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The Velvet Glove and Iron Fist Revisited:  
An Analysis of Contemporary Civilian Police Practices

Tim Hecker

A Thesis 
in 
The Department 
of 
Political Science

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
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March 2002

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ABSTRACT

The Velvet Glove and Iron Fist Revisited: An Analysis of Contemporary Civilian Police Practices

Tim Hecker

This paper will explore two separate but intertwined recent developments within U.S. civilian policing organizations: the popularity of "community"-based policing initiatives, and the increasingly paramilitary aspect of many police departments. This study will trace the development of these phenomena, their areas of intersection, and related issues, such as fear, ideology, telematic crime, and nostalgia. Because of the complex nature of the subjects, this study serves more as an exploratory tract than a prescriptive policy paper.
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Fear is the foundation of most governments; but it is so sordid and brutal a passion and renders men in whose breasts it predominates so stupid and miserable that Americans will not be likely to approve of any political institution which is founded on it.

—John Adams, "Thoughts on Government" (1776)

The definition of the role of the police entails a difficult moral problem. How can we arrive at a favourable or even accepting judgment about an activity which is, in its very conception, opposed to the ethos of the polity that authorizes it? Is it not well nigh inevitable that this mandate be concealed in circumlocution?

—Egon Bittner, "The Functions of Police in Modern Society" (1970)
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- .12 Gauge Tear Gas Launcher
- Remington 308 Rifle with Long-range Scope
I - INTRODUCTION

For the last thirty years, crime has been a constant on the radar of U.S. public opinion. Political careers have been aided by it, and lives have been destroyed from it. The prevalence of crime, as a political issue, has led to an enormous influx of spending on the criminal justice industrial complex. Conventional civilian police forces, perhaps have been the group which has benefited the most from this political and social concern. These new spending initiatives have led to numerous substantial institutional developments, from the birth of the SWAT team, to the mythological resurgence of the police officer as “night watchman”.

Of the institutional programs which were undertaken during this high-water period, perhaps the two most noteworthy were community-based policing initiatives, and movements towards greater technical and military capabilities. Community policing was intended as an effort to democratize and soften a view of police as an elite and hegemonic organization. This approach was intended to create a ‘dialogue’ between the police, and the communities they worked within.
The other strain with emerged during this period was one which viewed policing on much more proactive, antagonistic terms. This view saw crime fighting as warfare, a view which recommended greater technological and punitive powers. These advocates of paramilitary styles of civilian policing encouraged the development of local SWAT teams, the use of better technology in terms of armaments as well as infrastructure, and also the training of civilian police by elite military units, such as the U.S. Navy Seals.

Community policing is now almost a universal feature of civilian policing units, both in North America, as well as across portions of Europe - for the U.S., it has become the de facto institutional mandate. As well, aspects of paramilitary forms of policing can often be seen working within the same police units. Strangely, an increasing phenomena is for SWAT teams to be called out for non-emergency duties in the same neighborhoods which community-police detachments protect. It appears that both these phenomenon now enjoy a prevalent role within contemporary civilian policing organizations.

This study is the story of these two competing institutional narratives, one which has assumed the position as the organization’s soul, while the other, the
body. This paper will argue that civilian police are in the midst of a shift in both the techniques and the rationalization of their function within the liberal democratic state. This has manifested itself in two separate but intertwined lines of development: firstly, an effort towards greater institutional legitimacy through populist gestures of "community" integration (community-based policing initiatives); secondly, an increasingly militarized aspect of civilian policing (paramilitary policing units). Contemporary policing operates under the successful deployment of these two divergent and contradictory mechanisms of state control - community-based and paramilitary forms of policing. These two mechanisms operate on two separate terrains, yet act in concert as a symbolic display of organizational legitimacy. It will also be argued that these developments are both related to and buttressed by a fear-laden populace where mediatized depictions of crime are insidious and pervasive. The prevalence of public fear has been harnessed by politicians and bureaucrats to further entrench and strengthen the organizational mandate of civilian police.

This study uses an approach which is part historical, part empirical, and part theoretical. The U.S. is the primary focus, as disciplinary organizational developments
which have originated from here, historically have also tended to germinate elsewhere. This may not satisfy the scientific appetites of those who look for a rigorous normative approach, nor may it satisfy those who are in need of the theoretical discipline of political philosophy. Because of the broad and extremely complex nature of the subjects, this may serve more in the end as an exploratory analysis than a prescriptive manifesto. For the issues at hand, a middle path was needed, one which used empirical research to define broad processes - the results of this research have inherent theoretical implications. This is an attempt to trace the multitude of overlapping and complex relations between two separate phenomena. One is the public face of an organization, the other the blunt reality of state power. Yet what occurs is a slight of hand trick, one covers the other, in the end the two aren't so different in actuality.

A brief word may be helpful from the outset, to define what is meant by the term ideology. The common thread between the various examinations herein is that they are somewhat weighed in terms of their ideological impacts and symbolic displays. For this I turn to Terry Eagleton, who perhaps aside from the work of Antonio Gramsci, has given one of the most lucid surveys on the topic of recent times.
One of his definitions will be used as a framework for this exploration, that ideology is the ways which signs, meanings, and values help to reproduce the dominant social order.¹

II - FEAR & CRIME

A large percentage of contemporary political discourses are situated on the terrain of crime and security. Recent statistical evidence has shown that the American criminal justice industry has expanded to historically unprecedented levels during the last thirty years. For the United States, it has seen its incarceration rate double during this period. Next to the aging Gulag system of the former Soviet Union, the U.S. has one of the largest per-capita portions of its society incarcerated, incomparable to other western states. Many of the recent American presidents have been elected on platforms of tough-skinned “law and order” policies, and conversely, presidents have lost elections on charges of being too “soft on crime”². However, there seems to be something suspicious about conservative no-nonsense approaches to crime. Contrary to popular sentiments, North American crime rates have dropped significantly in the last eleven years; yet, public perception of crime is that it has never been worse, or a more pressing problem for politicians to address. And address it they have been
doing; the last thirty years have given witness to an endless stream of criminal legislation. It seems, most unfortunately, that the solution has often been worse than the problem. This section will examine some recent crime-based discourses. It will be suggested that the discourse of “crime” is a socially constructed problematic which contains strong ideological relations. That is to suggest that crime as such is a problematic and arbitrary construct, which has lent utility to the legitimacy of conservative politicians, police infrastructure, and media organizations. The section will look at crime as a discursively constructed reality; then go on to examine issues of public fear in relationship to crime discourse; and lastly, briefly look at “reality” crime television and how it nurtures public fear and penal legitimacy.

THE RISE OF CRIME AS A DOMINATING SOCIAL ISSUE

To begin to conduct a thorough genealogy of crime-based discourses and its ideological positions would take us back to antiquity; hence the following will present an examination of crime discourses in their recent manifestations. However, it can be briefly mentioned that the origins of English criminality have often been argued to have its roots in the development of private property
and the outlawing of the "vagabond" in the 13th and 14th centuries. In colonial America, the roots of crime are closely rooted in Puritan conceptions of shielded morality.  

During the great depression, a significant development occurred in the relationship between popular conceptions of crime and public policy. It was during this period, both in North America, as well as Europe, that crime surfaced as an issue of substantial public concern. The emerging German Nazi party, capitalizing on the discontents of the epoch, including widespread poverty and increasing disorder, was the first to base a political party predominantly on a platform of law and order. Also, concurrently in the United States was the beginning of widespread public fears of crime both from organized "gangsters" and more general depression-related social mayhem crime. For use of this discussion it is simply important to mention that a general popular conception of crime had its roots in the great depression era and became latent until the mid 1960's when it was resurrected as a widespread social issue and a politically manageable problem.

It was U.S. Senator Barry Goldwater who first made a push for crime as a presidential campaign issue in 1964. Promising that "enforcing law and order" would be central to his presidency, he went on to promise that "security
from domestic violence, no less than from foreign
aggression, is the most elementary form and fundamental
purpose of any government." It was directly before the era
of "free love" that Richard Nixon followed Senator
Goldwater to promote a similar no-nonsense approach to
discipline and order. Nixon argued that "the deterioration
of [a respect for law and order] can be traced directly to
the spread of the corrosive doctrine that every citizen
possesses an inherent right to decide for himself which
laws to obey and when to disobey them." Senator Goldwater
however was one notch stronger on the apocalyptic front
(even before the alleged crisis of the civil disobedience
waves to follow):

"Law and order have broken down, mob violence has
engulfed great American cities, and our wives feel
unsafe in the streets."`

Senator Goldwater lost the election to Lyndon Johnson
in 1964, but many of the issues put forward by
Goldwater were taken up during Johnson’s tenure, in
particular the ominous Omnibus Crime Bill, and the
Safe Streets Act, both in 1968.

The year 1968 also brought president Nixon into the
White House, and a steep escalation of anti-crime, anti-
drug rhetoric as well. The campaign emphasis on urban
disorder and moral decay had proved effective: one poll taken in 1968 noted that 81% of the respondents believed that law and order had broken down, and blamed it on either "communists" or "negros who start riots". Nixon had an impasse with regards to funding policing, which was that at that stage, predominantly an issue of local concern. This had little to do with federal politics or funding. During this period a trojan horse blossomed which would allow inroads to disciplinarian policies and an approach to addressing the crime rate: narcotics. Drugs were to become the "public enemy no. 1" of the state. Nixon argued that the use of drugs leads only to "shoplifting, muggery, armed robbery, burglary and so on". Narcotics policing was to give the necessary space to increase local policing and standardize/rationalize the country's contradictory, overlapping and haphazard patchwork of criminal law. Shortly after taking public office, Nixon told Congress that "Within the last decade, the abuse of drugs has grown from essentially a local police problem into a serious national threat to the personal health and safety of millions of Americans. A national awareness of the gravity of the situation is needed: a new urgency and concerted national policy are needed at the federal
level to begin to cope with this growing menace to the general welfare of the United States."  

The following years witnessed a landslide of legislation and bureaucratic reshaping to adjust to the new crime-centered focus of state policy. Departments such as the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) were formed among other programs such as (RICO) the Racketeering Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act, or (ODALE) Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement, the street patrol version of BNDD. All of the organizational shifts were implemented within a paradigm of technocratic rationality and technological necessity. What was started by Nixon was the roots of an increasingly paramilitarized modern civilian policing and criminal justice system.

With this "tough-love" approach to civilian protection being exercised in the American "heartland" came a crisis of legitimacy within the crime control industry. The events following eventually led to the genesis of community relations aspects of police operations. It was acknowledged that regular policing would not be enough to foster some sense of trust or popular comfort with police agencies. Community relations projects were designed or intended to
be, as suggested by several FBI reports, an attempt for police to rebuild their image, reach out to the community, and to “cool the fire of violence”. It appeared that community-police relations were a necessary, “soft” side to law enforcement, implemented in order to turn citizens towards the police-mandated “war” on crime. The various approaches to dealing with community policing ranged from setting up community dances in ghetto areas of the Bay Area of San Francisco, to organizing neighborhood “Community Watch” organizations in the affluent suburbs of Los Angeles. The issue of community policing affairs will be revisited shortly, but an interesting issue comes out of community relations - was it necessary for police agencies to organize CPR in order for citizens to feel more safe from the spectre of crime, or perhaps were the organizations partially responsible for inculcating the fear of crime which in turn lent legitimacy to the organization in general? From the viewpoint of this analysis, the argument weighs heavier towards the latter, yet contains elements of both.

Stepping back from this quasi-historical analysis of police policy and its development, it would be helpful to look at more general issues regarding the relationship between fear and crime. What exactly has happened over the
last forty years which has given witness to a transformation of a public space in which the majority of people apparently lived pastoral and fearless existences, household doors unlocked, to the contemporary situation in which at least 81% of people living in urban areas feel “unsafe” walking in the evening?10 Or the commonly held belief (89%) that crime is on the rise, against wide-sweeping reports that crime has been on the steady decrease for the last ten years at least. There is much disagreement with why people are so preoccupied with crime en masse. Some have argued that the commonly held paranoias of rape, muggings, and murder are justified given the relative high homicide rates in the U.S. compared with other advanced industrialized nations.11 Other people believe that crime is rising, it is becoming more “random”, often committed by increasingly younger children; while others believe that the apparent increase in crime is in fact a product of an amoral pro-violence media industry.12

It would be worthwhile to examine the conservative viewpoint on the nature of crime and their general sense of what constitutes suitable remedies. The conservative viewpoint is important because it has been the viewpoint which has turned and molded policy during perhaps the most important years of criminal justice reform: 1968-1992.
During those years it is worth noting that a Republican president was in power for 20 of those 24 years. What has been suggested is that the platforms of Republicans during this period have been ones which have been based on a politics of crime. Take for example, the 1988 elections in which Republican George Bush defeated Democrat Michael Dukakis. One cited reference attributed to the defeat of Dukakis was the issue of Willie Horton. Willie Horton was a convicted murderer who escaped from a prison furlow program while Dukakis was Governor of Massachusetts. While at-large, Horton raped a woman and killed her husband. The story of Horton was the focus of a negative-style television advertisement by George Bush’s presidential campaign which showed Horton’s image with a devastatingly blunt voiceover: “Governor Dukakis is soft on crime”.

This begets the question: what do conservatives gain from a no-nonsense, tough-love approach to criminal justice? This can be touched upon in four main points: firstly, similarly to the Cold War, crime gives conservatives something to rally middle Americans against in a common struggle. Secondly, crime benefits conservatives because its presence in the public agenda crowds out other issues less appealing to them such as health care, poverty, and education, issues that imply a
need for income redistribution or government initiatives. Thirdly, because many Americans conflate criminality with blackness, any Democratic response drives a wedge in any inter-racial coalitions that may exist. Lastly, if conventional wisdom is correct, conservatives are closer than liberals to the views of most Americans on crime and punishment.14 Interesting here is the tension which dates back to Presidential elections during the 1920s where ideological lines were situated in an urban vs. rural framework, where conservatives viewed urban centers as places of moral decay. This sentiment still exists, however, these criticisms are not as much sent from rural areas towards urban centers, rather perhaps from suburban gated communities against inner-cities.

Discourses on crime resonate mostly on two separate planes of analysis, policy-oriented academic and popular "conventional wisdom(s)". The policy-oriented discourse involves two contrasting ways of thinking about street crime. Structural explanations emphasize social disorganization with its roots in hierarchy, coercion, deprivation, and alienation. The alternative view relates street crime with individual pathologies - be it moral, genetic, or emotional. Generally, structural analyses see street crime determined by the material conditions of
society, as opposed to those who see it in terms of individual pathology, often consider it volitional - a matter of personal choice. These dichotomous understandings of complex phenomena do little but to clog the political arena with simplified gestures of political expediency. Any serious thoughts as to the origins of crime must adopt a far more nuanced understanding, as some criminological theorists, such as Stuart Scheingold, have argued.\textsuperscript{15}

Despite political misrepresentations, it remains unclear what a popular "conventional wisdom" on crime entails. A study of popular conceptions of crime by Theodor Sasson placed analysis on two major fronts: the faulty system belief vs. the social breakdown model.\textsuperscript{16} These two contending viewpoints are situated on two different plateaus of analysis, the first being a structuralist analysis of a system which needs repair, and the second being a moral claim - the traditional family structure is breaking down. As Sasson points out these competing truth claims in regards to crime and its management miss the point as to why crime is even an issue in the first place. How is it that, despite factual data which proves that crime should not be a pressing issue in the contemporary political agenda, is hysteria of crime at an all time high? It borders on the surreal that presidential platforms could
be situated on claims against pedophiles, and teenage goth-loners with assault rifles.

PUBLIC FEAR - PERPETUAL DECLINE

Fear, as both a social contagion and political lever, has received an insufficient amount of attention despite the apparently direct relationship between it and the popular legitimization of criminal justice policy. It is perhaps akin to the chicken-or-egg argument: did the material impacts of actual widespread crime generate the public fear, or did the nurturing and progression of public fear beget the belief of the pervasiveness of crime? This study takes sides with the later position. It is clear that fear of crime has led to an increasingly intolerant attitude towards criminal offenders and an increasing desire for heavier punishment. This has been well noted by studies such as that of Kevin Wright, in his Great American Crime Myth, where it was pointed out that the decades of the 1970s and 80s saw a steadily increasing punitive attitude within the American popular consensus. The state has responded swiftly, often under Republican governance, with stricter legislation and punishment, reducing judicial and correctional “discretions”, the restricting of parole, and the increasing prevalence of capitol punishment. But what Wright argues is that the fear of crime is based upon
a few standard and quantitatively false “crime myths”. The first myth is that “we are engulfed in a historically unprecedented wave of violent and predatory crime”. This entails that not only is there more crime but the criminals are more dangerous - more violent, and less rational. Secondly, it is the responsibility of government to respond to the problem. Importantly related is the assumption that crime is a solvable problem that “action can be taken to reduce crime and return the nation to safety and harmony known in the past”. Seldom are these basic assumptions challenged in any form.

In this context, it can be asserted that the pervasiveness of crime-oriented fears are somewhat overblown. According to a Newsweek cover story in 1981, with a photo looking straight into the barrel of a gun, it was declared that 1981 was the “year that mainstream America rediscovered violent crime”, “that people feel it [crime] as an epidemic come to crisis point”, and that ultimately “life now seems pitifully cheap”. The media often turn towards law enforcement officials (or vice-versa) in order to give commentary on the situation. The perverse nature of this media-police public relations feedback cycle is expounded by the thoughts of former Houston, Texas Police Chief B.K. Johnson:
“The fear of crime is slowly paralyzing American society. We have allowed ourselves to degenerate to the point where we’re living like animals. We live behind burglar bars and throw a collection of door locks at night and set an alarm and lay down with a loaded shotgun beside the bed and then try to get some rest. It’s ridiculous.”

From the vantage point of police public-relations discourses, there is no doubt that modern society is under siege.

Since public opinion on crime is predominantly based upon reporting done in the various news medias, one would hope that they paint an accurate picture of the issues which they report. However, it appears that in the case of crime, news medias are somewhat at fault for creating unjustified crime hysterias. Firstly, news media are prone to overanalyzing selected criminal events and extrapolating tenuous “trends”. A good example of this is the myth of the “crime wave” which has apparently been washing up on shore more and more frequently. Every few years, only after someone has either “gone postal” in their place of work, or a teenager has shown up at his local high school with an assault rifle, taking aim on “jocks”, do the media begin to dissect, commentate, and look for patterns. Often patterns
are found, and somehow the latest events fit into the jigsaw puzzle of a greater social malaise. For the most part, the trends that are uncovered by probing news medias are statistically questionable. As it has been noted by media researchers, news media have declared crime wars every twenty years or so, beginning with the crime “wave” of 1920.\textsuperscript{21} From the fact that crime booms have occurred at least every twenty years dismisses the “conventional wisdom” on crime that in fact crime is becoming quantitatively worse.

Secondly, news media are often prone to distort crime information. The media generally distort crime information by being selective as to which “news” events they choose to broadcast. Most often, media select particular incidents, such as the bizarre, violent and macabre acts. Most often it is graphic crimes like murder which receive unbalanced attention from the mediascape. While news media objectively report such incidents, entertainment programs pick up on these trends, themes, or graphic acts and circulate them as a fictitious narrative. Data presentation is often an issue with crime as well; for example, to say that in the U.S. in the year 1979 that 23,000 people were murdered is the same as saying that in 1979, 1 out of 10,000 people were murdered. Yet it is commonplace for news agencies to go
with the sensationalistic option, the first, rather than the more reasoned, less fear-mongering approach, the second.

Other times, media reports get the facts wrong through shallow analysis, or failure to include other data that may contradict the particular crime-oriented study. Take for example the story of Anthony Riggs, a soldier who'd just returned home to Detroit from the Gulf War, as the *Washington Post* reports:

"Conley Street, on this city’s northeast side, is a pleasant-looking row of brick and wood homes with small, neat lawns, a street that for years was the realization of the American dream for middle-income families. But in the past few years, Conley has become a street of crack, crime and occasional bursts of gunfire. And at 2:15 a.m. Monday, the bullets killed Army Spec. Anthony Riggs, something that all of Iraq’s Scud missiles could not do during his seven months with a Patriot missile battery in Saudi Arabia."

It was unfortunate that all the drama unfolding around the story, including images of Rigg's wife sobbing had all been seriously misguided. What the massive media attention eventually did show, due to an increased police investigation - not to the credit of news researchers themselves, was that Anthony Riggs was the victim of an
execution-style murder, a result not of the mean crack
addicted streets of inner-city Detroit, rather a contracted
murder by his wife for insurance money. Yet long before the
truth of the story emerged, a wave of crime legislation was
tabled, including one noteworthy crime bill by President
Bush Senior, upon which he announced: “Our veterans deserve
to come home to an America where it is safe to walk the
streets.” These crime myths with unfounded statistical
data can be found in many aspects of modern society—not
just homicides: other empirically unfounded myths include
the phenomena of workplace violence (i.e. “going postal”),
the myth of poison and razor blades in Halloween candy, and
pedophilia-phobia.24

The issue of pedophile-paranoia brings up the
interesting case of San Dimas, California. The city of San
Dimas was the first “child-molestation exclusion zone”,
shown by large signs posted around the city limits with the
warning: “Hands OFF Our Kids! We I.D. and Fingerprint Our
Kids for Safety.”25 As Mike Davis, a U.S. based urban
geographer, has noted just how incredible the “power that
bad dreams now wield over the public landscape”. The fear
of bad dreams perhaps could be partially attributed to the
surveillance techniques of the area. The city of San Dimas
is also situated within the San Gabriel Valley in the
outskirts of Los Angeles, precisely where the "Neighborhood Watch" programs originated. It was designed by the LAPD as an extension of the force in the "workingman's" quarters, serving blue-collar districts, somewhere in between the besieged inner city, and the more affluent gated communities furnished all the amenities of contemporary private security. The Neighborhood Watch programs have 5,500 neighborhood units around greater Los Angeles and since its inception has been adopted all over North America and Europe, from Seattle to London. Organized by neighborhood appointed block captains, the groups are designed to exercise vigilance in the protection of each other's property and well-being. People who are deemed to be suspicious are reported immediately and groups have weekly meetings also with LAPD members to organize neighborhood crime-prevention tactics. Of course this rugged law-and-order approach has its sinister side, for whom is to be deemed "suspicious"? One might be in fact suspicious of the slogan used by the program "Be On the Lookout for Strangers", for it suggests questionable informant-style methods and exclusionary practices. One negative result is that this practice stereotypes and stigmatizes social groups, be they youth or racially-based. As noted in some research, these programs often lead to
law-and-order based vigilantism. Concurrent with the advent of Neighborhood Watch types of community-based surveillance, have been other more radical forms of telematic surveillance and penalty.

**TELEMATIC FEAR, TELEMATIC CRIME**

The period beginning during the late 1980's witnessed the development of a new extension of the techniques of law enforcement: crime as spectacle. "Reality" based television was engendered by Hollywood television producers and nurtured by the cooperation of police departments and television studios throughout the U.S. Shows like *America's Most Wanted*, *Cops*, and *Hard Copy* were initially strange additions to the world of television because these shows were radical to their time, in the sense that they completely blurred the line between news and entertainment, sometimes even between fact and fiction. What distinguished these from other law and order based programs, was that they claimed to represent reality, to provide real stories of crimes, criminals and victims. Many such reality shows rely on stories situated upon common crime myths which aid to make the stories more exciting, and increase their ratings.

Two general formats are used by reality crime programs, and each format promotes reality claims in
different ways. Firstly there is the model utilized by the popular show *America’s Most Wanted*. This show utilizes vignettes in which actors recreate the crime scene events, and often interview friends, family, police, and victims, while flashing images of the suspects. Viewers are urged to telephone-in information to the police via the show to help apprehend the fugitive. Shows often feature follow-ups to show whether certain criminals have been apprehended or are still at large.

A second model of program is the one utilized by the popular show *Cops*, where television crews “ride along” with police in their police cars. They film footage of police in action—breaking down doors in drug busts, apprehending criminals, wrestling suspects to the ground. Much of this is touted as the “real thing”, the viewer hears what the police do etc. Each show is a careful edit of many hours of footage to capture the most interesting segments and produce effective narrative lines.

These reality-based shows are not only an American phenomenon. In fact this genre of television shows are widely popular and exist all over the world: in Mexico, Britain, Canada, the Netherlands, Germany, France, and Brazil to name a few. There are many others, and the basic formats outlined above have flowered into a thousand
variants of these themes. Yet its popularity and
development is an interesting but aside issue (perhaps a
new theatre of punishment). What is of concern here is the
value-systems these television shows affirm, and their
relationship to public perceptions of crime.

A major concern here is the ideological implications
of such a programme. Some analysts have argued that the
reality based genre privileges law and order. Here
authority is located within the hero/officer who triumphs
over evil, and hence determining the good in terms of a
preference for the social order. These shows promote an
us-vs. them approach to crime in which the audience clearly
identifies with the side of justice. It appears almost
difficult not to since the effect of post-production
editing selects crime or criminals in which the
perpetrators are generally aesthetically unpleasant,
uncivilized, poor, non-white, or some sort of uneducated
"white trash". Vignettes in AMW, for example, generally
begin by portraying the crime-scene to come as a pastoral,
peaceful state of equilibrium. Crime shatters this
tranquility, with the help of jump editing and discordant
soundtracks. What was once a pastoral utopia, is now a
state of inferno, with only civilian police who can act as
guardian. These vignettes serve to the effect of portraying
crime as out of control. Small towns or cities that were safe are no longer, crime is random, ever possible, in whatever form, and anyone can be its victim. And the alleged criminal in each case is generally presumed to be guilty; despite using the word “suspect” often the narratives and vignettes imply guilt, appealing to a common-sense verdict. Shows like AMW often include passing remarks about criminals who commit crime when out on bail or on parole, usually privileging sterner crime control measures like high bail and maximum penalties without parole. Often, indirectly, the death penalty appears to be endorsed.\textsuperscript{27} The law and order ideology which is deeply prevalent throughout the reality crime genre, presents a view of society which is seen to be in decline or a state of crisis because of increasing crime. This crime is often presented as violent street crime of the lower classes, usually tied into racial implications. This view suggests often that civil rights and due process are part of the problem, insinuating that all “right” thinking people know criminals are guilty. It is not the police who are too soft, it is liberal policies rather. The answer is stronger law enforcement with less liberal “legal wrangling” which hinders police from doing their job and being tougher.
Other concerns here involve the broader issue of these programs making the claim of “reality”, giving unnatural “closure” to stories which don’t in fact fit into a palatable story-line, and the general overall normalization of overt paramilitary tactics within the realm of non-crisis police situations. The critical point at hand is that these shows are not neutral in their ideological effects in relation to police issues. These representations of telematic crime lead to no choice but to endorse the legitimacy of the overt tactics and summary justice at hand. It has been well noted that police organizations are involved with these productions because they are recognized to be necessary to “pitch law enforcement” to the public.  

It is clear from the analysis that crime discourse is a discursively nurtured issue which is predicated upon public fear and has embedded relations of ideological domination. It would seem unreasonable that crime should be such an important issue at a time when it has been on a steady ten-year decline. In terms of any real world suggestions, it seems that what is needed is less criminal justice, as opposed to more. From every possible vantage point it appears what is happening is a crisis of sorts. Between the years 1969 to 1989, per capita U.S. state expenditures on
police and corrections increased tenfold. This funding financed the doubling of the police forces in the U.S. between the years 1980 and 1990, and an unprecedented expansion of the prison systems.29 Links between these phenomena and the telematic legitimizing effect of media representations of officers as ‘heroes’ and criminals as the scourge of the earth, cannot be dismissed easily.

The popular legitimacy which the civilian policing apparatus now enjoys, partially because of recent developments outlined above, has not always been so. Between the mid 1960s and mid 1980s it can be safely asserted that U.S. based civilian police were in a situation which can be defined as a crisis of legitimacy, as will be outlined in the coming pages. What has happened in the last ten to twenty years since, has been a radical attempt by police bureaucracies at the art of self-presentation, both by utilizing mass media and by ‘conceptually defining’ themselves as a democratically summoned community-based force.

During the early 1980s a radical study was tabled by the San Francisco based Institute for the Study of Labor and Economic Crisis which took an age old historical paradigm for civilian policing and brought it up to speed to look at what was happening with police organizations
during this period, entitled "The Iron Fist and the Velvet Glove". What was dismissed by many at the time as leftist agitprop was perhaps one of the most insightful and rigorous scholarly analysis done during this period. It is the intention of this study to serve as an contemporary appendix to this work, and the extrapolation of the core thesis contained in this text, the idea that the success of civilian policing rests on its ability to both present itself as a soft-power, a benevolent extension of populist security concerns, and at the same time being able to conceal the organization's ability to overrun this through overwhelming force. The rise of community-policing, it will be argued, can be considered as a contemporary manifestation of the former. It is the phenomenon of community-policing which has presented itself as the conceptual model for contemporary policing practices. As it will be shown, this process of self-representation is not without tacit symbolic/ideological dimensions.
From time to time throughout the history of large public institutions come challenges to the prevailing values and beliefs held as the aegis of those institutions. Such crises of legitimacy often bring into question the fundamental purpose of the organization itself. The police crisis which erupted in the 1960s comprised several different factors: new expectations about police performance, political protests against racial discrimination and the Vietnam war, and a sharp rise in the rate of violent crime. The U.S. presidential elections of 1964 and 1968 raised the issue of street crime to national attention for the first time. The race riots of 1963-7 and the Vietnam war protests suggested to mainstream U.S. citizens that police forces were ill prepared to accomplish their primary mandate - protecting and preserving the citizenry. The assassinations of President John Kennedy, his brother Robert Kennedy, and Martin Luther King, did little to help this public sentiment.  

This era also ushered in an deep public mistrust of the activities and actions of the police, fostered by such events as the killings of Black Panther leaders by the Chicago police and the Knapp Commission on pervasive police
corruption throughout the New York Police Department. A series of significant U.S. Supreme Court decisions buttressed that mistrust. From the view of the courts and various commissions, such as the 1967 Kerner and Crime Commission’s reports, the 1960s brought an end to the idea that the police performed their task in a non-discretionary, ministerial fashion and brought to light the absence of controls over discretionary police behaviour.\textsuperscript{31}

Most of the commissions of this period called for police reform. This was to be tackled through the modification of the organization structures and operational strategies which would address what was widely considered as profoundly problematic police-community relations. Institutional racism, as well as double-standards for black and whites were seen as endemic to both the Kerner and Crime Commission reports; this was publicly manifested through aggressive and violent behavior and an atmosphere of hostility and cynicism. These reports contended that this reservoir of grievances held by many citizens fostered an explosive atmosphere, where incidents involving police would often spark riots. The Kerner Commission reported that in 40% of riots started in this era, police actions triggered the riot.\textsuperscript{32} Often, institutional disorders occurred in communities with highly professionalized police
agencies. The Crime Commission of 1967 focused more heavily on the sharp increase in crime throughout the 1960s. Their criticisms spiked the current mandate of the agency-wide "professionalism" movement - police had failed to stem the rising tide of crime.

The common thread of both major reports was the mutual recognition of substantial problems with police-community relations. By all angles of analysis, the basis of police legitimacy as a professionalized force engaged in the practice of law enforcement, was undermined by its own inability to achieve its core aim. The reports all recommended a change from the professionalism model which had dominated the previous seventy years. What the 1970s ushered in was the development of organizational structures and strategies reintegrating police back into the life of the community. A legitimacy was to be found in terms of protecting neighborhoods and communities. Numerous strategies and experiments were conducted through the 1970s, due in part to U.S. Government funding for police experimentation through the auspices of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA). Many experimentations with community policing had interesting results. Some of which called for the renewal of the idea of police as craftsman, utilizing discretion and non-legalistic means to
settle conflicts, even in the company of law breaking. However, approaches to community policing began to solidify around dominant schools of thought.

**BROKEN WINDOWS (THE ASCENSION OF A DOMINANT CRIMINOLOGICAL PARADIGM)**

The revolution in community policing during the 1980s was aided by an intellectual trade wind of sorts, a 1982 *Atlantic Monthly* article published by criminologists James Q. Wilson and George Kelling. The thesis was fairly simple: if police address the small "quality of life" offenses which create "disorder", violent crime will diminish. Wilson and Kelling argued that "disorder and crime are usually inextricably linked, in a kind of developmental sequence." Neighborhoods which were left "untended" became frightening, anonymous, deserted, and "vulnerable to criminal invasion". Police were suggested to walk the beat, and leave the patrol cars behind, so as to better control the "panhandlers, drunks addicts, rowdy teenagers, prostitutes, loiterers, the mentally disturbed". As Wilson and Kelling suggested, enforcing laws against public urination, graffiti, and inebriation will create an aura of regulation that helps prevent brutal crimes like rape and murder.33
This school of thought, often cited as the zero-tolerance/quality of life argument, was reliant upon and integral to the community policing initiatives currently being developed when the article was written. A large amount of community police programs integrated Wilson and Kelling’s ideas into concrete practices. This radical and somewhat utilitarian philosophy appealed to various groups: police found interest in a new set of organizational initiatives, further legitimization through community support, and the rebirth of the popular conception of the police as “watchman”; while citizen’s groups found solace in its appeal to small-town yearnings. These two disparate concepts, community-based policing and quality of life policing, in many ways have become inseparable ever since, rather the two have become synonymous, with references to the theory as “the bible of policing”, “the blueprint for community policing” as well as the modestly recognized “Holy Grail for the 90s.”\textsuperscript{34}

What occurred was a sharp shift in the conception of the police officer in the 1980s, from “craftsman” to that of “watchman” - a shift from the somewhat relaxed early days of community policing where officers who would rarely invoke formal processes of law, even in the presence of law breaking, to an officer who would arrest to maintain
community order, even in the absence of law breaking. This new shift was a striking turn from the community policing of the 1970s which emphasized the policeman as craftsman, as one who had a strong local knowledge and utilized a large amount of discretion. Law enforcement was invoked only as a last resort, when all other strategies of order maintenance had failed. By the mid-1980s this paternalistic view of police officers as street-wise and tough but fair had become the "watchman" as no-holds barred aggressive order-maintenance enforcer who would arrest, even in legally ambiguous situations, in the name of protecting the "community".  

George Kelling, citing duty and responsibility, advocated police intervention in the public roller-skating activities of juveniles in Chicago. Kelling appealed as thus to the sensibilities of the reader: "Do we want police officers to develop a 'What the hell' attitude toward disorderly or dangerous behavior, even if it is not technically illegal?" Numerous assumptions were packaged into the Wilson/Kelling manifesto: suspicion of liberal policies, community protection over individual due process, a view of courts as weak, mistrust of strangers, and an appeal to "common-sense" moralities. The success of this was significant.
A curious aspect of the quality of life argument was the widespread interest - both by conservative and liberal sections of society. Liberals and moderates were seduced by the Kelling argument likely because it seemed less punitive than “get-tough” sentencing and incarceration policies. Furthermore the focus on disorder implied that fixing surface symptoms of decay could replace deeper, liberal symptomatic concerns such as the root causes of crime such as poverty, discrimination, and a lack of economic opportunities in inner-cities.

For liberals, police are to act as community organizers - their task is not aggressive “ass-kicking” order-maintenance -- rather crime prevention through community service.\textsuperscript{38} The officer engages in the harboring of community institutions through community and neighborhood organization. The office was to construct ties to the local community and develop local strategies which might help the community repair itself. These strategies include block watch, newsletters, non-enforcement police-citizen encounters, and victim follow-up. Hence, from the liberal vantage point, police function as a conduit to community self-repair.

For conservatives, police are proactive agents of aggressive order maintenance. Order maintenance, according
to this view, is an effective deterrent for crime.\textsuperscript{39}

Community breakdown doesn’t stem from underlying social or structural problems in those communities but from criminal “invasion” into those communities. Police become the moral representative of the community itself. Much of the prescriptive elements of the conservative view on community policing are in fact the arguments put forward by Kelling and Wilson. Likewise, the forms of community police patrols to come in the following two decades would more often suit the conservative appetite than the liberal one.

\textbf{BROKEN WINDOWS RECONSIDERED}

With the movement towards community policing taking interest throughout the U.S as well as other countries (Canada, Britain), some institutional entrepreneurs such as Kelling, became intellectual focal points of this structural transformation. Many cities adopted the community policing/quality of life initiatives, and some of these attributed crime rate decreases to the program’s effectiveness. Most notably, structural reforms to the New York Police Department in the early 1990s were implemented in a distinctly Kelling flavour, and Kelling’s approach was concluded to be “the” approach to community-based policing programs.
Not all social scientists and scholars were singing triumphant about this widely-praised approach however. This strange mélange of utilitarianism and provincial romanticism was often seen to be a wolf in sheep’s clothing. How exactly could a policy which involved proactive aggressive enforcement of obtuse “disciplinary” actions both illegal and legal be reconciled with a liberal democratic philosophy? Perhaps by appealing to those who harbour scepticisms of the moral tendencies of liberalism itself. The informal rules of this practice dictate that it is permitted to sit oneself in public space, it is another thing to lie down however - this may run one up against a community police officer.

PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF COMMUNITY POLICING

By some way of re-introduction, it is worth looking at what is and has been one of the most helpful definitions of the role of police in contemporary society - police are a mechanism for the distribution of non-negotiably coercive force employed in accord with an intuitive grasp of situational exigencies. Egon Bittner, one of the few criminologists to look at the theoretical implications and consequences of police on a broad systemic level, reflects on his proposed definition as follows:
"The ... definition of the role of the police entails a difficult moral problem. How can we arrive at a favorable or even accepting judgment about an activity which is, in its very conception, opposed to the ethos of the polity that authorizes it? Is it not well nigh inevitable that this mandate be concealed in circumlocution?"\textsuperscript{16}

Egon Bittner’s seminal study of the function of police in democratic society posed difficult questions about the role of police where the population is, in some senses, inherently against the organization itself. This definition and subsequent reflection, shed light onto the possibilities for community policing to achieve its declared populist intentions. Contemporary criminologists, sociologists, and political scientists rarely venture onto such abstract, but necessary terrain. Perhaps Bittner’s remarks on circumlocution may well have foreshadowed the rise in community-oriented policing strategies. As will become clear, community policing could very well be a rhetorical strategy of circumlocution against the concurrent and increasingly militarized nature of state security. The following are a few complications, paradoxes and dilemmas which will highlight the problematic nature of
this, the most radical conceptual shift of policing practices in recent times.

This radical shift of the core mission of police from serious crime-centered/professionalized to an order maintenance/community policing basis is justified along two major lines of thought. Firstly, stemming minor “disorders” might ultimately lead to the reduction of serious crime by neutralizing a theoretically escalatory lineage of community decay assumed to be generative of serious crime. Secondly, order maintenance is justifiable in and of itself, in that it contributes to the development of a civil environment, where citizens may live without fear and develop all things constitutive of a free and open society. The second argument is a moral mandate of sorts, one of which is certainly constitutive of an organizational role transformation. Where the law comes up short on distinguishing acts of order from disorder, which is usually the case, police action becomes intervention on behalf of the “political will of the community”. Such arguments as ones put forward by advocates such as Kelling, have a multitude of overlapping and contentious assumptions, some of which are as follows.

An obvious problem with community policing is associated with its very title - what is a community? It is
difficult to discern what constitutes such a grouping, whether it be shared assumptions, moral or religious inclinations. For conceptual policing models to work they need to maintain a minimum standard of what constitutes a community. Some commentators have noted that such a basis for police action requires a demonstration that a group of people—say a neighborhood—share a definition of what constitutes right order, threats to it, and appropriate methods for containing it.⁴³ To the extent that community implies functioning as a basis for citizens to work collectively with police to reclaim and preserve order, also implies a sense of collective consensus derived from shared experience and interaction. There certainly exist community areas with a high degree of such homogeneity of outlook and group attachment, however it is exactly where community policing is most needed, in the most afflicted areas, where such consensus is unlikely. Studies done examining the absence of shared norms about order amongst residents in low-income neighborhoods in Toronto and Chicago further complicate this necessity. ⁴⁴ Where order is consensually agreed as an important aspect, the means suggested to achieve this aim oscillate wildly.

When neighborhoods do develop strong “social control systems” (ie. active neighborhood crime councils who
corroborate with community policing attaches), it does not necessarily imply that these mechanisms of control reflect widespread value consensus amongst the community at large. Rather this may often reflect the political and cultural dominance of one group over others less connected or organized. What has often occurred when police departments turned towards community policing models, was to establish official lines of communication with neighborhood agencies. This usually has been achieved by dealing with selected organizational hubs from which to send community concerns to police. These mediating associations and how they achieve such relational status is a seriously problematic question.

Mediating associations claim to represent the concerns of citizens by presenting themselves as microcosms of the neighborhood, but as many scholars have shown this is rarely the case indeed. Wilson Reed spent the years between 1985 and 1993 examining the workings of community policing in the South End of Seattle, Washington. What was hailed by many within the criminal-justice complex as an ideal model of community policing, was to Reed a system full of resonating problems. South Seattle police officers worked predominantly with an neighborhood organization called the South Seattle Crime Prevention Council. The council was an
elite and well connected group of individuals, in a neighborhood which was mostly minority groups and low-income residents. What resulted was an unrepresentative representation of the neighborhood, by those who could monopolize the crime control agenda, having it skewed in favour of commercial property protection biases. The tradeoff for a less critical membership in this mediating association was greater police cooperation.

Police departments have shown to be reluctant to encourage the formation of non-sanctioned crimewatch organizations as well. What has been solicited as a revolution in democratic approaches to civil order, often slides towards the inescapable nature of acting as an agent of circumlocution. Many commentators have noticed the tendency for a variety of community crime prevention programs is that the bulk of communication is from the police to the citizen, explaining and selling prepackaged strategies devised without the particular neighborhood and its residents' preferences in mind. The effect of such monologues is that the citizenry, as represented by the dominant mediating association, become agents of a preordained disciplinary will.

Rather, as it has been shown, these programs seem to enlarge the capacity of the police bureaucracy to impose
its perspective of 'order' on neighborhoods while also encouraging citizens to channel their efforts in ways which are in line with police conceptions of useful community relations. Although these programs are implemented with the appeal being that "police will respond better to the needs of the citizenry", more often the opposite is what occurs - "the citizenry responds better to the needs of police". While these programs speak of collaboration and police not imposing themselves on neighborhoods, the police are in control of the information-gathering and dissemination regarding crime, disorder, and police work. They also play the main role with respect to deciding which community groups to collaborate with. What is left from this picture is an organization which presents itself as one which harbours self-less democratic intentions, and simultaneously uses this populist sheen to practice quasi expansionist bureaucratic aspirations.

**Against Kelling**

Beyond the material practices of the art of community policing, lie deep theoretical problematics, most of which may be traced to the initial urban disorder thesis by George Kelling. Going back to the thesis outlined earlier by Kelling, it is worth asserting at this point that the theoretical underpinnings of the community policing
initiative are indeed highly problematic – that is to say that the escalatory link between small-scale ‘disorder’ and violent crime lies on dubious assumptions and minimal research. These assumptions and research will be examined here.

Little more than a decade ago, New York City was seen as the most dangerous city in America, plagued with murders and serious crimes. Today it is considered to be one of the safest, having experienced a drastic reduction of crime during the same time period as its famous ‘zero tolerance’ policies. These policies were implemented by police commissioner Bratton after having received an endorsement by then Mayor Rudolph Guiliani. Many commentators, from the NYC Mayor’s office, to academic criminologists mostly assumed that this significant drop in the crime rate was the effect of the zero-tolerance policies employed.

Despite claims that the zero-tolerance policy was hitherto “empirically verified”, some observers took issue with this claim. Bernard Hunter, in his Illusion of Order, has argued that no reliable evidence exists to justify this assertion. He argues that broken-windows policing has little or nothing to with its celebrated drop in crime. Rather, more substantial factors were the end of the crack cocaine epidemic, a booming economy, and a population with
fewer males between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four. Compounded with these factors was that cities like San Diego and San Francisco saw similar drastic drops in the crime rate without resorting to a similar zero-tolerance strategy.49

The only major empirical study on the zero-tolerance strategy, Disorder and Decline: Crime and the Spiral of Decay in American Neighborhoods, by Wesley Skogan, has been found by various scholars to be a work of questionable empirical and intellectual worth.50 Yet it has remained virtually unchallenged as the empirical backbone of the success of zero-tolerance/community policing programs.

However dubious the intellectual foundations of this widely respected criminological theory, it has a deep reliance on foundational myths which underscored its appeal. Those are the myths of 'watchman' and 'community', used by Kelling in his 1982 Atlantic Monthly article, and applied by departments as its de facto mandate. This was an appeal to a historically vague notion of police as 'night watchman' looking over a moral community. By police adopting the elements of 'watchman' and 'community' into their structures and formalized activities, police ceremonially regained a legitimacy lost in the 1960s. As well some have argued, as did John Crank, that these myths
derived their power to mobilize sentiment from the mythic images of watchmen as community protectors and communities as enclaves of traditional American values. It can also be argued that institutional entrepreneurs have latched onto this mythology and modified it to suit the needs of 21st century policing, as can be seen in the work of George Kelling.

Furthermore, with respect to the symbolic aspects of community policing, there exists a pervasive disciplinary meaning. Hence the mention of utilitarianism goes deeper than shallow references to the work of Kelling, for community policing and its quality of life policies are responsible for a massive bifurcation of the citizenry. This is to say that recent community policing initiatives have had the effect of dividing the population along two general lines: ‘citizens’ and the ‘disorderly’. The wino, the drunkard, the panhandler - once all tertiary, harmless aspects of society not seen as problems -- now recognized as the cracks which threaten the foundations of civil society, hence the importance of their removal from the public sphere. Their removal is a mobilization which pits some citizens in a campaign against others. These projects of social sanitation urge the righteous to act as the department’s eyes and ears, and the righteous are
encouraged to accept more aggressive police interventions in their neighborhoods, on their behalf.

Some might comment on this as a manifestation of a Foucauldian disciplinary state. The answer seems to be both affirmative and negative. It is indeed a disciplinary project, but its effects are at once both simpler and more pervasive than other disciplinary practices discussed by Michel Foucault. Quality of life policing is not modeled on the rehabilitative ideal central to many disciplinary projects, such as welfare, mental hospitals, or social work institutions. It does not really cross over into the psycho-therapeutic. It does not utilize the disciplinary practice of examination, such as employed by educational institutions. The disciplinary tactics of quality of life policing challenges panoptic models of social surveillance, for here we see thousands of eyes, glances through cracks in curtains, calls made to neighborhood detachments. It is embedded within the populace rather than coming from the state. This is in fact, the most draconian aspect of both judicial and militaristic discipline - quality of life policing calls for the removal and punishment of questionable subjects, a sterilization of the public sphere with no remainder or memory trace. However, for all the similarities between this model and Foucault’s various
disciplinary theses, it seems counterproductive to draw upon these too extensively.

Examining community-based policing initiatives under the lens of symbolic effects, one clearly sees numerous streams which cross each other—disciplinary tactics, mythologies, legitimating drives, nostalgia, and ideology. Community policing has been employed as a legitimating agent for an organization which has become increasingly paramilitary in nature. Critics, such as Ralph Saunders, have argued that the masking illusion of community policing is "created, promoted and sustained by a combination of rhetoric and substantive action. The rhetoric of community policing ... constitutes a representation of police by police." Hence the practice of community policing can be seen as an attempt to visibly represent the police to the citizenry. It has been the opinion of these critics, as well as the author of this study, that such representations of the state in fact mask relations of power by attempting to present reality as more traditional, popular and natural than perhaps it really is. Following the lines of this argument, the representational practices of community policing are also very much ideological assertions.
MAYBERRY - NOSTALGIA IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD

"What ever happened to Mayberry, that small, fictitious town with the friendly sheriff and deputy who spent more time chatting over pie and coffee at the local drugstore than chasing after criminals? The best guess is that Mayberry grew up. Development brought more people and the police force grew. There wasn’t time for an afternoon snack and a rambling talk with a drugstore owner. Mayberry’s probably a lot like Redmond now. And Redmond, with its 51 officers, is trying to get back to Mayberry."

As the public sphere has recently undergone a new wave of sterilization due to numerous factors related to globalization and market consolidation, city centers once considered the hub of democratic societies, are now being relegated to the status of ghost-town financial districts and mega-shopping complexes. Yet the power of nostalgia in an era of globalization is still a potent one. Recent architectural trends for suburban development have pushed along the lines of provincial New England township gated communities. So popular is the yearning for a return to traditional morals and communities, in an era where the possibility of such is diminishing, that it has provided to be fertile ground for the development of the community-policing style of civilian patrol. Nostalgia seems to wield
a powerful and bizarre force amongst those that may not even know what Mayberry was indeed like in the first place.

This sentimental yearning which has led towards a fortress-style of provincial romanticism, has had its impacts in the realm of policing as well, as the resurgence of mythological ideas such as the “night watchman” has demonstrated. This militarized form of nostalgia, is at work within the organizational structures of contemporary policing. While the organizational mandate may be that of “community-based policing”, the tactics employed to execute that mandate have become increasingly paramilitaristic in character.

**IV - IRON FIST - PARAMILITARY POLICING**

To understand recent developments in the realm of police tactics, one only needs to turn on the television. That is to say that if one watches any reality-based police show such as Cops, they will notice certain subtle and not so subtle differences with regards to the tactics employed by police officers. What the viewer would see is an increasing reliance on military styles of operation and organizational rationality within the police force, as displayed by a non-descript SWAT team invading a house of a suspected drug
dealer, in any given town, on any given day. Eerily similar
to "Damiens the regicide", the opening sketch of Michel
Foucault's *Discipline and Punish*, images of show-trial
style punishment are available to anyone with a penchant
for telematic justice, the executioners hooded, just as in
the Jacobian reign. These new hooded SWAT teams, scuba-like
representations of the established order, are cut from a
new mould however.

Since the Cold war has come to a close, many within
the U.S. military complex have come under increasing
pressure to justify the role of the military in a world
with no substantial enemies. At stress to convince people
of the relevance of their institution, many began to look
towards internal issues of importance to the state itself.
The 1980's had already had a jumpstart on this broad
paradigmatic shift, having declared "war" on numerous
issues of national rather than international importance,
such as drugs and terrorism. What is contained in these
constant references to the metaphor of war is an underlying
ideological filter of 'militarism' - the set of beliefs
that promotes the use of force and domination as agents in
maintaining social order and political control, while
deifying the technological means to achieve this - military
power, hardware and technology.\(^5\) While social issues were
being treated with a military lens, traditional military forces were becoming more 'socially useful' by involving themselves in issues like domestic and international drug enforcement. It will be argued that the increasing trend of militarized style-policing, the paramilitarization of police forces, is one of increasing threat to generally held tenets of liberal democracy, and is an imperative issue that needs closer attention within social sciences oriented research.

As has been pointed out from the outset, this study is one which is a hybrid of both an empirical and theoretical approach. Criminologists and specialists from this field will undoubtedly find numerous exceptions and inconsistencies to the wide-sweeping generalities discussed herein. Yet there is merit to an approach which appeals to both everyone and no-one. As globalization has had the effect of homogenizing markets, and to some extent cultures, it has also had an impact on what Nils Christie has dubbed the "criminal justice industrial complex". It is possible in the contemporary era to speak in generalities since it is the most reasonable approach to dealing with an increasingly global homogenous disciplinary force:

"the most striking feature of the modern epoch is the homogeneity of forms of physical coercion. Armed
forces, police forces, paramilitary forces around the world make use of the same type of military technology... With the help of advisors and training courses, forms of command, patterns of operations, methods of recruitment also bear a global resemblance. For the first time in history, soldiers and policeman from different societies have more in common with each other than the societies from which they come."\textsuperscript{56}

In this light, it is important to assert that this study is more a reflection of the ethical intentions of political philosophy than it is an attempt to situate an argument within a narrow criminological based discourse. This issue of formalism and style is compounded by the current lack of theoretical approaches on police.

While a fairly reasonable body of literature exists on community-based policing, studies done on paramilitary developments are scarce. Because so little exists in terms of coherent theories of paramilitary policing, it becomes difficult to venture on this terrain, for few have gone in this direction. Peter Manning has put forward strong criticisms on this point - that contemporary academic scholarship and police research have had an increasingly apolitical orientation which is manifested by the unbalanced emphasis of research on structural issues such as bureaucratic efficiency.\textsuperscript{57} The problem with entering into
this discourse, is that any research project which looks at
police from a more critical perspective is often charged
with being “politicized” and hence a less noble form of
scholarship, and one that is unlikely to be taken
seriously. The apolitical gaze, that which is the norm of
police scholarship, generally overlooks the trend of
increasing paramilitarization of police units, and also
fails to properly identify the links to military
organizations.

Such academic practitioners often gloss over the other
assumed origin of civilian police forces. By focusing on
the well used concept of the “night watchmen” as the basis
and the origin of contemporary police, such people do
injustice to the fact the police forces often formed out of
militia groups and military soldiers, or conversely just as
often out of a public fear of military control. The
concept of the night watchman, as the noble origins of
modern day police, ignores that in fact police are either
or both a counter reactionary measure to state militarism,
or conversely an offshoot of that mechanism of the state.
This closely linked relationship between the military and
the police is one which has operated below the currents
ever since.
A Short History of SWAT

As it has been shown, the 1960s in the United States was a turbulent, and somewhat unsuccessful time for civilian police forces. Dealing with unprecedented social unrest due to issues including civil liberties, wide-sweeping political issues especially Vietnam, and labor unrest, many saw the respective responses of police action as a general failure. Among the questions raised regarding the role of police in the U.S. by various task forces and inquiries, the 1967 Crime Commission looked at the very nexus of the relationship between crime and police. While many of the task forces of this period gave brief thoughts to the relationship between crime and economic and social issues that may be factors towards the impetus for crime, the 1967 Crime Commission simply made reference to crime being a reality of contemporary urban living. Furthermore, this commission suggested that crime was the result of "certain inescapable natural, cultural and technological processes." According to this line of commonly held reasoning, the economic and social crimes must take a far second place to the pressing needs of devising the technological and organizational aspects of controlling and containing crime. For the Crime Commission of 1967, the forces of police "must accept society as it is."
Yet the Crime Commission, while recognizing crime as a historically constant aspect of democratic societies, saw the necessity for an organizational reassessment. The problems seen by the commission were technological and organizational in nature, rather than of orientation or purpose. Hence crime became much like the problems of disease or going to the moon; as a problem with a technical barrier, this needs to be overcome by channeling larger amounts of research and finances into addressing the problem. This same commission summed this issue succinctly by regrettably noting that while “more than 200,000” scientists and technicians were working on military problems, and hundreds of thousands were dealing with issues in other areas of modern life. Yet unfortunately for this commission, only a small portion were working to “control the crimes that injure or frighten millions of Americans each year.”

One of the more interesting points of the 1967 Crime Commission was that many police departments were “not organized in accordance with well-established principles of modern business management.” Respective measures were called out to quell the administrative chaos which was indicative of many organizations. During this period, operational strategies and techniques were increasingly
being drawn from the domain of the military, organizational forms were coming more from contemporary business models, as this "command and control" advertisement brochure from the Motorola corporation demonstrates:

"The land must be safe.
Among the concrete measures which came out of this organizational soul searching process was the internal management programs adopted by the Los Angeles police department. In order to find an organizational format for their program, LAPD made visits to various major private corporations "to study their management training programs" including Union Oil, Ford, North American Rockwell, Pacific Telecom, and IBM. Beyond influencing management programs, corporations also guided the direction of technological and strategic initiatives. As the above quote suggests, companies like Motorola and Rockwell devised entire "command and control" packages for many urban police
departments. This guidance included everything from "command control centers" to organizational charts, specialized communication devices, and (then) avant-garde computerized information systems. During 1969, when the New York Police Department inquired about the development of their command and control center, they were advised to visit the existing command centers at the Strategic Air Command Headquarters, the Pentagon, and the Manned Spacecraft center in Houston, Texas. The Texas center was then candidly described by NYPD officials as like a "war room". 65

Included in the development of advanced technologies to address the scientific concerns of crime was the use of special tactics squads. First developed in 1967 within the LAPD, the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team was developed in response to the increased "incidence of urban violence, and in particular the emergence of the sniper as a threat to police operation, the appearance of the political assassin, and the threat of urban guerrilla warfare." 66 The idea of the SWAT team, also known as "tactical" or paramilitary policing units (PPU), was an antidote to the unnecessary deaths of police officers on the job, and the problems of officers poorly trained to deal with difficult situations. As one officer put it:
"Those people out there - the radicals, the revolutionaries, and the cop haters - are damned good at using shotguns, bombs or setting ambushes, so we've got to be better at what we do." 67

The problems involved with looking at the SWAT phenomenon from the outset are fairly clear. Since tactical units treat policing as a war, it becomes obvious that this is what makes them so fundamentally dangerous. Indeed if SWAT operations treat policing as a war, then it follows that the civilian population is the enemy. This is clear if one traces the etymology of the term SWAT, coined by LAPD commander Daryl Gates in 1966. Gates started with the term SWAT, which had a militaristic and dehumanizing ring to it, the filled it with the term "Special Weapons Attack Team". Superiors of Gates heard the term and noted this "candid and robust" term to be slightly too provocative, hence settling with the term "Special Weapons and Tactics".

What occurred in the years following the Crime Commission and the initiation of the LAPD SWAT team, was an unprecedented wave of police militarization, first in the large metropolitan areas, and then outward to the smaller towns. Fueled by large bursts of U.S. government funding, with what is known as "pork barrel" spending, agencies such as the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA)
gave away billions of dollars to outfit towns and larger metropolitan organizations with advanced hardware and technology. Somewhere along the lines paramilitary units mutated from an inert, elite urban emergency response teams, to an essential part of everyday police operations, regardless of the size of the organization or city. Current estimates suggest that approximately 30,000 individual SWAT units are operating throughout the United States. Contrasting the police paramilitary units (PPUs) to the traditional police, these units are different in the following significant ways. PPU's are outfitted with advanced military equipment and technology. These units often refer to themselves as "heavy weapons units" and have equipment similar to elite military units, such as the U.S. Navy Seals. Their arsenal also often includes what is referred to as "less than lethal" technology, used for conducting "dynamic entries" (i.e. serving a search warrant), and weapons that stun, harm, but do not kill. Some PPU's also purchase and integrate a range of "fortified tactical vehicles", such as military armored personnel carriers and specially equipped "tactical cruisers". What comes from these special units is the view of themselves as "elite" units and officers, a sentiment that is shared and promoted by most within police organizations.
THE NORMALIZATION OF PARAMILITARY UNITS

In the early days of PPU s, their operations differed substantially from that of conventional police work. During what may be called their initial era, the focus was on emergency type of occurrences: civil riots, terrorism, barricaded suspects, and hostage situations. These units were more seen as a rare safeguard, than an everyday necessity. If PPU s were still confined to the rare emergency situations of which they were developed for, they would be a contingent if not inconsequential aspects of police organizations. However, in recent years, it is very difficult to differentiate what makes PPU s different from conventional forces, except that they deal with what police departments dubiously call "high risk". As it can be imagined, what constitutes high risk, in the line of police work, can be a grey and blurry distinction. Hence recent years have seen a sharp increase in the use of PPU s in everyday non-emergency situations.

Virtually the only academic to address this issue has been Peter Kraska, who has written numerous times on this subject. In his 1997 article "Militarizing American Police: The Rise and Normalization of Paramilitary Units", his research "found a sharp rise in the number of police paramilitary units, a rapid expansion in their activities,
the normalization of paramilitary units into mainstream police work, and a close ideological and material connection between PPU s and the U.S. armed forces." Kraska utilized a ethnographic approach in examining the nature of PPU s by doing a 40-point survey of 690 police departments across the U.S. His findings gave compelling evidence of a national trend towards the militarization of U.S. civilian police forces, and also the "militarization of corresponding social problems handled by the police". This phenomenon is illuminated by the words of this U.S. police officer:

"We're into saturation patrols in hot spots. We do a lot of our work with the SWAT unit because we have bigger guns. We send out two, two-to-four-men cars, we look for minor violations and do jump-outs, either on people on the street or automobiles. After we jump-out the second car provides periphery cover with an ostentatious display of weaponry. We're sending a clear message: if the shootings don't stop, we'll shoot someone." 

This significant tectonic shift in the paradigm of policing, can be seen clearly by examining the recent approach of Fresno, California in dealing with its "high risk" situations. Fresno was the first city to integrate the SWAT unit into full-time patrols of the poorer Latino
and African American neighborhoods. Having a situation deeply ridden by gang warfare and rampant drug use, Fresno decided to mount a special unit to deal with this, dubiously titled the Violent Crime Suppression Unit (VCSU). In Fresno, government project housing units amongst ghettos are seen as war zones, having the VCSU patrol in full armor, automatic rifles, armored vehicles, and “slung with [Hechler and Koch] MP5s” so that they may conduct sweeps, searching for “contact”.

What has occurred in the thirty odd years of the concept of SWAT, has been a radical departure from its origins, justified as an extreme emergency use only unit, to a unit adopting increasingly proactive roles in police operations. Fresno is an extreme case, but the fact of the matter remains illustrated by the four-fold increase of paramilitary police unit activity between 1980 and 1995.71

A few related trends involving PPUs can be quickly drawn upon to emphasize the scope of the increasing paramilitarization of U.S. police forces. The nature of U.S. presidential spending initiatives over recent history have given police chiefs a significant pool of resources to spend, often all at once, or over a period of a few years. During these short spurts of large cash flows, police departments have gone to outfit their organizations with
hi-tech equipment, and often chose to setup a paramilitary unit, as by now most police agencies have done. In most districts, the common logic has been, "now, what to do with them?". This line of thinking - to find a use for something one already has, many critics suggest is prevalent amongst U.S. police forces. And so SWAT units began to diversify their portfolios so to speak, to expand the elasticity of what may be considered "high-risk" situations, serving drug warrants, helping out in situations with barricaded suspects. The most serious concern though, as the Fresno example symbolizes, is the danger of having paramilitary units conduct the day to day patrols, baiting & luring suspects, doing "sweeps" of poorer neighborhoods. From here the distance to a robocop sort of Gestapo isn't all very far off. However, this connection isn't often made within the political, academic and middle-upper class publics.

Police paramilitary units are expensive to acquire and maintain both for start-up costs and upkeep. A major source of funding was realized through the development of property forfeiture laws, relatively unused through the 1970s, but more seriously utilized after the 1984 Crime bill, which essentially granted police forces up to 90 percent of the value of all assets seized. The implications for this trend were enormous - this greatly increased police autonomy from
civilian government, diminishing their accountability and in effect insulating law enforcement from popular criticism. As Christian Parenti notes on the "booty squads" of the police department in Glendale, California:

"By 1988 the Glendale squad had already pulled in enough cash to pay its annual $300,000 budget two years into the future as well as stock the department with infrared night vision goggles, cellphones, video surveillance and recording equipment, and a fingerprint reading laser wand. Moreover, they were still waiting for $7.2 million worth of seizures to be approved and forwarded by the overburdened Asset Forfeitures Office of the Department of Justice."

This is similar to other Californian police departments. Simi Valley, for example, "upgraded its SWAT team, outfitted its forces with semiautomatic nine millimeters, and replaced its central computer system". Many forces, seeing the possibility of acquiring inconceivable amounts of added revenue, developed what was called "wolf packs" -- undercover units with the sole purpose of pursuing criminal leads that promised the possibility of a high level of asset seizure. The majority of these people were not high-level drug dealers, rather for the most part, middle and lower levels. The trend that emerges is clear -- an increasingly militarized and autonomous police force.
As history has displayed over the last 50 years, it can be said that the emphasis within U.S. policy has oscillated between greater internal and external concerns. While perhaps the current era may be fixated on a distinctly international focus, it wasn’t so before September 11, 2001. The demise of the Cold War, as it was mentioned before, served as a symbolic catalyst for an inward turn in government policy. This inward turn has manifested itself by a look at the enemies within the U.S. state: terrorism, drugs, and crime. Increasingly, as some have mentioned, this focal shift has been packaged in the rhetoric of war — the war on crime, the war on drugs, and so on.  

**CIVILIAN POLICE AND THE RHETORIC OF WAR**

Much can be drawn from the utilization of martial rhetoric with respect to domestic security concerns. The use of aggressive rhetoric regarding issues of domestic security and policing has fostered an environment where militaristic solutions seem urgent, and overwhelming force a necessity. This in turn has served to help legitimize hard-line and paramilitary approaches to civilian policing.

This militaristic crime-control rhetoric, somewhat omnipresent in the modern world, emerged out of the early part of the twentieth century as a means of tackling social
ills. It aped with Richard Nixon, showing the possibilities of utilizing a “war”-based discourse, in looking at the problems of drug abuse. He labeled drug use to be “public enemy number one” and likened the issue of drug-use to “foreign troops on our shores”. President Ronald Reagan likened these internal social ills to a sort of anti-Christ. Regan went as far as codifying war talk into law by proclaiming, through presidential directive, “drugs” as a threat to national security. This trajectory of escalating war-mongering discourse to address matters of domestic jurisdiction went farther and farther with each new president, for example, Regan’s successor, George Bush Senior:

“There is no greater threat to the survival of our society than drugs. If the present condition continues, we will no longer be free, independent citizens, but people entwined and imprisoned by drugs. The military forces of this country must become more involved”

Also worth noting is the Clinton Administration’s use of marital rhetoric less focused on drug policy, but more on gang and urban violence. However, the use of drugs served easily to political expediency, as Clinton’s speech during
the appointment of his new “drug czar”, Army General Barry McCaffrey showed:

"McCaffrey has faced down many threats to America’s national security, from guerrilla warfare in the jungles of Vietnam to the unprecedented ground war in the sands of Desert Storm. Now he faces a more insidious but no less formidable enemy in illegal drugs."

The implications of this trend are obvious and fairly significant. If all winds blow as they appear to do, the assertion that the liberal democratic “leader of the free world” is in a state increasingly embroiled in many aspects of militarism, in many insidious ways. For the politicians and bureaucrats who frame the issue in terms such as this, relate the issue, whether it be drugs, crime or terrorism, to the security and legitimacy of the state itself. This was alluded to by the above quotes. The framing of these issues in the cloak of warfare, is an action of granting states agencies with the available power to utilize state-sanctioned violence. And as the saying goes, war is good for business. The idea of war grants legitimacy to these institutions to treat these issues as a type of "insurrection", as Peter Kraska suggests, hence justifying a military response, including campaigns to occupy,
control, and eventually restore order both within the public and private realms. After everything is locked down and under control, a whole new industry is available to warehouse the new prisoners of “war”. Judging from recent statistics that prison populations have increased threefold between 1980 and 1995, it appears that this “war” has been very successful. Yet ironically if the war has been won, it would seem to contradict the statistic that shows PPU call-outs in 1995 to be 29,962, up 939% from the 1980 level of 2,884 call-outs.77

This paints a fairly dismal picture if one considers that military special-forces units, such as the U.S. Navy Seals, are training civilian police units illegally under various inter-agency agreements. This should alarm those who nurture some of the basic tenets of the modern nation-state and democratic governance. These basis tenets - such as the clear delineation in form and function between internal security forces (civilian police) and external security forces (military) - are in a somewhat troubled position. These tectonic transformations suggest a historical shift in the nature of the nation-state, how it maintains order, and the nature of modern social control. The ideological implications are different from community-policing initiatives in that they encourage legitimacy and
acceptance via the display of overwhelming force, while the latter appeals to democratic ideals and exclusionary practices. The effects of an increasingly paramilitary-style policing are offset by the concurrent attempts at police transparency and democratization. This is the softer hand of the same apparatus: community policing initiatives, “quality of life” approaches to crime, and greater public relations efforts. The imagery, symbolism, and technocratic rationality which emerges from this trend in effect serve to mask the overt aggression, violence, and state coercion which these processes encourage. Many scholars in recent years have proclaimed, in Fukuyama-esque grandiosity, that state violence and surveillance in the land of the end of history is over. Given the above account, this couldn’t be less correct.

V - CONCLUSION

The popular legitimacy civilian police agencies currently enjoy is in part due to the success of an institutional re-definition as a community-based organization. Part conceptual, part practical, part rhetorical, this organizational self-representation aides in muting the other significant development of this epoch, such as a police force which is increasingly militaristic
in nature. Both aspects work in concert as symbolic and ideological displays of organizational legitimacy. Both have worked within and drawn from the allowances of a fear-laden populace.

These developments aren’t necessarily new to the history of civilian police, as the old caricature of police work as the velvet glove and iron fist suggests. However, what appears to be occurring is an elongation of the extremes of this paradigm – police as becoming more populist (impossibly so), and also more lethally physical (dangerously so). Both end up serving as challenges to democratic sensibilities, as the populist gestures of community policing may turn the promise of dialogue into an act of the informer; while the blunt power of paramilitary wings of police forces threaten to run it over, if dissent slides out of a designated ‘protest zone’.

This discussion has side-stepped the issues of recent months, in particular the events of September 11, 2001. Perhaps to some readers this paper can be seen as irrelevant, now that we exist in a “war on terrorism” obsessed world. Domestic security appears on the back burner, left as a secondary concern in order to attend to invading exteriorities. However, this is only an extension of a historically cyclical pattern of internal and
external-centric state policies. In fact, the thesis put forward here may only be heightened by recent shifts. Public concern towards these processes are at an all-time low, while the carte blanche has been given to security apparatuses to heighten their practices accordingly. These security apparatuses exist in a state of near-immunity to examination and criticism. Criticism as such has been recently related to treason. Perhaps here it may be both suitable, and yet somewhat overly alarmist to leave the last word to Jean Baudrillard. Irregardless, his thoughts on the subject are as follows:

"We have reached the point that the idea of liberty, an idea relatively recent and new, is already in the process of fading from our consciences and our standards of morality, the point that neoliberal globalization is in the process of assuming the form of its opposite: that of a global police state, of a terror of security."
1 Terry Eagleton, *Ideology*, p. 221.
2 Michael Dukakis losing to George Bush in 1988 is a good example of this.
3 For a proper look a such a genealogy, see Randall Shelden, *A Critical Introduction to the History of Criminal Justice*, p.39
4 quoted in Christian Parenti, *Lockdown America*, p.6
5 Ibid, p. 6
6 Ibid., p. 7
7 Ibid., p.7
8 Ibid., p.0
9 Mike Davis, *Ecology of Fear*, p.387
10 Statistics such as this abound in many studies: Wright, *The Great American Crime Myth*; Sasson, *Crime Talk*; Glassner, *The Culture of Fear* as but a few examples.
11 See the work of Elliot Currie quoted in Theodore Sasson, *Crime Talk*, p.3
12 Sasson, *Crime Talk*, p.4
13 Ibid., p. 6.
14 Ibid., p. 6.
16 Ibid., p. 161
17 Wright, *The Great American Crime Myth*, p.7
18 Ibid., p. 9
21 Ibid., p.20
22 Barry Glassner, *The culture of Fear*, p.23
23 Ibid., p. 24.
24 Ibid., p. 26-
26 See Gray Cavender, in *Entertaining Crime*, p. 84
27 Ibid., p. 86
29 Sasson, p. 4
32 Crank. 1994, p. 328
35 See Kelling and Wilson 1982.
37 Ibid., p. 91.
39 Kelling and Wilson, 1982.
42 see Kelling, 1987.
50 For Wesley Skogan’s study see Disorder and Decline (University of California, 1990). For critical approaches to his work see Bernard Harcourt, ibid; Andrew Karmen, New York Murder Mystery: The True Story Behind the Crime Crash of the 1990s (New York University Press, 2001); as well as John Eck and Edward Maguire (eds.) The Crime Drop in America (Cambridge University Press, 2001).
54 See Mike Davis, City of Quartz (Vintage), and Andrew Ross, Celebration (Verso).
63 Crime Commission, Police, op. cit., p. 44
64 ad from Motorola corporation, "Motorola Total Police Communications Systems", quoted from The Iron Fist..., Institute for the Study of Labor and Economic Crisis, p. 79.
65 The Iron Fist and the Velvet Glove, p. 80.
66 Ibid., p. 93.
67 Christian Parenti, Lockdown America, p. 112.
69 Ibid., p. 12.
70 Ibid., p. 10
71 Christian Parenti, Lockdown America, p. 113.
72 Ibid., p. 52.
73 Kappeler, VE. The Mythology of Crime and Criminal Justice. Prospect Heights,
77 Ibid., p. 211.