IN WHAT SENSE IS IT POSSIBLE TO SPEAK OF GOOD AND EVIL IN MAX SCHELER'S

DER FORMALISMUS IN DER ETHIK UND DIE MATERIALE WERTETHIK?

Thaddeus V. Krasnicki

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ABSTRACT

IN WHAT SENSE IS IT POSSIBLE TO SPEAK OF GOOD AND EVIL IN MAX SCHELER'S DER FORMALISMUS IN DER ETHIK UND DIE MATERIALE WERTETHIK?

Thaddeus Krasnicki

Max Scheler held the view that values such as good and evil are real objects which are given in phenomenological intuition. During his "second period", he also held the view that there exists an infinitely good God who created everything. From the point of view of metaphysics, these two views contradict each other. We propose as our thesis that the source of this contradiction lies in the view in which values are said to be objects of phenomenological research. We maintain that Scheler cannot speak of good and evil on the level of phenomenology. First we begin by showing that the problem of God and evil can receive a solution on the level of metaphysics. Here, we specifically discuss the solution of Thomas Aquinas and we examine how his metaphysics handles values. Second, we show that values are not "essences" in the phenomenological sense because they are not things. Things are intuitable phenomenologically because they have parts while values do not. Third, we also show that in disclosing the ranks of values using phenomenology, Scheler was actually doing a kind of metaphysics. Finally, we conclude by showing that since a person is not a thing but is, rather, a value-being, as it were, a philosophical anthropology is impossible for phenomenology.
TO MY MOTHER
CONTENTS

Preliminary Remarks ..................................................... Page 1

Chapter I ........................................................................ Page 1

Chapter II ...................................................................... Page 7

Chapter III ..................................................................... Page 25

Chapter IV ..................................................................... Page 46

Footnotes ........................................................................ Page 51

Bibliography .................................................................... Page 59
In what sense is it possible to speak of good and evil in Max Scheler's *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik*?

**Preliminary Remarks**

Max Scheler, in his *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik*, attempted to "establish a strictly scientific and positive foundation for philosophical ethics with respect to all its fundamental problems" by means of the phenomenological experience which "can be distinguished from all other experience such as that of the natural world view, or that of science". Phenomenological experience alone is an immanent experience which can yield facts "themselves". Scheler holds the view that values such as good and evil are subject to this experience and therefore they can be spoken of in a very particular way. For example, phenomenology requires that reality can only be spoken of in reference to what is intuited in reality as "essence" or essential interconnexion between "essences".

But as we shall show, Scheler does not altogether adhere to such requirements when discussing values. The gap that develops between what he can say of good and evil and what he is forced to say of them in order to discuss the most fundamental areas of philosophical ethics lands him in a very serious contradiction in this work and the works that are applications of the results found in this work, such as his, *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*. In trying to found a "framework of a philosophy with a phenomenological basis" not only does he ignore the existence of this contradiction, but also its nature and extent, even up to his "third period". Yet it turns out to be the Achilles' heel of the entire endeavour of his "second period", one which reveals the very serious limitations of his phenomenological attitude especially in the realm of ethics. But what is this contradiction, and how did it occur?

In his *Der Formalismus*..., Scheler holds the view that the "material" values that are grasped in phenomenological intuition are either positive or nega-
tive, and it belongs to the essence of each value to hold a particular rank with respect to other values. In an act of "preferring" or "placing after", one intuits a value to be "higher" or "lower" than another one. Good and evil, however, are values which do not belong to this order of ranks, but, rather, these are values which appear on the acts of a person, including those of willing.

"The value 'good'—in an absolute sense—is the value that appears, by way of essential necessity, on the act of realising the value which (with respect to the measure of cognition of that being which realises it) is the highest". Furthermore, the 'good' is the value that is attached to the act which realises a positive value, as opposed to a negative value, within the higher (or highest) level of value-ranks. Evil, on the other hand, is "the value that appears on the act of realising the lowest value", and "is the one that is attached to the act which realises a negative value". It is, then, negative and "lower" values that make evil possible: were there no such values, there would be no evil.

But such values do "exist in all nature apart from the comprehension of values". They exist independent of the organisation of all beings endowed with spirit", such as man. Just as the colour red is a quality of, e.g., a red ball, all values (including the values 'good' and 'evil') are non-formal (i.e. 'material') qualities of contents" such as "value things" or what Scheler calls "goods". Goods are the bearers of values, and "it is only in goods that values become 'real'". "In a good ... a value is objective and real at the same time".

Nevertheless, they are independent of goods; "they are independent phenomena that are comprehended independent of the peculiarity of contents as well as of the being real or the being ideal and the non-being (in this twofold sense) of their bearers". Unlike, e.g., colours, however, "values are facts that belong to a specific mode of experience", such as what Scheler calls "value-feeling".

This value feeling "gives us access to existing, objective values" through which eventually mankind will take possession of a realm of objective values and their
objective order, a realm that is independent of mankind as well as of its own manifestations". Therefore, since "it remains true that values ... in general exist", and "all values fall into two groups: positive and negative", negative values exist in all nature, just as the values "good" and "evil" exist in our world:

Socratic-Platonic intellectual idealism was mistaken at the outset in denying values of the bad, with their manifold qualities, as positive facts, and in identifying the bad with that which is the greatest distance from the highest good, or "the good", as well as in equating the bad with "appearances". But values of both the good and the bad occur at all levels of being, if one wishes to distinguish levels of being.

The consequence of having real negative and positive values existing in nature is that if one were to maintain, as by way of metaphysics, that there is an ens a se who created and thereby willed the being of all values, such a Being would have to be both good and evil. An ens a se when considered as a person would be realising both negative and lower values and therefore would be evil, as "evil is the value that is attached to the realisation of a negative value in the sphere of willing". He would as well be good when willing the being of both higher and positive values, for "good is the value that is attached to the realisation of a positive value in the sphere of willing". It would be a contradiction to maintain that an infinitely good ens a se, such as the God of Christians, wills into existence evil by willing into existence negative and lower values. Thus, Scheler's position on the being of values would rule out the possibility that the God of Christianity exists.

But this view is by no means in accord with his beliefs during this period of writing. Although he wanted in this work to establish a foundation for ethics without a presupposition of God, or, moreover, of metaphysics, he not only claimed to be a Christian and hence, a theist, but in his Vom Ewigen im Menschen which is a work in which the principles discovered in the Der Formalismus ... are applied and developed, he maintained only that God exists, but has the attributes of "ens
a se (infinitude), omnipotence and holiness, and furthermore, that He is the sumnum bonum:

On the grounds of two principles which I have previously expounded in my ethics—1. personal value is highest value, 2. concrete spirit postulates a person as subject—and on the grounds of the (by my theory) metaphysically knowable propositions that a) God is the sumnum bonum, b) God is infinite spirit, it is thought that I should be able to infer, purely syllogistically, that the sumnum bonum or infinite spirit must be a person.

Furthermore, in the Der Formalismus..., he maintained that "the idea of God is cogiven with the unity and identity and singularity of the world on the basis of an essential interconnection of complexes". What guides the formation of ideas of God and concepts of God are peculiar nuances of value-qualities of the divine that are given only in feeling and in the intentionality of love for God." In this respect, "the essential goodness of God is primally infinite as an indivisible essential value-quality". But this does not mean that the phenomenological attitude allows him to prove that God (i.e. the ens a se) exists. In the Der Formalismus, he does say that "if we posit one concrete world as real, it would be absurd (though not 'contradictory') not to posit the idea of a concrete spirit (Geistes)". But the idea of God and God are two different things. Phenomenology is not concerned with either rational "proofs" or existence as such. It does, however, allow him to speak of God as he appears to our consciousness or inner experience. Nevertheless, if it is the case, and Scheler claimed it is, that "the reality of 'God' has its only foundation in a possible positive revelation of God in a concrete person", then Scheler has blatantly contradicted himself: even the possibility of the existence of an infinitely good ens a se is in principle incompatible with the existence of evil.

It should not seem strange that such an obvious contradiction should elude Scheler. He was clearly aware that "we would not expect a world made by a creator equipped with the attributes of love and infinite reason to be anything other than a perfectly good and reasonable world, whereas the world we know..."
ness..." 26 Yet, he also felt that only theism can make sense of evil and proposed a metaphysical solution to this problem of the origin of the evil and wickedness of the world:

... after the world's creation, it was drawn by some free mental cause into a condition basically different from that which it enjoyed immediately upon leaving the creator's hands. The real world known to us is far worse than what accords with its basis. So the free action of some mind superior to human strength, an action whereby the world has fallen into its present condition, becomes an assured truth of reason. The "fall" is thus a truth of reason inseparable from theism: it is no mere proposition from revelation. 28

The difficulty here is that Scheler was misled into thinking that this "fall, which is a truth of a metaphysical order" 29 reconciles the two contrary elements, thereby avoiding the contradiction. In proposing that "the origin of the wickedness which is the ultimate basis of this world's evil and also the cause of direct temptation to human wickedness, can lie neither in the world-basis itself nor, solely, in man", 30 but rather, that "it must reside in a metaphysical zone lying intermediate between the two, in a free insurrection against God instigated by a person having power over the world", 31 he has not shown that God is not the per se cause of the existence of evil itself. This argument can exonerate God as being the per se cause of the fall, since the freedom given to this person with power over the world (presumably the devil) is a gift given to an initially good person, but who subsequently made himself evil by the misuse of his freedom. The evil of this person must be accounted for in the face of an infinitely good God, that is, a God who is meant to altogether saturate his creation with his goodness. In other words, this argument does not account for the existence of evil qua evil" as necessary constituent of the world we empirically know." 32 if, in the first place, God is the "ens a se on which all things are dependent," 33 in so far as the world, as a real and therefore contingent world, demands an effecting agent to posit it as real — something which either calls it from not-being into existence or is eternally 'calling' it and sustaining it in existence." 34 and, in the second place, if "God, as ens a se, is the sum and epitome not only of essences realised
in this world but of all possible essences and values, such as "god" and "evil" are, as Scheler calls them; "essences". We cannot know all possible essences which lie in the thought of God, but only those which are realised in our own de facto world; negative and lower values, as well as "evil" are essences that are found in our world. God, therefore, must have created them all. The devil became evil because either negative and lower values existed or evil existed for him to be a bearer of it; the devil, neither created evil or negative and lower values out of nothing. Therefore, the problem for Scheler is not to give a consistent account of how the perfect world was changed into an imperfect one, but rather of the existence and origin of evil itself. Scheler not only failed to do so, but he failed to make this subtle distinction.

Very few commentators have dealt with this problem that occurs in Scheler's philosophy. P.H. Spader, in his *The Non-formal Ethics of Value of Max Scheler and the Shift in His Thought*, does point out this contradiction. However, he suggests that the source of the entire difficulty lies in what he describes as the area of the realisation of ideal values:

The heart of the difficulties that Scheler fell into in trying to ground the ideal-real distinction in the second period was his identification of reality with its being willed, because will was a mental act and therefore we were led inexorably back to the primal person, the ens a se. The ens a se being mind, Scheler was hard put to maintain an ideal-real distinction and fell into contradictions.

But this is mistaken: the source of the difficulty lies not in how an infinitely good God can realise lower values, but, rather, in the nature not only of lower values but of negative values themselves. Whether there is a distinction between ideal and real, or whether ideal values are to be realised ignores the fact that, as shown above, negative values for Scheler are objective and real— that they exist. The existence of negative values, and specifically the value "evil" is in principle incompatible with the existence of an infinitely good God if this God is conceived as an ens a se. Therefore, since Scheler claimed that it is self-evident that
"there is an ens a se— or existent whose existence is a consequence of its essence—which differs from the whole of all contingent things, events, realities, i.e. from the whole of the 'world', and secondly, ... that this ens a se is the prime cause and basis of the fact that out of all intrinsically possible worlds this one contingent world is real", 39 he must be mistaken on one of these two points: either on the existence of an infinitely good God, or on the existence of evil as related to negative and "lower" values. It is not surprising to find, then, that Scheler eventually acquiesced to denying the former: "the theistic concept of God... inadequately explains evil and good only through the myth of the fallen angel." 40 He had no other choice but that one, if evil as well as negative values are essences which exist in the world.

Yet, metaphysically speaking, Scheler did not have to take this position. The classical problem of God and evil can be given a solution on the level of metaphysics, which is the level of solution Scheler's problem requires. But would it work for him?

II

In traditional metaphysics, such as that of Thomas Aquinas, the problem of God and evil is given a solution on the level of metaphysics. Like Scheler claimed to have done in his Vom Evigen..., Aquinas also demonstrates that God exists, is perfect and is good. "God alone is essentially good, for everything is called good according to its perfection", as Thomas says. 41 From this he concludes that God is the "Highest Good":

...good is attributed to God, as was said, inasmuch as all desired perfections flow from Him as from the first cause... Therefore, as good is in God as in the first, but not the univocal cause of all things, it must be in Him in a most excellent way; and therefore He is called the Highest good. 42

Furthermore,

... evil is the opposite of good. But the nature of the good consists in perfection, which means that the nature of evil consists in imperfection. Now, in God who is universally perfect, as we have shown above, there cannot be any defect or imperfection. Therefore, there cannot be evil in God. 43

It follows from this that if there cannot be any evil in God, He cannot be the cause
of evil, or otherwise that would make Him evil, as an effect derives its "form" from the cause. If so, then whence, according to Thomas, come the evils in our world? To answer this question we must first understand what evils are. But as we will see, to call something evil requires that we first understand what it means to call something good.

(A) What does it mean to call something "good"? In asking this question, we have moved from, what Maritain calls, "the level of experiment" into the level of philosophical discourse. When we taste an apple and find it pleasant tasting, we call it a good apple. When we build a house and find that scaffolding is useful, we call scaffolding good. And when we see an animal eating food, we call the food good because animals require food. From experience, we acquire the concept "good" as we do all other concepts. We "abstract" from our material world and obtain an immaterial world of intelligible and universal notions. But as Maritain points out,

Cette notion universelle de l'intelligence est virtuellement, non actuellement métaphysique, elle n'est pas encore dégagée de ses connotations purement expérimentales. Pour passer au plan métaphysique, il faut non seulement que l'intelligibilité en puissance de la notion animale ou purement sensible de bien ait été libérée et actualisée dans une idée, mais que de cette idée même du bien soit dégagée une intelligibilité indépendante en soi de l'expérience, non liée à l'expérience, non liée à la matière; et ceci arrive au niveau de la visualisation métaphysique, au moment où l'identité radicale entre le bien et l'être est intellectuellement perçue.

In philosophy, apart from clarifying and studying the concepts that we use, we study man in his relationship to reality: in metaphysics we study how the absolute relates to man; in ethics we study how man relates to the absolute. The latter cannot be known without the former. If to study implies using our reason to obtain the knowledge of things that are true and real, let us see how Aquinas answers this question, philosophically. Let us begin where Aquinas begins—by clarifying the concept of "the good" that we abstract from experience.

In the examples of the good that we have just mentioned, we find that there is something common expressed by the term "good", namely, that an appetitive "feeling", desire, or tendency exists either in the thing that is said to be good or capable of
being so, or in something else. A good apple is desired by one who eats it and finds it tasty; a good scaffolding is desirable for building a house; food is in itself desirable for animal nature. Or, virtue is itself desirable as it is good for man. Whatever is good, then, is in some way desirable. As Aquinas says, "The essence of goodness consists in this, that it is in some way desirable. Hence, the Philosopher says, 'Goodness is what all desire'." In the first place, then, we see that a thing is good insofar as it is desirable.

Furthermore, something is desirable to the extent that it perfects something. A man is perfected by having virtue which is good for him; scaffolding is perfected when it works well, and so forth. As Aquinas says, "Good signifies the notion (rationem) of perfection." In the second place, then, good is a perfection for which, as Klubertanz points out, "there is an appetite (tendency) either in the thing itself which possesses or is capable of possessing the perfection or something else".

Furthermore, we find that the good is in the intentional order. The good always has the aspect of a goal or an end for that whose good it is. "That to which an appetite (tendency) tends, is the end," as Thomas says. This is especially important for the will which is a rational appetite and therefore tends to the moral good as an end.

But in our discussion so far, the conception of the good has been that of what some call the 'proper good', that is, it has been a discussion of that good which adds a perfection to something. It can properly be predicated of only that which is proper to it; such as the good of an apple cannot be said of a tree or a house. The goodness of one kind of thing is proper only to it. Moreover, as Klubertanz points out, "in the beings of our experience, their proper good is a perfection distinct from their substance and so is an accidental perfection". What we now have to consider is whether that which is perfected, namely the substance, can be said to be good.

If one is to answer in the affirmative, then substance itself as bearer of
"accidental perfections" must in some way be desirable, perfect, or an end.
This requires that we investigate the nexus between these properties and substance
in general; that is, we must consider being as substance. In other words, we must
now enter metaphysics and study the transcendental good. As Thomas says, "goodness
of anything is twofold. One is of its essence; thus, for instance, to be
rational pertains to the essence of man ... Another kind of goodness is that
which is over and above the essence; thus, the good of a man is to be virtuous
or wise." 51 We have, up till now, briefly considered the latter under the title
of the proper good; let us now look at the former.

Whereas the proper good refers to the specific nature of a thing, the
transcendental good refers to all being as beings in general. It is meant to
signify the desirability and perfection of being in general:

    Now it is clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is
perfect; for all desire their own perfection. But everything is
perfect so far as it is in act. Therefore it is clear that a
thing is good so far as it is being (ens); for being (esse) is the
actuality of all things ... 52

To say that something is perfect is to say that it cannot be made better, in
that it is completely made, needing nothing more. But a thing would not be
complete unless it were actual rather than merely potential. As Aquinas says,
"A thing is said to be perfect according as it is in act, because we call that
perfect which lacks nothing of the mode of its perfection." 53 Indeed, by incor-
porating Aristotle's doctrine of potency and act into his own metaphysics, he
shows that being (ens) can be looked at as having a component responsible for
its act, that is for its being here and now in existence, and this he calls its
esse (i.e. its "to be"); it also has a potential component when compared to esse,
and this he calls the essence. Essence is what a thing is as signified by the
definition; it is "that to which the esse is due". Thus, beings exist because they have their particular esse; and are determinate because of their essence. Only in God is his essence His esse, in which case the esse is unlimited by anything, while that of His creatures is limited by the capacity of the creature's essence. Now, if act is a perfection, then whatever is in act is desirable to the extent it is in act. "Hence, it is clear that good and being are the same really (secundum rem). But good represents the aspect of desirableness, which being does not present." That is to say, that every being as being is good. However, to our 'conception' of being we can add the relation to the intentional order, that is, we can relate it to the appetite. In this way being and good are distinct only by virtue of our reason: they are the same in reality, and hence they are said to be convertible with each other, but they differ in idea.

It is evident that if being and good are transcendental, then each thing is good because it has esse:

Every being as being is good. For every being as being is in act, and is in some way perfect, since every act is a sort of perfection, and perfection implies desirability and goodness ...

And if act is a perfection, then, as we said, every being is good to the degree that it is in act. But "such as everything is, such is the act it produces". That is to say, since essence is what limits esse, everything of a specific nature has a different degree of esse. For example:

A superior intelligence, closer to the First Being, has more act and less potency, and so on with the others. This gradation terminates in the human soul which holds the lowest degree among intellectual substances... Having more potency than the other intellectual substances, the human soul is so close to matter that a material thing is drawn to share in its own act of existing (esse), so that from soul and body there results in the one composite one act of existing (esse) although in so far as it is the soul's act of existing it is not dependent on the body. Posterior to that form which is the soul, other forms are found still more potential and
closer to matter, to such a point that they do not exist without matter. Among these forms, too, we find an order and a hierarchy, until we reach the primary forms of the elements, which are closest to matter.  

This hierarchy which is determined by the measure of essence and hence esse, converts to a hierarchy of value when good and being are convertible. Value for Thomas is an aspect of being. As Simon has pointed out, "le bien peut être envisagé dans sa qualité de bien, dans sa ratio boni ou encore sous l'aspect de la perfection, de la plénitude d'ètre; c'est le bien comme valeur... Un bien n'est valeur que s'il est susceptible de déclencher le mouvement de la tendance qui lui fait face".  

God, being esse itself, is also goodness itself. Since no being is its own esse, or otherwise it would cause itself to be which is impossible, it must derive its esse from the esse subsistens, who is God. Thus, just as every being derives its esse from God according to its proper measure, so does it derive its goodness by participation in divine goodness:

If anything is good by virtue of the fact that it exists, none of them is its own act of being; none of them is its own goodness. Rather, each of them is good by participation in goodness, just as it is being by participation in existing being itself.

God, then, is the highest value, and all other beings find their value in relation to Him by the degree of goodness they have. The estimation of the goodness of being, then, depends not on the ordering it has to any particular thing, but to the order that it has in the whole of the universe, where, as just shown, everything has its place according to a hierarchy. Therefore, all beings are ontologically good; they are, as Scheler would say, value-things (Werdinge).

But if beings are valuable to the extent that they are in act, can actions and specifically moral actions also have value? Moral actions can indeed have value; they can have moral value which is simply an instance of value in general. It is a
specific ontological good. That is to say, to be in act for Thomas can mean two things: "The first act is the form and integrity of a thing, the second act is its operation". And since act is a perfection, something is good by virtue of both of these two acts. It is because act is of two ways that there are two types of goodness. Thus, one can say that man, insofar as he has a substantial form is good. Then if we speak of the actions of man, his actions are the operation of his soul, because like all operations, they come from some form. For Aristotle, and also for Thomas the soul is the form of a living body. Thus, we can also say that man is good by virtue of his actions insofar as they are actual operations, and these can constitute proper goods for man as explained earlier. As Aquinas says, "We must say that every action has goodness in so far as it has being (esse)". But another important distinction must be made here. Not all actions of a man are moral actions; only those that are voluntary can be said to be moral. Nevertheless, either type of action can still be said to be good ontologically. As Maritain explains,

Le bien moral n'est pas un transcendantal, mais il reste un concept métaphysique particulisé à la ligne de l'accomplissement de l'être humain; c'est donc un analogué particulier de ce concept analogue qu'est le bien ontologique ou métaphysique. Je ne crois pas que le passage du bien métaphysique ou transcendantal au bien moral s' affectue par une simple particularisation logique; il suppose l'irruption d'une donnée nouvelle, il suppose l'expérience morale. Mais il rest ontologique dans sa nature, c'est un bien ontologique particulisé.

The moral good, then, is somewhat special. It has the aspect of an end particularly for the rational appetite, that is the will. Unlike Scheler's view on this matter, reason apprehends many goods, and thus, a multiplicity of ends. Other faculties also present a multiplicity of goods as motivational objects (ends) to the will, but it is only right reason that can present the proper good as an end for each thing or action to the will.
Hence, when the will inclines to act as moved by the apprehension of reason, presenting a proper good to it, the result is a fitting action. But when the will breaks forth into action, at the apprehension of sense cognition, or of reason itself presenting some other good at variance with its proper good, the result in the action of the will is a moral fault.65

For Aquinas, that what distinguishes man from all the animals is his reason. Man's essence is to be found in his rationality. Indeed, even his free will is free because it is a rational appetite: "the fact that man is master of his actions is due to his being able to deliberate about them; for since the deliberating reason is indifferently disposed to opposites, the will can proceed to either".66 Therefore, since the voluntary is an act which consists in a rational operation, human acts are properly called human when they are voluntary; it is these acts that merit praise or blame and are therefore morally good or evil. Thus, a man is not said to be morally good because he has a good intellect, but because he has a good will.67

If all human actions are directed to an end, then can we not also speak of a last end of man in terms of intention, that is to say, is there not an ultimate goal which man aims for in his life? This is indeed the case, and we find this exemplified in the fact that men have an ultimate goal in their lives which they strive for. For some it is the acquisition of riches; for others it is some sort of pleasure; for others again it is something else. People are not agreed as to what their consummate good or final end is. If there is not one true and therefore absolute end for all men, then all last ends are relative each person's inclination. It would be difficult to say which is better than the other unless some standard or criterion were used; and if our evaluation of "better" is also not to be relative, then the standard or criterion must be linked to the absolute. It should not be surprising to find that when Aquinas proposes his own view on what the ultimate end of man is, this view is consonant with his overall conception of reality: in one
way or another, everything is linked to the absolute, that is to say with God. Thus, just as man's nature and things in general are linked to God, so are man's actions. If God is the highest good, then the best consummate good of man is God. That is, "God is not the end of things in the sense of being something set up as an ideal, but as a pre-existing being Who is to be attained". Without considering here Aquinas' discussion of the existence of the immortal human soul, we can see that the actual attainment of God is the perfect last end of man. As Thomas says,

... since everything desires its own perfection a man desires for his ultimate end that which he desires as his perfect and crowning good... It is therefore necessary for the last end so to fill man's appetite that nothing is left beside it for man to desire. And this is not possible if something else be required for his perfection.

It is only then that man will attain greatest happiness,

For happiness is the perfect good which quiets the appetite altogether since it would not be the last end if something yet remained to be desired. Now the object of the will, that is of man's appetite, is the universal good, just as the object of the intellect is the universal true. Hence, it is evident that nothing can quiet man's will except the universal good. This is to be found not in any creature, but in God alone, because every creature has a goodness by participation.

Since man by nature desires to know (i.e. his essence is to be rational), his rational appetite will not be satiated until he knows the causes of the effects that he knows. But as Aquinas showed, all causes can be reduced to the first cause of all things, whom he calls "God".

If therefore the human intellect, knowing the essence of some created effect, knows no more of God than that He is, the perfection of that intellect does not yet reach absolutely the First Cause, but there remains in it the natural desire to seek the cause. And so it is not yet perfectly happy. Consequently, for perfect happiness the intellect needs to reach the very Essence of the First Cause. And thus it will have its perfection through union with God as with that object in which alone man's happiness consists ...
Thus, if the primary goodness of a moral action is derived from its suitable object, then, by its very nature, a human (moral) action has absolute value to the extent that it is in conformity with man attaining his final end. In this way, moral values as well as all other values (and hence ethics which is the study of values) acquires the character of the absolute.

Now that we have shown how good is related for Thomas to God and reality, we must consider evil since it is said to be opposed to good.

(B) In our capacity to be able to know things, we can directly know only that which is, that is being (ens), while its opposite, that which is not, can only be known from the former. Knowledge is had only by means of the actual. For example, one does not know what blindness is unless one knows what sight is; it cannot be defined except by means of the actuality it deprives such as when we say that blindness is the lack of sight. And so too with evil. Since being (ens) is convertible with good, the opposite of good must be convertible with non-being as it were, that is, evil can be known only through the actuality it is meant to be opposed to, and this is the good. For this reason, Aquinas remarks that,

... since every nature desires its own being and its own perfection, it must be said that the being and the perfection of any nature also has the character of goodness. Hence it cannot be that evil signifies being, or any form or nature. Therefore, it must be that by the name of evil is signified a certain absence of good. And this is what is meant by saying that 'evil is neither a being or a good'. For since being, as such, is good, the taking away of the one implies the taking away of the other.\textsuperscript{73}

Thus, some things are said to be evil because they cause injury, and precisely because they cause injury to the good; conversely, it is good to injure the evil.

The important distinction that Thomas wishes to make, however, is not that good and evil are simply contraries without qualification, but following St. Augustine, that "evil is simply a privation of something which a subject is entitled by its origin to possess, and which it ought to have".\textsuperscript{74} As he says elsewhere, "evil is
distant both from absolute being and from absolute non-being, because it is neither a habit nor a pure negation, but a privation. Not every absence of good, then is evil. Taken negatively as a mere absence of good, what does not exist would have to be called an evil, as well as those proper goods which belong to something else, such as a man not having the swiftness of a roe or the strength of a lion. This is not what we understand by the evil that causes injury. Rather, it is the absence of good taken in a privative sense that is evil, as when privation of sight is said to be evil. On the other hand, every privation has the character of evil because privation consists in the lack of the fullness of being, that is, of perfection, of something, and therefore it fails in goodness. "In its proper acceptation, privation is predicated of that which is fitted by its nature to be possessed, and to be possessed at a certain time and in a certain manner." A thing is called evil, then, only when it lacks a certain perfection it ought to have.

We should mention here that evil, in its common usage, is often spoken of in two ways. In one way when we say "evil", we understand "that which is the subject of evil", and this subject is something which exists, that is, it is a being. In another way, when we say evil, we understand "evil itself", and this is not anything but it is a privation of something good, that is, it is not a real being. Since evil is itself nothing, it cannot exist in itself, but must occur in something that exists, as is said in the first way. Thus, although we often speak of something being evil, we must be careful to recognise that by this we mean that every privation is founded in a subject which is a being, and not that evil itself is a substance. As Thomas remarks, "any instance of a privation is a non-being (non-ens), yet its subject is a substance which is a being." It follows from this that privations are not real essences, but only negations in a substance. It is, metaphysically speaking, nothing.
As we mentioned earlier, there are two types of goodness. It follows that if evil is the opposite of good, there are two types of evils: one concerns the nature or essence, the other the operation. Blindness in man or drought in the world are evils of the first type, and these constitute a lack of the fulness of being due to the nature of a thing. Nature failing to advance a generated being such as man to its proper form and disposition so that monsters are produced is an evil of the second type, and is a lack of the fulness of being in the due operation of something. Such "evil in an action that is directed to an end in such a way that it is not rightly related to the end", Thomas says, "is called a fault, both in voluntary agents and in natural agents." But, "if a defect occurs in non-voluntary actions that are directed to an end, it is called simply a fault (culpa). But if such a defect occurs in voluntary actions, it is called not only fault, but sin (peccatum)." Thus, since the actions of a voluntary agent, such as man, may be involuntary as well as voluntary, the former, such as lameness is still called a fault; but the latter is called sin because a defect in a voluntary action deservedly brings blame and punishment on the agent. Nevertheless, voluntary agents can have two types of evils since there are two types of evils. With regards to the operation of the agent, it can be the evil of fault in both senses; with regards to the nature or essence of the agent, it is the evil of punishment or pain (poena) for the sin. As Thomas says,

But because good in itself is the object of the will, evil, which is the privation of good, is found in a special way in rational creatures that have a will. Therefore, the evil which comes from the withdrawal of the form and integrity of the thing has the nature of a pain, and especially so in the supposition that all things are subject to divine providence and justice, as was shown above, for it is if the very nature of a pain to be against the will. But evil which consists in the taking away of the due operation in voluntary things has the nature of a fault; for this is imputed to anyone as a
fault to fall as regards perfect action, of which he is master by the will. Therefore, every evil in voluntary things is to be looked upon as a pain or a fault.\footnote{38}

However, it must be stressed that, "Pain and fault do not divide evil absolutely considered, but evil that is found in voluntary things".\footnote{31} Sin, in general, is an action which is detrimental for a person to reach his final end,\footnote{32} and is, as are all other cases of evil, a \textit{non-esse}. That is to say, "A thing is called a non-being (\textit{non-ens}) . . . because non-existence (\textit{non esse}) is included in its definition; and this is why blindness is called a non-being".\footnote{33} Privations, in other words, are such non-beings, or if we prefer they are \textit{non-esse}. Evils, then, are nothing in the literal sense, and therefore they can only be caused or produced accidentally. A person, for instance, may will a good that is arrived at by the sensible appetite, and which is contrary to proper reason. But he still wills a good, even though it is not the proper good. And since it is not the proper good that is willed, it is an evil that is willed accidentally insofar as it is still a good that is willed. All such evils, then, are \textit{non-esse} which can only be caused indirectly, that is, by accident.

(C) This is not to say that Aquinas' doctrine is without any difficulties. But it does nevertheless overcome in a consistent manner the problem of God and evil. If evil is not an essence, then there is no inconsistency in claiming that a God, whose goodness has no limit allows evil to exist in his creation. For evil, as we said, is ontologically nothing. Therefore,\footnote{34} the source of all \textit{esse}, co-existing, as it were, with \textit{non-esse} or nothing is not a contradictory proposition. It can always be objected, for instance, that God is the cause of some \textit{non-esse} insofar as they are privations. But if God causes no-thing, which is what \textit{non-esse} or \textit{non-ens} is, then it cannot be held against Him, especially if as a result He will be giving a greater plenitude of \textit{esse}, and therefore of goodness, as a result. This can be
seen if we first consider the opposite, that is, what would happen were there no privations in the universe. In this case, St. Thomas points out that,

...many good things would be taken away if God permitted no evil to exist; for fire would not be generated if air was not corrupted, nor would the life of a lion be preserved unless the ass were killed. Neither would avenging justice nor the patience of a sufferer be praised if there were no injustice.

And because there is inequality in things, there are different grades of goodness, for instance,

...in natural things species seem to be arranged in degrees; as the mixed things are more perfect than the elements, and plants than minerals, and animals than plants, and men than other animals; in each of these one species is more perfect than the others. Therefore, as the divine wisdom is the cause of the distinction of things for the sake of the perfection of the universe, so it is the cause of inequality. For the universe would not be perfect if only one grade of goodness were found in things.

And as noted earlier, the perfection of things is measured by the degree of being (esse) a thing has, which itself converts to the degree of goodness.

Moreover, the objection that God, by His very nature, would not allow any evil to exist in His works does not hold either, for "As Augustine says, (Enchir. XI): 'Since God is the highest good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His works, unless His omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good even out of evil.' By willing the good, God wills evil accidentally. In this way, although one can say that God does will the evil of a natural defect, this simply means that God wills the good to which nothing, that is evil, is attached. Indeed, even in the realm of the action of a natural thing, it does not mean that God actually causes faults in these actions. As an agent, God is without fault because He is perfect. Faults, rather, are caused by the imperfection or evil in the agents themselves, whether their actions are voluntary or not. That there is non-esse is a necessary
requirement for the greatest perfection in the universe; but the tendency or action towards non-esse is not caused by God, but by the creatures themselves.

But on the other hand, although God does not will the evil of sin, He does will the evil of its punishment. Punishment or penalty is inflicted not out of malice but as a redress for sin which in itself is a disturbance of the right order of the universe, and which is caused accidentally by a voluntary agent, such as man. As Thomas notes, "the order of justice belongs to the order of the universe, and this requires that penalty should be dealt out to sinners". Hence, "a return to right order of justice is effected by punishment, whereby some good is withdrawn from the sinner's will". So, although "God is the author of evil which is penalty, but not the evil which is fault", God is not evil by accidentally causing evil, and therefore His infinite goodness is not compromised. Indeed, "one becomes evil by the evil of fault, but not by the evil of pain".

Furthermore, God's omnipotence is not compromised either when it is said, for instance, that He could have created this universe better than it is. This universe cannot be made better than it is even though evil is part of it. To see this, we must look at how any thing can be made better. Since, as mentioned earlier, the goodness of anything is twofold, a thing can be made better either by an increase in the goodness of the essence, or in an increase of that which is over and above the essence. With regards to the former, a thing cannot be made better. A lion, for instance, cannot be made any better than it now is, for it would then no longer be a lion but, say, a man which is better than a lion because it has a greater degree of esse. Thus, although a thing cannot be made better with regards to its essence, another thing can be made better than it. In this way, God can create another creature which is better than, say, a lion but not as good as a man thereby increasing the grades of goodness in our universe; but
this would no longer be our universe, and nor would the lion or any other thing in our universe be made better in its essence. With regards to the latter, a thing can always be made better, such as a man can always be made better by increasing his virtue or wisdom or anything else that is over and above the essence. However, the goodness of the universe does not consist in these accidents, but in the essence of things. As Thomas says,

The universe, the things that exist now being supposed, cannot be better, on account of the most noble order given to these things by God, in which the good of the universe consists. For if any one thing were bettered, the proportion of the order would be destroyed, just as if one string were stretched more than it ought to be, the melody of the harp would be destroyed. Yet God could make other things, or add something to those things that are made, and then that universe would be better.\textsuperscript{91}

In the latter case, the other universe may be better than ours, but in either case, each individual thing cannot be made better than it is in its essence, and thus, in its position in the order of good; that is to say, its degree of \emph{esse} would be the same in either universe. Thus, the judgement "of the goodness of anything does not depend upon its reference to any particular thing, but rather upon what it is in itself, and on its reference to the whole universe, wherein every part has its own perfectly ordered place...".\textsuperscript{92}

From what has now been discussed, it can readily be seen that Aquinas' solution to the problem of evil is effective, because it makes it meaningless to explain evil without asserting the existence of an all good God. The existence of evil presupposes an order of being, that is, an order of good, because "there would be no evil if the order of good were taken away, since its privation is evil".\textsuperscript{93} Thus, the existence of evil implies an order of \emph{esse}. But the order of \emph{esse} also implies the existence of God, for "this order would not exist if there were no God".\textsuperscript{94} With Thomas' solution, then, one cannot give meaning to evil
without affirming the existence of an all good God.

(D) From this metaphysical solution in which evil is a privation of good, several implications follow that are very important for Scheler's views. First, it follows that there is no highest evil which would be the primary source of all evils, and which, for example, would be the principle or being that is opposed to God. For,

if the highest evil be anything, it must be evil in its own essence, just as the highest good is what is good in its own essence. Now, this is impossible, because evil has no essence, as we proved above. So, it is impossible to posit a highest evil which would be the source of evils.  

We see here that Scheler's position of holding that evil is an existing thing is the very conclusion that Thomas had to avoid. Since evil, for Scheler, is something that itself exists the way good exists, it must come from some other than God who is the source of all good: This, as we saw, is for him the devil. But as we also saw, it inadequately explains the existence of an all good God with evil present.

Second, this also means that for Thomas evil cannot be a subject, but is in a subject or substance as a certain privation. Indeed, "every evil is based on some good, for it is present in a subject which is good as having some sort of nature". Thus, no person can be completely evil as no sin can completely corrupt one's nature, including that of man. As Thomas says, "For the substance of the act or the affection of the agent could not remain unless something remained in the order of reason". Thus, even the devil to the extent that he exists is good. Scheler's devil is metaphysically impossible for Thomas.

Third, since non-esse is part of the definition of privations, "It is impossible to conceive, either in our imagination or in our intellect, any form for such non-beings (non entis); and evil is a non-being of this type". Thus, we
can say that God knows evil only through the good. Consequently, God cannot be
said to have even the idea of evil in Him. In Scheler's terms, this means that
God cannot even realise the idea of evil because He does not have it.

Fourth, Thomas' metaphysical approach still allows him to speak of evil as
a being, although in a qualified sense. We saw that for him, "to the extent
that something is intelligible, to that extent it is in act". Since evil has
non esse in its definition, it has no intelligibility of itself. Yet even if
there is no essence that is actualised it does not mean that we cannot speak mean-
ingfully or intelligibly about it. For "not-being (non ens) has nothing in itself
by which it can be known, yet it is known in so far as the intellect renders it
knowable". We do, in other words, speak of evil, not as an essence, but as a
privation. In reality we say that a privation does not exist, that it is non
esse. But as Aquinas tries to show, we do, nevertheless, speak of evil as well as
of other privations as existing or having esse. But in this way we are in effect
saying that nothing exists. If we are giving esse to that which in reality we judge
does not have it only in order to speak about it, then we are left with only one
source for this other "unreal" esse, as it were, and this is the mind itself.

This can be seen from the way in which, according to Thomas, we grasp priva-
tions themselves. As we saw earlier, privations are known through the positive
being they are meant to deny. This means that a privation can only be known if
one first knows what the positive being is. It is, in other words, by recalling
the positive being and becoming aware that it is not in existence that a privation
is grasped. Since by privation one means "the lack of a good that ought to be",
it signifies the truth in a judgement. That is to say, one judges that the positive
being recalled to memory does not exist in reality, and this is what we call a
privation. Consequently, when we say that a privation exists, we call a priva-
tion a being in the sense of the truth in a judgement; being and truth, in other words, are convertible, just as good and being are. In this way,

As the Philosopher says, being is twofold. In one way it is considered as signifying the entity of a thing, according as it is divided by the ten predicaments; and in that sense it is convertible with thing, and in this way, no privation is a being, and neither therefore is evil a being. In another sense, being signifies the truth of a proposition which consists in composition whose mark is the word is; and in this sense being is what answers to the question Does it exist? and thus we speak of blindness as being in the eye, or of any other privation. In this way, even evil can be called a being. Through ignorance of this distinction, some, considering that things are called evil, or that evil is said to be in things, believed that evil was a kind of thing. 101

A privation, then, is not an essence in the metaphysical sense, that is to say in the sense of an ontological principle of real being. They are, rather, "meanings" or definitions which signify the truth in a judgement of existence, and therefore, they exist only in our minds. As such, they are simply called beings of reason, that is to say, they are things that exist only in our mind. Thus, the evil that Scheler admits as a real object is for Aquinas an ontological impossibility.

Let us now return to Scheler and see why his phenomenological approach brings about a contradiction.

III

Scheler's phenomenological attitude can be viewed, as he himself says, as "the most radical empiricism and positivism". 102 Only the facts that are intuited immediately in our experience of the world are relevant to phenomenology, "only what is intuitively in an act of experiencing (even if this should point to a
content beyond itself) - never anything that is meant as a content outside of, or separated from, such an act - can belong to it. This attitude excludes all forms of reasoning such as deduction and induction, since the conclusions that we obtain from these will transcend the intuitional contents, the "pure" facts of this experience. It is precisely because these facts are independent of induction and deduction that Scheler can call them "a priori" or "pure" facts, or, since they can neither be perfected or improved by observation or reasoning, they can also be labelled "absolute".

But without ratiocination, intuition is of crucial importance for phenomenology. It is through the content of an immediate intuition that these pure or phenomenological facts come to givenness, that is, that we become conscious of them. It is through this intuition that the phenomena of our experience become knowledge. Phenomenological intuition, can rightly be called "phenomenological experience". That which intuition furnishes is the determinate or, in a narrow sense, intelligible "what", namely essences and essential connexions. For this reason, Scheler also calls this intuition "essential intuiting". All facts in this intuition are either essences or their interconnections, and "either this 'what' is intuited and, hence, 'self'-given... or this 'what' is not intuited and, hence, not given".

These essences that phenomenology in general claims to intuit are of the objects which are given in the act of perception, such as seeing. Scheler's novelty consists in the claim that this sphere of intuitable essences and their interconnexions also includes values. Values, however, are not objects of perception as are the things of nature and their properties. Scheler claims that values are given in a special act called "feeling", and, moreover, in the feeling of loving or hating. As he says,
The actual seat of the entire value-a priori (including the moral a priori) - is the value-cognition or value-intuition that comes to the fore in feeling, basically in love and hate, as well as the "moral cognition" of the interconnexions of values, i.e., their "being-higher" and "being-lower". This cognition occurs in special functions and acts which are toto caelo different from all perception and thinking.

But how justified are his novel claims? Can phenomenology intuit good and evil as well as all the other values? We have just seen that traditional metaphysics rationally deduces a hierarchy of values - and not without effort - and how judgement is the necessary condition for the valuation of any being in this hierarchy. Evil is thereby reduced to nothing and as a consequence it cannot be in logical conflict with the existence of the Summum Bonum. Scheler, on the other hand, claims to intuit a hierarchy of real values, to intuit evil as well as good and the other values: "the order of the ranks of values can never be deduced or derived". As he insists, "The value itself always must be intuitively given or must refer back to that kind of givenness". If values are intuited, are values given to the same intuition as essence? Can values then still be treated as essences, that is, are values essences?

A) One way to answer our question is by formulating a test which we would apply to values to see whether they qualify as essences. Such a test would determine whether values have some essential factor that all essences must have. If values were found not to have it, then they could not be regarded as essences. This would mean that values could not be given in essential intuiting. Is there such an essential factor, and do values possess it?

It must be said at the outset that the essences of Scheler's phenomenology are not the essences of metaphysics. For the latter, an essence is what is signified by the definition; it is that by which something is what it is, that is to say, it is a limitation of esse as pointed out earlier. Since a definition can
refer to many individual things which it can encompass through its meaning so that they fall under it, essences, when abstracted by our minds, are universal concepts. They are universals existing only in our minds or in the mind of God, or even "separately" as the Platonic ideas.

But to conclude in this way that an essence is a universal is a deductive procedure or needs at least induction. Scheler's essences, if they are to have epistemological certainty, cannot be regarded as universals unless this "universality" is actually given in phenomenological experience. Nor can they be regarded as particulars unless this too is given. As he says,

The differences between universal and particular meanings come about only in relation to the objects in which an essence comes to the fore. Thus, an essence becomes universal if it comes to the fore in a plurality of otherwise different objects as an identical essence: in all and everything that 'has' or 'bears' this essence. The essence can, on the other hand, also constitute the nature of an individual thing without ceasing to be such an essence.

Nó, moreover, can Scheler's essences be definitions in the sense used above or in any sense that views definitions as conveying more information than a mere description of the thing. If the a priori belongs wholly to the given and the sphere of facts, then the a priori character of the essences of phenomenology means that phenomenology itself is a purely descriptive endeavour. What is outside the sphere of facts is extirpated from consideration. This attempt at making phenomenology presuppositionless, and hence to give its results certainty, must exclude the attempt to define things such as by genus and difference which relates the species to an abstract formal cause not immediately found in the content of an intuition. If we keep within the realm of the given, we would be using for our definition the very concepts we are trying to define. As Scheler remarks, "concerning concepts, however, which are a priori because they find their fulfillment in essential intuiting, there is the criterion that in attempting to define
them, we are inevitably trapped in a circulus in demonstrando."\textsuperscript{109} What, then, are the essences of Scheler's phenomenology?

Recalling that phenomenology is a descriptive endeavour, its results must be "descriptions" of the given. They must also be a priori even though they are in the sphere of facts of an immediate intuition. This means that

In phenomenological experience, nothing is meant that is not given, and nothing is given that is not meant. It is precisely in this coincidence of the "meant" and the "given" that the content of phenomenological experience alone becomes manifest. In this coincidence, in the very meeting point of fulfillment of what is meant and what is given, the phenomenon appears. Whenever the given surpasses what is meant, or whenever what is meant is not given "itself", and is therefore incomplete, there is no pure phenomenological experience.\textsuperscript{110}

Essences, therefore, must be the meanings that are given in intuition, which are both in a sense "descriptive" and yet a priori. As he says, "essences are ideal units of meaning: 'we designate as 'a priori' all those ideal units of meaning and those propositions that are self-given by way of an immediate intuitive content in the absence of any kind of positing of subjects that think them and of the real nature of those subjects, and in the absence of any kind of positing of objects to which such units of meaning are applicable'.\textsuperscript{111} Scheler calls essences "ideal" not simply because they are ideas that are immanent to consciousness.

When phenomenology was described as a radical empiricism, this we saw meant that phenomenology is an attempt to acquire certain knowledge from the empirical world of facts which, from the natural or ordinary standpoint, is characterised by contingency and change. It is in fact this contingency and change that makes the knowledge of the real world uncertain - that is a posteriori. The intuited essences, therefore, must be necessary in so far as propositions about them are necessarily true:
the truth of propositions that find their fulfillment in such essences is totally independent of the entire sphere of observation and description, as well as of what is established in inductive experience. This truth is also independent, quite obviously, of all that enters into causal explanation. It can neither be verified nor refuted by this kind of experience.¹¹²

Neither are they amendable or changeable by this experience since they are "a priori 'given' 'prior' to all experience (of this kind)".¹¹³ Not conforming to the exigences of the real empirical world, they stand out as non-empirical objects having no place in space and time.¹¹⁴ Like the objects of logic they are "ideal ideas" in the Platonic sense. So although meanings are ideal, they are to be found in the phenomenological experience of the world. "Whatever is a priori given rests on 'experience', as does everything else given to us by 'experience' in the sense of observation and induction."¹¹⁵

But what are meanings? Restricting ourselves to the sense of the term as it is used in phenomenology, the following remarks taken from Gerd Brand's comments on Husserl's later manuscripts, reflects Scheler's position. In his manuscripts Husserl remarked: "I experience things, I do not experience 'meaning of Being' (Seinssinn), things as meaning".¹¹⁶ Brand explains this by pointing out that,

... although it is true that in experiencing things "only", we do not experience them as meaning, we nevertheless experience them yet in their meaning. Whenever we experience an object, we experience it as what it is; and this object is what it is in the "whence" and "whither" of the functioning intentionality.¹¹⁷

That a being has meaning signifies that we understand it. This understanding can be made the subject matter of our investigation by thematizing the being itself. This is why Husserl says: "Being as such has its most original existential meaning as 'the me'". And in so doing we are no longer simply occupied with being only, but we make that being into our theme. For Husserl "theme" means planning to explicate something. Because being has meaning and thus is already a possible theme, being itself, even taken in the way in which it is given in the simplest experience, always implies
the demand of realising this possibility, of delivering its meaning — horizon from anonymity. 119

But it is not our functioning intentionality that creates meaning.

There is no meaning-less being just as there is no objectless meaning. That a being has meaning means that it is objective, given, intuitable, but also that as such it is only on the basis of our functioning intentionality which gives it its ground. 120

Furthermore, Husserl had already established that apprehending essences requires a procedure. As he explained,

... in general the method which is a basic part of the method of eidetic science generally is one of going forward step by step. The particular intuitions which minister to the apprehension of the essence may already be sufficiently clear to render possible a completely clear grasp of some essential generality, and yet not so adequate as to satisfy the main intention; there is a lack of clearness as regards the closer definitions of the interwoven essences; thus we need to scrutinize our illustrative instances more closely or to contrive others that are better suited, in which the pertinent single feature left confused and obscure standout and can then be transformed into data of the clearest kind. 121

These excerpts show that Scheler followed the general trend in Husserl's phenomenology and his views on meaning. The essence does not come forth in full clarity from the very outset of its being given in intuition. It must be investigated so that it may become progressively understood, until its meaning emerges in its plentitude. This means that meaning is constructed "step by step" as it makes its appearance in consciousness. However, these meanings are not constructed arbitrarily by the subject but constructed according to the meaning itself as it unfolds in its horizon. "We cannot separate the object from its horizon," as Brand explains, "the ego from the world, the subject from the object; nor can we ask ourselves how it is possible that they are so closely connected, because in that case, too, we relinquish the principle of all principles; that is, the
principle of the original intuition, and posit an object on one side and a subject on the other.\textsuperscript{122} The unity of meaning that Scheler speaks about, then, is that aspect of the object, that thread, as it were, which keeps together the various parts of the meaning in the progress of its being understood. This unity of the essence is itself given in its meaning. And if meanings are constructed, then they must have parts which are nevertheless unified according to the essence. Scheler observes that when phenomenological experience reaches the essence "itself" it attains "the prelinguistically given which is, as it were, still untouched by language, and, thus, the (the phenomenologist) sees what aspect of the given functions as a mere fulfillment of language".\textsuperscript{123} But in constructing the meaning, language is used "both as an instrument of discovery and as a means for exhibiting results."\textsuperscript{124} Yet it must not be forgotten that phenomenology "uses language only in order to bring to sight that which is essentially indeterminable by any possible symbol because it is determined in itself and by itself."\textsuperscript{125} Although language is used to construct the meaning, to bring out the "determinateness", the essences or their interconnections are not dependent on it. Thus, since essences are a priori "given", "the propositions that find their fulfillment in them are a priori 'true'".\textsuperscript{126} "A proposition is only a priori true (or false), insofar as it finds its fulfillment in such 'facts'. The concept 'thing' and the intuited 'thingness', the concept equality and the intuited equality, or the being-equal (as distinguished from the being-similar), etc., must be clearly distinguished".\textsuperscript{127}

From this discussion, we can draw one inevitable conclusion: one of the characteristics of essentiality, according to the phenomenological attitude, is that the essence must have parts. Phenomenology requires this "step by step" intentional 'penetration' of the essence. What has no parts cannot be constructed.
Therefore, it cannot be a phenomenologically intuitable essence. With this essential factor of essentiality, we have established a criterion to enable us to answer our earlier question as to whether values are essences. If so, values have to have parts.

Although we have been primarily concerned with individual essences as independent units of meaning, we have noted after Husserl and Scheler that there are always interconnexions among essences. Individual essences are independent only insofar as their meaning is independent of the meaning of another essence. When we examine any thing, we find that it has many parts to it. Phenomenologically speaking, when we divide it we find that it is comprised of many individual essences which are interconnected to form a unity which we call a "thing". When the thing is given to intuition, the essence "thingness" is itself intuited. This essence "establishes" the unity of the various parts, (that is essences) that comprise this thing. As Scheler says, thingness is "the essence of the form of unities". A thing then, will have its particular essence, but it will also "bear" other essences as is symbolised through the act of predication. The unity of all these parts constitutes the thing's thingness which, therefore, is the foundation for the interconnexions between the parts.

All this is true if one regards an object as a thing. A pure thing is valueless; it has no value. But an object may also be regarded as a value-thing, that is, as a good; or, it may even be regarded as both, as a valuable thing. As Scheler explains,

From the point of view of the originality of the genesis we prefer to say that in the natural view of the world, real objects are "at first" neither pure things nor pure goods, but "complexes" (Sachen), i.e., things insofar as they are of value (and essentially useful); and that from this intermediate field, as it were, the collection moving towards pure things (with deliberate setting aside of all
values) and towards pure goods (with deliberate setting aside of all thingness) begins.

A good, then, is quite different from a thing. It is not founded on a thing in the sense that it must first be a thing in order for it to be a good. The existence of either depends exclusively on how one chooses to form the collection of complexes. Just as thingness guides the formation of a thing, so it is value that guides the formation of a value-thing, that is, a good. A thing may have value, but it is not formed by the value. "A natural thing of perception may be a bearer of certain values, and in this sense a valuable thing. But insofar as its unity as 'thing' is constituted not by the unity of a value-quality but by a value that we fortuitously find on the thing, it is not yet a 'good'". A good must be totally permeated by a value. "For, according to the essence of a good, its value does not appear to be situated on a thing; on the contrary, goods are totally permeated by values".

But if goods are not founded on things, then on what is the unity of a good founded? This, for Scheler is founded on the value that guides the formation of the good. As he explains, "a good represents a 'thinglike' unity of value-qualities or value-complexes which is founded in a specific basic value".

The unity of a value guides the synthesis of all other qualities of a good - other value qualities as well as those which do not represent such qualities, such as colors and forms in the case of material goods. The unity of a good has its foundation in a specific value that fills, as it were, the 'location' of thingness (but does not represent it). Therefore, in a world of the same qualities things could be quite different from what they are, and yet the world of goods could remain the same.

If a thing or a good is a unity of qualities or complexes, then it would seem that each of these has parts. In the case of a thing, the unity of its parts is founded on its "thingness". Thingness, then, has several parts to its
meaning and essence. For it must have within its essence the various aspects which guide into a unity the various parts of a thing. This can be seen if we consider that the unity of a thing is characterized by the various interconnexions that exist among the parts of the thing. It is not the existence of the parts but the existence of the interconnexions among the parts that forms the unity of the thing. Thingness, then, is a source of the unifying interconnexions. Without certain parts there is no need for certain interconnexions. For this reason, removing one part of the thing does not necessarily destroy it. Nor does dividing a thing into its parts, that is analysing the thing, destroy it. We can always investigate phenomenologically each part of the thing without the thing being destroyed. This is so because the connexions among the parts remain. 134

Thingness, therefore, has parts. And this is verifiable in the concrete thing.

But can the same be said about value? Is the unity of a good constituted by a value in the same way as a thing by its thingness? For Scheler there is an important difference between the unity of a thing and the unity of a good:

The difference between unities of things and goods becomes clear when we consider that a good is destructible, for instance, apart from the destruction of the thing representing the same real object, e.g., a work of art (a painting) whose colors fade. Also, a thing can be divided, but the same real object as a 'good' is not divided but annihilated; or it may be that such a division does not affect the object's character as a good, namely, when the division pertains only to unessential factors. Thus, changes in goods are not identical with changes in the same real objects as things and vice versa. 135

Here we see that there is a sharp contrast between the unity of a thing and the unity of a good. Whereas we can remove or modify parts of a thing without necessarily annihilating it, this cannot be done with a good. To remove or modify parts in a good would mean that it is divisible into such parts. As this example illustrates, a fading colour in a work of art will annihilate it as a value-thing. As
Scheler himself has admitted, then, goods are indivisible while things are divisible. A good cannot be broken down into parts even conceptually, and yet still remain a good. Thus, the unity of a thing differs from the unity of a good in that a thing is a divisible unity, whereas the unity of a good admits of no division.

Without parts, goods are fundamentally different from things. Goods cannot be reduced to things even though things bear values. Scheler, then, is quite misleading to speak of a good as having "thing likeness" not 'the' thing", or as a thinglike unity of qualities or complexes, which seems to suggest that these qualities or complexes are parts of a good. Things cannot be compared to goods. Although primordially one can speak of complexes or qualities as parts, these parts put together into a unity through interconnections do not constitute a good but rather constitute a thing. Otherwise, as we said, a good could be divided into these parts. A good as a good must be one, unanalysable unity as the example of the painting shows. The unity of a good, then, admits of no parts.

If, as we said, the unity of a good (or ill) is founded on a basic value, then a unique characteristic of this unity — its indivisibility — also comes from the founding value (or disvalue). This value itself must be non-divisible, or otherwise it would give various aspects to a good according to the values' parts were it to have any. It is no wonder, then, that for Scheler, values seemed to be not definable — having "parts" is a requisite for a definition in any sense of the term:

It is entirely certain that, for example, the aesthetic values which correspond to the terms pleasant, charming, sublime, beautiful, etc., are not simple conceptual terms that find their fulfillment in the common qualities of the things which are bearers of these values. This is shown by the simple fact that each time we attempt to determine such 'common properties', we find our hands empty. Only when we have already classified
things according to a non-axiological concept can an attempt
to grasp such common properties - of pleasant vases or flowers
or noble horses, for example - have success. Values of this
kind are not definable.\textsuperscript{137}

In other words, he even admitted that a value has the "unity of an axiological
concept".\textsuperscript{138}

Goods or values, then, are not constructs of meaning; hence, they are not
essences in the phenomenological sense. They are not given to essential intuiting
as an a priori or an "absolute". As a phenomenologist, Scheler departs from
phenomenology's common notion of givenness. When he states that "goods and things
have the same originality of givenness"\textsuperscript{139}, he seems to overlook the difference.
He should perhaps distinguish between the givenness of a thing and the givenness
of a higher order, that is, the givenness of values. In short, values, such
as good and evil, are not objects of phenomenological research.

B) Does this mean that the rank of values is not an object of phenomenological
investigation? In a remark that is relevant to our question, E. Gilson while
discussing the traditional definition of truth in terms of the likeness of the
known object to that of the knowledge of the mind, once said that "Likeness is
always a matter of comparison and therefore of degree and approximation."\textsuperscript{140}
This means that "transcendental truth" obtains to a greater or lesser degree.\textsuperscript{141}

But even though metaphysically one can speak of degrees of truth as one does
of degrees of being, things are what they are. A thing either has a certain
essence or it does not. Essences, whether for metaphysics or for phenomenology,
admit of no degrees. We saw that for phenomenological intuition, "What' this
intuition gives cannot be given to a lesser or greater degree..."\textsuperscript{142} For pheno-
menology, then, truth must be reduced to essential interconnexions. For that
reason it cannot have a doctrine of the degrees of truth, just as it cannot have
a doctrine of the degrees of being. Phenomenology does not know esse because it is appropriated in a degree according to the essence. Metaphysics and phenomenology operate on different realms of reality.

Then should we say that the goods Scheler is speaking of are essences in the traditional metaphysical sense? As the metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas made manifest, it belongs to the nature of good to admit of degrees, just as there are degrees of being. We call some things good because we assert that there is for them a certain likeness, a likeness in terms of value. We saw that God is the "standard" of measure of value in that the more a being has a likeness to God, the greater is its goodness and hence the greater its value. A thing is valuable because it has goodness. Scheler also stressed this point by calling a good a "value-thing" (Wertedinge) as distinguished from a mere "thing-value". But for metaphysics, not every thing has the same degree of value, that is to say, the same value. Some things have more value and others have less. For Scheler, what corresponds to the degrees of value in the metaphysical sense is expressed differently because phenomenology cannot tolerate such expressions as "degrees of value". For him, the degree of value had to be expressed in terms of the a priori and he had to say that some values are "higher" while others are "lower" with respect to each other, forming a rank of values. This means that a good thing has more value if it bears a "higher" value, that is, when its good is founded on a "higher" value. With the nature of good, then, there goes a hierarchy of values.

The intuition of the rank of values goes also against the phenomenological attitude as does the intuition of the value itself. When Scheler says that "the height of a value is 'given', by virtue of its essence, only in the act of preferring" does he speak as a phenomenologist? Were values phenomenologically intuitable, he would be correct in saying that,
One must not assume that the height of a value is "felt" in the same manner as the value itself, and that the higher value is subsequently "preferred" or "placed after". Rather, the height of a value is "given" by virtue of its essence, only in the act of preferring. Whenever this is denied, one falsely equates this preferring with "choosing" in general, i.e., an act of conation. Without doubt, choosing must be grounded in the cognition of a higher value, for we choose that purpose among others which has its foundation in a higher value. But "preferring" occurs in the absence of all conation, choosing, and willing. For instance, we can say, "I prefer roses to carnations," without thinking of a choice. All "choosing" takes place between different deeds. By contrast, preferring also occurs with regard to any of the goods and values.\[145\]

Scheler's use of preferring and choosing is the camouflage of his embarrassment as phenomenologist. Does he not try to introduce into phenomenology what it cannot take, namely, valuation? If indeed value height or measure is grasped in preference, then what is this act? Does it have any other function than to give the height of value as Scheler seems to imply? If by judgement is meant the affirmation or denial of a certain relation between two things or aspects or reality, then to prefer is to judge.\[146\] The meaning of "preferring" itself suggests that there is some judgement of value. Thus, Scheler is correct to point out the difference between preference and choice, but he confuses the "givenness" in preferring with judgement. Indeed, he even says that,

As an act, "preferring" must be sharply distinguished from its kind of realisation. The realisation may consist in the special activity that we experience in its execution. This is the case in a clearly conscious preferring, accompanied by a "deliberation", among several values given in feeling.\[147\]

But how does one deliberate? Does not a deliberation lead to a conclusion? Does not such a conclusion indicate which value is higher, that is, is conscious preferring not a judgement as to which value is higher?
If the value ranks are not intuitable phenomenologically, then Scheler, in his *Der Formalismus...* must be doing metaphysics to arrive at these value ranks. Although as we said earlier Scheler claims that value ranks cannot be derived or deduced rationally, nevertheless he gives us a phenomenologically obtained "criteriological principle" that "can bring us nearer to the meaning of 'being-higher'", and from which certain criteria for the height of value can be derived:

"I assert it to be an essential interconnexion that values given in immediate intuition 'as higher' are values that are given as nearer to absolute values in feeling and preferring (and not by way of deliberation)." The following excerpt illustrates what he means by "relative" and "absolute":

We cannot assume that God, like men and animals, has a lived experience of all values of the agreeable. In this particular sense I maintain that the values of the agreeable and disagreeable are "relative" to a "sensibly feeling being", just as the values "noble and vulgar" are relative to "living beings" in general. In strict contrast to this, however, I maintain that absolute values are those that exist in "pure" feeling (and preferring and loving), i.e., they exist in a type of feeling that is independent of the nature of sensibility and of life as such.

Scheler cannot define the terms "absolute" and "relative" with reference to a phenomenological description. We see here again that phenomenology cannot intuit values. Then what he may mean by these terms is rather their relation to the cognising agent. But in this case, the cognising agent, that is man, has to be so conceived as to be able to intuit degrees of values. There is of course a relation between the nature of the being that grasps the value and the nature of the value that is grasped. As he says,

The basic mutual interconnexion between the act and its correlate implies that we must not presuppose any objective existence of values and their types (let alone of real goods that bear values of a certain kind) unless we can
find types of acts and functions belonging to the experience of such types of values. For instance, for a non-sensible being there are no values of the agreeable.\textsuperscript{150} Scheler definitely steps over the boundary of phenomenology when he asserts that beings that are less material (i.e. sensible) are more capable of grasping the absolute. This is rather an Augustinian notion.\textsuperscript{151} Scheler is unwittingly doing a kind of metaphysics.

For instance, let us take the example of endurance: "it is the higher values (and not goods) that, in their relation to lower values, are given as 'enduring' by a phenomenal necessity. 'Endurance' is, of course, basically an absolute and qualitative phenomenon of time".\textsuperscript{152} But, to assert a relation between two values is to make a judgement: "the lowest values are at the same time essentially the most 'transient ones'; the highest values, at the same time 'eternal' ones".\textsuperscript{153} The eternal ones are the highest because they are less bound to time, and closer to the eternally existing Being, Who is also the highest value. The highest values are those that participate in God's eternity and hence, their height can be measured by their degree of endurance.

We frequently come across Scheler's metaphysical excursions in his \textit{Der Formalismus}...: "I maintain," he writes, "that a value B is the 'foundation' of a value A if a certain value A can only be given on the condition of the givenness of a certain value B, and this by virtue of an essential lawful necessity. If this is so, the 'founding' value, i.e., the value B, is in each case the 'higher' value. Thus the value of what is 'useful' is 'founded' in the value of what is 'agreeable'."\textsuperscript{154} If we continue this line of reasoning to its ultimate conclusion, then all lower values would be founded on a highest value. As he himself concludes, "all possible values are 'founded' in the value of an infinitely personified spirit and its correlative 'world of values'."\textsuperscript{155} But is this not
another way of restating the conclusion of Aquinas' metaphysics that God is the source of all value, and that without God there could not be values? Eliminate the "infinitely personified spirit" and you eliminate all values. Without the phenomenological intuition of values, Scheler rationally deduces the hierarchy of values, and was therefore practicing metaphysics.

Were values objects of phenomenological research, Scheler could easily deny all of this. He had assumed that values and their rank are intuitable and proceeded accordingly even giving plenty of consideration to showing that the rank of values is not a deduction using judgements. This should have meant that were phenomenology able to intuit values, then it should also be able to reveal the rank of values and its specifications in a coherent manner. We say 'should' because the doctrine, in point of fact, is incoherent when taken from the point of view of phenomenology itself. This in itself suggests phenomenology's inability to deal with values or their rank:

As we saw, it belongs to the very essence of value to be higher or lower.

In the totality of the realm of values there exists a singular order, an "order of ranks" that all values possess among themselves. It is because of this that a value is "higher" or "lower" than another one. This order lies in the essence of values themselves, as does the difference between "positive" and "negative" values. It does not simply belong to "values known" by us.156

Again, there are "a priori essential interconnexions between the higher and lower levels of a value and its other essential properties".157 Yet, even if "the height of a value is given 'in' preferring, this height is nevertheless a relation in the essence of the values concerned. Therefore, the 'ordered ranks of values' are themselves absolutely invariable..."158

Now, in the metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas, we saw how privations are always
defined in terms of the positive thing or being which they are meant to deprive. For example, blindness is the lack of sight; ugliness is the lack of beauty; the unholy is the privation of the holy, and so forth. But Scheler, as we saw, claims that positive and negative values such as these exist as "objects". It is here that a difficulty arises. Since in the totality of values there exists a singular order of ranks that all values possess among themselves, negative values are included in this order. Scheler explains that "a priori relations obtain as an order of ranks among the systems of value qualities of non-formal values which we call modalities. They constitute the non-formal a priori proper in the intuition of values and the intuition of preferences". A value modality constitutes value of a specific type which ranges from its positive to its negative value, e.g., from the agreeable to the disagreeable. Similarly, the essence of the other values differ from these in such a way as to be correlated to vital feelings, and these constitute vital values, e.g., those ranging from the vulgar to the noble. The realm of spiritual values also constitutes another modality, e.g., values ranging from the ugly to the beautiful; another modality constitutes values ranging from the holy to the unholy. Among these modalities there is an a priori relation:

... these modalities have their own a priori order of ranks that precedes their series of qualities. This order of value-ranks is valid for the goods of correlative values because it is valid for the values of goods. The order is this: the modality of vital values is higher than that of the agreeable and the disagreeable; the modality of spiritual values is higher than that of vital values; the modality of holy is higher than that of spiritual values.

But does this mean, e.g., that the value "unholy" is higher than the value "beautiful"? Is not a positive value meant to be higher than a negative one in "proper preference"? Ought not a good person place a negative value after
a positive one? The affirmative is indeed suggested by the context of Scheler's views: "The proposition that the agreeable is preferable to the disagreeable (ceteris paribus) is not based on observation and induction. The preference lies in the essential contents of these values as well as in the nature of sensible feelings." But if so, what is the rank of the negative value 'unholy' in our example? Where is it to be placed in the hierarchy of values? We cannot place it higher than the beautiful, yet Scheler says that the modality of values ranging from the unholy to the holy is higher than that of the ugly/beautiful.

Scheler's writings do not suggest any solution to this problem. Could a possible solution be to have negative values to be lower values, and positive values to be higher? If so, at what point would lower values become negative, or how low could a value be for there to still remain a value? Again, the difficulty is insurmountable. Another solution, and this time more radical, would be to have two hierarchies, one for positive, and one for negative values, the former originating, say, from God, the other from the author of evil, as seems to be suggested by his earlier metaphysics where, as we saw, the devil is introduced as the cause of evil. But this not only contradicts his assertion of a single hierarchy which he claims to be a priori given, but it is also unsatisfactory because it leads to our original difficulty, viz. to the question of whether negative values are "real objects": all negative values as real existing objects are incompatible with the assertion of an all good God who created a single hierarchy of values. It is unfortunate that Scheler shrinks away from the problem of the "theory" of ordered ranks of values saying: "a more detailed attempt to found these propositions cannot be undertaken at this point".

If we put aside for a moment the distinction that Scheler makes between goods and values, we can see that Aquinas' way of dealing with disvalues as
privations of esse could be a solution to the problem. Had Scheler looked at negative values as privations of the positive, a single hierarchy of positive values would be left. In this case, negative values would not be existing values, and therefore, there would be literally nothing to place in this hierarchy. Everything save negative values could remain untouched.

But this solution is a metaphysical one and it is not possible for phenomenology. Scheler accepts into his phenomenology of values the a priori axioms that relate values to existence and non-existence which were originally discovered by Brentano. According to the second one, "the non-existence of a positive value is itself a negative value." Since such a non-existence is what is otherwise called "a privation", this means that where there is a privation of positive value, there will exist a negative value, that is, there is always a value albeit a negative one. A doctrine of the privation of any value, which is required for the above solution, cannot be incorporated into Scheler's phenomenology. Since Scheler was unwittingly doing metaphysics, he should have pursued his investigations by using metaphysics in the first place.
IV
CONCLUSION

(A) The unfortunate consequence of phenomenology's inability to investigate values and their ranks is that Scheler is unable to investigate man himself as essence (absolute) using phenomenology. But this shortcoming does not seem to hinder him from making other important contributions to ethics; one of them is the notion of person. Without inquiring into their validity as conclusions of a phenomenological investigation, Scheler makes the important observations that,

... the person is not a thing; nor does the person possess the nature of thingness, as necessarily the case with all value things. As a concrete unity of all possible acts, the person is outside the sphere of all possible 'objects' (including the objects of internal or external perception, i.e., psychic or physical objects); the person is, above all, outside the entire sphere of thingness, which is a part of the sphere of objects. The person exists solely in the pursuance of his acts.\textsuperscript{165}

This last point is part of a long tradition which views man as being essentially constituted by his actions.\textsuperscript{166} In the Aristotelian School, for instance, we saw in the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas that man's essence is to be found in his rationality. But rationality is one aspect of man's soul albeit the dominant one; here Thomas accepts the ancient Greek notion of the soul as the source of motion or that which produces movement. Man is thus the being that acts by virtue of the soul. The peculiarity of his soul is its rationality; man fulfills his essence when his actions are rational. Expressed metaphysically, an existing man is not his potentialities, for these do not really exist until they become actualised in action. Existing man is his actualities; his actions characterise him. But actions, as we saw for Thomas, are also always directed to an end or goal. When man acts freely, he acts for a good. As we said, only those actions that are free can properly be called human, and merit praise or blame and actions that are in conformity with reason can be called free and good.

But for Scheler, man's essence is not to be found primarily in his rationality.
Yet man is still characterised for him by his actions. He would agree that those actions that are free are always directed to an end or goal. As he explains, there is a certain conation or striving (Streben) that at any moment wells up in a man, and by virtue of which his actions are directed to a goal: "Conation" here designates from all having of objects (representation, sensation, perception), as well as from all feeling (Fuhlen) (feelings (Gefuhlen), etc.). But the goal of "conation" is not a thing as such, or its picture-like representation in consciousness:

With respect to any "goal", two components must be distinguished: the value-component and the picture-component. They are peculiarly related in that in conation the picture-component can be entirely absent or present in all degrees of "distinctness" and "clarity" when, at the same time, the value component is already given in a manner that is perfectly clear and distinct. Hence, the ontic relation between them is such that the value-component founds the picture component; that is, the picture-component is differentiated according to its possible suitability to the realisation of the value-component.

The goal of conation, then, is the value-aspect of the goal:

The contents, range and differentiation of our lived conations are in no case distinctly dependent on the contents, range, and differentiation of our intellectual activity of representation and thinking. The latter possesses its own origin and level of meanings. This implies, second, that the picture-contents of conation are not its "primary" but, as we have shown, its "secondary" contents, which are selected in terms of value-contents from possible "contents" of "consciousness-of-something" not yet differentiated by "conation" and "representation". Only those picture-contents that can become the carriers of such a value-content enter into the "goal" of conation as a picture-content.

Thus, even in the case of pleasure, what is striven for as goal is value of pleasure, not the pleasure itself: "Not the pleasure but its value is the immediate content of the goal". For in those cases where pleasure is the goal of conation, it is in terms of its value or disvalue that pleasure is intended. This means that a goal is also definitely distinguishable from its purpose:
the purposes of willing are, first of all, the represented contents (of a somewhat variable kind) of goals of conation. That is, what distinguishes "purpose" from a mere "goal", which is already given "in" conation itself, and its direction, is the fact that a goal-content (i.e., content already given as a goal is conation) is represented in a special act. It is only in the phenomenon of "withdrawing" from conative consciousness toward representing consciousness, as well as toward representing comprehension of the goal-content given in conation, that the consciousness of purposes comes to a realisation. Anything that is called purpose of the will therefore presupposes the representation of a goal! Nothing can become purpose that was not first a goal! The purpose is grounded in the goal! ... 171

Thus, even purposes of willing are founded on values, and therefore so is choice insofar as we will to choose according to such a purpose. For, "the purpose in willing originates in an act of choosing, whose occurence is based on value-goals of given conations and has its foundation in these value-contents through the act of preferring among them". 172 As he continues,

For it is far from being the case that the most basic value-difference among human beings is to be seen in what they posit as purposes in terms of choices. This difference lies, rather, in the value-contents— as well as in their structural relations given already in terms of drives (and automatically) —among which alone men must choose and according to which they must posit purposes. Value-contents and their relations form the possible field for the positing of purposes. Of course, one cannot immediately call "inclinations", conation, and welling up (Aufstreiben) (in our sense) "good"; rather, it is the act of willing in which we choose the (feelably) higher value from the values "given" in conations that we call good. However, this value is already the "higher value" in conations themselves, and by no means does this height originate in the value's relation to willing. 173

For Scheler, then, the cognition of value and its height is presupposed in all man's actions. Everything that man freely does, all his accomplishments, are directly related to value. Even his knowledge is subordinated under his culture and ethos which, in turn are founded on value and an order of value rank. To speak of man is to speak of "value-being", as it were. Man's essence is directly related to values, for man is not a thing, as things per se are value-less.
But as we showed, phenomenology can only have things as objects of its investigation. As the phenomenologist Van Der Leeuw once pointed out, "phenomenology seeks the phenomenon, as such; the phenomenon, again, is what 'appears'. This principle has a threefold implication: (1) Something exists. (2) This something 'appears'. (3) Precisely because it 'appears' it is a 'phenomenon'. But 'appearance' refers equally to what appears and to the person to whom it appears; the phenomenon, therefore, is neither pure object, nor the object, that is to say, the actual reality whose essential being is merely concealed by the 'appearing' of the appearances; with this a specific metaphysic deals". But value is not something that appears; it therefore is not a phenomenon in that sense. Even in terms of conations and goals phenomenology is limited. Only what "appears" in these are phenomena, namely the "picture-contents". The value-contents are not phenomena. So too can it only investigate the picture-content of purposes. Beyond these experiences of pictures, beyond what appears to consciousness, phenomenology cannot investigate. And without being able to investigate the foundation for all of man's voluntary actions, a philosophical anthropology is impossible for phenomenology. Phenomenology cannot answer the fundamental questions of philosophical anthropology, "What is man?", "Where is he going?", "What ought he do?", "What can he hope for?".

(B) It is in applying phenomenology to areas beyond its valid domain that has brought about for Scheler the contradiction between God and evil. Good and evil are not real objects. If phenomenology can only investigate what is an object, it cannot investigate values, i.e., good and evil. But having overlooked this, Scheler treats good and evil phenomenologically and regards them as a priori essences. Subsequently, when he proceeds to do metaphysics, he uses these essences of phenomenology in the sense of, e.g., Aquinas, giving them at the same time esse. Evil thereby acquires real being. But this position is incompatible with his other metaphysical
position in which an all good ens a se is said to exist. Scheler contradicts himself metaphysically because he does not realise the limitations of phenomenology, namely that phenomenology cannot discuss values.
NOTES


2. Ibid., p. 50.

3. These constraints will be discussed in detail below.


6. Ibid., p. 267.

7. Ibid., p. 261.

8. Ibid., p. 17.


10. Ibid., p. 185.

11. Ibid., p. 181.

12. Ibid., p. 270.

13. Ibid., p. 297.


15. Ibid., p. 81.


20. Ibid., p. 25.


22. Ibid., p. 294.

23. Ibid., p. 588.

24. Ibid., p. 396.

25. Ibid., p. 397.

28. Ibid., p. 231.
29. Ibid., p. 236.
30. Ibid., p. 235.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., p. 231.
33. Ibid., p. 219.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid., p. 176.
36. Ibid., p. 230.
39. Vom Ewigen im Menschen, English translation, page 150.
40. Philosophical Perspectives. p. 131 fn. 16.
41. Summa Theologiae (from hence forth, this work will be abbreviated as S.Th.). Ia,6,3c.
42. Ibid. Ia,6,2 c.
43. Summa Contra Gentiles (abbreviated as C.G.) I, 39.
46. S.Th. Ia,5,1 c.
47. Ibid. ad 1m
51. S.Th. Ia,25,6 c.
52. Ibid., Ia, 5, 1 c.
53. Ibid., Ia, 4, 1 c.
54. De Ente et Essentia, Ch. 1.
55. S. Th. Ia, 5, 1 c.
56. Ibid., Ia, 5, 3 c.
57. Ibid., Ia-Ilae, 18, 1 c.
58. Cf. S. Th. Ia, 45, 4 c. See also Carlo, William. The Ultimate Reducibility of Essence to Existence in Existential Metaphysics, (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966) for a discussion of esse as the intrinsic limitation of essence in the metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas.
59. De Ente et Essentia, Ch. IV.
61. C.G. Bk. 3 part 1, 20.
62. S. Th. Ia, 48, 5 c.
63. Ibid., Ia-Ilae, 18, 1 c.
65. C.G. Bk. 3 Pt. 1 Ch. 10.
66. S. Th. Ia-Ilae, 6, 2 ad 2.
67. Cf. S. Th. Ia, 19, art 1, c.
68. C.G. Bk. 3 Ch. 18.
69. S. Th. Ia-Ilae, 1, 5 c.
70. Ibid., Ia-Ilae, 2, 8c.
71. Cf. S. Th. Ia, 2, 3 c, the "second way."
72. S. Th. Ia-Ilae, 3, 8 c.
73. Ibid., Ia, 48, 1 c.
74. C.G. Bk. 3 ch. 7.
75. S. Th. Ia, 48, 2 ad 1.
76. Aquinas, Compendium Theologiae (abbreviated as C. Th.) Ch. 114.
77. C.G., Bk. 3 Ch. 11.
78. C.Th. Ch. 119.
79. Ibid., Ch. 120.
80. S.Th. Ia, 48, 5 c.
81. Ibid., ad 2.
82. Cf. S.Th. Ia-IIae, 1, 7 ad 1.
83. De Veritate. 3, 4 ad 6.
84. S.Th. Ia, 48, 2 ad 3.
85. Ibid. Ia, 47, 2 c.
86. Aquinas, S.Th. Ia, 2, 3 ad 1.
87. S.Th. Ia, 49, 2 c.
88. C.Th. Ch. 121.
89. S.Th. Ia, 49, 3 c.
90. Ibid., Ia, 48, 6 c.
91. Ibid., Ia, 25, 6 ad 3.
92. Ibid., Ia, 49, 3 c.
93. C.G. Bk. 3, Ch. 71.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid., Ch. 15.
96. Ibid., Bk. 3, Ch. 9.
97. S.Th. Ia-IIae, 73, 2 c.
99. S.Th. Ia q.5, art: 2, c.
100. Ibid., q. 16, art. 3, ad 2.
101. Ibid., Ia, 48, 3 ad 2.
104. Ibid., p. 48.
105. Ibid., p. 68.
106. Ibid., p. 89.
108. Ibid., p. 48-49.
109. Ibid., p. 50.
110. Ibid., p. 51.
111. Ibid., p. 48.
112. Ibid., p. 49.
113. Ibid.


117. Ibid., p. 201. This excerpt is from Ms. K III 6, p. 54.

118. Ibid., p. 201.


124. Ibid.

125. Ibid.

126. Der Formalismus... English Translation. p. 49.
So too in the real world the thing is not necessarily annihilated when it is physically divided. This can be seen in two ways: first accidentally, as when we say of the divided thing that a certain part belongs to it, e.g., the door in the yard belongs to that house. Second essentially, as when we say of the divided parts that comprise the thing, e.g., the pieces of an apple after it has been cut up.

Der Formalismus... English Translation. p. 21.
146. This is the traditional definition of 'judgement'. Cf. E. Gilson, op. cit., p. 114.

147. Der Formalismus... p. 89 (English Tr.).

148. Ibid., p. 98.

149. Ibid., pp. 97-98.

150. Ibid., p. 97.

151. Cf. Augustine, St., Confessions, Book 2, Chapter VII.

152. Der Formalismus... p. 91 (English Tr.).

153. Ibid., p. 92.

154. Ibid., p. 94.

155. Ibid., p. 96.

156. Ibid., p. 86.

157. Ibid., p. 90.

158. Ibid., p. 88.

159. Ibid., p. 104.

160. Ibid., p. 110.

161. Ibid., p. 105.

162. Ibid., p. 109.

163. Ibid., p. 110.


165. Ibid., p. 29.

166. We shall not consider here the question whether the person possesses the nature of thingness or has parts, nor other similar questions such as the question whether what is not "object" can be given to phenomenological intuition or not. The answers to these questions should become clear later.

167. Der Formalismus... p. 30 fn. (English Tr.).

168. Ibid., p. 39.

169. Ibid., p. 35.
170. Ibid., p. 36.
171. Ibid., p. 39-40.
172. Ibid., p. 41.
173. Ibid., p. 42.
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