

Fostering and Impeding Elements of Secularization in Quebec

Ronit Shemtov

A Thesis
in
The Department
of
Sociology

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Master of Arts at
Concordia University
Montréal, Québec, Canada

May 1985

© Ronit Shemtov, 1985

ABSTRACT

Fostering And Impeding Elements Of Secularization In Quebec

Ronit Shemtov

In Quebec, industrialism, urbanism and the Quiet Revolution of the early 'sixties pre-disposed Quebec society to secularity. Religion has become a private concern. However, in Canada, the integration of Catholicism, coupled with the ethnic sentiments that reinforce religious identity in general, serve to resist the secular process.

Though our data demonstrate that age differences, urbanity, education and modern/industrial occupations have strong and negative impacts on religious behaviour, sex and income differences are statistically insignificant with regard to religious behaviour. As impeding elements, non-secular denominations (Catholic versus non-Catholic) and ethno-religious community involvement are strong and positive determinants of religious behaviour. Catholics have a greater tendency toward secularity than non-Catholics; it seems that religion is more likely to persist within the pluralistic non-Catholic milieu.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My most heartfelt thanks go to my thesis advisor, Professor Gerry Dewey, whose invaluable knowledge, gentle persuasion and affable nature made two years of research and the writing of this thesis most enjoyable and satisfying.

I also wish to thank Professors Bill Reimer and Herb Horwich, who provided the necessary criticisms, insights and patience and who were never unwilling to offer guidance.

Last but never least, I wish to thank those special people who stood by me from the start and who inspired me to believe that what seems impossible at first is eventually attainable.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES.....vii

INTRODUCTION.....1

I. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE.....3

 Fostering Elements.....3

 The Private Sphere.....6

 The Secularization of Quebec Society.....16

 Impeding Elements.....24

 Summary of the Literature.....31

 The Theoretical Model and Propositions.....34

II . THE OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE MAJOR CONCEPTS.....42

 The Data.....42

 The Research Hypotheses.....63

III. THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DATA.....	69
Fostering Elements.....	70
Religion as a Control Variable.....	77
The Interaction Effects between Religious Denomination and the Pre-disposing Variables.....	84
Resistant Elements.....	88
The Measures of Private Religion.....	99
Theoretical Implications of the Data Analysis....	107
 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.....	 114
REFERENCES.....	119
APPENDIX.....	123

LIST OF TABLES

1.	A Comparison between Sample and 1981 Census Percentage Distribution of Age.....	43
2.	A Comparison between Sample and 1981 Census Percentage Distribution of Sex.....	43
3.	A Comparison between Sample and 1981 Census Percentage Distribution of Religious Affiliation.....	44
4.	Zero-order Gamma Values and Corresponding Levels of Significance for all Dependent Variables in the Empirical Model and their Independent Variables.....	71
5.	Percent Frequent Religious Attendance and Percent who Regard their Religious Group as Important by Age, Education, Early-Childhood Residence, Occupation, Income and Sex.....	72
6.1	Percent Frequent Religious Attendance by Education, Early-Childhood Residence, Occupation Controlling for Religious Denomination.....	78
6.2	Percent Frequent Religious Attendance by Income and Sex Controlling for Religious Denomination.....	79
7.1	Percent who Regard their Religious Group Important (Subjective Importance) by Education, Residence, Occupation, Income and Sex Controlling for Religious Denomination.....	80
7.2	First-order Partial Gammas Corresponding to the Cross-tabulation of Subjective Importance of Religious Group by Education, Residence, Occupation, Income and Sex Controlling for Religious Denomination.....	81
8.	Percent Frequent Religious Attendance and Percent Regarding their Religious Group Important by Religious Denomination.....	82
9.	Percent Frequent Religious Attendance by Religious Affiliation Controlling for Age.....	89
10.	Percent Frequent Religious Attendance and Percent who Regard their Religious Group Important (Subjective Importance) by Ethno- Religious Community Involvement.....	90
11.	Subjective Importance of Religious Group by Religious Attendance.....	93

12.	Percent Regarding their Religion Group Important by Religious Attendance Controlling for Age.....	94
13.	Percent Regarding their Religious Group as Important by Religious Attendance Controlling for Ethno-Religious Community Involvement.....	94
14.	Percent Regarding their Religious Group as Important by Religious Attendance Controlling for both Age and Ethno-Religious Community Involvement.....	95
15.	Percent Agreeing, Uncertain and Disagreeing with a Positive Attitude toward Co-habitation by Religious Denomination.....	100
16.	Percent Agreeing, Uncertain and Disagreeing with a Positive Attitude toward Abortion by Religious Affiliation.....	102
17.	Attitude toward Abortion by Age Controlling for Religious Denomination.....	104

Introduction

The transformation in the religious habits of North Americans over the last two decades is well documented in the sociological literature. The frequency of religious attendance has dropped dramatically and accompanying that trend has been a surge of small, new religious movements, esoteric interest and other symbolic expressions.

Though historically Quebec has been culturally - that is, linguistically and denominationally - distinct from American and Canadian societies, it has not remained unaffected by the overwhelming impact of secularizing forces such as urbanism and industrialism. Nor has it been unexposed to Eastern religious forms, cultic fads and humanist philosophies.

As an object of inquiry, Quebec society poses an interesting challenge to sociologists of religion. As a Catholic sub-society that only recently (i.e. during the early 1960's) experienced rapid institutional secularization of its state apparatus, it could very well demonstrate patterns of religious or, conversely, secular behaviour that deviate significantly from the Canadian and American patterns. As part of the Canadian reality, it shares in the

ethnic, regional, and socio-economic configuration that has come to be known as the Canadian cultural and vertical mosaic.

This thesis therefore attempts to explore the particular direction which secularization in Quebec has assumed; calling to attention both fostering and impeding factors of the process.

Chapter I will examine the pertinent literature concerning secularization; its pre-disposing and resistant elements. Chapter I will conclude with the presentation of the theoretical propositions that have been drawn from the literature review.

Chapter II will attempt to operationalize the major concepts that are presented in the propositions appearing at the end of the preceding chapter. The second chapter will conclude with the statement of the research hypotheses.

Chapter III consists of the statistical analysis of the data and includes the theoretical implications of our findings.

Review of the Literature

I. Theories of Secularization and Factors which have Fostered it

1.1 Thomas Luckmann (1967) and Peter Berger (1965) have dealt with secularization as a process by which religion has come to reside at the margins of contemporary industrial society, namely in the private sphere. They also explore the social-psychological implications which this process has for individual meaning in the modern world.

For Luckmann, it is too simplistic to assume that industrialization and urbanization have led to the automatic demise of religion. Rather, these processes are specific socio-historical events which, once they engendered significant alterations in the social structure, also affected the degree to which religion had provided the individual with a subjective system of meaning (Luckmann, 1967:38-39). Though he locates the primary source of secularization in the very nature of institutional specialization of religion (a central theme which will later be explored), industrialization and urbanization were events that reinforced such institutional specialization, thereby "free(ing) the norms of the various institutional areas from

the influence of superordinated 'religious' values" (Luckmann, 1967: 39). Religious values became confined to family and church as voluntary association since they were inconsequential for political and economic life.

Luckmann provides an extensive analysis of the social forms of religion among which the institutional specialization of religion bears an inherent potential for secularity (Luckmann, 1967: 76). This social form is most characteristic of complex societies wherein advanced technology, a complex division of labour and a production surplus are preliminary to the administration of religious functions by a highly specialized personnel. Although religious symbols attain their highest form of expression via a well-articulated doctrine, they lose the superordinate position they held in less complex systems, namely the diffusion of religious elements in other areas of social life, e.g. kinship, nationhood, etc.

Institutionalized religion, its archetype being the Judaeo-Christian tradition, has for both Luckmann and Berger unintentionally sown the seeds of its own demise. Berger traces the genesis of secularization in Protestantism and the Old Testament where the polarity between God and individual, sacred and profane, religion and society found initial expression (Berger, 1967: 111-123).

Luckmann prefers to focus on the fundamental character of institutionalized religion as it similarly represents a polarity between the sacred and non-sacred:

"In institutionally specialized religion, norms are highly specified; segregation of the sacred cosmos from the 'world' can encourage a weakening of the integrating function of religion for every day conduct if the effect of that segregation is not counteracted by the pervasiveness of religion in society."(Luckmann, 1967:75)

Luckmann further adds that perfect symmetry between an "official" model of religion and a subjective system of meaning is impossible given institutionalized religion. By virtue of its specialized function, religion can not represent the structure in its totality especially if religious symbols become divorced from non-sacred reality (Luckmann, 1967: 85). To use Luckmann's terminology, the internalization of segregated worlds of religious and non-religious symbols induce the person to "stop and think" about the dissimilar expectations of sacred and secular universes (Luckmann, 1967 : 86). On a structural level religion loses its plausibility as an overarching system of significance and on a social-psychological level, the internalization of a plurality of values poses a problem of meaning for the individual.

The problem of structural plausibility of religion and its social-psychological correlate becomes even more acute in the event of rapid social change, moreover, if the official model does not adapt itself to fluctuating

circumstances which also have a role to play in the development of ultimate meaning (Luckmann, 1967: 82). It becomes increasingly difficult to socialize subsequent generations into a religious model of significance given growing disparities between changing social conditions, the official religious doctrine and the subjective acquisition of these doctrines. However, notes Luckmann, as people continue to be integrated into a religious model they will not immediately experience incongruence; rather such incongruence will be more profound with following generations wherein religion is reduced to a form of mere rhetoric.

Furthermore, church-going may be performed for non-religious reasons and specific ideas, which once were the core of the religious tradition, are reduced to mere opinions and isolated beliefs. In addition, the degree of asymmetry due to changing social conditions will have further social-structural implications:

"the exposure of the members of a society to changing 'objective' circumstances will vary not only by generation but also by class position, occupation, sex and so forth." (Luckmann, 1967: 89)

The Private Sphere

Having lost its obligatory character, traditional religion thus recedes into the private sphere.

Inconsequential to those highly "rational" sectors of social existence, e.g. workplace, * the individual's identity becomes a highly personal and flexible phenomenon (Luckmann, 1967: 97). Indeed, modern "sacred" themes reflect these processes as they are expressed in terms which exalt the individual, namely a consumer orientation and an emphasis on autonomy:

"to a greater degree than in the traditional social order the individual is left up to his own devices in choosing goods and services, friends, spouses and even 'ultimate' meanings. He's free to construct his own personal identity." (Luckmann, 1967: 98; see also Berger, 1967: 145).

Relegated to the private sphere, religion enters a state of pluralism where it must compete with other symbolic systems including contemporary humanisms and popular psychology. Adds Berger, pluralism in the private sector means that religion loses its taken-for-granted character. Pluralism relativizes the importance of traditional religious meaning by forcing it to compete with other, even non-religious universes in an open-market situation (Berger, 1967: 151).

* Berger identifies the loci of secularization as being the highly rationalized economic sector and state bureaucracy, having themselves been developed by capitalist and industrial forces (Berger, 1967: 129-132). Secularization will also affect the various socio-economic groups to the extent that these strata will differ in terms of exposure to these forces. The closer the distance to secularizing processes, the nearer is one to what Berger terms a 'liberated territory' vis a vis religion.

Furthermore, since the success of religious institutions largely depends on their ability to service and thus meet the "consumer" needs of individuals in their private existence, they have limited themselves to performing mostly therapeutic or psychological functions (Berger, 1967: 147).

As sexuality and the family lose their traditional links with other institutional sectors, they too are pushed into the private sphere and thus liberated from their previous constraints. Nevertheless, the family and sex are capable of providing a basis for the individual's sense of self-image, self-expression and ultimate significance precisely because they are irrelevant and inconsequential for the primary sectors of society (Luckmann, 1967: 111).

1.2 David Martin's theory of secularization is an examination of religion in its structural manifestations, that is, the structure or frame which a particular socio-historical and cultural complex has assumed once modernity has been introduced (Martin, 1978: 13). Moreover, the question which Martin wishes to answer is essentially the following: what are those elements in the structure of a given society which either allow or inhibit modernity upon its introduction.

Martin's response to the question, is to be found in a categorization wherein he addresses the issues of (1) whether the dominant religion is Catholic as opposed to Protestant and (2) whether the frame of a given society is structured in such a fashion as to reveal either a religious monopoly situation or one of pluralism. Such a categorization is useful for our purpose since it permits us to place our unit of analysis, i.e. Quebec, between the poles of such continua.

At one end of the spectrum we find societies which demonstrate a near-total religious monopoly situation as these are most often societies in which Catholicism is the dominant religious institution e.g. France, Italy and Spain. Although religious minorities are to be found in such societies, they tend to have an affinity for the political left without necessarily embracing its extreme secularism. Martin goes on to point out that such an association between minority religions and sympathies for the left is exactly replicated where Protestantism is the dominant religion. However, where a total monopoly exists, moreover a Catholic monopoly, the potential for militant secularism is the greatest. Hence, Martin's "vicious circle" of intense religiosity counteracted by massive or intense secularism.

The second category consists of societies founded on a

religious duopoly with both Catholicism and Protestantism as the major religious dogmas with the difference that Protestantism is predominant either in the political arena or in its majority membership of the population. Whereas societies based on a Catholic monopoly have minimal dissent occurring, Protestant duopolistic societies tend to be more tolerant of religious minorities. Martin locates the source of monopolism in the nature of Catholicism as an inherently more organic institution than Protestantism.

The duopolistic situation by definition assumes religious dualism but nonetheless one where the minority, usually Catholic, constitutes a large minority. Often a duopoly is nothing more than a form of regional segregation with both confessions populating the different geographical sectors of the nation. Rightfully labelled the "mixed" pattern, extreme secularism is less likely to occur since the political orientation of the minority is one of centre-left.

Next along the continuum are societies characterized by religious pluralism. To a great extent this situation is revealed in the British and Canadian societies and even more so in the American pattern. In England we initially have a situation of a state church in competition with Protestant factions and other religious minorities. With the advent of industrialization, such a society becomes

stratified in such a manner that Protestants fill the middle-class positions and Catholics are overrepresented in the lower- and working-class echelons. The religious minorities form politico-religious constellations and tend to ally themselves with the political centre-left. Such an alliance deters the possibility of extreme secularism (Martin, 1978: 21-22).

The American pattern marks the final separation of church from state with all denominations serving as competing alternatives. Consequently, Catholics, Jews and other religious minorities will again tend toward the progressive or 'centre-left side without further tendencies toward extreme secularism which, as Martin points out, "is indeed already moderated by Protestant individualism".

In a more elaborate treatment of the "mixed" pattern, Martin addresses himself closely to the Quebec situation in Canadian context as corresponding to such a pattern - i.e., a large Catholic minority (both in terms of membership and power position) within a predominantly Protestant society (Martin, 1978: 204-205). Regionally and culturally segregated, the Catholic sub-culture is able to maintain its integrity by developing its own internal institutions and modes of communication (Martin, 1978: 168).

Once the possibility of leftist tendencies presents

itself, it serves as a factor which contributes to the weakening of sub-cultural integration. Using the Dutch Catholics as a case in point, Martin further illustrates how tendencies to the left have become expressions of the disintegrating Catholicism which has occurred in France and similar monopolistic cultures:

"Varieties of eastern cult found amongst Metropolitan youth...the openings to the left and the possible slackening of sub-cultural integration together with the very rapid progress of industrialization and urbanization in Holland, have led to a restructuring and psychic readjustment throughout the institutional church.(The) parish has been restructured, the role of priest adapted and humanistic personalism has infiltrated" (Martin, 1978: 170).

Holland as a "mixed" society is certainly not exempt from those influences which exemplify western industrial nations, namely, a disaffection with traditional morality, a drastic drop in the Catholic birthrate and an increased rate of intermarriage. Though disaffection has not extended to a diminished sense of religious belief, there has been a heightened interest in the various forms of humanism. As Martin asserts, "it is in such a milieu that Thomas Luckmann can locate his notion of an 'invisible' religion" (Martin, 1978: 200-201).

Though Martin perceives similarities between Dutch and Quebecois religio-historical factors, he nonetheless recognizes particularities within the Quebec case, a society

where not only religious divisions but linguistic and regional differences contribute to its existence as a relatively autonomous culture. Yet, adds the author, unlike the Dutch Catholics, Quebec underwent social differentiation without generating an internal clash of interests:

"Where we are dealing with a total functioning sub-society, as in Quebec, religion and politics are initially pushed together and then, with industrialization and differentiation, there occurs a separating out which arouses no special clash, because religion has to remain a main source of identity without being the prop of established power. As in America it becomes a cultural fact, without massive alienation by virtue of identity with established power" (Martin, 1978: 205).

1.3 Andrew Greeley (1972) has been quite vociferous in his critique of the positivistic view of secularization proposing that religion or religious needs of individuals have essentially collapsed in the contemporary situation. Not necessarily at odds with and often concurring with the Berger-Luckmann thesis, Greeley maintains that man's fundamental need for a sense of ultimate meaning has not in fact changed. What changes have occurred, argues Greeley, have made the problem of meaning and religion more acute than it ever was in the past:

"more knowledge, more power, a more complex society, and relatively more freedom do not, it seems to me eliminate man's need for faith, community, meaningful sexuality, the sacred, or religious leadership. If anything, indeed, the changes aggravate the need for all of these because they make the need more explicit, more

conscious, and more subject to choice" (Greeley, 1972: 53).

It is also interesting to note that what Greeley acknowledges as "changes" is considered "secularization" in the work of the previously cited authors: (1) the decline of the influence of religion in other sectors of society (though this does not minimize the importance of the religious function); (2) the ability of science to explain rationally phenomena which religion may have in the past; (3) myths are now interpreted in light of man's advanced capacity for abstract thought and (4) since religion is more a personal matter, the individual has greater freedom in making choices regarding religious commitment (Greeley, 1972: 15).

Whereas Berger and Luckmann locate the contemporary structural domain of religion and meaning in the private sphere and see a further threat to the official model in the pluralistic/relativistic atmosphere of this private realm, Greeley takes the "meaning" and "social location" functions of religion and ethnicity one step further. Not only does Greeley recognize that membership in ethnic and religious communities is invaluable to the formation of personal identity and status in modern life (a point on which Berger and Luckmann would not diverge), but he sees a further possibility in the function of such primordial

relationships, namely one of social integration and cohesion:

"A city government would view itself as fortunate in having large and diverse ethnic groups within its boundaries because such collectivites would prevent the cities from becoming a habitat for a 'lonely crowd' or a 'mass society'. Psychologists and psychiatrists would be delighted with the possibilities of ethnic-group membership providing support and self-definition as an antidote to the 'anomie' of the mass society" (Greeley, 1972: 37).

Greeley points out that given his model, one which proposes that gemeinschaft relationships persist in the face of increasing gesellschaft networks, one would expect secular man, lonely crowd and mass society to be non-existent phenomena (Greeley, 1972: 37).

Whether one chooses to side with Greeley's anti-positivistic stance is not as central to the present purposes as his recognition of man's persistent need for community which religion and ethnicity both satisfy. In fact, we have chosen to focus on this particular function of religion if only because it explores the relationship between ethnicity and religion as one of mutual reinforcement. Greeley first considers the ethno-religious dimension of man's quest for community where he quotes Herbert Gans's observation of Jewish and Protestant community life (Greeley, 1972: 146). What Gans concludes from his research is that ethnic community involvement and religious practice are given equal weight by his respondents.

with the former often given as reason for the pursuit of the latter. While Greeley concurs with Gans to the extent that ethnicity and religion provide the pillars of the community, he points out what he considers a major flaw in Gans's argument, namely, that Gans sees a qualitative difference between acquiring an identity, seeking out one's own kind and practicing religion (Greeley, 1972: 146). As only Greeley could exclaim:

"That peculiar kind of snobbery characteristic of so many American commentators on religion that believes that religion is serious only when it is isolated from all community involvement and relationship is simply at variance with everything we know about the history, psychology and sociology of religion" (Greeley, 1972: 147),
and:

"...it is simply not true to say that religion which is associated with and reinforced by social pressures is not authentic religion. It is the only kind of religion that man has ever known" (Greeley, 1972: 148).

II. The Secularization of Quebec Society:

Some Fostering Elements

The literature treats the secularization of Quebec society as a by-product of the Quiet Revolution of the early sixties: modernization and greater government involvement in areas of society which had traditionally been the jurisdiction of the Church, i.e. health, education and welfare (Guindon, 1983: 620).* As with many profound social

changes, the interests or activities of a given social group, often a stratum, will reach such intensity as to succeed in effecting a change. In Quebec the change agent was an emerging middle-class. The transformation it needed to meet its developing vocational interests was subsequently produced by the Quiet Revolution: greater financial support from the provincial government in areas where their professional training was most marketable, that is, public and semi-public organizations (Guindon, 1983: 624-625).

As Fournier and Maheu (1975) have further noted, it is not until the inception of a new professionally trained middle class and the subsequent rationalization of the state and educational sectors that one notices a considerable

* Though the Quiet Revolution marks the major event the consequence of which was the massive structural secularization of Quebec society, there is evidence to suggest the presence of a secular atmosphere antedating the events of the late '50's and early '60's. We are specifically referring to the urban character of a city such as Montreal wherein religious and ethnic pluralism as well as industrial activity had been pronounced long before the rationalization of the state apparatus and implications thereof. See especially, Linteau, Durocher and Robert (1983: 451-454) where reference is made to the concentration of immigrants and large minorities (e.g. Protestants and Jews). The authors also acknowledge the difficulty which the Catholic clergy met in imposing hegemony over non-religious institutions, a problem which was otherwise not incurred in the rural areas of the province where social, economic and religious structures were often one and the same. The indirect relationship between urbanization, industrialization and secularization has already been examined in reviewing Berger and Luckmann's thesis. Moreover, religious and ethnic pluralism will contribute to the secular process by relativizing religion or forcing the various religious systems to compete with each other.

increase in the number of university students and scientific research grants as well as the establishment of a ministry of education. The nationalization of science, technology and education was largely responsible (not to mention necessary) for the growth of science and its specialists in Quebec. Coupled with the rapid development of the pure and applied sciences, the social sciences and their respective disciplines similarly evolved - an evolution with its source in the transformation of the nexus between politics and science on the one hand and politics, religion and other intellectual traditions on the other (Fournier and Maheu, 1975: 107).

That the Quiet Revolution sowed the seeds of an incipient national consciousness is indeed acknowledged by all the aforementioned authors. Although it is beyond the scope of our concerns to elaborate on the development of Quebec nationalism, it is possible to assume that the Church, as a major partner in the traditional order, had a negligible if non-existent role in the further development of a national ideology following or at the time of the Quiet Revolution. If anything, nationalism has superseded religion as a force of cultural integration:

"as youth become oriented to urban traditions, they accept new ideologies such as separatism, that can potentially have the same integrative role as religion" (Gold and Tremblay, 1973: 258).

Religion lost its function of social legitimator to

language as the latter became the primary source of cultural identity and the driving source behind separatist politics (Martin, 1978: 205).*

Berger's notion of the economy and state bureaucracy as secular loci or motifs is indeed applicable to the Quebec context insofar as greater government involvement transformed the state and economic sectors into 'liberated territories' as far as religion was concerned.

Changes in Religious Behaviour in Quebec:

Indications of Secularity following the Quiet Revolution

As we have seen, Quebec has not remained unaffected by the larger processes of urbanization, modernity and their far-reaching consequences. Indeed, the research and observations presented in the literature bear witness to significant alterations in the religious conduct of the

* Religious affiliation, in the case of the French-Canadian Catholics, is only initially (that is, until the early '60's) linked with nationalist sentiments. With the Quiet Revolution and subsequent separation of church from state, linguistic distinctiveness, moreover, nationalism takes over the role of religion as social integrative force. One can refer back to Martin's theory especially the section dealing with the "Quebec" mixed pattern for additional comment on the matter.

Quebecois.

One change that has been reported is the drastic decline in the fertility rate among French Catholics, the widespread use of contraceptives and the increasing convergence in birth patterns between these and other groups in the population (Kyriazis and Henripin, 1983; Balakrishnan et al., 1975). The social and economic changes effected by the Quiet Revolution of the early '60's meant increased opportunities for a larger segment of the French population and a greater concern with social mobility. As Kyriazis and Henripin have noted: "Given these changes, we would expect fertility decision-making in the French Catholic population to be a rational process and, therefore primarily determined by economic considerations rather than normative factors." (Kyriazis and Henripin, 1983: 431).

For Kenneth Westhues, this deviation from Catholic morality has also signified that Canadian Catholics now see their religion as a voluntary enterprise. They have embraced an attitude similar to the Protestant notion of a personal relationship between the individual and the sacred (Westhues, 1976(b): 303). In a study of the religious experience of youth in Québec, Robert Sevigny (1976) has arrived at similar conclusions. A large proportion of his respondents seem to reject Church morality regarding sexual behaviour which, for Sevigny, is an indication that

Catholicism, as a form of institutionalized religion, has become irrelevant to many of its members (Sevigny, 1976: 494). Although the author does not wish to argue that his informants have no religious experience, he does concede that this experience is of a personal - rather than collective - nature even if it means individual choice between the many Church doctrines.

Others have approached the secularization of Quebec society in terms of social differentiation, the smaller recruitment of the clergy and declining religious practice (Guindon, 1983; Moreux, 1973). For Guindon, the socio-economic changes of the early sixties led to massive yet conflict-free institutional secularization or separation of church from politics. Not only did the clergy no longer exert control over health, welfare and education but many left the priesthood to pursue secular careers which were already burgeoning as a result of the new "order" (Guindon, 1983: 630). The sudden and rapid disengagement of the Church from public institutions meant that it was no longer a viable element in the routine performances of individuals. A drop in church attendance soon followed.

Indications of a Private Sphere: the Case of Quebec

It may be appropriate at this point to give theoretical significance to the various findings and observations which dealt with secularity in Quebec. First, the social differentiation or institutional secularization which the Quiet Revolution engendered meant that in the eyes of the Quebecois the Church was no longer a visible or relevant institution - relevant at least as far as other institutionalized sectors were concerned. As Guindon puts it, the Church "withdrew to service the spiritual and private needs of those who seek its counsel" (Guindon, 1983: 633). Once the presence of a religious personnel was removed from the primary public sectors of health, education and welfare, it was pushed toward the "private" sphere of individual existence.

The conclusions arrived at by Sevigny and Westhues similarly illustrate the presence of the private sphere in which religion must now operate. Moreover, the individualism inherent in a personal experience of God, the rejection of sexual morals and the recognition of a multiplicity of morals rather than one "official" model have further undermined the objective character of traditional religion, forcing it to compete with humanism, novel religions, popular psychology and even nationalism as alternate systems of ultimate significance. To reiterate

Berger's perspective on the matter, the polarization or privatization of religion produced by secularization and the demonopolization of religion has ultimately led to a pluralistic situation (Berger, 1967: 134-135).

Other indications of the privatization of religion can be found in the work of Collette Moreux (1973) in which she makes reference to the nuclear family as primary institution and socializing agent, the appearance of pluralism on a moral level (i.e. the acceptance of atheism and secular ideals) and a growing ignorance of Catholicism "leading innocently to heterodoxy" (Moreux, 1973: 331). Not unlike Berger and Luckmann, Moreux recognizes that some respondents in her study consciously choose to embrace Catholicism thereby minimizing its collective and transcendental power. In citing the findings of various opinion polls which in turn demonstrate a drastic drop in church attendance, she also notes that where practice is accompanied by a sense of obligation this obligation is no more than one toward family or social group.

III. Impeding Elements

3.1 The Integration of the Catholic Church in Canada

Kenneth Westhues (1976) delineates the three ways in which Catholicism has achieved integration in various social structures, the third of which is characteristic of the Canadian situation. At one end of the continuum lie Latin American societies wherein Catholicism has achieved "unique" recognition by virtue of being the national religion (Westhues, 1976(b): 294). The Catholic world-view, in turn, finds expression in other institutional sectors of the society - namely a repressed individualism and democracy and an educational system with a bias toward art and philosophy. At the opposite end of the spectrum lie those societies in which religion is accorded the status of "non-recognition" yet given the right to exist - the archetype being the U.S. Such a society achieves total separation of church from state and emphasizes individualism and competition as its primary values. Religion is therefore subject to individual choice as it gains a status of voluntary association-a status, notes the author, quite in harmony with Protestantism as such.

In Canada, however, the Church has come to enjoy a status of "partial recognition". Though not the state

religion, it operates as more than mere voluntary association. Westhues then goes on to identify those factors which have contributed to the Church's successful adaptation to the Canadian context as those factors are both historical and structural in character.

The historical dimension involves the exchange of loyalties which occurred between French and British following the latter's conquest. This exchange assured Britain loyalty of its new subjects in return for the Church's control over the school system. It also meant that the Church would act as the intermediary between government (or crown) and the larger population.

Other factors which have contributed to the unique Canadian mode of integration are indiginity, ethnic identification, vertical pluralism, and the corporatist character of Church and Canadian social structure. The first element refers to the Church as a "native" faith reinforced by the clergy's stronger sentiments toward the colony than mother country. The possibility of such sentiments was itself facilitated by the geographic and social isolation from Europe. Ethnic identification and religion are seen as necessarily reinforcing each other especially in the case of Quebec as a culturally and linguistically segregated society (Westhues, 1976(b): 300). Vis-a-vis other parts of the nation, the Catholic Church is

portrayed as a clever strategist in its ability to preserve the ethnic churches of the Irish, Scottish, Italians etc. Westhues further notes that in contrast, the U.S. Catholic Church reached a level of adaptation to its host society which culminated in the dissolution of ethnic parishes once recent immigrants became acculturated.

While both societies are characterised by ethnic and religious pluralism, the Canadian Catholic Church has been more successful in retaining its traditional corporatist character precisely because ethnic differences were emphasized:

"By reinforcing the traditional Catholic cultures of the immigrants' countries of origin, the Church is more successful in preserving an orthodox Catholic mentality than is the case when it allows Catholics to assimilate into a basically Protestant or secular culture, attempting at the same time to preserve the core of Catholic orthodoxy" (Westhues, 1976(b): 300).

The third factor involves the view of Canada as a vertically pluralistic society comprising a conglomeration of politically segregated yet autonomous minorities dominated by a political and economic elite. The author cites Smith and Kornberg who argue that multi-culturalism is a policy serving the elite in whose interest it has been to keep the French and other minorities at the margins of political involvement. The elite could count on the success of a policy which would ensure the minorities the persistence of their respective cultures. Moreover,

"Such an arrangement satisfied the needs of the Church as well since it would gain few if any advantages from the development of a secular political consciousness among its members" (Westhues, 1976: 301).

Lastly, the corporatist character of the Canadian social structure is seen as coinciding with the role of an organic Church presiding over the French population - an element which served to deter total differentiation of church from state.

priest, confession, sacraments etc. This "anti-individualist" orientation is further reflected in the Church's attitude to and involvement in social institutions such as politics, the economy and education - a corporatism that, in conjunction with that of the Canadian state, has retarded the separation of church from state in the Canadian situation (Westhues, 1976(b): 291).

The possibility of a relationship between Protestantism and secular behaviour has indeed been explored by Weber (1976) and more recently Berger (1965). As we mentioned earlier, Berger proposes a link between religious ideology (Protestantism and the Old Testament) and the polarization/secularization of the relationship between God and man. In summarizing the Weberian thesis of "disenchantment", Berger argues that Protestantism, unlike Catholicism, has eliminated the mysterious and emotional from religious life thereby divesting the power of man (especially priest), saints and sacraments as links with the sacred. Though an unintended consequence of its founders, Protestantism intensified the polarity between "this-world" and "other-world", denuded the world of man of what sacredness it did have and in so doing emphasized the boundaries of a secular, human world.

As we have seen, Martin's structural theory of secularization integrates the Catholic-Protestant

3.2 Religious Affiliation

Elsewhere in the literature, religious affiliation also has been given particular attention as an element which, depending on the denomination in question, has either facilitated or impeded the secularization process (Berger, 1967 ; Martin, 1978; Mol, 1975; Weber, 1976; Westhues, 1976(b)).

In a secondary analysis of a 1965 Canadian national election study, Hans Mol (1976) examines church attendance by eight major variables among which religious affiliation is especially critical. Having observed that Catholics are predominantly the most regular churchgoers, Mol maintains that the difference between Catholic and Protestant is a critical element as this difference is reduceable to one of collectivism versus individualism. Individualism, as it is inherent in the Protestant ethic of salvation through faith will lead to a weaker demand on Protestant adherents to attend services than will the corporate expectations of the more organic Catholic church.

As Westhues similarly notes, corporatism is inherent in the very nature of Catholicism, the Church being the prime mediator between lay and sacred spheres via the role of

distinction with the notion of religious pluralism and religious tolerance. Pluralism is most pronounced in Protestant societies such as England, Canada and the U.S. and minimized in Catholic cultures:

"Catholic religion is more integral, and this is the reason why it tends to reduce rival sectors, and why when in a minority situation it is so successful in building up associational networks for cultural defense" (Martin, 1978: 201).

Although Martin recognizes that Catholicism may create a counter-image of itself namely, a militant secularism, Protestant societies were initially pluralistic and thus forged in the secular ambiance of a church-free and tolerant state.

Summary of the Literature: Secularization, its Fostering and
Impeding Elements

In an effort to answer the first two parts of the research question, we reviewed the relevant theories of secularization and cited research which gave both indications of secularity in Quebec as well as defining those elements which fostered it. These, and the problem of what impedes or retards secularization, required comprehension of what the process entails. From the literature examined thus far, we can derive a summary definition of the process of secularization:

(1) An increased differentiation or separation between religious and other institutional sectors such as education, politics and the economy; (Berger, 1967; Crysdale and Wheatcroft, 1976; Guindon, 1983; Luckmann, 1967; Shiner, 1967)

(2) Religious pluralism or an increase in the alternatives of ultimate meaning (Berger, 1967; Crysdale and Wheatcroft, 1976; Luckmann, 1967; Moreux, 1973);

(3) Increased individual freedom in the choice of religious alternatives. Religion becomes a personal or private matter and its success depends on its ability to meet personal needs (Berger, 1967; Greeley, 1972; Luckmann, 1967; Moreux, 1973; Sevigny, 1976);

As already noted, the literature provides ample evidence of

such processes occurring or having occurred in Quebec.

II. Factors which fostered or accelerated the process in Quebec were identified as being the following:

- (1) the Quiet Revolution and the modernization of the state (provincial);
- (2) structural changes such as industrialization and urbanization;
- (3) as a result of the above, the developing interests of an emerging middle-class had to be met;
- (4) pluralism or competing systems of meaning such as a national consciousness, religious sects, popular psychology, humanism and even atheism have further undermined the state of church-oriented religion in Quebec.

III. The literature also acknowledged factors which have impeded or at least retarded the secular processes:

(1) Religious Affiliation:

the existence of a corporate (usually Catholic) church;

(2) ethnic identification or community involvement as this may reinforce religious behaviour;

(3) vertical pluralism as this has allowed ethno-religious groups to persist despite a Protestant and therefore secular environment;

(4) Religious and political corporatism as this has retarded

the separation of church from state in the Canadian and Quebec situations.

The Theoretical Model and the Propositions

From the three levels of inquiry to which our research questions were addressed, i.e. (1) what is understood by secularization, (2) what impedes it and (3) what fosters it, we can derive several theoretical propositions. We also inform the reader that the selection of the concepts was necessarily limited by the measures or variables available in our data. The empirical model will soon follow.

Theoretical Propositions

(1) The socialization of individuals into an institutionalized system of religion will vary by generation or, put differently, institutional religious behaviour (as dictated by an official, traditional model of religion) will vary or decrease for subsequent generations:

Generational Differences----->Institutional

Religious Behaviour

Explanation:

According to Luckmann, the incongruence between changing social conditions, the official model of religion and the subjective integration of that system will have profound implications with subsequent generations whereby the official model, including church-oriented activity will either not be taken seriously or performed for non-religious reasons (Luckmann, 1967: 82-88). Recall that changing social conditions which have been identified in the literature were the Quiet Revolution, industrialization, urbanization and the interests of a new bourgeoisie. We should therefore expect the younger generation to be less involved with institutional religious behaviour since they are more apt to be socialized into an environment which is itself a by-product of "changing objective circumstances".

(2) As a consequence of the above processes:

The meaningful* integration of an official religious model will be less successful with subsequent generations:

Generational Differences----->Meaningful
Integration of a
Religious Model

(3a) The greater the exposure of individuals to changing social conditions and/or secular forces, as this exposure varies by socio-economic status, sex, etc., the less intense will institutionally defined religious behaviour be:

Exposure to -----> Institutional Religious
Secular Forces Behaviour

(3b) Likewise, the greater the exposure to secular forces and changing social conditions, the less successful will the meaningful integration of religion be:

* "meaningful integration of an official model" - a term which is borrowed directly from Luckmann (1967)- will hereby be understood as representing the condition whereby religion or religious values become subjectively meaningful to the individual. That is, once acquired, religious values may occupy a central (or at least important) place in an individual's existence. To a great degree, the extent to which the integration of religious symbols is meaningful or successful will depend on the quality of a person's early childhood socialization and the role that religion plays in that socialization. Unfortunately, we can not control for that element since no variables in our questionnaire asked respondents to comment on parochial education or other relevant factors.

Exposure to -----> Meaningful Integration of
Secular Forces Religious Model

Explanation:

Both Berger and Luckmann propose a link between exposure to secular forces, as this exposure varies by class position, sex, generation, etc., and a growing incongruence between religious doctrine and its meaningful integration. Berger speaks of secular motifs such as industry and bureaucracy; the more exposed the social strata are to such secularizing forces, the more likely these strata are to be "liberated" vis-a-vis religion (Berger, 1967: 129-132). As we have already noted, Luckmann examines the process by which secular forces and changing social conditions such as industrialization and urbanization reinforced institutional specialization and increased the number of plausibility structures - this posing the problem of religious meaning for individuals.

Therefore, and to a great degree, socio-economic status becomes one element one can focus on if one is to compare different social strata in terms of how they vary with regard to that exposure. As we have already seen: "the exposure of the members of a society to changing "objective"

circumstances will vary not only by generation but also by class position, occupation, sex and so forth" (Berger, 1967: 89).

Assuming that certain effective changes have occurred we therefore expect that incongruence will be most felt by those groups who are most or first exposed to such changes namely those in higher socio-economic class positions. Collette Moreux has indeed made similar observations in noting that the liberal professions demonstrate a weak sense of religiousness and have been most exposed to imported European and American ideas and literature as these are not usually accessible to the lower classes (Moreux, 1973: 328). Workers, farmers and other groups which are vestiges of a traditional order appear to be more conformist as well as loyal to the Church (Moreux, 1973: 327; Luckmann, 1967: 30).

(4) Attitudes toward religion as a personal matter will vary by religious denomination in that the more collectivistic or corporate the person's official religion, the less likely will the person have an individualistic or personalized notion of religion:

Religious Affiliation----->Privatization of Religion

Explanation:

We proposed that religious affiliation and the existence of a Catholic or corporate religion will de-emphasize the polarity of a human and sacred reality and as such will retard the process by which religion is secularized and becomes a personal matter. The more corporate the belief system the less likely will one integrate diverse structures of meaning, the less likely will religion be privatized and the less likely will individualism be integrated as a system of ultimate meaning.

(5) Likewise, religious affiliation will affect the extent of religious behaviour and the meaningful integration of the religious model in that the more corporate the belief system, the more intense will religious behaviour and the meaningful integration of religion be:

Religious Affiliation----->Religious Behaviour

Religious Affiliation----->Meaningful Integration of
Religion

It follows, then, that the greater the exposure to a religious model through religious behaviour, the more successful is its subjective integration:

Religious Behaviour----->Meaningful Integration of
Religion

(6) Similarly as well, the more intense is institutional

religious behaviour,

the less likely will religion be regarded as a private matter:

Religious Behaviour----->Privatization of Religion
and:

(7) the more meaningful the integration of a traditional official model, the less likely is religion to be regarded as a personal matter:

Meaningful Integration---->Privatization of Religion
of Religion

(8) The greater the ethnic community involvement, the more intense is the institutional religious behaviour:

Ethnic Community Involvement----->Institutional
Religious
Behaviour

Similarly, the meaningful integration of a religious model will vary positively with ethnic community involvement:

Ethnic Community Involvement----->Meaningful
Integration
of Religion

Explanation:

Recalling Greeley's perspective on the matter, we should expect religiosity to be reinforced by ethnicity and ethnic community participation. Concomitantly, if religion is acquired or even reinforced by ethnic community, the individual's notion of religion as meaningful should also be heightened.

CHAPTER II.

The Data

The data consists of a randomly selected sample (N=445) obtained in 1982 by way of survey questionnaires mailed to individuals residing in the Greater Montreal and West Island regions*. Given the geographical limitations of the sample, we must restrict the generalizeability of the data to Montreal and its West Island.

It is also necessary to point out that the Montreal and West Island Telephone Directories served as our sample frames, the latter used in hope of obtaining a substantial Anglophone, moreover, non-Catholic response. The nature of the directories did, however, account for a marked skewness in the age and sex distribution (see Tables 1 and 2). Using the 1981 Census Reports as our point of reference, the males

* This community survey project entitled "The Impact of Religious Affiliation on Social, Economic and Political Attitudes" was made possible through an F.C.A.C. research grant. (Government of Quebec). My deepest thanks go to Professors Gerry Dewey, Herbert Horwich and Joseph Tascone, Concordia University, for their academic assistance and for both allowing and encouraging me to generate my thesis from their data.

in our sample appear to be over-represented by nearly 16 percent and women are under-represented by nearly 17 percent. We attribute this finding to the likelihood that where a two-parent household has one telephone line, the number will tend to be listed under the father's name. Respondents aged under 20 years were under-represented by almost 24 percent.

Table 1. A Comparison between Sample and 1981 Census*
Percentage Distribution of Age

	Sample	Census
Under 20 Years	1.3% (6)	25.57% (450,045)
20 Years and Over	98.7% (439)	74.43% (1,310,075)
	100.0% (445)	100.0% (1,760,122)

*Based on figures for the Island of Montreal Census Division (N=1,760,122). Montreal, in this sense, is regarded neither as a Census Metropolitan Area nor as a municipality.

Table 2. A Comparison between Sample and 1981 Census
Percentage Distribution of Sex

	Sample	Census
Male	64% (284)	47.73% (840,125)
Female	36% (160)	52.27% (919,995)
	100.0% (445)	100.0% (1,760,122)

Though the response rate was relatively modest (37%), we deem the process of selection of the sample adequate. Furthermore, there is a close resemblance between our distribution of religious affiliation and that noted in the Census figures although Protestants and non-practicioners are slightly over-represented (see Table 3). Once again, this is a function of the over-representation of the West Island respondents.

Table 3. A Comparison between Sample and 1981 Census Percentage Distribution of Religious Affiliation		
Religious Affiliation	Sample	Census
Catholic	68.3% (301)	74.47% (1,310,710)
Protestant	20.4% (90)	10.87% (191,270)
Jewish	5.2% (23)	5.11% (90,005)
No Religion	5.9% (26)	3.77% (66,425)
	(440)	(1,760,122)

The independent and dependent variables used to operationalize the major concepts and upon which we will subsequently elaborate, were borrowed directly from the survey questionnaire. One should bear in mind that the questionnaire was not developed with the theoretical

intentions or interests which underly this thesis. Given such limitations, our variables are often "indirect" measures and our data suggestive, at best, of factors which impede and foster secularization.

The Operationalization of the Major Concepts

Institutional Religious Behaviour (as defined by an official, traditional model of religion)

Limited to a particular data base and its accompanying variables, religious attendance* became one way of operationalizing Luckmann's notion of an "official" model of institutionalized (traditional) religion. That is, church or synagogue attendance offers a means of gauging the degree to which individuals are or have been exposed to and are presently involved in one of the various institutionalized religions. We acknowledge that religious behaviour per se comprises more than its mere objective dimension; besides attendance, prayer and religious attitude are equally important constituent elements. Nevertheless, church-going religiosity serves as an adequate measure of a traditional, "public" religion as opposed to "private", secularized religion whereby church-oriented behaviour becomes much less meaningful and more of a personal matter.

* As a variable, religious behaviour, moreover, its objective component: attendance, appears regularly in the sociology of religion literature. See, especially, Lazerwitz (1973: 205) who makes use of this dimension in his study. Lazerwitz also recognizes similarities between his measure, Lenski's "associational involvement and Glock's ritualistic dimension."

In correspondance with Demerath's (1965) scheme, we shall consider church or synagogue attendance "frequent" if performed between two or three times a month and once a week or more, and "infrequent" if performed once a month or less.

Subjective Integration of a Religious Model

The following question will serve to measure Luckmann's concept of subjective integration of a religious model: "If you are a member of a religious group, i.e. parish, synagogue or congregation, how important would you say such a group is to you?". This variable allows us to introduce a subjective dimension or the extent to which religion is regarded as meaningful. All responses of "important" and "very important" have been collapsed into the one category of "important", and all responses of "unimportant" and "not at all important" have in turn been subsumed into the single "unimportant" category. We of course assume that "important" and "unimportant" have similar meaning to all the respondents.

To put it differently, importance is equated with meaningfulness or the degree to which individuals regard their respective faith (traditional) as central or important

to their existence. In addition, though there may be a high degree of correspondence between frequent church attendance and the meaningful integration of religion (or importance of religious group), our subjective dimension is a more significant indicator of the effect of traditional religion and the extent to which that religion is taken seriously. Recall Luckmann's (1967) and Moreau's (1973) observations of secularized society, especially with regard to the possibility that religious behaviour may be performed for non-religious intentions (e.g. familial obligations). This variable not only allows us to measure the degree of symmetry between objective and subjective components of religion but it also enables us to "weed out" those respondents who do not see their religion as subjectively meaningful or important while concentrating on those who do*.

* We must also consider the possibility that those who regard their faith as important may also feel that a religious attitude or respect for tradition holds greater value than attending services at a congregation. If so, then we may have encountered some individuals who consider their faith a personal and private affair and who therefore place greater weight on belief than ritual - this being yet another dimension of secularized religion. Unfortunately we can not check for this possibility since we would need to introduce a question that is not included in the questionnaire, e.g. "is religious belief more important, as important or less important to you than attending your church, synagogue or congregation?"

The Privatization of Religion

The following statements will serve as indirect indicators of the extent to which religion has become privatized or personalized: Attitude toward cohabitation ("It should be acceptable for a man and a woman to live together without being married"); attitude toward divorce ("It should not be so easy to get a divorce") and attitude toward abortion ("An abortion should be a matter between a woman and her physician").

That is, by measuring a respondent's degree of modernity vis-a-vis these three moral and religious issues, we can assess how much respondents deviate from conservative hence traditional beliefs. We will consider liberalism or individualism the attitudinal analogue of private religion and conservatism the parallel of a traditional, religious mentality.

We need only refer back to Luckmann's analysis of the private realm to support our proposed link between individualism/liberalness and modern, privatized religion. To repeat, modern sacred themes such as autonomy, a consumer orientation and freedom in the choice of religious alternatives characterize contemporary culture. Forced to

compete with other belief systems, some of which are non-religious in nature, traditional religious symbols lose their privileged status and are not regarded as normative. They nevertheless form part of the heterogeneous private sphere (Luckmann, 1967: 98-100). A preoccupation with self, inner being and "individual autonomy" come(s) to stand for absence of external restraints and traditional taboos in the private search for identity" (Luckmann, 1967: 110).

We are only familiar with the social protests of feminists and their lobby for women's rights including which is the right to choose the fate of an unborn foetus. Not uncommon is the widespread use of other contraceptive methods despite the unwavering stand of the Catholic Church against such practices (see, Balakrishnan et al., 1975 and Westhues, 1976). The popularity of common-law relationships and the rising divorce rate, in conjunction with the two previously mentioned phenomena, all attest to contemporary expressions of individualism and personal autonomy.

Indication of agreement (strong or general) with the statements on co-habitation and abortion will be treated as a further indication of liberalness and individualism whereas disagreement (strong or general) will be treated as an expression of a conservative position. Given the manner in which the statement on divorce is worded, agreement (strong or general) will be considered "conservative"

whereas disagreement (strong or general) will be considered "liberal". Respondents who demonstrate some uncertainty with regard to any of the attitudinal statements will also be considered.

They will be treated as lying half-way on a continuum between "agree" and "disagree" as its poles. •

Exposure to Secular Forces

Variables such as education, occupation and early-childhood residence reflect exposure to secularizing forces such as a scientific perspective, industrial technology and urbanization, respectively. One should also recall that Berger and Luckmann proposed that the various socio-economic and demographic groups would vary in terms of exposure to secular forces. Similarly, one of Moreux's findings indicated that the upper classes are most likely to demonstrate a weak sense of religiousness as a result of high exposure to secularizing forces. We can therefore assume that those in higher socio-economic levels are more "secular", that is, less likely to engage in intense religious behaviour and less likely to regard their faith as meaningful or central to their existence.

Since the primary focus is on exposure to secularizing forces, we have therefore chosen SES and its related variables as well as gender to measure the extent of that exposure. More specifically, education and occupation can be used to operationalize exposure to a scientific/scholarly perspective and modernity/industrialization, respectively. We are using sex differences as another indicator of exposure to industrial and technological processes since

they are related to different patterns of socialization in society. We therefore expect males to be more secular than females since the former have traditionally been more exposed to such influences*.

To recapitulate, income, education and occupation will be used to operationalize SES. SES and its related variables will in turn be used to operationalize (1) exposure to a scientific/scholarly perspective and (2) exposure to modernity/industrialization, respectively. Sex will also serve to measure exposure to industrial technology. Early-childhood residence will then represent exposure to urbanization (or urban forces). Exposure to secular forces, at least in our study, encompasses exposure to science, industrialism and urbanism.

* Turn to Mol (1976) for further reference on the issue of sex differences.

A. Socio-Economic Status, Exposure to Scientific/Scholarly Perspective and Exposure to Modernity/Industrialization

Total family income, as measured by the request to "Indicate the income bracket that comes closest to that of your family for the current year" will serve as one measure of SES, which, as we have already noted, is related to levels of exposure to secular forces. Since the literature does not specify what kind of secularizing force is represented by income, we will use it as a general measure of exposure. Because it designates a total income, it will be considered "low" if it is under \$15,000, "medium" if it ranges between \$15,000 and \$34,999 and "high" if it is over \$35,000.

Occupation as measured by the request to "indicate the category that comes closest to describing your job or occupation" has been chosen as a measure of exposure to modernity/industrialization. From least to most modern or industrial, the occupational groups selected are "not in work force" (which includes students*, homemakers, retired

and unemployed individuals), "blue collar" (which comprises skilled workers or foremen, semiskilled workers, service workers, protective workers and labourers), "white collar" (which constitutes technical and clerical workers and salesmen) and "technico-professional" (which includes officials such as bank and company officials, managers, proprietors, professionals, farmers and semi-professionals

We feel that this classification of the occupation variable is in keeping closely with the occupational scheme devised by Mol (1976: 247-248). Although Mol uses occupation to measure SES, we remind the reader that we are introducing occupation as a measure of both SES and exposure to industrialism and technology.

* Though students will tend to be more "modern" than homemakers and unemployed people by virtue of exposure to the scientific world-view that is inherent in contemporary education, the case can nonetheless be made for keeping them in the same category. Berger (1973: 29), in his account of the effect of technological production on consciousness, re-introduces the notion of segregation of areas of social life (or institutions), particularly work from private sphere, to illustrate one of the major consequences of the industrial revolution. Further on in the text he reviews the now-familiar notion that "pluralization [both religious and non-religious] has a secularizing effect" leading ultimately to the dichotomization of social life into private and public spheres (Berger et al., 1973: 80). Put differently, students tend not to be engaged in the sort of technical/industrial activity which would otherwise predispose them to secularity, or better yet, private religion. Technological processes serve to segregate certain bodies of knowledge from others in the consciousness of the individual, a segregation, one may add, that poses a problem of meaning for the individual and leads to the relativization of traditional, religious symbols.

As we have already mentioned, gender may be used as yet another indicator of modernity/industrialization. It is in turn represented by the question: "What is your sex?".

Education was then selected as the primary measure of exposure to a scientific/scholarly perspective. It has been dichotomized into "low" and "high" education whereby the former includes secondary education and less, and the latter represents post-secondary education (including some C.E.G.E.P.).

The choice of secondary education as the cutting point was based on Glock and Stark's (1965) study. The authors initially hypothesize that religion's influence on other institutional sectors decreases as those institutions (e.g. science) develop their own value orientations (Glock and Stark, 1965: 262). As such institutions develop their own value orientations, religion and science become mutually exclusive systems. The various data which the authors use lead them to arrive at the following conclusions:

- (1) loss of faith is associated with being a graduate student;
- (2) if the initial hypothesis is valid (i.e. religion and science as mutually exclusive) then religious involvement is affected by the degree to which students are exposed to

scientific scholarship (their data supports this) and (3) the degree to which one is exposed to scientific scholarship will in turn vary by kind of school (secular vs. parochial), quality of undergraduate school and quality of graduate school. Since much of the content of modern education is secular in nature (see, especially, Bibby, 1979: 15) and we can not control for "quality" of school given the nature of the questionnaire, we can treat exposure to secular scholarly perspectives as a built-in element of higher education.

B. Exposure to Urbanization

Early-childhood residence, as measured by the question "Where did you spend most of your childhood" was used as an indicator of exposure to an urban environment (or urbanization). It was then reclassified into "non-cosmopolitan" (which includes villages, towns and small cities of less than 100,000* people) and "cosmopolitan" (which designates medium-sized, large and very large cities, i.e. cities of more than 100,000 people).

* The use of 100,000 people as the cutting point can be found in Mol's (1976: 249) work wherein he discovers a significant variation in religious attendance between areas of more than 100,000 people and those of 100,000 people and less.

Inherent in the notion that urbanization has accelerated the secular process is the assumption that urban concentration, in other words population density, and secularity are coextensive phenomena. Indeed, David Martin (1980: 3) has acknowledged that one of the trends which characterizes secularization (especially in modern, industrial societies) is "that religious practice declines proportionately with the size of an urban concentration." Not unlike Berger and Luckmann, Crysedale and Wheatcroft (1976: 5) note:

" (that) Accompanying urbanization, urbanism has become the dominant style of life, involving not only high population density but also heterogeneity in relationships (or the blending of people with various ethnic, religious, political, and economic attributes), frequency of interaction, and accentuated depersonalization. One study found that a frequent correlate of highly developed urbanism (as distinct from community size) is liberalism in forms of faith or creed, in heightened tolerance of differing values, beliefs, and behaviour, and in the approval of more public planning. "

Generational Differences

Age was chosen to designate generational differences and was based on responses to the question: "To which of the following age categories do you belong?". Since we were interested in those age groups which would most likely vary in terms of exposure to structural changes and secular

forces, 40 years was selected as the cutting point and the collapsed categories: (1) under 40 years and (2) 40 years and over served as our bases of comparison. It was felt that those under 40 years of age (i.e. individuals born during and following the period of the Second World War) would consist of both those who came of age by the early sixties and individuals who were youths during the period thereafter*. Age is therefore an indirect measure of the previously examined socio-historical events, their structural and social-psychological repercussions.

Religious Affiliation

Religious Affiliation was nominally measured by asking respondents "What is your religion?". The three denominations examined in the following analysis are Roman Catholics (or Catholics), non-Catholics, which includes Protestants (i.e. United, Anglican, Presbyterian, Lutheran and Baptist**) and Jews, and those indicating no religion

* Guindon (1983: 624) makes note of "the massive urbanization that accompanied the Second World War and immediate postwar period in Quebec..." As we have seen, urbanization, in addition to the later modernization of the state, marks those major structural/secular forces in the province.

** The inclusion of Baptists under which "Born Again Christians" were subsumed proved somewhat problematic in subsequent testing of the hypotheses. We therefore caution the reader to consider the fact that as fundamentalists, although Protestant, Baptists will not surprisingly demonstrate a high rate of church attendance and other

(non-practicioners). We feel justified in grouping Jews and the various Protestant denominations in such a fashion because the Catholic-non-Catholic distinction was of major interest and central importance to our theoretical concerns. To refer back to Berger (1965), Protestantism and Judaism bear an inherent potential for secularity because of the radical polarity between God and individual, whereas in Catholicism, the intervention of the sacred (or at least sacred ritual) is an indispensable component of the faith. Our classification or regrouping of the religious affiliation variable is therefore a continuum ranging from highly non-secular to highly secular denominations. Those indicating an other religious affiliation were effectively eliminated from the total sample and claimed as missing observations; their small number (N=4) were too few to matter as well as being extraneous to the issue at hand.

Ethno-Religious Communal Involvement

The following question: "Of your five closest friends, how many are affiliated with a religious group, i.e., a parish, synagogue, congregation, etc.?" will be used to

manifestations of intense religious behaviour and attitude.

operationalize the notion of ethno-religious communal involvement since no other question in the survey enabled respondents to give information regarding community or ethnic organizational activity. We are hereby using the ethno-religious community variable in much the same way it has been applied in earlier studies (Lazerwitz, 1973; Lenski, 1965).

Lazerwitz asked his respondents to offer information on the ethnic and religious background of their family and friends. Not unlike Lazerwitz, we are interested in the "extent of intragroup friendships and courtships" (Lazerwitz, 1973: 206). Though our question does not specify one's friends' religious and ethnic background, we assume that individuals will tend to interact with others similar to themselves - similar both in terms of cultural and personal attributes. Furthermore, it is highly likely that given many friends who are members of some religious group, the individual will be equally or comparably active, if only by association with these individuals*.

* One may wish to refer to Vander Zanden (1977: 229-231) in his discussion of reference and membership groups: Briefly, reference groups are collective units with which people identify themselves and need not but may consist of membership groups or units to which individuals actually belong. Reference groups provide both normative and comparative standards. That is, we not only acquire the lifestyle, values and even religious beliefs of our reference group but use those norms as standards against which we judge our own behaviour. As the author puts it, "our behaviour is group-anchored". One may also refer back

We will consider community involvement "low" if respondents indicate they have between zero and two friends who are affiliated with some parish, congregation or synagogue, and "high" if they have between three and five friends who are similarly affiliated.

to Greeley's work wherein he refutes the popular secularization thesis. In one section, the author cites data demonstrating that nearly 75 percent of Protestants and Catholics claim their three closest friends to be of the same faith (Greeley, 1972: 138). In contrast with Berger (1967), however, Greeley rejects the idea that a heterogeneity of social relationships relativizes one's religious beliefs.

The Research Hypotheses

We would like to remind the reader that the research hypotheses depict relationships between specific variables, the choice of which was inspired both by previously examined theories of secularization and research which made concrete application of concepts such as religious behaviour (or attendance) and ethno-religious community involvement. As it will become apparent, our empirical model illustrates five major endogenous or dependent variables. These are: (1) attitude toward abortion; (2) attitude toward divorce; (3) attitude toward co-habitation; (4) religious attendance and (5) degree of importance of one's religious group. These dependent variables, in turn, not only serve to operationalize some of the various concepts which were introduced in reviewing the literature concerning fostering and impeding elements, but serve yet another function, that is, they allow us to measure "secularization" per se. Given a secular/religious or private religion/public (traditional) religion continuum, "secularity" would consist of favourable attitudes toward abortion, divorce and co-habitation, infrequent church or synagogue attendance, and little or no importance attached to one's religious affiliation. Seen this way, "secularity" becomes the major concept or phenomenon which we wish to explain and the four dependent variables become the concrete measures of such a process. The independent variables are essentially those fostering

and impeding elements.

It is also necessary to note that we have decided to group the hypotheses by independent variable so as to be consistent with the scheme of differentiating between fostering and impeding elements of secularity. The third major grouping (III.) indicates those variables in our model that were chosen as independent variables which are related to the privatization measures (or attitudinal statements). The reader will also notice that two of the independent variables related to privatization were treated as dependent variables (or measures of secularity) in groups I and II.

I. Fostering Variables

Age

1.1.1 The degree of importance attributed to one's religious group will vary positively with age.

1.1.2 Religious attendance will vary positively with age.

Income

1.2.1 Religious attendance will vary negatively with income.

1.2.2 The degree of importance attached to one's religious group will vary negatively with income.

Occupation

1.3.1 Religious attendance will vary negatively the more modern/industrial a given occupation.

1.3.2 The degree of importance attached to one's religious group will vary negatively the more modern/industrial a given occupation.

Education

1.4.1 Religious attendance will vary negatively with education.

1.4.2 The degree of importance attached to one's religious group will vary negatively with education.

Sex

1.5.1 Religious attendance will vary by gender in that women are expected to be more frequent church-goers than men.

1.5.2 The degree of importance attached to one's religious

group will vary by gender in that women will tend to attach greater importance than men.

Early- Childhood Residence

1.6.1 Religious attendance will vary negatively with the degree of urbanity of one's childhood residence.

1.6.2 The degree of importance attached to one's religious group will vary negatively with the degree of urbanity of one's childhood residence.

II. Resistant Elements

Religious Affiliation

2.1.1 Religious attendance will vary by religious affiliation.

2.1.2 The degree of importance of one's religious group will also vary by religious affiliation.

Ethno-Religious Communal Involvement

2.2.1 Religious attendance will vary positively with the number of friends an individual claims to be affiliated with some church etc.

2.2.2 The degree of importance attached to a religious group will vary positively with the number of friends an individual claims to be affiliated with some church or

congregation.

III. Independent Variables related to Privatization

Religious Attendance

3.1.1 A favourable attitude toward abortion will vary negatively with frequency of religious attendance.

3.1.2 A favourable attitude toward divorce will vary negatively with frequency of religious attendance.

3.1.3 A favourable attitude toward co-habitation will vary negatively with frequency of religious attendance.

Degree of Importance of One's Religious Group

3.2.1 A favourable attitude toward abortion will vary negatively with how much importance individuals attach to their religious group.

3.2.2 A favourable attitude toward divorce will vary negatively with how much importance individuals attach to their religious group.

3.2.3 A favourable attitude toward co-habitation will vary negatively with how much importance individuals attach to their religious group.

Religious Affiliation

3.3.1 A favourable attitude toward abortion will vary by religious affiliation in that Catholics are expected to be

less favourable toward this issue than non-Catholics and non-practicioners.

3.3.2 A favourable attitude toward divorce will vary by religious affiliation in that Catholics are expected to be less favourable toward this issue than non-Catholics and non-practicioners.

3.3.3 A favourable attitude toward abortion will vary by religious affiliation in that Catholics are expected to be less favourable toward this issue than non-Catholics and non-practicioners.

Age

3.4.1 A favourable attitude toward abortion will vary negatively with age.

3.4.2 A favourable attitude toward divorce will vary negatively with age.

CHAPTER III.

The underlying theme of this thesis is fostering and impeding factors of secularization in Quebec. The literature review has taken us through a theoretical exploration of the major secular trends and determining factors, from which we were able to derive specific research hypotheses. These hypotheses in turn reflected the dual character of our theoretical concern, this being fostering and impeding elements of secularity*. More specifically, we were able to hypothesize that variables such as age, education, occupation and early-childhood residence are positive determinants of secularity, since these served to operationalize some of the major concepts such as generational differences, exposure to a scholarly perspective, modernity and urbanism, respectively. On the

* As a preliminary step to our statistical analysis, we have examined the separate effects of the measures of our dependent variable (religiosity/secularity) on each other. This was necessary since we have chosen religious attendance, subjective importance and the three attitudinal statements to measure the same concept. If these indices are intended to measure the same concept, they should be highly inter-correlated which they in fact are. These relationships and their accompanying statistics are presented in Table 4.

other hand we proposed that religious denomination (non-secular versus secular) and ethno-religious community involvement reinforce religious sentiments, thereby being negative determinants of secularity.

Given that our concern is twofold, it is most appropriate to approach the statistical analysis and its theoretical implication in terms of fostering elements on the one hand and impeding elements on the other.

I. The Statistical Analysis of the Data

1. Fostering Elements: The effects of Age, Education, Occupation, Income, Sex and Early-Childhood Residence on Religious Attendance and Subjective Importance of Religious Group

Tables 4 and 5 demonstrate that religious attendance and the degree of importance of one's religious affiliation vary positively and significantly with age,

Table 4.
Zero-order Gamma Values and Corresponding Levels of
Significance for all Dependent Variables in the
Empirical Model and their Independent Variables

Dependent Variable	Independent Variable	Gamma	P
Attendance	Age	.62	.00
"	Income	-.00	.59
"	Occupation	-.32	.00
"	Education	-.42	.00
"	Sex	-.05	.75
"	Residence	-.25	.02
"	Religious Affiliation	-.53	.00
"	Ethno-religious Community Involvement	.72	.00
Subjective Importance of Religious Group	Age	.49	.00
"	Income	-.05	.47
"	Occupation	-.28	.00
"	Education	-.42	.00
"	Sex	-.05	.73
"	Residence	-.05	.67
"	Religious Attendance	.91	0
"	Religious Affiliation	-.23	.00
"	Ethno-Religious Involvement	.84	0
Agreement with statements on:			
Co-habitation	Religious Attendance	-.72	.00
"	Subjective Importance	-.68	.00
"	Religious Affiliation	.04	.01
"	Age	-.73	.00
Divorce	Religious Attendance	.60	.00
"	Subjective Importance	.47	.00
"	Religious Affiliation	-.24	.02
"	Age	.40	.00
Abortion	Religious Attendance	-.46	.00
"	Subjective Importance	-.28	.01
"	Religious Affiliation	.45	.00
"	Age	-.06	.11

In both cases, the value of gamma* is relatively high: +.62 and .49, respectively, and the percentage difference across categories of age is likewise considerable: 28.6% and 24.5%, respectively. Among the remaining pre-disposing factors or "exposure" variables, only occupation, education and early childhood-residence appear to bear a significant impact on our objective dimension of religious (or conversely,

Table 5. Percent Frequent Religious Attendance and Percent who Regard their Religious Group as Important by Age, Education, Early-Childhood Residence, Occupation, Income and Sex

Independent Variable	% Frequent Attendance	% Regard Religious Group as Important
Age:(40 Yrs. and Over)	44.0 (248)	49.6 (234)
" (Under 40 Years)	15.4 (195)	25.1 (187)
Education:(Post-Sec.)	23.0 (248)	29.7 (239)
" (Sec. & less)	42.1 (195)	50.5 (182)
Residence:(<100,000)	38.3 (162)	40.4 (151)
" (100,000+)	27.0 (278)	37.8 (270)
Occupation:(Not in Work Force)	46.4 (84)	50.0 (80)
" (Blue Collar)	38.4 (73)	47.8 (69)
" (White Collar)	29.6 (82)	42.1 (76)
" (Technico-Professional)	22.8 (202)	29.6 (196)
Income (Under \$15,000)	35.3 (17)	41.2 (17)
" (\$15,000-34,999)	50.0 (30)	56.7 (30)
" (\$35,000 and over)	41.3 (46)	43.9 (41)
Sex Male	30.7 (283)	38.0 (271)
" Female	32.7 (159)	40.3 (159)

secular) behaviour.

* Though gamma is an ordinal measure of association, we justify using it in cases where our nominal variables are concerned since these are either dichotomous (e.g. male versus female) or constitute a rank order that is, at least

Table 5 further indicates that with a percentage difference of 19.1, individuals with at least some post-secondary education are less likely than their less educated counterparts to attend services on a frequent basis. Those who have spent much of their early childhood years in areas numbering less than 100,000 people are more likely to be frequent church-goers by 11.3 percent over their cosmopolitan counterparts. There is a marked and steady decrease in frequency of religious attendance as we go from the least to most modern/industrial occupational group.

theoretically, implicit in the categorization, e.g. highly non-secular (Catholic), secular (non-Catholic) and highly secular (non-practitioner) denominations. Note, especially, sections 1.2.1.5 and 16.1.2.5 of the SPSS manual for further reference on the matter.

Once subjective importance of one's religious group is the dependent variable, a pattern dissimilar to that observed for religious attendance occurs. If we return to Tables 4 and 5, we notice that early childhood residence has a negligible, not to mention insignificant, effect on the subjective dimension.* In the case where occupation is the predictor variable, there is no marked discrepancy in percentages between the first three groups; rather the contrast is between professionals on the one hand and non-professionals on the other. The relationship is nonetheless significant regardless of whether we collapse the first three groups.

* Though early-childhood residence is a significant determinant of attendance (Table 4) but not of subjective importance, such an unanticipated finding can be explained by noting the effect of religious denomination (Catholic versus non-Catholic) on the bivariate relationship. In comparing Table 4 with Table 5 we discover that the original bivariate relationships lose their significance or remain insignificant among Catholics only. Therefore, it appears that the relationship is non-existent or disappears for Catholics, this signifying interaction between early-childhood residence and religion. One may wish to treat this finding as one that gives empirical support to the suggested discrepancy in the cultural and socio-historical experience of Catholics and non-Catholics in Quebec. The considerable influence of the Catholic church, despite the acknowledged outcome of the Quiet Revolution, infiltrates the cosmopolitan/non-cosmopolitan barrier that is at least suggested in our classification of the early-childhood residence variable. The reader should bear in mind that early-childhood residence reflects the respondents' primary socialization, an element that denotes a time factor that is necessary to consider given that 98.7 percent of our sample is aged 20 years and over, that is, born prior to the Quiet Revolution. (Turn to Table 1, for relevant statistics).

It is also necessary to stress that age, in contrast to the other pre-disposing factors, contributes the highest proportion reduction in error (in gamma value): +.62 when attendance is the dependent variable and +.49 when subjective importance is the dependent variable. In order of strength of relationship, the effect of age on our religious dimensions is followed by education, occupation, early-childhood residence, sex and income. The effects of the last two relationships, as will be examined later in the text, are insignificant.

Table 4 also illustrates the insignificant effects of income on religious attendance and subjective importance of religious group. It also shows that sex is an insignificant determinant of our dependent variable(s). In light of these data, we will assume that sex differences, hereby treated as differences in sex-role socialization and, simultaneously, differences in the way in which men and women have been exposed to secularizing processes such as industrialization, have little if no impact on normative behaviour such as religious attendance and subjective attitude toward one's religious affiliation. It seems likely that this finding mirrors the ever-increasing participation of women in the labour force, a participation that consequently serves to expose women to the same if not similar industrial and/or contemporary processes and activity engaged in by their male counterparts. Nevertheless, we must examine the possibility

that the original proposed relationship between income and religiousness is spurious.

Although there is no statistically significant relationship between income and religious attendance and income and subjective importance, we cannot preclude income as a predictor variable.* Given that our income variable is in fact a combined or total family income, this may account for any lack of significance that may otherwise have appeared had the variable simply specified the yearly earnings of the head of the household. In addition, we may wish to explore the possibility that income per se, unlike education, occupation and early-childhood residence, does not, in fact, denote exposure to secularizing forces. Income may at best serve as a function of education and occupation but not as a factor that goes above and beyond them.

* Jean-Pierre Proulx (Le Devoir, Volume LXXIV, no. 75, 31/03/83) also examines the relationship between wealth (measured by total family income) and church-going. Citing 1981 and 1982 data collected by the University of Montreal Research Center, Proulx offers evidence to support the popular thesis that religiosity varies inversely with income, even when age and education are held constant. Whereas our proposed relationship between income and religion has something to do with distance from secularizing processes, moreover where the lower and working classes are furthest from such forces, Proulx re-examines the notion of relative deprivation among lower income groups.

Religious Denomination as a Control Variable

To check for the possibility that religion may cross-cut the various occupational, educational, income etc., groups, we have introduced religious denomination as a control variable. Moreover, this also allows us to test whether religious denomination serves as a competing and/or more significant determinant of attendance and subjective importance than the fostering or secularizing elements.*

In simply comparing the zero-order gammas in Table 4 with the partial gammas presented in Tables 6.1 and 6.2, we discover that when religious denomination is controlled, there is a reduction in the gamma values between education and religion and between occupation and religion. That is, the zero-order gamma for the relationship between education and religious attendance is $-.42$ while the net effect is $-.33$ when religion is controlled for. In addition, the zero-order gamma for the relationship between occupation and religious attendance is $-.32$ while the partial gamma is $.22$ when religious denomination is controlled for.

* Mol (1976) concludes that in nations such as Canada and the U.S., religious denomination is a more significant predictor of church attendance than the socio-economic factors due to the similarities in lifestyle and ideology that exist between the working and middle classes.

Table 6.1 Percent Frequent Religious Attendance by Education, Early-Childhood Residence, Occupation Controlling for Religious Denomination

	% Frequent Religious Attendance		
	Catholic	non-Catholic	No Religion
Education (Post-Sec.)	30.7	13.4	0**
	(153)	(67)	(23)
(Sec. & less)	46.3	30.4	0**
	(147)	(46)	(2)
Conditional Gamma:	.32	.48	N.A.
First-Order Partial Gamma:	.33		
Residence (<100,000)	43.0	36.1	0**
	(114)	(36)	(26)
(100,000 and+)	35.0	13.0	0**
	(183)	(77)	(15)
Conditional Gamma:	-.17*	-.58	N.A.
First-Order Partial Gamma:	-.21		
Occupation (Not in Work Force)	52.6	33.3	0**
	(57)	(24)	(1)
(Blue Collar)	37.7	45.5	0**
	(61)	(11)	(1)
(White Collar)	33.9	18.2	0**
	(59)	(22)	(1)
(Technico-Professional)	33.3	10.7	0**
	(120)	(56)	(23)
Conditional Gamma:	-.20*	.47	N.A.
First-Order Partial Gamma:	.22		

*Signifies that p is greater than .05

**No statistics were computed since there were no frequent church-goers among non-practitioners

Table 6.2 Percent Frequent Religious Attendance by Income and Sex Controlling for Religious Denomination

Income (Under \$15,000)	38.5 (13)	33.3 (3)	0** (25)
(\$15,000-\$34,999)	50.0 (22)	57.1 (7)	0** (25)
(\$35,000 and over)	56.3 (32)	8.3 (12)	0** (25)
Conditional Gamma:	-.21*	.63*	N.A.
First-Order Partial Gamma:	-.14		
Sex Male	39.2 (189)	18.3 (71)	0** (20)
Female	36.9 (111)	24.4 (41)	0** (5)
Conditional Gamma:	.05*	-.18*	N.A.
First-Order Partial Gamma:	.03		

*Signifies that p is greater than .05.

**No statistics were computed since there were no frequent church-goers among non-practitioners

When we introduce religious denomination as a control variable for those relationships involving subjective importance and the pre-disposing variables (Tables 7.1 and 7.2), a simple comparison between the zero-order gammas in Table 4 and the partial gammas in Table 7.2 will reveal that religion does little to explain the bivariate relationships between subjective importance and the socio-economic variables. There is little change in the gamma values for those relationships involving education, residence and occupation as independent variables when religion is controlled for.

Table 7.1 Percent who Regard their Religious Group Important (Subjective Importance) by Education, Residence, Occupation, Income and Sex Controlling for Religious Denomination

% Regarding their Religious Group as Important			
	Catholic	non-Catholic	No Religion
Education: (Post-Sec.)	33.6	31.7	0
	(149)	(63)	(22)
" (Sec. and less)	50.7	52.3	0
	(136)	(44)	(2)
Conditional Gamma:	.34	.40	N.A.
Residence: (<100,000)	38.7	60.6	0**
	(106)	(33)	(14)
" (100,000+)	43.6	31.1	0**
	(179)	(74)	(-10)
Conditional Gamma:	.10*	-.55	N.A.
Occupation: (Not in Work Force)	51.9	47.8	0**
	(54)	(23)	(1)
" (Blue Collar)	46.6	60.0	0**
	(58)	(10)	(1)
" (White Collar)	41.8	42.9	0**
	(55)	(21)	(0)
" (Technico-Professional)	34.7	32.1	0**
	(118)	(53)	(22)
Conditional Gamma:	.21*	.26*	N.A.
Income: (Under \$15,000)	38.5	64.7	0**
	(13)	(3)	(3)
" (\$15,000-34,999)	54.5	71.4	0**
	(22)	(7)	(7)
" (\$35,000 and +)	51.9	33.3	0**
	(27)	(12)	(12)
Conditional Gamma:	-.12*	.56*	N.A.
Sex: Male	41.0	41.8	0**
	(183)	(67)	(18)
Female	43.1	38.5	0**
	(102)	(39)	(6)
Conditional Gamma:	-.04*	.07*	N.A.

*Level of Significance is greater than .05.

Table 7.2 First-Order Partial Gammas Corresponding to the Cross-tabulation of Subjective Importance of Religious Group by Education, Residence, Occupation, Income and Sex controlling for Religious Denomination

Dependent Variable	Independent Variable	Control Variable	First-Order Partial Gamma
Subjective Importance	Education	Religion	-.35
"	Residence	"	-.02
"	Occupation	"	-.21
"	Income	"	.05
"	Sex	"	-.03

However, if we consider the significance levels in the partials, we then notice that the relationships between attendance and between residence and attendance and occupation are not significant among Catholics. (The discussion of the significance levels corresponding to the conditional gammas in each partial will, however, become more important when we examine interaction effects between religious denomination and the pre-disposing variables). We also discover that the relationship between occupation and subjective importance is not significant among both Catholics and non-Catholics.

This unanticipated finding may, however, be explained by looking at the effect of religious denomination on subjective importance (Table 8). Unlike the discrepancy in frequency of religious attendance that is noted between Catholics, non-Catholics and non-practitioners, Table 8 indicates that Catholics and non-Catholics equally regard

their religious group as important, 41.8 percent and 40.2 percent, respectively. That is, when it comes to the subjective element, or when individuals are asked to make a personal statement on their respective church, congregation or synagogue, denominational differences are irrelevant and the major contrast is between practitioners or affiliated persons (be they Catholic or non-Catholic) on the one hand and non-practitioners on the other. The implications of this finding for our theoretical model will become more apparent and meaningful when we examine the independent effects on our measures of privatized religion.

Table 8. Percent Frequent Religious Attendance and Percent Regarding their Religious Group Important by Religious Denomination

	Catholic	non-Catholic	No-Religion
% Frequent Religious Attendance (300)	38.3	20.4	0**
	(113)	(113)	(25)
Zero-order Gamma:	.23		
% Regarding their Religious Group as Important (285)	41.8	40.2	0**
	(285)	(107)	(24)
Zero-order Gamma:	.53		

**No percentages were computed since there were no non-practitioners who were frequent church-goers.

The effect of education on both religious dimensions remains significant even when religion is controlled for (see Tables 6.1 and 7.1). Nevertheless, the relationships involving income and sex as dependent variables remain

insignificant among both religious groups.

The Interaction Effects between Religious Denomination and the Pre-disposing Variables

The importance of considering religious denomination and its relationship to the pre-disposing elements is pronounced when we treat it as a variable that interacts, rather than competes, with the pre-disposing variables in affecting individuals' religious behaviour.

In comparing the effect of early-childhood residence on both attendance and subjective importance (Tables 6.1, 7.1 and 7.2), we notice that the relationships are significant but only among non-Catholics. This differential effect in each partial is a sign of interaction between religious behaviour and place of residence. More specifically, where attendance is dependent, gamma increases from $-.25$ in the bivariate comparison (no controls) to $-.58$ among non-Catholics. Where subjective importance is dependent, gamma increases from $-.05$ in the bivariate relationship (no controls) to $-.55$ among non-Catholics. We seem to have a finding that lends support to the thesis that Catholics and non-Catholics have experienced dissimilar cultural and religious atmospheres. As it will become clearer in our section dealing with the theoretical implications of our data analysis, such findings have most profound implications for further secular tendencies and variations among Catholics and non-Catholics in the province. However, since

we are examining the effect of the pre-disposing factors and not those which determine the measures of privatized religion, we will not elaborate further on the issue of differences in secular tendencies - an issue which does require previous analysis of the matter of privatization. We will resume this issue at a later point in the analysis following the last section of the statistical analysis.

If we refer back to Table 6.1, we will notice that there is an indication of an interaction effect between occupation and religious denomination given conditional gammas of $-.20$ and $.47$ as compared with a zero-order gamma of $-.25$. Furthermore, the relationship is insignificant among Catholics. One will also notice that in Table 6.1, among non-Catholics, blue-collar workers are the most frequent church-goers (45.5%) whereas in the bivariate table (Table 5), 38.4 percent of blue-collar workers attend frequently. Perhaps our data demonstrate that at least as far as non-Catholics are concerned, Luckmann's and Moreux's observations are supported; the persistence of traditional religious behaviour among the working class is in turn a "vestige" of a less secular historical period. That the same observation may not apply to Catholics should not discredit Luckmann's and Moreux's position on the matter. It may simply illustrate the far-reaching influence of religion across all strata of Quebec's French-Canadian population, a hegemony that remained unchallenged only until

the Quiet Revolution left its mark. The consequences of the modernization and secularization of Quebec society were indeed massive, transforming the social order at every level and further narrowing whatever gap existed between the strata of French-Canadian society. We must bear in mind that the recent socio-economic changes in the Quebec social structure were more deeply felt by the French Quebecois than by their Anglophone, hence non-Catholic, counterparts if only by virtue of belonging to a different socio-economic and cultural sub-system.

To recapitulate, when religious denomination is controlled for, we notice that the relationship between the pre-disposing, or fostering variables and the dependent variables (religious attendance and subjective importance) is affected somewhat. We also noticed that the effect of early-childhood residence and occupation on our two religious dimensions was insignificant among Catholics. Unlike the previous associations, the relationship between education and the religious dimensions was not radically affected when religion was controlled for.

Education has an undeniably strong impact on normative religious behaviour and this is true for both Catholics and non-Catholics. Education appears to compete with religion, or, in this case religious denomination and all that it encompasses, as a system or body of knowledge that has

developed into an autonomous hence competitive source of meaning vis-a-vis religion as an institution. What we possibly have here is an instance of what Berger terms a pluralistic situation. Education, however, enters the competitive "market" as a secular body of knowledge.

2. Resistant Elements: Religious Denomination and Ethno-religious Community Involvement

2.1 Religious Denomination

Table 8 illustrated the impact that religious denomination bears on attendance and subjective importance of religious group. A closer look at Table 8 reveals that there is little difference between Catholics and non-Catholics vis-a-vis the importance they attach to their group: 41.8% and 40.2%, respectively. Rather, the critical contrast is between those non-affiliated (or non-practitioners) on the one hand, and those who are (i.e. Catholics and non-Catholics). However, when religious attendance is considered to be the dependent variable, the differences between denominations are greater. Catholics are significantly more regular church-goers than non-Catholics 38.3% and 20.4%, respectively. (Not surprisingly, none of those claiming no religion attend frequently).

When we control for age (Table 9), we notice that the relationship between Religious Denomination and Attendance is affected. This is indicated by the fact that the relationship is not significant among those aged less than 40 years. A further glance at the conditional gammas

indicates possible interaction between age and religious denomination; gamma is $-.27$ among younger respondents and $-.68$ among older respondents. It would seem, at least as far as religious attendance is concerned, that the importance we ordinarily attribute to such doctrinal differences between Catholics and non-Catholics disappear with subsequent generations. Younger Catholics appear to resemble their non-Catholic counterparts in terms of rejecting and/or embracing institutional religious prescriptions.

Table 9. Percent Frequent Religious Attendance by Religious Affiliation controlling for Age

	% Frequent Religious Attendance	
	Under 40 yrs.	40 yrs. and over
Catholic	16.8 (137)	56.4 (163)
non-Catholic	15.0 (40)	23.3 (73)
Conditional		
No Religion	0 (14)	0 (11)
Gamma:	$-.27^*$	$-.68$
First-Order Partial Gamma:	$-.60$	
*P is greater than .05		

2.2 Ethno-Religious Community Involvement

When we introduce ethno-religious community involvement as an independent variable, we find this variable to have a highly significant effect on both religious attendance and subjective importance of religious group (Table 4). A closer examination of the percentage variation (Table 10) reveals that those highly involved persons surpass their less involved counterparts in terms of frequency of attendance by 40.2 percent. Highly involved respondents likewise overshadow less involved individuals by 54.7 percent in terms of how much importance they attach to their

Table 10. Percent Frequent Religious Attendance and Percent who Regard their Religious Group Important (Subjective Importance) by Ethno-Religious Community Involvement		
Ethno-Religious Comm. Involvement	% Frequent Attendance	% Regarding their Religion as Important
High	59.0 (134)	76.7 (129)
Low	18.8 (304)	22.0 (291)

religious group.

In comparing the percentage of highly involved respondents who attend church frequently (59%) and highly involved respondents who regard their faith important (76.7%), we find a marked difference of 17.7 percent. Given such a discrepancy, it would seem possible that the asymmetry between regular church attendance and subjective importance that we proposed in Chapter I and II appears in our data. We may wish to turn back to the assumption we made in the footnote corresponding to the subjective importance variable (Chapter II). (However, since it is methodologically inappropriate to compare across percentages of two different dependent variables, we will make the appropriate statistical analysis when we examine Table 11.)

To recall, we suggested that individuals who regard their faith as "important" may not necessarily consider attendance to be an integral aspect of their religious life but prefer to emphasize private prayer and respect for tradition. Our finding should therefore not be regarded as one which runs counter or even discredits Berger and Luckmann's secularization thesis. On the contrary, it simply lends support to the hypothesis that allowing for time and the influence of secular forces, the incongruence or asymmetry between an official model of religion and the subjective integration of that model increases. Ironically, perhaps, the asymmetry between religious dimensions that we encountered in our data, at least as far as high

ethno-community involvement goes, indicates that there may be more individuals who maintain a subjective "respect" for religion than there are people who engage in religious ritual 'tout court'.*

As an impeding element of secularization, ethno-religious involvement has a strong, positive and significant effect on both frequency of church attendance and subjective importance of religious group. Nonetheless, ethnic community involvement reinforces a religious attitude (subjective importance, in our case) more so than it does religious attendance; the gamma value is .84 and .72, respectively.

The possible or growing asymmetry between the objective and subjective dimensions of religion may also be suggested by noting the interaction that takes place between ethno-religious community involvement and age. More specifically, the importance of ethno-religious community involvement, not simply as an impeding variable vis-a-vis, secularity, but as a factor which competes with

* Martin and Greeley seem to hint at the same supposition. Martin, for one, explores the relationship between threatened cultural identity and persistence of religion as this is the case among the Catholics of Northern Ireland, French-Canadians (at least historically) and Sikhs of India. Greeley, as we have seen, does not deny but fully acknowledges ethnic-community involvement as an element that gives impetus to religious sentiments even if that involvement is a primary, if not sole, generating factor of religious education.

institutionally organized religion (measured by attendance) as a prime determinant of subjective religious meaning, is demonstrated by comparing Tables 11, 12, 13 and 14.

Table 11 indicates that the positive relationship between subjective importance and religious attendance is statistically significant.

Table 11. Subjective Importance of Religious Group by Religious Attendance		
Subjective Importance	Religious Attendance	
	Frequent	Infrequent
Important	83.3	18.5
Unimportant	16.7 (132)	81.5 (287)
Zero-order Gamma: .91		

As Tables 12 and 13 further indicate, the relationship between our two dimensions of religious behaviour remains strong even after controlling for age and ethno-community involvement:

Table 12. Percent Regarding their Religious Group Important by Religious Attendance Controlling for Age

Religious Attendance	% Regarding their Religious Group as Important	
	Under 40 yrs.	40 yrs. and over
Frequent	73.3 (30)	86.3 (102)
Infrequent	16.0 (156)	21.4 (138)
Conditional Gamma:	.87	.92
First-order Partial Gamma:	.91	

Table 13. Percent Regarding their Religious Group as Important by Religious Attendance Controlling for Ethno-Religious Community Involvement

Religious Attendance	% Regarding their Religious Group as Important	
	Ethno-religious Community Involvement	
	High	Low
Frequent	93.6 (78)	68.5 (54)
Infrequent	51.0 (45)	11.5 (235)
Conditional Gamma:	.89	.87
First-order Partial Gamma:	.88	

However, Table 14 reveals that among individuals aged under 40 years, high ethno-religious community involvement affects the relationship between attendance and subjective

Table 14. Percent Regarding their Religious Group Important by Religious Attendance Controlling for both Age and Ethno-Religious Community Involvement				
% Regarding their Religious Group as Important				
	High Ethno-Rel. Comm. Inv.		Low Ethno-Rel. Comm. Inv.	
	Under 40	40 and+	Under 40	40 and+
Religious Attendance				
Frequent	91.7 (12)	93.9 (66)	61.1 (18)	72.2 (36)
Infrequent	68.8 (16)	42.9 (35)	10.0 (140)	13.7 (95)
Second-order Conditional Gamma:	.67*	.91	.87	.89
First-Order Partial Gamma:	.88			
*P is greater than .05				

importance (p is greater than .05 and gamma is .67): Nevertheless, the original relationship between attendance and subjective importance remains significant among younger individuals with little community involvement. The same, however, can not be said of those aged 40 and over in which case religious attendance has a significant effect on the meaningful integration of religion, regardless of level of ethnic community involvement. One must bear in mind that unlike their younger counterparts, those aged 40 and over

have not been socialized into a "liberated" environment in terms of religion but one that offered a stronger reminder of Church supremacy. Not having been born children of the Quiet Revolution, or Baby Boom children for that matter, the older generation in our sample seem to recognize both religious and ethnic components of what they consider to be meaningful.

Table 14 seemed to illustrate that the interaction between ethno-religious community involvement and age is most interesting and telling in terms of our understanding of the symmetry between our objective and subjective dimensions of religion. As we mentioned before, perhaps what is occurring is that ethno-religious community involvement, in its interaction with age, competes with religious attendance as a determinant of subjective importance. Perhaps as well, younger individuals with high ethno-religious community involvement emphasize or focus on their respective religious beliefs in a manner that is unparalleled by their older counterparts and by their less-involved counterparts.

If we once more turn to the summary table of statistics (Table 4), we will notice that ethno-religious community involvement has a stronger impact on attendance and on subjective importance than religious denomination has on both attendance and importance. A glance at the column of

gamma statistics will reveal that when attendance is dependent, gamma is .72 when ethno-religious involvement is independent and -.53 when religious denomination is independent. When subjective importance is dependent, gamma is .84 when ethno-religious involvement is independent and -.23 when religious denomination is independent. These data serve to support our conclusion that though religious denomination is an important determinant of attendance and subjective importance, its effect is overwhelmed by the effect of ethno-religious involvement. We previously came to a similar conclusion in noticing that high ethno-religious activity affected the relationship between the objective and subjective dimensions among younger respondents.

III. A Comparison between Fostering and Impeding Elements: Toward an Understanding of Secular Trends

The reader will recall that in the first part of the chapter we examined and compared the various effects of the pre-disposing variables in our model since these variables are fostering elements as far as secularity is concerned. Our data then demonstrated that of these variables, age and education exerted the greatest impact on our objective and

subjective dimensions of religiosity, more specifically, strong and negative impacts. When the effects of religious denomination and ethno-religious involvement on religious behaviour were examined, the impact born by these variables was strong and positive, this lending support to our initial hypotheses suggesting corporate religious denomination and ethno-religious community involvement to be negative determinants of secularity. What may be warranted at this point is, a comparison of the fostering and impeding variables with regard to the influence these have on religious behaviour.

Yet another glance at the summary table will indicate that as a determinant of religious behaviour (both objective and subjective elements), ethno-religious involvement bears an impact that is greater than that exerted by age and education. Though our data demonstrate that the trend is one away from institutionally defined religious behaviour, as was suggested in comparing our two age groups, religious behaviour seems nonetheless reinforced or maintained by ethno-religious communal activity. That is not necessarily to say that the secular trend is "reversing" itself nor that the influence of religion outweighs the influence of secularity. It simply indicates that being involved as opposed to not being involved with one's respective community is a more telling or determining element of religious attendance and subjective attitude than age and

education. Bear in mind that only 30.6 percent of our sample interact intensely within their own cultural milieu, i.e. are highly involved in their ethno-religious community.

The Measures of Private Religion: Attitude toward Co-habitation, Divorce and Abortion and the Effects of their Independent Variables

The effects of age, religious denomination, religious attendance and subjective importance on attitude toward co-habitation are all statistically significant. In comparing the gamma values presented in Table 4, age bears the greatest impact (-.73) followed by religious attendance (-.72), subjective importance (-.68) and religious denomination (.04). In addition, Table 15 demonstrates that with regard to religious denomination, the critical contrast is between members and non-members of a religious group (or practitioners and non-practitioners).

Table 15. Percent Agreeing, Uncertain and Disagreeing with a Positive Attitude toward Co-habitation by Religious Denomination			
Attitude toward Co-habitation	Religious Denomination		
	Catholic	non-Catholic	No Religion
Agree	69.2	61.1	96.2
Uncertain	4.1	7.1	3.8
Disagree	26.8 (295)	31.9 (113)	0 (26)

In other words, the particular religion one belongs to is not as important a determinant of such an attitude as whether one actually belongs to some denomination, regardless of kind. It seems likely that at least as far as co-habitation as a moral issue is concerned, denominational differences are no longer determinant of variations in attitudes toward such a matter. The divergence in normative behaviour between members of differing religious traditions seems to be disappearing, probably as a consequence of the several universal, secularizing influences that we have examined in our theoretical chapter.* Yet another dimension

* Charles Westoff (1976) also recognizes the increasing convergence in normative patterns of behaviour between Catholics and non-Catholics in the U.S., more specifically with regard to contraceptive methods.

of secularization and the privatization of religion may be indicated by this ever-increasing convergence in subjective or personal attitudes toward religion. This convergence was, at least suggested in observing that denominational (i.e. Catholic versus non-Catholic) differences are becoming negligible.

The fact that there is a high correlation between attendance and attitude toward co-habitation also lends support to our initial hypothesis that the more intensely active one is with respect to his/her religious group, the more conservative his/her position regarding religious and sexual morality. The reader will then recall that we made parallels between liberalness and the privatization of religion in Chapter II. That is, the more active one is in a traditional, religious institution, the less likely is religion considered a private, individual matter.

When we then examine the effects of age, religious denomination, attendance and subjective importance on attitudes toward divorce and abortion, we notice that religious attendance contributes the highest proportion reduction in error (in gamma value) in predicting attitudes toward divorce and abortion*. In the case where abortion is

* To make certain whether the two levels of religious attendance cross-cut the various categories of religious denomination, we calculated the effect of attendance on

dependent, one will also notice that Catholics are more likely than non-Catholics to reject the notion of free choice with regard to the abortion issue; 37.6 percent and 18.6 percent, respectively (see Table 16).

Although the effect of age on attitude toward abortion is, quite surprisingly, not significant (Table 4), we can re-examine the effect of religious denomination on abortion, since the former interacts with age (Table 17). We then discover that the relationship is significant only among older respondents in which case the pattern that we observed in the bivariate is maintained.

Attitude toward Abortion	Religious Denomination		
	Catholic	non-Catholic	No Religion
Agree	55.6	77.0	84.6
Uncertain	6.8	4.4	0
Disagree	37.6 (295)	18.6 (113)	15.4 (26)

attitude toward abortion controlling for religious denomination. The results are then presented in Appendix I and the statistics clearly demonstrate that the original relationship remains significant when denomination is controlled.

The conditional gammas are $-.33$ and $-.54$ among younger and older respondents, respectively. Perhaps what is occurring is that differences in secular tendencies, i.e. the privatization of religious attitudes, are greater between age groups among Catholics, whereas among non-Catholics, especially older non-Catholics, secularity is already an inherent aspect of religion, this possibly being the reason why we only find a percentage difference of 7 percent between age groups who are sympathetic to the patient-physician relationship in the matter of abortion. We again remind the reader that secular forces had only recently, (i.e. during the last two decades) made a profound and sudden impact on the French-Catholic population. As a result, secular tendencies among Catholics aged 40 years and over will tend to lag behind those of their non-Catholic counterparts, a tendency that is not repeated among younger individuals regardless of denomination.

Table 17. Attitude toward Abortion by Age
controlling for Religious Denomination

	Age					
	Under 40 yrs.			40 yrs. and over		
	Cath	non-Cath	No Rel	Cath	non-Cath	No Rel
Positive Attitude toward Abortion						
Agree	61.2	72.5	86.7	50.9	79.5	81.8
Unsure	3.7	2.5	0	9.3	5.5	0
Disagree	35.1 (134)	25.0 (40)	13.3 (15)	39.8 (161)	15.1 (73)	18.2 (11)
Conditional Gamma	-.33*			-.54*		
*P is greater than .05						

That religious attendance has such a strong impact on all three attitudinal variables is not simply a reminder of the effect of exposure to religious doctrine (or its absence) on individual morality, but of the polarity that exists between "public", traditional religion as we know it, and a personalized, privatized attitude toward the sacred. Simply put, institutionalized religion and privatized religion (or secularized belief) are inversely related. The reader will then recall that three of the major hypotheses put forth held that a favourable attitude toward all three moral issues would vary negatively with frequency of religious attendance.

The reader will also notice that as a measure of religiousness/secularity, the subjective 'importance' of a religious group bears less of an impact on the attitudinal variables than its objective counter-component. This is most pronounced in the case where the attitude toward abortion is dependent. The fact that subjective importance is not such a strong determinant of the abortion variable may indicate that a subjective, though strong attitude toward religion is not necessarily at odds with a positive view on abortion unless that subjective attitude is largely generated by religious doctrine and, subsequently, religious attendance. The latter, however, may not be the case among younger respondents. Recalling our findings on the resistant elements, high ethno-religious community involvement explained the relationship between attendance and subjective importance among those aged less than 40 years.

It seems likely that subjective importance reflects not only institutional religion but privatized views on religion as well. This may be the reason why it does not exert such an impact on the moral attitudes as attendance. Related to this notion is the assumption we made concerning similarities between Catholics and non-Catholics with regard to the personalist views they hold on issues such as co-habitation: similarities that we assume to be increasing, especially among younger individuals. We must also bear in

mind that religious attendance was implemented as a measure of religious behaviour, since this behaviour is dictated by a particular religious doctrine. That is, on an objective level, Catholics and non-Catholics (especially those aged 40 years and over) are dissimilar, a dissimilarity that was noted whenever religious attendance was introduced as a predictor variable. On a subjective level, however, Catholics and non-Catholics resemble one another, a finding that we observed especially with regard to the matter of co-habitation (Table 15)*.

* Similar to this finding is the observation we made concerning the insignificant relationship between occupation and subjective importance of religious group when religious denomination was controlled for. To recall, we maintained that belonging to a particular religious group, regardless of denomination, as opposed to not belonging (or being a non-practitioner) was the critical contrast and not doctrinal differences, as was assumed, at least in theory.

II. Theoretical Implications of the Data Analysis

The first section of our analysis has so far indicated that the effects of the variables we chose to designate as fostering elements of secularity differ between Catholics and non-Catholics. At the very least, these results underscore the importance of considering cultural differences, in our case religious denomination, as determinants of variations in secular tendencies. Although our comparison of Catholics and non-Catholics aged less than 40 years provided one instance of the growing convergence in normative behaviour between differing religious traditions, there was nevertheless evidence to suggest that differences prevail.

These differences were suggested when we noted interaction between religious denomination and the pre-disposing variables. Most of the relationships between the fostering variables and either attendance or subjective importance were significant among non-Catholics only. To recall, we proposed that the socio-economic changes generated during the early sixties' affected one segment of the population more radically and profoundly than it did the other. This is just one instance to suggest that change, including secular change, has varied from one socio-cultural

Q

system to another. In addition, Table 9 indicated that the drop in religious attendance across categories of our two age groups may have been more radical among Catholics than non-Catholics. Similarly, in noting the effect of religious denomination on attitude toward abortion controlling for age, we noticed that the gap between denominations increased among older respondents. We attributed this increase in denominational differences to the conservative stance which older Catholics maintain, differences which no longer seem relevant among younger respondents as indicated by an absence of a statistically significant relationship.

If we place Quebec in the Canadian context then we are presented with a situation that comes closest to Martin's notion of a "mixed" pattern, that is, a small Protestant majority co-existing with a large Catholic minority. Nevertheless, we must bear in mind that unlike the Catholic minority situation in Holland, Quebec is much more differentiated as a sub-society with further potential for political autonomy. Due to differences in linguistic, cultural and historical experience, the schism that exists between Protestant and Catholic in Quebec is greater than the less complex confessional schism that differentiates Protestant from Catholic in the Dutch example.

Perhaps, as well, Martin's supposition that the militant secularism or counter-image that Catholic cultures

create for themselves as compared to the "laissez-faire" ambiance of Protestant milieus is represented in our study. Our observation that the drop in religious attendance and the greater inter-generational gap in attitude toward the abortion issue was more pronounced among Catholics may itself be an indication of that militantly secular potential which Catholic cultures bear whereas Protestant groups remain secular albeit moderately secular, as was suggested by the finding that little discrepancy existed between older and younger non-Catholics on the matter of abortion.

Quite possibly, our data is suggestive of a fourth religious and socio-historical situation, that is, a religious duopoly wherein the Catholic minority is also a majority in its own right - Quebec being a case in point. Consequently, religion qua religion may have greater chances of persisting within the non-Catholic, hence pluralistic situation, wherein religious dissent is not foreign to its nature but rather "promoted" by the laissez-faire ethos.

Pluralism is not simply a religious phenomenon," as Westhues has so well observed. The Canadian example is one of vertical and ethnic pluralism, whereby ethno-religious enclaves have been able to retain their cultural identity because of secular, Protestant social and economic hegemony.

Our findings regarding the privatization of religion

may also be suggestive of the larger, universal secular trend that denotes convergence in normative behaviour between individuals of varied religious and ethnic backgrounds. If religious and ethnic differences are indeed converging in the private sphere, especially among younger individuals, then perhaps our data is also indicative of Luckmann's conception of the private sphere as a new social form of religion. Traditional symbols, will nevertheless form part of the religious market situation although they have become de-objectified. As our data suggest, the success of traditional religious systems of meaning may be reinforced by or dependent upon the role they may serve in maintaining ethnic-group cohesion. Moreover, if the existence of ethnic groups is more characteristic of Protestant pluralism than either Catholic hegemony or minority, then the likelihood of traditional symbols persisting among non-Catholics may be greater and consequently, the privatization of religion may be more retarded among non-Catholics than their Catholic counterparts. However, to be able to test such a hypothesis would require an adequate sample of, non-Catholic yet non-Protestant individuals, something which we unfortunately could not obtain in our survey.

Our results also showed that ethno-religious communal activity may compete with institutional religion as an objective correlate of individual meaning or subjective

importance. This acknowledges that the trend is one away from institutionally-defined religious meaning, although that religious meaning is based on a sense of ethnic or cultural loyalty. The success of traditional religious institutions may reside in the role it serves in maintaining ethno-religious gemeinschaft relationships. Our conclusion is similar to Greeley's observations that ethnicity or ethnic identity has a role to play in reinforcing religious sentiments.

In addition, the asymmetry we noticed between objective and subjective dimensions further attests to the suggestion that the success of religion possibly depends more on its meaningful integration than on the performance of religious ritual as defined by the the "official" model of the religion in question. We may again refer to Berger and Luckmann's model of secularization particularly with respect to the notion that religion must meet certain individual needs in order to survive as a relevance structure. A sense of religiousness based on subjective importance rather than doctrinal obligations and demands may denote a more profound or authentic sense of religion especially if church-going behaviour is not meaningfully or subjectively integrated. Berger, Luckmann and Greeley have all acknowledged that religion has become more subject to choice and individual commitment. Greeley further adds that this novel emphasis on individual selectiveness makes the whole problem of

meaning and religion more acute and salient than ever before.

A word about the insignificant effects of income on religious behaviour and sex on religious behaviour is also in order. What probably occurs is that income, as an independent variable per se, but more importantly, as a simultaneous measure of socio-economic status and exposure to secular forces, does not imply a "segregated body of knowledge" the way that exposure to scholarly perspectives (via education) and technical/industrial experience (via modern/industrial occupations) do. That is, income, or the pursuit of it, may not necessarily compete with religious institutions as a determinant of individual meaning the way that urban, scientific and industrial forces have historically. We may also wish to reintroduce Mol's explanation of the lack of discrepancy in religious attendance that exist between the classes due to similarities in lifestyle and aspirations. It seems highly unlikely that the latter explanation is relevant to our study given that education and occupation are relatively strong determinants of religious behaviour.

As far as the effect of sex-gender on religious behaviour is concerned, we cannot draw upon the affective/instrumental dichotomy that is often used to

describe sex-role differences.* It seems more likely that the traditional gap between the sexes, one that has involved differences in socialization and motivation, is no longer a relevant phenomenon given the marked increase in the female labour force participation, to say nothing of the liberation of women from some of their traditional constraints.

* Mol (1976), as we have seen, also introduces sex-gender as a correlate of religious attendance. He does observe, however, that there are significant differences between the sexes as far as the ritualistic dimension is concerned.

Summary and Conclusion

This thesis attempted to examine the fostering elements of secularization in Quebec as well as those factors which serve to impede it. We have defined secularization as that process by which religion has receded into the private sphere, becoming inconsequential for public or economic spheres yet confined to family and church and subject to individual commitment.

An examination of the pertinent literature revealed that several factors have been responsible for the secular process. As we have seen, Berger and Luckmann discussed the secular potential inherent in social differentiation or institutional specialization of religion. Differentiation has in turn been reinforced by particular socio-historical events which we ordinarily attribute to secularity, namely, industrialization, urbanization, pluralism and scientific/technological innovation.

In Quebec, the effect of secular change was most deeply felt following the sudden impact of the Quiet Revolution of the 1960's during which time government agencies wrestled church control over health, education and welfare

institutions. Nevertheless, Canada and Quebec have integrated religion into their social system in a manner unparalleled by American and European societies. Though historically, the Roman Catholic Church was recognized as chief authoritative voice of the French-Canadian population, it has since lost much of that authority. However, Quebec education remains largely organized on a confessional basis. Elsewhere in Canada, ethnic communities were able to retain their religious and cultural heritage as a result of Anglo-Saxon, economic and social dominance. Hence, the popular cultural and vertical mosaic of Canada as we know it.

The propositions that were drawn from our theoretical discussion stated that religious behaviour and the subjective integration of religion would vary by generation and with exposure to secular forces. Contrariwise, religious behaviour and subjective integration of religion would be reinforced by the amount of ethnic community involvement and by the existence of non-secular denominations. Furthermore, the privatization of religion would vary by generation, religious affiliation, religious attendance and subjective importance of religious group.

The theoretical propositions were inspired by the literature review though our choice of propositions was largely constrained by the variables that were available in

our questionnaire. Some of these variables were relatively direct measures of concepts such as institutional religious behaviour (measured by religious attendance) and socio-economic status (measured by education, occupation and income). Others, however, were less direct and required us to be more tentative when making conclusions regarding our findings. We have in mind the measures of privatization of religion (i.e. attitudes toward co-habitation, divorce and abortion) and the measure of subjective integration of religion (subjective importance). Even though the variables were far from being inadequate, given greater resources we may have introduced questions or statements which could identify, or perhaps compare traditional doctrine, belief and ritual with privatized or secularized belief and behaviour. Examples would resemble the following: Indicate whether you agree, disagree or are uncertain about the following statements: "What the individual believes to be moral or immoral is more important than what the Church maintains is moral or immoral" and, "private prayer is more important to me than attending religious services."

It was also important to stress that the data was collected from the Greater Montreal and West Island regions. These geographical limitations gave way to a certain bias to the extent that Montreal is inherently urban, pluralistic, hence secular.

Our research hypotheses suggested that religious attendance and subjective importance of religion would vary negatively with age, education, occupation, income, place of residence and sex differences. Our dependent variables would vary positively with ethno-religious community involvement and religious affiliation (non-secular versus secular). Furthermore, positive attitudes toward co-habitation, divorce and abortion would vary negatively with age, religious denomination, attendance and subjective importance.

Briefly, our statistical analysis indicated that our hypotheses were supported except for those involving income and sex as fostering variables. Upon introducing religion as a control and later as a variable interacting with the fostering variables, we noticed that religion interacted with residence and occupation:

Theoretically, it meant that perhaps Catholics and non-Catholics had followed different patterns of secularity due to obvious differences in cultural experience. Further examination of the privatization variables and their determinants indicated that Catholics and non-Catholics were converging in normative behaviour such as attitude toward pre-marital sex, though Catholics tended somewhat more than non-Catholics to oppose free-choice with regard to abortion.

It should be stressed that our study did not specifically address itself to the phenomena of new religious movements and cultic behaviour, though, certainly, that "private" sphere in which religion(s) in secular society find domain, is a major concept in our theoretical model. Again, this is a function of the nature of the data from which this thesis was generated. Nonetheless, we feel that Berger and Luckmann's paradigm of society, religion and the individual provide an excellent framework in which to place novel and para-religious expressions. We therefore encourage future researchers in the science of religion to utilize such frameworks should they wish to give the objects of their study holistic significance.

In a more general sense, ours is a case study in social change, social structure and the implications these have for individuals in modern society. Though attempts have been made in the sociological community to portray the secular process as unilinear, unidirectional and, often, irreversible, our study demonstrates the need to consider the historical and cultural context of the various forms of secularity. In this respect, David Martin's theory of secularization was an invaluable typology that depicted the various structural manifestations of religion in the Western or Christian world.

REFERENCES

Balakrishnan, T.R., J.F. Kantner and J.D. Allingham
1975 FERTILITY AND FAMILY PLANNING IN A CANADIAN
METROPOLIS. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Berger, Peter and Thomas Luckmann
1966 THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY. New York:
Doubleday.

Berger, Peter L
1967 THE SACRED CANOPY; ELEMENTS OF A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
OF RELIGION. Garden City, New York: Doubleday.

Berger, Peter L., Brigitte Bergér and Hansfried Kellner
1973 THE HOMELESS MIND: MODERNIZATION AND CONSCIOUSNESS.
New York: Random House.

Bibby, Reginald W
1979 "Religion and Modernity: The Canadian Case." JOURNAL
FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION , 18(1): 1-17.

Crysdale, Stewart and Les Wheatcroft (eds.)
1976 RELIGION IN CANADIAN SOCIETY. Toronto: Macmillan.

Demerath, Nicholas J.
1965 SOCIAL CLASS IN AMERICAN PROTESTANTISM. Chicago: Rand
McNally.

Durkheim, Emile
1954 THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE. Glencoe,
Illinois: Free Press.

Fournier, Marcel and Louis Maheu
1975 "Nationalismes et Nationalisation du Champ Québécois."
SOCIOLOGIE ET SOCIÉTÉS , 7(2): 89-114.

Glock, Charles and Rodney Stark
1965 RELIGION AND SOCIETY IN TENSION. Chicago: Rand
McNally.

Glock, Charles and Robert Bellah
1976 THE NEW RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS. California: Berkeley
Press.

Gold, G. and M.A. Tremblay
1973 COMMUNITIES AND CULTURE IN FRENCH CANADA, Toronto:
Holt Rinehart and Winston.

Greeley, Andrew M.
1972 UNSECLAR MAN. New York: Schocken Books.

Guindon, Hubert
1983 "Quebec and the Canadian Question." Chapter 16 in AN
INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY. Edited by Michael M.
Rosenberg, William Shaffir, Allen Turowetz and Morton
Weinfeld. Toronto: Methuen.

Kyriazis, Natalie and J. Henripin
1983 "Women's Employment and Fertility in Quebec."
POPULATION STUDIES, 36: 431-440.

Lazerwitz, Bernard
1973 "Religious Identification and its Ethnic Correlates: A
Multivariate Model." SOCIAL FORCES , 52: 204-220.

Lenski, Gerhard
1966 THE RELIGIOUS FACTOR. New York: Doubleday.

Linteau, Paul Andre, Rene Durocher and Jean-Claude Robert
1983 QUEBEC, A HISTORY: 1867-1929. Translated by Robert
Chodos. Toronto: James Lorimer Company.

Luckmann, Thomas
1967 THE INVISIBLE RELIGION: THE PROBLEM OF RELIGION IN
MODERN SOCIETY. New York: Macmillan.

Martin, David
1978 A GENERAL THEORY OF SECULARIZATION. New York: Harper
Row.

- Mol, Hans
 1976 "Correlates of Churchgoing in Canada." RELIGION IN CANADIAN SOCIETY. Edited by Stewart Crysedale and Les Wheatcroft. Toronto: Macmillan.
- Moreux, Collette
 1973 "The End of Religion." COMMUNITIES AND CULTURE IN FRENCH CANADA. Edited by G. Gold and M.A. Tremblay. Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Nie, Norman H. et al.
 1975 STATISTICAL PACKAGE FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES. U.S.A.: McGraw-Hill.
- Proulx, Jean-Pierre
 1983 "Les pauvres, ont-ils fait de la religion leur bequille?" LE DEVOIR , (Montreal) March 31, 1983.
- Sevigny, Robert
 1976 "The Religious Experience of Youth in Quebec." RELIGION IN CANADIAN SOCIETY. Edited by Stewart Crysedale and Les Wheatcroft. Toronto: Macmillan.
- Shiner, Larry
 1967 "The Concept of Secularization in Empirical Research." JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION , 6(2): 207-220.
- Smelser, Neil
 1962 THEORY OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOUR. New York: Free Press.
- Statistics Canada
 1983 1981 CENSUS OF CANADA (93-X-941: PART I.). Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada.
- Weber, Max
 1958 THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM. New York: Scribner's.
- Westhues, Kenneth
 1976(a) "Religious Organization in Canada and the United States." INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE SOCIOLOGY , 17(3-4): 206- 225.

Westhues, Kenneth

1976(b) "The Adaptation of the Roman Catholic Church in Canadian Society". RELIGION IN CANADIAN SOCIETY. Edited by Stewart Crysedale and Les Wheatcroft. Toronto: Macmillan.

Westoff, Charles

1976 "The Secularization of U.S. Birth Control Practices." FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES , 9: 203-207.

Wuthnow, Robert

1980 "Recent Patterns of Secularization: a Problem of Generations." AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW , 41: 850-867.

Appendix

Percent Agreeing, Uncertain and Disagreeing with a
Positive Attitude toward Abortion by Religious
Attendance Controlling for Religious Denomination

Religious Attendance

Frequent

Infrequent

Cath. non-Cath.

Cath. non-Cath. No Rel

Positive Attitude
toward
Abortion

Agree	40.7	56.5	64.6	82.2	84.0
Unsure	11.5	4.3	3.9	4.4	0
Disagree	47.8	39.1	31.5	13.3	16.0
	(113)	(23)	(181)	(90)	(25)

First-Order Partial Gamma: $-.39$