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Foreign Policy Considerations and the Eisenhower Administration's Civil Rights Policies: The Case of Africa

Eric Marquis

A Thesis
in
The Department
of
History

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts at Concordia University Montréal, Québec, Canada

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ABSTRACT

Foreign Policy Considerations and the Eisenhower Administration's Civil Rights Policies: The Case of Africa

Eric Marquis

The 1950s witnessed great transformations in American race relations, with the eradication of segregation and the beginnings of the civil rights movement. These efforts received little support from President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who seemed more interested in preserving social harmony than in achieving racial justice. This thesis studies the evolution of the civil rights policies of the Eisenhower Administration. It argues that Eisenhower's policies, and especially his determination to court white southern voters for the Republican Party ("the Dixie Strategy"), impeded the implementation of desegregation, and produced symbolic achievements responding to the requirements of American foreign policy.

The influence of foreign policy considerations on Eisenhower's civil rights policies especially involved American interests in Africa. Africa became a high priority for American foreign policy in the 1950s, as the decolonization of Africa produced one of the swiftest and largest transfers of political authority in history. These radical changes generated great uncertainty within the Eisenhower Administration and raised the prospect of a
Communist takeover in Africa. It became evident that domestic racial problems handicapped American diplomacy in Africa. The Administration undertook reforms seeking to improve foreign perceptions of American race relations.

This thesis contends that foreign policy considerations influenced both the substance and the style of Eisenhower's civil rights policies. They compelled Eisenhower to enact legislation and to enforce desegregation during the Little Rock crisis. However, the Administration also tried to present more positive images of American race relations to Africans, and to conceal rather than solve racial problems.
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DEDICATION

A mes parents, Gilles et Géraldine, qui m'ont appris à cultiver ma curiosité, et qui m'ont constamment encouragé dans chacune de mes entreprises. Leur aide, leur appui et leur compréhension demeurent pour moi inestimables et sont une constante source de gratitude.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE OF CONTENTS</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER I</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE EISENHOWER PRESIDENCY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER II</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCERTAIN MODERATION: THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION AND THE ISSUE OF CIVIL RIGHTS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER III</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN AFRICA UNDER EISENHOWER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER IV</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE INFLUENCE OF FOREIGN POLICY CONSIDERATIONS ON EISENHOWER'S CIVIL RIGHTS POLICIES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENDNOTES:</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER I</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER II</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER III</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER IV</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

vii
INTRODUCTION

The Eisenhower Administration has been the subject of much debate among historians. Originally, critics and apologists alike viewed the 1950s as a tranquil interlude between the troublesome early postwar period and the turbulent 1960s. As President of the United States between 1953 and 1961, Dwight Eisenhower embodied serenity and confidence in the American way of life. Those deploring the status quo castigated his presidency as eight years of immobility marred by crippling conformity. To use the words of a contemporary, the 1950s were the decade of "the Great Postponement:"

In self-satisfaction, Eisenhower's America refused to respond to social change, and thus set the stage for the crises of the 1960s. Others, however, remembered the 1950s nostalgically as the last decade of peaceful political and economic progress in America; they saw Eisenhower as the rallying symbol of peace and prosperity.

Historical research over the last twenty years has showed that the characterization of the 1950s as a period of blissful materialism is an oversimplification. In fact, the Eisenhower years were a critical stage in the development of the United States as a world power. Anything but a stagnant period, the 1950s witnessed on the world scene the globalization of the Cold War, the daily threat of nuclear war, the dawning of the space age, and the twilight of colonialism in the Third World. Domestic issues were just as complex: McCarthyism haunted the
nation for most of the decade, and the rise of the civil rights movement revealed the extent of racial injustice and sectional divisions in America. These major transformations bred the sense of insecurity that actually characterized the Fifties. 3

American foreign policy also underwent important changes at the time. World War II and its aftermath had transformed the United States from a self-centered power into a superpower with global interests, and one whose domestic developments were subject to the scrutiny of allies and opponents alike. Under Eisenhower, the Cold War expanded into all continents, and also acquired new dimensions: super-power rivalry now involved psychological and cultural factors, and grew into a contest between two ways of life. Under these conditions, the interaction between domestic and foreign policy became almost constant.

This thesis studies the impact of foreign policy considerations on the civil rights policies of the Eisenhower Administration, with specific emphasis placed on American foreign policy in Africa. It describes how foreign and domestic policies became increasingly integrated under Eisenhower, and how this integration attests to the growing importance of foreign policy issues in American politics and society.

The core argument of the thesis contends that legal and institutional changes in American race relations under the
Eisenhower Administration were partly motivated by foreign policy considerations. These motivations included the protection of actual and potential American interests on the African continent. Changes in policy reflected American concerns about the massive decolonization of the Third World, and the negative impact of racial segregation on U.S. foreign policy. Without active presidential support, and in the absence of strong domestic political pressures for desegregation, world public opinion and the need to keep Africa on the American side in the Cold War exerted increasing influence on Eisenhower's civil-rights policies, especially from 1957 on.

The first chapter of the thesis discusses the major trends in the historiography of the Eisenhower presidency. Debate on Eisenhower has been dominated for the last twenty years by an interpretation called "Eisenhower Revisionism". It argues that President Eisenhower was actively involved in the elaboration of policy, and that he had a personal style of presidential leadership based on restrained domestic policies, a forceful, yet reasonable, foreign policy, and his own initiatives behind the scenes. Chapter One surveys the evolution of Eisenhower revisionism, and discusses the emergence of new interpretations challenging many revisionist postulates. After comparing revisionism with these interpretations, it can be argued that, although the latest research on Eisenhower does not dismiss Eisenhower
revisionism, it certainly undermines its usefulness as a
historiographic concept. Indeed, it seems that revisionism no
longer revises anything, but has instead become the common
ground of vastly conflicting interpretations.

In order to establish a direct relationship between
American foreign policy and the issue of civil rights, it is
essential to first identify the origins and goals of
Eisenhower's civil rights policies, as well as the forces
which shaped them. Chapter Two describes the evolution of the
attitude and policies of the Eisenhower Administration on the
most critical and divisive of the domestic problems it had to
face.

As president, Eisenhower was repeatedly confronted with
the race issue, especially after the Supreme Court's landmark
ruling in the case of Brown vs. Board of Education (1954),
which called for the desegregation of educational facilities
across the United States. The ruling paved the way for further
legal triumphs for the cause of desegregation, but it also
sparked a national crisis to which Eisenhower reacted with
characteristic ambivalence. Accordingly, Chapter Two seeks to
answer three questions: first, was there an evolution in the
Administration's policies on civil rights? Second, which
forces had the greatest influence on Administration policy?
Third, what kind of civil rights legacy did Eisenhower leave
for his successors? This writer argues that Eisenhower's civil
rights policies underwent significant changes over the years.
Initially, the Eisenhower Administration virtually ignored the issue of civil rights, and concentrated on limited efforts, such as the desegregation of the District of Columbia and of U.S. Army posts. However, mounting domestic and foreign pressures led to a greater commitment to racial equality, at least in symbolic terms, as evidenced by the 1957 and 1960 Civil Rights Acts and Eisenhower's forceful stance during the 1957 Little Rock crisis.

Chapter Three shifts the discussion to American foreign policy in Africa. It describes how, in the 1950s, Africa for the first time became a high priority concern of American foreign policy. A major development in the postwar world order involved the crumbling of the European colonial empires, which the Western powers had not foreseen. In the years following World War II, a new order arose in Asia and Africa: buttressed by the rising force of Third World nationalism, colonial areas gained independence much sooner than expected.

The rise of Africa posed a new challenge to American foreign policy, largely because independent Africa was an unknown variable. Though rich in raw materials, the black continent lacked the political and economic infrastructures necessary for its development. In the context of the Cold War, the United States obviously feared Communist infiltration of the area, denying access to American values and investments. It rapidly became clear that three things jeopardized the American position in Africa: first, American distrust of
neutralism; second, the half-hearted American commitment to anticolonialism; and third, the persistence of racial inequality in America.

Chapter Four analyses the interaction between American foreign policy and the civil rights policies of the Eisenhower Administration. Historians have acknowledged the impact of domestic politics on foreign policy: diplomatic maneuvers are often the result of domestic political pressures, especially electoral ones. For instance, the American reluctance to get involved in new foreign imbroglios during a presidential election year is well known. This thesis argues that the reverse trend can also be true, that domestic policies can be influenced by the dictates of foreign policy; this has been particularly true since the end of the Second World War.

Postwar international relations have seen a worldwide trend of greater interest in the domestic affairs of other countries. As a democratic super-power with hegemonic ambitions, the United States in the 1950s was, perhaps more than any other state, subject to foreign criticism of its society. Accordingly, domestic crises bore potential consequences for American foreign policy, and vice-versa. The peculiar nature of American race relations came under questioning and attack, and fuelled most anti-American propaganda abroad. Segregation openly contradicted American claims of defending freedom and democracy in the Cold War, and thus increasingly undermined American foreign policy.
Racial inequality had the greatest impact on U.S. foreign policy in the Third World. The decolonization of Africa and Asia led to the creation of more than fifty new states, many of which gained independence during the Eisenhower presidency. American efforts to obtain the support of these new states ran into difficulty, in part because of the segregation problem, which reminded Africans and Asians of the inequities of colonialism. As the problem of waging the Cold War in Africa arose, the need to erase the stigma of racial inequality in America, and to restore America's anticolonial image overseas, grew ever more urgent.

While foreign policy considerations were by no means the only forces shaping Eisenhower's civil rights policies, this writer argues that they gained increasing influence during his second term. Little Rock confirmed that the problem of race relations in America had evolved into a worldwide concern, and that the moral credibility of the United States overseas now hinged heavily on the government's ability to deal with this problem.

The much-maligned Eisenhower record on civil rights sought to address the issue in a way that would satisfy both foreign and domestic critics of Administration policies. Without enforcement, Federal proclamation of legal and constitutional equality among the races could only have a symbolic value, and would produce few tangible domestic achievements likely to aggravate the South, which adamantly
opposed integration. As a symbol of racial equality in America, however, such proclamations could restore America’s credibility overseas and strengthen its foreign policy in the Third World. Their value as such motivated in part a shift in Eisenhower’s civil rights policies from discreet activism to the creation of vivid symbols of racial equality.

The most important primary sources for this paper were found in the Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas. Of particular importance are the Presidential Papers and Records of Dwight Eisenhower, better known as the Whitman File and the White House Central Files respectively. In the Whitman File, the Administration and Eisenhower Diaries series are the most important sources of material on civil rights. The Dulles-Herter, International, and National Security Council series provide additional insight on Eisenhower’s African policy. In the White House Central Files, the most useful source is the Confidential File, which contains reports and correspondence on high-level foreign policy matters.

This study also draws extensively on the White House Office collections: of particular help were the records of the Cabinet Secretariat, the Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Office of the Staff Secretary, and the White House Staff Research Group. Other primary sources include the papers of Cabinet members and White House Staff members, and the records of government agencies, like the Council on Foreign Economic Policy.
Eisenhower's civil rights policies are also discussed in an impressive collection of oral histories and Administration memoirs. There is a growing body of literature on Eisenhower and civil rights; most of it, however, focuses on the school desegregation issue. In contrast, secondary sources on Eisenhower's foreign policy in Africa are practically nonexistent. The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series constitutes potentially the most exhaustive published source on that subject; however, delays in the declassification of the material have created large gaps in the collection, especially for the years after 1955.

Overall, the material used in the thesis confirms the revisionist argument that the making of American foreign policy under Eisenhower was a complicated and flexible process, dominated by the executive branch of government. Eisenhower flexibly responded to the increasing interaction between domestic and foreign policy, which sometimes limited and other times expanded the range of policy options, and which certainly complicated his task of governing the country.

Throughout his presidency, Eisenhower tried to strike a balance between the requirements of his foreign policy and his own domestic program. However, his activist foreign policy contrasted with his hands-off approach to domestic problems, and caused some inconsistencies. In fact, it seems that the Eisenhower Administration became more active on civil rights only after that issue had grown into a foreign policy problem.
The influence of foreign policy considerations on the evolution of Eisenhower's civil rights policies testifies to the inadequacy of his approach to solving the greatest moral and social problem of twentieth-century America. However, it also symbolizes the domination of a growing segment of domestic American politics by foreign policy issues, a domination that began following the Second World War, and which has lasted to this day.
CHAPTER ONE

A HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE EISENHOWER PRESIDENCY

For the last two decades, historical writing about the Eisenhower Administration has been dominated by an approach known as "Eisenhower Revisionism." It stresses the extent to which Eisenhower designed his own policies, and how the non-politician General was in fact very much attuned to the political realities of his day. Revisionist historians have been especially concerned with Eisenhower's foreign policy, as he clearly showed greater interest in world problems than in domestic ones.

This chapter analyzes the development of Eisenhower revisionism, with specific emphasis on foreign policy. However, since the thesis as a whole deals with the relationship between foreign policy considerations and Eisenhower's civil rights policies, this discussion of historiography must also trace the evolution in the views of historians and political commentators on Eisenhower's civil rights' record. This record has been the subject of constant attack and denunciation ever since the 1950s; however, the motivations behind the civil rights policies of the Eisenhower Administration have been scarcely studied heretofore. The chapter seeks to understand why Eisenhower Revisionism has gained credence amongst scholars, and how it has affected our understanding of Eisenhower's foreign policy, and its relationship to domestic policies. Finally, this brief
historiographical essay discusses Eisenhower's foreign policy in the Third World, a topic that revisionists have recently begun to address, and which has led scholars to revise their views on the validity of American foreign policy in the Cold War.

In discussing Eisenhower Revisionism, one must consider the orthodox interpretation antedating it. The orthodox view of the Eisenhower presidency argues that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was the architect of U.S. foreign policy in the 1950s. Dulles's dogmatic style, and his use of doomsday phrases such as "massive retaliation" and "agonizing reappraisal" led contemporaries to argue that the bellicose rigidity of U.S. foreign policy precluded any thaw in the Cold War. Dulles's high profile made him bear the brunt of criticism of American diplomacy, absolving Eisenhower of any responsibility for its excesses. On the domestic scene, the orthodox interpretation would have us believe that Assistant to the President Sherman Adams and other Cabinet members ran the country for an absentee President who spent most of his time on the golf links.

Concern about the lack of a presidential contribution instilled a belief that Eisenhower was a figurehead: nowhere was his lack of leadership more decried than in the field of civil rights. Eisenhower's narrow interpretation of his own role led many to infer that he disapproved of the Supreme Court decisions on desegregation. The lack of effective
federal action to enforce Brown v. Board of Education prevented a smooth and gradual transition from segregated to integrated schools. ¹ Though supportive of Eisenhower's decision to send federal troops to Little Rock in September 1957 to enforce desegregation, journalist Marquis Childs argued that "if only [Eisenhower] had acted more quickly, the worst consequences of this shameful episode would have been avoided."⁵ Eisenhower's civil rights record was regarded as woefully inadequate, and an offspring of his indifference towards the social and political problems of the country. According to orthodox writers, Eisenhower adopted a hands-off attitude, hoping that problems could be indefinitely postponed; in the aftermath of Little Rock and Sputnik, they concluded that his weak presidency ill-fitted modern America's need for strong executive leadership.⁶

Early orthodox works could not rely on primary documents or first-hand accounts, and produced intuitive judgments. However, memoirs from Administration members soon vindicated them. The most revealing are Sherman Adams's First-Hand Report (1961) and Emmet J. Hughes's The Ordeal of Power (1963).⁷ Adams asserts that "the hard . . . line that the United States government took toward Soviet Russia and Red China . . . was more a Dulles line than an Eisenhower one."⁸ First-Hand Report also discusses Dulles's disapproval of summit diplomacy, and his concept of "brinksmanship", which Eisenhower opposed.⁹ Finally, Adams's overall appraisal of Dulles confirms the
orthodox view:

Dulles was . . . not endowed with the creative genius that produces bold, new ideas to gain hitherto unattainable foreign policy goals.\textsuperscript{10}

In *The Ordeal of Power*, Emmet Hughes, a former Eisenhower speechwriter, outlines Eisenhower's and Dulles's respective approaches to foreign affairs: whereas the President sought conciliation, his Secretary of State emphasised confrontation and constant pressure on the Communist world. Dulles's policies concealed a subtle mastery of world politics, which he silenced for the sake of self-preservation in his relations with Congress.\textsuperscript{11} These concerns explain his advocacy of reckless policies to please the right-wing, such as active support for Nationalist China.

In contrast to Dulles's policies, Eisenhower's sporadic efforts usually succeeded in reducing Cold War tensions. But his initiatives seldom interrupted Dulles's aggressive policies, and the hard line of John Foster Dulles prevailed in the long run. It froze America

into a position of hostility toward any diplomatic confrontation with the Soviet Union--a position politically unnatural . . . and impossible to maintain indefinitely.\textsuperscript{12}

Hughes also nuances the orthodox view of Eisenhower's civil rights policies. He argues that Eisenhower's actions (or lack thereof) were not the product of indifference, but of his political beliefs, which "rested on the slow, gradual power of persuasion."\textsuperscript{13} Eisenhower's moderation on desegregation issues
was strengthened by his belief that "the Supreme Court
decision set back progress in the South at least fifteen
years." Hughes contends that Eisenhower's moderation went too
far and impeded desegregation. His wavering leadership over
the 1957 Civil Rights Act "served almost as a pathetic and
inviting prologue to Little Rock." Even after Little Rock,
Eisenhower adamantly refused to state his convictions on civil
rights issues; such detachment seemed increasingly incongruous
"in an Administration so prone to voice its opinions on far
more prosaic affairs, in highly moralistic accents:"
seriously damaged the nation's dignity both abroad and at
home. In that respect, Hughes pioneered in discussing the
global impact of American racial problems.

Overall, orthodox writers blame Eisenhower for lacking
imaginative leadership toward the solution of the problems of
his day. In contrast to Wilson, Roosevelt, or Kennedy, all
activist presidents, Eisenhower's restrained use of
presidential powers was obsolete. Dulles fared no better: his
lack of creativity in meeting the Soviet threat jeopardized
American superiority in the cold war. He "succeeded chiefly in
widening and institutionalizing the attitudes and structures
of the Cold War in American life." For the generation of the
New Frontier, this was a legacy of failure.

Since the late sixties, revisionist historians have
reversed this assessment of the Eisenhower presidency. They
contend that President Eisenhower, rather than his Secretary
of State, formulated his foreign policy. Herbert Parmet's *Eisenhower and the American Crusades* (1972), the first revisionist historical monograph on the Eisenhower presidency, fails to identify any dichotomy in U.S. foreign policy as outlined by Hughes: "to believe in the existence of any substantive difference on that issue between the President and his Secretary of State is fallacious. Their outlook toward the Far East was in harmony." Dulles was not the policymaker, but rather the Administration's spokesman on foreign affairs.18 Parmet agrees with the orthodox view that Eisenhower's foreign policy continued the Truman-Acheson containment policies; however, Eisenhower's brand of containment was more efficient. Dulles's rhetoric catered to the demands of the right-wing of the Republican Party, and opened the way for Eisenhower's more cautious policies.19 These policies coalesced in a strategy of double containment of Soviet expansion abroad, and of right-wing extremism at home.

Early revisionists concentrated almost exclusively on Eisenhower's foreign policy. However, Parmet also provided valuable insights on the civil rights policies of the Administration. Eisenhower approached racial problems with considerable circumspection, hoping to solve them discreetly. Parmet discusses how Eisenhower and Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert B. Anderson completed the desegregation of the Army "without any resistance-provoking publicity."20

However, civil rights never became a part of Eisenhower's
"Great Crusade:" eager to increase his popularity in the South, he tried to downplay the issue, with the consent of the Democratic leadership, aware that his middle-of-the-road policies "substantiated the basic consensus that the Administration represented." Eisenhower's moderation on civil rights resulted from his own ambivalence and indifference: his failure to provide political and moral leadership strongly undermined the effectiveness of his approach. It ultimately led to violent Southern opposition to desegregation, and "only convinced black leaders that real gains required meeting stiff conservative resistance with bolder means," which included boycotts, sit-ins, and non-violent civil disobedience.22

Overall, Parmet's qualitative appraisal of the Eisenhower presidency remains ambiguous. Over the years, double containment transformed the "Great Crusade" of 1952 into a global holding action. In doing so, Eisenhower managed to preserve his amazing popularity with the American people. Embodying the views and goals of postwar America, his reassuring moderation suited the times. Consequently, Parmet believes that "to label him a great or good or even weak President misses the point. He was merely necessary."23

Parmet and other early revisionists provide a much more positive appraisal of the Eisenhower years. The rise in their scholarly approval stemmed at first from contextual factors: most presidents experience it over the years, as historians begin to fully understand the problems they had to solve. In

17
Eisenhower's case, however, revisionist historians also praise his concept of the presidency. His restrained use of presidential power contrasts favourably with Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon, whose activist presidencies were marred by the disasters of the Bay of Pigs, Vietnam, and Watergate.

The key development in the growth of Eisenhower revisionism, however, involves the declassification of his Presidential Papers (the Ann Whitman File).\textsuperscript{24} This enormous collection of material provides historians with the primary evidence sorely lacking in orthodox and early revisionist works. It has fostered a wealth of revisionist writing, as the Whitman File confirms Eisenhower's deep involvement in the policy-making process, and the close relationship between the foreign and domestic policies of the Administration.\textsuperscript{25}

The best analysis of Eisenhower's presidential style is Fred I. Greenstein's \textit{The Hidden-Hand Presidency} (1982). He identifies five key elements in Eisenhower's style: hidden-hand leadership; instrumental use of language; refusal to engage in personality conflicts; action based on personality analyses; and finally, selective practice of delegation. The overall purpose of this strategy is to build and preserve a support base transcending sociopolitical divisions.\textsuperscript{26}

Eisenhower's hidden-hand leadership consisted of discreet presidential activism used to conceal his "participation not only in political activity generally falling outside popularly conceived bounds of presidential leadership, but also in more
commonplace political leadership." Through covert operations, personal communications and the use of third parties, Eisenhower achieved his political objectives. Key examples of a hidden-hand approach to foreign policy include the use of covert operations to overthrow unfriendly regimes in Iran and Guatemala, and efforts to influence politicians on the issue of foreign aid. In those situations, secrecy vastly increased Eisenhower's room for manoeuvre, and he used it efficiently.

From his military background, Eisenhower knew the importance of selective delegation. Greenstein considers the asymmetrical working relationships Eisenhower had with cabinet members. With John Foster Dulles, "unlike any other cabinet member, he entered into a collegial working relationship;" Eisenhower made the big decisions, but gave his Secretary of State considerable latitude in handling the public aspect of American foreign relations. Their lasting collaboration thrived on the broad community of views existing between them. Despite the orthodox perception, Eisenhower's and Dulles's respective analyses of the Cold War were in fact identical.

Greenstein discusses extensively Eisenhower's reorganization of the executive branch of government. With respect to foreign policy, Eisenhower's major innovations concerned the expansion of the National Security Council and the creation of many advisory positions on specific foreign policy areas. These changes reflected the need for a more flexible foreign policy machinery assisting an overwhelmed
State Department, but they also indicated a new orientation for American foreign policy-making. Foreign policy under Eisenhower fell increasingly under the control of the executive branch rather than the State Department. The NSC became a center for the elaboration and discussion of foreign policy, with special advisors providing the flexibility necessary to complement a highly formalized executive branch. Finally, the Central Intelligence Agency became a key executive tool for activities abroad, from espionage to the overthrow of foreign governments.32

Greenstein concludes by questioning the usefulness of Eisenhower's style for future presidents. At least one aspect of hidden-hand leadership, covert operations, has fallen into disrepute with the American public. Besides, hidden-hand leadership depended heavily on Eisenhower's amazing popularity, which went across partisan boundaries, and which no future president will likely be able to match. Greenstein doubts that future presidents will use Eisenhower's complex hidden-hand leadership style in its totality.

The theoretical contribution of The Hidden-Hand Presidency to Eisenhower revisionism is tremendous, but Greenstein perhaps divorces too sharply Eisenhower's methods from the merits of his policies. A more exhaustive revisionist discussion of the Eisenhower presidency is Stephen Ambrose's landmark biography of Dwight Eisenhower.

Ambrose reaffirms the major features of a hidden-hand
foreign policy: Eisenhower controlled Dulles and not the opposite, and he privileged covert operations as a means to achieve his goals. However, he argues that covert methods could be morally and legally reprehensible, as in the overthrow of Mossadegh in Iran. Still, the fledgling CIA offered Eisenhower a tantalizingly "quick fix for his foreign problems. It was there to do his bidding; it freed him from having to persuade Congress . . . or the public." The rise of the CIA paralleled that of the executive branch in American foreign policy-making. In many ways, Eisenhower initiated this change, wanting to assert his authority in that area; however, anything less than close supervision and direction of these new executive agencies by the President could lead to disaster, as Eisenhower's and Kennedy's handling of the Cuban problem demonstrated.

Ambrose praises Eisenhower's crisis management. Crises erupted on all continents throughout the 1950s, generally involving at least one of the superpowers, as Cold War hysteria branded every skirmish with an aura of impending doom. Ambrose argues that crises brought out the best in the hidden-hand method. For instance, in the Quemoy-Matsu crisis of 1955, Eisenhower managed to avoid war and to keep the islands free. In doing so, he refused to commit the United States to a single policy, despite mounting pressures from Congress, his advisers, and his bellicose ally from Formosa. Eisenhower's crisis management was a great asset for U.S.
foreign policy: he played down each crisis until a solution was found, and kept his options open at every stage. He thus avoided the diplomatic disasters that plagued his successors.36

Eisenhower excelled at managing crises, but his handling of day-to-day operations and long-term problems left more to be desired. Ambrose finds that important issues were simply ignored unless a crisis erupted. One only needs to look at inter-American relations during the 1950s, or at the colonial problem to realize that a readiness to postpone initiatives in these areas stifled constructive diplomacy, and left the United States facing crises it could easily have avoided.37

Eisenhower’s complacency toward long-term problems was most costly on the domestic scene, especially in the field of civil rights. According to Ambrose, Eisenhower wanted to ignore racial problems which "he did not understand, nor wish[ed] to study, much less to solve."38 His attitude derived in large part from his own contacts with Negroes, which occurred within a segregated context, and his Southern background and friends. The persistence of Attorney General Herbert Brownell and other supporters of civil rights within the Administration forced Eisenhower to take a greater interest in racial issues, but he refused to commit himself to the enforcement of Brown v. Board of Education, even after the events in Little Rock.39

Overall, Ambrose strongly commends Eisenhower’s foreign policy. Eisenhower is seen as the main architect of the
relative peace which lasted amidst increasing tensions through the 1950s. With the passage of time, it has become his greatest achievement as President, for all his successors have at one point or another sent American troops to fight overseas. Amazingly, this negative achievement coincided with the globalization of American strategic commitments and the rise of the famous "military-industrial complex." According to Ambrose, only Eisenhower could have succeeded in harmonizing those contradictory developments during the Cold War: he calls it "a magnificent performance."40

In contrast, Ambrose regards civil rights as the worst chapter of the Eisenhower presidency. Far from favoring a smooth desegregation process, Eisenhower's 'moderation' on civil rights was interpreted by Southerners as a "license to defy the Supreme Court" and to obstruct meaningful legislation.41 Ambrose argues that Eisenhower did not fully enforce desegregation because "he was trapped by his own prejudices, a prisoner of his own limited view."42 He persisted in seeing segregation as a local problem, and thereby missed "a historic opportunity to provide moral leadership . . . on the most fundamental social problem of his time."43

The works of Greenstein and Ambrose have established Eisenhower revisionism as the standard interpretation on that period. However, some historians have problems with the revisionist label. They feel that most revisionists are in fact Eisenhower apologists, who focus on overturning orthodox
arguments and fail to question the validity of his policies. Over the last decade, this neo-revisionist wave has shifted its research interests away from the policymaking process to the qualitative aspects of Eisenhower's foreign and domestic policies, relying on the declassification of the White House Central Files, of material from the NSC Files, and other primary evidence. Researchers on Eisenhower's foreign policy have broadened their scope to address topics such as the interaction between domestic politics and foreign policy, generational or cultural explanations of American foreign policy, and the definition of Eisenhower's strategic concepts. However, the areas where revisionism has come under the greatest attack are civil rights and U.S. foreign policy in the Third World.

The most impressive study of Eisenhower's civil rights policies is Robert F. Burk's *The Eisenhower Administration and Black Civil Rights* (1984). Whereas most revisionists have praised the benefits of hidden-hand leadership to Eisenhower's foreign policy, Burk dwells upon the limitations it imposed in major domestic policy areas such as civil rights. He argues that the civil rights record of the Eisenhower Administration had a major impact on the evolution of civil rights as a social and political issue in America. It institutionalized "an official definition of racial inequality, a pattern of federal response, and a public expectation of civil rights advance within a framework of political moderation and
consensus. Eisenhower's policies secured the conditions under which civil rights advances could be made. However, they also set the limits of these advances, and therefore contributed to the violence and disillusionment that marred the civil rights movement after 1965.

Burk divides his discussion of Eisenhower's civil rights record into two parts. First, he examines federal actions aiming at eradicating segregation in specific areas generally under federal jurisdiction. Such initiatives focused on the desegregation of military facilities and the District of Columbia, and on the abolition of discrimination in housing and employment. While the Administration was successful in the first two endeavors, the problem of discrimination in employment and housing remained largely unsolved. In a stinging indictment of Eisenhower's leadership style, Burk argues that the Administration "lacked the political will, the philosophical conviction, the personal understanding of the realities of unfair employment to blacks, and the enforcement tools necessary to make substantial gains in minority employment." Similar handicaps prevented the elaboration of a constructive solution to discrimination in housing, to the extent that urban blacks were in arguably worse housing conditions in 1960 than they were a decade before. Thus Eisenhower was most successful in eliminating segregation in areas under federal jurisdiction. He was unable or unwilling to solve racial problems requiring an important transformation.
of the social and economic infrastructures of American society. Instead, the Administration refused to acknowledge the existence of a growing black urban underclass because it challenged "the idea of an affluent, color-blind, democratic society so coveted by administration proponents that it had become an article of faith."49

The second part of The Eisenhower Administration and Black Civil Rights discusses the rise of a different approach to civil rights, which Burk calls "constitutional moralism." During the 1950s, the legal foundations of racial segregation were gradually overturned, starting in 1954 with the Supreme Court decision on Brown v. Board of Education on school desegregation. Eisenhower's reluctance to enforce desegregation became even greater after the second Brown decision, which requested the South to integrate its schools "with all deliberate speed."

Facing fervent Southern opposition to desegregation, the Eisenhower Administration limited the fight for racial equality to civil and voting rights instead of addressing more fundamental issues of economic and social inequality. The Administration played into the hands of those who opposed integration, as the ensuing battles over the 1957 and 1960 Civil Rights Acts demonstrated.50 The jury-trial amendment in particular crippled the voting-rights provisions of the 1957 Civil Rights Act, and made the legislation virtually ineffectual.51 The Administration's reliance "on the doctrine
of black self-protection through the vote . . . insured that the federal government remained unprepared to act in other ways to defend the lives and property of minority citizens." 52 Finally, Administration policies committed the U.S. government to a strategy of symbolism granting only token equality to black Americans. The causes and effects of this symbolic legacy will be discussed in Chapters II and IV of this thesis.

Neo-revisionist historians have also denounced almost every aspect of Eisenhower's foreign policy in the Third World. A key element of American foreign policy in the Third World involves the question of foreign aid. In Trade and Aid: Eisenhower's Foreign Economic Policy, 1953-1961 (1982), Burton I. Kaufman discusses American efforts to establish a new postwar economic order seeking to "nurture democratic forms of government abroad." Under Eisenhower, economic assistance evolved from a "trade, not aid" approach to one that combined trade with aid. The need for direct financial aid became more acute as the concerns of the American foreign aid program shifted from Europe to the Third World. This shift responded in part to the collapse of colonial empires, to reports of foreign economic policy advisor Clarence Randall, and to the inability and/or disinterest of the private sector to bolster Third World economies in the short run."

However, Kaufman argues that the nascent interest of the Eisenhower Administration in assisting Third World economies originated in large part from the Soviet economic offensives
beginning in the mid-1950s. Throughout his second term, Eisenhower requested foreign aid allocations as an essential part of American strategy. Kaufman describes these annual budgetary battles opposing the President and Congress over the issue of foreign aid. Despite Eisenhower's hidden-hand attempts to influence Congress, foreign aid appropriations remained far below his requests every year, and, needless to say, woefully inadequate for the financial needs of the ever-growing ranks of Third World recipients.

Kaufman blames Eisenhower for that sorry record, as he conceded defeat far too easily in his struggles with Congress. Tangible achievements of Eisenhower's foreign aid program are ultimately difficult to find: under his presidency, the economic condition of Third World countries worsened, and they showed little evidence of greater stability or friendliness toward the United States.


The coup toppled a government elected democratically on a program of social and economic reform. Agrarian reforms
undertaken in the early 1950s led to pressures from America's United Fruit Company, which had informally ruled Guatemala under previous regimes, on the U.S. government, asking for Arbenz's downfall. Immerman argues, however, that American involvement in the coup goes beyond the protection of economic interests. In fact, the United States sought "to halt what it believed to be the spread of the international Communist conspiracy."  

Eisenhower recognized the problems inherent in openly using force to achieve his objectives in the Third World; he relied instead on covert operations. In Guatemala, the CIA used a panoply of methods, ranging from the training of military exiles in Honduras to an extensive campaign of psychological warfare. The coup confirmed the success of covert operations for achieving American objectives in the Third World. An unfriendly government was replaced at minimal cost, without using American troops.

Immerman argues that the success of 1954 became a two-edged sword. Because American policy had a Cold War fixation, it paid too much attention to the global aspects of a crisis, and neglected its local causes. In Guatemala, American foreign policy viewed democratic reform and Communism as synonymous, and thus committed the United States to a repressive regime. Furthermore, successful covert operations in Iran and Guatemala created a myth of invincibility about the CIA. They became a panacea for dealing with Communist
subversion in the Third World. The lamentable failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961 revealed that such views were misguided, and raised doubts about the propriety of covert operations as a foreign policy alternative. Writing in the aftermath of the Sandinista revolution, Immerman concludes that while Eisenhower's Latin American policy brought its short-term rewards, it was detrimental in the long run.64

Since the publication of The CIA in Guatemala, studies of American policy in the Far East, the Middle East, and Latin America have revealed further shortcomings in Eisenhower's foreign policy.65 Very little, however, has been written on Eisenhower's foreign policy in Africa. This thesis will add to the historiography of the Eisenhower presidency by analyzing the evolution of Eisenhower's foreign policy in Africa. Through an extensive discussion of the evolution of American policies on that continent, this writer seeks to establish whether those policies resembled U.S. policies elsewhere in the Third World, and to explain the similarities and differences that will be identified.

One of the basic concepts to the study of American foreign policy in the Third World involves the question of Third World nationalism. In his article "Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism," Robert J. McMahon argues that the emerging Third World nationalism was "the single most dynamic new element in international affairs during the 1950s",66 and that the Eisenhower Administration was unable to respond
appropriately to this important development. American foreign policy in the 1950s closely linked Third World nationalism with Communism, and this misunderstanding lies at the root of most American problems in the Third World. Distrust of nationalism led to American support of reactionary elements in many societies; this in turn prevented the fulfilment of a major American policy objective, i.e. the political and economic development of those areas. By opposing nationalism in the Third World, Eisenhower's foreign policy "contributed to its instability, thus undermining a basic American policy goal."^67

Classical revisionism praises the restraint shown by Eisenhower in his foreign policy; Eisenhower's refusal to send troops to Indochina in 1954, and his policy during the 1956 Suez crisis are often cited as examples of such restraint. ^68 However, recent and more thorough studies of Eisenhower's policies tell a different story. While Eisenhower did not go to war, his policies were anything but prudent. His reliance on the atomic threat for settling crises only heightened tensions in the long run. As for Indochina, Eisenhower rejected war in 1954, but his subsequent attempt to install at any costs an anti-Communist bulwark in South Vietnam paved the way for the Vietnam debacle of the 1960s. ^69 Finally, greater sensitivity to Arab nationalism in handling the Aswan Dam deal might have prevented the Suez Crisis altogether. The Eisenhower Doctrine revealed that, even after the Suez crisis,
America regarded Arab nationalism as a tool for Communist expansion in the area, and a threat to its interests.

McMahon and other students of American foreign policy in the Third World thus reach significantly different conclusions than previous revisionists. Collectively, they have undermined the unbridled enthusiasm that characterized most assessments of Eisenhower's foreign policy. Moreover, by dealing with the goal and the results of Eisenhower's foreign policy, they provide a much-needed supplement to the previous revisionist focus on the policy-making process. Their work has greatly enlivened historical debate on Eisenhower's foreign policy. The previous critical consensus of the orthodox view and the buoyant consensus of early revisionism have become outmoded.

These recent developments lead this writer to question the future usefulness of Eisenhower revisionism as a historiographic concept. Indeed, virtually all research on Eisenhower now concurs with the core revisionist contentions that he controlled his foreign policy, and that he was not the bumbling figurehead that contemporaries believed him to be. Beyond that, however, revisionist research has reached increasingly conflicting qualitative judgments on Eisenhower's foreign and domestic policies, so that it now hardly forms a coherent school of interpretation. The time has come to study the Eisenhower presidency within a new set of parameters.

This writer argues that future studies of American foreign policy in the 1950s will indeed move away from the
orthodox vs. revisionist riddle, and provide a more complex picture of the Eisenhower presidency. With respect to foreign policy, three fields of inquiry deserve immediate attention: first, more careful study of the evolution of Soviet and Chinese policies throughout the period, and the degree to which American foreign policy perceived or reacted to those changes. Second, how the multiple dimensions of Eisenhower's concept of national security shaped his foreign policy. Third, how American foreign policy under Eisenhower integrated foreign and domestic considerations. This thesis addresses the last topic by analyzing the impact of foreign policy considerations on Eisenhower's civil rights policies. As a whole, future studies of the Eisenhower should indeed move on from the studies of Eisenhower's leadership style and of the policy-making process that have dominated much revisionist writing, and consider more thoroughly the qualitative aspects of Eisenhower's domestic and foreign policies, and the relationship between the two.

This does not mean, however, that we should dismiss Eisenhower revisionism, for it has considerably broadened our understanding of the Eisenhower presidency. Its insights on the foreign policy-making process and on the worldwide impact of American policies reveal the increasing complexity of American foreign policy since 1945. Eisenhower's restructuring of the making and implementation of policy produced a complex, yet supple, foreign policy apparatus that could respond to
changing realities both at home and abroad. In that respect, Eisenhower truly brought American foreign policy into the modern age.
CHAPTER TWO

UNCERTAIN MODERATION: THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION
AND THE ISSUE OF CIVIL RIGHTS

Eisenhower revisionism has had its greatest impact on our understanding of Eisenhower's foreign policy and leadership style; his domestic record, however, has not received similar praise from historians. Critics have especially singled out his handling of one of the greatest social problems of postwar America, racial segregation: they have denounced his failure to provide leadership in that area, and his ambivalence about what remained at heart a moral issue. Robert F. Burk, the foremost historian of Eisenhower's civil rights policies, has agreed with former Supreme Court Justice Earl Warren in arguing that Eisenhower's lackadaisical approach to civil rights paved the way for the racial violence of the 1960s.¹

Nevertheless, the 1950s witnessed pioneering steps in the eradication of segregation in schools and public facilities, and in the emergence of the civil rights movement. These developments undermined decades of official discrimination and indifference about racial inequality. More importantly, the struggle against racism unleashed forces revealing the sharpness of sectional divisions and misunderstanding in the United States, as well as the destructive effects of a social system whose reform was long overdue. In the midst of change, turmoil, and violence, America needed strong leadership, and calls for Eisenhower's involvement in the matter grew louder
and more frequent over the years.

This chapter discusses the civil rights policies of the Eisenhower Administration. As stated in the Introduction, it seeks to study the evolution of Eisenhower's policies, and identify the forces shaping them as well as Eisenhower's legacy in the field of civil rights. For that purpose, this chapter consists of two sections. The first, which forms the body of the chapter, surveys the history of civil rights under Eisenhower. This writer argues that Eisenhower's civil rights policies underwent major changes as the need to implement desegregation in areas outside federal jurisdiction became imperative. Especially after 1955, the Administration moved toward a policy of symbolic achievements which aimed at appeasing the South and satisfying black Americans at the same time. Also, this strategy sought to convey to the world the impression that strong government involvement was fostering progress in American race relations, even though achievements often remained largely symbolic.

The second section deals with the political impact of civil rights in the 1950s, and the political factors which influenced Eisenhower's handling of civil rights. It argues that although civil rights became the most pressing issue on the domestic political agenda, political considerations slowed down the Federal government's response, as the Eisenhower Administration tried to accommodate the South rather than alleviate racial inequalities. During his presidency,
Eisenhower pursued a middle-of-the-road civil rights strategy seeking to appeal to Southerners and blacks alike, but largely aimed at playing down the problem.

I

The 1950s were a significant decade in the history of American race relations. For the first time since Reconstruction, racial issues dominated the domestic political agenda. For decades after the Supreme Court decision of *Plessy v. Ferguson* (1896), which had legitimized the "separate but equal" foundation underlying segregation, it was handled as a regional problem best left in the hands of local authorities. After World War II, however, it became a national concern for black and white Americans alike. Black Americans felt an urgency to overturn the laws and customs preventing them from fully enjoying their rights as citizens. They contested the legality of segregation, and undermined its practicality via boycotts, sit-ins and other forms of social and political activism. Their efforts found support among some whites who regarded segregation as a daily denial of the American promise of democratic equality.

Several contextual factors favored the emergence of this new civil rights consciousness. On the domestic front, black soldiers returning from Europe wanted more than a position of acknowledged inferiority in the land they had fought for. The prosperity of the postwar years shifted political debate away from economic issues, and toward social and political issues.
Finally, black migration to Northern cities created a new and important force in American politics that could hold the balance of power at the local and national level. This gradual change coincided with the emergence of an educated black middle class rejecting the second-class status America granted to it.2

The cause of civil rights benefited from the international context as well. World War II and the Holocaust had demonstrated in horrifying terms the immorality of racial segregation and prejudice. Segregation also soiled America's image in the Cold War as the U.S. tried to stop Communist expansion, and respond to the rise of Third World nationalism.3 Federal action on civil rights began under Truman with the creation of a federal antidiscrimination board, and the desegregation of the Army. Government agencies established the principle of racial equality in their operations.4 Historian Robert F. Burk argues that Truman's civil rights legacy set the pattern for the policies of the 1950s. Federal action focused on the protection of black civic rights, neglecting economic issues, and it met stiff opposition from Congress, led by Southern Democrats.5

Despite the new forces unleashed in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the American racial picture had scarcely been modified by 1952. Moral and legislative support from the new Administration was vitally needed to achieve tangible results. As Eisenhower took power, however, supporters and opponents of
civil rights alike had no definite sense of how he would handle the problem of segregation. During the 1952 campaign, his position on civil rights had been ambiguous. It consisted of three elements: first, the American ideal of legal and political equality must not exclude anyone on grounds of race, religion or nationality. Second, legislation on the matter could aggravate rather than advance these egalitarian principles: desegregation should therefore be handled at the state level. Third, the Federal government should work within its powers to encourage state action, and to secure civil rights for all Americans.⁶

Taken separately, these principles stated clearly the objectives of the Administration. The integration of those three objectives into a coherent policy, however, revealed the contradictions in the Republican approach. The resolve to use federal power to eliminate segregation ultimately conflicted with the reluctance to infringe upon state authority via national legislation. Moreover, integration could not be speedily achieved without the clashes between state and federal power that Eisenhower tried to avoid.

These contradictions were not apparent during Eisenhower's first year in office, for his civil rights program focused on areas under federal jurisdiction, such as the desegregation of the District of Columbia. At the time, Washington remained a bastion of segregation: although opportunities for blacks seemed the greatest in Washington,
the social and economic disparity between the races there reached unparalleled proportions.\textsuperscript{7}

Racial discrimination in Washington thrived illegally since a 1872 ordinance had outlawed segregation in the District. On January 22, 1953, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in a case of segregation in restaurants, \textit{District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co.}, that since the old District law had not been enforced for years, it had become invalid, and segregation was therefore within the law. In the ensuing appeal to the Supreme Court, Attorney General Herbert Brownell took over the case, at the urging of Eisenhower and Interior Secretary Douglas McKay.\textsuperscript{8} Brownell filed on March 10 an \textit{amicus curiae} brief recommending the enforcement of the old desegregation laws; three months later, the Supreme Court overruled the Court of Appeals and upheld the 1872 "lost law."

Several other steps toward the desegregation of the District were undertaken in 1953. Privately-owned facilities such as theaters and hotels were not affected by the Supreme Court ruling, but the Eisenhower Administration worked behind the scenes to integrate them as well.\textsuperscript{9} Regarding government operations, the Committee on Government Contracts was created by Eisenhower in March 1953 to end job discrimination on such contracts. Chaired by Vice President Richard Nixon, the committee issued on October 25 a new policy making all District contractors subject to a no discrimination rule in
employment. Finally, twenty-three District government agencies were ordered on November 25 to desegregate their activities.

These accomplishments showed the limitations of Eisenhower's approach to civil rights. For the desegregation of the District of Columbia, Administration policies concentrated on official aspects of segregation, and neglected social and economic problems resulting from it. The Administration showed no interest in supporting District home rule, nor in upgrading District infrastructures. It focused instead on improving "the image of the 'citadel of democracy' through unobtrusive executive actions."[11 By the late 1950s, Washington had become a decaying city besieged by economic inequality and social disintegration.

Under Eisenhower, the integration of the armed forces was completed, albeit not without controversy, as school desegregation on Army posts became a thorny issue. On April 13, 1953, after one month of controversy on the subject, Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) Secretary Oveta Culp Hobby sent Eisenhower a memorandum explaining the complexity of this problem. Though Army posts were under federal control, many children went to schools operated on the base by local school boards according to local regulations, or to Jim Crow schools outside the base. In those cases, Hobby argued, integration went against state laws, and would require a Federal takeover of the educational system, which Eisenhower wanted to avoid at
all costs. Hobby advised a delay in the desegregation of Army schools operated locally until the Supreme Court announced its decision on the school desegregation cases.\textsuperscript{12}

In its early stages, Eisenhower's civil rights program thus worked discreetly within Federal jurisdiction. Its achievements did not require the public involvement of the President, nor did they interfere with congressional powers. From a political standpoint, the program reaped significant rewards for Eisenhower, as its discreet enforcement shielded him from most Southern criticism. However, the program had its inherent limitations: by narrowly defining federal jurisdiction in civil rights matters, it eradicated only those official instances of discrimination in areas outside private or state jurisdiction. The controversy over the possible creation of a Fair Employment Practices Commission underscored Eisenhower's reluctance to infringe upon state or congressional power. Prominent Southerners like South Carolina Governor James Byrnes criticized Nixon's Committee on Government Contracts, fearing that it would create an F.E.P.C. Eisenhower reassured Byrnes that committee regulations would only be enforced "where the Federal Government has clear and exclusive jurisdiction in the case."\textsuperscript{13} He then reiterated in a letter to Nixon his views on the purpose of the Committee. He opposed a F.E.P.C. law on the grounds that it "would undoubtedly, by creating antagonisms, set back the cause of progress by a good many years," and violate the
"Constitutional powers reserved to the states."\textsuperscript{14}

The need to accommodate Congress further limited the scope of the civil rights program. HEW Secretary Hobby warned Eisenhower that premature action on the integration of schools on Army posts, for example, might "easily lead to serious adverse action on the part of the Congress as it considers the two pending bills for extending aid to schools in federally affected areas."\textsuperscript{15} For those reasons, the Administration waited for the Supreme Court ruling on school segregation and avoided antagonizing Southern Democrats and the Republican Old Guard that dominated Congress. Accordingly, Eisenhower's civil rights accomplishments during his first year in office remained limited in scope. Because of its limitations, the Eisenhower approach to civil rights soon became obsolete. Its narrow definition of federal and executive powers left out too many dimensions of the problem of racial discrimination in America.

Eisenhower's policies were woefully inadequate for dealing with school desegregation. By 1950, seventeen states operated legally segregated schools.\textsuperscript{16} Since education was under state control, the quality of Jim Crow schools varied greatly from state to state. For instance, Kansas had attained relative equality in its separate schools. In contrast, the discrepancy between white and black schools in Virginia and South Carolina reached revolting proportions.\textsuperscript{17} Without political or economic support to abolish segregation via
legislation, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People attacked the constitutionality of segregation on the grounds that separate schools were anything but equal. It strengthened its findings on the inequality of segregated schools with sociological material showing that separation bred inequality and instilled a sense of inferiority in its victims.18

On December 9, 1952, the argument of Brown v. Board of Education and other school desegregation cases before the Supreme Court began. Right from the start, the complexities of the case were apparent: any ruling striking down segregated schools would go against the established laws and customs of the previous sixty years. Precedents went against desegregation, and only the most powerful arguments could lead the Supreme Court to overturn them. Furthermore, the Supreme Court's ruling on Brown could not limit its scope to school desegregation: ultimately, it had to address the whole concept of segregation, which might provoke violent reactions across the South. Finally, the most important problem involved the question of implementation: should the Supreme Court fail to consider it, a ruling for desegregation would have practically no value.19

On June 8, 1953, a divided Court announced that the Brown case was scheduled for reargument on October 12 over five questions addressing both the constitutionality of segregation and the implementation of integration should Plessy v. Ferguson be struck down.20 The death of Chief Justice
Fred Vinson on September 8 gave Eisenhower the opportunity to make his first Supreme Court appointment. It was a critical one, for the Chief Justice shapes the outlook of the Court over which he presides, especially on landmark cases such as Brown. Perhaps unwittingly, he appointed the man who would embody the moral and social leadership of the Supreme Court, former California Governor Earl Warren.

Warren came to the Supreme Court after a long and successful political career.²¹ As Governor, Warren built a liberal record that earned him the praise of Democrats and Republicans alike, and made him a contender for the Republican presidential nomination in 1948 and 1952. Eisenhower denied appointing Warren to fulfill a political commitment, but circumstantial evidence contradicts his position.²² The appointment of Earl Warren as Chief Justice reflected Eisenhower's desire to have a candidate with political acumen and a middle-of-the-road approach similar to his on most issues. It also attested to the rise of the Supreme Court as a political institution. In contemporary America, distinctions between the judiciary and the other branches of government have indeed become increasingly blurred. Judging from his Supreme Court nominees, it seems that Eisenhower well understood that fact, and tried to give the Court a more conservative slant. Warren's appointment has been called Eisenhower's greatest contribution to the cause of civil rights.²³ More sympathetic observers may disagree, but no one
can deny the impact Earl Warren had on the Brown decisions. His arrival on the Court was a breath of fresh air, and he used his tremendous leadership abilities to achieve a unanimous verdict on Brown.24

In its June announcement, the Supreme Court had invited the Attorney General to take part in the oral argument and file a new brief on the question. Via Herbert Brownell, the Administration got involved in Brown to a greater extent than it had expected. Brownell recalls that in the preparation of the Justice Department brief, Eisenhower questioned the need to take a stand on the constitutional issue, since the case did not directly involve the Federal government. However, the participation of the Justice Department in the oral argument made it inevitable that the Court would ask Assistant Attorney General J. Lee Rankin about the constitutionality of school segregation.25 On November 27, Brownell filed an amicus curiae brief advising the Supreme Court of its power to outlaw segregation, and recommending that Plessy be struck down.

The reargument of Brown v. Board of Education ended on December 9, 1953; over the next five months Earl Warren and the Supreme Court tried to reach a unanimous decision. They believed anything less than unanimity could have disastrous effects in a controversial and divisive case like this one. The Supreme Court finally rendered its much-awaited decision on May 17, 1954. That Monday, the Court stated the unconstitutionality of segregation as defended in Plessy v.
Ferguson. The verdict defined the universal applicability of the decision. In the decade following the first Brown decision, the Supreme Court struck down segregation of municipal and interstate transportation, housing, public buildings, and recreational and eating facilities.  

While the first Brown decision condemned segregation, it said little on the critical problem of implementation, which was left open until the Court’s next term. The Court hoped that during the hiatus all relevant authorities and the people affected by the decision could agree on a timetable for desegregation responding to the peculiarities of each case. Such large-scale consultation did not happen, as each side decided to wait for the second Brown decision. Extensive discussions between the White House and the Supreme Court created similar confusion. In his essay on Eisenhower’s approach to desegregation, Brownell outlines the enforcement process of the Brown decision suggested by the Administration. Its plan required each school district affected by the decision to submit a desegregation timetable to local district courts within ninety days.  

Above all, Eisenhower wanted Brown II to be a verdict of moderation and compromise that recognized the need for gradual implementation of desegregation in the South.  

The Court announced its verdict on Brown II on May 31, 1955; if possible, the South and the nation as a whole awaited that decision with even more impatience than the first one.
Indeed, the issue of school segregation addressed in Brown I was a clear-cut one for most Americans. However, the issue of implementation addressed by Brown II could become far more explosive. Southern opposition to desegregation had remained somewhat muted in anticipation of the second Brown decision. No one could expect a similar reaction should the Court order to enforce desegregation with any degree of immediacy. For those reasons, both the Supreme Court and Eisenhower handled Brown II as a delicate political decision.

The verdict complied with Administration wishes by giving the power of enforcement to the Federal District Courts, which could better adapt to the needs of each school district. However, the Supreme Court elected to leave a great degree of flexibility to the states, who were expected to undertake the integration of schools "with all deliberate speed." This went against Eisenhower's wish for a strict timetable that would limit the political impact of integration. Deliberate speed could mean almost anything, and was used in the South as a clever device to delay integration. Herbert Brownell argues that the ambiguity of Brown II bred much uncertainty in the South, and "sowed the seeds for violence that ensued at Little Rock and during the administrations of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson."29

There are of course two sides to this story. While Brownell, a genuine supporter of civil rights, blames the racial tensions of the late 1950s on the Supreme Court's
indecision, most committed integrationists and recent historians have instead denounced Eisenhower's appalling lack of leadership on civil rights. \(^{30}\) According to Earl Warren, desegregation would not have sharply divided the country had the White House supported it. \(^{31}\)

The animosity between Eisenhower and the Supreme Court over desegregation stemmed largely from their differing approaches to the enforcement of *Brown v. Board of Education*. In its ruling, the Supreme Court could not be too precise because of the lack of federal legislation on the subject. As Warren argued in his memoirs, the adoption by Congress of remedial legislation twenty years or so prior to the *Brown* decisions would have prevented much of the storm desegregation created. \(^{32}\) Without proper legislative support, the Supreme Court used equivocal language in its opinions. It relied heavily on the willingness of federal authorities to enforce desegregation, and to provide a practical and effective definition of deliberate speed.

In contrast, Eisenhower had hoped for a strict timetable that would commit local school districts to integration while leaving room for gradualism. Eisenhower believed in the success of a local and gradual desegregation. It was the best way of handling the problem at little political cost for him, as the White House carefully tried to avoid public involvement in segregation issues. This equation left out the desire of American blacks for meaningful equality, as well as the
resentment of Southern whites toward the Supreme Court decision. Thus 'deliberate speed' forced the Eisenhower Administration to be a part of the turmoil caused by desegregation, even when it chose to ignore the issue.

After the Brown decision, Eisenhower, in his civil rights policies began moving toward a strategy of symbolism, embodied in the adoption of measures conveying at least the impression that the Administration was making significant advances in its fight against segregation. The previous strategy of dealing only with entities under federal jurisdiction, and yet actively seeking legal and political equality for all Americans, had lost its credibility. Eisenhower's constitutional reservations seem insincere, as the President tried to influence the Supreme Court in its decisions. Furthermore, a strategy of limited accomplishments in restricted areas of federal jurisdiction had provoked sharp criticism from Southerners and black Americans alike. The South encysted itself in a position of virulent defiance of the court order that would culminate in the 1957 Little Rock crisis. In contrast, blacks and other supporters of racial equality denounced Eisenhower's apathy on racial matters. Their anger and frustration culminated after the Emmett Till murder case in 1955.

The shift in Eisenhower's civil rights policies began in April 1956, when Attorney General Brownell presented the Administration's civil rights program. The program outlined
four objectives: 1) the creation of a Civil Rights Commission to investigate civil rights violations and economic pressures resulting from segregation; 2) the creation of a Civil Rights Division in the Justice Department to merge its criminal and non-criminal activities in civil rights matters; 3) the amendment of the voting rights statutes in order to increase federal enforcement powers against state violations; 4) the amendment of other civil rights laws, again to increase federal enforcement powers.³⁵

The last two objectives were the most controversial, for they significantly broadened the powers of the Justice Department. Parts III and IV of this civil rights program would give the Justice Department the authority to prosecute civilly and to prevent voting and other civil rights violations. In other words, both public and private violators would be subject to federal prosecution.³⁶

This new program became the substance of the 1957 Civil Rights Act. Initially, the program reverted to the approach used by previous presidents, who had submitted civil rights legislation to Congress, knowing that it would get stalled and filibustered to death in the Senate. This conveyed the impression of executive action on civil rights, and reaped political benefits for the President. The program was submitted to Congress in April 1956, much too late to expect its enactment into law. Journalists and politicians quickly pointed out the political purpose of Brownell’s proposal: in
a presidential election year, nothing suited the Republicans better than a bitter intra-party fight among Democrats over civil rights. That year, the bill was adopted by the House, but predictably died in Senate committee.

As Eisenhower began his second term, pressures for government action on civil rights were mounting; in 1957, Brownell’s program was submitted again to Congress, although with more sincerity than the year before. Indeed, for reasons that will be discussed in chapters III and IV, civil rights legislation had evolved from a political tool into a necessity. Symbolism became a vital element of Eisenhower’s strategy. For instance, parts III and IV of Brownell’s program, which could broaden the scope of government action considerably, were presented as “suggestions offered by the Attorney General in his capacity as a legal expert.” While this protected Eisenhower politically, it gave the impression that the Administration was flexible on these points. Besides, Eisenhower’s insistence that the bill concentrates on voting rights invited the Senate to further weaken the proposal.

The most damaging blow to the enactment of a comprehensive civil rights bill was delivered by Eisenhower himself on July 3, 1957. Following allegations made the day before by Georgia Senator Richard Russell that the President did not understand the full implications of the bill, Eisenhower admitted at a press conference that he indeed
wanted to consult with Brownell to get some clarifications.\textsuperscript{40} This blooper opened the floodgates for Southern senators, who then proceeded to emasculate the bill. On July 24, Part III of the bill, authorizing the Attorney General to prosecute violations of any civil rights covered in the conspiracy statutes, was struck down. Finally, Part IV, dealing with the prosecution of voting rights violations, was crippled by the proposal of a jury-trial amendment for all federal contempt charges. Since the indictment of a white Southerner by his peers on such charges was at best unlikely, the amendment would invalidate the other provisions of Part IV. Despite Eisenhower's opposition, the Senate adopted the jury-trial amendment on August 1, and approved the watered-down version of the bill six days later.

Public reaction to the bill adopted by the Senate was unanimous in recommending that Eisenhower should veto the bill. Significantly enough, the most virulent opponents of the bill were the leaders of the black community, who felt that this bill was worse than none at all.\textsuperscript{41} Throughout August, the Administration and Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson worked on an acceptable compromise. The adoption of what had become almost a symbolic civil rights bill was vital to both Johnson and the Administration. While the former sought to use the bill as a springboard to the Democratic presidential nomination, the latter needed civil rights legislation to improve its domestic and foreign political prospects. Finally,
a compromise package limiting the jury-trial amendment to voting-rights violations was accepted by the White House, and the bill was adopted by the Senate on August 29, and signed by Eisenhower on September 9.\textsuperscript{42}

In spite of its shortcomings, the 1957 Civil Rights Act remained the first civil rights legislation enacted since Reconstruction, and in that sense constituted a remarkable achievement for Eisenhower. The new Civil Rights Commission and the creation of a Civil Rights division in the Justice Department established a framework for the study and solution of problems in implementing desegregation. But most importantly, the Civil Rights Act was a powerful legislative symbol of the success of his civil rights strategy. The compromise version of the bill passed by the Senate on August 29 was more warmly received by black leaders such as Martin Luther King than the previous version.\textsuperscript{43} Southerners also had little problem accepting the legislation: the presence of the jury-trial amendment and other restrictions appeased most of their worries.\textsuperscript{44} After all, the Senate had succeeded in amending what Eisenhower had called "the mildest civil rights bill possible."\textsuperscript{45}

Eisenhower's attitude during the whole enactment process has puzzled historians. His confession of ignorance about a major bill which had been elaborated within the Administration during the previous eighteen months sounds disingenuous. The withholding of Administration support for Parts III and IV of
the bill even prior to its submission to Congress implied that they were considered expendable. It also left Eisenhower some room to backtrack at the slightest Southern pressure on those sections, which he did in his July 3 press conference. Only when Southern opposition to the bill reached farcical proportions with the jury-trial amendment did Eisenhower reverse his position and decide to fight for that bill after all. In retrospect, it seems that Eisenhower was preoccupied with the symbolic aspects of this legislation. The enactment of any civil rights bill was a visible achievement that could serve either as a basis for future policies or as an inescapable symbol of Administration action.

The Administration's response to the transformation of American race relations seldom translated into executive action. In fact, little in Eisenhower's last three years in office indicated a resolve to build on the legislative power gained from the 1957 Civil Rights Act, especially when that action involved Eisenhower personally. Leadership in those matters was generally confined to the Justice Department, as if the implementation of desegregation was a routine law enforcement activity.

By September 1957, Eisenhower's civil rights policies had evolved from a reliance on restricted government action to one of large-scale symbolism. Neither approach proved to be successful in dealing with desegregation. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the main problem with desegregation was not
its elevation into a constitutional principle, but rather the process of its implementation sketched in *Brown II*. Since May 1955, many Southern states had challenged the Supreme Court order, taking advantage of Eisenhower's reluctance to publicly endorse the decision. His weak commitment to civil rights invited the South to further violate the orders of the Supreme Court, especially after his dissatisfaction with Earl Warren became a matter of public knowledge. Following the fiasco of the Civil Rights Act, it was only a matter of time before Eisenhower's resolve to uphold Brown would be tested.

By Southern standards, Little Rock, the capital of Arkansas, had a positive approach to school integration. It had rapidly prepared a plan of gradual desegregation after the Brown decisions. The plan called for the integration of high schools, junior high schools, and elementary schools in 1957, 1960, and 1963 respectively. In August 1957, however, segregationist pressures led to delays in the entry of eight black students to Little Rock Central High. Democrat Governor Orval Faubus supported the measure and gained an injunction from the County Court halting desegregation. However, an injunction by Federal Judge Robert Davies overruled the previous one and ordered that the integration timetable be respected.

Governor Faubus defied the federal courts by mobilizing the Arkansas National Guard on September 2, with the intent of blocking the black students' access to the schools. Even after
Judge Davies reiterated his orders that integration begin at once, Faubus resisted judicial authorities, arguing that the need to maintain public order motivated his actions. After much haggling between Faubus and Judge Davies, the former was summoned to appear in court on contempt charges. At that point, Faubus asked for a meeting with Eisenhower, in order to explain his side of the story. The Administration debated the wisdom of holding such a meeting. Attorney General Brownell strongly opposed any meeting with Faubus, arguing that he merely wanted to use Eisenhower to buy time. Others, like Assistant to the President Sherman Adams, believed that Faubus should be given a fair chance. Eisenhower sided with Adams on this issue, and agreed to meet Faubus, under the condition that Faubus would comply with court orders.

Eisenhower and Faubus met on September 14 at the Newport Naval Station where the President was vacationing. After Faubus protested that he wanted to obey the Federal court orders, Eisenhower told him that the National Guard would remain on the scene under new orders to enforce the integration of Central High. Should Faubus follow his instructions, Eisenhower would make sure that Judge Davies would not summon the Arkansas Governor to court.

Eisenhower’s notes from the meeting indicate that he was more than fair with Faubus. After all, Faubus was clearly disobeying the Federal court, and by extension, the Constitution. His behaviour revived the old Southern ghost of
nullification, i.e. that states could overrule the Federal government in matters concerning them. Nonetheless, Eisenhower was still hoping to reach a compromise with him. Above all, he tried to avoid a public clash between himself and Faubus: an open conflict could only result in the humiliation of Faubus and a significant political loss for Eisenhower. After a few days, it became clear that Faubus would not keep his part of the agreement: on September 19, the day before his scheduled court appearance, Faubus issued an affidavit of disqualification against Davies on grounds of prejudice.

Faubus's action caused a storm at the White House. That same day, staff secretary Andrew Goodpaster warned Eisenhower that Faubus challenged both the Federal court's order and the President's authority. Indeed, while the matter was still within the jurisdiction of the Court at the moment, it would land on the White House doorstep should Faubus defy an eventual Court order enjoining him to cooperate in the integration of Central High. If Faubus still refused to comply, Goodpaster argued, the Federal government would be obliged "to require Faubus to do so by whatever means may be necessary." Goodpaster recommended that Eisenhower explain the situation on national television prior to any drastic Federal action. Goodpaster's memorandum was the first expression of the Administration's decision to assume its responsibilities in the Little Rock events. However, the sending of troops to enforce the desegregation of Central High
did not begin at once, because the Justice Department wanted to keep law enforcement in local hands.

On September 20, Faubus ordered the removal of the National Guard from Central High. However, he also reiterated his opposition to desegregation, and did not guarantee that state police would try to control eventual mob actions seeking to prevent the entrance of the black students into the high schools. Washing his hands off the whole matter, Faubus then left Arkansas to attend the Southern Governors’s Conference. 53 He left behind a veritable powderkeg: on September 23, as the black students managed to slip into Central High through a side entrance, a large mob surrounded the building and forced the school board to remove them from there for security reasons. School integration in Little Rock had lasted half a day.

As it became evident that control of the situation had been lost, Eisenhower finally decided to intervene. He did so swiftly and forcefully: on the same day that the black students were chased out of Central High, he issued a wide-ranging proclamation stating that further interference with the implementation of desegregation in Little Rock would result in military intervention. The next day, army paratroopers from the 101st Airborne Division arrived in Little Rock to restore order. 54 The decision to send troops in Little Rock was a difficult one for Eisenhower, for it went against his principles on the implementation of desegregation.
In a July 17, 1957, press conference, he had expressed his conviction that under no circumstances would he send Federal troops to enforce integration.\textsuperscript{55}

Eisenhower's civil rights policies had always respected the division between federal and state power. Ambivalence toward school integration and sympathy for the South motivated in part his attempt to be a "moderate among extremists" on the desegregation issue, and the sending of troops hardly constituted a moderate solution to the problem of desegregation.\textsuperscript{56} Finally, the sight of Federal troops enforcing the integration of black schoolchildren damaged the Administration's image both at home and abroad, and undermined its civil rights strategy.\textsuperscript{57}

Eisenhower's address of September 24, 1957, in which he explained the reasons for the military intervention at Little Rock, provides valuable insights into his approach to desegregation. He described the mob violence that led to the intervention as the product of extremists "imported into Little Rock by agitators."\textsuperscript{58} He did not condemn the people of Arkansas or the South for disobeying the Brown rulings. Instead, he mentioned that desegregation was successfully implemented in many places, and that Little Rock was the exception, not the rule, in the Southern response to desegregation.\textsuperscript{59} Again, Eisenhower refused in his message to personally endorse the Supreme Court decisions, and ignored the moral dimensions of the problem. Distancing himself from
Brown, he expressed his sympathy for the South, but made no mention whatsoever of the black schoolchildren at Central High, nor of the multitude of other black Americans who were denied their inalienable constitutional rights at the time. Eisenhower ended his address by discussing the international impact of the Little Rock crisis. He described how the events in Little Rock weakened America in its fight against Communism, and at the United Nations. The Little Rock crisis was seen as "a blot upon the fair name and high honor of our nation in the world."

The duplicity and political opportunism of Orval Faubus had set the limits of Southern opposition to desegregation. Unfortunately, Eisenhower's civil rights policies did likewise to the implementation of desegregation. Though the military intervention at Little Rock was a dramatic development in the history of black civil rights, Eisenhower's subsequent policies indicate that the Little Rock crisis was an exception instead of a turning point in his policies. The lack of a coherent policy on integration had in large part created the Little Rock crisis; yet, no constructive action followed up the strong stance taken at Little Rock, as Eisenhower refused to address the issue. Having made the point that it would not tolerate extreme defiance of Brown and the Federal government, Eisenhower seemed ready to tolerate lesser civil rights violations.

Implementing desegregation was the key civil rights issue
of the decade, but the Administration clung to the idea that the problem would wither away if ignored long enough. Moreover, the intervention at Little Rock was in some ways little more than a cosmetic operation designed to improve the American image overseas. It was a powerful symbol of government enforcement of desegregation at a time when American prestige around the world had hit rock bottom. Once the paratroopers had landed in Little Rock, Eisenhower began making amends to the South with his September 24 address, and his October 1 meeting with Southern governors. At that meeting, four governors representing the Southern Governors' Conference stated their support for Eisenhower's action, in exchange for a promise that as soon as Faubus guaranteed the peaceful integration of Central High, Federal troops would be withdrawn from Little Rock. Federal troops were finally removed on November 7, 1957, leaving behind a powerful symbol of the potential of Federal power to implement desegregation in the South. The Eisenhower Administration elected to leave that potential untapped.

An amazing feature of Eisenhower's civil rights policies involved his reluctance to meet with black leaders, even though he regularly met and corresponded with Southern leaders like James Byrnes. From 1955 onward, as desegregation became a source of turmoil and violence in the South, civil rights advisor Maxwell Rabb and White House staff member E. Frederic Morrow repeatedly suggested that Eisenhower meet with black
leaders. At first, the requested meetings did not take place because the Administration was uncertain of the advisability of such meetings. Its refusal to deal with the black leadership, along with its hesitant public support of racial equality and desegregation, seriously damaged the Administration's image in the black community. Even when the protection of the fundamental rights of black Americans was at stake during the jury-trial amendment controversy, the White House refused to meet with black leaders such as Martin Luther King and A. Philip Randolph, although it seriously considered, at the behest of the State Department, inviting Louis Armstrong, as the trumpeter was about to embark on another world tour.

A meeting between Eisenhower and the black leadership finally took place on June 23, 1958. For that occasion, the White House invited NAACP President Roy Wilkins, Lester Granger of the National Urban League, Martin Luther King, and labor leader A. Philip Randolph. At the meeting, Randolph read a statement describing explicitly the most urgent demands of black Americans in the areas of civil rights, voting rights, and the improvement of the American racial picture. Each of the nine recommendations included in the statement called for Eisenhower's direct and committed involvement in these issues. Although they praised the civil rights achievements of the Administration, the black leaders explained that blacks were nonetheless getting increasingly bitter about their
situation, and expected more action and effort from their President.\footnote{68}

If Eisenhower still harbored any hopes that his civil rights strategy was approved by a majority of black Americans, they were shattered during that meeting. He was dismayed to hear that his moderate policies generated anger and bitterness instead of hope among blacks. Still, he refused to personally endorse any of the recommendations included in the statement read by Randolph. In spite of what the statement said about the need for a planned and comprehensive approach to civil rights, Eisenhower concluded by emphasising the importance of voting rights as the key to all other civil rights problems.\footnote{69}

No significant accomplishments resulted from the meeting. The discrepancy between the proposals of the black leadership and Eisenhower’s narrow conception of civil rights revealed the extent to which the Administration misunderstood the demands of black Americans, who felt that Eisenhower’s weakness and disinterest in civil rights betrayed their hopes. It also underscored that the civil rights policies of the Eisenhower Administration sought to appeal to a multitude of audiences, both at home and abroad, and American blacks were merely one of them.

At the same time that civil rights activists began to use nonviolence and civil disobedience as means to achieve meaningful equality, the Eisenhower Administration, oblivious to all these developments, presented another civil rights
package that would become the 1960 Civil Rights Act. Initially prepared in 1959 by the Departments of Justice, HEW, and Labor, it focused on greater federal involvement in the enforcement of school desegregation, the creation of a federal employment committee, and protection of voting rights, again regarded as the key element of the bill.\textsuperscript{70}

The Administration package encountered stiff competition in Congress, as Senate Majority leader Lyndon Johnson and a group of liberal Congressmen proposed their respective civil rights proposals. The ensuing debate over the various proposals prevented the adoption of a civil rights bill in 1959. As was the case in 1957, the Administration negotiated with Johnson for a package acceptable to both sides. In the end, the compromise version of the 1960 Civil Rights Act discarded federal proposals on desegregation assistance and equal employment opportunity, and did not broaden significantly federal enforcement powers against voting-rights obstruction.\textsuperscript{71} But the enactment of a second civil rights law once again fulfilled Eisenhower's main objective: after the 1957 Civil Rights Act had failed to secure and protect voting rights for Southern blacks, the Administration could show it had responded to the weaknesses in the previous legislation, even if in doing so it had sacrificed the rights of black Americans for the sake of expediency. According to E. Frederic Morrow, Eisenhower failed "to prove that he unequivocally stood for the right of every American to walk this land . . .
with every privilege . . . awarded a citizen of our Constitution." He had refused to fully commit his Administration to the cause of civil rights, except for symbolic gestures or statements in which style was readily divorced from substance.

II

Initially, Eisenhower's civil rights strategy consisted of limited, but effective government action: decisions and pronouncements remained within federal jurisdiction and affected only a limited number of people. As the fight for desegregation moved from the antechambers of the Supreme Court to the streets of American cities, this strategy was replaced by a new approach which took into consideration the international and national implications of what had become a major issue. Eisenhower's civil rights program tried to appeal to as large a section of the American public as possible, while satisfying world opinion. As discussed in section I, he opted for a strategy of limited executive action coupled with publicized legislative achievements such as the 1957 Civil Rights Act: this approach concentrated on the legal and official aspects of racial inequality, and neglected to address social and economic barriers to the implementation of desegregation.

This writer argues that the strategy of symbolic civil rights achievements fulfilled several domestic and global political purposes. It was dictated by the need to appease
Southern worries and anger about integration, while simultaneously convincing black Americans and especially world opinion that desegregation was proceeding with the active support of the Federal government. Since foreign policy factors will be discussed in Chapter IV, this section deals with the impact of domestic political considerations on the civil rights policies of the Administration.

When Eisenhower first campaigned for the presidency, no Republican President had been elected since 1928. The Democratic Party was the majority party both in the White House and Congress, in part because it counted on an extremely solid block of votes in the South. The roots of the Democratic Party had been firmly set in the South after the Civil War, representing the interests of race supremacy. In contrast, the Northern wing of the Democratic Party had become far more liberal in its views, and counted on the support of urban blacks since the Great Depression, when Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal provided them with greater economic opportunities.\textsuperscript{73}

Republican strategists knew that a shift in the balance of power depended on their ability to break the Democratic hold on Southern votes, and hopefully capture the votes of Northern blacks as well. In seeking to capture both, the Republicans pursued conflicting aims; that became especially clear after 1955, when civil rights became a major political issue in the nation. From then on, Republicans courted
assiduously only the Southern constituency. Their efforts produced one of the greatest political realignments in American history, the transformation of the South from the heart of the Democratic Party into a Republican stronghold.

Let us first consider how the Administration related to black voters, and whether that relationship affected its civil rights policies. The Republican Party under Eisenhower made a conscious decision of not actively pursuing the black vote, although there seemed to be several good reasons to reach out to that constituency. In Eisenhower, the party had a candidate who was deeply admired by Americans of all races, regardless of his own views on civil rights. Besides, the issue of civil rights drove a wedge between the Southern and Northern wings of the Democratic Party, and would be even more divisive in the future. Finally, if all other variables remained unchanged, the black vote secured several Northern and Western states, and the border states as well.

Initially, Eisenhower's civil rights policies managed to appeal to black voters without alienating Southerners. After the Brown Supreme Court decisions, however, it became clear that such a course was no longer politically viable. The Administration elected to pursue what former Republican National Committee Chairman Meade Alcorn has called the "Dixie Strategy," which aimed at building up the Republican Party in the South in an attempt to provide a choice to voters. The Dixie strategy resulted in the almost complete neglect of
black voters by the Republicans.\textsuperscript{75}

This neglect of the black vote was not the product of ignorance. In fact, supporters within the Administration of Republican efforts to reach out to black voters, such as Congressional liaison Bryce N. Harlow and civil rights adviser Maxwell Rabb, were impressed by a study appearing in \textit{Congressional Quarterly} assessing Republican prospects for gaining control of the House of Representatives in 1956. The study suggested that success could depend on the ability of the Republican Party to attract black voters. It showed that in 61 out of 315 Northern congressional districts, black voters held at least a theoretical balance of power, i.e. that their percentage was greater than the margin of victory of winning candidates in 1954.\textsuperscript{76} The black vote could play a determining part in other districts as well, and would likely grow in importance over the years, as the number of registered black voters was increasing. Besides, should the number of black voters in the South ever reach normal proportions, constructive civil rights policies could potentially reap significant political rewards there.

Thus the political justifications for a forceful and effective approach to civil rights seemed to be there. Strong civil rights policies could be costly in the South, but Southerners had voted Democratic for the last eighty years anyway. However, Eisenhower concentrated his efforts right from the beginning on winning the South. In 1952, against the
advice of his lieutenants, he decided not to write off the South and to campaign actively in that part of the country as well. Eisenhower's efforts brought unexpected rewards: Democratic strongholds such as Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia voted for Eisenhower in 1952, and Republicans did much better in other Southern states as well, thanks in part to the support of Democratic state governors like Allen Shivers of Texas and James Byrnes of South Carolina.

Republican inroads in 1952 convinced new party Chairman Leonard Hall that, with Eisenhower, the Republican Party could succeed in establishing a viable two-party system in the South while maintaining its Northern support base. These results had been achieved by side-stepping the most controversial issue in Southern politics, civil rights. While in the South, Eisenhower did not mention civil rights issues, and his campaign pronouncements on the subject were vague and inoffensive.

Eisenhower's neglect of the Northern black vote depended on other factors as well. First, the levels of registration among black voters were much lower than the American average. The Congressional Quarterly study pointed out that blacks could hold the balance of power in several congressional districts in 1956 -- "provided they register and vote." In their seminal study of the American electorate, political analysts Richard M. Scammon and Ben Wattenberg have argued that "young people, poor people, and blacks are less likely to
vote than the middle-aged, the wealthy, or whites." In other words, the powerful black vote mentioned in the *Congressional Quarterly* failed to materialize because of the low levels of registration and voter turnout among northern blacks. The average American voter clearly remained white, middle-class, middle-aged, and "middle-minded." The same phenomenon existed at the municipal level: only with the rise of the black middle class and changes in voting regulations in the 1960s and 1970s did the black vote display its power in electing black mayors in major U.S. cities.

Second, the Eisenhower Administration did not want to lose its traditional support. An active effort to seek the black vote might have nullified Eisenhower's Southern campaigning, and even erode traditional bases of Republican support in the North. In his study *The Future of American Politics*, Samuel Lubell defined Eisenhower's Northern constituency as "those Republicans who wanted to defeat the Democrats domestically, while going along with the administration's foreign policy." This constituency included "the businessmen, large and small, the professional, the farmer, the suburbanite, a largely white and Protestant party. They are for slower change, lower taxes and less federal power." In other words, the traditional Republican constituency included the people that were least likely to respond favorably to large-scale federal involvement in civil rights matters.
Lubell's comparison between voter reaction to a F.E.P.C. referendum held in California in 1946 and subsequent party preferences for the 1948 presidential election reveals the nature of the impact of civil rights issues on the American electorate. Whereas the Democratic voters were bitterly divided over the F.E.P.C., "opposition to [it] apparently solidified the Republican ranks . . . No non-Jewish Republican precinct showed a majority for F.E.P.C." Among Italio- and Irish-Americans, "the civil rights vote was almost twice as heavy in the low as in the upper income districts." Since Republican drew most of their ethnic support from the middle and upper middle-class, the impact of government action in the field of civil rights could deprive Eisenhower of traditional northern Republican support as much as it would nullify the "Dixie Strategy."

Thus the Eisenhower Administration made a conscious decision not to seek black votes, believing that such efforts would have been counterproductive. Any additional black support for Eisenhower would not result, therefore, from Administration efforts, but rather from the General's prestige among Americans of all races. In that respect, the early Eisenhower civil rights policies offered optimal political benefits for the Administration. Its discrete achievements and respect of state prerogatives did not upset the South, and yet brought concrete improvements in the rights of black Americans. However, the issue of school desegregation as
stated in the Brown decision provoked different reactions. Southerners, many of whom had voted for Eisenhower in 1952, wrote in massive numbers to denounce in insulting terms Eisenhower's appointment of Earl Warren, and the Brown verdict.86

After 1955, the Eisenhower Administration tried its best to take the politics out of the civil rights issue. Following Brown II, one hundred Southern congressmen had signed the Southern Manifesto, which pledged to uphold racial segregation and fight the Supreme Court on that issue. It was no coincidence that the Manifesto was adopted in an election year, as Dixie politicians performed their own version of the waving of the bloody shirt. More than anything else, the Manifesto indicated the extent to which desegregation could polarize the nation. Eisenhower did not wish to antagonize one section of the country on that issue; instead, he saw his role as that of a conciliator and moderator.87 As a result, the Administration played down its previous achievements, and Eisenhower steadfastly refused to endorse Brown v. Board of Education. Worse, he even tried to dissociate the Administration from the decision: in the drafting of the civil rights plank of the 1956 Republican Party platform, Eisenhower requested a mild plank and even rejected one version which stated that the Administration had supported the Supreme Court ruling on desegregation.88

This attitude dismayed supporters of civil rights in the
Republican Party. Throughout the 1950s, Republican strategists and leaders ignored Eisenhower's civil rights record; only Vice President Nixon openly discussed civil rights, albeit under the cover of attacks on Stevenson's own record. A more typical posture was that of former Arizona Governor Howard Pyle. Pyle, then a White House adviser, proclaimed in speeches that Southerners were in better hands with Eisenhower than with Stevenson, because the former was a temperate man on racial issues. Lacking support from Eisenhower and key Party leaders, the Republicans generally ignored civil rights during the 1956 Presidential campaign, and paid them irregular attention in congressional elections. In its appeals to black voters, the Minority Division of the Republican National Committee mainly blamed Congress for the lack of action on civil rights, and stressed the growing importance of segregationists in the congressional wing of the Democratic Party. However, such efforts addressed a very specific audience and did not become part of the overall campaign strategy.

Eisenhower's wavering support of civil rights did not hurt him politically, because the Democrats were even more sharply divided over civil rights. Whereas the Northern liberal wing of the party advocated progressive civil rights policies, the Southern wing, which dominated Congress at the time, wanted to fight desegregation to the bitter end. The South wielded disproportionate influence in the Democratic
Party, because it constituted the most reliable base of Democratic support in presidential elections. The Democratic presidential candidate, Adlai Stevenson, thus had to perform a difficult balancing act in order to preserve a semblance of unity. His running mate, Estes Kefauver, was a Tennessee Senator who had signed the Southern Manifesto, and his presence on the ticket embodied an attempt to unify a divided political formation. Stevenson's refusal to endorse *Brown v. Board of Education* served a similar purpose.

In that context, the "Dixie Strategy" proved to be successful in presidential elections, as Eisenhower made further inroads in the South. It was less successful in Congress: Eisenhower became in 1956 the first elected President in 108 years to fail to carry a majority in either house of Congress. Democratic control of Congress proved to be especially significant because of the unreliability of Republican support in Congress. Since 1953, the intransigence of the Republican Old Guard had forced Eisenhower to rely on Democratic support for his program, and especially his foreign policy. The need for Democratic support affected Eisenhower's civil rights policy, since a majority of the Democratic leadership were Southerners who, out of principle or political expediency, opposed desegregation under all its forms.

The need to secure Southern support played a significant part in the debate over the 1957 and 1960 Civil Rights Acts. For instance, Eisenhower had extended conversations with
Senators Lyndon Johnson and Richard Russell in which both Senators certainly took advantage of Eisenhower's legislative needs for 1957 to express their views on the civil rights legislation. On June 15 of that year, Johnson told Eisenhower that, as Senate Majority Leader, he would get the fifteen appropriations bills through rapidly, but that the fight over the civil rights bill could last through "July and August and if necessary into September." Likewise, Senator Russell, Chairman of the Senate Armed Forces Committee, impressed upon Eisenhower the need for clarifying amendments to the bill, in exchange for more active support on defence and foreign aid issues." Senatorial pressures complemented the Dixie Strategy in dictating civil rights policies that offered little in terms of tangible achievements. Without a powerful voice in Washington, supporters of civil rights could only watch as the Senate slowly but surely made the 1957 Civil Rights Act an ineffectual piece of legislation.

Overall, the Dixie Strategy indicated that, although civil rights were rapidly becoming the main domestic problem of the 1950s, political considerations actually exerted a restraining influence on Eisenhower's civil rights policies. After the Brown decisions, the Eisenhower Administration faced a critical choice between defending the rights of black Americans and trying to build a national consensus on civil rights, a consensus that would, however, leave out the victims of segregation. This does not mean that there were no
Republicans, black or white, who were fully committed to the cause of civil rights. Their voices, however, were subordinated to the will of the majority of American politicians, and probably Americans at large, who tried to avoid a national crisis by pretending not to see the impending difficulties created by enduring racial inequality.

The Dixie Strategy has had a lasting impact on American politics. The Republican inroads in the South achieved by Eisenhower helped to establish a greater community of views between the South and the Republican party that survived the armed intervention at Little Rock. As the race issue began splitting the Democratic coalition at the seams, Southern conservatives lost control of their party at the hands of the Northern liberal wing, and began looking for a political home. By the mid-1960s, the racial issues Eisenhower had avoided addressing flared up with the radicalization of the civil rights movement and the eruption of large-scale racial violence in Northern cities as well as in the South. In the midst of this polarization of American society, the Republican party became a magnet for the conservative elements of society. The Dixie Strategy has since been used by all Republican Presidents to build a winning coalition around issues of law and order, neo-Conservative economic policies, and neglect of racial problems.
CHAPTER THREE
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN AFRICA UNDER EISENHOWER

Since the Second World War, contradictory developments have affected international relations: while an amazing number of new nation-states have come into existence, world power has been extremely polarized, due to the Cold War opposing the United States to the Soviet Union. Until very recently, superpower rivalry assumed global dimensions and shaped political developments worldwide. As the world's greatest power, the United States translated its world leadership into an active foreign policy seeking to prevent Communist expansion anywhere.

The most significant transformation in the world picture has been the decolonization of the Third World and its emergence as an important and autonomous actor in world affairs. Between 1945 and 1975, vast European colonial empires were swept away by the rising tide of Third World nationalism, and replaced by a multitude of autonomous nation-states. Nowhere was the change more drastic than in Africa. In 1950, there were only four sovereign nation-states on the continent (Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, and South Africa): their number now exceeds forty, and may still be subject to an increase. The bulk of this rapid political growth took place between 1957 and 1963, following the independence of Ghana in 1957.

This chapter studies American foreign policy in Africa under Eisenhower. Little has been written on the subject;
students of that topic have generally deplored his policies (or lack thereof). They have condemned Eisenhower's disinterest in Africa, and the reactionary outlook of his foreign policy in the Third World.¹ To use the words of Jean Herskovits, an early analyst of Eisenhower's policies, sub-Saharan Africa was simply the "lowest priority" on the American foreign policy agenda, and the aspirations of Africans were largely ignored.² Most scholars have agreed with that statement, and have argued that the United States was a spectator to the political upheavals of the 1950s.

Contrary to these views, this chapter contends that Africa became a high priority area for American foreign policy in the 1950s because of the magnitude of the changes taking place on that continent at the time. Within a short timespan, the decolonization of Africa fostered a great number of nation-states that were not bound to the United States by any economic or military alliance. In the Cold War context, these changes raised serious concerns about the uncertain future of Western interests there. Such concerns were fuelled by the growing Soviet interest in the area, evidenced by large-scale economic and propaganda offensives during the mid-1950s. From 1955 onward, it was precisely the unpredictability of the future orientation of a decolonized Africa, compounded by the lack of knowledge of Africa among American policymakers, which motivated American foreign policy, and made of Africa a key American strategic concern. Although American interests in
Africa were real and tangible, the increasing importance of Africa in U.S. foreign policy under Eisenhower thus depended more on global considerations than on the intrinsic value of the continent.

The chapter is divided into three parts: Part I assesses the political, military, and economic stakes in Africa during the 1950s. Originally, American involvement in Africa was somewhat limited; however, as the European grip on that continent loosened, the importance of real and potential United States interests in Africa grew dramatically. Part II surveys the evolution of American foreign policy in Africa under Eisenhower, and presents the main issues facing American foreign policymakers. Finally, part III discusses how the Eisenhower Administration handled the most complex problem in Africa, South Africa and its policy of apartheid.

I

During the early 1950s, American stakes in Africa became more important than ever. Prior to that period, Africa was considered to be safely under the control of the European colonial powers allied to the United States, and attracted limited American interest. In the postwar period, however, the forces of nationalism broke up European colonial empires, first in Asia, and then in Africa as well. The overriding issue in U.S. foreign policy in Africa during the 1950s was African anticolonialism, and the American response to it. The abrupt end of European colonial rule forced the United States
to reconsider its policies in the Third World, and to chart its own course by taking into account the imminent reality of African independence and its impact on U.S. interests.

The military and strategic importance of Africa was the most obvious issue to Americans. Under European control, Africa did not pose security problems for the United States; however, an independent Africa could disrupt American security, should U.S. policy fail to deal with the acute problem of decolonization. A March 1954 paper prepared for the National Security Council (NSC) outlined the main African problems relevant to American security. The colonial question was at the center of most problems: without a concerted colonial policy, the United States would have difficulties tackling two potentially major African problems, economic development and Communist infiltration. ¹

From a military standpoint, the issues of base and transit rights, and of access to African raw materials and manpower were of paramount importance. ² Military facilities in Egypt, Morocco, Ethiopia and South Africa played a key part in American security policy in the Indian Ocean and the Middle East. Within the Cold War context, they could become highly valuable against Soviet encroachments in independent Africa. Because of its proximity to Europe and the Middle East, North Africa was the focus of U.S. military facilities in Africa.

Africa also provided raw materials that were vital to American security. For instance, large uranium deposits found
in South Africa and the Belgian Congo were of critical importance in the atomic age. Other strategic minerals for which the United States depended at least in part on African deposits included cobalt, diamonds, manganese, and copper. These resources were also important as a source of raw materials to which the Soviet Union did not have access.

The strategic importance of Africa in the 1950s depended upon the international context. Since the end of World War II, Cold War tensions had dominated world politics, involving the United States and the Soviet Union in a rivalry that transcended geographical and political boundaries. The contest between the superpowers reached a stalemate in Europe by the mid-1950s, and moved on to other battlefields. In that context, the strategic importance of Africa and the Third World in the global balance of power increased dramatically. For the United States, the importance of Africa remained largely negative in nature: the major objective of American strategy was to immunize Africa against Communist infiltration after decolonization.

Economic stakes in Africa were not as pressing as strategic ones, but could potentially become much higher. Initially, Africa was seen as a source of raw materials for American military or industrial production. The depletion of American natural resources presaged a greater dependency on foreign sources, and U.S. investments in Africa (which quadrupled from a very low base during the 1950s) focused on
resource exploitation ventures. American trade with Africa was at an embryonic stage during the fifties and remained far smaller than elsewhere. Except for natural resources such as oil, rubber, uranium, and manganese, the African contribution to the American economy in the early 1950s was measured in terms of its potential. Human and natural resources guaranteed that this contribution could only grow over the years.

For the United States, the political importance of Africa in 1950 was slim. After all, almost the entire continent remained under European control, and anticolonial forces seemed much weaker there than in other places. During the 1950s, however, the importance of African political problems in U.S. foreign policy grew exponentially. Even before decolonization, America faced significant political dilemmas, and tried to provide solutions moderate enough to accommodate their European allies, and yet imaginative enough to secure the support of African states and nationalist movements.

A major American concern was the nature of the relations between the metropolitan powers and their colonies. The last colonial empires belonged to European allies of the United States. Relations between America and these states, France and Great Britain in particular, were already quite complicated by European matters. The United States did not want to jeopardize the stability of its European alliances by dictating a colonial policy to its allies; instead, the colonial powers were given a free hand in the management of their colonies.
American policy on colonialism during the early postwar period was thus subordinated to European considerations, and questioned the virtues of political sovereignty for Africa. In November 1953, Henry Byroade, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, sternly warned about the danger of "premature independence" for colonial areas. He argued that Africans had yet to be able to cope with the forces of nature on their own, and that they would be seriously harmed by premature independence.¹⁰ Byroade suggested instead a course of gradual independence, during which colonial areas could prepare themselves for self-government, and get ready to assume the responsibilities as well as the privileges of sovereignty, for independence itself could not be a cure-all for the problems of Africa.¹¹

Byroade's warning against premature independence responded to the political environment surrounding decolonization. The need to accommodate European allies greatly influenced American policy, and dictated a strategy of unrestricted gradualism on colonial issues. Gradualism could also stabilize Africa: in contrast, rapid decolonization could create conditions favorable to Soviet intervention.¹² The United States, in spite of its own revolutionary past and of the Atlantic Charter (1941), thus failed to side entirely with Africans on the colonial issue, and tried instead to steer a middle course that could satisfy Africans while appeasing its European allies. Though a failure of this middle-of-the-road
strategy could have catastrophic consequences, the U.S. still preferred to accommodate Europe than to fully address the problem of colonialism in Africa.

The glaring lack of direct knowledge about Africa affected American policies: until the creation of the Bureau of African Affairs in the State Department in 1958, African matters were handled by both the European and the Near East and Asian Bureaus, which did not coordinate their activities. Officers from the European Bureau handling colonial matters naturally tended to view the colonial problem from the standpoint of the European powers.\textsuperscript{13} The American assessment of the colonial situation in Africa was influenced by unrealistic assumptions about gradual decolonization. No consensus existed as to the length of the decolonization process. Viewpoints such as Byroade's indicate that the State Department assumed as late as in 1953 that colonial rule in Africa might last for another twenty years, if not more. Even two years later, eighteen months away from the independence of Ghana, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs George Allen estimated that "within the next ten years we shall face in Africa South of the Sahara the same acute dilemma of colonialism that we are presently facing in Asia and North Africa."\textsuperscript{14}

While insufficient knowledge of Africa affected most American estimates of the Africar situation, it must be said that the continent evolved at a frantic pace during the 1950s.
The evolution depended on the rapid economic and political progress made by African colonies since World War II, and on the impact of Third World nationalism which, within fifteen years, shattered the colonial hold on Asia and Africa. By their own admission, U.S. foreign policymakers could not adequately measure the strength nor the speed of this evolution, which magnified the future prospects of Africa.

II

The lack of a coherent policy on colonialism revealed serious divisions within the Eisenhower Administration. The initial Administration policy stressed the importance of not jeopardizing American relations with France or Britain over colonial questions. Influential Cabinet members like Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey went even further in suggesting that the United States should discourage decolonization, on the grounds that Africa should wait to be economically viable prior to even considering independence. According to Humphrey, the United States should only support African independence when there would be a "reasonable adherence to our fundamental concepts and even a fair pretence of the protection of private property and the preservation of individual incentives." Collectively, the Administration more or less endorsed the position stated by Henry Byroade, warning Third World nationalists about the dangers of premature independence. Eisenhower did not oppose decolonization, but it
involved too many complications for American foreign policy in Europe to be wholeheartedly supported. Economic considerations also inhibited the Administration's position on colonial issues. The safety of American investments in the Third World required political and social stability, which colonial rule could better provide than any African nationalist government feeling its way while still euphoric over achieving independence.

The Administration's distrust of Third World nationalism strengthened its support of colonial rule in Africa. In a 1986 article, Robert J. McMahon argued that the positive outlook of Eisenhower revisionists on U.S. foreign policy in the 1950s is seriously undermined by American policies in the Third World during that period. Those policies "insisted on viewing the Third World through the inevitable distorting lens of a Cold War geopolitical strategy that saw the Kremlin as the principal instigator of global unrest."" in Latin America and the Middle East, the American fear of nationalism led to indirect military intervention through covert operations orchestrated by the CIA and Eisenhower himself."

The gradualist American stance on colonialism rested on the assumption that colonial problems would be best handled by the metropolitan powers, and that the United States should not interfere in the problems of its allies. An extreme example of Administration policy was its reaction to the Algerian civil war. Since 1954, Algeria had been fighting for its
independence against France, which did not want to give up what it officially considered to be an overseas department rather than a colony. The length and ferocity of the conflict created a major political crisis in France and shocked world public opinion. In spite of mounting criticism at home, epitomized by John F. Kennedy’s resounding speech on the subject, Eisenhower stuck to the position of deploring the events in Algeria without getting involved in the dispute. The United States followed the French justification that the war was not a colonial conflict, but instead a French internal matter. Comparing the case of Algeria with the peaceful independence of Tunisia and Morocco, the Administration argued that only the metropolitan power itself could provide a satisfactory solution to the crisis. In one of his last decisions as President, Eisenhower refused in December 1960 to recognize the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, leaving a vivid example of his unwillingness to uphold the legitimacy of African independence when it went against the desires of European allies.

Distrust of African nationalism was fuelled by the bipolar worldview animating American foreign policy at the time. The Cold War outlook was particularly dominant in American, Soviet and Chinese policies in the Third World. Paradoxically enough, Africa was in the 1950s the area where Communist infiltration was least likely, and nationalist leaders were least concerned about taking sides in the Cold
War. Instead, African leaders seemed more interested in a policy of neutralism, and most of them would pursue, at least officially, a neutralist foreign policy after independence. The Eisenhower Administration, which did not hide its distaste for neutralism, was initially hostile to African nationalism because it threatened the main objective of Eisenhower's policies, i.e. the political stability of Africa.

In his study of U.S. foreign policy in Africa, Thomas J. Noer has argued that the Administration neglected the aspirations and concerns of Africans until it began a "diplomatic reassessment" in 1957. Only then did his Administration undertake a series of political and organizational steps to acknowledge the rise of Africa as an American diplomatic interest. According to Noer, the reappraisal of American policy originated from both domestic and international political developments. On the international scene, the breach with France and Great Britain over the Suez crisis, as well as the progress to independence of several African colonies, moved American policy towards a less pro-colonial outlook. Within America, Noer finds an increase in popular interest in Africa, reinforced by the success of the civil rights movement, and fuelled by the presidential ambitions of leading politicians such as Vice President Richard Nixon and Democratic Senator John F. Kennedy.

This writer has perceived a similar evolution in American foreign policy in Africa, although the change in policy
antedated 1957 and was caused by a wider range of factors. Under Eisenhower, the containment of Communist expansion guided American policies in the Third World. During the colonial period, the Soviet presence in Africa was far more elusive and intangible than elsewhere, and accordingly American interest in the area remained low. Around 1955, however, the Soviet Union launched an economic offensive in the Third World; by February 1956, the Soviet Union had extended credits surpassing $1 billion to countries in the Middle East and South Asia, along with substantial technical assistance. American policymakers took this quite seriously, for they realized that industrial production in the USSR was rapidly increasing during the late 1950s and allowed for a more flexible foreign economic policy. While this early offensive was oriented towards the Middle East (including Egypt) and Asia, the Eisenhower Administration fully understood the strategic implications of Soviet moves for the decolonization of Africa. From March 1956 on, the Economic Intelligence Committee of the Council of Foreign Economic Policy reported the evolution of Sino-Soviet economic activities in the Third World, and later noted evidence of Soviet economic activity in Sub-Saharan Africa, immediately following the independence of Ghana and Guinea.

The Soviet economic offensive awakened the United States to the reality of Africa's rise in world politics. The same global considerations which had shaped the policy of
supporting the colonial powers now dictated a more realistic approach to the decolonization of Africa. While the overall objective of preserving the stability of the continent remained unchanged, the threat of Soviet penetration in Africa instilled a sense of urgency which led to a more accommodating policy toward African nationalism.

The American response to African nationalism was also affected by the Suez crisis, which revealed the bankruptcy of the pro-colonial policies Eisenhower had advocated heretofore. The nationalization of the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956 by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser followed the withdrawal of the American offer to finance the construction of the Aswan Dam. The nationalization was deeply resented in Western Europe, and by the U.S. government as well, for it placed the Western world in a position of "subservient dependence on Egyptian control of the waterways." Indeed, control of the Suez Canal seemed essential to states like Great Britain and France, which received the bulk of their oil requirements through the Canal. Attempts to restore Western control of the Canal without alienating Nasser failed miserably, and ended with the joint invasion of Egypt by Israel, Britain and France in late October 1956. Facing an outright attempt to regain control of the Canal by force, Eisenhower forcefully opposed the schemes of America's three closest allies and supported the intervention of the United Nations in solving the crisis.

While many have hailed Eisenhower's reaction to the Suez
crisis as his finest hour as President,²⁹ the fact remains that he had no viable alternative. The recklessness of his allies, and previous intransigent American policies toward Egypt, forced his hand by leaving no room for compromise and negotiation: he could only oppose or endorse the invasion.

There were two other factors which played a significant part in influencing Eisenhower's decision. First, the Suez invasion was condemned unanimously by the Afro-Asian states at the United Nations, leaving France, Britain and Israel standing alone in front of world public opinion. The condemnation preoccupied Eisenhower a great deal, leading him to stand tall against any foreign invasion of Egypt.

The second factor affecting Eisenhower's decision involved the international context, shaken up at the time by the Soviet invasion of Hungary as well as the Suez Crisis. While the United States could do little about the tragic events taking place in Hungary, except for a symbolic denunciation of Soviet imperialism, American inaction on the Suez Crisis would not be tolerated by the world community. As Eisenhower said in his October 31, 1956 address on the events in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, "there can be no peace— without law. And there can be no law— if we were to invoke one code of international conduct for those who oppose us—and another for our friends."³⁰ Thus the United States had no choice but to condemn the French-British-Israeli invasion of Egypt; failure to do so would have sanctioned Soviet military
intervention anywhere in its own sphere of influence.

Eisenhower's support of the U.N. against his natural allies bolstered American prestige in the Third World, and set the limits of American cooperation with the colonial powers. The Suez crisis attested to the power of Third World nationalism embodied by Nasser: colonial powers were stymied by a relatively new state with only limited power, but one which successfully upheld its territorial and political integrity.

The Suez crisis set a precedent of American action on behalf of the Third World against the metropolitan powers. As he had done on previous occasions, Eisenhower directed American action through the United Nations. Though the target of much domestic criticism, the U.N. served Eisenhower well: he often used it as an international forum to showcase to the world the lofty ideals of American policy with proposals such as "Atoms for Peace" in December 1953. During the 1950s, however, the United Nations experienced a spectacular growth in its membership, following the breakup of European colonial empires. The balance of numerical power at the U.N. became disproportionately tilted toward the Afro-Asian countries, to the extent that the Soviet Union, if it received proper support from a solid Afro-Asian bloc, could literally control the United Nations.

In the first half of the decade, the United States repeatedly sided with its European allies on colonial issues.
As the number of Third World U.N. members increased, however, American foreign policy had to respond more sympathetically to African grievances, and stop subordinating African problems to European ones. In an indirect way, U.N. arithmetic also contributed to the elaboration of a genuine African policy for the Eisenhower Administration. Constantly guided by Cold War considerations, Eisenhower's African policies after 1957 sought "to hold the emerging African nations on our side of the fence," for the United States had a vested interest in keeping the Soviet Union out of Africa.11

The growing American interest in Africa involved more than the Eisenhower Administration. In Congress, politicians such as Representative Frances Bolton, and Senators Mike Mansfield and John F. Kennedy called for a revision of U.S. foreign policy in Africa, based on the inevitability of African independence.12 Africa got the attention of American intellectuals as well: liberal writers in particular found similarities between African nationalism and their own values of democratic, humanitarian progress. Likewise, Afro-Americans linked the civil rights crusade at home with the struggle for independence in Africa, making them part of a single combat.13 The creation of African studies programs in universities also generated greater interest and knowledge about Africa; however, most of that expertise was untapped by the Eisenhower Administration in the elaboration of its African policies.

Most of all, however, the change in American policy
toward Africa was provoked by the Africans themselves, who literally forced their way onto the U.S. foreign policy agenda. The rapid development of African nationalism defied all schemes of gradual independence, and left the rest of the world scrambling for new policies dealing with the political emancipation of almost an entire continent. In that respect, all concerned, and especially the United States, ventured into unknown territory. The 1957 trip to Africa made by Vice President Nixon and the creation of an African Bureau in the State Department a year later were symptoms of the rising importance of Africa in American foreign policy.

By 1957, the Eisenhower Administration realized the acute need for a coordinated American foreign policy on Africa, independent of European considerations, which could respond to future political developments. Like most of the foreign policy-making process under Eisenhower, the new African policy was elaborated and discussed at the National Security Council, rather than the State Department. NSC 5719 and its companion report, NSC 5719/1, discussed extensively the nature of American interests in Africa, summed up current American policies, and presented the main problems and issues that could potentially undermine them.

NSC 5719 defined general and specific American interests in Africa. General American interests were geopolitical: the likely rise of an independent Africa in the near future vastly increased the influence of the continent in world affairs, and
American policies could greatly influence the political alignment of these new states. The report recommended that the United States encourage close cooperation between metropolitan powers and their colonies in their efforts to achieve self-government. It also urged the establishment of mutually advantageous economic relationships between Europe and Africa lasting beyond the colonial period. The possibility of an integral European pullout after decolonization raised much concern, as it could easily orient African nationalism toward the Soviet bloc.

Specific American interests in Africa South of the Sahara revolved around economic development, political stability, and the denial of the area to Communist control. The importance of Africa as a source of raw materials was already a given in American policy; the report emphasised the need for wider trade with Africa, and for large American investments there. American economic policies should encourage the economic development of black Africa, not only as an end in itself, but also "as an important factor contributing to democratic political evolution."

American strategic and political interests in Africa changed little with decolonization: the strategic value of Africa varied with the extent of Communist presence on the continent. NSC 5719 presented the need for political stability as the cardinal objective of American policy. Ultimately the American position was to secure "orderly political evolution
in Africa South of the Sahara. NSC 5719 identified the conflict between nationalism and colonialism as the key issue in Africa, and recommended a moderate American policy on the subject. The United States supported orderly and gradual evolution toward self-government, but disapproved of radical nationalism and harsh colonial policies.

While the report did not turn American policy in Africa upside down, it departed from the previous strategy of systematically favoring European rule over African independence. This modest shift in American policy responded to the rapid rise of African nationalism after 1956. NSC 5719 anticipated the rapidity of political change in Africa: no projections were made beyond the year 1960, because a useful long-term study of sub-Saharan Africa was not considered feasible at the time.

NSC 5719/1 described the potential problems facing the United States in each area of sub-Saharan Africa. It highlighted a major obstacle to the formulation of a coherent American policy: the geographical, political and cultural complexity of Africa showed the impracticality of a continental policy. Instead, American foreign policy in Africa had to be as flexible as possible, even though American knowledge of Africa was almost nonexistent.

Policies outlined in NSC 5719 were updated in NSC 5818, mainly in response to developments in the Middle East. That year, the formation of the United Arab Republic, the overthrow
of a pro-American regime in Iraq, and a constitutional crisis in Lebanon transformed the political landscape of the Middle East, leading up to American military intervention in Lebanon. The show of force did little, however, to appease concerns about the stability of the Middle East. As a result, the strategic importance of maritime and aerial communications throughout Africa considerably increased.41

NSC 5818 also updated the NSC's assessment of the Communist threat in sub-Saharan Africa. While Communism stirred up little trouble there at the time, the report discerned instances of Communist influence in the area. It argued that Soviet inroads in Africa were especially successful among students, largely because the U.S.S.R. had succeeded in presenting an anti-colonial, non-European image.42 In that respect, shaky positions on colonialism and apartheid greatly impeded American foreign policy in black Africa.

Overall, NSC 5818 attested to the growing stature of Africa in world politics, and reasserted the need for an independent U.S. foreign policy in Africa. The elaboration of Eisenhower's African policy became from 1958 onward a frequent topic in National Security Council discussions. Minutes from NSC meetings reveal that in order to preserve political stability in Africa, the United States was willing to deal with a great variety of regimes.

Because independent Africa lacked the infrastructures needed for stable development, American policy in Africa
emphasised less conventional means to attain stability than in other regions. For instance, the American military bases existing elsewhere were not established in most parts of Africa. In an August 7, 1958 meeting, Eisenhower strongly argued that military bases or defensive alliances were of little use in Africa. He recommended instead that the United States first work "through [economic], education and cultural relations" in order to establish American interests in the newly independent countries. That policy proved to be wise in Morocco, where the withdrawal of American forces was negotiated amicably, and Moroccan support of U.S. policies remained high.

In a similar vein, Vice President Nixon argued that American foreign policy "must work toward a continuation of independent national neutralism in Africa South of the Sahara." New states like Ghana and Guinea opted for a neutralist foreign policy in part because they did not want to bring the Cold War into their continent. Nixon also favored the abandonment of strict military alliances for more informal ties in which the emerging African states would not feel that the U.S. was wrestling away their recently gained sovereignty.

The American desire for political stability in Africa concealed another fundamental objective: that the United States sought above all to stop Communist infiltration. In doing so, American foreign policy faced a serious dilemma: its objectives of stability, democracy, and economic development
could not be fulfilled simultaneously in the disorganized post-colonial societies comprising sub-Saharan Africa. By 1960, it had become evident that stability overshadowed all other American concerns, to the extent that the Eisenhower Administration and its successors had no qualms about supporting an anti-Communist military dictatorship.\(^46\)

Minutes from the NSC meetings convey the impression that the Eisenhower Administration knew little about Africa, and based its policies on simplistic and ethnocentric assumptions. For instance, NSC discussions dwelt extensively on the political irrationality of Africans, whose political outlook was allegedly shaped by superstitions.\(^47\) It seems that certain members of the Eisenhower Administration drew most of their knowledge of Africa from Edgar Rice Burroughs.

The elaboration of an independent African policy presented greater complications than the previous policy of supporting the colonial powers. Few Administration members had ever been to Africa, and fewer knew the continent well. The creation of the Bureau of African Affairs in the State Department in 1958 failed to significantly improve the situation. In fact, since most senior officials in the African Bureau were European specialists, they opposed any significant revision of American policy.\(^48\)

Accordingly, Eisenhower relied on informal advisers for expertise on African matters. One of them was Vice President Nixon, who had visited Africa in 1957, and met with some of
the new African leaders, including Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. Nixon's report of his African trip constituted the first official statement from an Administration member calling for substantial changes in U.S. policies in Africa and alluding to the strategic importance of Africa in future international relations. The report also mentioned that successful U.S. policies in Africa depended in part on America's domestic policies, especially in the field of race relations.⁴⁹

While Nixon was well-versed in the political implications of American foreign policy in Africa, his background on other aspects of American-African relations left something to be desired. Advisers such as Clarence Randall and Maurice Stans provided Eisenhower with more useful information about Africa itself. Randall, the former president of Inland Steel Co., had been appointed Chairman of the Council of Foreign Economic Policy by Eisenhower; during his tenure he travelled across Africa and became well acquainted with the conditions that prevailed there. His reports recommended major reappraisals of American policies on colonialism and economic development in Africa.⁵⁰ Genuinely concerned about the development of Africa, Randall's effectiveness as an adviser within the Administration was diminished by his de-emphasis of strategic factors in Africa, and his opposition to American support of anti-Communist dictators in Africa. At the NSC meeting of June 18, 1959, he denounced the Administration's complacency over what he called "the biggest issue which he had heard discussed
in this body for a very long time."\textsuperscript{51}

Eisenhower's condonation of Third World military takeovers attested to the sacrosanct importance of the anti-Communist credo in his foreign policy. The fear of Communist infiltration animated U.S. policies in the Third World, often at the expense of wiser counsel. Budget Director Maurice Stans, one of Eisenhower's informal advisers on Africa, argued that the magnitude of the economic problems of independent Africa required swift, large-scale multilateral action. Stans suggested that the United States "cooperate with the USSR in ... the tremendous undertaking" of modernizing the African economy.\textsuperscript{52} The suggestion was dropped for two reasons: first, the African economy was not the primary area of American interest there. Second, Eisenhower wished to avoid cooperating with the USSR on African problems, since a primary objective of U.S. policy was to keep the Soviets out of Africa. Such rationales prevailed with Eisenhower as the United States became embroiled in the Belgian Congo.

1960 was "The Year of Africa:" that year, seventeen new countries were born in Africa out of the dismantling of the colonial empires. While most ex-colonies were prepared for self-government, the independence of the Belgian Congo came abruptly. The Congo constituted an extreme example of unpreparedness for independence: under Belgian colonial rule, native Congolese were denied a decent education, had no access to government jobs and army officer positions, and were
bitterly divided along tribal lines. Thus, in spite of all its mineral wealth (copper, uranium), the Congo lacked the tools and the infrastructure necessary for stable self-government.

The official independence of the Congo, declared on June 30, 1960, was immediately followed by civil unrest. On July 5, Congolese soldiers mutinied against their Belgian officers, leading to the destabilization of the country. Six days after the mutiny began, Moïse Tshombe announced the secession of the rich Katanga province, and Belgian paratroopers intervened in the Congo on a "pacification" mission.

At that point, the United States became involved in the Congo crisis. The Eisenhower Administration decided to work toward a United Nations settlement, refusing to assist the government of Patrice Lumumba. Following the adoption of a first U.N. Resolution urging the withdrawal of Belgian troops, and Belgium's refusal to comply with it, Lumumba announced on July 14 the suspension of diplomatic relations with Belgium. More importantly, he also contacted Khrushchev, suggesting that he might request Soviet assistance in the near future.

The United States saw in Lumumba's message to Khrushchev the proof of his Communist sympathies: the Eisenhower Administration believed that Lumumba was an African Castro, and that he had to be stopped. The American response consisted of working through the U.N. to prevent Soviet infiltration of the Congo, and of supporting Lumumba's
opponents in their efforts to replace him. A United Nations Security Council Resolution passed on July 14 created a multinational expeditionary force, which was sent to the Congo to restore order and to limit unilateral foreign involvement there. None of the great powers contributed soldiers to the U.N. force, which relied mostly on African troops. Although the U.N. action was in theory neutral, it clearly supported American interests in the Congo; the United States contributed by airlifting all troops and communication equipment to the Congo. The Soviet Union was deliberately not kept abreast of developments in the Congo, to the extent that the top Soviet delegate at the U.N., Georgi Arkadiev, was informally excluded from Hammarskjold's staff meetings on the Congo situation.

The alleged objective of U.S. policy in the Congo was to keep the Cold War out of Africa by settling the Congo crisis through the U.N. However, available evidence indicates that the United States waged the Cold War in the Congo via the United Nations, which conferred an aura of worldwide support for American denunciations of Soviet interference in the Congo. Khrushchev's decision to unilaterally provide military and technical assistance to Lumumba undermined his position vis-à-vis the Afro-Asian bloc at the United Nations: in contrast, the behind-the-scenes approach adopted by the United States achieved its more limited objective of simply preventing a Soviet takeover of the Congo. The American approach was met more favourably by the African states
precisely because it worked through the United Nations and was at least theoretically subject to African control. The United States cleverly exploited the expression "keeping the Cold War out of Africa;" whereas African leaders like Kwame Nkrumah took it as a promise of no superpower rivalry on the African continent, the Eisenhower Administration used it as the basis of a policy seeking to exclude the Soviet Union from Africa.

Eisenhower's policies indicated a willingness to settle for a "neutralist" Congo, insofar as it opposed Communist expansion. The Congo crisis demonstrated again that Eisenhower's foreign policy regarded Africa as an area where the stakes were largely negative in nature, and where neutralism could be tolerated.

American policy during the Congo crisis also revealed the limits of its commitment to democratic rule in the Third World. The nationalist policies of Patrice Lumumba went against American interests, and Eisenhower responded accordingly. Though the claim that Eisenhower ordered Lumumba's assassination is a contentious one, the fact remains that the political neutralization of Lumumba constituted a major objective of American policy. The Katanga secession underscored Lumumba's incapacity, or anyone's for that matter, to keep the Congo united. The United States encouraged the secessionists and other opponents of Lumumba, and actively sought a change in government, despite the fact that Lumumba had been democratically elected. The discrepancy between
American opposition to Lumumba and subsequent support of Joseph Mobutu epitomized Eisenhower's foreign policy in the Third World. Based on Cold War orthodoxies, American policy in Africa subordinated all considerations to the preservation of political stability. Policies were only developed in reaction to real or alleged instances of Communist infiltration, and nationalism was often misinterpreted as Communism. In the Congo and elsewhere, such policies often placed the United States alongside the colonial powers and reactionary regimes.

It has been argued that the Congo crisis constituted a turning point in U.S. foreign policy: opposition to Lumumba reversed the previous pattern of acceptance of Third World nationalism that had characterized Eisenhower's policies since 1957. Viewed from another angle, however, the American reaction to the Congo crisis was consistent with Eisenhower's previous African policy. American policy in the Congo responded to global considerations rather than local ones: it was the threat of Soviet intervention, rather than civil strife in the Congo, that led to American involvement. The Belgian Congo constituted the first test of the American resolve to stop Communist expansion in Africa, and could become a powerful Cold War symbol like Cuba.

The American record in the Congo crisis also followed the previous policy pattern of stressing the preservation of the status quo, if not political stability, in the Third World. In places like the Congo, where social and political chaos were
tearing the country apart, American policy tended to favor the establishment of authoritarian, anti-Communist regimes.

III

The transition from colonial status to sovereignty produced significant upheavals in African society and politics. The most explosive situation on the continent existed in the most economically advanced African state, the Union of South Africa. The South African system of apartheid, based on the separation of the races under white minority rule, was criticized around the world, especially after several African territories gained independence. South Africa was regarded as a bastion of the old order, and became the test of the world's commitment to racial equality.

U.S. involvement in South Africa was substantial: by 1956, American investments in South Africa totalled over 300 million dollars, principally in gold, uranium, and diamond mining operations.65 Its strategic location astride the Cape sea route made South Africa a great military and commercial asset as an alternative to the Suez Canal route.66 As the most Westernized and industrialized state on the African continent, white South Africa was a strong anti-Communist bulwark. Social conditions in South Africa, however, magnified the threat of a Communist takeover following the end of white rule, more so than in colonial Africa. The strong anti-Communist character of the Pretoria regime made it a natural ally of the United States, to the extent that the latter failed to consider
militant South African black nationalism as anything but a threat to its economic and strategic interests. 67

Under Eisenhower, American policy on South Africa indirectly supported white rule and tried to avoid Pretoria's political isolation from the world community. The U.S. worked to appease the denunciation of apartheid by the nascent Afro-Asian bloc at the United Nations, and in exchange hoped for South African concessions on apartheid. Without such concessions, the South African policy of the United States could become morally and politically bankrupt.

That the Americans were fully aware of the political impact of apartheid cannot be denied. As early as 1953, the U.S. Embassy in South Africa presented to the State Department a list of essential steps to eradicate apartheid. The despatch advocated the establishment of an official consultative machinery between the Pretoria government and its non-white population. 68 It also recommended the abolition of the controversial "pass laws," and of racial restrictions on education, housing, and employment. On voting rights, the American Ambassador hoped in the long run for a gradual and selective granting of the franchise to non-whites. 69 Although the overriding purpose of the suggested reforms was to secure white rule in South Africa, they underscored the conviction of the American government that orderly social and political development in South Africa ultimately depended on the abolition of apartheid. 70
American efforts to limit the political isolation of South Africa mainly took place at the United Nations. In 1952, the U.N. created a Commission on the racial situation in South Africa to study the situation and make recommendations on how the problem of apartheid could best be solved. In 1953 and 1954, following the Commission's yearly reports, resolutions condemning apartheid and calling for the continuation of the Commission's investigative work were introduced.\(^7\) South Africa opposed the resolutions on the ground that apartheid was a domestic matter over which the U.N. had no jurisdiction. However, Articles 55 and 56 of the U.N. Charter stated that one purpose of the organization was to promote the observance of fundamental rights and freedoms by each of its members.\(^2\)

The resolutions put the United States in an awkward position: while it wished to avoid alienating South Africa, the U.S. did not want to "open itself to propaganda charges of not only seeking to block free discussion of the subject but also of sympathizing with the Malan policy."\(^3\) The American policy on South Africa at the U.N. stressed that apartheid had to be handled cautiously and that "the issue should be dealt with as a broad social problem and not merely as a question involving South Africa alone."\(^4\) In other words, the United States condemned racial discrimination, but refused to single out South Africa as a blatant violator of human rights.

The Americans found their way out of this dilemma by supporting the inclusion of the proposed item on the agenda,
with the expressed hope that the Commission would be terminated. Motives for the American distrust of the Commission were twofold: first, there were fears that an extension of the Commission's mandate might lead to a direct U.N. intervention in the domestic affairs of America's closest ally in Africa. Official explanations of American policy, however, pointed to the Commission's failure to find a constructive solution to the problem of apartheid as the main justification for its dismissal. Although each justification played its part in determining the American position on apartheid, it seems that political expediency had the greatest influence. Indeed, American opposition to the U.N. Commission only became official after Great Britain took the lead in calling for its abolition, thereby shifting the blame for indirect protection of apartheid on the British. On December 6, 1955, the U.N. General Assembly failed to ratify the extension of the Commission's mandate, with the United States voting against the extension.

While the Eisenhower Administration accomplished its objective of limiting the political isolation of South Africa at the U.N., its efforts to improve the South African racial picture brought few results. In fact, after 1953 the South African government tried instead to "educate other nations on the need for apartheid." In interviews and public statements, South African leaders described apartheid as an attempt to preserve Western civilization in Africa, and a response to the
Communist threat on the continent. They responded harshly to American warnings about the potential costs of apartheid.

The resolve of the South African government to impress the permanence of apartheid on the rest of the world was demonstrated in 1955 when the American aircraft carrier Midway stopped in Capetown. The crew, which included a significant number of black and oriental sailors, was subjected to the apartheid rules confining non-white South Africans to second-class status. Despite NAACP protests, the U.S. Navy and South African Embassy complied with the policy.

The United States government realized the flaws in its approach, but was not in a position to modify it. Indeed, all other objectives of U.S. policy in South Africa were subordinated to the preservation of political stability. A more forceful approach to the solution of apartheid could have improved American standing in world opinion, but the United States greatly feared that it would disturb the social and political stability of South Africa, and consequently imperil American economic and strategic interests in the area. Thus in September 1956, when the Cape sea route was being secured as an alternative to the Suez Canal, the official American policy on apartheid did not go beyond "discreetly encouraging, where circumstances permit, a wiser and more constructive approach to the country's difficult racial problems."

In its attempt to gradually soften apartheid policies through persuasion, the United States relied on government
officers who believed that racial problems should become a subordinate aspect of U.S.-South African relations. For instance, the Ambassador to South Africa from October 1956 on was Henry Byroade who, in 1953, had warned the Third World about the dangers of "premature independence." In April 1957, the U.S. Embassy in Pretoria sent to Secretary of State Dulles two staff studies on the South African race problem; together, they advocated a reappraisal of American policy in South Africa. The first study presented a series of moderate objectives the United States should pursue to improve the South African racial situation. In support of its call for moderation, the study raised the specter of interracial conflict in South Africa. Racial violence could set ablaze fires of hatred and frustration all across the continent at the instigation and to the benefit of the Communist bloc, and constitute "a cardinal threat to American security."

According to the American chargé d'affaires in Pretoria, William Maddox, the American contribution to racial harmony in South Africa should revolve around four objectives: greater inter-racial contacts; the creation of safety valves for the black elite; the improvement of living standards for the urban masses; and the humanizing of white attitudes vis-à-vis race relations. The first and last objectives were attainable by getting white South Africans to know the non-European population and culture better. In other words, racial understanding would derive from a gradual process of personal
and cultural acquaintance with the other ethnic groups.

The second and third objectives involved significant transformations in South African laws and values. The creation of safety valves for the black elite meant that South African society had to provide opportunities for economic advancement or political expression to the minority of educated blacks. 87 Although the proposal reeked of tokenism, it could not be tolerated by an apartheid regime unless the black elite collaborated with the white government. The economic improvement of the black urban masses required a similar undermining of apartheid and economic segregation. However, the latter objective seemed easier to attain because of the inevitable integration of the white and black economies.

Overall, the reforms proposed in this study were minimal improvements "within the limited range of early practicality." 88 Such modest intentions could only bring modest results in the transformation of the South African racial picture; William Maddox and the staff of the U.S. Embassy in Pretoria were inhibited in their recommendations by the tremendous political stakes involved in an open struggle against apartheid. Suggestions remained moderate because they were part of a greater strategy of preserving white rule in South Africa without the curse of open white racist supremacy.

The Embassy's study also emphasised the political considerations of American efforts to change racial policies in South Africa. The report castigated the previous reliance

113
on an approach based on the United Nations Charter. U.N. denunciation of apartheid might have helped American standing with the Afro-Asian bloc (and even that was dubious, considering the American rejection of the U.N. Commission in 1955), but it had achieved nothing in terms of altering South African policies. The study recommended that future American policies should be more concerned about practical American interests in South Africa than anything else. For that purpose, the United States should play down racial and humanitarian issues in its dealings with Pretoria and emphasize instead the twin threats of militant black nationalism and Communism, as well as the dire prospects of white minority rule in Africa.

The radical shift in strategy suggested in the study raises many questions about the intentions of U.S. diplomats. Did the suggested policy try to scare South Africa into good behaviour, or was it merely accepting the racial status quo in order to secure the alignment of South Africa with the West? This writer argues that the suggested policy moved away from apartheid in an attempt to establish a community of goals and interests between the South African and United States governments, centered around a politically and socially stable environment, in which apartheid ultimately had no place.

The study identified five possible political developments that could significantly affect American interests in South Africa. First, a split in the ruling Nationalist Party would
favor American interests, as the most doctrinaire elements in South African politics would likely be driven away from power. Second, the continuing integration of the non-white population in the mainstream economy was unavoidable, and it would fatally undermine apartheid. Third, and most importantly, the preservation of white rule was in the best interests of the United States. In that respect, the study drew from the colonialist argument that native leadership lacked the managerial and technical skills necessary to manage the country efficiently. Fourth, in order to stay in power, the white minority should start making concessions to the non-European majority. Hard-line policies might be successful in the short-term, but they only postponed a greater and more violent crisis than the one repression tried to avert. The study concluded by stating that militant black nationalism went against American interests because of its radical nature and potential affinity with Communism. Black nationalism was as great a threat to American interests as apartheid.

Overall, the policy proposal reaffirmed that the primary American interest in Africa was the preservation of political stability in a continent undergoing tremendous changes within an incredibly short timespan. With respect to South Africa, political stability, at least in the short-term, meant the preservation of white rule regardless of the racial policies that accompanied it. The abolition of apartheid became a secondary objective of American strategy, with the protection
of U.S. political and economic interests taking precedence.

During its last three years, the Eisenhower Administration thus implicitly consented to apartheid policies for strategic reasons. Relations between South Africa and the United States were uneventful until the Sharpeville massacres of March 1960. In the aftermath of Harold Macmillan’s famous "Winds of Change" speech, the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), a militant black organization, had announced that March 21, 1960, would be an anti-pass day during which Africans should leave their passes at home and surrender to the police. The idea of a large-scale nonviolent political protest especially caught on in Sharpeville, a black township south of Johannesburg. Once touted as the model township, Sharpeville had become a center of popular discontent in the late fifties.

On the fateful day, 5,000 blacks gathered in front of the Sharpeville police station and demonstrated their frustration until the police lost control and fired at the crowd, killing 69 and wounding over 180.93

The American reaction to the Sharpeville massacres was somewhat confusing. The State Department issued at first a statement denouncing the killings and supporting the right of black South Africans "to obtain redress for legitimate grievances by peaceful means."94 However, Secretary of State Christian Herter reacted harshly to the statement. In a memo to White House Staff Secretary Andrew Goodpaster, Herter criticized the State Department initiative on the grounds that
an attack on a friendly government "on a subject which not only has world-wide interest, but also involves domestic political factors" should not have been issued without his authorization.5 A few days later, Eisenhower recommended that matters such as the Sharpeville affair should be handled with great caution by the United States, which had its own shortcomings in the area of racial equality.6

The reaction of Herter and Eisenhower to the Sharpeville events underscored how American foreign policy played down the race issue in its dealings with South Africa. Fears that a critical American reaction might impair U.S. relations with South Africa proved to be unfounded, for it almost went unnoticed in the midst of the far more critical judgments on apartheid and South Africa that were voiced around the world. Still, the American reaction to the Sharpeville massacres generated a lot of goodwill for the United States among the Afro-Asian bloc at the United Nations.7 Taking advantage of the context created by the Sharpeville events, the United States, despite pressures from Great Britain, supported a Security Council Resolution which condemned the massacres and called upon the South African government to abandon its apartheid policies.8 With the beginning of the Congo crisis, however, American policy reverted rapidly to supporting the South African government, which saw its credibility as an anti-Communist bastion of political stability restored:9 it was business as usual again.

117
Overall, Eisenhower’s policies toward South Africa were akin to his policies toward Third World nationalism worldwide. The inherently conservative American position was based on the preservation of at least apparent stability and a frequently mistaken identification of Third World nationalism with international Communism. Eisenhower’s failure to respond positively to Third World nationalism may very well be the weakest aspect of his foreign policy. Opportunities for mutually beneficial relationships between America and the Third World were ignored because of the inflexibility of U.S. foreign policy in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Contrary to what several historians have argued, the Eisenhower Administration did not simply ignore the Third World, nor did it consider Africa to be the lowest priority of American foreign policy. Primary evidence has revealed that there were meaningful debates within the Administration on the nature of the American response to the emergence of Africa in world affairs. In that respect, Clarence Randall and the Council of Foreign Economic Policy did much to expose Eisenhower to other policy options than a strict adherence to a pro-colonial, Cold War approach.

The Eisenhower Administration was more than a bystander in the spectacular developments that transformed Africa in the 1950s. Its support of the colonial powers up to 1956 was the fruit of a conscious decision involving the worldwide scope of American foreign policy. Over the issue of colonialism, the
United States initially supported Europe because of European commitments such as NATO, but also because colonial rule was the safest bet for short-term political stability in Africa. However, once the new African states had attained independence, the U.S. worked toward the consolidation of stable governments as bulwarks against Communist infiltration.

U.S. policies in Africa were definitely shaped by Cold War considerations. Although Africa remained somewhat of a mystery to Americans, Eisenhower's policies showed a lack of flexibility that was not present, for instance, in American relations with Western Europe. The rigidity of U.S. policies also reflected the rapid rise of American stakes in Africa: as late as 1955, it can be argued that the United States was a secondary power in Africa, except in Liberia and the Union of South Africa. By 1960, American involvement in Africa had expanded in quantitative and qualitative terms, and the United States exerted as much influence as anyone else in Africa. The rapid evolution of American foreign relations in Africa bred much uncertainty within the Eisenhower Administration, which tried to cling to a few certitudes in the elaboration of its policies. These certitudes concerned the prevention of Soviet infiltration and the building of stable pro-Western political environments. Both objectives coalesced into a foreign policy that mainly sought to prevent any significant disturbances in Africa; in that respect, Eisenhower's foreign policy enjoyed a fair amount of success, to the point that after the Congo
crisis, the likelihood of a Communist takeover of Africa had become nonexistent.

As was often the case with Eisenhower's policies in the Third World, short-term success bred long-term failure. Eisenhower's policies were too concerned with strategic rather than structural problems, and they failed to address the problems of economic and political development. Eisenhower and his successors watched with indifference the economic and social disintegration of Africa. In retrospect, it seems that Africa under Eisenhower was not the lowest priority, but a lost opportunity, wasted by narrow and misguided conceptions of the nature of long-term American interests in the area.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE INFLUENCE OF FOREIGN POLICY CONSIDERATIONS ON EISENHOWER'S CIVIL RIGHTS POLICIES

Many similarities existed between the decolonization of Africa and the civil rights movement. They were arguably the most significant developments in American society and world politics during the 1950s. Civil rights activists and African nationalists alike sought to overturn systems based on a form of racial supremacy, and to acquire the privileges and responsibilities of unadulterated citizenship, either within America or in new countries they could call their own.

Parallels between African nationalism and the civil rights movements have been noted since the 1950s. The simultaneous rise of both movements invited scholars to link them together and to question the impact of their relationship. Most studies of the connection between civil rights and U.S. foreign policy in Africa have argued that changes in American policies in Africa "resulted from the gradual growth of civil rights as an issue in America." In other words, the attitude of the U.S. government toward the decolonization of Africa changed because of the identification of American blacks with Africans, and because pro-colonial policies in Africa entailed political costs at home.

This writer argues that the relationship between Africa and civil rights under Eisenhower can be fruitfully examined in reverse fashion. The rise of Africa potentially involved a

121
major shift in the global balance of power, should independent Africa side with the Soviet Union. America’s worst liability in Africa was without question the persisting problem of racial segregation in the South. Combined with the dubious American record on colonial and South African issues at the U.N., it linked the United States with the colonial powers on their way out of Africa.

This chapter examines how foreign policy considerations influenced Eisenhower’s civil rights policies. It argues that the symbolic aspect of his civil rights policies especially catered to foreign audiences, and that the international context compelled the U.S. government to achieve results in that area. The chapter pays special attention to Africa: Chapter Three concluded that Eisenhower came to regard Africa as an area of great importance to U.S. foreign policy. It became a priority problem for Eisenhower because of the great uncertainty created by decolonization, compounded by American ignorance about Africa. From the mid-1950s on, the new strategic importance of Africa magnified the negative impact of segregation on U.S. foreign policy. This resulted in policies and actions seeking to improve foreign perceptions of American race relations.

This chapter consists of three parts: the first part discusses the impact of segregation on U.S. foreign policy, and how it could be damaging to American interests around the world. Part II examines how the U.S. government addressed the
domestic side of the problem via legislation and other means. Finally, Part III describes how Eisenhower tried to limit the adverse response of world opinion to America's racial tensions by concealing or playing down the race issue.

As argued in Chapter Two, implementing desegregation was a major domestic problem throughout Eisenhower's second term. Believing that rapid desegregation would breed violence and social chaos in the South, Eisenhower advocated policies that called for desegregation, but failed to provide the means to enforce it. He left a civil rights legacy based on symbolic achievements harmless enough to accommodate the South in most situations.

Eisenhower's civil rights policies tried to cater to several audiences at one time. While Federal inaction alleviated Southern resentment, the impression of action conveyed by the 1957 and 1960 Civil Rights Acts appealed to black Americans and foreign audiences. On the domestic scene, Republicans used the acts to support claims that Congress, not Administration inertia, slowed down desegregation, and that it was to be held responsible for this "greatest mockery and travesty of justice." Such efforts, however, were clearly subordinated to the "Dixie Strategy," which played down the race issue in order to secure Southern political support.

From the available evidence, it seems that Eisenhower's civil rights policies responded to contradictory pressures. While the quest for Southern support moderated government
actions, foreign policy considerations required that the federal government gave at least the impression of significant progress. Eisenhower's civil rights policies revealed how closely integrated the foreign and domestic policies of modern American governments had become.

I

Throughout the Cold War, American foreign policy defined its rivalry with the Soviet Union in moral terms: the Cold War was a conflict between Communist tyranny and the Free World, with the U.S. enjoying a clear ethical superiority. As time went on, however, the fact that a large proportion of the American population did not have full citizenship on account of its race seriously undermined the American position, and jeopardized United States interests overseas.

This section considers the foreign reaction to American race relations during the 1950s. It shows that, from 1955 on, U.S. foreign policy-makers became increasingly concerned about the effect of racial segregation on American foreign policy in Africa. With the dramatic rise of the number of independent African states, negative reactions to racial segregation in America could jeopardize American security, and could no longer be merely shunted aside.

Initially, foreign criticism of racial segregation in America in the 1950s was rather isolated, and did not affect Eisenhower's civil rights policies. Emphasizing low-key achievements in areas of undisputed Federal jurisdiction,
Eisenhower's policies failed to arouse in America tensions and crises which attracted worldwide attention. A rare instance of foreign criticism of U.S. race relations during the early Eisenhower years involved a close American ally, France, and the question of colonialism. A September 16, 1953 memorandum from the American Consul in Dakar to the State Department explained that French authorities and media there responded "to American charges of 'colonialism' and exploitation of autochthonous peoples," by pointing "to discrimination against the Negro in the United States." Although the memorandum then attacked France's racial practices in its colonies, the Consul recognized that "it is doubtless true that the American Negro is much less restrained, and more readily accepted, in Paris than in New York or Chicago, let alone Atlanta or Charleston." Foreseeing the trends of the late fifties, the memorandum argued that the problem of race relations around the world could only worsen in the future, and required careful attention from the United States government.  

Another racial issue affecting American policy at the time was apartheid. As discussed in Chapter Three, the United States tried to temper world opinion on apartheid by blocking the adoption of United Nations resolutions condemning South Africa. The October 25, 1955 meeting of the American Delegation to the U.N. revealed an ambivalence on racial issues. The possible adoption of a resolution on racism in South Africa led alternate Representative Laird Bell to wonder
if "under the same reasoning it would not be possible for the
UN to ... interfere in US domestic policies with respect to
the racial question." Another delegate more sympathetic to UN
action on South Africa expressed the reverse concern that
American opposition to a UN resolution would "leave us
vulnerable to charges that we were taking the position because
of racial conditions in the U.S." The United States would
eventually abstain on the resolution, but discussions within
the delegation reveal that conscious links were made between
apartheid and racial segregation in the United States.

The existence of segregation within the United States did
influence Eisenhower's position on apartheid. Aside from the
protection of sizable economic interests in South Africa, the
American toleration of apartheid reflected in part its own
record on racial issues. In his April 1957 report on racial
problems in South Africa, the American chargé d'affaires in
Pretoria, William P. Maddox, argued that the gradualist
approach to apartheid employed by the United States would
benefit from greater South African exposure to American race
relations, for the South Africans could witness how
Administration policies were "changing the human outlook of
Americans towards Negroes." Seven months later, however, the
justifications for American policy had changed: the United
States, according to Maddox, could not afford a strong U.N.
resolution against apartheid because Americans "are not
without fault ... we remain internationally responsible under
the Human Rights Charter for the delinquencies of state and local governments." Maddox still called for a moderate policy on apartheid and domestic racial issues, doubting that the United States "would gain a sufficient measure of transitory advantage with the Afro-Asians to offset the complete loss of one western voice and vote in the U.N."

Maddox's judgment on the relative importance of South Africa versus the Afro-Asian bloc was becoming the exception rather than the rule by 1957. Within the Administration, there was a growing conviction that race relations constituted a serious liability to U.S. foreign policy, and especially in Africa.

Nixon's trip to sub-Saharan Africa in March 1957 was the first undertaken by a high-level Administration member, and he reported his findings to Eisenhower as a guideline for future policy. His report reached contradictory conclusions; while he stated that nowhere else was "the prestige of the United States more uniformly high than in the countries which [he] visited on this trip," he also mentioned how racial discrimination within the United States caused "irreparable damage" to American prestige in the area.

In his discussion of African perceptions of American race relations, Nixon blamed a Communist-inspired propaganda campaign, which presented "a consistently distorted picture of the treatment of minority races in the United States" to Africans, thereby soiling the image of the United States among
black Africans. Though Nixon blamed enemy propaganda for that problem, he acknowledged that the American record on race relations left much to be desired, and needed considerable improvement. The solution lay within the United States, which could not "talk equality to the people of Africa and Asia and practice inequality" at home.\textsuperscript{12}

Nixon's recommendations were enhanced by his argument that an independent Africa could greatly alter the equilibrium between the United States and the Soviet Union. In his view, the United States might place itself in a position where it could "lose" Africa as a result of its racial policies. He took the China analogy one step further, contending that "Communist leaders consider Africa today to be as important to their designs for world conquest as they considered China to be twenty-five years ago."\textsuperscript{13} The analogy added a sense of urgency to Nixon's recommendations, especially since his trip made him an authority on Africa within the Administration.

Concerns about the impact of segregation on American prestige in Africa were also raised in NSC 5719. The report, which laid the basis for U.S. foreign policy in Africa, stated that American influence in Africa was "restricted by the extremely distorted picture Africans have been given concerning the race problem in the United States."\textsuperscript{14} It suggested a series of steps to eradicate the problem within America and overseas: domestic civil rights policies should "encourage, where practicable, a more liberal approach in the
areas where extremism is now the order of the day."\textsuperscript{15} On the world scene, NSC 5719 recommended an intensive media campaign emphasizing recent progress in American race relations, and the exertion of a moderating influence on the Afro-Asian bloc at the U.N.\textsuperscript{16} In its assessment of the implications of segregation, NSC 5719 suggested a greater coordination between Eisenhower's foreign and domestic policies.

In September 1957, the Eisenhower Administration faced the inevitable consequences of Southern insubordination and Eisenhower's complacency toward integration with the outbreak of the Little Rock school desegregation crisis. The Little Rock crisis generated negative reactions all over the world. Eisenhower was informed on a daily basis of the international response to this significant crisis in American politics and race relations. On September 11, Radio Moscow attacked the hypocrisy of the United States which defended the rights of Hungarians, but committed "unbelievable crimes and violations of the most elementary human rights" in its own country.\textsuperscript{17} The next day, accusations became more polemical, with Soviet radio claiming that racial killings in the South were "not just instances, but the custom," and that anti-Negro violence in Little Rock was "committed with the clear connivance of the US government."\textsuperscript{18} That day, the Egyptian and French media widely discussed the Little Rock crisis in uncomplimentary terms, with right-wing newspapers such as \textit{Le Figaro} and \textit{L'Aurore} reminding their readers that the United States often "sought
to give France lessons and advice on how to treat men of color."¹⁹

Former Eisenhower speechwriter Emmet J. Hughes vividly described the impact of Little Rock on the Third World: "the
tale carried faster than drum signals across black Africa. It
summoned cold gleams of recognition ... of the racial e. nities
that had helped to make colonialism, through the generations,
so odious to them."²⁰ A September 24 memorandum for the White
House Staff Research Group assessed the overall reaction of
foreign media to the Little Rock crisis. The memorandum found
little to criticize in foreign coverage of Little Rock,
although photographs of the events "were particularly damaging
to U.S. prestige." It warned that further violence at Little
Rock would have "serious adverse public reaction abroad."²¹
Simultaneously, the USIA frantically tried putting out the
fire with broadcasts that played down Little Rock, and
stressed instead recent progress in the area of civil rights.²²

After Eisenhower decided to send Federal troops to Little
Rock, foreign evaluations of the crisis denounced Orval Faubus
and praised Eisenhower. A study commissioned by the Foreign
Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) for September 27, 1957
reviewed foreign analyses of Little Rock. Interestingly
enough, most foreign commentators pointed to the diplomatic
loss the United States suffered at Little Rock; even the more
sympathetic British papers argued that it was "a blot on
America’s reputation and a corrosive stain on her power."²³
Soviet and Third World media were the most virulent in their analysis: Soviet media called the sending of troops by Eisenhower "an effort to repair the harm done by racial troubles to the propaganda of the United States abroad." However, Soviet broadcasts in the Third World, "normally the target of a large proportion of Moscow's condemnation of the U.S. way of life," reported the events in remarkably subdued fashion. The FBIS study argued that Soviet reserve in reporting Little Rock to Africa was part of "a deliberate design to let events speak for themselves." The Little Rock crisis provided the Soviet Union with a golden propaganda opportunity, and it quickly seized it. In the eight months prior to September 9, American race relations had been discussed on 63 separate occasions by Radio Moscow. However, within a fourteen-day period starting on September 9, 82 different broadcasts on that subject were included in the programming.

The study also presented the Third World perspective on Little Rock. Egyptian radio reached black Africa with a series of Swahili broadcasts providing Africans with "factual news reports" of the crisis. The Indonesian press reached more critical judgments, stating that after Little Rock, "America cannot be regarded as a champion of real democracy in other parts of the world 'especially in Asia and Africa'"

The Little Rock crisis had a "distinct negative impact" on American prestige around the world. The Arkansas capital
became "an international symbol of white race intolerance in the U.S.," and seriously impaired American foreign policy. Little Rock limited the range of American policy in Africa, especially for dealing with nationalism and colonialism, which had serious racial connotations. Subsequent instances of segregation of African diplomats in Southern public and private facilities (see Part 3 of this chapter) further impaired American prospects in Africa by showing the extent and the severity of segregation within the United States.

The dearth of knowledge about Africa within the Administration led Eisenhower to rely on informal advisers on African issues. These observers also reported fluctuations in African support of the United States. In his 1958 report to the Council on Foreign Economic Policy, Clarence Randall deplored the exportation of American racial practices by U.S. corporations, which "embarrassed our international relationships." At the May 8 National Security Council meeting, Randall mentioned the case of Firestone, whose segregationist practices in Liberia had compelled the local government to enact an anti-segregation law.

American worries about the world impact of U.S. race relations under Eisenhower were best expressed in a 1959 report by Matthew Marks, of the Office of International Finance of the Treasury Department, which was read at the White House. Marks argued that problems in U.S. race relations were "weakening American security." Since 1945, about a third
of the Earth's population had become sovereign; their sheer number secured for the newly-independent peoples a significant weight in world politics. Although the U.S. devoted large sums of money to Third World development, "the reactions of these peoples to race incidents in the U.S. undo much of the effect which ... aid and other programs are attempting to achieve."  

The "almost pathological interest of the newly independent, colored nations in our domestic race problem" was likely to increase as well; for instance, in its dealing with American news agencies, the Indian Press Service required that "25 percent of all news transmitted to India from this country cover American domestic race problems."  

Marks pointed to "the historical tie between racism and colonialism," and argued that the United States had to get rid of the stigma of domestic racism in order to play a leading role in independent Africa. His recommendations went along two distinct paths: first, that concrete steps toward the eradication of racism in America must be taken. Second, that the United States launch "a broad gauge attack on the international aspects of the domestic race problems," including greater involvement of black Americans in American diplomacy, and USIA propaganda campaigns.  

The Eisenhower Administration had to strike a balance between domestic worries about desegregation (mainly felt in the South) and foreign denunciations of segregation, which cost dearly in Africa. It responded with a dual strategy
seeking to improve the American racial picture via Administration action on civil rights, and to change African perceptions of American race relations through propaganda work by the USIA praising U.S. achievements in that field. Within the latter element of the strategy, the Administration also actively tried to conceal negative aspects of the American racial situation. The components of the Eisenhower strategy are discussed in Sections Two and Three respectively.

II

During Eisenhower's first term, America faced limited criticism of its racial practices. Since colonial rule in Africa then seemed fairly secure, the Americans were not heavily involved in Africa at the time, leaving the area to the colonial powers. By 1957, however, the rise of African nationalism and the emergence of civil rights as a social and political powderkeg had greatly increased external pressures for a reappraisal of American civil rights policies. Fears of losing an independent Africa to Communism became quite strong within the Eisenhower Administration, as reports indicated a sharp loss of American prestige in Africa resulting from racial segregation in the South. While diplomatic reports repeatedly stated that much of America's disrepute on the issue was the result of Soviet propaganda, they also admitted the tragedy of U.S. race relations. Vice President Nixon's report pioneered in that respect by recommending that it was in the best interests of U.S. policy in Africa that the
Federal government take the "necessary steps which will assure orderly progress toward the elimination of discrimination in the United States." His analogy between communist interest in contemporary Africa and China before World War II made the report a call for immediate action. Similar concerns and recommendations were raised in NSC 5719 and later NSC reports, to the extent that the Eisenhower Administration was aware of the foreign policy implications of its civil rights policies as early as 1957.

That year, government action on civil rights reached unprecedented heights, with the enactment of civil rights legislation and Federal involvement in the Little Rock crisis. The adoption of the 1957 Civil Rights Act was one of the most controversial episodes of Eisenhower's civil rights record. Eisenhower's behaviour during his July 3 press conference, in which he literally left Attorney General Brownell out in the cold, invited the Senate to eviscerate the bill (see Chapter II). Ultimately, he refused to veto the Senate version of the bill, even if it repelled a majority of black Americans.  

The available sources have yet to establish a direct connection between foreign policy implications and Eisenhower's attitude during the whole crisis. However, indirect evidence indicates that foreign policy considerations probably played an important role in shaping Administration policy. Eisenhower could be under no illusions that American blacks heartily endorsed the final version of the 1957 Civil
Rights Act. Within the Administration, White House assistant E. Frederic Morrow and Val Washington, Director of Minorities in the Republican Party, warned of the domestic and international political consequences of an ineffectual civil rights bill. In an open letter to Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson, Washington argued that the Senate's emasculation of the civil rights bill could seriously impair U.S. interests in the Third World, as "hundreds of millions in Asia, Africa, and South America watch with bated breath every test to which our democracy is put."

Still, Eisenhower did not veto the bill, which had lost most of its power to prosecute civil rights violations. The adoption of a weak civil rights bill satisfied the South. However, other domestic beneficiaries of an emasculated civil rights bill were hard to identify, since black dissatisfaction with the legislation was well-known even prior to its enactment.

The Eisenhower Administration behaved as if it benefitted from the adoption of almost any civil rights bill. Indeed, civil rights legislation constituted a most visible symbol of improvement in American race relations, and could be highly beneficial to U.S. foreign policy in Africa. Eisenhower's attitude toward the bill underscored a willingness to have a civil rights law enacted even if that meant compromising with Southern Senators on their own terms. The rejection of the Administration's civil rights bill by the Senate could have
dealt a lethal blow to American interests in Africa, at least in the short run. In contrast, a compromise bill could satisfy the South and world opinion.

Administration objectives were more clearly stated in Eisenhower's second civil rights bill, eventually enacted in 1960. The civil rights section of his 1959 State of the Union message insisted on the need to improve the image of America abroad via civil rights legislation, for on issues of "freedom from discrimination in voting, in public education, in access to jobs ... the world is ... watching our conduct." By then, references to the effects of civil rights activism on U.S. foreign policy were a regular feature of Administration statements. Foreign policy considerations exerted an undeniable influence on the making of Eisenhower's civil rights policies in his last years in office, as decolonization made Africa a major concern of U.S. diplomacy.

Foreign policy considerations exerted the greatest influence on Eisenhower's civil rights policies during the Little Rock crisis. Historian Robert F. Burk has argued that the decision to send troops to Little Rock was influenced by domestic political considerations. Burk compares the situation in Little Rock in 1957 to that in Mansfield, Texas the year before, where "Eisenhower had permitted state authorities to obstruct the entry of black students without complaint;" he concludes that he decided to intervene in Little Rock because "the political environment within which the Administration
acted in 1957 was different from that in 1956." In 1956, Burk argues, the electoral importance of Texas restrained Administration action on a clear defiance of the Supreme Court by Texas Governor Allen Shivers (a Democrat-for-Eisenhower), but Eisenhower responded to a similar offense in Arkansas the next year by sending Federal troops to enforce the integration of Central High School.

While the importance of domestic political considerations during the Little Rock crisis cannot be denied, they do not, however, fully explain Administration policy. Burk’s analysis ignores almost completely the impact of foreign policy factors on Eisenhower’s policies, except for a brief mention of propaganda activities by the U.S.I.S. immediately following the arrival of troops in Little Rock. In that respect, Burk oversimplifies the motivations and the context of Eisenhower’s policy during the Little Rock crisis.

Obstruction of school desegregation at Little Rock took place in a vastly different social and political context than in Mansfield the year before. By September 1957, civil rights had become the main issue in American politics and, following the fiasco of the 1957 Civil Rights Act, Eisenhower simply could not turn his back on segregationist resistance as he had done the previous autumn.

Changes in Administration policy were also influenced by foreign policy considerations. The Vice President’s report and NSC 5719 had built on previous assessments of the global
impact of racial segregation, and persuasively argued that racial segregation in America undermined U.S. goodwill efforts in Africa. At an August 23, 1957 NSC meeting, Nixon affirmed that "he was at a loss to know what developments were going to change the attitude of the Black Africans toward racism and colonialism over the next thirty months," short of complete desegregation at home.45

Nixon then emphasised the magnitude of the Communist threat in Africa, which existed in "Islamic, racist, anti-racist, or nationalist clothing."46 At the meeting, which took place during negotiations between the White House and the Senate over a compromise bill, the Eisenhower Administration discussed at length America's greatest liability and foremost enemy in Africa, respectively racial segregation and the Communist threat. Though portions of the NSC meeting have yet to be declassified, available segments indicate that segregation and Soviet expansion were seen as deeply interrelated, and that the prevention of Communist infiltration of Africa depended in part on progress in domestic race relations. Such progress would be realized either through changes in Administration policies or symbolic adjustments.47

While there is insufficient evidence to warrant the claim that the ideas expressed in the meeting influenced Eisenhower's decision to sign the 1957 Civil Rights Act, they provided him with strategic justifications for enforcing
desegregation. The importance of Africa to U.S. strategy had radically increased since the early 1950s as a result of decolonization. Africa could become the key to winning the Cold War, but only if the Soviet Union became the dominant power on that continent, since colonial Africa was already part of the Western camp. America's prospects in an independent Africa came to depend on its own racial record: failure to convince Africans that the U.S. was working toward racial integration could result in the "loss" of Africa.

Such fears were magnified by the incompetence of the Eisenhower Administration on African matters. Lacking the expertise necessary for a subtle understanding of the political and social intricacies of Africa, the U.S. was overly complacent about its successes in Africa, and paranoid about its liabilities.

Right from the beginning, however, Dwight Eisenhower was aware of the global implications of Little Rock. Though vacationing in Newport, Rhode Island, at the time, he received daily reports from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service on the evolution of world opinion about the events in Little Rock. The worldwide denunciation of American racism following the outbreak of the Little Rock crisis convinced Attorney General Brownell that, in light of Faubus's disobedience of Federal District Court orders, Administration involvement in the crisis was imminent. Eisenhower, reluctant to infringe upon state jurisdiction, pushed instead for a local solution
to the problem. Not until it became evident that Faubus would defy the Court's orders by calling for resistance to integration of Central High, and was encouraging mob action against the black children trying to attend the school that Fall, did Eisenhower consider military intervention as a viable option.

The decision to send the Army to restore order and enforce desegregation in Little Rock was taken on September 23. That evening, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles signed the draft proclamation in Eisenhower's name (since the President was in Newport), and Army paratroopers arrived in Little Rock the following evening. Eisenhower's action was justified on the grounds that Faubus had clearly reneged on his pledge to restore order in Little Rock, and that local authorities had lost control of the situation.

Foreign policy considerations also played an instrumental part in shaping Administration policy. Army intervention at Little Rock confirmed that the school desegregation crisis had become an international issue that involved more than local authorities: integration of Little Rock schools was a local problem, but racial discrimination had become a global concern. In that respect, Eisenhower handled the Little Rock crisis only after weighing its domestic and global implications.

The damaging impact of Little Rock on American foreign policy was perceived by prominent Republican leaders such as
Senator William Knowland, who believed that inaction on the part of the Administration would "undo all the goodwill we have built up in the world." John Foster Dulles was even more specific, telling Attorney General Herbert Brownell that Little Rock was literally "ruining our foreign policy. The effect of [Little Rock] in Asia and Africa [would] be worse for us than Hungary was for the Russians." Brownell overruled Dulles's objections about the need to make public these diplomatic considerations, but convinced the Secretary of State to prepare a statement dealing with the foreign policy implications of the Little Rock crisis for Eisenhower's televised speech on the subject that night.

Drawing from Dulles's suggestions, Eisenhower's address on Little Rock dwelt extensively upon its impact on American foreign relations. He said it was difficult "to exaggerate the harm that is being done to the prestige and influence, and indeed to the safety, of our nation and the world." The impact of foreign propaganda reported in the FBIS surveys was acknowledged: "our enemies are gloating over this incident and using it everywhere to misrepresent our whole nation ... portrayed as a violator of those standards of conduct which the peoples of the world united to proclaim in the Charter of the United Nations." Eisenhower concluded his broadcast by asking the people of Little Rock to accept integration and thus remove "a blot upon the fair name and high honor of our nation in the world."
Concern about the global implications of the Little Rock crisis also permeated the legal facets of Eisenhower's policy. In a memorandum on the legal aspects of Little Rock, Herbert Brownell explained that the constitutionality of military intervention to enforce the Brown decisions was enhanced by referring to the "vast interests involved." In his advice to the President, Brownell defined the vast interests involved in the Federal intervention at Little Rock as reaching "beyond the confines of that one city and, as publicly stated by you and the Secretary of State, vitally affecting our country's international relations."\(^{56}\)

The sending of Federal troops was received favourably at the U.N. There, according to Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, one could "see clearly the harm that the riots in Little Rock are doing to our foreign relations. More than two-thirds of the world is non-white and the reactions of the representatives of these people is easy to see."\(^{57}\) Lodge recommended that the U.S. use the goodwill generated by Eisenhower's action to launch a diplomatic offensive in "all those countries which are most upset by what happened at Little Rock."\(^{58}\)

Overall, the Little Rock crisis revealed the complexity of civil rights issues in America, and underscored the impact of foreign policy on Eisenhower's civil rights policies. After Little Rock, the Southern idea that racial segregation in the South was merely a regional concern of which outsiders could understand little had lost its credibility. Racial inequality
in America had become an international concern, subject to the influence of world opinion, and of foreign policy obligations and/or interests of the United States. Above all, the American experience in race relations "behooved [it] to approach racial problems elsewhere in the world with all humility."

III

American foreign policy under Eisenhower confronted the issue of domestic racism in several ways. The influence of foreign policy considerations on Eisenhower's civil rights policies was felt not only in official policies, but also in other aspects of American foreign relations. This section considers three areas where race relations and U.S. foreign relations were intimately linked. It devotes special attention to symbolic and propaganda aspects of American foreign policy, and how it tried to conceal or at least attenuate the damaging impact of racial segregation in the United States on American interests in Africa.

The first area concerns American efforts to "sell" positive images of its racial situation, mostly via the United States Information Agency. It discusses the activities of the USIA in Africa during the late 1950s, and how it tried to transform African perceptions of race relations in America. The second part deals with the political failure of an attempt to portray American race relations in more realistic terms, namely the "Unfinished Business" exhibit at the 1958 Brussels World's Fair. The eventual demise of the exhibit underscored
the U.S. Government's intolerance towards diversity and self-examination in the Cold War era. Finally, this section deals with the problem of discrimination against African diplomats on American soil, and Administration efforts to conceal Jim Crow discrimination from the attention of visiting African leaders.

The Cold War was perhaps waged most fiercely at the propaganda level. In the 1950s, both the United States and the Soviet Union "expected the other to collapse as a result of its own contradictions." The decade witnessed an expansion in the scope and means of propaganda used by the superpowers. The rise of an independent Africa in the late 1950s offered a new challenge to propagandists: although it consisted mainly of European possessions, the Africa of the future could go in any direction, judging from the sharpness of anti-colonial sentiment there.

It was in this climate of uncertainty that the USIA began its task of selling America to Africans. The Little Rock crisis was a traumatic event for the American information services; it fuelled anti-American propaganda for a long time afterwards, and left a lasting impression on world opinion. Surveys by the USIA's Office of Research and Intelligence showed that Little Rock had seriously damaged the credibility of the United States in racial matters. A survey of allied nations (Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Norway) revealed that negative attitudes toward American race
relations had been solidified and in some places worsened. 61

Although West European opinion of the United States remained on the whole positive, one can safely assume that Little Rock had much broader effects in areas for which figures were not available, such as Africa, and countries without economic or military ties to the United States. Since decolonization was already causing a reappraisal of U.S. foreign policy in Africa at the time, the impact of Little Rock and other racial incidents on African attitudes toward America constantly worried American foreign policy-makers.

Fears about the harmful impact of American race relations on U.S. foreign policy in Africa were fuelled by the rapid increase of Soviet propaganda activity there. During the first half of 1959, Soviet radio output in the Third World increased by 15 percent, and had more than doubled since 1957. 62 Soviet broadcasts and publications for foreign use relied on race relations issues "to prove the inhumanity of the American system." 63 The growth of the Soviet radio network instilled the fear that extreme depictions of the American racial picture broadcast across Africa could fatally undermine American prospects in that region.

Following the Little Rock crisis, the USIA acted jointly with the Department of State to protect American interests in Africa. The Agency's contribution consisted of selling to Africans the image of a forward-looking America making significant progress in the field of race relations, an
America in which incidents like Little Rock were the exception, not the rule. The appointment of George V. Allen as head of the USIA reflected the desire of John Foster Dulles for "closer cooperation between [the USIA] and the State Department." Under Allen, a career diplomat who was at the time Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, the USIA adopted a long-term, factual approach to American image problems. With respect to incidents like Little Rock, Allen instituted the guideline that such events, "while reported with candor, must be put in the perspective of the solid advance of the Negro in our democratic society." The Agency's role as an informal diplomatic agent thus became more important, especially in the Third World where traditional and official channels of American diplomacy were poorly developed.

The expansion of USIA activities in Africa responded to Soviet propaganda operations undertaken in the area. Starting in 1958, the USIA created several new stations for radio teletype service all across Africa, and established a news service catering specifically to African audiences. Monthly news review films, which had been shown to the African public since September 1957, included regular features on African and American developments, and provided an American perspective on its racial problems, thereby combining the didactic and diplomatic dimensions of propaganda.

Radio operations were a primary concern of USIA
activities in Africa. The Agency projected that the number of radio transmitters in sub-Saharan Africa would double by 1965, thanks to the emergence of government-operated radio in the new African states. This development was "expected ... to carry intra-African regional politics to the air, multiplying the amount of propaganda broadcasts, and enhancing the appeal of objective news and features from non-African sources." These expectations led to the creation of new posts, such as the one established in Yaoundé, Cameroun, in March 1960.

The creation of USIA posts in Africa fulfilled many American policy objectives in Africa, but its most important goal was without a doubt "the correction of misconceptions concerning the racial situation in America, and demonstration of U.S. interest in ... the emerging states of Africa." In that respect, the USIA followed Administration policies: at an October 1958 NSC discussion on the image of America abroad, President Eisenhower stressed that the USIA "could not confine itself merely to providing direct information to foreigners, [but] must also correct or try to correct errors in foreign opinion about the U.S." The USIA was relied upon for a key element of Eisenhower's policies in Africa, the transformation of African perceptions of American race relations.

The protection of American interests in Africa thus dictated changes in the nature and the presentation of Eisenhower's civil rights policies, and American race relations as a whole. The more sober approach the USIA adopted
under George V. Allen remained nonetheless a cosmetic operation seeking to conceal the tremendous problems caused by segregation, and to magnify the civil rights accomplishments of the Eisenhower Administration. Sincere attempts to explain the problems and achievements of American race relations were few and far between during the 1950s.

In that respect, the most interesting effort was the "Unfinished Business" exhibit presented in the American pavilion at the 1958 World's Fair in Brussels. Responding to the Fair's theme "A World View - A New Humanism," the American exhibit sought to "reflect the atmosphere of America generally and those distinctive phenomena which are considered characteristic of the American people." Eisenhower appointed Howard Cullman, head of the New York City Port Authority, as Commissioner General. Republican stalwart Katherine Howard and James Plaut, curator of the Institute of Contemporary Art (Boston) were the Deputy Commissioners, with Plaut in charge of selecting the exhibits to be included in the pavilion.

The Brussels World's Fair became another battlefield in the Cold War, as the United States and the Soviet Union "built pavilions dedicated to propagandizing their rival political systems." The Brussels Fair was also the first to feature exhibits from African countries, attesting to the impact of decolonization on world politics. Interestingly enough, the Fair also featured a Belgian colonial exhibit showing the benefits of colonial rule in the Congo, and exuded a
confidence and impression of stability that were light-years away from the Congo crisis of 1960.  

The U.S. pavilion came under tremendous attack at home for the nature of its exhibits. American tourists deplored the abstract paintings and sculptures of the Modern Art exhibit, and complained that the Soviet Union was much more aggressive in propagandizing its achievements.  

The most criticized exhibit, however, was "Unfinished Business," dealing with American racial problems. Based on contributions from Fortune magazine, the exhibit described "how Americans respond to the challenges of their society. ... [It did] not hide remaining unsolved problems. But it [did] project a free society's constant efforts toward their solution."  

Such idealism was not shared by American visitors and politicians, who agreed with Deputy Commissioner Katherine Howard and Under Secretary of State Christian Herter that "Unfinished Business" was "detrimental to the prestige of the United States."  

Criticism was especially virulent against the section devoted to race relations in America, which included highlights from the Little Rock crisis, as well as photographic evidence of racial violence in Mississippi. The fact that the seventeen million black Americans "had yet to win the equal rights promised by American democratic theory" was boldly stated for all the world to see. Following virulent criticism from Congressmen Prince H. Preston of Georgia and L. Mendel Rivers of South Carolina, who argued that the exhibit
was a deliberate slur on Southern culture and history, Eisenhower sent George V. Allen to Brussels on a fact-finding mission from June 19 to June 22. Soon afterwards, the "Unfinished Business" exhibit was dismantled and replaced for the balance of the Fair by a public health exhibit, as Deputy Commissioner General Howard had recommended, and the State Department had apparently urged.  

The liquidation of the "Unfinished Business" exhibit came at the urging of authorities higher than Commissioner General Cullman. As Director of the USIA, Allen thought that "Unfinished Business" was a novel and interesting idea, but feared that "an exhibit of this kind [was] hardly the best place to carry on a crusade against racialism." Upon his return, he conferred with Eisenhower to discuss the future of the exhibit. The minutes of the meeting reveal the issues that were at stake: although Southern opposition to "Unfinished Business" was loud and vociferous, the Eisenhower Administration was primarily concerned about the impact of the exhibit on the image of the United States overseas.

In contrast to the work of the USIA discussed above, "Unfinished Business" admitted the existence of racial problems in America and did not try to conceal them. The openness of the American exhibit may have been a refreshing sight for visitors at the World's Fair, but it embarrassed the Eisenhower Administration. The exhibit conflicted with the USIA approach when it gave visitors a glimpse of the grim
realities of American race relations. Finally, Eisenhower strongly believed that in large-scale propaganda festivals such as the World's Fair, the United States should "put on [its] best clothes ... not ... jeans and sneakers," and argued that "there [was] no reason in his judgment why we should not put our best foot forward at an exhibit like this." 78

The demise of "Unfinished Business" revealed the extent to which the Eisenhower Administration feared the impact of American race relations on U.S. foreign policy. Within the Cold War context, American foreign policymakers considered racial issues as their foremost vulnerability, and tried to downplay them as much as possible. USIA operations in Africa gave a clear indication of the limited degree of openness about race relations tolerated by American foreign policy: "Unfinished Business" was a casualty of this intolerant environment surrounding American foreign policy in the 1950s.

American relations with Africa in the 1950s were thus greatly affected by the issue of racial discrimination. American sensitivities on the subject contributed to the making of civil rights policies stressing the value of symbolic government actions, and to American attempts to improve foreign perceptions of the racial situation. Both approaches repeatedly came to a head in the late fifties, however, as African diplomats visiting the United States were the victims of isolated segregation incidents.

Issues of discrimination in U.S. relations with Africa
were raised from the outset of the Eisenhower Administration's efforts. The first American Ambassador to Ghana, Wilson S. Flake, was involved in a scandal even before his arrival there. At a March 16, 1957 reception at the U.S. Embassy in Rome, Ambassador Flake's wife allegedly told black journalists that she was not happy with the appointment, complaining that "somehow we always get the dregs." The incident caused a storm back in the United States, for the consequences of a misguided diplomatic appointment in the first independent country with majority rule in sub-Saharan Africa could be disastrous. E. Frederic Morrow investigated the story for the Administration, and found contradictory testimony over whether Mrs. Flake had actually said what was reported in the black press. Because there was no consensus version of the incident, it was dismissed, and Flake was cleared by the State Department. Nevertheless, the black newsmen had told Kwame Nkrumah their version of the story; Morrow expressed the concern that Flake's dealings with the Government of Ghana would be impaired because of his wife's alleged remarks. Morrow's investigation sought primarily to "see to it that the President's Administration does not have to take abuse for an unfortunate appointment."80

Throughout that incident, Morrow was involved in a damage control operation that often recurred in American foreign relations with the Third World under Eisenhower. The most famous racial incident involving a foreign diplomat took place
on October 9 of that same year, and once again, Ghana was at the center of the controversy. That day, Ghanaian Finance Minister K.A. Gbedemah and his secretary were not allowed to consume the soft drinks they had ordered in a Howard Johnson restaurant near Dover, Delaware. In the aftermath of Little Rock, this routine segregation incident had the effect of a veritable bomb within the Eisenhower Administration, since the victim was a foreign diplomat and a prominent politician in Ghana.  

In retrospect, the Gbedemah discrimination incident was even more of an affront: after all, Gbedemah was one of Ghana's top leaders, and yet he was treated like a second-class citizen in America. The Administration reacted swiftly to the incident, and Gbedemah, who had threatened to lodge a protest with the State Department, was invited by President Eisenhower to have breakfast with him on October 10. Again, the Eisenhower Administration was forced into a position of limiting the inroads the incident could make on American prestige in Ghana, and was put in an awkward position because of racial segregation prevailing in the South. Richard Nixon perhaps best summed up the American position when he told John Foster Dulles that the Gbedemah's rebuff in Dover "was one of those things where something has to be done." 

There were enough incidents like this one between 1957 and 1960 to make the Eisenhower Administration seriously concerned about the debilitating influence segregation exerted
on African perceptions of the nature of American society.⁴⁴ The discomfort of African diplomats in cities such as New York and Washington encouraged Khrushchev to call for the removal of the United Nations from New York and for its establishment elsewhere. The potential loss of the U.N. site was something the United States "[could] not be complacent about."⁵⁵ At the behest of the State Department, the housing problem in Washington for African diplomats was addressed by the Board of Commissioners of the District of Columbia during the Fall of 1960. In a letter to Robert E. McLaughlin, President of the Board of Commissioners, Secretary of State Christian A. Herter stated that "it [was] in our mutual interest to see that diplomats from all nations [were] hospitably received and comfortably settled in Washington."⁶⁶ Although situations like the Gbedemah episode still occurred, the Eisenhower Administration tried to eliminate the potential for disgraceful segregation incidents along the road connecting New York and Washington, which was a route frequently taken by African diplomats.

Administration attempts at modifying African perceptions of America had become more sophisticated by 1960. The rising importance of African delegates at the U.N. convinced the Eisenhower Administration to implement new measures that would create a better impression of the United States among the new African states. In that respect, the American Mission to the United Nations was "distressed by the African nations' lack of
understanding of civil rights in the United States," especially following Martin Luther King's arrest in October 1960. White House Special Assistant Frederic Fox suggested that Attorney General William Rogers, as the Administration's authority on civil rights, meet informally with U.N. delegates from some of the new African countries "for a realistic discussion with them of American civil rights -- progress and problems -- to help get a better perspective of our situation."87

The need to appease criticism from the new African states thus also compelled the Eisenhower Administration to deal with the problem of segregation by trying to change the African perception of American race relations rather than the nature of these relations. In the latter weeks of the Eisenhower presidency, the importance of the new African delegates to the U.N. had dramatically increased, with key votes on the Congo and an anti-colonial resolution coming later in the session. In order to appease African criticism of American society, the Administration sponsored a week-long American tour for all chief delegates of the newly admitted countries to the U.N. Fully aware that African grievances about America involved the segregation issue, the State Department, which organized the tour, charted an itinerary including New York, Pittsburgh, San Francisco, and Dallas.88 Held during the last week of November, the tour carefully avoided the Deep South, and only provided one day in its only Southern stop, Dallas, where scheduled
activities prevented any examination of the racial situation there.

The tour attested to the close relationship between domestic and foreign policy problems during the Eisenhower years. Fears about the political orientation of an independent Africa, compounded by the paucity of the Administration's knowledge about the continent, made Africa a major concern for American foreign relations. As the United States tried to secure its interests in post-colonial Africa, it became evident that racial segregation severely impaired American prestige, and this domestic problem constituted the chief weapon of the Soviet Union in its propaganda offensive in Africa.

From 1957 onward, the Eisenhower Administration adopted a series of steps aiming at downplaying the issue of race relations, in order to improve its prospects in Africa. These steps can be divided in two categories: government action in the field of civil rights, and symbolic adjustments seeking to transforms foreign perceptions, if not the reality, of American race relations. In doing so, the Eisenhower Administration, in spite of its claims to the contrary, did not handle race relations as a peculiarly local problem. Eisenhower's handling of the Little Rock crisis revealed an awareness of the worldwide impact of his civil rights policies, and that foreign policy considerations had to be considered in the making of his domestic policies, for the
sake of American security interests in Africa. Accordingly, the Administration pursued policies that were weak enough to accommodate the South, but vigorous enough to constitute a powerful symbol of ongoing progress, for foreign consumption.

Of course, foreign policy considerations were not the only influence on Eisenhower's civil rights policies. The problem of implementing desegregation in the South bitterly divided the country along racial and sectional lines, and certainly influenced Eisenhower in his adoption of a moderate, middle-of-the-road approach to race relations. However, the evolution of Eisenhower's civil rights policies paralleled the elaboration of his foreign policy for Africa. From 1957 onward, the American record on race relations tried to present a positive image, and convey the impression that significant progress was being made. Through their emphasis on symbolism, Eisenhower's civil rights policies fulfilled that purpose.
CONCLUSION

The close relationship between domestic and foreign policy which has characterized contemporary American politics intensified during the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Revisionist historians of the Eisenhower presidency were the first to explore the ramifications of that relationship; they have generally limited their considerations of the integration of Eisenhower's domestic and external policies to his concept of national security, in which economic and military requirements were carefully balanced.¹

Wiser in that respect than his successors, Eisenhower articulated a vision of national security protecting American interests around the world in a fiscally responsible way. Accordingly, American foreign policy under Eisenhower responded flexibly to worldwide political changes, and was perhaps more aware of the limits of America's power than it has ever been since. Policy priorities were thus the result of careful choices and conscious decisions, although these could sometimes be based upon faulty or insufficient evidence, as was often the case for American policies in the Third World.

This study has argued that Eisenhower's domestic and foreign policies were coordinated to an even greater extent, and that global objectives strongly influenced the President's policy agenda at home. It focused on the civil rights policies of the Eisenhower Administration, and tried to ascertain the nature and the degree of the influence foreign policy

159
considerations exerted on them. For the purpose of this paper, special attention was paid to the contribution of American relations with Africa in the 1950s to the elaboration of Eisenhower's civil rights policies.

This writer has tried to assess the extent of that impact, and how it translated into policies or other forms of political action. In order to achieve that goal, the paper first had to determine whether there was an evolution in Eisenhower's civil rights policies, and then analyze the nature of the changes in their style or substance. The second objective of the paper was to trace the evolution of Eisenhower's foreign policy in Africa, and to establish its relative importance in U.S. foreign policy at the time. Finally, the most important objective of this study of the Eisenhower Administration was to discuss the nature of African and other foreign perceptions of American race relations, and how the protection of American interests in Africa led the Eisenhower Administration to undertake substantial, but largely symbolic, reforms in its policies on race relations.

The history of American foreign policy since the Second World War has been characterized by the constant attempt by the United States to assume the responsibilities and the privileges of world leadership in a time of steady and accelerating change. During the 1950s, the globalization of the Cold War sharply increased American interests and commitments worldwide, and also made foreign policy a complex
and dominant issue on the American political agenda, a position it has generally assumed since.

Systematic ideological rivalry with the Soviet Union took on new dimensions at the time: it began incorporating cultural and psychological factors, and became a contest between two ways of life in which domestic events in the United States could have worldwide repercussions. Throughout the 1950s, the new reality of an omniscient world public opinion greatly affected American prestige around the world anytime that the complex issue of race relations in America was raised.

This study has reached the conclusion that the harmful impact of the American racial situation on U.S. foreign policy in Africa led to strong pressures on the Eisenhower administration to change those policies. The impact of foreign policy considerations on Eisenhower's civil rights policies had more to do with the style than the substance of American policies. This influence paralleled the overall evolution of Eisenhower's civil rights policies, which moved from an emphasis on limited, but tangible achievements within areas of Federal jurisdiction to a greater reliance on symbolic policy statements and actions that were primarily designed for foreign consumption. This development epitomized the greater influence of foreign policy considerations on American domestic politics, a phenomenon that has expanded ever since.

From a strategic standpoint, the Cold War evolved during the 1950s into a global contest that included new areas of
American interest such as Southeast Asia and Africa. In that respect, American foreign policy reacted not only to the natural expansion of super-power rivalry, but also to the conflict between nationalism and colonialism in the Third World. However, rigid Cold War orthodoxies often deprived United States foreign policy of the flexibility necessary to foster both its short-term and long-term interests, especially in the Third World.

The civil rights policies of the Eisenhower Administration experienced a significant evolution in style and content. The 1950s were marked by the rise of the civil rights movement, a development with which the Eisenhower Administration had great difficulties coping. Initially, Eisenhower's involvement in civil rights matters was limited to small-scale accomplishments in areas indisputably under Federal jurisdiction. By the late 1950s, however, the Administration tried to tame the civil rights crises that began tearing apart national unity via symbolic achievements conveying at least the impression that the administration was working toward the solution of the American race problem.

The turning point in Eisenhower's civil rights policies was Brown v. Board of Education II (1955), which addressed the issue of implementing school desegregation. Prior to that, the Eisenhower Administration had adopted a low-key approach which succeeded in producing limited achievements such as the desegregation of the District of Columbia. These achievements
seemed significant enough at the time to please the black population, and yet were limited enough to appease the worst Southern worries about aggressive Federal intervention in what was an area of state jurisdiction. The announcement of Brown v. Board of Education I, which proclaimed that "separate but equal" schools were unconstitutional, failed to generate the vociferous reactions that Brown II generated, probably because the principle of segregation itself was already under attack.

In contrast, the problem of implementation was much more controversial, as severe differences over the nature and length of the enforcement process existed. Neither the Supreme Court, nor the White House provided clear guidelines for the enforcement of integration. In Brown II, the Supreme Court ordered instead that desegregation be undertaken "with all deliberate speed;" while deliberate speed meant to some that desegregation would be undertaken immediately, others saw it as a pretext for stonewalling on the desegregation of their schools, and a justification for defying the Court orders.

The Eisenhower Administration did little to speed up the desegregation of schools and other public and private facilities in the South. Fearing that rapid integration would lead to massive social disruptions, Eisenhower pushed instead for a policy of moderation and gradualism, virtually hoping that the issue would disappear from the American sociopolitical landscape. Using a limited definition of Federal powers, Eisenhower was extremely reluctant to get his
Administration fully involved in the civil rights crises that bitterly divided the nation at the time. Only in a case of extreme defiance at Little Rock did the Federal government decide to forcefully endorse the Brown decisions: once the crisis was settled, Eisenhower reverted to a passive position.

In the elaboration of its civil rights policies, the Eisenhower Administration was influenced by domestic political considerations. By 1952, the Republican Party had been in a minority position for twenty years, failing to break the Democratic coalition between the solid South and Northern urban voters built by Franklin D. Roosevelt. To achieve that goal, Republican strategists had to weigh their chances of attracting voters from a variety of Democratic constituencies, the two most evident being the Southern and black votes. With Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Republicans worked toward the establishment of a viable two-party system all across the country. Their "Dixie Strategy" concentrated on getting the support of Southern voters, who had been voting Democratic ever since the antebellum period, except for the brief hiatus of Reconstruction, and neglected to go after the Northern black vote, which would have jeopardized traditional Republican support in the North and the Midwest. The strategy was designed to break up the most solid Democratic support base in the country.

The "Dixie Strategy" affected the substance of Eisenhower's civil rights policies. Its success depended upon
the ability of the Eisenhower Administration to reassure Southern voters about its capacity to handle civil rights issues in a way that was satisfactory to them. This led to the elaboration of policies revealing a half-hearted commitment to the enforcement of desegregation, as evidenced by Eisenhower's quick retreat during the controversy over the 1957 Civil Rights Act.

Overall, this paper agrees with the critical assessments of Eisenhower's civil rights policies that have characterized most recent scholarship on the subject. Eisenhower's civil rights legacy was one of symbolism: he failed to openly endorse the Brown decisions, and strove instead for a middle-of-the-road strategy seeking to reconcile supporters and opponents of black civil rights to a policy of moderation and gradualism. In its efforts to appease Southern resentment of the Supreme Court demands regarding desegregation, the Eisenhower administration failed to uphold the legitimate demands of Southern blacks, who asked for more than second-class citizenship. The Administration as a whole had serious difficulties in dealing with racial issues, and was unable to respond meaningfully to the rising demands of the civil rights movement. It also deluded American whites into believing that the abolition of racial discrimination in America could be done in a smooth and painless way. Both failures paved the way for the racial violence and social turmoil that rocked America during the 1960s.
This study has departed from previous perspectives on the civil rights policies of the Eisenhower Administration by discussing how they were influenced by foreign policy considerations. Of particular importance was American foreign policy in Africa, discussed in Chapter Three. Confronted with the same conflict between nationalism and colonialism that existed elsewhere in the Third World, Eisenhower’s foreign policy in Africa tried at first to strike a balance between its traditional support of the right of colonial peoples to self-determination and the protection of its relations with the colonial powers, which were all close allies of the United States in the Cold War.

During the 1950s, Africa ceased to be the "lowest priority" of American foreign policy and became after 1957 a high priority concern of the administration. Although American interests in Africa were steadily on the rise, the emergence of Africa as a priority area of U.S. foreign policy depended more on global and contextual factors than on the intrinsic value of the continent. Indeed, the rise of anti-colonial, nationalist movements all across Africa made it an unknown variable to American foreign policy. In the context of the Cold War, American foreign policy-makers feared that the collapse of colonial rule could lead to a Communist takeover of Africa. Such fears were magnified by the overall lack of knowledge of Americans about Africa, the absence of solid economic and political infrastructures in most African
territories, and the lack of American control over what would be the greatest transfer of political authority in history.

For those reasons, Eisenhower's foreign policy had to adapt to African nationalism, and became more tolerant of nationalist movements there than in Latin America and Asia for instance. American foreign policy in Africa was highly preventive in the sense that its primary objective was to avoid Communist encroachment in the area. In that context, the concept of neutrality, which was anathema to American foreign policy elsewhere, was tolerated in Africa. Containment of Communist expansion in Africa assumed different incarnations than elsewhere. For instance, covert operations, such as the ones used in Iran in 1953 and Guatemala in 1954, were out of the question until the Congo disaster of 1960; instead, the United States worked toward the establishment of stable political institutions, even if that would eventually involve the active support of authoritarian regimes.3

As Africa became increasingly important to U.S. foreign policy, the Eisenhower Administration actively sought to secure the support of the emerging African states. It moved away from its previous middle-of-the-road stand on colonialism, largely because the decolonization of Africa became a fait accompli that the United States was forced to adjust to. At that point, Africa had become a vitally important concern of American foreign policy, and even more so because the U.S. had no idea in which direction the black
continent would be heading. As part of this readjustment of American foreign policy in Africa, the Eisenhower Administration worked frantically toward the elimination of its greatest liability in Africa, the African perception that American race relations were completely unjust and racist.

The influence of foreign policy considerations on Eisenhower's civil rights policies was felt in two different ways. It caused changes in American domestic policies with the adoption of civil rights legislation, and influenced Eisenhower's decision to send troops to Little Rock. Complementing those domestic adjustments were extensive efforts to present a more appealing image of American race relations to Africans. Both responses revealed the impact of foreign policy considerations on Eisenhower's domestic policies, and the diversity of means and sources of influence in contemporary American foreign relations. Overall, however, the requirements of U.S. foreign policy in Africa dictated mostly cosmetic changes to the American racial situation.

Either out of nostalgia or disillusionment, the 1950s have been remembered as a rather simple period in contemporary American history, in which social and cultural transformations were subordinated to the enjoyment of peace and unprecedented prosperity. Historical research of the last two decades has demonstrated, however, that the Eisenhower presidency took place in the midst of constant political and social transformations both at home and abroad.
Perhaps the most interesting development in the Cold War during the 1950s was the integration of key foreign and domestic policies into a more comprehensive approach to government. Under Dwight D. Eisenhower, the presidency assumed its modern character with the establishment of a strong executive structure that took control of most aspects of foreign and domestic policy-making. The high degree of integration between domestic and international problems anticipated the evolution of modern American politics and reflected trends that emerged strongly after World War II. Because American politics during the Cold War had come to be dominated by international issues, Eisenhower recognized the close relationship between foreign and domestic policy.

This paper has explored some new dimensions of that relationship, and has tried to demonstrate the complexity of the policy-making process during the Eisenhower years. Eisenhower's presidency integrated to a remarkable degree foreign and domestic policies into a cohesive philosophy of government. By connecting the evolution of the Eisenhower Administration's civil rights policies with the growing American interest in Africa, this study has moved away from the orthodox-revisionist debate, and has tried to uncover new aspects in American foreign policy under Eisenhower by discussing the importance of global considerations in the elaboration of domestic policies.
ENDNOTES

INTRODUCTION


CHAPTER ONE


2- It is true that unlike most twentieth-century presidents, Eisenhower clearly established his Secretary of State as the administration’s official voice on foreign affairs. In contrast, Presidents like the Roosevelts, Wilson, Truman, and Kennedy often acted as their own spokesmen on foreign policy, and thus conveyed a more activist impression.


4- Ibid., p. 247.

5- Ibid., p. 257.


10- *Ibid.*, p. 110. In his memoir, Adams also discusses the role of Special Presidential Advisors, who were used by Eisenhower as sources for new foreign policy initiatives. Such foreign policy advisors included C.D. Jackson (Psychological Warfare), Harold Stassen (Disarmament), and Clarence Randall (Foreign Economic Policy) See Adams, *First-Hand Report*, pp. 90ff. However, these insights on a sophisticated foreign policy machinery were largely ignored by contemporaries, who read *First-Hand Report* as a vindication of the orthodox view.


19- Ibid., p. 574.

20- Ibid., p. 420.

21- Ibid., p. 464.

22- Ibid., pp. 503, 508, 555.

23- Ibid., pp. 575, 576, 578.

24- Named after Eisenhower's secretary, the Ann Whitman File consists of his papers as President. An extensive collection of correspondence, memoranda, reports, and other documents on Eisenhower's foreign and domestic policies, the Whitman File has been available for research at the Eisenhower Library since 1975, and its declassification was completed in 1983 (except for restricted documents). Other Eisenhower's records as president are available in the White House Central Files. These two massive collections are the largest and most useful sources of primary documents on the Eisenhower presidency.


27- Ibid., p. 59.

28- Ibid., pp. 59, 61, 62.
29- But the need for secrecy also showed the weaknesses of a hidden-hand approach: for instance, Eisenhower's attempt to remove Richard Nixon from the ticket for the 1956 election failed because he wanted no public showdown with his vice-president. Hidden-hand leadership failed here, as Eisenhower had no other alternative policy except keeping Nixon on the ticket. See Greenstein, pp. 63-64, 220, 234.


31- Ibid., pp. 88-90.

32- Ibid., pp. 125, 133, 244. Of course, greater Executive branch control of foreign policy by no means excluded Dulles from either the making or implementation of foreign policy, as the Secretary of State is a key member of the National Security Council. In that section, Greenstein also discusses the creation and the role of the Operations Coordinating Board, a NSC extension charged with the coordination of the various governmental bodies involved in security and foreign policy matters. See pp. 132-34.


34- Ibid., p. 333.

35- Ibid., pp. 497, 499, 515.

36- Ibid., pp. 385, 547-48.

37- Ibid., p. 545.

38- Ibid., p. 336.

39- Ibid., pp. 335, 341-42.

40- Ibid., pp. 295, 331, 454, 548.

41- Ibid., pp. 406, 443.

42- Ibid., p. 410.

43- Ibid., p. 368.

44- This issue is addressed in Richard H. Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist," Diplomatic History 14 (Summer 1990), pp. 320-24.

45- Studies integrating elements of the domestic and foreign


47- Ibid., p. 108.

48- Ibid., p. 126.

49- Ibid., p. 127.

50- Ibid., Chapters 10 and 11, pp. 204-50.


52- Ibid., p. 249.


54- Ibid., pp. 7, 11, 57-63, 73.

55- Ibid., pp. 55, 133, 198, 208.

56- Ibid., pp. 10, 35, 207.


58- For a discussion of Guatemala prior to the 1944 revolution and under the revolutionary government, and of United Fruit activities in Guatemala, see Immerman, pp. 20-81.
59- Ibid., p. 83.


61- Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala, pp. 132-44, 154-68.

62- Ibid., p. 9, 88.

63- Ibid., pp. 175, 180, 198.

64- Ibid., pp. ix, 195, 197.


67- Ibid., p. 457.


70- McMahon, p. 455, 457.

71- For a reasoned discussion of the limits of the hidden-hand school of interpretation, see Piers Brendon, Ike: The Life and Times of Dwight D. Eisenhower (London: Becker and
Warburg, 1987). Brendon establishes some interesting parallels between Eisenhower and Ronald Reagan, who conveyed a hands-off, conservative image similar to Eisenhower's. Perhaps it is no coincidence that the most enthusiastic revisionist works were published in the early 1980s, when the popularity of neo-Conservatism reached its peak.


CHAPTER TWO


3- Ibid., p. 12.

4- Ibid., p. 5.

5- Ibid., p. 15.


11- Burk, *Eisenhower Administration and Black Civil Rights*, p. 49.

12- Oveta Culp Hobby to Dwight Eisenhower, 13 April 1953, Ann Whitman File, Administration Series, Oveta Culp Hobby, Box 19, Eisenhower Library.


15- Oveta Culp Hobby to Dwight Eisenhower, 13 April 1953, Ann Whitman File, Administration Series, Oveta Culp Hobby, Box 19, Eisenhower Library.

16- Earl Warren, The Memoirs of Earl Warren (New York: Doubleday, 1977), p.2. Warren also mentions that many other states had de facto segregation, as postwar urban development led to the concentration of northern blacks in city ghettos, and the rise of middle-class suburbs. With respect to de facto segregation, issues such as busing and the decrepitude of the American public school system have revealed since the 1960s the extent to which education is a thorny and racially divisive national problem.

17- Richard Kluger, Simple Justice, pp. 18, 411, 447-48, 481, 521-523. The five cases included in the Brown Supreme Court decision were Brown v. Board of Education (Topeka, Ks); Briggs et al. v. Elliott et al. (South Carolina); Davis et al. v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, Virginia, et al.; Bolling et al. v. Sharpe et al. (Dist. of Columbia); and Gebhart et al., v. Belton et al. (Delaware)

18- The key sociological work used by N.A.A.C.P. lawyers was Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma (New York, 1944). In the controversial footnote 11 of his Brown opinion, Chief Justice Earl Warren mentions other sociological material which influenced the Supreme Court decision. See Kluger, Simple Justice, Appendix I: Text of the Decisions, pp. 779-787.

19- Assistant Solicitor General Philip Elman, quoted in Kluger, Simple Justice, p. 560.

20- Kluger, Simple Justice, p. 615.

21- Warren's career as District Attorney and Attorney General was generally successful and he acquired a reputation for fairness and efficiency. However, his tenure as Attorney General was marred by the forced removal of Japanese-Americans during World War II, an action that Warren did not publicly regret until thirty years later. On the subject, see Bernard Schwartz, Super Chief: Earl Warren and His Supreme Court -- A Judicial Biography (New York: New
22- See Dwight Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953–1956, p. 228. In fact, he argued that Warren played no part in his nomination as Republican presidential candidate, since the California delegation at the Republican convention had supported Warren through the first ballot, after which Eisenhower received the nomination. However, the key role played by California votes in securing the passage of the "Fair Play" amendment which unseated Taft delegates from three Southern states and replaced them with Eisenhower delegates, contradicts Eisenhower's contention. See Bernard Schwartz, Super Chief, pp. 3–7; Richard Kluger, Simple Justice, pp. 663–667.


26- Desegregation of public transportation was ordered in Gayle v. Browder(1956), as a follow-up to the Montgomery bus boycott; segregated housing was declared unconstitutional in New Orleans Park Improvement Assn. v. DeSoto(1958); the wave of student sit-ins led to the invalidation of segregated eating facilities in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority(1961). Mandatory integration of recreational facilities was proclaimed in Watson v. Memphis(1963), as was integration of government buildings in Johnson v. Virginia(1963).


28- New York Times Supreme Court reporter Anthony Lewis reports in Portrait of a Decade: The Second American Revolution (1964) that he saw an insertion in President Eisenhower's handwriting on a draft copy of the government brief for Brown II. The insertion urged the Court to give due attention and understanding to the eventual problems that the South would face in complying with the decision. See also Schwartz, Super Chief, pp. 112–113.

29- Brownell, "Eisenhower's Civil Rights Program: A Personal Assessment," p. 239.

30- See Chapter I for an overview of how Eisenhower's civil rights policies have been appraised over the years.


33- Besides the alleged Eisenhower insertion in the government brief discussed by Anthony Lewis (see note 28), other 'hidden-hand' attempts to influence the Supreme Court included Eisenhower's private defence of the Southern viewpoint in a conversation with Warren at a White House dinner prior to the first *Brown* decision. See Earl Warren, *Memoirs*, p.291.

34- On the nationwide public outcry that followed the Till murder, see Memorandum from E.Frederic Morrow to Maxwell Rabb, 29 November 1955, E. Frederic Morrow Papers, Civil Rights Clippings, Box 10, Eisenhower Library.

35- Herbert Brownell, Statement before House Judiciary Committee, 10 April 1956, E. Frederic Morrow Papers, Civil Rights Clippings, Box 10, Eisenhower Library.

36- Fact Paper No. 236, "Civil Rights Program," E. Frederic Morrow Papers, Civil Rights Clippings, Box 10, Eisenhower Library. See also "Administration Civil Rights Program," Bryce N. Harlow Papers, Box 8, Eisenhower Library.


39- Telephone Conversation, Dwight Eisenhower to Herbert Brownell, 3 July 1957, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries Series, Box 25, Eisenhower Library.


41- Telegrams and letters from black leaders to the White House, August 1957, E. Frederic Morrow Papers, Work Order Requests, Box 9, Eisenhower Library.


43- Letter from Martin Luther King to Richard Nixon, 30 August 1957, William P. Rogers Papers, Series V: Subject File, Richard Nixon - Correspondence, Box 50, Eisenhower Library.

44- Richard Russell to Dwight Eisenhower, 26 August 1957, Ann
Whitman File, Whitman Diary Series, Box 9, Eisenhower Library.

45- Telephone Conversation, Dwight Eisenhower to Lyndon Johnson, 15 June 1957, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries Series, Box 25, Eisenhower Library.


47- Schwartz, *Super Chief*, p. 171-75, 250. By October 1957, Eisenhower’s dissatisfaction with Warrer became so great that he had asked Brownell to examine Warren’s prejudicial career for any indication of his later positions as Chief Justice. See memorandum, Herbert Brownell to Ann Whitman, 8 October 1957, Ann Whitman File, Administration Series, Herbert Brownell, Box 8, Eisenhower Library.

48- Burk, p. 176.

49- Ibid., p. 179.

50- "Notes dictated by the President on October 8, 1957 concerning visit of Governor Orval Faubus of Arkansas to Little Rock on September 14, 1957," 8 October 1957, Ann Whitman File, Administration Series, Little Rock Crisis, Box 23, Eisenhower Library.

51- Ibid.

52- Memorandum, Andrew Goodpaster to James Hagerty, 19 September 1957, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries Series, Box 27, Eisenhower Library.

53- Burk, p. 184.


56- The best characterization of Eisenhower’s approach to civil rights matters is James C. Duram, *A Moderate Among Extremists: Dwight D. Eisenhower and the School Desegregation Crisis* (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1981). It argues that Eisenhower tried to chart a middle course between the extremism of Southern segregationists and the demands of the civil rights leaders. In doing so,
according to Duram, Eisenhower "legitimized" the Southern case for segregation. For a presentation of Eisenhower's moderate approach, see Duram, pp. 64-67.

57- The foreign policy implications of Little Rock are discussed in Chapter IV of this thesis.


59- Ibid.

60- Ibid., p. 3.

61- Ibid., p. 4.

62- Burk, p. 192.


64- See memoranda, E. Frederic Morrow to Sherman Adams, 16 December 1955 and 4 June 1957, E. Frederic Morrow Papers, Civil Rights Clippings, Box 10, Eisenhower Library. See also memorandum, Maxwell Rabb to Sherman Adams, 1 March 1956, Gerald D. Morgan Papers, Box 6, Eisenhower Library.


Martin Luther King’s impressions of Eisenhower and the meeting, see Stephen B. Oates, Let the Trumpet Sound: The Life of Martin Luther King, Jr. (Chicago: New American Library, 1982), pp. 129-131.

70- Memorandum from Wilton B. Persons to Dwight Eisenhower, 28 January 1959, Gerald D. Morgan Papers, Box 6, Eisenhower Library.

71- Burk, p. 246.

72- E. Frederic Morrow, Black Man in the White House, p. 299.

73- Memorandum from E. Frederic Morrow to Sherman Adams, 16 December 1955, E. Frederic Morrow Papers, Civil Rights Clippings, Box 10, Eisenhower Library.


75- Morrow, Black Man in the White House, pp. 28, 66, 95, 261. See also memorandum, E. Frederic Morrow to Gerald D. Morgan, 10 November 1958, Gerald D. Morgan Papers, Box 6, Eisenhower Library.


77- Leonard Hall, Oral History Interview, 19 May 1975, Eisenhower Library, p.27.

78- Burk, p. 17.

79- "Where Does Negro Voter Strength Lie?", Congressional Quarterly (30 April 1956), Bryce N. Harlow Records, Box 8, Eisenhower Library, p. 2.


81- Ibid., p. 21.


83- Scammon and Wattenberg, p. 173.

84- Lubell, p. 103.

85- Lubell, p. 104.
An extensive collection of adverse mail sent to Eisenhower after Brown can be found in the Leonard W. Hall Papers, Campaign Committees, 1953-1958, Box 9, Eisenhower Library.

See footnote 56, referring to James C. Duram’s discussion of Eisenhower’s moderate approach to desegregation.

Telephone conversation, Dwight Eisenhower to Herbert Brownell, 19 August 1956, Ann Whitman File, Whitman Diary Series, Box 8, Eisenhower Library.


Morrow, Black Man in the White House, p. 102.

Form letter from Val J. Washington, E. Frederic Morrow Papers, Civil Rights Clippings, Box 10, Eisenhower Library. See also Bryce N. Harlow Records, Box 8, Eisenhower Library.


CHAPTER THREE


7- Bertolin, in Whitaker, Africa in the United States: Vital Interests, table 1, pp. 24, 49.


10- Henry A. Byroade, Address on the World's Colonies and Ex-Colonies, reprinted in Hottelet and Herskovits, eds., The Dynamics of World Power, Volume V, p.556.
11- Ibid., pp. 557-58.

12- Ibid., p. 557.


16- John Foster Dulles, Telegram to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 22 May 1953, Ann Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series, Box 1, Eisenhower Library.

17- The clearest expression of George Humphrey's views on foreign aid and decolonization can be found in his letter to Paul Hoffman, 26 March 1957, Ann Whitman File, Administration Series, George M. Humphrey, Box 21, Eisenhower Library.


22- After their independence, Ghana and Guinea quickly affirmed their espousal of a neutralist foreign policy, and gently let the United States know about it. See Memorandum of Conversation between the President and Prime Minister Nkrumah, 24 July 1958, Ann Whitman File, International Series, Ghana, Box 15, Eisenhower Library. See also Sékou Touré, Telegram to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 8 April 1959, White House Office Files, Office of the Staff Secretary, International Series, Guinea, Box 7, Eisenhower Library.


24- Ibid.


32- Congressional reactions to the rise of Africa are presented in Hottelet and Herskovits, eds., The Dynamics of World Power, Volume V, pp. 561-72. See also Chester Bowles, Africa's Challenge to America (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1957).


35- Ibid.

36- Ibid., p. 3.

37- Ibid., p. 5.

38- Ibid., pp. 9-10.


42- Ibid., p. 6.


45- Ibid.


47- Minutes from the National Security Council Meeting, 14 January 1960, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 12, Eisenhower Library.

48- Noer, p. 49.

49- "The Vice President's Report to the President on his Trip to Africa," 7 April 1957, White House Central Files, Official File 116, Box 594, Eisenhower Library.


52- Maurice Stans, Minutes of the National Security Council Meeting, 18 August 1960, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 13, Eisenhower Library, pp. 8-10.


54- Telephone Conversation, Christian A. Herter to Dag Hammarskjold, 12 July 1960, Dulles-Herter Telephone Conversation Series, Reel 11.

55- Kalb, pp. xxvii, 28.


57- Kalb, p. 21.


59- Kalb, p. 106.

60- Kalb, p. 106-07.
61- Kalb, p. 22.


63- See Kalb, Chapter 3, and pp. 189-91.

64- See in particular Thomas J. Noer, Cold War and Black Liberation, p. 52.


66- Ibid., p. 789. During the Suez crisis, the Cape route was actually used for shipments of oil to Western Europe, and Western access to the route became even more important once Egypt assumed control of the Suez Canal.


69- Ibid., p. 985.

70- Ibid.


75- "Race Conflict in South Africa Resulting from Policies of Apartheid," 4 September 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, Volume XI, pp. 1009-10. See also Robert Murphy, Memorandum to John Foster Dulles, 30 November 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954,
Robert Murphy, Memorandum to John Foster Dulles, 30 November 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, Volume XI, p. 1024.


Ibid., pp. 776, 779.

Noer, p. 47.


Noer, pp. 46-47.


Henry A. Byroade, Address on the World's Colonies and Ex-Colonies, reprinted in Hottelet and Herskovits, eds., The Dynamics of World Power, Volume V, p. 556.


Ibid.

Ibid., p. 813.


Ibid., p. 818.
CHAPTER FOUR


2- Val J. Washington, Open Letter to Lyndon B. Johnson, August 6, 1957, E. Frederic Morrow Papers, Box 10, Eisenhower Library. Blaming Congress for inaction on civil rights was a recurring theme of all Republican political literature aimed at black audiences throughout the 1950s.
See Chapter Two of this paper, pp. 39-42.


4- Ibid.

5- See Chapter Three of this paper, pp. 108-113, for a detailed discussion of U.S. attempts to limit the worldwide condemnation of apartheid at the United Nations.


11- Richard Nixon, "The Vice President's Report to the President on his Trip to Africa," 7 April 1957, White House Central Files, Official File 116, Box 594, Eisenhower Library.

12- Ibid.

13- Ibid.


15- Ibid.

16- Ibid.

193


19- Ibid.


22- Ibid.


24- Ibid., p. 9.

25- Ibid., p. 11.

26- Ibid.

27- Ibid., pp. 6-7.

28- Henry Loomis, Memorandum to Frederick M. Dearborn, Jr., 22 November 1957, White House Office Files, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, OCB Series, Subject Subseries, Box 3, Eisenhower Library.


30- Clarence Randall, Minutes of the National Security Council Meeting, 8 May 1958, pp. 3-4, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 10, Eisenhower Library.

31- Matthew Marks, "International Repercussions of U.S. Race incidents," Report to Karl Harr, Jr., 26 October 1959, White House Office Files, Office of the Special Assistant
for National Security Affairs, OCB Series, Subject Subseries, Box 4, Eisenhower Library.

32- Ibid.
33- Ibid.
34- Ibid.
35- Ibid.
36- Richard Nixon, "The Vice President's Report to the President on his Trip to Africa," 7 April 1957, White House Central Files, Official File 116, Box 594, Eisenhower Library.
38- E. Frederic Morrow, Memorandum to Sherman Adams, 4 June 1957, E. Frederic Morrow Papers, Civil Rights Clippings, Box 10, Eisenhower Library.
41- Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Except from the President's State of the Union Message to the Congress," 9 January 1959, Gerald D. Morgan Papers, Box 6, Eisenhower Library.
43- Ibid., p. 186.
44- Ibid.
46- Ibid., p. 9.
47- Ibid.
48- See Notes 18, 19 of this chapter, for additional
information on the reports from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service on the foreign reaction to American racial incidents.


54- Ibid.

55- Ibid.


60- Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower, p. 484.

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64- John Foster Dulles, Telephone Conversation with Mike Mansfield, 16 October 1957, Dulles-Herter Telephone Conversation Series, Reel 6.


69- United States Commissioner General, Brussels World's Fair, 1958, This is America (Brussels: Office of the United States Commissioner General, 1958), p. 7.


71- Ibid., p. 315.


73- U.S. Commissioner General, Brussels World's Fair, 1958, This is America, p. 36.

74- Katherine Howard, Letter to Howard Cullman, 30 May 1958,
Katherine Howard Papers, Box 27, Eisenhower Library.

75- Cullman, p. 231.

76- Katherine Howard, Letter to Howard Cullman, 30 May 1958, Katherine Howard Papers, Box 27, Eisenhower Library.


78- Dwight D. Eisenhower, Memorandum of Conference with the President, 24 June 1958, Christian A. Herter Papers, Chronological File, Box 5, Eisenhower Library.

79- Morrow, Black Man in the White House, p. 147.


81- John Foster Dulles, Telegram to Wilson S. Flake, 9 October 1957, FRUS, 1955-1957, Volume XVIII.

82- Richard Nixon, Telephone Conversation with John Foster Dulles, 9 October 1957, Dulles-Herter Telephone Conversation Series, Reel 6.

83- Ibid.

84- The most publicized incidents involved the Chief Justice of Ghana and a Liberian official in 1957, and the Central African Republic's Ambassador to the United States in November 1960. For reasons that have remained unclear, the African Bureau of the State Department refused to deal with the discrimination incidents. One can only guess that the Bureau, which had a strong pro-European outlook, felt uneasy about racial issues. See E. Frederic Morrow, Memorandum to Richard Nixon, 10 December 1957, E. Frederic Morrow Papers, Box 10, Eisenhower Library; Christian A. Herter, Memorandum to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 11 November 1960, White House Office Files, Office of the Staff Secretary, Box 1, Eisenhower Library.

85- Christian A. Herter, Memorandum to David Rockefeller, 14 October 1960, White House Office Files, Office of the Staff Secretary, International Series, Box 15, Eisenhower Library.


198
CONCLUSION


2- See in particular Robert F. Burk, *The Eisenhower Administration and Black Civil Rights* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1984) for a discussion of the symbolic nature of Eisenhower's civil rights policies.

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200
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Maxwell M. Rabb
Allan Shivers
Maurice Stans
Robert G. Storey

From the Eisenhower Library:
Eugene R. Black
Herbert Brownell
Arthur S. Flemming
Andrew J. Goodpaster

Leonard W. Hall
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Other Unpublished Sources:
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