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Augustine on Evil and the Will

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A Thesis

In

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of

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## ABSTRACT

### Augustine on Evil and the Will

Jean Caron Morris

The purpose of this thesis is to clarify and evaluate Saint Augustine's conception of free will as the source of evil. It is argued that in two of Augustine's three periods, middle and mature, he is unable to uphold this doctrine. The introductory chapter gives a summary of five types of recognized evils, a brief synopsis of various historical conceptions of evil, and a definition of evil. This definition distinguishes between active and passive evil, and places the assessment for human responsibility in the active category. Augustine's core definition for evil is the privation of the good, utilizing this definition he places the source of evil in the human will, that is, in the active category. A contemporary definition of the free will is constructed to make a comparison with Augustine's formulation of the free will.

Augustine bases evil in the will to show that man, not God, is the source of evil. In this first period Augustine distinguishes between the freedom of the will to choose, and the freedom of persons to perform these choices. This separation implies a difficulty for the freedom of the will because choices can not be wholly severed from performed physical choices. However, in this first stage Augustine is able to account for both the mere choices and performed choices of the will.



During his middle period Augustine modifies his earlier conception of the power of the will to correspond to his conception of grace. The will has a necessary tendency to choose evil, unless aided by the grace of God, due to the consequences of original sin. This alteration to the power of the will means that grace is absolutely necessary both to choose and perform the good choices. In view of both his altered perceptions of the power of the free will to choose the good, and the necessary tendency to sin, Augustine's designation of man's responsibility for evil becomes debatable.

In his mature writings he both develops and clarifies his notions of predestination and the elect. His conception entails that both the elect and the non-elect choose and act in accordance with God's purpose. The human will, governed by one of two irresistible forces, lacks self-determination; therefore, the will can not be held responsible for evil. Augustine's formulation of the predestination of the elect can be seen as flawed, if it is judged by reason, because of the unacceptable consequence which results from his position. Now God is included in the responsibility for the continuation of evil. St. Augustine's influence on later doctrines about evil and free will is felt through the centuries both in secular and theological writings.

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## INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis is to clarify and critically evaluate Saint Augustine's conception of the human free will as the source of evil. It is argued that in two of Augustine's three periods, early, middle and mature, he is unable to maintain this conclusion. Each of the six chapters provides some element which is required for this assessment.

Chapter one includes: a summary of five types of recognized evils, a brief synopsis of various historical conceptions of evil, and a definition of evil. This definition distinguishes between active and passive evil, and places the assessment for human responsibility in the active category. Augustine's designation of human responsibility for evil will be compared with this manner of determining culpability.

An introduction to Augustine's various conceptions of evil, and a proposed definition of free will are the concerns of the second chapter. Augustine's core definition for evil is the privation of the good; utilizing this definition he places the source of evil in the human will, which is deprived of the good. A contemporary definition of the free will is constructed to enable the attribution of responsibility for active or chosen evil. To fully explicate this proposed definition the important interrelationships to the will, deliberation, physical action, and intention are also examined.

Chapter three is a study of Augustine's earliest formulation of the free will. He bases evil in the choices of the human will to show that man, not God, is the source of evil. In this first period Augustine distinguishes between the freedom of the will to choose, and the freedom of persons to perform these choices. This separation implies a difficulty for the freedom of the will because choices can not be wholly severed from performed

physical choices. However, in this first stage Augustine is able to account for both the good choices and performed choices of the will.

The fourth chapter analyses Augustine's writings during his middle period. He modifies his earlier conception of the power of the human will, to correspond to his conception of grace. The will has a necessary tendency to choose evil, unless aided by the grace of God, because of the impossibility of overcoming the penal consequences of sin. This alteration to the power of the will means that grace is absolutely necessary to both choose and perform the good choices. In view of both his altered perceptions of the power of the free will to choose good, and the necessary tendency to sin, Augustine's designation of man's responsibility for evil becomes debatable.

In chapter five an examination of Augustine's mature writings is presented. In this third period he both clarifies and elaborates on his notions of predestination and the elect. His conception entails that both the elect and the non-elect choose and act in accordance with God's purpose. The human will, governed by one of two irresistible forces, lacks self-determination; therefore, the will is not in a position to be held responsible for evil. Augustine's formulation of the predestination of the elect can be seen as flawed because of the unacceptable consequence which results: now God is included in the responsibility for the continuation of evil.

Chapter six includes a final summary of his three positions on the human will as the source of evil; each of these positions is evaluated against the criteria for responsibility provided in chapter two. In addition, a brief historical survey and estimation of his influence on the several main traditions of human responsibility for evil are provided.

## THE NOTION OF EVIL

This initial chapter includes both a brief survey of the standard types of evils, and of the work that has been done on the subject of evil. There are at least three ways in which a person can be the cause of evil. These are examined, and a definition of evil is provided which enables one to evaluate and attribute responsibility for it. It will be argued that to attribute human responsibility for evil, a person must choose evil; consequently, the potential for evil resides in the human will. The contents of this first chapter will facilitate the understanding of Saint Augustine's conceptions of evil.

### Five Types of Evil

The concept of evil is usually divided into four general types: physical, moral, metaphysical, and pain/suffering.<sup>1</sup> However, we shall also examine existential evil as a fifth type. Physical evils are natural disasters, such as earthquakes, diseases, and so forth. Moral evil, referred to as sin by theists, includes injustices committed by persons, such as lying, stealing, and killing. There have been numerous attempts to unite these two types. Some philosophers, such as R. Swinburne, maintain that as creatures who learn inductively from previous experiences we need the experience of natural evil to learn to become moral agents.<sup>2</sup> Other philosophers, such as St. Augustine, believe that physical evil is, in part, punishment for moral sin.<sup>3</sup> Others such as H. J. McCloskey believe that physical evil is significantly different from moral evil, and the former can not be reduced to the latter.<sup>4</sup> A.M. Fairbairn separates moral evil from physical evil: moral evil is positive because it is an action which is performed, whereas physical evil is negative because it must be suffered.<sup>5</sup>

Moral evil is both a choice and an action, whereas physical evil is a result or consequence.<sup>6</sup> Writers such as G. Wallace believe that any connection between moral and physical evil depends upon the moral/physical distinction which is made by the person.<sup>7</sup>

Metaphysical evil concerns the finitude, limitedness and imperfection of persons and the world.<sup>8</sup> This evil is conceived of as the suffering which is caused for no explicable reason. One metaphysical position which assumes that there is no meaning for our existence, or no way to think about existence is nihilism.<sup>9</sup>

There are two types of mental and physical pain/suffering. The evil which results from the other sorts of evil, and the evil of simply feeling the pain and the suffering.<sup>10</sup> John Hick distinguishes between pain and suffering; he maintains that some persons feel pain but do not suffer, and vice versa.<sup>11</sup> While some writers, such as M.J. Coughlan, believe that suffering is an evil which is not justifiable by its morally educative purpose,<sup>12</sup> others such as R. Swinburne, believe that this purpose is precisely what justifies the existence of evil.<sup>13</sup>

Existential evil can also be approached in at least two ways. The first is the subjective experience of evil; this form seems to resemble the evil of pain/suffering.<sup>14</sup> A second way is in a metaphysical or ontological sense which is based upon the manner in which a person exists.<sup>15</sup> Michael Gelven states that an evil person is one who does not affirm the meaning of existence, much like a nihilist.<sup>16</sup> By his analysis, much of what we consider to be moral evil would be conceived as bad or wicked.<sup>17</sup>

From these five recognized categories of evil, moral, physical, metaphysical, existential, and pain/suffering, it would seem that one overriding definition is not possible. Although some overlapping of types of

evils is clearly discernible, such as both moral and physical evil being the cause of the evil of pain and suffering, other types of evils can be conceived of separately, such as physical and existential evil. To interrelate these evils, the most promising position is a theist combination which would designate moral evil or sin as the cause which warrants physical evil as punishment; in turn, this punishment causes pain and suffering. A relationship with God would provide both metaphysical participation in the infinite, divine life, and would provide persons with existential meaningfulness. However, the criticisms of McCloskey regarding the complete irreducibility of physical evil to moral evil,<sup>18</sup> and the objections to theism make this conception unavailable to many.

### **Historical Conceptions of Evil**

Numerous historical and contemporary conceptions of evil are worthy of consideration. The positions taken by the Greek philosophers regarding evil were varied. Socrates claims that no one does evil knowingly; that is, persons commit evil through ignorance or lack of the knowledge of the good.<sup>19</sup> Plato believes that the Demiurge uses evil in his cosmic plan; evil does exist in the various parts which contribute to the whole, but evil does not apply to the whole.<sup>20</sup> In other words, some parts may be evil, but they contribute to the goodness of the whole cosmic plan. Aristotle thinks that two sources of evil exist, the wickedness of ignorance, and a defective moral weakness.<sup>21</sup> The latter means that a person knows the right principles but fails to act in reference to them.

For the Stoics, moral evil or sin is seen as false judgment, that is, conceiving of false claims as true.<sup>22</sup> Also, it is missing the mark of virtue which is caused by ignorance.<sup>23</sup> The assent given to false knowledge is



within our power, and is both an intellectual and moral act. Plotinus provides a scale of being in which the farthest emanation from God is evil, the point reached in physical matter.<sup>24</sup>

One medieval account of evil will be inspected later in this thesis; it is the absence of the good.<sup>25</sup> The privation theory of evil (*privatio boni*) is one of the most widely accepted medieval approaches to the problem of evil. Briefly, the absence of good to the appropriate degree in which it should be present, is considered evil. Regarding physical evil, St. Thomas Aquinas believes that God's creation of variety in the world allowed for corruptible beings. Although God allows for the suffering of the part, it contributes to the whole.<sup>26</sup> Duns Scotus maintains that the will must choose evil.<sup>27</sup>

Leibnitz recognized three types of evil: metaphysical, physical and moral.<sup>28</sup> Schopenhauer regarded evil as the evil will.<sup>29</sup> Nietzsche identified evil as a man-made distinction relative to the individual; the world is essentially non-moral.<sup>30</sup> Numerous Marxists, Michael Gelven states, believe that evil is an external enemy which threatens an existing system.<sup>31</sup>

More recent work on evil includes the conception of the banality of evil put forward by Hanna Arendt.<sup>32</sup> Some persons do not consciously commit evil, but contribute to the amount of evil through unreflective tasks. In addition, social anthropologists have attempted to make any absolute standards of good and evil seem dubious.<sup>33</sup> However, David Hicks claims that simple moral relativity is also unsatisfying, and does not make sense of all the gathered facts.<sup>34</sup>

## **Twentieth Century Problem of Ethical Knowledge**

One of the major philosophical themes of this century is the

contention that good and evil are terms which cannot be used because they are unknowable.<sup>35</sup> This charge of 'unknowable' is meant in a particular way. Logical facts or physical objects can be known only by accredited scientific methods. To state that some object or event is either good or evil does not give us knowledge about them; instead, it refers to how we should shape our attitude towards these objects and events.<sup>36</sup> As a result of this claim much of the contemporary work on evil has dealt less with the problem of evil, than with what can be said in terms of a moral philosophy; that is, whether the problem of evil can be dealt with in a conceptually sound manner.<sup>37</sup> Questions such as: "What is evil? How does it arise? and How can it be overcome?" have not, for the most part, been given the same consideration as earlier historical treatments because of this foundational focus on the intelligibility of making such claims.

### **Contemporary Theodicy**

A somewhat wider scope on the questions above is found in the contemporary discussion in theodicy.<sup>38</sup> This discipline considers the problem of evil in relation to the existence of God. Still, similar to much twentieth century moral philosophy, the subject matter of theodicy is largely overshadowed by formal concerns. Much of the recent work has been fueled by the reiterated charge that the existence of evil, especially the vast amount of superfluous and unnecessary evil, tends to prove that a good, omnipotent God does not exist. In spite of the battles over theoretical formalities, there has been some new or reconstituted solutions to the problem of evil.<sup>39</sup>

## The Free Will Defence

The most common way of justifying the belief in an omnipotent, good, God and evil is the free will defence. Plantinga has employed this defence against critics such as McCloskey, Mackie, and Anthony Flew. This form of the defence was designed to show that the theist approach is not logically inconsistent. Interestingly, he maintains that the possession of a free will does not have to be proven, nor does it have to be true, nor even plausible. All that is required from this defence is that it make the theist conception logically consistent.<sup>40</sup> In other words, the free will defence only needs to be logically possible. Plantinga defines the concept of free will:

What is relevant to the Free Will Defence is the idea of *being free with respect to an action*. If a person is free with respect to a given action, then he is free to perform that action and free to refrain from performing it; no antecedent conditions and/or causal laws determine that he will perform the action, or that he won't. It is within his power, at the time in question, to take or perform the action and within his power to refrain from it. Freedom so conceived is not to be confused with unpredictability.<sup>41</sup>

The possession of a free will means that it is no longer inconsistent for both evil and God to exist because persons can create evil. However, Plantinga also believes that only if more good is created than evil can God be morally justified in creating this world.<sup>42</sup>

Both Flew and Mackie claim that God could have created a wholly good world in which all persons would freely choose the good.<sup>43</sup> Plantinga states that this occurrence is logically impossible (free persons must make their own choices), but not necessarily false.<sup>44</sup> He argues that this claim is

contingent, that is, possibly true or possibly false. Some of the protagonists in this dispute, such as McCloskey, are uncertain that we do have free will, but continue to argue by giving this conception a logically possible status. McCloskey questions the value of a free will in at least three ways. One is the limited applicability of the free will, that is, animals do not have one,<sup>45</sup> nor do those who are mentally deficient.<sup>46</sup> Secondly, that we often curtail our freedom voluntarily.<sup>47</sup> Finally, given the amount of evil in the world, the capacity of free will does not outweigh the value of a pseudo-free will which would always choose the good, and yield a world with less evil.<sup>48</sup>

However, even if this defence makes the logical argument consistent, it is neither universally accepted that God should have granted man free will, nor the sort of free will which produces the great amount of evil in the world.

### **Active and Passive Evil**

In terms of the individual creation of evil, persons can be seen as performing moral evil, existential evil, and causing the evil of pain/suffering. There are at least three ways that a person can be caused to perform evil: by fate, as a result of their nature, and by self-determination. The Greek tragedians recognized a sense of fate in their plays. For example, the character Oedipus was punished for both killing his father and committing incest, yet he did not know the identity of either of these individuals.<sup>49</sup> Philip Rice Blair states that the deeds committed are not rooted in the character flaws of these individuals.<sup>50</sup> For this type of evil action persons actually do both choose and perform the evil, but it is beyond their abilities to avoid their predetermined fate.

Secondly, evil could be committed by persons if their nature was formed or reformed to allow them only to commit evil. In some of his writings St. Augustine recognized this cause of evil as a penalty for original sin.<sup>51</sup> From this formulation, a person acts according to her nature, as animals act according to their instincts.<sup>52</sup> Both of these first two causes are beyond the power of the individual to withstand. In these two formulations persons are passive in regard to the creation of evil. They are considered passive because they are not responsible in the sense of actively choosing to commit evil. Although they do choose to commit the deeds, in both types of instances, the individuals could not do otherwise.

Finally, persons can be seen to choose to commit evil deeds when they have the alternative to do otherwise. In this sense, persons are self-determined; in other words, the cause is within themselves. In this type of formulation, persons actively commit evil. If persons are seen as active agents with the ability to both choose to perform or not perform evil, then they can be held responsible for the evil that they choose. Given this conception, in order to hold a person responsible, she must possess a free will to choose between alternatives. There are at least three ways that evil can be committed by a human agent. But to hold a person responsible for evil, she must possess the ability to do otherwise. Therefore, for man to be responsible for evil he must have chosen evil, and this act of choosing implies that evil must lie in the free will.

### **Choice Implies Knowledge**

Choice is intimately associated with knowledge. If we have the ability to choose between alternatives, then we presume that we know what represents both a good and an evil choice. However, the history of ethical

philosophy is filled with numerous attempts to define good and evil.<sup>53</sup> Moral relativists have ably pointed out that what seems evil to one person may seem good to another;<sup>54</sup> indeed, this occurrence can also be witnessed in the same individual at different stages. The ability to choose among optional ethical codes does not necessarily mean that there is no absolute good and evil. There may not be any absolute code, but it is logically possible that one does exist.

Although we do not have a universally accepted knowledge of good and evil, we do have a few basically accepted normative rules, such as not deliberately causing unnecessary pain to another person. Good moral agents attempt to act according to these rules as often as possible. It may seem paradoxical that by sometimes breaking or ignoring these rules, that we can be seen to act morally.

As finite individuals we do not have perfect knowledge; our choices will always be subject to error. Because of this consequence our codes should be subject to a continuous process of evaluation dependent upon the acquisition of greater ethical knowledge. However, in spite of this epistemic limitation, individuals will choose what they believe to be a good or an evil choice.

### **Two Levels of Choice**

In view of the limitations of our knowledge, we must not only choose to do the good, but also choose what we consider to be the good. Michael Gelven asserts that we have a freedom which is prior to the freedom to cause moral or immoral actions.<sup>55</sup> If we accept his conclusion, then we are free both to choose what we believe is good and evil, and then free to make choices according to this code. To choose what we will acknowledge as

good or evil involves an interchange with others. We are involved with others in such instances as the propagation of various moral codes and public laws; still, one chooses to accept, reject, modify or create an ethical code. Clearly, a person is free to alter her ethical code, or substitute another whenever she decides that her present code is inadequate. The lack of certain moral knowledge necessitates two levels of choice, and these choices imply the freedom to choose at both levels. Thus, a person is free both to choose her moral code, and free to make choices according to this code.

### **Definition of Evil**

The definition of evil that will be used for this thesis is imbedded in the notions of choice and free will. In other words, to commit evil, in the active sense, one must choose to commit evil by the use of one's free will.

It is assumed that all people desire their own good, or their own pleasure.<sup>56</sup> However, pleasure is not equivalent to the good because we can also derive pleasure from evil. If one finds pleasure in doing evil (evil defined according to their chosen code), then one has chosen evil and performed an evil act. In other words, if a person finds pleasure in evil, then one has chosen evil. There is an important distinction here: a person may commit acts which would be considered by others as bad, or wrong, or evil, but unless he commits these acts knowingly and derives pleasure from them, they do not fall under the strict sense of evil. This definition may seem strange because we assume that we do not do evil for our good or pleasure. We are accustomed to believing that persons think that the evil which they choose is good, that is, that they are ignorant of the good.<sup>57</sup> Yet there are numerous instances where one does evil knowingly and derives

pleasure from it. For example, if the desire to witness or cause the pain of another gives a person pleasure, then this person is choosing evil, if the person acknowledges that causing pain to another is evil. Additional examples might include child molesters, persons who starts harmful rumours, the destructive comments that are made towards another, lying and cheating. With minimal self-reflection we are aware of the times that we have caused pain to others and found it pleasurable or satisfying.

Basing the analysis of evil on the subjective perception of the individual does not mean that all judgments of good and evil are equally valid; some moral judgments are more acceptable than others. Often the more tolerant attitude of allowing for differences is seen as more ethical than some of the absolute moral standards. However, again, epistemic ignorance of a moral absolute does not necessarily deny the existence of one. Because of this lack of the knowledge of absolute moral values, we can utilize a definition which, if not perfect, at least allows us to recognize personal evil, and choose to try to overcome it. With this definition of evil we are able to recognize when we choose evil, or when we cause pain unintentionally.

### **Problem—The Relativity of Knowledge**

Every definition has potential problems; it will be necessary to consider some of these possibilities. This definition of evil seems to ignore what might be considered by others as evil, but by the perpetrator as good. For example, if a sadist were to cause another pain, he would not derive his pleasure from evil, but would imagine that causing pain is good. This type of situation is one of the most difficult to understand. It seems to most of



us as the apex of evil, yet by the above definition, it seems to elude being considered as evil.

However, simply because the sadist does not choose evil according to his moral code, does not mean that he has chosen the good, although he has chosen the good according to his own standards. The sadist has also chosen a particular code and it is in his prior choice that the sadist would be considered to be evil by many individuals. This form of censure falls under normative ethics. However, it is in this initial choice that we can not conform to an absolute standard. Still, our normative ethics are not completely trivial, or most of us could not recognize the evil of the sadist. Although we can point to the sadist as evil, we can not from this example deduce a clear code of morality based upon universally acceptable premises. In other words, aside from this example, any premises we might derive are questionable by some individuals.<sup>58</sup>

As finite individuals who can not seem to recognize nor create a universal moral code, we must accept that some instances of evil can not always be redressed. Although individuals such as the sadist may seem to be the epitome of evil, all we can do is hope that they can be contained by laws, or that they will alter their conception of good and evil, or that some sense of justice is inherent and active in the world.

### **Problems with Definition: Weak-willed, Compulsives**

This definition also seems to ignore three other standard conceptions of an evil choice: choosing the lesser of two evils, compulsive behaviour, and the weak-willed individual. Committing the lesser evil means that one chooses evil knowingly but has to choose between two evil choices. Since our definition states that one must derive one's pleasure in evil, this

instance does not fall within our classification. However, committing the lesser evil means that one is faced with only evil choices, and by choosing the lesser evil one attempts to choose the good. It is true that evil is chosen knowingly, but not all situations lend themselves to an easy resolution of simply choosing between good or evil, nor do we have the power to alter certain situations. In an instance of choosing between two evils, the person who chooses the lesser evil has, within the best of her ability chosen the good.

The compulsive would be a kleptomaniac, or similar type of individual who is unable to avoid willing evil.<sup>59</sup> He is similar to the morally weak person because both sorts of individuals have a malfunctioning will. Through insufficient moral strength, the morally weak person finds herself choosing and performing what she believes to be evil.<sup>60</sup> This kind of individual can produce a great amount of pain and suffering to others. However, because these individuals do not derive pleasure from their choices they do not strictly fall within the given definition of evil. Rather, they could be seen as capable of causing pain and suffering to others but are too weak to do otherwise. Authors Bernard Gert and Timothy Duggan claim that some individuals do not have the ability to will various kinds of actions.<sup>61</sup> This inability is a form of mental illness. They claim that philosophers such as Aristotle, Hobbes, and Austin identified a willed action as a voluntary action.<sup>62</sup> However, this result ignores the condition where some performed actions are not freely chosen; in other words, these individuals are incapable of willing otherwise. Clearly, this type of behaviour is worthy of censure, but it does not merit the appellation of an evil choice because they possess a flawed will. In addition, these

individuals do not receive pleasure from their choices, and often suffer as much as the recipients of their actions.

Persons are responsible for the evil that they choose, but they do not always choose the evil that is apparent in this world. To ignore any form of definition due to a lack of ultimate clear principles is debilitating. Clearly, no one individual can rid the world of evil, but each can attempt to rid it of the evil that each contributes.

### **Conclusion**

There are various conceptions of evil; some we must bear, and some we create. Many philosophers have proffered conceptions of the source and solution to the problem of evil, but there does not seem to be one standard formulation. In the present century even employing the term 'evil' has proven problematic, although some work has been done in theodicy.

The creation of evil by persons can be considered in two senses, the passive and the active. Persons create evil in a passive sense through the inability to do otherwise. In contrast, persons create evil in an active sense through the use of their will. To be responsible for evil, persons must choose evil when they could choose otherwise. For this reason evil lies in the will because it is through the use of the will that one chooses evil. With a free will persons have both the capacity to commit evil or mitigate it. Although this definition does not account for all the evil in the world, it does account for humanity's creation of it.

## AUGUSTINE'S CONCEPTION OF EVIL AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE WILL

The second chapter has two purposes: to introduce Augustine's various conceptions of evil, and to supply a definition of the free will which will be used to compare and evaluate Augustine's treatment of the free will as the source of evil. Comparing and evaluating his treatment of the will is the subject matter of the following three chapters. The Augustinian texts which will be used in this chapter include: *Concerning the Nature of the Good, Against the Manicheans*,<sup>1</sup> *On the Morals of the Manicheans*,<sup>2</sup> *On Two Souls, Against the Manicheans*,<sup>3</sup> and *Divine Providence and the Problem of Evil*.<sup>4</sup>

There are at least four reasons which make Augustine pre-eminent on the subject of evil: the motivating force that the solution to the problem of evil had for him, the substantial amount of his writings on this subject, the strategic temporal location of his writings, and the enormous influence of his formulation. The solution to the problem of evil was one of the primary reasons for his intellectual acceptance and commitment to the three schools of thought to which he adhered, in succession, (Manichean sect, Plato's Third Academy, and Christianity). Secondly, Augustine was a prolific writer, and a great portion of his work is concerned with the problem of evil. In three of his extended confrontations, the Manichean, the Pelagian, and the semi-Pelagian, the problem of evil is of central concern. As a third factor, Augustine helped to provide an intellectual synthesis and transition between the classical world and the Christian world.<sup>5</sup> Finally, the scope of his influence, which will be considered in chapter six, can hardly be minimized. A great portion of his conception of evil has helped to shape the western mentality through the Catholic and Protestant religions.

Thus, for at least these four reasons, Saint Augustine is an obvious candidate in the consideration of the problem of evil.

### Philosophical Understanding and Faith

His treatment of the problem of evil is a sufficiently philosophical one. Saint Augustine's personal quest was for certainty and truth, which he eventually found in Christianity.<sup>6</sup> Augustine did not consider himself as introducing new elements into Christianity; rather, he believed that he was defending the accepted faith.<sup>7</sup> To do so he utilized a mixture of both theology and philosophy, faith and reason. J. Roland Ramirez states that Augustine's priority of faith, *crede ut intelligas*, does not imply a criticism of reason.<sup>8</sup> Faith is prior to reason in at least five ways: the acceptance of personal identity, the existence of an internal mental sense, the belief that historical events happened as recorded, the belief in the existence of other countries, and the notion that belief is prior to understanding.<sup>9</sup> The most important priority is that we must first believe in order to understand; this sequential arrangement is due to our insufficient mental capacity, and is a presupposition for all types of learning.<sup>10</sup> It is understanding or knowledge of God that Augustine prizes, not simply belief in God. But the only way to reach this understanding is through faith.<sup>11</sup>

Although Augustine seems to become sceptical of reason as he matures, his scepticism is directed to reasoning without the guidance of faith. Faith is based upon the authority of the Scriptures, whereas reason without reference to scripture easily leads to error.<sup>12</sup> Throughout his work Augustine's reliance upon reason is always in evidence. This reliance can be witnessed in three ways: by his arguing from premises to conclusions, by

his desire to resolve seeming conflicts between Scriptural passages, and by his continuous attempts at a unifying structure of Christian beliefs.<sup>13</sup>

### **Augustine's Understanding of the Good**

One of the motivating factors for Augustine's initial treatment of evil is his confrontation with the Manichean Sect.<sup>14</sup> As a past member of this sect, for nine years, Augustine was well-versed in their theoretical constructions.<sup>15</sup> The Manicheans recognized two conflicting material principles, one a force of darkness called Hyle, the other, God, was the force of light.<sup>16</sup> Both the world and humanity embody these two principles; both internal and external evil is attributed to one aspect, Hyle. The Manicheans claimed to offer truth and certainty, and Augustine wished to expose their assumptions as false.

To understand Augustine's conception of evil, we must first consider certain aspects of his conception of the good, because he states that evil arises in relation to the good. God is the highest good, and the source of all good;<sup>17</sup> in addition, God is ultimate being.<sup>18</sup> God created persons from nothing, that is, He did not form the world from some pre-existing material. "But he is not almighty who seeks the assistance of any material whence he may make what he will. From which it follows, that according to our faith, all things that God made through His word and wisdom, He made out of nothing."<sup>19</sup> This doctrine is known as creation *ex nihilo*. One implication of this doctrine is that persons should live according to God's commands because they have a created nature.<sup>20</sup>

God is the author of all measure, form and order; all entities, including persons, acquire their goodness to the degree that they possess these three attributes.<sup>21</sup> Measure is the manner in which entities are

constituted by extension, number and weight.<sup>22</sup> Form concerns comeliness or the harmonious appearance of the whole entity.<sup>23</sup> Order is the unified arrangement of the parts of a whole, for example, the uniformity of physical causes.<sup>24</sup> It is through order that God governs;<sup>25</sup> everything is arranged in a hierarchical order of goodness.<sup>26</sup> For Augustine, existence is a unity, and to the degree which order unifies entities into simple wholes it causes them to exist.<sup>27</sup> Insofar as entities retain their created measure, form and order they maintain their existence or goodness. In contrast, disorder tends toward non-existence, which he designates as a perversion or corruption of nature.<sup>28</sup> Insofar as entities fall or turn away from their created measure, form and order, they tend towards non-existence or evil. 29

### **Evil as Privation**

This conception of evil is termed "privation"; in other words, evil is the privation of goodness. Augustine's core definition of evil is the privation of goodness (*privatio boni*).<sup>30</sup> "Here, then, if you will consider the matter without stubbornness, we will see that evil is that which falls away from essence and tends to non-existence."<sup>31</sup> Essence is the designed nature of an entity created by God. This conception of evil is borrowed from the neo-Platonic philosophers.<sup>32</sup>

Augustine used the doctrine of the privation of evil against the Manicheans. "This evil is the disagreement, which certainly is not a substance, but hostile to substance."<sup>33</sup> Augustine uses the terms 'substance, nature, and essence' interchangeably.<sup>34</sup> In the *Morals of the Manichaeans* Augustine finds three answers to the question, "What is Evil?"<sup>35</sup> These are: that which is contrary to the nature of the entity, that which is hurtful to the nature of the entity, and that which is a corruption

to the nature of the entity. The last answer is the most accurate; the goal of corruption is the privation of the good. However, there can be no completely evil nature because evil is a corruption of the existing nature. To the extent that any entity exists according to its nature, it is good.<sup>36</sup> Therefore, evil is not a substance, instead, it is the lack of substance or goodness.

### **Physical Evil**

Augustine asserts that we use the term 'evil' in two senses, the evil which we commit and the evil which we suffer.<sup>37</sup> Augustine conceives of the latter evil in two senses. The first is usually regarded as physical evil and pain/suffering.<sup>38</sup> Sin corrupts the order of God's creation; to restore this order sin must be punished.<sup>39</sup> Augustine claims that this form of evil is both a just punishment,<sup>40</sup> and a corrective for our sins.<sup>41</sup> He connects physical evil to moral evil by denoting physical evil as the punishment for sin.<sup>42</sup> Because persons have a free will which enables them not to choose evil, if they do choose evil, then they must be punished. Augustine believes that pain is useful if it can correct the sinner; if it can not, then pain is useless.<sup>43</sup> Evil without experiencing pain is worse because one is rejoicing in iniquity, instead of feeling the pain of the corruption.<sup>44</sup>

Secondly, he acknowledges that some manifestations of the aesthetic unity of the created world may appear evil. However, some instances that appear evil to persons may not be so in reality.<sup>45</sup> This mistake occurs because of our limited human perspective, and lack of knowledge regarding God's purposes:

And furthermore, it is clear to a learned man that what displeases in a portion displeases for no other reason than



because the whole, with which the portion harmonizes wonderfully, is not seen, but that, in the intelligible world, every part is as beautiful and perfect as the whole.<sup>46</sup>

The world is filled with privations which seem evil, such as the temporal passing of various things, yet this is part of the created beauty which, like a painting, requires both shadows and light.<sup>47</sup>

Augustine's account of physical evil covers two aspects, evil as punishment and corrective for moral sins, and the aesthetic conception of the world which results from our limited perspective. The aesthetic conception effectively denies created evil. This study will focus upon physical evil as the punishment for human sins.

### **Moral Evil or Sin**

Using the definition of evil as privation, Augustine attempts to account for moral evil. Because the good of our created nature is to be obedient to God, disobedience is sin.<sup>48</sup> If a person turns away from God, then her nature becomes corrupt or deprived of the good. "Therefore, as I have said, sin is not the striving after an evil nature, but the desertion of a better, and so the deed itself is evil, not the nature which the sinner uses amiss."<sup>49</sup> Augustine means that God created persons with a good nature, and insofar as they exist they are good, but insofar as their nature is corrupted, they are evil. Therefore sin is to turn away from God and prefer the lower goods to the highest good; for example, Adam sinned by not obeying God's command.

To commit a sin one must turn away from God, and to do so requires an act of will. "Sinning therefore takes place only by exercise of will."<sup>50</sup> To sin, persons must have a free will, and Augustine believes that God

created persons with a free will. Sin is the will "to retain and follow after what justice forbids."<sup>51</sup> Justice is fully manifested in God; hence, to be just, is to will in accordance with the commands of the most just--God. To fully understand Augustine's conception of evil, its source, the human will must be examined.

In the following three chapters Augustine's three conceptions will be analyzed to see if the responsibility for evil can be attributed solely to the human will. If evil can be attributed to the human will, then a definition of the free will is required which would enable us to designate this culpability. This definition will be used to evaluate Augustine's various conceptions.

### **Modern Conception of the Free Will**

To claim that someone possesses a free will we must consider the notions of "free" and "will" in terms of the notion of free will. First, we shall examine the notion of free or freedom. The minimal requirements for freedom are the lack of obstacles and constraints.<sup>52</sup> Obstacles are impediments to movement, and constraints enforce movement. In addition, there are two sorts of freedom, one is negative, the other is positive. A negative sense of freedom is a choice which is unimpeded by either obstacles or constraints.<sup>53</sup> Negative freedom is often equivocally referred to as 'soft determinism' because it is compatible with the notion that all events require a cause.<sup>54</sup> This cause is an internal mental state, which is the result of preceding mental states, and so forth.

In contrast, positive freedom is more expansive than negative freedom. Like negative freedom, the choices of the will can not be impeded by obstacles and constraints. The difference between the two sorts of

freedom is based upon the notion of a cause. Although a cause (internal mental state) is a necessary requirement for choosing, it is not a sufficient condition.<sup>55</sup> In other words, a motivating reason must be present, but this reason is not sufficient to produce an effect. Choices are not random because causes or reasons do make us incline towards one course of action, but we are still able to choose a different course of action. This conception of positive freedom allows us to evade an infinite regress, in terms of mental causes, by positing every choice as a first cause. Positive freedom is superior to negative freedom because it acknowledges that persons can extend their choices beyond the limits of their past experiences. It is this type of freedom that will be utilized in our definition of a free will.

Secondly, to understand the notion of the will one of Augustine's earliest definitions will be used. "Accordingly, it is thus defined: will is a movement of mind, no one compelling, either for not losing or for obtaining something."<sup>56</sup> In other words, the will can choose between alternatives. The action of the will is to choose, and its result is the choice or chosen alternative.

### **Categories Related to the Notion of Free Will**

The concept of the 'free will' is a term with intimate relationships to at least three other notions: deliberation, physical action and intention. Deliberation is the activity of assessing options.<sup>57</sup> John Austin states, "when you act *deliberately* you act after weighing it up (*not* after thinking out ways and means)."<sup>58</sup> One important presupposition of deliberation is that the chosen course of action is within the individual's capacity or power.<sup>59</sup> In other words, a person can only deliberate on possibilities which are capable of being accomplished by her; for example, she can not

deliberate about past events, nor what other persons will choose.

Deliberation is connected to willing because this action analyses the viability of the various options. However, we are usually conscious of deliberation only when we make a choice between conflicting alternatives.

The second notion connected to the free will concerns physical action. This relationship is apparent because the manifestation of choices require a cause. To choose to perform some physical action presupposes that we are capable of attempting this action, otherwise we would merely be wishing. That is, we cannot deliberate about possibilities which do not exist, although we can wish that circumstances were different. The ability to attempt some chosen action does not guarantee its successful completion, but it does imply the ability to attempt to accomplish the chosen action. For example, a person may choose to become more tolerant, but find that she fails in some instances where she had the possibility to display more tolerance. However, if one did not have the possibility ever to perform one's choices, then one would be engaging only in hypothetical speculations. For the choices of the will to be manifested in the physical world a person must be capable of acting upon her choices, at least some of the time. Nevertheless, because choice is an action we can be held responsible simply for choices. However, if choices are not manifested, then we would not be aware of evil because we would be unable to witness its effects, or we could only witness the internal evil of ourselves. Therefore, that choices do become apparent actions in the world, at least sometimes, is a necessary component of the act of willing.

A third notion interconnected to the free will is intention. To attribute a free will to man which is capable of committing evil, we must first recognize the instances of evil; this point may seem a trivial

observation, but it has important implications. We do recognize manifestations of evil, and for this evil to exist we posit a cause; in other words, the cause must create the evil effect. We recognize evil instances and attribute this effect to the free will. This connection between the choices of the will and the manifestations of these choices is the intention. That is, when we look for a cause of an action we try to gauge the person's intention or what choice he actually made. Thus, intention is relevant only in terms of physical action.<sup>60</sup> The free will is intimately connected to deliberation, physical action and intention. Deliberation assesses the options, physical actions perform the choice, and the intention determines whether the choice was successfully accomplished physically .

### **Definition of the Free Will**

In chapter one two modes of action were examined for which persons can be held responsible for the evil which is committed, a passive sense and an active sense. Any evil act, regardless of the intention, which is performed by a person can be seen as passive evil, such as the actions of a kleptomaniac, or other type of compulsive natures. In these instances the person is held responsible solely because of the consequences of her actions. In contrast, the active sense of committing evil is quite distinct. To make an evil choice means that a person has chosen this alternative. The will can not be constrained, nor deflected with obstacles. The free will is a first cause; it is not solely subject to previous mental states. For the will to be considered free, the will requires a positive sense of freedom. In other words, a person must have the ability to deliberate between options, to choose one option, and to act upon these choices, at least some of the time. A free will is one which interrelates with intention, deliberation,

and physical actions. The free will can choose from among options, and the person can physically perform some of these choices. From this definition the person acting with a free will can be held responsible for her choices.

## **Conclusion**

Augustine's definition of evil as the privation of the good enables him to explain manifestations of evil as the lack of created goodness. In addition, his conception of some apparent evil as a result of our limited human perspective accounts for some evil. But, moral evil is the privation of goodness in the human will. A modern conception of a will which is free and can be held responsible for evil has been provided. With this notion Augustine's treatments of the free will, which will be examined in the following three chapters, will be assessed.

## AUGUSTINE'S EARLY TREATMENT OF THE WILL

This chapter is an examination of Augustine's initial conception of the will, in which we shall see why and how Augustine bases evil in the will, and some of the difficulties with this endeavour. The Augustinian textual reference primarily consulted for this early conception is *On Free Will*<sup>1</sup> The focus is almost exclusively upon this text, both because it is representative of his earlier phase of writing, and because of its subject matter. The text is written in dialogue form between Augustine and his friend, Evodius. As with all books written as a dialogue, there is the suspicion that the writer is not using his own thoughts. However his acceptance of this work with modifications is presented in *Retractations*<sup>2</sup>

His first formulation of the will is the result of his contentious encounter with the Manicheans<sup>3</sup> over the source of evil. Having been a member of this sect for nine years, Augustine was amply qualified for his task as opponent. Among other disputes with them, was his concern with the problem of evil.<sup>4</sup> The Manicheans recognized two principles, one a force of darkness called Hyle, the other is God, the force of light. As a consequence<sup>5</sup> of an initial battle between the two material forces,<sup>6</sup> man arose embodying the two principles. Consequently, for the Manicheans, the creation of evil arises from evil-itself, or Hyle.

Augustine wanted to show that there are not two powerful opposing forces of good and evil, and the most adequate solution would be to find a different source of evil. As a Christian his response had to incorporate certain premises; two of the most crucial are that God is the creator of all things,<sup>7</sup> and that all things which God creates are good.<sup>8</sup> Augustine needed to find another source for evil; otherwise God, as a single force, would be responsible for its existence. This other source is the human will. In his

solution he wished to stress the freedom of God, and to stress the freedom of the will only in so far as he could make it responsible for evil. Also, he wanted to show that God is more powerful than evil. If evil has the power to limit the good, then it must be more powerful because that which can limit something, is greater than that which it limits. In other words, if God can be limited by evil, then evil is more powerful. In his solution to the problem of the source of evil Augustine made certain that God's goodness, freedom, and power were in no way mitigated; thus, when forced to contend with such statements as "either God could have prevented evil, but would not; or God would have prevented evil, but could not," Augustine is able to respond to them without limiting or implicating God.<sup>9</sup>

To ensure that the creator of humanity is not responsible for evil, Augustine responds that a person must have the power to create evil. Evil is caused by turning away from ultimate being to things which have less being. Augustine believes that it is through the free will of man that evil enters the world. Although man may be created good, and is good in so far as he exists, he has the ability to create evil by freely choosing it. To be just, when imputing responsibility to a person, he must have a free will.<sup>10</sup> Consequently, Augustine must prove that the will is free. To examine his solution, we must first consider his conception of the will.

### **The Structure of the Soul**

Since the will is an element of the soul it will be appropriate to attend to the structure of the soul first. Augustine recognizes four ways in which soul(s) may have been created,<sup>11</sup> but encourages caution in accepting any one view because none of them is considered to be certain.<sup>12</sup> The soul is composed of existence, reason and willing (*esse, nosse, velle*).<sup>13</sup> Existence



is not explained by Augustine in this instance. Augustine believes that reason is an operation of the mind which distinguishes and connects the things we learn.<sup>14</sup> It is superior to the bodily senses; it both judges the bodily senses,<sup>15</sup> and allows us to grasp the eternal ideas.<sup>16</sup> Reason also has the power to alter character.<sup>17</sup> His early high regard for reason is obvious by such claims as:

A. You understand well. One thing more: tell me, if you can, whether anything seems to you more excellent than a wise and reasonable mind.

E. Nothing but God, I think

A. That is what I think too...<sup>18</sup>

Nevertheless, the will is more powerful than reason, and only the will can depose the mind from its ruling place.<sup>19</sup> The relationship between the will and reason is an interesting one, and should be observed in greater detail.

### **The Relationship of the Will to Reason**

The relationship between the will and reason is reciprocal, although not of equal influence. The will must desire the good to choose it, yet the will, with the aid of reason, must first know what is the good. However, one of the penalties of original sin is ignorance:

It is the most just penalty of sin that man should lose what he was unwilling to make good use of, when he could have done so without difficulty if he had wished. It is just that he who, knowing what is right, and that he who had the power to do what is right, does not do it should lose the capacity to know what is right, and that he who had the power to do what is right and would not should lose the power to do it when he is willing.

In fact there are for every sinful soul these two penal conditions, ignorance and difficulty.<sup>20</sup>

There is a clear distinction, for Augustine, between the way we were originally created and how we appear after the fall of Adam. This distinction will be made apparent wherever it is appropriate. The will can no longer clearly see the good so that it can choose the good, as could Adam; in fact, we now see the wrong things as desirable. We now see things in terms of our corporeal senses because we have lost our spiritual sight through the original sin of Adam; spiritual sight enables us to see what is the good.<sup>21</sup> Augustine states that fallen souls must turn to God so that He may clear the darkness of their minds and illuminate them with knowledge.<sup>22</sup>

Augustine maintains that God gave us the power to recognize that we should seek for the knowledge of the good.<sup>23</sup> To acquire knowledge we must first acquire faith, then God will give us understanding.<sup>24</sup> He asserts that we must first believe in order to understand, as he quotes the words of the Prophet, "Except ye believe, ye shall not understand."<sup>25</sup> Augustine is convinced that belief is prior, however understanding or knowledge is superior; for example, believing that God exists comes prior to knowing that God exists, but the latter is superior. Therefore, the will must desire to know the good, and for this purpose it will acquire faith; afterwards, it will be given understanding or knowledge of the good by God, so that it may choose it.<sup>26</sup>

### **Description of the Activities of the Will**

The final component of the soul is the will. Augustine describes it as an active power of the soul<sup>27</sup> which chooses among alternatives. To choose

is to consent or reject any possibility which is presented to the will.<sup>28</sup> Etienne Gilson states that the will is so important to Augustine's thinking that, "It is no exaggeration, therefore, to say that as the will is, so is the man, so much so, in fact, that a will divided against itself is a man divided against himself."<sup>29</sup> Augustine concludes that we must have a will because we experience the will when we desire: the will to know the answers to questions, the will to attain wisdom, the will for the well-being of our friends, and the will for a happy life.<sup>30</sup>

For the will to perform the task of choosing Augustine assumes that it must be attracted to one of the alternatives presented to it.<sup>31</sup> There are various ways in which attraction can be considered: attraction as a focusing of attention, or attraction as a motivation, or attraction as a cause which determines the movement of the will. However, the will cannot be determined by anything because the will is a first cause,<sup>32</sup> or self-motivated force. Given Augustine's comments on attraction, it would most closely resemble the second type, attraction as a motivation. Although the will determines what it finds attractive,<sup>33</sup> it does not have the power to control the things which affect it,<sup>34</sup> consequently, the will is exposed to both superior and inferior alternatives from which it may choose.<sup>35</sup> Thus, the will, for Augustine, is the power to select one alternative from those presented to it.

When considering the will, it is important to mention some of the major criticism it has engendered. In *The Concept of Mind* Gilbert Ryle devotes a chapter to the notion of the will; he attempts to show that the will is an artificial concept with no utility.<sup>36</sup> To prove his point he offers four objections to the notion of the will: that we have no empirical grounds for its existence, that is, we do not speak in terms of using our will in

everyday usage, such as, "I willed seven times this morning"; that we cannot witness acts of will in others; that the connection between acts of will and physical movements is an acknowledged mystery; and that if volitions (choices) are actions then we find ourselves in an infinite regress, that is, we can choose to choose, and so forth.<sup>37</sup> Basically, he believes that the conception of the will exists because we seek a mental cause for bodily movements, but that focusing on a causal connection is incorrect.

One claim which can be used to test the correctness of his four claims and his conclusion is Ryle's belief that the will is used as a synonym for intention.<sup>38</sup> However, contrary to Ryle if the action of the will is to choose, then when the will acts, it simply does so. In other words, in terms of the action of the will, its action is to choose. It is true, we do at times decide to make a future choice, but deciding to make a choice in the future is already an action performed by the will in the present. It would be more accurate to speak of intention as occupying a relational position between acts of choice (choices), and acts of choice that are performed (performed choices), that is, physical actions.

For example, I had chosen to give a friend a present that would please her, and to do so I bought her some perfume, but the consequence was that she detested the smell of that particular fragrance. In this example the choice made was to please her (aside from choosing both to give her a gift and the type of gift), however, the result was that it did not please her; hence, the intention was good, although the result was not. In these types of instances one is judged worthy of praise or blame by reason of the intention.

In contrast, the action of the will when choosing results in a choice, but this choice may or may not be performed, such as contemplating

adultery. However, it is only in reference to actions that are, or should be performed that we seek an intention. Therefore, the will is not a synonym for intention because intention is only applicable in reference to actions which are or are not performed, after the will has acted by choosing. Therefore, some of Ryle's criticism is mitigated when the action of the will results in a choice, as Augustine says, rather than equating will with intention.<sup>39</sup>

### **The Function of the Will**

Augustine thinks that the will is an intermediate good; it lies between the bodily goods which are the lowest, and the virtues, prudence, fortitude, temperance and justice which are great goods.<sup>40</sup> The latter are so termed because they cannot be misused;<sup>41</sup> the other two goods can both be used for either good or evil. The will is unique because as an intermediate good it can give us the highest good, "The will, therefore, which cleaves to the unchangeable good that is common to all, obtains man's first and best good things though it is itself only an intermediate good."<sup>42</sup> To use the will to live rightly, by choosing the unchangeable and common good, is the proper function of the will. "For since the good God made me, and since I can do nothing rightly except by my will, it is clear enough that it was given by the good God for that purpose."<sup>43</sup> Consequently, we live rightly by making good choices;<sup>44</sup> nevertheless, the will can also be used to make evil choices.

### **The Types of Wills**

Augustine is convinced that God did not create man in his present state; on the contrary, Adam was created without sin, and given a perfect

will and body . His will had the ability to choose both good and evil, and to perform them;<sup>45</sup> further, his good actions resulting from his good choices were worthy of merit. Man had to learn that he is subject to the will of God and not in his own power. The reason for God's prohibition to eat from the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil is to teach obedience;<sup>46</sup> consequently, eating the forbidden fruit revealed both the penalty of sin, and the knowledge of both the good of obedience and the evil of disobedience. Adam, by voluntarily turning away from God chose to place himself above God; in so doing he attempted to overthrow the divine hierarchical order.<sup>47</sup> Since this first sin of Adam, our nature and our will are now different from their created state.<sup>48</sup> Original sin is punished with certain consequences; Augustine focuses on concupiscence (intense sexual desire), ignorance, and mortality.<sup>49</sup> This penalty is seen, by Augustine, as a just punishment for sin; furthermore, he believes that this punishment shows more of God's clemency than his severity.<sup>50</sup>

He believes that there now exists a three-fold classification of wills in terms of sin: those who never will to sin,<sup>51</sup> those who always will to sin, and those who will sometimes in either direction.<sup>52</sup> Augustine provides us with a description of the good will which he defines as, "the power by which we seek to live rightly and honourably."<sup>53</sup> The person of good will possesses the four virtues of prudence, fortitude, justice and temperance; in addition, he values his good will.<sup>54</sup> Being virtuous is choosing the good, and the reward for doing so is happiness.<sup>55</sup>

Strictly speaking, the will is a good regardless of how it is used; so when speaking of the good will or the evil will he means that the will is used primarily to make these types of choices. The evil will is one that is used to create evil.<sup>56</sup> Moral evil or sin was defined as the neglect of eternal

things, as a turning away from God; thus to choose and to do evil is to turn away from God and love inferior things.<sup>57</sup> These inferior things may be good-in-themselves; what makes this endeavour evil is preferring the inferior to the superior.<sup>58</sup>

### **The Capacity of the Will**

The cause for the movement of the will, is the will itself. It is posited as a first cause. By making the will a first cause, he avoids the infinite regress of finding further causes.<sup>59</sup> If it were caused to move by something else, then the will would not be the cause; whatever caused it to move would be the cause, and this cause would require a further cause and so forth. To illuminate his point he provides an analogy with the cause of God's creativity, and insists that the search for a higher cause than God's will is useless because it does not exist.<sup>60</sup>

This claim responds to a difficulty with regarding choice as an action; this logical problem is Ryle's fourth objection to the notion of the will.<sup>61</sup> Because Augustine believes that willing is an action, then we can choose to choose, or choose to choose to choose, and so forth. Indeed, Augustine admits that we can use the will in this way. "Do not wonder then, that if we use other things by our free will, we can also use that free will by the will itself; so that in some fashion the will which uses other things uses itself..."<sup>62</sup> Although we are able to choose to choose, and so forth, we rarely take this process back very many choices. In any case, because the will is a first cause Augustine is able to by-pass this problem; as a first cause the will is able to initiate a choice, or action; therefore, it can commence to choose at any place in the sequence of actions, and, as such, is not subject to an infinite regress. A problem which could result from his

belief that the will uses itself is: how is the will, as a first cause, able to use another first cause. Augustine's response is "In some fashion."

Even in this penal condition, it remains within our capacity to choose the good, "For man, in so far as he is man, is good because he can live aright if he choses to do so."<sup>63</sup> Although man, since Adam's fall, is prone to concupiscence and ignorance, Augustine is optimistic that if shown the correct way, that man could choose the good. However, choosing the good is not equivalent to having the ability to do the good that is chosen. "When we are speaking of the will to do right, we are speaking of the freedom wherein man was created."<sup>64</sup>

There is a significant distinction for Augustine between the free will and freedom. One consequence of Adam's sin was the inability or freedom to perform the good action that is chosen.<sup>65</sup> Man in his penal condition does not have the strength needed to perform good works;<sup>66</sup> for these he requires the aid of God.<sup>67</sup> By choosing the good, God gives man the freedom to perform the good that man chooses.<sup>68</sup> Thus, Augustine believes that we have the power to use the free will to choose the good, but we do not have the power or freedom to do the good that we have chosen without God's aid.

The will also has the capacity to choose the contrary of the good. Augustine insists that a person is responsible for her evil choices, "Because that defective movement is voluntary, it is placed within our power. If you fear it, all you have to do is simply not to will it. If you do not will it, it will not exist."<sup>69</sup> Although we have lost the freedom to perform the chosen good unaided, we have retained the freedom to perform the chosen evil. In one sense, the freedom to perform evil is not accurate because we only have freedom, states Augustine, when we are free from sin.<sup>70</sup> Augustine provides numerous Biblical quotes from which we can see that the evil



choices may be executed,<sup>71</sup> such as, "For the good that I would, I do not; but the evil that I would not, that I do."<sup>72</sup> Thus, the will has the capacity to choose both good and evil, and we have the freedom to perform only our evil choices. We can see that Augustine ensures that man is the source of evil in both choice and deed.

### **Why the Will Chooses Evil**

Augustine considers numerous reasons why the will might turn toward evil, such as: pride, self-love, avarice, external force, persuasion, as a result of learning, as our nature, and as habit. At various times he seems to give a reason for the will's turning towards evil such as pride,<sup>73</sup> loving oneself more than God,<sup>74</sup> and avarice or cupidity.<sup>75</sup> Such things as pride, self-love, and avarice are personal qualities that we have developed; they are dispositions that we have acquired by making evil choices; for example, a person who has already made herself proud will continue to find attractive the sorts of things that reinforce this quality. Etienne Gilson, in reference to Augustine's thought, explains that both pride and avarice result from preferring the part to the whole. Pride is the refusal to accept one's place in the total scheme; instead, one attempts to make oneself the ultimate end. Avarice is the desire to hoard goods, both mental and physical, and not to share them with others.<sup>76</sup> Consequently, reasons such as pride, self-love, and avarice are broad categories of dispositions to will.

The will cannot be compelled to choose evil by an external force which is superior, equally powerful, or inferior. Because it is the good which is superior, the superior or equally good person would not force another person to choose evil, which is inferior; no inferior person has the power to force the good person to be evil.<sup>77</sup> Augustine also examines the

two sources of sin, "a man's own spontaneous thought, and the persuasion of a neighbour;"<sup>78</sup> then he categorizes them according to level of culpability.<sup>79</sup> For those who bemoan that the devil forced us into evil, Augustine counters by declaring that we yielded to his persuasion.<sup>80</sup> He dismisses the notion that we learn evil by identifying both learning and knowledge as good things, that is, because knowledge is good we cannot learn anything that is not good. In contrast, evil is a privation or lack of goodness; as a result, we cannot learn something which is a nothing or a lack of something good.<sup>81</sup> He also repudiates the opinion that evil is a necessary natural movement like the downward movement of a thrown stone; the difference is that we can voluntarily choose to commence or to arrest our motion.<sup>82</sup>

One serious difficulty for the will is that it must work very hard to overcome its habitual tendency to sin. Although baptism cleanses us of original sin, it does not cancel the penalties associated with it. These penalties cannot be underestimated; they make the will both unable to know the good and burden it with an intense lust. Given their power it is not surprising that we find it easier to sin. If a person then tends to choose evil, these choices eventually result in a habit. Augustine refers to the will's tendency to sin as a "sort of second nature" or "carnal habit."<sup>83</sup> In spite of this habitual tendency, Augustine believes that a person can use her will to overcome it.<sup>84</sup>

Ultimately, Augustine frankly confesses that he does not know the cause of the will's voluntary movement towards evil. "If you ask this, and I answer that I do not know, probably you will be saddened. And yet that would be a true answer. That which is nothing cannot be known."<sup>85</sup> Turning to sin is a "movement of ceasing" and since ceasing comes from nothing, there is no cause.<sup>86</sup> The will itself is a first cause. By analogy, when the

devil chose to turn from God, his choice was considered evil, yet why he should find turning from God rather than abiding by God as attractive, is unanswerable. The devil simply chose that option as preferable, but why it was preferable has no further cause; it rests in the will of the devil. Similarly, with man, will is a first cause; therefore, the will of man is the cause of evil. All that remains to be considered to justify attributing the source of evil to the human will, is to prove that it is capable of creating evil through its free choices.

### **Proofs for the Free Will**

His first substantial written thoughts regarding man's free will are found in the text, *On Free Will*. Augustine staunchly maintains that we have freedom of the will. "What each one chooses to pursue and embrace is within the power of his will to determine."<sup>87</sup> This freedom is necessarily posited because there must be a source of evil that is not created by an all-good God. Further, we must be free to choose this evil, or the punishment of God would not be just. Augustine is concerned with proving his contentions rather than just quoting authority because at this stage, he is still very concerned with demonstrating conclusions rationally.<sup>88</sup> Thus, his major concern is to show that the will is free and consequently, responsible for evil.

In *On Free Will*, Augustine provides eight arguments or proofs for the freedom of the will. For clarity, they will be listed numerically, and considered in the sequence in which he presents them. All of his arguments are found in conjunction with others, and he does not appear to categorize them in order of importance; instead, he provides the arguments wherever the subject matter is germane.

Augustine proffers his first arguments for the freedom of the will in Book 11, in which he considers the problem of whether God should have given man free will, because man uses his will to commit evil. Although Augustine is not especially concerned at this juncture to prove the freedom of the will, he does, within the context, provide two proofs.

Augustine argues that God gave persons a free will to enable them to live rightly, that is, to choose the good. Without a free will we are unable to live rightly. Therefore, the will must be free to enable a person to live virtuously, even if the will can be used to commit sin.<sup>89</sup>

His second argument is combined with the first, although both make separate points. The notion of justice, giving to each their due, entails that God punish the sinners and reward the virtuous. But both punishment and reward would be unjust if we did not have a free will to commit both sorts of actions. Hence, because God both punishes and rewards persons, and God is just, then the will is free.

The bulk of his arguments are found in Book 111 where he is concerned to show that God, especially in terms of foreknowledge, is not responsible for the evil which humans commit. The third argument is based upon the commonly-held conception that the will is culpable for sin. To be culpable, certain requirements must be satisfied. He then provides an analogy with a falling stone: the important difference is that the stone cannot stop its descending movement, when thrown, while human beings can use their wills voluntarily to arrest their descension into sin. This means that we are culpable in a way in which the stone is not because a downward motion for a stone, when thrown, is natural, whereas for a person it is voluntary. To blame man for evil, the movement must be voluntary.

Consequently, because we do blame man for evil, he must possess a free will to commit sins voluntarily.<sup>90</sup>

The next four arguments are interwoven within chapters two and three.<sup>91</sup> Augustine states what may appear to some as an unsolvable problem: the conflict between God's foreknowledge and the free will. The problem arises because acceptance of God's infallible foreknowledge implies that we must necessarily choose to do that which God foreknows we will do. Further, this implication means that God would be responsible for evil because we necessarily choose to sin, just as God foreknows that we will. Augustine defuses this dilemma by separating the conceptions of knowledge and cause; in other words, he attempts to show that knowledge is not causal. In addition, he also provides other types of proofs, such as his proof via definition.

His fourth proof acknowledges that if God's foreknowledge were causal, then God, knowing what He will continue to do, in what we would consider the future, would also be ruled by necessity. Therefore, because this result would be unacceptable, foreknowledge cannot take away the freedom of the will.<sup>92</sup>

His fifth proof is an argument which proves that foreknowledge does not imply a non-voluntary movement of the will. In this argument he shows that if God knew that someone would be happy in a year, this information would not mean that the person did not will to be happy in a year. The result is equally applicable in terms of choosing evil. Therefore, God's foreknowledge does not obstruct the free will.<sup>93</sup>

As a sixth argument Augustine focuses on the definition of "willing." Initially he clarifies the distinction between what can be willed, from what happens by necessity; the latter means that we cannot choose to age, nor

die; these things happen to us by necessity, while the former, willing, entails that we must use our will. But if God's foreknowledge implies necessity, then when we will, it is not really ourselves who will. "But if it is necessary, it must be acknowledged that I no longer will by will, but by necessity. O strange unreason!"<sup>94</sup> He assumes that willing is inherently voluntarily because willing implies that it is the person who wills, and if a person willed necessarily, then it would be someone else who is actually doing her willing, which Augustine thinks is an absurd proposition. Augustine further elaborates on this argument by asserting that a will which is not in our power is not a will; that is, a will by definition is something that is within our power. Because the will is within our power it means that it is free to be used by ourselves. Therefore, the will is free because it is in our power.<sup>95</sup>

His seventh argument rests on the premise that God's foreknowledge is infallible. This premise entails that a person's will must be free because God knows that she will use her will in the future voluntarily. Hence, God's foreknowledge ensures that the will is free.<sup>96</sup>

In his final argument he attempts to eliminate the problem of the relation between foreknowledge and cause by two analogies. He asks his friend, Evodius, if he possessed foreknowledge of the future sins to be committed by someone else, then would he be the cause of them; to which Evodius replies that he would not. His second analogy is given by drawing a parallel between God's foreknowledge and a person's memory. As a person's memory has no power to compel the completion of past events, similarly, God's foreknowledge has no power to compel future events. As a result of these two analogies, God's foreknowledge is not causal, and not detrimental to the freedom of the will.<sup>97</sup>

These eight arguments or proofs for the freedom of the will are provided to show that man, and not God, is responsible for evil. Both Augustine's brilliance and his ingenuity are evident from these arguments. However, some of them are questionable, such as his third argument which is based on a commonly held conception, and his sixth proof which analyses definitions. Arguments that are based on common conceptions do nothing to prove that the conception is correct; earlier in the text, Augustine shows a similar scepticism towards this form of argument.<sup>98</sup> Arguments based on definitions simply repeat exactly what is contested; for example, Augustine is able to state that the will is free because, by definition, the will is free. In other words, if one possesses a will, then one possesses a free will. In addition, many of his other arguments are contested.<sup>99</sup> However, the use of these arguments for the purpose of this study is only to become acquainted with his conception of the power of the free will.

### **Problems with his Conception of the Free Will**

Augustine has shown us that the will is free to choose both good and evil. Although the soul is especially burdened with ignorance and concupiscence we can still choose the good. God has punished us by taking away our freedom to do the good, but He has left us with free choice. But is free choice conceivable without freedom of action? In other words, does this characteristic of impotence, this inability to perform the good that is chosen, alter the freedom of the will?

Augustine recognizes two types of action in reference to the will: the action of the will to choose, and the action of performing the choices which the will has made. In the study which follows, the choices of the will, are to be designated as "choice," and the performance of the choice will be

designated as "performed choice." The ability of the will to choose and perform choices of only one sort, evil, causes at least two difficulties for maintaining the freedom of the will.

The first and most serious problem is the problem of the necessary connection between choice and performed choice. Augustine had been interested in the problem of evil prior to his conversion to Christianity.<sup>100</sup> When he comes to identify evil he states that it is the evil choice, regardless of whether or not the evil action is performed:

So long as you look for the evil in the outward act you discover difficulties. But when you understand that the evil lies in lust it becomes clear that even if a man finds no opportunity ... but shows that he desires to do so, and would do it if he got the chance, he is no less guilty than if he were caught in the act.<sup>101</sup>

In fact, Augustine believes that the eternal law, too, gives choice the first priority because it is through the action of the will, and not performed choices, that we merit praise or blame.<sup>102</sup>

However, we do not have access to another person's mind (although God does, and this is what is significant for Augustine); as a result, we could not recognize evil unless it is manifested. Further, unless evil is manifested it is not a problem, that is, we would not seek to know the cause, nor seek to know whether the action is voluntarily performed. Freedom of the will merits relevance and importance to us because of its relation to performed actions. Therefore, some of the choices of the will must be performed or we could neither recognize nor assign responsibility for good or evil. We do not perform all of the actions that we choose; for example, when we have external constraints, such as laws and physical



obstacles. However, because we can both choose and perform evil choices there is no difficulty for the will to be considered free to choose in terms of evil.

The problem enters when we consider this relation of choice and performed choice in reference to the good. The will, as a first cause, is beyond or not bound by the causal laws of the world; in other words, it transcends the physical world. By separating choice and performed choice into two different realms which correspond to different types of action, Augustine has separated reality into two sorts. One is the realm of performed choice or the physical world which is bound by a causal law; or more accurately, that we believe is bound by a causal law because it seems to conform to one. Roughly, this law states that each effect has a cause, and each cause is the effect of a prior cause; this sequence of events creates a causal chain of events. The other realm is the intelligible realm; Augustine believes that the will acts or chooses within this realm. As a first cause the will transcends the physical realm because it is not subject to its causal chain.

Although the will transcends the physical world, we still describe the will as a cause in a manner similar to that of a physical cause. The will as a cause is temporally prior to its effect, which is a choice. In addition, the action of the will is followed by a result or effect. The significant distinction between the will as a first cause and a physical cause is that a physical cause belongs to a chain of causes and effects, whereas the will is not moved by a prior cause. However, the movement of the will is not random; to choose, the will must be presented with certain motivations, either mental or physical.<sup>103</sup> But motivation does not mean causal necessity; as a first cause the will is not compelled to move by anything

other than itself. Because it is not part of the causal chain, the will transcends the causal law of the physical realm. The will acts or chooses in the intelligible realm, and these choices connect with the physical realm by being performed by the individual.

If we accept that Augustine has effectively proven that the will is free to choose, then we accept that the will is free in this transcendent sense. However, we are held accountable for actions that are performed; it is then that we look for the intention. Augustine's analysis leaves the will free in this transcendent sense; but this conclusion is not sufficient because there is an interconnection between choice and performed choice which is required to merit responsibility. Therefore, if the will is unable to perform at least some of its good choices, then the will is not free.

The second problem concerns the capacity of the will. If there is a necessary connection between the chosen and performed evil to make evil manifest, then there must also be the same connection in respect to the good. In other words, a free will should have the ability to make both types of choices manifest, at least some of the time. As a will, it has the ability to move in both directions; by not allowing the will to have equal capacity in both directions, in respect to performed choices, the will is flawed, and unable to function as it should. To allow this possibility in only one direction, evil, means that the will is not equally balanced. Therefore, a will which can perform choices in only one direction is not free.

Augustine believed that he could separate choice from performed choice, but this separation is unacceptable. However, it must be remembered that because Augustine could prove that the will is free, and that God could know the choices of the will, then responsibility is justified if the will is free only in this transcendent sense.

## The Freedom of the Free Will

Augustine is able, at this first stage of his thought, to circumvent the problem of severing choice from performed choice because he is optimistic enough to see the human will as a source or creator of goodness. He believes that not only is it just that God has punished us for original sin, but God, in his infinite mercy, has provided the means for our ascension back to the good:

Though if [the soul] is born in ignorance and toilsomeness there is no necessity for it to remain in that state. Indeed it could not exist were it not Almighty God the Creator of such souls. For before He was loved He made them. In love He restores them. And being loved He perfects them.<sup>104</sup>

We can choose the good because we have the example of Christ,<sup>105</sup> the Scriptures, and the members of the Church as an initial aid or grace. If we choose to have faith and turn to God, then He will confer grace which enables us to perform the good that we will to do, "... and that weakness should be humbly confessed, so that He who neither errs nor labors in His coming may come to the help of those who seek and confess."<sup>106</sup>

Augustine's major formulation of the conception of grace will be constructed during his confrontation with the Pelagians. However, certainly enough is mentioned at this earlier stage to inform us on the role, purpose and need of grace which he later modifies.<sup>107</sup> Grace strengthens and gives power to the will that has chosen the good so that it may do the good.<sup>108</sup> It would seem that Augustine believes, at this stage, that all those who turn to God will be given grace.<sup>109</sup>

The problem of severing choice and performed choice is now resolved. We cannot really claim that man is not free because by turning to God, which he can do by using his free will to choose, he becomes free also to perform these choices. For Adam both free will and freedom were given simultaneously, but for fallen souls this ability is given in increments; the more we cleave to God, the more freedom we receive. Another distinction between Adam and fallen souls is that Adam gained merit from both willing and doing, whereas we can now gain merit only from willing. Clearly, it is a partnership with God to do the good, in which we are a self-initiating source of goodness; he is able to both choose the good and then to do the good with the help of God. Thus, Augustine provides for both free choice and freedom.

## **Conclusion**

Augustine bases evil in the will as a solution to the problem of the source of evil. This solution guarantees that the one God is the creator of all good, and that He is not responsible for evil. Instead, the will as a first cause is culpable. The problems created by his division of choice and performed choice have also been considered and resolved. From Augustine's analysis man can be seen as capable of voluntarily willing and doing both good (with God's help) and evil, and he can be held accountable for both. Although Augustine has shown that the human will is the source of evil, he has also shown that the will is a creative, initiating source of the good.

## AUGUSTINE'S MIDDLE TREATMENT OF THE WILL

This fourth chapter is an investigation of why and how Augustine modifies his first conception of the power of the will, and the apparent difficulties which result from this endeavour. In addition, it will be made evident that Augustine has mitigated the good tendency of the will, and strengthened its propensity or attraction to evil. Augustine rarely writes books that deal exclusively with one topic; rather, most of his works incorporate his thoughts on various subjects. However, some of his treatises are more narrowly focused than others. For this chapter we shall primarily use four of his texts which are representative of this stage of his thought: *On the Grace of Christ, and On Original Sin*,<sup>1</sup> *On Nature and Grace*,<sup>2</sup> *On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins, and On the Baptism of Infants*,<sup>3</sup> and *To Simplician--On Various Questions. Book I*.<sup>4</sup>

In the preceding chapter I argued that the will remains in a transcendental realm unless it is capable of accomplishing what it wills. Further, to confirm that the will is free, it must connect with the physical world by being able to perform at least some of its choices. Also, a free will which is unable to act in the physical world is something that would not be of any interest, at least not in the sense of attaching any responsibility for actions. Augustine's notion of the free will showed how the will was capable of initiating the good (by choosing to acquire faith), and of a person's ability to accomplish the chosen good with the aid of God. Thus, the good choices of the will move from the transcendental realm to connect with the physical realm through the power of the grace of God. Both evil choices and performed choices rest exclusively within the individual's power.

This earlier position undergoes a significant modification which seems to be the result of both his reinterpreting Romans (especially chapters seven and nine), circa 394-396 A.D.,<sup>5</sup> and more reflection on the significance of Christ for human salvation. Augustine now believes that the will is more seriously undermined by the penal conditions than he had earlier assumed. To combat these difficulties God's grace is required to aid or prepare the will to choose the good. But if God must first prepare the will then how can it still be considered as free?

The debate over the necessity and type of grace required is fought between Augustine and the Pelagians. Pelagianism arose as a response to Augustine's altered conception of the power of the will. It is through his battles with the Pelagians that Augustine comes to further elaborate, clarify, and expand on his notion of grace; he wrote fifteen anti-Pelagian texts.<sup>6</sup> In 418 A.D. the doctrines of the Pelagians were pronounced heretical.<sup>7</sup> Pelagianism is a combination of the thoughts of three individuals, Pelagius,<sup>8</sup> his disciple Coelestus,<sup>9</sup> and Julian,<sup>10</sup> the Bishop of Eclanum. Each member contributed different elements; although they did not work as a group, sometimes they did work in conjunction.

His debate with the Pelagians centres on numerous issues. To obey the commands of God, the Pelagians believed that one requires three faculties: capacity (*posse*), which means the possibility; volition (*velle*), which is the ability to will; and action (*esse*), which means the ability to perform one's choices.<sup>11</sup> The capacity is given to persons by God, while volition and action are both within a person's power; as a result, each person is responsible only for her own sins, and she has the ability to make herself good by using her free will in the proper manner.<sup>12</sup> This result rests on their belief that human nature is not flawed by the sin of one man;<sup>13</sup>

however, Adam's sin did affect humanity through example, that is, Adam's disobedience created a bad example for a person to emulate. Moreover, since there is no original sin, there is no need for infant baptism.<sup>14</sup>

The Pelagians maintained that we do require grace, but it is significantly different from Augustine's formulation. It is seen as teaching, the law, and the capacity or possibility of the free will.<sup>15</sup> Although we do not require grace for both choices and performed choices, it does make them easier.<sup>16</sup> Grace is conferred for merit; for example, the meritorious act of acquiring faith through our free will.<sup>17</sup> It can be likened to the proper environment in which one can, but does not necessarily, become good. They place great emphasis on the personal accomplishments of the individual; for this reason Pelagianism is often considered as naturalistic.

### **The Necessity of Grace**

Much of Augustine's prodigious writings on the subject of grace are produced at this second or middle period of his thought. To ascertain the extent of his modifications to his initial conception of the free will, we must first examine his revised formulation of grace. Augustine is the 'Doctor of Grace', named in this fashion because of his enormous contribution to the subject. Although the Church has not accepted everything he wrote, he has been very influential in the creation of its doctrines.<sup>18</sup> A substantial amount had already been formulated by the Greek Fathers, but Augustine has considerably altered and expanded the notion of grace.<sup>19</sup> Augustine worked with various premises; two of the most significant correspond to the two functions he assigned to grace: to overcome the limitations of fallen nature, and to return to God. Both premises refer to the role of Christ in humanity's salvation. He now asserts

that if a person is capable of her own salvation, of turning to God through her own efforts, then Christ's death was for no purpose.<sup>20</sup> His death was unnecessary if we can reach God without Christ as intermediary. Secondly, Christ came to restore the image of God within the individual; this image enables the individual to partake in the divine life of truth, goodness and immortality.<sup>21</sup>

Augustine now rejects the view that a person can use his will to choose the good because he realizes that the penal conditions of ignorance and concupiscence are too powerful for the will to overcome.<sup>22</sup> Only God can restore or recreate humanity as it was originally.<sup>23</sup> God commands, through the law,<sup>24</sup> good deeds from humanity, yet we cannot perform these deeds unaided.<sup>25</sup> Unless man has first been given faith, and then given grace to allow him to perform the desired good works, man is incapable of doing any sort of good.<sup>26</sup> Thus, grace is absolutely necessary both to enable us to will and do any sort of good, and to restore the image of God within us. We can see that Augustine not only confirms that the will can still choose evil, but now that is all that the will has the power to do.

### **The Nature and Function of Grace**

After his reinterpretation of St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans, Augustine states that his earlier interpretation was faulty;<sup>27</sup> for this reason he altered his ideas regarding both the role of man's free will and grace. Earlier, he assumed that a person was capable of meriting the grace which enables her to perform her choices. A person gained this grace after acquiring faith through her own efforts. Then, for a brief period, he appealed to the acquisition of grace given for hidden merits.<sup>28</sup> Finally, he claimed, as did the apostle Paul, that grace is a gift which is not given for



any merit. Inherent in Augustine's definition of grace is the notion that it is gratuitous. "This grace, however, of Christ, without which neither infants nor adults can be saved, is not rendered for any merits, but is given *gratis*, on account of which it is also called *grace*"<sup>29</sup> If grace were given in exchange for the good works of individuals, then grace would be the payment for a debt which God owes us, and God does not owe us anything.<sup>30</sup> Augustine insists that grace must first be given so that a person may do good works which do gain merit.<sup>31</sup>

Grace has two functions, a negative one which removes sin and weakness, and a positive one which helps us to love the good.<sup>32</sup> Although Augustine usually speaks of grace in the singular we can find two types of grace in his works;<sup>33</sup> one which is temporary and one which is abiding. The temporary grace was examined in the last chapter; it is an activating power which allows persons to do the good works that they have already chosen to do. The activating grace is as powerful and as enduring as is required to perform the task. The second or abiding grace is a positive, justifying grace which is a spiritual indwelling of God, or to be more precise, the Holy Spirit.<sup>34</sup> The latter is that person of the Holy Trinity (God, Christ, and Holy Spirit) which is power and movement.<sup>35</sup> Through the Holy Spirit the commands of God's law are internalized, and then fulfilled.<sup>36</sup> This grace works by presenting the good as attractive to a person's will; then, the will responds by choosing the good.<sup>37</sup> Augustine is convinced that this abiding grace does not impel or take over our will; instead, it both cures the damages of sin, and reintroduces the image of God into a person's soul. The quantity and effectiveness of this abiding grace increases as we become more spiritual and closer to God, it is like a habit or a tendency towards the good; consequently, the greater amount that we possess increases our

delight in the good. Grace must be given for every good act,<sup>38</sup> and only through grace can we be separated from the mass of perdition which is lost;<sup>39</sup> in other words, only through grace can we be separated from sinners.

Through the Holy Spirit man is regenerated;<sup>40</sup> he is reborn with the three virtues of faith, hope and charity which help to repair his damaged soul.<sup>41</sup> Faith concerns belief, hope concerns what is desired, and charity concerns what we should love. Of the three infused virtues, charity is the most important because we judge the goodness of a person by what he loves. Charity alters a person's disposition; through it, he tends to love the good and desires to fulfil the commands of the law. However, to perform acts of faith, hope and charity we also require grace.<sup>42</sup> The entrance of the Holy Spirit into a person's soul raises it to a supernatural state.<sup>43</sup> This does not mean that one becomes part of God; rather, this means that when a person regains the image of God he participates in the spiritual or divine life.<sup>44</sup>

### **Additional Information on the Relationships of the Will--The Mind**

In *The Trinity*<sup>45</sup> Augustine draws an analogy between the Trinity of God, Christ and the Holy Spirit, and the trinity within the human mind. However, he readily acknowledges that this analogy is imperfect because of the finite nature of the human mind. The mind is a unity which is divided into three functions: will, understanding and memory.<sup>46</sup> Memory is a storage for both things past and things present, that is, it is conscious of all the impressions which are within the mind.<sup>47</sup> Understanding is the source of knowledge. He also describes the will as love or affection, because the will is moved by what it loves.<sup>48</sup>

Augustine asserts that nothing can be loved unless it is known.<sup>49</sup> Hence, for the will to choose, it must know what to value, and it does so

through its unity with memory and understanding.<sup>50</sup> Yet due to the penal consequences of original sin we cannot know the good unaided.<sup>51</sup> God must first illuminate the mind for the will to know the good,<sup>52</sup> then the will must choose it, and then a person can do it.<sup>53</sup> In other words, God must remove the penalty of ignorance for the will to apprehend the good. Augustine believes that the wisdom of humanity is to love God.<sup>54</sup> Further, the pinnacle of self-knowledge is the realization that the deficiency in ourselves can only be compensated for by grace; 'know thyself' means that we should seek to rid ourselves of our sins.<sup>55</sup> Augustine became suspicious of reason because it was hampered by sin; consequently, it could lead to numerous errors. In contrast, he came to rely more on the authority of Scripture, which is, he believed, never mistaken.<sup>56</sup>

### **Modification of the Will to Correspond to Grace**

Since Augustine recognized the necessity of God's grace for the will to do any good, even to have faith, his assessment of its ability had to undergo some modifications. Sin has now become a habit (*consuetudo*), in other words, a disposition.

"Forasmuch, however, as there is, owing to the defects that have entered our nature, not to the constitution of our nature, a certain necessary tendency to sin ... by the assistance of grace through our Lord Jesus Christ, both the evil necessity will be removed and full liberty be bestowed."<sup>57</sup>

Augustine is concerned to show that this tendency toward evil is not a consequence of our original nature; instead, it is a consequence of our altered nature. The penal conditions of ignorance and concupiscence work as an obstacle for the will to both choose the good and refrain from choosing

evil.<sup>58</sup> God prepares the will because it would not otherwise find the good attractive, that is, the will is capable of willing the good, but it would not do so on its own initiative because it is only attracted to evil. Augustine has dismissed his earlier assumption that the acquisition of faith is within the scope of the will's power.<sup>59</sup> "If anyone boasts that he has merited compassion by his faith, let him know that God gave him faith."<sup>60</sup> Faith, too, is the gift of God.

Augustine states that Paul, the greatest apostle,<sup>61</sup> had the foresight to know that adversaries to the grace of God would appear. Paul claimed that both willing and doing are effected by God;<sup>62</sup> consequently, Augustine believes that he follows Paul when he asserts that God works within a person to initiate any change to the good.<sup>63</sup> God prepares a person's will by external and/or internal means. He sends grace which can be a spiritual or a mental vision, a sensual admonition,<sup>64</sup> or an ineffable power (Holy Spirit) which operates internally.<sup>65</sup> When God wishes to save a soul He sends a grace that He knows will be effective, such as a miracle, a vision of Christ, and so forth,<sup>66</sup> thus, the will finds that it is attracted to the grace and responds to what it would not otherwise find appealing.<sup>67</sup>

In spite of God's preparation of the will Augustine staunchly maintains that the will we possess is a free will.<sup>68</sup> If we did not, then we could not be held accountable for evil. If the free will is not operational, then we would be determined, which would make God responsible for both good and evil.<sup>69</sup> Augustine believes that he can reconcile God's grace and the free will in two ways: first, the will is able to consent or to refuse the grace of God, and second, grace must have something to act upon.

First, to will is to consent or refuse to whatever is placed before a person. When God calls man, he is able to refuse the call. "For no one can

believe unless he is called, although none can believe against his will."<sup>70</sup> Theoretically the will is free to refuse or to respond to grace.<sup>71</sup> However, the will which has been given efficacious grace would not refuse to respond to it.<sup>72</sup> God calls many persons in the sense that many are aware of the Christian religion, and are free to consent or refuse to this call. But if God wishes to bestow grace on a person He does so in such a way that she will not refuse to respond because she is given a grace which God knows she will find attractive. This efficacious grace is variable, its distinctive feature is that it is the appropriate type of grace which will be attractive to the particular individual. Augustine believes that man cannot frustrate God's mercy. "But it is false to say that 'it is not of God who hath mercy but of man who willeth and runneth,' because God has mercy on no man in vain. He calls the man on whom he has mercy in the way he knows will suit him, so that he will not refuse the call."<sup>73</sup> Augustine means that it is not up to the choices (willeth) or the performed choices (runneth) of a person to refuse grace; rather, the choice is really God's, "For many are called but few are chosen."<sup>74</sup> This efficacious grace is not only a necessary condition, without which the will could not respond; it is also the sufficient condition which makes the will respond.<sup>75</sup> This causal feature of grace will be considered in the following chapter.

Secondly, Augustine contends that grace does not deny the importance of the free will; in fact, grace cures the free will and enables it to choose the good.<sup>76</sup> For without the will, grace would remain a mere potential for the good,<sup>77</sup> that is, unless a person has a functioning will, grace would not have a subject to work upon. Thus, for Augustine, grace increases the will's freedom to choose the good. We can see that Augustine is increasingly mitigating the good that man can do, and increasing his attraction to evil.

### **Differences Between his First and Second Positions**

We are now ready to consider three of the most relevant changes from his first position to his second position: the power of the will, the relationship between God and man, and the effect of the penal consequences of original sin. When regarding these changes it is important to note that Augustine's purposes had also changed. In his confrontation with the Manicheans, he was concerned to show that the will was free so that man could be seen as responsible for evil. In his confrontation with the Pelagians his concern is to show the will's need for grace. Augustine's alterations to the free will correspond with his revised notion of grace. In his first formulation, he separated the choice from the performed choice, however the will was able to choose the good by its own power, but unable to accomplish it; this latter aspect was given by God. Although the penal consequences made choosing the good difficult, and performing the good impossible, a person was still able to choose to have faith by her own power.

In his second period he claims that the action of initiating the good is no longer ours; the penal consequences are so potent that the will finds only evil attractive. For this reason the will does not have the strength to choose the good unaided. Faith is now recognized as a gift from God which He must first offer a person in a way which is effective, that is, in a particular way so that the will responds by finding it attractive. God takes the sole initiative by preparing our will; then, He co-operates with us to enable us to choose the good; then He enables us to perform the things that we have chosen (Rom., 14-25).

There are two different things that God gives us, the power to will and the thing that we actually will. The power to will he has willed should be both his and ours, his because he calls us, ours because we follow when called. But what we actually will he alone gives, i.e., the power to do right and to live happily for ever.<sup>78</sup>

It is clear that Augustine has changed his first formulation in three significant ways. The will no longer has the ability to acquire faith or choose the good unaided. The relationship is altered between God and the individual, that is, now God initiates all good. The inherent tendency of the will is to choose evil. Man becomes increasingly more associated with a propensity to desire evil.

### **Difficulties with his Second Treatment of the Will: First Critique**

Augustine's second formulation of the nature and capacity of the will is also subject to serious difficulties. There are at least three arguments which can be given to show that the will is no longer free. Unlike chapter three where the separation of the choice and performed choice caused a problem, these arguments consider whether the will is free even in terms of choosing, and not in terms of acting upon these choices.

The first and most obvious difficulty concerns Augustine's revised conception of a person's nature. The penal consequences of original sin weaken the soul to such a degree that a person has a necessary tendency to choose evil. These penal conditions present both an obstacle and a constraint which the will is unable to overcome without grace. In chapter two we examined the notion of freedom, in reference to which Richard Taylor commented upon its minimum requirements. "Obstacles and

constraints, then, both obviously limit my freedom. To say that I am free to perform some action thus means at least that there is no obstacle to my doing it, and that nothing constrains me to do otherwise."<sup>79</sup> An obstacle is an impediment to any activity, and a constraint is a force which compels one course of action rather than another.<sup>80</sup> We can juxtapose this sentiment with a quote from Augustine. "Ignorance, therefore, and infirmity are faults which impede the will either from doing a good work, or for refraining from an evil one."<sup>81</sup> He recognizes both an obstacle which prevents the will from doing the good, and a constraint which compels the will to choose evil. Since these forces make it impossible for the will to choose the good, that is because of ignorance of the good and the ability to find only the evil attractive, then the will cannot be free to choose both good and evil.

in defence of Augustine, Mother Mary Clark states that Augustine always maintained the necessity of the free will. "The discovery that God prompted man to ask for grace and gladly gave it never led Augustine to belittle or to rule out free choice."<sup>82</sup> Further, God never prepares the will without a person's request (through prayer) and consent.<sup>83</sup> Grace does not destroy the will; instead, it perfects it because real freedom, for Augustine, includes both willing and performing the good which is made possible only with grace.<sup>84</sup> She states that Augustine's distinction between freedom and free choice is often ignored and this omission distorts his thought.<sup>85</sup> Augustine does consistently distinguish between these two throughout his writings; real freedom is freedom from sin,<sup>86</sup> which means that we love God in the correct manner, whereas freedom of the will means that willing is within our power.<sup>87</sup> Augustine continues to maintain that the will is in our power, however it is only within our range of options to choose evil.



Basically, she seems to think Augustine's defence is equating willing with a free will, that is, because we will, we must have a free will. This defence seems to solve the problem because grace only assists the will, it does not exempt a person from willing.<sup>88</sup> Her reasoning corresponds to one of Augustine's earlier proofs for the freedom of the will.<sup>89</sup> He assumes that willing is inherently voluntary because willing implies that it is the person who wills; in other words, if a person willed necessarily, then it would be someone else who is doing her willing. Actually, all that Augustine still proves in this second phase of his thought, is that man has a will. His claim that the will is free rests on his questionable definition of the will, that is, if the will is defined as inherently free, then, of course, the will by definition is free. However, if freedom of the will means the power to choose between the alternatives of good and evil, then the will, unaided by grace, is not free.

### **Second Critique**

His distinction between "free" in terms of choice, and "freedom" is the crucial element in our second problem, which focuses on the use of terms. Augustine maintains that we will evil without God's help, and can only will the good after He has prepared or freed the will from the distorting influence of ignorance and concupiscence (by making the good attractive). To state that grace enables the will to choose the good means that the will must be freed from the influence of these penal consequences; in other words, God must free the free will.

This statement can only be understood when we analyze it in reference to Augustine's reasoning. He must insist on two premises: man must possess a free will or else he could not be considered responsible for

evil, and the will must be assisted by grace or else Christ's death was for no purpose because man is capable of obtaining his own salvation through his good choices. To maintain both positions he relies on the constitution of the will. The penal consequences did not alter the construction of the will; the will can still move in both directions. However these penal consequences did alter the will's access to one-half of its capacity. For example, imagine owning a door which can move in two directions; however, without help the door can only be moved in one direction. Although the door is constructed so that it can move in both directions, only one-half of its capacity is able to be utilized. By analogy, we could maintain, as Augustine, that the will is free simply because of its constitution, or we could maintain that the freedom of the will depends upon our access or power to use its full capacity. It would be more accurate to state that the will is free when it can be used to perform both good and evil choices. If the will is not free for our use, then it is not a free will. Even though the will, in virtue of its constitution, is able to choose the good, it is effectively prohibited from doing so; therefore, the will can no longer be considered free.

### **Third Critique**

The final and most damaging argument considers his reducing the power of the will from his earlier position. In his first stage Augustine believed that we had a free will to choose the good, but that we were not free to accomplish the chosen good; thus, he correlates freedom with the power to do or act. In his second formulation, the will is no longer seen as possessing the power to choose the good unaided. Still, he maintains that the will is free in a limited sense. "For free will in the sinner up to this

extent did not perish,--that by it all sin, especially they who sin with delight and with love of sin; what they are pleased to do gives them pleasure."<sup>90</sup> But if the will were free it would have the power to act or will both good and evil choices. Certainly, it is impeded by penal consequences, but it should still be able to choose the good. In his second analysis, a free will means one that could choose the good, if it wanted to, that is, the will is not deformed in such a way that choosing the good is an impossibility; indeed, grace helps it to choose the good. However, the penal conditions make this endeavour impossible; the will's ability to find the good attractive is deformed by both ignorance and concupiscence which makes choosing the good an impossibility. For example, if a person with good eyesight were to wear patches over both eyes, it is possible to say that she could see. However, if she could never remove these patches it would be more accurate to say that it is impossible for her to see, in spite of the fact that her vision is physically capable of sight. Therefore, if willing is considered as a two-directional action, and this action is restricted to one direction, then the will can no longer be considered free.

In effect, the free will is only so for Adam, for not only can we not perform good choices, but with this second formulation we are not able to will the good unaided. Augustine's analysis has proved that we possess a will, and that we can choose evil, but it can no longer be considered free because it does not possess the power to choose the good.

### **Three Different Conceptions of Human Freedom**

Romano Guardini provides an explanation of a way in which grace can be understood. Although he does not write in reference to Augustine, his exposition may be relevant. To the Christian mind, human freedom is

created. God is not only our creator, He is also the source of truth and goodness. Subordination to God is not subjection to a stronger power; instead, it is submission to the source of all that is good. In contrast, he claims that contemporary ethics regards freedom as "perfect self-autonomy";<sup>91</sup> this would mean that human freedom is equivalent to divine freedom. Guardini acknowledges that acceptance of this position makes obedience to God a denial of human freedom. Moreover, he states that this form of reasoning rests on a "serious misconception" which is possible only to a person who has lost all "practical contact" with God. This misconception is caused by equating God with "an other." If we were to subordinate ourselves to another person, then contemporary reasoning would be valid. However, a relationship with God is unique. "God is not 'an other' but is that Being in whom my existence is established, my truth preformulated, and the significance of my existence contained."<sup>92</sup> When we submit to God we both act in accordance with our true or essential nature, and become free from the unnatural elements within ourselves. In reference to freedom it would seem that his analysis bears close resemblance to that of Augustine.

Guardini believes that grace does not overpower the human will; rather, it opens up the possibility within the person for her to attain to her true nature.<sup>93</sup> God both calls man, and draws man to him. "In Christ God encounters man, invites him to cross over to Him, and gives him what is a precondition for making that passage. If man listens to God, an association of a novel sort comes into being."<sup>94</sup> It is at this juncture that a possible difference arises between Guardini and Augustine. The former seems to believe that it is possible for man not to "listen;" that man is free to consent or refuse to God's call. Augustine agrees in principle, but he also

maintains that if God calls the will effectively, then the will does not refuse to respond to His call. Further, that those who are called effectively, the elect, are predestined to be so. Although Augustine voiced this position about efficacious calling during the early, second period of his writing, it was not until his third or last period that he focused extensively on the matter. For this reason his analysis of election and predestination will be considered in the following chapter.

### **Conclusion**

After examining his modifications to the power of the human will we can see that the will is now prohibited from either choosing or performing the good unaided. In contrast, not only does the will retain its power to both choose and perform evil, but it finds only evil attractive. With this further separation, that is, not having the power to choose the good unaided, Augustine has both relinquished the freedom of the will, and shown that the will necessarily chooses evil because it is the only choice that it is capable of making. As such, whether man can be seen as responsible for voluntarily choosing evil is a moot point which will be developed in the following chapter. In his earlier treatment man was seen to be both a source of good and evil; in his second analysis, man, unless aided by grace is seen only as a source of evil. That the will chooses evil, and that it does so because it finds only evil attractive shows that Augustine's analysis, in his middle period, makes man's nature more repulsive.

## AUGUSTINE'S MATURE TREATMENT OF THE WILL

Augustine's most mature writings on the subject of the will are largely a response to his controversy with the semi-Pelagians concerning the predestined souls, or the elect. Augustine had written his basic position regarding election much earlier,<sup>1</sup> but it was not until his third period that the implications of it needed to be scrutinized. This fifth chapter will examine his clarification and explication of the notion of predestination, and its effect on the will. Moreover, the problems with his position will be analyzed to reveal that Augustine's role for man is to realize God's purpose. As such, a person's responsibility for evil, in the sense of blameworthiness becomes questionable. Augustine later writings which shall be used are: *Grace and Free Will*,<sup>2</sup> *Rebuke and Grace*,<sup>3</sup> *On the Predestination of the Saints*<sup>3</sup> and *On the Gift of Perseverance*.<sup>4</sup>

Although his later writings do not refer to reason in as philosophical a manner as his earliest ones, his use of reason both to argue from premises to conclusions, and to create a unified structure is still very much in evidence. It is necessary to examine his mature thoughts for two reasons. His later writings play as central a role in the Reformation of the Church as his middle writings did in the formation of the Church. In addition, a full treatment of his conception of evil, which he bases in the will, would be incomplete without his mature writings on the subject.

In Augustine's first conception of the free will persons could acquire faith, however he denied that a person could perform the good that she willed unaided; this power to perform good works was given by grace. In Augustine's second conception persons also require grace to have faith. Since all good things come from God and a person is weakened by the penal conditions, He gives us both the power to will and to do what we will. One

significant difference between the first and second formulations is that in the latter, God initiates and persons respond, whereas the roles were reversed in the former. In his second phase Augustine believes that the will freely consents to or refuses God's call. However, although the will can refuse God's call, when God prepares the will effectively it will not refuse. Further, they will not refuse because these effectively prepared wills are predestined to consent to God's call.

In his third phase Augustine emphasizes and elaborates on the predestination of the elect, or those who have their wills prepared effectively. His conception of the elect, because it had not been widely circulated, did not produce a controversy until a copy of one of his letters on the subject was carried into a monastery.<sup>6</sup> This aspect of his thought had been overshadowed by other issues of the Pelagian debate. Much of his success against the Pelagians was owing to their denial of the transference of original sin, the need for infant baptism, and that a person could effect her own salvation through the use of her unaided free will. These conceptions were largely accepted within the Christian community, and their denial by the Pelagians helped to condemn all that they had put forward.

The semi-Pelagians, his antagonists in this later period, were quite distinct from the Pelagians. To Augustine, this confrontation was a continuation or a variation of Pelagianism, but not nearly so serious or heretical. Only since the sixteenth-century has this theoretical construction become known as semi-Pelagianism.<sup>7</sup> The semi-Pelagians were dismayed at his claims regarding the elect; in contrast, they believed that God, through his foreknowledge, prior to the creation of the world saw who would believe and made these his elect.<sup>8</sup> Man, by his free will chose to

respond to God's call, and for this reason was elected. In this manner, the individual plays a role in her election and salvation through the use of her free will. Like Augustine, they agreed that man needed grace for both faith and works, but felt that his interpretation of Paul had erred. They maintained that God wished all men to be saved, not only the elect.

### **The Elect and Predestination**

Since Augustine's reinterpretation of Romans, he believes that God wills to save some, the elect, and not others.<sup>9</sup> He argues as follows: if man can consent or refuse God's call, then God depends on man, but man is surely not able to frustrate God's purpose.<sup>10</sup> In addition, to make sense of Paul's thoughts he reasoned that it was too difficult to maintain a semi-Pelagian position. That is, if God elects persons via his foreknowledge of the affirmative response to God's call, then it could not be proved that God elects a person for her works and not only for her faith.<sup>11</sup> The only solution that both insures the success of God's purpose, and proves that a person is not elected for her works is predestination. Those that God predestines are the elect; they will both believe in God and do good works.<sup>12</sup> Election is not based upon merit; it is entirely gratuitous; in fact, He chooses us so that we may be good.<sup>13</sup> Augustine believes that the identification of the elect is necessarily hidden.<sup>14</sup> This lack of certainty will reduce the occurrence of pride, and force the elect to try harder. To ensure secrecy some members of the non-elect are given grace for a period of time, but this grace is eventually withdrawn; this secrecy creates a trial for the elect.<sup>15</sup> Because we do not know who is a member of the elect, we should will that all persons be saved, even though some persons will not be redeemed.<sup>16</sup> Thus, election is not only prior to works and prior to belief, but prior to



existence, and the elect will be virtuous because God has predestined them to be so.<sup>17</sup>

In the early part of his second group of writings he does mention predestination,<sup>18</sup> but concentrates his attention on the preparation of the will of the existing elect. In his third phase he expands on the notion of the predestination of the elect; he asserts that he refers, in addition to Paul the apostle, to both Cyprian and Ambrose for his explication.<sup>19</sup> Augustine defines predestination as the preparation for grace.<sup>20</sup> Further, members of the elect can not perish; that is, they can not be permanently separated from God. Although they may temporarily fail, eventually they will continue in the good till the end of their mortal lives.<sup>21</sup> The number of the elect is fixed and limited;<sup>22</sup> the total number is great, but in proportion to the non-elect it is minimal.<sup>23</sup> He states that all the elect have not yet existed; for this reason the world will continue to exist until all the elect have lived on earth.<sup>24</sup>

He claims that the elect have been predestined before the foundation of the world to be the adopted children of Christ;<sup>25</sup> further, the most perfect example of predestination is Christ.<sup>26</sup> Augustine now believes that it is necessary to preach this doctrine both because it is the truth, and because it must be heard by the elect; without hearing it, there is the possibility that some might believe that salvation is due to a person's unaided merit.<sup>27</sup> He did not emphasize the notion of predestination before because, he explains, some concepts can be too confusing to those who do not have the ability to comprehend them.<sup>28</sup> Yet, due to the semi-Pelagian controversy, predestination must now be emphasized for clarification.<sup>29</sup> However, because of his consideration for human infirmity he states that it should be preached in a manner that is not too inconsiderate to those of the

non-elect.<sup>30</sup> Still, he also claims that the non-election of some persons should not bother the believer since all persons have been righteously condemned; that God chooses to have mercy on anyone is a great goodness.<sup>31</sup> Further, this formulation of predestination should not be a cause for despair because we can now put our hope in God, that He will redeem us, rather than ourselves.<sup>32</sup>

Since all persons are sinners through Adam,<sup>33</sup> why God chooses to elect some individuals over others is a mystery to Augustine. "All the paths of the Lord are mercy and truth."<sup>34</sup> But His ways are unsearchable. Therefore the mercy by which he freely delivers, and the truth by which he righteously judges, are equally unsearchable."<sup>35</sup> Although we do not know why some individuals are preferred over others, he believes that the elect represent God's mercy, and the non-elect represent God's justice.<sup>36</sup> In response to the question of why God does not choose to be merciful to all men, Augustine states that God must be just to some, to show that He is merciful to others.<sup>37</sup> However, God's righteousness is unquestionable.<sup>38</sup> In any case, Augustine is certain that it is God who chooses us, we do not choose Him.<sup>39</sup>

Although we can not know why God elects some persons over others, Augustine believes that we can discern something of God's purpose. He claims that God knew evil would arise from all the good which He created. In spite of this result God chose to bring good out of this evil, rather than not allow any evil to exist.<sup>40</sup> To bring good from evil, God ordained the lives of both angels and men so that they would see two events. First, God would show them the consequences of the use of their free wills; secondly, God would show them the consequences of both his mercy and justice.<sup>41</sup> When God's self appointed task is finished the elect, who receive His mercy,

will be seen as equal to the angels.<sup>42</sup> Moreover, the number of the elect corresponds to the number of the fallen angels, "The things in the heavens are re-established when the loss occasioned by the fall of the angels is made good from among men; the things on the earth are re-established when those men who are predestined for eternal life are redeemed from their old corruption."<sup>43</sup> Thus, Augustine believes that the elect are chosen prior to the creation of the world, and that they will do the good because it is for this reason that they have been predestined. After this mortal life their number will compensate for the number of the fallen angels, and they will enjoy the blessings of the divine life on an equal status with the angels; in addition, they are assured that when they reach this state, they shall never fall from it.<sup>44</sup>

### **Perseverance**

To prove that the elect would not depart from God, Augustine felt compelled to elaborate on the grace of perseverance. Perseverance is the ability to continue in one's attempt to attain to the good.<sup>45</sup> The gift of perseverance is an enabling grace without which no one can be saved.<sup>46</sup> Augustine insists that we can and should pray for this gift for both others and ourselves.<sup>47</sup> The criterion for establishing that one has received this grace is that she perseveres in the faith till the end of her life.<sup>48</sup> Perseverance is not a temporary grace which lasts for a given amount of time; it must continue to the end of a person's life.<sup>49</sup> However, this gift may be in evidence for either a long or very brief period before death.<sup>50</sup> The reason that perseverance must be until the end of one's life is because we must possess this grace to enter into the blessed life.<sup>51</sup> This grace will make us equal to the angels in goodness.<sup>52</sup>

Augustine's writings on this grace easily lend themselves to confusion because he seems to maintain two contradictory premises. He asserts both that perseverance must be effective, and that all mortal men sin. In reference to the first premise, he states that the grace of perseverance strengthens the will so that it can overcome sin.<sup>53</sup> Augustine uses the exposition, written by the martyr Cyprian, of the 'Lord's Prayer' to prove that the saints pray to God not to be 'lead into temptation.'<sup>54</sup> God does not permit his elect to be tempted by contumacy; in other words, God does allow his saints to be tempted to refuse to obey God's commands.<sup>55</sup> It might seem from this analysis that, once perseverance is given, that no person is able to sin because he can persevere in the good. Yet his second premise is that all mortal men sin, even the saints.<sup>56</sup>

Augustine recognizes two ways of committing sins: to sin in spite of one's best efforts, and to forsake the faith of God. Although the saints battle against sin, some sins 'creep upon them unawares'; in contrast, the 'sin unto death' is to forsake the true faith.<sup>57</sup> Augustine seems to believe that the sin which perseverance guards against is the latter. "I, however, say, that the sin is to forsake even unto death the faith which worketh by love."<sup>58</sup> Therefore, even though the elect continue to sin, because of the penal consequences, with this grace they will both retain their faith and enter the divine life.

The notion of the grace of perseverance reopened the question of Adam's original sin. Why was he not given perseverance? Augustine answers by stating that Adam did not need it. Adam was given grace within his free will, and could have continued in the good if he had willed to do so. However, because he did not will to continue, this ability is lost to all his progeny.<sup>59</sup> In contrast the grace of perseverance is much stronger because

it must overcome the resistance created by the penal consequences of Adam's sin.

### **Distinction between Liberty and Free Will**

Due to the semi-Pelagian controversy Augustine is once again concerned to show that the will is free. He attempts to prove his contention in two ways, by reference to the Scriptures which assert this claim,<sup>60</sup> and by clarifying the relationship between grace and the free will. For the latter he reasserts that the free will is qualitatively different from freedom. Freedom is to be free from sin,<sup>61</sup> and this freedom is termed 'liberty'. Grace works within a person to enable her to transcend sin and to delight in the good.<sup>62</sup> Persons are liberated or find salvation through God's grace.<sup>63</sup> In this sense, grace is liberation. However, this liberation is not a special name for grace; instead, it is the result of grace; with grace the will becomes free or liberated.<sup>64</sup> This freedom both allows man to will the good, and the ability to do the good that he wills.<sup>65</sup> In other words, the result of liberation is to direct our choices and performed choices to the purposes of God. One who is free from sin is free to serve God, to delight in the good and obey His commands.<sup>66</sup> For Augustine, this freedom or liberation is much superior to that of the free will because a free will still tends to choose evil.<sup>67</sup>

In contrast, the free will as it exists is free, but it is not liberated because it has a tendency to choose evil. With grace, the will retains its freedom and is also liberated.<sup>68</sup> "The fact is that the human will does not achieve grace through freedom, but rather freedom through grace, and through grace, too, joyous consistency, and invincible strength to persevere."<sup>69</sup> This quote means that a person does not receive the grace to

perform choices from the will's choosing the good (his first formulation); instead, the will is freed by grace to choose the good, then we are given the grace for performed choices. A liberated will is not a free will; rather, it is a freed will, that is, a will that has been freed or liberated from sin.<sup>70</sup> Therefore, a liberated will is beyond a free will in the sense that it can choose the good because it has been liberated from only choosing evil. However, a liberated will should not be confused with a totally liberated will; the latter is possible only after this mortal life because of the penal consequences which affect the body.

Augustine acknowledges that it is difficult for some persons to understand how eternal life is both a reward for good works, and a gift of faith.<sup>71</sup> Augustine reconciles the two claims by focusing on the interconnection between liberation and the free will. He states that the command to fulfil the law<sup>72</sup> would be useless unless a person has a will to obey it. "Then is the will of use when we have the ability; just as ability is also then of use when we have the will. For what does it profit us if we will what we are unable to do, or else do not will what we are able to do?"<sup>73</sup> In spite of the fact that the will is both prepared and liberated by God, works performed under grace gain merit because we actually do choose to do them. Unless grace has a will to influence, there would be no need for grace; grace would then not be a gift, but a command. Still, Augustine is convinced that God gives to man what He commands from him.<sup>74</sup> In other words, merit is really given for the grace which God gives to the will. Therefore, grace liberates the free will from only choosing evil, and allows a person to gain merit for their good works performed under grace.

### **Modifications of the Will to Correspond to Predestination**

God prepares the will of the elect, irresistibly.<sup>75</sup> Rather than receiving God's invitation to participate in the divine life, the elect, or prejustified,<sup>76</sup> are direct objects of God's will.<sup>77</sup> Since His will can not be resisted, if the elect are predestined, then they must fulfil the role for which they were predestined:

"If thou believest, thou shalt be saved," faith is required of us, and salvation is proposed to us as a reward. For these things are both commanded us, and are shown to be God's gifts, in order that we may understand both that we do them, and that God makes us to do them, as He most plainly says by the prophet Ezekiel. For what is plainer than when He says, "I will cause you to do"?<sup>78</sup> Give heed to that passage of Scripture, and you will see that God promises that He will make them to do those things which He commands to be done.<sup>79</sup>

Although the elect do choose the good, there is no question of not choosing the good because the elect are predestined to will in such a manner. Due to both Augustine's emphasis of God's power, and his claim that God bestows upon us what He demands from us, persons are not seen as capable of resisting God. As a result, all sense of genuine co-operation between a person and God is dismissed. All persons will respond in accordance to God's will.<sup>80</sup> Any reference to consent and refusal is unconvincing rhetoric at this later stage. The elect will consent to the good when it is made so attractive that they will choose it, and only consent to evil when overcome by their depraved nature,<sup>81</sup> or when God deserts them to teach them humility.<sup>82</sup> Similarly, the non-elect will consent to evil because the good

will not be made attractive to them, and only consent to the good when God gives them grace to use them as a means to test the elect.<sup>83</sup>

Regarding the will of the non-elect, Augustine also has much to say:

... not only men's good will, which God himself converts from bad ones, and, when converted by Him, directs to good actions and to eternal life, but also those which follow the world are so entirely at the disposal of God, that He turns them whithersoever He wills, and whensoever He wills--to bestow kindness on some, and to heap punishment on others, as He Himself judges right by a counsel most secret to Himself, indeed, but beyond all doubt most righteous."<sup>84</sup>

Fallen man has a necessary tendency to sin, and he will continue to do so unless aided.<sup>85</sup> However, if God does not choose to aid the sinner, then she remains in sin. God does give the non-elect some grace throughout their lives, but He does not give them the grace of perseverance without which none can be saved.<sup>86</sup> However, Augustine strenuously maintains that God does not make man a sinner, for man is a sinner through Adam, and his own free will.<sup>87</sup> God does not force a person to sin, He simply withholds his grace.<sup>88</sup> By analogy, if a man were drowning and a witness to this predicament did not aid him, it could be argued that although the witness did not help the drowning man, neither did the witness push him in the water. God withholds his aid from the non-elect, and it is in this sense that He hardens man.<sup>89</sup>

Augustine has modified the power of the will to such a degree that whether a person uses her will for good or for evil now depends solely on God. A liberated will is no freer in the sense of choosing between options than an evil will; both are subject to compelling forces. Because God both



prepares the will and gives it perseverance, He can be absolutely certain that the elect will remain as the elect. Thus, if no one can resist God, and He has chosen His elect, then it is certain that they will act in the appropriate manner, and it is certain that the non-elect will act in the appropriate manner.

### **Differences between his Three Positions**

Augustine readily acknowledges that there has been a progression of his thoughts within his works.<sup>90</sup> He confesses that he erred in his initial conception regarding the power of the human will.<sup>91</sup> At that time, he stated that man could acquire faith through his own efforts, and merited grace for this act of will. He now realizes that God gives what He commands;<sup>92</sup> consequently, grace is for grace.<sup>93</sup> That is, the grace to perform choices is merited by the grace which induces us to will.

The difference between his middle and final conceptions is not an alteration; instead, it is a clarification and expansion of his thoughts regarding predestination. In his middle period he thought that the conception of predestination should be briefly stated.<sup>94</sup> During this period he was concerned with both explaining the necessity of grace, and explaining how grace works on the will. In his mature writings he analyzes the conception of election, and the manner in which grace interacts with the free will in view of this election.

### **Problems with Augustine's Conception of the Elect: First Critique**

Similar to his other two formulations, the content of his mature writings also contains various difficulties. There are at least three serious difficulties with his conception of predestination which make man's

responsibility for evil, in an active sense, highly questionable. An active sense would be one in which a self-determined person chooses to commit evil.

The most serious difficulty concerns his reconciliation of predestination and free choice. Augustine noted that his conception of predestination seemed to some, as another way of stating fate.<sup>95</sup> Yet Augustine maintains that man still has a free will. In his *Retractations* regarding *On Free Will* he states:

Since our discourse was directed against these people [Manicheans], the books do not deal with the question of God's grace, by which He so predestines who the elect shall be that He even prepares the wills of those among them, who are already making use of their free choice.<sup>96</sup>

Augustine has always been able to maintain that man has free choice because he equates free choice with willing. Gilson describes Augustine's definition of free choice. "In St. Augustine's view, willing means making use of free choice, for in Augustine the definition of free choice is always identical with that of the will."<sup>97</sup> In addition, Gilson states that Augustine's distinction between those who possess grace and those who do not, is in the efficacy of the will.<sup>98</sup> This efficacy does not rest in free choice because both sorts of persons, given Augustine's definition, have free choice. As a result, Augustine is still able to claim that man's will is free because the elect desire to will the good; similarly, the non-elect desire to will evil. Yet both the elect and non-elect do use their will.

The difficulty with Augustine's mature formulation arises because of his emphasis on predestination. If the elect are predestined, then they have no ultimate responsibility for their salvation. They must eventually,

regardless of how many forays into sin, be redeemed.<sup>99</sup> They must necessarily will the good because it is for this reason that they were predestined. No one can withstand the power of God, although, admittedly the elect would not want to will in a contrary manner. Still, the reason the elect do not wish to will in a contrary manner is because God prepares their wills. If one is predestined, one has no control, nor free will in the sense of self-determination.

In at least three instances Mother Mary Clark attempts to defend Augustine against the charge of stating that God controls the will of persons through irresistible grace. "Augustine, moreover, does not cease to repeat that God is not only unfailingly powerful, but irresistible and invincible; yet this is with respect to God and does not give Him absolute sovereignty over the human will.<sup>100</sup> In contrast, it seems that Augustine speaks about God's power in terms of man's redemption. From numerous passages it would seem to be evident that God's power to convert man's will is irresistible.<sup>101</sup>

"The Lord both stirred up their spirit, and yet they came of their own will. For the Almighty sets in motion even in the innermost hearts of men the movement of their will, so that He does through their agency whatsoever He wishes to perform through them--even He who knows not how to will anything in unrighteousness.<sup>102</sup>

Although God does co-operate with the human will,<sup>103</sup> it is His purpose which is fulfilled by both the elect and the non-elect. Man does will, but it is God who decides who shall choose the good, and who shall choose evil.

Clark maintains that Augustine did not consider the grace given to the elect as irresistible; she combines three of his theories to prove this

contention.<sup>104</sup> The first theory considers the will's need for a motive to choose, and she implies that God is able to provide the most appealing motive. The second theory considers Augustine's conception (following Ambrose) that our thoughts are provided by God. This means that various uninvited thoughts enter into our minds. His final theory considers the notion of God's foreknowledge as an eternal present which enables God to know our response to various motives. From these three theories she maintains that Augustine believes that grace does not cause us to act, but causes us to want to act; hence, the will is free to determine itself.<sup>105</sup>

In contrast, Augustine explicitly maintains that God causes us to act.<sup>106</sup> He identifies two sorts of aids. There is an aid without which we cannot act, and an aid which causes us to act.<sup>107</sup> He uses an analogy with food to clarify their distinction; a person can not live without food, but the presence of food can not make a person live if he wants to die. He identifies God's grace as a combination of the two. "For the aid is not only that without which that does not happen, but also with which that does happen for the sake of which it is given."<sup>108</sup> In view of Augustine's unequivocal comments, a combination of three of his theories will not override his meaning.

As a final defence she concurs with the comments of Joseph Mausbach who claims that the capacity for evil and real freedom of choice exist simultaneously with the grace of predestination in Augustine's thought.<sup>109</sup> Although the elect can and do commit evil, Augustine presents this occurrence in a particular manner. He states that the elect may deviate, but when rebuked they return.<sup>110</sup> If the faith of a member of the elect does fail, it is eventually restored to them, their transgressions are pardoned, and the grace of perseverance is given to them.<sup>111</sup> In addition, he believes that God

uses the sins of the elect to their advantage; God teaches them to not become proud by removing His grace from them, and this removal makes them aware of their sinful nature.<sup>112</sup> After a member of the elect has been given the grace of perseverance, she will continue to desire to will the good.<sup>113</sup> However, due to the penal consequence that afflict the mortal body, some sins will be committed, in spite of her best efforts to resist them.<sup>114</sup> Therefore the elect do commit sins, but it is either before they are given grace, or when God withholds His grace, or due to the penal consequences which they strenuously battle.

That God respects the integrity of the human will is not a position Augustine maintains. God is the source of all goodness; in contrast, unaided man is the creator of evil. In addition, since God is our creator we have no right to question or expect anything; this contention can be verified from his use of Paul's potter and clay metaphor.<sup>115</sup> Augustine, like Paul, wishes to exalt God and humble man.<sup>116</sup> Given his estimate of the human will, it is not surprising that if any persons are saved, Augustine thinks it a great mercy.<sup>117</sup> To assert that God does not want to violate the human will implies a respect for the post-Adamic will which is debatable. This is especially true in light of the fact that this violation liberates the will from sin.

Augustine's formulation of predestination effectively denies the will the power to choose between options. Instead, the will is compelled by two irresistible forces, God and our depraved nature. It is God who chooses which force will exert the stronger influence on a person's will. Since Augustine believes that God has a purpose; and predestination is part of that purpose, then the human will must act accordingly.

## Second Critique

The second difficulty with Augustine's analysis focuses on two examples of his interpretative skills. Augustine's interpretation of Scriptures and his resulting formulations can be seen as a great edifice of ingenuity. His interpretations of difficult passages is truly remarkable, and his sincerity and integrity are unquestionable. However, it must be remembered that this is his interpretation; other interpreters, prior, contemporaneous, and since have chosen to consider many issues differently. In Scriptural analysis at least two significant problems are evident, both found in reference to the Epistle to the Romans.

It has been traditionally acknowledged that God wants to save all persons. In contrast, Augustine assumes that when he follows the writings of Paul,<sup>118</sup> 'all' refers only to 'all of the elect'. In other words, God wills to save all those persons that He wills to save. "God teaches all such to come to Christ, for He wills all such to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth."<sup>119</sup> By Augustine's reasoning God predestined those whom He would save, which is not all persons;<sup>120</sup> consequently, 'all' means 'some.' Still, he maintains that 'all' should continue to be used for two reasons. When one uses Biblical passages which include 'all,' one is usually preaching in the Church to believers; hence, it would seem inaccurate to state "some of you" to members of the congregation.<sup>121</sup> Secondly, since members of the elect are unknown, we must continue to pray for all to be saved.<sup>122</sup> To rework 'all' into 'some' is a creative interpretation of scripture, the accuracy of this reworking is questionable. Gerald Bonner writes that Augustine is seen as pushing his analysis too far and unsuccessfully.<sup>123</sup>

Secondly, Augustine uses Paul's hypothetical remarks to justify his formulation of predestination.<sup>124</sup> Paul speculates that God wishes to

display His power through both His justice, by condemning the non-elect to eternal punishment, and His mercy, by giving the elect eternal life:

*What* if God, willing to shew his wrath, and to make his power known, endured with much longsuffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction: And that he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he had afore prepared unto glory,<sup>125</sup>

Here, it would seem that the words, 'What if,' are clearly speculative. They represent Paul's own grappling with the problem of why God should choose some persons over others. Paul also uses the metaphor of the potter who uses one lump of clay, to make some vessels to honour, and some to dishonour. Augustine infers that the lump of clay refers to all persons united by the taint of original sin.<sup>126</sup> Paul does not know God's design,<sup>127</sup> but he thinks that perhaps one aspect or the complete reason might be that God wishes to manifest his power to man by showing his mercy to the elect, and his justice to the non-elect. Yet Augustine takes this speculative comment, and uses it as Paul's conclusion.<sup>128</sup> Augustine continues to insist that God wishes to manifest His power through both His mercy and His justice. As a result, only some individuals can be saved, and others lost. Augustine does not know why certain individuals are preferred over others, but he does believe that both sorts correspond to God's mercy and justice. Therefore, there are at least these two areas of tension, the reworking of 'all' into 'some' and the speculative comments relating to the Scriptures, which are problematic.

### Third Critique

The third difficulty arises in the implications from his formulation of

predestination. Augustine's solution can be charged with creating greater problems, for the solution to the source of evil, than it solves. At least five examples can be provided; he reintroduces a dualism, similar to Manicheanism, between the source of good and evil;<sup>129</sup> secondly, God uses persons as a means, all persons for his purpose,<sup>130</sup> and the non-elect for the good of the elect;<sup>131</sup> As a third example, Patricia Wilson-Kastner asserts that Augustine has altered the notion of co-operation between persons and God. He has depersonalized the notion of grace as participation in the divine life by reducing it to the molding of persons according to God's will.<sup>132</sup> Fourthly, in seeking to answer the problem of the source of evil, he creates a dichotomy between God's justice and mercy. As a fifth problem, we can no longer recognize the goodness of the creator, it merely becomes a tautology to assert that 'God is good,' for why He is good and how we can recognize this goodness becomes lost. Hilary Armstrong maintains that we can not discern where His goodness lay because God seems to have chosen indiscriminately; to mortals, this seems unfair.<sup>133</sup> Further, those that are saved are saved for no reason, and those that are lost are left to themselves to combat a nature that is necessarily evil. This battle for which they are both unequipped and unequal, is an encounter with only one outcome.<sup>134</sup> Given these serious difficulties, it becomes debatable whether Augustine's analysis and solution to the problem of the source of evil, does not create more problems than it solves.

### **Responsibility for evil**

By Augustine's continuous limitations of the human will and enlargements of God's participation,<sup>135</sup> a person comes to be seen as powerless in his own redemption.<sup>136</sup> "And he who has not this gift, -- I



shrink not from saying it, -- whatever others he has, has them in vain."<sup>137</sup> As powerless, a person is not responsible for her salvation, and if she is not responsible for her redemption, then she is not responsible for her continuance in evil. Man is seen as being truly responsible only in one instance, and that is the instance of Adam. Augustine's analysis has shown that persons, after Adam, have a depraved nature which can will only evil unless aided.<sup>138</sup> As such the will is not responsible for evil because the will chooses it necessarily. Certainly, persons can be seen as the passive creators of evil; they do both choose and perform choices which are evil, yet they can not be seen as blameworthy because they have no alternative. The most serious problem which results from Augustine's conception is that God is now seen, not as the creator of evil, but as the one who allows it to continue.<sup>139</sup> This charge can now be made because only God has the power to stop evil, or at least mitigate it.<sup>140</sup> God's purpose, Augustine maintains, is to bring good out of evil; by applying his mercy to all persons, His purpose would still be accomplished. As all-powerful only God can help man.<sup>141</sup> Reason follows Augustine's argument with difficulty, he makes a good case for basing evil in the will, then he goes too far by showing that, after Adam, the will is compelled to choose by either of two irresistible forces. If only God has the power to choose to stop evil, then God becomes, if not responsible for the commencement of evil, then responsible for its continuation. And surely this conclusion is unacceptable to Augustine.

## Conclusion

Augustine's elaboration of the concept of predestination has shown that the will of both the elect and the non-elect will act in accordance with God's purpose. By his continuous limitations of a person's ability to both

determine and work towards her own liberation, he has shown that the will necessarily chooses evil. Persons can be held accountable for evil because they do it, but because of their depraved nature they can not be held blameworthy because they have no alternative. By analogy, a cat can not be considered blameworthy if it does not act like a dog. In contrast, his emphasis on the power of God over both the human will and evil tends to make God accountable.

Augustine's analysis effectively destroys the theist defence put forward to reconcile the existence of evil with an all-good, all-powerful God: that God does not tamper with the human will. Augustine's conception of predestination which is not grounded in any form of self-determined merit makes this defence untenable. Therefore, from Augustine's final analysis he can maintain that man is the passive source of evil. Passive because a person has no alternative but to act in accordance with her inherited, depraved nature. However, his analysis now also includes God because He is the one who decides which persons shall overcome evil.

## **EVALUATION OF AUGUSTINE'S CONCEPTIONS OF EVIL AND THE WILL**

This final chapter includes a concise treatment of two issues. A brief summary of Augustine's three positions on the nature of the free will is given, and an evaluation of these positions against the definition of a free will provided in chapter two is made. This synopsis reveals that he has consistently maintained that the human will is the source of evil. Secondly, a brief historical survey of the influence of his thoughts on the several main traditions of human responsibility for evil is given.

### **Augustine's Three Positions on the Will**

In his first analysis Augustine based evil in the will as a solution to the problem of the source of evil. He separated the action of choice from performed choice; the will was able to choose the good by its own power, but unable to accomplish the chosen good; to accomplish the chosen good God confers enabling grace upon the person. In contrast, a person could both choose and perform her evil choices. Augustine had shown both that the human will is the source of evil, and that the will was capable of initiating the good.

A definition which would allow the free will to be held responsible for evil choices was provided in chapter two. This definition stated that the will is a first cause, and is not caused to act solely from previous mental states. In addition, the will could not be compelled to act, or be unable to act by constraints and obstacles. Persons could deliberate between options and use the free will to make choices, and persons could physically act upon these choices some of the time. Augustine's first formulation of the power of the free will satisfies these requirements because the person is free to deliberate among options. Although there is resistance caused by the penal

consequences the will is capable of making good choices. A person is capable of physically performing her good choices because Augustine believes that God will grant her the enabling grace to do so. Also, a person is free to both choose evil and perform evil choices. Thus, in Augustine's first period the will he envisions is free and can be held responsible for evil.

In his second period Augustine had to adapt his conception of the will to correspond to his notion of grace. He stated that the action of initiating the good was not within a person's power because of the necessary tendency to choose evil, which results from the penal consequences of sin. In addition, the acquisition of faith is no longer within the will's power; it is a gift from God. For man to do any good, God must take the initiative by preparing our will; then, He co-operates with us to enable us to choose the good; finally, He enables us to perform the things that we have chosen. Evil is still within man's ability to both choose and perform; indeed, unless aided a person will continue to sin.

In his second formulation Augustine has relinquished the power of the free will. By increasing the potency of the penal consequences of original sin, persons now have a necessary tendency to choose evil. Because this tendency acts as both an obstacle and a constraint the will is no longer able to choose between options. The will is now able to choose only evil without being prepared by God to find the good attractive. By the stated definition, the lack of obstacles and constraints is required for the free will to be considered culpable for evil; therefore, Augustine's second conception of the free will is one which can not be considered responsible for evil.

In his mature writings Augustine reasserts that God gives what He commands, and that the grace to perform choices is merited by the grace

which induces us to will. He focuses his attention on the predestined individuals. All persons are sinners through Adam, and through their own evil choices. The vast majority will suffer eternal death as punishment for these sins, but the elect will be saved because they have been chosen to represent God's mercy.

In his mature writings Augustine's formulation of the power of the free will to choose between options is completely eliminated. The will is caused to move by either of two irresistible forces, the necessary tendency to choose evil, or the efficacious graces of God. Again, given the initial definition of a will which could be held responsible for evil, the free will characterized by Augustine could not be considered free.

From Augustine's three formulations, the only one that could be considered to characterize a free will which would be responsible for evil choices is his earliest conception. His middle and mature formulations of the free will are both inadequate because the free will has a necessary tendency to sin which it can not overcome. His conception of humanity's tendency to both choose and perform evil has been extremely influential in both his own time and subsequent generations.

### **Historical Influence of Augustine -- The Early Centuries**

The influence of Augustine can not be overstated:

He has been aptly characterized as one of the great seminal thinkers of all time. In Western civilization he created a whole climate of philosophical and theological opinion which not only determined the course of Western thought in its formative period but virtually affected the whole of its historical period even down to the present.<sup>1</sup>

Judith Chelius Stark notes that even the terminology Augustine uses for his analysis has had a major influence.<sup>2</sup>

The impact of his writings was felt immediately; during his life many of his works enjoyed a wide circulation and high regard.<sup>3</sup> He was supported by both the native African Christians,<sup>4</sup> and others throughout Christendom. His work is considered as a bridge between the classical world and the evolving Christian world.<sup>5</sup>

Augustine's influence during the Middle Ages was equally impressive. He was respected by such eminent Christian philosophers as Saint Anselm, Saint Bonaventure, and Saint Thomas Aquinas. His conception of evil as the privation of the good was, to a great degree, continued by Pseudo-Dionysius (fifth century) and Saint Thomas Aquinas (thirteenth century).<sup>6</sup> However, over time his conceptions were combined with the thoughts of other thinkers, for example, the influence of Aristotle which was also incorporated into the works of St. Thomas Aquinas. For some time he was considered the intellectual luminary of the Franciscans, until Duns Scotus replaced him.<sup>7</sup> The impact of Augustine was so penetrating and profound that his work was not seriously and critically challenged until the twelfth century.<sup>8</sup> It would still take another century to create a rival to Augustine's theological formulations.<sup>9</sup> However, this rival, Saint Thomas Aquinas, who was also heavily influenced by him.

Saint Thomas Aquinas accepted Augustine's privation theory of evil. Also, he believed that all persons will the good; even when they choose evil they believe that some good will result. Like Augustine, he believes that moral evil or sin is the result of choosing the wrong goals.<sup>10</sup> With the exception of using his early period definition of evil as the privation of goodness, the balance and preponderance of his influence stems from his

writings during his middle period. Persons were believed to possess a free will which they could use to consent or refuse God's call. A great portion of Augustine's formulation on the subjects of sin and grace gained prominence in the thoughts of the sixteenth century religious reformers.

### **The Catholic Reform Movement**

His conceptions of the elect and predestination were given a cardinal position in three reform movements: Jansenism (Catholicism), Lutheranism, and Calvinism (Presbyterianism). Through the influence of these religious movements a sense of sin was again in the forefront.<sup>11</sup>

Michael Baius, also known as Michel De Bay, was one of the major contributors to Jansenism through his influence on Jansenius.<sup>12</sup> Baius' doctrines on the subjects of grace and justification were based, he believed, upon the works of St. Augustine.<sup>13</sup> He claimed to purify the thoughts of Augustine from the influence of both Aristotle and the Scholastics.<sup>14</sup> Man, infected with the sin of Adam, can do nothing but sin; only the predestined elect will receive salvation through the grace of Christ. Writers such as Henri De Lubac believe that Baius' interpretation was a falsification of Augustine,<sup>15</sup> but he notes that others maintain that Baius' teachings are the direct consequence of Augustine's thought.<sup>16</sup> Seventy-nine of Baius' propositions were condemned in 1567 by Pope Pius V in the bull *Ex Omnibus Afflictionibus*; in addition, Baius received renewed condemnation by Pope Gregory XIII in 1580.<sup>17</sup>

Jansenius, Bishop of Ypres, was the founder of the Catholic reform movement known as Jansenism.<sup>18</sup> Like Baius, Jansenius wanted to purify the thoughts of St. Augustine from the admixture of other thinkers. Jansenius devoted his attention almost exclusively to Augustine's works

because he believed that the Saint was comparable to both St. John and St. Paul in disseminating knowledge.<sup>19</sup> Jansenius attempted to interpret Augustine systematically; in other words, he approached Augustine with intellectual precision.<sup>20</sup> He concentrated his particular endeavours on Augustine's anti-Pelagian works. Jansenius stressed the conception of divine grace as that which alone can save persons. Further, following Augustine, he claims that only the limited number of the elect are saved, the majority will suffer damnation.<sup>21</sup>

Jansenius' major work, *Augustinus*, was dedicated to Augustine. However, both because this book had been published without the authorization of the Holy See, and because its content was markedly derived from the writings of Baius, Pope Urban VIII, in 1642, forbade its reading.<sup>22</sup> Plus VI, in the bull *Auctorem fidei*, condemned the errors of the Jansenist Council of Pistoia which was held in 1787.<sup>23</sup> Although the notions of both Baius and Jansenius are condemned, the Church still offers the writings of Augustine as a guide to theologians.<sup>24</sup> Augustine's conceptions regarding man's need for grace, from his middle period, are the notions which were incorporated into the Catholic doctrine. His writings on efficacious grace were not emphasized during this time. It could be argued that the reason for continued acceptance of Augustine's writings is based upon temporal circumstances. His writings on predestination are largely composed during the later period of his work, and since his middle formulation was accepted into Catholic doctrine, it would be difficult to condemn him. In addition, the question of whether these individuals interpreted Augustine correctly is a controversial matter.



## The Protestant Reform Movement

Like Augustine, Martin Luther<sup>25</sup> is considered one of the most influential figures of the reform movement. Although there are some significant differences between the thoughts of both men, Augustine is considered to be the second most important formative influence on Luther; the Bible holds first place.<sup>26</sup>

Luther believes, like Augustine, that a person is only able to sin without God's grace; salvation is completely the work of God.<sup>27</sup> Justification is by faith alone, and this faith is also God's gift.<sup>28</sup> Luther sees salvation in terms of grace, and grace must be accepted passively rather than actively;<sup>29</sup> that is, there is nothing that a person can do to merit the gift of grace:

So I say that man, before he is regenerated into the new creation of the Spirit's kingdom does and endeavors nothing to prepare himself, and when he is regenerated he does and endeavors nothing toward his perseverance in that kingdom. The Spirit alone, without ourselves, works both blessings in us, regenerating us and preserving us when regenerated...<sup>30</sup>

As Augustine, Luther maintains that persons without grace can not gain merit by adhering to the law. The law only serves to make us aware of our sins; it is not a route to salvation.<sup>31</sup> W.S. Reid notes that this view was in conflict with another sixteenth century view: that performing works is a necessary precondition for receiving grace.<sup>32</sup>

Luther believes that the human will is controlled by God.<sup>33</sup> Although persons do possess some freedom in affairs not related to salvation, the unaided will can do nothing to acquire salvation. "Free will apart from grace possesses absolutely no power for righteousness. Therefore St. Augustine

in his book against Julien terms it 'rather an enslaved than a free will'.<sup>34</sup> The position taken on the question of whether the will is free is considered as one of the major differences between the Catholic and Protestant positions during this time.<sup>35</sup> Luther engaged in a controversial exchange with the Catholic humanist, Erasmus, over this issue. In 1524 Erasmus wrote a defence for the freedom of the will, *Concerning Free Will (De libero arbitrio)*, and Luther responded in 1525 by writing, *The Bondage of the Will (De servo arbitrio)*. Luther maintained that the conception of the enslaved will was one of his best formulations.<sup>36</sup>

Although Luther accepted the theory of predestination, which means the eternal damnation of some individuals, unlike Augustine, he did not attempt to reconcile this notion with God's purpose of grace for all persons. He believed that both truths of faith must be accepted; further, he believed that it is impossible to reconcile these two notions.<sup>37</sup> Augustine's influence on Luther stems from the Saint's mature writings. It is in this period that Augustine's writings on the subject of the free will most closely parallels Luther's writings.

### **The Presbyterian Reform Movement**

John Calvin was another important figure in the Protestant Reform Movement, and is the founder of Calvinism.<sup>38</sup> This religious movement is considered to be the source of Presbyterianism. He was a prodigious writer, and acclaimed as the greatest systematician of the Reformation. The influence of Calvinism soon exceeded that of Lutheranism.<sup>39</sup> Like Luther, he was originally a Catholic who broke with his heritage, and is also considered one of the major forces which have shaped the Western

mentality.<sup>40</sup> Another similarity between these two theologians is the indelible and effective influence of Augustine.<sup>41</sup>

Calvin believed that the consequence of Adam's fall was the total corruption of man's nature.<sup>42</sup> He identifies sin with resistance to the demands of God,<sup>43</sup> rather than as a privation of being.<sup>44</sup> Although sin is associated primarily with the will, he believes that sin also distorts our reason.<sup>45</sup> Calvin claims that we do not possess a free will; all our choices are made in accordance with our corrupted nature. Like Augustine, Calvin believes that persons sin necessarily and voluntarily because their wills are the bond-servants of sin. "This is as old as Augustine but has been shut up in cloisters of monks for almost a thousand years."<sup>46</sup> Even though persons sin necessarily, Calvin asserts that persons are responsible for their sins.<sup>47</sup> Similarly, under grace a person also does not possess a free will, she is completely under God's power.<sup>48</sup> Adam's fall, too, is part of God's universal plan.<sup>49</sup>

The distinguishing feature of Calvinism is thought to be the conception of predestination.<sup>50</sup> This notion stems from Augustine, Calvin largely reproduces Augustine's argumentation, but Calvin places more emphasis on reprobation, that is, that some individuals are simply left to abide by their corrupt inherent nature.<sup>51</sup> He believed that the doctrine of predestination insured salvation, if one was a member of the elect, then one could not depart from God.<sup>52</sup> The preference of choosing one individual over another for salvation consists solely in God's will. "The reprobate like the elect are appointed to be so by the secret counsel of God's will and by nothing else."<sup>53</sup> The divine will can not be frustrated, God gives grace to His elect, and this grace can be neither resisted nor rejected.<sup>54</sup> Like Augustine, Calvin was charged with attempting to insert a fatalistic bias, similar to

that found in Stoicism, into Christianity; to rebut this charge he argued that fate is mechanical, whereas God is personal.<sup>55</sup> Calvin's thought is influenced by Augustine's mature writings on predestination. However, one fundamental difference concerns the will of Adam. Augustine believed that Adam did possess a free will, and our tendency to evil is a consequence of Adam's choice; in contrast, Calvin believed that Adam's choice was a result of God's will.

It is obvious from this cursory summation that Augustine was very influential during the Reformation. However, thinkers such as Mother Mary Clark and Henri De Lubac believe that that his thoughts were distorted and falsified.<sup>56</sup> Chapter five was a study of Augustine's mature writings, and from this examination it seems unlikely that his thoughts were distorted and falsified. Perhaps it would be more accurate to state that other conceptions, interpretations, and points of emphasis were added to those of Augustine. An interpretative example would be Luther's renaming of the free will. Although both men recognize the same character of the will, Augustine considers the will to be free, whereas Luther does not. An example of the emphasis of a particular aspect and the addition of conceptions can be found in the writings of Calvin. He makes the notion of predestination central, and goes further than Augustine by assuming that God also predestined the will of Adam. The actual thoughts of Augustine made a profound influence on the sixteenth century reformation; to state that his writings were distorted and falsified, as has Clark and De Lubac, is to commit the same mistake for which they accuse others.

### **The Later Centuries**

Augustine's influence in the eighteenth century Enlightenment was

polarized. His writings served as a form of thought to be repudiated; they tended to regard him with scorn for his contribution to the wars of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation.<sup>57</sup> This was a century when the ability of natural man was encouraged. However, the counter-reformation did return to many of Augustine's conceptions.<sup>58</sup>

In the present century, the Roman Catholic Church remains Augustinian in many areas. For example, those canons which Augustine formulated were initially accepted into the Council of Carthage in 418 AD. Canon five states that God's aid helps us to love the good, *ut etiam facere diligamus atque valeamus*, and Canon six states that God's help is absolutely necessary.<sup>59</sup> His notion of grace offered by God, and freely accepted by persons, is the standard conception. However, Augustine's conceptions regarding evil as privation have always been considered as only one interpretation within the Catholic tradition.

There is some dispute regarding the present impact of Augustine. Mary Carmen Rose writes that some persons reject Augustine because of his use of metaphysical language, his supernaturalism, and his Hellenistic bias.<sup>60</sup> Gerald Bonner states that few contemporary thinkers adhere to his conception of predestination.<sup>61</sup> Others, such as Norman Cantor and Peter Klein, maintain that there is a revival of Augustine's thought for both theologians and secular thinkers. The cause of this revival is attributed to the brutalities of our century, once more many individuals are willing to assign some sense of inherent corruption to our nature.<sup>62</sup> From this cursory sketch it is obvious that the influence of Augustine has been, and is still very significant.

## **Conclusion**

Since his conversion to Christianity, Augustine has consistently regarded man as the source of evil. From his three formulations of the free will, only with the earliest one could man, given the initial definition, be considered as responsible for choosing evil. The middle and mature formulations both describe a will which is compelled to choose evil, and prevented from choosing the good. However, he has consistently maintained three premises: humanity is the source of evil, all persons are sinners, and evil resides in the free will. The progression of his thought is a continuous narrowing of the human potential to overcome evil. His influence toward this conclusion has been enormous. The conception that evil is the result of a corrupt human nature is one of Augustine's most utilized formulations. This notion of a flawed human nature with a tendency to choose evil has helped to shape western mentality's self-perception of the human will.

## ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER ONE

<sup>1</sup>John Hick, "The Problem of Evil," ed. Paul Edwards, *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 8 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1967) 3:137. From a realist stand-point, most authors conceptions of evil depend upon their conceptions of human nature and of God.

<sup>2</sup>Richard Swinburne, "VI. Natural Evil," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 30 (1978): 295-301.

<sup>3</sup>G.R. Evans, *Augustine on Evil*, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1982) 97.

<sup>4</sup>H.J. McCloskey, "God and Evil," *God and Evil*, ed. Nelson Pike. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice, 1964) 62.

<sup>5</sup>A.M. Fairbairn, *The Philosophy of the Christian Religion* (London: Hodder, 1902) 134.

<sup>6</sup>Fairbairn 150.

<sup>7</sup>Michael L. Peterson, "II. Recent Work on the Problem of Evil," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 20 (1983). 331.

<sup>8</sup>John Hick, "The Problem of Evil," ed. Paul Edwards, *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 8 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1967) 3:136.

<sup>9</sup>Michael Gelven, "The Meanings of Evil," *Philosophy Today* 27 (1983). 215.

<sup>10</sup>Gelven 202.

<sup>11</sup>John Hick, *Evil and the God of Love*, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1977) 331-3.

<sup>12</sup>Michael J. Coughlan, "The Free Will Defence and Natural Evil," *Philosophy of Religion* 20 (1986). 107

<sup>13</sup>Swinburne 296.

<sup>14</sup>Peterson 334.

<sup>15</sup>Gelven 214.

- 16Gelven 216.
- 17Gelven 220.
- 18McCloskey, *God and Evil* 62.
- 19Gelven 201.
- 20Richard Mohr, "Plato's Final Thoughts on Evil: *Laws* X, 899-905," *Mind* 87 (1978): 574-5.
- 21John Kekes, "Understanding Evil," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 25 (1988): 14.
- 22Vernon E. Arnold, *Roman Stoicism*, (London: Routledge, 1911) 331.
- 23Arnold 330.
- 24Gerald Bonner, *St. Augustine of Hippo: Life and Controversies*, (London: S.C.M., 1963) 203.
- 25Saint Augustine, "On the Morals of the Manichaeans," *St. Augustine: Writings against the Manichaeans and Against the Donatists*, trans. Rev. Richard Stothert. ed. Philip Schaff. 14 vols. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church 1. (Michigan: Eerdmans, 1956) II, 11.
- 26F.C. Copleston, *Mediaeval Philosophy*, Vol. 2, part 2 of *A History of Philosophy*, 8 vols. (New York: Image-Doubleday, 1963) 90-1.
- 27Copleston, *Mediaeval Philosophy* 263.
- 28Fairbairn 104.
- 29Gelven 201.
- 30Gelven 211.
- 31Gelven 201.
- 32Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: a report on the banality of evil*, (New York: Viking, 1964).
- 33David Hicks, "Moral Evil as Apparent Disvalue," *Religious Studies* 13 (1977): 1.



<sup>34</sup>Hicks 2.

<sup>35</sup>Philip Blair Rice, *On the Knowledge of Good and Evil*, (New York: Random, 1955) 5.

<sup>36</sup>Rice 12.

<sup>37</sup>See Appendix on 20th Century Ethical Cognitivists and Non-cognitivists.

<sup>38</sup>See Appendix on Contemporary Theodicy.

<sup>39</sup>See Appendix on Theodicies.

<sup>40</sup>Peterson 333.

<sup>41</sup>Alvin Plantinga, *God, Freedom and Evil*, (New York: Harper, 1974) 29-30.

<sup>42</sup>Peterson 334.

<sup>43</sup>Peterson 333.

<sup>44</sup>Peterson 333.

<sup>45</sup>H.J. McCloskey, *God and Evil*, (Hague: Nijhoff, 1974) 116.

<sup>46</sup>McCloskey, *God and Evil* 117.

<sup>47</sup>McCloskey, *God and Evil* 123.

<sup>48</sup>McCloskey, *God and Evil* 123.

<sup>49</sup>Sophocles, *Sophocles*, tran. F. Storr. 2 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard U.P., 1912-13). Vol 1.

<sup>50</sup>Rice 285.

<sup>51</sup>Saint Augustine, "On Nature and Grace," *Basic Writings of Saint Augustine*, trans. P. Holmes ed. Whitney J. Oates. 2 vols. (New York: Random, 1948) LXXIX.

<sup>52</sup>The usage of pronouns conforms to one of those suggested by several agencies related to scholarly publication.

<sup>53</sup>Rice 5.

<sup>54</sup>Hicks 2.

<sup>55</sup>Geivn 216.

<sup>56</sup>Samuel Enoch Stumpf, *Philosophy: History and Problems*, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw, 1977) 351.

<sup>57</sup>Stumpf 44.

<sup>58</sup>See Appendix on 20th Century Ethical Cognitivists and Non-cognitivists.

<sup>59</sup>Bernard Gert, and Timothy J. Duggan, "Free Will as the Ability to Will," *Nous* 13 (1979): 201.

<sup>60</sup>Michael Bratman, "Practical Reasoning and Weakness of the Will," *Nous* 13 (1979): 153.

<sup>61</sup>Gert, Duggan 204.

<sup>62</sup>Gert, Duggan 212.

## ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER TWO

<sup>1</sup>Saint Augustine, "Concerning the Nature of Good, Against the Manichæans," *St. Augustin: Writings against the Manichæans and Against the Donatists*, trans. Albert H. Newman, ed. Philip Schaff 14 vols. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church 1. (Michigan: Eerdmans, 1956) 4: 351-65. *Concerning the Nature of the Good, Against the Manichæans* was written in 404 AD. It gives Augustine's thoughts on the nature of the good as measure, order and form, and he argues for the notion of evil as the privation of the good. In the endnotes this text shall be referred to as *CNG*

<sup>2</sup>Saint Augustine, "On the Morals of the Manichæans," *St. Augustin: Writings against the Manichæans and Against the Donatists*, trans. Rev. Richard Stothert, ed. Philip Schaff 14 vols. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers

of the Christian Church I (Michigan: Eerdmans, 1956) 4: 69-89. This text was written in 388 AD. It is another text regarding the origin and nature of evil. Again, he argues against the Manichean conception of evil resulting from two supernatural forces. In the endnotes this text shall be referred to as *MM*.

<sup>3</sup>Saint Augustine, "On Two Souls, Against the Manichæans," *St. Augustin: Writings against the Manichæans and Against the Donatists*, trans. Albert H. Newman ed. Philip Schaff 14 vols. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church I (Michigan: Eerdmans, 1956) 4: 95-107. This book was written in 391 AD. In this text he argues that existence can come only from God. In the endnotes this text shall be referred to as *Two Souls*.

<sup>4</sup>Saint Augustine, "Divine Providence and the Problem of Evil," *St. Augustine*, trans. Robert P. Russell ed. Ludwig Schopp, et al. 14 vols. The Fathers of the Church (New York: Cima, 1948) 1: 229-332. This work was written in 396 AD. It is dedicated to Zenobius, a friend. This text is primarily concerned with the notions of evil and order. Augustine reconciles the existence of these two notions through Divine Providence. In the endnotes this text shall be referred to as *DP*.

<sup>5</sup>Norman F. Cantor, and Peter L. Klein., *Medieval Thought: Augustine and Thomas Aquinas*, (Waltham: Blaisdell, 1969) 7.

<sup>6</sup>Augustine (354-430) was born in Africa in the town of Tagaste. He was born to a pagan father, Patricius, and a Christian mother, Monica. He was given the best education for the time, and became a teacher of rhetoric. His son, Adeodatus, was born in 372, the child of Augustine and his mistress. He converted to Manicheanism around the same time and stays with this sect for about nine years. In 383 he left for Rome where he embraced the scepticism of the Third Academy. Through the sermons of

Bishop Ambrose he again became interested in Christianity, and formally converted in 386. In 388 he returned to Africa, and was ordained a priest in 391. Many of his anti-Manichean writings were prior to his consecration as Bishop of Hippo in 395. After this time his polemics were mainly against the Donatists, the Pelagians, and the semi-Pelagians. In 430 he died as the Vandals besieged the city.

<sup>7</sup>Gerald Bonner, *St. Augustine of Hippo: Life and Controversies* (London: S.C.M., 1963) 314.

<sup>8</sup>J. Roland E. Ramirez, "The Priority of Reason over Faith in Augustine," *Augustinian Studies* 13 (1982): 123.

<sup>9</sup>Ramirez 125-6.

<sup>10</sup>Ramirez 130.

<sup>11</sup>Augustine, *DP* II, ix, 27.

<sup>12</sup>Augustine, *DP* II, ix, 26.

<sup>13</sup>Augustine, *DP* II, xi, 30; II, xviii.

<sup>14</sup>Along with the problem of evil, Augustine was also concerned with the reconciliation of seeming contradictions between the Old and New Testaments, and the relationship between authority and reason.

<sup>15</sup>Saint Augustine, "Against the Epistle of Manichæus called Fundamental," *St. Augustin: Writings against the Manichæans and Against the Donatists*, trans. Rev. Richard Stothert ed. Philip Schaff 14 vols. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church 1, (Michigan: Eerdmans, 1956) III.

<sup>16</sup>The Manicheans believed that the soul is part of the substance of God. They claimed that their religion was founded upon reason, not superstition. It was one of the gnostic sects which asserted that salvation

depends upon the assent of the intellect to certain truths. It was this reliance on reason, as opposed to authority which first attracted Augustine.

<sup>17</sup>Augustine, *CNG* 1.

<sup>18</sup>Augustine, *CNG* 18.

<sup>19</sup>Saint Augustine, "Acts or Disputation Against Fortunatus the Manichæan," *St. Augustin: Writings against the Manichæans and Against the Donatists*, trans. Albert H. Newman ed. Philip Schaff 14 vols. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church 1 (Michigan: Eerdmans, 1956). Day 1, VIII. This text, written in 392 AD, is a report of the public debate between Augustine and Fortunatus on the topic of the source of evil.

<sup>20</sup>William Maker, "Augustine on Evil: The Dilemma of the Philosophers," *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 15 (1984): 151.

<sup>21</sup>Augustine, *CNG* III.

<sup>22</sup>Augustine, *CNG* XXI.

<sup>23</sup>Augustine, *CNG* XXIII.

<sup>24</sup>Augustine, *DP* I, vi, 15.

<sup>25</sup>Augustine, *DP* II, iv, 11.

<sup>26</sup>Saint Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will*, trans. Carroll Mason Sparrow Vol. 4 of University of Virginia Studies. 4 vols. (Charlottesville: U of Virginia, 1947) III, v, 16.

<sup>27</sup>Augustine, *MM* VI, viii.

<sup>28</sup>Augustine, *MM* VI, viii.

<sup>29</sup>Augustine, *CNG* XXIX.

<sup>30</sup>*Privatio boni* or the privation theory is one of several approaches to conceiving evil in the Catholic tradition.

<sup>31</sup>Augustine, *MM* II, 11.

<sup>32</sup>Roy W. Battenhouse, ed. *A Companion to the Study of St. Augustine*, (New York: Oxford U.P.) 156. Although he was markedly and clearly influenced by the neo-Platonists in the earlier stages of his writings, this influence waned in time, to be replaced with more Christian thinkers. In terms of Augustine's doctrine of evil, Saint Paul is notable. There is some contention as to who is the greater neo-Platonic influence on Augustine's thought, that is, whether it is Plotinus, or his pupil Porphyry.

<sup>33</sup>Augustine, *MM* II, II.

<sup>34</sup>Augustine, *MM* II, II.

<sup>35</sup>Judith Clellius Stark, "The Problem of Evil: Augustine and Ricoeur," *Augustinian Studies* 13 (1982): 115.

<sup>36</sup>Augustine, *CNG* XVII.

<sup>37</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* I, I, I.

<sup>38</sup>Refer to the standard types of evil given in the first chapter of this thesis.

<sup>39</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* I, I, I; *CNG* XVII.

<sup>40</sup>Augustine, *CNG* IX; XX.

<sup>41</sup>Augustine, *CNG* IX.

<sup>42</sup>Augustine, *CNG* IX.

<sup>43</sup>Augustine, *CNG* XX.

<sup>44</sup>Augustine, *CNG* XX.

<sup>45</sup>Augustine, *CNG* VIII.

<sup>46</sup>Augustine, *DP* I, xix, 51.

<sup>47</sup>Augustine, *CNG* XVI.

<sup>48</sup>Augustine, *CNG* XXXV.

<sup>49</sup>Augustine, *CNG* XXXVI.

<sup>50</sup>Augustine, *Two Souls* XI, xiv.

<sup>51</sup>Augustine, *Two Souls* XI, xv.

<sup>52</sup>Richard Taylor, *Metaphysics*, ed. Elizabeth Beardsley, et al. 3rd ed. Prentice-Hall Foundations of Philosophy Series (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice, 1983) 41.

<sup>53</sup>David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge. 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1978) 407.

<sup>54</sup>Taylor 41.

<sup>55</sup>Taylor 49.

<sup>56</sup>Augustine, *Two Souls* X, xiv.

<sup>57</sup>Augustine, *Two Souls* X, xiv.

<sup>58</sup>John Langshaw Austin, "A Plea for Excuses," *Law and Philosophy: Readings in Legal Philosophy*, ed. Edward Allen Kent (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice, 1970) 279.

<sup>59</sup>Taylor 38.

<sup>60</sup>See chapter three for a more detailed analysis of intention.

### ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER 3

<sup>1</sup>Saint Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* trans. Carroll Mason Sparrow. Vol. 4 of University of Virginia Studies. 4 vols. (Charlottesville: U of Virginia, 1947). He began this work in Rome (Book 1) and finished it six to seven years later in Africa (Books 11 and 111), during the years, circa 387-395. This text is often assumed to contain Augustine's best philosophical style, and is an example of his thought influenced by neoplatonic sources.

<sup>2</sup>Saint Augustine, *The Retractations* trans. Sister Mary Inez Bogan. Vol. 60 of Fathers of the Church. 79 vols. (Washington: Catholic U of America P, 1968). In the Retractions, which criticizes his written works for

accuracy, the longest entry is for *On Free Will*. He comments that his fuller treatment of grace, the preparation of the will, and the predestination of the elect is lacking.

<sup>3</sup>Manicheanism, originally thought to originate in Persia and founded by Mani, is a form of Gnosticism that had extensive influence in northern Africa during Augustine's life.

<sup>4</sup>Augustine was also concerned with the reconciliation of the contradictions between the Old and New Testaments, which Scriptures are now authoritative for Christians, and the relationship between authority and reason.

<sup>5</sup>The forces of darkness attempted to infringe into the domain of light; after this battle, in which both earth and man were brought into being, some of the light was entrapped with the forces of darkness. God wishes to regain this light and man can help him in this endeavour.

<sup>6</sup>Manicheans believed that God and evil were types of material substances.

<sup>7</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* II, xvii, 46.

<sup>8</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* II, xvii, 47. There are other premises which he had to respect, such as original sin, and baptism.

<sup>9</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* III, xvi, 46.

<sup>10</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* III, xxii, 63.

<sup>11</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* III, xx.

<sup>12</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* III, xxi, 59.

<sup>13</sup>G.R. Evans, *Augustine on Evil* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1982) 43.

<sup>14</sup>Saint Augustine, "Divine Providence and the Problem of Evil." *St. Augustine*. Trans. Robert P. Russell. Ed. Ludwig Schopp, et al. 79 vols. The Fathers of the Church. (New York: Cima, 1948) II, xi, 30. This early work is



contemporaneous with, and similar in doctrine to *On the Freedom of the Will*

<sup>15</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* II, v.

<sup>16</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* II, viii, 24.

<sup>17</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* III, viii, 23.

<sup>18</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* I, x, 21.

<sup>19</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* I, xxi, 34.

<sup>20</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* III, xviii, 52.

<sup>21</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* III, xxv, 76.

<sup>22</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* III, xxii, 65.

<sup>23</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* III, xx, 57.

<sup>24</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* I, ii, 4.

<sup>25</sup>Isaiah VII, 9. King James Version.

<sup>26</sup>Providing an analysis of the relationship between the will and knowledge is a pervasive issue during the Middle Ages. Augustine's solution is not the only one.

<sup>27</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* II, xix, 50.

<sup>28</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* III, xxv, 74.

<sup>29</sup>Etienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine* trans L.E.M. Lynch. (New York: Random, 1960) 132.

<sup>30</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* I, xii, 25. "Quia roganti tibi respondere non debeo, nisi volenti scire quod rogas. Deinde nisi velis ad sapientiam pervenire, sermo tecum de hujusmodi rebus non est habendus. Postremo meus amicus esse non poteris, nisi velis ut bene sit mihi. Jamvero de te tu ipse videris, utrum tibi voluntas nulla sit beatæ vitæ tuæ." Saint Augustine, "De Libero Arbitrio." *Sancti Aurelii Augustini Opera Omnia* (Paris: Gaume Freres, 1836) cc. 944-5. The translation by Carroll Mason

Sparrow, which is paraphrased in the text, employs stronger terms than necessary.

<sup>31</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* III, xxv, 75.

<sup>32</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* III, xvii, 49.

<sup>33</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* II, xix, 53.

<sup>34</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* III, xxv, 74.

<sup>35</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* III, xxv, 74.

<sup>36</sup>Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (Middlesex, Eng.: Penguin, 1949)

61.

<sup>37</sup>Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* 62-7.

<sup>38</sup>Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* 73.

<sup>39</sup>However, for a more complete exposition of his thoughts and rebuttals to it, consult *A Short Commentary on the Concept of Mind* and William Lyons, *Gilbert Ryle: an introduction to his philosophy*, (Brighton, Eng.: Harvester, 1980).

<sup>40</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* I, viii, 27.

<sup>41</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* II, xviii, 52.

<sup>42</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* II, xviii, 53.

<sup>43</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* III, 1, 3.

<sup>44</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* II, xviii, 47.

<sup>45</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* III, xviii, 52.

<sup>46</sup>Saint Augustine, "The Nature of the Good," *Augustine: Earlier Writings* trans. John H.S. Burleigh. 26 vols. (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1958) XXXV. This early work is contemporaneous with, and similar in doctrine to *On the Freedom of the Will*

<sup>47</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* III, ix, 24.

<sup>48</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* III, xix, 54.

<sup>49</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* III, xx, 56.

<sup>50</sup>Saint Augustine, "Of True Religion," *Augustine: Earlier Writings*. trans. John H.S. Burleigh. 26 vols. (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1958) XV,29. This early work is contemporaneous with, and similar in doctrine to *On the Freedom of the Will*.

<sup>51</sup>Augustine identifies this group as the good angels.

<sup>52</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* III, v, 15, III, xvii, 47.

<sup>53</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* I, xiii, 29.

<sup>54</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* I, xiii, 27.

<sup>55</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* I, xiv, 30.

<sup>56</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* III, xix, 53.

<sup>57</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* I, xvi, 34.

<sup>58</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* II, xix, 53.

<sup>59</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* III, xvii, 48-9. By defining the will as a first cause, Augustine refutes Ryle's fourth objection. Ryle states that if choices are actions, then we can choose to choose, and so forth; this reasoning causes an infinite regress.

<sup>60</sup>James Anderson, *St. Augustine and Being: A Metaphysical Essay* (Hague: Nijhoff, 1965) 34.

<sup>61</sup>Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* 67.

<sup>62</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* II, xix, 51, "etiam ipsa libera voluntate per eam ipsam uti nos posse," Saint Augustine, "De Libero Arbitrio." *Sancti Aurelii Augustini Opera Omnia*, c. 988-9.

<sup>63</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* II, i, 2.

<sup>64</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* III, xviii, 52.

<sup>65</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* III, xviii, 51-2.

<sup>66</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* III, xviii, 51.

- 67Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* II, xx, 54.
- 68Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* III, xx, 58.
- 69Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* II, xx, 54.
- 70Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* II, xiii, 37.
- 71Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* III, xviii, 51.
- 72Romans VII, 19.
- 73Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* III, xxv, 76.
- 74Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* III, xxiv, 72.
- 75Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* III, xvii, 48.
- 76Etienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine* trans L.E.M. Lynch. (New York: Random, 1960) 119.
- 77Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* III, xiv, 39.
- 78Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* III, x, 29.
- 79Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* III, x, 29.
- 80Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* III, x, 31.
- 81Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* I, i, 2-3.
- 82Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* III, i, 2.
- 83Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* III, xviii, 52.
- 84Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* III, xxv, 74.
- 85Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* II, xx, 54.
- 86Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* II, xx, 54, "quoniam defectivus motus est," Saint Augustine, "De Libero Arbitrio." *Sancti Aurelii Augustini Opera Omnia* c. 990.
- 87Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* I, xvi, 34.
- 88As he matures he finds reason resistant to various truths, and also that one can be tricked by reason; thus, he eventually tends more and more to refer to revealed authority. This tendency will appear in later chapters.

<sup>89</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* 11, 1, 1-3.

<sup>90</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* 111, i, 1-2.

<sup>91</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* 111, 11, 4-111, 8.

<sup>92</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* 111, 111, 6.

<sup>93</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* 11, 111, 7.

<sup>94</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* 111, 111, 8, "si autem necesse est, non jam voluntate, sed necessitate id me velle fatendum est," Saint Augustine, "De Libero Arbitrio." *Sancti Aurelii Augustini Opera Omnia* c. 998.

<sup>95</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* 111, 111, 7-8.

<sup>96</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* 111, 111, 8.

<sup>97</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* 111, iv, 9.

<sup>98</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* 1, 111, 7.

<sup>99</sup>Criticisms appear in: (1) David DeCelles, "Divine Prescience and Human Freedom in Augustine," *Augustinian Studies* 8 (1977): 151-160. (2) William Lane Craig, "Augustine on Foreknowledge and Free Will," *Augustinian Studies* 15 (1984): 41-63. (3) Jasper Hopkins, "Augustine on Foreknowledge and Free Will," *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 8 (1977): 111-126.

<sup>100</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* 1, 11, 4.

<sup>101</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* 1, 111, 8.

<sup>102</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* 1, xiv, 30.

<sup>103</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* 111, xxv, 75-76,

"Discernenda igitur sunt genera visorum, quorum unum est quod proficiscitur a voluntate suadentis, quale illud est diaboli cui homo consentiendo peccavit, alterum a subiacentibus rebus vel intentioni animi vel sensibus corporis." Saint Augustine, "De Libero Arbitrio," *Aurelii Augustini Opera*,

Pars, 11, 2, Corpus Christianorum, (Turnholt: Brepols Editores Pontificii, 1870) 320. 250,25-30.

<sup>104</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* III, xx, 56.

<sup>105</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* III, x, 30.

<sup>106</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* III, xix, 53.

<sup>107</sup>Augustine discusses the soul's progression towards the good, by overcoming sin with the aid of God, *On the Freedom of the Will* from III, xix, 54 to III, xxii, 65.

<sup>108</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* III, xix, 53.

<sup>109</sup>Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* III, xx, 55.

#### ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER 4

<sup>1</sup>Saint Augustine, "On the Grace of Christ and On Original Sin," *Basic Writings of Saint Augustine*. trans. P. Holmes ed. Witney J. Oates. 2 vols. (New York: Random, 1948) 1: 583-654. *On the Grace of Christ, and On Original Sin* was written in 418 A.D. He wrote this work for a married couple, Pinianus and Melania. In this text, written in the same year that the Pelagian heresy was condemned, he attempts to refute their doctrines. For endnotes this title will be designated as *GC*.

<sup>2</sup>Saint Augustine, "On Nature and Grace," *Basic Writings of Saint Augustine*. trans. P. Holmes ed. Witney J. Oates. 2 vols. (New York: Random, 1948) 1: 521-79. *On Nature and Grace* was written in 415 A.D. It is written for two young men, Timasius and Jacobus, who asked Augustine for advice. They were given a book by Pelagius and were concerned that he denied the need for grace. In this work Augustine attempts to refute the thought of Pelagius, but does not refer directly to him; Augustine was

hoping that Pelagius would correct his errors when made aware of them. For endnotes this title will be designated as *NG*.

<sup>3</sup>Saint Augustine, "On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins and On the Baptism of Infants," *Saint Augustine: Anti-Pelagian Writings*. trans. Peter Holmes and Benjamin B. Warfield. ed. Philip Schaff. 14 vols. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church 1. (Michigan: Eerdmans, 1956) 5: 12-78. *On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins, and On the Baptism of Infants* was written in 412 A.D., and addressed to Marcellinus, a friend of Augustine's. It is written as a response to various questions. For endnotes this title will be designated as *MF*.

<sup>4</sup>Saint Augustine, "To Simplician--On Various Questions, Book 1," *Augustine: Earlier Writings* trans. John H.S. Burleigh. 26 vols. (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1958) 6: 370-406. *To Simplician--On Various Questions. Book 1* was written in 397 A.D. It succinctly shows his transition from his first to second period. It is addressed to Simplician who was Augustine's friend and counsellor in Milan; the former eventually became the Bishop of Milan. Simplician asked Augustine for various Biblical interpretations, and this book is the first of two which he wrote. For endnotes this title will be designated as *SV*.

<sup>5</sup>William S Babcock, "Augustine's Interpretation of Romans (A.D. 394-396)," *Augustinian Studies* 10 (1979). 74.

<sup>6</sup>Roy W. Battenhouse, *A Companion to the Study of St. Augustine*, (New York: Oxford. U.P., 1955) 21.

<sup>7</sup>Witney J. Oates, Introduction, "On the Grace of Christ and On Original Sin," *Basic Writings of Saint Augustine*. trans. P. Holmes ed. Witney J. Oates. 2 vols. (New York: Random, 1948) 582.

<sup>8</sup>Pelagius is a demanding individual with high moral standards who is often believed to be a monk; there is no evidence to indicate that he was ever ordained. He became concerned with the writings of Augustine after reading his *Confessions*. It seemed to him that Augustine's influence could encourage either despair or the idea of an easy grace. He is usually considered the least original and most orthodox thinker of the three. His contributions to the doctrines of Pelagianism centre primarily on the notion of the free will.

<sup>9</sup>Coelestius was a noble and prior to meeting Pelagius, a lawyer; also, he was one of the Roman exiles who came to Africa (after the sack of Rome). He was largely responsible for disseminating the views of Pelagius and applied to become a priest, but was denied ordination and eventually excommunicated with Pelagius. Coelestius also enjoyed the support of Julian. His major contributions to the Pelagian controversy regarded infant baptism, original sin, and the mortality of Adam.

<sup>10</sup>Julian of Eclanum was a bishop, and the third and most formidable of Augustine's opponents because he possessed the ability for both speculative and systematic thought. However, their arguments often degenerated into name-calling. Julian regarded Augustine as still under the influence of Manicheanism in the sense of creating a dualism between good (God) and evil (humanity). Perhaps the most striking contribution of Julian is his claim that free will emancipates man from God.

<sup>11</sup> *GC* I, iv; The Latin terms are provided by Stanislaus J. Grabowski, *The Church: An Introduction to the Theology of St. Augustine* (New York: Herder, 1957) 399. *Esse* refers to the action by which a person is made righteous.

<sup>12</sup>Augustine, *AG* XXV; LXIX; LVII; LIX.



13Augustine, *NG* XXIII; *GC* II, vi.

14Augustine, *GC* II, iv.

15Augustine, *GC* I, iii.

16Augustine, *GC* I, xiv.

17Augustine, *GC* I, xxxiv.

18Eugène S.J Portalié, *A Guide to the Thought of St. Augustine*, trans. Ralph J. Bastian. (London: Burns & Oates, 1960) 200.

19Patricia Wilson-Kastner, "Grace as Participation in the Divine Life in the Theology of Augustine of Hippo," *Augustinian Studies* (1976): 135.

20Augustine, *NG* II.

21Augustine, *MF* I, xxvi; *GC* II, xxxi.

22Augustine, *MF* II, iii.

23Augustine, *NC* LXII.

24See Appendix on Law.

25Augustine, *NG* XXIX; *GC* I, xvi; *MF* II, v.

26Augustine, *GC* I, xx.

27Saint Augustine, "Against Two Letters of the Pelagians." *Saint Augustin: Anti-Pelagian Writings*. Trans. Rev. Robert Ernest Wallis and Benjamin B. Warfield. Ed. Philip Schaff. 14 vols. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church 1. Michigan: Eerdmans, 1956. I, iv.

28Babcock, Augustine's Interpretation of Romans (A.D. 394-396) 62-65.

29Augustine, *NG* IV.

30Augustine, *GC* I, xxiv; *SV* I, II, 2.

31Augustine, *GC* I, xxvii; *SV* I, II, 1.

32S.J. Grabowski 412.

33Augustine, *NG* XXXV.

<sup>34</sup>Augustine, *MF* I, ix.

<sup>35</sup>S.J. Grabowski 231.

<sup>36</sup>Augustine, *GC* I, x; *NG* LXVII.

<sup>37</sup>Augustine, *GC* I, xiii.

<sup>38</sup>Augustine, *NG* XVIII; *GC* I, x; Portalié 193; Mary T. Clark, *Augustine: Philosopher of Freedom* (New York: Desclée, 1958) 101-2.

<sup>39</sup>Battenhouse 193.

<sup>40</sup>Augustine, *SV* I, ii, 17.

<sup>41</sup>Grabowski 407.

<sup>42</sup>Grabowski 407.

<sup>43</sup>Grabowski 406.

<sup>44</sup>Grabowski 408.

<sup>45</sup>Saint Augustine, "On the Holy Trinity." Trans. Rev. Arthur West Haddan. Ed. Philip Schaff. 14 vols. *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church* I. (Michigan: Eerdmans, 1956) 3: 1-228. The Trinity is a text that is written in the same temporal period as the other works that are being considered.

<sup>46</sup>Augustine, *Trinity* X, xi, 18; XII, iv, 4.

<sup>47</sup>Augustine, *Trinity* XIV, xi, 14.

<sup>48</sup>Augustine, *Trinity* XV, xxi, 41.

<sup>49</sup>Augustine, *Trinity* X, i, 2; XIII, iv, 7.

<sup>50</sup>Augustine, *Trinity* XV, xxi, 41.

<sup>51</sup>Augustine, *NG* XXIV.

<sup>52</sup>Augustine, *MF* I, xxxvii.

<sup>53</sup>Augustine, *GC* I, xiv.

<sup>54</sup>Augustine, *Trinity* XIV, xii, 15.

<sup>55</sup>Augustine, *Trinity* X, xi, 8.

56Evans 60.

57Augustine, *NG* LXXIX.

58Augustine, *MF* II, xvii.

59Augustine, *GC* I, xxxiv; *SV* I, II, 7; "On the Spirit and the Letter."

*Basic Writings of Saint Augustine*. Trans. P. Holmes. Ed. Witney J. Oates. 2 vols. (New York: Random, 1948) LIV.

60Augustine, *SV* I, II, 9.

61Augustine, *MF* II, xx.

62Augustine, *GC* I, vi; *SV* I, II 12.

63Augustine, *SV* I, II, 12.

64Augustine, *SV* I, II, 2.

65Augustine, *GC* I, xxv.

66Augustine, *SV* I, II, 14.

67Augustine, *SV* I, II, 13.

68Augustine, *SV* I, II, 20.

69Augustine, *Spirit and the Letter* LIV.

70Augustine, *SV* I, II, 10.

71Augustine, *Against Two Letters of the Pelagians* I, xxxvii.

72Augustine, *GC* I, xv.

73Augustine, *SV* I, II, 13.

74Matthew XXII, 14; Augustine, *SV* I, II, 10.

75Augustine, *GC* XIII; *SV* I, II, 12.

76Augustine, *NG* XXXVI.

77Augustine, *NG* XXXVI.

78Augustine, *SV* I, II, 10 "Aliter enim Deus præstat ut velimus, aliter præstat quod voluerimus. Ut velimus enim et suum esse voluit et nostrum; suum vocando, nostrum sequendo. Quod autem voluerimus solus

præstat, id est, posse bene agere, et semper beate vivere." Saint Augustine, "De Diversis Quæstionibus Octoginta Tribus Liber I," *Sancti Aurelii Augustini Opera Omnia*, Tomus Sextus, Pars Prior, (Paris: Gaume Freres, 1837) 168, 10B.

79Taylor 41.

80Taylor 41.

81Augustine, *MF* II, xvii

82Clark 82.

83Clark 81.

84Clark 108.

85Clark 90.

86Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* II, xiii, 37.

87Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* III, III, 8.

88Clark 93.

89Chapter 3, sixth proof for the freedom of the will; Augustine, *On the Freedom of the Will* III, III, 7-8.

90Augustine, *Against Two Letters of the Pelagians* I, v.

91Romano Guardini, *Freedom, Grace, and Destiny*, trans. John Murray (New York: Pantheon, 1961) 81.

92Guardini 81.

93Guardini 73.

94Guardini 126.

## ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER FIVE

1For this position, see: *To Simplician--On Various Questions. Book I.*

2Saint Augustine, "On Grace and Free Will," *Basic Writings of Saint Augustine*, trans. P. Holmes ed. Witney J. Oates. 2 vols. (New York:

Random, 1948) 1: 733-74. *On Grace and Free Will* was written in 426 or 427 A.D. as part of Augustine's response to the concern of Valentine and the monks in the monastery at Adrumetum. He attempts to show that grace and free will are compatible. For endnotes this title will be designated as *GF*.

<sup>3</sup>Saint Augustine, "On Rebuke and Grace," *Saint Augustin: Anti-Pelagian Writings*, trans. Rev. Robert Ernest Wallis and Benjamin B. Warfield, ed. Philip Schaff, 14 vols. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church 1. (Michigan: Eerdmans, 1956) 5: 468-91. *On Rebuke and Grace* was written in 426 or 427 A.D. It is addressed to Valentine and the Monks at the monastery of Adrumetum. It is written to show the relationship between grace and personal endeavour. For endnotes this title will be designated as *RG*.

<sup>4</sup>Saint Augustine, "On the Predestination of the Saints," *Basic Writings of Saint Augustine*, trans. R.E. Wallis, ed. Witney J. Oates. 2 vols. (New York: Random, 1948) 1: 777-817. *On the Predestination of the Saints* was written in 428 or 429 A.D. It is addressed to Prosper and Hilary who are two individuals who have advised Augustine on the upsurge of semi-Pelagianism in Southern Gaul. The purpose of this text is to combat the increasing popularity of semi-Pelagianism. For endnotes this title will be designated as *PS*.

<sup>5</sup>Saint Augustine, "On the Gift of Perseverance," *Saint Augustin: Anti-Pelagian Writings*, trans. Rev. Robert Ernest Wallis and Benjamin B. Warfield, ed. Philip Schaff, 14 vols. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church 1. Michigan: Eerdmans, 1956. 5: 521-52. *On the Gift of Perseverance* was written in 428 or 429 A.D. It is considered as the second book of *On the Predestination of the Saints*. Its purpose is to combat the

increasing popularity of semi-Pelagianism. For endnotes this title will be designated as *GP*.

<sup>6</sup>A monk, Brother Felix, copied a letter of Augustine's written to his friend, Sixtus (who was later to become Pope Sixtus III), and read it to some of his fellow monks.

<sup>7</sup>Augustine, *Retractations* LXXXII.

<sup>8</sup>Augustine, *PS* XXXVI; Saint Augustine, *Letters* Trans. Sister Mary Patricia Garvey. Vols. 18,20,30,32 of Fathers of the Church. 79 vols. (Washington: Catholic U of America P, 1953). In the letter Number 225, St. Prosper of Aquitaine to Augustine in which he informs Augustine of how others think about election.

<sup>9</sup>Augustine, *SV* I, II, 16; *PS* XIV.

<sup>10</sup>Augustine, *SV* I, II, 13.

<sup>11</sup>Augustine, *SV* I, II, 5.

<sup>12</sup>Augustine, *PS* XXII.

<sup>13</sup>Augustine, *PS* XXXVI.

<sup>14</sup>Augustine, *RG* 40.

<sup>15</sup>Augustine, *RG* 40; *GP* 19.

<sup>16</sup>Augustine, *RG* 40.

<sup>17</sup>Augustine, *GF* XX; *GP* 15; *PS* XXXV.

<sup>18</sup>Augustine, *SV* I, II, 6-8.

<sup>19</sup>Augustine, *GP* 48-50.

<sup>20</sup>Augustine, *PS* XIX.

<sup>21</sup>Augustine, *RG* 16.

<sup>22</sup>Augustine, *RG* 39.

<sup>23</sup>Augustine, *RG* 28.

<sup>24</sup>Augustine, *RG* 23.

25Augustine, *PS* XXXV; *GP* 68.

26Augustine, *PS* XXX.

27Augustine, *GP* 41; *GP* 51.

28Augustine, *GP* 40.

29Augustine, *PS* XVIII.

30Augustine, *GP* 61.

31Augustine, *PS* XVI.

32Augustine, *GP* 62.

33Augustine, *GP* 17.

34Psalms 25, 10.

35Augustine, *PS* XI.

36Augustine, *GP* 16.

37Augustine, *GP* 16.

38Augustine, *GF* XLIII; *PS* XVI.

39Augustine, *PS* XXXIV; *GP* 28.

40Augustine, *RG* 27.

41Augustine, *RG* 27.

42Augustine, *GR* 27.

43Saint Augustine, *Faith, Hope and Charity*, trans. Bernard M. Peebles, 79 vols. Fathers of the Church. (Washington: Catholic U of America P, 1947) XVI, ix. It is a text that is written during this same period.

44Augustine, *GR* 27.

45Augustine, *GP* 10.

46Augustine, *GP* 5.

47Augustine, *GP* 10.

48Augustine, *GP* 1.

49Augustine, *RG* 16.

- 50 Augustine, *GP* 1.
- 51 Augustine, *RG* 16.
- 52 Augustine, *GP* 6.
- 53 Augustine, *RG* 38; *RG* 35.
- 54 Augustine, *GP* 9.
- 55 Augustine, *GP* 10.
- 56 Augustine, *RG* 35; *GP* 4.
- 57 Augustine, *RG* 35.
- 58 Augustine, *RG* 35.
- 59 Augustine, *RG* 33.
- 60 Augustine, *GF* 11.
- 61 Augustine, *RG* 35
- 62 Augustine, *GF* XXVII.
- 63 Augustine, *GF* VIII.
- 64 Augustine, *RG* 35.
- 65 Augustine, *RG* 38.
- 66 Augustine, *RG* 35.
- 67 Augustine, *GP* 33.
- 68 Augustine, *RG* 42.
- 69 Augustine, *RG* 17.
- 70 Augustine, *RG* 42.
- 71 Augustine, *GF* XIX.
- 72 See Appendix on Law.
- 73 Augustine, *GF* XXXI.
- 74 Augustine, *PS* XXVII.
- 75 Augustine, *RG* 45.



76Justification is the transition from the state of sin or injustice to that of grace or justice. Election precedes justification. Persons are first justified through God's gift, and then able to gain merit because they are in a state of justice. Justification does not simply remove sin but it creates within us a just state. When justified we become partakers of the divine nature, and the image of God is reinstated within us.

77Augustine, *PS* XXXIV.

78Ezekiel 36,27.

79Augustine, *PS* XXII.

80Augustine, *PS* XXXIV.

81Augustine, *RG* 35.

82Augustine, *RG* 24.

83Augustine, *RG* 40.

84Augustine, *GF* XLI.

85Augustine, *RG* 9.

86Augustine, *GP* 5.

87Augustine, *SV* I, II, 15.

88Augustine, *GP* 25.

89Augustine, *GF* XLV.

90Augustine, *GP* 55.

91Augustine, *PS* VII; *GP* 41.

92Augustine, *PS* XXVII.

93Augustine, *GF* XX; "gratia est pro gratia" Saint Augustine, "De Gratiâ et Libero Arbitrio," S. Aur. Augustini Opera Omnia, Vol. 10, Pars Prior, (Parisii: Gaume Fratres, 1838) col. 1244.

94Augustine, *PS* XVIII.

95Augustine, GP 29; Gerald Bonner, *St. Augustine of Hippo: Life and Controversies* (London: S.C.M., 1963) 383.

96Augustine, *Retractations* VIII, 11.

97Gilson 157.

98Gilson 160.

99Augustine, GR16.

100Clark 109.

101Augustine, PS X:XXVI; PS XXII; PS XIII; PS XXXV; PS XX; PS XXXII; GP12; GP33; RG17; RG45; GF XLIII; GF XXX.

102Augustine, GF XLII; "ut per eos agat quod per eos agere ipse voluerit," Saint Augustine, "De Gratiâ et Libero Arbitrio," S. Aur. Augustini Opera Omnia, Vol. 10, Pars Prior, (Paris: Gaume Freres, 1838) col. 1263.

103Augustine, GF XXXIII.

104Clark 103.

105Clark 104.

106Augustine, RG 31.

107Augustine, RG 34.

108Augustine, RB 34.

109Clark 109.

110Augustine, RG 13; Augustine's concludes that rebuke is necessary in spite of the fact that perseverance is a gift. Rebuke may help to make a man repent, provided that God gives him repentance. Rebuke is medicinal to the predestined because it makes one aware of one's sins, but to the non-elect it is a 'penal infliction.'

111Augustine, RG 16.

112Augustine, RG 24.

113Augustine, RG 17.

114Augustine, *RG* 35.

115Augustine, *PS* XIV; *SV* I, II, 17.

116Augustine, *PS* IX.

117Augustine, *PS* XVI.

118Romans IX, 18-21; Augustine, *PS* XIV.

119Augustine, *PS* XIV.

120Augustine, *PS* VII.

121Augustine, *GP* 58.

122Augustine, *RG* 49.

123Bonner 383.

124In *SV* I, II, 18 Augustine includes the words "si autem" in his exposition of Romans 9, 22-23. In *PS* XIV Augustine no longer includes these first two words. In both texts Augustine's comments assume these passages to be scriptural authority.

125Romans 9, 22-23.

126Augustine, *SV* I, II, 17.

127Romans II, 33-34.

128Augustine, *PS* XIV; *Letter* 196; *Faith, Hope, and Charity*, p. 453; W.J.Sparrow, D.D. Simpson, *The Letters of St. Augustine* (New York: Macmillan, 1919) 164.

129R.L. Ottley, *Studies in the Confessions of St. Augustine* (London: Scott, 1959) 51.

130Augustine, *PS* XLI.

131Augustine, *GP* 18; *SV* I, II, 18.

132Wilson-Kastner 152.

133Hillary A. Armstrong, *St. Augustine and Christian Platonism*, (Villanova: Villanova UP, 1967) 29.

<sup>134</sup>Armstrong 24.

<sup>135</sup>Augustine, *PS* XXXVI.

<sup>136</sup>Augustine, *GP* 20.

<sup>137</sup>Augustine, *GP* 66.

<sup>138</sup>Augustine, *RG* 9.

<sup>139</sup>Augustine, *GP* 12; *PS* XXXIII.

<sup>140</sup>Augustine, *GP* 31, *PS* XIX.

<sup>141</sup>Augustine, *GP* 27.

## ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER SIX

<sup>1</sup>John A. Maurant, *Introduction to the Philosophy of Saint Augustine*, (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State U, 1964) 3.

<sup>2</sup>Stark 111.

<sup>3</sup>Henry Chadwick, *Augustine*, (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1986) 79.

<sup>4</sup>Evans 83.

<sup>5</sup>Cantor, Klein 7.

<sup>6</sup>Copleston, *Medieval Philosophy* 50.

<sup>7</sup>Copleston, *Medieval Philosophy* 230.

<sup>8</sup>Cantor, Klein 7.

<sup>9</sup>Cantor, Klein 7.

<sup>10</sup>Samuel Enoch Stumpf, *Philosophy: History and Problems*, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw, 1977) 196.

<sup>11</sup>Philip Schaff, Prolegomena, *The Confessions and Letters of St. Augustin With a Sketch of His Life and Work*, 14 vols. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers 1. (Michigan: Eerdmans, 1956) 1:21.

<sup>12</sup>Michael Baius, 1513-1589, born in Belgium.

<sup>13</sup>G. Gerberon, ed. "Baius Michael," *Encyclopædia Britannica: Micropædia*. 1974 15th ed. 1:740.

<sup>14</sup>Henri De Lubac, *Augustinianism and Modern Theology*, trans. Lancelot Sheppard (Montreal, Que.: Palm, 1969) 3.

<sup>15</sup>De Lubac 13.

<sup>16</sup>De Lubac xi.

<sup>17</sup>Gerberon 1:740.

<sup>18</sup>Cornelius Otto Jansen, 1585-1638, born in Holland.

<sup>19</sup>De Lubac 69.

<sup>20</sup>De Lubac 37.

<sup>21</sup>Marc Marie Escholier, "Jansen, Cornelius Otto," *Encyclopædia Britannica: Macropædia*. 1974 15th ed. 10:33.

<sup>22</sup>Escholier 10:34.

<sup>23</sup>De Lubac 303.

<sup>24</sup>De Lubac xiii.

<sup>25</sup>Martin Luther, 1483-1546, born in Germany. He entered the Monastery of Augustinian Friars.

<sup>26</sup>Rev. Ernest Gordon Rupp, "Luther, Martin," *Encyclopædia Britannica: Macropædia*. 1974 15th ed. 11:195.

<sup>27</sup>Ernst F Winter, trans and ed. *Erasmus-Luther: Discourse on Free Will* (New York: Ungar, 1961) x.

<sup>28</sup>B.A. Gerrish, "Luther, Martin," *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. 8 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1967) 5: 109.

<sup>29</sup>Rupp 11:190.

<sup>30</sup>Winter 132.

<sup>31</sup>Gerrish 5: 110.

32W. Stanford Reid, ed. *John Calvin: His Influence in the Western World* (Michigan: Zondervan, 1982) 128.

33Gerrish 5: 110.

34Albert Hyma, *Luther's Theological Development from Erfurt to Augsburg*, ed. Bernadotte E. Schmitt, (New York: Crofts, 1928) 24.

35Winter v.

36Winter v.

37Mitchell A Hunter, *The Teaching of Calvin: A Modern Interpretation*, 2nd ed. (Westwood: Revell, 1950) 110.

38Jean Calvin, 1509-1564, born in France.

39Hunter 2.

40Reid, complete work.

41Hunter 99; Schaff 22.

42T.F. Torrance, *Calvin's Doctrine of Man*, (Westport: Greenwood, 1957) 83.

43Nicholas Wolterstorff, "Calvin, John," *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 8 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1967) 2: 8.

44Torrance 83.

45Wolterstorff 2: 8.

46Hunter 122.

47Hunter 123.

48Hunter 125.

49Hunter 20.

50Hunter 93.

51Hunter 99.

52Hunter 103.

53Hunter 108.

<sup>54</sup>Hunter 113.

<sup>55</sup>Hunter 131.

<sup>56</sup>De Lubac 308; Clark 111.

<sup>57</sup>Chadwick 118.

<sup>58</sup>Chadwick 119.

<sup>59</sup>Clark 101, her footnote is taken from Portalié, *Dict. Théol. Cath.*, I, col. 2384. Denzinger, n. 105.

<sup>60</sup>Mary Carman Rose, "Augustine's Thought and Present-Day Christianity: A Reappraisal," *Thomist* 39 (1975): 49.

<sup>61</sup>Bonner 391.

<sup>62</sup>Cantor, Klein 177.

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## **Appendix: 20th Century Ethical Cognitivists and Non-cognitivists**

This dispute is debated between two generic groups known as cognitivists and non-cognitivists. The cognitivists endorse the view that we can have knowledge of good and evil.<sup>1</sup> In contrast, the non-cognitivists claim that moral or value judgments can not be considered under a scientific method, and only these kinds of methods can yield knowledge. A great proportion of this polemic has revolved around two major issues. The first concerns the question of whether goodness or rightness, is a property or characteristic of objects, experiences, or acts.<sup>2</sup> Secondly, and arising from the first issue is the concern over the "Naturalistic Fallacy." This fallacy was originally named by G.E. Moore, and one of its major arguments states that goodness is a non-natural property that can only be grasped by intuition.<sup>3</sup> The various objections and counter-objections to this fallacy contribute to this second issue.

Cognitivists agree that moral judgments can not be scientifically treated in the same manner as objects. But, they assert that moral judgments can be regarded as a different type of science. Normative science is both cognitive, and provides knowledge in the art of living; the knowledge of good and evil is its goal.<sup>4</sup> Cognitivists are further divided into two major sub-groups, and these two groups contain further conceptual distinctions within them. Empiricists or Naturalists, such as George Santanyana, R.B. Perry, and John Dewey, appeal to experience or observation to derive their knowledge of morality.<sup>5</sup> In addition, they claim that ethics more closely resembles the factual sciences.<sup>6</sup> Although Intuitionists or Non-Naturalists, such as G.E. Moore, C.D. Broad, A.C. Ewing and W.D. Ross, also rely on experience, they believe that at strategic conceptual limits they must appeal to self-evident a priori intuitions.<sup>7</sup> In contrast to the

Empiricists, the Intuitionists assert that normative science is more closely related to the a priori sciences, such as mathematics.<sup>8</sup>

Similar to the cognitivists, the non-cognitivists have also been divided into two major groups, Emotivists and Philosophers of Ordinary Language. Emotivists, such as Rudolph Carnap, Hans Reichenbach, A.J. Ayer, and C.L. Stevenson, claim that we cannot have ethical knowledge; instead, moral judgments are emotional expressions, like commands or exclamations, that we express towards some state of affairs.<sup>9</sup> In contrast, Philosophers of Ordinary Language, such as Ludwig Wittgenstein, Stephen Toulmin, R.M. Hare, Stuart Hampshire, J.L. Austin, and H.L.A. Hart, believe that ethical judgments can not be reduced to emotional attitudes.<sup>10</sup> Instead, ethical value judgements are performative, commendatory, gerundive or ascriptive. They either, "facilitate the performance of a task, or recommend an action, or ascribe to something or someone a function or an obligation."<sup>11</sup> This latter group is closer to the cognitivist position because they claim that value judgments rest on reasons, even though their purpose is not to convey knowledge.<sup>12</sup>

## **Appendix: Contemporary Theodicy**

We shall consider some of the numerous positions and their challenges commencing with the logical problem of evil; it is also known as the deductive problem, and the a priori argument.<sup>1</sup> The most popular version of this problem examines the reconciliation of two accepted theist propositions: the existence of a good, omnipotent God, and the existence of evil.<sup>2</sup> The combination of both propositions does not generate a contradiction unless we provide one other condition; we must assume that God does not want evil to exist. By adding this further condition we can imagine that a good, omnipotent God should be able to prevent evil. Yet, because evil does exist it would seem that either God is not good, or God is not omnipotent. J.L. Mackie lists some of the methods that have been employed to thwart these implications: deny omnipotence; restrict the meaning of omnipotence; maintain that evil is an illusion; maintain that evil is seen from a relative, limited point of view; to conceive of evil as the privation of the good; maintain that partial evil is only a portion of the universal good; the free will defence; and that evil or disorder is harmony misunderstood. He argues that some are fallacious solutions.<sup>3</sup> Since the early seventies, various ways to defuse the logical problem have been proffered by such writers as M.B. Ahern, Nelson Pike, and Alvin Plantinga.

Plantinga has helped to clarify many of the ambiguities involved in this problem by drawing the boundaries of what is logically possible of proof, and what, if proven, are the implications. For example, if the theist conception should prove logically unsupportable, this result does not necessarily deny the existence of God; it simply proves that the theist conception is inconsistent. Further, he recasts the problem: Plantinga maintains that what requires logical proof is not the justification of every



instance of evil; rather, the problem is to justify the possibility that there may be a reason for God's permission of evil.<sup>4</sup> Although the logical problem is interesting, writers such as Peter Hare and Edward Madden feel that the problem of accounting for evil is greater than the problem of the consistency/inconsistency issue of the theist position.<sup>5</sup>

Another major area of dispute is engendered by the inductive argument or the evidential problem. This type of analysis relies heavily on evidence, induction and probability.<sup>6</sup> Given the evidence of evil it seems more likely that a good God does not exist. Authors J.W. Cornman and K. Lehrer provide a hypothetical experiment in which they attempt to state what a world with a good God would be like, and we find that our world does not conform.<sup>7</sup>

In contrast to authors such as Michael Martin, George Schlesinger and Wesley Salmon, other writers view the evidential problem with suspicion. Nancy Cartwright also creates a hypothetical experiment in which random parts are placed in a box and shaken until some purposeful object results. Since the probabilities of this occurrence is minimal, she concludes that the probability of the existence of an intelligent designer is high, and the denial of existence is low.<sup>8</sup> Alvin Plantinga shows, through formal techniques, that arguments based on probability are dubious.<sup>9</sup> This result occurs because of the subjective bias of the various participants. Eventually, formal concerns over the viability of probability also gained prominence; again, writers tended to focus more on the construction of the problem, than the substance of the problem.

### **Appendix: Theodicies: Soul-making Theodicy**

The first one that we shall examine is Irenaean or soul-making theodicy.<sup>1</sup> Propounded chiefly by John Hick, its main feature is the creation of man in a moral evolutionary process which begins with self-centeredness and moves towards the good of others, and towards God.<sup>2</sup> Man is seen as a free being who must overcome an epistemic distance to know God. But crossing this distance must not be assumed to happen naturally; instead, progress is made through the free choices of the will.<sup>3</sup> Given his conception, in order to evolve, the world must be a place where persons can acquire various virtues by overcoming evil situations.<sup>4</sup>

Numerous charges have been levied against Hick's formulation. Regarding the quantity of seemingly superfluous evil, Hick believes that this obscurity may contribute to our development.<sup>5</sup> Further, from his analysis, Hick believes that God is responsible for evil in its origin and culmination, however individuals are responsible for its perpetuation in this world.<sup>6</sup> Criticism of soul-making theodicy tend to focus on both the failure rate of its method (evil corrupts as many individuals as it perfects), and the contention that the means may not justify the end.<sup>7</sup>

### **Natural Law Theodicy**

A second form of theodicy that has gained some recognition is Natural Law. It is an attempt to explain evil in reference to the purpose and structure of physical laws. H.J. McCloskey believes that the existence of natural evil justifies the dismissal of theism. He asserts that physical evil can not be reduced to moral evil.<sup>8</sup> The reductive approach claims that physical evil is either punishment for moral evil, or a method of teaching morality. McCloskey claims that conceiving of physical evil as instrumental

to moral good fails in three ways: pain often thwarts our attempts to improve, pain is not an effective nor necessary catalyst for numerous people, and that God could have used less evil in any given instance.<sup>9</sup> Further, physical pain can only be justified if a greater good occurs, but such evidence can never be logically nor evidentially provided.

Against McCloskey, Bruce Reichenbach provides three reasons for God's allowance of natural evil. He asserts that many of the acknowledged goods might be eliminated along with the physical evils, if the physical laws are altered.<sup>10</sup> Secondly, divine intervention in the form of miracles to avert disasters, would imply that God was not omnipotent because He created a world which does not function properly.<sup>11</sup> Finally, intervention would tend to interfere with rational human planning which requires a stable physical order.<sup>12</sup>

Richard Swinburne asserts that natural evil is a necessary component in any free system. Natural evil is necessary for the acquisition of knowledge which will enable persons to make moral choices.<sup>13</sup> We could gain ethical knowledge through experience or divine communication of consequences, but the latter would impair our freedom.<sup>14</sup> Therefore, because we learn inductively, we need to experience evil instances in nature in order to develop a capacity to make moral choices.

The work done in this area shows that physical evil can not be easily reduced to moral evil, although whether moral good can be mastered without natural evil is questionable.

### **Process Theodicy**

The third current form under examination is Process Theodicy; it stems from Albert North Whitehead.<sup>15</sup> Process Theodicy modifies the traditional conception of God by accepting some of His characteristics and eliminating problematic ones. There are at least three significant differences between this theodicy and a traditional theist approach. God is no longer seen as omnipotent; instead, God uses persuasion rather than coercion.<sup>16</sup> Secondly, God is conceived of as a process or principle.<sup>17</sup> Finally, Process Theodicy heavily favours an aesthetic component.<sup>18</sup> One of the strongest charges levied against this theodicy is given by Stephen Ely; he claims that its aesthetic quality would seem to condone any amount of evil.<sup>19</sup> Against this attack, David Griffin states that the divine aesthetic experience requires that evil be overcome.<sup>20</sup> Persons do possess a free will, and are able to resist God's will. Process Theodicy does provide another way of viewing the relationship between God and evil. Although it does rid us of certain problems, it brings certain of its own difficulties; for example, whether a principle can have various personal characteristics, and whether this type of God is worthy of worship.

## APPENDIX: The Law

The stages of the law are analogous with Augustine's formulations of the will, Adamic and post-Adamic. Augustine addressed the topic of law extensively in *On the Spirit and the Letter*.<sup>1</sup> The law of Moses was given to man so that he would be both aware of his sin, and realize his need for grace to enable him to fulfil the precepts of the law. Being subject to or under the law is considered as the second stage of man. Prior to the law, or the first stage, persons simply sinned but were unaware that they did so; as a result, they felt no moral conflict. When God gave His laws, sin increased, both because of the obvious recognition of sin, and because forbidden things increase our attraction to them. However, the fact that sin increases under the law does not mean that the law is evil, or a source of error; instead, it is a step towards the awareness that grace is required.

When sin was rampant, Christ came to fulfil the law;<sup>2</sup> nevertheless, grace was still present in the time of the law, but it was hidden.<sup>3</sup> Without grace, the law is too rigid, since it is bound to the letter, as opposed to the life-giving spirit of grace. To maintain that we can be virtuous by adhering to the law is erroneous because the law only makes us aware of sin, and without grace we cannot fulfil it, "Because they sought it not by faith, but as it were by work<sup>4</sup>--in other words, working it out as it were by themselves, not believing that it is God who works within them."<sup>5</sup> Those who know what to do but cannot, have been taught only according to the letter of the law and not the spirit. We fulfil the law through love or charity. With the aid of grace we come to delight in fulfilling the law, and the more grace we receive the easier it becomes to fulfil. It is not that Augustine would deny that the giving of the law is a grace, for all good things from God are a grace, but he would deny that the law is alone enough

for redemption; on the contrary, we need a further grace in order to fulfil it. This reasoning corresponds to the subject matter that concerned Augustine in his middle period, and is examined in chapter four. Christ's fulfilment of the law ushered in the third stage of man; now the law is internalized, and with the aid of the Holy Spirit within us, we are capable of fulfilling the spiritual law. After death we reach man's fourth and final stage which is a perfect peace in heaven. In chapter five, his treatment of the grace which enables a person to enter into this final stage is considered.

## ENDNOTES FOR APPENDIX ON 20TH CENTURY ETHICAL COGNITIVISTS AND NON-COGNITIVISTS

<sup>1</sup>Philip Blair Rice, *On the Knowledge of Good and Evil*, (New York: Random, 1955) 7. Rice's classification of thinkers as cognitivists and non-cognitivists in regard to the problem of evil is being used for the purposes of this appendix. Not all the authors noted here nor by Peterson in the appendix on "Theodicies" were themselves concerned with this problem.

<sup>2</sup>Rice 11.

<sup>3</sup>Rice 12.

<sup>4</sup>Rice 8.

<sup>5</sup>Rice 7.

<sup>6</sup>Rice 8.

<sup>7</sup>Rice 7.

<sup>8</sup>Rice 8.

<sup>9</sup>Rice 9.

<sup>10</sup>Rice 9.

<sup>11</sup>Rice 9.

<sup>12</sup>Rice 10.

## ENDNOTES FOR APPENDIX ON CONTEMPORARY THEODICY

<sup>1</sup>Michael L. Peterson, "11. Recent Work on the Problem of Evil," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 20 (1983): 321.

<sup>2</sup>Peterson 321.

<sup>3</sup>J.L. Mackie, "Evil and Omnipotence," *God and Evil*, ed. Nelson Pike. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice, 1964) 48.

<sup>4</sup>Peterson 322.

<sup>5</sup>Peterson 323.

<sup>6</sup>Peterson 324.

<sup>7</sup>Peterson 324.

<sup>8</sup>Peterson 325-6.

<sup>9</sup>Peterson 326.

## ENDNOTES ON APPENDIX FOR THEODICIES

<sup>1</sup>St Irenaeus was one of the Hellenistic Fathers who lived in the second century; he believed that the world is a place for the perfection of man.

<sup>2</sup>John Hick, *Evil and the God of Love*, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1977) 385.

<sup>3</sup>Hick, *Evil and the God of Love* 385.

<sup>4</sup>Hick, *Evil and the God of Love* 258.

<sup>5</sup>Michael L. Peterson, "II. Recent Work on the Problem of Evil," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 20 (1983): 328.

<sup>6</sup>Peterson 328.

<sup>7</sup>Peterson 329.

<sup>8</sup>H.J. McCloskey, "God and Evil," *God and Evil*, ed. Nelson Pike. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice, 1964) 62.

<sup>9</sup>H.J. McCloskey, "God and Evil" 76.

<sup>10</sup>Bruce Reichenbach, "Natural Evils and Natural Laws: A Theodicy for Natural Evils," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 16 (1976): 193.

<sup>11</sup>Reichenbach 183.

<sup>12</sup>Reichenbach 187.

<sup>13</sup>Richard Swinburne, "VI. Natural Evil," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 30 (1978): 296.

<sup>14</sup>Swinburne 301.



<sup>15</sup>Peterson 331.

<sup>16</sup>Peterson 332.

<sup>17</sup>Peterson 332.

<sup>18</sup>Peterson 332.

<sup>19</sup>Peterson 332.

<sup>20</sup>Peterson 332.

#### ENDNOTES FOR APPENDIX ON LAW

<sup>1</sup>It is a text that is written during his middle period.

<sup>2</sup>Augustine, *GC* II, xxx.

<sup>3</sup>Augustine, *GC* II, xxix.

<sup>4</sup>Romans IX, 31-2.

<sup>5</sup>Augustine, *Spirit and the Letter* L.

**ENDNOTE ABBREVIATIONS**

- CNG Concerning the Nature of the Good, Against the Manicheans  
DP Divine Providence and the Problem of Evil  
GC On the Grace of Christ, and On Original Sin  
GF Grace and Free Will  
GP On the Gift of Perseverance  
MF On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins, and On the Baptism of Infants  
MM On the Morals of the Manicheans  
NG On Nature and Grace  
PS On the Predestination of the Saints  
RG Rebuke and Grace  
SV To Simplician--On Various Questions. Book I