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**Artistries of Interior Time:
The Subjective Experience of Time
and Art Therapy,
Focussing on Schizophrenia**

Elizabeth Anthony

**A Thesis
in
The Department
of
Art Education and Art Therapy**

**Presented in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Master of Arts
Concordia University
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ABSTRACT

Artistries of Interior Time: The Subjective Experience of Time and Art Therapy, Focussing on Schizophrenia

Elizabeth Anthony

Time, and in particular the subjective sense of time, is an invisible medium crucial to art therapy processes that has not received a focused inquiry in the literature. After a review in the introduction of those considerations which have been given to time in art therapy literature, the initial chapters of this thesis explore theoretical and developmental perspectives on the subjective experience of time as formulated in the schools of psychoanalysis, analytical psychology and existential psychotherapy. While each school ultimately deals with a client's experience of time as a whole, each is shown to preference one temporal perspective: psychoanalysis the past, analytical psychology the "other time" of archetypal reality, and existential psychotherapy the future cusp of the present. These findings are then integrated into an exploration of interior time in creative process, particularly with regard to the process and products of art therapy, in order to arrive at an understanding of how qualities and dynamics inherent in therapeutically supported art processes and their visual products make art therapy uniquely suited to establish healing connectivities within our clients' experience of time. J. T. Fraser's formulation of temporal umwelts, which he has identified the artist as particularly adept in traversing, is used as a unifying model for this study. Finally, a brief examination of several psychiatric diagnoses from the perspective of each as involving a disorganisation of temporal experience culminates in the presentation of the case of a client with schizophrenia. In form and content, his art process and products are shown to eloquently embody the meanings of his experience of the psychoneurodynamic, temporal disordering inherent in schizophrenic process.

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To all of those who remain unnamed who have supported me through this time of creation, in small and large, and in material and soulful ways--thank you.

And always, eternal gratitude to the Mysterium in and out of whose radiance time flows.

**The flute of interior time is played
whether we hear it or not.
- Kabir**

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INTRODUCTION

The therapeutic relationship would not exist at all but for the presence of human suffering that leads one individual to seek out another so that together they might find the meanings concealed in distress. Moulyn (1982) has suggested that while religions interpret human suffering *sub specie eternitatis*, the humanist “searches for the meaning of suffering *sub specie temporis*” for ways to endure, communicate, and transform “the emotional turmoil which we are constrained to pass through in our existence this side of death” (p. 305). As therapists, we may not share the particular psychological disorders, physical illnesses or interpersonal and social stressors our clients are experiencing, but we do share in the same terminal diagnosis. The time of our lives as measured in days is numbered. For this reason alone, it is no wonder that we often consciously engage in, and inevitably find ourselves unconsciously participating in, the strategic artistry of interior time, through which we can expand and contract the narratives of our lives.

Etymological sources differ in their rendering of the origin of the word, time, from its Indo-Germanic root *ti*, or *di*. Ayoto (1990) supplies the meaning to “cut up, divide” (p. 532). Fischer (1967), citing one source which emphasises the spatial meaning of the root as not only “section,” but also “extension,” also provides a Sanskrit signification of “to light” or “to burn,” pointing out ancestral relationships between words we easily recognise as dealing with temporality, as well as “*tempo*, *tempus*, *temperature* and *temperament*. No wonder one is tempted¹ to equate burning with oxidation and thus time with the fire of life” (p. 441). The *tempo* of contemporary life continues to recall us to our need for *temples*, a portion of time and space sectioned off within the mundane stretch of hours in which to cultivate personal extension into timeless, or time-transcending, verities.

The many ways time has been represented in human experience is evidence for

¹ Fischer does not comment on his choice of the word *tempted*. Etymologically traceable to the Latin *temptare*, meaning “to test” (Random House, 1984), it is possible that it may have indicated old rituals of testing by fire.

the fact that we “have a hand” in the creation of how we experience time, quite literally when we embody temporal experience in the metaphorical images of art.² Time is a wheel, and arrow, a river; time is not. The experience of time requires an observer of change. To observe change necessitates the existence of memory. We observe the repetition of events, the spin of the heavens around the pole, and envision time as a cycling wheel. We observe change within these repetitions and refashion our naming of time into a spiral, a compromise of circle and line. We feel our singularity, decide we are not just our ancestors reborn; we note the irreversibility of our physical progression from birth and infancy to old age and death and again reshape time as an arrow, whose fated target we have the misfortune to be. We love, and, drenched in these ecstasies and other Dionysian brews, feel time’s river become an ocean, vast, supportive *and* swallowing, moving yet directionless, and we call time timeless.

Interior time, or the subjective sense of time, is each individual’s mismeasure of clock and calendar. It is time accelerated or slowed, time saturated with personal *meanings*. It is the creative error of *experiencing*, whereby one minute, on occasion, equals one hour. Interior time is designed on the warp threads of memory and anticipation. It is informed by the apprehension of beginnings and endings.

Stalling in their exploration of the riddles of the subjective experience of time,

² Of course, metaphors surround us, and, outside of intentional art-making, are embodied in the objects and object relations comprising human experience. Suda’s (1989) The moving image: Immutability, metaphors, and the time clocks tell provides an erudite ramble through metaphors of time, inclusive of his perspective on the myth inherent in digital time. Suda concludes that digital time reflects and encourages a predilection for an ahistorical experience of time. The arrested digital moment presents us with no larger field into which it is integrated “. . .the past and future appear to have a suspicious status” (p. 121). More colloquially, we might say that excised of its wheel, fate is divested of its powers of “comeuppance.” When there is no representation of time’s “round,” “what goes round comes round” loses its moral force. Compare this with Schiffer’s (1978) tracing of the bodily origins of the clock’s “face” to those organs through which we first established a relationship with time.

. . .the face is that of the mother at which the nursling stares, and the hands are those which pluck and snatch at the breast. We fashion the clock in the image of our nursing experience, and though it may approximate an objective measurement of time, it is we who have the mouth to suck and bite, and the hands to wind the knobs that enslave the clock to our command.” (p. 14-15)

While likening our efforts to interpret time to a pig snuffling out its relation to truffles, Suda ultimately celebrates our interpretive transcendence of our porcine appetencies through “an embodiment of metaphors with a world, a discovery in and through time” (p. 138).

many psychoanalytic investigators became aware of their own deep resistance to proceeding further. Citing confessional commonalities in the experiences of Freud, Namnum, Loewald and Eissler, Colarusso (1979) hypothesised why this resistance is so prevalent in the first of his insightful articles on the development of the sense of time.

In mid-life, when the . . . study of time is most likely to beckon, the unsatisfying adult concept of time is threatened by the increased awareness of time limitation and approaching death, leading to a wish for personal immortality--i.e., limitless, controllable time, the conceptualisation of early childhood. (p. 243)

Yet one does not go far into childhood before the idea of time provokes puzzlement. Piaget (1962) offers his five year old child's astute query: "Are there times when there aren't any hours, or are there always, always hours?" (p. 266). And then, it is many hours but not so very much longer until we embrace time as a treacherous friend, as our oxymoronic, enabling shadow, deepening its cast with the progress of days.

My thesis lends support to Colarusso's hypothesis in that for a number of years I have been an inhabitant of that developmental time frame called mid-life. This is the age when we are most likely to become, to use Kastenbaum's term, "psychochronophiliacs" (1977, p. 193), undoubtedly compelled into our loving obsession by its motivational heart, a kernel of alarm. As Suda (1989) has put it, fearing "the end . . . makes the middle a mockery," the mid-lifer "frantically flails about, hoping to grasp something which will make the middle coalesce with his beginning and his end" (p. 95). The mid-lifer's task is to begin to come to terms with the "abhorrent recognition" that "time's passage is the herald of his own annihilation" (p. 94), which has suddenly become not just a cognitive fact, but a mathematical weight, without invitation sagging its degenerate way into bodily experience. My experience of, and inevitably, my feelings toward time have changed as I have aged, both as to time's apparent rate of passage and to the remaining length of my voyage in it. I begin to feel composed of time more than of any other substance, feel its rich gathering in me--but with each year am also more keenly aware that my celebrations of time passing will end. The recent death of my father further deepened my experience

and valuation of time. Whereas my father was once the gentling, personal mediator of Father Time to me, now he is seamlessly absorbed into that greater body: the Body of Time.

My personal reflections on time³ increased as I turned my attention to the qualities of temporal experience *present* in sessions with clients in art therapy. The quantity of time remained constant each week with each individual or group. But the temporal textures of those hours could be so very different and revealing of the qualities of each individual's *subjective* sense of time, that internal perception of the flow, race or stalling of time, inclusive of states of timelessness. Kafka (1977) uses the term "temporal graining" (p.154) to describe the expansions and contractions of inner temporal life, which gives us the apt metaphor of wood grain, an embodiment of growth in time that can appear so vastly different in texture depending on the type of tree, and whether the year has been lean or fat in its weathers.

A woman with dominant paranoid personality traits *flew* through her fifty minutes, speaking without pause as she painted pictures featuring chairs in which no one was present. Her personal present was also largely uninhabited, as she projected herself ardently into her future, seeking to secure it through the hypervigilant prediction of the malicious actions of others against her. Interestingly, she had been a premature infant and was expected to die. From her birth, then, the future had been filled with threat, and it was only after giving birth that her paranoid traits intensified such that she required psychiatric intervention. Of course, her case was more complex than this sketch describes, but one can see a bodily based experience at the core of her subjective experience of time, founded on the untrustworthiness of a benign unfolding of life in

³ During the evolution of this thesis, several other events of note occurred that informed my understandings. I engaged in an independent study in which, beginning with a photograph of myself and my father from my childhood, I completed a series of art works during which I gave particular attention to the transformations in my subjective experience of time and affect within the art process and in their material representation in art products. These observations and supporting theory were presented in a course paper. Secondly, about midpoint in my research and writing I was diagnosed with hypothyroidism, in which the metabolic processes of the body are greatly slowed. In this intimate and bodily way I experienced the pervasive biological foundations of the subjective experience of time, as I had come to feel distinctly "slower" than the world around me in both mind and body. The evolution of a drawing during this time period catalogued, in its levels of complexity, force of material application, and general spirit, the progressive renewal of my energies as medication took effect.

time, and projected as a malignancy of intent onto others with influence on her future.

A client with depression seemed to drag himself through time, just as he dragged his paintbrush across the page, pulled more by where he had been in his life (and on the page) than toward where he was going. When I would ask him a question, I often experienced his inevitable pause as as his having to, *each time*, walk from the past to the present to retrieve the question and then his having to labour back into the past to locate the ingredients of his answer. He was lost to his own here and now.

In Chapter 5 of this paper, I will detail sessions in art therapy with an individual with schizophrenia. Never had I felt the vulnerability of time as a construct as I did during his sessions. Time seemed atomistic, to occur in diffuse particles. While he, too, had a past focus to his narratives, they did not retain the quality of true historicity; rather, they were alternately inflated and then, abandoning or abandoned by duration and succession, his tales crumbled, became mirage, and with it, his self, too, became “apparitional.”

An implicit question echoed within the process of each individual: Who am I, now? Why am I not as I was? If an individual is effectively dismembered in time, scattered like the god Osiris through his or her “when,” can art, and if so, *how* can art, be Isis, and collect the bones, restoring the individual to meaningful presence?

I found that my investigation into time as an “invisible medium” of the art therapy session could only be explored by gaining as thorough as possible of an understanding of all that transshapes the neutral phenomenon of clock-time, by which we measure the therapeutic hour, into the elasticised field of subjective and intersubjective temporal experience. Understandings of the unconscious, relational matrices from which temporal meanings arise allow for a pluralistic approach to clients, an inclusive way of working which harmonises with Fraser’s model of temporal umwelts, which will be introduced in Chapter 1. As therapists, we have to be able to flexibly transit reference clocks in order to promote balance in our clients’ frayed and erratic nests of times, sometimes narrowing creative experience to provide consistency and stability of focus, sometimes widening creative experience to reveal the possibilities

of becoming.

Creating art in therapy makes available the possibility of making intangible temporal patterns visible. In his meditation on time and living, Grudin (1982) concisely expresses the challenge of discerning temporal pattern.

Temporal pattern, though as pronounced and as natural as spatial pattern, is a great deal more difficult to recognise. For while spatial pattern is simultaneously before us, temporal pattern presents us with only one part or aspect at a time. Any of these aspects is easy to confuse with an aspect of another pattern or with mere chance; especially at the beginning of things, when there is no certainty that a pattern has been developing at all. Take, for example, the onset of an illness, the beginning of anger or anxiety, the roots of disaffection. Moreover, the crisis of an experience, which is in a sense the centre of temporal pattern, tends to obscure the earlier phases (which in our relief or exhaustion we often forget), making these preliminaries harder to recognise when they occur again. Thus, while temporal patterns are as intimate to us as our own heartbeats, . . . we feel ill at ease with them, if at all, as an almost ghostly undertone of experience, a persistent but indefinable *déjà vu*. (p. 24)

Déjà vu, of course, does not literally mean already lived, but already *seen*. It is this property that internal images made into objects in art therapy contributes to the discernment of temporal pattern. Art therapy provides not only for the intellectual, but for the bodily⁴ *seeing* of structures and symbols, through which the individual temporalises as a self, in both its processes and materials of the products through which these images are embodied.

Time and Art Therapy Literature

In addition to the personal and practica experiences presented above, Wadeson's (1980) cursory statement that "there is no time element" (p. 11) in art expression was a strong impetus to my study. While recognising that, contextually, Wadeson's statement was made to emphasise that art *objects* visually present all of their contents to us at once, in one field of presence, in contrast to, for instance, the presentation of music, which passes with time, I immediately "fell into" the questions left by the partial nature of her remark, and felt the need to begin to explore some of the temporal aspects I had so strongly felt with regard to clients' presence, art process and

⁴ Here, I use "bodily" holistically, as the affective body saturated with psyche.

products in art therapy sessions, with special consideration given to the subjective sense of time.

Time has not been given a concerted theoretical and phenomenological focus in art therapy literature, though time is infolded in every discussion of art therapy process, products and of the therapeutic relationship in the course of therapy, be it brief or long term. That the shifting experience of the self involves a mutable temporal organisation is implicit in discussions regarding the developmental aspects of art-making, regression with materials, and in the utilisation of art to bring memories into the present and to express and contain life review processes. Practical considerations of the time of the session, the differing facilitations of art process in brief and long term therapy, and differentially identifying when to engage in art processes that reinforce ego boundaries or that open them to the “different time” of primary process, all involve weighing factors of objective time against factors of the subjective time experience to arrive at the optimal therapeutic experience for the client. Client art works have been also examined in an attempt to ascertain a structural grid that would allow assessments of “past” and “future” to be gleaned from divisions of the page. Examples of these and other ways time has received consideration in art therapy literature follow. This is a selective rather than a comprehensive cataloguing of the mention of time in art therapy literature, that has as its intention the provision of illustrations of ways time has received some explicit focus, and ways temporal considerations are implicit in the theory underlying our practice.

Because the human ability to make images of what is seen develops in time along with cognitive and motor skills, the developmental aspects of art making have been given consistent attention (Pear-Cohen & Straus-Gainer, 1976; Case & Dalley, 1990). The stages of development in graphic expression as outlined by Lowenfeld (1965) are employed in assessment and in the consequent development, where possible, of interventions to facilitate movement for the person who is “stalled in time.” Toward the end of life, processes of dementia can be similarly evaluated through art, as memory, intellect and the ability to interpret and represent sensory impressions deteriorate (Wald, 1983). With the elderly and the terminally ill, art therapy has been

used to promote personal expression of what it means to the individual to be approaching the end of a lifetime, from engaging in life review through art works, to working through the mourning process and fears of death (Miller, 1984; Landgarten, 1981).

In a section of The Handbook of Art Therapy called "Time Boundaries," Case and Dalley (1992) speak of the measured time of the art therapy session as a temporal frame containing the art therapy experience for the client. They indicate ways in which the use of time is a nonverbal medium of communication. The lateness or unreasonable earliness of either the client or the therapist needs to be examined in terms of transferential and countertransferential issues. The same holds for the use of time within the session, such as a client--or therapist--leaving crucial issues until the session's end. Acting out can occur through time-ing. Case and Dalley sensitise the art therapist to the need to be attentive to the interpenetrations of past and present in the client's process.

The task of the art therapist is to facilitate a re-engagement with the past. . . . The art therapist must tolerate these disclosures and must be prepared for them to be understood in terms of the present--the here and now of the situation--but also in terms of the patient's past, particularly in terms of the patient's early experiences as an infant. As the focus of the session is narrowed onto the object of the image and onto the person of the therapist, early infantile experiences will be experienced in the exploration of original relationships. This is how the transference relationship becomes established. (p. 59)

But by and large time remains a *tacit* structural force within their discussions, even as regression, reparation, and the distinguishing features of conscious and unconscious processes are discussed. It is in this way that the particular relevance of time and subjective time within *art* therapy "riddles" our language, but has not been foregrounded.

With regard to the art product, Case and Dalley (1992) are in concordance with Shoemaker's earlier (1978) observation of the prospective nature of the first or first several pictures in a course of therapy. They note that it is as significant as the first dream presented in psychotherapy.

. . . it may contain a coded statement of the presenting problem, although this will not be known at a conscious level to the client but will take weeks or months of unpacking through a further sequence of images and interactions with

the therapist. (p. 108)

In addition to the initial images as providing a map of the journey, Shoemaker advises attention be given to the verb tenses of clients discussing art products, to the textures of imagined times the client creates, and to the temporal perspective most cathected by the client, with its motivational and avoidant meanings (p. 158-159). The image, inclusive of its processing, has thus been clinically observed to have a complex relationship with time, harbouring tinctures of the past, present and future that may be encoded in process, in the structure and composition of the art work, and/or in its content. This should come as no surprise since the image is generated from within the subjective body of time that is the client.

In addition to Shoemaker (1978) and Roby and Pastushak (1978), who indicate potentials for reading temporal perspectives within their art assessment grid, Perkins (1977) has applied Bach's division of the pictorial image into quadrants in work with children with life-threatening illnesses. In this interpretive repertoire, the left side of the image, often indicative of the past, represents the future only when it indicates a "going out of life," or a worsening of the illness: what might be called a regressive future. The lower right may represent the potential future or the recent past, the unifying condition being that this is the quadrant that shows those elements pressing toward consciousness: temporally, an unconscious force, comprising elements of the personal past and of timeless archetypal structures, exerting influence on the individual's unfolding present.

Perhaps it is the lack of research into the subjective temporal enigmas that has sometimes led to what I always feel is a disservice to our profession, in terming the prospective capacities of art images as "magic." Riley (1994) falls into this trap in her valuable contribution to the literature on family art therapy. Summarising her presentation of a woman who needed "time" until she was ready to disclose abuse that had occurred in her family situation, she writes:

Trust the art product to do its magic for foretelling the next productive step in informing the therapist and the client on how to creatively bring new meanings to view in an acceptable and effective manner. (p. 42)

“Magic” is an apt enough *experiential* description of what manifests as an uncanny force resident in image making processes, but does not challenge us to probe more deeply into why and how occurrences that appear to transgress the directional temporal conventions of consciousness come about.⁵ Theoretical speculations are available on the origin and operation of these phenomena that ultimately point toward the embedded matrix of the body/mind as comprising, in its potentialities, the evolutionary history of consciousness, rich with structural *patterns* of psychic development which, being in themselves transtemporal, allow for the possibility of aspects of psychic functioning to occur outside of time (Jung, 1971; Philipson, 1963; von Franz, 1974). Edwards (1987) does not explicate Jungian analytic art therapy from a temporal vantage point, but when he states that “working with pictorial images in a spontaneous way almost always seems to call up another side of the personality,” (p. 102), temporal implications are again present. The other “sides of the personality” that are less conscious may have a greater affinity with the archetypal “outside of time,” or, as normally less dominant functions of the personality, may approach experience through a different temporal perspective, as will be discussed in Chapter 2.

Simon (1970, 1981) develops a stylistic differential for evaluating client art using the temporal terms, “traditional” and “archaic,” for her primary categories. An idea of differently organised temporal psychic experiences isomorphic with Western historical art⁶ is implicit, but this remains undeveloped.

Carr (1981) sensitively points toward important issues of time in creative process over the course of one’s life in an essay describing a transitional period in her own creative process. She identifies a period in her life during which, for six years,

⁵ Our propensity to stay with the “magic” (and I do not mean to suggest that I am at all times immune to this!) of our work could profit by an examination of our motivations in light of Bakan’s (1965) discussion of “the mystery-mastery complex” as “the neurotic core of the contemporary psychological research enterprise” (p. 190).

Whereas mystery is the protection against the mastery impulse of others, it is also an objective which must be suspended for thoroughgoing mastery. Because in our total society we would be both masters and yet unmastered, we walk the complicated path of pursuing both the objectives of mystery and mastery. (p. 186)

Bakan suggests that the way out of the “archaic” objectives of this dichotomous agenda is the less inflated, more modest human goal and cooperative task of seeking to achieve “understanding.”

⁶ A critique of its cultural bias is offered in Chapter 4, note 3.

she “turned away from visual creative activity” to engage in other pursuits. Personal and social reasons contributed to this time of what she acknowledges as a period in which she repressed personal imagery, creating no art work as a result. Eventually, however, she began to have a feeling, that she was “about to redress the grievance of her own desertion” (p. 116). She found the resulting images evidenced greater creative resolution than those of six years ago. “Accidental passages, diffuse, ambiguous composition, condensations, were replaced by compositions which [were] balanced, rhythmical, integrated” (p. 116), while still thematically related to her earlier work. The first reason she offers for this re-emergence of dormant imagery is Freud’s conception of the id as having nothing in it corresponding to the idea of time, so that after the passage of prolonged periods of time, unconscious impressions can resurface “as if they had just occurred” (p. 116). During this passage of world time, she speculates, the unconscious had worked on the material, achieving greater integration of it. Carr does not note the discrepancy between Freud’s theoretical formulation and her own speculation. She leaves the temporal discussion of the paradox of change and complex integrations occurring over time within what she has identified as the “timeless” and largely unchanging unconscious unresolved.⁷ While emphasising the centrality of forms from Greek temples to Dionysius and Athena to her work, she does not bring Jungian understandings to her essay, that would support speculations on the structuring capacities of the archetypes existing outside of time in the collective unconscious to “intercourse” with mobile material in the personal unconscious, engendering new integrations of repressed imagery mediated through a maturing self/ego axis.

Borrowing from literature in art history exploring the temporal existence of the art object, Schaverien (1992) discusses “the temporal existence of the picture within the frame” (p. 74-77). She contrasts drama and art, the former having a script which is activated time and again by interpretive stagings each giving it different colourations; and the latter usually a single “performance” in time having as its residue a product that does not in itself significantly change, though understandings of its contents are likely

⁷ As we will see, Freud’s (in Bonaparte, 1940) reconceptualisation of the unconscious as having some sense of time, and Noy’s (1969) formulation of primary process as undergoing developmental growth just as secondary processes do, allow for a resolution of this paradox.

to. She emphasises the uses of this enduring object in reviewing individual and groups' therapeutic journeys, aiding in a "return to an atmosphere which was current and pictured months, even years ago" (p. 77). The need for the therapist to prudently time interpretations is also stressed, and the need to inform interpretations in consideration of the scope of the client's lifespan is given mention.

No attempt to systematically relate temporal considerations apparent in art process and product to psychiatric diagnoses is found in the literature, though certain descriptors imply attitudes, affective and psychophysical states suggesting characteristic temporal rates and perspectives. In Wadeson's (1980) summary chart of distinguishing features of psychotic art reported in the literature (p. 190), descriptors such as "indications of activity," "evidence of low energy," "grief and mourning," and "indications of restraint," all reflect ways of being in time and attitudes toward the unfolding of the self in time. The "fragmentation" or "disintegration" commonly observed in the drawings of persons of schizophrenia, while taken as a spatial descriptor, is really spatial evidence of the inability to develop one coherent composition in a sustained manner--*in time*. Pereira (1975) offers a cognitive perspective on the attentional difficulties that persons with schizophrenia evidence in carrying through the sequence of tasks in time necessary to completing a coherent composition. Her "interference theory of graphic representation" (p. 181) will be given further attention in Chapter 5 of this thesis. As will be brought out later, Wadeson's conclusion from her study is that there is not yet a "systematic procedure sufficiently refined to diagnose a patient simply on the basis of art expression" (p. 198). Nevertheless, she finds art expression of great value in differential diagnosis within the context of the client's discussion of the image, the qualities of interaction in the session, and the client's personal history. This application will be used with my client's material in Chapter 5.

This sampling of considerations of objective and subjective time in clinical art therapy theory and practice illustrates the wealth of areas to be explored that have been neglected in our visually biased tendency to preference space over time. It is my hope that this thesis will contribute to the rectification of our "oversight" of this invisible

medium.

Limitations and delimitations

In his penetrating exploration of the origin of the work of art, Martin Heidegger (1971) specifies the Greek meaning of the word thesis as “to let lie forth in its radiance and presence” (p. 83), or, “a bringing forth in the unconcealed” (p. 82). A thesis invites a topic into its boundaries framing a place in which the topic is brought into relation with unconcealedness.

The apparently effortless simplicity of process conveyed by Heidegger’s characterisation is at odds with the experiential reality of complex labour a thesis inevitably becomes. My thesis has been no exception. There is something in time that resists being brought forth into radiant presence, and *staying there*. Time *passes*, shows itself and leaves--continuously. Narrowing a discussion of “time” to the subjective experience of time would seem to secure it for examination, since as such it is to be found inside of the experiencer. But even this delimitation is mercurial, since time as a “radiance” transits innumerable subjectivities, each of which expresses its experience with idiosyncratic nuance. Time experience is one river comprising a multitude of tributaries and undercurrents, inclusive of biological time, circadian rhythms and cultural mediations of time. Because it is beyond all that we can say about it, time remains ultimately incomprehensible, and few are so bold as to state otherwise.

José Argüelles (1975) has ventured to describe time as the inscrutable medium of consciousness, which we deform in our very effort to make it comprehensible within the limitations of our consciousness.

To understand time is to understand the laws governing the unfoldment of our own mind. These are laws intuitively arrived at and expressible through the simplest and most natural images--the transformation of seed into plant and of plant into seed, sunrise and sunset, the turning of the seasons, the procession of the equinoxes, the cycles of the heavenly bodies. There is something inexplicably “round” about time, round and unfathomably deep.

In view of time’s enigmatic nature, it is no surprise that the first efforts toward mechanisation involved “straightening” time out. (p. 51)

Through the presentation of ideas about the subjective experience of time from various psychodynamic perspectives, this thesis seeks to prevent any theoretical mechanisation—or machination—that might “straighten time out.” It is inevitable that what is presented here is partial, and only a hand gesturing toward the panorama of complexities the subjective experience of time presents.

Since “time” has been a primary topic of philosophical speculation over the ages, it perhaps needs to be stated that this thesis involves itself with that broad body of literature only in the most peripheral way. Only occasional mention is given to the influence of certain philosophers’ conceptualisations of time on the development of psychological theory. The chapter on existentialist psychotherapy will show more of these philosophical foundations because of the centrality of tenets of existentialist philosophy to the theories of existentialist psychology.

Nor does this thesis extend its perspectives far into the rich anthropological literature on culture and time. The cultural specificity of this thesis is that of Western psychodynamic schools, though it must be noted that these were informed by understandings (however true or faulty) of other cultural realities. Jung, for instance, incorporated many insights from his studies in Eastern traditions into the development of the body of theory on which analytical psychology is based.⁸ I would, therefore, ask the reader to bear in mind throughout the reading of this thesis and its sources that when we describe an individual’s functioning as disordered with regard to time or any other criteria, we would do well to always make it clear that our use of the term, “disordered,” is with recognition that its determination is influenced by specific sociocultural prescriptions. When we term certain relationships to time as maladaptive, disturbed or even pathological, we should also hold forth the possibility that an individual’s difficulty in adapting to the exigencies of social time may in fact indicate his or her state of *personal health*. As Abel Jeanniere (1977) reminds us in an essay entitled, “The pathogenic structures of time in modern societies,” the diseased state of

⁸ See Jung’s foreword to The Secret of the Golden Flower (1962), in which he reveals the critical link this text provided in the evolution of his theory of the collective unconscious. Similar insights are available in his psychological commentary to The Tibetan Book of the Dead (1960). See also, Freud and anthropology: A history and reappraisal (Wallace, 1983).

relationship to time may, indeed, lie *in the state*--within the dominant cultural attitude. The cultural diversity of ways of being in time, and their reflection in language and image are therefore not represented, though some insights from a cursory reading of this literature have been integrated as appropriate to give the nudge to the margins of my study, in an effort to at least point beyond its needful limits to the needful whole of which it is but part.

Looking at unitary space-time would seem to be a natural perspective for the study of time in art therapy, an overtly space-oriented discipline. In this regard, my thesis might be considered to be chronologically prior to such a work. Beginning to read in that literature, I found my own need was to first more completely understand the model of time in human experience--in the *nootemporal umwelt*--as it is commonly understood, before I could enter the more complex considerations of space-time, and bring the latter as a critique to the more classical formulations. Relating some of the integration of the literature by von Franz into the theories of analytical psychology is the farthest this perspective is taken in this thesis.⁹ A study of the interface of art therapy with the perspective of space-time will become of increasing importance as the technological revolution increasingly reshapes our *daily* way of experiencing the space and time of our world-around as, indeed, space-time.

A goal of this thesis is to offer perspectives fostering a frame of attentiveness to the textures and usage of time by both the client and the therapist. This thesis will not provide a list of actions, images and their temporal meanings in the therapeutic hour and their relation to art media. Case examples of ways in which aspects of subjective time may be acted out in the clinical hour are prevalent in cited literature, to which the reader is referred. Each individual is his or her distinct muscular complex of temporal perspectives and rhythms and, as with the interpretation of images in art therapy, the image formed in the medium of time does not lend itself to a dictionary reading. Rather, this exploration seeks to provide a range of psychodynamic parameters in which to place the temporal actions of each client to arrive at understandings that most

⁹ A text for the interested reader to begin with is Danah Zohar's The Quantum Self (1991), whose bibliography will provide further readings.

illuminate that individual's subjective reality.

In the consideration of the subjective sense of time with relation to developmental concerns in psychoanalytic theory, primary focus will be given to infancy and early childhood with only brief mention of time experience in the stages of latency, adolescence and adult life. Obviously, this is another area which could be developed in further detail with great merit. The emphasis on infant and early childhood experience as laying the foundations of subjective time reflects the formative emphasis intrinsic to psychoanalysis and the perspective particularly characteristic of its clinical practice: for as adaptive ego functions are eroded in neurosis and psychosis, it is to earlier organisations of experience that the individual has been observed to revert.

General reference will be given for hypotheses regarding the characteristics of subjective time experience in a number of mental disorders, but only that of schizophrenia will be dealt with at length and illustrated with case material. Opportunities for experimental research studies into the development and evaluation of indicators of subjective time sense in mental disorders as revealed in the products and processes of art therapy will become evident, and will be given consideration in the conclusion. Out of such research, general treatment protocols could be devised that could be adapted to the specific needs of individual clients.

Within the delimitation of schizophrenia, a limitation of this thesis is that intrinsic to any case study: that the population examined is one person, and therefore the generalisability of the results can be brought into question. However, the support provided by theoretical and experimental literature, as well as other case studies cited, shows the interface of general findings in the field with the particular temporal world of the presented client. It is hoped that this will enable the reader to develop both a sense of time in schizophrenic process as a category of experience defined by certain descriptors, *and* of the individuality of the presented client within that category.

Finally, an intrinsic limit of this thesis is, within its attempt at objectivity, the perspectival tilt native to its author's own idiosyncratic walk within that installation

piece called time. While I speak of indications of my client's subjective sense of time as revealed in his art work, art process, and verbal disclosures, of course I, as therapist, took in perceptions and intuitions of Gaston's temporal experience through my own temporal being, inclusive of *its* subjectivity; and as author of this thesis, I am the discerner of the parts, the weaver of the whole, and the purveyor of these "revelations." What I term subjective and ascribe to Gaston, therefore, inevitably has a component of intersubjectivity to it. As Matson (1966) has elucidated with reference to quantum science, observation is a transaction in which there is a reciprocity of influence between the knower and the known. The subjective choices of the observer are of particular influence in the analysis of the event, in ascribing meanings to it. Certainly, in that Gaston and I were of similar age, and so lived out our stages of life under the same flux of North American Zeitgeist, I was able to enter "the history of his times" with an increased degree of understanding. Within the counterculture of the sixties and seventies, there was a social sanction for seeking out altered states of consciousness and particularly "timeless" states, not only through meditation but also through drug usage. Within the spiritual search of the counterculture, the definition of "objective" time was approaching the reversal of meaning achieved in Jung's usage of "objective," as originating in the objective psyche, or collective unconscious, considered by Jung to have "objective existence as a source of knowledge, insight and imagination" (Samuels, Shorter & Plaut, 1986, p. 100).

Considering the hermeneutical import of these semantic twists, it would be irresponsible not to acknowledge the inevitable indwelling of the uncertainty principle within this thesis, which at its simplest is an admission of the contingency of all knowledge presentations. It is for this that I hope the multiperspectival presentation, and the model of Fraser's nested temporal *umwelts*, provides some compensation.

I would wish that the insights and hypotheses collected and generated in this thesis are taken only as points of departure for further study by the reader, as they are by myself. Within the metaphor of art, Grudin (1982) has perhaps best expressed the noetic attitude with which I emerge from my theoretical and clinical perambulations in, around and through time.

“Like students of art who walk around a great statue, seeing parts and aspects of it from each position, but never the whole work, we must walk mentally around time, using a variety of approaches, a pandemonium of metaphor. No insight or association, however outlandish or contradictory, should be forbidden us; the only thing forbidden should be to stand still and say, ‘This is it.’” (p. 2)

Hypothesis

The task of “psychotemporal adaptation”¹⁰ involves the establishment of a working harmony between the vagaries of the subjective sense of time and objective, socially determined time. While each school of psychodynamic psychotherapy ultimately deals with a client’s experience of time as a whole, psychoanalysis, analytical psychology and existential psychotherapy each preference one temporal perspective: psychoanalysis the past, analytical psychology the timeless, archetypal reality, and existential psychotherapy the future cusp of the present. Understanding and utilising all of these perspectives in the practice of art therapy enables us to use image making to establish appropriate connectivities within our clients’ experience of time. It is hypothesised that qualities and dynamics inherent in therapeutically supported art processes and their visual products make art therapy uniquely suited to assess and aid individuals in their life-long task of psychotemporal adaptation, particularly when practised within this eclectic matrix of methodologies. Briefly examining several psychiatric diagnoses from the perspective of each as a disorganisation of temporal

¹⁰ “Psychotemporal adaptation” is a term applied by Seton (1974) to the adolescent’s temporal tasks. A sense of one’s own history in late adolescence required two achievements, and it is these achievements together that I mean to call the *psychotemporal adaptation*. The first of these is that the ego be able through its memorial function to exercise time as an ordering principle for the succession of events that constitute the individual’s history. The second achievement is the ability of the ego to experience “duration” (Bergson, 1910), and this very complex achievement depends upon the level of superego and ego development. (p. 796; Seton refers to Bergson’s *Time and Free Will*)

I use the term giving added consideration to the establishment of adaptive connectivities between the temporal umwelts of experience, as described by Fraser (1981), introduced in Chapter 1 of this thesis, and consider this task to be lifelong. In this regard, not just ego and superego development but the development of primary process within the unconscious, as proposed by Noy (1969), is also of central importance.

experience, this hypothesis will be applied in the clinical milieu to the case of a client with schizophrenia.

Methodology

A great portion of this thesis is presented as a review of the literature relevant to time within the schools of psychoanalysis, analytical psychology and existential psychotherapy, and within art therapy and the creative process. This body of literature is in itself massive; therefore, my review is necessarily based on selective rather than comprehensive reading.

Within the case study, a largely constructive/comparative method is employed to amplify the client's imagery, in keeping with Jung's (1960) utilization of it to determine "the goal the patient tried to reach through the creation of his system" (p. 186). This sometimes necessitates that, in effect, "the investigator himself takes over the standpoint of the psychosis" to enter the subjective logic of the presented images. . . . Only in this way can we do justice to man's psychic striving" (pp. 191, 192). The *standpoint* of the psychosis is, of course, to be distinguished from the psychosis itself.

That is not to say that what is sometimes termed the reductive method of psychoanalysis is not also employed as I trace elements of Gaston's images to early family dynamics. This, however, is done as only in conjunction with amplificatory, constructive methods so that in balance, that dilation and contraction of time which Kafka (1977) identifies as the therapist's role to moderate in sessions, occurs also in the analytical rhythms of this thesis.

I hope that I have achieved a balance such that, ultimately, reductive and amplificatory analyses are situated sensitively in the existential reality of Gaston: that the conflation of grand themes, be they oedipal, chthonic or cosmic, with the suffering of the client does not result in the former eclipsing the latter. The client's quotidian reality has its mythic dimension, but this has no ultimate relevance except as it is mediated within the human relationship of the therapeutic encounter.

Chapter Summaries

The initial chapters of this thesis explore perspectives on the subjective experience of time in psychoanalysis, analytical psychology and existential psychotherapy. These understandings are then integrated into an exploration of interior time in creative process, particularly with regard to the process and products of art therapy. Finally, clinical and experimental observations from the literature on the subjective experience of time in selected mental disorders are discussed and applied to the case study of a client with schizophrenia.

In **Chapter 1**, the subjective sense of time is explored as it is conceptualised within psychoanalytic theory, first, through a structural description of the distinguishing temporal characteristics of the unconscious, the ego and the superego. Then, the development of the subjective sense of time is presented, emphasising the foundational patterning implicit in early parent/infant relationships, which bind the nascent sense of time with affective experience, because these relationships centre around meeting the infant's psychophysical needs. Subsequently, responses to the increasing demand that these needs of the infant self be brought into congruence with less ego-centered familial and social norms is shown to condition relations to time and to the child's temporal relations with others. Mediating influences within latency, adolescence and adulthood and selected stage-specific tasks defining Seton's (1974) term, "psychotemporal adaptation," are given brief consideration. Finally, psychoanalytic perspectives on time within the analytic hour and the role of the analyst are reviewed. It is in this chapter that Fraser's (1981, 1988, 1990) model of nested temporal umwelts is introduced, which is subsequently utilised throughout this thesis as a model facilitating the comprehension of the plurality of temporal organisations we must each moment integrate that, given the establishment of normative connectivities, gives rise to the generally predictable comforts of the quotidian.

Theorists in analytical psychology practice within a complex understanding of time, but in this paper I emphasise that realm of time through which this paradigm distinguishes itself: that "time" which is outside of our usual definitions of time (von

Franz, 1992), in which are situated the eternal constitutive presences, the constellating “magnetisms,” of the archetypes. In **Chapter 2**, consciousness, the personal conscious and the collective unconscious are examined from a temporal perspective. As well, speculations in the literature regarding temporal orientation and personality functions are reviewed. Of particular importance to art therapy, the symbolic function is examined as that capability resident within psyche which mediates the “not-time” of the archetypal reality and the mundane time of the individual. The prospective nature of the symbol is explored in relation to Jung’s concepts of individuation and the collective unconscious (Jung, 1969b, 1972; Philipson, 1963). As a principle confounding psyche and matter in “unlawful” ways, synchronicity is discussed as that “occasional” principle in-forming phenomena which transgresses the normative, causal organisations of time and space through the compelling agency of the acausal, cohesive principle of *meaning*. As is discussed in a final section on time in the practice of analytical psychology, this realm will not receive the single minded focus in therapeutic sessions that I give it in this thesis, though it will undoubtedly be a primary organising principle brought by the analyst to client material. The importance of relating to archetypal dynamisms through their temporal, personal and social embodiments in the life of the client particularly as emphasised within the Developmental School is provided through summary offerings from Fordham (1986) and Samuels (1985).

In **Chapter 3**, the phenomenological methodology employed by existential analysts (Minkowski, 1958, 1970; Binswanger 1958a, 1958b; May, 1958) is seen to take as its point of departure the discernment of the meanings implicit in the client’s subjective experience of time, which enhance and/or inhibit the authentic unfolding of his or her being in time. Preferencing the future cusp of the now, theorists within existential psychotherapy are shown to discuss the past as a construction produced, as much as reproduced, by memory (Minkowski, 1970). While the formulation of *kairos* in therapy, grasping the auspicious moment productive of insight that enables decisive change, is discussed from literature spanning the disciplines presented, I conduct this discussion within this chapter since it embodies the posture of readiness, of

“living forward,” to which existential psychotherapy ascribes.

The foregoing chapters make clear that the integration of the many experiences of time into a flexibly ordered subjectivity is to no small extent a creative enterprise requiring the concerted engagement of skills from both conscious and unconscious repertoires. Founding its methodology on the expressive embodiments of this creative venture,¹¹ art therapy (and more generally, creative process) is examined in **Chapter 4** in order to identify the temporal tasks it can facilitate within each of the previously presented paradigms of psychological theory, and the reasons for its efficacy in these. Fraser’s (1981) identification of the artist as the time traveller *par excellence* between time’s subjective domains is introduced. Within the examination of time and creative process from a psychoanalytic perspective, Noy’s (1969) revision of primary process becomes central to considering how art therapy effects reorganisation of the temporal self, in that it *develops* primary process, which is free from the constrictions of linear time, in its assimilation of new experiences into the schemata of the self.¹² The bidirectionality of the art process and products as proposed by Rose (1964) is employed to illustrate how the boundaries of the qualitative temporal experience of the ego are expanded, while the object maintains an obdurate, anchoring presence in the here-and-now. Literature on creative process is reviewed for its role in dealing with issues of loss, narcissism, omnipotence, and with providing an opportunity to effect reparation. The creative process in art making is then examined from the perspective of analytical psychology as a way to provide the optimal circumstances for the transcendent function to operate, evidenced by the production of symbols, the “mediating third” within the conflict of opposites.

¹¹ While establishing beneficial connectivities between temporal umwelts and perspectives may not be a stated goal of therapy, I would contend that this is nonetheless central to all of the therapeutic goals we formulate.

¹² As will be discussed in Chapter 4, Noy differentiates the ego’s participation in primary processes from Kris’ (1952) “regression in service of the ego,” arguing that the concept of regression should be kept separate from that of primary process, so that the latter is not identified by reductive descriptors, but maintained as a different-but-not-inferior mode of processing experience.

The potential value of the suffering of the individual achieving placement within an archetypal cycle is discussed. Because the self, at its most profound depth, is an archetype, individuation as self-realisation is seen to require the establishment of a dialogue between the individual-in-time and his or her transtemporal, or outside-of-time nature, which can be initiated through embodying images from the unconscious in art materials. Art-making is also examined from an existential standpoint as the disclosure of the being of his or her world-design. Art, as an activity involving “futuring,” offers an activity in which the art therapist can observe the client temporalising as a self in interacting with the material world, as well as interpersonally with the therapist. Integrated into the previously offered existential psychological perspective are Heidegger’s (1971) philosophical treatise, *The Origin of the Work of Art*, and Fallico’s (1962) *Art and Existentialism*.

Lastly in this chapter, selected structural and formal considerations of art products and art process are explored for what they can reveal, or have been proposed to reveal, about the artist/client’s perspective of and situatedness in time. Ways in which the art object, as a relatively enduring material expression, encodes information about temporal experience are examined, followed by the exploration of the meanings of the art process as a sequence of acts *in time*.

In Chapter 5, understandings of the origins of subjective time experience are related to a number of psychiatric disorders--bipolar disorder, depression and schizophrenia--all at one time or another given as diagnoses or diagnostic impressions of the client whose art therapy sessions are presented later in the chapter. The dominant attitudes to mental disorders within psychoanalysis, analytical psychology and existential psychotherapy are presented with particular consideration given to how this is influenced by the temporal preference of each discipline. In the consideration of schizophrenia, neurophysiological considerations are introduced as a fundamental etiological factor influencing the subjective sense of time, and questions are raised regarding the complex interactions of these with psychodynamic theories. Mo’s (1990) experimentally supported hypothesis regarding the hemispheric temporal reversal in the

processing of time information in persons with schizophrenia was found to be particularly relevant to the presented client's imagery and art process. This client was an outpatient in a psychiatric rehabilitative program at the hospital at which I engaged in my second year's practicum in the Master's programme in art therapy at Concordia University. A pseudonym, "Gaston," has been given to the client to preserve confidentiality. His art works and art process are presented through a synchronic, comparative analysis of core symbols appearing in his images, particularly with regard to their temporal meanings, in which I employed a blend of the perspectives previously explicated in the thesis. The diachronic, linear aspect of time in the unfolding of the therapeutic journey is also attended to, especially through the meanings of termination to Gaston as reflected in his images.

* * * * *

The forms of temporal experience under investigation in this thesis and the theoretical models through which they are investigated are not presented in a hierarchical order: one is not preferable to another. Rather, I present these theoretical speculations on the forms of temporal experience in the same spirit in which Minkowski (1970) presents his consideration of mental "disorders:" as forms of psychic life in which connotations of "lack" are replaced by annotations of "difference."

The many authors from which I draw tend to privilege as the norm one view of time over the others. It is not surprising that most call real time the time of the arrow, and identify the goal of therapy as facilitating acceptance of the passage of time, which inevitably involves helping the client to identify and grieve for the necessary losses suffered on his or her life's path. But all in their own way also concur with Spiegel's (1981) corollary, that "the therapist's goal is to help the patient recognise and face the objective passage of time *and* to feel more like an author of the development of time in his or her life" (p. 6, italics mine). If objective time requires our adaptation *to* it, and subjective time is in significant part a compromise of psychophysical influences, our challenge becomes to provide opportunities for our clients to realize that the subjective

experience of time is amenable to change through acts of creation. That this authoring of one's time is a life-long endeavour involving continual memorial reconstruction is emphasised by Loewald (1972). Goldwert (1990), who proposes that "the evolution of the ego's time-consciousness. . . is a form of lifetime artistic creation" (p. 1218), describes art as providing "the bridge between historical perspective and psychological insight" (p. 1218).

Bringing the inevitable artistries of interior time at which psyche excels to consciousness is an ideal not all of our clients can, or will wish to, attain. This does not preclude, however, the fostering of connectivities that contribute to the re-formation of the interior time of a client's life, disfigured by the pressuring torque of painful emotions, so that it may be once again, or for the first time, "of a piece." I keep this somewhat ambiguous phrase in the spirit of its holographic reading: that from the interference pattern held within the images and sessions of the therapeutic journey--the pieced narratives of a client's life, and the "two beams"¹³ of the transference and countertransference--that from this timed yet timeless "piece" of the client's life that is therapy, the image of his or her life's time as whole may be regenerated through the co-creation of the depth dimension that is *meaning*.

. . . the temporal framework is the canvas upon which the life is painted--either static, flat, and two-dimensional, or vibrant and full of meaning, developed as part of the process of creating and observing it.

-Spiegel (1981, p. 11)

¹³ A hologram is produced by a laser's beam directed at a half-silvered mirror. A portion of the light is reflected onto the object to be photographed and then back to the photographic plate while the other portion goes directly through the mirror and onto the plate. The interference of these two beams recorded on the photographic plate is what enables the production of a three-dimensional image when a laser is directed through this plate (Briggs & Peat, 1984). The analogy of this process to the therapeutic process that makes the "silver" world of the imaginal realm central (Hillman, 1980, 1981) seems self evident. The three-dimensional image around which one can walk and which one can then view from different perspectives, but which one cannot touch, is analogous to the psychic reality of the client made "apparent" in therapy, and given tangible embodiments in art therapy.

THE SUBJECTIVE SENSE OF TIME IN PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY

That the study of time has received much attention from proponents of psychoanalytic theory should come as no surprise. Time in its many aspects is central to both the theory and practice of psychoanalysis. Theoretically, time is implicit in the functioning of the psyche as defined in the topographical and structural models put forward by Freud (Rycroft, 1968). While the unconscious is in part a repository for forgotten past experiences of the self, its repressed contents are memories with conditioning force, believed to be unequivocally pressing for--and frequently symptomatically achieving--representation in the present.

...the whole orientation of psychoanalysis as a genetic approach to mental life, as an attempt to understand mental disease in terms of the history of mental development and to cure it by promoting a resumption of this history--using the faculty of remembering as a main tool--points to the importance of time as being somehow the inner fibre of what we call psychical (Loewald, 1962, p. 268).

In psychoanalytic theory, the personal past is viewed as a crucially determining prologue to the adult personality (Gabbard, 1990). Developmentally, an individual's subjective sense of time is conceived to be initially conditioned by the affective response of the infant to having its physiological needs met, which becomes increasingly bound to the infant's evolving psychological sense of self (Arlow, 1989; Hartocollis, 1974; Gifford, 1960). Finally, in clinical practice, during the analytic hour as measured in the precise minutes of external clock-time, the analyst encourages the analysand to engage in free association in an effort to access unconscious material. Temporally speaking, free association can be thought of as fostering phantasies bred from the interpenetration of psychic contents encompassing time past, time present and time future, revealing conflicts in the dynamics of conscious and unconscious purposing (Arlow, 1986; Waugaman, 1992). The frame of "real time" is monitored by the analyst, freeing the psyche of the analysand from the linear measure of clockworks.

Bringing these conflicts to consciousness in the frame of the analytic session allows for their integration into the “real time” of the ego, which is strengthened by virtue of its growing ability to encompass the fullness of its history. Thus broadly rooted in time, psychoanalysis engages the individual in a process which seeks to afford him or her a *clarity and coherence* of personal, temporal depth.

The Development of the Subjective Sense of Time in Psychoanalytic Theory

Theoretical formulations of the relationship of time and psyche have developed along with the evolution of psychoanalytic thought. Classical foundations emphasising the hegemony of the unconscious were expanded to incorporate the importance of object relations in the development of the ego as it achieved prominence in the school of ego psychology.

When early analytic theory focused on the id and the topographical model, time was thought to be experienced mainly as a recapitulation of past states. With the ascendancy of the structural model and ego psychology, a more sophisticated theory emerged in which time sense became an expression of the dynamic interaction of id, ego, and superego. . . Now, with their acceptance into the mainstream of psychoanalytic thought, object relations theory and the developmental mode of thinking provide conceptual tools particularly suited to the psychoanalytic study of time (Colarusso, 1979, p. 243).

Structural considerations, with their inherent connotations of generic rigidity, were increasingly informed by examinations of the development of the sense of time as originating in the fluid context of human relationships which conditioned the manner in which these structures were formed, and would come to interact. Particular emphasis was placed on the mother/infant dyad.

As Colarusso has noted, even structural models of time and psyche are fundamentally models of relationship: the most basic characterisation of time as pure duration implies an “I” perceiving its relatedness to a “then” and a “now” in which no other change is discriminated. Freud attributed the origin of our sense of time to the method by which the system of perceptual consciousness works and, solipsistically, to

that system's perception of its method of working (Hartocollis, 1983).

It is as though the unconscious stretches out feelers, through the medium of the system Pcpt.-Cs., towards the external world and hastily withdraws them as soon as they have sampled the excitations coming from it. . . This discontinuous method of functioning of the system Pcpt.-Cs. lies at the bottom of the origin of the concept of time (Freud, 1925/1962, p. 231).

The sense of time arises out of the relationship of percept to percept and out of the perceiving individual's appraisal of an interval between these percepts—that is, out the relationship of the individual to its environment and the reflexive relationship of the individual to its own internal processes. A sense of time in this formulation seems bound to at least a rudimentary sense of self.

Freud conjectured that our understanding of time as inherent in the fabric of the universe is but a projection of the ongoing experience of these discontinuous “quanta”. Bonaparte (1940) asserts that in this, Freud was in basic agreement with Kant, who found time to be, in philosophical terms, a formal condition of human perception having only empirical reality. Unlike Freud, however, Bonaparte concludes that in its origin time is not a percept or concept issuing from the functioning of psychophysiological processes intrinsic to the human as organism. Rather, since developmentally the sense of time and the discernment of reality are co-emergent, she infers that time is a property of external reality which imposes its form upon us.

Neuropsychiatry explores the brain and nervous system as the biological bridge between external time and internal time, referred to by Wallis (1967) as an “anatomy of temporal function” (p. 797). While acknowledging that the corporeal seat of mind lies in the spatial, physical structures of the brain and nervous system, Wallis declares that “our mind only exists in time; it exerts its action in an endogenous time of its own; a functional, operatory time, characteristic and autonomous for each . . . individual man” (p. 785). His model of interior time advances Freud's overly simplified, mechanical environmental sampling to one having as its base the microscopic time of the nervous system, fine-tuned to the spin of electrons, of which memory is one of the more grossly defined functions.

. . .in the electric sense of the term there is complete connection between the reception of information, transmission of the communication through afferent nerves, autoconstitution of codes, symbolised in words or images, and

conservation of documents to enable simultaneous judgment in parallel comparison—allowing the discrimination of intelligence, the selectivity of choice, the planning of will, and initiative of action (p. 791).

In this lawful jungle of electrochemical communications, a sense of *timing* is essential to the integration of the ego and the interrelationship of the ego and its environment. Wallis arrives at the not unexpected conclusion that a mind disordered in its temporal functioning will be characterised by the disarray of its other functions: thought, language, memory, will, and the ability to initiate effective actions.

The inevitability of developmental changes in an individual's sense of time can be inferred from these perspectives, conditioned by the quantity and quality of synchronised channels for the transmission of symbolic information. Even if time exists objectively outside of us, we only know it through our perception of it, through our internal processing of its measures. Structural and developmental considerations are thus interwoven in the assessment of the subjective experience of time. Schiffer (1978) asserts that any psychoanalytic definition of time as subjectively experienced must include "oscillations of self regard first experienced affectively, persisting throughout life, and accruing from both the earliest introjections and the earliest projections surrounding the trauma of first loss" (p. 10-11). The subjective sense of time thus comprises childhood affective schematisations and what Schiffer calls the "pacemakers" of mature psychic organisation inclusive of conscience, or superego.¹

Time and the Structure of the Psyche

One of the most prolific psychoanalytic writers on time, Jacob Arlow, concludes, "Psychic structures are essentially temporal changes" (1986, p. 526). Very roughly, the temporal orientation of each psychic structure in psychoanalytic theory can be characterised as follows: the id is a repository for the psychic past, but its temporal structure is generally described as "timeless;" the ego's orientation is toward the present; and the superego attempts to form the ego toward its future (Loewald,

¹ The primary yoking, developmentally, of an understanding of the sense of time and affect is further exhibited in the acquisition of verb tenses in language skills. Berman (cited in Harner, 1982) observes that children's "early use of verbs is in the expression of personal needs and feelings" (p. 165).

1962). Implicating all psychic structures in the constitution of the subjective sense of time, Arlow cites the following as intrinsically conditioning an individual's experience of time: unconscious phantasy, perception, memory, the individual's sense of self, belief about the self's efficacy in the world, and the self's attitude toward death. Bound to affective states, the ego's temporal experience can be skewed by repressed affect, or dictated by the affective colouration of its superego's directives.

Loewald (1962) offers the simple assertion that psychic structures are temporal in nature because they develop in time. He stresses that the time characteristic of these psychic structures borrows from, but *is not*, the asymmetrical linear sequencing of objective external reality. While those parts governed by secondary process have learned to adapt to the exigencies of external time, those parts ruled by primary process connive to marry wish to fulfilment without delay. Loewald's psychic time is an on-going "presencing" of the active interpenetration of the linearly conceived past, present and future.

The remarkable fact is that in mental life the past, that is psychic past, is not in the (objective) past but is active now as past, and that the psychic present acts on the psychic past (Loewald, 1962, p. 265).

A feedback loop of mutual stimulation occurs between present experience and unconscious wishes and experiences of the past which seek gratification through repetition or resolution in the present—in often fractious consort with the superego's conscientious designs on the self's tomorrow. An individual's subjective sense of time can thus be seen as a complex function of the interplay of ego, id and superego. That each structure has a distinct temporal constitution means that the interweaving of their reciprocal influence is in part a braiding of present, past and future, each considered as active modes of psychic life and subject to the "impossible" warpages so easily engendered by the timeless unconscious.

The Unconscious and Time

When investigating the temporal realities of the psyche, Freud was consistent in aligning his theory of the internal experience of time with his model of a psyche based

on conflict. While constructing the theory and practice of psychoanalysis around a strong historical, and seemingly time-bound core, Freud also posited timelessness as intrinsic to psychic functioning: he theorised that the unconscious, the most primitive stratum of mental life out of which consciousness develops, does not have a temporal structure but is timeless.

The processes of the system Ucs. [unconscious] are timeless ; i.e. they are not ordered temporally, are not altered by the passage of time; they have no reference to time at all (Freud, 1915/1957, p. 187).

The pleasure principle, which regulates the functioning of the unconscious, seeks to disregard the meaning inherent in the conscious experience of linear time with the inevitable *cul-de-sac* it offers to its travellers. The pleasure principle motivates us to fall into reverie by day, by night into dream and tempts us into the intoxications of love, alcohol and drugs to distract us from the unpleasurable experience of contemplating the limitations of our existence. If our sense of time originates in the experience of delay between instinctual desires and their satisfaction, primary process with its dexterity in phantasied wish-fulfilment is a capable agent in producing satisfying distortions of our experience of the temporal flow (Rycroft, 1968).

Wishful impulses which have never passed beyond the id, but impressions, too, which have been sunk into the id by repression, are virtually immortal; after the passage of decades they behave as though they had just occurred. They can only be recognised as belonging to the past, can only lose their importance and be deprived of their cathexis of energy, when they have been made conscious by the work of analysis. (Freud, 1933, cited in Hartocollis, 1983, p. 6).

While some psychoanalytic writers, following Freud's early formulations, uncritically adopt the term "the timeless unconscious" (Bergler & Róheim, 1946), Bonaparte (1940) expanded the discussion by examining the possible meanings of "timeless" when attributed to unconscious processes or the id. She concludes that to say that the unconscious does not have knowledge of time is a truism because the unconscious, as a primitive assemblage of instincts, "knows nothing of any concept" (p. 438). Nor is it acceptable to conclude that the unconscious is unaffected by the passage of time: Bonaparte (1940) cites Freud's (1926) modification of his initial description of the unconscious as unalterable by time to one acknowledging that the

original impulses of the unconscious and its repressed contents are modified, however *slowly*, over time.

While the unconscious may not be able to “know” time, if and how it perceives time is endlessly debatable because we cannot, by definition, know the contents of the unconscious. Bonaparte explores this dilemma when concluding that the most likely interpretation of Freud’s hypothesis that the unconscious is timeless is that it fails to perceive time, as demonstrated in the characteristic mixing of the far past with current life happenings in our dreams. She also offers the reminder that the dream as it is recalled does not truly reflect unconscious processes because it is but a derivative of them, which has been cloaked in the structures of our perception in order to become conscious. The preconscious remains aware of the passage of time, editing dreams in accordance to the rigidity or flexibility of its temporal and moral protocols. One can then hypothesise that difficulties in dream recall have not only to do with moral censorship, but with the burdensome task the waking ego confronts as, while its temporal processes of consciousness seek their orientation in time and space, it also seeks to remain open to the temporal montage of the dream--*at the same time*.

Others have theorised that the unconscious does perceive some dimensions of time. Dooley (1941) observes that the delay preceding gratification of the desires of the id must be accompanied by some rudimentary perception of time, if only that arising as a result of the repatterning of recurrent psychophysical states of tension and gratification. Its “less exact time” (p. 22), she adds, is accompanied by the reassuring rhythms of pulse and respiration. Cohn (1957) concludes, “No other time orientation but body time prevails in the unconscious” (p. 171). Accordingly, he calls unconsciously conceived time, “time sensations,” which are imprecise when compared with measured time which secures the ego’s rational hegemony.

However, we have learned through the study of the phenomena of repression that the state of ego awareness is only deceptively clear—the notion of clarity being the ego’s own creation—and should objectively rather be regarded as vague and dim and more in the nature of an illusion,. . . a composite more or less, but never entirely, rational. (p. 168)

The ego emerges from the prioritisation of these competing urgencies and patternings

of time sensations according to the often conflicting criteria of pleasure and environmental contingencies. Bergler and Róheim (1946) suggest that the unconscious aspect of the ego is that part of the unconscious that dynamically retains a sense of chronology, maintaining for the unconscious as a whole a degree of contact with the passage of external time. Mintz (cited in Waugaman, 1992) concurs, citing that the interaction between the unconscious ego's sense of time and the "timelessness of the repressed drive impulses" (p. 40) is responsible for anniversary reactions.

Hartocollis (1983) describes the unconscious as undergoing its own developmental process, beginning as a timeless entity but gradually accumulating a sense of time resulting from (and here he reverts to a spatial metaphor) "successive layers of dissociated and repressed object relations [which] establish a history" (p. 43). These become defensively distorted, however, producing what might be called "id"-iosyncratic enmeshments and reconstructions of the original historical layering, which Hartocollis again calls timeless: "a regression to the level of its original absolute timelessness" (p. 43).

The idea that the individual unconscious undergoes development receives its phylogenetic counterpart in the theoretical model of the physicist J. T. Fraser, who has integrated psychoanalytic interpretations of psychic structure and time experience with a hierarchical theory of time based on the theoretical model of biologist Jakob von Uexküll.² Fraser (1967) observes that the discussion regarding the relation of time and the unconscious tends to diverge between conceptions of the unconscious as timeless or unchanging, or alternatively as "a primitive operational level of the mind that is time-

² Fraser (1981, 1988, 1990) developed his theory from the hypothesis of the early twentieth century scientist, Jakob von Uexküll, who "drew attention to the epistemic significance of the fact that an animal's receptors and effectors determine its world of possible stimuli and actions. He called such a species-specific world "the *Umwelt* of the species" (1981, p. 4). Fraser then documents the importation of the term *Umwelt* into psychological theory, citing author English & English define it as "the circumscribed portion of the environment that is meaningful and effective for a given species and that changes its significance in accordance with the mood operative at a given moment" (in Fraser, 1981, p. 4). Fraser's contribution is his development of the concept of nested *umwelts*, each of which manifests a distinct temporal reality, which he then relates to the psychoanalytic model of psychic function and dysfunction and the therapeutic goals of psychoanalysis.

ignorant” (p. 828). In the latter theory, chronological organisation may appear by default in the unconscious contents, but the unconscious will not recognise it as an ordering principle unless strong affective cathexis is present, as may appear in anniversary reactions, for instance. Fraser (1981, 1988, 1990) attempts to encompass the continuum of human temporal experience from timelessness to linear temporality in his model of the human psyche as a “noetic umwelt” (1981, p. 4), a collaboration of diverse universes of perception. This nested hierarchy of temporal realities recapitulates the evolution of consciousness from its biological foundation and comprises temporal formulations including the social and individual human capacity for comprehension of the past, present and future through symbol formation (the *sociotemporal* and *nootemporal* umwelts); to the organic present of the *biotemporal* umwelt; to the “nowless and directionless” time of macroscopical world of massive bodies (the *eotemporal* umwelt); to the “nowless, directionless and discontinuous” time of elementary particles in the *prototemporal* umwelt; to the paradoxical “nonexistence” of time in the *atemporal* umwelt of speed-of-light particles where “everything happens at once” (1988, pp. 484-487).

We live simultaneously in all the temporal umwelts of nature. . . .I wish to postulate that the speed-of-time experience is a mental time measurement that comprises unconscious comparisons between archaic and more recent modes of time perception. . . .

I assume that the unconscious comparison between the older and the newer reality assessments of the mind are weighted from instant to instant by the needs, desires and fantasies that mediate the comparison. (Fraser, 1988, p. 491)

Thus Fraser redefines the apparent timelessness of unconscious processes as resulting from a comparative process: as a *perceived* deficiency in the temporal organisation characteristic of the system consciousness and, giving his formulation its Freudian dynamic, that discrepancies in conscious and unconscious needs, desires and fantasies mediate that comparison. He suggests that the umwelt of the id is closest to the umwelt of the soma, the biotemporal umwelt, a “creature present” which shares with the pleasure principle the demand for immediate satisfaction of its desires (Fraser, 1981). In psychotic states, however, the temporal “organisation” is more characteristic of that

of the prototemporal umwelt with its properties of discontinuity and disorderability. "Nothing is ever definitely here or there; no event is definitely now or then" (Fraser, 1988, p. 486). Calling Freud's assertion that the processes of the unconscious are timeless "a form of twentieth-century Platonism," Fraser's theories suggest that the contents of the unconscious itself can be subject to the organisation of the various "archaic" umwelts. Describing the atemporal umwelt as that level of the hierarchy in which everything happens at once because the coordinates of the speed-of light particles are "imagined as travelling with them," he somewhat poignantly likens this singular reality to the "ultimate fugue of senility" (p. 487).

Fraser concludes that each temporal umwelt contains its own level-specific tensions, and because it is nested in a hierarchy of umwelts, is in conflict with temporal perspectives external to its own. He terms these conflicts as optimally *creative*, and not solvable in the sense of an individual reaching a *tranquil* integration of temporal experiences. Each more complex level of relations was created by, and continues to be sustained by, the internal conflict that is its lawful signature. Elimination of conflict results in "collapsing the structures and functions of the level in question into the level beneath it" (1988, p. 483). However, in an earlier rendering of his theory (1981), he does use the term "conflict resolution," which he borrows from ego psychology. But his usage clarifies that the "resolution" involved is the ability to *accept* conflict, not to eradicate it: to arrive at an understanding of the creative connectivities of the disparate temporal realities afforded by the nested umwelts, our "universes" of experience.

Because time operates as an ordering principle, the general consensus on the *relative* timelessness of the unconscious suggests that its internal relationships are established by means of categories other than that of linear time. Masler (1973) hypothesises that the sense of timelessness in the unconscious is generated by the organising principle of qualitative categorisation. Because a specific quality and the affects which bind and charge it are on-going, a sense of timelessness ensues. Thus for the unconscious, the foundations of continuities are not chronologies, persons or objects, but qualities shared by the phenomena it registers and generates. The

consolidation of the ego and the apprehension³ of time are coeval, occurring with the discrimination of difference between self and object, despite qualities held in common. Object constancy involves recognition that the object (and the self) can change in certain ways from time to time, or over time—can even periodically disappear—and still endure in time as the same object (and self). Similarly, Kafka (1964; 1977) discusses how the excessive application of the organising principle of “subjective equivalence,” a term he borrows from Heinrich Klüver, is an operative factor in the subjective collapse of both time and identity. Employed by the unconscious and apparent in psychotic states, subjective equivalence finds characteristics to be more fundamental—i.e., to offer greater stability—than the objects of experience. According to this principle, events in time are not arranged according to their chronology but are classified and even assimilated *into* one another by virtue of a characteristic held in common.

Kafka’s subjective equivalence is similar to Segal’s formulation of symbolic equation, which she differentiates from symbolic representation (Segal cited in Wolfe, 1981). In the former, the subject, which is developmentally still a “body ego,” and its objects are experienced as indistinguishable (Freud’s primary identification), while in the latter, the ego identifies with its objects but also recognises their separate identity (Freud’s secondary identification). The model of “neurospace” put forward by the electronic researcher, Harry Blum, provides a functional, electromagnetic basis for differentiating symbolic equivalence from symbolic representation. Wallis (1968) utilises Blum’s formulation in his exploration of the role of the mechanisms of vision in the construction of imagination and the human sense of time. He describes the “space” of electromagnetic wave propagation as being of two kinds: the “space of transformation” which is a function of time, a temporal encoding which quantises spatial memory; and the “space of association,” a communication matrix operative through the establishment of amplificatory relationships. Using this model, one can speculate that if the temporal codes of transformational processes are skewed or lost, only associational scannings of images stripped of their “real time” histories are likely

³ Note the duality of meanings inherent in the deliberate choice of this word. The arising ego “comes to know” time, but also “comes to anxiety” within this knowledge as it experiences not only the constructive organisation, but also the annihilating edge of its “terminal” contract with the ego.

to be left—which is what Wallis proposes occurs in dreaming. Symbolic representation would seem to utilise both the space of transformation and the space of association in that associational verities yield a sense of time transcendence, while temporal codings nonetheless remain operant and the subject ego feels the enrichment such amplification lends to his or her historical presence.

Reformulating an understanding of primary process within the values of ego psychology, Noy (1969) refers to primary process, the method distinguishing unconscious functioning, as “transcending” the limits of time (p. 176), and argues that primary process optimally undergoes a maturational process in tandem with the development of secondary process. While the organisation of experience according to characteristic qualities that ignore chronology can discombobulate the temporal arrow of autobiography, this need not be a destructive activity; rather, Noy finds primary process to be integral in the construction of the sense of the sameness and continuity of the self through time. “Instead of a careful distinction between the various elements of objects, experiences and memories, there is a need to find the similarities between past and present in order to integrate them into wider groups of experience and memory” (p. 176). Condensation, displacement and symbolisation, functions characterising primary process that are traditionally termed defence mechanisms, are revalued for their constructive potential as vital operations enabling the assimilation of new experiences into the evolving yet self-same self.

The psychoanalytic debate regarding the *value* of the sense of timelessness engagement in unconscious processes affords extends to the timelessness experienced by the meditator and the mystic. The ecstasies of the mystic are skeptically viewed by most classical psychoanalysts as a mistaking of “a subjective state of intoxication for the recognition of an objective reality” (Bonaparte, 1940, p. 437). While Freud regarded such experiences of oceanic timelessness as regressive, defensively recreating the infant’s sense of blissful satiety in mother’s arms for the adult, Arlow (1989) prefers to interpret them less reductively as a conscious derivative of an on-going, unconscious wish for the resolution of conflict and assured existence, found only in changeless, endless duration.

Within his nested umwelts, Fraser (1981) also denies “timeless” or “oceanic” experiences, or “sensations of eternity,” a transtemporal ascription. Also citing Freud, who reasoned that these feelings involved psychic regression to the point at which the boundaries of self are ill-defined, Fraser categorises such experiences as “primitive,” issuing from the “lower” (and evolutionary prior) eotemporal umwelt in which the psychic experience of time is one of the abiding present (p. 7). Seeking to maintain a close parallel between his evolutionary model and psychoanalytic constructs, Fraser does not allow for any umwelt superseding that of secondary consciousness, or the nootemporal umwelt⁴. In his structural-dynamic theory of time, each umwelt subsumes those levels beneath it, allowing for regressive recapitulations of the more primitive organisations. Though Fraser contends that the nootemporal umwelt, operating through “symbolic transformations only,” is capable of “the highest type of connectivity among events” (p. 6), he does not *progressively* give consideration to an experience of timelessness of a higher order than that the lower umwelts afford—though noetic interpretations may make it *seem* so.

Feelings of timelessness have often been thought of as peeps into a world that is superior to and is more advanced than ours. It seems to me that they are peeps into the opposite direction. They amount to the revisiting of childhood realities, or even those of our ancestors, where long-term futures and pasts and the burden of choice were not yet known. (1987, p. 302)

Within these arguable interpretations, Fraser nonetheless writes eloquently of the benefits of developing a conscious relationship to the symbolic transformations available in the experience of “lower” umwelts, and suggests artists are valuable to us for their cultivation of this skill, and for escorting the community in a sort of “time travel” through the display (1990), publication or performance of their works. However, labelling the “lower” umwelts as “primitive,” subtly undermines the full

⁴ Fraser’s later construct of sociotemporality does not differ fundamentally from nootemporality, but serves as the umwelt of social time. While nootemporality is “the brain’s way of minding the body [biotemporality]” (1987, p. 146), sociotemporality is society’s way of coordinating its individuals.

weight of their *coeval* presence in us⁵ and puts a backward spin on the *present* and even *future* function experiences of timelessness can paradoxically serve.

Loewald (1978) attempts to open psychoanalytic interpretation to a non-reductive understanding of the timelessness religious and aesthetic experiences may hold. Conceding that these experiences may be useful and necessary defences, he adds, "But it is not the whole truth" (p. 69).

I believe that "intimations of eternity" bring us in touch with levels of our being, forms of experiencing and of reality that themselves may be deeply disturbing, anxiety provoking to the common-sense rationality of everyday life. They go against our penchant for objectifying and distancing our experience and our world in order to make and keep it manageable and tolerable. (p. 69)

If we are willing to admit that instinctual life and religious life both betoken forms of experience that underlie and go beyond conscious and personalised forms of mentation—beyond those forms of mental life, of ordering our world, on which we stake so much—then we may be at a point where psychoanalysis can begin to contribute in its own way to the understanding of religious experience, instead of ignoring or rejecting its genuine validity or treating it as a mark of human immaturity. (p. 73).

Loewald's observation that secondary as well as primary mentation is involved in these

⁵ I am indebted for this idea to Johannes Fabian, whose critical analysis of the employment of temporal constructs in anthropological writing (in Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object (1983), and Time and the Work of Anthropology (1991)) focusses on anthropology's use of allochronic discourse, the placement of the Other in a Time different from our own. He suggests temporal distancing has been used defensively to deny the Other coevalness with Western culture because incorporation of the other as full partner in our present would threaten our self-defined "forward" progress. The movement in anthropological writing toward the presentation of material as intersubjective discourse seeks to restore the personhood of the Other.

Overlaying Fabian's critical construct on psychoanalysis is particularly appropriate in that Freud was influenced by his readings in anthropology while formulating his psychoanalytic theory (Wallace, 1983). While Freud certainly acknowledged the power of the unconscious in the *present* life of his patients, his formulation of the unconscious is one dominated by the conditioning of infant and early childhood experience, so that the unconscious appears, indeed, to be an Other not fully coeval with the individual in the present, but with the primacy of its instinctual drives always threatening to wrench the individual back into expression of the "primitive" instinctual drives of its infantile past. It is interesting to consider how reformulation of the unconscious as equal, coeval partner in our present, of instinctual drives as not infantile, but as forces empowering primary process (considered here as a sort of psychobiological mentation as necessary to our ongoing development as secondary process), would change the feeling-tone of our conscious involvement with the unconscious. The unconscious would then be experienced less as something which impedes our progress forward than as a force indispensable to our progress forward. Analytical psychology would appear to be closer to such a formulation with its emphasis on the *creative* unconscious, though here again, at times the archaic qualities are stressed to the detriment of full *presence*.

experiences gives us an understanding as to why “they are structured or centred differently” (p. 68). He gives religious erotic poetry by way of example in which “responsive interplay” occurs between the ego and the id: “. . .the two levels of experience symbolise each other, give *increased* meaning to one another” (p. 76, italics this author’s).⁶ Neither reality subsumes the other, but together they create a third. The mechanism of primary process in the “timeless” unconscious, experienced as *coeval* with consciousness, provides us with the opportunity to explore the reality and meanings of the ahistorical, timeless dimension of human life.

The Ego and Time

As a psychoanalytic construct, the ego has endured a number of theoretical reformulations (Gifford, 1960; Gabbard, 1990). Freud’s earliest conception of the ego was as a precipitate resulting from the adaptation of instinctual drives to the exigencies of the external environment for the survival of the organism. The ego’s division into conscious and unconscious aspects reflected its dual functions: consciously integrating and interpreting the perceptual data of experience to maintain a unified identity and cultivate syntony between this identity and its world; and unconsciously counteracting unconscious forces by means of various defence mechanisms that it perceived as undermining its conscious agenda. In 1932 Glover hypothesised the existence of multiple “ego nuclei” in the child which coalesce into one, unified ego by the end of the second year. Fenichel suggested that a “pre-ego,” a sort of undifferentiated matrix of functioning interpenetrating the organism as a whole, exists in the newborn infant which develops and differentiates into the ego proper. While initially the defensive functioning of the ego received the greater focus, in his later formulations Freud emphasised more of the inherently constructive aspects of the

⁶ Thus, Fraser’s and Loewald’s comparisons of temporal states resulting in experiences of timelessness carry different valuations and meanings to the reader: c.f. Fraser (1987):

When a person describes a feeling as one of “timelessness,” he is making a comparison . . . between the readings of two of his inner timekeepers. He says that compared with his waking, conscious experience of passing time, the feeling he now has *misses* something: perhaps continuity, perhaps direction, perhaps broad enough horizons. (p. 296, italics this author’s)

ego as a developmental tendency inherent in the biological organism cohering around principles of organisation, regulation and adaptation to the environment. The ego psychologists favoured the conscious aspect of ego functioning; Hartmann (cited in Gabbard, 1990) posited a “‘conflict-free sphere of the ego’ that develops independently of id forces and conflicts” (p. 24).

Hartmann defines the ego as “a substructure of personality defined by its functions,” which include the organisation and control of motility, perception, and thought. The ego modulates the intensity of both inner impulses and external stimuli, delays motor discharge according to the reality principle, and postpones immediate gratification for a future satisfaction more appropriate to the external environment. There is a close relationship between reality testing and the perception of time. . . . (Gifford, 1990. p. 8)

Consequently, each ego’s perception of and ability to integrate time’s internal and external aspects will give rise to differing senses of reality. Arlow (in Kafka, 1972) views the ego’s ability to effect a synthesis of the psychically active past, present and future as an indicator of both the the stability and flexibility of ego functioning.

Classically, the relationship of the ego and time is construed as being one of conflict. While adaptation to the exigencies of external time is a necessary component of healthy ego functioning and makes possible its adventure of effective action and fulfilment in the world, the ego eventually comes to know that it will be survived by this external time: time as present accomplice is no guarantor of ego continuance. Bonaparte (1940) speaks of the human experience of time as terminal to the localisation we achieve in space. “Space does not, by the mere fact of its existence, destroy us as time does. . . . We destroy time from the moment we begin to use it. . . . For in living our time we die of it” (pp. 430-431). Reflecting the conflicts intrinsic to the classical psychoanalytic model of the psyche, Bonaparte portrays time and ego as engaged in voracious, mutually destructive combat.

We arrive at knowledge of the certainty of our own death from our observations of individuals, and among them loved ones, who die in the external world. Cohn (1957) draws attention to the great amount of energy the ego invests in repressing perceptions and interpretations of time that portend its death. He observes that the attempt to neutralise the experience of time through scientific measurement may be its

chief accomplishment in this regard. Numerically calibrated, time can be related to as impersonal, homogenous units, spaces in a date book to be filled with activities yielding reassuring “sensations of time that equal life” (p. 180).

But the construct of time can also be seen as a defence against intolerable aspects of internal experience. Orgel (1965) notes that the hypercathexis of time is often a defence against merging with the id. In another description of time as a defence against the onslaughts of the unconscious and the superego, Dooley (1941) states that time provides a “continuous record of our contact with reality” (p. 20), preventing the ego’s submergence in unconscious processes by securing an outer world of objects which appear to relate in an orderly way to the ego. “This relationship to objects is maintained by a continuity we call Time” (p. 22). Their *scheduled* appearance and disappearance reassures. Early responses to the experience of time constellated around the disappearance and reappearance of mother with her supply of milk eventuate in “an autonomous physiological and emotional rhythmicity, which is a foundation stone for the subjective preconscious sense of time as well as for the differentiation of self and object” (Orgel, p. 107). Orgel’s case examples illustrate the way in which reality becomes the menu, measured time apportioning its food-events in bite-sized pieces for the ego to ingest. Crises in “eating” food or reality need to be examined for what they indicate about the individual’s relationship to time, as mediated by parental feedings of food--or reality--to the child. Careful watchfulness of time and adherence to its limits also wards off attack by the superego. The ego feels more confident of achieving the future ideals this organisational authority promotes.

But the ego’s organisational tasks of differentiation and integration can also be construed as creative work. Loewald (1962) consistently stresses that time as lived, internal experience is an *active* dimension. The ego’s orchestration of this dynamic dimension consists in creating and recreating *presence*. “It is useful to think of the ego’s function of presentation and representation, of creating and recreating presence, as the temporal aspect of its synthetic or organising function” (p. 264). Wallis (1968) offers an organic ground in which to root this perspective when in his functional description of the inevitability of the temporal workings of the brain as active

“presentification.”

From the functional point of view, the past, as it is defined in ordinary language, is only a heresy. . . . The future, as it is described in ordinary language, also constitutes only fiction for the functional brain. (p. 200)

The brain’s present temporal function is an perpetual work of actualisation in which “awareness finds its act and the self its existence” (p. 201).

Rank’s (1978) reworking of Freudian theory has at its organisational core the function of conscious, creative willing in the present. He criticises the emphasis psychoanalysis places on the historical, infantile, and usually Oedipally construed past as too often simply facilitating the denial and displacement of present feeling onto the past; its ideological interpretations promote “the pedagogic subjection of will” (p. 29). Oedipal formulations reinforce the individual’s sense of self as creature, whereas the goal of therapy for Rank is the ability of the individual to affirm himself as creator not of a fated but of a self determined life: “the bringing to pass and granting of experience” (p. 105). In this regard, the therapist must “serve the creative will of the patient as material” (p. 89). Termination of therapy thus becomes the “constructive experience of parting” in which the individual is ready to “take over and affirm the creative role of the self and its fate-creating will” (p. 87). The future is not passively received, but willed, accepted and constructively utilised.

These latter formulations taken together provide an arena of determined *and* creative choice available to the ego in its relationship to time. The ego’s development in time is subject to many shaping factors, not least of which are its own abilities of discernment and willing.

The Superego and Time

The superego is the last psychic structure theorised to appear in the individual; as such it seems appropriate that, temporally speaking, it represents the ego’s future. Writing on the superego and time, Loewald (1962) states, “The establishment of the superego completes the constitution of an inner world whose dimensions may be said to be the temporal modes past, present, and future” (p.268). Cautioning against any

static conception of this psychic future, Loewald stresses that the psychic past, present and future are to be considered as *activities*, or interactional patternings. Consequently he describes the superego as a system of introjections not of objects, but of interactions, between id-ego and the external world.

The primary introjected interactions comprising the superego are those the child experiences with his or her parents and, secondarily, other authority figures. Just as many of the interactions of parents and other authority figures with the child are as with a lively entity whose energies are in need of controls and further organisation, so the superego becomes the internal representation of “the past as seen from a future, the id as *to be organised*”, whereas the ego proper represents the id as organised at present” (p. 267). Citing Freud’s reference to the id as an inherited, “organic past”, the ego organisation can be said to personalise these energies, or make them present, and the superego to press for the acculturation of these according to family, religious and social mores: that is, to align the child with the social systems into which he or she progressively enters.

. . .the superego functions from the viewpoint of a future ego. . . The superego watches, commands, threatens, punishes, forewarns, admonishes, and rewards the ego, it loves and hates the ego. . . . Conscience speaks to us from the viewpoint of an inner future. . . Only insofar as we are in advance of ourselves, conceive of ourselves as potentially more, stronger, better, or as less, weaker, worse than we are at present, can we be said to have a superego. (Loewald, 1962, p. 265)

Settlage (1972) proposes that the space between infant and mother, which Winnicott termed “transitional space,” is that initial protected area in which the superego evolves as the relationships of id, ego and superego as patterned interactions are practised. Internalisation cannot be achieved without re-externalisation in this play space in which “that which has been a part of the self and that which may become a part of the self” (p. 80)—or, temporally, the child’s past and his or her possible future—can be related in an as-if present. Here the child is free to construct “stronger, better” possibilities, and “weaker, worse” ones, externalise the interactions of the evolving superego with these possibilities in the field of play, and again internalise the outcomes of this most serious work of “make believe.”

The polarity of creative and destructive energies comprising the superego, which facilitate and/or obstruct the self's unfoldment into future time, receives its clearest if most conflictual formulation in Kleinian theory. Klein (1952/1975b) places the origin of the superego in the experiences and resultant phantasies of the infant at its mother's breast. The infant taking in milk from the object breast introjects the *qualities* of this experience at the same time. These qualities of experience are intermixed with its libidinal and aggressive impulses which manifest the life and death instincts operating in the individual in "polarity and fusion" from birth onwards (Klein, 1958/1975b. p. 236).

The introjection of the breast is the beginning of super-ego formation which extends over years. We have grounds for assuming that from the first feeding experience onwards the infant introjects the breast in its various aspects. The core of the superego is thus the mother's breast, both good and bad. (Klein, 1952/1975b, p. 49-50)

When in service to the life instinct, the mechanism of projection enables the infant to rid itself of an overload of destructive impulses that threaten the self and its loved objects. The infant therefore projects those impulses of wishing to devour the mother's breast onto the breast, which is then feared as the devourer, stimulating annihilation anxiety in the infant. "According to this view, the fear of death enters from the beginning into the fear of the super-ego and is not, as Freud remarked, a 'final transformation' of the fear of the super-ego" (Klein, 1948/1975b, p. 30).

The relationship of infant to breast—characterised by rhythms, fulfilments and frustrations—is the primary relationship of the infant *in* time that conditions its relationship *with* time. Time is a good substance: the more of time we "take in," the larger the field we are provided in which growth and development can occur. But equally present is the fear that the more time we "take in" the less there is for us to consume. Time is a bad substance, a betrayer: without it we cannot live, but devouring it, we are devoured. "Time (Chronos) devours the children who wish to devour him. The control of time. . . [is] equivalent to mastery of the wish to devour, and the magical protection against the fear of being devoured by time--the mother who feeds on her children" (Orgel, 1965, p. 118).

Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that Klein posits life *and* death instincts to be predominantly fused in the superego, for without the allied presence of the life instinct the ego would be too threatened to enter into relationship with the flux of superego directives.

The ego, supported by the internalised good object and strengthened by the identification with it, projects a portion of the death instinct into that part of itself which it has split off—a part which thus comes to be in opposition to the rest of the ego and forms the basis of the super-ego. Accompanying this deflection of a portion of the death instinct is a deflection of that portion of the life instinct which is fused with it. Along with these deflections, parts of the good and bad objects are split off from the ego into the super-ego. The super-ego thus acquires both protective and threatening qualities. (Klein, 1958/1975b, p. 240)

Klein goes on to refer to the superego as having an “organised part,” which is acceptable to the ego, and an “unconscious part,” the latter harbouring totally split-off persecutory and idealised figures (p. 241-242). Similarly, we come to have a conscious, organised part of our temporal existence and a more unconscious complex of often persecutory relations.

The superego formulations for the future of the ego can thus be seen to arise out of an interaction of times, and timelessness. Its content is organised on a polar, instinctual matrix of creative and destructive energies existing at birth which is overlaid with psychophysical and psychosocial interactions with the individual’s parents in infancy and childhood. It can be hypothesised that insofar as the superego’s orientation is toward the future, its unconscious parts will be projected onto that future, arousing feelings of paranoia with phantasies of persecutory events always about to occur. Klein (1946/1975b) came to acknowledge that defensive splitting may occur in time rather than in space.⁷ In its extreme, breaks in the continuity of experience may result, further threatening the ego.

In the paranoid-schizoid position, the future will be anticipated with anxiety because while the good breast may be present in it, it will always be endangered by the bad breast and so elaborate efforts will need to be made to gain foreknowledge of the bad breast’s subterfuge. Once the depressive position is achieved and the good and bad

⁷ Klein (1946/1975b, p. 6n) mentions that the possibility of splitting occurring in time was brought to her attention in a discussion of her paper, “Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms”, with Dr. W. C. M. Scott.

breasts are perceived to be one object, while the future no longer holds the intolerable anxiety which was provoked by the bad breast that had no redeeming characteristics to rein in “its” voracious appetite, neither is the future felt to hold the all-good object with which the infant once felt itself to be fused in blissful satiety; consequently, the child may long for its past in which resides the ego ideal of infancy: blissful merging with the now forever lost, omnipotent perfection of its parents.

Klein (1929/1975a) dates the termination of superego development at latency when the internalisation of parental figures more clearly mirrors who they indeed, are, enabling the repression of oedipal desires and acceptance of their admonitions and prohibitions. Settlage (1972) sees the superego as undergoing periodic modifications as the family is increasingly influenced by the larger culture as the shaping force distributing rewards and penalties. This view allows for a far more creative evolution of the individual in relation to an ever-changing environment in time. The superego is therefore likely to be an increasingly complex formulation, a matrix of judgments that may, like any supreme court, have dissenting votes. Only a creative relationship with the polyphony of praise and punishment of the superego’s moral ministry will enable the ego to distil from its edicts an organisation of its inner future which can be made livably and fulfillingly *present*.

The Meanings of Time: A Psychoanalytic Developmental Perspective

Freud observed that our perception of the discontinuous quanta of time becomes transformed into a sense of the continuity of time’s passage through the inner perception of our own life processes as “passing”; that is, through the moment-to-moment flux of its experience, the nascent “I” feels a paradoxical sense of constancy with the gradual consolidation of ego-consciousness. Development, intrinsic to each human being as a psychophysical organism, has everything to do with time for it implies change, a modification of the state of an entity during which its identity is maintained (Arlow, 1986; Rycroft, 1968). Hartocollis (1983) succinctly

identifies that the experience of linear time as being dependable is crucial in fostering a sense of interrelatedness between the disparate ways we feel ourselves to be as we grow and respond to our environment.

Time in its experiential sense is the unifying element of consciousness, a process that ascribes unity to the perception of the self in a world of constant change. Time provides a sense of identity to the experience of discontinuous emotional states and to the perception of discontinuity in change. . . . The unifying property of time makes what was before, what is now, and what will be next appear related in a causal, personal way (p. 3).

The psychoanalytic hermeneutic of time can thus be seen to arise out of the personal experience of relationships: the relationship of percept to percept, the earliest of which occur within the context of the mother-infant dyad, cradle to the slow coalescence of self-awareness. The ego of an individual is hypothesised as having its rudimentary structure formed in infancy and childhood; again, the telos of development within the psychoanalytic model finds its template in the past.

Infancy and Early Childhood

While the meaning of time to an individual changes during the course of his or her life, the inner relations of id, ego and superego as established in childhood before clock and calendar are perceived to have any relevance to lived time, strongly condition the subjective experience of time.

How a child will experience a given time period will depend therefore not on the actual duration, measured objectively by the adult, by the calendar and by the clock, but on the subjective inner relations of either id or ego dominance over his functioning. It is these latter factors which will decide whether the intervals set for feeding, the absence of the mother, the duration of nursery attendance, of hospitalisation, etc., will seem to the child short or long, tolerable or intolerable, and as a result will prove harmless or harmful in their consequences (Anna Freud, 1965; cited in Colarusso, 1979, p. 244).

But the infant's characteristic structural dynamics are moulded in concert with the conditioning factors of biological rhythms, the maturational appearance of proper developmental motility and language skills, and the interpersonal interactions of the parents with their child. "Consequently, not even the biological precursors of time sense are experienced objectively, for they are interpreted by the developing ego as part of the vicissitudes of the powerful affectual interchange between mother and child

which is the basis of their relationship in the child's infancy" (Colarusso, 1979, p. 244). Colarusso sensitively cautions theoreticians against the over-refinement of sophisticated, abstract theories of the origin of time sense from the observation of preverbal infant experience that impute conceptualisations of experience of which the infant is likely to be incapable. Applying his caveat to his own speculations, he permits the conclusion that the infant "does have enough awareness of the external world to register in some way a beginning connection between instinctual frustration and gratification *and the time it takes to move from one state to the other*" (p. 245).

This echoes Piaget's (1954) more cognitively oriented speculations on the nature of the infant's engagement in causal processes in the sensorimotor stage of development. Speaking of the early sequencing of behaviors of nurslings that proceed toward gratification, from opening the mouth before sucking to turning its head toward a sound to determine its source, he writes:

For the observer, not only are the child's acts arranged in time but it is easy to establish that they are made with regard to the sequence of events. But that does not prove that the sequence as such is perceived by the subject, that is, that it gives rise to a consciousness of sequence. Or if this consciousness exists, nothing proves that it is related to the sequence of external events . . . and is not solely related to the development of internal states, objectified and conceived as filling the universe of perception. (p. 365)

Piaget's resolution of this dilemma is to differentiate the causality inherent in *acts* from the noetic category of causality as a *concept*, when it becomes understood as a principle of the external world. For the infant, then, Piaget finds causality is *experienced*, rather than understood, through its being a structural principle, a "sensorimotor schema" (p. 249), inherent in the organism.

The infant's experience of time as fundamentally physiological arises out of the relationship of the infant's body to its caregivers. The "time sensations" of Cohn (1957), related above, encapsulate the hegemony of body time in unconsciously conceived time. While the rhythms of pulse and respiration are the throbbing drones of this experience, many psychoanalytic theorists agree that the primary conditioning of our internal sense of time occurs in the experience of delay between instinctual desires and their satisfaction (Arlow, 1989; Orgel, 1965; Hartocollis, 1974; Meerloo, 1970).

The awareness of time arises when the pleasurable, in other words, “timeless” satiation of the infant, is interrupted by the first “need” through the feeling of hunger. Thus the feeling of hunger writes the first diagram of time. (Sachs, cited in Orgel, 1965, p. 103)

But the duration of hunger is determined by the response of the Other, most frequently the mother, to the agitated movements and cries of the helpless infant. In this way, what is biological increasingly becomes interfused with what is psychological. The feeling states of pleasure and unpleasure, primary to the infant’s developing sense of time, are bound up with the qualities of its relatedness to objects in its environment. The rhythmic activities of feeding and sleep which satisfy instinctual needs of the id become increasingly determined by relationships with the external environment. These external relationships and their growing alignments with clock time are important in the consolidation of the ego (Dooley, 1941; Gifford, 1960).

Arlow (1989) posits that the human infant has no discrete sense of time: its sense of time is wholly intermingled with feeling states. Asserting that “time is a feeling before it is an abstraction” (p. 85), Arlow goes on to elaborate on the linkage between quality of nurturance, the affective response of the infant, and the effect of these on the emerging sense of time. The beginning of the time sense arises from *unpleasure*: from the infant sensing a state of duration made tangible by the physiological experience of the intervals between need and gratification. Perhaps the friction in our relationship with time starts from this first visceral experience of it as an “awareness of enduring unpleasant, distressing sensations of ungratified needs” (Arlow, 1989, p. 86). When, however, a reliable sequence of need distress, signal, and gratification is the infant’s experience, the infant develops a sense of efficacy within the flow of time, and, learning to anticipate the pleasure of gratification, develops a positive relationship to the future. Duration becomes “tinged with pleasure,” the present is serene, and the future promising. When the infant’s needs are frequently frustrated, rage is likely to ensue, obliterating the sense of time and threatening the nascent ego. While satiation yields a trustworthy sense of timelessness to which the developing ego can safely yield, repeated experiences of hunger’s impotent rage devour trust in time as the medium of gratification and devour trust in

mother as purveyor of gratification. In either scenario, mother and time may become melded, either as nurturer or as devourer. "She becomes Mother Time" (Colarusso, 1979, p. 246).

Winnicott (1965) also cites the quality of holding which the mother provides for the anxious infant, who accumulates benign and persecutory fragments of the mother, as crucial to the integrations of its ego in time. "Time is kept going by the mother, and this is one aspect of her auxiliary ego-functioning" (p. 77). Too many failures in holding produce unbearable anxiety reactions in the infant which cut through its sense of "going-on-being," of trustworthy temporal continuance. Experiences of Mother Time as disorder are likely to skew the child's development in time toward the mental organisations we term pathological. The time between cause, or even the thought of initiating causes, and effect becomes patterned with rhythms of apprehension specific to the interpersonal dysfunction of the dyad.

Thus the anthropomorphisation of time has its origin in these familial relationships in which the infant comes to *feel* this thing he or she later will call time through mediating person-events. Since time is first experienced in a dyadic, human relationship, we continue, if only unconsciously, to view time as an agent rather than purely as a neutral concept. Time as creator and destroyer is, psychoanalytically speaking, none other than, respectively, mother when she feeds us promptly and mother when she withholds that which sustains our life. Redfearn (1987) integrates object relations theories with analytical psychology to formulate the process through which "things become persons." Relations to a parent that stimulate overwhelming conflict are split off to become the animating forces of cathected images, objects and mental processes. In such a way, we can extrapolate that anxieties and conflicts arising within the psychosomatic experience of being mothered and fathered in infancy may be reinvested in the personifying of time, with time consequently related to in both psychic and bodily ways that deflect inappropriate affect and acts from being directed toward mother and father. The individual may also behave *in and toward time* in ways intended to repair or affirm the infant experience with parents.

While the earliest experiences in psychoanalytic literature are construed as

occurring between the feeding mother and the infant, later, of course, and not very much later if the child can be fed with a bottle, these positive and negative aspects of time intermingle with the relationship with father as well. Colarusso emphasises that both parents come to carry positive and negative attributes with regard to time. Mother Time as provider in the oral period becomes, traditionally, Mother Time as controller in the anal period. As the parent seeks to toilet train the child, the child comes to realize controlling the timing of his bowel movements provides him with opportunities for manipulating relations with the parent involved (Colarusso, 1987).

Many of these ascriptions of gender will be modified in those contemporary families in which early parenting may be more equally shared, ultimately necessitating semantic and theoretical reformulations.⁸ Expanding on Winnicott's usage of the "environment mother," Bollas (1987) describes the "comprehensive mother" as "less significant and identifiable as an object than as a process" (p. 14). While Bollas does not do so, we might include father in aspects of the "mother process," and later, mother in aspects of the "father process." These terms cannot become collapsible, however, if only because of the very real qualitative differences in bodily holding and nurturance between father and mother as sexual persons. While Colarusso (1987) states that Father Time sexualises time, I would prefer to say that as the child develops and its discernment of difference between mother and father grows, and its discernment of its own likeness to its parent of the same sex grows, the experience of time becomes sexualised. For the boy, Father-as-Time can be seen as gratifier in presenting a potent role model of the future possibilities of man hood and relatedness to the feminine; but, of course, Father-as-Time can also be feared as castrator, destroyer, in his refusal to grant sexual gratification with the loved mother--NOW. The girl, as well, will experience Father-as-Time in positive and negative ways: pleasurable time spent with

⁸ Meerloo's (1948) early article on Father Time tends to rather simplistically (though always interestingly) relegate Mother Time only to eternity, disregarding completely the primary role mothers have always played (and sometimes sternly played) in the initial introduction of the child to the contingencies of Chronos. We see, however, the same ascription in William Blake's world of personified forces, who, as Fraser (1975) points out, regarded "time and space as real beings, a male and a female. Time is a man, space is a woman, and her masculine portion is death" (p. 452n, quoting from The Portable Blake, New York: The Viking Press, 1963, p. 667).

father gratifies a measure of the oedipal phantasy and promotes the necessary separation from mother, giving a sense of distinctness of being. But the girl-child also has to come to terms with the scythe of Father-as-Time: the great “No” of “No, you cannot marry me.”

Latency

During latency, crucial changes occur in the maturing child that enable it to incorporate its environment in increasingly abstract ways. Refinements in the central nervous system allow for more cognitive strategies to develop which facilitate the differentiation of playing, or phantasy, and reality (Piaget, 1952). Colarusso (1987) suggests that these maturational and structural changes, indicating a profoundly different organisational reality, influence the changing subjective experience of time in the latency child. The child begins to be able to read the measures of social time: clocks and calendars. Past, present and future are increasingly differentiated. The evolving ability to engage in the logic of the adult world aids in the transformation of oedipal attachments into identification with the parents. “The ego is modified by this identification and adopts the task of observing the demands of the drives and the outside world—the superego is formed” (Becker, 1974, p. 3). Because the superego is so recently internalised, its dicta tend to be infused with the sadism and masochism of the id. Colarusso (1987) describes the ways in which the superego comes to use time as one of its weapons.

Time is thus experienced as cruel, controlling, and depriving. This attitude is also sensed as coming from without in relation to such realistic demands as school performance, practising sports, etc.—it is both internalised and institutionalised in the organisation of daily life.

This new sense of time as tyrannical and frustrating is vividly demonstrated by latency-age play . . . Unlike the free-flowing idiosyncratic play of the oedipal period, latency play is organised and controlled, usually requiring multiple players and roles, and it is often time-regulated. . . There is order and sequence to football, Monopoly, jacks, jump-rope and soccer. In some games time is limited; it runs out, resulting in loss and frustration or victory and gratification. Thus time becomes the yardstick of performance, the ultimate determinant of success or failure, competence or incompetence. (p. 137)

Piaget (1962) terms these “games with rules. . . : they are the ludic activity of the

socialised being" (p. 142). Play may be called "free time," but it is not free *of* time; time is inevitably enjoined as one of play's "counters." Separately and in relationship to each other, time and the self-in-time become increasingly divisible entities according to these social measures of play, and of roles within play, prefiguring community experience as entered into in adulthood.

The development of the superego facilitates the concept of the self as having a past as it negatively judges and represses oedipal wishes which, being interfused with many memories of the infantile past, create the subjective sense of a temporal distance of the here-and-now self from its early years. "For the first time the here-and-now is associated with an organised quality of deprivation and judgment" (Colarusso, 1987, p. 136). As in the last verse of the circle game, "Farmer in the Dell," which begins with the acknowledgment that the *farmer*, not his son, has taken the wife/mother, unacceptable, infantile temporal parts are shaved off the encompassing present of the ego in early childhood until the "cheese"⁹ is left standing alone.

In an experimental study utilising projective techniques inclusive of selected Rorschach cards and the estimation of time intervals, Fisher and Fisher (1953) found consistent evidence that the perception of time is related to an individual's unconscious conceptions of his or her parents, particularly the parent of the same sex. Their results indicated that having the unconscious concept of the same sex parent (or of both parents) as highly controlling increased the likelihood that the individual would perceive the passage of time in an overvaluing way, subjectively perceiving short term time intervals to be longer than their actual clock measure, supporting their hypothesis.

. . . it was felt that the individual who had been subjected to the influence of a strict, dominating parent, one who had set narrow limits and strict rules, would tend to carry over such parental injunctions into his feelings about time passage. . . . He would, in contrast to the individual with freer and less dominating parents, feel that time was something available only in limited, controlled quantities. (p. 497)

They question whether spatial perceptions might not be influenced in a similar way, a forbidding parent, for instance, transmitting to a child "the feeling that it is not proper to

⁹ "Cheese" as that which is made, and aged, from (mother's) milk; cheese as in "big cheese," the self-important ego.

view things in their full perspective, in their full depth” (p. 504). The parent unsupportive of the child’s aspirations giving rise to a truncated, shrunken view of the world. It is during latency that the child normally arrives at an ability to apply elementary principles of perspective in drawings, subject and object achieving measurable specificity of relationship (Gardner, 1980). Interestingly, Piaget (1969) discovered that it is in this same “concrete operational” period that children are able to conceive of a relationship between spatial distance and temporal duration as determinants of velocity.

Adolescence

Intolerable anger at mother or father during the oedipal period for not permitting the enactment of the desired phantasy may be displaced and acted out in the child’s, and later adult’s, relationship with time. After all, it was Time that did not allow the simultaneous sexual maturity of child and parent to occur. In adolescence when the positive and negative oedipal impulses are dangerously reawakened in the sexually mature body of the young adult, time often becomes an arena of conflict between parents and children.

By removing the factor of physical immaturity from the equation, puberty gratifies long-standing oedipal wishes and makes the present exciting—and dangerous. Instead of being a powerful *frustrating* force, as it was during the oedipal phase, time now becomes the ultimate *gratifier*. (Colarusso, 1988, p. 183)

The appropriate decathexis of infantile objects is played out in the adolescent’s insistence that the primary external regulating agency of personal time be shifted from parents to peers. It is here that impulse gratification is sought as the superego relaxes due to, in part, the defensive deidealization of the parental introjects (Colarusso, 1988). “Killing time” can be thought of as symbolically killing the monitoring, introjected parents, who generally advocate the delay of gratification, by contravening their intrusive injunctions regarding the management of the time of one’s life.

If, in the fantasy of early growth, there is contained *death*, then at adolescence there is contained *murder*. . . growing up means taking the parent’s place. *It really does*. In the unconscious fantasy, growing up is inherently an aggressive act. . . It is legitimate, I believe, as well as useful, to look at the game “I’m the

king of the castle". . . . This is a game of early latency, and at puberty it becomes changed into a life-situation. (Winnicott, 1971, p. 144).

The adolescent child *has* triumphed. He or she takes the parent's place in time, *has* arrived at "that future time when the child has the adult sexual attributes and the strength to compete with and vanquish the oedipal competitor" (Colarusso, 1987, p. 127).

Omnipotent phantasies regarding time may be acted out through a casual disregard for schedules, daydreaming, luxuriating in the infatuations of love, and experimentation with alcohol and drugs. But Seton (1974) reminds us that the need for this regressive timelessness is necessary to healthy adolescence.

This regression is not only part of the developmental process, it is in the service of it and makes possible the new and higher level integrations in the psychic structures, in contrast to the regression that is by way of defence and closure. The reactivation of time in both its metrics and the enveloping sense of one's own history is a sign that consolidation and structuralisation has resumed. (pp. 816-817)

Colarusso (1988) concurs, describing the adolescent sense of "time diffusion" (p. 183, a term he borrows from Erikson and Bonaparte) or psychic "temporal suspension" (p. 196) as a normative defensive delay that may serve adaptive or regressive goals.

Present-focused, temporal suspension provides for the delay of decathexis from infantile objects and for postponement of the demands of the adult world impinging on the adolescent's future horizon.

Temporal perspective, the focus on past, present or future and their interrelations, contributes distinctive textures to adult life. Kastenbaum (1977) urges that more attention be given to time perspective as *interpersonal* as well as *intrapersonal* in origin. The origin of temporal experience within the mother/infant dyad is, psychoanalytically speaking, primary and conditioning, but it is only the first of many organisations of time dependent on human relationships.

Next, I wonder about the *interpersonal network* of time perspectives. Am I mistaken here, or are we missing an entire level of concept and method? We usually concentrate upon individual time perspectives; some of us also fashion generalisations about broad national, ethnic, or socioeconomic-echelon perspectives. But I do not see many guidelines for understanding how intimately related people enter into each other's perspectives, or collectively develop, share, and modify a perspective. (p. 212)

Thus the determining influences of subjective time conceived as genetic become modified by developmental considerations beginning in family life, but increasingly involving extrafamilial influences.

Adulthood

Extrafamilial influences on the subjective sense of time are nowhere more apparent than in adult life. While here I will offer only a very brief summary of considerations influencing the ongoing evolution of the subjective sense of time in adult life, it can be said to be a more, rather than less, complex experience. Themes of infancy, latency and adolescence do not vanish but are transformed into adult themes (Colarusso & Nemiroff, 1981). All of the psychodynamic hypotheses of adult development offered by Colarusso and Nemiroff involve formulations to which unresolved past developmental tasks are central, which inhibit a fulfilling transition into the present, as well as identifying the new tasks appropriate to the developmental stage of adult life in which the individual finds him- or herself. Settlage (cited in Colarusso & Nemiroff, 1981) calls adult development “rearrangements” of dynamic interactions between:

- ... (a) biologically determined progression through the developmental stages,
- (b) the gradual shift from the family of origin to the family of procreation (a process that continues well into adult years), and
- (c) changing technological and sociocultural conditions.

Biological considerations initially offer individuals a sense of expansion and continuance in time through their children, but later increasingly bring the adult in mid-life to the sense of physical limitation and mortality. The future-perspective provided by the family of procreation shifts as children attain adolescence and young adulthood, and they appropriate their own futures, leaving parents with the need to reformulate their own priorities in a future that is (generally) shorter in active years than the unalterable past behind them. The changing nature of the family, resulting in many people being involved in blended families, or having several families of procreation, one often later in life, all change traditional formulations of age specific temporal tasks. Difficult economic times may result in children of any age, and at times their families,

returning to live with parents, activating a confusion of nested familial umwelts causing adjustments for all members. Persons who cannot or do not have children may have unique issues to resolve with regard to generativity, continuance and time.

Nor must we underestimate the interplay of changing sociocultural and technological environment. Particularly influencing our sense of time are the advancements in and invasions of computer technology, not only in our professional lives but in our private lives as well. We are infiltrated by a “here-now-everything” profusion of information conditioning our experience of time. Perhaps this is why our age receives characterisations of both narcissism, which thrives on omnipotent fantasies of the self as the rightful centre of the world of time; of schizophrenia, in which the whole of temporal experience fragments into loosely linked informational bits; and ultimately of depression, when deep, animating meanings connecting the individual to the continuous creation of self and community are lost (Levin, 1987; Gabbard, 1990). Suda (1989) speculates whether “schizophrenia is not an extreme metaphor for the historical dismemberment of the age” (p. 105). He suggests that the proliferation of artifacts (recordings, video cassettes and films, books, photocopying, television, radio and now the internet) has led to a dissection of wholeness into informational bits that leaves us with an “atomistic and dessicated” experience of time. In a thoughtful essay, Campbell (1993) questions the ramifications of “the 24-hour world machine” (p. 24) that leads us to a disregard of the role of natural rhythms in our lives. Time as commodity, considered as an operating cost, leads to the assessment of “individual success and job security. . .by how fast one is at what one does, how many tasks are taken on, however superficially, and ‘who finds out what first’” (p. 25).

Compensatory to this unconscionable pressure is the conflicting expectation of entitlement: that in this 24-hour world of easy informational and entertainment access “you can do what you want when you want” (p. 25), the desire and expectation by adults for instant (one wants to say infant) gratification. Campbell argues that the restoration of rhythmicity in accordance with natural rhythms in our lives is not only personally necessary, but culturally, environmentally and morally necessary as well.

Malia (1978) reminds us of the cultural relativism of adulthood as a concept,

and finds “the self-conscious concern with ‘what it means to be an adult’” (p. 173) to be a specifically American concern. This is likely not unrelated to our North American culture’s idolisation of youth, material self-gratification and freedom, leaving consenting adults of conscience to guiltily pursue their normotic pleasures in the deteriorating bed of social responsibility. In contrast to this is the organic understanding of aging embraced by traditional Japanese society in which adulthood is perceived as leading to the *satisfactions* of old age offered by Rohlen (1978).

. . . part of the fascination of the Japanese view of biographical time is that it is at once fatalistic (nature has its way) and yet, contrary to our understanding of that fatalism, simultaneously preoccupied with the challenge and potential for human perfection contained in the submission of “self” to a greater reality. Acceptance of the process of aging, for example, brings the person into closer contact with all natural change. (p. 130).

Adults are revered for the wisdom gleaned from their years of steeping in the cycles of time. What contrast such serene attitudes toward the cycle of life afford to the aggrieved pen of Wallace Stegner (1978), who writes of the relationship of writers and adulthood.

Adulthood, I should say, is always an approximation--a failed approximation. Among the saints it may be justified by faith; more generally it is shaped by indecision and doubt. And I think it does not necessarily last from the time when it is approximately achieved to the time when the coffin lid is closed upon the serene and upward-staring face. It is a stage on the way to senility--or, in the case of many writers, a tentative, half-scared, half-hopeful, nearly-compulsive time for the exploitation of a gift that at any time may be cruelly withdrawn. (p. 236)

Fluctuations in creativity are not here experienced as the natural ebb and flow of the creative Tao through the human vessel; rather, blockages to creativity are experienced as assaults on the specialness of the ego, the final embargo being that of death. Stegner does not speak for that other writer, Rumi (1984, #1616), a thirteenth century Sufi poet and mystic, who, as a person writing from within a vastly different era, culture and spiritual centre, relaxes the competitive press of time on haunted over-achievers in this simple fashion.

Inside the Great Mystery that is,
we don’t really own anything.
What is this competition we feel then,
before we go, one at a time, through the same gate?

From this overview of the development of the subjective experience of time, it becomes apparent that the healthy ego is one that can encompass vast fluctuations in temporal experience without feeling unduly threatened. It must be able to integrate periods of felt timelessness; periods of temporal compresence when past, present and future are experienced as being in creative and/or chaotic interpenetration; and it must be able to pull out from this changing inner experience an integral sense of self evolving in external time, and the temporal mode of functioning appropriate to the external environment in which it finds itself at a given moment. In this way, “psychotemporal adaptation,” Seton’s (1974) descriptive phrase regarding the late adolescent task of achieving an integrated sense of personal history, can be seen to begin in early childhood and continue throughout life.

Time in the Analytic Hour

The passage of the analytic hour is inadequately represented by the numerical sum of its minutes. Loewald (1975) likens the imaginative, *temporal* reorganisations of play that take place in Winnicott’s third, or transitional, space to those temporal reorganisations which occur in the psychoanalytic hour. Settlage (1972) describes how the infant externalises primitive image-memories into the transitional play space described by Winnicott and there compares and correlates them with “the current and more consciously perceived experiences with the mother and the emerging self. The infant plays, as it were, with past and present images of self, object and self-object relatedness as they are on their way toward stable intrapsychic representation” (p. 76). Through this alternation of externalisation and re-internalisation in which temporal experience is specialised, the infant begins to experience object permanence in the form of object “re-presentations” and consequently becomes increasingly able to deal with the sense of loss brought by the absence of mother. Settlage stresses that what is termed internalisation retains this feature throughout all human developmental phases: the need for re-externalisation in an intermediate area held separate from both inner and outer worlds, in which the individual can freely enter into relationship with the images

of experience “with the aim of discrimination and mastery” (p. 76). Winnicott (1971) explicitly states the temporal operations of the third space—which he tangentially mentions “takes up” not only space, but also time—to be the linking of past, present and future. Perhaps it is because the allegiance of time set aside for play is not to that of time as linear arrow that Winnicott formulates it as space.

The time of the therapeutic hour becomes a “space of time” set aside, from the client’s perspective, as a “just-for-me” time. The client will recapitulate developmental conflicts in his or her use of this time: “the hour” may be mother or father, may be used “fantastically” as the infant uses the pre-oedipal mother, may be felt to be ample or parsimonious. Morris (1983) summarises developmental aspects of the experience of time inclusive of their influence in the analytic hour.

Therefore, the experience of time may be regarded as a measure of the completeness of that aspect of the separation-individuation process which includes the resolution of ambivalences that prevent the integration and differentiation of identifications with ambivalently loved objects; a measure of the degree to which the lost infantile omnipotence of symbiotic union has been successfully dealt with; a measure of the degree to which the image-introject of Mother Time has been replaced through identification with an internal relatively autonomous ego-superego structure such that time is experienced as duration, not intensity. To the extent that this transformation is incomplete, each subsequent psychosexual stage will be influenced, and derivatives of the early object-relations problem will appear at each stage of psychosexual development in the form of distorted time experience symbolically related to that stage. In the psychoanalytic situation, where unresolved conflicts over loss of omnipotence are revived and reactivated through the transference neurosis, such developmental deficiencies will manifest themselves in the patient’s experience of time and the transference. (pp. 672-673)

During the elaboration of fantasies in the analytic hour, the patient may operate from a regressive level of experiencing in which fantasy, memory and present actuality are not distinguished, much as occurs in early childhood. Time’s arrow branches, turns on itself, fragments, fades, is restored. In Fraser’s (1981) formulation, a recapitulation of the developmental hierarchy of the temporal umwelts takes place, with the analyst facilitating a process of creation comprising both chaos and order which eventuates in the realignment of the temporal nest and with it, “appropriate modes of connectivities” (p. 20).

The fantasy creations born from unresolved infantile conflicts are shaped by the

therapeutic relationship of patient and analyst, and their effective or ineffectual resolution contributes to the patient's choices and actions in his or her future life.

Loewald (1975) describes the art of psychoanalysis as follows:

The art of the psychoanalyst, then consists in a threefold activity that is therapeutic: (1) He promotes that regression which conjoins the patient's experiential past (memories and fantasies) with his experiential present--the actuality of the analytic situation--so that they tend to become one. (2) The analyst, by appropriately timed and appropriately responsive interpretations and other interventions that speak to the reflective levels and capacities of the patient, reminds him of the difference between past and present, between memory-fantasy and actuality. (3) In doing so, the analyst helps the patient to reestablish connections, links between these different facets of reality, links that give renewed meaning to memories and fantasy life and to the patient's actual life in the present. Insofar as the patient's experiences in the analytic situation become part of his mental life, they influence his future life. (p. 295)

The patient's mode of existing in time as conditioned by infantile experience becomes apparent as fantasy/memory relations to mother and father are enacted within the transference to the analyst, inclusive of reactions to frustrated desire and loss of the analyst/parent between sessions. Loewald calls this the Janus-faced quality of the analytic session. Janus as a figure embodying reciprocity is also present in that not only are the present and future influenced by the past, but "the past--as a living force within the patient--is influenced by the present" (p. 287).

The historical emphasis of psychoanalysis can be said to be primary; unconscious fantasies are examined to reveal a "mental set" established in the past but continuing to dynamically influence the present (Arlow, 1986; Loewald, 1962, 1972). Nevertheless, the past is not emphasised at the expense of the present; a summary of the contributions of a panel of the American Psychoanalytic Association on the subjective experience of time stresses views which favour a reconsideration of our notions of memorial activity based on the psychoanalytic experience in which "the patient's past is not a memory, but a living present" (Kafka, 1972, p. 663). Wallace (1983) emphasises that the psychiatrist, as the historian, does not work with the "real" past, which is not recoverable, but with its meaning in the present. The presented historical facts need the current event of the transference in order to create a reconstruction of the past. Thus the history of the person can always therefore be said

to be a *creation*. That this lifelong endeavour involves continual memorial reconstruction is emphasised by Loewald (1972). Goldwert (1990) proposes that “the evolution of the ego’s time-consciousness . . . is a form of lifetime artistic creation” and identifies art processes as capable of bridging “historical perspective and psychological insight” (p. 1218).

Like Loewald, Kafka (1977) sees the role of the analyst as that of bringing the analysand “in touch with his own range of available temporal graining” (p. 154) through which to live and observe his life. He lists a wide range of the ways time is implicated in the psychoanalytic hour, which I quote in full.

1. The patient’s analytic hour, his extended “time out” (from work, from usual activity, from usual style of behaviour, and from usual style of communication), is the analyst’s extended and relatively usual “time in.”
2. The analyst, more than the patient, assumes that contiguity of communication (and of experience) has *possible* “meaning” implications transcending contiguity as such.
3. The analyst, more than the patient, assumes that temporal distance between communications (and experiences) does not eliminate the possibility of *meaningful* connections between them, and may even be a *defence* against such connections.
4. The analyst may thus be said to be both a “condenser” and “dilator” of time.
5. Sequence may be translated in the context of clarifications and interpretations as having specific meaning as such. Sequential dream “phrases,” for instance, may be translated into prepositional clauses.
6. The analyst may thus be seen by the patient as dealing with time in a peculiar way.
7. The patient who finds that some of these peculiar dilating and contracting ways are productive of further insight, are “meaningful,” may by identification, by other mechanisms, or for other reasons, learn from and utilise them in looking at his own temporal experience.
8. The stage may thus be set for reorganisation--or in the language of experimentalists, for recoding--of time experience. (pp. 152-153)

Kafka clarifies that by “recoding” he means not only a reorganisation of a subjective time image but a change in “time feeling,” which is suggested in his sensory descriptor of “textures” to distinguish diverse experiences of time, recognising that time is *felt* within the body ego as much as perceived in the mind.

The idea of the analyst as dilator and contractor of time resonates with formulations by other psychoanalytic writers as well. Rose (1964) observes the need for the analyst, like an artist, to have “one foot in either world” so he or she can orchestrate a therapeutic flux in the client between ego core and the expansion of ego boundaries, a dialectic which he also refers to as a universal need “to lose and refind oneself personally and endlessly in space-time” (p. 83). Perhaps it is in part this modelling that enables the patient to leave analysis “on two legs,” as Rank (1978) advocates, tolerant of his splits, conflicts and ambivalences, which are “the actual spring of life” (p. 206). Fraser’s formulation of our temporal states as *umwelts* invites a similar role for the analyst. The analyst can be seen to be guiding the client through these nesting worlds of temporal reality, helping him or her to achieve familiarity with their organisation and knowledge of the appropriate application of each. Fraser describes the task of analysis as involving “a process of creation so that upon the termination of the analysis the developmental hierarchy of the temporal *umwelts* may be well ordered in the patient’s mind—both in their conscious and unconscious dimensions” (1981, p. 20). As we shall see in Chapter 4, Fraser also finds the artist especially able to traverse the temporal *umwelts* of psychic life and give these realities creative expression.

Within the model of neurospace presented by Blum and outlined above (Wallis, 1968), the analyst can be said to initially deemphasise the “space of transformations” which is that of temporal, quantising encodements, and seek to cultivate the “space of association” in the patient through the methodology of free association. Ultimately, of course, in the back-and-forth between objective narration and what Loewald (1975) calls “re-enactive memory,” the balance of functions is restored, each experienced as complementary, not threatening, to the other.

By virtue of this “space of association,” the analytic time may come to be seen by the patient as a microcosm through which his or her relationship to time can achieve unconscious representation with regard to both its historical chronology and subjective qualitative orderings.

The time frame of an analysis—its initiation, duration, and termination—may stir the patient to experience various unconscious associations and repetitions. So

will other aspects of analytic time, such as the beginning and end of the session and the analyst's schedule. As with all forms of repetition . . . the patient can use the temporal elements of analysis both to express and to disguise his unconscious conflicts. (Waugaman, 1992, pp. 29-30)

Waugaman cites cases illustrating some ways in which the client may experience the duration of the analysis as a temporal parallel of infancy and childhood. He notes the well known fact that termination carries connotations of death and/or rebirth, alerting the reader to the fact that "the time structure of each session may mirror the time structure of the analysis as a whole, and may therefore evoke a similar set of reactions" (p. 36). He cites Rose's observations that the patient's "unconscious calendar" sometimes includes "unconscious birth fantasies in the ninth month of treatment" (cited on p. 39). Providing numerous case illustrations, Mintz (1971) speculates that what he calls "anniversary reactions" are "attempts to master through reliving rather than through remembering" (p. 720). He speculates that the unconscious ego can recathet traumatic events because it harbours a sense of time whereas repressed instinctual drives remain timeless. Citing Pollock, Morris (1983) links anniversary reactions to the "incomplete mourning" of lost objects.

To the extent that this transformation is incomplete, each subsequent psychosexual stage will be influenced, and derivatives of the early object-relations problem will appear at each stage of psychosexual development in the form of distorted time experience symbolically related to that stage. In the psychoanalytic situation, where unresolved conflicts over loss of omnipotence are revived and reactivated through the transference neurosis, such developmental deficiencies will manifest themselves in the patient's experience of time and the transference. (pp. 672-673)

The potential temporal parallel of childhood development with the course of analysis allows the analyst to be alert for unresolved conflicts over object loss expressed as distorted time experience or acting out through attempted manipulations of the analyst's time.

Meerloo (1964) explores what he terms telepathic, unconscious communication between the therapist and client as an expression of the unification tendency, a "quest for archaic communion," that exists between the various forms of organic life. The relation between extreme danger and an increased need for communication may result in a telepathic dream or episode seeming to defy the laws of time and space when normal

avenues of communication are blocked. Such a telepathic dream or episode “is a function, not only of the repression of emotionally charged material by the patient, but of repression of similar or related emotionally charged material by the therapist as well” (p. 16). Such paranormal occurrences may be embraced or resisted. While they may be felt to satisfy the needs of the individuals involved for omnipotent knowing and symbiotic connectedness, and in some cases offer a release from personal responsibility for decision making to invisible (parental) powers, the ego is just as likely to resist belief in their occurrence because they are felt as invasions of the laws by which its very structure and boundaries are established. As well, when they portend the future, the sense of personal responsibility may be greater. Meerloo observes that these experiences are most likely to happen during the “minus functions” of sleep, hypnosis and any other state of lowered consciousness—inclusive of the client in the analytic hour—when the unconscious, which still participates in a “four-dimensional, timeless and magic world” succeeds in its quest for archaic communion.

Summary

The subjective sense of time in psychoanalytic theory emerges as one arising from the intricate interplay of the structure of the psyche and the development of the individual as engendered within the relationships of parent-infant bonds. Perhaps the subjective sense of time itself can be seen as a compromise formation between unconscious, conscious and social organisations of experience that result in competing temporal measures that have, as part of their signified, diverse assessments of needs, desires and fantasies. Implicit in these psychosocial formulations of time are rhythms and cycles of personal bodily experience, and those of the body of the world around. Fraser’s concept of nested temporal umwelts seems an apt embodiment of this complex interpenetration of temporal experience, allowing for the sense of time to comprehensively involve less structured systems inclusive of timelessness, which is in accordance with the Freudian formulation of the predominant tendency of the unconscious.

Psychoanalytic theory privileges the past in its classical roots, yet its clinical application can employ this focus in reductive *or* constructive ways. The conscious appropriation of one's personal history is not an unrelievedly backward arrow. It is none other than discerning the interpenetration of the three human temporal modes of past, present and future as a spiralling journey of recapitulation and creative transformation of patterns of being established in childhood (Loewald, 1978).

Chapter 2:

THE SUBJECTIVE SENSE OF TIME IN ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY

Contrasting his own theories of psychic functioning to those of Freud, Jung (1975) charged Freudian psychology with being over-determined by the unalterable cycle of biological urgings, “namely of the fleshly bond leading back to father and mother or forward to the children that have sprung from our flesh--‘incest’ with the past and ‘incest’ with the future, the original sin of perpetuation of the ‘family romance’” (pp. 230-231). Perhaps it should come as no surprise, then, that Jung’s temporal orientation was toward what lay outside the familial boundaries of the oedipal calendar. Even the Jungian future-oriented project of individuation is founded upon giving countenance, sometimes quite literally, to the *primordial* energies of the unconscious, the wellspring of psychic life, conceived of as being timeless, outside of time, or paradoxically, at the heart of time (von Franz, 1992).

Analytical psychology continues to evolve, however, and the theoretical cast of the Developmental School, with its incorporation of object relations into the Jungian framework, effects a greater inclusion of the personal and particularly infant past into the temporal balance of its work (Samuels, 1985). Nonetheless, the centrality of the symbolic realm in the analytical methodologies of dream interpretation, association, amplification, and active imagination seeks to unite the subjective meanings of the symbol with its objective reality in the archetypal field of the collective unconscious, providing a depth perspective on the meanings of the symbol to the individual at that moment in his or her life. Jung (1968b) sought to release the concrete personal data gained through the application of psychoanalytic principles into the archetypal field. In this way, what is in time is experienced as participating in the *tremendum* of the timeless. Using alchemical terminology, “regression” becomes stage of *reductio/fixatio*: that is, a temporary locating of the archetypes of the *tremendum* in their

initial embodiments in the personal past of the individual. But this *reductio* is but a recurrent effort in the total opus which, again, locates the individual within a broader, deeper perspective on individual life, one participating in linear time, cyclic time *and* timelessness. Thus, the method of analytical psychology employs the alchemical dictum, “alternate to improve,” within its temporal praxis.

In its elucidation of the structure of the psyche and its relationship to time as conceived of in the theory of analytical psychology, this chapter will give particular emphasis to those aspects of its temporal focus that distinguish it from psychoanalysis: its valuation of developing a personal relationship in the present with archetypes from the timeless collective unconscious through the creative interactions with their expressions in the personal unconscious.

A Relational Overview of the Structure of the Psyche and Time

Jung conceived of the psyche as tripartite in structure, composed of the conscious, the personal unconscious and the collective unconscious. Within analytical psychology, psyche is often used to refer to the personality as a whole, as differentiated from the conscious personality (Hall & Nordby, 1973). Wholeness of the personality, or individuation, occurs over time, involving the development of optimal relations between these structural parts. Individuation is an on-going process of bringing ever more aspects of the self to consciousness and maintaining these as an integral whole. In that the structural parts of the psyche are organised according to different understandings of time, their integration involves the accommodation by the personality of varying temporal realities.

Consciousness

Consciousness is that aspect of mind known directly by the individual, which Harding (1963) suggests begins as *autos*, a somatic consciousness coalescing from “a sentience of needs, of well- or of ill-being” (p. 207). Nascent consciousness slowly effects a split in the otherwise undifferentiated sea of unconscious being. Harding

regards the ego to be coeval with its increasing capacity to remember “things past.” Consciousness, implying the existence of an object of which to be conscious, is therefore wholly bound up with time, with the discernment of change in its objects giving rise to the discrimination of now from then. Slowly, “scattered elements such as memory images” are gathered which form the nucleus of a rudimentary ego complex. With further growth and discrimination, the rudimentary ego becomes a conscious ego, an organisation of the conscious mind whose structures select and eliminate psychic material to provide coherent identity and continuity to the personality in time. The conscious ego is distinguished by its capacity to observe itself and its relationship to its environment.

Jung’s (1930/1971) essay entitled “The Stages of Life” is oriented toward that part of a human’s lifetime to which he considered conscious individuation most appropriate: mid-life. His provocative delineation of the dynamics of this stage of life is bookended by disappointing relegations of childhood and old age as “stages of life without any conscious problems” (p. 22). While Jung assigned the problems of these stages to the unconscious, inevitably, later theorists in analytical psychology had to redress this imbalance in the body of his theory (see Samuels, 1985; Dieckmann, 1991). Jacobi extended the concept of individuation to encompass the full span of human life. The Developmental School, of which Fordham is a primary proponent, sought to rectify Jung’s relative neglect of the first half of life. Acknowledging the self as one of the constituents of the sea of unconscious being, Fordham (in Dieckmann, 1991) has hypothesised that from birth, the new stimuli experienced by the psychosomatic unity of the infant instigate a “deintegrative stage”.

These deintegrates of the self then play an essential role in ego formation, since that of their contents which reach consciousness are annexed by and integrated into the archetypally and structurally inherent ego-germ. (p. 92)

Fordham proposed that phases of deintegration and integration are not specific to infancy, but occur throughout the process of maturation and individuation.¹ This

¹ This contrasts with Neumann’s formulation, also addressed in this chapter, which Dieckmann (1991) describes as postulating that ego formation does not begin until the third or fourth year of life, after an extended uroboric period of participatory experience.

process can be viewed temporally as a repeating integration of formative principles of the self that lie outside of time and consciousness into the temporal embodiment of the ego in the world. The importance of the self's rootedness in primordial not-time to individuation will be discussed at length later in this chapter.

Consciousness comes to process its interactions with the world through what Jung (1971) described as the two attitudes of extraversion and introversion, and the four functions of the mind: thinking, feeling, sensing and intuiting. While each individual is a composite of these four functions, the ego will come to have a dominant function which will condition its way of interpreting the material of conscious experience; this habitual mode determines the personality type of the individual. Mann, Siegler & Osmond (1968) have proposed that each personality type exhibits a preferred temporal orientation. According to their observations, thinking types tend to process experience through the linear logico-historical model of time, giving weight to impersonal causal processes. Past, present and future are seen as a vast set of events which diminish the importance of the personal now, except as it can contribute to the broader perspectives of historical being. Feeling types, on the other hand, value the past, and the present as derived from the past, having as a primary motivation the desire "to achieve a satisfactory memory" (p. 38). Time acquires a circular quality, the future and present groomed and embraced to augment "the feel of real," which is in large part determined by past relationships. These two types are referred to as "continuous types" because their temporal awareness is one of flow. The "discontinuous types" are those of sensation and intuition. Sensation types are oriented toward the present, with little energy reserved for attending to the past or the future. "The object perceived through the senses at any moment is all of reality; it is the sensation type version of truth" (p. 46). Intuitive types, however, place their faith in what is not yet manifested, in the intangibles of impossibilities: "it is precisely the future which is first perceived and, to get to the current moment, the intuitive goes backwards from the vision of the future into the other and lesser reality of the present" (p. 50). For this reason the intuitive person processes experience prospectively through the imagination "and then is constrained to return to the present and wait until chronological time has caught up with

his vision" (p. 57). Within the category of the intuitive type in particular, Mann, Siegler and Osmond distinguish between the two attitudinal types of introversion and extraversion. While extraverted intuitives are likely to appear inexpeditiously scattered, always racing toward the next possibility, the normal experiential world of introverted intuitives is that of timelessness. In either case, "it is in no way natural or comfortable for an intuitive to 'attend' to time"; yet both can "inspire others with a vision of the future" (p. 52).

Jung (1969b) found experiences of timelessness to be more common to the introverted attitude in general since the focus of the introverted individual's mind tends to be withdrawn from the external world—inclusive of its measurements of time—and localised in the subjective reality normally informing the background of consciousness.² A greater proportion of experiences of the unconscious reality naturally result, imparting feelings of temporal indefiniteness, or timelessness, and unity. One of the goals of individuation is to develop one's capacity to experience and integrate one's participation in the world as much as is possible through all four functions and the two attitudes. Mann, Siegler and Osmond's model allows us to view individuation as, in part, the task of developing functional flexibility within a matrix of temporal perspectives.

Arguing for the co-existence of diachronic and synchronous models, Samuels (1989) has put forward a pluralistic developmental theory built on the tenet that "all events and experiences may be regarded as having a simultaneous *and* a successive order" (p. 20). Samuels suggests that the ambivalence humans express in their relationship to chronological, clock time may need to be looked at from a less exclusively developmental-causal perspective to include acceptance of our simultaneous horizontal *and* vertical relations with the events and experiences through which we

² This generalisation is open to debate. Because the extraverted or introverted attitude is modified by dominant and auxiliary functions, extraverted individuals will not necessarily be able to deal with objective time better than introverted individuals, nor will introverted individuals necessarily be undermined in their affairs by a preference for timelessness. Easy conclusions are further obstructed when one realises that the inferior attitude and functions are hypothesised to dominate the unconscious life of the individual in archaic ways (Jung, 1971b), making relations to time in accordance with personality a complex affair.

experience time. Within the vertical view, the adult personality is not *caused* by *childhood* experiences; rather, elements within the personality which the culture deems most appropriately embodied in childhood are co-present with all other elements of the personality throughout life. Descriptors of experience are not temporally reduced, or relegated, to “pastness.”

At this point, we might turn to the task of working out a synchronous and pluralistic approach to development in which the various stages and phases are not regarded either as fading away, or as evolving towards an apparently more mature version of themselves, or as integrating over time, or as behaving in a way that will bring about some final goal. Each element in personality would be *personally eternal*, to coin a phrase. (p. 22)

Samuels questions the validity of hypothesising any *a priori* psychic structure that is not constantly transforming in response to the movements of these contents. In his model, consciousness becomes less a fixed, structural component of psyche than a viewpiece resolving images of reality in accordance with the “grind” of the lens intrinsic to the array of archetypal and personal forces--“the imaginal network” (p. 14)--gathered at any given time in the glass. That the structure of consciousness changes with time becomes more than a developmental truism; it also changes with the revolution of personality dynamics having as much to do with the synchronic-acausal interactive fields of archetypal forces as with diachronic causality. Relying on Jung’s profession that “*reality is apprehended in images*” (p. 44, Samuels’ italics), Samuels implies that *images*--as imaginal networks--provide the “coruscating” structure of consciousness, and the psyche as a whole.

With tantalising consistency, consciousness never disappoints in being far less straightforward than its summary descriptions; with regard to time, it (and we with it) seem teased into existence by the tension between its chronological and literalised, and its synchronic and metaphorical relations to the objects of experience. What Western consciousness tends to “put out of consciousness” are those latter understandings, which do not conform to its clock-driven cultural framework. Experiences challenging temporal conformity are more likely to be denied, to “go underground,” where they may achieve symbolic representation.

The Personal Unconscious

The personal unconscious is the aspect of psychic functioning which stores experiences the ego does not recognise. These include psychic contents incongruous with the dominant function (i.e., a “thinking type” may have a preponderance of feelings in his or her personal unconscious); repressed contents and experiences; seemingly irrelevant or unimportant experiences; and experiences too weak to penetrate or remain in consciousness (Hall & Nordby, 1973). The personal unconscious tends to organise around complexes, which Jung first called “feeling-toned groups of representations” (Jacobi, 1971). These are clusters of psychic contents, also referred to as constellations, which may operate like separate sub-personalities within the total personality; that is, they seek to influence, or even control, the greater personality. The degree of autonomy the complex exercises depends on its infusion with archetypal energy from the collective unconscious. Because the complexes are organisational structures, their existence is not in itself an indication of pathology. The healthy individual seeks to develop avenues of communication with his or her complexes so that they do not become split off, which is Jung’s definition of neurosis; psychosis occurs when the split reaches the organic structure and the dissociated complexes live autonomously with no centralising personality to hold them together (Jung, 1968). Because of its admixture of benign residues of consciousness and potent infusions from the collective unconscious, the personal unconscious can be seen as multivalent in its temporal organisation, capable of baroque hybrids of historical and ahistorical reference.

The analogy to things “baroque” is not untoward here, for historically, the Baroque period was a temporal threshold *between* the Renaissance and modern times. It “acknowledges no sharp distinction between sculpture and painting” and is frequently organised around “the invisible complement” (Jansen, 1977, p. 487). In Baroque chapels, “real” time and space are interfused with the ecstasies of saints and mythic dramas. The limits of the frame are creatively, intentionally transgressed to embrace a larger meaning, a less reductive experience of time. What Jansen says of Rubens’ paintings is an apt description of the personal unconscious: “Everything flows together

here in swirling movement: heaven and earth, history and allegory. . . myth and reality become one.” (p. 505, 506).

The Collective Unconscious

The “invisible complement” of the historical contents of the personal unconscious is the archetypal dynamism of the ahistorical collective unconscious. Jung considered the collective unconscious to be an objective field of psychic activity operating independently of the conscious mind. Its contents do not represent a reservoir of repressed experience; it is not dependent at all on personal experience but gives evidence of being “an inner correspondence to the world as a whole” (Jacobi, 1974, p. 60). Jung summarised its antecedent structural reality in this way: “The form of the world into which he [the individual] is born is already inborn in him as a virtual image” (cited in Hall & Nordby, 1973, p. 41).

The patterning dynamism of the collective unconscious is the archetypes, referred to as “predispositions” or “inherited possibilities of expression.” They are “magnetic fields . . . underlying the transformation of the psychic process into images” (Jacobi, 1974, p. 48). Unknowable in themselves, archetypes emerge as knowable archetypal *images* as their energies constellate and take form in the tripartite structure of an individual psyche. They gather their specificity and personal *meaning* from the contents in the personal unconscious of the individual. The particular symbolic form each takes is a consequence of its constellating “magnetism,” which progressively cloaks its core with relevant material from the personal unconscious of the individual as it surfaces toward consciousness where it presses for conscious recognition and integration into the personality. The archetypes of the collective unconscious can also be thought of as structural stages of psychic maturation which operate as eternal constitutive presences unfolding in the historical sequence of individual development (von Franz, 1992). The ego’s task is to enter into dialogue with these primordial images. In this way it comes to know the archetypal realities and translate their subterranean promptings into the active language of the present (Philipson, 1963).

The archetypes include the persona, or configuration of identity shown to the

world ; the anima and animus, or psychic principles of gender constellated in the unconscious; the shadow, or “the thing a persona has no wish to be” (Jung, cited in Samuels, Shorter & Plaut, 1986, p. 138); and the self. Whereas the ego is the organising principle of consciousness, the self is considered to be the organising principle of the personality as a whole. Unlike the ego, it seeks to include in its organisation unconscious content which the ego might well repudiate.

. . . leading man to his wholeness and not to a one-sided perfection is the treatment goal of individuation. However, completeness also embraces suffering, illness, death, and creative non-adaptation to existing conditions. . . Individuation does not consist in an egocentric orientation toward the given peculiarity of the individual but rather demands a living cooperation among all the universal factors present in the human being. Individuation aims at . . . developing all the potentialities in an individual in equal measure (Dieckmann, 1991, p. 16)

Temporally, individuation is not blind accedence to social time; is not revelling in the elastic subjectivity of the time of the ego; nor is it repression of the felt need for timelessness as regressive, or, on the contrary, relinquishment of here-and-now concerns in submission to the ratified “not-time” of the objective psyche. Rather, individuation is the creative project of cultivating increasingly conscious, meaningful habitation in the *fullness* of times.

The relationship of the ego and the self is thus crucial in the process of individuation, and is often hypostasised as the self/ego axis. Neumann (1973) theorises that its initial constellation is in accordance with the qualities of the relationship between mother and infant. The dominant experience of bi-unity with the mother during the first year of life, in which separateness and merging comprise the infant’s reality, establishes a matrix of totality embracing “two” in relationship.

The primal relationship of the *participation* experience is characterised by intense empathic warmth, loving attention and attentiveness of the mother to the needs of the child. For Neumann, this Eros aspect is the essential relationship. As a totality, the relationship constellates the theme of connections. Positive Eros connectedness between self and ego cannot occur with the child alone since ego and self are not yet formed and differentiated. Only in so far as the mother positively incarnates the self for her child through the Eros aspect of the primal relationship can the developing ego consciousness experience its connection to a nourishing and sustaining centre of totality. (McCurdy, 1987, p. 318)

Implicit in this model is the need for the mother to sensitively embody a comfortable relationship between time and timelessness for the infant, which begins with loving care given to the rhythmic bodily needs of the infant.

Jung's (1969a) discussion of two figures of the archetypal feminine, Demeter and Kore, illustrates the deeply complex, temporal communion inherent in the mother/daughter bond as archetype.

The psyche pre-existent to consciousness (e.g., in the child) participates in the maternal psyche on the one hand, while on the other it reaches across to the daughter psyche. We could therefore say that every mother contains her daughter in herself and every daughter her mother, and that every woman extends backward into her mother and forward into her daughter. This participation and intermingling give rise to that peculiar uncertainty as regards *time*: a woman lives earlier as a mother, later as a daughter. The conscious experience of these ties produces the feeling that her life is spread out over generations--the first step towards the immediate experience and conviction of being outside time, which brings with it a feeling of *immortality*. The individual's life is elevated into a type, indeed it becomes the archetype of woman's fate in general. This leads to a restoration or *apocatasis* of the lives of her ancestors, who now, through the bridge of the momentary individual, pass down into the generations of the future. An experience of this kind gives the individual a place and a meaning in the life of the generations, so that all unnecessary obstacles are cleared out of the way of the life-stream that is to flow through her. At the same time the individual is rescued from her isolation and restored to wholeness. All ritual preoccupation with archetypes ultimately has this aim and this result. (p. 188)

Much of this cycle of deepening "arche-temporal" participation can be generalised not only to all parent/infant experience, but also, as Jung states, to ritualised interaction with all archetypes, whereby we disinter and reanimate ancestral forces, reappropriating our psychic lineage.

That this is the ultimate *aim* of archetypal work must be stressed. The temporal *disorientation* that the intermediate stages of such potentially integrating experiences may bring to the ego--of dilating time through the archaic to the timeless--is an inevitable stage of the work. While it is possible for an individual to explore personal symbols and their relation to archetypal realities on his or her own, this is advisable only to a certain depth of inquiry. One vital role of the analytical psychotherapist is to monitor and facilitate an informed alternation of focus from personal time frame, to familial generational cycles, to transpersonal mythic and archetypal patterns so that the

individual can be assured of a witnessing other capable of modulating the figural dominance between the imaginal real and the everyday real.

In the process of analysis, a dialogue is begun between the personal, or subjective psyche, and the collective, or objective psyche. Through the medium of images arising in dreams and the amplificatory methodologies of association and active imagination, this dialogue can be seen as one taking place between two contingent temporal models: the linear time of the ego, and the “primordial” unconscious. Von Franz (1992) cautiously introduced a schematic representation into her discussion of the psychological experience of time, stressing that “every schematic model clarifies but also blurs in some ways the facts which one tries to describe by it” (p. 121). Reflecting a theoretical orientation which has as its goal the reconciliation of opposites (Samuels, Shorter & Plaut, 1986), the mandala of the totality of the personality which she presents embraces time and “not-time.”




Figure I (von Franz, 1992, p. 122)

On the outer rim the ego is moving in a stream of outer and inner events—in time. Below it is the psychic sphere of the so-called personal unconscious, which is still relatively closely time-bound. Inside it comes the sphere of archetypal images, which seem still time-bound but exist in a much vaster time, some even moving in aeons of thousands of years. They can “constellate” themselves, however, as we call it, an expression which alludes to the existence of time. Further inside is that movement of inner self-renewal within the Self, which Jung has described in his work *Aion*, and still further inside would be the eternal archetypes, their many-oneness, and the Self. In the centre is the empty hub of the wheel, a realm of pure not-time. . . . The closer we get to the outer ring, the more we come into the realm of time, in that form which is generally known to us (von Franz, 1992, pp. 121-122).

The graphic and theoretical centrality of “not-time” in the structure of the psyche is

demonstrated by von Franz's inclusion of lines from the Tao Teh Ching in her descriptive model.

Thirty spokes converge upon a single hub;
It is on the hole in the centre that the use of the cart hinges.

Within the model of analytical psychology, then, meaningful mobilisation of the ego in time and space is contingent upon the development of a creative relationship with the not-time and not-space of archetypal reality.

The Time of Symbols and the Unconscious in Analytical Psychology

Ultimately, the temporal perspective of the unconscious remains beyond specification in the texts of analytical psychology. Jung refers to the unconscious as having its "'own time' inasmuch as past, present, and future are blended together in it" (cited in von Franz, 1992, p. 314n). In personal correspondence to J. R. Smythies, however, Jung wrote, "As in the psychic world there are no bodies moving through space, there is also no time. The archetypal world is 'eternal,' i.e., outside time, and it is everywhere, as there is no space under psychic, that is archetypal, conditions" (cited in von Franz, 1992, p. 121). Von Franz (1992) refers to the temporal mode of the unconscious as "relative timelessness" (p. 297), as an "other time" (pp. 298), as "outside of time" (p. 121), and as "not-time" (above). Describing the arrow of time as running parallel to conscious psychic life, von Franz (1992) observes that "the conscious conception of time as an arrow and 'flux' seems to become curiously relative (or possibly nonexistent) in the unconscious" (p. 296). In accordance with most analytical psychologists, von Franz finds the parallel universe of primordial time which typifies the unconscious to be most authentically embodied in the endlessly renewable cycles of myth, fairy tales and dreams. Finally, she adventurously declares, "Not only the past is preserved and still fully alive in the unconscious but also the future" (p. 116), as experienced, for instance, in the prognostications of dreams.

How, then, do we who are in time come to know that part of our being which is

outside of time? We only come to know the unconscious through its intermediaries: symbolic *presentations* which trans-fer, or, etymologically, *carry* the unconscious dynamism *across* the threshold into consciousness. Within the theoretical formulations of analytical psychology, symbols, or mythologems, are considered to be those images which emerge from the unconscious in dreams and creative works that embody the archetypes activated in an individual's life (Jung, 1967; Whitmont, 1978; Jacobi, 1971). Symbols differ from signs in that they can never be reduced to a one-to-one correspondence with an event or meaning. They by definition point beyond both themselves and what is immediately observable or capable of being understood. It is for this reason that they are more correctly called presentations, rather than representations. Most importantly, they are transformative dynamic *powers* which bring about a *re-experiencing* of the psychic process which they embody (Jung, 1967). Stressing the autonomy of symbolic process, Whitmont (1978) states, "The symbolic experience thus is not *made by* us, rather it *happens to* us" (p. 23); in doing so, it reactualizes a space- and time-transcending motive within the psychophysical boundaries of the space and time of an individual's life.

The Structural Reality of Archetypes: In and Out of Time

Samuels (1985) discusses the parallels to be found between archetypal theory and structuralist perspectives in psycholinguistics and anthropology. In his critical analysis of the temporal ramifications of structuralist theory in anthropological discourse, Fabian (1983) outlines the elimination of time which structuralist theory effects by locating the organisation of experience in the nature of neural patternings which condition the sign systems through which consciousness operates to arrive at "a system that is synchronically intelligible" (a phrase used by Lévy-Strauss, cited in Fabian, 1983, p. 56). Translating from its etymological derivation, "synchronic" can be understood as "together-time," a compresence of past, present and future. The structural hermeneutic of *symbolic* systems can likewise be seen to give rise to a contemporaneous organisation of temporal events. The experience of timelessness may

ensue as the particularities of the present are absorbed “anhistorically” into the mnemonics of archetypal structures (Eliade, 1954). In this way, the symbolic experience *does*, in part, “happen to us” as experience is unavoidably processed through the organisational (discriminatory) *and* associational (relational) matrices of psyche. The active development of symbolic experience becomes the challenging endeavour of incarnating the timeless within time such that the symbolising centre of meaning suffuses the fabric of the experience. Matter so formed as to be redolent with significant content is then capable of conveying the “together time” as that continuing luminosity of meaning which transubstantiates the sequential time of its material existence.

The compresence of times that gathers to the heart of the archetypal image is eloquently expressed by Thomas Mann (1939, cited in Rose, 1964) in *Joseph and His Brothers*.

. . . nothing comes first and of itself, its own cause. . . everybody is begotten and points backwards, deeper down into the depths of beginnings, the bottoms and the abysses of the well of the past. . . backwards and backwards into the immeasurable. . . the dream memory of man, formless but shaping itself ever anew after the manner of sagas, reaches back to catastrophes of vast antiquity. . . What concerns us here is . . . time's abrogation and dissolution in the alternation of tradition and prophecy, which lends to the phrase 'once upon a time' its double sense of past and future and therewith its burden of potential present. . . For it *is*, always *is*, however much we may say *It was*. Thus speaks the myth. . . the mystery. . . (and) the recurrent feast which bestrides the tenses and makes the has-been and the to-be present to the popular sense. . . In it life and death meet and know each other. Feast of story-telling, thou art the festal garment of life's mystery, for thou conjurest up timelessness in the mind of the folk, and invokest the myth that it may be relived in the actual present. . .
. (p. 80)

This compresence of archetypes as effective figures moving and mooring the temporally mercurial dramas of the inner world and, *at the same time*, the apparently chronological dramas of the outer world is noted by Edinger (1989), and by Willeford (1987), who writes: “. . .they [archetypes] are not located in a supercelestial place--or in the collective unconscious conceived as such a place. Rather, they are in the world, in complex relations among subjects” (p. 317). They are not only contenders in the organization of our psyches, but of our families, love lives, our work, communities, cultures, crimes, nations, and our cosmos, as well.

The timelessness of the archetypes as *structure* may be a primary constituent of what Jung (1968) calls the “religious function” of the soul. Rasmussen (1974) relates Eliade’s description of the sacred as an irreducible “element in the structure of consciousness, not a moment in the history of consciousness” (p. 33). Addressing those critics who on the one hand found his archetypal analysis of Christ-as-archetype to be a near-heretical psychologising of religious truths and, on the other hand, critics who found his psychology too “religious,” Jung stated that “psychology is concerned with the act of seeing” the images within one’s unconscious which are the equivalents of the sacred figures of religious experience.

The religious point of view, understandably enough, puts the accent on the imprinter, whereas scientific psychology emphasises the *typos*, the imprint--the only thing it can understand. The religious point of view understands the imprint as the working of an imprinter; the scientific point of view understands it as the symbol of an unknown and incomprehensible content. Since the *typos* is less definite and more variegated than any of the figures postulated by religion, psychology is compelled by its empirical material to express the *typos* by means of a terminology not bound by time, place or milieu. (p. 17)

Only when we are dealing with signs does structural analysis become reductive. In analytical psychology, which deals with symbols, the structural reality of the archetypes of the collective unconscious is not conceived of as static; it is *experiential*, means re-experiencing, and invites a *reconstruction* which promotes new understanding *each time* it radiates through the diachronic realm of the historical individual.

Rasmussen (1974) describes the intentionality animating symbolic experience as motivating participants to restore in image, language and action that which has been broken in experience, inclusive of time. This can be accomplished because the temporal ground of the archetypal symbol is that of *in illo tempore*, the primordial time of the original creative act. When one enters the archetypal structure, the paradoxical *timeless archetype of temporality* is also entered, in which is enfolded the capacity for regeneration. “Because the unconscious is the matrix mind, the quality of creativeness attaches to it” (Jung, 1969b, p. 490). Jung’s statement is wise in its refusal to call the unconscious creative in an unqualified way; destructive energies also reside there, but cohabit *with* the “quality of creativeness,” which is ours to cultivate.

The methodology Rasmussen garners from Eliade’s structural hermeneutics

bears more than a little family resemblance to the clinical methodologies of analytical psychology.

It is by uncovering the intentionality of a sacred modality through an act of imaginative reconstruction within consciousness that understanding occurs. . . . Understanding does not occur by the reconstruction of a particular phenomenon, but rather by the reintegration of that phenomenon within its system of associations. Such a hermeneutic approach could well be called *eidetic reintegration*. . . . The consequence of that reintegration is understanding. (p. 32)

The methods of association and amplification are seminal to the practice of analytical psychology. Outlining the constructive method he employed to activate what he termed the transcendent function, Jung (1971; Jacobi, 1971) stressed that symbols were not to be primarily evaluated symptomatically, as a sign of pathology, or semiotically, as indicators of instinctual processes, though these may begin the process of understanding the role of the symbol in the individual's life. To end there, however, would be to reduce the symbol to sign. Evaluating a symbol *symbolically* is a synthetic enterprise to which meaning and purpose are primary. Psychotherapy described by Jung as an "act of seeing" and Rasmussen's "eidetic reintegration" are interpretations in separate disciplines pointing to one process of understanding the dynamic conditioning effected by archetypal (or symbolic, or mythic) structures within human communal and individual experience.

Jung (1970) defines the transcendent function as a "continual process of getting to know the counterposition in the unconscious" (p. 200). It results in the union, or rapprochement, of conscious and unconscious contents in the psyche, each being compensatory to the other (Jung, 1971). Integrating the *temporal* counterposition of the unconscious is a process of coming to know the vital interpenetration of "not-time" throughout our colourful, ephemeral, historical bustle. Jung stresses his use of the term "transcendent" is not to lend metaphysical airs to his methodology; rather, "it is called 'transcendent' because it makes the transition from one attitude to another organically possible" (p. 279).

"Organic" characterises well the means Jung advocates to engage the transcendent function. He advocates involvement of the full *organism* of the individual

in activities such as drawing, painting, work with plastic materials and dance and bodily movement to give form to the emotional disturbance which is invested with the energy presently unavailable to the individual for creative fulfilment in the world. Sometimes Jung's emphasis on the archetypal matrix as inclusive of basal, *bodily* experiences--the world of sensation-- is overlooked in favour of the mythic *otherworldliness* of the amplified primordial image (Samuels, 1985). If Mann, Siegler and Osmond's (1968) hypothesis has validity, then Jung's methodology, in utilising the four functions of thinking, feeling, sensation and intuition is intrinsically synthetic with regard to time, effecting an alchemical circulatio among the function-toned foci of past, present, future, and the "other time" of the unconscious. The linear arrow of the time of the ego is transcended through these plastic involvements with the timeless structures of the unconscious to which the ego's past adheres; but equally, the unconscious is called upon to transcend its potentially grandiose categories of "type" and enter into the critical matter of time.

The Prospective Nature of the Symbol

When archetypes enter time, they bring with them intimations of the future. When in symbolic form they carry unconscious dynamisms across the threshold of consciousness, the conscious mind is not only rooted in "the original time of creation," but is also extended *forward* (Jung, 1969b),³ an essential posture in the future-oriented project of individuation. Jung (1971b) is adamant that "anything psychic is Janus-faced--it looks both backwards and forwards" (p. 431). Fantasy may or may not manifest archetypal content, but attains a symbolic function when it is interpreted not causally, as the outcome of the personal past, but purposively, as holding within it "a line of future psychological development" (p. 432). Discernment of the prospective significance of the symbol in therapy is the responsibility of the analyst, whose symbolic attitude facilitates making patterns of meaningful personal and transpersonal

³ Jung (1971b) attributes the concept of the prospective nature of the unconscious, which became central to his formulations of the function of the symbol, to Maeder's 1913 monograph, *Über das Traumproblem (The Dream Problem)*, and Adler's observations of an anticipatory ability in the unconscious.

connections visible in the fabric of time (Hubback, 1988).

Philipson (1963) examines the field from which the prospective significance of the symbol arises. The primordial image is most likely to emerge when the ego's will is suspended, creating a void which is filled by unconscious content, more readily able to surface under this easing of conscious censorship. The archetypal symbol's quality of futurity results from its interpretation by the ego "in respect to lines for development . . . the indication of what ought to come" (p. 76). Jung (1972) postulated that these "lines for development" result from condensations of similar journeys and their destinations which have imprinted the collective unconscious with their patterns, contributed by our human *and* animal ancestors.

. . . the animal symbol points specifically to the extra-human, the transpersonal; for the contents of the collective unconscious are not only the residues of archaic, specifically human modes of functioning, but also the residues of functions from man's animal ancestry, whose duration in time was infinitely greater than the relatively brief epoch of specifically human existence. (p. 98)

As a "mnemic deposit" of psychic functioning, the primordial image is a "constantly effective and continually recurring expression" (Jung, Psychological Types, cited in Philipson, 1963, p. 58). Silberer (cited in Piaget, 1962) advocated anagogic interpretations of symbols as re-presentations of the past for the purpose of present adaptation. Embracing symbols as *purposive* presupposes a vector of efficacy infolded in a symbol and an unconscious evaluative faculty at work accommodating the capacities inherent in the symbol's effectual meaning to a given individuation process. Lines for development would be seen to be structured on past experiences inclusive of and transcending the individual's "time," the archetypal, transcendent aspects taking on the colouration and criteria of the individual's experience and needs as they surface from the collective unconscious, through the personal unconscious and into the ego. As a "mythological motive," the archetypal image is characterised by the attributes of mythical thinking described by Cassirer (1955): the concrescence of past, present and future, and an orientation toward "being and becoming as a whole" (p. 111).

While the experience of purposive symbols frequently has numinous qualities, particularly when synchronistic phenomena concurrently manifest challenging our

commonly accepted conceptual frameworks of space and time (see below), the idea of a purposive symbol in itself need not be construed in such a mysterious fashion. On a purely humanistic level, an intentionality toward personal fulfilment is evident when we monitor what brings us satisfaction in our lives. Bühler (1968) offers a perspective on this way of looking at the idea of intentionality, still inclusive of unconscious motivation.

The fact that toward their end, if not before, people feel their expectations were fulfilled or disappointed points to the occurrence of earlier, even if unconscious, directives regarding the whole of their lives. Thus my original hypothesis seemed confirmed that a person's life is permeated by some kind of intentionality, an intentionality directed toward fulfilment. Fulfilment is defined as a closure experience of an overall feeling of satisfaction, accomplishment and success, which in different individuals is anticipated and visualised differently. This anticipation helps in varying degrees to direct and unify a person's endeavours. (p. 185)

That intentionality also operates unconsciously seems evident as we go about our lives without giving conscious attention to each choice and action's contribution to personal goals. That conscious and unconscious fulfilment may be at variance also seems apparent, given that the unconscious holds content the conscious mind cannot countenance. That the psyche should produce, in its native language of symbols, images embodying its fulfilment, its anguish when it is deprived of fulfilment, and create compensatory images synthesising the many dynamics of this struggle with indications of options for resolution does not seem revolutionary, but an almost expectable reflection of the native intelligence of its functioning. Reluctance to grant the unconscious mind this intelligence, an inner logic of images, can be seen as an expression of the insidious temporal distancing we fall prey to in our attitudes to the unconscious. The classical psychoanalytic perspective of the unconscious as, in the main, a repository of infantile repressions and raw, instinctual desires contributes to a view of the unconscious as "primitive," inclusive of the retrograde temporal connotations of that word. In this light, the unconscious seems pre-logical, unintelligent. A more comprehensive view is evident in Piaget's (1962) recounting of Silberer's discovery that the dream can simultaneously symbolise "infantile desires and serious present thought" (p. 194), making possible not only retrospective but also

anagogic (etymologically, “leading”) interpretation. What might seem at first to be semantic manipulation harbours a crucial “felt” difference: to categorise the desires commonly termed “infantile” as admissible components of *present* desiring situates the adult in a deep present rather than placing his or her dynamics in a segmented temporal continuum whose origin would lure or tear him or her from the present into a “past-time” of infantile inappropriateness.

The often numinous prospective significance of archetypal symbols cannot be applied as a magical overlay on individual suffering. Rather, each might be viewed as an angel with whom to wrestle, who comes from “not-time” and whose value to the personal time of the individual can only be found through creative dedication to the labour of encounter. Singer (1979) cautions against all *fixity* of interpretive meaning or evolutionary principles in archetypal work.

. . .to assign the motivation for particular and individual behaviours to archetypal patterns is to risk losing the precious and unique qualities of the individual spirit. . . . To place a fixed characterisation upon the mobile complexity that is the human organism is to attempt to freeze in time something that moves through a continuum of experience. The archetypal images may portray the psyche, but only as a photograph portrays a living, moving person. (pp. 8-9)

It is possible to move with the energy constellated by the archetype while that energy is flowing, but only if we do not stop the action in order to examine it. (p. 15)

Ultimately an embracing model would seem to be needed, one reflecting the paradoxical particle and wave manifestations of matter: that is, while we inevitably *will* “stop the action in order to examine it,” we must remember its wave-like continuity through the on-going present; and when working with the incessantly evolving, modulating properties of the archetype-as-wave, we must remember its durable structure.

The challenge for analyst and analysand in analysis is to create the conditions which facilitate openness to the organically emerging symbol; explore its meanings through methodologies of association, amplification and active imagination; and within this process to situate the intentionality of the symbol appropriately in the unfolding history of the individual. While Jung, in his attraction to the numinosum, has been criticised for not giving enough attention to the personal dimensions of experience

(Samuels, 1985), his theory of symbol formation allows for alternation between intensely personal and “impersonal” work. As we have seen, the archetypes are unknowable in themselves; they only achieve visibility through gathering resonant content as they surface through the collective *and* personal unconscious of the individual. Therefore each symbol is potentially a most intimate companion on the journey of individuation, while offering potential bridging to the collective. Because the collective past exceeds the personal past in length of years and potential breadth of interpretation it is easy to allow its richness to override the shorter span and specificity of the personal realm. Jung speaks of the patient’s “analytical removal into the past” (Jung, CW 16, cited in Samuels, 1985, p. 183), a past one can assume to be both personal and collective. The responsibility of the analyst lies in sensitive facilitation of this removal and return of the client through the temporal structure of the symbolic image so that the ultimate felt sense of this “time travel” is one of going *deeply* into his or her *present*.

The Symbol of the Self in Time

The full reality of the individual within the theory and practice of analytical psychology is always considered to go beyond what can be said about its manifest being, behaviours and expressive communications; in this regard, the individual shares in the definition of symbol. Within analytical theory, this mysterium at the heart of human being derives from the ego being conceived as but the ordering principle of consciousness, while the self, as an individuating archetypal matrix, is considered to be the ordering principle of the personality as a whole. “The self as a unifying principle within the human psyche occupies the central position of authority in relation to psychological life and, therefore, the destiny of the individual” (Samuels, Shorter & Plaut, 1986, p. 135). A teleological point of view is apparent in Jung’s characterisation of the self as an *a priori* existent. “Man cannot escape being destined by the self even in his freedom, but the possibility of an experience of *meaning* lies in recognising its imprint” (p. 148). Thus the self, resident in what is variously termed

the timeless, archaic or primordial unconscious, paradoxically also seems to *precede* the individual in time, drawing him or her toward meaning that is simultaneously highly personal and abundantly collective.⁴

Whitmont (1971) deals at length with the exploration of the self as destiny, “a prepersonal yet individual pattern of intended wholeness” (p. 185), and the implications of self-as-destiny in psychoneurosis, as outlined by Jung.

Psychoneurosis must be understood. . . as the suffering of a soul which has not discovered its meaning. But all creativeness in the realm of the spirit as well as every psychic advance of man arises from the suffering of the soul. . . (Jung, Psychology and Religion: West and East, cited in Whitmont, 1971, p. 185).

Behind the neurotic perversion is concealed vocation, destiny, the development of personality, the complete realisation of the life-will that is born with the individual. The man without *amor fati* is the neurotic (Jung, The Development of the Personality, cited in Whitmont, 1971, p. 185).

Within this formulation, the self, rooted in the primordial not-time, takes on the aspect of verb: it seeks to future, to creatively unfold the sheer potentiality of its structure of vital energies in the challenging exigencies of time and space.

Destiny, in this sense, may be experienced merely as meaningless bondage and pointless suffering, or as fulfilment of one’s deepest and as yet unknown identity and creative freedom, depending largely upon the individual capacity of awareness, of ability to experience symbolic significance and to attempt a cooperative acceptance of the tragic as well as the joyful patterns of life. (p. 185)

The uroborus is eminently symbolic of this conception of self-relationship.

Unfoldment cannot proceed without turning inward to ingest the caudal, primordial matrix of becoming. It can be argued that destiny constantly gathers to itself new tendencies as ongoing experience is integrated into the primary form. Because the ingestion of one’s past (as *repast*, feeding again) is the nutriment which enables meaningful becoming and this past encompasses developmental stages with conflicting priorities and ways of organising experience, the feasting uroborus is no grinning

⁴ In this regard, the formulation of the self of analytical psychology bears comparison with that of the superego of psychoanalysis as that motive agency which seeks the just shaping of the future of the individual. The authorial voice of each is vastly different: while the superego potentiates the individual primarily insofar as he or she adheres to the dicta of internalized parental and authority figures (Loewald, 1962), the self potentiates the individual insofar as he or she embodies a very individual “pattern of intended wholeness” (Whitmont, 1971, p. 185).

epicure. More often than not its menu is one of distress, of a spirit which feels itself to have been repeatedly transgressed by the exigencies of existence, yet still seeking for the viable reconstitution of its wholeness in the embodied now.

In The Age of Anxiety, the poet W. H. Auden (1961) gives acute expression to the pervasive sense of despair that ensues when the temporal individual "Me" no longer feels himself to be, or to be able of becoming, "his pure I."

Let us then
Consider rather the incessant Now of
The traveller through time, his tired mind
Biased toward bigness since his body must
Exaggerate to exist, possessed by hope,
Acquisities, in quest of his own
Absconded self yet scared to find it
As he bumbles by from birth to death
Menaced by madness; whose mode of being,
Bashful or braggart, is to be at once
Outside and inside his own demand
For personal pattern. His pure I
Must give account of and greet his Me,
That field of force where he feels he thinks,
His past present, presupposing death,
Must ask what he is in order to be
And make meaning by omission and stress,
Avid of elseness. All that exists
Matters to man; he minds what happens
And feels he is at fault, a fallen soul
With power to place, to explain every
What in his world but why he is neither
God nor good, this guilt his insoluble
Final fact, infusing his private
Nexus of needs, his noted aims with
Incomprehensible comprehensive dread
At not being what he knows that before
This world was he was willed to become.
(pp. 66-67)

The recognition of this discrepancy between the felt destiny-potential of the self and the ego's failure to embody this potential gives rise to much of the suffering individuals bring to therapy, and becomes the catalyst for individuation. Whitmont (1971) urges for a balance between reductive and amplificatory perspectives which "enable us to grasp the different facets of the life-engendering destiny impulse of the self in its striving for unfoldment in space and time" (p. 189). The analyst aids the analysand in discovering his or her archetypal pattern of suffering in both its personalistic and

mythological meanings. The hollow breach between potential and perceived self which seemed to throw back to the sufferer endless echoes of self-incrimination gradually becomes reexperienced as an opening to be filled with creative becoming. Whitmont describes compulsions, fascinations and projections as “expressions of a relative disproportion between the personal actualisations available for the expression of constellated archetypal elements and their ‘intended’ range” (p. 190), and advocates the conscious development of new channels which can adequately express the fullness of the archetypal energies. Expressive therapies are ideal in this regard as they provide avenues for the required variety of manifestation which Whitmont finds these energies present: images, concepts, feelings and emotion-driven action patterns. In this way *amor fati* is born in the individual, who now feels him- or herself to be the creative interpreter, or choreographer, of an unfolding, personal destiny pattern in time.

This sense of destiny which primes the teleological motives inherent in individuation is relieved of its eschatological frame by writers such as Neumann (1989) who emphasise that the work of individuation is not toward the realisation of one’s life oriented toward a future, final state at the end of one’s personal time, but “toward the fulfilment of the present as an ‘everlasting present’ ” (p. 369).

Synchronicity

In time—yet outside of time. This *coincidentia oppositorum* characterises the temporal stance of analytical psychology toward psychic reality and is nowhere so evident as in the concept of synchronicity. Synchronicity is defined as “a *meaningful coincidence* of two or more events, where something other than the probability of chance is involved” (Jung, 1971, p. 505). It occurs at the intersection of two kinds of realities: psychic and physical, or inner and outer, as is evident in the three categories of synchronistic events outlined by Jung.

1. The coincidence of a psychic state in the observer with a simultaneous, objective, external event that corresponds to the psychic state or content. . . where there is no evidence of a causal connection between the psychic state and the external event, and where, considering the psychic relativity of space and

time, such a connection is not even conceivable.

2. The coincidence of a psychic state with a corresponding (more or less simultaneous) external event taking place outside the observer's field of perception. . . and only verifiable afterward. . .

3. The coincidence of a psychic state with a corresponding, yet not yet existent future event that is distant in time and can likewise only be verified afterward.
(p. 512)

Thus, while synchronistic phenomena need not occur with strict simultaneity in external time, they tend to most frequently occur within what might be called the extended horizons of the subjective present of the person or persons to whom they are meaningful (Keutzer, 1984). Because the principle of causality is primary in our meaningful interpretations of events in linear, external time, synchronistic events, manifesting in space and time, appear "impossible," seeming to derive their "cooccurrence" not from *reasons* but from the power of *meaningfulness* alone (Progoff, 1973).

Jung differentiated causality and synchronicity in his forward to The I Ching (1977), a Chinese divinatory practice used to predict the changing course of events in time according to structures of patterning *meanings*.

Since. . . [causality] is a merely statistical truth and not absolute, it is a sort of working hypothesis of how events evolve one out of another, whereas synchronicity takes the coincidence of events in space and time as meaning something more than mere chance, namely, a peculiar interdependence of objective events among themselves as well as with the subjective (psychic) states of the observer or observers. (p. xxiv)

While synchronistic events are felt to be exceptional and uncanny to those through whom they manifest, Jung (1969b) adroitly reminds us that all formulations of space and time are psychic conventions. Synchronistic events involve a greater inclusion of the reflexivity of the psyche as simultaneous subject and object, perhaps catching itself in the making of the world.

In themselves, space and time consist of *nothing*. They are hypostasised concepts born of the discriminating activity of the conscious mind, and they form the indispensable co-ordinates for describing the behaviour of bodies in motion. They are, therefore, essentially psychic in origin. . . . But if space and time are only apparently properties of bodies in motion and are created by the intellectual needs of the observer, then their relativisation by psychic conditions is no longer a matter for astonishment but is brought within the bounds of

possibility. This possibility presents itself when the psyche observes, not external bodies, but *itself*. (p. 436)

Perhaps one can go one step further and suggest that synchronistic events occur particularly when the psyche, intensely absorbed in the archetypal reality, finds that it is suddenly observing itself *through matter*. The property of synchronistic events which Jung (1969b) termed “transgressivity” exceeds the commonly experienced boundary between psyche and matter. Because of their intrinsic meaningfulness effected through a “leap” across categories which are traditionally considered to be causally segregated, Jung termed synchronistic events “acts of creation in time” (cited in Whitmont, 1971, p. 187).

Von Franz (1992) proposes the physicist David Bohm’s formulation of the *holomovement*, or ongoing flux of one single, basic universal energy through the two orders of explication (or unfolding) and implication (or infolding) as a way of understanding the dynamics of synchronicity. Weber (1986) introduces her interview with Bohm with a summary of his theory.

Bohm’s theory proposes that, in general, there are three major realms of existence: the explicate order, the implicate order, and a source-ground beyond both. The explicate order is the world of separate and isolated thing-events extended in space and time. The implicate order is a realm in which all thing-events are enfolded in a total wholeness, a wholeness and unity that, as it were, ‘underlies’ the explicate world of separate things and events. The ‘source-ground’ . . . is radically unqualifiable and totally beyond thought-symbols. (p. 91)

In the implicate order of the holomovement, “the connections of the whole have nothing to do with locality in space and time but have to do with an entirely different quality, namely enfoldment” (Bohm, cited in Weber, 1986, p. 26). Bohm speculates that consciousness and matter are one continuum within the holomovement. In it, time is not the *measure* of time but has a “depth of inwardness” in which all that appears as succession in the explicate order is compresent.

The isomorphism of Bohm’s formulations with Jung’s speculations (in a letter to Smythies, 1952, cited in von Franz, 1992) regarding the psyche as a continuum of “unextended intensity” extending itself through the neural transformations of the brain is readily apparent, a transformative process analogous to Bohm’s flux of implication

and explication.

It might be that psyche should be understood as *unextended intensity* and not as a body moving with time. . . . As in the psychic world there are no bodies moving through space, there is also no time. The archetypal world is “eternal,” i.e., outside time, and it is everywhere, as there is no space under psychic, that is archetypal conditions. Where an archetype prevails, we can expect synchronistic phenomena. . . (p. 208)

Within this formulation, the self as archetype, as an infolded destiny, would be no stranger to synchronistic occurrences originating in the heart—or “depth of inwardness”—of this destiny-pattern. They affirm and further; they are motif and motive.

Gammon (1973) gives temporal depth visual form by utilising the images borrowed from physics of curved spacetime with its central wormhole which allows for two connections between any two points on its Euclidean surfaces: one “causal” and utilising space and time, and the other acausal, taking place outside of time through the “hole connection,” or “window into eternity”. These diagrams, in effect, are the temporal diagram of von Franz (Figure 1) visualised in three dimensions. The meaningfulness crucial to the definition of synchronistic events occurs because the acausal connection has initiated the compresence (in *subjective* time) of events at the numinous threshold of inner and outer worlds.

If space is multiply connected by way of the hole between two aspects of itself, then the psyche may be multiply connected through an analogous hole in its structure. A synchronistic event may be experienced by consciousness as coming from within the psyche in a different sense than a causal event which is experienced as happening from outside the psyche. Thus synchronistic events have a ‘self-subsistent’ meaning which ordinary events do not generally have.. . . In other words, the synchronistic event takes place through a connection with its other part and is thus a connection with its own totality (past, present and future). (p. 19)

Gammon speculates that synchronistic events are experienced as exceptions to causal events because they are perceived “exceptionally:” not through causal channels, but through the window of meaning. While “meaning” is conceptually elusive in part because its content is subjectively as well as collectively determined, for Gammon its importance is strikingly simple: “. . . meaning is a cohesive principle within the life of the psyche. As a result of its ‘inner’ uniting character, an ‘outer’ effect comes into

existence. And in this sense it may be said that meaning gives rise to effect" (p. 22) . Meaning arising from "the archetypal ground of the self which is both a deposit of experiences and a precondition existing eternally" (p. 23) has the power to supersede--unpredictably--the lawfulness of causality. The individual does not passively receive his or her fate from this ground, but also creatively contributes the distillations of lived experience to its ongoing accretion.

Neumann (1989) stresses that due recognition must be given to the individual specificity the archetype can purvey: that although the archetypes are rooted in the collective unconscious, they are bearers of more than universal knowledge. "Indeed, their compensatory significance often lies exactly in their grasp of the fateful connections which their knowledge allows, but of which the conscious ego is unaware, and which apply to that individual only" (p. 32). The fields of knowledge available to the psyche can be understood from centred and decentred perspectives. Neumann describes the process of archetypal guidance reaching consciousness in "as if" fashion: creative inner authorities, gate-keepers at the threshold of time and not-time, seem to collect and organise the needed imaginal material and transmit it to the individual at the propitious moment. In the case of synchronistic events it is even usually conveyed in accessible form such that the "aha!" response is immediate and catalysing.⁵

Synchronistic events in therapy often move analyst and analysand into greater belief in and involvement with the therapeutic process, "waking" both to what existentialists speak of as "the pregnant moment," the Augenblick (Keutzer, 1984). The individual awakens to what Neumann (1989) calls his or her "time of fate," a time that is felt to be simultaneously, *paradoxically*, creative *and* fated. While they frequently operate as midwife to a more meaningful future, the irrational character of synchronistic events results from their apparent causal impossibility *from the ego's point of view*.

The beneficial effect of synchronistic experiences in therapy--as in life--comes precisely from the expansion of the ego's perspective to an awareness of itself as

⁵ For this reason, synchronistic events may be considered to be an instance of *Kairos*, the "auspicious moment," which is more fully discussed in the following chapter.

“mattering” in a field of meaning and supported in its path toward individuation. Furthermore, synchronistic experiences viscerally demonstrate the keen and interpenetrating relationship of psyche and its material environment which, in art therapy, often deepens commitment to embodying inner images in art media, and instils a sense of responsibility in the individual for personal change, generating hope with regard to the way personal change can effect the course of his or her future.

Reviewing these positive benefits, Keutzer (1984) also cites the potential hazards synchronistic experiences pose to some individuals. *Ego-identification* with archetypal material does not result in meaningful connectedness with all things but in ego-inflation and a fascination with transpersonal events to the exclusion of responsible engagement in daily life. Therefore careful ego-assessment of the client is important before encouraging the amplification of synchronistic experiences so that their meanings within the totality of the personality can be brought to consciousness.

Time in Therapy in Analytical Psychology

Temporally speaking the therapeutic hour in analytical psychology provides a protective frame, or *temenos*, in which the client “alternates to improve,” in alchemical fashion, between the meanings of his or her life in time in relation to it as a pattern-event in not-time. Therapist and client consciously, imaginatively, enter into events as *meanings*, inclusive of the event of therapy. Gammon (1973) describes this as accompanying an event through the “window into eternity” to its originating archetype, transformatively strengthening the conscious relationship with the self. Therapy sessions become that “window of meaning” outside--but equally inside--of time through which the archetypal urgings can be heard.

Cautionary use of this “window into eternity” must be used advisedly, as has been stressed throughout this chapter. Fordham (1986) cautions against too much focus on dreams and archetypal content that results in an apparent devaluation of the personal and interpersonal realm of the client. The more personally focused dream may be the transference itself, which Fordham suggests be considered as the client’s dream

within the therapeutic session. The archetypal frame of temporal reference is vast, and can actually *dislocate* the individual from the specific coordinates of his or her here and now. Samuels (1985) voices this caution as he presents a critical summary of perspectives on archetypal theory within analytical psychology.

But, for those who come into contact with archetypal imagery, one element stands out. The individual really is gripped by archetypal experience and imagery; his conscious life experiences and attitudes may count for nothing as they are swept away by pre-subjective schemas (p. 44).

Samuels expresses agreement with the Developmental School within analytical psychology on this issue, advocating the use of the archetypal dimension in therapy only as it elucidates the contemporary, personal dimension of the client's life. When used, the transhistorical dimension of experience in its symbolical meanings must be brought to root in the historical unfolding of the person as a psychophysically and interpersonally relevant, quickening force. One frequently used method that grounds the timeless within the personal time of the individual is to work with the client's favourite childhood fairytale, which often proves to be a primary component of the individual's personal myth (Dieckmann, 1991). Within this format, the relevance of the "once upon a time" to the personal time of the client is relatively easily accessed, and the familiar tale, long wedded to the individual's mythos, is already identified as providing a structure of containment for the archaic energies of the individual.

As in most psychotherapies, the regularity of sessions plays an important role in establishing a rhythmic assurance to the client whose inner world is disordered. Dieckmann (1991) speaks of the frequency of sessions *in time* as that rite which offers the protection of a consistently measurable *rhythm* through which the client can explore the "other time" characteristic of sessions and feel assured of a reliable egress back into social time. He offers his extensive clinical experience as validation of Meier's (1971) advocacy of the need for analysts to develop an ability to work from the mandala of their personality—from both the attitudes of introversion and extraversion and the four functions—in order to rotate the wheel of their personality in ways advantageous to the progression of the client's therapy.

One should be able to expect that analysts would have developed all four functions to some extent in the course of their training analyses and that they

would consequently be able to let their typological systems rotate. . . . Only in this manner can analysis become a dynamic process and can a productive tension develop between the two systems. (Dieckmann, pp. 196-197).

Adapting Mann, Siegler and Osmond's (1968) linkage of temporal experience with personality type to the analytical relationship, we can say that the analyst must be able, in some degree, to experience in him- or herself the temporal organisations of each attitude and function. Only in this way can the analyst meet and understand the client in the temporal coordinates of his or her world and, rotating the "clock" of his or her *own* personality, induce change in the client's temporal organisation of experience.

The arts, with their inherent ability to access unconscious content (Ehrenzweig, 1967), have traditionally been used in analytic practice to both access and contain the experience of the collective unconscious. The use of the visual arts will be more extensively detailed in Chapter 4. Dance, which is movements in time, may be used to effect eloquent and unified expression of the client's psychological *and* bodily experience of the personal unconscious, the cultural unconscious, the primordial unconscious and the self (Chodorow, 1984). The favourite fairy tale of a client in childhood may take the client to the indiscriminate "once upon a time" of archetypal "timeless" reality, while also reactivating the time of his or her childhood in memory, and at the same time opening the client to ways he or she still lives within that tale's organisation of experience in adult life. Alternatively, a fairy tale may be used by the analyst on which to structure and negotiate her experience of a client's reality.⁶ The imaginal dialogues of active imagination may be dramatically enacted to "make present" and give voice to the cast of characters composing the "plural psyche"⁷ of the singular individual.

The therapeutic relationship can be seen as one reconstituting the mother/child relationship. The therapist becomes that embodiment of the self which enables the client to renegotiate his or her birth into time and ego consciousness in the presence of

⁶ The Jungian analyst Marion Woodman documents her use of the Grimms's fairy tale, *Allerleirauh* in this way, and the therapeutic use of various arts by three clients, in her book Leaving my father's house (1992).

⁷ While he does not document the use of drama in therapy, this model of the psyche is extensively explored by Samuels in his book, The plural psyche (1989).

an “other” as “a nourishing and sustaining centre of totality” (McCurdy, 1987). In this way the ego-self axis is made strong, and the transcendent function with its ability to form symbols resolving the conflict of opposites can become operative. The desire for timeless experiences will no longer be consistently marked by regressive yearnings, but will become progressive, nurturing the blooming of the individual from his or her origin in the creative unconscious into fulfilling individuation in time.

Summary

Perhaps the central contribution of the theory of analytical psychology to a discussion of the subjective experience of time is its revaluation of experiences of “timelessness,” or what is outside of objective time. Consequently, inner images that seem to relate little to the time of outer experience are viewed and utilised as essential to the project of individuation. This revaluation of timelessness as a primordial state of origins is generated by Jung’s understanding of the unconscious as a repository of organising principles, inclusive of the self, that are inherently creative and purposive, and his development of methodologies that elucidate expressions from the unconscious in constructive rather than reductive ways. Images and objects are not read primarily as signs of object relations in the past but as symbols embodying “the tendencies of the subject,” the attitude, or qualities of readiness, through which the client’s road of individuation proceeds. Analytical psychology therefore may be considered the most inclusive of the three models presented in its advocacy of all temporal modes as valuable constructs of human experience.

THE SUBJECTIVE SENSE OF TIME IN EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOTHERAPY

The theoretical schools of psychoanalysis, analytical psychology and existential psychotherapy share in recognising that psychological, or subjective, time does not conform to the rigid measures of external, or objective, time. While psychoanalysts seek to illuminate an understanding of the client's present through examination of the real and phantasmic past as elaborated through a matrix of primitive, if sometimes sublimated, instinctual drives; and analytical psychotherapists "actively imagine" the past, present and future of an individual's psychic dynamics through the elaboration of archetypal structures described as originating outside of time; existential psychotherapists start from a point of inquiry that is more simply stated: "they boldly place time in the centre of the psychological picture and proceed to study it not in the traditional way. . . but in its own existential meaning for the patient (May, 1958, p. 65).

While my discussion of the subjective experience of time in existential analysis is shorter than those of psychoanalysis and analytical psychology, this in no way reflects a paucity of interest or literature on time in its archives. On the contrary, as we shall see, the existentialist takes the temporal qualities of being as central to its understanding of human existence. The brevity of the chapter has rather to do with the fact that the understandings of the structure of the psyche and of historical time in the life of the individual represented in the previous two chapters may, although usually in modified form, be part of the existential therapist's perspective, insofar as the theories and methodologies psychoanalysis or of analytical psychology illuminate the *present*, *existential* meaning of time for the patient. May (1958) and Binswanger, for instance, do not dispense with the idea of the unconscious, but do object to the tendency to reify and segregate it in a way that may seem to absolve the unitary being from taking full

responsibility for the task of self-creation. May states:

Binswanger remarks that, for the time being, the existential therapists will not be able to dispense with the concept of the unconscious. I would propose, rather, to agree that being is at some point indivisible, that unconsciousness is part of any given being, that the cellar theory of the unconscious is logically wrong and practically unconstructive; but that the meaning of the discovery, namely the radical enlargement of being, is one of the great contributions of our day and must be retained. (p. 91)

Such an existential reformulation of the unconscious denies it a limiting power on the future of the individual.

Binswanger (1958b) arrived at a synthesis of psychoanalysis, phenomenology and existentialist concepts which he called *Daseinsanalyse* (Existential Analysis) founded on Heidegger's Analysis of Being. The existential analyst seeks to understand the entire structure of the existence of the individual, who may live in several conflicting "worlds."

Existential analysis strives to reconstruct the development and transformations of the individual's "world" or conflicting "worlds." Binswanger stressed the fact that this study implies a biographic investigation conducted according to psychoanalytic methods. (Ellenberger, 1958, p. 121)

While many existential psychotherapists will not use psychoanalytic methods, nonetheless an inquiry into the past, present and envisioned future worlds of the individual will be conducted. The goal of the investigation is to arrive at an account of "being as it is," which becomes a structural and empathic comparison of "world-designs," each of which may have at its heart a different temporal organisation.

Being as Temporalisation: The-One-Who-Keeps-Emerging-As-A-Self

The phenomenological methodology employed by existentialist analysis takes as its point of departure the most immediate aspect of the subjective experience of time, the flowing of life. Keen observation of the ongoing emergence of existence has as its goal the arrival at the meanings which attach themselves to both the fluid and halting unfoldment of the individual in time. "What we call the feeling of the 'meaning of life' cannot be understood independently of the subjective feeling of experienced time.

Distortions of the feeling of time necessarily result in distortions of the meaning of life” (Ellenberger, 1958, p. 106). In the therapeutic milieu, therapist and client join in seeking to account for the aberrations in this flow which keep the individual from realising his or her full potentiality.

While the terms “the individual” or “the patient” can both be found in the literature of existential psychology to refer to the person the therapist encounters in the therapeutic relationship, Binswanger’s (1958a) reference to Ellen West as “this existence” demonstrates in its etymological roots the primacy of the phenomenology of *becoming*, which is at heart a temporal unfolding, to the existential formulation of personhood (or, perhaps more appropriately, *personing*). To demonstrate the “Thou-ness”¹ of Binswanger’s usage of “an existence” which, taken out of context, may appear cold and impersonal, I will include a passage from his classic text of the case of Ellen West which demonstrates the intimate degree of professional care which contextualises his choice of terminology.

When an existence, as in the case of Ellen West, is ruled to such a high degree by the existential forms of death, dread, and guilt, this means that it is claimed to an especially high degree as an individual one. When the existence is claimed so exclusively as an individual one, and especially when it exists to such a high degree as a desperate individual one and can throw off this desperation only through the sacrifice of life, then love, which claims existence as a dual one. . .has evidently not achieved a breakthrough. This shows, among other things, in the fact that Ellen West cannot wait, not even for death, but rather is constantly in dread of “losing time,” even in the regard to the resolve for death, whereas love is *passion infinie* per se and by no means “time’s fool,” . . . This existence would not have suffered so agonisingly from its emptiness and impoverishment, experiencing them not only as a burden but as a hell, had it not had a secret knowledge of the possibility of being-beyond-the-world. (pp. 312-313)

While “individual” stresses undividedness and, as Binswanger suggests, isolation, “an existence” connotes the-one-which-keeps-emerging-as-itself through its etymological derivation of *ex-sistere*, forth-standing, emerging (Ayto, 1990). This term connotes the inherently active nature of human being addressed in existential psychotherapy that the more passive *Dasein*, or “being-there,” may not hold. That which stands forth *and*

¹ Ellenberger (1958, p. 121) documents the influence of Martin Buber’s book *I and Thou* on Binswanger. The relationship of I and Thou is one of reciprocal encounter through the *wholeness* of each sharer’s being.

its ground are invoked as a dynamic of relationship taking place in each moment. While two individuals may be quite different in the qualities of their coherent yet disparate integrities, therapist-as-an-existence and client-as-an-existence stresses the shared, formal posture of one-who-stands-forth *encountering* another-who-stands-forth, co-emerging within the *same* ground of being--temporality.

These existences derive their existential task from the model put forth by temporality itself, which, according to Heidegger (1962/1927) “ ‘is’ not an entity at all” but “temporalises possible ways of itself. . .[which] make possible the multiplicity of Dasein’s modes of Being” (p. 377). Time “stands out” from temporality as the three *ecstases* of past, present and future. In just this way, “Dasein temporalises itself as a self” (Kocklemans, 1985, p. 77). Declaring that “the primary meaning of existentiality is the future” (Heidegger, 1962/1927, p. 376), Heidegger describes the futuring of Dasein as Dasein coming toward its true self, which it experiences “always already as having been thrown forth (past), and concerning itself with beings. . .(present)” (Kocklemans, 1985, p. 76). Becoming thus involves a temporal loop, through which it manifests the meaning of care.

By fetching itself back time and again, *Dasein* lets its own self be in terms of its authentic past; in addition, it also is as constantly coming toward its authentic self. It is thus in this complex process that *Dasein* hands over to itself its own heritage and thus “finds” its true self. (Kocklemans, 1985, p. 76)

The paradox implicit in this temporal *retrieval toward* authenticity is the existential task that defines Dasein as an active, creative construct which each moment “hands over to itself its own heritage,” *through* which it futures. While the disposition of Dasein is toward the future, because its consciousness is of a temporal world that is a nexus of interpenetrating times, there arises the distinguishing capacity of a human being to transcend any given mode of time. In fact, existential analysis understands psychoses, which may exhibit typical *and* idiosyncratic temporal organisations, as “specific modes of transcending”² ways of being in time that are unbearable (Binswanger, 1958b, p.

² May (1958, pp. 71-76) provides a discussion defining the use of the word “transcendence” in existential literature, which has none of the ethereal, visionary connotations present in its general usage, but rather means “to surmount” through the perception, consideration, choice and enactment of possibilities.

194). Nurturing the human capacity to transcend enables existential analysis to effect change in its clinical applications.

Hale (1993) devises an ennead of time dimensions which he categorises into authentic and unauthentic time. He advocates the development of temporal authenticity, which he defines as 1) the ruling of outer and inner life by subjective time; 2) immersion of this subjectivity in immediate experience; and 3) relating meaningfully to the past and future. While his systematisation of time holds some interest in its poetic, mythical and literary dimensions, his divisions seem arbitrary and his advocacy of an authentic time defined as “ruling” *outer* life by inner subjective time fails to deal with the realities of objective time to which individuals must adapt. In aspiring to authenticity, Hale does not make clear, as Jung (1971b) does in his summary of individuation, that “adaptation to the minimum of collective norms must first be attained. If a plant is to unfold its specific nature to the full, it must first be able to grow in the soil in which it is planted” (p. 449).

In Binswanger’s *Daseinsanalyse*, the full contextualisation of the subjective feelings of the experience of time is sought through the reconstruction of the development and transformation of the individual’s world or worlds (Ellenberger, 1958). Just as we found Fraser (1981, 1990) applying the bio-environmental formulations of von Uexküll’s *umwelts* to psychoanalytic theory, so Binswanger used them as a model for his existential theories regarding the several, conflicting “worlds” which individuals inhabit. For Binswanger, the *Umwelt*, or “world around” is the world of the biological and environmental realities, in which each existence is motivated by needs, drives and instincts and survival involves adjustment and adaptation. The *Mitwelt*, or “with-world,” is that of the interrelationships of human beings with each other for which the *modus vivendi* is that of encounter. The *Eigenwelt*, or “self world,” is the subjective world of the individual to whom all that it can perceive or conceive is known in its “for-me-ness” (May, 1958).

While centred on the world of humans in relationship, Binswanger’s model shares with Fraser’s the idea of interpenetrating or nesting realities, each with a different temporal organisation. Within Ellenberger’s (1958) account of the modes of

existential being in which an individual engages in relationships in the *Mitwelt*, or world of fellow human beings, differing experiences of time can be observed. The “dual existential” mode of I-Thou encounters of deep love and friendship frequently manifest “an exigency of eternity.” Profound moments of interpersonal reciprocity “coincide with eternity by excluding transient duration. This *Heimat* (inner home of love), which transcends space and in which the moment and eternity fuse, forms the core of the normal existential experience, according to Binswanger” (Ellenberger, 1958, p. 122). In the “plural mode” of formal and frequently competitive relationships adjustment to social, clock time is of primary importance. In the “singular mode” of the relationship of a person to her or himself, subjective psychological time dominates, into which is woven the complex, yet in health, unified time of bodily rhythms. In the fourth, “anonymous mode,” the individual lives, acts and is acted upon in the anonymous collectivity. Time and causation are felt as impersonal. All interactions are distanced from the subject. The *Umwelt* would contain the natural rhythms of the environment and of the body. The *Eigenwelt* would be characterised by the internalisation and integration of all these temporal rhythms.

As described by Binswanger (1958a), temporal conflict is inherent in the “singular mode” of existence of the being with itself and in the relation of the singular mode to the plural mode of relations within the *Mitwelt*. The friction produced by the conflicting *meanings* of these worlds of time is a factor in the composition of “the inner border of sin” where the being experiences “concealing shame.” While the duration of the self seems independent of space and time, the being, as bodily self, is a corporeal presence of autonomous processes that are *seen* to be mortal. Considered in this way, time is felt to arise and end with the body. Using the ideas of Scheler and Kierkegaard, Binswanger speaks of existential impoverishment as, in part, the descension of the experienced eternity of the self into temporality in such a way that the freedom of the self is felt to be irretrievable. Freedom deteriorates into compulsions as the self become fixated on its finite aspects. Compulsions serve to divert the attention of the ego and the other from this “inner border of sin” but only succeed, much as in blushing (Binswanger, 1958a), to call attention to it. “In shame, therefore, in a

peculiar and obscure way, mind and flesh, eternity and temporality, essence and existence touch each other" (Scheler, cited in Binswanger, 1958a, p. 338). Time brings us to shame because it brings us to our limits.

As in other theoretical formulations, in existential psychology the subjective sense of time is also seen to be conditioned by where we are in the cycle of our lives. Youth is a radiance kindled by possibility; in youth we gambol at the forefront of our becoming. As we age we gradually become more aware of the temporal limit to our existence and activities. Living toward the future may hold a debilitating irony, since the future now holds the fact of the being's own death close to it for scrutiny. While Minkowski (1970) stresses that in health this feeling is counterbalanced by the rewards and enjoyments of those activities to which we have chosen to devote our life's time, he describes the feeling that one's own being no longer unfolds in pace with world-time.

In the last analysis, a feeling of a *gap between one's own life and ambient becoming*, as well as a feeling of *impotence* and very often of distress, is found at the heart of the phenomenon of "growing old." (p. 312)

This feeling of a gap will manifest as what Minkowski calls "harmonic phenomena," from its manageable appearance in the normal consciousness to debilitating and even psychotic dissociations in geriatric pathological disorders. Aging may be experienced as in some ways shameful, and depression may ensue when the once less fettered self finds its physical and mental vehicles increasingly derelict in their duties. A similar sense of disharmony can arise at any age during the experience of mental or physical illness, inclusive of the effects of medications on the ability of the patient to enter the flow of social time. The experience of an ever widening "gap between one's own life and ambient becoming" is also that "between mind and flesh, eternity and temporality, essence and existence."

While becoming a greater challenge in old age, the task of bridging the heterogeneity of temporal experience, whether intrapsychically or between self and world, is one which the human individual takes on with her first breath. Humans can transcend the apparent boundaries of time through memory and imagination, bringing the past into the present and projecting themselves into possible futures. Fallico (1962)

identifies art as a mode of transcendence which enables us “to see life steadily and to see life whole” (p. 83). In its making, which can also be considered a “retrieval forward,” art shares with time the quality of presencing, binding the “original font of purposing” (p. 84) within the communicative, enduring object in which “passing becomes a permanence, now” (p. 80). Mowrer (1950) speaks of “time-binding” as a distinctive feature of the human personality. This function of the personality is commonly evident in the human experience of the present, which is not an isolated “now” bereft of moorings but, as described by Merleau-Ponty (in Zaner, 1964), is a “field of presence” with a “double horizon”: it retains the impression of what has just passed and its future edge predelineates what is to come.

Living Forward: The Present as Futuring

Living forward, we are brought to our possibilities. Perhaps because the continuous availability of attention, so essential to phenomenological processes of knowing, contradicts closure, existential theorists propose that the future is the dominant temporal mode for humans. While science studies past events as closed phenomena in which new factors cannot interfere, Giorgi (1970) suggests this is questionable posturing in a *human science*: “. . .once a human being is introduced into a phenomenon as a constitutive aspect, a ‘closing’ attitude is no longer adequate” (pp. 187-188).

Maslow (1968) argues for the concept of the human future “dynamically active at this present moment” to be made a central construct in psychology, pointing out that factors such as growth, hoping, wishing, apprehension and self-actualisation all presuppose a “currently active future” (p. 15): “I am convinced that much of what we now call psychology is the study of the tricks we use to avoid the anxiety of absolute novelty by making believe the future will be like the past” (p. 16). May (1958) describes the individual as “always in the process of becoming, always developing in time, . . . never to be defined at static points” (p. 67). Because existence is always streaming out of itself, knowledge of it can *only* be in a state of isomorphic becoming.

Being and becoming are actualised in a present at the precise moment in which it is creatively “futuring.”

Minkowski (1970) refers to this spontaneous unfolding of a being toward its future as its *élan vital*, which causes becoming to be irreversible and to have meaning.

We said above that the *élan vital* creates the future before us and that it is the only thing that does. Here, also, it would be inexact to say that we know that a future exists and that we orient our impulse toward that future. No, the future and the *élan vital* are so intimately connected that they are but one. The *élan vital* discloses the existence of the future to us, gives it a meaning, opens it, creates it before us. (p. 39)

In Minkowski’s formulation, the *élan vital* eagerly, unquenchably, enters into the fullness of its possibilities in each moment. The personal *élan* provides “the *inward intuition*, the *inner conviction*, that in letting my personality grow I find myself in perfect accord with the general purposes of my existence. . .” (p. 50). The individual who is at one with his or her personal *élan* is inevitably *within* creative futuring. Such an individual is not in conflict with time because he or she is wholly given to its passage.

For this present is not part of time, ridiculously conceived to be between the past and the future; it is a completely different manner of living time from that which characterises the past. It does not set apart or isolate, but integrates, unfolds, and radiates, in opening the horizon of the future before us. (p. 165)

The “contexture” of the present cannot be transcribed in accounts of this present when it has become past because the present is affirmation, whereas “negation has penetrated time” that is past (p. 167). For Minkowski, however, time need not bring us to the shame of limits; rather, time, if entered into, provides the occasion for realisation of the relatedness of the personal *élan* to that which enfolds it and surpasses it--the impersonal *élan vital*. The *élan vital*, which is unlimited, prevents the unfolding of lived time from being a reproduction of the past projected in front of us. In health, we do not live forward only through the limits of our memory. Minkowski identifies six vital phenomena which enable a being to live its future: activity, expectation, desire, hope, prayer and the ethical act. The individual who feels her personal *élan* as dynamically interpenetrated by the *élan vital* can fully and indefatigably *be* her future inclusive of her

death. For within this enlarged perspective, death “is only an incident which scarcely merits remembrance” (p. 146). “Death is . . . only a point which life surpasses on all sides” (p. 145).

This position of what might be called a “decentred” *élan*, however, is one which most people only rarely achieve. Humans as both subject and object of research into time must acknowledge that in the fullness of their engagement they *are* each, nonetheless, a terminal event: we are “in a perspective,” with measurably shortening temporal coordinates. While the sense of “I exist” affirms being as much if not more than becoming, providing a point of rest for the ego in the river of time, this point of rest often seems to be a floating island at best, its “current” drifting toward the nearing horizon of death. Fallico (1962) construes the “now” in two ways; juxtaposed, these clearly show the immense perplexity infolded in an individual who braves the utterance, “I am.”

We might say that the very meaning of this passing away which somehow stays, or staying which passes away—this time of our existence—yearns to be an accomplished now of being with no past or future needed to give it being. (p. 79)

Even the future, as a matter of fact, is a sort of prospective memory, as the past is a retrospective one; our sense of identity requires that we “remember where we are going,” no less than where we have been. . . . When the two memories between which our existential now is sandwiched disappear, nothing remains of us for ourselves. . . . in itself, the moment of time is no abode for our being. (p. 78)

A life that is “full of meaning,” therefore, reveals itself to be an aesthetic construction in which non-being, the inevitable death of each individual, contributes to the creative fire of being. Rollo May (1958) writes:

To grasp what it means to exist, one needs to grasp the fact that he might not exist, that he treads at every moment on the sharp edge of possible annihilation and can never escape the fact that death will arrive at some unknown moment in the future. . . . But with the confronting of non-being, existence takes on vitality and immediacy, and the individual experiences a heightened consciousness of himself, his world, and others around him (pp. 47-48).

The awareness of the absoluteness of one’s death from an existential perspective, says May, gives “my existence and what I do each hour an absolute quality” (p 49).

Melges (1982) appended a personal epilogue to his book on the significance of psychological time and mental disorders, which he wrote while undergoing kidney failure and a consequent risky transplant from which recovery was not certain. The understanding of time distilled from his personal experience echoes the attitude of May. "When we fully realize that we are not eternal in this life, each instant has eternal significance" (p. 291). This sense of significance only fuelled Melges' desire to *create*, in communicable and lasting form, from within physical upheaval and deterioration, his clinical insights into time.

But death as non-being need not be narrowly defined as a physiological occurrence; non-being also happens when the individual loses a sense of her own potential, her unique way of taking in, relating to and expressing the conjunction of self and world in the stream of time. Conformism offers the individual an escape from the anxiety of *being*.

Heidegger holds that our preoccupation with objective time is really an evasion; people much prefer to see themselves in terms of objective time, the time of statistics, of quantitative measurement, of "the average," etc., because they are afraid to grasp their existence directly. (May, 1958, p. 68n)

Likewise, conformism offers the individual an escape from the anxiety of *non-being*, as he or she yields his or her identity to the being-of-the-mass. The survival of the individual-as-unit is guaranteed because these units *qua* units are replaceable. This identification with the group differs from Minkowski's realisation of personal *élan* as participant in the greater *élan vital* in that the former cedes creative becoming to homogeneity, while the latter contributes creative becoming to the ongoing creative unfoldment of humankind.

The Existential Past: "I-Am-As-Having-Been"

The past is not considered to be deterministic by existential psychotherapists or even existential psychoanalysts, for whom a detailed case history is crucial, because the *future* is considered to "determine" the past. What Dasein harvests in its "retrieval forward," referred to above, is influenced by its vision of its future. The understanding

of temporality as an in-forming process of Dasein, or the “being-there,” of an individual existence, was expressed by Heidegger in Being and Time (1962/1927) as follows.

Only insofar as Dasein *is* as an “I-*am*-as-having-been,” can Dasein come toward itself futurally in such a way that it comes *back*. As authentically futural, Dasein *is* authentically as “*having been*.” Anticipation of one’s uttermost and ownmost possibility is coming back understandingly to one’s ownmost “been.” Only so far as it is futural can Dasein *be* authentically as having been. The character of “having been” arises, in a certain way, from the future. (p. 373)

Transposing this from philosophical to psychological discourse, May (1958) states, “What an individual seeks *to become* determines what he remembers of his *has been*” (p. 69). The notorious selectivity of memory is generated by the beliefs an individual has about himself through which he or she actively and passively shapes a future. Minkowski (1970) exposes the paradox in acts of memory as he explores the phenomenological aspects of “pastness.”

In memory two things are noticed. “I remember an event” means: I remember it *and* it has really taken place. But if memory is the only means of putting us in relation with the past, it seems equally as justified to affirm that memory produces the past as it is to say that it reproduces it. . . Besides, it is easy to realize that all verification of our memories can only depend on a new act of memory. (p. 151)

Minkowski does not find this logic, however, to adequately describe the *felt* reality of the past in those moments when it suffuses our present. He endorses Pichon’s phenomenological description of levels of recall: the “insensible level” of factual recall, the “emotive level” of nostalgic reverie, and the “level of anguish” in which the past is “actually relived” in all its intensity. Pichon suggests this anguish is comparable to a “state of extreme mourning, probably because it consists in the contrast between the actual endopsychic presence of the past and its irreparable objective inexistence” (Pichon, *Essai d’étude convergents des problèmes du temps*, cited in Minkowski, 1970, p. 152). While existentialism privileges the here and now, it also acknowledges the temporal reservoir of inner psychological and bodily experience which can enrich or deplete the now.

This felt complexity of the *inner* historical past cannot be adequately conveyed

through the charted assessments of clinicians. The data of a client's past leads only to the constructions of inductive knowledge. Because the existential psychotherapist does not view human being as merely fleshed out cause and effect, the anemnesis needs to be supplemented by another mode of knowing, which Minkowski calls "intuitive knowledge through penetration."

Certainly, the knowledge we have of an individual's past plays a great part in the judgment we make concerning him. However, quite often, when we are with him and have to judge him, this knowledge is surpassed by the need to penetrate his whole being in a single act. (p. 222)

The living personality *presenting* itself to the therapist can only be apprehended through what Minkowski refers to as acts in the present: "intellectual sympathy, discernment, diagnosis through feeling" (p. 222). In is only in this way, Minkowski concludes, that the clinical syndrome is deepened into a psychological phenomenon.

Kairos

If there were to be declared a god of existentialist theory it would be *Kairos*. While the open, presence of being that is characteristic of the therapeutic relationship in existential psychotherapy is ever-renewed, and in this sustained way participates in duration, its distillate could be said to be that pure moment of keen realisation of one's moment to moment unfolding, and within that, full openness and readiness to incarnate the possibilities of one's being that have previously seemed unachievable. As noted in footnotes in previous chapters, however, the principle of *kairos* is addressed within psychoanalysis and analytical psychology as well, for "auspicious moments" may appear in the practice of all psychotherapies. In his excellent article on the phenomenon of *kairos*, the psychoanalyst, Kelman (1969), describes *kairos* as "a psychological moment, and auspicious, a right time, life itself as it unfolds moment to moment" (p. 59). Ehrenwald (1969) calls *kairos* "a moment outside measurable time and space" (p. 89), while Goldwert (1991) refers to it as "a time of divine decision. . .the decisive moment" (p. 553). The salience of *kairos* to existential psychotherapy as a more sustained posture is immediately apparent; in both *kairos* and existential psychotherapy,

one is constantly challenged to be actively present, making available the full potentiality of one's being to grasping the fullness of each moment. One will then be poised for "rebirth" through those moments pregnant with a confluence of factors able to stimulate crucial change.

A grandson of Chronos and the youngest son of Zeus, *Kairos* is most often portrayed as a youth with a forelock of hair in front and a bald head behind. The phrase "to take time by the forelock" embodies the existential attitude which Kelman points out must be the essence of an individual's relationship to *kairos*. Kelman gives us the reason behind this forthright injunction which dictates the only possible relationship a human can have with this swift god. One was adjured to "respond totally to the existential confrontation and seize him [*Kairos*] by the forelock where your grip was firm."

One moment later as you passed him and he passed you, it was too late. To turn around for a second chance would put you in an almost ineffectual position of moving forward and backward at the same time; you would be in a very unbalanced condition and much worse, with your limited resources available to you, you would face the bald back of his head with no place to grab hold. (p.59)

Ehrenwald terms the experience of *kairos* as effecting an existential shift in the client. The fact that Ehrenwald as well as Kelman write primarily from a psychoanalytic perspective only shows how inevitably existential values surface in all models of psychotherapy³ because they spring from the most fundamental phenomenon of being. For Ehrenwald, moments of *kairos* offer a compensatory reprieve from the reductive rigours of psychoanalysis: "Kairos implies, among other things, the paradox of both the therapist's and the patient's experience of freedom versus determinism in their joint venture" (p. 92), and "pave[s] the way for both the patient's and therapist's faltering attempts to assert their independence from . . . the tyranny of the instincts" (p. 93).

Booth (1969) finds a biological basis for human *kairos* in those

³ Goldwert (1991) not only summarises the interpretation of *kairos* within Eriksonian psychoanalysis but also within analytical psychology, where its origins in Greek myth are stressed and *kairos* takes on a more archetypal significance.

instances of sudden, apparently acausal, leaps in the evolution of life forms.

... on all levels of evolution some organisms have auspicious moments in which they responded to the environment in new ways. Their genes changed, they developed new bodily forms and new types in behaviour. (p. 85)

Booth traces the concept of *kairos* back to its origins in the aphoristic tenets informing the somatic medicine of Hippocrates: "Life is short, art is long, the auspicious moment sharply limited,⁴ experience untrustworthy, judgment difficult" (p. 84). Thus, *kairos* and crisis are linked, the latter being the stimulus for the former, which is an intensity of acausal reorganisation of the psychosomatic being, enabling resolution. Booth goes on to advocate holistic assessments in medicine.

In the age of physical science, patients and physicians are predisposed to accept physical processes without considering the question of their existential meaning. Thus the pathogenetic influences of inner attitude and/or psychosocial environment are generally not recognised and cannot be corrected. (pp. 85-86).

Booth uses Rorschach imagery to clarify the personal form of specific somatic disease processes in his patients, because its non-representational forms elicit representational forms from patients that frequently suggest the relationship between the life history of the individual and the disease process. Perhaps the projective moment can be viewed as an opportunity for *kairos*, for unconscious content to leap out and grasp the forelock of configuring meaning offered to it.

Booth accounts for *kairos* occurring in organisms because they are not independent mechanisms related only through predictable chains of cause and effect, but interdependent existences related through reciprocity. Between two organisms lies an animate field which has both biological and, in humans, psychological significance.

The human *encounter* in existential psychotherapy recognises shared qualities of human being, one of which is the ability of the individual to transcend general laws. Clinically, a diagnosis is only a tool within which the *personal form* of the mental

⁴ Booth finds the fact that this part of the phrase, referring to the "auspicious moment" or acausal *kairos*, is omitted on the frieze in the New York Academy of Medicine diagnostic of scientific medicine's attempt to reduce "the therapeutic encounter between patient and physician to the interaction between the physical processes of the body and their scientific manipulation by the doctor" (p. 84).

illness process is drawn out (quite literally in art therapy), and within which both pathogenic and healing factors become visible. While each moment in existential therapy is not a moment of *kairos*, the temporal attitude that is cultivated in therapist and client is one of invitation and availability to the passing of this elusive, “moment-ous” god.

Summary

Existential psychotherapists centre their inquiry into the subjective experience of time around its meanings to the client. The temporal perspective given emphasis is that of the cusp of the present/future. In psychotherapy, the various world-designs in which the individual lives are determined and analysed in order to assess their harmonious and conflictual relationships. The client is invited to participate in this investigation, and explore within these worlds the potential reasons he or she is not able to discern and creatively realize his or her own possibilities.

Existential theory posits that existence is motivated by the future, not determined by the past. It does not deny the shaping power of past experiences, but stresses that the significance and recall of the past is determined by the individual's attitude toward the present and future. Only a commitment to changing something in the future is theorised to give meaning to uncovering the past. Situating itself in the pure “now” of the individual, the practice of existential psychotherapy seeks to reconnect that now with “the original font of purposing” (Fallico, 1962, p. 84). Becoming is then experienced as emergence, each moment a moment of renewal comprising acts of self-retrieval and self-creation.

Chapter 4:

**THE SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE OF TIME IN THE CREATIVE
PROCESS AND PRODUCTS
OF ART THERAPY**

Then came, at a predetermined moment, a moment in
time and of time,
A moment not out of time, but in time, in what we call
history: transecting, bisecting the world of time, a
moment in time but not like a moment of time,
A moment in time but time was made through that mo-
ment: for without the meaning there is not time, and
that moment of time gave the meaning.

-T. S. Eliot, *The Rock (Chorus VII)*
p. 119, Selected Poems

The moment and succession of moments that occasion the creation of art in art therapy are a relational event of not only persons, psyche and matter, but of these with time, and of these with *time and time*. Phrased in this way, the durational moment of creation in the succession of moments that comprise a sequence of sessions in art therapy can be seen to participate in the complexity of the moment T. S. Eliot speaks of in his chorus, *The Rock*. As therapists we attempt to enable the client to pass “through doubt to assurance, by reflecting, in the moment, and by grasping the moment imaginatively” (Willeford, 1987, p. 14). As *art* therapists, we facilitate the individual in active expression of the spectrum of feelings that are intrinsic to such moments in paints, drawing and sculptural materials. Within the application of each medium of art is articulated the secret discourse of time. In this way the receptive and active capabilities of the individual are united in creative becoming. The creation of those moments in which time regains its meaning for the client are moments of *kairos* in which time is made anew, and personal change becomes possible. These moments are within time, within our datebooks and within the history of the individual, yet are felt equally to be moments “transecting, bisecting the world of time.”

Our task often shares in the qualities of the work of the historian, whom Kubler (1962) likens to the painter.

He is committed to the detection and description of the shape of time. He transposes, reduces, composes, and colours a facsimile, like a painter, who in his search for the identity of the subject, must discover a patterned set of properties that will elicit recognition all the while conveying a new perception of the subject. (p. 12)

We are committed to the detection and description of the “shape” the individual models out of his or her relations to material others in immaterial time; to discerning that “patterned set of properties that . . . elicit recognition” of the individual, even as we seek to facilitate in him or her a new way of perceiving self. This is that generative moment in time which gives meaning, enabling the client to entrain conscious and unconscious energies in modelling the shape he or she *chooses* to cast in time.

Calling the “moment” of art therapy at once both sensual and reflective places us within the philosophic context of Hume for whom the perceptual dialogue of sensing and reflecting were the foundation of the way a human comes to understand its world. Hume’s ratiocinations provide a philosophic account of how the moment of experiencing the making of, and reflection on an art object is inescapably a moment of making and reflection on the self, feelingly bound up with the materials of its perceived objects.

If it [substance] be conveyed to us by our senses, I ask, which of them, and after what manner? If it be perceived by the eyes, it must be a colour; if by the ears, a sound, if by the palate, a taste; and so of the other senses. But I believe none will assert that substance is either a colour, or sound, or taste. The idea of substance must, therefore, be derived from an impression of reflection, if it really exist. But the impressions of reflection resolve themselves into our passions and emotions. . . (cited in Whitehead, 1955, pp. 33-34)

According to Hume, we can have no idea of a substance distinct from that collection of qualities garnered in processes of involvement and discernment by a being that is both emotional and passionate—even in his or her “reasoning.” Within this perspective, there is no manipulation of materials in art therapy, inclusive of the *matter* of time, that is not the manipulation of passions and emotions, even when an intellectualising client limns his or her well-reasoned work. The creative process in art therapy carries the force of ritual in that it unfolds, *each time*, as a discovery and enactment of the drama of

one's own passion play *in time*, resonant with *timeless* archetypal themes. Emotions an individual bears toward the invisible medium of time are inescapably plied within the materials through which inner experience is creatively borne across the threshold into the space and time of the outer world.

While the psychologising physicist, Fraser (1990), would not go so far as Hume in concluding that sensory and reflective impressions cannot prove the existence of real objects, he does propose that external reality is not a tableau of fixed information from which we select and incorporate data; rather, it "comprise[s] acts of creation" (p. 75) which are structurally similar for members of a species because of their common psychobiology. Fischer (1967) describes creation as "an activity by which a system externalises and thus replicates its own pattern as an environment for itself," and finds that these activities exhibit the "archetypical" constraints of "ritual, style and value" through a group, tribe or nation's ability to synchronise the individual expression of shared referential systems (pp. 476-477).

Within Fraser's temporal formulations of the extended umwelt principle, human acts of creation issue out of the nest of distinct temporal umwelts giving rise to expressions of ways of experiencing self and world that have characteristic temporal signatures. The creative process of the artist is singled out by Fraser (1990) as representative of "unsystematic adventuring among the many umwelts of man" (p. 401), umwelts which he elsewhere (1981) describes as temporal moods, each with distinct psychodynamics. The artist, "our time-roving ambassador" (1990, p. 402), mixes the images of his or her journeys in the simultaneously binding and reanimating medium of focused, relational meanings, whether of form and structure, emotion and content, or both.

... the power of art resides in the capacity of the artist to roam freely among the moods of temporalities and then report about his journey through such metaphors. ... as are able to stimulate the emergence of fantasies, appropriate for the stages of the journey. (1981, p. 22)

Finding that in his experience styles of painting, music and literature induce "the peculiar moods that correspond to hallmarks of temporalities" (1981, p. 20ff.), Fraser attempts to assign a number of styles to the various temporal umwelts. He finds

aleatory paintings, created within the artist's surrender to chance, as representative of atemporal and probabilistic prototemporal umwelts. He assigns cubist painting, with its concretions of parts that appear to be interchangeable because perspectives that would be viewed successively in linear time are presented in the space of one abiding present, to the eotemporal frame. Forms that are not "broken" but are timeless, such as Plato's timeless forms, he also places here. Fraser uses arts other than the visual to illustrate the "moods" of the biotemporal and nootemporal umwelts, but describes these as characterised by the expression of unresolvable conflicts, such as those of Eros and Thanatos, or the tension inherent in human being which comprises "the freedom of the noetic" and "the unfreedom of matter." Significantly, in these increasingly "human" umwelts Fraser tends to move from explications of form to ones of content. Meanings become explicate in the complex organisations of the umwelts which were later to evolve.

The assignment of specific styles to certain umwelts, while seductive, is ultimately too simplistic because it too easily suggests that all works within that style have characteristics of only one temporal umwelt. Certainly the force of Picasso's *Guernica* is an interpenetration of the conflictual content Fraser assigns to the nootemporal *with* the compositional fracture he assigns to the eotemporal. And in fact, when rendering Schaltenbrand's neurological theories, Fraser (1990) applies Schaltenbrand's description of formal communicative gestalts as "streams of resonance" as being applicable to his own formulation of umwelts, stating that only a flexible synergy enables smooth functioning of the whole. He cites Chagall as the contemporary artist who best projects "a vibrating unity of integrative levels" (p. 406).

That Fraser groups the biotemporal and nootemporal umwelts in one discussion as a "passage" suggests that it is this aspect of *passage* that is important in providing the creative tension which enlivens any effective work of art, a tension augmented through precisely this interpenetration of temporal rhythms and meanings. It is the "frisson of difference. . . that clash of significations at the interface of different codes" (Welchman, in Freeman, 1989, p. 82), inclusive of codings of diverse temporal systems, that transports a work of art from mere phenomenon to a noumenon of "mysteriousness."

In art therapy, identifying the primary temporal predilection of a client is only preparatory to facilitating temporal *passage* between the ways we as humans experience time, working toward the establishment of that “vibrating unity of integrative levels.”

I would argue that in art therapy, there is the possibility for therapeutic adventuring to be either free *or* systematic, in accordance with the needs of the client. Fraser (1981) notes the similarity, in terms of temporal itineraries, of the artist’s journey and that of psychoanalytic therapy. In art psychotherapy, these achieve an effective marriage, for the journey through the nesting temporalities is guided by images that, as both process and product, hold in them therapeutically relevant information at each stage of the journey. The sequence of art objects ordered according to the calendrical and clock time of the sessions offers a record of the client’s temporal experience, inclusive of regressions and progressions, that reinforce that function of time described by Dooley (1941): measured time as a *necessary* defence against the unconscious and superego, providing a “continuous record of our contact with reality” (p. 20). But, *at the same time*, the reality of that aspect of psychic experience that is unbounded with regard to time and space is acknowledged as traversable and as that ground out of which the being becomes.

The closed portfolio of the client at each session’s end shares that quality of containment evoked at its moment of fullest opposition by Bringhurst (1975) in his poem about Parmenides, who dives into the pleroma of Being, “the heart’s whole cargo coming / tumbling up into him.” Parmenides is nearly undone by his encounter with the wash of the all-things-always-everywhere that breaks without end on his shore.

Nevertheless he pushed into it,
choked on exhaustion, swallowed, piled into it:
the whole bill of lading,
everything intermingling into

finally, only
the endless, full
indivisible stillness:
the lock
on the safe of creation.

In accordance with this powerful image, the art therapist’s responsibility is clear: to

firmly maintain her position at the gate between *times*, between the specificities of here and now and the superabundance of the “always everything,” and to make “safe” the risk creation *is*. In this way the art therapist clears a “space of time” for new patterns of relationship to emerge; for “true artistic virtue, like scientific veracity, is predicated on a willingness to move from one centre to a new centrality, gather power, and then rework the patterns again” (Stern, 1977, p. 192).

The three interpenetrating perspectives on time offered by psychoanalytical, analytical psychology and existential/phenomenological theories offer three centres of experience through which to organise our understanding of the self in time. They offer us alternative ways to work and rework our patterns of understanding, even as in art therapy we may work and rework a vital image in various media, each with different constructive possibilities and resistances, each providing invaluable contributions which enrich our understanding.

The Umwelts as Theoretical Frames

I will dare to apply the instructive risk and inevitable error engaged in by Fraser in briefly relating his extended umwelt principle to the theoretical frames I address in this exploration of subjective time experience. My insistence on a plurality of ways of understanding subjective temporal experience grows from my experience of these multiple, theoretical and methodological perspectives as “nested” interpretations of psychic experience, each contributing its singular emphasis to a more profound understanding of the whole: the nest is not a hierarchical, but an hermeneutical matrix. In our assessment of therapeutic interventions for clients, the need for compensatory or reparative *temporal* experience may determine which strand we emphasise in the braid of methodologies at our disposal.

I do not wish to suggest that each theoretical discipline deals exclusively with one temporal umwelt. This is the “inevitable error” to which I referred: the tendency for categorisations to be taken not as tools of thought but as solid realities. Indeed, as we have seen, effective practice within any one methodology is contingent upon the

practitioner's ability to bring its interpretive methods to relevance in all aspects of temporal experience. Yet each methodology has its stronger and weaker applications, and it is here that compensatory interdisciplinary knowledge and methods can strengthen our practice and help us effect modes of creative, temporal passage for our clients. Fraser (1981) made the following hypothesis regarding reality testing with respect to the umwelts of time experience. "Perhaps we are faced with a *spectrum of realities* which differ among themselves in qualitative ways" (p. 4, italics mine).

It follows from the hierarchical and nested nature of temporalities and levels of causation that, as the patient attunes himself to an (assumed) external time, he must learn to master the contributions to his nootemporal umwelt of all the latent temporalities and also learn to live with all the archaic types of causations which coexist with human freedom. (p. 6)

I would propose the same comprehensive embrace be extended for reality testing with regard to theoretical framework. The "nest" is best served not through contest, but mutuality.

While not dealing exclusively with a single umwelt, each theoretical discipline gives *emphasis* to moving the individual toward health through the examination of his or her relationship to a different umwelt, or temporal reality. Health is not here defined according to medical criteria but as an individual's ability to live, work and love in a way he or she finds fulfilling and that does minimal harm to the self and that self's community. In this regard, an assessment of the health of that self's community of others is also crucial. Joined in this goal, all psychodynamic schools can be said to appropriately privilege the nootemporal umwelt, "the world of symbolic causes, the tensions between what is desired and what is possible, the stage upon which the human drama is played" (Fraser, 1981, p. 5). The following preferences define the alternate temporal umwelt through which the work of therapy progresses.

Psychoanalysis can be said to give weight to the biotemporal umwelt, that of the id/soma, or largely unconscious body ego, as a developmental accrual that patterns the personality (Fraser, 1981). Time experience, then, as we have seen, has much to do with the affective experience of the interaction of instinctual drives with their demands for immediate gratification and the environment. Certainly the id contains strata that

can be argued to be organised in accordance with Fraser's "lower" temporal realities, as becomes observable in dream and psychosis; but what becomes important in psychoanalytic interpretation, arising as it did from within a mechanistic medical model, is the mediation and expression of these temporal experiences through the time of the instinctual body. The enduring pattern of this mediation is seen to be established in infancy and childhood. When immediate gratification is frustrated, instinctual drives grow creative in their search for fulfilment, plying the cunning indirections of the symbolic function. Here, symbolisation is an encodement of the connectivities of the bodytime of desire seeking its objects in the alternative temporal nests of interpersonal and social relationships, culture and, when all else fails, psychosis.

Analytical psychology can be said to preference the eotemporal umwelt. Its reliance on the primordial archetypal realm as the structural ground of psyche and invisible complement of personal history results in nesting the mundane world of the client within the *unus mundus*, a pattern of continuous creation that "exists from all eternity, repeats itself sporadically, and is not derivable from any known antecedents" (Jung, cited in von Franz. 1992, p. 217). Fraser characterises the eotemporal umwelt as without directional preference with regard to time.

All cyclic processes determine eotemporal umwelts for they provide variations but not a preferred direction. . . .Endless time, eternity, and the abiding present are different ways of talking about eotemporal conditions. . . . Eotemporality is also the predominant umwelt of the manifest content of dreams, of the virtual immortality of impressions that have been sunk into the unconscious. . . (1981, p. 5)

The meaningful, acausal connections of synchronistic phenomena originate here where orientation is achieved not through points on a compass or clock but through coordinates that locate us in an field of meaning dissolving these distancing, mechanistic partitions of space and time. Because the self also lives within this "time," individuating through the development of a vital self/ego relationship ensures an archetypal/personal connection to this ground of creativity. The transcendent function through which the healing symbol arises, which mediates what are consciously experienced as unresolvable opposites, derives its efficacy from discerning continuities where consciousness sees only discontinuity. In this way creative solutions praised for

their “discontinuity” (Bloom, 1973), their imaginative “leap,” can be said to derive from a ground of continuities not accessible to conscious mentation. Hence, the frequent citation of dreams as purveyors of discoveries in science and physics.

Existential psychology can be said to maintain its preference for the nootemporal and (in Fraser’s later formulation) sociotemporal umwelts¹ in that it privileges here-and-now relationships. Its emphasis on the creative freedom and choice each individual has in realising his or her own possibilities in a dynamic, self-actualising embrace of the future fringe of each moment is in keeping with Fraser’s characterisation of the laws of higher integrative umwelts as incapable of being determined by lower levels. However, in keeping with the principles of the phenomenological method, which seek the clear description of the “world-around” of the individual, when the world of the individual appears to be governed by temporal relations characteristic of lower umwelts, these too might be descriptively used if they best express the functioning of that world. An individual’s creative freedom includes the choice to withdraw to a different temporal umwelt (organisation of time), which is termed his or her adaptive mode of transcendence, and the reasons for this will accordingly be explored in the course of therapy.

No matter what the methodological framework or frameworks through which the therapist organises his or her understanding of the client and their interactions in therapy, with regard to temporal experience the goal is the same: to facilitate a series of internal transformations in communication and relationship between psyche and soma, and self and social environment, that serve to integrate the timetables of the organism with the temporal realities of the psychosocial human being in a way consonant with a state of health. Because creative process and its channelling into the discrete objects of artmaking involves the integration of all these aspects of human being, art therapy becomes an ideal modality through which to effect these transformations.

¹ This is not to be confused with the use of the term umwelt by existential psychotherapists, as outlined in Chapter 3, in their own delineation of the simultaneous “worlds” of human dwelling: Umwelt (natural world), Mitwelt (social world), and Eigenwelt (own world) . (May, 1958)

Psychoanalytic Perspectives on Time and Creative Process

While Freud's formulation of creative process always seem tinged with temporal reductionism, such as when he describes creative writing as "a continuation of, and a substitute for, what was once the play of childhood" (1976/1908, p, 53), successors redressing the balance of his concentration on investigations of the id acknowledge the rich expansion of temporal experience which development of the creative imagination affords the ego. Rose (1964) identifies art as a primary way, though not the only way, of stimulating the growth of creative imagination. "Indeed . . .creative imagination includes perception and learning and comprises the sensitively aware audience as well as the productive artist" (p. 76). He expands on Winnicott's formulation of the intermediate area of experience, from which arise art, religion, imaginative living and creative scientific work, providing relief from the tension of relating inner and outer realities.

If creative imagination provides relief from the strain of relating inner and outer reality it may be because it does not provide a vacation from the problem but poses the most satisfactory solutions for it. Creative imagination does not provide some peripheral diversion from the task but deals directly with the task itself—the task of relating inner and outer reality. Far from being a detour from reality or some compromise with it, it leads most deeply into it. It offers not only the opportunity of losing oneself but of refinding oneself with deeper awareness and within wider and more meaningful integrations of reality. (p. 82)

While Rose defines the inner world of the ego as a bodily world, thereby emphasising the time implicit in Fraser's biotemporal umwelt, Rose defines health as that ability to expand the temporal experience of immediate ego consciousness, and finds that art-making can enable this. The artist is engaged in spatial and temporal condensations and an unconscious scanning which involves "the chief nodal points of his psychosexual history with their inherent image body clusters" (p.80). Together these efforts effect spatial and temporal interpenetrations of the ego core and its boundaries. The concrete object with its anchorage in the here-and-now cultivates proximity to the core of the ego *while at the same time* potentially expanding the ego's boundaries through its vision, or delineation, of that ego's horizons. This bidirectionality of the art experience, which Rose bundles as "economic telescopings of temporal as well as spatial differentiations"

(p. 81), enables it to be used to find a wider integration of the self in time and space, expanding “the time interval of immediate consciousness” (p. 82); or, with the psychotic individual who is lost in time, to lead him or her back to the core of the ego and strengthen its experience of the communally verifiable here-and-now.

Creative imagination may thus serve as a bridge between ego ‘core’ and ego boundaries. . . . *The analyst, like the artist, must have one foot in either world in order to allow a constant flux of the progressive-regressive universal needs to lose and refind oneself personally and endlessly in space-time*” (p. 83, italics this author’s).

The engagement of the creative imagination, such as in image making, has been advanced from a “substitute for” the play of childhood to a necessary component of the adult’s on-going journey through space-time. Cohn (1957) describes artistic creativity the sensualisation of time experience. As a sublimatory experience, it cycles through “ancestral relatedness. . . a basic need of the ego” (p. 181), if only on an instinctual, unconscious level, to create a future, expressive product--a cycle which is brought to consciousness in art psychotherapy.

Loewald (1975) likens the analytic process to the creation of visual art.

. . . it is the momentum of an active imaginative process which, as it were, creates the next step, propelled by the directional tension of the previous steps. This directional tension is the resultant of the artist’s imagination and the inherent force of his medium . . . In the mutual interaction of the good analytic hour, patient and analyst. . . become both artist and medium for each other . . . In this complex interaction, patient and analyst . . . may together create that imaginary life which can have a lasting influence. (p. 297)

The media utilised in art therapy *take the imprint of* this process of the imaginal work of each hour, logging the odyssey of the individual in relationship to the analyst that is at once a journey through the structural or topographical forms of psychic reality; through time, its events chronologically and achronologically re-stored in the various organisational systems of the mind’s archives; through what is, what was, what never was nor can ever be; through what is fantasised and wished for, and through possibility; and it is a journey travelled through the agency of the variously yoked functional vehicles of the primary and secondary processes. Holding is offered for temporal experiences that vary with regard to both the structural dynamics and the developmental level of the psyche.

Fraser (1981) emphasises that one reason infantile memories are difficult to access is that the temporal Umwelt in which the memories were coded is not the referencing nontemporal frame of the healthy adult. He identifies the therapeutic task as a “process of creation” that progressively organises the conscious and unconscious dimensions of the temporal Umwelts in the individual. Fraser’s interest in assigning styles of artmaking to Umwelts (as outlined above) suggests the possibility of monitoring the spontaneous formal flux of patients’ artistic styles, with regard to both process and product, for potential correlation with these temporal considerations. From this, research could proceed into the efficacy of stylistically discrete, directed, artmaking tasks for both accessing memories coded within distinct temporal frames and promoting a healing mobility between them. Deserving further development in this regard may be Simon’s (1970, 1981) categorisation of pictorial styles in art therapy. Linear and massive renditions of both “traditional” (in its European art historical context) and “archaic” styles are analysed for their relevance to personality assessment,² symptom analysis and course of therapy (1970). While Simon finds each client has a habitual style, or habitual blend of styles, in the process of art therapy movement may be noted. In her study of bereavement art, Simon (1981) finds the process of working through bereavement reflected in changes in art styles, which she finds “indicate modification of the underlying habitual attitude because it has proved inadequate to the present situation” (p. 136). There is an implicit, but not developed, temporal statement regarding art expression in her word choice for her categories, and their reflection of Western art as developing *in time* from emotional/sensual based experience to narrative ideas and subjects. While her descriptions deserve some

² While she does not make the connection, descriptors of her four styles fit well with the Jung’s four functions: traditional massive, “essentially intuitive” (p. 162) (intuition); traditional linear, “approaches art intellectually” (p. 163) (thinking); archaic massive, “extensive emotional commitment” (p. 165) (feeling); archaic linear, “lives as far as possible in the present sensual experience” (p. 164) (sensing). Consideration of combining of the temporal perspective of each Jungian personality type as assigned by Mann, Siegler and Osmond (1968) with Simon’s (1970) simpler temporal categories might produce a stylistic prism of greater merit.

challenge,³ they also seem worthy of development for their tacit sensitivity to the idea of pictorial styles as reflective of subjective temporal organizations of experience; and that in art therapy, a client's movement through changes in style may indicate the establishment of "connectivities" between the complex genetic interplay of affective and subjective temporal experience as expressed by Arlow (1989).

Loss and Reparation: Creation as Restoration and Renewal

The centrality of the individual's psychosexual *history* in the *present* expression of his or her experience, coupled with the primacy of the repetition compulsion in the dynamics of the psyche as put forward by Freud, were used by Segal (1952) in her application of Kleinian theory to aesthetics to formulate her hypothesis "that all creation is really a re-creation of a once loved and once whole, but now lost and ruined object, a ruined internal world and self" (p. 199). Segal would open out the meanings of "person" in Rose's identification of the need "to lose and refind oneself *personally* and endlessly in space time," to include the endless loss and reinstatement of internal objects that characterise what might be called the "ali-mentations" of the person's psyche.

Freud's (1976/1908) own words regarding the creative writer's motivations show the temporal loop effected by creative work in classical psychoanalytic theory.

A strong experience in the present awakens in the creative writer a memory of an earlier experience (usually belonging to his childhood) from which there now proceeds a wish which finds its fulfilment in the creative work. The work itself exhibits elements of the recent provoking occasion as well as of the old memory. . . (p. 53)

The fantasies to be embodied in the creative work are mutable, receiving a "datemark" that is the contribution of the present situation to the core material of the phantasy.

The relation of phantasy to time is in general very important. We may say that it hovers, as it were, between three times--the three moments of time which our ideation involves. Mental work is linked to some current impression, some

³ Cultural bias is evident in Simon's reliance on Western art. As well, "archaic" cave art is not only about emotional/sensual experience, but is high in narratives about subjects: the hunt, to name only one topic. Finally, what Simon calls primitive art is often now referred to as traditional art in an effort *not* to temporally distance tribal peoples from our "now" or suggest a "lower" (i.e., prior to our own) level of development; rather, terms of "difference" are preferred, "traditional" simply indicating a culture whose present is a relatively seamless continuance of its past, *as compared with our own*.

provoking occasion in the present which has been able to arouse one of the subject's major wishes. From there it harks back to a memory of an earlier experience (usually an infantile one) in which this wish was fulfilled; and it now creates a situation relating to the future which represents a fulfilment of the wish. What it thus creates is a daydream or phantasy, which carries about it traces of its origin from the occasion which provoked it and from the memory. Thus past, present and future are strung together, as it were, on the thread of the wish that runs through them. (pp. 50-51)

In Kleinian theory, one aspect of this "wishing" is grieving for the *time* when this wish was fulfilled, which took with its passing the objects providing fulfilment. All mourning over present losses of external objects is seen to simultaneously be mourning for early objects: the parents as they were in infancy, who are lost in both internal and external worlds. Working through the process of mourning leads to the wish to recreate the lost objects, not only to simply restore them but also as a reparative act atoning for aggressive feelings and destructive wishes that inevitably accompany positive feelings toward these objects. In his poem, *A Short History*, Bringham (1975) speculates on the causal circularity set in motion by the tension of guilt and reparation inherent in chronological being itself in which "before" and "after" are variously privileged and penalised positions.

What Anaximander in fact says is:
the necessity is
that things flare out into that out of which
they came to be, because

they pay one another the penalty
and compensation for
the mutual injustice of their
chronological order.⁴

Within the phenomena of sequential generative and terminal occurrences we call time originates the inequality of before and after, something coming into being as something else passes, that cries out for redress.

Segal offers Proust by way of example. She interprets the creation of a work of art for Proust as a work of mourning which enabled him to grieve over his dead and

⁴Part two of this volume of Bringham's poems seems to have "flared out" into being, in part to re-work and make present *as his own* in the timelessness of poetic form the community of Greek philosophers to which he feels akin and which have become his creative fire. They are perhaps a compromise formation which gratifies the wish for the livelier *mutual* interchange with these fathers of *nous poietikos* that chronology unjustly proscribes.

dying (or past and passing) loved objects: gradually these objects are let go of in their bygone forms, but through their commemorative symbolic recreation in a narrative, they become reinstated in his ego and simultaneously are given permanent life in the work itself. Symbol formation, particularly as embodied in creative works, can in this way lead to the transcendence of the experience of time-as-loss. T. S. Eliot (1971) cogently expresses this in his Four Quartets.

See, now they vanish,

The faces and places, with the self which, as it could, loved them,
To become renewed, transfigured, in another pattern.

Stern (1977) defines true artistic virtue as the willingness to rework patterns from a centre beyond the given. The process of artistic creation is that of “rework[ing] object relationships to a point where new possibilities begin to emerge” (p. 192).

Niederland’s (1976) formulations are in agreement with Stern’s in this regard, and he identifies the efficacy of artistic production as inherent in its being “an adaptive phenomena of a particular kind that, albeit rooted in and influenced by the primary process, is oriented toward reality (secondary process)” (p. 189).

Because the psychoanalytic model is one based on conflict, inevitably speaking of creation within its frame necessitates addressing destruction as well. Segal is comfortable with the description of the art work as “eternal” because she makes it clear that the “creative” *process* through which effective eternalisation is achieved is not one of denial of loss within the passage of time, but acknowledgement of the death instinct inclusive of its aggressive and destructive components. As Segal astutely points out, that very stasis of the completed work of art that symbolically eternalises its objects “is terrifying because this eternal unchangeability is the expression of the death instinct--the static element opposed to life and change” (p. 206). The working through of grief through art means giving the fullest expression the the conflict and union between the death instinct, which she also calls the “ugliness” necessary to all great art, and the life instinct, which she terms its beauty. The triumph of the work of art is thus paradoxical. Segal would ultimately see its triumph not as one over time, but as one which is capable of embodying the *living tension* between time and timelessness: the

passing of the I, the continuance of the world outside, the passing of the world.

Perhaps our own emphasis on the "lasting product" of art in and out of therapy betrays our own discomfort with the eventual passing of all things, even of those expressions of our inner experience we have banked in paint, clay and ink.

Dreams of a vast Outside inside each mind
May tempt with world each one to be a thief.

And yet they are not aeons, they are not space,
Not empires, not maps: they are only
Heads dreaming pictures, each fixed in his place.
And Geography and History are unfurled
Within each separate skull, grown lonely
With Time, making, shedding, a World.

That I use Spender's poem (1934, from *Explorations*) to express the bleak isolation of transient, personal experience, however, shows the ability of art, in this case poetry, to make the greatest losses bearable, because they become sharable expressions of experience. Spender's poem transcends its own content as many "separate skulls" take in his shed world and find it akin to their own. The representations of one individual are incorporated in the living experience and future expressions of those who live on. There is, then, no originating work, but renewing, medial fibres of "ancestral relatedness" that braid our fleeting lives into the deepest meanings of time.

Narcissism, Omnipotence, and Creative Process

Within a psychoanalytic formulation, the enjoyment of that part of the creative process felt to be timelessness can be seen as a way of symbolically "killing time," or the parental introjects. Chessick (1957) has commented that "we should mention the common tendency in both poets and patients to personify time as some sort of controlling omnipotent being who must be mastered by one magical process or another" (p. 324). Metaphorically, we might say our parents provided, but then took us off childhood's temporal ferris wheel of care-free, renewable, cyclical time, and put us on the one-way train of linear becoming, scheduled within a socially responsible itinerary. And we will, in part, always find this objectionable.

As reparative of Segal's "ruined self," psychoanalytic theory also posits a narcissistic impetus to the creation of works of art. The most basic "ruining" of the self

is perhaps that most intimate experience of loss intrinsic to the experience of time as linear, unidirectional passing. While linear flow may be experienced as the creative opportunity for individuation and the creation of the self, inevitably, and particularly in later life, time will take on the qualities of subtraction rather than addition. As Bonaparte (1940) succinctly put it,

Space does not, by the mere fact of its existence, destroy us as time does. . . . Time retains its frightening qualities, time which seems to pass more quickly with each successive day as we grow older. And how shall we find in it a haven? . . . We destroy time from the moment we begin to use it. . . . For in living our time we die of it. (pp. 430-431)

Entering into the creative moment allows an individual to fuse the motives of phantasy and cosmogony through participating in childhood, parental and divine prerogatives. In the art product, "what we, like Narcissus, take to be something quite other turns out to be our own image in reflection" (MacLagan, 1977, p. 6). Subject and object are confounded in a potentially enduring product.

Even if we do receive that affirming gleam in the eyes of our parents essential to a healthy image of the self as suggested by Kohut, the loving arms into which we toddle are also those of time, whose beckoning gleam of fulfilment eventually begins to blur and demand uncomfortable reregistry as the glint of its scythe. Few selves find this tolerable. To create an enduring self expression *in space*, then, enables the individual to counter the terminal outcome of his or her temporal denouement. Time's rude retrieval of its gifts is, in some measure, contravened.

The narcissistic response to self-extinction, according to Stern (1977), is to "revert the time span so that the return moves toward one's own image" (p. 191). This defensive strategy tends toward an omnipotent fusion of ideal self, ideal object and actual self images until, in pathological narcissism, the ego attempts to install itself and its time sequence as the temporal spine of all narratives. The past is let go of only when "return" is guaranteed in a controllable cycle of omnipotence.

The art object as a potentially enduring expression of the self gratifies in some measure wishes for omnipotence. *Time*, consumed during the creative process, is *made*, extruded, drawn out, located, and finally stilled in its transfer into the materials

and forms of the art object. Freud was of the opinion that “In only a single field of our civilisation has the omnipotence of thoughts been retained, and that is in the field of art” (Freud, Totem and Taboo, cited in Nederland, 1976, p. 198). Schiffer (1978) utilises Freud’s designation of art objects as anal products, reflecting that if “the human hunger for stopping time through oral efforts at reuniting with the maternal breast” is unsuccessful, “it made sense that failure to achieve this reunion would in no way deter an individual from prolonging the quest through the agency of his bowels” (p. 119). Within this formulation, the work of art is viewed as symbolic “excrement” that has been brought to life by the creative artist in a discharge of energy which physically disengages it from his or her person. Its making is an effort at self-replication through the creation of a restored self-as-object suspended in time, the self interwoven through symbolisation into the redemptive object. Time is transcended through the resuscitation of a lost and mourned object, often at least in part the undamaged self.

Moments of narcissistic time transcendence must, however, be only moments in healthy narcissism. Nederland (1976) would argue that the renewed creativity of the individual is due to the inevitability of the failure of one creative work to fulfil narcissistic and omnipotent wishes: “. . . the long travail is bound to be renewed, leading to further accomplishments and, inevitably, to failures which, in turn, reactivate fresh attempts at restitution and re-creation” (p. 210).

In art therapy, consistently narcissistic object creation and relations to those objects, can only be a reparative stage of the therapeutic process which must, at last, reach worldward. For ultimately, as Stern also notes, “the notion of temporality requires a constantly renewing sense of individuation and separation, making living space a coordinate of authentic time” (p. 209). Individuation proceeds *into* community with its own temporal norms and demands for accommodation to the needs of others in the global living space that is, after all, shared space and time.

The Creation of Art and Primary Process

The relationship of the unconscious, primary process and the preconscious to symbolic process and the creation of art do not achieve theoretical unanimity in

psychoanalytic literature (Segel, 1961). While it is not my intent to detail this discussion here, I will briefly note several discordant theories before elaborating on that which I find to be the most productive to my discussion on time and creative process as revealed in image making.

Kris (1952) challenged Freud's view that regressive experiences were necessarily threatening to the ego and were only surmounted through defence mechanisms, among which numbered the sublimated phenomena of discharge we call art. He expanded Freud's topographical concept of the preconscious as a "place," or state of psychic functioning, to which the healthy ego could regress without losing control even though its functions would become "primitivised." Kris explored the creation of art as just such an experience of regression into primary process that is *regulated* by the ego. Kris cites Freud's contention that the preconscious processes use the bound energy of secondary process, but continues that this formulation emphasises extremes to construct its point. He makes clear his theoretical preference that the preconscious is a field of transition comprising non-deliberative as well as deliberative processes, the former in greater proximity to the id with its potentially irruptive, mobile energy of primary process. In keeping with the economic model of the psyche, this means that cathexis is withdrawn from some functions of the superego and redirected toward preconscious processes. One can infer from Kris that temporally, the products of these "controlled regressions" could be expected to be marked by a reformulation of chronological memory, re-rendering images and narratives of the past, present and future future that are a compromise of the atemporal, fantasied wishes of the unconscious and the preconscious demands of ego, superego and social needs.

Also favouring the preconscious as the "atelier" of creative psychic work, Kubie (1961) goes so far as to characterised the unconscious as *non-creative*, declaring that its repetitious rigidities play a "destructive role in relation to creativity" (p. 65). Kubie's understanding of unconscious symbolism is that it is organised in accordance with memory traces of the past which are *fixed*. Only the preconscious stream creatively recombines this old data with new through the analogic processes of free association. Free association operates at a speed exceeding that of conscious processes

because of the highly allegorical and figurative symbolism it employs, each symbol potentially prismatic with interpenetrating, concurrent meanings. Kubie suggests that the contributions the unconscious makes to creative process are not inherently creative; they are simply patterned conflicts seeking resolution whose tension may or may not be responded to in a creative manner. The unconscious contributes problems, but not creative solutions to the growth and development of the individual in time. For Kubie, overdetermination by the fixed dynamisms of the unconscious neurotically or psychotically distorts the creative process.

The measure of health is flexibility, the freedom to learn though experience, the freedom to change with changing internal and external circumstances . . . and especially the freedom to cease when sated. . . Any moment of behaviour is neurotic *if the processes that set it in motion predetermine its automatic repetition*, and this irrespective of the situation or the social or personal values or consequences of the act. (pp. 20-21)

The creative working through of temporal experience would then be characterised by cessations of repetitive experience through the transformation of experience into a new, meaningful, and flexible pattern.

While Noy (1969) would likely agree with Kubie's definition of health, his understanding of the dynamics and function of creative process in human development result in another shuffling of functional and relational definitions of terms. In contrast to the above exploration of narcissism and creation, Noy's formulation of the self-centred nature of the creation of art does not, in its very terminology, seem to always be on the slide toward pathology. This results from his consideration of primary process as an organisational mode of functioning distinct from the *system* of the unconscious. Describing primary process as self centred and secondary process as reality oriented, Noy proposes that just as the self undergoes development and we naturally expect secondary process to evolve with the maturation of the individual, *primary process also constantly changes and develops* with the growth of the individual.

. . . there is really no difference between the primary process and any other mental function: the processes remain the same, but their level of organisation and performance changes, develops and improves constantly, along with general cognitive development. . . . It means that the basic processes of condensation, displacement and symbolisation remain the same all through life, but their level of functioning and performance constantly develops and improves--and as expression of 'concept formation' is not regarded as a

regression to a childish kind of thinking, even though this process stems from childhood, *so also expression of displacement need not be regarded as 'regression.'* (p. 158, italics this author's)

Regression connotes a developmental impasse to which the individual returns, going back to a way in which the individual functioned earlier in time that is no longer appropriate. Noy argues that the concept of regression needs to be separated out from that of primary process.

If primary processes are 'primitive,' 'infantile,' 'non-developed,' and characterised particularly by 'less' (timeless, orderless, etc.), then, of course, any expression of those processes in the behaviour, perception or thought process, of the adult has to be regarded as a regression. (p. 157)

Noy argues that this is not so: that one can, as in the creation of art, utilise primary processes without regressing into infantile behaviour and psychosexual patterns. While these early repressed matrices may have been established through primary process functioning, they are not identical with it.

Primary processes can therefore no longer be regarded as only serving the pleasure principle, at least in its narrow definition as instinctual gratification. In that the ego arises from the id, the pleasures and gratifications of the ego can also be hypothesised as having at least a delimited organisational influence in the unconscious. These would include the maintenance of identity, the pleasure of self-continuity. Noy proposes that primary processes, using a representational repertoire of vivid visual, affect-laden or other sensual images, assimilates new experiences into the schemata of the self nuclei that are determined by affective states; that is, primary process serves the ego function of the preservation of a sense of self-continuity and identity--a formulation of being in service to the ego that is not so exclusively "hind-sighted" as regression connotes. Temporally, then, for Noy primary process is essential in establishing the continuity and development of the self in time--essential in what Seton (1974) has called "psychotemporal adaptation"--and the creative process of art-making can be useful in this yoked endeavour.

The nurturing of primary process is thus as essential to the development of the individual as the cultivation of secondary process because any disintegration between their healthy yoking results in pathology. The ego must, in Noy's terms, "master" the

two systems of processes in order to effectively encounter reality and integrate its experiences with a continuous self that has, however, an evolving identity in time.

This [self-centred] function always remains the main task of the primary processes—to assimilate and integrate new experiences into the gradually growing self, and, after the self's maturation, to maintain its sameness and continuity, as the inner constant core of the ego. (p. 175)

Noy specifies that the primary processes cannot be limited to word presentations but must be “free to ‘speak’ any language” so that they can present all of the components of an experience as a synchronous whole. Exercised in the activities of dreams, fantasies and art, they are essential in the working through and mastery of new experiences. The quality of the self's future relationships to, and behaviours in, its environment is dependent on their synthetic powers for its development.

Because primary process works toward the integration of experience into “synchronous wholes,” Noy describes it as being “free from any consideration of time.”

The assimilation of new experience into the self means integration of present with the past in order to safeguard the future, an activity which has to transcend any limits of time. . . .

Instead of a careful distinction between the various elements of objects, experiences and memories, there is a need to find the similarities between past and present in order to integrate them into wider groups of experience and memory. (p. 176)

Noy is thus in agreement with with Rose who, as stated above, advocates art making as a way to expand the boundaries of the temporal consciousness of the ego.

Noy stresses that *primary* process is not a more *primitive* level of functioning, the latter connoting a value judgment passed only by that half of reality which is oriented toward objective, logical interpretations.

If the viewpoint is shifted to the self and its needs. . . the ability to represent a full experience, including all the feelings and ideas involved, is a higher achievement than merely operating with abstract concepts and words, and the ability to transcend time limits and organise past experiences with present ones is a higher ability than being confined to the limitations of time and space. Would it not be better to leave all this discussion of primitiveness or higher developmental rank and say simply that the difference between the primary and secondary processes is in their function and not in their degree of development? (p. 176)

Noy's discarding of hierarchical valuations in favour of difference and reciprocal functioning fits well with rethinking Fraser's hierarchy of temporal umwelts as a matrix of organisational complementarities.⁵ Each umwelt, each modality of processing experience, is contributory to the dimensionality of human being.

What is attractive about Noy's formulation is that development of primary process is not only possible but necessary; and that while this occurs to some degree naturally with the development of the individual in dream and fantasy, that it can be further promoted through art. While Noy is adamant in stating that primary process is not definitionally a state of developmental arrest, his reformulations suggest that a developmental arrest of primary process is indeed possible, and that when it does occur pathology results perhaps because of a fusion of the *function* of primary process with the infantile organisation of the *contents* of the unconscious. The individual then, indeed, becomes a victim of his or her infantile past as the self's continuity and identity is constantly reorganised around *only* this nucleus of experience. This results in a distorted freedom from the consideration of time; in this state, primary process is not free, but harnessed to the past. In Kubie's words, the individual no longer has the "freedom to cease when sated." I would then argue that through art, the creative energies of the primary process *can* be gradually freed from their *fusion* with the past, the "primitive" infantile matrices of self nuclei, to encompass the entire history of the individual. One way this "develops" primary processes is by freeing its operational mechanism of symbolism from the fusions of symbolic equivalence attributed to human infancy, to express the sameness-within-difference of symbolic representation. Again overlaying this on Fraser's umwelt formulation, primary process would then be free to creatively moderate all the varieties of temporal experience comprising the subjective reality of the individual within the continuity of the self system.

Fraser (1975) offers Ehrenzweig's conceptualisation of the process of visual

⁵ An anthropological perspective of primary process in dream experience utilising Noy's theoretical contributions is offered by Kracke (1987), who concludes: "Dream thinking, or primary process, is not merely a degenerate, regressive form of adult logical thought, but is rather a distinct form of thinking. . . as valid as logical, categorical thought, but appropriate for different kinds of problems" (p. 52).

perception in fine arts to support this theory.⁶

Every act of visual perception, according to Ehrenzweig, recapitulates the ontogenetic development in the visual motor pattern of the child, hence it has to run through infantile, undifferentiated stages of dreamlike structure before it is articulated into the final images which emerge into consciousness. Therefore, the unitary picture which emerges is a composite of many levels of form differentiation. In terms of our philosophy, then, aesthetic experience draws upon all the perceptual Umwelts of man, that is, on the hierarchy of the many temporalities surviving in man. (p. 403)

Within this hypothesis, tremendous temporal odysseys are considered to be undertaken with regard to form and content at each moment within the visual feedback loop operative within the creation of an image.

The Art of Memory

Loewald (1980) calls the ego “an organisation of reproductive action . . . on . . . a stage of internality” (p. 171). As such, it is a precipitate of “memorial activity” that must forego its original embeddedness in totality and develop its own conscient, representational memory that memorialises its origins. With memories secured, separation and departure from unity becomes possible. Only in this way can the ego come into being.

To move from one eventful moment to the next without having lost the first one—so as to be able to link and match one with the other—requires memorial activity. Without the mind’s activity of holding and rebuilding its impressions and its own acts, affects, perceptions, ideas, images, and fantasies, an activity in which present reality is organised by matching and comparing with what has been and what, in anticipation, might be—without all this there would be for us neither past or future. These are the modes of time, the mutually dependent articulations of experience that arise through memorial activity. Without such inner reproductive holding, in which consists the linking together of before, now and after, we would experience neither duration nor change. (p. 149)

Loewald comments on the ancient etymological relations of the words “mind,” “memory” and “mourning,” suggesting the purpose of “inner reproductive holding” is a process which reconciles loss, mourning and restitution. Cohn (1957) calls latent memories “time preservers . . . [which] have become values and are of necessity narcissistically precious” (p. 177). The “art of memory,” by which I here mean the art

⁶ Fraser’s source is Ehrenzweig’s The psycho-analysis of artistic vision and hearing (New York: Braziller, 1965). See also Ehrenzweig (1967).

products created within art therapy expressing the psychic history of the individual in their manifest and/or latent content and form, memorialises even as it creates anew the precipitate of the self. It continues to make safe the play first begun in the transitional holding space provided by the good enough mother (Winnicott, 1971): the primary experience of losing and finding oneself in the mother, transformed into the ongoing creative experience of what Rose (1964) called “the wish to lose and find oneself in space-time” (p. 82). The specifically oedipal, pre-oedipal and more generally erotic resonance is evident as the individual seeks to lose and find him- or herself in the (m)other: transferentially in the therapist, but also in art-making, through manipulations of art *materials*.

Niederland (1976) suggests that memory is stimulated to create when its function as reservoir is coupled with desire (or, we might more metaphorically say, when the body of psyche thirsts to drink in through the eyes again). “Combining memory with desire, it [nostalgia] is perhaps the most sophisticated type of regression” (p. 208). Niederland hypothesises that when the object, lost in time yet retained in memory, is recreated, the body of the artist may be felt to be reconstituted.

Freud (1928) defined the body image as an aggregate or deposit of internalised images encompassing the self-representation and internalised representations of the love object. Therefore, the disappearance of a significant figure, through prolonged absence or death, produces a feeling which is equivalent or comparable to body loss. (p. 204)

An incomplete or incohesive self-representation demands intrapsychic completion. (p. 196)

The attempts to *constitute* a phantasied perfect state, or alternatively, a less utopian but more realistic cohesion, is seen as *reconstitutive* in psychoanalytic formulations. The reconstitution occurs in the present, but is also transtemporal, subjecting the history of the individual to its recall. Where no unusual trauma of loss or an other or actual bodily disfigurement is apparent, the normal loss of preoedipal unity with mother serves to give all individuals access to “the felt experience of the body” as partial. Niederland reminds us that memory is more than a mental process: that *bodily* memory, “the backdrop for the lifelong interaction of kinesthetic-visual-auditory, and perceptive-sensorial-emotional-cognitive ego functions” (p. 198), is an essential constituent of

artistic restitutions. In art therapy, the client's body-ego is facilitated in its self-parturition as, within the generative holding of the therapeutic relationship, the client creates a new "body of memory" on which to found future experience. "Deficiency" becomes womb as "the felt experience of the body is re-created and transposed, artistically, into imaginative tales centring on body imagery and body-ego related creativeness" (p. 203). A working identification with the product confirms the individual's ability to create *proficient* forms. Art-making within therapy secures a world of objects in which the unconscious and the ego can share. Furthermore, it provides that "continuous record of our contact with reality" which Dooley (1941) reminds us is essential to prevent submergence in the unconscious: "...the fear of losing track of time means fear of loss of the world of objects; loss of a portion of the mind, and by analogy loss of parts of the body" (p. 20). The opening of the portfolio for periodic reviews of a client's "body of works" in art therapy has the potential to experientially demonstrate that time, the world of created objects and their referents, mind and body are held in one meaningfully interrelated system.

Art products enable the inner reproductive holding to be actively experienced as a *making* of a tangible correlative of inner experience. They stave the slippage of disordered processes so that they can be seen in a more protracted now, specialising now into a habitable earth between the temporal horizons of before and after. The individual is given a "space" of *timeless time to remember to create*, gathering the self retrospectively into its prospective task of futuring.

By virtue of his immersion in the creative act, and thus protected, the artist comes to live, for periods of time, in the *hortus conclusus*. . . , a walled-off realm of creative potentialities with ready access to primary process thought and imagery from which he emerges—after the completion of the creative work—with the affirmative value of the product created. It is self-affirmative because he emerges, with the task completed, as its progenitor. (Niederland, 1976, p. 209)

The creative act in itself may not offer the "protection" needed by persons who are psychologically fragile. The art therapist ensures a use of materials and pacing of process that secures a viable, creative ecosystem particular to each client's or group's needs.

Hutton (1987) explores the relationship of memorial activity as understood in

psychoanalytic theory with the “art of memory” as practised by rhetoricians and later, by the hermetic magi of the Renaissance. Historically, the “art of memory” was a system of mnemonic “associations between a structure of images easily remembered and a body of knowledge in need of organisation” (Hutton, 1987). In its origins the art of memory was spatial in character; that is, it advocated the mental placement of what was to be remembered on striking images occupying niches of an internalised architectural structure through which one could imaginatively, or imaginally, walk and retrieve the rhetoric of one’s speech as it unfolded in mundane time. Yet it was used as more than a tool of rhetoric, for its itinerary was lodged on mythopoetic forms such that to retrieve the text to be communicated, the orator must be in communion with the attributes of timeless mythic forms. Utilised in this way, memory serves the paradoxical function of simultaneously acknowledging *and* negating historical time, creating an intermediate space between past and present in which to restore, through force of imagination the seminal but lost “other” into the self.

Equally, however, in this application of memory the self reituates the coordinates of its personal reference in a greater map. Levin’s (1989) introduction of a recollection that is “non-memory” relates to this memorial activity that is as much synchronic as diachronic.

It is not memory but *non-memory* which gathers up the past. The past *can* be “wholly collected up”, but only when we renounce our memory, our ego-logical habits of accumulative serial remembering. Recollection is a very different gathering—a gathering embrace that thinks, without grasping, holding, trying to possess, *into* the dimensionality of time as a whole. (p. 268)

Hutton argues that the temporal aspects of Freud’s methodology, as well as his reliance on the myth of Oedipus, flow from premises put forward by Vico in his “New Science,” which advocated that social communities be cultivated in communion with “ideal eternal history,” as discussed by Verene (1981) in his exposition on Vico’s work.

The perception of the end against the origin gives us access to ourselves as humans. The notion of ideal eternal history as something felt has a ground in the individual’s ability to grasp his existence as a structure of birth and death, in which both the birth and the death are real points bridged by memory, by the human’s power to grasp himself recollectively as a particular universal. . . . It give us access to ourselves as makers of the true. (p. 117).

Hutton finds this common dynamic in Freudian and Vichian thought: the premise of the formative influence of origins which course through time in the performative phantasies of dreams, their mnemonic codes lived out in interpersonal behaviours and social relationships.⁷ “Henceforth memory would be employed as a technique to uncover forgotten origins understood as lost poetic powers” (p. 380), defined by Vico as the true exercise of memory.

The art of memory grounded in image was not abstract in character, then, but required animated participation in the original imprints on the memorial matrix.

Recollection in this sense, Verene points out, becomes performative.

But Vico’s science shows that self-reflective knowledge depends upon the activity of *fantasia*. This process of seeking an origin is not one of simple chronological tracing, nor is it one of metaphysical reasoning to the principle of a ground. It is a process in which the origin is approached *as if it were something present to the senses*. (p. 154, italics mine).

In art therapy, we are doing just this: making *sense* of time, making time a sensual affair, allowing individuals to grasp, to come to handle, the particular *and* the universal forms intrinsic to their existence in a material way, in this way making Verene’s eloquent formulation operational.

Time and Creative Process in Analytical Psychology

While the goal of individuation within analytical psychology is one of personal developmental maturation in “real time,” its progression is facilitated by the integration not only of contents of the personal unconscious, but of archetypal material from the collective unconscious (von Franz, 1992). In Jungian literature, “creative” is a frequent adjective of the noun unconscious, because, as the fertile “matrix mind” (Jung, 1969b, p. 490), the unconscious gives rise to individual being. Individuation is thus considered to be a creative process occurring “outside of time” as well as inside of it.

⁷ Oddly, while lamenting the neglect of the historical depth structure of mnemonics as indicative of “our forgetfulness of the cultural sense of memory’s meaning” (pp. 391-392), Hutton does not discuss Jung’s conception of the collective unconscious with its constellations of archetypal energies as acknowledging and restoring human relations to the depth culture of original images of “divine” powers across time, situative of the historical individual within pantemporal arche-tectural structures.

This is because the temporal ground of the archetypal symbol is considered to be *in illo tempore*, the primordial time of the original creative act.

Because the self originates in the self archetype, the self can be said to arise from structures in the unconscious that are outside of time. Its timeless foundational principles can only be brought into conscious integration with the personality as a whole through activities that bring about psychic states that are experienced as being in some measure outside of time—that is, states in which the individual is “in touch with,” and operates in conjunction with, his or her timeless self—one of which Jung identified as art making.

As this “inside” is invisible and cannot be imagined, even though it can affect consciousness in the most pronounced manner, I induce those of my patients who suffer mainly from the effects of this “inside” to set them down in pictorial form as best they can. The aim of this method of expression is to make the unconscious contents accessible and so bring them closer to the patient’s understanding. The therapeutic effect of this is to prevent a dangerous splitting-off of the unconscious processes from consciousness. In contrast to objective or “conscious” representations, all pictorial representations of processes and effects in the psychic background are *symbolic*. They point, in a rough and approximate way, to a meaning that for the time being is unknown. (Jung, CW 15, p. 136).

Jung introduced the term “transcendent function” to designate that process through which conscious and unconscious contents are brought into animated intercourse, and out which a “third thing” is generated. Expressed as a symbol, this “third thing” embodies the potential for “a movement out of the suspension between opposites, a living birth that leads to a new level of being” (Jung, 1971, p. 298). As such, it is prospective.

The opposites of the timeless and time-directed functions of the psyche are always inherent in the dynamics of the transcendent function which is, in part, a resolution between a conscious position and an unconscious counterposition. Jung describes the temporal loop which giving form to emerging archetypal images extends to consciousness in this way: “By giving it [the archetypal image] shape, the artist translates it into the language of the *present*, and so makes it possible for us to find our way *back* to the deepest springs of life” (Jung, 1966, p. 82, italics mine). This would seem to be the foundation of what Wallace (1987) calls the “profound historical truth”

that resides in archetypal images (p. 114), while Edwards (1987) restricts the “past” aspect of the symbol to its links with the individual’s personal past and finds its archetypal structure contributes present and future relevance.

Chronology becomes an infinitely malleable medium in the creative process as interpreted within analytical psychology, with many *times* anagogically compressed into the formal space of the object, available for release through active engagement with it. The theory and methods of analytical psychology emphasise the healing dimension of the symbolic third, which is an amalgam of transpersonal unconscious motives inclusive of the self (the word choice of “motive” is meant to emphasise the inherent intentionality, the shaping force, in each motif), complexes in the personal unconscious, and the needs and desires of the ego of the individual. That part which is considered to be outside of time, the archetypal matrix of the mythologem, holds the potential for healing because it brings into the here and now a perspective inclusive of, yet not limited to, the conflicts of the individual. The expressions of myth, organised around archetypal themes and integrated with personal material, may provide capable maps of these temporal tasks when integrated with the specific world of the individual (Willeford, 1987). Because each archetype is believed to have been shaped by millennia of human and animal experience (Jung, 1972), it is also believed to hold patterns of unfoldment, or the potential resolution of the conflict addressed. These patterns become apparent through the individual rendering “bodies of images” which inevitably house not only personal, but archetypal themes.

And so it is with the hand that guides the crayon or brush, the foot that executes the dance-step. . . : a dark impulse is the ultimate arbiter of the pattern, an unconscious *apriori* precipitates itself into plastic form, and one has no inkling that another person’s consciousness is being guided by these same principles at the very point where one feels utterly exposed to the boundless subjective vagaries of chance. Over the whole procedure there seems to reign a dim foreknowledge not only of the pattern but of its meaning. Image and meaning are identical; and as the first takes shape, so the latter becomes clear. Actually, the pattern . . . portrays its own meaning. (Jung, CW VIII, par. 402, cited in Olney, 1980, pp. 288-289)

Art therapists utilising Jungian methodologies such as active imagination aid the individual in discovering the weave of his or her “ply” in the personal, cultural and

finally transcultural embroideries of an archetypal tapestry. The original image, or image from the Origin, is brought forward and transformed into the present in the personal present and historical context of the specific individual.

While it is needful in contemporary clinical practice to maintain a distinction between the domains of religion and psychology, the experience of the *sacred*, which as a capacity of psyche transcends the formulations of any specific religious doctrine, inevitably becomes part of image-work in analytical psychology. “Sacred” comes from root meanings of “to consecrate”, or “to make holy,” which means “to make whole” (Ayto, 1990, pp. 452-453), a fitting definition of the work of individuation (Jung, 1968b, p. 27ff). To make a whole of the experience of time can be considered an essential component of the individuation process. The sacred manifests itself through “its power of turning a natural object into a paradox by means of a hierophany; (it ceases to be itself as a natural object, though in appearance it remains unchanged)” (Eliade, cited in Rasmussen, 1974, p. 28). For this reason these objects which facilitate the wholeness of the individual are experienced as numinous (i.e., as lodgements in time for the timeless and immortal “numen,” or deity), and are capable of facilitating this because, while *taking up space in this time*, they are also redolent with meanings other than those arising from the here and now. The attentive repetition of actions in making or in relating to an object become a ritual engagement, in which “profane time” is abolished.

. . . insofar as an act (or an object) acquires a certain reality through the repetition of certain paradigmatic gestures, and acquires it through that alone, there is an implicit abolition of profane time, of duration, of “history”; and he who reproduces the exemplary gesture thus finds himself transported into the mythical epoch in which its revelation took place. (Eliade, 1954, p. 35)

No one interpretation of such ritual engagement is appropriate to all situations in therapy, as in life. In art therapy, repetitive, ritual engagements may indeed be defensive gestures, refusals to enter into the creation of the self in “profane” time which necessitates the acceptance of mortal losses. However, within the methodologies of analytical psychology, repetitive, ritual engagement is also valued for its potentiality for regeneration. The “eternal return” is a return to the first act of creation, *originating*

time. To rest in this creative moment can offer the individual the conditions for self renewal.

Jung stressed that the encounter with the numinous is at the centre of his work. The main interest of my work is not concerned with the treatment of neuroses but rather with the approach to the numinous. But the fact is that the approach to the numinous is the real therapy and inasmuch as you attain to the numinous experiences you are released from the curse of pathology. (Jung, letter of 1945, cited in Adler, 1980, p. 8)

Using this citation, Adler emphasises that this “approach” is one of hard work, grounded in the grit and ordinariness of experience, to which St. Paul’s admonition is apposite: “*per visibilia ad invisibilia*.” However, many clients use the term “magical” to describe this transit (Wallace, 1987). The self in relation to those meanings it finds in the object that are outside of time finds, *at the same time*, that aspect of the self which is outside of time; but as the object surely sits before the self *within* space and time, so the individual is provided grounding within space and time by virtue of its obdurate presence.

This sense of the ego and its actions in the here and now as nesting, or being held within the self and its archetypal relations as timeless *presence* is easily accessed within creative image-making because participation in time, times and the transtemporal is an intrinsic dynamic of its processes. Neumann (1989) discusses how creativity helps the individual attain that leap of meaning in which personal suffering is coped with through the expression or shaping of it in a sensible form as something that belongs to the essential nature of reality.

However different the experiences of artists may be, and in whatever different ways these experiences may appear to them and through them, their creativity always represents a breakthrough in which the dimension of the purely personal opens out into that realm of the intrinsic essence of things which constitutes the suprapersonal background of reality. (p. 160)

The individual can feel accompanied and held in his or her suffering through experiencing it as participation in an archetypal structure. Nor is this “structure” divorced from human feeling, for it has achieved its organisation through an accumulation of human experience. *Mediated through the person of the therapist*, the archetypal form becomes a human dwelling place.

Neumann's (1989) description of the phenomena of the *participation mystique* in the interplay of what he calls "creative man" and reality pertains here. The dynamic of the participation mystique is that of "a total extension of the psyche over the world" (p. 180) and/or the absorption by the world of everything psychic, which Neumann describes as "an emotionally toned unitary experience" (p. 27). This eventuates in a shift in experiential centre from the ego to the self, from life in a partial world to life in the unitary reality. (We should recall here that the self, in therapy, is frequently projected on the therapist, who holds and facilitates the embodiment of its organising principles for the client's introjection.) If one were to draw Fraser's umwelts in a vertical schema with the ego/self axis as penetrating this "nest," as the ego and self achieve an ever more vital relationship, so the "lower" temporal realities of the various umwelts are increasingly accessible to consciousness. The self's habitation in a world of synchronicities may then bring to the nootemporal ego experiences with temporal characteristics that are consonant with the realities of particle physics. In review, Fraser's (1988) description of what he calls increasingly less complex temporal umwelts comprises that state in which time is "the time of the physicist's *t*" (p. 486) and causes and effects are interchangeable (eotemporal); that state in which time is experienced as nowless, undirected and discontinuous (prototemporal); and that state in which everything appears to happen at once (atemporal). Similar descriptions of the temporal experiences of the self abound in the writings of von Franz (1974, 1992) as she explores her hypotheses regarding psyche, matter, time and number. Self, she finds, has more to do with Bohm's "implicate order" in which all that is, is outside of time, yet is infolded in every instant. Here we arrive at the unitary reality, font of creative experience because the combinatory possibilities of the ALL are endless.

Dream work is central in the methodologies of analytical psychology because a dream, "the best possible expression of still unconscious facts" (Samuels et al, 1986, p. 49) is considered to be a creation of the unconscious in which the "I" of the ego participates as "dream ego." Generalising from the tenet that the relationship of the dream to consciousness is compensatory, the temporal elasticity of the dream can also be viewed as compensatory. The loose and reversible organisations of the time of the

unconscious, through which a day may be compressed into minutes of sleep, is effected through a purl of internal imagery, releasing the dream ego from the rigid organisations of conscious temporal life. Drawing these dreams and relating to them through association and active imagination establishes ties to the world of the conscious ego but also enlarges its perspectives through verbal and material dialogue. At this level of intensity the lowering of ego consciousness occurs in the therapeutic session as the dream ego is given voice. The continuum of times within which the ego is constantly emerging is activated, grounded in the self, and given expression.

With attention given to the activation of the ego/self axis, interpenetrations of models of reality with differing temporal/atemporal organisations are likely to become manifest in synchronistic phenomena. As was noted in Chapter 2, synchronistic events are exemplified by meaningful, symbolic transgressions of the ordinarily observed partition of psyche and matter. Bringing matter, in the form of art media, into the realm of psyche in the therapeutic container⁸ sets a stage particularly ripe for synchronistic occurrences, which can confirm the constellation of an autonomous archetype within process. As has also been noted, the therapist may or may not emphasise these events to the client, some of which only he or she may be aware, in accordance with an assessment of the ego strength of the client and his or her ability to integrate the occurrence into daily life in a meaningful, but not inflated, fashion (Keutzer, 1984). Responses, whether of delight or horror, to the sense of “magic” that synchronistic occurrences afford must be matured toward taking responsibility for one’s niche in this matrix of interconnectedness, this power resident in the intercourse of self with the matter of the world.

Berry (cited in Avens, 1980) finds the plasticity provided by the *presence* of the image makes it a particularly capable vehicle for accessing symbolic interpretations of psychic experience to which depend on transtemporal connections of meaning. Her phrases also resonate with Fraser’s descriptions of the temporal qualities of the *umwelts*, as she describes how, through the cotemporaneous presentation of its parts,

⁸ This is, of course, the alchemical understanding of the therapeutic container as alembic (Edinger, 1985).

the “full democracy of the image” allows us access to that psychic reality in which “everything is occurring while everything else is occurring, in a different way, simultaneously” (p. 44). Only a willingness to participate in the psyche as polycentric, as advocated by Hillman (1975, 1985), can grant to these realities the status of cohabiting partners contributing to the fullness of an individual life. In contrast to Fraser’s model of *umwelts*, the “manyness” of the archetypal paradigm conceived by Berry is not perceived to be hierarchical, but democratic, or polycentric. The perspective of the ego, along with its understanding of mundane time, is a necessary but, in itself, insufficient vehicle for the creative project of individuation.

The prospective capacity of the symbol as outlined by Philipson in Chapter 2 can be said to rise from the cotemporaneous quality of image. Access to nonverbal indications of the pattern of unfoldment within which the individual who comes to art therapy “futures” him or herself receives particular application in the clinical observations of Shoemaker (1978) and Roby & Pastushak (1978). Shoemaker uses the word “synthessence” to include the “map of the journey” (p. 157) that is often visible in the symbolic expressions of the first or first several images. Roby & Pastushak offer an earlier formulation of Shoemaker’s thought in which she used a less spatial, and more temporal, metaphor: “schedule⁹ of the journey” (p. 88). This schedule can be read in accordance with developmental considerations, but also with the sometimes less chronological schedule of complexes, with their underlying archetypes, to be visited (Edwards, 1987).

Because image-making processes can potentially access temporal realities that may threaten the ego, it is essential that creative activity with those whose ego’s are already frail take place in the holding environment provided by an art therapist cognizant of how to therapeutically mediate the materials and process of art-making to the client. It is not difficult to see that the particular value that the perspective of analytical psychology places on the physical nature of the art object lies in its compensatory function to the sometimes rarefied journeys afforded through active

⁹ Interestingly, the word *schedule* comes from the Latin *scēda*, meaning “papyrus leaf, piece of paper, page,” which travelled into English via Old French where it meant a sheet of paper giving details of what has been arranged (Ayoto, 1990, p. 461). One can indeed look at the work of art in this light.

imagination: the object provides anchorage, a grounding polarity of sensual experience for the errant ventures of psyche. The temporal process of the self-in-transformation is, literally, 'made an object' of conscious discrimination in the present.

Edwards (1987) advises that the image be looked at "in different time settings" (p. 102). While he does not clearly state what he means by this, integrating the temporal perspective as outlined here into his text I would suggest that what he describes as the necessary movement from dialogue *within* the image to a counterposition outside of the image is also a transit of "time settings." Both can be effected through spatial distancing from the object, as well as through temporal distancing: viewing the image in later sessions. While "within" the image, the client experiences its transtemporal matrix inclusive of times from the personal past. Creating spatial distance from the object within a session may help to position the client's perception of the object in "mundane" time, effecting the client's return to clocktime. Edwards is explicit in stating that "once the first examination of the artwork is over, subsequent dialogues with the image may take place: tomorrow, in a month, a year, or even ten years' time." Using the forms of relating to images that arise out of active imagination, the personified image becomes a companion through which the artist can continue to access the voices of the unconscious energies it constellates.

Many images need to be "lived with" (p. 103). Schaverien (1992) describes the complex involvement of an art therapist with her own therapeutic artwork that literally incorporated her body in the protracted time of its making. While the piece was initiated while the woman was a participant in an art therapy group, later, hair and nail clippings added to the surface of the artwork over the course of a year became art media. Schaverien describes this as that woman's way of maintaining contact with her meaningful group experience. Her need to save bits of her body that are usually shed also "embodies" Niederland's (1976) assertion that all object loss is felt to some degree as body loss. Saving what would normally be lost in time was a way of reconstituting a wholeness of experience and symbolically preserving it, on this timeless and primary level, until it could be integrated into the psyche.

In such a way, the "profound historical truth" of the image referred to by

Wallace (1987) is experienced not only in the rarefied macrocosm of archetypal referents in the collective unconscious, but in the commonplace microcosm of the individual. In reciprocal generosity, the archetype contributes to the historical becoming of the individual and the individual contributes to the historical accretion of the archetype.

The Creation of Art in Existential Psychotherapy: **“The Truth of Beings Setting Itself to Work”**

We have seen that within the existentialist perspective, the *Dasein*, or “being there” of the individual is not described as a condition of ontological stasis; rather, the *Dasein* as “an existence” is the-one-which-keeps-emerging-as-itself. When that aspect of our experience of time which is perpetual emergence receives emphasis, the “eye” of time becomes the “now” with its double horizon of past and future. “Now” becomes unceasingly available to us as an ever newly replenishing point of origin. Creation occurs within the tensile oscillation between resolve toward the horizon of the future, and retrieve from the horizon of the past within the living now.

Binswanger (1958a) has described existential impoverishment as a fixation on finiteness, of the excision of eternity from temporality that results in an individual clutching an *élan* pruned of its wealth of personal possibilities. Art-making within the therapeutic relationship offers a remedial experience to the existentially impoverished individual because it fosters creative activity that originates within the client. Both that which is felt to be timeless and that which is felt to be historical within the individual receive validation in the on-going activity of creation and reflection on creation in the present. Within the therapeutic relationship, the being “becomes” able to take on the risks of creative emergence as she finds her becoming caringly and respectfully received by another being in the world. Within the ever-renewed now, the individual grasps hold of the present edge of her future, originating herself as a historical being.

Retrospectively and reparatively, aesthetic moments within human experience,

inclusive of creative process, are interpreted as moments of “existential memory” by the psychoanalyst Bollas (1987). He merges existential and psychoanalytical formulations of those moments which are “caesura[e] in time when the subject feels held in symmetry and solitude by the spirit of the object” (p. 31) in his understanding of such moments not as experiences of mind, but of being, that recapitulate the preverbal rapport that is the heart of the mother/infant experience.

The mother’s idiom of care and the infant’s experience of this handling is one of the first if not the earliest human aesthetic. . . . The uncanny pleasure of being held by a poem, a composition, a painting, or, for that matter, any object, rests on those moments when the infant’s internal world is partly given form by the mother since he cannot shape them or link them together without her coverage. (p. 32)

The aesthetic moment in therapeutic art process is reparatively mediated by the therapist for those individuals whose early holding experiences were not pleasurable or trustworthy. Within the bi-une transference¹⁰ onto therapist and image, the individual is facilitated in cultivating his or her own capability to create objects that offer deep renewal which only experiences of timeless holding can provide.

Minkowski (1970) has identified activity as one of the vital phenomena which enable us to live the future.

“Activity is a phenomenon of temporal nature. It participates in becoming, not in being. More precisely, it contains the factor of the future. Through its activity the living being carries itself forward, tends toward the future, creates it in front of itself.” (p. 83)

“It [activity] is found in the ego insofar as it tends toward something. It is thus a true ‘going’ ahead and constitutes the only way of really advancing life.” (p. 83)

At its simplest, then, creative activity promotes the creative “presencing” of the living being in its authenticity.

The temporal emphasis within existentialism is inevitably on the “now,” the only perspectival point from which we can recollectively view what has

¹⁰ I have borrowed this particular term from the Jungian writer on creative imagination in Sufism, Henri Corbin (1978) to describe the dual transference which occurs in art therapy to both therapist and image (see also Schaverien, 1992). He uses the structure of a bi-unity to describe the dialogic relationship of the individual and his or her inner spiritual guide. The psychological goal of establishing a dialogic relationship between ego and self can be seen as analogous to this.

gone on before and what is to come. To engage in art-making is to create expressions of “self-identical beingness” (Fallico, 1962). In this way we can make our nows most truly our own because authenticity and spontaneity can be engaged in without guilt.

A philosophical description of this process is sensitively inquired into by Heidegger (1971) in his treatise, *The Origin of the Work of Art*. It must be stated at the outset that Heidegger clearly states that he is writing of “great art” only, in which “the artist remains inconsequential as compared with the work, almost like a passageway that destroys itself in the creative process for the work to emerge” (p. 40). This paradoxical “fall” on Heidegger’s part into the contemporary myth of the tormented artist is an unfortunate slip away from the truth of what he has previously so exquisitely stated about the truth of the work of art in relation to the being through which it occurs—but perhaps at the same time well illustrates the existentialists’ idea of “the fall” of a being into the collectivity and away from its own ontological destiny. Only four pages earlier, Heidegger eloquently describes the unitary search of the maker of art and the work that is made, that is as descriptive of a client as artist in art therapy as it is of a “great artist” in the studio.

If there occurs in the work a disclosure of a particular being, disclosing what and how it is, then there is here an occurring, a happening of truth at work.

In the work of art the truth of an entity has set itself to work. ‘To set’ means here: to bring to a stand. Some particular entity . . . comes in the work to stand in the light of its being. The being of the being comes into the steadiness of its shining.

The nature of art would then be this: the truth of beings setting itself to work.
(p. 36)

For Heidegger, art is intrinsic to a being’s efforts to gain self-understanding. Self-understanding occurs through the conflictual struggle of the artist coming-to-be through yielding his or her being to the battle between “world” and “earth” (Kocklemans, 1985). World is all that exists for a being at a given time, enabling “beings to attain to the Open of their paths” (Heidegger, 1971, p. 63). Measureless, world carries within itself the necessity of its intimate opponent, measure, which Heidegger terms earth,

“the self-secluding factor that juts up in the Open” (p. 63). The opposition of world and measure, which hides a unity, is perhaps best described by the word “cleave,” with its double meaning of “to split or divide. . . especially along a natural line of division,” and “to adhere closely. . . to remain faithful” (Random House College Dictionary, 1975).

Through entering the Open of world, giving “‘itself’ to understand in terms of ‘its’ world. . . *Dasein* temporalises itself as a *self*” (Kocklemans, 1985, p. 77).

Dasein, then, like the artist, temporalises itself as a self *through* the conflict of world and earth. This conflict can also be formulated as that between fantasy and reality, or between resolve toward the future and recollection of the patterned, historical self.

These conflicts are embodied and enacted in art therapy as the individual seeks to make an expressive unity of the Open of his or her desired image-communication in the enclosure, or earth, of the material art medium with its inherent limitations. *Dasein* cannot enter world without the obdurate laws of earth rising up as a circumscribed path through world, “the heavy weight of stone, the dumb hardness of wood, the dark glow of colours” (Heidegger, 1871, p. 63).

The strife that is brought into the rift and thus set back into the earth and thus fixed in place is *figure, shape, Gestalt*. Createdness of the work [of art] means: truth’s being fixed in place in the figure. . . .

In the creation of a work, the conflict, as rift, must be set back into the earth, and the earth itself must be set forth and used as a self-closing factor. . . . But it is at all times a use of the earth in the fixing in place of truth in the figure. (p. 64)

While one might ordinarily expect the truth of a being to be its “Open,” that the truth of a being achieves figural expression through the conflict of the openness of world and the concealing properties of earth prepares us for Heidegger’s paradoxical statement regarding truth: that “truth, in its nature, is un-truth” (p. 54). That is, that the truth of a being, its unconcealment, embraces a component of concealedness: refusal, which is the limit of what we can know about any being; and dissembling, or the simulation by beings of other beings. This paradox resonates with the psychological formulation of the “truth” of the ego-being of the personality as structurally dependent on adaptive defences, and that while much unconscious material can be brought to consciousness,

much is ever beyond our probe. Perhaps for this very reason one can say that the “earth” of the work of art enables material to come into the Open that *can only do so* through concealment: through qualities inherent to the media, through veils of metaphor and rhythmic gestural traces contributing to the gestalt of structural encodements.

Dasein comes toward its truth, its authentic self, through a constantly renewed commitment to cultivating Janusian poise—or poiesis—during this challenging, life-long act of parthenogenesis on the cusp of now. The coition occurs between temporal aspects of the being: *Dasein* comes toward its true self, its future, with a resolve that, “from the perspective of temporality. . . manifests itself as retrieve.”

By fetching itself back time and again, *Dasein* lets its own self be in terms of its authentic past; in addition, it also is as constantly coming toward its authentic self. It is thus in this complex process that *Dasein* hands over to itself its own heritage and thus “finds” its true self. (Kocklemans, 1985, p. 76)

Heidegger (1971) describes art as “historical” (p. 77), as a “founding” (p. 76). While his application concerns the work of art in the history of a *people*, I find that his words pertain equally well to the work of art in the history of the *person* in therapy. “Art lets truth originate” (p. 77) by clearing a space for the being to be as he or she needs to be in the mixing of self, earth and world. Art enables the being “to bring something into being from out of the source of its nature in a founding leap” (pp. 77-78). Human emergence and creative emergence are entrained as processes of expressive embodiment. Art enables this truth of a being to attain figuration, or creative preservation—to become historical. Engaged in as an inquiry into being, art making becomes a revisitable activity of origin in and of our historical existence. In a fecund moment of temporal convergence, we at once resolve to create *and* retrieve the authentic self. In this way we do not “merely make appeal to a cultivated acquaintance with the past,” but live “in our existence historically at the origin” (p. 78).

Rukeyser (1974) expresses the unique nature of historicism within the existential perspective in her exposition on creative process in poetry, in which the experience of time—past, present and future—is processed through impassioned images of emotional truth.

Now we turn to memory, we search all the days we had forgotten for a tradition that can support our arms in such a moment. If we are a free

people, we are also in a sense free to choose our past, at every moment to choose the tradition we will bring to the future. We invoke a rigorous positive, that will enable us to imagine our choices, and to make them. (p. 20)

Even when it is a graphic articulation of conflict and despair, the work of art stands as that “rigorous positive” that is witness to the historical moments of its creation and the transhistorical expression of existence it embodies.

Fallico (1962) suggests that, because the art object endures, it offers a field of complete presence comprising a sense of timelessness. Because it carries its past and future within itself, there is no passing of time for it or for the viewer who with openness enters its field: “. . . passing becomes realised as a permanence, a now.”

We can say that in this way, a sort of Nietzschean “eternal recurrence of all things” is achieved which overcomes time itself by making a self-identical and enduring being out of becoming. . . . Only in art do we find experience which endures, not by substitution and displacement, but by the kind of self-identical re-positing which keeps self-identity in being. (p. 80)

Fallico stresses the contemporaneous nature of *all* art.

All art is contemporaneous in its very nature: it is always *now* by the fact that its being is to be nothing else but presence. Notwithstanding the merely useful fiction of the historical and the antiquarian mind, there is, really, no primitive art or art which belongs to other times. (p. 80-81)

All art that is present can be re-enacted now, eternalising and validating its world “in its pure possibility” (p. 81). Fallico proposes that experiencing art within this existential perspective permits persons to take an aesthetic, “now-realising” attitude toward life, cultivating the ability to be with both positively and negatively experienced *events* as art presences so that experience itself is celebrated.

But the celebration is not one at the end of the day’s work, not one necessarily marking the “resolved problem,” the moment of rest between strenuous exertions. It also can celebrate defeat, madness, even death itself. Commemorative glow comes upon concrete experience, whatever its ordinary import, which fills up time, flooding the world with unique, personal meaning. (p. 84)

The now suffused with such *unutterable* intensities of meaning is amenable to being spilled as a swash of undiluted colour or angrily pressed into the brittle, rasping drag of

vine charcoal over paper's uncompromising tooth.

In art therapy, attentiveness is brought to the phenomenology of the moment of the individual emerging *through* his or her expressive engagement with the materials: art not only as product, but as process. What is happening to the art medium and what is happening to the individual are equally "material." The resolve to create images in the therapeutically held time and space of the session *is* a resolve to create the self within the temporal and spatial dimensions of that supportive frame, an effort which encompasses "retrieve." For many adults, even the handling of art materials is an act of retrieve, a calling forth of a modality of creative expression in which they have not engaged since childhood.

Others may have to paradoxically create retrieve. Moon (1990) has observed that the ahistorical adolescent patient often takes immediately to the art-making process. "There is something dramatically immediate in creating art that reverberates within the emptiness of the ahistorical patient" (p. 127). Working within an existential frame, Moon describes art of these individuals as action taking place in the present which offers a "here-and-now hook that . . . both echoes and transcends their dramatic *nowness*" (p. 127-128). Every image is an addition to an evolving self-portrait through which aspects of the self are claimed. The creative play and ritual aspects of art-making make this a safer endeavour than it might otherwise be felt to be; introspection can be experienced as occurring through nonverbal extraspection of self-made images. Through the visual documentation of art a past is created providing a foundation for present actions oriented toward the future.

Fundamental to the involvement of creative arts in psychotherapy from an existential viewpoint, therefore, is their inherent positioning of the individual in active creation of self in relationship to an other, the therapist, and to the world through the obdurate nature of the "earth" of the art materials. In this way, the therapeutic session becomes a microcosm of the individual in relationship to the larger world-around. Even as the person is encouraged to retrieve his or her past, the "recovery" is enacted as a progression toward the authentic self. The completed work itself is historical, yet continuously present, and endlessly renewed through its relations with those who admit

it into their field of contemplation.

Structural and Formal Considerations

Words move, music moves
Only in time; but that which is only living
Can only die. Words, after speech, reach
Into the silence. Only by the form, the pattern,
Can words or music reach
The stillness, as a Chinese jar still
Moves perpetually in its stillness.

-T. S. Eliot, Four Quartets, p. 19)

In the linear unfolding of his poem, Eliot has charmed the perpetual *passing* of time into perpetual movement that stays by placing the passing of time in a Chinese jar: not inside it, tightly capped, but inherent in the formal pattern of its being, without which it is not. A jar, of course, is circular, making the time of travelling its plain or patterned surfaces one of return. But more generally we can say that Eliot has moved from words to the incarnated object/image of art to achieve temporal lodgement because in it the metric of movement is one of space. The experience of time created by perceptual processes taking in that patterned space, felt as changing visual movements that take time to perceive within dimensionally unchanging space, is given paradoxically within a timeless whole: the enduring object, a coition of movement and stillness.

The timelessness of the object also arises because it demonstrates at once “the totality of the form in all its capacity for motion, and in all the rhythmic play of that motion” (Stofft, 1975, p. 165). In this way the object seems isomorphic with memory, which Arnheim (cited in Stofft, 1975) has described as having a spatial character enabling it to present experience whole. The creation of an art object in therapy can thus serve to “stay” the concurrent verbal process which disappears in time, but for the reservoir of memory. In many clients, memory may be abnormally ravaged in its workings by the disorganising processes of their mental or physical disorder, by

organic deterioration, the side effects of pharmacological treatments or ECT's, or simply by contents too painful to remember that may subtract a space of years from recall. Words may be inaccessible, or inadequate. Their evanescence when spoken may be too reminiscent of loss; their cryptic sigils on the written page may feel remote from human experience.

Words strain,
Crack and sometimes break, under the burden,
Under the tension, slip, slide, perish,
Decay with imprecision, will not stay in place,
Will not stay still.

(Eliot, *Four Quartets*, p. 19)

Considered in its object-ness, *most* of the art in art therapy does stay still. The comparatively permanent products of art therapy are frequently cited as a therapeutic factor unique to this expressive modality (Wadeson, 1980; Case & Dalley, 1992; Schaverien, 1992). Art images may embody past experiences, which now can be brought into and removed from view as desired, offering clients a feeling of control over relations to the objects of inner and outer experience in time. Clients can make the art object and its contents appear and disappear.

Lavelle (*Du temps et de l'éternité*, cited in Fraisse, 1963) astutely observes that "only a relationship can give us a representation of an object which is not present" (p. 285). In art therapy, the opportunities for relationship include making representations of relationships with past objects; making representations of past objects through rendering the symbolic transference here-and-now; and making relationships with the media and processes of art-making. These world-designs are woven into the final product, which is therefore the condensed issue of many relationships.

The Object as Temporal Code

Nearly all verbalizations contributing to the expressive field created in art therapy will inevitably, with each utterance, express a "tense" of being or action. While a therapist will understand the tense of many utterances to not, in fact, constrain the fullest meaning of what is said to one particular sector of time, nonetheless, language

will unavoidably be conditioned in this way. The openness of the image to time is perhaps one of its primary sources of power. In fact, perhaps due *to* its very openness, *all* times may be interpolated in its tacit presencing.

Yet we cannot say that time, in very *specific* ways, is not also present in and intrinsic to art's existence and expressions. Time is implicated in our internalisation of the world in less macroscopic ways than our narratives, devoted to clear temporal perspective, convey. Summarizing the essential nature of time in all human perceptual processes, Fischer (1967) states, "The transformation of time delay into space in all sense modalities appears to be the basis of what we call space-time equivalence and illustrates the process of our weaving the delicate fabric of reality" (p. 458). We interpret the microscopic temporal disparity of percepts as space.

Visual relationships within the art object give rise to a sense of time. "Spatial change creates time," Stofft (1975) observes in his structural exploration of space and time in painting. He describes the world of time conveyed by an art object as a result of the perception of relationships inherent in the sensuous materials of the art work. The timeless whole, the object as presentation, "represents the totality of the form in all its capacity for motion, and in all the rhythmic play of that motion" (p. 165). To Stofft's formulation of perception as a dynamic entangled with the principle of duration, which he borrows from Ushenko (1953), must be added the psychoanalytic understanding of all that can condition the individual's felt experience of duration, engaging the mechanisms of perception with *psychodynamics*. As soon as one tries to isolate "the object" outside of its relationship with the viewer(s) to whom it *is* object, one has ignored the most basic truth that, to paraphrase Lavelle, "only a relationship can give us a representation of an object which *is* present."

Time as timeless being and time as becoming may both be conveyed through a work. Dynamic arrangements of masses and line give rise to visual rhythms; vision, in turn, is not only a mental but also a bodily experience, and thus these visible rhythms may be felt as psychophysical measures of time. Ehrenzweig (cited in Fraser, 1990) has speculated that every act of visual perception "recapitulates the ontogenetic development in the visual motor stages of dreamlike structure before it is articulated into

the final images which emerge into consciousness“ (p. 403). Perhaps because of this, as Stofft observes, “when the rhythmic play of masses and planes (lines) is interwoven such that parts disappear in a complex moving-through, measure and objective time tend to completely disappear” (p. 170). In art-making, the passage of time is arrested through the constructive act of organising the time-of-creation and the time-of-memory into a coherent spatialised pattern of formal and contextual meanings such that all time is held in a timeless unity. Immersed in the flow of creative *becoming*, the artist makes an object-*being*. The feeling which “tells” an artist that a work is completed may be just this sense of a process of becoming having reached a level of representation such that it has achieved viable life, the status of a *being*, as defined by the parameters of that “other” with which the artist is in need of relationship.

Fraisse (1963) argues that because our visual perceptions give us the most useful representation of the world, temporal experience is often transposed into a matrix of spatial coordinates. While the image of spatialised time does not correspond to any immediate experience, it allows us to make past and future states and changes present. “Thus we let the dynamic aspect of the experience of becoming slip away” (p. 283). However, this temporary reprieve allows for the reorganisation of experience.

The ability to form a simultaneous representation of several successive moments, by placing them side by side and separating them by intervals or durations, permits us to complete our rough images of becoming (p. 283).

In art therapy, these simultaneous representations need not “depend only on thought,” as in Fraisse’s discussion, but also involve the full round of the domains of experience, inclusive of the functions of feeling, sensing, and intuiting.

In an attempt to “determine the extent to which time tends to be apprehended in spatial terms, and whether there are any space symbols for time which occur more or less universally” (p. 420), Guilford (1928) devised an introspective interview experiment utilising written and graphic responses, during which the observation of motor responses was also crucial. While many of Guilford’s methods are open to

criticism,¹¹ Fraisse obtained similar results in his related experimental study. While the highly personal nature of spatialised location of changes in time was evident, nonetheless, a general tendency was demonstrated to place the past to the left or, secondarily, below, and the future to the right or, secondarily, above. Significantly, 35% of Fraisse's subjects preferred to form *sequential* images of time-related images rather than locating them within space.

As mentioned before, Shoemaker (1978, p. 158f) also describes the general applicability in our culture of future events on the "forward," or right side of the page. She reminds us that cultural considerations are paramount in this regard, our spatial future in most of the Western world conditioned by the structure of reading, which proceeds from left to right. This may be reversed for persons still close to their Jewish or Oriental heritage. However, while in a drawing a secondary horizon of the future is the upper portion of the page (and particularly the upper right), generally the future on a page of text is downward, suggesting that for this general directional indicator, the bodily reality of "growing *up*," or taller in space, holds sway. Cautioning that context may modify all grids of interpretation, Perkins (1977) utilises Bach's divisions of the image into quadrants in work with children with life-threatening illnesses. In this interpretive repertoire, the left side of the image may also represent the future, but as a "going out of life," or a worsening of the illness. The lower right may represent the potential future *or* the recent past, the unifying condition being that it is the quadrant that shows those element pressing toward consciousness. Many other factors influencing the placement of images in the therapeutic context must be kept in mind, however. For instance, if the therapist sits to one side of the client, this, in its transferential implications, may have as much or more to do with the orientation of

¹¹ Guilford's attempt to have his interviewers observe and analyse the eye movements of the interviewees precedes the more complex considerations given to this kinesthetic response as later developed by proponents of Neuro Linguistic Programming (Bandler & Grinder, 1979). Thus, whether recalled memories were predominantly visual, auditory or kinesthetic was not considered as potentially influential on eye movement, nor the functional preference for accessing the memory suggested in the interviewer's choice of instructive term (in this case, "think" and "recall"). As well, in reporting the high percentage of subjects who drew time as an ascending curve, he did not attempt to correlate this to the age of his subjects, all university psychology students and therefore presumably young. Fraisse also refers to his subjects as "students".

images than temporal considerations alone. The interweaving of conditioning circumstances becomes complex, as the therapist receives projections of persons in the client's past, present and hoped for relations with real and phantasised others in the future, and as these projections are (often indirectly) symbolised in art. The zoning of a page into times must be utilised as only one *possible* reading, an underlying *tendency*, to be integrated with other interpretative matrices.

The use or lack of perspective in drawings has been suggested to have some bearing on the client's experience of time. Distance in time can impart psychological perspective just as distance in space imparts physical perspective. That one should be able to symbolise the other seems reasonable. Eissler (1952) speculated that the ornamental, stylised art of his client whose psychopathology included that of depersonalisation and isolation was isomorphic with her experience of time. Objects were stylised and consistently dissolved into ornamental patterns without depth: ". . .the drawings were so cleverly designed that they could have been used as cut-outs, or arranged in an entirely different pattern in relation to the borders of the sheet" (p. 19). Similarly, he noted that his client's recounting of her history seemed flat, without horizon or depth.

It turned out that the patient lacked the capacity to experience any contents of the present and the past as being connected with each other. . . It became evident that she had no feeling of a stream of time, but that the process of subjective life was for her an accumulation of disparate time units, of strictly separated and isolated moments. (p. 7)

This client could not bear to wear a watch, and experienced the seasons as spatial, not temporal, change. Unfortunately, Eissler does not go into the relations between this patient and her parents, leaving us unable to see if she would illustrate Fisher and Fisher's (1953) speculation that spatial perceptions might be influenced by a forbidding parent transmitting to a child "the feeling that it is not proper to view things in their full perspective, in their full depth" (p. 504). In our exploration of possible relations between a client's lived time and space of the art work, it is nonetheless important to keep in mind Hartocollis' (1983) admonition regarding equating far space with far time

in the interpretation of dream images.¹² Space and time are not reducible to each other, he reminds us, and the elusiveness of defence mechanisms such as displacement may in fact place far away in space what is near in time. The same inversion is possible in art.

The constant denial of the possibilities of portraying depth in the picture plane may also be considered from the viewpoint of Arlow (1984) in his citation of the work of Heiman, who had a patient who associated the “vanishing points,” those virtual points where the perspectival lines in drawings would converge, with death. Arlow informs us that the German word for the point of convergence is “*Todtpunkt*, the point of death” (p. 19), and alerts us to its possible association with the belief that each individual is destined to die at a specific temporal and spatial location: a fateful point of convergence. Avoidance of perspective or its exaggerated use can be explored for its relation to anxiety over death. However, the French term, *le point de fuite*, carries the connotation of flight and escape, and calls to mind the Latin phrase, *tempus fugit*, time flies. The metaphorical meanings of these formulations are many, from death as escape, to escape from reality within the picture plane's depth, etc. The languaging of visual devices in art makes cultural sensitivity imperative.

Interpreted psychoanalytically, visual rhythms in artwork, observable in both process and in product, occur within a field of libidinal meanings related to those bodily rhythms through which we achieve, and have achieved, gratification, whether it be those of sucking from mother's breast, or those of achieving sexual orgasm. “Rhythmisation--the imposition of personal volition on time--is experienced as a conquest of time” (Meerloo, 1948. p. 594). Patterning a page, or the clothing of a person, may indicate, through this temporal overregularisation of impulse, the need to control anxiety regarding and/or achieve gratification from the person or process symbolised in the image.

Huyghe (1977) finds psychological time to be primarily conveyed in the colour, not the forms of works of art. Colour calls not only on our experience of space but also, psychologically, on our experience of time as duration because it “stirs up

¹² For a further contextualisation of time and space in dreams from the perspective of physics, see Schneider (1948).

emotional forces in us which can be perceived only in time that has been lived through, in inner duration” (p. 129). As such, Huyghe suggests that colour is invested with unconscious meanings because it also “belongs” to inner duration. Used expressively, colour therefore conveys qualities of the inner duration of psychic states; conversely, Huyghe claims that colour can be used environmentally to influence psychic states, citing studies that suggest large fields of colour are not only sensed through optical channels, but through other physiological systems as well. Distinguishing between the perception of colour and the sensation of the *experience* of the perception of colour, Huyghe emphasises their qualitative difference and its relation to interior time.

A sensation whose origin was isolatable to begin with ends up as a sentiment, an affective condition; it has become associated with memory. . . . From the moment the sensation comes into consciousness it is connected in time with what no longer exists except in memory--a tremendous step since from there on we enter the domain of duration. The sensation of colour does not just affect our psychology at the time when it occurs, it connects with all of our experience in time. (pp. 137-138)

While Huyghe cites a study which describes the psychophysical effects of coloured rooms on persons whether they are seeing or blind, he also makes clear that the general relations of one colour to human experience is mutable because “the action of colours on the nervous system provokes psychological attractions and repulsions by reanimating obscure memories of past experiences” (p. 141). Observations of the expressive use of colour must be integrated with observations of its more plastic and relational use. Huyghe describes these as “psychological prolongations” which give indications of the artist’s ability to use it in a way which shows colour (and in art therapy we would also infer the artist) to be capable of “diversifying and renewing itself through successive transformations” in time (p. 134). To seek meaning in the chosen colours in client art is, then, in a Goethean sense,¹³ to engage in a simultaneous inquiry into the “activities or sufferings” (p. 154) of light and of the self, whose eye does not passively receive but actively contributes to its world .

All discussions of temporal coding in the art object, and in particular in the art object made in therapy, must be mindful of the time-of-making, the time of its

¹³ Goethe described colour as “the deeds done and suffered by light” (cited in Portmann, 1977, p. 4).

becoming as an object, *in relation to* its completion as an art-being, for it is often this which best informs our choice of interpretive matrices in art therapy. It is this complexity of times embodied in the artwork, its relationship to the client and to the here-and-now of the relationship of the therapist and client that calls us to open our interpretations to the fullness of ways of understanding the human experience of time.

Process: The Making of Art as a Sequence of Acts in Time

In its most phenomenological simplicity, the act of creating art offers a full compendium of temporal experiences. On the one hand, the maker is always in the present, creating a here-and-now object that accumulates over time, and abides after its making is accomplished. However, to embark on the journey of making—to make one’s journey—the risk of *actively entering the time of creation* must be taken, whether tentatively or with boldness. From that point on, past marks must be integrated into the present making of the work, to achieve coherent expression—even when that expression is the paradoxical “coherent expression of chaos.” The maker of art may have a fore-image of the final product, in which case his or her endeavours will be at first, circular; future-oriented toward a past image. But likely, the art endeavour will gradually situate itself more and more within the present: *the media of art insist on this*, for they are not made of the stuff of inner vision, but have qualities that demand the modification of past plans by moving with openness to present contingencies toward the ultimately unknowable future. So even when content, manifest or latent, is not taken into consideration, the maker of art is always within the applications of time. Within art therapy, the invitation to the client to embody material from his or her life history in the making of art only deepens the field of the circle of time in which the work of art turns, as the personal past is processed through the present, and as images of future becoming are expressed. What has been forgotten, cast out or through attrition deleted from active memory, casts *its* light and shadow through the work. Greater still, according to the understanding of analytical psychology, is the archetypal time underlying and permeating all these particularities. Rhythms of applying and handling the art media speak against the foil of the steady outward progression of the minutes of the session.

Within these, rhythms of action and reflection, of doing and undoing and redoing are enacted. The body of the maker sways, stills, clenches, twitches, taps, empties, reddens, quickens, pales. And the imprint of all these articulations of time are woven into the visual rhythms and placements of form and colour onto the page, into the textures and turns of sculptural objects.

The process of making art is the objectification of subjective experience, inclusive of the subjective experience of time: time past, time present, and time future, coursing through the ritual timelessness of the creative act as archetypally experienced. The primacy of the past in determining these actions which exhibit the potentialities of the maker in relation to his or her substance, to which psychoanalysis gives its nod, is given expression in a strictly philosophical context by Whitehead (1955).

The past consists of the community of settled acts which, through their objectifications in the present act, establish the conditions to which that act must conform. (p. 36)

Whitehead goes on to cite Aristotle's conception of matter as "being pure potentiality awaiting the incoming of form in order to become actual." The *pure* potentiality of matter--and, in our discussion, of the matter of the person of the artist/client--is limited by these "objectifications of the settled past." The potentiality of the matter of the artist is inevitably impressed with these settled forms each time. "The 'substantial' character of actual things. . . expresses the stubborn fact that whatever is settled and actual must in due measure be conformed to by the self-creative activity" (p. 37).

In art therapy, we assay the form, content and the process through which images are embodied for those "stubborn facts of settled acts" which are prohibiting the healthy unfoldment of the individual in time. By facilitating *new* creative acts in the repertoire of the individual, which then also become commingled in that sediment of "settled acts," potentiality is impressed with a revised pattern of self-creation.

Thus the time of the acts of making works of art can be seen as a microcosm of the way the client participates in time in his or her many acts of making the self. Ushenko's (1953) concept of "cumulative disposition," which he uses to describe the temporal aspect involved in viewing, hearing or reading works of art, can be applied to

making a work of art as well, looked at microscopically and macroscopically. Ushenko defines cumulative disposition as the “mental residue” which accumulates over time as an individual engages in perceiving a work of art, be it visual, literary or musical. Ushenko states, “Cumulative disposition is the residue of an actual process” (p. 125). Along with its inherent reference to the past, it coexists with the protensive present, which “can be identified with a single event in the making, i.e., with an event while it lasts” (p. 129), giving a sense of “the fusion of the present with a retroactive immediacy” (p. 125) which fosters the uninterrupted progress of the work. Retroactive immediacy occurs through an expansion of the immediacy of the present which “transforms the past within the perspective of the present because it brings into the open, into explicit actuality, features that were latent at the date when the past was present” (p. 143). This temporal loop that is effected holds true for both the drawing process and the parallel memorial activity which accompanied it. Each mark on the page literally leaves a residue, which is past, yet is also “protensive” in that it awaits completion and integration, whether through harmony or conflict, with the strokes to follow: in an existential framing, it (as it exists in the artist/client) “seeks to attain to the Open of its path” (paraphrase of Heidegger, above). In this way the present becomes enlarged, as long-past strokes and ones just drawn equally await to embrace or repudiate the consequences to their community of the one to come. This sense of pantemporal presence is even more comprehensively felt during the process of creating an artwork in which one *consciously* cultivates an active partnership with unconscious processes, including unconscious “scanning” (Ehrenzweig, 1967), and when one engages in art expression that has as content or emotive force autobiographical material. Personal history may then become implicated in the hairs of the brush, in the layering of the paint.

Spears (1972) has stated that “time and history cannot be escaped by a movement in space.” This is certainly true in the space of a work of art which is claimed by the spontaneous and/or considered placement of *personal* residues. Time and history may be delayed through movements on the space of the canvas. They may be tucked into metaphor, and into the space of the portfolio of works, but they are not

escaped, and, for healing to occur, they must ultimately be worked through. The portfolio of works in art therapy is its own layered canvas of cumulative residues and, in periodic reviews, these works “bring into the open, into explicit actuality, features that were latent at the date when the past was present” (paraphrase of Ushenko, above). Object constancy may be undone in the interior time of the picture plane as forms arise and are (perhaps) erased, painted over, reinstated. Yet amid this flux the picture-as-a-whole, and the portfolio, endure, valuably mirroring the self enduring the multiple losses of loved persons, places and things.

Remembering the past is accompanied by remembering that one has a future. Melges (1982) reminds clinicians not to lose sight of the simple therapeutic effect of that component of interpretations of content. Refocussing on the future in realistic ways can bring about a shift in the unproductive formal relationships the client had established between past, present and future. Art processes can be used to foster such a focus. To express, and eventually refine the expression of subjective reality requires that an effective working relationship be established between subjective time and the sequence of creative actions in external time that must be followed in order to actualise an outer image of an inner state. The individual is invited to actively make projections of the self into the past and future tangible and present. These alternations in focus offer an opportunity to enlarge temporal perspectives of the self that have become fixated or narrowed, and to integrate newfound potentialities in a series of images that work through the viability of these alternatives.

While any number of criteria can be used in grouping a client’s body of work in art therapy, implicated in these groupings is the fact that they nonetheless accumulated as a chronological sequence of works. Their sequential, cumulative effect as objects gives evidence of changes occurring over time (Miller, 1984). Each image appears at a specific time, or times, not earlier and not later. Kubler (1962), theorising with regard to the grand temporal gallery of human art-making activity that spans the rise and fall of civilisations, speaks of the “progressive” or “positional” values in works of art that are serial or sequential. While he does not address these formulations on the intimate scale of the personal life, he briefly mentions that these also occur in the microcosm of the

individual as well. These positional values may include parallels, antetypes, and prefigurations. Each work is related to in accordance with the “changing systems of forms in which its occurrence belongs” (p. 98) He speaks of historic time having “envelopes” within it, durations defined by a pattern of contents or, achronologically, early and late versions of the same pattern.

In such corporate works of art, each separable part has a positional value in addition it its own value as an object. Usually our comprehension of a thing is incomplete until its positional value can be reconstructed or recovered. Hence the same thing can be quite differently valued as an object separated from context, and as a corporate work within its intended setting. (p. 97)

In art therapy, we can see these positional values as being historically instructive in terms of the progress of the therapy, but perhaps as well, particularly in an analytical setting, as a recapitulation of the early life of the individual (Waugamann, 1992). The temporal record imaged within the creative process of the client has a chronological construction by virtue of its manufacture week after week. Schaverien (1992) explores some of the uses of this review record for expanding therapeutic possibilities.

A retrospective exhibition can be particularly revealing of interests and preoccupations which have an often unconscious sequential development. It may become clear that certain themes, colours, figures or types of mark are repeated in different pictures, these taking on quite different implications from those initially intended. The artist/patient may form a different relationship to the process as the unconscious significance of the sequential connections in the images becomes evident. This may give insight into why it was, for example, that a certain picture was, at first, rejected. . . . The insights gained from viewing all the images together can accelerate self-understanding. (p. 76)

When this calendrical ordering is deconstructed into envelopes of meaning, recurring patterns of expression, whether of form or content can be seen to play against chronological measure, and the psyche’s regard and disregard for “real time” is revealed. Kubler’s “parallels, antetypes and prefigurations” can be observed, and the organising principle of the unconscious, operative in accordance with “qualities” rather than chronologies, persons or objects (as described by Masler, 1973, Chapter 1) can be explored.

Visual art in therapy, as embodiments of metaphor, allows the individual to

arrive at non-chronological recreations of her life story through the “mis-readings”¹⁴ its non-linear, image-text generates. The compensatory deceits of soft chronology yield analogical truths whereby the individual is reconstellated with objective time as but one temporal measure. Other measures become qualities or ways of being, which may manifest as archetypes, that are not bound to linear time.

Creativity enables *discontinuity*. While the establishment of continuity is important for all clients, the existential need to dare discontinuity is also important. Both are part of the journey. The discontinuation of life-patterns resulting in and from unfulfilled living and/or illness is necessary to healing. Bloom (1973) invokes the image of William Blake’s Covering Cherub as a symbol of creative blockage, calling this undifferentiated, hermaphroditic cherub “a demon of continuity; his baleful charm imprisons the present in the past, and reduces the world of differences into a greyness of uniformity. The identity of past and present is at one with the essential identity of all objects.” While Bloom is speaking in particular of poetry, since Blake’s poetry was intimately wed to his visual art, we would not be unduly extending Bloom’s proposition to suggest that *art* “must leap, it must locate itself in a discontinuous universe, and it must make that universe (as Blake did) if it cannot find one. Discontinuity is freedom.” This posture invokes the spirit of existentialist *élan*, in which the future is not conceived to be predestined, but is owned as an arena of self-creation. Binswanger (1958) identifies the constriction of being to the category of continuity as fundamental in the development of phobias and anxiety disorders. A world-design based solely on principles of preservation, cohesiveness, and continuity disallows for the integration of that time quality of “*suddenness*. . . the time quality that explodes continuity, hacks it and chops it to pieces, throws the earlier existence out of its course, and exposes it to the Dreadful, to the naked horror” (p. 204). Discontinuity, however, is most profitably only a stage through which new and more meaningful—and now, flexible—connectivities are established.

In this discussion of art process as an act in time, which I sometimes also refer

¹⁴ Sexson (1982) uses Harold Bloom’s term “mis-reading” to explore how mis-readings define the gnostics of metaphor in her doctoral dissertation on the fool of the Renaissance Tarot and the feminine as boundary metaphors capable of revivifying rigidified social and religious structures.

to an image-making process, a distinction that can be made between art object and image needs clarifying. Art object and image exist differently in time. An image is a continuum, a live and autonomous *psychic phenomenon* that may be given expression on the page, canvas or in sculptural materials. In this way, the art object can be said to perform the function of an “image stop.” “Image-making” refers to just this embodiment of the psychic experience at a given moment in time. The *image*, however, is beyond the object, and continues to metamorphose in the psyche of the client, in the container of the therapeutic relationship, and in the greater life of the individual in the world. Through memory, we can look back on events as if they are on a spreadsheet, co-present. The picture in art therapy is often such a spreadsheet. In it, time assumes some of the qualities of space, its volatile nature temporarily fixed for review. The maker and the viewers of the pictured image, however, are still in the stream of becoming, and therefore, the *image* is not fixed, since it is conmixed and carried along within those who have seen it. The picture, or sculpture, stabilises; the *image* continues to metamorphose in the life of the client. The *image* remains in process.

Summary

The perception of external reality is an act of creation involving the integration of multiple neurophysiological and psychological processing systems with differing temporal organisations. The creative process of art-making, which again externalises the internalised experience of the world, involves the conscious and unconscious navigation and reworking of these multiple interpretations of experience, both as they are and in their possibilities, inclusive of their temporal codes. The desire for clear-cut interpretations of the temporal significance of art processes and products cannot be satisfied. Reducing the complexity of the subjective experience of time and its relation to objective time undermines the intricacies of the nest of temporal umwelts that gives rise to human psychophysical life. Aleatory processes in art-making may indicate

surrender to meaningless discontinuity, or to the possibilities of inherent significance in the constellations of meaning synchronistic experiences afford. The portrayal of ideal forms, while indicating the desire for relations with timelessness, may suggest a client is defensively, and perhaps inflatedly, clinging to what is perceived to be unchanging; or it may portray advancement through the “holding patterns” of eternal forms into, again, the specificity of his or her own personal suffering. Fractured forms with interchangeable parts colliding several temporal perspectives in one unstable, shifting world carry temporal signatures that can only finally be read in the context of individual meanings, and the ability of the maker’s ego to hold, or break under, the pictured conflict. An assessment of the state of the ego is of paramount importance in formulating all therapeutic treatment plans. In art therapy, the quality of the ego’s grounding in objective time will be a primary indicator of the temporal perspectives the art therapist will facilitate through his or her verbal and non-verbal interventions.

Fraser’s model of temporal *umwelts* offers us a framework for considering psychoanalysis, analytical psychology and existential psychotherapy as nested interpretations of temporal experience, each based on a distinct temporal perspective. The conscious integration of the individual’s experiences in and attitudes toward each of these temporal perspectives permit him or her to live more rewardingly in the present. Each school’s understandings of creativity and art-making offer theoretical and methodological models for the art therapist to apply in understanding clients’ temporal worlds and developing strategies for promoting passage between their distinctive temporal organisations. Within the art making activity, emphasis may be placed on its relevance to issues of loss and reparation, or its uses in the service of narcissistic needs and omnipotent phantasies, working toward a comprehensive interpretation clarifying the historical unfolding of the individual, consonant with the psychoanalytic model. Alternatively, the needed perspective may be provided through experiences of the archetypal reality, which place the personal journey in the larger, recurring narrative themes of individuation. These experiences of timeless realities will be placed in the service of creating deeper, more meaningful existence for the individual *within* the bounds of time. In this way the time-directed horizons of the ego are

broadened and held within the time-transcending motives of the self. Or (or alternately), emphasis may be given to the phenomenological act of moment to moment self-creation, enabling clients to become available to realising their own creative potentialities through imagining themselves first into “the possible real” of art-making, and from there into life.

The art therapist seeks to understand the meanings in the dynamic structure of the temporal layers of creative expression with the goal of facilitating “appropriate modes of connectivities” (Fraser, 1981, p. 20). Emphasising temporal experiences inside, or alternatively, outside the awareness of the client can serve to consolidate and/or expand ego boundaries, as appropriate to the client’s needs. The formal framework of art made within the therapeutic relationship helps to insure the “safe return” of the individual during the “as if” journey of creative process, inclusive of those processes that are felt to reverse and/or neutralise the “arrow of time.” The value of these achronic umwelt experiences is shown in the respectful use of their commemorative art objects in therapy. The spatialised conflicts of being in time are held in the timelessness of the object—and then interpretively released into time again in the interactions of art therapist and client in the therapeutic hour. The lasting benefit of art therapy is that upon the termination of therapy, many clients leave *with* the ability to integrate the artful “dilation and contraction” of time (Kafka, 1977) into their temporal experience in ways productive of meaningful insight through the creation of sustaining images that hold forth a continuing record to them of their courage to become.

DISORGANISATIONS OF TEMPORAL EXPERIENCE

A human being in a state of wellness is characterised by a flexible synchrony between the intercoursing systems of his or her interior life and those systems exterior to it. As has been shown, an individual's subjective sense of time, arising out of complex psychological and physiological factors, is a primary structure of the self that enables or disables relationship with others and with the environment. Melges (1982, 1987) and Edlund (1987) concur that disorders of the mind may have subjective time distortions as their first expression. Melges (1989) advances the thesis that distortion in what he terms psychological time, "whatever the underlying cause, alters consciousness and the capacity for testing reality" (p. 100). For this reason, at least some evaluation of the individual's perception of time appears on most clinical intake assessment forms. Verbal and nonverbal assessment of patients' problems with sequence, rate, and temporal perspective can indicate the ways in which these interact to create "psychopathological spirals of progressive psychological disorganisation" (Melges, 1982, p. 45).

Subjective temporal disorganisation may originate in one or multiple processes impinging on individual identity. Neumann (1989) reminds us of the vulnerability of the ego's mooring in time when he states that "any process which alienates us wholly or partially from our bodies—whether it be intoxication, ecstasy, sickness, or exhaustion—removes us or kidnaps us, as it were, from the spatio-temporal definiteness of our existence" (p. 75). Spiegel (1981) cites irruptions of primary process material as undermining temporal mastery, resulting in "regression in disservice to the ego." But theoretical perspectives valuing only one temporal measure as real, usually that of the ego, are challenged by those which acknowledge a multiplicity of realities which need not be derogated as regressive, but which can be met without judgment as "other" (Watkins, 1986). Within this perspective, the time of the ego is accepted as having

relative, but not absolute, value.

Fraser (1988) hypothesises that failure to coordinate the hierarchically nested systems of the temporal *umwelts* informing our time experience is a component of psychological disorders.

I wish to postulate, therefore, that disturbances of selfhood necessarily correlate with disturbances of hierarchical, dynamic balance among the canonical forms of time which—as I shall argue—are always present in the mind, as parts of the mind's store of reality assessments. (p. 490)

While Fraser's contributions are usually found in psychoanalytical journals, the perspective his model provides is invaluable for its ability to encompass the temporal foci of analytical and existential psychology as well. Fraser (1981) defines mental health not as attunement to an assumed objective, absolute temporal matrix but rather as the capacity to “accommodate the archaic reality of primitive causations and temporalities, lodged in his fantasy, memory and dreams, and integrate them with the ambiguities of human freedom” (p. 23). Through word, image and other nonverbal communications, the therapist gains an understanding of these discrete temporal organisations comprising the client's world, and with the client seeks to determine their function in daily life.

In the continuous comparison among the various clocklike processes jointly responsible for our conscious sense of time's flow, it is probably the process whose reality happens to be invested with the most emotional energy that is taken to be the reference clock. Reasons for preferential cathecting of the archaic or the later clocks may be threats of inner, psychological dangers or physical, biological or social ones. (1988, p. 493)

In art therapy, art and therapist provide a way for the client to navigate the temporal zones of the self, to make a consortium of its cabal of clocks. The therapist quite literally provides auxiliary anchorage for the reference clock of the ego by having the room's timepiece visible only to his or her eyes. The therapist also entrains the lowering and raising of the client's psyche, as if lock by lock, among the levels of the waters of the unconscious where the individual needs to go on his or her journey toward integration—entrains these times with the time by which the ego must abide to live in the world it shares with others.

Theoretical Perspectives on Psychopathology and the Subjective Sense of Time

Originating in the medical model, psychiatry and psychology have tended to utilise its terms in their descriptions of experience that deviates from what is considered to be the norm. The normal subjective sense of time, however, comprises a vast continuum of what would be termed abnormal experiences if they were to persist, and the readings of the spectrum of health given by different theoretical perspectives are suffused with unique colourations. While these have been touched on in earlier chapters, I will give a brief summation of their differences before proceeding to a discussion of time experience in specific disorders and the presentation of case material.

Psychoanalysis

In psychoanalytic theory, subjective experiences of time contributing to neurotic and psychotic experience are considered to have originated within the early relationship of the child and its parents. Parenting practices providing for the satisfaction of the infant's psychophysical needs and, subsequently, the entrainment of these to the schedules of the social norm interplay with the primary force of sexual and aggressive instinctual drives to establish a foundational paradigm for each individual's subjective sense of time, from its experience as duration to the preferential focus of time perspective. Metaphorically, one could say that the socialisation of these biological and instinctual drives produces the tension in the spring of the subjective clock by which the individual maintains, gains and loses time. Events which undermine the healthy use of defence mechanisms maintaining the integrity of the ego may allow for irruptions of repressed conflicts and fixations of which the individual was previously unconscious: irruptions, therefore, of the past into the present. If the content cannot be admitted because it necessitates change which the individual is unwilling to make, other alterations in the experience of time may be felt, intended to ameliorate the inner conflict: for instance, the person may repudiate parts of the self, withdrawing from full presence such as is typical in states of depersonalisation. Repressed parts of the self are, in effect, relegated to temporal organisations of the self, or *umwelts*, to which the

conscious ego is not privy, and in which time, become less linear, may take on the qualities of space.

While defence mechanisms are necessary to psychic health, consistently exaggerated use of the more primitive mechanisms, such as splitting, projective identification, and denial, results in personality disorders and psychoses (Gabbard, 1990). The use of defence mechanisms is a psychic response by the ego to perceived threats to its integrity, processed through unconscious fantasies. These unconscious fantasies include the fantasy of the omnipotent manipulation of time as a defence against all that would contravene its wishes, whether it be the dicta of parental introjects or the certainty of death. These patterns are discerned as they operate within the present analytical relationship in the client's transference, and may be detected through changes in the analyst's own experience of time resulting from countertransference and projective identification. Through the reparative experience of therapy, which enables unconscious content to be brought to consciousness, the inflexible uses of defence mechanisms resulting in psychopathologies may be ameliorated.

Analytical Psychology

Within analytical psychology, the individual is said to be born with an innate capacity for wholeness of personality which, in the human project of individuation, is developed to ever greater degrees of both differentiation and coherence. Creative engagement with one's capacity for wholeness is a goal of psychotherapy, which has as one of its dimensions wholeness of temporal experience.

The variety of temporal realities coexisting within each individual are seen as necessary to wholeness. The self, as archetype, originates in the relative timelessness, or "not-time," of the collective unconscious, and the goal of individuation is to bring the ego into integral relationship with this principle. The transhistorical archetypal dimension is a reservoir of symbolic energies that can inform the contemporary, personal dimension of the individual's life with meaning. Watkins (1986) describes this as a shift from the psychoanalytic perspective in which imaginal life results from distorted internalisations of real events that generate pathological organisations of

experience, to one which views imaginal life as the active creation of realities which “cohere” as long as their host actively attends to their resonant meanings.

Jung increasingly tried to avoid the word “pathological,” in one lecture going so far as to state the eminently arguable point that “Between an artistic inspiration and an invasion there is absolutely no difference” (Jung, 1968a, p. 37). For Jung (1960), painting within the analytic journey was a way for the client to tame otherwise unmanageable invasions by unconscious material.

... you can get the patient’s mind at a sufficiently safe distance from the unconscious, for instance by inducing him to draw or paint a picture of his psychic situation. (Painting is rather more effective, since by means of the colours his feelings are drawn into the picture too.) In this way the apparently incomprehensible and unmanageable chaos of his total situation is visualised and objectified; it can be observed at a distance by his conscious mind, analysed, and interpreted. The effect of this method is evidently due to the fact that the originally chaotic or frightening impression is replaced by the picture ... The *tremendum* is spellbound by it ... and whenever the patient is reminded of his original experience by its menacing emotional effects, the picture he has made of it interposes itself between him and the experience and keeps his terror at bay.” (p. 260)

He further explained that these invasions “are pathological only in the old sense of the word when pathology meant the science of the passions” (Jung, 1968, p. 24a). The etymological root of *passion* is to “suffer,” which in turn means “to carry up from underneath” (Ayto, 1990). In analytical psychology, suffering the passions, which with their roots in the “underneath” of the unconscious care little for calendrical and clock time, is considered to be part of the ordinary phenomenology of human being, and is termed “neurosis” or “psychosis” according to the degree to which suffering becomes habitual, and the degree of its pervasiveness and/or dissociative impact (Jung, 1968a).

A biological and evolutionary ethos informs Jung’s (1976b) model, as is evident in his terming the organisation of reality that comes to the fore in schizophrenia an “earlier,” and more “archaic” mode of adaptation to reality. While in neurosis, earlier *personal* organisations, such as those of infancy, surface as the reactivated models of functioning psyche makes available to the individual, the fragmentation of personal organisation that occurs in psychosis results in reversion to the archaic,

archetypal organisations of experience characteristic of the collective unconscious. Fraser's model of temporal *umwelts* resonates with Jung's model, even in shared hypotheses that propose the brain itself *is* this evolutionary or hierarchical nest, processing perceptual experience through varying temporal and atemporal codes in its different parts, and which produces the intangible unity called mind through its synthesis of these paradigms.

"What comes up from the underneath" of this psychic structure, demanding to be carried, arrives in the form of symbols, which in analytical psychology are evaluated less for diagnostic purposes than to discover their meaning and purpose in the unfolding of the individual's life. If their irruption in the psyche is considered disruption, the disruption is viewed as a purposeful attempt of the psychic system to restore its balance (Jung, 1968a), whether through an integration of repressed personal material, or of impersonal, indigenous psychic factors. That the latter, roused by factors in the *collective psyche* striving for integration into consciousness (Schwartz-Salant, 1982), may overwhelm the ego's equilibrium, can only enhance our sense of collective responsibility for assaying sociopolitical factors contributing to "personal" pathologies.

Hillman (1975) coopted medicine's organisation around pathologies and organised his "re-visioning" of psychology around a positive reinterpretation of its password, utilising the root of "pathology" as an active verb. Paradoxically, to *pathologise* then becomes the psyche's embarkation on a journey toward the disclosure of meaning, which requires a period of "dis-order" in order to arrive at a new and more meaningful order of experience. The psyche chooses to engage in the creative embodiment of its passions, inclusive of the role of destruction in creation.

In order to approach the psychology of pathology afresh, I am introducing the term *pathologizing* to mean the psyche's autonomous ability to create illness, morbidity, disorder, abnormality, and suffering in any aspect of its behaviour and to experience and imagine life through this deformed and afflicted perspective. (p. 57)

A paradigm for Hillman's therapeutic method was that same art of memory which was mentioned in Chapter 4 in connection with the psychoanalytic interpretations of Hutton

(1987). In its most arcane form, the art of memory utilised the installation of striking images in what were called “memory theatres” as structures for ordering and retrieving knowledge construed to be universal. Within the practice of archetypal psychology, pathologizing is staged within interlocking psychobiological fields that are, in part, memorial structures encoding experiences, each of which has an imaginal expression. Finding “the God in the disease” (Hillman, 1985, p. 40) allows therapy to proceed through creative interactions with imaginal centres of experience which impact the psychophysical organism.

The therapeutic retrieval of these potentially healing relationships is not a quick-fix, symptom-ameliorating, pharmacological enterprise. In the offices of the imaginal, time is not measured in money, but in the deepening of efficacious memory that exceeds the recall of personal history. “The art of memory is an art of time,” Hillman affirms, “. . . the deepening of psychological space increases through slowness” (1975, p. 94).¹

Jungian praxis is attentive to the needs of the infant and mature human spirit for participation in not only the particulars of its here-and-now existence but in the timeless ground of existence. Experiences of the *unus mundus* mediated by the therapist root the individual in that inner reality that is outside of time; participation in this reality is not reduced through categorically regressive interpretations. Jung (1975) was adamant.

The psychotherapist must not allow his vision to be coloured by pathology, he must never allow himself to forget that the ailing mind is a human mind and that, for all its ailments, it unconsciously shares the whole psychic life of man. He must even be able to admit that the ego is sick for the very reason that it is cut off from the whole, and has lost its connection not only with mankind but with the spirit. (p. 232)

The symbols and metaphors through which the individual consciously and unconsciously communicates his or her suffering to the therapist reveals the matrix of forces which seeks to embody its meanings in the individual's life. Through dialogue and visual intercourse with these images of “the suffering of the passions,” the person

¹ This statement alone suggests that the temporal perspective inherent in each methodological approach to psychotherapy will determine the appropriateness of its methodologies, as traditionally practised, to brief therapy.

consciously enjoins primary aspects of the objective psyche, as well as complexes in the personal unconscious, in the project of individuation.

Existential Psychotherapy

The most profound psychological experiences were observed by existential psychotherapists to have as a major component a disruption of the individual's usual relationship with time, which alters the relationship between subject and object. From an existential perspective, being-in-the-world in sickness and in health is a hyphenated affair, signifying the human ability and need to transcend the gap between subject and object. The psychoses are viewed as "specific modes of transcending;" each psychopathology is seen as a world-design, a form of existence with its own way of ascertaining how each thing is (Binswanger, 1958b, p. 201).

In this context we do not say: mental illnesses are diseases of the brain (which, of course, they remain from medical-clinical viewpoint). But we say: in the mental diseases we face modifications of the fundamental or essential structure and of the structural links of being-in-the-world as transcendence. (p. 194)

The distinct structural temporalisations of the being-in-the-world are called modes of transcendence.

... transcendence is rooted in the very nature of time, in its unfolding into future, "having been" (*Gewesenheit*), and present. This will help to explain why, in our anthropological analyses of psychotic forms of being-human, we are not satisfied with our investigation unless we gain at least some insight into the respective variations of the structure of our patients' time. (p. 194)

These ways of being-in-time can then be seen as ways of transcending, or "climbing over or above, mounting" (p. 193) that gap between subject and object, of which temporality is a central component. Even objects which stay are changing, because they are not outside of relationship. This can be said even of the I, as object of the subject-I: the ego's relations to I-as-having-been, or the I-to-come. The "transcendent" nature of behaviours emerges from what the medical model terms "symptoms" only through seeking to understand their meanings in relation to lived experience (Corin, 1990).

Therapists operating within an existential/phenomenological perspective may utilise any number of methodologies in their attempts to elucidate the phenomenological

realities of clients. As discussed in Chapter 3, psychoanalytic understandings may inform the existential psychotherapist's understanding of a patient, but the patient is never reduced to being a sum in an algebra of past circumstance. In his attempts to treat a woman suffering from visual and auditory hallucinations, Boss (cited in Watkins, 1986) relates how he ultimately had to acknowledge the "pathological" experiences of his patient not as part of her reality induced by physiological imbalances, or as "mere" apparitional projections of inner conflicts, but as a reality *in itself*. What became important was not interpreting experience within the hierarchical dichotomy of health and pathology, but of identifying the phenomena of being and becoming as *realities* and, in the attitude of existential care, establishing dialogue between them much as is done in the active imagination of analytical psychology. Existence is allowed to "speak up about itself" (Binswanger, 1958b, p. 200). Operating in this way, the *therapist* begins to "hear voices" in those symptoms through which persons are given the diagnoses of pathology; symptoms become speakers in the circle of counsel. Some of these speakers may be voices of time.

We know that we have to ascertain the kind of spatialization and temporalization, of lighting and colouring; the texture, or materiality and motility, of the world-design toward which the given form of existence or its individual configuration casts itself. Such a methodical clue can be furnished only by the structure of being-in-the-world because that structure places a norm at our disposal and so enables us to determine deviations from this norm in the manner of the exact sciences. Much to our surprise it has turned out that, in the psychoses which were so far investigated, such deviations could not be understood merely negatively as abnormalities, but that they, in turn, represent a new norm, a new *form* of being-in-the-world. (p. 201)

If "distortions of the feeling of time necessarily result in distortions in the meaning of a life" (Ellenberger, 1958, p. 106), the reharmonisation of meanings should result in a continuity of care which results in "the freedom of letting world occur" rather than "the unfreedom of being overwhelmed by a certain 'world-design'" (Binswanger, 1958b, pp.194-195).

Transcendence can be achieved in many ways: May (1958) identifies the use of symbols as a potential mode of transcendence, whereby humans can discover, communicate and achieve new perspectives on their world-designs. In the transfer of

qualities predicated by symbolisation, an object or situation is borne outside of its concrete immediacy, shows itself capable of movement, and is tinged with the qualities of that which now bears it to consciousness. Love, care and imagination are other modes of transcendence, the latter being identified by Kierkegaard as “the faculty *instar omnium* [for all faculties]” (cited in May, 1958, p. 75). Imagination makes possible human freedom, and change.

An individual may transcend the concrete givenness of his or her situation by temporalising a world-around in a way that cannot synchronise with the norm, because the norm threatens the organisation of the self, inclusive of its psychological and biological constituents. What may begin as a limited, self-protective strategy, however, may burgeon into an isolating structure which increasingly undermines all attempts at communication and mutual, human understanding. The refuge found in the past, flight into the future, or the fragmentation of temporality eventually increases the suffering of the individual as the subjective time in which he or she lives conflicts with the demands of the temporal frame of social living.

May (1958) argues that the psychotherapist must be wary of becoming an agent of the dominant culture rather than an advocate of the *Dasein* of the individual. The goal of existential therapy is the empathic understanding of the world-design of the individual with a mental disorder. May negates the goal of “cure” as the appropriate focus in existential psychotherapy: “Therapy is concerned with something more fundamental, namely, helping the person experience his existence; and any cure of symptoms which will last must be the by-product of that” (p. 86). A “cure” of normative adjustment to social culture that involves “giving up being”—that is, that does not embody the unique being, or *Dasein*, of the individual—will only produce a temporary release from conflict, ultimately generating a profound, underlying despair. Temporally speaking, this means that a primary goal with each client in existential psychotherapy will be to aid the individual in the discovery of that personal organisation of temporal experience that is most congruent with the fulfilment of his or her existence.

The Subjective Experience of Time in a Selection of Specific Disorders

The methodological dilemmas in attempting to measure the subjective sense of time, in or out of pathological states, have been outlined by Zakay (1990), who concludes:

Time is a domain in which modern physics and psychology meet. The uncertainty principle, which was originally stated by Heisenberg in 1927, says that every measurement disturbs the measured system when the measurement tool is not essentially different from the measured phenomenon. This principle applies in the field of psychological time almost as well as it does in the domain of quantum physics. This might not be a coincidence. (p. 81)

Edlund (1987) has outlined a number of definitional and methodological problems that accrue to research on time and mental illness in particular. Caveats particularly abound with regard to finding underlying measures that would indicate reliable groupings of subjective time experience correlating to psychiatric diagnostic categories. Edlund cites the changing definitions of schizophrenia as an example of the evolving nature of diagnostic categories of mental illness. Issues of the validity and reliability become “highly problematic in reviewing the literature on time and the mentally ill, much of which is old” (p. 71-72). While counselling that “all generalisations about time and mental illness must be made cautiously” (p. 73), his own research nonetheless leads him to conclude that patterns of subjective time distortion in mental illness do appear to be relatively specific.

I would give the same cautions with regard to the case material I will present in this chapter and the literature review which precedes it. While the client presented was generally considered to have schizophrenia, his hospital file showed that over the years his psychiatric diagnosis vacillated between paranoid schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder, with consideration also given to bipolar disorder. It is interesting to speculate whether or not the subjective experience of time might be a differential feature distinguishing manic episodes from psychotic symptoms in paranoid schizophrenia which may be similar to those in mania. Speculations within my case presentation along these lines remain only that: with a medicated client, the subjective experience of

time is also a byproduct of psychopharmaceutical interventions, and is not a pure reflection of the fluctuations and mean of his or her unmedicated temporal experience. My literature survey is not intended to be exhaustive, but rather provides an overview of works on the subjective time experience in mental illness, with special emphasis given to clinical and experimental research into the subjective experience of time of persons with schizophrenia as a background to discussion of the case material; for even though medicated, my client's experience of time as clinically observed and countertransferentially experienced revealed a consistency with that attributed to persons with schizophrenia in the literature.

Edlund (1987) divides the subjective experience of time into that of duration and perspective. He defines the subjective feeling of duration as "the feeling of how time is now passing" (p. 12) and as influenced by emotion, affect, memories, perception, cognition and even language itself. When a person becomes unable to synchronise this subjective experience of time with external time calculations and internal time estimations, the "fit" of the individual into the shared temporal world begins to deteriorate. Edlund relates that arousal, activity levels, boredom, pain and pleasure have all been hypothesised as mediating factors of the subjective sense of duration. The subjective experience of temporal perspective is intimately tied to memory and associated affect which facilitates or inhibits "our ability to trace our lives forward into the future and backward into the past" (p. 14). Subjective time perspective not only changes with age, but with the affective components of mental and physical disease.

The importance of events to us subjectively may have little to do with their relative closeness or remoteness in objective time. Sometimes, particularly in psychosis, this priority of subjective time perspective may entirely overwhelm the ability to place events in objective time, and yesterday, tomorrow, or even childhood, may turn and occupy all of the present. (p. 16)

Both subjective time duration and perspective are central in the construction of personal meaning.

Melges (1982, p. 51) concentrates on problems with temporal sequencing, rate and perspective. While he charts these as rather simplistically correlating to specific disorders, in his text he makes the complex interrelationship of his categories clear.

Problems with rate and rhythm, charted as specific to mania and depression, lead to shifting emphases of temporal perspective. The temporal disintegration of sequences characteristic of schizophrenic disorders may lead to over-focus on the future in its paranoid expression. Without remediation, all on-going, radical aberrations of temporal experience are likely to result in the desynchronisation of transactions with others.

Wallis (1967) organises temporal experience around the concept of “temporal alienations” (p. 792) that correlate with a “disorientation of interior time” resulting in, or from, the disintegration of the ego. Distortions of the temporal field of the ego result in distortions of the ego’s possibilities of action. Again, the desynchronisation that occurs as the sharability of one’s time experience diminishes results not only in the cognitive experience of temporal alienation, but in a deeply felt alienation from intimate and communal human relatedness.

Bipolar Disorder

In bipolar disorder, individuals experience a temporal fluctuation in rate and perspective (Melges, 1982). Both polarities evidence a “refusal” or inability to create a present, either through investing in the past as a refuge (depression) or taking flight into a future of phantasied fulfilments (mania) (Wallis, 1967). However, all sources are not in agreement with Melges’ and Wallis’ assignment of time perspective. Basing his conclusions on Minkowski, Fraisse (1963) describes the euphoria of mania as contingent on a mood “which depends entirely on the present.” Contact with the present, however, is “only an instantaneous contact” remaining disconnected with past, future and the real requirements of the present. Perspectives on depression as fixation on the past resulting in a constriction of the personal future, however, receive near if not total unanimity (Edlund, 1987; Melges, 1982; Wallis 1967; Binswanger, 1958a).

Melges (1982) differentiates the temporal disorganisations of bipolar disorder from that of schizophrenia through the observation that while in bipolar disorder there are disjunctions between plans and goals, there is no confusion or disintegration of sequential thinking as in schizophrenia. In mania, the investment in maintaining the

divisions of time past, present and future and inhabiting the strategic sector is crucial in the temporal system of defence which the psyche has organised.

Manic Process

Most often, the temporal analysis of mania is conceived as one of speeded rate and accelerated rhythms that are generally agreed upon to be a defensive quickening, a psychophysical embodiment of the wish to escape present disillusionments and an unsatisfactory past through the ill-considered propulsion of the self into compensatory future of grandiose schemes (Gorman & Wessman, 1977). Because these intrigues lack realistic foundations, the leap *from* the present results in a plunge *back into* a present redolent with the past because it cradles, again, what is perceived to be a failed self.

In her formulation of the psychogenesis of manic-depressive states, Klein (1975a) observes that the individual “endeavours ceaselessly to *master and control* all its objects” (p. 277), necessitating hyperactivity. I would suggest that one of these objects may be time itself: time itself has become a “bad object” because it is paradoxically filled with lost objects. The individual engages in killing time by filling it with inflations of the self in such a way that time and the self become symbolic equivalents. The manic individual has exhausted his or her ability to mourn; as Klein notes Freud pointed out, “in mourning time is needed for the command of reality-testing to be carried out in detail, and . . . when this work has been accomplished the ego will have succeeded in freeing its libido from the lost object” (Freud, cited in Klein 1975a, p. 344). Killing time in manic activity kills that duration which pulls the self to mourn, and may also satisfy sadistic impulses and the need for omnipotence, because as we have seen, in this symbolic drama, time may be unconsciously cast as Mother and/or Father Time. When mania runs its course, however, the individual reenters the time of as yet unmourned lost objects, and the lost object of the omnipotent self looms increasingly large as yet another object to be mourned.

Kay Jamison, a world renowned specialist in manic-depressive illness (her preferred term) who only recently revealed her own struggle with the disorder, speaks

of mania as feeling like “I could fly through star fields and slide along the rings of Saturn.” She was not able to accept her need for life-long medication for some time.

Jamison finds being “normal” a “bittersweet exchange.” “I know without lithium I’d be dead or insane,” she says. And yet “I don’t see Saturn’s image now without feeling an acute sadness. (Toufexis, 1995, p. 69)

Jamison uses the planet Saturn purposefully, because of its mythohistoric assignment to the role of Father Time. Occurring at the edge of the known universe in ancient times, Saturn became god of all things liminal: those who were melancholy, sick, physically disabled—and the creative, for it was he who was said to have given Zeus the measures of creation (von Franz, 1978). As the slowest moving planet observable at that time, its connection to melancholia is obvious: Jamison’s interpretation of its rings nicely adapts the planet as a symbol of the full affective range of this disorder.

McCurdy (1987) interrelates the understandings of manic-depressive illness put forward by Binswanger, Jung and Neumann and also finds the experience of time to figure prominently in the illness process. Binswanger hypothesised that both affective states resulted “from an alteration of time structure. . . .The change in mood is a consequence of the change in the process of temporalisation” (p. 314). Binswanger therefore finds that the illness is not a disorder of mood but of consciousness and of the ego dissociated from the full range of its functions. This is echoed in Minkowski’s (1970) formulation of mania. He argues that the change in temporalisation is *not* one of rate, in terms of the manic person manifesting more rapid psychic activity, but, a difference in quality of temporalisation. Psychic activity is characterised by its “instantaneous contact” with reality, evidencing no penetration into it as participation in a lived duration: “What is lacking in our manic patient is *unfolding in time*” (p. 294).

McCurdy transports these considerations into the dynamics of the mother/infant dyad as that biunity from which the infant’s ego individuates *and* upon which it patterns the structure of its relationships. Consistently inadequate nurturing may result in insufficient provisions for a full, integrated range of ego functioning.

Although the pure ego is still capable of self-identity, it is, however, paralysed in its directive function because the transcendental ego, with its category of time, is dysfunctional. From a Jungian point of view, I suggest further that the ego’s defect derives from a severely damaged ego/self axis, an expression of a failure of the primal relationship. (p. 320)

The mother incarnates the self for the child and facilitates or inhibits the organic growth of the child's ego consciousness out of the biunity of the dyad *within the passage of time, the duration*, of the early childhood years. McCurdy speculates that failures have occurred in the mother/infant relationship upon which the self/ego bond is modelled. A significant inadequacy in this relationship would of necessity include deficiencies in modelling of the relationship between the "other time" of the unconscious and the empirical time of the ego. McCurdy finds Dionysius, as "the god who appears and disappears, who comes and goes, who gives both intense joy and terrible suffering" (p. 321), to personify the cyclic experiences of manic-depressive illness from the influx of creative energies, to their sudden turns into destructive energy, to experiences of death, dismemberment and interment in the slowed time of the seemingly subterranean lair of depression. In his comprehensive rendering of Dionysian myth and cult, Otto (1965) describes the moment of the enantiodromia.

But the splendour of the god, to whom all of the treasure rooms of the world have opened, is overcast suddenly by a profound darkness. Behind the enraptured truth there looms another truth which brings on horror and catches up the dancers in a madness which is no longer sweet but somber. (p. 103)

Depression ensues.

Depressive Process

The world of a person with depression is experienced in degrees of slowness. While a depressed individual can usually give an accurate determination of objective time, the person has lost a "moving" orientation in time providing creative momentum for the self to create itself *into* the future. Meanings, if they are brought to consciousness, are found to be lodged in the past in an involute way, so that the person cannot effectively engage the future. A reciprocal relationship is set in motion between constriction of being and a cancellation of becoming.

In describing the centrality of the individual's relation to time in affective experience, Hartocollis (1983) identifies the apprehension of oneself as helpless in the wake of a past disaster, real or imagined, and external or internal in origin, as characterising the introjection of real and perceived traumas which result in depression.

While perceived threats to the ego's adequacy in the future are experienced as anxiety, in depression the ego is pervaded by the certainty of its own inadequacy in the past and present as well.

...by perceiving itself inadequate in relation to a noxious event in the past, the ego assesses reality as inescapable, unavoidable, irrevocable—finality being the essence of the past. And the ensuing experience is one of depression. (Hartocollis, 1983, pp. 63-64)

Identifying helplessness as genetically traceable to the oral period, when gratification is not forthcoming from nurturing others, Schmale (in Hartocollis, 1983) also observes hopelessness as characterising depression, in which the ego also experiences its own inadequacy in gratifying its needs. He traces the genetic origin of hopelessness to unresolved conflicts in the phallic period, when the formation of the superego extends the ego's horizon farther into the future.

Melges (1982) describes depression as the experience of the future as blocked through dynamics originating in hopelessness and grief. Mental processes often slow; the depressed individual feels that his or her plans for achieving an imagined future are deficient. An increasingly "vicious spiral" of hopelessness ensues as the person continues to cling to goals that may be impossible for him or her to reach. The diminishing future horizon may terminate in suicidal impulses as the final inadequacy of the self is experienced as its inability to bear itself one moment longer into the future. This may be expressed altruistically for loved ones as freeing *them into* a future from which the impediment of the failed self has been removed. Advocating future-focussed therapy for persons with depression, Melges identifies activities that encourage risk taking and spontaneity as therapeutic, particularly when they offer intrinsic rewards in the near, rather than the far, future. Art therapy would satisfy these criteria, its processes enabling the person to experience a sense of creative efficacy in time, as self expression is risked and valued within the therapeutic relationship. Particularly in milieus practising within the model of art as therapy, works with aesthetic merit would also be fostered as they reinforce the individual's ability to fulfil the self's and others' needs for nurturant beauty.

Depression may occur as an element of, or in conjunction with, many

disorders, among them schizophrenia. Binswanger (1958a) differentiates the rather simple temporal perspective of uncomplicated depression from the complexity of temporal experience in schizophrenia. He concluded from clinical observations that in schizophrenic process, the person's general focus on the past occurs "in unison with the falling apart of the ex-stasies of time, so that, according to the patient Hahnenfuss, 'The entire constitution of the soul can be taken [not as finite-timely but] equally well as eternal'" (p. 358). As will be shown, the images and verbalisations of my client offer strong support of Binswanger's analysis. The complexity of determining the temporal experience and its etiology in schizophrenia is reflected in the literature, a selected review of which follows.

Schizophrenia

While few researchers would argue that subjective temporal disorganisation is not a component of schizophrenic process, their formulations vary in the qualities they attribute to this experience, in the directions of research they follow and in the interpretations they put forward. Seeking to order the schizophrenic experience of time in their own minds, investigators have variously described it as frozen (Spiegel, 1981); as encased in the past (Minkowski, cited in Spiegel, 1981); as atomistic (Seeman, 1976); as fragmented (Edlund, 1987); as an intemporal refuge (Fraisie, 1963); or as being primarily a problem with determining temporal sequence, having a neurological basis (Melges, 1989; Mo, LeFevre & Kersey, 1984; Mo, 1990; Schwartz, Winstead & Walker, 1984; Schwartz, McGinn & Winstead, 1987). Experimental tests of the latter researchers have yielded data that begin to chart the differential routings of temporal information in the visual and cortical systems of individuals with schizophrenia. These lend support to Minkowski's (1970) earlier observation that, unlike in other mental disorders, in schizophrenia "time entirely breaks down, . . . a modification is produced in the domain of time itself" (p. 284).

Edlund (1987), however, referring to tests researchers have used to measure the subjective time perspective of persons with schizophrenia, doubts the validity and

usefulness of many of these experimental endeavours. The temporal disorganisation that is part of schizophrenic process, in Edlund's estimation, may be quite an individual affair.

The clinical usefulness of such tests is doubtful. To obtain a flavor and an understanding of these differences, it is best to perform a clinical interview. Then one can note the enormous variation with which time is ordered and disordered in schizophrenics. (p. 84)

The ever-shifting parameters of the clinical definition of schizophrenia noted by Edlund may have much to do with the variations of time experience reported and observed, since psychotic episodes within affective disorders may leave clinicians sometimes puzzling over where a given individual's illness is best placed in the occasionally overlapping symptoms characterising affective disorders with psychotic episodes, schizoaffective disorders or schizophrenia.

Agreeing with Minkowski that persons with schizophrenia are trapped in their pasts, Spiegel (1981) cites the case of a patient who "surrendered genuine becoming for the security of becoming what he already is. . . the essential mystery of the future which is part of human experience is the victim of the schizophrenic process. The patient's time consists of circular repetitions of the past" (p. 9). However this sounds remarkably like a description of a person suffering from depression as well, a dysphoric mood often found as a component of schizophrenia (DSM-III-R, 1987). Further investigations reveal the subjective temporal experience of persons with schizophrenia to be complex and paradoxical. That we wish to give definitive closure on their experience may only indicate how threatening the betrayals of temporal constancy in schizophrenic experience are, not only to those individuals who are its host, but to us as researchers and clinicians.

To demonstrate the observed tendency toward a shortened future horizon in persons with schizophrenia, Fraisse (1963) cites a study by Wallace designed to measure the imagined temporal horizon of participants with schizophrenia. When the patients were asked "to enumerate and date ten events which would take place during the remainder of their lives. . . the average extension of their anticipation was twelve years" (p. 198) whereas the average extension for the control group (matched for both

age and intelligence) was thirty-six years. In a measure of time spans in invented stories for which the beginning was given as, “When Bill wakes up he begins to think of the future; he hopes. . .”, participants with schizophrenia averaged a perspective of nine months, while the control group averaged four years.

As shown above, Minkowski’s (1970) clinical observations of a past-focus in schizophrenia is but part of his more complex analysis of its “profound dislocation of the phenomenon of time” (p. 284). Immersion in, or subduction by, the most static dimension of lived time, the past, corresponds to what Minkowski observes as the attraction to a spatial organisation of experience than to becoming and time. The characteristic immobilisation and isolation of the person with schizophrenia correlates with a “pathological predominance of criteria and elements of a *spatial* order to the detriment of vital dynamism” (p. 278). This spatial order in turn is characterised by the inflexibility, or “morbid geometrism,” of its design.

When we assess the generation of a world-design by the individual having schizophrenia in a way consonant with the methodological emphasis of existential psychotherapy, we must also be cognizant of the designed world in which the person with schizophrenia finds him- or herself. Estroff’s (1989) examination of personhood and the subjective experience of schizophrenia from the perspective of social science offers a much needed, compensatory approach to the tendency to medicalise the temporal disorders of schizophrenia, which places them only in the body of the patient, and not also in the social systems of which he or she is a part. Calling schizophrenia an “I am” illness to which the dimension of time-as-personal-history is central (p. 189), she looks at the factors in the social construction, deconstruction and reconstruction of identity that interrupt the person’s sense of self-same being over the course of the illness. Within this perspective, Estroff points out that it is imperative for caregivers to examine their interventions, or lack of them, for contributing to the temporal entrapment of the patient, “unnecessarily, wastefully contributing to the chronicity and the construction of schizophrenic patients” (p. 195). We must examine the dynamics our metaphors and methods of “care” set in motion.

Our metaphors and methods are best evaluated within our dedication to arriving

at the best understanding we can of the temporally different worlds of persons with schizophrenia. The medical model provides numerous exploratory hypotheses regarding aberrations in neurological functioning that can help us to understand the bodily-based generation of these worlds.

The Skewing of Time Information in Schizophrenic Process

Minkowski's formulation of the world of schizophrenic process as of a predominantly *spatial* order resonates with the more recent neurological hypotheses of Mo and his colleagues (Mo, 1990; Mo, LeFevre & Kersey, 1984), who have conducted experimental studies that indicate a "temporal reversal" in the processing of time information in the brains of persons with schizophrenia. Experimental results have led them to hypothesise that this temporal reversal is spatialised as lateral reversal in the hemispheric sites for processing prior and posterior time information. Schizophrenia has been hypothesised to involve a lateralised left hemisphere dysfunction, and/or a dysfunction of the inter-hemispheric connection. Mo, LeFevre and Kersey present this "third view" of brain asymmetry--"that schizophrenia is characterised by reversed or diminished hemispheric asymmetry" (p. 230)--as another research perspective through which to examine the accumulating and sometimes difficult to interpret evidence on the relation between schizophrenia and brain hemispheres.²

Using one group of 60 male participants with a diagnosis of schizophrenia and a control group of 60 male participants with alcoholism,³ Mo, LeFevre and Kersey conducted visual field tests utilising an auditory warning signal of variable duration followed by the display of a single dark dot to either the left, centre or right of the visual field. Participants were to judge the duration of this dot in two conditions: in an uncorrelated condition in which the foreperiod was not consistently related to the pitch

² Beaumont (1982) has edited a volume entitled Divided Visual Field Studies of Cerebral Organisation provides a review history of this research and alerts the reader to the many methodological and theoretical difficulties in the design and interpretation of relevant experiments. It precedes Mo's study, but is a valuable source for raising questions with regard to DVF research. Christopher J. Colbourn's chapter, *Divided Visual Field Studies of Psychiatric Patients* (p. 233-247), summarises research directions and studies, and problems of interpretation involved in DVF research with this population.

³ Further subject criteria are enumerated in Mo, LeFevre & Kersey (1984, p. 231).

of the warning signal, and in a correlated condition in which it was. In the former condition, judgment as to whether the stimulus duration was “short” or “long” was informed by posterior time information from the foreperiod itself, while in the latter condition, judgment was made on prior time information of the pitch of the warning signal. While in persons without schizophrenia the temporal information extracted *from* test events (posterior time information) was found to be processed more strongly in the left hemisphere, persons with schizophrenia were found to process it more strongly in the right hemisphere. Prior time information (that is, information predictive of future events not taken from the accumulating perceptual data of the event itself) for persons with schizophrenia was found to be processed in the left hemisphere. Test results achieved significance ($p < .025$) only when the stimulus input was binocular.⁴ The experiment is based on the assumption that there is an inverse variation between posterior and prior time information: that is, that “prior time (intensional) information decreases, and posterior time (extensional) information increases, progressively, as time progresses during the foreperiod duration,” a property of temporality shared with logic and cognition (Mo, 1990, p. 244).

The experimental study of Schwartz, Winstead and Walker (1984) indicates that for situations of temporal sequential analysis, the left hemisphere function is superior to the right hemisphere function in both persons with and without schizophrenia.⁵ Therefore it can be hypothesised that the primary hemisphere for temporal sequential analysis for persons with schizophrenia organises around *prior time information*, which is based on expectancies having, objectively, an unreliable temporal sequence at best. Temporal information about what *has happened* would thus appear to receive its conditioning organisation in the right brain, the seat of non-syllogistic logic. For this

⁴ Mo, LeFevre & Kersey (1984) state: “The results of *F*-test based on arcsine transforms show that the triple interaction among the effects of group (schizophrenics, alcoholics), information (correlated, uncorrelated) and visual field (left, center, right), reach[ed] an acceptable significance level, $F(2, 72) = 4.27$, $p < .025$. Such triple interaction was not statistically significant for the left-eye and right-eye groups” (p. 233).

⁵ Mo, LeFevre & Kersey (1984) infer from their experiment that time *information* is lateralised toward the left hemisphere in persons not having schizophrenia, and toward the right hemisphere in persons with schizophrenia. This does not necessarily contradict Schwartz, Winstead and Walker (1984), who are speaking of a task involving temporal *sequential analysis*.

reason, Mo, LeFevre and Kersey (1984) suggest that the thought disorder characteristic of schizophrenia should not be termed a “deficit in deductive reasoning,” but a “reversal in deductive reasoning” (p. 235). Given that transfers of information between hemispheres occur in the corpus callosum, nonetheless, the initial codings of information would be marked by this reversal of orientation. This transposition of temporal functions could be seen to be influential in the struggle of the person with schizophrenia to differentiate between metaphorical and concrete thinking. In this model, incoming temporal information about the concrete world would first be processed on matrices of cognition preferencing metaphor, resulting in a world experienced as concretised metaphors of emotional experience.

Mo uses the theory of Shakow, who speaks of persons with schizophrenia having a “future-past reversal in terms of motivation” (p. 245), to further support his findings on the apparent reversal in temporal processing in schizophrenia and the contribution of this reversal to delusional thinking.

Suppose that a situation calls for gaining information from an event, but one believes that he or she already knows all about that event. In such a situation, the person is not so much ignorant as delusory. . . . Conversely, suppose that a situation calls for knowing about an event, but one attempts to gain information from the event. This reversal is likely to involve a process of segmentalization such as Shakow (1962) discussed, and it is similar to the popular notion of inability to see a forest because one is too obsessed with the trees. (p. 247)

Mo concludes that “delusion persists because it is prior in time to experience” (p. 251). Perhaps it needs to be added that in this hypothetical formulation, delusion is not only prior in time to experience but is taken *as* experience. Mo hypothesises that the person with schizophrenia does not so much organise the incoming event around perceptual information coming from *it* as from information experienced as already “known” and idiosyncratically mapped for projection. For this reason, Mo, LeFevre and Kersey (1984) argue for a distinction between “regression *in* time,” which is “the regression of the ego along a developmental hierarchy,” with “regression *of* time” (p. 230).⁶ It is obvious from their context that they mean a regression in the *subjective experience* of

⁶ Interestingly, Mo & Kersey (1982) suggest that this regression *in* time can be understood through Fraser’s model of temporal *umwelts* (pp. 37-38). They then suggest that regression *in* time is one factor differentiating neurosis from the regression *of* time which characterises schizophrenia.

time, resulting in the following phenomenon: “. . . what is remembered as pastness by nonschizophrenics may be expected as futurity by schizophrenics” (p. 230). We can recognise this pattern as a common projective technique of our unconscious life; for persons with schizophrenia, however, Mo, LeFevre and Kersey seem to be saying that because of the hemispheric reversal in temporal processing, this is not just a contributing subsidiary mode, but the primary organisational mode for futurity for persons with schizophrenia. Furthermore, this “pastness” no longer is, or is not only “past,” because the temporal sequencing skills of the left hemisphere are less, or aberrantly, influential in the organisation of the data of experience.

Mo equates prior time information with intensional information, attributional information about what has not yet occurred. Although Mo does not state this, it seems feasible to say that prior time information is conditioned in its expectancies at least in part by an incorporation of posterior time information from previous stimulus/response events, or in life, by previous experiences. Galin (1974) characterises the right hemisphere as striving for spatial syntheses in processing perceptual material. If posterior time information in persons with schizophrenia is initially processed in this hemisphere, and then transferred to the left, the temporally more linear organisational structures of the left brain would then become filled with information *predictive of experience* whose temporal encodements have already been skewed on spatial, associational matrices, echoing Minkowski’s (1970) observation of the predominance of spatial over temporal organisations of experience in persons with schizophrenia.

Generalising from data collected from the processing of time information in experimental stimuli in a laboratory to the processing of the greater experience of the individual in the world holds inherent risks. But Mo has himself hypothesised that this temporal reversal may be responsible not only for delusional experience, but for the subject-object reversal in schizophrenia that manifests as depersonalisation. In this reversal, the intensive self is experienced as extensive, and ideas of reference redound on the self, as external events are interpreted as alluding in meaningful, if delusional, ways to the referent self. Ultimately, subject-object reversal results in the objective world, as normatively defined, ceasing to exist, because its dimensions are suffused

with subjective formulations.

Seeman's (1976) account of the subjective experience of time of one individual with schizophrenia as it was expressed over a course of psychotherapy supports Mo's contentions. Seeman, whose clinical observations precede Mo's experimental studies, states: "It remains to be proven that the schizophrenic does in reality experience time-sense distortions. Clinically, it *appears* to be so" (p. 193). She found that her patient, whom she calls Carrie, experienced time as capable of reversals, as bidirectional, which Seeman understands as the wish to "delay aging, recreate childhood, and suspend time" (p. 190). Biological periodicities such as hunger or sexual arousal were dissociated from their rhythmic source in her body and, no longer rhythmically anticipated, seemed to have as their causes objects external to her self. Carrie could only have *compatible* emotions, memories, thoughts and perceptions existing *at the same time* in herself and/or another person. A contradictory inner experience would be projected outside of herself or split away from the other, potentially in either time or space. Many of these difficulties are usually explained as difficulties in object relations; as in my discussion of mania above, I would urge that time be thought of as one such object, and that relations to *it* may be played out with its spectral mediators: parents, friends, therapists, society. Contradictory experiences of one's relationship to time may be projected onto relationships with time's agents, just as contradictory experiences of one's relations to persons may be acted out in the arena of time.

What Seeman calls the "atomistic concept of time" (p. 191) made it difficult for Carrie to identify the stimulus that had disappeared as being responsible for a feeling or response that she was still experiencing; commonly, Carrie would then hallucinate a stimulus, or attribute her response to whatever had immediately preceded it in time. Using Mo's formulation, we could say that the information *about* what has happened is not immediately available in that part of the brain that conducts temporal analysis. Causations are therefore determined through phantasy. This temporal atomism also contributes to the lack in a sense of continuity of the self as the categories of past, present and future crumble, and with it, sustainable meaning. Seeman also traced Carrie's belief in clairvoyance as due to distortions of time. She cites Melges et al.,

who wrote: “with a loss of distinction between memories, perceptions, and expectations, predictions or hunches may be interpreted as actualities, thereby giving rise to inappropriate positive feedback as well as feedforward” (p. 192). The temporal reversal in hemispheric functioning put forward by Mo could lead to just these distortions in experience, since the reversal of “feedback” and “feedforward” seems to be precisely what is occurring: expectancies are experienced as realities. Given this reversal of temporal processing, it would then be odd if a person with schizophrenia did *not* feel themselves to be in some measure clairvoyant.

Dooley’s (1941) description of the temporal experience of a patient with schizophrenia reveals her tacit sensitivity to the possibility of abnormalities in processing perceptual experience, resulting in an inadequate ability to process the “too massive impact of the outer world” (p. 20). She attributes the fragmentation of experience typical of schizophrenic process to the need to omit portions of experience from attention in a desperate attempt to “catch up” and reestablish synchrony between the flow of external events which in itself is too rapid to absorb, and the internal world of drives and desires overstimulated and panicked by this consequently broken experience of the world.

Edlund (1987) sees a predominance of symbolic associations governing the schizophrenic organisation of experience, replacing the meanings of objective causal connections which are temporally bound.

The jumbling of time that schizophrenics experience almost invariably contains references to events that are considered symbolically important in their lives. This is the same as the order of subjective time perspective, where people define proximity not by the linear distance of an event in relation to absolute time, but by the event’s personal emotional significance. . . . This bizarre, intermittent fragmentation of time for schizophrenics is perhaps the most salient feature of their temporal disorganisation. It may be that in acute schizophrenic psychosis, the sense of subjective time, and what is important in subjective time perspective, overwhelms all objective time considerations. (p. 85)

Spiegel (1981) offers that paranoid delusional organisations, threatening as they may be, remove the ambiguity of “the uncertainty inherent in an authentic sense of the temporal flow, at a great price. The persecutory motives of others are certain, not ambiguous, the world of the paranoid dangerous, but clearly defined” (p. 9). The

schizophrenic individual's perspective need no longer alter with references to changes in the environment: "the temporal order becomes frozen."

Thus each formulation of schizophrenic experience bears its own nuance. Fraisse (1963) describes schizophrenic process as moving its host to take "refuge in the intemporal" (p. 197). He cites both Minkowski's description of schizophrenic behaviours as "actions with no tomorrow, petrified actions, short-circuit actions, actions with no purpose" (p. 197); and Bonaparte's (1939, *L'inconscient et le temps*) explanation of the temporal disorder of persons with schizophrenia as a "destruction of the 'dykes between the preconscious and the conscious' of great enough extent 'to allow a flow of intemporality to rise from the depths of the unconscious, sufficient to submerge the sense of duration or time almost completely'" (p. 197). The internal phantasms that the individual encounters do not obey the laws of change governing external reality, and so begin to organise around them a rarefied, intemporal society of forms.

Subjective temporality that is in lived syntony with objective temporality is mediated by the perception and introjection of temporal objects. Transformed in the interiority of psychic life, objects nonetheless retain aspects of their original temporal coding⁷ even as they are processed in other achronological, associational matrices. Husserl theorised that "a phenomenological analysis of time cannot explain the constitution of time without reference to the constitution of the temporal Object" (cited in Minkowski, 1970, p. xxxiv). A phenomenological analysis of the subjective sense of time seems to rest on the assimilation of objects as a temporal series so that within the potentially atomistic experience of "consciousness of," aspects of sameness are noted and unities emerge giving rise to the experience of durable objects.

In the stream of time it is the unity which is fundamental. Within this unity of flow, repetition occurs, and this repetition is accomplished by retention. It is memory, in the form of retention, that makes possible the fact that consciousness can have an object as content. Without retention the unity of the flux would not be comprehensible. (N. Metzger, *Translator's Introduction*, in Minkowski (1970), p. xxxiv)

⁷ How the temporal attribute is coded, *what* encodes it and what that code *is*, is not clear. See Jackson, 1990.

Retention and, more particularly, the discernment of repetitions among clusters of data retained, are predicated upon the consistent temporal coding of perceptual experience.

The characteristic attentional and memory impairments observed in persons with schizophrenia that give rise to a sense of existential impoverishment can be hypothesised to result at least in part from this reversal in the temporal processing of experience. But Mo, LeFevre and Kersey's study is further complicated by the presence of diverse research studies indicating the probability of other neurotemporal processing differences in the construction of worlds by persons with schizophrenia (Schwartz, Winstead & Walker, 1984; Schwartz, McGinn & Winstead, 1987; Braff & Saccuzzo, 1985). The corpus callosum is a pathway for the transfer of temporal information from the right hemisphere of the brain to the left for sequential analysis (in right-handed persons), and important in the transmission of information contributing to judgments of simultaneity or non-simultaneity. Schwartz, Winstead and Walker (1984) found that corpus callosal transfer time of temporal information for persons with schizophrenia is over two times slower than for persons without a psychiatric diagnosis. In a later study, Schwartz, McGinn and Winstead (1987) hypothesised that the disordered spatiotemporal processing characteristic of persons with schizophrenia results from abnormal sensory gating or aberrant filter systems. Both result in irregularities in the temporal integration of visual information in the earliest milliseconds of perceptual experience.

Although the subsequent impact on higher cortical functions is unknown at this time, these deficits could lead to faulty selection of information from the environment and/or subsequent distortions of that input, and ultimately, misperception of visual cues. Thus, these deficits might ultimately result in some of the clinical symptomatology observed in these patients. (p. 696)

Attention to the "series of nows" as commonly perceived is stressed through an atypical yoking. As the minute chronological intricacies of sorting perceptual experience become confused, the effort to organise experience again falls on more synchronic and associative matrices. In the earliest phases of visual information processing, separate stimuli may become fused (Schwartz, McGinn & Winstead, 1987).

...with slowness of information processing, the normal flow of information is disrupted so that stimuli are no longer processed in smooth serial order. . . . Before one stimulus is fully processed, the next stimulus causes interference

through abnormal integration and/or disruption of stimulus processing. This processing-speed dysfunction theoretically correlates with or results in cognitive disturbance that is expressed as abnormal perception and disorganized thinking. (Braff & Saccuzzo, 1985, pp. 172-173)

Meanings bleed and homogenise the tissue of time, or meaning dries up, and time, made friable, crumbles. In either fashion, the individual becomes an island of seemingly unsharable experience.

Space will also take on unshared dimensions if, as Fischer (1967) indicates, the human experience of space originates within the differential delays of perceptual stimuli to the brain, and this processing is subject to mutations in the neurological functioning of persons with schizophrenia. "The transformation of time delay into space in all sense modalities appears to be the basis of what we call space-time equivalence and illustrates the process of our weaving the delicate fabric of reality" (p. 458). How even more vulnerable is the weave of space and time in the fabric of the world of the person with schizophrenia! Minkowski (1970) noted that persons with schizophrenia are easily disoriented by movement. To reconstruct a movement it seems necessary to "solder together mentally the infinite number of points into which discursive thought could supposedly divide movement" (p. 276). The faulty systems of sensory gating and filtering, the temporal delays, reversals of functioning, and confusion of subject and object result in enervating attempts to repeatedly construct a constantly eroding world.

Developing an "interference theory of graphic representation" (p. 181), Pereira (1975) brings the relevance of these impairments to the process of art making in therapy. She concludes that the characteristic fragmentation in the drawings of individuals with schizophrenia results from disturbances of attention and in the ability to maintain a major set permitting the development and enactment from start to finish of a plan.

In terms of the temporal sequence of the picture execution, interference is more likely to occur when an element or detail is being completed. At this moment, the major set is lost and task-irrelevant material intrudes. Having lost the outline and being unable to recapture it through the integration of what he had drawn previously, the patient can only continue to draw by association to the individual elements and to the details already drawn. The more profound the loss of the set, the greater will be the disintegration, and the fragmentation of the patient's

graphic production. (p. 177-178)

When the major set is lost, the patient continues “by association through contiguity” (p. 179), often resulting in a product conspicuous for its fragmentation, stereotypy or iteration.

Maintaining a cognitive approach to her study, Pereira discounts rather than inquires into whether these contiguous associations might carry genetic and/or archetypal meanings for the client. *However, it seems essential to discern what the meanings, temporal and otherwise, are of the form and content used to fill a temporal hiatus caused by breakdown in the ability to maintain an unfolding linear continuity and yoking of subjective time to objective time in the performance of a creative task.* It is only this which provides a human dimension of personal meaning to experimental studies, such as that of Schwartz, Winstead & Walker (1984), whose study is based on temporal measurements of the neurological processing of a dot. Kastenbaum (1977) urges researchers to supplement the rigour of measure with descriptive accounts that carry experience whole to the reader.

Yet I continue to wonder how well our studies represent the experiential world of psychological time. Consider, for example, the meanings and uses of time for those who have themselves survived the passing of many hours, years, and decades. It is doubtful that either popular stereotypes or the available research do justice to the varieties of time experience at their command. (p. 193)

The individual phenomenology of the form and content of the secondary symptoms of schizophrenia became the foundation of much of Jung’s (1960) methodology of comparative, constructive, archetypal image analysis which has as its purpose the determination of the complexes vying for autonomy within the fragmenting structure of the personality. Within analytical psychology, only through determining the nature of each particular *abaissement* of individual consciousness into the collective unconscious --the losing of personal structures, inclusive of measures of time, within the *tremendum*--could the individual be aided in the return to the singularity of personal meanings. Just as persons without mental disorders have unique temporal worlds, so do persons with mental disorders. Discovering common neurological components of abnormal functioning must not desensitise us to the discrete temporal graining of each

individual's illness process, with its specific personal and historical meanings.

The Nurture of Temporal Experience and Schizophrenic Process

Most of the research into the neurological aspects of temporal processing infers, if only by omission of alternative theories, that the cause of abnormalities originates in neurophysiological, anatomic, or neurotransmitter functioning. It has not been determined at what point neurological pathways for processing temporal experience achieve their normative function in the developing child. While Piaget's (1954) observational studies led him to state that the nursing "can manage to regulate his acts in time without either perceiving or representing to himself any sequence or temporal series regulating the events themselves" (p. 366), by four months of age an anticipatory function is already in evidence, necessitating that Mo's *categories* of prior time and posterior time information are already operative, though it is possible that the neurophysical *sites* of adult information processing are not yet staked out.⁸ Supposing that these sites are not rigidly fixed in infancy and early childhood, when cognitive processes are still forming, would allow for parental nurturing styles to highly condition neural pathways of processing experience. Galin (1974) hypothesises that the cerebral hemispheres can begin to function in ways similar to those of individuals whose have been surgically disconnected through their repeated subjection to conflictual information. He gives the example of a child whose parent consistently presents supportive messages verbally but whose facial and body language communicate the opposite: the typical "double bind" situation arguably a foundational dynamic in the childhoods of persons with schizophrenia.

Each hemisphere is exposed to the same sensory input, but because of their relative specializations, they each emphasize only one of the messages. The left will attend to the verbal cues because it cannot extract information from the facial gestalt efficiently; the right will attend to the nonverbal cues because it cannot easily understand the words. . . .In this situation, the two hemispheres might

⁸ For a discussion of studies investigating the hypothesis of progressive lateralisation and methodological issues involved in developing valid research protocols, see Beaumont (1982), pp. 113-128. No studies directed toward temporal processing from a developmental perspective are mentioned. However, because the human understanding of time evolves from its beginnings in infancy through adolescence (Piaget, 1969), a hypothesis that its neurophysiological ground may be susceptible to influence from environmental factors seems reasonable.

decide on opposite courses of action; the left to approach, and the right to flee. Because of the high stakes involved, each hemisphere might be able to maintain its consciousness and resist the inhibitory influence of the other side. The left hemisphere seems to win control of the output channels most of the time, but if the left is not able to 'turn off' the right completely, it may settle for disconnecting the transfer of the conflicting information from the other side. . . . (p. 576).

Galin suggests that because the mental process in the right hemisphere is so highly cathected, it does not fade, but takes on an autonomous life which conditions future perceptions, expectations and evaluations of experience. He also hypothesises that the right hemisphere is the seat of primary process mentation. It follows that psychotic irruptions of primary process content would therefore manifest this ego-dystonic unconscious organisation of conflictual childhood experience which, while historical in its origins, knows little of the conscious measures of chronology. The earliest forms of consciousness, the adaptive strategies of infancy and early childhood, would be those strategies to which the adult reverts in times of extreme stress.

Corin (1990) founds her anthropological examination of the lifeworlds of persons with schizophrenia in part on Tellenbach's concept of the "endo-cosmogensis" of psychiatric disorders. A temporal component informs Tellenbach's approach in that an alteration in "basic rhythms" resident in the endogenous development of schizophrenic process causes the organism to "quest for rhythms in the environment with which it harmonises and synchronises its own rhythms. Thus, it is a congruence between inner and outer forces that precipitates the disorder" (p. 161). Just as in Corin's quotation of Tellenbach on melancholia--that "*typus melancolicus*. . . bends towards the gravitation field of melancholia" (p. 161)--so one can propose that the individual engaged in schizophrenic process "bends toward the gravitational field of schizophrenia." Schizophrenic process becomes constellated not only *within* the individual, but within the interactional fields of the person's environment.

McGlashan (1983) states the etiology and pathogenesis of schizophrenia to be both genetic and environmental, with the latter factor particularly influential in shaping the expression and course of the illness. He advocates an integrated view of parent and infant interactions; whether "schizophrenogenic" parenting *and/or* neurological

aberrations in the infant can be identified or hypothesised, “a mismatch of poor mutual cueing” results in real or phantasised experiences of persecution (p. 910-911). It is not difficult to see how the abnormal temporal processing of experience as early as infancy would tend to skew interpretations of even initially normal patterns of relating, with difficulties only increasing over time. In the schizophrenogenic family *system*, this child may eventually become the repository for the “craziness” of all the family members (Searles, 1979). The focus on the past that may be observed in persons with schizophrenia can on the one hand be seen as expressive of the desire to return to a premorbid level of functioning. At a deeper psychic level, the paradoxical need to experience the known, dysfunctional dyad, or family system, *and* the wish to have it refashioned in a way that stays whole and does not transmogrify in time is being expressed. This paradox is felt in the countertransferential feelings of the therapist who becomes, in McGlashan’s apt terms, the “dialysis” unit for detoxifying archaic modes of functioning.

While each hypothesis, whether neurological or psychodynamic, remains inconclusive in itself as a proven cause of schizophrenia, all contribute to our understanding of the illness process as perhaps as complex in its etiology as in its symptomatology and treatment. Interestingly, as researchers, we have our own difficulty when we try to causally assign a rigid temporal sequence to the development of schizophrenia. What seems important is not to allow a parallel “mismatch of poor mutual cueing” occur in *our* communications between neurological and psychodynamic frameworks of interpretation, but to be attentive to ways in which the hypotheses issuing from both avenues of research can be integrated into an evolving, multi-dimensional understanding of schizophrenic process. This may well necessitate the development of new and more integrative research paradigms encompassing genetic, neuropsychological and environmental research findings that include the impact of cultural variables on attempts by individuals with schizophrenia to construct manageable lifeworlds consonant with their particular neuropsychological vulnerabilities (Corin, 1990).

Case Presentation: Gaston

The art therapy experience of one client cannot, of course, bear the weight of illustrating the entire breadth of theory presented in the foregoing chapters of this thesis, particularly when the course of therapy was in no way designed to elicit expressions of temporal experience. Yet each life is lived in time, is communicated through time, and the many textures of the time I spent with Gaston are textures of *meaning*, which the foregoing explorations in this thesis will serve to elucidate. The distinguishing feature of my temporal experience with Gaston was that these varied textures nearly always seemed to resolve themselves in the same way. Whether the body of a session had as its temporal heart Gaston's past, experiences outside of time, his life in the present, or his hopes for the future, it inevitably seemed to crumble and sift through my fingers like sand. I was left holding his images, *which stayed*, in my hands.

In this way, the creative work of writing this thesis can be seen to be an endeavour to make whole the body of temporal experience I shared with Gaston in his art therapy sessions by entering into *what stayed*--his images. Through them and session notes, I again access the experiential process of art therapy in a general way with an individual with schizophrenia, but most specifically, with the personal meanings of schizophrenic process to Gaston. Because schizophrenic process is characterised by what Jung termed archaic thinking, however, the personal and the archetypal achieve a highly visible interpenetration.

As will be seen, this process of *making whole* is not "cure," but an attempt to effect understandings of the body of the experience, and to achieve pluralistic perspectives on its psychological dimensions. I would again bring forward Grudin's (1982) statement as epigraph to this case presentation, because it reflects not only my perambulation around, but also my reentry into the temporal nest of the art therapy sessions with Gaston.

Like students of art who walk around a great statue, seeing parts and aspects of it from each position, but never the whole work, we must walk mentally around time, using a variety of approaches, a pandemonium of metaphor. No insight or association, however outlandish or contradictory, should be forbidden us; the

only thing forbidden should be to stand still and say, "This is it." (p. 2)

Personal and Family History

At the time of his art therapy sessions, Gaston was a forty-year-old unmarried male, living alone and having no work history. Most of his years since leaving home were spent travelling extensively around the world in a way not uncommon in the late sixties and seventies, when his journeys began. Visits to India, Arizona and the Mediterranean were all part of what he described as a spiritual search. During this time his use of drugs was frequent, inclusive of hallucinogens, and he occasionally existed as a street person. He reported no use of street drugs for the three years prior to our meeting. Raised in the Catholic faith, in his twenties Gaston felt increasingly drawn to the philosophy and practices of the Hindu religion, which culminated in his trip to India. He somewhat dispiritedly describes himself as no longer a practitioner of its yogas, yet still seemed to derive some spiritual sustenance from vestiges of his experiences within Catholicism, Hinduism and with transcendental extraterrestrials, what Corin (1990) has termed a "'bricolage' at the level of belief" (p. 179).

Gaston rarely spoke about his boyhood, but his hospital chart documented his childhood as uneventful, and described Gaston as a brilliant but isolated student who had difficulty communicating his ideas. Gaston is the only child of parents that at the time of his sessions were in their late seventies and early eighties. Both were retired, though his mother was still active in various community involvements. Gaston spoke frequently of her, proudly citing her extensive past achievements in her profession. He said little about his father; hospital charts revealed that he "attempted to kill his father" in his mid-twenties, but gave no context for or elaboration of this action. Describing both parents as stern, and his father as taciturn, Gaston pointedly asserted that his present relations with his parents were changed and "good," and appeared to find it painful to recall the many years when there was acrimony and rejection felt on both sides.

Psychiatric History

While there was no history of psychiatric illness in Gaston's family, he had been hospitalised frequently in the prior twenty-two years. His first hospitalisation followed what he described as "a bad LSD trip" at age eighteen, which generated frequent disturbing flashbacks. The primary diagnoses given over the course of these hospitalisations have been those of paranoid schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder/manic depression. Past symptoms have included violent and aggressive behaviours, exposure of genitalia, flight of ideas, paranoia, auditory hallucinations and grandiosity. Some of the earliest notes in Gaston's file revealed core themes and metaphors through which he expressed his early years of struggle with schizophrenic process. At age 20, he was described by a therapist as an avid writer of poetry which had as its most frequent themes dreams, the distortions of time, the loneliness of the infant without his mother, and foetal life.

Gaston's most recent hospitalisation was a year previous to his commencement of art therapy. He had been brought into the emergency room by his mother for inappropriate behaviour. His provisional diagnoses at that time were acute psychotic episode/depressive episode, with schizoaffective disorder and bipolar disorder also receiving consideration. He had been followed by that hospital's psychiatric unit for twelve years.

Treatment at Time of Referral to Art Therapy

An out-patient in psychiatric rehabilitation, Gaston was referred for individual art therapy for supportive and, as deemed appropriate, insight therapy. He was described as isolated and as having low self esteem. Concurrently he was being seen by a psychiatrist for case management and medication monitoring. His psychiatrist expressed concern about his "dark side" and the mother-son relationship, which Gaston had on occasion described to her as being "too-close." A past time perspective was immediately constellated in her admonition that I might have difficulty eliciting more from him than grandiose stories about his previous travels.

Gaston and his art therapy process and products can be investigated through a

number of temporal perspectives.

1) Having received various diagnoses, though commonly described on the unit as having chronic schizophrenia, Gaston's words, creative process and his works can be analysed looking for temporal indicators of schizophrenia, which according to the above discussion would evidence difficulties in sequencing, resulting in an inability to maintain time as a coherent whole; bipolar disorder, which would evidence problems with rate; and paranoid process and depression, which would evidence changes in time perspective. These analyses will be made with consideration given to the fact that Gaston was on multiple medications (Valium, Lithium, Stelazine, Kemadrin and Fluanxol) which likely interact in complex ways to modify his experience of time.

2) The distinct qualities of temporal experience identified in Gaston's art process and art works can be examined for their psychodynamic meanings within the theoretical perspectives of psychoanalytic, analytical and existential psychologies. Each can contribute a narrative richness to the understanding of Gaston's being-in-time which need not exclude the others. Indeed, following Fraser's umwelt model, I would suggest that each describes an organisation of temporal experience nested within the others and contributory to the whole of his personality.

While my work with Gaston took place while I was developing my thesis proposal, I was careful not to let my growing research interest condition his process in any directed way. Rather, I simply observed his use of time in the making of images, occasional spontaneous remarks regarding time, verbalised and tacit interrelations of past/present/future, etc.

The institutional team oriented its rehabilitative treatment plans for Gaston toward activities focussing his attention on the here-and-now and goal oriented behaviours, and I was cautioned against using art-making in a way that would encourage Gaston's narrative inflations of his past. I adopted a compromise plan of generally encouraging the spontaneous production of images, while at other times eliciting images in response to comments he would make regarding his present living

situation which made a here-and-now focus seemed advisable. At the time, I was not always sure that uninterrupted investigation of his primary symbols would not have been of greater benefit, particularly since he had other therapeutic caregivers who worked with him on daily concerns. That the length of my work with Gaston was dictated by the academic practicum year was, however, a strong argument in favour of maintaining a primary focus on daily concerns; concerted exploration of and immersion in his “pastness” would likely be intense, and would still eventually require an integration of times to effect closure, for which eight months of weekly sessions would be an insufficient container. The resulting journey was one of attempting, first of all, to come to understand Gaston’s subjective experience of time, and secondly to establish connectivities between perspectives and sequences of temporal experience so that a measure of wholeness and fullness of time might be restored to him.

Symbols of Temporal Experience

My presentation of Gaston’s images will be a compromise of chronological and associative organisations. While the sequencing of works, of course, always informs the meanings of the evolution of images (and this will be noted as necessary), of equal importance are achronological aggregations of images giving emphasis to particular iconographic, or archetypal, themes. Jung (1960) observed that images expressed in the experience of schizophrenia evidence a mixture of personal and collective material, but that the latter predominates. Personal time is overtaken by timeless motifs, often with an archaic intensity that shatters the structures of the ego, inclusive of its temporal measures.

As discussed in Chapter 4, the first or first few images in art therapy are often seen as potential “maps of the journey” (Shoemaker, 1978) and Gaston’s were no exception. For Gaston, these were the island, expressive of the isolation, depersonalisation and existential threat found in each interface of his “I” with the “not I;” and the mesa, expressive of the dyadic relationship of mother and self in both its personal and archetypal forms. In that a mesa is sometimes referred to as an island on land, the two images are closely related.

The Island of Temporal Experience:

Gaston's first image, which can existentially be thought of as his first disclosure of the way his particular being "sets itself to work," was an island (Plate 1). Yet it was accompanied on the page, albeit by a most ambiguous object.

After Gaston drew the tongue-like island, with a line coursing down its centre, he drew a wind and water mill next to the island, saying that this was the windmill-and-waterwheel-mill "on" the island. He identified the mill's function as that of grinding the grain from which bread is made. Initially, he left the supporting armature for the spiral, situated closest to me, empty. Later he filled it with the red spiral, calling this an "artificial sun."

The physical proximity of the armature to where I was seated suggested that Gaston was sensing me as a new, ambiguous entity that might, as a mill/sun, nurture and empower him, and give measure to his days. No doubt the "infancy" of our experience together in the first session contributed to a compounded mother/father symbol, that might be read as breast, sun *and* mill. But the condensed rendering of forms gives no evidence of an anticipated benevolence; Gaston's wish for empowerment is matched by his overwhelming fear of disempowerment. Of all the moments in the agrarian cycle that begins with sowing seed and ends with the eating of a nurturing loaf, Gaston has featured the moment of pain, of the "suffering" of the grain between two stones. Shapes like forked snakes' tongues protrude from the arc of the wind/waterwheel's measured dentation, a wheel that can also be considered as breast-like next to the tongue of the "I-land." This portrayal of the cycle of feeding is a portrayal of an anxiety-producing experience, not a trustworthy one.

After drawing the spiral, Gaston added red lines around his island, in his words, "to make the shape better." These appear to be curiously pieced, defensive structures, characteristic of the many words suggesting dividedness that have been used to describe schizophrenic process: "splitting, dissociation, segregation, segmentalization and sejunction" (Burnham et al., 1969, p. 23). Remembering that the

root of the word “time” also stems from the idea of segmentation and division, and that time’s objective measures protect the ego from the devouring maw of undifferentiated eternities, one can speculate that the defensive manoeuvres of this island, with which Gaston identified himself and which here achieve their representation in space, may well take place in time.

While Jung (1966) characterised the artwork of persons with neuroses as having a unified feeling-tone evidencing meaning and the desire to communicate it, he observed that the art of persons with schizophrenia tends to show a lack of personal relationship to feelings which are likely to be contradictory. He observed that images will appear formally fragmented, and may contain lines of fracture, like psychic fault lines, that may run right through the picture. Such lines are visible in many of Gaston’s images (Plates 3, 6, 10, and in other images not shown). Jung concluded that the person with schizophrenia seems to be the victim of the meaning of his or her image rather than the creator of its meaning: he or she is overwhelmed, swallowed and dissolved by it, so that preventative withdrawals perforate the person’s attempts at object relations. The *denial* of relational meanings becomes imperative because the boundaries of the ego are not capable of sustaining relations short of merging.

While the evasiveness and fragmentation of schizophrenic process are sometimes referred to as a defence, Forrest (1983) suggests that while these mechanisms do occlude conflicts they actually represent a failure of meaningful defence. While the age of onset of interhemispheric desynchronisation and/or reversals experimentally documented in persons with schizophrenia has not yet been determined,⁹ their measurable existence gives us a neuropsychological understanding of fragmentation as a structural and/or functional destabilising shift in the temporal processing of incoming information about the world. We should not then be surprised that discourse about, and images of, this world would display isomorphic anomalies.

In fact, shifts of topic and significance characterised Gaston’s verbalisations

⁹ Much of the literature, if only through default, seems to assume these structural and functional abnormalities to be genetic and not acquired. For a discussion on the complexities of drawing conclusions from divided field studies with regard to developmental aspects, see Beaumont (1982), in his chapter entitled *Developmental Aspects*, pp. 113-128.

(the tongue's I-land) during most sessions, resulting in a scattering of frequently grandiose, biographical anecdote often lacking extended narrative coherence. Gaston's "dis-course," etymologically "a running to and fro" (Random House College Dictionary, 1975), thus favours what Lacan called the vertical axis of each of its units. This atemporal, associative implication of contexts constantly challenges the linear, temporal anchoring necessary to stave off "the *incessant* sliding of the signified under the signifier" (Benvenuto & Kennedy, 1986, p. 114).

While Mo (1990) speaks of subject-object reversal as occurring in the mentation of persons with schizophrenia because of the hemispheric reversal of temporal processing, Kafka (1964), while not speaking directly from temporal considerations, hypothesises subject-predicate reversal. In schizophrenia, the reality of a characteristic becomes "more fundamental, more lasting, more 'identical' than the person" (p. 576). With a characteristic as subject, the person becomes a personification of the stable, meaningful characteristic, that is, becomes predicate. The foundation for continuity in time in the sensibility of a person with schizophrenia, then, would be object constancy only in the sense that there be *some* object present that has the *qualities* necessary to embody the characteristics around which he or she has structured a world. It could be further hypothesised that where such an object is lacking, it will be hallucinated.

Religious community also fulfilled this role in Gaston's life. He was particularly drawn to cults and cultures in which timelessness was revered, whether it be the attainment of nirvana or participation in a cult in which each member "became" one of the twelve disciples of Jesus. As Corin (1990) points out in her phenomenological/anthropological study of persons with schizophrenia, "religious groups can also mediate a rearticulation to a social space" (p. 181). For Gaston, the structure of these particular groups allowed him to participate in a social time, because his preferential cathecting of timelessness was not greatly compromised. Relations with others could occur at a comfortable--and even reverential--distance. Adhering to such prototypical relations of beings distilled human interactions of their unbalancing vagaries.

Kafka's formulation provides a new perspective on Minkowski's (1923/1958)

description of the temporal experience of a patient with schizophrenia who was also depressed.

. . . each day kept an unusual independence, failing to be immersed in the perception of any life continuity; each day life began anew, like a solitary *island* in a grey sea of passing time. (p. 133, italics this author's)

Unable to temporise, the patient is described as feeling that his extinction is imminent. Minkowski's observation of the lack of attraction to becoming in time on the part of persons with schizophrenia may have to do with what Kafka describes. Equivalence-within-continuity of the self yesterday with the self today is overruled by a greater equivalence-within-identity with *qualities* perceived to be held in common by another, and the self.

This is poignantly captured in the homophonic possibilities of Gaston's explanation that the island he drew was like Ios, a Greek island he had not visited but had come close to, which he pronounced "I-us." His final expression in this drawing was to "join" the forms of the island and the mill with firm, yellow lines. I had taken this to be a cancelling out of these forms, since he had just expressed dissatisfaction with his drawing, and the lines did not simply join, but crossed over the figures. Gaston announced, however, that he was "trying to unite something."¹⁰ This internal contradiction between act and verbalised intention was frequently repeated in the course of his sessions. Jung (1971) describes the coalescence of the ego-complex in childhood out of the time before there is continuous memory as dependent on "islands of consciousness," or "islands of memory," joining *in order* to provide a continuity of ego-memories, and this in turn is dependent on their having "acquired an energy of their own" (p. 7). Gaston has placed the energy source for his island outside of it, and apparently has projected it onto me. He tries to unite "I-us," and it is after this that he draws the "artificial sun" filling the void of the mill's arc. He seems to indicate a wish/fear for the great breast of the mother/father therapist to bring this unnatural, condensed milk of what appear to be both endangered and endangering solar measures

¹⁰ As we shall see, the use of the colour yellow in a motion not congruent with the *e-motion* expressed is congruent with a family dynamic of communication Gaston expressed in image in his fourth session, when the fruit passed at the family table is a lemon.

of time to him. They were stated as being “on” his I-land, but have been projected outward. The desire to re-incorporate them is expressed, but even more, the fear of doing so: the fear of being, instead, incorporated.

Gaston’s tripartite defensive structures around his island may well have oedipal significance. Temporally, they might be seen as representing one rampart against Mother Time, one fending off Father Time, and one against the ego in Time, who must ultimately perish. In later sessions, Gaston spoke of his initial drug usage as a response to his mother’s intrusiveness in his teen years. When I asked him what he would have liked to change in his parents after he had voiced irritation at their responses to his hospitalisation after bad drug experiences, he replied (the ellipses are long yawns): “I don’t want to recall. . . . I forget. . . . I, I, I renounce. . . I should be asleep. . .” Silent for a while, he then reverted to speaking of his travels. What was to be his consistent retreat into narratives of the years around which he organises his identity was evident from the first session: the psychedelic years of drug and ascetic, meditative experiences, for which he felt “rewarded” with sightings and visitations by UFO’s. Others, outside of space and time--perhaps personifications of that part of the super-ego that lies within the unconscious--praised him for the enjoinder of his subjective sense of time to *unearthly* time.

Particularly because of the primacy of material from the objective psyche in Gaston’s art, the method of amplification, practised within analytical psychology, seems eminently appropriate to use in exploring the meanings of his images. This comparative method demonstrates that the individual’s choice of symbol participates in a mythocultural, timeless archetypal core that persists through myriad manifestations in time. The archetypal resonances of Gaston’s compound image are profound not only for their symbolisation of the human counterparts of mother and father, but for their mythological sources in temporal symbols. De Santillana and von Dechend’s (1969) provocative foray into the celestial sources of myth, Hamlet’s Mill, provides a particularly intriguing situative context for the whole of Gaston’s image with regard to time. Gaston’s mill had immediately appeared “cosmic” to me, first, in the relationship of its size to that of the island; secondly, in its holding structure’s likeness to a

measuring armillary arc that has historically held celestial spheres; and lastly, in that the spiral form held in it was declared by him to be a sun. De Santillana and von Dechend detail transcultural, mythic, narrative structures in which Saturn, or Kronos, that planet uniformly related to the measures of time, was recognised as the owner of the cosmic Mill, the grand metaphor for the apparent wheeling of the sky above and around the table of the earth. The unhinging of this Mill of Time was caused by the shifting of the world axis, which resulted in a whirlpool which was the downfall of this god of time.

The Lord of the Mill is declared to be Saturn/Kronos, he whom his son Zeus dethroned by throwing him off his chariot, and banished in "chains" to a blissful island, where he dwells in sleep, for being immortal he cannot die, but is thought to live in life-in-death, wrapped in funerary linen, until his time, say some, shall come to awaken again, and he will be reborn to us as a child. (p. 148)

The neurological hypotheses of the hemispheric shift in temporal processing in the brains of persons with schizophrenia, coupled with Gaston's depiction of an eddying mill/solar symbol, have an uncanny resonance with this mythological depiction of a shift in the world axis which results in a maelstrom. Also called an "implex" (p. 239) that "goes through the whole globe" (p. 238), this shift-spawned whirlpool was said to bring about the downfall of the measures of time, thereby undoing the act of the separation of the parents of the world through which Kronos became "the originator of times," causing him to be mistaken for the sun on occasion (p. 133-134). Gaston's conflated image of breast/mill/sun is held in a toxic, saturnine, armillary sickle, its powers of measure twisted into wounds of mismeasure.

Staying within the presented metaphors, it does not seem too extreme to call the normative separation and consequent creative intercourse of the temporal functions of the left and right hemispheres of the brain to be that necessary separation of structures which "parent" a sharable world to which the just measures of time are fundamental. The frequent embedding of the sun, which gives measure to our conscious day, in the earth in Gaston's images (Plates 3, 5), an iconographic feature I have observed in other clients with schizophrenia, becomes poignantly isomorphic with the reversed neurological processing of temporal information in the brains of persons with schizophrenia hypothesised by Mo. The functions of the right brain have often been




Plate 1



Plate 2




Plate 3

described as “feminine,” *yin* capacities, the seat of the unconscious, which is often also termed feminine. The functions of the left brain have often been termed masculine, harbouring the powers of logos, word, and conscious discrimination. If Mo’s hypothesis is right, a power of the “male” hemisphere is displaced into the “female” hemisphere in schizophrenic process, and vice versa.¹¹ The requisite “parental” separation is not effected. Melges (1982) speaks of the “indistinction of past, present and future” in schizophrenic experience, making “memories, perceptions, and expectations, which are *ordinarily separated by geophysical time*, seem to be interconnected in psychological time” (p. 162-163, italics mine). Images such as these give eloquent witness to these impacted times.

As we shall see, Gaston painted and referred to himself after age eighteen as “an apparition.” Given the centrality of the temporal factor to the human construction of reality from perceptual information (Fischer, 1967), temporal dysfunctions of processing would understandably place the experience of self “beyond the pale” of what is considered to be normative, resulting in a phantasmic sense of self. In a telling slip of the tongue, Gaston confided that his meditative and drug experiences had taught him the great truth of “death after life.” As his schizophrenia progressed, the increasing deterioration of his foreknown identity left him with a sense of self as an island broken off from once sharable community of life.

The Mesa: An Overlay of Tablelands

The heavenly mill “churned once gold, then salt, and today sand and stones” (de Santillana & von Dechend, 1969, p. 146). The devolution of world ages from those of ductile gold to those of frangible stone, and back again, is an apt metaphor for the repeating shift in the temporal qualities of the axis of my therapeutic relationship with Gaston. A durable time of coherence and connection would inexplicably break, and an “age” of dessicant discontinuities ensue. As I accompanied him through his

¹¹ These gendered descriptors must be taken as sociotemporally conditioned. The society in which Gaston’s childhood occurred and with which he would have compared his parental figures, would still by and large have espoused the differentiation made here.

labyrinth of temporal disrepair, my task became one of attentively holding and following, if not always understanding, the intricate braid of impairments in his neurological functioning, their repercussions in his intrapsychic and social life and his imaginal strategies of repair.

Transference and Countertransference in the Mesa: Accommodating Erosion

In his second session, Gaston began the first rendition of what was to become his core image: the mesa, a metaphor for a “complex” gathering of elements (Plate 2). Self, mother, family, his therapeutic journey, and his transferential relationship to the therapist were constellated within the image of the mesa by virtue of both its fullness and its hollows. Gaston deftly summed up his wish for a close, if otherworldly, therapeutic alliance when, associating to the background form which he identified as a mesa, he stated that the image reminded him of the earthwork in the movie, “Close Encounters of the Third Kind.”¹² Of his own choosing, Gaston extended the creation of this art work over two sessions, showing an investment in the image, an ability to stay with it over time, never self-initiated again in future sessions.

Showing what would continue to be an alternation of media in time, Gaston chose gouache paints in this session, and limned what seemed to be an obviously transferential, yellow-haired woman’s head and shoulders in the foreground (Plate 2). First declaring that it was “just a face,” he later added that she is a clear-sighted person, someone with more power than he has, and with lots of thoughts in her head, a seeker seeking her goal, which is right in front of her. “She just has to walk along the path in front of her to it.”

This image expresses aspects of the three manifestations of the therapist/client relationship outlined by Pao (1979). In that Gaston’s interaction with the image

¹² This is particularly apt since the imaginal terrain of the image is frequently referred to as a “third space” in art therapy; through the transference and countertransference, an intimate meeting occurs in this framed area of outer space that is governed by what still are really only hypothesised, psychic principles.

expresses the basic human need to be engaged with others, it gives evidence of attachment. In that it visualises commitment to a goal-oriented path, it *insinuates* therapeutic alliance, defined as a conscious commitment to therapeutic goals oriented toward becoming an individuated person. However, in that Gaston had difficulty naming concrete goals for himself in therapy, and in that the image shows the clear-sighted *woman* seeking the goal, the drawing is not indicative of therapeutic alliance but of transference issues, and ones particularly typical of the client with schizophrenia. Pao describes the person with chronic schizophrenia as one who has adopted “the policy that it is not his responsibility to communicate to others what he wants, it is the duty of others to ‘know’ what he wants” (p. 413). The tasks of relationship are distilled of their weight among the labours of time in favour of space-and-time-transcending clairvoyance and wish accomplishments. Gaston consistently expressed the expectation that I should be “curing” him through my knowledge of what his pictures meant. These verbalisations expressed the transference meanings of this image: that I, as therapist, must by definition be a clear-sighted, structuring guide who will, magically empowered, simply take a few steps forward and arrive at the goal. In this way, an accelerated alchemical operation was to be performed, the tempo of the natural pace of the matter of the client hastened toward perfection through the application of the professional/arcane knowledge of the therapist/artifex.¹³ While considering these psychodynamic understandings, we would do well to also keep in mind the neurological interpretation offered by Mo (1990) in conjunction with his hypothesis of a hemispheric reversal in temporal processing in persons with schizophrenia: that *expectancies are experienced as realities*.

The way in which Gaston expresses his expectancy/reality, reveals the particular meaning it holds for him. Within a Jungian context, it would seem that Gaston was illustrating his loss of anima, which Hillman (1985b) equates with the experience of depersonalisation, or derealisation. Gaston shows the potentially empowering anima as existing *outside* of his experience, the small mesa he identified

¹³ Eliade (1978) describes the relationship of alchemy and temporality as one of an acceleration of the tempo of Nature through the application of heat toward the transmutation of base matter into gold. This simultaneous *opus* was to also free the alchemist from time, resulting in his or her immortality.

with that appears to be more of a butte. As mesa, the self is endangered land, and prone to being eroded, emptied out. Hillman speaks similarly of the experience of loss of anima.

... together with the emptying of the "I", there is a transformation of world ... It is no longer significant. ... *There is a loss of time value, of depth perception and visual perspective.* Here and there, near and far merge. (p. 103, italics this author's)

The path "in front" of the woman could literally be taken to be Gaston himself, since the woman is facing out of the picture. Yet the path he has drawn for her within the picture plane leads back into the distance, to water and to the representation of Gaston. The water might equally represent renewal, or erosion. While in this session renewal was suggested, the following session *enacted* erosion. The indication of far distance could be understood as the past, but if so, it is a past without true recession, for it is also the goal. Again, the suggestion by Mo, LeFevre and Kersey (1984) seems to be graphically portrayed in Gaston's art and art process: that the past is experienced as futurity. The goal should be "right there in front of her," because she has already been there in her expectancy.

After session two, the image retained a certain iconographic clarity. The woman's face remained unstreaked; the small brown mesa and miniature landscape of sun, sea and trailing green path to the right of her were the only background yet created. However, in the third session, the journey of the woman became circular, as with the addition of the large mesa, the background, or past, pressed her forward into the present.

Gaston entered the third session, sat down, and said, "We were going to continue with last week's painting." The inclusive pronoun and his following observation of the painting—that "it looks more real than I recalled, like the things are really there"—seemed to indicate the potential power of this image for him in creating a profound and meaningful, interpenetrating *presence* in his psyche of his personal historical time, the time of the image, and the time of the therapeutic relationship. He began to paint the larger mesa engulfing the head of the woman and, speaking as he painted, said how angry he was four days ago, when he thought he would like to paint

around “it” (the woman) in black, and put lines over her because he was depressed after the session. Explaining he was angry because he didn’t want to have to tell me about his pictures, but have me tell him about them, he nonetheless denied any feelings of anger *at me*. However, he challenged, “If art is like a dream, what good is it then?” I empathically reflected his wish to have me solve his problems for him and his apt portrayal of this wish in his art, but differentiated the rightful expression of the wish in art from the possibility of having it fulfilled in the real time and space of life; I indicated that we would work together to come to a better understanding of what was happening and had happened inside and outside of him in his life, and his feelings about these, and changes would hopefully arise from this—but that this would take *time*. He began to paint over the woman’s face in blue, and darkened her eyes. Finishing, his responses to his painting were conflictual. He liked the “clear-sightedness” of his painting, and saw “gladness” in it—but then said the woman’s eyes were “terrible.” When I asked if those two feelings of “gladness” and “terribleness” were ones he might be feeling simultaneously in himself, particularly regarding the difference between his wishes and the reality of therapy, and he broodingly answered, “Yeah.” He again identified himself with the mesa, indicating it was the one he illegally visited years ago which had been cordoned off for an archeological dig.

Various splittings in time were evident in this session. Although he still seemed angry, Gaston displaced his anger in time, acknowledging it as only occurring in the *intervening* week, not toward me in the here and now. The dream time of art-making was perceived as painfully *split* from the real time of life. While a depressive position of holding “gladness” and “terribleness” at the same time was briefly achieved by Gaston through bringing the art expression into consonance with his present feelings, he soon retreated to an archaic holding form—literally, in a mesa—metaphorically inviting, however, the possibility of connection through archaeological efforts, perhaps analogous to those of art therapy. However, conflicts regarding the framed space of the “archeological dig” of his art therapy were surfacing. Something felt “illegal” about it, but that had not stopped him in the past from attaining his ends. And with the doubling of the mesa, one now belonging to the woman and one to him, a doubling of

the dig was indicated. Perhaps it was not only the dig into the self but his “dig” for and into the therapist/mother, in all the idiomatic meanings of “dig,” that was feeling illegal to him.

Gaston constellated “time and again” that period of his life to which the mesa was the central organising landmark, the *omphalos*. While he identified only several drawn images as mesas (Plates 2, 5; 7), in nearly every session he would verbally return to that time of his life to which this landscape was central. This resulted in images not ostensibly about “mesa-dwelling” being experienced by me as images created to express, evade or buttress the spaces resulting from the constant temporal erosion of his experience by schizophrenic process. Gaston would pause, become distracted by something in the environment, return to his foundational ground of the adventurous seventies. The parts of this selected past time which Gaston experienced pleasure in recalling were usually ones involving timeless mystical experiences which had as their inducement the complicated braid of hallucinogen ingestion, pathology and yogic practice, so it was not surprising that they were frequently presented in a self-aggrandising manner in which Gaston portrayed himself as the gentle, spiritual seeker engaged in purificatory rites of asceticism, and at other times the trickster besting contemporary society’s materialistic values.

I attempted to facilitate some exploration of the values and meanings in these past temporal sites that could be brought forward to not inflate, but sustain, Gaston’s present. In what the therapeutic team judged might be an unproductive focus on this period of his past, fostering egoistic grandiosity, I felt there was also a potentially constructive calling. The team’s perspective of the ego-centredness of these images provided the key; indeed, Gaston’s ego *was* organised around them. It became clear as his images unfolded that core images from this time in his life were highly symbolic of the way his ego would construct and deconstruct itself.

Adopting, as compromise, the hermeneutics of deconstruction, I began to ask: what is the interpretive centre of Gaston’s narrative, around which he appears to organise himself, which is crucial to the coherence of his self *across time*? What archetypal culture of the self, of Gaston’s self, and of human being, is legitimately

founded in mesa dwelling, and that cannot be brought to consciousness unless its archetypal temporal and spatial reality are entered and respected? If his psyche claims *mesa* as native soil, surely efforts to relocate him *toute suite* in the “establishment time” of urban skyscrapers can be viewed as a sociopolitical imposition of temporal bias (see Kastenbaum, 1977, p. 213). After all, whole cultures have thrived in mesas: cultivating the dry spaces of the mother, moistening them with myth, they turned them into viable dwellings for communities nourished through their deep attachments to mother earth and father sky. The event Gaston associated to the historic mesa was that long ago, Native Americans would dance there all night to make the corn grow. Therefore, there was some power resident in this “native” landscape for him that centred on rites of fertility and growth.

Describing the Cliff Palace erected in what came to be called Mesa Verde National Park, Fewkes (1911) called the dwellings, inclusive of sacred and secular spaces, a “mental production” (p. 11), an expression of human intelligence responding to its arid surroundings. Gaston’s images can then likewise be responded to as expressions of his human, imaginal intelligence communicating the structures and mythologems through which he attempts to adapt to his surroundings. Facilitating the expression of these was not motivated by resignation to the textbook “past-focus” of persons with schizophrenia. Rather, my goal was to *meet* him there, within the mesa, to discover the nature of the terrain of his situatedness, and look for transformative ways of relating to what was at present a life-limiting landscape.

What contributions to his perception of aridity lay within the primary others of his infancy and childhood, conditioning his patterns of relating, and what lie within neurological deficits, it is impossible to say. But Gaston’s image portrayed his wish that art therapy would help him to bring water to the culture of the mesa, a wish fraught with paradox because water is also the primary elemental, liquid chisel that carved these cradling, yet crumbling absences into the body of the motherland: a wish in its elemental oppositions poignantly embodying the “need-fear dilemma” identified by Burnham et al. (1969) as a characteristic dynamic of persons functioning within schizophrenic process. Gaston had begun this image with water paints, using them in a

controlled manner, and delineating a contained body of water and the wish that I assess and provide interpretive remedies for his psychological problems. But in the next session he washed over the picture in anger, and allowed objects to transgress each others' boundaries in "terrible" ways. Because the person with schizophrenia has a weak, easily disorganized ego and is unable to form dependable constructs of reality, he or she becomes dependent upon others to structure his or her world and differentiate inner from outer phenomena, resulting in diminished autonomy. Furthermore, while desiring relationships which compensate for his or her deficiencies, the individual with schizophrenia also fears them because self/non-self boundaries are so easily blurred; "being with" is likely to be experienced as "flowing-into" since the longed-for relationship is symbiosis with the mother. Flowing into is the precursor of engulfment, and engulfment results in the dissolution of those portions of the ego that are less well organised. When the waters of engulfment recede, the residual self is left exposed as a monument of the processes of erosion .

Redfearn (1982) suggests that imaginal landscapes are highly indicative of the world/mother/self matrix.

. . . blighted landscapes, ruined buildings, images of world destruction, are all very close to depersonalisation. In these images we have destruction or blighting of the world/mother/self image. . . . The landscape represents the Great Mother at the level where what happens to Her is very close to actual (somatised) happenings in the imager's actual body. (p. 229)

Unbearable conflicts in experiencing the interface of self-world and mother-world result in splitting off the affect these give rise to and cathecting images, objects, mental processes--and/or segments of time--with this intolerable disturbance in the feeling self. In this way, mechanisms of defence such as splitting can be analysed for their investment in the slippage of temporal cogs (as noted by Klein, 1946/1975b, p. 6n), as well as its concomitant, projective identification (discussed below). All the good may be placed in one *period of time*, and all the bad in another.

The mesa can be viewed as just such a cathected earth-structure in which to give placement to the unbearable expectancy of the simultaneous occurrence of needful relationship along with the dis-integration such relationships have afforded in the past.

The mesa becomes the synthesising, or transcendent, symbol for these opposites. A product of erosion initially by streams and rivers and, thereafter, by drying winds, a mesa *exists by virtue of the severe* interplay of presence and absence; its presence is *defined* by absence, produced by the constant removal or loss of its own material, slowly, over *time*. It is a creation “built” through subtraction. The part that is materially present, the tableland, features a resistant cap, usually of congealed lava flows, that protects the underlying stratified sediments from further erosion. It is bounded on at least one side by a steep cliff. An island of land, the mesa appears isolated, a residual “hill of circumdenudation” (Challinor, 1978, p. 51; Gary McAfee and Wolf, 1972). In this regard, Gaston’s mesa is an expansion on his initial self-representation as an island.

Gaston’s verbal and visual delineations of the mesa were portrayed in such a way that I experienced his mesa less as object than as an ongoing event in time, a structural, geophysical ritual of relationship. In psychodynamic nomenclature, this “ritual” is best termed projective identification, a term introduced by Melanie Klein to describe a paradoxical defence mechanism that serves to distance an individual from unwanted aspects of the self while simultaneously keeping them handily near. In that projective identification is motivated by phantasy, its origin can be said to lie within intrapsychic instinctual impulses, which are at base “border-line psychosomatic processes” (Isaacs, 1948). Through projective identification, the individual annexes another psychosomatic entity to process its intolerable yet needful phantasy through a blurring of self/other boundaries (Goldstein, 1991). Projective identification begins with an individual’s unconscious wish to rid itself of a part of itself experienced as destructive, *or* to preserve a cherished part endangered in the self. Plate 2 illustrates Gaston’s initial projection of his “good” and magical anima, a clear-sighted effective force that *needs no time* to complete her tasks; and then overpaints that projection with the “bad” watery erosion, that would disallow the need to become *in time*. Because unconsciously Gaston only wished to deal with the timeless, I often felt that he was attempting to erode me into timelessness through, in sessions, undermining the temporal becoming intrinsic to even the most supportive treatment plan, and

undermining interactions requiring differentiation so that things would revert to their primordial unity. That this “wish” may originate in neurological functioning does not lessen its interpersonal psychological impact. The projected feelings are processed through the recipient’s personality system in a process variously termed metabolisation (Lang, in Ogden, 1979) or dialysis (McGlashan, 1983), and in therapy this is hopefully accomplished in a way that is ultimately helpful to the client. The metabolising of time for the client with schizophrenia, often requiring a temporal retexturing of experience, becomes a primary task within the therapeutic relationship. Within those moments of feeling my own sense of subjective time fragment as I processed Gaston’s eroding devices that seemed intended to undermine me so long as I persisted in the practice of art therapy *in time*, I was keenly aware of the *intersubjective reality* of temporal states within the therapeutic frame: that Gaston placed not only on the page, but sought to place within my-body-as-Great-Mother, aspects of his disorder, inclusive of temporal ones, so that, to rephrase Redfearn’s observation above, what happened to me would be very close to actual happenings in his body/mind. It is only through attentiveness to this reality that I could attempt to feed back to Gaston the reformulation of temporal nutrients that seemed to be required, whether that was supportively being with him outside of time, reinforcing the measures of objective time and his tasks within it, or a balance of these.

Metaphorically, I came to understand his mesa to comprise *trans-parent*, transtemporal overlays of tablelands, from early parental introjects as, for instance communicated in a later image of the tableland of a family meal (Plate 4); to geopsychophysical expressions of “real” mesas (Plates 2, 5, 7); to the tableland of art therapy, the finished art work on the tabletop operating as that “resistant cap” that helps protect the psyche from further erosion. When Gaston would lose hold of the meaningful continuity of his work in one or a series of sessions, the images were there as firm ground making available to him the possibility of the reconstruction of his experience.

The Family Tableland: Passing Lemons, Passing Time

I had indicated to Gaston in our first session that he was free to draw, paint or sculpt whatever he wished, but that I might occasionally suggest a topic, such as a family drawing. I made this intervention in the fifth session in order to arrive at a general assessment of his family's dynamics. The "tableland" of the family meal was Gaston's response (Plate 4), a painting that locates and expresses the archetypal configuration of family dynamics more manifestly in the personal past of actual family relations than that which can be inferred through his image of the mesa. Gaston began without hesitation, incompletely mixing black and white paints to produce a striated grey, with which he began to paint the table and chairs. The unfoldment of his family image in the time of his art process thus began with the expression of something about its underlying structure, comprising the murky coexistence/conflict of opposites (black and white). Most of the table's "supportive" legs were brushed in with dry strokes, and the whole image was left floating in the "timelessness" of the white page. The table's cantilevered legs immediately recalled to me the profile of his mesa.

Gaston then laid his brush, his "tool," down on the image, and it left two grey marks above the table, one of which he only later used as the "seed" for his image of himself after painting images of his parents. In this way, Gaston seemed to be *enacting* his sense of being engendered from an "error" emergent from the underlying familial structure; his personal material was "furnished" from the structural dynamics of the family, and the "error" became part of the arm with which he reaches out to his mother in his picture. The complex resonance of the brush as phallic object, as belonging to his mother (who also paints), and to myself as art therapist, whom he comes to because of "errors" in his psychological functioning, underlies not only this, but all of Gaston's images and his art process, as he struggles with his sense of impotence in his present life.

Before painting the image of himself, Gaston painted the bowl of fruit, and then his parents. Painting his mother posed him great difficulty. Moving red paint in ways that appeared in process and product to be both mangling and libidinous, Gaston smeared his mother's body several times onto her chair, enlarging her, and covering

over a mass of blackness placed at her back halfway through. As a result, she appears to have what is commonly called a “dowager’s hump.” Her head, initially tiny, “grew” through repeated applications of paint, after which he took the black with which he had made her eye and drew a dark slash across her feet. Father was more quickly and assuredly made, squashed in the space between table and chair. But when Gaston lastly drew his own grey, apparitional self-image, he made his right foot/leg thicken and rest on top of his father’s. Both father and son reach for a long, yellow banana-like fruit in appearance, which Gaston, however, identified as a lemon. The image is located in time only by Gaston’s revelation that he is “probably eighteen” in the image; but the time-penetrating presence of oedipal conflicts is abundant. In choosing to be eighteen in his family image, Gaston, at age forty, is disclosing that crucial developmental tasks have not been completed.

The inhabitants of this rendering of the tableland offer a dramatic presentation of the family’s ill-defined feet, giving further resonance with an interpretation of this image from the psychoanalytic perspective of the myth of Oedipus (“wounded foot”), whose father, Laius, nailed and bound Oedipus’ feet together when told by the oracle that his son would kill him. The metaphorical substitution of foot for phallus has historical use in Greek language and literature (Caldwell, 1989). The drama of the footplay in Gaston’s image suggests the symbolic castration of his phallic mother, whom he always portrayed as his more powerful and world-effective parent, through the black slash across her feet. Only she has eyes and a mouth, albeit amorphously rendered. The metaphor of the “dowager’s hump” suggests the accrual to an elderly woman of the assets of her *deceased* husband. Gaston also suggests his own need to symbolically castrate his father, as his self-image stands on, or at least interferes with, the feet of his father while appropriating the phallic lemon for himself. Father has been “fixed” in his chair, immobilised and neutered. But by whom? The perceived depotentialization of father by mother may well be what fuels Gaston’s inadmissible libidinous aggression toward both parents, that has surfaced when he is psychotic, in genital display and violence. The foot-blending that also occurs in this aggression toward father has ramifications in the shadowy, apparitional “definition” of himself.

Because the phallus he has received from his father is inadequate, Gaston must enter mother to claim his phallus/birthright. Yet, how is he to enter her with ineffectual phallic energies—with an apparitional penis?

When Gaston painted his two legs, he joined them with an unfaltering horizontal stroke that seemed to simultaneously cancel out his genital reality. As if in response, he made tentative rooting movements in the abdomen of his self-figure with his brush above the tabletop, resulting in an alternating erection and cancellation of his phallic power through a conflictual assertion of phallic and umbilical modes of connectivity to mother. Gaston's image suggests that the phallic power handled by the family's men is a "lemon." Gaston's imagined dialogue for this image was as follows:

Mother (showing surprise): "Ah! He's passing me a fruit!"

Father: "What's this! He can't be passing fruit!"

Self: "I am passing my mother some fruit." [To the art therapist, who comments on the bitterness of this chosen fruit: "Yes, I pass it as a joke."]

Mother (critically): "What's wrong?! You're passing me a lemon! Why? What's wrong with you?"

No one has hands, or well-formed feet, which suggests the intangible, and inadmissible nature of this latent sexual commerce. That Gaston rendered his self-image eyeless also reflects a historical oedipal theme, as Oedipus, discovering that he had indeed murdered his father and married his mother, puts out his own eyes. In Gaston's case, his conscious portrayal to me of himself as a pacific, generally celibate person "gave no countenance" to his aggressive and libidinous feelings that were consequently underground, erosive factors of his mesa dwelling. The actions he portrayed toward his mother were also among those enacted transferentially toward me in numerous sessions as, attributing the-power-of-cure to me, he would then wrest that invested power from me, symbolically castrate me, take the inflated phallus as his own, wondering aloud "what good art therapy was." At those times, the experience became a lemon for us both, and I would share with Gaston's depiction of his mother a sense of my misshapeness as a therapist. "Passing lemons," however, deprived Gaston of the very relationships he also hungered for. In a later review session, glancing at his family portrait, Gaston poignantly said he could not look long

at it because his parents looked so “untouchable.”

Father-as-Time has not been a gratifier for Gaston, according to his picture, for the father is not depicted as providing a potent role model through whose example and guidance Gaston could achieve manhood. Gaston’s self-image likewise receives minimal definition and colour. Recalling Schiffer’s (1978) statement that the affective experience of oscillations in self regard resulting from the earliest parental introjections influences the subjective sense of time throughout life, we can see that Gaston’s struggle for self adequacy only found embodiment through the projection of a “shadow” self. His first episodes of psychosis occurred at age eighteen, the age at which he portrays himself in this picture. The superego is hypothesised to be largely formed by parental introjects, and Gaston characterised both parents as “severe.” During psychotic experiences, the time of the superego, the time of a future holding repercussions for acting on repressed libidinous and aggressive drives, could be contravened. His oedipal wishes no longer negatively judged, he could act out his conflicts toward his parents in genital exposure to the mother to whom he felt he was “too close,” and in aggression toward his father.

Given this picture of the oedipal dynamics governing the nurturing (mealtime) patterns of Gaston’s household, it is little wonder that, to “enter mother” and gain his power, Gaston unconsciously chose the earlier-in-time, initially positive and later splittable, preoedipal mother. He spontaneously painted Plate 7 in a later session as he began to talk about his relationship to his mother. Describing her as intrusive in his teens, he then confided that “She was—or maybe I was—*bad*.” He would not elaborate on what “bad” entailed, other than that it resulted in immense anger inside of himself. Describing his completed picture as “a hand reaching out to the sun,” which he identified as symbolising happiness, he has interred the feminine underground as a disembodied head. He related this image to the time his travels in Europe (the “severed” hand was drawn while reflecting on his defection from art school in France) and also to the mesas in the American southwest. Since Gaston identified what he called the “pyramid” (triangle) above the severed hand as representative of spirituality, I infer that he attempted (perhaps “single-handedly”) to make a mountain of a mesa—



Plate 4



Plate 5




Plate 6



Plate 7

regain his potent ascendancy—through spiritual endeavours. Gaston sought to do this through what might be described as entering the mother through the ingestion of her (as mother earth's) psychotropic substances in order to regain the feelings of omnipotence available in symbiosis, that earlier, preoedipal mothertime that effects rhythmic relations within timelessness. Burnham et al. (1969) suggest that drug usage ritually concretises the gratification of the hallucinated oral desire "to obtain unlimited, unconditional and magical oral supplies from the object" (p. 30).

But the preoedipal mother is a split mother, with a good breast and a bad one. Gaston's path of spiritual attainment involved ascetic practices, which Roheim (1962) identifies as a form of self-punishment in which the object world as a source of pleasure is taken away from the ego by the archaic, preoedipal superego, introjected at separation as the "bad mother" who then begins to "kill" the subject through austerities. This phase of self and object destruction has as its goal the fantasied reparation of omnipotent communion with the infinite, atoning for the fundamental evil of separateness from mother.¹⁴ Continuing his oscillation between good and bad mother, and between fear and need, Gaston looked at this image again the following week and called the woman in the painting an "Indian," saying that he liked native people because during his travels, they "gave me everything I needed." Again, these feelings continued to be expressed transferentially, as Gaston alternately deprecated art therapy as meaningless because I did not tell him what his pictures meant and thereby cure him; *and* as he appeared to value the sessions as a *time* to express, and have seen and heard, his history and his present. He once called the sun his companion on his journeys. Also acknowledging that his sessions gave measure to his weeks in a way only matched by his visits to his mother, he metaphorically likened these timed events to a "sun," as, in his estimation, we "passed time" storying the only picture there is. "There's only one picture, isn't there?" he would rhetorically ask. "Sun, earth, water,

¹⁴ The psychological assessment of religious phenomena must always be approached with respect for the individual's experience and caution toward reductively analysing potentially transformative, spiritual energies. But certainly one way to distinguish "devotion from dysfunction and piety from pathology: (Caplan, 1992) is to assess the degree to which the spiritual experience has been integrated into the individual's life enhancing their well-being and/or that of the community. Gaston gives scant evidence of such integration.

tree. Just arranged in different ways.” The resignation with which Gaston uttered this suggested the “different arrangements” did not substantially alter the economics of the landscape. The parental bodies mediating the first measures of time and becoming to him still exercised their organisational force.

Phallic Magic in the Mesa: Omnipotence Inside the Outside-of-Time

The first time Gaston declared that there was only one picture was while painting another mesa image (Plate 5) as he again detailed his travels in Arizona. Waugaman (1992) suggests that repetitions within treatment may be a way of attempting to create the feeling of timelessness as a denial of loss. If a landscape of origin--literal or metaphorical--is repeated, then, it can be viewed as expressing an essential geography of the psyche through which loss is countered.

Recognition of time as nonreversible change means the acceptance of endings. Gaston paused in his painting of this mesa to comment that this was a confusing landscape, harbouring no depth. I wondered aloud if that was not a little like his memories of Arizona: of events occurring long ago but very present here. Gaston expostulated: “*Not memories!* I don’t have to *remember* them! They are *in me!*” Gaston seems to indicate that memories are outside the self. To remember is to acknowledge loss, and the agency of time in processes of loss. Gaston is insisting that his experiences in Arizona are not memories, are not lost, are not separated from his present by a linear, passing time. They do not need recalling because in some measure they *are* his present reality--despite his use of the social convention of past tense in relating them.

Thus, his retort appeared to confirm my observation: the “confusing” flatness of his image’s spatial plane reflected his impaired sense of temporal depth, resulting in a “confusing” interpenetration of his past and present. This concurs with Eissler’s (1952) observation mentioned in Chapter Four that the ornamental, stylised, art of his patient seemed reflective of the way in which she recounted her personal history: without temporal horizons, or depth. I would not go so far as to say that Gaston, when

not psychotic, was *without* temporal horizons or depth, but if one “scratched the surface” of his narratives, so to speak, as in our discussion about memory, one soon found these forms had insubstantial anchorage in his subjective reality. They were socially determined structures he acknowledged and by which he abided, but were not reflective of his self-arising temporal organisation. On the contrary, Gaston’s images suggest his universe is governed by a vertical, associational time of transgressed horizons and boundaries of inner and outer worlds: of multiple suns (Plate 3) and of the confounding of the horizons of time with the horizons of things (Plates 4; 10). In light of Gaston’s characterisation of both parents as “severe,” Fisher and Fisher’s (1953) speculation that spatial perceptions might be influenced by a forbidding parent transmitting to a child “the feeling that it is not proper to view things in their full perspective, in their full depth” (p. 504), also bears consideration. Neurological functioning *and* nurturing style contribute to temporal measure and mismeasure.

In this image (Plate 5), Gaston is *in* the mesa. It is his image of triumph. Water seems to abound and flow through the spaces of what he called the desert’s mesa. During several subsequent reviews of his work, he identified this image as his favourite. He called it an image of his “strength,” which, he said, resides in the “magic wand” the figure holds. The abstracted, shamanistic, ithyphallic figure in fact bears two “wands”, one a shadowy blue, the other mauve, reddened with Gaston’s chosen mother-colour in the family portrait. There is no outer sun to measure time in the sky. Rather, the luminescent “son/sun” stands potent within the mother/mesa, *omnipotent*--but not humanly real. Alchemically and archetypally, one can see this as an image of the son/hero’s quest for the route out of the condition of uroboric incest (Jung, 1970). The son battles the Great Mother-as-phallic-androgyne, the devourer, to effect his second birth, by taking the creative, regenerative “magic” from her as his own (Neumann, 1954).

While critical of Neumann’s formulation which allows for no existence of the principle of phallos independent from its matriarchal origins, Monick’s (1987) summation of Neumann’s “double phallos” (p. 57ff) offers ground for analysis of Gaston’s image. Within this image, within its archaic field of archetypes, Gaston has




Plate 8



Plate 9




Plate 10

imaged himself as phallic hero, wielding what Neumann terms as the chthonic and the solar phalli of mother and father, respectively. The mesa is at last awash with seminal fluids, but only on an inflated, and ultimately inhuman playing field of supersaturated libidinous energies. The journey of the hero is not carried forward into the separation of the parents, the principles of masculine and feminine, or of consciousness and the unconscious, in a way such that linear time and becoming ensue, and real tasks in the real world are undertaken. Rather, the high noon of Gaston-as-sun, his phantasied moment of mastery, is that *medial* moment suffused with the magic of the symbolic *equation*, of the potentialities of consciousness *embedded* in the matrix of the unconscious.

Again, temporally, while the degree to which these dynamics reflected the real relationships between Gaston and his parents remains largely speculative, their archetypal constellation is unquestionably operant in his artwork, and was felt within the therapeutic relationship. In the tableland of art therapy, Gaston wanted me to be the magical phallic mother who could penetrate the meanings of his artwork and cure him. When it did not make him angry, Gaston always thought it curious that I should have to ask him about his images. For him, in doing so, I was tacitly admitting that we both were impotent: that either he had not formed his image well enough to communicate his meanings, and/or I was inadequate to the task of reading, or “divining,” his image. If the latter were true, neither was there hope for him to complete his heroic task of claiming the phallus of the mother, for then, in his estimation, I had none. Questions and tentative interpretations I offered were often rejected in what I felt not to be the spirit of honest dialogue, but because of his “desire” to annul any intervention lest it be efficacious. In this way he repetitively made of me his most historically companioning structure, a mesa. *I* was his sculptural *material*. Eroding, washing away my potency, he enacted what his second image (Plate 2) had, in process and product, prospectively embodied, albeit unconsciously. However, to consistently label this dynamic of relationship as the issue of the *desire* to undermine would be unfair. The degree to which these processes were psychodynamic in origin and goal and the degree to which they were due to patterns of neurological processing specific to schizophrenia were not

always discernible. Through their often unclear mixture—but at other times *clearly* through the mechanism of projective identification in which Gaston made me be his mesa/mother—I learned from Gaston how in truth one feels both “terrible and glad” within mesa dwelling, as its provisions for shelter and nurturance alternate unpredictably, and sometimes fearsomely, between caves of apparently safe haven, and inhospitable slippages.

Existence

Some of Gaston’s most poignant images were those portraying particulars of his daily life. These were elicited through asking him, in the process of our dialogue, if he could make a picture to show me his feelings about some fact or event he was describing. He never spontaneously painted these daily realities; spontaneous imagery always centred on the years of his travels, if not overtly in content, then as a parallel creation accompanying his verbalisation of these years. Because image responses to aspects of his day-to-day present reality, which included an anxiety-provoking move to a shared apartment, were elicited by me, Gaston would often determine that they were not art. He said he would only call those images “art” which came spontaneously from him, and which I, as art therapist, could accordingly meaningfully interpret to him, effecting his cure. A premise intrinsic to art therapy, particularly as practised in analytical psychology,¹⁵ was held within his expectation: unconscious knowledge¹⁶ of the illness and the necessary conditions for healing¹⁷ is believed to exist within the client and to be expressed within his or her images. However, again, Gaston couched

¹⁵ The conscious role of the therapist as healer constellates the polar opposite of his or her own woundedness in the unconscious, while the conscious positioning of the client’s woundedness constellates the compensatory energies of healing in the unconscious (Groesbeck, 1975).

¹⁶ This “knowledge,” of course, is not cognitive, but represented through the symbolism, condensations, and displacements through which the unconscious communicates its distillations of psychic and somatic events.

¹⁷ I use “healing” as distinct from “cure,” the latter suggesting the complete removal of symptoms and restoration to health, but the former implying some alleviation of symptoms, but characterised by an integrative understanding and holding of those aspects of one’s illness that are not amenable to cure, resulting in an increased sense of personal wholeness. The gerund form, “heal-ing,” also implies an ongoing process, not a *fait accompli*.

this process in the magical time of omnipotent processes, not in the real time of human suffering and therapeutic process.

Upon entry into my office in his eighteenth session, Gaston appeared to be very depressed and withdrawn, and in response to my questioning, he stated how difficult it is after sessions to go back to his apartment, where the voices he hears so often assault him. I asked if he could make an image of how he feels in his apartment and he drew the image in Plate 10. While all of Gaston's images portray his existential reality, perhaps this one most graphically illustrates how the structural configurations and motifs of this hostile, vocable, hallucinated reality, and the images he calls upon to counter it, warringly interpenetrate his simplest moments of being in his room. The world-design of his existential reality is a rending portrayal of "the kind of spatialization and temporalization, of lighting and colouring; the texture, or materiality and motility . . . toward which the given form of existence or its individual configuration casts itself" (Binswanger, 1958b, p. 201). Binswanger states that a goal of existential psychotherapy is to ascertain "in what way everything that is . . . is accessible" to the individual (p. 201). Indeed, Gaston's image suggests that he cannot creatively access his world because he is so unremittingly accessed by it, as is a fly in a spider's web. The comprehensive threat imposed by the subject/object reversal hypothesised by Mo (1990) in the neurological functioning of persons with schizophrenia is graphically illustrated.

Gaston began by drawing the black perspectival lines of his room, yet never fully achieved a sense of its depth and recession in space. Space is flattened not through ornamentation (Eissler, 1952) but through linear webs, and his self-representation is immured in the wall, which has attained a psychological transparency such that it gives onto the outer earth's horizon. In fact, inner space and outer space (and, one might hypothesise, time) become spurious categories as their structural boundaries dissolve. While the viewing eye wants to push the terrestrial horizon back in space, that horizon nonetheless remains affixed to the seam of floor and wall. Personal time and cosmic time are interfused. Like space, time has no depth, in its all-at-onceness. The again apparitional and now footless son, and sun, are situated on the

limen, between the time of day, or consciousness, and night, or the unconscious.

Gaston identified the webs as, in part, the voices he hears, which denigrate him; the earth, sun and plant on the wall as representing the “comfort” nature provides; and the orange door outlined in red as the “emergency door,” left ominously handleless.

Gaston described his self-representation as “tied up,” which is the way he said he felt in his apartment. This binding seems to occur at least in part by virtue of the conflict of the orange pyramid of his spirituality (claiming his body from the waist up, but for one hand) with the chaos of unentrained forces careering around the room. Lines of wished-for escape issue from his solar plexus to the window, which Gaston identified in another image of impacted inner and outer realities as the window of imagination, of escape (Plate 9). Yet the “outside” of imagination into which the window should open seems to lead nowhere, but only to deflect the viewer back to the plane of other orange vibrancies in the inside/outside of this ambiguous interior.

If one’s world-design reflects one’s “mode of transcendence” of the gap between subject and object (Binswanger, 1958b), one can read Gaston’s mode of transcendence as a grasping toward what he formulates as cosmic powers to counter the deconstruction of self and its objects by an indistinct array of primary, or primal, interactive forces. This mode of transcendence is likely a complex convergence of neurological, unconscious and conscious strategies; it shares an underlying structural dynamic with the forces that assail it. Like forces are interchangeable, indicating the preferential employment of associational thought processes rather than processes of discrimination. The incoming world appears to be arrayed on the spatial, associational matrices of the right hemisphere of the brain, in a way similar to that proposed by Wallis (1968). Flat overlays occur, rather than true temporal sequencing that permits the depth of the time it takes to travel in space (cf. Fischer, 1967). The gap between the vagaries of subjective time and measures of objective time is “transcended” through reversion to primordial timelessness, the original soup in which the sun of consciousness is not yet free of the horizon of the unconscious. Gaston’s repetition of the embedded sun seems to enact what Eliade (1954) refers to as a paradigmatic repetition that has as its intention the abolishment of profane time and history. Yet

here, sacred time does not ensue, though Gaston struggles desperately to realize it. The sun as the consummate emblem of objective time is captured at its most ambiguous moment of slippage.

Applying Fraser's formulation of temporal *umwelts* to Gaston's image of his reality, it would seem that during moments such as that depicted in Plate 10, Gaston lives in a transparent nest of interpenetrating temporal organisations. Here, this confounding is less one of the "perspectives" of past, present and future than one of the hegemony of the prototemporal *umwelt*'s nowless, directionless and discontinuous "time" undermining the normative collaboration of these diverse universes of perception. If the art of Chagall evidences "a vibrating unity of integrative levels" (Fraser, 1990, p. 406), a flexible synergy preferencing the nootemporal yet showing his visual allegiance to the peculiar laws of "lower" *umwelts* as well, this image from Gaston's oeuvre displays his victimisation by a fractious disunity of warring levels to which he is affixed, not unlike Prometheus, as a perpetual witness to his moment to moment, paradoxically inexhaustible extinction.

Gaston did change his place of residence toward the end of his art therapy sessions, for there were indications that his paranoid reactions to his neighbours were not wholly unfounded. While he was eager to leave his present apartment, his proposed move into a shared apartment¹⁸ filled him with apprehension. Gaston's images regarding the move can be looked at from a temporal perspective for his attitudes toward future time, in particular with regard to coping strategies he employs to help him in the negotiation of change. In his sixth session, he stated how very hard it was to even consider moving because of his daily, self-identified feelings of nervousness and disorientation due to the voices he hears. He was never sure if they originated from his neighbours or in his mind. He was also upset by the thought of having to change his daily habits. To support his own present-focused concerns, I suggested that he draw a picture to express what he imagined moving would be like for him (Plate 13). Gaston chose a black, dry pastel and drew a jagged line in the lower left corner of the page, filling it with lines and shading, which he identified as the boxes

¹⁸ The move was closely supervised and facilitated by his social worker.

of his belongings he must move. Then he chose orange, and made an ovoid sweep, and taking the blue pastel, added a face, hair and halo, which he said was the Virgin Mary, “the only one who can help me.” He explained that although he still felt more of a Hindu than a Catholic, he was raised as the latter, and since he had seen the Virgin’s apparition several times in childhood, she is still whom he calls on when he really needs help.

Reversion to archetypal, timeless figures when life within time poses difficult challenges is not a schizophrenic response, but a psychic pattern of response that is profoundly human. It is rather the *way* in which Gaston expresses this response that suggests its insufficiency as a spiritual support moving him toward creative action in his future. And in fact, Gaston ended his picture here, as if the Virgin were to save him *from* moving and his future, rather than accompany him into it. Gaston has not drawn himself into the picture, and Mary’s disembodied head floats with a fixed, iconic stare. When a bit latter Gaston again dispiritedly said how hard moving will be, I asked if he could draw further how the actual move would be for him. Taking the orange pastel, he drew the linear profile of a flight of stairs (which homophonically resonates with Mary’s transfixing gaze as a “*flight* of stares”), the numeral 3, and the name of his possible roommate at the top, explaining there were three times as many steps going up to the place to which it seemed he would be moving. A Lacanian analysis (Muller & Richardson, 1982) might identify Gaston’s use of word in this drawing as symbolic of his anxieties of his potential roommate as, and necessitating that he also be, the *speaking* child, whose emergence ruptures the nonverbal, primordial union with *mater*.¹⁹ Language is a later developmental achievement than image, and enables the creation of an increasingly complex and abstract internal presence of, and communications about, absent objects. Gaston did not draw his roommate into presence, but abandoned him to word.

Movement into his future within the drawing, which Gaston did depict as a left to right movement, needed much facilitation. Even so, future forms become

¹⁹ This, of course, also applies to a transferential reading of the image. The word is on the side of the page closest to where I was seated. Gaston’s resistance to talking about his images reflects his desire to recreate the nonverbal, primary state of union with mother.

increasingly floating and less embodied. Gaston made no provision for supported, sequential movement toward his goal, no groundline along which to transport his belongings; his image, indeed, conveys no sense of desire for, or personal belonging to his future. The “bulk” of his investment is in his present, dark, uncomfortable-but-known, cornered existence, under the protection of the Virgin.

In the following session, Gaston again spoke about his fear of moving, and particularly of sharing accommodations with someone else. Again I decided to suggest he draw what that might be like for him (Plate 14). As he drew, he spoke of the increasing difficulty he was having with the voices he hears. Upon completing his image, he stated that his picture had nothing to do with his move. Rather, he had drawn it to “pass time.” Indeed, he did “bypass” overtly addressing the objective time of his moving through the creation of timeless, abstract, geometric forms, which he spoke of in terms of their spiritual values to him. On the right, he drew a representation of the sacred Sanskrit syllable, “Om,” symbolising the universe resolved into cosmic principles, into the creative point of sound as generative thought-force (Khanna, 1979). When I commented that the active lines *moving through* the spiritual forms reminded me of some of his lines of the previous week’s image about moving, he replied, “No, it’s about various matters achieving unity.”²⁰ These linear forms operated as holding forms for Gaston, the sacred syllable of sound as generative thought force operating as a positive, if grandly omnipotent, emblem compensatory to the hallucinated voices denigrating him. Campbell (1968) translates the Mandukya Upanishad’s explication of the sacred syllable (which he renders as AUM) as follows:

This imperishable sound is the whole of this visible universe. Its explanation is as follows. What has become, what is becoming, what will become--verily, all of this is the sound AUM. And what is beyond these three states of the world of time--that too is the sound AUM. (p. 647)

Thus, the “3” of his previous image (Plate 13) has here (Plate 14) found a symbolic

²⁰ Transferentially, the unconscious desire to reconstitute that primordial, timeless union with the mother(therapist) is represented not only in this statement, but also in the touching figures of pyramid and crescent which he desires to unite. The image appears as a sort of idiosyncratic wish-yantra rendered in the fractured geometries of schizophrenic process, for which the traditional translation of the components of “Om,” “Hail to the jewel in the lotus,” is caption. Again, however, as in the “wish to join” expressed in Plate 1, it is drawn in a manner fraught with internal contradiction.



Plate 11




Plate 12




Plate 13



Plate 14

association in and beyond time--the various *times* achieving unity--in the *transcendent* symbol for "Om." I would offer that whether this transformation becomes flight from his tasks in time, or an unconscious support ameliorating the real and metaphorical hardships of *ascending* stairs with his chattel, depends at least in part on the mediation of these symbols provided within the therapeutic relationship. Depth interpretations *about* his use of these symbols were inappropriate at this time, and would have been at any rate refused, as it was already evident Gaston wanted no conscious joining of his havens out of time with his problems in time from me.

Nonetheless, holding the two themes in human compresence across the time of several sessions nonverbally provided crucial, symbolic yoking. To allow for and respectfully witness Gaston's embodiment of his existential mode-of transcendence in art media provided connectivities between the temporalities of matter, events of the world, human relationships and his subjective reality.²¹ His "otherworldly" symbols were brought *into* time, receiving placement in the nested times of the therapeutic relationship.

Indications of Subjective Temporal Experience in Gaston's Art Therapy Process

Gaston's art therapy process can be examined in terms of the temporal qualities of his application of media, for his ability to use the sequence of art therapy sessions and meaningfully relate to his images in a cumulative way; for the relations of these to his psychiatric diagnoses; and for his way of expressing and dealing with the ending of the sessions and the therapeutic relationship.

Process: The Invisible Medium of Time

The weave of temporal textures giving Gaston's art therapy sessions their distinct temporal cast produced a paradoxical fabric. While the dutiful clock wound out its forward hours, Gaston journeyed back in time to present mystical experiences, visions outside of time from his past: what might be called a "past perfect" focus. The

²¹ It is, of course, equally crucial that this was complemented by a consistent, present-oriented, psycho-social focus by his social worker, and pharmacological attention by his psychiatrist.

“past perfect” tense in verbs indicates the “past of some time in the past” (Perrin, 1965, p. 425), and for Gaston, this past of the past was the perfection of unities existing outside of time, visitations of extraterrestrials or religious figures. Gaston reported that these experiences, whether occasioned through ascetic practices, pathology or drug usage, gave him a feeling that the purity for which he strove through yogic practice was confirmed by higher consciousnesses; their approval made him feel at one with the cosmos.²² Elements of these experiences, inclusive of their singular temporal qualities, had contributed to the favoured topics of his early poems documented in his hospital file: dreams, the distortion of time, the solitude of the infant without its mother, and fetal life, that “perfect past of the past” of human being.

Mystical experience, whether achieved through meditation or drug induced, has been characteristically termed timeless (Hartocollis, 1983). Laura Huxley (1968) describes her first LSD trip with Aldous as “a timeless roundness” (p. 131). An altered perception of time is the first characteristic of “the biochemical expansion of consciousness” which Watts (1962) describes in his documentation of his own hallucinogenic drug experiences. The different quality of attention given to the world is, in part, a different temporising of perceptual processes that results in “a dancing present—the unfolding of a pattern which has no specific destination in the future but is simply its own point” (p. 27).

Gaston’s image-making process certainly embodied this quality of seeming to have “no specific destination in the future but is simply its own point.” The perambulatory quality of Gaston’s spontaneous art process, however, was not a “dancing present.” The self-admitted purpose of art making for him was not to penetrate and abide in the timeless heart of time but to “pass time.” An image unfolds *in* time, and Gaston’s difficulty in grasping time as whole seemed a conditioning factor in the difficulty he often experienced in grasping each individual image *as* a meaningful whole and understanding its relationship to previous and subsequent images.

²²Beneficent personifications of the concept of timelessness can be seen as a return to the preoedipal mother (particularly as enacted in the oral ingestion of drugs), and as compensatory to over-severe parental introjects. The Virgin Mary can be seen in this compensatory relationship to the God who requires his Son to die for the sins of humanity. Gaston spoke of the harshness of his childhood religious training, characterising it as “too strict. If you don’t go to church, you go to hell.”

Gaston's repetitious characterisation of making art as "passing time" evidenced a sense of boredom he felt in there being *too much* time. As long as he took his medication and followed the accompanying psychiatric advice, time could no longer be evaded through taking street drugs or psychosis. Distinguishing boredom as that affect most acceptably admitted as a disturbance in the sense of time, Hartocollis (1983) defines boredom as "an inability to synchronise attention with the activities of the surroundings, or, in their absence, with one's own fantasy life" (p. 67). With schizophrenia neurologically predisposing individuals to difficulties in the synchronisation of self and world, the individual withdraws into fantasy to seek for self-adequacy. But when these fantasies begin to express unacceptable sexual and aggressive drives, their repression may result in a profound sense of boredom as the person denies these impulses their present meaning by projecting them in time and space.²³

As his inadequacy—the breach in his ego boundaries—cannot be placed in a time perspective, future or past, the individual experiences neither anxiety nor depression, but a sense of impatience with the present. (p. 68)

Gaston was reluctant to place his emotional experience in a time perspective, sometimes saying he could not see what good could come of drawing pictures about his feelings, or of his past.

Consequently, Gaston experienced difficulty in placing his *process* of making art in a time perspective. While spontaneous imagery is generally encouraged in art therapy, usually at some point in the art making process personal connections will be acknowledged and developed, and conscious and unconscious processes will become entrained. Gaston's spontaneous images were almost never conscious, purposeful constructions intended to communicate feelings, or even events. Most of his drawings unfolded "by chance," like improvised background music filling silence, or accompanying our dialogue. Aleatory processes, which Fraser identified as

²³ Medication may also be a factor in Gaston's sense of boredom. Optimally, it serves to place the individual once more in synchrony with the world. Unfortunately this is often difficult to achieve, and psychodynamic factors may be made less accessible to psychotherapy through the dulling effect of certain medications. Boredom may in some cases be explored as a symptom of pharmacological repression.

representative of the atemporal and probabilistic prototemporal umwelts, nearly always marked Gaston's *mode* of working; even in directed renderings of family, or of life in his apartment, the re-presentation was just a meniscus against which less ordered organisations of experience pressed.

While drawing or painting, Gaston appeared to execute strokes and images in a mechanically additive fashion, such that both he and his strokes seemed curiously disengaged from what were sometimes *apparently* highly meaningful expressions. Because of this, even those images in which he achieved a measure of compositional integrity were always precarious, in danger of falling apart during attempts to place them meaningfully within either the unfolding time of his sessions in art therapy or the greater time of his life.²⁴ Machover (1949) found such a consistently desultory drawing process to be characteristic of persons with schizophrenia, charting her observations of one client in this way: "He did not follow out a goal, but detailed each area in spatial succession, without any apparent reference to the whole" (p. 118). The "cumulative disposition" of Gaston's images was therefore most frequently not one of what Ushenko (1953) calls "mental residues" building toward a unified whole, but of loose residues that would frequently wash out in attempts to bring them to consciousness: they were mesa constructions. For this reason, the art product became valuable as a consistently available object for focus and reflection. The art product simultaneously documented erosions of meaning, while insisting that these erosions had expressive merit. While erosion occurred during his art process and during reflections on it, the object remained, quietly insisting on what had been expressed and in this way resisting the processes of disintegration neurological dysfunction brought about. Each image placed each session obdurately in time as a cumulative disposition of *tangible* memories giving witness to Gaston's expressive acts and to the therapeutic relationship through time.

Gaston was well aware that creative art processes, with their involvement of

²⁴ Perhaps for this reason, Wadeson (1980) and Lehnson (1972) suggest that it is often advisable not to try in any way to change the experience of the client with schizophrenia through their art therapy process, but to permit him or her to "unwittingly . . . assimilate psychic contents" as the images unfold (Lehnson, p. 26).

primary process, are not without danger; this is particularly true for persons with unstable ego formations. The tangibility of art products was one reason Gaston had continued to occasionally make visual art at home over the years, while relinquishing poetry writing entirely. Gaston's awareness, if not always control, of these processes in which he was prone to dangerous slippage was demonstrated in his quiet observation that the windows of escape through the imagination which he placed in several of his images (Plates 9, 10) were to be used "with discernment." He recognised his use of his imagination for pleasurable escape, but also the dangers this posed for him.

In session ten, Gaston drew on a halved page what he eventually concluded were the psychoactive chalice flowers he had encountered in Florida (Plate 6), which he said were of two kinds, or powers: one was called "the devil's chalice," and the other "the angel's chalice." In the lower left corner of the drawing he then placed a flower like one he said he drew at age eighteen, which he had called *fleur d'enfer*, and about which he had written a poem. He explained the interplay of sounds and letters that drew him to it and to poetry. When I invited him to write a poem now about these flowers, he declared he no longer wanted to write poetry because it was, in his words, "too dangerous," taking him "away from reality and too much into the imagination." A poem, having no tangible sensory data, is less amenable to anchorage in sensory reality, in an "outside world as distinct from self and inner experience," than visual artworks.

That, for the psychologically fragile, art making can aid in compensation, or, when improperly (or not at all) facilitated, decompensation, is given a structural rationale by Fischer (cited in Hartocollis, 1983), who has proposed a "perception-hallucination" neuro-arousal continuum of creative, hypnotic, mystical, drug and psychotic experience.

When the subcortical system becomes aroused, the perceptual-behavioral apparatus or cortical level of function regresses to a more dependent status, losing its freedom to interpret the sensory data of the outside world as distinct from the self and inner experience. Hence the experience of union with God or the eternal universe. (pp. 171-172).

The "danger" Gaston sometimes described poetic process, in particular, as having for

him was just this dissolution of the boundary of inner and outer. One can hypothesise that this is so because the image expressed in poetic word represents a boundary configuration between the left linguistic hemisphere and the right visual hemisphere (Galín, 1974), and is subject to greater slippage of aural and visual associations. The separation of the “hemispheric parents” of the psychic world is less guarded as word and image achieve potent coition.

“Slippage” was consistently observable in Gaston’s attentional focus. As noted earlier in this chapter, the observation of those forms and content used to fill a temporal hiatus caused by breakdown in the ability to maintain an unfolding linear continuity and yoking of subjective time to objective time can provide a key to those core images an individual uses to reorganise him or herself in time. The origination of Gaston’s attentional difficulties, characteristic of schizophrenia, was frequently difficult to assess, sometimes appearing to have psychodynamic import, but at other times seeming to simply be due to neurological lapses. When sequences of thought would break, Gaston’s attention would often veer out the window of my office (using the window as he described its use within his images), and he would comment on the sun, or some movement of cloud, smoke or bird. At times this “escape” through the window appeared to be an escape away from recall of the familial past to an “outside” reality less threatening to his ego. The sight of the sun, or cloud through the pane²⁵ would then often stimulate an association to Arizona, his place of anchorage; he would reorganise his self *in the present* around the *structures of the past* through reassertion of those images and events around which his ego had come to be organised. Initiating or resuming the painting of these images reinstated the albeit fragile organisation of his personality.

At other times, I could not be sure that attentional lapses were psychodynamic in origin. The sense of a sentence simply seemed to evaporate; meaning was lost. Sometimes I would attempt to restore the thread of meaning, using his images if they had seemed integral to his communication; but at other times it felt more appropriate simply to accompany Gaston through this emptiness, to let it be, so that he would

²⁵ “Pain” must also be heard here.

experience human relationship as not dependent upon his capacity for maintaining sequential thought. In this nonverbal way, assurance was given that the therapeutic relationship within the tableland of art therapy was stalwart enough to withstand the erosive processes of his illness process.

Temporal Indicators and Their Relationship to Diagnosis

Art processes are central to the practice of art therapy. The process passes in time, but the product remains. Because of this, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that the marks that are left *are* activities. In the same way, when looking for what are sometimes called “diagnostic indicators” in a client’s art expressions, I prefer also to consider pathologies less as nouns than as processes, active within the person, and influencing his or her activity of world- and image-making. This perspective seems also to inform Wadeson’s (1980) extensive search for relationships between art images and diagnosis.

I have often heard and read such terms as ‘a depressed picture,’ ‘schizophrenic art,’ and the like. My observations indicated that there is so much within group variability and between group overlap that such distinctions are impossible to make. (p. 197)

Nonetheless, she finds the art product of great help in arriving at differential diagnoses *in the context of* a client’s process, history and verbalisations. Within the discussion of Gaston’s art work, again it must be kept in mind that he was highly medicated, levelling the otherwise more extreme effects of his illness process(es) on his art process.

As is by now apparent, some measure of fragmentation of images and/or of process, often considered characteristic of schizophrenic process (Jung, 1966; Wadeson, 1980²⁶), was always apparent in Gaston’s images (Plates 1, 3, 6, 10, 11, 13, 14). Temporally speaking, this was perhaps the most prominent indicator of a

²⁶ Wadeson provides a list of “distinguishing features of psychotic art reported in the literature” (p. 190) that supports this view. It is in this same chapter, however, that she cautions against using such characteristics as diagnostic since clients from other diagnostic groups may also produce similar pictures from time to time.

disorganisation of temporal experience within his art products, and seemed most reflective of his frequent difficulty maintaining the temporal sequence of thoughts and actions necessary to sustain a insightful relationship to his images and the therapeutic process. Gaston did not seem to be in dialogue with the meaning of his images except as I facilitated such interaction, and he often denied their significance altogether.

As well, paranoid process is evident in his depictions of the threat to the self from a “without” that is equally “within.” The boundaries of self and not-self are unclear. Melges (1982) speaks of “paranoid connectivity” (p. 163) as resulting from the dissolution of temporal sequence. When temporal perspectives of before and after, or past, present and future, lose their distinctions and inside and outside events become indistinguishable, irrational clusters of meaning may consolidate, threatening the now fragile integrity of the self. These dynamics are apparent in images such as Plates 5, 8, 9, and 10. Figure and ground, interior and landscape, interpenetrate.

While his art products showed a fluctuation between fullness and emptiness of the page, and in vibrancy versus conservatism of colour (cf. Plates 5, 7, and 9 with Plates 1, 3, and 14) which may indicate bipolar process (Wadeson, 1980), his art making *process* belied any manic energies, as even his more robust images were paradoxically executed with a stolid slowness. There was no alteration in his rate of the application of art media to the page from session to session over the course of therapy. Medication may well, of course, be a factor here. Depressive process, however, was evident and admitted by Gaston, particularly reactively, when he was faced with moving, and when his auditory hallucinations increased with a concomitant difficulty in distinguishing subjective reality from objective reality. While a temporal perspective preferencing the past is characteristic of depressive process, I found Gaston’s focus on the past was generally more indicative of schizophrenic process than depressive process because the “window of the past” on which he focused was his “escape window” into timelessness. Gaston became *livelier* in talking about this period, and this focus became his defence against opening not to his *timeless*, but to intimacies of his *historical* past, which held family conflict and the loss of his personal dream of becoming a professional artist. This defensive manoeuvre could be said to be on the

continuum of hypomanic defence against depression, yet the temporal location of the defence is situated within the past, not in the active present/future that is characteristic of manic processes, as discussed in the literature (Fraisse, 1963; Wallis, 1967; Melges, 1982).

Understandably, Gaston's active strategy in coping with loss, and with temporal confusion, was to retreat to those past experiences in which time was not a measure of experience. But this strategy also failed him and fractured. In summary, then, the temporal indicators within Gaston's work and process are most supportive of a diagnosis of schizophrenia with depressive symptoms.

Termination

Inevitably, Gaston's tenuous ability to maintain linear continuity, apparent throughout his therapy, was also operative in his final session, in which we reviewed his art as a way of gathering together the emergent themes of his course of therapy. In the preceding weeks, Gaston had not been able to verbalise any feelings regarding my questions as to how he felt about the termination of his therapy, but his images and other nonverbal communications made it clear he was experiencing difficulty with it. He had also "forgotten" his appointment three weeks previously, the only time he did so. Psychodynamically, this can be considered as Gaston's anger at therapy ending in accordance with my school year and not his needs being expressed through an unconscious preemptive attempt to enact toward me what he fears will be my response at termination. His sense of, and fear of, being "forgotten" is inverted into a competitive manoeuvre of "I'll forget you first!"

Gaston's final image (Plate 12) seemed to be in dialogue with one completed four sessions earlier (Plate 11), and not only because they were the only images in which Gaston chose to use collage materials. During the composition of Plate 11, Gaston cut out the image of the bottle of perfume, said that "it" was "futile," and then asked me if I was leaving in the following month. I confirmed that I was, and asked how he felt about our sessions ending. He laconically replied, "It's O.K.," and cut the

stopper (its homophonic resonance with “stop-her” should be noted) from the bottle of perfume and glued it, tipped, above the tiger. When choosing the tiger, Gaston had called it his protection and companion animal, and later said he had wanted to cut it *all* up along its stripes and glue it down. Particularly because the tiger’s colours were the same as those I was wearing in that session, Gaston’s actions transferentially seemed to suggest both his feelings of anger and aggression at my leaving *and* his desire to undo the fated process of my departure from the unit. He wanted to cut me up and yet glue me down and appease me. Horses, which he had previously identified with his bodily reality, race above, in the direction of this phantasied activity. Gaston declared that he was not the tiger; rather, he agrees with the Native American he met on his travels who called him a grizzly bear. When he said that was because he likes to sleep, I wondered aloud to him if the Native American might have also recognised in him those growly bear feelings of deep-down feelings, hungers, and angers that are a part of human being, too. Gaston fell silent, then softly said, “Maybe.” A felt shift in Gaston was palpable at that moment. This occurred just before that session’s end. Upon entering the following week, Gaston said that something I had said the previous week at last gave him a feeling for what art therapy is all about. He said that he couldn’t say what his understanding was, but that he now just had a different feeling for it.

One month later, in his final image Gaston (Plate 12) chose horses from the same magazine article as those in Plate 11, but now they run to the left, the side of the page hypothesised to represent the past, and to the side of the page opposite to that on which I sit. The rest of his image is a churning map of what Gaston later reluctantly disclosed was desert, though water and hot coral also seem to roil in this volcanic depiction, as if the mesa’s “resistant cap” is undergoing a temporal reversal and once again being liquefied. Gaston left the third of the page closest to me blank, and indeed, for much of this session he was challenging, refusing to talk about his image. Placing the welfare of his narcissistic needs squarely in my hands, he told me that I should know what it means; if not, he has done an awfully bad job of painting! With encouragement, he later described the image to me as situated in Arizona and France, those havens of the past to which his horses repetitively run. The *repressed* drives,

desires and fears underlying this landscape seemed poignantly symbolised in the images he chose but did *not* include in his collage: a bear (recalling the session of Plate 11), a gigantic eel, and a small boy kneeling apparently at the bottom of a sea, with only two cheeksful of life-sustaining air, surrounded by large, silent, staring fish. Through these nonverbal images, placed like lines in a play whispered as “asides,” Gaston was able to communicate aggressive and sexual feelings he could or would not verbally acknowledge, as well as feelings of abandonment and immense vulnerability: the fear that he would now be left to sink into the often less than human forms of his unconscious life. Riley (1992) suggests that collage images permit “the greatest amount of peripheral information to ‘accidentally’ slip into the art task, since magazine photos are often very complicated in their content and visual attributes” and allow for a measure of disowning full responsibility for what the image communicates (p. 40). Collage therefore simultaneously permits a facade of control, distance--the client manipulates *someone else’s* images--and inadvertent disclosure.

The final two sessions, which were used for review, were mirror opposites. In the first, Gaston was affectively open, and took pleasure in choosing images to review. He commented that he had been “very artistic” when he drew the chalice flowers (Plate 6); and saying he *very* much liked Plate 7, described the hand in it as “open--not giving or receiving, but open to another hand being laid on top of it.” Gaston felt more “present” in this session than in any other, and as he left, instead of his usual abrupt “Good-bye” uttered without turning as he walked out, he turned at the door and said, “Bye-bye, Elizabeth.”

In the last session, however, Gaston seemed dispirited by his review, and to have forgotten many images. He again insisted that art was simply to *pass time*, and not connected to feelings. An attitude of depressed fatalism seemed uppermost. When given the opportunity to share how he felt about this being the last session, he responded conceptually, saying haltingly that he felt like he really did not understand art therapy, “except for once, and I can’t remember what I understood.” His moment of *kairos*--those preeminent moments of timing, of grasping the fleet moment of insight--had escaped him.

Underlying the extreme poignancy of Gaston's statement seems to be an equal probability of psychodynamic issues and deficits in neurological/cognitive processing. Particularly since the time he felt he most understood art therapy seemed to be when he connected to unexpressed "growly feelings", his present feelings seemed to be in part due to the repression of anger that the sessions were ending, masked in statements eroding the mother/therapist now perceived as bad and abandoning. But, equally, his inability to understand his art therapy experience was influenced by the isomorphic neurological erosion of perceptual data that was *always* occurring in his experience, such that understandings could seldom be kept, but were always undergoing slippage. The presence of the art work alleviated this process, but at times, particularly at the negative extremes of the entanglement of psychodynamic and neurological processing, even its meanings were washed out by the insidious sands of time, bringing loss. For the unconscious, the foundations of continuities are not chronologies, persons or objects, but *qualities* shared by the phenomena it registers and generates. Sadly, then, through acts making our relationship end as an evacuated mesa, what felt to me as a negative occurrence Gaston may have experienced as continuity of experience. A collapse of time was effected through repeating the historic pattern of erosion in human relationships. Microtemporally, in his cerebral processes, this occurred from microsecond to microsecond in the processing of the data of experience, which nootemporally, became the norm of interpersonal relating.

It is my hope that as Gaston cycles through his core images, he will find, in their cumulative residue, at least a small deposit commemorative of their having been shared with respect and a measure of understanding; and that the pattern of being attentive to the images of inner life with their rich conmixtures of timeless archetype and the personal past *and* to the needs of the ordinary day of the shared, objective present will have been sufficiently modelled to hold this way of functioning as a dynamic possibility in his psychic life.

Summary of Understandings

While experimental studies indicate that differences in neurological functioning give rise to the temporal singularities of schizophrenic process, the extent of their role as patterning, or as patterned by, intrapsychic functioning and social interaction is unclear. It seems most likely both occur, in an ongoing diathesis/stress interchange. Psychotherapeutically, verbal and nonverbal content filling the structures of schizophrenic process can be examined for those psychodynamic factors that express the conscious and unconscious meanings this organisation of experience holds for the individual.

Unfortunately, art therapy sessions with Gaston spanned only the seven months of my internship. Pao (1979) states that with schizophrenic individuals in the chronic phase, developing the therapeutic alliance can take years, and even then is difficult to maintain. When the processes of disorder have become “chronic,” commensurate *time* itself becomes a necessary dimension of the therapeutic container for change to be effected. Nevertheless, Gaston’s art therapy sessions literally made visible aspects of some of the *meanings* of his subjective experience of time, as well as other aspects of his experience that became helpful to his other, longer-term caregivers. His psychiatrist observed that the extent to which Gaston had conveyed his life experience to me through art in that relatively short period of time surprised her, revealing to her aspects of his life with which she was not acquainted, or of which she was only minimally aware: in particular, his painting and description of family interactions in his teens (Plate 4); the image of his subjective sense of reality in his apartment (Plate 10); and his drawing of what was for him a terrifying experience in the psychiatric ward in the United States (Plate 8). Their “graphic” portrayal enabled team members to more sensitively enter into Gaston’s own perception and feeling of his life circumstances. As mentioned above, within this time frame I was also able to model a pattern of alternation of temporal focus validating Gaston’s core images in both their personal past and timeless/archetypal dimensions, while also facilitating an adaptive temporal focus on difficulties he was experiencing in his present reality.

Psychoanalytic Understandings

Fraser (1981) viewed the therapeutic process of psychoanalysis as a process of creation which, from a temporal perspective, had as its goal a reorganisation of the conscious and unconscious dimensions of the temporal *umwelts* of the individual. Perhaps this can be most clearly understood with reference to art therapy by incorporating this idea into a paraphrase of Rose's (1964) statement regarding the creative imagination quoted in Chapter 4. Then we could say that image-making in art therapy provides relief from the strain of relating the various organisations of subjective time with objective time, *not* because it provides a vacation from the problem but because it deals directly *with* the task, but in a way that is at one time serious and imaginative. The mandate of Gaston's other caregivers was primarily to orient him toward outer reality. Art therapy was therefore a valuable component of his treatment program in which inner and outer were not split from each other but provision was made for their discernment *and* meaningful integration.

Gaston's art made possible an assessment of his ego horizons in time (Rose, 1964). In Gaston's case, this metaphor of "horizons" was concretised in images of the transparent fusing of the human symbolic and the cosmic literal horizons, making it clear that his ego boundaries needed not expansion, but delimitation. What was indicated metaphorically as the need for the separation of the solidities of earth from the transparencies of the heavens can be interpreted as the need for a consolidation of conscious measures of time and their separation from the undifferentiated time(s) of the unconscious: a separation of the temporal structures which contribute to "parenting" the world. Oedipally this dynamic has its reflection in the need to separate out gender roles modelled by his parents in order to complete his developmental tasks, since in his family, traditional male and female attributes, as socially sanctioned in the era of his developmental years, appear to have been reversed. Neurologically this dynamic also appears to have its counterpart in the hypothesised reversed temporal processing in the hemispheres of persons with schizophrenia.

The challenge in working with Gaston in this task of separation was to

simultaneously have it be a task of integration. This was particularly so with those images embodying spiritual realities. His image world fulfilled his personal need for a spiritual life. While his spiritual needs were bound up with hallucinatory concretisations and a propensity for grandiose identifications, the latter extreme, defensive elaborations did not justify denying to him the benefit of their spiritual core. Through his art, therefore, the establishment of connections between his havens in and out of time and the realities of existence in the here and now were sought. The art media offered literal grounding for his expressions, providing the means to realize a Vichian participation in origins as if they “were present to the senses” (Verene, 1981, p. 154), not in a hallucinated, but in a shared, creative Real. Art makes matter medial, between the concrete “earth” of its materials and the abstract “heaven” of its meanings. Gaston’s predilection for concretisation found an appropriate arena in this medial, or transitional, world of art, which simultaneously placed what was outside of time in time for our reflection on its function in his daily life. Even when verbalised associations and amplifications stalled, image-making in the presence of a receptive Other served to place inner, atemporal anarchies within time, where they were held “in trust” by a being valuing expressions of time and of timelessness—the therapist. Further mediation of this experience could have been developed in an eventual wider use of art media. Materials for working in three dimensions were available to Gaston, but he did not choose to explore these.

Looking at Gaston’s therapy with regard to themes of the role of creation in dealing with loss and reparation lends a poignancy to Segal’s (1952) statement quoted in Chapter 4, “that all creation is really a re-creation of a once loved and once whole, but now lost and ruined object, a ruined internal world and self” (p. 199). Gaston’s mesas are just such a statement and restatement of presence and absence enacting in art media the sacred geography of “motherland.” While we often say that art enables an individual to engage in omnipotent fantasies, it must be stated that for Gaston, the act of art-making itself always harboured a degree of mourning for his lost, healthy self. Estroff (1989) describes the change in personal narratives given by family and the client as schizophrenia becomes a presence pervading stories of the self.

So often, when relatives tell their story, they begin with a description of their loved one *before*, when there were accomplishments and successes, a known, knowable, and welcomed presence. And then the narrative of loss begins--the tale of the new, strange, disturbed and disturbing, not-really-who-they-were-before-but-still-somehow-the-same-person. (p. 191)

Visual art was the activity that in Gaston's youth drew him toward his future goal of wanting to become a professional--in his words, "famous"--artist. Gaston would sometimes disparage the work he did in art therapy because it was not "great art." Each mention of this was a visit to the graves of rue, event-markers of buried dreams of his healthy self.

Yet, paradoxically, to have had this possibility *once* before him also *continued* to feed Gaston's need to feel special, even if he could no longer attain that dream. To consider that art making might have other values than sheer aesthetic merit within it, however, values that might be accessible to anyone, deflated an important part of his *past* agenda, around which his present personal myth continued to revolve. Also, it was more satisfying to his need for magical, grandiose realities to believe art therapy involved divination of the causes and cures for his illness than that it was a joint, and not always clear, effort of inquiry and dialogue to which his contributions were essential. Art-making was therefore an activity laden with paradox for Gaston, connecting him to his past in ways that enhanced *and* encumbered his self-esteem. Because Gaston's attentional difficulties often resulted in the dissolution of experience, the externalisation of "inner reproductive holding" (Loewald, 1980) afforded by the art product helped to make possible the reconciliation processes of acknowledging loss, and engaging in mourning and restitution in time.

Temporally, art therapy also offered Gaston a dilatable and contractible tableland in which to complete developmental tasks. Colarusso and Nemiroff (1981) urge clinicians to be attentive to the capability of persons with chronic illness to proceed with developmental tasks, and to provide facilitated interpersonal and creative opportunities through which this development can be nurtured. In Erikson's (1978) developmental model of life stages, Gaston's age-related task would be identified as the need to resolve the conflict between the polarity variously termed care vs. rejectivity, or

generativity vs. self-absorption. Having no children, having elderly parents with increasingly ill health about whom he voiced concern, and having his own self development arrested within frequently “timeless” drug-induced experiences in early adulthood, Gaston had few avenues through which generativity could be fostered. Involvement in familial bonds increasingly brought fears of loss and death. For what he called his present “apparitional” self, Gaston’s hypostatised, historical past made a reified structure, a home more comfortable to haunt than the unproven “in-process” structures of the present and future.

One of my goals with Gaston was not to deny him this salvatory past, but to elicit his images and narratives of it as an act of self-recollection accomplished as “enactment”: the creation of seminal images from his past as what Loewald (1975) calls “re-enactive memory.” Reactivation of his mesa/tableland in the tableland of art therapy utilised primary process to, as Noy (1969) states, establish the continuity and development of the self in time. Creative reconstruction of his past in present art products, and a meaningful journeying through these with a caring other, had the potential to ground his narrative’s apparitional tendencies in the embodied nature of both the art product and the here-and-now therapeutic relationship. Reciprocal recognition of the time of the other is necessary for this kind of communication to take place. Time and his sense of self might in this way be experienced as less fragmented, and the images of his art would give him tangible works in which to ground communications of his life to others. Gaston was pleased to know that the rest of the team was seeing some of his work in my presentation of the course of his therapy to them.

Complicating the developmental tasks of Gaston as a man in midlife are unresolved developmental tasks from previous stages of life. The art work was an invaluable aid in identifying them. Those images of Gaston which manifested latent oedipal themes, particularly that of the family meal in which he painted himself as an adolescent, suggest the lack of positive and negative oedipal resolutions, which are among the developmental tasks of adolescence crucial to establishing a sense of identity (Blos, 1979). Enmeshed with psychotic experiences in late adolescence, whether

endogenous, drug-induced, or both, these tasks were regressively dodged by Gaston's retreat into, for instance, phantasies of protected fetal life. Cathecting phantasies in which time was reversible, or simply was not, Gaston found a haven in the omnipotent manipulation of time as a defence against the difficult task of coming to terms with stern, forbidding parental introjects.

Longer term art therapy would hold the possibility for Gaston to symbolically complete these developmental tasks in some measure as, through the medium of art, he would have the opportunity to consolidate a sense of personal power and effectiveness in the expressive and communicative power of his art. The corrective relationship with the female therapist would enable him to symbolically appropriate "the phallus," the paintbrush, of the mother (therapist and his biological mother, who painted) to generate his own creative future. In a longer term therapy, I might have eventually considered working with Gaston toward a format through which some of his work might be shared with others, perhaps in a show in the outpatient unit or by having him create a series of smaller images from his travels that could be bound in book format. It would have been interesting to discover if this literal "binding" of creative experience might also have enabled him to return to facilitated poetry writing, through the maintenance of firm connections between poetic image, image embodied in art materials, and the therapeutic relationship. Bridging to others also effects bridging and bringing discernment to temporal experience: distinguishing subjective, private experience from objective, shared experience. In this concrete way, appropriate modes of connectivities of the temporal umwelts could be reinforced.

Understandings Within the Frame of Analytical Psychology:

In psychoanalytic terms one can speak of the defensive cathecting of subjective states of timelessness in Gaston's work. This was effected through the concentration on that past time in which the latent temporal content was one of timelessness, a fusion with the mother-land that was both wish-fulfilling and fearsome. Because Gaston in his own words *was* his memories, all time perspectives tended to collapse into this "past time (and, equally, pastime) of timelessness," which, however, threatens an

ego's integrity of separate being.

From the perspective of analytical psychology, Gaston's affinities for infinities of time receive a different valuation. The type of disordered, psychic experience from which Jung's theoretical model crystallised was primarily that of dementia praecox, or schizophrenia: it is perhaps no wonder, then, that he elaborated a body of theory that would seek to bridge the conflict of the psyche's experience inside and outside of time. Within Jung's (1960) constructive standpoint, the content of a psychic system is seen as "neither infantile nor in itself pathological, but subjective. . ." (p. 187)

. . . it is of the nature of the subjective that it cannot be judged objectively. You cannot measure distance in pints. The subjective can only be understood and judged subjectively, that is, constructively. Any other judgment is unfair and does not hit the mark. (p. 187)

The constructive method does not reduce, but through comparative analysis seeks the wide basis of parallel types on which the construction rests, and is "necessarily speculative" (Jung, 1960, p. 185). Within this model Gaston's process can be understood as a reversion to archaic, archetypal organisations of experience characteristic of the collective unconscious when his personal organisation begins to fragment, whether during psychotic experience, or more generally as the organisational tendency of chronic schizophrenic process. Applying Jung's thesis that there is an underlying organisation of experience in schizophrenic process, even at its psychotic extreme, albeit an archaic one,²⁷ leads to a different emphasis in the interpretation of Gaston's images. We can observe Gaston's reversion from the personal mother to the Great Mother who is beyond time, and who has both a nurturing and a devouring aspect. The "storying" of his entry into the Great Mother to reclaim his phallic power is less "regressive" in this constructive telling than an immersion in the always present, archetypal ground of experience, in an attempt to effect there developmental tasks bypassed for complex reasons: his own illness and the physical and psychological

²⁷ This does not mean it is easy to discern. Jung (1960) states that "Not only are the products of schizophrenic compensation archaic, they are further distorted by their chaotic randomness" (p. 263). Nonetheless, ". . . in dementia praecox there is no symptom which could be described as psychologically groundless and meaningless. Even the most absurd things are nothing other than symbols for thoughts which are not only understandable in human terms but dwell in every human breast" (p. 178).

consequences of drug use, but also to renegotiate the necessary archetypal, developmental dramas that were inadequately facilitated and humanised by his parents. Therefore, for both personal reasons and reasons implicit in his pathology, meaning and progression was sought in the imaginal world. In Gaston's case, this route of "subjective adaptation" (Jung, 1960, p. 189) was unsuccessful because it did not serve as a transition to the world, but became an inescapable labyrinth of irreality.

My task as art therapist, therefore, was not to deny, but to mediate, humanise and connect this timeless or atemporal world to the world of objective time. In supported art processes, Gaston's atemporal chaos was given a form in time, was stilled, even when it expressed a horrific aspect. The interpenetrating transparencies of cosmos, home and mind, mercurial suns, transfixing webs and stampeding horses were "captured," for a time, so that more conscious relations could be established with them. Working within this perspective, Gaston's spontaneous imagery was validated as, indeed, holding great expressive power, more through my quality of holding it than by virtue of any explicit interpretations offered. In this short course of therapy, my verbalisations were rather an attempt to promote connectivities through the art to Gaston's existential world: in his words, to nurture his self-identified need for "discernment;" to effect "the separation of the parents," temporally speaking, into the distinguishable forms of time.

Gaston's images were not only holding forms for his experience, but also for me within my countertransference. Indeed, this image, particularly as limned in Plate 2, embodied that prospective significance of a "map of the journey" referred to by Shoemaker (1978) and Philipson (1963). Its manifest content expressed Gaston's manifest wish within this journey, and in its imaginal communication the process and product made clear that a certain "resistant cap" of auxiliary ego strength would be necessary for me to provide, so that I and the tableland of art therapy might withstand the erosive processes that were to be part of our relationship. To stay within the metaphor, the "resistant cap" is not, in balance, a negative formation; it offers a tenacious benevolence of protection for what is built in the underlying hollows, and seeks to understand these life-forms as positive constructions giving meaning to the

negative spaces of loss.

Existential Understandings

Each human's task of developing a useful construct of the nature of reality and his or her place in it is only made more onerous under the instabilities mental disorders impart to the perceiving mind. Many of Gaston's images paid keen tribute to his intimacy with the existential apprehension described so eloquently by Pascal.

When I consider the brief span of my life, swallowed up in the eternity before and behind it, the small space that I fill, or even see, engulfed in the infinite immensity of spaces which I know not, and which know not me, I am afraid, and wonder to see myself here rather than there; for there is no reason why I should be here rather than there, now rather than then. . ." (Pascal, cited in May, 1958, p. 18)

Gaston attempted resolution of this existential conflict by identifying with these immensities, only to then despair and fragment in "their" disregard of that immensity as "his."

The consequent emptying out of meaning that occurred for Gaston resulted in what Binswanger (1958) terms "existential impoverishment," that acute sense of being as an isolate that results, in part, as the self, experienced as eternal, falls into the limitations imposed by temporality. For Gaston, this process was intensified by neurological processes resulting in the fragmentation of sequential connections essential to living within socially settled, objective temporal forms.

In its troubled way, Gaston's artwork is an enactment of Heidegger's (1971) formulation of art as a vehicle through which a being "comes in the work to stand in the light of its being" (p. 36), and to beings "attain[ing] to the Open of their paths" (p. 63). The image Gaston rendered in his second and third sessions (Plate 2) of the clear-sighted woman about to step onto her path, literalises this theme, but he has projected this existential task onto the therapist. While this projection onto the therapist is not uncommon in the early stages of therapy, seldom was there movement from this abdication of responsibility. *I* was to temporalise *him* as a self.

While only Gaston can ultimately temporalise himself as a self, the existential reading of this image does indicate what came to be one of my primary tasks within the

therapeutic relationship—and perhaps in a synchronous, prospective way, what I further carried forward as *task*, within this thesis, in order to arrive at a deeper understanding of its dynamics: to respect and accompany Gaston within those modalities of time that had come to be his adaptive, existential “mode of transcendence”, and in this way come to know their phenomenological reality; but to also needfully modulate temporal perspectives and establish temporal connectivities within the art therapy session.

The temporal textures of being within our sessions were varied as Gaston painted from his past, his present, his future and his phantasy. While on the one hand, with the proliferation of archetypal material present in Gaston’s work, the containing “nest” or temporal *umwelt* seemed to be that of timeless realities, these were also contained within the here-and-now of the therapeutic relationship. Within an attitude of genuine existential care, the most realisable goal within only seven months of weekly sessions was to provide a place for Gaston’s existence to “speak up about itself” (Binswanger, 1958b, p. 200) in word and image: to accompany him, as Wadeson (1980) advises, with empathy in his endeavour to communicate the nature of his “phenomenological isolation” (p. 114). Maintaining a consistently warm, attentively available, yet non-intrusive attitude of genuine care may be what is most needed for the person with schizophrenia to orient him- or herself in the present, helping to provide that continuity of care that ameliorates in some measure those “distortions of the feeling of time [which] necessarily result in distortions in the meaning of a life” (Ellenberger, 1958, p. 106). The “existence” of the artworks themselves also served this function with their consistency of presence and availability for review. The art works were too solid to slip like time’s sands through his fingers or mine. They embodied the principle of sequential unfoldment. They also embodied the principle of atemporal presence through their qualitative association of themes. Finally, they embodied the principle of consistency of care, documenting the therapeutic relationship.

Over the course of the therapy, Gaston was able to disclose memories and feelings about a number of incidents and relationships in his past that were threatening to him. The art helped him to do so, as when he drew an image of family (Plate 4), or drew what he felt was his most fearsome experience: a psychiatric seclusion room in

the United States where he was put in restraints, and knew no one (Plate 8). Gaston stated that men should not acknowledge their fears, so for him to gradually open his fears into the care of another through images was not easy. Doing so in art provided him with a record of having done so; in our reviews he could again observe for himself that he had shared his fears and repeatedly received confirmation that they were accepted, and not belittled. An accepting, rather than a persecutory voice, answered back to him.

* * * * *

In final summary, this discussion has shown that the intelligence of images speaks to the subjective nature of time that gives rise to the client's interior universe, which in turn establishes a relational continuum from compatibility to incompatibility with objective time. Just as Fewkes (1911) called mesa dwellings "mental productions," expressions of human intelligence responding to arid surroundings, Gaston's images are psychic expressions of his imaginal intelligence communicating, and attempting to come to terms with, the nature of his being in a world experienced through schizophrenic process, in all of its neuropsychological complexity.

The archaic organisational processes that take over as more complex cognitive processes falter reflect, in Fraser's terms, the cathecting of archaic umwelts of temporal experience, in which time's arrow fragments and the psyche falls back on bi-, multi-, or nondirectional temporal configurations. Art therapy becomes a natural vehicle for the integration of this archaic reality with "the ambiguities of human freedom" (Fraser, 1981, p. 23) because, as an image-based process, it is dependent upon the yoking of primary processes, which utilise these older temporal forms, and secondary processes, which do not. As Ehrenzweig (1967) has pointed out, "If psychosis is creativity 'gone wrong,' treatment might have to be concerned with setting into motion the mutilated creative process" (p. 276). The structure, content, and materials of art-making allow for overlays and interpenetrations making visible the artist/client's subjective experience of time, inclusive of its ramifications on lifetime developmental tasks. Disorganisations of temporal experience, whether of perspective, rate and/or sequence that are revealed in

art process and product receive literal holding in the enduring physicality of the work. But perhaps most importantly, empathic, human presence is offered by the art therapist who experiences the clients' world with him or her, and, as appropriate and possible, facilitates connectivities among the perspectives and umwelts of temporal experience through the agency of images.

CONCLUSION

“A man sets himself the task of drawing the world. Through the years he populates a space with images of provinces, kingdoms, mountains, bays, ships, islands, fish, rooms, instruments, heavens, horses and persons. Shortly before dying, he discovers that the patient labyrinth of lines traces the image of his own face.”

-J. L. Borges (Epilogue to *The Maker*, cited in Barrenechea, 1965)

“Since authenticity is something we accomplish, it takes time—all the time we have. Time is the medium out of which we make ourselves. The past, present and future are like the height, depth and breadth of ourselves. We cannot be truly ourselves if we deny the flow of time; it is our dimensionality.”

-E. Melamed (1983, p. 198)

I came across the above epigraph by Borges when only beginning my thesis research, and immediately felt how its sense “mirrors” that of anamorphic images, which achieve their intended resolution only from a specified perspectival point. The conflation of Borges, that master narrator of the enigmas of subjective time, with anamorphic images¹ purveys the sense of how these images spatially illustrate resolutions in our understanding of our lives that only come with time, and, it seems, cannot be reached until one arrives at a certain “point,” or placement, in time. It is not unwarranted to describe the mien of many clients coming to therapy as one of wearing their lives, or trailing their lives behind them, like some distended “hide,” into which the familiar and capable self has disappeared. The sort of anamorphic images particularly symbolic of the therapeutic journey are those catoptric, or mirror, portraits

¹ Synchronistically enough, at the end of writing my thesis I have come across an author who uses the same quote from Borges and the example of anamorphoses--though not in the same chapter--to illustrate readings of the constructions of the self in art and in text. Gandleman (1991) also brings Lacanian theory to his lively post-modern exploration of visual activity and what “showing” means in the visual art and in literature.

in which the visual angle is replaced by angles of *reflection*, most often provided by a cylindrical or conical mirror, which reconstitute the portrait into an at last discernible and human self (Baltrusaitiss, 1977, pp. 131-158). The therapeutic journey, to which time is essential, then can be seen as the co-construction of that mirror by client and therapist, which provides the perspective through which the unrecognisable self attains coherence. It must be said that, unlike in the smooth magic of presented anamorphoses, the construction of the mirror in therapy and of journeying toward the requisite angle of reflection is *work*, and changes the self. That this mirror is round, and usually placed at the centre of the image to resolve its turgid swarm, resonates nicely with the Jungian formulation of the mandala as the symbol for the self.

Even so must a conclusion operate as a sort of resolving angle of reflection of the many chapters preceding it. We have seen that an individual's subjective sense of time is, in itself, a creative "resolution" of many interpenetrating factors: the *temper* of the dyadic relationship with primary caregivers in infancy that has patterned the experience of time as trustworthy and gratifying, or untrustworthy and frustrating, both with regard to the presences and absences of these caregivers and to their meeting the bodily and emotional needs of the infant; the internal physiological rhythms of bodily time; the capabilities of the neurological system in its processing of perceptual experience; the natural, environmental rhythms of day and night, and of the seasons; the temporal code of the cultural system, or competing cultural systems, into which the individual is socialised; and the dense loam of the unconscious, of the collective unconscious, and of primary process, differently organised with regard to time. It is the tolerance for what may appear to consciousness as the "turgid swarm" of the latter that allows for the artistry to occur, the creative synthesis of these often competing organisations that becomes the time of the individual's interiority.

The "resolution" of this study is that, indeed, art psychotherapy *is* a modality particularly suited to the assessment, expression and reconstruction of the distressed "temporal nest" of the client. Much as it supports our lives, the nest of times informing our experience transpires as a ground phenomenon--or a surround phenomenon--through which the figures of art in art therapy emerge. Time is infolded in process.

Art therapy provides a framework for the experience of time as duration, as “that which passes;” for the experience of time as linear becoming through the yoking of personal transformation with sequential, cumulative, creative acts; for the experience of time as cyclic in the repetitive ritual of sessions; for experiences of timelessness, or extra-ordinary time, through the engagement in primary process; for the experience of time as limitation in the predetermined length of sessions and the final termination of the therapeutic experience; and for the experience of a way of transcending temporal limits through the creation of durable art products which are more than things, because they are embedded in intrapsychic and interpersonal relationships that have struggled toward, and often achieved, enduring meaning. The images commemorate the disclosures of the suffering being within time who has been held within relationship and, when therapy attains a measure of its goals, has been transformed, in small and sometimes large ways, through a deeper understanding of the self within time.

These understandings of the temporal agency of art therapy have been supported by a broad range of psychodynamic literature. Fraser’s (1981, 1987, 1988, 1990) formulation of temporal *umwelts*, which he also refers to as temporal moods, provided a useful model through which to proceed. Bringing together Fraser’s identification of the artist as that person most skilled in traversing these temporal states and communicating their qualities in images, with his description of the goal of therapy as effecting a salutary organisation of the conscious and unconscious *umwelts* of the individual, prepares the way for art *in* therapy to be considered as an optimal tool for reaching this therapeutic goal. The writings of Rose (1964) and Niederland (1976) contributed further theoretical explanations for the reparative and progressive efficacy of art from a psychoanalytic perspective. Spatial and temporal condensations were shown to be effected through the process of unconscious scanning engaged in during the making of images (Ehrenzweig, 1967). This processes traverses “the chief nodal points of his [the painter’s] psychosexual history with their inherent image body clusters” (Rose, p. 80), inclusive of their indwelling residual affect, working to effect temporal interpenetrations of the ego core and its boundaries that become the material of the therapeutic hour. Freud’s speculations that all loss is experienced as a loss of

bodily integrity was supplemented by Niederland's (1976) discussions of how art's embodied images can serve to repair this loss. Noy's (1969) reformulation of primary process supported art-making as enabling the *development* of primary processes, which transcend time in their normal course of integrating past and present experience. And of course, at its simplest level, art in therapy enables the telling of the personal past, central in psychoanalytical methodology, in a nonverbal modality in which truths may be disclosed inadvertently, or through the sleight of metaphor, that the conscious ego could not, or would not dare to, *speak*.

Likewise, Jung's utilisation of image-making in analytical psychotherapy was shown to have an implicit temporal rationale in that it serves to make available to consciousness, in a most undiluted way, images from the "other time" of the personal unconscious and the collective unconscious. Comparative, constructive analysis of such images can transcend the historical situation of the individual, promoting healing by offering a broader perspective in which the individual can place his or her own suffering--in the storied-deeps of the transtemporal nest of all of humankind. With regard to the future, viewpoints on the prospective, or purposeful nature of symbols were also examined. Residual possibilities held within the symbol, which are mnemonic deposits of human and animal existence according to Jung (1972), are available to the individual ego as "lines for development" that, through image work and active imagination, can be brought into time, and to personal significance. Whitmont's (1971) identification of the need to facilitate a certain *amor fati* in clients was introduced to demonstrate how the arts are conducive to his *creative* interpretation of "fatedness." The arts in therapy can accompany a client into life, where they become applied in the creative choreography of the unfolding of personal destiny: in Whitmont's view, an animated, simultaneously receptive *and active* endeavour. Finally, image-making is particularly suited to the project of individuation, which necessitates the cultivation of intimate dialogue with the self, which in its deepest reaches resides in the other-time of the archetype, a more fulsome reality than words unprimed by poesis can convey. The need for developing a facility for dialogue through images, complementary to that which occurs with words, is based on the hypothesis that archetypal processes

originate in the right brain, the seat of synthetic, visuospatial, rather than analytic/verbal skills (Rossi, 1977). The image in itself is a *present*-ation, having no verb tense. Engaging in a dialogue with archetypes through both word and image and bringing the distilled meanings into daily life enacts the vital connectivity of temporal umwelts of which Fraser speaks.

Through the integration of aspects of Heidegger's treatise, *The Origin of the Work of Art*, with the concepts of existential psychotherapy for which Heidegger's philosophy was an informing source, the suitedness of art-making to revealing the unconcealedness of a being engaged in the existential task of becoming was demonstrated. Through image-making, the world-design of the being achieves graphic reality--even in moments of resistance to art processes--with both the art product and the process extending the dimensionality of the therapist's knowledge of how the being exists in time. The observation of the activity of art-making and the verbalisations and silences regarding it, enact, through "the body" of process and product, how the client temporalises a self not only within the world of language, but within the world of matter and of things.

In Chapter 5, literature supporting the notion that disorders of psychic experience involve disorders of subjective temporal experience was presented. There appears to be *general* agreement in observational data on the connection of certain temporal perspectives, rate and ability to sequence, to certain disorders, though Edlund's (1987) caveat that "all generalisations about time and mental illness must be made cautiously" (p. 73) bears repeating. Through concentration on the primary diagnosis of the presented client, additional complexity was given to the psychodynamic theories presented on the development of the subjective sense of time. In schizophrenia, differences in neurological functioning were shown to be receiving increasing experimental support as a primary contributing factor to the temporal processing of percepts characteristic of schizophrenic process. Through the analysis of the images and art process of Gaston, the history and qualities of his interior time were assayed, in part a speculative endeavour, but with these speculations supported by his art, his verbalisations and his mode of being within the therapeutic relationship.

His core image of the mesa was found to be particularly revealing of what might be existentially called, as world-design, his “topographical mode of transcendence,” with the *topos* being his unitary psyche and soma expressed in the metaphor of the mesa as *event*: that is, the object as temporal process. This form was found to be redolent with temporal meanings from the perspectives of psychoanalysis, analytical psychology, and existential psychotherapy. This “mental production” (Fewkes, 1911, p. 11) was shown to operate as a both sacred and secular space, an expression of a coping, human intelligence responding to the perceived aridity of surroundings. Multivalent, the mesa comprised the tableland of art therapy, the family table, real sites in the American southwest visited by Gaston, and was paradigmatic of his relational processes with others. In this way the image operated as a site of temporal juncture. With Gaston, direct interpretations of this overlay were often inappropriate; rather, the supported creative process was used as that activity of making-*in*-relationship which creates that therapeutic relationship within which, over time, psychic contents may be “unwittingly” assimilated (Lehnsen, 1972, p. 26.).

Developing an art therapy treatment plan for Gaston was shown to reflect a compromise of needs, which can be seen as attending to the various temporal umwelts of human existence. Congruency with the goals of his other care-givers was effected through art interventions designed to elicit aspects of Gaston’s everyday experience with which he was having difficulty. But unique to his *art* therapy was the offering of means to make visible the invisibles of his precious past, his fears, his safe havens of timelessness, his altered and alternate reality, and in this way to bridge the gap between self and other.

In that I wish this conclusion to add to, rather than simply repeat summaries offered in the separate chapters, I would like to append a particularly important caveat to the temporal investigation I have presented with regard to mental disorders. Observations of characteristic temporal processing and perspectives among persons with mental disorders can be a useful tool in our attempts to assess and understand the worlds of our clients and in our efforts to develop treatment plans in therapy. Yet it is important to conscientiously monitor our use of yet another category of “difference.”

Our involvements in the suffering of the Other often result, if only unconsciously, in self protective efforts to distance ourselves from that suffering. One such way is to list categories of experience and behaviour and term them patently “Theirs.”

This consideration has received much discussion in the field of anthropology as ethnographers reflect on how the sacred and mundane constructions of time in the cultures of the Other have been experienced and reported in anthropological literature (Fabian, 1983; Gell, 1992; Munn, 1992). Finding post-modern anthropological critiques that raise appropriate questions for researchers in the psychological disciplines to ask themselves should come as no surprise, since it has been noted (Wallace, 1983) that a primary influence on Freud in the formulation of psychoanalytic theory was the anthropological discourse of *his* time. Fabian (1983) observes that anthropology has traditionally “manipulat[ed] concepts of Time in setting up relations between Us and Them” (p. 82). Perhaps its most well-known hegemonic “device of temporalizing discourse” is in the semantics of terming cultures “primitive,” which results in a “denial of coevalness” (p. 31). “By that,” states Fabian, “I mean *a persistent and systematic tendency to place the referent(s) of anthropology in a Time other than the present of the producer of anthropological discourse*” (p. 31, italics his). In this way, the risks and responsibilities of the intersubjectivity that characterises coevalness, which “has to be created” (p. 31), are evaded. Such temporal contrivances have “long served an ideology whose ultimate purpose has been to justify the procurement of commodities for our markets” (p. 95). Fabian gives “primitive art” as one example of this practice.

The need to generate a critique of our own often indiscriminate importation and use of words such as “primitive” and “regressive” in psychotherapeutic practice becomes immediately evident. Equally evident is the need to monitor our use of our observations regarding persons whose mode of being in time we experience as significantly “other” than--or “foreign” to--our own. We should remember that relations between two differing subjective experiences, or between subjective and what we call objective experience, are just that: relations. What this relation, this relative difference *means*, must receive our most careful consideration. Do we exploit temporal difference to create temporal distance? When are our efforts to make what we might

term the “temporally different” individual conform to the norms of the dominant culture’s time advisable; when do we do so to avoid the repercussions conscientious social and professional critiques would entail? It is here that the acknowledgement of intersubjectivity is important in temporal discourse. The creation of coevalness in art therapy sessions with Gaston necessitated that I come to know (as much as one can “know” these processes underlying consciousness) within myself the eotemporal, prototemporal and atemporal organisations of time: what they offer that is of value, and what they offer that, unframed, can undo the ego. Only the intersubjective reality, which includes my acknowledgement of his differently organised temporal experience as reflective of an umwelt resident within my own temporal “nest,” enables me, as therapist, to facilitate connectivities in a meaningful way.

A needed and fascinating extension of this work generated from these anthropological perspectives would be, from a multi-cultural perspective, the impact and meanings of integrating culturally different experiences of time in the immigration experience. This would give greater emphasis to the relationships of intrapsychic temporal reality and social time, or Fraser’s sociotemporal umwelt, which was his last to formulate. It would also be interesting, in light of psychoanalytic theories, to conduct research exploring whether different cultural modes of infant care result, in and/or reflect, different adult social organisations of temporal experience, and what the nature of the interface of subjective and objective time is within these cultures.

A study designed to map the continuum of subjective time and intersubjective time in therapy would be of great value. Not only the client’s experience, but the therapist’s fluctuating temporal experience as a phenomenon produced from the coition of the subjective temporal qualities purveyed by the client and the therapist’s own history could be evaluated. A further and more complex application of this would be to groups. Research might be conducted into the phenomenon of “group resonance” (Roberts, 1985) as, perhaps, occurring through the phenomenon of the intersubjective harmonisation of cathected temporal umwelts.

In both individual and group therapy, form and content analyses of verbalisations could be coupled with the development of a parallel form and content

analysis of images, to better understand the temporal meanings of the interface of word (inclusive of images, but within the temporal perspective generated by verb tenses) and embodied art image.

Another area of future research generated by this thesis could be the development of an assessment protocol designed to evoke material indicative of those aspects of temporal being preferentially cathected by the client. This said, however, it is equally true that much can be gleaned from images generated by assessment tools that are already established.² Of primary importance is simply bringing questions of expanded temporal dimensionality to art assessments. Does the client's spontaneous drawing and his or her discussion of it preference one temporal perspective above another? What is the temporal "graining" of the interview? What feels to be, in the therapist's countertransference, the temporal *umwelt* cathected? If this is not just an assessment interview, but a sequence of sessions, is one temporal organisation typical of all sessions, or does the client traverse *umwelts* and perspectives? What sort of "connectivities" or lack thereof does the client show between past, present and future? Between subjective time and objective time? What is the client's experience of duration? Does a client's experience of regression appear to be ones of regression *in* time, or regression *of* time? And most importantly, what are the meanings of the answers to these questions from from a psychoanalytic perspective, from the

² While we speak of the four-image Ulman Assessment (Ulman, 1975) as a continuum of tasks beginning with conscious spontaneous production, progressing into scribble drawing intended to elicit more unconscious content, and ending with a return to a spontaneous drawing, this same continuum could also receive a temporal reading. Usually the first picture expresses the *nootemporal* *umwelt* in some fashion. Here, temporal perspective might be discerned. The kinesthetic record then begins a "descent" into the *biotemporal* *umwelt*, of somatic expression "without appreciable mental content" (Fraser, 1981, p. 5), while its rhythmic nature takes it even deeper toward the *eotemporal* *umwelt* of "rhythmic tensions and relaxations" (p. 5). Its inception through mimicry of the therapist's gestures can indicate both the willingness to enter the temporal rhythm of the other, but particularly as this is based on the templates of dyadic rhythmic relationships, those of the infant with its parents. The aleatory nature of the scribble drawing reflects the temporal conditions of the *prototemporal* and *atemporal* *umwelts*, with "no intrinsic reference to which the direction of human time may be tied" (p. 21). However, we ask the client to find an image within it. Again in Fraser's words, "Atemporal and prototemporal conditions may appeal to fantasies lodged in the lowest temporal *umwelts*, at the bottom of primary process functions" (p. 21). The final, again spontaneous, image would then reflect the ease, or lack of ease, with which the client traverses these temporal organisations of experience, and which organisation, or *umwelt*, is preferentially cathected. This can inform the development of the treatment plan with regard to both type and continua of interventions to be considered.

perspectives of analytical psychology, or from the perspective of existential psychology? The implications for assessment generated by this thesis will be to heighten the art therapist's ability in integrate temporal information, both visual or verbal, in appropriate ways into diagnostic assessments, and to inductively reason what purposes this information serves in the psychodynamic and social aspects of the world-design of the client.

Particular interventions could be developed to facilitate the client's movement between umwelt experiences, and to establish connectivities. Again, I think this is not an effort that should be highly "proceduralised;" in fact, we effect these connectivities all the time, but do not always analyse the ways in which their agenda is temporal. For instance, our attentiveness to ego integrity leads us to guide certain clients to materials and methods of working that variously promote the softening or strengthening of ego boundaries. This is, however, *also* a temporal intervention, in that we seek to open the client to the timelessness, or differently organised time, of the unconscious, or reinforce the here-and-now and objective temporal measures. Bringing temporal meanings of our interventions to *our* consciousness will increase our preparedness for moments of *kairos*, when an appropriately timed intervention will be able to be integrated by the client with maximum benefit, and will enable us to deepen ability to be with the client in "great-patterned time" (Kastenbaum, 1977, p. 213).

Kastenbaum, who has written extensively on psychotherapy with seniors, employs this phrase as he reaches to frame a praxis that honours the long life of time that is part of even the youngest child in therapy.

I see energetic, spontaneous children living intently in the moment-by-moment jostle of life. At the other end of the age spectrum, I see old men and women living in thought patterns woven from the past moments experienced. Must I choose between one orientation or the other or put both aside in favor of some hypothetical midpoint? Or is it, perhaps, that the development of a completed person and the maintenance of a resourceful society require a progression from multiple encounters with the "raw moment" to the conservation and appreciation of great-patterned time? . . . I would like to know much more about the process by which the individual moves from immersion in the moment to become a master of time rituals in which the meanings of families, generations, and nations are preserved and transformed. (p. 213)

Kastenbaum ends with a list of felt needs emerging out of his meditations on the

temporal perspectives of older adults and children that encompasses the need for live immersion in the moment to symbolic preservation of these moments, resulting in the construction of “a framework that is more secure and dependable than the stuff of life itself” so that *being*, each moment, occurs “without interfering, without artifice, without self-deceit” (p. 214). Kastenbaum’s use of the term, “time rituals,” points to the possibility of developing client-specific rituals to aid in the meaningful realignment of a client’s nest of temporal realities, beyond what the ritual therapeutic process, in itself, is. Particularly within brief therapy, ritual can offer a way of framing a structured passage into “great-patterned time,” and back again (Wyrostok, 1995). Occasionally, this will be self-arising from the client; when it is not, clients can be facilitated in developing symbolic objects with art media as carriers of the sacred, or the psychoid, during the ritual process. With regard to therapy *as* ritual, we can view the *practice* of theoretical models as procedural methods with implicit time rituals that orient us in the matrix of temporalities in particular ways: in terms of our histories, in a return to our biopsychical origins; with regard to time measured by the timeless rhythms of archetypal forces of which our lives are singular and complex incarnations; and as self-creation within now’s foregathering plenitude.

The ability to experience the client within this deep, temporal perspective comes through viewing psychodynamic perspectives as “nested temporal methodologies,” each of which contributes a dimensional possibility to the shape the individual casts through time. Historical cause and effect, which can serve to impart morality; occurrences changing an individual’s life in time through the acausal connective power of meanings, which impart a spiritual, or soulful, depth; and the poised, kairotic posture of readiness to grasp each moment as one of creative becoming can be employed as mutually enhancing understandings that befriend rather than falsely “straighten out” the ambiguities inherent in the human experience of time.

Nearing the end of writing this thesis, I woke one morning from a dream upon which a voice effected closure, proclaiming, “Time can neither be created nor destroyed. It can only be mediated.” Surely, our temporal goal in art therapy is just this: to enable each client to become his or her own mediator, a Janus-figure giving

countenance both to time's outward social myths and measures and to its profound "depth of inwardness" (Bohm, cited in Weber, 1986, p. 31). The therapeutic relationship and the accretion of enduring artworks bear witness to the journey of the self in time, demonstrating that each self has a creative hand in authoring the artistries of interior time, which temper with meanings the evolution of its world, and of its world's interface with the Other.

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APPENDIX

**AUTORISATION POUR PHOTOGRAPHIE,
CINÉMATOGRAPHIE,
ENREGISTREMENTS SONORES ET AUTRES**

**AUTHORIZATION FOR PHOTOGRAPHY,
MOVING PICTURES,
TAPE-RECORDINGS, ETC.**

Date _____	No Dossier Record No. _____
Nom Name _____	Âge Age _____
Adresse Address _____	
Médecin traitant Attending Physician _____	
Responsable Responsible _____	
Adresse Address _____	
Chambre No Room No. _____	

JE, SOUSSIGNÉ
I, THE UNDERSIGNED _____

AUTORISE L'HÔPITAL
AUTHORIZE _____

HOSPITAL

À PRENDRE:
TO TAKE ANY

	OUI YES	NON NO
PHOTOGRAPHIES · PHOTOGRAPHS	—	—
CINÉMATOGRAPHIE · MOVIES <i>video</i>	—	—
ENREGISTREMENTS SONORES · TAPE-RECORDINGS	—	—
<i>use case material</i>	—	—

QUE LES MÉDECINS JUGERONT OPPORTUN ET À LES UTILISER ET PUBLIER POUR DES FINS MÉDICALES, SCIENTIFIQUES ET ÉDUCATIVES, À LA CONDITION QUE DES PRÉCAUTIONS RAISONNABLES SOIENT PRISES POUR QUE SOIT CONSERVÉ L'ANONYMAT.

THAT PHYSICIANS DEEM APPROPRIATE, AND TO UTILIZE AND PUBLISH THEM FOR MEDICAL, SCIENTIFIC AND EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES, PROVIDED THAT REASONABLE PRECAUTIONS BE TAKEN TO CONSERVE ANONYMITY.

J'ÉMETS CEPENDANT LES RESTRICTIONS SUIVANTES:
HOWEVER, I MAKE THE FOLLOWING RESTRICTIONS:

SIGNATURE DU MALADE OU GARANT
SIGNATURE OF PATIENT OR GUARANTOR _____

DATE _____

TÉMOIN À LA SIGNATURE WITNESS TO SIGNATURE _____

DATE _____

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