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Is Friendship between Men and Women a Virtue?

Catherine Klempa

A Thesis

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Canadä

ABSTRACT

Is Friendship between Men and Women a Virtue?

Catherine Klempa

Friendship as a virtue has been an integral part of ethical discussions in philosophy. However, friendships between men and women have received little philosophical attention, and women were often denied this form of friendship on the basis of their sex. It is the intrinsic value placed on the friend, the direct concern for the other's good and a shared pursuit of goods that defines friendship as a virtue and gives it ethical value.

This thesis defends the argument that friendship between men and women can be a virtue. This defense is achieved through the critical analysis of classical theories about friendship, and the practical application of these theories to selected examples of friendship between men and women philosophers. In contrast, philosophical theories that argued friendship between men and women were not possible were also evaluated, and the philosophical basis of these theories was questioned. The examination of particular contemporary ethical theories disclosed specific insights into a philosophical conception of friendship. These theories provided a defense of a virtue-based ethics, and the relevance of friendship within such an ethic.

The importance of this topic for contemporary ethics is evident. Our current social problems easily attest to a distorted understanding of the relationship between men and women and the re-examination of this relationship has taken on a vital urgency. The conception of friendship as a virtue provides a different perspective from which to view our relations with others, and specifically between men and women.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

Table

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this thesis is to address the following question: Is friendship between men and women a virtue? Aristotle claimed that there are three types of friendship corresponding to the three objects of love - love of pleasure, love of utility and love of character. Most classical philosophers accept this division, and it will be assumed in this thesis.[1] In friendships based on pleasure and friendships based on utility, the other person is loved for pleasure or for need and is viewed as a means to these ends. A friendship based on virtue involves loving the person for him or herself, and it has as its central principle the conscious effort to promote the friend's good.

Virtuous friendships have been an integral part of ethical discussions in the history of philosophy. However, within contemporary ethics, friendship has lost its philosophical significance, and has often come to mean nothing more than an emotional state or feeling. The purpose of this thesis is to articulate this third type of friendship, specifically as it applies to relations between men and women, and its relevance within a virtue-based ethics.

The virtues have been gaining considerable attention within philosophical debates, and many contemporary philosophers, like Alasdair MacIntyre, are

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[1]It should be noted that not all contemporary theorists accept this division. For example, some may argue that it is the person and not the character which should be the object of friendship. However, this issue is beyond the more narrow scope of this thesis, and it will not be addressed.

defending a virtue-based ethics. The critical assessment of MacIntyre's ethics based on the virtues in chapter 4 will illustrate the cogency of a virtue-based ethics and the important place friendship, specifically between women and men, has within it. The virtues are those dispositions of character that aid a person in his or her quest for the good. This good is not pre-set or defined from the beginning, but rather it is discovered in the course of one's life and in one's relations with others. This quest for the good involves the pursuance of certain ends that contribute to human flourishing. An ethics based on the virtues focuses on character, the development of that character and what character traits one should strive to develop. Thus, a virtue-based ethics encompasses the whole life of the person, and the moral life within this framework is the life-long pursuit of human excellence. This thesis concentrates specifically on friendship between men and women because this type of friendship has received little philosophical attention. Furthermore, I think there is an urgent need within contemporary society to re-examine the relationship between men and women.

Chapter 1 analyzes the classical conception of friendship in the writings of Aristotle, the Stoics, Augustine and Immanuel Kant. This analysis articulates the preconditions, principles and effects that define friendship as virtuous, the importance friendship plays within each philosopher's ethical theory, and specifically how it applies to friendship between men and women. Often within these theories, women were denied the highest form of friendship because of their assumed fundamental inequality with men.

Chapter 2, in contrast, evaluates the philosophical theories of Niccolo

Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, Friedrich Nietzsche and Mary Daly, each of which challenges the claim that friendship is a virtue for men and women. These arguments are either founded on the tenets of individualism, in which friendships of utility are the only possible kind, or else they are founded on the contention that the relation between men and women is one of conflict and opposition. The philosophical validity of each of these theories is questioned.

To support the argument that friendship between women and men is a virtue, chapter 3 presents four practical examples of friendship between men and women philosophers. The philosophers considered - Heloise and Abelard, John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor, Simone de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre and Jacques and Raissa Maritain range from the late medieval to contemporary times. In each case, the original writings by both philosophers, male and female, regarding their particular friendship and their views on relations between men and women, in general, are examined. Certain preconditions, principles and effects that define friendship as virtuous, outlined in chapter 1, are drawn out in each example, and the ethical relevance each friendship played within the friends' lives is elucidated.

In chapter 4, the contemporary ethical theories of Max Scheler, Alasdair MacIntyre, Nel Noddings and Lawrence Blum are examined. Each of these philosophers offers specific insights into a contemporary philosophical conception of friendship. These insights are used to base a defense of the claim that friendship is a virtue between men and women.

Given the vast amount of material this thesis covers, it has been impossible to

consider every aspect of each philosopher's theory. Rather, the purpose of this thesis is to explicate what various philosophers have said about friendship in general, and to consider specifically how these theories apply to friendships between men and women within a virtue-based ethics.

Given the specific focus of this thesis, it has not been possible to cover virtuous friendships between men or virtuous friendships between women. Further research on whether friendships between men and women have a specific nature that differs from friendship between members of the same sex would be fruitful.

The methodology used in this thesis involved a careful reading of the original texts of philosophers in order to isolate passages which concentrate on the theory of friendship and specifically friendships between men and women. Relevant key passages from these sources have been quoted throughout this thesis. The methodology also included bibliographic computer searches on the topic of friendship by combining individual philosopher's names with the term "friendship." A careful examination of relevant secondary sources has also been used. A systematic analysis of the factors that comprise the notion of friendship for each individual philosopher was articulated and summary tables of these factors are included in the conclusion of each chapter. Lastly, this thesis considered the application of contemporary ethical and feminist theories to the question of friendship between men and women.

CHAPTER 1

CLASSICAL CONCEPTIONS OF FRIENDSHIP AS A VIRTUE

Friendship as a virtue and its relevance to ethics, traditionally, has occupied an important place in philosophical discussions. This chapter focuses on five philosophers who considered friendship to be fundamental to the ethical life - Aristotle, Cicero and Seneca (the Stoics), Augustine and Immanuel Kant. Friendship has certain preconditions, principles and effects that define it as virtuous. These were first outlined in detail by Aristotle, and they are inherent, with some variances, within the discussions on friendship in the ethical theories of the Stoics, Augustine and Kant. The fundamental characteristic of a virtuous friendship in each theory is the concern with and effort to promote the good of another person. However, this good differs according to the particular theory of each philosopher. Each theory of friendship will be critically analyzed to assess its importance within the philosopher's ethical theory and its particular relevance to friendships between men and women.

Aristotle

The conception of friendship as a virtue properly begins with Aristotle's detailed analysis in his <u>Nicomachean Ethics</u>.[1] The necessary role friendship plays in the ethical sphere and in the attainment of the human good is contained within this

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[1]Aristotle <u>Nicomachean Ethics</u>, trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company Inc., 1985).

5

analysis. Aristotle articulates specific preconditions, principles and effects that define friendship as virtuous. This definition does apply to relationships between men and women within Aristotle's framework, but, because of women's assumed inequality, it is an extremely limited conception. In order to comprehend what makes friendship virtuous, it is necessary to elucidate briefly Aristotle's meaning of the good life and the virtues.

Implicit within Aristotle's doctrine of the good life is his claim that all of nature moves towards realizing its own peculiar *telos* or end. Everything in nature has an inner source of potentiality which, through proper development, will be realized or made actual, and this is the good towards which all things aim.[2] This highest good, defined in terms of the individual's function, is the *telos* towards which one realizes his or her capacities to the fullest. The human being's highest good is *eudaimonia* or happiness which is dependent upon one's function as a human being. Aristotle defines this function as the soul's activity that expresses reason. Since the human good is to perform this function well, and to perform one's function well is to express the proper virtue, then "the human good turns out to be the soul's activity that expresses virtue."[3]

Arete, for Aristotle, can be translated to mean "excellence" or "virtue." The virtues are states or dispositions, acquired through activity, and they involve decision. Decision is reasoned deliberation about which actions one should choose and about

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[2]Ibid., 1094a 1-3.

[3]Ibid., 1098a 16.

how to achieve particular ends. The virtues are interdependent, and a complete flourishing life would consist in possessing all the virtues. Aristotle distinguishes between the moral virtues and the intellectual virtues. The rational control of the desires and appetites are the domain of the moral virtues, and these virtues are acquired through habitual exercise. The intellectual virtues include theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom, and these virtues are acquired through teaching. Practical wisdom or prudence is "a state grasping the truth, involving reason, and concerned with action about human goods."[4] Prudence is essential to Aristotle's ethical theory for without it one cannot acquire the moral virtues. Whereas the moral virtues enable a person to choose the right end to aim at, prudence enables one to choose the right means.[5] In general, prudence is equivalent to moral insight, and it directs the person's whole life towards the highest good.

The virtues, therefore, enable a person to perform her or his function well and to attain happiness or well-being. It is important to note that this function is limited to a very small number of men in Aristotle's theory. Women and slaves, whom Aristotle contends either do not possess reason or possess it to a limited extent,[6] have different functions. Since a woman's intellect is innately inferior to a man's, she does not participate as completely in virtue as does a man. Women are free and not

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[4]Ibid., 1140b 22.

[5]"For virtue makes us reach the end in our action, while intelligence makes us reach what promotes the end." Ibid., 1145a 5.

[6]"For the slave has no deliberative faculty at all; the woman has, but it is without authority." Aristotle, The Politics, ed. Stephen Everson, trans. Jonathon Barnes (Cambridge, Great Britain: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 1260a 12-13.

7

regarded as slaves within Aristotle's framework. However, they do not participate in the public life of the *polis,* and they are regarded as inferior and subordinate to men. Woman's function is confined strictly to the private sphere and to her role as wife and mother. As such, since a man's and a woman's functions are different, their virtues likewise will be different.

> So it must necessarily be supposed to be with the excellences of character also; all should partake of them, but only in such manner and degree as is required by each for the fulfilment of his function...Clearly, then, excellence of character belongs to all of them; but the temperance of a man and of a woman, or the courage and justice of a man and of a woman, are not...the same; the courage of a man is shown in commanding, of a woman in obeying. And this holds of all other excellences.[7]

Aristotle divides friendship into three species which correspond to the three objects of love. There are friendships based on utility, on pleasure and on character. Friendships based on utility or pleasure are for the individual's own advantage. These friendships are formed, not because of who the other person is, but because of the pleasure or usefulness that other person can provide. Friendship based on character is friendship between individuals similar in virtue and "who wish goods to their friend for the friend's own sake."[8] It is "friendship in itself, and endures."[9] Moreover, friendship based on character is a necessary component in the attainment of *eudaimonia* and a flourishing complete life.

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[7]Ibid., 1260a 14-24.

[8]Aristotle, <u>Nicomachean Ethics</u>, 1156b 10-11.

[9]Ibid., 1164a 12.

Components necessary for the formation of virtuous friendships include community, equality and similarity in virtue. Community constitutes a group of individuals that pursue a common good together. The political community is one in which citizens work together towards the good of the *polis*. Particular communities are parts of this political community. The community of man and woman has as its goal the good of the family. Aristotle contends that friendships between men and women are more fundamental[10] than friendship between men within the political community.

> The friendship of man and woman also seems to be natural. For human beings naturally tend to form couples more than to form cities, to the extent that the household is prior to the city, and more necessary.[11]

Both the man and woman have specific functions within their particular community which, when performed together, produce a good family.

> Human beings, however, share a household not only for child-bearing, but also for the benefits in their life. For from the start their functions are divided, with different ones for the man and the woman; hence each supplies the other's needs by contributing a special function to the common good. Hence their friendship seems to include both utility and pleasure. And it may also be friendship for virtue, if they are decent. For each has a proper virtue, and this will be a source of enjoyment for them.[12]

It is thus within the context of community that particular friendships are formed.

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[10]It is more fundamental, but not more valuable. Friendships between men and women are prior in generation, and they form the basis of civil society. However, it is friendships between men in the polis that are at a higher social level and therefore more valuable.

[11]Ibid., 1162a 17-19.

[12]Ibid., 1162a 21-26.

Equality is also essential in virtuous friendships. Aristotle's notion of a hierarchial society presupposes different levels of equality, and it is obvious that only a limited number of males, the citizens of the *polis*, were regarded as equal with one another while the rest of the population were subordinate to them. It was only these men that Aristotle thought were capable of a complete flourishing friendship. Aristotle assumes that friendships based on inequality could be made more equal by the less worthy person contributing more to the relationship. This applies specifically to friendship between men and women which is based on Aristotle's assumption that men were superior to women.

> A different species of friendship is the one that corresponds to superiority, e.g. of a father towards his son...of a man towards a woman...These friendships also differ from each other...nor is friendship of father to son the same as that of son to father, or of man to woman as that of woman to man. For each of these friends has a different virtue and a different function, and there are different causes of love. Hence the ways of loving are different, and so are the friendships. Each does not get the same thing from the other, then, and must not seek it.[13]

Thus, the inferior party in the relationship must contribute more to the friendship in order to balance it out.

> In all the friendships corresponding to superiority, the loving must also be proportional, e.g. the better person, and the more beneficial, and each of the others likewise, must be loved more than he loves; for when the loving reflects the comparative worth of the friends, equality is achieved in a way, and this seems to be proper to friendship.[14]

Likewise, Aristotle argues, in relations between men and women:

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[13]Ibid., 1158b 13-21.

[14]Ibid., 1158b 24-29.

The friendship of man to woman is the same as in an aristocracy. For it reflects virtue, in assigning more good to the better, and assigning what is fitting to each. The same is true for what is just here.[15]

Lastly, a virtuous character is necessary for friendship. As was earlier discussed, the virtues are interrelated, and the possession of one implies the others. Virtuous friendships thus require, as a prerequisite, a virtuous character, and individuals who possess such a character will be attracted to one another.

Aristotle expounds several principles that comprise and define a friendship as virtuous. These principles include a concern with and effort to promote the good of the other, reciprocated good will, love, trust, shared activities and concord. Friendship as a virtue is a state requiring activity and decision. The activity within friendship would be found in loving, whereas decision would be found in the deliberation about how best to promote the good of the friend.

Loving would seem to be a feeling, but friendship a state. For loving occurs no less towards soulless things, but reciprocal loving requires decision, and decision comes from a state...in loving their friend they love what is good for themselves; for when a good person becomes a friend he becomes a good for his friend.[16]

Self-love[17] is the basis of virtuous friendships in Aristotle's discussion. The person must be of virtuous character, guided by practical wisdom and of single mind

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[15]Ibid., 1161a 23-25.

[16]Ibid., 1157b 30-35.

[17]It should be noted that this notion of self-love is understood within the context of the essentialist tradition. This tradition maintains that identity of persons depends upon the qualities we share with others, and therefore a person loves another because of the qualities one shares. This is in contrast to the existentialist tradition in which the individuality of the person is accentuated and not their sameness.

prior to the formation of friendship. It is this kind of person, Aristotle argues, who can truly love himself and is capable of promoting his own good. When a person finds another similar to one's self, these characteristics are extended from one's self to another. The good towards which that person aims then becomes shared and extended. The friend's good becomes the other's good in which they work together towards shared goals. The defining "features of friendship extend from oneself to others."[18] The virtuous person is of one mind, wishes goods and does them in his or her actions. Likewise, in virtuous friendships, the friend wishes and does good things for the friend's own sake, and wishes the other to be and live for his or her own sake. Moreover, the friends make shared choices together, enjoy spending time together and each shares the other's distresses and pleasures. "The decent person, then, has each of these features in relation to himself, and is related to his friend as he is to himself, since the friend is another himself."[19]

Self-love suggests a rather egocentric aspect of Aristotle's theory of friendship. However, Aristotle seems to be emphasizing that the ability to love one's own self and develop one's own moral character are necessary prerequisites to friendship. Only with this self-knowledge, can one truly engage in another's good and be a true friend. Nevertheless, Aristotle's emphasis on the friend as another self does not seem to take into account how friendship is enriched by each person's special uniqueness

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[18]Ibid., 1168b 5.

[19]Ibid., 1166a 30-32.

and particular differences. This is especially relevant to friendships between men and women.

Reciprocated good will is another principle in Aristotle's discussion of friendship. Good will exists between friends when it is mutually acknowledged and reciprocated. Good will is found in all three types of friendship, but it is only in virtuous friendships that good will is given unconditionally without regard to any benefits or consequences the friend would receive. One wishes goods to his or her friend for the friend's own sake.

Love or benevolence, Aristotle maintains, is a central principle of virtuous friendships. It involves activity, production and unselfishness. Aristotle counters the common belief that it is better to be loved than loving. Loving, Aristotle argues, is an activity, while being loved is being acted upon. The activity is greater because it is only through activity that one realizes or actualizes her or his capacities. This is best illuminated by the analogy Aristotle draws of the benefactor who, similar to the craftsman, likes his own beneficiary or product more than it would like him. This is so because the beneficiary or product is something that the benefactor or craftsman had a part in creating. Likewise, "loving is like production, while being loved is like being acted on; and [the benefactor's] love and friendliness is the result of his greater activity."[20]

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[20]Ibid., 1168a 20-22.

Aristotle also describes trust as an essential part of friendship. "Among good people there is trust, the belief that he would never do injustice [to a friend], and all the other things expected in a true friendship."[21]

Shared activities, or what Aristotle refers to as "living together," are an important feature of friendship. Activities and goals cannot be continuously engaged in or sustained if they are only private. It is only when they are shared with a friend that they become extended, given more value and contribute to human flourishing. Shared activities and goals become, within a friendship, a common good towards which the friends work. Moreover, by sharing them, the friends become more committed to the activities and perceive them as valuable.

Concord, another principle of friendship, is a necessary part of sharing activities and goals within friendship. Concord means agreement or harmony between persons. It arises when friends agree and make decisions together about courses of action for common pursuits and goals that the friends share. Thus, it involves friends working with one mind towards certain shared goals.

There are many benefits derived from the friendship between good people. A virtuous friendship allows for the further cultivation of virtue, and it necessarily brings in the other virtues. It enables friends to realize their human capacities, to share their lives with one another, and it contributes to self-sufficiency. Friendship is, thus, an intricate part of the excellent life. Human beings can only live well in a community, Aristotle would argue, and the virtue of social intercourse is friendship.

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[21]Ibid., 1157a 23-25.

As such, friendship is a necessary part of the good life and the basis of a good community. Only by becoming virtuous, can we love ourselves, hope for friends and have a truly complete and happy life.

Does this definition of virtuous friendship apply to relationships between women and men? As was earlier demonstrated, this definition does apply to friendships between them to a limited extent. Aristotle concedes that a man and a woman can have a virtuous friendship if each is of good character. However, this type of friendship is likened to that of a benefactor to a beneficiary. Aristotle assumes that a woman is biologically an "inferior male" or a not fully formed human being. She is not fully capable of discursive reasoning but only has correct opinion, and this places her in a position of inferiority with the man.

Relationships based on inequality could, Aristotle contends, be made equal by the inferior party contributing more to the relationship. Even with the inferior individual contributing more to the friendship, the fact remains, in Aristotle's scheme, that the woman is still inferior as an individual. A necessary element within friendship is the presence of biological, social and intellectual equality between the friends, so that each one contributes equally to the relationship. There is no possibility of a reciprocal exchange in friendships between men and women in Aristotle's framework. It is problematic, therefore, for Aristotle to maintain that a friendship based on inequality, could be made virtuous by having the lesser contributing more.

15

Since a woman's function differs from a man's, and their virtues are likewise different, friendship as a virtue will also be different for both of them. In promoting the good of the other, it is only the man who can achieve true happiness within Aristotle's ethical theory. A woman's happiness is in relation to her function which is to promote the good of the family. As such, a woman who belongs exclusively to the private sphere cannot participate in the full dynamic of the ethical life and the role that virtuous friendships play within that life among men.

Aristotle has presented some profound insights into the nature of virtuous friendships, but these insights have been shadowed by his view on women and slaves. Aristotle was one of the few philosophers whose theory on friendship included a systematic account of friendships between men and women. Aristotle laid the groundwork for future discussions on friendship for other philosophers. Moreover, some of his insights do contribute to the definition of friendship between women and men which will be explicated in chapter 3 of this thesis.

Cicero and Seneca

Virtuous friendships in the ethical writings of Cicero and Seneca are a necessary element in attaining the good life. The Stoics maintain that the cosmos has a rational order in which each person possesses a spark of a divine reason. It is the ethical ideal of the Stoic to live in harmony with the cosmos. This involves casting aside external goods and those things subject to change and fortune, mastering the passions and focusing on the true good exhibited in the cosmos and found within

one's self. The means to such a life is virtue, conceived in a unitary fashion, and the attainment of this ideal implies a state of self-sufficiency and inward tranquillity. Friendship is an essential component in the achievement of this Stoic ideal.

In Cicero's philosophy, true friendship is confined to the Roman citizen who actively participates in the affairs of the state. Given that virtue and friendship are restricted to those persons participating in the public sphere, and women were not part of this sphere, Cicero essentially denies friendship and virtue to women. However, Seneca maintains that everyone possesses a spark of this divine reason and, on this basis, he argues that there was an equality everyone shared, including women. In the Consolations, written to two particular women - Marcia and his mother Helvia, Seneca argues that women are as capable as men of virtue, wisdom and achieving the Stoic life. Therefore, virtuous friendships between men and women were thought to be possible within a Stoic framework, although they are not part of the Stoics' discussions on friendship. As will be shown in chapter 3, it is this Stoic ideal of friendship that Heloise and Abelard strove towards in their relationship.

The preconditions, principles and effects of the Stoics' conception of friendship are elucidated in Cicero's De Amicitia[22] and Seneca's Epistulae Morales.[23] De Amicitia, modelled on Aristotle's theory of friendship, is a dialogue in which Gaius Laelius is asked to give a discourse on friendship by reflecting on his own practical experience of it. Laelius is a good man "who was distinguished by a glorious

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[22]Cicero, De Amicitia, The Loeb Classical Library.

[23]Seneca, Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, Vol. I, The Loeb Classical Library.

friendship"[24] with Africanus, another Roman citizen, who has just died. Likewise, Seneca's Epistulae Morales are letters of advice on practical matters addressed to his friend Laelius. Thus, both Cicero's and Seneca's accounts of friendship are illuminated by particular friendships.

The fulfilment of several preconditions were necessary for the formation of the Stoics' conception of friendship. For Cicero and Seneca, friendship arises from nature and not from need. This was important in Stoicism, for the Stoic sage is self-sufficient and in need of nothing. If friendship is sought for its own sake rather than for material gains, the Stoics argue, then it could be sought by the self-sufficient Stoic and insulated against change. One of the greatest concerns within Stoic philosophy is that the Stoic sage must attain a level of self-sufficiency, in which he or she is in need of nothing that belongs to the world of fortune and change. This is a difficult ideal to achieve, and it explains why Seneca and Cicero are so insistent that the Stoic is not in need of friendship. However, when friendship is chosen freely by one's own will regardless of fortune and need, then it is true friendship which endures. Equality and maturity are also preconditions of friendship. "It is of the utmost importance in friendship that superior and inferior should stand on an equality."[25] Moreover, the friends must be good persons similar in virtue, sharing the same intellectual community of the Stoics; and in Cicero's case, they must share the same political community and gender.

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[24]Cicero, 113.

[25]Cicero, 179.

Several principles of friendship are elucidated by both Cicero and Seneca. Love is a central principle in the Stoics' understanding of friendship. Love, like friendship, must be cultivated for its own sake, and the love between friends must be given freely, independent of any advantage or gain. As Seneca points out, "pure love, careless of all other things, kindles the soul with desire for the beautiful object, not without the hope of a return of the affection."[26] Moreover, friendship(*amicitia*) is derived from the latin term for love(*amor*):

> For it is love (*amor*), from which the word "friendship" (*amicitia*) is derived, that leads to the establishing of goodwill...friendship springs rather from nature than from need, and from an inclination of the soul joined with a feeling of love rather than from calculation of how much profit the friendship is likely to afford.[27]

This is a disinterested love, fostered for its own sake. It is similar to Aristotle's conception of love in that it extends from love of one's self to love of the friend.

> For everyone loves himself, not with a view of acquiring some profit for himself from his self-love, but because he is dear to himself on his own account; and unless this same feeling were transferred to friendship, the real friend would never be found; for he is, as it were, another self.[28]

Seneca and Cicero both contend that one must appraise a person before love and friendship are formed. Once the person passes this test, complete trust and loyalty must be placed in one's friend. "Ponder for a long time whether you shall admit a given person to your friendship; but when you have decided to admit him,

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[26]Seneca, 49.

[27]Cicero, 139.

[28]Ibid., 189.

19

welcome him with all your heart and soul."[29] Trust and loyalty are therefore central

to friendship. Cicero states that:

> the support and stay of that unswerving constancy, which we look for
> in friendship, is loyalty; for nothing is constant that is disloyal.
> Moreover, the right course is to choose for a friend one who is frank,
> sociable, and sympathetic - that is, one who is likely to be influenced
> by the same motives as yourself - since all these qualities conduce to
> loyalty.[30]

Seneca likewise contends that:

> if you consider any man a friend whom you do not trust as you trust
> yourself, you are mightily mistaken and you do not sufficiently
> understand what true friendship means. Indeed, I would have you
> discuss everything with a friend; but first of all discuss the man himself.
> When friendship is settled, you must trust; before friendship is formed
> you must pass judgment.[31]

Shared interests and values are necessary both as a foundation for friendship

and as a defining feature of it.

> The fact is, the same thing is advantageous to me which is
> advantageous to you; for I am not your friend unless whatever is at
> issue concerning you is my concern also. Friendship produces between
> us a partnership in all our interests. There is no such thing as good or
> bad fortune for the individual; we live in common. And no one can live
> happily who has regard to himself alone and transforms everything into
> a question of his own utility; you must live for your neighbour, if you
> would live for yourself.[32]

Permanence and endurance are also central to the Stoics' conception of

friendship. Cicero maintains that old friends are more appreciated than new friends,

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[29]Seneca, 11.

[30]Cicero, 175.

[31]Seneca, 11.

[32]Ibid., 315.

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just as an aged bottle of wine is better. "As a rule decisions about friendship should be formed after strength and stability have been reached in mind and age."[33] A long period of time is needed for friendship to develop. "Men must eat many a peck of salt together before the claims of friendship are fulfilled."[34] The importance of permanence in friendship will be illustrated in each of the practical examples of virtuous friendships in chapter 3. In each case, the friendship lasted throughout a lifetime. Cicero also emphasizes respect, a principle that Kant also thought important for friendship. "For he who takes reverence from friendship, takes away its brightest jewel."[35]

> Virtuous friendships are integral to the achievement of the Stoic life.
>
> Friendship was given to us by nature as the handmaid of virtue...because virtue cannot attain her highest aims unattended, but only in union and fellowship with another. Such a partnership as this...should be considered the best and happiest comradeship along the road to nature's highest good.[36]

Cicero and Seneca both maintain that the Stoic is self-sufficient and not in need of friends. Complete self-sufficiency would make friendship an impossibility. It is problematic that Cicero and Seneca maintain both that the Stoic has no need of friends and that the virtuous life of the Stoic cannot be achieved alone. This latter claim implies that friendship is a very necessary part of the ethical life, and therefore,

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[33]Cicero, 183.

[34]Ibid., 177-79.

[35]Ibid., 191.

[36]Ibid., 191.

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that we need friends for ethical fulfilment. Self-sufficiency, therefore, cannot be a prerequisite of friendship, but rather something that arises out of friendship.

The Stoics' emphasis on reason, permanence and endurance, and their attempt to exclude all contingency and those things subject to change and fortune, I think, seems to disqualify certain features of virtuous friendships. Friendship based on reasoned choice, the Stoics argue, guards it against fortune and change. The fact that friendship is vulnerable to change and fortune is an aspect of friendship that must be recognized and accepted. In true friendship, change has a positive role to play in that it allows the friendship to grow and develop, and the friendship to be tested.

Augustine

Augustine's reflections on friendship are based on: the classical conception of friendship inherited from Aristotle and Cicero; his own Christian philosophy; and his practical experience of friendship, as illustrated in three important relationships in the Confessions.[37] Within this classical conception, as previously discussed, there are certain preconditions, principles, and effects that define friendship as virtuous. Some of the elements that comprise Augustine's conception of friendship include: an equal standing between the friends; shared interests and goals; reciprocated good will; and a recognition of the friend's goodness through the active participation in the other's good. Augustine further enriches this conception with his own Christian philosophy

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[37]Augustine, Confessions, trans. R.S. Pine-Coffin (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books Ltd., 1961).

in which his notion of love is central. Friendship in Augustine's ethics becomes an all encompassing notion. Friends are a gift from God, and the particular love shared between friends enables them to move outward into a universal eternal community with God. A brief analysis of Augustine's ethics, in which the notion of love is central, will illuminate the fundamental role friendship plays in his ethics. The various elements that comprise Augustine's conception of friendship, previously articulated, are exemplified in Augustine's relationships with his boyhood friend whom he does not name, his friend Alypius, and his mother Monica. After considering these examples, the specific application of this conception to friendships between women and men will be evaluated.

Augustine maintains, like Aristotle, that happiness is the *telos* or goal of human life. However, unlike Aristotle, Augustine believes that life on earth is an endless struggle filled with misery, uncertainty and the constant temptation to sin. True happiness, therefore, cannot be found in this life which is subject to contingency and change. It could only be achieved, Augustine argues, in an eternal life with God. The possession of God, who is the supreme good, therefore, is the path to true happiness. This possession of God is attained through love or *caritas*.

Love is thus the pivotal focus of Augustine's ethics and his notion of virtue. Since love is a fundamental principle of friendship, friendship likewise will have an essential role in Augustine's ethics. Augustine maintains that, just as gravity is the

force which moves physical objects, love is the force that moves a person's will.[38] Love itself, as the force that moves us, is morally neutral. However, it is the objects towards which our love is directed that defines it as good or evil, and this is best understood by Augustine's distinction between *caritas* and *cupiditas*. *Caritas* is love that is directed towards a union with God; whereas *cupiditas* is love directed to earthly possessions, and it therefore can never lead to true happiness. It is God alone who is to be loved for God's own sake, whereas other loves are to be placed in their proper order by reference to this love. This order of love is essential to Augustine's ethics and his conception of virtue. Augustine states that "it is a brief but true definition of virtue to say, it is the order of love."[39] Virtue is therefore loving what we ought to love, and it enables us to direct our love towards goodness and ultimately to the immutable good or God. This notion of *caritas* is central to Augustine's understanding of friendship because the love shared between the friends is referred to God, and it helps each friend move towards a spiritual union with God.

Augustine's recollection of his boyhood friend, with whom he had grown up and gone to school, is the occasion of his first reflection on friendship in the Confessions. The friends were of the same age, came from similar backgrounds and shared the same interests. Augustine describes their friendship as though "our two

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[38]"If love is the inner force which moves the will and the will denotes the man, we can say that man is essentially moved by his love." Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, trans. L.E.M. Lynch (New York: Random House Inc., 1960), 13.

[39]Augustine, The City of God, trans. Marcus Dods (New York: Random House, Inc., 1950), 511.

24

souls had been as one, living in two bodies, and life to me was fearful because I did not want to live with only half a soul."[40] Augustine's young friend became gravely ill and shortly thereafter died. The pain and anguish Augustine felt as a result of his young friend's death causes him to reflect on the nature of true friendship. Augustine contends that it was not true friendship that he experienced with his boyhood friend because their love had not been bound by love for God.

> Yet ours was not the friendship which should be between true friends...For though they cling together, no friends are true friends unless you, my God, bind them fast to one another through that love which is sown in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, who is given to us.[41]

It was madness, Augustine maintains, to love his friend as though he were more than human.[42] If the love Augustine and his friend shared had transcended into a love for God, then the friendship would have never ceased.

> Blessed are those who love you, O God, and love their friends in you and their enemies for your sake. They alone will never lose those who are dear to them, for they love them in one who is never lost, in God, our God who made heaven and earth and fills them with his presence, because by filling them he made them.[43]

Love between friends must be transformed into love for God. Since friends are a gift from God, Augustine would argue, the love that exists between friends must be bound by love for God. The friendship is truly virtuous only when this criterion is fulfilled.

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[40]Augustine, Confessions, 78.

[41]Ibid., 75.

[42]Ibid., 78.

[43]Ibid., 79-80.

Augustine's friendship with Alypius is an exemplification of true friendship. Alypius was a student of Augustine's, and had originally come from the same town. The two friends shared similar interests and goals, and each recognized the other's natural disposition to goodness.[44] Both Alypius and Augustine were searching for truth, and they were perplexed to know which course of life they ought to follow.[45] This quest for truth led them to God. Augustine recalls in his <u>Confessions</u> that his conversion to Christianity took place in a small garden where he sat with Alypius. Augustine recollects that he probed the inner depths of his soul and picking up the Bible opened it to a passage which dispelled all his doubt.[46] Augustine related this to Alypius who "without suffering the distress of hesitation he made his resolution and took this good purpose to himself."[47] Together the friends were baptized into the Christian faith. The love shared between Alypius and Augustine in their friendship enabled each to move towards a life with God.

Lastly, there was Augustine's relationship with his mother. A great proportion of their lives together was an ordinary relationship between mother and son. Towards the end of Monica's life, the relationship could be described as true friendship. Augustine loved his mother, and it was she who instilled Christian principles within him. However, in his youth, when Augustine moved to Carthage to

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[44] Ibid., 120.

[45] "These were the qualities I knew in Alypius, who was my close friend and, like myself, was perplexed to know what course of life we ought to follow." Ibid., 125.

[46] Ibid., 177-78.

[47] Ibid., 178.

teach, he became estranged from his mother. He took a mistress and became involved with the religion of the Manichees which caused Monica a great deal of grief. Monica was a devout Christian and her fervent goal was to see her son baptised into the Christian faith. She continued to use all means possible to persuade her son towards Christianity, and she asked the bishop Ambrose to speak to Augustine. This eventually helped Augustine towards his conversion. While Augustine loved his mother and admitted he never uttered a harsh word against her, he nevertheless felt she was rather overbearing and put pressure on him, especially when she had followed him to Italy. Therefore, he secretly left without telling her.

The relationship between Monica and Augustine had been a real struggle throughout their lives together. She had patiently watched him being emotionally tormented and living a life which went against all her moral principles. Augustine had seen his mother suffer and deeply grieved by his actions, but he chose not to do anything about it because of his own spiritual struggle. However, with Augustine's conversion, the relationship between Monica and Augustine moved to a different stage. They now shared the same values and Christian ideal, and their relationship became a truly virtuous friendship which was joined together by love for God. The pinnacle of their friendship is illuminated in the scene by the window described in Augustine's Confessions. Here, in a conversation between Monica and Augustine, shortly before her death, they discussed the lives of the saints. This discussion then turned to the state of their own souls.

> And while we spoke of the eternal Wisdom, longing for it and
> straining for it with all the strength of our hearts, for one fleeting

27

instant we reached out and touched it. Then with a sigh, leaving our spiritual harvest bound to it, we returned to the sound of our own speech, in which each word has a beginning and an ending.[48]

This scene by the window with mother and son is reflective of the highest aspect of friendship, according to Augustine, in which the friends' love transcends the physical plane and is directed towards a love for God.

Thus, some of the characteristics that define friendship as virtuous are illustrated in each of Augustine's three relationships.[49] However, the fundamental component of true friendship for Augustine, and witnessed in two of his three friendships, is primarily a love shared between friends who direct that love towards a love for God.

It is clear that virtuous friendships play a fundamental role in Augustine's ethics. Given Augustine's basic view of women, it needs to be asked whether he thought true friendship between women and men is possible. Augustine believes that women were subordinate to men; the man was the head of the household and it was a woman's duty to serve and obey her husband. However, Augustine maintains that this subordination of women to men was the result of the Biblical Fall, rather than the result of an inherent defect in women's nature. Augustine believes that God created women and men as equals before their expulsion from Paradise and that they would once again regain an equal standing in the resurrection.

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[48]Ibid., 197.

[49]Although Augustine states that the friendship with his boyhood friend was not truly virtuous, it did have some of the defining characteristics.

For my part, they seem to be wiser who make no doubt that both sexes shall rise...For before they sinned, the man and the woman were naked and were not ashamed. From those bodies, then, vice shall be withdrawn, while nature shall be preserved. And the sex of woman is not a vice, but nature. It shall then indeed be superior to carnal intercourse and child-bearing; nevertheless the female members shall remain adapted not to the old uses, but to a new beauty, which, so far from provoking lust, now extinct, shall excite praise to the wisdom and clemency of God...He, then, who created both sexes will restore both.[50]

Therefore, when people enter a relationship with God, a new equality is created. As such, an equality between men and women is established when they move together towards a love for God.

For you created man male and female, but in your spiritual grace they are as one. Your grace no more discriminates between them according to their sex than it draws distinction between Jew and Greek or slave and freeman.[51]

Love for God is that in which all Christian members are joined, and virtuous friendships include everyone, both female and male, who are Christians and who desire a loving union with God. The friendship between Monica and Augustine is a lucid example that virtuous friendships between women and men can exist within Augustine's framework.

Augustine contended that true love and true happiness can only be found in that which is immutable and eternal, namely God. Love for friends, as Augustine learned from his boyhood friendship, can quickly end when the friend dies.

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[50]Augustine, <u>City of God</u>, 839-40.

[51]Augustine, <u>Confessions</u>, 333.

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Consequently, Augustine felt that only when love between friends is bound by love for God can eternal friendship be ensured. Thus, Augustine focuses only on those aspects in friendship that lead the friends to God and which give it eternal permanence. Those aspects of friendship which are transient and belong to the material world, like the Stoics' conception of friendship, are discounted. Moreover, Augustine would argue that virtuous friendships are restricted to Christians, and those who do not participate in a love for God cannot experience true friendship.

The central principle of true friendship, as seen in Aristotle's and the Stoics' theories, is to promote the good of the friend. Within Augustine's theory this good is defined in terms of God. Each friend thus promotes the other's good by directing the love they share to God and drawing one's friend into a loving union with God. Together the friends can share in this eternal union with God and all Christians, and in this lies true happiness. Augustine has presented some unique features of virtuous friendships. He enriched it with his own Christian thought, by focusing on the centrality of love in friendship, and he cogently demonstrated the importance friendship has within the moral life.

Immanuel Kant

Kant's account of friendship is found in The Metaphysics of Morals[52] and Lectures on Ethics,[53] which both have as their purpose to elucidate the application of the supreme principle of morality - Kant's Categorical Imperative. Kant's conception of friendship, though limited in its scope, especially as it applies to women, offers some incisive ideas into the nature of virtuous friendships, and it demonstrates the importance friendship still has within moral discussion.

In the Lectures on Ethics, Kant explicates three types of friendship corresponding to Aristotle's division in his Nicomachean Ethics. "Friendship of need comes about when men can trust one another in the mutual provision for the needs of life."[54] There is also friendship of taste which Kant calls a pseudo-friendship. "It consists in the pleasure we derive from each other's company, and not from each other's happiness."[55] Lastly, there is true friendship which Kant calls friendship of disposition. Kant articulates several features of this third type of friendship which are definitive of virtuous friendships. Equality between the friends is an essential precondition. He states: "the relation of friendship is a relation of equality."[56] The

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[52]Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge, Great Britain: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

[53]Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans. Louis Infield (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1963).

[54]Ibid., 203.

[55]Ibid., 205.

[56]Ibid., 204.

friends must also share the same values and interests. In true friendship, the friend is:

> one in whom we can confide unreservedly, to whom we can disclose completely all our dispositions and judgments, from whom we can and need hide nothing, to whom we can communicate our whole self.[57]

Furthermore, friends must share the same principles and values, but Kant maintains, differences in thought between the friends are often better than similarities.

> What then is that adaptation of man to man that constitutes the bond of friendship? Not an identity of thought; on the contrary, difference in thought is a stronger foundation for friendship, for then the one makes up the deficiencies of the other. Yet on one point they must agree. Their intellectual and moral principles must be the same, if there is to be complete understanding between them. Otherwise, there will always be discrepancy in their decisions and they will never agree.[58]

This insight, I think, presents an interesting basis for friendships between men and women who possess philosophically significant differences,[59] yet who can share the same principles and values with one another. Moreover, it suggests that perhaps the foundation for the friendship is stronger because of these differences. Lastly, friendship can exist only among a few people. Within normal social intercourse, Kant contends, a greater part of our disposition is withheld. Virtuous friendships provide the means by which one can confide unreservedly in another. Friendship:

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[57]Ibid., 205-6.

[58]Ibid., 207.

[59]Examples of these differences include lived experience of the body, socialization as male or female, gender history within a particular culture, and so on.

is a peculiar association of specific persons; it is man's refuge in this world from his distrust of his fellows, in which he can reveal his disposition to another and enter into communion with him.[60]

Kant also explores the social evolution of friendship in the <u>Lectures on Ethics</u>. This is an innovative idea not usually found in the other discussions on friendship. In primitive social conditions, Kant claims, friendship is formed for need. This is similar to Hobbes' theory, as will later be seen, in which people come together for the sake of survival. As society becomes more complex and the focus is no longer on economic factors alone, friendship takes on a moral character and friendships of disposition are formed. However, Kant, like the theories of individualism to be elaborated in chapter 2, starts from the premise that the individual is an isolated unit, and he or she exists prior to one's relations with others. Within such a framework, I think, friendship's importance cannot be adequately considered. Moreover, Kant does not think of friendship as belonging to the highest social order, for he argues that friendship "is not of heaven but of the earth; the complete moral perfection of heaven must be universal; but friendship is not universal."[61] In contrast, Augustine also argued that the community of heaven was of a higher order, yet it was friendship between particular friends on earth, when bound by love for God, that enabled a person to move into this community of heaven. Thus, in this aspect of Kant's understanding of friendship, there is no movement outwards from particular friendships to a more universal community.

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[60]Ibid., 207.

[61]Ibid., 207.

Kant's account of moral friendship is given a more systematic exposition in The Metaphysics of Morals. In this book, Kant argues, the Categorical Imperative has two areas of legislation which correspond to the division of The Metaphysics into its two parts. "The Metaphysical Principles of Right" or "The Doctrine of Right" and "The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue" or "The Doctrine of Virtue" are differentiated by the motives in the legislation of actions. The "Doctrine of Virtue" explores those duties of virtue which are considered in terms of ends and which prescribe internal legislation to actions.

As a rational agent, one legislates actions in accordance with the Categorical Imperative, and the only incentive for these actions is that they are done for the sake of duty. Human beings, because they possess reason and a will, are capable of setting ends to their actions. The Categorical Imperative sets itself an objective end which must have an absolute value in itself. Since the only thing good in itself is the will governed by reason, the rational will is, therefore, the objective end of the Categorical Imperative.

Kant recognizes the importance of a virtuous disposition within the moral sphere to follow the Categorical Imperative. Virtue "is...the moral strength of a man's will in fulfilling his duty, a moral constraint through his own lawgiving reason."[62] The application of the Categorical Imperative in its second and third formulations gives rise to duties of virtue. These duties of virtue promote the ends of one's self and the ends of others. It is the human being that is the self-existent

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[62]Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 206.

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end to which the Categorical Imperative commands both to respect as an end in itself and to promote this end in ourselves and in others. Thus, duties of virtue are "one's own perfection and the happiness of others."[63] It is in light of these ends that the maxims of one's actions are made.

One's own perfection involves striving towards that perfection which is deemed for humanity, whereas our duties towards others are divided into duties of love and duties of respect. The laws of duty, Kant states, govern the moral world just as the laws of nature govern the physical world. Love and respect, Kant argues, are the principles that govern our relations with others, and one's maxims must be set in light of these ends. Love and respect are considered in the practical sense in contrast to the feelings of love and respect. Therefore, love, in the practical sense, is to be thought of "as the maxim of benevolence (practical love), which results in beneficence."[64] Respect, on the other hand, is understood "as the maxim of limiting our self-esteem by the dignity of humanity in another person."[65] These two principles are essential to Kant's conception of friendship.

Kant maintains that "friendship (considered in its perfection) is the union of two persons through equal mutual love and respect."[66] Perfect friendship is unattainable in practice, Kant contends, because it is impossible to attain the proper

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[63]Ibid., 190.

[64]Ibid., 244.

[65]Ibid., 244.

[66]Ibid., 261.

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balance of love and respect. If a person loves one's friend more than the friend loves him or her, then that friend's respect is likely to diminish. It is also morally important to point out a friend's faults, but that friend could see this as a lack of respect or a loss of the other's respect. Friendship also implies helping the other in need.

> Friendship...cannot be a union aimed at mutual advantage but must rather be a purely moral one, and the help that each may count on from the other in case of need must not be regarded as the end and determining ground of friendship...but only as the outward manifestation of an inner heartfelt benevolence.[67]

However, helping a friend in need creates an imbalance in the friendship in terms of respect, since the one who benefits "sees himself obviously a step lower in being under obligation without being able to impose obligation in turn."[68] Perfect friendship "is an ideal of each participating and sharing sympathetically in the other's well-being through the morally good will that unites them."[69] Although it is unattainable in practice, it is an ideal towards which we should aim in our relations with others.

Kant also distinguishes moral friendship from aesthetic friendship or friendship founded on feeling. Moral friendship is realizable in action. It also has the peculiar characteristic of revealing one's true self to the friend and sharing one's thoughts and feelings with the other. Kant recognizes the awkwardness a person feels in revealing

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[67]Ibid., 262.

[68]Ibid., 262.

[69]Ibid., 261.

36

one's true self to others and the fear that accompanies it. Moral friendship removes this awkwardness and fear.

> If one finds a man of good disposition and understanding to whom he can open his heart with complete confidence without having to worry about such dangers, and moreover with whom his opinions about things are in accord, then he can give vent to his thoughts. Then he is not completely alone with his thoughts, as if in prison, but enjoys a freedom which he misses in the mass of men, among whom he must keep himself to himself...The strictest friendship requires an understanding and trusted friend who considers himself bound not to share without express permission a secret entrusted to him with anyone else.[70]

However, there is a certain reserve in Kant's conception of friendship in that one must always be wary of revealing one's true self for fear of being hurt. Even in true friendship, Kant argues, there is always the possibility of the friend becoming an enemy and using the other's confidence against him.[71]

Kant's account of friendship shares many of the same characteristics found in the other classical discussions of friendship. He has shown that persons possessing reason and a will that is good must be considered as ends in themselves, and this consideration gives rise to the duties of virtue both to ourselves and to others. The concern with and effort to promote the other's good within Kant's framework would consist in adopting the ends of others as my own. Thus, a person adopts as her or

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[70]Ibid., 263.

[71]"We must so conduct ourselves towards a friend that there is no harm done if he should turn into an enemy. We must give him no handle against us....it is very unwise to place ourselves in a friend's hands completely, to tell him all the secrets which might detract from our welfare if he became our enemy and spread them abroad." Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 208.

his own end, the happiness of one's friend. Friendship is therefore central to the moral life and a necessary part of moral discussion.

In Kant's notion of friendship, love, sympathy and respect are seen as duties towards others. Considered as duties, they seem to lose some of the uniqueness that is peculiar to virtuous friendships. The duty of friendship, Kant claims, is the proper moral attitude we must adopt in our relations with others, since, as rational agents, they possess absolute value. However, what is not taken into account is the person's uniqueness and intrinsic value that draws people together and gives rise to particular friendships. Friendship considered as a duty tends to take away the personal aspect of friendship.

A basic mistrust of humanity also shadows Kant's conception of friendship. As was seen earlier, friendship, according to Kant, is a refuge in this world from a distrust of one's fellows. Yet the confidence a person extends to a friend could be used against one's self if that friend turned into an enemy. Therefore, within Kant's conception of friendship, there is an element of mistrust, and a certain reserve exists in the confidence one places in a friend.

Kant has presented a lofty ideal of the human being as a person who possesses dignity and absolute value, and who is capable of moral self-legislation. This is an ideal, like friendship, but one that needs to be aimed at in our regard towards others. As well, Kant has presented an inspiring account of duties to others in terms of the union of love and respect in friendship. A brief analysis of Kant's view on women's nature and the marriage relationship, however, will reveal that women were

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essentially excluded from this lofty moral perspective. Therefore, true friendship was not possible between men and women in Kant's framework.

Kant's view on the differences between man's and woman's nature are found in his essay Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime.[72] Kant's distinction between the beautiful and the sublime corresponds to the female and male respectively. This distinction carries with it the implication that woman is governed by emotion, man by reason. Within the ethical sphere, woman acts morally because evil is ugly, not because it is right; whereas man is capable of acting morally on principle.

> The virtue of a woman is a beautiful virtue. That of the male sex should be a noble virtue. Women will avoid the wicked not because it is unright, but because it is ugly; and virtuous actions mean to them such as are morally beautiful. Nothing of duty, nothing of compulsion, nothing of obligation! Woman is intolerant of all commands and all morose constraint....I hardly believe that the fair sex is capable of principles, and I hope by that not to offend, for these are also extremely rare in the male.[73]

Kant makes the assumption that woman is governed solely by her emotions. His insistence on excluding the emotions from the moral perspective, and his association of woman with the emotions, thus makes it obvious that she was excluded from Kant's kingdom of ends. To deny woman the capacity to act on reason and

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[72]Immanuel Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, trans. John T. Goldthwait (Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 1981).

[73]Ibid., 81.

principle, and thus to exclude her from the moral perspective on the basis of her sex, is not philosophically sound.

Kant's notion of the relationship between a man and a woman, witnessed in his opinion on marriage, is also problematic. Kant maintains that a woman and a man are essentially two halves who together in marriage make up a whole.

> In matrimonial life the united pair should, as it were, constitute a single moral person, which is animated and governed by the understanding of the man and the taste of the wife.[74]

Kant also argues that the sexual union within marriage is a reciprocal possession of one's person over the other.

> the relation of the partners in a marriage is a relation of equality of possession, equality both in their possession of each other as persons...and also equality in their possession of material goods.[75]

This is an equality of possession, but Kant maintains, this does not conflict with the law granting dominance of the man over the woman because he possesses a natural superiority over her.

> If the question is therefore posed, whether it is also in conflict with the equality of the partners for the law to say of the husband's relation to the wife, he is to be your master (he is the party to direct, she to obey): This cannot be regarded as conflicting with the natural equality of a couple if this dominance is based only on the natural superiority of the husband to the wife in his capacity to promote the common interest of the household, and the right to direct that is based on this can be derived from the very duty of unity and equality with respect to the end.[76]

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[74]Ibid., 95.

[75]Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 97.

[76]Ibid., 98.

It is clear from Kant's writings that true friendship cannot exist between men and women. Men and women, according to Kant, are not equal; they have different virtues and a different moral perspective. His fragmentation of the female and male into two halves, and his view of the marriage relation, denies the consideration of a man and a woman as integral persons capable of engaging in a dynamic relationship. Moreover, the limitations Kant places on friendship in general, as was shown earlier, does not adequately account for the moral significance of virtuous friendships. Nevertheless, some of Kant's insights on the nature of friendship offer interesting considerations for friendships between women and men, such as, his recognition that differences between the friends who share the same principles are a stronger basis for friendship than similarity.

Friendship as a virtue has thus occupied an integral place within ethical discussions in the history of philosophy. However, these discussions, for the most part, are confined to friendships between men. Aristotle, Seneca and Augustine all held that friendship between men and women were possible, but it is only in Augustine's theory that virtuous friendships between men and women can fully flourish. Reason, equality and participation in the public sphere were necessary prerequisites for virtuous friendships as evidenced in the theories of Aristotle, Cicero and Kant. These philosophers maintained that women were severely limited in their reasoning capacity and governed instead by emotion. Women were denied access to the public sphere and confined strictly to the private sphere of the home. These

philosophers also contended that women were basically inferior to men. As a result of these assumptions, women could not participate fully in the ethical life. They were considered to possess different virtues than men, and therefore were denied the virtue of friendship, at least in its complete sense. Aristotle maintained that virtuous friendships can exist between women and men within the context of the family, but as was demonstrated, this was a severely limited friendship, and I think it was doubtful whether it could in fact be virtuous. Within Augustine's framework, it was seen that virtuous friendships were possible between women and men when bound by love for God. In Seneca's philosophy, friendship between women and men could be possible if they lived by the Stoic principles. Setting aside these unfounded assumptions of women's nature by some of these philosophers, their insights can contribute to the conception of virtuous friendship between men and women. This will be elaborated in chapter 3.

The following chart summarizes the preconditions, principles and effects that define friendship as virtuous according to the philosophers discussed in this chapter. The following format is applied to all the summary charts in this thesis: 'Yes' indicates that the philosopher considered this relevant to his or her theory; 'No' indicates that the philosopher did not consider this relevant to his or her theory and a blank indicates that the philosopher did not discuss it.

TABLE 1: CLASSICAL CONCEPTIONS OF VIRTUOUS FRIENDSHIPS

		Aristotle		Stoics		Augustine		Kant	
		men-men	women-men	men men	women-men	men-men	women-men	men-men	women-men
I Preconditions	1)Equality								
	-sex	yes	no	yes	Seneca only	yes	no	yes	no
	-social	yes	no	yes		yes	no	yes	no
	-intellectual	yes	no	yes	Seneca only	yes	no	yes	no
	-spiritual					yes	yes		
	2)Shared community								
	-political	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
	-intellectual	yes	no	yes	Seneca	yes	no	yes	no
	-religious					yes	yes		
	-family		yes				yes		yes
	-gender	yes		yes				yes	
	3)Similarity in character	yes	possess different virtues	yes		yes		yes	
II Principles	1)Shared interests & values								
	-political	yes		yes				yes	
	-intellectual	yes		yes	Seneca only	yes		yes	
	-spiritual					yes	yes		
	2)Shared goals	Related to polis	Related to family	Stoic ideal	Stoic ideal -Seneca	Union with God	Union with God	Rational nature	
	3)Good of the Other	yes	Dependent on one's function	yes		yes	yes	yes	
	4)Good will	yes		yes					
	5)Love or benevolence	yes	yes	yes		yes	yes	yes	
	6)Loyalty			yes				yes	
	7)Concord	yes	yes	yes		yes	yes		
	8)Trust	yes	yes	yes		yes	yes	yes	
	9)Respect			yes				yes	
	10)Permanence	yes	yes	yes		yes	yes	yes	
III Effects	1)Growth								
	-personal	yes	limited	yes		yes	yes		
	-intellectual	yes		yes		yes	yes	yes	
	-spiritual					yes	yes		
	2)Self-sufficiency	yes	limited	Precondition				yes	
	3)Realization of one's good	yes	yes(limited for women)	yes		yes	yes	yes	

CHAPTER 2

THEORIES THAT CHALLENGE FRIENDSHIP AS A VIRTUE

The philosophical theories espoused by Niccolo Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, Friedrich Nietzsche and Mary Daly each challenge the argument that friendship between women and men is a virtue. Each of these theories, which claim that friendship between men and women is not possible, will be critically assessed.

Niccolo Machiavelli

Niccolo Machiavelli's book The Prince,[1] dedicated and presented as a gift to Lorenzo de Medici, is a guidebook on how political power is acquired and maintained. An analysis of this book reveals Machiavelli's general conception of ethics, human nature, and relations between men and women. This conception, as later seen in Hobbes' philosophy, is a form of individualism in which power and self-interest are the primary motives for an individual's actions. Ethics, likewise, is founded on self-interest and the needs of the individual. Friendships of utility can exist in such a framework, but there is no possibility of friendship developing as a virtue. In particular, the relationship between men and women within Machiavelli's framework is one of opposing forces.

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[1]Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. George Bull (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books Ltd., 1961).

Machiavelli maintains that human nature is timeless and unchanging, whereas society as malleable, is taking shape and form in the hands of strong leaders. Individuals act out of self-interest, and those possessing the right qualities for leadership will take power. Machiavelli's conception of ethics is illuminated by his account of how a prince must govern his conduct. Moral actions are judged not by their motives or intentions but by their consequences. An individual's actions are determined according to need and according to what others do, and thus moral actions depend upon circumstances. The prince must decide when the situation calls for the right action. He must not question whether his actions are vicious or virtuous, but rather act according to what the situation calls for.

> The gulf between how one should live and how one does live is so wide that a man who neglects what is actually done for what should be done learns the way to self-destruction rather than self-preservation. The fact is that a man who wants to act virtuously in every way necessarily comes to grief among so many who are not virtuous. Therefore, if a prince wants to maintain his rule he must learn how not to be virtuous, and to make use of this or not according to need.[2]

Machiavelli makes several references to friendship in The Prince, but these are strictly friendships of utility which allow no movement towards friendships of virtue. The prince must be friends with the people to utilize them as allies and so that they do not turn against him. Likewise, the people befriend the prince because he wields the power, and they are dependent upon him. Friendship, in Machiavelli's framework, thus involves conferring and receiving benefits through which one is placed under obligation. "The nature of man is such that people consider themselves

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[2]Ibid., 91.

put under an obligation as much by the benefits they confer as by those they receive."[3] However, there is no consideration of the other person in this kind of friendship except as a means to one's own ends.

Those characteristics that are definitive of virtuous friendships are seen in Machiavelli's theory as signs of weakness. Men are not to be trusted, Machiavelli maintains:

> because men are wretched creatures who would not keep their word
> to you, you need not keep your word to them...Men are so simple, and
> so much creatures of circumstance, that the deceiver will always find
> someone ready to be deceived.[4]

Love is also a bond that is quickly broken when it is to one's advantage to do so.

> One can make this generalization about men: they are ungrateful,
> fickle, liars, and deceivers, they shun danger and are greedy for
> profit...Any prince who has come to depend entirely on promises and
> has taken no other precautions ensures his own ruin...The bond of love
> is one which men, wretched creatures that they are, break when it is to
> their advantage to do so.[5]

Machiavelli's conception of relationships between men and women is best illuminated in the opposing forces of *virtu* and fortune. *Virtu*, translated as prowess or vitality, is the antithesis of fortune. The prince needs both prowess and fortune to acquire power, but the less dependent he is upon fortune the better off he is. Fortune, according to Machiavelli, represents woman. Fortune "is a woman and if

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[3]Ibid., 73.

[4]Ibid., 100.

[5]Ibid., 96-97.

she is to be submissive it is necessary to beat and coerce her."[6] Although, woman

is often used as a personification of fortune, Machiavelli is arguing simultaneously

that men and women represent these two forces, and the relationship between these

two forces is one of conflict and opposition.[7] Vitality, on the other hand, represents

man, and it is the defining characteristic of great men.

> Fortune, as it were, provided the matter but they gave it its form;
> without opportunity their prowess would have been extinguished, and
> without such prowess the opportunity would have come in vain.[8]

Fortune, Machiavelli contends, like woman is fickle and changeable whereas

virtu, the mark of strong men, is constant. Machiavelli argues that fortune controls

half of our affairs while the other half is determined by us.

> Nonetheless, so as not to rule out our free will, I believe that it is
> probably true that fortune is the arbiter of half the things we do,
> leaving the other half or so to be controlled by ourselves.[9]

From this it would seem to follow that a balance or harmony between these two

forces is essential. On the contrary, fortune or women, must be controlled otherwise,

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[6]Ibid., 133.

[7]"One might say, then, that relations between fortune and men range for
Machiavelli, like relations between the sexes, from outright hostility and war to a kind
of semiaffectionate, mutual teasing and tempting...fortune is always juxtaposed to
virtù." Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, Fortune Is a Woman: Gender and Politics in the
Thought of Niccolo Machiavelli (Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of
California Press, 1984), 155.

[8]Ibid., 50.

[9]Ibid., 130.

like a raging river, she is capable of total destruction.[10] To control fortune, a man must become like her, capable of changing when the situation calls for it.

> Thus a man who is circumspect, when circumstances demand impetuous behaviour, is unequal to the task, and so he comes to grief. If he changed his character according to the time and circumstances, then his fortune would not change.[11]

However, this is difficult to achieve since it runs contrary to a man's character. Machiavelli continues:

> Nor do we find any man shrewd enough to know how to adapt his policy in this way; either because he cannot do otherwise than what is in character or because, having always prospered by proceeding one way, he cannot persuade himself to change.[12]

The other alternative, as mentioned above, in controlling fortune is to confront her with force. When she is subdued by force, the relation between man and fortune turns to friendship of utility. Fortune must be forcefully subdued and utilized for the achievement of great men. Young men who are strong enough to subdue and beat fortune, Machiavelli contends, achieve this relationship.

> Always being a woman, she favours young men, because they are less circumspect and more ardent, and because they command her with greater audacity.[13]

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[10]"I compare fortune to one of those violent rivers which, when, they are enraged, flood the plains, tear down trees and buildings, wash soil from one place to deposit it in another." Ibid., 130.

[11]Ibid., 132.

[12]Ibid., 132.

[13]Ibid., 133.

A constant fear of women and their threat to men's virility is inherent in Machiavelli's writings. Machiavelli's ambivalent attitude towards women, thus, portrays the relationship between men and women as one of conflict and opposition. Their relationship in Machiavelli's framework is best described as a battle of the sexes. Consequently, Machiavelli's theory is an impoverished view of human nature, especially in its application to relations between men and women. Like other theories of individualism, it cannot account for the complexity and richness of human relations especially between men and women and the community within which they live. It is only within a framework in which friendships of virtue are considered significant ethical phenomenon that one can properly account for the complexity of human relations and their importance to personal growth.

Thomas Hobbes

Thomas Hobbes' philosophy, a theory of radical individualism, is founded on the premises that the individual exists in a 'state of nature' as a solitary isolated unit, and whose actions are primarily motivated by the desire for self-preservation. Hobbes concludes from these premises that this state of nature is a state of war, and that social interaction and the formation of a commonwealth take place simply because it is a more rational means to self-preservation. Hobbes' philosophy, therefore, sets forth a view of humanity as naturally asocial in which social interaction necessarily involves conflict and war. This theory discounts the possibility of any meaningful relationships existing between individuals. It is, therefore, in direct

contrast with other philosophical theories which claim that one's very identity is constituted through social interaction, that the human good is tied in with the good of others and that virtuous friendships are possible and desirable. A critical analysis of Hobbes' premises and conclusions that are articulated in the Leviathan,[14] and specifically his view on the relations between men and women, will demonstrate that his theory cannot provide a sufficient account of human nature and human relationships.

Hobbes' conception of the person as an isolated unit prior to any social context evolves from his mechanistic view of human nature. Human functions such as sensation, reason, the passions and the use of language operate according to mechanical principles which Hobbes views as essentially private. We can only know ourselves and the internal workings of our own mind, Hobbes argues, and therefore our thoughts and feelings are incapable of being shared with one another. Thus, one cannot have accurate knowledge of another person except by comparing their actions with our own.[15]

Language, Hobbes maintains, is of instrumental value to the individual. That is, its uses are either marks or notes for remembrance or signs to let others know of our needs and desires. Hobbes does not seem to recognize the complexity of

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[14]Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge, Great Britain: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

[15]"And though by mens actions wee do discover their designe sometimes; yet to do it without comparing them with our own, and distinguishing all circumstances, by which the case may come to be altered, is to decypher without a key, and be for the most part deceived, by too much trust, or by too much diffidence." Ibid., 10.

language and the fact that it can only be developed within a social context He also ignores a fundamental purpose of language as a form of communication with others. Language, as communication, is important in friendship in that it is the outward manifestation of one's inner self to the other. These human functions, described within a mechanistic framework, deny the possibility of being able to know others, and to communicate and share one's thoughts and feelings with others which is an integral part of virtuous friendships.

Hobbes maintains that the fundamental desire of human nature is the desire for self-preservation, and a person's actions are motivated primarily by this desire. The many desires of an individual, especially the desire for self-preservation, need to be fulfilled, and this continuous search for means to satisfy one's desires is called "power." Since satisfying one's desires is lifelong, so also is this search for power. The power of a person "is his present means, to obtain some future apparent Good."[16] This apparent good is the foreseeing of good in a whole chain of consequences. The value or worth of the person is thus defined by Hobbes in terms of power.

> The Value, or Worth of a man, is as of all other things, his Price; that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his Power; and therefore is not absolute; but a thing dependant on the need and judgement of another...For let a man (as most men do,) rate themselves at the highest Value they can; yet their true Value is no more than it is esteemed by others.[17]

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[16]Ibid., 62.

[17]Ibid., 63.

Virtuous friendships are incapable of being developed in such a framework in which individuals are essentially confined to their own private worlds, incapable of real communication and valued in terms of a market commodity -the price given for the use of one's power.

The desire for self-preservation and Hobbes' contention that individuals are basically equal,[18] leads Hobbes to conclude that the state of nature is a state of war. A radical assertion made by Hobbes is that men and women are basically equal in this state of nature.[19] Biological and psychological equality with other individuals, in which they share similar desires and similar faculties of body and mind, entail that similar objects will be needed to satisfy an individual's desires. Competition will arise for these objects, and this inevitably leads to war.

> From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining
> of our Ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing which
> neverthelesse they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the
> way to their End, (which is principally their own conservation, and

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[18]"Nature hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body, and mind; as that though there bee found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind then another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himselfe any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he...I find yet a greater equality amongst men, than that of strength. For Prudence, is but Experience; which equall time, equally bestowes on all men, in those things they equally apply themselves unto." Ibid., 86-87.

[19]"But in the state of nature, if a man and woman contract so, as neither is subject to the command of other, the children are the mother's:...because the inequality of their natural forces is not so great, that the man could get the dominion over the woman without war." The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, ed. Sir William Molesworth, Bart, vol. II, Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society (London, Great Britain: Scientia Allen, 1962), 118.

sometimes their delectation only,) endeavour to destroy, or subdue one another.[20]

The principle causes of conflict between individuals are competition, mistrust, and glory. Mistrust arises because individuals will attempt to outwit others in the obtaining of the objects they desire. Glory is a source of conflict since others may not bestow the same value on the individual that he or she feels befitting. Thus, the state of nature is essentially a state of war. Hobbes' source of conflict is based on two assumptions. He assumes that there is a scarcity of objects in the state of nature and that conflict inevitably leads to war. There is no reason to suppose that there is a scarcity of objects in the state of nature, nor does Hobbes give any reason for this assumption. Even though conflict may arise when individuals want the same objects, this conflict can be resolved through cooperation. War is not the inevitable consequence of conflict.

In the state of nature, Hobbes claims, each individual has the right to use whatever means are available for self-preservation. This Right of Nature, according to Hobbes, "is the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation of his own Nature."[21] However, it is obvious that in the state of nature, there is not much security when there is this constant tendency for war between individuals. The individual's life in this state is basically "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short."[22] Therefore, ensuring peace between individuals becomes

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[20]Hobbes, Leviathan, 87.

[21]Ibid., 91.

[22]Ibid., 89.

53

a reasonable means for self-preservation. Individuals enter into an original contract with one another in which they forfeit some of their basic rights of nature to unite under an absolute sovereign power. This is the formation of the commonwealth, or what Hobbes refers to as the "Great Leviathan." The commonwealth provides security among individuals and it makes society, culture, knowledge and morality possible. Relationships are formed with one another on the basis of need, and others are considered merely as means to one's ends. It is therefore only friendships of utility that can develop within such a framework.

Moral philosophy comes about with the formation of the commonwealth. In the state of nature, it is each person for him or herself, and there is no conception of morality. Moreover, Hobbes argues that there is no absolute conception of good just as there is no end to our desires or final state of satisfaction. Good, Hobbes maintains, can only be defined in relation to the individual and his or her desires. Moral philosophy is comprised of what Hobbes refers to as the "Laws of Nature."

> A Law of Nature is a Precept, or generall Rule, found out by Reason,
> by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life,
> or taketh away the means of preserving the same.[23]

The first Law of Nature asserts the need to ensure peace among individuals, and it embodies all the other Laws of Nature. Hobbes outlines another eighteen Laws of Nature which all have as their end to ensure peace and provide a means for self-preservation. These Laws of Nature are recognized by everyone in the commonwealth as good and, therefore, to obey them is regarded as virtuous.

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[23]Ibid., 91.

And consequently all men agree on this, that Peace is Good, and therefore also the way, or means of Peace, which...are Justice, Gratitude, Modesty, Equity, Mercy, & the rest of the Laws of Nature, are good; that is to say, Morall Vertues; and their contrarie vices, Evill.[24]

For Hobbes, the virtues are those qualities which ensure peace in the commonwealth, and they are recognized by everyone as good in that they are a more reasonable means to each individual's self-preservation. This is in stark contrast to the classical conception of the virtues seen in chapter 1, which have intrinsic worth rather than an instrumental use. Thus, the virtue of friendship has no place within this context because the virtues are regarded as means to promote one's own self-interests.

Hobbes' notion of the state of nature is at times obscure, and perhaps this is due to his difficulty in abstracting individuals completely from a social context. This obscurity is manifested in his views on relationships between men and women in the context of the family. The family is also given an individualistic interpretation by Hobbes when he claims that natural family bonds are artificially created contracts between members of the family. In the commonwealth, Hobbes maintains, a family is much like a little monarch in which the father is sovereign. However, hypothetically, it is matriarchal right that is primary in the state of nature. Here, there are no law. of matrimony, and there exists only the natural inclination of the sexes. This natural inclination of the sexes results in the generation of children.

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[24]Ibid., 111.

Dominion of children naturally belongs to the mother because it is unreasonable to suppose that men and women can maintain a long term relationship, and that the father would still be around at the time of the child's birth. Moreover, the father cannot be known unless the mother makes that claim.

> In the state of nature it cannot be known who is the father, but by the testimony of the mother; the child therefore is his whose mother will have it, and therefore her's. Wherefore original dominion over children belongs to the mother: and among men no less than other creatures, the birth follows the belly.[25]

The child, Hobbes maintains, recognizing that the mother has the power of life in her hands, consents to the mother's dominion by contract. Thus, the most natural and first important social bond the child experiences, is described by Hobbes as an arbitrary social contract. One must concede that it is absurd to suppose the child capable of understanding the concept of a contract. However, the child's simple recognition of the mother's power over the child's survival, Hobbes would argue, is all that is required for the formation of a contract. Thus, the relationship between mother and child, Hobbes claims, is an artificially contrived contract. This contention of Hobbes does not take into account the most natural of all human re..tionships, and it discounts the caring and nurturing aspects so fundamental to the child's growth.

Families, according to Hobbes, exist prior to the formation of the commonwealth, but given the basic premises of Hobbes' theory, the question arises as to how this can be. It is only possible when a family is viewed, not as a

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[25]Hobbes, <u>Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society</u>, 117.

fundam ital social unit, but rather as a private confederation consisting of a master and his servant in which one individual has acquired dominion over another. If natural dominion of children is matriarchal, then a family is not created out of procreation but out of dominion by conquest. Hobbes asserts that private confederations exist in the state of nature in which an individual obtains dominion over another. This is exemplified in Hobbes' discussion of small families waging war with one another.[26]

However, Hobbes conception of the family existing in the state of nature is rather ambiguous. There is a serious gap in Hobbes' theory - from a state of nature in which men and women equally are capable of fending for themselves and where dominion of children is matriarchal, to a patriarchal commonwealth in which women are servants. It is assumed that all women have been dominated in the state of nature, have given up their basic rights and have become subordinated to their husbands. It is then the men who unite under a common power in which the Leviathan comes into being. Given Hobbes' contention that everyone equally are capable of fending for themselves in the state of nature, how is it that only men gain dominion and form private confederations? It can be granted that a woman with a small child is less able to fend for herself and she would therefore submit to a man's dominion for protection. However, why this would be the case for all women is not clear.

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[26]Hobbes, Leviathan, 118.

All relations between individuals in Hobbes' framework are arbitrarily contrived contracts which discount any meaningful relationships from existing between persons. Furthermore, relationships between men and women only exist within the context of the family which arises out of the dominion over and subordination of women. This relationship, Hobbes maintains, is that of master and servant. As such, virtuous friendships cannot exist between anyone, especially between men and women, within Hobbes' framework.

Hobbes' theory, which attempts to reduce things to their more simple elements in order to describe how the complex whole comes into being, cannot be given practical application to human nature and to society. Society is not the sum of its parts, namely the individuals that comprise it. When Hobbes attempts to construct a commonwealth from its individual aggregates, he leaves out fundamental constituents of human life, such as, the fact that one cannot exist or be defined as an isolated individual. Our relations with others are not artificially contrived contracts, nor does the family, commonly regarded as the fundamental social unit in the community, arise out of dominion as Hobbes claims. Moreover, the relationship between women and men is not limited to the home, nor can it be summed up as a relationship of master and servant. Hobbes' theory thus negates the fact that social relationships make up the very fabric of our identity; they contribute to our moral growth; and they form the basis of the community in which we live. Only within an ethical theory that considers virtuous friendships an integral part of human life, can these factors be accounted for properly.

Friedrich Nietzsche

Nietzsche's theory of individualism, his critique of morality and his ambivalence towards women create a philosophical framework that also does not properly account for the significance of virtuous friendships, and it further denies any possibility of friendship between women and men.

Nietzsche argues that the one basic motive of human action, and the only thing desired for its own sake, is power. The will to power manifests itself in all living organisms, and it is the organism's attempt to use and overcome others who are less powerful. The will to power, used creatively in strong individuals, can be used to overcome oneself, and the ideal towards which one tries to aim is the 'Superman.' Nietzsche maintains that the destruction of old values instilled by a society in decay, and the creation of new values are integral to the process of 'self-overcoming.' Self-overcoming is a recognition of the stagnation and mediocrity of the old Christian values. It involves the strength to reject these values and create new values of one's own, thereby becoming 'lord of one's own desert.'

Self-overcoming is an individual process, requiring solitude and searching within one's self to become one's own creator.[27] Although friendship within this framework does not contribute much to the process of self-overcoming, Nietzsche does consider it important. Friendship exists only between strong creative spirits. The friend is someone who sees our negative side that we tend not to acknowledge

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[27]Solitude does not necessarily mean being alone. It is more an attitude of mind than a physical state.

to ourselves, and who is honest enough to criticize. One's friend should be one's greatest enemy.

> 'At least be my enemy'! -thus speaks the true reverence that does not venture to ask for friendship. If you want a friend, you must also be willing to wage war for him: and to wage war, you must be capable of being an enemy...In your friend you should possess your best enemy. Your heart should feel closest to him when you oppose him.[28]

This criticism is essential to individual growth. However, friendship within Nietzsche's philosophy does not play much more of a role than criticism for growth.

This strong creative spirit, the ideal of humanity, who affirms life is reserved only for men. Women are weak and their characters are shallow, Nietzsche argues, so they are therefore incapable of the strength necessary for the process of self-overcoming. The most women can hope for, in Nietzsche's framework, is to be the bearers of the Superman. Zarathustra proclaims to women:

> Let the flash of a star glitter in your love! Let your hope be: 'May I bear the Superman!'[29]

Since women's nature is weak, Nietzsche contends, they therefore must obey men.

> The man's happiness is: I will. The woman's happiness is: He will...And woman has to obey and find a depth for her surface. Woman's nature is surface, a changeable, stormy film upon shallow waters. But a man's nature is deep, its torrent roars in subterranean caves: woman senses its power but does not comprehend it.[30]

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[28]Friedrich Nietzsche, <u>Thus Spoke Zarathustra</u>, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books Ltd., 1961), 82-83.

[29]Ibid., 92.

[30]Ibid., 92.

Nietzsche further maintains that women are incapable of friendship. "In woman, a slave and a tyrant have all too long been concealed. For that reason, woman is not yet capable of friendship: she knows only love."[31] Women and men, therefore, cannot be friends because there is no equality - she is either a slave or a tyrant.

Nietzsche's critique of ethics, and specifically the Christian ethical system, revolves around the claim that these systems espoused virtues and values of life beyond this earth. Therefore, they placed the interests of the community and of God above the interests of the individual. Nietzsche, thus, calls into question the foundation of all ethical systems, and he maintains that a transvaluation of all values is necessary. Nietzsche believes that the values of life in this world, created by the individual through the process of self-overcoming, are fundamental. This conception of ethics presents a stark contrast to an ethics in which virtuous friendships are considered significant.

The history of ethics, Nietzsche claims, can be broken down into two types - 'master morality' and 'slave morality,' belonging to the strong and to the weak respectively. Slave morality, or the morality of the herd, is the Christian ethics of modern western society. Master morality, in contrast, is the ethics of the strong creative spirit, and the values held in this ethics are those created through the process of self-overcoming. Master morality, which Nietzsche tends to support, affirms values of individuality and strength which leaves little room for social and altruistic values.

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[31] Ibid., 83.

Women, Nietzsche argues, belong essentially to the morality of the herd, and they are detrimental to the will to power.

Nietzsche's ambivalence towards women, inherent throughout his writings, results in a limited conception of women's nature and their relationship to men. He presents the relationship between men and women, as do Machiavelli and Daly, as one of conflict and opposition. Nietzsche identifies women by their biological functions as reproducers and mothers, and it is in these functions, he declares, that they find their true vocation. This maternal function weakens women and denies them the ability to be self-creative, yet Nietzsche also maintains that women who do not fulfil their proper function, like the feminists of his time, become sterile and unhealthy.

Nietzsche creates a polarity between men and women which not only excludes any possibility of friendship, but also any other normal relationship. Men and women, Nietzsche contends, have completely different natures; and it is therefore difficult, if not impossible, to have proper relationships with one another. "The same emotions are in man and woman, but in different tempo; on that account man and woman never cease to misunderstand each other."[32] Nietzsche further states:

> The sexes deceive themselves about each other: the reason is that in
> reality they honour and love only themselves (or their own ideal, to
> express it more agreeably). Thus man wishes woman to be peaceable:

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[32]The Philosophy of Nietzsche, trans. Helen Zimmern, Beyond Good and Evil (New York: The Modern Library 1954), 454.

but in fact woman is essentially unpeaceable, like the cat, however well she may have assumed the peaceable demeanour.[33]

This relationship between men and women is one of conflict and opposition, best described as a war between the sexes. In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche maintains:

> the natural order of things, the eternal war between the sexes, assigns to her by far the foremost rank. Have people listened to my definition of love? It is the only one worthy of a philosopher. Love's methods are war; love's basis is the mortal hatred between the sexes.[34]

In the Birth of Tragedy, he likens women to the Dionysian element and men to the Apollonian element. These are two conflicting forces wherein the Dionysian element represents the emotions of joy, affirmation and ecstasy. The Apollonian element, in contrast, represents reason and order.

> Art is bound up with the *Apollonian* and *Dionysian* duality: just as procreation depends on the duality of the sexes, involving perpetual strife with only periodically intervening reconciliations.[35]

Likewise, Nietzsche stresses the tension that exists between men and women:

> to be mistaken in the fundamental problem of "man and woman," to deny here the profoundest antagonism and the necessity for an eternally hostile tension, to dream here perhaps of equal rights, equal training, equal claims and obligations: that is a *typical* sign of shallow-mindness.[36]

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[33]Ibid., 463.

[34]The Philosophy of Nietzsche, trans. Clifton P. Fadiman, Ecce Homo (New York: The Modern Library, 1954), 862.

[35]The Philosophy of Nietzsche, trans. Clifton P. Fadiman, The Birth of Tragedy From the Spirit of Music (New York: The Modern Library, 1954), 951.

[36]Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 544.

In marriage then, the woman is repressed and dominated by her husband. The best way to subdue a woman, Nietzsche claims, is through pregnancy. "Have you heard my answer to the question how a woman can be cured, "redeemed"? -Give her a child! A woman needs children."[37] In <u>Beyond Good and Evil</u>, he likens the relation of a man to a woman to that of a master to a slave.

> A man who has depth of spirit as well as of desires...can only think of woman as <i>Orientals</i> do: he must conceive of her as a possession, as confinable property, as a being predestined for service and accomplishing her mission therein.[38]

It is clear from Nietzsche's writings that he bore a deep hostility towards women, yet was strangely attracted to them. Nietzsche identifies women with the Dionysian element, the element he felt essential for self-overcoming, yet women were not capable of this process. He also identifies himself with the Dionysian element, claiming that this is why he is so perceptive of women's nature.[39] If Nietzsche has such a negative view of women, it is difficult to see why he would associate himself with them. This hostility Nietzsche bears towards women, not only distorts his philosophy in that the superman is an ideal only men can achieve, but it also presents an unfounded view of women's nature and their relationship to men. Nietzsche's relationship with Lou Salome which was ended abruptly after two years could be, in part, the cause of his view of women. If Nietzsche had become part of a dynamic

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[37]Nietzsche, <u>Ecce Homo</u>, 862-63.

[38]Nietzsche, <u>Beyond Good and Evil</u>, 544.

[39]"May I venture to suggest, by the way, that I know women? That is part of my Dionysian patrimony. Who knows? Perhaps I am the first psychologist of the eternal feminine." Nietzsche, <u>Ecce Homo</u>, 862.

64

relationship with Lou Salome, perhaps his philosophy may have taken a different direction.[40]

Nietzsche thought the individual was primary, and only through a process of self-overcoming could creativity and integration of the true individual- the ideal exemplification of the superman - come about. Nietzsche's hostility towards women led to his view that the relationship between men and women is one of conflict and tension. Moreover, he contended that women are basically inferior to men. These two factors combined with Nietzsche's theory of individualism thus deny any possibility for friendship between women and men within his philosophy.

Mary Daly

Mary Daly's radical feminism is a further example of the view that men and women, given their different genders, are significantly different from one another, and that they are incapable of relating to one another except as enemies. This view maintains that men, as the originators and perpetuators of a patriarchal system, have created a war in which women's only choice for survival is to fight back. "Males and

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[40]"Who knows what different directions Nietzsche's thought might have taken if he and Lou Salome had been able to form a long-lasting and deep relationship?" Christine Garside Allen, "Nietzsche's Ambivalence about Women," in The Sexism of Social and Political Theory: Women and Reproduction from Plato to Nietzsche, ed. Lorenne M.G. Clark and Lynda Lange (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), 126. Ellen Kennedy likewise remarks in a footnote, "The humiliation of this failure in love certainly contributed to Nietzsche's views on women." Ellen Kennedy, "Nietzsche: Women as Untermensch," in Women in Western Political Philosophy: Kant to Nietzsche, ed. Ellen Kennedy and Susan Mendus (Sussex, Great Britain: Wheatsheaf Books Ltd., 1987), 199.

males only are the originators, planners, controllers, and legitimators of patriarchy."[41] Daly's view, therefore, allows no possibility for men and women to be friends even on a superficial level. However, friendship among women is integral to her theory. An analysis of Daly's theory will reveal the hostility she bears towards men, and the rather one-sided view she presents leads one to question the feasibility of her philosophy, especially her contention that there should not exist any interaction between women and men.

Women, Daly argues, have been oppressed and defined by men throughout history. Language, history and the various disciplines are male-defined, and they do not account for women's history, their accomplishments and experiences. Therefore, woman, Daly contends, must break away from male-dominated patterns of thought to a true understanding of her self. This consists in embarking on her own journey in which an 'Otherworld,' other than patriarchy, comes into being.

Women's quest for herself, outlined in Daly's books Gyn/Ecology and Pure Lust,[42] is a spiralling journey comprised of three spheres. The method Daly suggests for this quest is the 'Gynocentric method' with the central features of what she calls 'exorcism' and 'ecstasy.' Exorcism consists in identifying and destroying the demons of patriarchy which, according to Daly, are the personifications of the seven

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[41]Mary Daly, Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism (Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon Press, 1978), 28.

[42]Mary Daly, Pure Lust: Elemental Feminist Philosophy (Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon Press, 1984).

deadly sins. Out of this process of exorcising arises ecstasy.[43] The first two spheres

involve uncovering and destroying the myths of patriarchy and identifying the enemies

of women. The third sphere is the movement into the Otherworld which is woman's

own space/time. It is in this sphere that sisterhood and female friendship play a

central role. Sisterhood entails an uncovering of women, a breaking of boundaries,

and it is related closely to female friendship of which 'Sparking' is an essential

ingredient. Sparking, Daly contends, is recapturing the fire or energy in women that

has been drained away by men. Female friendship "is the radical withdrawal of

energy from warring patriarchy and transferral of this energy to women's Selves."[44]

Daly, in Gyn/Ecology, contrasts her notion of sisterhood with male comradeship.

Male comradeship, Daly maintains, consists in a loss of self-identity, and it depends

upon the draining of female energy. Sisterhood, in contrast, has its source in

freedom, and it is self-affirming. It produces a context in which female friendship can

come about.

In Pure Lust, this third sphere is called 'Metamorphoses,' and it is

characterized by such activities as 'Be-Longing,' 'Be-Friending' and 'Be-witching.' Be-

Friending is an activity that creates or weaves a context in which female friendship

is made possible. While not all women can be friends, Be-Friending creates a context

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[43]"Gynocentric Method requires not only the murder of misogynistic methods
(intellectual and affective exorcism) but also ecstasy, which I have called *ludic
cerebration*. This is 'the free play of intuition in our own space, giving rise to thinking
that is vigorous, informed, multi-dimensional, independent, creative, tough.' " Daly,
Gyn/Ecology, 23.

[44]Ibid., 372.

for sisterhood and the potential for particular women to be fr nds. Daly cites Simone de Beauvoir's writings as an example of this activity of Be-Friending. Beauvoir's book, The Second Sex,[45] Daly claims, relates women's experiences, and it thus creates a framework in which women could share their experiences.

> The Second Sex helped to generate an atmosphere in which women could utter their own thoughts, at least to themselves...It can be said that she has been part of the movement of Be-Friending and that she has been a catalyst for the friendships of many women.[46]

Daly outlines several features of friendship that characterize it as virtuous, although in her theory, this virtue is strictly confined to women. Friendship is integral to self-awareness and personal growth. It involves harmony between the friends and commitment to one another.

> A genuine friendship between any two women develops over a long period of time, and it requires basic creative harmony between the friends and a firmness of commitment to each other.[47]

Female friendship, in Daly's theory, involves promoting the good of the other which leads to a discovery of woman's true being.

Why is it that women and men cannot be friends according to Daly? An analysis of Daly's views on men and women and the patriarchal system created by men, which has caused this war between the sexes, offers some answers. In God the

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[45]Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, trans. H.M. Parshley (New York: Vintage Books, 1989).

[46]Daly, Pure Lust, 374.

[47]Ibid., 374.

Father,[48] one of her earliest works, Daly argues that men and women are from two different worlds. An equal meeting of these worlds is only possible when each moves towards androgynous being, that is, a setting aside of sex roles and characteristics.

> Women and men inhabit different worlds. Even though these are profoundly related emotionally, phys..ally, economically, socially, there is a wall that is visible to those who almost have managed to achieve genuine interplanetary communication with the opposite sex. The prerequisite of this achievement is communication within the divided self, discovery of the lost self. The adequate meeting of the two worlds, then, cannot be imagined as a simple one-to-one relationship between representatives of humanity's two halves, for half a person really never can meet the objectified other half. The adequate "cosmosis" will require a breakdown of walls within the male psyche as well as within the female. It will require in men as well as in women a desire to become androgynous, that is, to become themselves.[49]

Daly believes that sex roles are acquired rather than inherited, and the choice to shed these imposed roles enables both men and women to uncover their true being. In her book Gyn/Ecology, Daly no longer uses the word 'androgyny' by which she was trying to convey 'integrity of being.' It seems from her later works that she no longer thinks there is a possibility of these two worlds meeting.

In Daly's later works, she outlines in detail how men have created a patriarchal system which has been inimical to women's well-being.

> Even novice Furies are accused of thinking or saying that "men are the enemy." This is a subtly deceptive reversal, implying that women are the initiators of enmity, blaming the victims for The War. Its deceptive power is derived from the fact that the Fury in every woman does fight back against males and male institutions that target her as The Enemy.

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[48]Mary Daly, Beyond God the Father: Towards a Philosophy of Women's Liberation (Boston Massachusetts: Beacon Press, 1973).

[49]Ibid., 171-72.

> The point is that she did not create The War, but rather finds herself
> in a set-up in which fighting is necessary for Surviving.[50]

Daly presents the negative effects men have had on women - they sap women's energy, and they are detrimental to women's well-being. However, the other side of the relationship is never examined, and it is easy to discern that Daly's view is rather one-sided. Is men's effect on women so completely negative that there is absolutely nothing positive in their interaction with one another, as Daly suggests? In addition, the question never arises, in Daly's framework, as to whether women have any negative effect on men.

Daly's approach, like that of other radical feminists, seems rather unrealistic. The fact that both men and women belong to the same species, live within the same society, share the same planet and are quite capable of interacting with one another, indicates that there are many similarities they share. It is important to recognize the negative effects a patriarchal system has had on women and to call attention to women's own creativity and being as Daly has done. However, excluding half the human race and laying the blame on them for an oppressive system created by our predecessors is certainly not the answer, nor is creating a reverse patriarchal system as Daly has done. In the Second Sex, Beauvoir traces the roots of women's oppression and recognizes the need for change in our society. However, Beauvoir acknowledges that change can only be brought about when men and women truly recognize each other as persons, and when virtuous friendships are allowed to

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[50]Daly, Gyn/Ecology, 364-65.

develop between them. Women and men must work together to change the pitfalls of our society and try to eradicate the patriarchal system within it. This cannot be accomplished by dividing women and men against one another. Rather, it can only be achieved in a framework which allows true friendship to exist and flourish between them.

The theories above, in which each philosopher claimed that friendship between men and women is not possible, were founded either on the premises of individualism or the argument that the relationship between men and women is one of conflict and opposition. Machiavelli, Hobbes and Nietzsche each advocated a philosophy of individualism. The primary motives for an individual's actions in each theory were either power, self-preservation or self-interest. Others were viewed as means to the individual's own ends, and society was viewed as an aggregate of individuals. Nietzsche does consider the importance of friendship between men, but it is not a significant element in the process of self-overcoming. Within this framework of individualism, it was seen, that human nature, relations with others, and the community cannot be accounted for sufficiently in comparison to a framework that considers virtuous friendships important.

Machiavelli, Nietzsche and Daly each argued that the relationship between men and women is one of conflict and opposition which is best described as a war between the sexes. These arguments were based on an inherent hostility each philosopher bore toward the opposite sex. The emotion of hostility, as previously

discussed, cannot provide a philosophically valid basis for their claims. These theories, therefore, which maintain that friendship between men and women is not possible, have not been substantiated philosophically.

The following two charts summarizes the foundations of each philosophical theory that challenge friendship as a virtue discussed in this chapter and its particular application to friendship. 'Yes,' 'No,' and 'blanks' follow the same format as the summary chart in chapter 1.

TABLE 2: THEORIES THAT CHALLENGE FRIENDSHIP AS A VIRTUE

I Foundations of Theory

	Machiavelli	Hobbes	Nietzsche	Daly
Tenets of Individualism	X	X	X	
Individual as basic	X	X	X	
Relationships based on contract	X	X		
Self Interest & Power as motives for action	X	X	X	
Hostility towards opposite sex	X		X	X

II Theory applied to Friendship

	Machiavelli		Hobbes		Nietzsche		Daly	
	men-men	women-men	men-men	women-men	men-men	women-men	women-women	women-men
Relationship of Conflict-opposing forces		yes	yes	yes		yes		yes
Friendships of Utility 1)self-interest	yes		yes	yes	yes			
2)one's own advantage	yes		yes	yes	yes			
3)self-preservation	yes		yes	yes				
4)another as a means to one's own ends	yes		yes	yes				
5)power	yes		yes	yes				
Virtuous friendships	no	no	no	no	yes	no	yes	no

CHAPTER 3

ANALYSIS OF PRACTICAL EXAMPLES OF VIRTUOUS FRIENDSHIPS

BETWEEN SELECTED MEN AND WOMEN PHILOSOPHERS

The friendships between Abelard and Heloise, John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor, Simone de Beauvoir and Jean Paul Sartre and Jacques and Raissa Maritain will be analyzed in this chapter to support the argument that friendship between men and women can be virtuous. These examples of friendship were selected because: original writings from both friends on the topic of their particular friendship are available; and original sources on their general philosophical conceptions of friendship, specifically as it applies to men and women, exist. The friends, both male and female, were each philosophers in their own right, and they provide a diverse selection which ranges from the medieval to the modern period.

These examples, like the classical conception of friendship previously examined, have certain preconditions, principles and effects that define the friendship as virtuous. Although friendship between men and women presupposes a fundamental biological difference, the basis for each friendship is provided by a sense of equality, a common social background and a shared community. The principles central to each friendship include love, loyalty, trust, shared interests and values and a certain harmony between the friends that enabled them to work towards shared goals. Most important, there was a concern with and effort to promote the other person's good in each friendship. This enabled the friends to realize their capacities,

enhance each other's lives and work towards a shared conception of the good that was particular to their friendship.

Heloise and Abelard

In order to understand the complex friendship between Heloise and Abelard, it is necessary to elucidate briefly the background against which their friendship was formed. The tragic drama of Heloise's and Abelard's friendship is described by Abelard in his "Historia calamitatum."[1] It is also critically retold by Etienne Gilson, in his book Heloise and Abelard.[2] Peter Abelard, a cleric and a gifted and famous philosopher, was commissioned by another cleric, Fulbert, to tutor his niece Heloise. The relationship between Heloise and Abelard quickly developed into passionate love, and Heloise soon discovered she was pregnant. When her uncle Fulbert discovered the situation he was furious. Abelard felt the only way to appease Fulbert and restore Heloise's honour was for them to marry. Abelard stipulated the marriage must be kept a secret. Heloise and Abelard married shortly after their son Astrolabe was born. Despite Fulbert's promise to keep Heloise's and Abelard's marriage a secret, he spread the news of their marriage. As a result, Abelard's recourse was to take Heloise to the convent at Argentuil where, as a young girl, she had been educated. Fulbert and his friends, feeling that they had been deceived, sought

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[1] Abelard and Heloise, The Letters of Abelard and Heloise, trans. Betty Radice (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books Ltd., 1974).

[2] Etienne Gilson, Heloise and Abelard, trans. L.K. Shook (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1951).

revenge on Abelard. They broke into his room and castrated him. Soon after, Abelard, initially because of his injury, and Heloise, at the request of Abelard, entered monasteries. A few years later, Abelard, learning of the expulsion of Heloise and her nuns from the monastery at Argenteuil, gave her his only parcel of land containing an oratory called the Paraclete. Heloise later became abbess of this new community.

It is within the exchanged dialogue in the Letters of Abelard and Heloise and Abelard's narrative of his life in the "Historia calamitatum" that the virtuous elements of Abelard's and Heloise's friendship are expressed. This friendship can be divided into two stages. Initially, it was a passionate physical relationship in which there was a certain inequality. Abelard was older than Heloise and, as her tutor, he was intellectually more mature. He was also stronger, and there was a forceful element of sexual and physical abuse[3] on Abelard's part within this early part of their relationship. However, Heloise and Abelard did share a common interest in philosophy and intellectual pursuits. This would become an integral part of their friendship and a good they pursued together. After Abelard's injury and their entry into religious life, their friendship moved onto a more spiritual level where together they devoted their lives to their religion and their efforts towards improving monastic

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[3]"what else was [Fulbert] doing but giving me complete freedom to realize my desires, and providing an opportunity, even if I did not make use of it, for me to bend her to my will by threats and blows if persuasion failed?...To avert suspicion I sometimes struck her, but these blows were prompted by love and tender feeling rather than anger and irritation." The Letters of Abelard and Heloise, 67.

life. It was in this latter stage that their friendship became equal and took on a virtuous dimension.

Abelard's and Heloise's friendship often focused on their view about what an ideal relationship consists in, and it was this ideal they tried to actualize in their lives together. At the core of this ideal is the Stoic conception of friendship as developed in the writings of Cicero and Seneca. True friendship, the Stoics maintained, must be sought in and for itself. An essential component in the Stoic view and an integral part of virtuous friendships was the notion of disinterested love in which one friend loves the other freely and without any regard to advantages or material gains. Heloise worked towards this ideal during her physical relationship with Abelard, but it was only when their relationship moved towards celibacy and spiritual values that they both were able to put this ideal into practice.

Before they married, Heloise presents several arguments to Abelard, elaborated in the "Historia calamitatum," concerning why they should not marry. The Stoic ideal of friendship and this notion of disinterested love are at the centre of her arguments. Heloise specifically mentions the Stoic, Seneca. Heloise argues that they should not marry because of "the risk involved and the disgrace to [Abelard],"[4] and she maintains, using several classical allusions, that philosophy and marriage do not mix. A philosopher's life, like the life of the Stoic sage, must be detached from domestic life and the cares of this world. Abelard's duty and obligation as a

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[4]Ibid., 70.

philosopher, a teacher and a canon in the church, Heloise contends, is a dignified position in which he must not put base pleasures before his sacred duties.[5]

Marriage, Heloise thought, would destroy the ideal towards which she strove in her relationship with Abelard. She maintains that their relationship should be one of love freely given, and not forced by the ties of marriage. In marriage, Abelard's and Heloise's friendship would no longer be willed freely since it would be constrained by the laws of marriage. This notion of disinterested love is reflected again in one of her letters to Abelard.

> God knows I never sought anything in you except yourself; I wanted simply you, nothing of yours. I looked for no marriage-bond, no marriage portion, and it was not my own pleasures and wishes I sought to gratify, as you well know, but yours.[6]

It was Heloise who attempted to put this ideal relationship into practice. She had done everything out of love for Abelard without any regard for herself. She had become Abelard's wife despite her convictions against marriage because he insisted; and she later entered monastic life at his request despite her friends' advice against such a life. She writes to Abelard:

> I carried out everything for your sake and continue up to the present moment in complete obedience to you. It was not any sense of vocation which brought me as a young girl to accept the austerities of the cloister, but your bidding alone...I would have had no hesitation, God knows, in following you or going ahead at your bidding to the flames of Hell. My heart was not in me but with you, and now, even more, if it is not with you it is nowhere; truly, without you it cannot exist.[7]

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[5]Ibid., 73.

[6]Ibid., 113.

[7]Ibid., 116-17.

Abelard, on the other hand, often deviated from this ideal. He wanted to marry Heloise secretly to make amends to Fulbert, but he was also thinking of preserving his own reputation,[8] and at the same time keeping Heloise to himself. Heloise also has doubts whether it was only lust and not love that Abelard felt for her.[9] However, once Abelard enters the monastic life, he views their relationship now on a spiritual level, and as Etienne Gilson astutely points out, Abelard "was now about to outstrip Heloise in the way of divine love as she had once excelled him in the perfection of human love."[10]

Abelard committed himself to the monastic life shortly after his injury, and whatever his initial reasons for entering this life, he did become a devout Christian. Heloise, in contrast, had doubts about her vocation as a nun, and it is in Abelard's letters of consolation to her that he expresses a true concern for her good.

Heloise writes to Abelard of her physical longing for him and the hypocrisy she feels in being a nun.[11] Heloise entered the convent because Abelard asked her to and not because she felt called by God, whereas Abelard has made a serious and

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[8]"All I stipulated was that the marriage should be kept secret so as not to damage my reputation." Ibid., 70.

[9]"Tell me, I say, if you can - or I will tell you what I think and indeed the world suspects. It was desire, not affection which bound you to me, the flame of lust rather than love." Ibid., 116.

[10]Gilson, 70.

[11]"Men call me chaste; they do not know the hypocrite I am. They consider purity of the flesh a virtue, though virtue belongs not to the body but to the soul. I can win praise in the eyes of men but deserve none before God, who searches our hearts and loins and sees in our darkness." The Letters of Abelard and Heloise, 133.

79

lasting commitment to God. Responding to Heloise, Abelard states that their relationship has changed, and it is now on a spiritual level. For Abelard, Heloise is no longer his lover but his sister in Christ, and even though she is still his wife, she has a far greater honour now that she is the bride of Christ. This is reflected in the addresses he uses in his letters to Heloise. His first letter is addressed: "To Heloise, his dearly beloved sister in Christ, Abelard her brother in Christ,"[12] and his second letter is addressed: "To the bride of Christ, Christ's servant."[13]

Abelard attempts to console Heloise and to show her that many of the grievances she expressed in her letters actually reveal a divine purpose. Their ill-starred marriage, and the consequence of Abelard's injury, he argues, had an inherent good. He passionately points out to Heloise, that while God united them together in holy matrimony:

> he was already planning to use this opportunity for our joint conversion to himself. Had you not been previously joined to me in wedlock, you might easily have clung to the world when I withdrew from it, either at the suggestion of your relatives or in enjoyment of carnal delights. See then, how greatly the Lord was concerned for us, as if he were reserving us for some great ends, and was indignant or grieved because our knowledge of letters, the talents which he had entrusted to us, were not being used to glorify his name.[14]

If Heloise's inability for penance is due to her rebellious will against God because of her love for Abelard, then Abelard urges her to follow his own will which

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[12]Ibid., 119.

[13]Ibid., 137.

[14]Ibid., 149.

begs her to renounce this rebellion. If Heloise will follow Abelard to the flames of hell, why not follow him instead to heaven. Abelard beseeches Heloise:

> If you are anxious to please me in everything, as you claim, and in this at least would end my torment, or even give me the greatest pleasure, you must rid yourself of it. If it persists you can neither please me nor attain bliss with me. Can you bear me to come to this without you...Seek piety in this at least, lest you cut yourself off from me who am hastening, you believe, towards God; be the readier to do so because the goal we must come to will be blessed, and our companionship the more welcome for being happier.[15]

Abelard also points out that it is Christ and not Abelard who shows this pure disinterested love for Heloise, and thus is her true friend.

> He is the true friend who desires yourself and nothing that is yours, the true friend who said when he was about to die for you: 'There is no greater love than this, that a man should lay down his life for his friends.'[16]

Therefore, Abelard urges her to come to Christ. "Come too, my inseparable companion, and join me in thanksgiving, you who were made my partner both in guilt and in grace."[17]

Finally, Abelard asks Heloise to accept her sufferings "for what they really are: not as evils making a continual mockery of her most exemplary monastic life, but as purifying tests winning for her the martyr's crown."[18] Abelard maintains that he

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[15]Ibid., 145.

[16]Ibid., 152.

[17]Ibid., 149.

[18]Gilson, 83.

does not deserve merit because there is no struggle for him since the seat of his desire has been removed.

> Then too, I complain less that my own merit is diminished when I am confident that yours is increasing; for we are one in Christ, one flesh according to the law of matrimony. Whatever is yours cannot, I think, fail to be mine, and Christ is yours because you have become his bride. Now, as I said before, you have as a servant me whom in the past you recognized as your master, more your own now when bound to you by spiritual love than one subjected by fear.[19]

Abelard ends his letter with a prayer that they who have been separated on earth may be joined together in heaven. His second letter to Heloise is a good example of the spiritual love he has for her. This total disinterested love for Heloise that Abelard was never able to achieve during their physical relationship, he has achieved spiritually as her 'brother in Christ.'

Heloise, perhaps heeding Abelard's spiritual advice, turned her interests towards the direction of the Paraclete. We never know whether she was able to overcome her physical love for Abelard and reorient herself in her religious faith, but her direction and work, over a period of forty years, for the Paraclete suggest that she did. Heloise's letters to Abelard are now requests for the direction of monastic life for women. The intellectual exchange between them is manifested in these letters of direction. Together they worked towards the improvement of monastic life for women, and helped each other move towards a deeper spiritual belief in God. Heloise maintains in one of her letters to Abelard that the previous rules made for monastic life were exclusively for men, and they did not apply in many places to

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[19]The Letters of Abelard and Heloise, 154.

82

monastic life for women. At Heloise's request, Abelard not only wrote letters to her on the theory and practice of monastic life at the Paraclete, but he also responded to her particular questions on passages of scripture which presented a problem for women. Mary Martin McLaughlin[20] points out that it was Abelard and Heloise together who provided a comprehensive response for women seeking a more active role in spiritual and monastic life. In reference to Heloise, McLaughlin states:

> How seriously she took her tasks as a teacher and exegete she showed in her Problemata...and on a subject that may reflect her own view of the priorities, and the practicable, in Abelard's program for her community. Her questions remind us, too, of her crucial role in their collaboration, and especially of her initiative in requesting the works which, whatever their part in her "conversion", must have offered to both of them the varied consolations, spiritual and intellectual, that were evidently far from the least among their purposes.[21]

While the lives of Abelard and Heloise had its tragic aspects, their friendship enabled them to turn their lives towards more constructive purposes. The characteristics that defined friendship as virtuous were inherent in Heloise's and Abelard's friendship and witnessed in their letters to one another. These elements included: love, loyalty, shared in 'rests and values; an ideal relationship they tried to actualize, and a concern for each other's good. Moreover, Heloise's and Abelard's friendship involved working towards shared goals and a common good that arose out of their spiritual lives. The spiritual guidance Abelard gave Heloise probably helped

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[20]Mary Martin McLaughlin, "Peter Abelard and the Dignity of Women: Twelfth Century 'Feminism' in Theory and Practice," in Pierre Abélard, Pierre le Venérable: Les Courants Philosophiques, Littéraires et Artistiques en Occident au milieu de XIIe siècle (Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1975).

[21]Ibid., 330.

Heloise devote herself to her vocation, and the spiritual counsel each gave the other allowed them to devote their lives more fully to the Catholic faith. As well, their collaboration provided invaluable advice and improvement to the religious life of medieval women. Thus, Abelard and Heloise were able to actualize those aspects of virtuous friendships, articulated by the classical philosophers, in their relationship.

Abelard spent his last days at the abbey of Cluny, and as a final act of his love for Heloise, he wrote his profession of faith. Peter the Venerable, the abbot of Cluny, brought Abelard's body, at Heloise's request, to be buried at the Paraclete. In Peter the Venerable's letter to Heloise, he recognizes the deep friendship that existed between Abelard and Heloise and pays tribute to it.

> Him, therefore, venerable and dearest sister in the Lord, him to whom after your union in the flesh you are joined by the better, and therefore stronger, bond of divine love, with whom and under whom you have long served God: him, I say, in your place, or as another you, God cherishes in his bosom, and keeps him there to be restored to you through his grace at the coming of the Lord, at the voice of the archangel, and the trumpet-note of God descending from heaven.[22]

Twenty years later, Heloise followed Abelard to the grave and was buried beside him.

Harriet Taylor and John Stuart Mill

The friendship between John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor is a lucid example of a virtuous friendship between a man and a woman. Similar social backgrounds and intellectual and social equality were some of the preconditions that made Taylor's and Mill's friendship possible. They were both from a liberal Protestant background,

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[22]The Letters of Abelard and Heloise, 283-84.

and they were involved in similar social circles. Prior to meeting, Taylor and Mill were both involved in radical liberal groups which advocated political and social reform. The emancipation of women was a specific issue intensely debated in these groups. This interest in political and social reform, particularly the emancipation of women, was commonly shared by Mill and Taylor. It would become an integral principle in their friendship and a shared good towards which they worked.

Equality of rights and opportunities between the sexes was of central importance in Mill's and Taylor's friendship. As Mill points out in "The Subjection of Women,"

> thorough knowledge of one another hardly ever exists, but between persons who, besides being intimates, are equals.[23]

Freedom of action and freedom to choose one's future must be available for both men and women. Thus, a sense of equality, socially and intellectually, between Mill and Taylor was an essential basis of their friendship.

The integrity of Taylor's and Mill's friendship also depended upon their loyalty to previous commitments. An example of this loyalty is demonstrated in Harriet Taylor's marriage to John Taylor. Despite her uncertainty and indecision in maintaining her marriage during her early years of friendship with Mill, Taylor resolved to remain faithful to her previous commitment of marriage, and Mill

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[23]John Stuart Mill, "The Subjection of Women," in Essays on Sex Equality: John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor, ed. Alice S. Rossi (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970), 152.

supported her in this decision. All of these factors laid the foundation for the twenty-eight years of personal and intellectual communion between Taylor and Mill.

The principles that defined the friendship between Mill and Taylor as virtuous are explicated in their correspondence and writings. A reciprocal sharing of their ideas, interests and knowledge with one another were central aspects of Taylor's and Mill's friendship. Thus, their correspondence with one another was indicative of a pervasive exchange of ideas and interests, and these shared interests were enriched by the joint productions they discussed and published. They composed a list of shared topics they planned to write on in the future. Mill writes to Taylor "but all the other subjects in our list will be much more difficult for me even to begin upon without you to prompt me."[24] The topics of interest are discussed in a later letter. Mill writes:

> I finished the 'Nature' on Sunday as I expected. I am quite puzzled what to attempt next - I will just copy the list of subjects we made out in the confused order in which we put them down. Differences of character (nation, race, age, sex, temperament). Love. Education of tastes. Religion de l'Avenir. Plato. Slander. Foundation of Morals. Utility of religion. Socialism. Liberty. Doctrine that causation is will. To these I have now added from your letter, Family & Conventional (?)...Perhaps the first of them is the one I could do most to by myself, at least of those equally important.[25]

Taylor's and Mill's letters also discuss a great deal of Mill's autobiography which they both refer to as "the life." Mill states:

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[24]F.A. Hayek, <u>John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor: Their Friendship and Subsequent Marriage</u> (New York: Augustus M. Kelly Publishers, 1951), 191.

[25]Ibid., 192.

The fact is that there is about as much written as I can write without your help & we must go through this together & add the rest to it at the very first opportunity.[26]

In reply to Mill's question of what is advisable to put in the autobiography regarding their relationship, Taylor states:

> a summary of our relationship from its commencement in 1830...This ought to be done in its genuine truth and simplicity - strong affection, intimacy of friendship, and no impropriety. It seems to me an edifying picture for those poor wretches who cannot conceive friendship but in sex -nor believe that expediency and the consideration for the feelings of others can conquer sensuality. But of course this is not my reason for wishing it done. It is that every ground should be occupied by ourselves on our own subject.[27]

The earlier draft of Mill's autobiography, which has been discovered only recently, has Taylor's suggested revisions and comments pencilled in. It is clear from their correspondence and discussions that they decided together what would go into the autobiography.

The Principles of Political Economy, published in 1848, was the first major work that was said to be a joint production. Its re-publication into its second and third editions is one of the central topics in their letters of 1849. Mill writes to Taylor: "The Pol. Ec. packet came on Monday for which a thousand thanks. I have followed to the letter every recommendation."[28] After discussing in detail why he wrote certain sentences in reply to Taylor's objections, Mill states:

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[26]Ibid., 190.

[27]Ibid., 196.

[28]Ibid., 144.

87

we shall have all those questions out together & they will all require to be entered into to a certain depth, at least, in the new book which I am so glad you look forward to as I do with so much interest.[29]

In another letter of Taylor's to Mill, she discusses the essays they plan to publish in the future:

> About the Essays dear, would not religion, the Utility of Religion, be one of the subjects you would have most to say on - there is to account for the existence nearly universal of some religion (superstition) by the instincts of fear, hope and mystery etc., and throwing over all doctrines and theories, called religion, and devices for power, to show how religion and poetry fill the same want, the craving after higher objects, the consolation of suffering, the hope of heaven for the selfish, love of God for the tender and grateful - how all this must be superseded by morality deriving its power from sympathies and benevolence and its reward from the approbation of those we respect. There, what a long winded sentence, which you could say ten times as well in words half the length.[30]

Mill replies to Taylor:

> Your program of an essay on religion is beautiful, but it requires you to fill it up - I can try but a few paragraphs will bring me to the end of all I have got to say on the subject. What would be the use of my outliving you! I could write nothing w⸱ ·th keeping alive for except with your prompting.[31]

This was later to become the essay "The Utility of Religion," published in 1874, in the book Nature, the Utility of Religion and Theism. These examples illuminate the reciprocal sharing of ideas and knowledge between Taylor and Mill, and they demonstrate how each contributed to the other's intellectual growth.

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[29]Ibid., 146.

[30]Ibid., 195-96.

[31]Ibid., 197.

A deep and understanding love between Mill and Taylor was an integral part

of their friendship. A little less than two years after Taylor and Mill met, Taylor

wrote to an intimate friend, Eliza Flower, describing her feelings towards Mill.

> O this being seeming as tho God had willed to show the type of the
> possible elevation of humanity. To be with him wholly is my ideal of
> the noblest fate for all states of mind and feeling which are lofty &
> large & fine, he is the companion spirit and heart desire -we are not
> alike in trifles only because I have so much more frivolity than he.[32]

Almost twenty six years later, in a letter from Mill to his friend W.T. Thornton

announcing the death of Harriet Taylor, Mill expresses the extent of Taylor's role in

his life.

> My Wife, the companion of all my feelings, the prompter of all my best
> thoughts, the guide of all my actions, is gone...It is doubtful if I shall
> ever be fit for anything, public or private, again. The spring of my life
> is broken. But I shall best fulfil her wishes by not giving up the attempt
> to do something useful. I am sure of your sympathy, but if you knew
> what she was, you would feel how little any sympathy can do.[33]

The love Mill and Taylor shared is constantly reflected in their correspondence

and in their lives together. Their friendship was thus one of deep personal growth.

The conception of love Mill and Taylor espoused depended upon the values they

shared and their notion of an ideal relationship between a man and a woman. This

centred on the issue of equality and freedom of choice that must be accessible for

both women and men. Taylor and Mill believed that education and freedom of

choice were fundamental to human integrity, and a proper relationship between a

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[32]Ibid., 54.

[33]Ibid., 263-64.

man and a woman was not possible if one of the partners was denied these fundamental rights. A genuine union between a man and a woman must be based on a solid foundation of love and friendship which can only exist between equals in privileges as in faculties.[34] Mill's and Taylor's life together and their marriage were exemplifications of this ideal.

Mill and Taylor held similar values and worked towards shared goals. Their friendship was one in which there was "complete unity and unanimity as to the great objects of life."[35] Both were deeply concerned with social and political reform, and according to them, reform for the betterment of civilization could only be brought about through education and equal opportunities available for every individual. These views were applied to the issue of women, one of their first common interests together, and this became an integral part of the intellectual discussions Taylor and Mill would share over their twenty-eight years together.

Both Taylor and Mill thus stressed the importance of social and political reform for the position of women. They wrote essays for each other in the 1830's on the subject of women and their position within marriage. Years later, Taylor published her essay "Enfranchisement of Women" in 1851, and Mill published his book The Subjection of Women in 1869 in which they each advocated views on equal rights for women. Taylor points out in "Enfranchisement of Women" that women are

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[34]Harriet Taylor, "Enfranchisement of Women," in Essays on Sex Equality: John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor, ed. Alice S. Rossi (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970), 115.

[35]Mill, "The Subjection of Women," 233.

denied personal freedom in choosing their own future. The fact that society refuses

to educate women, not only leads to submissive, weak, dependent and uneducated

women, but also leads to a deterioration in the minds of the men with whom they are

intimate companions. Taylor argues:

> If one of the two has no knowledge and no care about the great ideas
> and purposes which dignify life, or about any of its practical concerns
> save personal interests and personal vanities, her conscious, and still
> more her unconscious influence, will, except in rare cases, reduce to a
> secondary place in his mind, if not entirely extinguish, those interests
> which she cannot or does not share.[36]

She concludes that "for the interest, therefore, not only of women but of men, and

of human improvement in the widest sense, the emancipation of women...cannot stop

where it is."[37] Mill likewise argues in his essay that social advancement is hampered

by the inferior position society places on women. He states:

> every restraint on the freedom of conduct of any of their human fellow
> creatures...dries up pro tanto the principal fountain of human
> happiness, and leaves the species less rich, to an inappreciable degree,
> in all that makes life valuable to the individual human being.[38]

Mill and Taylor believed, therefore, that the emancipation of women was essential

for social progress. Thus, the effort to change the position of women both socially

and politically was a goal towards which they strove.

Friendship between women and men was an essential component of Mill's and

Taylor's views on social progress. Equality between men and women, they argue,

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[36]Taylor, "Enfranchisement of Women," 111.

[37]Ibid., 117.

[38]Mill, "Subjection of Women," 242.

would enable friendship to be formed in marriage, and this was crucial for social progress. In the "Enfranchisement of Women," Taylor stresses the importance of friendship based on equality between men and women.

> The highest order of durable and happy attachments would be a hundred times more frequent than they are, if the affection which the two sexes sought from one another were that genuine friendship, which only exists between equals in privileges as in faculties.[39]

The highest form of friendship, as seen in the classical discussions in chapter 1, was generally excluded from the marriage relationship. Although Aristotle argued that a virtuous friendship can exist between a husband and a wife, it is a very limited conception. What is incisive about both Mill's and Taylor's views on friendship between men and women is their ability to apply this classical ideal, and the full scope of moral enrichment that results from it, to the marriage relationship.

In Mill's essay "The Subjection of Women," he describes the ideal friendship between a man and a woman which is definitive of the classical conception of virtuous friendships.

> When each of two persons, instead of being a nothing, is a something; when they are attached to one another, and are not too much unlike to begin with; the constant partaking in the same things, assisted by their sympathy, draws out the latent capacities of each for being interested in the things which were at first interesting only to the other; and works a gradual assimilation of the tastes and characters to one another...more by a real enriching of the two natures, each acquiring the tastes and capacities of the other in addition to its own. This often happens between two friends of the same sex, who are much associated in their daily life: and it would be a common, if not the commonest, case in marriage, did not the totally different bringing-up of the two sexes make it next to an impossibility to form a really well-assorted

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[39]Taylor, "Enfranchisement of Women," 114-15.

union. Were this remedied, whatever differences there might still be in individual tastes, there would at least be, as a general rule, complete unity and unanimity as to the great objects of life. When the two persons both care for great objects, and are a help and encouragement to each other in whatever regards these, the minor matters on which their tastes may differ are not all-important to them; and there is a foundation for solid friendship, of an enduring character, more likely than anything else to make it, through the whole of life, a greater pleasure to each to give pleasure to the other, than to receive it.[40]

One can view this as Mill's personal testimony of his friendship with Taylor. This notion of friendship within marriage, as elaborated in the writings of Taylor and Mill, is best exemplified in their own marriage.

Mill and Taylor were married in April of 1851, two years after Taylor's first husband died. Their marriage was a reflection of the values and goals they shared in respect to the position of women and the kind of friendship they believed can and should exist between men and women within the marriage relationship. They were vehemently opposed to the existing laws on marriage and the status of women within this relationship. Mill feared that if he and Taylor married these laws would apply to them. Thus, prior to their marrying, Mill wrote a formal declaration of his marriage promise to Taylor.

> Being about, if I am so happy as to obtain her consent, to enter into the marriage relation with the only woman I have ever known, with whom I would have entered into that state; & the whole character of the marriage relation as constituted by law being such as both she and I entirely & conscientiously disapprove, for this amongst other reasons, that it confers upon one of the parties to the contract, legal power & control over the person, property, & freedom of action of the other party, independent of her own wishes and will; I, having no means of legally divesting myself of these odious powers (as I most assuredly

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[40]Mill, "Subjection of Women," 233.

would do if an engagement to that effect could be made legally binding on me) feel it my duty to put on record a formal protest against the existing law of marriage, in so far as conferring such powers; and a solemn promise never in any case or under any circumstances to use them. And in the event of marriage between Mrs. Taylor and me I declare it to be my will and intention, & the condition of the engagement between us, that she retains in all respects whatever the same absolute freedom of action, & freedom of disposal of herself and of all that does or may at any time belong to her, as if no such marriage had taken place; and I absolutely disclaim & repudiate all pretension to have acquired any rights whatever by virtue of such marriage.

6th March 1851   J.S. Mill[41]

Personal and intellectual growth were at least two of the effects Mill's and Taylor's friendship had on their lives. Their friendship enabled them to live out practically the relationship they thought should exist between women and men. Moreover, their friendship broadened and made more profound their ideas on political and social reform. Taylor and Mill stressed the necessity of educating women, the importance of individual freedom and the constant need for political and social reform for the advancement of civilization. Their writings were an attempt to change the position of women and to show the necessity of social and political change. This was a common good Mill and Taylor shared and for which they strove. Taylor's and Mill's life together was, thus, a testimony of a virtuous friendship between a man and a woman.

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[41]Hayek, 168.

94

Simone de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre

Simone de Beauvoir's and Jean-Paul Sartre's relationship, spanning a period

of fifty-one years, is a complex friendship that can only be understood from their own

perspective. Basic shared interests and an equal standing in their relationship were

preconditions that made the friendship between Sartre and Beauvoir possible.

Beauvoir and Sartre were both from a French bourgeois background, and they met

at the Sorbonne in 1929 where they were both studying philosophy. Beauvoir quickly

demonstrated her brilliance in university finishing the four year program in three

years. At the end of the school year, both written and oral examinations were

required for the completion of the program. Beauvoir was invited by Sartre and his

friends to join them for study sessions in preparation for these exams. These sessions

marked the beginning of the intellectual collaboration and philosophical discussions

Sartre and Beauvoir would share over the years, and this would become a central

principle of their friendship. The oral examination demonstrated the extraordinary

intelligence of both Sartre and Beauvoir and the intellectual equality they shared.

Sartre took first place in the examinations while Beauvoir took second place.

However, it was Sartre's second time taking the exam, and apparently the judges had

great difficulty in deciding between Sartre and Beauvoir.

Sartre and Beauvoir quickly realized the common interests they shared and the

similarity of their ideas. Deirdre Bair, Beauvoir's biographer, comments on this

aspect of their friendship.

> As they began to develop a bond of common experiences and mutual
> acquaintances the little things they disliked about each other gradually

became unimportant. What mattered, finally, was that they thought alike and, independently or together, came to the same opinions and conclusions about everything.[42]

As well, they always regarded one another as equals. Sartre describes this best.

> I have been able to formulate ideas to Simone de Beauvoir before they were really concrete. I presented all the larger themes in Being and Nothingness to her before it was written...I have presented all my ideas to her when they were in the process of being formed....she was the only one at my level of knowledge of myself, of what I wanted to do. For this reason she was the perfect person to talk to, the kind one rarely has. It is my unique good fortune...What is unique between Simone de Beauvoir and me is the equality of our relationship.[43]

Thus, similar social backgrounds, intellectual equality and their common interest in philosophy laid the foundation for Beauvoir's and Sartre's friendship.

Many of the principles that were emphasized in the classical discussions on virtuous friendships comprised their friendship. Some of these principles included honesty and trust, an understanding love of one another and a sharing of ideas, interests and knowledge. As well, Beauvoir and Sartre shared similar values and worked towards shared goals.

Honesty and trust were core principles in Sartre's and Beauvoir's friendship. At the beginning of their relationship, they realized their intense need of one another both sexually and intellectually, and thus they contemplated marriage. This idea was

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[42]Deirdre Bair, Simone de Beauvoir: A Biography (New York: Summit Books, 1990), 182.

[43]Jean-Paul Sartre, Life/Situations: Essays Written and Spoken, trans. Paul Auster and Lydia Davis (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977), 58.

quickly abandoned, and as Beauvoir recalls later in a conversation with her biographer Bair:

> after we had decided what our relationship was to be, we were both embarrassed that we had even briefly considered the most bourgeois of institutions, marriage, to be the answer.[44]

They swore to always be completely honest with one another and share everything. Beauvoir told her friend Colette Audry, cited by Bair, that her pact with Sartre "became a sacred contract, founded on truth, not on passion...and that's not an easy pact to live."[45]

Some aspects of loyalty between them can be doubted, especially on the part of Sartre because of his sexual promiscuity during their physical relationship. Beauvoir was also promiscuous, but at a later time when they no longer had a sexual relationship. Therefore her promiscuity, in contrast to his, did not reflect any disloyalty to Sartre. When their sexual relationship ended, it could be argued that neither one was unfaithful to the other when both had affairs of their own. There are many indications of a different kind of loyalty Sartre and Beauvoir shared in their friendship. Beauvoir was critical of anyone who voiced a contrary opinion or negative criticism of Sartre, and she continuously supported his views. The publication of The Second Sex initially created a great deal of animosity from the public towards Beauvoir, and Sartre defended and stood by her during this time. Furthermore,

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[44]Bair, 156.

[45]Ibid., 182.

Sartre and Beauvoir always supported each other in the actions and projects they chose in their lives. In reference to their loyalty to one another, Beauvoir states:

> In my memoirs I said that if Sartre gave me an appointment to meet him at a certain hour of a certain day and year in a strange place many miles away, I would go there in complete faith to find him waiting, because I knew I could always depend on him. Well, after so many years, this was still true. In spite of everything -no, perhaps because of everything we had been through together -we always depended on each other. He would never disappoint me; I would never let him down.[46]

There was also an understanding love between Beauvoir and Sartre. Many people questioned why Beauvoir tolerated Sartre's sexual promiscuity. One of the reasons, previously mentioned, was the fact that they were no longer sexually involved. Sartre had told Beauvoir at the beginning of their friendship which was retold by Beauvoir to her biographer Bair,

> what we have, he said, is an essential love; but it is a good idea for us also to experience contingent love affairs. We were two of a kind, and our relationship would endure as long as we did.[47]

It was obvious that there were painful emotional times for Beauvoir in the early part of their relationship, but she loved Sartre and accepted him for what he was. Beauvoir and Sartre became the professional couple. This professionalism, their intellectual discussions and the collaboration and editing of each other's works set the tone for the rest of their friendship.

Beauvoir's and Sartre's initial shared interest in philosophy became a central principle of their friendship and a common good they would share throughout their

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[46]Ibid., 415.

[47]Ibid., 158.

lives together. Existentialism, as formulated by Sartre in <u>Being and Nothingness</u>,[18]

reflects the tenets Sartre and Beauvoir advocated. Intellectual discussions and

collaboration in their philosophical writings were an essential part of their everyday

life together. Almost everything Beauvoir and Sartre wrote independently the other

read and criticized. As Beauvoir commented in an interview with Sartre:

> We always show each other everything we write. Sartre has criticised almost everything I have written, and I have criticised almost everything he has written. And sometimes we don't have exactly the same opinion. With some books he has said to me, I don't think you will finish that, leave it be...But I stuck to my guns. And when I was still very young, I said to him, I think you ought to devote yourself to literature rather than philosophy - but he still stuck to his guns. Fortunately! Each of us is independent within our life together.[49]

In a interview, Sartre also comments on this aspect of shared criticism and

collaboration within their friendship.

> [Interviewer]   Still, you have had occasion to defend yourself against Simone de Beauvoir's criticisms, haven't you?

> [Sartre]   Oh, often...But I knew that she would be the one who was right, in the end. That's not to say that I accepted all her criticisms, but I did accept most of them.

> [Interviewer]   Are you just as hard on her as she is on you?

> [Sartre]   Absolutely. As hard as possible. There is no point in not criticizing very severely when you have the good fortune to love the person you are criticizing.[50]

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[48]Jean-Paul Sartre, <u>Being and Nothingness</u>, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Washington Square Press, 1972).

[49]Alice Schwarzer, <u>After the Second Sex: Conversations with Simone de Beauvoir</u>, trans. Marianne Howarth (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 58.

[50]Sartre, <u>Life/Situations</u>, 58-59.

A further example of Sartre's and Beauvoir's intellectual collaboration is illustrated in the prolific amount of writing Sartre produced in the late 1940's. Many scholars questioned Beauvoir's role in helping Sartre. In reply to this question from Deirdre Bair, Beauvoir states:

> People as close as Sartre and I, who had been together for so long, who thought the same things, believed the same things-we could not fail but to influence each other, and that is all I need to say about this. What did it matter who had the idea first or said it best? It was the one who wrote it down that counted.[51]

Thus, Sartre and Beauvoir inspired one another, shared their knowledge with the other and helped each other in their respective writings.

Sartre and Beauvoir also shared similar values and worked towards shared goals. These values were found within the Existential framework that Sartre explicated in his philosophy. One of the central ideas in Existentialism is that the actions and projects an individual freely chooses and sets for one's self is what gives meaning and justification to the individual's existence. Another important notion in Existentialism is the individual's relationships with others. In <u>Being and Nothingness</u>, one of his early works, Sartre devotes a lengthy discussion to this topic.[52] In <u>The Second Sex</u>, Beauvoir uses this concept of the individual and the Other to develop

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[51]Bair, 658.

[52]The philosophy of love in Sartre's early writings was chosen in this thesis because it was written around the same time as Beauvoir's <u>The Second Sex</u>. Comparison of this theory with later developments in his philosophy is beyond the scope of this thesis.

her own feminist philosophy. A brief outline of Sartre's ontology will illuminate his philosophy of relations with other selves.

Sartre's ontology in Being and Nothingness is centred on two types of being - 'being-in-itself (etre-en-soi)' and 'being for-itself (etre-pour-soi).' The being-in-itself is undifferentiated existence, and the only thing that can be said of it is that 'it is.' The being-in-itself is that which appears to human consciousness, but it is transphenomenal, that is, it does not depend upon its appearances. Furthermore, being-in-itself is one aspect of the human being. It includes one's body, one's past and one's situation. It is what Sartre refers to as one's facticity. The being-for-itself, the second aspect of the human being, is human consciousness. It is the nihilation of being-in-itself, Sartre would argue, because it is not being. The for-itself is what makes each of us uniquely human, and its chief characteristic is action.

The first person is used to facilitate Sartre's description of being for others. The individual discovers a new dimension of his or her being in the presence of the Other. In this dimension of 'being-for-others,' Sartre maintains, "the Other is revealed to me as the subject for whom I am an object."[53] I, therefore, realize I exist outside as an object for others. As such, "my being-as-object is the only possible relation between me and the Other."[54] This being-for-others, although a part of me, is something I can never know or appropriate, but I nevertheless want to recover. This awareness of myself as object for the Other, and my inability to recover the

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[53]Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 460.

[54]Ibid., 476.

being which I am for the Other, brings about two attitudes that I can assume. These two attitudes are the origin of my concrete relations with the Other.

First, I can attempt to transcend the Other's transcendence. When the Other looks at me and turns me into an object, I can turn upon the Other and make him or her into an object because the "Other's object-ness destroys my object-ness for him."[55] The concrete relations arising from this attitude are indifference, desire, sadism and hate. I can also adopt another attitude in which I attempt to assimilate the Other's freedom. This attitude produces the relations of love, language and masochism. The failure of one attitude means the adoption of the other. Thus, Sartre contends, one's concrete relations with the Other is an endless circle from which one can never escape. Moreover, these concrete relations with the Other imply conflict. Thus "conflict is the original meaning of being-for-others."[56]

Sartre's notion of love is articulated in this second attitude one can adopt towards the Other. This attitude, in which one attempts to assimilate the Other's freedom while leaving the Other's subjectivity intact, gives rise to two consequences. First, in trying to assimilate the Other's freedom, I try to adopt the Other's point of view of myself. "It is this concrete Other as an absolute reality whom in his otherness I wish to incorporate into myself."[57] Second, in trying to assimilate the Other as the

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[55]Ibid., 473.

[56]Ibid., 475.

[57]Ibid., 476.

Other looking at me, "I identify myself totally with my being-looked-at."[58] Thus, the ideal aimed at in attempting to assimilate the Other's freedom is to be other to oneself, and this "is the primary value of my relations with the Other."[59]

Love then "is the ensemble of the projects by which I aim at realizing this value."[60] In the relation of love, the lover wants to take possession of the beloved's freedom as freedom. However, the lover "wants to be loved by a freedom but demands that this freedom as freedom should no longer be free."[61] The lover wants to be the whole world for the beloved, that is, the absolute choice and limit for the Other's freedom. The love of the Other makes me secure and enables me to invest the Other with my facticity.

> Whereas before being loved we were uneasy about that unjustified, unjustifiable protuberance which was our existence, whereas we felt ourselves "de trop," we now feel that our existence is taken up and willed even in its tiniest details by an absolute freedom which at the same time our existence conditions and which we ourselves will with our freedom. This is the basis for the joy of love when there is joy; we feel that our existence is justified.[62]

But, Sartre argues, love is doomed to failure. In the relation of love, the lover wants to assimilate the beloved's freedom as a subject, but he or she also demands

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[58]Ibid.

[59]Ibid.

[60]Ibid., 477.

[61]Ibid., 479.

[62]Ibid., 483-84.

to be loved. In doing this, the beloved in order to love, must become an object for the Other.

> I demand that the Other love me and I do everything possible to realize my project; but if the Other loves me, he radically deceives me by his very love. I demanded of him that he should found my being as a privileged object by maintaining himself as pure subjectivity confronting me; and as soon as he loves me he experiences me as subject and is swallowed up in his objectivity confronting my subjectivity.[63]

Thus, the relation of love seems to be an impossibility according to Sartre. This attitude fails as well, giving way to the first attitude, and the endless circle continues.

Beauvoir's philosophy of other selves, best illustrated in her book The Second Sex, is closely related to the principles explicated in Being and Nothingness. However, she focuses particularly on relationships between men and women. In writing The Second Sex, Beauvoir develops the doctrine that "all theories of human history and human relationships were biased because women had been eliminated from the official record since the beginning of time."[64] The purpose of The Second Sex is to show through a detailed and thorough discussion: how women have been viewed according to particular ideologies in history such as biology, psychoanalysis and historical materialism; and how the feminine has come about and why women have been defined as the Other. It also examines the roles and situations assigned to women, and the traditional view that the true destiny for women is marriage and

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[63]Ibid., 490.

[64]Bair, 390.

104

motherhood. Lastly, The Second Sex attempts to describe the world in which women

must live from their own perspective. In doing all this, Beauvoir argues:

> we shall be able to envisage the difficulties in [women's] way as,
> endeavoring to make their escape from the sphere hitherto assigned
> them, they aspire to full membership in the human race.[65]

Beauvoir, in The Second Sex, defends the existentialist tenet that every

individual subject needs to justify his or her existence by engaging in freely chosen

projects. However, women, from the beginning of time, have been relegated to the

status of the Other by men.

> What peculiarly signalizes the situation of woman is that she-a free and
> autonomous being like all human creatures-nevertheless finds herself
> living in a world where men compel her to assume the status of the
> Other. They propose to stabilize her as object and to doom her to
> immanence.[66]

In such a situation, Beauvoir argues, women do not engage in their own freely chosen

projects but live according to what men want.

> She is defined and differentiated with reference to man and not he
> with reference to her; she is the incidental, the inessential as opposed
> to the essential. He is the Subject, he is the Absolute-she is the
> Other.[67]

Beauvoir thinks that this conflict between the individual subject and the Other can

be overcome. As previously demonstrated, Sartre held that the primary meaning of

relations with others is conflict, and that these relations with the Other are constantly

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[65]Beauvoir, The Second Sex, xli.

[66]Ibid., xli.

[67]Ibid., xxviii.

moving in an endless circle. In contrast, Beauvoir, using the same doctrine of being-

for-Others, believes there is a way to overcome conflict with the Other.

> It is possible to rise above this conflict if each individual freely recognizes the other, each regarding himself and the other simultaneously as object and as subject in a reciprocal manner. But friendship and generosity, which alone permit in actuality this recognition of free beings, are not facile virtues; they are assuredly man's highest achievement, and through that achievement he is to be found in his true nature.[68]

The emancipation of women and the restoring of her individual subjectivity,

therefore, are necessary components to improving relationships between men and

women. Reciprocity, equality and friendship, when a part of the relationship between

a man and a woman, will do away with the status of woman as the Other.

> To emancipate woman is to refuse to confine her to the relations she bears to man, not to deny them to her; let her have her independent existence and she will continue none the less to exist for him also: mutually recognizing each other as subject, each will yet remain for the other an other. The reciprocity of their relations will not do away with the miracles...worked by the division of human beings into two separate categories; and the words that move us...will not lose their meaning. On the contrary, when we abolish the slavery of half of humanity, together with the whole system of hypocrisy that it implies, then the "division" of humanity will reveal its genuine significance and the human couple will find its true form.[69]

Beauvoir's lifelong relationship with Sartre is a good example of her attempt to

integrate these ideas into her life.

Both Sartre and Beauvoir applied these tenets of existentialism to their beliefs.

Beauvoir's view on relationships played an integral role in her life. Friendship was

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[68]Ibid., 140.

[69]Ibid., 731.

106

very important to Beauvoir, and she always placed Sartre's well-being and interests ahead of her own. Beauvoir thus expressed a true concern for Sartre's good. She helped Sartre in his writings and in the development of his philosophical thought. She stated many times that his writings always took priority over her own.

Towards the end of Sartre's life, Beauvoir's concern and effort to promote Sartre's good is cogently expressed in <u>Adieux: A Farewell to Sartre</u>.[70] Sartre had become increasingly blind and he took this disability very hard. Beauvoir tape-recorded her conversations with Sartre in which she asked him particular questions in an effort to get him to express himself since he was no longer capable of doing this through his writing. These conversations Beauvoir states "do not reveal any unexpected aspects of him, but they do allow one to follow the winding course of his thought and to hear his living voice."[71] These conversations, which Beauvoir wrote down and edited, and her care for Sartre at the end of his life express her true concern for his good.

Sartre's philosophical tenet that relationships with others, and especially the relationship of love, expounded in his earlier works, all seem to end in failure, seems to be in sharp contrast to his practical experience in which he was able to maintain a lasting friendship with Beauvoir. However, I think Sartre was limited in his idea of what a relationship could be, and this is reflected not only in his writings but in his

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[70]Simone de Beauvoir, <u>Adieux: A Farewell to Sartre</u>, trans. Patrick O'Brian (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books Ltd., 1984).

[71]Ibid., 131.

relationship with Beauvoir. In an interview at the age of seventy, Sartre discusses a more lenient view on relationships with others, particularly between men and women.

> My relations with women have always been the best, because relations that are literally sexual allow for the objective and the subjective to be given together more easily. Relations with a woman - even if one is not sleeping with her, but if one has slept with her, or if one could have - are richer. First of all, there is language which is not speech, which is the language of hands, the language of faces. I am not talking about the langauge of sex, properly speaking. As for language itself, it comes from the deepest place, it comes from sex when a love relationship is involved. With a woman, the whole of what one is can be present.[72]

This is a more positive view than the one held in Being and Nothingness in that Sartre recognises that relationships do not necessarily end in conflict. Yet this view, I think, is shadowed by Sartre's preoccupation with sex.

Sartre, therefore, seems to be quite limited in his ability for true friendship. He did express a certain concern and effort to promote Beauvoir's good in that he helped her in her writings and supported her in the views she advocated. However, I suspect that he did not give the fullest attention to her writings as she did to his, and there was a certain inequality of exchange in this respect. Her interests and well-being certainly did not come before his own, as it was in the case of Beauvoir. This is supported by the fact that in the early part of their relationship Sartre was aware of the pain that he caused Beauvoir, but this did not stop him from continuing to have affairs. It is evident that Sartre's and Beauvoir's friendship was thus limited on his part.

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[72]Sartre, Life/Situations, 65.

Sartre and Beauvoir shared similar political goals and both worked towards political reform. Both felt the need to put into practice the views they espoused, and they initially became involved in politics for different purposes. Beauvoir became interested in politics as it applied to her feminist thought, whereas Sartre often got involved with particular individuals or groups whose ideology or beliefs he shared. Beauvoir's and Sartre's joint efforts for political reform are clearly illuminated in the many trips they took together. They visited Cuba and supported Castro's policies; they travelled to Brazil, Argentina, China and made many trips to Russia to support socialist policies; and they signed the Manifesto of 121, a document protesting against French policy in Algeria. Thus, similar shared values and working towards common goals were intrinsic components of Beauvoir's and Sartre's friendship.

The most unique feature of Sartre's and Beauvoir's friendship was their ability to maintain their own autonomy and independence. Each explored her or his own separate interests while maintaining an intertwined life together. This important aspect of friendship, which is particularly relevant to friendships between women and men, is noted in Nancy Sherman's The Fabric of Character.

> The relationship between virtue friends exhibits some mindfulness both of the differences between friends and of their separateness. This entails that such friends promote each other's good in a privileged way...but in a way that is still respectful of the mature rational agency of each.[73]

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[73]Nancy Sherman, The Fabric of Character: Aristotle's Theory of Virtue (Oxford, Great Britain: Oxford University Press, 1989), 139.

It was an essential aspect of Beauvoir's and Sartre's friendship that they maintained their own individuality despite their extreme closeness and the many similarities they shared.

The friendship between Sartre and Beauvoir is an illuminating example of a lifelong partnership and communion between a man and a woman. Many feminists questioned how Beauvoir reconciled her feminism with her dependency and association with Sartre. But in fact what Beauvoir actually illustrated in her life was the tangibility of a lifelong friendship between a man and a woman.

One of the effects of Sartre's and Beauvoir's friendship was their ability to bring about some political reform with their joint efforts. As well, Beauvoir and Sartre were extremely influential thinkers in twentieth century intellectual thought. Beauvoir's book The Second Sex played an unprecedented role in the women's movement, and Sartre's work in Existentialism had an important place in contemporary philosophical thought. Sartre's and Beauvoir's writings were usually the result of intellectual collaboration and mutual criticism. Their friendship was based on equality and freedom which allowed each to maintain their own autonomy and pursue separate interests. Their life together thus was a symbol of intellectual and sentimental communion between a man and a woman. Sartre's and Beauvoir's friendship lasted as long as they did, just as Sartre said it would long ago. Sartre died in 1980 and Beauvoir wrote a tribute to him, cited previously, called Adieux: A Farewell to Sartre. In Beauvoir's own words she states:

His death does separate us. My death will not bring us together again. That is how things are. It is in itself splendid that we were able to live our lives in harmony for so long.[74]

Raissa Maritain and Jacques Maritain

The friendship between Jacques Maritain and Raissa Oumansoff Maritain began at the Sorbonne where they were both studying for a degree in science. Their first meeting occurred, as Raissa Maritain recalls in her memoirs, when Jacques Maritain asked her to join a committee protesting against the ill treatment of Russian socialist students.[75] Jacques Maritain and Raissa Oumansoff quickly discovered that they shared many similar ideas and interests. In her memoirs, Raissa Maritain writes:

> After class he would walk home with me...Our conversations were endless...Did anything else exist in comparison with all we had to tell each other? Together we had to think out the entire universe anew, the meaning of life, the fate of man, the justice and injustice of societies. We had to read the poets and novelists of the day, go to classical concerts, visit the museums of art...Time passed too quickly; we must not waste it on banalities of life. For the first time I could really talk to someone about myself, emerge from my silent reflections in order to share them, put my torment into words. For the first time I had met someone who at the outset inspired me with absolute confidence; someone who from that moment I knew would never disappoint me; someone with whom I could so readily come to an understanding on all things. Another Someone had pre-established between us, and in despite of such great differences of temperament and of origin, a sovereign harmony.[76]

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[74]Beauvoir, <u>Adieux: A Farewell to Sartre</u>, 127.

[75]Raissa Maritain, <u>We have been friends together & Adventures in Grace: The Memoirs of Raissa Maritain</u>, trans. Julie Kernan (Garden City, New York: Image Books, 1961), 41.

[76]Ibid., 42.

There was also a sense of equality, intellectually and socially, between the Maritains which is an essential precondition for virtuous friendships. Jacques Maritain and Raissa Maritain were from similar social backgrounds and each of them possessed a gifted intelligence. They had each been searching for some sense of absolute truth, and this goal was not only something they shared in common at the beginning of their relationship, but would become an integral principle of their friendship and a good towards which they worked. Raissa Maritain recalls in We have been friends together that "the very principles of all action and of all conviction were...the main objects of our inquiry."[77] The Maritains believed originally that the natural sciences would provide these principles, but they became quickly dismayed when these sciences could not provide the answers they were seeking. Thus, disenchanted with the rationalist teachings of the Sorbonne which upheld the belief that science could explain everything, their quest for truth continued. Truth, as Raissa Maritain maintains:

> has greater scope; it attracts by the beauty of invisible and immaterial things which are not the objects of science. And that spiritual heaven, those mysteries of metaphysics do not attract the eye of the scientist, nor do they arouse his mind.[78]

The Maritains' friend Charles Péguy invited them to a lecture given by Henri Bergson at the College du France, and it was Bergson's philosophy that would liberate the Maritains from their tormenting search for truth. Shortly after, the

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[77]Ibid., 55.

[78]Ibid., 56.

Maritains were to meet Léon Bloy, a French writer and fervent Roman Catholic. These two men were instrumental in helping the Maritains achieve their quest for truth. This quest, in the course of the Maritains' friendship, would lead them, ultimately, to a belief in God and their baptism into the Catholic faith. Thus, similar interests and goals and the equal basis of their relationship were preconditions that made the friendship between the Maritains possible.

Several principles that constituted the classical conception of virtuous friendships were inherent in Jacques Maritain's and Raissa Maritain's friendship. These principles included mutual love and trust between the friends, shared interests and values, and a concern for the other's good. As well, there was a sense of harmony between the friends in which their similar values helped them work towards a shared conception of the good that was particular to their friendship. These principles defined the Maritains' lifelong friendship.

The profound mutual love the Maritains shared was an integral facet of their friendship, and this love became an extension of the deep spiritual love they each expressed for God. The Maritains, from the beginning of their relationship, had recognized their intense need for one another. Raissa Maritain explains that their engagement to be married in 1902 had taken place in the simplest manner without any proposal.

> We were alone in my parents' living room. Jacques was sitting on the rug, close to my chair; it suddenly seemed to me that we had always been near each other, and that we would always be so. Without thinking, I put out my hand and stroked his hair; he looked at me and all was clear to us. The feeling flowed through me that always-for my happiness and my salvation (I thought precisely that, although then the

113

word "salvation" meant nothing to me) -that always my life would be bound up with Jacques'. It was one of those tender and peaceful feelings which are like a gift flowing from a region higher than ourselves, illuminating the future and deepening the present. From that moment our understanding was perfect and unchangeable.[79]

It is commonly believed that after they married, the Maritains requested permission from the Pope to have a celibate marriage.

The Maritains' individual notebooks and memoirs are filled with constant reminders of the love they shared and the deep respectful awareness of each other's personality. Raissa Maritain, in her Journal, reflects upon her own destiny.

In the midst of all my sufferings, God has given me a very clear view of my destiny. I have a destiny, and that, in itself, is marvellous. For a destiny makes the unity, the usefulness and beauty of a life. And my destiny is not to belong to myself. God has granted Jacques and me the same destiny and, as a viaticum, a unique and marvellous mutual affection.[80]

Raissa Maritain reminisces in We have been friends together of her feelings for Jacques Maritain.

He was even then overflowing with inner activity, with goodness and generosity. He was entirely without prejudice: his soul was as though brand new, and seemed constantly to discover for itself its own law. He was not in the least a respecter of persons, because he had the greatest respect for his own conscience.[81]

Jacques Maritain, in his Notebooks, writes a long tribute to Raissa Maritain. Briefly summarized, he writes:

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[79]Ibid., 84-85.

[80]Raissa Maritain, Raissa's Journal, presented by Jacques Maritain (Albany, New York: Magi Books, Inc., 1974), 248.

[81]Raissa Maritain, We have been friends together, 42.

Goodness. Purity. Raissa always goes to the bitter end, with a direct intention and an upright will. Her courage is without calculation and her pity without defence. Where there is no beauty she suffocates and cannot live. She has always lived for truth...For her heart, as for her understanding. it is the essential reality which matters...Her thought, her genius, tends always to intuition. As she is wholly interior, she is wholly free. Her reason can be content only with the real, her soul only with the absolute...In her there is not only beauty, but that living spiritual light which is like a glance of God above beauty, and which we call grace...Finally, she loves God, she has always loved God, even before knowing Him...This vocation is that of humanity itself, I know; but those who are marked for the glory of God are not outside humanity, they are the very characteristic and the essence of humanity.[82]

These are just a few examples that illuminate the quality of friendship between Raissa and Jacques Maritain.

Shared ideas and interests were another defining feature of the Maritains' friendship, and there are many examples of this principle. Raissa Maritain began reading Thomas Aquinas, and she experienced a great sense of joy which she shared with her husband who had not read Aquinas before. Jacques Maritain, whose philosophy was to later become deeply influenced by the thought of Thomas Aquinas, writes of the first time he read the Summa Theologiae:

> Finally! Thanks to Raissa, I begin to read the Summa Theologiae. As it was for her, it is a deliverance, an inundation of light. The intellect finds its home.[83]

Intellectual discussions on philosophical and theological issues were an integral facet of the Maritains' friendship. The Maritains collaborated together on many

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[82]Jacques Maritain, Notebooks, trans. Joseph W. Evans (Albany, New York: Magi Books, Inc., 1984), 31-34.

[83]Ibid., 65.

articles and books which arose out of these discussions. They had been strongly influenced by Henri Bergson and Raissa Maritain began an article on his philosophy. After continuously working on this article, she became fatigued by illness, and could not complete it. Jacques Maritain, at her request, finished the article. It was called "The Evolutionism of Bergson" and was published in 1911 under Jacques Maritain's name. In reference to this essay, Jacques Maritain writes in his Notebooks: "Fear of established rules? Old masculine rudeness? It will appear only under my name. I should of demanded that Raissa sign it with me."[84] Raissa Maritain also did another work for Jacques Maritain on Bergson, and this helped him in writing his articles and book on Bergson. Jacques Maritain writes in his Notebooks:

> Raissa continues to read St. Thomas with the same winged joy. She also does an entire work on Bergson for me [from which I greatly profited in my articles, and later in my book. If I had been less grob, this book should have appeared under our two names. And Raissa would doubtless have deterred me from many of those violences which I was to regret afterwards.][85]

The Maritains collaborated together on Prayer and Intelligence, published in 1934, and they worked together on many articles. It is clear from the many articles and books published by both the Maritains that each played an instrumental role in the development of the other's thinking. Jacques Maritain's philosophy was very much a product of his and Raissa Maritain's shared ideas and discussions. He writes in the forward to Raissa's Journal:

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[84]Ibid., 72.

[85]Ibid., 62-63.

And, dominating all the rest, there was her concern for my philosophical work, and for the kind of perfection she expected of it. To that work, she sacrificed everything. In spite of all her physical and mental suffering, and, at certain moments, of an almost total exhaustion, she succeeded by a hard effort of will(and because the collaboration I had always asked of her was, for her, a sacred duty) in revising in manuscript everything I have written and published, both in French and English.[86]

The values and goals the Maritains shared arose out of their search for truth in the Catholic faith. As was shown earlier, this search for truth was a goal they shared from the beginning of their friendship and which led them, eventually, to their baptism into the Catholic faith. They, thus, became deeply committed to their religion, and their friendship was a journey of increasing faith and love in their understanding of God.

Their conception of love and friendship, specifically between men and women, was influenced by Aquinas' philosophy and their own religious beliefs. This conception is discussed in both the Maritains' memoirs. The ideal presented in these discussions was a good they worked towards in their relationship. Raissa Maritain comments briefly on her views of love and friendship.

> The essence of love, is in the communication of oneself, with fulness of joy and delight in the possession of the beloved. The essence of friendship is in desire for the good of one's friend, strong enough to sacrifice oneself for him.[87]

Elaborating on this and making further reflections on his wife's insights, Jacques Maritain in his Notebooks states that "within disinterested love, or love-for-the-good-

[86]Raissa Maritain, Raissa's Journal, 13.

[87]Ibid., 162.

itself-of the beloved,"[88] there are two kinds of love which Raissa Maritain calls love

and friendship. In friendship:

> the lover gives himself to the beloved by giving to the beloved his
> goods or that which he has...The friend, in giving that which he has, no
> doubt also gives, in a certain manner, at the same stroke that which he
> is, his own person or subjectivity itself.[89]

In the case of love:

> in which the spirit is engaged...the person or subjectivity gives himself
> directly, openly or nakedly, without hiding himself under the forms of
> any other gift less absolutely total, he gives himself wholly from the
> very first in giving or communicating to the beloved, in ecstasizing in
> him that which he is.[90]

The difference between love and friendship, according to the Maritains, is:

> a difference in the intrinsic quality of disinterested love or the
> ontological level at which it constitutes itself in the soul, in other words,
> in the power which it has of alienating the soul from itself.[91]

Between persons disinterested love is of two different kinds; whereas in the

relationship between God and the individual, "friendship and love are only two

aspects of one and the same infinitely perfect disinterested love, which is the

transcendent God Himself."[92]

There are various kinds of human love which Jacques Maritain expounds in

his Notebooks. There is love-passion which is a romantic kind of love that is not

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[88]Jacques Maritain, Notebooks, 220.

[89]Ibid., 221.

[90]Ibid., 221.

[91]Ibid., 222.

[92]Ibid., 222.

truly authentic. On a higher level, there is authentic love or *bel amour* which one can

usually attain only after a certain maturity and experience. This is the kind of love

"in which one really gives to the other, not only what he has, but what he is (his

person itself)."[93] Love in its absolute form is the kind of love which Jacques

Maritain calls *amour fou* or 'mad boundless love.'

> This love in which the very person of each gives itself to the other in
> all truth and reality is, in the order of the ontological perfections of
> nature, the summit of love between Man and Woman.[94]

Mad boundless love presupposes existing friendship, but it goes far beyond friendship:

> because it constitutes itself at a more profound-absolutely radical-level
> in the soul, from the very fact that it is the direct, open, naked, gift of
> the person himself in his entirety, making himself one in spirit with the
> other.[95]

Jacques Maritain carries this elucidation of love and friendship into his views

on Christian marriage. He stresses the importance of developing authentic love

based on devotion and friendship in a marriage. The Christian marriage:

> has to transmute romantic love, or what existed of it in the beginning,
> into real and indestructible human love, and really disinterested love
> which certainly does not exclude carnal passion and desire but which
> rises more and more above them because in itself and by essence it is
> principally spiritual - a complete and irrevocable gift of one to the
> other, for the love of the other. The love of which I am speaking here
> is above all a disinterested love. It is not necessarily mad, boundless
> love; but it is necessarily and primordially a love of devotion and of
> friendship - that entirely unique friendship between spouses one of
> whose essential ends is the spiritual companionship between the man

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[93]Ibid., 223.

[94]Ibid., 223-24.

[95]Ibid., 225.

and the woman in order to help each other to accomplish their destiny here on earth.[96]

In a Christian marriage, it is the role of each spouse to help the other advance towards the perfection of charity in God. However, it is only "under the regime of mad, boundless love that the soul can reach a perfection of charity greater in intensity as well in depth of gift of self."[97] Therefore, it is necessary, if there already exists mad boundless love between the spouses, to renounce this kind of love. There cannot exist, Jacques Maritain argues, mad boundless love between spouses as well as between the person and God. This would imply a contradiction since in this type of love the person must give the whole of one's self, and this can be given only once. This renunciation of mad boundless love for each other does not take anything away from the marriage relationship. As Jacques Maritain already pointed out, the ideal of Christian marriage is to aid one another in realizing their spiritual destiny on earth. This can only be achieved fully and absolutely in the regime of mad boundless love with God. As well, the renunciation of this love for each other does not take away the truly authentic disinterested love they share. In fact,

> the sacrament of marriage was only more profoundly lived by them, because one of the essential ends of marriage, the spiritual companionship between spouses in order to mutually help themselves to advance towards God, found itself strengthened and realized in a higher manner in mad, boundless love for God.[98]

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[96]Ibid., 243.

[97]Ibid., 250. footnote 2.

[98]Ibid., 253.

120

Raissa Maritain also reflects upon temporal marriage which is supposed to end at death.

> But does there then remain nothing for heaven of the union of a husband and a wife, faithful to each other till death?- What remains is what friendship may have created of purely spiritual union between them, of similarity of soul, of equality of merits, perhaps in a life in which everything has been in common.[99]

The Maritains, thus, shared these values on love and friendship, the ideal Christian marriage, and a person's belief in God, and they strove to integrate these values into their daily lives. Their friendship and marriage were practical examples of these aspirations.

The value of friendship was very important in the Maritains' lives. Their own friendship was integral to their lives, and it extended outwards to the intimate circle of friends they shared. Raissa Maritain's memoirs, <u>We have been friends together</u>, recounts the many friends who influenced and were a part of the Maritains' lives. She writes: "our friends are a part of our life, and our life explains our friendships."[100] Raissa Maritain, describing her first meeting with Jacques Maritain, entitles a section of her book: "The Greatest of My Friends."[101] Jacques Maritain, likewise, places a high value on friendship. He writes in the forward to <u>Raissa's Journal</u>:

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[99]Raissa Maritain, <u>Raissa's Journal</u>, 231.

[100]Raissa Maritain, <u>We have been friends together</u>, 12.

[101]Ibid., 41.

one's pains are repaid by what is best in this world, the marvel of those friendships which God induces and the pure loyalties he inspires, which are like a mirror of the gratuitousness and generosity of his love.[102]

The Thomist circles, meetings held at the Maritains' home in Meudon, were another lucid example of the shared values they espoused and a goal towards which they worked. These Thomist circles were held every month in which intellectuals from all walks of life would gather. While Catholic intellectuals were predominant in the meetings, intellectuals from other religions were welcome. According to Jacques Maritain, these retreats were initially Raissa Maritain's idea, but a great deal of the preparation for these retreats was done by Raissa Maritain's sister Vera. The defining feature and atmosphere of these retreats was the "spirit at one and the same time of liberty and of fervor, and the inextricable intermingling of the fires of intelligence and of those of the spiritual life, and of the quest for God through prayer."[103] These retreats were the Maritains' endeavour to put into practice the values they advocated, and they illuminated the utter devotion and commitment of the Maritains' lives to the Catholic faith.

The Maritains' friendship had many worthwhile effects. Their life together and their commitment to their faith set an example for many people and thus helped others in their attempt to lead a Christian life. The Maritains' writings paid tribute to the human being as a person who has its roots in spirit:

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[102]Raissa Maritain, Raissa's Journal, 15.

[103]Jacques Maritain, Notebooks, 154.

122

Our whole being subsists in virtue of the very subsistence of the spiritual soul which is in us a principle of creative unity, independence and liberty.[104]

This kind of thinking made way for a new dimension of Christian humanism. The Maritains' friendship enabled them to develop their individual capacities and talents, and, most importantly, it enabled each to achieve spiritual fulfilment through their belief in God.

Although the four kinds of friendship above all exhibited many of the defining characteristics of virtuous friendships, they were, in many ways, very different from each other. Abelard and Heloise were from a medieval French background, they were devout Catholics, and although they were married, they lived in separate religious communities. Taylor and Mill lived in Victorian England, and throughout most of their friendship, Taylor was married to another man. They were both liberal Protestants, and they advocated a utilitarian philosophy. Beauvoir and Sartre were from a contemporary French background, they were existentialists, and they were both avowed atheists. The Maritains were also from a contemporary French background, but they were both Catholic and deeply religious. They advocated a Christian humanistic philosophy.

A sexual relation and marriage are aspects that often arise in friendships between men and women. The role that a sexual relationship played within each

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[104]Jacques Maritain, "The Individual and the Person," in The Social and Political Philosophy of Jacques Maritain, ed. J.W. Evans and L.R. Ward (London, Great Britain: Butler & Tanner Ltd., 1956), 24.

123

friendship was very different. Abelard and Heloise, along with Sartre and Beauvoir, likely would argue that a sexual relation hindered their friendship. In both cases, a sexual relation caused the friends pain and difficulty within the friendship. Abelard's seduction of Heloise ultimately led to his mutilation. As was illustrated earlier, it was only when Abelard and Heloise moved towards a relationship of celibacy that they developed a truly virtuous friendship.

In Beauvoir's and Sartre's, case, Beauvoir was deeply hurt by Sartre during their sexual relationship because he was so promiscuous. Their friendship likewise improved when their sexual relationship ceased. Mill's and Taylor's case was very different. Throughout most of their friendship, Mill and Taylor had a Platonic relationship. After the death of Taylor's husband, Mill and Taylor married, and they were able to integrate a sexual relationship into their friendship. In the Maritains' case, a sexual relationship appeared not to be an important aspect of their committed love. This is supported by the Maritains' request to the Pope for permission to have a celibate marriage.

The role that marriage played within each friendship was also different. For Abelard and Heloise, Heloise believed marriage would hinder the ideal relationship towards which they were both striving. However, later in Heloise's and Abelard's separate lives, their marriage affirmed their loyalty and commitment to one another. In Mill's and Taylor's case, they both had very definite views on the state of marriage and the importance of friendship between the wife and husband. When Mill and Taylor did marry, they were able to put their ideal into practice.

Beauvoir and Sartre, in contrast, were very opposed to the state of marriage. Although Sartre and Beauvoir briefly considered marriage in the early part of their relationship, they decided against it, and they remained unmarried throughout their friendship. They were able to achieve, in their friendship, a strong sense of commitment and loyalty to one another as well as a life of independence. Marriage was very important for the Maritains,' and it provided a way of affirming their love and deep commitment to one another. As such, in three of the four friendships, marriage had a very positive role to play because it strengthened the friends' love, loyalty and commitment to one another. Therefore, the role that a sexual relation and marriage have within a friendship between men and women largely depends on the dynamics of the particular relationship and the individuals that comprise it.

Despite these differences, among the four examples, there were significant similarities. In each case, as earlier demonstrated, there were specific preconditions, principles and effects that defined each friendship as virtuous. The friendship in each case developed and grew over the course of the friends' lives together, and it contributed to their personal, intellectual, spiritual and moral growth. In each friendship, common shared interests and values that attracted the friends to one another became an integral principle of their relationship. These interests and values, through the course of each friendship, took on new dimensions and became a common good that the friends pursued together. Moreover, a conception of love and the ideal relationship between a man and a woman were developed through the values each friend shared. In each case, the friends strove to actualize this ideal in

125

their relationship together. The ethical significance virtuous friendships between men and women have is, thus, easily discerned in these examples.

The following chart summarizes the preconditions, principles and effects of each of the four examples of friendship analyzed in this chapter.

TABLE 3: VIRTUOUS FRIENDSHIPS BETWEEN SELECTED PHILOSOPHERS

		Abelard	Heloise	J.S. Mill	H. Taylor	Sartre	Beauvoir	J. Maritain	R. Maritain
I Preconditions	1)Equality -sex	no	no	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
	-social	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
	-intellectual	no	no	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
	-spiritual	yes	yes					yes	yes
	2)Shared community -political			yes	yes	yes	yes		
	-intellectual	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
	-religious	yes	yes					yes	yes
	3)Similarity in character	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
II Principles	1)Shared interests & values - political			yes	yes	yes	yes		
	-intellectual	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
	-spiritual	yes	yes					yes	yes
	2)Shared goals	Union with God	Union with God	Pol & Social Reform	Pol & Social Reform	yes	yes	Truth & God	Truth & God
	3)Love	Stoic conception	Stoic conception	Liberal Protestant conception	Liberal Protestant conception	Exist notion	Exist notion (limited)	Aquinas & Religion	Aquinas & Religion
	4)Good of	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	limited	yes	yes
	5)Loyalty	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	limited	yes	yes
	6)Sympathy	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
	7)Caring	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
	8)Trust	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
	9)Permanence	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
III Effects	1)Growth -personal			yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
	-intellectual	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
	-spiritual	yes	yes					yes	yes
	2)Self-sufficiency	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
	3)Realization of one's good	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

127

CHAPTER 4

APPLICATION OF CONTEMPORARY ETHICAL THEORIES

TO FRIENDSHIP AND A VIRTUE-BASED ETHICS

The contemporary ethical theories of Max Scheler, Alasdair MacIntyre, Nel Noddings and Lawrence Blum will be critically assessed in light of their relevance to virtuous friendships between men and women. Each of these theories elaborates specific insights that contribute to an ethical framework for virtuous friendships. These insights include: the notion of the person; the apprehension of other persons as a key ethical function; one's relations with others and one's community as integral to self-identity; the concern for the good of the other; and a defense of a virtue-based ethics. Each of these theories provides support for the philosophical significance of virtuous friendships within ethical discussion.

Max Scheler

The problem of the other and the problem of empathy, as central concerns in phenomenology, have been uniquely developed by Max Scheler in what is known as his Ethical Personalism. These problems bear a direct relevance to virtuous friendships in that friendship is founded on how we come to know or understand others. A brief outline of the main tenets in phenomenology is first necessary to understand Scheler's ethics.

Phenomenology focuses on the structure of our lived experiences and on the immediate original data of our consciousness from a subjective standpoint. This involves a shift in perspective from an objective standpoint to a subjective one in which the focus is placed on the intentional acts of the subject and the objects to which those intentions are directed. Within the ethical sphere, this shift is from the detached observer to the acting agent. The phenomenological method involves both this shift in perspective and a bracketing or setting aside of common everyday assumptions, such as, subject-object, mind-body, and internal-external distinctions. This method is used to uncover essences, the invariant features or structures of experience, that are presented in intuition, and to describe lived experiences devoid of these assumptions.

Max Scheler applied the phenomenological method he inherited from his professor Edmund Husserl to the whole field of ethics. Scheler's ethical personalism focuses on the primacy of affectivity from a subjective standpoint, the apprehension of values inherent in experience, love as the measure of the moral worth of the person and the intuition of another person's essence as a key ethical function. A brief analysis of Scheler's personalism and his notion of love will elucidate the centrality of these insights to virtuous friendships.

Scheler's ethics is found primarily in Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values[1] and The Nature of Sympathy.[2] Scheler's Non-Formal Ethics is

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[1]Max Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, trans. Manfred S. Frings and Roger L. Funk (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973).

129

a detailed critique of Kant's ethics. Scheler's main contention with Kant's moral philosophy was that Kant delineated too sharply between the senses and reason. Thus, Kant discounted a large dimension of human affectivity. Scheler maintains that the realm of affectivity also has its own *a priori* order which is independent from that of reason and which Scheler calls the *ordre du coeur*. This *ordre du coeur* is the value hierarchy that is self-given in intuition.

> The *emotive* elements of spirit, such as feeling, preferring, loving, hating, and *willing*, also possess original a priori contents which are not borrowed from "thinking," and which ethics must show to be independent of logic.[3]

Values are the *a priori* of feelings, and they are described by Scheler as intentional objects of intentional feelings. Values are accessible to the person independently of their being represented as properties belonging to things or to people. Values are revealed to us through our primary acts of love and hate, and their hierarchy is apprehended through the value cognition called "preferring." Scheler outlines the four levels of value hierarchy - the values of the senses, of vital functioning, of the intellect and the holy or spiritual values. It is the task of the Non-Formal Ethics to define and establish this hierarchy.

Scheler's notion of the person is the pivotal focus of his ethics. He outlines in detail what he means by "person" prior to describing the person within the moral context. The person cannot be described within a physical or psychic context as the

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[2]Max Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy, trans. Peter Heath (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1970).

[3]Scheler, Non-Formal Ethics of Values, 63.

natural sciences or psychology attempts to do. He or she is not to be identified with the "ego" or the "I," and can never be considered as an object. The person is comprised of a whole range of activities - volition, affectivity, reason, preferring etc., and can only be known through the execution of his or her acts which are intuited. As such, *"the person is the concrete and essential unity of being of acts of different essences."*[4] Furthermore, the person is not only contained in every act but varies in and through his or her acts, and is not exhausted in these acts. This is important for Scheler because it means the person cannot be described within a spatio-temporal framework.

Scheler outlines several criteria that must be met in order for the definition of person to apply. The person must be bound by a unity of sense. "The person is given as one who executes intentional acts that are bound by a unity of sense."[5] This unity of sense is a necessary part of intuiting and understanding the essence of the person.

> What is essential for "understanding" is that out of this *spiritual center* of the other, which is cogiven in intuition, we experience the acts of the person (speech, expressions, deeds) with respect to us and the environment as intentionally *directed* toward something, and that we re-execute such acts, i.e., that we "rejudge" his spoken propositions and the corresponding judgments, "refeel" his feelings, and "relive" his acts of will, and that we attribute to all of this at once the unity of some *"sense."*[6]

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[4]Ibid., 383.

[5]Ibid., 478.

[6]Ibid., 477.

In addition, a certain level of development is necessary. Children are not considered fully persons, for they are at the level of development incapable of distinguishing their own acts from that of another. Thus, a unity of sense and a certain level of development are necessary for an individual to be considered a person who is capable of making correct moral choices. It is only when these conditions are met that an individual can be considered a person and a moral agent.

The person must also be distinguished from character and other empirical conceptions. Character implies enduring dispositions, and interpreting one's acts from these dispositions implies a causal nature. Virtues which are inextricably tied to character would seem to be discounted in Scheler's ethics. However, this is not the case.

> There are types of value which are essentially related to personality as their vehicle, and which can only attach to a person; 'virtues', for example, are values of this type. But in addition to this there is the value of the person as such, i.e. as that which essentially possesses these virtues. *Love for the value of persons*, i.e. for the person as a reality mediated in personal value, is *moral love* in the full sense of the term.[7]

This analysis of person is directly tied to the problem of other persons, and how one intuits their essence.

Scheler contends that knowledge of other selves is known immediately. Theories that claim knowledge of other selves is known through analogy with our own feelings are mistaken, Scheler maintains, in that they assume knowledge of ourselves precedes knowledge of others. According to Scheler, the child does not differentiate

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[7]Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy, 166.

at first between him or herself and others until at a later stage of development. At this later stage, Scheler argues, egocentricity settles in and the individual self becomes primary, what Scheler refers to as a *desordre du coeur*. It is only through love and sympathy that the order of love is re-established and other selves also become important.

Knowledge of other selves, Scheler argues, is achieved through an understanding love of other persons. I think this is of central importance in friendship in that how one discerns the other will determine the nature of the friendship. In friendships based on utility and pleasure, the other person is viewed as a means to the individual's needs or pleasure. It is only in friendships based on virtue that the friend is recognized as a unique individual with an intrinsic value of his or her own. In coming to understand the other, it is important that one does not project one's own feelings and understanding of the situation onto the other person. This is extremely important in friendships between men and women, who given their different lived experiences, necessarily differ in their situations. It is thus extremely difficult, but a necessary part of the ethical life, to attempt to understand the other from her or his situation and to understand how the other values and feels. This is an ideal, but one that has to be continuously worked at in order to truly understand the other. This knowledge of other selves, Scheler contends, can only be accomplished through the act of love. Therefore, the development of an understanding love of other persons is not only a key ethical function, but a necessary

part of virtuous friendships. This understanding love will be elaborated briefly in order to elucidate its ethical importance.

The concept of person, as developed by Scheler, cannot be known empirically or psychologically except intuitively from the phenomenological perspective. This intuition into the essence of another person can only be done through the act of love. Scheler's detailed analysis of love, using the phenomenological method, has a direct relevance to friendship, not only because it bears on how we know others, as previously articulated, but also because love is a central principle in friendship. Love and hate, Scheler contends, are primary spontaneous acts of the person. They represent a unique attitude towards objects that possess value. Love is the movement from lower values to higher values, whereas hate moves in the opposite direction. The influence of Augustine, who described love as the force that moves us, is easily discerned in this notion of love. Love, described phenomenologically,

> is that movement wherein every concrete individual object that possesses value achieves the highest value compatible with its nature and ideal vocation; or wherein it attains the ideal state of value intrinsic to its nature.[8]

Thus, love is a creative force that enhances value and brings higher values into the sphere of existence. "It is essentially as a movement tending to the enhancement of value that love acquires its significance...as a creative force."[9] Through love, new values are disclosed to us. This does not mean that one projects higher values onto

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[8]Ibid., 161.

[9]Ibid., 154.

another person, nor does one seek higher values in another. Rather, through the act of love, higher values that one did not see before are disclosed to us. Love, therefore, is not blind but opens our eyes.

> In love there is no attempting to fix an objective, no deliberate shaping of purpose, aimed at the higher value and its realization; *love itself, in the course of its own movement*, is what brings about the continuous *emergence* of ever-higher value in the object-just as if it was streaming out from the object of its own accord.[10]

The moral goodness of the person is the measure of his or her love, and Scheler sees the moral dimension of love in its relationship with others. Love "has a specifically moral value *insofar as it represents a relationship between persons.*"[11] Love, thus defined, presents some interesting implications for virtuous friendships. Love, as mentioned previously, is a central principle of friendship and Scheler, like Augustine, has philosophically analyzed the concept of love to illustrate its necessary role within the ethical life. Love discloses new values, and enables us to see things on higher levels of value. Likewise, in friendship, values that exist individually take on new dimensions and grow when shared together, and they become a good towards which the friends work.

Scheler's Ethical Personalism, which focuses on the fact that the moral value of love is found in relationships with others, and that it is only through love that we are able to intuit another person, thus presents a strong defense for virtuous friendships and their place within ethics.

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[10]Ibid., 157.

[11]Ibid., 165.

Alasdair MacIntyre

Alasdair MacIntyre, a contemporary moral philosopher, articulates and defends a virtue-based ethics in his book After Virtue,[12] as an alternative approach to our contemporary ethical theories. A critical assessment of some central themes within MacIntyre's theory will elucidate the important role virtuous friendships can play within such an ethics. Our contemporary moral situation, MacIntyre argues, is in a state of crisis.

> The language and the appearances of morality persist even though the integral substance of morality has to a large degree been fragmented and then in part destroyed.[13]

MacIntyre maintains in After Virtue that the formation of small communities and the incorporation of the whole classical tradition of the virtues into these communities will resolve our current moral crisis. This is an illuminating and inspiring task because this whole virtue tradition carries elements of heroic society, sees Aristotle as the central point of focus, and brings in contributions from Augustine, Aquinas and the medieval tradition.

In order to resolve our moral crisis, MacIntyre argues, we must begin with an understanding of the narrative history of ethics. This history involves the notions of tradition and narrative. It is important within MacIntyre's theory because it shows the prominent place the virtues played when ethics flourished and how they slowly

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[12]Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 2d ed., (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984).

[13]Ibid., 5.

lost their importance within ethical discussion. The narrative history of ethics, according to MacIntyre, encompasses three stages, and it is inextricably tied to the history of moral language.

The first stage in which morality flourished, according to MacIntyre, began with heroic society and ends around the fifteenth century. It is in this stage that the tradition of the virtues, of which Aristotle is the central point of focus, is found. The second stage began when Newtonian science emerged in the seventeenth century and with it the rejection of Aristotelianism. Newtonian science invoked a mechanistic explanation of human nature, and human action became defined in terms of "laying bare the physiological and physical mechanisms which underlie action."[14] Hobbes' philosophy is a vivid manifestation of this view. Contemporary society is the third stage in this history which signals the disintegration of morality. Contemporary society, MacIntyre maintains, is an embodiment of the prevailing dogma of liberal individualism, a product of the enlightenment and the implicit acceptance of emotivism. MacIntyre's main contention is that it was wrong to reject the Aristotelian tradition of the virtues. A rational vindication of this tradition will not only provide a viable basis for ethics, but will "restore intelligibility and rationality to our moral and social commitments."[15] Friendship plays an essential role within this tradition of the virtues.

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[14]Ibid., 82.

[15]Ibid., 25.

The tradition which begins with heroic society is exemplified in the Homeric poems and Icelandic sagas in which "the chief means of moral education is the telling of stories."[16] The person is defined in terms of the particular role she or he plays within heroic society, and the virtues are those excellences or qualities which enabled a person to perform a specific social role. Thus, "morality and social structure are in fact one and the same in heroic society."[17] Within heroic society, friendship is inextricably tied to the other virtues. The virtues of courage and fidelity, especially, are essential components of friendship, and it is fidelity, MacIntyre states, that is central in friendships between men and women.

> My household's fidelity is the basic guarantee of its unity. So in women, who constitute the crucial relationships within the household, fidelity is the key virtue. Andromache and Hector, Penelope and Odysseus are friends (*philos*) as much as are Achilles and Patroclus.[18]

Within Aristotle's ethics, MacIntyre argues, virtuous friendships embody:

> a shared recognition of and pursuit of a good. It is this sharing which is essential and primary to the constitution of any form of community, whether that of a household or that of a city.[19]

A shared effort in working toward the common good of the community is thus achieved through the immediacy of one's particular friendships. This notion of friendship and the notion of community as a shared project is, MacIntyre contends, alien to our liberal individualist world. Friendship within modern society, MacIntyre

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[16]Ibid., 121.

[17]Ibid., 123.

[18]Ibid., 123.

[19]Ibid., 155.

argues, "has become for the most part the name of a type of emotional state rather than of a type of social and political relationship."[20] It has lost the importance it once held with the tradition of the virtues.

It is implicit within MacIntyre's theory that virtuous friendships require a political context similar to Aristotle's notion of community. Once this context is lost, friendship becomes relegated to nothing more than an emotional state. Within modern liberal society, friendship, MacIntyre argues, is nothing more than utility friendship.

> Indeed from an Aristotelian point of view a modern liberal political society can appear only as a collection of citizens of nowhere who have banded together for their common protection. They possess at best that inferior form of friendship which is founded on mutual advantage. That they lack the bond of friendship is of course bound up with the self-avowed moral pluralism of such liberal societies.[21]

MacIntyre believes that a community based on communitarian principles is the necessary context for the virtues. Whether the context of a political community, such as Aristotle's polis and MacIntyre's conception of communitarianism, are the necessary background for virtuous friendships, however, is debatable.

After tracing this tradition of the virtues from its roots in heroic society, MacIntyre attempts to draw out a unitary core in his conception of the virtues. Despite the varying meanings of the virtues throughout its history, one will notice that the concept of a virtue:

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[20]Ibid., 156.

[21]Ibid.

always requires for its application the acceptance for some prior account of certain features of social and moral life in terms of which it has to be defined and explained.[22]

MacIntyre's theory of the virtues encompasses three stages in which each stage has its own conceptual background. The first stage concerns the virtues in activities within individual lives. The conceptual background against which the virtues can be made intelligible is the notion of practice defined in a highly specific way. By "practice" MacIntyre means:

> any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended.[23]

The distinction between internal and external goods is essential to the notion of practices. External goods include such things as money, power and status. Internal goods are specified in terms of the particular practices, and it is the acquisition of the virtues that enable us to attain these goods.

It is easy to discern how friendship may fit into the first stage of MacIntyre's theory of the virtues. Virtuous friendships involve the shared pursuit of goods, and they require the practice of other virtues such as love, trust, truthfulness, justice etc. Likewise, the pursuance of goods internal to practices is defined by our relationships with others within the practice, and it requires other virtues in order for the practice

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[22]Ibid., 186.

[23]Ibid., 187.

to be sustained and to flourish. In both cases, it is the pursuance of excellence and goods, when done together with others, that extend human powers and transform and enrich lives of individuals. MacIntyre cites John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor as an example of this.

> The notion that the pursuit of excellence in a way that extends human powers is at the heart of human life is instantly recognizable as at home in not only J.S. Mill's political and social thought, but also in his and Mrs. Taylor's life.[24]

The second stage encompasses the role of the virtues in a whole life. The conceptual background necessary for this stage is the notion of a narrative. The self conceived as a narrative unity carries with it the notion of intelligibility and accountability. A person's actions are intelligible within the context of one's life, that is, the person's intentions, the goals towards which those intentions point and the settings of those intentions. Accountability implies that a person can account for her or his actions, and that these actions are intelligible within the particular context of that person's life.

> To identify an occurrence as an action is in the paradigmatic instances to identify it under a type of description which enables us to see that occurrence as flowing intelligibly from a human agent's intentions, motives, passions and purposes. It is therefore to understand an action as something for which someone is accountable, about which it is always appropriate to ask the agent for an intelligible account.[25]

This conception of the self is similar to Scheler's notion of the person wherein one's actions are bound by a unity of sense, and he or she is accountable for these

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[24]Ibid., 199.

[25]Ibid., 209.

actions. The narrative of a person's life runs from one's birth to one's death. Furthermore, the narrative of one's life is interlocked with others' narratives. Lived narratives are characterized by unpredictability and a certain teleological character. The "unity of a human life is the unity of a narrative quest."[26] Narrative unity is not a property of every human life but that towards which a person strives. A person's narrative is a quest because it is a search for the good in one's life. This good is not pre-set or defined from the beginning, but something that one discovers through the course of her or his life. Thus, it is the virtues that will enable us to pursue the good in our lives, and it is specifically in friendship that this pursuance of the good, when shared, is extended and enriched.

> The virtues therefore are to be understood as those dispositions which will...sustain us in the relevant kind of quest for the good, by enabling us to overcome the harms, dangers, temptations and distractions which we encounter, and which will furnish us with increasing self-knowledge and increasing knowledge of the good. The catalogue of the virtues will therefore include the virtues required to sustain the kind of households and the kind of political communities in which men and women can seek for the good together and the virtues necessary for philosophical enquiry about the character of the good.[27]

The third stage shows how the virtues relate the individual's whole life to that of his or her community, and the conceptual background in this stage is that of a moral tradition. The individual is always part of a community in which he or she has a particular social and historical identity. To bring the virtues to their full definition then we can say that:

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[26]Ibid., 219.

[27]Ibid., 219.

142

> The virtues find their point and purpose not only in sustaining those relationships necessary if the variety of goods internal to practices are to be achieved and not only in sustaining the form of an individual life in which that individual may seek out his or her good as the good of his or her whole life, but also in sustaining those traditions which provide both practices and individual lives with their necessary historical context.[28]

MacIntyre's theory of the virtues thus comprises: the notion of practices and the goods internal to them; the pursuance of these goods with others; and the self conceived of as a narrative unity who is tied to a particular social, political and moral tradition. These themes all demonstrate the necessity of the virtues in sustaining the ethical life of the person, and the particular relevance the virtue of friendship has within a virtue-based ethics.

The Aristotelian framework of the virtues, as elaborated in MacIntyre's theory, must be embodied in small forms of communities which work towards a shared conception of the common good. Modern liberal society, according to MacIntyre, has no shared conception of the good, and his solution is to do away with it and create small communities founded upon communitarian principles. Certain communitarian principles, when critically assessed, do enrich a virtue-based ethics, and they demonstrate the important role a community has in the ethical life of its members. However, whether we have to do away with existing society, as MacIntyre contends, is perhaps unrealistic.

MacIntyre's theory of communitarianism raises certain problems when it is applied to the particular community of men and women. Within a communitarian

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[28]Ibid., 223.

143

society that MacIntyre has in mind, the individual is tied to a historical and social tradition to which he or she is responsible. Government would be geared towards enhancing the public good and protecting those goods internal to practices from being corrupted by external goods and institutions. The problems of liberal society today demonstrate all too clearly the need for communitarian principles. However, as Marilyn Friedman astutely points out:

> Communitarians invoke a model of community which is focused particularly on families, neighborhoods, and nations. These sorts of communities have harbored social roles and structures which have been highly oppressive for women.[29]

It is thus necessary to view communitarian principles within this light. Friedman argues that friendship and relationships within urban communities:

> offer an important clue toward a model of community which usefully counterbalances the family-neighborhood-nation complex favored by communitarians.[30]

While using the insights of communitarianism, Friedman outlines aspects of friendship and urban relationships which find their basis in voluntary choice. This points towards a notion of community for both men and women that provides non-oppressive roles and structures, and it offers more congenial aspirations for women.

Friendship, unlike certain socially ascribed roles, Friedman argues, is "grounded in and sustained by shared interests and values, mutual affection, and

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[29]Marilyn Friedman, "Feminism and Modern Friendship: Dislocating the Community," in Feminism & Political Theory, ed. Cass R. Sunstein (Chicago: The Chicago University Press, 1990), 145.

[30]Ibid., 145.

possibilities for generating mutual respect and esteem."[31] Socially ascribed roles are those that we inherit or are born into such as relationships of family, city and nation. As MacIntyre maintains:

> I inherit from the past of my family, my city, my tribe, my nation, a variety of debts, inheritances, rightful expectations and obligations. These constitute the given of my life, my moral starting point. This is in part what gives my life its own moral particularity.[32]

Self-identity begins from a person's particular moral starting point, but it does not imply accepting the limitations of that particular situation or those non-voluntary relationships one inherits. It is in moving forwards from this that one's quest for the good begins.

Our social relationships, both those we inherit and those voluntarily chosen, are what constitute and define self-identity. The relationship of marriage is usually based on voluntary choice. However, the roles of husband and wife are usually dictated by strict social sanctions and an inherited tradition that can often embroil a woman in a highly oppressive role, as is so well attested to in our modern society. Virtuous friendships between men and women can perhaps offer a re-definition of their relationship within marriage.

An interesting insight presented by Friedman is that friendships among women have played a highly important role in social change. Through their friendships,

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[31]Ibid., 154.

[32]MacIntyre, 220.

145

women were able to move out of their conventional social roles and advocate political and social change.

> Friendship among women has been the cement not only of the various historical waves of the feminist movement, but as well of numerous communities of women throughout history who defied the local conventions for their gender and lived lives of creative disorder. In all these cases, women moved out of their given or found communities into new attachments with other women by their own choice, that is, motivated by their own needs, desires, attractions, and fears rather than, and often in opposition to, the expectations and ascribed roles of their found communities.[33]

Many feminists, like Friedman, have stressed the importance women's friendships with one another have played in the feminist movement. Likewise, friendships between women and men also can have a positive role to play in social change. The feminist movement has vastly changed the roles of women and men and their relationships to one another. Virtuous friendships can offer a new light within which to view our relationships with one another, and it opens up the possibility of an ethical community in which both men and women can share.

While there are certain problems in MacIntyre's theory, he has offered an inspiring ethics based on the virtues. In doing so, he has demonstrated that such an ethics involves the whole life of the person, one's relationships with others and the community within which we live. It is within this kind of ethics that the true value of virtuous friendships is illuminated.

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[33]Friedman, 155.

Nel Noddings

Nel Noddings, in her book <u>Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education</u>,[34] offers a shift in perspective from the traditional ethical theories based on moral reasoning to an ethics of caring based on the virtues and finding its point of focus in concrete caring relations. Noddings contends that the traditional approach to ethics, which she terms a masculine ethics, has been largely based on moral reasoning in which judgments and abstract principles are used to determine moral actions. She argues that this traditional approach cannot adequately account for moral experience. A new approach or perspective in ethics is needed which Noddings maintains is a feminine ethics rooted in natural caring. Several themes inherent in Noddings' ethics bear a direct relevance to friendships between women and men. These themes include: her exposition of caring; her premise that our identity is derived from our relations with others; and an understanding of other persons as an integral part of the moral perspective. A critical assessment of these themes within Noddings' ethics of caring will illuminate their application and importance to friendship.

Noddings' ethics of caring has its foundation in natural caring and our earliest experiences of it, primarily in the mother-child relation. This ethics takes our relatedness with others as basic and our memories and longing for caring as the motivation to be ethical. The "one-caring" and the "cared-for" comprise the caring

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[34]Nel Noddings, <u>Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education</u> (Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press Ltd., 1986).

147

relation. They each have their own obligations within the relation, and they are reciprocally dependent.[35]

Engrossment and inclusion are the central components in the role of the one-caring. Engrossment is the situation in which the one-caring receives the other and shares his or her feelings. This necessarily involves adopting an alternative perspective, namely the perspective of the cared-for. The one-caring does not project his or her feelings or reality onto the other; instead he or she receives the other by attempting to see things from the other's perspective or frame of reference.

> When my caring is directed to living things, I must consider their natures, ways of life, needs, and desires. And, although I can never accomplish it entirely, I try to apprehend the reality of the other.[36]

This adoption of another's perspective or apprehension of another's reality is what Noddings refers to as inclusion. Inclusion is a very difficult thing to do, but it is an integral part of understanding and coming to know the other. As articulated previously in Scheler's ethics, this attempt to understand the other from his or her situation and how the other feels and values is an essential part of virtuous friendships and the ethical life. It is only in apprehending the other's reality, Noddings argues, that one can be truly said to care.

Within the caring relation, inclusion is a necessary component on the part of the one-caring but not so on the part of the cared-for. In a teacher-student relationship, for example, it is necessary for the teacher to apprehend the student's

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[35]Ibid., 58.

[36]Ibid., 14.

reality in order to help the student, but it is not necessary on the part of the student to apprehend the reality of the teacher. When there is mutual inclusion, the relationship moves towards friendship.[37] Thus, in equal meetings such as friendship, there is mutual caring and the roles of caring do not need to be distinguished.

Reciprocity is essential to the caring relation and the cared-for, as well, has his or her own specific function. The cared-for must receive the other and acknowledge and respond to the presence of the one-caring. The major effect of the caring relation is the growth of the cared-for. It is in the free development of the cared-for that is his or her major contribution to the caring relation.

> This recognition of the freedom-as-subject of the cared-for is a fundamental result of her genuine receiving of the cared-for. The responsive cared-for, in the fullness of the caring relation, feels the recognition of freedom and grows under its expansive support...The cared-for is free to be more fully himself in the caring relation. Indeed, this being himself, this willing and unselfconscious revealing of self, is his major contribution to the relation.[38]

The ethical ideal is a necessary part of the caring relation, and it encompasses Noddings' notion of virtue. The ethical ideal arises out of the sentiment of natural caring and our sentiment to recapture or maintain our most caring moments. It is the realistic picture of ourselves as one-caring that guides us as we strive to meet the other morally. However, it is necessary that the one-caring also be cared-for in order for this picture to be completed. We recognize natural caring as good, and our desire

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[37]"Mutual inclusion moves a relationship away from that of teacher-student toward friendship." Ibid., 67.

[38]Ibid., 72-73.

or sentiment to maintain this or recapture it is our motive to behave morally. Recourse to one's commitment to the ethical ideal is necessary when the one-caring loses interest or does not want to care. While caring is not a virtue, according to Noddings, the context of the caring relation is necessary for the exercise of the virtues which can only find their fulfilment in the other.

> We are dependent on each other even in the quest for personal goodness. How good I can be is partly a function of how you- the other - receive and respond to me. Whatever virtue I exercise is completed, fulfilled, in you.[39]

This is particularly relevant to friendship in that the fulfilment of the virtues and the ethical life can only be done together. It also calls attention to MacIntyre's second stage of the virtues in which the virtues are those dispositions that will aid us in our quest for the good. This good is not pre-set from the beginning, but something discovered in one's life and in one's relations with others.

The difficulty with Noddings' ethics founded on caring is that it presents a rather simplistic approach to ethics. Caring and concrete caring relations are fundamental to the ethical perspective, but surely cannot comprise the whole picture. As many philosophers have pointed out, including MacIntyre and Lawrence Blum, contemporary ethics is derived from a number of moral traditions and there simply cannot be one core concept upon which ethics is founded.[40]

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[39]Ibid., 6.

[40]"The concept 'moral' itself cannot rightly be given a unitary meaning, but rather bears the heritage of different moral traditions from which it gathers different sorts of meanings." Lawrence A. Blum, Friendship, Altruism and Morality (London, Great Britain: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1980), 8.

Noddings' basic premise that men and women approach moral problems differently is also problematic. She is not arguing that women are incapable of reasoning or deducing things logically, but that women do not see this approach as relevant to ethics. Men, in contrast, use moral reasoning and an appeal to abstract principles in approaching a moral situation. Noddings contends that this new approach to ethics, although termed a feminine ethics, is accessible to both men and women. I am apprehensive about this delineation, since one could almost argue from this, as Aristotle did, that men and women have different virtues. Biological differences between women and men naturally attest to different lived experiences as well as a certain difference in the way they value things. However, I think it is an over-generalization to claim that men approach ethical problems through abstract principles in contrast to women approaching ethical problems from concrete caring relations. Noddings has defined the Kantian ethical perspective as the traditional ethical approach and generalized it to a masculine way of ethical thinking. Augustine, Hume and Scheler are just a few examples of men who argue for an ethics focusing on love and sympathy and who do not conform to Noddings over-generalization.

Lastly, I think that Noddings must be careful in focusing on a feminine ethics founded on one-caring. The characteristics of self-sacrifice and the role of one-caring have been generally viewed, in history, as those peculiar to women, and this has quite often led to oppressive situations for them. Women, in their roles as wives and mothers, often sacrificed themselves to the caring of their families, sometimes to the

151

detriment of their own self-identity. Noddings is astute to recognize that self-identity is necessary in order to properly maintain a caring relation. The ethical ideal cannot be completed if one person always serves the role of one-caring. The man also loses out in this kind of relationship in that he never fully participates in the one-caring aspect of the relation. The past has attested to the fact that many women can lose themselves as one-caring to their husbands and children, and this has not only led to oppressive situations but often left a sense of powerlessness.

> The main problem with this vision of moral life, this picture of the moral agent filling her consciousness with the needs and desires of the other, is that it is presented as an abstract ideal with no reference to the social conditions under which people have aspired to that ideal. The ideal of turning away from the self and becoming engrossed in the other has proved to be the ideal of the powerless. For women the qualities associated with this ideal have also been associated with gross oppression, exploitation, and victimization.[41]

Nevertheless, Noddings' ethics, like Scheler's, MacIntyre's and Blum's presents an illuminating framework for friendship. Central to each of their theories is the notion that a shift in perspective is needed to bring new insights into ethics. As well, the attention drawn to the apprehension of another's reality or frame of reference in both Scheler's and Noddings' ethics demonstrates the fundamental importance this insight bears within the moral perspective. This insight is essential in friendship, in that the way one apprehends the other determines what type of friendship it will be. As well, how one comes to understand their friend cannot be shadowed by one's own

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[41]Sheila Mullet, "Shifting perspective: a new approach to ethics," in _Feminist Perspectives: Philosophical Essays on Method and Morals_, ed. Lorraine Code, Sheila Mullet, and Christine Overall (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 114.

preconceptions and feelings, but through a true effort to see things from the other's frame of reference. Only in doing so can one promote the good of the other. As was demonstrated earlier, this insight is specifically important to friendships between women and men.

Noddings' contention that our very identity is defined in relation to others and that the caring relation is an integral part of moral growth is particularly relevant to friendship. In the case of virtuous friendships, as was noted before, the roles of caring are not distinguished, and one can see the importance of the caring relation, as reciprocally shared, within friendship. Lastly, Noddings' exposition of caring and concrete caring relations, like Scheler's account of love and sympathy and Blum's account of the altruistic emotions, elements fundamental to virtuous friendships, demonstrate that these notions are deserving of philosophical attention and ethical discussion.

Lawrence Blum

Lawrence Blum, in <u>Friendship, Altruism and Morality</u>, puts forward an alternative approach to moral philosophy in which the altruistic emotions such as sympathy, compassion and concern for others and friendship, as a context for these emotions, are given a substantial place. It is Blum's contention that the altruistic emotions and friendship have been, for the most part, neglected in moral philosophy as a result of the dominant Kantian perspective on the emotions. In his argument that the altruistic emotions and friendship be considered significant moral

153

phenom ·ia, Blum elucidates central features of virtuous friendships, especially the concern for the good of the other, already seen within the classical studies of friendship.

Blum analyzes the arguments raised in the Kantian view that contends the emotions have no place within the moral perspective, and he demonstrates that the altruistic emotions are immune to these criticisms. The moral perspective, according to the Kantian view, must be impartial and universal, applying to all rational beings, and it entails obligation to the moral imperative. This moral imperative must be followed independently of any personal self-interest, inclinations or desires. The Kantian view argues that the emotions are transitory, passive, and partial, and since they are not under one's control, one is not responsible for them. Thus, the emotions, inclinations and desires, the Kantian view argues, must be excluded from the moral perspective.

Blum outlines several features of the altruistic emotions to demonstrate that they are not transitory and capricious, and they are fully capable of morally motivating us. Altruistic "emotions are themselves capable of the strength and reliability which the Kantian demands of moral motivation."[42] They must be separated from personal feelings and emotions, moods and inclinations and failure to do so leaves them open to the Kantian criticism that they are morally unreliable.

Altruistic emotions are intentional, and they have as their objects, other persons in light of what Blum calls their "weal and woe." "Weal" refers to one's

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[42]Ibid., 4.

154

welfare or good, whereas "woe" refers to one's misfortune or suffering. As such, the "altruistic emotions...are grounded in the weal and woe of others."[43] Personal feelings, in contrast, have as their object others in light of their personal features. Altruistic emotions, as such, are grounded in moral considerations, whereas personal feelings are not.

> The moral significance of altruistic feelings, then, lies not only in their promotion of morally good acts, in particular the acts of beneficence, but also, and at a deeper level, in the fact that their objects are the good of other persons.[44]

The altruistic emotions have both a cognitive and affective dimension, and they involve an active motivational aspect as well. A person must know and understand that another is in need, be affected by this and motivated to do something about it. This motivational aspect is founded in the desire or regard for another's good.

> Common to the altruistic emotions in situations in which one is in a position to help and those in which one is not is a desire for, or regard for, the good of the other (for his own sake). This desire prompts (intended) beneficent action when the agent is in a position to engage in it.[45]

Thus, the altruistic emotions involve an internal connection with another person's good. It is this concern for the good of the other that is the common feature of all the altruistic emotions and their respective virtues. It is within the context of friendship that the altruistic emotions come into play.

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[43]Ibid., 4.

[44]Ibid., 27.

[45]Ibid., 14.

Friendship, Blum maintains, has been neglected within moral philosophy, and it runs contrary to the Kantian moral perspective. The Kantian perspective is impartial, and it argues that each of us is to be treated equally and equally entitled to beneficent acts from others regardless of our personal relationships. Friendship implies favouring one's friends and bestowing beneficent acts on them that we would not normally bestow upon strangers. Blum persuasively argues that impartiality is not the moral perspective to be adopted in many situations, and it applies only in restricted sorts of situations. Within the context of friendship, there are certain situations, such as work, in which impartiality is necessary and where it would not be morally appropriate to favour friends. However, the position of the job requires a certain impartiality,[46] and this does not imply that conflict exists between helping one's friends and helping others. Thus, impartiality is appropriate only in certain situations, and it is not a perspective one must adopt to act morally. It is also important to note that impartiality implies that people have certain claims on one's benefits, and it is only within this context that impartiality is required.

> It is only when someone has a certain claim on a benefit that it is a matter of impartiality to give due regard to his interest in that benefit.[47]

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[46]"Institutional roles and positions are an obvious arena of life in which a certain kind of impartiality between the interests of all, including those to whom we are personally connected and attached, is demanded of us. Equally obvious is the fact that situations covered by such roles are very untypical of those in which we interact with and benefit our friends. And so the existence of such roles does not betoken a common, much less a fundamental, moral problem regarding the beneficence dispensed to our friends." Ibid., 48.

[47]Ibid., 52.

Impartiality, Blum argues, between the interests of our friends and other people arises from the mistaken view that our friends are in competition with others for our beneficent acts which is not the case at all. Friendship is a particular context in which doing something for a friend or engaging in a shared activity is particular to that relationship and how the friends define it. The giving of oneself, the sympathy, care and concern with the other as well as the engrossment in the other's good in friendship goes far beyond what is morally expected of us to give to others. Furthermore, it is the friend who makes a true effort to know the other and who has taken an active participation in the other's good. Therefore, the friend would know best how to truly foster that good, whereas a stranger or acquaintance would not. The Kantian view, Blum concludes, cannot properly account for the moral significance of friendship. Friendship "as a central human endeavor does not require a moral vindication, in the sense of a justification according to impersonal and universal principles."[48]

Friendship is the context within which the altruistic emotions and their virtues become morally relevant. In his argument that friendship is a morally significant phenomenon, Blum brings out several salient features. The fundamental aspect of friendship is its concern for and fostering of the other's good. It is in this way that friendship has true moral significance. Blum maintains that there is both a personal aspect and an altruistic aspect in friendship. The personal aspect has to do with the

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[48]Ibid., 64.

personal significance our friends have, whereas the altruistic aspect involves a substantial concern for the good of the other for his or her own sake.

Friendships of pleasure, in which each enjoys the other's company, do not involve a desire on the part of either to give of themselves or a genuine caring and concern with the other. Blum points out that there is nothing wrong with such a friendship, but it does not have the moral significance that virtuous friendships have. It is in the deep caring and commitment for another's good that gives friendship its moral value. As was seen in the four examples of friendship between men and women philosophers. it was this commitment and deep level of caring for each other's good that was the definitive feature within each of these lifelong friendships.

To foster the good of the other requires, as a prerequisite, an ability to truly understand the other, and this was demonstrated in the theories of Scheler and Noddings. It is a necessary part of friendship to give of oneself to the friend, but also to recognize the friend's otherness and their own integrity and separateness as a person. This was a defining feature in Scheler's notion of the person, and it is an especially important feature in friendships between women and men. Sympathy and caring, which were given detailed exposition in Scheler and Noddings, are key components of friendship outlined in Blum's account. The virtue of sympathy enables one to perceive another's weal or woe that would not necessarily be perceived in the absence of this virtue. Blum argues that there are different levels in friendship, and it is our commitment to caring for the other that determines the level of friendship.

It is:

> the level of caring itself which primarily determines the level of moral value in the friendship. It is the genuine care for another person which constitutes a moral activity of the self...In caring we as it were go out from ourselves to another person; we give of ourselves; we affirm the friend in his own right.[49]

It is within the context of virtuous friendships that a person is engaged in the good of the other. Friendship involves effort and struggle, a commitment into the future and a true giving of oneself that is not seen as self-sacrifice. In friendship, there is not a true separation between one's own interests and another's, and to forgo one's own interests for the sake of another does not involve self-sacrifice. Friendship "is a context in which the division between self-interest and other-interest is often not applicable."[50] It is in working towards the other's growth and happiness and an engrossment in the friend's general good that becomes a shared and reciprocal endeavour in friendship.

Blum maintains that the altruistic emotions are a reflection of our moral selves just as the quality of a person's friendships is an expression of his or her moral being. Blum does not defend a virtue-based ethics in that he believes ethics is of a more pluralistic nature, and that the virtues alone cannot fully account for moral change. However, the virtues, like the altruistic emotions, involve attitudes and dispositions that reflect our moral selves, what he calls our "being-towards others," and for which

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[49]Ibid., 74.

[50]Ibid., 76.

159

we are morally accountable. "Therefore character, like being-towards-others, is a kind of totality which encompasses ways of behaving, attitudes, and emotions."[51]

Blum implicitly accepts the Kantian view of reason and the Kantian moral perspective, and he works within that context while trying to show its deficiencies, but he gives no reason why this view is accepted. Moreover, Blum is imprecise as to whom we attribute this Kantian view that is so prevalent in contemporary ethics. As well, Blum mentions Kant's own presentation of friendship only in passing, and he does not give a proper justification to it. Since Blum uses the Kantian view as a foil to his own presentation of moral philosophy, I think it is necessary that he address Kant's views on friendship.

Blum, like MacIntyre, is an excellent example of a contemporary articulation of friendship as a virtue, and they both demonstrate the fundamental importance friendship has within ethical theory. Blum's analysis of the altruistic emotions, the concern and fostering of another's good and friendship cogently demonstrates their relevance within ethical discussion. Lastly, Blum has called attention to essential insights, also elaborated by MacIntyre, Scheler and Noddings, for an ethical framework in which friendship is co'' Jered morally ignificant.

The application of these contemporary ethical theories to friendship elucidates the significance virtuous friendships play within ethics. Our contemporary society is predominantly founded on the tenets of liberal individualism. The private interests

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[51]Ibid., 205.

and rights of individuals are considered to be fundamental, and Hobbes' premise that an individual is primarily motivated by self-interest is, unfortunately, a fairly accurate depiction of our society today. To counter the predominance of individualism within contemporary society, one effect of feminism has had a positive role to play within friendships between men and women. It has brought equality, a necessary precondition for friendship, to relationships between men and women, and it has thus created new ranges of friendship between women and men. The conception of the person as essentially connected to others; the notion of friendship as inherently valuable and contributing to human flourishing; the importance of community and a defense of a virtue-based ethics all offer an illuminating perspective for contemporary ethics.

The notion of the person, conceived in these theories as a centre of activity whose actions and intentions are intelligible within the context of one's life, provides a basis in which the apprehension of other selves is made possible. This apprehension of other selves was elaborated in both the theories of Scheler and Noddings as a key ethical function. This notion is directly relevant to friendship, specifically between men and women, in that a concern and fostering of another's good can only be achieved through a true effort to understand another person. This ideal is difficult, and many people would argue impossible, in the case of men and women. Neither a man or a woman can fully understand what it is to be the other sex. However, the attempt towards this ideal is necessary in that the other's perspective is acknowledged, viewed as valuable and respected.

161

The philosophical analysis of love and sympathy, caring, the various virtues and the altruistic emotions in Scheler, Noddings, MacIntyre and Blum, respectively, demonstrate their ethical relevance to friendship and a virtue-based ethics. Moreover, the concern and fostering of the other's good, explicated in each theory, illuminates one of the defining principles of virtuous friendships and what gives it its moral significance.

Also fundamental to friendship is MacIntyre's defense of a virtue-based ethics. The critical assessment of MacIntyre's theory, examined earlier, elucidates the crucial role virtuous friendships have within a virtue-based ethics. This kind of ethics focuses on community in which our relations with others are an integral part of human nature. Our particular friendships, that centre around the concern and participation in another's good, can extend outwards into one's particular community in which there is a shared pursuance of common goods.

A virtue-based ethics, as previously discussed, is founded on the tenets of community in which one's relations with others are considered fundamental to self-identity. In such an ethics, the important role friendship between men and women plays is evident, and it suggests the possibility of an ethical community created by both which includes their shared goals and pursuits. Moira Gatens' article on Mary Wollstonecraft's philosophy[52] offers some thought provoking insights into this notion

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[52]Moira Gatens, "The Oppressed State of My Sex: Wollstonecraft on Reason, Feeling and Equality," in Feminist Interpretations and Political Theory, ed. Mary Lyndon Shanley and Carole Pateman (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991).

of community. Gatens argues that "the governing ethic between men and women is still primarily conjugal in that it treats women primarily as wives/ mothers/ sexual partners."[53] Gatens asks what "are the possibilities for women and men sharing a co-authored ethical community?"[54] An ethical community created by both women and men can be made possible: by returning with new insight, "to Wollstonecraft's early claim that the most holy band of society is friendship;"[55] and by developing the understanding of friendship between men and women presented in this thesis. Thus, the possible implications friendships between women and men have, within the ethical framework developed in this chapter, is a re-examination of our relations with one another and the sharing of a co-authored community. This kind of community could be an extension of women's and men's particular friendships, and it could encompass their shared goals and aspirations.

The following chart follows the same format as that in chapter 2. The foundations of each theory and the application of that theory to friendship are summarized for each philosopher.

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[53]Ibid., 126.

[54]Ibid., 127.

[55]Ibid., 126.

TABLE 4: ETHICAL FRAMEWORK FOR VIRTUOUS FRIENDSHIPS

		Scheler	Noddings	MacIntyre	Blum
I Foundations of Theory	1)Tenets of community	X	X	X	
	2)Relation with others as basic	X	X	X	X
	3)Notion of person	X		X	X
	4)Knowledge of others as a key ethical function	X	X		
	5)Defense of a Virtue based ethics			X	
II Application of theory to friendship	Phil. exposition of characteristics central to friendship: -caring		X		
	-sympathy	X			X
	-love	X			X
	-altruistic emotions				X
	-good of the other	X	X	X	X
	-virtues in general			X	X

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this thesis is to defend the argument that friendship between men and women can be a virtue. This was accomplished first, through a detailed analysis of what philosophers have said about friendship and what defines it as virtuous, specifically as it applies to women and men; secondly, through the analysis of four practical examples of friendship that existed between men and women philosophers. This analysis has disclosed three basic forms of friendship: friendships based on pleasure; friendships based on utility and friendships based on character. In friendships based on pleasure or utility the friend is viewed as instrumental to one's own pleasure or needs. Friendships founded on character are virtuous friendships in which the other person is regarded as possessing intrinsic value.

The virtues, in both classical and contemporary discussions, are dispositions of character, acquired through activity which aid us in our quest for the good. The virtue of friendship is different from the other virtues in that it is a virtue shared by two people who participate in a common quest for the good. As discussed earlier, this quest for the good is not pre-set or defined at the beginning, but it is something that one discovers in the course of one's life and in one's relations with others. The particular good of the friend, when shared in friendship, becomes extended into a common quest for the good, and it is within this kind of friendship that a person is truly engaged in the good of the other. Virtuous friendships, therefore, join two people together in a common pursuit of the good. This type of friendship is

developed between good people who share common interests and values, and who have an equal relationship with one another. True friendship is a lifelong endeavour, which develops and grows over the friends' lives, and it takes considerable amount of effort and work to sustain. It involves community and a lifelong commitment to one another. The practical examples in chapter 3 supported the argument that friendship contributes significantly to personal, intellectual, spiritual and moral growth. It is this intrinsic value placed on the friend, the intertwining of the friends' lives together and the direct concern with the other's good that gives virtuous friendship its ethical value.

It was argued in chapter 1 that the classical philosophers contended that friendship ought to be an integral part of the morally good life, essential to human flourishing and a necessary component for the foundation of a good community. There were specific preconditions, principles and effects, outlined in each theory, that defined friendship as virtuous. It was a necessary component in achieving the ends or goods specific to each philosopher's ethical theory.

Chapter 2 presented arguments that friendships between men and women are not possible. These arguments rested either on the tenets of individualism or an inborn hostility the theorist bore to the opposite sex. The male/female relationship, as such, was one of conflict and war which can best be described as "a battle of the sexes." Each theory was shown to have a philosophically questionable foundation.

The classical conception of friendship, articulated in chapter 1, was applied in chapter 3 to practical examples of friendship that existed between men and women

philosophers. These examples demonstrated the possibility of virtuous friendships between women and men, the importance the friendship played in each philosopher's life and its ethical value. Each of these friendships was a lifelong venture in which each friend contributed to the other's personal intellectual and spiritual growth. The interests and values the friends shared at the beginning of their relationship took on new dimensions and became a common good they pursued together. The friendships brought in other virtues such as love, loyalty and trust. Each friendship attests to the fact that virtuous friendships between men and women are possible, ethically valuable and contribute significantly to human flourishing.

The application of contemporary ethical theories to friendship, elucidated in chapter 4, provided a philosophical framework for friendship and a virtue-based ethics. Friendship is intricately tied to the other virtues, and in its practical application necessarily brings in other virtues. Love, sympathy, caring, loyalty and trust, fundamental components to virtuous friendships, were given philosophical analysis by each theorist in chapter 4. An insight also elaborated in this chapter was the apprehension of another's reality without imposing one's own preconceptions and values. This was an integral part of friendship, especially between men and women. In this situation, the good of the other can only be properly promoted when the other person sets his or her own preconceptions aside and places him or herself in the other person's perspective. Given men's and women's different lived experiences, this is a difficult accomplishment, but each must attempt to understand the other from his or her own perspective. This ability to place one's self in another's perspective

is a necessary ideal to work towards in order that one can be truly engaged in the good of the other. MacIntyre's theory, when critically assessed, demonstrated the cogency of a virtue-based ethics and the significant role friendships contribute to it. Most importantly, friendships between men and women open up the possibility of an ethical community created by both.

This thesis also revealed the formidable problems biological differences present to the formation of friendship between men and women. In some of the classical discussions on friendship, women, on the basis of their sex, were regarded as inferior, limited in their reasoning capacity and excluded from the public sphere. As such, they were incapable of participating fully in the ethical life, and were essentially denied friendship in its most complete form. If there was friendship between a man and a woman, it was often limited and confined to the private sphere and women's defined role as wife and mother. This view of assumed inferiority of women, the exclusion from the public sphere and the denial of the right to education for women were all factors that prevented friendship from developing between men and women. Taylor, Mill and other theorists argued that this kind of relationship between men and women hinders the progress of society and civilization. True friendship between men and women, these theorists maintained, was essential to the progress of society. This could only be achieved through the emancipation of women: by supporting their right to education; and by recognizing an equal standing between both men and women.

The philosophers discussed in chapter 2 maintained that differences between

men and women were so significant that there was no possibility of any meaningful interaction between them except perhaps by way of conflict or opposition. Chapter 3 demonstrated that, despite the problems that can arise, many men and women have worked to overcome these obstacles, and have developed a truly virtuous friendship. This was clearly evident in the lives of the four selected examples of friendship between men and women philosophers elaborated in chapter 3.

In contemporary society, factors other than simple biological differences impede friendships from forming between men and women. Many women feel anger and resentment towards men because of the patriarchal system that has subordinated and oppressed women. Daly argues that men, as the originators and perpetuators of a patriarchal system, have created a war with women, and that women's only solution is to fight back. This is a feeling shared by many women today. An unjust social system and the prevailing and overwhelming violence men direct against women also contribute to enormous tensions between them. A simple inability to understand one another, as well as culturally and socially inscribed differences, all contribute to the problem of friendship between them. As such, the ability for men and women to overcome these difficulties and develop a true friendship is all the more challenging. However, I believe that the enrichment friendship brings to the lives of men and women, as demonstrated in this thesis, offers sufficient incentive.

Friendship between men and women is therefore a far more difficult achievement then friendships between members of the same sex. Our contemporary social problems easily attest to a distorted understanding of the relationship between

women and men. Therefore, the re-examination of this relationship has taken on a vital urgency. The formation of an ethical community between men and women, described in chapter 4, presents a perspective in which they can work together towards shared goals. Declaring men as the enemy, as some feminists argue, is not in my opinion a solution to our social problems or an answer to our relationships with one another. Marilyn Friedman's arguments, as summarized in chapter 4, stated that friendships among women have been a catalyst in the feminist movement, linking them together in their common experiences and their fight against a patriarchal system. Likewise, friendships between women and men can be catalysts for social change and offer a re-definition of our relations with one another.

The ability to live peacefully in an equally shared community and the pursuance of common goods can only be accomplished when friendship exists between men and women. Differences between women and men, while detrimental, may also have a positive aspect. These differences must be acknowledged and respected and within the context of true friendship, they can contribute to the diversity and richness of the friendship. The conception of friendship, developed in this thesis, as a lifelong commitment in which where there is a true attempt to understand the other from her or his perspective, combined with the direct concern for the other's good, offers profound implications for a re-examination of this relationship between men and women. It is not claimed that the conception of friendship, as articulated in this thesis, will solve our moral problems, but it does suggest a different perspective from which to view our relations with one another.

Further research that could flow from this thesis is a more comprehensive look at what philosophers have said about friendship. Many philosophers, other than the ones articulated in this thesis, have also discussed the ethical significance of friendship. They include Plato, Epicurus, Thomas Aquinas, Montaigne, Francis Bacon and Ralph Waldo Emerson. In addition, Von Hippel and Mary Wollstonecraft have argued for the ethical importance of friendship between men and women. Other friendships that existed between men and women outside of the philosophical context could be explored to show the significant contribution each makes to the other within the context of friendship. As well, the comparison of friendships between members of the same sex to friendships between men and women may reveal the special nature of friendship between men and women.

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