HUSSELR'S THEORY OF EVIDENCE
A Study of Husserl's Phenomenological Reformulation of the Evidence Problematic

William J. Massicotte

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Abstract

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This is a detailed study of Husserl's theory of evidence. The theory of evidence is absolutely fundamental to Husserl's pure transcendental phenomenology. Despite this, it has been relatively ignored in the literature or confused with general problems.

In Chapter I, the intentional logic with which Husserl formulates the theory of evidence is reconstructed from the Logical Investigations. Chapter II analyses the merits and often unnoticed limits of the Cartesian formulation of the theory, as found in the Cartesian Meditations. Chapter III argues that the imagination and imaginative variation are the keys to understanding Husserl's theory and that the imagination plays a major role in epistemology and science.

Finally, Chapter IV contains some additional novel conclusions beyond those enumerated at the end of the preceding three chapters.
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my thesis director, Professor Dallas Laskey. In the spirit of philosophical collaboration so often called for by Husserl, Professor Laskey has given freely of his time, advice, and encouragement. It has been a privilege to be guided by a philosopher so deeply immersed in pure transcendental phenomenology.

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while on sabbatical leave.

Thanks are due to Professor Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka for inviting me to participate in the American Phenomenology Research Seminar, entitled "Evidence, Truth and Certainty Revisited," in the summer of 1978, and for the fellowship that made it possible. I should also like to thank her for the invitation to return in 1979, which I took as a unique compliment.

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The Post-Graduate Student Society of McGill University provided me with constant intellectual stimulation during the actual writing of the thesis. Since such contact is essential for intellectual work, I thank the Society, especially the staff of Thompson House.

Perhaps the single most important person in the whole process was my muse Mia, who suffered with me and remained loyal throughout. I would like to dedicate this work to our son, Matthew William.
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Abbreviations

In accordance with the norms of my discipline, I intend to use the following abbreviations of the texts of Husserl which I often cite.


Note

References with no text indicated are to the present work.
Introduction

1. The Centrality of the topic

The problem of evidence occupied Husserl throughout his long career. It is addressed in every introduction to phenomenology which he wrote. It is so basic, that there is difficulty isolating evidence as a distinct theme in his work.

Husserl's theory of evidence supplies phenomenologists with the basis upon which all claims made by phenomenologists are to be accepted or rejected. It is a radically reflexive theory. Husserl adjudicates even his own claims by appealing to his own set of criteria.

The claims of phenomenologists who use Husserlian style phenomenology must use his criteria of evidence and their claims can be judged in proportion to the extent that they meet his criteria. Given the centrality of this topic, it is singularly striking that there is very little literature on it. Granted, there are a few articles and indirect studies which will be mentioned, but in general, it is safe to say that the problem, for the most part, is ignored.

It is not safe to presume, however, that because it is ignored, it is well known. This thesis will explicate this topic which is fundamental for phenomenology.

2. Selection of primary sources focused upon

Husserl was a prodigious writer. It is simply impossible to address each and every work he wrote within the confines of this thesis. Some representative samples have been chosen which are available in English. I have chosen to emphasize the Logical Investigations (hereafter known as LI), Cartesian Meditations (CM) and Formal and Transcendental Logic (FTL). The justification for this is more complex than a reader might suspect. In the first place, since Husserl reworks problems from different angles, what he says in one text must be offset by readings in other texts. In the second place, Husserl himself once recommended to one of his better students, Dorion Cairns, that he first read the CM, then the latter part of the LI, then Ideas, and so on.¹

The suggestion that the LI can be read profitably only after gaining some understanding of phenomenology as Husserl formulated it, has proved invaluable. Throughout footnotes in later texts, Husserl refers to the LI in such a way as to suggest that he is reformulating and developing insights gained in writing that book. I will attempt to emphasize the degree to which later works use the work on intentionality which occurs in the LI and do so by giving an extended treatment of the salient features for the problem of evidence of the LI in my first chapter.

I have placed less emphasis on Ideas I since there are numerous indications of Husserl's dissatisfaction with that text.² However, I

¹Dorion Cairns, Conversations with Husserl and Fink, edited by the Husserl-Archives in Louvain, with a foreword by Richard M. Zaner (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), p. 3. See also pp. 6, 11, 19, 23 and 61.

have by no means ignored it. It has not been chosen for specific focus since many of the advantages that it possesses over the LI are similarly possessed by the CM. I am guided, however, by several critical notions found in Ideas I.

The bi-polar intentional structure stressed in Ideas I, and expressed as the theory of the neotic-noematic structures, is constantly before us. The fact that Husserl treats evidence under the general heading of the "phenomenology of the reason" was instrumental in the development of the reconstruction of the LI contained herein. Moreover, this famous expression regarding the primordiality of evidence drew my attention to the problem:

No theory we can conceive can mislead us in regard to the principle of all principles: that every primordial datum Intuition is a source of authority (Rechtsquelle) for knowledge, that whatever presents itself in "intuition" in primordial form (as it were in its bodily reality), is simply to be accepted as it gives itself out to be, though only within the limits in which it then presents itself.

The focus on the CM is required, since most English and French commentators rely extensively on this work. I will suggest in Chapter II that there are problems with over-emphasizing the formulation of phenomenology and the evidence problem as it occurs in the CM. These points will be re-emphasized in the early part of Chapter II along with some indication of the place of the shorter works, for example, The Idea of Phenomenology, and The Paris Lectures.

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2Ibid., pp. 379-403.
3Ibid., p. 92.
Perhaps work on *Ideas III* could have been included, but this work was not available in translation in time to be addressed in this thesis. Selections have been considered such as "The Method of Clarification" which was available and relevant.¹

*FTL* and *Experience and Judgement* (hereafter known as *EJ*) give an extensive treatment of the evidence question; however, it is often neglected in the literature.

*FTL* supplies a good indication of the role of the imagination in Husserl's transcendental reformulation of the evidence problem, so I devote Chapter III to explain this correction. It is clear to all readers of Husserl that many of the meanings of the themes associated with intentional, non-formal logic addressed in *FTL* have already been introduced in the *LI*, and that Husserl presumes familiarity with the *LI* on the part of those reading *FTL*. I will not readdress these themes in detail given their extensive treatment in Chapter I. It should be acknowledged that a modification in Husserl's style of thinking has occurred by the time he wrote *FTL*. There will not be a minute comparison of differences in the way intentional logic is formulated, but rather, some attempt to explain the rationale and justification for these modifications will be presented, which I conclude rests heavily on Husserl's use of imaginative variation.

3. Some basic distinctions

There is a basic distinction which must be made in order to understand both Husserl's work and this thesis. I will outline it here, but I will not claim to have defended its plausibility to critics outside of phenomenology.

a. When Husserl speaks about evidence, he does not mean verification as it occurs in science, or evidence in the legal sense. A commentator who specifically makes this point is David Hemmendinger:

Evidence in Husserl's sense of the word should not be confused with evidence for some state-of-affairs; there is evidence for something precisely when that thing is not itself present but is suggested or indicated by something else, which means that it is not evident.

In philosophy of science as conceived by the heirs of positivism, evidence is understood as the basis of confirmation of a scientific hypothesis.² Philosophers spend a great deal of time with the problem as it is conceived to occur in a scientific practice, but rarely apply the same scrutiny to their own statements. This is the reflexive dilemma which Husserl addresses. To be blunt, let us consider Popper's interesting and well known criteria of falsification. We would have to ask whether Popper's own claims meet his own criteria. If they do

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¹ David Hemmendinger, "Husserl's concepts of evidence and science," The Monist 59, no. 1 (January 1975): 82.

² For treatment of the problem as it is usually conceived, see Clark Glymour, Theory and Evidence, Limited Paperback editions (Princeton: University Press, 1980), especially Chapter V on "Theory and evidence", p. 110:

Like Carnap and Reichenbach in the 1930's I think our evidence provides instances of theoretical claims, and that these instances are deduced from the evidence by using other theoretical claims; unlike them, I do not think that there is a special privileged class of theoretical claims - the analytic truths, or the coordinating definitions - that connect evidence and theory.

See also pages 148-149 in the same work.
not, then upon what are they based? I suggest that Husserl recognizes this subtle reflexive problem, which Popper fails to notice.

b. It must be acknowledged that Husserl's theory of evidence can not be conceived of as offering a substitute for normally conceived scientific verification. It is arguable that we cannot specify what "normally conceived scientific verification" is in such a way that it applies to all cases. What I mean is that Husserl's theory does not offer us a specific technique to, say, measure the exact amount of oxygen in a given volume of air, or any other type of measuring procedure occurring in science as it is normally conceived. Husserl always respects de facto scientific practice, and is concerned with the transcendental justification regarding the possibility of knowledge. He takes this to be the neglected question of the philosophical foundations for our knowledge claims.

This distinction is fundamental and difficult to systematically retain while assessing Husserl's work. It hinges on his well known view regarding the crisis in our understanding. Therefore I insist that the second part of this basic distinction revolves around his notion that we can conceive of disciplined understanding as a whole with non self-sufficient members within this whole. This of course is his notion of phenomenology as a science. Much confusion can be avoided if we do not look for a model of understanding based on one non-self-sufficient member science. This is the idea of pure phenomenology as a first order discipline and not a derivative discipline from one instance of de facto successful knowledge acquisition.

It is clear that Husserl misleads many readers with his statements regarding the crisis in European sciences and science in general. Apart from variations of the meaning assigned to science in Europe,
and Germany specifically, some of the confusion is easily resolved
by attending to Husserl's repeated statements distinguishing his
work from the de facto sciences. Consider that it is therefore
at least plausible to view the crisis as a residing in our philosophical
understanding of the sciences as non self-sufficient members within
the postulated regulative whole or reason and disciplined study which
we 'are at this moment imagining'.

Following this line of thought, the crisis must rest not in
any current methodological problem in one given science, but rather,
in our philosophical understanding, and even in the individual scientist's
philosophical understanding of his own discipline. Here the scientist
is functioning as a philosopher the moment he enters into such
considerations.

Helen Longino's article, "Evidence and hypothesis: an analysis
of evidential relations" is formulated outside of the phenomenological
tradition and clearly indicates the non-phenomenological conception of
the problem. She lists three evidential relations:

1. a relation between a sentence describing a state
   of affairs said to be evidence and a sentence, the
   hypothesis, for which the state of affairs is said
to be evidence;

2. a relation between a state of affairs said to be
   evidence and another state of affairs described
   by a hypothesis for which the former is said to be
   evidence;

3. a relation between a state of affairs said to be
   evidence and a statement or proposition, the hypo-
   thesis, for which the former is said to be evidence.

Please refer to Chapter III of this thesis. I would argue that
any reader can imagine such a whole of reason even if we cannot specify
what this whole is like in detail.

Helen Longino, "Evidence and hypothesis: an analysis of
evidential relations," Philosophy of Science 46 (March 1979): 35-56.

Ibid., p. 36.
She goes on to claim:

It can be argued that precisely what distinguishes scientific reasoning from ordinary, everyday reasoning is that in scientific inquiry inferences relying on hidden background assumptions are disallowed.¹

From within the phenomenological framework we would have to argue that one can try to disallow assumptions; this is impossible in the naive framework, since a mode of constituting the problem addressed is a major feature of intentional consciousness and consequently of scientific consciousness. In fact, background beliefs and assumptions are the philosophical components of reasoning and Husserl's idea is to specify how to make them explicit.

4. Scholarly justifications

The absence of dependable literature on evidence considered from within the phenomenological framework is one good reason serving to justify this thesis. If, moreover, an ability to adjudicate claims within phenomenology is dependent on some mastery of the evidence problematic², then there is even stronger need for a study such as the present one.

The literature is often critical and, to my way of thinking, confused.³ Consider Spiegelberg's statement at the end of his early exposition:

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¹Ibid., p.42.

²Problematic is probably a better expression than problem, since a problem can be clearly stated, and something is problematic if the appropriate mode of formulating the problem is not yet clear.

³See for example, V.J. McGill's article, "Evidence in Husserl's phenomenology," Phenomenology, continuation and criticism: essays in memory of Dorian Cairns Phaenomenologica 50 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), 145-166. The article basically says that the author did understand the problem and suggests that mind-brain identity theory might be a better solution.
I am, however, quite prepared to admit that this does not constitute any absolute guarantee with regard to the world of non-subjectival reality-phenomena.

And also:

I do not claim that this analysis disposes of all possible objections against the trustworthiness of self-evidence as a test of truth. The most radical objection left would be: Suppose there is such a phenomenon as that of genuine self-evidence in the sense of unimpeded accessibility and apparent self-presence; what guarantee is there that it is supported by real self-evidence, that what is supposedly accessible and self-present, is actually in our hands?

Speigelberg in this early article has raised the problem of how to know when we have self-evidence. Herein I try to outline how to acquire self-evidence from within the intentional framework.

Levin provides a survey of the theory, but his rejection of its basic components is extremely clear:

The conclusion of our critique is that the ideal of apodicticity can never be anything but an illegitimate and, indeed, subversive pretension for the phenomenological enterprise.

Levin might have considered such a rejection to be extremely subtle; however, since apodicticity is the first step towards adequacy (cf. Chapter II), Levin (unwittingly) is, in effect, rejecting Husserl outright. There are numerous studies which touch upon the theory of evidence by emphasizing one element or one formulation. The only sympathetic study that is exclusively on evidence and attempts to be thorough is Hemmendinger's ambitious and thoughtful study, an

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2Ibid., p. 451.
3Levin, Reason and Evidence, p. xxv.
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, quoted earlier.¹

Herein I emphasize that evidence as a topic is first addressed in the LI and would suggest that is probably cannot be understood without study of that work. I emphasize that Husserl's work on the evidence problem cannot be understood solely in terms of the CM and I suggest that the key to understanding evidence as an acquisition rests in Husserl's work on imaginative variation which has its best expression in FTL.

Other features of the theory inadequately emphasized in the literature which I focus on herein are:

1. The intentional character of evidence. It is the bi-polar component which is expressed in each treatment that Husserl gives the problem.

2. Evidence is a performance on the part of a possible reflective subject.

3. Evidence is always a matter of degree (cf. fulfillment in my Chapter I) and that while Husserl is seeking to specify absolutely dependable philosophical understanding, it is essential to such a degree of rigour that revisability of naive levels of apodicticity be possible. Therefore, that it is misleading to reject Husserl on the basis of naive absolutism.²

¹A review of the relevant literature indirectly concerned with the problem of evidence is indicated in footnotes throughout this thesis. There are, however, some good articles, such as Henry Pietersma, "Husserl's views on the evident and the true", Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals, edited with introductions by Frederick A. Elliston and Peter McCormick, forward by Paul Ricoeur (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), 38-53.

4. Evidence as a progressive acquisition requires the use of imagination on the part of actual subjects engaged in philosophizing (cf. Chapter III) and that this is the key to understanding the distinction between apodictic and adequate evidence.

5. The unifying theme is that phenomenology conceived of as radical self-clarification makes it possible to view the development of Husserl's thought as it moves from the LI to CM to FTL as engaged in such clarification. Thus, it makes sense that Husserl uses the results of the LI as a starting point for such clarification. In these aspects of this thesis I am engaged in commentary, but I would argue that scholarly commentary is one of the legitimate tasks of those who follow (historically) great philosophers such as Husserl.

6. Lastly, I suggest that there is merit in organizing a reading of Husserl around one central theme, and that the theme of evidence is perhaps the most elusive one, but arguably the most profitable. I also suggest tacitly throughout the thesis that philosophers cannot do phenomenology in Husserl's style without understanding this theme.
CHAPTER I

The initial statement of the theory of evidence as it occurs in the Logical Investigations.

1. An Overview of the Text

The Logical Investigations is an enormously complex and rich work; hence, a number of basic features of the text are not readily apparent: the topic of the text, its structure, and its overriding aim. Accordingly, an overview is called for in advance of even a fairly detailed explication of its major themes. This is necessary to do historical justice to the text, and to avoid systematic misinterpretation; based on philosophical predispositions.¹

At the outset, we must question any tendency to read the LI as a commentary on formal mathematical logic, despite the title and an awareness of Husserl's background in mathematics and logic. It could have been entitled the "Intentional-Logical Investigations", if my interpretation is correct. It will emerge in this chapter that Husserl uses logic as a point of departure for a broader philosophical project.² It will also become clear that other points of departure have been used to cover similar ground in Husserl's later texts.

The LI has also been characterized as a sustained attempt to remove the error of psychologism, as a response to Frege's work contra


²There is a jurisdictional dispute here, I would argue.
the Philosophy of Arithmetic. If Husserl had not recognized this error, he could not have fruitfully engaged in the project contained in the LI, but this is not the sole theme of the LI.

What the text is clearly concerned with is to explain the idea of knowledge in a philosophically appropriate fashion. As Husserl himself characterizes it:

Its aim is not to explain knowledge in the psychological or psychophysical sense as a factual occurrence in objective nature, but to shed light on the Idea of knowledge in its constitutive elements and laws.1

What this amounts to is the attempt to construct a phenomenological theory of knowledge.2 This project involves the attempt to render 'knowledge itself intelligible'3 and in order to arrive at such intelligibility, the essence of knowing must be characterized. The essence of knowledge is co-extensive with an explication of the invariant features of the idea of knowledge. Husserl's contention is that any idea of knowledge necessarily contains an idea of evidence. Hence, the theory of evidence emerges as a necessary part of any acceptable theory of knowledge.

The structure of the text of the Logical Investigations mirrors


2Note regarding Marvin Farber's The Foundation of Phenomenology: Edmund Husserl and the Quest for a Rigorous Science of Philosophy, revised 3rd edition, (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1943). It has been suggested by some of my readers that this work is relevant here. I would argue that this work of 1943 is largely out of date. It served as a substitute (albeit poor) full translation of the LI, but a full translation of the LI has been available since 1970. Farber's work is an undependable exposition and has been superceded by that of people like Mohanty and Sokolowski. See for example, Readings on Edmund Husserl's Logical Investigations, ed. by J.N. Mohanty, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977).

3Ibid., 2:804. Cf. Ideas I.
its topic. In doing so, there is a progression through the investigations towards Investigation VI. Husserl himself indicates that "the sixth investigation is the most extensive, most mature in content, and probably also the most fruitful one of the entire book."¹ This statement is indicative of the self-conscious hierarchy occurring in the Logical Investigations. The notion of hierarchy that I am using is derived from Husserl's characterization of phenomenology as reflexive self-clarification.

The approach adopted in this chapter takes into account the aim of the Logical Investigations as a whole, that is, to arrive at an adequate theory of knowledge and evidence in a progressive fashion through the investigations. This necessitates sketching the content of the earlier investigations only insofar as they are relevant to the problem.

The critical reconstruction of the Logical Investigations focuses on the integration of the hierarchy of explanation² which occurs

² I am using the term hierarchy here. Husserl uses the expression "zigzag", which is the one David Hemmendinger uses to guide his investigations in "Husserl's concepts of evidence and science", The Monist 59 (January 1975): 81-97, particularly p.82.

Suzanne Bachelard applies the zigzag notion in A Study of Husserl's Formal and Transcendental Logic, translated by Lester E. Embree, Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968). I am deriving my notion of reflexively clarifying hierarchy from Husserl's zigzag notion, and from Bachelard's statements, such as the following:

The investigation in Formal and Transcendental Logic does indeed zigzag, as can be seen in the numerous recurring advances: a cycle of investigations leads to results which enable us to advance in the understanding of logic. But, while proceeding in this way, one acquires new results, which lead, in turn, to a more profound analysis than that which was previously completed. Possessed of these new means of analysis, one is to go back over the preceding results, which were only provisional, (p. 80-81).
with the theory of evidence itself. Thus, the reconstruction itself constitutes an argument that the Logical Investigations progressively explicates the criteria of adequate knowledge. The theory is formulated in terms of concepts derived in the earlier investigations (i.e., I through IV). The prerequisite concepts will be treated only insofar as they are necessary to understand the theory of evidence proper. The interrelation between each topic addressed in the Logical Investigations will be illustrated in the critical reconstruction.

The Logical Investigations is often characterized as originating from the eidetic stage of the Husserlian project;¹ and it is often viewed as an immature work, or a precritical work because of this.² Consequently, it is often given cursory treatment with reference to the problem of evidence. David Levin, for example, devotes a scant sixteen pages to the Logical Investigations throughout the course of the work and in the abstract of 1901. However, in Formal and Transcendental Logic Husserl indicates that he agrees with the central features of the theory of evidence as it is expressed in the Logical Investigations.

I do not find that sufficient attention has been paid to the clarification of evidence and of all the pertinent relationships between mere "intention"and "fulfillment" , which was first effected in the Logische Untersuchungen, II. Teil, and deepened in my Ideen. ... still I believe that I am right in seeing in this first clarification a decisive advance of phenomenology beyond the philosophic past.³

¹ Husserl, Introduction to the Logical Investigations, p. 17.
The *Logical Investigations* is regarded by Husserl as a decisive advance\(^1\), despite the fact that it lacks clarity in many areas. Therefore, as the first statement of the theory of evidence, the *Logical Investigations* needs be addressed prior to the later texts. It is noteworthy that the sixth investigation was rewritten as late as 1920.\(^2\)

This serves as an indication of the unity of the Husserlian project throughout the corpus. While the critical exposition of the *Logical Investigations* may appear to be excessively long, it must be borne in mind that the LI is a work of 869 extremely dense pages filled with distinctions, many of which are used in Husserl's later works. One of the arguments of this thesis is that the later works function as commentaries and clarifications of themes introduced in the LI.

The objection is often raised against the LI that it cannot be relevant to transcendental phenomenology proper, due to the absence of the reduction. I draw the reader's attention to Husserl's following statement:


What is new in the *Logical Investigations* is found not at all in the merely ontological investigations, which had a one-sided influence contrary to the innermost sense of the work, but rather in the subjectivity directed investigations (above all the fifth and sixth, in the second volume of 1901) in which, for the first time, the cogitata qua cogitata, as essential moments of each conscious experience as it is given in genuine inner experience, come into their own and immediately come to dominate the whole method of intentional analysis. Thus "self-evidence" (that petrified logical idol) is made a problem there for the first time, freed from the privilege given to scientific evidence and broadened to mean original self-giving in general.

\(^2\) Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, 2:661. This is one of the justifications for writing this thesis.
An epistemological investigation that can seriously claim to be scientific must, it has often been emphasized, satisfy the principle of freedom from presuppositions. This principle, we think, only seeks to express the strict exclusion of all statements not permitting of a comprehensive phenomenological realization. Every epistemological investigation that we carry out must have its pure foundation in phenomenology.

In my Chapter II, I will suggest that the reduction be interpreted as a more elegant condensation of many results already achieved in the LI. If I am correct in my interpretation, then a suitable alternative placing of the LI results. Insofar as my reconstruction stresses the centrality of the LI without rejecting transcendental phenomenology, my reconstruction is very different from the remarks of commentators such as Maurice Natanson:

But whatever doubt may linger about an "existential" interpretation of Husserl, there is no question about the secondary status given to the Logical Investigations in this study...It is not that I see nothing in Husserl's logic or that I find no credible connection between phenomenology and linguistic philosophy. Rather, it is that I read the early Husserl as a prelude to transcendental philosophy--precisely the turn which the admirers of the Logical Investigations think brought phenomenology to grief and which the votaries of linguistic analysis find offensive.

Lastly, I caution the reader that what follows is not an exposition. For purposes of the reconstruction I am guided by the later texts. Therefore, herein there is an argument that these are the elements of the LI relevant to the more developed phenomenology found in Husserl's later works, and that these are the elements subjected to sense-clarification.

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1 Husserl, Logical Investigations, 1:263.
2. The Emerging Reflexive Hierarchy of Explanation in the Logical Investigations

In volume one of the German edition of the Logical Investigations, Husserl sets the context within which a pure phenomenology is to be formulated. He entitles this section a "Prolegomena to pure logic". The sense Husserl assigns to the expression 'logic' must be clarified since he uses the term in two distinct ways: the first use refers to formal or mathematical logic, and the second use refers to pure logic. The notion of pure logic has its origins in Leibniz's notion of mathesis universalis. While Husserl does not identify phenomenology as mathesis universalis, the distinction between the two uses of the expression 'logic' serves to differentiate formal logic from pure phenomenology. Husserl's purpose in the Prolegomena is not to attempt to replace or criticize mathematical logic.

The following critical reconstruction of the stages of the investigations preceding Investigation VI will be seen as useful in arriving at a manageable conception of the theory of evidence. Husserl mentions necessary aspects of evidence in a cursory fashion throughout the Prolegomena, and Investigations I through V; however, evidence is not made specifically thematic until the sixth Investigation.

The sixth Investigation is the most important and the most highly concentrated section of the Logical Investigations. It utilizes conclusions regarding signification, expression, perception, meaning,

intentionality, and consciousness (among other concepts), which Husserl develops in the preceding investigations. Husserl indicates a familiarity with the available literature on formal logic, and although he does not give a detailed review of this literature, he does indicate full approval for the project of rendering logic scientific by thoroughly formalizing and mathematizing it. In point of fact, he clearly states that such a project, even in its embryonic form found in Leibniz, stirred a certain sympathy in him. He emphatically agrees, moreover, with an early German logician who attributed to logic an absolute validity for every rational, thinking being, whether or not the rest of his constitution agrees with ours or not.\textsuperscript{1,2}

Husserl is of the firm opinion that if a logical relation \( A \) is a valid one, it is possible for any rational creature to ascertain its validity.\textsuperscript{3} This can be established with philosophical self-evidence.

Since Husserl does not naively dismiss the importance of formal logic, it cannot be argued that he is engaging in an attempt to establish an alternate set of logical principles based on transcendental philosophizing, (i.e., mathematical logic is retained).

If it is claimed that modern logic or some branch of modern logic succeeds in doing what Husserl attempts in the LI, it indicates a failure to appreciate that while Husserl was aware of the advantages


\textsuperscript{3} Ibid, 1:190.
of pursuing mathematical logic, he self-consciously chose an alternate project for himself. He takes this project to be fully compatible with mathematical logic, and does not, in any way, see it as a possible replacement.

Although mathematical logic has developed since 1901, Husserl's position is not inconsistent with a further development of mathematical logic, and, indeed, he sees the development as inevitable. It is possibly because Husserl sees the viability and universality of the theorems of logic, that he wants to understand the nature of the understanding which is capable of generating such important and broadly applicable theorems.

These observations facilitate a critical assessment of phenomenological literature. Not only Husserl's critics, but also his apparent supporters have missed or ignored this position on logic qua logic. These apparent supporters occasionally imply that logic and its various sub-disciplines are a trite enterprise, and they would lead us to believe that support for their position can be found in Husserl. While this may be the position of an individual philosopher calling himself a phenomenologist, it is certainly not consistent with Husserl's views, and this should be kept clearly in mind.

His position as indicated above and clearly stated in the text.

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1 We have no indication that Husserl loses the respect he has for logic in later stages of his career. Occasionally, he may refer to logic as naive, but he means this in a technical, and certainly not in a pejorative, sense. By *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, Husserl clearly assigns the following status to formal logic: it is properly understood formal ontology. He means that it can be retrospectively understood as characterizing the pure relations among pure objects. The implication is that it can be accurately constituted as metaphysics in this sense.
is that "a division of labor is necessary." The techniques and theorems of logic must be derived by the logician, but the philosopher still has the possible task of performing analysis to determine the implications of the logician's work. This is analogous to the relationship between mathematics and the philosophy of mathematics. Both are separate and viable enterprises, and while occasionally both enterprises may be performed by the same individual in his career, they still remain separate, and one cannot replace the other. The philosopher can reflect upon mathematics, and provide certain clarifications that the pure mathematician might not be inclined to pursue; similarly, Husserl's position is that a philosopher doing philosophy in Husserl's fashion, can reflect upon logic (among other things) for purposes of uncovering implications for which the logician qua logician might not be inclined to look.

It is not the mathematician, but the philosopher, who oversteps his legitimate sphere when he attacks 'mathematizing' theories of logic, and refuses to hand over his temporary foster-children to their natural parents. The scorn with which philosophical logicians like to speak of mathematical theories of inference, does not alter the fact that the mathematical form of treatment is in their case (as in the case of all strictly developed theories in the proper sense of the word) the only scientific one, the only one that offers us systematic closure and completeness, and a survey of all possible questions together with the possible forms of their answers. 

There are some intrinsic limitations, it would appear, to what a philosopher can legitimately do. However, Husserl is quite sure that logic, for example, is not co-extensive with philosophy, just

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1 Husserl, Logical Investigations, 1:244. Marvin Farber uses "logical pluralism" for this division which I find misleading. See Farber's Foundation of Phenomenology: Edmund Husserl and the quest for a rigorous science of philosophy, 3rd edition revised. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1943).

2 Husserl, Logical Investigations, 1:244.
as logic and science are not co-extensive with the field of knowledge as a whole. Logic is normative in a certain limited sense with regard to the sciences, but this does not mean that the sciences are merely a part of the discipline of logic.

The particular patterns of combination of the concepts, propositions and truths which form the ideal unity of a particular science, can of course only be called 'logical', in so far as they are instances falling under logic. They do not belong among the actual parts of logic.

In a similar fashion, Husserl claims that his pure phenomenology is normative in regard to philosophical understanding. While this is a very strong claim in itself, Husserl implicitly retains the possibility of revising, improving, and achieving further clarity regarding those propositions which his phenomenology generates at any one time. Clearly his programmatic statements concerning what ought to follow his own work, and his characterization of virtually every major text as an introduction to phenomenology, indicate that the criteria of revisability or something like falsification \(^2\) is an essential feature of his work. It emerges that the attempt to construct a rigorous theory of knowledge must incorporate a provision for revisability. Perhaps ironically to those unfamiliar with Husserl, revisability is an essential feature of evidence.

There is nothing novel in observing that philosophers have made very different claims throughout the history of philosophy, and Husserl takes this to be highly problematic, as did Descartes. It

\(^1\)Ibid., 1:186

\(^2\)Cf. Popper's criteria of falsification. Husserl's work is not a dogmatic theory, since it specifies revision and moreover, it requires this of all phenomenology and all philosophy be guided by the idea of science, that is, reason.
is problematic since we ought to be able to determine the quality of philosophical propositions, while allowing the possibility of modifying our position on the basis of further philosophical investigation.¹ Suggesting that any theory of philosophical evidence must have the criteria of revisability as one of its essential features, is novel, insofar as propositions judged to meet the criteria of self-evidence must be repeatable. The Logical Investigations uses formal logic as a point of departure, since at least some principles of logic are repeatable. The reflections on formal logic are characterized as a philosophical transformation utilizing a priori reflection which is not psychological, and by which the certainty which is contained therein, can be generalized.

A little reflection will make matters clear. Every law of pure logic permits of an (inwardly evident) transformation, possible a priori, which allows one to read off certain propositions about inward evidence, certain conditions of inward evidence, from it.²

Husserl argues that logic can be misunderstood when viewed from an empirical standpoint; psychologism is an instance of such misunderstanding. Philosophical reflection aids us in ascertaining that evidence is not possessed in an adequate fashion in the absence of meeting the repeatability criteria. The repeatability of evidence indicates a certain qualitative difference in our level of understanding.

¹André de Muralt, The Idea of Phenomenology: Husserlian Exemplarism, trans. Garry L. Breckon, Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), p. 226. André de Muralt observes that the decideability of judgement is the ideal anticipation of its effective adequation. The notion of quality is central unless we wish to claim that one true proposition is replaced by another true proposition, where both have the same referent.

²Ibid., 1:189.
Understandably so, since there evidently is a general equivalence between the proposition A is true and it is possible for anyone to judge A to be true in an inwardly evident manner.

The fruitfulness of purely philosophical reflections upon logic can be taken as an example that further understanding is possible beyond the mastery of a technique. In a similar fashion, mastery of the techniques used in empirical investigation is not taken to be co-extensive with a complete understanding of the empirical sciences.

Many of the most fruitful and characteristic methods of the most advanced sciences, only achieve satisfactory intelligibility if we look to the peculiarities of our mental constitution. As Mach excellently remarks on this point: 'To do mathematics without achieving clearness in this regard, is often to have the disagreeable impression that one's paper and pencil are cleverer than oneself.'

The possibility of utilizing rigorous philosophical reflection to improve our understanding of the accomplishments in logic, mathematics and science constitute a forceful argument for the necessity of philosophy in general, and for the necessity of a philosophy of science in particular. According to this view, Husserlian phenomenology can make a contribution to a possible philosophy of science. Substantiating this possibility is outside the scope of this thesis, but is a theme worth bearing in mind with respect to the topic of evidence.

The theory of knowledge of which evidence is a necessary part,

1Ibid., 1:190.
2Ibid., 1:201, quoting Ernst Mach, Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklung (Prague, 1883), p.460.
is not attempting to construct a proof of a factual, but of a general truth.¹ The Husserlian project is to arrive at a highly abstract formulation of what he calls 'laws', which have the jurisdiction over what will constitute explanatory grounds. Here the term 'jurisdiction' is used in a quasi-Kantian fashion, and it indicates the transcendental nature of this project in general, even at the stage of the Logical Investigations. Its proposed comprehensiveness necessitates an extreme level of abstraction. It does not, however, propose to be comprehensive in the sense of dictating in detail how a specific field of knowledge, for example, mathematics, acquires proofs or evidence from within that context. Husserl at the stage of the Logical Investigations is not proposing that there is one type of evidence appropriate for every discipline, or that there is an ideal unity of all possible evidences in all possible fields over which his theory of evidence functions in a normative and detailed sense.²

There is an implicit notion of horizon,³ wherein the mode of verification in a specific area of investigation will be dictated, in part, by the results attained in that discipline. In other words, Husserl would agree, that it is impossible to try to anticipate every concrete development in the sciences on a priori grounds. However, he would also agree that certain highly abstract, formal relations found in formal logic are normative in the sense that no possible science can

¹Husserl, Logical Investigations, 1:228.
²Ibid., 1:229-241.
³The notion is not explicit in the LI. Horizon is a decidedly more elegant notion which Husserl later develops to better express complete fulfillment and adequation.
uncover empirical evidence to falsify them; for example, the law of contradiction cannot be falsified (perhaps a conception of the law can be). Further, no intelligible science can be constructed which explicitly contravenes the law of contradiction. This statement of the status of the law of contradiction ought in no way to offend logicians or scientists, and the explicit indications of its normative status is an example of the kind of clarification and knowledge which Husserl thinks appropriate for a philosopher to pursue. In order to pursue such knowledge, the philosopher himself needs some guidelines; Husserl is contributing to the formation of these guidelines with his work on evidence.

It is not therefore enough that the Ideas of logic, and the pure laws set up with them, should be given in such a manner. Our great task is now to bring the Ideas of logic, the logical concepts and laws, to epistemological clarity and definiteness.

Here phenomenological analysis must begin. Logical concepts, as valid thought unities, must have their origin in intuition: they must arise out of an ideational intuition founded on certain experiences, and must admit of indefinite reconfirmation, and of recognition of their self-identity, on the reperformance of such abstraction.

3. Meaning, Sign, Signification and Expression

The theory of evidence in the Logical Investigations claims that if we have a meaningful assertion which is fulfilled by experience and accompanied by self-critical insight, then we can have self-evidence. Evidence of this caliber can occur only in the philosophical

1Ibid., 1:251-252.
2In Findlay's translation of the Logical Investigations, two variations of the spelling of the word fulfillment occur, i.e., 'fulfillment' and 'fulfilment'. The American spelling has been adopted in the thesis, except in cases of direct quotation which may be of either spelling.
arena. Evidence is defined (partially) as a characteristic of propositions. A proposition is an act of asserting the content or matter of an experience. This preliminary statement of the theory of evidence is offered as a guideline to the critical exposition continued below. It is too early yet to assess the argument, but this formulation will be returned to, and supplemented.

In order to understand the theory of the idea of evidence, we first require a notion of signification. A meaningful sign is an expression which is part of speech. Not all signs are meaningful. Other signs, such as facial gestures, while indicating a communicative intent, can not be reflected upon for philosophical purposes unless the experience of the gesture is rendered into an expression in speech.\(^1\) While significations in general are important within the context of the world in general, for our philosophical purposes only those significations which have been rendered into speech are important, in the sense that they can lead us towards truth, or evidential acquisition.

Acts of signification are not exhausted in their application for the purpose of acquiring knowledge; however, that a certain class of acts of signification must necessarily play a role in this project, is taken to be clear.\(^2\)

We are, accordingly, only interested in those significations to which we give expression, and it seems clear that we can verbally express virtually every kind of phenomena relevant to attaining philosophical knowledge, for example: judgements, surmises, questions,

\(^1\)Ibid., 1:278.
\(^2\)Ibid., 2:715.
wishes, and so forth. The argument continues that:

The expressive role of speech lies, accordingly, not in mere words, but in expressive acts; these create for the correlated acts to be expressed by them a new expressive material in which they can be given thinking-expression, the general essence of which constitutes the meaning of the speech-form in question. The importance of this statement is that any acquisition of evidence must involve those types of signitive acts which are meaningful. Signs must be signs of something, that is, they must have an object, at least in principle.

A sign emerges from the act of signifying something. If this holds, then the project of constructing an adequate theory of evidence can scarcely ignore the phenomena of signification. Moreover, this phenomena will occur in the process of arriving at such a theory, or any other attempt to acquire philosophical understanding. The upshot of these remarks is that according to Husserlian phenomenology, no legitimate philosophizing can occur outside the arena of meaningful speech acts.

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1 See my note in Chapter III 6.1 on arguments.
2 Husserl, Logical Investigations, 2:675.
3 A name is an instance of signification: "A name, e.g. names its object whatever the circumstances, in so far as it means that object. But if the object is not intuitively before one, and so not before one as a named or meant object, mere meaning is all there is to it. If the originally empty meaning-intention is now fulfilled, the relation to an object is realized, the naming becomes an actual, conscious relation between name and object named." (Ibid., 1:280-281).
4 A meaningful sign is an expression which is part of speech: "Such a definition excluded facial expression and the various gestures which involuntarily accompany speech without communicative intent, or those in which a man's mental states achieve understandable 'expression' for his environment, without the added help of speech...Such 'expressions' in short, have properly speaking, no meaning." (Ibid., 1:275). Note: Husserl acknowledges his 'violence to usage'.
Even this seemingly obvious claim must be thoroughly investigated, in order to meet the critical requirements of rigorous philosophizing, which is guided by the ideal of being free from presuppositions. Husserl attempts to do precisely this in the first of the Logical Investigations which is entitled "Expression and Meaning".

The importance of the role of expression has been indicated above, but its relation to meaning deserves greater attention. Within the context of twentieth century philosophy, it is not particularly novel to think in terms of speech acts and accordingly, what Husserl calls 'expressive acts'. However, characterizing the phenomena of meaning as an activity, or an act, is novel.

For an act to be an expression, then, according to Husserl, meaning-conferring acts, or meaning-intentions, must be present. In other words, meaningful signs are meaningful by virtue of acts which confer sense upon them.\(^1\) Yet, clearly, expressions mean something, as Husserl is well aware; but he does not straightforwardly see meaning to be a function of reference. Within the whole phenomena of meaning, he sees two poles, both of which are acts, properly speaking; the meaning-conferring acts on the one hand, and the meaning-fulfilling acts on the other.

We shall, on the one hand, have acts essential to the expression if it is to be an expression at all, i.e., a verbal sound infused with sense. These acts we shall call the meaning-conferring acts or the meaning-intentions. But we shall, on the other hand, have acts, not essential to the expression as such, which stand to it in the logically basic relation of fulfilling (confirming, illustrating) it more or less adequately, and so actualizing its relation to its object.\(^2\)

\(^1\)Ibid., 1:281.
\(^2\)Ibid., 1:281.
Again we have an instance of the reflexive nature of the Husserlian project. The earlier results are used to continue the investigations. Phenomenology has itself as a topic, and continuous investigation and clarification of the meaning of the assertions it makes is one of its guiding motifs. This applies equally to the investigation into the meaning phenomena itself.

One should not, therefore, properly say (as one often does) that an expression expresses its meaning (its intention). One might more properly adopt the alternative way of speaking according to which the fulfilling act appears as the act expressed by the complete expression: we may, e.g. say, that a statement 'gives expression' to an act of perceiving or imagining.

Everyone's personal experience bears witness to the differing weight of the two constituents, which reflects the asymmetry of the relation between an expression and the object which (through its meaning) it expresses or names.\(^2\)

The relationship between meaning and reference cannot be determined on the basis of prior ontological commitments concerning the furniture of the world.\(^3\) It must first be described in the most

\(^1\)Ibid., 1:281.
\(^2\)Ibid., 1:282.
\(^3\)I think Iso Kern is attempting the impossible when he suggests that there is a way to Husserlian style phenomenology through ontology: According to Husserl, the ontology of the life-world is the most fundamental—the one to which all other ontologies ultimately refer back in some way or other. Hence it forms the most basic point of departure for the way through ontology. But it is an idea of the late Husserl. (p. 137)


Even Husserl's later works which clarify the sedimented components in our meaning-conferring acts are conducted in an ontologically neutral fashion.
philosophically neutral fashion possible.

... an expression only refers to an objective correlate because it means something, it can be rightly said to signify or name the object through its meaning. An act of meaning is the determinate manner in which we refer to our objective of the moment, though this mode of significant reference and the meaning itself can change while the objective reference remains fixed.

The problem of objective reference is also subjected to an investigation with the goal of determining its sense. It ought to be borne in mind, that Husserl periodically characterizes phenomenology in general as 'sense' or 'meaning investigations'.

The act-analysis of meaning investigates 'what is contained in our meanings' in a totally different sense. Here alone such a mode of expression is appropriate: meanings are reflected upon and made objects of investigation, their real parts and forms are enquired into, not what is true of their objects.

What Husserl is trying to indicate here is that phenomenology as meaning investigation constitutes and enormously complex field of study. Clearly, what must be ascertained is the objective referent for the expression 'meaning' itself. This referent, or what Husserl characterizes as 'fulfilling acts', presupposes a critical assessment of the notions of species and abstraction, among other things.

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1 Similarly, Guido Küng, in his article "The Phenomenological Reduction as Époché and Explication", Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals, ed. by Elliston and McCormick, pp. 338-349, seems to ignore Husserl's expanded concept of experience and perception which I outline below.

But then the specific weakness of inner experience must also be taken into account; namely, one must check the account based on inner experience and see that it harmonizes with the convictions based on external perception. (p. 348).

If we compare this to Husserl's statement quoted above, Küng's attempts to strengthen epistemological statements by reference to external perception considered in an ontologically committed sense, minimally places Küng outside of transcendental phenomenology as Husserl conceives it.

2 Husserl, Logical Investigations, 1:289.

3 Ibid., 1:401.
Pure phenomenological identification and distinction, combination and separation, as well as generalizing abstraction, will lead us on to the essential species and forms of meaning: one will get down, in other words, to the logically elementary concepts which are merely the idealized forms of primitive semantic differences.

4. Intentional Analysis

Investigation II is devoted to this topic, but we find that even there it can not be dealt with adequately. Husserl does not attempt to treat this phenomena from the perspective of objective analysis: such analysis would be empirical and properly treated by empirical scientists, for example, psychologists, anthropologists, and so forth. Rather, meaning investigation, or phenomenology proper, is a mode of radical, philosophical reflection which strives for an epistemological clarification of the idea of knowledge, and accordingly, leads Husserl to a realm which he characterizes as the realm of essences.

And, even if a theory of abstraction aims at the field of what is immanently discoverable in all true (and therefore intuitive) abstraction, and steers clear of the misguided confusion between essential (i.e., epistemologically clarifying) and empirical (i.e., psychologically explanatory) analysis, it will still go astray from the start if it falls into the other confusion (strongly suggested by ambiguous talk of 'general representation') between phenomenological and objective analysis.

The goal, then, in meaning investigation, is to apprehend an ideal unity, at a very high level of abstraction. The basis for ascertaining when such an ideal unity has been realized, is the theory of evidence. However, the theory of evidence must be expressed, and

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1Ibid., 1:400.
2In this sense, no philosophical investigation is exhaustive in detail. The theory of meaning may, in principle, be explicated (however).
3Ibid., 1:349.
accordingly, utilizes meaning. It would make no sense to say that a proposition is evident, in proportion to the perceived agreement between the meaning-intending act and its experienced fulfilling acts, in the absence of such preliminary explication of the theory of meaning itself.\(^1\)

While this constitutes another preliminary statement of how Husserl characterizes evidence, it will not become clear why this is the case until later. However, it does somewhat supplement our preliminary working definition: that a meaningful assertion which is fulfilled by experience, and accompanied by self-critical insight, yields self-evidence.

Husserl gives numerous indications of what constitutes evidence throughout the text, but no one characterization is taken to be definitive. When he uncovers an instance of some proposition which he takes to be evident, he attempts to distill the reason why he takes that proposition to be evident, and states it. For example, his comments about the status of logic in the Prolegomena, addressed above, indicate that the laws of formal logic are repeatable, and when properly philosophically understood, can be seen as instances of evidence.

Similarly, in Investigation I, Husserl takes it as established with self-evidence that fruitful philosophizing cannot occur outside the arena of meaningful discourse. In Investigation II, he gives another example of the self-evidence of perception:

I may be deceived as to the existence of the object of perception, but not as to the fact that I do perceive it as determined in this or that way, that my percept's target is not some totally different object, a pine-tree.

\(^1\)Ibid., 2:764.
e.g., instead of a cockchafer. This self-evidence in characterizing description (or in identification and distinction of intentional objects), has, no doubt, its understandable limits, but it is true and genuine self-evidence.

This statement is reminiscent of pain-talk in contemporary philosophical circles. Without elaborating on a particular treatment of pain-talk, the above example could be compared to the following: if an empirical subject has an experience of pain which he reports, could we legitimately claim that he is not experiencing pain, even if we cannot determine the cause of his experience? In a similar fashion, Husserl is claiming that there is a self-evident aspect to all perceptual phenomena, which cannot be argued away. The irreducibility of the fact of experiencing a phenomena, either inwardly, or outwardly ('sensory moments') is so compelling, that Husserl claims when thinking clearly we could not seriously argue that we did not have the experience we just had, without being conscious of absurdity.²

As previously indicated, these examples illustrate instances of the occurrence of self-evidence, but Husserl's purpose is broader. What he has before his philosophical regard is the idea of evidence, which he takes to be a fundamental feature of the theory of knowledge. This is one indication why no single statement describing evidence, or self-evidence, is definitive.

Accordingly, the distinction between singular judgements and universal judgements is a theme running through all the investigations.

Singular judgements divide into individually singular judgements such as Socrates is a man, and specifically

¹Husserl, Logical Investigations, 1:412.
singular judgements such as Two is an even number, or A Round Square is a nonsensical concept. Universal judgements divide into individually universal judgements such as All men are mortal, and specifically universal judgements such as All analytic functions can be differentiated, or All propositions of pure logic are a priori.¹

The propositions concerning the idea of evidence, which are those propositions constituting the theory of evidence, are taken to be a priori and universal. However, they are taken to have this character in a highly unusual sense.

Husserl argues that simply because a proposition is a priori, does not mean that such a proposition is perfectly clear, that is, the sense of propositions is progressively realized.² Hence a priori and universal propositions are not taken as absolute, since they can be modified on the basis of further philosophical investigations; even if their form is not modified, the meaning of these propositions can be realized in a progressive fashion.³ According to Husserl, this is only contradictory on the surface, and can be resolved from within the context of a phenomenologically clarified notion of the a priori.

All the main obscurities of the Kantian critique of reason depend ultimately on the fact that Kant never made it clear to himself the peculiar character of pure Ideation, the adequate survey of conceptual essences, and of the laws

¹Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, 1:341. This point is absolutely essential for the distinction between apodistic and adequate. See Chapter II and III.

²This will be explained later when the notion of fulfillment is addressed.

³The apodictic character of an insight expressed in a proposition does not guarantee the adequacy of our understanding of that proposition. This is central to the Husserlian position, and it is returned to in the *Cartesian Meditations: an Introduction to Phenomenology*, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970) and *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969). An example is the Cartesian Cogito: that we think is apodictic, but simply knowing this does not yield an adequate understanding of this philosophical landmark.
of universal validity rooted in those essences. He accordingly lacked the phenomenologically correct concept of the a priori.  

There is a distinction between reflecting on an instance of a phenomena and reflecting on the species of a phenomena, which Husserl takes to be basic and necessary. If he is to arrive at the "pure form of possible objects of consciousness as such," then due to the level of generality of such considerations, he must consider the species of phenomena presented to consciousness. Therefore, the thrust is to explicate the ideal unity of evident phenomena in order to arrive at a theory of evidence. The ideal unity is co-extensive with the invariant features of adequate understanding. 

The essence of meaning is seen by us, not in the meaning-conferring experience, but in its 'content', the single, self-identical intentional unity set over against the dispersed multiplicity of actual and possible experiences of speakers and thinkers. The 'content' of a meaning-experience, in this ideal sense, is not at all what psychology means by a 'content', i.e., any real part or side of an experience.  

Success in this project necessitates entering an arena of discourse where we speak on a high level of abstraction. Abstraction is a common practice among philosophers, and Husserl is convinced that within the approach adopted in the Logical Investigations, a clarification of the appropriate manner of abstraction is effected. 

It is accordingly evident that when I say 'Four' in the generic sense, as, e.g., in the statement 'Four is a prime number relatively to seven', I am meaning that the Species Four, I have it as object before my logical regard, and am passing judgement on it, and not on anything individual.

We should not be led to think that Husserl is arguing that these  

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1 Husserl, Logical Investigations, 2:833.  
2 Ibid., 1:340.  
3 Ibid., 1:327.  
4 Ibid., 1:366.
abstract species objectively exist. They do not have the ontological status of independent prior existence which is radically severed from consciousness.

The excesses of conceptual realism have led men to dispute, not merely the reality, but the objectivity of the Species. This is certainly quite wrong.

As possible objects of consciousness, they are real in a limited sense. It is outside the scope of the thesis to exhaust the debate as to whether Husserl adopts a realist or a transcendental idealist position in the Logical Investigations.

Two misunderstandings have dominated the development of doctrines concerning universal objects:
First: the metaphysical hypostatization of the universal, the assumption that the Species really exists externally to thought.
Secondly: the psychological hypostatization of the universal, the assumption that the Species really exists in thought.²

We may leave aside, as long disposed of, the misunderstandings of Platonic realism.³

Clearly, some form of categorical representation is operative in the Logical Investigations. If we can, as Husserl claims, have philosophical knowledge, then the objects of such categorical representation must be governed by certain laws which, in principle, can be specified. If this was not the case, then any theory of knowledge, whatsoever, would be impossible. It would be impossible because its conceptual apparatus would refer to a realm of pure randomness. Knowledge of pure randomness is, in principle, absurd; therefore, philosophy can legitimately address the topic of the idea of knowledge itself.

¹Ibid., 1:340. Statements such as these support my argument that it is always a mistake to interpret the LI on the basis of philosophical realism.
²Ibid., 1:350.
³Ibid., 1:351.
The concepts used in formulating any theory of knowledge can themselves be clarified. For example, the concepts 'clarity' and 'clarification' themselves remain ambiguous until they have been subjected to critical analysis.\(^1\) Commitment to the proposition that it is possible to clarify concepts does not entail a metaphysical stance within Husserl's phenomenology.\(^2\) In short, a conceptual apparatus can be analysed or subjected to criticism without going to the metaphysical excesses of claiming that by virtue of this, the context or referent of the operative concepts are transcendent, self-existing entities.

To talk of 'idealism' is of course not to talk of a metaphysical doctrine, but of a theory of knowledge which recognizes the 'ideal' as a condition for the possibility of objective knowledge in general, and does not 'interpret it away' in psychologicist fashion.\(^3\)

The project of characterizing the Idea of Knowledge is co-extensive with investigating the meaning of this idea. Phenomenology in general is seen by Husserl to be meaning or sense investigation. Meaning investigation is taken to be a clarified form of pursuing understanding. Philosophical understanding is not seen as radically dissimilar to acquiring evidence. The entire project of the Logical Investigations is the attempt to arrive at the essence of the Idea

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\(^1\)See Husserl, "The Method of Clarification".

\(^2\)Although Husserl calls this type of essential clarification formal ontology, he cautions us repeatedly: that it is carried out entirely within a transcendental framework. Thus, both the Heideggerian project in Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962) and the Sartrean project in Being and Nothingness: an Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, trans. and with an Introduction by Hazel Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), radically depart from Husserlian phenomenology: they both make strong ontological commitments. Husserlian 'essences' are transcendental and not metaphysical entities.

\(^3\)Husserl, Logical Investigations, 1:338.
of Knowledge, albeit in the non-metaphysical sense of evidence.

Investigations I through V illustrate what is involved in the idea: that is, they make the elements of this complex idea distinct. That the concepts are distinct does not necessarily mean they have been brought to philosophical clarity. The Cartesian concepts of clarity of distinctness are appropriate since they are found in a modified form in the theory of evidence itself. Clarity and distinctness are seen by Husserl to be prerequisites for knowing what is meant by a concept in a philosophically acceptable fashion.¹

Investigation III "On The Theory of the Wholes and Parts"² is concerned with the project of differentiating the categories with which an object of consciousness can be dealt with philosophically. It contributes to the theory of meaning in a detailed sense which is not specifically relevant to the topic of evidence.³ It outlines a pure theory of the categories of the objects of meaning.⁴ Despite the fact that an entire investigation is devoted to it, its importance for the meaning concept is minimal in light of extensive treatment of meaning elsewhere in the text, and the characterization of phenomenology itself as meaning investigation. It contributes to the aforementioned pure

¹Husserl, "Method of Clarification".
⁴"The systematic place for its discussion should therefore be in the pure 'a priori' theory of objects as such, in which we deal with ideas pertinent to the category of object, ideas such as Whole and Part, Subject and Quality, Individual and Species, Genus and Species, Relation and Collection, Unity, Number, Series, Ordinal Number, Magnitude, etc. as well as the a priori truths which relate to these (Husserl, Logical Investigations, 2:435)."
formal ontology and must be read as a transcendental investigation and not as metaphysics proper, as indicated above.

Investigation IV continues the theme, but Husserl cautions us, that the importance of meaning investigation did not fully come to his attention until the second edition of the work. The thrust of investigations III and IV is the notion of an a priori grammar of consciousness.

Within pure logic, there is a field of laws indifferent to all objectivity to which, in distinction from 'logical laws' in the usual pregnant sense, the name of 'logico-grammatical laws' can be justifiably given. Even more aptly, we can oppose the pure theory of semantic forms to the pure theory of validity which presupposes it.

In this mid-point of the book, the criteria of revisability as a necessary aspect of the theory of evidence seems to be transgressed. Husserl holds at this stage that an exhaustive set of laws to adjudicate over philosophical sense and nonsense can be specifically explicated. He sees this as prior to formal logic's role of enabling us to guard against formal absurdity.

These laws, which govern the sphere of complex meanings, and whose role it is to divide sense from nonsense, are not yet the so-called laws of logic in the pregnant sense of this term; they provide pure logic with the possible meaning-forms, i.e., the a priori forms of complex meanings significant as wholes, whose 'formal' truth or 'objectivity' then depends on these pregnantly described 'logical laws'. The former laws guard against senselessness (Unsinn) the latter against formal or analytic nonsense (Widersinn) or formal absurdity.

Husserl's claim will remain that an expression or set of expressions must be meaningful and be formally correct if knowledge is to result. However, an extremely important modification occurs even at this stage. It is the notion that even within the concept of self-

1Husserl, Logical Investigations, 2:498. See note.
2Ibid., 2:494.
3Ibid., 2:493.
evidence there is an horizon of improvement in philosophical understanding. If one proposition is brought to self-evidence before our philosophical regard (for example the law of contradiction) it does not mean that we have thereby exhausted all implications of the proposition. Simply, if some philosophical knowledge is acquired, this enables us to acquire more knowledge. It also indicates the direction in which fruitful investigation can occur; in specifically Husserlian terms, an horizon of meaning investigation is uncovered.

If we take seriously the concept of an a priori grammar which explicitly states all the laws of sense and nonsense, then we can easily take Husserl to be making the questionable claim that the Investigations III through IV end the necessity of philosophizing.¹ This is inappropriate since he modifies his position by virtue of clarifying the concepts of evidence and meaning in the more important investigations, V and VI. That the later investigations even occur indicates that III and IV are formulated in a misleading fashion. Otherwise, Husserl would have merely applied this a priori theory of sense and nonsense to all possible philosophical questions as a calculus. A careful reading of the preface and introduction indicate that he himself is aware of these problems.

At the onset of Investigation V, Husserl outlines the notion of fulfillment which supplements and clarifies the a priori theory of meaning forms.² He also provides us with a third preliminary character-

¹Cf. Edmund Husserl, Phenomenological Psychology: lectures, summer semester, 1925, translated by John Scanlon (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), p. 29, regarding the old idea of an a priori ontology as distinguished from new (apparently) non-metaphysical one. Husserl suggests limits to Phenomenological Psychology in the introduction to the Logical Investigations and suggests there was limited sophistication in the third and fourth Investigations.

²In Formal and Transcendental Logic, Husserl again takes up the notion of formal ontology in a much more mature and helpful fashion.
ization of the evidence phenomena.

We have often spoken of the fulfillment of a meaning-intention through a corresponding intuition, and have said that the highest form of such fulfillment was that of self-evidence. It is therefore our task to describe this remarkable phenomenalological relationship, and to lay down its role, and so to clarify the notions of knowledge which presuppose it.

The notion of fulfillment will emerge shortly as a major feature of the theory of evidence. The character of meaning acts does not exhaust the character of the content of these acts. To deal with the content of these acts, we must briefly address Husserl's treatment of clarification of his notoriously elusive concept of intentionality. In Investigation V, consciousness is primarily characterized as intentional experience. Further, intentional experience is identified with meaning acts.

5. Three concepts of consciousness clarified

Husserl identifies three concepts of consciousness which can profitably be addressed in order to clarify the concept of mental acts which is operative within the investigations.

1. Consciousness as the entire, real (réelle) phenomenalological being of the empirical ego, as the interweaving of psychic experiences in the unified stream of consciousness.

2. Consciousness as the inner awareness of one's own psychic experiences.

3. Consciousness as a comprehensive designation for 'mental acts', or 'intentional experiences', of all sorts.

1Husserl, Logical Investigations, 2:533.
2Ibid., 2:534.
3Ibid., 2:552 ff. see Chapter II for a modification of the exclusively Cartesian conception of phenomenology.
4Ibid., 2:563.
5Ibid., 2:535. Note: Observe how late in the LT these basic distinctions occur.
Husserl does not want to overstep the boundaries of philosophizing by attempting to derive meaningful propositions concerning the psychological or the physiological phenomena associated with the expression 'consciouness'. He clearly delineates the distinction between empirical investigation and philosophical investigation. Philosophy is not empirical investigation; hence, it cannot legitimately generate propositions concerning psychological functions of empirical egos, or propositions describing physiological influences on the behavior of empirical egos.

Thus, Husserl is not concerned with the first concept of consciousness.

This relation of the phenomenal object (that we also like to call a 'conscious content') to the phenomenal subject (myself as an empirical person, a thing) must naturally be kept apart from the relation of a conscious content, in the sense of an experience, to consciousness in the sense of a unity of such conscious contents...

Husserl utilizes an expanded concept of 'perception' in outlining his theory of knowledge. He does claim that there is some form of inner perception operating when a reflecting ego perceives that philosophical understanding has been attained. This has prompted the rather superficial interpretation that Husserl is assigning to introspection the role of adjudicating the truth value of philosophical propositions. Husserl does not claim that introspecting can not occur, and he implicitly leaves open the possibility that introspection could be of use in some hypothetical science.

Self-perception of the empirical ego is, however, a daily business, which involves no difficulty for understanding. We perceive the ego, just as we perceive an external thing. That the object does not offer all

1 Ibid, 2:539.
its parts and sides to perception is as irrelevant in this case as in that.

What he does claim, however, is that we do not acquire philosophical understanding by introspecting. He observes that the experience of philosophizing is clearly different from the experience of introspecting.²

While there may or may not be psychological phenomena associated with the activity of being philosophically engaged on the part of a given philosopher, such phenomena are irrelevant to the quality of the philosophizing itself. Yet clearly, if any mind whatsoever is reflecting, that mind is having an experience of the contents of its reflection; if this were not the case, that mind would be empty and an empty mind cannot be reflecting.

If we consider the self-evidence of the Cogito, ergo sum, or rather of its simple sum, as one that can be sustained against all doubts, then it is plain that what here passes as ego cannot be empirical ego.³

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¹Ibid., 2:551.


³Husserl, Logical Investigations, 2:543.
In Husserl's utilization of a neo-Cartesian formulation of the reflecting ego, he is arguing that such an ego cannot be identified with empirical phenomena; and furthermore, introspection is concerned with empirical phenomena. Therefore, the second concept of consciousness is a sub-set of the first concept, and consequently is also outside of the arena of philosophy proper. He identifies an ambiguity within the expression 'inner perception':

In view of the just exposed ambiguity of the expression 'inner perception', it would be best to have different terms for inner perception, as the perception of one's own experiences, and adequate or evident perception. The epistemologically confused and psychologically misused distinction of inner and outer perception would then vanish; it has been put in the place of the genuine contrast between adequate and inadequate perception which has its roots in the pure phenomenological essences of such experiences.

What this amounts to, is that there is an experiential component which is necessary if philosophizing is to occur; however, this experiential component is not to be taken as composed of psychological phenomena. If there are experiential components, then there is perception, for it is nonsense to say that an unperceived experience can occur. Through the examination of the two concepts of consciousness (which are inappropriate to the Husserlian project), he uncovers the

\[1\] In contradiction to the formulation of transcendental phenomenology in the Cartesian Meditations, Husserl indicates in a note added to the second edition that a specific stance on the ego question is not essential to the formulation of phenomenology found in the Logical Investigations. "Important as this question may be, phenomenologically or in other respects, there remain wide fields of phenomenological problems, relating more or less generally to the real content of intentional experiences, and to their relation of essence to intentional objects, which can be systematically explored without taking up any stance on the ego-issue." (Ibid., 2:551).

\[2\] Ibid., 2:543.
importance of the third concept.

The third concept identifies consciousness as intentional experience, and uncovers the arena of transcendental philosophizing. It identifies further that class of experience with which Husserl is concerned:

...we perceive the fundamental importance of our class of experiences, since only its members are relevant in the highest ranks of the normative sciences. They alone, seized in their phenomenological purity, furnish concrete bases for abstracting the fundamental notions that function systematically in logic, ethics, and aesthetics, and that enter into the ideal laws of these sciences.

It is specifically the third concept of consciousness which enables this critical reconstruction of Husserl's sustained argument to be brought into sharper focus. This is partly the rationale for arguing that there is a hierarchy of explanation in the Logical Investigations. Husserl indicates that the third concept of consciousness:

...ranges over the same phenomenological field as the concept of 'mental act'. In connection with this, talk of conscious contents, talk in particular concerning contents of presentations, judgements, etc., gains a variety of meanings...

Intentionality characterizes that range of experiences which are differentiated from sensation; moreover, Husserl takes intentionality to be an essential feature of any possible conscious (sentient) being.

A sharply defined class of experiences is here brought before us, comprising of all that enjoys mental, conscious existence in a certain pregnant sense of these words. A real being deprived of such experiences, merely having contents inside it but unable to interpret these objectively, or otherwise use them to make objects present to itself... would not be called 'psychical' by anyone.

Husserl indicates that he has grave reservations about adopting

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1Ibid., 2:553. See also Brentano's notion of intentionality.
2Ibid., 2:552.
3Ibid., 2:553.
the expression 'psychical phenomena'. This term is used in Brentano's *Psychologie* and Husserl wishes to indicate his departure from Brentano's concept of intentionality, since the expression 'psychical phenomena' is ambiguous and misleading with reference to Husserlian phenomenology.

Such expressions promote two misunderstandings: first, that we are dealing with a real (realen) event or a real (reales) relationship, taking place between 'consciousness' or 'the ego', on the one hand, and the thing of which there is consciousness, on the other; secondly, that we are dealing with a relation between two things, both present in equally real fashion (reell) in consciousness, an act and an intentional object, or with a sort of box-within-box structure of mental contents.

The theory of consciousness, which yields the theory of intentionality, retrospectively fills out Husserl's treatment of signification, expression and meaning. Signifying, expression and meaning have the character of being acts. Similarly, intentionality has an act character in the sense that the aspect of consciousness upon which Husserl is focusing, has an experiential component.\(^2\)

We too reject the 'mythology of activities': we define 'acts' as intentional experiences, not as mental activities.

The word act, then, is not to be understood in the sense of activity, but rather, the focus is on the experiential component. Husserl refers to the dynamic by which a hypothetical ego goes from the process of straightforward experience to the reflective mode.

We perform the description after an objectifying act of reflection, in which reflection on the ego is combined with reflection on the experienced act to yield a relational act, in which the ego appears as itself related to its act's object through its act... The

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\(^1\) Ibid., 2:557. This prefigures his critique of Descartes' transcendental realism.

\(^2\) I call the reader's attention to this paragraph.

\(^3\) Ibid., 2:563.
original act is no longer simply there, we no longer live in it, but we attend to it and pass judgement on it. 1

Husserl is concerned with the contents that a consciousness experiences. This is a modified notion of apperception. 2 Clearly, the notion of intentionality is not separate from the notion of experience. All experience is intentional: an experience of nothing is a self-contradictory notion, that is, it is a pure impossibility. The sentence 'I just had an experience of absolutely nothing' is either absurd or is to be interpreted as a sign that the subject is reporting a state of complete unconsciousness, where even the absence of consciousness was not observed retrospectively.

Intentionality is not over and above experience. There are not two distinct states of affairs, but rather, one, that is, the whole experience, whose character is called into question to reveal the intentional component involved. 3

If an experience has an object or a content then it is precisely this content that concerns phenomenological reflection.

Husserl's focus is on a range of conscious experiences, which have an act character in the sense that they are intentional. Intentional experiences have an intended object; this object may or may not coincide with the intending. For instance, a person could intend to fulfill the concept of a square circle with a drawing, or even a picture in his imagination. Neither the drawing nor the

1 Ibid., 2:562.
3 Husserl, Logical Investigations, 2:558.
imaginative picture could fulfill the intention. The intentional object does not fulfill the intending act on the part of the subject. The extended investigation into the bi-polar structure of consciousness taken as intentional experience which occurs in Investigation V, is central to the theory of evidence. In its formulation in the Logical Investigations, evidence occurs when what we mean by a proposition or an intending corresponds to the intentional object. Evidence, then, is a certain type of intentional act. It will be noted that this is a fourth characterization of Husserl's theory of evidence.\textsuperscript{1}

Prior to examining the implications of the above statement, it is necessary to examine briefly the three concepts of an intentional object. The first concept is the intentional object of the act.

It concerns the intentional object, e.g., a house when a house is presented...

We must distinguish, in relation to the intentional content taken as object of the act, between the object as it is intended, and the object (period) which is intended.\textsuperscript{2}

This is a simple distinction between intending a certain side of an object, and having that side given, as opposed to intending an object in an exhaustive manner, and perhaps having that object given in an exhaustive manner. Taking the example of a house, if we have in mind a basic structure with walls and roof, and we see such a structure, this is one state of affairs. If we have in mind the concept of a house, the object of this concept might require extensive anthropological, social, and other scientific information to adequately

\textsuperscript{1} See above.

\textsuperscript{2} Ibid., 2:578.
represent its intentional object. This could be extended to a variety of possible complex and highly selective and theorized perspectives upon a particular object in question. An exhaustive characterization of a particular house could entail studies in engineering, the history of architecture, the psychology of perception, and so on, ad infinitum. With a simpler example, Husserl illustrates the same point:

The idea, e.g., of the German Emperor, presents its object as an Emperor, and as the Emperor of Germany. The man himself is the son of the Emperor Frederick III, the grandson of Queen Victoria, and has many other properties, neither named nor presented.²

There are simple and complex acts of intending. Even in the case of a complex intention there is a single object which alone could be judged to fulfill this intention. This object might be an ideal unity of a highly complex series of investigations.²

The full and entire object corresponding to the whole judgement is the state of affairs judged: the same state of affairs is presented in a mere presentation, wished in a wish, asked after in a question, doubted in a doubt, etc.³

The second concept of an intentional object refers to the material which is intended, as opposed to the mode or quality of intending.

Content in the sense of 'matter' is a component of the concrete act-experience, which it may share with acts of quite different quality.⁴

Husserl uses the example of a man presenting the view that there are intelligent beings on Mars.⁵ This view could be framed in an assertion, a question, a wish, without changing the content,

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¹Ibid., 2:578.
²The intentional object fulfilling the idea of evidence is an instance of an ideal unity emerging from highly complex investigations.
³Husserl, Logical Investigations, 2:579.
⁴Ibid., 2:586.
⁵Ibid., 2:587.
although the quality of the utterance would be altered. One and
the same state of affairs is intended.

This 'reference to an object' belongs peculiarly and
intrinsically to an act-experience, and the experiences
manifesting it are by definition intentional experiences
or acts. All differences in mode of objective reference
are descriptive differences in intentional experiences. 1

Husserl is arguing that objective references can be retained
within the framework of a modification to the mode of reference.
Quality of reference modifies the mode of reference. Husserl states
that "reference to objects is possible a priori only as being a
definite manner of reference: it arises only if the matter is fully
determined." 2

The third concept of intentional object refers to the intentional
essence. An act's intentional essence is composed of the unity of its
matter and quality. 3 Quality and matter are two constituents of all
intentional acts. Basically, this constitutes the important elements
in Investigation V for purposes of dealing with the evidence problem.
It should be noted that Husserl includes an abundance of distinctions
which are not always clear in the fifth Investigation. Experience and
Judgement and Formal and Transcendental Logic address these distinctions
in a much clearer manner. It is of questionable utility to examine
in detail distinctions which are not found operative in Husserl's more
mature works, and Husserl himself recommends that we read his earlier
works in terms of the later ones. 4 However, the beginnings of a theory

1Ibid.
2Ibid., 2:589.
3See above.
4In one of Dorion Cairns' recorded conversations with Husserl, Husserl
instructed him to first read the Cartesian Meditations then the latter
part of the Logical Investigations, and only then, Ideas (Dorion Cairns,
Conversations with Husserl and Fink, ed. Husserl-Archives in Louvain,
of judgement are outlined in Investigation V.

Judgement is indicated to be operative in determining the essential content of an intentional experience. The argument is that we employ a judgement to determine whether the object coincides with the intending. Judging is connected with assertions, that is, we judge a state of affairs to be thus and so, and then we assert it.\(^1\)

Judging is also characterized as an act. Hence, within the framework of the investigations, virtually all the operative features of knowing have an act character. Signification, expression, meaning, intending, judging, and intuiting: all are characterized as having an 'act quality'.\(^2\)

Since these notions are functioning in the formulation of the theory of evidence, it is not surprising that Husserl argues that evidence also has as act character, in the sense that it is a performance. It becomes clearer in the sixth investigation, why Husserl argues that evidence acquisition has the essential attribute of being a performance, or an act.

6. Analysis unifying the preceding sections

It has been argued that Husserl is seeking to characterize the essential and invariant features of the idea of evidence (Evidenz). A treatment of evidence is an important part of a phenomenological theory of knowledge. Phenomenology investigates knowledge from a transcendental perspective. The objects which it investigates are all objects given


\(^2\)Ibid., 2:619. "We must accordingly acknowledge differences in the comprehensive Genus Act-quality, and pin these down phenomenologically." See also *Ideas*, 306ff., Section 2.
in experience, that is, consciousness in the third sense (consciousness as intentional experience). Thus, Husserl claims that it is an a priori investigation into the possibility of knowledge. He seeks to make a priori assertions regarding the objects of possible consciousness, and to delineate the features of that class of objects of which we can have knowledge.

Husserl identifies the project of investigating ideal objectives as an a priori project. The criteria for knowledge in the strict sense, that is, a categorical framework fulfilled by sensible intuition which Kant proposes, cannot be reflexively applied to the assertions Kant makes in the Critique of Pure Reason. Since the objects under examination in a theory of knowledge are not themselves empirical objects, it makes no sense to adopt the same criteria used in evaluating empirical assertions. For these reasons, Husserl claims that Kant lacked a sufficiently clarified sense of the a priori. Kant's criteria for knowledge in the strict sense cannot be reflexively applied to vindicate the criteria itself.

\[1\] Husserl, Logical Investigations, 2:862.

\[2\] Ibid., 2:833. Husserl would argue that the Kantian categorical framework is too rigid to do justice to our actual experience. I return to this point below in Chapter III, part 3.

\[3\] It is outside the scope of the thesis to go into detailed examination of Kant's metaphysics of knowledge and a comparison of it to a Husserlian conception.
The notion of the a priori is itself placed in question. Husserl's implicit argument is that the analytic a priori is strongly associated with consciousness as intentional experience. That class of experiences which are intentional yield a priori statements; furthermore, the Logical Investigations in its entirety can be classified as an exercise in intentional analysis. This intentional analysis is carried out with a sustained neutrality towards ontological commitment. For these reasons, it must be argued that Husserl is already engaged in transcendental philosophy, and the emphasis on essences in no way contradicts this, when essence is understood from a position of ontological neutrality.

The critical thrust of the Logical Investigations makes way for the introduction of a notion of categorical intuition. Since the questions raised are a priori and intentional, they concern relations between categories. Sensible intuition cannot be appealed to, in order to determine the relations between categories. Husserl takes the distinction between categorical and sensible intuition to be fundamental to any theory of reason.²

A critique of knowledge amounts to an elucidation of the invariant elements involved in knowing. Such a critique, when it explicitly separates itself from empirical investigations³ is concerned

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² Husserl, Logical Investigations, 2:662.

³ Cf. First and second concept of consciousness discussed above.
with conceptual or categorical clarification.

The conception of categorical acts as intuitions, first brings true perspicuity into the relation of thought to intuition - a relation that no previous critique of knowledge has made tolerably clear: it is the first to render knowledge itself intelligible, in its essence and its achievement.

The expression 'intuition' which appears in Husserl's work, refers to an adequate perception of the relationships present between concepts. Intuition is introduced to distinguish an act of understanding from an act of thinking, in the sense of mere signitive reference. Intuiving is a type of perceiving. Husserl uses an expanded concept of perception in order to encompass that range of mental experiences which are a necessary component of philosophical activity. This inner perception, or intuiving, is a type of mental seeing, but it has nothing in common with introspection. The Husserlian concept of intuition does not even remotely resemble the popular concept where intuition is characterized as a mysterious mental faculty. It straightforwardly characterizes the phenomena that a categorical state of affairs cannot be understood, unless it is experienced in some fashion. Similarly, the object which is referred to by an ideal category must also be seen or intuited; otherwise, understanding of what a concept means would be impossible.

The concept of intuition has already been used in the preliminary characterizations of the theory of evidence. Intuitions belong to the class of intentional experience, and accordingly, require fulfillment.

1 Husserl, Logical Investigations, 2:804.
2 Cf. Chapter III, part 3.2
3 Husserl, Logical Investigations, 2:832, sec. 66 ff.
4 Ibid., 2:786
The fulfillment of an intention by an appropriate intentional object is the key to the theory of evidence. The theory concerns the processes of evidence acquisition on the side of the subject alone. The key to the four previous characterizations of the theory of evidence is the notion of fulfillment. This notion of fulfillment has already been utilized in the critical reconstruction, but its implications have not yet been fully brought to light.

Husserl's theory of evidence in the *Logical Investigations* is often taken as being identical with his stance on self-evidence. A proposition can, in principle, be self-evident, when the meaning intended by that proposition is completely fulfilled by what is given to a subject as the intentional or meant object of that proposition. That is to say, there is a complete agreement between what the proposition means, and what is meant. This statement must be understood solely from within the framework of consciousness as intentional experience, ignoring all empirical components of mental existence.

The discussion of possible relationships of fulfillment therefore points to a goal in which increase of fulfillment terminates, in which the complete and entire intention has reached its fulfillment, and that not intermediately and partially, but ultimately and finally.

Where a presentative intention has achieved its last fulfilment, the genuine *adequatio rei et intellectus* has been brought about. The object is actually 'present' or 'given' and present as just what we have intended it; no partial intention remains implicit and still lacking fulfilment.

This ideal of adequate presentation of an object of knowledge is the regulative ideal guiding Husserl's work. Husserl indicates that

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1 Ibid., 2:760. Note: There is a tacit cogito involved here.
2 Ibid., 2:762.
we have no choice as pursuers of rigorous philosophy but to strive to comply with this regulative ideal. He by no means indicates a conviction that the propositions contained within the LI meet this standard of rigor. There is a temptation to characterize this ideal limit as the first basic proposition of Husserl's theory of evidence proper; however, this would be conceptually inappropriate, since it is the final goal.

The hierarchy of explanation and understanding reaches its ideal limit in the regulative ideal of self-evidence. Self-evidence is a highly modified interpretation of the correspondence criteria of truth.

This final fulfilment represents an ideal of perfection. ...The synthesis of fulfilment achieved in this limiting case is self-evidence or knowledge in the pregnant sense of the word. Here we have being in the sense of truth, 'correspondence' rightly understood, the a'daequatio rei intellectus: here, this a'daequatio is itself given, to be directly seized and gazed upon."

Husserl rarely uses the expression 'correspondence,' preferring the expression 'fulfilment.' The concept 'correspondence' could mislead readers of Husserl into thinking that there is some relation between an inner thought and an external object; whereas, the more unusual expression 'fulfilment' serves as an indication that self-evidence occurs entirely within the arena of intentional experience. In the case of complete fulfillment, an essence is beheld. The de-ontologized usage of the expression 'essence' corresponds to the Husserlian concept of the thing itself: "In fulfilment our experience is represented by the words: 'This is the thing itself.'"

The notion of the "thing itself" cannot be understood too strictly.

1Ibid., 2:670.
2Ibid., 2:720.
since no experience of fulfillment can make an actual phenomenal object present. They are objects of knowledge and if it happens that there is adequate self-presentation of an object of knowledge, that object does not come into existence before us. Returning to the previously used example of a house, a complete fulfillment of the concept of a house does not cause this ideal unity to be made manifest in an actual house. Clearly, this would be absurd. A Husserl thing-in-itself is an intentional essence; otherwise, Husserl would be claiming that an adequate understanding of an object on the part of the subject would cause that object to pop into existence. Obviously, this is pure impossibility,¹ and indicates that a naturalistic reading of the Husserlian project can only yield systematic misinterpretation.

The theory of evidence itself has certain features which sharply distinguish it from a theoretical explanation of what is habitually called evidence in empirical sciences.² The features of the theory itself are not

¹See Chapter III for the explanation of the thought experiment involved here.

²Here I am reacting against Hemmendinger's interpretation that the theory of evidence is not a theory. I steadfastly refuse to use the word 'dogma' due to the pre-critical overtones of this expression, which I think are antithetical to Husserlian phenomenology when it is considered as radical sense-clarification on the part of transcendental subjectivity. If Hemmendinger's point is that it is not a theory in the normal way that we construct theories in the de facto sciences, then I am in complete agreement with him.

Husserl says of this view of evidence that it is not a new "theory" or interpretation which might be tested in experiments. It is itself an evidence "attained at a higher level, by the phenomenological explication of any experience and of any actually exercise 'insight'"...It is clear why Husserl says that it is not a theory, for if it were it would have a theoretical foundation which would not itself be evident; it would be interpreted in terms of more primitive concepts which would still have to be made evident. As I indicated before, this would bring us to an infinite regress or a vicious circle, but is Husserl's position any better? His view seems to call for an unending series of evidences each explicating the previous one; higher and higher levels would be needed to achieve complete insight into evidence itself.

Quoted from David Hemmendinger's "Husserl's concepts of evidence and science" The Monist, pp. 87-88.
entirely co-extensive with the features of what it seeks to explain. The theory is entirely formulated within the framework of intentional experience, and consequently has a bi-polar structure. That is to say, the idea of evidence is fulfilled by the ideal unity of the features of evidence acquisition. It is a theory only in a highly unusual sense, since it provides its own explanatory grounds. For example, the theory is an a priori theory, but it calls into question, and seeks to clarify, the notion of the a priori.

It is not the place to enter into an elaborate examination of the relations between the concepts law, theory, and hypothesis, as they occur in the sciences. Suffice it to say, that usually where there is a theory, it is quite easy to distinguish between the theory itself, and what the theory seeks to explain. For example, if a theory is constructed seeking to explain the relationship between nutrition and rate of growth in humans, it is quite clear that the theory is not the rate of growth in humans, nor is the theory nutritional. However, in the case of philosophy, it has itself as its subject matter. While there is a distinction, then, between evidence and evidence acquisition, itself, the distinction cannot easily be explicated due to the radical reflexivity involved.

7. **A Summary of the invariant features of the theory of evidence**

The strategy adopted herein is to isolate the basic propositions expressing these invariant features which comprise the theory of evidence. This list of propositions cannot possibly exhaust Husserl's detailed treatment of evidence in the *Logical Investigations*; clearly, every proposition cannot be covered without virtually rewriting the text. It is
advantageous, therefore, to simplify the theory into a smaller set of basic propositions.

7.1 The first basic proposition

Only a possible\(^1\) proposition which functions as a meaningful sign can be made evident. What Husserl means by 'possible' is that it is not a proposition which is formally contradictory; furthermore, it must also be capable of meaning something. If it means something, it can be fulfilled. For example, the proposition 'Assertions are red' is not logically self-contradictory, but it is not a possible proposition, since no fulfillment can occur. Such fulfillment must be possible in principle; it need not be realized by a particular empirical individual.

A thing counts as possible, if it allows itself, objectively speaking, to be realized in the form of an adequate imaginative picture, whether we ourselves, as particular empirical individuals, succeed in thus realizing it or not.\(^2\)

The distinction between signification in general and that class of signs which are meaningful has been dealt with above. The theory of evidence presumes a treatment of signification, meaning, and expression. It is not necessary to reiterate in detail the results of the critical reconstruction; it will be recalled, however, that the meaningful signs Husserl is concerned with are expressions in speech.

Husserl acknowledged that truly meaningless or senseless speech would be uninterpretable, "like the rattle of machinery".\(^3\) However, expressions can function signitively, and we can understand them as symbols,

\(^1\)It is arguable that possibility is determined by a process of imaginative thought experiments but this only becomes clear in FTL. See Chapter III below for the development of this argument.

\(^2\)Husserl, Logical Investigations, 2:760.

\(^3\)Ibid., 1:303. Note: I call the reader's attention to this point. Cf. my Chapter III.
yet, we can gain no knowledge from them.

The four preliminary characterizations of the theory of evidence have as their first component either a proposition, a meaningful assertion, a meaning intention, or "what we mean by a proposition". All these cases correspond to, and are consistent with, the first basic proposition of the theory of evidence.

7.2 The second basic proposition

A meaningful sign must be capable of being fulfilled in principle, and a proposition is evident in proportion to the degree of fulfillment. The ideal limit of complete self-evidence on the basis of final fulfillment has already been addressed. Husserl does not argue that we either have self-evidence, or we have no evidence whatsoever.

It is clear from the start that, if knowledge admits of degrees of perfection, even when the matter is constant, matter cannot be responsible for such differences of perfection, and cannot therefore determine the peculiar essence of knowledge as against any identification whatever.

The notion of fulfillment is crucial. A gradual ascent from acts of poorer, to acts of richer fullness occurs, and during this ascent, there is progressively more direct evidence. The highest evidence is the ideal goal in which an adequate presentation of the objects of knowledge would be made to the cognitive agent. This is the 'thing itself' or the 'essence'.

The fulfilling act has a superiority which the mere intention lacks; it imparts to the synthesis the fulness of 'self', at least leads it more directly to the thing itself.

At the opposite end of the scale, there is simple identification,

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1 See above.
2 Husserl, Logical Investigations, 2:719.
3 Ibid., 2:720.
4 Ibid.
that is, setting the object before our regard. Signitive acts identify, but possess no fullness whatsoever. Intuitive acts can have fullness, but according to Husserl, intuition is representation within the imagination. There is an ambiguity concerning Husserl's concept of intuition. Intuition refers to his expanded notion of perception; however, intuitive acts are juxtaposed with the perception of a direct presentation of the intentional object. The ambiguity is resolved when representation in the imagination is opposed to a direct presentation of the ideal fulfillment. In both cases, the modified concept of perception as intellectual intuition is operative.

7.3 The third basic proposition

The agreement between the meaningful sign and its fulfillment must be perceived, in order to acquire understanding. Husserl comments, "I do not merely assert but also perceive the matter of fact in question, and that I assert it as I perceive it." Evidence is acquired in pro-

1Ibid., 2:761. See Chapter III below.

2Levinas addresses the notion of intuition profitably, but excludes many of the other aspects I am emphasizing. Cf. Levinas, The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology, p. 97:

The Logische Untersuchungen (particularly the first volume) has earned Husserl the reputation of being a logicist and a "Platonic realist." (p. 97). Husserl realizes that some parts of the Logische Untersuchungen form a transition to, and clearly break the ground for, the Ideen, (p. 103).

We have tried to show that these questions do not merely concern the structure of life as it reaches these objects, and that they do not pertain merely to the theory of knowledge, but that, by virtue (sic) of the origin of all being in life, they investigate the meaning of the very existence of being. The deeply philosophical task of this investigation is incumbent on reflection, which is philosophical intuition, (p. 154).

My final comment is that I can make no sense of the equation of all philosophical reflection with intuition in the absence of many of the clarifications I have supplied in this chapter.

3Husserl, Logical Investigations, 2:679.
portion to the detailed agreement between what is meant, and what is
given, but only insofar as this agreement is perceived, and further,
judged to be perceived. A disagreement could also be perceived. Where
disagreement is perceived, a lack of fulfillment is present; in such
a case, basic proposition number one may be contravened, in the sense
that the possibility of fulfillment for that proposition is not present.

Knowing, or adequate understanding, is characterized as a recogni-
tion;\(^1\) but on the side of the subject, it cannot be a static recogni-
tion, since there is no object other than the perceived object.

But we have seen that there is no object in the experience,
only a perception, a thus and thus determinate mindedness
(Zumutesen): the recognition act in the experience must
accordingly base itself on the act of perception.\(^2\)

The subject must not only experience, but must judge that he
is experiencing. In judging an experience, the subject is making a
percept, that is, a judgement of perception. Perceptions are a class
of experiences. Husserl uses an expanded concept of perception to in-
corporate his conception of consciousness as intentional experience.
Within intentional experience, perceptions are made, and judged to
be made.

Perception and percepts make a contribution to the meaning of
a statement, but they do not constitute the meaning.

Perception accordingly realizes the possibility of an
unfolding of my act of this-meaning with its definite
relation to the object, e.g., to this paper before my
eyes. But it does not, on our view, itself constitute
this meaning, nor even part of it.\(^3\)

The meaning is given by the expressive act; however, we can

\(^1\)Ibid., 2:707.
\(^2\)Ibid., 2:689.
\(^3\)Ibid., 2:684.
express the perception of the agreement between the meaningful sign and its fulfillment.

We must accordingly say: This 'expression' of a percept—more objectively phrased, of a perceived thing as such—is no affair of the sound of words, but of certain expressive acts... This mediating act must be the true giver of meaning, must pertain to the significantly functioning expression as its essential constituent, and must determine its possession of an identical sense, whether or not this is associated with a confirming percept.

Therefore, the perceptual element involved in the theory of evidence which necessitates judgements of perception, indicates that evidence is an acquisition on the part of the subject. Analysis of propositions to determine which class of propositions function as meaningful signs, and the analysis of what these meaningful signs refer to (that is, how they are fulfilled) constitute necessary, but not sufficient conditions for rigorous knowledge.

7.4 The fourth basic proposition

The correlate of self-evidence is truth. The full agreement of what is meant with what is given, is experienced in self-evidence. When the ideal of self-evidence is acquired, truth is present as a correlate of this act. Self-evidence is not simply the perception of truth, but rather, it is the experience of ideal coincidence between the object given, and the manner in which the object is meant. In Husserl's terminology, this is the objective correlate of truth. The idea of truth in the strong sense coincides with the idea of absolute adequation. Adequation is understood as the ideal fulfillment of a possible proposition. Truth, in this sense, is an ideal, since absolute adequation is also an ideal.

1 Ibid., 2:681-682.

2 This is over and above this coincidence, and does not follow directly from it. If it did, there would be no foundation problem.
Self-evidence itself, we said, is the act of this most perfect synthesis of fulfilment. Like every identification, it is an objectifying act, its objective correlate being called being in the sense of truth, or simply truth - if one does not prefer to award this term to another concept of the many that are rooted in the said phenomenological situation.\(^1\)

The reason Husserl uses the expression 'being in the sense of truth, or simply truth' has its roots in the sustained lack of ontological commitment which governs the Logical Investigations.

Not in reflection upon judgements, nor even upon fulfilments of judgements, but in the fulfilments of judgements themselves lies the true source of the concepts State of Affairs and Being (in the copulative sense). Not in these acts as objects, but in the objects of these acts, do we have the abstractive basis which enables us to realize the concepts in question.\(^2\)

The expression 'being' refers to some object actually given before our philosophical regard, when the object is given as we mean it, in an objectifying act.

Husserl remembers Kant's dictum that 'being is no real predicate' but Husserl is not talking of anything real, but rather of the quality of fulfillment.\(^3\) The expression is extremely unusual in the Logical Investigations, and perhaps superfluous. Being is used to indicate that a judgement is operative, and Husserl describes judgements as assertive acts in general.\(^4\) When we assert that something is thus and so, we are asserting its character without existential commitment.

Similarly, the ultimate frustration of a meaning intention would yield falsehood in the sense of non-being, or an experience of

\(^1\)Husserl, Logical Investigations, 2:765.
\(^2\)Ibid., 2:783-784.
\(^3\)Ibid., 2:765, 780-786.
\(^4\)Ibid., 2:769.
absurdity. In this context, it is a pure impossibility that one hypothetical subject could perceive the self-evidence of a proposition, while another hypothetical subject perceive the same proposition to be absurd.

Such doubts are only possible as long as self-evidence and absurdity are interpreted as peculiar (positive or negative) feelings which, contingently attaching to the acts of judgement, impart to the latter the specific features which we assess logically as truth and falsehood.  

This concludes the treatment of evidence in the Logical Investigations. The theory outlined is an a priori theory, it is pure in this sense, and it strives to be scientific, that is, presuppositionless. Husserl claims that instances of apodicticity can be acquired, without necessarily fully realizing the ideal of adequation. If the ideal is realized, it cannot be contradicted. If it cannot be contradicted, it can be repeated by any subject whatsoever. Adequation, therefore, implies universality, just as universality implies repeatability.  

The ideal unity of all instances of adequation is claimed to be co-extensive with the arena of philosophical knowledge as a whole. In the event that an overestimation of the status of a particular proposition is made, the provision for revising the proposition is left open.

This is exactly what Husserl does in texts which follow the

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1Ibid.
2Ibid.
3Repeatability is always repeatability in principle. I do not think this leads to transcendental solipsism based on my argument against the Cartesian reading of Husserl. See Chapter II below.
LI. Thus, I will outline in the next two chapters the modifications and clarifications of the theory of evidence which occur in the CM and FTL.

As a final comment on the LI, let me say that there are great difficulties with this text. I have attempted to extract the merits of the text, and I think the merits are, in fact, profound. Husserl was well aware that the LI once set in motion was difficult to alter and edit into a truly acceptable form. Books (and I suppose these, for that matter) have a style which, once established, is difficult to alter midway through. Compare these comments with the final word which I leave to Husserl:

> Once again the old proverb came true: that books have their destinies...Only very recently have these systematic studies led me back into the territories where my phenomenological researches originated, and have recalled me to my old work on the foundations of pure logic which has so long awaited completion and publication. Divided as I am between intensive teaching and research, it is uncertain when I shall be in a position to adapt my old writings to the advances made since and to recast their literary form.\(^1\)

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\(^1\)Husserl, Logical Investigations, p. 661. This excerpt was taken from the 1920 Forward to Volume Two, Part Two of the second German edition.
Chapter II

Distilling refinements of the theory of evidence from the Cartesian Meditations

1. Situating the text in the context of Husserl's corpus

There are some striking and obvious differences between the formulation of phenomenology found in the CM, as opposed to that found in the LI. Many commentators, notably Levin on the evidence problem, take the CM as a more definitive statement of phenomenology in general. Traditionally, the CM is viewed as a much more mature position than the LI. Actually, we see from Cairns that the CM was written over a period of time, finishing somewhere approximately around 1933, despite its earlier translation and publication into French in 1931.¹ The original text is dated 1929, and we note that the forward to volume 2, part 2 of the LI is dated 1920² indicating that a relatively short period of time separates Investigations VI and the CM.

Cairns further records that the purpose of the CM was to provide the public with a more accessible introduction to phenomenology that the LI provides, or the Ideas.³ Furthermore, the CM is a rewriting of

¹Cairns, Conversations with Husserl and Fink, p. 10 for these dates. Note that Husserl says to Cairns that "the Méditations Cartésiennes must be read like a mathematical work. He spoke of phenomenological work as even stricter than mathematical work." Note: The sixth meditation was viewed primarily as Fink's work, not Husserl's. See Cairns, Conversations with Husserl and Fink, p. 102.
²Husserl, Logical Investigations, 2:664.
³Cairns, Conversations with Husserl and Fink, p. 2.
lecture notes as made manifest by its similarity to the *Paris Lectures*\(^1\) and the *Idea of Phenomenology*, written in 1907.\(^2\)

While there is no doubt that Husserl's position is maturing in accordance with the program he had set up earlier, by the time of writing the *CM*, the *FTL* is a much more thorough work. The style of presentation in *CM* has misled, I believe, many (Carr, etc.)\(^3\) to place undue emphasis upon the neo-Cartesian mode of entering into phenomenological investigation. Husserl's statements in later works (*The Crisis*, and *FTL*) indicate that the neo-Cartesian mode is one manner of leading a reflective philosopher into phenomenology. Husserl tends to give the impression to readers of the *CM* that he is convinced that he is establishing a universal self-grounded, comprehensive, and internally complete philosophy in the *CM* itself. We can say definitively, on the basis of Husserl's programmatic statements, that he never was convinced that phenomenology as a rigorous science is established in the *CM*.

Having placed the text of the *CM* in relation to the *LI* and *FTL*, some clarification of the way evidence is presented in the *CM* is called for. Since the *CM* is more extensively commented upon in the literature, an exposition or rational reconstruction is not necessary as it was in the case of the *LI*.

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What I propose to do instead is to address each major element used by Husserl to characterize evidence after the transcendental reformulation of the problem. I intend to maintain a high overview of the text in order to try to avoid missing the forest for the trees. In effect there will be a suspension of the arguments which occur within the CM, in order to concentrate on the refinements of the evidence problematic which occur therein.

2. Privileged Access: the reduction and epochés

A claim can easily be construed to run through the CM that we have privileged access to the reformulation of the evidence problem in explicitly transcendental terms by virtue of two intellectual maneuvers: the reduction and the set of epoché which can be performed.  

Let us consider the notion of the reduction first. The reduction is properly a comprehensive intellectual decision. The transcendental phenomenological reduction occurs in the CM after Husserl has already spent long years meditating on Kant's work and after his efforts at transcendental philosophy in the LI.  

1 At least those that are novel to the CM formulation.  

2 For the standard exposition on the reduction, cf. Pietersma's "Husserl's Views on the Evident and the True", Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals, ed. by Elliston and McCormick, especially pp. 45-46. Pietersma calls it an insight that the world might not exist, rather than a thought experiment; therefore, he is in error.  

3 Gaston Berger's excellent study, The Cogito in Husserl's Philosophy, translated by Kathleen McLaughlin, with an introduction by James M. Edie, Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972) is of help clarifying the reduction and the transcendental ego:

Placing the phenomenological reduction at the center of philosophy is precisely the way to show that the "cogito" is reached only at the end of a special and prolonged effort, without which we could not strictly say that we think (pp. 65-66).
transcendental clarification of knowledge contrary to what the majority of commentators suggest (Levin, Ricoeur, Natanson, etc.) and Husserl states this clearly:

Its aim is not to explain knowledge in the psychological or psychophysical sense as a factual occurrence in objective nature, but to shed light on the idea of knowledge in its constitutive elements and laws.

and moreover, he asserts to Cairns in 1931 in a conversation:

Husserl's dirty work was largely done in the Logische Untersuchungen and the first

The Logical Investigations did in fact continually return to the central ideas of consciousness and subjectivity. Their transcendental origin remained to be discovered. In his basic preoccupation with "sense", the theory of intentionality, and the procedure of "eidetic reduction", Husserl possessed the essential elements that permitted him to posit the "cogito" in the very way he posited it in his most recent works, that is, at the end of the original step that he calls "phenomenological reduction". As Edith Stein quite justly notes, "Husserl was able to arrive there without passing through Cartesian doubt". (Berger quoting Stein, La Phénoménologie, report on the colloquium of September 12, 1932) (Juvisy, 1932), p. 46.

Berger also notes how aware Descartes was of many of the problems which Husserl later addresses, which is very just in my opinion. One cannot say that Descartes was ignorant of this domain if one believes the words he puts in the mouth of Poliandre in the final lines of what has reached us of the Search for Truth: "There are so many things contained in the idea of a thinking thing that entire days would be needed to explicate them". (Berger quoting Recherche de la vérité, ed. Adam and Tannery, X, 527 (trans. Bridoux, Œuvres de Descartes (Paris: Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 1937), p. 690), p. 110.

Husserl, Logical Investigations, 1:265. See also 2:222.
workings out of the rough outline of the
constitution of the objective world.¹

I will make no attempt whatsoever to sort out why the commentators
believe the myths put forth about the LI (for example, Natanson claims
that it has nothing to do with phenomenology proper) apart from pointing
out again that this is not Husserl's opinion concerning the text. What
this has to do with the transcendental phenomenological reduction (here-
after the reduction proper) is to make clear that this intellectual
maneuver (that is, the reduction) can be understood only if it is taken
to represent a condensation² of several developed philosophical attitudes.
These include:

(a) the idea of striving towards presuppositionlessness³

(b) the transformation of our actual acquired knowledge from the
naive straightforward attitudes to a truly philosophical
understanding

(c) the identification of constituting sense in intentional
performances.

All of this Husserl has already thought of quite a lot before

¹ Cairns, Conversations with Husserl and Fink, p. 23. Note: "dirty
work" always means basic ground work or consideration of foundation.

² Cf. H.L. van Breda "A note on reduction and authenticity according
to Husserl" in Elliotson and McCormick's Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals,
p. 124.

³ Clearly, Husserl is also committed to the view that radical independ-
ence of mind is a necessary condition for making a contribution in
philosophy. Cf. Husserl's letter to Brentano, dated October 4, 1904:
Always inclined to acknowledge the superiority of others
and to let them lead me upward, again and again I find my-
self compelled to part company with them and to seek my
own way.

Taken from Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement: a historical
introduction, 2 vols., Phaenomenologica, 5-6, 2nd ed. (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1971), 1:89.
writing the CM, so it is a mistake to identify transcendental philosophy with this one condensed maneuver. While Husserl says that the reduction uncovers the realm of intentionality and consequently, evidence in the CM, surely we must take this in the context of treating the CM as a thought experiment (see Chapter III) within a broader perspective. On these grounds I rule out entering into the debate as to whether or not the reduction is or is not a guarantor of privileged access in and by itself.

Furthermore, the problem of the status of the world after the reduction and how we get back to the world that we lost somehow, strikes me as an inappropriate and mistaken formulation of the whole procedure. We never leave the world, but really, the problem is that the world as we normally perceive it is all too obvious:

How is the naive obviousness of the certainty of the world, the certainty in which we live—and, what is more, the certainty of the everyday world as well as that of the sophisticated theoretical constructions built upon this everyday world—to be made comprehensible?!

We cannot enter into a transcendental clarification of de facto knowledge acquisitions if we were entering into some normal solipsism by virtue of the reduction. But we are not entering into a normal solipsism.²


²Compare this quote, taken from Formal and Transcendental Logic, pp. 241-242:

But the solution of this enigma lies, firstly, in the systematic unravelling of the constitutional problems implicit in the fact of consciousness which is the world always existing for me, always having and confirming its sense by my experience; and, secondly, in progressively advancing exhibitions that follow the hierarchical sequence of problems.
As Husserl knew perfectly well, the problem of even a transcendental solipsism is artificial, but it is taken seriously only in the context of the CM, never anywhere else. The purpose of the thought experiment of the CM is to highlight the comprehensiveness of intentionality, that is, that our theories, languaging, culture and pre-suppositions structure or present the world in a certain fashion. The idea is to try to acquire a personal sense of where this structuring, or intending, is appropriate to the range of phenomena under observation. This is why I call the reduction a transformation to intentional or transcendental reflection. Therefore, the extensive debate as to whether we can reacquire the world after we perform the reduction is contrived based on a misunderstanding, and furthermore, as Husserl knew perfectly well, the reduction is impossible to enact in one mental operation (as if by magic).¹

Concerning the epochés, I make a distinction between the reduction and the epochés on the model that the epochés concern a detail of the world, or an individual transcendental transformation of a problem. So, for example, with the endless set of presuppositions that we find as a result of our reflections both in and out of the Cartesian formulation, with each presupposition uncovered and judged to be unmerited and a naivete.

¹Cf. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. xiv. I think that the incompleteness of the reduction was never a problem for Husserl. Merleau-Ponty made this a problem for himself based on his reading of Husserl. It is not a problem for Husserl in the sense that it is a basic observation for all phenomenologists that the depths of intentional analysis do not leap out at us with one attempt at the reduction. This is an important element in my argument regarding the mistake of considering only the Cartesian formulation of phenomenology, to which the French commentators, predictably enough, often fall prey.
we then can choose to place it in abeyance while we perform an individual piece of philosophical analysis.¹

3. The Transcendental Ego

In the formulation we find in CM, the transcendental ego is represented as the acceptance basis of all our objective acceptances.² Again, I am systematically refusing to enter in the egological formulation of phenomenology³ and rather choose to treat the CM as one of many formulations of the problem, in other words as a thought experiment (cf. Chapter III). Despite the prevalence of commentaries going in the other direction, I claim to be following Husserl's own directions on how to understand his work. We see, for example, Cairns reporting that Husserl tells him:

But it is important to see that the phenomenological reduction does not involve a suspension of thetic activity. This characteristic it has in common with the above-described "suspension" of judgment. The naive setting of the world still goes on. The epoché is one exercised by the ego, not as directly living its intentionalities, but as reflecting on them. As phenomenologically reflecting upon itself and its acts, the ego does not participate in the doxic element involved in its acts.⁴

³Cf. A. Gurwitsch, "A Non-Egological Conception of Consciousness", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, II (1942), 551-58. It is outside the scope of the thesis to include extensive consideration of Gurwitsch's work, but I find it closer to mine where he says, for example, "Perhaps these situations would not have turned out as they did, had not so much time and energy been wasted in 'existential interpretations' of concrete human situations, but had rather been concentrated upon the examination of these conditions with minds of impartial intellectual probity to disclose their structures, to obtain, that is to say, insight and rational knowledge about them."
⁴Cairns, Conversations with Husserl and Fink, p. 12.
Of course, we cannot suspend all doxic commitments, this is a representation of the ideal of presuppositionlessness. My purpose here is to search for a way of speaking about the transcendental ego that makes some sense in a contemporary idiom and not to merely repeat the party-lines\(^1\) so often uttered by philosophers sympathizing with Husserl.

The transcendental ego has two basic factors:

(a) it is an ideal representation of the commitment to searching for presuppositionlessness in the sense of justifying (cf. Kant) any presupposition by acquiring rational assent that just such a presupposition is necessary and is therefore no longer naively in operation, but self-consciously in operation;

(b) it refers to an actually given person\(^2\) who is reflecting philosophically in a disciplined mode, trying to diminish the gap between understanding mediated, i.e., on the basis of commitment to some theorizing, and what he himself understands immediately as a personal acquisition.

Husserl, of course says in the CM in section 11, that the

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\(^1\)I am strongly committed to the view that we must always guard against the problem of developing a self-referential inbred language which precludes utilizing research from other disciplines.

\(^2\)David Carr makes this same point in "Kant, Husserl, and the Non-empirical Ego," Journal of Philosophy 74, no. 11 (November 1977), 682-690, specifically p. 685:

Unlike many of his commentators, Husserl does not confuse the transcendental ego with the eidos ego (which is more properly called the "eidos transcendental ego") mentioned in the Cartesian Meditations. The latter is clearly an eidos, not an ego. The transcendental ego is clearly to be regarded as an individual. Transcendental philosophy, he says, is "the knower's reflecting upon himself and his knowing life." The course of all transcendental philosophy assertions is "I myself." Carr quoting Husserl's The Crisis, p. 97f.

transcendental ego is different from the psychological ego, and that the transcendental ego, and that the transcendental ego is "not a piece of the world".¹ However, in this non-Cartesian reformulation of the Meditations based on an anticipation of the explication of the experimental thinking form called imaginative variation, we do not have to argue from within the Cartesian formulation.² There is some support within the CM for such an interpretation. Husserl says "the transcendental ego is inseparable from the process making up his life."³ On the face of it, here we seem to have the transcendental ego in a non-reduced state, trying to acquire certainty about the world, which, for sake of the thought experiment, is only posited. This leads to the alleged transcendental solipsism on the one hand, or to the more basic rejection of phenomenology as trying to posit a subjective criteria for knowledge to replace the normal verifying procedures with which we conduct science, mathematics, or logic.⁴

I wish to suggest that it makes a lot more sense to think of the transcendental ego as any person philosophizing who is aware of the

¹Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 25.
²Compare with Ricoeur's formulation:
Is the whole set of problems concerning being (être) annulled by the reduction? In order to affirm this, it is necessary to decide whether this problem-set is entirely contained in the natural attitude, that is to say, in the positing of each particular being (étant) absolutely, without relation to consciousness. It must be admitted that Husserl never brought this problem directly into the open.
³Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 65.
⁴Cf. Basic distinction, in my Introduction.
structuring character of languaging, and consequently, all theorizing about the world.

If we refer back to the important considerations Husserl gives us in the Prolegomena to the Pure Logic (cf. Chapter I), the idea is to acquire an understanding of the sense in which formal logic proofs are, in fact, proofs. Clearly this is an extension of the Kantian notion of transcendental apperception where the "I think" can accompany all our representations which is distinguished from empirical apperception, where "consciousness of self according to the determinations of our state in inner perception is (merely) empirical and always changing."  

With Kant, the source of such synthesis is imagination, as with Husserl. Without getting into that labyrinth of the Critique of Pure Reason in too much detail, one of the problems with Kant's treatment of the imagination is that he seems to limit it to the normal way of thinking that it is "the faculty of representing in intuition an object which is not itself present."  

The critical difference here with Husserl's formulation is that his goal is not to merely show that in principle we can argue a priori that the "I think" can accompany all our representations, but rather, to bring this actually reflecting "I think" to accompany some of the

1 This neologism is coined throughout phenomenological literature. The justification is that language is considered as an intentional performance structuring the world as experienced. The act-character is emphasized by this formulation.

2 Viewed this way, then, the Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations is reflecting as a transcendental ego.

3 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 136 (A 107) and p. 154 (B 135).


5 Ibid., p. 170 (B 160), and p. 165 (B 152).

6 Ibid., p. 164 (B 151).
representations immediately before us. This could be called first order thinking, that is, not talking about philosophizing, or referring to debates which occur in the literature, but rather, taking a position. Here I will quote Cairns, and in doing so in this context, I am using his words, therefore, to express my position:

No opinion is to be accepted as philosophical knowledge unless it is seen to be adequately established by observation of what is seen as itself as given "in person". Any belief seen to be incompatible with what is seen to be itself given is to be rejected. Toward opinions that fall in neither class—whether they be one's own or another's—one is to adopt an "official" philosophical attitude of neutrality.2

The 'in person' notion, in effect, indicates that we are taking a position and this would be tantamount to relying on a subjectivist criteria for knowledge if there was no additional test. But there is an additional test and it is the test of repeatability, the test that other like-minded thinkers come up with the same conclusion, and the test of comprehensiveness of our understanding.3

What is given to us when we reflect as transcendental egos is apodictic,4 but it is not apodictic and adequate. To be adequate, we would

1In Ideas this is called "doxic positionality". See Ideas, sections 102-106.
3Here the distinction between apodictic and adequate evidence is required and entailed.
4Every effort has been made in Chapter I to characterize apodicticity, but Husserl does not offer a definition of apodicticity. Cf. Logical Investigations, p. 60-61:

Rather we may say that, if it is to be called 'knowledge' in the narrowest, strictest sense, it requires to be evident, to have the luminous certainty that what we have acknowledged is, that what we have rejected is not, a certainty distinguished in familiar fashion from blind belief, from vague opinion however firm and decided, if we are not to be shattered on the rocks of extreme scepticism. Cf. also the Cartesian Meditations, pp. 151-152, where Husserl says that there are ranges, limits, and modes of apodicticity. It seems this kind of certainty is specific to the area of thematic focus and requires an a priori transformation. See below, section 2, point 5.
have to have a complete fulfillment of our meaning intentions expressed in linguistic format before our regard. This of course, is really not possible, and is the reason why Husserl comes up with the notion of a horizon, which means in effect, that we are projecting with our imaginations, a range of possible fulfillments based on a representative sample. I think it is arguable that this is precisely what Kant is appealing to when he concludes that the "I think" can accompany all our representations. One flaw in the Critique of Pure Reason is that Kant does not explicitly name this as the criteria for the certainty of his merited judgement, and his own criteria for knowledge in the strict sense, (that is, understanding (schematized) combined with an object of possible experience) we would not be able to claim that we know strictly that the "I think" could accompany all the representations. Hence, Kant would be begging the question in this limited and reflexive sense.  

4. Mediate versus Immediate (or the problem of prepredicative experience) 

There are problems associated with the notion of immediacy, especially if we take the idea of intentionality seriously. If something is given to us immediately, then how are we to account for the universality

\[1\text{Cf. my Chapter I.}\]

\[2\text{Cf. The argument of the Schematism thus makes use of the idea that a category brings it about that the manifold can be thought of as all experienced by me, as objective, and as permitting self-awareness ("contains pure synthetic unity of the manifold in general"). Hence it might be objected that, rather than grounding the legitimacy of the employment of the categories to "make experience possible", it presupposes it.}\]


\[3\text{There are innumerable other examples of such beggings the question. For example, A.J. Ayer begs the question with his weak verifiability principle, which cannot be used to justify Ayer's own philosophical claims. This parenthetically, is an example of the naiveté of apodicticity to which Husserl refers.}\]
of intentional process? Let me formulate this a little differently. The notion is that we experience an exact convergence between mediating intentions and the fulfillment of these intentions which occurs after the transcendental turn, which causes our focus to shift specifically into the intentional realm.¹ The idea latent here is the prepredicative experience, usually associated with the naive pretranscendental turn consciousness. This is further complicated by the observation that virtually none of these problems occur without utilising phenomenology as mediating theorizing to make the observations. Here we seem to be involved in a hopeless paradox which suggests that immediate apprehension is a highly mediated concept. Moreover, for all of those influenced by the notion of the linguistic turn, we see that it is incredibly difficult to refer to a conscious or perceptual process without using language, and these judgements are echoed by Husserl in the LI².

Also, we have before us that any acquisitions in the realm of non-phenomenological straight-forward theorizing, structure and clarify our vision of the phenomena at hand. Whole ranges of observations are simply not possible without previous knowledge, and we do not have to go to some high realm of theoretical physics to see the prevalence of this phenomena. If, therefore, all theories are mediating devices and our goal is to arrive at an immediate presentation (i.e., immediate intuition) and we cannot eliminate theorizing, then we must recharacterize our goal as the attempt to transform such pre-existing theories into personal,

¹Sedimented intentions contributing to the constitution of the thematic object in question and it is these intentions that are explicated. See below, section 2, point 5.
²Cf. Chapter I.
immediate acquisitions which we ourselves understand. Again, let me refer you to the first chapter, and to Mach's comment about the mathematician who has the impression that "one's pencil and paper are cleverer than one's self".¹

In the normal conception of intersubjective validity, the idea is of course, not to rely on what any given individual understands, but to rather have a cumulatively evolving technique that guarantees dependable results. On this model, mediated judgements are perfectly acceptable; but for a philosophical comprehension of why our procedures give us dependable results, this is unacceptable, and is indeed what Husserl refers to as the Crisis.

`Technik is something which can be learned without learning the culture behind it.²`

In order to comprehend with something approaching adequacy, we must have some understanding of how it relates to our history and culture in general. We must always, therefore, distinguish between verification and proof on the one hand, and adequate understanding on the other. This also indicates the necessity of historical reflection in philosophical discourse.

Consider the following anecdote. I was having a conversation with a Ph.D. candidate in molecular biology who had sufficiently mastered the techniques of science to teach at university level, who confided in me in extremely serious tones that "the trouble with scientists is that they say two plus two equals four, but they believe it!" Further inquiry disclosed that he believed the universe was populated with hobbit like creatures and thought that until scientists realized the truth

¹Cf. Chapter I.
²Cairns, Conversations with Husserl and Fink, p.8.
of this marginally sane vision, no serious results would occur. This type of uncomprehending blind and successful following of technique is much more prevalent than one would suspect, and is by no means adequately expressed in Russell's little maxim that no one is perfectly consistent.¹

5. Apodictic and Adéquate

These two technical expressions are more than occasionally confused by commentators, or at least inadequately distinguished.² It should always

¹I offer these anecdotal comments without apology:
Science is made by men, a self-evident fact that is far too often forgotten.
Popper makes the point even more explicit:
By emphasizing the role played by the observer, the investigator, the theorist, Kant made an indelible impression not only upon philosophy but also upon physics and cosmology. There is a Kantian climate of thought without which Einstein's theories or Bohr's are hardly conceivable...Here, I believe, is a wonderful philosophical find. It makes it possible to look upon science, whether theoretical or experimental, as a human creation, and to look upon its history as part of the history of ideas, on a level with the history of art or of literature.

²Cf. Levin, Reason and evidence in Husserl's phenomenology, p. 150:
Our demonstration stands unless it can be shown that inadequacy does not entail non-apodicticity, or unless the contention that adequate evidence is not feasible in the eidetic sphere can be refuted by a phenomenological analysis of the evidences involved.
Levin's conclusion beginning on page 203 is dependent upon his confusing these two notions.
Cf. Hemmendinger, "Husserl's phenomenological program: a study of evidence and analysis", dissertation presented at Yale. See his section beginning on page 110 entitled "Adequacy and apodicticity", especially page 115:
This clarification shows that adequacy and apodicticity (at the level of natural eidetic science) are two moments of the same thing, the formal system, and that without the entire system of mathematics it is impossible to understand the relation between them.
We see that Prof. Hemmendinger also confuses scientific verification, mathematical proofs and Husserl's transcendental reformulation of the evidence problem and in doing so clouds the entire issue. Cf. my introduction.
be clear in our minds that the further test of adequation is to offset the more obviously subjective criteria of apodicticity. If this was not the case Husserl would be justifiably criticized as a sceptical subjectivist.

Apodictic perception has priority as Husserl emphasizes in the CM. It is clear that apodictic perception is the same as apodictic experience. It is always a perspectival viewing of any problem and is clearly the case that the syntheses any of the great philosophers construct are just such perspectival viewings. While it is probably obvious to my readers that we can construct a reinterpretation of the history of philosophy based on any sufficiently powerful synthesis, bear with me while I claim that most philosophers appeal to their 'vivid' or 'eidetic' perspectival viewings. So even Popper's perception of the merits of fallibilism is apodictic to Popper.\(^1\) The reason why the apodictic has priority as far as Husserl is concerned is because it has relative immediacy (Cf. above). It represents a position taking and it is a variation\(^2\) of the prerequisite apperception insofar as the "I think" can accompany such experiences when they are expressed in statements.

Husserl claims that the apodictic is provisional, and carries a certain sort of naiveté. This should never strike us as contradictory, since our mode of constituting a problem is the result of accrued sedi-

\(^1\)The reader can extend this to any examples which occur to him, for example, to Ludwig Wittgenstein's *On Certainty*, or to Kant's conviction that ...

\(^2\)See Chapter III.
mentations acquired by the history of reflection, learned through the personal history of the individual mediator. It is in this sense that Husserl is quite right in claiming repeatedly that the whole of phenomenology is the radical self-clarification on the part of transcendental subjectivity.¹

All transcendental-philosophical theory of knowledge, as "criticism of knowledge," leads back ultimately to criticism of transcendental-phenomenological knowledge (in the first sense, criticism of transcendental experience); and, owing to the essential reflexive relation of phenomenology to itself, this criticism also demands a criticism.²

As the reader knows, I have suspended the specific formulation of the problem as it occurs in the CM and am occupied with the question: "What does Husserl appeal to?" and the project of translating this into a relatively current idiom. I think the error of apodicticity, although not in this precise formulation, is constantly before us. One of the forms it takes on a more mundane level is the tendency to overestimate the explanatory power, for example, of the discipline within which a researcher (working scholar or professional) is working.³ Perhaps this is even an informal law, but let us just make the weak claim that the

¹See, for example, Cartesian Meditations, p. 83 Section 41, or p. 151, Section 63.

²Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 152.

³Undoing this would be a fairly correct example of the application of self-clarification which is arguably similar to applying the notion of critical dialectic in Kant.
tendency is prevalent and unless explicitly guarded against, leads to unnoticed problems.

The idea of formulating problems based on a series of intentional activities is inherent in Husserlian phenomenology and the failure to observe such performances can be equated with what is technically referred to as naïveté. Therefore, the idea of overestimation (see above) is entailed in the notion of apodicticity. If there was some guarantee of insight and understanding just by virtue of the elementary stage of acknowledging perspectival viewing and the primordiality of apodicticity, then Husserl would be appealing to a privileged experience not accessible by other minds (perhaps even in principle), and his work should be dismissed. Apodicticity is always subjected to further self-clarification which entails a movement towards adequacy.

In Chapter I (above), I have taken pains to show that adequacy is:

(a) a performance on the part of a subject
(b) a matter of degree
(c) is progressive (fulfillment)
(d) must be repeatable (i.e., alter ego given in pairing)
(e) is an ideal which we do not reach
(f) can be understood only within an intentional framework.

Therefore, we have the logic before us which Husserl uses to write the CM. What fulfills the notion of adequate evidence is composed of several sets representing an ideal.

In the first place, the constitution of the apodictic, to be adequately understood, necessarily involves acknowledgement of the historical character of language. Sedimentation is entailed in intentionality
and the sedimentation to which Husserl and all philosophers, for that matter, appeal, is the history of philosophical work which is imperfectly sedimented in our very formulation of the problems. So the adequate minimally involves the set of teleological-historical studies which Husserl projects (programmatically) using his imagination. I do not have to carry out all such possible historical studies and neither does he, in order to claim that the realization of adequate evidence which is identical with adequate philosophical understanding can be specified as involving minimally a developed sense of history. This history throws the shadow of its past on the present formulations. We have to understand how this here given (apodictic) formulation occurs.

It is to be noted in this connection that, in a free variation, I can phantasy first of all myself, this apodictic de facto ego, as otherwise and can thus acquire the system of possible variants of myself, each of which, however, is annulled by each of the others and by the ego who I actually am. It is a system of a priori incompossibility...

Such results and the course of the investigations lending to them enable us to understand how questions that, for traditional philosophy, had to lie beyond all the limits of science can acquire sense (regardless of how they may be decided)—for example, problems we touched on earlier.

This is identical with sense investigation; adequacy is realized in a set of intentional explications. It might very well be asked what sense it makes to outline criteria of adequate philosophical under-

1 Cf. the following statement by Husserl taken from the Cartesian Meditations, p. 140:
Actually, therefore, there can exist only a single community of monads, the community of all co-existing monads. Hence there can exist only one Objective world, only one Objective time, only one Objective space, only one Objective Nature. Moreover this one Nature must exist, if there are any structures in me that involve the co-existence of other monads.

2 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 141.
standing which is ideal and unrealizable. It seems on the face of it that we can say nothing at all that meets this set of criteria, since it is far too comprehensive.

6. **Summary and transition to the next chapter**

The following should now be relatively clear:

(1) what Husserl appeals to in writing the *CM* is an emphasis on the apodictic. We are entirely justified in stating that this entails a level of naïveté and Husserl is well aware of this shortcoming.

(2) that he fails to achieve adequacy in the *CM* is obvious and hardly merits comment. It is merely an introduction to the problem.

(3) any commentator who even entertains the equation of the apodictic with the adequate is confused.

(4) the reduction and epoché cannot be appealed to as the sole guarantee of adequacy.

(5) on the way to more adequate evidence, as an acquisition we must always return to the apodictic. That is to say, we must bring it to self-evidence in the ordinary sense that we ourselves must understand what we are claiming. Husserl’s technical term “self-evident” has no strong relationship to the usual naïve use of the expression (cf. above, part 2b). If the transcendental ego is entirely disassociated from actual individuals, no self-evidence occurs.

(6) Just as there are degrees of adequacy, there are degrees of presentation, immediacy, and intuition. None of these entail the appeal to some obscure occult perception. They all relate to the basic

1See above.

2This presumes an ontologically neutral stance.
distinction between the apodictic and adequate.

(7) that we cannot rely on the "intuitive" in the ordinary sense is clear. What is given as understanding is often given by virtue only of highly convoluted and sometimes unrecognized theorizing which Husserl places under the general category of mediation. We have two distinct choices to make:

(a) either we say what we understand ourselves is always subject to error; therefore we will look for some technique to guarantee inter-subjective (i.e., objective) validity by placing the subjective component systematically out of operation. (This is useful for verification and proofs); or

(b) that we try to acquire actual personal, immediate understanding of why our procedures make sense. This is the way out of the crisis in philosophy, or in science where scientists function as philosophers.

(8) the general way that Husserl acquires a greater degree of adequate evidence, which can then be transformed into relatively more apodictic evidence, is by thought experiments or imaginative variation, which is the subject of the next chapter.

(9) many problems associated with the CM disappear if it is read as an example of the application of imaginative varying. This is a textual point which was hard won and occurred as spin-off from my original focus and circumstentially indicated the advantages of organizing a reading of Husserl around the theme of the evidence problematic. (No doubt failure to do so makes the Fifth meditation seem impenetrable).

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Parenthetically, I would suggest that this becomes clear in Formal and Transcendental Logic, and that this book will remain opaque and confuse any reader who fails to appreciate the extensive explication of imaginative variation contained in it.
Thus the investigations concerning the transcendental constitution of a world, which we have roughly indicated in these meditations, are precisely the beginning of a radical clarification of the sense and origin (or of the sense in consequence of the origin) of the concepts: world, Nature, space, time, psychophysical being, man, psyche, animate organism, social community, culture, and so forth.

\[\text{---}\]

I would emphasize the word "roughly". Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 154.
Chapter III.

The role of the imagination as used in imaginative varying and
the attainment of evidence in Husserl's sense: Major emphasis.

FTL.

1. Preamble

I have yet to read an article in phenomenological journals that
begins with the phrase "let us freely and imaginatively vary the follow-
ing technical terms," nor have I heard this in graduate courses or pro-
fessional conferences. While there are some articles outlining character-
izations of what imaginative variation refers to in Husserl's work, the
process is rarely appealed to explicitly and reflexively by people working
in Husserlian style phenomenology.

It is fair to say that it remains one of the most obscure points
in Husserl's work, and it is also one of the invariant elements used in
his characterizations of evidence acquisitions. It is therefore important
to deal with it as Kuhn has wisely stated:

When reading the works of an important thinker, look
first for the apparent absurdities in the text and
ask yourself how a sensible person could have written
them. When you find an answer, . . . when these

I do not think that it is an accident that Husserl's doctoral dissert-
ation in mathematics which he submitted in Vienna in 1881 was on the calcu-
lus of variations, but I have by no means enough knowledge of mathematics
or the history of mathematics to draw out whatever implications there may
be here. See Natanson's biographical note to his preface to Edmund Husserl:
philosopher of infinite tasks, p. xiii.
passages makes sense, then you may find that more central passages, ones you previously thought you understood, have changed their meaning.

This is an expedient procedure to arrive at dependable understanding.

This notion (imaginative variation) provides us with the key to link the LI with CM and FTL. I have already used this notion to reformulate the CM in my Chapter II. I am arguing that a version of imaginative variation is used to write the LI and CM, but that Husserl's clearest treatment of it occurs in FTL and EJ. EJ is somewhat less dependable in light of Ludwig Landgrebe's substantial role in writing the book, despite Husserl's authorization of the elaborative effort.2

FTL started out as an introduction to EJ3 and is often linked with the positions expressed in CM. Superficially this is not surprising, since they were written in the same time frame. The formulations of the problems are quite different, and moreover, reinforce the importance of the LI by constant reference to the LI.

For anyone influenced by contemporary philosophy, appeals to the imagination and talk of essences should strike us as very suspect. I intend to first address each of these from outside the pure Husserlian framework to help the reader entertain the plausibility of Husserl's claims.

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3Occasionally, they are treated as one continuous work.
The major focus is on FTL since imaginative variation is treated quite clearly and explicitly in it. Many other themes already covered in this thesis which reoccur in FTL will not be readdressed.

2. The prevalence of the implicit and explicit appeal to the imagination

Scholars investigating problems both inside and outside of philosophy regularly utilize the imagination. Here are some obvious examples. If I succeed in pointing this out, perhaps the reader will begin to wonder why it is that so few epistemologists and philosophers of science devote much attention to clarifying how we might use the imagination in a more disciplined way, or at least recognize its role.

It is clear that Husserl rarely supplies us with examples. The reason for this is both obvious and striking. Examples rarely serve to adequately illustrate statements at the highest level of philosophical generality; they fall under the general point, but do not exactly illustrate it. This claim is not found in Husserl or in his commentators; nevertheless, I contend that it is obvious. Therefore I am supplying some

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1Professor Mario Bunge is an exception in his excellent appendix to his equally excellent book Causality: the place of the causal principle in modern science, Meridian books (Cleveland and New York: World Publishing Co., 1963), p. 357:

Science is the work of bold imagination no less than of patient work, and nobody can predict whence is the new light to come. As the mathematician, Isaac Schoenberg used to say, scientists need be given moral credit for their fantasies as much as they need financial credits. Still, the point stands that scientists acknowledge the imagination, but epistemologists rarely do so adequately.

2Cf. What game adequately illustrates Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical views concerning language games?
examples in advance, but I do not claim they perfectly illustrate Husserl's point.

2.1 Some Examples within philosophy

Kant is the most obvious choice when searching for a philosopher who speaks in a detailed fashion about the imagination. The difficulties in dealing with Kant are profound, and to avoid obscuring the point I wish to make, other examples will be used. We see Quine, for example, enjoining us to imagine throughout Word and Object:

We can imagine him partly settling that separation by what is vaguely called scientific method: by considerations of simplicity of the joint-theory of ordinary things and molecules.2

I do not think Quine is using the word "imagine" as a façon de parler, but rather, in order to follow many of his arguments, it is essential that we do use our imagination. Popper argues that:

It is this: every 'source'--tradition, reason, imagination, observation, or what not--is admissible and may be used, but none has any authority...But it is part of our critical and fallibilist approach: every source is welcome, but no statement is immune from criticism, whatever its 'source' may be.3

1 Cf. Kant's deprecation of the imagination upon which he is so dependent early in the Critique:

The products of the imagination are of an entirely different nature; no one can explain or give an intelligible concept of them; each is a kind of monogram, a mere set of particular qualities, determined by no assignable rule, and forming rather a blurred sketch drawn from diverse experiences than a determinate image--a representation such as painters and physiognomists profess to carry in their heads, and which they treat as being an incommunicable shadowy image of their creations or even of their critical judgements.

Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, p.487 (B598).


So Popper considers that the imagination in general can be a 
source for information, but that, of course, we might be mistaken. This 
is surely very close to Husserl's sustained claim (on my interpretation) 
that what is acquired apodictically by a subject is more dependable than 
what is not so acquired. However, this does not guarantee adequacy and 
therefore, the apodictic is subject to further tests. That is, what is 
given as certain might no longer be so given after further investigation. 
Returning to Popper, it is just as well that he at least recognizes that 
the imagination is a source of something since he is impressed by Einstein 
as a philosopher (quite correctly in my judgement) and Einstein himself 
repeatedly refers to how important this source was for him:

When I examine myself and my methods of thought I 
come to the conclusion that the gift of fantasy has 
meant more to me than my talent for absorbing 

There are numerous passages in Einstein's biography which substantiate that this was his sustained opinion. I think this is hardly surprising, since the level of generality or abstraction\footnote{Cf. EJ, section 92. "The hierarchical structure of pure generalities and the acquisition of the highest concrete genera (regions) by the variation of ideas" p.356.} that Einstein's work was conducted at seems, on the basis of common sense, to require imagination, and a highly disciplined one at that.\footnote{See also the invitations to engage in thought experiments at the end of Popper's Conjectures and Refutations Harper Torchbooks (New York: Harper & Row, 1968).} While I claim no 
competence to comment on theoretical physics, I would suggest
that Einstein's¹ description of how he worked could be commented upon separately.

Although I think my point is already well made for the reader to supply similar examples for himself, consider one last case. In ethics, we often are enjoined to imagine other situations designated like circumstances so therefore R.M. Hare, for example, also appeals to the imagination. All hypothetical situations and consequences tax our imaginative powers, so discourse about ethics, including discourse about the language of ethics (or the way we transcendentally constitute ethics) can simply not be understood without our imagination.²

If this is so, why not address the problem explicitly or make it thematic, to use Husserl's phrase.

¹Compare the letter of Einstein to Popper in 1935:

Altogether I really do not at all like the now fashionable "positivistic" tendency of clinging to what is observable. I regard it as trivial that one cannot, in the range of atomic magnitudes, make predictions with any desired degree of precision, and I think (like you, by the way), that theory cannot be fabricated out of the results of observation, but that it can only be invented.


²I should add that in ethics while we all recognize that good judgement in a specific situation is essential to having good moral judgement, it is generally not observed that a prerequisite to having good judgement is the ability to imagine the implications of the situation and of any action that is going to be taken and to imagine, moreover, the consequences of the actions that are going to be taken; how the action, taken in its broadest possible sense, will affect other people, other situations, and furthermore, to imagine even what like subjects would do if we refer to Kant's famous maxim in the same situation. Therefore, it is even prior to the criteria of universalizability. In order to understand the criteria of universalizability, we must use the imagination.
2.2 **Some examples outside philosophical discourse**

This is much easier, and I will not go into much detail.

a) It is widely known that governments and military strategists use the technique of scenario building to plan courses of action. Clearly this is speculation as to the outcome of events given certain possible reactions and interactions. Two obvious examples are planning MAD (i.e., Mutually Assured Destruction) and attempting to forecast election results given this or that set of policy decisions. While this is outside the realm of either precise science or epistemology, clearly it indicates the prevalence of appeals to uses of the imagination for problem solving.¹

b) Whenever we have a theory that strikes us as in need of verification and we thereby design an experiment to test it, we must first imagine the range of possible experiments that can do this job. It is certain that this is a stage preceding verification. It does not supply us with verification, but we may exclude a range of possibilities as unsuitable.² This requires no elaborate substantiating documentation, for every day there are students and faculty pacing the halls trying to dream up possible experiments if only to double check work from another angle.³

¹With reference to the logic of the wholes and the parts as found in the LI and considered completely abstractly: when you have a part of a situation and you try to determine the whole of the situation, no matter what that situation might be, it is very obvious that what you do (it is very obvious that it is, apodictically certain), that what in fact occurs, is that you project a horizon using your imagination.

²Cf. Popper, *Conjectures and refutations.*

³"b" is a thought experiment.
3. Essence: a highly problematic concept

If we jump ahead and state that the technique of imaginative variation is how we intuit an essence\(^1\) and acquire a higher level of adequation and thus acquire evidence in Husserl's sense, we would be presuming far too much. We would be passing over very important lessons from contemporary philosophy.

In the first place, the notion 'essence' is seen to be dispensable and quite rightly. Non phenomenological essences\(^2\) are problematic. I shall take it for granted that only antiquarians think it is necessary to use the expression 'essence'. In a seminar on Aristotle we might use the expression 'essence' but we could not seriously believe that this expression is necessary to formulate philosophical problems even in a regulative fashion (in the Kantian sense) and in short, we should really conclude that 'essences' indicate so vague an approximation\(^3\) that using the notion is suitable for myths, poetry, and the like, but not science or philosophy.\(^4\)

3.1 Essence and Category

All this and a lot more should cause us to be very suspicious about the archaic expression 'essence' in Husserl's work. Of course it is a

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\(^1\) Cf. Sokolowski, *Husserlian Meditations*, pp. 57-85, his chapter on "How to intuit an essence".

\(^2\) Cf. Quine, *Word and Object*, p. 199:
Curiously, a philosophical tradition does exist for just such a distinction between necessary and contingent attributes. It lives on in the terms 'essence' and 'accident', 'internal relation' and 'external relation'.

\(^3\) Something like ether in discourse about the physical universe.

\(^4\) Our goals as phenomenologists is towards eliminating the occult metaphysical commitments philosophers have made.
highly technical expression and like all the expressions Husserl uses, it is dispensable or translatable within his own framework into other technical expressions. Husserl works with categories to which he does not fix precise definitions, but rather, uses a set of characterizations. Some of the features that characterize essence in Husserl are: invariant features, or persisting structure, and core-formation. This list could go on indefinitely, but we should not conclude that Husserl is imprecise as a result. There is such a wide range of possible formulations of the general problem of isolating what persists as a feature of intentionality that it would require an arbitrary decision to fix the meaning of 'invariant' or 'essence' by means of a definition.

3.2 A Note on Interpretation

I think it is fair to make a broad sweeping statement that most philosophers look for what is 'invariant.' I will first say that phenomenology in Husserl's sense is metaphilosophy and concerned with the foundation of our philosophical positions.

In a word, metaphilosophy is not a separate specialization inside the domain of philosophy in the way that philosophy of history or epistemology are; rather, metaphilosophical issues are issues that can arise inside any philosophical specialization.

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1Cf. Formal and Transcendental Logic, p. 121: That which comes into being and has come into being as judged in the judicative producing, that which then, as an ideal objectivity, is always reidentifiable, is it not, by definition, a judgment? Is it anything else but a categorical objectivity?

2See FTL, section 12, "The core-formation, with core-stuff and core-form," p. 309 ff.

3Peter McCormick, "Phenomenology and metaphilosophy" in Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals, p. 351.
Some broad statements about what philosophers do is called for when addressing Husserl's work.¹ Husserl recommends that we approach his work with "a vital readiness to understand" and the implication is that we should approach other philosophers with the same attitude. It is clear that Husserlian phenomenology supplies an apparatus with which to interpret and evaluate other philosophical work. Herein I am mainly concerned with applying this apparatus to interpret Husserl's work itself. Let us consider the notion of 'essence' from this angle.

I will not work out examples for this as I did above in 2.1 and 2.2 for the imagination.³ Just consider in general that formal logic seeks to isolate what is consistent in formal argument (cf. my Chapter I) and this could be called an heir to the vague notion of essence. Ludwig Wittgenstein's notions regarding language games and meaning as use, whether or not they are accurate or adequate, are attempts to isolate the invariant.

This could continue. The question remains whether the description of such general directions in philosophical inquiry should include the expression 'essence' and the resulting characterization entailed (i.e. constitution of the problem). The term 'essence' could be replaced by 'invariant feature' for example, and I think this is completely in line with Husserl's overall purpose. This procedure could be extended to many other technical expressions to great heuristic advantage.⁴

¹ These considerations are usually done in thought experiments which is the focus of this chapter.
² Husserl, The Crisis, p. 102.
³ Of course it is the case that there is hardly a philosophy book to be found which does not use the expression essence or essential.
⁴ For this reason, the Analytical Index at the end of André de Muralt's excellent commentary The Idea of Phenomenology, pp. 383-411, is flawed and not particularly helpful. The index at the end of the Gibson translation of Ideas I is similarly flawed, but less so.
4. Some indications of the transformation of imagination and essence within the transcendental perspective.

There are any number of indications (I hesitate to say arguments) of why the procedure of imaginative variation occurs with different emphases within the transcendental framework so elaborately outlined by Husserl from the time of the LI. Let me outline an obvious example of where Husserl repeats the idea of the transformation in the CM. In the section entitled "The idea of a transcendental grounding of knowledge" (section 12) which is obviously about transcendental philosophizing, he suggests we direct our attention to the "field" opened up by taking the transcendental turn:

...Instead of attempting to use ego cogito as an apodictically evident premise for arguments supposedly implying a transcendental subjectivity, we shall direct our attention to the fact that phenomenological epoché lays open (to me, the meditating philosopher) an infinite realm of being of a new kind, as the sphere of a new kind of experience: transcendental experience.²

Now we must remember that this quote is not an argument but a suggestion to entertain the extended thought experiment which the CM no doubt is. However, the way to see the field is clearly indicated after the above quoted by his implicit enjoiner to imagine like circumstances where the 'I think' could be modified by a little imaginative exercise. Examine the following:

When we take it into consideration that, for each kind of actual experience and for each of its universal variant modes (perception, retention, recollection, etc.),

¹The notion of transformation is developed in Chapter II regarding the epoché. I prefer this expression Guido Klöng's "transposition" in his article "The Phenomenological Reduction as Epoché and as Explication", The Monist 59 (January 1975), pp. 63-84.

²Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 27.
there is a corresponding pure phantasy, an "as-if experience" with parallel modes (as-if perception, as-if retention, as-if recollection, etc.), we surmise that there is also an apriori science, which confines itself to the realm of pure possibility (pure imaginableness) and, instead of judging about actualities of transcendental being, judges about its apriori possibilities and thus at the same time prescribes rules a priori for actualities.

Now it would be quite easy to illustrate why this quote makes little sense on its own by ignoring the exacting context which it occurs in. However, let us take it as an example of varying. When we experience, we can in effect generalize and say that there are an indefinite number of modes of experiencing. There is no problem with this, but to continue translating, we can also consider a type of experiencing that we are not currently having. This is why Husserl coins the expression "as-if". Moreover, this is possible, that is, we do not imagine any problem with it, but since it is being considered abstractly, we could think of it as a pure possibility. And lastly, possible types of experiencing should have bearing on what we actually experience.

I hope this little exercise in translation is not an affront to my readers' own abilities to do this for themselves when reading Husserl. I am trying to indicate that the phenomena of being able to consider the range of possible experience transcendently is a function of imaginative ability and is described by Husserl's characterization of imaginative variation.

\[\text{Ibid.}, \ pp \ 27-28. \ \text{Note:} \ \text{we could vary any type of experience; therefore if you link it to one type we will be making false claims. So my notion of transformation (Chapter II) can be applied to each and any thematic realm.}\]
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What has this to do with evidence considered after the transcendental turn? Evidence is no longer identified straightforwardly with verification or proofs. However, neither proofs (say in logic) nor verification (say of an empirical hypothesis) is questioned, but it is also not focused upon. Evidence is seen as understanding and a type of experience which is a possible experience or imaginative variation on the basic self-observation that all of us do indeed experience something. Evidence or understanding that something is the case is at least a type of experience, and this we can say on a priori grounds. Consider if evidence rested in the objects, verification, and proofs, but we could not experience these, what kind of a nightmare would we be faced with? Evidence in the mundane sense would exist, but we would know nothing about it.

As against this, the foregoing has already made it evident that a life of consciousness cannot exist without including evidence— if only by virtue of the sphere of immanent time—and also that, if we think of such a life as a consciousness relating to Objectivity, it cannot exist without including a stream of external experience.

So no matter what else is involved with understanding, we can state minimally that it, as experience, is an "a priori structural form

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1 I am presuming a distinction between verification in the naive sense and evidence within the transcendental framework (Cf. my basic distinctions in the Introduction and my Chapter I). Husserl does say "reason refers to possibilities of verification; and verification refers ultimately to making evident and having as evident" (Cartesian Meditations, p. 57). This does not nullify my distinction, but rather serves to illustrate its importance. The occurrence of de facto verification points to the transcendental problem of evidence as an acquisition on the part of reflecting subjectivity. Husserl himself presumes the distinction when he refers to evidential experience, which is on the side of the subject, not the object.

2 Cf. the elaboration of the bi-polar framework in my Chapter I.

3 Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, p. 289.
of consciousness."¹ Husserl suggests that this is essential to living, as we understand it, so these considerations are not so devoid of existential import.

"Evidence", or the giving of something-itself, as fulfillment, confirmation, verification, cancellation, falsity, practical failure, and so forth—all these are structural forms belonging a priori to the unity of a life; and the investigation of this unity, an investigation paying heed to and clarifying them all, is the immense theme of phenomenology.²

Minimally, we can say that the transcendental imagination in Husserl indicates a shift in our focus to experiencing and examining how we structure the world through intentional performances. The comprehensiveness of this is such that we examine how we structure (i.e. think of) or intend structuring. We can structure the world only in the framework of possible experience and we use our imagination to determine impossible experiencing.³

5. Attempting to condense Husserl's description of imaginative variation.

In the first place, all types of variation fall under the imagination.⁴ My thesis here is, in part, that the expression thought experiment is useful to characterize the cluster of technical terms indicated below.

¹Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, p. 289.
²Ibid., p. 289-290.
³We could say that this amounts to ontological clarification considered within the intentional framework.
⁴We start with some possible example. This can be any possible experience whatsoever. There are no limitations here. Such examples might be an experience of an argument form, a feeling, a willing, or a valuing.
Husserl uses a whole series of expressions\(^1\) to characterize it, depending on the context in which he is speaking. "Eidetic variation," for example, refers to the same process when we are trying to isolate what is persistently vivid with respect to a range of phenomena under consideration. Experience in the mode of "as-if" obviously is a mode of imaginative varying and I have indicated this above, that is, an experience that we are not currently having, but are considering it. Furthermore, an "adumbration" is still a variation; it is not a separate technical concept. Experience in the mode of "so forth" is referring to projecting a horizon and a horizon of possible fulfilments can only be projected using the imagination. Where Husserl says "free variation", he usually means that we are here performing a small époque\(^2\) to suspend ontological commitments. When Husserl indicates a realm of "free phantasy variation", he is talking about

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\(^1\)See Edward S. Casey, "The Image/Sign Relation in Husserl and Freud", Review of Metaphysics 30 (December 1976), 207-225. Casey used this notion without specifying it. Compare his retranslation of a critical section of Ideas with the original:

> in phenomenology as in all eidetic sciences, free images enjoy a privileged position in relation to perceptions... freedom in the investigation of essences necessarily requires that we operate on the plane of imagination. (p. 211)

The following is from Gibson's translation of Ideas:

> There are reasons why, in phenomenology as in all eidetic sciences, representations, or, to speak more accurately, free fancies, assume a privileged position over against perceptions, and that, even in the phenomenology of perceptions itself, excepting of course that of the sensory data. (p. 199).

Here too at all events the freedom of research in the region of the essence necessarily demands that one should operate with the help of fancy. (p. 200)

\(^2\)See Chapter II.
thinking imaginatively after an epoché to make an imaginative test to consider on a priori grounds that this is something that we can conceive of, or for that matter, can't conceive of.

So my readers and I can imagine scholars going through Husserl's text to try to isolate minor variations in usage in order to clarify all his convoluted and demanding language. Surely we can just bypass such a stage on the basis of understanding that the proliferation of terms results from Husserl a) adopting different perspectival viewings on the same problem, i.e., when he is describing the use of the imagination, and b) more importantly from the fact that Husserl uses this technique, so when he is using it and enjoining his readers to use it the way he describes it, it is context specific.

So we are often left on our own to figure out what this is and we invariably misunderstand all Husserl's writing without a) some facility at imagining ourselves and b) some gleaned sense of the procedure. As Husserl is reported to have said to Cairns in 1932:

But here again, what is the evidence for all this that I have just been saying? Again, it is an isolation of the essential in evidence, by a process of free variation.

However, if I simply quoted many instances of what he is doing, it would make better sense. Consider:

All its results, when freed from factualness and thereby transposed into the realm of free phantasy-variation, become eidetic, become results that (as is apodictically evident) govern a universe of conceivability (a "pure" allness), in such a manner that the negation of any result is equivalent to an intuitable eidetic imposibility, an inconceivability.²

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¹ Cairns, Conversations with Husserl and Fink, p. 76.
² Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, p. 249.
Now we know that the apodictic is different from the adequate (chapter II) and that we can revise anything given apodictically. The method is not, therefore, a guarantee of truth in any normal fashion, but rather, a way of decreasing the gap between mediate and immediate intuition (understanding, but often called 'eidetic' by Husserl). Now I am trying to do something quite impossible as far as Husserl is concerned. I am trying to represent mundanely what can be properly understood only by doing phenomenology or intentional reflection (which might still be naive). Consider:

To explicate the eidetic method is not to describe an empirical fact, a method that can, as a matter of empirical fact, be repeatedly followed at will...Only in eidetic intuition can the essence of eidetic intuition become clarified.  

In other words, Husserl never tells us exactly what imaginative variation is; he shows us by using it. Nevertheless, I will still translate Husserl into a relatively mundane and technically naive language and claim that imaginative variation is a thought experiment like the thought experiments spoken of above. It is certainly not straightforwardly reducible to a method. Nothing which is solely and exclusively a method makes conclusions about itself, even when such is claimed. Imaginative variation requires an acknowledgement of intentional constitution, to be used in exactly Husserl's sense. What is varied is often the manner of

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1 By this expression I mean pre-phenomenological, non-transcendental, and to a certain extent, outside the intentional framework.


3 Not all thought experiments are variations, however.

4 Note: On this reading, analytic philosophy of language is not only a method since the commitment to use it entails decisions regarding possible legitimate philosophizing, and this is a philosophical position.
constituting the parameters of the problem under focus. This is the key to understanding variation: we vary the how we think to make it clearer what we think. This is the criticism of reasoning without questioning science qua science.

Such criticism and the whole ruling-conception involve separating science and the criticism of reason; they involve granting science a separate existence in its own right and taking criticism of reason as a science of a new sort, relating to all science and enjoying a higher dignity, but not disturbing the rightful independence of the sciences.¹

To debate whether or not this procedure raises philosophy to the level of a science while retaining the usual (and legitimate in its own right) notion of science is to become involved in a verbal dispute as to who has jurisdiction over current usage. Imaginative variation is however a rational procedure to heighten the degree of rigour with which we reason about the foundation of our judgements regarding the already known legitimacy of our formal logic and sciences. This is coextensive with the whole field of transcendental logic.

That is to say, we examine the evidence awakened by our reflection, we ask it what is was aiming at and what it acquired; and, in the evidence belonging to a higher level, we identify and fix, or we trace, the possible variations owing to vacillations of theme that had previously gone unnoticed, and distinguish the corresponding aimings and actualizations,—in other words, the shifting processes of forming concepts that pertain to logic.²

I claim that focusing on variation is a rational procedure because it seeks to discipline our philosophical observations and raise them above

¹Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, p. 172.
²Ibid., p. 177.
the level of speculation. To do so is varying the way we are thinking until we understand it ourselves, that is, bring it to immediacy.

Experience is the performance in which for me, the experiencer, experienced being "is there", and is there as what it is, with the whole content and the mode of being that experience itself, by the performance going on in its intentionality, attributes to it.1

What we are looking for is sedimented history2 which is identical with the intentional performances referred to in the above quotation. This is what is constitutive in any example chosen viewed after the epoché as constituted. The essence sought is a feature of experience.3 Imaginative variation always has the feature of transformation (cf. chapter II) and we will not vary what we constitute unless we make the implicit regional epoché.

The truly fundamental cognition in this connexion—a cognition foreign to all previous psychology and all previous transcendental philosophy—is that any straightforwardly constituted objectivity (for example, an Object belonging to Nature) points back, according

1Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, p. 233.

2Cf. page 245 in Formal and Transcendental Logic, where Husserl says: To be sure, the method of intentional explication had first to be developed, owing to the remarkable fact that Brentano's discovery of intentionality never led to seeing in it a complex of performances, which are included as sedimented history in the currently constituted intentional unity and its current manners of givenness—a history that one can always uncover by following a strict method.

3Naively considered, a categorical intuition or essence or invariant feature is viewed as independent of history. In Husserl's work, each essence is considered as an acquired and constituted entity. To clarify and justify the sense of each entity requires genetic analysis. In addition, there is no one single class under which an experience can be placed. Each experience can be abstracted from, to provide a variety of classifications. Therefore, it is critical that we start from experience qua experience and not from a fixed set of categories determined a priori in which we attempt to place each experience.
to its essential sort (for example: physical thing in specie), to a correlative essential form of manifold, actual and possible, intentionality (in our example, an infinite intentionality), which is constitutive for that objectivity.

It is not straightforwardly a substitution alone, since it does not start with a category but rather with an experience. We look for a stylistic component to the experience which is invariant. In a naive categorical framework the vast array of experiences are ignored and so too is the constitutive-intentional focus which has its unifying structure the transcendental ego.

The multiplicity of possible perceptions, memories, and, indeed, intentional processes of whatever sort, that relate, or can relate, "harmoniously" to one and the same physical thing has (in all its tremendous complication) a quite definite essential style, which is identical in the case of any physical thing whatever and is particularized only according to the different individual things constituted in different cases.  

Let me go back to the house example from the first chapter, even though this is bound to be misleading. In the substitution model, you would form a category house, and look for other like things designated however, and this makes straightforward sense. In this model you look back: what is sedimentated in the house experience? At least: warmth, craftsmanship, the history of tool making, social choice regarding personal space, sexual mores, and this list goes on infinitely as he says above. The summation of this perspectival viewing is united by one essential

1Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, p. 246.

2As R. Sokolowski in Husserlian Meditations goes as far as to say (on page 76) "The process of free variation--free substitution--can go on indefinitely". (emphasis mine).

3Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, p. 246.
feature of experience: the house. The house is naively but legitimately thought of as that physical thing and structure. So long as we retain only the straightforward and naive way of thinking we will never approach an adequate understanding of the house and if not united in our own experience it will not be apodictic. Still we think of any such object as examples of other like (so designated) physical things.

Primarily we must inquire here for the manners of "appearance" that are constitutive in the pregnant sense, the ones that are experiences of the exemplary objects in question or of their variants; and we must look for the manners in which the objects take shape as synthetic unities in the mode "they themselves", in those experiences.

I am sure that some of my readers will object to the ontic overtones above, but consider that Husserl emphasizes that such ontic forms fall under a category, in such passages as the following:

This invariant is the ontic essential form (apriori form), the eidos, corresponding to the example, in place of which any variant of the example could have served equally well.

But, when one turns one's regard reflectively from the ontic essential form (highest of them all, the "category") to the possible experiences that do the constituting, the possible manners of appearance, one sees that these / necessarily vary concomitantly with the constituted objects, and in such a fashion that now an essential form with two correlative sides shows itself as invariant.

In FTL, Husserl gives us no examples of categories in this sense. This is perhaps justifiable since FTL is a logic of phenomenology and not

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1All of Section 95 in Formal and Transcendental Logic, pp. 236-237, entitled "Necessity of starting, each from his own subjectivity."


3Ibid., p. 248.
concerned with specific applications. Recognizing this, Husserl refers as in Appendix I to the ITI stating:

Any categorical formation that does not already have "nominal" or "substantival" form can, as the Logische Untersuchungen expressed it; be "nominalized"; and here too, speaking more precisely, it is not the concrete formation, but its total syntactical stuff, that receives a substantival form—"substantival" in the amplified sense.

With respect to this, the critical point to remember is that the conceptual apparatus is always modifiable. Whenever the identity is drawn between one set of concepts and the nominal world, we are in serious trouble. This is the justification for modifying such naive identifications.

The range of our dependable observations is therefore categorical and not identified (exactly, at least) with a specified set of concepts. Whenever we cannot solve a problem the suspicion that an exercise of imaginative variation on the currently operative apparatus is indicated.

1Note all those who still are convinced that the Logical Investigations is not relevant.

2Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, p. 311.

3See Guido Küng's excellent article, "The Phenomenological Reduction as Epoché and as Explication," particularly page 69:

The theory of sense and referent, as it is worked out in contemporary possible-world-semantics, allows for the singling out of the actual world within the set of all possible worlds. But these possible worlds are not what may be called different possible conceptualizations: they are merely all the possible factual variations within the framework of one single conceptualization...But ordinary possible-world-semantics does not deal with the question of metaphysical illusion, namely, with the possibility that an entire world picture, an entire conceptual scheme (an entire ontology) may be mistaken.

This last sentence is close to the point I am making, but Küng is referring to the macro level and I am referring to regional ontological errors and commitments.
Failure to perceive the intentional character of such conceptual frameworks will usually preclude such manoeuvres except in a naive pre-phenomenological use of imagination.

6. Some of the implications of Imaginative Varying for Husserlian language and terminology.

Husserlian language is certainly precise if read from within the Husserlian framework. From the outside, however, the language appears arbitrary. The absence of definitions and of consistent terminological usage leads many readers to despair of ever understanding him or to judge his work to be worthless. In the preceding section I have outlined what I take to be a key to understanding what Husserl says and why he expresses himself in the manner that he does. I will now attempt to give some

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1 See Husserl's "The Method of Clarification," p. 66
With the explication of the essences in the self-givenness and with the observation of the contexts of essence, there are ordered necessities, possibilities, and impossibilities of connection, of manifold relations according to essence, which, expressed in true concepts, become basic truths of ontology.
The sense in which ontology is used by Husserl is always in terms of ontic-sense bestowing performances.

Every claim is inherently complex, and this complexity itself has several dimensions, only one of which is immediately germane here. If we consider any particular claim, just as a claim, it is clear that it has a certain epistemic character, one aspect of which is that it alleges something to be and be thus-and-so; it refers or otherwise points to affairs other than itself and alleges (supposes) that they are (Das-sein) and that they are thus-and-so (So-sein). Second, the claim qua supposed (vermeinter Sachverhalt) just as clearly "supposes" what it supposes with some modality—positive belief, apodicticity, likelihood, mere belief, probability, dubiousness, positive disbeliever, etc. (sic).
indication of the relationship between variation and Husserlian language.

First let me say that I agree, and I think Husserl would agree with Professor Bunge when he observes:

From Aristotle we have inherited not only the most influential theory of causation but also the definitionist mania, consisting in the belief that all key terms should be defined...Yet, logicians have taught us long ago that primitives must be accepted in every context unless one is prepared to run in circles.¹

The problem represented here is twofold. If we define precisely we commit ourselves to any error sedimented in the formulation, yet we need some primitives or their heirs to begin. In Husserl's work, he seeks for some primitives but they have a provisional character, that is, subject to further clarification. Since any problem he addresses will be reexamined repeatedly from other perspectival angles (see Chapter II on adequation) and since he uses the above characterized 'method' of imaginative variation to avoid error, there are virtually no consistent definitions in his work considered in the mundane sense.

Therefore, Collins was quite right in remarking that it is a mark of a great philosopher that:

The very vigor of his internal shaping of language compels students to follow every turn of the text and hence to demand better textual readings and editorial presentations of his words. A philosopher's


I am well aware of Professor Bunge's sweeping dismissal of phenomenology. This dismissal is unfounded and should in no way prevent phenomenologists from reading and using his work.
greatness becomes manifest in his engagement with the languaging act, corresponding to which is the whole series of problems raised for a critical edition of his writings.\(^1\)

Collins believes it is a rule that all great philosophers have the "ability to employ the latent resources of language."\(^2\) In Husserl's case, this is not accidental; it is pursued purposefully. No matter whether the reader agrees with Collins' view or not, it is clear that Husserlian language is demanding, requires a suspension of the meaning readers ordinarily\(^3\) apply to expressions; and that because of the programmatic drive to uncover the self-constitution of meanings viewed as accrued sedimentation, language modification is an essential feature of Husserl's phenomenology.

In my view, imaginative variation is an alteration of modes of conceptualizing. Consider these remarks of the later Crisis:

I am speaking now of the alteration of perspectives. The perspectives of the shape and also of its color are different, but each is in this new way an exhibiting of—of this shape, of this color—This happens not as a blending of externals; rather, as bearers of "sense" in each phase, as meaning something, the perspectives combine in an advancing enrichment of meaning and a continuing development of meaning, such that what no longer appears is still valid and retained and such that the prior meaning which anticipates a continuous flow, the expectation of "what is to come," is straightway fulfilled and more closely determined.\(^4\)

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\(^2\)Ibid., p. 382.

\(^3\)More pointedly, technical meanings applied to terms derived from developed philosophical positions.

\(^4\)Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, p. 158.
These remarks are consistent with my interpretation and I think they indicate the rationale for the change in Husserl's language. If we recall the LI and my comments on it, there the language appears more formal and suffering from some residual definitionist mania whereas the language in CM is more first order (that is, "I think x, y, z"); and as we progress to FTL it refers more directly to experiencing. The process of explication is accomplished by moving closer to experience, and remember that Husserl says:

All evidence, we may say, is experience in a maximally broad, and yet essentially unitary, sense.

However, straightforwardly identifying evidence with experience may be apodictic but it is not adequate. In order to accomplish adequacy (and it is an accomplishment on the part of the reflecting subjects) the language and formulation of epistemological problems must move closer to expressing how we experience. To any reader outside of phenomenology, this must seem bizarre. I will not try to give an adequate explication, but only this above indication, that in order to move closer to immediate understanding, the terms we use move closer to expressing the way we experience and not further away.

Therefore, artificial languages are always mediated and cause us to be further away from understanding in Husserl's sense. So although Husserlian language is technical it is not artificial or purely formal. This remark must be tempered with the obvious observation that Husserl's Language bears little relationship to that mythical "ordinary language".

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1 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 57.
In order to determine the sedimentations occurring in ordinary language, we must (Husserl would agree) step back from it and examine its intentional features by imaginative variation.¹

It is clear that all terms in Husserl are defined (or better given their sense) by reference to several perspectival analyses of a problem. For example, when we try to define phenomenology, we get a set of characterizations such as have been quoted in this thesis. This is exactly the case with the expression evidence.

6.1 A Note on Arguments

There is an even more radical implication regarding Husserl's mode of arguing. It should be quite clear to any reader of Husserl that no arguments (in the mundane sense) are presented. It is a consequence of intentional analysis and imaginative variation that all sustained claims are not judged to be adequate even if they are apodictic.² This makes any commentator's job extremely difficult. I have known this for years and still suffered as a result of trying to specify what Husserl is arguing in on location of one text. It is preferable but requires the acknowledgement of a vastly more complicated framework, to view what appears as an argument-form as a possible variation. It is, in effect,

¹ There is, of course, an arguable parallel in the sense that some appeals to ordinary language are similar to Husserl's appeal to the pre-predicative life world. On this view, ordinary language must refer to informed intellectual opinion before philosophical consideration is brought to bear on the problems.

² It could be said that Husserl is offering descriptions and that of course there is the implicit argument that the descriptions are correct. The adjudicating procedure is very complicated, and if it was not, this present work would be unnecessary. Cf. chapter II.
a choice of a perspective, or thematic interest and a more profitable way of evaluating such studies is to imagine alternate perspectives on the problem ourselves.

Therefore, what appears to be an argument is taken as a possible example of what we might argue. It is viewed as a judgement or even a judgement form (i.e., a way we might judge). Whenever types of judgement forms cease to clarify and bring to relative immediacy we can drop them. Part of the problem here is that it is difficult to determine in advance how far we can take one style of generating judgement-forms. To predict how profitable it would be to address a given problem from a Kantian perspective (for example) is not readily determinable. Recognizing the mode in which a problem is being conceived is determinable; after such recognition, a temporary suspension of this mode is always (in principle) possible.

It is fair to say that the way we could use this part of phenomenology as a critical tool is to determine and object to the way problems are formulated and addressed.  

7. Brief Recapitulation.

In my formulation of the way Husserl uses the imagination and his

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1 Cf. Husserl, when he says in the Crisis, p. 170:
When we take an interest in the subjective-relative life-world, what first arrests our gaze is, naturally: appearance and that which appears; and we remain at first in the sphere of the intuitively given, i.e., the sphere of the modes of experience. The nonintuitive manners of being conscious and their relatedness back to possibilities of intuition remain unconsidered.

2 I think the so-called mind-brain problem is a prime candidate for such a reformulation.
consequent programmatic recommendations for how we could follow him, we still have quite an abstract set of principles. More concretely, it is not usually stated what we actually imagine. I think we imagine like minded investigators,\(^1\) other philosophers as examples of alternate conceptual modes.

The following features remain consistent through each characterization of imaginative variation:

a) it is always a thought experiment.

b) the thrust is to uncover constituting sense.

c) it is used to produce a relatively higher degree of immediate understanding.

d) often a regional epoche is implicit and a tacit cogito,\(^2\) even if the cogito is not explicitly mentioned.

e) it is consistent with the performance or acquisition model of evidence as philosophical understanding present as early as the \(\Pi\).

\(^1\)Cf. The problem of the "other" in the CM.

\(^2\)I should acknowledge my indebtedness to Professor Dennis O'Connor for calling my attention to this term. This expression is borrowed from Maurice Merleau-Ponty's working notes in The Visible and the Invisible: followed by working notes, edited by Claude Lefort, trans. by Alphonso Lingis, Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968), pp. 170-171:

> The Cogito of Descartes (reflection) is an operation on significations, a statement of relations between them (and the significations themselves sedimented in acts of expression). It therefore presupposes a prereflective contact of self with self (the non-thetic consciousness of oneself, Sartre) or a tacit cogito (being close by oneself)--this is how I reasoned in Ph.P.

Having said this, I must emphasize strongly that I am not using it in an identical fashion to Merleau-Ponty. Kant's transcendental unity of apperception is foremost in my mind when I use tacit cogito, i.e., the "I think" which can accompany all our representations. Cf. "The principle of apperception is the highest principle in the whole sphere of human knowledge." Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 135.
f) it entails implicit recognition of comprehensive intentionality and probably makes little sense without such a recognition.

g) as a critical device it presumes how we think about something determines what we think.

h) it is always judged by Husserl to be a rational procedure to discipline our reasoning and judgement. It is also to safeguard against naive apodicticity.

i) insofar as it presumes awareness of the sedimented habitual intendings contained in our procedures of reasoning and perception, it therefore has historical overtones and cannot be understood a-historically.

j) it is related to essence understood as relatively invariant features of experiencing acquired by the history of man and seeks to re-establish the links involved in the acquisition.
Chapter IV

Conclusion

1. The importance of the subject in knowledge acquisition

There is no finally acceptable way to bypass the problem of the role of the subject in acquiring knowledge. In doing so, we inevitably engage in reflections on experience, and the appropriate fashion to speak about experience. This is especially important for philosophical knowledge, since the special sciences\(^1\) continue without philosophical foundation, the effect on the practice and success would be profound, although unspecifiable in detail on a priori grounds.\(^2\)

What I mean by the role of the subject in the acquisition of knowledge contains acceptance of Husserl's implicit claim that constituting evidence as identical with logical consistency, or the empirically observable, is inadequate philosophically, since a subject must still grasp this consistency or the agreement of theory with observables. This is not a superfluous problem. However, it is by no means as simple-mindedly obvious as many writers in phenomenology imply.

All science presupposes the world of primordial experience as the basis on which it arises. Whatever unity or systematic connection exists between the sciences is due to their origin in that common source.

\(^2\)Cf. J.N. Mohanty, Edmund Husserl's Theory of Meaning, 2nd ed., Phaenomenologica, 14 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), pp.138-139. It is not one of the tasks of philosophers to recommend to the scientists anything affecting their method or subject matter. All that Husserl seems to be saying is that a proper philosophical understanding of the sciences should take into consideration the close and inseparable connection which they have with experience.

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Following reason wherever it might lead, we are led to conclude that for good reasoning the subject must be investigated and I do not conclude that this entails subjective scepticism, or radical relativism. However, this investigation of the subject cannot replace logic, philosophical analysis, empirical observation, or any other class of entities usually taken to be the sole members in the class of evidence. I also do not accept the notion that acquisition of evidence in Husserl's sense is reducible to understanding an argument or theory.

I would like to argue the following things:

(a) it is not the role of the philosopher to generate prescriptive and normative statements regarding actual scientific practice; and

(b) that any statements or implications that philosophy in a scientific manner can somehow replace science is incompatible with Husserl's notion of philosophy being conducted as a science.

Nothing lies further from our intention than to play sceptical paradoxes off against the natural rational activity of life or against natural experience and its self-confirmation in its harmonious continuation, or against natural thing (and also valuing, active striving) in its natural methods of reasoning (and, therefore, also against natural science), and it is not intended that any of these be deprecated.

1.1. The question which arises is: what are we to make of Husserl's repeated statements that phenomenology is, or is working towards,

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1 The model for the division of labor is supplied in Chapter I, pt. 2 above.

the ideal unity of all sciences? The appropriate way to think of this is the following: this is essentially a mathematical idea projecting in an imaginative space all possible knowing subjects with their de facto intellectual accomplishments, including the extremely rigorous intellectual accomplishments in the special sciences. It takes an extreme modification of our usual sense of rigor to include other de facto accomplishments, for example, art, as having equal rigor; nonetheless, such disciplines require enormous effort and discipline along with intellectual performances. However, it requires an extremely impoverished perception of such work to miss the acquisition of evidence in a regionally appropriate sense in disciplines outside the sciences.

The test for this is, as usual, ultimately your own phenomenologically disciplined judgement, which requires actual work.

Phenomenology is not "literature" by means of which one goes riding for pleasure, as it were, while reading. As in any serious science, one must of course work in order to acquire a methodically schooled eye and only thereby the capability of making one's own judgements.

We all want naturally to stand on the shoulders of our

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1 Cf. Edmund Husserl, Phenomenological Psychology: lectures, summer semester, 1925, trans. by John Scanlon (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977) p. 3 especially:
But it then becomes evident that a strictly self-enclosed and infinite science of the a priori of phenomenological interiorities is bordered off, which is the central science for all socio-cultural sciences, but also the fundamental science for psychophysical, experimental psychology.
Cf. my Introduction above, pt. 3.

2 I am indebted to David Hemmendinger, for suggesting that there is a mathematical aspect to Husserl's work on evidence. Mathematical here does not mean formal. I am perfectly aware that the model is usually taken to be historical and dialectical. I am suggesting something new and in addition. Cf. also Kant's cautionary note regarding dialectic as sophistry (B 85-86). Cf. the elaborate zig-zag method mentioned earlier in the thesis, p. 14.

forefathers and use the results of their labors, and this is why meditation on phenomenology is inevitably historical. However, we cannot use these results without acquiring them for ourselves. Parenthetically, we could remark that Husserl's problematic use of the expression "monad" to refer to an individual thinking subject, neither commits him to Leibnizian idealism, nor to some form of realism. This, too, is used in an ontologically neutral fashion to try to gain access to this imaginative set of the ideal unity of thinking, or more broadly, conscious subjects.

2. The problem of excessive complexity

It is obvious (we could say apodictic) that this theory is too complicated in any of its expressed forms to be easily used in day to day judgements concerning the legitimacy of claims made in science or philosophy. I ask my readers to refrain from dismissing this as a facile remark. No doubt Husserl's unrelenting and uncompromising drive towards thoroughness (adequacy) is responsible for the complexity of his theory.

2.1. An indication of its complexity is Husserl's failure to state (completely) the theory in any one of his texts. Another indication of its complexity is that no philosopher is, to date, able to use either the entire theory, or the part of it to which he ascribes, in judgements concerning his own work. I challenge someone to give me an example of a piece of work written, even by a Husserlian,

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When I say "use," I mean with facility analogous to the way followers of Wittgenstein use his ideas, or the way logicians can use logic, to, in principle, formalize an argument.
that takes into account all the standards of rigor.

2.2. The rectification of this complexity problem would have, as its first prerequisite, the statement of the essential features of Husserl's treatment of the evidence problem, stated in the form of a theory. This statement would have to be expressed in the briefest possible mode, while still covering several versions of the theory. This is what I set out to do in this thesis.

2.3. The reflexive challenge

The next stage in solving the complexity problem would be for some hard-minded Husserl scholar, or any other hard-minded philosopher for that matter, to take up the challenge of correcting Husserl on the basis of some awareness of his standards from inside the Husserlian framework. This is not an audacious suggestion, if one appreciates the basic observation that being a dogmatic Husserlian is a self-refuting and therefore untenable stance. This follows if we take seriously the notion that each reflecting phenomenologist must acquire insights as his own.¹

2.4. The possibility of using mathematics or formal logic should not be dismissed too lightly. Since the theory is too complicated, perhaps a mathematical expression of at least parts of it, could help us to entertain more of the theory at one time. What I have in mind is saving mental labor analogous to the Cartesian principle outlined in

¹Cf. Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, Section 95, entitled "Necessity of starting, each from his own subjectivity", pp. 236-243.
Rule XI of Descartes' *Regulae.* Perhaps extremely accurate exegesis would suffice, but even this is extraordinarily difficult, as evidenced in part, by my review of the literature.

2.4.1. There, of course, is a very real problem in attempting to formalize the processes on the part of the subject in the acquisition of understanding which could be deemed evidence of an apodictic, not to mention adequate, sort. There are severe problems which can be imagined (using eidetic variation) in retaining the basic thrust of Husserl's program, while using symbolic representation. The audience for such a rendition is difficult to imagine, since the majority of people who study Husserl have not, to date, had a profound appreciation of the advantages of using mathematical logic which already exists, much less attempting to derive from it some usable (and perhaps very novel) symbolic representation appropriate to this task of simplifying Husserl.

2.5. Husserl does provide us with a shortened statement in the *CM,* but this has proved misleading if my argument in Chapter II is correct regarding the misinterpretation of Husserl's project based on

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1René Descartes, *Rules for the Direction of Mind,* trans. by Elizabeth S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross, *Great Books of the Western World,* 31 (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1952), p. 17: If, after we have recognized intuitively a number of simple truths, we wish to draw any inference from them, it is useful to run them over in a continuous and uninterrupted act of thought, to reflect upon their relations to one another, and to grasp together distinctly a number of these propositions so far as is possible at the same time. For this is a way of making our knowledge much more certain, and of greatly increasing the power of the mind.

2David Hemmendinger, whose training to the Masters level was in mathematics, does not attempt this in his doctoral dissertation, although he does supply us with some useful diagrams which partially serve the purpose. See pp. 155, 198 and 208 of Hemmendinger's *Husserl's Phenomenological Program.*
an overemphasis of the Cartesian point of departure.

2.6. The problem of the definitive statement of Husserl's theory of evidence can partially be overcome if we view it:

(a) as a guide,

(b) not as a calculus for decision procedure in philosophy and

(c) certainly not as a single criteria which can be ascertained all at once.

Therefore, this idea is a misconception of Husserl's purpose, that is, when we treat it as a method, as does Farber. Furthermore, a comprehension of the idea of evidence as an acquisition may be useful, whereas specifying in detail the foundation of philosophical judgements in the Husserlian fashion is an infinite task, as Husserl well knew. Here we see the justice to Merleau-Ponty's remark that there is always a distinction between what is lived and what is known; however, surely Husserl knew this very well.

Lastly, that a cogitatum is given along with the cogito is by no means the end of the issue, but only the beginning.

3. Husserlian language and his formulation of the evidence problem in general.

At the earlier stages of development, the mode of expression

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1 Cf. my Chapter II above.

2 Cf. Remarks made in my Chapter I regarding a priori grounds of consciousness.

3 Cf. Farber, Foundation of Phenomenology.

4 Cf. the Cartesian conception of evidence in Chapter II above.

5 Ultimately, a rejection of Husserl will follow from a failure to appreciate a) intentionality; and b) discourse about experience (mind) without ontological commitment and the resulting absurdities of transcendental realism.
that Husserl uses is more in keeping with traditional philosophical expression. At the stage of the LI, for example, the shift towards experiential terminology has not yet occurred in a full-blown manner. Accordingly, this text appears more accessible, and is more open to systematic misinterpretation. However, Husserl and Fink caution us that the LI ought to be read in terms of the later works.\footnote{We go from the relatively formal expressions of fulfillment of a meaningful proposition, to an indication that this is best done in Lebenswelt language.} Since there is a progressive conceptual development (filling out) of the theory of evidence, it is not surprising that a fully clarified and adequate characterization of the theory does not yet occur at the stage of the LI. This is not to say that there are radical breaks with the form the theory takes in that work, but rather, that it is incomplete.

The application of the criteria of rigor which emerge in Husserlian phenomenology is progressively applied to his phenomenology itself. Consequently, there is a progressive development towards an adequate description of the essence or invariant structure of evidence.

The experiential component of evidence becomes somewhat more apparent in Ideas, and much more apparent in CM and FTL. Since any evidential acquisition has an experiential component, the shift towards experiential terminology is a logical outcome of the progressive sophistication of Husserl's concept of evidence itself. In other words, to accurately describe or explicate the phenomena of evidence emerges as virtually impossible without experiential terminology.

3.1. The unusual language with which Husserl expresses himself is occasionally represented by critics as a shortcoming and a sign of conceptual confusion. From within the Husserlian context, it is more appropriately viewed as an indication of his uncompromising drive towards accurate explication (description). Such accuracy is a necessary condition if the further stages of clarity and evidence (that is, philosophical knowledge) are to be reached. Collins suggested that one of the marks of a great philosopher appears to be his "ability to employ the latent resources of language."

As Collins indicates, major philosophers are almost invariably involved with the languaging act itself, and we would expect that such philosophers are constantly making deliberate comparisons between different traditions of philosophical usage, along with ordinary usage of concepts in the process of attempting to generate a mode of expression which is acceptable to the clarity to which they are striving. This is not offered as an excuse for some of the unusual language difficulties and associated problems we find in Husserl, but rather, as an explanation of why they are so difficult to avoid in such an original philosophical enterprise.

Furthermore, perhaps there is a benefit to the difficulty of reading Husserl, in that reading any philosophical views which are expressed in such a difficult fashion does not easily allow one to mistakenly assume that their meaning and implication is transparent. Again,

1Cf. Ricoeur's view that he abandons description in Ricoeur's Husserl: an Analysis of his Phenomenology.
2See my explanation of the relation between the language shifts and free variation in Chapter III, pt.6 above.
3Collins, Interpreting Modern Philosophy, p. 382.
Collins is useful in this regard, when he says "the very rigor of his internal shaping of language compels students to follow every turn of the text, and hence to demand better textual readings and editorial presentations of his words."  

3.2. The shift towards experiential language is consistent with the commitment towards rationality (that is, philosophy guided by the idea of science) since it provides for greater accuracy which is called for by the results of self-criticism.

3.3. Therefore, I would suggest that a further advantage of reading Husserl while focusing on the evidence problem is that it engenders a more useful understanding of his philosophical language.

3.4. Lastly, what is often implicitly objected to is Husserl's formulation of the problem, that is, in the intentional mode of transcendental philosophizing. With a good awareness of his ideas concerning a division of labor, with respect to philosophical analysis, formal logic, and his sustained respect for science qua science, this should not be such an obstacle.

4. The expanded concepts of meaning, perception and imagination

Throughout the thesis an effort has been made to stress the role these concepts play in the formulation of Husserl's theory of evidence. I will not repeat the lists of conclusions drawn at the end of each chapter, but will add a few pertinent remarks.

4.1. Meaningful speech

I wish to draw the reader's attention to Husserl's claim that any

expression or combination of expressions that we utter has some meaning. This is in remarkable contrast to the sustained attempts in epistemology to develop pre-emptive demarcations of meaning, which seek to limit the range of intelligible significations. On Husserl's view, we mean far more than we can readily specify by each of our utterances. I would argue that this is much more in keeping with our experience, both day to day experience and in the scientific arenas.

The claim that every experience whatsoever gives us evidence of something can be made on Husserl's behalf. We may not be able to specify what the evidence is of in detail, since this entails developed judgements regarding appropriate manners of structuring any given experience.

Minimally, however, we can claim that the comprehensive theory of evidence is related to the comprehensive theory of meaning on pure phenomenological grounds. We may also claim that what I have designated as the comprehensive theory of meaning is developed in the LI and that the comprehensive theory of evidence is emphasized in the CM, therefore Husserl's theory of evidence cannot be understood outside of his theory of meaning.

4.2. Expanded role of perception

This point was emphasized in Chapter I and throughout the LI. We perceive more than sense perception, and it is an error to limit perception to bodily sense perception. We can perceive relations between concepts, ideas, formal structures, and intendings. As phenomenologists, we are making statements about what we perceive when we focus on experience qua experience. In contemporary philosophy, attempts have been made to interpret away experience on ontological grounds. To designate experience as "physical" is not materially relevant to phenomenology, nor is it.

\[1\] Husserl, Logical Investigations, 1:303.
strictly acceptable within the intentional framework. Perceptions are types of experience. The theory of evidence must speak of perception to operate with the intentional framework. Evidence as an acquisition of reflecting subjectivity makes no sense if subjects do not perceive the epistemological relation in question.

Parenthetically, this is a partial justification for treating Husserl's work on evidence as a theory. Theories provide an organizing framework within which we can interpret ranges of experience. Since Husserl's theory of evidence provides us with a reinterpretation of experience, perception, and meaning, it meets this general definition of theory.

4.3. Imagination

Imagination cannot be limited to pictures drawn in the mind. In order for it to fulfill the role Husserl calls upon it to do, we must be able to imagine non-visual phenomena. This meets with our experience. We regularly imagine the applicability of examples or ways of arguing against a position.

Husserl in enjoining us to imagine alternative conceptual frameworks to improve our understanding of what remains invariant and essential. It should be clear that this is not a picture which can be understood with analogies to vision alone. It is noteworthy that the expression "eidetic" has as one of its meanings a 'vivid mental picture,' but eidetic perception would indeed be a limited class of entities if we restricted it to vivid visual-type presentations. If we follow Husserl, we must conclude that philosophers (and others) are often mistaken in the descriptions of their activities regarding the role of the imagination.

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1Cf. above, Chapter I, pt. 7.3.
5. The pairings: weak and strong evidence

Throughout Husserl's work, he uses juxtapositions of concepts when he speaks of evidence. It is critical to see the similarity in such juxtapositions. The first important one was introduced in my Chapter I: fulfillment-empty sign.¹ If we make a list of the pairings used to characterize the features of evidence, it would include the following:

- apodictic - adequate
- partial fulfillment - full complete fulfillment
- mediate (perception, etc.) - immediate (perception, etc.)
- theory laden - intuitive
- perspectival viewing - repeated and repeatable judgment tested using imaginative variation

This list could go on indefinitely. The important element to emphasize here is the sustained distinction between weaker evidence and stronger evidence. If we use the apodictic-adequate distinction as paradigmatic, their use becomes clearer. Apodictic evidence is certain but very incomplete. Statements which express apodictic evidence are always statements about experience considered qua experience. They are true as far as they go, but they provide us with relatively weak claims in relation to the far stronger criteria of adequacy.

Adequate understanding entails much more self-clarification. The sedimented habitualities and their historical origins must be clarified. Furthermore, the range of possible applications must be

¹Cf. Chapter I, pt.2.
specified. This diagram may illustrate it somewhat:

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Genetic foundations  Apodictic  Horizon of possible application
Analysis of historical sedimentation
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The apodictic is the starting point for such investigations. We work backwards to the historical antecedents and forward to the horizon of implications.

The stronger claims are extremely elusive. We can specify on pure phenomenological grounds what would be entailed in adequate understanding, but realizing such understanding is surely an infinite task.

I will refrain at this stage from offering critical remarks on Husserl's work beyond the modifications suggested in the reconstruction and analysis above. Other commentators are very forthcoming with such remarks, which are often based on what seems to be cursory familiarity. To suggest a replacement for Husserl's work while adequately responding to it seems clearly outside the scope of this thesis. As an alternative, allow me to quote one of the many inspirers of Kant:

But all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare.

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1Cf. Husserl, Experience and Judgement, p. 32: Every experience has its own horizon; every experience has its core of actual and determinate cognition, its own content of immediate determinations which give themselves; but beyond this core of determinate quiddity, of the truly given as "itself-there," it has its own horizon.
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Works on Husserl and Phenomenology


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