce its regulations and restrictions of certain market exchanges because there is still a market system operating alongside it and because the bureaucracy involved in such regulations and restrictions is too complex. Thus, the regulations and restrictions will only be effective once we substitute a more cohesive economic system than the capitalist market. As Polanyi has shown, the capitalist market ethic is incompatible with social cohesion, that is, in treating land, labor, and money as commodities, we necessarily exclude all values associated with community and replace these values with the values of
greed, consumption, and competition. Nevertheless, changing the ways in which we commonly view land, labor, and money does not ensure that things will remain changed or that new inequalities will not be formed. Thus, Walzer's theory of complex equality and distributive justice finds its place only after Polanyi's changes have been made, only after people realize the incompatibility between capitalist values and social cohesion. On Walzer's theory, society would then be protected from individuals, individuals from society, and individuals from each other.

Walzer has argued for respecting differences between societies, individuals, etc. Walzer's theory stresses the importance of distributive justice and complex equality. As well, he has argued for a respect for boundaries, boundaries made and enforced in a particular society because they express the shared understandings of society members. Lastly, Walzer argues for keeping individuals and goods in their own spheres so as to avoid tyranny and abuses of power, such as, money used to gain political office, to rule others, to control religious affiliation, etc.
In section I and II Walzer's arguments against capitalism and his communitarian changes of contemporary society were discussed. It may now be useful to spend a little time evaluating his theory, as well as responding to several of his critics.

Walzer develops a strong communitarian ethic, but there are some problems with his theory. Joshua Cohen's review of Walzer, for instance, provides a clear and penetrating analysis of Walzer's theory. Cohen argues that while Walzer aims at providing a sustained account of social justice supporting critical, democratic principles on communitarian foundations he ends up with a problematic account of justice. Walzer rejects the simple egalitarian view of justice (that all resources must be equally distributed unless it is for the common advantage to permit a departure from equality) in favor of his theory of complex equality. As Cohen points out, Walzer attempts to demonstrate that "what is unjust, for example, about wealth determining political power in our society is that it violates our understanding of power--what political power is and what it is good for--not that it conflicts with a general
presumption in favor of an equal distribution of all goods" (Cohen, 1986: 459). And it is precisely for this reason that Cohen believes Walzer's account of justice is problematic. In other words, Cohen believes that Walzer's assertion that the distribution of wealth, for example, should not determine the distribution of power because of differences between our shared understanding of the value of wealth and of the value of power is wrong since "it lacks the (apparent) depth that comes from standing back from our values and wondering whether they are themselves reasonable" (Cohen, 1986: 461). According to Walzer, there is no perspective that one can adopt apart from the values of a particular community and it is here that we find Cohen's strongest objection.

Cohen's central argument against Walzer concerns Walzer's view of community and shared values. The first objection Cohen considers is the conception of consent implicit in Walzer's view of communitarianism. Walzer has assumed that consent to a political order reflects a commitment to preserving and advancing the way of life of that order. However, Cohen argues that such consent can also result from "combinations of fear, disinterest, narrow self-interest, a restricted sense of alternatives, or a strategic judgement about how to advance values not now
embodied in the political community. Only in the case of commitment does it seem right to say that the members share the values embodied in the society" (Cohen, 1986: 462). Furthermore, Norman Daniels' review also points out Walzer's failure to recognize that social meanings can come in all possible variations. For instance, Daniels argues, "a culture may reflect a history of class struggle and domination by a ruling class, or domination by external cultures. Nevertheless, the shared social meanings may be ones to which dominated groups acquiesce--over time it may seem like true consent, but it may only be "false consciousness"" (Daniels, 1985: 145). Thus, Walzer's account of actual societies tends to disregard the variety of sources of consent.

The second objection Cohen concerns himself with is Walzer's view of criticism and community. Walzer holds that the theory of complex equality provides a critical perspective by being attentive to current social values. Walzer's strategy, according to Cohen, is to show that "actual distributions, and even common beliefs about just distributions, sometimes do not conform to the distributive norms that follow from shared understandings" (Cohen, 1986: 463). But, on closer examination, this strategy appears to be flawed. Cohen argues that "the existing practices serve
as evidence—in fact as the only evidence—for the account
of the "collective consciousness" (Cohen, 1986: 463).
However, this suggests a dilemma when one tries to use
shared community values as a critical perspective. As Cohen
points out:

if the values of a community are identified through its
current distributive practices, then the distributive
norms subsequently "derived" from those values will not
serve as criticisms of existing practices. . . . On the
other hand, if we identify values apart from practices,
with a view to assessing the conformity of practices to
those values, what evidence will there be that we have

Thus, there is clearly a dilemma concerning Walzer's appeal
to shared community values as a critical perspective.
Although, for Walzer, "the notions of community and shared
values mark the limits of practical reason"¹¹, not its point
of departure. . . . there still is no plausible way to fix
the limits of practical reason" (Cohen, 1986: 467-468).

Cohen has correctly identified two major problems for
Walzer's theory. However, as William Galston's review of
Walzer reveals, Cohen inaccurately criticizes Walzer for not

¹¹ Practical reason is to be understood in the usual
philosophical way, that of connecting the facts with desires
in order to produce conclusions about what we ought to do.
Practical reason is to be understood in the usual
philosophical way, that of connecting facts with desires in
order to produce conclusions about what we ought to do.
having boundaries or limits to practical everyday reason. Galston argues that Walzer's argument has two admirable features. The first is the scope of Walzer's discussion. Walzer identifies several distributive spheres of justice: immigration, office, leisure, education, etc. Yet, "sensibly, he does not argue for centralized political control over these spheres. But he emphasizes, rightly, that the distributions taking place within them have profound effects on our lives and that these distributions can be, and ought to be, guided by specifiable principles" (Galston, 1984: 331). The second admirable feature is the way in which Walzer delimits each of the distributive spheres he discusses. For example, the use of blocked exchanges of money and the blocked uses of political power. And it is here, with the blocked exchanges, that Walzer sets up the limits to practical reason. Nevertheless, the major problems identified by Cohen, that of consent and that of critical method, still remain.

Galston identifies the same two problems with Walzer's theory. Galston argues that Walzer speaks of social meanings as though our path to understanding them is unobstructed. As well, he argues, Walzer underdefines the role of history in his argument. For instance, it is difficult to determine what the historical examples
exemplify, "especially in an argument that so forcefully emphasizes particularity of time and place as the locus of meaning" (Galston, 1984: 332). Furthermore, Galston argues that Walzer does not adequately deal with the pluralism within the distributive spheres. Although Walzer has delimited the boundaries of autonomous distributive spheres, he does little to reassemble them into a unified community or a common life. In other words, although Walzer argues that politics must "defend the boundaries of all the distributive spheres, including its own, and to enforce the common understandings of what goods are and what they are used for . . .; political power is always dominant--at the boundaries, but not within them" (Walzer, 1983: 15n). Thus, Walzer has shown that "shared meanings are constituted and altered through the discursive activity of politics" (Galston, 1984: 332).

Norman Daniels provides an analysis of Walzer's theory similar to that of Cohen's. However, Daniels is much more concerned with the internal structure of Walzer's distributive spheres. Daniels states that Walzer has developed the theory of complex equality so that we cannot use it as a normative theory except "from within the system of social meanings created by a particular culture" (Daniels, 1985: 144). Daniels then argues that:
the theory is at best a schema--and then not a uniform one--for theories of complex equality. . . It does not tell us what the spheres must in general be and what principles must govern them, but only that, if a society attributes certain social meanings to goods, marking off spheres in which distributive principles are to apply, then its spheres must be kept distinct" (Daniels, 1985: 144).

Thus, the content of this 'schema' can only be provided by finding the principles already embedded in a particular culture. Nevertheless, Daniels criticism is weak at best. The point of Walzer's theory is to respect cultural plurality while at the same time defending equality of distributions; and besides, for Walzer, a particular community is supposed to fill in this 'schema'.

Andreas Teuber, in his review of Walzer, defends Walzer against the criticisms mentioned so far. Teuber outlines Walzer's theory showing that different forms of social life yield different conceptions of what is just. Furthermore, Teuber points out, Walzer takes this point considerably further by arguing that the principles of justice within a particular society "are themselves pluralistic in form. . . Different social goods ought to be distributed for different reasons, in accordance with different procedures, by different agents" (Walzor, 1983: 6). Thus, there is no single set of basic or primary goods. For Walzer, "we must look at the meaning of the goods themselves to discover how
to distribute them in a way that is proper and just. And since the social meanings of particular goods have a history and change over time, the distributive arrangements will also change as social life changes" (Teuber, 1984: 118). Every social good then, makes up a separate distributive sphere within which certain criteria are appropriate and in which "distributions are just or unjust relative to the social meanings of [the] particular goods" (Teuber, 1984: 120).

Whatever possible responses to the objections over his critical method that Walzer could come up with, his theory still "hangs on how much is built into the meanings of a social good" (Teuber, 1984: 120). Teuber further argues that Walzer has depended on "the existence of a world of common meanings" (Teuber, 1984: 120) and is not aware of the possibility of collective sensibilities being so thin that "it cannot constitute a world of common meanings rich enough to provide the kind of guidance Walzer's view requires" (Teuber, 1984: 120). Nevertheless, Teuber does state that the point of Walzer's examples, of his describing the things we distribute one at a time, is "to bring home to us the force of our conceptions of these things" (Teuber, 1984: 120).
However, Teuber, like the other critics, has identified a major problem for Walzer. As Teuber states it,
what justifies a claim that this or that interpretation is how we, in fact, conceive of this or that social good is not always clear. Sometimes it seems an appeal is being made to the social understandings of a majority of citizens, but at other times what most of us think seems less relevant than what the tradition and practices within the culture can teach us (Teuber, 1984: 121).

Yet, Walzer does offer an answer to the question of how the members of a particular community can decide which interpretation of a social good should be taken. Walzer's theory provides a commitment to an ongoing democratic politics where the citizens of a community establish "institutional channels for their expression, adjudicative mechanisms, and alternative distributions" (Walzer, 1983: 313) of their particular understandings of social goods. And therefore, Walzer does not allow his theory to construct permanent fences around particular social goods. For instance, Walzer argues that we are all culture-producing creatures and that we all make and inhabit meaningful worlds. For Walzer, one order cannot be said to be better than any other because none of us are in a position to judge anyone else's order. Yet, since there is no way to rank and order these worlds with respect to their understanding of social goods, Walzer argues, "we do justice to actual men and women by respecting their particular creations. And they claim justice, and resist tyranny, by insisting on the
meaning of social goods themselves" (Walzer, 1983: 314).

Lastly, the objection that Walzer has a limited treatment of consent is somewhat misplaced, considering the purpose of his theory. Walzer's theory of complex equality and distributive justice is supposed to protect contemporary society from abuses of political power. He wants his theory to be able to allow for greater opportunities for consent of new social goods that change from place to place and time to time. "The citizen must be ready and able, when his time comes, to deliberate with his fellows, listen and be listened to, take responsibility for what he says and does" (Walzer, 1983: 310). Walzer's focus on the separation of social spheres is his way of dealing with consent. He is able to ensure that no one individual, or group of individuals, and no one good are able to dominate other individuals or other goods. Walzer does this by allowing boundaries and social goods to be constructed and agreed upon by the vast majority of citizens within a particular community. Thus, Walzer suggests that consent is implicitly given in our shared agreements over social meanings. For Walzer, the important thing is to create boundaries that are able to protect society from tyrannical abuses of power. Yet, we never know exactly where to put the fences; they have no natural location... Boundaries, then, are
vulnerable to shifts in social meanings, and we have no choice but to live with the continual probes and incursions through which these shifts are worked out" (Walzer, 1983: 319).

However, consent is achieved by allowing individuals to have a place in which to come together, discuss, and agree upon particular social meanings, and this is precisely what Walzer has suggested. Therefore, Walzer has adequately dealt with the problems of consent.

IV

Now that Walzer's theory has been evaluated we are able to see that there are only a few minor problems with it. However, these problems can be overcome with the aid of Polanyi. Therefore, we must now illustrate how Polanyi's ideas and concepts, raised in the previous chapter, can strengthen Walzer's theory.

Walzer and Polanyi have somewhat different views of how dominance in contemporary society is to be prevented. For Walzer, blocked exchanges help to allow everyone equal access to the market economy. However, as Polanyi's theory suggests, the use of blocked exchanges cannot wholly protect society from abuses of power as long as there is a self-regulating market economy functioning in society. The real
problem, Polanyi wants to argue, is the society that makes it necessary for there to be abuses of blocked exchanges. In other words, the real problem is the market economy itself which views land, labor and money as commodities. Dominance arises, according to Polanyi's theory, when the market economy becomes self-regulating. With the self-regulating market economy human beings are reduced to a commodity called labor and therefore become enslaved to the demands of the market economy itself; human beings become an accessory of the economic system. Hence, Polanyi argues for a shift in perspective with respect to the ways in which we commonly view land, labor, and money. Polanyi argues that we need to change the view that there is value in treating these entities as commodities. Thus, Walzer realizes that in order to ensure democracy in contemporary society there will have to be blocked market exchanges, and this is precisely what the welfare state aims at. However, Walzer fails to realize that the welfare state does not practice democracy in regards to its enforcement of such blocked market exchanges. As well, the bureaucracy involved in the state welfare system produces a loss of social cohesion among members of society and therefore makes it easy to treat individuals unequally, that is, to give certain individuals freedom to do what they like while at the same time denying similar liberty to the rest of society.
Therefore, Polanyi's changes to contemporary society must first be made in order to prevent the capitalist market economy from impeding the regulations and restrictions that are designed to protect democracy within the welfare state and to rediscover the social cohesiveness of society. However, even after changes to the ways in which we commonly view land, labor, and money are made and an alternative to the capitalist market is developed there is no guarantee that the welfare state will properly enforce its regulations and restrictions equally among all its citizens and that the impediments of state bureaucracy will be rectified in a manner that will protect the social cohesiveness of society. However, this can be done by implementing Walzer's theory of complex equality and distributive justice. In so doing, we can ensure that equalities remain within every sphere of social life and that dominance in one sphere does not become dominance over other social spheres.

Walzer argues that his theory is an attempt to make money harmless, or, at least, "to make sure that the harms experienced in the sphere of money are not mortal, not to life and not to social standing either" (Walzer, 1983; 107). However, Polanyi's theory illustrates that this cannot happen. According to Walzer, "once we have blocked every wrongful exchange and controlled the sheer weight of money
itself, we have no reason to worry about the answers the market provides" (Walzer, 1983: 107). Yet, if money is still to be a commodity and there is still a market economy then there would have to be a continuous redistribution of wealth among society members and a continual reformulation of what are to be considered as blocked exchanges in order to reduce the dominance that certain individuals, because of their wealth, are able to exert over others. Again, Walzer fails to realize that the welfare state does not properly enforce its blocked market exchanges. Furthermore, to suggest that we have no reason to worry about the answers provided by the market seems to confuse the very issue at hand. Our present problem is exactly the fact that money and the market have been able to exert control over almost every other social sphere of our lives. Blocked exchanges have not been successful in checking the control and power money has in a self-regulating market economy. However, if those wrongful exchanges can be blocked more effectively then it is possible to control the influence and power of money. Yet, it is not clear how this is going to happen for Walzer. His blocked exchanges effectively have the same result as Polanyi's suggested changes to society, that is, in establishing a cohesive society characterized by some form of justice and equality. But, Walzer's ideas cannot be realized because the capitalist market and the bureaucracy
of state welfare prevent such regulations and restrictions from being effective. Therefore, a shift of perspective with respect to the ways in which we commonly view land, labor, and money must first be made. We must first change the view that there is value in treating these entities as commodities if we are to effectively protect individuals and their rights to democracy.

Polanyi, on the other hand, seems to have a solution. He recognizes the same problems Walzer does, but his treatment of them is quite different. According to Polanyi, "Robert Owen's was a true insight: market economy if left to evolve according to its own laws would create great and permanent evils" (Polanyi, 1944: 130). For instance, production (the interaction of man and nature) that is regulated through a self-regulating market economy allows man and nature to be brought into its orbit. Thus, man and nature "must be subject to supply and demand, that is, be dealt with as commodities, as goods produced for sale" (Polanyi, 1944: 130). Therefore, Polanyi suggests, not that money be blocked, but rather that we completely give up the idea that there is value in treating money as a commodity. He argues for a dismantling of the uniform market economy through a shift in perspective with respect to the ways in which we commonly view these entities, that
is, by changing the view that there is value in treating land, labor, and money as commodities. In so doing, the market economy has its self-regulating power taken away. Thus, people must recognize the harm to social cohesion that the market produces. Once people understand this harm to society other values can be realized.

Polanyi lays the groundwork for re-thinking the values behind the self-regulating market economy. Yet, there is nothing to guarantee that, in Polanyi's system, there would not be the tyranny of dominance either by the state or by those who have power in one sphere and are able to usurp power in other spheres. To prevent this from happening we need to see that Walzer's distinct spheres of justice can ensure freedom and equality once the social cohesiveness of society is restored. Walzer has recognized an important point; that is, that "there cannot be a just society until there is a society" (Walzer, 1983: 313). Polanyi's theory helps to show that once we change our improper understandings of the value of land, labor, and money, that is, once we give up the idea that there is value in treating these entities as commodities, the self-regulating market loses its power to dominate us and the social cohesiveness of society is able to be developed and ensured once again. Once this happens we can then worry about making society
just. Thus, Polanyi's theory is needed first, to show the way to reestablishing social cohesiveness, and before Walzer's theory can be used as a model of a just society.

Polanyi has shown what is necessary to restore society, yet we must ask how society can remain protected. Walzer argues for a series of redistributions of market power, money, and property rights and entailments of ownership. But these redistributions can never produce simple equality as long as they function as commodities. As we have seen, Polanyi is correct to argue that treating land, labor, and money as commodities is incompatible with social cohesion. Once the market economy is no longer self-regulating, once the negative effects of the market are destroyed, society can be protected by Walzer's theory of complex equality and distributive justice. That is, society is to be protected by "spheres of arbitrary freedom protected by unbreakable rules"(Polanyi, 1944: 255) where its citizens will have "to live with the autonomy of distributions and to recognize that different outcomes for different people in different spheres makes a society just"(Walzer, 1983: 320). By using Polanyi and Walzer in this way a just society is able to be built.
Polanyi and Walzer appear to be opposed to one another because of what socialism and communitarianism commonly mean. That is, socialism tends to support state planning and control of social goods, whereas communitarianism tends to support community planning and public control of social goods. However, Polanyi's and Walzer's particular theories are not as opposed as one might first think. Polanyi suggests that there be state planning and control only to the extent that they provide an arena in which the self-regulating power of the market can be prevented and dominance prohibited. Polanyi is more concerned with rediscovering society, the social cohesiveness of society, and the ability of early twentieth century society to ensure and promote a stronger kind of democracy, than he is with who will ensure that these things can be done. After all, Polanyi argues that such changes "may happen in a variety of ways, democratic and aristocratic, constitutionalist and authoritarian, [or] perhaps even in a fashion yet utterly unforeseen"(Polanyi, 1944: 251). Walzer, on the other hand, suggests that there be community planning and public control of social goods. Walzer believes that there must be some sort of arena in which all the citizens of a community have an equal opportunity and an equal say in the formation and distribution of social goods. However, he does understand that there will have to be a political sphere in which the
state may be able to "defend the boundaries of all the distributive spheres, including its own, and to enforce the common understandings of what goods are and what they are used for" (Walzer, 1983: 15n). Yet, this political power is never to be allowed to be dominant over the other social spheres. Nevertheless, Polanyi's socialism tends to support Walzer's requirements. As Polanyi asserts, "every move towards integration in society should thus be accompanied by an increase of freedom; moves towards planning should comprise the strengthening of the rights of the individual in society. . . . The true answer to the threat of bureaucracy is to create spheres of arbitrary freedom protected by unbreakable rules" (Polanyi, 1944: 255). And this is precisely what Walzer's theory of complex equality and distributive justice does. Therefore, Polanyi and Walzer support each other in order to develop a socialist communitarian ethic that is able to ensure a better kind of democracy in contemporary society than does a western capitalist market ethic.

In conclusion then, Walzer and Polanyi have many similarities and differences, but despite those differences, together they can be seen to support each other's theory and compliment each other's requirements for what is needed in establishing a just and democratic society. Together they
can be used to resolve the problems created by the self-regulating market economy and are able to yield a solid socialist communitarian ethic that is built on the ideas of distributive justice and complex equality. It remains now to determine how these two theories, combined together in a socialist communitarian ethic, can resolve specific philosophical problems concerning threats to democracy (the limits of liberty) in contemporary society. As well, the desirability and impact of such a socialist communitarian society must be determined.
Chapter III

In this final chapter, I will demonstrate how the socialist communitarian ethic establishes a better kind of democracy by showing how it resolves the following philosophical problems concerning threats to democracy (limits to liberty) in contemporary society: 1. the use of power and compulsion in a democratic society, 2. the necessity of obeying other individuals or associations of individuals, 3. the use of monopoly and dominance in a democratic society, and 4. the appearance of this society in the end: a. is it desirable?, b. is it the only solution?, c. does it adequately portray human and social realities? (is this as good as it gets?), d. does it overcome the urge to find one solution that will unite all values? However, before proceeding with this next chapter, it may prove beneficial to spend a little time outlining where we are now so as to determine how best to proceed.

Throughout this thesis the shape and character of the socialist communitarian ethic has been developed. As we saw in chapters 1 and 2, the theory of complex equality and distributive justice helps to protect society from abuses of political power. As well, it helps to provide a framework
on which to rebuild contemporary society. Furthermore, it should now be clear that in order for the theory of complex equality and distributive justice to be implemented in contemporary society, specific changes must first be made. That is, the self-regulating market economy is no longer able to exert its dominance over our lives once we give up the idea that there is value in treating land, labor, and money as commodities. In so doing, the social cohesiveness of society can be rediscovered and the theory of complex equality and distributive justice can be implemented. Lastly, it has been shown that only after such changes have been made can contemporary society be protected from threats to democracy.

So, while Polanyi and Walzer both argue for ways to protect society from abuses of political power, they do admit that society cannot exist without some power and compulsion. Yet, this is not to suggest that all types of power and compulsion are necessary. Rather, as Polayni suggests, the only way to make the necessary changes in society a reality is through some medium of political power and compulsion that remains faithful to and tries to promote what Walzer describes as the theory of complex equality and distributive justice, that ensures a stronger kind of democracy in contemporary society by promoting just and
equal distributions of freedom to all members of society.

The idea of distributive justice presupposes a bounded world (a world made up of distinct social spheres) within which distributions take place: a group of people committed to dividing, exchanging, and sharing social goods, first of all among themselves and then with others. That world, already discussed in chapter 2, is the political community. However, nothing has really been said about the human community. According to Walzer, this is the first and most important distributive sphere. After all, the primary good that we distribute to one another is membership in some human community. "And what we do with regard to membership structures all our other distributive choices: it determines with whom we make these choices, from whom we require obedience and collect taxes, to whom we allocate goods and services" (Walzer, 1983: 31). Therefore, it may help to examine one particular sphere in order to see how this theory is to be applied. Outlining and explaining Walzer's treatment of membership in this way will help to provide a clearer understanding of how the theory of complex equality and distributive justice is worked out.

Walzer attempts to determine by whom and for whom
decisions about distributions are made. The answer to the first question is obvious. For Walzer, "we who are already members do the choosing, in accordance with our own understanding of what membership means in our community and of what sort of a community we want to have" (Walzer, 1983: 32). Thus, although it is we, the members of a community, who make the choices about distributing the social goods, we can only make such decisions with respect to our understanding of the meanings of our community that we have previously chosen and agreed upon. Hence, in order to understand membership it is necessary to look at Walzer's treatment of strangers, relatives, refugees, and guest workers. In so doing, it will be possible to show what rights to the distribution of goods, if any, these groups are entitled to.

In analyzing the case of strangers Walzer explores the case of mutual aid. Walzer believes that what one stranger owes to another is not entirely clear, but it is certain, he thinks, that positive assistance is required if:

(1) it is needed or urgently needed by one of the parties; and (2) if the risks and costs of giving it are relatively low for the other party (Walzer, 1983: 33).

The case of strangers is an interesting one for Walzer since it constitutes the basis for his treatment of the other
groups. By maintaining the member/stranger distinction Walzer hopes to describe the internal and external principles that govern the distribution of membership and in so doing he provides a review of both immigration and naturalization policies. Yet, before doing so, Walzer shows that the only major public policy issue is the size of the population; its growth, stability, or decline. Nevertheless, these decisions cannot, Walzer states, be exercised over those who are already members because it would contain unacceptable high levels of coercion and would not be tolerated by the members of the community.

Admission policies are shown to be shaped in part by three arguments: arguments for economic and political conditions in the host country, arguments about the character and "destiny" of the host country, and arguments about the character of countries (political communities) in general. The last of these three is identified by Walzer as the most important since "our understanding of countries in general will determine whether particular countries have the right they conventionally claim: to distribute membership for [their own] particular reasons" (Walzer, 1983: 35). In order to determine whether or not countries have this right Walzer suggests looking at the political community, the country, through the use of three analogies: neighborhoods,
clubs, or families.

The neighborhood is "an association without an organized and legally enforceable admissions policy" (Walzer, 1983: 36). In a neighborhood, strangers can be welcomed or not welcomed, but they cannot be admitted or excluded. Nevertheless, Walzer does admit that very often there is not much difference between the two. Being welcomed or not welcomed can be the same as being admitted or excluded. However, neighborhoods are not static. There may be some cohesive culture, but it cannot last indefinitely since people would move in and out and soon this cohesion would be gone. "The distinctiveness of culture depends upon closure [of containing only one particular cultural group], and without it, cannot be conceived as a stable feature of human life" (Walzer, 1983: 39). Most people seem to think of this distinctiveness as a value and hence closure (excluding certain people from membership) must be permitted somewhere. As Walzer states, "at some level of political organization, something like the sovereign state must take shape and claim the authority to make its own admission policy, to control and sometimes restrain the flow of immigrants" (Walzer, 1983: 39). In other words, if distinctiveness is to be a value then the members of the community must give their leaders the responsibility of making choices and regulations in
regards to immigration. However, the right to control immigration does not include or entail the right to control emigration. As Walzer states, "the restraint of entry serves to defend the liberty and welfare, the politics and culture or a group of people committed to one another and to their common life" (Walzer, 1983: 39). Yet, if emigration was also restricted then the commitment would be replaced by coercion. Immigration and emigration are, for Walzer, morally asymmetrical.

Communities can also be seen as clubs. In clubs the founders choose themselves (or one another) and all other members have been chosen by those who were members before them. Likewise, communities are founded and then the members decide who to admit and who not to admit. Walzer argues that "individuals may be able to give good reasons why they should be selected, but no one on the outside has a right to be on the inside" (Walzer, 1983: 41). However, this account, says Walzer, does not accurately describe the moral life of contemporary political communities. Citizens often believe that they are morally bound not to let just anyone in to the country. Yet, at the same time, they believe themselves morally bound to allow national or ethnic "relatives" to enter the country. And it is in this way that Walzer thinks countries are more accurately conceived.
as families rather than clubs.

Having analyzed the case of goods distribution among the members of a community and their national or ethnic relatives, it remains to analyze how these goods are to be distributed to refugees and guest workers. Walzer argues that allowing refugees to enter the country does not "necessarily decrease the amount of liberty the members enjoy within that space" (Walzer, 1983: 49). As well, Walzer thinks that we have an obligation to any group of people whom we have helped turn into refugees. For example, the United States has such an obligation to the Vietnamese. Likewise, if a group of people are persecuted or oppressed because they are like us then we also have some obligation to helping this group, especially when "we claim to embody certain principles in our communal life and encourage men and women elsewhere to defend those principles" (Walzer, 1983: 49). Walzer further argues, that because of sometimes scarcity of territory, when the number of victims is small mutual aid will function practically, but when the number of victims increases then we are forced to choose among the victims; often choosing those who have the most direct connection to our own way of life.
Walzer further suggests that we are bound to grant asylum for two reasons: "because its denial would require us to use force against helpless and desperate people, and because the numbers likely to be involved, except in unusual cases, are small and the people easily absorbed" (Walzer, 1983: 51). So, in regard to refugees we have particular obligations towards helping them, but these obligations are somehow regulated by the availability of territory needed to handle these people. Thus, the principles of mutual aid only modify, but do not transform, the admission policies of a particular community.

In discussing the naturalization process, Walzer attempts to show that the same standards used in immigration apply to naturalization. Hence, every immigrant and every resident is a citizen and entitled to the same rights. Yet, it remains to determine what is the case for guest workers. Walzer argues that "without the denial of political rights and civil liberties and the everpresent threat of deportation, the system would not work" (Walzer, 1983: 58). As a group these guest workers are disenfranchised people and are often exploited and oppressed because of their disenfranchisement. Thus, Walzer argues that because these guest workers do socially necessary work and because they are enmeshed in the legal system of the host country, "they
ought to be able to regard themselves as potential or future participants in politics as well. . . . They must be set on the way to membership" (Walzer, 1983: 60). Walzer suggests that one way this could be done would be for the host country to make formal treaties with the home countries, wherein a list of "guest's rights" are outlined. If democratic citizens want to bring in new workers they must be willing to accept and enlarge their membership. If they are unwilling, they must find other ways of getting socially necessary work done.

Having examined Walzer's discussion of membership it is possible to understand how the theory of complex equality and distributive justice works itself out from our shared understandings of social goods. Membership is the primary social good that gets distributed in society. Thus, from the discussion of membership we are able to understand that, like any social good, membership has specific rules and regulations that govern its distribution. These rules and regulations, derived from our shared understanding of membership, reflect the essence of the theory of complex equality and distributive justice. As we have seen, the distribution of membership to those outside of the community is not subject to the constraints of justice (that all be treated equally) since the right to choose an admissions
policy is a way of maintaining communal independence. After all, "no one on the outside has a right to be inside" (Walzer, 1983: 41). However, those who are already members must be treated equally and hence, are subject, only here, to the constraints of justice. These two points suggest the deepest meanings of self-determination. Without them, there could not be communities of character . . . with some special commitment to one another and some special sense of their common life (Walzer, 1983: 62).

Hence, self-determination is subject only to the internal decisions of the members themselves and to the external principles of mutual aid. Immigration is then a matter of political choice and moral constraint, but naturalization is entirely constrained. Every new immigrant, refugee, resident, and guest worker must be offered the opportunities of citizenship. As Walzer states,

the determination of aliens and guests by an exclusive band of citizens . . . is not communal freedom but oppression. The citizens are free, of course, to set up a club, make membership as exclusive as they like, write a constitution, and govern one another. But they can't claim territorial jurisdiction and rule over the people with whom they share the territory. To do so is to act outside their sphere, beyond their rights. It is a form of tyranny (Walzer, 1983: 62).

Thus, Walzer has argued that everyone must share the same rights of citizenship and these rights are to be distributed equally, but at the same time, the original members of the community have the right, as part of their self-
determination, to make rules and regulations for entry. Nevertheless, there are certain instances in which the community must allow certain persons or groups to enter the country, despite the rules and regulations. Lastly, Walzer further concludes that although the extent of control and/or coercion is restricted to deciding who will be allowed to enter the country, it cannot be enforced once these people or groups are admitted.

In conclusion, this section has attempted to briefly examine and explain the detailed interworkings of the theory of complex equality and distributive justice through the example of membership. The remainder of this chapter will now have to address the problem of how the socialist communitarian ethic can work to ensure a better kind of democracy in contemporary society.

II

The problem of how the socialist communitarian ethic can work to ensure a better sense of democracy in contemporary society must now be addressed. In order to do this, I will begin by examining a particular society which has exemplified, in its social organization, most of the
central concepts expressed by this ethic. That is, I will closely examine the social organization of the Teton Sioux in its era of greatest vigor and renown—the brief span of less than fifty years from about 1830 to 1870. In particular, I will examine the spheres of politics, family and kinship, security and welfare, and recognition within this Sioux society and then compare its dynamics with Walzer's treatment of these spheres. Finally, I will then demonstrate how the case of the Teton Sioux resolves the philosophical problems concerning the threats to democracy that were outlined at the onset of this chapter. However, before doing all of this, it will be useful to spend some time providing an overall sketch of traditional Sioux society.

The Sioux nation, known as "the Seven Council Fires", was originally composed of seven separate political and cultural groupings: the Mdewakantons, the Wahpetons, the Wahpekutes, the Sissetons, the Yanktons, the Yanktonais, and the Teton. Originally these seven groups were all part of the same nation and met once a year to discuss matters of national importance. However, for the most part, each of these groups constituted a separate division within the nation and was an autonomous political and cultural system.
In recent centuries the Sioux divisions have been separated by historicists and anthropologists into three distinct entities: Dakota, Nakota, and Lakota. Furthermore, this separation reflects the differences in dialect in the Siouan language, also known by the terms Dakota, Nakota, and Lakota. Nomenclature here becomes difficult in that no group is identified by a single name. The Dakotas were also known as the Santee Sioux; the Nakotas as the Yankton and Yanktonai Sioux; and the Lakotas as the Teton Sioux or Western Sioux. The identification of these peoples becomes even more involved, however, because in early times the Chippewas referred to the Seven Council Fires as the "Lesser Adders" or "Nadoweisiw-eg". The French, encountering the term garbled the Chippewa word ("Nadoweisiw," in the singular), transforming it to "Sioux". Thus, in anthropological terminology, all three groups--the Dakotas, Nakotas, and Lakotas--properly may be called Sioux. However, as Royal Hassrick states in his *The Sioux: Life and Customs of a Warrior Society*, "in popular nomenclature, the word "Sioux" has become identified with the Tetons, the dashing buffalo hunters of the prairies" (Hassrick, 1964: 6). Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, I will use only one particular division of the Sioux Nation, the Lakota or Teton Sioux, as an expression of the socialist communitarian ethic.
The Sioux Indians with whom this section deals call themselves Lakota, as distinguished from their relatives the Nakotas, or Yankton Sioux, and the Dakotas, or Santee Sioux. The terms Sioux and Lakota will heretofore be used interchangeably. The Lakota nation was composed of seven major divisions: the Oglala, Sichangu (Brules or Burnt Thighs), Miniconjou, Hunkpapa, Sihasapa (Black Feet), Itazipcho (Sans Arc or Without Bows), and Oohenonpa (Two Kettles). Each of these seven division within the Lakota Nation, while independent, sometimes joined others and lived so closely that their distinctions tended to be lost. Thus, "around 1800 the Two Kettles, the Without Bows, the Blackfeet, and the Hunkpapas probably formed one group known to some as the "Saones," while the Oglalas, the Brules, and the Miniconjou formed another group and were sometimes referred to as the "Tetons"" (Hassrick, 1964: 6). However, as time passed, other relationships developed. New groupings appeared and old ones dissolved, so that "after 1850 the Sioux tended to band themselves into four or five rather than two main bodies" (Hassrick, 1964: 7). Generally, they held separate Sun Dances, possibly joining with one or two groups with whom they traded, and spent the rest of the year hunting and camping throughout their respective territories. However, in the minds of the Lakota Sioux, there were, regardless of associations of convenience, seven
Lakota Sioux divisions

Generally, the entire Lakota Nation assembled each summer to hold council. The purpose of this summer council was to renew acquaintances, decide matters of national importance, and give the Sun Dance. It was a period of renewed unity and celebration and symbolized the cohesiveness of the nation. At the council the Wicasa Yatapickas, the four great leaders of the Lakota nation, met for deliberations. Each of these leaders was selected from among the outstanding headmen of the Sioux divisions and at this one occasion they became the ultimate authority. Thus, since they only met once a year the bulk of tribal administration was relegated to the leaders of the separate divisions. In particular, each division of the Lakota Nation was an autonomous system capable of functioning independently of the tribe and each division was generally under the authority of four chiefs or Shirt Wearers.

The firm base upon which the Lakota Sioux's fluid governmental structure rested was the family hunting group or tiyospa. Such an organization structured Sioux social life and rendered the nation flexible and cohesive. As Hassrick explains, "existence for the Sioux people, as for
all mankind, was the vexing combination of individual endeavor and group enterprise" (Hassrick, 1964: 11). As early as 1700 the Sioux were hunters of small game and buffalo. Thus, Sioux society had to be structured around small, close-knit family hunting groups in order to survive the demands placed on them by the limits of wildlife in specific areas. These clanish groups were headed by a patriarchal family head (usually a grandfather) who provided and protected the group by his bravery, fortitude, generosity, and wisdom.

As we will shortly see when we look at several of the social spheres of Sioux life, the Sioux had their own way of working out and of distributing their own social values. For the Sioux there were specific virtues for men and for women which were to be emulated and encouraged. Of course, these virtues were ideals and no one could ever fully possess all of them, but they served as a guide to structure one's individual life. For men, the virtues of bravery, generosity, fortitude, and wisdom were the ideals on which male individuals structured their lives and strived to obtain. For women, the virtues of bravery, generosity, truthfulness, and fecundity were of central importance. So too were the feminine virtues of industry and fidelity which each woman also tried to promote for herself. As Hassrick
explains,

while it was understood that no man could achieve excellence in all of these qualities, it was believed that every man should endeavor to attain something of each. Nor were they separate, but rather interdependent. In order to exhibit generosity, for example, bravery and fortitude—conceivably even wisdom—were contributing factors (Hassrick, 1964: 32).

All of these virtues were taught and encouraged from childhood on and the rewards for exhibiting them served as sufficient reasons for striving towards them. For instance, an individual would be accorded prestige and honor for exhibiting such values. Leaders (chosen among the males) were not chosen solely on the basis of popularity, but were rather chosen on the basis of their actions (eg. giftgiving, holding ceremonies) in demonstrating that they did indeed possess such values. If a man was seen to possess the four male virtues in great abundance he could be considered by the group as a potential leader. Yet, although leadership was often passed down to one's eldest son, that individual would have to possess the four virtues if the members of the group were to accept him as a leader. Nevertheless, individuals with outstanding merits were often elected as leaders. As for the feminine virtues, fidelity can be seen as an important virtue for women considering the fact that familial cohesion was of the utmost importance to the identity, security, and stability of Sioux social life, even though polygamy and divorce were quite common among the
The Sioux had very different social and moral views than we have today. Prestige and recognition, leadership and reverence were accorded to selfless individuals. Property was real and individually owned and there were definite rights of property. However, accumulation of more property than was needed was discouraged by the acclaim given to generous activities. As Hassrick comments, "the man who owned horses and hoarded them was flaunting convention and was looked upon as selfish. Unless he had compensating virtues, his prestige was less than that of the man who continually gave away horses" (Hassrick, 1964: 256). For the Sioux, property was for use, not accumulation, and its chief use was bestowing it on others. To accumulate property for one's own sake was seen as disgraceful. For example, at death a man's property was buried with him and his best horse killed. Distribution of material things took place during one's lifetime. Although an individual gained prestige from his generous activities, the Sioux also required that prominent leaders (to maintain their status) give certain ceremonies in which large giveaways were a central part. "The interrelationship of this series of ceremonies and the giveaway pattern imposed upon the leaders the beneficence which the ideals of society upheld and
conversely protected the members from exploitation from their leaders" (Hassrick, 1964: 257). Thus, the indigent, rather than being burdens to society, were necessary vehicles whereby successful men gained status. As Hassrick comments, "here was socialism with a vengeance. It meant that, ideally and in reality, no member was to go without" (Hassrick, 1964: 37). The distribution of wealth for the benefit of all fostered relatively equal economic standards for all members of the tribe. Thus, "the Sioux evolved a system which ensured the well-being of all the people by the voluntary and highly rewarding dispersal of property" (Hassrick, 1964: 37).

Another way in which the Sioux endeavored to work out and distribute their social values was through their religious system. As Hassrick points out,

Sioux religion was more than a mere hierarchy of Controllers who governed the world and man. It was a moral system. It declared that good outweighed evil. It set forth virtues which were to be emulated and penalties for disregarding them. It did this by parables, by commandments, and by acts. Moreover Sioux religion was vital. . . . It forthrightly gave the Sioux something to believe in that was greater than man himself and thereby rendered a source of emotional security, inspiration, and code of behavior. The Sioux religion permeated man's every action, his every living moment. He was of it and it was of him (Hassrick, 1964: 224).

The Sioux religion was a very effective means of ensuring
adherence to and acceptance of social values. For example, one of the Sioux myths concerns the appearance of Whope, The Beautiful One, on earth. Whope, a goddess of virtue, was sent by the Controllers as a representative to teach mankind certain moral codes, to reiterate the humanness of the Controllers (all the good and bad gods), and to instruct the people in the mysteries of ceremony and to bring the first peace pipe to the Sioux. This story reveals the tender quality of their religious morality and serves as a concrete example of the living quality of Sioux belief.

Lastly, in birth, life, and death the whole Sioux community took an active role to celebrate and honor the individual. As such the individual growing up in Sioux society naturally came to a generalized acceptance of and belief in the value of the Sioux way. Furthermore, the variety of roles open to the individual and the sanctioned activities which one might emphasize or minimize allowed for personal variations within the group. As Hassrick states, while it behooved the individual to determine how best he or she might evolve a workable equilibrium, the culture, as it were, took into account that no two persons were alike and that no two of their solutions would be identical. Here was a culture which offered opportunities to resolve the conflict but placed the responsibility for the resolution squarely upon its members (Hassrick, 1964: 298).

Thus, the variety of roles available to individuals in Sioux
society accounted for the pluralism within its society. Hence, the Sioux were able to organize themselves socially in such a way as to ensure complex equality and distributive justice for all its members.

Having provided just a brief sketch of traditional Sioux society we are already able to see that they had their own understanding of the values needed for their society and how they were to be distributed. This brief sketch has served to identify and situate the Sioux as an example of a working socialist communitarian ethic. It now remains to examine several spheres within Sioux social life so as to demonstrate in more detail how they worked out and distributed their social values. In so doing, the Sioux will serve as an illustration of a society that promotes and ensures complex equality and distributive justice within its spheres of social life in the manner to which the socialist communitarian ethic demands.

III

Having dealt with the socialist communitarian ethic and given a brief overview of traditional Sioux society it now remains to examine the spheres of politics, family and
kinship, security and welfare, and recognition as discussed by Walzer in order to show how these same spheres in Sioux social life exemplify the ideal of and meet the demands of the socialist communitarian ethic.

The Sioux had their own way of working out and distributing goods in the sphere of politics, but it will soon become clear that their political sphere was organized in a manner that allowed for complex equality and distributive justice and therefore meets the demands of the socialist communitarian ethic. However, before doing this let us briefly reiterate, from Chapter 2, the ways in which the socialist communitarian ethic functions within the sphere of politics.

The theory of complex equality and distributive justice is alert to difference and sensitive to boundaries. However, the sphere of politics is dominated by many goods and many people. For instance, state power is colonized by wealth or talent or blood or gender. Placing priority of one or all of these above any of the others makes state power and its agents tyrannical. As Walzer argues, the agents of state power "don't police the spheres of distribution but break into them; they don't defend social
meanings but override them" (Walzer, 1983: 282). Thus, there is, indeed, a prudential argument for democracy: that the different companies of men and women will most likely be respected if all the members of all the companies share political power. Hence, Walzer argues that "once we have located ownership, expertise, religious knowledge, and so on in their proper places and established their autonomy, there is no alternative to democracy in the political sphere" (Walzer, 1983: 303). In other words, the only alternative is a political order in which the citizens govern themselves. Democracy means that every citizen must have the chance to talk about and to provide resolutions to the political concerns of the community. As Walzer argues,

Ideally, the citizen who makes the most persuasive argument— that is, the argument that actually persuades the largest number of citizens— gets his way. But he can't use force, or pull rank, or distribute money; he must talk about the issues at hand. And all the other citizens must talk, too, or at least have a chance to talk (Walzer, 1983: 304).

In this way, complex equality is ensured within the political sphere. That is, not that power is shared, but that the opportunities and occasions of power are shared. And this is the meaning of complex equality and the end of tyranny.
The political structure of the Sioux is very complex and difficult to understand, but I will try to give a general summary of its structure. Each division of the Lakota Nation was an autonomous system. Generally, each division was under the authority of four chiefs or Shirt Wearers. Next there were essentially two kinds of fraternal societies: the Akicitas (policing societies) and the Nacas (civil societies). The officers of the Akicitas were chosen from all able young men and though its officers carried out specified roles, each was considered equal in authority and importance. Generally, leaders of the band appointed one Akicita society (a kind of club) as the official police for a single season. Yet, while the police societies were the proving ground for political aspirants, the chief's society (another kind of club), or Naca Ominicia, was the resource of tribal leadership. Qualifications for Naca membership were many and varied. However, as Hassrick explains, "a Naca might be a former headman of one of the bands, a leading shaman of proven integrity and magnetism, or a hunter or warrior whose outstanding career had brought him renown. Then, of course, the elders, recognized for their qualities of bravery and fortitude, wisdom and generosity, were also members of the group" (Hassrick, 1964: 25). Clearly, the members of the Nacas were required to possess
outstanding achievements as a sign of their devotion and ability to serve the people.

Leadership within the Akicitas, as for example among the Tokalas (an Akicita society), was "invested in twelve officers--two pipe bearers, two drummers, four lance owners, two rattlers, and two whippers. The pipe bearers were the counselors in times of discord." (Hassrick, 1964: 23). The twelve men were thought of as leaders, but none took precedence over the others. However, they were guided and directed in all major decisions by three old men. The three old men were former Tokalas, members of the Nacas, venerable leaders of the tribe. As overseers, Hassrick explains, "they were consulted regarding the selection of new members, their advice was asked about ceremonial ritual, and they rendered their opinions concerning the over-all activities of the society" (Hassrick, 1964: 23). The Sioux recognized the elders' mature experience as valuable to the existence of the club.

The Naca Ominicia was, in truth, the real council of the tribe. It was they who gathered together to hear the reports of scouts, to determine whether a tribal hunt should be held, whether camp should be moved, whether war was to be declared or peace was to be made. In this sense, the Naca Ominicia held a true legislative responsibility. The
members acted only in unison and decisions were reached only with unanimous voice. As Hassrick comments, "here the individual constituted a potent minority with veto power. The group must convince the opposition, mediate and reconcile difference, or acquiesce and forego the decision" (Hassrick, 1964: 25). In addition to the Naca's legislative responsibility, its power extended to ultimate control of tribal administration, for it was this body which appointed the administrators and executives. For example, the Naca Ominicia appointed from among themselves ten Wicasa Itacans who served as an executive committee that put into effect the policies of the larger council of Naca Ominicia.

The Wicasa Itacans were generally regarded as the real government and were responsible for appointing the Shirt Wearers (who were also chosen from among the Naca group). These Shirt Wearers were the official executives of the tribe and served as the voice of the Wicasa Itacans. The term of office of the Shirt Wearer depended in large measure on the individual's wishes. The Shirt Wearers had to decide matters of tribal concern, resolve internal disputes between individual families, provide bountiful hunting and good campgrounds, and function as supreme counsellors. When they felt that they could no longer fulfill their obligation of office, it was their responsibility to train a younger man
for the task. The office required that the individual possess the proper virtues and that the individual hold specific ceremonies. Generally, office was hereditary, as usually only those of high standing could afford to hold such ceremonies. Yet, as mentioned earlier, this did not preclude someone of lower status and outstanding qualifications from becoming a leader.

Last in the political hierarchy were the Wakincuzas or Pipe Owners. They were usually, if not always, members of the Naca Ominicia and were appointed by them. However, they served under the direction of the Shirt Wearers. They assigned camp location to the bands and individual families and appointed a certain Akicita society for camp moves.

Until the middle of the nineteenth century, the overall national government was organized in the same way as this divisional government. Thus, the elders of the Nacas of the seven Lakota divisions appointed four executives, the Wicasa Yatapikas or Supreme Owners of the tribe. The Wicasa Yatapikas were the national counterpart of the Shirt Wearers. They were the executives of the Nation with the same authority and responsibility for national welfare as the Wicasa Itacans had within each division. They too had
to be above reproach, display the proper virtues, hold the specific ceremonies, and constantly prove themselves judicious leaders of the people. Clearly, Sioux leadership involved a relationship of trust between members and leaders.

From the way the Sioux worked out their political structure it is possible to see how they exemplify the socialist communitarian ethic and how their distribution of power within the sphere of politics reflects the purposes of complex equality and distributive justice. In particular, the Sioux were able to ensure that every member of their society was able to share the opportunities and occasions of political power by distributing political power to various groups within the Sioux community, by allowing decisions to be decided in unison, by placing on leaders the responsibility of providing for the needs of the whole community rather than their own needs, and by working out the political sphere in such a way as to allow every individual the power to accept or not accept individual leaders. Lastly, it must be conceded that although women did not form a part of the political hierarchy, they too had their own, albeit unequal, civil societies. However, their powers extended only to the governance of women and women's roles and responsibilities in Sioux society. It is
difficult to determine whether or not all members of Sioux society, including women themselves, had a shared understanding and acceptance of women's roles and functions in their society. If they did then there is no problem with the fact that women were excluded from participation in their political hierarchy. However, if they did not then the use of the Sioux as an example of a society which ensured complex equality and distributive justice within its political sphere becomes problematic. As well, it should be reiterated that the political situation I am describing is specific to the period from 1830 to 1870. It is quite possible that the position of Sioux women in political involvement would have changed over time as it has in our own society. At any rate, we must now turn our inquiry to several of the other spheres of Sioux social life.

The tiyospe, a group of individuals banded together under a common leader and often related through descent or marriage to the patriarch, was the ancient and important core of Sioux society. Through the able guidance of an experienced and dependable elder, small groups of people co-operated in hunting and in war, in carrying out the daily chores of homemaking, rearing children, celebrating, and worshiping, in caring for the aged, and in burying the dead. To accomplish all of these successfully, the tiyospe was of
necessity an intensely cohesive organization and was itself imbued with a sense of order. The tiyospe was generally composed of one or more families. Boys usually chose to associate themselves with the father's family and girls with their mother's. Nevertheless, they were members of both families. Furthermore, affiliation depended on proximity of either the father's or the mother's family. While the conjugal family of husband and wife was subject to dissolution by divorce or death, the family of lineal and collateral relatives was permanent. As Hassrick explains, "an individual remained responsible to these [lineal and collateral] relatives during his lifetime, regardless of his marital status or his residence" (Hassrick, 1964: 99). In the event of a divorce the woman returned to her family, the man to his, and children of five or six were allowed to choose who to go with, and younger children often went with their mothers. Generally, boys went with their father and girls with their mother. Lastly, grandparents played an important child-rearing role, for these older people acted as nursemaids for their married children. However, not all aged parents could expect to seek shelter in their children's home because of the avoidance taboo placed on wives' mothers and husbands' fathers. Hassrick explains that "so strong was the avoidance taboo that if the wife's mother had no son to whom she might go, she must camp
alone" (Hassrick, 1964: 102). Yet, this is not to suggest that such individuals were uncared for. Because of the importance placed on generosity and the prestige gained by giving, young men gave food and supplies to these individuals. Thus, these individuals were ultimately wards of the society.

The tiyospe was further imbued with a sense of order as proper behavior patterns were governed by four principles: familiarity and respect, reciprocity of action, sex differentiation, and generation. As Hassrick explains:

the individual adjusted his actions toward others first in accordance with the degree of familiarity or respect which the other's status demanded; second, with reference to the way in which the other person behaved toward him; thirdly, with regard to the sex of the other, including the sex of the person through whom the relationship existed; and fourth, in relation to the generation in which the other belonged, whether senior, peer, or junior (Hassrick, 1964: 104).

Familiarity and respect were the foundation upon which the kinship system operated. In practice, there was nothing haphazard or complicated, the rules provided clear-cut gradations of behavior and assured group well-being. This is precisely Walzer's point in his discussion of the sphere of kinship. Walzer argues that throughout most of human history love and marriage have been far more closely regulated than they are nowadays. All the distributive
questions of Who... whom? (Who can marry whom? Who lives with whom? Who must show respect to whom?) are answered differently in different societies and change over time. Yet, the answers to these questions constitute an elaborate system of rules, and it is a feature of the earliest understanding of political power that chiefs or princes who violate these rules are tyrants. As Walzer states, "the deepest understanding of tyranny probably lies here: it is the dominance of power over kinship" (Walzer, 1983: 228). For instance, as Walzer comments, in many times and places the determinations of kinship have shaped political institutions by fixing the legal status and life chances of individuals. Thus, the Sioux worked out an elaborate and effective system that enabled all individuals to understand and answer the distributive questions of Who... whom? The Sioux were able to work out the answers to these questions by making the answer a part of their social practices. For instance, as children found security in being the responsibility of many people, so adults too did not find themselves in need of a sense of belonging. The individual was rarely independent; the individual was "a participating member of a team of close-knit relatives—part of a family with no beginning and no end" (Hassrick, 1964: 109). Consequently, existence within such a formalized family system could only imply devotion of self to the welfare of
others. "Members were a cog in a wheel, working first in relation to the common good and secondly for themselves. . . . No individual was without responsibility" (Hassrick, 1964: 109). Thus, the success of the tiyospe was dependent upon the cohesive functioning of its members, and the kinship system was ideally suited to implementing it.

The structure of the kinship system of the Sioux is extremely close to Walzer's description of the most radical egalitarian proposal to prevent the inequalities of politics and economics from entering the sphere of family, that is, the abolition of the family, raised in The Republic when Plato discusses the life of his Guardians. Among the Guardians all the members are siblings who know nothing of their own blood ties. All Guardian children are children of the adult Guardians and all the adult Guardians are parents to the Guardian children. Kinship is universal, hence effectively non-existent, assimilated to political friendship. Further, in order to eliminate the constraints of passion and jealousy the Guardians are not allowed to own individual property. Instead, these men and women are to experience pleasure and pain as common passions and the jealousies of family life are said to be replaced by an emotional and material egalitarianism. The purpose then of abolition is not to achieve some balance between kinship and
community, but radically to reverse the outcome of the
effects of the political community over kinship. Therefore,
the ways in which the kinship system of the Sioux functioned
was, in effect, a sort of abolition of the family. The
individual family structure was still in place, but it was
extended into a much larger communal 'family' structure
which took precedence. As a result, the Sioux had no
problems in separating kinship from politics and economics.
For instance, the demands of Sioux leadership required that
one possess and display the proper virtues in order to be
considered and chosen as a leader. If he did not continue
to exhibit the proper virtues the people would simply
abandon the leader and follow someone else. Thus there
were, in the social structures of Sioux society, safeguards
that prevented power from dominating kinship. Furthermore,
these safeguards address Walzer's concerns that a democratic
regime "could not tolerate such a division; [that] kinship
would have to be abolished entirely" (Walzer, 1983: 230).
After all, Walzer admits that if we give up universal
kinship, "no arrangement of family ties seems to be
theoretically required or even generally preferable. There
is no single set of passional connections that is more just
than all of the alternative sets" (Walzer, 1983: 231). Yet,
among the Sioux no such alternatives needed to be adopted
since universal kinship was not given up, but was rather
adapted to fit the needs of the individual functioning for the benefit of the whole community. For example, each village, although a politically and economically autonomous group, often joined with others on the tribal buffalo hunt. At these times all individuals worked together, but this time for the benefit of a larger 'familial' community. James Howard explains this event in his The Canadian Sioux:

To maintain order on the hunt the village council, or a council of the combined village groups, would select one or more hunt chiefs. For the duration of the hunt, these men were in complete charge, possessing dictatorial powers. Like the war chief in times of war, the hunt chief temporarily outranked even the village chief (Howard, 1984: 7).

Thus, having discussed the role of kinship among the Sioux and having shown how it meets Walzer's concerns, we must now turn to the role of marriage among the Sioux, since, as will become apparent, it constitutes such a large portion of Walzer's argument for free and equal love in the sphere of family.

Among the Sioux, marriages followed, to a large extent, the pattern of marriage for exchange and alliance that Walzer describes. Walzer believes marriages for exchange and alliance grow out of a twofold process of boundary drawing, not only between kinship and economic life, but also between kinship and politics. For example,
aristocratic and haut bourgeois families of the early modern period were little dynasties. Their marriages were complex matters of exchange and alliance, carefully planned and elaborately negotiated. However, for the Sioux, marriages were not only a matter of exchange and alliance. In fact, as Hassrick explains, marriage was a complex of what might be termed an agreement between families and a concurrence between partners. As Hassrick describes it,

in some instances, to be sure, parental agreement amounted to contrivance, but more frequently it became a matter of acceptance, primarily because the Sioux man actively courted the girl of his choice. When family opposition was strong, elopement invariably brought acquiescence. (Hassrick, 1964: 111).

For instance, courting involved flirting at public ceremonies and formal courtship in the evening and early part of the night. As well, there were occasions in which ceremonies were held to publicly announce that one's daughter had reached womanhood and was ready for marriage. These ceremonies were an opportunity to display generosity in celebration of womanhood and to give young people a chance to interact more closely. Furthermore, there were many opportunities for social dancing. Although many dances were primarily of a religious, ceremonial, or military nature, there were other dances that were purely social. Nevertheless, a youth, having flirted with a girl at a dance, and perhaps having received some sign of
encouragement from her, would position himself on a hill near her parental home and sing or play love songs on his flute. The girl, if she were interested, would attempt to go out and meet him, perhaps on the pretext of getting a pail of water or a bundle of wood. Yet, since Sioux girls were closely chaperoned, there was usually only time for the exchange of a few words. As Hassrick explains, "while the courting custom gave the girl a certain control of the situation, it also protected her very well. This was the formal dignified Sioux design for love-making—a most reserved, most restricted kind of courtship. But this was the Sioux way" (Hassrick, 1964: 115).

When a man wanted to marry a woman he would send, by way of a close friend or brother, a formal proposal to the girl's brother or to some male standing in a similarly close relationship to her. After arrangements were made and the bride-price determined, the marriage took place. Sometimes, if it was difficult to accumulate sufficient capital goods, the man would go and live with his fiancés' family for a year and would hunt and perform menial tasks for the family. If he demonstrated during this time that he was able to support a wife, he was then formally married to the girl. Thus, for the Sioux, contractual marriage may represent an early type since parentally planned marriages began to give
way to those based on individual choice when the
introduction of horses brought about greater mobility.

Since marriage for the Sioux had become a matter of
mutual consent the inequalities between familial wealth,
political influence, and social status no longer served as a
determining role in the formation of marriages. These
aspects no longer reflected inequalities, but instead
reflected the commitment and ability of individuals to
support their 'families', and hence the community. And this
is precisely what Walzer wants. It is through the
separation of distributive spheres that such inequalities
are eliminated. As Walzer puts it, "if family membership
and political influence are entirely distinct, if nepotism
is ruled out, inheritance curtailed, aristocratic titles
abolished, and so on, there is much less reason to think of
marriage as either an exchange or an alliance" (Walzer, 1983:
235). Once marriage is taken out of the hands of parents
and their agents and delivered into the hands of children,
the distributive principle of romantic love becomes free
choice. And it has this crucial implication: the man and
the woman are not only free but equally free, the feeling
must be mutual. Therefore, according to Walzer, "we call
parent tyrants if they try to use their economic or
political power to thwart the desires of their
children" (Walzer, 1983: 235). Once the children are of age, parents have no right to punish or restrain them. And so, freedom in love describes a choice made independently of the constraints of exchange and alliance, not of the constraints of love itself. And it is here with the Sioux that this seems most self-evident.

If children are free to love and marry as they please, Walzer argues, "there must be a social space, a set of arrangements and practices, within which they can make their choices" (Walzer, 1983: 236). Walzer here seems to argue for the establishment of civic balls of the Rosseaeuan type. That is, Rousseau argued that there should be a particular sort of public festival: "the ball for young marriageable persons". Yet, Rousseau also thought that mothers and fathers (and grandmothers and grandfathers) should attend these balls, as spectators not participants; and this would, to say the least, impose a certain "gravity" upon the occasion. Nevertheless, no matter how and where these things are worked out all that is required, for Walzer, is that individuals be free to love or not love whomever they wish. The opportunities for social dancing in Sioux society seems to suggest that they were quite able to provide a suitable arena in which to facilitate love choices and that they were able to combine both freedom and
responsibility into the individual's choices.

Lastly, Walzer's main objective has been to show that while the constraints of kinship are often burdensome and close, they are not for that reason unjust. As Walzer put it, "because of what families are, freedom in love can rarely be anything more than a free acceptance of (a particular set of) domestic constraints"(Walzer, 1983: 239). Therefore, in looking at the particular set of domestic constraints of Sioux society we are able to see that the Sioux exemplified, in their kinship system, many of the ideals set up by Walzer and, so far, remain faithful to the demands of the socialist communitarian ethic. We must now further this inquiry by examining their sphere of security and welfare.

The Sioux had their own way of working out and distributing the socially recognized needs inherent in their particular understanding of the sphere of security and welfare. Yet, one of the purposes of the socialist communitarian ethic is to free security and welfare from the prevailing patterns of dominance. Hence, the distribution of security and welfare for the Sioux, if it is to exemplify the aspects of the socialist communitarian ethic's approach
to security and welfare, must be worked out in a manner that remains faithful to the promotion of complex equality and distributive justice within the sphere of security and welfare so as to protect this sphere from dominance. That is, they must have worked out and distributed their socially recognized needs in such a way that, as Walzer suggests, their political community attended to the needs of its members as they collectively understood those needs; that the goods that were distributed were distributed in proportion to need; and that the distribution recognized and upheld the underlying equality of membership.

We must therefore ask, what is the rightful share of security and welfare for individuals in a particular community? That is, the range of goods that ought to be shared, the boundaries of the sphere of security and welfare, and the distributive principles appropriate within this sphere must be determined. Walzer argues that "once the community undertakes to provide some needed good, it must provide it to all the members who need it in proportion to their needs" (Walzer, 1983: 75). Furthermore, goods must be provided to needy members because of their neediness, but they must also be provided in a way that sustains their membership. Hence, when all the members share in the business of interpreting the social contract, "the result
will be a more or less extensive system of communal provision. If all states are in principle welfare states, democracies are most likely to be welfare states in practice" (Walzer, 1983: 83). Therefore, the category of socially recognized needs is open-ended. The people's understanding of what they need for life, and a good life, is to be found in the articulation of their own distinct socially recognized needs. Hence, the articulation of the socially recognized needs of the Sioux must now be examined.

Membership was previously identified as the most important need that gets distributed in a society. It is important because of what the members of a political community owe to one another and to no one else in the same degree. Walzer argues that "the first thing they owe is the communal provision of security and welfare" (Walzer, 1983: 64). That is, communal provision is important because it teaches us the value of membership. However, one of our needs is community itself, a community with a particular culture, religion, and politics. As Walzer states, "it is only under the aegis of these three that all the other things we need become socially recognized needs, take on historical and determinate form" (Walzer, 1983: 65). Yet, needs are not only elusive; they are also expansive, that is, they are hard to state for all time and in all
instances. Thus, "without some shared sense of the duty and
the dues there would be no political community at all and no
security and welfare--and the life of mankind would be
"solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short"" (Walzer, 1983:
68). Therefore, an examination of the role of religion in
Sioux society will demonstrate the importance religion had
for them in ensuring complex equality and distributive
justice within the sphere of security and welfare.

The Sioux religion, and the values of social and moral
life that their religion encouraged, was one of the ways in
which the Sioux worked out and distributed the needs of
security and welfare. The Sioux religion, by functioning as
a moral system, which set forth virtues to be emulated and
penalties for disregarding them, was an effective means of
ensuring adherence to and acceptance of social values. In
particular, it was an effective means of defining their
socially recognized needs and of outlining the proper
distribution of those needs within the sphere of security
and welfare. By giving the Sioux something to believe in
that was greater than themselves, the Sioux religion was
therefore able to provide the individual with a code of
behavior and a feeling of emotional security and
inspiration.
The concept of one god, embodied in the Great Mystery and endowed with multiple manifestations, is basic to the religious philosophy of the Sioux. There is a four-part being to Wakan Tanka that is divisible into sixteen gods. Hassrick explains the Sioux belief in Wakan Tanka,

He [Wakan Tanka] is the Gods both Superior and Associate and He is the Gods-Kindred, both the Subordinate and the Gods-like. He is the good and evil gods, the visible and the invisible, the physical and immaterial, for He is all in one. The gods had no beginning and they will have no ending. Some are before others; some are related as parent and child. . . Since the gods were created, not born, they will not die. Mankind cannot fully understand these things, for they are of the Great Mystery (Hassrick, 1964: 205).

Thus, all these gods are part of Wakan Tanka and He is part of them. The Sioux believed in Wakan Tanka, the Great Mystery, and according to the Sioux He was endowed with four titles. He was the Chief God, the Great Spirit, the Creator, and the Executive.

Next in descending order there were the four Superior Gods: Inyan, the Rock; Maka, the Earth; Skan, the Sky; and Wi, the Sun. Each of these had a special area of responsibility in the order of the universe. For instance, Wi, though last of the Superior Gods, ranked first among them as the all-powerful Great God, defender of bravery, fortitude, generosity, and fidelity. The Superior Gods were in turn followed by the Associate Gods. Even as Wakan Tanka
was identified with each of the Superior Gods, so did the
Superiors become identified with their Associates. Thus,
The Associate of Sun was Hanwi, the Moon; Tate, the Wind was
Associate of Sky; Whope, the associate of Earth, the
daughter of Sun and Moon, was known as the Beautiful One;
and Rock claimed as his associate Wakinyan, the Winged. The
Gods-Kindred appeared on the next level of importance in
this coterie of divine beings. They were the issue of the
Superior or Associate Gods, and as such were frequently
called the Subordinate Gods. Again numbering four, this
group included the Buffalo, the Bear, the Four Winds, and
the Whirlwind. Lastly, were the Wanalapi, or Gods-like, who
formed still another division within this system and might
be described as abstract philosophical concepts. They
included the Spirit, the Ghost, the Spirit-like, and the
Potency.

All these benevolent powers had their malevolent
counterparts, but although the evil gods were many and had
definite status and rank, with few exceptions, each was
independent of the other. Such then, was the Sioux
cosmology--a dual concept of good and evil powers
controlling the universe long before the origin of man.
These conflicting spirits were called the Controllers.
However, the Sioux accepted that they could not fully
understand the Great Mystery in any complete fashion. This knowledge and interpretation was reserved for the special few, the shamans, the Wicasa Wakan or Holy Men. Versed and trained in the knowledge of the universe, able to establish a rapport between themselves and the Controllers, these Holy Men had the responsibility of interpreting the macrocosm to the people and of giving advice on proper conduct. Yet, the shaman's perception of the powerful Controllers was simultaneously humble, acute, intimate, and familiar. For instance, as Hassrick explains, "it was essential for him to know that the Sun as all-powerful chief reigned over the Spirit World, the world itself, and the world beneath the world. He knew that the Sky as the source of all power provided each man with a Spirit or personality, a Ghost or vitality, a Spirit-like or essence, and a Potency or power" (Hassrick, 1964: 214).

For the Sioux, certain shaman were influential in safeguarding their religion and in explaining to the individuals the proper conduct of life. However, this is not to suggest that individuals blindly accepted the words of the shaman. For example, although the Sioux believed that certain individuals had special abilities to establish a rapport with the Controllers, to cure people with powerful medicines and magic, etc. the Sioux were quite pragmatic in
their beliefs. It was part of the social customs of the Sioux that on certain occasions Dreamers and healers would publicly test their powers. As Hassrick states, "these exhibitions were apparently required of all neophytes to prove their strength of power, as a kind of final examination. Displays were also given to re-establish in the minds of the people the mystical potency of their abilities" (Hassrick, 1964: 239). Furthermore, in the Sioux culture, the shamans, Dreamers, and herbalists had their powers limited to specific activities and purposes. Thus, "many highly successful men and Dreamers had to resort to [the] purchase" (Hassrick, 1964: 252) of many herbs, charms, cures, etc. that were outside of their knowledge and domain. For instance, shamans were informed concerning the significance of the whole Siouan cosmology whereas Dreamers might know only particular aspects of it. Hence, the Sioux, in meeting the needs of the people, were able to limit the control of power that one individual might exert over all the others.

To paraphrase Hassrick then, from the point of view of the entire society, the dream cult had a real foundation in the economic and religious needs of the group. Yet, there was no schism between the individual need and the group need. Thus, the power and authority of the Dreamer were
understood by all, and the theoretical and practical aspect were consistent. However, the sacred did not usurp the authority of the secular; it merely supplemented and assisted the civil authority in matters which the latter did not pretend to understand or control. For example, in cases where a shaman had foretold the appearance of bison, it was he who proscribed the peculiar form upon which the success of the particular hunt rested. But when the buffalo were sighted, the civil authority assumed its standard pattern. Hence, the divisional structure of the Sioux religion was reflected in the divisional structure of Sioux social life. Religion helped the Sioux to pattern their life on the virtue of generosity. Just as the Great Mystery assisted the individual, so also the individual assisted other individuals in the community. By placing importance on the value of generosity, the Sioux effectively distributed socially accepted needs equally to all members of the community. Thus, ideally and in reality, no member was to go without, and hence, the Sioux were able to ensure "the well-being of all the people by the voluntary and highly rewarding dispersal of property" (Hassrick, 1964: 37). Thus, each individual in the Sioux society had their own place and their own purpose by which the whole community was served, by which the needs of the whole community were met. Therefore, clearly the Sioux did in fact distribute their
socially recognized needs according to the demands of the socialist communitarian ethic.

Lastly, we must now turn our attention to the sphere of recognition in order to determine in what ways the Sioux worked out their understanding of this sphere and in order to determine whether or not their treatment of it is compatible with the demands of the socialist communitarian ethic.

In order for complex equality and distributive justice to be promoted within the sphere of recognition, recognition must be free from every sort of domination. That is, we must be free to give recognition and to withhold recognition. In order to do this, considerations of honor and punishment must be based on individual desert. If we know everyone's title, as in a hierarchical society, then we know the social order and we know to whom we must defer and who must defer to us. Yet, in such a society recognition can never be free from domination. In such a society rank becomes dominant over recognition. As Walzer states, "if titles are hereditary, blood is dominant over rank; if they can be purchased, money is dominant; if they lie in the hands of the rulers of the state, political power is
dominant. In none of these cases are praise and blame freely given" (Walzer, 1983: 250). Thus, most often, the flow of recognition is distorted by the dominance of other goods and the monopoly power of old families, castes, and classes. Yet, if we break free from these distortions then "we will be entrepreneurs in the sphere of recognition--some of us flush, others destitute" (Walzer, 1983: 259); the ability to give or withhold recognition will be free.

In the modern period there arose an attack on the whole system of social prejudgments in hierarchical society and this attack culminated in the substitution of a single title. In the English language, the common title is "mister". This single title changed the influence of dominance in the sphere of recognition. As Walzer states, "since no one knows where he belongs, he must establish his own worth, and he can do that only by winning the recognition of his fellows. [And] each of his fellows is trying to do the same" (Walzer, 1983: 253). Nevertheless, although we are all called by the same title, we are not given the same degree of recognition. Recognition now depends "entirely upon individual acts of honoring and dishonoring, regarding and disregarding" (Walzer, 1983: 255). In the struggle for recognition then, there cannot be equality of outcomes, but there can be equality of
opportunity. As Walzer suggests, once the general competition is broken up, once wealth does not entail office, or office, power, then recognitions can be free.

The purpose of public honor is to search out not the deserving poor, but simply the deserving, whether they are poor or not. Thus, the crucial standard for public honor is desert. However, as Walzer argues, "public honor is indeed distributed for public reasons, but the public reasons, unlike the private ones, come into play only when we choose the qualities that are worthy of honor, not when we choose the people"(Walzer, 1983:260). Thus, we honor individuals on the basis of desert, and what is being rewarded is individual merit. Public honor is not a gift or a bribe but a true speech about distinction and value. As Walzer suggests, "the acknowledgement that honor can be deserved by those who are conventionally honorable is a crucial feature of complex equality, but it doesn't reduce or annul the singularity of honor"(Walzer, 1983: 268). That is, someone who is always honorable can receive recognition for their actions, just as can someone who does only one outstanding honorable thing in their life. Yet, this does not reduce the importance of honor because it is a part of our shared understandings that honor function in this way. It is part of our shared understanding of honor that it cannot be
bought and sold and that those who do nothing honorable deserves no recognition.

The case is the same with punishment, the most important example of public dishonor. Punishment requires a specific judgment, a jury's verdict, and that suggests that we punish people only when they deserve to be punished. As Walzer states "punishment, like honor, is a singling out. . . . Whatever the aim of the punishment, however it is justified, the distributive effect is the same" (Walzer, 1983: 268). Thus, if punishment is dishonorable, as it is, then it must be the case that individuals deserve or do not deserve to be dishonored. Therefore, it is crucially important that we find the right people. Yet, we are not gods and can never really be sure, thus "we must design distributive institutions so as to bring us as close to surety as possible" (Walzer, 1983: 269). And we decide who the right people are through the mechanism of the trial, by a public inquiry into the truth of a particular action. Hence, some time should now be spent describing the ways in which the Sioux worked out and distributed recognition.

The Sioux had their own ways of working out and distributing recognition. While the Sioux had definite
rules that governed the proper behavior that individuals were expected to give to others, recognition, honor, was given only to the virtuous. Although leadership was hierarchical, it was not by any means a matter of one or key individuals ruling over the rest. The authority of leadership was shared at all levels and the whole community took part in it. Recognition was not given to individuals because of their high status and position, but rather individuals were honored for their outstanding displays of virtue. Hence, individuals considered to exhibit great virtue were honored by the community by being given status and position. For instance, not only did leaders have to exhibit the proper virtues in order to receive their position they also had to exhibit the proper virtues while in their position, otherwise they would run the risk of having the people abandon them. Such standards for leadership guaranteed that their leaders be fit to guide them. As Hassrick comments, "rarely has mankind devised a better assurance for dedicated, consecrated leadership" (Hassrick, 1964: 268). Likewise, the Sioux withheld recognition from those individuals who did not adhere to the requirements of the society and who did not exhibit the proper virtues. On the one hand the society encouraged and honored individual initiative, but on the other hand, it penalized egocentricism when it failed to
conform to the code of generosity and selflessness. Penalties took many various forms and were distributed only after a trial had been had and unanimous decision reached (for example, sentencing circles). For the more serious acts, the individual could face ostracism by the community. For lesser acts, for example, if an individual went ahead of everyone else during a hunting party and scared the game away, the akicita, or soldier police, would destroy the individual's home and property as a form of punishment. After all, food obtained from hunting was a very important need, not only for the individual but for the whole community.

Lastly, the idea that power could be gained through self-sacrifice, operative in the vision quest and the Sun Dance, the giveaway and the graded ceremonies, served as a means of effecting the successful continuance and adjustment of the societal system. The implication of self-sacrifice is most clearly exemplified in the Sioux war pattern. Risk and daring were essentials for prestige, and the Sioux tempted death each time they went to war. Yet, as Hassrick argues, "this does not necessarily mean that the Sioux warrior was intent on suicide. . . . But the Sioux point of view was so strongly directed toward self-sacrifice that men voluntarily and willingly risked their lives solely for the
recognition which the risk afforded" (Hassrick, 1964: 268). The idea that individuals might gain power through self-sacrifice was, as Hassrick suggests, not only a mechanism for preventing aggressive individualism, but it was also a device to foster the ideal that it was the individual, not the group, who was responsible for Sioux welfare. Therefore, it should now be clear that the sphere of recognition, for the Sioux, was worked out and distributed in a manner that reflects the purposes of complex equality and distributive justice and which, therefore, meets the demands of the socialist communitarian ethic.

In conclusion, the Sioux were effectively able to organize their society in such a way as to promotes and ensures complex equality and distributive justice. After examining the spheres of politics, family and kinship, security and welfare, and recognition of Sioux social life it is now clear that their working out of these spheres and their distributions within them demonstrate the Sioux, from about 1830 to 1870, as an example of a society that properly met the demands of the socialist communitarian ethic.
To conclude, the Sioux, by promoting and ensuring complex equality and distributive justice within its social structures, serve as an example of a society that met the demands of the socialist communitarian ethic. In so doing, the Sioux serve as an example of how certain philosophical problems concerning threats to democracy in contemporary society can be resolved. That is, how the problems of power and compulsion, obeying other individuals or associations of individuals, and the use of monopoly and dominance can be resolved by the socialist communitarian ethic.

Every society is a distributive system that generates its own values, its own understanding of those values, and its own distribution of those values. In developing the socialist communitarian ethic it was shown that democracy seems to distribute values in the best way. That is, democratic societies distribute values by allowing for a separation of social spheres to be governed by the theory of complex equality and distributive justice. However, from the point of view of the socialist communitarian ethic, the practice of democracy in contemporary Western market society does not reflect our shared understanding of, or our shared
meaning of, democracy. Our practice of democracy has therefore been shown to be lacking. The socialist communitarian ethic, and in particular the case of the Sioux, help to identify where we went wrong, what is needed to resolve the problems, and to illustrate how our society should look once democracy is protected and guaranteed.

The socialist communitarian ethic has not ignored the pluralism of contemporary society and it has not ignored our need to choose between ultimate values. In fact, it is one of the aims of the socialist communitarian ethic that such pluralism be respected. Socialist communitarianism has developed a pluralistic account of the theory of goods and attempts to ensure and promote a political climate in which the opportunities and occasions of power are shared equally among every citizen.

The socialist communitarian ethic protects and ensures personal liberty by using political regulations (such as blocked exchanges) to ensure that all members of society share the same freedoms as everyone else. That is, by politically creating "spheres of arbitrary freedom protected by unbreakable rules" (Polanyi, 1944: 255) society is protected. Thus, the socialist communitarian ethic (with
its use of complex equality and distributive justice within each sphere), requires using blocked exchanges in order to limit the amount of power and compulsion that the state and others are able to exert over us. And in so doing, it is able to protect society from abuses of power and compulsion. Hence, the socialist communitarian ethic, with its complex equality and distributive justice, ensures that democracy properly exists in contemporary society and that the appropriate, coherent, and non-arbitrary limits of freedom are properly addressed.

The case of the Sioux has demonstrated that when society organizes its social structures along the lines suggested by the socialist communitarian ethic, society is able to protect itself from illegitimate uses of political power and compulsion. We limit the liberty of certain members in society because we believe it of greater value that all share equal liberties. Individuals must obey other individuals or associations of individuals so that we can maintain the value of liberty, despite its liberal limitations. And so, even after changes have been made to society, there will still be a need to restrict the freedom of certain individuals' actions, but such laws are to be used only as a means of establishing equal freedom for all. The purpose of the laws are not to create new inequalities,
but rather to extend the same amounts of vested freedom to all members of society. Thus, the socialist communitarian ethic, by using some measure of political power and compulsion, is still able to remain faithful to the ideal of promoting the highest level of democracy for all by allowing for the development of complex equality and distributive justice.

The dominance that the market economy has over virtually all spheres of human life should be apparent. It was shown, when I developed the socialist communitarian ethic, that once you stop treating land, labor, and money as commodities there is nothing left to exert a dominance over. Thus, by politically ensuring that the view that there is value in treating these entities as commodities no longer exists, the self-regulation disappears and the market system collapses. As a result, the control the market once had over our lives is taken away; the dominance of the market system in virtually all spheres of human life is prevented. Yet, it is possible that things will not remain changed; new inequalities may be formed. Therefore, there must be a system of regulations in place after changes are made and it is here that the theory of complex equality and distributive justice has its greatest importance. Again, the case of the Sioux illustrates this point very well. The Sioux were able
to organize their economic structure in a way that allowed for markets of exchange without using land, labor, and money as commodities. Furthermore, by respecting boundaries, by keeping individuals and goods in their own spheres, and by allowing boundaries to be created and changed over time (depending on shifts in social meaning) the Sioux were able to protect their society and their individual members from monopoly and dominance.

Some final comments must be made with regard to what the socialist communitarian society looks like in the end. Clearly, it is not possible to revert to some ancient time, as that of the nineteenth century Sioux, and it would most likely be undesirable to most individuals in contemporary society. The crucial step, and purpose of this thesis, is to first identify the values that are needed to ensure democracy in contemporary society. Exactly how the socialist communitarian changes are to be implemented is not important here. However, it is necessary to first determine the social structures that will allow democracy to be ensured in contemporary society. That is, in our society, we need all the social structures that have been discussed throughout this thesis. We need to get those values back and incorporate them into contemporary society if our shared understandings of the value of democracy is to be ensured.
Perhaps after determining the necessary values for democracy we will discover, in those changes, the way to proceed. In other words, perhaps the answers to how changes can be made to allow for such values will be found in our everyday understandings of social praxis. Perhaps the answers can come out of the stages of particular solutions; perhaps the answers are already within the hearts and minds of all of us now.

The socialist communitarian ethic is a desirable option on which to develop contemporary society. The case of the Sioux helps to illustrate that the changes of the socialist communitarian ethic can in fact protect society from threats to our shared understandings of the value of democracy. It may not be the only solution for rectifying the problems already discussed; there may be other ways in which to resolve such issues, but nonetheless the socialist communitarian ethic does provide strong solutions for overcoming the limits of liberty. While the changes of the socialist communitarian ethic do address current social realities, that is, the weaknesses of contemporary western market society, it may in the future be shown that other conditions are needed to implement these changes. In other words, the socialist communitarian ethic provides the necessary changes to contemporary society, but it does not
establish itself as the final and only solution. Yet, it does show that if we want to promote and ensure a stronger kind of democracy, the socialist communitarian ethic will work as a viable alternative.

Lastly, the socialist communitarian ethic helps us to overcome the urge to find one unifying solution that will unite all values. Socialist communitarianism presents itself as a theory in which democracy, freedom and equality, and justice can be promoted and ensured. Furthermore, the theory of complex equality and distributive justice allows for difference between social meanings and their just distributions. Yet, while the socialist communitarian ethic may deal with the aforementioned values, it does not suggest itself as a final or unifying solution of society's problems. Finally, the socialist communitarian ethic allows for an atmosphere of cultural and social pluralism to be created. That is, an atmosphere in which the citizens of a society come together and create their own social meanings and distributions, or boundaries, which are vulnerable to shifts in social meaning. Thus, the socialist communitarian ethic recognizes that boundary conflict is endemic and also recognizes that there can be no final and unifying solution that will unite all values. In fact, it suggests that we must "live with the autonomy of distributions and recognize
that different outcomes for different people in different spheres makes a just society" (Walzer, 1983: 320).

In conclusion, the purpose of this thesis has been to show how a socialist communitarian ethic better provides the necessary foundations for democracy than does a Western capitalist market ethic. In chapter 1 Polanyi's socialism was described. In chapter 2 Walzer's communitarianism of complex equality and distributive justice was likewise described. And throughout this thesis these two have been combined to form a solid socialist communitarian ethic. Finally, in this last chapter, the case of the Sioux, serving as an example of a working socialist communitarian ethic, was discussed in order to show that it, and likewise the socialist communitarian ethic, was able to resolve specific problems concerning the limits of liberty. At last, it is clear that the socialist communitarian ethic does stand up to criticism and assessment and does promote and ensure a stronger kind of democracy in contemporary society. That is, it promotes and ensures our shared understandings of the value of democracy.
Bibliography.


