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The Nature of Synthetic Judgements A Priori and the Categorical Imperative

Geoff Tozer

A Thesis
in
The Department
of
Philosophy

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for the Degree of Master of Arts at
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ABSTRACT

The Nature of Synthetic Judgements A Priori and the Categorical Imperative

Geoff Tozer

This thesis attempts to show that the five different formulations of the categorical imperative that Kant provides are all equivalent, in spite of their apparently differing meanings. To meet this goal I propose to display the nature of synthetic judgements a priori, since Kant claimed that the categorical imperative was this sort of judgement. This requires examining Kant's exposition of synthetic judgements a priori in mathematics and natural science in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, where he dealt with them at length. After showing that there can be no subject-object distinction with regard to synthetic judgements a priori, in either mathematics or natural science, I apply this moral to Kant's formulations of the categorical imperative in *The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* and the *Critique of Practical Reason*, from which perspective I try to reveal that, at the relevant level of abstraction, there are no real differences between these formulations.
Dedication

To my parents.
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INTRODUCTION

To maintain a priori, in advance of the attempt, that such abstraction is not possible in the answer, because it is not possible in general, is to maintain that it is also impossible in the question, and hence that the question, as put, is impossible.

—Johann Gottlieb Fichte

Much has been written up to the present about Immanuel Kant and much will be written about him in the future. After all, every philosopher has their favourite Kant. For the generation of his lifetime and immediately following it, the favoured interpretation of Kant was that of the philosopher who put mind at the foundations of science. The phenomenologists saw in his philosophy a precursor to their own transcendental philosophy with his notion of the synthetic a priori. The positivists appreciated what they considered his epistemology. Heidegger praised what he called Kant's ontology. Wittgenstein modeled both his early and late philosophies on Kant's analytic method. Deleuze admired, however much at a distance, Kant's aesthetics. My favourite Kant is the philosopher of ethics. It is my contention, though not the central one of the following thesis, that it is Kant's ethics that are central to his philosophy. For though Kant's metaphysics are propounded at greater length (the second edition of the first Critique runs 884 pp. to the second Critique's mere 163 pp.), the whole purpose of this metaphysics is fundamentally ethical: "I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith" (Critique of Pure Reason, B xxx). It goes without saying that this faith is ethics and its objects in the Critique of Practical Reason are God, freedom and immortality.

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The goal of this thesis is to exhibit the nature of synthetic judgements a priori and their relation to subject and object. What I try to show is that, with regard to synthetic judgements a priori, subject and object arrive at the same time, in the same sense and in the same way. Using this thesis and the evidence for it in the Kantian œuvre, I ultimately wish to argue that there is no real distinction to be drawn between the five different formulations of the categorical imperative that Kant gives in his ethical writings. However, to get there I will have to explain and distinguish between the methodologies of mathematics and philosophy as well as between the results of mathematics, natural science and ethics.

Chapter I shows how synthetic judgements a priori work in mathematics. The key concept there will be seen to be that of 'construction.' This notion of construction unites subject and object because the judgements of mathematics which are constructed always refer back to themselves. Chapter II explains in three sections how the pure concepts of the understanding (the synthetic judgements a priori called the categories) make possible experience of the world. Section (A) explains how universal assent is required for objectivity on Kant's theory. Section (B) explains how Kant's concept of the unity of apperception relates to objectivity. Finally, section (C) explains how the concepts of the previous two sections are interrelated and combine to make objectivity. In these sections, the concepts expressed play the role of relations which make all other relations possible but are not reducible to these other relations.

Chapter III introduces Kant's ethics in two parts. Part (A) focusses on how Kant dealt with theological issues in his ethics, while part (B) introduces the notion of intentional action. This latter is modeled on, but does not reduce to, the synthetic judgements a priori of sensibility and understanding. Where intentional action differs from what I call bare intentionality is in how a lack of distinction between
subject and object is arrived at. Chapter IV systematizes the concepts introduced in Chapter III in order to lay bare the unity of the three formulations of the categorical imperative. In terms familiar from the philosophy of science: in mathematics Kant is an instrumentalist, treating mathematical relations as merely useful and not referring to anything in the world (other than themselves); in natural science Kant is a realist and quite happily speaks of things existing independently of the perceiving subject; finally, in ethics Kant remains an instrumentalist of a certain type. ¹

There are three Appendices. The first two defend Kant’s ethical philosophy from the assaults upon by Scheler and Brentano. We will see that the former’s assault contains contradictions, while the latter’s is not sufficiently thought through. Appendix III considers the development of Kant’s philosophy in the *Opus postumum* as interpreted by Werkmeister (1980), a development that would render useless the work of the critical period. I take a rather Quixotic stance here and defend the critical Kant against the post-critical Kant.

Before beginning, I thought it might be helpful to lay out my philosophical and scholarly influences, so that many of my biases may be seen and understood at least, if not agreed with. The most important influence on me has been Wittgenstein, specifically his discussion of aspects in his (1945) work, found between pp. 193-210, from which the idea for this thesis first sprung. For the idea of "seeing as" is precisely what I mean by subject and object arriving at the same time, in the same way and in the same sense. Take the duck-rabbit. Seen under one aspect it is a duck and under another it is a rabbit. Under either aspect it is what we say it is. Seen under one aspect, the duck-rabbit is what that aspect indicates it is. If it were otherwise, we wouldn’t be seeing it under the aspect we claim we see it under. Note that subject and object arrive at the same time and it is impossible to say which
came first. The subject 'determines' the object by seeing the object in a certain way. The object 'determines' the subject to see it in a certain way by making this way of seeing the object possible.

From here I began my apprenticeship to Derrida, with a reluctant curiosity at first (I wanted to see what all the hubub was about), but enthusiastically once it became clear Derrida and Wittgenstein are in agreement on essentials. Once that happened I quickly began to see the flaws in the analytic philosophy I cut my philosophical teeth on. The main flaw in all analytic philosophies, from Frege to Chomsky, from Russell to Putnam, is reducible to their poverty-stricken theory of intentionality. I won't take this up here since I take it up in the main body of the thesis twice, first in Chapter III (B) and again in Chapter IV. This apprenticeship to Derrida required becoming familiar with Heidegger, Bataille and Merleau-Ponty. I mention Derrida's influence on me, not because he is actually discussed much in this thesis (he's not), but because he played a significant part in the tacit background of the writing of the thesis.

As far as Kantian scholarship goes, the main influence here has been Werkmeister (1980). For it was in this text's second Chapter, Mathematics and the Construction of Concepts, that I saw that what Wittgenstein called aspects were in fact synthetic judgements a priori. There are problems with Werkmeister's interpretation, however, most importantly his failure to learn the main lesson from Kant's critical period, namely, that all observations are theory-laden. He seems to be of the opinion that there is a Kant in himself out there somewhere that only he has access to. Thus he draws continuity where there is none (between the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason with regard to the relation between freedom and the moral law on p. 97) and discontinuity where there is none (between the Critique of Pure Reason and The
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science with regard to the problem of a metaphysics of physics on pp. 104-5). This much said, I still have to admit that Werkmeister's interpretation of Kant is the best one offered to date.

Before I enter the main body of my thesis, I should explain what the quote from Fichte is doing at the top of this Introduction. What the German idealist is noting is that subject and object affect one another. The subject affects the object by asking questions of it. The object affects the subject by making possible some questions that can be demanded of it, but not others. And this just is the thesis I am offering. In what follows I introduce each Chapter with a quote that I find relevant to the point being made there. Where my intention in offering the quote is not totally transparent from the quote itself (and my intentions are transparent in Chapter IV) I will explain in due course why I have chosen it to represent the Chapter.
CHAPTER I

The nature of synthetic judgements a priori in mathematics

Construction is the presentation of a concept through the spontaneous production of its corresponding and verifying intuition.

—Lewis White Beck

The first place that Kant discovered synthetic judgements a priori was in mathematics, so I suggest that we begin by looking there to examine their nature with regard to subject and object. The texts by Kant that I will use to make my case are his "Inquiry concerning the distinctness of the principles of natural theology and morality" (1763) the first Critique (1787, first edition 1781) and the Prolegomena (1783). The texts by scholars on Kant that I will use are Beck (1969), Werkmeister (1980), Hintikka (1974) and Ferrarin (1995). To close off the Chapter I will resort to Dummett (1977) to show how Kant's philosophy of mathematics has influenced contemporary thought about mathematics.

Prior to Kant there had been a scientific and philosophical revolution, started by Descartes and Galileo and brought to completion by Newton. According to what has come to be known as the modern philosophy, we must be certain of what we know. Knowledge and certainty were identified (for how could one know what one was not certain of?). The modern philosophers thus placed great weight on mathematics and logic, because if we held anything with certainty, it was mathematics and logic, the negation of either of which was inconceivable. As different in their approaches to philosophy as they may have been, Hume and
Leibniz (both of whom were the last great spokesmen for their traditions) were in agreement that there was no difference between mathematics and logic.

However, Kant argued that mathematics and logic were not to be identified. For instance, as Beck's (1969) exposition of Kant's philosophy points out "Mathematics begins with synthetic (arbitrary) definitions which can be shown to be real definitions by exhibiting what is defined in concreto, in intuition" (p. 442). Kant first argued for this distinction between mathematics and logic in his "Inquiry." There he draws a distinction between the methodology of mathematics and the methodology of philosophy. Mathematics' method is synthetic, while philosophy's is analytic. By synthesis in mathematics Kant means "the arbitrary combination of concepts," while by analysis Kant means "separating out that cognition which has been rendered distinct" (Ak. 276, original italics).\(^5\)

The peculiarity about mathematics is that there can be no subject-object distinction in it. For the thinking subject, in plumbing his or her depths in order to produce mathematical knowledge, is its object. And for the object which is produced by the construction of concepts there is always a subject, that is, there are no subjectless mathematical objects. Kant says as much on Ak. 281 of the "Inquiry": "In mathematics, the definitions are the first thought which I can entertain of the thing defined, for my concept of the object only comes into existence as a result of the definition." The subject, in defining a mathematical thing from out of its concepts, makes that very thing.

The methodology of philosophy, on the other hand, must take for granted a concept and break it up into its constituent sub-concepts:

In philosophy, the concept of a thing is always given.... The concept has to be analysed; the characteristic marks which have been separated out and the concept which has been given have to be compared with each other in all kinds
of contexts; and this abstract thought must be rendered complete and
determinate (Ak. 276).

Philosophy always takes a concept for granted and proceeds to take it to pieces. In
order to take a concept to pieces, the concept must be seen in a variety of contexts.
Owing to the contextual nature of "conceptual analysis" (Ak. 280), concepts acquire
their meaning through use in contexts: "In philosophy generally and metaphysics in
particular, words acquire their meaning as a result of linguistic usage..." (Ak. 284).

The last thing to mention with regard to the "Inquiry" is that mathematics is
atomistic and proceeds from parts to a whole, while philosophy is holistic and
proceeds from whole to parts. This is what Kant is saying on Ak. 296: "But
whereas in mathematics the definitions are the first indemonstrable concepts of the
things defined, in metaphysics, the place of these definitions is taken by a number
of indemonstrable propositions which provide the primary data."

Further evidence for my thesis of the unity of subject and object in synthetic
judgements a priori is found in the Critique of Pure Reason's discussion of
mathematics, a discussion which remains largely unchanged from that of the
"Inquiry." Here Kant writes that "mathematical knowledge is the knowledge gained
by reason from the construction of concepts. To construct a concept means to
exhibit a priori the intuition which corresponds to the concept" (B 741, original
italics). Note that concept (the subject side) and intuition (the object side) arrive at
the same time in construction. In the Introduction to the first Critique Kant
provided the example of addition to illustrate the construction of synthetic
judgements a priori in mathematics:

We might, indeed, at first suppose that the proposition $7 + 5 = 12$ is a
merely analytic proposition, and follows by the principle of contradiction from
the concept of a sum of 7 and 5. But if we look more closely we find that the
concept of the sum of 7 and 5 contains nothing save the union of the two numbers into one, and in this no thought is being taken as to what the single number may be which combines both.... We have to go outside these concepts, and call in the aid of intuition which corresponds to one of them, our five fingers, for instance, or, as Segner does in his *Arithmetic*, five points, adding to the concept of 7, unit by unit, the five given in intuition. For starting with the number 7, and for the concept of 5 calling in the aid of the fingers of my hand as intuition, I now add one by one to the number 7 the units which I previously took together to form the number 5, and with the aid of that figure [the hand] see the number 12 come into being (B 15-16).

Though in the last analysis it is untenable, for clarity's sake I will resort to the use-mention distinction to explain what Kant is saying in this passage. When Kant writes "That 5 should be added to 7, I have indeed thought in the concept of a sum \( = 7 + 5 \), but not that this sum is equivalent to the number 12" (B 16) we could basically read it as saying that \( 7 + 5 \) is analytically equivalent to 'the sum of 7 and 5,' a name, not a number. What the number is remains unknown until we use pure intuition to construct the resulting concept. For all intents and purposes, this is what the quote from Beck cited at the top of the Chapter is saying.\(^7\)

What can be noted here is that, in a quite literal sense, mathematics tells one about the world because it is the world. The subject constructs the object by exhibiting its concepts in concreto. The object constructs the subject because the objects which are exhibited indicate the broad outlines of reality. For mathematics is internally, not just externally, related to sensibility. The discussion of space in the first *Critique* leads Kant to regard geometry as the purest expression of spatial relations:

Geometry is a science which determines the properties of space
synthetically, and yet *a priori*. What, then, must be our representation of space, in order that such knowledge of it may be possible? It must in its origin be intuition.... Further, this intuition must be *a priori*, that is, it must be found in us prior to any perception of an object, and must therefore be pure, not empirical, intuition. For geometrical propositions are one and all apodeictic, that is, are bound up with the consciousness of their necessity; for instance, that space has only three dimensions. Such propositions cannot be empirical or, in other words, judgments of experience, nor can they be derived from any such judgments (B 40–41).

Note that geometrical judgements are not "of" (read: about) experience; rather, they *are* experience. According to Kant, we inhabit the world of Euclidean geometry. In the *Prolegomena*, Kant states his case somewhat more weakly as follows: "Pure mathematics, as synthetic cognition *a priori*, is possible only by referring to no other object than the senses. At the basis of their empirical intuition lies a pure intuition (of space and time), which is *a priori*" (Ak. 283–284). I say that Kant's case is expressed somewhat more weakly because the first sentence claims that mathematics is about ("refer"s to) the senses. But the second sentence alleviates this by claiming that the basis of empirical intuitions are pure (that is, mathematical) intuitions.

As examples of the construction of concepts, W. H. Werkmeister (1980) offers three: "Fictitious characters in a novel...the...concepts of mathematics and physics" (p. 19). As evidence for my thesis that subject and object are the same in synthetic judgements a priori, I provide the following quote: "the [mathematical] concepts are all 'true' because the mathematical objects are identical with the stipulations of the definitions" (p. 20). Jaakko Hintikka (1974) explains what Kant means by "pure intuition" with his own notion of "individuals which are represented" and this
entails the same conceptualization of mathematics as the last quote I provided from Werkmeister: "For Kant, an intuition is simply anything which represents or stands for an individual object as distinguished from general concepts" (p. 130). What this means is that pure intuitions are not sensuous and refer to no other object than themselves. For instance the algebraic term $x$ represents ("stands for") unspecified numbers as an individual and thus refers to them (potentially) in pure intuition, from which it came. Evidence for the claim that synthetic judgements a priori refer to themselves is found in the following from the first *Critique*:

When in *a priori* judgment we seek to go out beyond the given concept, we come in the *a priori* intuitions upon that which cannot be discovered in the concept but which is certainly found *a priori* in the intuition corresponding to the concept, and can be connected with it synthetically (B 73).

In other words, a pure concept or an "*a priori* judgment" is "connected" with the "intuition corresponding to the concept," though not in an analytic manner, because analysis deals only with "the given concept," that is, only with what can "be discovered in the concept." (If analysis dealt with intuitions, it would be constructive, that is, synthetic.)

We receive a similar picture to that in the commentaries of Werkmeister and Hintikka, from Alfredo Ferrarin (1995): "What the issue of formal intuitions shows is that the very genesis of mathematical objects is synthetic, that the concept is constructed as the production of its corresponding intuition" (p. 114). Note that here as well subject and object arrive at the same time out of this act of construction. Kant himself is cited by Ferrarin to be making this point about the synthetic a priori nature of mathematical judgements: "*All synthetic judgments of theoretical knowledge are only possible through the relation of a given concept to an intuition*" (cited ibid.). While Kant has expressed himself misleadingly here with
regard to mathematics (he speaks of concepts relating to intuitions, in a rather
dualistic manner) what he is trying to say is correct as far as it goes. What he is
trying to say is that, for some subject doing mathematics, by this very activity of
mathematics, the subject has an object for itself. Expressed less phenomenologically
and more according to the structuralist tradition (structuralists deny that the subject
is active) the object is the final cause of the subject and causes the subject to think
the way it does. Either way one expresses it, subject and object are indistinguishable
and arrive at the same time and for the same reason. As another example of the
point I am driving at, I quote Ferrarin as follows: "The synthesis or composition
(Verbindung) is the only representation which I cannot acquire from experience:
the spontaneous activity of the understanding generates it" (p. 142). I have claimed
above that mathematics is internally related to what is found in sensibility. Ferrarin
goes one step further and points out that understanding too is related internally to
mathematics, through the productive imagination:

    Kant's appearances are not just the stage of the understanding's self-realization
    as master of nature via geometricized physics, but the spatio-temporal world
given to us and to which our productive imagination must be essentially, not just
externally, related (p. 152).

The objects (appearances) are not forced to be the way they are through the subject
(understanding's) being master of them by means of mathematical natural science.
Rather, the objects are internally related to the subject. 9

    Kantian mathematical instrumentalism 10 appears in the following quote from
Ferrarin, which reveals Kant to be an anti-Platonist: "Numbers then are subject to
the condition of time whenever we construct them or exhibit them in intuition. This
does not mean that they have a separate existence" (p. 168). Numbers do not have
an existence independent from the subject that thinks them. It is Kant's insight in
the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Analytic that, owing to what he calls imagination (where mathematical natural science is not forced on nature but, rather is nature), the subject has no existence independently from numbers. (Which is that which was to be proved.) This anti-Platonistic instrumentalism shows up also in the contemporary philosophy of mathematics known as intuitionism, which Michael Dummett (1977) explains as follows:

Thus, while, to a platonist, a mathematical theory relates to some external realm of abstract objects, to an intuitionist it relates to our own mental operations: mathematical objects themselves are mental constructions, that is, objects of thought not merely in the sense that they are thought about, but in the sense that, for them, esse est percipi. They exist in virtue of our mathematical activity, which consists in mental operations, and have only those properties which they can be recognized by us as having (p. 7).

Intuitionism is the Kantian school of the philosophy of mathematics par excellence because it believes that mathematics is composed of synthetic constructions a priori. (Logicism believed that mathematics is analytic but is presently dead because it could not fulfill its promise of showing mathematics to be nothing but logic in disguise; formalism believes that mathematics is synthetic a posteriori and was significantly reduced in ambition at the hands of Gödel's incompleteness theorems.) Thus we can see that mathematical entities are to the extent that they are perceived. (Which are Berkeleyan terms which actually serve to falsify Dummett's point. What he should say is that mathematical entities exist to the extent that they can be constructed.) Does this rule in instrumentalism or anti-realism in the natural sciences? Not obviously, because Kant was a scientific realist, and this for two different reasons, as we shall see in the next Chapter.
CHAPTER II

The nature of synthetic judgements a priori in natural science

Speech is the surplus of our existence over natural being.

—Maurice Merleau-Ponty

Kant introduced something he considered to be a revolution in philosophy in his first Critique (1787, first edition 1781), calling it a Copernican turn. He suggests the hypothesis that, since all attempts to the contrary have failed, knowledge is made by objects conforming to the mind. This, I suggest, is something that could also be considered an intentional turn. Kant never suggests that objects are irrelevant to the mind. Rather, what he means is that all objects are affected by the mind, basically for the same reason that Kuhn (1970) argues that verificationism is false: all observations of objects are made possible by one theory or another and not vice versa. Kant's Transcendental Deductions are elucidations of this point. I suggest that we look to these Deductions to see the relevance of synthetic judgements a priori to natural science, because Kant thought that they showed what made science possible.

I will go through both Transcendental Deductions and the relevant sections of the Prolegomena (1783) to bring to the fore what I think is Kant's main claim, namely, that subject and object are intertwined. I will be arguing for certain controversial points, most significantly with regard to the nature of objectivity, so I will back myself up with various secondary sources which either interpret Kant as I do or offer similar theories of objectivity or provide valuable contrasting positions. These secondary sources are Werkmeister (1980), Heidegger (1973), Deleuze
(1963), Strong and Sposito (1995), Habermas (1981), Goodman (1983), Husserl (1929), Ferrarin (1995) and Wittgenstein (1933-44) and (1945). Resort will briefly be made to the Critique of Judgment in order to display Kant's notion of objectivity there. On my interpretation, Kant offers an agreement theory of truth to guarantee objectivity, which I expose in section (A). From there I introduce the unity of apperception, which, on my interpretation, Kant also argues is necessary for objectivity, so I devote section (B) to it. I show the interrelations of these two theories in section (C). I will begin with the sketch that the Prolegomena provides of synthetic judgements a priori in natural science and fill in the details with the first Critique.

(A) Objectivity and universal assent

Kant begins the Prolegomena, as he did in the first Critique, with the analytic-synthetic distinction. As we have seen in Chapter I, analytic judgements say nothing new about the cognitions they are derived from. Kant calls these judgements explicative. "The Common Principle of all Analytic Judgments is that of Contradiction" (Ak. 267). This is because, since the sub-concepts one finds in a concept are entirely derivative upon that concept, the sub-concepts always amount to the concept and nothing more. Analytic judgements cannot be falsified, so they are not about experience. They are only about, as we saw in the "Inquiry," our linguistic usage, that is, our conventions.

Synthetic judgements, on the other hand, are called ampliative, that is, they increase the information in cognitions. There are two types of synthetic judgements: a posteriori and a priori. Synthetic judgements a posteriori are easily explained as the "continual joining together (synthesis) of perceptions" (Ak. 275). (As we shall see later, things are not as entirely simple as this last quote suggests. I
put aside the question of how things are more complicated here for simplicity's sake.) The question Kant seeks to answer is "How are synthetic cognitions a priori possible?" (Ak. 278, original italics). We've already seen that "Pure mathematics, as synthetic cognition a priori, is possible only by referring to no other objects than those of the senses" in Chapter I. With regard to natural science, synthetic judgements a priori are made possible by "objective validity." This notion of objectivity in Kant will require some going into, because it is a strictly theoretical concept, a concept which summarizes the complex, interrelating web of meaning found in the Transcendental Analytic.

Kant's notion of objectivity requires universal assent. What can be assented to in principle (N.B.: the assent-giving need not be actually given) is objective. Kant states this twice on Ak. 298 of the Prolegomena:

...if we have reason to hold a judgment to be necessarily universally valid (which never rests on perception, but on the pure concept of the understanding under which the perception is subsumed), we must consider it to be objective also, that is, that it expresses not merely a reference of our perception to a subject, but a quality of the object.

...objective validity and necessary universal validity (for everybody) are equivalent concepts, and though we do not know the object in itself, yet when we consider a judgment as universally valid, and hence necessary, we understand it thereby to have objective validity.

The first quote is saying that synthetic judgements are made by combining something which is heterogenous to concepts to provide information about those concepts. The contingent combination of heterogeneity in concepts, a combination that can be otherwise, is not objective in Kant's sense. This type of combination is a posteriori. To be objective in Kant's sense requires a necessary combination of
what is heterogenous to concepts. This combination must be potentially
performable by all subjects (that is, universally). Because it is universal, this
combination is a priori. The second quote explicitly identifies objectivity with
universal and necessary assent: "objective validity and necessary universal validity
(for everybody) are equivalent concepts." Going beyond this Kant also identifies
the two criteria for a priori judgements, universality and necessity: "...universally
valid, and hence necessary...." This idea of assent-giving is an agreement theory of
truth," wherein agreement between subjects guarantees truth rather than
correspondence between theory (the understanding in Kant's terms) and
observation (sensibility in Kant's terms). In the first quote this is endorsed in the
claim that what is "necessarily universally valid" expresses a "quality of the object,"
not just the "perception" of a subject. In the second quote, what is "universally
valid, and hence necessary" has "objective validity." To be sure, Kant does admit
that there is a correspondence theory of truth. He just thought that it is
uninformative about the nature of truth. For in the first Critique he states "What is
truth? The nominal definition of truth, that it is the agreement of knowledge with
its object, is assumed as granted..." (B 82). Note that this definition of truth is just a
nominal definition, not a real one. W. H. Werkmeister (1980) explains the
difference between nominal definitions and real definitions in his text. Nominal
definitions "are essentially grammatical," that is, they enumerate the attributes of an
object, which enables one to identify the object to which a concept refers. They
determine the meaning of a word only in so far as this is needed for the purposes of
"ready communication." Real definitions, on the other hand, "contain everything
that is possible in the thing itself" and "define the thing, not the name" (Kant cited
in Werkmeister (1980), p. 19). Heidegger's (1973) text quotes Kant as saying that
Real-Definitionen are taken "from the essence of the matter, from the initial
ground of possibility" and explain "the matter according to its inner possibility" (Kant cited in Heidegger (1973), p. 80).

This claim of mine, that Kant is offering an agreement theory of truth, has rarely been recognized and those that do recognize it express themselves in a relatively obscure manner. I will resort to some philosophers who have found in Kant what I have to make it clear that my theory of objectivity in Kant is not mine alone. These philosophers are: Heidegger (1973), Deleuze (1963) and Strong and Sposito (1995). Before introducing the similar theory of objectivity found in Habermas's (1981a) book, I will discuss the agreement theory of truth found in the third *Critique*. I will conclude this initial discussion of Kant's agreement theory by contrasting it with Goodman's (1983) agreement theory of truth. This discussion remains initial and is not properly concluded until the end of the Chapter in section (C), where Ferrarin (1995) and Wittgenstein (1937-44) and (1945) are discussed in order to put all the pieces of Kant's notion of objectivity into play with my interpretation of the Chapter on Schematism and the Second Analog of the Principles of Pure Understanding, which latter applies all of the Transcendental Elements discussed up until then.

Martin Heidegger (1973, first edition 1929) was the first to my knowledge to recognize in Kant an agreement theory of truth. He displays this theory of Kant's as follows:

...if finite intuition is now to be knowledge, then it must be able to make the being itself as revealed accessible with respect to both what and how it is for everyone at all times. Finite, intuiting creatures must be able to share in the specific intuition of beings. First of all, however, finite intuition as intuition remains bound to the specifically intuited particulars. The intuited is only a known being if everyone can make it understandable to oneself and to others

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and can thereby communicate it (p. 18).

Note especially the last sentence. According to this interpretation, one can know only what one and others can understand, from which communication is derived.

Gilles Deleuze (1963) also interprets Kant as offering an agreement theory of truth: "Knowledge implies a common sense, without which it would not be communicable and could not claim universality" (p. 21). Note that which is common is the form of sense, not the content of sense. It is the form of this sense which is common that makes knowledge, and thus communication, possible. In the English-speaking world 'common sense philosophies,' such as those of Moore or Russell, typically mean to preserve the content of common sense. For instance, Moore rejected the ideality of time simply because, according to him, it entailed that one need not show up for work or appointments on time, and what could have more real (that is, unideal) effects than that? (It should be noted that the favourite claim of the layperson with regard to common sense, namely, that it is not common, is always lost on the English-speaking philosophers of common sense.) In contrast to this, the Continental tradition's common sense philosophy is one which asks how our sense fits together and how it functions.

Tracy B. Strong and Frank Andreas Sposito (1995) also claim that Kant offers an agreement theory of truth: "The threat of the skeptic is thus for Kant a threat to communication" (p. 270, original italics). They back this claim up with the following quote from the Prolegomena, Ak. 299:

What experience teaches me under certain circumstances it must always teach me and everybody; it and its validity are not limited to the subject nor its state at a particular time.... Therefore objective validity and necessary universality (for everybody) are equivalent terms... (cited p. 271).

Of course, they proceed to claim that Kant offers what Bataille would have called a
general economy in the third *Critique*, to go into which would take us too far
affield. While I don't think that they are sufficiently thorough in this regard
(general economies can be found in all three *Critiques*), I do agree with them on
this regard.

It will not be debated that Kant offers an agreement theory of truth in the
*Critique of Judgment*. Between Ak. 237-40, he discusses the type of presupposition
needed for taste. The pleasure we feel in contemplating the beautiful is the result of
the free play of the faculties, not the result of outer sense, that is, the pleasure is
strictly internal to the mind. (Which, in itself, is not particularly surprising—for
where else would pleasure reside?) However, there are clear differences with this
account of agreement and the account given in the first *Critique*: for instance, the
earlier account is one of the interplay of concepts, intuitions and ideas, not of whole
faculties. Nevertheless, Kant proceeds from a Transcendental Deduction of
knowledge in general to produce his agreement theory for aesthetics. He argues as
follows:

...if cognitions are to be communicated, then the mental state, i.e., the
attunement of the cognitive powers that is required for cognition in general
—namely, that proportion suitable for turning a presentation (by which an
object is given us) into cognition—must also be universally communicable. For
this attunement is the subjective condition of [the process of] cognition, and
without it cognition [in the sense of] the effect [of the process] could not arise.
And this [attunement] does actually take place whenever a given object, by
means of the senses, induces the imagination to its activity of combining the
manifold, the imagination in turn inducing the understanding to its activity of
providing unity for this manifold in concepts. But this attunement of the
cognitive powers varies in proportion, depending on what difference there is
among the objects that are given. And yet there must be one attunement in which this inner relation is most conducive to the (mutual) quickening of the two mental powers with a view to cognition (of given objects) in general; and the only way this attunement can be determined is by feeling (rather than by concepts). Moreover, this attunement itself, and hence also the feeling of it (when a presentation is given), must be universally communicable, while the universal communicability of a feeling presupposes a common sense (Ak. 238-9).

A lot of things are going on in this selection. For one thing, Kant is offering a summary of his Transcendental Deductions. However, going beyond the Deductions, Kant offers here an agreement theory of truth for aesthetic judgement. In the first Critique, the only things that had to be "attuned" were concepts (which was performed by the unity of apperception, as we shall see) and these were about intuitions. Here feelings (intuitions) too must also be "attuned." It is here that we leave the scope of my thesis and enter into aesthetics. However, it should be noted that all of what Kant is saying can be endorsed from the perspective of this thesis.

Kant's agreement theory of truth is in certain respects like Habermas's, as presented in Volume I (1981a) of his Theory of Communicative Action: "A judgment can be objective if it is undertaken on the basis of a transsubjective validity claim that has the same meaning for observers and nonparticipants as it has for the acting subject himself" (p. 9). Where Habermas and Kant differ (and this is also where Heidegger and Kant part company, as we saw in note 9 in Chapter I) is what the source of meaning is. For Habermas, the lifeworld is the source of meaning. This is why Habermas regards the colonization of the lifeworld, discussed in Volume II (1981b), by functional systems (specialized fields of knowledge which rationalize) as a disaster. For Kant meaning is identified with experience and
experience is identified with the objects of mathematical natural science. This is why Kant does not offer a theory of the pragmatics of meaning in everyday life such as is found in Being and Time's discussion of what is ready-to-hand,16 as a pragmatics of meaning in mathematical natural science. This is why one will strive in vain to discover anything other than the necessary conditions for mathematical natural science in the Analytic of Principles of the first Critique.

Kant's agreement theory of truth is one of simultaneous de jure and de facto agreement, not de facto agreement only. This contrasts rather sharply with Nelson Goodman's (1983, first edition 1954) discussion of reflective equilibrium. This latter is an expression of the troubles one gets into when one promotes the de facto side of agreement at the expense of the de jure side. Goodman states his case as follows: "A rule is amended if it yields an inference we are unwilling to accept; an inference is rejected if it violates a rule we are unwilling to amend" (p. 64, original italics). The problem with this is that as a pure description it is ad hoc because anything follows from it. And as a normative principle it is either vacuous or false: it is vacuous because it works in a circle between theory and observation and has no way of distinguishing between the two, thus making all thoughts based on it trivially true; it is false because it predicts that there could be a group of people who regard Kandinsky paintings as representing people in the same way as family photographs represent people, something we have little reason to expect to find in experience. The principle Kant offers is the unity of apperception, which I shall now turn to.

(B) Objectivity and the unity of apperception

Kant calls the combination of concepts with what is heterogenous to them superaddition:

If all our synthetic judgments are analyzed so far as they are objectively
valid, it will be found that they never consist of mere intuitions connected only (as is commonly supposed) by comparison into a judgment; but that they would be impossible were not a pure concept of the understanding *superadded* to the concepts abstracted from intuition, under which pure concept these latter concepts are subsumed and in this manner only combined into an objectively valid judgment (Ak. 301, my italics).

Where what is superadded comes from is the synthetic concept a priori of the understanding. This concept is called by Kant the unity of apperception. The unity of apperception *makes possible*, but is not found *in*, experience. Thus we find Kant explaining himself in the second edition of the *Critique’s* Transcendental Deduction:

Thus *unity of synthesis* of the manifold, without or within us, and consequently also a *combination* to which everything that is to be represented as determined in space or in time must conform, is given *a priori* as the condition of all *apperception*—not indeed in, but with these intuitions (B 160-161, original italics).

The "*unity of the synthesis* of the manifold" is the unity of apperception and this is found *with*, but not *in* intuitions. It might be thought that all Kant intends by this superaddition of the unity of apperception to concepts is that new information is expressed in the predicate of a synthetic judgement about the subject, as in 'Grand pianos are heavy.' This is not Kant’s view. Or, rather, Kant’s view is more than just this:

...if I were to have it called a judgment of experience, I require this connection to stand under a condition which makes it universally valid. I desire therefore that I and everybody else should always necessarily connect the same perceptions under the same circumstances (Ak. 299).

The condition that makes judgements of experience universally valid is the unity of
apperception. The unity of apperception is identical to the synthesis of an undetermined object of experience, called by Kant the transcendental object = x. Of this transcendental object = x in the first edition, Kant writes:

[it is] an object which cannot be intuited by us, and which may therefore be named the non-empirical, that is, transcendental object = x.

The pure concept of this transcendental object, which in reality throughout all our knowledge is always one and the same, is what can alone confer upon all our empirical concepts in general relation to an object, that is, objective reality (A 109).

This object is what the unity of apperception is directed to:

This synthetic unity [of apperception] presupposes or includes a synthesis, and if the former is to be a priori necessary, the synthesis must also be a priori....

We entitle the synthesis of the manifold in imagination transcendental, if without distinction of intuitions it is directed exclusively to the a priori combination of the manifold..." (A 118).

The "a priori combination of the manifold" is what does the unifying of the unity of apperception's transcendental object = x. This synthesis is a priori:

Here, then, is a synthetic unity of the manifold (of consciousness), which is known a priori, and so yields the ground for synthetic a priori propositions which concern pure thought, just as do space and time for the propositions which refer to the form of pure intuition (A 117).

It should be noted that Kant is not discussing things in themselves with his notion of the transcendental object = x (they are properly called by Kant transcendent objects, which is something entirely different from the transcendent al object = x). Rather Kant is discussing what makes objective experience, experience which is accepted by everybody, possible. How the unity of apperception is identified with
the transcendental object = x is as follows: the unity of apperception is a synthetic concept a priori; this concept is no particular concept, rather, it is a concept in general; thus the concept is an object because it is no particular concept. Kant states his case thus:

All possible appearances, as representations, belong to the totality of a possible self-consciousness. But as self-consciousness is a transcendental representation, numerical identity is inseparable from it, and is a priori certain.... Now, since this identity must necessarily enter into the synthesis of all the manifold of appearances, so far as the synthesis is to yield empirical knowledge, the appearances are subject to a priori conditions, with which the synthesis of their apprehension must be in complete accordance (A 113).

With this we are part of the way to the goal of my thesis, namely, that in the synthetic judgements a priori of mathematical natural science, subject and object are indistinguishable. For self-consciousness (the subject) subsumes under itself appearances (the object) because appearances are internally related to self-consciousness. I can get away with this latter claim for two reasons: (1) we saw it was true in Chapter I; (2) Kant claims as much on A 105: "It is only when we have thus produced synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition that we are in a position to say that we know the object. But this unity is impossible if the intuition cannot be generated in accordance with a rule..." (A 105)

What Kant calls the unity of apperception's superaddition to concepts in the Prolegomena and the Transcendental Deductions, Merleau-Ponty, in the quote at the top of this Chapter, calls the surplus of speech over natural being. Both of these philosophers are discussing intentionality. Intentionality was first explicitly introduced into the philosophy of mind by Brentano (actually it was reintroduced by Brentano—the Scholastic tradition, which was founded itself in a recovery of
Aristotle's philosophy, is where it was first discussed) and was developed by
Edmund Husserl. The latter's (1929) text draws a distinction between noesis and
noema which is helpful for an understanding of Kant. I will quote the passage
where he first draws the distinction in full in order to explain myself with the
greatest amount of perspicuity:

...on the one hand, descriptions of the intentional object as such, with regard to
the determinations attributed to it in the modes of consciousness concerned,
attributed furthermore with corresponding modalities, which stand out when
attention is directed to them.... This line of description is called *noematic*. Its
counterpart is *noetic* description, which concerns the modes of the *cogito* itself,
the modes of consciousness..., with the modal differences inherent in them..." (p. 36).
The subject pole is composed of noesis and it is directed by intentionality to
noemata. They are both found in a single set of intentional acts called by Husserl
*cogitationes*, which he defines as "the flowing conscious life in which the identical
Ego... lives" (p. 31). The cogitationes break down into a subject side, the cogito,
and an object side, the cegotum. The *cogito* can be defined as the complete set of
noetic poles, while the *cogitatum* can be defined as the complete set of noematic
poles.

What made Husserl aware of all of this was his refusal to broker in naturalistic
questions, that is, he brackets the natural attitude's relation to the world, which is to
say, he does not consider if the content of the natural attitude actually refers to
anything in nature. This bracketing he calls the phenomenological reduction or
epoché. The epoché reveals "transcendental-phenomenological self-experience" (p. 
26). This self-experience is to enable us to have a science that has "a beginning and
a line of advance" that [is] not... chosen arbitrarily but [has its] basis 'in the nature of
things themselves"" (p. 12, original italics). In a certain sense Husserl's approach is the exact opposite of Kant's, proceeding from consciousness of self (what Kant calls the "I") to the object and the objects of experience have no independence from the subject. In Kant's first Critique, on the other hand, self-consciousness (or the "I") is an epiphenomenon and can be talked about in an analytic sense only: "For through the 'I', as simple representation, nothing manifold is given; only in intuition, which is distinct from the 'I', can a manifold be given..." (B 135). Nonetheless, we can see that for both Kant and Husserl subject and object arrive at the same time and for the same reason in synthetic judgements a priori. In Husserl this is so because he brackets the natural attitude: by not considering the ontical (factual) side of knowledge, he has revealed to his satisfaction the far richer ontological side of experience in general. In other words the subject is inseparably a part of the beings it finds itself confronting. In Kant the subject and object are similarly bound together. Where for Husserl what does this binding is the intentional life of the person summarized as cogitationes, in Kant what makes subject and object inseparable is transcendental imagination:

*Imagination* is the faculty of representing in intuition an object that is *not itself present*. Now since all our intuition is sensible, the imagination, owing to the subjective condition under which alone it can give to the concepts of understanding a corresponding intuition, belongs to sensibility. But inasmuch as its [imagination's] synthesis is an expression of spontaneity, which is determinative and not, like sense, determinable merely, and which is therefore able to determine sense *a priori* in respect of its form in accordance with the unity of apperception, imagination is to that extent a faculty which determines the sensibility *a priori*.... This synthesis is an action of the understanding on the sensibility... (B 151-2, original italics).
Imagination is the principle which unifies the unity of apperception and intuition: it is active enough to produce intuitions; it is passive enough for the understanding to work on it to produce knowledge and thus experience." What Husserl calls cogitationes are summarized by Kant as imagination. I stress again that imagination is in both intuition and understanding with the following quote: "Now it is imagination that connects the manifold of sensible intuition; and imagination is dependent for the unity of its intellectual synthesis upon the understanding, and for the manifoldness of its apprehension upon sensibility" (B 164).

(C) The interrelation of Kant's concepts of objectivity

The peculiar thing about Kant's Transcendental Deductions is that they don't exactly end with the close of Book I of the Transcendental Analytic, but actually continue into Book II of the Analytic. For it is not until The Schematism of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding and this is itself related to The Principles of Pure Understanding is stated, that we reap the benefits of our labours in the Deductions. For where the Transcendental Aesthetic was about pure intuitions, the Transcendental Deductions were about pure concepts. However objective Kant may have claimed the pure concepts of the understanding may have been, nowhere did he explain how they were to be combined with intuitions. So there has to be more than just the two elements of experience, intuitions and concepts, but "some third thing, which is homogeneous on the one hand with the category, and on the other with the appearance" (B 177). Kant has expressed himself somewhat misleadingly here because this "third thing" is actually the one thing by which both concepts and intuitions can be explained. There is just a single layer of intentionality with two poles, subject and object, which, in synthetic judgements a priori, are distinguishable analytically only.

Kant defines the schema of a concept as the "representation of a universal
procedure of imagination in providing an image for a concept" (B 179-80). It is important to note that it is not the image that is the schema, but rather the "universal procedure of imagination" (my italics) which makes the image that is the schema. In other words, schemata are processes ("procedure"s). Since they are processes, they change. Because they change, they are subject to time, the necessary condition of possibility for all change. Kant states as much: "This formal and pure condition of sensibility [inner sense, that is, time] to which the employment of the concept of understanding is restricted, we shall call the schema of the concept" (B 179). Kant relates three different varieties of schema: pure sensible concepts, the example of which is a triangle, empirical concepts, the example of which is a dog, and pure concepts of the understanding, the examples of which are provided throughout the remainder of the Chapter. He states over and over again, somewhat quixotically, that none of these examples reduces to an image. Why none of them reduces to images is because there is a surplus involved in their synthesis. That is, their schema is what is "superadded" to them. For instance, the schema of a triangle is universally valid for all triangles, whether these are provided with images of what is right-angled, obtuse-angled or acute-angled. The empirical concept of 'dog' is about a rule which "delineate[s] the figure of a four-footed animal in a general manner" (B 180), but it is not reducible any figure which can be presented, that is, any image. Both the schema and the image of particular dogs are made possible by what Kant calls a monogram derived from pure a priori imagination. I will argue in due course that this notion of a monogram is what distinguishes the synthetic concepts a posteriori of what is empirical from the synthetic concepts a priori of pure intuitions and pure understanding.

With regard to these pure concepts of the understanding, Kant states that no image can ever be provided for them. This is what distinguishes the pure concepts
of the understanding from the pure concepts of sensibility (that is, the concepts of mathematics). For it will be recalled that various images can be provided for the pure concepts of sensibility, but that their schematization denies that these concepts can be reduced to the images. As a preliminary step in his explanation of the schematism of the pure concepts of the understanding, Kant summarizes the Transcendental Deductions. The schema of a pure concept of the understanding "is a transcendental product of imagination, a product which concerns the determination of inner sense in general according to conditions of its form (time), in respect of all representations..." (B 181), where these representations conform to the unity of apperception, that is, are connected a priori in one concept. Note that the schema of a pure concept of the understanding is related to, but different from, the unity of apperception. This is because the schemata are atomistic, whereas the unity of apperception is holistic with regard to the pure concepts of the understanding. Kant's reasoning for this holism, a holism which applies strictly to the understanding and is thus atomistic (as we saw the synthetic concepts a priori of mathematics are) in its own way, is that the understanding is the faculty of rules. For example, in the Transcendental Deduction (A), Kant writes: "We may now characterise it [the understanding] as the faculty of rules" (A 126). The reason for this is because of the nature of the self and self-consciousness. For Kant argues that "I think," the self-consciousness which can potentially accompany any experience, is analytic. This being the case, it follows that there is only one field of experience. Kant states his case as follows:

The original and necessary consciousness of the identity of the self is thus at the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts, that is, according to rules, which do not only make them necessarily reproducible but also in so doing determine an object for
their intuition, that is, the concept of something wherein they are necessarily interconnected. For the mind could never think its identity in the manifoldness of its representations, and indeed think this identity a priori, if it did not have before its eyes the identity of its act, whereby it subordinates all synthesis of apprehension (which is empirical) to a transcendental unity, thereby rendering possible their interconnection according to a priori rules (A 108).

What all of this is saying is that from out of the activity of the unity of apperception arises the self. The identity of self-consciousness is made possible by the activity of the unity of apperception which "subordinates all synthesis of apprehension... to a transcendental unity."

This production of self-consciousness through the activity of the self is closely related to Kant's Refutation of Idealism. For there he argues that the inner intuition of self-consciousness is made possible by the outer intuition of permanent things independent of oneself. This argument is entirely analytic for Kant: "The immediate consciousness of the existence of outer things is, in the preceding thesis [which is that we have self-consciousness only if there is a world external to the mind], not presupposed, but proved, be the possibility of this consciousness understood by us or not" (B 276). This comment by Kant indicates that the argument is analytic, because it states that if there is consciousness, regardless of whether or not this consciousness's condition(s) of possibility are understood, then there has to be an external world. (See note 15 for Kant's other proof of the external world.)

Because self-consciousness is analytic, all experience is rule-bound for Kant. We have a clear statement of this in the Transcendental Deduction (A):

This transcendental unity of apperception forms out of all possible appearances, which can stand alongside one another in experience, a connection
of all these representations according to laws. For this unity of consciousness would be impossible if the mind in knowledge of the manifold could not become conscious of the identity of function whereby it synthetically combines it in one knowledge (A 108).

Since analytic judgements require a given concept to take to pieces, Kant must be presupposing something in which these rules of experience inhere. This, I will argue, is the universal assent people give to (scientific) experience. In other words, the agreement theory of truth is what is presupposed in Kant's Transcendental Analytic. The possible assent which can be given to the pure concepts of the understanding makes possible experience. Kant analyzes how we reach consensus in the context of scientific investigation in order to reveal what elements this consensus requires. We saw that this was Kant's opinion of how philosophy should proceed in his "Inquiry" in Chapter I. That Kant held to this method of conceptual analysis is evident from the following statement: "the analytic unity of apperception is possible only under the presupposition of a certain synthetic unity" (B 133, original italics). Kant's criticism of pure reason is analytic. He states this as follows: the critique of pure reason "ought properly to be only negative, not to extend, but only to clarify our reason" (B 25). This is in complete conformity with the "Inquiry"'s claim that the task of philosophy is "to search for the distinct, complete and determinate concept" (Ak. 283), which is found in a given, confused concept.

Now it is with agreement that we arrive at all forms of "surplus of our existence over natural being." For if one can give one's assent to something in the present, one can give it in the future too. We saw with regard to the schemata of the pure concepts of sensibility that no image amounted to them. This is because, for example, we are committed to calling triangles, not just those which we have seen in the past and do see in the present, but also those of the future which we have
not yet seen and may never see. With regard to the concept 'dog,' it is through consensus in our conventions that we call the "figure of a four-footed animal" a dog. We will call all "figures" which are "delineated" by this rule dogs, including those which we have not observed. However, in the empirical concept our conventions could have been otherwise. There is universality and necessity involved in the pure concepts of sensibility. In empirical concepts, on the other hand, there is only particularity and contingency. This is what the term "monogram" (B 181) signifies: the schema is not necessarily, but only contingently, connected to the concept by the monogram from pure imagination which produces it. In other words, empirical concepts all stand under the possibility of being shown to be otherwise, that is, they are one and all falsifiable. This is the interpretation Alfredo Ferrarin (1995) offers as well. He mentions the problem of the schematism of 'dog' as Wittgensteinian in spirit. In the case of the schematism of 'dog' he writes: "[the] schema here is not a method, but rather works as an admonition to find the one in and for the many, to interpret the picture of the 'this' as an essence" (p. 159). What is particularly Wittgensteinian about this is that in both his (1933–44) and (1945) works, Wittgenstein argued that there can be no obeying a rule privately because rules require interpretation and interpretation is only made possible by a community which has a public check on that interpretation. And the public check is what is capable of making false an empirical concept. Kant agrees that rules require interpretation because he argues that "although an abundance of rules borrowed from the insight of others may indeed be proffered to, and as it were grafted upon, a limited understanding, the power of rightly employing them must belong to the learner himself..." (B 172). Transcendental logic differs from general logic because "besides the rule (or rather the universal condition of rules), which is given in the pure concept of understanding, it can also specify a priori the instance to which the
rule is to be applied" (B 174-5). Which is to say that (Kant's) transcendental philosophy, the philosophy of how consensus is reached in mathematical natural science, is an analytic description of interpretation, which latter analysis is derivative upon consensus. For, in order to tell when a "rule is to be applied," we need an interpretation of the rule, which is "the power of rightly employing" it.a

There is finally the matter of the schematization of the pure concepts of the understanding. As already noted, these concepts, even more than pure concepts of sensibility and empirical concepts, are not reducible to images. In fact we will search for images in vain with regard to them. This type of schema "can never be brought into any image whatsoever. It [a schema of a pure concept of the understanding] is simply the pure synthesis, determined by a rule of that unity, in accordance with concepts, to which the category gives expression" (B 181). I will consider only one of Kant's illustrations of the schematization of the pure concepts of understanding, that of causality. The schema of a cause is "the real upon which, whenever posited, something else always follows" (B 183). To paraphrase this in terms of the principle of causality discussed in the Second Analogy, the recognition of causality requires the real, not just nominal or logical, possibility of the objective succession of events in time. Kant immediately proceeds from the above quote to the claim that the schema of causality is "in the succession of the manifold, in so far as that succession is subject to a rule" (ibid.). The succession of the manifold according to a rule is what guarantees the objectivity of a given cause. The sole rule of the schematism is that of time, as we saw above (wherein "the employment of a concept of understanding is restricted" to temporality, the "formal and pure condition of sensibility" (B 179), also called inner sense), so the second part of the last quoted sentence is somewhat redundant. For all succession is in time. What prevents it from being totally redundant is that the rule is a question of
schematism, that is, it is objective. In this context, though not in the Second Analogy, as we shall see, there is no question of a subjective succession of events expressed in the (pure) concept of causality. It might be thought that, since Kant also ascribes rules to empirical concepts and pure concepts of the understanding (in his claim, with regard to the former, "The concept 'dog' signifies a rule..." (B 180) and with regard to the latter, the schema of a pure concept of understanding "is simply the pure synthesis, determined by a rule of that unity..." (B 181)), there are more rules than merely temporal ones. But this is a misunderstanding. It is true that concepts are rules, but concepts are not themselves schemata. Schemata are the mediation of concepts with appearances by means of the determination of time. As Kant states: "an application of the category to appearances becomes possible by means of the transcendental determination of time, which as the schema of the concepts of understanding, mediates the subsumption of the appearances under the category" (B 178).

The System of the Principles of Pure Understanding are dependent upon the schematism in so far as they are determined by "universal conditions" (B 187), by which Kant means particularly to emphasize that transcendental judgement (which makes knowledge possible but is not itself identified with that knowledge) is rigorously, not just incidentally, linked to the synthetic concepts a priori of the pure understanding. Recalling that the goal of this Chapter is to show that the synthetic judgements a priori of natural science are simultaneously both subject and object of that science, we can find evidence for my thesis in the following quote:

Principles a priori are so named not merely because they contain in themselves the grounds of other judgements, but also because they are not themselves grounded in higher and more universal modes of knowledge. But this characteristic does not remove them beyond the sphere of proof. This proof
cannot, indeed, be carried out in objective fashion, since such principles [do not
rest on objective considerations but] lie at the foundation of all knowledge of
objects. This does not, however, prevent our attempting a proof, from the
subjective sources of the possibility of knowledge of an object in general (B
188, original italics).

Kemp Smith's interpolation in square brackets about how principles a priori "do
not rest on objective considerations" actually serves to confuse the point I am trying
to drive at. For when Kant speaks of the proof for principles a priori not
proceeding in "objective fashion" and that the proof for those principles must
proceed from "subjective sources" of knowledge of an object, he means that the
proof for the principles is internal to what we already know. In other words, Kant
is not offering a foundationalism. I doubt that Kemp Smith could legitimately
complain about this criticism of his translation here because he notes at the bottom
of the page that "This sentence [the one about the lack of an objective proof for the
principles] has been variously emended" (p. 188). From the perspective of the anti-
foundationalism noted here, I would like to point out that Kant is endorsing exactly
what I say he endorses, namely, we can see from the inside of our knowledge (its
"subjective sources") what objects this knowledge requires. The objects are
internally, not merely externally, related to our knowledge. The only way to
account for this is if subject and object, in certain respects (the synthetic a priori
respects), arrive at the same time, in the same way and in the same sense.

Further evidence for my thesis is Kant's discussion of The Highest Principle of
all Synthetic Judgments. This highest principle is "every object stands under the
necessary conditions of synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition in a possible
experience" (B 197). While this is an important point for Kant's philosophy
(because it displays once again the importance of the unity of apperception), more
important for my thesis is the last sentence of this Section: "We then assert that the conditions of the possibility of experience in general are likewise conditions for the possibility of the objects of experience, and that for this reason they have objective validity in a synthetic a priori judgment" (ibid., original italics). The italicized portions of this sentence prove my case for me. In the conditions of "experience in general" we have at the same time "objects of [that very] experience."

Returning to the concept of causality which I left at the end of the discussion of schemata, we can see that Kant's proof for it in the Second Analogy leans heavily on the agreement theory of truth that I have argued he endorses. To see this we will have to look at what he says. After discussing the difference between the succession of events in observing a house and the succession of events in observing a boat moving down a river, Kant comes to the conclusion that the latter, but not the former, is necessary. Kant proceeds from here as follows:

In this case [the case of a necessary order of events], therefore, we must derive the subjective succession of apprehension from the objective succession of appearances. Otherwise the order of apprehension is entirely undetermined, and does not distinguish one appearance from another. Since the subjective succession by itself is altogether arbitrary, it does not prove anything as to the manner in which the manifold is connected in the object. The objective succession will therefore consist in that order of the manifold of appearance according to which, in conformity with a rule, the apprehension of that which happens follows upon the apprehension of that which precedes.... This is only another way of saying that I cannot arrange the apprehension otherwise than in this very succession (B 238, original italics).

Because all observers stand under the rule of time (which makes succession in the object possible and is prescribed by the schema of causality), they can ascribe
objectivity and thus necessity to the moving of a boat down stream.20

Now the subjective succession of events, such as observing parts of a house, is also in time. However, it is entirely derivative upon the objective succession of events. Where subjective succession is "arbitrary" and says nothing about how "the manifold is connected in the object," the objective succession is such that it "cannot arrange the apprehension otherwise." The rule at work in causality is strictly temporal because Kant argues that "I cannot reverse this order [of the event], proceeding back from the event to determine through apprehension that which precedes" (B 239). Because temporality is the rule of the Second Analogy, we can see how this Analogy connects to the schematism of causality. The time of subjective succession does not proceed in any way whatsoever with regard to the object, which is why Kant calls it arbitrary. Once again, subjective succession is derivative upon objective succession because, though it is about objects in experience, it is not essentially or internally connected with them. If no internal connection existed between appearances and the principle declared by the Second Analogy in any case of succession, there could be no subjective succession because all subjective successions would melt into one apprehension of succession, that is, "the succession in our apprehension would always be one and the same" (ibid.). Objective succession, on the other hand, is internally connected to the successive events:

The advance... from a given time to the determinate time that follows is a necessary advance. Therefore, since there is certainly something that follows [i.e. that is apprehended as following], I must refer it necessarily to something else which precedes it and upon which it follows in conformity with a rule, that is, of necessity" (ibid., Kemp Smith's italics in his interpolation).

The reader should not be misled by Kant's insistence that causality is just an effect

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of rules by such claims of his as that causality always works "in conformity with a rule." If we did so causality would be an epiphenomenon itself caused by rules. This is not Kant's position. For he points out that "In conformity with such a rule there must lie in that which precedes an event the condition of a rule according to which this event invariably and necessarily follows" (B 238-9). The rule is made possible (it requires a preceding condition) by being ascribed to a set of objects. Which is to say that it is the rule which is the effect and it is derivative upon objectivity in general. Once again we see that Kant believes that rules are epiphenomenal and are derivative upon the agreement theory of truth he believes in.

As far as the goal of my thesis and Kant's proof for causality is concerned, we can see that subject and object are indistinguishable here, as before. I say this because the subject and the object here are essentially and internally related, as already noted above. If there were no objective succession of events, there would be no subjective succession of events. But the objective succession always exists for some potential set of subjects. This type of succession depends on a set of subjects because it depends upon the agreement of what can be ascribed to the object. The set of subjects are potentially given, that is, no group of people needs actually to subscribe to Kant's theory of causality in order for it to be true.

I will explain here the interrelations of the three types of judgements. In Husserl's language synthetic judgements a posteriori are directed from noesis to noema in a contingent manner. Strictly speaking, they have to do with matter only. Because they can all be falsified and are not necessarily true, they are, for philosophical purposes, false. (Note bene: this is true for philosophical purposes only, not for scientific purposes.) Husserl did not believe in analytic judgements, but Kant did. These latter are strictly formal. Because they only refer to the form
of consensus arrived at and what follows from this form, they never fail to refer, because they aren’t intended to refer. In language familiar from elementary logic courses analytic judgements are directed from an intension to an extension in a universal and necessary manner. Because the intension-extension distinction is purely analytic, in a very material sense, they cannot be distinguished, that is, because they are identical, intensions are not truly directed by intentionality to extensions as was the case with noesis and noema. Instead, an intension just is its extension.\footnote{Thus I will speak of intensions and extensions always as intension-extensions.} Synthetic judgements a priori are a combination in equal parts of both matter and form. In them we are directed from a noesis through an intension-extension algorithm to a noema. Because synthetic judgements a priori refer to themselves, we could equally say that we proceed from a noema through an intension-extension algorithm to a noesis. Synthetic judgements a priori refer to themselves, so they never fail to refer—they are always true. Just in using them they show their truth.

One might still be tempted to believe that Kant is an idealist, albeit a transcendental idealist, by arguing that the object is more dependent on the subject than the subject on the object. After all, in the *Prolegomena* Kant argues that the objects of thought are only possible by the concept of the understanding subsuming (or being superadded to) the manifold of sense. One might cite Kant as follows in order to prove this:

> The given intuition must be subsumed under a concept which determines the form of judging in general with regard to the intuition, connects the empirical consciousness of the intuition in consciousness in general, and thereby procures universal validity for empirical judgments (Ak. 300).

What this argument overlooks is that this concept which does the subsuming is the
unity of apperception and this is an object. To restate the argument offered above again, the unity of apperception is an object because it is identical to the transcendental object $= x$. They are identical because the unity of apperception is a concept in general and is thus no particular concept, which makes it an object in general, which, it will be recalled, just is the definition for the transcendental object $= x$. This latter, as we saw above in the quote from A 113, is such that the manifold of appearances (that is, any appearances—which is to say, any objects for the subject) to which it is applied are in complete accordance with it. Kant identifies the unity of apperception with the transcendental object $= x$ as follows:

The pure concept of this transcendental object, which in reality throughout all our knowledge is always one and the same, is what can alone confer upon all our empirical concepts in general relation to an object, that is, objective reality.... Since this unity [the object which is always one and the same] must be regarded as necessary a priori—otherwise knowledge would be without an object—the relation to a transcendental object, that is, the objective reality of our empirical knowledge, rests on the transcendental law, that all appearances, in so far as through them objects are given to us, must stand under those a priori rules whereby the interrelating of these appearances in empirical intuition is alone possible. In other words, appearances in experience must stand under the conditions of the necessary unity of apperception, just as in mere intuition they must be subject to the formal conditions of space and of time (A 109-10).

Further evidence of the identity of subject and object in the transcendental object $= x$ is found in the Paralogisms' discussion in A of the transcendental subject $= xc$

We can assign no other basis for this teaching than the simple, and in itself completely empty, representation 'I'; and we cannot even say that this is a
concept, but only that it is a bare consciousness which accompanies all concepts.

Through this I or he or it (the thing) which thinks, nothing further is represented than a transcendental subject of the thoughts = X (B 404).

We have seen this transcendental subject = x before with regard to the "I think" which can potentially accompany all conceptualization. We saw before that it was entirely derivative upon the unity of apperception. Here Kant continues to make it derivative upon the unity of apperception (it merely "accompanies all concepts") and thus refuses to grant any type of synthetic knowledge of it. It is, for all intents and purposes, merely analytic and says nothing about the world because it is tautologously derivative upon, not a cause of or in, that world. Thus we see that subject and object, here transcendental subject = x and transcendental object = x, are flip-sides of the same coin. And so we see that Kant was an idealist according to his description of himself only. In the final two Chapters I enter into the darkest regions of Kant's insights into synthetic judgements a priori: the judgements of ethics.
CHAPTER III
The nature of synthetic judgements a priori in ethics

We are faced with a kind of Pascal's wager: assume the worst, and it will surely arrive; commit oneself to the struggle for freedom and justice, and its cause may be advanced.

—Noam Chomsky

(A) Morality as the foundation of theology

In this section of this Chapter, I will examine Kant's two different approaches to establishing the basis of morality in two of his works, the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), henceforth FMM, and the Critique of Practical Reason (1788), henceforth CPrR. Here my main goal is to explain what the categorical imperative requires of the world. This will lead to the next section, where we will see that Kant had a hitherto unheard of notion of intentionality, intentional action (intentionality affecting the real world, not just bare, mental intentionality). While there are similar approaches to intentionality offered by some philosophers, we will see that there are also differences, which will justify my claim that the intentional action of Kant's philosophy has been "hitherto unheard of."

In FMM, Kant argues that the possibility of morality is freedom, as the following subsection's title makes clear: "The Concept of Freedom Is the Key to the Explanation of the Autonomy of the Will" (Ak. 446). His idea is derived from the first Critique's argument dealing with the third Antinomy. It is a double aspect
theory of reality. On the one hand Kant was a resolute determinist, as all scientific minded people were back then. On the other hand, Kant had his religious convictions and these stressed the responsibility of the individual for his or her actions. If the universe was deterministic, there was no way any individual could be responsible for him- or herself. (Rather, nature or the Hand of Fate would be.) So what Kant did was to put freedom in the world of things in themselves and determinism in the world of possible experience. It is because people can be viewed under these two different aspects that we can say that people are free and determined at the same time (but, crucially, in different senses). Kant called his principle of morality the categorical imperative and explained this latter through freedom: "Thus categorical imperatives are possible because the Idea of freedom makes me a member of the intelligible world" (FMM, Ak. 454).

The philosophy behind FMM is a thoroughly atheist one and the only time religion is mentioned in it, it is with disparagement (i.e., divine command theory on Ak. 443). So Kant does not relate freedom to God. In fact he says that it is something like a mystery as to how one gets freedom of the will: "The subjective impossibility of explaining the freedom of the will is the same as the impossibility of discovering and explaining an interest which man can take in moral laws" (Ak. 459). Basically, Kant takes it as a brute fact that we are free and this is as far up in the series of conditions that we can go. Once again, what makes morality possible is freedom:

Thus the question *How is a categorical imperative possible?* can be answered to this extent: We can cite the only presupposition under which it is possible. This is the Idea of freedom.... But how this presupposition itself is possible can never be discerned by any human reason (Ak. 461).

We know Kant remained dissatisfied with this picture because he changed his
approach in CPrR. In this approach morality makes freedom, God and immortality possible and is taken as fundamental. The following quote makes this clear:

Instead of this vainly sought deduction of the moral principle, however, something entirely different and unexpected appears: the moral principle itself serves as a principle of the deduction of an inscrutable faculty which no experience can prove but which speculative reason had to assume as at least possible.... This is the faculty of freedom, which the moral law, itself needing no justifying grounds, shows to be not only possible but actual in beings which acknowledge the law as binding upon them (Ak. 47).

Note the shift of Kant's focus here: it is not freedom that makes morality possible, but rather morality that makes freedom (practically) possible. This should have been obvious to Kant to begin with because the categorical imperative is supposed to be a synthetic judgement a priori ("This imperative is an a priori synthetical practical proposition," FMM, Ak. 420) and these are supposed to be taken for granted and make experience possible. Here the categorical imperative makes moral experience possible. To sum up the argument in a slogan: ought implies can. 25

Kant was a relatively sophisticated theologian. In the same way that morality makes freedom (practically) possible, so too does it make God and immortality possible. For, in order that we may be happy for being virtuous, we need an omniscient meritocrat to provide happiness for us when and where we deserve it in the hereafter in a perpetual quest to improve ourselves. 26 And since we will take forever to become perfect, we have an immortal life in the hereafter. Note that these are postulates of practical reason, required for finite agents, not necessary for a holy will, a will which only wills the good. 27
(B) Intentional action

That Kant had a picture of intentionality was argued in the last Chapter. In this section of this Chapter I will take this for granted and try to show that he had a picture of intentionality that produces what Jean-François Lyotard (1979) has labelled a meta-narrative, that is, there exists a superstructure (relatively independent from its base) which guides the thought and activity of the particular 'atoms' that make up its 'molecule.' I will argue that the meta-narrative operates according to something like a self-fulfilling prophecy, much like Chomsky's "Pascal's wager" cited at the top of this Chapter. To explicate what I mean I will resort to Allison (1990), Apel (1979), van der Linden (1988), Deleuze (1963) and Mészáros (1972). In order for me to make my case I must return to Husserl's (1929) picture of intentionality, which is familiar from Chapter II, section (B). We saw there that in synthetic judgements a priori we start with a noesis, proceed into an intension-extension algorithm and arrive at a noema. All noeses are contained in their cogito and all noemata are contained in their cogitatum. The relation between noesis and noema in synthetic judgements a priori can be summarized in the following phenomenological theorem:

(1) noesis => \{intension-extension\} => noema.

I will proceed from synthetic judgements a priori to intentional action, which results in self-fulfilling prophecies and, ultimately, mediation. From here I will proceed into Chapter IV, where I will systematize the conclusions of the present chapter in order to argue that there is no difference between the three different formulations of the categorical imperative.

Henry E. Allison, in his (1990) text, suggests that Kant held that most important for syllogistic reasoning was not just sufficient conditions, but belief: "In other

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words, the premises must not only be good and sufficient reasons for asserting the conclusion, they must also be regarded as such" (p. 38). What Allison calls "good and sufficient reasons" are intension-extension algorithms. These are all analytic, as was noted in Chapter II, section (B). Here I would like to argue that there is a difference between beliefs, on the one hand, and intension-extensions, on the other. This is not immediately apparent, though I think it will be readily assented to once it is admitted that beliefs have real consequences. Take the intension "ghost" and the extension \textit{ghost}. They are the same for all people who understand the meaning of the words. They all select the empty set. But there is a peculiar difference for those who believe in ghosts, namely, that they do not believe that the intension "ghost" selects the extension \textit{ghost}, the null set. They believe that ghosts have real consequences in the world. Thus they structure their lives differently. Thus there are real effects of something that does not exist. The only way of accounting for this, short of some sort of Platonism guilty of a perpetual regress, is to stipulate that there are minds with beliefs and that these have real effects in the world. Husserl's cogitatum (the set of noemata), introduced above, are beliefs, while the mind for which they occur is directed to them from the cogito (the set of noesis) in its cogitationes by intentionality.

What does intentionality have to do with Kant's ethical philosophy? It deals with willing, specifically, what may be called good willing. Kant writes: "Nothing in the world—indeed nothing even beyond the world—can possibly be conceived which could be called good without qualification except a \textit{GOOD WILL}" (FMM, Ak. 393, original italics and capitals). The good will is "good only because of its willing (i.e., it is good in itself)" (FMM, Ak. 394). The language of duty is the language of the will because duty demands respect, every other motive being arbitrary and capricious. Kant identifies practical reason with the will:
Only a rational being has the capacity of acting according to the conception of laws (i.e., according to principles). This capacity is the will. Since reason is required for the derivation of actions from laws, will is nothing less than practical reason (FMM, Ak. 412).

This leads to the nice dovetailing of practical reason (= the will) with Husserl's cogito. Noesis indicates that the cogito (= reason) is directed in its cogitationes to noemata and the will (= practical reason) is directed by duty to laws (when rational). This brings in the agreement theory of truth argued for in Chapter II which establishes objectivity. Kant writes: "Practical good is what determines the will by means of the conception of reason and hence not by subjective causes but objectively, on grounds which are valid for every rational being as such" (FMM, Ak. 413). Note that universal assent guarantees objectivity." This universal assent need not be actually given because it is a de jure assent. It is hypothetical in the sense of Rawls's (1971) social contract theory of justice. By hypothetical, I do not mean that the categorical imperative is hypothetical (far from it, Kant holds that it is "an apodictical practical principle" (FMM, Ak. 415)); rather, I mean that the theory of the categorical imperative, practical philosophy, is hypothetical.

This notion of Kant's, that there is intentional action, is brought to the fore in the following quote:

Since every practical law presents a possible action as good and thus as necessary for a subject practically determinable by reason, all imperatives are formulas of the determination of action which is necessary by the principle of a will which is in any way good (FMM, Ak. 414).

The actions that the categorical imperative prescribes are not given like the objects of the senses; rather, they must be made through the application of the categorical imperative. The following footnote from FMM makes this clear:
Teleology considers nature as a realm of ends; morals regards a possible realm of ends as a realm of nature. In the former the realm of ends is a theoretical Idea for the explanation of what actually is. In the latter it is a practical Idea for bringing about that which does not exist but which can become actual through our conduct and for making it conform with this Idea (Ak. 436).

Ethics has as its object that which should be (noema) by universal assent. We find a similar picture of intentionality in CPrR:

Practical principles are propositions which contain a general determination of the will, having under it several practical rules. They are subjective, or maxims, when the condition is regarded by the subject as valid only for his own will. They are objective, or practical laws, when the condition is recognized as objective, i.e., as valid for the will of every rational being (Ak. 18-19).

In other words, practical principles direct the will to its object, the same way that intentionality is directed by noesis to noema. When universal assent can be given to the practical principles they are objective.

Now, though I came to my conclusions with regard to Kant on my own, I am not the only person to propound a theory of intentional action. Karl-Otto Apel (1979) states the exact same thing as I do, except in the context of the natural sciences:

The same concept of *intentional action* that in Chapter III of [von Wright's] book serves as the presupposition for a theory of intentional understanding and teleological explanation is seen in Chapter II to form the presupposition for the concept of causal-nomological necessity; for here, the concept of *intentional action* is one of experimental action that can interfere with the course of nature (p. 84, my italics).

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The difference between Kant's account of intentional action and Apel's has to do with knowledge. Apel's account is used to explain just the possibility of determinism in science. According to Apel, by freely intentionally acting in the world, we arrive at the conclusion that the world is deterministic. As we saw in the previous Chapter, Kant had different reasons for believing in determinism (reasons derived from reflection on the nature of synthetic judgements a priori). Nevertheless, Kant does agree with this argument in a certain sense. For we distinguish ourselves from the world by noting that we are free while the world is determined. Thus we arrive at a type of (entirely synthetic a posteriori) knowledge of ourselves. Another similarity between Kant's and Apel's account of intentional action regards the possibility of interpreting actions in a moral light and thus the possibility of practical knowledge of the world: we could not interpret actions in the world as moral unless there is freedom. We will see later in Chapter IV, however that this second similarity is particularly limited in Kant, owing to his bifurcation between phenomena and noumena.

What does intentionality have to do with a meta-narrative? In the context of Kant's politics, Harry van der Linden (1988) notes that "The interesting suggestion here is that what appears as a flawed human nature is itself in large measure the product of faulty political structures" (p. 9). In terms that Apel (1979) summarizes as "human quasi-nature" (pp. 216-7), culture rules over nature, creating a single layer of culturenature. This meta-narrative is something that guides human culturenature: "He [Kant] also relates this political event, and the history of humanity in general, to the possibility of the moral society or the highest good" (van der Linden (1988), p. 12). Note that the meta-narrative infects inquiry into society as well, it infects our rational reconstruction of culturenature's history:

Practical reason views the world in both its natural and human aspects as a field
for the expression and realization of the highest good, and it holds, moreover, that our ultimate purpose and satisfaction are to be found in transformative activity directed towards this ideal (p. 13).

I would like to note briefly here that this is something like the self-fulfilling prophecy in Chomsky's "Pascal's wager," cited at the top of the present Chapter (I continue with this idea after the discussion of culture)nature which immediately follows). We can see what I have called intentional action in van der Linden's text on p. 22: "Kant's real meaning now becomes apparent, namely that in testing our maxims we are constructing a moral world" (my italics). Note that we are constructing a moral world, exactly as in mathematics one constructs by defining one's intuitions. In other words, the subject creates the object and the object creates the subject. That there is no nature independent of culture)nature is brought to the fore in the following quote from van der Linden:

Just as the moral society requires the transformation of institutions as well as of external nature, so the ideal of the human agent as a rational order (i.e., the reconciliation between virtue and the pursuit of happiness) requires the transformation of human nature (p. 27).

Van der Linden makes the same point again on p. 31: "But to strive for humanity as it ought to be also involves the demand to pursue the institutional preconditions for the development and exercise of these capacities" (original italics).

I would like now to address the self-fulfilling prophecy side of the meta-narrative. It is this that basically permits us to recognize ourselves in the meta-narrative, so we can avoid speaking of Hegel's transcendent, alien Geist (a constant threat when discussing meta-narratives). We see this in what inspires moral action: "Moral indignation inspires social action, and, ideally, such action is a cooperative activity, reflecting the moral society and the legislative self" (p. 55).
One is connected internally to society through one's character and, should one alter oneself, one alters society. The task is to make society human, in other words, reflective of oneself. We witness this again on p. 57:

Just as the virtuous person may derive moral pleasure from individual acts that accord with the moral law, so the commitment to change the world may be accompanied by moral enthusiasm, inspired by those historical events which intimate that humanity is taking a moral interest in the highest good or its immediate ends.

The meta-narrative is a self-fulfilling prophecy and nowhere is this more in evidence than in the rational reconstruction of society:

He [Kant] maintains, in effect, that the drama we have just watched displays only the surface of the history of humanity. Accordingly, on his account, the spectator must reconstruct the human tragedy so that its progressive aspect becomes visible, watch the reconstructed drama and encourage others to see it as well; then, inspired by it, he, and they, will attempt to steer the next act toward the moral society (p. 93).

This self-fulfilling prophecy aspect is seen again on p. 95: "Kant's thesis [of the progress of history] will stimulate social moral action...." The meta-narrative thus guides us and we guide the meta-narrative: "The conscious affirmation of free rationality, in other words, is an option which is itself the product of historical progress" (p. 103).

Deleuze (1963) points in the direction of the unity of subject and object with his idea of what Kant means by the term 'subject' in ethics: "the same beings are subjects and legislators, so that the legislator is here part of the nature over which he legislate" (p. 32). Deleuze also notes the self-fulfilling prophecy in Kant's ethics as follows:
a representation of an object can never determine the free will or precede the moral law; but by immediately determining the will, the moral law also determines objects as being in conformity with this free will.... More precisely, *when reason legislates in the faculty of desire, the faculty of desire itself legislates over objects* (p. 40, original italics).

The self-fulfilling prophecy indicated by this quote is in its claim that the moral law determines objects and is thus found in those very objects (they conform to the free will). The objects of morality are essentially and internally related to the moral law, just as the objects of knowledge are essentially and internally related to that knowledge, which we saw was Kant's philosophy of science in Chapter II. This indicates the unity of subject and object in ethics. (Note that when "*reason legislates ... desire,*" that is, when reason has desire as its object, desire in turn determines what reason gets, that is, desire determines the subject (reason).) As we have seen over and over again: the subject determines the object and the object (in this case, what desire provides reason with) determines the subject.

From here I would like to introduce the crucial notion of mediation. This is where we have three or more elements which interact as parts of a system. It will be most painless if I use István Mészáros ((1975), pp. 104-112) to introduce this Hegelian notion because he, more than anyone explains it clearly. In the work of Marx there are three elements which interact causally: humanity (H), labour, (L) and nature (N). These three react off of each other in the following fashion:

(2) H <=> L <=> N.

Nature affects humanity, because humanity is a part of nature. Nature affects labour by setting up the conditions of possibility of a given industry. Labour affects nature by altering it, producing either pollution or benefits for nature's inhabitants (including humans), usually both. Labour affects humanity by being its specific
mode of interacting with the world. Humanity affects nature by being a part of it. And humanity affects labour, as the various revolutions in agriculture and industry have shown.

What does this have to do with Kant? In Kant we have an analogous dialectic: the moral law (M), reason (R) and moral activity (A); these interact to produce the interlocked chain:

\[ M \leftrightarrow R \leftrightarrow A. \]

M (the moral law) affects R (reason) because it is R's end (see CPR, Ak. 121, for reason's unity). M affects A (moral action) by indicating which actions are appropriate. R affects M because it tells morality what the different possible motives it may take are (for instance, pleasure or duty). R affects A by making it possible (if there were no reason there would be no moral activity). A affects M by making a situation wherein M may be applied. A affects R by setting up dilemmas which it must solve.

This interpretation was suggested to me by reading Allison (1990). I will explain how this happened, but it would be most helpful if I quoted him first:

In the argument here attributed to Kant, however, the moral law is not so much a presupposition of experience as an ingredient given in it (in its typified form as the rule of judgment operative in our moral deliberation), with the inference being to the nature of this law as a product of pure practical reason. It is from this result, then that its validity, and with it that of the particular moral judgments or "laws" based upon it, is established, much as the empirical reality (as well as transcendental ideality) of space and time is inferred from their status as forms of human sensibility (p. 235).

This quote from Allison has the self-fulfilling prophecy of Chomsky's "Pascal's wager" (for what else could happen from interpreting the law as an "ingredient" in
experience?), but out of this comes the mediation between (practical) reason (which amounts to reason simpliciter) and morality, produced by moral action, interpreted in light of the moral law. The self-fulfilling prophecy produces the mediation, because the 'moral action, interpreted in light of the moral law,' hinges on the type of interpretation one gives, which in turn depends on the moral law. The M element is found in the form of interpretation offered by the "inference" one gives with regard to this "product of pure practical reason" (R). The moral law (M) is found as an "ingredient" in experience, so it follows that the A element, the element which conforms to action, is real too.

I say all this in order to cut off a criticism at the pass: namely, that since one goes from noesis (belief1, the interpretive, subject side of intentionality) to intension-extension (the categorical imperative) to noema (belief2, what the interpretation is about), the disagreement expressed in the intension-extension of the various formulations of the categorical imperative, the disagreement as to what the rules require of a noema relating to a noesis, excludes by definition my case that all versions of the categorical imperative amount to being the same thing. However, in order for me to fully express my case, I must first introduce the various formulations of the categorical imperative, and this is what I do in the next Chapter.
CHAPTER IV

The unity of the formulations of the categorical imperative

For laws as such are all equivalent, regardless of whence they derive their grounds.

—Immanuel Kant

In this final Chapter I argue that all the different, apparently conflicting, versions of the categorical imperative that Kant offers in the *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785), henceforth FMM, and the *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788), henceforth CPrR, can be interpreted to be the same one at a certain level of abstraction because they all have the same effects in the world (more precisely: they have the same effects in both worlds—phenomenal and noumenal). What we will see, using the cluster of ideas developed in Chapter III (B), is that, with regard to ethics, Kant is an instrumentalist in a peculiar sense. I distinguish this from the instrumentalism of Jamesian pragmatism (that is, Dewey's) because Kant would have spent little time praising Mill (as does James in the dedication of his (1943) text on p. 11) and would have shown how futile all utilitarianisms are, as he does throughout his ethical works. Typically an instrumentalist will keep a theory around so long as it leads to what makes him or her happy, in whatever sense of 'happy' they happen to be using at that moment. For instance, theoretical happiness means a theory by which observables are deduced from unobservables but the unobservables predicted by the theory, the things on which the observables are premised, are regarded as of no real (as opposed to logical) consequence. Ethical happiness is something else—one must 'believe' (quotes because the consistent instrumentalist, such as Quine, doesn't believe in beliefs, whatever that's
supposed to mean) a code of conduct that pleases oneself, even if it isn't in the universal interest, that is, one's own interest. After all, the quickest way to happiness in any hierarchical society is that variety of intellectual prostitution known as mandarinism. What is common to both instrumentalist varieties of happiness is that they come from the concrete: in the first example, from concrete observables; in the second, from concrete emotions. The instrumentalism of Kant, on the other hand, requires the intentional action we have seen and a noumenal world which offers room for freedom and will have nothing to do with 'happiness' (on the contrary, the emphasis is on worthiness to be happy, something quite different).

To show the unity of the formulations of the categorical imperative, besides FMM and CPrR, and the concepts I have discovered in them, I will employ a text by Acton (1970), which, while being flawed, offers in skeletal form the same argument I do. I will also offer polemics against Harman's (1977) text, which tries to show a gap between the first formulation of the categorical imperative and rationality. Resort in these polemics will be made briefly to Allison (1990).

Concluding this Chapter, I will present Werkmeister's (1980) interpretation of Kant's three formulations of the categorical imperative, which also argues that there is no difference between them, but differs in certain fundamental respects from mine. Accordingly, I will argue against it.

Kant offers three formulations of the categorical imperative in FMM and two in CPrR. Those of the former are:

(i) "Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law" (Ak. 421);

(ii) "Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of
another, always as an end and never as means only" (Ak. 429);

(iii) "every rational being must be able to regard himself as an end in himself with
reference to all laws to which he may be subject whatever they may be, and thus
see himself as giving universal laws" (Ak. 438).

Those of the latter are:

(iv) "So act that the maxim of your will could always hold at the same time as a
principle establishing universal law" (Ak. 30);

(v) "in the order of ends, man (and every rational being) is an end-in-himself, i.e.,
he is never to be used merely as a means for someone (even for God) without at
the same time being himself an end..." (Ak. 131).

Kant is of the opinion that they all have the same effects in the world, as his many
casuistical examples provided in The Metaphysics of Morals show. This leads to a
type of anti-realism, familiar from instrumentalists and positivists, where the same
effects are regarded to have the same causes.

In order to see the point I am driving at, we will have to go to CPrR and see
what Kant was up to at various places. We've already seen that Kant believes in
intentional action, that is, reason's forming power in the world. We proceed from
belief₁ (or noesis) to rule (the categorical imperative) to belief₂ (noema). Strictly
speaking, ethics does not deal in beliefs, but rather desires. Desires are by
definition not about how the world is, but how one wants it to be. Because Kant
wishes to deal solely in ethical desires, his desires are about how the world ought to
be. Thus in ethics we are led from the noesis or desire₁ (noetic pole) through its
intension-extension to desire₂. I will refer to this relation of desires as noemoughta,
because they define the world, not as it is, but as it ought to be. This is another
phenomenological theorem:

(4) noesis => {intension-extension} => noemoughta.
Evidence that Kant believes in noemoughta, or the world as it ought to be, can be found early in CPrR:

However, a thorough analysis of the practical use of reason makes it clear that the reality thought of here implies no theoretical determination of the categories and no extension of our knowledge to the supersensible. One then perceives that all that is meant in attributing reality to those concepts is that an object is attributable to them either in so far as they are contained in the necessary determination of the will a priori or because they are indissolubly connected with the object of this determination (Ak. 5).

The first sentence is saying that there is no science of freedom because one will search the laboratory in vain for what we call responsibility. This is because the categories which could organize a series of intuitions require the sensible upon which to work and Kant denies the sensible any role in ethics. The second sentence points to two different reasons for what the categorical imperative simultaneously makes possible and is made possible by: either the will requires the objects of practical knowledge for its consistency or because what the will wants requires also the objects of practical knowledge (these are God, freedom and immortality). This is instrumentalist in a particular way: our knowledge of what we sense is not increased one iota by believing in these things, but we need them around anyhow. Note that this has nothing to do with 'happiness.' Rather the question is one of believing in things that are unperceivable out of coherency and drawing a theory out to its fullest expression.

This is something of a clue to the rational character of ethics, that is, that ethics is in the domain of reason, because it is exactly this type of theory-driven instrumentalism that made Kant regard God, freedom and immortality as necessary but inexplicable heuristic fictions of science in the first Critique. However, we have
seen that in ethics positive knowledge of God, freedom and immortality are required. For example, we have positive knowledge of God, because we (practically) know that He will reward us according to how worthy of happiness we are. We also have positive knowledge of freedom through the moral law, which requires that we act according to duty. And we have positive knowledge of immortality because it is 'where' we strive to improve ourselves. I will return to this rational character of the postulates of ethics, immediately after the slight digression which follows in the next paragraph, with the notion that reason's objects are always things in themselves, that is, reason has as its motive and end the noumenal world.

Digressing slightly, as evidence of what I have called the phenomenological theorem (4) I will quote the following: "...I want to know whether this maxim can hold as a universal practical law. I apply it, therefore, to the present case and ask if it could take the form of a law.... I immediately realize that taking such a principle as a law would annihilate itself..." (CPrR, Ak. 28). Note one begins with a desire (what Kant calls a maxim), finds out if the categorical imperative accepts it (applies rules to it or puts form to it) and acts accordingly (either does or does not behave with the maxim guiding action). Another example of theorem (4) is found in CPrR on Ak. 35:

Therefore not the object, i.e., the happiness of others, was the determining ground of the pure will but rather it was the lawful form alone. Through it I restricted my maxim, founded on inclination, by giving it the universality of a law, thus making it conformable to the pure practical reason.

Again one starts with a maxim, not the effects of a maxim (happiness of others in this case), gives shape to it with the categorical imperative and then ascribes the result to (pure practical) reason.
To begin to return from my slight digression: the thing to note is the place of reason in Kant's architectonic over all. Reason is directed to things in themselves, always seeking out what can never be experienced in science and ethics. There are three types of things in themselves according to Kant, corresponding to the three levels found in all four classes of the understanding's categories:* God, freedom and immortality. In science all claims to positive knowledge of these were found to be spurious. Things are different in ethics. To begin with, ethics requires freedom, because, if there were no freedom, all people would turn out to be automatons, essentially, and there would be no moral law. Since there is a moral law, there must be freedom. Ethics also requires God and immortality because the goal of life is to be worthy of happiness, rather than to actually be happy, so there has to be an afterlife, wherein one continues to perfect oneself as best as one can and God is the hoped for judge of the level of happiness. It is important to note that these are, as far as science is concerned, hopes and not the types of things which are capable of synthesis by the understanding. Thus they are unfalsifiable.

As I was saying, reason is directed to things in themselves. In fact, owing to the mediation argued for in Chapter III (B), a case can be made here that the objects of reason's practical activity arrive at the same time as the subject of reason's practical activity. For if reason affects moral activity, moral activity affects morality and morality affects reason, one is going to soon find that the goals one thinks of performing actually arrive as soon as one has gotten clear what it is one can desire. For instance, the object of a maxim is either permitted or proscribed. If permitted, one acts to reach the object. One soon finds that one actually has the object in the sense that it is indirectly affecting oneself (exactly in the same sense that those that believe in ghosts are affected by them, regardless of whether or not they realize that "ghost" selects the null set). For example, say one wishes to create a work of
art and the moral law permits this (in some circumstances it may not be permitted; for example, if a person is drowning nearby). In the making of the work of art one makes the object and is either satisfied or dissatisfied with its execution. The object also makes oneself because it is the expression of what one desires, even as it is in the process of execution. If the moral law proscribes a desire, one acts accordingly and produces another maxim (which passes the moral law). Thus the object produces that specific subject. The subject arrives at the same time as the object of the categorical imperative here because the object was a proscription, an avoidance, and obviously the subject obeying this (in following another maxim) produces that object.

Kant says as much in CPrR: "The mere form of a law, which limits its material, must be a condition for adding this material to the will but not presuppose it as a condition of the will" (Ak. 35). The form of the categorical imperative provides the "material" that one gets from the will, not the other way around. The matter of the will does not itself provide for the results of willing. Two things are going on here: (1) more obviously, duty is to be the only interest we are to take in willing; (2) less obviously, duty conditions nature (called here "material"). This is precisely the instrumentalism I am ascribing to Kant. What Kant is saying is that our activities, when guided by duty, need not worry about sensible results in intuition, firstly, because these results have always already occurred in the subject, secondly, because the subject is its object. What exactly does that mean? Firstly, by the results of morality always already having occurred in the subject, I mean that the subject has its motive in its object, so, secondly, the subject, by acting morally, cannot be distinguished from its object (for plainly those that believe in ghosts are not affected in any empirical sense by ghosts). Where this differs from the bare intentionality of beliefs is that one is acting in the world with this intentionality.
That is, there are results in nature, which are visible to the naked eye, from the categorical imperative. It should be noted that one doesn’t know this in any theoretical sense. For, according to science, there is only one type of explanation: that of a series of efficient causes over time. Thus, according to science, when one saves a drowning child, one merely acts according to neurons firing. However, since one also has the other foot in the noumenal world, one can also describe it in other ways, such as out of duty, out of fear for the wrath of God or the desire to be a hero. The level of intentional action only arises at the level of self-conscious creatures. To summarize: what I call Kant’s ethical instrumentalism says that the objects of the subject are unimportant because (1) the subject is its object and the object is its subject and (2) the objects are always already realized for the subject. (2) happens because of intentional action, wherein real effects of real action result in a lack of a distinction between subject and object. I call this instrumentalist because (1) and (2) occur according to the instrumentalist principle that if two apparently distinct meanings refer to the same entities with no contextual indexes to them, then they are actually identical. Here the identity is the subject and the object. However, this ethical instrumentalism is, in a certain sense, the exact opposite of scientific instrumentalism, as we shall see shortly. We must draw a distinction between scientific and ethical instrumentalism for the following reason: if ethical noesis were merely directed to noema (the world as it is), instead of noemoughta (the world as it ought to be), there would be no room for interpretation as to why an individual did what he or she actually did (the difference between the scientific approach and the ethical—I am not claiming that there is room for interpretation of the categorical imperative). For still more evidence of Kant’s variety of instrumentalism, we find him endorsing my interpretation of maxims being directed to noemoughta in what follows:

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practical reason is concerned not with objects in order to know them but with its own capacity to make them real (according to knowledge of them), i.e., it has to do with a will which is a causal agent so far as reason contains its determining ground (CPrR, Ak. 90).

Here we can see that Kant is talking, not about the world as it is, but rather as it ought to be, one in which "reason contains [the will's] determining ground." This is another difference between the first Critique and the second. For in the first, one proceeds from intuitions (or qualia of sensibility) to concepts (or rules of understanding) to ideas (or heuristic fictions of reason). In the second, rather, one proceeds from maxims (what amounts to the qualia of all faculties combined) to imperatives (rules of understanding) to things in themselves (the objects of reason, namely, acting freely in a kingdom of ends). What this means is that the principle of instrumentalism (according to which one is obliged to identify all meanings, by which I mean beliefs and desires, which refer to the same things, by which I mean qualia) is actually used against scientific instrumentalism in the field of ethics. For scientific instrumentalism does not care if the unobservables it prescribes actually exist. For example, if two theories of the motions of the planets make identical predictions, then, for the instrumentalist, the two theories are indistinguishable, even if one is Newtonian and the other Leibnizian. The ethical instrumentalism I ascribe to Kant follows from instrumentalism's main principle, but in such a way that one must be a realist about unobservables and regard all observables as irrelevant for determining the meaning of distinct theories (precisely the opposite of scientific instrumentalism's announced aim of discounting unobservables in favour of observables). For in ethics one deals with things in themselves (unobservables), not appearances (observables). The thing in itself most apparent (philosophically speaking) is freedom, which is never observed. Through this
freedom, we saw that we are affected by what we desire: in striving to act according to our maxims, we alter the world and the world alters us; we alter the world by acting in it; the world alters us by making it possible to interpret our actions as freely chosen; because our actions are free, in striving for something, we always get what we want (on a moral level). As an example of this latter claim, all we have to do is consider the example of dissidents in police states. Whether or not the dissidents actually succeed in altering their state, they have succeeded in siding with the moral law and, as far as morality is concerned, this is all that matters. Because one always gets what one wants (in the specifically moral sense I have outlined), there is an identification of subject and object. I call this identification instrumentalist because the subject is its object and the object is the subject, making any distinction between them in morality irrelevant. It is a specifically ethical instrumentalism, however, because the identification of subject and object occurs at the level of unobservables.

It is this type of instrumentalism that permits Kant to say that God and angels, rational agents in the strict sense, follow the moral law without the categorical imperative—they conform to it, but don't obey it consciously. Finite agents, such as humans, have to deliberate over the moral law using the categorical imperative, while rational agents necessarily obey the moral law no matter what they do. The moral law is the entirety of judgements which have passed the categorical imperative. Because rational agents always obey the moral law, they also conform to the categorical imperative. The effects of rational agents (in the noumenal world) are always the same, so the cause is always the same for both finite and rational agents, according to the ethical instrumentalism I've ascribed to Kant. Since they don't intentionally follow the categorical imperative (in the phenomenological sense), any ascription of the categorical imperative to them is
illegitimate. But because their actions conform to the moral law, this latter can be ascribed to them, even if they don't produce the actions with the same means (the categorical imperative) as finite agents. 9

I claimed earlier that the Hegelian mediation between the moral law (M), reason (R) and moral action (A) was crucial to my case. We can see precisely how important it is by offering an obvious counterargument to my position: the moral law that I ascribe to Kant occurs at the level of intension-extension or rules; thus there is a significant difference between the three formulations of the categorical imperative, namely, their conflicting intension-extensions; in other words the form of morality differs in the three formulations; so, regardless of what I ascribe to Kant as far as desires or noemoughta go, the differences between the three formulations are fundamental. However, before one gets too panicked, one would do well to remember that, according to my interpretation intentional activity is moral, it is activity which reflects the moral law. That is, in A's heart of hearts, there is the categorical imperative. For the categorical imperative guides A and from this are derived noemoughta (the various objects of the good will). However, equally to be underscored is the fact that A is guided in its heart by R too. This is owing to the nature of R which supplies the motive for A. From here it is not a long step to noticing that M creeps into R and A: into the former because it is R's goal in life (Kant explicitly makes the claim that the moral law is the goal of all life in the universe in the third Critique, Ak. 445); into the latter because without M, there simply would be no A, rather all there would be is bare action, not moral action. Finally, we note that R is in both M and A, just as we would be led to believe, should we have learned from our experience of the overlap of the two previous examples (M and A). On the one hand, without R, all there would be is, as far as M is concerned, nothing in the world. (There would be form without matter,
that is nothing but analytic judgments, none of which can be said to refer to anything, including themselves. Recall that only synthetic judgements a priori refer to themselves.) On the other hand, should R have nothing to do with A, it is difficult to see why there are ethical dilemmas, for ethical dilemmas require at least two distinct strategies of action for their resolution and one resorts to R to see exactly how to resolve them.

We've seen all of this before in Chapter III (B) with Hegel's notion, appropriated by Marx and explained by Mészáros (1975), of mediation. What it teaches us here, with regard to the intension-extension of the various formulations of the categorical imperative, is that the categorical imperative is more than a mere rule. This should have been obvious from the start because the categorical imperative is a synthetic judgement a priori, as noted earlier. The characteristic of all synthetic judgements is that they are not reducible to, and go beyond, the relation between intension-extension, an analytic relation, to touch noemata (being) owing to the surplus of intentionality which permits a given synthetic judgement to assert something about experience. It is rather clearcut as to how synthetic judgements a posteriori manage to touch a given noema. They assert something about experience because they can be falsified. Synthetic judgements a priori are judgements which assert something about experience and are unfalsifiable. The task of the Transcendental Analytic in the first Critique was to explain how synthetic judgements a priori could be about experience but also be unfalsifiable. The answer there was that they remain unfalsifiable because they are assumptions, but rather than being illicit assumptions, they are required in the interests of science. As was displayed in Chapter II, science both implies, and is implied by, the synthetic judgements a priori of the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Analytic. The interests of science rule in the assumptions of the Doctrine of
Elements which are applicable to experience. Similarly, Kant's answer to why the categorical imperative is synthetic a priori is that the interests of morality rule it in. This can be interpreted to mean that, in a sense which will be specified: there never was a time when the categorical imperative's effects weren't noted.

And what this means for those who would claim that the formulations Kant gives of his categorical imperative differ in intension-extension from each other, and so cannot be regarded as the same, is that de facto and de jure they are the same. (De facto because they each have the same effects. De jure because they are synthetic a priori and thus free from being falsified.) The mediation of ethical reality entails that, since we have a circle of mutual influence (recall the formulation M <=> R <=> A), the moral law, reason and moral action all arrive at the same time. This is what I meant by my (otherwise so easily falsified) claim that there has been no time when the effects of the categorical imperative were never noted. (The claim is easily falsified because it does nothing to point to the reality of the development of the child from an amoral, selfish beast to a dignified person.) This does not follow merely from the lack of a distinction between subject and object which I've made familiar with regard to the results of synthetic judgements a priori. Rather, it requires further the creation of self-fulfilling prophecies and the interpretations that these spawn when guided by the moral law, which is where van der Linden (1988) comes in. Self-fulfilling prophecies and their interpretations follow simply from noemoughta. To see this, I provide the following thought experiment: Take a subject that acts according to the moral law. Thus he or she acts in favour of, not what is, but what should be (and this is noemoughta). By acting according to the moral law he or she ascribes to their past self the belief that the moral law can actually work, that is, regardless of the empirical effects, he or she witnessed the moral law in action, he or she witnessed the world as it should be,
and this is all that is needed to start the idea of moral progress. For if one person finds that they can do it, they will try to persuade others of its likelihood, not out of any search for happiness, but rather out of duty, in order to improve the world, as they are restricted by the moral law to do.

To summarize: The mutually presupposed subject and object of ethics is made possible by self-fulfilling prophecies, which result from intentional action that is itself modeled on the bare intentionality of synthetic judgements a priori. Self fulfilling prophecies in their turn produce mediation, because mediation is the result of discovering oneself in the moral law and the moral law in oneself. Mediation proves beyond a shadow of a doubt that something can have different intension-extensions, all the while really being the same formula two or three times over. This is for the following reason: when carefully examined, the moral law turns out to be determined by the two things it determines itself (in a different sense from mechanistic determinism), namely, reason and moral action. There is agreement between both my exposition of synthetic judgements a priori and my exposition of mediation, namely, that there is no subject-object distinction to be drawn, but the latter is peculiarly ethical since it derives from intentional action. The argument is that the moral law is both the effect and cause of itself. The argument for the lack of distinction between subject and object, owing to the nature of synthetic judgements a priori, is required for ethics because it shows what the moral law presupposes. Mediation shows how the moral law acts, that is, it shows the results of the moral law. Taken together they reveal how to show that there is no conflict between the three different formulations of the categorical imperative.

I promised that I was going to show that all three formulations of the categorical imperative in FMM and CPrR amount to the same thing owing to what I've called Kant's instrumentalism. I will wade into this topic with the sketch
offered by H. B. Acton (1970) and then fill in the details and attempt to prevent any misinterpretations which may arise. Acton states his case as follows: Kant, under what I have called the first formulation and what Acton calls the Principle of Universal Law, insists that the individual should do only what all other people could will to do. From here Acton ascribes to Kant the idea that, in making one's choices, one ought to consider the scope of others' choices. (This is a utilitarian assumption and it will be duly jettisoned by me.) Thus all people who are affected by an action are in one's domain of concern. (This, however, is true.) Following from the distinction between things and persons, one finds that people are ends in themselves and have infinite value. The Principle of Universal Law accepts this by considering each of those affected by an action as people, that is, as ends in themselves. The first and second formulations are interchangeable. Q.E.D. This, surprisingly enough, is true as far as it goes. What Acton is saying is that, while, at the level of intension-extension, they are different, they still have the same effects in reality, thus they are one and the same principle expressed in so many different ways. The questionable aspect of Acton's rational reconstruction is his ascription to Kant of the belief that, in making choices, we ought to regard others' potential choices as limiting our own. In parentheses I claimed that this was utilitarian. It is utilitarian in precisely the sense that one must be perpetually calculating the effects of one's actions on others in order to act. On the contrary, one must absolutely not consider others' choices, much less calculate them (which can only be done on the assumption of mechanism), but, must deliberate on, what responsibilities one has towards others, given the situation one finds oneself in (so long as one regards oneself as an end in itself, that is, has self-respect). And this for two reasons: (1) the agent is not the people he or she affects and thus has different belief and desires (qualia are not communicable between people); (2) the agent is
not responsible for others’ choices freely taken, only his or her own.

It may not be obvious but all of the preceding on mutually presupposing subjects and objects, phenomenological theorems, self-fulfilling prophecies, mediation and ethical instrumentalism were necessary to bring out the idea that, regardless of differences in intension-extension, the various formulations of the categorical imperative were the same. For instance, the lack of a subject-object distinction and the phenomenological theorem were keys to unlocking the secrets of intentional action. For we saw that, just as belief (noesis) is led to knowledge (noema or the world as it is), desire is led to noemoughta (the world as it ought to be), owing to the noumenal moral law. The self-fulfilling prophecy was required to introduce mediation, because the self-fulfilling prophecy is the result of the experience of noemoughta. Self-fulfilling prophecies resulted in the mediation between the three ethical elements: the moral law, reason and moral action. Mediation was necessary to show how morality, moral action and reason interlocked and played off of each other in order to effect the lack of a subject-object distinction. And this last step produced Kant's ethical instrumentalism, wherein the subject is its object are indistinguishable and the object desired or not desired is irrelevant because it has always already arrived or not arrived, as the case may be.

Acton's analysis will be over all English-speaking philosophers' heads for the simple reason that they think intentionality is propositional. This single assumption has caused so much damage to the English-speakers that only a mass die-off of the current generation of Anglo-American philosophers could set things right again. I have already refuted the reduction of intentionality to intension-extension in Chapter III (B) and will do it here again with a similar argument, if it pleases the reader. Say one thinks to oneself "dog" and then says 'dog' all the while pointing to
an instance of a *cat*. Does it follow that the meaning of 'dog' was not, as one thought, "dog," but rather "cat"? If it does not, then some pretty fancy bells and whistles are going to have to be added to the intension-extension theory of meaning. If it does, then the theory has abandoned what most people actually do and think.\(^4\)

Returning to Acton and the background he presupposes, we can see the background’s relevance to showing how, in ethics, the same effect has the same cause, understood as a principle of action. This results in what I have called Kant’s ethical instrumentalism. It is only by analyzing the nature of synthetic judgements a priori and finding intentional action in order to produce mediation, through self-fulfilling prophecies, that Kant’s ethical instrumentalism will make sense.

One thing that should be made clear is that Kant does not believe that the phenomenal and noumenal worlds can be said to interact. (I realize that it is conventional practice to distinguish between phenomenal and noumenal aspects rather than worlds. However, for clarity’s sake I have opted for the word 'worlds' in order to emphasise the radical discontinuity between phenomena and noumena.) Rather, what goes on is that we offer distinct, incommensurable but compatible interpretations of the world. As evidence of this I provide the following: "The law of this autonomy is the moral law, and it, therefore, is the fundamental law of supersensuous nature and of a pure world of the understanding, whose counterpart must exist in the world of sense without interfering with the laws of the latter" (Ak. 43). Note that the moral law does not interfere with the laws of "the world of sense" (more accurately: the moral law does not interfere with the world of sensibility united with that of understanding because intuitions without concepts are blind and concepts without intuition are empty). Kant’s freedom, like all freedoms that aren’t indeterminate, that is, a freedom for which one is held responsible, is rule-bound. What the rules bind is the type of interpretation we can make of a
given event involving agents. Thus it is a category error to believe that the
metaphysical, noumenal, supersensuous categorical imperative can affect physical,
phenomenal, sensible appearances.

And it is at the level of a category error that we find Gilbert Harman's (1977)
objection to the categorical imperative. After offering his interpretation of Kant's
ethics (an interpretation which argues erroneously that the categorical imperative is
"like the Golden Rule" (p. 73); Kant distinguishes his ethics from the Golden Rule
in FMM in a note on Ak. 430), Harman presents the following objection to the first
formulation of the categorical imperative:

Kant's argument depends on an ambiguity concerning what is involved in
accepting a principle. Suppose your ultimate principle is to maximize your own
happiness. Then you must think that this principle is a rational one.... There is
therefore a sense in which you must accept everyone's acting on your basic
principle; for you must agree that it is rational for them to do so. But it does
not follow that you must accept this in the sense that you have to want everyone
to act on that principle (p. 76).

The problem with this is that we will the moral law into existence, that is, we take
an interest in it. Which is to say that interests define the moral law. Kant writes:
"The dependence of a contingently determinable will on principles of reason,
however, is called interest. An interest is present only in a will which is not of itself
always in accord with reason..." (FMM, Ak. 413). Since we have an interest in the
moral law, we have to want what we will, not just act according to whatever maxim
we may have lately got into our heads.

Allison (1990) offers an interpretation similar to mine. He writes: "Kant's
position is rather that freedom is actual, or better, actualized, in the interest that we
take in the moral law" (p. 248). By taking an interest in the moral law we display
our freedom. Thus we must want what we will because we take an interest in what we will. This goes hand in hand with the 'rich' picture of reason that Kant has, according to which we are free to the extent that we are rational and rational to the extent that we are free. This entails that we cannot take an interest in just any maxim, as Harman seems to imply with his maxim of maximizing utility. Rather we can only have interests in maxims that are rational and free at the same time. This explains the conflict that Harman's maxim has with the second and third formulations of the categorical imperative, although it does not appeal to them, namely, that by emphasizing happiness, as he does, he is treating himself as a mere means and not as an end and thus vitiates the kingdom of ends.

Given all that we now know about Kant's ethics, can we legitimately claim that we should accept a morality for ourselves, but not others? For it is this threat, not merely utilitarianism, that Harman is forcing Kant's philosophy to encounter. Let's start at the beginning with intentional action. In the case speculated by Harman, though others presumably can be found, we start with the desire: maximize utility for oneself, but not others. From there we apply the moral rule: do not will utility for others, but rather, merely for oneself. This entails the noemoughta: the sole responsibility one has is to oneself. This creates the self-fulfilling prophecy: the moral world one lives in can be seen by oneself only. This in turn creates the mediation between the moral law (M), reason (R) and moral action (A): M limits R to being motivated into an A that denies M to others. Because one denies M to others, one cannot claim to have their interests in mind when arguing with them. Thus one lies to them in order to get them to do what one wants, because others simply will not do what is asked of them should their interests be denied. Furthermore, because one denies the interests of the other, one finds the other expendable and may as well kill them should they ever prove less than useful. Thus
one has become a liar and a murderer, all because of not wanting to will as a
universal law one's moral principle. I am not making this type of system up. It can
be mapped quite easily onto Chomsky's (1992) political analysis, though I will
spare the reader such an exegesis. The philosophy that states that one should do as
one wishes and ignore others can be put in a single word: hypocrisy.

It seems to me that the rationality of Harman is similar to what Habermas,
following Weber, has called rationalization, not rationality. This, in a nutshell, is
Harman's category mistake.

Like the interpretation offered here, W. H. Werkmeister (1980) also argues that
"there is in effect only one categorical imperative" (p. 136). Where we differ in
our interpretations is with regard to why they are one. Werkmeister argues that the
first formulation refers to the form of the categorical imperative, while the second
refers to its content and the third refers to the harmony of all maxims which
conform to it. His argument, which I have just summarized, I quote as follows, in
order not to be charged with making a straw man out of his position:

It [the categorical imperative] demands, objectively, that all maxims which are
to become laws of the intelligible world be universal in form.... It demands,
subjectively that the maxims have as their material content the rational being as
divine end-in-itself. And it demands, as a combination of the first two demands, the

\textit{harmony of the maxims} of action among themselves... (p. 137, original italics).

Werkmeister goes on to claim that "the three formulations of the categorical
imperative are but progressive definitions of a 'perfectly good' or 'holy' will" (p.
138). Which is to say that they are about (or are "definitions of") God, angels or
other purely theological wills. (Kant states that the divine will is a subset of wills
which are holy in FMM on Ak. 414.) This last claim misinterprets what Kant
means by a will which is perfectly good in relation to moral laws. For a perfectly
good will is not "constrained by them [moral laws] to act in accord with them" (FMM, Ak. 414). Humans, as finite agents, can only be capable of being in conformity with what amounts to a bare good will, that is, a good will which is not a perfectly good will. Kant claims as much in his argument that from the "concept of an absolutely good will" we can by no means derive "by analysis" the universal law which summarizes the maxim of its action (FMM, Ak. 447).

With regard to Werkmeister's argument about the three formulations of the categorical imperative being the same owing to their form, their matter and their harmony of maxims, Kant does explicitly endorse this on Ak. 436 of FMM. But there is more to the picture than what Kant (and, following him, Werkmeister) presents. I say this because Kant applies the first two formulations of the categorical imperative to the same examples. Which suggests that they are identical with regard to both form (they have the same results) and matter (they are applicable to all the same things). For example, in FMM the cases of suicide, the making of deceitful promises, the cultivation of one's talents and altruism are taken up on Ak. 422-4, with regard to the first formulation, and are taken up again on Ak. 429-30, with regard to the second formulation. The third formulation of the categorical imperative enters only in so far as it is a combination of the first two. (Which probably explains why it is never mentioned in CPrR.) Being just a combination of the previous two formulations, whatever is true of them is true of it too. My argument against Werkmeister amounts to an argument about the nature of the judgements of ethics, namely, their status as synthetic a priori. Because they are synthetic a priori (and Kant claims they are in FMM on Ak. 420), subject and object arrive at the same time, in the same sense and in the same way, as I have been arguing throughout this thesis.
CONCLUSION

So we have seen finally how the categorical imperative works as part of Kant's greater system of synthetic judgements a priori. In Chapter I it was argued that Kant was an anti-realist (or instrumentalist) in mathematics, because in it the subject simply is its object and the object is the subject. In Chapter II we saw that Kant was a realist in natural science because what is perceived requires agreement and a common form of sense, and the only way to explain this was if the subject affected the object and the object affected the subject (owing to the arguments found in the Transcendental Analytic and summarized in Chapter II (C)). Finally, in ethics we found that Kant was an anti-realist in a specific sense. In Chapter III the stage was set for this instrumentalism by means of the unification of subject and object from intentional action, which was itself modeled on the bare intentionality of synthetic judgements a priori. Chapter IV fully explained the nature of Kant's ethical instrumentalism by the mediation which results from intentional action: the subject is internally related to its object and the object is internally related to its subject and this entails that, regardless of whether or not the object is intuited (that is, whether or not the object of an ethical demand becomes a phenomenon), the objects prescribed by the moral law are always realized. It was important to produce this ethical instrumentalism in order to show that like effects (obeying the moral law) have like causes (the categorical imperative).
Notes

Introduction

1. Fichte (1797), p. 32.

2. What I mean by 'instrumentalist' in this context will be first introduced in Chapter III and fully elucidated in Chapter IV, pp. 57-65 and nn. 36-9.

3. I can claim that aspects are synthetic a priori because, on Werkmeister's interpretation, which I follow, characters in a novel are synthetic constructions a priori. How this relates to aspects is that characters in novels very frequently affect how we interpret with the world. For instance, if someone is excessively frugal, we call them a Scrooge, after the Dickens character. In other words, we are seeing the excessively frugal person under the aspect of Dickens's Scrooge. Since characters in novels are constructed, it follows that they are like mathematical objects. If this note doesn't really make sense right now, it should after reading the first Chapter.

Chapter I


5. I have neatly skipped over something that requires further elaboration: philosophy's relation to logic. Philosophy's relation to logic is that philosophy is a type of logic, though not one familiar to analytic philosophers. Philosophy is transcendental logic. What analytic philosophers call logic is called by Kant general logic. Transcendental logic differs from general logic by being applicable to experience, that is, synthetic judgements a priori. General logic applies only to analytic judgements and their interrelations. Transcendental logic is, nonetheless, entirely analytic and thus a logic too. We will see why this
is so in the paragraphs which immediately follow. (See n. 18 for more on how transcendental logic is still analytic.)

6. It should be noted that, with regard to mathematics, Kant can admit geometries with more than the three spatio-perceptual ones because these too are constructed, thus just as synthetic, as any other mathematical concepts. If mathematics were simply synthetic because it could be applied to reality, there would be no difference between a Kantian and a Hilbertian formalist.* (See Körner (1960) for an introduction to formalism in mathematics.) Formalists think that mathematical judgements are abstractions derived from intuitions, that is, they are synthetic judgements a posteriori. If mathematics were synthetic only because it applies to reality, it would be a posteriori. I say this because the judgements of mathematics would then be entirely derivative upon, and not forming of, empirical intuitions. But mathematics is not derived from empirical intuitions because it tells us about pure intuitions, that is, intuitions which are not found in nature, because they cannot be falsified. What got the formalists to assume that mathematics is a posteriori was the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries, from which the moral was drawn that it is possible to falsify Kant's claim that we have pure intuitions. But this is mistaken because any alternative geometries would have to be constructed and their theorems therefore provide the form of pure intuition for their particular set of possible experience, however much Kant's claim that reality is necessarily Euclidean has proven false.

* That Kant did not intend his constructions to necessarily coincide with undetermined objects of experience (intuitions, in the popular sense) has been amply demonstrated by Friedman (1992), who takes this hypothesis as far as it can go, only to end up ascribing Skölem functions to Kant, functions of which
7. Mathematical concepts can be constructed with the help of something like mnemonics (or simple ideas summarizing complex ones). For instance in adding 555 to 777, we resort to neither our fingers nor to points, but rather assume the two numbers in order to make the construction that is their combination, 1332. The assumption of these numbers is something like a mnemonic because they are summaries of potential constructions. Because they are treated as knowable, potential constructions, neither 555 nor 777 need to be actually added up individually using fingers or points. This much is also evident: with the advent of the infinitesimal calculus, individual numbers are themselves potential constructions.

8. It should be noted that current work (as of 1991) in mathematics confirms this idea of Kant's. James A. McGilvray, in his text, argues that the statement that 5 + 7 = 12 refers to itself (cf., pp. 238-9). Of course he goes wrong in writing that this agrees with Platonist assumptions (Why, since, as he admits, they don't refer to anything in any transcendent world?) and formalist assumptions (Why, since the referring is entirely a priori?).

9. Heidegger's (1973) interpretation of Kant on imagination tries to show that imagination is "the common root" (p. 24) of both pure intuitions and the pure concepts of the understanding. "In this triad [of pure intuitions, pure concepts and imagination], the pure synthesis of the power of imagination holds the central position" (p. 43). The greater part of what Heidegger has to say about Kant is in agreement with my interpretation. Of particular interest for the task I've set for myself in this thesis is Heidegger's claim that "The knowing of Being, however, is the unity of pure intuition and thinking. Hence, for the essence of the categories it is precisely the pure intuitability of the notions that
becomes decisive" (p. 44). According to these two sentences, what is "decisive" for "the essence of the categories" is that they are made possible by "the unity of pure intuition and pure thinking," that is, subject and object are internally related.

Where Heidegger and I part company is with regard to the following points: Heidegger claims that divine intellectual intuition makes possible human sensible intuitions (see pp. 25, second paragraph of § 7, and 28, the first paragraph of B). This is a muddle because then we have, not merely negative knowledge, that is, no knowledge, of things in themselves, but genuinely positive knowledge of (one of) them (God). Heidegger refuses to grant any value to mathematical natural science. For instance, in his discussion of pure intuitions, he does not once mention any branch of mathematics which might show how in them subject and object are indistinguishable. Meanwhile, in his description of experience in general, he seems to think that Kant subscribes to the pragamtics of reference endorsed in Being and Time with what is ready-to-hand. While I find this latter's explanation of the possibility of reference superior to Kant's (for Kant cannot explain how scientific revolutions occur, since he insists that the synthetic principles a priori he outlines are the only ones that there are), because it is based on everyday experience (and not the more esoteric branches of knowledge of the mathematical natural sciences), this theory is not Kant's.

Appendix II to the book on Kant, a summary of the Davos Disputation Between Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger, finds Heidegger arguing that "In the doctrine of Principles, what Kant really wanted to give is not a categorical, structural doctrine of the object of mathematical natural science. What he wanted to give was a theory of beings in general" (p. 174). This is a complete misinterpretation, misled, perhaps, by Kant's distinction between the
mathematical, apodeictic and the dynamical, regulative syntheses of the Pure
Principles of Understanding. (See B 199-200 and B 221-223 for this
distinction.) For while the Newtonian laws of nature prescribed in the Analogies
and the Postulates are "mediately and indirectly" (B 200) connected to
intuitions, they still "have certainty a priori" (B 223). Since we do not have the
citation Heidegger gives which verifies his opinion that Kant offers the same
ontology as him, and since we have such an abundance of evidence that Kant
was concerned with explaining mathematical natural science alone, we can only
conclude that Heidegger was mistaken about this. The last thing we disagree on
is about the claim that analytic judgements are "already synthetic, even if the
ground for the univocity of the subject-predicate connection lies merely in the
representation of the subject," because "every judgment is an 'I connect':
namely, subject and predicate" (p. 10). This claim of Heidegger's is right with
regard to what makes possible analytic judgements (connection between subject
and predicate, that is, synthetic judgements), but it is nonetheless quite wrong
with regard to the moral it derives from this. Analytic judgements are not to be
confused with synthetic ones because they take as given a (synthetic) concept and
break it down, assuming it as a whole, into its constituent parts. Synthetic
judgements, on the other hand, are always constructed out of parts which make
a whole. For a further explication of synthetic judgements in Kant's philosophy
of both pure and empirical experience, see Chapter II.

10. By 'mathematical instrumentalism' I mean that the concepts of mathematics are
something like tools which do not refer to objects in the real world, much like
how scientific instrumentalism does not care if it refers to unobservables.

11. Intuitionists and Kant are not in complete agreement on everything, however.

For intuitionists, who eschew consistency proofs for mathematical systems,
there is no need to provide axioms for those systems. Kant on the other hand did believe in axioms for mathematical systems. (Werkmeister (1980) exposes this aspect of his thought as follows: the theorems of mathematics are grounded and dependent on axioms "which, Kant argues, are 'synthetic principles a priori' derived... 'by means of the construction of concepts'" (p. 22).) But this is a minor disagreement because intuitionism insists that, if there is to be any mathematics what so ever, then it must be constructed.

Chapter II


13. I owe this idea to Charles Taylor's "Overcoming Epistemology," found in Baynes, Bohman and McCarthy, eds. (1987). Of course, Taylor is off the mark if he means by "intuition" the same thing as Kant in his statement that Kant is making an "appeal to intuition" (p. 475), but okay if he means by "intuition" an appeal to common sense.

14. Fichte (1797) would say "interdetermining."

(A)

15. I first found this idea in Putnam (1981), p. 56. Of course, Putnam is way off target by considering Kant to be a verificationist. He also holds that Kant "postulates" (p. 61) the existence of the external world. But this is false. Rather, Kant proves the existence of the external world with a simple two-valued logic: either it is an experience or it is not. If it is not, it is something I can never be aware of, that is, a thing in itself. This fails, of course, not only because it is analytic and tells us nothing about the world, but also because, since quantum mechanics and intuitionism, it seems necessary to stipulate a three-valued logic.

16. Heidegger surely has had some influence on Habermas, however much he may deny it, simply because the notion of the lifeworld is derivative upon Husserl's
(1954) work which is itself largely derivative upon and an answer to Heidegger's (1927) discussion of Dasein.

(B)

17. This interpretation is owed somewhat, but not entirely, to Heidegger (1973). It is not owed completely to him because he argues that there is something like a break between Kant's Transcendental Deduction in A and that which was made in B. What I have just quoted seems to me to indicate that there is no real difference between the substance of either editions' Deductions.

(C)

18. As argued for in n. 5, transcendental logic is just as analytic as general logic. Kant only seems to be denying this with his claim cited that transcendental logic tells one "the instance to which the rule is to be applied" (B 175), because this claim can be stated in which the rule is the necessary condition for the instance, that is, 'if circumstance x arises, apply rule z.' Logic in Kant's philosophy, general or transcendental, deals in the necessary conditions of something assumed. General logic is weaker because it only deals in nominal definitions, that is, it only deals in what can be conceived without contradiction, while transcendental logic is stronger because it deals in real definitions, that is, what can potentially be constructed.

20. It should be noted that, while temporal succession guarantees objectivity, it presupposes universal assent in which to inhere. In other words, time is inscribed in universal assent.

20. It is important to remember that all objectivity is only possible in being ascribed to what is experienced. For example, Kant argues as follows:

Thus to say that 'The body is heavy' is not merely to state that the two
representations have always been conjoined in my perception...; [rather] what we are asserting [that is, what we are ascribing to the object] is that they are combined in the object, no matter what the state of the subject may be (B 142, original italics).

Self-consciousness itself is only possible through this objective ascription: "it is only because I ascribe all perceptions to one consciousness (original apperception) that I can say that I am conscious of them" (A 122).

21. Phenomenologists in general refused to distinguish between the analytic and the synthetic a priori apparently because for them analytic judgements are informative: they do tell one about the world, in particular, one's conventions, that is, they are informative about us. This is misguided, of course, because analytic judgements are also distinguished from synthetic judgements by being holistic, as noted in Chapter I. In other words, and in this Kant seems to have foreseen Wittgenstein's interpretation of the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem, analytic judgements fail to refer anything because they refer to everything.

22. There is this peculiarity about analytic and synthetic judgements: the claim that a judgement is analytic is itself synthetic because it tells one something new about the judgement, namely, that it is unfalsifiable; the claim that a judgement is synthetic, on the other hand, is analytic, because it follows transparently from understanding the judgement that it expresses a contingent event.

Chapter III


(A)

24. Now is as good a time as any to reveal that Kant was an overdeterminist according to my interpretation. Overdeterminism is the doctrine that there are multiple causes for the same event at the same time as it occurs. To see this,
imagine a situation in which one person is likely to hit another. The first might
want to hit the second because he or she insulted the first. But the first might
also want to hit the second because the second shot the first's spouse and the first
knows it, and thus would still strike out at the second, insult or not. This relates
to Kant because he subscribes to a double aspect theory of reality. There is the
phenomenal cause aspect and the noumenal cause aspect. The former deals with
entities that are not conscious, while the latter deals with entities which are both
conscious and unconscious (people). Thus in the example of the two people in a
fight, the person about to hit the other can be described in terms of molecular
biology (his or her neurons are firing in a certain way), while he or she can
also be described under the aspect of freedom (he or she has been offended by
the other).

25. It should be noted that there is no radical break in Kant's philosophy with
regard to this point. As noted, he thought that the categorical imperative was
synthetic a priori in FMM as well as CPrR. The main difference between the
two books, with regard to the status of the possibility of (practical) freedom, is
whether or not it is the source of the moral law (FMM's position) or the moral
law is its source (CPrR's position). In fact, as we shall see in Appendix III, the
only work where Kant breaks with conceptions he held previously is the *Opus
postumum*.

26. It seems to me that there are problems with Kant's theology, however
sophisticated it may be. For instance, when we have died we are outside of space
and time. But if we can change ourselves for the better, then we are still at least
in time because time is a necessary condition for change.

27. There is a problem with this: God doesn't seem to need to believe in Himself,
because His will is holy. This is a rather strange state of affairs.
28. Lyotard is obviously wrong about there being no meta-narrative because the claim that there is no meta-narrative is just the meta-narrative that there is no meta-narrative. One can no more escape from tradition by merely declaring an epistemic break than one can defy gravity by disbelieving in physics. I owe this transcendental argument to Derrida (1967), in his encounter with Foucault's archeology of madness.

29. I owe this notion of "superstructure" to Harland (1987).

30. It might seem that my claim that universal assent guarantees objectivity is false because assent is given consciously by individuals. But this is a misinterpretation of what I am arguing. The assent that individuals consciously provide is determined by their object. It is the claim of this thesis that the object (which it should be recalled is synthetic a priori here) is itself determined by the subject, because subject and object are indistinguishable. As we saw in Chapter II (A), this indistinguishability between subject and object necessarily requires universal assent.

31. Apel (1979) holds a similar view of intentionality. There are apparently two sources for Apel's belief in intentional action: firstly, and more obviously, Wittgenstein's (1945) discussion of aspects or "seeing as," between pp. 193-210; secondly, and less obviously, Heidegger's (1927) similar discussion of the "as," between H. 148-153. That Apel has been influenced by Wittgenstein is seen in the very title of his book, *Understanding and Explanation*, which is derivative on the title of an earlier book by von Wright, *Explanation and Understanding*. Von Wright is a Wittgensteinian, as is well known. Heidegger's influence on Apel is less obvious, but it is there nonetheless, for Apel uses the terms "always
already" throughout his text (initially on p. 37), and these are found for the first time in *Being and Time*. Apel can get away with this mixing of Wittgenstein and Heidegger because they both say that aspects have their source in our action in everyday life.

32. As noted by Harland (1987), this is precisely the type of philosophy that has been recurring on the Continent at least since Spinoza's *Ethics*.

33. As we saw in Chapter II (*B*), in synthetic judgements a priori, subject and object are indistinguishable. This means that there is no real difference between belief₁ and belief₂. The different numbers in the subscripts are there mainly to maintain continuity with Husserl's (1929) distinction between noesis and noema, which, it should be recalled, he regarded as poles of a *single* level of cogitationes.

Chapter IV

34. Kant (1788), Ak. 71.

35. There are both internal and external critiques that can be offered against both of these varieties of instrumentalism. The internal critique of scientific instrumentalism comes from the philosophy of quantum mechanics, which is erroneously regarded as instrumentalist. What quantum mechanics insists on is the abstract nature of the concrete. Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (1935) tried to show the impossibility of this with their famous thought experiment, a thought experiment which was Cartesian to its core, arguing that all that existed is a collection of bare individuals (an argument that has a long tradition in nominalism, a rather peculiar place for those who are usually regarded as realists to get their arguments). Bohr (1935) replied to this argument by merely affirming the relational and holistic nature of reality (yes, the two electrons are connected and this connection is instantaneous, that is, faster than the speed of
light). The experiments of Aspect bore out Bohr. As far as an external critique of scientific instrumentalism goes, we can point out that there are no theory-free observations, because without some idea of what we are looking for, how will we know when we've found it? Thus the theory that argues that we must observe in order to build science fails to coincide with the actual activity of scientists.

The internal critique of ethical instrumentalism Kant provides (in FMM, Ak. 395-6) is simple: since when does doing what one thinks will make one happy actually make one happy? For instance, it is well known that people go on vacations, which they look forward to, only to discover during their vacation that they'd rather be at work. (I'm not sure what the reason for this is. Perhaps it's owing to the fact that getting rewarded is not as exciting as anticipating that one will be rewarded. In other words, the hype is more fun than that which is hyped about.) Regarding an external critique: we can point out, as Kant does, that ethics will have nothing to do with hedons and dolors.

36. Kant's reasoning here always escapes me, however, because he produces four antinomies to correspond to the four classes of categories, but comes up with only three arguments for God's existence, which he claims correspond to the three levels of categories in their four classes. Since there are three ideas (God, freedom and immortality), which correspond also to the three layers in the four classes of categories, it seems Kant is being inconsistent.

35. This argument owes its origin to Deleuze and Guattari's (1972) discussion of what they call machinic desiring-production. This latter discussion itself owes its origin to Heidegger's (1927) discussion of beings which are ready-to-hand which includes beings which are present-at-hand as a limiting case, rather than vice versa.
38. I should make it clear that maxims do concern all faculties, including sensibility, though in a way harmless to ethics. For Kant admits that there has to be a sensible world in which one can be interpreted to act, otherwise what would be the point of saying that we are not to be influenced in ethics by this world? The sensible world performs a necessary function by giving ethics a domain over which it can exercise its interpretations. For one always interprets phenomena, never noumena, owing to the simple fact that nowhere can one claim to have seen any noumena. This much said, it can also be pointed out that the deterministic phenomenal world provides an explanation for why people behave heteronomously: they've been conditioned and are acting like Pavlovian dogs or they've been brainwashed and haven't taken Kant's (1784) slogan of the enlightenment, "Dare to know," to heart. Also, the deterministic phenomenal world provides an awareness of a lack of freedom from which we distinguish ourselves from the rest of nature.

Adorno (1966) notes this peculiarity about Kant's theory of freedom: at a certain level, that of empirical psychology, the condition of possibility of the awareness of freedom is its opposite, that is, determinism. Of course the opposite holds at the transcendental level: the condition of the possibility of determinism is freedom. (Adorno's criticisms fail for the simple reason, as we've seen, that all three faculties are needed to produce ethics. Thus ethics is thoroughly mediated and as much of a totality as anything else because each faculty acts according to the role of the other faculties.)

39. Evidence for the position argued here is not significant enough to be cited in the main body of the text. None the less, I cite the following from The Metaphysics of Morals (1798, first ed. 1997), from which can be inferred the point I am driving at:
If one of these [a moral agent] is a being that has only rights and no duties to the other (God) so that the other has only duties and no rights against him, then the principle of the moral relation between them is *transcendent* (Ak. 488, original italics).

Here Kant is setting up his argument that God is so morally pure that He has only rights and no duties. He calls the relation that finite agents have with Him transcendent, because finite agents have only duties to Him and He has none to them. The argument as to why God has only rights and no duties is given in the following citation:

*God's end with regard to the human race (in creating and guiding it) can be thought only as proceeding from *love*, that is, as the *happiness* of men. But the principle of God's will with regard to *respect* (awe) due to Him, which limits the effects of love, that is, the principle of God's right, can be none other than that of *justice*. To express this in human terms, God has created rational beings from the need, as it were, to have something outside Himself which He could love or by which He could also be loved* (ibid., original italics).

Basically God has only rights here because he is one of the necessary conditions for the moral law (as applied by finite agents). Thus we must have respect or be in awe of Him because we must also have respect or be in awe of the moral law.

How does this relate to my point about finite agents, rational agents and the moral law? Because finite agents must respect God come what may, they must treat their duties as divine commands. We find Kant stating this as follows:

*The *formal aspect* of all religion, if religion is defined [*erklärt*] as "the sum of all duties as *(instar)* divine commands," belongs to philosophic morals, since this definition expresses only the relation of reason to the *Idea*
of God which reason makes for itself; and this does not yet make a duty of
religion into a duty to (erga) God, as a Being existing outside our Idea, since
we still abstract from His existence.... But this duty [that is, the relation of
duty to God] with regard to God (properly speaking, with regard to the Idea
we ourselves make of such a Being) is a duty of man to himself, that is, it is
not objective, an obligation to perform certain services to another, but only
subjective, for the sake of strengthening the moral incentive in our own
lawgiving reason (Ak. 487, original italics).

What Kant is saying here is that God is a necessary but not sufficient condition
for the moral law ("the sum of all duties"). This is why "The formal aspect of
all religion" is subsumed under "philosophic morals," its sufficient condition.
But because God is a necessary condition for ethics (directing oneself to the
moral law by means of the categorical imperative), this means that He conforms
to the moral law too. For the sufficient condition that is the moral law (which is
the necessary condition of the categorical imperative, which applies to finite
agents) must have inscribed in it God, for God is part of the larger set that is
the highest good.* I make this claim that the highest good is the necessary
condition of the moral law because Kant writes as much in what follows:

But it is self-evident not merely that, if the moral law is included as the
supreme condition in the concept of the highest good, the highest good is
then the object, but also that the concept of it and the idea of its existence as
possible through our practical reason are likewise the determining ground of
the pure will. This is because the moral law, included and thought in this
concept, and no other object, determines the will as required by the
principle of autonomy (CPrR, Ak. 110-1).

Note that the moral law is included in the highest good, that is, the highest good
is the set which is the necessary condition of the moral law. The peculiarity of
Kant's position is that no other concepts are included in this concept. The way
of explaining this is that the highest good is analytic, so nothing sensuous
follows from it.

* I am claiming here that, in ethics, finite agents' relation to God is an analytic one.
This is why Kant explains that God is a mystery as far as people are concerned
in the following:

...[In] ethics, as pure practical philosophy of internal law giving, only the
moral relations of men to men are conceivable by us. The question of what
sort of moral relation holds between God and man goes completely beyond
the bounds of ethics and is altogether inconceivable for us ((1798), Ak. 490,
original italics).

This is not so with regard to theoretical knowledge, where God is a synthetic
idea a priori—one which refers to totalities (all logically possible experience,
that is, experience of both phenomena and noumena) and tries, but fails, to
inform people of them in a constitutive manner.

40. The odds against Acton making any correct judgements about the ethics of
CPrR were heavily set against him by his not having properly read the second
Critique. For he actually claims that it is the second formulation (what he calls
the Principle of the End in Itself) which is left out in CPrR, while the third
formulation (what he calls the Principle of Autonomy) is found in it (while it in
fact remains something like a hidden premise and is left out of the text): "In the
Groundwork, but not in the Critique of Practical Reason, another formulation is
introduced between the Universal Law formulation and the autonomy formula.
This is: 'So act that [etc.]...'" (p. 35). That this book found a publisher goes to
show exactly how wanting English-speaking interpretations of Kant are.

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41. This is what Kripke and Putnam basically do with their causal theory of reference. As usual, the only defence that these people make in their own favour is that they are doing 'science' and don't care what ordinary people have to say—even if what they are studying just is what ordinary people say.

42. I get this idea from Deleuze and Guattari's (1972) book, strangely enough. There they argue that there is no such thing as interests and that really everything in society reduces to what they call desiring-production. I am interested enough in what they have to say to agree with them that there is much desire in oppressive situations, not just on the oppressor's side, but also on the oppressed side. (After all, if the average first-world worker (a place where workers are not explicitly repressed, like in Haiti or El Salvador) found absolutely no gain in their situation, why doesn't he or she revolt immediately at the prospect of a life of meaningless drudgery?) However I think it is a mistake to say that there is, thus, no interest,* because all institutions, from the micro-level to the macro-level work according to interest. For instance, private property exists to protect the interests of the dominant class. Furthermore, they are returning to a certain Hegel in which the meta-narrative is such that absolute spirit "did what he wanted and wanted what he did" (Debord (1967), §76). This picture is refuted decisively by Wittgenstein's private language argument.

I offer the following clue to a deconstruction of Deleuze and Guattari's theory of desiring-production by noting the signal peculiarity of Volume I of Capitalism and Schizophrenia's title, Anti-Oedipus, that is, an express negation of theory derived from the myth of Oedipus. I call this peculiar because Deleuze and Guattari wish to perform an act of pure, Nietzschean affirmation. (This is the motive behind their theory of desiring-production, which is always positive ("productive").) Things get even more problematic in Volume II
because there we find them offering a theory based in the Oedipus myth on p. 290. So Oedipus is both the condition of possibility of Deleuze and Guattari's (1972 and 1980) theory and its condition of impossibility.

* It will be noted that, because I have argued that they are basically qualia, the desires that match the categorical imperative's challenge are positive too. Thus, in Deleuze and Guattari's language, ethics is productive. I have also identified the moral law with interests by arguing that the latter defines the former. But not all interests are ethical. Kant argues in the third *Critique* that there is an aesthetic interest which has nothing to do with ethics. It would be foolhardy to deny economic interests exist, as a brief encounter with history indicates, so we can speak of these too. That there are also scientific interests on Kant's theory is seen in how science requires a posteriori knowledge (this is why the dynamical principles of understanding are called regulative by him). All of these are negative. Aesthetic interest is negative because it is made possible by teleology and teleology is not (mechanistic) knowledge, that is, strictly speaking, it is false. Economic interests are negative because of their utilitarian nature (by which I mean: in economics we always try to bring about states of affairs that are not already available for survival). And scientific interests are negative in their a posteriori side because they are all false.
Bibliography


APPENDIX I: On Scheler's critique of Kant

The work of Max Scheler (1966, first edition 1916) presents one with "the major contribution of early-twentieth-century Continental philosophy to the field of ethics" (Frings and Frank (1973) p. xiii). It is basically a Kantianism that he offers, in so far as he asks what the conditions of experience in general are. However, where Kant thought that sensibility had nothing to teach ethical experience, Scheler thinks that there are certain fundamental qualia (what he calls non-formal (German: *material*) values) which in fact guide moral judgements. He thinks that Kant's mistake was his attempt to leave the judgements of ethics formal, that is, non-sensible. Scheler tries to get around Kant's formalism by treating values as qualia, that is, as immediately sensible states of the subject. He states his case thus: "Values are *clearly feelable phenomena*—not obscure X's which have meaning only through other well known phenomena" (p. 16). Crucial to Scheler's case is that these qualia come in a hierarchy. He explicitly states this in a note on p. 26: "Higher and lower values form an order that is completely different from the positive and negative natures of values...."

And it is with this notion of a hierarchy of values that we can make problems for Scheler. For what is a hierarchy of values? Let's go to the other senses, besides the ethical one, that deal in qualia. Let's take colour in sight for instance. There we are faced with a whole range of colours on the colour dial, none of which can be said to be more of one colour than another. For what would it mean to say that blue is more red than green? Proceeding into hearing, we find similar difficulties. We may wish to say that one tone is higher than another, but the hierarchy is arbitrary, for what we call a high-pitched tone could easily be imagined to be called a low one.
and vice versa. This is a striking disanalogy with ethics, where we wish to claim that the hierarchy is not arbitrary. Taking touch, can we say that what is hard is more hot than what is soft? With regard to taste, can we say that strawberries taste more like grapes than apples? Finally, taking smell into consideration, can we say that tulips smell more like roses than oranges? The five senses are exhausted and we have no reason to stipulate a sixth, ethical sense.

The fundamental problem with Scheler is that his philosophy has no room for analytic judgements because of how he defines the meaning of a priori. His definition is as follows:

We designate as "a priori" all those ideal units of meaning and those propositions that are self-given by way of an immediate intuitive content in the absence of any kind of positing of subjects that think them and of the real nature of those subjects, and in the absence of any kind of positing of objects to which such units are applicable (p. 48).

Because the a priori, on Scheler's definition, is always connected to intuitive content, there can be no analytic judgements, judgements which are true by virtue of the form of their meaning and are never directed towards the world. For instance, does a blind person, never seeing the grass, nonetheless know that the grass is green? How do they do this if there is some qualia that they are to attach to the judgement? Or take the sentence 'John painted his house brown.' Just by virtue of the meanings of the words, we know that John is painting the outside of his house. It is difficult to think of any intuition that could either confirm or disconfirm either of these cases. They are just how we use our words, in other words, they are strictly conventional.

A problem derivative upon this for Scheler's account of the a priori is that he cannot account for his knowledge of himself, because he regards all knowledge as
synthetic. This is because there is no meta-language to language itself for the simple reason that the so-called meta-language can be expressed in terms of its object language. In other words, the object language infects the meta-language from root to branch. This entails that Scheler's entire discourse, a reputed discourse about discourse, is contradictory (which is not to say unusable—Frege's system was usable even though it had contradictions). The contradiction is between what he says and believes he is doing and what he actually does. What he actually does is alter how we interact with the world and one another. In other words he destroys what he is studying in order to understand, much like a vivisector.\(^1\) Kant is innocent of this charge because his Transcendental Deductions were analytic. It is exactly this that Wittgenstein (1945) is talking about when he says that philosophy leaves everything as it is.\(^2\) Kant takes for granted something that everyone takes for granted and then asks about what makes that set of relations that people take for granted possible as a matter of intension-extension.

**APPENDIX II: On Brentano’s critique of Kant**

I will show in this appendix that Brentano’s ethics are less radically intentional than Kant’s. Brentano thought that he could refute Kant’s first formulation of the categorical imperative with an argument involving bribery. I will quote the entire paragraph in which his assault occurs because I find his argument rather obscure and it will require careful inspection.

It is easy to see that Kant’s reasoning is invalid and in fact absurd. If in consequence of a law certain actions cease to be performed, the law does exert an influence. It is therefore still effective and it has in no way nullified itself. To see the absurdity of what Kant says, we have only to deal with the following
question...: "Should I give in to a man who tries to bribe me?" The answer would have to be this: "Yes!" For if the contrary maxim were to become a universal law, then people would no longer attempt bribery. Therefore the law could not be put into effect since there would be no instances to which it applied, and therefore it would nullify itself (p. 50, original italics).

In the second sentence Brentano seems to mean 'maxim which has failed the categorical imperative' by "law," not exactly the most precise manner of expressing oneself. The third sentence follows tautologically, because a maxim which has failed the categorical imperative and yet "exert[s] an influence" is obviously, self-evidently and transparently one which is "effective." It is hard to say why Brentano feels compelled to write that the law "has in no way nullified itself," because this seems to be redundant. It seems that Brentano is trying to say that there are negative effects of a law failing the categorical imperative, namely, that we are acting according to the negative of this maxim which failed the categorical imperative. But Kant would not have accepted this because he denies that negative knowledge will tell us anything about the world, which is why he never fails to mention that the sole theoretical knowledge we have of things in themselves is negative, for example, that is, we have no theoretical knowledge of things in themselves. What he would claim is, not that we are following a maxim's negative (its failure to pass the categorical imperative), but rather that we are following a different maxim altogether, whichever one we've replaced the failed maxim with.

The problem for Brentano at this juncture is to explain exactly what a negative belief or desire is. For beliefs and desires can only be understood as positive. It might be thought that beliefs can be negative because we can have false beliefs. But we do not recognize these false beliefs as false. Rather, they are qualia affected by how we interact with the world and others. As was pointed out in Chapter III (B),
all synthetic a posteriori beliefs are false. But this does not stop us from acting on them. There is a dynamic between existence and qualia: existence affects qualia and qualia affect existence. As far as desires are concerned, it might be thought that desires can be negative because we always have desires for things which we do not have. But the problem with this is that desires (as with beliefs) in my sense are qualia. Which is to say that desires are incommunicable, unfalsifiable and qualitative, like one's emotions or perception of colours. 'Desire,' in the sense of a lack is in fact an interest (see note 52 for more on desire and interest).

The final sentence is expressed in misleading terms: Brentano writes "Therefore" leading us to expect that he is discussing the results of his counter-argument to the first formulation of the categorical imperative with the maxim of bribery. But, in fact, by "law" he is not referring to the maxim of bribery, but rather the "contrary maxim" to bribery used in the second-to-last sentence, which would bring down bribery as an institution. This, he takes it, is a reductio ad absurdum of Kant's ethics. The problem for Brentano's argument concerning bribery is that it ultimately sets up an unpalatable mediation, which is to say, there is something wrong with the desire from which the mediation derives. To show this, I will start with the desire: Brentano wants Kant to start with: accept bribes. From here there can be prescribed, as a universal law of nature: all people are to accept bribes under all circumstances. This leads to the noemoughta (or desire): one ought to do as one has been bribed to do. This entails the self-fulfilling prophecy: those who accept bribes live at the beck and call of those who can afford to give them out. The mediation between the moral law (M), reason (R) and moral action (A) becomes: M limits R to having as its motive or end an A which denies M to those who have not payed their bribes. This is a rather peculiar morality. Furthermore, it should be relatively clear that personal integrity goes out the
window, owing to the fact that one denies M to oneself (for what would it be to bribe oneself to do something?). Far from proving the lack of worth of Kant's ethics, Brentano's example confirms it.

It should also be noted, again with regard to Brentano, that he came to believe in the agreement theory of truth that I've found in Kant. For, on p. 75, we find the editor of the German edition pointing out in a note that Brentano's later work, The True and The Evident, argues that the truth of a judgement has nothing to do with being "correlated" with existence, but rather is seen to have to do with the possibility of anyone coming to accept, after judging evidence, an affirmative or negative judgement about that evidence.

APPENDIX III: On Kant's doctrine in the Opus postumum

In this Appendix I defend Kant's critical philosophy (and the doctrinal component which comes with it) from the (purely) doctrinal philosophy of his Opus postumum. For, by the time of this posthumously published work, Kant had come to the conclusion that the transcendental philosophy of his critical period was not the "highest" statement of this type of inquiry into the possibilities of experience. To explain the differences between the two approaches, I will have to explain the difference between critical and doctrinal philosophy, and their relation to transcendental philosophy. I will use W. H. Werkmeister's (1980) interpretation of Kant's last transcendental philosophy. I will assume this interpretation is trustworthy because it is composed mostly of citations from the Opus postumum (there are 299 notes to this final exposition in Werkmeister's text, more than any other Chapter). I will deal with the Opus postumum in two sections, (A) and (B), the first of which exposes the Opus postumum's doctrine and the second which
criticizes it.

(A) *Exposition of the Opus postumum’s doctrine*

Early on in the first *Critique*, Kant distinguishes the critical method from the doctrinal. By *critique* Kant means a strictly negative approach to speculation and which does not extend, but which can "only clarify our reason" (B 25). The *doctrine* of nature presented in Kant’s *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, on the other hand, lays the foundations for mathematical natural science in a positive fashion: "A rational doctrine of nature, then, deserves the name science only when the natural laws that underlie it are cognized a priori and are not mere laws of experience" (Ak. 468). In other words, physics or mathematical natural science requires metaphysics or the doctrine of that science: "Natural science properly so called presupposes metaphysics of nature" (Ak. 469). This doctrine is modeled on the mathematical method because this is the only method which is simultaneously a priori and about the world. Kant explicitly states this as follows: "I have in this [doctrinal] treatise followed the mathematical method" (Ak. 478). Which amounts to the claim that metaphysics, legitimately understood, deals solely in synthetic judgements a priori applicable to experience. This metaphysics is as much a part of transcendental philosophy as the physics laid bare in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. For it will be recalled that the definition of *transcendental* found there was: "all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be possible *a priori*" (B 25). The basic difference between a critique and a doctrine, then, is in their methods: a critique is entirely analytic and displays the parts found in knowledge, while a doctrine is entirely synthetic and constructs the objects of knowledge.

Now, by the time of the *Opus postumum*, Kant wanted to guarantee that there
was necessarily only one field of experience. In this work transcendental philosophy is still what links metaphysics with physics. Evidence for this in the *Opus postumum* is his claim that "From the metaphysical foundations of natural science the [synthetic] principle [a priori] goes to the higher position of transcendental philosophy and *from there* finally to physics" (cited in Werkmeister (1980), pp. 115-6, Kant’s italics). Note that Kant speaks of the metaphysical principle. This indicates that the metaphysics of wholes or totalities comes to play a much greater role with regard to the possibility of experience than in the critical period. For in the critical period there was never just one principle, but rather many. And, indeed, we find Kant rejecting the mathematical method, which is atomistic, for what he called transcendental philosophy, which "is the idea of the whole of the senses as in one system" (cited in ibid., p. 178), in the following summary and quote of Kant from Werkmeister: "the mathematical approach can never lead to 'a satisfactory whole of physics—not even in conception'" (p. 182).

The one principle announced in the *Opus postumum* is the Ether. For Kant claims that the Ether is "the concept of the only possible means of having experience" (cited in ibid., p. 181). His argument for the Ether is that if experience is one, then there has to be one principle from which experience can be derived. In the *Opus postumum* Kant does not provide an argument as to why experience is one, but rather assumes it as basic and provides its condition. For example, he declares without argument that "There is only one experience" (cited in ibid., p. 176). In this we can detect the influence of Fichte, as Werkmeister concludes, because Kant argues for "the unity of experience in accordance with the principle of identity" (cited in ibid., p. 179), which is plainly related to Fichte's (1797) philosophy because the latter argues that A = A is the one principle from which all experience is derived (see especially pp. 94-102). Kant states his case
most fully as follows:

Viewed objectively, there is but one experience and all perceptions belong to one system of the absolute totality of them which is not invented but given, i.e., there exists an absolute totality as system of the moving forces of matter, for the concept of it is objectively a concept of experience, and an object thus thought is therefore real.... This concept is unique in its kind (unicus) because its object is only one (conceptus singularis); for "the All of Matter" designates not a distributive but a collective universality of the objects which belong to the absolute unity of all possible experience (cited in Werkmeister (1980), p. 180, original italics).

What this citation is saying is that there is one whole ("totality") within which the parts ("moving forces of matter") act. The concept of this whole is identical to its object. And this is owing to its nature as a synthetic concept a priori. I say that the concept that Kant has of the Ether is synthetic a priori because he argues as follows: "The existence of moving forces of matter which fill the whole space of the world must be presupposed;... otherwise empty space would be an object of the possibility of experience.... [And] there is no absolutely empty space" (cited in ibid.). To make my point I will have to provide some background. Kant is arguing that there is no empty space because, if there were, experience would not be one. From the unity of experience, Kant argues for the Ether as its one principle, an argument which Werkmeister summarizes as follows: "the unity of experience and the Ether are simply two aspects of one and the same experiential situation" (ibid., p. 182). The quote from Kant, immediately above, indicates that by thinking about the "matter" in experience we come to its formal presuppositions. In other words, in thinking the matter, we necessarily think the form, which is a property of synthetic judgements a priori, as I have argued throughout this work. This same point, that
by thinking the matter of experience we are thinking its form, is made by Kant again, this time as follows: "The thought of such an elementary system of the moving system of matter (cogitatio) necessarily precedes the perception (perceptio) and... is given a priori in the subject through reason" (cited in ibid., p. 184). Note that by thinking of "the moving forces of matter" we think of them as part of "an elementary system" and this precedes experience "through reason."

From the single synthetic concept a priori which experience presupposes, we can derive all of what is experienced. We can derive all of physics because this (metaphysical) principle infects physics as its condition of possibility: "the doctrine of the laws of moving forces of matter, insofar as they are known a priori, is called metaphysics. Insofar as they can be derived from experience only, it is called physics" (cited in ibid., p. 183). Whereas in both the first Critique and the Metaphysical Foundations, empirical intuitions were necessary to complete our knowledge (which is why the dynamical Principles of Pure Understanding were thought to be regulative), in the Opus postumum, the one principle of experience permits us to derive all of physics. Which is to say that both types of synthetic judgements, a priori and a posteriori, are flip-sides of the same coin and that the a priori makes possible the a posteriori, but not vice versa.

Because experience is one and we experience life, which is not just bare matter, it follows that Kant's one principle subsumes life under itself too. Kant argues that the Ether makes possible life by organizing living things in wholes. Here the Ether has an immaterial principle: "The principle of life in [a body] is immaterial" (cited in ibid., p. 186). This immaterial principle is the "world soul," a principle which forms a subset of the Ether. As with the Ether, Kant argues that there is only one world soul because the world is an interlocked, organized whole. This allows Kant to proceed to claim that "The world is an animal" (cited in ibid., p. 190). But the
world soul "is not God" (cited in ibid.). Rather, it is a principle for animals, the highest of which for Kant is certain "individualities of races" of the species "man" (cited in ibid, p. 187). Kant argues that God is "heterogeneous" to the world, but that it is "I, the thinking being in the world, who combines them [God and the world]" (cited in ibid. pp. 194-5). Note that it is the individual who is the "mediating concept" (ibid.), not the world soul. With this Kant has jettisoned the agreement theory of truth of both his pre-critical and critical period. Now he argues that all objectivity comes from the I: "[I] posit myself for the purpose of possible experience a priori, and constitute [myself] as an object" with this I being "the representation of the thing-in-itself and then in appearance" (cited in ibid., p. 195). Kant is now permitted to speak of objectivity this way because the condition of experience, while not an object in it, is that experience considered as a totality.

As pointed out above, God and the world are thought by Kant to be heterogenous. This is because "God is not an object of intuition" (cited in ibid., p. 192). This introduces a Kierkegaardian twist to the theology of the Opus postumum. For, as we saw, it is the individual who mediates God and the world. Since it is the individual alone who can relate to God, Kant argues that the self is driven to Him by the moral law because "In the categorical imperative God reveals himself" (cited in ibid.). Kant argues that "It makes no sense to ask whether God exists" because "The mere idea of God is at the same time a postulate of his existence. To think him and to believe is an analytic proposition" (cited in ibid., pp. 192, 191, respectively). In other words "the proposition, There is a God,... is an axiom" (cited in ibid., p. 192). I call this Kierkegaardian because it was Kierkegaard who first claimed that belief in God was necessary for the individual, but that no proof could or should be given for His existence.
There are a number of criticisms that could be made of Kant's last doctrine. For instance, the history of science presented in Kuhn (1970) indicates that science itself is not one. Which is to say that experience in Kant's terms (for, as we saw with regard to Heidegger's (1973) interpretation of Kant above in note 9 and Habermas's philosophy in note 16, Kant's sense of experience is scientific experience) is by no means unitary. However, I will not take this tack for the following two reasons: firstly, Kant's transcendental philosophy would have to be grounded in the life-world if one admits the possibility of there being sciences instead of one science, a consideration which Kant never thought possible; secondly and more importantly, I wish to defend the philosophy of the critical period on its own terms—in other words, I want to show that the doctrine of the *Opus postumum*, far from being the "HIGHEST FORM OF TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY" (cited in Werkmeister (1980), p. 196, original capitals), is in fact incoherent. To show this, I will have to criticize point by point the claims of the *Opus postumum*, summarized above. I will try to show that everything that Kant wished to prove in his last, unfinished work, he rightly closed the door on in his critical period. I will claim that the critical philosophy is right using various results from other transcendental philosophies and the natural sciences, which, while Kant could not have foreseen them, nonetheless validate the earlier critical enterprise and invalidated the purely doctrinal later one.

To begin with, the transcendental method of the critical period was analytic. The analytic judgements Kant made were about the use of words in the context of mathematical natural science. From the analysis of the synthetic concepts a priori of physics in the *Critique of Pure Reason* he offered the synthetic concepts a priori of metaphysics in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*. While their
combination produced a coherent whole, all of these concepts were displayed in an atomistic fashion. (Which is why, as noted, the method in his (1786) work is called mathematical.) The transcendental philosophy of the *Opus postumum*, on the other hand, is synthetic. It is no longer a discourse about discourse, but rather is constitutive of all discourses. And this is owing to the holism of his principle, the Ether, which is "the concept of the possibility of experience and constitutes the transition from the elementary system to the world system" (cited in Werkmeister 1980, p. 189). As seen above, the Ether "constitutes" "the world system," from which can be derived the "elementary system," that is, physics. However, because it is synthetic, it informs and thus alters the very things it claims to be talking about in a neutral fashion. (This same point was made above in note 35 and also Appendix I, with regard to Scheler's philosophy.) Kant's one principle thus alters and irreparably disfigures the very physics he claims it makes possible. In other words, the physics Kant invisages in his last work is impossible according to the very criteria he sets up for physics' possibility.

But things are not as simple as that because Kant does not seem to distinguish between what is analytic and what is synthetic in the *Opus postumum*. For he claims that God is both an axiom and analytic. As we saw (parenthetically in note 11, above) in Chapter I, axioms are synthetic for Kant because they are constructed. So God is both synthetic and analytic. It is not just with regard to God that this confusion arises. For we saw that the *Opus postumum* argues that the Ether is the principle of "the unity of experience in accordance with the principle of identity" (cited in ibid., p. 179). This means that Kant's synthetic principle for all objects of experience is also analytic because the principle of identity is analytic. The self also suffers from this same confusion because Kant argues: "this act of apperception (sum cogitans) is no judgment (iudicum) concerning an object; i.e., it is not a
relating of a predicate to a subject through which cognition is founded; I am simply
an object to myself" (cited in ibid., p. 195). In the first *Critique*, self-consciousness
was entirely derivative upon the (synthetic) relation of a subject to a predicate.
Here the self is made when "I posit myself" (cited in ibid.). That the self is also
analytic, however, shows up in the following definition: "Transcendental
philosophy is the absolute principle for determining oneself idealistically as a
system of synthetic cognitions *a priori*... in respect of the form of
self-consciousness" (cited in ibid., p. 199). Note that while one is determined by
synthesis *a priori*, this is only in respect to "the *form* of self-consciousness." As we
have seen, it is analytic judgements alone which are purely formal.

After Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen's (1935) attempt to derail quantum
mechanics and Bohr's (1935) defense of it, we can see that contemporary science
has come to the conclusion that reality is composed of relations and that, as far as
we are concerned, there are an infinity of these. (We saw this also in note 35 of the
main body of the thesis and note 1 to the appendices, above.) Kant's philosophy of
the critical period can cope with this because all of his synthetic judgements (*a
priori* and *a posteriori*) are plural and relational, that is, they are simultaneously
atomistic (with regard to the individuation of information between them) and
holistic (the information in them comes all at once). By contrast, Kant's "highest
form of transcendental philosophy" is holistic at the expense of the parts which are
found in that whole.

Perhaps the decisive argument against Kant's last doctrine is Kurt Gödel's
incompleteness theorem, summarized in Nagel and Newman (1958). According to
this theorem "no final account can be given of the precise logical form of valid
mathematical demonstrations" (p. 99). This is because "we cannot deduce all
arithmetical truths from the axioms" (p. 86). Owing to the first *Critique*'s
arguments about mathematics as providing the form of intuitions, we can see that from the axioms of mathematics, there will always be intuitions which do not fit into those axioms precisely. And this is because no finite axiomatic system can generate all true theorems of mathematics. Since there are undecidable theorems in mathematics, where theorems are understood as elemental pure intuitions, a fortiori there are also empirical intuitions which do not conform to any axiomatic system designed to map onto them. Which means that Kant's attempt to derive all of what is synthetic a posteriori from either one supreme synthetic concept a priori, or one supreme analytic concept, is doomed to failure a priori.

Notes to Appendices

Appendix I

1. It should be pointed out that this has been noted in quantum mechanics. There they happily admit that they destroy nature in order to understand it. They call their principle for destruction the principle of indeterminacy. Things have come full circle from the Cartesian-Galilean days where it was thought that there were parts but no wholes which made it possible to describe nature in a neutral language. (Basically Galileo's Two New Sciences are applications of the atomistic philosophies of Epicurus and Democritus, distorted for the purposes of the ascending bourgeoisie—I say distorted because of the lack of an indeterministic swerve.) In quantum mechanics there are wholes with no parts. However, because the scientists of the quantum insist on understanding nature synthetically, they too distort nature. Thus there is no neutral language with which to describe nature. To a certain extent quantum mechanics is the opposite of Cartesianism and also, simultaneously and for the same reason, the logical conclusion of Cartesianism. It is the opposite of it because quantum mechanics
comes to the opposite conclusion of it with regard to nature, namely, there are wholes with no parts and that, in discovering these, scientists distort nature as a matter of course. It is its logical conclusion because quantum mechanics took the premisses of Cartesianism (express all of nature in a mathematical formula) as far as they could go. Unfortunately, we cannot destroy people in order to understand them, owing to our responsibility for them. There can be no mathematical natural science of people.

2. Cf., Wittgenstein (1945), § 124. It is this fact (that philosophy is an analytic method) that makes Kant the first analytic philosopher, not Frege and not Russell.

Appendix III

3. Metaphysics illegitimately understood differs from the mathematical method because its synthetic concepts a priori have to do with totalities or wholes and surpass possible experience (see the first Critique, B 374-83). Owing to their holistic nature, they cannot be confused with the synthetic concepts a priori of sensibility or understanding, which, as argued throughout Chapters I and II, are atomistic. These totalities should not be confused with analytic judgements just because they are holistic, however. For they play a legitimate, regulative role with regard to the objects of possible experience. In other words, they inform experience by systematizing it (but nothing else).

4. However analytic and synthetic they may be, these methods of criticism and doctrine, respectively, have nothing to do with the analytic and synthetic methods which Kant ascribes to himself in the Prolegomena. There the analytic method assumes what it sets out to prove and "ascend[s] to the only conditions under which it is possible," that is, it is "regressive" (Ak. 276 n. 6) and proceeds from what is actual to that actuality's conditions of possibility. The
synthetic method, on the other hand, is called "progressive," because it proceeds, not from what it wants to prove, but from the conditions of possibility of what is actual to what is actual. In a certain sense, these two methods are indistinguishable because they are both analytic, seeking out what follows as a matter of conceptual analysis from something given. In the "analytic" method what is given is an actuality, while in the "synthetic" method what is given are conditions of possibility which are then shown to be realized in the actual.

5. It might be argued that all talk of the Ether has been radically falsified by relativity physics. But Werkmeister is careful to point out that the electromagnetic fields discovered by Maxwell (from which relativity physics was first derived) are the hypostatized relations of electromagnetic matter. Kant's Ether is similar, only it applies to all matter, not just the electromagnetic. This relates strongly to relativity physics, which, earlier on in his text, Werkmeister argued Kant had largely prefigured in his (1786) account of circular motion. On Werkmeister's interpretation of Kant "The observable effect of circular motion is... one of the relation of material particles to one another, not one of a changing relation relative to absolute space" (p. 111). Werkmeister, it should be noted, actually argues for "the continuity of Kant's thinking" (p. 181) in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science and his last work with the principle of the Ether. But there is this crucial difference, noted above: the principles applicable to experience of the critical period are all atomistic and plural, while there is only one principle applicable to experience in the Opus postumum.

5. And here we see that Kant, like most intellectuals of his time, was a racist and sexist. For he speaks of men and a hierarchy of these found in the Great Chain
of Being, which latter notion Werkmeister finds Kant accepted throughout his career. (With regard to Werkmeister's (1980) exposition of this idea in the pre-critical Kant, see pp. 10-11; in his critical period where it works implicitly, see pp. 166-171; in the Opus Postumum, see p. 188.) The only reason I can come up with as to why racism has been unpopular for so long, even among elites, is Auschwitz, which was its logical conclusion. With the rise of the transnational corporation and the failure of totalitarian socialism to be a viable alternative to capitalism, we are witnessing a dangerous resurgence of racism, which finds itself displayed in all its glory in the various sub-intellectual discussions of The Bell Curve in even the most mainstream of media. For a valuable summary and criticism of these discussions, see Naureckas (1995).

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