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The National Question and the Collapse of Yugoslavia: Geopolitics and Stateless Peoples

Davorka Ljubisic

A Thesis
in
The Department
of
Sociology and Anthropology

Presented in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts at Concordia University Montreal, Quebec, Canada

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To the memory of

my parents

and

Cary Boucock

For my sister and brother

who survived
ABSTRACT

The National Question and the Collapse of Yugoslavia:
Geopolitics and Stateless Peoples

Davorka Ljubisic

My thesis is an examination of the correlation between three broad areas related to the collapse of Yugoslavia: the national question, geopolitics and the phenomenon of statelessness. This study combines a critical theoretical reflection on nations and nationalism and an empirical investigation in order to explore some basic issues pertaining to the dismemberment of socialist Yugoslavia and the refugees' lifeworld in Montreal. The emphasis is placed on a historical and political retrospective of the Balkanization as well as the refugee problematic with special regards to the obstacles for their better and faster integration in Quebec society. The history of the national question in Yugoslavia challenges both established theories of the nation and nationalism, primordialism and constructivism, as it reflects neither 'ancient hatreds' nor 'artificiality' of the Yugoslav idea and its 'imagined community'. Due to the informative and exploratory nature of the study, conclusions are formulated as open questions which address important issues and demand further work to be accomplished in order to better understand the complex environment surrounding the dissolution of Yugoslavia.
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"CRIMES COMMITTED WITH EXTRAORDINARY BOLDNESS ARE MORE LIKELY TO SUCCEED THAN ANY OTHERS"\(^1\)

"HITLER CIRCULATED MILLIONS OF COPIES OF HIS BOOK IN WHICH HE STATED THAT TO BE SUCCESSFUL, A LIE MUST BE ENORMOUS"\(^2\)

INTRODUCTION

The ongoing Yugoslav drama and the Balkan tragedy is a story about crimes committed with extraordinary boldness and a big deception about them, propagated by politicians and media inside and outside Yugoslavia. It is about both sides of the so-called Balkanization, that is, the internal one resulting in the civil or ethnic war(s) as well as the external one, or the foreign dimension and International involvement. This is a story about innocent civilians as the victims of both Balkanizations, that is, the massively displaced population or uprooted people, or refugees. The main purpose of this study then is to explore and present some of the essential elements of the collapse of Yugoslavia and its consequent refugee crisis. Due to the complexity of “the Yugoslav Drama”, to use Mihailo Crnobrnja’s\(^3\) term, with its external and internal factors, it is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a complex analysis of the dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia. My intention is rather to point out some main points and elements that such an analysis should encompass in order to portray the multitude of external and

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internal forces that contributed to the dismemberment of Yugoslavia. My goal is to contribute to current debate in the multidisciplinary field of social science by linking the lifeworld of refugees from the former Yugoslavia, more specifically Bosnia and Herzegovina, to the various scholars and their respective arguments that directly or indirectly deal with the issues related to the dismemberment of the former Yugoslavia and the ‘ethnic cleansing’ of its ethnically heterogeneous territories. For this reason, my paper embraces and links both levels of analysis, macro and micro. While the macro level deals with theories of nation and nationalism as well with the global historical-political context of the constellation of power in the Balkans, the micro level examines the uprootedness and lifeworld of Yugoslav/Bosnian refugees in the historical and comparative perspective.

My interdisciplinary theoretical approach thus includes historical and political analyses combined with some elements of the socio-economic analysis of the Yugoslav drama. My main thesis statement is that Yugoslavia was dismembered due to both forms of Balkanization, that is, external and internal factors/actors as both are the main protagonists of this tragedy. Moreover, I argue that the foreign dimension in terms of International involvement, particularly the role of the USA and Germany, was decisive (and prior) to the emergence of the ethnic nationalism in its aggressive-chauvinist form. In other words, I argue that the external Balkanization was prior, historically and

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3 Prof. dr. Mihailo Crnobrnja presently teaches political science at McGill University. He was the last ambassador of the former Yugoslavia to the European Union and a participant in the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia in The Hague in 1991.

4 My approach only points out some analytical parts of the drama due to the limited space of this study. It is impossible, for example, to include a very much needed analysis of the deep seated socio-economic and political crisis prior to the eruption of ethnic nationalism. As well, the media analysis, within and outside Yugoslavia, is excluded from this project.
recently, to the internal divisions of the country and bloody civil war. It will be shown that the external Balkanization dates even prior to the settlement of the South Slavs\(^5\) in the Balkan peninsula in the sixth and seventh centuries and that the divisions of the Balkans are primarily a product of the well-known ancient Romans' conquering formula: 'Divide and Rule'. For this reason, I argue that the ethnic nationalism, or the internal Balkanization, is a product of the external (foreign) conquest or colonialization of the Balkans. A complete picture of the recent crisis and war must take into account both the external and internal Balkanization. Both are equally responsible for the civil war and its victims, particularly for the massive displacement of the people, that is, the refugee crisis. In this regard, I completely agree with Michael Parenti's ([1999] 2000) analysis in his article "The Rational Destruction of Yugoslavia", particularly with his argument about the correlation between the ethnic enmity and United States (US) 'diplomacy',

"When different national groups are living together with some measure of social and material security, they tend to get along. There is intermingling and even intermarriage. But when the economy goes into a tailspin, thanks to sanctions and IMF [International Monetary Fund] destabilization, then it becomes easier to induce internecine conflicts and social discombobulation. In order to hasten that process in Yugoslavia, the Western powers provided the most retrograde separatist elements with every advantage in money, organization, propaganda, arms, hired thugs, and the full might of the US national security state at their backs. Once more the Balkans are to be balkanized" (13, my emphasis).

For these reasons, I maintain that the ethnic nationalism was a necessary but not a sufficient reason for the dismantling of the former Yugoslavia. As will be demonstrated in the first two chapters, both schools of thought in sociology and anthropology on the

\(^5\) In this study the term *South Slavs* refers to all seven South Slav nations of the former Yugoslavia: in alphabetical order, Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Muslims, Slovenes, Serbs, and declared Yugoslavs. See Dijlas (1996) concerning the exclusion of the Bulgarians ("Introduction" and notes to it).
question of nationalism and ethnicity, namely primordialism and constructivism, have failed to satisfactorily and sufficiently explain the Yugoslav drama because of their fixation on the ethnic nationalism as the only reason for the collapse of Yugoslavia. While in terms of primordialism nations stand above the history and their origins are prehistoric, constructivism claims that nations are a product of modernity emerging in the so-called age of nationalism. Although I will present theoretical frameworks of both schools in more detail, I need to stress now that, as Alexander Motyl (1999) argues, extreme primordialism is often presented as the “ancient hatreds thesis”, or “Dark Gods theory” that is entrenched among journalists and policy makers as well as advocated by some scholars of which the most prominent is Samuel Huntington (85, 86). Thus, the ancient hatreds thesis is central in the presentation of the crisis and war in the Balkans by global media reports and Western politicians. It is the core of the image of the barbarian Balkan tribes who have historically fought against each other. It is also the basis of the division of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ guys in the Yugoslav drama.

In this regard, Huntington’s article and hypothesis about “The Clash of Civilizations?” (1993)⁶ definitely influenced America’s foreign policy in the Balkans and provided a theoretical framework for the Hollywood-like scenario in Yugoslavia. He argues that conflicts of the future will occur among civilizations, that is, along the cultural fault lines that separate civilizations. For Huntington, Yugoslavia, in particular Bosnia, are the best examples and confirmation of his hypothesis that the future conflicts will occur as the clashes of the civilizations, because all of the three major civilizations met there: Western Catholic, Eastern Slavic-Orthodox and Islam (Bosnians Muslims and
Kosovo's ethnic Albanians). According to Huntington, from Yugoslavia to the Middle East to Central Asia, the fault lines of civilizations are the battle lines of the future. For him, the future conflicts will not be primarily ideological or economic, but cultural:

"Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future. Conflict between civilizations will be the latest phase in the evolution of conflict in the modern world" (1993:22).

While Motyl (1999), as will be shown, discredits Huntington's extremely primordialist claim on the theoretical level, I argue that his hypothesis is also unsustainable on the empirical level with regards to Yugoslavia and Bosnia. Indeed, the history of Yugoslavia does not support his claims about 'ancient hatreds' among Yugoslav nations and the clash between civilizations in Bosnia as will be demonstrated in chapters two and three. On the contrary, the conflict between the Serbs, Croats and Muslims is recent, occurring within the twentieth century. As well, it is not 'the clash of civilizations' as the Yugoslav peoples are of the same ethnic stock and have similar rather than different cultures, even though they have different religions (socialist Yugoslavia was an officially atheist country). Moreover, Huntington's hypothesis is challenged by my thesis about 'the external Balkanization', or the foreign dimension in the Yugoslav drama. I argue that instead of a 'clash of civilizations' there is rather a long history of foreign occupation of the Balkans based on the old Roman military strategy and conception of 'Divide and Rule'. Thus, this external Balkanization and the international intervention in the Balkans, particularly by the United States', are not due to

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Huntington’s notion of the “kin-country syndrome” between nations and civilizations (1993:35-39), but rather due to the specific geopolitical and strategic, as well economic, interests of the USA-led Western powers in the Balkans.

In contrast to all of the primordialisms’ claims, of which the extreme, strong and weak variants are further explained and elaborated along with a critique of all constructivisms, I agree with Michel Chossudovsky (1997) who argues that Western public opinion has been misled by the global media and Western politicians. The presentation of the Yugoslavian crisis as the outcome of an ‘aggressive nationalism’ resulting from deep-seated ethnic and religious tensions historically rooted is, as Chossudovsky writes, simply wrong and misleading. He points out that the deep seated economic crisis was induced with the first round of IMF’s macro structural adjustment reforms enforced in 1980, on the eve of Tito’s death (1997:243, 244). In his words,

“the economic and social causes of the civil war have been carefully concealed. The strategic interests of Germany and the US are not mentioned, the deep-seated economic crisis which preceded the civil war has long been forgotten. In the eyes of the global media, Western powers bear no responsibility for the impoverishment and destruction of a nation of 24 million people. Yet the break up of the Yugoslav federation bears a direct relationship to the programme of macro-economic restructuring imposed on the Belgrade government by its external creditors. This programme, adopted in several stages since 1980, contributed to triggering the collapse of the national economy, leading to the disintegration of the industrial sector and the piecemeal dismantling of the welfare state. Secessionist tendencies feeding on social and ethnic divisions, gained impetus precisely during a period of brutal impoverishment of the Yugoslav population” (1997:244, my emphasis).

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7 For him, the “kin-country syndrome” is natural phenomenon of “civilization rallying”. In Huntington’s words, “Groups or states belonging to one civilization that become involved in war with people from a different civilization naturally try to rally support from other members of their own civilization” (1993:35).

8 He is referring to the account of Warren Zimmerman, the former USA Ambassador to Yugoslavia, 1997, pp. 243, 260 note 1.
Furthermore, even though I find Robert Hayden’s (1996) analysis of the ethnic cleansing and constitutional nationalism in the successor states of the former Yugoslavia accurate and powerful, I disagree with his constructivist approach that claims the artificiality of Yugoslavia as an ‘imagined community’. I will elaborate my arguments against both schools in the first three chapters as well as provide the main points of Hayden’s valued and relevant analysis of the (impact and ‘hidden agenda’ of) ethnic cleansing in the fourth chapter. For now, I want to single out basic arguments of Hayden and the constructivist school. Although I disagree and argue against constructivism, my critique is primarily directed against primordialism, because it is entrenched among journalists and politicians. Also, while I disagree with Hayden’s constructivist approach, I agree with his theoretical argument:

“To reverse Benedict Anderson’s evocative phrase (1983), the disintegration of Yugoslavia into its warring components in 1991-92 marked the failure of the imagination of a Yugoslav community. This failure of the imagination, however, had real and tragic consequences: the Yugoslav community that could not be maintained, and thus has become unimaginable, had actually existed in many parts of the country. Indeed, it is my argument that the spatial patterning of the war and its terrible ferocity are due to the fact that in some regions the various Yugoslav people were not only coexisting but also becoming increasingly intermingled” (1996:788, my emph.).

Indeed, I find this argument confusing and contradictory as well as essentially not much different from the primordialists’ argument about ‘ancient hatreds’, as both approaches end in the ‘deadlock’ or circularity with the same result, that is, Yugoslavia was either ‘an artificial community’ or was built up on ‘ancient hatreds’, therefore it had to be dismembered sooner or later. Hayden at the same time however supplements and contrasts the primordialist argument. He states that the “extreme nationalism in the
former Yugoslavia has not been only a matter of imagining allegedly ‘primordial’
communities, but rather of making existing heterogeneous ones unimaginable”
(1996:783, my emph.). For Hayden, in these mixed heterogeneous regions “the idea that
the Yugoslav peoples could not live peacefully together was empirical nonsense”
(1996:790, my emph.). And finally, as Hayden is drawing on Anderson’s constructivism,
he also argues that the power of an imagined ethnic community to break up Yugoslavia’s
actually existing communities is “clear and apparent” (1996:793, 794). Therefore, for
Hayden, the former Yugoslavia was an artificial ‘imagined community’ but the new
successor states are also, in the same sense, ‘artificially imagined communities’ as they
are building their homogenous nation-states in heterogeneous territories. In this sense,
there is no difference between the ‘old’ Yugoslavia and the new successor states: both
are ‘imagined communities’. In my opinion, this is a superficial argument that suffers
from circularity, because it explains neither the complex environment that brought about
the collapse of Yugoslavia nor the conditions that enabled the emergence of the new
successor states.

Hayden (1996) rightly points out that the Yugoslav peoples were living peacefully
together and that the new successor states are ‘cleansing’ their heterogeneous regions in
order to build ethnically homogenous nation-states. But, as I have just argued, he falls
into circularity over the on-going emergence and collapse of the artificial or imagined
communities. Thus, from the constructivist point of view, all national communities are
imagined, and therefore, all nations are artificial. More importantly, for both theories of
nations and nationalism, the Balkan is an inherently unstable region due to the ancient
hatreds of belligerent ethnic groups, in the primordialist sense, or due to the artificiality
of the imagined communities in the constructivist point of view. Therefore, according to both theories, peaceful and stable nation-state(s) are impossible in the Balkans even though different reasons are provided for this instability.

In particular, I argue that there is no satisfactory explanation for the victorious ‘ethnic vote’ on the eve of the war which is central to the constructivist argument about the artificiality of Yugoslavia. In this regard, I stress that, first of all, there are discrepancies and inaccuracies in the statistics about the ‘ethnic vote’, especially in Bosnia. I agree with Catherine Samary (1995) who emphasizes that the ethnic vote in Bosnia was not so much ethnic, but rather it was essentially an anti-Communist vote⁹. Moreover, I argue that in every country, especially in Yugoslavia which had survived Nazi occupation, the popular memories of the Nazi terror and atrocities committed by domestic Fascist forces are still very vivid. Therefore, it was not too difficult to induce ethnic mistrust and collective paranoia through a politics of fear (Crnobrnja, 1994 and 1995). We should not ignore in this regard the fact that the recent civil war(s) in Yugoslavia (1990s) were fought under the same flags and symbols as during W.W.II.

In contrast to the arguments of both schools (ancient hatreds and artificiality of the former Yugoslavia), and particularly in contrast to Huntington’s hypothesis of the clash of civilizations, I agree with the following opinion of Lord Owen who was one of the peace negotiators in Bosnia. In an interview for Foreign Affairs in 1993, he provides the opposite point of view and prediction for the future of the Balkans. When asked: "Given the hatred and the bloodshed of the past two years and the historic ethnic

⁹ Also, all of the ‘ethnic’ Parties declared themselves essentially democratic and liberal as is apparent in their names which included the word ‘democratic’.
enmities, is it realistic to hope these groups will lie down together and live in peace?”,

Lord Owen stated that

“I think it’s realistic because these people are of the same ethnic stock. I believe some political leaders in the Balkans are not authentically speaking for all their people. There are still very strong elements of modernization within Bosnia-Herzegovina. Many people there still see themselves as European and even now don’t think of themselves as Muslim, Croat or Serb; some deliberately and proudly call themselves just Bosnians. That sentiment is reflected in the degree of intermarriage. It’s reflected in the fact that, even now, you can go to Sarajevo under bombardment and see Muslims, Serbs and Croats living together in the same streets and apartments. Throughout Yugoslavia people are still all mixed in together and, in many cases, living peaceably” (Foreign Affairs, 1993:6, 7).

This study illustrates then that the complexity of the Yugoslav drama far exceeds both arguments: the primordialist ancient hatreds thesis and the constructivist artificiality of the imagined community. I argue that the Yugoslav dilemma, or the question ‘why Yugoslavia collapsed?’, cannot be reduced to the internal factors, or the internal Balkanization in my terms, as both schools have done. The third chapter demonstrates the importance and the crucial role of the external Balkanization. Indeed, my thesis about historical and recent divisions of the Balkans by external forces is my basic counter argument to both schools. Similarly to Crnobrnja’s remark about his account of the Yugoslav drama, I also assert that “the account that follows should allow the reader to decide whether the creation of Yugoslavia was a noble experiment in an inherently unstable part of Europe or an impossible task from the start” (1994:34). In this regard, a good starting point for an understanding of some basic historical facts about the Yugoslav nations and the origins of the Yugoslav idea for the creation of a common state of all South Slavs is to acknowledge the centrality of the Croats and the Serbs for the
Yugoslav unity as well the conceptual synonymy of the ethnic group and the nation within the Yugoslavia's context. This is best explained by Aleksa Djilas ([1991] 1996) who points out that

"since the creation of Yugoslavia in 1918, the conflict between Croats and Serbs has posed the greatest threat to the Yugoslav union. Its causes can be traced to their development of separate cultural and political identities as they took crucial steps toward becoming modern nations in the nineteenth century. Non-Slav observers did not distinguish between Croats and Serbs until the ninth century. These two names became established when the first forms of political organization appeared. The Croatian and Serbian tribes, though identical in ethnic and linguistic origin, developed distinct political organisms. The formation of two separate polities was, from the beginning, an important differentiating force between Croats and Serbs ... From the time of their settlement in southeastern Europe during the sixth and early seventh centuries, Croatian tribes were influenced by Latin and Germanic political orders and cultures. The Croats were at the periphery of this western civilization. To the east lived the Serbian tribes, adjacent to the Byzantine world. In the following centuries these eastern and western influences, especially Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic, frequently transgressed the borders—which were never firmly established anyway—between Croatian and Serbian tribes and Croatian and Serbian states, creating a pluralistic mosaic rather than a simple division between 'western Croats' and 'eastern Serbs'” (4).

It is for all of the above mentioned reasons that I argue that worldwide public opinion is misled by Western media and politicians about the 'real and true' picture of the Yugoslav crisis. In line with the authors presented in this paper (Baudson, 1996; Chossudovsky, 1996, 1997; Crnobrnja, 1994, 1995; Hayden, 1996; Parenti, 1999; Samary, 1995, et al.), I argue that nationalism and religious conflicts were not the primary cause and reason for the war. The common image about the 'good guys' (Croats, Muslims, and more recently Albanians) and the 'bad guys' (Serbs) is misleading. I argue that the ethnic or national identities of refugees and/or displaced people as civilian
victims of the war and 'ethnic cleansing' are misinterpreted in the simplistic and one-sided official explanations and media representations.

While it is well-known, for example, that refugees from Bosnia are 'the Bosnians' (*Bosanci*, singular *Bosanac* in Serbo-Croatian), there are different perceptions of who the 'Bosanci' are. This confusion is enhanced with the usage of newly created term 'the Bosniaks' (*Bosnjaci*, singular *Bosnjak* in Serbo-Croatian). Media and politicians promote both terms without the explanation of what the difference is between them or why they are used interchangeably and in such a confusing and contradictory manner. For example, while Huntington (1993) refers to the Bosnian Muslims as 'the Bosnians-Bosanci', Lord Owen (1993) uses the same word to describe all three major Bosnian nations, or ethnic groups: the Bosnian Muslims, the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs. Moreover, the official and media reports never included the 'Yugoslav' national identity even though it was declared by many former Yugoslavs, particularly Bosnians, in the last census in 1991. Some people went so far as to jokingly declare themselves to be 'Eskimos' as a way of denying any ethnic identity at all. Besides an explanation of these terms, it will be shown in the fourth chapter that these 'Yugoslavs, Bosnians and Eskimos' are disappearing without traces as if these national and/or personal identities never existed.

This study illustrates, particularly in the latters chapters, how and to what extent the life histories and experiences of a small strategic sample of Bosnian refugees in Montreal support the arguments of various scholars who argue that the causes of and reasons for the civil war as well as the ethnic identities of victims of ethnic cleansing are different and more complex than what is usually assumed in the West. All of the presented authors argue that there is a multitude of factors and causes of the war, of
which the most important is the crisis of a socioeconomic and political system that is brought about particularly by the ‘new world order’ and its ‘dictate of the free-market’. As it will be demonstrated, there is strong evidence showing that the victims and perpetrators include all of the nations involved in conflicts, for example, the Serbs, the Croats and the Muslims in multinational, or multi-ethnic Bosnia. Above all, the civilian victims of the civil/ethnic war in the former Yugoslavia are primarily nationally ‘mixed’ people and ‘newly created’ national minorities, such as Serbs, Croats and Muslims in Bosnia. Both groups, that is, the ‘mixed’ and the ‘new’ minorities, became by definition an ‘undesirable’ population. Similarly to various authors (Baudson, 1996; Hayden, 1996; Samary, 1995) I argue that all involved parties, particularly in Bosnia, had the same goal: to avoid the status of national minority that ultimately meant their expulsion or treatment as second class citizens.

With regards to the expulsion of national minorities and subsequent emergence of Yugoslav apatrides/refugees due to the external and consequent internal Balkanization, the last chapter provides a theoretical framework for understanding this hundred year old story dating from the very creation of the first Yugoslavia in 1918. I deduce my arguments from the previous chapters and link them with the life histories of Bosnian refugees living in Montreal. My historical and comparative analysis of the present day Bosnian refugees and the first modern European, and Yugoslav, apatrides examines the phenomena of statelessness, homelessness and rightlessness as the common ground of both groups. My theoretical approach is based on Hannah Arendt’s ([1951] 1973) remarkable analysis of these phenomena and the very emergence of the first modern apatrides and/or refugees. I will demonstrate that the present day refugees from
Yugoslavia/Bosnia, similarly to those analyzed by Arendt, consider(ed) themselves as to be stateless, homeless and rightless due to the dismemberment of Yugoslavia. Besides providing a necessary theoretical framework, this historical and comparative approach best links the macro and micro levels of this paper by examining the refugee problematic within a global and historical context.

The main purpose of the empirical part of this study, or its micro level, presented in the fourth and fifth chapters, is to explore and describe the complexity of issues pertaining to the past and present life experience of refugees from the former Yugoslavia/Bosnia living in Montreal. I will examine the main reasons and circumstances under which they resettled in Canada as well as the main obstacles in rebuilding of a lost home, or making a new life in Montreal. Thus, central to my analysis of the ‘Yugoslav Saga’, or the ‘Odyssey’ of Yugoslav refugees in Canada, is the presentation of refugees’ opinions about their displacement, and consequent resettlement including the examination of the obstacles or difficulties in rebuilding a new life. I do not intend to analyze their complex life histories as I agree with the following statement by David Albahari’s\textsuperscript{10} mother who expressed skepticism about writing her life history. In her words: “there is no book that could embrace the whole life, or even a part of it” (Albahari, 1997:133). Thus, this is rather a preliminary study that explores some basic questions such as: Who are the refugees from the former Yugoslavia? Who are the Bosnians, the Yugoslavs and the Eskimos? For what specific reasons and under what circumstances did they come to Canada? What are the main problems or obstacles in

\textsuperscript{10} David Albahari is a famous Yugoslav writer of mixed Jewish and Serbian origins, who recently immigrated to Canada (Calgary) where he is pursuing his career. In his book \textit{Mamac} (A Bait), Belgrade: Narodne Novine, 1997, he depicts interweaving similarities of his mother’s life with his own destiny.
creating a new home in Montreal, or rebuilding a lost one? How are they supported by the various urban community organizations, particularly by the ethnic one(s)? What kind of help do they have and to what extent are their needs being fulfilled?

I maintain that the prerequisite for understanding the most important parts of these extraordinarily rich and tragic life histories is to place them in broader historical and socio-political contexts. For this reason, I link relevant parts of their personal experiences and visions with a multidisciplinary theoretical approach that together will provide some different insights into ‘The Yugoslav Drama’, and consequent ‘Yugoslav Saga’. This combination of theoretical and empirical research will enable us to better understand the complexity of the historical, socio-economical and political background of the Yugoslav Saga, that is, the intimate relationship between the past and the present life experiences of Yugoslav refugees with the history and politics in the Balkans. Thus, in order to illuminate some different aspects of history and geography of the ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia, I link theoretical arguments of various authors from different disciplines and the findings of my recent survey research about refugees’ life histories conducted in Montreal in January of 2001 (see attached questionnaire in Appendix I).

However, I argue that Western public opinion is misled with regards to both the civil war in the former Yugoslavia and the ethnic/national identities of refugees. In

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11 I use these two terms interchangeably in this study due to the fact that they are conceptually synonymous as will be explained more in detail in the first two chapters. For now, it should be noted that in the former Yugoslavia (as well now in the successor states) the word ‘nation or narod’ signifies what Americans view as ‘ethnic’. Also, in the Constitutions as well as in public usage there is the well established word ‘people or narod’ that refer to the ‘nation(s)’ that again in the North America means ‘ethnic’. In Yugoslav official and common vocabulary we find words ‘narod and narodnosti’ where the former refers to people/nation and the latter to nationalities or national minorities. See Djilas, 1996; Hayden, 1996 and Samary, 1995.
consequence, people who are against fanatical nationalism or ethnic and religious divisions, that is, the anti-nationalists, those who are from ‘mixed’ marriages or ‘mixed children’ as well as those who declare(d) themselves as ‘Yugoslavs’ and recently ‘Eskimos,’ are invisible victims of the civil war and its ethnic cleansing. As well, these Yugoslavs, Eskimos, and Bosnians (in this context the latter refers to anti-nationalistically oriented Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs as well the other Bosnian nationalities) are excluded from Canada’s multiculturalist agenda for three basic reasons: practical ‘non-existence’ due to media exclusion, being a small group incapable of leadership and the existence of Serbian, Croatian, etc., ethnic communities.

I argue that the fact that Yugoslavia’s various nations and nationalities (narodi and narodnosti) were increasingly intermingled and their people increasingly considered themselves to be Yugoslavs in combination with the history of the peaceful coexistence, particularly after the atrocities committed in the W.W.II, is proof of the opposite maintained and propagated truth. I claim that these people who are anti-nationalists and of mixed ethnic origins/families, particularly the Yugoslavs and Bosnians or ‘Eskimos’, are a living disproof of both the ‘artificiality’ of Yugoslavia as the imagined community and the historically rooted ethnic hatreds and aggressive-chauvinist nationalism. According to the Western media reports, the ancient hatreds and the ethnic nationalism were the only cause and reason for the dismemberment of the former Yugoslavia. First of

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12 The term ‘Eskimos’ is meant in an entirely positive sense as Samary also points out. She dedicates her book Yugoslavia Dismembered (1995) to all friends of all nations and nationalities from the former Yugoslavia, including those that have resisted the ethnic/national division of Yugoslavia/Bosnia, and have chosen rather to declare themselves as ‘Eskimos’, instead of Serbs, Croats or Muslims, in the last Census in 1991.
all, I argue that these people who did not perceive Yugoslavia as an artificial country or as unstable due to ancient hatreds, particularly the mixed families combined by the old and new undesirable national minorities, are the majority of the civilian war’s victims and refugees. Secondly, due to their (purposeful or accidental?) ‘invisibility’ and exclusion from the framework of multiculturalism in Canada, these people who lived and believe(d) in peaceful multinational coexistence consequently lack the appropriate multi-ethnic community organization in their ‘new homeland’.

These people, that is, the Yugoslavs, or people who believed in the Yugoslav idea which promoted ‘civic’ nationalism based on the socialist internationalism that transcended ‘ethnic’ nationalism\(^\text{13}\), the Bosniangs who were and are still against ethnic and religious divisions, and the mixed families/children, challenge(d) the nonsense of the ethnic divisions and ‘purification’ of the nations presented by scholars, media and politicians as the ‘ancient hatreds’ conflict. As I have already mentioned, some of these people resisted the whole process by declaring themselves sarcastically to be ‘Eskimos’ in the latest census of 1991\(^\text{14}\). Ironically, these Yugoslav Eskimos, now also ‘Canadians’,

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\(^\text{13}\) One illustrative example is the popular official slogan “svoje nedamo, tudje necemo” meaning “we protect and keep what is ours and we don’t want what belongs to others”. As I argue in the second chapter, the national identity of ‘Yugoslavs’ as the seventh nation of Yugoslavia was based on ‘supranationality’ of Yugoslavism. Even though ‘Yugoslavs’ were composed of ethnic Serbs, Croats, Muslims, etc., they were a political nation that was above ethnic nationalism.

\(^\text{14}\) Although it is beyond the scope of my analysis, I stress that these people, i.e., the declared and undeclared ‘Yugoslavs’ or simply people who believed or loved socialist Yugoslavia, represent the vast majority of the former Yugoslavia’s population. In other words, people might want socio-economic and political change but not national divisions and civil wars. This majority did not want or support the break up of Yugoslavia. Crnobrnja points out in his analysis of the role of the “Intelligentsia and Nationalism in the Yugoslav Drama” that the idea of multi-party elections and a referendum throughout Yugoslavia based on the principle of “one person-one vote” was refused by the republican nationalist governments and intelligentsia (1995:135). Apparently, the citizens of the former Yugoslavia were ignored as the individuals and reduced to ethnic ‘nationals’, that is, the Serbs, the Croats, the Muslims, etc. This transition, or rather regression from the civic to ethnic nationalism, or the national homogenization, is best expressed by well-known Croatian/Yugoslavian intellectual, a writer Mme. Slavenka Drakulic, who states that “Being Croat has become my destiny ... I am defined by my nationality, and by it alone ... Along with millions of other Croats,
somehow envisioned, or symbolically predicted, their resettlement in Canada as the homeland of the real Eskimos, that is, the Inuit people. Interestingly, similarly to the meaning of 'Yugoslavs', which refers to the Yugoslav people(s), the national identity and term 'Inuit' also means 'people'. While 'Inuk' means 'a person', similarly 'Yugoslavs' were defined and considered themselves by personality, as persons, and never by nationality. Indeed, similarly to the Yugoslav national identity which included and referred to all nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia, the 'Bosnians' refer(ed) to all nations and nationalities living in Bosnia. Both national identities, the Yugoslavs and Bosnians were based on 'civil projects' in contrast to recent 'ethnic claims'.

Even more importantly, due to their non or misrecognition, the Yugoslavs, Bosnians and Eskimos together with other nationalities who all believe(d) in peaceful coexistence, that is, all those who were/are against the recent break up and the ethnic division of Yugoslavia, these refugees (and immigrants in general) are lacking in their new life in Montreal the multi-ethnic Yugoslav community organization in their languages that would be inclusive to all nations and nationalities from the former Yugoslavia. Therefore, I argue that if we do not understand or know who the refugees are from the former Yugoslavia and what happened to them, then we cannot understand the impact of resettlement in Canada nor what their main problems and obstacles in

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I was pinned to the wall of nationhood - not only by outside pressure from Serbia and the Federal Army but by national homogenization within Croatia itself. That is what the war is doing to us, reducing us to one dimension: the Nation. The trouble with this nationhood, however, is that whereas before, I was defined by my education, my job, my ideas, my character - and, yes, my nationality too - now I feel stripped of all that. I am nobody because I am not a person any more. I am one of 4.5 million Croats ... I am not in a position to choose any longer. Nor, I think, is anyone else ... there is no escape ... One doesn't have to succumb voluntarily to this ideology of the nation - one is sucked into it. So right now, in the new state of Croatia, no one is allowed not to be a Croat" (Slavenka Drakulic, The Balkan Express: Fragments from the other Side of War, New York: W.W. Norton, 1993, pp. 50-2. Cited in Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed, [1996] 1999, p. 20, my emph.
rebuilding a new life and home are. For this reason, it is impossible to separate past, present and future if one wants to understand who the refugees are from Yugoslavia/Bosnia and their current life and urban experience in Montreal.

In order to elaborate these claims and provide the necessary theoretical and empirical support and evidence, I have divided this paper into five chapters that are interrelated and together make a comprehensive whole. As my theoretical approach is primarily a method of deduction, I will first demonstrate some aspects of the broader theoretical, historical, economic and political background of the Yugoslav Drama and Saga, and then apply it to the particular issues pertaining to the life experiences of Bosnian refugees in multicultural Canada and their participation in Montreal’s urban culture.

To sum up, while the first chapter provides a literature review on theories of the nation and nationalism, the second one examines their application in the Yugoslavian context. This theoretical background is necessary and crucial for understanding the complexity of the national question in Yugoslavia and the role of ethnic nationalism in the Yugoslav drama. The third chapter is a brief summary of the historical and political background of Balkanization, particularly the external one that is identical with the old and new world orders, that is, the ‘Divide and Rule’ politics that embrace the division of the territories of Yugoslavia, and the Balkans at large. This legacy of continual conflict due to external Balkanization and its impact on the current crisis/war (1991-ongoing) will be further linked to the geography of ethnic cleansing in the next chapter. The fourth chapter then describes the heterogeneous ethnic/national composition of the republics of the former Yugoslavia, and consequent various identities of refugees from Bosnia that
immigrated to Canada/Montreal. The last chapter exposes the correlation between the
destiny of these refugees and the first Europeanapatridese, both the 'undesirables'. This
historical and political analysis of the phenomenon of 'the statelessness and/or
homelessness' provides a necessary theoretical approach to the refugees' problematic as
well as the additional link between macro or global level, and micro level or lifeworld of
refugees. This chapter also explores some of the positive and negative implications of
multiculturalism and its impact on the life and urban experience of Bosnian/Yugoslav
refugees in Montreal. Finally, I will also identify some main difficulties and obstacles to
faster and better integration into Québec society. Besides these main directions and
arguments, each chapter also includes some additional sub-discussions about related
issues in order to avoid over-simplification of such complex social settings and
phenomena.

a) Methodology and Research Design

My methodology is a combination of historical comparative research and survey
research, or a combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches and data. This
combination of historical comparative and exploratory study embraces the method of
interviewing, historical and comparative analyses, as well as the method of observation
and participation (Neuman, 1997). Having in mind the historical fact and argument of
various authors (Baudson, 1996; Hayden, 1996; Samary, 1995) that Bosnia was 'a mini

15 For my methodology and research design see more details in Neuman, Lawrence W. Social Research
Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches, 1997 (1991), in particular chapters 2, 6, 9, 10, 13 and
15.
Yugoslavia’ in terms of its multinational and multicultural social structure, I focus my sampling frame on Bosnian refugees as the best representation of the social and cultural multi-reality of the former Yugoslavia. In order to better illustrate the relationship between the background and life experience of refugees from Bosnia, I interviewed people with various national origins and identities, that is, nationally ‘mixed’ (between Serbs and Croats and between Serbs and Muslims) and ‘pure’ families (Serbian and Muslim ones). I maintain that this ethnic diversity of the respondents will contribute to the accuracy of my research.

Thus, I primarily explore the correlation between the different or alternative (that is not mainstream) points of view of the authors and the opinions and experiences of refugees from the former Yugoslavia. In order to do so, I conducted face-to-face interviews with seven respondents from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Four spouses of these respondents as well as one adult child also participated bringing the total number of respondents to twelve. Although this small strategic sample, is not a representative one, I suggest that we take seriously into account their voices as they are an exemplary representation of the socio-political complexity of Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia at large. In particular, due to the fact that these people actually and apparently represent the multinationality and cultural diversity of Yugoslavia and especially Bosnia. With regards to my historical comparative method, a historical retrospective of the external Balkanization, or ‘Divide and Rule’ politics in the Balkans, will show that Yugoslavs were in the first lines of the ‘new wave’ of migrations of modern refugees and apatrids at the beginning of the XXth century.
Initially, I envisioned a much bigger sample (15-20 respondents) that would include refugees from throughout the former Yugoslavia. However, I realized very soon that the data is quite inaccessible due to both the confidentiality of official documents as well as the unwillingness of people to participate in such a study. Also, after reviewing the most updated version of the existing Citizenship and Immigration Statistics 1996 (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 1999) about immigration flows of refugees, I noticed that Bosnia was the first among the top ten countries in 1996. There were 4,963 refugees (out of 28,271) who had their last permanent residence in Bosnia, of which 1,460 had Quebec as their intended destination. This data far exceeds the second largest flow of refugees, that is, 1,797 people from Afghanistan\textsuperscript{16}. This ‘popularity’ of Bosnia in combination with the limited space and purpose of this research, the inaccessibility of data and the representative multi-ethnic portrait of Bosnia are the main reasons for both my focus on respondents from Bosnia and the smaller research sample.

Regarding the above mentioned problem of inaccessibility of data I need to point out that the reluctance to participate in the study is due to different reasons. People have little leisure time, they are too busy and nobody likes participating in surveys, and in particular, people are unwilling to talk about themselves, and their present or past life, or problems. After several initial refusals for interviews, I was nevertheless successful in finding respondents because I personally know a lot of them\textsuperscript{17}. Also, it is important to mention that all of the respondents were uncomfortable with the idea of recording the

interview even though I assured them that their participation was completely confidential. As I was told, none of them liked to be ‘recorded’, because the presence of a tape-recorder is too official and serious, and as such, constrains their spontaneity. I suggest that ‘fear of talking’ could also be one of the (unspoken/silent) reasons for the unwillingness to participate in the study. Although all respondents were happy to help me in my research, I maintain that refugees from the former Yugoslavia are a particularly sensitive social group and are unwilling to participate in surveys. Keeping in mind that these people are reluctant to give personal information I designed the questionnaire primarily as aggregate categories for all demographic data in order to emphasize the confidentiality and impersonality of data. I also excluded as irrelevant for the research any identifying categories, such as names of places or persons.

The question order is designed in a manner that provides a chronological and a comfortable flow and atmosphere (see Appendix I). Thus, the introductory demographic questions are followed by more personal questions about some aspects of life in the former Yugoslavia and reasons and circumstances of the arrival to Canada. The second set of questions relates to the urban experience in the city of Montreal as a central part of the questionnaire. The concluding set of questions include more delicate questions about national identity and citizenship issues. On the one hand, all respondents felt comfortable in answering the questions and there is statistically insignificant missing data. On the other hand, all of the interviews took more time than I had predicted due to several reasons: participation of more than one respondent, writing instead of recording and

17 I met many newcomers/refugees from the former Yugoslavia during 1995/1996 while working in CSAI (Centre Social d’Aide aux Immigrants) as well in private circles. I only met one family interviewed through CSAI.
different interruptions that enhanced the comfortable atmosphere (cooking lunch, drinking coffee, telephone calls, childcare). To sum up, I designed the questionnaire in a manner that would primarily explore issues relating to their experience of war and the immigration process, in particular in terms of their human, civil and social rights. I maintain that comparison between current everyday life in Montreal and the former Yugoslavia prior to the civil war (although incomparable in some aspects due to complete different settings and/or social systems: capitalism vs. socialism) will better illustrate some aspects of refugees’ life histories that are essential for understanding their current life in Montreal.
CHAPTER ONE: Theories of Nation and Nationalism:

Primordialism and Constructivism

My goal in this chapter is to offer a theoretical framework for a better understanding of the complexity of the national question in Yugoslavia (1918-) and the Yugoslav drama, that is, the external and internal factors that contributed to the collapse of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. While this chapter provides a literature review of the theories of nation and nationalism, the next chapter demonstrates the origins of the Yugoslav idea of the unification of all the South Slavs (meaning Yugoslavs) in a common state. The following concise overview of some basic concepts (the nation, ethnicity, national versus ethnic minority) as well as of the theories of nationalism is designed to contribute to my historical and sociological analyses of the national question in Yugoslavia, in particular regarding the main issue, that is, was Yugoslavia dismembered due to the ‘ancient hatreds’ thesis as advocated by the primordialist school or due to the ‘artificiality of imagined community’ as constructivists argue?

1.1 Literature Review: Ethnicity, Nation and Nationalism

I begin this chapter with Kai Nielsen (1999), who is in favor of a liberal nationalism and a “pluralistic multiculturalism” (27) that, in his view, are “compatible” (10) modern movements. For him, multiculturalism is a “social fact” (17). He thus advocates the emergence of multi-nation states based on equal partnership of the nations
as well as the integration without assimilation for cultural minorities (31). Nielsen’s
definition of a nation implies:

“a people who constitute a political community. A nation is a group of
people with a) a distinctive history, distinctive traditions, customs,
typically, but not always (e.g. the Scots), with a distinctive language, ...
with a distinctive encompassing (societal) culture and b) as well, with a
sense that they are a people sustaining or seeking some form of self-
governance. To be a nation a people will almost invariably inhabit a
territory which they regard as their homeland or, if in Diaspora, they will
have an aspiration to inhabit a place that will become their homeland”
(1999:9).

Nielsen argues that there are “nationalisms and nationalisms” (8), that is, there
are “bad and good nationalisms” (10) considering that “some forms are barbaric and
vicious, others are liberal and tolerant” (9). Thus, Nielsen radically distinguishes between
“good or liberal nationalism” and “bad or ethnic nationalism” (10). Ethnic nationalism is
a non- liberal one because it demands membership in the nation that is marked “by
descent”, or “blood”, and therefore, it is “incompatible with universalism or
cosmopolitanism” (9) as well with multiculturalism. For Nielsen, ethnic nationalism is
“barbaric ... xenophobic, exclusionist, typically racist”, with a tendency of engagement
“in genocide and ethnic cleansing”, if there is an “opportunity” (9). In contrast to the
ethnic nationalism that is “incompatible with a cosmopolitan morality” (15), Nielsen
argues that in modernity we also have liberal nationalism, which is at once
particular/local and universal/cosmopolitan. In other words, it is committed
simultaneously to “near and dear” (particularism) and to “pluralism and tolerance”
(universalism) (8, 10). In this sense, liberal nationalism is open and tolerant as national
membership (nationality) is not attained through descent but through “cultural
attunement, a willingness to accept membership in the nation and to recognize others similarly attuned and similarly inclined as members” (Nielsen, 1999:10).

For Nielsen, although not “as common as ethnic nationalism”, liberal nationalism is our modern reality. He provides the example of the independence struggles of Norway and Iceland from Sweden and Denmark that were carried out “within the framework and parameters of liberal democracy” (10). For this reason, he is in favor of Quebec separation from Canada as Québécois see themselves as a ‘people’ and they struggle to become a ‘nation’ within a framework of liberal, non-violent, nationalism. Nielsen claims that, “the struggle for Quebec sovereignty is intense and bitter, as was the struggle for Norwegian and Icelandic sovereignty, but it will be fought out within the limits of liberal democracy alone. However it gets settled, if it ever gets settled, it will be settled with words and votes and not guns and tanks”. For Nielsen then, Quebec nationalism, as well as African-American nationalism, are “reasonable manner in the spirit of cosmopolitanism, fallibilism, ethical universalism and liberal nationalism” (1999:11). Although the level of national awareness and consciousness differ between Quebeckers and African-Americans, both groups see themselves as a people, thus having legitimate claim to become a nation. In Nielsen’s words,

“African-Americans are by now, and have been for a long time, a people and as a people they could aspire to some form of political community with some form of self-governance ... There is a subjective factor that is also crucial to nationhood, namely that to be a nation, people must see themselves as a people, as a nation ... Moreover, to recognize that you are a people is to recognize that you can become a nation (a political community)” (1999:12).
Nielsen further maintains that nations are distinct from ethnic groups, or immigrants, who seek to integrate without assimilation and “without political aspirations to form a distinct political community”. Nations, according to Nielsen, are “also distinct from national minorities”, that is people who he defines as “historically located in a nation and as a distinct part of that nation, but who have as well another encompassing (societal) culture which is that of an adjacent nation (e.g. anglophones in Quebec and francophones in Ontario)” (1999:9). As the concepts of ‘nation’ and ‘ethnic group’ will be further elaborated, for now I proceed with the distinction between national and ethnocultural, or immigrant minorities. This distinction between the national and immigrant, or ethnic groups, is well explained by Will Kymlicka (1998) who analyzes the ethnocultural relations and limits of multiculturalism in Canada.

For Kymlicka, Canada is “a world leader in three of the most important areas of ethnocultural relations: immigration, indigenous peoples, and the accommodation of minority nationalism” (1998:2). In his examination of the “two major sources” of Canada’s increasing “ethnocultural diversity” (5), he points out that “the first source” contains the people “who were here before the British, namely the Aboriginal peoples and French Canadians” (1998:6). In this regard, Kymlicka maintains that a national minority is a “historical society, with its own language and institutions, whose territory has been incorporated (often involuntary, as is case with Quebec) into a larger country” (1998:2). He explains that Quebeckers, Puerto Ricans, Catalans and Flemish are “national minorities” because these groups “tend to view themselves as ‘nations’ and to form nationalist movements in defense of their language rights and collective autonomy ... and [these groups] have historically sought various forms of self-government so as to
maintain their status as culturally distinct and self-governing societies within the larger state” (1998:2, 6). The second major source of Canadian ethnocultural diversity is “mass immigration” as a common ground of both ethnocultural groups: the immigrant and ethnic. Although some ‘older’ immigrant groups such as Irish immigrants, or German Canadians or Ukrainian Canadians are perceived by many people, and themselves, as ‘ethnic groups’, their origins in Canada “lie in the act of immigration ... [and] these groups have very different histories from the ‘nations within’. They are the result not of the involuntary incorporation of complete societies settled in their historic lands, but of the decisions of individuals and families to leave their original homelands for a new life” (Kymlicka, 1998:7).

For this reason, Kymlicka uses concepts of an immigrant group and ethnic group interchangeably as both groups are “formed through acts of immigration” (7), which in the case of refugees or African-Americans was not voluntary (9). He distinguishes those ethnocultural groups from the Aboriginal and French-Canadian national groups. In Kymlicka’s words, “Historically, immigrant/ethnic groups have sought and achieved social and political integration in Canada — not self-government— although they have also wanted some accommodations of their ethnocultural distinctiveness” (1998:7). Kymlicka defines the ‘Canadian model’ of multiculturalism as an approach and policy that accommodates those ethnocultural groups. In his examination of the limits of multiculturalism, he claims that “multiculturalism is working well, and fears of ethnocultural separatism are misplaced” (1998:10).

He points out however that Canada is more successful in dealing with accommodation of “immigrant ethnicity than in accommodating minority nationalism”
(11). He notes that the accommodation of national differences in Canada "is not particularly promising" in spite of strong disagreement of both the Québécois and Aboriginal peoples with the established model of "symmetrical federalism", or "the national unity strategy" (10). Although Kymlicka is not "very optimistic" about the model of multi-nation federalism advocated by both groups, he admits that "it may be our only chance to keep Canada together" (1998:11). According to Kymlicka,

"In recent years, both the Québécois and Aboriginal peoples have strongly asserted their distinctive national identities. For them, Canada is a single country that contains more than one 'nation': their citizenship is Canadian, but their national identity is Québécois, Cree, etc. As a result Canada is sociologically speaking, a 'multination' state, and like all multination states it must find a way to accommodate minority nationalisms ... The sort of 'multination' federalism desired by most Québécois and Aboriginal people rests on a model of federalism fundamentally opposed to the model of symmetrical federalism that is endorsed by the (non-Aboriginal, non-Québécois) majority in Canada" (1998:10).

In a chapter entitled "Putting Multiculturalism into Perspective" Kymlicka further elaborates the differences between the ethnic and civic nations as well between national minorities and immigrant/ethnic groups. He maintains that while "ethnic nations take the reproductions of a particular ethnonational culture and identity, as one of their most important goals", on the other hand, "civic nations, by contrast, are 'neutral' with respect to the ethnicultural identities of their citizens, and define national membership purely in terms of adherence to certain principles of democracy and justice" (1998:26). While national minorities have always resisted integration and "rejected the idea" of accepting a majority language, immigrants "have historically accepted state pressure to integrate" (Kymlicka, 1998:28). Therefore, national minorities in Canada and in other Western countries have historically resisted integration and fought for self-government. In this
regard, Kymlicka defines national minorities as “historically settled, territorially concentrated, and previously self-governing cultures whose territory has become incorporated into a larger state. Such groups include the Québécois and Aboriginal people in Canada, the Puerto Ricans and American Indians in US, and Flemish, Catalans, Saami, and Basques in Europe” (1998:30).

In terms of “an ambitious nation-building project” (34), Kymlicka argues that, inside and outside Canada, it “is found only in non-immigrant national minorities” (35). In contrast, immigrant groups have typically integrated into dominant culture. He states that “one reason” is that immigrants have “voluntarily left their own cultures [homelands] with the expectation of integrating into a different national society”. Kymlicka asserts that another reason is that immigrants have arrived “as individuals or families, rather than as entire communities”, and therefore they “typically lack territorial concentration or corporate institutions needed to form a linguistically distinct society alongside the mainstream society”. He maintains that multiculturism in all its forms is not a separatist movement as none of its programs are related to the project of nation-building or the logic of self-governing territories. In his words, “immigrants are very different from national minorities, for whom nation-building threatens a culturally distinct society that already exists and has functioned for generations. Historically, the nationalist option has been neither desirable nor feasible for immigrants” (35). Kymlicka states that “while national minorities have resisted integration ..., immigrants have accepted the expectation of integration” (35, 36), with exception in the case of colonialism where “colonial settlers did not see themselves as ‘immigrants’, since they
had no expectation of integrating into another culture: rather they aimed to reproduce their original society in a new land” (1998:37).

Returning now to theories of the nation and nationalism, Craig Calhoun (1997), who belongs to the so-called constructivist school of sociology and anthropology, points out that none of the offered definitions of the nation “has ever gained general acceptance” (127, note 1). In contrast to Nielsen’s radical division of good and bad nationalisms, Calhoun claims that “Nationalism comes in manifold forms, some benign and reassuring and others terrifying. Social scientists have sometimes been tempted to try to analyze ‘good’ nationalism, or patriotism, and ‘bad’ nationalism, or chauvinism, as though they were completely different social phenomena”. For Calhoun, this distinction “obscures their commonalities” and confuses our understanding of “both positive and negative manifestations of national identity and loyalty”. In an extremely constructivist manner, he argues that nationalism is “a discursive formation”, and therefore, “national identity and loyalty are shaped by the common discourse of nationalism” (1997:3).

He maintains that nationalism is a distinctive modern phenomenon. In Calhoun’s words, it is “a way of constructing collective identities that arose alongside transformations in state power, increased long-distance economic ties, new communications and transportation capacities, and new political projects”. In spite of the modernity of nationalism, he argues that it is “important analytically to distinguish nationalism from ethnicity..., and both from kinship..., since ethnicity is often presented as an extension of kinship and nationalists commonly present nations as large families sharing bonds of culture and descent” (1997:29). In this regard, he points out that there are “two mutually exclusive claims to explain nationalism by ethnicity and claims to
explain it by state building and self-interested elite mobilization”. For this reason, as Calhoun notes, “the literature on nationalism” is respectively divided between the primordialist approach and the constructivist or instrumentalist approach (30). According to Calhoun, while primordialists emphasize historical “continuities between modern national cultures and their antecedents, ... [particularly] like family and ethnic bonds” (30), in contrast, constructivists “underestimate the power of culture” (32). They rather emphasize “the historical and sociological processes by which nations are created”, in particular the role of nationalist elites whose “leaders often manipulate [and mobilize] ... their followers ... on the basis of nationalist ideology (Calhoun, 1997:30).

In his analysis of “kinship, descent, ethnicity and nationality”, Calhoun argues that even though “modern nations often have historical roots in old ethnic identities” (36), nevertheless, in his view, “nationalism is a different way of thinking about collective identity from ethnicity, and ethnicity itself is only one aspect of the way most collective identities were organized in the past” (37). He maintains that “closely related, but more basic and pervasive, was the rhetoric of kinship and descent”. He argues that all “peoples on the earth” historically have connected to and identified with “each other through kinship and descent”, that is, through “marriages..., parentage, families, ... inheritance and collective identitiy through either paternal lines, maternal lines, or both”. Moreover, the role of these relations is different in modern Western societies than in “traditional and relatively low-technology societies”, such as, for example, Northern Ghana where “kinship and descent are ... the basic organizing principles for nearly all of social life”. Calhoun points out that although “the modern claim to nationhood is often evoked through the language of kinship and descent ... it is misleading to use the
language of kinship and descent to characterize nations” (1997:37). He provides an example of contemporary Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia arguing that although kinship and family are valued and more important “in organizing social life than, say, in England, the United States or Australia ..., they are not the template of the whole social order” as in traditional societies.\(^{18}\) (1997:38).

For Calhoun, “nationalist rhetoric” is distinctive in the sense that “(1) it can only be used for the country as a whole, and (2) ... the claims of the whole nation have clear priority over sectional claims”. In his words,

“Nationality, thus, becomes one large categorical identity that encompasses many smaller categories (‘tribes’, ethnic groups) each of which may be organized internally on the basis of further categories and complex networks of interpersonal relationships. Nationalist rhetoric posits whole categories of people without reference to their internal differentiation, or claims priority over all such internal differences; ideally typically, one is a member of a nation directly as an individual” (Calhoun, 1997:39).

Furthermore, the basic difference between a “tribe” and an “ethnic group” is that the former is centered on kin relations which are analytically irrelevant for the latter. Calhoun maintains that “kin are those to whom one is related by sharing either descent from a common ancestor or connection through marriage. Kinship, thus, can be used

\(^{18}\) As Calhoun explains, Tallensi of Northern Ghana organized society on the basis of kinship and descent that link them together, and “clans” which are exogamous organization of “kin relations between individuals ... [who] share common identities as equal members of a unitary whole” (39). In contrast, Orthodox Christians, Catholics and Muslims (Serbs, Croats and Bosnian Muslims) “are not taught to pray to their ancestors, but to God ... the office of president is not inheritable in any of the three countries”. Moreover, their economies are not based on kinship and descent, but on the “cash exchange, long-distance trade, and factories and other enterprises in which kinship is the basis of neither employment nor the organization of production”. While Tallensi are members of a segmentary lineage society where “all Tale lineages also fit into clans”, the Serbs, Croats and Muslims are members of “the nuclear family of parents and their children”, ranging from “a minimal lineage linking two or more such nuclear families under a common parent” up to maximal lineages of “ten to twelve generations distant common ancestors”. Thus, the nationalist rhetoric of Serbian or Croatian leaders implies that “we are one family”, but ‘we’ is not divided by any loyalty to smaller
inclusively to refer to the whole set of relationships and identities formed by affinal and consanguinal ties - ‘in-laws’ and ‘blood’” (1997:131, note 10). Ethnicity then, for Calhoun, is situated between kinship and nationality: it has “an intermediary position” that is “not simply an extension of kinship”, because it provides “more general links ... than kinship”. In other words, ethnic identities historically developed “wherever multiple groups have dealings with each other in a common territory” (Calhoun, 1997:40).

Thus, ethnic identities have emerged due to “the concentration of population in a city, the development of economic links beyond the local level, and/or the creation of a state, particularly an empire”, where distinct peoples had to deal “with each other or with the state itself”. As Calhoun maintains, “Internally, an ‘ethnic group’ may be organized in terms of kinship and descent or in terms of its own mix of categories and relations. Externally, vis-à-vis other ethnic groups or the state, it appears as a category of equivalently ‘ethnic’ members” (1997:40). Calhoun provides an example of the Romans who distinguished themselves from non-Romans, that is, the Jews, Greeks, Gauls and others. As well, the Ottomans dealt with Jews, Armenian Christians, Greek Christians and other communities. Calhoun maintains that “central authorities [in Roman and Ottoman empires] dealt with intermediary authorities” which were responsible for the internal organization of the population that was “of secondary (if any) concern to the center”. This “indirect rule” was central to the empires (Calhoun, 1997:41). In this sense, Calhoun notes that the root of the word “nation” comes from the Roman term “natio”, which in its original usage was equivalent to ethnicity as “it meant simply people of common ancestry and thereby common character” (1997:132, note 13).

or cross-cutting groups, that is, “there is no single, fixed unit so primary that a Tallensi would always think
On the one hand, Calhoun stresses that “the ethnic identities are like national identities, which also never stand alone”. In other words, “the boundary of the group requires internal similarity as much as external difference” (1997:42). On the other hand, he argues that ethnic identities differ as nationality is a modern identity that implies the notion of individualism. For him, the modernization of Europe “yielded ethnic groupings” as it was based on “both migration and gradual integration of regions into larger states”. As Calhoun argues, “While nations may have ideologies of common descent and shared kinship, they are organized primarily as categories of individual members, identified on the basis of various cultural attributes - common language, religion, customs, names, etc.”. He notes that modern Western thought understood nations as “being individuals”, thus existing “in and of themselves” (1997:44). In this regard, each nation, like individuals, is “indivisible ... and ... the bearer of a distinctive identity. Each nation had a distinct experience and character, something special to offer the world and something special to express for itself” (Calhoun, 1997:45).

For Calhoun, ethnicity is only one factor which helps to transform “a mere aggregate of persons” into “self-identified - people”. Ethnicity, according to Calhoun, does not provide sociocultural groups with the ingredient to become nations. Although ethnic groups promote “social solidarity” and a “common culture”, they do not have “a monopoly” over them as “collective identity is not precisely equivalent to or guaranteed by common culture”. In this regard, Calhoun provides the examples of Switzerland, Canada and the United States that have developed “political cultures - and consumer and media cultures - that are not reducible to the culture of any of the many ethnic groups of it” (Calhoun, 1997:38).
within them" (1997:48). These countries have developed distinct political cultures despite their internal ethnic differences. They show that although nationalism draws on and reflects previous ethnic identities and traditions, it also “transforms” them and “gives a new significance to cultural inheritance”. Thus, Calhoun argues that “ethnic roots and cultural distinctiveness are only aspects ... of the creation of modern nations”. He asserts that the United States demonstrates this claim as independence from Britain was won by “an ethnically heterogeneous” group composed by English, Scottish, Irish, Welsh, Dutch, French, descendants of African slaves and Native Americans. The United States also illustrates one of the distinct meanings between civic and ethnic nationalism as it “has retained a national identity even while absorbing a wide range of immigrants and allowing them to retain considerable ethnic distinctiveness. Part of the key is that the United States was conceptualized - at least in part - as a willed community, not just ethnic or other categorization” (Calhoun, 1997:49).

Therefore, Calhoun argues that “nationalism not only comes in many forms and contexts, but carries many different political and moral values”. It can mean modernization and unification as opposed to “backward” and “conflict-ridden tribalism” or “communalism”, or chauvinistic defense of the “virtues and interests of one’s own nation” (Calhoun, 1997:86). Calhoun rejects the division of positive/good and negative/bad nationalism and its discourse. He maintains that “the modern idea of nation grew up alongside the idea of democracy as part of an effort to base politics in the will of ‘the people’. The nation could be identified with the people of a country against their rulers - whether these were foreigners or simply monarchs who lacked popular support” (1997:87). In his analysis of “universalism and parochialism”, Calhoun points out that
"backward claims to ethnic localism, ... from the 1780s to the 1870s ... flourished as a liberal, cosmopolitan discourse emphasizing the freedom of all peoples". According to Calhoun,

"the discourse of nationalism is too basic and too wide-spread to pigeonhole as either positive or negative ... there is strong inclination among some groups of scholars to distinguish patriotism as 'good' love of country from nationalism as a 'bad' distortion. This is not only rooted in a general desire to maintain sharp distinctions between good and bad, but it reflects some of the history of nationalist discourse itself" (1997:86).

He further asserts that "early liberal nationalism" promoted loyalty to the nations, not to the kings and emperors, with the aim of achieving "self-determination, both in the sense of democratic self-rule ... and ... autonomy from the domination of other nations" (87). Calhoun states that "the liberal theory" labeled Western European experience as "patriotism" and the Eastern experience as "bad' nationalism" where the former implies people "with strong and stable national identities" and the latter has problematic or unstable identities (Calhoun, 1997:87, 88). Although Poles, Magyars and Germans might think of their nationalist projects as similar, or identical to the patriotism of French and English, their "emotionally disruptive and populist 'Eastern' nationalism" was in opposition to the "ideal type of relatively stable Western countries ... [with] benignly integrative 'Western' patriotism" (Calhoun, 1997:88). Calhoun explains that

"This West/East contrast is cognate with the opposition between 'political' or 'civic' nationalisms and 'cultural' or 'ethnic' nationalisms. In the former case, national identity is understood to be something established by legitimate membership in a constituted political state; members of the nation are understood first and foremost through their political identities as citizens. In the latter case, national identity is defined on the basis of some cultural or ethnic criteria distinct from, and arguably prior to, political citizenship" (1997:88-89).
Central to Calhoun’s argument against the division or classification of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ nationalisms is his claim that although Germans are the example of an ethnic or cultural nation and the French of ‘Western’ political or civic nationalism, they are not such different and “separate phenomena”. Calhoun argues that there is a civic component of ethnic nationalism, i.e., nationalism includes both concepts. In his words, “France and Germany, and all of Western and Eastern Europe, have been shaped by the international discourse of nationalism - including both ethnic claims and civil projects of popular political participation” (Calhoun, 1997:89).

Alexander Motyl (1999) takes a step further and completely discredits the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism. He enriches the debate about nation, nationalism and ethnicity by providing an interesting critique of both schools of sociology and anthropology, the primordialist and constructivist. Even though Motyl disagrees with both schools and their theories, he is against the recent division of good-constructivist and bad-primordialist theoretical frameworks. He criticizes the claim of the so-called constructivist school, advocated by Calhoun (1997) and Rogers Brubaker ([1996] 1999) among other scholars, that national identity, like the nation, is invented or imagined, or a category of practice where national identity and loyalty are shaped by the discourse of nationalism and by nationalist elites. Motyl eloquently argues that the constructivists’ proposition that national identity is constructed by elites is problematic, because elites are irrelevant to the emergence of national identity and for the transmission of national myths and national traditions. For Motyl, it is a “set of beliefs” and not elites that define national identity (1999:69-76).
Motyl states that “many established elites, the office holders, construct identity simply by ‘doing their job’, by ‘mindlessly’ following the rules, patterns, habits, and procedures prescribed by institutions” (1999:76). He further argues that although national identity is “a coherent package of propositions relating to historicity and boundaries” it does not “necessarily involve some sense of the past”. Motyl points out that even though historicity “provides a nation with a place in the flow of time, whereas boundaries grant it present-day distinctiveness ... national historicity can also be defined, and frequently has been defined, in terms of the future”. He provides the example of the XIXth century “Ukrainian socialists-turned-nationalists” who instead of emphasizing “the glorious history of the Ukrainian nation”, rather based themselves “on its glorious future”. For him, “historical place can be projected forward or backward into time; it can also be found in the present (1999:77). Therefore, Motyl argues that nations are

“groups of people who believe in two things: that their group, as a group, has a place in history, and that their group differs from other existing groups in ways other than historicity. If a national identity must consist of both sets of propositions, it can do so if and only if they fit together in a single propositional package. ... A nation, then, exists, or comes into being, when people sharing a lifeworld believe in a set of logically complementary propositions regarding historicity and otherness” (1999:77, 78).

Using the example of contemporary Ukrainians, Motyl strongly supports his claim that “the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism, ... or national identity”, is at least “confused”. The origins of the Ukrainian nation can be traced back “to the state of Kievan Rus,’ founded about a thousand years ago”. As well, the Ukrainians distinguish themselves from “‘the other’, the Russians”. Thus, Ukrainians fulfill both sets of national propositions, that is, they “claim historical legitimacy ... by claiming Rus’ and Kiev for
themselves ... [and] by differentiating themselves from Russians”. Motyl argues that “Inasmuch as these two complementary propositional sets exist in contemporary Ukraine and are believed by some of its inhabitants, they make of their believers a nation even if, as is indeed the case, many ‘Ukrainians’ might dispute their nationhood or prefer the term narod (people) to natsiia (nation)”. For this reason, Motyl argues that the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism is confusing as “all nations are ethnic nations, inasmuch as ethnicity and nationhood are conceptually synonymous”. Also, as all nations claim their “place in history” and to have certain boundaries, “all national identities are exclusionary”, even “constitutional patriotism”19 promoted by German intellectuals (Jürgen Habermas among them) as it applies only to “German-language speakers” (1999:78). Motyl stresses that

“the quality of being more or less exclusionary or inclusionary has nothing to do with whether a putative ethnicity underlies the putative nation, because there is ... no meaningful difference between an ethnic group (or ethnie) and a nation. Both entities accept propositions about their place in history and both draw boundaries. Even if we conclude that nations are merely ethnic groups writ large or modern-day ethnic groups, we still posit a fundamental continuity that overrides whatever differences may emerge in the course of time” (1999:78).

He asserts that nationalism is usually defined “as ideology, as social movement, or as group consciousness ... [or] as ideas, collective action, or culture”. For him, nationalism is placed in “ideology, ideas”, or in more general sense, “belief systems”. According to Motyl, “collective actions, like social movements, are the coordinated activities of groups”, and therefore, there is no difference between “a Fascist ... a Communist, Catholic or nationalist collective action” (1999:79). On the other hand,

19 See more details also in Calhoun (1997) and Brubaker ([1996] 1999)
nationalism "as culture, cultural identity, group consciousness, or ethnic solidarity" is even more problematic, because "everything involving culture or nationality" is not nationalism. Motyl argues that the awareness of one's "ethnic markers (language, color, religion, customs, etc.)" as well as "love" and "loyalty" to one's nation is not nationalism but "universally held ... communal sentiment[s]". He states that the reduction of nationalism to any of these forms would mean "the conversion of all human beings into nationalists" (1999:80). Therefore, he claims that

"If nationalism is neither action nor culture, all we are left with is belief system. That is, nationalism must be a specific type of belief, idea, doctrine, or ideology. ... Nationalism is not just any ideal, however, but a distinctly political ideal: that is, it posits certain political ends and highlights certain optimal political relationships. Nationalism, obviously, is about nations, but it is about much more than that as well. Nationalism connects nations with the 'essence' of the political - states - and claims that all nations should have their own political organizations in control of administration and coercion in some geographic space ... Nationalism is a political ideal that views statehood as the optimal form of political existence for each nation" (1999:80, my emph.).

In contrast to the constructivists who argue that nationalism is a modern phenomenon, Motyl emphasizes that there is nothing modern about a belief system. For him, nationalism is not necessary modern, because there can be "nations before nationalism and, ... even nationalism before nationalism" (1999:82), for example, ancient Greeks, Israelites and Romans\(^ {20} \). He maintains that even though "the origins of the self-

\(^ {20} \) It is important to note that the basis of word nation has a long history. According to Thomas Spira, "In ancient Roman times, natio meant a backward, exotic tribe, today's natives. During that period, civilized people were called gens. The Roman people, as the bearers of sovereignty, called themselves populus, or populace. In later ancient times, the Latin Vulgate designated natio and gens to refer to the Gentiles, or non-Romans, while the Romans continued to be called populus. In the ecclesiastical society of the Roman Catholic Church in the Middle Ages nation meant a specific territory and its people. The most important attributes of the medieval nation were common dialect, traditions and customs" (Nationalism and Ethnicity Terminologies: An Encyclopedic Dictionary and Research Guide. Volume 1. 1999, pp. 419-420). In this sense, like Romans, ancient Greeks, or Israelites, were nations and nationalists before modern age of

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styled ideal of nationalism” is located in the modern age (XVIIIth and XIXth century), there is nothing particularly modern about “a belief positing a relationship between groups of people sharing certain kinds of complementary propositions and a certain type of political organization” (1999:81). Motyl thus argues that while the “self-styled ideal nationalism” is undeniably modern, “it is possible to find instances of unself-styled nationalism in pre-nationalist times as it is possible to find nationalism among modern-day movements that sincerely reject the nationalist label (such as the non-Russian popular fronts in ‘support of perestroika’)” (1999:81, 82). For Motyl, it is unsustainable to claim that nationalism must be modern, because “nationalism, like the nation, exists whenever and wherever its defining characteristics exist” (1999:82).

Motyl further discredits both primordialist and constructivist theories. He points out that while the former claims that “any specific nation has existed immemorially” (83), thus “outside history” (85), or pre-historic nations, the latter claims that nation and nationalism, “like all other social constructs”, have been “imagined and invented” (83) by (nationalist) elites in the age of nationalism, thus having “no place in history” (1999:91). In contrast, Motyl argues that “nations exist wherever and whenever compatible propositions regarding historicity and boundaries exist within the belief set of some group of people”. He rightly points out that it is impossible to know what kind of logic and dynamic makes these propositions compatible, that is, when “the facilitating conditions” (will) become the “sufficient conditions” for the emergence of a nation. Rather, he asserts knowing that “national identity can come about as a result of elites and nationalism. These groups shared historicity and a certain type of political organization as well as distinctiveness from the ‘others’. In this sense, I argue that some of the Yugoslav nations were ‘old’ nations,
nonelites, acting and speaking as nationalists and as nonnationalists”. Therefore, central to Motyl’s argument is his claim that the formation of national identity could happened before the age of nationalism. For Motyl, the ancient Israelites, the Romans and the Byzantine Greeks were nations in the same sense as contemporary nations; they all had “national belief systems [that] provided them with a distinct place in time and space” as well as distinguishing themselves from “the other” - “barbarians” (1999:99). Motyl also argues that the nations flourished in recent centuries and not in the distant past due to “several ‘modern’ conditions [that] facilitate national identity formation - secularism, modernization, the market, the state, democracy, and nationalism (1999:100). He states that,

“These six conditions may explain why nations have multiplied with modernity; if so, they also suggest that nations are likely to be with us for a long time to come (102) ... We can, in sum, expect nationalism to grow in intensity as modern states become even more modern and unmodern states embark on the road to modernity... modernity can only continue to breed nationalism” (1999:113, my emph.).

For Motyl, these two schools of thought are not “monolithic theories” that stand in “binary opposition” to each other, but rather “variegated sets of related theoretical approaches”. He maintains that primordialism and constructivism “only as monoliths” must involve bipolar opposition, that is, while the former implies “undifferentiated notions of immutability, objectiveness, timelessness, and naturalness”, the latter must involve “similarly undifferentiated notions of mutability, subjectiveness, temporal boundedness, and artificiality” (1999:83). Thus, Motyl argues that their “commonalities

thus they were ‘nations before nations’ as they existed before modernity, or the age of nationalism. This claim will be further elaborated in the next chapter.
conceal differences that are no less important" (1999:84). He states that there are three dimensions along which both approaches to the nation differ:

"First, with respect to how nations are caused, all primordialisms contend that they are not purposefully constructed—or not necessarily constructed—by self-conscious nation builders. Second, with respect to where nations are located in time, all primordialisms countenance the possibility that nations could have emerged before what Ernest Gellner calls the 'age of nationalism'—a period that began sometime between the English Revolution of 1688 and the French Revolution of 1789 and that continues to this day—and may exist, or even emerge, in the future. Third, with respect to the properties of nations, all primordialisms argue that, because they are not easily susceptible to elite manipulation, they are more or less stable. In contrast, all constructivisms argue that nations are constructed, invented, or imagined in the age of nationalism by constructors, inventors, or imaginers" (1999:83-84).

Motyl analyzes both theoretical approaches in their weak, strong and extreme variations. While the extreme variants make "the most radical claims", weak primordialism is "the least radical", and the strong variants are "in-between" (1999:84). Thus, he argues that for extreme primordialism, "nations are temporally transcendent human communities with immutable properties immanent in life itself. Extending from the distant past, through the present, and into the distant future, nations effectively are outside history". The extreme variants are often presented as the "'ancient hatreds thesis' (or ... 'Dark Gods theory'), [that] are also entrenched among journalists and policy makers". Motyl points out that according to this thesis, the recent war in Bosnia-Herzegovina is the struggle "between existentially hostile nations" (1999:85). Samuel Huntington is one of the most popular scholars who, in Motyl's words, "takes extreme primordialism to new heights by effectively attributing its characteristics to human communities that are even larger and more complex than mere nations. For all practical
purposes Huntington’s civilizations ... stand outside history, appear to have no identifiable cause, and do not change” (1999:86).

For Motyl, strong primordialism makes the less radical and uncompromising claim that “nations are human communities that, as the product of some conjunction of historical forces, possess not immutable but merely permanent properties”. This is a weaker variant of the ancient hatreds thesis that stresses “the importance of a political culture ... [that] involves a deeply ... rooted set of beliefs, attitudes, norms and significations” (1999:87). Thus, central to strong primordialism’s definition of the nation is that each nation has its distinct national political culture, or national character.

According to Motyl, weak primordialism is the most persuasive model, because in difference to all other variants of primordialism and all variants of constructivism, it claims that “nations are always and everywhere possible”, for example, in Serbia, Rome, or Sparta (1999:95). In other words, nations may exist in present, past and future as well as for brief or long periods of time. For this reason, Motyl argues that “the combination of theoretical self-restraint and open-endedness enables weak primordialism to propose an irenic alternative to primordialism’s claim that nations are virtually timeless and to constructivism’s claim that they are fleetingly contemporary” (1999:96). On the other hand, weak primordialism cannot provide a “grand theory”, or a “covering law”, of the nation due to “so much variation” in its claim that “the properties of nations are determined conceptually and are always possible historically” (Motyl, 1999:95).

Similarly to weak primordialism, weak constructivism is the least radical among constructivisms. According to Motyl, it modestly claims that “nations are substantialist human constructs that emerge ... only ... in modern times ... [in] the age of nationalism”
(Motyl, 1999:93). Although Motyl agrees that nations are human constructs, he argues that there is no reason to think that nations are constructed only by nationalist elites in nationalist times as is assumed by all constructivisms (1999:94).

However, in a more uncompromising stance, strong constructivism claims that “the nation is a malleable human community with properties that were created, invented, or imagined by self-styled nationalist elites pursuing conscious, goal-oriented action in nationalist—that is to say, modern—times”. As it claims the necessity of nationalist elites, strong constructivism is “perfectly compatible with most nationalist ideologies” (Motyl, 1999:89). However, Motyl argues that strong constructivism “cannot explain where nationalist elites come from” unless it explains them “historically” as strong primordialism could easily do by arguing that “a variety of historical forces transform nonnationalist elites suffering from ressentiment into nationalists”. As Motyl rightly points out, historical explanation may not be confined to the age of nationalism, and “the further back in history strong constructivism goes—as it must in order to account for nationalist elites and thereby salvage itself—the more it comes to resemble strong primordialism” (1999:90).

And finally, extreme constructivism, as that of Calhoun (1997) and Brubaker ([1996] 1999), even more radically, claims that although “nationalism as a discourse is ontologically real, nations, being contemporary discursive constructs, are only words. As such, the word nation is an empty signifier, lacking an empirical referent and having no real place in history” (Motyl, 1999:91). In contrast to the attractiveness of strong constructivism, this extreme variation is not interesting for nationalists. As Motyl notes, “Nationalists obviously would reject such a view, whereas postmodernists generally
would embrace it” (Motyl, 1999:92). In summary, Motyl concludes his analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of both schools by arguing that “extreme primordialism is no less preposterous than extreme constructivism, and strong primordialism is no less flawed than strong constructivism, whereas weak primordialism is only slightly less modest than weak constructivism” (1999:96).

1.2. Concluding Remarks

The above literature review on theories of nation and nationalism, including some definitions of the terms and concepts used in this study, has provided a necessary theoretical framework and background for better understanding of the next chapter that deals with the national question in Yugoslavia in regard to both schools of thought. As we have seen in this chapter, Motyl criticizes both schools, primordialist and constructivist, arguing that their claims are theoretically and empirically unsustainable. As I agree with his critique as well I find it very important and relevant for analyzing Yugoslavia’s context, I will further demonstrated its applicability in the next chapter. Also, Motyl maintains that primordialisms and constructivism they are not monolithic theories that are binary opposites, but rather related theoretical approaches. Although primordialism is theoretically discredited, Motyl disagrees with recent labeling of primordialism as “bad” versus “good” constructivism, because its differences with constructivism make it a valuable competitive force. In contrast to constructivisms’ claims, Motyl demonstrates that nationalism is not necessarily modern and that nationalist elites are “irrelevant” for the emergence of nations and nationalism. He also
discredits primordialisms’ claim that nations are life itself, involving timelessness, or being placed exclusively in the past. As we have seen, weak primordialisms’ claim that nations are “human collectivities with stable properties” implies that nations are “always and everywhere possible”. Although this is the most persuasive claim, Motyl maintains that “the claim that the properties of nations are determined conceptually and are always possible prevents weak primordialism from proffering a grand theory of the nation” (1999:95). In conclusion, I do agree with Motyl’s critique of both schools and particularly with his claim that it is impossible to know what kind of logic and dynamic ultimately makes “the facilitating conditions” become “the sufficient conditions” for the emergence of a nation. In the next chapter, I will apply both theoretical frameworks in Yugoslavia’s context.
CHAPTER TWO:  The National Question in Yugoslavia with regards to
Theories of Nation and Nationalism

In this chapter, my interdisciplinary theoretical approach primarily embraces historical and comparative analysis that in combination with an economic and political overview, presented in the next chapter, provide valuable insight into recent civil war in the former Yugoslavia and consequent massive displacement of its population. I argue that the Yugoslav crisis and war are due to both the external and internal forces, that is, the international involvement (particularly US and Germany) and the ethnic nationalism in its aggressive-chauvinist form. Both, the external and internal Balkanization are thus directly responsible for the civil war and its victims, particularly refugees - the survivors. For this reason, I claim that the theoretical framework of both schools of sociology and anthropology regarding ethnicity and nationalism, namely primordialism and constructivism, are insufficient for explaining the complexity of the national question in Yugoslavia and its dismemberment.

This chapter then, in addition to the previous one, provides a necessary multidisciplinary discussion about nationalism and its discourse, including common explanations and definitions of terms and concepts that I apply or use in my analysis of the recent civil, fraternal, war and the refugee crisis. As historic development of the national question in Yugoslavia is too complex and broad an issue, I recognize that a comprehensible analysis would require much more work. Although this question far exceeds the scope and the purpose of my analysis, nevertheless, it is important to provide a theoretical framework and a brief overview of the theories of nation and nationalism
that will ultimately open a debate about some basic issues regarding the collapse of Yugoslavia, such as: Was Yugoslavia a federation of nations or republics? Are the new successor states of Yugoslavia uni-national or multi-national? How does the notion of ethnic and civic nationalism fit into Yugoslavia’s context? What are the differences between the spirit of Yugoslavism and the recent ethnic nationalism? What are the basic differences between federal models of the former Yugoslavia and Canada?

2.1. *The Yugoslav Idea between Primordialism and Constructivism*

In returning now to the question of the former Yugoslavia, I argue that the theoretical frameworks of both schools of thought, primordialism and constructivism, are insufficient and inadequate for grasping the complexity of the case, that is its particular context. For this reason, I agree with Mihailo Crnobrnja who maintains that “It is not easy to hold together all the elements necessary to a comprehensive study of *what went wrong*. But then nothing about Yugoslavia is really easy. Answers to some very important, fundamental questions can be reached only by complex analysis” (1994:9). If such a complex analysis is beyond the scope of this chapter and thesis as a whole, nevertheless, my goal is to explore and present some historical, economic and political elements that are important parts of the external and internal environment surrounding the collapse of Yugoslavia. Even though both schools of thought are not completely nor necessarily wrong in their analyses of the Yugoslav drama, I argue that both approaches fail to grasp the complexities of the dissolution of Yugoslavia.
For the purpose of my analysis, which focuses on the failure of both schools to provide a comprehensive analysis of Yugoslavia, it is not so important whether they are compatible and related theoretical approaches in Motyl’s sense, or if they are a presupposed binary opposition of two monolithic theories. I concentrate instead on recent and historical empirical evidence in order to explore reasons why both schools failed to appropriately explain the complexity of the national question and recent civil war in Yugoslavia. I argue that the Yugoslav crisis/war can simultaneously ‘fit’ into the theoretical frameworks and explanations of both and neither of these schools, because nationalism was not the only reason and cause for its collapse. Even though we can find some historical evidence to support both theses (e.g., history of genocide, the collapse of communism in Europe/Yugoslavia in the late 1980s, the ‘ethnic vote’ in the 1990/1991 and low percentage of declared ‘Yugoslavs’), I argue that their arguments are too limited to grasp and explain the real causes of the dismemberment of Yugoslavia.

Indeed, Yugoslavia was not dismantled exclusively due to ‘the ancient hatreds’ between its nations and nationalities as primordialists argue, nor because it was an artificial ‘imagined community’ that as such had to dismember as constructivists explain. If both, or any of these, claims would be such an imperative, Yugoslavia(s) would not have existed for the past 80 years. In particular, it would not have been able to enjoy such international respect as a socialist-communist country that, furthermore, was also one of the founders of both the United Nations and the Non-Alignment Movement, the latter established as the ‘third way’ in the antagonistic and hostile Cold War bipolarity of the world, or as the anti-blocque international policy of the ‘peaceful and active coexistence’.
Thus, I agree with Crnobrnja who points out that the end of communism in Europe was also marked by the dramatic and violent collapse of Yugoslavia, a country "which only a few years ago not only seemed to be but was stable, reasonably prosperous and certainly very interesting as a maverick in the socialist camp, became engulfed in a destructive, ultra-nationalistic and national-chauvinistic turmoil which has left deep scars and wounds and untold inflicted suffering on the population" (Crnobrnja, 1995:131). The historical and political analyses of Crnobrnja and other presented authors suggests that "nationalism was a necessary but not sufficient condition for the destruction of Yugoslavia" (Crnobrnja, 1994:6). As ethnic nationalism was not a sufficient condition, both schools fail to explain the real causes and circumstances under which Yugoslavia was dismembered. In contrast to both of these schools, I argue that there is neither sufficient historical evidence for the 'ancient hatreds' thesis nor for the constructivist view that the Yugoslav idea was defeated exclusively because it was an artificial 'imagined community'. I claim instead that Yugoslavia was dismembered due to a multitude of external and internal factors, which will be further elaborated in the next chapters that deal with both external and internal Balkanization. For now, my aim is to contribute to the debate about nationalism and the dismemberment of Yugoslavia.

First of all, I also agree with Crnobrnja who maintains that the end of the "Yugoslav Drama" is still not close\textsuperscript{21}, nor is "the necessary historical distance to objectively and dispassionately explain, judge and evaluate the processes and the forces which have brought about this tragic outcome" (1995:131, my emph.). I maintain that Crnobrnja's (1994, 1995) historical and political perspective with regard to the
aggressive nationalism is anti-primordialist for sure, and to some extent it could be seen as constructivist. With regards to the ancient hatred thesis advocated by primordialism, Crnobrnja’s anti-primordialism is well expressed in his claim that “mutual antagonism and aggression” among Yugoslav nations are not so ancient, but rather recent phenomena, i.e., within XXth century (1994:6). He argues instead that the Yugoslav community failed due to several reasons\textsuperscript{22}, of which the foremost is “the question of borders”, that is, the non-correspondence between the ethnic borders with the administrative borders of the republics. The fact that they were of administrative nature and not ethnic or national\textsuperscript{23} is the principal cause of the violent, and not peaceful, dissolution of Yugoslavia (Crnobrnja, 1994:10). Similarly to Robert Hayden (1996), Crnobrnja (1994) maintains that the aggressive nationalism and the failure of Yugoslavia as an ‘imagined community’ are the major reasons for dissolution. Although Crnobrnja does not use the same term ‘imagined community’, he uses concepts that echo Hayden’s ‘constructivist’ approach.

\textsuperscript{21} neither when he wrote this article, entitled “Intelligentsia and Nationalism in the Yugoslav Drama” (1995), nor now, particularly due to the extension of the war across the Macedonian border.

\textsuperscript{22} Although I find that Crnobrnja (1994) underestimates the importance of the foreign dimension in the Yugoslav Drama, in both economic and (geo)political sense, nevertheless, his historical-political analysis is very powerful and objective. More importantly, I find the following remarks very appropriate, perhaps more than ever, because as in 1994 it is also now true that “The final curtain has not yet fallen on the Yugoslav Drama. We are still in the thick of it. That is why the most important set of questions concerns what the future will bring. There is, of course, no crystal ball that will provide a sure and definite answer. Even if we know and understand the unfolding of the drama so far, there is no knowing with certainty how events will evolve. All we can say for sure is that the three principal factors - nationalism, political structures, and the foreign dimension - will again determine the final outcome. But what the outcome will be and how it will be achieved remains a matter of speculation and assumption” (Crnobrnja, 1994:11, my emph.).

\textsuperscript{23} Indeed, except Slovenia, all other republics were ethnically mixed, or multinational. Moreover, we will see in the following chapters that in addition to the fact that republics were composed of more than one nation, their various nations and nationalities were increasingly intermingled, particularly in Bosnia which had the highest rate of mixed marriages and children of mixed origins. These ‘mixed people’ were, and still are, the core of the Yugoslav national identity as they usually declared themselves as ‘Yugoslavs’. Of course, ‘Yugoslavs’ were/are not exclusively people of mixed national origins.
Crnobrnja’s valuable analysis of the external and internal factors and "actors" of/in The Yugoslav Drama maintains that this drama is a "story of a national awakening and the victory of aggressive nationalism ... [that] led to the dismantling of a country and a vicious and bloody civil war". According to Crnobrnja, aggressive nationalism is "the moving spirit of the drama, if not its principal actor". For him, "nationalism is an amplified expression of a national awakening and consequent national movement towards attainment of certain goals" (1994:3). He points out that "some Yugoslav nations, most notably the Slovenes, Croats and Macedonians, [as well as Bosnian Muslims who were the last to become a nation] had not undergone the full historical trajectory of national movements before entering into the multinational state of Yugoslavia". More importantly, as the leaders of recent nationalist movements were "unable or unwilling" to offer "contemporary national programs", they re-appropriated them from "the ideologies and experience of the national movements of the past" (Crnobrnja, 1994:4). Similarly to Nielsen’s (1999) concepts and distinction of good/civic and bad/ethnic nationalism, Crnobrnja maintains that nationalism is not exclusively aggressive, or ethnic-violent in Nielsen’s terms. As Nielsen, Crnobrnja argues, but in different terms, that there are "benign/romantic" and "malign/aggressive" forms, that is, "Romantic nationalism rejects the idea of national aggrandizement through the imperial domination or assimilation of other nations. This benign ideology visualizes universal peace and harmony when national communities each obtain their own national state. Although benign nationalism is best suited to territories that have substantial national and ethnic mixes, the sad truth, one that is also valid for Yugoslavia, is that these are precisely the areas where aggressive nationalism has a much

24 Although all of the Yugoslav nations, except Slovenia, were medieval states, only the Kingdoms of Serbia and of Montenegro entered into the Yugoslav state in 1918 as internationally recognized states as they had been, finally, given de jure statehood at the Berlin Congress in 1878. See more details in Baudson, 1996; Crnobrnja, 1994 and Djilas, 1996.
better base for operation. The other, aggressive version of nationalism is the ‘integral’ kind, insisting on the ‘completeness’ of the nation in question. Depending on specific circumstances it can be and often is assimilationist and therefore dangerous to the integrity of neighboring nations. Integral nationalism emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century as part of the process of liberal decline, adapting itself to the positivist spirit of the age” (1994:4, my emph).

Thus, Crnobrnja asserts that “irrational [aggressive] nationalism ... is at the root of the Yugoslav drama” (1994:5). For him, “the process of national revival took the wrong turning” and direction towards this aggressive chauvinist, violent form of nationalism. This is partially due to “the insufficiency and inadequacy of the political system”, Yugoslavia having being ruled by some kind of totalitarian regime since 1918 (Crnobrnja, 1994:6). Although Communism and Tito’s rule are directly responsible for unresolving the national question by suppressing “democratic” and “national expression”, the recent events in Yugoslavia “cannot be understood ... as, simply ... Communist aggravation of the nationalist problem”. On the contrary, communists were the main protagonists of the Yugoslav drama, majority being republican nationalist leaders. Indeed, as Crnobrnja points out, after Tito’s death in 1980, “the vacuum at the top of society and within the political system was quickly filled by political opportunists who saw the possibility of very swiftly rising careers”25. In Crnobrnja’s words, “With the exception of the leader of Bosnian Muslims, all other nationalist leaders in Yugoslavia, and most of the national ideologues, were previously either high Communist officials or at least card-carrying members of the Communist Party” (1994:7). In this sense, the new nationalist elite was formed by and from the former communist elite. This fact
additionally complicates the constructivist claim about the importance of the nationalist elites. For this reason, I agree with Motyl’s critique that nations and nationalism can emerge with or without nationalist elites.

With regards to this issue about nationalist elites central to constructivism, Crnobrnja (1995) argues that the intelligentsia is a “segment of the social elite” that is usually “credited with liberalism, tolerance, open-mindedness and a respect for the civil and social values”. According to Crnobrnja, “none of these values” were articulated and presented by the majority of Yugoslav intellectuals on all sides (1995:131). He maintains that only “a minority defended cosmopolitan interests”, even though there were “notable exceptions” in intellectuals from all sides who fought against “nationalistic one-sidedness, close-mindedness and collective paranoia”, risking the label of “national traitors” (1995:131-132). Even a larger number of intellectuals “chose not to get involved at all” and watched the ongoing drama at home or in the countries to where they had, meanwhile, emigrated (Crnobrnja, 1995:132). For Crnobrnja, many of the intellectuals should thus be

“held directly responsible for generating and nurturing the national exclusiveness, intolerance, suspicion and hatred toward members of other nationalities through their writings and speeches. Without infusing the social psyche of the Yugoslav nations with this intolerance, no politicians, no matter how crafty they were, could have started the bloody conflict” (1995:131-132).

In Crnobrnja’s view, this “preliminary work was necessary” and many intellectuals on all sides did it “willingly and enthusiastically” as leading nationalist

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25 For more details about the shift from state socialism to state nationalism, performed by the same persons who just changed their shirts, see Zarana Papic et al. “From State Socialism to State Nationalism: the Case of Serbia in Gender Perspective” (1995). Also see Hayden, 1996 and Samary, 1995.
ideologists (1995:132). I agree with Crnobrnja’s assertion that the intellectuals became nationalists for the same reason as the communist bureaucracies in their republics which led nationalist movements. That is, in an Orwellian sense, it was ‘power for power’s sake’. He argues that while the communists “played their last card ... of nationalism ... in a desperate attempt to hold on to power”, the intellectuals saw “an opportunity to rewrite history” and to be heard by millions, not only by some of their peers (1995:133, 139). Those intellectuals who answered the nationalistic call suppressed and reduced the ‘individual’ into the ‘national’. Crnobrnja thus argues that it was “an opportunity” and not a “revanchism toward communism”, because “nationalism, like communism before it, offered an opportunity to rewrite history” (139). He stresses that

“It could probably be argued that a large segment of the intelligentsia was actually conditioned to accept nationalism following a prolonged period of a totalitarian and essentially nonhumanistic rule by the communist elite. Being a victim of power under communism, a large segment of the intelligentsia became transfixed by the concept of power per se. Living for decades in a prescribed ideological mould, which accommodated rather than actually accepted them, thereby depriving them of any real influence or power, the intelligentsia now saw an opportunity to approach power, to even be part of it. It now felt needed, even if it was for a historically questionable role” (1995:139).

For Crnobrnja, the most tragic stage of the Yugoslav drama is the ethnic war which is (partially) a result and outcome of the manipulation of the population by communists-turned-nationalists and intellectual elites. This is due to the fact that “their followers, which is to say the population at large, with little if any democratic experience and tradition, were easily misled in the desired direction” (Crnobrnja, 1994:7). Although in different terms, Crnobrnja argues, similarly to Hayden and the constructivist school,
that Yugoslavia failed as an ‘imagined community’\textsuperscript{26}. In his own words, “The most deep-seated cause of the Yugoslav drama lies in the fact that even though Yugoslavs have a nationality, they have never been able to form a nation” (1994:6). He is drawing his argument from Ernest Renard, a French historian, whose definition of the nation emphasizes its spiritual principle originating in a “long past of common struggle and sacrifice” embracing a willingness for “present and future solidarity”. In this sense, Crnobrnja maintains that

“The spirit of Yugoslavism had to coexist with, or in spite of, the spirits of the various nations forming it. Yugoslavism did not emerge as a kind of melting-pot blend of the various nationalities composing it. That is why the revival of centrifugal nationalist forces within it acted to destroy what did come together in the state of Yugoslavia. There was an insufficient history of common struggle and sacrifice; the identification with Yugoslavia was not strong enough and daily made weaker by the aggressive propaganda of the nationalist champions ... the length and type of union that Yugoslavia represented was insufficient to cement firmly and unequivocally the willingness to embrace the present, and especially future solidarity” (1994:6).

Similarly to Crnobrnja’s argument about the failure of Yugoslavism and victory of aggressive nationalism, Robert Hayden (1996) maintains that the politics of nationalism in the late 1980s and early 1990s was based on the presumption that “the various Yugoslav peoples could not live together and that therefore their common state had to be divided”. For Hayden, “The electoral success of this message meant the defeat of the ‘Yugoslav idea’ of a common state of the south Slavic peoples, an ideology that had been devised as a counter and rival to the separate national ideologies of each group”

\textsuperscript{26} I stress again that in Crnobrnja’s sense, primordialist approach is incorrect, because there was not a long Yugoslavian history of struggle against each other. On contrary, “mutual antagonism and aggression is of a relatively recent nature” (Crnobrnja, 1994:6). For this reason, I find his argument being closer to
(1996:788). As support for this claim, Hayden refers to Alekša Džilas ([1991] 1996) who provides an excellent analysis of the historical and political development of the origins of “the Yugoslav idea” as well as the (unsolved) national question in Yugoslavia(s). In order to properly understand Hayden’s claim about the defeat of the Yugoslav idea and thus the failure, or artificiality, of the Yugoslav community, it is important to look at some main points of Džilas’ complex analysis of the Communist revolution and Yugoslav unity, essential for understanding the complexity of the national question in the multinational socialist republic of Yugoslavia.

Thus, Džilas argues that the close relationship between Yugoslavism and “progressive’ ideas” began with its early association with the XVIIIth century “Enlightenment and its heirs, liberal democracy and revolutionary, mostly socialist, radicalism” (1996:15). According to Džilas, “the choice of Yugoslavism ... [and] the idea of Yugoslav unity”, that began to develop a “new Yugoslav identity”, were incorporated and advocated by both “the South Slav liberal democrats and the progressive revolutionaries” (socialists, or future communists). For him, “the ideas and values” of both social movements and ideologies “were founded on the heritage of the Enlightenment and the traditions of European critical rationalism”. Džilas explains that,

“There was an important connection between radicalism on social questions and radicalism on the national question. Most revolutionary South Slav socialists were national revolutionaries struggling both for the destruction of Austria-Hungary and for the unity of all South Slavs and an independent South Slav state. This intertwining of ‘progressive’ and national radicalism stemmed from the tendency to seek radical solutions in all spheres of political and social life” (1996:36).

constructivism even though Crnobrnja’s overall analysis is more complex and thus surpasses its theoretical framework as we will see in the following pages.
In general, "the South Slav socialists were internationalists" who believed in "global unification of all nations into one stateless society" and therefore they subordinated the national question "to the demands of the class struggle". In their view, "the South Slavs spoke a common language... had a common origin and were ethnically similar". As Djilas notes, many socialists prior to unification saw "the South Slav peoples as tribes—usually Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes—that ought to be unified into *one modern Yugoslav nation*" (1996:44, my emph.). At that time, "the Yugoslav idea was omnipresent ... because ... its radicalism ... presupposed the destruction of Austria-Hungary". For this reason, as Djilas points out, the Croatian socialists proposed the creation of a modern Yugoslav nation. Moreover, both Croatian and Slovenian socialist "theoreticians of the national question" argued that "the creation of the Yugoslav nation ... with one language and one culture" was necessary for "the triumph of socialism in the South Slav lands". Djilas emphasizes that for them, "the division of South Slavs into regions, religions, 'tribes', and ethnic groups obstructed the modern social-democratic movement" (1996:45). For this reason, "the all-Yugoslav socialist conference" held in

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27 While Slovenian was distinctive, but also very similar and closely related, the Macedonian language and nation were not officially recognized at that time. Indeed, the first Yugoslavia (1918-1941) was founded as the unitary monarchy, known as the 'Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, thus excluding other peoples.

28 This conference was important for several reasons. First of all, the idea that the workers and their socialist party, later renamed into Communist party, "could be the creators of the Yugoslav nation" was a completely "new idea" (Djilas, 1996:46). Before the conference, "when Yugoslavism had been promoted by the intelligentsia", it was assumed that the spirit of Yugoslavism, (like literacy) would "permeate the lower classes from above". According to Djilas, "the Tivoli resolution" drafted at the end of the conference, among other decisions, addressed the national question stating that "Austria-Hungary should, through constitutional changes and reform of the electoral law, become a *confederation*, with democratically elected political parties that would represent the *nations* rather than the sovereign states" (1996:47, my emph.). Djilas explains that socialists argued that as "sovereignty was within nations ... the unity of the South Slavs should first be achieved through one literary language". Even more importantly, "the Ljubljana conference and the Tivoli resolution showed on the eve of the First World War that socialists of the different Yugoslav nations had no great difficulty in working together in the *spirit of Yugoslavism*" (Djilas, 1996:47, my emph.).
“Ljubljana [Slovenia] in 1909 developed a program for the solution of the ‘Yugoslav question’”. Djilas explains that,

“This term did not refer to relations among Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes. All of these were considered to be one nation (or at least suitable material for a future nation), and it was assumed that relations among them would pose no real problem. Rather, the Yugoslav question concerned the relations of all the South Slavs with the Austro-Hungarian monarchy in general, and with Austro-German and Hungarian nationalism. The socialists at the Ljubljana conference did not call for destruction of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, but they demanded political as well as linguistic and cultural autonomy. For the first time the idea appeared that socialism could unify the South Slavs ... only the workers and the working-class party ... could be the creators of the Yugoslav nation” (1996:46, my emph.).

Similarly to Crnobrnja (1994, 1995), Djilas (1996) points out that the national question was unsolved in both Yugoslavia(s). He argues that even communists in the interwar period, particularly immediately after the Great War, advocated “unitarism and centralism” as they failed to recognize and acknowledge the importance of the national question in the first Yugoslavia (“The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes”). As Djilas notes, “[in] the April [of] 1919 [at the] Congress of Unification”, Yugoslav communists believed that “Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were one nation ... [and they] described Yugoslavia as a one-nation (jednonacionalna) state”. Even though the Congress neither admitted nor recognized the multi-nationality of Yugoslavia, it “strongly opposed” and protested against the “central government’s discriminatory policies” and the oppression of “non-Slav national minorities”, in particular against the “Albanians and Hungarians, but also [the] Germans” (Djilas, 1996:62). The turning point was the “Third Party Conference [in] 1924 ... in Belgrade” when communists “officially acknowledged the importance of the national question in Yugoslavia”, particularly regarding the
“conflict between Croats and Serbs” (Djilas, 1996:71). According to Djilas, even then in 1924, “no one in the Yugoslav [Communist] party or in the Comintern seemed to be aware that there might be more than three nations in Yugoslavia” (Djilas, 1996:72).

However, Djilas notes that in the 1920s, communists became more aware of “national dissatisfaction” emerged due to “Serbian hegemony” in “Macedonia, Montenegro ... [and] Bosnia” as they were incorporated into Serbia and their people were considered Serbs, or a national minority (Macedonians and Bosnian muslims were not considered nations at that time) (1996:63). For this reason, after the bloody Nazi occupation, the civil-fraternal war and the parallel socialist revolution (1941-1945), Yugoslav peoples led by communists voluntarily and willingly united into “The Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia” (FNRY, later renamed into “Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” - SFRY). As Djilas points out, Article 1 of the constitution of 1946 stated that all nations of Yugoslavia were equal in their “rights and duties”, i.e., there was no leading nation (1996:160). Thus, FNRY was defined as a community of peoples with equal rights. In contrast to the first Yugoslavia, there were five of these peoples or nations: Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Serbs, and Slovenes. The Yugoslav federation was composed of six republics29, which “were proclaimed to be equal in all aspects of their rights” and responsibilities (Djilas, 1996:161). Although the equality of the republics was based on their sovereignty, in fact, they were not sovereign. As Djilas best explains,

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29 Indeed, since the creation of the Yugoslav federation in 1945, Bosnia was a republic without a majority nation, that is, it was a homeland of three nations: Serbs, Croats, and Muslims (although then Bosnian Muslims were not recognized as a nation, they were treated as a special group). See Map 2 “Tito’s Yugoslavia” and Map 3 “Ethnic Composition of Republics” in Appendix II, for geographic visualization.
"The republics’ borders were created on partly national and partly historical principles. Because of the mixed population, it would have been impossible to create purely national republics even if that had been the primary concern of the CPY [Communist Party of Yugoslavia]. Yet the republics were defined as sovereign nations: Croatia of Croats, Serbia of Serbs, [Bosnia of Croats, Serbs and Muslims] and so on. Minorities in the republics, however, had the same rights and duties as the majority. They therefore had the right to take part in all decisions affecting the sovereignty of the predominant national group and its republic. At the same time minorities were defined as part of their own nation; thus, the Serbian minority in Croatia was a part of the sovereign Serbian nation. This meant that Serbs were entitled to sovereign rights within three sovereign republics—Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia—two of which were the sovereign homelands of other sovereign nations. The same was valid for Croats, who lived not only in Croatia but also in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Serbia. Finally, since all citizens of Yugoslavia had the same rights everywhere in its territory and could move freely from one republic to another, a citizen of any republic had the right to political participation in any other, if he declared to settle in it” (1996:161-162, my emph).

These basic principles were never changed, even though the constitutional law of 1953\(^{30}\) radically modified the constitution of 1946. For this reason, I argue, first of all, that even though republics were homelands of sovereign nations, republics themselves were, from the birth to the death of socialist Yugoslavia (1945-1991), never sovereign. In other words, nations were sovereign, but republics were not. Secondly, citizens of Yugoslavia always had equal rights and freedom to move and live in any of the republics,

\(^{30}\) As Djilas explains, “the constitutional law of 1953” abandoned previously “sacred Soviet model of 1946 ... [as] Yugoslav Communists were emphasizing their independence from the Soviet Union”, particularly after the conflict with Stalin in 1948. This “new and ‘original’” constitutional law was seen as the constitution, moreover, as “a legal symbol for the individuality of the Yugoslav revolution”. It was meant to serve as “a legal framework for the development ... of different ... socialist system ... [than] Soviet Stalinism” (Djilas, 1996:178). According to Djilas, it “defined Yugoslavia primarily as a union of producers and a community of people whose ‘socialist consciousness’, based on the practice of self-management, superseded their national consciousness. The sovereignty of the individual republics was founded on the working people (the producers) and not the people as a whole ... the constitutional law omitted the right of secession, mentioned in article 1 of the 1946 constitution. Although even that article implied that the creation of Yugoslavia was irreversible, its absence from the new constitution was a clear sign of further development toward Yugoslav unity” (1996:178, 179).
that is within the whole territory of Yugoslavia. Thirdly, the borders between republics were of an administrative nature as they were never congruent with the national composition of republics. Except Slovenia, all other republics were ethnically heterogeneous, or multinational, especially Bosnia\textsuperscript{31} (Baudson, 1996; Crnobrnja, 1994; Djilas, 1996; Hayden, 1996; Samary, 1995). In fact, while all of the republics had various (mainly non-Slavic) national minorities, the four central republics (except Slovenia and Macedonia) were also multinational in terms that they were composed of more that one sovereign, or majority, nation\textsuperscript{32}. In this sense, both Djilas (1996) and Calhoun (1997) point out that the republic of Croatia was a multinational state as a significant number of Serbian people lived there who were one of the constitutive nations of Yugoslavia. In this regard, the last constitution of SFRY of 1974, similar to that of 1946, stated in its opening sentence that

``Based on the right of every narod [nation, or people] to self-determination, including the right to secession, narodi [nations] of Yugoslavia ... together with narodnosti [nationalities, or national minorities] with whom they live, are united in federal republic of free and equal narodi and narodnosti [nations and nationalities] in creation of socialist federal community of the working people — Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ..." (Constitution of the SFRY 1974: “Introductory Part, Basic Principles, my translation and emphasis).

For this reason, I agree with Hayden’s argument that the socialist constitutions of republics grounded the state in “the dual sovereignty of ‘the working class and all

\textsuperscript{31} Djilas also points out in his “Introduction” that “the four central republics” (Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro) were the core of Yugoslav unity. While all of them are ethnically heterogeneous, their peoples speak the same language (Serbo-Croatian or Croato-Serbian). In contrast, Slovenia and Macedonia are both "ethnically and linguistically homogenous (except for the Albanian minority inside Macedonia), and in this sense [both republics] resemble the nineteenth-century European model of the nation state” (Djilas, 1996:2).

\textsuperscript{32} In fact, Montenegro is similarly to Macedonia, primarily inhabited by Montenegrins, but also has a significant number of ethnic Albanians and Bosnian Muslims.
working people' and 'the nations and nationalities' of Yugoslavia” (1996:790). I also agree with Hayden that according to the constitution of 1974 (and in 1946 as we have seen), “the right of every nation to self-determination, including the right to secession referred, not to the populations or citizens of republics, but to the nations, narodi (singular: narod), of Yugoslavia, ethnically defined” (1996:787). Thus, in contrast to the Soviet Union which was a federation of republics and not a federation of nations as was Yugoslavia, Hayden claims that the Yugoslav republics, “unlike those of the Soviet Union, did not have a right to secede” (1996:787).

Similarly to Crnobrnja, Hayden argues that the collapse of socialism in Yugoslavia meant “the transition ... from state socialism to state chauvinism”, as all of the successor states, or former republics, developed “similar formulations of constitutional nationalism”. In other words, with the collapse of socialism, the working class and all working people lost previous sovereignty and thus became reduced to their nations. The new constitutions of successor states thus legitimize(d) “bureaucratic ethnic cleansing” or “constitutional nationalism”, as they exclude those that are not of “the ethnonational majority” (Hayden, 1996:790-794). Hayden rightly points out that “the

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33 Perhaps it should be seen as a triple sovereignty as the federal and republics’ constitutions of 1974 also include term citizens (gradani in Serbo-Croatian, or obcani in Slovenian languages) (see article 1 and 3 of constitutions of SFRY and republic of Slovenia, or any other republics).

34 It is important to stress that notable exceptions are the constitutions of the new, third, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and its two constitutive republics, Serbia (with Kosovo and Vojvodina provinces) and Montenegro. Both federal and republics’ constitutions provide a legal framework for ‘civic’ and not ‘ethnic’ states. According to the constitutions, they are ‘civic states’ (drzava gradani) that promote the rights of citizens (gradani) and not national or ethnic groups. For this reason, there is no single mention about nations or nationalities or ethnic groups. I stress that Hayden also notes that the new constitution of the Republic of Serbia (as a part of the third, present day Yugoslavia) looks progressive, although incompatible with Slobodan Milosevic’s authoritarian rule (1996:798, note 11). As Milosevic is now in prison in Belgrade/The Hague, it is noteworthy to mention that this new constitution of the rump, third, Yugoslavia is the sixth one since the creation of the first Yugoslavia in 1918. Article 1 states that “Yugoslavia is defined with three elements: sovereignty, a federal system, and the constitutive elements typical for federation — citizens (gradani) and federal units (republics - members of federation) ... the third element ... in contrast to
question of citizenship ... is one of utmost importance ... [as] those who do not attain citizenship will be denied the rights essential for any kind of normal life”. Moreover, for many people, “the question of citizenship was new”. As Hayden best explains,

“the constitution of Yugoslavia had provided for a single, uniform Yugoslav citizenship and guaranteed the equality of Yugoslav citizens throughout the country. Suddenly, however, the citizenship of many residents in the newly independent states became questionable. New citizenship laws, written to privilege the members of the sovereign majority in each case, have worked to discriminate against residents who were not members of the majority groups. In essence, the new citizenship regimes have simultaneously extended citizenship to nonresident members of the majority ethnonation through easy naturalization while denying citizenship to many residents who are not of the right group. This last process turns residents who had been equal citizens of federal Yugoslavia into foreigners of their own republics, a process we might call denaturalization” (1996:793).

As we can notice by now, all of the presented authors, except Djilas, interchangeably use the terms ‘nation and ethnic group’, most frequently in terms of ethnonation, or ethnonational group when referring to Yugoslav nations. We can also notice that neither Djilas nor the constitutions of the socialist, second, Yugoslavia (nor the new ones of the successor states) that he analyzes, use the term ‘ethnic’ to describe any of the Yugoslav nations, e.g., the Serbs, the Croats, etc. I argue that this ‘interchangeability’ and the usage of the term ethnonation, emerged due to several reasons. Above all, I agree with Motyl that both terms, that is, a nation and an ethnic group, are conceptually synonymous. In particular, this distinction is irrelevant in the Yugoslavian case and, as we have seen, practically non-existent in official terminology. For the convenience of reading in this paper both terms are used interchangeably even

the constitution of SFRY of 1974, there is no place for national [nacionalne] states, national economies and state nationalism” (The Constitution of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with 10 special Appendixes, 1992,
though I prefer the term national to ethnic groups. Another important reason is the complexity of Yugoslavia. Similarly to Crnobrnja, Djilas stresses that

"Yugoslavia is a difficult country to understand ... [because] its many nations, languages, and religions generate centrifugal tendencies. At the same time there exists powerful centripetal forces: the common South Slav origin of the majority of the population is the basis for many ethnic, linguistic, and cultural similarities; and there are also many shared historical experiences" (1996:1).

With regards to the history and complexity of the national question in Yugoslavia, I agree with Motyl's argument that both schools, primordialism and constructivism, obscure, or simplify, the historical dimension of the nations and nationalism. As we have seen, while primordialism situates the nation 'outside' history as a 'prehistoric' category, for constructivism there is no place for the nation in history, as it is an 'imagined', or invented social construct that emerged in the age of nationalism, that is, modernity. For this reason, I agree with Motyl that there are nations and nationalisms that existed even before the age of nationalism, as did, for example the Croats and the Serbs. Therefore, my goal in this chapter is to 'root' the Yugoslav nations back into history, from where they have been 'uprooted' by both schools, which stripped them of their historical achievement of 'nationality'. However, both schools present all Yugoslav nations as

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35 However, the Croats and the Serbs and so on are ethnonational groups as they are both the ethnic groups and the nations, or in other words, they are ethnocultural nation. For example, the Serbian 'narod', people or nation, refers to all of the ethnic Serbs regardless where they live, i.e., the Serbs from Serbia, the Croatian Serbs, the Bosnian Serbs, the Canadian Serbs, etc. In contrast, Serbian 'nacija', or nation, is more specifically referring to the Serbian national state, thus prior to the recent war it included all Serbs living across the former Yugoslavia. Now, as the Serbs became a national minority in the new successor states of Yugoslavia, Serbian 'nacija' refers to the Serbs living in present day Yugoslavia and Republic of Serbia. Of course, I need to stress that the precarious status of the Bosnian Serbs is the most problematic as their national state is 'de facto' and 'de jure' non-existent.
ethnic groups in order to emphasize their ‘tribalism’ and recent barbarism in the form of ethnic cleansing.

I stress that in this sense a comprehensive analysis of the nations and nationalism in the former Yugoslavia should treat every single nation and nationalism in its particular historical developmental context as there are similarities, but also significant differences. In particular, a special emphasis should be given to the analysis of Croatian and Serbian nationalism as central to both the creation and destruction of Yugoslavia(s). For these reasons, I agree with Djilas’ definition of the Yugoslav nations and his argument for the irrelevancy, or conceptual synonymy in Motyl’s terms, of the distinctiveness between ‘nation’ and ‘ethnic group’. In Djilas’s words, “American media use the term nation to describe the people in the territory of one state, under one government. In this book the term nation means a community of people with territory, culture, and identity based on historical memories. This is also how Serbs, Croats, and so on see themselves—they never describe themselves as ‘ethnic groups’” (1996:189, note 1).

Therefore, I argue that, for example, the Croats and the Serbs, like Motyl’s Ukrainians, were nations before nations. They, as well as all the other Yugoslav nations,

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36 A good starting point could be the analysis of the fraternal civil war (1941-1945) that resulted in the genocide of Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies, which is misinterpreted, or simplified by primordialisms as ‘ancient hatreds’. More importantly, Crnobrnja’s remarks that in the W.W.II “the big difference between the Chetniks [the Serbs] and the Ustashi [the Croats] was that the former were relatively isolated guerrilla units, especially in territories were they mixed with other ethnic groups, while the latter had a state organization. Thus the scale of murder, plunder, and ‘ethnic cleansing’ performed by the latter far outstripped the evil deeds of the former” (1994:66). Needless to say, these mixed territories primary include Krajina in Croatia and the whole of Bosnia were most of the crimes were committed in both civil-fraternal wars: during the W.W.II and the recent one(s) (1991-1995). On the other hand, the ethnic nationalism, or ‘irredentism’ of the Albanian minority in Kosovo should also be put into historical perspective and analyzed in its particular context.

37 I limit my argument to these two nations for two reasons. First, as I have already argued, every Yugoslav nation should be studied separately, particularly due to their different historical developments, for example,
perceived themselves as *narod* (people) rather than as *nacija* (nation, or *natsiya* in Russian language). Moreover, as we have seen, Yugoslavia’s constitutions use both terms interchangeably, *narod* and *people*, as both mean the same thing: a *nation*. Like Ukrainians who define themselves in contrast to their quintessential version of ‘the other’—the Russians (Motyl, 1999:78), the Croats and the Serbs define themselves as distinct from each other, and from the other Yugoslav nations. Thus, I agree with Motyl that in this sense there is no radical distinction between both an ethnic group (or ethnie) and a nation as well as between civic and ethnic nationalism, because “all nations are ethnic nations, inasmuch as ethnicity and nationhood are conceptually synonymous” (Motyl, 1999:78). Similarly to the Ukrainian case, the national identities of Croats and Serbs are rooted in the memories and traditions of their medieval kingdoms (see Djilas, 1996 and Crnobrnja, 1994).

For all of the above mentioned reasons, I agree with Djilas’ concluding remarks which best illustrate how Croats or Serbs are simultaneously both an ethnie and a nation, and moreover, why the whole of Yugoslavia could be defined as a mono-ethnic state:

“The Croats and the Serbs, as separate nations have a history whose beginnings are lost in the depths of time ... Despite the fact that they are old nations, neither their national identities nor the states they created were continuous ... The instability of the Croatian and Serbian medieval states, followed by the Ottoman conquests, interrupted the development of either two clearly separate identities or a homogeneous proto-Yugoslav one. In the nineteenth century the Croats and the Serbs, found themselves lacking the strong state tradition that allowed the ‘old, continuous’ nations to emerge as modern nation states ... Ethnically and linguistically they were not separate, so differentiation rested primarily on historical

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Slovenia was not a medieval state and Bosnian Muslims, the sixth Yugoslav nation, are Islamized Slavs due to the Ottoman rule and so on (see particularly Crnobrnja, 1994; Djilas 1996). Secondly, although we should analyze even these two groups separately, I draw my argument on Djilas who best explained the centrality of these two nations for Yugoslav unity as well as the conceptual synonymy of the ethnic group and the nation within Yugoslavia’s context.
memory, traditions, and religion. One could even say that Croats and Serbs are *ethnically almost homogeneous*, but are heterogeneous from the standpoint of national consciousness and loyalties. In fact the whole of Yugoslavia could be defined as a *mono-ethnic state* with three closely related languages (Macedonian, Slovenian, and Croato-Serbian or Serbo-Croatian) and many different national political consciousnesses. When Yugoslavia was created in 1918, the South Slavs were not one nation. They had largely different political and state loyalties. Between the two world wars, national ideologies developed further and became widely disseminated (1996:181, 182, my emph.).

2.2. **Concluding remarks**

After all is said, I want to stress that I agree with Calhoun (1997) who, like Motyl (1999), argues that the distinction between ethnic/cultural, and civic/political nationalism is an inappropriate approach for analyzing nationalism. Calhoun argues that “all of Western and Eastern Europe”, particularly Germany which is a prototype of ethnic nationalism and France as an example of civic nationalism, “have been shaped by the international discourse of nationalism - including both ethnic claims and civil projects of popular political participation” (1997:89). I argue that Yugoslavia is a good example in supporting this claim, because it was and still is shaped by both nationalisms. As we have seen, the historic development, since the Enlightenment, of the Yugoslav idea about the

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38 Similarly, Calhoun argues, in contrast to the primordialisms’ ‘ancient ethnic hatreds’ thesis advocated by the USA Secretary Christopher, that although *the Croats and the Serbs* are “now presented as an ancient ethnic-national distinction, as late as the early nineteenth century this was mainly a difference of religion between people who shared the same language and ethnic stock” (1997:62, my emph).
unity of the South Slavs in one state included both civic and ethnic nationalism, or political and cultural projects.

In Crnobraj’s and Djilas’ terms, Yugoslavia was shaped by both centripetal (building one modern Yugoslav nation, or Yugoslavism) and centrifugal (separate national projects, or separatism) forces. Even though ‘the Yugoslav nation’ is the biggest paradox of Yugoslav unity due to the fact that it was never formed, or has never come into being as a nation in the ‘classic’ sense, the spirit of Yugoslavism was, and still is, a viable idea. However, the fact that people who declared their nationality as ‘Yugoslavs’ (6% in the census of 1981 and 3% in 1991 of the total Yugoslavian population) best illustrates the paradox that even though “‘Yugoslavs’ ... might well be considered [as] the seventh South Slav nation of Yugoslavia”, they were not completely recognized, i.e., they

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39 Even now, in the new successor states of the former Yugoslavia we can find both forms of nationalism in their new constitutions. While all of the new states emphasize the ethnonational principle for citizenship, in contrast, the new, third, Yugoslavia is founded as a civic state with inclusive principle of citizenship for all of its citizens. Moreover, state nationalism is constitutionally prohibited (see article 1 of The Constitution of FRY, 1992). However, in both cases we can find elements of both nationalisms. Even though the new constitutions (of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia) promote ethnic nationalism, there is, for example in the Slovenian constitution, some elements of civic project of which the most notably is the inclusion and protection of the rights of two major national minorities: Hungarian and Italian (see art. 5 of new Constitution of Republic of Slovenia, 1991). On the other hand, although the new Yugoslavia is a classic federal state based on the civic principle of political unity of the citizens (not only members of the major national group), it has a significant problem with the ethnic Albanian minority living in the province of Kosovo. Although of secondary importance for my argument, I need to stress that this tension and bloody conflicts between the Serbs and the Albanians is quite an exceptional case that should be studied and analyzed in its historical perspective (for a brief and accurate historical analysis see particularly Baudson’s account of “Albanian Occupation of Kosovo”, 1996: 127-133; also on the recent conflict (1999) see the excellent analysis of Micheal Parenti ([1999] 2000).

40 First of all, present day Yugoslavia (FRY) is still a state and a country of the South Slavs-Yugoslavs even though it consists of only two former republics of the former Yugoslavia. A large portion of its people still consider themselves being primarily ‘Yugoslavs’. Also, this third Yugoslavia became a ‘new homeland’ for the ‘old’ Yugoslavs that became refugees or internally displaced persons in their own republics and thus, they sought a shelter in this ‘new homeland of the old Yugoslavs’. However, as the focus of my thesis project is on Bosnia, I had to omit these Yugoslavs from the present day Yugoslavia.
were "recorded separately in statistics but [were] not recognized as a nation"\textsuperscript{41} (Djilas, 1996:1).

We will see in the fourth chapter that people who declared themselves as ‘Yugoslavs’ were among the first civilian victims in the new successor states of Yugoslavia, particularly in Croatia and Bosnia, of both forms of the ethnic cleansing, that is, of the massive displacement or uprootedness, and of the bureaucratic ethnic cleansing, or constitutional nationalism in Hayden’s terms. For this reason, I argue that the collapse of the former Yugoslavia should be analyzed in the light of the transition from civic-nonviolent to ethnic-violent nationalism, that is, from the new, socialist, ‘supranational’ Yugoslavism that was civic nationalism\textsuperscript{42} built on the idea of political unity and

\textsuperscript{41} This paradox, in my view, is due to the ‘supranationality’ of the Yugoslav unity and new Yugoslavism. As Djilas (1996) points out, “the new Yugoslavism” was particularly promoted by communist theoreticians in the aftermath of the conflict with Stalin in 1948. They emphasized that “the new Yugoslavism” was neither the imposition of “one hegemonic nation ... upon other nations”, as promoted by King Alexander in previous unitary monarchy, 1918-1941, nor “an attempt to create a new nation”. It was rather a communist “belief in the interdependence between socialism and Yugoslavism” and the need of modernization of the country in the sense of developing a modern interconnected community for the peoples of Yugoslavia. According to Djilas, “in 1953, Edvard Kardelj” defined this pro-Yugoslav orientation as different than the “old type of federation” created immediately after W.W.II that “had been rendered obsolete by the development of socialism”. In Dijlas words, “On the basis of the common interest of the working people, and within the framework of an already developed and unified sociopolitical system, a ‘unified Yugoslav community’ was coming into being. This new community was overcoming the national consciousness of individual nations without at the same time becoming a nation in the ‘old sense’” (1996:180, my emph.). One might even say that to some extent Yugoslavia was, to use Motyl’s analogy, a ‘supranational’, or post-national, community before such community was ‘invented’. That is, Yugoslavia was a European Unity and Yugoslavs were Europeans before European Unity (EU) was even ‘imagined’ let alone created. The new Yugoslavism was based on this ‘supranational’ principle even though its driving force was socialism and not capitalism. We will see in the next chapter that in fact, Yugoslavia was Europe in miniature in terms of the variety of nations and nationalities that composed it.

\textsuperscript{42} I need to stress that prior to this new Yugoslavism in the 1950s there were two other forms of nationalism in socialist Yugoslavia that were more ethnic than civic forms, and for this very reason, the new Yugoslavism emerged. Indeed, as Djilas points out, after W.W.II and the victory of the socialist revolution, "seen in the context of the civil war and prewar Serbian predominance, federalism and Yugoslavism were great steps toward national tolerance and cooperation among the nations of Yugoslavia. There were, however, new forms of nationalism, nationalist prejudice and persecution, which arose in the euphoria that enveloped the CPY after its victory" (1996:168). This euphoria produced the belief that the Yugoslav people were "superior to many other nations in their courage and love of liberty". As well, this nationalism, inspired by a victorious socialist revolution and victory over Nazism, influenced the negative attitudes and mistrust "toward non-Yugoslav minorities, especially the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina and the Albanian
community of all of its citizens and working people, to the recent ethnic, aggressive and chauvinist, nationalism based on building homogenous nation-states in ethnically heterogeneous territories. This transition from ‘the individual’ to ‘the national’ is best described by Slavenka Drakulic (already quoted in the Introduction) who argues that she is no more “a person”, that is, her personality is reduced to her nationality. For this reason, I also agree with Nielsen’s (1999) argument that ethnic nationalism is bad as it is violent, barbaric, nonliberal and often includes, as in Yugoslavia’s case, some form of ethnic cleansing. In this sense, I have to agree that there is a huge and basic difference between civic or non-violent nationalism (as in Quebec) and ethnic or violent nationalism (as in the former Yugoslavia), because the former implies, in Nielsen’s terms, “words and votes” and the latter “guns and tanks”. However, I disagree with the division between good and bad nationalism as usually nation building projects involve both elements, ethnic claims and political participation.

In this regard, as I have already mentioned, the complexity of the Yugoslav drama exceeds and supersedes claims and arguments of both schools, primordialist and constructivist. First of all, it is important to note that the war in Yugoslavia (1991-) was avoidable on both levels, internal and external. Moreover, as we will see in the next

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minority in Kosovo, ... because of their wartime support of the occupying forces”. Djilas explains that “the worst displays of Yugoslav nationalism were the expulsion of German ... [and] Italian minority” although it is “unclear ... how many [of them] left from fear of retribution ... and how many were forced to leave” (1996:169). The second form of postwar nationalism was “a peculiar version of supranational nationalism ... revived ... [by] Soviet leaders ... [at] the end of the war” that was resembling the version of “traditional pan-Slavism”. However, after the duel with Stalin in 1948, “pan-Slavism was expunged from the official ideology” (Djilas, 1996:170). I have to point out that this supranationality of the imperialist pre and post war Soviet pan-Slavism has nothing similar or common with my analogy between the former Yugoslavia and European Union as I previously argued. The supranationality of the new Yugoslavism was based on equality of nations and working people of Yugoslavia whereby national identity was supersedes with supranationality of Yugoslavism and Yugoslav citizenship.

43 Although the external, or foreign, dimension will be further discussed, at this point I need to point out that I completely agree with Gerard Baudson (1996), and other here presented authors, that “the international
chapter, the ethnic divisions and struggle over borders and territories, or in my terms the ‘internal’ Balkanization, are the consequence of previous ‘external’ Balkanization, that is, the division and subjection of the South Slavs due to the geopolitical and strategic importance of their territory and economic interests of the great powers. For now, I stress that prior to the recent ethnic, civil or fraternal war(s) in Yugoslavia, there were massive, multinational, workers demonstrations across Yugoslavia provoked by deep economic and socio-political crisis induced, according to Chossudovsky, by “the macro-economic structural adjustment reforms of the IMF and the World Bank” (1996, 1997). As Chossudovsky rightly points out, “in 1990”, their new “economic package” additionally fueled “the process of political balkanization and secessionism” (1997:246). We will see in the next chapter that the external factors, primarily the economic and geopolitical interests of the Western countries, particularly USA and Germany, are crucial figures in the Yugoslav drama or tragedy.

Even more important for the debate on nationalism, that is central in this chapter, is the fact that the war could have been avoided also on the internal level, that is, within community ... EU and UN” is directly responsible for the outbreak of the civil war. Baudson demonstrates that “the break up of Yugoslavia” as well as “the war in Croatia ... could be avoided or refrained” if the International Community would have established “protection of national minority rights” in Croatia as well in the other new successor states (1996:153-155). Baudson argues that Yugoslavia was “sacrificed” for the European unity due to “the German pressure” and its early self-initiated recognition of “Slovenia and Croatia”. Moreover, “the Badinter Commission”, established to investigate the possibility and suitability of the Yugoslav republics to become independent states, largely ignored the question of “newly created” minorities, that is, the issue of borders between republics. Instead, the Badinter Commission completely ignored the existing “international law” and recognized the republican borders, which were exclusively administrative and not ethnonational, as the new international borders of the new states. Thus, the war could have been avoided if the International Community would have accepted “the French diplomatic initiative” and the recommendation of “President Mitterand” about “freezing” the international recognition of the republics “until the international community could established the rights of [national] minorities” (Baudson, 1996:153-157). Similarly, the war in Bosnia could have been avoided for the same reasons. Moreover, the Lisbon plan for ‘cantonization’ of Bosnia, a model similar to Switzerland, that was signed prior to the war by all three national groups (the Serbs, the Croats and the Muslims) failed, because Alija Izerbegovic, a
Yugoslavia. Internally, there was a civil, or political solution to the ethnic division of the country and the civil war. Indeed, prior to the war and dissolution of the country, the Slovenian communists (backed up only by the Croatian delegation) had proposed a model of confederation as the next step of the Yugoslav community at the (last) 14th Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia held in Belgrade in January 1990. As the proposal was refused, Slovenian and Croatian delegations abandoned the Congress and stepped out of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. This was the beginning of the end for the multinational Yugoslav state. Again, for this reason I agree with Calhoun that the ethnic claims are intertwined with the civil projects of political participation.

For all of the above mentioned reasons, I agree with Kymlicka that even though “a multinational model of federalism” that is advocated by the Québécois and Aboriginal people in Canada, might be the “only chance to keep Canada together”, there are “no guarantees” that, even if the proposed multinational federalism would be accepted by Anglophone Canadians, “it would not be simply a stepping-stone to the inevitable dissolution of Canada” (1998:11). As socialist Yugoslavia was founded on this multinational principle, it is a good example of both a successful model of multinational federalism and the dissolution of its salient federal model. The collapse of Yugoslavia was, among other reasons, also due to the rejection of the confederation that would be the next logical step as well as the solution for avoiding civil war. In fact, as we have seen in this chapter, Yugoslavia was actually somewhere between a federation and a confederation. That is, the republics were the states within the state of Yugoslavia which was constitutionally a state founded on dual sovereignty, that of the nations and

Muslim leader, backed up (retreated) his signature after consultation with Warren Zimmerman, the American
nationalities and the working class people. Moreover, it was a socialist self-governing democratic community of the working people and citizens as well of the equal nations and national minorities (art. 3, The Constitution of SFRY, 1974).

In contrast to Canada, the former Yugoslavia was not an immigration country, and therefore, there were no immigrant minorities in Kymlicka's terms, even though all of Yugoslavia's national minorities, in particular the Albanians44, could also be defined as both immigrant and ethnocultural groups. As I have already mentioned, socialist Yugoslavia was a federal republic formed as a state community of voluntarily united nations and nationalities, or national minorities (narodi and narodnosti in Serbo-Croatian). Thus, neither in Yugoslavia's constitutions nor in the official terminology, nor in the public usage, can we find terms that are in Canadian daily usage, namely, 'immigrants' and/or 'ethnic minorities'. As we have seen, in contrast to Canada, socialist Yugoslavia was initially composed of five constitutive and sovereign nations (Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Montenegrins and Macedonians) that were joined more recently by the Muslims as the sixth nation. According to Crnobrnja, "the notion of a Muslim 'nation' was introduced by the constitution of 1963" (1994:21). Arguably, the 'Yugoslavs' were "the seventh nation", or at least "a well established national minority" in their own country (Crnobrnja, 1994 and Djilas, 1996). As we will see in the following chapters, this seventh South Slav nation of Yugoslavia, including 'the Bosnians' and 'the Eskimos' or 'others', is excluded from reports about refugees in terms of their national identities.

44 The large portion of the ethnic Albanians who live in Serbian province of Kosovo are recent post-W.W.II immigrants who were massively running away from impoverished and totalitarian, Stalinist, neighboring Albania to Tito's more liberal Yugoslavia, settling largely in the province of Kosovo. Although 'Albanian
Ironically, these people who declared or considered themselves as ‘the Yugoslavs’ in the latest census were/are majority of the displaced or uprooted peoples, refugees. Moreover, the new successor states of the former Yugoslavia abolished the usage of word ‘Yugoslav’; officially, neither term nor concept exist. The Yugoslavs thus disappeared from the official and public vocabulary as well as statistical category of their national identity, within and outside the former Yugoslavia. Of course, this account excludes ‘the Yugoslavs’ living in the present day, third, Yugoslavia (FRY, founded in 1992).

In terms of national minorities, Yugoslavia was and still is (FRY) a treasure of various nationalities (narodnosti). Their diverse cultures and traditions in regard to the former Yugoslavia were, in Baudson (1996) words, representing “Europe in miniature”. As Yugoslavia was a republic, thus based on group rights, these numerous and various national minorities had extensive and well protected rights, in particular the two largest groups, the Hungarians in the autonomous province of Vojvodina and the Albanians in the province of Kosovo. Their two distinct languages, besides the three major Slavic languages (Serbo-Croatian, Slovenian and Macedonian), were also the official languages and in official use. According to Crnobrnja, “the other minorities - Italians, Slovaks, Rumanians, Bulgarians, Turks, Roms (Gypsies), Rusines, and so on” definitely contributed to “the complexity and richness of the Yugoslav linguistic cocktail”. All of them “were entitled to education and cultural communication” in their own languages (Crnobrnja, 1994:20). In this sense, similar to Canada, Yugoslavia was a multicultural occupation of Kosovo’ in Baudson’s terms has a long ‘immigration’ history, it is important to mention that the Albanians were the largest recent immigration group in socialist Yugoslavia.

45 As Michael Parenti points out in the aftermath of the NATO’s bombing campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999: “Ironically, while the Serbs were repeatedly charged with ethnic cleansing, Serbia itself is now the
state with a completely open and inclusive multicultural agenda. In contrast to Canada which is founded on liberal, thus individual rights, Yugoslavia was a republic that as such embraced all of the large and the small ‘ethnocultural’ and/or ‘ethnonational’ groups. Even though it was a country of the South Slavs, all of its ‘national minorities’ were considered equal with the same duties and rights as the Yugoslav nations.

For this reason, there were no meaningful disputes or confrontations between the Yugoslav state and the minorities, except in the Albanian case that can be well defined as ‘minority nationalism’ in Kymlicka terms, or Albanian ‘irredentism’ in Yugoslav official and public terminology. As Crnobrnja (1994) explains, the dispute was made by Albanian demands to be treated as a “constitutive nation of Yugoslavia”, that is, having the political independence of Kosovo. They argued that “by their numbers ... they are larger than three of the nations that had their own republics”. The Yugoslavian counter-argument was that “they cannot be a nation within Yugoslavia since there is an Albanian national state adjacent to Yugoslavia, so they must be satisfied with the status of a national minority, regardless of their number” (Crnobrnja, 1994:21). However, according to the recent events the ethnic Albanians might finally get their ‘Independent State of Kosovo’.

As we have seen, although Canada and the former Yugoslavia are both federal and multicultural states, their political and social systems differ, in particular with regards to group rights, that is, while the former is founded as liberal democracy, the

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46 As we will see in the last chapter, this is the reason why ‘Yugoslava’, similarly to Salvadorans, as a small ethnic group are not included into Canada’s multiculturalism agenda. Also, it is important to note that
latter was a socialist republic. However, Yugoslavia's national minorities could be defined as immigrant groups and as ethnocultural groups, because all of them 'immigrated' at some point in history. Different from Canadian ethnic and immigrant groups and similar to Québécois and Aboriginal national minorities in Canada, all of Yugoslavia's national minorities consider themselves to be 'starosedeeoti' (aboriginal, indigene, autochthonous), or 'the old settlers' and/or 'colonial settlers' in Kymlicka's terms. However, according to Yugoslav terminology these ethnic minorities were defined as 'narodnosti', or national minorities.

And finally, I argue that if socialist Yugoslavia, which was an exceptionally advanced multinational federation, was an artificial community then by the same logic every country that is officially, or sociologically speaking, composed of more than one nation is under the threat of soon dissolving into smaller units, new states, including Canada. Although I present in the fourth chapter Hayden's (1996) remarkable analysis of the ethnic cleansing and nation-building of the homogenous states "over the dead body of Yugoslavia" in its heterogeneous territories, I need to stress that his arguments would be more attractive and powerful if they would be less constructivist and include more historical, economic and political explanations, particularly in terms of the external and internal factors that contributed to the collapse of Yugoslavia. In contrast to the constructivist approach and claim that Yugoslavia was an artificial 'imagined community', my argument is based on the fact that, among other things mentioned in my

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Yugoslavs are completely excluded from the Western politicians and media reports, and therefore, they are basically 'invisible' war victims and 'non-existent' refugees.

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47 In fact, Baudson points out that "the Yugoslavian virus of fragmentation has already arrived in the West" (1996:156). Similarly, Samary (1995) meaningfully entitled her conclusion "Today Yugoslavia, Tomorrow Europe ...."
introduction, there was also a strong multinational resistance across Yugoslavia against the dissolution of the Yugoslav state and approaching civil war\(^{48}\). This claim will be elaborated in the fourth chapter that exposes some parts of the popular and political resistance, particularly in multinational Bosnia. For now, I stress that I agree with one of the respondents (a Serb) who pointed out that “Yugoslavia needed changes, but in a peaceful way, and in no case by war” (question 68: Are you Yugonostalgic?).

Also, we have seen that the Yugoslav idea about one common state for the South Slavs has a long history. As well, the Yugoslav nations are the old nations that voluntarily united in the first, then in the second, and now in the third Yugoslavia. Therefore, the questions I am raising are: Was the idea of Yugoslav unity and common state artificial since the beginning? What was artificial in the past hundred years of the emergence of the Yugoslav state? Was socialist Yugoslavia artificial due to its ethnic and/or national composition or due to the artificiality of socialism, or both? And finally, if it was an artificial country since the beginning why was the same artificiality, or the same mistake, repeated not only once, but twice within the twentieth century (three Yugoslavias)?

We will see further in the following pages that the complexity of the Yugoslav drama far exceeds both arguments: the primordialist ‘ancient hatreds’ thesis and the constructivist ‘artificiality of the imagined community’. We will see that the ‘Yugoslav dilemma’ cannot be reduced to the internal factors, or the internal Balkanization in my own terms, as both schools have done. The next chapter deals with the external Balkanization that is my basic counter argument to both schools. For now, I conclude this

\(^{48}\) In the 1990, as Chossudovsky notes “worker resistance crossed ethnic lines, as Serbs, Croats, Bosnian and Slovenians mobilized ... shoulder to shoulder with their fellow workers” (1997:246, Chossudovsky is
chapter by answering Crnobrnja’s question as to whether “the creation of Yugoslavia was a noble experiment in an inherently unstable part of Europe or an impossible task from the start” (1994:34). As we have seen and will see in the next chapter, Yugoslavia was definitely a noble experiment in the unstable Balkan, a successful socialist country based on a not-for-profit oriented economy. For these very reasons it was an obstacle to the victorious global dictate of the ‘free-market’ policy of the new world order that emerged from the ruins of the Cold War division of the world.
CHAPTER THREE: History of the External Balkanization or ‘Divide and Rule Schemes’ of the Old and New World Orders

The following historical and political retrospective of the external Balkanization will provide new insights about the origins and legacy of ‘national and religious fanaticism’ in the former Yugoslavia. The historical background of external Balkanization, or the foreign dimension, will enrich our understanding of the intricacy of the Yugoslav crisis/war and its impact on the past and present life experience of refugees from the former Yugoslavia/Bosnia. I will demonstrate in this chapter that the territories of Yugoslavia were historically divided in half by all major (European) empires and religions; that is, the border line divided the ‘Western and Eastern’ parts of the country. These external divisions and border re-making usually, but not exclusively, cut Yugoslavia in half, going through or around Bosnia. For this reason, I claim that the geopolitics and military strategic factor in the Balkans combined with economic interests of the powerful Empires or countries were, and are again, the main causes and reasons for the divisions and consequent bloodshed in the Balkans. In other words, the external Balkanization produces an internal one; or at least, the complexity of ‘the Balkanization’ far exceeds the internal Balkanization that is the aspect most often presented to worldwide publics. The internal Balkanization, or religious and national fanaticism expressed in the form of ‘barbaric’ ethnic wars, is by far ‘over-represented’ in analysis.

The argument presented in this chapter (and the whole thesis) is neither a denial of this internal Balkanization, nor of these factual atrocities. Rather it is an attempt to illustrate the other side of the coin. The history of Yugoslavia reflects the history of the
‘old and new world orders’ with the well-known ‘Divide and Rule’ politics in the Balkans, or ‘Divide et Impera’ in original Roman version, performed by external occupying forces. That is, the division of territories and changes of borders within Yugoslavia were and still are primarily due to the external Balkanization, or the foreign interests in the Balkans. I argue then that the internal Balkanization, or territorial divisions by the internal forces, is a consequence of the previous external division, or Balkanization. In other words, once occupied and divided by hostile and often belligerent powerful empires (e.g., Ottoman and Austria-Hungary), the South Slavs/Yugoslavs were subjected against each other and had to fight on the opposite sides. For example, in both world wars they fought against each other. In W.W.I the Slovenes and Croats were Austro-Hungarian soldiers while the Kingdoms of Serbia and of Montenegro were allies with the Entente. Moreover, the Nazi occupation and division of Yugoslavia, particularly the creation of the Nazi state of Croatia embracing Bosnia, resulted in bloody fraternal war and genocide of the Serbs, Jews and Gypsies. Therefore, I argue in this chapter that the ethnic nationalism is a product, or ‘a child’, of external Balkanization.

3.1. The Old World Orders in the Balkans

The history of the Balkans, particularly that of Yugoslavia, is primary a history of permanent struggle for liberation from foreign occupation. The ‘Divide and Rule’ politics of powerful Empires, particularly the Roman, Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian ones, implied divisions of Yugoslav territories and historical subjection of, first the aboriginal Illirians and, subsequently, the South Slavs or Yugoslavs. Thus, the history of the
Balkans\textsuperscript{49} reflects the history of the ‘World Orders’, such as the Roman Empire, Holly Christendom, the Ottoman Empire, Napoleon’s Rule, Austro-German ‘Drang nach Osten und Suden’ and Hitler-Mussolini’s World Order. The fact that the territories of Yugoslavia were historically divided between the West and East parts of the country by all major Empires and World Religions (Roman-Catholic, Greek-Orthodox and Islam) is illustrated by Map 1a, b, c and d\textsuperscript{50} that shows some of the “Divide and Rule Schemes in the Balkans, i.e., the external Balkanization” (see Appendix II).

As we can see on the Map 1a, the border division of the Roman Empire on Western and Eastern (Byzantine) Empire cut Yugoslavia in half: the line would be similar to present day Yugoslavia on the East (FRY - Serbia and Montenegro Federation), and Bosnia and Croatia on the West side. The second Map, 1b, shows west-east division of the future Yugoslavia by the border-line of the Byzantine Empire c. 1050. A similar border-line was drawn by the Schism of the Christian Church in 1054 on the Roman Catholic and Greek Orthodox Churches. The most important border division (see Maps 1c and 1d) occurred during the Ottoman Empire’s invasion of Europe that, in particular, demonstrates the importance of the geopolitical and military strategic factor in/of the Balkans. As Maps 1c and 1d show, Yugoslav territories had for centuries played a major role in the European Defense System as a “Military Buffer Zone”, or “Vojna Krajina” in the Serbo-Croatian language. Krajina was established “by the Habsburg Monarchy in the XVth century” on the territory between today’s Croatia and Bosnia. In return for “mandatory military service”, the settlers of Krajina (mostly Serbs) were granted land

\textsuperscript{49} For the purpose of this study, my focus is only the Yugoslav part of the Balkan peninsula.

and an autonomous, special, status territory (History: Encyclopedic Lexicon, 1970:729-730).51

The result of centuries long Ottoman rule was the islamization of some parts of the Balkans and centuries long subjection of the South Slavs. This division of the territories between Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empire, under the Habsburg Monarchy, on the west and east parts of the future Yugoslavia is another example of what I call the external Balkanization. The Map 1 (a, b, c, and d) shows these ‘Divide and Rule’ schemes in the Balkans that, in my opinion, are the ‘real’ legacy of continual, external and internal, conflict in the Balkans/Yugoslavia. For the purpose of my analysis of the external Balkanization it is needed to point out that the South Slavs were nomadic tribes and “pagans” when they have settled Balkan peninsula in “VI and VII century CE” (Crnobrnja, 1994:17)52. Nevertheless, the Islamization of the Balkans and its impact on future Yugoslavia is best summarized by Crnobrnja:

“The Turkish invasion and the domination of most of these territories by the Ottoman Empire brought with it the Islamic religion. The original Islamic believers were Turks who came and settled in conquered territories, but a portion of the indigenous population converted to Islam. The converts were relatively few among Orthodox Christians, even fewer amongst Catholics. The largest conversion to Islam occurred among the Bogumils, a heretical religious sect that occupied Bosnia, the central part of what was later to be Yugoslavia” (1994:17).


52 As discussed above, all major world religions (Roman Catholic, Greek Orthodox and Islam) intersect in the Yugoslav part of the Balkans, (i.e., Bosnia) due to their internal historical fight for domination of these territories. See more about geographies of religions, in particular their conquest of the Balkans, in Secibovic, Refik. Introduction to the General Geography of Religion (Uvod u opstu geografiju religije). Novi Sad: Prometej, 1995.
As one can see, the external Balkanization historically divided and subjected the peoples, future nations, of Yugoslavia. A Yugoslav popular saying best illustrates public opinion about such history: “We were dying for Emperors who played war games!” The two Balkan wars that occurred in 1912 and 1913 are a most powerful example of how external Balkanization produces internal division. Indeed, while the first Balkan war was fought by the ‘Balkan Alliance’ (Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria and Greece) for the liberation from Ottoman (Turk) Rule, the second Balkan war was initiated by Bulgaria against Serbia and Greece over the territories of Macedonia, that further spread and involved Montenegro and Romania (History: Encyclopedic Lexicon, 1970:61). Thus, once liberated from foreign domination, the Balkan countries ended up in the second Balkan war over the disputed territory of Macedonia claimed by each of them as historically their territory, and thus, having the right to occupy and dominate it. Also, Yugoslav nations had to fight against each other in the W.W.I as the territories of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia were part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire while Serbia and Montenegro were allied with the Entente. As well, in W.W.II there was a civil war due to Nazi occupation and its Divide and Rule politics in the Balkans/Yugoslavia.

With regards to the external Balkanization, Gerard Baudson\(^3\) points out that, after W.W.I, France influenced the creation of the First Yugoslavia (in 1918) in order to surround Germany with a “security zone”, that is, with the “creation of three new states: Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia” (1996:104). Also, Hitler’s vision of the ‘New World Order’, as he wrote in Mein Kampf, states that: “all the countries that emerged

\(^3\) Baudson was actively involved in the Yugoslav crisis from the very beginning as part of French diplomatic team. Besides Le Nouvel Ordre Mondial et la Yugoslavie (1996) he also published Europe of Lunatics (1993) and Europe of Apartrides (1994).
from the 'Versailles Agreement' are an insupportable insult. Yugoslavia is one of these countries” (Baudson, 1996:105). Once again, in W.W.II, Yugoslavia was a victim of Hitler's world order and his 'Divide and Rule' politics in the Balkans.

And again, the Second, or Tito’s, Yugoslavia (SFRY: 1945-1991) was created by Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt at the Yalta Conference in 1945 where they were establishing the post-war 'World Order'. This Conference made some important compromising decisions well-known as “fifty-fifty politics that hit the Balkans particularly hard especially Yugoslavia, the territory which became a sphere of interest divided between the USSR and Western powers”. Although Yugoslavia was liberated by its own forces (the Yugoslav Army), the Conference recommended an agreement between Tito’s National Committee and the Government in exile living in London since 1941 (History: Encyclopedic Lexicon, 1970:357, my translation). However, the Communist Party led by Tito won the first free post-war elections in 1946 and the socialist Yugoslavia as the federation of five constitutive nations was born. In order to avoid over-simplification of these historical events, it is needed to point out that W.W.II in Yugoslavia simultaneously included Nazi occupation, civil war and a socialist revolution. After the bloody civil war and Nazi occupation which together had caused the genocide of Serbs (750.000)54, Jews (50.000) and Gypsies (25.000), Yugoslav nations were, again, voluntarily united in a socialist and multinational Yugoslavia with Marshall Tito as its life-long President55.

55 As we have seen in the previous chapter, the very idea of the unification of the South Slavs into one state has a long history. See more details about historical development of the idea of Yugoslav Unity and
Due to all these factors, I argue that external Balkanization, or the ‘Old and New World Orders’ politics in the Balkans, with the ‘Divide and Rule’ schemes, has always cut and divided the territory of Yugoslavia on the West and East parts. Therefore, it is the external Balkanization and its subjection of the South Slavs/Yugoslavs that produces the internal ethnic conflicts over historically disputed territories. I argue thus that the ethnic nationalism is a child of the external Balkanization, particularly in the twentieth century that includes two Balkan Wars, W.W.I and W.W.II and the recent civil war. Besides, and in spite of, ethnic nationalism and civil wars in recent Yugoslavian history, there was an even stronger sense of national and religious tolerance and mutual respectfulness. In particular, once liberated from Nazism and its domestic ultra-nationalist collaborators (i.e., Croatian ‘Ustashi’, Serbian ‘Chetniks’, Bosnian ‘Young Muslims’, Kosovar Albanian ‘Balists’, etc.), the peoples of Yugoslavia had united in a socialist and a multinational country which developed a sense and a politics of national tolerance and cultural diversity. Internally and externally, Tito’s Yugoslavia established a well-known policy of ‘an active and peaceful coexistence’.

Yugoslavism in Alekса, Djiлаs. The Contested Country: Yugoslav Unity and Communist Revolution 1919-1953, 1996 (1991). As Djiлаs maintains, this idea of the unification was on the agenda of Yugoslav intelligentsia and socialists, since Enlightenment. He exposes the complexity and development of national question in both Yugoslavias, particularly the tension between those who advocated Yugoslavism and the ethnic nationalists, as well as the progressive role of the socialist revolution and subsequent creation of the multinational and multicultural Yugoslavia. Also, see more details about ‘the spirit of Yugoslavism’ in Crnobrnja, 1994.
3.2. **Yugoslavia and the New World Order**

In terms of the current ‘New World Order’\(^56\) that advocates and imposes the global ‘dictate of free market’, Canadian economist Michel Chossudovsky (1997) argues that the former Yugoslavia is just another country on the long list of victims of the “Globalization of Poverty”. In other words, he claims that the imposed structural adjustment reforms of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank brought about the global economic devastation of over a hundred of the Third World countries. As these reforms were also applied in all former communist countries, and socialist Yugoslavia, with the same devastating economic results, Chossudovsky rightly names this process the ‘*thirdworldization of Yugoslavia*’ (1997:225-263). On the question of Bosnia, Chossudovsky (1996) argues, in his excellent article “Dismantling Yugoslavia, Colonizing Bosnia”, that the Dayton Peace Accord, in 1995, had “installed a full-fledged Western colonial administration in Bosnia”. In his words:

“With a Bosnian peace settlement holding under NATO guns, the West has unveiled a ‘reconstruction’ program that strips that brutalized country of sovereignty to a degree not seen in Europe since the end of World War II. It consists largely of making Bosnia a divided territory under NATO military occupation and Western administration” (1996:32).

These facts of the division of Bosnia and the NATO occupation are also obvious in the attached excerpt of CNN’s report that is, ironically, entitled “Mission: Peace, Bosnia divided before and after the war” (see the maps and underlined text in Appendix

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II). This report and maps best illustrate the current external Balkanization or “neocolonialization of Bosnia” in Chossudovsky’s terms. As he states:

“the neocolonialization of Bosnia is the logical culmination of long Western efforts to undo Yugoslavia’s experiment in market socialism and worker’s self-management and to impose the diktat of the free market. Multiethnic, socialist Yugoslavia was once a regional industrial power and economic success. In the two decades before 1980, annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth averaged 6.1 percent, medical care was free, the literacy was 91 percent, and life expectancy was 72 years. But after a decade of Western economic ministrations and five years of disintegration, war, boycott, and embargo, the economies of the former Yugoslavia are prostrate, their industrial sectors dismantled” (1996:33, see footnote 11 for statistical data according to World Bank’s report: “World Development Report 1991, Statistical Annex, Tables 1 and 2”).

Similarly to Chossudovsky, Michael Parenti ([1999] 2000), an American scholar, also points out in his analysis of “the rational destruction of Yugoslavia”, particularly with regard to NATO’s bombing campaign in 1999, that the United States and other Western powers’ ultimate goal is privatization and “Third-Worldization of Yugoslavia”. Although socialist Yugoslavia “was not the kind of country global capitalism would normally tolerate”, Parenti maintains that it “was allowed to exist for 45 years because it was seen as a nonaligned buffer to the Warsaw Pact nations”. For Parenti, it is clear that “the dismemberment and mutilation of Yugoslavia was part of a concerted policy initiated by the United States and the other Western powers in 1989”. He rightly claims that “Yugoslavia was the one country in Eastern Europe that would not voluntarily overthrow what remained of its socialist system and install a free-market economic order” (2000:2, my emph.). Parenti stresses that there is a “public record” of US direct involvement in dismembering Yugoslavia, that is,
“In November 1990, the Bush administration pressured Congress into passing the 1991 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, which provided that any part of Yugoslavia failing to declare independence within six months would lose U.S. financial support. The law demanded separate elections in each of the six Yugoslav republics, and mandated U.S. State Department approval of both election procedures and results as a condition for any future aid. Aid would go only to the separate republics, not to the Yugoslav government, and only to those forces whom Washington defined as ‘democratic’, meaning right-wing, free-market, nationalistic parties” (2000:3).

As one can see then, the former Yugoslavia, as a multinational and socialist state, with a successful economy and Western European living standard was somehow a corner-stone in the globalisation process and ‘New World Order’ plan for the Balkans. In line with these authors (Baudson, 1996; Chossudovsky, 1996, 1997; Parenti, 2000; Samary 1995, et al.), I argue that the geopolitical factor and the Western economic interest, in particular that of Germany and the USA, were, once again, primary reasons and causes for dismantling of Yugoslavia. In other words, once Yugoslavs were divided by the ‘new world order’ politics whose ultimate goal is privatization and the ‘dictate of free market’, it was easy to turn them against each other and light the fuse of civil war. Again, this is not to deny the existence and performance of the aggressive, ethnic nationalism among Serbs, Croats and Muslims (and Albanians who are non-Slavic people), but rather a criticism of Western oversimplification of the Yugoslav crisis that excludes any other reason or cause, in particular Western or International involvement and responsibility. In this regard, Catherine Samary points out that

“the break up of a multinational country, Yugoslavia, is combined with the crisis of a (socioeconomic and political) system, in the context of a world where the ‘free market’ is on the offensive ... There will be no peaceful ‘new world order’ founded on exclusion. Antiliberal and fascist nationalism is the classical answer to such crisis (1995:11, 14, my emph.).
The importance of geopolitical and strategic location of the Yugoslav territories is also illustrated by the well-known notion that they are historically the ‘Golden Door between the West and the East’. As Baudson notes, Yugoslavia was called by Winston Churchill the “tender belly of Europe” (1996:83). Similarly to Baudson, Crnobrnja (1994) argues that “the international environment - that is, the broader political setting ... aside from aggressive nationalism and an inadequate political system”, had influenced both the formation and the destruction of Yugoslavia.\(^{57}\) In terms of the external factors, Crnobrnja points out that “as with most countries, and certainly every European country, the international context was and is extremely important. The territories of Yugoslavia, central in both geopolitical and strategic terms, have been of interest to large powers for centuries” (1994:8). Crnobrnja also emphasizes that neither “national characteristics” nor “the history of mutual aggression” qualify as primary factors for the recent war. He stresses that it is true “there have been bloody confrontations amongst the Serbs, Croats, Muslims and Albanians. But we are not talking about a millennium-old history of hatred and fighting, as is sometimes claimed” (1994:9). According to Crnobrnja, the “mutual antagonism and aggression” among Yugoslav nations “is of a relatively recent nature”, that is, within the XXth century. For him, “nationalism, ... was a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the destruction of Yugoslavia. Other ingredients ... are the state of

\(^{57}\) In order to clarify Crnobrnja’s argument, I stress that he acknowledges the importance of the foreign dimension, but not as the only factor in creation and destruction of Yugoslavia. In his words, while “it would, however, be an exaggeration to say that Yugoslavia was imposed on the Yugoslavs by foreign powers ... it would not be an exaggeration ... to say that Yugoslavia was to a considerable degree moulded by influences from without ... [therefore] If Yugoslavia was not created by external forces alone, it certainly found one of its important reasons for staying together in the hostile environment of the Cold War” (1994:8).
the political system, the international environment, economic condition, history, tradition, and national characteristics” (1994:6). In other words, Crnobrnja argues that if it would be an imperative and if the first Yugoslavia (1918-1941) was a mistake, then “why was the same mistake repeated in 1945?, [and] ... how was it possible for Yugoslavia to reach the level of international respectability and internal stability that it enjoyed for almost thirty years?” (1994:10).

In terms of the inadequate political system(s), Crnobrnja maintains that Yugoslavia(s) (1918-1991) was mostly ruled by some kind of “totalitarian regime”. While the First Yugoslavia, or “The Kingdom of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs” (1918-1941), was commonly characterized by “an absolutist non-parliamentary monarchy”; the Second Yugoslavia, or “Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” (SFRY, 1945-1991) was under “the quasi-parliamentary rule of the Communist Party and Tito personally” (Crnobrnja, 1994:6,7). In these regimes, Crnobrnja sees a lack of the democratic political culture and the suppression of national questions and tensions as the main unresolved issue in Yugoslavia (1918-1991) which contributed to the onset of the war. He states that “the national issues, masterfully guided through the media by the ‘patriots’, rapidly turned into nationalism and then into its aggressive variety, pushing the problem of the democratic deficit to the sidelines” (1994:7-8). More importantly, Crnobrnja claims that “the borders”, i.e., the non-correspondence of the ethnic with administrative borders of the republics in Yugoslavia, are the “major issue” of the national disputes and conflicts (1994:10). In other words, Yugoslav Republics were composed by more than one nation, in particular multi-ethnic Bosnia.
In this regard, I need to stress that the majority of authors presented in this paper argue that the former Yugoslavia was primarily dismantled by the external/Western powers. For them, ‘de jure’ International recognition, first by the Vatican and Germany, and then the United States, of the new successor states of the former Yugoslavia in their administrative borders which embraced ethnically heterogeneous regions, was, in Baudson’s words (1996), a “death bell or knell” for minority and human rights across former Yugoslavia (Hayden, 1996; Samary 1995, et al.). In consequence, as Baudson further explains, all involved parties in the civil war tried to avoid the status of minority, particularly the Serbs, of whom over 2 million lived outside Serbia (Crnobrnja, 1994; Samary, 1995; Hayden, 1996). On the other hand, Samary and Hayden additionally point out that multi-ethnic Yugoslavia had an ever-increasing rate of mixed marriages and people declared as Yugoslavs, in particular in Bosnia which was the most mixed republic, so-called “Yugoslavia in miniature” (Crnobrnja, 1994). Central to the argument of these authors is the claim that the majority of victims of the ethnic cleansing were mixed people and ‘newly created’ national minorities, originally constitutive nations, including the most bizarre one, that is, the Yugoslavs, as will be demonstrated in the next chapter.

In his excellent historical and political analysis of the dismemberment of Yugoslavia due to the ‘New World Order’, Baudson (1996) argues that never in history were there so many changed borders in such a short period of time, from the Adriatic coast to the borders of China. In terms of the Yugoslav dilemma, that is, if Yugoslavia was dismembered due to the internal factor, i.e., ethnic nationalism, or due to the external factor, i.e., International/Western intervention for the sake of the new world
order, Baudson lucidly depicts the image: "At last, what is Yugoslavia - 'a suicide of one nation' or 'a homicide of one country'? Let's say that the victim was found hanged after shooting itself from behind" (1996:157, my emph.). For him, it is clear that Yugoslavia was definitely a victim of the 'New World Order' with an undesirable 'boomerang effect'. In Baudson's words:

"It is madness to destroy a country which has existed for 80 years and has 24 million people ... It is madness to transform nations [narodi] into national minorities as the Badinter Commission has done. It is madness to wish to create a Europe constituted by different nations, nationalities and religions, different languages, cultures and customs; and at the same time, to destroy Yugoslavia which was already Europe in miniature constituted of multiple nationalities, religions and customs. The dismemberment of Yugoslavia is a 'death bell' for the European 'homeland' of Nation-States" (1996:135, my translation).

In this regard, it is noteworthy to mention the following opinions of two American generals about avoiding the status of national minority and American involvement in the war in Bosnia, that are cited in Pierre Marie Gallois's 'Foreword' in Baudson's book Le Nouvel Ordre Mondial et la Yugoslavie (1996):

"We, Americans, say that we want peace, but we have encouraged spreading of the war ... all parties in the former Yugoslavia had same goal: to avoid status of minority in Yugoslavia or any of the successor states. USA supported all these ambitions except Serbs in Bosnia (General Charles Boyd, p. 11, my trans.)

There is no good guys on the one side and the bad guys on the other side" (General Brickmon, p. 11, my trans.).

Similarly, Baudson describes the war in Bosnia in terms of a Hollywood scenario of the 'good and bad' guys and sarcastically comments on the International Justice System (the Hague Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia):
"In November 1995, there were 52 sentenced persons, of which 45 were Serbs. When we encounter the barbarism of all civil wars; when we know that in Bosnia there are three conflicting sides which are from time to time both allies and enemies, as is a case with Croats and Muslims; it is incredible that the other seven are Croats from Bosnia sentenced for the massacres of Muslim civilians! There is no sentence for the war crimes against Serbs. Thus, there are evil Serbs, good Muslims and mainly correct Croats" (1996: 210, my trans.)

This is not to diminish the responsibility of the Serbs. Rather, I advocate shared/joint responsibility for the war crimes that all parties committed. All sides involved in conflict committed crimes and the victims, that is the killed and the displaced people, are the civilian population of all Yugoslav nations and nationalities. The civilian victims were, in general, all 24 million of the former Yugoslavs, and in particular, the designated “undesirables”, i.e., newly created minorities that were previously constitutive nations, mixed people and ‘Yugoslavs’. In consequence, there are no winners in this war(s) of losers! In terms of a completely ethnically mixed Bosnia, Hayden notes that the result of civil war “as of late 1994 was the more or less complete exchange of populations” among Serbs, Croats and Muslims (1996:795, see particularly Table 1 and 2). For this reason, it is logical that all parties tried to avoid the status of minority and consequent expulsion. As socialist Yugoslavia (1945-1991) was a mini-Europe, or ‘a country of diversity’, with so much cultural variety on a very small territory, it is both an absurdity and a crime to homogenize, by all forms of ethnic cleansing, the originally heterogeneous territories. In this regard, Crnobrnja reminds us of the famous popular saying that provides the best description of the former Yugoslavia, that is, it had “seven

neighbors, six republics, five nations, four languages, three religions, two scripts, and one goal: to live in brotherhood and unity" (1994:15).

The following short description of the seven neighbors of Yugoslavia and their historic relations provides a valuable background for better understanding the national minority question, the complexity of the Yugoslav state and its cultural diversity. According to Crnobrnja, Italy, historically has always been "an occupying force" in Yugoslavia, from Venice to fascist Italy and therefore, "has left a strong cultural influence", especially along the Adriatic sea. As Crnobrnja asserts, "At times it has been directly hostile to the very idea of Yugoslavia". Furthermore, he states that Austria and Hungary "have separately and as the Dual Monarchy held Slovenia, Croatia, Vojvodina, and, for a brief period, BiH [Bosnia] under their rule". They both left a strong cultural influence there and these regions are the most developed in Yugoslavia. As Italy, they both disliked and resisted the creation of Yugoslavia. The confrontation between Austria and Serbia over Bosnia led to W.W.I. With Romania, there were no disputes and it stayed like this until today. Bulgaria, borders with both Serbia and Macedonia. The latter was a reason for "strained relations" between Serbia and Bulgaria. According to Crnobrnja, "the situation today has not changed dramatically". Greece, on the other hand, "traditionally supported Serbia, and vice versa, against the Bulgarians, Turks, and Albanians". I agree with Crnobrnja that "the question of Macedonia" could again, as in the past, "be a reason for new alliances and confrontations among the neighboring countries" (1994:33). And finally, with Albania, "except for a brief period after the Second World War, relations have usually been very tense". This was partly due to "the penetration of Albanian population into traditionally South Slav territories, partly
because of claims for a Greater Albania reminiscent of the one that was formed as a puppet state during the latter years of the Ottoman Empire” (Crnobrnja, 1994:34).

The following brief overview of relevant statistical and socio-economic data of the six republics of Yugoslavia, in alphabetical order, provides valuable insights especially into the national and ethnocultural heterogeneity of the republics. Crnobrnja states that *Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)* “was often called ‘little Yugoslavia’”. According to the census of 1991, it “had around 4,365,000 inhabitants” of which almost “44 per cent declared themselves Muslims, 31.5 per cent Serbs, and just over 17 per cent Croats. The rest belonged to other nationalities, including 5.5 per cent declared Yugoslavs” (Crnobrnja, 1994:22). Even more importantly, Bosnia had the highest rate of mixed marriages. As Crnobrnja notes, “16 per cent of the children in BiH were from mixed marriages”\(^{59}\). Thus, the new current divisions or the Balkanization of Bosnia “cut not only through territories but also through families” (Crnobrnja, 1994:23)\(^{60}\).

Economically, it was one of the less developed republics with “the GNP per capita ... between 70 and 80 per cent of the Yugoslav average” (Crnobrnja, 1994:24). *Croatia* in the 1991 Census had 4,760,000 inhabitants of which “78 per cent have declared themselves Croats and just over 12 per cent Serbs ... 2.2 per cent declared Yugoslavs and just over 1 per cent Muslims”. Crnobrnja further asserts that there are about 110,000 Croats living in Serbia (mainly in Vojvodina), and 756,000 living in Bosnia (mostly in the self-declared “Herzerg-Bosnia” as well as mixed with others). Its GNP per capita was about “25 to 35 per cent above the Yugoslav average” (Crnobrnja, 1994:24-26).

\(^{59}\) See also Hayden 1996, p. 789

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Macedonia had just over 2 million inhabitants, “of which 65 per cent are Macedonians, 21 per cent (over 400,000) ethnic Albanians”, and 4.8 per cent Turks, 2.7 per cent Roms and 2.2 per cent Serbs. Macedonia was the poorest republic and was a recipient, like Bosnia and Montenegro, of development aid from the richest republics, that is, from Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia (Crnobrnja, 1994:27-28).

Furthermore, Crnobrnja notes that Montenegro had “just over 600,000 people” of which “62 per cent declared themselves Montenegrins, 15 per cent Muslims, 9.5 per cent Serbs, 6.6 per cent ethnic Albanians, and 4.5 per cent Yugoslavs”. It was also less developed republic with GNP per capita “about 80 per cent of the Yugoslav average” (Crnobrnja, 1994:28-29). Slovenia, “the Alpine state”, had population of approximately 2 million being “ethnically the most homogeneous, more than 90 per cent Slovene”. Slovenia was the most developed and rich republic with “a GNP per capita almost 60 per cent above the Yugoslav average”. Crnobrnja points out that “the Slovenes, unlike the other South Slavs, never had a medieval national state” and for centuries Slovenia was divided mostly between “German and Austrian rulers”. On its behalf, Yugoslavia was “involved in disputes about the ethnic rights of Slovenes in both Austria and Italy” (Crnobrnja, 1994:29, 30). Finally, the sixth republic, Serbia was the biggest republic “both in size and population”. Serbia had, in census of 1991, about 9,800,000 people, of which “65.8 per cent [are] Serbs, 17.2 per cent [are] Albanians, 3.5 per cent [are] Hungarians, 3.2 per cent [are] Yugoslavs, 2.4 per cent [are] Muslims, 1.4 per cent [are] Montenegrins, and 1.1 per cent [are] Croats”. Although Serbia’s GNP per capita “was

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60 As Hayden argues the real victims of the “ethnic cleansing” are/were mostly from the mixed territories, thus Bosnia and Croatia. Recent opening of the “South Balkan War” could be understood as prolongation of the dismantling of the Yugoslavia and new revisions of south borders.
somewhat below the Yugoslav average (93-95 per cent)
), it was nevertheless “among the better-developed republics”, and therefore, contributed aid to the less developed (Crnobrnja, 1994:30-33). Similarly to Baudson (1996), Hayden (1996) and Samary (1995), Crnobrnja also points out that,

“A crucial issue in both the construction and the destruction of Yugoslavia has been the fact that many Serbs live outside Serbia. The total number of people declaring themselves Serbs in 1991 was just under 8.5 million. Of that number 6.4 million live in Serbia, 1.4 million in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 580,000 in Croatia, 57,000 in Montenegro, and 44,000 in Macedonia” (1994:30).

As I have already mentioned, besides Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Slovenes and Serbs, the sixth nation of Yugoslavia are the Muslims that together with the popular Communist slogan of ‘brotherhood and unity’ were both Tito’s inventions for the purpose of the preservation of national tranquillity. The seventh nation are the ‘Yugoslavs’ who are, in fact, both a nation and a national minority in their own country. Also, Crnobrnja rightly points out that instead of four languages as the above fable states, there were three, as Serbo-Croatian and Croato-Serbian are the same language. The other two are Macedonian and Slovenian which are distinct languages. As we have also seen, the three major religions are Roman-Catholic, Greek Orthodox and Islam. The two scripts are Cyrillic and Latin that were both in official use. In terms of their usage, the Yugoslav population was split in half with regards to both scripts. However, gradually, Latin script prevailed as Yugoslavia was oriented towards the West (Crnobrnja, 1994:15-19).

This multinational and cultural variety is well illustrated by Samary’s maps, in particular with Map 2 entitled “Tito’s Yugoslavia: The Republics and Autonomous
Regions of Socialist Yugoslavia” (1995:16) and Map 3 “Ethnic Composition of Republics” (1995:18) that are attached in Appendix II. These two maps (2 and 3) best show the non-correspondence of the ethnic groups with the administrative borders in Tito’s Yugoslavia. In terms of the internal Balkanization, this fact was, as Crnobrnja also emphasizes, a major issue in current national disputes and conflicts. As Bosnia was the most ‘mixed’ republic, the nonsense and crime of ethnic division and homogenization in/of such multinational and multicultural territory is best explained, as we will see in the next chapter, by Hayden’s analysis of geographies of the ethnic cleansing and by the Nostradamous-like two episodes of the popular TV comedy show ‘Top List of Surrealists’ which predicted and sarcastically presented the future division and fraternal war in Sarajevo/Bosnia.

On the one hand, although ethnic nationalism was defeated in W.W.II, it was never totally uprooted as recent events show and support. On the other hand, ethnic nationalism was a necessary but not a sufficient reason for the recent civil war. I agree with Crnobrnja’s argument that the Yugoslav nations voluntarily united and lived in socialist Yugoslavia, i.e., if the first Yugoslavia (1918-1941) was a mistake, then why was the same mistake repeated in 1945, and how was it possible for socialist Yugoslavia to reach the level of international respectability and internal stability it had maintained for almost thirty years? Similarly, Parenti also stresses that “Yugoslavia was built on an idea, namely that the Southern Slavs would not remain weak and divided peoples, squabbling among themselves and easy prey to outside imperial interests. Together they could form a substantial territory capable of its own economic development” (2000:2). For these reasons, I share the opinion of many authors who argue that socialist
Yugoslavia was primarily a multinational and multicultural country with a pronounced sense and politics of national and religious tolerance and mutual respect, as well as being an economic success prior to the IMF and the World Bank’s first round of structural adjustment reforms in the 1980s (Baudson, 1996; Chossudovsky, 1997; Parenti, 2000; Samary, 1995, et al.). Similarly to these authors, I maintain then that Yugoslavia was dismembered due to the external Balkanization, or the new world order’s dictate of the free-market with the well known formula of ‘divide and rule’ politics in the Balkans that besides economic reasons includes geopolitical and military strategic factors.

In Samuel Huntington’s (1993) extremely primordialist account of “the clash of civilizations” and the “kin-country syndrome” these factors and goals (economic, geopolitical and strategic) are not mentioned. In a very contradictory manner with respect to the war in the former Yugoslavia, particularly Bosnia, Huntington acknowledges the international intervention in the Balkans, but exclusively as the “kin-country syndrome” that apparently justifies the foreign and/or international involvement. In Huntington’s words,

“Western publics manifested sympathy and support for the Bosnian Muslims and the horrors they suffered at the hands of the Serbs. Relatively little concern was expressed, however, over Croatian attacks on Muslims and participation in the dismemberment of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the early stages of the Yugoslav break up, Germany, in an unusual display of diplomatic initiative and muscle, induced the other 11 members of the European Community to follow its lead in recognizing Slovenia and Croatia. As a result of the pope’s determination to provide strong backing to the two Catholic countries, the Vatican extended recognition even before the Community did. The United States followed the European lead. Thus the leading actors in Western civilization rallied behind their coreligionists. Subsequently Croatia was reported to be receiving substantial quantities of arms from Central European and other Western countries. Boris Yeltsin’s government, on the other hand, attempted to pursue a middle course that would be sympathetic to the Orthodox Serbs
but not alienate Russia from the West. ... By early 1993 several hundred Russians apparently were serving with the Serbian forces, and reports circulated of Russian arms being supplied to Serbia. Islamic governments and groups, on the other hand, castigated the West for not coming to the defense of the Bosnians. Iranian leaders urged Muslims from all countries to provide help to Bosnia; in violation of the U.N. arms embargo, Iran supplied weapons and men for the Bosnians; Iranian-supported Lebanese groups sent guerrillas to train and organize the Bosnian forces. In 1993 up to 4,000 Muslims from over two dozen Islamic countries were reported to be fighting in Bosnia.... In the 1990s the Yugoslav conflict is provoking intervention from countries that are Muslim, Orthodox and Western Christian” (1993:37, 38).

Of course, Huntington’s notion of the kin-country syndrome omits why the Western ‘brotherhood’ is supporting Bosnian Muslims, and more recently the ethnic Albanians who are mostly Muslims, too. In my view, his overall analysis, and particularly the part about ‘kinship relations’, provides justification for the International-Western intervention as well as the expansion of the NATO in the Balkans through ‘Partnership for Peace’. Probably, for this reason, Huntington is not mentioning the geopolitical, geostrategic and economic interests of the Western countries, in particular the energy crisis in the USA and its consequent ‘friendship’ with countries, particularly with Muslim ones, which possess rich oil fields (Baudson 1996). Not surprisingly then that these Western economic and political interests are intertwined in the Balkans due to the oil pipeline routes from the rich Caspian sea basin to Europe through the Balkans. In contrast to Huntington, Ronald Hatchett and Sir Alfred Sherman (among others) demystified the core of the kinship relations as well as the clash of civilizations in Yugoslavia, especially Bosnia, by analyzing America’s Intervention in the Balkans (1998). In this regard, Ronald Hatchett points out, in the “Foreword” of this collection of
papers presented at the Lord Byron Foundation’s Third Annual Conference devoted to USA policy in Southeast Europe held in Chicago in March 1997, that

“many nations operate with hidden agendas in the international arena ... According to Mr. Clinton and his administrators, American policy in the post-Cold War world is focused on expanding the community of free enterprise-based democracies and ensuring fundamental human rights for all peoples” (1998:5).

Hatchett notes that American foreign policy is “supposedly guided by rule of law, respect for global norms and the sovereign equality of states, not by great power hegemonism”. With regards to Yugoslavia, particularly Bosnia, he argues that Clinton’s Administration portrays a picture of American aid to “a small independent nation, called Bosnia, whose people are struggling to escape military conquest by an aggressive Yugoslav state dominated by the notoriously warlike Serbs, and led by an anachronistic, neocommunist, authoritarian regime” (1998:5, 6). Similarly to Hatchett, Sir Alfred Sherman comments on Bosnia and stresses that nobody has taken seriously the meaning and intention of the book written by a Muslim President Alija Izerbegovic entitled “Islamic Declaration” as “their predecessors were loath to take Mein Kampf seriously”. He emphasizes that prior to the crisis and war, most residents of Bosnia

“did not want to become ‘Bosnians’ in any political sense. The Croats, concentrated in western Herzegovina, sought secession from Yugoslavia in order to facilitate their union with an enlarged Croatia. The Serbs, for their part wanted to remain linked to their brethren of the Drina river [Serbs in Serbia, Yugoslavia], having suffered for centuries under alien misrule, including the clerico-fascist Ustasa regime, which in 1941-1945 perpetrated genocide against the Serbs of Croatia and Bosnia with active Muslim participation” (Sir Alfred Sherman, 1998:10).
In this regard, Hatchett maintains that “the media ... seemingly competing with each other in raising the level of sensationalism through selective reporting ... provides a moral high ground for U.S. government actions in the Balkans” and simultaneously increases the selling rate of newspapers and TV ratings. At the same time, “the Clinton team” has created “the myth” about the European inability “to resolve the Balkan problems without American leadership”. Hatchett states that anyone who is “familiar with ... the problems of the Balkans” knows that U.S. media and politicians reports are “pure bunk!” called “‘public diplomacy’ when directed towards the American people, and ‘political theater’ when directed towards governments of other nations”. He rightly points out that “if another country was the source of such rhetoric we would call it simply, and accurately, ‘propaganda’” (1998:6). Hatchett critically questions American policy:

“If America was committed to the concept of a ‘multicultural’ state in the Balkans, why did it so readily condone the dismembering of Yugoslavia? ... If it prizes rule of law, why did America renego on its obligations under the U.N. Chapter, and its agreement under a Helsinki Final Act of 1975 to ‘respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all member states’ - including Yugoslavia, a founding member of both institutions? If America places the right of self determination of peoples above the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, why does it apply these principles to Slovenes, Croats, Bosnian Muslims and Skopje-Macedonians, but not to Serbs? ... Why is the desire of Serbs to come together into a single country such a crime against humanity and a threat to world peace?” (1998:6, 7).

In Hatchett’s opinion, “the rights and aspirations of small nationality groups like the Serbs” are sacrificed for the more important U.S. “geopolitical goals, such as: strengthening ties with the Billion-plus Muslims of the world; giving new purpose to NATO” which hopes that in the post-Cold War period it will be “the vehicle for
continuing American ‘leadership’ in Europe”, and the prevention of “any ‘resurgence’ of Russia” as well as the overseeing of “the flow of oil from newly developing fields in the Caspian region” (1998:7, 8). Thus, in contrast to Huntington’s primordialism and the media reports, all of the above mentioned authors share the opinion that Yugoslavia was destroyed due to Euro(German)-American interference including the NATO and the U.N. Intervention. In addition, Smilja Avramov⁶¹ points out that one of the main ideas of the ‘New World Order’ was expressed by the US President George Bush in regard to the Gulf War when he stated that “it is not only a war for Kuwait, but for the ‘New World Order’... in which the ‘Law of the Jungle’ will be replaced by the ‘Rule of Law’” (1997:46). Apparently, the same logic and reason were applied in order to justify the USA and NATO intervention in Yugoslavia. In addition to Hatchett’s argument about geopolitics, particularly in terms of the ‘oil route’ from the Caspian sea, Avramov explains that in 1991 at the NATO Summit in Rome there were two zones indicated as a “geostrategic” priority: “the territory of former USSR and Mediterranean basin” (1997:82).

Avramov argues that with “the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia”, the territorial status quo, or the so-called ‘gray zone’, has been destroyed in Europe. Consequently, with the disappearance of the Eastern Bloc, or Warsaw Pact, its basic function disappeared, too: “the connection between West and East” as we can see in Map 4 in Appendix II (1997:96). Moreover, “the NATO Expansion to the East through ‘Partnership for Peace’” including the former republics of the Soviet Union was strongly

contested and condemned by many Russians, among whom is also Gorbacov who argues that this “NATO expansion ... leads to a new confrontation between East and West” (Avramov, 1997:97). As we can see on the Map 5, NATO, with its 24 new country-members of the ‘Partnership for Peace’, covers a huge Euro-Asian territory and is much closer to Russia. We can see on these two Maps (4 and 5) with the naked eye that the territories of both the former Yugoslavia (SFY) and the present day Federation of Serbia and Montenegro (FRY) are surrounded by NATO countries. Also, we can see that these territories are on the ‘oil route’ that connects the East with the West, from the Caspian and Black sea to both the Baltic and the Adriatic/Mediterranean sea.

For this reason, the geopolitical and military strategic factor of the South Slavs territories is still a key point of the Balkans’ integration, or colonialisation, (by agreement or by military force) into NATO/Western projects and plans. Also, it should be noted that by the dismantling of the present day Yugoslavia (FRY) both common goals of NATO and Germany would be achieved, that is, the Russians would be completely cut off of from access to the all three seas and Germany as the American ‘partner in leadership’ would finally dominate all of ‘Middle Europe’ by connecting the Baltic sea through ‘the Danube river valley’ (Serbia/Vojvodina) to the Black/Mediterranean sea. Ironically, as Avramov points out in her concluding remarks, while Croatia celebrated its independence by singing ‘Danke Deutchland’, Germany celebrated its unification by singing the old hymn “Deutchland, Deutchland über alles”. Avramov thus concludes her political analysis of the Postheroic War of the West against Yugoslavia with the

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statement that "who had not learned from history become inevitably its victim" (1997:448).

As I have already discussed, the borders in the Balkans, products of the external Balkanization, directly produce, or encourage, the internal ethnic conflicts and wars. This is particularly true in terms of Bosnia where Western/International actors were, and still are, very active in (re)drawing maps and borders. This fact is well illustrated by Map 6 entitled by Samary "The International Community on Trial", and by Map 7 "Dayton Peace Accord" (see both Maps in Appendix II). Map 6 shows Lord Owen's plans for border-divisions in Bosnia in 1993 drawn with Vance, and in 1994 with Stoltenberg, all appointed peace negotiators for Bosnia. As Samary's title of the chapter explaining International involvement in the Balkans suggests, the International Community should be put on trial for drawing such maps. Similarly, Map 7 shows the Dayton Peace Accord that was signed in 1995 in the United States and officially ended the civil war in Bosnia. As Chossudovsky points out, the Dayton peace settlement installed a full-fledged Western colonial administration and NATO occupation that completely stripped Bosnia of sovereignty. Indeed, the Dayton Peace Accord created a neocolonial Bosnian 'constitution' with appointed High Representative as its head who has pronounced colonial power, that is,

"The High Representative is the final authority in theater regarding interpretation of the agreements. He will work with the multinational military implementation force (IFOR) Military High Command as well as creditors and donors ... The new constitution hands the reins of economic policy over to the Bretton Woods institutions and the London-based European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The IMF is empowered to appoint the first governor of the Bosnian Central Bank, who, like the High Representative, shall not be a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina or a neighboring State" (Chossudovsky, 1996:32).
These two Maps (6 and 7) explicitly show the current external Balkanization as both maps were designed by the so-called International Community in order to impose new borders within Bosnia. Therefore, these Maps should be perceived as both a direct Western/International interference in redrawing internal borders and as the continuation of ‘Divide and Rule Schemes in the Balkans’ (see old schemes in Map 1 a, b, c and d). Also, if we compare Maps 6 and 7 with Map 3 that shows the ethnic composition of Yugoslav republics, we will see that Bosnia was the most mixed region which, as such, could not be homogenized without ethnic cleansing. If we recall that all major border-divisions went through or around the territory of Bosnia which is, for this reason, the most Islamized republic of Yugoslavia, we can see that Map 3 also illustrates a legacy of the external Balkanization in both senses as inherited cultural diversity and as potential ethnic conflicts over historically disputed territories. These Maps (3, 6 and 7) explicitly show the emergence and/or creation of ‘new’ minorities that all conflicting parties tried to avoid, i.e., Serbs, Croats and Muslims. As we will see further in the next chapter, the changes of the administrative borders into the ethnic borders in completely ‘mixed’ regions of Yugoslavia, particularly in terms of the ethnic division of Bosnia, illustrate the geographies of the violence and/or ethnic cleansing. As Hayden (1996) and Samary (1995) point out, the violence and the ethnic cleansing occurred mainly in the ethnically

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63 In support of my argument see the attached newspaper article in Appendix III, written by Paul Taylor, “Ethnic crisis revives Balkan map debate” in The Globe and Mail, March 17, 2001. In particular, it is interesting to note the role of Lord Owen who calls for redrawing of the Balkan map including an independent Kosovo state and redrawing the boundaries of Bosnia along the lines that he drafted in 1993 (see Map 6 showing Vance-Owen and Owen-Stoltenberg Plans).
mixed regions of the new successor states of Yugoslavia which are building homogenous nation-states in the heterogeneous territories of the former Yugoslavia.

3.3. Concluding Remarks

As we have seen in this chapter, nationalist conflicts and disputes over borders in Yugoslavia(s) are products and outcomes of the external Balkanization, or in other words, the ‘Divide and Rule’ politics in the Balkans of the ‘Old and New World Orders’. The destiny of the Balkans was indeed always sealed by powerful external (occupying) forces which also left behind a strong economic, political and cultural influence, particularly Islam, that became a part of the diverse cultural heritage of the South Slavs/Yugoslavs. This multiethnic and multicultural legacy of Yugoslavia is primary due to the ‘Divide and Rule’ politics of the powerful empires which historically subjected the South Slavs. This in turn contributed to the legacy of continual conflict in the Balkans as each nation or national minority may find a disputed territory once belonging to them, that is, all of them might claim their historical rights over disputed regions. Although invading hordes, ambitious empires, and the cultural divide between East and West left the Balkan Peninsula with a legacy of continual conflict and consequent massive migrations, socialist Yugoslavia successfully reconciled ‘the belligerent spirits of the past’ and developed a remarkable sense of peaceful co-existence in such a multinational and multicultural country. Due to external Balkanization, the former Yugoslavia (SFRY) was by definition a mixture of different cultural traditions, primarily Western/European, Eastern/Slavic and Oriental/Islam. These various cultures historically intermingled and
created a multiethnic and multicultural socialist Yugoslavia. This fact is well illustrated in closing by the popular song "This is the Balkan" of the famous Yugoslav pop-rock star Bajaga: "This is the Balkan - A country from a dream between the powerful forces of good and evil - Here everyone can be a fiend/foe and a brother/friend - Each 50 years a war break outs - This country was created by warriors, poets and different Gods - This is the Balkan - A fragrant flower, warm but incomprehensible for all the world".
CHAPTER FOUR: Multinational and Multicultural Yugoslavia and
Geographies of the Ethnic Cleansing

As I have argued in the previous chapter, the peoples of Yugoslavia were historically subjected by various imperialistic powers. For this reason, their history embraces permanent resistance and struggle against foreign occupation. As well, the civil wars in the XXth century are primary due to the external Balkanization and its subjection of the Yugoslavs. This chapter illustrates that while Yugoslavia, in particular Bosnia, were a ‘mixture’ of various nations and cultures, their inhabitants were additionally ‘mixing’ among themselves. Not surprisingly, they were particularly mixing in the twentieth century in spite of the ethnic nationalism and civil wars. This fact is also obvious in the findings of my limited survey research which show that the majority of the respondents (6 out of 7), regardless if their nuclear family is ‘mixed or pure’, have ‘mixed’ national family background for the past several generations, i.e., in the twentieth century (question 56). In fact, while only one nuclear family is ‘pure’ and has a ‘pure’ family background, another family stated that while their nuclear family is ethnically ‘pure’, the kinship is ‘mixed’.

My goal then in this chapter is to demonstrate that the former Yugoslavia was indeed ‘Europe in miniature’ in terms of its richness of nationalities, religions and customs. It was probably the most heterogeneous European country with well pronounced and protected rights of numerous minorities (Baudson, 1996; Crnobrnja, 1994; Samary, 1995). As various Yugoslav nations and national minorities were ‘mixing’ among themselves, particularly in Bosnia, it is practically impossible to ‘ethnically
purify' such historically mixed regions. To draw ethnic border-divisions, particularly in Yugoslavia's mixed regions, meant to divide families and commit crimes. Besides the analysis of geographies of the ethnic cleansing and national identities of refugees from Bosnia/Yugoslavia, in particular with regards to the respondents, I also examine the multinational popular and political resistance to the absurdity of the ethnic divisions and civil-fraternal war. In this chapter I argue and provide empirical support for my claim that Yugoslavia was not an artificial imagined community but rather a viable multinational state whose citizens, in the eve of the war, protested and demonstrated their disagreement and fear of the future. The popular and political resistance is also examined by the analysis of two episodes of the well-known TV comedy show 'Top List of Surrealists' performed by Bosnian artists from Sarajevo. We will finally see who 'the Yugoslavs, Bosnians and Eskimos' are and what happened to them in terms of their civil, social and human rights, that I further elaborate in the last chapter. While this chapter elaborates my claim that ethnic division of the country and consequent civil war were imposed on its citizens by internal and external forces, the last chapter deals with subsequent massive displacement of the Yugoslav population in the historical perspective of the phenomenon of statelessness.

4.1. The 'Purification' of Heterogeneous Territories and the Emergence of Yugoslav 'Eskimos'

As Samary points out in her introductory background on Yugoslavia, it was a multiethnic and multicultural country with such religious and linguistic diversity best
described as "The Mosaic of People" (1995:17). In addition to Map 3 which shows the multi-ethnic and multicultural composition of the former Yugoslavia, we can further visualize this national and cultural diversity in Table 1 that shows Census data from 1981 and 1991.

Table 1. Ethnic Composition of Yugoslavia according to the 1981 and 1991 Census

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1981 Census in %</th>
<th>1991 Census in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Peoples&quot; or nations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenes</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonians</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegrins</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Minorities&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarians</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma (Gypsies)</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>N/A, less than 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Undetermineds&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Yugoslavs&quot;</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Others&quot;</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL POPULATION</td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td>100 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IN NUMBERS</td>
<td>22,424,000</td>
<td>23,529,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Samary, Catherine (1995:15,19); see also Crnobrnja (1994) and Hayden (1996)

First of all, I need to point out that Samary's data for 1981 misses the last category in the table - 'Others' (1995:15). Also, as her sum total for 1981 is only 97%, I assume that missing 3% belongs to category 'the others', and therefore, I added it in my Table 1. It is needed to say that Samary's data for 1991 includes 5.9% of 'Others', but excludes national minorities with less than 1% of population, thus Roma people are excluded (1995:19). As Samary did not specify who belongs to the category "Others", I
added that it includes other minorities, undetermineds and unspecified others, for example "Eskimos". More importantly, she remarkably describes the popular and political resistance in Yugoslavia and eloquently defines and conceptualizes the term ‘Eskimo’ by dedicating her book to

“all the men and women who resist, to my friends—Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Gypsies, Montenegrins, Macedonians, Muslims, Albanians, Jews—Bosnians, Yugoslavs, ‘Eskimos’ ... [that is] many former Yugoslavs who reject national divisions have taken to calling themselves ‘Eskimos’, even on census forms [in 1991], instead of Serbs, Croat, Muslim, etc. The term is meant in an entirely positive sense” (Samary, 1995: dedication page).

Although Table 1 shows that the highest increase of a single nationality occurred among Albanians from 7.7% in 1981 to 9.1% in 1991 (due to the highest Natality (birth) rate in Yugoslavia), there is another significant change that is even more important for the purpose of this paper. Indeed, we can see that while the percentage of the ‘Others’ increased, from 3.0% in 1981 to 5.9% in 1991, in contrast, the percentage of people who declared themselves ‘Yugoslavs’ decreased, from 5.7% in 1981 to 2.9% in 1991. This phenomenon is well explained by Crnobrnja, Hayden and Samary. Although I have already discussed the issue of the national identity of ‘Yugoslavs’ in previous chapters (Djilas, 1996 and Crnobrnja, 1994), nevertheless, I want to mention again Crnobrnja’s remark that the most bizarre dispute about nationalities in Yugoslavia was whether ‘Yugoslavs’ are/or can be a nation. As Crnobrnja points out, the number of declared Yugoslavs has ranged in various post W.W.II Census between 3 and 6.2% of the total population which accounted for a well-established ‘national minority’ in their own state (1994:22). According to the latest Census, in April 1991, Crnobrnja notes that more than
half a million people (2.9% in above Table 1) were nationally "undecided", that is, Yugoslavs. As Samary points out, in 1981 there were 1.2 million of Yugoslavs, or 5.7% as shown in Table 1 (1995: 28, 160). According to Samary,

"for many years, people could not call themselves ‘Yugoslav’ in the census. This word referred to the citizenship (affiliation with the Yugoslav state) that everyone shared, but not to a ‘nationality’ (in the ethnic-cultural sense) that any one person could choose. Rejection of the ‘unitary’ character of the first (pre-World War II) Yugoslavia, which attempted to impose a Yugoslav nationality on everyone, contributed to a suspicion of any cultural or ‘ethnic’ ‘Yugoslavism’, which was seen as a treat to particular identities. But people could tell the census-taker that they were ‘undetermined’, which is what more than 1.2 million ‘Yugoslavs’ did in 1981: 7.9 percent in Bosnia, 8.2 percent in Croatia, 0.7 percent in Macedonia, 5.3 percent in Montenegro, 4.7 percent in Serbia—but 8.2 percent in Vojvodina and 0 percent in Kosovo—and 1.3 percent in Slovenia" (1995: 159-160).

Indeed, as we have seen in the second chapter, there were centrifugal and centripetal forces and tendencies in Yugoslavia (Crnobrnja 1994 and Djilas 1996). As Djilas points out, the former tendencies are due to its many nations, languages and religions and the latter consists of the common South Slav origin of the majority of the population as the basis for many ethnic, linguistic similarities (1996:1). Also, we have seen that the development of the Yugoslav idea and the spirit of Yugoslavism has a long history. In order to understand properly Samary’s statement about ‘Yugoslavism’ we should also recall that the Yugoslav idea and the national question embrace different types of ‘Yugoslavism’, including the ‘new’ one that emerged in the 1950s. I argue that the relatively small percentage of declared Yugoslavs in 1981 is also due to the further development of ‘supranationality’ of the ‘new Yugoslavism’ as well as due to the fact that multinational Yugoslavia was a republic, thus a political community of the
people/citizens and of the nations. Thus, people were simultaneously both: the Yugoslavs and the Croats, the Serbs, etc., although the former referred to the citizenship and the latter to the ethnicity/nationality. As already mentioned, Djilas points out that people who declared themselves ‘Yugoslavs’ might be well considered the seventh Yugoslavian nation even though they are partially recognized, that is, as the statistical category and not as a nation (1996:1). However, we will see further that the mixed marriages and the number of declared Yugoslavs were likely to increase.

The decrease of Yugoslavs from 5.7% in 1981 to 2.9% in 1991 was, according to Hayden, due to the fact that a lot of people were scared to lose their jobs or property if they declared themselves as Yugoslavs “in the chauvinist political climate then dominant” (1996:789). Similarly to Samary, Hayden also notes that many people who declared themselves Yugoslavs in 1981, due to a chauvinist political climate, declared themselves Serbs, Croats or Muslims in the 1991 Census. Even more importantly for the purpose of my analysis of the most significant change between categories ‘undetermined/Yugoslavs’ and ‘others’ from 1981 to 1991, this decrease of Yugoslavs could be explained by the increase in the category ‘others’. Indeed, many people, particularly in the ethnically heterogeneous or ‘mixed’ Bosnia, preferred to declare themselves ‘others’ rather than Serbs, Croats or Muslims. In this regard, Hayden also stresses that “some respondents to the census [of 1991] registered a protest against the whole process by listing themselves as Eskimos, Bantus, American Indians, Citroens, lightbulbs, and refrigerators among other fanciful categories” (1996:797, footnote 9, my emph.).
This significant change between 1981 to 1991 of the categories ‘Yugoslavs and Others’ is then due to the nonsense, or absurdity, of ethnic nationalism and/or civil war in such a multinational and multicultural country. More importantly, if we sum up both categories, there is approximately 9% (8.7% in 1981 and 8.8% in 1991) of the total Yugoslav population that accounts for more than 2 million people who were nationally ‘undecided/Yugoslavs or the Others/Eskimos’! These people combined with the ‘mixed family/children and the old national minorities’\textsuperscript{64}, like Jewish and Roma people (Gypsies or Cincars), as well as with newly created ones, particularly Serbs, Croats and Muslims, were civilian victims of all forms of the ethnic cleansing.

As Bosnia is the focus of this research paper, it is important to note again that Bosnia was the only republic without a majority ethnic group while all of the other republics had one majority nation. For this reason, the current division of Bosnia that is due to the external and internal Balkanization cut not only territories but also families, as will be later illustrated with the TV episodes of ‘Top List of Surrealists’. As I have already mentioned, according to Crnobrnja (see also Samary’s Table “Ethnic Composition of the Republics in 1991”, 1995:19), Bosnia in the 1991 Census had 4,365,000 inhabitants of which 44% declared themselves Muslims, 31.5% Serbs and just over 17% Croats. The rest belonged to other nationalities, including 5.5% declared Yugoslavs. More importantly, Bosnia also had the highest rate of mixed marriages - 16% of the children were from mixed marriages (Crnobrnja, 1994:23, see also Hayden, 1996:789 and Samary 1995). Not surprisingly the ethnic cleansing and refugee figures were particularly important in completely ‘mixed’ Bosnia.

\textsuperscript{64} Recent events in Kosovo regarding crisis and war between ethnic Albanian minority and the Serbs, who
For these reasons, in line with many authors presented here, I argue that the former Yugoslavia was not 'an artificial' country that, as such, had to dismember sooner or later. As Hayden (1996) and Samary (1995) point out, the geographies of violence show the 'purification of the Balkans', i.e., the hidden agenda of building 'pure' Nation-States in heterogeneous territories/regions. Their argument offers a different picture than presented by Western media and politicians about 'good and bad guys'. This contrary picture is well depicted by Samary in her introductory statement about the ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia: "First minority communities are expelled. Then children of mixed marriages are attacked, and all the 'bad Serbs', 'bad Croats', and 'bad Muslims': i.e., everyone who tries to elude the tightening net that hinders any expression of diversity of thought, interest, identity, or political choice" (1995:9). Similarly to Samary and Baudson, Hayden stresses in his analysis of the demise of Yugoslavia that,

"The logic of 'national self-determination' in Yugoslavia not only legitimates homogenization of the population but has also made that process so logical as to be irresistible. The course of the war has followed this logic of establishing the nation-state by eliminating minorities. What can be done bureaucratically by a majoritarian regime in a state with a numerically overwhelming majority, however, must be accomplished in other ways if the majority is not secure in its rule - specifically, military conquest and subsequent expulsion of the unwanted population" (1996:795).

Also, Hayden argues that the geography of violence in the former Yugoslavia since 1991 is a very important issue, because wars have taken place almost entirely within "mixed" regions where the various nations of Yugoslavia were most intermingled. Similarly to the other authors who argue that the media representation of ethnic
nationalism and the Hollywood-like scenario of the ‘good and bad guys’ in the Balkans is misleading, Hayden also claims that

“The extraordinary violence that has shattered these places was not the fury of nationalist passions long repressed by communism, as many journalists and politicians would have it. I argue instead that the wars have been about the forced unmixing of peoples whose continuing coexistence was counter to the political ideologies that won the free elections of 1990. Thus extreme nationalism in the former Yugoslavia has not been only a matter of imagining allegedly ‘primordial’ communities, but rather of making existing heterogeneous ones unimaginable” (1996:783).

Moreover, Hayden’s analysis of the Constitutions of the successor states of the former Yugoslavia shows that they are legitimizing ethnic cleansing, i.e., that the ethnic cleansing includes also a constitutional “bureaucratic ethnic cleansing”. In other words, all of them aim to construct homogeneous nation-states in heterogeneous territories. For Hayden, such a policy may be achieved through forced assimilation or expulsion, as well as through border revision. In his words: “I consider ‘bureaucratic ethnic cleansing’ as well as direct violence, recognizing both as consequences of the same logic in different social settings” (1996:785). Hayden maintains that the constitutions of the successor states are the combination of “easy naturalization of nonresidents” (e.g. emigrants) with the “denaturalization” of residents, i.e., ‘new’ minority groups, for example, Serbs in Croatia (1996:793). Not surprisingly then that all conflicting Yugoslav nations tried to avoid the status of national minority.

Similarly to Crnobrnja (1994), who emphasizes the importance of the non-correspondence of the administrative borders with ethnic one of Yugoslav republics (Baudson 1996 and Samary 1995), Hayden points out that,
“the separate nationalist political movements were justified on the grounds of ‘self-determination’ ... A statement in the first line of the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution about the right of every nation to self-determination, including the right to secession referred, not to populations or citizens of republics, but to the nations, narodi, of Yugoslavia, ethnically defined. While these ‘nations’ were recognized as having their several republics, it was the ‘nations’, not the republics, that were described as having united to form the Yugoslav state; the Yugoslav republics, unlike those of the Soviet Union, did not have a right to secede” (1996:787).

Hayden argues that after the elections of 1990, by definition, anyone not of the majority ethno-nation could only be a citizen of second class. He states that the separatist republics rewrote “their respective republican constitutions to justify the state on the sovereignty of the ethnically defined nation in which others might be citizens but could not expect an equal right to participate in control of the state” (1996:788). Thus, similarly to Samary, Hayden also argues that the majority of the victims of ethnic cleansing were ‘mixed’ people and ‘Yugoslavs’ from the most intermingled and heterogeneous regions of the territory of the former Yugoslavia. He claims that

“in some regions the various Yugoslav peoples were not only coexisting but also becoming increasingly intermingled ... they served as living disproof of the nationalist ideologies. For this reason, the mixed regions could not be permitted to survive as such, and their population, which were mixing voluntarily, had to be separated militarily” (1996:788).

Hayden’s findings show that between the census in 1981 and 1991, “heterogeneity increased in Montenegro, Macedonia, Slovenia, and Serbia, but decreased in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina”. He points out that “from the early 1950s through the 1980s, ‘mixed marriages’ increased ... throughout most of Yugoslavia, but were particularly common between Serbs and Croats, and between Serbs and Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina”. As Hayden states, “Not surprisingly, the highest rates of
intermarriage occurred in the places in which the populations were the most intermingled: the large cities, the province of Vojvodina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the parts of Croatia [Krajina] that had large numbers of Serbs and Croats” (1996:788). Even more importantly, he stresses that “Yugoslavia was developing an increasing sense of community and that support for the multinational community was likely to increase, as would self-identification as Yugoslavs” (1996:789).

4.2. The Findings of Survey Research with regards to the Multiethnic Resistance and Disappearance of Yugoslavs and Eskimos

After this illustration of the complexity of Balkanization and ethnic cleansing, we will be able to better understand the findings of survey research, particularly in terms of my crucial research question, which is: Who are the refugees from Bosnia? My findings strongly support Hayden’s and Samary’s argument about an anti-nationalist atmosphere in the former Yugoslavia with an ever-increasing sense for a multinational community and self-identification as Yugoslavs. My argument is that Yugoslavia was not an artificial country, but rather a successful experiment in both multinational federation and socialist self-governance based on not-for-profit economy. Due to the external Balkanization, Bosnia was the most ‘mixed’ republic of the former Yugoslavia that, as such, developed and maintained a pronounced sense for multinational and multicultural co-existence. As we have seen, Bosnia had the highest rate of mixed marriages as well as an ever-increasing self-identification of its peoples as Yugoslavs.
Not surprisingly, in terms of my findings, the majority of the respondents have ethnically ‘mixed’ families and kinship, for the past several generations, i.e., within the XXth century. In terms of the ethnic composition of the respondents I succeeded in including two ‘pure’ Serbian and two ‘pure’ Muslim families and three mixed families, of which two are mixed between Serbs and Croats and one between Serb and Muslim. I was not able to find a ‘pure’ Croatian family from Bosnia or one ‘mixed’ between Croat and Muslim. This failure to include all ethnic combinations is partially due to the inaccessibility of data about refugees and partially due to rare ‘mixture’ between Croats and Muslims in Bosnia as we saw in the above Hayden’s portrait of mixed marriages, i.e., mixed marriages in Bosnia were particularly common between Serbs and Muslims and between Serbs and Croats, but rarely between Croats and Muslims. The following Table 2 illustrates the ethnic composition of the respondents and their responses regarding national identity over a period of time.
Table 2. Ethnic Composition of the Respondents and their National Identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ethnic composition of respondents</th>
<th>nationality declared prior to 1990</th>
<th>Nationality declared in Census 1991</th>
<th>nationality declared in Canadian papers</th>
<th>current national declaration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mixed family: Serb and Croat</td>
<td>Serb and Yugoslav</td>
<td>Serb and Yugoslav</td>
<td>Serb and Yugoslav</td>
<td>Serb and Yugoslav</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pure Muslim family</td>
<td>Yugoslavs-Bosanci of muslim creed</td>
<td>Bosnjak of muslim creed</td>
<td>Bosnjak</td>
<td>Bosanac of muslim creed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mixed family: Serb and Muslim</td>
<td>Yugoslavs</td>
<td>Eskimos - not allowed; thus left Yugoslavs</td>
<td>mixed marriage of Serb and Muslim, thus Yugoslavs</td>
<td>Canadians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pure Serbian family</td>
<td>as Yugoslav is too broad term, we are Serbs; in BiH one had to specify its nationality</td>
<td>same response (Bosnian Serbs or Serbs from Bosnia)</td>
<td>same response (Bosnian Serbs)</td>
<td>same response (Bosnian Serbs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mixed family: Serb and Croat</td>
<td>Yugoslavs</td>
<td>Croat and Serb</td>
<td>Croat and Serb</td>
<td>Croat and Serb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pure Muslim family</td>
<td>Yugoslav</td>
<td>Yugoslav</td>
<td>Muslim from Bosnia, I had to specify nationality</td>
<td>Bosanac, and no more Yugoslav</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pure Serbian family</td>
<td>Serbs from Bosnia</td>
<td>Serbs from Bosnia</td>
<td>Serbs from Bosnia</td>
<td>Canadian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Conducted Interviews in Montreal, 2001 (see Q 60 in attached questionnaire)

In order to understand this “Bosnian Blend”, as Samary calls it, of the various ethnic identities prior to and after the recent civil war, we need to remember that Bosnia was the most mixed republic. As Samary suggests, the essence of this blend is best expressed by Xavier Bougarel: “If Bosnia-Herzegovina has one distinctive and enduring feature, it consists in belonging to no one people, in being a permanent site of intermingling and assimilation, a crossroads of civilizations and a periphery of empires” (1995:87, my emph.). As Table 2 shows, this mosaic of ethnic/national identities varies through different periods of time. The majority of the respondents declared their nationality as Yugoslavs prior to the war (before 1990). More importantly, we can see
however that those declaring themselves ‘Yugoslavs’ are gradually disappearing from column to column, i.e., while there were 5 of them prior to the war (before 1990), in Census 1991 there were only 3 Yugoslavs, in Canadian official documents there were 2, and at this moment there is only one of them left. I need to point out again that the term ‘Yugoslav’ refers exclusively to the former Yugoslavia (SFRY: 1945-1991), thus none of the respondents refers to present, third Yugoslavia (FRY- Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a federation of Serbia and Montenegro).

I argue that this disappearance of Yugoslavs is due to the dismemberment of Yugoslavia and the consequent ‘purification’ of Bosnia, and Yugoslavia at large. As we can see in the Table 2, one of the respondents who used to identify as Yugoslav prior to the war and in the 1991 Census, explicitly points out that after 1991 he/she had to specify nationality, thus he/she declared as Muslim from Bosnia. On the other hand, as Table 2 shows, another respondent emphasizes how also prior to the civil war in Bosnia one could not be nationally undetermined, i.e., “as Yugoslav is too broad term, we are rather Serbs, because in Bosnia one had to declare nationality as Serb, Croat or Muslim”. In other words, although people identified themselves as Yugoslavs or Bosnians, they were primary Serbs, Croats or Muslims, or belonging to one of numerous national minorities living in Bosnia.

Table 2 shows that while the majority of respondents declared their nationality prior to 1990 as Yugoslavs, there are also some Serbs from Bosnia (Bosnian Serbs) or Bosnians of Muslim creed (Bosnian Muslims). In terms of ‘Bosanac’ and ‘Bosnjak’ national identities, the basic difference is that while ‘Bosanac’ is an ‘old’ Yugoslav term
that referred to all nations and nationalities/minorities living in Bosnia, Bosnjak is a ‘new’ term that emerged due to the partition of Bosnia. In Samary’s words:

“The official terminology has changed in Bosnia, and been codified in the constitution of the new Croat-Muslim federation. The term Muslim now refers only to religion. A member of the Muslim ethnic-national community is now called a Bosnjak - as distinct from Bosanac, which refers to a citizen of Bosnia in general” (1995:162, note 22).

As is obvious in Table 2, only one respondent mentioned the new term ‘Bosnjak/Bosniak’ while the others rather use the old one: ‘Bosanac’. The essence of the term ‘Bosanac’ is rooted in Bosnian multinational and multicultural identity that embraces all peoples living in Bosnia, namely, Bosnian, Serbs, Croats, Muslims and other national minorities. This fact demonstrates that interviewed refugees, in particular Bosnian Muslims, do not necessarily support recent nationalist ideology and its new terminology. As majority of respondents declared themselves ‘Yugoslavs’ prior to the war, they rather share a destiny of this seventh South Slav nation: the uprootedness and statelessness. At last, ethnic nationalism destroyed the extraordinary Bosnian example of a multiethnic peaceful coexistence that was, and still is, inherent to the term and concept ‘Bosanac’. Therefore, the logical question arises: Why should refugees be in favour of ethnic nationalism which dismantled their country and homes?

As I have already mentioned, this multi-ethnic portrait of Bosnia represented and reflected Yugoslavia as a whole, or in other words, it was ‘Yugoslavia in miniature’. This attachment to the multicultural and multinational Bosnia and Yugoslavia, is the common ground of all respondents that is well summarized by one of them (in the last question 69: “Do you have anything else to add to the information that we have collected?”) who
points out that Bosnian people/Bosanci, regardless of their nationality, whether Serb, Croat or Muslim,

"were tied to the Bosnian soil, territory, country. Bosnia was a heart of Yugoslavia, a tie that kept Yugoslavia together and united. This is well expressed in the popular saying 'jebes zemlju koja Bosne nema (the hell with the country which does not have Bosnia)'. We are all 'uprooted' people that are eradicated from our root - multicultural Bosnia. As multicultural Montreal reminds and resembles Sarajevo, we, people from Sarajevo feel very good in Montreal which additionally has a cosmopolitan spirit lacking in Sarajevo'.

As we saw earlier, the peoples of Yugoslavia resisted the ethnic division of the country and their families, particularly in the census of 1991 when some of them declared their nationality as Eskimos, Bantus, American Indians, Citroens, lightbulbs, refrigerators, etc. (Hayden, 1996 and Samary, 1995). In this regard, we can see in Table 2 that there is one family that wanted to declare their nationality to be 'Eskimos' in the census of 1991. As the officials did not allow them to declare themselves 'Eskimos', they left 'Yugoslavs' as they were prior to the 1990. This family represents a typical 'mixed' Yugoslav family that mostly declared themselves 'Yugoslavs' prior to the war. In the eve of the war, in the census of April of 1991, this family, similarly to other mixed families, considered themselves 'Eskimos', being the only appropriate (sarcastic) answer to the nonsense of the whole process and the actual situation of growing ethnic nationalism and danger of the civil war. As we have seen, this change in national identities from Yugoslavs to Eskimos, or the category of 'Others', is also well analyzed by Crnobrnja, Hayden and Samary. Finally, as Table 2 shows, this typical Yugoslav mixed family declares their current nationality to be Canadian and no more to be Yugoslav. Thus, they were Yugoslavs until they became Canadians.
Obviously, the dismemberment of the former Yugoslavia meant also the dismantling and disappearance of the ‘Yugoslav’ national identity as such. In general, the ‘Yugoslavs’ and ‘Eskimos’ were among the first ones to consider or declare themselves to be Canadian, or other nationalities depending of the country of immigration. Although the next chapter elaborates issues pertaining to the phenomena of statelessness, homelessness and rightlessness as well as the respondents’ life experiences of resettlement and rebuilding a lost home in Montreal, for now, it is important to note that Bosnian refugees due to the multiethnic and multicultural climate in/of Bosnia, and Yugoslavia at large, highly appreciate the similar atmosphere of multicultural Montreal.

To sum up, Table 2 shows that these Bosnian refugees, regardless if they are of ‘pure’ or ‘mixed’ families, primarily declared their national identity as Yugoslavs, or symbolically ‘Yugoslav Eskimos’ since 1991. With the dismemberment of Yugoslavia, these people, particularly from mixed families, lost, by definition, not only their state, but also their homeland, i.e., they became apatrides, or ‘heimatlosen’ (the oldest group of stateless people or person who lost his/her homeland). Also, Table 2 illustrates that Yugoslavs are gradually disappearing from column to column. In terms of the current declaration, we can see that while there is only one Yugoslav left (out of 9 respondents), the remaining of respondents demonstrate ‘traditional’ variety in declaring their national identities. There are two Canadians, two Serbs, one Croat, one Bosnian/Bosanac, one Bosnian Serbs and one Bosnian/Bosanac of Muslim creed. Therefore, the destiny of all of these nationalities, particularly the ‘Yugoslavs’, should be primarily perceived as a destiny of the first victims of the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia as well as across Yugoslavia. In this regard, there is obviously bias and inadequate media representation of various
national identities of Yugoslav/Bosnian refugees. Up to now media reports neither include nor ever mention the peoples of Yugoslavia who considered and declared themselves to be Yugoslavs, Bosnians/Bosanci or Eskimos. Although these peoples are the majority of victims of this war and ethnic cleansing, they are ‘invisible’ victims who are non-existent in the mainstream official ‘truth’ maintained by media and politicians inside and outside the former Yugoslavia. However, the ethnic cleansing of Yugoslavs is finalized as there are fewer and fewer people declaring themselves ‘Yugoslavs’, within and outside the former Yugoslavia.65

I hope that it is clear by now that the Yugoslav nations, particularly in multinational Bosnia, did not historically hate each other. In contrast to Western media and politicians portrayal of the historically rooted ethnic nationalism, and consequent ‘artificiality’ of the former Yugoslavia, I argue that the peoples of Yugoslavia, particularly Bosnia, rather developed a multicultural and multinational society that they loved as such. For this reason, the majority of Bosnian people or ‘Bosanci’, meaning the nations and nationalities of Bosnia, resisted the ethnic nationalism and consequent civil war. On the one hand, the overwhelming presence of the ‘Yugoslavs’ in my findings strongly supports my argument that the majority of victims of the ethnic cleansing were Yugoslavs and mixed families, besides ‘the new’ minorities whose status all conflicting parties tried to avoid. On the other hand, the presence of one ‘Yugoslav Eskimo’ additionally supports my argument about the anti-nationalist political climate and multiethnic resistance to the war, in particular, in completely ethnically mixed Bosnia.

65 Although there is a lot of people who still declare themselves as ‘Yugoslavs’ in the present, third, Yugoslavia (FRY), they are excluded from my analysis as this ‘rump’ Yugoslavia is beyond the scope of this research.
In this regard, it is important to note that throughout 1991 and 1992, the majority of people across Yugoslavia were protesting against the emerging danger of civil war. As Smilja Avramov points out, while the federal government of Yugoslavia and the governments of the Republics were having a series of unsuccessful meetings in 1991 throughout Yugoslavia discussing its future and searching for a peaceful agreement, the Yugoslav people in their humorous way perceived and called these actions and actors "The Traveling Theater" (1997:140). At the same time, the vast majority of Yugoslav nations and nationalities were massively demonstrating against nationalist disputes and the civil war in most major cities across Yugoslavia. In Belgrade, the Army with tanks was sent into the streets to end a massive anti-war protest in 1991. The multiethnic resistance in Bosnia⁶⁶ was particularly pronounced as it was the most heterogeneous republic. The result of massive multiethnic anti-war demonstration in front of the Parliament Building in Sarajevo in the eve of war in April of 1992 was that 6 people were killed by anonymous ‘snap-shooters’. Moreover, there were strong multiethnic anti-war women's and feminist protests across Yugoslavia that were also unsuccessful. As Dubravka Ugresic notes, "In the autumn of 1991 women in Sarajevo protested against the war. ... A few days later hundreds of women from Croatia and Bosnia set off for Belgrade, where they were to be met by women from Serbia (1995:135)"⁶⁷.

These are only a few examples of how people from all across the former Yugoslavia were against the war and the break up of Yugoslavia. However, republican nationalistic governments and foreign 'engineers/planners' thought and acted differently.

⁶⁶ see more details in Samary, 1996, particularly pp. 103, 104
There is more and more evidence that the war in Yugoslavia could have been avoided if the world, led by the USA and Germany, would not light the fuse that inflamed multiethnic Bosnia and Yugoslavia as a whole.\(^{68}\)

Furthermore, there are two episodes of a popular political comedy TV show, “The Top List of Surrealists”\(^{69}\), that best illustrate the nonsense of nationalism and the division of Yugoslavia/Bosnia/Sarajevo as well as the crucial role of foreign interference and intervention, i.e. that of the International Community, particularly the European Community and United Nations in the Yugoslavia crisis. Also, these two episodes explicitly demonstrate and best summarize my argument that the internal Balkanization is a child, or a product, of the external Balkanization. The episodes show that ethnic nationalism and the consequent division of Bosnia was, above all, due to the interference of the International Community. This ‘Top List of Surrealists’ is written and performed by an alternative theater group from Sarajevo (the capital of Bosnia) of which many performers were from the punk-rock band “No Smoking”, whose most prominent member is internationally well known film director Emir Kusturica\(^{70}\). According to the respondents that I called back (of whom I was able to reach 5) these two episodes were made and presented in the late 1980s, thus prior to the outbreak of the war. All of the

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\(^{68}\) Besides already provided arguments and evidence, there is also an interesting ongoing documentary entitled “Yugoslavia: The Avoidable War” on the History channel (No. 47, April 2, 9 and 16 at 10 p.m.) that present an almost identical argument and evidence about International involvement in the dismembering of Yugoslavia. Similarly, Lord Carrington who was the first European Community peace negotiator for Yugoslavia points out the crucial role of the West, particularly that of Germany and the USA, in disabling any kind of peaceful solution in the Balkans. In terms of Bosnia, Lord Carrington, and many other political analysts, argue that the war could have been avoided if US Ambassador for Yugoslavia, Robert Zimmerman, would have not encouraged Bosnian Muslims’ President Alija Izetbegovic to back up his signature of the Lisbon Plan in 1992 that would prevent the eruption of the war. For an identical argument see particularly Avramov, 1997 and Baudson, 1996.

\(^{69}\) I saw them with one of the respondents who has video tape recorded from TV, and therefore, I do not have a precise reference.
respondents that I reached have seen both episodes that were in their view “visionary”. All of them stated that “nobody in Bosnia or Sarajevo believed that something like this could happen. It is a comedy with Nostradamus-like force. As if the war was made according to the scenario of the ‘Surrealists’, i.e., these episodes predicted everything that happened, as ‘Surrealists’ knew everything in advance”.

According to one of the respondents, the first episode is (sarcastically) entitled “United Brothers”. This episode shows Sarajevo before the war. There are two friends, a Muslim and a Serb, who play pool, drink beer and have fun in a bar. On the street, there are two already quite drunk foreign observers in white uniforms who are complaining about the peaceful atmosphere and consequently their inability to write any report about national hostility and conflicts as was demanded by their supervisors. As their deadline for the reports was approaching, they decided to try to create a conflict between a Muslim and a Serb who they already knew. So, they bought a case of beer and went to the bar. The Muslim and Serb were laughing at the attempt of the observers to create a seed of national mistrust and/or conflict, because they were friends since childhood, ‘brothers’ who knew each other well. Nevertheless, after drinking a case of beer, the observers finally succeeded in provoking a fight between the now drunken Muslim and Serb. While these two were still fighting in the bar, the observers were laughing and running to write their reports.

The second episode illustrates the nonsense of internal Balkanization in multiethnic Bosnia, particularly in Sarajevo. It shows a family in Sarajevo shooting at each other with the popular Russian machine-gun ‘Kalashnikov’ in their own apartment.

70 Some of the respondents (as well as myself) enjoyed their concert in Montreal in the summer of 2000.
which is divided according to each one's nationality, i.e. as their family was 'multinational mixture' they end up in war. They end up fighting for the bathroom, kitchen, living room, corridor, cold room/canteen, etc. One of the respondents said that there are more similar episodes (which I have not seen) with the same scenario. In one of them, a skyscraper in which tenants are from various ethnic families (Muslim, Serbs, Croats, other national minorities and the mixed ones) similarly end up fighting against each other for the domination of the floors in the building (e.g., Muslims control 1st floor, second is Serbian, etc.). In my opinion, these episodes are the best depiction of absurdity of the division of Yugoslavia and particularly Bosnia, because the division of territories of Yugoslavia/Bosnia divided families, too.

4.3. Concluding Remarks

I have argued that an examination of the historical and socio-political background of Yugoslavia offers some different insights into the complexity of the external and internal Balkanization. We have seen that external Balkanization produced and still produces internal Balkanization. In other words, national disputes and conflicts over the borders and territories in Yugoslavia are the outcome of external Balkanization, or the 'Divide and Rule' politics of the 'old and new world orders'. Also, we have seen that this external Balkanization contributed to both the ethnic and cultural diversity of the Balkans as well as to the legacy of ethnic conflicts that resulted in recent ethnic cleansing. As Samary and Hayden argue, pure or homogeneous Nation-States were built in

when they officially closed 'The Montréal International Film Festival'.
heterogeneous regions primarily by the expulsion of the old and new minorities, mixed people and Yugoslavs, or simply the undesirable population. As Bosnia was the most 'mixed' republic of Yugoslavia and the only one without a single majority ethnic group, it is not surprisingly that the ethnic cleansing resulted in 2.5 million displaced people/refugees (Samary, 1995:34). There is an obvious 'under-representation' in Western media of the anti-nationalistic climate in the former Yugoslavia and consequent multiethnic resistance to the civil war. More importantly, as Yugoslavs and Eskimos are completely excluded from their reports as if they never existed, these people are disappearing in silence without leaving any traces behind them.
CHAPTER FIVE: Stateless Peoples and Rebuilding a Lost Home in Montreal

The Twentieth Century’s external Balkanization represents for some Yugoslavians the beginning of a legacy of ‘a hundred years of homelessness, statelessness and rightlessness’. We will see in this chapter that for Yugoslavians, Hannah Arendt’s ([1951] 1973) analysis and diagnosis that these phenomena will symbolize the Twentieth Century, has proved accurate. In order to introduce this chapter, I will first briefly demonstrate some relevant main points of Arendt’s excellent historical and political analysis of the origins of totalitarianism that is condition sine qua non for understanding the origins of the contemporary ever-growing refugee crisis, or the phenomenon of statelessness. According to Arendt, the origins of totalitarianism and statelessness are traceable to the Post-W.W.I world order political climate that enabled the very momentum of the emergence of the police state and its management of the “undesirables” as a prelude or susceptible ground for the forthcoming totalitarian regimes (1973:267-302).

Arendt argues that the incapability of the European Nation-State to provide legal protection of the stateless people, and consequently, the transfer of its authority of “the whole matter to the police, ... [for] the first time ... in Western Europe”, enabled the police “to act on its own”, that is, “to rule directly over people”. In other words, the police “had become a ruling authority independent of government and ministries” (Arendt, 1973:287). This political atmosphere had accommodated the emergence of the police state that consequently in totalitarian regimes enabled the police to rise “to the peak of power” (Arendt, 1973:288). This atmosphere also enabled the shameful
collaboration of local police with the Nazis in conquered countries. Arendt points out that,

"the Nazis eventually met with so disgracefully little resistance from the police in the countries they occupied, and that they were able to organize terror as much as they did with the assistance of these local police forces, was due at least in part to the powerful position which the police had achieved over the years in their unrestricted and arbitrary domination of stateless and refugees" (1973:289).

Arendt warns against "the totalitarian solutions" that are inherent to the modern Nation-States which might reappear whenever there is the problem of over-population, of "economically superfluous and socially rootless human masses". This very (post)modern condition is combined "by loneliness and isolation" as the everyday experiences of the XXth century. However, this condition of loneliness is ever-accelerating due to the information revolution. According to Arendt, this legacy and the permanent danger of the radical evil and/or totalitarian tendencies is inherent to modern societies (1973:437-479). For Arendt, the specificity of totalitarianism is that the "demand" of the "unlimited power" is in its very "nature", but the very uniqueness of totalitarianism is striving not toward despotic rule over men, but toward a system in which men are superfluous" and reduced to "Pavlov's dogs", that is, "conditioned reflexes" (1973:456, 457). In her words, "the ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and fiction (i.e., the reality of experience) and the distinction between true and false (i.e., the standards of thought) no longer exist" (1973:474). Nevertheless, as Arendt points out, "the totalitarian belief that everything is possible seems to have proved only that everything can be destroyed", and that "there are ... absolute evil ... crimes which men can neither punish nor forgive".
In this sense, she warns against the constant danger of “radical evil” of totalitarianism where “all men ... become equally superfluous”, the manipulators and the victims (1973:459). As the legacy of radical evil also embraces the nature of isolation and loneliness as preconditions for total domination, it is a constant attraction and a warning. In Arendt’s words:

“The Nazis and the Bolsheviks can be sure that their factories of annihilation which demonstrate the swiftest solution to the problem of over-population, of economically superfluous and socially rootless human masses, are as much of an attraction as a warning. Totalitarian solutions may well survive the fall of totalitarian regimes in the form of strong temptations which will come up whenever it seems impossible to alleviate political, social, or economic misery in a manner worthy of man ... What prepares men for totalitarian domination in the non-totalitarian world is the fact that loneliness, once a borderline experience usually suffered in certain marginal social conditions like old age, has become an everyday experience of the ever-growing masses of our century” (1973:459, 478).

Thus, Arendt’s analysis of the origins of totalitarianism includes the prediction of the ever-growing loneliness and ‘undesirables’, or superfluous population, that she sees as both a constant attraction and warning against the totalitarian solutions in (post)modernity. Drawing on Arendt, in this chapter, I argue that there is an intimate relationship between the phenomena of statelessness, homelessness and rightlessness and the refugees from Bosnia, or Yugoslavia at large. This element further contributes to my historical and comparative analysis of the legacy of Yugoslavian apatrides due to external, and consequent internal, Balkanization. As I have previously discussed, the creation of the ‘Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes’ in 1918 marginalized Montenegrins, Bosnian Muslims and Macedonian peoples, the future nations of a socialist Yugoslavia, as their territories became a part of Serbia and these peoples were
referred to as the Serbs (Djilas, 1996). As well, the national minority rights were directly jeopardized. For this reason, some Yugoslavian minority groups were among the first modern European apatrides, or Heimatlosen, who emerged due to the post-W.W.I Peace and Minority Treaties.

As we will see in this chapter, this phenomenon of homelessness is still actual, perhaps more than ever, for some Yugoslav nations and national minorities. Indeed, my survey research findings support this claim, as the vast majority of the respondents consider(ed) themselves to be the apatrides and refugees, or more specifically, to be homeless, rightless and stateless. They are the ‘uprooted’ people who, as such, did not have ‘freedom of choice’ in planning their emigration. It is this ‘unchosen’ emigration that brought them to Canada, specifically Montreal, in order to build a new life in a peaceful and prosperous country. Besides sharing the common trauma of a lost home and ‘a good life’ in socialist Yugoslavia, they also share a good professional and educational background with long term working experience that are their main advantages in their integration in Canada. These advantages however were diminished by their age, their knowledge of both official Canadian languages as well as the absence of a multiethnic Yugoslav community as I will explain in the following pages. Thus, Bosnian refugees are additionally disadvantaged as they lack the city’s community agencies’ support in general, and in particular, that of their (non-existing) multi-ethnic organization. The fact that these people, that is Bosnian/Yugoslav refugees, are excluded from both the Western media reports about the ethnic identities of refugees and the multicultural agenda of Canada, ultimately constitutes one of the main obstacles to a better and faster integration in Canada, more specifically, Quebec society and the city of Montreal.
5.1. *History of Apartheid or Hundred Years of Homelessness, Statelessness and Rightlessness due to the External Balkanization*

With regards to the ethnic/national identities of refugees, particularly those of ‘mixed’ people who mainly declared themselves as ‘Yugoslavs’, or more recently as ‘Eskimos’, Samary points out that “many individuals and families are of mixed origin, which ethnic maps do not reflect” (1995:87). As well, statistics about internally displaced people and refugees from the former Yugoslavia significantly vary from source to source and it is rarely specified whether victims are internally displaced persons or refugees. For these two reasons, statistical accuracy and validity about the number of refugees, and their ethnic identity should be questioned, particularly with regards to the ethnic, or national, identity of the victims of ethnic cleansing. For example, Samary’s data which is quite similar to the official statements inside and outside Yugoslavia from 1994-1995 asserts that there are “2.5 million people displaced in Bosnia - 3.5 million refugees from the entire Yugoslav area, on top of 750,000 people who have applied for asylum abroad” (1995:34). Although the question of statistical (in)accuracy is beyond the scope of this research, I argue that the majority of civilian victims of the war belonged to both categories: displaced people and refugees. Ultimately, there is no difference between these two categories, as refugee status is a broader term which includes internally displaced people who fled their homes/country for the same reasons as refugees, but remained within the borders of their home country. In other words, internally displaced people were those displaced within their republic, or elsewhere within the former
Yugoslavia. As these people were forced to flee their homes, they usually moved to another safer republic where they were only able to obtain refugee status. They were thus denationalized citizens of the former Yugoslavia, *les misérables* of the war and *les indésirables* of Europe, who once banished from Bosnia were also banished from the family of all nations, and thus welcomed nowhere. If their refugee status was recognized by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR), it ultimately meant 'de jure' international recognition as refugees. This in turn, opened the door for the successful emigration process. It seems to me that these victims of the war, of the physical and bureaucratic (denationalization of citizens and/or constitutional nationalism) ethnic cleansing, were simultaneously internally displaced persons who automatically became refugees within their own republic or elsewhere within the former Yugoslavia. For example, Bosnians were both displaced peoples and refugees, particularly if they moved to another former Yugoslav republic. Once refugees in their own state and homeland, some of them applied for political asylum abroad, or UNCHR’s refugee status. Some of them remained within former Yugoslavia as refugees, or internally displaced people who, it is hoped were able to become citizens of one of the new successor states of Yugoslavia.

This is particularly true in the case of the respondents. Once these refugees from Bosnia left their homes, they sought shelter in the neighboring Yugoslav republics. All of them were thus internally displaced persons and refugees. None of them had their last permanent residency in Bosnia prior to their arrival to Canada. This is due to the fact that

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71 Although I did not ask the names of the republics in which they sought shelter, it is well known that Serbian families usually fled to the present Yugoslavia - FRY, while Muslims and Croats fled to Croatia or Slovenia.
all of them fled Bosnia, but remained within the borders of the former Yugoslavia. Also, all of them obtained only refugee status regardless of which neighboring republic they fled to. Therefore, none of the respondents belong to the above mentioned data of 4,963 refugees (Citizenship and Immigration Statistics 1996, 1999) who had their last permanent residency in Bosnia prior to their resettlement in Canada, although the vast majority landed between 1994-1996. Thus, these respondents, probably like the majority of Bosnians, were simultaneously internally displaced persons and refugees.

In spite of these statistical data and its (in)accuracy, I have provided so far a different historical perspective and theoretical background, including empirical data, that give a better picture about national identities and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. Ultimately, this has enriched our understanding of the circumstances and reasons that made Bosnian refugees decide to resettle in Canada. More particularly, as my findings further show, all of the respondents lost “everything they had” (question: Q 58), that is, they lost their property as well as their personal belongings. Not surprisingly, this loss occurred regardless of whether they belonged to the ‘new’ national minority or majority that in both cases include Serbs, Croats or Muslims/Bosniaks. Ironically, in terms of mixed families this means both, that is, while one spouse belongs to the minority, the other belongs to the majority (Q 66). Also, all of the respondents were forced to leave their homes and were displaced due to the ongoing war and consequent violence (Q J, J1, 3 and 57). All of them thus left Bosnia (Q 4) in search of a safer place within Yugoslavia, where they then became refugees, that is, being “without any status” as one respondent pointed out (Q 4, 4 a). As refugee status was precarious and the dangers of war combined with the economic disaster were spreading across the former Yugoslavia, none of the
respondents could envision any prospects for their future, particularly for their children. Furthermore, none could feel welcome or safe anywhere in the former Yugoslavia (Q 4 b, 5). Not surprisingly, all of them agreed (6 agreeing completely and one ‘just agreeing’ in Q 53) with Euripides, the last representative of Greek classic tragedy, who stated in 431 BC that “there is no greater sorrow on earth than the loss of one’s native land” (appropriated by UNHCR as logo on their web site www.unhcr.ch). For the respondents, the dismemberment of Yugoslavia meant the loss of their homeland, and the consequent end of their human, social and civil rights.

This phenomena of “rightlessness, statelessness and homelessness” is remarkably well analyzed by Hannah Arendt ([1951] 1973) in the well known classic The Origins of Totalitarianism72. I argue that Arendt’s analysis of these phenomena is, more then ever, actual and applicable for present day refugees in general, and in particular for Bosnian/Yugoslavian refugees. The actuality of Arendt’s argument of the ever-increasing figures of refugees worldwide is particularly true in terms of the flooding of Eastern Europeans into Western Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall, which included a huge portion of refugees from the former Yugoslavia and among them there was also one of the respondents. In the beginning of the 1990s, Jürgen Habermas points out that

“Hannah Arendt’s diagnosis - that stateless persons, refugees, and those deprived of rights would come to symbolize this century - has proved frighteningly accurate. The ‘displaced persons’ that the Second World War left in a devastated Europe have long since been replaced by asylum seekers and immigrants flooding into a peaceful and prosperous Europe from the South and the East. The old refugee camps can no longer accommodate the flood of new immigrants. Statisticians anticipate that in coming years twenty to thirty million immigrants will come from eastern Europe alone” (1996: 508, my emph.).

72 See particularly chapter 9 “The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man".
Due to the external Balkanization, or the post W.W.I world order, various national minorities from Yugoslavia were among those Europeans who became, in Arendt’s terms, “The Nation of Minorities and the Stateless People”. I argue that the history of Yugoslavia, for some of its peoples, reflects a century long destiny as/of modern apatrides and refugees, or stateless people. This legacy of the Yugoslav apatrides is clearly due to the external Balkanization, or the old and new world orders, as they had influenced both the formation and the destruction of Yugoslavia(s) as well as failed to protect, or solve question of, national minorities. In this regard, Arendt argues that W.W.I., and the consequent Peace Treaties, entailed both the appearance of minorities in post-war Europe and a growing number of refugees emerging due to revolutions and civil wars. She states that the post-war Peace and Minority Treaties failed to solve the problem of minorities in multinational states, particularly in Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia where the Western principle of the Nation-State was questioned by the existence of large national minorities (1973:270-272).

As we have already seen, the first Yugoslavia (1918-1941) was the “Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes”, a product of the post W.W.I world order enhanced by the Peace and Minority Treaties. These Treaties failed to protect national minorities discriminated against in this first Yugoslav state, for example, the Bosnian Muslims, Albanians, Hungarians, Germans, but also Jews and Roma people. In this regard, we

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73 Although Roma people, or Gypsies, and Jews were mentioned neither by Aleksa Djilas ([1991] 1996) nor by Rogers Brubaker ([1996] 1999) in their discussion of the national minority question in the first Yugoslavia, and even though they were very small ethnic groups, particularly at that time, it is necessary to mention them due to their extinction in W.W.II that is further enhanced, or continued and repeated, by their recent expulsion or ‘voluntarily’ emigration.
should recall Baudson’s argument that Yugoslavia was created on French initiative in order to surround Germany with “a security belt” (1996:104). Also, as Baudson stresses, “one of the Yugoslav paradoxes is the fact that in the war from which Yugoslavia was born, the future co-citizens were fighting on opposite sides” (1996:105). The Serbs, on the side of the victors had a choice of creating Serbia within borders recognized by the allies in 1915, or Yugoslavia. As he explains, in contrast to the losers, that is, the Slovenes and Croats, the victorious Serbs were able to choose “between the creation of ‘the Greater Serbia’ and creation of one common state on ‘the Yugoslav territory’”. According to Baudson, “They [Serbs] chose the latter possibility, induced by the French to whom they could not ‘refuse anything’, because all the Serbian narod [people, nation] considered France to be ‘the second mother homeland [motherland]’” (1996:106).

As Crnobrnja notes, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was “created on 1 December 1918 ... [with] a population of just over 12 million ... according to the first census, taken in 1921”74 (1994:51). We can visualize a various and rich national structure of the first Yugoslavia according to the census of 1921 in the Table 3 below.
Table 3. The National or Ethnic Composition of the first Yugoslavia in 1921 Census

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>4,665,851</td>
<td>38.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>2,856,551</td>
<td>23.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenes</td>
<td>1,024,761</td>
<td>8.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnian Muslims</td>
<td>727,650</td>
<td>6.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonians</td>
<td>585,558</td>
<td>4.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Slavs</td>
<td>176,466</td>
<td>1.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>513,472</td>
<td>4.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarians</td>
<td>472,409</td>
<td>3.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td>441,740</td>
<td>3.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumanians, Vlachs, Cincars</td>
<td>229,398</td>
<td>1.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>168,404</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>64,159</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italians</td>
<td>12,825</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>80,079</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12,017,323</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In addition to Baudson’s remark above mentioned about the French initiative and already presented Djilas’ analysis of the origins of the Yugoslav idea and the creation of the first Yugoslav state, Crnogorčić rightly points out that “the people that come together knew very little about each other” (1994:51). As Crnogorčić maintains, while “it is true that Serbia did not want Yugoslavia as strongly as Croatia did”, it is also “true that the

\[^{74}\text{In 1929, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was renamed in \textquote{The Kingdom of Yugoslavia}.}\]
Yugoslavia that Croatia obtained was not exactly the Yugoslavia it was looking for". Even more importantly, he stresses that "the other nations, Montenegrins, Slovenes, and Macedonians, played a secondary role, if at all, at this stage... [thus] the newly created country, though not artificial, did not have a very sound structure" (1994:50, my emph.). With regards to the political system and the question of national minorities in this first South Slav state, Crnobrnja points out that

"The Serbs brought a tradition of a centralist and Unitarian state. Until the Balkan Wars this state [Serbia] had been nationally homogeneous with no minorities. The sensitivity of the Serbian polity to questions of national minorities was therefore understandably, if regrettably, small. But the Serbs also brought a tradition of a functioning parliamentary democracy with limited sovereign powers, and the sense of a free political spirit, gained through long struggle against an oppressive foreign power. They had attained their freedom on their own and were proud of it. The way in which they attained that freedom had a direct impact on the political structure, favouring strong, central decision-making" (1994:52).

Furthermore, in terms of the (unsolved) question of national minorities, we should recall Djilas’ ([1991] 1996) remark that in 1919, the Yugoslav Communist Party was strongly opposed to any form of national oppression, protesting against the central government’s discriminatory policies toward non-Slav minorities, particularly Albanians, Hungarians, but also Germans. The second Congress of the Party in 1920 again demanded for persecuted minorities the same civil and political rights as those of the South Slav citizens of Yugoslavia (Djilas, 1996:62, 63). As we can see in Table 3, “The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes” was indeed a multinational state, composed of more than three recognized nations and a variety of national minorities, mainly consisting of people from neighboring countries. All of the authors (Baudson, 1996; Crnobrnja, 1994; Djilas, 1996; Samary, 1995) who provide a historical background to Yugoslavia
point out the centrality of the massive migrations of peoples in the Balkans. Indeed, the history of Yugoslavia reflects these large-scale migrations, or *velike seobe* in Serbo-Croatian, of both *naroda* and *narodnosti* (nations and nationalities/minorities).

In this regard, Rogers Brubaker ([1996] 1999)\textsuperscript{75} argues that "migration has always been central to the making, unmaking, and remaking of states" (148). In terms of the relationship between the emergence of the first Yugoslav state and the migrations of "newly created" national minorities, Brubaker maintains that the "ruling ethnic or national group in a multinational empire was abruptly transformed into a national minority in a set of new nation-states" (1999:151-152). These new states, like Yugoslavia, emerged after the dissolution of the multinational Ottoman and Habsburg Empires resulting in "the large-scale migrations" and mass "ethnic unmixing" of the Balkan peoples. Brubaker explains that the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was followed by "Balkan migrations of ethnic unmixing ... of Muslim Turks and non-Turkish Muslims [or Balkan Turks and Balkan Muslims]" who emigrated from the new successor states (1999:152-156). Similarly, "ethnic Hungarians and Germans" emigrated after the collapse of "the Habsburg empire [Austria-Hungary] ... from Balkan successor states" (Brubaker, 1999:156-166).

More importantly, some Yugoslavian national minority groups joined the European "nation of minority" that was composed of similar European national minority groups, all victims of the post-W.W.I Peace and Minority treaties. As Arendt points out, due to the fact that these European national minority groups were perceived in their new States as being "not-nationals" and lacking International protection from their forced
assimilation, they soon banded together in a minority congress which “contradicted the very idea behind the League [of Nations] treaties by calling itself officially the ‘Congress of Organized National Groups in European States’” (1973:273). As I have already discussed, Baudson (1996) maintains that the post W.W.I world order had created three new states, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia in order to surround Germany with a “security zone”. Moreover, Arendt notes that these states were also “the belt of mixed population” as none of them was “uni-national” (1973:274). Thus, the fact that some Yugoslav national minorities were among the first European apatrides due to the post W.W.I Peace and Minority Treaties supports my argument of a century-long Yugoslav history of apatridism and/or homelessness as a legacy of the external Balkanization.

Furthermore, Arendt argues that these events (the Peace Treaties, revolutions and civil wars) undermined the internal stability of Europe’s Nation-State system between the two World Wars. In particular, she points out that civil wars “were followed by migrations of groups who”, in contrast to previous migrations due to the religious wars, “were welcomed nowhere and could be assimilated nowhere”. Here, Arendt points out in her description of the concealed destiny of these new deprived groups that: “Once they had left their homeland they remained homeless, once they had left their state they became stateless; once they had been deprived of their human rights they were rightsless, the scum of the earth” (1973:267, my emph.). In other words, once they were banished from their nation, they were banished from all the family of nations, that is, they were welcome nowhere. In Arendt’s terms, stateless people (i.e., modern apatrides and refugees) and minorities were “cousins-germane” that, once were singled out as

73 See particularly chapter 6 entitled “Aftermaths of Empire and the Unmixing of Peoples”.
“undesirables” from their countries, they became “the indésirables of Europe” (1973:268, 269).

She emphasizes that neither the League of Nations nor the Minority Treaties would have protected the national minorities from their destiny of being assimilated or discriminated against due to the fact that the Nation-State principle implied that “only nationals could be citizens”, and therefore, “the law of a country could not be responsible for persons insisting on a different nationality” (1973:275). Arendt claims that with this “rise of stateless people ... the transformation of the state from an instrument of law into an instrument of the nation had been completed; the nation had conquered the state, national interest had priority over law long before Hitler could pronounce ‘right is what is good for the German people’” (1973:275). According to Arendt, “the problem of the stateless people” or the phenomenon of statelessness emerged due to “the Peace Treaties” that augmented when those who became known as “Heimatlosen”, or the oldest “apatrides”, were joined in “legal status by the postwar refugees”, mostly victims of mass denationalization (1973:277-278, my emph.). As both established policies, “repatriation and naturalization”, failed due to “the very undeportability of stateless persons”, these “indésirables” were left completely “at the mercy of the police” (Arendt, 1973:281-283). In fact, as Arendt points out, the only “practical substitute for a nonexistent homeland was an internment camp. Indeed, as early as the thirties this was the only ‘country’ the world had to offer the stateless” (1973:284).

Although I did not ask the respondents if they had lived in any kind of camps, one can easily recall images from the media of displaced people in overloaded trains and buses with uncertain destinations, as well as frightened faces behind barbed wire in the
camps held by all of three conflicting sides in Bosnia. With regards to the phenomena of homelessness, statelessness and rightlessness, or in terms of civil, social and human rights, my findings show that the majority (6 out of 7) of the respondents felt homeless and rightless due to the war (Q 52, 54). As well they considered themselves being apatrides and refugees (Q 54a). Interestingly, only 4 respondents said that they felt stateless, i.e., that they feel they have lost their state. This decrease regarding ‘statelessness’ is due to different ethnic/national perceptions and sentiments of belonging to the present Bosnia as is best explained by one Serb, Muslim and Croat respondent: “Bosnia is still state and homeland of Croats and Muslims, but no more of Serbs who lost Bosnia. Therefore, while all Bosnian Serbs will say that they are homeless, stateless and rightless, Bosnian Muslims and Croats are only rightless and homeless because they lost Yugoslavia (SFRY) but not Bosnia which is still their state” (Q 54, 54a). Nevertheless, regardless of a respondents’ nationality, all of them are ‘Yugonostalgic’, that is, they have nostalgia for socialist Yugoslavia (SFRY), but not for the present Yugoslavia or present Bosnia (Q 68). All of the respondents point out that they miss the Adriatic sea, friends, family and, particularly the life-style they enjoyed. Two of them, a Muslim and Serb, emphasized nostalgia for their grandparents and the hearth as their memory of Yugoslavia is very vague and blurry, i.e., they were too young when the war broke out and they had to leave the country.

The findings clearly show that Arendt’s notion of the phenomena of homelessness, statelessness and rightlessness is still very actual and applicable in analyzing present day refugees, particularly if they are from Bosnia/Yugoslavia. It seems to me that the postmodern world has not advanced much since the beginning of the XXIst
century regarding civil, human and social rights. While the number of worldwide refugees increased and it is ever-increasing (on daily basis), the protection of Human Rights is decreasing throughout the world. Not surprisingly then that "the UNHCR" statistics put "the figure of worldwide refugees since 1945 at 60-100 million" (Donald S. Moore, 1997:106, note 33). On the other hand, Autar Brah (1996) stresses that "since the 1980s ... we witness a new phase of mass population movements ... across the globe".

More importantly, Brah maintains that "in 1990", according to the estimation of "the International Organization for Migration ... there were over 80 million ... 'migrants'" on the global scale, of whom "15 million were refugees or asylum seekers". Moreover, Brah further states that "by 1992, some estimates put the total number of migrants at 100 million, of whom 20 million were refugees and asylum seekers" (1996:178). Such ever-increasing refugee figures as well as the usual statistical inconsistency and/or inaccuracy of the exact number of refugees is best analyzed by Arendt who argues that "the lack of any reliable statistics" about refugees and apatrides, or stateless peoples, is due to "the decision of the statesmen to solve the problem of statelessness by ignoring it" in order to enhance "repatriation". For this reason, Arendt argues that "the postwar term 'displaced persons' was invented during the war for the express purpose of liquidating statelessness once and for all by ignoring its existence" (1973:279). In my opinion, Arendt's statement is still the best explanation of statistical discrepancy for refugees:

"While there is one million 'recognized' stateless, there are more than ten million so-called 'de facto' stateless; and whereas the relatively innocuous problem of the 'de jure' stateless, occasionally comes up at international

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76 Ironically, the 'new style' of protection of jeopardized human/minority rights by the International Community now includes also NATO's Air Strikes and bombing campaign against entire counties/population (e.g., Iraq and present Yugoslavia, the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia).
conferences, the core of statelessness, which is identical with the refugee question, is simply not mentioned” (1973:279)

In terms of the current ‘new world order’, officially promoted by George Bush in 1990 as justification for the Gulf War, Baudson (1996) demonstrates statistical evidence about its direct responsibility for the ever-increasing number of the refugees on a world scale. As Baudson lucidly remarks:

“In contrast to the Roman Empire that sustained Pax Romana during two centuries on both coasts of the Mediterranean, the new world order within six years has delivered more armed conflicts and UN interventions than 40 years of the Cold War: 22 UN operations between 1988 and 1994 in contrast to 13 between 1948 and 1988. There has never been so many displaced people and refugees as since the new world order is on stage: 17 million refugees in 1991 and 27 million in 1996” (1996:17, my translation).

For these reasons, I am arguing that the Yugoslavian legacy of apatrides/refugees is due to the external Balkanization, in particular within the XXth century. This argument is well sustained with Baudson’s political analysis of the new world order as well with Arendt’s analysis of the emergence of the phenomena of statelessness and homelessness due to the post W.W.I world order. As we have seen, Yugoslavia(s) (1918-1991) was created and destroyed primary, but not exclusively, by powerful Western countries and their ‘Divide and Rule’ politics which jeopardized minority rights and established consequent legacy of apatridism/statelessness. It is beyond the scope of this study to analyze if refugees are now easier naturalized or repatriated than in Arendt’s time, in particular due to the enormous increase in refugees figures. Nevertheless, for the lucky ones that succeed in the very selective and demanding immigration process, it is assumed much easier to become a naturalized citizens than it was in Arendt’s time.
The findings with refugees from Bosnia support the well-known fact that Canada is the number one country, that is, the best ‘safe haven’ for refugees. This is due to Canada’s well organized immigration process, the good socio-economic conditions as well as it having one of the fastest naturalization politics. This fact is made obvious from the findings of my survey research. When asked “Why did you choose to live in Canada” (Q 6 a), the vast majority of respondents point out that Canada offered the best conditions, such as well organized paperwork and paid/credited journey with immediate permanent residence and work permit, very good social and healthcare services, as well as citizenship within 5 years. Also, some respondents emphasized that they chose Canada because it is a multiethnic and ‘humane’ country due to its social policies, fewer criminal acts/crimes and thus more safe than the USA or other Western European countries (which have very rigorous immigration policies). Furthermore, as the majority of the respondents landed in Canada between 1994-1996 (Q Ka), they already became naturalized citizens of Canada (Q 64). Ironically, according to my findings, it is easier to become a Canadian citizen than a citizen of the new successor states of the former Yugoslavia (ratio 5:4 in comparison between Canada and Yugoslavia in Q 64 and Q 63). In addition to the findings in Table 2 where we can see that 2 respondents already declare their nationality as Canadians, the majority of respondents also stated (in Q 65) that beside considering themselves as citizens of Canada (5 of them), they also see themselves as cosmopolitan citizens (4 of them).

In this regard, I argue that the Yugoslav Saga has a ‘happy ending’ in a multicultural and cosmopolitan Montreal for refugees from Bosnia, and Yugoslavia at large. I want to stress that this happy ending does not relate in any sense to the banal
Hollywood happy endings: usually with American Rambo(s) as winners. Rather, the happy ending for Bosnian refugees, particularly for the majority of respondents who are already citizens of Canada, is primary due to several specific reasons that favour their staying in Canada as opposed to returning to Bosnia. These reasons, I maintain, are as follows. Firstly, I argue that the ethnically divided and ‘purified’ Bosnia is also a ‘pure’ economic catastrophe\textsuperscript{77}, in particular due to the second round (the first was in 1980s) of the IMF’s and World Bank’s structural adjustment reforms in the 1990s (Chossudovsky 1996, 1997). Furthermore, this ‘ethnic purification and economic disaster’ of Bosnia produces a so-called ‘fear of the future’ which is particularly enhanced by the history of the external and internal Balkanization as a root of the uncertain future that provides unpleasant ‘lessons’ from history. This notion is best expressed by Avramov who maintains that if “one does not learn a moral lesson from history one becomes inevitably its victim” (1997:448). In addition, there is an emerging ‘panic’ regarding uncertainty of the contamination by depleted uranium\textsuperscript{78} due to NATO’s bombing campaign in the Balkans (Krajina, Bosnia, Yugoslavia-Kosovo). Besides all of these reasons, consummating a Canadian citizenship ultimately means the end of homelessness, rightlessness, statelessness and safer and brighter future for their children. All of these reasons combined with the familiar multicultural social setting in Montreal are the main

\textsuperscript{77} I need to point out that ‘the ethnic purification’ is particularly visible in mixed parts of Croatia and Bosnia. While Slovenia was and still is the most ethnically homogenous successor state of the former Yugoslavia (with approximately 90% of Slovenes), the present day Yugoslavia (FRY) is the most ethnically mixed state, and as such still ‘homeland’ of various nations and minorities. Although Macedonia is also ethnically mixed, its mixture primarily includes Macedonians and the ethnic Albanians (non-Slavic people who immigrated from the neighboring Albania). On the other hand, in terms of ‘the economic catastrophes’, Slovenia is the only successor state of the former Yugoslavia where this fact is not as viable and tangible as in the others successor states.

\textsuperscript{78} See “National Post”, “The Gazette”, “La Presse”, Montreal, January 2001. Also see extensive writing on the subject by Chossudovsky, et al., on http://emperors-clothes.com
reasons for choosing Canada or naturalization, instead of repatriation or return to Bosnia, or another successor state of the former Yugoslavia.

The following responses of the respondents provide further insights into the main reasons that refrain them from returning to this ‘new’ nationally divided and religious Bosnia. So to the question “What are the main reasons that prevent you from returning to your ‘home’ in the former Yugoslavia? Probe: Under which conditions would you return?” (Q 67) the respondents said:

1 - I would not return because SFRY [1945-1992] is dismembered and Bosnia is nationally/ethnically divided. I have a mixed marriage and I feel as a citizen of the world. I would not return even if my [multicultural] city would belong to my ethnic group [Serbs], because I don’t want/like national divisions. For me and my child is unacceptable to live in muslim culture with obligatory religious (muslim or catholic) programs in the schools.

2 - As I did not grow up in SFRY [a Muslim, under 24 years] I do not know much about Yugoslavia, but I would never go back into such problems and troubles.

3 - Where to go? In such unstable political and economic situation and in such unemployment crisis? I would return only in the ‘old former Yugoslavia’ (SFRY), not in these new states. Children cannot get used to new education system/schools [mixed marriage, a Serb and Muslim].

4 - I would never return, because there are no more Serbs in my city, some ‘new’ people live there now, there is primitivism and no conditions for return. There is no future, there is nothing there [in Bosnia]; what we [our family] need is ‘return to future’ [a Serb].

5 - I would return if I would find a job in my profession and if it would be resembling ‘life’, conditions and economic standard as it was before the war [a Croat].

6 - First of all, I don’t have a house or place to return, because everything is burned down. Secondly, even if I would get my apartment back, I need a job that is not easy to find, as it is impossible to get back the former one. Finally, my children have dropped out of the Yugoslav system, they get used to Canadian life-style and education system, they don’t want to go back to Bosnia [a Muslim].

7 - I would not return because there is nothing left of what used to be my everyday life, nothing familiar exists anymore: neither state nor city or people [a Serb].”

In order to better understand these statements, particularly in terms of new obligatory religious educational programs or classes in the schools, we must remember that socialist Yugoslavia (SFRY), similarly to other communist countries, had separated
politics/state from religion/church and promoted official atheism. In consequence, Yugoslavia was primarily an atheist country with pronounced religious diversities and protection of religious freedoms. Samary's Table "Ethnic Composition and Religious Affiliation in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1990 (by percent)" strongly supports the above claim. Prior to the war, while the vast majority of 46% of Bosnians were without religious affiliation, the rest was divided as follows: 20% of Orthodox/Serbs out of 31% of Bosnian population, 16.5% of Muslims out of 43.7% of Bosnian Muslims and 15% of Catholics out of 17.3% of Croat population (Samary 1995:89).

The findings also demonstrate an overall sense of anti-nationalist and multiculturalist orientation by the respondents. This is due to the fact that they had 'a good life' in the multinational and multicultural socialist Yugoslavia which they loved as such. These former 'Yugoslavs' and 'Eskimos' (see Table 2) were and still are anti-nationalists/chauvinists with a pronounced sense for cultural and ethnic diversity. For this reason, they appreciate multiculturalism and/or cultural diversity in Montreal that reminds them of Bosnia, in particular of Sarajevo, as previously stated by one respondent from Sarajevo who also pointed out the additional advantage of Montreal being a cosmopolitan city.

5.2. Rebuilding the Lost Home in Multicultural Montreal

According to the findings, this multicultural climate in Montreal/Canada is a valuable element in contributing to making the respondents to feel more 'at home' than they would in an ethnically homogeneous country (Q 50, 51). Not surprisingly, while
only two respondents still do not consider Montreal their new home, but rather ‘a temporary one’, the majority of the respondents (5 out of 7) stated that Montreal is their new home. This ‘adaptation’ was quite fast: four said they accepted it within the first year and one after 2 or 3 years (Q 50, 51).

Furthermore, in order to support the above argument about the anti-nationalist and multicultural orientation of the respondents, I stress that the vast majority of respondents made new friendships in Montreal primarily with newcomers (i.e., the 1990s) from the former Yugoslavia of various (multi)ethnic origins (6 out of 7 respondents in Q 31). Similarly, the majority of respondents stated (in Q 34 b) that they spend most of their leisure time with Yugoslav newcomers/refugees of various national origins. Thus, to some extent, the spirit of multicultural and multinational Yugoslavia still lives in Montreal. The peoples from the former Yugoslavia, even after the bloody war, do not hate each other. On the contrary, they still live together and support each other. In the words of one of respondent: “I am not interested in ethnic origins of the person I meet, but rather if we have a common ground, common interests and problems; for this reason I am mostly with our people [newcomers/refugees from the former Yugoslavia of various ethnic origins]” (Q 31). Besides these various Yugoslav ethnic groups, the respondents’ new friends include an additional variety of the other (world) ethnies/cultures, such as: Quebeckers, English Canadians, Ethiopians, Bulgarians, Latin Americans and Inuits (Q 31 and Q 34 b).

Also, the vast majority stated that Montreal is above all a beautiful and multicultural city. As well, some stressed the advantages of it being a “bilingual, European, French and cosmopolitan city” (Q 25 and 26). None of these respondents had
lived in a city with such a similar size to Montreal (Q 19) as Belgrade is the biggest city in the former Yugoslavia with over one million people, less than half the size of Montreal. This pattern of the positive opinions about the city of Montreal is similar, but also differs from the reasons for choosing Montreal. The most important reasons for choosing Montreal is having had relatives or friends already living in Montreal (3 respondents) as well as its multiculturalism and resemblance to a European city (3 respondents). The advice of a Canadian immigration officer as well as the bilingualism of the city were mentioned by two respondents for each reason. Finally, one mentioned choosing Montreal due to job opportunities as it has a developed industry in the spouse’s profession, and another respondent mentioned its cosmopolitanism (Q 20). We can see that multiculturalism is a key figure for both choosing Montreal and still living here. As one of the participants points out in terms of first impressions of Montreal: “It has ‘soul’, something unique” (Q 21). This uniqueness of Montreal (Q 29) is further explained by the same person: “It has a soul; it is an academic/university city with concentration of young students that give a special charm to the city. It is also a cosmopolitan and immigrant city where English and French cultures meet and dominate the basis of [cultural] ‘life’ that is not ‘interrupted’ by immigrants whose cultures simultaneously exist”.

For these reasons, multiculturalism, besides the above mentioned immigration procedure and social services/security, plays a major role in accepting Montreal as a new home, and Canada/Quebec as a new homeland. As one respondent, who was at first a refugee in another republic of the former Yugoslavia and than asylum seeker (refugee claimant) in Western Europe, singles out Montreal as unique, because “there is a lot of
ethnies and cultures, and all of them are coexisting in harmony and mutual respectfulness without provocation and intolerance” (Q 29). Despite these positive aspects of this multicultural and cosmopolitan attractiveness of Montreal, we will see in the next section that Bosnian/Yugoslav refugees also face some negative impacts of multiculturism as well as other obstacles that prevent a better and faster integration and being full-fledge citizens in such an attractive city.

Sociological research on (im)migration demonstrates that the immigrants’ age, knowledge of the language(s), educational and professional skills as well as personal characteristics and motivation are key figures in the integration process[79]. As well, the immigrants’ reception by their new homeland and its people is very important, particularly at the first moments. In terms of the first impressions, the findings show that the respondents appreciated the services offered at their arrival, in particular those of CSAI (Centre Social d’aide aux immigrants). As explained by its director Lorette Langlois, CSAI was born in the aftermath of the W.W.II, and since 1992 is mandated by MRCI “pour accueillir et établir les réfugiés publics à Montréal. Depuis 1994, plus de 2000 personnes ont transité par le centre” (Le Jumelé, 2001: 8)[80].

According to my findings, such a reception and accommodation of refugees is unique to Quebec where Immigration Québec provides very appreciated services at their arrival, such as: airport reception, accomodation in a downtown hotel and welcoming services of the CSAI for the first week, including paper work and assistance in finding a

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[79] See more details particularly in Marina Luksic-Hacin 1995 and Peter Klinar 1985, who besides general theories of migration also elaborate issues pertaining to migration flows in the former Yugoslavia, with special emphasizes on Slovenes as both scholars are from Slovenia.
first apartment (Q 10, 11, 12). Besides these positive first impressions of, above all, the reception and immediate financial security provided by the social service system, there are some other favorable elements for their successful integration. Importantly, the majority of respondents have good educational skills and long employment history and work experience. With regards to their education,\(^8^1\) two out of ten have high school, three the equivalent of college, two a B.A., and finally three M.A. (Q E). Also, all of them were permanently employed in Bosnia an average of ten to twenty years (Q G, 2, 2 a) and were very satisfied with their job position, salary and social status (Q 2b). This fact is also the core of ‘Yugonostalgý’, or a remorse and memory of lost ‘good life’ and home.

5.3. **Particular Problems and Obstacles to the Integration and Negative Implications of Multiculturalism**

As a complete analysis of the integration process is beyond the scope of this research, I rather intend to pinpoint some particularities of the immigration trajectory that will ultimately enable or disable successful integration. Refugees in general, and specifically these respondents from Bosnia, are a particular social group that, by definition, is disadvantaged in ‘making a new life’ as they lost everything they had, including state, property, good jobs, friends and family, or put simply ‘a good life’. Furthermore, the circumstances under which a person leaves her or his country play a

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\(^8^1\) See more about Yugoslav immigrants in Quebec, in particular about their education and profession profiles in *Profils des communautés culturelles du Québec* (1995) MAIICC: Quebec.
major role in the integration process, because ‘forced’ migration of refugees implies different conditions and opportunities than ‘voluntary’ economic/business migration. While refugees primarily seek a ‘safe haven’ in order to rebuild a lost life, or make a new one, the economic immigrants have a prior vision and perspective of their new or better life conditions, particularly job opportunities in the country of immigration.

The main problems and/or obstacles of the newcomers, particularly refugees, that prevent better integration into Montreal’s society and community network are well exposed in the above mentioned newspaper Le Jumelé, issue on “Régions du Québec et Nouveaux Arrivants: Des Actions pour Conter l’Exclusion Sociale” (2001). In particular, there are two articles from Montreal’s region that best summarize issues pertaining to refugees’ problems and obstacles to integration. The first one relates to the Art therapy in which the author Hoori Hamboyan summarizes her interview with an artist from Sarajevo who declares that she feels “uprooted since her arrival in Montreal”. Besides this “uprootedness” of refugees, Hamboyan also exposes the other issues and problems pertaining to their integration process. She states that “Il apparaît que la différence, l’isolement, les difficultés avec la langue, le choc culturel, le manque de confiance en soi, et le sentiment de culpabilité d’avoir ‘abandonné’ son pays, empêchent ou relentissent le processus d’intégration”. With regards to the community support for refugees, Hamboyan also notes that “Nous, intervenants auprès des réfugié(e)s, nous nous demandons souvent comment améliorer les services offerts pour faciliter l’intégration dans la société d’accueil et diminuer la souffrance d’avoir dû fuir loin du pays d’origine” (2001:8). The second article is “Propos” de Lorette Langlais, the director of CSAI, that pertains to “L’Accueil des réfugiés”, or welcoming services. Langlais maintains that,
"L’Accueil des réfugiés, c’est tout d’abord, la prise de conscience que ces personnes ont vécu des situations tragiques : séparations, ruptures, viol, tortures, stress, insécurité, exil. D’où, l’existence d’un suivi après leur installation. Pour la première installation, il faut conjuger le respect des clients, le contacts heureux avec les institutions et les entreprises, le suivi des rendez-vous et l’efficacité des démarches.... Aux organismes d’accueil nous recommandons de conjuger la compassion, l’efficacité, la créativité, une saine gestion et la patience, espérant que tout va s’améliorer” (Le Jumelé. 2001:8).

These welcoming services are even more important in the case of refugees who are coming as ‘uprooted’ people\textsuperscript{82} without the possibility of careful choosing and planning of their emigration, i.e., to plan their resettlement as a desired life project. Even though this ‘undesired’ emigration means a final rescue and desired opportunity for starting a new life, the uprootedness of refugees is undermining ‘successful’ integration, in particular due to the important difference between age groups. In this regard, the majority of respondents are in their late 40s (Q A) and this disadvantage is expressed by one respondent’s concluding comments:

"We, people who made and had a ‘full and good’ life and came to Canada in our late 40s, will never be completely integrated as will young people who previously have not created neither home nor life. Bosnians are traditional people tied to Bosnian soil and if the war would not have happened I would never leave the former Yugoslavia (SRJY). The problem number one is that after 40s integration is harder, particularly due to different life-styles and cultural gap between Canada and Yugoslavia. It is harder to change yourself and adapt to new life-styles when you are in the late 40s. As the Bosnian saying states ‘A plant/tree is best transplanted while young’ (Q 69).

Furthermore, all the respondents were sponsored by the Canadian government, which ultimately means coming without money, and consequently, living immediately on social assistance. This financial aid is welcomed and appreciated when settling, in contrast to the subsequent feeling toward it (Q 14 a). In terms of the ‘cultural shock’ it is noteworthy to mention the impact of the so-called ‘climate shock’, that is, all of the respondents who came in winter were quite discouraged and disappointed by the cold and snow, and therefore, were less impressed by the beauty of Montreal (Q 21). Also, one respondent was shocked by the “washing machine”, i.e., by the existence of the laundromats and the fact that people wash their laundry together, because in the former Yugoslavia almost everyone had a washing machine in their apartment. This same respondent was further shocked by the “politique santé”, in particular, having to wait for 4 or 5 hours in the emergency room before seeing a doctor.

Although the majority consider themselves well integrated (Q 49), nevertheless, they identify barriers and obstacles of faster and better integration. The main ones are first lack of money (5 out of 7), then linguistic barriers (4) followed by their unemployed status. Other obstacles include the lack of social connections and interactions, isolation, insufficient access to information, lack of leisure time, social stigma of immigrants as poor people as well stigmatization of welfare recipients (Q 49 a). According to the responses in the questionnaire pertaining to participation in urban culture, lack of money (particularly for unemployed respondents) is the main reason for their overall decrease in life standard and participation in the cultural and social life. This decrease in cultural and social life is augmented by a lack of leisure time, particularly for those working. In terms of the awareness and participation in various cultural events, the majority of respondents
are aware and participate in the multitude of ‘free’ cultural events in Montreal, such as
the Jazz Festival, Montréal Film Festival, St-Jean Baptiste and Canada Day (see list in
Q36). As well, they show awareness of the different services offered by urban community
organizations, such as YMCA, Access Montreal and Maison de la Culture, some of them
use these services (Q 35). The biggest disadvantage in their new life in Montreal is the
lack of multiethnic community inclusive to all the peoples (nations and national
minorities) from the former Yugoslavia, where they would be able to meet, discuss
issues, exchange information about events in the former Yugoslavia and job
opportunities in Montreal, or elsewhere in the North America. The findings point out that
this negative impact of multiculturalism’s politics results in the ‘non-existence’ of a
multiethnic or multinational Yugoslav community as well as insufficient inclusion in the
urban community support agencies network for newcomers and refugees.

In spite of the respondents’ awareness of some community agencies for
newcomers, they insufficiently used their services (Q 22-23). In 1994, the Quebec
Government (MAIICC: Ministère des Affaires Internationales, de l’Immigration et des
Communautés Culturelles) published the Directory of Community Agencies at the
Service of Newcomers designed as a reference tool to help newcomers integrate into
Quebec society. This directory includes over 30 community organizations from the city
of Montreal, other towns and cities of the island of Montreal and its south shore. As
stated in the “Introductory Note”, these organizations received financial assistance in
1993-1994 from the MAIICC “for the reception and settlement of immigrants,
employment assistance and assistance for the francization of immigrants”. Except CSAI
which was the only organization that all of the respondents knew and had used its
services, there is insufficient awareness of these other community organizations for newcomers as the respondents awareness ranges only from 2 to 8 organizations. Even more insufficient is the usage of their services, in particular employment assistance, as a major problem of the respondents is unemployment and unfamiliarity with the job market in Montreal.

When asked for comments and suggestions for improving the offered services of urban community organizations, particularly those for newcomers (Q 24), only one (out of 7) respondent who recently arrived, that is in 1999-2000, and is aware of only two organizations, CSAI and Centre des femmes de Montreal, stated that “they are excellent, they are helpful as you can address them for your problems, particularly in terms of settlement/accommodation” (Q 24). The other respondents who landed between 1994-1996, point out that:

“1- I don’t know what kind of services they offer as I am not aware of them, except CSAI which gave me what was designed for me;
2- We need faster information in our maternal language [Serbo-Croatian] provided by the center(s) and people in our language in order to avoid ‘wandering’ and wasting time;
3- Although all of them have humanitarian ground, it is contrary to the mentality of the former Yugoslavs [we are proud people] to accept help in clothing and food supplies, we need primary moral support;
4- I would close all these organization, except CSAI’s services to be used for the first week, because it is a waste of money. I would abolish Welfare and these organizations as needless and useless, instead I am in favor of Immigration’s support for settlement and jobs search, i.e., for support in adaptation of professional skills through ‘stage’ programs in our professions, and not through ‘stupid programs’ that they are offering to us;
5- If Quebec has so many organizations it should give money also to our community [Serbian church] to employ our person who would direct us in the first moments to avoid ‘wandering’;
6- It is very important in the first contact with Canada to be received by someone in our language, with our mentality and our taste, i.e., to explain which alimentation resembling ours, e.g., the real mayonnaise and not sweet pickled cucumbers. Due to the cultural differences this is possible only if provided by a person from our cultural milieu, and in no case by Canadians”.

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As I have already mentioned, besides the positive aspects of multiculturalism, there is also the negative impact of it resulting in the lack of a ‘Yugoslav’ multi-ethnic community organization in Montreal. This lack is partially due to the non-existence of Yugoslavs, multi-ethnic Bosnians and resisting Eskimos, and partially due to the inadequate multicultural policy. In consequence, the Yugoslav people who are primarily anti-nationalist, particularly mixed families and the Yugoslavs, lack their own community support and network. In addition to the insufficient support by the above mentioned community organizations for newcomers, the respondents are also excluded from the ethnic community network in their language(s) due to the national/ethnic divisions and religious affiliation of all of the existing ethnic communities that are concentrated in and around churches (e.g., Serbian, Croat, Muslim, etc.)\(^3\). The only respondent who participates in various activities of the Serbian church emphasizes that the church is not helping them at all, on the contrary the people help the church (Q 34). The other respondents stated that they did not receive any help or support from their ‘ethnic’ communities. Moreover, the majority did not even contact these organizations as all of them are ‘nationalistic’, and as such inappropriate for them. For this reason, the vast majority of respondents addressed the need of having “multinational organization in order to be together, and not these divisive ones where we do not belong and cannot find ourselves” (Q 34 a).

Besides the simplistic black-and-white Hollywood scenario about ‘good and bad guys’ in the Balkans, and subsequent misinterpretation and/or biased representation of

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\(^3\) As already mentioned, the majority of people in Bosnia, and Yugoslavia, were without religious affiliation, i.e., they were atheist or did not practice religion. See more about existing ethnically divided communities
various and numerous ethnic identities of refugees from the former Yugoslavia, the consequent lack of the desired and needed multi-ethnic Yugoslav community organization in Montreal is also due to the limits of multiculturalism, or its negative impacts for refugees from civil or ethnic conflicts. I share the opinion of Beryl Langer (1998) who argues that “the settlement experience of Salvadoran refugees” demonstrates “the limits of multiculturalism” which, thus, should be rethought and rewritten. I find his critique of multiculturalism very appropriate for Yugoslavians. Even though Salvadorans and Yugoslavs have different histories, and consequently different needs in their new homeland(s), both groups are refugees from civil conflicts. In this sense, both challenge the “concept of ‘ethnic community’” in multicultural states (Langer refers to Canada and Australia) which is based on the exchange of history for ethnicity that, in turn, erases their contested national histories and personal identities. According to Langer, the Salvadoran case challenges the foundational concept of ‘ethnic community’, “for refugees from civil conflicts construct the boundaries of an ‘imagined community’ in terms of social and political divisions not easily papered over by ‘ethnicity’” (1998:163). Langer further explains that “the history-ethnicity exchange implicit in multiculturalism rests on a fictive separation of culture from politics which is in practice unsustainable” (1998:166). In other words, the multicultural concept of ‘ethnic communities’ constructs the ‘Salvadoran ethnicity’ in diaspora regardless of the fact that “being Salvadoran is not a matter of ethnicity but of citizenship, and within Salvadoran citizenship ‘difference’ is marked in terms of class, politics, region, and whether or not one’s forebears were Indian or Hispanic” (Langer, 1998:167).
Central to Langer’s criticism of the concept of ‘ethnic community’ is that “multiculturalism proceeds on the dubious assumption that these divisions [of class, religion, race/ethnicity and region] are rendered irrelevant by the experience of migration” (1998:164). In his words,

“Contested histories which produce different subject-positions have no place within the discourse of multiculturalism, which constructs immigrants not as bearers of history but as bearers of something called ‘ethnic culture’ - or culture divorced from history. For Salvadorans, the journey to ‘countries of immigration’ like Australia and Canada is a journey from history to ethnicity, stepping out of the continuing drama of civil war and negotiated peace in Central America into the cast of an ‘ethnic group’ in which divisions of class and politics are glossed by unities of culture and language” (1998:165).

Langer further notes that, for this reason, multiculturalism “gives immigrants the right to retain their language, music, food, religion and folkloric practices, but not the racial, religious or class conflicts”. He argues that “Migrants are expected to leave their history at the door, ... and embrace the convenient fiction of ‘ethnicity’”. According to Langer, this exchange of history for ethnicity is due to the fact that multiculturalism, “as ideology and state policy, ... was negotiated in the context of post-war migration from nations which had been on different sides, and whose internal divisions were a further source of potential conflict” (1998:165).

Furthermore, due to the fact that Salvadoran refugees are “too small and too divided” a group for successful “alternative funding claims within the framework of multiculturalism”, their destiny is to belong to “Spanish-speaking, ... or Latin American, community” that is unified only by “language” regardless of “the complex histories of
conquest and postcolonial struggle” in the different Spanish-speaking countries (Langer, 1998:168-169). Thus, Langer argues that multiculturalism’s reconstruction of the political as cultural is a form of “misrecognition” opposing Salvadorans’ “existential need for ‘recognition’ and ‘dignity’” (1998:169, 175). For this reason, he suggests that we must defend not “‘multiculturalism’” ... [but] ‘diversity’, which is demonstrably not always ‘recognized’ either within ‘ethnic communities’ or between them”. Langer claims that, in the Salvadoran case, we must acknowledged the historical conditions which created this diversity as “we are dealing not just with ‘cultural difference’ but with the contested histories through which that difference has been inscribed” (1998:175).

In this regard, Langer’s argument about this ‘misrecognition’ of Salvadoran refugees is similar to mine about the complexity of the Yugoslavian history and the current civil war(s) including various ethnic identities of war victims, and their subsequent ‘misrecognition’ in Canada, which promotes multiculturalism. As the civil war in Salvador did not include ethnic war as is the case with Yugoslavs, these two groups have different needs regarding community organization in their new homeland(s). While Salvadorans need a fragmented community network that would embrace all internal (not-ethnic) divisions, Yugoslavs/Bosnians need a united multi-ethnic organization that would embrace all nations and nationalities/minorities from the former Yugoslavia. However, both groups lack the adequate understanding of their contested histories and cultural identities as well as the appropriate community organizations. Also, both groups are disadvantaged in terms of funding claims within the framework of multiculturalism as they are too small and without stable leadership. For these reasons, I
argue that both groups challenge the limits of multiculturalism and strongly support Langer’s claim that,

“In the context of multicultural politics, ‘ethnic community’ might best be understood as a rhetorical device for legitimating claims to ‘leadership’ and infrastructural support, on the one hand, and as a bureaucratic fiction dictated by the need to rationalize the diminishing resources available for migrant welfare services, on the other. It is, however, a rhetorical device that recognizes neither the heterogeneity of contested history nor the complex and contradictory conditions of identity-formation with the global cultural economy. Narratives of ‘ethnic community’ must therefore be rewritten in terms which guarantee citizenship without suppressing difference” (1998:176).

5.4. Concluding Remarks

Besides the historical and political background regarding the emergence of the phenomena of statelessness, homelessness and rightlessness which, for some social and national groups of/in Yugoslavia(s), reflected a century long destiny of being apatride/stateless, this chapter has provided some valuable answers to my research questions. In particular: What are the main problems or obstacles of Bosnian refugees in creating a new home in Montreal, or rebuilding a lost one? How are they supported by the various urban community organizations, particularly by their ethnic one(s)? What kind of help do they have and to what extent are their needs being fulfilled?

As I have argued, the lack of a multiethnic Yugoslav community organization is the foremost disadvantage in the integration process for the refugees from Bosnia/Yugoslavia. If they had such a multiethnic community network and support, they would be less isolated, as well as would have better circulation and access to the
information regarding job opportunities. Consequently, with good jobs and more money they would be able to enrich their participation in diverse cultural events offered by multicultural and cosmopolitan Montreal. Also, such multiethnic community would help them to preserve the ‘multinational and multicultural’ Yugoslav tradition. As well, it would enable refugees to discuss their life problems and exchange opinions and memories with people who would understand them as they share the same destiny. Ultimately, it would help them to feel ‘more at home’ in Montreal and better appreciate Canadian multiculturalism, particularly the assistance of various community agencies for newcomers.
CONCLUSION

As I have argued, the collapse of socialist Yugoslavia is a complex issue that exceeds the limited theoretical frameworks of both theories of nation and nationalism, primordialism and constructivism. The modest amount of literature on the “nation” and on “nationalism” that I read and presented in this study suggests that both schools of thought focus their analysis exclusively on ethnic nationalism, or for the purpose of this paper, internal Balkanization. Because of this, they fail to embrace and explain the broader international economic and geopolitical perspectives. The answer to or the analysis of the question “What went wrong or Why did Yugoslavia collapse?” cannot be reduced to internal factors. Rather, it should include both a foreign dimension as well as internal nationalist forces. In my view, the history of Yugoslavia reflects neither primordialist claims about ancient hatreds among Yugoslav nations nor constructivist arguments about the artificiality of its imagined community. Instead, the provided historical retrospective of the Balkanization illustrates a centuries-long struggle of the South Slavs for the liberation from various colonial powers.

Both theories ascribe ‘divine’ characteristics to the nation by claiming that its birth and the ideal type of a stable national identity can be found only in the West. For both schools, Eastern Europeans on the contrary have unstable identities, basing themselves on ‘collectivity or solidarity’ instead of Western individualism and/or liberalism. For this reason, even though the literature on nation and nationalism is divided between primordialism and constructivism, both schools, in discussing the Yugoslav civil war due to ethnic nationalism, refer to the seven Yugoslav nations as
'ethnic or ethnonational’ groups. In the Yugoslav context, both theoretical approaches reach a dead-look by claiming the ‘irresolvability’ of nationalist conflicts, in Brubaker’s view, for example, or ‘the clash of civilizations’ and ‘kin-country syndrome’ in the Balkans, as advocated by Huntington.

I have demonstrated in this study that on the internal level, Yugoslavia was created and shaped by both “centripetal and centrifugal forces” (Djilas, 1996; Crnobrnja 1994). While it is true that within the twentieth century there have been, every 50 years, bloody confrontations or ‘ethnic’ conflicts among Yugoslav nations, it is also true that there were strong centripetal tendencies resulting in the unity of the South Slavs and creation of a common state(s). While the origins of ethnic nationalism and conflicts are rather recent, the Yugoslav idea about the unity of all South Slavs into one state and the creation of one modern nation is traceable to the Enlightenment. We have seen that Yugoslav nations (alphabetically: Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Muslims, Serbs, Slovenians, and Yugoslavs) never described themselves as ‘ethnic groups’. Similarly to Ukrainians, they perceived themselves as ‘narod’ or people/nation, rather than as ‘nacija’ or nation. Also, the whole of the former Yugoslavia could be defined as a mono-ethnic state (Djilas 1996; Calhoun, 1997). Moreover, the Yugoslav idea was shaped by both civic and ethnic nationalism, including political and cultural projects.

My theoretical and empirical findings suggest that Yugoslavism was, and still is, a viable and noble idea in spite of a small percentage of statistically registrated ‘Yugoslavs’. This paradoxical seventh nation of Yugoslavia instead of proving the ‘weakness’ or ‘artificiality’ of the Yugoslav idea and state, rather shows ‘supranationality’ of Yugoslavism built on socialist internationalism and the idea of
political unity and community of its citizens and working people. Yugoslavism was and is a form of civic nationalism, embracing ‘declared’ and ‘undeclared’ Yugoslavs. In contrast to ethnic nationalism, it referred to citizenship and not ethnicity. In fact, peoples were simultaneously both Yugoslavs and Croats, Serbs, Muslims, etc. While Yugoslavism, or Yugoslav national identity, was based on citizenship and individuality (or personality), the ethnic projects have reduced ‘individuals’ into ‘nationals’. The history of Yugoslavia then illustrates recent hatreds as well as ‘viability’ instead of ‘artificiality’ of the state.

The Yugoslav nations, particularly in multinational Bosnia, did not historically hate each other. On contrary, I have argued that the peoples of Yugoslavia, particularly Bosnians, rather developed a multicultural and multinational society based on peaceful and respectful co-existence, which they loved as such. For this reason, the majority of Bosnian people or ‘Bosanci’, meaning the nations and nationalities of Bosnia, resisted ethnic nationalism and consequent civil war. The overwhelming presence of the ‘Yugoslavs’ in my survey findings supports the above argument. As we have also seen, the majority of victims of the ethnic cleansing were Yugoslavs and mixed families, besides ‘the new’ minorities whose status all conflicting parties tried to avoid. The presence of one ‘Yugoslav Eskimo’ in my findings symbolically supports my argument about the anti-nationalist political climate and multiethnic resistance to the war, in particular, in completely ethnically mixed Bosnia - a mini Yugoslavia. Indeed, Yugoslavs became Eskimos or Gypsies, refugees in their homeland and abroad.

The Yugoslav dilemma embraces both external and internal forces. Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was apparently a noble and successful experiment of
both a not-for-profit oriented economy based on social ownership and an example of self-
governance by workers and citizens united in an advanced model of multinational
federation composed of nations and national minorities - nationalities. While nations, and
not republics, as in the case of the former Soviet Union, were sovereign, national
minorities enjoyed the same rights and duties as national majorities. Also, they perceived
themselves as the Aboriginals (‘starosedeci’) of the Balkans/Yugoslavia. I have argued
that the violent collapse of Yugoslavia is due to the non-correspondence of the borders
between ethnic groups/nations and administrative borders of the republics. Above all, it
is due to early and unreasonable international recognition of the new successor states in
their republican, thus not national/ethnic, borders without any guaranteed protection of
national minority rights. Indeed, the historical retrospective of my thesis about the
primacy of external Balkanization in the Yugoslav context reveals that the foreign
dimension, or the (neo)colonialization of the Balkans, has a long history.

The ethnic divisions and struggle over borders and territories, or ‘internal’
Balkanization, are rather the consequence of previous ‘external’ Balkanization, that is,
the division and subjection of the South Slavs due to the geopolitical and strategic
importance of their territory and economic interests of the great powers. Prior to the
recent ethnic, or fraternal war(s) in Yugoslavia, there were massive, multinational,
workers demonstrations across Yugoslavia provoked by deep economic and socio-
political crises induced, according to Chossudovsky, by “the macro-economic structural
adjustment reforms of the IMF and the World Bank” (1996, 1997). In 1990, the second
round of a new “economic package” additionally fueled “the process of political
balkanization and secessionism” (Chossudovsky, 1997:246).
The Yugoslav Drama and consequent refugee crisis can be historically perceived as one hundred years of statelessness, homelessness and rightlessness due to imperialism and totalitarianism, or in my words, external Balkanization, which historically has produced or enabled the internal Balkanization, including the expulsion of ‘undesirables’. The history of “Divide and Rule” politics in the Balkan shows that Yugoslavia(s) was created and destroyed by the external imperialist powers as well as by external and internal totalitarian forces. In consequence, some of Yugoslav national minorities were in the first lines in the twentieth century of emerging modern European apatrides, the oldest group of Heimatlosen. These first Yugoslav apatrides in post-W.W.I Europe were superseded in W.W.II first by the victims of Nazism and then with political emigration of Nazi collaborators\(^4\); and now, in this recent war, by an estimated 4 million refugees caused by the displacement and/or uprootedness of the designated ‘undesirable’ population. This legacy of apatrides is primarily due to the external Balkanization, or the ‘old and new’ world orders, which are inherent to the XXth century’s history of Yugoslavia.

As we have seen, the recent national movements (re)appropriated the national symbols and flags from the ‘dark’ Nazi past. As the ideology and practice of these movements and their new states reflect national (racial, or ethnic) intolerance from W.W.II, any future analyses of the recent aggressive-chauvinist-ethnic nationalism in Yugoslavia with its destructive effects should incorporate an analysis of the origins of totalitarianism, particularly totalitarian state terrorism, remarkably analyzed by Hannah

\(^4\) which included both the Yugoslavian nations (Croatian Ustashi, Serbian Chetniks, etc.) and the Yugoslavian national minorities (German Folksdziece, Italians, Hungarians, Albanians, etc.)
Arendt (1973). As well, Zygmunt Bauman’s (1989) analysis of the intimate relationship between modernity and the Holocaust can be very useful for understanding both the horrors of state terror in the Nazi sponsored state of Croatia (the so called “Independent State of Croatia” which also included Bosnia, 1941-1945), and the recent events and practice of ethnic cleansing in the new successor states of the former Yugoslavia. As Crnobrnja (1994) and Djilas (1996) note, the genocide of the Serbs, Jews and Roma people (Gypsies) in W.W.II was downplayed by Tito’s communist regime in order to maintain the socialist policy of ‘brotherhood and unity’, a war time slogan. Tito believed that ‘the dark spirits’ (of the not-so-ancient past) could be overcome by turning toward a ‘bright socialist future’ as well as by recognizing five constitutive nations of Yugoslavia (since 1963 six with Bosnian Muslims) and by giving extensive rights to national minorities, including political and cultural autonomy for two provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo, where the two largest minorities, Hungarians and Albanians, live.

Indeed, the recent refugee crisis emerged due to the ‘ethnic cleansing’ or expulsion of an unwanted population (Hayden, 1996 and Samary, 1995). The current Yugoslav Saga of massively displaced people emerged due to such ‘purification’ and entailed uprootedness of ‘undesirables’. Although, on the one hand, present day naturalization policies are more appropriate and accessible for refugees/apatrides than they were in post-war Europe (W.W.I and W.W.II), on the other hand, there is ever-growing number of refugees worldwide. The findings, albeit limited, of my exploratory research suggest that Bosnian/Yugoslav refugees have additional burdens and obstacles in rebuilding a lost home in Montreal, or in any other new homeland. This is primarily

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85 See more details in Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, 1989, in particular, ch. 4 “The
due to the insufficient and simplistic explanation of the civil war by Western media and politicians, particularly regarding the ethnic or national identities of these refugees, with the consequence that the Yugoslavs, Bosnians and Eskimos practically do not exist in such schema. Similarly, their multinational resistance to the division and fraternal war in Yugoslavia is omitted in media reports.

We have also seen that Montreal as a multicultural and cosmopolitan city is highly appreciated by Bosnians and Yugoslavs as it reminds them of their multinational and multicultural country that they lost forever. As such, multicultural Montreal offers Bosnians, after their experiencing the horrors and suffering of this ‘best of all possible worlds’ in Voltaire’s sense (Candide or Optimism, 1947), an appropriate and fertile soil for ‘cultivating their new garden’. Similarly to Voltaire’s Candide who realized that the world in his time was far from being ‘the best of all possible ones’ and that consequently life is a permanent struggle and suffering, today’s refugees from Bosnia/Yugoslavia come to the same conclusion, that is, in Candide’s words ‘it is a time to go and work in the garden’ in order to survive.

Besides the positive implications of multiculturalism, there are also negative effects of it that are additional obstacles for Bosnian refugees in their ‘cultivating of a new garden’ or rebuilding a lost life. First and foremost is the lack of a multiethnic Yugoslav community that would ultimately enable them to faster and better integrate into Quebec’s society and feel more ‘at home’ in multicultural Montreal. For this reason, multiculturalism policy should be rewritten and inclusive for small ethnic or national groups. My findings show that lack of money (due to unemployment or ‘badly’ paid

---

Uniqueness and Normality of the Holocaust” and ch. 6 “The Ethics of Obedience (Reading Milgram)".
immigrant jobs), linguistic barriers and a lack of leisure time are the main causes and reasons for the overall decrease in participation in cultural and social life, or in Montreal’s rich urban culture. As one respondent states “every beginning is hard and time consuming”, particularly if people are ‘uprooted’ and displaced in their mature age after losing everything they had in their lives.

As pointed out in this study, this loss primarily means the ‘loss of a good life’ and the ‘freedom of choice’ as multinational socialist Yugoslavia was an economic success with a mostly publicly owned not-for-profit economy that offered affordable public transportation, housing, and utilities. As Parenti points out, “Between 1960 and 1980 it had one of the most vigorous growth rates: a decent standard of living, free medical care and education, a guaranteed right to a job, one-month vacation with pay, a literacy rate of over 90 percent, and a life expectancy of 72 years” (2000:2). This thesis has hopefully enlarged our horizon of understanding of the issues pertaining to the past and present life experience of refugees, in particular, why the majority of the respondents are still ‘Yugonostalgic’. This loss of ‘freedom of choice’ that is central to the refugee problematic is remarkably expressed (in a postcard showing two women on a windy day watching the ocean on the Mozambique coast) by the well-established Canadian artist Laiwan: “try to give reason for having left - there is no reason in leaving - there could have been a choice - one leaves when home is made a foreign place - this is never for you to choose - there is no good reason to choose precariousness...” (Laiwan, Burnaby Art Gallery: May 2000).

86 While Calhoun points out that in Serbia by 1996 nationalism was replaced by ‘Yugo-nostalgia’ (1997:135, note 7), I saw a meaningful Graphite “Kill all Yugonostalgics (Ubiti sve Yugonostalgice) in the summer of
I want now to conclude with some important findings of my exploratory survey research. The foremost one is to rewrite multiculturism in order to include and establish a multiethnic Yugoslav community. Regardless of whether such a community will ever come into existence, one should keep in mind that some of the refugees (particularly Yugoslavs and Bosnians) ‘chose’ resettlement or precariousness of their new life in Canada, because they did not want to answer the question: “What is your nationality? Are you Serb, Croat or Muslim, etc.?” As well, one should not believe the worldwide media’s established myth of ethnic nationalism and ancient hatreds that is inherent to the history of Yugoslavia, because still today the refugees of all Yugoslav nations and nationalities do not hate each other. On the contrary, when they find money and time, together they will enjoy Montreal’s multicultural night life by dancing and singing ‘as in the old good times’ in the bars where they can listen to ‘their’ music performed, for example, by a (refugee) band with the meaningful name “Gypsies from Sarajevo”.

1997 at the bus station in Croatia (Krajina) on the highway called ‘Brotherhood and Unity’. I am not suggesting and I do not believe that this graphite represents the opinion of all Croatian people.
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APPENDIX I: INTERVIEW GUIDE pp. I - XXXVIII

(Original version in Serbo-Croatian, legal paper 8.5 x 14)
INTERVIEW GUIDE

Respondent's # __________

INTERVIEWER NOTE:
PLEASE, READ CAREFULLY ALL RESPONDENT'S NOTES, QUESTIONS AND PROBES. IF THE ANSWERS ARE AMBIGUOUS, VAGUE OR INCOMPLETE USE PROBES AND ALWAYS ASK FOR SPECIFIC EXAMPLES: "ANY OTHER REASONS?", "COULD YOU PLEASE BE MORE PRECISE?", "COULD YOU EXPLAIN FURTHER?". ALWAYS CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BRACKETS FOR EACH OF THE PROVIDED CATEGORIES THAT APPLY. IF RESPONDENTS DO NOT RECOGNIZE THEMSELVES IN ANY OF THE PROVIDED CATEGORIES, PROBE FOR OTHER DESCRIPTIONS AND PERCEPTIONS OF THE SITUATION. IN OTHER WORDS, CONSIDER SUCH QUESTIONS AS OPEN-ENDED. NOTE THAT INTERVIEWER'S NOTES ARE WRITTEN IN ITALICS IN ORDER TO BE CLEARLY DIFFERENTIATED FROM THE RESPONDENT'S NOTES AND INSTRUCTIONS. TRY TO INCLUDE ALL FAMILY MEMBERS WHO LIVE WITH RESPONDENT AND ARE WILLING TO RESPOND, E.G., CHILDREN, HUSBAND/WIFE, FIANCEE(E), COMMON LAW PARTNER, SIBLINGS, COUSIN(S). IF THEY ARE WILLING TO PARTICIPATE IN THE INTERVIEW, CHECK THE APPROPRIATE ANSWERS SEPARATELY FOR EACH PERSON THAT APPLY. AFTER ASKING FOR PERMISSION TO TAPE THE INTERVIEW, START WITH THE FIRST SET OF QUESTIONS AND FOLLOW THE INSTRUCTIONS AND FLOW OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE.

RESPONDENT NOTE:
I AM A GRADUATE STUDENT IN SOCIOLOGY AND I AM CONDUCTING A STUDY ABOUT RECENT NEWCOMERS FROM THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. THE MAIN PURPOSE OF MY RESEARCH IS TO EXPLORE THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH YOU HAVE ARRIVED AND RESETTLED IN QUEBEC AS WELL AS YOUR EXPERIENCE OF URBAN CULTURE IN MONTREAL. IN ORDER TO EXPLORE SOME OF THESE IMPORTANT MOMENTS OF YOUR LIFE HISTORY, THE QUESTIONNAIRE IS DIVIDED INTO THREE SECTIONS OF QUESTIONS. THE INTERVIEW WILL TAKE APPROXIMATELY 45 MINUTES. YOUR PARTICIPATION IS HIGHLY APPRECIATED AND INVALUABLE TO THE ACCURACY AND SUCCESS OF THIS STUDY. PLEASE NOTE THAT YOUR PARTICIPATION WILL REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL. IF YOU FEEL UNCOMFORTABLE ABOUT ANSWERING ANY OR ALL OF THE QUESTIONS, YOU MAY DECLINE FROM ANSWERING ANY OR ALL AT ANY TIME. DO YOU HAVE ANY OBJECTIONS IF I TAPE THE INTERVIEW?
RESPONDENT NOTE:
THIS FIRST SECTION OF THE INTERVIEW EMBRACES SOME GENERAL
INFORMATION AND DEMOGRAPHIC DATA. IT ALSO INCLUDES
QUESTIONS ABOUT THE CONDITIONS THAT SURROUNDED YOUR
RESETTLEMENT IN CANADA. PLEASE TRY TO BE PRECISE IN YOUR
DESCRIPTIONS AND EXPLANATIONS.

INTERVIEWER NOTE:
PLEASE HAVE THIS DEMOGRAPHIC SECTION (Q A-K, pp. II-V) IN FRONT OF
YOU DURING THE INTERVIEW IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO ASK THE
CORRECT QUESTIONS OR CATEGORIES/OPTIONS.

Q A) AGE:

[ ] 0 - 24
[ ] 25 - 34
[ ] 35 - 44
[ ] 45 - 54
[ ] 55 - 64
[ ] 65 and over

Q B) GENDER:

[ ] male
[ ] female
[ ] other, please SPECIFY: ________________________________

Q C) CURRENT MARITAL STATUS:

[ ] single
[ ] married
[ ] divorced/separated
[ ] widow/widower

[ ] common law

[ ] other, please SPECIFY: ________________________________

Q D) Do you have children?

[ ] Yes -------> GO TO QUESTION 1

[ ] No -------> GO TO QUESTION E

Q E) What is the highest level of education you have completed in the former Yugoslavia?

[ ] elementary school

[ ] secondary school

[ ] university degree, please SPECIFY: [ ] B.A [ ] M.A [ ] Ph.D.

[ ] other ________________________________

Q F) What was your primary occupation before leaving the former Yugoslavia?

[ ] unskilled worker

[ ] skilled worker

[ ] specialized worker

[ ] civil servant

[ ] administrator/manager/bookkeeper

[ ] engineer in any field

[ ] technician/mechanic in any field

[ ] social scientist, e.g., lawyer, social worker, journalist, teacher/Prof., etc.

[ ] medical personal, e.g., doctor, nurse, technician, etc.
Q G.) Were you employed in the former Yugoslavia?

[ ] Yes -----> GO TO QUESTION 2

[ ] No, specify reasons: ______________________________________________________

NOW GO TO QUESTION H

Q H.) In which republic of the former Yugoslavia were you born?

[ ] Slovenia [ ] Montenegro

[ ] Croatia [ ] Macedonia

[ ] Bosnia and Herzegovina [ ] Serbia, please SPECIFY:

   a) Republic Serbia
   b) Province Vojvodina
   c) Province Kosovo and Metohia

Q I.) In which republic was/is your ‘home’ meaning the place were you lived prior to the civil war in Yugoslavia?

[ ] Slovenia [ ] Montenegro

[ ] Croatia [ ] Macedonia

[ ] Bosnia and Herzegovina [ ] Serbia, please SPECIFY:

   a) Republic Serbia
   b) Province Vojvodina
   c) Province Kosovo and Metohia

Q J.) Was your last permanent residency in the former Yugoslavia, meaning the country where you has resided on a permanent basis for one year or more regardless of having legal status of a permanent residence, the same as the above mentioned republic of your ‘home’?
[ ] Yes
[ ] No

Q J1.) Did you change your permanent residency due to the onset of the civil war in 1991?

[ ] Yes          GO TO QUESTION 3
[ ] No           GO TO QUESTION K

Q K.) YEAR AND PLACE OF LANDING IN CANADA?

a) Year:          b) Place:
[ ] < 1985          [ ] Montreal
[ ] 1986 - 1990    [ ] Toronto
[ ] 1991 - 1993    [ ] Ottawa
[ ] 1994 - 1996    [ ] Vancouver
[ ] 1997 - 1999    [ ] other ____________
[ ] 2000 +

Q K1.) Since living in Canada, did you live only in Montreal or you lived in another Canadian city(ies)?

[ ] only in Montreal
[ ] elsewhere in Quebec
[ ] elsewhere in Canada

INTERVIEWER NOTE:
THE DEMOGRAPHIC SECTION IS NOW COMPLETED. PLEASE GO TO QUESTION 5 AND FOLLOW THE USUAL NUMERICAL SEQUENCE, I.E., Q 5, 6, 7, ETC.
Q 1.) Were any of your children born in Montreal?

[ ] Yes ———> (GO TO QUESTION 1a.)
[ ] No ———> (GO TO QUESTION E)

Q 1a.) Could you compare your children born in Montreal with your children born in the former Yugoslavia?

(Probe: Any differences, particularly in terms of their raising, growth, social behavior and interactions? Could you compare childcare policy, such as family allowance, tax benefits, daycare and education, between Quebec/Canada and the former Yugoslavia?)

NOW GO TO QUESTION E

Q 2.) Were you employed:

INTERVIEWER NOTE:
PLEASE, ASK ALL QUESTIONS IN SEQUENCE FROM Q 2 - 2e.

[ ] full-time:
   a) permanent/on salary
   b) on contract

[ ] part-time

[ ] occasionally/on call

[ ] other, please SPECIFY: __________________________________________

Q 2a.) How long have you been employed in this position?

[ ] < 6 months
[ ] 10 - 20 years

[ ] 6 months - 1 year
[ ] 20 - 30 years

[ ] 1 - 5 years
[ ] > 30 years

[ ] 5 - 10 years
Q 2 b.) On a scale of 0 - 5, how would you grade satisfaction with your job position, salary and social status prior to 1991, where

0 is not at all satisfied
1 is minimal satisfaction
2 is somewhat satisfied
3 is satisfied
4 is very satisfied
5 is extremely satisfied

PLEASE CIRCLE THE APPROPRIATE ANSWER:

a) job position: ________________> 0  1  2  3  4  5
b) salary: ________________> 0  1  2  3  4  5
c) social status: ________________> 0  1  2  3  4  5

Q 2c.) Why do you grade like this the satisfaction with your job position, salary and social status?

____________________________________________________________________

Q 2d.) Are you entitled or receiving a pension from the former Yugoslavia?

[ ] Yes, I am:
   a) entitled
   b) receiving
[ ] No

Q 2e.) Could you specify reasons why you are or are not entitled to a pension or other employment benefits?

____________________________________________________________________

NOW GO TO QUESTION H
Q 3.) For which specific reasons and under which circumstances have you changed your permanent residency?
(Probe: Did you move voluntarily, flee or were you expelled?)

GO TO NEXT QUESTION 4

Q 4.) Since 1991, in how many countries/republics did you live prior to your arrival to Canada?

PLEASE CIRCLE THE APPROPRIATE NUMBER:

1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   10 +

Q 4a.) What was your official status in this/these countries/republics?

[ ] a refugee

[ ] a citizen

[ ] a permanent resident

[ ] an economic immigrant

[ ] political immigrant/asylum claimant

[ ] tourist

[ ] other, specify: ____________________________________________________________

Q 4b.) Why you did not stay there?

___________________________________________________________________________

GO TO QUESTION K

Q 5.) What were your existential resources, i.e., how did you survive and provide necessities for living for yourself/family between 1991 and your arrival to Canada?
Q 6.) How many times did you apply for permanent residency in Canada?

PLEASE CIRCLE THE APPROPRIATE NUMBER:

1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  10+

Q 6a.) Why did you choose to live in Canada?
(Probe: Since you first applied, how long it took to get an immigration visa?)

Q 6b.) How would you summarize the immigration process for Canada, for example, was it:

[ ] easy or [ ] complicated
[ ] cheap or [ ] expensive
[ ] fast or [ ] slow
[ ] other, please SPECIFY: ________________________________________

**INTERVIEWER NOTE:**
FROM NOW ON, WHEREVER IS NOT SPECIFIED WHETHER THE QUESTION RELATES TO CANADA OR MONTREAL, ASK FOR BOTH IF RESPONDENT HAS LANDED OR LIVED ELSEWHERE THAN MONTREAL. IN CONTRAST, ASK FOR MONTREAL IF RESPONDENT LANDED OR LIVED ONLY IN MONTREAL (REFER TO Q K-K1).

Q 7.) What was your intended or desired destination in Canada?

[ ] Montreal ----------------> GO TO QUESTION 8

[ ] Toronto
[ ] Ottawa
[ ] Vancouver
[ ] Other, please SPECIFY: __________________________________________

GO TO QUESTION 7 a.

Q 7 a.) Why would you prefer this city to Montreal?
__________________________________________
__________________________________________

NOW GO TO QUESTION 8

Q 8.) Prior to resettlement, did you have any friends or relatives already living in Canada or Montreal?

[ ] Yes: ____________________ -> GO TO QUESTION 9
a) in Montreal
b) in Toronto
c) in Ottawa
d) Vancouver
e) other, specify: __________________________________________

[ ] No ________________ -> GO TO QUESTION 10

Q 9.) What kind of help or support they offer to you regarding your resettlement in Canada?

[ ] sponsorship for immigration visa
[ ] financial support
[ ] moral support
[ ] hospitality for the first moments in Canada/Montreal
[ ] finding the first apartment
[ ] paper work and translations
[ ] none

[ ] other, specify: ________________________________

Q 10) Did you have any help or support in managing the first moments in Montreal/Canada?

[ ] Yes: ____________________________→ GO TO QUESTION 11
   a) from friends/relatives
   b) from community organizations, specify NAME: ________________________________
   c) other, specify: ________________________________

[ ] No, I managed all alone __________→ GO TO QUESTION 12

Q 11.) What kind of help and support did they give or offer to you?

[ ] financial support

[ ] moral support

[ ] hospitality for the first moments in Canada/Montreal

[ ] finding the first apartment

[ ] paper work, translations

[ ] accueill/welcoming services

[ ] none

[ ] other, specify: ________________________________

Q 12.) Where did you sleep the first week in Canada/Montreal?

[ ] Hotel Maritime arranged by Quebec Immigration

[ ] at friends/relatives

[ ] YMCA

[ ] Hotel
Q 13.) On a scale of 0-5, how would you estimate your knowledge of French and English languages when you first arrived in Canada/Montreal, where

0 = no knowledge at all
1 = minimal knowledge
2 = somewhat knowledge
3 = good knowledge
4 = very good knowledge
5 = excellent/fluent knowledge

a) **French language**

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b) **English language**

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Q 13a.) Did you learn French or English languages in the school in Yugoslavia?

[ ] Yes:
   a) French
   b) English

[ ] No

Q 14.) What was your intended or desired occupation in Canada/Montreal?

[ ] the same as previous in the former Yugoslavia
[ ] other, specify: ________________________________

Q 14a.) How did you provide for living for yourself/family in the first year?

[ ] I received Welfare

[ ] I worked/employed

[ ] Other, please specify: ________________________________

Q 14b.) Are you or were you employed since living in Montreal/Canada?

[ ] I was employed

[ ] I am employed

[ ] I am unemployed and I receive Welfare since arrival

[ ] Other, specify: ________________________________

Q 14 c.) How are you providing for living at this moment?

[ ] I work/employed

[ ] I receive U. I.

[ ] I receive Welfare

[ ] I receive a student financial assistance (loan or bursary)

[ ] other, specify: ________________________________

IF 14 a, b, c = WELFARE GO TO QUESTION 15,
OTHERWISE GO TO THE NEXT QUESTION

Q 14 d.) Are or were you working in your profession, or close to it?

[ ] Yes

[ ] No
[ ] Other, specify: ________________________________

Q 14e.) How long did you need to get a first job in Montreal/Canada?

[ ] < 6 months

[ ] 6 - 12 months

[ ] 1 - 2 years

[ ] 3 - 4 years

[ ] 5 - 6 years

[ ] > 6 years

Q 14f.) In total, how long have you been employed in Montreal/Canada?

[ ] < 6 months

[ ] 6 - 12 months

[ ] 1 - 2 years

[ ] 3 - 4 years

[ ] 5 - 6 years

[ ] > 6 years

Q 14 g.) Are or were you employed:

[ ] full-time:
   a) permanent/on salary
   b) on contract

[ ] part-time

[ ] occasionally/on call

[ ] other, please SPECIFY: ____________________________________________
Q 14h.) On a scale of 0-5, how would you grade satisfaction with your job position, salary and social status in Montreal/Canada, where

0 is not at all satisfied
1 is minimal satisfaction
2 is somewhat satisfied
3 is satisfied
4 is very satisfied
5 is extremely satisfied

PLEASE CIRCLE THE APPROPRIATE ANSWER:

a) job position: 0 1 2 3 4 5

b) salary: 0 1 2 3 4 5

c) social status: 0 1 2 3 4 5

Q 14i.) Why do you grade like this the satisfaction with your job position, salary and social status?

Q 15.) What is your experience with positioning yourself into the job market, i.e., finding a job in Montreal?

(Probe: Do you find it easy or difficult, familiar or completely new? What are your expectations and preoccupations regarding your present and future employment opportunities in Montreal?)

Q 15 a.) What are your main resources and channels for receiving information regarding available job positions in Montreal?

[ ] friends
[ ] family/relatives
[ ] Internet
[ ] working place/co-workers
[ ] community organization(s), specify name(s): __________________________

[ ] newspapers, specify: __________________________

[ ] TV - Radio, specify stations: __________________________

[ ] Job banks, specify: __________________________

[ ] Other, specify: __________________________

Q 16.) What is your experience with the Welfare system in Quebec/Canada?
(Probe: Could you briefly summarize the positive and negative sides of Welfare?)

__________________________________________

Q 17.) Since living in Canada/Montreal, were you enrolled in any course or school related to your professional, occupational or linguistic skills, such as:

[ ] computer skills:
   a) operational skills/know how to use different programs
   b) programming/engineering
   c) other: __________________________

[ ] professional skills, specify: __________________________

[ ] occupational skills, specify: __________________________

[ ] linguistic skills:
   a) French, specify:
      [ ] COFI
      [ ] full-time
      [ ] part time
      [ ] other __________________________
   b) English, specify:
      [ ] full time
      [ ] part time

Q 18.) On a scale of 0-5, how would you now estimate your knowledge of French and English, where

0 = no knowledge at all
1 = minimal knowledge
2 = somewhat knowledge
3 = good knowledge

XVI
4 = very good knowledge
5 = excellent/fluent knowledge

**a) French language**

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**b) English language**

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Q 18a.) What you think would help you to improve current knowledge of French and English languages?

- [ ] language courses
- [ ] daily conversation
- [ ] contact with Native speakers
- [ ] other, specify: ________________________________________________________________________

**RESPONDENT NOTE:**

THE FOLLOWING SET OF QUESTIONS PERTAINS TO YOUR LIFE EXPERIENCE OF MONTREAL, IN PARTICULAR REGARDING YOUR ADAPTATION TO A 'NEW LIFE' AND APPROPRIATION OF NEW HABITS AND CUSTOMS. ALSO, SOME QUESTIONS RELATES TO YOUR AWARENESS OF THE COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS AND PARTICIPATION IN THE URBAN CULTURE.
Q 19.) Have you ever lived in a City with similar size of population to Montreal?

[ ] Yes

[ ] No

Q 20.) Why did you choose to live in Montreal?

[ ] no specific reasons

[ ] I had some family/relatives/friends in Montreal

[ ] it is a multicultural city

[ ] it is bilingual city

[ ] it is cosmopolitan city

[ ] it is an European city

[ ] other, please SPECIFY: ________________________________________________________

Q 21.) If you recall your first moments in Montreal, how would you describe your first impressions?

(Probe: Were you shocked, fascinated or disappointed?)

________________________________________________________________________________

INTERVIEWER NOTE:
PLEASE HAND TO THE RESPONDENT THE DIRECTORY OF COMMUNITY AGENCIES AT THE SERVICE OF NEWCOMERS (MAIICC, 1993). IF RESPONDENT LANDED OR LIVED ELSEWHERE THAN MONTREAL ASK THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS FOR THAT PLACE/THOSE PLACES TOO.

RESPONDENT NOTE:
THIS IS THE DIRECTORY OF COMMUNITY AGENCIES AT THE SERVICE OF NEWCOMERS, PUBLISHED BY THE QUEBEC GOVERNMENT (MAIICC) IN 1993 IN ORDER TO ASSIST NEWCOMERS TO INTEGRATE INTO QUEBEC SOCIETY, I.E., MONTREAL.
Q 22.) Have you ever seen or do you have this brochure?

[ ] Yes,
   a) I saw it
   b) I have it
[ ] No
[ ] Unsure/don’t know

Q 22 a.) Do you know any of the following community organizations at the service of newcomers?

[ ] Service d’aide aux refugiés et aux immigrants du Montréal métropolitain (SARIMM)
[ ] Service d’aide et de liaison, La Maisonnée
[ ] Centre social d’aide aux immigrants (CSAI)
[ ] La Maison de l’Amitié/Montreal House of Friendship
[ ] Centre de promotion, références, information et services multi-ethniques (PRISME)
[ ] Centre des femmes de Montréal
[ ] Centre multi-ethnique de Notre-Dame-de-Grâce
[ ] Hirondelle, comité d’accueil inter-ethnique
[ ] Project Genèse
[ ] PROMIS (Promotion-multiculture-intégration-société nouvelle)
[ ] Accueil aux réfugies de Saint-Léonard
[ ] Accueil liaison pour arrivants (ALPA)
[ ] Association pour la défense des droits du personnel domestique de Montréal
[ ] Carrefour communautaire Le Moutier
[ ] Carrefour d’aide réfugies C. S. C.
[ ] Carrefour d’intercultures de Laval
Q 22 b.) Have you ever use any of the offered services of these organizations, such as:

[ ] reception, welcoming services/accueil
[ ] referral, information and counseling,
[ ] interpretations and translation (serbo-croat, macedonian),
[ ] general information on housing
[ ] search for accommodations
[ ] offering employment assistance with job research programs
[ ] helping in finding food and clothing
[ ] part-time French courses
[ ] none/never used any services
[ ] other, specify: ______________________________________

Q 22 c.) When did you become aware or start using their services?

[ ] I have never heard of them
[ ] I have never used their services
[ ] I am aware now
[ ] I was aware about their services within
  a) first month
  b) 3 months
c) 6 months

[ ] I used their services within
  a) first month
  b) 3 months
  c) 6 months
  d) first year
  e) other ________________________________

[ ] Other, specify: ________________________________

Q 23.) Up to now, did you use any other services offered by various community or government organizations, such as:

[ ] food/cloth banks (Welcome Hall, Sun Youth, Churches)

[ ] job banks or job research programs

[ ] professional trainings or schools

[ ] financial assistance for students (loan or bursary)

[ ] other, specify: ________________________________

Q 24.) Do you have any comments or suggestions for improving the above mentioned services offered by government institutions and community organizations for newcomers in Montreal?

__________________________________________________________________________________

Q 25.) How would you define the city of Montreal, for example, is it:

[ ] a big city or [ ] a small city

[ ] a beautiful city or [ ] an ugly city

[ ] a rich city or [ ] a poor city

[ ] other, please, specify: ________________________________
Q 26.) How would you describe Montreal in terms of culture, for example, is it:

[ ] an American city
[ ] a French city
[ ] an European city
[ ] an English city
[ ] a multicultural city
[ ] a cosmopolitan city
[ ] other, specify: ____________________________________________

Q 27.) Have you been (visit or lived) in some other cities in Quebec, Canada or USA?

[ ] Yes:        GO TO QUESTION 28
   a) I visited
   b) I lived
[ ] No         GO TO QUESTION 29

Q 28.) Could you compare these cities to Montreal?  
(Probe: What are the similarities and differences between them in terms of public safety, culture and social life?

____________________________________________________________________________________

Q 29.) Do you find anything unique or specific to Montreal?

____________________________________________________________________________________

Q 30.) What are advantages and disadvantages for you (and your children) of the required bilingualism in Montreal?

____________________________________________________________________________________

XXII
Q 31.) Who are your new close (house) friends in terms of their ethnic/national origins:

[ ] newcomers (1990s) from the former Yugoslavia of
   a) various ethnic origins
   b) same ethnic origins, specify group(s): _________________________

[ ] Yugoslavs immigrants (prior to 1990) that still declare themselves as Yugoslavs

[ ] Serbian immigrants (prior to 1990)

[ ] Croatian immigrants (prior to 1990)

[ ] Muslims immigrants (prior to 1990)

[ ] Slovenians immigrants (prior to 1990)

[ ] Macedonians immigrants (prior to 1990)

[ ] Montenegrins immigrants (prior to 1990)

[ ] French Canadians or [ ] Quebeçois

[ ] English Canadians

[ ] Quebeçois

[ ] Other ethnic groups, please specify: _______________________________

Q 32.) How do you usually meet people, for example,

[ ] in bars

[ ] through family/relatives

[ ] through friends

[ ] in the community organizations

[ ] at cultural manifestations

[ ] at different courses/school

[ ] other, specify: ____________________________________________
Q 33.) Are you and your family members more involved in French or English culture? 
(Probe: In which language do you usually communicate at home and in public life? Which Newspapers do you read and which Radio and TV station you watch, French or English?)

Q 34.) Are you involved in any kind of activities within the Yugoslav or Serbian, 
Croatian, Bosnian/Muslim, Slovenian, Macedonian ethnic communities? 
(Probe: If you did contact them, what kind of help or support they offer to you? Do you participate in their various activities?)

Q 34 a) In your opinion, what would improve or enrich the relationship between these immigrant communities and newcomers from the former Yugoslavia?

Q 34 b.) With whom do you spend most of your leisure time, e.g., with Quebeckers, Yugoslavs or another ethnic communities?

Q 35.) Are you aware or do you use any of the following or similar community/city organizations?

[ ] YMCA/Gym
[ ] City pool
[ ] Access Montreal
[ ] Maison de la Culture
[ ] Neighborhood committee
[ ] Other __________________________________________

XXIV
Q 36.) Are you aware of any of the following or similar cultural events:

[ ] Jazz festival
[ ] Festival des films du monde de Montreal/Montreal World Film Festival
[ ] Festival Juste pour rire/Just for Laughs Festival
[ ] Les Francofolies
[ ] St-Jean Baptiste Day
[ ] Canada Day
[ ] Fireworks Exhibition
[ ] Divers-Cité/Gay Pride Parade
[ ] Nuits d’Afrique
[ ] St.-Patrick’s Parade
[ ] Caribbean parade
[ ] Other ________________________________

Q 37.) Do you know if any of the above events offer free shows?
(Probe: Did you see any of them? Are you aware or participate in another cultural events?)
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

Q 38.) What are your main resources and channels of the information about various cultural events in Montreal?

[ ] friends
[ ] family/relatives
[ ] Internet
[ ] working place/co-workers
[ ] community organization(s), specify name(s): __________________________
Q 39.) In terms of cultural life in Montreal, how often do you go to:

[ ] bars/night life/restaurants:
  a) once a week
  b) once in two weeks
  c) once a month
  d) once per year
  e) other: ________________________________

[ ] cinema:
  a) once a week
  b) once in two weeks
  c) once a month
  d) once per year
  e) other: ________________________________

[ ] city library:
  a) once a week
  b) once in two weeks
  c) once a month
  d) once per year
  e) other: ________________________________

[ ] theater:
  a) once a week
  b) once in two weeks
  c) once a month
  d) once per year
  e) other: ________________________________

[ ] concerts:
  a) once a week
  b) once in two weeks
  c) once a month
  d) once per year
  e) other: ________________________________
Q 39a.) In terms of cultural life that you had in the former Yugoslavia, could you recall how often you went to:

[ ] bars/night life/restaurants:
  a) once a week
  b) once in two weeks
  c) once a month
  d) once per year
  e) other: ________________________________

[ ] cinema:
  a) once a week
  b) once in two weeks
  c) once a month
  d) once per year
  e) other: ________________________________

[ ] city library:
  a) once a week
  b) once in two weeks
  c) once a month
  d) once per year
  e) other: ________________________________

[ ] theater:
  a) once a week
  b) once in two weeks
  c) once a month
  d) once per year
  e) other: ________________________________

[ ] concerts:
  a) once a week
  b) once in two weeks
  c) once a month
  d) once per year
  e) other: ________________________________

Q 40.) Did you accept and do you participate in Quebec’s customs, e.g., Halloween, Thanks Giving Day, Christmas gifts or any other?

______________________________

______________________________
Q 41.) In average, how often do you have a coffee with your neighbors in Montreal?

[ ] once a day
[ ] once a week
[ ] once a month
[ ] once a year
[ ] never
[ ] other, specify: ____________________________

Q 41a.) In average, how often did you have a coffee with your neighbors in the former Yugoslavia?

[ ] once a day
[ ] once a week
[ ] once a month
[ ] once a year
[ ] never
[ ] other, specify: ____________________________

Q 41b.) How do you usually spend your leisure time in Montreal?

[ ] visiting friends/relatives
[ ] in cinema, theater, concerts
[ ] in library
[ ] at cultural manifestations/festivals
[ ] shopping/visiting Shop Halls
[ ] promenades
Q 41c.) How do you usually spend your week-ends in Montreal?

[ ] visiting friends/relatives

[ ] in cinema, theater, concerts

[ ] in library

[ ] at cultural manifestations/festivals

[ ] shopping/visiting Shop Halls

[ ] promenades

[ ] at home, specify:
   a) reading
   b) watching TV
   c) housework/cleaning
   d) other, specify: ________________________________

[ ] other: ________________________________

Q 42.) Did your buying power increase or decrease since living in Canada?

[ ] increased

[ ] decreased

[ ] same

[ ] other _______________________________________________________________________

Q 42a.) In comparison with the former Yugoslavia, are you now spending more or less time in shopping?

[ ] more
Q 42b.) In terms of your current buying habits, are you buying:

- [ ] on sale
- [ ] in Dollarama
- [ ] on Garage sale
- [ ] in Village Valeur/Salvation Army/second hand stores

[ ] Shopping Halls:
  a) Wal-Mart
  b) Plaza St-Hubert
  c) Place Versailles
  d) other: _________________________________

[ ] other, specify: _________________________________

Q 43.) Do you consider that your current everyday-life is significantly changed in comparison with the former Yugoslavia in terms of:

- [ ] cultural life:
  a) Yes, specify: _________________________________
  b) No, specify: _________________________________

- [ ] social life:
  a) Yes, specify: _________________________________
  b) No, specify: _________________________________

- [ ] buying habits:
  a) Yes, specify: _________________________________
  b) No specify: _________________________________
Q 44.) Have you changed your life habits in terms of:

[ ] physical activities:
   a) Yes, specify: ________________________________
   b) No, specify: ________________________________

[ ] political activities:
   a) Yes, specify: ________________________________
   b) No, specify: ________________________________

[ ] social activities:
   a) Yes, specify: ________________________________
   b) No, specify: ________________________________

[ ] cultural activities:
   a) Yes, specify: ________________________________
   b) No, specify: ________________________________

Q 45.) If you compare your current quality of life in Canada with your former one in Yugoslavia, do you consider it as:

[ ] better

[ ] worse

[ ] same

[ ] other ________________________________

Q 46.) Do you perceive your current life standard as decreased or increased in comparison with the former Yugoslavia?

[ ] decreased
Q 47.) On a scale of 0 - 5, how would you grade the satisfaction with your life-style and socio-economic status in Montreal, where

0 is not at all satisfied
1 is minimal satisfaction
2 is somewhat satisfied
3 is satisfied
4 is very satisfied
5 is extremely satisfied

PLEASE CIRCLE THE APPROPRIATE ANSWER:

a) life-style: ---------------> 0 1 2 3 4 5

b) soc-econ. status: ---------> 0 1 2 3 4 5

Q 48.) What was your vision of ‘good job’ and good life’ in Canada?
(Probe: What obstacles did you encounter in their realization?)

Q 49.) At this moment, do you consider yourself as well integrated into Quebec/Montreal’s society?

[ ] Yes
[ ] No
[ ] Other

Q 49a.) If anything, what do you perceive as the main obstacles for your faster and better integration into Montreal community?

[ ] No obstacles, I am well integrated
[ ] financial situation- lack of financial resources
[ ] language barriers

[ ] unemployment

[ ] lack of social contacts and interactions

[ ] isolation - loneliness

[ ] insufficient access to information

[ ] Other

Q 50.) Do you consider Montreal as your new ‘home’?
(Probe: What are the major difficulties in building a ‘new home’ and what would help you to feel more at home in Montreal?)

Q 51.) How long did you need to embrace Montreal as your ‘new home’?

[ ] < 6 months
[ ] 6 - 1 year
[ ] 1 year
[ ] 2 years
[ ] 3 years
[ ] 4 years
[ ] 5 years
[ ] > 5 years
[ ] I still do not consider Montreal as my home
[ ] other, please specify: ________________________________

Q 52.) Have you ever felt as ‘homeless/loss of home’ since or due to the dismemberment of the former Yugoslavia?

[ ] Yes

[ ] No

[ ] other: ________________________________
RESPONDENT NOTE:
THIS LAST COUPLE OF QUESTIONS RELATES TO YOUR NATIONAL
IDENTITY AND CIVIL RIGHTS, IN PARTICULAR TO THE CITIZENSHIP
ISSUE.

Q 53.) What is your opinion about the following statement written by Euripides in 431
B.C., who was the last representative of Greek classic tragedy, and now posted on
the UNHCR’s (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) web site
(www.unhcr.ch):

"There is no greater sorrow on earth than the loss of one’s native land"

[ ] strongly/completely agree

[ ] agree

[ ] somewhat agree

[ ] somewhat disagree

[ ] disagree

[ ] strongly/completely disagree

[ ] don’t know/unsure/do not have an opinion

Q 54.) Since the onset of the civil war in 1991 up to now, have you ever considered
yourself being:

[ ] homeless/loss of homeland/heimatlosen

[ ] rightless

[ ] stateless

Q 54a.) Have you ever considered yourself being:

[ ] apatride/person without homeland, state

[ ] displaced person

[ ] refugee
[ ] person in Diaspora

[ ] economic immigrant

[ ] political immigrant

[ ] other, please specify: __________________________

Q 55.) For which specific reasons you feel that you belong(ed) to any of the above mentioned categories?

__________________________________________________________________________________

Q 56.) Is your family nationally ‘mixed’ or ‘pure’ for the several past generation, i.e., in the twentieth century?

[ ] mixed

[ ] pure

[ ] other __________________________

Q 57.) Have you or any of your family members experienced any acts of violence or discrimination due to your nationality or religion since 1990/91 until arrival in Canada?

[ ] Yes

[ ] No

[ ] other __________________________

Q 58.) Did you lose any propriety or personal things due to the civil war?

[ ] I did not loose any propriety, e.g., a house, an apartment, a car, a boat, etc.
    a) because I did not have anything
    b) because I still have everything

[ ] I lost my house, country/summer house, apartment

[ ] I lost my car, boat

xxxv
[ ] I lost my personal things, photo-albums, books, cloths, shoes, furniture, technical equipment (wash-machine, TV, music box, CDs, etc.)

[ ] Other, please SPECIFY: ____________________________________________

INTERVIEWER NOTE:
IF RESPONDENT LOST ANYTHING ASK Q 59, IF NOT GO TO Q 60.

Q 59.) In terms of your propriety rights and reparations, do you believe that you will be able to get back what you have lost?
______________________________________________________________

Q 60.) How did/do you and your family members declare your nationality/national identity:

a) prior to 1990: ____________________________________________

b) in Census 1991: ____________________________________________

c) in official Canadian documents: ________________________________

d) at this moment: ____________________________________________

INTERVIEWER NOTE:
IF THERE ARE ANY DIFFERENCES ASK Q 61, OTHERWISE GO TO Q 62

Q 61) Could you explain why these differences in your national identity occurred?
______________________________________________________________

Q 62.) In 1992 the former Yugoslavia was dismembered. Since then, have you always been entitled to a citizenship and passport?
(Probe: Were you always able to move and travel freely?)
______________________________________________________________
Q 63.) Are you, at this moment, citizen of any of the successor states of the former Yugoslavia?

[ ] Yes:
   a) citizen by birth
   b) naturalized citizen

[ ] No

Q 64.) Are you citizen of Canada?

[ ] Yes

[ ] No

Q 65.) Do you feel to belong to any of the following categories:

[ ] citizen of Canada
[ ] citizen of Quebec
[ ] citizen of Montreal
[ ] citizen of Europe
[ ] citizen of the world/cosmopolitan citizen
[ ] homeless citizen of the world/cosmopolitan apatride
[ ] second class citizen
[ ] a stranger
[ ] other ____________________________

Q 66.) Do you belong to the ethnic minority or majority in your former ‘home’ in the former Yugoslavia?

[ ] minority

[ ] majority

[ ] other ____________________________
Q 67.) What are the main reasons that prevent you from returning to your ‘home’ in the former Yugoslavia?
(Probe: Under which conditions would you return?)


Q 68.) Are you Yugonostalgic?
(Probe: What do you miss the most in Montreal, e.g., Buco cheese, Gavrilovic salami, cevapcici, pita, Adriatique sea, life-style, friends, family, etc.)


Q 69.) Do you have anything else to add to the information that we have collected?
(Probe: Anything that was ‘forgotten’ to ask or any other information that you find relevant to this study).


RESPONDENT NOTE:
THE INTERVIEW IS NOW COMPLETED. THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND PARTICIPATION. I WOULD LIKE TO REMIND YOU AGAIN THAT ALL THE INFORMATION WILL BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL. IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO HAVE A COPY OF THIS STUDY, PLEASE GIVE ME YOUR ADDRESS, AND I WILL SEND IT TO YOU AS SOON AS IT WILL BE COMPLETED.

DATE OF INTERVIEW:________________________________________

PLACE WHERE WAS THE INTERVIEW HELD:____________________

TIME INTERVIEW BEGAN:____________________________________

TIME INTERVIEW ENDED:_____________________________________
APPENDIX II: MAPS 1 - 7

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Map 6: "The International Community on Trial"

Map 7: "Dayton Peace Accord"
Map 1: "Divide and Rule Schemes in the Balkans, i.e., External Balkanization"

Bosnia divided before and after the war

Before fighting broke out in 1991, Yugoslavia was a unified nation of republics.

After nearly four years of fighting, a peace plan preserves Bosnia as a single state but still divided into two separate republics -- the Bosnian-Croat Federation and the Bosnian Serb Republic.

NATO has since divided Bosnia into three main sectors, each dominated by one of the major allies. There's also an area of northwestern Bosnia controlled by NATO's Rapid Reaction Force.

Military areas of control

The British sector, headquartered in Gornji Vakuf, is in northwestern Bosnia. Troops from Canada, Belgium and the Netherlands will also patrol here.

The French sector covers the southern part of the country. NATO contingents from Spain and Italy also will be part of this sector. The headquarters for this sector will be the capital, Sarajevo.

Under the Dayton agreement, Sarajevo's Serb and Muslim neighborhoods are to be reunified under Bosnian government control. Bosnian Serbs, who object to being governed by their war enemies, would prefer Sarajevo remain a divided city.

Troops from the United States and Russia are responsible for the U.S. sector in northeastern Bosnia. This area includes the disputed Posavina corridor, a narrow strip of land that Serbs now control. They want to hold on to it to link their territory to the east and west.

But the Bosnian government also needs the Posavina corridor for vital access to the Sava River. The issue was unresolved in the Dayton agreement and is due to be resolved by arbitration within one year. Headquarters for the U.S. sector is Tuzla.

Source: Samary, Catherine. Yugoslavia Dismembered. 1995, p. 16
Map 3: “Ethnic Composition of the Republics”

Source: Samary, Catherine. Yugoslavia Dismembered. 1995, p. 18
Source: Avramov, Smilja. Postheroic War of the West against Yugoslavia. 1997, p. 110

Source: Samary, Catherine. *Yugoslavia Dismembered*. 1995, p. 117
Map 7: "Dayton Peace Accord"

APPENDIX III: NEWSPAPER ARTICLE

Ethnic crisis revives Balkan map debate

Diplomats working in area say redrawing would be dangerous, unrealistic move

By PAUL TAYLOR, LONDON

The spectre of fresh ethnic conflict in Macedonia has revived debate in the West about redrawing the map of the Balkans, but diplomats directly involved warn that would open a can of worms.

The violence by ethnic-Albanian guerrillas has raised fears that the most southerly former Yugoslav republic, which stayed calm throughout the 1990s despite being regarded as a potential powder keg, could be the next Balkan state to explode.

While officials of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have played down the seriousness of the fighting, United Nations Balkans envoy Carl Bildt says this week's clashes around Tetovo, Macedonia's main ethnic-Albanian city, mirrored events that plunged Bosnia and then Kosovo into war.

"What is happening in Tetovo is one of the most alarming events in the Balkans during the last 10 years," Mr. Bildt said.

Lord Owen, a former British foreign secretary who was the European Union's peace envoy on Bosnia in the early 1990s, called this week for a redrawing of the map to create more viable states in the Balkans, including an independent Kosovo.

Breaking every Western taboo, Lord Owen wrote in The Wall Street Journal: "What is needed today is a Balkans-wide solution, through a present-day equivalent of the 1878 Congress of Berlin, with pre-agreed boundary changes endorsed by the major powers."

He said NATO's peacekeeping mission in Kosovo is becoming impossible. U.S. President George W. Bush should demand a reappraisal of whether NATO could hold the province within Yugoslavia against the will of 90 percent of its inhabitants, who are ethnic Albanians.

Some Western analysts predict that ethnic-Albanian hard-liners will eventually turn their guns on the NATO forces who drove out Yugoslav troops in 1999, if the West comes to be seen as the last obstacle to Kosovo's independence.

Faced with a choice between endless war and independence, the West should do what it takes to secure peace, Lord Owen argues.

That would mean accepting Kosovo's independence, redrawing the boundaries of Bosnia along the lines of a three-republic plan he drafted in 1993, and transferring some territory from the Bosnian Serb republic to Serbia. In return, Serbia's sister republic, Montenegro, would be allowed to secede from Yugoslavia.

But Lord Owen sees no geographical solution for Macedonia, where ethnic Albanians make up about a third of the population (the other two-thirds are mainly Orthodox Slavs).

"There is politically little room for even the smallest of boundary adjustments in Macedonia," he wrote, saying it is up to the European Union to give the country more economic and political help, and possibly military support.

Diplomats involved in current Balkans peacemaking describe Lord Owen's ideas as unrealistic and dangerous, saying they could encourage radicals in Kosovo and Macedonia and undermine efforts to rebuild a multiethnic state in Bosnia, the other country where...
Macedonian forces shell town centre

TETOV, MACEDONIA

Mortar rounds slammed into the centre of Tetovo yesterday, as Macedonian forces battled to drive out scores of ethnic-Albanian rebels perched on a hill above the city.

Four mortars hit the deserted centre of the predominantly ethnic-Albanian town, many of whose buildings are already pockmarked by bullets after three days of heavy fighting. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization vowed not to let yet another Balkan country fall apart.

Five civilians were injured by stray bullets in the fighting; Tetovo hospital director Raim Taci said, bringing the toll to one ethnic Albanian killed and 25 people injured.

Clouds of smoke rose from the hilltop where an estimated 200 gunmen from the self-proclaimed National Liberation Army fired down on police, who pounded their positions with mortars.

Interior Ministry spokesman Stevo Pendarovsky said in Skopje that around 2,000 people had fled Tetovo, both ethnic Albanians and Slav Macedonians.

Many ethnic Albanians were trying to enter Bulgaria en route for Turkey, he said.

In Berlin, Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping said German tanks were sent from a base in neighbouring Kosovo, the war-torn Serbian province, as a protective measure after unidentified assailants shot at a German barracks in northwestern Macedonia. (NATO troops are on a peacekeeping mission in Kosovo, with backup troops and supplies based in Macedonia and Albanian proper.)

"We won't let anyone play games with us, including ethnic-Albanian terrorists," said Mr. Scharping, whose troops keep the peace in a nearby sector of Kosovo.

He said he did not expect the troops to be sucked into the fighting. AFP