BUREAUCRATIC - PROFESSIONAL CONFLICT

AS A CONSEQUENCE OF SOCIAL WELFARE LEGISLATION:

AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS

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ABSTRACT

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This case study of Family Service Association (FSA)
analyses a private English speaking welfare agency in Mont-
real, Quebec. FSA was involved in the reorganization of the
social service sector outlined by a Royal Commission inves-
tigating Health and Welfare services. As a result of this
investigation legislation was enacted (Bill 65) which estab-
lished a public welfare network.

Following the implementation of Bill 65, a great deal
of tension was created. This tension was acted out between
the social workers at FSA and the bureaucrats or administra-
tors at Ville Marie Social Service Centre (VMSSC). VMSSC was
the newly established social service centre for the English
speaking population.

This study explains the conflict by examining socio-
political tensions in Quebec society, between anglophone and
francophone interests and Catholic and Protestant interests.
These are linked with internal organizational tension about
issues of structure and 'role' conflicts. Both external and
internal sources of tension contributed to bureaucratic-
professional conflict.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Ville Marie Social Service Centre:	VMSSC, Ville Marie; The Centre
Family Service Association:	FSA
Minister of Social Affairs:	MAS
Children's Service Centre:	CSC
Society for the Protection of Women and Children:	SPWC
Charity Organization Society:	COS
Central Consumer's Council	CCC
Federation des Services Sociaux a la Famille:	FSSF
Centre des Services Sociaux Montréal Métropolitain:	CSSMM

INTRODUCTION:

CHAPTER 1:

The central theme of this thesis is to demonstrate how socio-political conditions outside a non-government welfare agency, Family Service Association (FSA), contributed to bureaucratic-professional conflict expressed within FSA. The objectives are to describe and explain the nature of the conflict at FSA following that agency's incorporation into a public welfare system.

FSA was one of many social welfare agencies in Montreal associated with the total reorganization of the social service system that was ordered by the legislation, Bill 65 (Chapter 48). The reorganization created a great deal of tension within FSA. I shall argue that the bureaucratic-professional conflict at FSA was symptomatic of more fundamental tensions outside the organization and the social service arena. The major tensions were between anglophone and francophone interests and to a lesser extent between Protestant and Catholic interests. Francophone interests in the province of Quebec had begun to question anglophone control in the province. The anglophone response was fear. This fear was expressed in terms of concern about their future in Quebec, their rights and privileges and ultimately the viability of residing in that province.

This introduction identifies the context in which the conflict was expressed. This is followed by comments as to how the evidence to support the argument was gathered. The theoretical assumptions that framed the questions I asked and a brief overview of the content of the thesis, complete the introduction.

FSA was a private anglophone social service agency in Montreal, in the Canadian province of Quebec, an agency which began as a Charity Organization Service in 1900. Over the decades, many different kinds of social services were implemented as the agency Board of Directors and staff sought to cope with the many social problems affecting the anglophone Protestant population of Montreal. Survival was never an issue. The agency was largely funded by the Protestant population of Montreal until the 1960's when the Board approached the Government of Quebec for additional financial assistance in the funding of the services of the agency.

In 1971, legislation, Bill 65, was introduced which altered the entire social service delivery system in Quebec. Some services were abolished, others substantially changed and all services were co-ordinated by the Quebec Government's Ministry of Social Affairs (MAS). As a result, in June 1973, the Board of Directors at FSA gave up the charter; an anglophone social service centre was established, Ville Marie Social Service Centre (VMSSC). FSA was reduced to a division of VMSSC.

The legislation established a new Board of Directors at VMSSC. Administrative procedures moved from FSA to VMSSC. A new group of administrators was appointed. They established a new central office for VMSSC. The social work professionals at FSA found that their world was reordered when the new administrative group at VMSSC began issuing directives from the central office.

The struggle between these two groups, the bureaucrats and the professionals was related to both tensions within the organization and tensions outside the organization. The bureaucratic-professional conflict became a safety valve for the expression of all conflicts. Board meetings became an arena where this conflict was acted out. The concerns of the consumers of service had little effect on the energy which the other groups invested in disputes. From my observation of events in the agency, services to clients were not a priority in 1975.

Bill 65 (Chapter 48) had been promoted by a provincial Royal Commission of Inquiry into Health and Welfare Services. The report published by this Commission identified four reasons behind the implementation of the legislation.

> Four phenomena played a positive role in the
> sectors evolution. First, there was the state's
> decision to itself distribute all financial allowances;
> this was equivalent to recognising, in actual fact a
> distinction between social services and income
> security. Second, the search for a more rational
> method of financing social services other than
> residential care showed a desire to recognise the social
> necessity of certain services. Third, the founding of

the Federation des Services Sociaux à la Famille in
1963 not only contributed to orienting the work of
social agencies but also helped the government to
determine the elements of a possible social service
policy. Four, the happy experience of citizen part-
icipation in establishing a network of residential
care homes across Quebec was an event of prime
importance. (1)

The second reason articulated the need for rational
planning. The focus on rationality was a phenomenon of Quebec
government during the decade of the 1960's and continued into
the 1970's. Bill 65 was part of the overall attempt to
'rationalize' government administration. Investment in
social services was seen as a necessary government activity.

Information about the effect of legislation upon FSA was
gathered while I was working at FSA as a social worker.
Participant observation was the principle method of data
collection. Because I was a resident of Quebec and employed
at FSA, I was a committed participant in the proceedings. I
utilised my experience of being involved at the agency to
assist in identifying the issues which I wished to investigate
as a researcher.

There were three sets of theoretical notions that helped
frame the questions I explored during the research. Two were
associated with complex organizations and the third with ideas
about the role and function of a Board of Directors. The
first approach that I utilised was an open system strategy.
This led me to consider the organization in relation to its
environment in its ability to respond, adapt and cope with
uncertainty. My second set of theoretical assumptions drew me

into focusing on issues within organizations that contributed to conflict. A particular theorist who influenced my research questions and, therefore, my data collection was J. Kenneth Benson. Two notions of his were useful: the suggestion of examining sequences of events and examining the conflicts inherent in the organization (both internal and external). A third theoretical assumption that was of use, concerned the behaviour of Boards of Directors. This behaviour provided a link between the organization and the external environment. By focusing on the role and function of the Boards of FSA and VMSSC I was able to develop an understanding of the changes that occurred at the level of the Board following the legislation. These changes in turn were linked to the maintenance of bureaucratic-professional conflict within the organization.

The theoretical assumptions associated with explanations of behaviour in complex organizations are considered in detail in Chapter 2. The methodology is contained in Chapter 3. As indicated, Chapter 4 deals with the socio-political conditions in Quebec. It includes a history of FSA and some consideration of the legislation. Chapter 5 is concerned with the evidence of bureaucratic-professional conflict and the impact of changes in the function of the Board of Directors from FSA to VMSSC. The final chapter reflects on the usefulness of theories about the operations of complex organizations. It also draws together the evidence and comments about the effects of the

legislation. As Phillip Hepworth notes "What Quebec start-
lingly demonstrates is that after all the revolutions, much
of the old still remains" [2].

CHAPTER 2:

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This study sets out to explain behaviour in a specific organization, Family Service Association of Montreal. Within the theory of complex organizations there are two major groups of ideas that proved useful in this study. The first useful assumption is that of an open system strategy. The concept of understanding organizational behaviour by considering the organization in relation to its environment is central to this study. I shall identify an open system strategy as a 'grand theory' approach. A number of theorists have suggested specific focuses upon particular aspects of complex organizations. These 'middle range theories' are the second group of ideas. They identify issues of concern within FSA. The most useful of these theoretical frameworks for the purpose of this study was a dialectical approach to the analysis of bureaucratic-professional conflict, outlined by J. Kenneth Benson.

It is the intention of this thesis to identify those aspects of the environment that had an effect upon the behaviour of participants within FSA. The uncertain political climate which created a tenuous position for anglophone minorities in the francophone province also produced tentative behaviour in groups within the organization. Uncertainty in the environment refers to the programme of rationalization of government services, the social unrest as depicted in a

variety of political events and the implementation of Bill 65 (Chapter 48). This uncertainty was viewed with suspicion and fear by the anglophone population of Montreal. They were quite fearful of what the future might hold for them in the province of Quebec. This uncertainty about their future position was carried over into the organization FSA and influenced the presentation and perpetuation of bureaucratic-professional conflict. There were structural conditions within in FSA-VMSSC that influenced the expression of bureaucratic-professional conflict. Consideration of the impact of the external conditions upon the organization, together with consideration of internal conditions creating conflict, serve as an explanation of conflict in this case study. My identification of this conflict was facilitated by the theoretical notions that guided the questions asked in the research. These notions require elaboration.

Open Systems Strategy

According to James d. Thompson,

> The open system strategy shifts attention from goal achievement to survival, and incorporates uncertainty by recognising organizational interdependence with environment. A newer tradition enables us to conceive of the organization as an open system, indeterminate and faced with uncertainty, but subject to criteria of rationality and hence needing certainty. [3]

Thompson continues that within this conception the main issue for an organization is to cope with uncertainty. This concept

established the possibility that the adaptation I observed at FSA, i.e., the bureaucratic-professional conflict, was FSA's attempt to cope with uncertainty. In this way I began to conceive of the bureaucratic-professional conflict as a safety valve for the conditions in the environment creating uncertainty. Those conditions, as I have suggested, included the anglophone/francophone tension and the Protestant/Catholic tension. This open system concept established that the general concern of the organization FSA, was to cope with uncertainty. A brief review of the literature on complex organizations draws attention to the internal conditions associated with bureaucratic-professional conflict. Benson discusses both internal and external conditions related to bureaucratic-professional conflict.

Bureaucratic-Professional Conflict

While bureaucratic-professional conflict is the prime focus of this thesis, it is imperative to outline the dimensions of the issues and to demonstrate what is meant by the terms bureaucracy and profession. A brief review of the literature on bureaucracy includes reflections on some of the writings of Weber and Blau. Merton, Argyris and Crozier serve to highlight some of the issues facing individuals who work in the bureaucracy. Theorists such as Gouldner and Perrow illustrate some of the issues for professionals in bureaucracies. This serves as an introduction to the theme of professionalization

which is elaborated by both Scott and Benson who suggest
frameworks for analysing bureaucratic-professional conflict.
Benson's framework will be outlined in detail; it serves as a
useful beginning to explain bureaucratic-professional conflict.

Bureaucracy,

Weber is perhaps the most notable of the earlier theorists
who dealt with bureaucracy. For Weber, bureaucratic authority
was an 'ideal type'. His primary concern was to contrast
bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic forms of organization.
Bureaucracy was the outcome of rational thought applied to
organization. Weber describes what he considered to be the
major characteristics of this ideal type. Merton provides a
succinct precis of Weber's notions.

As Weber indicates, bureaucracy involves a clear cut
division of

> integrated activities which are regarded as duties
> inherent in the office. A system of differentiated
> controls and sanctions is stated in the regulations.
> The assignment of roles occurs on the basis of tech-
> nical qualifications which are ascertained through
> formalized, impersonal procedures (e.g., examination).
> Within the structure of hierarchically arranged authority,
> the activities of trained and salaried experts are
> governed by general, abstract, clearly defined rules
> which preclude the necessities for the issuance of
> specific instructions in each specific case. The
> generality of the rules requires the constant use of
> categorization, whereby individual problems and cases
> are classified on the basis of designated criteria and
> are treated accordingly. The pure type of bureaucratic
> official, is appointed, either by a supervisor or through
> the exercise of impersonal competition; he is not elected.
> A measure of flexibility in the bureaucracy is attained
> by electing higher functionaries who presumably express
> the will of the electorate (e.g., a body of citizens or a
> Board of Directors). [4]

The ultimate criteria was efficiency. Weber considers this bureaucratic structure the most effective way of achieving efficiency. He also sees it as the ultimate in rational process. Weber, in fact, concludes that,

> bureaucratic administration means fundamentally the
> exercise of control on the basis of knowledge. This
> is the feature of it which makes it specifically
> rational ..... Bureaucracy is superior in knowledge,
> including both technical knowledge and knowledge of
> the concrete fact within its own sphere of interest. (5)

A review of the critical literature on Weber's work suggests that much of the dispute over his ideas falls into two main areas. The first is the dispute of his account of the type and process of modern administration in terms of its empirical validity. The second is a rejection of the idea that bureaucratic process is rational process. This second theme is the more interesting to consider in the context of this paper.

Blau is an exponent of the view that there is not nec-essarily a relationship between rationality and bureaucratic trends. He comments,

> Weber conceived of bureaucracy as a social mechanism
> that maximises efficiency and also as a form of social
> organization with specific characteristics. Both these
> criteria cannot be part of the definition since the
> relationship between the attributes of a social
> institution and its consequences is a question for
> empirical verification and not a matter of definition. (6)

In evaluating how Blau conceived of the notion of rationality, Albrow notes that having isolated these two alternatives Blau oscillates between them in his own work. In <u>Bureaucracy In Modern Society</u> (7) Blau suggests that it might be preferable to

define bureaucracy as an organization that maximises efficiency in administration. But in the book he co-authored with W. Richard Scott, he considers the terms as used neutrally to refer to the administrative aspects of organization. Albrow concludes that,

> Thus Blau's Dynamics of Bureaucracy [8] proposes to revise the concept of rational administration and advocates certain practices which will ensure the stable attainment of organizational objectives. Paradoxically, the assertion of the relativity of standards of rationality is only the prelude to offering a more universally applicable set. [9]

Blau was one of the theorists who developed Weber's notion of bureaucracy and yet remained within a functionalist framework. His focus was largely on the internal dynamics of organizations. He does not appear to extend his analysis to include the impact of the environment on the organization. Although the criticisms of Weber are many, nevertheless, with his typology of an ideal type, a bureaucracy, he began what today is the study of modern complex organizations.

Participants within Bureaucracy

Merton, Argyris and Crozier each demonstrate the problematic dimensions for the participants within the bureaucracy. It is this facet of their work that merits elaboration here. Perhaps Merton is the most adamant in his characterization of a bureaucratic personality. Merton suggests that when a structure is rational in the Weberian sense, consequences can be precipitated that are in conflict with the general focus

of the organization.

> Merton argues that emphasis on precision and
> reliability in administration may well have self-
> defeating consequences. Rules, designed as means to
> ends may well become ends in themselves. The graded
> career structure of the bureaucrat may encourage him
> to an excess of the virtues he is supposed to embody:
> prudence, discipline, method. Governed by similar
> work conditions officials develop a group solidarity
> which may result in opposition to necessary change.
> Where officials are supposed to serve the public the
> very norms of impersonality which govern their behaviour
> may cause conflict with individual citizens. (10)

Thus, Merton emphasizes some of what he considers to be

dysfunctions for the organization that are generated by the

excess stress on efficiency and rationality. He suggests how

various sub-units can set-up goals of their own which may not

coincide with the goals or purpose of the organization.

Crozier emphasizes how the individual may use the rules

of the organization to his own advantage, "An emphasis on

keeping to the letter of the law may be the strategy which the

bureaucrat uses to protect himself against having to get

involved in particular cases". (11) The consequences of this,

of course, are that bureaucrats have an interest in maintaining

the rules and structure and are thus resistant to change.

Although it can be said of Crozier that his writing is coloured

by his intense dislike of the French bureaucratic system,

his profile of the participant within bureaucracy has many

points in common with the profile drawn by Merton.

Argyris in a book titled, _Personality and Organization_,

suggests that there is tension which must exist between the

needs of the individual and the needs of the organization? He comments that employees often set-up a network of informal. communications as a way of dealing with or even destroying the formal organization. The employee's process of self-actualization is constantly hampered by the organization. These three writers document the role conflicts which ensue when participants are confronted with bureaucracy. By dealing with the relationship between the actor and his prescribed role they are able to provide an account of role conflict.

Professionals in Bureaucracy

Gouldner and Perrow serve to bridge the gap between the literature on bureaucracy and that on bureaucratic-professional conflict. Parsons' criticism of Weber, is used as a starting point by Alvin Gouldner in his Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy. Parsons essentially suggested that Weber had confused two distinct types of authority, "Authority which rests on incumbency or legally defined office and that which is based on technical competence." [12] Gouldner generalises the argument on the conflict of professional and bureaucratic authority in an analysis of the basis of compliance within an organization.

Gouldner suggests that there are two distinct types or forms of bureaucracy-representative bureaucracy and punishment centered bureaucracy. (Gouldner does suggest a third type, mock bureaucracy, when none of the participants comply

with the rules but this type represents ignoring rather than complying.) Gouldner's notion of representative bureaucracy is based on rules that are established by agreement and are administered by qualified people who are authorized by voluntary consent of the individuals involved. Participants become qualified by the possession of technical knowledge and their reference group is based outside the organization. For Gouldner, punishment centered bureaucracy occurs when the organization demands that members comply with rules that they have had no part in formulating. Gouldner, therefore, acknowledges the basis of professional-bureaucratic conflict. When it is perceived that organizations that are manned by professionals are for the most part socially involved it becomes clearer that a bureaucracy involving professionals is going to be organized around two distinct types of authority. The authority that emanates from the rationale of the administration and the authority which is legitimized by an external source, such as a professional corporation or group, are the two types of authority which may be polarized in the organization. By describing these alternative notions of compliance, Gouldner provides an additional dimension of bureaucracy.

Perrow develops a model for highlighting differences in organizations. He bases his model on two concepts: exceptions and search. He develops a typology of organizations.

The following, (Figure 1) represents Perrow's division of organizations by technology.

Figure 1. Exceptions and Search

	Few Exceptions	Many Exceptions
Unanalyzable Search	Craft 1	Nonroutine 2
Analyzable Search	4 Routine	3 Engineering

The dimensions merit some elaboration. Exception refers
to the degree to which the organization faces changes in work
procedures. Perrow suggests 'Uniform and Stable' and
'Nonuniform and Unstable" as the two extremes. Search refers
to the extent to which the organization relies on a precise
knowledge base for analysing problems. Perrow suggests, that
'Not well understood' and 'Well understood' are the two
extremes. Where an organization is confronted with many
exceptions and cannot depend on a precise body of knowledge
from which to derive solutions to its problems, a structure
approximating a professional model will emerge, i.e., solutions
are nonuniform and unstable and are not well understood (Type 1).
When these conditions are reversed, i.e., when there are few
exceptions and unanalysable problems a routinized hierarchical
pattern approximating bureaucracy emerges (Type 4).

Figure II. Perrow's illustration of Bureaucratic
and Professional Organizations

Not well understood	Socializing Institutions (e.g., some schools)	Elite psychiatric agency
		1 . 2
	4	3
Well understood	Custodial Institutions, vocational training.	Programmed learning school

The two other types (1 and 3) are a mixture of the
bureaucratic / professional types. Perrow suggests that the
kind of work done in an organization affects the way people
organize themselves to do the work, i.e., the technology
effects the structure. For example, a bureaucratic structure
emerges in response to routine work. Perrow offers some
explanations of his terminology. He suggests that,

> The distinction between technology and structure has
> its gray areas, but basically it is the difference,
> between an individual acting directly upon a material
> that is to be changed and an individual interacting
> with other individuals in the course of trying to
> change that material. [13]

He thus suggests that the kind of technology operant in the
organization is related to the type of structure the organ-
ization will develop. He concludes that given the goals and
the environment, a given technology adapts to these variables
and this, in turn, determines the internal structure. Perrow

therefore provides us with a framework for comparing organizations. His notions about how structure is determined by technology highlights a potential area for bureaucratic-professional conflict.

In drawing conclusions from Perrow, Benson suggests that,

(1) functionally articulated combinations of bureaucratic and professional elements are possible, depending on the technology involved,

(2) the professional structure is always precarious since advances in knowledge may permit routinization and an evolution towards bureaucracy,

(3) that bureaucratic-professional conflict may be limited to those situations in which structural arrangements inappropriate to a technology have been imposed. [14]

While it does not appear that Perrow limits conflict to where structure is opposed to technology, the relationships between structure and technology that he identifies may account for at least some of the conflict.

Bureaucratic - Professional Conflict

As has been demonstrated, although there have been widely differing opinions on whether bureaucracy is the most rational and efficient form of organization, Weber's basic characterization remains. Clark and Carr-Saunders have offered two interpretations about the notion of professionalism. Clark suggests, "We define profession to mean a specialized competence with a high degree of intellectual content, a specialty heavily based on or involved with knowledge". [15]

A.M. Carr-Saunders defines a profession as, "an occupation based upon specialized intellectual study and training, the purpose of which is to supply skilled service or advice to others for a definite fee or salary". [16] In both definitions, the concept of profession involves an extensive knowledge base which is developed outside the organization and is independent of the organization.

Having determined the general scope of the terms bureaucracy and profession, the notion bureaucratic-professional conflict will be explored. Richard Scott and J. Kenneth Benson have developed arguments. Scott concentrates on role conflict and suggests that

> the profession and the bureaucracy rest on fundamentally different principles of organization, and these divergent principles generate conflict between the professionals and their employers in certain specific areas. [17]

Futhermore, Scott continues there are four distinctive areas where conflict can be generated.

(1) the professional's resistance to bureaucratic rules;
(2) the professional's rejection of bureaucratic standards;
(3) the professional's resistance to bureaucratic supervision; and
(4) the professional's conditional loyalty to the bureaucracy. [18]

Therefore, Scott's outline of conflict areas helps sensitize the student of organization to possible areas where conflict may occur between the bureaucratic role of the participant and his professional role. However, although this outline is highly relevant as it can assist the prediction of where con-

flict will occur, a more plausible account of how to explain
conflict when it exists is the framework suggested by Benson.
This framework will serve as the basis for the analysis of
bureaucratic-professional conflict evidenced at Family Service
Association.

Benson suggests that a useful way to account for bureau-
cratic-professional conflict is to design a longitudinal
study. He considers that event sequences are an essential
part of understanding this conflict. Together with this he
postulates two other main areas in which to focus discussion
of this conflict. An exploration of these areas will provide
a useful account and explanation of the conflict. Sections of
Benson's framework coincide with facets of other theorists;
this is illustrated below.

(1) The connection of bureaucratic-professional conflict to
     fundamental contradictions.

Benson suggests that the way the various groups in the
organization relate to each other, shapes the form and the
extent of the conflict. Firstly, he suggests that the existence
of diverse interest groups which compete with each other for
commodities such as prestige and authority, may be associated
with bureaucratic-professional conflict. He illustrates by
noting that,

> One occupational group ..... may be in a position of
> dominance based upon and enforced by bureaucratic
> structure. That is, the rules and procedures of the
> bureaucracy may enforce the dominance of one component
> over others. In such a situation, professional claims

by the dominant group may be compatible with and may
reinforce the bureaucratic structure, while professional
claims of a subordinate group may take the form of
attack upon bureaucratic structure. The attempt by the
subordinate group to establish professional structure
as the context of its practice, may, then, take the form
of an attack upon the bureaucratic structure in which
the dominance of another group or division is
institutionalized. (19)

Secondly, he suggests that elements of both bureaucratic
and professional groups may be linked to conflict between
central and administrative elites and sub-sections of the
organization. How the administrative elites deal with the
various sub-sections, that is how they buffer conflict, pro-
mote professionalism or bureaucratization is very important to
demonstrate. Thirdly, bureaucratic-professional conflict may
be linked to contradications between sections of an occupational
group. In a welfare setting this may take the form of an old
guard committed to rules and regulations, fighting the new guard
of professionals committed to flexibility and individual
autonomy. Fourthly, the bureaucratic-professional conflict may
be linked to the relationship between the organization and the
public. Conflict for groups within the organization may ensue
as the result of militant groups outside the organization
forcing a change upon it.

(2) Bureaucracy and profession as pure forms.

Benson suggests that participants in the organization may
have images of ideal structures, against which they evaluate
proposed structural forms. For instance, based on the ideals
of efficiency and rationality, the bureaucratic group may con-
stantly evaluate the autonomous professional group as inefficient.

He suggests that research should be, "focused in part upon the contingencies which cause bureaucracy and profession to be stated in diametrically opposed form". [20]

(3) The analysis of event sequence.

Benson suggests that an analysis of event sequence should yield information about the character of bureaucratic-professional conflict. Event sequences around Differentiation, Domain definition, Technological innovation, Centralization/Decentralization and Rigidification lead us to understand the ebb and flow of bureaucratic-professional conflict. Benson calls his framework a Dialectical approach, [21] and describes himself as reacting against the functional approach to the study of bureaucratic-professional conflict.

A close look at Benson's framework reveals that he perceives an organization to respond to both internal and external forces. His breakdown of the interrelationships of vested interest groups, suggests notions of coalition and bargaining. He specifically refers to the 'public' and to the domain of the organization. His framework then is sufficiently comprehensive for this study. The four principle groups described in this paper, the Board, the administrators, the professionals and the consumers of service are able to be considered within this framework.

To recapitulate, comments on Weber form a necessary part of the theoretical notions inherent in bureaucratic-professional conflict. Weber's profile of a bureaucracy remains intact, even though his judgement that this is the most rational

process of organization, has been questioned by Blau. As
subsequent translations suggest, Weber in Economy and Society,
does point out that it is possible to have an irrational
commitment to rationality. Still others, Merton, Argyris and
Crozier question what bureaucracy does to the individuals
involved, and suggest that in terms of the human component,
this type of structure may be somewhat less than efficient.
Gouldner widens our understanding of complex organizations by
expanding the notion of bureaucracy to include compliance.
Perrow develops a framework for comparing organizations,
sections of which serve to account for bureaucratic-
professional conflict in part. Scott details some role vari-
ations, which account for conflict. Benson develops a frame-
work for understanding bureaucratic-professional conflict
along both internal and external dimensions.

Summary

This thesis presents evidence to suggest that there are
situations where external conditons contribute to bureau-
cratic-professional conflict within an organization. A case
study of Family Service Association illustrates how a combin-
ation of internal and external factors are reflected in
bureaucratic-professional conflict.

The methods I employed to gather evidence, occupy the
pages of the next chapter. Chapter 4 deals at length with
the context of the conflict. Such detail may seem mundane but
is nevertheless important to the understanding of how and why

conflict was expressed in this form. Chapter 5 presents
the data, - the events within the organization that created a
conflict situation. Finally, Chapter 6 comments on the
strengths and shortcomings of theories of complex organizations.
This chapter draws together the evidence, and relates the
evidence to the central theme of bureaucratic-professional
conflict.

CHAPTER 3:

METHODOLOGY

The Nature of the Empirical Material

In this study of Family Service Association, three types of empirical material were examined. These were, information from informants; information from written records including minutes of meetings and reports; information from observation. These sources of data were identified as complimentary ways of yielding information about events that took place at FSA. This information is presented as evidence to support the central theme of this thesis that bureaucratic-professional conflict is a reflection of the more fundamental anglophone/francophone conflicts of interest in Quebec society. Francophone interests were agitating for less anglophone influence in the affairs of the province of Quebec. This created an atmosphere of concern among anglophone groups.

I elected to do a case study of Family Service Association. There were two reasons for choosing FSA, one was opportunity and the other was commitment. As I was employed at FSA I had the opportunity to design a longitudinal study. The process of incorporation of FSA into VMSSC was undertaken over a period of months, so it was important not to have time con-straints. A case study approach was selected as a way of making statements about a specific case and therefore generating propositions about other situations. Family Service Association

was an agency I had worked in from 1971 to 1975. I had gained
a great deal of knowledge and enjoyment from that work
experience. While recognizing the tension in the province of
Quebec and being involved in the conflict at FSA, I became
interested in explaining the disruption within the organization.
FSA became the focus of my concern in this explanation.

My commitment to 'social work' and to FSA may at times
have influenced my interpretation of the empirical material.
I have attempted to control my personal views about the plight
of the social workers. Despite this, I acknowledge that a
certain partisan flavour may creep into my writing.

There is one final issue that may concern the readers of
the data. Both the social work and the bureaucratic groups
are presented as 'ideal' types. In order to distinguish
between the social work professional group and the administrative
groups I have exaggerated the essential features of each. This
may give the impression of groups that are completely separate.
In reality this was not the case. These groups did not exist
in pure forms. In reality it would have been hard to identify
one person whose characteristics completely represented either
the social work or administrative groups.

Exploration to Determine What Was to Be Observed

As a social worker working within FSA, it was apparent to
me that the implementation of Chapter 48 (Bill 65) would
irrevocably alter the character of FSA as a private social work

organization. The initial phase of this study was to explore
some of the manifestations of this change as the implementation
of the legislation proceeded. In January-February of 1974,
I conducted some twelve semi-structured interviews with the
social work staff at FSA. The purpose of these interviews
was to identify the changes that these professionals saw as
important consequences of the implementation of Chapter 48.
The outcome of these interviews was the realization that
although there was a great deal of concern being expressed
about impending changes, little had in fact changed in the
day to day work of the social work professional group. The
professionals were still at the same location, performing the
same functions as they had done in the past. At that time it
was not clear what administrative changes would be implemented
and how this would affect potential users of the social workers'
services. What was clear however, was that there had been a
distinct change at the level of the Board of Directors. The
Board of Directors of FSA disbanded in June 1973; when the
agency gave up its charter, the Board was no longer a legal
entity. A Provisional Board of VMSSC was formed and functioned
from June 1973 to June 1974 when the first legal Board of
VMSSC was elected.

Being under the control of the Quebec government by
June 1974, the Board of Directors was the first group to
change noticeably. It seemed possible that the new Board might
relate differently to the other groups involved in the organi-
zation: the professional group, the administrative group, and

the users of the services. As a result there could be resulting
changes in the organizational style which would affect the
services offered. As Zald [22] suggests, a Board performs
two major functions, that of linking the organization to the
environment and that of monitoring the internal operations of
the organization. It follows that Board meetings become a
place where the various interests are represented. Initial
exploration confirmed that the beginning focus of this study
would be the Board of Directors. Observation of what happened
at Board meetings, how these groups co-operated or competed,
complemented my observations at FSA.

Methods of Data Collection

The data collection was undertaken during the time I
was employed at FSA as a caseworker. Participant observation
was the principle method used in order to utilise the opportunity
of conducting research that minimised the impact of the
researcher. Observation confirmed areas of the study that
required more specific investigation. For example, content
analysis of minutes of Board meetings and the semi-structured
interview were also used to explore the dimensions of the role
and function of the Boards of Directors of both FSA and VMSSC.

It has been possible to illustrate the changing nature of
the Board and consequently the changing nature of the Board's
relationships with the other groups. In addition, an analysis
of the content of the Commission Report provided information

about the rationale behind Bill 65. As Chapter 48 (Bill 65)
is the intervening 'factor', this study compares the pre-
legislation situation with the post-legislation situation.
1968 and 1971 form the pre-legislation phase at FSA and 1975
is the post-legislation phase at FSA and VMSSC. Participant
observation was the basic method of collecting data in the
post-legislation phase because conflict was visible and specific.
Analysis of minutes of Board meetings and the use of semi-
structured interviews was the most appropriate method to gather
information about the pre-legislation phase. The semi-
structured interview was also used to gather information about
the post-legislation phase. The following pages include a
description of how each method of data collection contributed
to the overall study.

Participant Observation

By participant observation, I am referring to the process
whereby the observer participates in the situation of the
observed and uses the experience to gather data. Thus, the
observer is part of the social environment, influences it and
in turn is influenced by it. It is therefore imperative to
acknowledge that my role was as a social work professional and
therefore my observations are influenced by my perspective as
a trained social worker. Nevertheless, I have attempted to
be as 'objective' as possible when describing the perspective
of the administrators or other groups. For the most part, the

process of participant observation involved no role pretense.
I was accepted as a professional worker with access to written
documents and people. I was also able to relate at an
informal level to members of each of the four groups.

In this study the process of participant observation
yielded information about the nature of the Board of Directors
as well as the nature of the relationship between the pro-
fessional group and the administrative group. For example, I
was able to attend Board meetings and observe the proceedings.
In this way I developed an understanding of the role and
function of the Board of Directors of 1975. My presence at
these meetings did not affect the process taking place. It
was accepted that professional staff would be present.

At FSA I was involved in Task Forces and committees
which were comprised of both administrative staff and pro-
fessional staff. In this way I was able to be a part of the
evolving relationship between these two groups as each group
formulated their position in relation to specific issues. I
participated at meetings at FSA and VMSSC and responded to
memos, as any other social work professional. Yet, with
information I had collected from observation, I attempted to
influence the situation by sharing these observations. For
example, when I became aware (through observation) of the con-
flict between the Board and the Administrative group, I
shared this information with the professional group. I did
this in order that the professional group could use this
information in developing a strategy around unionization.

Event Sequences

In order to reduce the information which I needed to collect, I chose to observe a series of events that took place during the process of change. Events about which the social workers expressed concern, were those selected for the pur- poses of this study. These were subsequently categorised as inter-organizational events, personnel- focused events and client-focused events.

Written records, memos and reports were examined in conjunction with the above events. This was done concurrently with participant observation. The written material was selected for its relevance to the situation being observed.

Content Analysis

The minutes selected for comparison and analysis were those of January to June of 1968, January to June of 1971 and January to June 1975.

A brief review of the literature on content analysis suggests that there are two major issues of contention, that between qualitative and quantitative and that between manifest and latent aspects of the content. The minutes were recorded by an independent recorder (a secretary). For the most part the minutes themselves did not yield qualitative material such as the feelings of Board members about specific issues or the context within which discussion took place. While the position of each item on the agenda may have been important, I elected

not to attempt to analyze the importance of it because it was difficult for the Executive Director to recall the reasons behind the scheduling of specific items. The focus in this study was on quantifiable material.

The second issue is that between manifest and latent content. On the one hand, one argument concludes that the manifest content is the only content that is important - i.e., the language used represents the total meaning. However, an alternative argument suggests that it is not the words used, but rather the meaning the message conveys that is important. The focus was on the manifest content, while an awareness of latent content was maintained during the process of this content analysis. Issues that were hinted at in the written material (e.g., the organization's relationship to government) were explored by interviews with Board members and social work staff. In terms of the qualitative and latent aspects of the minutes such interviewing and observation yielded different kinds of data.

Schema

In developing the categories for the content analysis of the minutes, a schema was developed from a preliminary analysis of the minutes themselves. To reiterate, the orientation adopted in this paper, is that there are two kinds of functions that a Board of Directors basically performs, - an externally-oriented function of linking the organization to the other

groups in the environment and an internally-oriented function of establishing the policy of the organization. The first section of this schema is a division of the content into internal and external. The second section notes to which sector the content of the item is directed. The third section notes who was present at the board meetings and the fourth section notes what the 'matter' of the item was about. The final section notes who appeared in control of the issue being discussed.

The schema was developed by a trial and error process, my goal being to make the categories mutually exclusive yet sufficiently representative of the content. More specifically, the broad categories were suggested by the literature on the functions of Boards of Directors, while the sub-section of each category was suggested by the minutes themselves. Details on how each item was coded are included as an Appendix.

Content Analysis of the Commission Report

A Commission of Inquiry into Health and Welfare Services was established in 1966 under the direction of Claude Castonguay. A report prepared by this Commission spearheaded the legislation reorganizing the health and welfare services in Quebec.

The information provided by this analysis provided insight into the rationale for introducing the legislation.

Because the issue of total government control was so dramatically different from the combination of religious and government authority accepted in Quebec in the past, it was

of interest to look at the report of health and welfare services, which precipitated the legislation. A content analysis of this report complemented my research objectives.

Methodology

Preliminary analysis of the report prepared by the Castonguay Commission of Inquiry into Health and Welfare suggested that the material was presented in such a way as to argue for government control. The conclusion that government control was the solution to the demise of the system became the focus of the analysis. The categories of analysis therefore were selected in order to document how the public and private sectors were described by the report. There were four broad categories that were developed.

1. The General and Specific Role of the Quebec Government.
2. Character portrayal of the Government.
3. Images of the Private Sector.
4. The Role of Social Services.

These categories were suggested by a review of analysis of other political documents. In addition, a sub-category of attitude (positive, negative or neutral) was used in order to obtain a description of the emotional tone of the material.

Although the report was a description of health and welfare services, this analysis was confined to welfare documentation. There were two volumes about 'welfare'. Four of

the five chapters of these volumes were pertinent. A sample
of every tenth page of the total of 352 pages was used. The
theme of each paragraph was used as the recording unit, while
the paragraph itself was considered as the unit of enumeration.
I categorised each item, of each sampled paragraph into one
of the four identified categories. The attitude was also
recorded. An example of a negative comment on the private
sector is article 224 on page 71. "The present social services
field in Quebec is a tangle". A quantitative summary of all
the attitudes about government and the private sector was then
possible. The most interesting result that emerged was the
extent to which the government was described in positive terms.
There was a total of 59 references to the government and the
private sector in the sample. Percentages were calculated
for these categories only.

Table I : Evaluative Content of Comments Recorded in
the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into
Health and Welfare, in Private and Govern-
ment Sectors.

Evaluation

Sector	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Total	
Private	1.69%	59.15%	15.21%	76.08%	(N=45)
Government	18.59%	0%	5.07%	23.66%	(N=14)
Total				100.00%	(N=59)

By describing the existing private sector negatively and
the government positively, it seems clear that the report's
strategy was to conclude that the government was more capable
of providing social services. The report subtly describes the

government as the saviour to rescue the failing private sector and concludes that government control is the solution. This analysis, while not central to the issue of bureaucratic-professional conflict, provided insight into the role of the government. As such it is important background information.

One major issue remains to be discussed, the technique of the semi-structured interview, used to acquire information about the functioning of the Boards of Directors.

Semi-Structured Interviews with Key Informants

Seven Board members including three Board Presidents were interviewed in order to substantiate some of the relationships suggested by the content analysis. These individuals were selected by isolating those people who would be likely to have such information and cross-checking this with other Board members.

In general, the interview time taken was from 1½ hours to 4 hours. As an introduction, the interviewee was told who I was and why I was doing this study. I explained the focus of the study and provided some general information in order to assist recall (for those people who served on the Boards in 1968 and 1971). The interviewee was then asked to recall specific information. An example question was "I noticed a great deal of reference in the Board minutes to Protestantism. Could you explain how this religious philosophy was incorporated into the agency's function ?". As the President of 1968

responded, it seems that Protestantism was not important in itself but the term was used to describe all those who were non-Catholic and non-Jewish. In these interviews specific issues were focused on and each Board member was asked to clarify his or her recall of the issues. Other issues that were explored during these interviews included, the agency's relationship to the government and staff and consumer representation at the Board level. In this way information was collected about the relationships between the four groups - the Board, the administrators, the professionals and the community. All the Board members that I interviewed seemed very willing to co-operate and were quite comfortable about sharing information. In addition to those interviewed, an additional three members felt that they did not have the time to meet with me. Two of these members (in 1971) were identified as being uncomfortable with change and had not wished to continue as Board members.

Summary .

Each of these techniques, participant observation, content analysis and the semi-structured interview, yielded different but complimentary data about how legislation had affected FSA. As the exploration stages of this study confirmed the emergence of conflict, each method of data collection served to produce evidence which contributed to the explanation of the conflict.

The questions I asked in this study were framed by three major theoretical considerations. The first theoretical notion was an open systems strategy. This directed me to examine the relationship between the environment and the organisation. The most obvious 'environmental issue' was the legislation Bill 65. A description of associated environmental features seemed important in order to place the legislation in context.

FSA had functioned as a private anglophone social service agency since 1900. The traditions it had developed, as well as the mechanisms of conflict resolution, must have shaped the agency's responses to any new influence. This background material is essential for an understanding of the bureaucratic-professional conflict which emerged during the changeover to a public system.

Because the first identifiable change at FSA took place at the Board level, this seemed to be an appropriate focus to begin to look at each of the four groups in the new organization. The board was also a major link with outside interests. This is the second theoretical consideration. The third theoretical influence which shaped the data collection was that of Benson. It was Benson who suggested that an analysis of event sequences concentrating on issues such as Differentiation, Domain, Technology, Centralisation/Decentralisation and Rigidification, would produce an understanding of bureaucratic-professional conflict. Both internal structures of the organization and external conditions were examined in order to collect evidence

about the nature of the bureaucratic-professional conflict.
This thesis will now explore the socio-political conditions in
Quebec and provide a brief history of FSA. Both contribute
to understanding the context of bureaucratic-professional
conflict, as expressed in the divergent interests of the
administrative group at VMSSC and the social workers at FSA.

CHAPTER 4:

THE SOCIO-POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Part I

Prelude

Family Service Association had its beginnings at the turn
of the century. It was incorporated in 1900. The agency
survived until 1973 when it was legally incorporated into
Ville Marie Social Service Centre, responsible to the Ministry
of Social Affairs, a department of the Liberal government in
the province of Quebec. This thesis presents a perspective
on how this agency survived until 1973 and focuses on how the
agency adapted to the incorporation into VMSSC. The specific
response this thesis is concerned with is the interaction
between the bureaucrats at VMSSC and the social work professionals
at FSA. In order to understand the dimensions of this con-
flictual interaction between the bureaucrats and the social
work professionals it is necessary to discuss and review some
historical facts. Family Service Association and its historical
development, together with the social welfare legislation
Bill 65 (Chapter 48) play an integral part in understanding
the bureaucratic professional conflict of 1975. This chapter
looks at the historical context of the agency and of the
Quebec government's Bill 65.

I   Agency History 1900-1975

It must be remembered that social welfare in Quebec was
initially totally offered under the auspices of private charity.
The state had gradually intervened over the years by way of
accepting financial responsibility for some facets of social
welfare. This obviously had an effect on the services
offered by the charity institution. The following brief
history details how the agency (Family Service Association)
had diversified its 'outputs' as a result of adapting to the
'inputs' from the profession of social work, the state and
the community. The description includes aspects of religious
affiliation, services delivered to different sections of the
public, professionalism, the Board of Directors and the role
of the state. This latter aspect links up with the second
part of the chapter, Bill 65.

Religious Affiliation

The agency, Family Service Association, (which in 1975
was a division of Ville Marie Social Service Centre) was
incorporated in 1900 as the Charity Organization Society (COS) of
Montreal. The religious affiliation was Protestant. In
Montreal at the time there was a clear delineation within the
community on the basis of religious denomination. Individuals
and families received services according to their religion.
Of the total 1900 population of 267,730 persons, there were
202,091 who were Roman Catholic, 58,897 who were Protestant
and 6,745 Jews. Impetus for the development of the agency

appeared to come from wealthy elites, such as Lady Drummond[23],
who felt that something should be done about people begging
in the streets. The implication was that 'beggars' were
polluting the image of the city. This had the effect of
making the elites of the city somewhat uncomfortable. The
major objective of the COS was the improvement of the con-
ditions of the poor. Early comments on the services of
Registration and Investigation (giving relief) are coloured
with the sentiments that it was necessary to separate the good
poor from the bad poor. Preventing the unworthy from receiving
relief and directing the worthy to means of employment seemed
to be the overriding philosophy. This was in keeping with
the Protestant tradition the agency had adopted.

Thinking around the notion of Protestantism began to
undergo changes at the level of the Board of Directors in the
mid sixties. In fact, as will be mentioned later, what were
services exclusively directed to Protestants, were extended
to include all those who were non-Catholic and non-Jewish. In
this way there was a loosening of the policy of offering
service according to religious denomination, which became
reflected at the level of the agencies' day-to-day operations.

Services Delivered to Different Sections of the Public

Notions about what services were appropriate changed
during the seventy three years of the agency's existence. A
brief account of these services indicates the way the agency
responded to need as expressed by different sections of the public.

Together with the services of Registration and Investigation,
employment planning and information were offered from 1900-1914.
This was the first attempt to develop a scientific approach
to the delivery of services. In 1916, a central registry was
developed by the Montreal Council of Social Agencies, to record
the names of all those persons receiving relief. As the result
of changing conditions, new services were gradually offered
by the COS. Following an economic slump in 1908, homeless
men found at the police station were referred for relief.
Subsequently a shelter was built in 1914. Other investigation
led to the development of additional resources in the community,
e.g., for juvenile delinquents. In 1907 the Shawbridge Boys
Farm and Training School was set-up and in 1911 an establish-
ment for girls was organized at the Girls Cottage School.
In 1921 there appeared to be a shift away from giving service
to the poor as a group. The agency changed its name to Family
Welfare Association and began to identify the family as the
focus of service. This was further extended by offering
services to old people in 1924, unattached women in 1927,
Homemaker Service in 1937 and to unattached men in 1944.

In 1928, decentralization characterized the structure of
the agency. Some 7 branch offices had been established.
However, following the state's acceptance to pay total relief,
the orientation of the agency became directed towards the
middle class, towards people requesting help around emotional
problems and not asking for money. In 1962 the agency again

became centralized in structure by setting up its location in Westmount. From that location service began to be organized around a therapeutic model[24]. In keeping with this medical model, the payment of fees was instituted as a practice. The United States body, Family Service Association of America, was suggesting that the amount of money collected in fees was an indicator of an agency's worth.

The notion of agency social workers being involved in collective social action seems to have been present in the late '50s and early '60s. It was expressed in the form of workers being involved in pressuring the government to develop and maintain a more adequate programme of public assistance. Therefore, the notion of helping the poor had been extended or shifted towards animating the poor and the government towards looking for solutions to alleviate poverty. However, casework[25] was still the main method of the social work practice of the agency.

The recorded history of FSA by Margaret Dunlop does not go beyond 1967. Subsequent information was collected from interview minutes of meetings and observation.

In 1969 the first group worker joined the agency. Within a year, according to Mrs. Ellen Prince, "twenty five social workers had groups"[26]. She added that extending the range of services to include group work did not appear to cause any stress. Group work was seen as a "new dimension and a good treatment mode"[27]. In 1975 only a handful of social workers

were running groups. The agency had organized teams of social
workers to offer services on a geographical basis. Each team
serviced specified areas of the city. Mrs. Prince commented
that "teams made group referrals more difficult"[28]. However,
social work staff were so involved in the bureaucratic-
professional struggle, that they had no time or energy to
develop new ways of organizing group referrals. There was a
reduction of group work services offered.

In 1970 the first community organizer joined the staff of
the agency. Again according to Mrs. Prince, the introduction
of community organization as a method was seen as "more of a
threat (because of the suggestion that it) superseded casework".
[29] In 1975 a group of about eight social workers met as a
community organization group. They identified themselves as
being more "aware of a social action thrust". [30] This
group of workers involved themselves with various interest
groups in the community e.g., tenants groups, the committee
working on Children's Defense, groups interested in the Child
Care issue and womens' groups on abortion and rape. While the
introduction of community organizers may have been difficult,
observation up until 1975 confirmed that social workers in
FSA were not divided on issues by the method of their social
work practice. According to Helen Bastien, the first consumer
elected to the Board of FSA, community organization was intro-
duced in response to various interest groups in the community
demanding that social workers get involved with 'grassroots'
issues.[31] In 1975, all social work positions were frozen,

no-new social workers were hired. Because of the political climate, caseworkers at FSA were unwilling to be involved in social action initiatives. The interest in grassroot issues was not developed.

In 1975, social workers at FSA were providing three kinds of service: casework, groupwork and community organization. Concern was expressed at staff meetings that there was at least an implied threat to community organizers once the services were under the control of the government. Social action directed towards changing government policy might not be tolerated by that government from state employees.

With a few exceptions all services in 1975 were offered by professionally qualified social workers or trained welfare officers. There were three workers who had no training. A Greek woman was employed to work with Greek families under the supervision of a Greek social worker. Two so-called 'community' people were employed to work with specific groups. One worked with tenants' groups and the second worked with women's groups. These three workers were identified as 'indigenous' workers. There were a few other workers who were trained as psychologists and were called social workers. There were some forty-five social workers employed by FSA at the time of this research.

Professionalism

When the organization was founded, the goals were phrased in terms denoting social planning and prevention. Notions

about professional ethics did not appear to emerge until about
1913. At this time (prior to the establishment of the School
of Social Work) the agency set-up educational courses under
the directorship of Dr. Helen R.Y. Reid. According to
Esther Kerry the School of Social Work "was conceived around
Dr. Helen R.Y. Reid's dining room table".[32]

In Montreal, the School of Social Work was originally
set-up in 1918. FSA became a place where field training of
students took place. McGill closed its School of Social
Work in 1932. The following year the Montreal School of
Social Work was privately organized and a director of casework
from the agency became Director of the School. It was only
in 1945 that McGill again accepted responsibility for the
professional school. At that time it seemed that the profession
was recognised as a "social and intellectual process, one
based upon interaction between science, social work knowledge
and growing social experience".[33] The thrust of the social
work profession with its increasing body of knowledge, was tied
to the development of the agency. The two institutations
appeared to enjoy a relationship of mutual co-operation.

Notions inherent in casework, such as the individual
right to self-determination, began more and more to permeate
the work of the agency. Counselling became the modus operandi
during the 1960's. This thrust of professionalism grew out
of the education of social workers and their subsequent identi-
fication with the profession. Registration was compulsory in

Quebec in order for an individual to be able to practice and be identified as a social worker. In Quebec in 1973, the professional Association of Social Workers demanded a working knowledge of French in their eligibility requirements. The profession of social work reflected the socio-political conditions in Quebec.

Professional identity had provided FSA social workers with a sense of security. The 'authority' vested in them by their professional status had given them some sense of power and control over the services they offered. The professional Association was powerless to assist social workers to deal with the government takeover.

Board of Directors

One of the initial functions of the Board of Directors of the agency was fund raising. However, in 1922 fund raising (which was becoming increasingly difficult for the individual agencies) became a joint venture and a financial federation (Red Feather) was formed to collect money for all the Protestant agencies of the city. Nonetheless, personal financial resources of individual Board members were subsequently still used. In 1928, it was recorded that the extra costs associated with a student training unit within the agency, were met by the President of the Board, Mr. Wilson Fairman.

According to Tom Thompson, Director of FSA from 1965-1974 the members of the Board were traditionally upper middle

class people whose presence on the board added prestige to the agency. Moreover, after the fund-raising function had become centralized, the notion of prestige took on even more importance. A significant step in the evolution of the Board towards being representative of a wider community, was the election to the Board of two University Professors in 1965. This marked the beginning of the thrust towards what became 'consumer representation'.

Wilensky and Lebeaux in their historical analysis, offer some interpretation of Boards of private welfare agencies, "Such Boards have evolved from the early-years when a group of wealthy persons would constitute themselves the patrons of a charity".[34] As more money was needed, the function of the Board expanded and it became instrumental in obtaining resources from the community. As this happens, the authors suggest the,

> Board assumes legal responsibility and becomes the entity of incorporation. It represents the agency in community and interagency relationships and, most important from the view point of every day welfare practise it has the power to set policy in all phases of agency operation, from rules governing client eligibility to pay scales for professional staff.[35]

These comments describe the Board of Directors at FSA. When the legislation, Bill 65, was implemented, the entity of a Board of Directors was retained in the structure of a social service centre. However the power of the Board was severely limited. The Board no longer controlled the finances of the agency. The agency budget was controlled totally by Quebec. Control by the state was the provincial government's final solution for the administration of social services in Quebec.

The Role of the State

It seems clear that the Province of Quebec had always been reluctant to assume responsibility for social welfare matters. Social Welfare services were traditionally largely under the auspicies of the church. In 1921, the Public Charities Act was passed. Cassidy reflects that,

> the Act is designed to provide a sound financial basis for the operation of private (mainly religious) charitable institutations and agencies of various sorts. In principle, each of three partners, the private agency, the municipality and the provincial government bears one-third of the costs of the care given to needy persons by the agency.[36]

He thus demonstrates the first phase of governmental intervention.

In the 1930's, the destitution precipitated by the economic depression, led to "the adoption of a provincial-municipal unemployment relief programme and of provincially operated systems of old age pension and mothers' allowances".[37] State responsibility for welfare continued to be increased. In 1945, Cassidy commented that,

> there is urgent need for integration of the welfare services of the provincial government and for provincial leadership in the public welfare field comparable to that which has been provided in public health. Such leadership need not mean the displacement of the older element of private charity.[38]

It is of interest to note that Cassidy suggests that the two elements of state and private charity were in uneasy association. Other commissions such as the Social Insurance Commission of 1933 and the (1944) Garneau Commission were instrumental in facilitating a larger role for the state. The state took

over total funding of relief money in 1959. This left FSA
with resources to redirect, because the agency no longer
served the function of giving relief. In this way, 'inputs'
from the state are evident, albeit indirect. The agency re-
directed resources towards a therapeutic model of service,
aimed at a middle class constituency. This diversification was
thus an adaption to environmental influences.

The next major 'input' from the state was in the form of
the Castonguay Nepveu Commission Report. This report was the
result of a study based on community 'inputs'. As a result of
this report, legislation was tabled designed to reorganize the
social service delivery system. The role of the state was
increased dramatically.

The legislation that irrevocably altered the course of
the institution of private welfare was Bill 65, which in 1975
as a law was referred to as Chapter 48. As perceived by FSA,
government intervention through funding was not a threat but
rather a welcome support to help the agency to cope with the
increasing burden of financing its operations. In fact, in
the minutes of FSA's Annual General Meeting in 1967, it was
reported that, "One bright sign on the horizon is the policy
of the provincial government to begin to make operation
allocations to private social agencies to assist them in meeting
operating expenses".[39] By 1971, Family Service Association
was funded 54% by the government. Already in 1970 the govern-
ment of Quebec had indicated its intention to provide for

greater co-ordination of social services. The process of compiling the report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Health and Welfare had been underway since 1966. When tabled in 1971 the report recommended the total reorganization of health and social services. Bill 65 had the effect of changing legal control of the existing private agencies so that in future they would be accountable to the government of the Province of Quebec. In June 1973, Family Service Association became a division of Ville Marie Social Service Centre, along with Catholic Family and Children's Services, Children's Service Centre, Lakeshore Community Services, the John Howard Society and the Foster Home Recruiting Centre. Bill 65 had provided for one social service centre. However, the anglophone and the Jewish populations each argued for their own parallel systems, so that in 1975 three social service centres existed in Montreal.

It is important to reflect on the development of social services in the French sector. It was not until 1945 that the French sector developed any private social service organization. Prior to that, social services were offered by Catholic religious orders of priests, brothers and nuns. In 1963 the French agencies merged their services and began co-ordinating their functioning. Therefore, when Bill 65 was implemented in 1973, the reorganization thus demanded appeared to be less of a crisis within the francophone sector, than in the anglophone sector. Within the anglophone sector there was considerable upheaval. The anglophone sector was not expecting

that their financial dependence on the Quebec government, would result in their being controlled eventually by that government.

It is interesting to note that the professionals in the anglophone sector did not appear to be prepared to develop any alternative to government finance. In the 1971 Annual Meeting in the Report of the Agency Director,[40] the professional group appeared determined to force the government to find solutions to the social problems of the community. This seems to support the Commission Report findings that the professionals seemed insecure about coping with the responsibilities of the social service system.

Although the social workers were agitating for government involvement in social policy, they did not appear to relate such involvement to the possibility of a government takeover of the private social welfare sector. Prior to Bill 65 social work staff at FSA did not reflect any concern about the increased role of the state. Because of the economic social and political conditions in Quebec in 1975, the implementation of Bill 65 (Chapter 48), the government takeover of the private welfare sector, generated considerable concern. The major socio-political conditions external to FSA, revolved around francophone interests questioning anglophone influence in the affairs of the province. This was extended to the social welfare arena with the implementation of Bill 65. Social workers at FSA were just as concerned as other anglophone

groups about what this might mean to their future in Quebec. When this uncertainty was combined with organizational changes within FSA, the dislocation experienced by the social workers was expressed as bureaucratic-professional conflict.

Summary

FSA had been established in response to the needs of the poor. It later diversified its functions in relation to changes in the social, economic and political conditions. These developments took place within an environment in which health, welfare and educational institutions were separated along linguistic and religious lines, higher incomes and status were unevenly distributed along these same linguistic and religious lines, and local political affairs were left to the French-speaking majority. Within the welfare sector impetus for change came from the social work profession, the government and consumer groups. These changes, which were introduced through legislation, came as part of a total movement directed towards the modernization of Quebec. Of necessity, this movement changed the dominant-subordinate relationship between anglophone and francophone groups, and consequently placed the previously segregated anglophone institutions in a position where the rules of the game were defined by the francophone majority. The specific political issues in Quebec, together with details of the legislation Bill 65, are examined next. This description offers a perspective on bureaucratic-professional conflict within a particular organization as a reflection of pressures generated from the outside.

CHAPTER 4:

Part II

Bill 65 (Chapter 48)

This section examines Bill 65 (Chapter 48) in the light
of the programme of   rationalisation of the government of
Quebec. Both economic and political events helped shape the
atmosphere in which Bill 65 was ennacted.   These are considered
briefly.   The rationale of the Castonguay Commission report
is identified, together with the stated philosophy of the new
Act. Finally, a sketch of the new and re-ordered structures
of the new social service system, allows the reader to gain a
perspective on how Family Service Association fitted into
this overall pattern of reorganization.

The Quiet Revolution, a Programme of Government Rationalization

The phrase the Quiet Revolution is used to describe the
ten years between 1960 and 1970 in Quebec. It began when
Jean Lesage was swept to power in June 1960.   "He proclaimed
a 'quiet revolution' to transform Quebec into a fully modern
state within a single generation".[41]

Andre Larocque suggests that,

> The years of 1960 and 1970 were marked by the con-
> struction of a truly modern state. Within the
> framework of British parliamentary institutions;
> which were more or less unquestioned, Quebec
> adopted its first set of political and
> administrative institutions. [42]

Thus the years of the Quiet Revolution were years in
which the government made remarkable advances in terms of
modernising their administrative strategy. Vincent Lemieux
suggests that the Liberal rationalization took place at many
levels.

> Since the victory of the Liberals, in June 1960,
> relations between the dominant party and Quebec
> society have been changing. The challenge is no
> longer to perpetuate and reflect a static society
> with fixed majority groups and traditional scales
> of values, but to reform certain facets of it
> through government action. (43)

Lemieux continues,

> Reform of the public service and certain other
> legislative steps served the same purpose by
> greatly restricting the favours and jobs
> available for distribution through patronage.
> Modernization of the labour code and the
> authorization of collective bargaining in the
> public service have increased the jural as well
> as the material resources of the trade unions
> ..... They undertook through sweeping educational
> reforms to increase the informational resources
> available to the yound people of the Province
> ..... (The Liberal government) set out to make the
> state of Quebec a self-sustaining unit for the
> development of Quebec society, and demanded that
> Ottawa grant it all the rights and the means
> necessary to accomplish its objectives. (44)

These writers articulate the sweeping changes that were taking
place in all facets of government activity. The Commission
investigating Health and Social Welfare in Quebec and the
subsequent legislation Chapter 48, were part of the attempt
to rationalize and modernize government activity.

Economic Arguments

There appears to have been at least two economic arguments
which supported state intervention in the private sphere of

welfare services. The first, is the French Canadian elites'
view that the state can solve social problems. The second
argument is about the high cost of welfare services. The
first economic argument is presented by Andre Raynauld, who
suggested that,

> In relative terms unemployment in Quebec was
> typically two percentage points higher than in
> Ontario throughout the entire period 1941-57.
> After 1958, the gap widened to an average of
> 3.5 percent. (45)

Raynauld argues that while unemployment was high, it does not
explain, why the economic discontent in Quebec was viewed as
a 'political powder keg'. He looks for an explanation in the
distribution of income and ownership of enterprises. He
suggests

> That the unequal access of French Canadians to
> quite high-income and high-power jobs in the
> private sector of Quebec's economy is related
> specifically to ethnic factors and is reflected
> in the relative income levels of French
> Canadians both in Canada and within Quebec .....
> these factors should be reflected in any explan-
> ation of ..... the belief, widespread among
> French Canadian elites that action by the state
> is the best, if indeed not the only way to solve
> Quebec's economic and social problems. (46)

Raynauld clearly articulates the support for the intervention
of the state by French Canadian elites who supported the
government's programme of modernization, including the
rationalization of the health and welfare sector.

The second major economic force giving rise to government
intervention in the field of social services, is the govern-
ment's increased involvement in funding the private sector.

Therefore expenditures in the field of welfare had greatly increased. Table II illustrates this increase.[47]

Table II. Expenditures of Government Departments

Selected Departments of Government Expenditure	1961	1971	% Increase
Family & Social Welfare	$ 95,734,067.60	$551,663,423.36	600
Health Department	$101,862,845.07	$934,672,204.91	900
Public Works	$ 21,213,140.98	$ 88,652,465.55	400

If one examines the increased expenditure in Social Welfare and Health, it seems reasonable to expect that a government faced with these increases in expenditure might attempt to rationalize the services in order to contain expenses.

Bill 65 as Conceived by the Castonguay-Nepveu Commission of Inquiry into Health and Social Welfare

Bill 65 was legislation directed towards the re-organization of health and welfare services in Quebec. A Royal Commission was established in 1966 to investigate the health and welfare system. It was under the direction of Claude Castonguay and later Gerard Nepveu. Before 1966, it would seem that the Government of Quebec had been reluctant to initiate legislation on health and welfare. Richard Jones[48] suggests that while the Federal Government passed legislation

concerning old age pensioners in 1927, it took nine years for Quebec to follow suit.

The report gives a very interesting account of the rise of state intervention in Quebec, highlighting cultural aspects of this intervention. It seems it was during the 1960's (in fact the years of the Quiet Revolution) that the government began to be more involved in the area of social services e.g., the Family Court. It was only in 1959 that the government made the distinction between income security and social services when it accepted total responsibility to fund relief. The Boucher Commission recommending this, was unable to establish which areas the government was really funding. "For example, it was completely impossible to find in the public accounts the sums paid to agencies delivering social services".[49] The underlying message in the way this historical material was presented, was the notion that in health and welfare the government should develop rational economic policies.

The Commission elaborated on the weakness of the sector,

The centre of gravity of social services moved away from institutions towards agencies, without it being possible to identify what society expected from either of them. The absence of precise objectives prevented co-ordination between institutions and agencies. For their part, the agencies were rather accurately acquainted with the state's responsibility but were not successful in clearly defining their own responsibility. Too often the need to develop policies which guaranteed minimum resources to individuals and groups, intended to maintain them or restore them to their natural milieu, yielded to professional concerns .... Finally there was a feeling of insecurity in the sector which hindered the progress of social services. (50)

There is no indication that the Commission felt that the
Province of Quebec was unusual, given the existence of the
private charity agencies. However, they further elaborated
that both government and non-government agencies lacked
specific objectives which prompted those involved to divide
responsibility between the public and private sector, solely
in terms of financial responsibility. They concluded that
existing social services were too costly, too vague and diffuse
and too bureaucratic. The evaluation of the social service
sector with its lack of precise objectives and its insecurity
pointed to the need for re-organization. The re-organization
that the Commission suggested was directed towards central
government control. This alternative fitted in with the Quebec
government's programme of rationalization. It also fits in
with Raynauld's suggestion that in the minds of French Canadian
elites state government intervention was an acceptable
alternative to the maintenance of private agencies.

The October Crisis

Together with this political process of rationalization
and the economic issues which supported the Quebec Government's
involvement in health and welfare, there appears to be one
socio-political event which also forms part of the environment
in which Bill 65 was introduced. This is the October crisis
of 1970. Although social unrest had clearly been surfacing
throughout the 1960's, as in the labour struggles of "the
cabbies and the mail truck drivers"[51], this crisis was the

single most important event to dramatize the francophone

refusal to tolerate an anglophone minority domination.

> In October 1970 ..... members of an extremist group
> of Quebec separatists, the Front de Liberation du
> Quebec, kidnapped a British diplomat James Cross,
> and a provincial Cabinet Minister, Pierre Laporte,
> eventually assassinating the latter. After an
> agonizing period of uncertainty and danger of
> anarchy, Bourassa (Robert Bourassa was the
> Liberal Premier of Quebec at the time) requested
> the federal government to proclaim the War Measures
> Act, suspending civil liberties and enabling
> the forces of law and order to conduct searches
> and make arrests without warrants. Cross was dis-
> covered and his release was negotiated, Laporte's
> kidnappers were arrested and brought to trial.(52)

According to Raymond Breton

> There exists a high level of discontent and a sense
> of inequity in segments of Quebec society, attitudes
> that presumably could be mobilized for either con-
> structive or destructive collective action .....
> given the socio-political conditions in Quebec on
> the eve of the October events, there was a problem of
> potential social disruption, of potentially uncon-
> trolled social confrontations. (53)

It is not surpising given the socio-political and economic

situation of Quebec, that Bill 65 was tabled in July 1971.

It was just nine months after the October crisis and before

the Commission Report had been completed. The legislation had

been seen by many as being aimed at redistributing resources.

It questioned the anglophone monopoly of resources in Quebec

and aimed at a fairer distribution by central government

control. Social unrest in Quebec which resulted in such

incidents as the October crisis, together with the agitation

which resulted in the growth of the citizens' groups concerned

with changing government policy, are additional background

features which provide an understanding of the social situation

which Bill 65 addressed.

Philosophical Considerations of the Act

The philosophy of the legislation is documented in Sections 4-7 of the Act which reads:

> 4. Every person has the right to receive adequate, continuous and personal health services and social services from a scientific, human and social impact, taking into account the organization and resources of the establishments providing such services.

> 5. Health services and social services must be granted without discrimination or preference based on the race, colour, sex, religion, language, national extraction, social origin, customs or political convictions of the person applying for them or of the members of his family.
> 6. Subject to Section 5 and any other applicable legislative provision, nothing in this act shall restrict the freedom of a resident of the province of Quebec to choose the professional or establishment from whom or which he wishes to receive health services or social services or that of a professional to agree or refuse to treat such person.

> 7. The medical records of the patients in an establishment shall be confidential. No person shall give or take communication of them, even for an inquiry, except with the express or implied consent of the patient or in the order of a court, or in other cases provided for by law or the regulations. The same shall apply to the records of persons receiving social services from an establishment.

In reference to this legislation, Phillip Hepworth suggests,

> Although the means to provide the social services thus described as rights, are spelled out in the legislation and regulations, they are largely described in organizational and legal terms. But the re-organization of services envisaged, integration of some and the consolidation of others and the co-ordination of the units of organization thus created depend in large measure on the professional people working in the formally separated agencies and services. Success depends on their working harmoniously together to bring about an arrangement of services that they have played little part in devising. To some extent the government may have counted on professional ethics of the different groups overriding other, more personal reservations (54)

Hepworth, infers that social work professionals were a source
of discontent within the new system of personal social
services.

While the Quebec government may have identified the
problems in the old system, to rely on the professional ethics
of those groups working in the social service system to
solve these same problems overlooks certain personnel issues.
The professionals were insecure in the old system. If they
were not involved in designing the new system, it seems likely
that they would feel even more insecure. This thesis will
examine what happened at FSA, a private anglophone social
service agency when the state government took control of the
agency. For the first time in seventy five years, the agency
was no longer in control of the delivery of services.
Professional social workers' cherished autonomy in 'voluntary'
or 'private' agencies, was to be pruned drastically.

The Re-Organization of Social Services

Five types of organizations were outlined in the legis-
lation, Regional Councils, Local Community Service Centres,
Social Service Centres, Hospitals and Reception Centres. The
Regional Councils were to oversee the health and welfare
services offered by the other centres. Each organization had
its own internal hierachy. The Regional Council structure was
part of the chain of command leading to the Minister of
Social Affairs in the Quebec government.

Family Service Association with its historically inde-
pendant status was now contained within this complex, hier-
archical system. Previously, independent Protestant and
Catholic agencies came under the umbrella of Ville Marie Social
Service Centre (VMSSC). Hepworth comments,

> The transition from separate agencies to unified
> centres has not been easy, nor has it been instan-
> taneous. The whole process has been termed a long
> birth and a long death. (55.)

When VMSSC became a legal entity a Head Office was opened at
Place Dupuis. The four independent agencies (Lakeshore
Community Services, Children's Service Centre, Catholic Family
and Children's Services and Family Service Association)
became divisions of VMSSC. The plan was to phase these
divisions into Area Service Centres. The agencies (Foster
Home Recruiting Centre and the John Howard Society) were also
reorganized as programmes offered by the centre. All these re-
sources, in 1975, remained at the original locations.
Social workers in schools, hospitals, courts and reception
centres were under contract by VMSSC to the School Commissions,
Hospitals, etc. VMSSC had the function of co-ordinating some
six hundred social workers.

Hepworth hints at the experience of the participants in
this reorganization. He hints at the crisis which his reference
to birth and death was intended to illustrate. The next
chapter describes the crisis at Family Service Association when
the agency became a division of Ville Marie Social Service
Centre. A series of events promoted conflict at Family Service

Association. By examining the relationship between four
groups, the social work professionals, the bureaucrats, the
Board of Directors and the consumers of service, this thesis
argues that the conflict, while it is expressed internally,
can be seen as a manifestation of structural conditions out-
side VMSSC.

CHAPTER 5:

BUREAUCRATIC-PROFESSIONAL CONFLICT

Part I

The contention of this thesis is that the bureaucratic-professional conflict between social work staff at FSA and administrative staff at VMSSC during the period May 1974 to August 1975, was a symptom of a much wider struggle. This professional-bureaucratic conflict was in fact a safety valve for other more fundamental struggles such as those between anglophone and francophone populations and to a lesser extent those between Protestant and Catholic interests.

The parameters of this conflict can best be illustrated by focusing on some major events during the changeover phase following the implementation of Bill 65 (Chapter 48). One of the difficulties has been to make sense of a whole chain of events in terms of understanding how these events relate to bureaucratic-professional conflict. In December 1974 a Draft Development Plan was distributed throughout VMSSC by the Director of VMSSC. This was potentially the single most conflict-laden event in the short history of the new social service system.

The details of this draft development plan will be presented. Following this, additional issues that precipitated conflict will be identified and described. In order to make

the argument more coherent, these organizational issues that
generated conflict will be presented within broad categories.
The conflict that emanated from each event was more than might
be expected from an event in isolation. Only when the
bureaucratic-professional conflict is considered in the light
of the more fundamental conflicts in the culture and social
structure of Quebec does this conflict begin to make sense.

Benson's framework provides a useful way of organizing
the analysis of the information. Notions such as conflicts
inherent in the system, centralization/decentralization,
differentiation, rigidification and domain are a starting
point in the analysis that follows my account of key events.
The links between the internally expressed conflict and the
external context of the agency, is provided by an analysis of
the functions of the Board of Directors. The second section
in this chapter will address this issue. To begin with, I
shall 'set the stage' by describing the scene of the conflict.

The Scene of the Conflict

FSA occupied a compact three storey building with a
delightful garden area in the middle and at the rear. Offices
were comfortable and could be decorated in the occupants own
taste. Staff had a large coffee room on the basement floor
and during winter had lunch, coffee and conversation there.
During summer the garden was used for lunch. The reception
area on the ground floor was spacious and inviting. The

corridors of the building were large and usually abuzz with people. There were two sets of stairs in the building. The reader might wonder at this description. It is included because it is essential to understanding the daily process of staff interaction at FSA. During the time the research was undertaken, conversation in the coffee room and the garden was very often about events at VMSSC. Staff continuously exchanged information about the committee's they were on and what was happening. Much anger and a great deal of personal frustration was expressed about the changeover process. Indeed, Tom Thompson the Director of FSA from 1965 to 1974, reflected after he had left the agency that he was "sorry Bill 65 had interfered because FSA was at the forefront".[56] Staff huddled in the corridors or stopped on the stairs to discuss some of the many directives being circulated. The anger was always directed at the bureaucrats at VMSSC. The conflict took place between the bureaucrats at VMSSC and the social work professionals at FSA. Staff at FSA did not confront MAS or the Board of Directors or Community (Consumer) Groups.

This thesis proposes that each of these groups within the anglophone sector was determined to avoid conflict with the francophone government for fear of reprisals, such as the withdrawal of resources. Therefore the tension generated by the re-organization of the new anglophone social service centre was inevitably contained within that system.

Certain events generated the conflict that pre-occupied social work staff in the corridors of FSA. The following outlines help identify how both FSA and VMSSC were organized (i.e., the number of staff and how they related officially to each other). Problems arising from the differences in these two structures contributed to the overall conflicts. Specific problems will be discussed in the section, conflicts inherent in the system.

Figure III. Structure of FSA prior to 1973

Figure IV. Structure of VMSSC in August 1975

Area Service Centres

Events During the Changeover Process

The following description draws the reader's attention to the issues that gave rise to the expression of bureaucratic-professional conflict. Three sets of events emerged as major talking points at FSA.

1. Inter-organization events. The Draft Development Plan, the plan for the relocation of services and the Social Development Plan.

2. Personnel-focused events.

3. Client-focused events.

The events will be described. Some explanations will be offered to answer the question, why did these events precipitate so much conflict between the social work professionals at FSA

and the bureaucrats at Ville Marie.

1. Inter-Organization Events

Draft Development Plan

Since the initial phase of the implementation of Chapter 48, I observed a general atmosphere of concern at FSA. This concern became openly acknowledged fear, expressed by the professionals in terms of the bureaucratic structure dominating professionalism. In December 1974 the management group of VMSSC submitted a Draft Development Plan to the Board of Directors. The social work professionals were given only a few copies of this document of 86 pages and limited time in which to review it. On December 19, 1974, the Board requested additional time to review this document. One professional estimate suggested that if this plan was implemented there would be 137 people at the Central Office, whose function would be to co-ordinate the remaining 600. Specific estimates were difficult because the 'organigram' only outlined functions. Additional people, such as assistants and secretaries, were thought to be adjuncts to the functions that were identified. These fears about bureaucracy culminated in a demand by the social workers that VMSSC halt its development in order to study its progress.

In a memo circulated to other divisions of VMSSC, the staff at FSA stated,

Specifically, we are concerned about the potential
development of a giant bureaucracy which the
Castonguay Nepveu Commission found to be a fault,
in the private welfare system. With so many func-
tions centralised, we are concerned about the
limitations placed on us to offer service. (57)

This memo resulted in two study days in February, 1975. At

the commencement of these study days, the management pre-empted

the situation by presenting their review of the concerns of

social work staff.

1. Bureaucracy.
   VMSSC is top heavy, too bureaucratic, management
   is in place - programmes and services to people
   have been lost in the superstructure.

2. Participation.
   Participation has become a cliche - the
   Consultation Programme has not been used by the
   administration; management is controlled by the
   MAS. - it is not listening to staff and consumer
   concerns; consumer participations is tokenism.

3. Action vs Planning.
   When do we stop planning and start doing ? (58)

Management at Ville Marie then presented an outline of the

many complex tasks facing VMSSC. The purpose of this was to

justify the existence of so many staff at the central office.

However, the presentation suggested that the further develop-

ment of the centre would depend on Task Force recommendations.

There would be four (4) Task Forces composed of central office

personnel, divisional and hospital personnel. The administrators

at VMSSC appeared willing to involve the social workers from

FSA and the other agencies in the decision making process.

However I observed the social workers at FSA to be reluctant

to believe that their participation in decision making was

possible, given the lack of participatory procedures at VMSSC
in the immediate past.

However, at a special Board meeting on April 10, the
Board in a close vote, vetoed the plan in favour of a much
simplified plan involving few positions, which they elected
to draw up. This plan was then sent to Quebec. According to
management the request came back that MAS wanted more detail.
Meanwhile the process of centralization of service components
continued. Court and school social services were defined as
regional services and these units of professionals were attached
to the central office, prior to the regional services task
force presentation. The professional staff, noting these
changes, continued to express concern about increasing
bureaucratization. At subsequent staff meetings at FSA, con-
siderable time was taken up with voicing discontent about
administrative practices.

The administrators at VMSSC also expressed concern about
what was happening within VMSSC. They therefore commissioned
a study by Dr. Walter Schmolka, a consultant from the
communications field. His study, submitted June 30, 1975, was
an analysis of the problem existing between central office and
the rest of the service delivery system. The study acknowledged
the existence of bureaucratic-professional conflict. However
the author concluded that the problem was simply one of
communication.

> It is generally claimed that communications between
> central office and the divisions, programmes and
> services have broken down ...... it is significant that

about 25 per cent of those interviewed blame manage-
ment, while the remaining 75 per cent are ready to
identify the cause as growing pains ..... At any
rate, the result of this communications breakdown
./... is a credibility gap.[59]

The Draft Development Plan was not mentioned again by the

bureaucrats during the research phase up to August 1975.

This document created so much dissension that the management

group had difficulty knowing what to do. They employed

Schmolka. However, his analysis of the problem was couched

simply in terms of communication difficulties. In consequence,

the management group had no coherent plan as to how to cope.

with opposition and conflict. So, they did nothing. This

created more tension.

The Plan for the Relocation of Services

In October of 1974, a committee was set up to look at

possible ways of relocating services. Membership on this

committee included the Director of Organization and Methods

from VMSSC who was the co-ordinator, together with an elected

social work staff member from each of the existing divisions

of VMSSC. I was the staff member who represented FSA. This

committee met on a regular basis in the following months.

The objective of the group was to study the services and

resources in the areas serviced by the existing agencies/

divisions and to present a plan for alternative service points.

The study involved extensive data collection of demographic

statistics from the census and the agencies, together with

more specific documentation on institutions, e.g., schools

and hospitals in each area. Agency files were examined in
terms of analysing where the clients of each agency lived.

After some months, this committee had amassed an
impressive array of detail about each area. Coloured maps,
maps with blue pins, maps with red pins, shaded maps, identified
the clients and current services of VMSSC. There was a con-
centration of services and clients in the downtown area of
Montreal. The next phase was to consult with each division,
to reach some understanding with all staff about alternatives
to the current distribution of services.

One of the acknowledged problems of the network of
anglophone social services was the location of all but one of
the services within a half mile of each other, close to the
centre of the city. Clients needing services could not all
be living close to these services. There was some general
consenus among the staff that some alternative points of
service delivery was necessary. Some redistribution of current
agency facilities and staff was discussed positively at staff
meetings at FSA. For example, the Director of FSA, Bill Duncan,
urged staff to reach out to ethnic communities in Montreal.
He openly acknowledged that, with a shrinking English speaking
population, survival might hinge upon establishing close links
with ethnic communities. These communities were spread across
the city of Montreal, with many in the francophone areas of
the city. This kind of argument which promoted the redistri-
bution of services was accepted by social work staff. Although

some anxiety was expressed during these meetings, about the fact
that some staff might have to move and work in new locations,
there was general agreement that some change was inevitable.

This committee, examining service distribution, recognised
that the staff of the divisions were being asked to participate
in examining and planning the future of service delivery
within VMSSC. The committee's work was undertaken concurrently
with other changes but was suddenly halted in February 1975.
The co-ordinator of the committee simply stated that it was
not possible to continue until VMSSC made further plans.
Staff at FSA were angry at this stalling process and called a
meeting with the co-ordinator. He attended an FSA staff
meeting some weeks later. The result of this meeting was the
reluctant but hostile acceptance by FSA staff that work on
the relocation of services would continue at some time in the
future.

Social Development Plan

The Director of FSA had been advocating the need to
address the issue of the philosophy of VMSSC. As a social
worker committed to community organization he promoted the
notion of preventive social work. During the bargaining pro-
cess that followed the workshop on the Development Plan, the
Director of FSA announced at a staff meeting that VMSSC had
agreed to commit to paper a plan of the social development
goals it should work towards. He, together with two senior VMSSC
representatives and the Director of the West Island agency

were to identify staff, voluntary agency, client and consumer
group attitudes about the future philosophy of VMSSC. A
group of staff formed a working party of this committee to
bring together the ideas of all the participants in VMSSC. I
was a member of this working party of four. Soon after the
establishment of this committee the two VMSSC central office
representatives stated that they were over committed and could
not remain involved. This left the two divisional directors
and social work staff representatives.

The term social development was used throughout that
research exercise. It was a term currently in vogue and,
meanings attributed to it included preventive social work.
The committee in the final statement of this social
development plan stated,

> Social development and social treatment are essential
> facets of social health, which is the objective of
> social service centres of MAS. Social health cannot
> be obtained or maintained without both, and the
> responsibility is the stated and implied mandate of
> many systems, institutions and professions. The
> assigned role of the Social Service Centre is to
> facilitate social health to all. If social develop-
> ment and psychosocial treatment are essential
> modalities - these must be realised through con-
> scientious policy and programs.[60]

After four months of painstaking work, which included the
design and implementation of a questionnaire that was adminis-
tered to staff, a structured interview schedule administered
to voluntary agency directors, and a number of workshops with
consumer groups, a social development plan was produced. This
was submitted to central office and the Board of Directors.

Staff waited for a response. The response from VMSSC administrators was that central office could not make a commitment to follow through on the policy and programmes recommended but would consider them. Again staff at FSA were angry that their time and energy had been wasted because Ville Marie might not implement any of the recommendations. Again the conversations in the corridors of FSA reflected tension and conflict.

For example, the Director of FSA who spearheaded this report, felt personally slighted and began to voice his concern about Ville Marie's disinterest in service to clients. He began to openly state that he did not consider his position as Director to be viable.

2. Personnel-Focused Events

Hiring of Staff

Prior to August 1975 there was no directive from VMSSC stating that hiring of staff would be done by central office. There was no acknowledgement by the director of FSA that hiring procedures had changed. However, in early 1975 social work positions at FSA were frozen, i.e., they could not be filled. The reason given for this was the change process of the implementation of Chapter 48. By June 1975, all financial operations e.g., payroll were centralized. I became aware in June, 1975, when a social work contemporary was looking for employment that the hiring of all staff was being done only by the central office.

There had been a subtle shift in procedure. Changes in hiring procedure had never been explicit. When social work staff at FSA became aware of the reality that a Personnel Director in central office was now responsible for hiring social work staff, considerable resentment was expressed in staff conversations and meetings.

Unionization

In early 1971 according to my recollections, unionization had been a non-issue. The professional social workers at that time perceived no need to organize themselves against bureaucrats. By June 1973, the time when the Board of Directors was disbanded, the unionization issue was raised and this time actively pursued. Social work staff at FSA expressed a need to protect themselves through unionization and actively promoted unionization in other divisions. The social workers at FSA became unionized in July, 1974.

Promotion of Staff from Catholic Family and Childrens Services (CF&CS)

While the social workers at FSA did not develop any statistical argument on the chances of being promoted either from CF and CS or FSA to VMSSC, there was clearly a feeling that promotion was being offered to CF and CS staff. The Director of VMSSC was the previous director of CF and CS. The religious issue was never discussed as an issue. The

fact remains that each social service agency had a 'religious' identity and had maintained parallel but separate development. The religious division had prevented them from becoming more closely aligned or amalgamating.

When the contentious issue of promotion was discussed at FSA, 'religious' affiliation was identified as a possible explanation of why people were promoted. In a conversation with a consultant, Mr. Dufeys from Kates, Peat and Marwick, who was involved in the initial stage of the establishment of Ville Marie, he revealed his impression that a Catholic appointment to the position of Director of Ville Marie would philosophically please the Catholic francophone government.[61] Mr. Ray Cartwright, President of the Board of 1975 referred to the 'system of patronage'[62] in operation at VMSSC. The Catholic grouping was the only grouping of individuals. The Catholic-Protestant distinction was a division between staff at VMSSC although it was never articulated as a problem at meetings.

3. Client Focused Events

Central Index of Client Files

Professional staff at FSA received documentation which instructed them, in detail, how to fill out cards on clients. There were pink cards for some and white cards for others. Only certain responses from workers were acceptable. The elaborate instructions gave no indication why the information

was being sought, although staff were told it had to do with
developing a central client index. Ideologically, the social
work professional was aware that planning meant developing
an understanding of who the clients were. However, the
frustration about giving information without being involved
in deciding why such information should be collected, was
readily acknowledged by the social workers. Moreover, the
social workers were instructed in order to maintain confident-
iality they would not have access to any centralized information.
Ville Marie was establishing rules with little thought for
the social worker staff. It was also not clear how this
procedure would benefit clients.

Emergency Relief Funds

Emergency relief funds under FSA administration were paid
to clients immediately upon the client presenting with a
critical problem. There was never an abundance of money,
but social work staff knew that a limited amount was available
and their recommendation had been sufficient for the money to
be issued.

Emergency relief was quite different under VMSSC
administration. Requests for funds for clients had to proceed
through the chain of command at the Area Service Centre and
then through the superimposed chain of command at the central
office. An example highlights the dilemma for the professional.
To request funds for a family, an individual social worker

had to present a petition which went through the Area Service
Centre and then up to the central office. The situation had
to be described in such a way as to suggest that a crisis
would be precipitated if money was not given. After a
committee had met on this and other similar petitions, the
decision was handed down and then the money arrived for the
client at the Area Service Centre. Typically, two weeks were
required for the process. The worker could no longer meet a
client's need immediately. The decision was no longer
dependent on the social worker's interpretation of the client's
need but depended instead on an administrator's assessment of
the quality of the social worker's written plea.

The following section examines why the bureaucratic-
professional conflict was precipitated and perpetuated.

Conflicts Inherent in the System

The conflicts within the newly organized social service
centre, were manifested in tensions between a scientific
approach and a welfare approach, between participation and
decree, between an informal structure and a formal structure
and between the performance of service tasks and the co-
ordination of service tasks. To illustrate these conflicts,
reference will be made to the events just described.

A Scientific Approach Contrasted with a Welfare Approach.

The bureaucrats at VMSSC upheld a scientific approach
which promoted efficiency and techniques such as Management by

Objectives (MBO). MBO combined participatory goal (objectives) setting and evaluation of the outcomes of performance. The social workers at FSA upheld a welfare approach which promoted the view that people in need were in that position because of personal or social upheaval. The scientific approach suggested that there was an objective way to determine the services that should be offered. The welfare approach suggested that service should be determined by need.

An example of how these two approaches were polarized was the Draft Development Plan drawn up by the bureaucrats at VMSSC. The many specialist services and VMSSC's proposed hierarchy of authority suggested a more rational, objective and scientific way of organizing services. The social workers considered that they were limited in their ability to respond to individual need by such an approach. They considered that a scientific approach would interfere with their professional autonomy and ability to make decisions based on social work knowledge.

These two approaches were in conflict. In this situation they were almost impossible to resolve because of the deeper conflicts bound up in the existence of the anglophone social service centre in the francophone province of Quebec. The bureaucratic focus on a scientific approach was linked to their understanding of the demands of the francophone government. The bureaucrats frequently suggested that unless VMSSC was efficient the government would not allow it to continue. The social workers' focus on a welfare approach was linked to their

perception of the needs of clients.

This conflict was neither negotiated nor resolved. The bureaucratic-professional conflict was preserved and perpetuated. This had the effect of obscuring and deflecting the historically more deep seated conflicts, between anglophone and francophone sections of the province and Protestant and Catholic interests.

Participation Contrasted with Decree

The conflict between participation and decree was high-lighted in the social development plan. The social work professionals had been arguing for their participation in the decision making process. Their arguments precipitated the establishment of a working party to look at a policy statement and a plan to implement such a policy. However, given that nothing happened when the final plan was submitted to VMSSC, it is apparent that participatary decision making about VMSSC policy was not on the agenda of the VMSSC bureaucrats. They were interpreting the decree from the francophone government about the style and organization of the new anglophone social service centre. While the bureaucrats may have wanted to pacify the demands of the social work professionals for participation in the organization of the new system, they were bound to follow the directives from the francophone government. Again, the hidden conflict between the anglophone social service centre as an institution representing the needs of English speaking people, and the francophone government's

interests was not expressed. Conflict was confined to the arena where the interests of certain professionals and bureaucrats were at stake.

An Informal Structure Contrasted with a Formal Structure

To demonstrate the conflict between an informal structure and a formal structure, the structure of both FSA and VMSSC is analysed. The diagrams are on pages 69 and 70.

FSA

The structure of FSA was basically at four levels. A social worker was hired (and fired) by the director of the agency in consultation with a director of casework, group work or community organization. He or she was then assigned to a supervisor (if the worker was a caseworker) or assigned directly to the director of group work or director of community organization. Although it was generally accepted that the worker went through the supervisor with requests or complaints, it was also accepted that workers could go directly to the Executive Director. Communication was informal. Administrative services were separate. Decisions about personnel, salaries and budget were definitely under the control of the Executive Director. These functions of administration developed as an adjunct to the social work function which was the primary task of the agency. Decisions about administrative matters were made quickly. Social workers had access to those people

who made decisions and who had access to information.

VMSSC

In the re-organization of the new social service system another structure was superimposed onto the existing structure of each of the old 'agencies'. At level 2, for the diagram on page 70 only two of the functions were social work oriented, Professional Services and Programme Management. At level 3, there were four functions which were concerned directly with the delivery of service. The Directors of the Area Service Centres were originally seen at level 4, but after considerable effort, management conceded and moved them to level 3. These lines of communication and responsibility resulted in tension because from the perspective of the professional there was no need for so many people to be in central office, when the function of the social service centre remained the same - services to individuals, families and groups in the community. The administrative perspective however inferred that the proliferation and centralization of the additional functions was absolutely essential in order for Ville Marie to complete its mission.

Perrow, in his elaboration of the notions of exception and search, suggests that a professional organization develops a structure that is flexible. Because there are many exceptions, there are no rules set out for the participants to follow. At FSA it was accepted that the problems con-

fronting the workers did not fit into a precise knowledge base, and therefore workers dealt with problems in a non-routine manner. However, VMSSC attempted to impose a different structure - a rule bound, routine structure. According to Mrs. Ellen Prince, Director of Casework at FSA[63], VMSSC thought that FSA was disorganised. Because the tasks remained the same, i.e., the professional work remained constant, the shift in structure caused tension.

For example, social workers accustomed to having access to the Director of FSA, suddenly found that access to the Director General of VMSSC was limited. The lines of communication had been formalized. There were a number of other people, who in turn had to review an issue before passing it on. Access to information was also limited. Social workers at FSA no longer considered they had access to informal discussions which yielded current information. For example, social work staff were not advised about negotiations with the government. VMSSC did not have a 'staff meeting' in which FSA social workers were involved. Therefore the formal structure established by the administrative group at VMSSC was an additional source of conflict for the social workers at FSA.

Performance of Service Tasks Contrasted with the Co-ordination of Service Tasks

The conflict between the performance of service tasks and the co-ordination of service or administrative tasks was also

woven into the fabric of the bureaucratic-professional con-
flict. The client-focused events such as the reorganization
of emergency relief funds and the reorganization of client
files, illustrate this conflict. The objectives of the social
work professionals included being able to meet an expressed
client need immediately as well as having access to other
social workers' files on clients. These new decrees, issued
because the bureaucrats wanted co-ordination of services to
clients, in fact prevented the social worker offering the
most appropriate service. The two groups, the social work
professionals and the bureaucrats were polarized on this
'service' issue. For example, the social workers wanted to
meet client's needs immediately while the administrators
wanted each decision to be made by a committee in order to
ensure equitable services. Again, negotiation about and
resolution of the conflict did not happen because the reasons
why each group framed its position in the way it did, were
never examined. The anglophone/francophone conflict over-
shadowed the service conflict but remained in the shadows as
an unarticulated fear in the minds of both these anglophone
groups.

One additional conflict about 'service', is tied up with
the Social Development Plan. Inherent in this document was the
notion that services should be preventive in nature. If this
was carried to its natural conclusion it meant that clients'
interests were promoted above the interests of the

funding body. Could VMSSC politically afford to have
'community organizers' animating consumer groups to demand
changes in government policy? VMSSC was not prepared to
leave themselves open to the Quebec government's criticism and
wrath by promoting social work involvement in community
organization activities. For these reasons the bureaucrats
decided that it would be politically disadvantageous to promote
the Social Development Plan.

Differentiation

With the organization of the new social services centre
there was a shift from a very simple chain of command to a
much more complex model. There was a dramatic shift in the
division of labour affecting the professional social workers.
In FSA, decisions about clients and professionals were made
by the professionals themselves. However, at Ville Marie in
1975, the professional played a less important role. Functions
that were previously within the realm of the professional were
delegated to staff in other specialities. For example, the
hiring of staff was done by the Human Resources Department,
who also approved expenditures for professional development
and educational programmes for staff. Therefore the division
of labour was different. The role of the social worker became
more rigidly controlled in the process. Control over how
services were offered was considerably reduced. The social
work professional, saw that those making decisions in certain
areas (e.g., Human Resources Department) were making the

decision based on different assumptions, and became very angry
and agitated and complained to other staff. For example,
decisions about the allocation of funds for the professional
development of staff were seen by the professional as a
prerogative based on knowledge of their professional needs.
However, the Human Resources Department, saw that the decision
should be made based on budget allocations. Social workers
who had previously had major responsibility for deciding on
issues of professional development resented the encoachment
on 'their" territory. They resented this loss of control over
a professional activity.

Centralization/Decentralization

An additional contentious issue between FSA and VMSSC
was the centralization of decison making. Examples of this
include those cited as personnel-focused events and client-
focused events. The effect on social work professionals was
one of frustration because established procedures of decision
making were altered. Decisions about these events could no
longer be made by the social workers. The bureaucrats
acquired the authority through the new order and proceeded to
exercise it. Each group was convinced about their legitimate
right to make decisions believing that they knew what was most
appropriate.

The process by which the bureaucrats of VMSSC made
decisions was not clear. An examination of the decisions

involved with the Draft Development Plan suggests that one of the struggles was around the centralization of power. Mr. Ray Cartwright president of the VMSSC Board of Directors in 1975, reflected the general staff and Board attitude about the draft development plan when he said that the management was positively "feudal in their power building".[64] With almost no consultation the bureaucrats of VMSSC produced a document which in essence defined that all decision making on important issues be done at central office. Cries of 'foul play' and 'power hungry bureaucrats' were heard from the social work professionals at FSA. Staff were angry at their loss of autonomy. They attempted to organize all non central office staff as well as the Board of Directors, into a protest. The workshop discussing the draft development plan was the result. However this workshop was at VMSSC and therefore controlled by the bureaucrats. Concessions were made about participatory decision making but control over who should participate and when, was in the hands of the bureaucrats at central office.

Following this workshop the social work professionals realised that they, the Board of Directors, and consumer groups had little power to effect change over the bureaucrats who were responsive to and financially dependent upon the francophone government. This realization immobilised the social work staff. They were unable to negotiate a satisfactory compromise or resolution to the issue of where

decisions should be made and retreated to a position of non-co-operation.

With respect to what happened about the committee working on a plan for the relocation of services, the bureaucrats had decided that a 'scientific approach' was possible and that this could be achieved by involving staff of the divisons. However, during the process of the study of the distribution of existing services, it became very apparent to me that the real issue was about the redistribution of personnel offering those services. It also became apparent to the bureaucrats at VMSSC that the real issue was about the relocation of social work staff. The bureaucrats disbanded this committee hoping to defuse the potentially explosive issue concerning the re-organization of staff. As Mrs. Ellen Prince, Director of casework at FSA commented, "after Bill 65 there was a lack of leadership" within the anglophone sections of the community. She continued that the scene in the new order became "a struggle over territorial rights".[65]

Rigidification

Rigidification refers to "a process through which operations of the organization become increasingly rule bound and regulated either through the expansion or enforcement of rules".[66] In the development of the new social service centre there was considerable expansion of procedures and rules governing the behaviour of staff articulated in the rules about emergency reflief funds and client files.

The role that social work professionals saw themselves performing under the old informal structure, was that of caring, responsive, helping persons who although working within a bureaucracy had considerable power and control over the way each offered services. The social work role under the new structure was altered by the many constraints the organization placed upon them by way of new rules governing the services they offered. For social workers who aimed to enable individuals and ￭ps to enhance their ability to have control over their 'environment' - this was a bitter pile to swallow. Being unable to exert control over essential aspects of their work place, they were insecure in their professional roles.

Promotion of staff was an issue for which no rules had been established. Social workers developed their own explanations about patterns of promotion.

For example, at VMSSC there was a feeling that Catholic staff were promoted more often than Protestant staff. Although two (2) members of senior management were from the 'Catholic' system the remaining five (5) positions were not identified by their religious affiliation. Promotion procedures had been limited in FSA because there were only three types of positions above that of a regular social worker. For the most part social work staff under the old system were not concerned with being promoted. In the new social service system there were considerably more opportunities for promotion and diversification of tasks. However, the rules about promotion had not been widely published. Staff reverted

to old religious divisions to explain why certain people were
promoted. This fundamental Catholic-Protestant religious
issue was never clearly articulated but remained in the muttered
complaints of staff about 'the way things happen'. Both the
expansion of rules and the lack of specific guidelines created
tension for social workers.

Domain

Domain according to Thompson,

> Identifies the points at which the organization is
> dependent on input from the environment. The
> composition of that environment, the location
> within it of capacities, in turn determines upon
> whom the organization is dependent. (67)

Benson further elaborates, "Domain definition is a process
through which the sphere of appropriate activity of an
organization is established or changed".(68) In effect, an
analysis of the domain of an organization identifies to whom
the organization relates and responds.

Some understanding of the notion 'domain', contributes
to an understanding of the bureaucratic-professional conflict
at FSA/VMSSC. Its contribution lies in the fact that it
expands the possible explanation of conflict to include issues
beyond the immediate world of this agency's work. If we ask
who the organization is financially dependent upon, the answer
for VMSSC must be the francophone government. If the same
question is raised about FSA prior to Chapter 48, the answer
supplied from minutes of Board Meetings would be, both the
anglophone community in Montreal and to a much lesser extent

the francophone government. As the financial resources of a
social service sector determine the extent and range of
services, it is the single most important item in this
dependancy issue. The notion of domain extends these areas of
organizational decision making which required investigation in
order to explain why bureaucratic professional conflict
existed and why it remained unresolved. VMSSC was financially
dependent upon the Quebec government. Every phase of service
development had to be approved by MAS.

In discussions with Board members and contact with social
work staff, nothing was ever said to suggest that any of these
anglophone participants felt that the anglophone group could
alter or significantly influence the policy of the francophone
government. There was no question of fighting policy. These
participants appeared quite resigned to the reality of
increased francophone influence. While there was concern and
fear about how future francophone influence might alter the
quality of the anglophone 'life', the inevitability of franco-
phone domination was accepted. In FSA an attitude of
acceptance of the tension created by changes in the political
order existed. In consequence, problems in the bureaucratic-
professional arena remained unresolved. Anger against the
political changes, with their inevitable cultural and
religious overtones, was channelled into resentment towards
changes in agency administration. Anger against the widespread
political changes was not openly expressed.

Government

Ville Marie's relationship to the government was dramat-
ically different from FSA's relationship to the government.
Prior to 1970, FSA approached the government asking that they
accept some additional responsibility for the funding of
anglophone social services; the agency looked favourably on
increased government financial assistance. With the advent
of Bill 65, FSA became more cautious in its dealings with the
Quebec government. Dr. Carmen Bjerre an FSA Board member at
the time, remembers a feeling that the government was "sneaking
in the dark to do something".[69]

After the establishment of VMSSC, the administrators at
VMSSC sent frequent delegations to Quebec. The dependancy on
the Minister of Social Affairs (MAS) for funds meant that MAS
must approve each phase in the development of Ville Marie.
This introduced a very important notion - the notion of
survival. The social work professionals, the bureaucrats,
the Board of Directors and the consumer groups associated with
VMSSC all knew that their resources came from the francophone
government, and that they could be withdrawn. Protest was not
directed at the funding source but rather contained within the
anglophone sector to avoid losing resources.

Survival

Bill 65, Chapter 48 clearly advised the establishment of
one (1) social service centre on the islands of Montreal and
Laval. Recognizing that the majority of the population was

francophone, the anglophone social service centre sector realized that it was living on borrowed time, because the legislation required only one social service centre and the francophone sector was much larger in number. The strategy used by the management group was therefore comprehensible given the uncertainty of the environment. There remained a distinct strategy on the part of management, to develop a strong central power base (in keeping with the style of the francophone sector) in order to effectively bargain with MAS.

In 1975 there was a sense in which Ville Marie attempted to emulate the francophone social service centre (Centre des Services Sociaux Montreal Metropolitain, CSSMM). An example was the struggle at Ville Marie to acquire centralized legal services which CSSMM had. Ville Marie also attempted to establish a unique character. Management acknowledged with pride that they were the only sector that had a consumers' council. Each of these different techniques of organizational development was associated with a strong instinct for survival expressed in the responses of the participants at FSA/VMSSC.

Summary

The thrust of this thesis has been to suggest that bureaucratic-professional conflict was both precipitated and perpetuated by legislative intervention and was expressed between the professional group at FSA and the administrative group at VMSSC. I have attempted to account for this conflict by using a framework developed by J. Benson. He suggests that this

conflict is a result of organizational tensions as well as tensions that emanate from the social order. I therefore explored organizational features suggested by Benson, e.g., the division of labour, the process of centralization/decentralization and structural differences between FSA and VMSSC.

Professional-bureaucratic conflict as has been described in 1975, did not exist prior to the legislation, but did exist after the legislation because the professionals and the administrators, each with different goals, felt that the goals of their group should dominate. The birth of the administrative group was contingent upon the legislation. The specific bureacratic-professional conflict at FSA was a consequence of the legislation. This conflict was neither negotiated nor resolved. On the one hand the social workers were obligated by virtue of the legislation to negotiate with the bureaucrats. On the other hand the bureaucrats by virtue of their perception of the situation were unable to confront MAS, a necessity if the grievances of the professionals were to be met. This inability to confront the government was related to the long separation of anglophone institutions and anglophone spokesmen from the government in Quebec, and the perceived threat to the continued existence of anglophone institutions.

While the government had agreed to the existence of Ville Marie there was a concern about how long that agreement might continue if Ville Marie did not stay in line with government thinking. Each of the groups involved, the social work professionals, the bureaucrats, the Board of Directors and

consumer groups, understood the potential threat of the loss
of resources. The dissatisfaction felt by all was not expressed
at government policy making but was expressed within the
organization and concentrated in the bureaucratic-professional
arena.

The second dimension of the bureacratic-professional
conflict relates to the Board of Directors. The following
section looks at the Board of Directors at FSA prior to the
legislation and compares it with the Board of Directors at
VMSSC after the implementation of the legislation. The Board
performed a major link   to the social, political and economic
influences upon the organization. An analysis of how the
Board related to various sections of the public, illustrates
the way in which the Board 'supported' the bureaucratic-
professional conflict. An analysis of how the Board related
to the professionals and the bureaucrats illustrates how
their powerlessness to effect policy decisions, created
further tensions in the bureaucratic-professional arena.

CHAPTER 5:

Part II

The Board of Directors

The Board of Directors, the social work professionals, the bureaucrats and the consumers of service are the four principle groups in this case study of Family Service Association. The major arena of conflict at the time of observation was the bureaucratic-professional arena as outlined in the previous section. In exploring the organizational dimensions of the agency after the implementation of Bill 65, it became apparent that Board meetings provided an opportunity for the bureaucrats and the professionals to act out their differences. In order to explain why it was that the bureaucratic-professional struggle dominated Board meetings as well as the daily communication of the agency, the minutes of board meetings were analysed.

A review of the literature provided a useful framework for analysing the interactions between these four groups. The function of a Board of Directors features in the literature as

1. "a mechanism of linkage to the environment, or

2. administration".[70]

Zald suggests that these functions are not mutually exclusive and some Boards do both. An examination of what the FSA Board and VMSSC Board were concerned with, provided an account

of how each Board related to the external world of the
environment, and the internal world of the day to day adminis-
tration of the organization.

This section will dwell on the nature of the Board, both
before Bill 65 and after the implementation of Bill 65. In
order to highlight features of the organization as affected
by the legislation, the categories pre-legislation and post-
legislation referred to in earlier discussion will be used
again. To understand the impact of the legislation, it is
imperative to contrast the pre-legislation phase with what
was happening after the legislation was implemented.

This section identifies three distinct changes that took
place at the Board level after the implementation of the
legislation.

1. The Board lost its role of negotiating with
   Quebec over the resources distributed to the
   organization.

2. The Board no longer performed the function of
   protecting the interests of social work pro-
   fessionals. It was unable to facilitate the
   social work goals on major issues such as the
   Draft Development Plan and the Children's
   Defense Committee.

3. The Board no longer functioned as a buffer
   between the organization and the consumers of
   service.

This thesis argues that these changes occurred because the

Board reflected the fear of the anglophone section of the
community about what additional rationalization the francophone
government could initiate that could have a negative influence
on their rights and privileges. This fear immobilised the
Board and ensured that they did not confront the Quebec govern-
ment on policy issues. Furthermore, this thesis argues,
because issues were not resolved at Board meetings, bureau-
cratic-professional conflict was sustained.

Some of the features of a Board of Directors that have
an affect on the way the Board functions are the composition
of the Board and the representation on the Board, the process
of decision making and the responsiveness and sensitivity to
the interests of different sections of the public. Each of
these features is examined by way of contrasting the pre-
legislation phase with the post-legislation phase.

Pre-legislation (1968 and 1971) Phase of the Board of Directors
Composition and Representation

Directors on the Board at this time were from "a high
socio-economic group, or were professionals"[71] according to
the President of the Board of 1968, Mrs. Claire Kerrigan who
reflected a consensus of opinion, confirmed by other Board
members that members were "not company presidents but rather
high officials". In other words, Board members had considerable
personal and economic resources at their disposal. The Board
of 1965 heralded the development of wider community represent-
ation, with the addition of university professors to the

membership. Mrs. Kerrigan reflected[72] that this was the
first time membership had included more than the traditional
lawyers, ministers, women and business men. She noted that
by 1968, women were accepted as being useful Board members; so
that there was a definite shift away from women "choosing new
curtains and making tea".[73] She continued, that it was
the women during this phase who assumed responsibility for the
bulk of the work, as it was difficult to get men who had the
time to do the work to be involved. She acknowledged that
members were elected to the Board because they were personally
known, had been approached and asked to join the board.

According to this informant and others[74], who were
describing the Board at the time, Board members expressed many
sentiments about being involved. Some felt a sense of 'doing
their bit', others felt it was prestigious. There were others
who had developed a social-conscience. There was an overriding
impression that Board membership was a hobby, an interest.
By 1971, it seemed that some of the more conservative of the
Board members dropped out with the introduction of "community
and staff elements".[75] It was suggested that they could not
tolerate the lengthy and often loud debates over social
issues that social workers and consumers brought with them to
Board meetings. The impetus for the initial change appeared
to come from both Board and staff. As Helen Bastien (the
first community person elected to the Board), commented "the
community was after the agencies. People were down on social
workers for their unresponsiveness".[76] It must be remembered

that 1971 was the height of the citizen group movement in
Montreal. Both the Board and staff were attempting to respond
to community pressure.

A staff person was elected to the Board in 1968 and a
consumer was elected in 1971. According to the Executive
Director of FSA in 1968, much concern was expressed about how
the Director's position would be made vulnerable by a staff
person being on the board. This concern was expressed by
other Board members as well as the Director himself. He
recalled his negative feeling about having a staff person, a
subordinate, on the Board, who would be his boss.[77] The
issue was resolved by having the person who was second in
command at the agency, join the Board. In this way the notion
of staff representation was effected and accepted.

The impetus for consumer representation appeared to come
from the staff who by 1971 were free to attend Board meetings
and openly express opinions. With both consumer representation
and staff representation came the notion of accountability of
Board members to constituencies. According to Helen Bastien
at this time there was quite vigorous debate about whether the
individuals on the Board were representative of any group at
all. The staff and consumers had acknowledged constituencies.
Recordings of minutes revealed that there were usually about
five staff members present at Board meetings in 1971. By 1973
there was equal representation of Board, staff and consumers.
However, finding seven consumers to sit on the Board posed

\some problems. "The diminishing interest in citizen group
activities meant that there were fewer consumers available
to participate.[78] Mrs. Barbara McConachie,President of
the Board in 1971 commented that the Board was "exciting and
productive, there was conflict yet it was a time of consensus".
She commented that while the "Executive Committee dealt with
many conflictual issues there was a consensus".[79] She
confirmed that the Board had been able to cope with and adapt to
the changing demands made upon it. The composition of the
Board of Directors was important because a vote at a meeting
determined the outcome of an issue. Issues were resolved.

Post-Legislation (1975) Phase of the Board of Directors Composition and Representation

When the Board of FSA dissolved in June 1973, a provisional
board of VMSSC was established. The first legal board of
VMSSC was set up the following year - late 1974. Chapter 48
determined the representation on the Board of a social service
centre. Both consumer and social work professional represent-
ation was formalized.[80]

The notion of elite composition had all but disappeared
from the Board of VMSSC, although some of the Board members
had come from the private agencies of old. Membership still
carried with it, the notion of prestige. There appeared to
be a subtle shift away from membership that was a hobby,
towards membership because it was politically advantageous.
The President of the Board of 1975[81], inferred that the

experience of negotiating with the government was viewed by some as positive experience in terms of career advancement. Individuals were interested to be involved because of what they could gain from the experience, rather than be involved because of what they could contribute. Indeed the usefulness of Board members for their personal and financial resources had disappeared. Mr. Ray Cartwright commented that the Board had "no relationship to Quebec, it is always management who has gone to Quebec". He continued that after the legislation was passed "Management does and the Board just approves".[82] He was commenting on the Board's inability to influence the policy of VMSSC. He felt that there were "only four publicly oriented members"[83] on the current Board. Cartwright spoke freely about the pressure the Board was under and said that some "Board members want to quit".[84] He reflected the tension at the Board level that the change in legislation had provoked.

Comparison of the Pre-legislation Phase and the Post-legislation Phase

There are two issues that when compared highlight areas where the function of the Board differed. One is the notion of personal resources and the other is the notion of consensus/conflict.

In the pre-legislation phase the Board of Directors was a group of people who knew each other and who had some influence within the anglophone community. Following legislation, the

representation, on the Board was formally determined. Members did not have any social network link to each other. The attribute of personal influence was no longer relevant. The general manager of the social service centre was appointed by the Quebec government not the Board of Directors. Therefore he was accountable in terms of the budget or schedules on development to the Quebec government not to the Board of Directors. The personal resources of Board members had been used prior to the legislation to bargain with the government for services to the anglophone sector of the public. In the post-legislation phase, the administrative group assumed the role of negotiating with the government for services to the anglophone sector of the public. Although the Board made some attempts to intervene as in their vote of the draft development plan, for the most part I observed them to comply with government policy. Ray Cartwright said that the "Board wants to struggle with its identity. It does not want to concede to Quebec, Quebec did not appoint it".[85] He also conceded that the "Board would be a rubber-stamp if management had its way".[86] He identified the dilemma that the Board found itself in. Board members saw themselves as the representatives of the anglophones of the province, yet being anglophone themselves they reflected the fear in the anglophone sector about questioning the policy of the Quebec government. The Board no longer fulfilled the role of negotiating with the government on behalf of the agency.

The second issue that requires elaboration is the notion of consensus/conflict. In the pre-legislation phase, the style of the Board meetings·was described by members as "consensus".[87] It appeared that the Board was able to adapt to change. In the post-legislation phase, I observed a high level of tension. Board meetings did not produce resolutions to issues. The Board became immobilized because it reflected the anglophone fear of withdrawal of service.

The next item to be considered is the process of decision making within the Board of Directors. This process of decision making altered·considerably as a response to organizational changes heralded by the legislation Bill 65.

Pre-legislation Phase of the Board of Directors
Process of Decision Making

An interesting change which became evident from the minutes of Board meetings and which was supported by informants, is the change in the relationship of the professional group to the Board. This change set the stage for subsequent bureaucratic-professional conflict.

In 1968, there was considerable evidence of paternalism at the Board level. Recording in the minutes of Board meetings suggests that it was the Board who decided what was best for staff and the agency as a whole. For example, they decided that extra money from a Board-staff function should be donated to the McGill School of Social Work.[88] At this

same meeting,[89] professional staff presented two reviews of
cases as information to the Board. Board members had
suggestions for solutions to these professional dilemmas.
The Board meeting was a place where their opinions could be
verbalised.

According to the President of the Board, in 1971 the
Board became aware of the emergence of a more dramatic, vocal
professional group, who were prepared to develop strategy in
order to force Board decisions around policy matters. The
formation of a small group of politically orientated social
workers appeared related to the employment of community
organizers. Information acquired from interviews as well as
from observation, confirmed the notion that after a community
organizer was hired, the agency began to look around for
additional resources. In the 1968 minutes of Board meetings
there was discussion about a merger with another Protestant
agency, Lakeshore Community Services. This discussion did not
materialize into a merger. In 1971 there was a great deal of
Board and staff energy expended in merger negotiations with
two other agencies, Children's Service Centre (CSC) and the
Society for the Protection of Women and Children (SPWC). The
merger with CSC did not take place and SPWC gave up its charter.
The Director of FSA at the time[90] recalled that the social
work positions from SPWC were divided between FSA and CSC.

The President of the Board in 1971, reflected that
following the collapse of merger negotiations between FSA and

CSC, Board members of both organizations "packed their bags and went home".[91] She felt that the Board members wanted to leave the politics of the agencies to the professionals involved.

There appeared to be a claim which was becoming stronger from the professional group to the Board to accept the notion that it was the right of the professionals to be involved in making policy decisions. There was a feeling at the Board level that they were being told to get out and let the professionals run the show. Therefore, the paternalism of the Board was greatly diminished as the professionals began to demand that they be heard.

Although the agendas of the Board meetings were set by the Executive Director via the executive committee this was not an issue of contention. The Board was dependant on the administrator in terms of access to information. This dependancy increased with the agencies increasing dialogue with Quebec. Although the Executive Director was meeting with FSSF (Federation des Services Sociaux a la Famille) around Bill 65, in the Spring of 1971, the Board members did not recall hearing about the legislation before it was tabled.[92] There is little evidence of conflict between the administrator and the Board. The Board's dependancy on the administrator for information seems to have been tempered by the fact that the administrator utilized the prestigious position of Board members in order to obtain resources for the agency. The

The superscript (93) is a non-mathematical citation marker.

Executive Director commented,[93] that on a number of occasions
Board members accompanied him on delegations to the government
in Quebec City. On one occasion, they travelled in a chauffered
driven car (provided by the company of one of the Board
members) in order to impress the government. He also commented
that he made sure the government personnel were aware of who
was on the Board of Directors. The administrator at that time
was seen as the go-between for the Board and the professional
group.

It is possible to infer from this that the professionals
in the pre-legislation phase were in the process of becoming
a strong body who were able to make themselves heard in
negotiations with the Board of Directors. This strength
acquired by the professional group could be claimed as a partial
explanation of why the professional group was able to oppose
the bureaucratic group so vigorously in the post-legislation
phase. -Board meetings were seen by social work staff as a
useful place to develop changes in policy. Although the
paternalism of the Board decreased through the years prior to
legislation, the Board protected the interests of social work
professionals. The Board accepted and supported the changes
in service delivery that accompanied the introduction of
social workers to do group work and community organization.
Above all, Board meetings served as a place where issues could
be resolved. Decisions were taken at these meetings and they
were binding on all involved.

Post-legislation Phase of the Board of Directors

Process of Decision-making

Conflict between the Board and the management group was observed in the post-legislative phase. The conflict emanated from control issues, i.e., both groups considered that they had the right to make decisions. The administrative group took advantage of the situation of the previous provisional board and acquired a much stronger knowledge position vis-a-vis the Board of 1975. Nevertheless, the Board considered that the legislation gave them the right to control policy decisions.

The administrative group considered that they, as the 'professional' elite of the organization had greater insight into the problems of the organization. They attempted to avoid instructions from the Board or, at least, responded that the Board's request was inappropriate. According to the President of the Board he repeatedly asked that minutes of the executive meetings be taken and circulated. Management just did not make secretarial assistance available. When he requested that a description of the centres' activities be compiled in order to inform the public, he was presented with a summary of job descriptions at the centres. Management's reply to him was that they did not want to stimulate the public to make requests that the centre could not meet. [94]

Because of the increased size and complexity of VMSSC, the Board had difficulty addressing policy issues. It

seemed that the management group was attempting to administer the organization without the assistance of the Board. The administrators avoided using any of the personal resources of Board members. For example, none of the 1975 Board members had been to Quebec City on behalf of the centre, while management had sent almost weekly delegations. A situation evolved in which the Board was struggling to gain information in order to counter the dominance of the administrative group. The increased power of the administrative group vis-a-vis the Board of Directors was a phenomenon peculiar to the post-legislation phase.

Although the Board was able to veto the Draft Development Plan submitted by management and submit a simplified version to the government, it was not able to continue the negotiation because management controlled the communication with the government. A content analysis of the minutes of Board's meetings revealed the Board's decreased contact with the Quebec government. Table III identifies the decrease in communication from 1968 to 1975. It is acknowledged that the standardization of these data, given the small numbers, opens the interpretation to question. However, in the light of the overall decrease in communications with the external environment, and the supportive information from observation, the figures nevertheless indicate the decrease in communication with the government.

Table III.   Communications relating to External
             Sectors (in Percentages)

| | Years | | |
	1968	1971	1975
External Sectors			
Related Agency	13.3	5.9	2.1
Red Feather	11.1	11.8	0
University	8.8	0	0
General Community	13.3	5.9	2.1
Citizen's Groups	0	41.1	20.8
Government	13.3	8.8	6.3
Other (external)	13.6	8.9	24.9
Total External	73.4	82.4	56.2
Total Internal	26.6	17.6	43.8
Total	100%	100%	100%
	(N=45)	(N=34)	(N=48)

This decrease in communication with the government contributed
to the Board's inability to defend the interests of the social
workers.

A second example of the Board's inability to making
decisions about policy involves the Children's Defense Committee.
This committee was spearheaded by social work staff from FSA.
Its aim was to introduce the right of children to legal defense
following arrest and during hearings at the Children's Court.
Management was not willing to support the aim of this committee.
When the issue was raised by social workers and placed on the
agenda at Board meetings, the Board was not able to form a
resolution in order to vote in support of this initiative. In
this issue as well, the Board was unable to facilitiate the
goals of social work staff. Because these issues were never
resolved at Board meetings, the differences continued to be
acted out between the bureaucrats and the social work

professionals in the day to day running of the organization.

Comparison Between the Pre-legislation Phase and the Post-legislation Phase

In the pre-legislation phase there was a gradual increase in the relative power of the Executive Director. As the knowledge necessary to run the organization increased, the position acquired more power. However, because this shift in power was gradual and because the administrator was, one person and not a group, decisions were more readily made. The Board was able to promote the interests of the social workers at FSA. They encouraged and supported new developments in service delivery. Board meetings produced decisions on issues. In the post-legislation phase, however, there was a dramatic increase in the knowledge base of the organization. At the same time there had been the birth of an administrative group who saw themselves more specialized and therefore more competent than the Board to make decisions on organizational matters. Therefore, confrontation between the administrative group and the Board was inevitable. Nevertheless, because the Board was not able to resolve many of the issues presented to it, it was not able to protect the interests of social work staff. The Draft Development Plan and the Children's Defense Committee illustrated this point. Again the Board did not see itself powerful enough to confront the Quebec government. The unresolved issues remained in the bureaucratic-professional arena. Both these groups actively pursued their own interests,

making conflict inevitable and ongoing.

Pre-legislation Phase of the Board of Directors
Responsiveness and Sensitivity to the Interests of
Different Sections of the Public

In 1968, with no consumer representation on the Board, there was a strict delineation between the donors of service and the receivers of service. Board minutes reflect concern about the need for public relations in order to enhance the image of the agency with the 'community'.

The Board had a definite function of linking the agency to the community. However, in 1968, there was still no real acceptance of opening Board meetings to the public and encouraging them to attend. In 1971, with the advent of citizens' groups, there was an opening up of Board meetings. Because of consumer representation, there was a legitimate voice for the consumer at the Board level. In fact, when citizen groups began agitating and expressing anger at the 'welfare system', the focus of a great number of their complaints was at the professionals in that system.

Consumers of services considered that the professionals were not responding to the needs and the concerns of the community. It is possible to infer that the Board acted as a buffer between the various sections of the public and the social workers. In 1971, the Board room was a place where community demands were negotiated. Consequently, there was no

confrontation between social workers and community groups.
The agency was able to respond to the demands of the community
and make service changes. Therefore, the Board's function was
to buffer and to facilitate negotiations between the
agency and the community.

Post-legislation Phase of the Board of Directors
Responsiveness and Sensitivity to the Interests of
Different Sections of the Public

In 1975, there was a subtle shift. It is very clear that
the Board was no longer a buffer between the organization and
the external world. One community group, in a brief submitted
on the occasion of the Annual Meeting of VMSSC, stated
categorically,

> We deplore the fact that there has been no effort by
> management to co-operate with community groups .....
> We express our gratitude to the present Board for
> the voluntary service rendered to the community.[95]

Community representatives saw themselves in coalition with the
Board of Directors against the management group. Helen Bastien,
a member of the CCC considered that there were "two positions,
the management versus the rest".[96] The CCC, recognizing
this coalition described themselves as being a little uneasy
because of their expectation of being opposed to both Board
and management.

The Board was aligned with the consumers and the social
workers. These groups were fighting with management in an
attempt to influence decisions about policy. Management was

often on the defensive at Board meetings. They became

secretive and protective of their own interests. Such secrecy

and protectiveness was reflected in a certain rigidity of

conduct at Board meetings.

Contrast of the Pre-legislation Phase with the Post-legislation Phase

The most startling evidence of the shift in the

organization's position vis-a-vis the community, is data

collected from the analysis of minutes of meetings. The

following table illustrates the increase in internal commun-

ication as a percentage of the total communications.

Table IV.   Internal Communications as a
            Percentage of Total Communications*

Content of Communications	Year		
	1968	1971	1975
Board-Staff Relationships	15.5	5.8	14.6
Board-Administrative Relationship	0	0	14.6
Staff-Administrative Relationship	0	0	4.2
Other	11.1	11.8	10.4
Internal Total	26.6	17.6	43.8

* Internal Communications refer to the number of comments in
the Board Minutes, that are directed to the internal functioning
of the organization. Note that in 1968 (N=45) the remaining
73.4% of comments were directed to the external functioning of
the organization. In 1971 (N=34) 82.4% were external comments
which in 1975 (N=48) 56.2% were directed outside the organization.

The Board-staff relationship received attention in each

of these years. However, the nature of the exchange was

different. The paternalistic attitude of the Board decreased

as it opened up to include staff and consumers. In 1975,
there was a coalition between Board and staff. Both groups
viewed management with suspicion. The Board was fighting with
management. The professional group acquired more power by
joining the Board.

The Board-administrative relationship was present only
in 1975. 14.6% of the total communication attests to con-
siderable energy being spent on the nature of this relation-
ship. My observation of Board meetings suggests that both
groups were concerned to protect their own interests. Each
group was convinced of their 'right' to control the decisions
about policy. Conflict was inevitable.

The staff-administrative category attests to an increase
in dialogue between the professionals and the bureaucrats.
The observations presented in the previous section show that
this dialogue involved hostility over conflicting interests.
This hostility was acted out at Board meetings in 1975.

Summary

The Board of Directors' concerns in the post-legislation
period, show that it no longer functioned in the role of
negotiator with the Quebec government. Personal resources
of Board members were no longer useful to the Board. The
Board could no longer promote the interests of social work
professionals because they were unable to control the decision
making process. Management controlled the supply of information

to the Board and distanced the Board from the Quebec government.
Finally, the Board no longer functioned to buffer or facilitate
negotiations between the organization and consumers of service.
The Board no longer had sufficient influence or interest to
promote the concerns of consumers. Consequently, the contentious
issues between the professionals and the bureaucrats were
not resolved at Board meetings. This ensured that these
differences remained problematic. This also ensured that the
bureaucrats and the social work professionals would continue
to struggle for supremacy in the decision making process.

Recapitulation

This chapter presents information gathered in a case
study of Family Service Association. My central theme con-
cerns the sources of bureaucratic-professional conflict.
Social welfare legislation established a new public organization
in which the 'role' of the social worker was vastly different
from what had evolved in the private agency setting. VMSSC,
the new organization produced a new group of administrators.
By examining a series of events that took place in the FSA-
VMSSC structure it has been possible to draw out and identify
some elements of the different structures that contributed to
bureaucratic-professional conflict. Members of the organization
had differing reference groups and therefore different
interests. Differences in Differentiation, Rigidification and
Domain also added to the expression of conflict. Social work

professionals and administrators were unable to resolve their differences because neither were able to confront policy makers in Quebec City. They seemed afraid as if to question or confront might mean the loss over the 'territory' they had. Therefore, the squabble between the social work professionals and the bureaucrats over territorial rights continued. The Board of Directors functioned to sustain this bureaucratic-professional conflict. The ultimate power to make decisions no longer remained with the Board of Directors. In the new structure, VMSSC, the Board did not negotiate with Quebec. This meant that the interests of social work staff and consumers of service were not protected by the Board. Issues that these groups brought to the Board were not resolved at Board meetings. These issues continued to be issues that the bureaucrats and the professionals struggled over. Each was determined to win yet could not overcome the problem that the Quebec government was the principle authority. The ultimate source of control had been removed beyond the reach of the administrators and the social workers, by the legislation Bill 65.

The following chapter brings together the various theoretical orientations that framed the questions this research asked and evaluates their usefulness for this study. A summary of all the findings and issues identified by the research, together with some comments about what this might mean for service delivery, concludes the final chapter.

CHAPTER 6:

CONCLUSION

This chapter will deal with three major topics: a summary of the issues and findings; an evaluation of the theories used; some comments about the implications for service delivery.

As stated in the introduction, the aim of this study has been to explain the behaviour of staff within FSA/VMSSC following the implementation of Bill 65. The central theme has been to demonstrate how conditions, external to FSA compounded tensions within the agency. These tensions emerged in various forms of bureaucratic-professional conflict within FSA.

I will draw together the main issues identified in this thesis. A combination of influences in Quebec society, the anglophone/francophone tensions, some implications of the Commission of Inquiry into Health and Welfare and Protestant /Catholic tensions demonstrate how behaviour within an organisation can be explained only by considering the impact of pervading socio-political conditions. A web of external influences, which was part of the fabric of Quebec society affected the daily transactions within FSA/VMSSC.

1.   External Issues

Anglophone/Francophone tension

The most salient feature in Quebec society in 1975 was the francophone takeover of the affairs of the province.

Traditionally, anglophone groups had enjoyed a comfortable life in the Province of Quebec and high status positions in that society. This was associated with anglophone control over economic resources rather than their minority status. In 1975, there was a general climate of fear. Major companies, such as Texaco Canada Ltd., had shifted their head office from Montreal to Toronto. The reason for such moves as expressed by English speaking Quebecers, was that an English speaking province would be more politically stable. The exodus of anglophone resources created an air of uncertainty for the anglophone population who remained in Montreal. Their future in Quebec was at stake. Francophone interests had been agitating for increased francophone control in the province. The preservation of the French language and culture as well as economic opportunity for French speaking Quebecers were part of the complex rationale that generated the francophone concern. This anglophone/francophone tension was woven into all relationships experienced by people living in Quebec. This anglophone/francophone tension permeated institutions in Quebec society.

FSA was one organization affected by this tension. The major participants in FSA were English-speaking social workers who believed that their future employment and residence depended upon the outcome of 'negotiations' between francophone and anglophone interests.

The Commission of Inquiry into Health and Welfare

The Castonguay Commission report described and evaluated the anglophone social services very negatively. Criticism was directed at services that were too bureaucratic, diffuse and costly. This report had been the most substantial evaluation of social services in Quebec. It indicated that social workers at FSA were insecure about their responsibilities. They did not question the 'higher' authority who published such criticism. They capitulated along with the Board of Directors at FSA and noticed no substantial protest about the government takeover of their agency.

The policy of government takeover bore no direct relationship to the criticism of the health and welfare sector contained in the Castonguay Commission report. It seems probable that the government had a takeover in mind prior to establishing the Commission of Inquiry.

The health and welfare legislation, Bill 65 (Chapter 48), was in fact only part of the Government of Quebec's plan to 'rationalise' all government services. The agitation for increased control in Quebec affairs expressed by francophone groups, together with the programme of rationalization of government services, were factors which created a climate of fear for anglophone people living in the Province of Quebec. The fear was associated with an implied threat that more 'resources' would be taken away from the anglophone community.

Protestant/Catholic Tension

It was very difficult to ascertain how the religious
denominations influenced the behaviour of participants at
FSA. Quebec was a predominantly Catholic province. Catholicism
has always been the religion of the province. All social
services to the anglophone groups in Montreal had been
developed initially by Catholic, Protestant and Jewish
interests.

In 1973, when the Board of Directors of FSA relinquished
the agency charter, the assets of the agency were frozen.
The Protestant community of Montreal had developed two aged
persons' facilities, Prospect and Belvedere. The building
which FSA occupied was owned by the 'Protestant community'.
There were also several Trust Accounts of money that had been
bequeathed to FSA. In 1975 it was not clear what would
become of these assets.

Individuals representing Protestant interests were resigned
to the release of these assets from their control. This attitude
of resignation was characteristic of the Protestant population in
Montreal who occupied a minority position in Quebec. The Protestant
churches in Montreal had little power by comparison with the
stronghold the Catholic church had over the Province. The
interest that had generated the funds to establish FSA
seemed to have been dissipated. There was no 'Protestant'
protest mounted against Bill 65. Disagreement was kept at
the level of the explanation about why certain Catholic

individuals were promoted over others who were Protestant. Such 'explanations' occurred after the new social centre had been established.

The francophone/anglophone tension, the hidden agenda of the Commission of Inquiry into Health and Welfare Services in Quebec and the Protestant Catholic tension were the major external influences permeating FSA in 1975. I am not arguing that these external factors created and maintained bureaucratic-professional conflict to the exclusion of internal factors. Rather I am describing a unique situation at FSA in Montreal, where both external and internal issues were related to the expression of bureaucratic-professional conflict at the organizational level.

The Link Between External and Internal Issues

The Board of Directors functioned to make links between external and internal issues. In the sense that the interaction of external or internal events could be observed in terms of bureaucratic-professional conflict, the Board of Director's activities foreshadowed such conflict.

There was a difference between the function of the Board at FSA and the function of the Board at VMSSC. At FSA, the Board made decisions about the agency. The Board at VMSSC had lost the power to make decisions. At FSA, social work staff and consumers of service could take issues to the Board and be confident-that a decision would be made. Following the implementation of Bill 65, this was no longer possible. Decisions on issues were not made at VMSSC

Board meetings. The Board was no longer in a position of control over VMSSC because VMSSC was totally funded by and responsible to the Government of Quebec.

Prior to 1973, the Board of Directors of FSA, represented the Protestant population of Montreal and made decisions about services to that community. After Bill 65 (Chapter 48), the Board was theoretically empowered to make decisions about services to the English-speaking groups in Montreal. However, most decisions about services involved some aspect of policy, making negotiations between the administrators and the Government of Quebec essential. The Board was placed in a position of dubious influence. The VMSSC Board reflected the attitude of fear about the potential withholding of resources to the English speaking community and VMSSC. They were therefore unable to bargain effectively with the government or to delegate authority to make decisions. In short, they were afraid they might lose additional resources.

Control of the anglophone social service system had been lost when Bill 65 reorganized those services. Because the Board was not able to resolve issues that were raised at Board meetings, the conflict between the social work professionals and the bureaucrats was sustained. In sum, the role of the Board of Directors was substantially altered by the legislation. The Board no longer negotiated with the Government of Quebec for resources. Moreover it was not able to protect either the interests of social work staff or consumers of service.

All evidence suggests that the Board had little influence on the policy of the organization. Yet the participants within VMSSC clung to the vestiges of the old structure. The Board of Directors was duly constituted. As the legislation required, they met regularly, yet did not perform a basic function of establishing the policy of VMSSC. The title of this group was never questioned. A resource group may have been a more accurate description.

The participants clung to such structures at the Board because of the fear with which anglophone interests viewed the francophone takeover. While the anglophone power base was continuing to erode, they were not in a position to question the directives of the government. They were dependant financially upon that government. Consequently, the more fundamental loss of anglophone control in the province was acted out in the bureaucratic-professional arena at FSA.

Internal Issues

The major internal issues that emerged at FSA were unionization and the tension between the social workers and the bureaucrats.

Unionization

FSA social workers became unionized, after the legislation had been passed. It was too late for the union to be involved in any protection of 'professional' autonomy. FSA staff became a branch of a major Quebec union.

I recall a union organiser, meeting with social workers at
FSA urging them to be concerned about their future. Had the
social workers been unionized prior to the legislation, a
'union' analysis may have promoted social workers' awareness
of what investigation into the field of Health and Welfare
might mean. An employee-focused -analysis may have generated
more cautious negotiations with the government with respect
to the terms of employment of social workers.

The Tension between the Social Workers and the Bureaucrats

The reorganisation of the social service system created
VMSSC and a new group of employees, the administrators or
bureaucrats. This reorganisation meant that in 1975, the
social work staff at FSA were forced to consider making some
changes in the way services were offered. Administrative
changes were being made. During the changeover to the new
structure at VMSSC there were a series of events that created
situations in which the bureaucrats had a different perspective
on what should happen than did the social work professionals.

The bureaucrats, who for the most part were not social
workers, were functioning in order to meet with the approval
of the funding body, the Government of Quebec. The aim of
the bureaucrats was to administer the new organization VMSSC,
in a 'rational' way. To them this meant a committment to a
scientific method, e.g., Management by Objectives (MBO). They
were concerned with designing the new structure which meant
they issued decrees about pending changes. Their ideas about

efficient services included a formal structure with a
hierarchy of authority and clear rules about who made decisions.

The social workers' perspective contrasted with the
bureaucrats. The social workers were committed at least
implicitly, to a welfare approach which promoted the importance
of the individual client and client groups. The social
workers were also concerned to protect their own participation
in decision making. They argued that an informal structure
which afforded flexibility was the best possible way to
offer services.

These two quite distinct occupational groups, each with
different perspectives on how social services should be
organized, were involved in the common task of reorganizing
social services for the English speaking population of
Montreal. Each time there was an important event in the
process of reorganisation, there was conflict between the
social work professionals and the bureaucrats about what
should be done. Both the social work professionals at FSA
and the bureaucrats at VMSSC seemed afraid of how the policy
makers in Quebec might respond to VMSSC. They were concerned
about the survival of VMSSC. Neither group appealed to the
Government to resolve issues. They fought over their local
differences. The national source of these differences was
beyond their control. The conflicting external and internal
interests resulted in bureaucratic-professional conflict.
The powerlessness of agency employees in particular the social
workers, to influence these external interests
facilitated such conflict.

2. Evaluation of Some Theories About Complex Organizations

/The theories about complex organizations referred to in Chapter 2, merit some evaluation in terms of their usefulness in unravelling and explaining the bureaucratic-professional conflict at FSA.

Weber's notion of bureaucracy and the elements that comprise a bureaucratic organization form an important part of understanding the bureaucrats' behaviour at VMSSC. In Weber's writing, a bureaucracy is an 'efficient' organization, yet he does acknowledge that there can be an irrational committment to the rational form. An examination of VMSSC showed a serious attempt on the part of the bureaucrats to centralize decision making. Yet according to Thompson

> The monolithic authority network with centralized decision making is not typical of complex organi-zations in modern societies, for it is appropriate only when closed-system conditions are approximated.(97)

If, as Thompson suggests, centralized decision making does not have to be typical of complex organizations, the plan to centralize decision making at VMSSC could be considered inappropriate. In this instance, the bureaucrats at VMSSC were behaving in an 'irrational' way. It was Thompson, who in refining notions about modern complex organizations, made sense of one form of irrational behaviour - centralized decision making.

For my purposes the notion of bureaucracy was too simplistic. The focus on the internal dynamics of an organization did not enable me to account for external issues such as the socio-political influences that I identified as influencing the be-haviour of participants at FSA/VMSSC.

Thompson's framework of the open systems strategy has been a cornerstone of the explanation I developed about the behaviour of staff at FSA. This approach explains the general principle of internal organizational behaviour at FSA as a response to FSA's attempt to cope with an uncertain environment. However this framework was not useful in developing any general indicators as to which sectors of the environment might create more uncertainty in an organization like FSA. In Quebec in 1975, a web of political, economic and social conditions produced social unrest and a Government programme of rationalization. An open systems strategy did not lend itself to tracing the interrelationship of this web at FSA/VMSSC.

The position of the social work professionals cannot be understood in terms of the usual notions about professionals. The social workers were a group of employees who wanted to protect their own interests. Above all they were concerned with survival. As employees they joined a union because they considered they needed the protection of that union. They did not seek help from the social work professional association.

Merton, Crozier and Argyris, in their writing about the individuals within complex organizations illuminated the need to focus on such things as rules and formal communication. However, because these accounts did not acknowledge influences external to the organization, they were useful only as partial explanations. It was particularly important to acknowledge socio-political influences in analyzing behaviour at FSA. FSA was a social welfare organization. In contempory society, 'welfare', is practiced largely within and by government. This dependant

relationship upon the government was central to understanding the internal dynamics of FSA.

Gouldner's notion of compliance was particularly useful. So too was the identification of the two forms of bureaucracy, representative bureaucracy and punishment centered bureaucracy, even though these categories did not fit precisely the situation at FSA/VMSSC. The conflict that I witnessed resulted from a situation in which neither group (the professionals, or bureaucrats) were prepared to acknowledge the legitimacy of the other. Their perspectives on how the organisation should operate were quite different. While some of Gouldner's writing was useful, it did not lead me to explain how and why bureaucratic/professional conflict emerged in this situation. In a sense no theorist could anticipate and explain the conflicting series of events which Quebec welfare agencies had to contend with in 1975.

For my purposes, Perrow's typology of organisations based on exceptions and search was both fascinating and useful. This analysis formed part of the explanation of bureaucratic-professional conflict by highlighting the need to articulate the activities of the social workers and the bureaucrats. According to Perrow, the type of structure that a complex organisation develops needs to be compatible with the activities performed by that organization. If the structure and the activities are incompatible, conflict will occur.

Kenneth Benson provided the most useful framework for the analysis of professional bureaucratic conflict at FSA.

His framework highlighted both internal and external facets
of organizational life and identified the impact of both on
professional-bureaucratic conflict. I was able to usefully
analyse the behaviour of staff at FSA by considering the
framework developed by Benson. For example, my observation
of external and internal developments produced a wealth of
material which when unravelled enabled me to spell out the
environmental dimensions which influenced professional-
bureaucratic conflict at FSA. The most important relationship
I identified was FSA's relationship with its funding body the
Government of Quebec. In modern society governments are
increasingly playing a dominant role in funding welfare
activities because of the immense costs involved.

Any account of organizational behaviour in a welfare
setting must include an in-depth analysis of the relationship
that organization has with the social political and economic
influences within its environment. A welfare organization
offering a service that is funded by government must ultimately
be accountable to its source of funding. Government decides
who to fund and how much. This in turn is influenced by the
various interest groups within their constituency. A description
of these interest groups, together with an analysis of the
effect they have on government policy, is an essential feature
of the study of a welfare organization. An explanation about
the behaviour of participants in a welfare organization, must
include an understanding of influences from the political arena.
This 'understanding' involves identifying which outisde events

influenced the behaviour within organizations of such employees as administrators and social workers.

3. Implications for Service Delivery

There are a number of implications for service delivery that I wish to identify as a result of my study of FSA. Social work practice became conservative i.e., social workers were not inclined to develop new initiatives in offering services to clients. In addition to this social workers were reluctant to promote new forms of work organization for themselves, such as autonomous workgroups. Finally, it became apparent to me that clients became of secondary importance.

Of primary concern to the Commission of Inquiry into Health and Welfare was the basic insecurity they identified in the social workers offering social services. The Commission report implied that this insecurity dulled any creative approach to social problems. They recorded their concern that social workers could not take responsibility for defining services.

My observation at FSA following the legislation designed to correct these faults, suggested that the opposite occurred. Social workers became even more insecure. They were unable to exercise control over their own daily work in the agency. For example, an individual social worker could not decide if a client would receive financial assistance. This resulted in conservatism in the way social workers offered services and in the way they organized themselves.

Prior to Bill 65, both groupwork and community organization flourished in addition to casework as methods of social work

intervention. After the legislation was effected, there was
a reduction in group work services offered by staff at FSA.
Prior to Bill 65, group work at FSA had been considered by
social work staff to be innovative. As a method of social
work intervention, group work services flourished. However,
after the legislation was implemented, there was a reduction
in group work services. Social workers no longer attempted
to include groups in their work load.

Community organizers were concerned about their future in
the new social service centre Ville Marie. Caseworkers no
longer elected to be involved in social action. This meant
that the number of issues in which FSA staff were involved was
limited to the community organizers. This had not been the
case prior to Bill 65. Social workers in 1975 were too insecure
to be involved in any initiatives that attempted to deal with
problems and problem situations in new ways.

An additional ramification of the legislation Bill 65,
was an organizational response that can only be called con-
servative. The reorganization called into question the tra-
ditional responsibility of the social work professionals to
determine and deliver services to the clients of the agency.
The reorganization spearheaded the development of a new group
of organizational participants, the bureaucrats at VMSSC.
This group was involved in implementing health and welfare
legislation which in 1975 was considered responsible and re-
sponsive to consumer needs. During the process of adapting and
developing the new structure determined by the legislation, both
the social work professionals and the bureaucrats became con-

cerned with protecting their own territorial rights.

This meant that the reorganization adopted a conservative form. I did not observe any attempts to consider any new form of organization of work such as autonomous work groups. Both social work and administrative staff became concerned with survival: survival of their jobs and survival of their position in Quebec society as English speaking people. The fear that they could lose everything created a climate in which creativity languished and conservatism dominated.

Perhaps the most unfortunate outcome of Bill 65 was that the clients 'came last'. The development of consumer representation that had occurred in FSA did not develop beyond representation on the Board of Directors in VMSSC. It was possible that clients of the agency could have become more involved in deciding how services would be offered. This did not happen in VMSSC. The polarization and conflict between social workers and administrators that occurred in VMSSC meant that services to clients which should have been a primary concern became peripheral.

The assumptions about service delivery held by the social work professionals and the bureaucrats were quite different. The social work professional group was committed to the idea of the 'rights' of consumers of service. For them this involved the professional 'right' and ability to determine the most appropriate services for clients. For instance, clients were rarely invited to their own case conferences and never to staff meetings. At these meetings

social workers spent hours deliberating over what was best for
clients.

The bureaucrats were committed to the reorganization of
services in such a way as to meet with the approval of the
Government of Quebec. Their assumptions were associated with
the desire to reorganize service in an efficient and 'cost-
saving' way. The reason put forward was that this was best
for clients. Unless the 'service' was developed quickly and
designed economically, the bureaucrats argued that there would
be no service at all from an anglophone social service centre.
Because of these differing assumptions, service to clients
became of secondary importance. The energy of the social
workers and the bureaucrats was consumed by the struggle to
win in the bureaucratic/professional arena. The clients, as
it were came last.

Summary

This study which outlines the organizational effects
upon FSA resulting from legislation, highlights a dilemma
that faces policy makers in the social welfare arena. In
Quebec the Commission Report foreshadowing Bill 65, identified
as a major concern the insecurity of the social work profess-
ionals. The legislation implemented in the social context of
Quebec, created even more insecurity for the professional
group.

A legislative mechanism Bill 65 was developed to modernize the social service delivery system in Quebec. However, the policy makers did not take into account the fundamental tensions between francophone and anglophone interests and Protestant and Catholic interests. Such tensions were acted out in the usually invisable private world of agencies such as FSA. The Bill 65 modernization created further problems in the anglophone social service sector. These problems were not addressed in ways that could effect solutions by either anglophone interests or francophone interests. Agency social workers were powerless to effect change. Their energies became diverted into conflicts with 'bureaucrats'. Consumers of service were even more powerless. Ultimately it was these consumers of service for whose benefit (at least explicitly) the sector had been reorganized. From my observation at FSA it was hard to understand how consumers would benefit. The powerlessness of social workers and consumers of service, always present, was heightened by Bill 65. From the perspective of clients, Phillip Hepworth was right when he said "after all the revolutions, much of the old still remains".[99]

PROPOSITIONS:

The following propositions serve as a formulation of ideas for further study. They were suggested by the exploration in this study.

1. That with an increase in formalization of consumer participation, there will be a decrease in the quantity of real consumer issues brought to the Board.

2. That with an increase in the size and complexity of the social service organization, there will be a decrease in the power of the Board of Directors.

3. That with an increase in the budget provided by the government, there will be an increase in the dependancy of the organization upon that government.

4. That with an increase in the dependancy of the organization upon the government, there will be an increase in the power of the administrative group who negotiate with that government.

5. That with an increase in the size and complexity of an organization there will be an increase in protective measures adopted by a professional group.

6. That with an increase in the size of the administrative body of the organization, there will be an associated decrease in the power of the professional social work group.

This list is by no means exhaustive of the issues that could be investigated.

Proposition 1. Follows from the realization that con-
siderable energy is required from Board members simply to
keep up with the volume of organizational material presented
for review and therefore there is less time available for
consumer representatives who are Board members, to remain
linked with their constituencies.

Proposition 2. Follows from the assumption that decisions
in social welfare are increasingly more difficult to make
without specialized knowledge, so that Board members without
specialized knowledge are at a disadvantage.

Proposition 3. Was suggested because traditionally
governments want some say in how their money is spent.

Proposition 4. Follows simply because the administrative
group could claim more knowledge of government policy gained
from close contact.

Proposition 5. Relates to the issue of unionism and the
increase of unionism in instances where professional groups
no longer have direct contact with top decision makers.

Proposition 6. Relates to the issue of bureaucracy and
an increase in routinization associated with size which
influences the power of any of the groups within the organization.

FOOTNOTES:

(1) Quebec Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Health and Welfare, Quebec City, Quebec Official Publisher, 1971.

(2) Phillip Hepworth: Personal Social Services in Canada: A Review, (Canadian Council on Social Development: Personal Social Services in Canada: Access and Delivery, Vol. 7, Ottawa, 1975). p.8.

(3) James D. Thompson: Organizations in Action, New York, McGraw Hill, 1967, p. 10.

(4) Robert K. Merton: Social Structure and Social Theory, Bureaucratic Structure and Personality, Glencoe III, The Free Press, 1949. p. 151-152.

(5) Alvin A. Gouldner: Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy, New York, The Free Press, 1954. p. 21.

(6) Peter M. Blau: The Dynamics of Bureaucracy, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1955. p. 257.

(7) Peter M. Blau: Bureaucracy in Modern Society, New York, Random House, 1956.

(8) Peter M. Blau: op.cit.

(9) Martin Albrow: Bureaucracy, New York, Praeger, 1970, p. 70.

(10) Martin Albrow: op.cit. p. 70.

(11) David Silverman: The Theory of Organizations, London, Heineman, 1970. p. 209.

(12) Alvin A. Gouldner: op.cit. p. 23.

(13) Charles Perrow: "A Framework of the Comparative Analysis of Organization" in Complex Organizations and Their Environments (ed.) Merlin Brinkerhoff and Phillip Kunz. Iowa. Wm. C. Brown Co., 1972. p. 49.

(14) J. Kenneth Benson: "The Analysis of Bureaucratic-Professional Conflict: Functional Versus Dialectical Approaches" in The Sociological Quarterly 14 (Summer 1973). p. 380.

(15) Burton, R. Clark: "Organizational Adaptation to Professionals" in Professionalization (ed.) Howard M. Vollmer and Donald L. Mills, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1966. p. 282.

(16) A. M. Carr-Saunders: "Professionalsim in Historical Perspective" in Professionalization. (ed.) Howard M. Vollmer and Donald L. Mills. New Jersey. Prentice Hall, 1966.. p. 269.

(17) W. Richard Scott: "Professionals in Bureaucracies - Areas of Conflict" in Professionalization. (ed.) Howard M. Vollmer and Donald L. Mills, New Jersey. Prentice Hall, 1966. p. 269.

(18) W. Richard Scott: op.cit.

(19) J. Kenneth Benson: op.cit. p. 285.

(20) J. Kenneth Benson: op.cit. p. 287.

(21) Benson suggests that his label is dialectical because in the cited article he says "My formulation emphasizes subjective processes of situational definition and an interactive relation between man and society ..... My formulation emphasizes the concept of emergent contradication, i.e., that seemingly coherent, integrated structures contain hidden contradictions which emerge at crucial points to shape the course of events.

(22) Mayer N. Zald: "The Power and Function of Boards of Directors: A Theoretical Synthesis" in American Journal of Sociology 75. p. 98.

(23) Margaret Dunlop: "History of the Family Service Association of Montreal", unpublished, Family Service Association, 1965.

(24) The term is generally used in Social Work to refer to the Method of Treatment which developed from the work of Freud and others. Therapy is a structured treatment with established rules of when the meetings are. The therapist and the patient work out treatment goals, i.e., issues to be worked on. The theoretical assumptions are basically psychoanalytical. Because of the expense involved in this method of treatment, it is most often considered a middle class prerogative.

(25) Casework is a term used to describe a method of social work. It is individual or family oriented. The term is a 'catch all' word because it includes, helping people find jobs and marriage counselling. Alternatively community organization usually refers to the method of working with the community rather than the family. Groupwork is concerned with small group processes.

(26) Personal interview with Mrs. Ellen Prince. Director of Group work at FSA. June, 1975.

(27) *ibid.*

(28) *ibid.*

(29) *ibid.*

(30) *ibid.*

(31) Personal interview with Mrs. Helen Bastien. VMSSC
Consumer Liaison and an FSA Board member of 1971.
15 July, 1975.

(32) Esther W. Kerry: "Early Professional Development in
Montreal". Address given to the Alumni Society of
McGill University School of Social Work. Montreal, 1960.

(33) Esther W. Kerry: op.cit.

(34) Harold Wilensky and Charles Lebeaux: Industrial Society
and Social Welfare. New York, The Free Press, 1965,
p. 269.

(35) *ibid.*

(36) Harry Cassidy: Public Health and Welfare Re-organization,
Toronto, Ryerson Press, 1945. p. 366.

(37) *ibid.*, p. 365.

(38) *ibid.*, p. 391.

(39) Family Service Association. Proceedings of the
Annual Meeting 1967.

(40) Family Service Association. Annual Meeting 1971.

(41) Dale C. Thomson: "Introduction" in Quebec Society and
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and Stewart, 1973. p. 14.

(42) Andre Laroque: "Political Institutions and Quebec
Society" in Quebec Society and Politics. (ed.) Dale C.
Thomson, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1973. p. 71.

(43) Vincent Lemieux: "The Political Party System in Quebec"
in Quebec Society and Politics. (ed.) Dale C. Thomson,
Toronto McClelland and Stewart, 1973. p. 104.

(44) Vincent Lemieux: op.cit. p. 107.

(45) Andre Raynauld: "The Quebec Economy: A General
Assessment": in Quebec Society and Politics. (ed.)
Dale C. Thomson, Toronto McClelland and Stewart, 1973.
p. 141.

(46) *ibid.*, p. 146.

(47) Public Accounts of the Province of Quebec, 1961 and
      1971.

(48) Richard Jones: Community in Crisis, Carleton, Ottawa
      1972.

(49) Commission of Inquiry Report. op.cit. p. 59.

(50) *ibid.*, p. 62.

(51) Public Accounts of the Province of Quebec, 1961 and 1971.

(52) Dale C. Thomson. op.cit. p. 17.

(53) Raymond Breton: "The Quebec Economy. A General
      Assessment" in Quebec Society and Politics. (ed.)
      Dale C. Thomson, Toronto McClelland and Stewart, 1973.
      p. 231.

(54) Quebec: An Act Respecting Health Services and Social
      Services. Chapter 48, 1971, Article 52.

(55) Phillip Hepworth: op.cit. p. 10.

(56) Personal Interview with Mr. C.E.R. Thompson. Executive
      Director of FSA in 1971 . 13 July 1975.

(57) Memo circulated by FSA staff, February 1975.

(58) Brief presented by VMSSC management at Professional
      Advisory Council Study days, February, 1975.

(59) Walter Schmolka: "Communications Study and Recommendations",
      Presented to VMSSC, June 1975.

(60) Social Development Plan distributed within VMSSC, 1975.

(61) Personal interview with Mr. Art Dufeys of Kates, Peat
      and Marwick. October 1974.

(62) Personal interview with Mr. Ray Cartwright. President
      of the 1975 Board of VMSSC. 16th July 1975.

(63) Personal interview with Mrs. Ellen Prince. op.cit.

(64) Personal interview with Mr. Ray Cartwright. op.cit.

(65) Personal interview with Mrs. Ellen Prince. op.cit.

(66) J. Kenneth Benson. op.cit. p. 388.

(67)   James D. Thompson: op. cit.   p. 10.

(68)   J. Kenneth Benson: op.cit.   p. 389.

(69)   Personal interview with Dr. Carmen Bjerre.   A member of
       the 1971 Board.   10 July 1975.

(70)   Mayer N. Zald. op.cit.   p. 98.

(71)   Personal interview with Mrs. Claire Kerrigan. A member
       of the 1968 Board.   11 July 1975.

(72)   *ibid.*

(73)   *ibid.*

(74)   Personal interview with Dr. Carmen Bjerre.   op.cit.

(75)   Personal interview with Mrs. Helen Bastien.   op.cit.

(76)   *ibid.*

(77)   Personal interview with Mr. C.E.R. Thompson.   op.cit.

(78)   Personal interview with Mrs. Helen Bastien.   She recalled
       that when she was a member of the Board of the Federation
       of Catholic Charities, it was a problem to find seven
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(79)   Personal interview with Mrs. Barbara McConachie,
       President of the Board of FSA in 1971.   16 July, 1975.

(80)   Quebec: An Act Respecting Health Services and Social
       Services.   op.cit.

(81)   Personal interview with Mr. Ray Cartwright.   op.cit.

(82)   *ibid.*

(83)   *ibid.*

(84)   *ibid.*

(85)   *ibid.*

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(88)   Family Service Association April Board Meeting Minutes
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(89) *ibid.*

(90) Personal interview with Mr. Tom Thompson. op.cit.

(91) Personal interview with Mrs. Barbara McConachie. op.cit.

(92) Personal interview with Dr. Carmen Bjerre. op.cit.

(93) Personal interview with Mr. Tom Thompson. op.cit.

(94) Personal interview with Mr. Ray Cartwright. op.cit.

(95) Brief submitted to the Annual Meeting of Ville Marie
      Social Service Centre, 1975, by the CCC.

(96) *ibid.*

(97) James d. Thomson. op.cit. p. 160.

(98) Phillip Hepworth. op.cit. p. 8.

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APPENDIX:

Coding

The following description outlines the procedure involved in coding the items in the minutes of Board of Directors' meetings at FSA and VMSSC.

An example of a unit from the minutes, is one of the items in the minutes of an executive committee meeting of January 1975.

> Black Community: After discussion, it was recommended that a meeting be requested with key MAS (Minister of Social Affairs) spokesmen to discuss ethnic groups. Acknowledgement to be forwarded to the executive of the Black Community. Involvement by the Public Issues Committee suggested. (*)

This item was handled by categorizing the communication as establishing a link with the environment, i.e., it is externally oriented. The group towards which this issue is being addressed is the government. The content of this item can be described as discussion of an extended range of service. The direction of control can be described as Management-Board initiating, i.e., the Management via the Board of Directors, appears to be instrumental in making plans for service changes. The decision to code the item as external was made after considering that the communication was about requesting a meeting with the government . Although

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* Recorded in January 1975 Minutes of Executive Meeting of. FSA Board.

the government funds the organization, they are not part of the internal functioning of the organization. The content of the item was described as 'extended range of service', as the discussion was about the black community. As the major focus of the organization is service delivery, the discussion about ethnic groups would involve discussion about service rather than public relations. The reasoning behind the organization choosing to offer service to ethnic groups may involve vested interest or other such interests but the predominant purpose was service expansion. The direction of control was described as Management-Board, after considering that the management usually has control over which items appear on the agenda. The Board however has more control at the Board meetings.

The coding procedure used was not a reliable measure of this category of 'direction of control', as there was no way of eliminating other factors, e.g., a staff person could have requested a Board member to make sure that the topic was arranged on the agenda. It was not possible to make an accurate decision about this category with the available information.

A random sample of items from these sections was given to a co-worker to code, as a cross-check on the reliability of the decisions made. The worker was given instructions and an explanation for each of the categories.

The instructions given followed the format below:-

I   Describe the focus of the unit. It is internal if the communication is addressed to any internal part of the organization, e.g., professional staff, administrative staff, clerical staff or the Board. Volunteers are considered as external as are all other groups in the community. (Although it is possible that clients are an internal group of the organization, for the purpose of this study the decision was made to view them as external, on the grounds that although the entire population are potential clients, the entire population cannot be considered as internal to the organization).

II Select the single most important sector to which the item is directed.

III Describe who is present at the time of discussion of the unit.

IV Select the content of the unit that best describes what is taking place. (Because the co-worker was operating under the same social work assumptions, only a brief description of the items was given).

V   Describe who you see has control over the decisions being made.

The use of the co-worker was used as a minimal check. Data was considered reliable if the coding of the co-worker matched that of the original. In fact only one item in Sections I, II, and IV, did not match and was coded as can't

decide. Therefore Sections I, II and IV yielded reliable data. However on Sections III and V, the co-worker could not make a decision. Therefore Section III and V did not yield reliable data. For example, in Section III, there was no accurate measure of which actors were present at Board meetings. Consequently, this information was gathered by interview and by observation. In Section V it was difficult to assess who, in fact, was influencing the decisions made at the Board level. To return to the example of ethnic groups, it seems unlikely that it was simply a management decision to pursue the policy of actively seeking to serve the ethnic groups. Therefore, because this data was not reliable, it is not included in the body of this paper.

The unit of enumeration is the item in the minutes listed as the topic of discussion. The central issue in each item was isolated and described. New categories were developed to describe items that could not be contained within existing categories. All items were included with the exception of announcements. The minutes analysed include all available executive committee meeting minutes and all regular Board meeting minutes.

In 1968 (Jan. to June) there were 4 Board meetings
and 2 Executive committee meetings.

In 1971 (Jan. to June) there were 4 Board meetings
and 2 Executive committee meetings.

In 1975 (Jan. to June) there were 4 Board meetings
and 1 Executive committee meeting.

Special Board meetings and annual meetings were not analyzed specifically, but were used to develop insight into the general atmosphere at that time. The coding system was used to facilitate the process of quantifying the content of the minutes. Each item was given a weight of one (1), on the assumption that each item assumed relatively equal importance and if one item was more important, it would appear again in the minutes. Each item was then coded and recorded on a mastersheet. When the coding was complete, it was then possible to count the number and variety of categories. The following is an outline of the schema that was developed.

SCHEMA

I. Is it a case of Linkage   If it is not a case of
       Yes   No   Linkage
    If yes, then to what   Then to what sector.
    sector.

II Sector (external)   Sector (internal)
       Related Agency   Board-Staff Relationship
       School System   Board-Administration
       Funding Government   Relationship
       'Other' Government   . Supporter Professional
       University   Service
       Funding Body   Staff .
       General Community   Staff-Administration
       Specific Population   Relationship
         Group - aged   Board-Community Relationship
               - women   Total Organization
       Private Groups   Can't Decide
               - Rotary
               - Mile End
    Citizens Groups
               - GMAPCC
    Can't Decide

III Actors on the Scene
    Board + 1 Administrator
    = Board
    Board + 1 Administrator
    + Staff + Community
    = Board (full)
    (full) Board + Professionals
    (full) Board + Administrators
    (full) Board + Community

Actors
    Board + Administrator
    Board + 2 Administrators
    Board + Administrators
       + Staff
    Board + Administrators
       + Staff + Community

IV Content
    Extended Range of Service
    Public Relations
    Professional Services
    Information Gathering
    Education of Board
    Charity Donations
    Vested Interest Orientation
    Merger
    Position Stance
    Client Rep. on Board
    Budget
    Staff Rep. on Board
    Better Communications
    Government
    Financial Support Requests
    Total Funds from Government
    Bi-lingualism
    Membership in FSA
    Community Contact-Board
    Can't Decide

Content
    Professional Services
    Administrative (how to
      proceed)
    Arrangements for Meetings
    Merger
    Organizational
      Restructuring
    Board Demanding Power
    Staff Demanding Voice
    FSA Unionization
    Administration Demanding
      Power
    Community Demanding Action
    Education of Board

V Direction of Control
    Board Initiating
    Management-Board Initiated
    Board Responding
    Management-Board Responding
      - Government
      - Community
    Staff Initiating
    Can't Decide

Direction of Control
    Board Initiating
    Management Thinking
    Management-Board
    Initiating
    Staff Initiating
    Staff-Board Initiating
    Community Initiating
    Can't Decide