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# **An Abacus of Behavior: A Theory of Third Party Intervention**

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A Thesis in the Department of Political Science

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of  
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## **Abstract**

### **An Abacus of Behavior: A Theory of Third Party Intervention**

**Mitchell A. Belfer**

A study of third party intervention is in fact a study of state behavior. A study of state behavior is meant to examine the roles and influences of this type of international actor. This thesis is centered on a very precise type of state, the third party intervener. It examines the postures and perceptions of these states when they are confronted with a regionally or internationally based dyadic conflict. It supposes that these postures are the result of an interaction effect between the certainty, vulnerability and opportunity variables and utilizes contemporary case studies as empirical evidence of this interaction. It discusses state behavior by investigating the rationale behind alliance formations, conflict contagion and neutrality.

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## **Abstract**

A study of third party intervention is in fact a study of state behavior. A study of state behavior is meant to examine the roles and influences of this type of international actor. This thesis is centered on a very precise type of state, the third party intervener. It examines the postures and perceptions of these states when they are confronted with a regionally or internationally based dyadic conflict. It supposes that these postures are the result of an interaction effect between the certainty, vulnerability and opportunity variables and utilizes contemporary case studies as empirical evidence of this interaction. It discusses state behavior in systems of flux and seeks to answer the question of why third party states act in the manner they do. This thesis analyzes state behavior by investigating the rationale behind alliance formations, conflict contagion and neutrality.



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## **1.0 Introduction:**

This thesis is based on a survey of third party intervention into ensuing dyadic military conflicts. It argues that the very postures advanced by triparts are the result of the interaction between three essential variables, certainty, vulnerability and the opportunity to ally. Certainty varies across the categories of favorable, unfavorable and uncertainty. Favorable certainty is when the outcome of the dyadic war is believed to enhance the security and the opportunities to gain for the tripart because a non-threat or an ally will be victorious. Unfavorable certainty implies that an adversary is more likely to win the dyadic war, decreasing the security of the tripart. And, uncertainty means that the dyadic conflict is still undecided in that the outcome is not predictable by triparts. Vulnerability fluctuates between high and low levels. When the vulnerability of a tripart is high because of or as a result of the dyadic war then its insecurity is high. Its posture is designed to reflect this and tends to promote collective action. When vulnerability is low the tripart has many more opportunities to act then the tripart is

more prone to adopt an autarkic posture. The vulnerability variable assumes that the level of tripart security has a decisive effect on its posture. This is in contrast to certainty, which is the way a tripart looks at the external conflict and the affects this conflict has on its geopolitical security. The final variable, the opportunity to ally measures the opportunity a tripart has to ally with other interested states and whether it must face the conflict alone. Even though these three variables can explain quite a bit on their own, it is the fusion of them that indicates how states produce their postures once a conflict has begun in proximate distance.

A theory of state behavior is something of an exercise of interpretation and definition. Therefore the outcome of the interaction effect of these three variables is an important venture. I redefine, alter and expand on many fundamental definitions in international relations theory and work to develop a comprehensive theory of tripart action. These outcomes take the form of tripart postures. I investigate the rationale behind these postures by applying the logic and variance of the independent variables to each corresponding postures.

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<sup>1</sup> Hereafter referred to as triparts,

There are several different methods to explore the variance of both the theoretic and posture aspects of this work. One approach is to look at the postures along a single continuum with unitary postures on one side and collective postures on the other and then work backwards to deduce why. The flaw in doing so is the loss of the importance of the independent variables. I have chosen to break the postures up along the lines of variance in the independent variables. The second part of this work will consist of three sub-categories, favorable certainty, unfavorable certainty and uncertainty. Under each of these general headings I will look at the effects of high and low vulnerability and opportunity on the postures of triparts.

This entire work is based on the following graphic representation of the independent variables and the dependant outcomes.

	Low Vulnerability	High Vulnerability
Favorable Certainty	High Oppt: Bandwagoning  Low Oppt: Jackaling	High Oppt: Dysfunctional CA  Low Oppt: Forced Bandwagoning
Unfavorable Certainty	High Oppt: SCA  Low Oppt: Preemptive Balancing	High Oppt: Regular Bal  Low Oppt: Forced Bandwagoning
Uncertainty	High Oppt: Neutral for Profit  Low Oppt: Neutral for Gains	High Oppt: Allied Neutrality  Low Oppt: High Neutrality

This representation shows the interaction effect, variance and outcomes of the independent variables. The second part of this work is designed to further explain the rationale behind this model. Isolating the independent variables and examining their variance in relation to the outcomes does this. To be sure, the first section of this thesis examines the independent variables while the second section investigates the interaction effect and its accompanying postures.

The actual postures being articulated in this work vary along many different lines. Some are based on collective action while others are characteristically more unitary. Within these broad categories the specific postures rest on the interaction between the three independent variables. Whether tripart postures are more or less unitary depends primarily on the last variable, the opportunity to ally. When there is a high opportunity to ally states may practice dysfunctional or successful collective action, they may bandwagon, balance, be persuaded by allies into neutrality or remain neutral for profit. It is interesting to note that free-riding is endemic in each of these collective postures. On the other side of the spectrum, the more unitary postures include self imposed and regular-forced bandwagoning, jackaling, offensive balancing, forced/high neutrality and neutral for gains.

This survey of tripart behavior is rooted in the realist school. I take for granted that the nation-state is sovereign and self-interested. The aims of the state are survival and self-preservation in the face of an

anarchic international system. I agree with the supposition that there is no underlining order in the international system, that states through the pursuit of power for self-preservation shape the dynamics of and impose an order. In this study I hold the state as the carrier of national interest implying that no distinction is assumed between the governing bodies and the general population within a state. Echoing many other theorists I believe that the relationship between states is highly competitive but that this competitiveness does not preclude alliances and collective action.

Grounded in realism and including a three variable explanation, this thesis aims to establish some new insights into the realm of state behavior. I keep the subject narrow, examining only the role and function of triparts when confronting a dyadic conflict. These combine to help build a comprehensive and novel contribution to the study of international relations theory.

## **2.0 Literature Review:**

In conducting this study it is in the interest of scholars of international relations theory and general readership to examine some authors and theories that have helped shape this work. To be certain, no independent work to date has focused exclusively on the issue of third party intervention into ensuing conflicts. Yet, through a reading in the fields of alliance formations, contagion, collective action and state decision making one is able to see evidence of the impact triparts have on many issues in contemporary international relations theory. Indeed, no region in the world escapes the impact of triparts. Whether we consider the 1990/91 Gulf War, the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon or the two World Wars of the last century we find that the actions of triparts both affect and are affected by dyadic conflicts. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait had a profound impact on the postures of Saudi Arabia and Israel in much the same way the German invasion of Poland affected the policies of France and Britain. In any event, since interstate conflicts are geographically bound and because regions consist of multiple actors and interested parties we may assume that dyadic conflicts affect the regions



they belong to and exogenous actors that have interests in these regions. This section reviews some literature that is relevant to a discussion of tripart perceptions and actions when a dyadic conflict commences. I have turned to the following authors because they each have contributed too my survey of tripart intervention by examining general state behavior.

In commencing on this review it seems only fitting to discuss perhaps the most influential scholar of alliance formations, which incidentally is similar to our theory of tripart intervention. This is because alliances are one possible framework, which house triparts in times of dyadic or other types of disputes.

Stephen Walt in his work on the Origins of Alliances<sup>2</sup> sets out to determine when and why states balance and/or bandwagon. Walt's theory recognizes the importance of triparts but does not look at them independently. Instead he sees the system as consisting of competing alliances. For Walt alliances clash and individual states are merely parts of a larger process. However, since no alliance has ever included all state

actors I believe that a theory pertaining to who joins and alliance and who does not is an extremely important endeavor. My own theory of tripart intervention is more than an alliance theory. It includes the varieties of state options and impacts even as non-combatants and/or non-alliance members.

At first glance one is struck by the austerity of Walt's assumptions. The abilities of states to formulate their postures in response to the confrontation of a "significant external threat"<sup>3</sup> are quite confined because in this case only two options are available. It seems that this may not be enough. States have quite an assortment of possibilities at their disposal that varies from state to state. This is not to say that size is irrelevant, instead it suggests simply that different possibilities exist for different states. It is a matter of decision making as to which posture a state will adopt and not merely because of the presence of a "significant external threat."

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<sup>2</sup> This portion of Walt is based on Chapter 2. "Explaining Alliance Formation."

<sup>3</sup> Walt, Pg. 17.

Large portions of this work are devoted to expanding on Walt's original balancing and bandwagoning hypotheses. This is done to build a wider spectrum of possible state action in the face of a proximate military threat. I include the balancing and bandwagoning hypotheses but redefine them within my study of how certainty, vulnerability and the opportunity to ally affect a state's behavior and its alliance choices.

Walt's "balancing and bandwagoning" offers a reader insights of how states react to the emergence of a "threat." This hypothesis does not however focus on how a state perceives its international position. Neither does it discuss other possibilities than a balancing alliance states could pursue to better secure themselves. The assumption is clear, balancers join forces against the prevailing threat and bandwagoners align with the "source of danger."

Walt's use of the terminology "source of danger" and "significant external threat" is problematic for determining alliance choices. Why must a state with a preponderance of power be labeled as a "danger" if it attracts states to it? The level of threat rests upon the

intentions of the actor in question: a distinction that is made by Walt though not specified as to when or how these states emerge and who they threaten. Furthermore, the assumption that security is the result of the existing type of international system (balancing or bandwagoning) and not of the postures individual states formulate runs parallel to Kenneth Waltz's stability of bipolarity theorem. This confuses the systemic level of analysis with a state level. Simply because a state balances does not imply a balance of power in the wider global scope. I hope to clarify these issues by illustrating that states choose their postures and their alliances to better secure themselves and not necessarily to alter the system even if the state they have aligned with those that seek systemic alteration.

States are fluid entities that alter their postures in accordance with the certainty of a dyadic conflict, their own vulnerabilities and the availability of allies. I borrow from Walt's propositions to better comprehend the rationale behind state actions in the context of ensuing conflict. There seems to be a recognizable pattern of tripart action and behavior that could act as a clue to better understanding the intricacies of

international politics. Finally, I deviate from Walt by stressing the importance of this fluidity. States survive by being adaptive. They change their postures when they perceive increased security in doing so. I presume that states adjust their postures to promote their survival. Fluidity implies the freedom of action needed for states to alter unrealistic postures in times of crisis. Furthermore, states may alter their postures as certainty of the dyadic conflict outcome changes, implying that balancing and bandwagoning are but two options in a multiplicity that accompany action. Walt's balancing and bandwagoning alliance theory did not mention the issue of when states alter their posture. This is needed to demonstrate that actors are not confined to their initial posture for the entire duration of a conflict.

Two more brief issues are worth discussing in regards to Stephen Walt's hypotheses. The first is based on his empirical evidence, which seems mildly inconsistent to his theory. The second is in regards to the influence of power on a state's alliance decisions. Due to spatial constraints let us focus on a single empirical flaw: the over-categorization of state behavior.

Since Walt is dealing with only two types of behavior then for all his case analysis only one of two conclusions may be drawn, either the state(s) in question balanced or bandwagoned. If this is the case, then why have most conflicts remained on the dyadic level?<sup>4</sup> If this were accurate, conflict expansion would always occur. In a bandwagoning environment weak states fearing occupation would flock to the more powerful state/alliance to enhance its security. Alternatively, in a balancing system the states would pool their resources together and confront a challenger as a single military unit. Yet, multi-state conflicts are rare in comparison to dyadic level ones confirming that states do not always posture themselves to act or submit in cases of conflict. Most states neither bandwagon nor balance but choose other postures.

As for an empirical fault take the case of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany's Non-Aggression Treaty. Walt claims "Stalin was thus able to gain both time and territory by bandwagoning with Germany...(by virtue of the treaty)."<sup>5</sup> Yet, by using Walt's own definition of bandwagoning that argues it is a posture reserved for

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<sup>4</sup> Gartner and Siverson, "War Expansion and Outcome," Pg. 5,

weak states wanting to share in the spoils of victory and who are threatened by the emergence of this new power.<sup>6</sup> As will be demonstrated in the body of this work Stalin was encouraged by Hitler to enter Poland, not vice versa. Military historians have shown that the USSR in 1939 was much stronger than Germany, especially if one considers the military lethargy caused by the invasion of Poland.

Also, the British resolve to honor its alliance obligations to Poland strengthened. This had a diversionary effect because an attack from the British would not have been on the German occupational forces but on Germany proper. The Germans had to pacify the Soviets and transfer the bulk of their soldiers to the Western front. For purposes of administering Poland and the diversion of German forces to the West the Germans welcomed a neutral Soviet Union. The USSR did not bandwagon with the Germans. Instead, the Germans sought to pacify the Soviets, an issue which raises the importance of neutrality as a posture, adding, for the time being another option to the two presented by Walt.

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<sup>6</sup> Walt, Pg. 21.

<sup>7</sup> A threatened state does not always bandwagon with its tormentor. In many cases it resist. However, states, which feel threatened and retain the opportunity to ally with the source of their danger sensibly

As to the issue of power, Walt sees it as being of secondary importance to the level and the source of threat. However, power and its application is the producer of threat rendering it of greater analytical value to avoid reification. Walt makes amends for this idea by stressing the aggregate power of the threat as a means for a state to recognize the danger a systemic contender could pose. Yet, it is an unclear indicator of both a threat and a state's response to a threat because it lacks the distinction between hostile and benign power.

Walt injects "aggressive intentions" as a means to further understanding how power can be a threat. According to Walt, aggressive behaviors are those, which spark a "countervailing coalition,"<sup>7</sup> against it (the state), as "it combined substantial power with extremely dangerous ambitions."<sup>8</sup> This would imply that the opposite is true as well. Passive behaviors are those that do not spark a countervailing coalition against it. We know that this is not always the case. Take the contemporary example of China and the 1995 dispute over Mischief Reef

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opt for a situation from where they may gain, as opposed to engaging their threat.

<sup>7</sup> Walt, Pg. 25

<sup>8</sup> Ibid. Pg. 25.



in the South China Sea as an example. Even though most observers of this event indicated China's aggressive behavior, no balancing alliance was formed.

Walt then fell mildly short in deducing the logic of state behavior by not providing details of what an aggressive intention is and why other states perceive it as such. Take the ambiguity of this theory to another case. Was the Soviet invasion of Eastern Europe following WWII an aggressive conquest? Or was it merely a defensive security pursuit following the devastation it had experienced during the War? With no definite framework for this hypothesis each conclusion retains too much validity. Walt's theory does not predict behavior; only diagnose what occurred in a retrospective manner.<sup>9</sup>

Randall Schweller's work, *"Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,"*<sup>10</sup> builds on and refines Walt's original hypothesis of alliance formation. Schweller's work in its totality is a dynamic and

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<sup>9</sup> For further discussion see, Kenneth Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," *Dædalus*, Summer 1993, Pg. 881-909, Susan B. Martin, "Balances of Power versus Balancing: A Conceptual Analysis," *Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics Working Paper Series* #02, 1999, and Joanne Gowa, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and Free Trade," *American Political Science Review*, 83:4 December 1989, Pg. 1245-56.

<sup>10</sup> Found in, *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 1, Summer 1994, Pg. 72-107.

important illustration of the fluidity of the international system particularly in relation to the multiple options states have at their disposal when faced with either a threat or a conflict it may benefit from. He nevertheless mismanages empirical data and does not filter some theoretical ambiguities that arise. For instance, Schweller supposes that the regional allies of the 1990/1 Gulf War piled on after the conflict was over.<sup>11</sup> This is inaccurate because states such as Saudi Arabia, Syria, Kuwait and Egypt were aligned to the US long before the hostilities against Iraq commenced.

Schweller's review of Walt is an excellent indication of unbiased research into state behavior. His methodological approach of pointing out the differences between balancing and bandwagoning are of extreme importance and greatly influenced the work here.<sup>12</sup> These differences point to the fact that the balancing and bandwagoning postures are not two sides of the same coin rather they are two completely different modes of state action. This is very important for my own work as I also

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<sup>11</sup> Schweller, Pg. 95/6.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid, Pg. 74.

look at each of the available postures as being different from one another.

That being said let us now investigate the details of Schweller's hypothesis. Schweller, while still working from Walt's balancing and bandwagoning system, seeks to redefine some key terms of state behavior and their implications. He defines balancing as "self-preservation and the protection of values already possessed," and that "...balancing is driven by the desire to avoid losses..."<sup>13</sup> Because this argument stands in opposition to bandwagoning the opposite must be true to bandwagoning. According to Schweller bandwagoners either do not possess values worth protecting or their values are replaceable with those of the rising power, hence the title "...*Bringing the Revisionist State Back In.*" This is problematic because in many cases states desist from conflict for reason of defending their values.<sup>14</sup>

Bandwagoning states, described by Schweller as being driven "by the opportunity for gain,"<sup>15</sup> may at times gain

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid. Pg. 74.

<sup>14</sup> It may also be noted that by stipulating the reliance of values as a determinant of state behavior, Schweller poses an alternative to the realist school, and adheres to a second image analysis, as the very notion of values is domestically laden.

<sup>15</sup> Schweller. Pg. 74.

only in the protection of their values possessed, such as their sovereignty. Also, the presence of a threat is a necessary prerequisite for balancing and it is "unnecessary for states to bandwagon."<sup>16</sup> This latter supposition may in fact be true but the negation of self-preservation by the opportunity for gain may be erroneous.

Simply, no matter what posture a state formulates in times of peace or war its aim is always self-preservation. Gains are relative to this principle since no gain is worth the price of not being able to preserve the integrity and security of the state itself. This is the first indication of the position Schweller adheres to; that states, for the opportunity to gain may risk their national survival. If this is accurate, states need little certainty in the postulation of an offensive posture. This is also problematic because the majority of state postures require that outcome certainty of an ensuing war or a potential conflict is high. This high certainty acts as insurance so that their actions do not open the window of opportunity for other states to

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid. Pg. 74.

diminish the abilities of a bandwagoner to preserve itself.

When Schweller states that, "Alliance choices...are often motivated by opportunities for gain as well as danger, by appetite as well as fear..."<sup>17</sup> he again negates that principal to a states alliance choices is the enhancement of security. What exactly are gains according to Schweller? We are not quite sure though they seem to include territory. In that case, how can territory not be included as a gain that could increase the ability of a state to survive? Territory is perhaps the most potent guarantee of this. It provides a buffer from potential attack,<sup>18</sup> greater natural and human resources as well as a strategic advantage; say by holding hostage the peoples in the conquered lands. The size of the state is very important for its capabilities and international relationships because it is a way to measure the strength

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid. Pg. 79.

<sup>18</sup> Even in the case of nuclear weapons added territory increases the abilities of a state to survive for the state may retain certain protective measures not available to smaller states, such as population transfers out of the zone of war. Since most conflicts to date have been fought over territory it may be accepted that an enemy employing nuclear weapons would still have to physically occupy the land to achieve its goals. Extended territory makes that occupation a more difficult task. Despite the above comments, considering this paper focuses on conventional conflicts further discussion as to the role of nuclear and other non-conventional weapons will be omitted.

and influence it may exert. The survival of Russia owing to its vastness is a good example of this.<sup>19</sup>

I support Schweller's claims that in regular bandwagoning it is "the promise of rewards and not the threat of punishment,"<sup>20</sup> that attracts bandwagoners to ally with a "dangerous" state. These rewards must be seen as strictly security minded though. For this reason, the empirical cases presented by Schweller in defense of his hypothesis must be reinterpreted.

When Schweller declares that, "Security from Germany was not the primary motivation for Italy's declaration of war against France in 1940, or Japan's decision to bandwagon with the Allies later in the year,"<sup>21</sup> he is really arguing that in times of war states do not necessarily polarize for collective security. Italy was presented with its own security concerns<sup>22</sup> and acted once

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<sup>19</sup> In this brief discussion of territory I have raised its importance in terms of state gains though have not mentioned how territorial gains may actually become a liability rather than an asset by over-extension. This is because the distinction that states acting as tripartites often seek limited aims in terms of territory. For a countervailing view, and further discussion see: Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1991. And, Peter Liberman, Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1996.

<sup>20</sup> Schweller, Pg. 79.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid, Pg. 81,

<sup>22</sup> Which involved the same adversaries as the Germans, though to stipulate an indistinguishable set of security priorities within the Axis is highly problematic for even in the 11<sup>th</sup> hour of the wars, the states retained their independence of actions.

certainty was acceptable. This was done to enhance its security at the expense of the French who were engaged in their war against Germany. To be sure, the Italians did not engage the French simultaneously with the Germans. Instead, as the French retreated from their Northern positions, the Italians grew fearful of a reprisal against their soft Mediterranean frontier and acted to prevent this. While it is true that Italy held dated aims of controlling the Mediterranean basin these all equated to its long held security preferences and not to the assumption that it joined Germany to realize these preferences. As for Japan, it seems that it never bandwagoned with the Germans at all. Instead, it allied itself with the Germans to promote the political ends of reducing isolation from the world. History has not shown any military achievements or spoils, aside from the security gain of military resource support that the Germans gave their Japanese ally.<sup>23</sup>

Schweller's work lacks a definitive section that discusses what a gain is equal to if not for the enhancement of a state's security in the face of a fluctuating system. His interpretations of empirical data

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<sup>23</sup> See: Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life, 1997.

suffer as a result of this insistence of gains void of security, and his theory does not fully explore the rationale behind bandwagoning state actions.

Yet, his expansion of Walt's theory is an important step. Schweller identifies other postures, such as jackal bandwagoning and piling on. However, articulating these postures divorced from the security concerns of the states formulating them is slightly misleading. Finally, Schweller does not recognize or detail the importance of certainty in regards to the postures that states seek to advance. His suppositions of why states behave the way they do seems to stem from atheoretical empirical interpretations and not through the construction of a conceptual framework.

In this work of tripart intervention I build upon Schweller's notions. I aim to uncover not only the components of a bandwagoning paradigm. I also intend to articulate many types of postures that are available to tripart actors. On a tangential note, in both the text and this review I re-examine the notions of revisionist and status quo states for they seem to be the ground from which Schweller builds his theory. I propose that these



indicators of a state's posture have too many shortcomings and do not warrant articulation in terms of their intended end, the rationale for state action.

It is from these misgivings that I commence my own theoretical design as to the ways in which states enter an ensuing dyadic war, collectively or as a unitary actor. I examine the causes of a tripart's perception prior to its engagement or deferral into the conflict and pose answers to the question of how these perceptions lead to the postures they adopt.<sup>24</sup> In contrast to the views of Schweller high levels of favorable certainty is an extremely important variable for triparts to perceive as a requisite for many of its actions, notably, though not confined to; jackal bandwagoning. In stating this, I am also suggesting that states never act for gains without considering their strategic position. This assumes that at the heart of all vital state interests and the state's decision to intervene or dissent from a conflict stems from the quest to better survive.

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<sup>24</sup> For further analysis see: Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, 44:2, Spring 1990, Pg. 137-168.

How triparts determine their position in relation to conflict certainty is aided by the work of Michael Mastanduno, David Lake, and G. John Ikenberry, in *"Towards a Realist Theory of State Action,"*<sup>25</sup> these authors raise issues of exceptional importance for this thesis. While their work was written as a piece promoting the "second image reversed,"<sup>26</sup> or the international influences on domestic politics, it succeeded in shedding much light on the issue of tripart intervention. Their analysis is embedded in the realist tradition and without wavering adheres to this position throughout the entire work. The definitions they provide about the self-help environment of the international system aides one in understanding the general constraints facing a state and more importantly, the interaction of a state's aims and abilities in its pursuit for greater security.

In beginning the realist theoretical portion of the work they open with three well-known assumptions to the realist tradition, the dominance of the nation state and the pursuance of power and material well-being. However it is the third realist assumption that holds the

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<sup>25</sup>Found in: *International Studies Quarterly*, #33, 1989. Pg. 457-474.

<sup>26</sup>Mastanduno, Lake, Ikenberry, Pg. 458.

greatest importance to our study, that "the relations between nation states are fundamentally competitive, although this does not preclude the possibility of cooperation in the pursuit of national interests."<sup>27</sup>

Taking this to the theory of tripart intervention it is evident that states will always act in preservation of their national interests, and central to the pursuit of these interests is the advancement of mechanisms that assist in the survivability of a state. The anarchy of the international system serves only to place otherwise strange bedfellows together in cooperative setting to promote the above aims. As such, cooperation, whether to an aggressive or a passive state is nothing more than an avenue for protection of small or large states.

This work acts an inspiration to those political scientists concerned with measuring threats, aims and certainty, placing them into a framework and then applying their implications to theories of state behavior. Using resources, mobilization and extraction as key variables of perception and abilities, the authors are able to illustrate how states should act when

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<sup>27</sup>Ibid. Pg. 458.

presented with certain circumstances. In employing these measurements, and in conjunction with other means for determining a state's power, such as its ability to apply military pressure in the prescribed 'zone of war,' we may develop better mechanism for understanding how tripartite perceive the certainty of an ensuing dyadic war. States look at many factors of the conflict in order to satisfy their security needs. They necessarily develop their posture because of their perception(s). In my contribution I borrow and superimpose Mastanduno, Lake and Ikenberry's theory onto tripartite posture selection. This helps to establish some general methods for state posture selection by means of the perceptive tools at the tripartite's disposal.

Because this work is concerned with the interaction effect between certainty, vulnerability, opportunity and how states develop their postures the contributions of the above authors enhance the certainty aspect of my theory. This is done by measuring certainty and interpreting whom in the dyad has an advantage? This is an issue of extreme importance in the decision of a tripartite to act. While I am in agreement with much that the above theory offers I use their assumptions as a mode

to better understand ways in which the certainty of outcomes is determined by the triparts. I take the assumptions of this work and link them to the postures triparts formulate in the context of the international system. As such, my work applies the state uses of mobilization and resources to the perceptions of triparts in determining their posture for the dyadic conflict.<sup>23</sup>

While certainty and postures seem to be important for reviewing the above works they are only a part of the equation. Another issue of concern is to what end a state intervenes into a dyadic-level conflict. My thesis proposes that whether a conflict expands or isolates is primarily determined by the postures of triparts. This is because the states sitting on the sidelines of a conflict are presented with a window of opportunity to achieve goals they might otherwise be unable to attain or are negatively affected in a manner they were unprepared for.

In any event, most states within geographic proximity to a conflicting dyad conceive postures that are designed to secure the tripart and also to influence

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<sup>23</sup> See also, Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1976.

the dyadic conflict's outcome. In gathering information concerning this issue, I turned to Scott Sigmund Gartner and Randolph M. Siverson's exceptional survey, "*War expansion and War Outcome*."<sup>29</sup> This work brings together certainty (which the authors refer to as 'probability'), aims and state actions to illustrate when and to what end tripartite intervene in ensuing conflicts.

Despite the significance of including this work, the authors commence with the supposition that wars seldom expand beyond the original dyad.<sup>30</sup> I dispute this claim on the basis that even inaction affects the outcome of the conflict, a point, which is evaded altogether by the authors. Take for instance a state that practices a neutral posture if it is coerced to do so if its intervention would alter the certainty/probability of success. The exercise of coercion logically implies fear on behalf of the state trying to pacify another and is thus a form of tacit intervention. It diverts or threatens to divert resources towards actualizing its threat.

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<sup>29</sup> Found in, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 40, No. 1, March 1996.

<sup>30</sup> Gartner and Siverson, Pg 4-5.

For Gartner and Siverson the rationale behind this isolation effect is twofold. "...Because the states which initiate wars are inclined to choose as targets those states (1) that they believe they can defeat by themselves and, (2) that will not be joined by wartime coalition partners."<sup>31</sup> Not only does this stance stipulate two actors in a conflict, an "initiator" and a "target," it also negates the idea that states on the peripheral of a given conflict are prone to intervene even when the certainty of gains is high.

I have deduced a very different set of hypotheses regarding war expansion and plan to illustrate them in great detail in the text of this work. Take as a modest example the position of a jackal state, which actually waits for a conflictual dyad to begin hostilities as a prerequisite for action. This is so it may gain from the fluctuating system and the distraction of the dyadic actors that comes from their conflict.

Gartner and Siverson construct an important element for the perceptive capacity of a state one which I later apply to the study of tripart intervention; conflict

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<sup>31</sup> Ibid. Pg. 5.

initiation. The above quotation from the Gartner-Siverson text provides an integral tool for how triparts decide where the certainty of outcomes resides for precisely the same reasons the authors employ when defending why conflicts do not extend. For them, triparts examine who initiated a conflict and which state has a greater ability to succeed in order to advance their posture. While it is true that in certain circumstances triparts do not intervene against either state, say against a successful initiator because their vulnerability may be high or the opportunity to ally is low, in other cases they do. Even balancing alliances formed to deal with the emergence of a threat are designed to gain through preservation. This is achieved by deterring an adversary from acting against the individual units.

The theoretical aspect of Gartner and Siverson is meaningful because they produce a coherent methodology for generating state perceptions, in which triparts must be included. It is on the ends of these perceptions that I differ in opinion from these authors. Whereas Gartner and Siverson believe that "wars tend to be small because initiators choose as targets states that they judge will



not receive support in a war from third parties."<sup>32</sup> I see that as certainty in the dyadic conflict becomes clearer it encourages triparts to intervene as the states of the dyad have been significantly weakened by their engagement. I am not suggesting that every conflict will expand beyond its original scope. However, I outline the types of postures available to states that enable them to intervene and perhaps gain from the dyadic war.<sup>33</sup> Also, I introduce and elaborate on postures of inaction that aid in determining the outcome of the conflict, again raising the importance of neutrality as a posture. Finally, this thesis conducts a mild survey regarding the dyadic and tripart postures that are more likely to inspire conflict expansion and which postures are able to confine the combatants, to, as promoted by Gartner and Siverson, a lone initiator and target.

On this same issue of what motivates states to enter an ensuing conflict, the examinations and findings of Geoffrey Blainey in his book, The Causes of War are of considerable value.<sup>34</sup> While the entire book deserves much

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid. Pg. 14.

<sup>33</sup> See also: Michael Altfeld and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "Choosing Sides in War," International Studies Quarterly, 23:87-112, 1979, and Benjamin Most and Harvey Starr, "Diffusion, Reinforcement, Geo-Politics and the Spread of War," American Political Science Review, 74:932-46, 1980.

<sup>34</sup> Published by: Richard Clay (The Chaucer Press), Ltd., 1973.

credit in its handling of international relations theory at large, it warrants special consideration for its implications to this work of tripart intervention.

Blainey's work is riveted with implicit characterizations of how tripart states behave independently and in alliance structures. He even devotes an entire chapter to the issue of jackaling and although he does not articulate the actions of states as such it is a chapter, which has greatly influenced this thesis of third party intervention. "While Waterbirds Fight,"<sup>35</sup> offers an explanation to the puzzle of the motivations of triparts that affect their abilities and their preferences to enter an ensuing conflict either explicitly on the side of one or the other, or for gains from one or both of the states locked in conflict.

Blainey's remark that, "every decision to wage war is influenced by predictions of how outside nations will affect the course of the war..."<sup>36</sup> is quite true. I aim to illustrate the opposite side of the coin to solve the puzzle of how triparts are affected by a waging war

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<sup>35</sup> Chapter 4.

<sup>36</sup> Geoffrey Blainey. The Causes of War, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition. Pg. 57.

fought by a dyad. Whereas, Blainey looks at the conflict itself and how the combatants act and react to the presence of triparts in the system I examine how these triparts see themselves. I look at how their postures are formulated and their behavior is shaped in relation to the dyadic actors and conflict. I suggest that a tripart's resolve to enter a conflict is based on how they see the certainty of favorable outcomes and with which side in the dyad this certainty rests upon. This is in contrast to Blainey who audits state actions by declaring; "a nation's decision to go to war always includes an estimate of whether outside nations will jeopardize its prospects of victory."<sup>37</sup> Indeed, even triparts estimate the reaction of exogenous states, or "n" party actors to help in their intervention decisions, though I am building on Blainey who, as I have mentioned, develops his theory in reference to the dyad itself.

My contribution then, is to implement Blainey's hypothesis onto a theory of tripart intervention where the triparts examine the dyadic conflict and devise their posture according to the certainty of that conflicts outcome.

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<sup>37</sup> Ibid. Pg. 58.

On a different note, Blainey is one of the few academics in this field to express the importance of neutrality as a posture. He begins by stipulating the role of the "fisherman" may at times be to allow the "Waterbirds" to quarrel as to secure himself the ability to gain from them both. This runs parallel to my hypothesis of a state remaining neutral for gains and/or profit. I suggest that states may pursue a posture of neutrality if they can gain from the flux the conflict is causing in the system. For Blainey, opportunism equates to a form of jackaling where I pose a distinction between the two. I employ the logic of opportunism for both action and inaction-based postures.

I elaborate on Blainey's work by specifying several types of neutrality postures and their effects on both "n" party actors and on the dyad. This is a unique expansion because it offers a deeper analysis of neutrality, which is not a uniform posture. Neutrality stems from uncertainty but its specific forms are reliant on vulnerability and the opportunity of the triparts in question to ally.

While the above literature may seem rather brief in its presentation of authors I confess that I have selected the works that have the greatest impact for developing a theory of tripart intervention. Other works retain importance to very precise issues of this thesis while those discussed above were fundamental in the overall theoretical designs I have conscripted for my own contribution to international relations theory.

Let us turn now to the first theoretical chapter of this work and begin an independent study of tripart intervention in dyadic wars. This chapter concerns the issue of how the variables: certainty, vulnerability and the opportunity to ally interplay with a tripart to help formulate viable and beneficial postures.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> For further readings see: Colin Gray and Geoffrey Sban, Geo-Politics: Geography and Strategy, 1999, Erik Gartzke and Michael W. Simon, A General Test of Alliance Theory, 1999, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "Towards a Scientific Understanding of International Conflict: A Personal View," International Studies Quarterly, #29, 1985, Pg. 1121-1136, and Kenneth Oye, "Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypothesis and Strategies," World Politics, Pg. 1-22.

### **3.0 Certainty, Vulnerability and the Opportunity to Ally:**

As mentioned, the decision of a state to intervene in an ongoing dyadic conflict is the result of the interaction of three essential variables. While it is important to illustrate how these variables; certainty, vulnerability and opportunity interact with one another and the tripart; we must first isolate them and discuss their individual importance. Only after we have developed a firm comprehension of each variable can we proceed to amalgamate them and apply their interaction to the general theory of tripart intervention being presented in this thesis. I will examine and explain the way a tripart perceives its position via the outcome certainty of a dyadic conflict, its vulnerability and its ability to ally with other states in light of the conflict.

Because this entails a theoretical understanding of what contributes to developing notions of certainty, vulnerability and opportunity for the tripart I will also investigate the outcome of interpreting these variables in different ways. For example, if the tripart foresees an unfavorable outcome in terms of its own posture

abilities how does this obstacle affect its vulnerability? And how does the tripart reconcile its position in order to remain secure? I hypothesize that the options available to states facing an uncertain dyadic conflict are different then states perceiving a certain outcome in the same conflict, whether or not the certainty is favorable. I proceed to articulate the options available, at what costs and to what end they are available to the triparts.

This portion begins with a survey of certainty, deals with vulnerability and concludes with the opportunity to ally from a tripart's perspective. This is a prerequisite to an understanding of the final chapter of variance and state postures. I propose that the interaction of certainty vulnerability and the opportunity to ally lead triparts to formulate their posture in respect to the conflict at hand.

### **3.1 Certainty:**

The first variable to consider is that of certainty. If it is true that certainty affects the posture third parties will adopt it is a matter of great importance to

conduct an investigation of what causes this certainty (or uncertainty). This is done so that we may realize how a state chooses its posture. To do so I have established a grid containing the varieties of certainty complete with potential outcomes.<sup>39</sup> To be certain, there are three distinct types of certainty; favorable, unfavorable and uncertain. Because favorable certainty runs directly counter to unfavorable certainty, I shall not overhypothesize by including an in-depth analysis of both. Instead, I surmise that the causes of favorable certainty inverted are the causes of unfavorable certainty. If an abundance of military power in the hands of an ally produces high favorable certainty for a tripart then an abundance of military power in the hands of an adversary causes this tripart to foresee unfavorable certainty.

The third type, uncertainty, remains in a category of its own. This is because there is no such thing as purely favorable or unfavorable uncertainty. Uncertain conflicts imply that the outcome is still undecided. Also, uncertainty always leads to a neutral posture. On the other hand, favorable and unfavorable certainty leads to a mixture of collective and unitary postures. The

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<sup>39</sup> See Graph 1, Pg. 4 in text,



likes of which depend on the other variables, vulnerability and opportunity. The details of this interaction are placed later in the text in a bid to avoid convolution.

For the following survey, I do not detail these three branches of certainty. I introduce and articulate the causes of certainty and assume that the opposite results in uncertainty. All the following notions of the origins of certainty in absence produce uncertainty. Similarly, from the perspective of triparts, the causes of favorable certainty may also act as unfavorable certainty if attained by an adversary.

We may now continue and investigate the causes of certainty with the benefit of a more precise subject matter. The focus of this chapter includes a definitive aspect of the variables and develops a cause and effect relationship that will become clearer when we incorporate variable variance and state postures.

In order to deduce the influences and effects the certainty of a dyadic conflict has on tripart postures some basic assumptions can be made. This exercise will

further familiarize the readers with the understanding of the framework from which this work becomes valuable. Since the terms, certainty, vulnerability and opportunity will be routinely used it is important to clearly define them and appropriate their influences on triparts in times of conflict. In doing so I hope to establish the boundaries of this study.

Let us now commence on an introduction and examination of the indicators of certainty as it is interpreted from the perspective of a tripart posturing itself in view of an ensuing dyadic conflict.<sup>40</sup> A tripart tries to predict the outcome of a conflict as a means to grasping its own vulnerabilities. When the certainty is high and favorable the tripart has different posture options at its disposal than if the certainty is high and unfavorable. As mentioned earlier I have taken a stand on the issue of neutrality. When conditions in a dyadic conflict produce uncertainty, triparts attempt to stay neutral until the conflict becomes more decided. Even in neutrality triparts look to other states, may seek allies or choose to confront the conflict alone. But what is it

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<sup>40</sup> Which simultaneously engages, or provokes that the opposite, that is the opposite of that which produces certainty, produces uncertainty. Since this method overlaps these two notions, certainty and uncertainty, then for the sake of parsimony, we shall establish what the causes of certainty are and

that guides a state to accept a specific posture? To answer this I have developed a perceptive criterion triparts utilize that helps them determine the outcome certainty or which side will win the conflict.

The first, and most important indication of which actor in the dyad will be victorious is the actual initiation of the conflict. The link between victory and conflict initiation is based on the perception of the tripart that attempts to predict the outcome and adopt the most beneficial posture available. Therefore, questions such as, which state began the conflict, how and why it began are important for the decision making of triparts. Answering these questions gives triparts necessary clues of a state's motivations for waging a conflict. Sometimes these motivations illuminate a state's resolve for commencing the conflict. Even if motivations do not paint a picture of capabilities it shows the issues that are at stake and what the actors involved are willing to risk to finalize these issues.

Before the commencement of hostilities the postures of the dyadic actors affects the certainty of the

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assume that the opposite

conflict. Take for example, the military postures of states, which practiced either preemptive or preventive strikes that resulted in the conflict itself. If state "A" retained an offensive posture and took the responsibility of conflict initiation, then the impression of n-party actors equates to high certainty of "A's" victory.<sup>41</sup> Why would "A" initiate a conflict it would lose? More specifically, if "A" were weak an offensive military option would have become of secondary importance and a defensive posture would have emerged as being more beneficial.<sup>42</sup>

This certainty does not necessarily lead to one posture or another. It suggests to the triparties what the end of the conflict may bring. Outcome certainty prepares a tripart for what may lie ahead. Whether outcome certainty is favorable for the tripart or not it guides triparties to different postures. Here we see variance in the independent variables because the type of certainty resulting from the conflict affects the posture being adopted.

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<sup>41</sup> An easy case to explain this is found in Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, once hostilities began all n-party actors saw an imminent victory for the Iraqis. However, once the coalition of states opposed to Iraq's actions was formed and hostilities from that source began, the n-parties perceived a quick coalition victory, which was the case nearly a fortnight after the initial dyadic conflict had begun.

<sup>42</sup> Scott Sigmund Gartner and Randolph M. Siverson, "War Expansion and Outcome," Journal of Conflict

Conflict initiation as a means to measure power and certainty is not a novel addition to international relations theory. It has been widely discussed and debated in many academic circles. The subject of preemptive and preventive attacks is one such subject. Analyzing conflict initiation without mention of preemptive and preventive wars would be misleading. The following tenet of this work examines these propositions and seeks to understand their value regarding conflict initiation.

Both preemption and prevention are designed to curb the power or capabilities of an adversary in the short and long terms, respectively. The acceptance of these postures illustrates an immediate (and at times temporary) asymmetry of "aggregate power," as it corresponds to a rival. The initiator must be, (at least at the time of the initiation), more powerful than its adversary.<sup>43</sup> The initiating state must sense that if it does not act to restrain the increasing abilities of this

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Resolution, Pg. 7-8,

<sup>43</sup> If the two were isolated from n-party intervention, as alliances and/or jackal states, and favorable/unfavorable neutrality may very well tip the scale.

adversary it would lose its advantage and ultimately its regional position.<sup>44</sup>

Preemptive postures affect tripart posturing by building perceptions of victory or capitulation. In a preemptive war the initiator gains a battlefield advantage as the conflict is being waged on the territory of the defender and not its own. Thus, when an initiator attacks the perception of the triparts is that of increased certainty of the initiator's victory.<sup>45</sup> This is because a battlefield advantage may equate to positive insights of the capabilities of both the initiator and the attacked.

Preventive postures or conflicts meant to affect the long-term components of the dyadic relationship illuminate another military attribution in regards to certitude. Similar to preemption an initiator attacks an adversary to ensure that its margin of power is retained. As Machiavelli has stated, "...that there is no avoiding war; it can only be postponed to the advantage of

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<sup>44</sup> See: Jeffery Hart, "Three Approaches to the Measurement of Power in International Relations," *International Organizations*, 30:2, Spring 1976, Pg. 289-305,

<sup>45</sup> This implies that the potential triparts have not yet entered the conflict, but will wait and see how the conflict progresses. This idea of initiation, in connection with the other variables work to decide the posture(s) of triparts and potential triparts.

others."<sup>46</sup> This seems to be a component of the logic adopted by initiators of preventive wars. This logic also epitomizes a method for states to achieve the most beneficial posture available to its circumstances. A weak state would not have the ambition or the means to wage a preventive war. Once a state engages an enemy in an attempt to hinder its capabilities, the triparts may perceive the action as producing a certainty of conflict outcome in favor of the initiator. More specifically, because the initiator is acting in defense of the current relationship of power the perceptions of its abilities are further enhanced.<sup>47</sup> Dyadic conflict certainty affects the posture of triparts. The preemptive and preventive postures of the dyadic states encourage these triparts to posture themselves in accordance with the perceptions these postures yield.<sup>48</sup>

The means available to dyadic actors prior to conflict initiation also affects tripart perceptions of certainty once initiation occurs. If one state is

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<sup>46</sup> Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, Pg. 10,

<sup>47</sup> See: Dan Reiter, "Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never Happen," International Security, 20:2, Fall 1995, Pg. 5-34, Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 1960, and Arms and Influence, 1966,

<sup>48</sup> See: Jack Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War," World Politics, vol. 40, Pg. 82-107, James D. Morrow, "The Logic of Overtaking," in Jack Kugler and Douglas Lemke, Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of the War Ledger, and Randall L. Schweller, "Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?," World Politics, vol. 44, Pg. 235-269,

defensively stronger than the other and retains a defensive posture tripartis might (rightly)<sup>49</sup> perceive that the outcome will end in the defenders favor.<sup>50</sup> Evidence suggests that an asymmetry of defensive and offensive capabilities affect the perceptions of tripart actors. While this seems to be in contradiction to the former assumption I must stress that each tenet works in conjunction with one another.

As I have stated above, the initiator would not engage an adversary if it did not foresee victory.<sup>51</sup> As the conflict continues and information becomes more accessible the perception of tripartis may shift if and when the combatants have proven their true capabilities. This theory does not intend to suggest that tripartis base their postures solely on one perception. Instead, I am trying to account for certainty or the lack of it by

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<sup>49</sup> Sigmund and Siverson, Pg. 11-13,

<sup>50</sup> I will not detail all of the possible scenarios of this seemingly endless debate. However, to further strengthen this claim, we may provide a brief illustration of the effect of the offence-defense debate and include a counterfactual to further build on these claims. The 1967 Middle Eastern war, in the Sinai campaign, we see that both belligerents (the Israelis and the Egyptians) retained a high propensity of offensive weapons systems and aims. The Israelis, preempted, gaining a decisive battlefield advantage and thus won the war. Had the Egyptians preempted the Israelis then, essentially a similar situation, to their advantage would have emerged. (Bearing in mind the conflicts isolation from exogenous actors.) On the other hand, had the Egyptians been defensively stronger than the Israelis, they may have been able to thwart the preemptive assault. The multiplicity of possibilities may be immense, though each leads to a similar end; that the (a) symmetry of offensive and defensive capabilities matter, and hence affect the perception and posture of interveners and other tripart actors.

<sup>51</sup> There are a number of alternatives to this assumption such as diversionary wars.



examining all possibilities of its cause and effect.<sup>52</sup>

Pre-conflict alliance formations also aid in hypothesizing a conflict's outcome. Alliance structures strongly influence the certainty of war outcomes and serves to advocate post-hostility tripart intervention. States perceive that when a dyadic state triggers a balancing alliance against it then the initiator is more powerful than its adversary. It is regarded as having the ability to alter the system.<sup>53</sup> This explains why some initiators receive much support; as outcome certainty increases if the initiator either fractures the balancers or gains equivocal support from other states.

Outcome certainty increases if the initiator is able to maneuver itself to confront each of its opponents individually. "Even when an initiator might want to defeat multiple targets, it would prefer to deal with them one on one, as Hitler did at the beginning of WWII, than as a unified adversary."<sup>54</sup> Thus, if the initiator is able to rupture an alliance, which was formed against it,

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<sup>52</sup> See; Jack S. Levy, "The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis," International Studies Quarterly, #28, 1984, Pg. 219-238,

<sup>53</sup> If it did not retain that capability a balancing unit would not have emerged in an attempt to deter this state.

<sup>54</sup> Sigmund and Siverson, Pg. 8,

the tripart perception of certainty in favor of a belligerent is greatly enhanced. A side effect of this maneuvering is the proliferation of allies to the initiator. For each military success it achieves, it further attracts exogenous states to it, either on a tacit or explicit level.<sup>55</sup>

Alternatively, and in some connotations more importantly than who joins an alliance is who does not. If major powers remain neutral the ability of an initiator to produce a positive outcome increases the certainty of these outcomes from the acute eyes of the tripart.<sup>56</sup> Take the outcome certainty levels found in geographically proximate nations to Germany in the Second World War as an example. After the Non-Aggression Treaty was signed between Germany and Russia, the pacific assurances provided by the United States and the successful fracturization of the supposed balancing alliance<sup>57</sup> of Britain, France, Norway, Belgium,<sup>58</sup> The

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<sup>55</sup> As illuminated by: Michael Mastanduno, David A. Lake, and G., John Ikenberry, in "Towards a Realist Theory of State Action," International Studies Quarterly, #33, 1989, Pg. 459, "that the relations between nation-states are fundamentally competitive, although this does not preclude the possibility of cooperation in the pursuit of national interests."

<sup>56</sup> As implied by Robert Jervis in, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life, Pg. 147, and Randall Schweller in "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security, Vol., 19, #1, 1994, Pg. 73-74,

<sup>57</sup> As an attempted deterring alliance,

<sup>58</sup> However reluctant, it nonetheless joined forces with the others to act as a deterrent to German aggression.

Netherlands and Denmark, contributed to the preferences of many to join Germany. It was seen as being the choice of highest certainty.<sup>59</sup>

Information is the second mechanism employed by triparts in a quest to effectively posture itself.<sup>60</sup> Triparts that rely on information provided by the combatants, find that this method of aiding in the development of their posture to be both problematic and incredibly important. While the different postures attainable to triparts require varying levels and types of information, and keeping in mind that objective and perfect information in the fog of war is impossible, we may still hypothesize on how information is utilized by triparts for the aim of posture development.

Facts and information may be completely opposite to one another, yet there is little doubt that once a state receives information its posture sets to gain or secure as much as possible. There is also something of a race

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<sup>59</sup> For further readings see: Paul F. Diehl and Jean Kingston, "Messenger or Message?: Military Buildups and the Initiation of Conflict," Journal of Politics #49, 1987, Pg. 801-813, Daniel S. Geller, "Power Transition and Conflict Initiation," Conflict Management and Peace Science, #12, 1992, Pg. 1-16, and Daniel S. Geller, "Patterns of War Initiations Among Status Quo Challengers and Defenders," Paper Presented to the XVIth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, August 21-25, Berlin Germany, 1994,

<sup>60</sup> Including, battlefield reports media coverage, intelligence reports/briefings and public-political statements as to the intentions and success/failure of the dyad itself.

among triparts to obtain reliable information before their counterparts do. This enables them to formulate a beneficial posture and implement a corresponding strategy before having to confront other, similar minded actors, or even lose the 'fish' to an exogenous 'fisherman.'<sup>61</sup> The Jordanian involvement in the 1967 Six-Day War is a good illustration of this.

During the initiation stages of the conflict the Jordanians remained neutral, as the uncertainty of the outcome was still great. They did not intend to intervene if the Egyptians suffered greatly early in the conflict. However, once the battle field reports came in (mostly) from Radio Cairo declaring that "...the Zionists are being driven into the sea..."<sup>62</sup> Jordan reassessed its position and made an attempt to jackal some territory from the Israelis. While it may be difficult to proclaim Jordan's jackaling posture solely on the information provided by the Egyptian media, there is little doubt that it profoundly affected their decision making process.

While information or a lack thereof may never be the sole impetus for the decision of a state to posture

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<sup>61</sup> Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition, Pg. 65-66,

itself in one way or another it does aid in determining the certainty of the dyadic conflicts outcome. More precisely, information produces or fosters perceptions of certainty, which lies at the heart of tripart action or intervention. This ingredient, while not sharing the overall importance of conflict initiation contributes to the decision of a tripart to act in a certain way under certain circumstances and therefore deserves this attention.<sup>63</sup>

Military power, the ability to apply that power in the prescribed 'zone of war,'<sup>64</sup> and the success of previous military operations<sup>65</sup> combine to produce the third measurement and predictor of outcome certainty. The perceptions derived from these three dimensions affect a tripart in two ways, through anticipation and

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<sup>62</sup> Peter Young, The Israeli Campaign: 1967, Pg. 86,

<sup>63</sup> Even if it may be recorded as a non-event,

<sup>64</sup> Blainey, Pg. 123,

<sup>65</sup> This is meant to illustrate the importance of recent history in military achievements for enhancing a tripart's posture. Recent military campaigns include those fought during the five years previous to the conflict in question. While five years may seem rather arbitrary, military reorganization and effective military-technological advances require this period as a minimum. For example, in the German-French War of 1940 triparts may have hypothesized as to the outcome by weighing the German military achievements in Poland in 1939 or Norway in early 1940. However, the tripart's predictions would not be reliant on German performance during the general war of 1914-1918. This logic explains the lull between the German (and Russian) annexation of Poland and the outbreak of multistate wars. There was no method for the allies of Poland to use in order to predict the power they would have in comparison to the Germans until the finale of the conflict itself. Because there was no realization of the gap between; for example Britain and Germany, the British had to wait and see what the outcome of the Polish campaign might be (as did Russia, which explains why it did not intervene simultaneously with the Germans). They both lost important window of opportunity by doing so. Yet, this is merely a retroactive prescription. The British, at the time required high levels of certainty to enter the conflict in defense of the Poles.

demonstration. The former represents the forecast triparts make in light of the previous victories of one actor in the dyad.<sup>66</sup> After the speedy collapse of the Maginot line in France, the United States, Italy and the British themselves expected (and rightly so) the turn of German forces against the UK.<sup>67</sup>

The latter is important immediately following the outbreak of hostilities or the initial phase of a conflict. Here triparts weigh the achievements (confirmed or not) of a dyadic actor and gain increased awareness of possible outcomes. For instance, when a combatant is able to push the other back from the pre-conflict demarcation lines it signals to others a level of certainty as to the conflicts end. This may seem to be a poor indicator of determining a triparts action, however it encourages the first round of intervention. This is especially true for those states requiring speed to achieve their aims and those determined to gain before the other triparts can.

As for the 'zone of war,' we may deem that tactical advantages are unequivocally important. States able to effectively apply military strength in one zone may be

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<sup>66</sup> See above,

incapable to administer it in another. States whose strength rests on naval supremacy may be hard pressed to engage in a large-scale ground war for example. Therefore, the type of military power being used and the type of military using it also plays an important role for the certainty of a dyadic conflict. Be it German soldiers relatively untrained in winter tactics succumbing to the Russian's who were much better equipped for the same conditions, or the Russians in Afghanistan, who knew neither the terrain nor the socio-political resolve of their enemies, eventually leading to Soviet capitulation.

When triparts are considering intervention they necessarily look to the type of conflict being waged. The conditions of the conflict also affects a tripart's perception as even the most powerful nations may be unable to contend with states much weaker than themselves if the zone of conflict is alien and incomprehensible before its initiation.

The forth dimension are predictions of how other triparts may act. While this may seems a bit redundant

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<sup>67</sup> As did many other nation-states,

considering its mention in previous paragraphs; it must still be examined independently. "N" party intervention and war expansion may be seen as nothing more than a domino effect of tripart interference. For this it warrants a complete analysis in an attempt to better understand the conditions for war expansion and/or its isolation.

To this end let us suppose metaphorically that the international system is a boxing stadium filled to capacity by unitary, self interested and paranoid individuals. Let us also suppose for the purpose of this metaphor that each of these actors seeks to better their position relative to the others in the arena.<sup>68</sup> As an added element, presume that the actors are locked into the actual room where the duel is taking place, a room void of any overarching authority. Although anarchy is widespread, there does not seem to be symmetry of vulnerability. Those who are seated near the epicenter of the ensuing contest postulate their postures with less

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<sup>68</sup> Let us imagine that the people in the arena are there to cheer on one, or the other contender. Also, each of the spectators is different in size and capabilities, some are very strong, some are weak and many are of middle power in relation to the two other extremes. Let us also assume that each has different goals. Some want to pickpocket others as to secure some wealth, while others simply want their potential threats to be destroyed, while others still would like to see themselves the strongest of the bunch. Yet there are two underlining principles, which govern each actor's behavior, the first, as mentioned before is that of survival. The second, which will not be acted upon unless the first is guaranteed, is that of gains, or, as some would call it, profit.



available time if they are to protect themselves and/or benefit. Alternatively, those seated far away seem to have the luxury of viewing and interpreting the events as they unfold with a clearer perspective and mindset watching the interaction of individuals involved.

While the two, equally matched adversaries are dueling, the crowd anxiously awaits the finale and there is time for the spectators to plot their posture and act upon it in the framework befitting the situation. A powerful ringside individual thinks that because he is stronger than the two participants are, he may be able to take the glory and does so by marching into the ring and attacks one of the fighters. As the fighter collapses several smaller spectators drag him off the canvas and jackal from the remains of the original jackaler. The second fighter thinks that his victory by default has left him in a vulnerable situation, tired and alone. Thus, he invites others to share the spoils of victory with him to secure allies with the promise of gain and against the rise of another contender.

Yet, one of the invitees seems much more capable of ending conflict contagion by walking around to everybody,

with his keen support crew behind him and harassing them into capitulation or arbitrarily pouncing on them simply because he can. On the other side of the room, out of eyeshot of the new arm in town the same thing is going on. A powerful actor is attempting to cajole some to heed its cause, all the while beating others to deter them from challenging it. The arena is simply too large for any one, or even two contenders to fully dominate. Hence, while their great eyes are looking around, or administering a beating, someone steps out from the corner, where he had kept his back against until the right moment came along for his intervention, and so he steals someone's wallet and then returned to the corner. Alternatively, while a strong man walks or gets engaged in a conflict, the others just make a semi-circle around them. This on the one hand is designed to keep them fighting, as everyone around them keeps hurling chants of encouragement.<sup>69</sup> On the next hand they circle the contenders as packs of wolves circle their prey, as a means of insurance against one among them taking everything before any others could act.

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<sup>69</sup> Alternatively, silently awaits a window to act, or at least befriend one that will act.

And so it goes, the international system much like its boxing arena counterpart represents anarchy in its purest form, where the only order is to survive, though the tactics for this end are as numerous as the actors themselves. However, there seems to be some logic behind the choices triparts make, which is in part dependent on how they believe other triparts will act. Some types of neutrality may be pursued if other triparts are stronger or have reacted quicker than the state in question. While other types of neutrality, such as for gains or profit are derived from watching and waiting for the conflicting parties to grow tired, ensuring high yields at relatively low costs. Without reiterating the entire theory of tripart posture development, it is safe to suggest that all tripart states determine in part their postures by the presence of "n" party actors in the system.

States, like the spectators in the arena observe a conflict in two distinct ways. They look towards the ensuing conflict and formulate predictions as to the possible outcomes, and the available postures depending on the conflicts' end. Simply, triparts examine their own abilities, vulnerabilities and allies in the face of favorable, unfavorable or uncertain conditions and

develop corresponding postures to secure themselves as well as possible. Additionally, triparts look to their geographic sub-system and try to predict the actions of other tripart in light of the circumstances. This is done to try to guarantee that if they are to commit themselves to a posture, another tripart does not gain from it while it is diverted to the current conflict theatre.

If a state's survival is not jeopardized by the posture it maintained then this posture was the result of how the certainty of a dyadic conflict affected the immediate tripart actors, and how it effected the tripart in relation to "n" party actors. Basically, states "were persuaded to fight because they knew that a powerful rival was at war elsewhere and could not interfere...they were persuaded to seek peace because they feared that a powerful rival was now about to turn against them."

Fifthly, the domestic cohesion of the dyadic actors is an important second image<sup>71</sup> indicator for the interpretation of outcome certainty by a tripart. When states are seen to be fractured in terms of a populations

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<sup>70</sup> Blainey, Pg. 122,

<sup>71</sup> As understood by Kenneth Waltz in, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis, Colombia University Press, New York, N.Y., 1959,

adherence to government policies, or a fracturization of the government itself, the tripart's perception of how well this state will perform is greatly affected in the conflict that it is now engaged in. Take the example of the US and Vietnam and the tripart perception of China in the mid-1970's. One would assume that in the wake of the American withdraw from Vietnam due in part to the domestic fracture and pressures from within the US, China, in its quest for gains would also have detected the unity of the Vietnamese. However, their inability to do so led to China's military loss as well.

While this is both a modest and rather nominally detailed example it illustrates that even when states face an asymmetry of arms national unity may circumvent capitulation. This could come from waging costly guerrilla warfare or through the mobilization of a population towards a single aim. This quasi-national unity theory helps in articulating domestic aims and international outcomes and its reverse, international gains through domestic outcomes."

There is no single method for analyzing the tenets

of a states foreign policy and then deduce how the population affects policy outcomes. In more occasions than not the only actors responsible for a state's foreign policy are the actual statesmen. However, this is not an exercise in the field of domestic decision-making. Instead it is a theory of third party action. What is important though, is to understand, at least mildly, how domestic situations of the dyadic actors affect the posture of the tripart. This link produces an important assumption: states that are more unified than their adversary, in terms of a populations support for their government's actions are more likely to breed a second level of certainty for victory.<sup>73</sup> Conversely, states internally fractured have decreased certainty for their victory.

Included in this second image theory is the notion of national resolve and ideology. We have already mentioned how national resolve, national unity and nationalism can aid in increasing the certainty of the

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<sup>72</sup> Mastanduno, Lake, Ikenberry, Pg. 458,

<sup>73</sup> This element necessarily comes after the initiation of the conflict and may in fact reverse the perceptions of triparts first leveled postures, again illustrating the fluctuation in postures throughout a conflict. Lets us return to the US- Vietnam Conflict for articulation purposes. The regional triparts and in fact most of the world, saw that the US intervention of Vietnam, because of the asymmetry of military might, would result in a US victory. However, once the Vietnamese unified themselves towards the defeat of the Americans, and topped by the fractured domestic situation gripping the US, the triparts altered both their perceptions and postures. The same could be said of the 1979 Russian invasion of

dyadic conflict. Now we should turn our attention to the widely debated issue of ideology to gain a clearer view of this second image of analysis. Stephen Walt attempted to deal with the impact of ideology on alliance formations and touches on how ideological solidarity necessarily affect the certainty of a dyadic conflict. This is because ideological partners almost always share the same regime type and larger world-view. This fusion creates a situation where one would assume that fundamentally similar states must come to each other's defense if the situation rises.

"Ideological solidarity refers to alliances that result from states sharing political, cultural, or other traits. According to the hypothesis of ideological solidarity, the more similar two or more states are, the more likely they are to ally."<sup>74</sup> This is the central theme behind the Democratic Peace Theory, which boasts that no two democracies have ever waged war against one another.<sup>75</sup>

While national unity in the face of invasion reinforces a national identity and builds a framework for

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Afghanistan.

<sup>74</sup> Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances, Pg. 33,

<sup>75</sup> Without getting too deep into the DPT most favorable literature points to common regimes,

state survival the opposite is true of ideological determination. Ideology does not really matter only capabilities do. Even though ideology often mobilizes masses in public squares they rarely mobilize them to an unnecessary war even if an ideological partner is threatened. Let us briefly explore a case in point to provide a basis for this assumption.

The ideology of National Socialism founded by Mussolini and embraced by Hitler never played a strategic role for which states they were to enter into conflict with or defend. If ideology really mattered the Italians would not have had last minute jitters for the impending war between its German ally and Poland and later with France and Britain. Yet, they did and it was the result of strategic planning and not ideological solidarity.

The same could be said of the allies in the above case. Britain did not come to the aid of France because of the values and ideology they shared. Instead, the posture articulated and maintained by Britain right until the conclusion of hostilities on the European continent was that of a defensive one. Britain assisted France not

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institutions and ethics as being responsible for this peace and the alliance itself.



because they shared an ideology of democracy and liberalism, but because the British thought that the status quo was better for it than an uncertain future where Germany would have a dominant continental position. Britain's posture reflected its strategic interests and not its ideological ones.<sup>76</sup>

The sixth and final component of conflict outcome certainty concerns the economic abilities in the dyad. Which state has an economic advantage in terms of its control over key or necessary resources? Which state has high industrial capabilities and which relies on international trade? Is one state economically more autarkic than the other or do they both rely on imports and exports from others? These questions, while not explicitly dealing with how tripartite determine certainty, nevertheless encourage tripartite postures.

Returning momentarily to the concept of mobilization, states that can easily mobilize resources and economic transactions towards approaching conflict

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<sup>76</sup> In addition to the idea that ideology does not imply an increased strategic awareness nor does ideology stipulate alliances in international relations. In terms of mobilization, and drawing from the Mastanduno, Lake, Ikenberry piece, "Towards a Realist Theory of State Action," there does not seem to be an aberration between democracies and autocracies in terms of population mobilization. While the former requires a threat to the state and vital interests as the catalyst for action, the latter is more the

have an advantage over an adversary that lacks this ability. "The concern with power and wealth creates...domestic strategies all states must pursue...mobilize resources and intervene in the economy to simulate economic growth...The state, in other words, performs a role...not for the good of the community, but for the interest of the community."<sup>77</sup>

This is of extreme interest to potential interveners because they take into account the economic side of the war equation. When states possess the means of military action the certainty of their victory is raised in as much as the margin that lies between two adversaries. Israel engaged Egypt in war in 1967. Other bordering Arab states expanded the conflict and were fully equipped by the USSR, while Israel received an arms embargo from its traditional allies. The perception of tripartite<sup>78</sup> was that of an Arab victory. If for nothing else, the fact that the Arab states were able to fight for longer periods of time and that their essential economic activities were not as greatly hindered by the war as Israel's.<sup>79</sup>

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product of the ideological commitments the ruling party has made and thus, the mobilization is forced.

<sup>77</sup> Mastanduno, Lake, Ikenberry, Pg. 462,

<sup>78</sup> In the earliest phases of the conflict, before information became accessible,

<sup>79</sup> Once the other variables are weighed then outcome certainty become much clearer. States still formulate their immediate postures on part-and rather imperfect information, a point which is

The sectoral make-up of a state's economy also plays a role in how others see them. When a state has a centrally planned economy consisting primarily of heavy industry controlled by a few personalities, the ability to focus the economy towards military production increases the perception of certainty. This element transcends even will as there is no will if there is no way.<sup>80</sup> Recalling the WWII German example, we find that it was not necessarily the national socialist ideology, which led the Germans to victory early on in the Wars against Poland and Western Europe. Rather it was the ability to out-produce the Western states in terms of military hardware. Only then through the application of this hardware on the battlefield were the German armies able to gain superior positions, which definitely affected the perception of tripartts.<sup>81</sup>

The British proceeded to a relatively slow start in

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supported by the fact that states alter their postures very rapidly, as rapidly in fact, that better information becomes available.

<sup>80</sup> See, D. Michael Shafer, Winners and Losers: How Sectors Shape the Developmental Prospects of States, Pg. 1-48, for a more complete analysis of sectoral influences in state actions.

<sup>81</sup> As stated by Alec Lawrence Macfie, in Blainey, Pg. 91, "International wars were more likely to begin when an economic recovery was well underway or had mounted the slopes and reached a prosperous tableland." This insinuates that as one nation's economic recovery is underway, then in relative terms it is surpassing the abilities of its adversaries in this realm. A window of opportunity is thence opened from which; the recovering state has a measurable advantage to gain by diverting it attention to military affairs while being economically secure.

its military production due to its low/high sectoral balance, which did not permit easy manufacturing shifts and therefore a steady military economy.<sup>82</sup> If it were not for the immediate transfer of military equipment to the UK by the US under the Lend-Lease Agreements, the demise of the British would probably have been similar in character similar to their French counterpart.<sup>83</sup>

Finally, "changes in economic moods and conditions affect not only bankers...manufacturers...farmers and all they employ: they also affect monarchs, first ministers, and chiefs of staff of the armed forces. They affect the revenue and expenditure of governments...They affect social unrest or cohesion. And perhaps most importantly they subtly affect expectations of what the coming months will be like and whether they can be shaped with ease."<sup>84</sup>

Upon completing this analysis of tripart perceptions of dyadic conflict certainty it is important to sum up the implications of the certainty narrative and its link to state postures. We must bear in mind that while some

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<sup>82</sup> France's did not accelerate at all, by the time it was preparing for the shift the war against it had already been concluded in the favor of the Germans, whose economy had been altered nearly four years hence.

<sup>83</sup> Conversely, once allied forces occupied essential economic areas of interest, then the tripart perception of the outcome was severely altered. Take the loss of the Southern Rumanian oil field and

of the aforementioned elements that determine certainty are more important on the posture setting elements of the triparts themselves. None act in isolation. It is the interaction of them that guide a tripart towards its most beneficial policy option.

At times, triparts look at the initiation of the conflict to determine its outcome and then prematurely advance a certain posture only to alter that posture once or if the conflict situation changes. This indicates that a tripart's posture is never stagnant or isolated from the crisis it is reacting to. Instead, postures change in accordance with available information. States may be poised to jackal only to find out that their targeted state is superior in strength than themselves. The state may opt to bandwagon depending on potential intervention of other triparts. A fractured state may invite jackals against it, only to unite from the intervention. In doing so, some triparts are forced to defect from their posture, and perhaps even spark a balancing alliance against it. This is illustrated in the European general war following the French Revolution. No matter what combination of events shape tripart postures, it must be

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the allied occupation of the strategic port of Narvik as cases in point.

taken as a given that states always act to preserve themselves. Only after this has been achieved by the standards set by the state itself will they act to advance their position relative to their neighbors. This requires triparts to examine the aggregate abilities, capabilities, domestic and international postures of other triparts as well as the dueling dyad, in its quest to formulate a beneficial posture.

This study of conflict perceptions remains only partially complete without investigating the vulnerability variable. A state's posture is also reliant on the perception of its own vulnerabilities. The certainty of the outcome for the dyadic conflict may increase, decrease or not affect the vulnerability of a tripart. In any case, the fluctuation of vulnerability plays an important role in driving the decisions of a tripart to pursue a certain posture. When vulnerability is low and certainty is favorable triparts may either jackal or practice regular bandwagoning. On the other hand, if vulnerability is high and the certainty is unfavorable, triparts may allow themselves to be forced into a bandwagoning arrangement or practice defensive

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<sup>84</sup> Blainey, Pg. 93,

bandwagoning. In the above examples the tripart's decision on one posture or the other rests on the opportunity to ally. However, the perceptions of vulnerability or invulnerability narrow the options for triparts. Since vulnerability is an independent variable along side certainty and opportunity, I will explore it independently. Only after we have established the characteristics of vulnerability can we proceed to introduce the function of opportunity and finally the complete integration of this three variable model.

### **3.2 Vulnerability:**

If certainty aims to describe the predictive abilities of triparts vulnerability seeks to position the triparts in terms of the level of threat facing them. When states are more threatened or believe that high vulnerability surrounds them, their posture reflects a more cooperative attitude. On the other hand, as vulnerability decreases since the tripart is more powerful than either dyadic combatant it has many options at its disposal and tends to behave in a more unitary manner.

Vulnerability is a variable from which tripart assess their weaknesses against the certainty of the dyadic war. In this section, I aim to show how vulnerability also affects the posture of tripart actors from a different set of sub-variables. I propose that three main categories; geography and geographic considerations, such as proximity, the initial or pre-conflict posture of the tripart, and technological factors, as in military advancements are the main sources of a state's perception of its vulnerability.

A state's vulnerability interacts with the certainty of the dyadic conflicts' outcome in the quest to establish posture of maximum benefit.<sup>55</sup> However, how can a state determine the effects its actions will have on its vulnerability? With the presence of "n" party actors in any system or sub-system it is no wonder that a state very carefully plots its posture by examining its own vulnerabilities and powers as well as the certainty of its actions.

Although the vulnerability of the tripart does not directly affect the certainty of a dyadic conflict it



does confine triparts in their actions and interventions into a conflict. When vulnerability is very high for the tripart it cannot, for instance, practice a posture of jackaling as the costs may outweigh the benefits. Alternatively, when vulnerability is low the tripart's options increase immensely. "The very identity of belligerents, whose status as belligerents stems noticeably from the relative location and scope of their politically organized space, which has shaped their strategic history."<sup>86</sup> Here Gray is entering the vulnerability-laden strategic realm by infusing the notion of a political and military posture into a larger framework of geography. In fact, we may not be able to separate these ideas as it is shown that the posture a state adheres to is partially the result of its proximity and the boundaries of its enterprise.

If we accept the traditional realist paradigm of international interactions we are presented with three main hypotheses that govern the intricate and complex decisions of triparts in relation to vulnerability. Firstly, the international system is dominated by self-

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<sup>85</sup> See: Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "An Expected Utility Theory of International Conflict," American Political Science Review, #74, Pg. 917-932,

<sup>86</sup> Gray, Pg. 171,

interested and self-determining nation-states that never willingly cede power and no higher authority than the state exists. The international system is anarchic and if a state is to persevere its policies and postures must reflect the protection of its vital interests. Of these interests, survival sits alone on the pedestal. No gains, interests or postures are important if a state's very survival is threatened. A state's citizens for instance, would not direct their attention to soaring bread or oil prices or inflation if the survivability of the state were jeopardized.

Vulnerable states adhere to postures that best guarantee their survival. Competition between the staunchest allies for resources is quite illustrative of this point. The interest of survival transcends all interstate relationships. It led Canada and the US into a conflict over fishing rights in the Arctic and it constantly breeds animosity between the US and its West European allies. That being said, the relationship between all states is highly competitive. The product of this is an international system of self-help where the determinants of state relationships are power and common interests. Finally, under such conditions states "behave

purposely in the pursuit of power and material well-being."<sup>87</sup> Keeping this in mind, and maintaining our previous aim of speculating the causes of vulnerability, let us present the variables that account for the perceptive techniques of triparts. In contrast to previous work in international relations theory, particularly the work of Randall Schweller,<sup>88</sup> it is imperative that our assumptions regard survival as being the basis for all state endeavors.

States will never jeopardize their existence for profit. Hence, all state actions are designed to advance their security and survival, even if on the surface they seem only to the ends of gain.<sup>89</sup> Vulnerability matters since it tempts us to predict how states will act under a multiplicity of circumstances. When states are very vulnerable the types of postures they practice differs greatly from states that are significantly less vulnerable.<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>87</sup> Mastanduno, Lake, Ikenberry, Pg. 459,

<sup>88</sup> In regards to his work entitled, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,"

<sup>89</sup> Take territorial occupation as an example. A state may occupy all of or parts of another state in what seems to be in an exploitative manner, yet this territory also acts as an important buffer against another rival. This territory then, increases the security and aids in preserving the state from future conflicts.

<sup>90</sup> To simplify the following exercise let us assume that great powers by virtue of their size and capabilities are less vulnerable than weaker counterparts. Size matters for this analysis but will not be discussed at any great length for the sake of parsimony. Yet it will continually be implied because of the aggregation of the other variables that amounts to the asymmetry found in size, capabilities and

For this limited analysis of the impact and ends of vulnerability I shall now analyze the three components of vulnerability. The first and most important is the geographic location of the state. This includes its neighbors<sup>91</sup> and borders, its natural defensibility and resource availability. Next, the posture the tripart takes, while not designed to undermine its national survival may at times increase its vulnerability. Pre-conflict postures are important for a better illustration of vulnerability as these postures have implications to alliance structures and the division in conflict between hostile and friendly states. Finally, the technological factors linking geography and postures together are also quite significant. Technologies are often the driving force behind the capabilities that a state may have and the means from which a state can reduce its vulnerability.

Regarding the first variable, let us commence with the question of how geography affects a state's

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postures between states in the system. On a more administrative note, the definitive aspects as to the different sizes of states stems from Jack Levy's assumptions in his work entitled, War in the Modern Great Power System: 1495-1975, University of Kentucky Press, Lexington Kentucky, 1983,

<sup>91</sup> Proximity to the dyad and other potential triparts, which may be possible rivals to the aims, a tripart itself may retain as to the dyadic conflict.

vulnerability, and in what way is geography important to how a state will act?<sup>92</sup> There is evidence to suggest that because, "all politics is geopolitics...all strategy is geo-strategy,"<sup>93</sup> the postures of triparts must be fundamentally linked to their physical environment and to the "other" states surrounding them. In fact, "geography can not be an optional extra for consideration...it drives the character and the potential contemporary reach of tactical hence, operational, prowess."<sup>94</sup> This supposes that a nation's location is vital to the pursuance of certain strategies and its vulnerability. States that are naturally defensible and less vulnerable to an attack posture themselves more independently than states experiencing the opposite.<sup>95</sup>

The United States in its 1941-45 War against Germany and Japan never feared its own capitulation as a national entity. Its vulnerability to attack was low even after the bombardment of Pearl Harbor. Being detached from the theatre of war by two vast oceans allowed the US to pursue any posture it deemed proper without the conflict

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<sup>92</sup> Paraphrased from Colin S. Gray, "Inescapable Geography," Found in, Geopolitics: Geography and Strategy, by Colin Gray and Geoffrey Sban, Pg. 161,

<sup>93</sup> Gray, Pg. 163,

<sup>94</sup> Gray, Pg. 164,

<sup>95</sup> Let 'naturally defensible' include what most military scholars would agree on, such as mountain

directly affecting its vulnerability. However vulnerability was inescapable even for the US. Once France had lost its war against Germany and Britain's naval capacities had been crippled the situation indirectly affected the vulnerabilities of the US. Having a hostile power on the opposing shores of the Atlantic heightened the sense of alarm in the US even though its frontiers were not in danger.

Finally, a state's vulnerability is also the product of the obstacles facing it and the power it has during a dyadic war. States like pre-WWII Poland, which thought that they were powerful sometimes, overestimate their abilities. The failure of some states to advance as quickly as their adversaries militarily (technologically and tactically speaking), are decisively more vulnerable than a state utilizing its policy apparatus to remain neutral and avoid a conflict altogether. Vulnerability, much like its certainty counterpart is based largely on perceptions and abilities. Much of this topic is important only in a retroactive manner. I nevertheless believe that by understanding the causes and effects of our presented variables we can actually establish some

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ranges, rivers, forests and obstructed borders. The easiest territory to protect, are island states, such

predictive indicators to help in determining the best possible posture for a state in a specific situation to initiate.<sup>96</sup>

### 3.3 The Opportunity to Ally:

The third and final variable to discuss is the opportunity to ally. Both the certainty and the vulnerability aspects of this work remain strictly theoretical if we do not add opportunity to the equation. The opportunity to ally is the distinguishing feature resulting in different outcomes even when certainty and vulnerability are the same. When favorable certainty is high and vulnerability is low it is the opportunity to ally with other states that decides on whether the tripart will act in a unitary manner and jackal from one of the conflicting parties or whether to pursue a collective posture and bandwagon.

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as Britain and the United States.

<sup>96</sup> For further readings on vulnerability see: Nazli Choucri and Robert C. North, "Dynamics of International Conflict: Some Policy Implications of Population, Resources and Technology," World Politics, vol. 24, 1972, Pg. 80-122, Saul Cohen, Geography and Politics in a World Divided (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition), Oxford University Press, 1973, Paul F. Diehl, "Geography and War: An Assessment of the Empirical Literature," International Interactions, vol. 17, 1991, Pg. 11-27, David Garnham, "Dynamic International War, 1816-1965: The Role of Power Parity and Geographic Proximity," Western Political Quarterly, vol. 29, 1976, Pg. 231-242, and Nils Petter Gleditsch and J. David Singer, "Distance and International War, 1816-1965," in M.R. Khan, Proceedings of the International Peace Research Association, Fifth General Conference, Oslo: International Peace Research Association, 1975,

When a tripart has allies available to it then the course of its posture reflects less urgent and vulnerable characteristics. This is not always the case. At times, tripartts feel invulnerable and the certainty of the dyadic war is favorable yet there is no opportunity to ally. Under these conditions jackaling is likely to occur. Yet, if allies are available in the same condition states prefer to bandwagon. Theoretically, opportunity is an independent variable, which varies along high and low levels. It directs the vulnerability of tripartts because states with many allies prefer resistance to submission when it is a defender.

The opportunity to ally is the simplest variable to understand and apply to the variance of tripart behavior. Either a state has the opportunity to ally or does not. In any event this opportunity impacts a tripartts vulnerabilities and hence its posture. Therefore, when we begin to examine the particular postures of tripartts we must keep in mind the opportunity to ally even though it is not as important as certainty and vulnerability is a necessary variable to determine state behavior.



Now that the theoretical composition of the relationship between certainty, vulnerability and the opportunity to ally has been developed I will proceed to a second theoretical investigation. I have defined a total of ten possible tripart postures. These postures are accompanied by case studies drawn from the Second World War and from the ongoing Middle Eastern Wars. The range of postures is twofold, collective and unitary. I will now proceed to link the postures triparts advance by examining each posture individually while incorporating its cause. In this case, the postures are considered as dependant variables while certainty, vulnerability and opportunity co-vary independently. To fully grasp the connection between the independent and dependant variables an examination of the variance within certainty, vulnerability and the opportunity to ally is a very important task.

## 4.0 Variance and Posture Formulation:

The following section applies the variance of the independent variables to their outcomes in the form of tripart postures. If a hierarchy can be drawn certainty is definitely the most important variable. Vulnerability and opportunity rely on certainty. A tripart will feel more or less vulnerable depending on how they see the certainty of the dyadic war. Vulnerability is still an independent variable because it is felt and fluctuates before, during and after the commencement of the dyadic conflict and will be examined in this manner. The opportunity to ally is the least important independent variable because there are many options for states regardless of the availability of allies. States can jackal, offensively balance or remain neutral for gains without the presence of allies. But the opportunity to ally affects a state's perception of its vulnerability at times. It is an independent variable because it helps produce outcomes of state postures. An interaction effect thus occurs between these three independent variables and it is my primary goal to examine this effect.

Since the most important variable is certainty this portion will be divided according to its variance of favorable certainty, unfavorable certainty and uncertainty. Within each of these portions I will subdivide vulnerability and the opportunity to ally into high and low variations and correlate the corresponding tripart postures with each equation. The first section, favorable certainty deals with outcomes that produce favorable outcomes for a tripart. A tripart's vulnerability while being affected by this outcome is not reliant on it. A dyadic conflict may be favorably certain but still increase a tripart's vulnerability. This portion deals with the results of a favorably certain conflict on triparts. The second section, unfavorable certainty follows the same logic but aims to investigate outcomes unfavorable to triparts. The final section is based on uncertainty. Since I have already concluded that uncertainty produces neutrality I will use this portion to examine different types of neutrality and their causes.


## ***1.1 Favorable Certainty***

### **High Vulnerability:**

As mentioned throughout this work, favorable certainty is when the expected outcome of the dyadic conflict is favorable for the tripart. We take for granted that this favorable outcome decreases the tripart's vulnerability. This is not always the case. Sometimes the vulnerability is reduced and other times it actually increases. There are many factors that contribute to these feelings of vulnerability such as "n" party involvement and contagion. When certainty is favorable but vulnerability remains high two postures are available to the triparts. The first one is dysfunctional collective action, which happens when the opportunity to ally is high. The second posture defensive balancing occurs when it is low.<sup>97</sup>

## **Dysfunctional Collective Action (DCA):**

The first posture to be discussed is dysfunctional collective action (DCA). This posture is the result of favorable certainty, high vulnerability and high opportunities to ally.



Even though I am opening this section with DCA it is a slight anomaly of tripart behavior. This is because the triparts remain or become vulnerable even though the dyadic conflict is predicted to or has ended favorably for them. Dysfunctional collective action is an alliance with no agenda except the protection of shared interests. However, the dysfunction hinders their abilities to protect these interests. It is dysfunctional because of the amount of buckpassing that occurs regarding their common defense. The triparts that make this alliance do

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<sup>97</sup> For the remainder of this survey let "oppt" represent the opportunity to ally, "V" represent vulnerability and "Z" represent certainty.


so because the opportunity to ally is high and they perceive a reduction in their vulnerabilities if they ally. But their vulnerabilities continue to mount because no one tripart is willing to defend another or risk war with their collective threat. Each state in a DCA passes the responsibility of defense to the others. Free-riding is endemic but the triparts free-ride on promises and not actions. It is interesting to note that a rare type of deterrence is practiced by the supposed threat against triparts in a DCA. This can be coined deterrence through frustration. The threat actually exposes the dysfunction of the alliance by attacking an allied state. Once it becomes apparent that the other aligned states will not act in defense the alliance usually crumbles. Dysfunctional collective action embodies the collective action dilemma to a tee. Questions of how to ensure that the allies will come to the aid of an allied state are very important. Essentially, an alliance of this type retains all the shortcomings of this dilemma without the benefits of acting collectively.

A good example of this is found in the 1958-61 UAR alliance between Egypt and Syria. We may assume that the outcome of the 1956 Suez/Sinai war was favorable for both

Egypt and Syria. However, both remained highly vulnerable. The opportunity to ally was quite high and they formed an alliance based on mutual protection. The years following the 1956 conflict were quite conflictual in this region and the Israelis consistently exposed the dysfunction of the UAR by carrying out large scale and asymmetric retaliation raids primarily against Syria while Egypt passively looked on. The frustration came from the Syrians who wondered why they embarked on such a relationship if there was no benefit. The mounting Israeli reprisals and Egyptian inaction eventually led to this alliances collapse.

### **Self-Imposed Forced Bandwagoning:**

As the title suggests this posture is self-imposed alignment to an adversary. Although the tripart sees that the dyadic conflict will be favorable to it, it experiences high degrees of vulnerability and has low opportunities to ally. These two strikes outweigh the benefits it may derive from the dyadic conflict and it chooses to bandwagon with an adversary as a means to alleviate its vulnerability.



The details of this posture will be made clearer when the discussion of regular forced bandwagoning is made.<sup>98</sup> What is important to keep in mind is that this is a self-imposed posture. The tripart actually decides on alignment with an adversary instead of resistance for it would have to resist alone. This posture is rarely practiced because states facing favorable certainty seldom retain high vulnerabilities and low opportunities to ally.

Thailand in WWII is a good illustration of this posture. The prospects of a Japanese victory over China and Indochina produced a favorable outcome for Thailand. This favor was short-lived however. The Japanese soon turned their attention to Thailand as part of its overall South Asian strategy. Thailand was highly vulnerable and had no regional allies available. It chose to bandwagon with the Japanese before the Japanese could invade it. In

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<sup>98</sup> In the following section of unfavorable certainty,



a manner of speaking Thailand preemptively bandwagoned with an adversary before it could be forced to do so.<sup>99</sup>

### **Low Vulnerability:**

When the certainty is favorable and the triparts feel invulnerable the options available to them significantly change. Both of the above postures stress the importance of allies because the presence of them alters the tripart's vulnerability. When states feel invulnerable their postures are directed to more autarkic aims. The opportunity to ally is still important but it is considerably less important than in a vulnerable situation. The postures available are jackaling and regular bandwagoning. When allies are available triparts will bandwagon but do so for gains and not through persuasion. On the other hand, when no allies are available triparts will choose to gain by jackaling. When allies are present states join them because they feel that their security may be easier to enhance by bandwagoning. When no allies are available states will jackal to enhance their security.

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<sup>99</sup> See: The Colombia Encyclopedia, Colombia University Press, Feb. 2001,


## Regular Bandwagoning

In this survey regular bandwagoning offers quite a different picture than had originally been supposed by Walt.<sup>100</sup> It is not merely the adherence to the demands of a more powerful state. Bandwagoning is not solely the result of an aggregately more capable state with great offensive capabilities located geographically proximate to any number of triparts, threatening them.<sup>101</sup> Bandwagoning is an intricate posture different from forced bandwagoning because the triparts that jump on the "wagon" and bandwagon do so with the protection of their security in mind and not because a conflicting state coerced them to do so. Bandwagoning is the alignment with a state currently engaged in a conflict, which produces a high level of favorable certainty and demonstrates the will, desire and ability to defend those states in alliance with it. Regular bandwagoning comes from high and favorable certainty in the dyadic war. The states that practice it feel low levels of vulnerability and they have high opportunities to ally.

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<sup>100</sup> As shown in the above literature review,

<sup>101</sup> Walt, Pg. 32,



This posture is employed by states that perceive high, favorable certainty on the part of its "wagon," and wish to share in the increased security that loyalty provides.<sup>102</sup> This posture is termed bandwagoning because a single state achieves a preponderance of power, or as proposed by Walt states having more aggregate power than its opponents are. The triparties flock to this power for greater security. They go willingly and are never forced. Here we find the postulation of a positive feedback cycle to be both evident and influential for the entrance of tripart to a bandwagoning alliance where the "wagon" is already engaged in military operations.

Borrowing from Robert Jervis, Randall Schweller and Thomas Schelling,<sup>103</sup> for the "wagon" "nothing succeeds

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<sup>102</sup> Bandwagoning is a reciprocal posture. The "wagon" and bandwagoners are in need of each other. The dyadic state engaged in war is relieved from some stresses of conflict in that willing triparties align themselves this contender and aid this state by providing war materials or soldiers. The bandwagoners are welcomed into this alliance and receive increased security for its alliance selection.

<sup>103</sup> For further readings see, Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life, Princeton University Press, 1997, Randall Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1, Summer 1994, Pg. 72-107,

like success."<sup>104</sup> When a state is successful in its military endeavors the surrounding triparts perceive it to have more power and capabilities than its adversary does. This perception leads to the proliferation of willing allies because triparts believe their security will be enhanced not hindered by their alignment selection. No state has ever willingly entered an alliance that it thought would jeopardize its security and ability to survive. Let us hypothesize that the only element of coercion in the bandwagoning posture is reserved for triparts the "wagon" believes are fence-sitting. This non-committal posture could be extremely hazardous to the "wagon" and only in this case would it attempt to force the tripart to bandwagoning. The tripart then decides whether or not it commits or resists coercion.<sup>105</sup>

When conditions are favorably certain, the tripart feels low vulnerability and there is a great opportunity to ally states are willing cede some of their territorial sovereignty by granting freedom of passage to the contender. They align themselves with the more powerful state because they believe that if their "wagon" were

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<sup>104</sup> Schweller, Pg. 73,

defeated their own vulnerabilities would increase drastically. Also, there is no threat to bandwagoning triparts from the "wagon." It seems counterintuitive to threaten a state to cooperate and align if that state is already interested in such an arrangement. The contender threatens those it needs to pacify and/or co-opt because the failure to do so or the ability of an adversary to do so first damages or impairs the capacity of the contender to fulfill its security needs and obligations to its allies.

Bandwagoning is a state posture of alignment to a powerful state based strictly on security concerns. Bandwagoning is practiced by states that are weaker than both dyadic states. These triparts usually have no real allegiance to the pre-conflict hierarchy of power because there is nothing for them to protect. Their decision to enter an alliance with a conflicting state is done for very pragmatic reasons: the enhancement of their relative power and influence.<sup>105</sup>

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<sup>105</sup> As mentioned in forced bandwagoning,

<sup>106</sup> To contrast this with strategic balancing these two are opposite postures. Both reflect tripart's preferences of the best way to promote their security. Whereas states that balance hope to protect the pre-conflict power relationships and hierarchy, bandwagoners expect increased security by helping to alter this power structure. We may also look to an interesting hypothesis of Blainey as a means to clarify this point. For Blainey, war is "a dispute about measurement...Wars usually begin when nations disagree on their relative strength." (Pg. 122) With this in mind we can assume that the "wagon" attracts states to it to redefine the hierarchy of power. This redistribution opens the window of

Another issue of importance raised in discussing regular bandwagoning is what the outcome of a successful bandwagoning alliance looks like? Before an answer can be suggested, suppose that if strategic balancing is successful it leads to a balance of power because it aims to deter a state from achieving a preponderance of power. This deterrence either stops a potential contender before it can fully alter the system or it escapes having to battle at all. If balancing succeeds over reform a clear demarcation line is drawn of who has power.<sup>107</sup>

Contrarily, if a bandwagoning alliance is victorious in its alteration of the power hierarchy the emergence of a hegemonic system is forthcoming. In this situation tripartite cede some territorial and/or economic freedoms for security guarantees by the hegemon. This helps to explain the emergence of the US to the unipolar position of global hegemon. After the dust of war settled and it became apparent that the USSR was intent on maintaining

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opportunity for some states to gain substantial amounts of power where they had little before.

<sup>107</sup> The case of the US and USSR during WWII and the Cold War is telling of this. It is erroneous to suggest that the USSR balanced with the US during the Second World War. It formulated its posture in stark contrast to the US because the situations facing them were very different. By the conclusion of the conflict Western Europe was strategically balancing with the US against potential Soviet aggression. On the other hand most of Eastern Europe bandwagoned with the USSR. The result of this difference was the emergence of a collective security system-or an offensive balancing arrangement with the US at its center versus a sudo-hegemonic alliance with the Soviets atop the power hierarchy.

its positions in Eastern Europe,<sup>108</sup> the Western European states allowed the Americans to keep naval, air and army installations within their borders.<sup>109</sup>

There were many benefits for the Europeans in actively seeking out the US to be their security guarantor. It gave them favor within the alliance and the new hierarchy of power. Favor that was void in the balance of power system of the interwar period where autarky was the most vital interest states pursued. They became eligible to receive significant aid from the US under the Marshall Plan to rebuild after the war. This plan promoted an interaction between the powerful US and less influential West Europeans. The economic security of these nations also became the responsibility of the US. With the economic rebuilding and defense responsibilities of the US the Europeans could divert their attention to other areas such as exports and high technology and they had the expansive, consumer oriented US market at their disposal. The West Europeans were free riding on the

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<sup>108</sup> Let us begin this case in 1952, when the popular revolts against the USSR's occupation first occurred in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland.

<sup>109</sup> We are referring to NATO countries that bandwagoned with the US after WWII. The reader may note our usage of this same case for our discussion of offensive bandwagoning. Once the offensive balancing posture of NATO became evident and the Soviets reacted by establishing the Warsaw Pact the postures of the Western powers changed. They saw that they would be more vulnerable to Soviet attack if the US did not provide assistance. As the threat from the USSR intensified Western Europe bandwagoned with the US.

hegemonic US, established with the blessings of these same Western states.

Bandwagoning is pursued with three important aims in mind: free-riding for economic benefits, free-riding for increased security by establishing a regional hegemon for that end, and finally gaining access and favor from the "wagon." This favor gives triparts power in their other foreign affairs as they "holds the ear" of the hegemon. It also increases the triparts wealth, or rather the potential to accumulate wealth because this hegemon must also be aggregately wealthier than its subordinates if it hopes to defend them.<sup>110</sup>

High, favorable certainty must be present for triparts to bandwagon with a conflicting state. Since the dyadic conflict is underway at the time of alignment a miscalculation of who to ally with could prove quite damaging as Rumania demonstrated WWII, the Jordanians in 1967 and the Cubans in 1961. Triparts must also feel a low sense of vulnerability. Unless the failure to align with a more powerful state sets it into panic over its security it would not feel the need to cede anything for



protection because it is stable and secure in its present situation. There are also high opportunities to ally. Triparts are not only allied to the dominant power they also have links to the other allied states. Their entrance into this alliance should not be opposed by other triparts and in the cases where it is; the dominant state has the final word. For instance the enduring rivalry between Greece and Turkey functionally ended with their entry into NATO because the US would not tolerate a conflict between member states

This posture reads that states, when presented by an exogenous threat seek to align itself with the state most able to and willing to provide it with security. This enhanced security further reduces the vulnerability of the tripart and further increasing an already favorably certain outcome of the dyadic conflict. This is because the dyadic state gains from having more war materials and territory at its disposal to conduct the conflict.

High favorable certainty, low vulnerability and high opportunities to ally are requisites for triparts to bandwagon. In a bandwagoning alliance the states

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<sup>110</sup> If the triparts sense that this power would not be able to defend them or lack the wealth to do so,

willingly cede part of their sovereignty to another state. In contrast to previous postures where polarity is high because of threats and bribes bandwagoning is the result of triparts employing their perceptive techniques and choose a state or alliance to defend its security. Polarity is low except from states with a preponderance of power. Polarity shifts in relation to this power as do bandwagoning triparts who are determined to let a larger power incur the costs of war while they gain the reduction of vulnerability, increased security, greater economic potentials and a taste for real uninhibited power in its relationships with other, exogenous states.


## **Jackaling**

The most unitary posture for discussion is jackaling. The term jackaling is taken to mean a state acting, as one would expect states in a pure anarchic system to behave. When the window of opportunity is open, the states of this posture act much like jackals in the wild do. In order for states to jackal they must perceive favorable certainty in the dyadic struggle. This certainty is most important on the effects it has on the

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they would not pursue a bandwagoning role.

tripart's vulnerability. Not only does the jackaling tripart need high favorable certainty to act it also needs to feel invulnerable. Because jackaling is a unitary posture the opportunity to ally is not essential as long as its vulnerability does not increase.



Take a struggle between a lion and a gazelle as an illustration. When a lion makes a kill it often has to fight off the jackals that approach to steal this kill away from it. Sometimes the jackal aims its attention at the target because it would offer no resistance and the initiator, weakened by the battle may not have the strength to keep its gain. At other times if the conflict initiator is very weak and its ability to defend itself from other actors is hindered it may become the target of multiple jackals that work independently together<sup>111</sup> and harness security gains at the expense of the exhausted dyad. A connection between opportunity and tripart

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<sup>111</sup> An oxymoron of terms, though a possibility in anarchy, for an actor, in promoting its own interests, may also be aiding and abetting others.

jackaling is apparent and quite important. However they are not synonymous, and must be further explored to understand the often-vague distinction.

Jackaling is the most pervasive form of opportunism. This is true by the definition of jackaling of attacking hostile territory for limited aims when the forces of the target are preoccupied with their current dyadic conflict. Jackaling is an action based posture because it entails the physical engagement of troops and the process of driving into enemy and sometimes-neutral territory.<sup>112</sup> Contrarily, inaction possesses characteristics of a non-event but may still be interpreted as a form of opportunism, opposite to jackaling. Take the 1970 Jordanian-Syrian conflict as a case in point. Israel did not jackal against either of its enemies during this conflict even though the window of opportunity was open to do so. Israel practiced defensive opportunism and did not carry out any operations. It did however mobilize some forces against Syria and in defense of Jordan. In doing so, the Israelis pacified the Jordanians from

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<sup>112</sup> Geography renders neutrality a fallacy. Instead, states that seem to be neutral still aid in the certainty/uncertainty of an outcome. Take the idea of threatened neutrality for example. Syria might well have been justified to occupy a "neutral" Jordan because the lack of a hostile border between Israel and Jordan would imply a redistribution of forces along the Israeli-Syrian border. This would be quite unfavorable to Syria.

further military action against it,<sup>113</sup> and deterrence through frustration illuminated the fragility of alliances in the Middle East and the vulnerability of the Syrian defenses. It is important to note here that no word or deed came from the Egyptians during this conflict. The conflict remained isolated. This seemed, at the time to reify the region because deterrence prevailed parallel with jackaling opportunities bred by the conflict.<sup>114</sup>

Jackaling is a form of opportunity, revealed as an action against a preoccupied opponent. Pure opportunity on the other hand is a general subject engulfing both jackaling and inaction. Tacit opportunism is employed more preventively while jackal opportunism is more preemptive.<sup>115</sup> A tripart would not interfere in a conflict where the potential gains and payoff's are high because the long-term outcomes of non-intervention are more favorable than the short-term intervening ones. Counterfactually, had Israel invaded a preoccupied Syria

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<sup>113</sup> This has a hint of irony because collective action is less likely when there are more states involved. In pacifying the Jordanians the Israelis actually increased the potential for successful collective action against it, as demonstrated during the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

<sup>114</sup> The opportunity for the Saudis or Iraqis to invade and jackal on Jordan was present, however the indirect Israeli involvement deterred these interventions.

<sup>115</sup> Tacit opportunism is an exercise of soft power and seeks to deter or pacify its opponent rather than engage it. Tacit opportunism aims to achieve long-term goals with the prevention of collective action. Jackaling is preemptive as action is employed to gain as much as possible in the shortest timeframe.

or Jordan the political repercussions would have further isolated Israel from the region. It would have ended the hostilities between Syria and Jordan and opened a window of opportunity for tripart intervention and jackaling against a preoccupied Israel, notably from the Egyptians who were still fighting their war of attrition.

Stepping back from the brief comparison between opportunity and jackaling, let us better define this action and its repercussions. Jackaling implies a lack of alliance affinity and cannot be mistaken with collective action.<sup>116</sup> The only affinity jackals have is to other triparts with similar or overlapping interests. This affinity is problematic. If the aims of two jackals are the same piece of territory a conflict between triparts may emerge. This is rare because jackals seek limited aims and attempt to win adjacent territory. Because jackals need high favorable certainty and low vulnerability to enter a conflict they are less likely to jeopardize this invulnerability by expanding the conflict to uncertain proportions. If they did we might propose

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<sup>116</sup> Confusion may arise when jackaling triparts enter a conflict that is subsequently decided by their intervention. It would appear that they have entered to aid one side in the dyad to realize its victory. However, the triparts enter for independent reasons of territorial gains and not in defense of a conflicting party. The triparts use the dyadic conflict to determine the victor and the certainty of outcome. Only then do they formulate their posture. Jackals may rhetorically invoke collective action to

that jackals would fight one another as was shown in the 1947-9 Middle Eastern War. The affinity of jackals to one another originates from the quest to jackal from the dyad as a means to acquire limited territory. The presence of other jackals increases the certainty of success for this posture because the dyadic states have many more fronts to protect than the source of their threat. Moreover, jackals do not fear a rising power if the aims of that state do not interfere with the sovereignty of this tripart.

Jackals never gamble for territory if certainty is low or indeterminate. In other words jackals require high certainty because they choose the state they attack through their own limited aims and not because they were forced to. If certainty is high and favorable for the initiator the jackal will not jeopardize its security by attacking that state. Contrarily, jackals assess the situation to determine the resolve and abilities of the dyad to gain from the weaker one to ensure higher certainty in its limited actions. Jackals are not confined or hindered by polarity. Jackals remain neutral until they perceive high certainty for the enhancement of

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manipulate a window of opportunity by allowing another state to commence hostilities against an

their security by means of extending their frontiers. They rely on the fluctuation of the system to achieve these aims.

In order to show the impact of this posture a brief case study is in order. The best case of tripart jackaling occurred in the first round of the Arab-Israeli conflict, 1947-9. This case presents two important qualities. First, it shows the conditions for jackaling. The parties involved had asymmetrical capabilities. For instance, Egypt, Jordan and Syria had established military and political leadership while Arab and Jewish Palestine were disorganized in both these areas. The triparts feasted on the weakest state, Palestine for limited aims. Second, this case illustrates what happens when the limited aims of jackals physically overlap. Once Jewish Palestine became Israel and was strengthened militarily and politically a race of sorts occurred between it and the other triparts for the remaining territories of Arab Palestine ensued. The much-quoted "Arab-Israeli conflict" began as a rush to secure limited aims from a defeated dyadic actor. Jordan entered Jerusalem and other West Bank cities, Egypt entered Gaza

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adversary granting the jackal the ability to gain from the dyadic conflict.



and Israel extended its frontiers in every direction and conquered the Negev Desert. These actions swallowed Arab Palestine before it was born according to the guidelines of the 1947 Partition Plan.

In contrast to many historic claims the 1948 conflict was not a concerted effort on the behalf of the Arab states to push the young Israeli State "to the sea." In fact the image of collective action is very misleading. Instead, several dyadic conflicts occurred spatially and temporally proximate. In keeping with this assumption the first round of combat between the Arabs states and Israel was something of a series of dyadic conflicts: Israel versus Egypt, Egypt versus the Palestinians of Gaza, Jordan versus Israel, Israel versus the Palestinians, and the Palestinians versus the Jordanians.

The details of the conflict correspond with the prescription of jackaling because certainty between each dyad was favorable to most parties with the exception of the Palestinians. The Israelis were certain of their victory over the Palestinians, as were the Egyptians and Jordanians. Also, the vulnerability of these three was

low while the Palestinian's was high. Of the five main actors of the 1948/9 war there is evidence to suggest that the Arab states lacked a cohesive policy and aims towards Palestine. They acted independently to achieve their own limited aims. The destruction of Jewish Palestine was not included in these aims. The ensuing war was directed more to the intra-Arab dispute over status and leadership in the larger Arab world. It is interesting that the concept of jackaling introduces an alternative explanation regarding the behaviors of the Arabs and Israelis one that encourages a more in-depth understanding of the events of this conflict.

To restate, there is evidence to suggest that the "main interest of...the...Arab countries was not the destruction of the new Jewish state."<sup>117</sup> I suppose that the more powerful parties involved Israel, Jordan, Egypt and to a lesser extent, Syria saw the military and political disarray of the Palestinians and jackaled the territory allotted to them in the 1947 Partition Plan. The Israelis and Palestinians constituted the dyad and the surrounding Arab states were the triparts that examined and tried to predict the conflict's outcome.

Once the Israelis began entering the territory allocated to the Palestinians the triparts acted as to enhance their security. This included military operations of limited aims like the Egyptian occupation of the Gaza Strip and the Jordanian annexation of the West Bank. "The final Egyptian decision to invade Palestine came only on May 13<sup>th</sup> 1948, and only after Shukri al-Kuatly, (the Syrian President) had informed King Farouq of Egypt that King Abd-Allah of Jordan had decided to enter and occupy Arab parts of Palestine."<sup>117</sup>

This shows that the conflict with Israel was not as important for the Arab states as increasing their territory was, a clear indication that jackaling had occurred. Further, the tripart Arab states on the periphery saw that both dyadic actors were relatively weak. They chose to dismember Arab Palestine because it received much less international assistance than Jewish Palestine in the military realm. As the certainty of an Israeli victory grew it helped the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian decisions to jackal against the Arab Palestinians. Only after the spring of 1948 did these triparts begin quarreling with Israel. The subsequent war

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<sup>117</sup> Evron, Pg. 16,

did not consist of jackals tearing apart a fragmented territory. It became a conflict over the distribution of spoils. According to Middle East expert Yair Evron, the Egyptians held a long-standing security aim of establishing a land bridge to the Eastern Arab states.<sup>119</sup> As the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians commenced, the Egyptians remained neutral until the conflict seemed a likely victory for the Israelis. The Egyptians felt that their national security would be diminished if the Israelis secured all Palestinian territory. This would have made it difficult for Egypt to achieve its "land-bridge" preference. Seeing that the Israelis had been weakened by their yearlong conflict the Egyptians entered to jackal Palestinian territory before the Israelis arrived. The same could be said for the other actors as well. The Jordanian desire to occupy Jerusalem, the Syrian aims of protecting its fisheries on Lake Tiberius and the headwaters of the Jordan river on which its agriculture is reliant and the Israeli design to occupy all of "ancient Israel" for security and religious reasons.<sup>120</sup>

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<sup>118</sup> Ibid, Pg. 17

<sup>119</sup> Ibid, Pg. 19,

<sup>120</sup> Ibid, Pg. 19-21,

Jackaling is a unitary posture. The case shows that even in an area where states share linguistic and cultural similarities jackaling occurs to reap security benefits when the opportunity to gain is high and to ally is low. An alliance between jackaling states is not shared action but overlapping aims. We can also see what happens when jackals disagree over the distribution of the spoils. At times however these overlapping aims diverts the target's attention more than one front increasing the probability of the jackals being successful. Certainty must be favorable and high, vulnerability must be low and the opportunity to ally is either low or not necessary to achieve the limited aims the tripartite sets out to achieve.

## **1.2 Unfavorable Certainty**


### **High Vulnerability:**

This section uncovers different ways for triparts to posture themselves once the dyadic conflict is certain but the outcome is unfavorable to them. When vulnerability is high and the opportunity to ally is low states tend to allow themselves to be forced into a bandwagoning alliance. When the opportunity the ally is high however, states tend practice a regular balancing posture. When the opportunity to ally is low the tripart feels that it's only recourse to survive rests in submitting to the source of its vulnerability. Alternatively, when the opportunity to ally is great triparts feel less vulnerable and choose to resist the source of vulnerability.

### **Forced Bandwagoning and Regular Balancing**

Regular balancing and forced bandwagoning are two distinct possibilities for state's facing similar situations. These two operate in conjunction with one another because they are two sides to the same coin.

Regular balancing and forced bandwagoning are both postures responding to the emergence of a threat. In the first case balancing is designed to deter the threat by bringing several states together. The tripart perceives high unfavorable certainty, high vulnerability but has a high opportunity to ally.




In the second case, forced bandwagoning is a practice embarked upon by the threat to deter tripartes from acting against it. The threat forces some tripartes to acquiesce. While balancing attempts to illustrate high costs for initiating an attack against the components of the alliance, forced bandwagoning is deterrence resonating from the threat itself. Powers seen as being a threat maintain the desire to pacify potential opponents laying geographically proximate and tend to force the peripheral powers to bandwagon with them,<sup>121</sup> lest they act

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<sup>121</sup> A failure to persuade even small states into an alliance could eventually lead to the demise of the state in question. Retaining hostile neighbors necessarily requires occupation, consummating in the diversion of important military resources to zones of little importance.

as a bridge for the threat's adversaries.<sup>122</sup> Yet this posture enjoys a duality of benefits for the triparts that are in proximate distance to the threat. These states may also adhere to a bandwagoning alliance to avoid the very military occupation that the threatening state has (subtly or explicitly) warned its neighbors of. Forced bandwagoning retains the same characteristics as its balancing counterpart. There is high unfavorable certainty and high vulnerability. However, for forced bandwagoning the opportunity to ally remains low. This explains why these triparts give in to the demands of the threat and do not offer resistance.



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<sup>122</sup> Both balancing and forced bandwagoning consist of several weaker states, those significantly less powerful than the contending state. But states cannot balance alone. It is the culmination of smaller states and the potential for pooling together a wide assortment of power that is designed to deter an enemy. If only one state is involved in deterring a regional adversary a regional balance of power system emerges, not a balancing one. On the other hand, forced bandwagoning assumes multiple state action (a trend not a rule). Those states geographically close to one or the other of the belligerents have their posture choices thrust on them for they do not have to means to determine it themselves. (This is the case only when the conflicting parties are great powers, though it seems that both of these sub-postures are taken only in great power struggles). It is on this note as well, where we may differentiate balancing from a balance of power. While the former requires multiple state actors, the latter may be comprised of a sole player, as we have seen in the Cold War with the US and USSR. For a further analysis as to this subject matter see; Susan B. Martin, "Balances of Power versus Balancing: A Conceptual Analysis," Published in the Christopher H. Brown Center for International Politics, University of Pennsylvania Working Paper Series, #99-02. In this work, Martin argues that balance of power is a systemic situation which arises from the preponderance of power within competing camps, while



States forced to bandwagon aim to keep their territorial integrity by giving in to the demands of a power. Also, by aiding the threatening state to achieve its goals the states forced to bandwagon must also contribute forces or provide other benefits to the source of danger. Here the triparts actually divert the attention away from them but keep themselves relevant for the pursuance of the threats aims. In contributing to the aims of another the triparts send forces on military adventures beyond the scope of their nation. This function further acts in a protective manner to the security of the acting tripart. We can deduce that the relationship between the triparts whom are being coerced into alignment and the source of this coercion is symbiotic in that a "tug-of-war" type of struggle does not emerge.<sup>123</sup> Instead, while the tripart might not have otherwise joined such an alliance now that the threat is present it is quite content to receive the benefits awarded to it by virtue of its passivity to the contender. Due to this arrangement triparts unwillingly accept the conditions of the alliance arrangement. The trade-off consists of bartering a guaranteed national

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balancing is a state action against the preponderance of power in a single entity.

<sup>123</sup> While the aims of a tripart does not mirror that of the larger power it has aligned with, its aims of security and benefit are enhanced as the power does not occupy the tripart. It guarantees the

existence and territorial integrity for its military and/or foreign policy posture decision-making abilities.

A prime example of this is Rumania's decision to bandwagoning with Nazi Germany during WWII. Had Rumania refused the demands made upon it by the Germans its fate would have probably mirrored Poland's dissection. Alternatively, if the Germans did not pay attention to their southeastern neighbor then Rumania would have been an ideal asset for any allied invasion especially one involving the USSR. Had Rumania offered resistance to the Germans and wished to maintain their independence, their abilities to do so would have been significantly hindered. Added to the above, the pre-war economic interdependence irreconcilably linked Rumania to Germany.

Rumania did not share in the dogmatic enterprise of the Nazi regime. It did not particularly wish for the demise of France, Britain or the other west European states. Still it did not have much trouble in deducing the security<sup>124</sup> and economic benefits it would gain in

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existence of the tripart by providing it with security from its enemy's occupation of it.

<sup>124</sup> Recall the Soviet and Bulgarian invasion of the Eastern most parts of Rumania on the eve of Operation Barbarossa.

submitting to German demands.<sup>125</sup> In fact Rumania remained an ally to Germany until their security needs could no longer be guaranteed, at which time they promptly altered their alliance arrangements. By that time the Germans had also lost the ability to coerce these states into formulating postures that gave Germany benefits. The defection of Rumania marks this portion of the posture as being rather important in the attempt to illustrate the underling message that state postures always reflect a state's pursuit for greater security. When Rumania saw the dismemberment first of Czechoslovakia and later Poland, topped with the Non-Aggression Treaty between the USSR and Germany it understood that it had to give in to the by demands made on them by Germany. If they refused, their security would be severely jeopardized and a costly invasion might have been forthcoming.<sup>126</sup> Rumania did not necessarily wish for the emergence of a new German dominated system. Instead they sought to keep the war away from their borders and protect the internal design of their state.

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<sup>125</sup> The prime security aim of Rumania was protection from the USSR, which was seen as having aggressive intentions. It was widely believed that the USSR wanted to carve out an extended frontier for itself. Jackaling would have accomplished this while the "Waterbirds" fought. Rumanian was in part laid claim to by the USSR because it held important economic and social attributes that the USSR thought would enhance its own security pursuits.

<sup>126</sup> This was especially made clear when it witnessed the appeasing reaction of Chamberlain in the Czechoslovakia episode ending in the Munich Accord and the slow reaction of Poland's western protectors to its dismemberment.

This is only half of the equation though. In order to fully understand the intricacies of forced bandwagoning we must also advance its theoretical linkages to certainty as it interplays with vulnerability and the opportunity to ally. Then we can determine which posture a state will adhere to.

Even states coerced or forced into a bandwagoning arrangement make a choice to do so. Alternative postures are always available, though the circumstances that surround the tripart's position often lead it to disregard these alternatives if the costs outweigh the benefits. For example, states may be threatened by fear of invasion into alignment. However, in the face of such threats the tripart in question may opt for resistance instead of submission as the Yugoslavs under General Tito did during WWII and the formative years of the Cold War.

If there are variants of the postures triparts adhere to in similar conditions, what are the influences that finally determine the initial posture<sup>127</sup>-or whether

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<sup>127</sup> Once the conflict expands or retracts or any number of unpredictable events unfold, such as technological advancements (i.e. nuclear weapons) or "n" party interventions the postures of triparts may also shift. Outcome certainty and its fluctuation have quite the same affect.

or not the state submits or resists? The answer rests in the states understanding of certainty, its own vulnerability and the opportunity to ally in relation to the conflict at hand. Not to mention the impact its involvement would have on "n" party actors. If its submission to one of the dyad states brings exogenous militaries opposed to that side to the border of the tripart, its vulnerability increases. If its involvement provokes Blainey's "Waterbird Dilemma" by increasing a tripart's vulnerability in proportion to its massing of forces in "other" zones of conflict it is unlikely a state would allow itself to be forced to bandwagon. If a tripart believes that the outcome of the dyadic conflict is uncertain it will attempt to remain neutral until the outcome becomes clearer. Even in cases where the danger of time looms heavy states will try to avoid making their fundamental posture arrangements until the conflict picture becomes more certain. All state action revolves along its security concerns. Because a state's posture sets it on a quest for the most efficient protector first and foremost of its integrity and then of gains which enhance its security we may ascertain that for forced bandwagoning the certainty of the dyadic conflict outcome is quite important. For states to adhere to this

submissive posture a high degree of unfavorable certainty must be evident. This notion also follows the reasoning that if a state threatens another and for this threat to be taken as a plausible rather than an idle one the tripart must be aware of the threat's abilities and resolve. These abilities include the variety set proposed in the certainty portion, from economic and political to military and ideological factors.

Drawing from these faucets triparts determine their posture based on the reality or the perception of a reality that unfolds.<sup>128</sup> In terms of forced bandwagoning, "target tripart's"<sup>129</sup> submission to a more powerful state the certainty levels of a favorable outcome for the supposed threat is essential. When a tripart is examining the ensuing dyadic conflict a favorable outcome or high chances for a favorable outcome by the state attempting

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<sup>128</sup> This is being reiterated to call attention to a central theme of this work. Postures are alterable and often shift in accordance with conflict developments. Of all the international relations theorists who discuss the issues of alignment and state postures none truly provides a workable framework where interested readership may grasp just how fluid conflict based postures are especially for the many triparts any given conflict includes. It is for this purpose that I have addressed this concern here. In order to understand this theory one must be able to distinguish between peacetime postures where the aims and objectives retain no pressing time constraints and conflict-based postures that are quite opposite in time considerations. Conflict based postures do not always develop out of a state's vital interests, save it's survival. They are frequently geared toward the lowest common denominator of a cost-benefit analysis, hence emphasizing national survival. While peacetime postures focus on the same issues as its wartime counterpart they nevertheless are not vital in the sense of their immediate ramifications. Conflict based postures never stagnate until the decisive battles have been fought. We must keep in mind that states alter their postures in relations to the shifting powers and certainty being derived from this fluctuation, the triparts sense of vulnerability, opportunity to ally and the remedy for such psychological ailments.

to coerce triparts to bandwagon must be apparent. If the outcome of the dyadic war were still undecided, no matter how much pressure is exerted on potential bandwagoners they would not submit until certainty becomes unfavorably high. The explanation behind this is quite straightforward. If the dyadic situation is uncertain in that either side may still prove victorious the combatants are unable to mount truly significant pressure for strategic union with any other state. If it redistributes even some of its forces to quell dissent from a tripart it simultaneously decreases its abilities to succeed in its current battle. Triparts thus weigh the abilities of the threatening state and try to remain neutral until it is impossible to do so which happens once the dyadic outcome has been determined.

A case in point as to this tenet of forced bandwagoning requires a brief examination of the WWII years, and more specifically, Rumanian's posture during those years. We have already decided that Rumania had become heavily reliant on Germany for the protection of its security and stability. It had traded its posture options for its independence and protection. Germany

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<sup>129</sup> The state being coerced into the alliance arrangement,

would decide on how Rumania would posture itself during the crises and engagements for the years in question. By threatening Rumania with a loss of security and ultimately a German invasion,<sup>130</sup> the Germans were able to force Rumania to bandwagon. This submission left the Rumanian armed forces at the disposal of the Reich.<sup>131</sup> Yet, as the outcome of the war against the USSR became less certain in terms of a favorable German outcome, the Rumanians began to inch away from the alliance. This was due to competing uncertainties. It grew uncertain that the Germans, with circumstances as they were,<sup>132</sup> would even be able to protect Rumania when the situation most required it. On the other hand, the certainty of a German victory over the USSR was reduced tremendously. This presented the Rumanians with the dilemma that its continued support for the German war aims could result in its occupation by an extremely hostile and determined Soviet enemy. The sobering prospects of Soviet occupation in the face of German inability's to defend Rumania led it first to defect from certain policies it had allowed

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<sup>130</sup> Rumania was considered of extreme geographic importance due to its oil fields and proximity to the USSR,

<sup>131</sup> Which we see later were employed along the northern frontier of the USSR during the second advance in the winter of 1943.

<sup>132</sup> The loss of Tunisia, massive counteroffensives by Soviet forces in the East, continued neutrality of Franco in Spain, the swelling of resistance movements across the European continent and the unprecedented bombing campaigns of the UK and US on German city and industrial centers, to name but a few.



the Reich to stipulate, such as its arms production and distribution. As the uncertainty continued to mount Rumania further withdrew from its pro-German posture. It recalled much of its forces engaged in conflict with the USSR. Those forces remaining behind began following their own directives. Politically this insubordination is a defective act from an alliance.

Finally, once the outcome certainty become clear and unfavorable to the Germans the Rumanians completely defected from the alliance leaving the Germans to face the allies alone. Essentially, the Rumanians saw that they could leave the alliance without fear of German reprisal except through propaganda. They also correctly perceived the fall of the Third Reich and tried to reconcile with the allies before their fate was sealed and all that they had worked for diplomatically amounted to more costs than benefits. Rumania reconciled in a bid to avoid sharing the fate of the Germans-complete occupation. It is true that after the defeat of Germany the Soviet Union occupied Rumania regardless of its alliance shift. However, its occupation was carried out against the desires of the majority of allied powers. It was a singular act perpetrated by the USSR and protested

by the Western allies. We must not assume that the post-war situation for Rumania was due to its inability to alter its posture in accordance to changing realities in WWII. It was due to the territorial claims and aspirations of the USSR at the end of the war.

In articulating such a case we must ask why a shift in posture occurs at all? We may suggest that competing theories such as Walt's work on the "Origins of Alliance," and Randall Schweller's article of "Bandwagoning for Profit," fail to offer a convincing explanations. For Walt, Rumania was bandwagoning from the beginning to the end of the war. But history has shown us that Rumania defected from its supposed bandwagoning alliance and joined the allies to combat the Germans in the final year of the war. Was Rumania balancing against the Germans at the end of the war when the certainty of the conflict's outcome became clear and quite favorable for the allies? Or, did they simple reassert a bandwagoning posture with the winning side depicting perpetual bandwagoning? The second option is much more plausible than the first. However, it still requires a deeper analysis because Rumania's shift in alliance choices from Germany to the victorious allies does not

fit into Walt's definition of bandwagoning. For starters it allegiance with Germany and later to the allies did not require the loss of Rumanian independence. Instead these alignments were meant to promote its independence. If we concede to Walt's paradigm and suppose that, "Balancing is alignment with the weaker side...and...bandwagoning with the stronger..."<sup>133</sup> then how can one explain Rumania's shift without assuming that the allies had become the source of danger, a prerequisite for bandwagoning?<sup>134</sup>

This is not the basis of our analysis though.<sup>135</sup> Instead I will try to provide an understanding of the reasons behind the alternation of Rumania's WWII posture. The allies could not be considered a wagon and Rumania must not be viewed as having bandwagoned. Its posture reflected the developments of the conflict between the USSR and the Germans and had little to do with the western allies. While the Rumanians were unaware of Soviet intentions to remain in Eastern Europe they

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<sup>133</sup> Walt, Pg. 21,

<sup>134</sup> We are certain that the allies were not balancing against a devastated Germany in 1943/4,

<sup>135</sup> To be fair, Schweller would argue that Rumania "piled on" at the end of the conflict as to undeservingly gain or free ride from those states that bled for victory. This is too easy an escape for the rather challenging question, which asks what the driving forces were that aided the Rumanians in formulating their new posture. Fortunately for this study Rumania gained nothing from its defection to the victorious side notwithstanding its occupation by the USSR following WWII and not as a phase of this conflict.

understood the power realities of the time. These realities stipulated the demise of the Nazi German entity and the emergence of the US and the USSR as the superpowers on the European continent. The other powers like Britain and France had been severely mauled in the six years of general war to be considered powerful relative to their American and Soviet counterparts. Logically, Rumania did not change its posture for the material gains the allies could provide. It tried to gain by allying with the West in an attempt to guarantee its security by siding with them while the window was open to do so. The Germans could no longer force the Rumanians to remain loyal to their cause and they no longer required the economic, political, or military assistance of the Germans because the Germans simply could not provide it.

Forced bandwagoning is a posture of choice, not based solely on coercion. It is a mixture of cost and benefit where the costs for not joining this type of alliance are usually higher than the benefits of inaction, neutrality and resistance. The tripart perceives an unfavorable outcome of the dyadic conflict has high vulnerability and low opportunities to ally. Triparts practicing this posture divert a conflict away

from its frontiers by submitting to the adversarial victor of the dyadic conflict. This submission is done to help the state survival because the need to occupy a complacent and vulnerable enemy is low.

Regular balancing on the other hand features many similarities and differences from its forced bandwagoning counterpart. Without restating this posture's introduction balancing is also a responsive posture to the emergence of "a significant threat."<sup>136</sup> It is also a forced action because it would never have taken place without the existence of a threat. The shared circumstances of facing a threat bring these states together. Their refusal to capitulate to the demands of this threat binds them to deterrence. Each unit in a balancing alliance is self-determining and does not cede its sovereignty to any other state. This posture is designed exclusively to deter a shared adversary. Because of this it is not considered an action-based alliance. Notice that during WWII neither the US nor the USSR participated in deterring the Germans before the commencement of hostilities in the West even though both

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<sup>136</sup> Walt, Pg. 17,

feared Hitler's actions.<sup>137</sup> Instead of immediately confronting Germany these states adopted different postures regarding the conflict. Both these states sought to gain more than balancing would allow.

Regular balancing is a collection of like-minded states that combine their energies (theoretically)<sup>138</sup> in a quest to deter threats to their common security. This is achieved through swaggering. The balancers display their capabilities and resource fungability to gain a global perceptive that equates to military abilities. Regular balancing tries to project to its enemies an unwavering resolve to take military action even though the states involved do not retain the capacity for a conflict. Regular balancing is therefore a posture of rhetoric and not action. For this reason a regular balancing arrangement fails if and when deterrence fails. Once deterrence becomes unattainable because it is disregarded by the "source of danger," the allies tend to polarize

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<sup>137</sup> Even Stalin, who signed the Non-Aggression Treaty in 1939, did so to prolong the involvement of the Soviet Union. He understood Hitler's European design well. After examining some material on Stalin's perception of the German threat it can be suggested that each Soviet action was designed to repel the Germans in the eventuality of their attack. Take the Soviet occupation of Poland in 1939, the strategic incursion of the Soviets into the Eastern portions of Rumania an area of extreme importance to the German military-industrial complex, and the complete annexation of the "northern tier," of the zone of war, namely Estonia. The Soviets also received large amounts of German military hardware, much of which was later utilized against their producers.

<sup>138</sup> The states of this unit "put up a concerted front" though there is little power behind it. They present the world with a common foreign policy and combined military determination but they do not have the

along different lines of allegiance. Some attempt to avoid the conflict by following a neutral posture. Others may practice a "if you can't beat 'em, join 'em," posture and choose to bandwagon. Some are forced to bandwagon while some choose resistance in its many forms.<sup>139</sup>

The ends of regular balancing are one of a possible two, either the aversion or commencement of hostilities. Since deterrence either succeeds or fails and because balancing is designed as a deterrent against an unfavorable conflict, the failure of one results in the failure of the other. When in 1940 the French, British, Norwegians, and Belgians formally declared their joint intentions of combating further German incursions into Europe there is no doubt that they were trying to persuade the Germans from initiating hostilities against any one of them. When push came to shove and Norway was attacked and invaded, illustrating a failure of deterrence, the allies were relatively slow to react. The

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time to truly coordinate one. As such, balancing is a guise that aims to prevent the "source of danger" from engaging, militarily any of the involved states.

<sup>139</sup> Balancing is not always a tripart posture but it always consists of triparts. While balancing states may come to represent one side in a conflicting dyad each state constitutes a tripart if hostilities have already broken out elsewhere. The attempted balancing arrangement of the Arab states during the 1956 conflict is a good example of this. Egypt had a tacit alliance with Syria and Jordan. The Israeli, British and French attacks against Egypt could be considered as attacks against the other Arab states. In this case the others must be triparts. The Israelis, French and British on one side and Egypt on the other constitute the dyad. We may suggest that states get together to deter in a reactionary manner after the threat has struck. The initial target must be considered part of the dyad and the balancers are

balancing states began to develop strategies on their own. The British contacted its colonies and dominions and began its preparations for war. The French launched an independent diplomatic effort in a last minute bid to reconcile with the Germans and avoid a war it was unprepared for. The Belgians pleaded with the Germans to respect its "neutrality" and even to act as the guarantor of this posture.<sup>140</sup> These "allies," having fooled themselves with their own rhapsody jointly deployed troops in northern France. What ensued was a disastrous folly and the allies forfeited an incredible amount of strategic and military wealth to the German onslaught. This outcome was due to the lack of a working joint military and strategic plan. The near catastrophe or "Miracle" of Dunkirk was the result of the swaggering balancing posture these allies embarked upon or rather the failure of it. On a retrospective note, the German divisions responsible for the blitzkrieg in the west were nothing short of "a German military screen..."<sup>141</sup> in the days following the invasion of Poland.

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the tripart.

<sup>140</sup> Belgium's neutrality was in fact respected in terms of the German non-oppressive policies and the kept promise not to employ military force within the territory of Belgium.

<sup>141</sup> Shrier, Pg. 635,



In contrast to forced bandwagoning, regular balancing maintains quite a unique principle as to the type provocation required for states to adopt this posture. Firstly and incidentally in agreement with Walt, balancing occurs when the contender state is perceived as being aggressive in its pursuits. Secondly and collaborating with the former stands the issue of certainty. Contrary to forced bandwagoning, regular balancing is the result of a high degree of vulnerability attached to high levels of unfavorable certainty with the ability to ally. The states embarking on a balancing alliance weigh the costs and benefits of submission and adherence to the contender with the unfavorably certain prospects of defiance. When presented by "a significant threat"<sup>142</sup> these states choose to defy the contender rather than submit to it. Although certainty is unfavorable and high these states prefer to challenge the source of their danger instead of opting for submission.

Why do some states adhere to the demands made upon them by the contender while others attempt to balance against it? The answer to this rests on the strategic concerns of the tripart. The abilities of the individual

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<sup>142</sup> Walt, Pg. 17,

states to mobilize their nation and the allies it has during the conflict. That is to say, states not relying on a new contender for their security in the economic or political realms less often adhere to the demands of this entity even though their security is jeopardized by its emergence. Furthermore, states, which are geographically less vulnerable to the source of danger, tend to see its conquest as being untenable, and may underestimate the resolve of the dangerous state. Additionally, if a state has the logistic and mobilization abilities to conduct a formidable defense of its national frontiers and vital interests it may believe that it can afford to gamble on low certainty.

No variable is more important for this posture than the opportunity to ally. This is because the vulnerability and certainty of this posture is the same as in the forced bandwagoning posture. The opportunity to ally decides on whether a tripart will submit or resist. When allies are plentiful a tripart feels less vulnerable. When allies are few then in order for a state to survive it may need to submit to the contender.

Regarding the above paragraph let us add some of the findings from Gartner and Siverson's "War Expansion and Outcomes." They state that, "...the probability of victory...represents a systematic element on which initiators base their selection of wars to start."<sup>143</sup> In other words, the probability/certainty of victory leads a contender to decide if and where to attack. States that are vulnerable are considered easy targets. However, those states belonging to a collective system of deterrence in a pre-conflict alliance are perceived by a potential initiator to be more secure and less vulnerable. In this case initiating a conflict may not be a suitable response unless the power and abilities of the contender outweigh that of the deterring alliance. In this instance triparts affect the potential for successful deterrence against a contending state even though their members are reliant on the levels of certainty and vulnerability perceived by triparts and "n" party actors.

When vulnerability is low and opportunity is low states will practice offensive balancing. When

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<sup>143</sup> Gartner and Siverson, Pg. 7,


vulnerability is low and opportunity high states will act in an SCA.

### **Low Vulnerability:**

It is interesting to note the difference vulnerability makes to triparts facing an unfavorably certain outcome. In the first case we saw resistance and capitulation as available options. Turning now to low vulnerability we are confronted with two collective minded postures even though in one case the opportunity to ally is low. Successful collective action occurs when the opportunity to ally is great, while offensive balancing occurs when this opportunity is low.

### **SCA Successful Collective Action**

This posture is the result of unfavorable certainty, low vulnerability and high opportunities to ally.



The most complete definition of this posture incorporates its rationale and the envisioned goals. I provide an explanation for how this alliance stays unified even in the face of a threat greater in power. Successful collective action occurs when several states act within a united and agreed upon agenda. This type of collectivity is not necessarily designed for deterrence. It is an action-based alignment where states act in unison towards agreed upon and articulated aims. Allied states do not cede sovereignty or power to any other aligned state even to those proportionately stronger. This alliance is formed out of necessity not for its own sake and the states in this collective may or may not have been allies in previous situations. A successful collective action alliance is usually temporary and designed to deal with the dyadic conflict and its immediate repercussions.

Successful collective action is the product of dyadic conflict unfavorable certainty for tripartite if they remain non-aligned. When this type of unit is formed it may be considered a single body as the states involved share a commonality of purpose. While it may be argued

that the aims of this type of posture fluctuate greatly in different circumstances an SCA type of alliance is developed for two main reasons, for a multi-front conflict and/or for collective jackaling-while other powers are preoccupied in other conflicts. As a rule, the more states involved in this alliance the more likely it is to fail in its ability to act collectively.<sup>144</sup>

There is a mechanism that helps bind states together for collective action: threats and bribes. Some states threaten others with defection from the alliance. This defection would lead to the collapse of the alliance because it would allow an enemy's troops to be redirected to the other states decreasing the ability to succeed. This threat increases the potential defector's influence in the alliance because its solidarity becomes a paramount interest to the others. Threats lead the other states to bribe potential defectors with the promise of large gains at low costs or as I have coined, consensual-free-riding.<sup>145</sup> In this situation the potential defector may ride on the successes of its counterparts while

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<sup>144</sup> When too many states ally and wish to achieve a common aim the opposite is likely to happen. Too many states would free ride (without the consent of the others) and hope to gain without sacrifice.

<sup>145</sup> Free-riding with permission from the other allies,

fulfilling only a minimal criterion, such as diplomatic pressures or low cost military actions.<sup>146</sup>

In an SCA arrangement there is no pooling of resources and each state retains its full independence. The distinction here is that these states have decided on a collective aim and work together to achieve it.<sup>147</sup> A case in point of an SCA arrangement is the 1973 Yom Kippur war in the Middle East. We may define the dyad as being Egypt and Israel and the third party as Syria.

In this case the number of states involved, two, aided in fostering the success of the action.<sup>148</sup> Therefore, while the Israelis were largely unprepared for a conflict with even one state the calmative operations by both Syria and Egypt greatly tilted the balance of power in the region against the Israelis. Because of the victories and occupation of strategic lands the 1967 War produced for Israel, Egypt and Syria both felt an increased level of vulnerability. By weighing potential outcomes Syria and Egypt saw that independent action

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<sup>146</sup> Enough to keep enemies occupied and the alliance together,

<sup>147</sup> Certainty is enhanced by states working together. If they attempted to achieve their aims independently the ability to do would be lower than if they work as a collective.

<sup>148</sup> When there were three in the 1967 bout collective action failed because each state buckpassed defensive responsibility,

against Israel would result in high unfavorable certainty. However, they had a high opportunity to ally and coordinate an attack. This alliance tilted the balance of power against the Israelis even further.

The earliest phases of the conflict found the Syrians and Egyptians within reach of their collective goals of recapturing lost territory.<sup>149</sup> Syria and Egypt orchestrated an attack against Israel simultaneously on two fronts reducing the certainty of an Israeli victory. This case shows a method for tripart intervention one that affects the outcome of a dyadic conflict. Whereas Egypt and Israel were locked in a war of attrition from 1969-1971 ending in a draw it seems logical that the dyad would have remained these states. However, Syria acting as a tripart entered into a SCA alliance with Egypt and was able to aid in deciding the outcome of the conflict, which would have remained dyadic without its involvement.

In another context, the presence of a SCA unit on the peripheral of an exogenous conflict reduces the vulnerability of the tripart because it contains the combined power of its members. Yet this is not an



alliance of collective defense because its aims usually imply territorial gains for increasing the security of the individual members. The presence of this type of alliance on the sidelines of a dyadic war forces the combatants to end their hostilities as soon as possible. A continued conflict could result in the SCA jackaling from one, the other or both conflict-committed states.

An SCA retains an advantage in its non-involvement and the non-weariness of its forces because in this case it has not yet engaged an enemy. It has wide power base, or the aggregate power of the sum total of its units and its fluctuating mandate between offensive and defensive aims produces much uncertainty and high vulnerability. As such, this alignment has the ability to isolate a conflict and prevent contagion as much as it has the ability to extend the conflict through its intervention.


## **Offensive Balancing**

When the opportunity to ally is low offensive balancing occurs. The term balancing usually has connotations of high abilities to ally. I dispute this

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<sup>149</sup>Those territories lost during the 1967 conflict.

inasmuch as these balancers have few allies that can be counted on. There is still the opportunity to ally but proportionately fewer opportunities than other postures where opportunity is greater. Even though this posture has been practiced many times in history it has remained largely unarticulated and under-theorized. It consists of states perceiving high unfavorable certainty in the dyadic conflict. Low vulnerability at present with the expectation that vulnerability will increase is a central theme. These triparts also have a lower opportunity to ally.



This posture is not reliant on a present threat for the actualization of its aims neither does it assume a reactionary practice. It uses both deterrence and compellence as its tools not only for a clear and present danger but also for a non-existent threat. Offensive balancing is meant to "beat" its anticipated enemy to the

"punch."<sup>150</sup> States of this posture build a framework of collective security and act preemptively against potential threats by employing deterrence, though not hesitating to use force and compellence as the situation requires. The definition of this posture holds that the triparts involved pool their resources together in the same manner as defensive balancers but for long (er) periods of time. This alliance does not act on an ad hoc basis it acts on anticipation of the rise of and to preempt a threat. Offensive balancing seeks several aims like the diminishment of extra-systemic power-transitions without their consent or balancing opportunity to act as a check to other budding powers.

The crux of this posture is the promotion of survival by reducing the vulnerability of each member state in relation to their adversaries. Additionally, this alliance aims to preemptively protect the power hierarchy. This alliance maintains a dominant position because they organized themselves faster than their adversary. They preempt an adversary to maintain this position. Essentially, this unit becomes an umbrella type of organizational hegemony. The combined power of the

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<sup>150</sup> Achieve its aims before its adversary poses a significant threat,

component states outmatches potential adversaries providing a deterrent with the ability and will to remain intact after deterrence failure. Even to the point of the employment of force in an attempt to keep power and their steadfast balancing position against any power that could rise as a challenger. Therefore, the aims of this posture are (sub) systemic empowerment in a framework of collective security and to decrease the vulnerability of each member state while producing favorable certainty in a dyadic contest.

It must be pointed out that this is a very difficult alliance to enter into, if not for want or luck. This type of posture is reserved for geographically proximate state because the source of danger must also be proximate in order to encourage such an alliance. The limit of ally's stems from this criterion. Also, there are high entrance costs and other states may be reluctant to allow other triparts to join. This is because of a hybrid theory based on Robert Jervis's security dilemma. If states always gain and lose relative to one another then the accumulation of allies at the expense of their neutrality and of an equal-gains scenario must produce a threshold of the patience of the adversary. If within a

system an overwhelming number of states join an offensive balancing alliance the chances for conflict increase drastically. This is because the state for which the alliance had been established would attempt to prevent a conflict where it is greatly disadvantaged and would perpetuate a preventive war. Or, if the conflict is ensuing and triparts are gravitating to one state as allies each of them becomes potential targets. Once conflict expansion begins it results in increased uncertainty, increased vulnerability and further tripart intervention. In this case triparts affect the resolve for war and of war expansion beyond the original scope by merely entering an alliance of this proportion.

The Cold War and the establishment of NATO are quite illustrative of this. What began as a misunderstanding between the US and USSR in 1946 regarding the future of Europe (East and West-though specifically Germany and Czechoslovakia), blew into the 50 year long "Cold War," threatened international security until 1990-1.<sup>151</sup> This conflict is a good example of the offensive balancing

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<sup>151</sup> Although there was scarcely a bullet fired between the two superpower belligerents over the course of the entire conflict, it holds importance for the proxy conflicts fought and the international-systemic implications of the conflictual climate.

posture in that the conflict between the US and USSR developed into a NATO-USSR conflict.

Only after the establishment of the offensive balancing alliance NATO, did the Soviets develop the Warsaw Pact. The Warsaw Pact was an overtly defensive balancing system designed to persuade NATO countries from initiating a conflict with the USSR based on assumptions of Soviet revisionism. The commitment of NATO to the European Theater meant that exogenous forces had increased opportunities to gain from NATO states in other parts of the world. Take the 1956 Suez/Sinai conflict for example. Both Britain and France lost their last strategic foothold in the Middle East due to the bipolarity of the international system and their collective fear of Soviet conflict initiation. Because of reduced forces in the Middle East by these two powers to further deter the Soviets in Europe, Egypt saw a window of opportunity to nationalize the Suez Canal and expel the Europeans from the region.

Offensive balancing may also aid in explaining the Falkland War, The Algerian Secessionist Conflict, and the rationale behind the Polish, Czechoslovakian, and

Hungarian revolutions in 1955 and 1956 respectively, and Prague Spring in 1968. While Soviet forces were engaged in a prospective conflict with NATO triparts from within the sphere of Soviet influence sought to gain believing that the larger power to the East was too preoccupied to act.

When states are engaged in either a defensive or offensive balancing unit the temptation of peripheral triparts to act and enhance their security position is great. When conflict situations have expanded because of the intervention of triparts in their formation of an offensive balancing alliance two conclusions may be drawn; the promotion of conflict cessation or the encouragement of conflict expansion. The precise outcome is determined by the levels of certainty, vulnerability and opportunity the triparts perceive for the formulation of their postures. When certainty is low and the state practices offensive balancing as a means to provide "safety in numbers" then the outcome is surely conflict expansion for other triparts seek to gain at the expense of that state in need of exogenous protection from an ensuing war. This is because certainty also affects the distribution of forces. States that perceive a threat

from the initial source of danger tend to mobilize their collective security resources to thwarting that danger.<sup>152</sup> This opens up other fronts to attack for its forces are preoccupied with the conflict at hand.

Although the outcome of the Franco-Italian War in 1940 favored the French it is still a good illustration of this idea. Notably, France and Britain contributed much of their armored forces to the Belgium front in a collective manner to protect themselves from the coming conflict with Germany. In doing so after the initial German attack on France proper, the Italians moved into the southern sectors of the country opening a second front and in a mild manner, increased the ability of Germany to wholly occupy France.<sup>153</sup> As such, it was the perceived unfavorable certainty of combined British and French losses that encouraged conflict expansion by way of the Italian attempts to wrestle away parts of southern France, or in the words of Geoffrey Blainey, "while the

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<sup>152</sup> The initiator or potential initiator,

<sup>153</sup> It may be argued after rationalizing some valuable information as provided by William L. Shrier in his work, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich that although France and Britain acted once a threat in the system was present, they did not have enough reliable information to believe that an attack against them was imminent even with the attacks on Norway. Thus, they acted to preserve the hierarchy of power in the system which held them to be on the pedestal, hence their postures shifted, upon the collapse of a normal balancing system from a purely deterrent minded posture to one of action. That action took the form of offensive balancing, a posture which came to late to matter, as history has shown, but a posture that must be illustrated in order to illuminate state actions, particularly in the face of danger.



Waterbirds fought." When states are uncertain their vulnerability is higher and they try to stay neutral.<sup>154</sup> This neutrality is not always possible though and it can promote other triparts to intervene in what seems to be low cost gains. When states feel very vulnerable and the certainty is mounted against a positive outcome states tend to act more collectively, granted the opportunity to ally is high.

Contrarily, when certainty is high in favor of an offensive balancing alliance the opposite is true. Potential war expansion results in war containment. Counterfactually, had the British and French allowed for more time<sup>155</sup> by acting in an offensive balancing manner much before the conflict reached the West by formulating their joint postures once hostilities began in Poland the outcome of the outcome of the second world war would have been much different. Certainty of a western loss would have been diminished because they would have retained a unified posture. A posture that would have meant more supportive divisions on the front with Germany and a less defeatist oriented military command.<sup>156</sup> This would have

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<sup>154</sup> Then if certainty was high,

<sup>155</sup> Or had this time been granted by circumstances facing the Germans,

<sup>156</sup> According to Shrier the allies outnumbered the Germans at the outbreak of hostilities, though they

deterred Italy from attacking France, as Italy needed high victory certainty to entertain notions of intervention. While the certainty of defeat decreases so does the vulnerability of states.

It is on this last point where this theory of tripart interventions must clarify the variants of possible outcomes and then serve to identify the conditions needed for these variants to actualize into an outcome. When certainty is high and there are two outcome possibilities, victory or defeat within the dyad, triparts behave to secure themselves from the increased vulnerability siding with a vanquished state may produce. This may entail the alteration of its previous posture to reduce the chances that the victory of an adversary over its conflict partner does not equate to the triparts defeat as well. Take the swift posture alteration of Jordan after it became evident that the certainty of the Coalition's victory over Iraq was unfavorably high during the 1990/91 Persian Gulf War.

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lacked the coordination to employ these forces usefully in the zone of war.

### **1.3 Uncertainty**


#### **High Vulnerability:**

I have already mentioned the impact of uncertainty on triparts facing a dyadic conflict. Various neutrality postures are practiced until the outcome becomes clearer in favor of one or the other. Neutral postures are meant as a preventive step to deciding a triparts role in the ensuing conflict. When uncertainty plagues a dyadic conflict and the tripart has high vulnerability its posture options are reflected in its abilities to find allies before the conflict outcome becomes apparent. In cases of low opportunity triparts allow themselves to be forced into neutrality. This is termed high neutrality. When the opportunity to ally is great triparts practice allied neutrality.

#### **Allied Neutrality**

Allied neutrality is perhaps the subtlest neutral posture on the continuum. It occurs when a state or alliance tries to keep an ally from entering a conflict. The outcome uncertainty of this conflict is not enough to

deter a tripart's involvement. It needs to be offered compensation by it allies who do not want its involvement because it feels that it is highly vulnerable to attack. However, the nature and multitude of its allies help to reduce its vulnerability. Allied neutrality is the result of an uncertain outcome for the dyadic war, high vulnerability and the high opportunity to ally.



In many conflicts it is beneficial for the combatants to limit participants if conflict contagion occurs. When a state is persuaded to be neutral by allies however threats are not often used. Instead a dyadic state or alliance bribes its ally to prevent it from acting. If threats are used they usually consist of economic factors and never military action. This posture is practiced by a state explicitly aligned to the source of its persuasion.

The desire to confine the conflict is based on a collective security agenda. The intervention of this

particular tripart may further jeopardize the outcome of the conflict. By persuading a state into neutrality the persuader is forfeiting valuable military resources. In cases of persuaded neutrality the cohesion of the alliance is more important than the benefits each member contributes. This leads us to believe that conflicts where allied neutrality occurs have characteristically determined outcomes. In other words even if uncertainty were high for both dyadic states the intervention of some triparts would increase this uncertainty or create unfavorable certainty for the persuader. If this were not the case the tripart would defy the persuader without fear of military action against it because these states are allied. When a tripart threatens the stability of an alliance its ally is part of then this ally will try to persuade the tripart not to intervene.

What are the reasons for a state to persuade an ally into neutrality? To answer this question we must explain another item that helps develop and understand this allied neutrality. The state employing persuasion tactics and the tripart on the receiving end of these tactics are not geographically continuous. This sheds some light on allied neutrality because allies sharing a border where

the threat and/or conflict directly affect both are more apt to develop joint strategies. When the threat affects two states in the same manner it is very difficult to persuade one not to intervene especially if its national security is concerned.<sup>157</sup> We may deduce that the context for this posture stems from one of two options.

The first is that the persuader is not geographically proximate to the tripart it is attempting to pacify. Because they are allied the ability to persuade a tripart rests largely on the security concerns of this state. If the threat is one the tripart feels is more formidable than its ally is it will disregard the persuasion. If its security needs are met the opposite occurs and the tripart accepts the persuasion. Secondly, one or many states within an alliance may try to persuade another state from entering the conflict. The former is important because the pacification of a tripart reduces the chances for unfavorable outcomes such as war expansion through jackaling. The later is important because it holds the alliance together, and with this cohesion certainty may become high and favorable.

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<sup>157</sup> To qualify, even the threat of bombing from an adversary does not retain the same psychological

The former aspect of geographic separation is best represented in the Sinai War of 1956.<sup>158</sup> After the initiation of the war by the Israeli incursion into the Sinai<sup>159</sup> and the subsequent bombing and paratroop landings along the Suez Canal by British and French forces Syria and Jordan made contact with the Egyptians. They stressed their commitment to aid the Egyptians and informed them of the soon-to-commence mobilization of their armed forces to attack the Israelis while they were occupied in the Sinai desert. The Egyptians rejected this pledge and it sought to pacify Jordan and Syria before their intervention led to further war expansion, which would have reduced the opportunity for Egypt to secure a favorable outcome.<sup>160</sup>

To be sure, Egypt lost the military aspect of the conflict but without question won the diplomatic war. This equated to a military loss for the Israelis British and French who withdrew their forces to the pre-conflict

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costs as a shared border between allies and adversaries does.

<sup>158</sup> For further reading as to the significance of the Sinai War, see: Jacob Tsur, Prelude a Suez: Journal d'une ambassade, 1953-56,

<sup>159</sup> While the casus belli was the barring of Israeli shipping vessels from the usage of the international waterway of the Red Sea, imposed by the Egyptian blockade, the commencement of hostilities falls on the shoulders of this triad.

<sup>160</sup> The US, USSR, and many other states (specifically in the UN), pledged to diplomatically pressure the triad into returning to the territorial status quo of September 1956.

demarcation lines as demanded by the larger international community.

Counterfactually, if the Syrians and Jordanians had conducted military operations against Israel the British and French would have intervened in defense of Israel because of their military pact. The distribution of their Mediterranean forces would have made the attainment of their aims an easy venture from the military perspective. Taking this a step further, because France and Britain were bound to the US by treaty and NATO the further expansion of the conflict would have brought the Super Powers closer to the brink of conflict. This would have pushed the Egyptian issue down the priority list, a possibility the Egyptians adamantly fought to avoid.

The Egyptians persuaded the Syrians and Jordanians to remain pacific. This neutralization increased Egyptian sympathy abroad especially among the non-aligned movement as it isolated the conflict to the initiators and itself the "target." Under these circumstances there is no doubt that Egypt would walk away the victors for standing up to



"the imperialist powers"<sup>161</sup> and prevented further conflict escalation. Egypt understood that if Syria and Jordan opened a second and third front against Israel it would not be able to aid them even if the situation warranted it. Additionally, Israel would receive much international sympathy if the war expanded and its vulnerabilities were on display.<sup>162</sup>

As to the latter portion of allied neutrality of states being persuaded not to enter the conflict by an alliance some interesting conclusions can be drawn. In persuading a tripart into neutrality the alliance aims to keep the alliance cohesive. If they allow this tripart to act and militarily participate in the conflict, the ability to keep a cohesive alliance becomes impaired. As we have learnt in collective action the more participants involved, the greater the diminishment of certainty because the chance of damaging defection increases. The involvement of this tripart may advance the disintegration of an alliance particularly if some alliance members are not comfortable with its presence. This discomfort may come from "n" party actors that may

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<sup>161</sup> Paraphrasing Evron, Pg. 45-46,

<sup>162</sup> This could have led to Israel's retention of the Sinai because pressure would have fallen elsewhere. Such a conflict would have looked like a concerted effort on behalf of the Arab counties to dismantle

be encouraged to act against the tripart if its forces have been diverted or due to political differences between the alliance members and the tripart. Not only does this posture pacify some states, aim to prevent further war expansion and strengthen the abilities of an alliance it also gives the tripart unearned security. If a state is persuaded by an ally to stay neutral in the face of danger the persuasion must come in the form of a security guarantee so the vulnerability of the tripart does not lead it to disregard the source of persuasion and enter the conflict anyway.

A case in point is that of the US as a member of the Gulf War Coalition and its persuasion of Israel to remain neutral under attack from Iraqi Scud Missiles. The majority of states in this alliance would have defected if Israel were to become a member. Instead Israel was given formal security guarantees by the US.<sup>163</sup> The certainty of the coalition's victory became high once it was made public that Israel would not enter the conflict. Also, the situation did not demand Israeli involvement. Independent Israeli action would have fractured the

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the eight-year-old Israeli state.

<sup>163</sup> Politically and in the placement of Patriot Missile batteries (manned jointly by American and Israeli soldiers) as a countermeasure to the Scud missiles,


coalition because it would have been very domestically unpopular in the Arab states, which were told of Israeli neutrality as a prerequisite for alignment with the western powers against Iraq. The US tactic to keep Israel out of the war was of paramount concern. It proved to be successful. The alliance remained cohesive and defeated Iraq, Israel retained its neutrality for the reasons provided above and the conflict did not escalate beyond its intended scope. The achievement of these aims rested on the levels of certainty, vulnerability and the opportunity to ally that plagued Israeli perception mechanisms.

A tripart adhering to allied persuasion does so only as its vulnerability decreases because of its protectorate and the availability of other allies. This tripart does not simply let others fight its battles it participates politically on the behalf of its allies and gains security through free riding. It also gains politically by showing restraint and receives much sympathy for any action conducted against it.

## High Neutrality

High or forced neutrality much like the other forms of neutrality gives the impression of inaction. However, even inaction has its costs and benefits in the context of an anarchic international system. Unlike forced bandwagoning that force triparties to enter a conflict this posture is more-or-less a bluffing alternative. A conflictual belligerent locked in a dyadic war seeks to push this posture on some of the more sensitive nations within its geographic proximity. The tripart allows itself to remain on the sidelines of the ensuing conflict even though its sympathies lie with the "other contending state." An adversary demands the neutrality of a tripart and has threatened military action if its demands are not heeded. We may deduce that high neutrality is initiated by the belligerents and practiced on weaker states that are of strategic importance. If a tripart is defensively powerful and retains the potential for increased capabilities their entry could alter the present, more favorable position of the contending state hence this

contender tries to neutralize it.<sup>164</sup> A state practicing this posture still believes that the outcome of the dyadic conflict is uncertain. It allows itself to be forced into neutrality because it is highly vulnerable and has low opportunities to ally.



Dyadic states try to neutralize tripartits they can not force to bandwagon and/or those relatively immune to occupation because of the associated costs. The neutralization of these "sensitive states" helps confine the conflict to the dyad. Several assumptions may be drawn regarding this. Firstly, in failing to curb contagion the states responsible for the dyadic conflict may create the environment for their own defeat.<sup>165</sup> The US in WWII illustrates this point quite clearly. If the Japanese did not bombed Pearl Harbor spurring the and if

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<sup>164</sup> Let us note for the record that this threat and posturing cycle is practiced by adversaries and never allies,

<sup>165</sup> Paraphrasing Geoffrey Blainey in "While Waterbirds Fight," we may share his conclusion that if two states locked in battle do not provide the scope of conflict by coercing some states to join and others to remain neutral, it is possible that a stronger state, who previously had no inclination to wage war, steps forth onto the conflict stage and steals the fish while the others are preoccupied in the quest for victory to notice.

they did not threaten US interests in the South Pacific the US would not have been committed to the conflict. They would not have been able to establish a justification for hostility and would have continued to remain neutral. It may be assumed that the inability of the Axis powers to keep the US neutral (by one tactic or another) eventually led to its complete commitment to the war effort. The commitment of the US was not as much on the "side of the allies" but rather for its own strategic interests. The US resolve proved disastrous to both Japan and Germany.

However, the inability of the "allies" to curb the level of US involvement in the war eventually led them to lose significant strategic possessions and influences at the hands of their American ally. The European allies became second rate powers while the US rose to dominate global affairs and security until this very day by securing itself a foothold on the European continent; a direct result of their war effort.<sup>166</sup> So, from the perspective of the dyadic states it is better to

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<sup>166</sup> The US was considered by the Europeans to be an uncommitted and isolationist state that did not care to involve itself in another European war. In fact, Hitler believed that Germany could defeat the US after it had secured the European Theater, a miscalculation that brought the collapse of the Third Reich.

neutralize some potential combatants because the entry of these states could cause their defeat.

Secondly, since triparts interact with other states it may be suggested that by failing to keep some states from engaging in combat, the dyadic states may allow their alliances to be undermined. The German-Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty again is very illustrative of this. Had the Germans attempted to force Soviet neutrality instead of encouraging their entry into the war against Poland, the possibility of later Soviet aggressions against Finland and Estonia would have been greatly reduced.<sup>14</sup> Both cases of Soviet aggression illustrate the fragility of the Axis alliance system. The former issue deserves more attention to clarify this posture. The strongest ally Germany, Italy, balked at the treaty. Throughout most of the conflict years Mussolini was content on the character of Italian-German relations. Even after his own global reverence was replaced by Hitler's Mussolini did not speak or act against Germany. Yet upon the commencement of hostilities between the Soviet Union and Finland, Mussolini's support wavered and he delivered the most bombastic letter ever sent to the German dictator.

He demanded the nullification of the agreement and charged Hitler with supporting a "Bolshevik invasion of Europe." Furthermore, the Soviet-Finnish conflict coincided with the "Strietzkrieg"<sup>168</sup> in the west. The Italians held out. They did not conform to the vision of attack as presented by the German generals.<sup>169</sup> No matter how modest an example, this shows the possibilities of alliance fracturization because of the failure to neutralize some states in geographic proximity to the conflicting dyad.

In successful high neutrality the tripart adheres to the demands made upon it. It perceives that uncertainty characterizes the dyadic conflict and its vulnerability is high. Also, its ability to defend itself is uncertain of the threat chooses this tripart as a target. The tripart makes the decision to remain neutral. It gives in to the threatening state's demands because it prefers its

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<sup>167</sup> Both of these states were undeclared allies of the Germans, the Finns because of their "Volksdeutsche" heritage and the Estonians for strategic benefits.

<sup>168</sup> This term is meant as a pun to the French war effort. Its literal translation is something of a "sit-down-war" where France, the supposed military power in Europe, hunkered down in concrete structures in a bid to avoid fighting. So, Strietzkrieg is the German term for the initial conflict in the West. See: Shrier, Pg. 633, Also, for a deeper analysis as to the Finnish-Soviet war, see Pg. 680-687 and 710/11,

<sup>169</sup> This was in fact due to many variables, one of which, as articulated by Count Galeazzo Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister at the time, was the infamous, Non-Aggression Treaty. For further readings see: "The Nazi-Soviet Pact," and "The Launching of WWII," in, William L. Shrier's work, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, Pg. 513-544 and Pg. 597-601,



own inaction than risk its security by confronting a formidable militarized state.<sup>170</sup>

For forced neutral triparts uncertainty is high. Vulnerability is also very high because the dyadic war remains undecided and there are no allies available. The most important aim of these neutral states is the protection of its security. This is attained through appeasement and the aversion of a militarized conflict. It is unnecessary for the dyadic states to attack or occupy a tripart that has already ceded its sovereignty by submitting to the demands of another state, abstained from initiating militarily and stays pacific for the duration of the conflict.

The tripart is often misled over the outcome of its refusal to adhere to the demands of its instigator. If there were few costs to occupy a state it would occur more often. Occupation at low costs offers greater benefits than the enforcement of neutrality on tripart and would be utilized more frequently because as Peter Liberman pointed out, conquest does pay.<sup>171</sup> Why then is forcing neutrality practiced more than state occupations?

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<sup>170</sup> It always retains the ability to resist or fight regardless of the odds of victory,

Whether the Germans seized the Rumanian Oil Fields, the Israelis annexed the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the Soviet military's suppression of Eastern Europe or the British occupation of India, war time pressures are greatly relieved by employing conquered peoples and the increased amounts of resources that comes with occupation. If a belligerent is to threaten a tripart with invasion even if it has occupied other nations it is seen as a weakness not strength. In an anarchic world where power is the only international currency, a state that is more powerful than another acts with foresight of potential added value in occupation. When the benefits of conquering a tripart are great in material and security wealth but the dyadic state does not attempt to gain this wealth a tripart should read this as its opportunity to shed its previous acceptance of the threats demands. Due to the high uncertainty surrounding this posture, triparts tend not to maximize their options. They tend to settle on secondary preferences including isolation from the conflict rather than gains associated with victorious intervention.<sup>171</sup>

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<sup>171</sup> Peter Liberman, Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies, Pg. 1-35,

<sup>172</sup> Defined as normative national ideas; the way things ought to be according to the ideals of the state.

This posture is also striking in its conformity to many theories of compellence void of the uses of force like bombing. High neutrality is synonymous with successful compellence, where a tripart gives into the demands of the threat for fear of military action against it. The many resources available on compellence have helped develop this posture because high neutrality is a posture being thrust on the tripart: a posture the tripart would not normally have chosen. While the layman's definition of compellence is "the ability of 'A' to force 'B' to do something it normally would not do through employing the threat of force," high neutrality is the posture that comes from this ability.<sup>173</sup>

High neutrality is a posture based on choosing the best between two bad options and the will of the state to survive when international forces press for its destruction. This is also a posture borne of uncertainty, high vulnerability and low opportunities to ally for triparts. This is because through a state's cognition the threatening state has proven capabilities to carry out its threat and the tripart in its final bid to survive

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<sup>173</sup> For further readings of compellence see: Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, and Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War,

adheres to the demands of the threat rather than resisting it.


### **Low Vulnerability:**

When triparts feel that they are invulnerable regardless of the dyadic conflict's outcome they choose from two posture possibilities depending on their opportunities to ally. When triparts have many opportunities to ally they usually become neutral for profit. On the other hand, when the prospect of triparts facing a conflict independently is great, they tend to practice a neutral for gains posture.

### **Neutral For Profit**

Being neutral for profit is a very fluid posture. Central to neutral for profit is the idea of an anticipatory element. This type of neutrality entails that triparts alter their posture once a window of opportunity opens for the state to make great gains with few costs. This is more of a transitional posture than an independent one. The crux is that these triparts gain

territorially and/or economically without participating in the conflict. Being a neutral posture the outcome of the dyadic war is uncertain. The tripart feels low levels of vulnerability and has high opportunities to ally but usually chooses not to.



Neutral for profit is usually reserved for powerful triparts, which the members of the dyad try to pacify. This is because the dyadic actors are preoccupied in their current struggles and must develop a mechanism to keep potential jackals from profiting at their expense. Therefore, dyadic states offer some powerful triparts a share in the spoils of victory without engaging the enemy. This is done to purchase the acceptance of the conflict its aims and results. This posture strengthens a triparts position at no cost and can be considered a free riding posture.

There is a little more to this posture than meets the eye. Because being neutral for profit is situational

and responsive it must come as a result of the dyadic conflict. The tripart is bribed into a neutral position with the promise of free-riding the gains of a combatant. This is done in an attempt to avoid the formulation a hostile posture by the tripart. Because of the power this tripart has in determining the outcome of a conflict its neutrality is guaranteed by the dyadic state doing the bribing. While this may seem a bit convoluted a solid example will aid in advancing the details of this posture.

Contrary to popular belief the Soviet Union did not bandwagon with Germany for possession of half of Poland during the German-Polish war of 1939. It was given to them as a good faith gesture by the Germans in an attempt to cajole them to accept their war efforts against the Poles and later against the West. The Soviets gained half of Poland, rights to Estonia<sup>174</sup> and the silence it needed from the Germans for the initiation of a conflict with the Finland. In retrospect, had the USSR entered the conflict against the Germans while they were attacking Poland they could have jackaled Germany's gains as they had greater capabilities at the time. The Non-Aggression

treaty had served as the platform from where the Soviets became pacific towards the Germans and gained undeservingly from German conquests, which incidentally became the catalysts for the Soviet counter-offences a fortnight later, when the Soviet posture shifted in response to Operation Barbarossa.

This posture affects the outcome of the conflict because of its biased position in regards to the conflict at hand. The capabilities at its disposal have been pacified by one in the dyad and cause panic in the other.<sup>175</sup> One dyadic actor bribes a large power from feasting on the vulnerability that accompanies war and establishes an environment void of the uncertainty of how this tripart state will act. The ability to do so greatly enhances the resolve of the combatant who knows that its adversary will not attain additional proximate allies to diminish the chances for victory. Yet, being neutral for profit changes into a more action based posture once the tripart has gained.

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<sup>174</sup> For the construction of military installations such as naval and air bases,

<sup>175</sup> In rare instances both of the conflicting dyad. An example of this concerns the Austrian-Hungarian empire gaining from both actors in the first Balkan war, between Serbia and Bulgaria in 1885,


It is one thing to have been given conquered lands and something quite different to send troops into these lands to administer them. This intermediary posture often shifts to jackaling once its neutrality produces gains because a tripart must secure these gains and develop their utility to the highest capacity. In the first days of the German invasion of Poland when Germany's overture to the USSR promised the gains of Poland the Soviets altered their posture in bid to secure these gains. They jackaled, practiced limited aims and snatched the eastern half of Poland while most Polish forces were engaged against the German onslaught in its western provinces.

### **Neutral for Gains**

Neutral for gains occurs when a tripart retains its abilities and desires to remain neutral in the face of a dyadic conflict. As the posture indicates the tripart actually gains from its inaction. Its gains however do not usually result from remaining neutral but stem from the window of opportunity that neutrality provides this tripart. The neutral for gains posture quickly adjusts once a window of opportunity opens. Defined simply as a state that takes all necessary steps to remain neutral



because of the uncertainty of a conflict situation. These tripart keep long-term territorial and economic goals, which require the alteration away from a neutral posture but because the conflict is still undecided it prefers to wait and see what the outcome of the dyadic conflict could be. Being neutral for gains requires low vulnerability. These states can afford to wait for the outcome to become more certain because the fear of attack is remote. Neutral for gains is also the result of having low opportunities to ally.



This posture assumes that neutral for gains tripart's use the guise of neutrality to hide its true intentions. They employ neutrality as a catalyst for increased security relative to the states in the dyad or those committed to the conflict before its involvement. Remaining neutral is not a simple matter however, especially when the state in question has pre-conflict alliance commitments. Because of this, states that are neutral for gains seek high secure gains for their

participation in the conflict. In many instances they contribute to the outcome of the conflict and their entry may alter the certainty and vulnerability of the conflicting states.

The aims of this posture are to decide the conflict. This contribution gives much esteem to this tripart intervener because it is regarded as the peacemaker. It is easy for a tripart of this posture to enter into an alliance of almost any type and to rise quickly in the decision-making processes of this alliance. Its entry is so vital to one side or another that the combatants themselves are willing to allow the tripart to gain immeasurably at their expense because failing to bring this tripart into the conflict could cost them more.

Keeping this in mind, we may ascertain that this is a posture usually practiced by great/larger powers.<sup>176</sup> Only powerful triparts could mobilize themselves towards tilting the scales of the conflict. In a cynical way the large power declares itself neutral and acts with its full capacity to preserve that posture. However, this

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<sup>176</sup> The reason for both the distinction and the link of these two very different types of states is simply a matter of scope. Whilst great power is reserved for global systems, I offer larger powers as being the regional equivalent,

powerful tripart has other aims it wants to realize. It is usually quite obvious from the onset of the war where the sympathies of this tripart rest yet it never sheds the cloak of neutrality until the conflict's outcome becomes highly certain and unfavorable to the states of sympathy. The entry of a previously neutral for gains tripart stabilizes the conflict situation and settles it as a favorably certain situation. In other words, low certainty of a conflict's finale is what keeps this tripart neutral. The perceived unfavorable certainty to the states of sympathy brings neutral for gains tripart to change their posture and high favorable certainty is the outcome it aims to achieve.<sup>177</sup>

A tripart of this posture tends to free-ride on the conflicting states or alliances. Without interfering it allows those entities to suffer heavily at the hands of one another and then steps in with such overwhelming power that it produces the conflict's outcome. To further explain this posture a brief presentation of a hard case

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<sup>177</sup> Cases of this posture are very rare since the presence of states that can alter the outcome of a conflict too are rare. As shown by Gartner and Siverson, most wars do not escalate and therefore do not require a tripart to decide the conflict. This is a theory of tripart intervention though, and we shall overlook the infrequency of this posture and focus on it as being a possible action of a tripart, as it has occurred in the past, and shall, in all probability, occur again in the future, a fact which would make its omission counterintuitive to the work at hand.

study is in order.<sup>178</sup> Let us look the 1960 conflict between Israel and Syria to achieve this end.<sup>179</sup> In this situation Israel and Syria consist of the dyad and Egypt enters as a tripart of the neutral for gains paradigm.

On February 1 1960, the Israelis mobilized two brigades to the Syrian front in a quest to alter the unfavorable status quo in the region one that had led to numerous military exchanges between these two states. In response to this mobilization and violation of the status quo the Syrians also mobilized. These reciprocal actions spurred a conflict spiral and its accompanying brinkmanship crisis and justifications for hostilities.<sup>180</sup> After a "full brigade attacked Syrian positions on the Eastern shores of the Lake (Sea of Galilee)," the crisis dwindled and the belligerents returned to their pre-escalation postures. The conclusion of this action was because Egypt, an exogenous tripart had mobilized in defense of Syria. The exact details of this round of

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<sup>178</sup> It may be noted that the US intervention in both of the World Wars, and especially WWII are easy cases because the alternative explanations to the US involvement do not explain the theory as well as this one might. The hard case's alternative explanations are much more difficult to negate.

<sup>179</sup> We must consider this a sudo war of attrition, as there had not been, since 1958, calmness on this shared frontier. The shelling of civilians from the hills of the Golan by the Syrians, and the Israeli tampering (diverting) of the Jordan river's headwaters, not to mention the Israeli reprisals on both civilian as well as military targets must be regarded as acts of war and hence the escalation of this conflict in 1960 reflects a war expansion, and not the beginning of an independent, isolated conflict.

<sup>180</sup> Syria and Israel by this point were already locked in a security dilemma. From the Syrian perspective if they failed to respond with equal vigor to the Israeli mobilization then the Israelis would have broken

conflict are rather difficult to come by, as the states involved have been rather hush-hush about the entire affair. But it must be assumed that the possible entry of the Egyptians led to the de-escalation of the conflict the secession of the war of attrition on this frontier.

Since the 1956 Sinai War, Egypt had played the self-ascribed role of leader of the Arab and Third world, a questionable position on both fronts.<sup>182</sup> It was in regards to the former that its leadership was questioned the harshest.<sup>183</sup> In a bid to solidify and legitimize its leadership over the Arab world, it needed to accomplish something to award it this position in the eyes of the other Arab states. The budding Israeli-Syrian war did just that. Egypt, having been rather neutral in the preceding years (that is during the attritional phases of this conflict),<sup>184</sup> altered its posture when it envisioned large gains from the toils of Syria and Israel, such as its uncontested leadership of the Arab world.

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out of this cyclical relationship and retained a strategically more favorable position than the Syrians.

<sup>181</sup> Yair Evron, The Middle East, Pg. 50,

<sup>182</sup> Evron, Pg. 42-42,

<sup>183</sup> Specifically from Iraq and Saudi Arabia, who also claimed the same title. As to the leadership of the Third World, it may be noted that Egypt was among the more formidable states of this type and its esteem was greatly enhanced at the 1955 Bandung Conference of the Non-Aligned movement.

<sup>184</sup> Perhaps in correlation to its pro-Western stance at the time,

It appears that the conflict ended much too early for the Egyptian to gain what it sought. Ideally, had the war intensified and Egypt entered to bring victory for the Syrians and the "Arab cause" its security and reputation would have been so greatly enhanced to provide it with the leadership status it so desperately wanted. The conflict did not expand though. The presence of the Egyptian military massed at the border of Israel provided enough of an incentive to the Israeli leadership to abandon its aggressive stance towards Syria and strategically redistribute its forces defensively.<sup>185</sup>

The certainty of the outcome of this conflict was low because both dyadic states possessed roughly equal amounts of weapons and soldiers.<sup>186</sup> Egypt entered the crisis/conflict to favorably increase the certainty for the Syrians and at the expense of the Israelis. Whereas, both states of the dyad were vulnerable during the war of attrition, once Egypt entered on the side of Syria, Israel's vulnerability rose and Syrian's decreased. Egypt had low opportunities to ally because of inter-Arab competitions. The United Arab Republic had already been

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<sup>185</sup> The 1960 crisis provided the catalyst for revamping the Israeli military doctrine and spurred the Israelis and their Arab counterparts to embark in an arms race and weapons build-up program.


<sup>186</sup> Though biased towards Israel as it had demonstrated its abilities in the 1956 war,

dissolved, the crisis in Yemen had begun and Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Jordan had taken a hostile position towards the dictates of Nasser.

This case provides an essential element of the rationale behind the aims resulting from adherence to this posture. While we should not assume what an altered posture or when the alteration of this posture occurs we may surmise that being neutral for gains is the vehicle for assuming a different posture. We are sure that this other posture is also designed to provide high security gains to the tripart practicing it.

### **Exogenous Neutrality:**

There is one more posture worth mentioning even though it falls outside of the theoretical design offered above. Exogenous neutrality is a posture of non-interest in the ensuing military conflict except in diplomatic debate. Because of this non-interest it is safe to assume that states practicing this posture are not particularly interested in the conflict's outcome because their vulnerability is static regarding it and the geographic distance between it and the conflict is too great.



The relationship between certainty, vulnerability and the opportunity to ally in this case is irrelevant because these triparts have no vested interest in the conflict, except avoiding its extension if its vulnerabilities would then increase. Exogenously neutral states are not necessarily apathetic to the ensuing war; they are disinterested in committing themselves to combat. Exogenous neutrality is a posture reserved for noncontiguous states having the luxury of geographic distance. These states do not significantly impact or alter the outcome of the dyadic conflict.<sup>157</sup> Exogenously neutral states do show concern for the conflict and may even offer financial, material and/or political support in different arenas. This intervention is usually passed off as "business as usual" in the international environment where states often benefit economically from other nations at war.

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<sup>157</sup> The term "position" is in reference to geography and not posture. I suppose that because these states are far from the zone of war their neutrality does not affect the states in the conflicting region in



History is plagued with examples of this type of tripart because no conflict has ever engulfed the entire globe at precisely the same moment of time. For illustrative reasons the case of Canada's diplomatic efforts to end the Peruvian-Ecuadorian war of 1995 is taken as an example. Being geographically divorced from the dueling states gave Canada the ability to apply objective diplomatic pressure to attempt to dissolve the conflict before it spread to other, neighboring states. This was to avoid a domino effect that could eventually affect Canada directly.

Canada in this case had tried to end the conflict to avoid having to deal with it physically later. Even in this supposedly mundane posture a state's obsession with its security and survival is central. States are not always prepared to engage in unnecessary military actions sometimes they fight diplomatic wars for the same end of promoting their long-term security.

The Canadian government kept with its foreign policy goals of war containment and the pursuance of a peaceful

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the same way regionally neutral states do.

global order. Its low vulnerability and geographic distance allowed it to call on the UN to draft a resolution pertaining to the conflict and be a signatory on this resolution without fear of attack. At the same time Canada was selling foodstuff and industrial goods to the Peruvians.<sup>186</sup> No matter what proposals Canada offered the belligerents they could continue to wage war without fear of physical Canadian intervention. Alternatively, by acting as a neutral tripart Canada could influence only diplomatic outcomes that are by their nature in relation to military accomplishments.<sup>189</sup>

This is the most frequently employed posture though bears the least significance in determining the effect triparts have on ensuing dyadic conflicts. As untheoretical as this posture is its inclusion helps develop an understanding of how geographically, politically, militarily, and socially distanced triparts behave in circumstance of conflict.

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<sup>188</sup> NAFTA by that time had begun its expansion into the South American continent,

<sup>189</sup> This posture affects the military arrangements of a state through diplomatic work. However a distinction should be made because objectively neutral states can not alter the resolve of the conflicting states. It can only offer a compromise the states involved either accept or reject. This posture resembles the UN's function in conflict resolution.

## Conclusion

It would be quite mistaken of me to suggest that this study has examined all the possible posture outcomes of triparts. It is equally mistaken to think that this study puts to rest many assumptions in the realm of international relations theory. Instead, this was meant as an explanatory exercise into the postures of triparts linking them to the certainty of a dyadic conflict's outcome, their vulnerabilities and the opportunity to ally. This linkage has shed some much-needed light on the behaviors of triparts facing exogenous dyadic conflicts. The framework that I have developed here acts as a stepping-stone to advancing a new method for understanding the roles and perceptions of triparts under these conditions. I introduce these variables to help predict how third party actors determine their posture when they are confronted with a dyadic conflict.

After completing the theoretical components of this work I feel quite satisfied with the implications that this study has on international relations theory in general. In the first portion of this work I introduced

the key definitions, literature and authors to illustrate the importance of this survey. In the second chapter I focused on establishing a theoretical structure for understanding the variables that lead triparts to behave the way they do. I examined the importance of certainty by breaking it down into the sub-categories of favorable certainty, unfavorable certainty and uncertainty. I then turned to vulnerability and determined how triparts should act when they feel very vulnerable and invulnerable. Finally, I accounted for the opportunity to ally and how the presence of allies also helps to shape the postures of triparts. The connection of these three variables has an interaction effect on the outcome of tripart postures because they collectively and separately contribute to these postures. By examining these variables in isolation I paved the way to examine their variance and the way they interact with one another to produce tripart postures.

The final portion of this work did just that, walked through the variance of each independent variable, meshed them together and showed the outcomes that result from the interaction. I broke this section into three parts,

favorable certainty, unfavorable certainty and uncertainty. Within each sub-section I showed the variance of high and low vulnerability and high and low opportunity. By doing so, I was able to show the tripart postures that stemmed from the different types of interactions.

Several issues can however be laid to rest as a result of this work. Firstly, in contrast to many international relations theorists, notably Randall Schweller, states rarely behave aggressively when outcome certainty is low. In fact, they often do not act at all. When uncertainty is great, states tend to posture themselves as neutrals. Neutral postures shift as the certainty of the conflict becomes clearer, either favorably or unfavorably but remains static as long as uncertainty is evident. Secondly, states free-ride more frequently when their vulnerability is low. This means that when there is a clear and present threat to two or more allied states the level of free-riding decreases. Thirdly, autarkic postures are practiced when there are no allies available. This may seem tautological but I am suggesting that states prefer allies that further reduce

its vulnerabilities than taking action alone. Only when the conditions for action are right and no allies are available do triparts jackal alone. Finally, tripart behaviors fluctuate in relation to the outcome of the dyadic war. When the outcome of the conflict is favorably certain triparts act differently than when it is unfavorably certain. As the dyadic war becomes clearer then the postures shift to best protect triparts and enhance their ability to survive.

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