# Montreal's Twinning with Shanghai – A Case Study of Urban Diplomacy in the Global Economy

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# ABSTRACT

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It is an increasing trend that Canadian cities demand more of an international presence, and that municipalities are eager to form their own international policies relation to economic globalization. In this case, how do we understand urban international relations beyond the usual criticism that they merely serve local politicians' interests through exotic trips financed by taxpayers? Based on qualitative interviews, records in Montreal municipal archive and local newspapers, this research provides a case study of Montreal's sister-city relationship with Shanghai between 1985 and 2001 in order to shed light on how urban diplomacy is forged in the intertwined processes of international communication, global-local dynamics, intergovernmental relations and interpersonal communication. The research also contextualizes urban international relations in terms of structure and agency at local, regional and global levels.

Montreal's twinning with Shanghai aimed at the "low" policy of diplomacy with the hopes of enhancing both cities' international connections and urban competitiveness. Seeking mutual help and advantages between Montreal and Shanghai was a municipal entrepreneurial strategy in response to the pressure, challenges and opportunities opened up in the global economy. These twinning objectives were not under the aegis of Quebec's international relations in searching for its distinctive political status, nor were they guided by a specific political ideology in hoping for the improvement of human

rights in China. However, twinning does not occur in a political vacuum. This research further presents political problems and controversies surrounding the Montreal-Shanghai connection. First, the question is asked about the absence of a broad-based public participation in the twinning processes. Second, the concern is raised about the lack of an overt twinning agenda on human rights in China. A critical evaluation of both issues is given as a normative inquiry into the significance of urban international relations.

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## Contents

Introduction

# Montreal's Twinning with Shanghai: A Case Study of Urban Diplomacy in the Global Economy

When we think about the tasks of municipalities, we often come across the ideas of snow removal, garbage treatment, parking regulation, property taxation, zoning bylaws or managerial tasks confined to municipal boundaries. Nevertheless, city halls are going abroad. The Toronto mayor, Mel Lastman, launched a heavy lobbying campaign in the *World Health Organization* in order to remove the city from a list of travel advisory areas due to the SARS epidemic. Competing against other cities and winning the 2010 winter Olympics also required the Vancouver municipal government to become an active player at the international stage. In addition to the above types of international activities forged by municipal governments that have caught national or even global-wide media attention, municipalities have engaged themselves in various types of international activities, ranging from heading trade missions, promoting tourism, attracting outside investment and encouraging external investment to sister-city relationships (SCRs). These have gone beyond the traditional understanding of municipal tasks taking place within the confines of municipal boundaries. We might ask: what is going on? What drives municipalities to orient their activities abroad?

Studying sister-city relationships in general and the Montreal-Shanghai relationship (MSR) in particular permit us to understand why and how Canadian municipalities are increasingly engaged in international relations/activities through rescaling the territorial

boundaries of municipal affairs. My dissertation, thus, focuses on answering the following research questions:

1. Is twinning a relevant subject matter for communication studies?
2. How do we explain SCRs in the discourses on globalization? Why is enhancing the close tie with Shanghai considered to be economically important for the city of Montreal?
3. How do we understand SCRs in the Canadian intergovernmental relations, given that Canadian municipalities are constitutionally subject to provinces? What makes the MSR distinctive from Quebec's international policy?
4. How do we understand SCRs in the terms of agency, involving actors, leadership and cultural values?
5. What are the political and normative implications of SCRs? In the case of the MSR, how do we explain the absent concerns with urban citizenship and human rights in China?

Each research question leads to an individual chapter of the dissertation and layers SCRs and municipal international relations in the interplay between forces of structure and agency. That is, why municipal governments go abroad and why twinning has gained its significance or new meanings have to be understood from the macro aspect of the local-global dialectics, the meso aspect of intergovernmental relations and the micro aspect of agency and cultural values. Combining the three levels of the discussion also helps us to grapple with the theoretical pendulum between structure and agency (Giddens 1984). Before making the research propositions, related literature on SCRs is reviewed according to major themes of discussion. The literature review further teases out what has to be emphasized, redressed, enriched or transformed in understanding international relations forged by municipalities.

**Twinning Objectives**

Tracing the history of SCRs shows that it is not a recent phenomenon to have municipalities and urban residents engage in cross-border activities. Twinning burgeoned

in the post-WWII period as part of war relief. Vancouver's 1944 twinning with Odessa was based on the humanitarian rationale of offering assistance to a war-devastated port city (Smith 1992). SCRs were also an initiative of reconciliation between foes. The 1947 twinning between Bristol (U.K.) and Hanover (Germany) served as a good example: relief goods were sent from the former and school children from the latter performed music in return (Cremer et al. 2001). U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower further promoted SCRs in 1956 as the "people-to-people program". The primary objective of the program was to reach world peace and avoid another world war by encouraging direct contact between peoples. Therefore, at the earlier stage, SCRs were intended to be channels of international communication in which cultural or educational exchanges took place. This has been commonly discussed by researchers from New Zealand, Australia, Europe, the United States and Canada (Cremer et al. 2001; O'Toole 2000; European Commission 2000; Bush 1998; Smith 1998, 1992; Zelinsky 1991; Smith 1990). For instance, Patrick Smith (1992) argues that the main objectives of Vancouver's international policy between the 1940s and the 1970s were in parallel with what was promoted by the *Federation of Canadian Municipalities*:

> Direct contact between diverse peoples to foster international understanding and co-operation; formalized/expanded contact between new Canadians and their homelands to improve cultural/race relations in Canadian communities; provided an opportunity to develop appreciation of foreign culture, history and traditions through exchanges, allowed a better understanding of problems/opportunities at home through the perspective of having to interpret a "local" way of life to people in another country; and enhanced the potential for trade and other business opportunities by a better understanding of local conditions elsewhere" (*Federation of Canadian Municipalities*. Quoted in Smith 1992: 93).

We can also find more recent examples of SCRs as channels for international communication, where cultural or educational activities occurred to enhance the friendship between peoples in two cities. The Quebec-Saint Malo sailing race involves

the symbolic friendship between the city of Quebec and Bordeaux. High-school student exchanges between Osaka, Japan, and North Shore City, New Zealand, is also an example of city-to-city communication that have lasted for more than ten years (Cremer et al. 2001). Other cultural or educational exchanges also include visits of theatrical groups, musical events, craft shows, and language-instruction programs (Zelinsky 1991). There is no standard formula about how communication should proceed between sister cities. It depends largely on demands and capacities of both sides to design programs suitable for and reciprocal to each other's interests.

It was not until the 1980s that the communicative scope of SCRs was broadened to include other forms of urban international activities, ranging from environmental protection, urban development to economic/trade missions. This reflects the changing needs for international communication between cities along with the changing world dynamics. Enhancing international communication is no longer an end in itself. The communicative rationale behind twinning turns into the foundation for an instrumental purpose to achieve certain specific goals. For instance, Vancouver's SCRs in the 1980s emphasized the involvement of business and ethnic communities in identifying and establishing formal linkages with gateways to significant regional or national economies. Its twinning with Los Angeles in 1986 was meant to make the city into *Hollywood North* by promoting the film industry (Smith 1998). Kevin O'Toole also discusses how Australian sister cities attempted to develop "short-term economic returns through trade, tourism and to a lesser extent investment" (O'Toole 1999:406). The economic motivation behind SCRs has been especially explicit with Chinese cities. For instance, Qinhuangdao, a port city in China, and Toledo, Ohio, found a joint venture to produce glass, as the

American city was attracted by the market potential in China and the Chinese city needed help to upgrade its industrial and technological infrastructure (*Beijing Review*, 3 April 1989).

SCRs underlined by an economic rationale reflect cities' increasing demands for urban competitiveness in the processes of the global economy. The cliché "you do business best with friends" is a twist to legitimize non-profit, cultural activities for economic exchanges, such as trade missions, exhibitions, contract opportunities, joint ventures, foreign investments, tourism or other activities entailing economic spin-offs. In other words, the traditional ideal of international communication through twinning is no longer an end in itself, although "it is the cultural understandings that are built up over time that provide the positive environment which can reduce risks and uncertainties involved in economic enterprises..." (Cremer et al. 2001). Rolf Cremer and his colleagues take an integrated approach, which "strives for a balance of cultural, political, political, social and economic development for both cities, and insist on tangible results in all of those priority areas... The integrated approach recognizes a concern with sociability as an important supplement to the profit motive" (Cremer et al. 2001: 383-4). As evident in some twinnings of Australian and Japanese cities, a discrepancy between cultural/communicative and economic/instrumental objectives in SCRs can cost the friendship between sister cities (O'Toole 1999).

Some SCRs are also characterized by political motivation. For instance, Seattle's twinning with Managua, Nicaragua, and its refugee policy in the 1980s were politically motivated in order to protest against the Reagan administration's foreign policy in Central America (Bush 1998). Some U.S. twinning initiatives were also political projects

for the rising practices of democracy in Eastern Europe after 1989 (*Sister City International*. Quoted in Cremer et al. 2001). SCRs in Europe serve as sub-projects to forge political integration under the grand scheme of the European Union (Dürrschmidt and Matthiesen 2002). SCRs forged by cities in client states, such as Taiwan, are also political means to seek out international recognition (Zelinsky 1991). Even U.S. President Eisenhower's "people-to-people program" was criticized for being political because it sought to project positive U.S. images abroad during the Cold War (Bush 1998; Zelinsky 1991). Twinning for a political cause often arouses controversies and/or criticism. For instance, a professor of International Studies criticized the Seattle-Managua connection as an initiative of "pseudo-diplomatic relations" and a subversion of "the entire sister-city concept" (Pedro Ramet 1984. Quoted in Bush 1998: 116). Some scepticism is cast on the political motive of SCRs. For instance, the German-Polish border sister cities, Guben and Gubin, were selected as model cities for European integration. However, specific local conditions and long-term mistrust challenged the connection between the two across the border (Dürrschmidt and Matthiesen 2002).

The above literature is rich in showing that twinning objectives are diversified because they are local measures developed along with broader national or international changes. However, what is missing in the previous literature is the overarching objective of SCRs across time and space. Despite different twinning aims, SCRs are channels of international communication for development. This common concern was not theorized in the past partially because most of the previous studies of twinning focused on individual cases without developing a comparative dimension, and partially because the media-centric research on international communication does not pay attention to twinning.

I therefore propose to study SCRs in the language of international communication in order to stake out the overarching objective in the proliferation of twinning activities. Development here refers to the cultivation of the city-to-city connection, as well as the urban developmental needs of individual sister cities. The immediate objective of twinning is to build intercultural exchanges, friendship and mutual understanding between peoples in two cities. Montreal's twinning with Shanghai shows that even the conception of development can be communicated or exchanged in the twinning processes. Nonetheless, reaching an intercultural understanding or developing trust and reciprocity between two cities is not an end in itself. Sister cities seek advantages from each other according to their specific circumstances and demands. This is especially evident when the SCR is between more "advanced" and less "developed" cities in the process of Western modernization. However, this is not to say that twinning as international communication for development is "a one-way flow of advice, information, equipment, and other types of assistance when the pairing is between an advanced community and a less-developed one" (Zelinsky 1991:3). Since its inception in 1985, Montreal's twinning with Shanghai shows that the horticultural exchanges and various construction projects on gardens were never a one-sided influence from Montreal to Shanghai. On the contrary, these projects gave layers of significance to both sister cities. Even though the exchanges of urban management between the Montreal municipal government (MMG) and the Shanghai municipal government (SMG) seemed to be a one-way flow of information and advice that was aimed to help the latter catch up to the Western processes of industrialization and urbanization. Montreal still gained benefits by building up political

networks in the financial powerhouse of China and by identifying possible cooperation projects with the hopes of economic spin-offs.

**Local and Global Contexts of Sister-City Relationships**

The shifting twinning objectives from cultural/educational exchanges to economic interests and the pursuit of economic spin-offs are often explained as the local consequences of the global economy. Wilbur Zelinsky argues how examining the sister-city phenomenon is a means to measure "the creation of transnational commonalities of thought and social behaviour in an increasingly interdependent late-twentieth-century world" (Zelinsky 1991:1). He further claims how SCRs generally confirm Immanuel Wallerstein's core-periphery model of the world system. In other literature on twinning, economic globalization is also mentioned to explain the transformation of twinning objectives. For instance, O'Toole holds that the discourse formation on the Australian perception of SCRs is heavily influenced by the notion of economic globalization. "In many instances, the [SCR] has been transformed into a commodity for local governments to use in their quest for broader economic development strategies" (O'Toole 1999: 406). He further contests that recent twinning development is framed by the global economy and underlined by neo-liberal logic. Therefore, municipal officials are expected to justify twinning with an economic return. Smith also contends that international activities of municipal government are in response to "the external forces of interdependence and globalization and the internal fragmentation of political power..." (Smith 1998: 62). Therefore, making sister-city connections with strategic cities in the Pacific Rim is a means to make Vancouver itself a global city. As mentioned, Cremer et al. (2001)

suggest integrating cultural and commercial objectives in twinning in order to advance local interests through SCRs. Moreover, they also emphasize "an in-depth analysis of contextual uniqueness" in order to avoid the over-generalization of sister cities as the interface of the local-global divide.

The above arguments have their merits because they are moving away from the danger of de-contextualizing twinning by solely focusing on the relationship itself. This problem is especially shown in Moira Ball's work (1992), where survey-type research leaves little room to embed twinning in the broader background. However, the discussion of twinning in "the increasingly interdependent late-twentieth-century world", as Zelinsky claims, and in the "local-global divide", as Cremer et al. argue, remain to be vague. The problem is that their arguments are still generated from within the SCRs, but little has been said about how twinning is forged between the global and the local or how twinning is played out between the global structure and the local strategy. That is, because their research scope was limited, the previous studies either pushed the global into the background as some sort of external forces, or reduced globalization and the transformation of twinning objectives into a cause-effect process. In short, the previous literature on twinning failed to address twinning or municipal international relations within global-local dynamics.

In this research, I argue against Cremer et al's claim that twinning occurs at the interface of the global-local divide. If we treat the global and the local as a divide, we can easily fall into the pitfall of relating the two in a causal effect. Twinning should be contextualized in the dialectical dynamics between the local and the local. Globalization is broadly understood as growing and intensified cross-border transactions and increasing

capacities of tremendous geographical mobility and penetration. Nevertheless, globalization gives rise to the importance of cities in directly linking national/regional economies to the global flows of financial, material, human and information resources. As Saskia Sassen argues, globalization "contains not only the capacities for enormous geographic dispersal and mobility but also pronounced territorial concentrations of resources necessary for the management and servicing of that dispersal and mobility" (Sassen 2002: 2). In other words, the dynamics between the global and the local are dialectically taking place in different or overlapping spatial scales. While globalization is regarded as an external force occurring outside of the cities, it is paradoxically done in the cities (Sassen 2001).

I consequently argue against the simplification of twinning as a local response to the global influences. It is accurate to see the transformation of twinning into strategic cities alliances for the economic interests of sister cities. This can also be understood as an entrepreneurial strategy for municipalities to respond to pressure and opportunities generated from the structural forces of economic globalization. However, the literature on twinning neglects the fact that twinning itself constitutes transnational, structural links around the globe. To put it in another way, twinning contributes to the complexity of the global, structural context. This context therefore should be regarded as "an emergent, over-determined phenomenon rather than a *sui generis* causal mechanism" (Jessop 2000: 84).

Studying the economic aspects of Montreal's twinning with Shanghai sheds light on the dialectical processes between the global and the local or between economic globalization and the cities. The MMG interpreted the global economy as a form of

pressure which challenges Montreal's traditional position as a gateway city between Europe and North America. To enhance the city's competitiveness in managing the global flows and seeking opportunities in the global economy, Montreal can no longer be satisfied with this traditional advantage and it has to extend its international reach to China, the rising manufacturing and consuming power in economic globalization. Therefore, the Montreal-Shanghai connection was used to build up Chinese networks, to create footholds for the local business community to seek out investment, and to promote Montreal's strategic sectors in correspondence to Shanghai's developmental needs. Looking for economic spin-offs transforms twinning into an entrepreneurial measurement of city networking and city marketing. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the local responses to the global influences, in turn, consist of parts of the global circuits where local interests spill over national boundaries and local officials extend their power beyond the confines of municipalities. Economic globalization consequently is mediated, regenerated and intensified by global actions and strategies of the local. That is, municipal officials nowadays not only have to "think globally and act locally", but also to "think locally and act globally".

**The Intergovernmental Contexts of Sister-City Relationships**

If SCRs are international relations operating at the municipal level, questions are often raised in reference to senior governments: Is there an overlap of foreign policies and a concomitant waste of resources when different levels of government are active at the international stage? How autonomously can municipalities develop their own twinning agreements or international policies?

Cremer et al. argue that SCRs can be the sole efforts of local communities and municipal governments without the interference from central government, or they can occur "largely outside the auspices of any central government's involvement" (Cremer et al. 2001:377). If central government is not involved in SCRs in New Zealand, it is certainly not the case elsewhere. Nor does it mean that the absence of central government in SCRs has no impact at all. Smith (1992) discusses how Vancouver's foreign policies and choices for SCRs were aligned with federal and provincial policies in making the city into an Asia-Pacific centre. In addition, what have been remarked upon are not overlapping activities, but rather, cooperation, among three levels of Canadian governments in Vancouver's development of twinning relationships. Daniel Bush (1998) explains how Seattle's tie with Tashkent was framed by the U.S. federal policy towards the former Soviet Union; yet, its relation with Managua and its refugee policy were in an immediate conflict with the federal policy in Central America in the '80s. In addition, O'Toole (1999) argues how the absence of federal policy both constrains and supports SCRs in Australia. That is, on the one hand, without clear policies from senior governments, municipalities are constrained by the legitimacy of receiving or allocating resources in its double pursuit of urban development at both local and international levels. On the other hand, municipalities can take advantage of the ambiguous federal guidelines by developing programs more suitable to the city's needs.

Overall, in contrast to the viewpoint of Cremer et al., Smith's, Bush's and O'Toole's arguments point to the idea that twinning cannot possibly take place outside of the intergovernmental context. In this study, I also argue for the importance of contextualizing twinning within intergovernmental relations. Twinning implies that the

work of cities goes beyond traditional boundaries and jurisdictions set to differentiate tasks, interests and responsibilities of governmental agencies in the hierarchical order. Through studying Montreal's twinning with Shanghai, I further propose that the operation of twinning resides in the interplay between Canadian municipalities' formal/ constitutional status and informal/flexible governing capacity. The MMG was both limited and advantaged by the lack of clear guidelines from its senior governments to develop twinning. Its lack of sufficient resources kept it from developing a full-fledged foreign policy without being criticized for ignoring the domestic affairs in Montreal. Nevertheless, the lack of clear guidelines from the senior governments gave the MMG freedom to develop exchange programs suitable to its own needs, while legitimately bypassing the pressure to integrate sensitive issues into high policy of diplomacy, such as national security and ideological/political contestation, into the twinning with Shanghai.

The traditional conception of foreign policy as the sole concern of the central government has been widely refuted in the literature on international relations forged by the non-central government (NCG). Nevertheless, attention is often paid to governments at the regional or provincial level. For instance, due to the sovereignty movement, the Quebec government's international policy has received lots of scholarly attention in terms of its evolution, tension, conflict, negotiation and/or reconciliation with the Canadian federal government (Balthazar 1999; Bernier 1998; Hocking 1993). Meanwhile, international relations forged by the MMG are still unknown in the context of intergovernmental relations. The case study of Montreal's twinning with Shanghai, consequently, is significant in comparing and contrasting the MMG's and its senior government's foreign policies. I argue that although the Canadian municipalities are

constitutionally subject to provinces, the MMG's international relations with Shanghai are never subject to Quebec's sovereignty movement in seeking out international recognition of Quebec's cultural and political distinctiveness. Quite the contrary, the stereotype of Montreal as being the hotbed of the political instability plaguing Canada had to be redressed in order to promote a better image of the city abroad. That is, the MMG was distinctive from its senior government in the attempt to remove any political association with the twinning activities.

**Agencies, Actions and Interpersonal Communication**

It is commonly argued that SCRs are distinct from state-centred international relations because they are regarded as channels of constituent diplomacy. That is, public participation or grass-roots involvement have been commonly discussed as an integral part of SCRs. Previous cases of Vancouver, Seattle, Bristol and North Shore City all have their constituent basis on twinning initiatives made and sustained by strong community involvement. This further makes SCRs distinct from the traditional understanding of diplomacy carried out by professional diplomats. As Bush argues, "[t]raditionally, it has not been easy for many citizens to involve themselves overseas due to an insufficiency of personal resources and relevant information". Thus, the merit of SCRs is to become "a way for citizens to overcome these obstacles" (Bush 1998: 167). Constituents become diplomats and foreign policy is turned into the responsibility of urban residents. Diplomacy, therefore, is not the privilege of professional diplomats who are familiar with various cultural codes, international laws and negotiation strategies. Constituent

diplomacy, on the contrary, is to bring those who are not familiar with other cultures or peoples closer through various exchanges.

As channels of constituent diplomacy, SCRs are not tantamount to international voluntarism across various international cities, like the peace protest against the war in Iraq, the manifestation against meetings of the *World Trade Organization*, or the *International No Car Day*. This is due to the fact that municipal officials are actively involved in making formal agreements in order to cultivate a long-lasting friendship between two cities. Researchers argue that a successful SCR cannot be devoid of municipal involvement along with citizen participation (Dürrschmidt and Mattiesen 2002; Bush 1998; Smith 1998; Zelinsky 1991; Smith 1990). Some umbrella organizations further recommend the establishment of an independent committee to ensure the sustainability of SCRs free from politicians' ulterior motives or from the shifting of municipal politics (*European Commission* 1999; *Sister City International* 2003). Cremer et al. (1996) outline the municipal government's role of organizing SCRs in terms of the rationale, selection processes, management structures, organizational and financial resources and strategic planning. As mentioned, they further promoted an entrepreneurial model to ensure the balance between municipal involvement and community participation: "the inclusion of a dual terminology-'community' and 'municipal'-effectively communicates the need for active community participation together with an explicit, overarching support provided at a local governmental level, rather of central government" (Cremer et al. 2001:390).

Citizen participation or communal-municipal cooperation has been the focus of discussing the success and sustainability of SCRs. The previous literature also shows a

sense of celebration for twinning as a channel through which ordinary people can directly engage themselves in foreign affairs. Indeed, it is important to have a broader base of public participation in urban international affairs. However, such a discussion can fall into the pitfall of simplifying the making of a successful twinning, if no attention is paid to other aspects of agencies, actions or values. It is also important to institutionalize a broader base of public participation in urban international affairs because it is a means to ensure long-lasting exchanges. However, the praise for citizen participation can also be a tendency to romanticize twinning, if no attempt is made to problematize power relations in urban governance or the notion of urban citizenship.

Compared to other SCRs, the MSR was unique because it lacked ordinary citizen participation. If there was any sense of public participation, it was mainly from the business community. This forces a different perspective in reflecting on what makes the MSR successful by shifting the focus away from constituent diplomacy. It then opens up the examination of agencies and action within Montreal in terms of the coalition style between the MMG and the business community, as well as the significance of leadership and its supporting system as the sources of empowerment in twinning. Furthermore, it leads to the investigation into the link between the Montreal and Shanghai municipal governments, as well as the significance of cultural values of trust and *Guanxi* (or networking) in building up the foundation of the twinning and lubricating interpersonal communication. Overall, unlike the previous focus on the municipal-communal partnership, examining governing coalition, leadership and the transnational governing capacity as the supporting system, *Guanxi* and trust in the MSR contributes to rethinking the making of successful SCRs. I further argue that the success lies in the intertwined

processes between organizational and interpersonal communication. That is, even though twinning, on the surface, operates as international communication at the institutional/municipal level, its success largely depends on the mixture of formal/institutional and informal/interpersonal communication through which cooperation, trust and networks are built up between involved actors.

**Citizen Participation**

As mentioned, what made the MSR different from other twinning relationships was the lack of ordinary citizen participation. What made the MSR weak was also the lack of a broader scale of public involvement, since it attributed to the discontinuity of the actual exchanges with Shanghai after the demise of the Bourque administration in 2001. On the one hand, it requires a reality check on the lack of constituent diplomacy in Montreal by looking into the local, political culture, including the boss politics, neo-liberal governmentality and the absence of institutional mechanisms to ensure the sustainability of the MSR. The lack of public participation in the MSR, on the other hand, helps to examine the distinction between functional and non-functional constituent participation in twinning. Such a distinction is needed in order to reveal the blind spot in the previous studies on twinning. While urban citizen participation was celebrated as a distinctive contribution to democratic practices in the cities, the literature is devoid of an in-depth examination into the following problematics: the transformation of the state-centered to the municipal-centered conception of citizenship; the qualification of urban citizens; the limits of conceptualizing urban citizen participation in association with urban public spheres; and the normative quest to maintain and modify urban citizenship in response to

municipal affairs spilling over the given territorial boundaries beyond urban residents' concerns with everyday practices.

In addition to addressing the above conceptual problematics, the case study of Montreal's twinning with Shanghai further indicates the lack of urban citizenship and the rise of economic citizenship. When the MMG used twinning to open the doors to the Chinese market for Montreal's business community, it simultaneously gave rise to economic citizenship, which belongs to firms, markets and global economic actors, rather than to individuals or citizens. This form of citizenship has nothing to do with the ideal of social justice, equality and democratic participation. Therefore, there is a normative demand to call forth a more feasible and sustainable means to ensure and allow urban residents' participation in urban international affairs. Otherwise, when maximized efficiency and economic profits are held high as the maxim of economic globalization, we would encounter the same problems of an absence of urban citizenship and the demise of public awareness in contrast to the rise of economic citizenship benefiting those who are already the most advantaged.

**Human Rights in China**

Montreal's twinning with Shanghai not only lacked ordinary citizen participation, but also an overt agenda on human rights in China. With few exceptions (Bush 1998) the previous literature did not discuss human rights, even though the discussion of this issue has become indispensable concerning international relations with China after the 1989 Tiananmen massacre. Bush argues that concerns with human rights are often raised when the twinning is between a Western liberal and a non-Western totalitarian regime. They

are especially raised by human-rights promoters in the cities or by those who are concerned with the repression of their ethnic groups in the sister-city. For instance in the 1970s the Jewish community pressured the Seattle municipal government to raise concerns about the living conditions of their Jewish counterparts in the sister-city of Tashkent. In return, they demanded that the Russian sister-city improve the treatment of religious groups by the communist regime.

Bush's discussion of the concerns with human rights in Seattle's SCR is mainly a historical, descriptive account. He made no attempt to articulate the philosophical complexity of this issue, nor to evaluate the policy instrument for incorporating human rights in the twinning development with cities from an authoritarian regime. Studying Montreal's twinning with Shanghai, therefore, is significant in articulating this issue with a normative concern. First, criticism and debates over whether the MMG should put pressure on its Chinese counterpart are presented. In addition, the local debates are interpreted in the philosophical arguments about the conflicts and problems of human rights. Third, by examining political realism in China, I argue for the low-profile measurement, like twinning exchanges, to improve human rights in China.

Similar to the Seattle government, the MMG faced local pressure to condemn human-rights violation in China. This pressure was from opposing municipal councillors, *Falun* followers and the local English media. Meanwhile, the MMG was criticized for being ignorant of or in alliance with the human-rights violators because of the cozy friendship with the SMG. The MMG's responses can be summarized in the following three points: 1) the central focus of twinning was on the low policy of diplomacy, instead of political or ideological contestation; 2) it is unfair to the Chinese regime by overlooking the rapid

social and economic improvement in the past decade; 3) twinning can be a more effective means to indirectly influence Chinese officials' mentalities through proceeding low-profile twinning exchanges.

The debates between the MMG and its critics would be limited in the scope of the urban power struggle between ruling and opposing parties, if we fail to embed each side of the argument in the philosophical inquiries into human rights. On the one hand, the criticism of the MMG's lack of concern about human rights in China reflected a deep moral sentiment rooted in Western liberalism and a belief in human rights as fundamental norms of conduct. Their demand for shaming and naming human-rights violators was closely linked with the emotional anger evoked by historical events since the 18th century. Their demands for demanding the change of the human-rights condition in China were partially reasonable because there is not much philosophical controversy over the gross violation of human rights, like the Tiananmen massacre or the crackdown of *Falun* followers. On the other hand, the MMG's arguments reflected the conflicts among rights and the difficulty to argue that one set of rights is prioritized over the other. If it was more than the rhetorical defence, the MMG's implicit agenda on the low-profile strategy or the indirect influences through twinning exchanges was considered to be a better option than putting direct pressure on the Chinese government. This is under the consideration that high-profile condemnation has backfired to give rise to Chinese nationalism in the last decade.

After exploring the grey area of human rights and applying a mixture of critiques to each side of the argument, the thesis concludes with the final proposition: gross human-rights violations in China should not be forgotten or excused. However, juggling between

putting direct condemnation and inserting indirect influences through twinning exchanges, the latter is a better policy instrument because it has a better chance to create channels of intercultural communication even at a small scale and to reach an unforced consensus on human rights in the long run.

**Thesis Outline**

In Chapter 1, through re-working Hamid Mowlana's theory of international communication (1997), I argue for the first proposition that SCRs are distinctive channels of international communication for development. This not only intends to redress the media-centric field of international communication, but also to interpret twinning in the language of international communication at the organizational level. Moreover, through introducing the initiative and two major aspects of Montreal's twinning with Shanghai, the horticultural exchanges and urban management, I argue that twinning as international communication for development is not only based on communicative rationale of reciprocity, but also on the instrumental rationale of developing mutual interests and meeting specific demands of sister cities. Therefore, the twinning between a more advanced and a less developed city is never a one-way flow of influences.

In Chapter 2, I propose to examine the shifting twinning objectives from cultural/educational exchanges to economic interests in the macro structure of the global-local dialectics. First, the dubious status of nation-states as the key player at the international stage is examined in order to show how the spatial units of cities relatively gain importance in all sorts of global flow. Cities make up the global circuits, but their importance in controlling and influencing the global economy depends on their position,

performance and competitiveness in the world urban hierarchy (Friedmann 2002; Taylor and Walker 2001). Furthermore, interrelated with the problems of welfare states, cities also face multidimensional crises in management. The external demand to be competitive and the internal need to better manage the cities have contributed to the transformation from urban managerialism to entrepreneurialism (Harvey 2001). Municipal affairs are no longer confined to the given territorial boundaries, city halls go abroad and municipalities become entrepreneurs to compete against each other in seeking out developmental opportunities. It is within this context that twinning is transformed into a municipal entrepreneurial strategy with an emphasis on the economic spin-offs. That is, twinning is emphasized to be strategic cities alliances through which sister cities aim to find advantages from each other in order to develop individual urban competitiveness. The MSR shows that while the SMG gained urban managerial expertise from the MMG in order to cope with the rapid urban development in the 1990s, the MMG attempted to redefine Montreal's position in the global economy by the potential Chinese market. In turn, twinning partially constitutes the network of the global economy where flows of investment, information and resources are mediated by municipalities. This eventually helps us to understand the dialectical connection between the global and the local.

In Chapter 3, the meso structure of twinning in intergovernmental relations is teased out in order to show that the functional explanation of urban diplomacy in the discourse of the global-local dynamics need to be complemented by the specific regional determinants that politically or culturally frame a Canadian municipality's international policy. The third proposition is that the limits and opportunities of what a municipality can do at the international stage greatly resides in the interplay between its constitutional,

formal position as the subject of the province and its less sensitive and more flexible position as the enabling factor in pursuing suitable twinning programs for the specific needs of the city. The discussion starts with the Canadian historical background of giving room to multi-layered diplomacy and progresses to the brief review of Quebec's paradiplomacy or protodiplomacy—that its political motivation to gain recognition for Quebec's sovereignty once created controversy and tension with the Canadian federal government. The discussion of Quebec's development of international relations sets the background of comparison with Montreal's twinning with Shanghai in order to single out the depoliticized nature of the MMG's urban diplomacy with the orientation towards the low policy of horticultural, urban managerial and economic exchanges.

In Chapter 4, the discussion shifts from the "hard", structural analyses to the "soft" social and cultural tissues of the twinning. Unlike the previous literature focusing on ordinary citizen participation or constituent diplomacy, lacking the involvement of non-functional constituents in the MSR leads into a different path of examining the micro aspects of twinning. First, the combination of communicative cooperation and power dynamics in forming a coalition between the MMG and the local business community is examined. This examination heavily relies on the ideas of urban governance and power relations discussed by Alan DiGaetano and John Klemanski (1999). It also refers to Jan Kooiman and his colleagues' work (1994) on governance as the interaction between governmental and non-governmental agencies. By applying Howard Elcock's theory of leadership (2001), I further look into the roles, tasks and interests of former mayor Bourque's leadership and his cultural advisor's transnational capacity as the supporting system. Moreover, interpersonal networking or the Chinese conception of *Guanxi* is

discussed as a cornerstone and the source of empowerment for the MSR. Finally, by following Niklas Luhmann (1979) and Piotr Sztompka (1999), the other cornerstone of the MSR, trust, is theorized as a moral trait and a quality of social relationship and social capitals.

Overall, this chapter views twinning from the angle of purposeful actions woven in power dynamics, supported by human resources, infused with social values and empowered by creative capacities cutting across different spatial settings of governmental and functional-constituent agencies. In other words, this chapter proposes to understand twinning in the language of interpersonal communication. That is, although certain governmental formality and authority are required to build up the twinning with the Chinese cities, its success mainly depends on the enthusiasm of individuals, the reciprocal interaction and the good will to maintain the friendship at both an interpersonal and an institutional level.

In the final chapter, I discuss the absent concerns about citizen participation and the lack of an overt integration of human rights in the MSR scheme. Discussing what was missing is as important as what was present, because it potentially indicates the weakness, expands the given scope and looks into improvement in the future. Thus, the lack of citizen participation in the MSR is not only the chance to shift the focus to other aspects of actions and agencies, but also occasions the reflection on the local, political culture in the mixture of boss politics, neo-liberal governmentality and the traditional absence of institutionalized channels of citizen participation in Montreal. If the MSR was built on interpersonal communication between governmental officials, the limited communicative scope also cost the activeness of twinning along with the changes of municipal politics.

In addition, distinguishing functional and non-functional constituents carefully treated urban citizen participation.

In the empirical analysis of the MSR, it is shown that such a distinction is necessary because the interests of the latter can have nothing to do with the ideal of democracy or citizenship. The encouragement of the entrepreneurial approach towards twinning, rather, advantaged the business community the most and gave rise to economic citizenship in the global economy. However, this normative concern about the lack of non-functional citizen participation cannot be adequately redressed by the conception of urban citizenship, which is closely associated with rights and responsibilities in urban public spheres. Through presenting and contesting the work of Robert Beauregard and Anne Bounds on the theory of urban citizenship (2000), it remains to be a normative quest to find out how citizen participation can be ensured when municipal affairs go beyond the given territorial boundaries or the reach of urban everyday practices.

The second part of Chapter 5 discusses the absent agenda on human rights in the twinning with Shanghai. In addition to fairly presenting arguments from the MMG and its critics, I argue for the necessity of understanding the rationales underlining their arguments. On the one hand, the MMG critic's arguments are understood in the language of rights derived from the Western liberal individualism and rooted in the contemporary ideal of respecting human autonomy and dignity. This belief in human rights as the underlying moral principles and the universal norms of conduct further become the source of forming the politics of naming and shaming those who violated the assumed cosmopolitan ideal. On the other hand, the MMG's defence for its implicit or indirect human-rights policy resides in the grey area of human rights, where conflicts of different

sets of rights dwell upon the reality of no obvious improvement in human rights after applying direct pressure on the Chinese regime. In short, there is neither a simple answer nor a quick fix to the condition of human rights in China. However, if twinning is consistently used as an indirect channel to discuss what is a better human condition of living—even at a very small scale—such as the necessity of having green spaces and the avoidance of developing an alienated urban environment, it is considered to be a better policy instrument than condemnation without sufficient local knowledge. This is not to propose cultural relativism, nor does it suggest any justification of gross human-rights violations in China. To follow Charles Taylor's argument (2002), the long-term goal is rather to reach an unforced consensus on human rights as norms of conduct, regardless of the sources of underlying justification.

**Methodology**

Although many sister-city relationships have been woven around the globe, academic discussion remains sporadic on this form of international diplomacy. In the work that has been done in this area, we often see the survey type of policy research in which we know little about the involved actors' initiatives and justification, nor the local, political factors which shape the uniqueness of each twinning (O'Toole 2001; Cremer et al. 2001; Ramasamy et al. 1996; Ball 1992; Zelinsky 1991; Smith 1990). Therefore, the documentation of Montreal's twinning with Shanghai, in the analysis of qualitative interviews with involved actors, is in itself essential because it provides a first-hand access to the voices, viewpoints and insights behind the twinning, as no secondary literature on the MSR is to be found.

These qualitative interviews, 12 in total, were conducted in accordance with Concordia University's ethical research codes[1]. Most of them were conducted with senior municipal officers under the Bourque administration. Others were involved actors in the twinning from the private sector, the Chinese community in Montreal, or an educational institution. The shortest lasted 25 minutes and the longest lasted 3 hours. The average length of an interview was approximately 60 to 70 minutes. There are 250 pages of double-spaced transcripts in total. Some interviews were done in Chinese, and were translated and transcribed into English later. In quoting some of the interview results in this dissertation, minimal editing has been done in order to ensure interviewees' anonymity and confidentiality, as well as the flow of discussion.

Concerning interviewing procedures, formal interviews were conducted in order to encourage the interviewees' reflection on their formulation of viewpoints in a more systematic manner. In addition, they were also conducted in a semi-structured manner to allow a more flexible and elaborative discussion. The interviews were guided by five themes of discussion: 1) the interviewee's role, tasks, degrees of involvement in the Montreal-Shanghai relation. 2) the interviewee's knowledge of the history, objectives, achievement of the relation. 3) the interviewee's knowledge of the components of the relation in both official/formal and interpersonal aspects. 4) the interviewee's views on the significance, contribution and/or problems of the relation. 5) the interviewee's expectation of the possible improvement of the relation. Probing techniques were utilized in order to clarify ideas or to obtain more information, even though my interviewees were informative in the first place. At the end of each interview, every interviewee was asked

about any other crucial point concerning the twinning outside of the scope of the above five themes of discussion.

Filled with official rhetoric, unofficial anecdotes, ideologies, personal stories, opinions, and so forth, the interview results were rich in themselves. Even though the interview results are integral to the development of arguments in this research, a cross-examination of the validity of the interview data is required by referring to other sources of research data, including news reportage[2] and municipal documents[3]. The multiple sourcing of research data is also essential to relate discourses to the practices and to examine how the MMG and other involved agencies acted on perceived structures and strategies. In a sense, drawing information from these different sources is in accord with the methodological use of triangulation recommended by Norman Denzin (1970). News reportage is helpful to understand how the Montreal-Shanghai connection was represented and how debates or controversies were evoked in the public culture. This source of data complements the insufficiency of opposing viewpoints collected in other forms of data, since no details of debates in the municipal council were available and since no opposing councillors at the time responded to my request for an interview. Their viewpoints were published frequently in the English daily, *The Montreal Gazette.* Official documents provide rich information about the mobilization of municipal resources, such as budgets, governmental and non-governmental agencies and their various capacities. They are also informative about the official discourse on the importance of the twinning and on the local governmental conceptualization and strategies of the city's response to the global economy.

Finally, given the research interest and scope of my dissertation, the focus is on Montreal rather than on Shanghai in the twinning development. The research also pays more attention to the MSR under the Bourque administration between 1994 and 2001, which was the most active period of development since its inception in 1985.

# Chapter 1
# International Communication for Development between Sister Cities

Much literature on international communication or development communication emphasizes the economic and political processes in relation to technological and cultural changes occurring at the sphere of international information and communication technologies. This media-centric orientation has led to a neglect of organization networks and interpersonal communication taking place at the international stage (Tehranian 1999). This chapter, therefore, aims to redress this problem by examining SCRs as a distinctive field of international communication for development. This objective is pursued by reworking Hamid Mowlana's theory of international communication and by examining SCRs in general and the MSR in particular.

SCRs are distinctive from state-centred international relations, because the former usually orients towards the so-called low policy of diplomacy, ranging from cultural, economic, and educational to urban managerial exchanges. That is, there is a lack of the central government's concern with the so-called high policy concerning political, ideological or military issues in international relations. Furthermore, SCRs between Western and Chinese cities show that the Chinese opened the channels of communication with the West in order to proceed selective modernization and to better integrate to the world capitalist system. Nevertheless, this process of communication for development is not one-sided and is based on mutual reciprocity for international cooperation on relatively equal footings.

While most of the previous literature on SCRs associated twinning with the so-called constituent diplomacy, which allows ordinary citizens to share diplomatic responsibilities, the case study of the MSR is unique because the latter's operation between 1985 and 2001 lacked public invovlement. It was mainly undertaken by the MMG in tandem with the SMG at the organizational and the interpersonal levels. To better develop the arguments, this chapter mainly focuses on the organizational aspect of interaction between the MMG and the SMG. Interpersonal communication will be discussed in Chapter 4 where the micro aspect of actions and agencies in the MSR is examined.

## Sister-City Relationships as Channels of International Communication

Even though thousands of SCRs have been woven around the globe[1], and despite the fact that nearly half (48%) of the American cities indicated an active engagement in SCRs (Kincaid 1997), there has been only a handful of studies that have directly addressed this worldwide phenomenon. While international communication has been regarded as a multiple-actor arena, the existing literature often focuses on actors including nation-states, supranational organizations, multinational corporations, mass media, intergovernmental organizations, international non-governmental organizations and individuals (Thussu 2000; Mowlana 1997; Hamelink 1994). Non-central governments, especially municipal governments, are left out of international communication research. An examination of SCRs is practically non-existent. Mowlana's following argument summarizes this lack of research interest:

> Unfortunately, nearly all traditional international relations research has been carried out on the level of the national unit, emphasizing only (1) high- and middle-level policy makers, including formal institutions and bureaucracy, and (2) diplomatic, political, economic, and military aspects

> of international relations. Consequently, with the exception of a few studies, international communication has been neglected (Mowlana 1997: 131-2).

Mowlana goes on to argue for nine broad channels of international communication carried out by various agencies, including immigrants and refugees, labourers and professionals, tourists, military, diplomatic and intelligence agencies, businessmen, performers in mass media and popular culture, sportsmen and volunteers. That is, to make the field of international communication more comprehensive, Mowlana thinks that it is necessary to pay attention to the above channels. He particularly discusses international tourism as a mode of international relations of the public, especially in the age of globalization.

The foreign relations of the public are not a totally new phenomenon, as traditional SCRs, burgeoned in the post-WWII period, were channels of citizen engagement with the help of the municipal government. For more than fifty years, the public has been able to engage itself in the so-called low policy of diplomacy for war relief, humanitarian aids, cultural/educational exchanges, sports events, volunteering, etc. In some cases, twinning programs are also channels for the general public to participate in the high policy of international relations. For instance, Seattle's twinning with Managua was the channel in which Seattle residents protested against the American federal government's foreign policy in Central America in the 1980s (Bush 1998). Nevertheless, it should be noted that the Seattle-Managua tie specifically for a political cause is not evident in the twinning phenomenon. Most of the reported SCRs operate at the level of low policy closer to the practices of everyday urban life. Therefore, unlike international relations conducted by national units, SCRs rarely intend to touch sensitive political issues in world politics.

Even though they have been understudied in the field of international communication, SCRs are still a distinctive channel for transnational activities, if we follow Mowlana's definition:

> International communication [is] a field of inquiry and research that consists of the transfer of values, attitudes, opinions, and information through individuals, groups, governments, and technologies, as well as the study of the structure of institutions responsible for promoting or inhibiting such messages among and between nations and cultures. It is a field of study and research, which entails an analysis of the channels and institutions of communication. More important, it involves examination of the mutually shared meanings that make communication possible (Mowlana 1997: 207).

SCRs, without doubt, are channels for the transfer of values, attitudes, opinions and information, and they are often promoted and carried out by municipalities and/or urban residents. The mutually shared meanings certainly are required in order to bring once unconnected cities closer to each other. Such mutually shared meanings between sister cities are often understood in an idealistic-humanistic approach, which emphasizes international communication as a means to build up cooperation or friendships across national or cultural boundaries. Accordingly, SCRs can be forces of empowerment to reach international understanding or cooperation. For instance, in the agreement between Taichung (Taiwan) and North Shore City (New Zealand), both cities consented to:

> Establish lasting, friendly relations... strive to maintain their close alliance and improve bilateral 'understanding and trust' and 'make every effort to contribute to the free and prosperous life of people in both Taichung and North Shore City.' Both cities also agreed to 'exchange experiences concerning municipal construction projects, to organize visits, and to learn from each other' and to "promote co-operation in the area of trade, cultural, economic affairs, education and social development to strengthen their binding ties' (Quoted in Cremer et al. 2001: 396).

These objectives are typical of the mission statements of SCRs. By emphasizing equality and reciprocal advantages, SCRs are friendships between two cities in which cultural stereotypes, political ideologies or economic disparities are supposed to be broken down, and the differences between two sister cities are something to be recognized as facilitating rather than hindering international communication. That is, the concept of

friendship at the interpersonal level is applied to the institutional, international level where the development of SCRs is based more on voluntarily negotiation or agreement than on force or coercion.

Unlike international relations of the central government, SCRs, therefore, are less formal and less constrained by ideological, political, or economic differences. Nevertheless, this is not to say that there are no obstacles or problems in SCRs. Without compulsory or formally institutionalized constraints, SCRs can be easily stopped by geographical distances, due to unbearable travel expenses, linguistic or cultural barriers (Rummel 1999). Friendship between sister cities can turn sour if there is a lack of substantial friendship or mutual trust due to the instrumental orientation towards the advantages of sister cities, or if there are external political constraints due to the tension or conflict between nation-states (O'Tootle 2001; Bush 1998). Furthermore, SCRs can go dormant with the change of municipal officials and their different ideas on the importance of developing and maintaining friendships with sister cities (Zhang 1989).

In addition to the above obstacles which challenge the idealistic-humanistic approach towards the pursuits of SCRs, Zelinsky (1991) and Bush (1998) also point out that such an approach entailed in the American initiative of sister-city programs in the Cold War period was not simply about creating channels of dialogues among different peoples. It was also about the promotion of American or Western life styles against the Communist ideology. That is, U.S. President Eisenhower's "people-to-people program" actually entailed a particular worldview or ideological belief, which was presented through SCRs as an ideal system. However, the success of SCRs ironically depends on the fulfillment of the humanistic ideal of partnership or friendship underlined by mutual reciprocity.

Among recent cases, the SCR between the Swiss city of Zurich, and the Chinese city of Kunming serves as a good example to illustrate a successful CR based on exchanges of low policy and mutual interests. The large-scale collaboration between the two cities included conservation of historical heritage, regional planning, potable water treatment and supply, sewage drainage and the public transportation design and management in Kunming. A Chinese official emphasized that "the Swiss experts' profound understanding of Chinese culture, their respect for the traditions of Kunming, and the active absorption of modern know-how from Zurich by the Kunming urban planners all formed a solid foundation for successful cooperation because good urban design is based on active cultural exchange!" (Wang 2002: 65-6). Municipal officials from the two cities have never been naïve about the humanistic ideal of SCRs. The Swiss ambassador to China clearly pointed out the difficulties of facilitating a successful SCR:

> The partnership between Kunming and Zurich had to overcome a number of obstacles from the start. These were not all caused by the geographical distance and the language barrier. Not only are the political systems in our two countries very different, but the local authorities are also organized based on different principles. The local government of Kunming is part of an administrative system resulting from a long history and characterized by centralization and control by a single political party. The Zurich municipal government is ruled by the long tradition of wide-open democracy in Switzerland. Should the differences between these two systems be an obstacle to dialogue and to the establishment of relations of a non-official and non-governmental nature between the two towns? Obstacles are there to be overcome, and if there is good will on both sides, overcoming them will make them springboards for further developments and further success. This is what was understood with the establishment of this partnership, and this is what was essentially realized over the course of these two decades (Dreyer 2002: 206).

The Swiss official emphasized differences in the political systems between sister cities, one democratic and the other authoritarian. Nevertheless, the "non-official and non-government nature" of SCRs made the partnership possible. This is not to say that such a SCR did not operate at the top-top governmental level. Quite on the contrary, the Zurich side knew the crucial role of the political leaders in the Chinese centralization system as the key to success of the partnership, and it was important to raise their awareness and

support right from the beginning of the partnership (Joos 2002). Thus, the "non-official and non-governmental nature" is more about that of twinning activities oriented towards the low policy of diplomacy, which does not touch sensitive political issues of governing styles, democracy or human rights in China.

**Sister-City Relationships as International Communication Development**

SCRs are also processes of international communication development through which certain developmental goals of sister cities can be achieved. SCRs entail instrumental functions and their development is not an end in itself, but a means to other objectives, such as Kunming's urbanization through Zurich's assistance. SCRs between Chinese and Western cities, in general, orient towards *communication for development*[2]. That is, communication through twinning exchanges is built with both communicative and instrumental rationale in order to achieve developmental goals in and between sister cities. On the one hand, SCRs are communicative processes in which sister cities mutually develop a sense of affinity with each other. On the other hand, the communicative rationale between SCRs not only builds up friendships, but also becomes a foundation for each city to look into possible developmental goals from each other's advantages or specialty.

If twinning is potentially an ideal site where communication for development takes place, it follows the logic that "development, in all its complexity, is communication and that communication is development...[The combined term] communication development...[is to] encourage the construction of development programs to fit the society, rather than orienting society to fit development programs" (Mowlana 1997: 196).

The complexity Mowlana refers to is that of the interplay between political economy, cultural identity and value systems in the linkage between communication and development. Despite that his empirical discussion is located at the national and global level with a specific attention to how communication

technology or mass media has been played out in the above complexity, the theoretical implication of Mowlana's theory of communication development is still sound in considering SCRs.

The conception of development is central to either rhetoric or actual twinning projects, such as the development of friendship, of mutual understanding, of cooperation, of urbanization, or of urban competitiveness, etc. Studying SCRs, thus, is to investigate how communication as social processes spilling over national boundaries is intertwined with communication as an instrumental means to see some sort of change or transformation between and within cities. In a sense, communication and development are two sides of the same coin that exchanges of ideas, value systems, information or professional knowledge cannot help but involve with a sense of initiative, growth, change, or advancement, which are meanings closely related to development. Communication for development is especially central to links between more "advanced" and less "developed" regions of Western modernization. Nevertheless, the central concern is about how to "encourage the construction of development programs to fit the society, rather than orienting society to fit development programs"[3] (Mowlana 1997: 196). To what extent can the use of various communication strategies for developmental programs be maximized with a minimum negative impact on the local cultures of less developed regions? Twinning between a Chinese and a Western city best exemplifies the

above concerns. However, before going into this problematic, the historical background of SCRs between Chinese and Western cities is examined.

SCRs involving Chinese and Western cities were generally initiated at two critical moments in recent Chinese history: one was the launching of the U.S.-Chinese diplomatic relation in 1979 and the other was during Deng Xiaoping's implementation of the open-door policy of economic reforms in 1985. The former symbolized the détente of the Cold War for the Chinese communist regime and the latter welcomed and encouraged international exchanges and alternative economic models. It was no coincidence that the three twinning relationships involving Canadian and Chinese cities were all initiated in 1985: the Vancouver-Guangzhou connection, the Calgary-Daqing link and the Montreal-Shanghai tie. These links would not have existed had China continued to be inaccessible to non-Communist countries. Even though political change is not the overt prerequisite for economic development in the open-door policy, one of its implications has been the decentralization of authority, which enables municipal government and enterprises to experience more autonomy. The open-door policy, which is eventually about a limited and gradual opening process to global capitalism, has also opened up more opportunities for the municipal governments of coastal cities in China to take active roles in attracting foreign direct investments and in promoting their own developmental interests (Logan 2002; Pereira 2002; Fie and Taubmann 2002).

As one of my interviewees explained, in the eyes of many Westerners the Chinese, having been cut off from non-Communist countries for more than thirty years, remained mysterious, conservative or even backward with the stereotypical portrait of Chinese men sporting queues and women with bound feet (*Interview*, 17 May 2002). SCRs are one of

the policy instruments for the Chinese to open themselves to the outside world and project an image of their own by drawing on some aspects of traditional Chinese culture esteemed to be positive in order to redress the negative images. In other words, SCRs, for Chinese cities, as well as for their counterparts, are channels for "mutual understanding, local exchanges and cooperation based on equality and mutual benefit" (Zhang 1989: 36). In addition to developing a more positive image of the Chinese, the Chinese municipal government was interested in SCRs in the 1980s because they provided development opportunities to catch up to the West. SCRs allow Chinese cities to catch up in terms of economic growth, as well as technological advancement and urbanization. Derived from the economic open-door policy, this set of objectives is a selective development of modernization, which committed more to Western industrialism and capitalism than anything else. SCRs are a convenient means to go through the above selective processes of modernization, especially because it is beyond the municipalities' responsibility to deal with high policy charged with potential ideological or political confrontation in foreign relations. This is not to say that liberal democratic values are not indirectly or partially channeled to Chinese cities through SCRs. For instance, with a limited scale, citizen consultation was done in the urbanization project in Kunming (Wang 2002). While addressing the importance of cultural exchanges in the spirit of communicative mutuality, the Chinese never shy away from expressing their instrumental interests in SCRs as a means to access the flow of information or professional knowledge from more advanced cities in order to facilitate economic-reform policy. This is especially the case when "[Chinese] leaders of provincial governments and cities visit their sister states or

cities and realize that China has lagged far behind in economy, administration, science and technology" (Zhang 1987: 37).

Getting back to the problematic of communication for development between a more advanced and a less developed region: to what extent do the exchanges of professional knowledge or expertise on urban development consider the idea that developmental programs should fit local conditions, instead of the other way around? This question is raised especially because development, as with the catching-up processes, in Chinese sister cities is about the genesis of economic modernization accentuated by material growth and technological transformation. It is also about a strong orientation towards integration in the global economy and a gradual opening process towards Western liberal capitalism characterized by the encouragement of consumption. However, it should be noted that these dimensions of development are kept within the systems of governmental control. Without a cautious reflection about whether developmental projects fit local conditions, or whether Western models are good in themselves, development for Chinese cities can be simply an imitation of the Western hegemonic developmental paradigm. The danger of fitting Chinese society into developmental projects of urbanization is exemplified in the case of Dalian, a Northern-Chinese industrial city where governmental officials once treated its existing urban tram network as out of date. The reason was simply because it did not seem to be a modernized form of public transportation and because many tram networks in Western cities have long been replaced by buses or underground metro systems (Gou 2002: 182). However, compared to constructing metro or bus systems, working on the existing local tram system could have been the best

option for Dalian to guarantee the most space-efficiency, the least air pollution and the least amount of developmental costs.

The myth of Western economic modernization can be reified in SCRs with Chinese cities, if there is a one-way flow of professional knowledge, information or expertise imposed from one side to the other. Nevertheless, SCRs, as communication for development, also entail the potential to break such a myth of modernization, if developmental projects spawned from SCRs consider each sister city's individuality, local and cultural conditions, demands, specialty and capacities. That is, when these considerations are taken in the communicative processes, suitable projection of development can be identified or cooperated between sister cities. As one Chinese official involved in the Zurich-Kunming partnership argues, "the option of urban planners from developed countries was rated high in China"; however, "no two cities are alike. If Zurich had applied its experience unaltered to Kunming the project would have failed" (Wang 2002: 61, 65-6).

While the above discussion of SCRs as international communication for development has mainly been about how Western conceptions and re-conceptions of modernization partially constitute developmental projects in less advanced regions, this is not to say that the flows of exchanges and influences in SCRs is one-sided—where the more "advanced" city has more authority to tell the less advanced one what to do. For instance, Chinese cities, like Kunming, seem to be the only beneficiary of the twinning because the collaborative project helped the city to catch up to the processes of modernization. This impression is especially reinforced when the Chinese official admits that the opinions of experts from the developed area are highly appreciated. However, if the flow of

communication between sister cities is not mutually directed, its sustainability is highly questionable. Alexius Pereira has already emphasized the importance of mutuality through the case study of the intergovernmental collaboration for developmental strategy and transformational development in Suzhou (China) undertaken by both the Singapore and the Chinese governments. "The initiative hope was that the two separate interests could be complementary; however, after it was evident that one partner was not benefiting, the collaboration began to weaken" (Pereira 2002: 134). The Zurich-Kunming partnership also showed that benefits cannot possibly be restricted to one sister city. Zurich argues for the importance of building networks in China in the sense that Kunming is the gateway for Zurich to China and that the pilot urban project in Kunming can become a model of other Chinese urban developments. Consequently, it brings opportunities for the Swiss to entrench their influences in China. In addition, the *Chinese Garden in Zurich* was also praised as beneficial to Zurich.

These two points are well taken; however, it is rather unclear why a Chinese garden is important to a Western city or whether being implicated in the Chinese network can bring more economic opportunities for a Western city. The case study of Montreal's twinning with Shanghai therefore helps to answer the above questions.

**Montreal's Twinning with Shanghai: Initiative and Development**

In either rhetorical or actual terms, Montreal's twinning with Shanghai was developed through the communicative processes of cooperation. The following is a typical statement in the MSR memoranda: the twinning "is in the spirit of equality and reciprocal advantages". In addition, "two cities have established a close relation for cooperation and

have also facilitated friendly exchanges in the domain of technology, economy, and culture, which advantages the economic and social development of both countries since 1985" (Montreal Municipal Government 1999(a), 1987). However, before going into the details of the MSR, it should be noted that, even though the MSR was oriented towards the development of friendship between two cities, it was not tantamount to constituent diplomacy of which citizen participation played a central role in determining the content, flow and volume of international communication between cities. The municipal government plays a facilitating but not necessarily dominating role in constituent diplomacy. Therefore, without referring the term "constituent" to voters, citizens or urban residents, Graham et al. (1998) wrongly equates the term constituent diplomacy with paradiplomacy, which actually emphasizes sub-national (urban) government's relatively independent role in international activities.

Without the dimensions of constituent diplomacy, the MSR can be more easily understood as top-top or even top-down institutional processes of paradiplomacy in which exchanges or cooperative projects were mostly initiated and undertaken by municipal governmental agencies. Participation from "the bottom" came mostly from the business community. In other words, unlike other SCRs between more advanced cities, such as the one between Japanese and New Zealand cities, or between European cities, the MMG and the SMG were not keen to mutually send school children to learn either French or Chinese[4], nor were they eager to develop any program which needed "bottom-up" urban resident participation in any cultural events. This can be partially explained by Zelinsky's argument (1991) that the larger the population scale of sister cities, the less the involvement of urban residents. In related Chinese reportage on SCRs (Li 1998; Wu and

Huang 1990; Yang 1989), the top-top institutional processes are not uncommon, as the political system in China does not necessarily permit the bottom-up process of exchanges between urban residents in sister cities[5].

Even though the Montreal-Shanghai relationship was initiated in 1985, the first official contact between the two can be dated back to 1979 when the former invited the latter to participate in an international horticultural exhibition, *Les Floralis*. Given uncertainty of being open to the rest of the world and given Shanghai faced numerous internal problems following the end of the Cultural Revolution, the SMG first did not show any interest to accept the invitation from the MMG (*Interview*, 15 May 2002). The former mayor of Montreal, Jean Drapeau, therefore, wrote a letter to a high-ranking Chinese official at the central government, Huang Hua, who used to be the Chinese ambassador to Canada, to see if the SMG would change its decision. Huang eventually made the Shanghai delegation come to Montreal, and "they not only came in 1981, but also opened up a window to North America" (*Interview*, 17 May 2002). The window, in this context, refers to the Chinese horticultural practices of penjing (or bonsai in Japanese). The same interviewee elaborated his point by stating that:

> the [delegation from Shanghai] came in their *Jong Shan Juang* (the dress similar to a military uniform with a closed collar)... their exhibition won the 4th prize overall, and it gave people a completely new impression. Since then, Chinese culture attracted attention in Montreal. The Canada-Chinese Association was established. China also encouraged foreigners to know China (*Interview*, 17 May 2002).

The frequent horticultural exchanges between Montreal and Shanghai since 1981 became the foundation of the official friendship four years later.

Even though there was an economic disparity between Montreal and Shanghai in the 1980s, the flow of exchanges cannot be adequately explained as a "one-way flow of advice, information, equipment, and other types of assistance when the pairing is between

an advanced community and a less-developed one" (Zelinsky 1991:3). Horticultural exchanges made partnership and collaboration on equal footing possible. As one official explained, "Some of our gardeners went to Shanghai and studied the art of penjing... This is something that cannot be learned in Montreal. The knowledge is not available. [In turn] people from Shanghai got a lot of technical information [about green houses] from what we have in Montreal" (*Interview*, 11 July 2002). Frequent horticultural exchanges were transformed into three collaborative projects with the construction of the *Chinese Garden in Montreal* in 1991, the *Shanghai Downtown Green Space* project in 1999 and the *Montreal Garden in Shanghai* in 2000. Planting trees or building gardens are not uncommon twinning activities, as they are materialized forms of symbolic friendships or partnerships between sister cities. However, building three large-scale gardens and park together is rare in urban international relations.

The *Chinese Garden in Montreal* was designed according to those built in the southern Yangtze River region during the Ming dynasty. It is also called the *Mon-Hu Garden* in Chinese (or the *Dream Lake Garden* in English). *"Mon"* indicates Montreal and *"Hu"* indicates Shanghai. In other words, the name of the garden itself symbolizes friendship between the two cities (Le 2000). The MMG contributed to the financing and engineering aspects of the project. For its part, the SMG provided the landscape design, construction materials, and Chinese craftsmen to carry out the project. The cooperation model for building the *Montreal Garden in Shanghai* was similar. The MMG was responsible for the gardening design featuring the Canadian landscape and a multimedia pavilion to showcase Montreal's business specialties or innovation. It was also responsible for the engineering aspects of the construction. The Shanghai side provided

labour on site, in addition to financing two of the overall seven-million-dollar cost. In an interviewee's words, this project was "designed in Canada and made in China" (*Interview*, 11 July 2002). The significance of the second garden for economic spin-offs will be discussed in the following chapter. The following discussion returns to the *Chinese Garden in Montreal.*

This garden is significant for different reasons. First, it is understood as a social production of space where various social, cultural, economic, political or technological factors combined to result in the material creation of a physical setting. That is, to understand the significance of the *Chinese Garden*, we first need to discuss the objectives of its emergence. For Shanghai, it was an important project because of its potential to redress the backward or negative Chinese images overseas. Unlike some of the negative images of the Chinese circulating since the 18$^{th}$ century or those created by the Cultural Revolution, a Chinese garden is treated as a universal expression of artistic ideas and people's intimate feelings for nature across time and space. It is often interpreted as a site of Daoist freedom, tranquility and spontaneity. It is also a showcase of the "holistic nature" of the Chinese worldview where humans and nature are interconnected, and where different elements of life are intertwined in a harmonious manner. Constructed as a microcosm of Chinese philosophy, the social production of the Chinese garden is meant to be an authentic gaze through which the essence of Chinese culture can be experienced in a concrete setting overseas (Keswick 1978). Such a reading of the Chinese garden has been criticized for a reifying attempt to fix Chinese philosophy into a specific worldview, to simplify the complexity of Chinese culture or to de-contextualize the historical, economic or geographical backgrounds of gardens in the southern Yangtze River region

during the Ming dynasty (Clunas 1996). However, in the eyes of Chinese officials it was a better option to present a simplified version of Chinese culture or to fix specific discourses onto a Chinese garden as opposed to images of the Chinese as being brutal, backward, un-modernized or underdeveloped. Therefore, the *Chinese Garden in Montreal* is supposed to be a cultural envoy and a place where Montrealers can get a glimpse of Chinese culture without travelling outside of Quebec.

For Montreal, the significance of the *Chinese Garden* lies in its creation of a public space where cultural differences are present. Such a presence is not only embedded in the physical design of architectural styles or gardening layouts, it is also reinforced by a regular hosting of Chinese cultural festivals, such as the ice-sculptures from Harbin (a northern Chinese city), the tea exhibition from tea-growing regions in Asia, or the lantern festival from Shanghai. There is no doubt that the *Chinese Garden in Montreal* bounded on four sides is a construction of difference, and that it is exactly the Chinese exoticness which makes such a public space distinctive. The reproduction of the Yangtze-style gardens in Ming dynasty China is distinctive from other parts of the urban landscape; festival activities inside the garden are also meant to be distinctive from the normality of everyday practices outside of it.

While public spaces retain various cultural and political meanings symbolically embedded in the spatial relations of the built environment and its surrounding areas, the above differences characterizing the urban scenes of the *Chinese Garden* can be interpreted from various angles. On the one hand, it, once again, can be interpreted as a means of reifying the relation between the European "us" and the Oriental "exoticness" through providing an impressive traditional cultural form to create another stereotypical

understanding of Chinese culture, as its social, economic, or regional diversity is submitted to a homogenous search for the harmonious relation with the nature. On the other hand, the *Chinese garden in Montreal* can also be interpreted as a constructed spatial representation, which symbolizes the changing nature of Montreal in the process of becoming a cosmopolitan city. The exoticness of the garden, along with the existence of different ethnic communities and parks named after immigrants' motherlands, such as the *Little Italy*, the *Portuguese* Park, or the *Dr. Sun Yet Sen* Park in Chinatown, not only makes Montreal "physically" more internationalized, but also makes the city "symbolically" more cosmopolitan by granting recognition to the local Chinese community long suffering from social and institutional racism (Chan 1991). In other words, this garden provides a spatial dimension for forming or consolidating Chinese identity outside of Montreal's Chinatown, even though it is still questionable whether a homogeneous Chinese identity ever really existed considering the fragmented nature of the Chinese community itself. Nevertheless, as the former director of the *Chinese Garden*, Ming Shyr explains, "The [Chinese] community knows there is a place where the young Chinese in the city can come to learn about their own culture and understand their roots. This is very important to them" (*The Gazette*, 9 February 2002: H10).

To summarize the above arguments, the *Chinese Garden in Montreal* is significant because it is a site of social production where dialogue between local and Chinese cultures occurs in an ongoing interaction. Its existence is not only a window for the Chinese to diffuse certain aspects of Chinese culture to create a more positive Chinese image, but also a window for Montrealers or Quebeckers to be one step closer to another foreign culture. The *Chinese Garden in Montreal* is also an urban scene where Shanghai

wants to be seen properly represented in the exchange with its sister city, Montreal, which in turn wants to be seen in a more open and cosmopolitan manner. Finally, it is a site of dialectical relations where oppositional, contested, as well as possible transformative points of interpretation intersect, which leaves room to articulate how such social construction entails the uncovering of various meanings for larger cultural issues.

While the above discussion was more about the individual significance of the *Chinese Garden in Montreal* for Shanghai and Montreal, its significance also lies in its contribution to the consolidation of the friendship between the two cities by going through the political turmoil of the Tiananmen massacre in 1989. Even though the horticultural exchanges did not entail any political agenda, twinning activities cannot take place outside of the political vacuum. The project was proposed in 1987, and the preparation of the construction was done in 1989. While there was an international sanction on China for what happened in the Tiananmen Square in June 1989, Montreal did not close its doors to the reception of the delegation from Shanghai in July 1989 to discuss the collaborative project (Montreal Municipal Government 1989). In addition, while Canada and Montreal stopped all other aspects of diplomatic relations with China after the massacre, cultural and educational exchanges continued. It was under such diplomatic measurement that the former Director of the *Montreal Botanical Garden*, Pierre Bourque, who subsequently became the Mayor of Montreal, acquired special permission from the three levels of government to carry out the project of the *Chinese Garden.* For the Chinese, the continuation of the project symbolized a strong commitment to the partnership between Montreal and Shanghai, especially as it is understood in a Chinese proverb that states, "you know who your friends are when you

are in difficulties" (*Interview*, 15 May 2002). That is, as one of the first foreigners visiting Shanghai after the international sanction, Bourque was regarded by Chinese officials in Shanghai as a "true friend" and eventually gained trust and solidified further expansion of the twinning through this project (Bourque 2002). As one governmental official in Montreal argued, "[t]he construction of the garden creates a context that permitted Montreal and Shanghai to speak more openly, to develop more projects, and to continue the exchange at different levels" (*Interview*, 11 July 22). Another governmental official also explained that he also gained the SMG's trust because of this chance for collaboration, thus allowing him to play a stronger and more active role in the twinning afterwards (*Interview*, 17 May 2002). This is to say that *the Chinese Garden in Montreal* is significant because it became an entry point for collaboration. The "flower diplomacy" that was often coined by cynics to describe Bourque's international policy actually initiated and consolidated the friendship between Montreal and Shanghai.

As discussed earlier, twinning between a Western and a Chinese city is a channel of communication for development because the Chinese are eager to catch up to the selective process of Western modernization. Without exception, the exchange of urban managerial expertise was another important aspect of twinning activities between Montreal and Shanghai. To take the second memorandum as an example[6], developing urban management in Shanghai was a priority in the partnership with Montreal:

> Both cities recognize the significance of developing exchanges in the following sectors:
>
> - The integrated system of commission. Accompanied by a group of Montreal specialists, the commissioner from the City of Montreal will visit Shanghai in 1988. A seminar on the integrated system of commission will be given. The *Shanghai Commission Office* will undertake a mission to Montreal in 1988 or whenever the timing is appropriate.
> - The waste treatment. Both parties will evaluate the actual situation and the waste treatment in Shanghai. Montreal will submit a preliminary report.
> - The modernization of the telephone network in Shanghai.
> - Both parties will examine possible exchanges in the following areas:

- The filtration of portable water.
- The wastewater treatment and the sewerage plant
- The storage and distribution of natural gas.
- The metro system, including the controlling, signalling and the ventilation systems.

(Montreal Municipal Government 1987).

Such a demand for the exchanges of urban management and public work remained the central focus of the MSR under the consideration of Shanghai's specific local conditions. This Chinese city undertook the leading industrial role to support the poorer regions in China throughout decades of political tension and instability. Therefore, the wealth created by Shanghai did not necessarily contribute to the improvement of its urban condition. Infrastructural deterioration, environmental pollution, overcrowding and a backward industrial basis resulted in a tremendous pressure to rejuvenate Shanghai in the 1980s. The assistance that the SMG demanded from the MMG included the establishment of basic urban infrastructures in the processes of Western modernization, such as telephone networks, the filtration of portable water, the waste treatment, and more. This demand for urban managerial exchanges increased especially in the 1990s when Shanghai's Pudong area was chosen by the Chinese central government to be the special development area in order to transform the city into the next global centre of commerce and finance in the 1990s (Montreal Municipal Government 1991; 1997; 1998; 2001). The exchanges were further expanded to other more complex and sophisticated areas, including subways, heritage conservation, underground space management, firefighting, archival management, environmental protection, e-commerce and multimedia.

While professional expertise in urban management was in demand in Shanghai, the MMG offered its "in-house" specialties and human resources to meet the demands of its

Chinese counterpart. Coming from a more advanced city with the experience of urbanization technologies, Montreal officials tended to play the role of experts who had the know-how allowing them to generate a high quality of urban life (*Interview*, 7 October 2002). For instance, Montreal is renowned as the expert of the underground city where the 30-kilometer system in the downtown core area is a convivial space of *joie de vivre*. Work and fun, as well as production and consumption, are channeled and come across in busy, yet spacious passages of half-a-million people per day. Compared with Paris and Tokyo, Montreal's underground compound is not a lifeless mode of transportation, not a maze for rats, not a cradle of social problems, nor a victim of terrorist attacks. One of my respondents argued that the MMG was eager to promote Montreal's underground experience around the world by giving conferences and receiving "learners" especially from China and Japan (*Interview*, 7 October 2001). In a sense, Montreal, as an advanced city in developing underground space, did have something which Shanghai desired. As part of Shanghai's place-making, people from Shanghai came to learn about Montreal's underground city, which had been described by a Chinese delegate as "ahead of its time" (*The Gazette*, 30 September 1997: A1). The MMG's underground expert was also sent to Shanghai to host lectures or seminars, and to discuss the conversion of Shanghai's underground from a military to a commercial space.

While the urban managerial exchanges between the MMG and the SMG formed a one-way flow of transmitting ideas, expertise and experiences from the former, it, once again, raised the same question of whether or not it would impose a hegemonic

developmental paradigm onto the latter. This can easily happen, as my interviewee explained:

> Because we are foreigners, it's much easier than being a local. As foreigners, they [the Chinese] asked for your opinions, they wanted to know what you think, they wanted to know how you do things, and they wanted to learn from you. So they gave us a lot of authority, which is not the case for local firms...The Director of the [Shanghai] Park Department told me, "If there is any problem, you come to tell me. I will resolve it for you" (*Interview*, 10 June 2002).

For the Montreal side, this question of blindly following Western footsteps was handled with care. That is, attention was paid to cultural differences and local historical elements in the developmental project. For instance, while designing Shanghai's downtown green space, local plants were arranged and specific architectural elements, such as the Chinese rockery, were implemented in the conceptualization of the green space according to the six senses, including the Buddhist idea of intuition that once lost its significance in the Communist regime. A working-class neighborhood, which was about to be destroyed by the SMG for the development of the downtown green space, was preserved to reflect partial historical development in Shanghai. In addition, developing densely populated high-rise buildings in a downtown core area, like Manhattan, is regarded by the Chinese as a symbol of success and the concentration of economic power. The Pudong area in Shanghai was transformed and developed in the 1990s by creating such an image of urban landscape. Nevertheless, one interviewee argued that in order to create such an international image conformed to the Western model, "they destroyed some of the good things they have, [and] they are using our models" (*Interview*, 10 June 2002). "Our model" of the West, in a sense, is not necessarily the best one to follow because the downtown business core of high-rise buildings, as a result of rapid urban growth, is often in danger of creating monotony, homelessness and alienation. On the other hand, traditional Chinese urban design characterized by varied urban patterns and complex

intersections of everyday experiences are destroyed. In other words, these projects of building high-rise buildings in Shanghai do not necessarily fit society, and society has to fit into development because of a blind worship for Western modernization. The same interviewee, therefore, warned his Chinese counterpart by providing specific cases in Montreal's errors in urban development. It was hoped that Chinese urban planners would not make the same mistakes as Montreal did. For instance, the enclosed design of *Place Desjardins* in the downtown core once discouraged urban life on the street level. In order to build high-rise apartment complexes, the *La Cité* project destroyed traditional Victorian houses. Like *Place Desjardins*, its enclosed design, which does not permit shops to be directly accessible on the street level, is also responsible for the disappearance of urban activities around *La Cité* and for the rising sense of urban alienation. Such advice on the pitfalls of Western processes of urbanization had been part of the exchanges in the MSR, although "it was difficult for them to understand it... because it [Shanghai] had to be developed very fast" (*Interview*, 10 June 2002). This example shows that the exchanges in belief and value systems in the MSR further exemplifies SCRs as the concurrent evolution of developmental projects and communication processes, where the conception of development and modernization is examined and contested simultaneously.

The above discussion of the MSR as international communication for development is evolved around horticultural and managerial exchanges. These exchanges did not aim to develop political recognition in Quebec in the 1980s. Such an impression can be easily made if we consider the political climate of Quebec during the MSR initiative. Two of my interviewees argued that the twinning initiative was initiated and engineered by René

Lévesque, the former Quebec Premier, who held the first referendum on Quebec's secession from Canada. At the time, relations between the federal and provincial governments were tense, and as a result the MSR seemed to be the only means to expand Quebec's reach to China (*Interviews*, 15 May 2002; 17 May 2002). However, in an interview with a local journalist, Jean Drapeau argued the opposite by emphasizing that the twinning initiative was actually made by the SMG. The proposal was made before Lévesque's trip to Hong Kong and China for the promotion of Quebec's economy, and the MMG's positive response was given to the Mayor of Shanghai, Wong Daohang, by Lévesque in person (*La Presse*, 14 May 1985: A2). It is uncertain if Lévesque's involvement gave the impression that Montreal's twinning with Shanghai was part of his plan to promote Quebec's sovereignty movement overseas, or if the twinning initiative was made after much controversy over whether or not the federal government intervened in or disapproved of Lévesque's trip to Shanghai (*Le Devoir*, 20 October1984: 2; 18 October 1984: 4; 29 September 1984: 2; 25 September 1984:10). As I will discuss further in the section on intergovernmental relations, Quebec's sovereignty movement did not dictate the MSR. Since the first memorandum signed in 1985, beyond the mutual visits of official delegations, twinning activities were about horticultural, urban managerial, economic and cultural exchanges.

If the MSR did not aim to develop specific goals in order to achieve Quebec's sovereignty movement, it certainly aimed to develop networking in China. That is, through horticultural exchanges and through providing developmental experiences, the MMG, in turn, received an opportunity to build up Chinese networks. According to Mowlana (1997), networks are systems of connecting separate entities together; they

function as mediators for individuals or institutions to achieve certain ends and entail a potential resource for empowerment and redistribution. For Montreal, such a Chinese network is important in considering the immense business potential opened up in Shanghai as the leading Chinese industrial city in the 1980s and also the leading financial powerhouse in the 1990s. Gaining networks in China can be important for Montreal because it is a means to open up a economic linkage to Asia, and to transform its traditional position as a point-of-access city between North America and Europe. That is, the economic implication of such a network is regarded as a chance for Montreal to "conquer the vast Chinese market" since the inception of the MSR (*La Presse*, 8 August 1985: 1). This will be further explored in the following chapter.

**Conclusion**

The first part of this chapter theorized SCRs as a distinctive form of international communication for development taking place at the municipal, organizational level. In order to exemplify the general theorization of SCRs, the second part of this chapter presented the initiative, involvements and two major aspects of twinning exchanges between Montreal and Shanghai. Twinning between a more advanced society and a less developed area cannot be simplified as a one-way flow of exchanges or influences. To reiterate, it is crucial to have reciprocity between sister cities or to realize the idea that there is always something to learn from the less advanced region. The MSR showed that its horticultural aspects gave various meanings and development to both Montreal and Shanghai, respectively, and to the development of friendship between the two cities. Its urban managerial aspects helped Shanghai to cope with the pressure of rapid urban

development; in return, it helped Montreal to build up connections in China, when China gradually arose as the powerhouse of manufacture and consumption in the global economy.

Chapter 2
## Sister-City Relationships and Urban Competitiveness

The early 1980s economic rationale redefined SCRs as instruments for reaching local economic competitiveness in the global economy. Even though achieving international understanding or facilitating various exchange programs can still be an integral aspect of SCRs, it is hardly the sole purpose of city-to-city communication. The objective of this chapter, thus, is three-fold: First, it aims to explain that as a local response to the global economy, SCRs are used as instruments to strengthen economic linkages between cities. Second, I intend to argue that the network among sister cities partially constitutes globalization. Third, this chapter endeavours to argue that the economic development with another (sister) city can be an attempt to re-define a city's position in the global economy. The case study of Montreal's twinning with Shanghai helps to reach these three objectives.

The first two objectives of this part of the discussion are mainly about cities in the dynamic processes of economic globalization. On the one hand, enhancing the economic tie with sister cities is a local response to increasing challenge, pressure and opportunities opened up to cities in the global and regional processes of growing economic interdependence. It is also an entrepreneurial strategy, underlined by neo-liberal governmentality, to seek out cities' competitiveness and to maintain or improve cities' position in the global economy. This argument is often made in the background of some previous literature on the economic aspect of SCRs (Cremer et al. 2001; O'Toole 1999;

Smith 1992; Zelinsky 1990). On the other hand, if we are satisfied with the above argument on the global-local division, we would reify the dynamics of economic globalization by treating the global as something external to, and dominating of, the local. The global and the local consist of a dialectical relationship in that "globalization takes place in cities and cities embody and reflect globalization. Global processes lead to changes in the city and cities rework and situate globalization" (Short and Kim 1999: 9). Or simply put, cities reproduce and respond to globalization at the same time. Studying the specific local conditions and contexts of Montreal and Shanghai helps to understand the above dialectical dynamics, but also facilitates the understanding that economic ties between sister cities constitute parts of the global economy. Finally, the case study of Montreal's economic tie through the twinning with Shanghai further helps us to re-consider the former's attempt to transform and strengthen its competitiveness in the global economy with the hopes that the close tie with the latter opened up Montreal's overall reach beyond Europe and North America, given that the city usually does not have an obvious relation with the Asian economy. The third objective of this chapter, thus, discusses how gaining privileged access to Shanghai's governmental officials opened the doors to China or created footholds for Montreal's business community, and how it echoed the Quebec government's objectives of creating *Quebec Inc.*

While the main focus here is on the global and local conditions of developing economic relationships through sister-city programs, the importance of the national/regional set of parameters in which SCRs operate should not be underestimated. The relation between nation-states and globalization will be briefly discussed in this chapter in order to derive the emerging importance of cities in economic globalization.

The national/regional context of SCRs will be discussed in the next chapter on intergovernmental relations through which SCRs operate.

This chapter starts with the problematic of nation-states and globalization. The discussion is furthered by the dialectical relation between the local and the global, or between cities and economic globalization. It also discusses how SCRs can be implemented as a means to forge urban competitiveness in the dynamics of the global economy. Moreover, the theoretical discourse on the significance of examining local conditions is formatted. Finally, the case study of the economic aspects of the Montreal-Shanghai relation is explored through an introduction of the official rhetoric and empirical activities. The case study not only illustrates the theoretical arguments about the global-local dynamics, but also helps us to re-consider Montreal's changing role in the global economy.

**Economic Globalization and Nation-States**

Discourses on globalization have been widely developed into multiple dimensions: some focus on the question of political power and governance by engaging the debates over the relations among nation-states, multinational corporations (MNCs) and transnational organizations, and over the strengthening or diminishing role of nation-states (Held and McGrew 2002; Petras and Veltmeyer 2001; Narin 1997; Mearsheimer 1994). There is also a concern about the emergence of the homogeneous culture formed by global media versus the sustaining of the national culture (Lee et al. 2002; Thompson 1995; Rheingold 1995; Appadurai 1990). Attention is also paid to the current international economic order by generating the arguments over the continuation of the

national capitalist model versus a novel integration of the world economy (Rugman 2001; Rosneau 1997; Castells 1996; Wade 1990). Some researchers focus on ideological or political ideals by concentrating on various forms of resisting, contesting, managing or adapting to global forces (Strange 1996; Omae 1995; Held 1995; Walker 1994). Finally, the global-local argument is made by engendering discourses on the local penetration by the global versus the global mediated by the local (Friedmann 2002; Sassen 2001; Clarke and Gaile 1998; Magnusson 1996).

Without doubt, all these political, economic, cultural, social, or spatial dimensions in the discourses of globalization are intertwined. Nevertheless, economic globalization is emphasized in this part of the discussion because it directly situates the economic activities in SCRs and also because it is the primary force of global flows (Beauregard 1995). In addition, the discourse on the global-local dynamics is emphasized, because it is directly associated with the problematic of cities and localities. In order to understand why cities gradually go beyond the national boundaries to transform themselves into more significant economic actors at the international stage, the highly debateable status and the challenged role of nation-states in globalization are discussed prior to examining cities and economic globalization.

Globalization can be broadly defined as the "expanding scale, growing magnitude, speeding up and deepening impact of transcontinental flows and patterns of social interaction" (Held and McGrew 2002: 1). What passes through transcontinental flows can be financial capital, manufacturing goods, cultural products, cultural or political ideas, people, etc. Concerning economic globalization, it has often been suggested that despite how uneven it is, there is an increasing process of world integration in production, global

markets and global finance. The operation of multinational corporations (MNCs) and the high mobility of corporate capital have given rise to a new international division of labour which rearranges interregional relations, as well as a new pattern of resource distribution and inequality (Castells 1996). In such a new international division of labour, we have witnessed the shifting of manufacturing centres from developed to developing regions, as well as an increasing share of world exports and inward/outward foreign direct investment (FDI) in Newly Industrialized Economies (NIEs), such as the four little dragons of Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea. It has been a recent trend that the manufacturing centre is shifting once again from NIEs aroused in the 1980s to China. Furthermore, deregulation and liberation have further advanced international capital movements by making national boundaries more open and porous. Anthony Giddens describes this international economic order as the 'run-away' world in which the world economy is increasingly and intensely more competitive because factories or shops move away as long as cheaper manufacturing costs can be found somewhere else (Giddens 2003). As a result, the national control over transnational economic flows is weakened and MNCs gain more bargaining power in seeking the maximized profits. Some have radically argued for the obsolescence of traditional nation-states by the 'run-away world' characterized by the high mobility of capitals in favour of the private sector. As Kenichi Omae argues, "traditional nation-states have become unnatural, even impossible business units in a global economy" since economic and political power are increasingly transformed into "a transitional mode of organization for managing economic affairs" (Omae 1995: 5, 149). Given that "a systemic discontinuity between what used to be thought of as national growth and the forms of growth [is] evident in

global cities since the 1980s", Saskia Sassen argues for the decline of nation-states and the rise of global cities, such as New York, London and Tokyo, as the commanding centre of global financial flows (Sassen 2001:8).

Overall, those who argue for the overwhelming forces of economic globalization tend to conclude that no country can claim the dictating role of global trade and commerce, either because the commending role is gradually transformed to MNCs, transnational economic agencies, or global cities, or because the international division of labour and the high mobility of capital do not guarantee the success of one national economy. Thus, nation-states no longer enjoy the same autonomy as they did in the state-centred capitalism. This is not to say that national governments are made powerless by the global economy. Nonetheless, when those directing domestic economies have to frequently refer to the transnational economic flows, national governments have to share their power of decision-making for the well being of national economy or to find ways to accommodate the forces of economic globalization. Simultaneously, the multilayered global governance gradually hampers the democratic ideals of social-welfare states.

For critics of the above arguments, the so-called global economy is no more than the expansion of state-centred economies into three core blocks, namely Europe, Asia Pacific and America (Rugman 2001; Hirst and Thompson 1999). Second, from a Marxist perspective, others cast their doubts on the novelty of the global economy based on the following assumption: the existing international economic order is merely the spread of Western imperial/capitalism driven by the needs of financial capital gains within the capitalist states, coupled with the necessary exploitation of those in the disadvantaged (Petras and Veltmeyer 2001). In addition, supranational organizations, such as the *World*

*Trade Organization* (WTO), or the *North American Free Trade Agreement* (NAFTA), are dominated by powerful countries and are mainly for national interests (Mearsheimer 1994). In a word, nation-states, for the sceptics, are still the engineers and architects of globalization because they retain considerable bargaining power with MNCs, who often require the access to national economic markets and/or resources. Indeed, nation-states are still significant players in world politics. Paradoxically, along with the economic integration around the globe, we have witnessed the burgeoning of different ethno-political units in the hopes of becoming nation-states in the post-Soviet era, paradoxically along with the economic integration around the globe (Narin 1997). Some political instability or uncertainty is often associated with the national question, as we can observe situations in Israel, Northern Ireland, Taiwan or Quebec (Cleary 2002; Cooper 1999; Couture et al. 1998). The rise of NICs in East Asia has also created the important role played by their central governments in planning and implementing the national economy (Ong 1999; Weiss 1998). Furthermore, the United States' exercising of geopolitical power has been more evident than anything else after the September 11$^{th}$ attack. Finally, in examining the rise of Shanghai as an indicator of China's awakening power in this research, we cannot help but arguing that nation-states are far from dead.

**Economic Globalization and the Entrepreneurial City**

It is not easy to precisely pinpoint the extent to which nation-states are still crucial players in the current international political or economic order. John Short and Yeong-Hyun Kim rightly locate the difficulty that "[t]he globalizers point to the areas of global connectivity, the sceptics highlighting the space in between... A global economy is in the

process of becoming, but it is not uniform, nor complete, nor all-encompassing" (Short and Kim 1999:22). Nevertheless, the dubious position of nation-states in the global economy has made room for discussion about cities that goes beyond the conventional conception of them as sub-national units. In contrast to the debatable role of nation-states, the ascent of cities in the process of economic globalization has been ascertained. Economic globalization has been characterized by processes of rapid economic restructuring, and the functioning of industries on a worldwide scale through global corporate networks and technological innovations in communication and transformation media. These processes, most of the time, are initiated, imagined, mediated or done in the cities. That is, the emerging global networks of finance, market, production, professional services, cultural, politics, media and telecommunications have been spatially configured through global networks of cities. For instance, John Friedmann has developed a general, conceptual framework of the world-city hierarchy in an attempt to allocate world cities' positions and roles in the global network. His basic argument is that "every city occupies a position that reflects its relative importance in the articulation of the global 'space of flows', or, to put it more plainly, its relative economic power" (Friedmann 2002: 7). Saskia Sassen (2001) has worked on the network of New York, London, and Tokyo to illustrate how the global economy is controlled by these cities characterized by the economic aggregation of producer services and other factors. By following Friedmann's conceptual framework and by extending Sassen's empirical research beyond global cities, Peter Taylor and D.R.F. Walker (2001) have further developed a more comprehensive measurement to pinpoint 55 world cities' positions in the circuits of global flows. Each city's position is quantitatively articulated by dimensions and intensities of global service

location strategies, including cross-city profiles of law, banking/finance, advertising and generally mixed sectors firms.

While cities have become more advantaged by their strategic positions in the international market and have become significant as economic players at the international stage, the global economy also provides challenges for the cities. These challenges can be either obstacles or opportunities depending on the policy choices of municipalities. The mobility of capital not only has an effect on national autonomy, but also influences cities' economic development and positions in the urban hierarchy. Mobile capital is not understood in the narrower sense of capital investment, but in a broader range of inward investment in high-tech production industries, employment opportunities, MNC or national headquarters, transnational institutions, global events, tourism, etc. In addition, cities face growing 'glocal' or 'intermestic' pressures when the conditions of urban life are increasingly affected by events, actions or decisions outside the municipal, national, and even continental boundaries. That is, while globalization takes place in cities, cities, in turn, are pressured by the economic interdependence, intensified competition and the increasing overlap of international and domestic issues in aspects of industrial restructuring, urban space, immigration, tourism, trade, investment, or repositioning cities in the global economy, etc. Nonetheless, it should be noted that not all cities are equally affected by economic globalization. Nor are they able to take advantage of economic globalization. Each city develops its own unique interface between the global and the local, depending on how specific local, political, economic and cultural conditions respond to and rework global forces. For many municipalities, a lack of sufficient support from senior governments, or an increase of downloading and fiscal instability certainly

does not help to cope with the pressures from economic globalization (Fry 1995). In addition, traditional macro-economic strategies and structural policies developed at the national level have gradually become ineffective or inflexible for cities to directly take advantage of or to avoid risks from economic globalization (Clement 1995). Thus, due to the intensified process of economic globalization and the reserved engagement of central governments in local production, cities are more on their own to develop measurements for their competitiveness in economic development. Indicators of urban competitiveness include: the creation of high-skill, high-income jobs; the production of environmentally sustainable goods; desirable production of goods and services; the generation of full employment; the development of specialized sectors as a means to control its future; the capacity to enhance its position in the world-city hierarchies. As Peter Kresl points out, being competitive is not simply about promoting more growth, but "rather a process of economic evolution that will generate specific results that are considered especially desirable" (Kresl 1995:50).

The notion of enhancing urban competitiveness in economic globalization has given rise to the so-called entrepreneurial cities. For Joe Painter (1998), the entrepreneurial city can refer to a range of meanings: the city as the site for entrepreneurial activities; urban residents' increasing entrepreneurial spirit; the privatization of the public sector; the promotion of economic competitiveness by the public sector. What I am concerned with here is the last aspect of the entrepreneurial city because it adequately sets the background against which the economic aspect of SCRs is developed. In 1979 Robert Goodman published a book on how American municipalities played the role of so-called public entrepreneurs and competed against each other by taking the measurements "from

billions in tax incentives to subsidized sports stadiums, from job training to industrial revenue financing..." (Goodman 1979: 31). The fierce competition between cities, ten years after, was expanded from the national to international scale, when David Harvey wrote his influential piece on an obvious transformation of urban governance from managerialism to entrepreneurialism. Harvey (1989) argues that even the most left-wing socialist municipalities cannot resist this trend.

The shift to entrepreneurialism in the work of cities indicates a shift from allocation of resources to the encouragement of private capital, due to the globalization of late capitalism. The main tasks of municipalities, thus, are no longer confined to providing local services and maintaining public order, such as snow and garbage removal, street repairs, parking-permit issuing, urban zoning, property taxation, etc. In the rhetoric of pursuing urban competitiveness and ensuring a position in economic globalization, municipal officials, among others, struggle to figure out what economic globalization means for their cities, what are the best strategies to respond to the global trend, and what measurement should be taken to ensure urban competitiveness.

Much of the struggles are internal. For instance, local urban initiatives, such as re-inventing the downtown core (Bélanger 2002) and re-drawing municipal boundaries of Montreal (Nielsen et al. 2002) were chosen and implemented in the hopes of re-structuring Montreal's local economy. Some urban policies are external or international. We have seen cities compete against each other either in the same or foreign countries for "major conventions, for location of production facilities, for headquarters' activities, for location of international organizations, for transportation connections or hubs, and for bridge or point-of-access city status" (Kresl 1992:196). They also compete against each

other for attracting investment to obtain employment and growth, seeking external/foreign markets for their local products, promoting local know-how or technology in the desirable economic sectors and promoting their cities as attractive tourist destinations. This is especially important for small- and medium-sized firms when they lack international connections or required resources to establish themselves abroad. In a word, local governments have gradually become global actors for the sake of the city's internationality, economic competitiveness and advantaged position in globalization. As Robert Beauregard rightly argues,

> It is obvious that 'local' planners have to be empowered to be 'global' actors. This does not mean relocating them to the global scale or creating supra-planning entities that operate internationally. It does mean that planners must be able to react to influences impinging on their 'communities', regardless of where those influences originate and which actors are responsible. In effect, planning powers need to be extended beyond political boundaries. Planners cannot be confined to defined places but must be able to roam across political boundaries, as need dictates, and additionally, through collaborative endeavours that thereby provide another mechanism for responding to the multitude of (particularly external) actors who shape their communities. (Beauregard 1995: 244).

To "react to influences impinging on their 'communities'" and to reach the above mixed set of objectives, marketing the city, thus, is one of the entrepreneurial measurements which municipal government take to pursue their international activities. The promotion of the economic advantages of a city requires that it be packaged, advertised, marketed or commodified like any other product in capitalism. Municipalities' entrepreneurial strategies vary, but they are undertaken with a general objective of promoting the city's values and image in creating a friendly business atmosphere. Consequently, it entails the advantages to allure potential investors' interests in the city's distinctiveness in the overall conditions of production, infrastructure, location, economic structure, urban amenities, governmental effectiveness, governing strategy, public-private cooperation and institutional flexibility (Kresl 1995:51). Ronan

Paddison (1993) argues that those who fail to market themselves successfully risk economic stagnation and urban decline.

Friedmann has modeled city marketing in the following passage:

> The *action frame* [of the city-marketing model] here is chiefly the core city stripped of its outer suburbs and immediate hinterland. The *time frame* is typically short-run political advantage, such as attracting, global capital that will—so it is hoped—improve the competitive profile of the city and generate jobs and income. The model's *scope* is in the narrowest sense economic, and other concerns, such as social or environmental, tend to be sacrificed to serve short-run advantage. The *primary impulse* of this development model is assumed to lie beyond the city's control and, much like South Pacific cargo-cults, is exogenous. At the same time, the *mode* of development is seen in starkly competitive terms. Because there is only so much global capital to go around—this seems to be the reasoning—if your own city doesn't latch on to it, some other city will: city marketing is an unforgiving zero-sum game (Friedmann 2002: 20-21).

Friedmann is critical of the city-marketing strategy as an entrepreneurial measurement to engender urban competitiveness, because its objectives are deprived of social goods, its development only maximizes economic growth, its power base is narrow and technocratic, and its sustainability is questionable.

To further understand the rationale behind the city-marketing strategy, I turn to the conceptual tool of neo-liberal governmentality. To begin, the notion of governmentality originated with Michel Foucault and was re-worked by Mitchell Dean as "the idea of mentalities of government [which] emphasizes the way in which the thought involved in practices of government is collective and relatively taken for granted" (Dean 1998: 16). To study governmentality is to study how thought operates within the organized ways of doing things, building regimes or practices and actualizing its ambitions and effects. In other words, to study the mentality of government is to analyze how specific thought made practical and technical in ensuring governmental power and legitimacy. Governmentality is the art of government, which requires careful articulation, active imagination, practical tactics, empirical know-how, and the mobilization of institutional resources.

As a type of governmentality, neo-liberalism is no longer interpreted as a form of political thought intertwined with certain moral philosophy. Rather, it is a specific style of the general mentality of rule distinguished from other governmentalities such as communism, communitarianism or neo-conservativism. There are variations of neo-liberalism; nevertheless, this specific style of the general mentality is characterized by the essentialization of market and the recognition of "the quasi or artificial market as a solution to the excessive expenditure, rigidity, bureaucracy and dependency of the welfare state" (Dean 1998: 149). David Held and Andrew McGrew hold that, "[t]he political programme of neo-liberalism includes the extension of the market to more and more areas of life; the creation of a state unburdened by 'excessive' intervention in the economic and social life; and the curtailment of the power of certain groups" (Held and McGrew 2002: 100). Neo-liberalism is not simply a reflection of transforming welfare states, but also a response to economic globalization. Neo-liberalism not only penetrates the debate over the weakening of nation states, but also dominates the discourse on the promotion of the city's international competitiveness. It has underlined the primary project for many cities and has become a driving force for municipalities to generate urban policies. The Montreal municipal government, during 1994 and 2001, would serve as a good example in the final part of the discussion.

In addition to city marketing, the entrepreneurial city also takes other strategies to engender the city's competitiveness, or to enhance the city's position in the global economy. One of them is urban networking. Rather than emphasizing the competitiveness between cities, networking and cooperation are the key to the success of cities in globalization. According to Norris Clement, cities still compete against each

other, but "each city can increase its own competitiveness by cooperating with others in many other areas (e.g., exchanging information on programs to combat common urban problems and lobbying together for needed urban policies at the national or transnational level)" (Clement 1995: 139). While debasing the market-city entrepreneurial approach, Friedmann appraises the model of quasi city-states, which can be partially developed by municipalities' global involvement and cooperation with others. He states that "[it] must not shut itself off from the world but reach out, and one of the ways to reach out is to link up with other city-regions in the pursuit of common objectives. These linkages give rise to intercity networks suggestive of both collaboration and competition" (Friedmann 2002: 34).

Both Clement and Friedmann elaborate the notion of urban networking with the examples of the linkage between European cities. Recognizing growing interdependence, democracy and regional institutions, the European idea strongly suggests a political necessity to bring about a more cooperative world order through city networking. Local officials from various cities have worked together in order to expand or influence European-wide urban policies. This has the obvious political motivations of forming a basis for European integration, and of the granting of formal recognition by Brussels to cities as significant agents of EU governance. With the principles of local self-government and of subsidiary or proximity, European municipalities demand to be partners in European politics, since they can be the mediators between the regional supra-state of the European Union and local residents.

Town twinning is encouraged by the European Commission and financial supports, in the forms of awards or subsidies, are given to institutionalize urban inter-regional

collaboration (The European Commission 2000). In other words, SCRs, in the European context, are recognized as the facilitators of tighter political integration and closer economic cooperation. For instance, the German-Polish border twin towns, Guben and Gubin, have been selected as model cities for European integration in the governmental efforts to make the border borderless and to integrate both towns to encourage a stronger economic cooperation. However, Jörg Dürrschmidt and Ulf Matthiesen (2002) demonstrate the cleavage between the above ideal of intercity collaboration and the impasse of institutionalizing such city networking due to local challenges and difficulties rooted in specific historical mistrust and resentment across borders. Their case study rightly indicates the pitfall of theoretical optimism about the city networking or sister-city link due to the ignorance of vernacularism in the dialectical relation between the global and the local.

The entrepreneurial approaches of city marketing and city networking are not only governing strategies of municipalities in response to the challenges of economic globalization to strive for urban competitiveness. As Kieran Bonner argues, "the historical distinctiveness and inheritance of non-primary centres is challenged by the hospitality and openness such cities show to the technological and economic influences all contemporary cities have to face" (Bonner 2002: 4). The historical distinctiveness and inheritance of the cities are not only challenged, but also the conditions in which limited choices at certain historical moments are offered to cities in response to the global challenges. In turn, as economic globalization takes place in the cities, it is dialectically reproduced according to each city's particular history, geographical setting, economic functions and development trajectory. Therefore, it is crucial to research local contexts in

order to understand current transnational developments. In other words, we not only need to study the operation from the global to the local, but also from the local to the global. SCRs are ideal sites to infuse an empirical examination of local contexts into the above theoretical understanding of the dialectical relationship between economic globalization and entrepreneurial cities.

**The Dynamics between the Global and the Local: Montreal's Economic Tie with Shanghai**

Some researchers have argued how the economic aspect of SCRs is a response to the challenges of economic globalization (Cremer et al. 2001; O'Toole 1999; Zelinsky 1990). Nevertheless, the above theoretical conception of the division between the local and the global has been applied in the previous literature on SCRs as an obvious and convenient object for setting the background of their arguments. Thus, treating the former as an external constant outside of their borders often flattens the relationship between economic globalization and SCRs. Or the local is over-generalized and, at the same time, goes unrecognized as a social construct that plays a unique role in responding to, resisting, re-working and reproducing economic globalization. Consequently, the previous discussion of SCRs in the global economy is often one-sided without realizing how SCRs partially constitute economic networks of globalization. Studying Montreal's economic tie with its sister city, Shanghai, helps to illustrate the above theoretical argument on the dynamics between economic globalization and entrepreneurial cities in terms of the MMG's marketing and networking strategies to enhance and transform its position in the world-city hierarchy. With the exception of the recent work done by Sassen and her colleagues (2002), the inquiry into the economic ties that goes beyond the

network of global cities, such as the one between Montreal and Shanghai or between a more advanced and less developed city, is still underdeveloped. Therefore, this part of the discussion also contributes to an understanding of how economic globalization is a process of integrating local specificities through collaboration between non-primary, second-tiered cities from both developed and developing countries. Again, to avoid the pitfall of discussing the global-local dynamics by over-emphasizing the global forces and over-generalizing the cities' responses, this part of the discussion starts with the local conditions and context of Montreal and Shanghai in the 1990s. This contextualization of the link further facilitates an understanding of the MMG's entrepreneurial approaches towards the marketing of Montreal and its articulation of the strategic network with Shanghai. In other words, although we have seen the ideal types of both governing strategies, this case study shows the mixture of marketing and networking the cities for the enhancement of urban competitiveness.

In the *spatial dimension*, Montreal, along with Toronto, is a Canadian gateway to the trans-Atlantic passage. That is, Montreal's traditional advantage was the hosting of the headquarters or decision-making centres on a continental basis. It enjoys a point-of-access status "as a point from which economic actors may gain access to cities in the other country. These actors may be multinational companies from other continents or they may be firms within the city's own nation" (Kresl 1991: 352). The official rhetoric has stressed Montreal's advantage over Toronto given its bilingual status and European-ness, which can connect a parent company in a French-speaking country to its North American subsidiary more easily or vice versus. Nevertheless, Kresl argues that Toronto is advantaged over Montreal because the former has a significant American partner city,

Buffalo, where Toronto-based companies can set up distribution, shipment, warehousing and customer services across the border. What makes Montreal competitive is actually its indigenous, Quebecois business community. Since the Quiet Revolution, these transnational companies, be they manufacturing, finance or resource industries, have received, as part of Quebec's national project, strong support from both Quebec and Montreal governments. As Kresl argues, governments at both levels "did all they could to support economic development, business education and company development by Francophones" (Kresl 1991: 353).

From the perspective of the world-city hierarchies Taylor and Walker (2001) define the spatial dimension of Montreal as a minor North Atlantic world-city node where the accumulation of the global economy takes place at the subnational (regional) level. Montreal, therefore, is not defined as a powerful globalizer in terms of commanding and controlling the global economy. Nevertheless, its world-city status cannot be denied due to the strong presence of international organizations. There are sixty-seven headquarters of governmental or non-governmental international organizations located in Montreal, such as *Commission for Environmental Cooperation* (CEC), *International Civil Aviation Organization* (ICAO), *Secretariat of the Convention on the Biological Diversity* (SCBD), or *Multilateral Fund Secretariat for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol* (*Montreal International* 2003). For David Simon (1995), this is especially an indicator of Montreal's world position when it is defined by transactional networking and hub functions. Among diversified international organizations in Montreal, many of them are in the strategic sectors of aerospace, telecommunications and multimedia, which indicate a strong critical mass of the related private companies and the city's specialties in the

world. Such an accumulated economy further enhances Montreal's unique position in the global niches market of these strategic industries. In addition, as part of the legacy of former Montreal Mayor Jean Drapeau, the cosmopolitan urban scenes, consumerism, cultural richness and good quality of life should also be considered as being advantages for Montreal's international presence. For Graham Todd (1995), if Toronto is one of those "wannabe" global cities with a strong aspiration to transform itself into another commanding global center through encouraging a freer market, lesser state control, and increasingly privatized social services, the economic development of Montreal is more geared towards the niche market in either the national or North American context. Interviews with the MMG officials confirmed that the municipal government had no intention to turn Montreal into another global city, such as New York. Consequently, the MMG oriented the development of its local companies towards niche markets in several strategic sectors, including aerospace, life science, telecommunication, information technology (*Interviews*, 11 July 2002; 9 January 2002).

Concerning the *temporal dimension*, Montreal struggled both economically and politically in the 1990s. André Langlois and Peter Kitchen (2001) have identified and measured aspects of urban deprivation in Montreal through the analysis of the 1996 *Statistics Canada* Census Data. They clearly demonstrate that Montreal was the most distressed city in the 1990s concerning three economic indicators. First, Montreal had the highest unemployment rate among major Canadian cities. For instance, 14.6 percent of the population in the core of Montreal was unemployed in 1991, and 15 percent in 1996. Second, the percentage of low-income families in the same area also topped the rest of major Canadian cities. It was at 27.9 percent in 1991 and 34.1 percent in 1996. Third, the

division between the center and suburbs in the metropolitan region of Montreal was the largest in terms of both unemployment (between 3 and 4 percent) and low-income families rates (around 12 percent). This represents a sharp social and economic division in Montreal. The urban deprivation was largely due to recessions across North America, economic restructuring and the out-migration of residents to suburban communities or other Canadian cities. Langlois and Kitchen have argued for a dramatic restructuring and de-industrialization process in the city of Montreal where there is a severe collapse of the former inner-city manufacturing basis, in the southwest region along the Lachine Canal. Furthermore, out-migration to the suburban areas was also distinctive. "Between 1972 and 1996, the population of the Island of Montreal... fell by 260,000 while the off-island suburbs grew by 700,000... The central city has been left with a disproportionate concentration of disadvantaged residents, including the unemployed, low-income families and individuals, single mothers and seniors" (Langlois and Kitchen 2001: 125-6). The out-migration trend was also evident in the business sector. Between 1981 and 1996, there was evidence of decline in Montreal's central business district in a relative, but not an absolute, sense. It was mainly due to the "changing intra-metropolitan geography of employment in four finance, insurance and real estate (FIRE) services and eight business services" from the city core to suburban Montreal (Coffey and Shearmur 2002: 359). This point is best illustrated by the agglomeration of telecommunication, pharmaceutical and aerospace industries dispersed from downtown to the West Island.

In the public discourse, some also attributed Montreal's economic deprivation to the political instability that resulted from Quebec's 1995 referendum. In addition to the high unemployment rate, there was an exodus of head offices, such as *CP Rail* and *Zellers* in

1996, to Calgary or Toronto (*The Gazette* 19 April 1996: A10). Fearing Quebec's separation, there some 11,645 Quebeckers went to other provinces between April 1 and June 30, 1996. Among those who left Quebec after the referendum, one-half were Anglophones with English as a mother tongue, one-sixth were from the Allophone community, and many were professional and managers (Statistic Canada 1996. Quoted in *The Gazette* 26 October 1996: A1). Furthermore, the political uncertainty clouded inward investment and professional attraction. One local investor's voice best amplified this sense of insecurity about Quebec's political future: "[w]e cannot and should not expand in Quebec until somebody assures me that we are not going to have another referendum, at least for years. Otherwise, why build another factory? We don't build five-year factories" (*The Gazette*, 4 November 1995: D1).

The worry for Montreal's stagnated economy eventually swept over the result of the 1995 referendum. Saving Montreal's economy became the pressing need for three levels of government. Striving for Quebec's sovereignty was somehow put on the back burner. Despite former Premier Jacques Parizeau's controversial blame for the loss of the referendum on "money and the ethnic votes", post-referendum Montreal was oriented towards a city where business is welcomed, cultural/linguistic differences are an asset and the Anglophone community regained recognition. In other words, Montreal, officially, is still a French city, but it has gradually simmered with an international flavour where diversity is encouraged, language restrictions are more relaxed and various measurements on urban development were taken. All in all, this was to encourage the "returning" of investments and the "reviving" of economic activities as a means to "save" Montreal.

The pressing need for the re-vitalization of Montreal's economy can be summarized in a recommendation made by the then mayor Pierre Bourque to Lucien Bouchard who, following the 1995 referendum became the Premier of Quebec:

> Montreal, like many other cities [in Quebec], suffered from political instabilities in the past months [of referendum]...It is heavy-duty work to manage Montreal... To keep our enterprises and our larger social background, it is necessary to understand that our Anglophone community constitutes a profound richness for Montreal. The exodus has to be stopped... Main contracts are developed outside the country, but it allows the expansion of large-scale business, such as SNC-Lavalin, Bombardier, Dominion Bridge, etc. in Montreal. We cannot afford to lose these companies and all levels of government should support such economic missions [like *Team Canada*]... Thins are starting to change, but change needs a collective will, and it also needs to stop the political quarrel (*La Presse*, 20 January 1996:A1).

While Montreal was struggling, its sister city, Shanghai, was a promised land of hope, advancement and prosperity. Studies of modern Chinese history cannot ignore the importance of Shanghai. It was one of the five port cities opened up by the Opium War. The end of the 19th century saw the rapid transformation of Shanghai into a financial and economic center, as well as a city of colonial concessions. It remained prosperous and international until WWII. Shanghai's development was relatively stagnant between the 1950s and the 1980s. In 1990, the Chinese central government decided to develop the Pudong area of Shanghai, and granted preferential status and more autonomy to the city of Shanghai. This status made the authority of Shanghai municipal government equivalent with that of a Canadian province. Compared to Montreal's sister city, Shanghai did not suffer as much from neo-liberalism of downloading and budget cutting, which many Western cities have commonly experienced.

Shanghai, in general, is advantaged by human resources, an industrial foundation, the Yangtze River commerce, its coastal position and the potential to be the economic gateway to the emerging Chinese manufacturing power and domestic market. However, this city was heavily burdened by its century-old industrial basis, its backward urban

management and serious urban pollution. The rebirth of the city as a competitive, global, financial center was envisaged and outlined by the Chinese central government. Zhengji Fu (2002) argues that Shanghai's urban transformation is regarded as part of China's open policy, which seeks a gradual reform from state socialism to market economy. This reform, despite the difficulties mentioned above, responds to globalization often understood by Chinese leaders as economic globalization. Re-building Shanghai is not only a means to make the city competitive or to revive its previous prosperity prior to WWII, but also to re-construct the Chinese national identity through a "national rejuvenation [intended] to restore China to its historic greatness" (Moore 2000: 124). In a word, the success of Shanghai with its orientation towards the becoming of the next global city in East Asia, under the implementation of China's economic open policy, is not simply an indication of transformation pathway to western capitalism, but also an indicator of China's national strength.

An interviewee described Shanghai's accelerated development in the past decade as like "building Manhattan in five years" (*Interview*, 10 June 2002). Such accelerated economic growth unfolds in the expansion of the city scale, in the transformation of the population structure, in the urban landscape and infrastructure, and in investment growth. In turn, there is a demand for changes in municipal management for the creation of a good business clientele (Fu 2002; Wu 2000), and a call to international expertise to redress Shanghai's lack of experiences. Duao Wu and Taibin Li (2002) argue that if Shanghai wants to catch up rapidly, it needs to take advantage of international experience, especially by drawing on the successful cases. The same respondent who commented on Shanghai's rapid development emphasized that, "it is very good for foreigners in

Shanghai. They value our opinions and they want to learn our ways of doing things" (*Interview*, 10 June 2002).

It is in the above contexts of Montreal and Shanghai in the 1990s that Montreal's then mayor, Pierre Bourque, headed trade missions at least two times per year in North/South America, Europe, Middle East and East Asia. It also explained why the MMG toured some strategic East Asian cities, such as Hong Kong, Beijing, Kunming, and Hiroshima. The major objectives of *Team Montreal* were to promote the city's image, to introduce the city's potential to foreign investors, to attract external investment, to market Montreal-based businesses, and to put Montreal back on the world map. For instance, his trip to Hollywood was especially about marketing Montreal's edge in the film industry. While leading the delegations of the business community, the MMG also attempted to extend its network by signing more friendship agreements with other cities, such as Ho Chi Minh (Vietnam), Bucharest (Romania), Algiers (Algeria), Casablanca (Morocco), and Tunis (Tunisia).

It was also in the above local contexts that the MMG intensified the economic relationship with Shanghai, although economic exchanges had been an important aspect of the twinning since its inception in 1985. The sharp contrast between Montreal's deprivation and "depressed" atmosphere, and Shanghai's potential prosperity and "upbeat" morale was commented on by a government official:

> Bourque and I went to the rotating restaurant on top of [Shanghai] Xin Jing Jiang Hotel in 1993. There was no citywide supply of electricity at the time. Today, it is well developed. Nevertheless, we exclaimed that this city is going to be prosperous one day. Now, you can see skyscrapers everywhere in Shanghai. Back in 1993, you could only see red lights on construction cranes everywhere, very spectacular... For urban development, nowhere in China or even in the world is comparable with Shanghai. *We started to have a sense of crisis. We must get a firm grip on Shanghai. In other words, we foresaw that Shanghai is going to pass us one day...* The development of Montreal was very terrible [in 1993]. That is why Bourque wanted to be involved in politics. Shanghai gave him a lot of strength and inspiration (*Interview*, 17 May 2002. The author's emphasis).

Montreal governmental officials' senses of crisis did not simply arise from the sharp contrast between urban scenes in Montreal and Shanghai. Rather, it was deeply rooted in the urge to re-invent Montreal for urban competitiveness in the global economy. "To get a firm grip" on Shanghai's rapid urban development was a means to ease the Bourque administration's sense of crisis. More importantly, it was part of the MMG's governing strategy to turn Montreal's economic crisis into an opportunity, an opportunity in which the MMG actively played the role to expand Montreal's reach eastward towards China.

As mentioned earlier, Montreal traditionally has been defined as a point-of-access city between Europe and North America. Nevertheless, the MMG, in the 1990s, was no longer satisfied to define its city's competitiveness when the trend of globalization has gradually turned to Shanghai and China. A similar passage has been read across documents in municipal archives concerning the justification of trade missions to Shanghai, China, or other parts of East Asia, and of specific development projects with Shanghai:

> It is important to maintain the privileged link with East Asia, particularly China, where their market permits Montreal to see that our urban economy much depends on the international market. Without doubt, the visit [to Shanghai] is going to help us deepen our bilateral relationship and consider the opportunities of exchanges (Montreal Municipal Government 1998(a)).

Compared to Toronto or Vancouver, Montreal is not usually thought of as a city with strong Asian ties, in light of its smaller Asian population. Nonetheless, other Canadian municipalities did not have the same access to the MMG's networks in China's financial and economic powerhouse. In short, Montreal's twinning with Shanghai constituted a new economic linkage in the global economy, and it especially gave Montreal an advantageous position in relation to the potential Chinese market, which, in turn, redefined its urban competitiveness.

The MMG's efforts to enhance economic ties with Shanghai are clearly a governing strategy of city networking in response to the global economy, and simultaneously in re-shaping the orientation of Montreal's business development. As former Mayor Pierre Bourque claimed, "[O]ur future is in the world. We have pretty much finished our development in the city. We have to consolidate that and so on, but we are in a global economy now, a new economy that works on exportation of talent, creativity and knowledge. That is the future. For that, you have to make yourself known" (*The Gazette*, 31 March 1998). Therefore, it is an entrepreneurial effort of the MMG to market Montreal-based companies in trade missions through SCRs. While the SMG demanded help to ease the pressures of rapid urban development, the MMG sought to market Montreal as an expert city when it comes to generating quality urban life, which was on demand in Shanghai. We can see such a projection of Montreal in a municipal publication, entitled *Montréal, métropole du 21e siécle* (1998(c)). The MMG was proud of its leading urban management and related, strategic industries. Simultaneously, Montreal was promoted as a world-class city having both a vibrant cultural life and world-pioneering science and technology. Interestingly, this handbook was first written in French and later translated into Chinese to target the MMG's Chinese counterparts.

A Montreal government official claimed, "I believe that the mayor and the City of Montreal want to have twinning agreements that will mostly facilitate the marketing efforts of our companies where there are potential markets" (Canadian Parliament 1995: 15). As mentioned, the exchange and transfer of urban management were not often ends in themselves: they were also a means of introducing Montreal's business community to opportunities in Shanghai. That is, other twinning aspects helped to promote Montreal's

business potential or to "sell" Montreal's local expertise to Shanghai by following the reception of demands and the identification of niches. In other words, the entrepreneurial strategy of city networking or collaboration for competition helped the SMG's efforts in coping with rapid urban development. In turn, the marketing strategy of the MMG is implicated in the offering of exchanges or assistances to Shanghai. Thus the MMG was able to position itself within the Chinese market in part, and in the global economy in general, through building and enhancing its official link with Shanghai and its interpersonal network with Chinese officials. When the power of local governments is entrenched in almost every sphere of Chinese cities, business opportunities are often part of these networks.

One of the most successful cases in marketing Montreal through networking with Shanghai was the introduction of a landscape company to Shanghai. With the help of both sides of the municipal governments, this company won the contract of designing and building a 23-hector park (People's Square) in the heart of Shanghai's downtown area. With a budget of approximately 50 million RMB (Chinese currency), this project was the SMG's priority for the year 2000. The project was appreciated for the building of "green lungs' to improve the air quality and to improve urban life in Shanghai's downtown core (Hu 1999). The MMG also involved large-scale companies in the SMG's urban projects. For instance, *S.N.C. Lavalin* was involved in a waste treatment project, *Dessau Soprin* was introduced to the river-treatment project, and *Bombardier* participated in the bidding on Shanghai's mass-transit development. Even though, for various reasons, none of these companies received a contract from the SMG, business networks were nonetheless expanded for these companies. For instance, *Bombardier*'s CEO was later invited to sit

on the SMG's foreign advisory committee. The company further expanded its network to other parts of China. A contract was given from Shanghai's sister province, Yunan, where regional jets were needed. *Bombardier* also positioned itself for the market of transportation in Beijing[1] (*Interview*, 15 June 2002).

The horticultural exchanges between the MMG and the SMG were not simply about intercultural communication. They were intertwined with the economic motivations to promote Montreal in Shanghai. For the MMG, the *Montreal Garden in Shanghai* entailed economic spin-offs in two forms. First, several firms from Montreal participated in the 7-million-Canadian-dollar project: *Saucier & Perrote*, an architectural firm, designed the multimedia pavilion in collaboration with the engineering company, *Dessau Soprin. CESAM* further conceptualized and realized the multimedia showcase of Montreal and its leading business sectors. Second, as an intergovernmental project, the multimedia pavilion was to promote Canadian, Quebecois and Montreal technological knowledge in China and in Asia. It was also meant to present an innovative and dynamic image of Montreal, Quebec and Canada to the general public in Shanghai. Furthermore, the multimedia pavilion was designed as the public space where exchanges between business communities on both sides can take place (Multimédia *CESAM* and Montreal Municipal Government 1999). An interviewee explained,

> [t]here were two or three trade missions organized during that time [the construction of the *Montreal Garden in Shanghai*]... there were opportunities for different groups to get to know Shanghai through the related events organized around the opening of the *Montreal Garden in Shanghai*... I imagine that some private companies were able to get work in China, or to find partners. That's only an impression I have from seeing all those people there at the same time. I don't know how many Canadians left with contracts in their pockets but that's part of the whole process and an aspect of the international scene, in terms of business. The construction of the *Montreal Garden* provided the opportunity to open the door for different businesses, and to provide a glimpse of China... (*Interview*, 11 July 2002).

The original design of the *Montreal Garden, therefore,* was not only a "static" milieu where Montreal landscapes were projected in multimedia presentation, but also an "active" for business or diplomatic activities at the heart of Shanghai's new economic zone. The marketing strategy of Montreal, once again, was realized in the networking strategy with Shanghai, and more importantly, in the establishment of a physical setting where the visibility of Montreal does not disappear after trade missions or official visits. In the official discourse, the presence of Montreal is concretely inscribed in a significant global economic, financial and commercial metropolis (Multimédia *CESAM* and Montreal Municipal Government 1999).

Overall, the MMG's strategy of using the twinning with Shanghai to create footholds for its local companies in China is not far from the Quebec government's creation of *Quebec Inc.* With the objectives of strengthening the Quebec economy and pursuing Quebec's political power, *Quebec Inc.* was created by the provincial government to seek ways to build a distinctive model of development based on the close linkage between the public and the private sectors and sustained by various socio-economic organizations. *Quebec Inc.* is also underpinned by the political pursuit of Quebeckers' distinctive cultural and political identity via obtaining the functional autonomy and gaining the economic control over the region (Bélanger 1998). Therefore, it is also regarded as a form of market nationalism, which asserts the collective interests of Quebec[2]. *Quebec Inc.*, in the past thirty years, has resulted in a stronger control over the Quebec economy in the hands of Francophones and a smaller gap between Anglophone and Francophone enterprises. While *Quebec Inc.* continues to evolve since the Quiet Revolution, there has been a strong emphasis on the importance of integrating *Quebec Inc.* to the global

economy in the 1990s. Bernard Landry, then Vice-Premier who was responsible for Quebec's finance and economic development, promoted a set of strategies, hoping to give Quebec leverage in facing the challenge of globalization. In the same language of achieving competitiveness in the global economy, *Quebec Inc.* encourages local companies (most of them are based in Montreal) to invest in the overseas market. It also emphasizes specific industrial sectors which possess comparative advantages in the respectively niche markets of aerospace, telecommunications, multimedia, biotechnologies pharmaceutics and medical equipment. Furthermore, *Quebec Inc.* recognizes the importance of reviving Montreal as "Quebec's instrument of opening to the world" (Bélanger 1998: 187). While it is very likely that the MMG followed the blueprint of *Quebec Inc.* in developing the economic tie with Shanghai, it should be noted that the MMG's entrepreneurial approach to creating the advantages for its local business community was not in any overt language of strengthening Quebec sovereignty. The MMG's international relations were mainly functionally targeted than politically specific. This nuance will be further discussed in the following chapter.

**Conclusion**

It has become a cliché that nowadays governmental officials have to "think globally and act locally". It implies that current national or urban policy-making requires considering the impact of the overlap of international and domestic issues on nation-states or cities. Nevertheless, the case study of Montreal's twinning with Shanghai shows the inversion of the above cliché: in the rationale of urban competitiveness, of building the city's international image, and of maintaining or upgrading a city's position in the

world economy, the entrepreneurial efforts made by the MMG can be best expressed as "think locally and act globally". Through the communicative processes of the sister-city relationship, the MMG made space either in the physical sense of the *Montreal Garden in Shanghai*, or in the abstract sense of opening the door to Shanghai for the local business community. It is within this space that local interests played out at the global level and that local officials extended their power beyond the confines of municipal boundaries. In other words, the global-local dynamics are not a simplistic spatial linkage. Through studying the economic aspect of the Montreal-Shanghai connection, the global-local linkage is first understood as social relations or communicative processes through which cities respond to the challenges of the global pressures, while creating space within or beyond the boundary of municipalities. The created space is a response to the envisaged global, structural forces, but it is also the source of intensified human, financial, production, or cultural flows around the globe. Therefore, the global-local nexus is a dialectical process in which the global can impose challenges or pressures onto the local, but the local can accommodate, embrace, resist, or rework the global according to local conditions, demands and capacities.

I have discussed the macro aspect of the global-local level on which the twinning between Montreal and Shanghai played out. We now have a better grasp over the economic rationale behind twinning, and over the work of cities beyond the municipal boundaries in the discourse of improving urban competitiveness in the global economy. It was actualized by undertaking both entrepreneurial measurements of city marketing and networking through which new economic linkages can be constituted, cities' positions

can be re-defined, and economic globalization can be re-generated and intensified by the participation of local governments.

Chapter 3
# Twinning and Canadian Intergovernmental Relations

In this chapter, the discussion turns to the meso, or regional elements, within the process of the MSR. These elements include the centrifugal tendency of Canadian international relationships, Montreal's formal position as a city in the Canadian Constitution, Quebec's international diplomacy as a reflection of the relationship between the Canadian and the Quebecois governments, and the roles of both senior governments of the MMG in the MSR. In other words, the meso elements I examine focus on the MSR in the intergovernmental processes among three levels of Canadian government. Without considering the mediating elements at the regional level, SCRs would be easily over-generalized in the functional discourse of globalization and localization. Such a functional reasoning of the local-global dynamics in twinning needs to be complemented by explanations of constraints and opportunities embedded in the regional context in which a sister city is situated. The discussion in this chapter, therefore, is important because these specific elements shape different characters of twinning programs. Studying Montreal's twinning with Shanghai reveals that a lack of specific policy from its senior governments set both constraints and opportunities for the MMG in the development of twinning programs. How the MMG dealt with the constraints and how it took advantage of the opportunities shaped the distinctive characters of the MSR.

The MSR was different from the international activities pursued by the Quebec government. While Quebec has been widely discussed as one of the most advanced cases

of non-central governments' (NCGs)[1] involvement in international activities, namely paradiplomacy or protodiplomacy, much attention has been paid to the conflict, tension or reconciliation between Canadian federal and Quebec provincial governments in the evolution of Quebec's diplomacy. While acknowledging the importance of discussing Quebec's diplomacy as setting the regional context of the MSR, this chapter points out the differences between Quebec's and Montreal's international activities, respectively. That is, the MMG had developed a much more de-politicized orientation, as well as a mode of organizational cooperation with its senior governments through developing the so-called "low policy" with the SMG.

This chapter starts with the development of multi-levered diplomacy as permitted by Canadian constitutional and historical contexts. Furthermore, the city of Montreal's formal status in the Canadian Constitution is examined in order to outline the constraints and opportunities of twinning activities developed in the interplay between the MMG's formal, subordinate status and informal, quasi-constitutional capacities. How and why the MMG developed a cooperative relationship with its senior governments will also be discussed.

**The Canadian Context of International Diplomacy**

Conventionally, central governments are regarded as primary or unique actors in conducting diplomacy. Within such a hegemonic understanding of foreign diplomacy, NCGs' international involvement is often regarded as insignificant, confrontational, or trespassing against their domestic responsibilities. In other words, there is always a concern that diplomacy is not a fitting task for NCGs. Nevertheless, along with the

intensified processes of globalization, it has gradually become legitimate to blend the traditional policy of domestic and international categories into the so-called "intermestic" one located in various political arenas: international, national or sub-national. NCGs are more eager to conduct marketing, export promotion, or outward investment to encourage the competitiveness and internationalization of their local companies. NCGs, in the age of the increasing mobility of capitals, also try to go abroad to attract inward investment or to promote tourism.

In addition to the recent trend of globalization as a functional explanation of NCGs' increasing role in international affairs, what needs to be emphasized is that Canadian NCGs as international or transnational actors are not a new phenomenon, long before the global economy. As such, there has always been room for international activities of Canadian provinces or cities in the historical context of the Canadian constitutional arrangement. As Brian Hocking argues, despite its development over time, "[t]aking an overview of federal systems, it is apparent that Canada has, over the last two decades, exhibited the most pronounced tendency for its sub-national governments to stake a claim to involvement in external policy issues" (Hocking 1993: 48). This trend can be traced back to the historical development of Canada as a decentralized state and of the international multilateral development of Canadian foreign policy.

Louis Balthazar also agrees with Hocking that "Canada is a country that is particularly susceptible to give way to centrifugal diplomacy" (Balthazar 1999: 153). Overall, Canada is a country that does not have a long historical development of nationalism. On the one hand, the federal government did not attempt to officially control its foreign relations until 1931. The British tie was not fully cut off until the 1960s.

Canadian citizenship was not instituted until 1947. The Canadian Supreme Court did not gain full power from the British Privy Council prior to 1949. There was no official Canadian flag until 1965 nor Canadian anthem until 1979. On the other hand, Canadian provinces, claiming to be the equal partner of the central government, were autonomous bodies in charge of a wide range of jurisdictions. Oftentimes the Privy Council in London favoured a larger, provincial authority when it held the final authority over Canadian constitutional matters. What was deemed to be historically significant in ascertaining the provincial power was the 1937 Labour Conventions case (Leeson 1973). In this case, the Privy Council determined that the Canadian federal government had the power to conclude foreign treaties, but it was up to provincial authorities to determine whether they would implement the treaties. The implication of this decision was not that the federal government was rendered powerless in pursuing international affairs nor that foreign policy became the major task of the Canadian NCGs. Rather, its significance was about its assurance of NCGs' involvement in facilitating external relations. It was particularly evident about the involvement of provincial governments in the negotiation process between Canada and the U.S. on free-trade matters. Canadian provinces gained access to insert their influences because regional interests were significant in this matter. The provincial governments' active involvement in international affairs was also evident in the dispute process between Canada and the U.S. on the acid-rain control, where Ontario and Quebec actually led the evolution of negotiation (Hocking 1993). In short, the conventional understanding of diplomacy, which resides in the sphere of central governments, is not sustainable in the Canadian context. Rather, multi-layered diplomacy

is a more adequate term to describe the phenomenon where both central and non-central governments are involved in international affairs.

The Canadian context of multi-layered diplomacy not only resulted from a lack of long-term nationalist projects, but also from the development of multilateral international policies. In order to develop a good reputation on the international stage, Canada tends to uphold certain values in the processes of international participation and Canadian officials tend to make friends, rather than enemies, in international organizations. This country probably has the largest number of membership in international organizations. Thus Canada is renowned for its internationalism rather than its nationalism. Balthazar argues that this stance towards foreign affairs "prevailed at least until 1968, and it created a climate within the country that allowed for a loose and decentralized conception of the national interest, if there was such a thing as a unique Canadian national interest" (Balthazar 1999: 155). Balthazar goes on to assert that while being a neighbour of the world superpower, Canada did not and could not develop a strong or original foreign policy. Its involvement in international affairs is often reactive, and its central concern is mainly economic interests and foreign trades. Economic interests also pertained to provincial jurisdiction, especially in the area of natural resources. Therefore, the federal government can hardly conduct foreign policy without the involvement of provincial governments.

Canadian provinces' active roles on the international stage can also be traced to the structure of Canadian federalism, which has a relatively weak 'interstate' mechanism for the expression of regional interests. A lack of provincial representation of interests at the federal level makes direct communication with the central government difficult. William

Chandler (1986) holds that as a result, provinces might feel as if they are not fully integral to the constitutional order and that their regional interests are easily ignored by Ottawa. While striving for stronger voices at the central level, provinces and NCGs also go abroad for economic reasons and/or for political gains. The case of Quebec has been constantly discussed as one of the best examples of NCGs' aspiration for greater political control or secession from central governments. From Quebec's viewpoint, Ottawa is indifferent to the cultural distinctiveness of Quebec in which the majority of the population are French-speaking, and the interests of these citizens would not be best represented by English Canada. Thus, in addition to the creation of *Quebec Inc.*, there was the need to actively forge its own international ties as a means to search, negotiate and/or consolidate its autonomy. Although Quebec's international activities are far from solely political, and there is no single model developed during different periods of Quebec Liberal and Parti Quebecois governments, tension, negotiation or reconciliation with the federal government has been the centre of academic discussion for the past three decades (Bernier 1996; Chevrier 1996; Balthazar et al. 1993; Painchaud 1977).

In short, the brief review of Canadian NCGs' international involvement is to provide a historical explanation of why NCGs go abroad beyond the functional reasoning resided in the global-local discourse. Michael Keating (1999) argues that we cannot find all explanations from functionalists, because political impulses of structures, goals, strategies and resources must be taken into account in building or promoting regional interests in either economic or political terms. Quebec's long-term development of international activities further serves to stress the importance of such a political understanding. The

following discussion of Quebec's diplomacy will contribute to a better comparison with the MMG's twinning programs characterized by a de-politicized process.

**Quebec's International Relations and Canada's Responses**

Long before Quebec's Quiet Revolution in the 1960s, there had been international relations between Quebec and France and between Quebec and Great Britain. Before Canada sent diplomats to Paris, Quebec had already appointed one in 1882. Quebec also had delegations in London in 1908 and in Brussels in 1915. For the promotion of trade and tourism, Quebec also had an office in New York. During the Quiet Revolution, these connections were re-initiated and more offices were opened in other European or American cities with an aspiration of modernizing Quebec and of increasing the power of the Quebec government for the special interests of Quebeckers. In other words, reviving international relations was not simply about re-assuming the old ties Quebec had developed in the past. It further carried out the nationalist sentiment in seeking external recognition for Quebec's cultural uniqueness and political secession from Canada. Its international relations, therefore, partially entailed a projection of a positive and vibrant image of the French-speaking society different from that of English Canada and partially entailed an ambition to become a full-fledged nation-state with its own sovereignty. This political sentiment was best expressed by Paul Gérin-Lajoie, a former Minister of Education, in a straightforward manner:

> Quebec is not sovereign in all matters: it is a member of a federation. But it constitutes, in a political sense, a state. It possesses all elements: territory, population, autonomous government. It is also the political expression of a people that is distinct in many ways from the English-speaking communities inhabiting North America. In all matters that are completely or partially under its competence, Quebec intends from now on to play a direct role that conforms to its personality and its rights... Quebec is determined to take its proper place in the contemporary world and to make sure it has, externally as well as internally, all the means necessary to realize the aspirations of the

> society it represents (Bernier 1996. Quoted in Belthazar's translated version 1999:159).

The above political aspiration has been regarded as a threat to the integrity of Canada. A stronger sense of Canadian nationalism was cultivated along with the growing Quebec sovereignty movement. The federal government responded to Gérin-Lajoie's remark with a strong assertion of its rights to sign international treaties, underlined by a firm emphasis on one Canadian nationality and one Canadian voice on the international stage.

France played a central role in encouraging and fostering Quebec's international presence. The DeGaulle government was not only eager to sign a treaty on educational and cultural cooperation with Quebec, but also encouraged Quebec to forge formal relationships with former French colonies in Africa. Without inviting Canada, Gabon welcomed Quebec to participate in a conference on French education in 1969. This resulted in Ottawa's immediate sanction of Gabon by disconnecting the official diplomatic relation and Gabon eventually had to apologize to Canada in order to resume the friendship (Balthazar 1999:160). The conflict between Quebec and Canada over international diplomacy reached its apex from the '70s to mid-'80s. Ottawa insisted on being the only representative of Canada to participate in the large-scale French international organization, *Francophonie*, whereas Quebec, with full support from France, would certainly want to become a member of the political organization among Francophone countries. The tension over international activities was in parallel with the double-headed development of Canadian and Quebec nationalism, respectively, under the leadership of Pierre Trudeau's Liberal Party in Ottawa, and under that of René Lévesque's Parti Québécois (PQ) in Quebec. The situation remained the same until 1985,

when negotiation and cooperation were possible between a new conservative government in Ottawa and the return of the Quebec liberal government.

The intergovernmental relation between the two became intense upon the election of a new PQ government lead by Jacques Parizeau in 1994. Parizeau's firm stance towards Quebec's sovereignty was turned into the 1995 referendum in Quebec. Despite the referendum result of a defeated PQ proposal, the extremely close margin of less than 1 percent caused great concern in Ottawa and in the rest of English Canada that Canada could have disintegrated as a possible result of losing Quebec. Although Quebec did not officially claim or mobilize its sovereignty movement at the international stage, Quebec's external affairs gave more an impression of protodiplomacy rather than paradiplomacy. The former refers to a NCG's diplomatic efforts to obtain international recognition for a complete status of sovereign state; the latter refers to such efforts without an intention of becoming an independent country. Therefore, the PQ government's international activities received counter efforts from the Canadian federal government as the reaction towards every possible move towards the sovereignty of Quebec.

The conception of a unified Canada consisting of a mosaic of subcultures has been reinforced and promoted overseas. This new image of Canada was clearly outlined in the federal statement of foreign policy, *Canada and the World.* While cultural diplomacy is an important task for the federal government, the Canadian culture is written in the singular, as if a homogenous "one" prevailed in a Canada that includes Quebec (*Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs* 2003). In other words, the distinctiveness of Quebec society was denied in Canadian foreign policy, in which the Canadian nationalist projection endorses a stronger central government in comparison with the weakening of

the provincial power. While Ottawa's intention to monopolize cultural diplomacy for its own interests is clear, its attempt to obliterate multi-layered diplomacy is also evident in the case of *Francophonie*, where Canada prevails without the mention of Quebec. The uniqueness of Canada lies in its "bilingual, multicultural, and is deeply influenced by its Aboriginal roots, the North, the oceans, and its own vastness" (*Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs* 2003). Quebec is not referred to as the reason for bilingualism, nor is the province in general mentioned as an important partner of the central government in facilitating cultural policy. By observing the above evolution of Canada-Quebec intergovernmental relations, Balthazar concludes that there is less room for Quebec diplomacy and the Canadian federal government will only tolerate the international presence of its provinces or regions "as long as it is not too meaningful" (Balthazar 1999:169).

And what is the implication of Balthazar's conclusion drawn from Quebec's experiences in developing foreign relations? So long as Canadian regions are not internationally engaged in protodiplomacy nor in the high policy concerning national integrity or securities, Canadian NCGs would face fewer obstacles in developing their international activities and foreign counterparts will unlikely face retaliation from Ottawa in the diplomatic development with Canadian NCGs. In contrast, NCG's "low policy", such as trade, environmental and cultural exchanges, at the international arena, is much welcomed by the federal government. It is at this level on which Canadian municipalities, including the MMG, operated its sister-city programs. It is often the case that Canadian municipalities form their international relations or twinning agreements in the spirit of communication and cooperation, rather than confrontation or competition, with their

senior governments. It is also argued that there is no overlap between the interests of Canadian municipalities and their senior governments when it comes to international relations. Nevertheless, while these phenomena are noticed, there is a lack of explanation behind the above arguments through teasing out Canadian municipalities' position in the intergovernmental context, as well as limits and opportunities inherent in such a context.

**Canadian Municipalities in the Intergovernmental Context**

Municipalities, in the Canadian constitutional context, are often regarded as the third level of government. According to Stephan Dupré (1968), while the provincial-federal relation is supposed to be considered as a horizontally equal one based on constitutional law, the provincial-municipal relation is a hierarchically subordinate one in which cities are creatures of provinces based on statutory law. Moreover, while the federal government only has to deal with ten provinces, Canadian provinces have to deal with a large number of municipalities, ranging from small towns to large metropolitan regions. Intergovernmental relations, thus, are more complex at the provincial-municipal level. Provincial governments not only dictate the development of Canadian municipalities, but also mediate and/or control most of the formal contacts between federal and municipal governments. For instance, if the MMG were to receive any funding from governmental agencies at the federal level over 50,000 dollars, it would need the approval of the Quebec government. In short, the existence and authority of municipal governments in Canada depended on provincial legislation or court ruling, and consequently "municipalities are not governments" (Hoehn 1996:XXVi). Felix Hoehn especially

makes the argument by tracing the effects of major legislation and relevant court decisions from all Canadian jurisdictions on the authority of local governments.

Engan Isin further argues that Canadian municipalities are not only creatures of provinces, but are also gradually constrained by a double movement of centralizing and downloading from provincial governments:

> There has been a paradoxical double movement where, on the one hand, central governments have increased their control over local authorities via new techniques and technologies, such as auditing, monitoring, appointing, measuring and regulating, and where, on the other hand, they have increasingly developed, downloaded, contractualized, marketized and entrepreneurialized local governmental functions via a plethora of agencies, guangos and partnerships (Isin 2000: 150).

Downloading refers to a governing strategy of provincial governments to assign new responsibilities to municipal governments without a corresponding transfer of financial or other resources. This movement corresponds to the neo-liberal governmentality that justifies the economic principle of capitalist competition and demands sharing responsibility between governmental and non-governmental agencies (individual or community). Isin further claims that municipal governments are "increasingly like an empty shell where territory marks out the once-meaningful boundary of the political" (Isin 2000: 157). In the research on Montreal's municipal amalgamation, we again witness the subordinate position of municipalities and their incapacity to resist the gradual centralization of the political control of the provincial government (Nielsen et al. 2002).

Whether municipal governments are as "empty" as claimed by Isin is, however, arguable. Instead of focusing on the constitutional position that renders Canadian municipalities powerless, some also argue for informal capacities of local governments for self-ruling (Feldman and Graham 1979). David Cameron (1980) ascribes the term

"quasi-constitutional status" to such a municipal capacity by arguing that, without the direct involvement of provincial governments, the independence of municipal councils is still intake, and certain power and autonomy are still required to fulfill specific responsibilities of municipal governments. Hoehn (1996) holds a similar view that municipalities should still be honoured as a form of government because they are democratically elected and reflect certain local values, interests and aspiration.

A certain degree of autonomy that Canadian municipalities enjoy can also be observed in their development of international affairs. As Katherine Graham and her colleagues argue, "[t]he international activities of Canadian cities might be considered as one example of urban governments flexing their quasi-constitutional muscles" (Graham et al. 1998:190). The long-term practices of twinning have become a readily available or convenient channel for Canadian cities to flex their quasi-constitutional muscles by initiating trade, international communications, environmental management, or urban development assistance. Developing diplomacy for cities is not only a means to actively engage municipalities in the processes of economic globalization, but also a means to develop urban policy beyond the municipal boundaries into the international arena where constraints and subordination from senior governments are not necessarily present. Through examining Vancouver's twinning activities, Theodore Cohen and Patrick Smith (1995) argue that the autonomy of Canadian municipalities has been exercised in twinning activities without strong provincial or federal restrictions. In other words, there is no specific guideline from senior governments regarding what can or cannot be done by the municipalities in the international arena. Despite possible conflicts with federal or

provincial jurisdiction, courts—as an inadequate sphere of municipal jurisdiction—never rule out the international activities conducted by Canadian municipalities.

In the case of Montreal, we cannot argue that because municipalities are creatures of the provinces, the MMG was obliged to follow the Quebec government's path in developing foreign policy. In other words, despite the fact that the MMG occupied a subordinate position in the intergovernmental relation, it did not act internationally with an objective of fulfilling Quebec's specific demands for political recognition. Despite having both the governments of Quebec and Montreal involved internationally, they were not homogeneous actors. Their differences at the international stage lie in the characters of the relative positions, the extent of autonomy and the availability of resources in the intergovernmental relations. Furthermore, the interplay between Montreal's constitutional position and its informal governing capacity paradoxically set limits and opportunities, as appeared in the twinning process.

## Twinning Constraints and Opportunities Embedded in the Intergovernmental Relations

Both sides of the argument on the autonomy of Canadian municipalities in the intergovernmental context are correct in their own logic. Nonetheless, by observing Montreal's twinning with Shanghai, I argue that it is the interplay between the formal constitutional status and the quasi-constitutional capacity that sets constraints and opportunities for the cities' international activities. It is also in this interplay that municipal governments have to manage intergovernmental relations while developing international activities as a means to enhance urban competitiveness in the global economy. In other words, sister-city activities or other international measurements taken

by municipalities operate in the grey area of international relations, where presence and/or absence of senior governments results in a complex interaction between restraints and opportunities for the MMG's twinning activities. Consequently, doubts can be raised about Cremer et al.'s strong claim that sister-city linkages are "largely outside of auspices of any central government involvement" (Cremer et al. 2001: 378). Central or senior governments may or may not directly get involved in the process of city-to-city communication. Nonetheless, their indirect involvement is unavoidable, as they are implicated in municipalities' intergovernmental interaction with their senior governments.

Even though the MMG was subject to the Quebec government, the latter did not provide a specific policy framework regarding the former's development of twinning activities. This resulted in both negative and positive effects on the MSR. On the one hand, the constraints were much about a lack of policy direction, and thus a lack of stable funding and a lack of legitimacy to pursue urban policies beyond municipal boundaries. Therefore, no matter how the MMG tried to justified its approach of "thinking locally and acting globally", a lack of specific and constant support from its senior governments, either at the policy or at the resource level, resulted in much criticism and doubt on the validity and legitimacy of the MMG's twinning activities in Shanghai. On the other hand, without a clear and strong support from its senior governments, and without a definite specification of what can or cannot be done by municipalities at the international stage, it became the source of opportunities for the MMG to develop twinning activities suitable to its own demands, specialties and capacities. The subordinate position also gave room for interpretation of legitimacy in handling edgy, political issues.

I first start with the constraints inherited by the intergovernmental relation between the Quebec provincial and Montreal municipal governments. Even though the Quebec government once published a practical guideline for twinning (Quebec Government 1991), it only aimed to play a supportive or consultative, rather than regulative or restrictive, role. For instance, the Quebec government emphasizes the importance of creating a twinning committee and the significance of assuring citizen participation in sister-city programs. The Quebec government did not stop the MSR, nor did it intend to intervene, despite a clear absence of both crucial stages of developing the SCR suggested in the handbook. However, Quebec's consultative role implies that municipalities in Quebec are mostly on their own when it came to finding resources and to defining their own interpretation of benefits from international activities. Furthermore, there is no mention of sources of funding in the handbook, even though different stages of twinning procedures are discussed, such as the discussion with municipal authorities, the creation of a committee for the development of twinning mandates, the informing and participation of citizens, the choice of a sister city, and the official twinning processes, or even when standard formulations of protocols or memorandums are provided.

This is to say that the MMG was unlikely to receive stable funding and was constrained by limited resources to simultaneously pursue both local and international aspects of urban development in a legitimate manner. To develop its sister-city programs with Shanghai, the MMG had to find funding from the given budget allocated to each municipal department involved in various twinning projects. It was more of a dilemma to find a balance to allocate resources within and outside of municipal boundaries. Or to be more precise, the MMG confronted the dilemma of conducting urban affairs at the

juncture between the local and the global or between the domestic and the international. As one governmental official explained, "Montreal [the MMG] has responsibility to take care of its citizens to meet the needs. And simultaneously, it's a dilemma, but it's a part of life. Montreal has to go out, to be out there in the international scene. So both exist simultaneously. How you allocate your resources, that's always a dilemma" (*Interview*, 11 July 2002). Consequently, the legitimacy to juggle between two areas of urban development or to actively conduct municipal tasks physically outside its own boundaries became a concern. This was a direct outcome in instances when resources were not given by the senior government specifically for twinning activities or when no municipal budget was independently allocated for sister-city programs.

The constraint of legitimacy was not only evident in the MMG's need to justify benefits of its international activities, in the rhetoric of the importance of undertaking intermestic tasks beyond the municipal boundary, but also in opposition by some councillors or criticism by ordinary residents. The former mayor promoted the MSR to the point that he was criticized for not paying enough attention to local issues in Montreal[2]. An opposing city councillor commented that, "[r]unning off to China might sound glamorous, but the mayor should never forget how to collect the garbage" (*The Gazette*, 21 January 2001:A4). An angry resident complained that, "Mr. Bourque [could] build a garden in Shanghai, but he can't keep our city clean" (*The Gazette*, 18 December 2000:B2). The above criticism questioned whether sister-city programs with Shanghai were mainly for the mayor's personal interest, or for the common good of Montreal. It also challenged the legitimacy of spending millions of dollars in a garden where tangible benefits were not evident to Montreal's ordinary residents, or where economic spin-offs

did not seem to be produced immediately. In other words, compared to fixing potholes, improving local parks or speeding up snow removal, many international twinning activities were not immediate concerns about urban residents' everyday practices.

Despite the above constraints, a lack of formal policy from its senior government also gave rise to opportunities for the MMG in the development of its twinning programs. That is, free from standard guidelines and tight restrictions, the MMG was able to develop the connection with Shanghai according to its local, specific demands and capacities. Thus it was free from the dictated interests of the provincial government. Even though Quebec's former Premier, René Lévesque, was behind the scenes in initiating the Montreal-Shanghai connection, the aspiration for Quebec sovereignty was never inscribed in such a process of international city-to-city communication. Some might argue that the PQ government at the time could use the MMG as part of its overall diplomatic strategies by redefining sensitive political issues at the lower level, such as horticulture or urban management assistance. For instance, Jules Nadeau sees the MSR as Montreal's triumph over Toronto because the former was twinned with one of the most important Chinese cities, whereas the latter was with a less significant one, Nanking. The MSR, moreover, was regarded as the "little victory" of the PQ government over the Trudeau government's desire for Shanghai as the "no-Quebec land" (*La Presse*, March 2 1985: Plus 7). Nevertheless, as Balthazar (1993) points out, the PQ's international policy, under the leadership of René Lévesque, was not simply a political motivation. The policy also had a strong orientation towards Quebec's economic development through seeking international business partners. Lévesque's trade missions to New York and Hong Kong best illustrate such an economic motivation. That is, Quebec's international activities

were not limited to the political projects since they were also about economic gains. In short, despite a tendency to politicize the MSR as part of Quebec's national movement due to the intergovernmental tension at the time, there is little indication that its objectives, activities, and involvement bore such a political burden, or that it has been under the aegis of Quebec's nationalist movement.

On the contrary, to better facilitate the MSR, it had a strong tendency to de-politicize Montreal as the hotbed of Quebec's sovereignty movement, and by projecting Montreal as an expert city in environmental protection, urban management and horticulture, as discussed in the previous chapter. It was not only an attempt to redress the stereotypical impression of Montreal as the source of political instability in Canada, which has prevailed in Asia, but also a chance to focus on the development of twinning exchanges at the municipal level without the reference to political or ideological differences. This coincides with John Kincaid's (1997) argument that American municipal governments rarely take a political stance in the development of international activities, nor do they intend to translate economic interests into formal political agendas communicated to either federal or state governments. In other words, in the twinning process, the MMG was able to play a less politically sensitive role in that its central concern with urban everyday practices is less subject to the influence of international policies or ideological confrontations.

The MMG played a less sensitive, political role not only in dealing with the "domestic" political question overseas, but also in handling the issue about China's human-rights records. The subordinate position of Canadian intergovernmental relations became a shield for the MMG not to directly address China's human rights. Since the

1989 Tiananmen massacre and the political repression of the non-political, spiritual *Falun* followers were imprinted on many Western minds, many questioned the former mayor and his administration for failing to put pressure on their Chinese counterpart in this regard. In the construction of the *Montreal Garden in Shanghai*, the MMG was even regarded as an ally of the human-rights violator[3]. This frequently raised issue led to a standard answer: Montreal is a municipal government, and its international activities are legitimate as long as they follow Canadian foreign policy. That is, as a local government whose major responsibilities were mainly defined by the provision of goods to urban residents in everyday practices, the MMG was not pressured to develop the political dimension of foreign policy. Furthermore, if Ottawa does not put pressure on China's record of human rights, why would Montreal? While it is important to address human rights in Canadian foreign policy, other interests are given weight at the same time. This certainly can be a dilemma for the Canadian government. Bold rhetoric is still applied, but sanctions for countries violating human rights remain ambiguous. The MMG thus not only took advantage of its subordinate status, which does not need to directly deal with formal international policy, but also took advantage of Ottawa's ambiguous policy about direct sanction on human-rights violators. The problematic of integrating human rights in the MMG's twinning agenda will be further examined in Chapter Five.

Overall, the MMG's facilitation of twinning activities was not only made possible by its subordinate status as a less politically sensitive government, but also by its status as the largest city and the economic motor of Quebec. The MMG might not be able to resist the double movement of centralization and downloading due to its constitutional position. However, that Montreal must be economically powerful makes room for the MMG to

develop its governing strategy to retain a certain degree of autonomy for its senior government. A government official confidently claimed that, "in the future Quebec will need more Montreal than the country because the future belongs to cities, more than provinces. The country remains, but all those agreements and all the globalization processes focus on cities. Cities will pull provinces. [The province] needs Montreal more and more..." (*Interview*, 15 May 2002).

The above supports expressed by the MMG's senior governments echo the arguments of Gary Marks and his colleagues (1996) that intergovernmental networks are significant to an understanding of NCG's international activities in that their resources can be channelled together as long as their challenges to the power of the central government is limited. The achievement of NCG's international goals lies in their capacities to take advantage of or to seek opportunities offered within the network in which they are located. Nevertheless, it should once again be emphasized that, without specific policy guidelines where the conditions of supports are specified, and without stable funding from senior governments, such a channel, in the case of Montreal's international activities, was on an *ad-hoc* basis. In other words, there are no long-term strategies developed among three levels of government concerning sister-city exchanges or other aspects of municipalities' international activities.

The above discussion, in short, sheds light on the constraints and opportunities in the Canadian intergovernmental context in which the MMG was both advantaged and disadvantaged by its subordinate governmental status. This further indicates that the overall advantage of the MMG's position as a Canadian city to implement its twinning programs with Shanghai was the flexible character of the municipal government's hybrid

role at the international stage. On the one hand, the MMG was definitely more advantaged by private companies because it is still a legitimate polity that entails certain authority or governmental representation, especially in the absence of its senior governments. On the other hand, it lacked the attributes and concerns of the central governments in aspects of sovereignty, national security, or formal international policy, which often are in conflict with economic, cultural or other diplomatic objectives.

**Twinning as a Result of Intergovernmental Cooperation and Partnership**

The argument on the constraints and opportunities was developed from the MMG's subordinate position in the intergovernmental relation. In this part of the discussion, the focus is turned to the MMG's informal capacity as a partner of its senior governments in the context of the Montreal-Shanghai connection. That is, twinning activities made the partnership between three levels of Canadian government possible, and it was especially on demand when mutual interests were perceivable in such a partnership. This echoes Caroline Andrew's argument about the shifting provincial-municipal relations in which "[s]ome larger municipalities will develop more dynamic strategies designed to gain support from senior governments in order to pursue policies destined to improve their place in the global economy" (Andrew 1995: 157).

Rather than a hierarchical, top-down relation, the horizontal partnership between the MMG and its senior governments reflected a communicative and cooperative mode of intergovernmental relations. This was made possible because the MMG's twinning activities, located at the sphere of everyday practices in the cities, were never seen to be a threat to its senior governments' authority either at the political or economic level. For

the federal government, the less politically sensitive nature of the MMG at the international arena did not pose a threat to the integrity of Canada as a nation-state. For both federal and provincial governments, as long as promoting Montreal's economic interests is beneficial to both Canada and Quebec, there is no reason that the MMG's twinning activities should be restrained (*The Gazette*, 21 February 2000: A1).

Such a cooperative relation was evident in the following examples. First, the Canadian Embassy or Quebec overseas missions often provided local support to official delegations whenever *Team Montreal* had a trade mission to China or other Asian cities. After leading a trade mission in 1995, a governmental official expressed that,

> [a]s for our trade mission in Asia, we did not want to reinvent the wheel. So we worked with the existing people and programs. We also worked very much with the federal network, the embassies and consulates, and also with the Quebec delegations network abroad to set up this trade mission where 25 to 30 businesses followed us in Vietnam and in China (*Canadian Parliament* 1995: 6).

The close relation with its senior governments, thus, was much needed by the MMG because it was not an international actor with a full-fledged governmental capacity to develop international activities. Nevertheless, as a governmental agency, its access to other levels of governmental supports was more privileged than private companies, and such an embedding in the overseas federal or provincial networks enhanced the MMG as a legitimate political representative at the international stage.

While the partnership was formed between the MMG and its senior governments, people might still wonder if there were overlapping, international activities among federal, provincial and municipal governments. A more direct question is: "Is it necessary...to have all of these various levels [of government] competing for space or running over one another [concerning international affairs]?" (*Canadian Parliament* 1995: 6) For the

MMG officials, overlap or conflict was at a minimum and was not the primary concern. *Team Canada, Team Quebec and Team Montreal* were all in operation, but it did not upset the communicative mode of cooperation, nor did senior governments feel that the MMG was on their respective turfs. One respondent simply explained that "overlap was not the primary concern here. What is at stake is that we do not have enough volume from Canada towards China, if you realize how much opportunities have been opened up there" (*Interview*, 9 January 2002). Such a collaborative effort is especially beneficial to business communities. As a governmental official from Calgary emphasizes:

> There's no doubt that the more we can partnership and focus on what we're trying to do, the better it is, because there's only one businessman, and he's being represented by maybe all three levels of government. That's what I believe to be one of the strengths of this co-location project that we are undergoing right now. I would strongly advocate a coordinated effort, probably across the country (*Canadian Parliament* 1995: 6).

If there was a concern about overlapping interests, it occurred at the regional level between the city of Montreal and other suburban municipalities. Thus the creation of *Montreal International* was meant to integrate Montreal's core and surrounding areas' interests in order to promote the overall competitiveness of Montreal region in a more unified way overseas[4].

While the MMG's trade missions to Shanghai and other Asian cities were not regarded as being overboard to infringe on the privileges or interests of its senior governments, it further suggests that international diplomacy, in the age of the global economy, is gradually intergovernmentalized. In other words, managing multi-layered diplomacy requires an access to different spheres of political power. Such a multi-layered diplomacy, especially in the rhetoric of engendering urban competitiveness in economic globalization, also occurred in other cases where the MMG forged a close, communicative relation with either Quebec or the Canadian federal government. An

example of cooperating efforts with both senior governments can be seen in the MMG's winning bid for the hosting of the Olympic Anti-Doping Agency (*Interview*, 10 June 2002). The three levels of government also cooperated to finance the *Montreal Garden in China.* Despite naming it after Montreal, an interviewee emphasized that, "[w]e opened it last year [2001] with Mr. Chrétien and all the Premiers from Canada. It is *our* garden" (*Interview*, 15 May 2002. My emphasis). According to the project report (*CESAM* and *Montreal Municipal Government* 1999), the total cost was about $3,075,000, which was shared by all three governments. Quebec gave $950,000 to conceptualize and construct the pavilion, while $1,000,000 was financed by the Canadian government through the Economic Development Agency of Canada for the conception, realization and installation of the Virtual Garden. The remaining $1,125,000 was paid by the MMG for managing and finalizing the rest of the project. Once again, the MMG needed to be on good terms with its senior governments because of its limited financial capacity to engage in such a larger scale of twinning projects. Hocking rightly argues that, "[w]hilst conflictual relations between national and subnational governments are by no means absent, they are but one point on a spectrum of relationships equally characterized by the need for cooperation" (Hocking 1993: 176). Despite its *ad-hoc* basis, the supports from federal and provincial governments are at least in the spirit of cooperation and communication. To quote Hocking again, "from the perspective of the municipal government, developing close working relationships with the central government can be valuable in dealing with growing international forces. Here it has to be recognised that developing an international profile is not a cost-free activity..." (Hocking 1993: 178).

It should be noted, however, that the Canadian and Quebec governments would not have financed the *Montreal Garden in Shanghai*, had they not perceived similar economic spin-offs to promote Canada and Quebec through establishing a permanent site in Shanghai. In other words, the Canadian intergovernmental relation, in this specific context of the *Montreal Garden in Shanghai*, was not only characterized by cooperation, co-steering, co-decision-making, mutual learning and understanding, but also by the fulfillment of mutual interests of three levels of government. From the perspective of senior governments, cooperation with their municipal government gains importance because it is beneficial in both economic and networking senses. In the case of the *Montreal Garden*, although the provincial and federal governments had to devote considerable resources to the project, what they gained was a chance to promote the Canadian and Quebec economies in Montreal's sister city, Shanghai.

More importantly, what senior governments gained was the access to skill and information that only the local government could provide. Cooperation in such an intergovernmental context, therefore, is less about the municipal government's subordination to its senior governments. Within the process of Montreal's twinning with Shanghai, a mutual dependence or an exchange of interests between the MMG and the Quebec government was evident. Pierre Bourque once remarked that, "I asked for Quebec's support for helping us [for building Montreal's pavilion in the Pudong Park], to be really a true partner, and it went very well. We have to co-ordinate our efforts in all fields" (*The Gazette*, 2 February 1999:A3). In turn, when former Premier Lucien Bouchard decided to send a trade mission to China, the MMG's organizational resources were mobilized and its Chinese network was extended to the provincial level. An

interviewee stated that, "[t]he Premier asked the mayor to help him to go to Shanghai. The mayor did. They went there with hundreds of companies. Bouchard could not go to Shanghai without Bourque's support" (*Interview*, 15 May 2002). In a word, the MMG held the bargaining power in exchange for its senior government's support.

The constitutional constraints imposed on the position and status of Montreal was partially overcome by processes of intergovernmental collaboration, which required the help of local competence in international delegations. Local competence, in the case study of the MSR, included not only the MMG's privileged access to the Chinese political sphere, but also its transnational governing capacity, which will be further examined in the next chapter on organizational communication of the MSR at the micro level. However, it should be reminded that such a cooperative mode of intergovernmental relations was still limited, and the demand for mutual exchanges of interests leaves little room for naïveté about a better positioning of cities in the Canadian intergovernmental relations overall. Even though there is little sign that the MMG encountered much difficulty in the cooperative relationship with its senior governments, Hocking (1993) warns that coordination processes among different levels of government can be problematic due to inter-bureaucratic conflicts or the complicated linkages between horizontal or vertical bureaucratic responsibilities. Therefore, limits still exist, and it remains to be a challenge to engender a more sustainable mode of cooperation through creating more effective channels of intergovernmental communication.

## Conclusion

In view of the fact that most of the previous literature on SCRs failed to situating twinning in intergovernmental relations, this chapter introduced the literature on paradiplomacy in order to fill the gap in research. Nevertheless, whereas provinces are often the focal point in literature on NCG foreign affairs, such as the evolving tension, conflict, negotiation and reconciliation between the Canadian and Quebec governments, the significance of the MSR developed within the MMG's intergovernmental relations helped to spotlight the international activities conducted by municipal governments, whose constitutional position and governing capacities have provided them with a different role. How well constraints are turned into opportunities, how resources and power with senior governments are mobilized, how a municipality's role as a subordinate, hybrid, yet flexible international actor is played, and how cooperation takes place through channelling mutual interests in such an intergovernmental network, determine the achievement of twinning objectives.

Examining the meso aspect of SCRs, which resides in the interplay between municipalities' formal constitutional status and the informal governing capacity in the intergovernmental relation, is helpful with the conception of the political constraints and opportunities a sister city may face. Discussing the macro aspect of SCRs, which resides in the dynamics between the global and the local, is beneficial to the understanding of the functional needs or motivations in making the economic potential of city-to-city communication possible. However, the complex twinning phenomenon would not be satisfactorily understood if we did not locate the discussion at the micro level, where agency, trust, capacities, and power are also crucial determinants of the character of

SCRs. These micro-elements of twinning will be at the centre of the discussion in the following chapter.

# Chapter 4
# Agencies, Actions and Social Values in Sister-City Relationships

In the previous chapters, a structural or institutional approach was developed to understand SCRs at the macro or meso level. A city's position, role and transformation in the local-global interplay help to explain how SCRs are part of the global network in which sister cities seek out economic or developmental advantages from each other. SCRs are shaped and can reshape intergovernmental relations between municipal and senior governments due to legal or formal structures as well as informal governing capacities. While continuing the case study of Montreal's twinning with Shanghai, I turn the discussion to the micro aspects of SCRs in order to complement the structural approach. That is, combining the three levels of arguments enables us to grapple with the sociological pendulum that swings between structure and agency (Giddens 1984). The discussion here is also a shift from "hard" systemic images of SCRs in societal, institutional and legal contexts to their "soft" social and cultural fabric woven by values, beliefs, resources, capacities, or power dynamics in the matrix of agents' purposeful actions across different cultural, governmental and non-governmental entities.

This chapter starts with the examination of the relations between the MMG and other Montreal-based agencies in the twinning processes. The perspective of urban governance is adapted in order to articulate how the MSR was the milieu where a complex set of cooperative and power relations among governmental and non-governmental organizations. Furthermore, I turn to the discussion of leadership and its supporting

system by examining former Montreal mayor Pierre Bourque. I will focus on his roles, tasks and contribution in the MSR, his cultural advisor's transnational or intercultural capacity to mediate different political and cultural code, as well as the extension of the mayor's network to the Chinese central government. The discussion is further carried out by the conceptualization of *Guanxi* (the Chinese conception of interpersonal networking) and trust, which are esteemed as one of the most valuable assets in twinning development.

**Agencies and Urban Governance in Sister-City Relationships**

Being involved in the complexity of the global-local interplay, and transforming SCRs into an instrument for cities to respond to the pressures and challenges of economic globalization, local authorities need to carefully evaluate their options, resources, competitions, strengths, weakness and overall policy direction. Local authorities often come to realize that it is impossible to comprehend the complex, dynamic, yet uncertain global environment. In fact, no actors in the state or non-state sectors possess full technical, economic, or cultural knowledge to navigate its due course within the processes of economic globalization. Thus, a "neither-dependent, nor autonomous" feature in tackling the "glocal" or "intermestic" tasks is increasingly characterizing governments, especially municipal governments. This feature of municipal governments is even better understood by introducing the concept of interdependence in urban governance. Jan Kooiman (1994) focuses on cooperation, co-steering, co-direction, co-decision making, mutual learning, understanding and communication as the essence of interdependence between governmental and non-governmental agencies. He also assumes

no room for naïveté by emphasizing the need to fulfill interests of involved agencies without the sacrifice of the communicative processes of deliberation.

Based on New Zealand experiences, Cremer et al. proposed the cooperation between governmental and non-governmental agencies in the model of municipal-community entrepreneurship. It intends to incorporate advantages from both governmental and non-governmental participation in twinning. That is, while the official representation of governmental agencies is thought to be important in SCRs, especially SCRs with Chinese cities, the participation of volunteer grass-root, ethnic groups and business communities are also important for innovative inputs. They also are "a catalyst for the growth of local employment opportunities particularly for ethnic minorities with low levels of human capital" (Cremer et al. 2001: 389). Smith, in his work on Vancouver's twinning development (1992, 1998), also suggests the significance of community involvement as citizen participation in urban diplomacy and the importance of cooperation between governmental and non-governmental agencies in the pursuit of twinning activities. However, such an understanding of governance tends to downplay the power dimension embedded in the governing processes, where inclusion/exclusion and competitive/contradicting interests can take place at the same time. The work of Alan Digaetano and John Klemanski, therefore, is helpful in thinking about how different forms of power are played out in the processes of urban governance as the interaction between government and society.

Through reworking Clarence Stone's work on power and urban studies, Digaetano and Klemanski in *Power and City Governance* explain three ideal types of power in governing alignments. These include dominating, bargaining and preemptive power.

First, "[d]ominating power is used to secure compliance...implicated in relationships marked by conflict, where actors utilize resources to overcome or to prevent actions of others" (Stone 1988. Quoted in DiGaetano and Klemanski 1999: 20). Dominating power aims at overcoming rival fractions by facilitating a conflict mode of decision-making. Second, bargaining power is used to build coalitions and is a "relationship between actors bargaining from autonomous bases of strength" (DiGaetano and Klemanski 1999: 22). In this power relationship, actors possess "complementary resources, perhaps complementary domains in which each has command power" (Ibid). When the use of dominating power cannot bring forth the intended outcome, the agencies involved may turn to bargaining power to form a co-operative relationship or negotiation as compromise. Bargaining power can direct governing structure into coalitions among the involving actors in the contingent mode of cooperation. Relations among governing elites are developed for the sake of convenience and effectiveness in making decisions. Finally, the third ideal type of power is the preemptive one understood as "the capacity of fusing dominating and systemic power, which, in turn, enables a coalition to control policy setting through the ability to hold and occupy a strategic location in the governing process" (Stone 1988. Quoted in DiGaetano and Klemanski 1999: 20). Those who exercise preemptive power have the ability to direct policy setting and to prevent possible opposition to the policy agenda by making challenges almost impossible. In other words, preemptive power is exercised to preclude the opposition from the decision-making process. Preemptive power directs governing structure into the regime type through facilitating the enduring-cooperation mode of decision making. It should be noted that

these three forms of power are ideal types and their implementations can be the mobilization of any combination of the three in the processes of governance.

Montreal's twinning with Shanghai helps to exemplify the above concern about urban governance in twinning as both communicative cooperation and power coalition between municipal governments and other governmental, for-profit or not-for-profit agencies. The MMG could not possibly go abroad without the involvement of other agencies. I have discussed how its senior governments are involved in the twinning processes on a legal, constitutional, and financial, or simply *ad-hoc,* basis. Beyond governmental agencies, the MSR was also woven by the participation of Montreal's business and the fraction of the local Chinese community. For instance, *Team Montreal* has been a collaborative effort between the MMG and the *World Trade Centre in Montreal* (WTC) (*Interview*, 12 June 2002). Cooperation between the two was needed for the supports of financial and human resources in a trade mission. As a non-profit business service agency, the WTC organized and participated in trade missions to Shanghai for its members because the twinning exchanges of urban management helped private companies to identify specific business or industrial opportunities in Shanghai's urban development. As one government official argued, "they [the business community] would take advantage of the presence of the mayor. Maybe they also need to ask some insights from the mayor" (*Interview*, 7 October 2001). Insights can range from the appropriateness of gift-giving, specific cultural codes and negotiation style to Chinese culture, which people from Montreal might find foreign. In turn, the MMG needed the participation of the WTC members to fulfill its governing strategy to market Montreal's business and industrial sectors in the international market and eventually to make the Montreal economy stronger. The MMG also needed the WTC

to ensure the credibility of private enterprises when they were introduced to Shanghai. In short, the relation was based on cooperation, interdependence and mutual reciprocity.

Such cooperation between the MMG and the WTC can also be interpreted as a bargaining power alignment in urban governance. This can also be identified in the interaction processes between the MMG and the *Chinese Chamber of Commerce* (CCC) in Montreal. Members of the CCC usually accompanied the former mayor to trade missions to Shanghai or other Asian cities. One governmental official argued the importance of the CCC's participation was that it gave symbolic support for the MMG by showing the Shanghai side that the Chinese community is behind the mayor's actions (*Interview*, 7 October 2001). The CCC President also helped the MMG to broaden its network in Beijing by introducing some high-level Chinese officials to the mayor (*Interview*, 15 May 2002). To reciprocate, the mayor introduced the CCC members seeking out business opportunities in Shanghai, much like the action taken for the WTC members. In addition, the CCC was also a crucial partner for the MMG in undertaking two projects brought back from Shanghai: the construction of the Chinese arches and the transformation of the *Dr. Sun Yet Sen* Park in Chinatown. By following the model of the *Chinese Garden in Montreal*, these projects were financed by the MMG, designed, fabricated and undertaken by Chinese artisans sent from Shanghai. The CCC, in these cases, acted as the representative to decide and justify the common interests of these projects for the Chinese community. It also participated in some technical or financial details to assist the MMG (*Interview*, 15 May 2002; 26 June 2002).

The connection between the MMG and the CCC seemed to be an ever-enhanced friendship through the collaboration on both "internal" and "external" urban policies.

Once again, what is also present here is the bargaining power relationship between the two, in which complementary resources and domains of influences made the communicative processes smooth and possible (*Interview*, 26 June 2002). Nevertheless, what is out of the picture is the exercise of the so-called preemptive power understood as the capacity of enabling a coalition as a means to control policy-setting through holding and occupying a strategic location in the governing processes. To repeat, the preemptive power is used to preclude the opposition from the decision-making processes while making the enduring-cooperation mode of power alignment possible with "friends" or with those who are communicative or agreeable.

In the case of projects "brought back" to Chinatown from Shanghai, the bargaining power was exercised to recognize the CCC as the leader or the representative of the fragmented and heterogeneous Chinese community. The preemptive power was also in use to exclude other organizations that either held an opposing viewpoint or competed for similar interests in the community. One interviewee from the Chinese community, who was aligned neither with the MMG nor the CCC, expressed his viewpoint in a mixture of appraisal and criticism on the Chinese arches as the materialized form of friendship between sister cities:

> What was quite positive [about the Montreal-Shanghai relation] is the fact that [some of] the cultural aspect has been imported from Shanghai to Montreal, and that trust has been developed [between the two cities]. What I found as a shame, however, is the project that was chosen. The type of chosen project [the construction of the Chinese arches] is not necessarily one that can benefit the Chinese community as much as it could... The business people they are consulting, are they representatives [of the Chinese community]? Go outside to ask people... We are not a big community in Montreal. People know who the real players are... (*Interview*, 7 January 2002).

The above passage, on the one hand, recognized the contribution of the twinning relation as building a solid friendship between the two cities. On the other hand, it criticized the

power alignment between the MMG and the CCC by questioning the latter's representation and the significance of the chosen project for the common good of the community. For those who opposed the power alignment between the MMG and the CCC, they often argued that the priority of revitalizing Chinatown was either to build the Chinese Culture Centre or to improve the Chinese elderly housing condition, rather than the Chinese arches or the revitalization of the park within Chinatown[1].

**Leadership and the Support System in Twinning**

Twinning, like any other political or commercial development, needs vision. Vision does not come from every involving actor or agency, but from leaders who perform various functions in order to project the vision, to manage the complex dynamics of governance and to lead ways to coping with challenges and pressures from the rapid changes in globalization. By examining the ambassadorial and reticulate roles undertaken by political leaders in general we may further look into this aspect of SCRs. In addition, leaders also need a supporting system to pursue the political actions. Even though successful twinning development greatly depends on the personal will of leaders and their interests in sustaining it, no leaders can pursue twinning alone nor do they possess all the required capacities, attributes or political capital to undertake the tasks of city networking. The cross-border working requires at minimum different linguistic and cultural skills leaders do not necessarily possess. Therefore, a supporting system is needed to enhance leadership and transnational/intercultural capacity. This is especially discussed here to see how an interlocutor or a mediator at the governmental level is an asset to better facilitate urban international relations.

In general, it is not uncommon to find criticisms of SCRs as no more than a "'junket for politicians financed from rate payers' money" (Dupuis and de Bruin 2000. Quoted in Cremer et al. 2001: 394). However, we cannot underestimate that SCRs are often founded, transformed or institutionalized through intercultural and interpersonal communication. The friendship or "sisterhood" between such cities is often initiated between mayors or governmental officials when twinning agreements are first signed. Leadership is not only crucial in the initial stage, but also critical in nurturing trust, identifying mutual interests and building cooperation in later stages (Cremer et al. 2001: 388). Moreover, as Keating argues, "[t]he reality of these [partnerships and cooperation across regions] often depends on the enthusiasm of individuals and their willingness to follow them through" (Keating 1999: 9). In other words, governmental officials, leaders or mayors can be important in SCRs, especially in those which emphasize the official interaction between municipal governments, because their official roles, tasks, personal values, visions, capacity, enthusiasm and trustworthiness determine the character and success of twinning.

Leadership in local authorities, such as mayor/officials, performs tasks in two major sets of functions: one is concerned with the "governing" roles of managing the internal operations of governments, such as maintaining governing cohesiveness, developing governmental strategies, capacities and policy orientation, and implementing actual programs. The second set of tasks with which local leadership is concerned are the "governance" roles of representing the local authority in relation to other agencies, including senior governments, local governments in different regions, private enterprises and community-based organizations (Leach and Wilson 2000).

To realize the first set of tasks, former mayor Bourque had to ensure that developing the external relations or the twinning with Shanghai was a significant policy. This also required an efficient mobilization of municipal, governmental resources scattered in different departments, including the *Parks Department,* the *International and Cooperation Office*, the *Economic and Urban Development Office*, the *Public Works Office*, and the *Mayor's Office*. Some of the governing tasks he developed as part of the MSR include allocation of municipal resources in both local and international/twinning aspects of the work of cities, and justifying both sides of urban development. Within this set of tasks, he also needed to gain support from party councilors to develop overseas projects. It is especially the second set of tasks that the then mayor Bourque performed to pursue the MSR in which cooperation was required with Canadian federal, Quebec provincial, local business and ethnic organizations in order to form a more solid partnership with the SMG. As discussed earlier in this chapter, governance is the management of inter-organizational relations by governmental authorities, and it is an increasingly significant task for political leaders—this on account of the fact that governments can achieve little without partnership and governmental agencies are getting more interdependent with their environment.

By undertaking the "governance" tasks, political leaders play two different, yet interrelated roles: the ambassadorial and the reticulate (Elcock 2001). In the case of the MSR, the then mayor Bourque played the first role by acting as a representative and spokesperson for his government in dealing with other agencies or actors whose support or coordination was needed. The ambassadorial role was also played in order to promote or to market the city as a desirable place to live, work, visit, etc. By playing such a role,

the mayor took substantial executive responsibilities in the involvement of negotiations with leaders of other governmental or non-governmental agencies. It can also be a symbolic role representing the city he governed in the participation of many ceremonial occasions, such as the opening of the *Montreal Garden in Shanghai*, or the augmentation of the Chinese arches in Montreal. The importance of playing the ambassadorial role lies in the occasion in which the mayor can extend his network or improve the relationships with actors in other agencies. That is, the mayor needed to play the second role of reticulist and to develop the skills of networking for the management of increasingly complex inter-organizational relations, as his position was at the center of a vast system of actors. The second role of the mayor required the capacity to offer or share information with other actors, to stay at a central location in his government where information, resources and needs can be accessed easily, to encourage coordination through established channels, to position himself to develop further networks, and to facilitate communication among various actors. Since multiple networking has become a common practice for local political leaders (Elcock 2001), the mayor was required to be knowledgeable of the structure of intergovernmental relations, formal and informal networks, political costs and benefits, and personal values and attributes which appreciate such a reticulist role.

The reticulate role played by the then mayor Bourque in the MSR was evident in the sense that he emphasized the importance of twinning as the intermestic issue. In addition, he was personally fascinated by Chinese culture, and enjoyed the diplomatic relations with his Chinese counterparts. He also valued the personal and political networks built up with the Chinese (*Interview*, 7 October 2001; 7 January 2002). That is, he cultivated the

personal abilities to undertake a facilitative role, which mediated and brokered between actors involved in the MSR. Thus he was able to introduce and share his Chinese network with Montreal's business community. An interviewee even emphasized that "it was the mayor who introduced the Chinese community to Shanghai, not the other way around" (*Interview*, 15 May 2002). In a sense, the reticulate role of the then Montreal mayor was to open doors for participants in the MSR from Montreal. "The mayor is able to open doors for the businessmen in various communities. Once the mayor has opened the doors, the businessmen [can] take over and basically run the meetings and the contracts" (Canadian Parliament 1995:3). A Montreal government official, in the same meeting held by the federal government about how municipalities assist small and mid-sized companies to invest overseas, reinforced the above idea: "[that]... the politician support, be [the] mayors or other officials, is very important in countries such as Vietnam or China, where public organizations can do a lot to establish the credibility of business" (Canadian Parliament 1995: 6). Such a door-opening role was appreciated by the local business communities:

> The mayor's presence [in trade missions] gave us a visibility as well as some credibility that were quite beneficial. That enabled us to have easy access to [Chinese] authorities, and thanks to participating in the mission, we have been able to sign a partnership agreement to have our products assembled in Shanghai, valued at 1.1 million U.S. dollars, plus we sold a container to the Shanghai First Department Store (Canadian Parliament 1995: 9)

This is also to say that the former Montreal mayor knew well the importance of his position as a governmental, authoritative figure to influence the patterns of interdependence within the business community and with the SMG. In his understanding of the Chinese political culture, Tong Fang (1999) gives his "insider's advice" on the importance of the presence of political leaders in trade missions. While China is opening its door to capitalism at a time when private ownership is rare, the Chinese government is

still the "big boss" of all businesses. Thus, Chinese politics and businesses are porous to each other, and Chinese decision-makers tend to regard the government as the biggest boss in the West. A company without the mayors or the high-rank governmental officials' endorsement can be a symptom of instability, uncertainty and unreliability as perceived by the Chinese. In addition, as Bala Ramasamy and Rolf Cremer observe twinning between New Zealand and Chinese cities, "... the [Chinese] tend to emphasize individual authority, integrity and linkages more than procedures, contracts and organizations. The [Chinese] concept of 'face' is often reason enough to involve the mayor and other dignitaries..." (Ramasamy and Cremer 1998: 456). "Face", in the Chinese understanding, refers to one's respect, status and moral reputation recognized by another and is equivalent to social or political position with an emphasis on "the reciprocity of obligations, dependence, and the protection of the esteem of those involved" (Wong and Leung 2001: 36)

To play both ambassadorial and reticulate roles well in a twinning relation with a Chinese city, consequently, required a good understanding of Chinese culture, such as face and *Guanxi* (the Chinese conception of interpersonal relationship) Before discussing the importance of building up *Guanxi* as the foundation of twinning with a Chinese city, it should be noted that if a political leader from the West lacks relevant knowledge about the Chinese political culture or lacks the linguistic capacity to speak Chinese languages, it is better to employ someone who is culturally and linguistically capable of receiving moderate advice on appropriate cultural behaviors, or to decipher specific cultural codes. This is not only required to show respect for the conventions and manners of other societies, but also a means to enhance the governing capacity of the political leader by

introducing a support system (Elcock 2001). It is also about the development of new skills and the cultivation of new capacities beyond the existing ones in urban governance in order to effectively manage the challenges of increasing interdependence in the diplomatic world (Keetl 2002).

In the case of the MSR, the former Montreal mayor selected a Chinese immigrant who possessed transnational capacity as a cultural advisor to city hall. Transnationalism often refers to "the process by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement. We call this process transnationalism to emphasize that many immigrants today build social fields that cross geographic, cultural and political borders" (Basch et al. 1994: 7). Ahiwa Ong (1999) posits that when the spotlights of the global economy shifts to China, a group of Asian investors develops the transnational capacity through mixing migration strategies and capital accumulation. This capacity refers to the ability of immigrants to become *transmigrants* through building and maintaining multiple relationships across national boundaries in a wide range of familial, social, cultural and political settings. Such a capacity not only resides in a certain amount of recent immigrants, but also in a municipal government (i.e., the MMG). Making the Chinese transnational capacity a governing resource helped to consolidate the tasks of the former mayor in pursuing twinning activities. That is, the transnational capacity was "borrowed" from the immigrants' trans-border everyday experiences and was transformed into a governing capacity for the mayor to enhance his ambassadorial and reticulist roles.

It should also be noted that not every transmigrant is qualified to undertake the assistance of the governance role of leadership because such a position requires strong

personal, intercultural attributes, and a good knowledge of both Western and Chinese political systems. Therefore, it is possible to effectively play the roles of an interlocutor or a catalyst and to build the linkage between sister cities by reconciling and uniting cultural differences. (Gudykunst and Kim 1997). For instance, the former cultural advisor, Wen Qi, as such was important because his familiarity with Western and Chinese cultures permitted him to mediate the so-called high-context and low-context communication, and to sensitize different cultural codes embedded in the two types of communication. According to William Gudykunst and Young Yun Kim (1997), the former refers to the processes of communication taking place in a more indirect, ambiguous and understated manner, while speakers are more reserved and sensitive to listeners. This type of communication style is often seen in collective cultures in Asia where there is a strong tendency towards the in-group's goals, fitting into the in-group, a large disparity between in-group and out-group communication, "we" identity and confrontation avoidance. In contrast, low-context communication refers to the one in which "the mass of information is vested in the explicit code" (Hall 1976, Quoted in Gudykunst and Kim 1997: 65). In other words, it is characterized by a more explicit, direct, precise fashion in the transmission of messages. Low-context communication often takes place in individualistic cultures, where individual goals, self-achievement, less disparity between in-group and out-group communication and "I" identity are emphasized.

In addition, a transnational, or an intercultural person, as a cultural advisor to city hall can also help to expand from the municipal government's existing network. In the case of

the MSR, the former cultural advisor was able to extend the MMG's networks to higher, governmental levels in China. Bourque, in his autobiography, states that:

> [Wen Qi] accompanied me in most of my trips and I have benefited from his numerous contacts with Chinese authorities and the Chinese embassy in Ottawa. He opened many doors for me in the "forbidden city" [Beijing]. One of my best memories is about my meeting with the Vice Premier Minister of China, Mr. Li Langqing, who is responsible for governing 1200 million people. I was also able to meet many other Chinese ministers... (Bourque 2002: 230).

Once again, this capacity to bridge a local, Canadian municipality to the central, Chinese government is not a common attribute shared by any Chinese transmigrant. Nor is such networking easily built by any transmigrant who does not possess a previous network or background in the Chinese political circle. An interviewee explained that Bourque's cultural advisor was able to help the former mayor reach a higher level of Chinese officials because his father used to be the official photographer for Mao Tzedong. His family remained to have close contacts with the political leaders in Beijing (*Interview*, 15 May 2002).

All and all, this directs us towards the importance of *Guanxi,* or interpersonal networking, which was woven into the MSR. *Guanxi* is especially a Chinese cultural code, which requires some cultural knowledge or familiarity to build up and develop. The following turns to the discussion of two other aspects of agency in the MSR: *Guanxi* (networking) and trust as important values, personality traits and types of social relationships. Without *Guanxi* and trust developed through leadership and its supporting system, the MSR was unlikely to be developed or expanded from the initiative stage.

**Guanxi and Interpersonal Networking**

The practice of *Guanxi* attracts much attention in literature on cross-cultural negotiations and on international business relations with the Chinese. (Gold et al. 2002;

Wong and Leung 2001; Rapport 1999; Brunner and Koh 1988). It has also been emphasized that building interpersonal networking and trust are the foundation for a good, cooperative relation with a Chinese sister-city (Wagner 2002). In a sense, this social type of relationship "seems to be the lifeblood of the Chinese business community, extending into politics and society" (Wong and Leung 2001: 4). This part of the discussion, thus, examines how *Guanxi* was the foundation of MSR and how it was intertwined with the institutional development of Montreal's twinning with Shanghai.

The word *Guanxi*, in a general sense, is equivalent to "relationship" in the Western sense. Nevertheless, what makes researchers interested in the study of *Guanxi* is its specific reference to the Chinese emphasis on interpersonal networking through which close bonding and trust are developed among those who are within the network. Such interpersonal ties are also foundations for other forms of social relations, such as business partnerships, political alliances, diplomatic connections, and so on. The emphasis on *Guanxi* in Chinese society reflects a sense of social insecurity and political instability throughout Chinese history, since there has been limited confidence vested in formal institutions, governmental bodies, legal systems, or contractual agreements. *Guanxi*, therefore, is a more effective means to prevent risk or uncertainty in the future. Even in China today, *Guanxi* is still an effective means to cope with the fast-changing pace of modernization and transition since Deng's open-door policy.

*Guanxi* functions as a protection mechanism by requiring those who are in the network to conform to basic ethics of Confucianism, which mainly organizes the society in a hierarchical manner through which the practice of filial piety is extended from the familial relationship to teacher-student, employer-employee, and subject-ruler ones. To

disobey those authoritative figures, i.e. parents, teachers, rulers or employers, is deemed to be wrongdoing, and it would be "something like a sin in the Judeo-Christian context (Wong and Leung 2001: 43). In other words, *Guanxi* is vertical bonding, where the acceptance of the hierarchical order is required and where respect for social status and authority are taken for granted. In addition to the idea of giving "face", the respect for social status and authority also explains why the presence of mayors in SCRs with Chinese cities is important.

While *Guanxi* can be understood as the hierarchical, familial-based extension of interpersonal networking, the horizontal connection between siblings and between friends is also integral to *Guanxi.* What governs *Guanxi* at this level are the ethical virtues of benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom and fidelity. In various dimensions, friendship can simply be about helping a stranger out through hospitality, about cultivating self-identity or capacity, or about developing mutual exchanges. In *Guanxi*, friendship is often about mutual help by keeping trust between each other and by giving and returning favours. In other words, it is "the special treatment of an individual, the allocation of resources to another party as a 'gift'... to tighten up the bonds between parties" (Wong and Leung 2001: 13). A favour (or *Renqing* in Chinese), in a sense, is a form of resource which is used as a medium of social exchange. Even though there is no rule defining when and how a favour should be returned, a favour is supposed to be returned at the appropriate moment to complete the mutuality between friends. If someone fails to do so, s/he is seen to be immoral, unjust or self-centered. Or this person is someone who only takes friendship instrumentally for his or her own sake. Such a person eventually is left out of the network s/he was in.

Building *Guanxi*, overall, is first about entering a network of interpersonal relations and to make oneself an insider. This process can take a long time if someone was a complete outsider without knowing anybody in the existing network. Building *Guanxi* is also about finding a mediating person who is already in the network and whose trustworthiness helps an outsider to become an insider. To rely on *Guanxi*, thus, means to build up interpersonal relations upon pre-existing ones. Relying on good *Guanxi* means that obligation in the vertical dimension and/or reciprocity in the horizontal one of international ties can be easily mobilized to fulfill various social needs and instrumental ends. Therefore, the so-called *Guanxi* person who has good connections can be crucial for those who want to build up social relations or to open doors in China for any kind of intention. Lacking *Guanxi*, or missing the *Guanxi* person, can become a great obstacle to invest, form a joint venture or build up any other business partnership in China. Nonetheless, having a good *Guanxi* person can aid the process of opening doors to China and promote efficiency in getting the work done there, as it works as a "lubricant to 'oil the wheels of a transaction' in the absence of a well-developed legal system" in China (Wong and Leung 2001: 94).

In his autobiography (2002), former mayor Bourque explains how he built up his Chinese affinity and consolidated *Guanxi* with the Chinese officials in Shanghai. He was fascinated by modern Chinese history, discovered "its diversity, beauty and all the rest related to cultural heritages and humanities", noticed and credited "its profound transformation during the 1980s", and desired to "make a contribution to make a linkage between China and our country" (Bourque 2002: 221, 223). He further described how the personal friendship between former mayor Jean Drapeau and China's Vice President at

the time, Huang Hua, was mobilized to make Shanghai participate in the International Horticultural Exhibition hosted by *Montreal's Botanical Garden* in 1981. This personal friendship between Drapeau and Huang was built up when the former welcomed the latter to be the Chinese Ambassador to Canada in the 1970s. Concerning Bourque's personal friendship with Chinese officials, it started when he was the Garden director. In that position, he made friends with the representatives from Shanghai during the International Horticultural Exchanges. His contact was maintained with Chinese officials, Dajun Wang and Zhengqian Wu, by frequent exchanges in horticulture, and the "circle of friends" eventually was expanded by the time he visited Shanghai in 1988, while the idea of constructing a Chinese Ming-style garden was also fermented. As already mentioned, such a personal friendship intertwined with the official twinning relation was not interrupted by the 1989 Tiananmen massacre or by embargos on diplomatic relations between Chinese and Western countries. Bourque described that he was the only occidental visitor en route to Shanghai right after the sanction on the Chinese regime. Consequently, he was treated by his Chinese friends as a brother or a true friend, because he was the only Westerner who came to visit when the Chinese "suffered". As Bourque explains, "my presence remarked much of our relations with China" (Bourque 2002: 226). Bourque thus became someone who was trustworthy in the eyes of his Chinese counterparts, which added extra credibility to his "door-opening" role in Shanghai.

To become a "brother" or a "true friend" means to become an insider. An interviewee involved in the MSR also expressed the need to make friends or to be treated as a part of family before "doing business" with the Chinese. Once *Guanxi* is established, it is quite easy to make the work happen. "The Director of the [Shanghai] Park Department said [to

me] that 'the first time we just met, the second time we were friends, and the third time you are a part of my family...[Since] you are a part of my family, you should come to my home for the New Year festival" (*Interview*, 10 June 2002). The same interviewee also mentioned that "we had a lot of dinners and discussions together because a lot of work was done at meals. They would invite all [those who are involved]... We would eat and talk. It was very nice. It's based on friendship, really" (Ibid).

While networking and getting the work done in the form of dining together are not an uncommon feature of building and consolidating *Guanxi*, what is more interesting about the above description of working with the SMG officials is how such interpersonal relations entail a double-sidedness of official and unofficial connection. That is, a sense of affinity was developed by mingling the official partnership with the interpersonal tie, by fusing governmental or business cooperation with informal brotherhood or friendship, and by blending public and private lives together. That is, the diplomatic processes of international communication between the two sister cities were inseparable from the cross-cultural processes of interpersonal networking. On the one hand, formal authority or social/political status represented by the mayor or governmental officials was required to recognize the "face", esteem and commitment of both sister cities. Yet, informal interpersonal connections were established in order to ensure trust and reciprocity beyond the formal, legal, contractual context. A written form of official contracts, memoranda, or protocols was in place, but they often came in at the final stage after *Guanxi* and trust were built and intensified through interpersonal networking.

Finally, concerning giving and returning favours in *Guanxi*, it is closely related to the basic principle of reciprocity mentioned in Chapter One. SCRs are based on

reciprocity and mutual interests to fulfill specific demands from each side. The mutuality between sister cities can be regarded as the extension of giving and returning favours in *Guanxi* at the international or institutional level. One of my interviewees explained the practices of giving and returning favours between the MMG and the SMG in the following passage. The quote is rather long, but it is worth citing:

> Shanghai thinks that it's worth to learn experiences from Montreal. For Montreal, for government officials, we know Shanghai is going to pass Montreal one day. If we help Shanghai today, of course, we are willing to help, Shanghai will help us out another day... [However], this is something that cannot be calculated in a utilitarian way. It's not about how much I can take from the amount I gave away. From the standpoint of interests, Montreal has many exchanges with Shanghai and mutual trust is established. Without doubt, Shanghai would have something in return. For instance, Montreal paid Shanghai to construct the garden, and Montreal always paid people from Shanghai [to work on the garden, arches and the park in Chinatown].... However, it is very interesting that the pattern started to change. Two years ago, Shanghai wanted to construct the largest green spaces in front of the Shanghai city hall. The total is 72 hectares. They spent billions of Renminbi [The Chinese currency]. This was a direct influence of Montreal because they find lots of parks and green spaces here. Shanghai told us to participate. They wanted us to bid on the contract, and they told us that they were going to help. Montreal's private landscape company really won the bid... The park has become the model in China. Now, they [Chinese] paid us to build something for them...This becomes mutual exchanges (*Interview*, 17 May 2002).

Helping the sister city to cope with pressures of urban development is a great idea, but there is always an expectation that the favour would be returned when it is needed at the appropriate moment. The same interviewee also emphasized that such mutual exchanges or reciprocity is not simply for economic consideration, nor can it be articulated in an instrumental manner. It is true that interests of economic exchanges, to a certain extent, can be calculated by counting the number of contracts and the flow of investment. Other aspects, such as the importance of environmental protection or green-space preservation, can also be a result of mutual exchanges. "It [reciprocity] is more integral, from civil, moral, economic, political and cultural exchanges" (ibid). Nevertheless, civil and political impacts did not seem to be obvious in the MSR, and it requires another chapter to examine such a problematic.

**Trust**

In addition to the establishment of interpersonal relations intertwined with the official, diplomatic relation between Montreal and Shanghai, trust is another pillar that sustained the MSR in the past 16 years of development. Nevertheless, beyond the commonsensical recognition or a general feeling for the importance of trust, there is a need to conceptualize its meanings, foundation, targets, dimensions and functions in order to understand why it is another bonding force between the actors in the MSR.

Trust is often examined as moral traits between individuals as "the expectancy of others' virtuous conduct towards ourselves" (Sztompka 1999: 5). This interpersonal moral trait conveys a basic meaning of trust and is extended to other levels of analyses, such as organizational communication or cross-cultural negotiation (Kopelman and Olekalns 1999; Strong and Weber 1998). As a social norm, it is one of the vectors which situates an individual in the moral horizon and which defines the parameters of the self-other relation. Whether I trust someone or I am trusted by the other singles out a sense of belonging and delineates the boundary between "we" (insiders) and "others" (outsiders). One might or might not feel the moral obligation to trust or to be trusted, depending on whether one feels to be part of the "us" or not.

Trust, in a sense, is a morally bonding force between actors, and it furthers a social field in which various, interconnected sets of social actions are vested to become a crucial element of the social life. Trust, therefore, is not only an individual, moral trait or a basic social emotion of confidence in those who belong to the network, but also a quality of social relationships where direct or indirect exchanges of actions take place. "It is a direct

exchange when the act of placing trust evokes reciprocity, that is, results in returning an entrusted object, or paying back with mutual trust" (Sztompka 1999: 60). Trust can also be an indirect social relationship when it is projected towards others who might not necessarily know that their actions are important for someone, nor might they be aware of the trust vested by the same person.

What makes trust significant as a quality of social relationships is the so-called "risk society". As Nikolas Luhmann (1979) argues in his influential work on modern societal systems, the importance of trust arises along with the increasing risk, complexity, uncertainty and uncontrollability of the future characterized by the nature of modern society. The concept of a risk society denotes the developmental processes of modern society in which social, political, economic and individual dimensions of risks exceed monitoring and protection mechanisms in place. Trust, by no means, is an obsolete resource in modernity. The unknown, the unexpected or the unintended increases along with the growing interdependence of social relationships and growing anonymity and impersonality of others' actions. In Luhmann's words, "[w]here there is trust there are increased possibilities for experience and action, there is an increase in the complexity of the social system and also in the number of possibilities which can be reconciled with its structure, because trust constitutes a more effective form of complexity reduction" (Luhmann 1979:8). If the future can be fully anticipated, if society is simple and organic, and if other people's action can be entirely ascertained, there is no need for trust. Trust, therefore, functions in social relationships as a "bet about the future contingent actions of others" (Sztompka 1999: 25). Or put it another way, trust functions to reduce uncertainty about the future by acting as if the future is ascertained in social relationships. To quote

Luhmann again, "[by] means of trust, the truster unburdens himself with complexity which he cannot sustain (Luhmann 1979: 63).

Trust, initially, can be unilateral, but it eventually has to be reciprocated. As Giddens (1991) points out, trust cannot be one-sided if we expect the relationship to last or if we expect the avoidance of continuous disappointment. Each actor in the trust relation is a truster and a trustee at the same time, and to play the double role in a trust relationship requires reflexivity of each involved agency. The trustee not only simply meets the truster's expectation by conducting persistent, accountable, and reasonable actions, but also extends trust towards the truster with the same expectation that the truster would also be trustworthy in her/his conducts. Mutual trust, consequently, "...is the precondition for cooperation and also the product of successful cooperation" (Sztompka 1999: 62). This is on account of the fact that the success of each element in the processes of cooperation depends on the reduction of risk and uncertainty multiplied by various participants. Each participant needs to depend on and is depended by others, each needs to cast trust onto each other, and the network of mutual trust turns to be more complex. Finally, trust goes beyond a personal, moral trait or a quality of social relationship. It can be developed into an abstract sense of trust, in which case rules out the general spirit of cooperation within a specific group. Or, it can become a social capital or the property of social wholes, which enables social actors to act together in a more effective manner to pursue any kind of shared objectives (Putnam 1995)

The function of trust, consequently, goes beyond the reduction of uncertainty and the facilitation of a more active and constructive attitude towards the future. It functions as a form of empowerment (Luhmann 1979). Firstly, to be trusted is to be empowered

because it opens up more opportunities and it allows more spontaneous or innovative actions, whereas others' control and scrutiny on one's action are reduced. Secondly, trust is a form of empowerment because it encourages communication and sociability that interpersonal networks are intensified, the scope of interactions is enlarged, and a stronger emotional sense of familiarity or intimacy between people is possible. In other words, among others mutual trust displayed in specific social relationships or in society functions to facilitate communicative processes and to reduce agony or ignorance in the labyrinth of modernity. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the accumulation of trust requires a constant self-maintenance to keep up the self-presentation of trustworthiness, as well as the good will between each other. Otherwise, when trust is breached, mistrust eventually results in the "danger of collapsing under the pressure of complexity" (Luhmann 1979: 63).

A successful SCR has to be a trust relation. It is first based on the trustworthiness of involved agencies. The former Montreal mayor and other Montreal officials were regarded as trustworthy in the eyes of the SMG because their reputation and performance were built up and reinforced in different opportunities. In other words, reputation and past performances were the foundation of the former mayor's trustworthiness. Reputation was not only attached to the mayoral position or other high-ranked titles, which the Chinese political system values, but it was also derived from the familiarity of previous performance, actual deeds, present conducts or visible results in order to accumulate and reinforce the presentation of trustworthiness. This in turn brought on a more extensive scale and a deeper degree of trust from his Chinese counterparts. For instance, several occasions of cooperation in horticulture and gardening exchanges gave certain ideas,

information and knowledge obtained by Shanghai officials about Bourque's and other governmental officials' responsibility, reasonableness, regularity and commitment in the twinning relation. As mentioned in Chapter 1, a governmental official argued that he was able to work more openly and freely with the SMG in other aspects of twinning activities. This was a direct result of his Chinese partners having been able to evaluate his capacity and reliability through the experiences of cooperation in the project of *the Chinese Garden in Montreal*. His argument further reinforced the idea that the presentation of personal trustworthiness played a significant role in making the cross-cultural negotiation and cooperation possible: "Shanghai trusted me. If they suspected me, I was not able to complete the tasks... The most important thing is the trust from China. Even if they really want to interact with the West, it would not work, if they do not trust you as a person" (*Interview*, 17 May 2002).

Once the Bourque administration established its reputation in Shanghai through past deeds and significant governmental roles, the former mayor himself was a target of trust, and he held a valuable resource in the twinning relation. As Sztompka argues,

> Reputation is a capital asset. It is a sort of investment, a resource which allows us to elicit from others some other valuable assets, among them, their trust and all that goes with it... Once earned, it is a precious and fragile commodity... High reputation adds to the visibility of actions, and invites more scrutiny and control by means of more demanding standards (Sztompka 1999: 75).

His trustworthiness based on reputation and past deeds became a resource to consist of the so-called third-party or contagious trust needed in *Guanxi*. "If somebody, or some institution, is known to be trusted by others—and especially 'significant others', the people whose judgment I trust seriously—I am ready to imitate that trust, and consider the target trustworthy without considering other cues" (Sztompka 1999:73). Trust can be extended or transferred to those with whom Shanghai officials were not necessarily

familiar through Bourque, who was already seen to be trustworthy. His accumulated trustworthiness made his recommendation or testimony a reliable source of authority and credibility, and he would not want to lose his reputation as a "precious and fragile commodity". This also explains why the presence of the mayor in the trade mission was important and why he could possibly play the "door-opening" role for the Montreal business community better than others. The business community presented by the former mayor thus can be considered as the secondary targets of trust after Shanghai officials placed their primary trust in the former Montreal mayor. Simply put by one interviewee, "private firms actually gain benefits from the mayor's credibility. A lot of credibility! When companies are with the mayor, they are more credible outside. The mayor also has to make sure that the companies with him have credibility, too. He has to ensure that" (*Interview*, 7 October 2001).

An international twinning relationship is successful, not only because of trustworthiness of involved actors, but also because of a general spirit of trust cultivated to facilitate cross-cultural communication and to more open exchanges. Also mentioned in Chapter One, horticultural exchanges and the *Chinese Garden in Montreal* were the foundation, as well as the result, of mutual trust. That is, gaining and receiving trust from both sides made the intertwined official and interpersonal networks between the two cities solid. Mutual trust developed from cooperative exchanges in horticulture made the extension of the trust relationship to other areas of cooperation possible. In other words, both sides of the municipal government were willing to count on each other or "bid on" each other's actions to produce a sense of order and security in facing uncertainty in economic globalization. It was especially true with the so-called "anticipatory trust"

between the MMG and the SMG. Generally speaking, this type of trust is oriented towards others when one believes that the actions of others will be favourable to one's interests, needs and expectation in facing possibly an unwelcome, threatening and uncertain future (Sztompka 1999). For instance, building mutual trust with the MMG gave the SMG a sense of security and reduced the foreseen complexity in making Shanghai the next global city because the advice and expertise of the MMG on urban development was regarded as trustful and reliable. In turn, mutual trust between the SMG and the MMG was also important for the latter to cope with the pressure of economic globalization, because being trusted by the former made the external, diplomatic tasks of the latter easier to open doors for the local business community, and to extend Montreal's overall economic network eastward to Shanghai.

Overall, this general sprit of trust between the two cities was not only a personal capital of involved actors, but also a collective one. It made the MSR resourceful for both local governments to cope with the risk society of globalization characterized by a double-bind ideology of hope/potential and risk/uncertainty. To deploy or cultivate the spirit of trust is exactly to face the future of risk and uncertainty actively and constructively with hope and potential for the development of both sister cities. A successful SCR breeds the culture of trust between two cities in globalization because of the following reasons. First, international twinning relation is at the interface between local and global, and is a concrete site where we can observe globalization as actions at a distance or increasing interpenetration/interdependence of individual lives and global development. Second, SCRs bring different localities closer to each other, and cultivate a sense of familiarity. SCRs further breed "a trust-generating atmosphere, where it is easier

to believe that trusting predictions will be borne out, that entrusted values will be cared for and returned, and that others will reciprocate with mutual trust" (Sztompka 1999:124). Trust between sister cities are also embedded at both formal and informal levels: the official twinning status, signed protocols and memoranda, regardless of being effective or not, are symbolic bonding of trust relations between sister cities. They also provide some concrete references points for interactions between cities, a sense of security, support and predictability. Trust in the interpersonal networking of twinning relations makes the actor's endowment of formal trust feasible by conducting certain specific actions, such as aspirations, enthusiasm, open attitude, activism, and so forth.

**Conclusion**

This chapter examined agencies in the MSR and their relations in the combination of cooperation and power relations in urban governance. The roles, tasks and personal trait of leadership and its supporting system were also discussed as another crucial element of the MSR. Furthermore, while the political leader's role of networking was singled out in the MSR, *Guanxi* or interpersonal networking was further examined beyond the mayoral role to see how it was a resource of empowerment for the MSR. Trust, as another personal and social resource for the development of the MSR, was examined in the final section to show that a successful international twinning relation has to be a trust relation. In this case cooperative actions are actively oriented towards each other with the hopes of reducing risks and increasing a sense of security in the complexity of global interdependence.

After analyzing the initiative, motives, backgrounds, structures, resources and agencies of the MSR at macro, meso and micro levels, there is an understanding of what constitutes a twinning relation and what are possible elements in determining its success or sustainability. The following chapter turns the discussion to what was missing or controversial in the evolution of the MSR and their political implication concerning urban citizenship and human rights.

Chapter 5

# The Absent Concerns: Urban Citizenship and Human Rights in China

In the preceding chapters, the MSR has been analyzed from the perspectives of international communication, global-local dialectics, intergovernmental relations and interpersonal communication. The driving forces, elements and evolution of the MSR have also been examined as local inventiveness and tenacity played out between structure and agency at macro, meso and micro levels. In addition, even though the three main aspects of the MSR oriented towards the low policy of international relations, twinning cannot possibly take place in a political vacuum. Furthermore, a lack of interest in the high policy of international relations, such as promoting political ideologies, liberal democracy, human rights or national defense, does not mean that the MSR was free from political and normative questionings.

Based on the empirical analysis of the MSR, this chapter makes an inquiry into two absent concerns in Montreal's twinning with Shanghai. One is the absence of constituent diplomacy and urban citizenship in contrast to the rise of economic citizenship; the other is the MMG's lack of overt concerns about human rights in China. The former points to the fact that while the MMG's entrepreneurial measurement in twinning strived for urban internationalism and competitiveness, Montreal's political culture was characterized by "boss politics" and an absence of citizen participation was reinforced. Human rights in China has become an important issue in foreign policy and world politics since the 1989 Tiananmen massacre, as well as an increase in pressure

from Western governments to condemn the Chinese government. However, complexities and uneasiness prevented the adoption of a policy of condemnation and the politics of naming and shaming the Chinese and their human-rights violations.

**Constituent Diplomacy**

The ideal of sister-city relationships resides in the so-called constituent diplomacy that constituents can directly participate in international relations and that ordinary citizens can undertake some of the tasks of professional diplomats. This ideal was behind former U.S. President Eisenhower's promotion of twinning as a "people-to-people program" in the late 1950s. Edward P. Eagan, in the 1960s, argued that "the job of creating mutual understanding and cultivating friendship is too big for government alone. In addition, government actions are frequently suspected of having some ulterior motive, where common people exchange mutual interests, the resulting friendship is usually genuine" (Quoted in Roeslein 1965:7). Accordingly, twinning, at its best, creates space for citizen participation and community involvement in order to substantiate intercultural communication between people in sister cities. This ideal fails if twinning solely resides in official visits and governmental exchanges without the inclusion of ordinary citizens. It also fails if twinning entails an "ulterior motive", such as economic interests or free trip opportunities for governmental officials. Furthermore, this ideal is meant to make twinning more sustainable in the sense that the actual exchanges between constituents would create a deeper relation less affected by the change of local municipal politics.

If we follow the above ideal in a strict sense, perhaps very few twinning arrangements around the world are successful because twinning nowadays entails overt municipal

entrepreneurialism in order to pursue sister cities' international connectivity and urban competitiveness. In addition, excluding the participation of local governments might not be the best idea for twinning development. Some researchers argue that local governments need to play a key role in twinning because they have the capacity to set up the overall institutional framework for the twinning initiative. Their interest and commitment would also help to nurture trust and cooperation to yield tangible or less tangible social, cultural and/or economic benefits (Cremer et al. 2001). Furthermore, the participation of municipal governments in twinning is deemed to be important because they are in a better position to amass required organizational resources to develop urban international relations (Smith 1992). Since the 1980s, there is even a tendency for local governments to play a more active role in twinning in order to shape a city's international image, to define a city's international policy and to ensure a greater control over its foreign relations (Bush 1998; Smith 1992).

Constituent participation, nonetheless, is still regarded as a crucial element in forming successful and sustainable sister cities. For instance, drawing upon the twinning experiences of New Zealand, Cremer and his colleagues argue for twinning as a model of municipal-community entrepreneurship so that municipalities can act as a catalyst on the one hand, and local communities can provide more resources on the other hand. Instead of "relying on the efforts of a few individuals", the inclusion of citizens "strives for a balance of cultural, political, social, and economic development for both cities, and insists on tangible results in all of those priority areas" (Cremer et al. 383-384). In addition, while tracing Vancouver's twinning evolution in four different phases, Smith (1998) also argues for the importance of community involvement in sustaining a

municipality's international activities. He states that "[p]ushed by their citizen movements, municipalities like Vancouver are becoming directly involved in a variety of issues to counter threats to humanity (e.g., environmental degradation) and to improve the quality of life for individuals locally and beyond" (Smith 1998: 70). There is a broad base of community participation in Vancouver's twinning activities ranging from ethnic, peace, environmental to business communities. Furthermore, Smith optimistically argues that while economic benefits have become an explicit driving force behind twinning since the '80s, two things have come out of Vancouver's experiences. First, a strong community base provides the most capacity to have an impact on the city's economic development. Second, it "suggests a more complete municipal-global citizen," whose concerns also include world peace, foreign aid, and global ecological development (Smith 1998: 70-72).

In sharp contrast with Vancouver, citizen participation or community involvement was not central to Montreal's twinning with Shanghai. As argued in previous chapters, twinning exchanges mainly stayed at the top-top level between municipal officials in both cities, and the local communities did not "push" the MMG to pursue twinning activities in the same way as the Vancouver government. If there was ever a sense of citizen participation, it occurred in the top-down process, in which "governmental officials made the first step and the private sector followed" (*Interview*, 17 May 2002). The top-top or top-down process of the twinning evolution made the MSR unique in the sense that it showed the efforts of the MMG to actively seek out entrepreneurial measurement to market local business. A MMG official argued that:

> I think that the mayor's objective is first of all to listen to what the people from Montreal want to do. As for his trade mission in Asia, he was not sure that he would go at the beginning of the year. He made two rounds of consultation with some sixty business people gathered at two working

> lunches in order to ascertain whether Montreal businesses would be interested to have the mayor of Montreal go on a mission in Asia and, if so, whether they were interested to go (*Canadian Parliament* 1995: 15).

"The people from Montreal," who were consulted by the mayor, were functional constituents from the business community. The mayor further took care of their interests by opening doors for them into a potential Asian market. Even the participation of the Chinese community in these trade missions was from the *Chinese Chamber of Commerce* (CCC). In other words, "the people from Montreal" who participated in the MMG's international activities were not the marginalized, such as the Chinese unilingual elderly dwelling in the questionable living conditions of Chinatown. Nor were 'the people from Montreal" who were interested in learning Chinese languages, arts, philosophy, and/or ways of living, let alone those who raised a great concern about China's human-rights records, such as the *Falun* followers.

Montreal's experiences, thus, indicate the need to distinguish between non-functional and functional constituents, and between non-profit and for-profit community participation. If the term "constituent" is used loosely, we might fall in the pitfall of being over-optimistic about the municipal-community entrepreneurial approach proposed by Cremer et al., or about the rise of municipal global citizens celebrated by Smith. If constituent diplomacy, grass-roots movement and public participation are praised as crucial to the success of twinning, we need to have an inquiry into the conception of urban citizenship. This helps us to better grasp the implications of twinning in the political culture of the contemporary cities in the global economy. Questions concerning meaning, qualification, possibilities, limits and/or challenges of urban citizenship are asked: What is urban citizenship? How has urban citizenship evolved from the traditional, liberal idea of citizenship? What makes constituent diplomacy in twinning

qualified as a form of urban citizenship? Who are urban citizens? What are the possibilities and difficulties of realizing constituent diplomacy and urban citizenship? Answering the above questions through a theoretical inquiry further helps to form a critique of the MSR.

**Urban Citizenship**

Citizenship has been traditionally grafted on to the nation-state, as its development paralleled the emergence of nation-states in the 18th and 19th centuries. With the requirement of loyalty and obedience, it serves as an integrative device by setting up the legal qualification and by politically and/or culturally assigning a national identity (or national identities). That is, citizenship not only entails a legal sense of inclusion and exclusion, but also political/cultural meanings of identity and belonging. Wars, ideological differences, and economic competition externally reinforce the qualifications, meanings, and sentiments of national citizenship. They are also internally buttressed by educational systems, taxation, mass media, identification documents, etc. Citizenship had been an effective mechanism to ensure the social cohesion of a nation-state until recently. Furthermore, citizenship is also an indicator of democracy coupled with rights and responsibilities. T.H. Marshall (1950) argued for a linear progression of Western liberal democracy from civil rights in the 18th century, political rights in the 19th century and social rights in the 20th century. Marshall's discussion can be moderately understood in the historical context of postwar Britain, where he argued for social rights as a means to redress the discontent of capitalist development. His work has also become the starting point of the contemporary debate over citizenship. Nevertheless, his theoretical

framework reaches its limits when critiques find it ethnocentric and gender-blind. Its universal, evolutionary and analytical vagueness does not empirically reflect the diversity of nation-states, where rights are not necessarily implemented in a linear fashion and where the obtainment of rights is often accompanied by severe political struggles. Nor does Marshall's framework of citizenship adequately reflect the changing nature, functions and positions of nation-states in the changing global environment (Nash 1999; Turner 1992).

The conception of citizenship has changed along with the shifting spatial configuration of the world characterized by increased global flows and dubious national sovereignty. Some scholars have worked on the conception of cosmopolitan citizenship with an argument that nation-states and national citizenship are going to be eroded or obsolete due to the challenges to maintain the enclosed integrity or authority of national sovereignty. Dismissing national ties with the replacement of cosmopolitan citizenship further reflects an aspiration to reject or to re-negotiate power and social structures derived from nation-states (Linklater 1998). Furthermore, cosmopolitan citizenship, characterized by a transcendent set of rights and responsibilities, cuts across segmented political space and is rooted in the whole of humanity. It assumes to be a universal system of global governance to protect the "global commons", to defend human rights and to entrench democratic law around the world (Held 1995). In other words, cosmopolitan citizenship rejects the parochial nature of national citizenship, which sets the limits of political intervention beyond national boundaries. Most importantly, cosmopolitan citizenship is regarded to be a better device to respect differences, hybridity and multiplicity of the world through establishing a democratic order at the global scale.

Without cutting the tie between citizenship and nation-states, some scholars have worked on the conception of transnational citizenship (Ong 1999; Basch et al. 1994). The basic argument is that nation-states have been transformed but not severely weakened by the global forces. Nation-states will stay and people will continue to claim national identities. Nevertheless, transnational migrants who are affiliated with both motherlands and host countries can challenge loyalty to a single nation-state. Spanning social, cultural, familial and political ties across national boundaries for transnational migrants means that their commitment and obligations are not bounded within one nation-state, and it requires both countries of origin and destination to grant rights to multiple citizen statuses.

It remains unresolved about how the idealism of cosmopolitan citizenship can be realized in a legally and institutionally accountable manner and how the practices of transnational citizenship can be based on the legal openness of nation-states or the moral attachment of the transnational. Nevertheless, as Robert Beauregard and Anne Bounds argue, both discourses on cosmopolitan and transnational citizenship help us to rethink the relation between citizenship and nation-states and to recognize the limits of national citizenship in managing "non-national or cross-national allegiances" or in responding to "environmental and humanitarian crises that require intervention across national boundaries" (Beauregard and Bounds 2000: 246). Both discourses on the transformation of citizenship also indicate the need to recognize people's multi-stranded ties to different political units and to have a multiplicity of citizenships entrenched into different spatial dimensions.

In addition to sometimes contesting, but often overlapping conceptions of citizenship at the national and transnational levels, there is a third group of researchers who advocate

the conception of urban citizenship. Urban citizenship often couples with cosmopolitan or transnational citizenship not only because cities are the primary economic units in economic globalization, but also because they are the "glocal" places where transnational immigrants gather, differences co-exist, identities are transformed, economic and political power aggregate, and political resistance and engagement are made. There is an exigent demand for urban citizenship because the city is closer to the nation-state to resolve issues occurring in people's everyday practices and because an identity is easier to be developed in the concrete life space of the city than the imagined national community. Thus, the city could be a significant locus of social movements and citizenry activities.

If the modern city is the space of democracy, and if the urban public sphere is the place where citizens exercise their rights and responsibility, the understanding of urban citizenship is closely linked with the urban public realm. Beauregard and Bounds (2000) suggest a normative model of urban citizenship that has to be realized in the public realm, which functions as an open and inclusive space embedded in civil society. Urban residents have to practice rights and responsibility of safety, tolerance, political engagement, recognition and freedom in the public realm. The public realm is further divided into the public and the parochial. The former, such as parks, sidewalks and malls, is the space where strangers are co-present and where interests and concerns are publicized. The latter, such as churches and cafes, is where everyday life is practiced and where acquaintances and neighbors gather to articulate, debate interests and form identity. The public realm, therefore, is the root of democracy, where citizenship is practiced through urban residents' political engagement, ranging from debates with

friends and neighbors, expressing concern over a political issue, to participating in parades or public demonstrations. Emphasized by Hannah Arendt (1958), what makes a physical setting a public space is the interaction of discursive components, such as talks, dialogues, debates, discussions, arguments, speeches, etc. within the physical space. These deliberative elements in the urban settings are especially important to the practices of communicative democracy through expanding the deliberative processes from formal sites, such as parliaments, municipal councils or courts, to the streets, town squares, parks, church basements, etc (Young 2002: 168).

According to Beauregard and Bounds, the normative role of urban government is to be a supportive institution for the exercise of urban citizenship in such a public realm to ensure its accessibility and openness. In a sense, urban citizenship is not about a top-down process of granting formal rights and responsibilities, but a bottom-up process of citizen participation. To use Bryan Turner's term (1992), urban citizenship is an active version in contrast to the passive version of the state-centered citizenship because the former entails the potential to have grassroots mobilizations grounded in everyday practices in either an organized or an unorganized manner. However, as Beauregard and Bonds also point out, urban citizenship has some unresolved problems in ensuring the city as the space of democracy. First, the public realm has no cohesive or formal organization with structurally defined tasks, rights and responsibilities, which are usually attached to the legal conception of national citizenship. It can be every urban resident's responsibility, but, at the same time, it can end up as nobody's responsibility. In addition, urban citizenship is rather vague about membership and eligibility or about who belongs and who does not, although Beauregard and Bonds, without further discussion, insist that

every urban resident, either legal constituents or temporary tourists should claim urban citizenship. They further argue that the collective impact of urban citizenship on political decision-making remained to be weak and illusive. In other words, it remained to be a task to recognize urban citizenship and its potential. It is also a challenge to realize urban citizenship in a more feasible form before we resolve "the political problem of the modern city [as] the problem of democracy" (Innis 1995: 485).

Beauregard and Bounds pay attention to how the "external" or the "global" have become part of the local condition of the city and how cosmopolitan and transnational elements of the urban life have made the co-existence and tolerance of differences as crucial to urban citizenship. However, they tend to overlook the fact that local municipalities also endeavor to broaden their influences, competitiveness and internationality. As discussed before, municipalities, in the logic of urban entrepreneurialism, gradually become active players to head trade missions, to forge urban diplomacy and to pursue international twinning. In a sense municipal issues are no longer confined to the municipal boundaries. However, the external aspects of municipal affairs are not necessarily sensitized in the urban setting of everyday life. Nor do they necessarily take place in urban, physical settings. The normative model of urban citizenship, grounded in the physical space, still confines urban public concerns to the internal, municipal issues that occur at the level of everyday practices. It still expects the traditional role of urban government "as an administrative extension of welfare state and as the most proximate infrastructure and social service providers" (Brodie 2000: 116). Consequently, this model of urban citizenship, characterized by the discursive ideal of democracy and the bottom-up process of citizen participation, somehow falls short, when

considering public affairs with a local focus but take place outside the municipal boundaries.

Overseas projects of municipal government might not be visible or significant to the general public. For instance, the MMG promoted and invested one million dollars in the construction of the *Montreal Garden in Shanghai*. There were debates in the city council about the adequacy of an overseas project and about whether investing over one million dollars in a public work, to which most Montrealers had no access, may actually abet the investment on some immediate, domestic projects. Consequently, it remains a daunting task to find a model of urban citizenship that permits constituent diplomacy or citizen participation in the international aspects of urban affairs. This is the case if we agree that "those [international] links with the strongest and widest community bases—both cultural and business—have the best chance of success" (Smith 1998: 72). Along with the expanding scale of municipal activities complicated by the multiple processes of globalization, urban citizenship ought to go beyond the parochial nature of localism.

The traditional mechanism to ensure citizen participation in twinning has been the institutionalization of a committee outside of the bureaucratic structure of the municipal government. Seattle's twinning development, documented by Bush (1998), shows the historical possibility of this model. The European Commission (2000) also advocates the same institutional mechanism to ensure that citizen participation in twinning activities is not diminished either along with the budgetary constraint of the local government or the change of political leadership. It is also a means to ensure the balance between non-profit and for-profit aspects of twinning. The institutionalization of a twinning committee, in a sense, is meant to create a *discursive space* in which urban residents, rather than local

officials, decide the orientation of municipal diplomacy. This committee is also answerable to municipal authorities, whereas local governments oversee grass-roots efforts without setting up an agenda on how twinning is going to be developed. The twinning committees, in most cases, are characterized by volunteerism based on the participation of civic organizations, ethnic communities, schools, professional or business groups, etc. This hints at a more collective formulation of urban citizenship in contrast to a state-centered one based on the liberal tradition of individualism[1]. It also indicates that a successful twinning relation relies on the vital role of civil society in promoting inclusion, diversity, equality and expression. In short, such a twinning committee is a creation of a public sphere which functions as "the primary connector between people and power" and as a space of opposition, accountability and policy influence (Young 2002: 173).

This is not to say that a twinning committee composed by members from civil society can fully ensure citizen participation in the international aspects of urban policies. Nor can it guarantee the partial realization of the ideal of an active version of citizenship. Like any governmental or non-governmental organizations, it can be subject to abuses of power, manipulation for personal interests or indifferences to accountability. It should also be noted that there are limits to civil society, despite a renewed interest in grassroots efforts, social movements and civil society in the hopes of constructing an alternative site, where social justice and well being can be pursued. To follow Iris Young's argument, civil society is constrained by the lack of the unique capacity of governmental agencies "for co-ordination, regulation, and administration on a large scale that well-functioning democracy cannot do without" (Young 2002: 156). Furthermore, such a

model of an institutionalized committee, which is supposed to be derived from civil society but entails the characters of formal sites of deliberation, can also suffer from the *de facto* processes of institutionalization itself. While institutionalizing a twinning committee can be a means to build up the organizational framework and accountability for the practices of constituent diplomacy, it can also discourage the interests of citizen participation if it is bureaucratically burdened by the institutional structure. Nevertheless, despite the above potential weaknesses, a lack of the public, discursive mechanism, like twinning committees, can significantly question the activeness and sustainability of twinning or other international aspects of municipal affairs. That is, without a deliberative creation of a public space which bridges between people and power or between informal and formal sites of political communication, urban international affairs can be invisible or inconsequential to the everyday practices of ordinary urban residents. In the following section, Montreal's twinning with Shanghai exemplifies the political consequences of a lack of an institutionalized committee external to the MMG's work on twinning with Shanghai: the lack of urban citizen participation and the rise of economic citizenship.

**The Lack of Urban Citizenship and the Rise of Economic Citizenship**

Since the major participants were local officials and business people, Montreal's twinning with Shanghai lacked a broad range of citizen participation. Unlike Vancouver or Seattle, twinning in Montreal was never initiated or rooted in the local culture of social movements or public participation. Rather, it reflects the specific political culture of Montreal characterized by the pursuit of internationalism and autocratic political

leadership. It also reflects the neo-liberal governmentality, which engenders citizenship into a weak social category and turns citizens into clients.

Jean Drapeau's almost-30 years of leadership certainly marked Montreal in various ways. His legacy includes hosting major international events, such as the '67 Expo, the '76 Summer Olympics, the '81 *Les Floralis*, and so forth. He also spearheaded the construction of grandiose, mega urban projects, such as the metro system, the artificial islands on the St. Laurence River, the Olympic stadium, *les Habitats*, *Place des Arts, Place Ville Marie,* etc. Each project is "something grander and more grandiose than what his fellow English-Canadian mayors could have accomplished" (Chorney and Molloy 1993: 71). In addition to these projects which elevated the city's world-class status, Montreal is also the home of various headquarters of international governmental or non-governmental organizations. To a certain extent, the link with Shanghai is another strategic acquisition of Montreal's internationality. Harold Chorney and Andrew Molloy argue that Drapeau's ambition lay in "constructing a model of Quebec metropolis that would show the whole world the achievement of the French-Canadians in North America" (ibid). Nevertheless, Andrew Sancton warns us that Drapeau did not seem to "confine his view of Montreal to its role in either a sovereign Quebec of a federal Canada. He [saw] Montreal as being on the world stage, as the great cosmopolitan city of North America" (Sancton 1983). These projects, indeed, successfully enhanced Montreal's international presence and connections through the production and consumption of urban monumentalism, the creation of an attractive, modernized, urban imagery, and the promotion of grand-scale, ephemeral events. They also contributed to Montreal's international trait of a leading, cosmopolitan city.

Montreal's more than thirty years of emphasis on internationalism, however, has also come at a painful price. The most notorious case is that of the 1976 Olympics project, which turned out to be a financial fiasco, since the city continues to pay the debt of having hosted this international event. This echoes David Harvey's argument (1989) that building specific places within a city in order to strive for its international outlook and ephemeral economic advantages, instead of investing in the territory of the city as a whole, eventually would result in the alienated nature of the urban economy. Furthermore, the city's orientation towards internationalism was also at the cost of the internal demands of urban residents. His vision to turn the city into a modern, Quebecois metropolis "was shaped by rapid urban redevelopment, including large-scale demolition of working-class neighborhoods to be replaced by highways, public housing and other forms of urban redevelopment" (Lustiger-Thaler and Shragge 1998: 236).

Protest movements were formed in the 1960s to defend both housing and neighborhoods. The Montreal Citizens movements (MCM) were born in 1973 based on the coalition of left-wing intellectuals, trade unionists and community organizers. It was not until 1986 that the MCM took power under the leadership of Jean Doré. However, the Doré administration turned out to be a disappointment because it did not seize the chance to integrate citizen participation or community movements into the centre of Montreal's urban political processes. This explains why the chance to encourage citizen participation in the MSR slipped through the Doré administration, despite the fact that Doré did not show a strong interest in following Drapeau's vision to reinforce Montreal's international status.

The 1994 election brought Pierre Bourque into power, and he returned to Drapeau's autocratic governing style (Graham et al. 1998). By neglecting public opposition, several controversial land-use decisions were made through the executive committee. With an attempt to oust two members of the executive committee, Bourque almost faced a caucus revolt in 1997. By abolishing "most city council commissions, Montrealers lost the right to participate in the city's development. By reducing councillors' speaking time in half during the question periods, the quality of local, deliberative democracy was diminished. By neglecting the demand from opposing councillors for the explanation of his administration's decisions on various urban policies, local democracy was assaulted (Sévigny 2001). Marvin Rotrand, an opposing council at the time, cynically criticized Bourque's governing style, which seemed to be inspired by "the 'democratic' mode of the People's Republic of China" (*The Gazette* 12 January 1999: B3).

As Drapeau's follower, Bourque was also enthusiastic about urban internationalism with the bent of the entrepreneurial approach underscored by neo-liberal governmentality. However, such an approach encourages the economic change of the city with little expectation to support or enable citizen participation. This further evoked a similar challenge of balancing external and internal aspects of urban policies, which already occurred in Drapeau's administration. With limited municipal resources, municipal departments had to manage both aspects of urban development. For the MMG, both were perceived as two sides of the same coin, as one interviewee emphasized that,

> The City of Montreal has a responsibility to its residents, to meet their demands, to supply services, and to offer a secure, clean, wonderful city... that's for sure. But the City of Montreal also has a role to represent the city at the international level and to make Montreal interesting for investors from outside...as well as to provide an opportunity for Montreal businesses to have higher visibility. The ultimate good of having a garden in Shanghai is more related to this level (*Interview*, 11 July 2002).

It was, nevertheless, more of a dilemma to find a balance in the allocation of limited resources. To juggle with limited municipal capacities in two directions of urban development further evoked much criticism. As already discussed in Chapter 3, the former mayor promoted China to the point that he was criticized for paying insufficient attention to local issues in Montreal. This repeats a similar criticism of Drapeau's over-emphasis on the glamorous, international image of the city, but his ignorance of local citizens' demands for good services at the heart of people's everyday practices.

Susan Clarke and Gary Gaile (1998) conducted an empirical study of cities' internationalism characterized by diversified and often entrepreneurial responses to the challenges of the global economy. They concluded that local officials tend to choose urban policies that do not necessarily encourage citizens to have the social and economic means to participate in an accessible and accountable local government. They further state that "doing 'the work of globalization' precludes the practice of local citizenship. This citizenship can be undermined by compressed wages, reduced social benefits, limited job-retaining opportunities, lack of affordable housing...inaccessible and unaccountable political processes..." (Clarke and Gaile 1998: 211). For Clarke and Gaile, reinventing urban government while restoring urban citizenship has been an exigent, normative demand for the democracy of the city. Disappointingly, urban entrepreneurialism coupled with neo-liberal governmentality has resulted in neglecting the erosion of urban citizenship and to the political marginalization of many urban residents. That is, they have little to contribute to a city's development in the global economy, less stake in the involvement of political processes or even less interests in participating in the public life.

In the case of Montreal's twinning with Shanghai, ordinary people lacked a chance to take on their civic responsibilities or to voice their concerns and interests through participating in the twinning processes. This cannot be simply explained by the idea that the larger the city-scale, the lesser the citizen participation (Zelinsky 1991). Montreal's twinning with Shanghai lacked a mechanism to encourage citizen participation, such as a twinning committee independent from the municipal government or even from the *Mayor's office*. That is, a lack of citizen participation was partially due to the lack of a public forum in which political decision-makings about twinning was accessible. While being asked about the reason why there was not a twinning committee as such, an interviewee argued that MMG was not able to financially sponsor each twinning committee for every twinning (*Interview*, 5 August 2002). This argument might have its validity. However, we might also question whether the funding for the travelling expenses spent on trips to Shanghai or other parts of Asia during the Bourque administration was more valued by the MMG than providing the financial resources to set up a twinning committee. For instance, Bourque's administration spent $291,141 in overseas travels and work in 1999, and the bill came to $778,600 in 2000[2]. The other unconfirmed explanation of the missing twinning committee might be that, regardless of how Bourque's political leadership motivated his administration to passionately engage in the twinning, his autocratic ruling style did not welcome the spread of power by institutionalizing a committee which welcomed citizens' concerns about the city's international urban policies. If the former mayor dismantled city council commissions to permit citizen participation in local democracy, why would he add a foreign committee allowing citizens to have a say on twinning development? It could also be argued by the

other unconfirmed explanation that the creation of a twinning committee would simply increase the bureaucratic processes of the MMG's pursuit of twinning activities, and this was against Bourque's advocacy of reducing the size of the bureaucratic, governing structure. As he explained in his autobiography, "during this period of crisis [Montreal's economic stagnation in the mid 1990s], it is more important for my administration to reduce the expanses...The public function itself was too burdensome and it needed a program to reduce the labour force. This has been actualized by cutting down 1500 personnel" (Bourque 2002: 46).

Montreal's twinning lacking citizen participation was also due to the narrower scale of twinning focusing on exchanges between governmental officials and business communities. In other words, the rise of neo-liberal governmentality in the name of coping with the global economic trend engendered a new criterion of inclusion and exclusion of citizenship. The citizens gaining the most benefit from the entrepreneurial work of the cities were those who already possessed social and economic advantages. Montreal's twinning with Shanghai clearly shows that these people were from the local business community and that they were well taken care of by the MMG. This is on account of the fact that the economic interests were a priority in twinning. Furthermore, the work of the city in the global era tends to make the citizenship status increasingly uneven across and within communities.

It is obvious that the Chinese community, rather than the Haitian or African communities, was involved in the decision processes of the MMG's international activities. This local condition in Montreal reflected China's rising status in the global economy. However, the involvement of the Chinese community was uneven because its

"delegates" were mainly from the *Chinese Chamber of Commerce*. No democratic selection from a diversity of Chinese groups within the community was pursued to form a forum on how the twinning could have benefited the Chinese community as a whole (*Interview*, 7 January 2002). The *Chinese Chamber of Commerce* obviously served the commercial interest of Chinatown, and consequently it sought out economic spin-offs from every community project (*Interview*, 26 June 2002). For instance, as another concrete result from the twinning between Montreal and Shanghai, the construction of the Chinese arches on Boulevard St. Laurent was not only meant to beautify Chinatown, but also intended to make them into landmarks to attract tourism and thus to increase merchants' business opportunities.

In short, the community involvement in the MSR not only reflected the uneven process of globalization across and within communities, but also had little to do with political jurisdictions, citizenship rights or any other democratic ideals. If we do not pay attention, Chinese participation in Montreal municipal affairs seems to be a cheering moment that democracy is deepened through the inclusion of a traditionally marginalized ethnic group. It even seems to exemplify Young's model of communicative democracy, when the municipal-community entrepreneurship recognizes cultural differences as a source of political empowerment. Nevertheless, Young also warns us that "[w]here there are structural inequalities of wealth and power, formally democratic procedures are likely to reinforce them, because privileged people are able to marginalize the voices and issues of those less privileged" (Young; 2000, 34).

In Montreal's twinning with Shanghai, those who were privileged and included were the so-called transnational and economic citizens. That is, the twinning between Montreal

and Shanghai in the context of the global economy set a parameter of inclusion and exclusion and gave rise to economic citizenship. Positioning Montreal by opening the door to Shanghai for the local business community was done by the former mayor's endorsement of corporate or business interests. This is to say that economic actors or functional constituents from the business sector from Montreal, in fact, gained more power in the global economy. To follow Sassen's argument, "this economic citizenship does not belong to citizens. It belongs to firms and markets, particularly the global financial markets, and it is located not in individuals, not in citizens, but in global economic actors" who seek for maximized profits in the shortest term (Sassen 1996: 38). The rise of economic citizenship coincides with the emphasis on neo-liberal governmentality, which essentializes market functions and simultaneously undermines economic rights of ordinary citizens to employment, economic well-being and survival. Economic citizenship arising from the global economy especially challenges the traditional, liberal understanding of citizenship as a form of people's sovereignty paving the way to democracy.

A set of unresolved, normative questions remain after providing the theoretical discourses on urban citizenship in order to form a critique of the lack of urban citizenship and the engendering of economic citizenship in the MSR. When government initiates projects or activities, to what extent can voluntarism be motivated by the development of urban international policy, which is often implemented beyond the reach of ordinary citizens? How is the governing accountability of sister-city programs ensured and sustained? What would be the measurement for urban government to "open doors' not just for businessmen, but also for ordinary, urban residents? How can twinning be

maintained without the government's strong interventionism? Urban citizen participation often takes place in the public realm to practice the rights and responsibilities of safety, to be politically engaged, to learn to appreciate differences, and to gain recognition and freedom, among others. How can official sister-city networks be converted into a public realm, where the question of sustainability would be taken care of by urban citizens and where democratic values are exchanged in a more effective, but less obtrusive way? No fixed answers can be given to the above questions since each sister-city relationship is unique in itself. Nonetheless, these normative questions have to be addressed in order to establish a more accountable and sustainable international urban activities.

**Twinning and Human Rights**

Many instances of twinning between a more developed society and a less advanced community in the post-war period often geared towards humanitarian aids and democratic ideals. Many sister cities nowadays still orient towards the improvement of social justice, democratic practices and human conditions. For instance, the American umbrella organization of *Sister Cities International* promotes programs of HIV/AIDS education and prevention issues between several American cities and their African counterparts; young Russian leaders were brought to the United States to learn more about governance and democracy (*Sister Cities International* 2003). Some U.S. communities launched twinning with cities or regions in Central America devastated by civil wars. Seattle's twinning with Managua, Nicaragua, is one instance, and the twinning between Bangor, United States and Carasque, El Salvador, is another case. Similar to twinning arrangements between Vancouver and Odessa or between Bristol and Hanover

after WWII, some twinning relations, in the age of the global economy, still function as a channel of raising political concerns or cradling humanitarian projects with the hopes of redressing problems of social justice. Nevertheless, mutual processes of exchange and learning gradually subvert one-sided humanitarian aids from an advanced to a less advanced city.

Twinning has also functioned or been demanded as the occasion to raise the concern about abuses of human rights in a repressive regime. One of the most extreme examples is the city of Berkeley's decision to immediately suspend the twinning relation with the Chinese city of Changde right after its inception in 1996. The city's *Peace and Justice Commission* made the decision after considering local human-rights activists' concerns that Berkeley's twinning would be seen as an approval of the Chinese government's oppressive exercises of power. "In a repressive regime like China, a sister-city relationship is one with the (government) officials and those selected and condoned by them" (*World Tibet Network News*, 2003). In a less dramatic degree, the Jewish community in Seattle demanded its municipal government raise the concern about the repression of Jewish people in its Russian sister city, Tashkent (Bush 1998). In addition, 20,967 residents signed a petition in Zurich to demand the city of Zurich's appeal for justice for *Falun* practitioners in the sister city of Kunming (*Faluninfo* 2002).

The issues of human rights gradually become an avoidable subject matter in twinning between Western and Chinese cities, especially after the Chinese government's brutal crackdown of demonstrators in the Tiananmen Square in June 1989. The worldwide live broadcasting of the event put human rights on the diplomatic agenda between Western and Chinese governments. Western human-rights advocates especially put great pressure

on their governments and international organizations to take action against the Chinese government either by economic sanction or verbal condemnation. In order to avoid international isolation, the Chinese government has adopted a defensive diplomacy of human rights by advocating principles of state sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs on the one hand, and by making certain concessions on the other hand. The concession includes the release of prominent political dissidents, the signing of international human-rights treaties and the documentation of human-rights white papers (Wan 2001). However, the harsh repression of the *Falun* spiritual, "nonpolitical" movement under the Jiang Zemin regime only reflects the gap between the rhetoric and the reality of the human-rights condition in China. It also ensures that human rights continue to be an important subject in current international relations between China and the West.

It is against the above background that Montreal's twinning with Shanghai was developed in the last decade. While the MMG was keen to cultivate friendship with its Chinese counterpart in Shanghai, it also faced the domestic challenges to the affinity with an authoritative regime. This created tensions between the MMG and those who advocated Western human rights, including opposing city councilors, local media and Chinese political dissidents. Moreover, arguments were made against the MMG's ignorance of human rights in China. There was also criticism against the MMG's activities in Shanghai, namely, the provision of working conditions during the construction of the *Montreal Garden in Shanghai*. Both sides of the argument deserve a closer examination in order to reveal the complexity of this issue and the unease to make

a homogeneous claim for or against one or the other, when the debates over human rights reside in the complexity of this concept at different levels.

**Arguments from the MMG and its Critics**

In this part of the discussion, I first present criticism against the MMG regarding its stance towards human rights in China. The MMG's discourses are later introduced as its response towards criticism. Both sides of arguments will be evaluated in the final section of this chapter.

As already mentioned, Montreal's twinning with Shanghai was suspended right after the 1989 Tiananmen massacre parallel with the worldwide sanction on the Chinese government's brutality against demonstrators. Nevertheless, the twinning was quickly resumed within a few months. Following the Canadian federal policy that cultural and educational exchanges with the Chinese were exempted from the diplomatic sanction ensured the project of the Chinese Garden in Montreal. Consequently, even though there were demonstrations against the Chinese government, the friendship with Shanghai was rather enhanced during the political turmoil. Despite the scale of human-rights violations in Tiananmen Square, there was no strong opposition against the MMG to resume the relation since cultural and educational exchanges were regarded as an open window to the possible changes in the repressive regime. Not until the Bourque administration, however, was there an increased demand for the MMG to put pressure on its sister city to improve the human-rights condition. In 1999, ten years after the massacre, opposition city councilors proposed a motion to denounce the actions of the Chinese government in Tiananmen Square. However, the majority of Bourque's *Vision Montreal* Party on the

city council defeated the motion (*Montreal Municipal Government* 1999(b)). In 2000, the *Montreal Garden in Shanghai* was criticized for being a site of human-rights abuses because workers lived on the construction site among "piles of dirt, empty tins, broken pieces of wood and twisted wire"[3] (*The Gazette* 16 July 2000: A3). In 2001, *Falun* followers tried to meet with the mayor to express their concern about the Chinese government's massive repression on this spiritual group. However, they received the response that the city could not offer them help (*The Gazette* 14 October 2001: A3).

The rejection of condemning the Chinese regime, the refusal of meeting with *Falun* followers and the negation of human-rights abuses in the *Montreal Garden* only made the opposition reinforce the idea that Bourque was an ally of human-rights abusers. Helen Fotopolous, an opposing councilor, strongly criticized Bourque by comparing him with Marie Antoinette and Catherine the Great (*The Gazette* 16 July 2000). The coziness with his Chinese counterpart was not credited as an advantage to improve the city's internationality or urban competitiveness through creating footholds for the local business community in the Chinese market. The twinning was criticized because it was understood as "an approval of a relationship with one of the planet's most notorious human-rights violators" (*The Gazette* 28 July 2000: B2). While the critics did not necessarily oppose the relation between twinning and economic growth of the city, they did condemn the MMG for its inability to develop a balanced foreign policy of economic development. They also condemned it on the issue of human rights, feeling it was fearful of damaging the tie with Shanghai, once the issues of human rights were raised.

From the viewpoints of the critics, the deplorable working conditions in *the Montreal Garden in Shanghai* was further denounced as being reminiscent of imperialism or the

resemblance of transnational cooperations' exploitation of Third-World laborers. Therefore, Abe Limonchik, the President of the *Montreal's Citizen's* Movement, made normative demands for the MMG. He implored them to "develop protocols that dealt with and respected workers' rights and human rights" and "to apply the same standards in China that we would want applied all over the Third World and in our world" (*The Gazette* 16 July 2000: A3). Fotopolous expressed the same need to improve the working conditions for workers in the *Montreal Garden* by stating that "Yes, I know the working conditions in China are not the same as here, but even China has basic standards, and besides, this is supposed to be a Montreal Park. It's not money we threw at Shanghai to say 'Hey, do what you want to do with it'" (ibid). The former opposing city councilor's passage implies that the working condition in the *Montreal Garden* was even below the Chinese standard. This implication echoed her earlier comment on Bourque's resemblance with dictators like Marie Antoinette and Catherine the Great. By quoting Fotopolous once again, the project of the *Montreal Garden in Shanghai*, for the critics, can be summarized as "colonial, deplorable and immoral" (ibid).

Despite local pressures and criticism, the MMG consistently did not adopt the narratives of its critics on its twinning agenda with Shanghai. Along with other domestic issues, this consistent refusal of making human rights an aspect of twinning relations irritated the opposition and aggravated the sentiment that Bourque was undemocratic. A lack of communication or an open dialogue with the local opposition certainly did not help to redress the negative image affiliated with the MMG's overriding of putting pressure on human-rights violators. However, the MMG officials tried to defend their position with three different, yet inter-related, arguments.

First, as mentioned in Chapter 3, the MMG was advantaged by its position as the lower level of government in intergovernmental relations and by the flexibility to develop the low policy aiming at trade, horticulture and urban management. Unlike its senior governments, it was not obliged to divert its limited resources to developing the high policies of diplomacy. As long as it did not violate the Canadian federal policy on China, the MMG enjoyed the freedom to develop twinning agreements based on its specific needs. A governmental official argued that this Canadian policy on China, which the MMG espoused is "opposed to the United States, never wanted to make this linkage between trade and human rights" (*Canadian Parliament* 1995: 8). It indicates that it is rather unrealistic to develop multiple goals of trade, human rights, culture, or other aspects of diplomacy at either the national or municipal levels. Those who mix various issues in international relations are unrealistic in that they are likely to be criticized, from abroad and home, as inconsistent in their concerns about human rights. That is, when economic interests and national security are on the agenda of diplomacy, it is unlikely to be consistent in closing the gap between the rhetoric and the reality of human rights.

Second, mixing human rights with other twinning issues was not only unrealistic, but also unfair to China. One interviewee elaborated this idea with a strong emotional sentiment: "I always stand for China. I know there is always corruption. I know that. This has always existed. But I also know... how those [Chinese] people are evolved so fast and [how much] energy they put to improve their qualities of life and to establish rapid [economic] development. I admire them..." (*Interview*, 15 May 2002). Despite a lack of rhetorical skills to avoid the accusation of being an ally of human-rights violators, former mayor Bourque publicly responded to the question of human rights in China by

following the same line of argument: "I've seen the reduction...of poverty in China. I've seen the development of China. Unfortunately, other people talk about other aspects. It's normal. It's life" (*The Gazette*, 16 October 2001: A4). For Bourque and his administration, it is unfair to simply address what China has not achieved without giving credit to the improvement in China. There is no doubt that China's economic reforms since the mid-1980s have resulted in a more prosperous and open society and the Chinese overall have enjoyed a greater degree of freedom in making personal choices. As another governmental official argued:

> For those who don't understand the contemporary development of China, it's very easy to make criticism [of China's human rights]. If we understand contemporary Chinese history, Shanghai was extremely poor when they participated in the flower exhibition in the early '80s. GNP in Shanghai has increased many times. It's not a necessary condition to have a corrupted government, but it's a common phenomenon. There is corruption in Canada as well. There are also problems of human rights in Canada. In comparison, it is more severe in China. However, China is much more advanced than 20 years ago. Under these circumstances, shall we just ignore its improvement? I don't think it's fair if we do so. Beside economic improvement, there is improvement in public-mindedness and political situation. China is different now. During the Cultural Revolution, if you said something against the Chinese government, you would go to jail or get killed. Nowadays, you can blame the government, as you want, as long as you don't go to the government with a gun. Of course, this person would go to jail if he does so [even in a Western country].... Thus, China has a higher degree of democracy. Lots of people who criticize China have never been there (*Interview*, 17 May 2001).

The above long passage reinforced the MMG's official argument that it is not fair to judge China without giving a more balanced view of its social and economic development and that it is also not fair to criticize China without acquiring local knowledge. While acknowledging the importance of gaining local knowledge, we certainly have to be careful with the above pro-China stance. It is certain that Chinese dissidents and Western human-rights observers would not agree that ordinary Chinese people can freely criticize the Chinese government as my interviewee argued.

In addition to the above two reasons, which explained the lack of an overt agenda on human rights, the third official argument was extended from the separation between

putting direct pressure on human rights and other issues in international relations. On the one hand, there was an acknowledgement among MMG officials that human rights needed to be improved in China. The same interviewee stated that "the Chinese should learn many humanist ideals in Montreal, such as human equality, democratic principles and law abiding, etc" (ibid). Another governmental official showed a sense of disapproval of the Shanghai government's displacement of the Pudong residents in order to develop the city's new economic center:

> You can never demolish the whole neighborhood and then tell people to leave the neighborhood where they've grown up, never come back, and put them some place they don't even know. This is done in China in the name of progress. I think that it (the Chinese government) won't probably be able to do that for long because people have much more say now than before (*Interview*, 11 July 2002).

On the other hand, the MMG did not consider the politics of naming and shaming or putting a direct pressure on the Chinese government as a better option or an effective measurement of contributing to the changes of human rights in China. Rather, it considered indirect exchanges of political or non-political thoughts with Chinese officials from Shanghai as more feasible. One official from the MMG claimed, "[p]ersonally, I believe that this is the way to foster dialogue and exchanges" (*Canadian Parliament* 1995: 8). Another interviewee elaborated the same idea by arguing that:

> To open up to the West [through twinning exchanges] only brings advantages to the Chinese society. This is a window. If you close the window, those who suffer the most are the ordinary Chinese. They do not have any chance to know the West. There is less contact with the West, if the window is shut... Many people criticized that Bourque was not concerned with this issue. This is not the case here. It does not matter how much Montreal is concerned with the issue of human rights [in China]. What can Montreal do? What problems of human rights can Montreal solve? In comparison, it's easier to influence Chinese political leaders' thoughts through enhancing cultural exchanges, right? We do what we can in correspondence with our capacities (*Interview*, 17 May 2001).

This is to say that, in rhetoric, the MMG preferred to have a low-key approach to a high-pressured one because it was believed to be more effective and less confrontational, if

any impact can be formed to change human rights in China. The suggestion about having informal or indirect exchanges of thoughts with Chinese officials can also be less irritating and a lesser risk of costing the friendly relation perceived to be advantageous to the economic development of Montreal. Ideally, dialogues, in the spirit of reciprocity in twinning, would permit both sides to listen to and learn from each other, instead of one-sided preaching from the West to the Chinese.

**Underneath Both Sides of the Arguments**

If we do not examine their views within the context of philosophical ambiguity or if we do not have a more thoughtful reflection on human rights in foreign relations with China, the above arguments can be simply reduced to local politics between the ruling and opposing city councilors. In this section, I first present human rights in the philosophical struggles between universalism and relativism and the problems of prioritizing one right over the other. These two sets of ambiguity are certainly not exhaustive to the philosophical inquiries into human rights, but they are central to what underlines the MMG's official arguments and its critics' viewpoints. At the end, after discussing the policy choices between strong interventions insisted on by the MMG critics and constructive engagement suggested by the MMG, I consider the latter as a better choice.

***Philosophical Debates***

Human rights have undisputable Western origins in the language of (subjective) rights, the respect for human agency, the demand for equality and the minimization of

suffering in human existence. First, some elements of subjective rights became more significant in Europe since the Middle Ages than elsewhere in the world (Dagger 1989). In the 17th century, John Locke was influential in furthering the language of rights based on the theory of Natural Law about how human beings were universally born with certain rights, how these rights originated from the Creator and how human society was governed by a Law of Nature. Fundamental ideas of Natural Law have prevailed in the last three decades: natural rights were attributed to individuals prior to their consents to form a contract to end a State of Nature, to form society and to establish political authority. These ideas of natural rights, as if they were the natural property of individuals, were greatly significant in asserting individualism, freedom and rights to consent to society under which they lived. In the 18th century, the language of rights evolved and the idea that God is the originator of these rights were gradually replaced by human nature, dignity, reason or agency. The existence of human beings stood out more than anything else, even more than the cosmos order or the mechanic nature God created in Natural Law in the philosophical thoughts of the previous century.

Max Weber described the infusion of human agency into the language of rights as the disenchantment of the world. That is, it was advancement in humanism developed along with various historical achievements since the Enlightenment of the 18th century, such as the French Revolution or the American Independence, in the pursuit of an expended immunity and freedom previously enjoyed by a small amount of the population. Upon certain agenda of justice, these historical moments were often vested with "anger, indignation, and the imperative to punish historic wrong-doing" (Taylor 2002:110). Universally, granting rights to every individual entailed the notion of equality, which

defies the legitimacy of maintaining a hierarchical, social order and challenges human differentiations according to this order (Taylor 2002). According to Charles Taylor, apart from the "ideals of self-responsible freedom and dignity of self-exploration and of personal commitment", the humanist idea also gave rise to the affirmation of ordinary life, which "have also exalted man as producer, one who finds his highest dignity in labour and the transformation of nature in the service of life" (Taylor 1996: 215). In addition, humanist ethics, influenced by utilitarianism, aimed at the maximized pursuit for happiness and the avoidance of pain and suffering. Therefore, Taylor concluded that the language of human rights was a political formulation of people's moral immunities:

> [t]o the extent that Westerners see their human rights doctrine as arising simply out of the falling away of previous countervailing ideas—e.g., the punishment scenarios of the ancient regime—which have now been discredited, and leave the field free for the preoccupations with human life, freedom, the avoidance of suffering... (Taylor 2002:118).

For the critics of the MMG's policy on human rights in China, the above ideas of human rights are norms of conducts, their underlining justification and a political-belief system. That is, human rights are believed to be the essentiality of human beings, and they are believed to be universal in the construction of social order or in the processes of social interaction. Therefore, one of the MMG critics argued the need "to apply the same standards in China that we would want applied all over the Third World and in our world". This type of argument opens up debate between universalism and relativism. There have been arguments about whether human rights are universal values cutting across different historical, political or cultural experiences, or whether there is one universal standard applicable to every society. For cultural relativists, the universality of human rights is derived from the pseudo-universal Western politics imposed on the non-Western world. This is based on the argument that the Western origin of human rights

makes it incompatible with other cultural values or inapplicable outside Western liberal societies. For instance, Lee Kuan Yew, the influential political leader in Singapore, and other political leaders in Southeast Asia who follow his argument, claim that democracy and human rights are not compatible with East Asian values. Lee's basic argument is that human rights encourage individual over communal values, rights over responsibilities, and self-regarding over a sense of belonging. Consequently, human rights would lead to social conflicts or disorder. Thus, human rights are incompatible with the so-called Asian values derived from Confucianism, emphasizing communal values, responsibilities and social stability.

Much of Lee's argument has been rejected for various reasons. For instance, Daniel Bell (1999) and Marina Svensson (2002) have argued against a homogeneous East Asian culture and have contested a unified set of East Asian values derived from a part of Confucianism. Furthermore, Lee's argument has been widely criticized as a means to justify political authoritarianism. Cultural relativism as such is dangerous because it overrides the possibility of cross-cultural communication, and it amounts to moral nihilism, which tends to justify massacre, ethnic cleaning, apartheid, or holocaust. For instance, the Chinese government has claimed the legitimacy of using forces in Tiananmen Square in the name of national security and social stability. Therefore, it is wrong for the West to intervene the domestic affair in the name of human rights.

Cultural relativism is not the answer to the questions of human rights, nor can we follow some MMG officials' certain arguments to justify the condition of human rights in China as a relative degree of violation or as a symptom of governmental corruption. Nevertheless, this is not to say that the underlying principles of human rights are

universally derived from a single ground of respecting human agency, dignity, freedom and individualism as Michael Ignatieff (2003) insists. Many have argued against the idea that human rights are the first principle of moral authority or the sole underlying moral justification (Gutmann 2003; Taylor 2002; Rawls 2002; Svensson 2002; Bell 1999). For instance, John Rawls states that "[t]hey [human rights] are a special class of rights of universal application and hardly controversial in their general intention" (Rawl 2002:33). Taylor, in a less assertive manner, argues that "[p]erhaps we are incapable at this stage of formulating the universal values in play here. Perhaps we shall always be incapable of this. This wouldn't matter, because what we need to formulate for an overlapping consensus is certain norms of conduct" (Taylor 2002: 102). Amy Gutmann (2003) calls for a plural foundation of a human-rights regime. In a sense, if human rights are perceived to be universal, they are not about *why* we should act in certain ways towards each other, but about *how* we should act in certain ways, regardless of the underlying justification drawn from often different and incompatible cultural, philosophical, religious or spiritual backgrounds.

We can fairly claim that no philosophical arguments would justify acts or gross brutalities, including genocide, massacre, apartheid, rape, murder and starvation. These minimal prohibitions give rise to the importance of protecting the minimal rights of human beings, which entail a more universal or absolute trait of immunity (never to be violated). Therefore, the MMG's critics rightly raised their concerns about or even anger for the violations of human rights in China. The Tiananmen massacre should not be forgotten or forgiven by shifting the focus to other aspects of advancement in China. However, while there has been less public controversy about minimal rights and this set

of immunity from inhumane acts is held to be absolute in theory, other sets of human rights are still subject to heated debates in theory and intense political controversy in practice.

The prioritization of one right over the other partially consists of a gray area in the debate over human rights. One of the most obvious examples is the dispute over abortion because it is difficult to find common ground between pro-life and pro-choice or between an unborn child's right to live and a woman's choice to terminate her pregnancy. The debates between the MMG and its critics also rest in the gray area of the prioritization of one right over the other. On the one hand, the critics emphasized the importance of civil and political rights and the so-called negative rights (the rights of individuals and groups against the authority of governments). Therefore, they condemned the lack of freedom of thought, speech, publication, belief, association and assembly in the specific cases of the Tiananmen and the *Falun* crackdowns. On the other hand, when the MMG emphasized the social and economic development in China, what were prioritized were economic prosperity and the right to subsistence. Thus, the MMG officials did not think it was fair to simply focus the criticism of civil and political rights on China. China's advancement in enhancing the so-called positive rights (the rights of citizens to certain degrees of economic well being) should not be ignored. This type of debate is relatively old-fashioned. In the Cold War, the U.S.-led coalition condemned the lack of political freedom in the communist regimes and the Soviet-led allies condemned the lack of economic and social equality in the capitalist society. This prioritization of one set of rights over the other does not end with the Cold War. As Seyom Brown points out:

> [w]ithin the Western/Northern grouping...there was, and continues to be, a wide spectrum of views, ranging from democratic socialism to laissez-faire capitalism, over the *degree* to which the

> state should be involved in running the economy and assisting those who are unable to compete effectively in the market (Brown 2000: 5).

In addition to the above debates about social/economic and political/civil rights within or outside the West, the gray area of debates over human rights also includes "minority rights and the rights of indigenous peoples, the rights encompassed within family law and criminal law, the freedom of speech, and the participatory rights inherent in Western-style democratic practices" (Bell 1999:29).

Bell continues to argue that when these controversies over human rights are not resolved within the West, and when Western human-rights activists try to promote these rights without acquiring local knowledge, this usually generates counter effects or even no effects in improving human rights in China. Arguments against the violators of human rights cannot go very far, especially when no attempt was made to understand local ways. The critics of the working condition in the *Montreal Garden in Shanghai* typify the problems of condemnation without adequate local knowledge. The *Montreal Garden* was condemned to be the site of human-rights violation because its working condition was not up to the Canadian standard or was even below the Chinese one. Bourque was condemned as a human-rights violator. This criticism was made based on the pictures taken by a radio reporter's teenage daughter who probably did not receive professional journalism training. In addition, to what extent can we say that human rights for these workers were violated without acquiring more information about the overall working "standard" in China, without talking to the on-site workers, or without any proof of these workers physically or mentally tortured by the working condition?

***Policy Instrument of Human Rights in Diplomatic Relations***

The MMG critics' approach towards human rights in China strongly suggested the measurement of intervention to either show the concern about human rights abuses for *Falun* followers or to condemn what happened in Tiananmen Square. However, the MMG officials were reluctant to do so because they believed that the measurement of constructive engagement through twinning exchanges might have a better chance to improve human rights in China. In order to exercise better judgment on this debate, once again, it requires more local knowledge about how human rights, as an aspect of foreign policies, have been perceived by the Chinese.

Human rights, in theory, are not about atomic, individualistic, or self-regarding behaviors (Svensson 2002). Nor does individualism make respect for others, recognition from others or responsibilities obsolete (Taylor 1991). Or as Taylor further argues, "[t]he issue is not 'individualism' as such... The danger is any form of either individualism or group identity which undercuts or undermines the trust that we share a common allegiance as citizens of this polity" (Taylor 2002: 106). However, Ming Wan, in his research on Chinese views of human rights, makes the following argument: "the notion that [individual] freedom may lead to instability is persuasive to many ordinary Chinese", even though the younger generation of the Chinese becoming more individualistic (Wan 2001: 27). That is, linking individual freedom with social disorder is neither the propaganda of Chinese officials nor the basic discourse of emerging neo-conservative Chinese scholars in the post-Tiananmen period. The social disorder resulting from the collapse of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia gave a negative impression that political changes in promising great individual freedom can simultaneously undermine

social stability to the Chinese. In addition to social stability, the Chinese, at the moment, also value more economic development as an indicator of national strength at the international stage. While "work hard and get rich" has become ordinary Chinese citizens' motto in the post-Tiananmen period, economic rights, continuous from the communist legacy, has been prioritized over civil and political rights in China (Wan 2001).

Wan, consequently, concludes that "[a] powerful combination of aversion to political instability and awareness of economic interests and rights provides a fertile ground for developmentalist and instrumentalist views of human rights, now shared by the [Chinese] government and most of society..." (Wan 2001: 29). This viewpoint is generally reinforced by the rise of the living standard in the past decade and the satisfaction of seeing China thriving as a prosperous and dominant country, becoming "the center of the world" (the meaning of China in the Chinese language), as it had always been before the commencement of colonialism in the second half of the 19th century. The above-combined factors and the tight authoritarian control over media are powerful enough to fence off the voices of Chinese dissidents and the shaming politics of international human-rights advocates. Therefore, human rights are the problems of international affairs, not those of domestic issues, from the current Chinese official perspective.

This is not to say that either the Tiananmen Square massacre or the crackdown on *Falun* followers can be justified. Nor is it to say that cultural imperialism is camouflaged by the universality of human rights and therefore it has to be rejected by the so-called "Asian values" as proposed by Lee Kuan Yew. However, when China prioritizes economic modernization and national sovereignty over democracy and human rights,

they are suspicious of the motives behind the West, especially the United States, linking human rights to the issues of trade and international security in foreign policies. This link is widely interpreted as a means to obstruct China's modernization and to hinder its transformation into one of the most powerful countries in the world (Svensson 2002; Wan 2001; Zhao 2000). The foreign interference, such as trade sanctions or shaming human-rights violators, therefore, had little effect on changing the actual conditions in China. The external pressure did not bring in basic political and civil rights to the Chinese. Rather, foreign interference often backfired because it encouraged Chinese nationalism and consolidated Chinese sovereignty.

The above arguments help us to better assess the criticism made against the Bourque administration on not integrating human rights in the twinning with Shanghai. If the viewpoints of the MMG's critics were made beyond the power struggle between ruling and opposing parties in city hall, it reflected more of a general, moral sentiment in Western liberal society. Furthermore, it entailed a moral wish that naming and shaming the behaviors of the Chinese government could result in a quick dose of actual improvement for the ordinary Chinese. Their criticism was made without recognizing political realism in China, where the central government strongly resists external pressure and where ordinary Chinese people and many intellectuals (not Chinese dissidents or some academics) are satisfied with their government as the "necessarily evil" in the exchange of greater economic and social freedom.

Wan also doubts that indirect or low-profile constructive engagements have changed the behaviors of the Chinese government in the past decade. "Western governments have limited ability to change Beijing's general behavior in human rights... And ultimately a

high-pressure or a low-key approach does not make much difference if judged by actual behavior changes in China" (Wan 2001: 136). However, Montreal's twinning with Shanghai showed the possibilities of changing the Chinese official's mentalities, even on a very small scale. It is true that, on the one hand, human rights were certainly not on the exchange agenda. If the construction of the *Chinese Garden* did not violate human rights, neither did this project intend to set a model of improving working conditions in China. If trade and other economic exchanges opened a window to Shanghai, it was more likely capitalism than democracy or human rights. On the other hand, it is also logical to argue that urban management, as well as the construction of green spaces and large-scale parks were a contribution from Montreal to improve the living condition in Shanghai and to introduce the importance of urban sustainability. As one interviewee argued, Shanghai officials decided to have more green spaces after they visited Montreal and liked the vitality of urban life in the old port of Montreal (*Interview* 17 May 2002). As quoted in Chapter 1, the other interviewee advised his Chinese counterparts about the danger of blindly following the Western developmental model and suggested an alternative model of urban planning, which would discourage urban alienation and retain urban vitality. If changing the human-rights condition at the large political/legal scale in China was never contemplated by the Montreal side, to a certain extent its twinning exchanges helped to advocate the ideas of giving respect for human existence in relation to environmental protection or more comfortable urban spaces for everyday practices.

This is still far from promoting the ideal of the public space where people feel free to be different from each other, where massive gatherings are allowed and where discursive activities essentially make the space "public". Nevertheless, the contribution counts, even

if these projects were relatively very small steps of improving human rights in China. If high-pressure and low-key approaches do not show the differences in the short term, the latter is still preferable in the long term. Given the Chinese's strong resistance towards the former, what is needed is the accumulation of low-profile projects in the twinning spirit of reciprocity. It, on the one hand, does not irritate the Chinese authority or to stimulate a stronger sentiment of national pride; on the other hand, it has a better chance to contribute to human rights in China, if we are not looking for a quick fix to the problem.

Eventually, there is no single formula to implement twinning as a low-profile means or constructive engagement to improve human rights in China. The MMG's exchanges of urban management was significant, as it provided a channel for both sides of governmental officials to discuss what consists of humane, urban spaces. As shown in the Zurich-Kunming twinning exchanges, the Chinese officials were shown the importance of respecting the ideas and wishes of local residents through conducting citizen consultation. Beyond the official exchanges between municipalities, student exchanges, such as Chinese law students' visits to Université de Montréal or Chinese geography students' visits to Concordia University, can also be a good occasion to have an impact on the mentalities of future Chinese law enforcers or urban planners.

**Conclusion**

Overall, this long chapter shows both political and normative concerns about Montreal's twinning with Shanghai. Democratic citizenship and human rights, in the Western framework, are two facets of human liberty against the arbitrary or inhumane

rules from government or other forms of authority. They are developed together in the language of rights, the respect for human dignity and the humanist ideal of equality and justice, but they have also faced challenges and require transformation in order to be recaptured in the changing world dynamics.

I have discussed both as absent concerns in Montreal's twinning with Shanghai. First, the lack of citizen participation in the twinning was attributed to various factors, including the boss politics of Montreal's political culture, the missing efforts to institutionalize the twinning in the form of a citizen committee, and neo-liberal governmentality, which gives rise to economic citizenship. The specific case study further indicates the limits of urban citizenship closely associated with the experiences of urban, public realms. I also raised the concern about how citizen participation in public affairs can be ensured when municipal activities are no longer confined to the limited local boundaries.

In the second half of the chapter, I presented the absence of an overt agenda to incorporate human rights in the twinning, its critiques and the underlying philosophical and realist arguments. A mixed critique of both sides of the argument and strategies pointed to the fact that human rights are not a total package which can be universally applied without considering the complexity of conceptual debates and world politics. On the one hand, we should not forget nor forgive human-rights violations in the Tiananmen Square massacre or the brutal crackdown of *Falun* followers, since gross inhumane acts as such violate human rights as universal norms of conduct. On the other hand, the gray areas of conflict between rights and the call for a broadened cultural source of human rights increase the importance of obtaining different cultural values and local conditions

before judging the violation of human rights. Finally, juggling between direct condemnation and indirect influences on the changes of human-rights violations in China, it is certain that the former eventually leads to counter-effects or a vicious circle, and that the latter has a better chance to reach "an unforced consensus on human rights" in the long run (Taylor 2002).

# Conclusion

In this study of Montreal's twinning with Shanghai, I have argued against the idea that twinning can be studied within the communicative processes between city and city and have suggested that understanding it needs to be situated within the dynamics of structure and agency at different levels. Furthermore, I have also argued against the argument that twinning between a more advanced and a less developed city is a one-way flow of influences and have shown twinning as reciprocal processes of international communication for development. Finally, I have also argued against the idea that twinning can take place within a political vacuum and have examined how it entails both political and normative implications concerning citizen participation and human rights.

At the macro level, the global-local dynamics have given significance to recent twinning development. On the one hand, globalization has given rise to the importance of cities as the intersection of organizing social, economic and political vectors of transnational flows and has emphasized the idea of urban competitiveness in striving for a city's advantages in the uneven processes of globalization. On the other hand, the notion of the entrepreneurial city or the global strategy of municipalities as the local response towards the structural forces of globalization has given the international communication of twinning an instrumental rationale to look for urban competitiveness through city networking and cooperation. Twinning itself is not tantamount to urban competitiveness, but it is strategically implemented at the level of agency in the reflection

of local demands, interests, capacities and limits. In turn, twinning partially weaves the complex, multi-layered and multi-centred processes of globalization. These dialectical processes between the global structural forces and the responding, entrepreneurial strategies at the local level, thus, cannot be simply understood as a coherent, linear or causal relationship between the global and the local.

At the meso level of structure and agency, twinning has been examined via intergovernmental relations. A Canadian municipality's capacity to go abroad is structured by its given, formal, constitutional position as the subject of the provincial government. Traditionally being limited within the managerial scope and recently being constrained by the available resources to manage the cities, the ambiguity or the lack of the senior government's direction for urban diplomacy has made developing both domestic and international aspects of urban policy a dilemma. Nevertheless, it has also given room for the municipalities to develop their own interests in foreign relations. However, the flexibility of the lowest governmental agency, the municipalities' informal competence and the accumulation of the transnational capacity in building international networks can give an edge to the local government in forming a cooperative relationship with its senior government. Twinning, thus, is part of multi-layered international relations that come across at various governmental levels. Its concern with low policy does not form a threat against the sovereign status of nation-states nor does it become a waste of overlapping diplomatic resources.

Apart from the macro and meso contexts, twinning itself at the micro level is an international communication for development operated at both institutional and interpersonal levels. On the one hand, channels of international communication in

twinning need to be initiated, organized and maintained in the forms of official representation, governmental authority and formal ententes between two cities. This is especially the case when we consider twinning with a Chinese city, where the local culture values the importance of the institutional formality associated with the idea of giving face to Chinese officials. In addition, it is necessary to "internally" mobilize a city's resources in the pursuit of twinning within the organizational communication processes between governmental and non-governmental agencies in aspects of leadership, its supporting system, and urban governance, where cooperation and power relations are intermingled to include or exclude those who have an interest in a city's international policy. On the other hand, twinning is made on the basis of interpersonal communication—both within the involved agencies of a city and between sister cities. Such communicative processes have been infused with the societal values of trust and interpersonal networking (*Guanxi*) in order to reduce the sense of structural insecurity generated with the processes of the global economy.

In my case study of Montreal's twinning with Shanghai, I have looked closely into the local conditions of Montreal and of Shanghai to a lesser extent. This first led to the conclusion that twinning between cities from the East and the West or between the less developed and the more advanced is never a one-sided process. Without doubt, Shanghai opened a window to the world in the '80s and received managerial advice to cope with the rapid urban developmental needs in the '90s from the twinning exchanges with Montreal. In turn, the friendship internally provided Montreal with a more cosmopolitan flavour and externally opened the doors to the potential market in China. This, in a sense, has not been far from the ideal of *Quebec Inc.*—that the governmental agencies actively

promoted the interests of the local business community. However, while implementing the low policy of diplomacy or fulfilling the practical needs of the city, Montreal's twinning with Shanghai was distinctive from its senior government's international diplomacy, which often caught scholarly attention by its attempt to gain international recognition for Quebec's special status.

My final concern with twinning in the global economy has been its political and normative implications. Within the logic of neo-liberalism, which heralds maximized governing efficiency, minimized bureaucratic structures and the best economic returns, the entrepreneurial strategy of municipalities in responding to the pressures of the global economy or in engendering the cities' influences in the transnational flows does not guarantee the desired consequences of urban competitiveness. Nor does it guard the democratic ideal of citizen participation in public affairs. In other words, even before we can fully grasp its meaning, qualification and distinction from the traditionally state-centred notion of citizenship, urban citizenship is already challenged by neo-liberal governmentality in the global economy. If urban citizenship needs to be re-invented, it has to be done with the consideration that the work of the cities has gone beyond the given municipal boundaries and that the urban space-binding conception of citizenship needs to be transformed to ensure citizen participation in both internal and external aspects of urban policy. The creation of democratic deficits by the implementation of neo-liberal governmentality has been widely discussed in the internal aspects of urban policy. This research has shown that the lack of non-functional constituent participation and the rise of economic citizenship were also evident in the international aspect of urban policy. The ideal of constituent diplomacy was never fully realized in Montreal's

twinning with Shanghai. This was partially explained by the autocratic ruling style rooted in the tradition of Montreal's political culture, which attributed to the lack of institutionalization of broader public involvement in urban international affairs. Consequently, the actual twinning exchanges could not survive the demise of the Bourque administration in 2001, even though Montreal and Shanghai remain as sister cities on paper. This implies that the international aspects of urban policies need to be institutionalized or organized for broader community interests. Otherwise, municipalities' overseas activities remain suspicious of serving government officials' self interests by wasting taxpayers' money.

Human rights in China have been an unavoidable subject matter, no matter how the MSR oriented towards the low policy of diplomacy without any obvious intention to integrate political, ideological or humanitarian objectives. This evoked local criticism that former mayor Bourque and his administration were human-rights violators because the cozy friendship with the SMG indicated the approval of inhumane treatment against the ordinary Chinese. Therefore, the critics' viewpoints concluded that the MMG ought to condemn its Chinese counterpart in Shanghai. The normative demand for putting such direct pressure to name and shame human-rights violators is rooted in the language of rights and in the belief in justice, human agency and dignity. There is not much doubt that the gross violation of human rights in Tiananmen Square or the brutal crackdown of *Falun* practitioners can never be justified by any rationale. However, the gray areas of human rights in philosophical debates, the overshadowing of human rights as norms of conduct by political realism, and the lack of local knowledge can only result in counter effects from putting direct pressure on a country seeking to re-build its national strength

in the processes of the global economy. Nor is it morally right to always resort to the politics of naming and shaming. Therefore, it is a normative question to ask whether there are other measurements to integrate human rights in international relations as a means to improve human rights in China. Or beyond the rhetorical defense, can twinning as low-profile, indirect exchanges improve the human condition in China? These are not questions that are easily answered, as long-term observation and a consistent approach towards twinning as a less intrusive channel of influencing the Chinese officials are required. Montreal's twinning with Shanghai has shown that the exchanges of more humane and thoughtful urban planning and management contributed to the change of the living condition in Shanghai. Even though it was on a smaller scale, perhaps far from making an impact on the overall Chinese socio-political structure, the indirect, low-profile instrument policy had a better chance in the long run to contribute to the improvement of human rights in China.

This research obviously has its limitations. First, it is hard to quantitatively estimate the extent to which the MSR contributed to the rising economy in Montreal at the end of the last decade. This is not simply about the lack of statistical numbers of economic spin-offs generated by the MMG's strong emphasis on the link with Shanghai. The inability also lies in the difficulty of explaining the changes of the urban economy vectored by complicated factors. Second, it is always difficult to build a model of urban diplomacy or even to justify claims on twinning simply based on one case study. Nevertheless, I hope that this research will generate more interest in studying urban diplomacy along with the increasing importance of the cities in the global economy. Finally, by focusing on the city of Montreal and the MMG, there is certainly a limit to developing a more holistic view

on the link or network between cities. Another study specifically focusing on Shanghai is required to engender a more dialectical research on global networks between sister cities.

# Notes

**Introduction**

[1] Conditions of participation include: 1) There is no obligation to discuss issues with which interviewees do not feel comfortable. Interviews can be discontinued at any time. 2) Interviews are taped upon the consent of interviewees. The tapes are kept in confidence by the researcher. 3) Interviewees' participation and identity are strictly confidential. Their anonymity is ensured by the following ways: a) all obvious identifiers will be removed in the research, and b) all the raw data including tapes and correspondences will be destroyed once the research is finished. 4) A copy of the transcript is given to each interviewee to verify the content of the interview. 5) The final result of the research is available to interviewees. 6) The researcher's identification can be verified by providing contact information. 7) A consent form is signed with a witness of signature.

[2] News reports related to the research subject were selected from both local English (*The Gazette)* and French newspapers' (*Le Devoir* and *La Presse*) on-line databases. 507 French articles, during the period of January 1980 and December 2001, were selected under the keyword search of "Montreal" and "Shanghai" through *Biblio Brachée*. 180 English articles, during the period of January 1985 and December 2001, were selected under the same keyword search through *Canadian Newsstand.*

[3] Municipal documents included memoranda, protocols, cooperation pacts, municipal council resolutions, executive committee resolutions, and correspondences between the MMG and other agencies, such as the SMG, the *Federation of Canadian Municipalities*, the Quebec and Canadian governments. However, the first memorandum signed in 1985 was not found in Montreal's municipal archive. Some other types of documents, such as letters to the mayor, mission reports, and meeting minutes about the MMG's international policy, are not available to the general public.

**Chapter 1**

[1] According to Zelinsky (1991), there were 11,000 pairs of sister cities from about 159 countries by 1988.

[2] According to Tehranian, communication development can be divided into various categories. "Development *of* communication may be defined as expanding the channel capacity of the communication system. Development *by* communication might mean employing that capacity to provide social services such as tele-education, telemedicine, telelibraries, telebanking, etc., alongside the traditional services. Development *for* communication might be interpreted to mean power-free and dialogic communication among government, business, and civil society so that public policy decisions are based on communicative rather than instrumental rationality" (Tehranian 1999:87). However, communication *for* development is missing in his categorization.

[3] Mowlana's empirical discussion of communication development is located at the national and global levels with a specific attention to how communication technologies or mass media have been played out in the complexity between communication and development, or between the interplay of political economy, cultural identity and value systems. Nevertheless, his conception of communication development is still theoretically sound in examining SCRs.

[4] There were some educational exchanges between universities in Montreal and in Shanghai. However, because education is not part of the municipal jurisdiction, universities mainly conducted these exchanges without much support from the MMG. The areas of educational exchanges vary from arts, theatre, urban planning, law, and science to technology. It is difficult to generalize this area of twinning activities because

there were different senses of active involvement, formalities or success depending on individual school or faculty.

[5] The only exception could be the Zurich-Kunming tie in which a referendum in Zurich was held to back up its municipal government's resources mobilized for urban development in Kunming. Nevertheless, this is still far from the ideal of constituent diplomacy where exchanges permit a direct communication process between constituents in two cities.

[6] The first memorandum signed in 1985 was not found in the Montreal municipal archive. In order to have a sense of how the twinning initiative was made, I requested a special access to information of the city of Montreal. However, the request was declined by *La Commission d'accès à l'information*, the Government of Quebec. Therefore, I can only gather ideas about twinning scope and direction at its inception from news reports. It is believed that the direction of the second memorandum signed in 1987 was not far from the 1985 initiative.

**Chapter 2**

[1] The multinational transportation company, *Bombardier*, was not only introduced to the Chinese market even dated back to the 1980s, but also was introduced to Greece by the MMG in a 1996 trade mission. A one-billion contract on a mass-transit system in Thessaloniki, Greece, was finalized in 1999 as another significant economic spin-offs from Mayor Bourque's international trips (*The Gazette*, 31 March 1999: A6).

[2]There has been discussion about the problems of *Quebec Inc.* For instance, while it was intended to serve the common good of the Quebec society, some researchers argue that it gave rise to a social class of new Francophone elites who gained the most benefits out of it (Arbour 1993; Fraser 1987). In addition, Yves Bélanger (1998) argues that *Quebec Inc.* should not be romanticized because it is less productive than expected regarding its objective to achieve the well being of Quebeckers and to make Quebec-based enterprises into multinational corporations.

**Chapter 3**

[1] Provincial and municipal governments are non-central governments, instead of sub-national governments in this research. This is on account of the fact that, many regional governments, like Quebec, claim to be a nation without a state, and that the communication processes between three levels of government in international affairs do not necessarily follow a vertical or hierarchical division of power relationship.

[2] Dürrschmidt and Matthiesen (2002) also discuss how the Mayor of Guben's transnational interests in expanding the European Union eastwards earned him the nickname of "polenfreund" (Friend of Poles), and his job was thrown away, like a bowling pin, by his fellow German Gubeners.

[3] A Montreal radio journalist visited the site of construction with her teenage daughter. While interviewing the Montreal official who was responsible for the project, the daughter took some pictures of the shed where the construction workers stayed. These photos, later, were used to accuse the MMG of violating human rights in China because the workers' living conditions were poor, compared to Canadian standards.

[4] *Montreal International* is a non-profit, government-subsidized agency. Its mandate is to attract foreign investment in the greater region of Montreal. Although its initiative was to overcome the conflict or competition over investment in different Montreal regions, its ambitious, yet ambiguous objectives failed to attract significant investment (*Interview*, 10 June 2002). Based on cost benefit analysis, Fernand Martin asserts that *Montreal International* is oversubsidizd "with little potential to enhance local economic activities" (Martin 2001, 372).

**Chapter 4**

[1] The CCC was also interested in the project of the *Chinese Culture Centre*; yet, the contract was made in the mid 80s between the MMG and another Chinese organization, the *Montreal Chinese Community Housing Cooperation* (MCCHC) for a 52-year lease on the destined site of the center. Despite then mayor

Bourque overtly endorsed the CCC to take over the project to advance their power alliance, the legal binding between the MMG and the MCCHC cannot be challenged.

**Chapter 5**

[1] According to Isin, it is adequate to propose a sub-national or urban citizenship resided in professionalism with the premises that the obtainment of citizen rights and the exercises of citizen participation have always embedded in the processes of class and group struggle and that "the city emerged not as a place of loyalty but as a space where new professions [were] organized" (Isin 1999: 278). Thus, Isin suggests the formulation of urban citizenship around professional groups through their control over the cultural capital that enables collective problems to be addressed. As much as the advocacy of the group-based citizenship makes sense, urban citizenship should not be limited to professional associations for two reasons: first, professional citizens or functional constituents are not loyal to the city but to their professional or functional associations; second, professional associations tend to have a stronger capacity and more cultural resources than other groups, associations, or those who are outside of any group in society.

[2] The information about the international travel expenses made by the Bourque administration was revealed by the opposing city council, Marvin Rotrand, through an access-to-information request (*The Gazette* 14 February 2001). There was no fixed, annual budget allocated to those expenses and the approvals to those expenses were made by the Executive Committee on the *ad-hoc* basis (*Interview*, 5 August 2002).

[3] Photos of the construction site and the living condition in the *Montreal Garden in Shanghai* were originally posted on the *Canadian Broadcasting Corporation* (CBC) website: www.montreal.cbc.ca/ritter.html. This site is no longer available at the completion of this research.

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