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Moral Education and Moral Agency:  
A Deweyan Approach

Steve R. Hreha

A Thesis
in
The Faculty
of
Arts and Science

Presented in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at
Concordia University
Montreal, Quebec, Canada

August 1989

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ABSTRACT

Moral Education and Moral Agency:
A Deweyan Approach

Steve R. Hreha, Ph.D.
Concordia University, 1989

In this thesis, the desirability of adopting a Deweyan moral framework within which an approach to moral education can be developed is defended. The aim of moral education, it is claimed, is to nurture the growth and development of moral agency. The central idea of this thesis is that Dewey's conception of moral experience and his understanding of the nature and formation of character result in a number of significant consequences for the theory of moral education and moral agency. Its chief objective is to identify these.

Dewey's conception of moral experience is developed against the backdrop of his "metaphysics". The claim is made that character is an intrinsic constituent of both pre-reflective and reflective experience. It is then argued that in conditioning the structure and quality of pre-reflective experience, affective character thereby also conditions the course and outcome of reflective moral experience.

The pattern of reflective moral inquiry is the
distinguishing characteristic of reflective moral experience. The primary, but not exclusive, subject-matter of reflective moral experience, it is claimed, is the character development of the agent involved. Dewey's conception of moral inquiry, it is argued, is comprised of two distinguishable, but not separable, phases, viz., the diagnostic and the prescriptive. The task of the former is to articulate the problem inherent in an indeterminate experiential situation eliciting moral inquiry, while the task of the latter is to project and assess ends-in-view.

In light of Dewey's understanding of moral life, the following consequences for the theory of moral education and moral agency are identified:

1) moral education cannot be value-neutral;
2) moral education is character education;
3) feelings must play a greater role in moral education;
4) moral education must unfold within the context of a liberal arts education.

The main conclusion of this thesis is that a Deweyan approach to moral education is an important alternative to values clarification and to Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental approach.
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I owe a great deal to my major advisor, Dr. Dallas Laskey. He not only introduced me to Dewey's writings, but also kept me from falling into the morass of dogmatism. From the very beginning of my work, he has been a kind and supportive voice encouraging me to pursue my ideas. I shall always be grateful for his counsel and generosity of spirit.

To Dr. Bill Knitter, my advisor, I owe much more than I can hope to acknowledge here. Throughout the course of my work, and regardless of his other commitments, he was always available to meet with me to discuss Dewey's views, as well as other ideas and issues in education. His understanding of Dewey's philosophy helped make it come alive for me in a way that I may otherwise never have known. His support, encouragement and many helpful suggestions have enriched my work in ways too numerous to mention.

I would also like to acknowledge my debt to my third advisor, Dr. Jack Ornstein. His good advice made it possible for me to see my thesis in a clearer light. His encouragement of my work was very much appreciated.

I would like to thank Concordia University for awarding me a graduate fellowship and for providing me with the opportunity to pursue my interests.

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I would also like to acknowledge my thanks to my parents. Throughout the course of my work they never wavered in their support. I shall remain forever grateful for their encouragement and confidence.

The writing of a thesis requires much work and even more sacrifice. My thesis would have remained a pipe-dream had it not been for the steadfast support of my wife, Lucy. Over the years of study and writing, she was always there for me with prudent counsel and a sympathetic ear. I owe her more than I can possibly say in these acknowledgements.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge my debt to John Dewey. His writings have had a profound effect on my way of seeing and understanding the world. I hope I have not betrayed the spirit of his ideas.


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The problem of restoring integration and cooperation between man's beliefs about the world in which he lives and his beliefs about the values and purposes that should direct his conduct is the deepest problem of modern life. It is the problem of any philosophy that is not isolated from that life.

John Dewey
...matters concerned with conduct and questions of what is good for us have no fixity, any more than matters of health. The general account being of this nature, the account of particular cases is yet more lacking in exactness; for they do not fall under any art or precept but the agents themselves must in each case consider what is appropriate to the occasion, as happens also in the art of medicine or of navigation. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics

Moral education is of some concern to most everyone. This is especially true in times of uncertainty and social upheaval. In his preface to Dewey's book Moral Principles in Education, Sidney Hook writes:

Every time a political or moral crisis engulfs the nation, sooner or later the ethical deficiencies of public life are related to the prevailing ethics of the community and to the education its citizens have received, or have failed to receive, in school and out. Wherever schools have existed they have been expected to reinforce, supplement, sometimes even to substitute for, the moral education children have acquired at home or church.¹

The socio-political conditions cited by Hook, together with rapid technological change, serve to account for the current interest in moral education and, in particular, the moral
education programs offered in the schools. The specific values and ideals comprising the subject matter of moral education, the classroom practices associated with it, and its underlying philosophical assumptions and commitments are frequently the object of intense public scrutiny and criticism. Moreover, given the reemergence of conservatism and religious fundamentalism, these controversies often prove to be intractable and intensely partisan since religious and secular views of the nature and purpose of morality are deeply incompatible, thus precluding the possibility of an approach to moral education common to both. Ralph C. Page clearly underscores the sharp contrast between these competing conceptions of morality and moral education when he writes:

The stripe of Liberalism in which rights are prominent rests on a neutral conception of the good. Justice, the highest social value in this system, is represented as fairness to competing conceptions of the good. This is primarily because the "independence" of "individuals" is seen as the highest personal value, and since both independence and the individual supposedly are conceptualized apart from particular moral and religious conceptions of the good, heavy restraints are put on the authority of any particular conception of the good not required by this ideal of individual freedom. This just about sums up the "secular humanism" that so many denominational schools in this country have been founded to combat. It is "humanist" because individuals are conceived apart from their relation to God--because individuals are seen as
sufficiently good to realize their own highest potentials. It is secular because the highest personal good is freedom or self-direction, rather than redemption and piety; and, it is secular because the highest social value is justice, which is blind to religious commitments since it is conceived as neutral across various conceptions of the good.

The controversy attending moral education is further exacerbated by the fact that both the religious and the secular constructions of morality are marked by their own forms of discord and division. Since few educators, if any, can ever succeed in completely distancing themselves from their own moral outlook, most educators, if not all, directly influence the moral quality of the moral education programs with which they are involved. Given that most educators involved in moral education espouse either a religious or a secular view of morality, it follows that the belief that moral educators can be morally neutral while teaching moral values and the belief that they can succeed in teaching only the methods and principles common to all moral codes (ideals favoured by liberals), are both simply untenable. The net conclusion to be drawn in light of this is that very little, if anything at all, can be said about moral education that will meet with universal acceptance and approval.

Regardless of the approach involved, moral education must be informed by theory if it is to be coherent and
rational. Speaking of educational practice in general, Morris L. Bigge writes:

Any action, whether a part of teaching or some other activity in life, either is linked with theory or is blind and purposeless. Consequently, any purposeful action is governed by theory. Everyone who teaches or professes to teach has a theory of education. A teacher may or may not be able to describe that theory in explicit terms; however, we can usually deduce from the teacher's actions the theory that has not yet been verbalized. So, the important question is not whether a teacher has a theory of education, but rather how tenable it is. Everything a teacher does as a teacher is colored by the educational theory that person holds.  

Bigge's claim, although it is about educational practice in general, nevertheless can be applied with equal weight to the practice of moral education. It follows, therefore, that the practice of moral education is theory-laden. Moreover, as Bigge clearly implies, the theory which education involves must itself be assessed with a view to determining whether or not it is tenable. Thus a theory of moral education presupposes a larger philosophical framework within which its specific value orientations, commitments, and prescriptions for practice can be articulated and justified. Given the radical divergence in views regarding the nature of morality cited above, it follows that to seek to avoid controversy and conflict in the development and justification of a theory of moral education is a will o'
the wisp and, hence, one must not be too sanguine in the hopes one entertains for the proposals one advances in this area.

The theoretical and philosophical dimensions of moral education, as is no doubt apparent, can be approached and developed in a number of different ways. Moreover, since the field of moral education encompasses a complex subject-matter, a variety of interests and objectives are reflected in the concerns it elicits. In what follows, therefore, I shall delineate the specific objectives of my thesis as well as the particular strategy I propose to adopt as a means to achieving these objectives.

A: FOCUS AND LIMITATIONS

A teacher engaged in conducting a class as part of a moral education program clearly must have some idea not only of the specific learning objectives that s/he has set for that particular class (and of the objectives connected with the program as a whole) but also of the activities and methods best suited to achieve these objectives. The determination of the aims of moral education, however, and the means to be employed for their achievement is not typically an aspect of practice but rather an outcome of a specific theory of moral education. Moreover, the aims and methods prescribed by practical theory themselves stand in
need of clarification and justification. The task of providing these falls within the province of the philosophy of education. The problems and issues in the field of moral education thus can be divided into three areas of inquiry: (1) actual classroom practice, (2) the theoretical constructions which inform and guide that practice, and (3) the philosophical matrix within which the assumptions and value judgements inherent in the theoretical constructions employed are analyzed and justified. In the first area of inquiry, questions can be raised regarding both the utility as well as the morality of the classroom practices associated with a particular approach to moral education. Thus it can be asked whether or not classroom discussions of specific values (e.g., honesty) are sufficient (or even necessary) to an individual's coming to hold these values. Apart from utility, discussions of values such as honesty may be challenged on the grounds that they serve to indoctrinate rather than to educate the students involved. In the second area questions can occur not only about the proper aims of moral education, but also about the character of the cognitive and affective stance to moral situations that ought to be fostered. For example, should the aim of moral education be individual autonomy or respect for and obedience to the will of God? Is moral conduct rooted in feeling or in thought? In the third area of inquiry, questions arise about the nature of morality and
the ground of moral judgement. Are moral standards grounded in nature or must they be derived a priori? Can a prescriptive judgement be derived from a descriptive one?

In light of the foregoing it can be concluded that any approach to moral education will inevitably involve questions and issues in each of the areas of inquiry identified above. More importantly, however, it can be argued that in order for an approach to moral education to be rational, coherent and complete it must include, among other things, the following desiderata: (1) prescriptions for practice (pedagogical/theoretical component), (2) the identification of intermediate and terminal learning objectives (curricular/theoretical component), and (3) clarification and justification of the aims and methods prescribed (philosophical component). Given these desiderata of moral education it can be reasonably concluded that the delineation, clarification and justification of the aim of moral education is a key component in any theory of moral education.

1. The Aim of Moral Education

The task of delineating, clarifying and justifying the aim of moral education is comparable to the task of determining the aim of education in general. In discussing the aim of education T.W. Moore, following R.S. Peters, writes: "Formally a general theory of education can be said
to have one aim only: to produce a certain type of person, an educated man." He then goes on to add: "The interesting question is how to give substantial content to this formal aim." In Moore's view, the purely formal statement of the aim of education can be given substantive content in one of two ways. The first of these--

...is to develop an analysis of the concept of education, to work out in detail the criteria which govern the actual use of this term. The criteria will be those which enable us to mark off the educated man from one who is not. The task of working out these criteria falls to the analytical philosopher of education.

The second way in which the aim of education can be given substance

...is to place it in some particular social, political or religious context. The formal aim simply demands an educated man, but this notion will vary in content according to the time, place and culture in which the aim is to be realized.

He adds:

It is perhaps worth mentioning here that the fact that the substance of the aim is bound to be culture-relative is a good reason why no general theory can provide recommendations applicable to all educational situations and why no such general theory will command universal acceptance.

For Moore, therefore, the purely formal statement of the aim of education can be given specific content either by means of conceptual analysis or by relating it to a specific
socio-cultural matrix.

In view of the foregoing, it can be argued that if the aim of education can be given in purely formal terms, then the same procedure can be adopted for the more limited field of moral education. Thus, if the aim of education is to produce an educated person then the aim of moral education is to produce a morally educated person. Given that a morally educated person and a moral agent are one and the same, it follows that the aim of moral education is, in effect, to nurture and encourage the growth and development of moral agency. Since the purely formal statement of the aim of moral education can be regarded as common to all theories of moral education, it follows that the central task of any coherent approach to moral education must be to elucidate the substantive content of this aim. As indicated above, however, this task can be accomplished either by analyzing the concept of "moral education" or by fleshing out the notion of moral agency from within the parameters of a particular moral theory. In my view, a purely conceptual approach to this task is untenable. In this thesis, therefore, I propose to outline an approach to moral education that is thoroughly grounded in a Deweyan construction of moral experience. I shall, accordingly, begin by delineating the principal characteristics of Dewey's understanding of moral experience and of his understanding of the nature and formation of character. I
shall then proceed to develop some of the more important implications of his view of moral experience and character for both the theory and practice of moral education and the notion of moral agency. This strategy for approaching moral education along Deweyan lines departs from customary discussions of Dewey's views on moral education in that its primary focus, rather than centering on his philosophy of education per se, centers instead on the development of the implications for the practice of moral education (and its attendant notion of moral agency) to which his view of moral experience and character gives rise. The advantage of this strategy is that it provides a thoroughly Deweyan moral framework within which to outline an approach to moral education. Once developed, the implications for moral education and moral agency of a Deweyan construction of moral experience can be used to critically assess approaches to moral education claiming to be compatible with Dewey's philosophical outlook.

The principal objectives of my thesis thus can be formulated as follows: (1) to delineate the aim of moral education and (2) to clarify and justify this aim. As can be readily inferred, my concern with moral education is entirely theoretical and philosophical. Hence I do not propose to discuss teaching methods and activities, nor do I propose to survey and assess the various programs of moral education currently in place. I shall, moreover, restrict
the scope of the theoretical and philosophical discussion of moral education to those problems and issues which are directly related to my objectives as stated above. Thus I shall not be concerned with issues and ideas that are not directly relevant to these objectives, however vital and relevant these may otherwise be to a full and complete discussion of moral education.

2. The Meaning of "Philosophy"

Before discussing the reasons for the specific approach I have adopted to the task of delineating the aim of moral education, it is necessary to consider, albeit briefly, a difficulty in connection with the use of the term "philosophy". In restricting the focus of my thesis to the theoretical and philosophical aspects of moral education I am, in effect, undertaking an inquiry in the philosophy of education. Just what is to count as philosophy of education, however, is a source of some controversy.

The term "philosophy of education" does not, in point of fact, denote a single, homogeneous and precisely defined discipline encompassing various branches and schools but rather a constellation of related inquiries whose common focus is education. Moreover, developments in the philosophy of education tend typically to follow those in its parent discipline, philosophy, and as a result much of the history of the philosophy of education roughly parallels
the history of philosophy. Throughout most of its history philosophy of education was generally conceived as an inquiry into the metaphysical, epistemological, ethical, and axiological assumptions of education. In his book Education and Philosophical Thought published in 1962, Kingsley Price writes:

"Philosophy of education", as the phrase is employed here, means an analytical treatment of education together with an attempt to relate it in a certain way to metaphysics, ethics and epistemology. It should be noted that this way of understanding the phrase conforms to the practice, if not to the explicit formulation, recorded in the literature.

He then adds:

In its first subdivision, analysis, philosophy of education is the activity of clarifying our understanding of those terms in education which need it. In its second subdivision, philosophy of education attempts to show that there is a metaphysical explanation for the factual part of education and a certain supplement for it. In its third subdivision, ethics provides a justification and clarification of the recommendations which education includes. In its fourth subdivision, the philosophy of education endeavours to provide a theory of learning derived from epistemology.

Plato's views on education, as developed in The Republic, serve as a paradigm example of this conception of the philosophy of education.

With the turn of the century and the work of Moore, Wittgenstein, and Russell philosophy underwent a significant
change in course, becoming less systematic and more analytical. This "revolution in philosophy" was ushered into the philosophy of education in 1942 with the publication of C.D. Hardie's book *Truth and Fallacy in Educational Theory*. In 1956 the appearance of D.J. O'Connor's book, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education*, helped consolidate the new approach to the philosophy of education and opened the door to the work of R.S. Peters, B. Othanel Smith, and Israel Scheffler. In his "Introduction" to the eightieth yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, Jonas Soltis writes:

> In recent years philosophers of education, following the trend in general philosophy, have been less inclined to build or interpret systems of philosophy and have been more engaged in examining a number of topics and ideas relevant to educating by the use of their highly honed philosophical skills. Thus they have tended to view philosophy less as a noun and more as a verb, less as system building and more as ways of thinking critically about some important aspect of educating, such as moral education, equality of educational opportunity, and the nature of educational research. They have tried to use the techniques of philosophy to help educators think more clearly about what they are doing. 17

The term "philosophy of education" thus has come to have, among anglo-american philosophers of education, at least, an almost exclusive connection with conceptual analysis.

In view of these differing conceptions of what the
philosophy of education amounts to, it is evident that in undertaking an inquiry in the philosophy of education it is not immediately apparent just what it is that one intends to do. It should be noted, therefore, that contrary to current practice in philosophy of education, I do not propose to adopt an exclusively analytical approach in delineating the aim of moral education.¹⁸ I shall, instead, adopt an approach that is more in keeping with the conception of the philosophy of education as outlined by Price.

In the foregoing brief discussion of the term "philosophy" my aim has been to clarify a difficulty in connection with its use. Having done so, I now propose to consider in more detail the reasons for rejecting a purely conceptual approach to the task of delineating the aim of moral education thereby providing partial justification for the approach I have adopted.

3. John Wilson on Moral Education

The work of Oxford philosopher of education John Wilson can readily serve as a paradigm example of a purely analytical approach to the task of providing substantive content for the formal aim of moral education.¹⁹ In discussing the inadequacy of a purely analytical approach to this task I shall, accordingly, restrict my attention to Wilson's work in this area. I shall begin by presenting a summary of his views focussing especially upon his method.
I shall then develop a critique of his approach underscoring several serious difficulties with it which, in my view, render it untenable.

Wilson claims that "moral education" is "...a name for nothing clear". The theories and practices associated with it are all either hopelessly muddled or else simply vacuous. This is the case, in his view, largely because theoreticians and practitioners of moral education fail to pay sufficient attention to the meanings of the key terms involved. Since the aim of moral education is the production of a morally educated person it follows, given Wilson's diagnosis of the confusion characteristic of moral education, that in order for this situation to improve it is necessary to first determine the meaning of the term "moral". He writes:

Some types of research, among them research in an area for which 'moral education' may stand as a convenient general title, are intended not only to establish what is the case: they are also intended to assess what is the case in terms of what ought to be the case, and to discover methods of moving the former nearer to the latter. The researcher is concerned not only to determine what the morality of various people or 'subjects' (Ses) actually is: but also to determine how far it falls short of what it ought to be.22

He then goes on to add: "Research of this kind needs to be clearly demarcated, because its interests require a significantly different methodology. I shall give it a
grand name and call it 'normative'. Wilson then concludes:

That research in moral education is normative, in the sense described, is a matter of simple logic. The morally educated S must be an improvement on the morally uneducated S: this is part of the meaning of 'morally educated'. The researcher must therefore begin by establishing the norms of his (normative) research: that is, what it means to be 'morally educated', or educated in the area of morality.

Lest there be any misunderstanding about the meaning of "meaning" Wilson underscores the point that the "meaning" to be elucidated is linguistic and not any other kind. "...the initial question for all researchers in this field..." he writes, "...is not "What is morality?" in the sense of "What does morality consist of (what is its essence, how does it function)?", but rather "What are we going to count as "moral" or "morality" -- What are we going to mean by these terms?" For Wilson, therefore, conceptual analysis must be the first order of business in developing an intelligible theory of moral education.

In Wilson's view, as the passages cited above make plain, a normative structure is essential if a coherent and rational understanding of moral education is to be developed. In his view the analysis of the term "moral" is fundamental not only because it results in a greater degree of clarity, but also because it reveals the very normative structure that is required. In analyzing the meaning of the
term "moral" Wilson begins by suggesting that scepticism about traditional and conventional value systems results in the search for a new basis upon which to construct a new value system. Writes Wilson:

"For some people the old values, faiths, creeds and so on begin to lose their force. Of course many other people are still solidly attached to them; and other people (a certain type of extreme atheist, for instance) maintain a kind of identity by continued passionate opposition to them: but many of us feel lost." 26

He then adds: "So we seek to replace them. We seek a new basis for our morality, a new ground on which to build, perhaps a new authority to accept, admire and obey." 27 In his view, however, the search for a new basis for morality is liable to go wrong in virtue of the preconceptions that are entertained about the "basis" of morality. "...the only kind of 'basis' for morality of which most of us have had any experience...", he writes, "...has been an authoritarian basis." 28 He adds: "Now that the old basis has let us down, we naturally look for a new basis of the same logical type." 29 For Wilson, to seek a new basis for morality that is of the same logical type as the ones rejected (i.e., authoritarian) is futile. He writes:

"If one basis or authority can be rejected and hence result in break-down, chaos, uncertainty, etc., then so can another. We may give our children a 'new basis' by devising a new moral code (drawn from whatever source), but will this do the job better than the old one?
Is it likely to last? Ought it to last?\textsuperscript{30}

The implication here is that if the "new" basis for morality that is sought is of the same logical type as the one which has been rejected, then it too will eventually have to be rejected. If we are to avoid this state of affairs then the new basis which is being sought must, in fact, be truly new. Such a basis can only be found by means of critical reflection. "...if we want to find the right basis, or at least a more reasonable basis...", he writes "...then we shall have to think about it: we shall have to try to answer the general question "How are we to judge between one basis and another?".\textsuperscript{31}

In Wilson's view the shift from simply replacing one basis of morality with another of the same logical type to inquiring into the principles by which the basis of any moral system is to be judged is of fundamental importance. This is the case because in asking the question, "How are we to judge between one basis of morality and another?", the door is opened to the possibility of a non-partisan method of assessing different moral systems. He writes:

...as soon as we take this question seriously, we begin to see that it isn't the 'new basis' itself which is going to be ultimately authoritative, but the criteria by which we judge. As soon as we get into the position of questioning authorities, of asking for a 'new basis'--and as soon as we begin questioning we can't get out of this position, whether we like it or not--
then in a sense these authorities are no longer ultimate. We are no longer searching only for a leader, a hero, a clear and simple moral code to put all our trust in: we are searching for general principles which will enable us to assess and perhaps choose between leaders and codes. 32

He goes on to conclude:

Hence it is really these principles (whatever they may be) which we are going to put our money on. It will be these principles which, if we can get clear about them, may form a genuinely 'new basis'. But it is now fairly obvious that these principles will not themselves be moral principles or codes: they will be principles by which one judges between various moral codes and authorities. 33

It is clear, therefore, that for Wilson the key to correctly understanding morality is not be found in this or that particular moral code or authority, but rather in the principles revealed by the analysis of the term 'moral'. Indeed, without a clear understanding of these principles, one could not, logically, distinguish between what does and what does not belong to the moral sphere. It thus can be concluded that, in his view, conceptual analysis provides the normative structure required of a coherent and rational approach to moral education. 34

In Wilson's view the normative structure of the term "moral" leads to a conception of moral education in which the method of argument required to support a particular moral judgement is fundamental. He makes this point by
drawing a parallel between science education and moral education. He writes:

Suppose we were in the Middle Ages, and tried to find a 'basis for scientific education' by combining those beliefs which were generally accepted. We might say "Well, at least we all agree that the earth's round, that there are unicorns, that the sun goes round the earth, etc., so let's call that science and teach people to believe it, and then they'll be educated in science." 35

He goes on to add:

The point here is not (or not only) that some of these beliefs are mistaken. It is rather that 'educating people scientifically' is not simply to make them repeat certain scientific truths, but to get clear about what scientific method is and to teach them how to do science well. It is to get clear about what counts as success in science, and to give them skills to be successful: to show them that it involves, for instance, close and patient observation, accuracy, testing by experiment and so forth. So too, with history, literary criticism, and any other field of human activity. Educating people in these activities is not to extract 'right answers' from them, but to teach them what counts as a 'good reason' in history, literary criticism, etc., and how to think and act in accordance with these reasons. 36

Wilson then concludes by comparing the role of method in both moral and science education. He writes:

Hence any 'basis for moral education' should consist of imparting those skills which are necessary to make good or reasonable moral decisions and to act on them. We are not primarily out to impart any specific content, but to give other people facility in a method. This
is what eventually happened with science, and this is why science and education in science eventually prospered: and this is what must happen to morality. Such an approach does not deny that we have moral knowledge now, any more than we would deny that the Middle Ages had scientific knowledge: but it does involve trying first to reach agreement about the second-order principles governing morality, rather than about what should be the (first-order) content of particular moral beliefs.37

Thus, in Wilson's view, moral education amounts to an initiation into the meaning and use of second-order principles characteristic of morality.

In the discussion thus far, attention has been drawn to Wilson's conception of moral education and his contention that the normative structure presupposed by moral education is to be found in the analysis of the term "moral".38 One final point must now be made. In Wilson's view the major advantage of his conception of moral education is that it is neutral and non-partisan. More specifically, he believes that the approach to moral education which he had developed does not presuppose a particular moral system or a particular conception of morality. Referring to his own conception of moral education, he writes, "If the neutral and liberal picture of morality and moral education that I have painted has to be accepted, we are committed to a programme of research which might otherwise be very different."39 Given Wilson's view, it follows that if his
conception of moral education is valid (i.e., if his analysis of the term "moral" is sound), then his approach to moral education can be implemented anywhere. He makes this point explicitly when he writes: "The concept of moral education developed in this book is, no doubt, the product of a particular kind of society which might roughly be described as 'liberal' or 'pluralistic'".\(^4\) He then adds:

> But it is not intended to apply only to that kind of society. If the way we have developed it is right, then as a concept—as an ideal, if you like—it is right for all: even though different societies may have to take different measures to realize this ideal."\(^5\)

He goes on to conclude:

> We shall not argue for this concept on the grounds that it fits 'the British way of life', 'a liberal philosophy', 'western democracy', 'a mobile society', 'the twentieth-century world', or for any such culture-bound reasons. We shall argue for it simply on the grounds that is is reasonable. Whatever the merits of our particular arguements, anyone who dismisses the concept as being partisan, or designed to meet a particular social situation which may not arise elsewhere, will have missed the point.\(^6\)

For Wilson, then, moral education involves the same general principles regardless of where it occurs. Moreover since the principles thus involved are, in his view, presupposed by any particular moral code it follows that the charge of indoctrination cannot readily be brought to bear against his conception of moral education.
In the foregoing summary of Wilson's approach to moral education my objective has been not only to present Wilson's view in particular, but also to illustrate thereby what a purely conceptual approach to the problem of determining the substantive content of the formal aim of moral education amounts to. In what follows I shall develop a critique of Wilson's views. In particular, I shall argue that his approach to moral education (and, by extension, any purely conceptual approach) is untenable.

4. A Critique of Wilson's Views

Wilson's conception of moral education rests upon three interconnected assumptions. The first is that in approaching the field of moral education one needs an Archimedean point from which to survey the scene and on the basis of which one can critically assess the competing moral codes and precepts involved. Such a point would guarantee neutrality, a necessary condition of an approach to moral education acceptable to all the interested parties involved. The second assumption is that only conceptual analysis can provide the Archimedean point in question. Given the function of this point, it follows that Wilson also assumes that the analysis of concepts, qua method, is itself neutral and hence that the analysis of key moral concepts (notably the term "moral") is both necessary and sufficient to elucidate what is common to all "moral" codes thereby
providing the required Archimedean point. These assumptions are central to understanding Wilson's conception of moral education. Of these assumptions, the third is clearly the most important since it is the condition \textit{sine qua non} of Wilson's whole approach to moral education. In what follows, therefore, I shall discuss this assumption with a view to showing that it cannot be sustained and hence that Wilson's approach to moral education must be abandoned.

Wilson's assumption that the analysis of concepts is neutral, and hence both necessary and sufficient to provide moral education with an Archimedean point, presupposes a conception of linguistic meaning and analysis that is essentially Platonic. To see this more clearly, consider Plato's early dialogues in which he is primarily concerned with the definition of various terms. In \textit{Euthyphro}, for example, Plato has Socrates and the priest Euthyphro discuss the nature of piety. Responding to Socrates' request for an explanation of what holiness is, Euthyphro replies by claiming that holiness consists of doing \textit{t}... kind of thing which he himself is about to do, viz., bringing a charge of murder against his father. Socrates rejects this explanation of holiness on the ground that it fails to articulate its \textit{essence}. He says:

\[\ldots\text{what I asked of you was not to tell me one or two out of all the numerous actions that are holy; I wanted you to tell me what is the essential form of holiness which makes all holy actions}\]
holy. I believe you held that there is one ideal form by which unholy things are all unholy, and by which all holy things are holy.43

He then adds: "Well then, show me what, precisely, this ideal is, so that, with my eye on it, and using it as a standard, I can say that any action done by you or anybody else is holy if it resembles this ideal, or, if it does not, can deny that it is holy."44 In these passages Socrates clearly assumes that if something is holy then it must be because it has those characteristics that are common to all holy things and in virtue of which the holy is holy and not some other thing. Socrates, in other words, is assuming that the term "holy" is governed by a set of necessary conditions.45 Thus in order for Euthyphro to satisfy Socrates' request for an explanation of what holiness is, he must identify these conditions. In doing so he would be articulating the standard whereby all holy things are holy regardless of where they are to be found.

The Platonic view of meaning adumbrated above is precisely the view which Wilson adopts. There are, he maintains, numerous things which people are prepared to call "moral" (in the descriptive sense of this term).46 Unless we know what the term "moral" means, however, we cannot determine which of the many things that are presented as "moral" truly are "moral" and which are not. Writes Wilson:

Different societies at different times might have called certain people
'moral', 'virtuous', 'good' or even 'moral education'. The ancient Spartans would have chosen some for this description, the ancient Athenians others: in the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, Victorian England and Nazi Germany others again would have been selected.47

He goes on to add:

Now it is one thing to say whom we (or some other society) would describe in this way: but quite another thing to say whether this description is accurate. We may think we know who these people are: but unless we are clear about what it means to talk of somebody being 'good' or 'moral' or 'moral educated', we can't be sure that we do know.48

As these passages make plain, for Wilson the task of analysis is to identify and elucidate the conditions (he uses the term "principles") which must be satisfied if something (i.e., a reason, precept, rule, principle, person, code of conduct) is to be correctly designated by the term "moral". Since the conditions thus identified determine whether or not something is "moral", it follows that whatever fails to satisfy these conditions cannot be "moral". This, however, amounts to the view that the term "moral" is governed by a set of necessary conditions. It can be concluded, therefore, that Wilson presupposes a Platonic conception of linguistic meaning.49

The Platonic conception of linguistic meaning presupposed by Wilson is central to his approach to moral education. Hence the question to be considered is whether
or not this conception of meaning can be sustained. More specifically, is it the case that the term "moral" is governed by a set of necessary conditions? In what follows, I shall argue in support of a negative answer to this question.

The contention that the term "moral" is governed by a set of necessary conditions can be effectively challenged from a Wittgensteinian point of view. In the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein develops a trenchant critique of the referential theory of meaning of which his own previous conception of meaning in the Tractatus, as well as Plato's, are paradigm examples. In his view the allure of the referential theory of meaning is bound up with the Circean, albeit naive, assumption that all terms in a natural language function as names. Given this picture of meaning, it follows that in order to understand the meaning of a word one must know the object which it names. For Wittgenstein, however, this conception of meaning will not do. He writes: "It is important to note that the word 'meaning' is being used illicitly if it is used to signify the thing that 'corresponds' to the word. That is to confound the meaning of a name with the bearer of the name." Once the picture of naming as a key to understanding linguistic meaning is abandoned the door is opened, in Wittgenstein's view, to a more satisfactory theory of meaning.
The meaning of a word, for Wittgenstein, cannot be dissociated from its role and use in language. He writes: "For a large class of cases--though not for all--in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language." If linguistic meaning is understood in terms of use, then the multiplicity of uses of a particular word in an almost-unending variety of contexts becomes readily apparent. Wittgenstein uses the term "language-game" as a metaphor to underscore this rich diversity. He writes:

But how many kinds of sentence are there? Say assertion, question, and command? -- There are countless kinds: countless different kinds of use of what we call "symbols", "words", "sentences". And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all; but new types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten.

The notion of a language-game, however, is not to be construed as denoting nothing more than an abstraction involving syntactical rules but rather as a constitutive element embedded in the myriad contexts and practices of daily life. Wittgenstein uses the term "forms of life" to capture this dimension of meaning. "...the term 'language-game'..." he writes, "...is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life." Given this conception of linguistic meaning, it follows that in order to
understand the meaning of a word it is necessary to first investigate its diverse uses in their various contexts. In approaching linguistic meaning in this way, the use of a particular word in a broad variety of contexts comes clearly into view. It thus becomes apparent that these various uses of the word are not connected by some common element. Wittgenstein illustrates this point by examining the various uses of the word "game". He writes:

Consider for example the proceedings that we call "games". I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all?--Don't say: "There must be something common, or they would not be called 'games'"--but look and see whether there is anything common to all.--For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don't think, but look!55

The absence of a common element linking together these various uses of the term "game", however, does not mean that each use is therefore sui generis. For Wittgenstein these diverse uses of the term are connected by what he calls a "family resemblance". He writes:

And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail. I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than "family resemblances"; for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc.,
etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way. 56

The net import of these considerations is that words as they are typically used in ordinary language are not governed by necessary conditions but rather by sufficient conditions. 57

The question under discussion, it will be recalled, is whether or not the term "moral" is governed by a set of necessary conditions. The soundness of Wilson's conception of moral education requires that this question be given an affirmative answer. In light of the Wittgensteinian conception of meaning adumbrated above, however, it is clear that this question must be given a negative answer. It follows from this that Wilson's approach to moral education is untenable.

In reply to the foregoing criticism of Wilson's approach to moral education, it could be claimed that I have missed the point of his argument and that hence my criticism is really directed against a straw man. In support of this contention it could be argued that, contrary to what I appear to assume, Wilson does, in point of fact, acknowledge that the term "moral" is used in a variety of ways. He writes: "The words 'moral', 'morality', and 'morally' are used in all sorts of ways, and we need not get involved in too lengthy a dispute about their various senses." 58 He then goes on to draw a general distinction between two types of use, viz., the evaluative and the descriptive. In its
evaluative use "moral" presupposes a particular moral system and is thus contrasted with "immoral". In its descriptive use, however, "moral" is used to "...classify a particular kind of action or belief. Its opposite here is simply 'not moral' or 'non-moral' (as when we say, "It's not a moral issue, it's simply a matter of taste."). 59

In considering the descriptive use of "moral" Wilson draws attention to a critically important point. He writes, "But this descriptive or classificatory sense can be based on different criteria and hence mean different things." 60

In his view the descriptive use of "mor..l" is governed by two distinguishable sets of criteria. The first set determines its use:

...in a 'sociological' sense. Sociologists and historians commonly talk about 'the morality' of a particular society or social group, about what counted as 'moral' or 'immoral' behaviour in ancient Sβarta or during the Victorian age in ββland. Here we refer to a particular code, or set of mores. 61

This use of "moral", it is clear, varies relative to the mores with which it is connected. Given the variety of codes and customs, it follows that in its 'sociological' sense the term "moral" is governed by a set of sufficient conditions. The second set of criteria, however, fix what can be called its "normative" use and thereby constitute its "normative structure". Wilson characterizes this use as follows:
It can be used to mark out a particular kind of human thought and action, not on the basis of what the mores of a particular society are, but on some other basis. Thus when we say ... "What sort of clothes you wear isn't really a moral issue, it's a matter of taste", we are obviously not thinking just of what the mores of a particular society are. We seem rather to be making some kind of logical or conceptual classification of the areas of morality, quite apart from what anyone regards (rightly or wrongly) as that area.62

The normative use of "moral", unlike the "sociological" use, does not vary relative to a particular code or set of mores. It is, instead, used to distinguish between what is and what is not, logically speaking, "moral". It can be concluded therefore that in its normative use, the term "moral" is governed by a set of necessary conditions. In developing his conception of moral education, Wilson focuses his attention upon the normative use of "moral" while almost completely ignoring its "evaluative" and its "sociological" use. The whole point of his analysis is to elucidate the criteria (i.e., the necessary conditions) governing this use of the term "moral", thereby establishing a neutral foundation for moral education.

In light of the fact that Wilson does not deny that in one of its uses "moral" is governed by a set of sufficient conditions, it follows that the criticism of his conception of moral education presented above misses the point altogether. The point at issue is whether or not Wilson is right in claiming that apart from its "sociological" use,
the term "moral" also has a "normative" use that is governed by a set of necessary conditions. If he is right in this, then he has succeeded in providing a neutral foundation for his conception of moral education. Insofar as my criticism fails to address this point it is, quite simply, irrelevant.

The reply to my criticism of Wilson sketched above will not do. It must be acknowledged, of course, that the basic point at issue is indeed whether or not "moral" has a "normative" use that is governed by a set of necessary conditions. It is not the case, however, that the appeal to Wittgenstein's conception of meaning is irrelevant to establishing a negative answer to this question. In what follows I shall further develop this point thereby clarifying my criticism of Wilson.

In discussing the meaning of the word "game" Wittgenstein enjoins us to look and see how the word is used. His injunction "Don't think, but look!", clearly is intended to "remind" us of the contextual dimension of linguistic meaning. The point here is that language is used by people and people live together in groups, in particular places and at particular times. The language they use is an inexpungible constituent in their form of life and not simply some foreign element interpolated into it. "...to imagine a language...", writes Wittgenstein, "...means to imagine a form of life." Linguistic meaning is thus inextricably intertwined, not only with the specific
context of its use, but also with the broader social, cultural and historical matrix within which the specific occasions of its use emerge. It follows from this that linguistic meaning is best understood as dynamic, forming and being formed by emerging contingencies and not as something static, to be fixed once and for all. Writes Wittgenstein:

Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses.65

Stated baldly, although Wilson does acknowledge that "moral" has a "sociological" use (and hence is governed by a set of sufficient conditions), he really appears, nevertheless, not to understand about context. This is evident given his claim that the analysis of the "normative" use of "moral" can provide a neutral foundation for moral education (in England and elsewhere), since it reveals the criteria whereby the moral can be distinguished from the non-moral, independently of this or that particular moral code or set of mores. In advancing this claim, Wilson clearly must assume that context plays no role in fixing the criteria thus involved. If context did play a role, then given the variety of contexts connected with "moral", it follows that the analysis he proposes could not provide the foundation that he seeks for moral education. The import of
Wittgenstein's argument, however, is that no term (including the term "moral") can be correctly understood independently of its proper context. For Wittgenstein, "...philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday."\(^{66}\)

The problem with Wilson's analysis is that he commits the fallacy of composition. He begins his analysis by distinguishing between the evaluative and the descriptive use of "moral". Its descriptive use, he then goes on to argue, can be either sociological or normative. Given that the evaluative and the sociological use of "moral" varies relative to a particular moral code or set of mores, it follows that the criteria governing its use will likewise vary. Hence, within the parameters of a particular moral code or set of mores, the evaluative and sociological use of "moral" will be governed by a set of necessary conditions, whereas apart from these parameters the term "moral" has no evaluative use and its sociological use is connected with a set of sufficient conditions. Within a Kantian moral framework, for example, the assessment of the consequences of an act would be considered morally irrelevant to determining its moral quality. Within a utilitarian framework, however, its moral quality cannot be determined apart from such an assessment. What a utilitarian would consider as a morally relevant reason for performing an act thus would be rejected by a Kantian.\(^{67}\) Within each context, therefore, the evaluative and sociological use of
"moral" is determined by a different set of necessary conditions. If context is taken into account, then clearly Wilson is right in identifying a normative use of "moral". His mistake, however, lies in his assuming that what is true about the use of "moral" in a particular context must also be true about its use apart from this context. Once this assumption is made, the search is on for "something in common" linking the diverse contexts connected with its use. Had Wilson been writing about the sociology of sport rather than on moral education, he no doubt would have discovered that "game" has a normative use. The conclusion to be drawn, therefore, is that "moral" does indeed have a normative use but only within the parameters of a particular moral framework and not apart from it. To seek the criteria for its normative use apart from such a framework thus is an error.

The import of the foregoing argument is that the analysis of the term "moral" (and, by implication, all other moral terms) must take into account the social, cultural and historical context connected with its use. If this is done, then it at once becomes apparent that, apart from its use in a particular context, "moral" does not have a normative use. It could be replied, however, that this point has really not been established. The term "moral" (and moral language in general), it might be countered, cannot be compared to such a relatively unimportant term as "game". By way of response
to this contention, consider Alasdiar MacIntyre’s argument as presented in his book *A Short History of Ethics*. 68

"Moral philosophy is often written..." he claims,

...as though the history of the subject were only of secondary and incidental importance. This attitude seems to be the outcome of a belief that moral concepts can be examined and understood apart form their history. Some philosophers have even written as if moral concepts were a timeless, limited, unchanging, determinate species of concept, necessarily having the same feature throughout their history, so that there is a part of language waiting to be philosophically investigated which deserves the title "the language of morals" (with a definite article and a singular noun). 69

He adds:

In fact, of course, moral concepts change as social life changes. I deliberately do not write "because social life changes", for this might suggest that social life is one thing, morality another, and that there is merely an external, contingent causal relationship between them. This is obviously false. Moral concepts are embodied in and are partially constitutive of forms of social life. 70

In MacIntyre’s view, as the passages just cited clearly attest, the analysis of moral concepts must take into account the social, cultural and historical context connected with their use. It is not unreasonable to conclude, therefore, that a normative use of "moral" cannot be made intelligible apart from such a context.

In the foregoing discussion, my objective has been to establish the claim that a purely conceptual approach to the
task of providing substantive content for the formal aim of moral education is untenable. My argument in support of this claim revolves around the views of John Wilson. His approach to moral education was taken as a paradigm example of a purely conceptual approach to this task on the assumption that if his approach could be shown to be inadequate, then it could reasonably be inferred that no purely conceptual approach could succeed where his had failed. The assessment of his approach to moral education revealed two key assumptions: (1) that a natural foundation for moral education is desirable, and (2) that the analysis of the term "moral" can provide such a foundation. In considering the second, and more fundamental assumption, Wilson's approach to the analysis of "moral" was shown to proceed from a Platonic conception of linguistic meaning that Wittgenstein had succeeded in undermining in his *Philosophical Investigations*. Hence the conclusion was drawn that Wilson's approach to moral education could not be sustained. In light of this, it can now be maintained that a purely conceptual approach to the task of providing substantive content for the formal aim of moral education is untenable. Moreover, since the only alternative to this approach is one in which the notion of moral agency is fleshed out within the parameters of a particular moral framework, it follows that a neutral foundation for moral education cannot be established. Partisan conflicts in
the development and implementation of moral education programs thus cannot be completely avoided but only countervailed by the cultivation of tolerance.

The foregoing argument establishes that the notion of moral agency must be delineated within the parameters of a particular moral framework. It does not establish that this framework must be Dewey's. What is required, therefore, is some justification for selecting Dewey's view of morals as the framework within which to delineate the notion of moral agency. It is, accordingly, to this task that I now turn.

5. Dewey's Conception of Morals

The notion of moral agency varies relative to the moral framework within which it is developed. Every moral framework thus can be seen to engender a particular conception of moral agency. In defending the selection of Dewey's view of morals as the framework within which to delineate a conception of moral agency, therefore, one of two strategies can be pursued. One could set about proving that of all the available moral frameworks only Dewey's is correct and hence that only his understanding of morals can result in an acceptable view of moral agency. Alternatively, one could argue that although Dewey's view of morals is not the only one that is available, it nevertheless does provide a more interesting and plausible framework within which to delineate a view of moral agency.
because it encompasses features characteristic of the moral life that are either ignored or insufficiently explored by alternative conceptions of morality. Of these strategies, the first will not do. This is the case because it rests upon two assumptions--one questionable, the other untenable. In order to "prove" that, of all the available moral frameworks, only Dewey's is correct one clearly requires a criterion (or set of criteria) in virtue of which the morally correct can be distinguished from the morally incorrect. This assumes not only that such a criterion is possible, but also that it is already known and generally acknowledged. The first assumption is at the heart of normative ethics. Whether or not it is valid, however, is a moot point and hence it must be concluded that this assumption is questionable. The second assumption involved is simply untenable. The debates and conflicts characteristic of normative ethics are precisely over whether or not such a criterion has been found. Consequently, in the discussion which follows, I shall take up the second, more modest approach in defending Dewey's conception of morals. My principal aim will not be to show that his understanding of morals is "correct", but rather that it encompasses key features of the moral life, thus making it both more interesting and more desirable as a framework within which to develop a conception of moral agency.
Before considering Dewey's conception of morals, it is first necessary to underscore a fundamentally important commonplace characteristic of moral life. Regardless of the moral system a person actually adopts, it is clear that, apart from the interaction of a particular agent and the world within which her/his life unfolds, there would be little or no moral life to speak of. The agent involved is clearly not only a thinking being, but also a being who feels and imagines, remembers and learns from past experience, has needs and wants, espouses principles, experiences emotions and is moved by impulse and constrained by habit. The natural and socio-cultural environment that is involved is clearly no less complex. Forces and energies within it (many of which are beyond either individual or collective control) result in a stream of constant changes affecting all aspects of the agent's life. The frequent complexity and difficulty characteristic of moral life is thus the product of forces originating from within the agent involved and of contingencies prevailing within the natural and socio-cultural environment. It is equally clear, moreover, that the interactions presupposed by moral life are almost endless in their number and variety. It can be inferred, therefore, that the function of a moral framework is to inform the agent's thinking, feeling, deliberating, valuing, judging, choosing, doing and acting as these occur throughout the entire spectrum of interactive situations.
comprising the whole of her/his life.

A second feature characteristic of moral life is that the moral system involved is neither self-explanatory nor self-applying. It is the agent who must undertake to acquire as complete and as deep an understanding of the principles comprised as s/he is capable of achieving, and it is also the agent who must recognize when to invoke these principles and who must develop skill and sensitivity in applying them. Apart from an agent, a moral framework is little more than a constellation of inert ideas. It is the agent, therefore, who is the locus of moral life and hence its quality is as much conditioned by the character of the agent involved as by the moral system espoused.

The moral system integral to moral life thus can be compared to an architect's blueprint. The blueprint must be properly understood and used in guiding a complex of activities unfolding within spatio-temporal constraints. Furthermore, it must reflect the purpose of the building, its location, the resources, material and technology available as well as the skill of the workers hired to do the job. In a somewhat similar way, a moral framework must be understood and used. More importantly, however, it presupposes some understanding of the nature of the agent who is to use it as well as a conception of value. It also presupposes a view of the natural and socio-cultural environment within which the diverse interactions requiring
its use unfold. In other words, the moral framework involved in moral life presupposes not only a conception of human nature, but also an epistemology, metaphysics, and axiology. Taken together these presuppositions constitute the philosophical framework within which a moral framework is developed.

In light of the foregoing considerations, it follows that different moral frameworks involve different philosophical presuppositions and hence that they can be compared on the basis of their respective conceptions of human nature and the epistemological, metaphysical, and axiological views which they presuppose. The claim that Dewey's view of morals is more interesting than other views thus amounts to the contention that his conception of human nature and his epistemological, metaphysical, and axiological presuppositions are more interesting than the ones involved in alternative moral systems. In defending the selection of Dewey's understanding of morals as the framework within which to develop a conception of moral agency, therefore, it is necessary to distinguish between two separate lines of argument. In the first, the objective is simply to support the contention that, in virtue of its philosophical presuppositions, Dewey's understanding of morals is more interesting than alternative views. It is clear, however, that showing Dewey's understanding of morals to be more interesting than alternative conceptions of
morality is not sufficient, in and of itself, to show that his understanding of morals is tenable. Hence in the second, more fundamental line of argument the chief objective is to support Dewey's understanding of morals by way of clarifying and supporting his conception of human nature and his epistemological, metaphysical and axiological presuppositions. In view of these two distinct lines of argument I shall, in the balance of this section, pursue the first and argue that Dewey's understanding of morals, in virtue of its philosophical presuppositions, provides a more interesting and plausible account of moral life. The second line of argument shall form an integral part of the two chapters that follow.73

All moral systems address (among other things) the aspects of moral life delineated above. The differences between them are in how they go about doing this. What makes Dewey's understanding of morals interesting is that, unlike alternative views, his provides a more adequate account of it. The salient features of his conception of morals74 can be summarized as follows: (1) it is rooted in experience; (2) experience is construed as being in and of nature; (3) the agent involved in moral experience is conceived as a biological being capable of thinking, feeling, and acting and whose whole character contributes to determining the quality of moral experience; (4) character and conduct are connected by means of a biological
construction of habit; (5) reflective inquiry is the key factor not only in creating desire by transforming impulses into ends-in-view, but also in reconstructing the indeterminate experiential situations comprising pre-reflective experience; (6) value is viewed as a construction conditioned by agent-centered and environment-centered forces and energies; (7) moral principles are regarded as rules-of-thumb directing and illuminating reflective inquiry; (8) means and ends are understood as parts of a continuum of experience; and (9) the universe within which experience occurs is open. Dewey's understanding of morals, as can be readily inferred, is thus thoroughly naturalistic. He rejects the Cartesian view of human nature and develops instead a conception of it that is inspired by Darwin's biology and James' psychology. As a consequence he not only avoids the intractable dualisms dogging the Cartesian view (e.g., mind/body, reason/emotion, thought/action, subject/object, is/ought, private/public), but also sets philosophy upon a new course. Moreover, his view of value as a construction presupposing inquiry undertaken in the context of an indeterminate experiential situation leads him to reject both moral subjectivism and moral absolutism. In his view, values are to be found in experience—not, to be sure, experience as it is traditionally understood, but rather in a view of it that heretofore has not been developed.
In view of the commonplaces of moral life sketched above, the sense in which Dewey's understanding of morals is more interesting than alternative views can now be more clearly indicated. In emphasizing the place of character and inquiry in the reconstruction of experience and the creation of value, Dewey captures the heart of moral life. Moreover, in rejecting Cartesian dualism and the conception of man and nature it engenders in favour of a naturalistic view, the interactive situations comprising moral life can be more adequately understood. On Dewey's view, the whole of the agent's character is involved and affected by these experiential situations and not merely some fragment of it. Finally, Dewey's conception of principles as rules-of-thumb guiding inquiry opens the door to a more sensitive and discerning awareness of the features of experience as well as to the possibility of growth—both individual and collective. Alternative conceptions of morals prove to be less interesting than Dewey's because they either ignore or insufficiently explore the commonplaces of moral life that are addressed by his view. This is the case in virtue of the philosophical presuppositions within which these conceptions of morals are developed.

The differences between Dewey's understanding of morals and alternative views becomes more readily apparent if they are compared. The countless moral systems that have been developed can be grouped, for the sake of convenience, into
three categories: (1) teleological theories, (2) deontological theories, and (3) consequentialist theories. Although a complete discussion of these theories falls beyond the scope of this thesis, I shall nevertheless discuss them, albeit briefly, in order to highlight the contrast between these theories and Dewey's understanding of morals.

In a teleological moral system, morality is conceived as the pursuit of "the good". The good, however, is defined relative to Man and hence morality is grounded in a conception of human nature. The views of Aristotle, as developed in the *Nicomachean Ethics* can be taken as a paradigm example of this approach to morals. His understanding of morals and the conception of human nature upon which it rests, however, cannot be adequately understood apart from his metaphysics. The concepts matter/form, potentiality/actuality, and his understanding of causality all play a vital role in Aristotle's metaphysics. In his view, everything is what it is in virtue of its form. Since this form is not fully or completely instantiated in any individual, it follows that every individual has a potential for achieving a greater actualization of its form. Entelechy is simply the conatus inherent within every individual to actualize its potential. Given that human nature is what it is in virtue of its form, it also is characterized by entelechy. The notion of
entelechy is thus fundamental to Aristotle's conception of human nature and morals. Moreover, since human nature does not change from one place to another and from one age to another, it follows that morality must be the same regardless of where or when it is to be found. If, as a matter of fact, it is found to vary relative to culture then this can be accounted for by citing an incorrect understanding of human nature as the cause of the diversity.

Although Dewey's understanding of morals and Aristotle's are similar in certain respects, there are nevertheless some irreconcilable differences between them. The most important of these is that in Dewey's conception of human nature, unlike in Aristotle's, the notion of entelechy is altogether absent. In a post-Darwinian world, Aristotle's view of human nature is difficult, if not impossible, to sustain. Dewey's conception and the view of morals which it informs thus proves to be more interesting as well as more plausible.

The characteristic feature of a deontological system of morals is the central place it accords the notion of duty and obligation. Deontologists argue that what makes an action morally right is that:

...it is of a kind that all moral agents have an obligation to perform; it is wrong if it is one that all moral agents are obligated to avoid. The statement that all moral agents are obligated to do or to refrain from doing a certain kind of action is a moral rule of conduct....
In their view, the ground of such obligation "...lies in the fact that the moral rule in question satisfies the requirements of an ultimate norm or supreme principle of duty, which is often designated as 'the Moral Law'". Not all deontologists, however, would agree about the source of the "Moral Law". For some, notably Christian fundamentalists, it is to be found in the revealed word of God while for others, as in the case of Kant, it is to be found in reason. Regardless of its source, one point is clear, viz., that an action is morally right and hence obligatory if, and only if, it instantiates a valid moral rule. Hence the context within which an action occurs, its consequences, and the intentions of the agent involved are all irrelevant.

The contrast between a deontological conception of morals and Dewey's is no doubt apparent. In the first place, Dewey's conception of principles as rules-of-thumb derived from and conditioned by experience is deeply incompatible with the view of them taken by deontologists. For deontologists, moral principles are either revealed by God and hence absolute, or else they are determined by reason and hence are formal and empty. More fundamentally, however, Dewey's conception of experience and nature precludes the supernatural, and his view of inquiry is altogether incompatible with Kant's view of reason. In the second place, a deontological conception of morals results
in a view of moral life in which the character and role of
the agent involved are insufficiently explored and the
consequences of action are entirely ignored. Dewey's view,
on the other hand, underscores these very aspects of moral
life and is, therefore, more adequate.

In a consequentialist moral system the moral quality of
an action is fixed by its consequences. Consequentialists
argue that the ultimate standard of what is morally right is

...the non-moral value that is brought
into being. The final appeal, directly
or indirectly, must be to the
comparative amount of good produced, or
rather to the comparative balance of
good over evil produced.\footnote{77}

Consequentialism has three forms (i.e., egoistic, altruistic
and universalistic) depending upon whose interests are taken
into account when the consequences of an action are being
considered. Pleasure or happiness are the standards of
value most frequently employed by consequentialists in
evaluating the goodness of an action's consequences.
Mill's utilitarianism, in which happiness is the standard of
value used to assess the consequences of an action is the
predominant form of consequentialism today. In sum, for
consequentialists fixing the moral quality of an act
requires: (1) a determination of its consequences, and
(2) an evaluation of these consequences in terms of their
non-moral value.

In comparing consequentialism with Dewey's
understanding of morals two points can be made. The first
is that for Dewey it is the experiential situation within which the need for action emerges that must be taken into account in determining what action is to be undertaken. Moreover, in his view, all action must be viewed as part of the means/ends continuum. The goodness of an action therefore must be assessed in terms of its role within this continuum. Hence, one cannot set about seeking to assess the intrinsic goodness of an action's consequences apart from the situation within which the action is undertaken. The second point to note is that, in Dewey's view, a significant fact regarding the consequences of an action are the effects it has upon the character of the agent involved. For consequentialists, however, the morality of an act is fixed by the non-moral value of its consequences as determined by an external standard. The standard thus employed is regarded as the *summum bonum*. The effects of action upon the character development of the agent involved are altogether ignored. For these reasons, therefore, Dewey's understanding of morals provides a more interesting account of moral life than does consequentialism.

In contrasting Dewey's understanding of morals with teleological, deontological, and consequentialist views, differences and incompatibilities were noted. My objective in underscoring these differences was not to prove that these alternative views are untenable, but rather to indicate more clearly the sense in which Dewey's
understanding of morals is more interesting. Having done so, this brief discussion comparing alternative conceptions of morals with Dewey's can be drawn to a close.

The principal objective of my thesis, it will be recalled, is to outline some of the implications for moral education and its attendant conception of moral agency of Dewey's view of moral experience and his understanding of the nature and formation of character. The whole of the foregoing discussion was undertaken in order to: (1) clarify the focus and limitations of my thesis, and (2) justify the approach to moral education that I have adopted. A summary of this discussion is now in order.

In discussing moral education the point was made that the substantive content of the formal aim of moral education can be provided either by way of an analysis of the concepts involved or within the parameters of a particular moral framework. In considering the conceptual approach to this task, the views of John Wilson were considered and found to be untenable thereby supporting the contention that a particular moral framework is needed in order to flesh out a conception of moral agency. It was then argued that the selection of Dewey's understanding of morals as the framework within which to develop a conception of moral agency was reasonable on the grounds that his conception of morals is more interesting than the alternative views available. Thus in delineating a Deweyan conception of
moral agency, I shall not be concerned with conceptual analysis. Nor shall I undertake an empirical survey of the moral education programs currently in place. Instead, I shall restrict my attention to Dewey's conception of morals and his understanding of the nature and formation of character. In so doing I shall discuss the epistemological, metaphysical, and axiological presuppositions of his views.

The task of delineating Dewey's view of moral experience might reasonably be thought to require, as a necessary first step, an exposition of the main principles comprising his ethics. This view of the matter, however, proceeds from the somewhat problematic assumption that Dewey does, in fact, have an ethics. Before concluding this chapter, therefore, this assumption must be considered.

B: THE PLACE OF ETHICS IN DEWEY'S THOUGHT

The question, "Does Dewey have an ethics?", cannot be answered with a simple "yes" or "no". The reason why this is so is connected with the term "ethics". In his book Principles of Ethics: An Introduction, Paul Taylor defines "ethics" as follows:

To say that a moral standard or rule is "valid for all moral agents" is to say that it is justifiable to appeal to it in judging any moral agent's character and conduct. An ordered set of such standards and rules is sometimes called a "normative ethical system", and the activity of constructing and justifying such a system is known as normative ethics.78
Thus within the context of philosophical discourse, "ethics" is typically employed to denote a branch of philosophical inquiry which is primarily concerned with: (1) the determination and grounding of a standard whereby the distinctions between right and wrong, good and bad can be drawn, and (2) the characterization of the virtues and goods contributory to a worthwhile life. In this traditional sense of the term "ethics" Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Mill, Moore, Ross, and Rawls all can be regarded as having an ethics; Dewey cannot—that is, Dewey does not develop and defend a specific standard of right and good to be used in fixing the moral qualities of actions, things, or agents. In fact, one can say of him that he has come to bury "ethics", not to practice it.

Dewey's rejection of ethics is ultimately grounded in his theory of experience and nature. Ethics, as a distinctive form of philosophical inquiry, originated with the Socratic rejection of custom and tradition as an adequate guide to moral conduct. The rejection of convention, however, created the need to find an alternative ground for the principles governing conduct. Thus traditional ethics, by and large, can be regarded as chiefly concerned with the problem of providing a foundation for morality. The search for foundations, however, was handicapped from the very outset since both the need, as well as the search, emerged and evolved within the
parameters of a dualistic metaphysics in which
nature\textsuperscript{80} (including man \textit{qua} biological organism) was
rejected \textit{a priori} as a possible locus of value.\textsuperscript{81} This
initial handicap was further exacerbated by medieval
Christian theology, and finally consolidated by the
Cartesian bifurcation of mind and matter. Dewey's rejection
of Cartesian dualism\textsuperscript{82} (and all that it implies) in favour
of a naturalistic metaphysics is thus tantamount to a
rejection of what Richard Rorty has called "Philosophy".\textsuperscript{83}
Since "ethics" developed within this tradition, it follows
that it stands in need of reconstruction. In particular,
the search for the \textit{ground} of the right and the good (what
Dewey refers to as the quest for certainty) must be
abandoned and replaced by a \textit{method of inquiry} whereby the
right and the good are to be \textit{constructed}.

In rejecting ethics in the traditional sense Dewey is
\textit{not} thereby also rejecting the reality of \textit{moral experience}.
On the contrary, for Dewey moral experience is but one phase
of experience as a whole. In his writings devoted to
morals, one can readily discern two currents of thought: one
critical and the other constructive. In the critical phase
of his writings Dewey pinpoints the logical, metaphysical,
epistemological, and psychological inadequacies inherent in
traditional approaches to ethics, while in the constructive
phase he endeavours to provide a detailed and empirical
analysis of the features characteristic of moral experience.
In this thesis I shall be primarily concerned with his analysis of moral experience.

Two points should be noted at the outset of developing an account of Dewey's view of moral experience. The first of these is that for Dewey "moral" experience, although distinctive and distinguishable from other phases of reflective experience (e.g., cognitive, religious, esthetic), is nevertheless not absolutely sui generis. In other words, moral experience is characterized by both distinctiveness and continuity. When viewed as "moral", certain qualitative features emerge which are peculiar to it qua "moral" experience. As a phase of experience, however, moral experience is continuous with other phases of experience, that is, there is no radical break between moral experience and other forms of experience and, hence, no question of moral experience comprising a separate and unique category of experience. Thus moral experience, its distinctiveness notwithstanding, is part of experience in its inclusive sense.

The second point to note follows directly from the first, viz., that for Dewey moral experience is itself comprised of distinguishable components, some of which are peculiar to it, while others are common to most forms of experience. Thus, moral experience involves, among other things, a pattern of inquiry, values, valuation judgements, the projection of ends-in-view, the play of habit, impulse
and desire, and a qualitative "gestalt" characteristic of the moral situation per se. Among these, the quality characteristic of the moral situation, the values inherent in the situation, the pattern of inquiry and the eventual valuation judgement are all, in various degrees, peculiar to and deeply characteristic of moral experience, while the projection of ends-in-view, the play of habit and impulse, and certain aspects of inquiry are common to most, if not all, forms of experience (esthetic experience being, in some respects, an exception). Hence the relationship between experience, moral experience, and the elements of which moral experience is comprised can be viewed as comparable to the organic relation between a whole and its parts. More specifically, moral experience is simultaneously both a whole and a part in its experiential interconnections. From the side of experience, "moral" experience is a part, and in order to fully understand it one must also understand the features characteristic of experience. From the side of "moral" experience, it is the whole of which its component elements are the parts, and hence to understand it, one must understand its parts in their various interconnections. A full account of Dewey's view of moral experience, therefore, requires not only an examination of the component elements of which it itself is comprised, but also an elaboration of the features characteristic of all forms of experience.88

In light of the foregoing discussion, two questions
emerge: (1) What is experience? and (2) What are the specific features of moral experience in virtue of which it can be distinguished from other phases of experience? The first question involves Dewey's naturalistic metaphysics and must be addressed before proceeding to a more detailed examination of his view of moral experience. I shall, accordingly, take up the discussion of this question in the chapter that follows. In Chapter Three I shall consider Dewey's view of moral experience, together with his understanding of the nature and formation of character. Against this background I shall, in Chapter Four: (1) draw out some of the more important implications for the practice of moral education connected with Dewey's view of moral experience and his understanding of the nature and formation of character and, (2) flesh out, albeit not in full detail, a Deweyan conception of moral agency. With these preliminaries out of the way, it is time to consider Dewey's naturalistic metaphysics. It is to this task that I now turn.
NOTES


2. An example of this is Kathleen Gow's acerbic criticism of the three main approaches to moral education (i.e., Simon and Raths' "Values Clarification", Kohlberg's "Moral Deliberation", and Beck's "Reflective Thinking") currently in place in Canadian schools. In her book Yes Virginia, There is Right and Wrong! she argues that these approaches completely misconstrue the nature of morality. She further claims that they not only undermine morality altogether by encouraging students to make up their own morals but also seriously harm the psychological health and well-being of the students involved. For example, in her discussion of the "Life Raft" exercise (one of a number of classroom exercises comprising the values clarification approach) she writes: "What happens to the self-worth of the participant who--by the group's decision--is voted to be thrown out of the life raft and die? What happens to the self-identity of the others who, by aggression, grandiose promises, ability to "read" the group's sentiment, by emotive appeals, or by any other means, are voted to remain in the life raft and live? Are students to conclude that this is what "developing one's self-worth is all about? ... What happens to these students when the bell rings and they go out for recess together? Will this Values Clarification session be quickly forgotten? Or will it continue to haunt at least some members in the group even when they are adults?" Kathleen M. Gow, Yes Virginia, There is Right and Wrong!, (Toronto: Wiley, 1980) 26-27.

3. The conflict between religious and secular approaches to moral education is ultimately grounded in their respective constructions of what it means to be moral. For liberals moral autonomy conditioned by reason is a fundamental requirement of the moral life. For those adopting a religious view, the liberal emphasis on moral autonomy is tantamount to hubris. In their view, it is not autonomy but obedience to the will of God that is the hallmark of the truly moral life. In his Ethics, Dietrich Bonhoeffer writes: "Whoever wishes to take up the problem of a Christian ethic must be confronted at once with a demand which is quite without parallel. He must from the outset discard as irrelevant the two questions which alone impel him to concern himself with the problem of ethics: "How can I
be good?" and "How can I do good?"; and instead of these, he must ask the utterly and totally different question: "What is the will of God?" ...What is of ultimate importance is now no longer that I should become good, or that the condition of the world should be made better by my action, but that the reality of God should show itself everywhere to be the ultimate reality." Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics, ed., Eberhard Bethge (New York: MacMillian, 1965) 188.


5. The term "morally neutral" should be understood as being roughly synonymous in meaning with the term "morally non-partisan". Something p (a reason, principle, condition) is morally neutral if it is common to all moral systems or codes (and hence does not favour one system over another) or if it is compatible with all moral codes. Thus, the claim that moral education cannot be morally neutral amounts to the view that no moral education program can be developed which could not be challenged on the grounds that it is inadequate because in some important respect it fails to do justice to some conception of morality. This does not imply, however, that some degree of understanding and tolerance between individuals espousing differing conceptions of morality cannot be achieved. For a further discussion of this point, see Section 4 of this chapter as well as Chapter 3, Part A, Section 3.

6. Morris L. Bigge, Educational Philosophies for Teachers (Columbus: Merrill, 1982) 2.

7. The contention that the teacher must have some idea of the objectives connected with the classroom activities that are part of a program of moral education is connected with what James E. McKeon calls the intent condition of "teaching". In his book Philosophy of Education, he writes that teaching activities "...are found wherever people are related in any continuing way
to one another—-in homes, schools, churches, unions, armies, hospitals, factories, farms, bureaus." He goes on to add that when "...we try to say exactly what it is that all these activities have in common such that we call them all teaching, we have to revert to talk about a particular form of mode of encounter which would have no point or purpose apart from an intention to get someone to learn something." He concludes by claiming that this "intent" condition is "...grounded not in a simple fact about the use of "teach" in English, but rather in a complex, quasi-institutional fact about a distinctive mode of human encounter: that mode which is shaped or formed by the intention to promote learning." James E. McClellan, Philosophy of Education (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1976) 33-34. In making this claim I am not, of course, claiming that every teacher is always clear about the objectives involved in the activities s/he has planned. It is quite possible for these objectives to be implicit or only partially understood.

8. Vide Endnote #2 for an example of this type of criticism.


18. In Section 4 of this chapter, I shall discuss in more detail the grounds for rejecting an exclusively analytical approach to moral education.


21. In this regard consider, for example, Wilson's summary assessment of theories of moral development. "I have..." he writes, "...said little or nothing in this book about any 'theory' (or theories) of 'moral development'. This is... chiefly because it seems to me quite clear that all such theories are at best muddled, and at worst vacuous." Wilson, *Assessment* 110.


24. Wilson, *Assessment* ix. The influence of Peters' analysis of the concept of "education" on Wilson's understanding of the concept of a "morally educated
person" is here readily apparent. Peters discusses his contention that the concept of "education" involves the idea of improvement in several places chief among which is his paper "Education as Initiation" reprinted in Archambault, Analysis 87-112. See also R.S. Peters, Ethics and Education (Atlanta: Scott, Foresman, 1967).

25. Wilson, Assessment 3-4. Wilson further clarifies the distinction between these two senses of the term "meaning" when he writes that it is essential to distinguish between "...questions of the form "What is the meaning of 'X'?", where we put X inside inverted commas in order to keep ourselves firmly in the realm of meaning and definitions, and questions of the form "What is the nature of X?", where we are asking about the thing X and not the word 'X'. Both types of questions can take the form of "What is X?", thus being either a demand for information about what the word 'X' means, or a demand for information about the nature of the thing X itself. Wilson, Assessment 1.


27. Wilson, Introduction 23.


33. Wilson, Introduction 24-25. It might be concluded that in emphasizing the principles according to which the basis of any morality is to be assessed, Wilson is thereby implicitly rejecting all traditional and conventional moral systems. This, however, is not the case. "Correctness in morality..." he writes "...is not a matter of what is commonly accepted." He then adds: "Now (as I shall say later in the book) this does not at all mean that it is a waste of time to look at the moral views of other people, both past and present; or that we should not try to get our own morality as correct as possible; or that we may not be able to prove (in some sense of the word) that some moral views are right and others are wrong. But to start here would be to start at the wrong end. For we cannot do any of these things until we know how to settle such matters." Wilson, Introduction 25-26.
34. Wilson, as is no doubt readily apparent, is here following Peters. For Peters the term "education" is not "...a term like 'gardening' which picks out a particular type of activity." He then adds: "In this respect 'education' is rather like 'reform'. It picks out no particular activity or process. Rather it lays down criteria to which activities or processes must conform." Peters, Ethics 3. Peters then proceeds to develop his now familiar analysis of "education" in terms of the criteria which a particular process or activity must satisfy if it is to be regarded as part of education. Wilson, it is clear, proposes to do the same for "moral". He writes: "Different societies at different times might have called certain people 'moral', 'virtuous', 'good' or even 'morally educated'. He then adds: "Now it is one thing to say whom we (or some other society) would describe in this way: but quite another thing to say whether this description is accurate. We may think we know who these people are; but unless we are clear about what it means to talk of somebody being 'good' or 'moral' or 'morally educated', we can't be sure that we do know." Wilson, Introduction 28. Accordingly, he argues, "...I shall try to outline the concept of moral education, and to deal with some of the conceptual confusion which exists in the minds of both practical workers and research workers on this topic." Wilson, Introduction 30.


37. Wilson, Introduction 27.

38. It should be noted here that in discussing Wilson's conception of moral education I have restricted my attention to his method of approach. He does, of course, develop a model of a morally educated person based upon his analysis of the term "moral". I shall not discuss his model, however, since such a discussion falls outside the scope of my thesis.


41. Wilson, Introduction 11.

42. Wilson, Introduction 11.


45. In his book *The Way of Words*, Ronald Munson offers the following definition of the term "necessary condition": "To say a property P is a necessary condition for applying a word to an item is to say that the word is used in such a way that whatever lacks P is not correctly referred to by the word." Ronald Munson, *The Way of Words: An Informal Logic* (Atlanta: Houghton, 1976) 40.

46. The term "moral" has both an evaluative and a descriptive use. In his book *Ethics*, William Frankena distinguishes these uses as follows: "The terms 'moral' and 'ethical' are often used as equivalent to 'right' or 'good' and as opposed to 'immoral' and 'unethical'. But we also speak of moral problems, moral judgements, moral codes, moral arguments, moral experiences, the moral consciousness, or the moral point of view. 'Ethical' is used in this way too. Here 'ethical' and 'moral' do not mean 'morally right' or 'morally good'. They mean 'pertaining to morality' and are opposed to the 'nonmoral' or 'nonethical', not to the 'immoral' or 'unethical'." William F. Frankena, *Ethics* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1973) 5-6. In the present discussion, unless otherwise noted, the term "moral" is being used descriptively.


49. It should be noted here that in claiming that Wilson presupposes a Platonic conception of linguistic meaning, I am not thereby also claiming that he adopts a Platonic metaphysics and epistemology. Whether or not Wilson's conception of linguistic meaning commits him to a Platonic ontology is a moot point, the discussion of which falls outside the scope of this thesis.


57. "To say a property or set of properties P is a sufficient condition for applying a word to an item is to say that the word is used in such a way that whatever has P is correctly referred to by the word." Munson, *Words* 40. Munson offers the following analogy by way of explanation: "Words, then, are typically connected with properties in the way that a presidential candidate is connected with registered voters. If a sufficient number of people vote for him, then he wins. But no one certain person has to vote for him, and some of those registered may not vote at all. If a sufficient number don't vote for him, he loses. But that doesn't mean that nobody voted for him." Munson, *Words* 47.

58. Wilson, *Introduction* 44.

59. Wilson, *Introduction* 44.

60. Wilson, *Introduction* 44.

61. Wilson, *Introduction* 44.


63. It should be noted here that human beings may not be the only language-users on the planet (or elsewhere for that matter). Experiments with dolphins, gorillas and chimpanzees have revealed that these animals either have a form of language of their own or are capable of learning American sign language.


67. For an analysis of the different senses of "moral" characteristic of contemporary moral philosophy, see William K. Frankena "Recent Conceptions of Morality" in Hector-Neri Castoneda and George Nakhnikian, eds. Morality and the Language of Conduct (Detroit: Wayne State UP, 1965) 1-24. Frankena's paper provides convincing support for the contention that the analysis of "moral" provided by Wilson is inadequate.


69. MacIntyre, History 1.

70. MacIntyre, History 1.

71. It must, of course, be admitted that strictly speaking this conclusion does not follow from the premise cited. Given the fact that Wilson's approach to moral education fails, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that his approach to moral education fails together with all other approaches that are significantly similar to it. It does not follow that some other purely conceptual approach to moral education cannot succeed where his has failed. However, in view of the fact that Wilson's approach is the most widely discussed approach of this kind (if not the only one), it is reasonable, albeit "illogical", to conclude that if it fails then a purely conceptual approach to the task in question must be abandoned.

72. This contention is indirectly supported by MacIntyre. He writes: "A history which ... is concerned with the role of philosophy in relation to actual conduct, cannot be philosophically neutral." MacIntyre, History 3. It should be noted here that Wilson's search for a neutral foundation for moral education can be criticized from the anti-foundationalism implicit in Dewey's pragmatism.

73. It should be noted here that in the two chapters which follow, I do not propose to defend and justify every aspect of Dewey's conception of human nature and of his epistemology, metaphysics, and axiology. Dewey himself has already done a good enough job defending himself. Hence I shall assume that, in general, his views are plausible and not obviously mistaken. For the most part, therefore, I shall attempt to clarify those of his ideas that are relevant to my thesis. In the case of his moral views, however, I shall argue in support of them.
74. Dewey's conception of the moral life will be considered in greater detail in Chapter 3.


76. Taylor, Principles 56-7.

77. Frankena, Ethics 14.


79. In the dialogue Crito, where Socrates defends his decision to remain in jail, Socrates rejects Crito's appeal to public opinion. He says "...my dear fellow, what we ought to consider is not so much what people in general will say about us but how we stand with the expert in right and wrong, the one authority, who represents the actual truth. So in the first place your proposition is not correct when you say that we should consider popular opinion in questions of what is right and honorable and good, or the opposite." Hamilton and Cairns, Plato 33.

80. In making this claim, an ambiguity in the meaning of the term "nature" must be addressed if misunderstanding is to be avoided. The Greeks did, in fact, contrast nature and convention and they did look to nature as a source for principles governing conduct as well as for standards of value. However, the meaning which the term "nature" had for the Greeks is considerably different from the meaning it has in the claim I have made. For the Greeks "nature" meant, somewhat roughly, either a thing's (or act's) inherent purpose or its essential structure. It was not understood as denoting the spatio-temporal world of unfoldings, processes, changes and endings which, again roughly, it is today generally understood as denoting. Hence the term "nature" should be taken in this latter sense when considering the claim I have made.

81. The views of Aristotle are an exception to this generalization.

82. It can be justifiably claimed, I believe, that the overriding concern animating Dewey's philosophical endeavours from the turn of the century onward was to work out in detail the full implications for philosophy of: (1) rejecting Cartesian dualism; (2) accepting Darwin's theory of evolution in particular, and the method of the sciences in general; and (3) accepting the full import of democracy as a way of life.
The enormity of this undertaking is reflected in the following passage in Dewey's essay "Antinaturalism in Extremis": "...it is not just 'matter' which continues to reflect the beliefs of a prescientific and predemocratic period. Such words as 'mind', 'subject', 'person', 'the individual', to say nothing of 'value', are more than tinged in their current usage (which affects willy-nilly philosophical formulations) with significations they absorbed from beliefs of an extranatural character. There is almost no word employed in psychological and societal analysis and description that does not reflect this influence." He then goes on to add: "Hence, draw the conclusion that the most pressing problem and the most urgent task of naturalism at the present time is to work out on the basis of available evidence a naturalistic interpretation of the things and events designated by words that now exert almost complete control of psychological and societal inquiry and report." John Dewey, "Antinaturalism in Extremis," Naturalism and the Human Spirit ed. Yervant H. Krikorian (New York: Columbia UP, 1944) 3-4.

83. In the introduction to his book, Consequences of Pragmatism, Rorty distinguishes between "philosophy" and "Philosophy". The former denotes the effort to see how things hang together, the latter denotes the Platonic-Kantian tradition of seeking understanding by means of inquiry into the "true" nature of things. He writes: "I shall capitalize the term 'philosophy' ... in order to help make the point that Philosophy, Truth, Goodness, and Rationality are interlocked Platonic notions. Pragmatists are saying that the best hope for philosophy is not to practise Philosophy. They think it will not help to say something true to think about Truth, nor will it help to act well to think about Goodness, nor will it help to be rational to think about Rationality." Richard Rorty, introduction, Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1982) xv.

84. Developing an account of Dewey's view of moral experience is made difficult by the fact that his views on this subject are not presented in a fully developed and clearly articulated form in one or two principal books. During his career, which began with the publication of his first article in W.T. Harris's The Journal of Speculative Philosophy in April 1882, and spanned seven decades till his death in 1952, Dewey authored over 700 articles and 40 books. Thus, there
emerges the exegetical problem of determining which of Dewey's writings on morals are to be regarded as definitive of his mature view. This problem, however, presupposes that Dewey's views regarding moral experience changed substantially over the course of his career—an assumption which appears to be untenable. In his article on Dewey's ethics in Jo Ann Boydston's book Guide to the Works of John Dewey, Darnell Rucker writes: "The changes Dewey's philosophy underwent in his early writing as he developed his own distinctive brand of thought are perhaps less obvious in his ethical writings than they are in the other works. Two reasons for this lack of apparent change are the degree of continuity in the content of his ethical writings and the similarity of language and approach between earlier and later works. The shifts which do take place appear to be largely shifts in emphasis, the working out and strengthening of the underlying theoretical analysis taking place in the psychological and logical investigations". Darnell Rucker, "Dewey's Ethics," Guide to the Works of John Dewey, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1970) 112.

In this thesis, therefore, I shall assume that beginning with Dewey's article "Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality" (1903), all articles and books thereafter devoted either directly or indirectly to moral experience can be regarded as comprising a more or less coherent view of it that is definitive of his mature outlook.

85. In the Introduction to a collection of Dewey's essays published under the title John Dewey on Experience, Nature, and Freedom, Richard Bernstein, emphasizing the importance for Dewey of a community of inquirers, writes: "Through the funded experience of such a community, rules are transmitted and become effective guides for future inquiry. It is more accurate to speak of types of inquiry, since Dewey, like Aristotle, realized that different subject matters require different rules of procedure, and the various types of inquiry will have differing degrees of precision.... Aesthetic and moral experiences, for example, have their own unique qualities which differentiate them from other modes of experience, and the procedures of inquiry can and ought to be adapted to the distinctive features of these varieties of experience without doing violence to the uniqueness of the subject matter." Richard J. Bernstein, ed., John Dewey on Experience, Nature, and Freedom, (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1960) xxxi-ii.
86. Dewey's view that there is no absolute and radical break in continuity between experience and "moral" experience stands in sharp contrast to the view found in much of traditional ethics. In Platonic philosophy, for example, the supreme form of the Good is held to be the ultimate ground not only of value but also of all being (Plato's "great inversion"). This form, however, is not part of the empirical world, nor is it merely a concept in the mind of a particular individual; it is, instead, an eternal and immutable existence to be found only in a transcendent world and to be apprehended only through rational intuition (noesis), a capacity presupposing extensive training in the discipline of dialectic. Thus in Plato's view, experience and morals are, quite literally, worlds apart. Similarly, in Kant's view there is a radical dichotomy between categorical and hypothetical imperatives, the former alone being definitive of morality, the latter of mere prudence. The laws of moral duty, and hence of all morality, must not have any connection with any aspects of the empirical world. "Everyone must admit...", he writes, "...that a law has to carry with it absolute necessity if it is to be valid morally--valid, that is, as a ground of obligation: ...here consequently the ground of obligation must be looked for, not in the nature of man nor in the circumstances of the world in which he is placed, but solely a priori in the concepts of pure reason; and that every other precept based on principles of mere experience--and even a precept that may in a certain sense be considered universal, so far as it rests in its slightest part, perhaps only in its motive, on empirical grounds--can indeed be called a practical rule, but never a moral law." Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans, H.J. Paton, (New York: Harper, 1964) 57. In Kant's view, therefore, morality cannot be connected with experience and hence in approaching it, empirical knowledge is of no avail. Dewey's insistence on the continuity of "moral" experience with experience thus can clearly be seen to be at odds with much of traditional ethics of which the theories of Plato and Kant are key exemplars.

87. In his discussion of Dewey's metaphysics, James Gouinlock writes: "...there are aesthetic situations, cognitive, moral, indeterminate, religious situations and so on... The adjectives which describe situations (e.g., moral, aesthetic) mark the general, pervasive qualities which distinguish one kind of situation from another and which provide the context for the various phases of human experience. That there are distinguishable kinds of situations does not mean,
however, that there is only one kind of transaction within the entire set of relations qualified as moral, aesthetic, cognitive, etc. The situation presents a complex of interacting processes and possesses a variety of different elements. Presumably, however, any such situation possesses certain traits in common with all other situations and can be characterized by reference to such traits."


88. "Dewey's naturalistic metaphysics is an attempt to determine those traits which are present in every situation... A naturalistic metaphysics is then a basic and inclusive set of concepts which are applicable to all instances of experienced reality. These generic traits of nature must be acknowledged in some form in any attempt to characterize any such reality thoroughly and accurately." Gouinlock, *Value* 11.
CHAPTER TWO

DEWEY'S NATURALISTIC METAPHYSICS

In this chapter I shall restrict the focus of my attention to the delineation of the characteristic features of Dewey's conception of experience. His conception of experience, however, departs substantially from the understanding of it in traditional Western philosophy and it so thoroughly permeates his methodology and metaphysics that one cannot provide an adequate account of his view of experience apart from its connection with his conception of metaphysics. Dewey's understanding of "moral" experience thus can be seen to presuppose not only his conception of "experience", but also the larger metaphysical context of which it is such an integral part. Hence, in developing an outline of Dewey's naturalistic metaphysics, my overriding concern shall be to: (1) provide the background necessary to a clear and adequate understanding of his view of "moral" experience, and (2) underscore the vital connections between his metaphysics and both his theory of inquiry and his axiology--connections which are critical to a coherent understanding of his views. I do not intend to provide a comprehensive exegesis of his metaphysics, nor shall I endeavour to defend his views against the criticisms raised either by fellow naturalists or by philosophers whose views are grounded in alternative metaphysical or philosophical
frameworks. A discussion along these lines clearly falls outside the parameters of the present work. In thus restricting the focus of my attention, however, I do not wish to suggest the absurd view that Dewey's metaphysical views are above criticism or that further elaboration and development of them is unnecessary or impossible.

A. DEWEY'S CONCEPTION OF METAPHYSICS

1. TRADITIONAL METAPHYSICS

Before proceeding to outline the main features of Dewey's naturalistic metaphysics, a preliminary point must be made regarding his notion of the nature of metaphysics and the form of argument he adduces in support of the outlook he develops. Dewey does not, in fact, have a metaphysical position in the traditional sense. In its traditional sense, the term "metaphysics" is generally understood as denoting the science devoted to the delineation of true reality. The use of the term "true" to qualify "reality" is intended to underscore a central contention of traditional metaphysics, viz., that reality is distinct from, and not reducible to, the experienced world. True reality is thus understood as comprising the eternal and immutable principles underlying the world as apprehended in sense experience, and hence a metaphysical account of reality cannot have any truck with the empirical world, the latter being dismissed as no more than mere appearance and
illusion. Since metaphysical discourse and inquiry is concerned with the eternal and immutable principles underlying the empirical world, it follows not only that these principles do not exist in the empirical world, but also that they cannot be apprehended by mere sense experience, and hence require some other means for their discovery, viz. rational intuition. When attained, therefore, metaphysical knowledge is characterized by certainty, immutability, and universality. Moreover, no mere empirical fact or event can count, ex hypothesi, as evidence against it.\(^2\) Plato's "allegory of the cave" and his discussion of the means of knowledge and their appropriate objects which immediately precedes it in The Republic can be regarded as a paradigm example of traditional metaphysics thus understood.\(^3\)

In the foregoing sketch of traditional metaphysics, two dualisms clearly emerge: (1) the subject-matter of metaphysics is comprised of "objects" and "relations" of a super-sensible, hence extra-natural, kind and (2) knowledge of the existence and characteristics of these objects and relations requires a distinctive mode of apprehension thereby implicating a theory of knowledge. In his book The Quest for Certainty,\(^4\) Dewey develops the view that the problems besetting philosophy all revolve around dualisms of one kind or another (e.g., mind/body, subject/object, knowledge/belief, is/ought, appearance/reality,
individual/society) and that these dualisms are ultimately grounded in the fundamental dichotomy of "theory" and "practice". This dichotomy, together with the disdain with which practice is viewed, is a reflection, he argues, of particular social and cultural forms existing at a certain point in history. He writes:

Work has been onerous, toilsome, associated with a primeval curse. It has been done under compulsion and the pressure of necessity, while intellectual activity is associated with leisure. On account of the unpleasantness of practical activity, as much of it as possible has been put upon slaves and serfs. Thus the social dishonor in which this class was held was extended to the work they do. There is also the age-long association of knowing and thinking with immaterial and spiritual principles, and of the arts, of all practical activity in doing and making, with matter. For work is done with the body, by means of mechanical appliances and is directed upon material things. The disrepute which has attended the thought of material things in comparison with immaterial thought has been transferred to everything associated with practice.5

The complete separation of theory from practice, however, not only reflects certain social and cultural forms, but also the need individuals have for security and certainty. The quest for certainty, argues Dewey, is

...a quest for a peace which is assured, an object which is unqualified by risk and the shadow of fear which action casts. For it is not uncertainty per se which men dislike, but the fact that uncertainty involves us in peril of evils.6
In view of the role the dualism between theory and practice has played in fixing the issues and concerns of philosophy throughout most of its history, it follows that in rejecting it one thereby also succeeds in rejecting much of mainstream philosophy. In the specific case at hand, in rejecting this fundamental dichotomy, Dewey succeeds in undermining not only the longstanding dualism of appearance and reality characteristic of traditional metaphysics (and, thereby, traditional metaphysics itself), but also what he calls the "spectator theory of knowledge" connected with it. Thus in approaching Dewey's naturalistic metaphysics one must not attempt to construe it as yet another effort, in the long history of such undertakings, to provide a complete and apodictic account of the true principles of reality. Instead, it must be viewed as an effort to develop a clear and coherent description of the most general features characteristic of existence (Dewey refers to these as the generic traits of existence) as these unfold within experience. His metaphysics is thus "naturalistic" because: (1) it incorporates the principles and methods of experimental science, and (2) it does not appeal to or presuppose extra-natural principles in its description of existence. It is "metaphysics" because it is a description of the most general traits of existence as experienced. In characterizing Dewey's metaphysics, James Gouinlock writes:

The problem for metaphysical inquiry ... is to determine what are the traits of
existence which are implied by all the various events of human experience. Such inquiry aims at finding the traits common to all occasions of experience. It seeks fullest generality: the generic traits of nature... A naturalistic metaphysics attempts to discriminate those traits of nature which are present in any encountered subject matter or situation.8

In light of the foregoing, Dewey's endeavour to develop a naturalistic metaphysics can be seen to rest upon one critically important claim, viz., that the transcendent reality forming the subject-matter of traditional metaphysics does not exist. If this claim were shown to be false, (i.e., if such a reality could be shown to exist), then clearly Dewey's efforts would have little purpose. His arguments in support of this claim thus prove to be of considerable interest and importance. In point of fact, however, Dewey does not develop any direct or explicit arguments in support of it, since to do so would be tantamount to playing the traditional metaphysician's game. Instead, his strategy appears to be to support the tenability of his claim by undermining the view that a transcendent reality exists. In other words, he supports the tenability and desirability of 'p' by showing the untenability of its competitor, 'q'. He goes about accomplishing this by developing two distinguishable lines of argument. In one of these, his objective is to situate the view in question (as well as various other claims connected with it) within its social, cultural, and
historical context—a procedure he terms the "genetic method."9 Once this context has been established he then goes on to argue that since the conditions which initially prevailed as part of this context have changed, the context presupposed by the view no longer obtains and that, hence, in losing its ground, the view becomes untenable. In developing this line of argument Dewey frequently pinpoints key errors in the analyses of previous philosophers. Chief among these errors are what he terms the "fallacy of selective emphasis"10 and the "intellectualist fallacy".11

In the second line of argument Dewey endeavours to show, by employing his methods of inquiry, the advantages which accrue if his approach to specific philosophical problems is adopted, while at the same time vigorously emphasizing the impossibility of resolving such problems so long as one remains entrenched within the framework of traditional philosophy. Although part of a discussion focussing on early 20th-century British philosophy, G.J. Warnock nevertheless succeeds in neatly capturing the spirit animating Dewey's strategy when he writes:

...metaphysical systems do not yield, as a rule, to frontal attack. Their odd property of being demonstrable only, so to speak, from within confers on them also a high resistance to attack from outside. The onslaughts of critics to whom, as likely as not, their strange tenets are very nearly unintelligible are apt to seem, to those entrenched inside, mis-directed or irrelevant. Such systems are more vulnerable to ennui than to disproof. They are
citadels, much shot at perhaps but never taken by storm, which are quietly discovered one day to be no longer inhabited. The way in which an influential philosopher may undermine the empire of his predecessors consists, one may say, chiefly in his providing his contemporaries with other interests.\textsuperscript{12}

In the preceding discussion attention was drawn to the difference between traditional metaphysics and Dewey's conception of it, as well as to his method of arguing in support of his outlook. I shall now proceed to develop an overview of the main features of his "metaphysics"\textsuperscript{13} as a propaedeutic to the discussion of his view of moral experience. Throughout the discussion, I shall attempt to clarify Dewey's views by contrasting them with the views of other important philosophers, notably, but not exclusively, Descartes. I shall also indicate, where necessary, the connections between his metaphysics and other aspects of his philosophical outlook, as well as highlighting its implications for his understanding of both moral experience and the conception of moral education to which it gives rise.

Two pairs of what might be called architectonic terms stand out as being fundamentally important in understanding Dewey's naturalistic metaphysics. The terms "nature" and "experience" comprise the first pair of terms and serve to mark a relation that proves to be the cornerstone of his metaphysics, while the terms pre-reflective (or primary)
experience and reflective (or secondary) experience, central to his method, comprise the second pair of terms. Although both pairs of terms mark distinguishable components in Dewey's metaphysics, they are nevertheless interconnected. The character of this connection will emerge during the course of the discussion which follows.

2. **NATURE AND EXPERIENCE**

In Dewey's metaphysics the terms "nature" and "experience" have a meaning which is somewhat different from the one they are typically assumed to have. Unfortunately, he does not provide a definition of them and hence their meaning must be the subject of inference. In their traditional post-Cartesian employment, the terms "nature" and "experience" are used as antipodal terms, the former being used to denote everything in the world "external" to mind, while the latter is used to denote the occurrence of a private, inherently subjective, and intrinsically mental set of events distinct from, and completely unconnected with, the external world (i.e., nature).\(^{14}\) Dewey characterizes this traditional employment of these terms in the following manner:

To many the associativity of the two words will seem like tail g of a round square, so engrained is the notion of the separation of man and experience from nature. Experience, they say, is important for those beings who have it, but is too casual and sporadic in its
occurrence to carry with it any important implications regarding the nature of Nature. Nature, on the other hand, is said to be complete apart from experience. Indeed, according to some thinkers the case is even in worse plight: Experience to them is not only something extraneous which is occasionally superimposed upon nature, but it forms a veil or screen which shuts us off from nature, unless in some way it can be "transcended". So something non-natural by way of reason or intuition is introduced, something super-empirical.15

As can readily be inferred, such a construction of these terms gives rise to a number of intractable difficulties chief among which are the problems of how, if at all, experience and nature are to be related and whether or not knowledge of the natural world can ever be obtained by means of experience.

In contrast to the traditional understanding of these terms, Dewey uses them not as antipodal terms, but as correlative ones. Experience, he claims, penetrates into nature,

...reaching down into its depths, and in such a way that its grasp is capable of expansion; it tunnels in all directions and in so doing brings to the surface things at first hidden—as miners pile high on the surface of the earth treasures brought from below.16

He then goes on to add:

No one with an honest respect for scientific conclusions can deny that experience as an existence is something that occurs only under highly specialized conditions, such as are found in a highly organized creature
which in turn requires a specialized environment. There is no evidence that experience occurs everywhere and everywhen. But candid regard for scientific inquiry also compels the recognition that when experience does occur, no matter at what limited portion of time and space, it enters into possession of some portion of nature and in such a manner as to render other of its precincts accessible.\(^{17}\)

In these passages, experience is characterized as being a particular kind of existence whose occurrence presupposes both an organism and an environment of a certain degree of complexity. Moreover, Dewey's use of the terms "experience" and "nature" clearly reveals that he recognizes that their respective meanings are not logically synonymous (since if they were, he could not, literally, advance the claims which he does) and that, hence, their extensions cannot be numerically identical—that is, portions of nature must be acknowledged to exist apart from being involved in any experiential situations. In light of this, it might appear to follow that Dewey not only espouses some form of realism,\(^{18}\) but also adumbrates an inchoate dualism of experience and nature as insidious as the one he is intent on combatting. Such an interpretation, although initially plausible, would be premature. Dewey is neither a realist, nor an idealist and he certainly does not bifurcate nature and experience. In keeping with the tenor of his philosophical outlook, Dewey must be regarded as holding the view that the terms "experience" and "nature" are best
understood as marking an analytical distinction drawn in some specific context of reflective inquiry for some identifiable purpose.\textsuperscript{19} "Nature", as a collective noun, denotes the totality of existences, relations, events, unfoldings, changes, and endings not only apart from experience but also as encountered in experience, while "experience" is construed as one of the numerous events occurring in nature and, hence, as an inherent part of it, not separable from it in any ontological sense.\textsuperscript{20} The following passages support this reading of Dewey:

...experience is of as well as in nature. It is not experience which is experienced, but nature--stones, plants, animals, diseases, health, temperature, electricity, and so on. Things interacting in certain ways are experience; they are what is experienced. Linked in certain other ways with another natural object--the human organism--they are how things are experienced as well.\textsuperscript{21}

For empirical method the problem ... is to note how and why the whole is distinguished into subject and object, nature and mental operations. Having done this, it is in a position to see to what effect the distinction is made: how the distinguished factors function in the further control and enrichment of the subject-matters of crude but total experience.\textsuperscript{22}

The import of the first of these passages is twofold. In the first place, Dewey explicitly characterizes experience as an interactive process occurring as part of and in nature, and hence as requiring for its occurrence
more than one element. In this respect, therefore, experience can be instructively compared with any other process occurring in nature. In the case of combustion, for example, several distinguishable elements (e.g., temperature, oxygen, material) must be present if it is to occur. The properties of the resulting combustion thus vary in relation to specific qualities of each of the elements involved—a wood fire, for example, is significantly different from a graphite fire raging in the heart of a nuclear reactor. Moreover, the occurrence of combustion results in several consequences some of which are common to all forms of combustion (e.g., light, heat), while others are peculiar to the type of combustion (e.g., the production of toxic gasses). In consequence of this, the phenomenon of combustion is open to control insofar as the degree to which the specific conditions for its occurrence are known. Hence it can be "tamed" and used to advantage (as well as to disadvantage, as in the case of pyromaniacs). Furthermore, in virtue of the knowledge attained about combustion, a specific occurrence of it can be investigated with a view to determining its cause. In short, combustion, which at one time was regarded as a deeply mysterious phenomenon as well as being a gift from the gods, is thus seen to be a complex process of nature which cannot occur of itself and ex nihilo.

What holds for combustion can also be said to hold for
experience when it is viewed as being part of nature. Thus, it too is an interactive process requiring more than one element for its occurrence. Moreover, as in the case of combustion, experience also varies in relation to the conditions of its occurrence, is subject to control, and results in consequences. Hence the approach one would take to investigating a case of combustion is roughly indicative of the main lines to be followed when investigating the occurrence of specific experiences. The key point to be noted here is that experience is not the kind of phenomenon which can occur in and of itself independently of all interactive connections. It is a natural occurrence presupposing an environment—not a purely private and inner adventure.

The second point embedded in the passage under consideration centers upon Dewey's view that experience, when considered from the side of the human organism involved, can be regarded as having certain qualitative characteristics. In other words experience, qua experience, is a particular kind of natural occurrence to be understood along the lines already sketched. When experience is viewed from the side of the individual undergoing it, however, it is seen to have certain felt qualities. A comparison of experience with "disease" may contribute to making this point somewhat clearer. When a disease is viewed from a medical standpoint (i.e., qua disease), it can be said to
have a specific and familiar pathology (in most cases, at least); a set of symptoms connected with it that are instrumental in its successful diagnosis, some of which are peculiar to it while others are common to a number of other diseases; and various courses of treatment, each exhibiting degrees of salubrity. When viewed from the side of the patient, a disease has vividly-felt characteristics such as discomfort, fatigue, and listlessness, as well as associated anxiety, hope and frustration—to mention only a few. These felt qualities of the disease are irreducible parts of the experience of having a disease. It is clear, however, that both the medical view and the patient's view of a particular disease are connected, although in each view different aspects of it are emphasized. What is true of disease when considered from the patient's point of view may also be said to apply equally to experience when viewed from the position of the individual undergoing it.

This introduction of "felt" qualities as integral parts of experience appears to pave the way for the claim that Dewey, malgre lui, thereby introduces into his metaphysics a subjective element that cannot be reconciled with his naturalism. A disease, it may be argued, does not feel itself and, hence, to consider the felt qualities of a disease one must posit a subject who is capable of feeling them. In a similar fashion, if the qualities of this or that particular experience are held to be felt, then there
must be a subject not only whose experiences they are, but who can also feel them. Thus it could be claimed that the introduction of felt qualities presupposes the distinction between a "subject" who feels them and the "object" which is felt. The conclusion then could be drawn that the subject thus presupposed is distinct from and irreducible to the experiences had and is, therefore, an entity unto itself—the proverbial "ghost in the machine".

The temptation to make this claim should be resisted. In the passage under consideration, Dewey dismisses a clear implication of this view when he claims that "it is not experience which is experienced". The view itself he rejects as untenable in somewhat more direct and explicit terms in Chapter VI of Experience and Nature when he examines the notions of "self" and "subjectivity" at length. He writes:

...one can hardly use the term "experience" in philosophical discourse, but a critic rises to inquire "Whose experience?" The question is asked in adverse criticism. Its implication is that experience by its very nature is owned by someone; and that the ownership is such in kind that everything about experience is affected by a private and exclusive quality. The implication is as absurd as it would be to infer from the fact that houses are usually owned, are mine and yours and his, that possessive reference permeates the properties of being a house, that nothing intelligible can be said about the latter. It is obvious, however, that a house can be owned only when it has existence and the properties and relations disappear to be digested into
egypt. It is additive; it marks the assumption of a new relationship, in consequence of which the house, the common, ordinary house acquires new properties. It is subject to taxes; the owner has the right to exclude others from entering it; he enjoys certain privileges and immunities with respect to it and is also exposed to certain burdens and liabilities. Substitute "experience" for "house", and no other word need be changed. 

In speaking of the "felt" qualities of an experience, then, one need not be ipso facto committed to a Cartesian view of subjectivity. The important point to bear in mind is that these qualities of experience are neither dependent upon the existence of an inner, private self nor do they spring into existence, mysteriously and magically, the instant experience is considered from an individual's point of view. They are, instead, part of the experience at all times and emerge as focal points of attention only as a result of distinctions drawn in reflective analysis. It is the analysis of "pre-reflective" experience which results in the discrimination of "subjective" and "objective" factors. Borrowing a Jamesian metaphor, Dewey argues that experience is "double-barrelled" in that "...it recognizes in its primary integrity no division between act and material, subject and object, but contains them both in an unanalyzed totality." 

It is the tendency to reify the results of reflective analysis, in his view, which proves to be a major source of the widespread belief in the existence of an inner and private self—the core of a Cartesian view of
subjectivity.\textsuperscript{27}

In the discussion thus far, attention has been focussed upon Dewey's view of "nature" and "experience" together with the character of their relation. Two features of his view in particular have been highlighted, viz., (1) that experience is \textit{not} separable from nature and hence \textit{sui generis} but is, instead, an integral part of it, and thus any inquiry into instances of it must take into account the full context of its occurrence; and (2) that experience, when viewed from the side of the individual undergoing it, is seen to have felt qualities as constituent parts of it. If the structural character of the distinction between "subject" and "object" is borne in mind, then the first of these features can be regarded as constituting the "objective" view of experience, while the second constitutes the "subjective" view. This dual character of experience is the cornerstone of Dewey's naturalistic metaphysics in particular, and of his philosophy in general, since it grounds the "denotative method" whereby the generic traits of existence are discovered.\textsuperscript{28} It is this aspect of the relation between nature and experience that I shall now consider.

a) \textbf{Dewey's Denotative Method}

As previously noted experience is, for Dewey, both in and part of nature and hence there is, in his view, a
continuity between nature and experience. The occurrence of experience, moreover, presupposes an interactive connection with an organism of a certain degree of complexity. Thus experience, as Dewey conceives it, is not only a particular kind of natural phenomenon but also, by virtue of its continuity with nature, a reliable gateway to the discovery of the character of nature. Experience, he claims, "...controlled in specifiable ways, is the avenue that leads to the facts and laws of nature". He goes on to add:

Theory may intervene in a long course of reasoning, many portions of which are remote from what is directly experienced. But the vine of pendant theory is attached at both ends to the pillars of observed subject-matter. And this experienced material is the same for the scientific man and the man in the street. The latter cannot follow the intervening reasoning without special preparations. But stars, rocks, trees and creeping things are the same material of experience for both. 29

Experience thus discloses the character of nature not only because it is itself a part of nature and hence, a fortiori, its characteristics must be parts of nature as well (such a view would clearly be both trivial and tautologous) but also, and more fundamentally, because the subject-matter of experience is nature. It is precisely because of this interconnection of experience and nature that experience becomes, for Dewey, the ground of his methodology. He writes:

...experience presents itself as the method, and the only method, for getting
at nature, penetrating its secrets, and wherein nature empirically disclosed (by the use of empirical method in natural science) deepens, enriches and directs the further development of experience.\textsuperscript{30}

The meaning and purport of this method is that "...things are studied on their own account, so as to find out what is revealed when they are experienced".\textsuperscript{31} Empirical method thus characterized is what Dewey terms "denotative method".\textsuperscript{32} It is this method alone which, in his view, proves to be the condition \textit{sine qua non} for the discovery of the generic traits of existence. He writes:

If experience actually presents esthetic and moral traits, then these traits may also be supposed to reach down into nature, and to testify to something that belongs to nature as truly as does the mechanical structure attributed to it in physical science... The traits possessed by the subject-matters of experience are as genuine as the characteristics of sun and electron. They are found, experienced, and are not to be shoved out of being by some trick of logic. When found, their ideal qualities are as relevant to the philosophic theory of nature as are the traits found by physical inquiry.\textsuperscript{33}

The generic traits of existence thus disclosed in experience are not the product of mere conceptual analysis, nor are they determined by a priori categories of mind. They are integral parts of nature on a par with the disclosures of natural science.

In light of the foregoing outline of Dewey's denotative method, it can now be concluded that the generic traits of
experience are ipso facto the generic traits of nature. Writes Dewey: "...all modes of experiencing are ways in which some genuine traits of nature come to manifest realization." The careful analysis of experience, when informed by the outcomes of previous analyses (including the forms of inquiry thereby established) is thus both necessary and sufficient to yield "knowledge" of nature. This fact about denotative method demands the adoption of a radically different stance toward experience. Dewey underscores this point unequivocally when he writes:

Suppose however that we start with no presuppositions save that what is experienced, since it is a manifestation of nature, may, and indeed, must be used as testimony of the characteristics of natural events. Upon this basis, reverie and desire are pertinent for a philosophic theory of the true nature of things; the possibilities present in imagination that are not found in observation are something to be taken into account. The features of objects reached by scientific or reflective experiencing are important, but so are all the phenomena of magic, myth, politics, painting and penitentiaries. The phenomena of social life are as relevant to the problem of the relation of the individual and universal as are those of logic; the existence in political organization of boundaries and barriers, of centralization, of interaction across boundaries, of expansion and absorption, will be quite as important for the metaphysical theories of the discrete and the continuous as is anything derived from chemical analysis. The existence of ignorance as well as of wisdom, of error and even insanity as well as of truth will be taken into account.
Dewey then goes on to conclude that nature is construed in such a way that "...all these things, since they are actual, are naturally possible; they are not explained away into mere 'appearance' in contrast with reality". In view of the enormous variety of experiences human beings can undergo, it follows that the outcome of their analysis will depend upon the context and purpose for undertaking it. Such analysis can thus lead not only to the discovery of the generic traits of existence, but also to the determination of the causes of earthquakes, improved skill in training puppies, or a decision as to which places to visit while holidaying in Switzerland.

Thus far in my discussion of Dewey's method I have emphasized the critically important role played by his conception of experience. There is, however, another equally important aspect of it which must be considered, viz., his distinction between the "crude" subject-matter of pre-reflective experience and the objects (constructions) of reflective experience. Hence it is to this distinction that I shall now turn.

3. **PRE-REFLECTIVE AND REFLECTIVE EXPERIENCE**

The distinction between the subject-matter of pre-reflective experience and the objects of reflective experience is at the very heart of Dewey's denotative method. It is vital to both his notion of a "situation" as
well as to his conception of having an experience and thus to his understanding of the specific character, not only of "moral" experience, but also of other forms of experience (e.g., esthetic, cognitive, religious). In the discussion which follows, therefore, the import and role of this distinction shall be considered.

Dewey characterizes the distinction between pre-reflective (primary) and reflective (secondary) experience in the following manner:

This consideration of method may suitably begin with the contrast between gross, macroscopic, crude subject-matter in primary experience and the refined, derived objects of reflection. The distinction is one between what is experienced as the result of a minimum of incidental reflection and what is experienced in consequence of continued and regulated reflective inquiry.\textsuperscript{39}

The distinction between pre-reflective and reflective experience thus marks the difference between subject-matter as it initially occurs, with little or no reflective thought being involved in it, and this "same" subject-matter as it has been reconstructed in consequence of the interpolation not only of the process of reflective inquiry but also the objects of knowledge which are its outcome.\textsuperscript{40} As the passage just cited makes clear, the key to this distinction is the critically important function of inquiry in experience.\textsuperscript{41}

Dewey's emphasis on the subject-matter of pre-reflective experience, however, could lead to the view that
pre-reflective experience is entirely comprised of subject-matter. This view of pre-reflective experience would be mistaken. Dewey’s use of the term "subject-matter" is technical and hence, in referring to the "subject-ter" of pre-reflective experience, he thereby implicitly distinguishes two senses of the term "pre-reflective experience". In its broadest designation, pre-reflective experience comprises, in unanalyzed form, the rapidly shifting series of events, things, changes, unfoldings, endings, etc., that are characteristic of life and the occurrence of which are marked by immediacy.\textsuperscript{42} "The things of primary experience...", he writes, "...are so arresting and engrossing that we tend to accept them just as they are—the flat earth, the march of the sun from east to west and its sinking under the earth."\textsuperscript{43} They are "...objects to be treated, used, acted upon and with, enjoyed and endured... They are things had before they are things cognized."\textsuperscript{44} In this broad sense, therefore, pre-reflective experience can readily be viewed as "raw" material awaiting the "transformations" to be wrought by reflective inquiry.

Although pre-reflective experience, thus understood, presupposes little or no reflective thought, its occurrence, contrary to what might be expected, is nevertheless not "pure", that is, unaffected by previous experience. As it occurs at a particular time in the course of the life history of some individual, pre-reflective experience
already bears the stamp of the outcomes of previous instances of reflective inquiry. These previous inquiries include not only those engaged in by the individual, but also all the inquiries undertaken by the collectivity of individuals who, viewed historically, have fashioned the socio-cultural matrix within which pre-reflective experience occurs. Writes Dewey:

...experience is already overlaid and saturated with the products of the reflection of past generations and bygone ages. It is filled with interpretations, classificatory due to sophisticated thought, which have become incorporated into what seems to be fresh, naive empirical material. It would take more wisdom than is possessed by the wisest historic scholar to track all of these absorbed borrowings to their original sources.45

Pre-reflective experience is thus freighted not only with numerous and diverse attitudes, values, beliefs, prejudices, etc., but also with the patterns and forms that have come to be embedded in the very language used to talk about experience (e.g., subject/object, fact/value, past/future, inside/outside, good/bad). Furthermore, the possibility of reaching a more primitive and pristine layer of experience (which, for some philosophers, is presumed to be the necessary ground of a view of reality sub specie aeternitatis) is rejected by Dewey. He writes:

We cannot permanently divest ourselves of the intellectual habits we take on and wear when we assimilate the culture of our time and place. But intelligent furthering of culture demands that we
take some of them off, that we inspect them critically to see what they are made of and what wearing them does to us. We cannot achieve recovery of primitive naivete.\textsuperscript{46}

In its broad designation, therefore, pre-reflective experience is the "field" from which \textit{subject-matter}, in Dewey's technical sense of the term, is discriminated in consequence of the emergence of reflective inquiry and the conditions instigating it. Writes Dewey:

Were it not that knowledge is related to inquiry as a product to the operations \(\nu\) which it is produced, no distinctions requiring special differentiating designations would exist. Material would merely be a matter of knowledge or of ignorance and error; that would be all that could be said... But if knowledge is related to inquiry as its warrantably assertible product, and if inquiry is progressive and temporal, then the material inquired into reveals distinctive properties which seemed to be designated by distinctive names. As \textit{undergoing} inquiry, the material has a different logical import from that which it has as the outcome of inquiry. In its first capacity and status, it will be called by the general name \textit{subject-matter}... The name \textit{objects} will be reserved for subject-matter so far as it has been produced and ordered in settled form by means of inquiry.\textsuperscript{47}

Hence, \textit{prior} to the appearance of reflective inquiry, pre-reflective experience occurs in the manner already indicated. Specific subject-matter as a constituent \textit{part} of pre-reflective experience emerges \textit{only} as the result of the involvement of reflective inquiry. "Subject-matter" and "reflective inquiry" are thus correlative terms marking a
structural distinction within a functional whole.\textsuperscript{48}

Dewey's view that the "recovery of primitive naivete" is impossible, and hence that pre-reflective experience (in the broad sense outlined above) is the only available locus for the subject-matter of reflective inquiry, has a profound bearing upon his conception of the character and role of philosophy. As previously noted, he regards philosophy primarily as a form of criticism.\textsuperscript{49} Given that pre-reflective experience incorporates the structures, values, beliefs, etc., of the culture within which it occurs, it follows that the task of philosophy, \textit{qua} critical activity, is to identify and articulate these characteristics of experience. Referring to these as "prejudices", Dewey writes:

\ldots philosophy is a critique of prejudices. These incorporated results of past reflection, welded into the genuine materials of first-hand experience, may become organs of enrichment if they are detected and reflected upon. If they are not detected, they often obfuscate and distort. Clarification and emancipation follow when they are detected and cast out; and one great object of philosophy is to accomplish this task. An empirical philosophy is ... a kind of intellectual disrobing.\textsuperscript{50}

The "disrobing" Dewey here envisions, however, is not, as the passage cited clearly implies, to be undertaken merely for its own sake but rather in order to reconstruct our ideas of experience and thereby to delineate the instrumentalities of a reconstruction of experience itself.
The analysis of experience as a propaedeutic to reconstruction is thus essential. Writes Dewey: "...reconstruction cannot, as far as I can see, be made without giving considerable critical attention to the background within which and in regard to which reconstruction is to take place."\textsuperscript{51}

In light of the fact that for Dewey the subject-matter of philosophical analysis is located in pre-reflective experience, and given that pre-reflective experience cannot be transcended, nor a more pristine layer of it attained, it follows that philosophy \textit{cannot} escape the historical-cultural setting in which it unfolds.\textsuperscript{52} In consequence of this, the normative scaffolding which reconstruction presupposes can only be built from the \textit{materials of experience}, naturalistically construed. Writes Dewey: "...experience is capable of developing from within itself methods which will secure direction for itself and will create inherent standards of judgement and value."\textsuperscript{53}

Dewey's conception of the nature and office of philosophy, as adumbrated above, together with his view that experience can provide standards for its own development and direction, is quite clearly incompatible not only with the "method of doubt" advocated by Descartes in his \textit{Meditations on First Philosophy},\textsuperscript{54} but also with most of traditional Western philosophy. Descartes, as is well known, believed not only that by resolving to doubt whatever was not clear
and certain he could set aside all of his beliefs and opinions which thus proved to be doubtful, but also that if a proposition were thereby found to be irrefragable, he could deduce from it a system of knowledge whose certainty would be apodictic. Descartes thus believed that he could transcend time and place and set philosophy upon a firm and indubitable foundation. In dramatic contrast, Dewey contends that context is indispensable "...for thinking, and therefore for a theory of logic and ultimately of philosophy itself." The neglect of context is, he maintains, "...the greatest single disaster which philosophic thinking can incur." In Dewey's view, context (which is both temporal and spatial) and thought cannot be separated and hence Descartes's "method of doubt" is, in fact, impracticable. He writes:

When we think, there are some things which we are immediately thinking of, considerations that are before us, and that are reflected upon, pondered over, etc. They are that with which we are wrestling, trying to overcome its difficulties and to reduce to order. Surrounding, bathing, saturating, the things of which we are explicitly aware is some inclusive situation which does not enter into the direct material of reflection. It does not come into question; it is taken for granted with respect to the particular question that is occupying the field of thinking. Since it does not come into question, it is stable, settled.

He then concludes:

To think of it in the sense of making it an object of thought's examination and
scrupulous is an irrelevant and confusing distraction. It, or rather some part of it, comes into question, or into the explicit material of reflection, only when we suspect that it exercises such a differential effect upon what is consciously thought of as to be responsible for some of the confusion and perplexity we are trying to clear up. Then, of course, it enters into the immediate matter of thinking. But this transfer never disturbs the whole contextual background; it does not all come into question at once. There is always that which continues to be taken for granted, which is tacit, being 'understood'. If everything were literally unsettled at once, there would be nothing to which to tie those factors that being unsettled, are in the process of discovery and determination.59

This passage thus clearly reveals not only the significance for Dewey of context in fixing the pattern and direction of thought, but also the specificity of all thinking.

In the discussion thus far, two senses of the term "pre-reflective experience" have been distinguished; the place of subject-matter in pre-reflective experience and the manner whereby it emerges have been indicated; and Dewey's view of the nature and scope of philosophy clarified. The question which must now be considered is how the subject-matter of pre-reflective experience is related to the objects of reflective experience. Before turning to this question, however, the conditions instigating reflective inquiry must be considered. It is to this task that I now turn.
a) The Conditions of Reflective Inquiry

Dewey's view of the conditions antecedent to reflective inquiry proceeds from his conception of experience as the interactive connection of human organism and environment (i.e., that portion of both nature and the socio-cultural world directly involved in the interactive relation). In stark outline his view is that reflective inquiry is a function of an indeterminate experiential situation. In other words, when the combined interactive contingencies comprising experience result in indeterminateness or disequilibrium, then reflective inquiry emerges as the means whereby determinateness and harmony are to be restored. The function and outcome of reflective inquiry is thus "instrumental" and hence its efficacy can be readily tested by direct appeal to subsequent experience. In the Cartesian view, by contrast, "thinking", which is construed to encompass virtually all forms of mental activity, is held to be strictly dependent upon mind for its occurrence and thus is regarded as being a peculiarly mental phenomenon. Moreover, given that mind can exist independently of all connection with the material world, including the body as a biological organism, it follows that both the stimulus as well as the outcome of thinking are entirely mental and hence only contingently connected (if connected at all) with nature. What applies to "thinking" clearly applies, a fortiori, to reflective inquiry. In consequence there is,
in this view, no extra-mental means whereby the "product" of thinking can be tested and hence no practical method for distinguishing between the self-consistent worlds of the wise man and the fool.

In considering Dewey's view more fully it would be best to begin with his contention that all living things, regardless of their position on the evolutionary scale, must, in sharp contrast to inanimate things, adjust and adapt to prevailing conditions if they are to survive. He writes:

...the physiological organism with its structures, whether in man or in the lower animals, is concerned with making adaptations and uses of material in the interest of maintenance of the life-process...66

The adjustments and adaptations which are thus required vary with the type of organism and its environment. In achieving these adjustments, the organism and its environment comprise a unified whole. "The processes of living...", writes Dewey, "...are enacted by the environment as truly as by the organism, for they are an integration."67 In the case of organisms possessing few distinctive physiological structures, such adjustment is a relatively simple and direct affair. The more complex the organism, however, the greater the structures involved in its constitution and hence the more intricate the interactive relation between it and its environment. Writes Dewey:

...with every differentiation of
structure the environment expands. For a new organ provides a new way of interacting in which things in the world that were previously indifferent enter into life-functions. The environment of an animal that is locomotor differs from that of a sessile plant; that of a jelly fish differs from that of a trout, and the environment of any fish differs from that of a bird ... the difference is not just that a fish lives in the water and a bird in the air, but that the characteristic functions of these animals are what they are because of the special way in which water and air enter into their respective activities. 68

In the case of complex organisms, therefore, not only is the environment greatly expanded (for human beings it includes the socio-cultural world), but also adjustment becomes increasingly more difficult to achieve and to maintain. 69 It follows from this that changes affecting this integration, either from within an organism or from within its environment, are a threat, in various degrees, to its survival and that life is therefore relatively precarious. Hence whenever such changes do occur, the organism must react in ways which will restore balance and thereby ensure survival. Writes Dewey:

With differentiation of interactions comes the need of maintaining a balance among them; or, in objective terms, a unified environment. The balance has to be maintained by a mechanism that responds both to variations that occur within the organism and in surroundings. ...As long as life continues, its processes are such as continuously to maintain and restore the enduring relationship which is characteristic of the life-activities of a given organism. 70
Equilibrium of organism and environment is thus the hallmark of life and life-processes.

As indicated above, the changes jeopardizing achieved equilibrium can originate either from within the organism or from within its environment. When disequilibrium or indeterminateness emerges, however, it is neither purely subjective nor purely objective. Bearing in mind Dewey's conception of experience as an interactive process, it follows that the indeterminateness which such changes can cause is a quality inherent in the experiential situation itself. Moreover indeterminateness characterizes the experiential situation taken as a whole and not just some particular aspect of it. Writes Dewey:

...the terms distressing, perplexing, cheerful, disconsolate (sic)...do not designate specific qualities in the way in which hard, say, designates a particular quality of a rock. For such qualities permeate and color all the objects and events that are involved in an experience. The phrase 'tertiary qualities', happily introduced by Santayana, does not refer to a third quality like in kind to the 'primary'and 'secondary' qualities of Locke and merely happening to differ in content. For a tertiary quality qualifies all the constituents to which it applies in a throughgoing fashion.

By way of clarification he goes on to offer the following illustration:

A painting is said to have quality, or a particular painting to have a Titian or Rembrandt quality. The word thus used most certainly does not refer to any particular line, color or part of the
painting. It is something that affects and modifies all the constituents of the picture and all of their relations. It is not anything that can be expressed in words for it is something that must be had.\textsuperscript{73}

The indeterminancy or disequilibrium characterizing a particular experiential situation is thus a pervasive quality permeating and, paradoxically, binding it together. Writes Dewey:

\begin{quote}
The pervasively qualitative is not only that which binds all constituents into a whole but it is also unique; it constitutes in each situation an individual situation, indivisible and unduplicable. Distinctions and relations are instituted within a situation; they are recurrent and repeatable in different situations.\textsuperscript{74}
\end{quote}  

Experiential situations, therefore, are both unique as well as being the "stuff" of which pre-reflective experience is made. "The statement that individuals live in a world", he writes "...means, in the concrete, that they live in a series of situations."\textsuperscript{75}

In view of the fact that the occurrence of indeterminateness results in a reaction whose aim is to restore integration; and given that indeterminateness when it occurs, is an inherent characteristic of a particular experiential situation, it follows that the reactions of the organism involved vary in relation not only to their own complexity but also to the complexity of the situation itself. Less complex organisms react directly and immediately. In the case of more complex organisms,
however, the reactions cease being direct and immediate and acquire a quality of their own commensurate with the complexity of the organism and its environment. With human beings, and quite possibly with some non-human organisms as well, such "reactions" becomes "responses" possessing an intellectual quality. Writes Dewey:

As organisms become more complex in structure and thus related to a more complex environment, the importance of a particular act in establishing conditions favorable to subsequent acts that sustain the continuity of the life process, becomes at once more difficult and more imperative. A juncture may be so critical that the right or wrong present move signifies life or death. Conditions of the environment become more ambivalent: it is more uncertain what sort of action they call for in the interests of living. Behavior is thus compelled to become more hesitant and wary, more expectant and preparatory. In the degree that responses take place to the doubtful as the doubtful, they acquire mental quality. If they are such as to have a directed tendency to change the precarious and problematic into the secure and resolved, they are intellectual as well as mental. Acts are then relatively more instrumental and less consummatory or final; even the latter are haunted by a sense of what may issue from them.76

With simple organisms, therefore, situations marked by indeterminacy (or disequilibrium) are "felt" as ones involving tension. Since thinking is absent, the reaction evoked is direct and "blind". Its success in effectively resolving the difficulty encountered, when not the product of instinct, is purely fortuitous. In the case of human
beings, situations characterized by indeterminacy, rather than being simply felt as ones involving tension are, instead, sometimes perceived to be problematic as well.\textsuperscript{77} The perception of a situation as problematic, however, involves reflective inquiry. "Many definitions of mind and thinking...", writes Dewey, "...have been given. I know of but one that goes to the heart of the matter:--response to the doubtful as such."\textsuperscript{78}

Although the perception of an indeterminate experiential situation as problematic involves reflective inquiry, the response to an indeterminate situation nevertheless need not always involve reflective inquiry and, hence, need not result in a perception of it as problematic. The response to an indeterminate experiential situation can, for example, be little more than mere wishing, imagining or day-dreaming. The thinking involved becomes reflective inquiry when it seeks, intelligently,\textsuperscript{79} not only to establish and articulate the precise character of the difficulty involved in the indeterminate situation but also to discover an effective resolution of the difficulty thus disclosed. The task of reflective inquiry is thus twofold. Writes Dewey:

...it must discover, it must find out, it must detect; it must inventory what is there. All this, or else it will never know what the matter is; the human being will not find out what 'struck him', and hence will have no idea of where to seek for a remedy--for the needed control. On the other hand, it
must invent, it must project, it must bring to bear upon the given situation what is not, as it exists, given as a part of it. 80

Reflective inquiry is, then, a characteristically intelligent mode of response to an indeterminate experiential situation. It emerges when "...there is something seriously the matter, some trouble, due to active discordance, dissentiency, conflict among the factors of a prior non-intellectual experience; when...a situation becomes tensional." 81

Although thus far attention has been directed to the nature of the indeterminate experiential situation antecedent to the emergence of reflective inquiry, it should not be concluded that the indeterminate situation thus presupposed can only occur in cases involving disequilibrium or disharmony between an organism, qua physical being, and its natural environment. Although the indeterminate situations with which human beings are involved do include instances of this kind of disequilibrium, they nevertheless are not the only type of disharmony encountered. Human beings live in a socio-cultural world as well as in nature. Given the enormous diversity of beliefs, opinions, roles, relations, practices, traditions, etc. comprising this world, together with the changes constantly affecting them and challenging their propriety, it can be readily appreciated how conflicts and disharmonies among them can arise. When such disharmonies do arise an indeterminate
experiential situation results and the door is open for reflective inquiry.\textsuperscript{82} Moreover, indeterminate situations result not just when conflicts among beliefs, etc., occur, or when uncertainty about either the grounds from which they proceed or about their consequences emerges, but also from perplexity over their meaning (i.e., consequences).\textsuperscript{83} The conditions of reflective inquiry thus saturate the world in which human beings live.

As indicated above, the thinking involved in the response to an indeterminate situation need not be reflective inquiry. In fact, an indeterminate experiential situation may not result in any kind of thinking at all. Thus the occurrence of an indeterminate situation in and of itself does not automatically eventuate in reflective inquiry and hence it is only a necessary, and not a sufficient, condition of it.\textsuperscript{84} A number of failings, therefore, can characterize an individual's response to an indeterminate experiential situation. In the first place, a genuinely indeterminate situation may not result in reflective inquiry because the individual involved fails altogether to recognize it as being indeterminate. Conversely, a situation may be taken to be indeterminate when it is not. Another type of failing occurs when an individual responds to an indeterminate situation as problematic, but with only partial inquiry animated by a preconceived idea as to its proper outcome. An opposite
failure characterizes the response of an individual who is paralyzed by inquiry that is too cautious. The failures involved in each of these cases are, for Dewey, directly linked to the habits of inquiry which the individual involved has acquired and developed. "Habits...", writes Dewey, "...are conditions of intellectual efficiency." He goes on to add:

Concrete habits do all the perceiving, recognizing, imagining, recalling, judging, conceiving and reasoning that is done. 'Consciousness', whether as a stream or as special sensations and images, expresses functions of habits, phenomena of their formation, operation, their interruption and reorganization. Without the directive force of appropriate habits, therefore, the occurrence of an indeterminate situation either fails to eventuate in reflective inquiry or the resulting inquiry suffers from some defect or excess in its execution.

In the discussion thus far, attention has been directed to the conditions antecedent to the emergence of reflective inquiry. The point was made that reflective inquiry presupposes not only the occurrence of an indeterminate experiential situation, but also an individual possessing appropriate habits of inquiry. The quality of being indeterminate, moreover, was seen to pervade the experiential situation as a whole, thereby not only imparting to it its uniqueness and identity, but also fixing the direction of appropriate inquiry. As previously noted
the pervasive quality of a situation, together with whatever other qualities are inherent in it, are had prior to being known. This "having" constitutes immediacy. The notion of immediacy is an important one for Dewey and hence a brief account of it is in order before taking up the discussion of the relation between the subject-matter of pre-reflective experience and the objects of reflective experience.

b) Immediacy

In Dewey's view all existent things, events, relations, etc., possess inherent qualities. In the interactive connection of organism and environment which results in an experiential situation these qualitative things, etc., (together with the qualities of the situation taken as a whole) are directly had (i.e., emerge in consciousness, as they qualitatively are). That is to say, given Dewey's view that the distinction between "subject" and "object" is the outcome of reflective analysis and not an ontologically grounded one, it follows that this distinction is not a "fact" given in and characteristic of pre-reflective experience. In consequence experience, when it occurs prior to reflective inquiry, simply is--it is undergone, enjoyed, suffered. It is "had". For Dewey the term "immediacy" characterizes this aspect of the experiential situations comprising pre-reflective experience. Writes Dewey: "...in
every event there is something obdurate, self-sufficient, wholly immediate, neither a relation nor an element in a relational whole, but terminal and exclusive." These things, he adds, are the "...irreducible, infinitely plural, undefinable and indescribable qualities which a thing must have in order to be, and in order to be capable of becoming the subject of relations and a theme of discourse." He then goes on to conclude:

Immediacy of existence is ineffable. But there is nothing mystical about such ineffability; it expresses the fact that of direct existence it is futile to say anything to one's self and impossible to say anything to another. Discourse can but intimate connections which if followed out may lead one to have an existence.

Immediacy, then, marks the way in which the qualitateness of things involved in the experiential situations comprising pre-reflective experience unfold prior to the reconstruction of these situations by reflective inquiry. In claiming that nothing can be said about the qualitateness of direct existence, Dewey is making the point that no symbol system, or representational modality, can either reproduce or replace this dimension of the experiential situation with which it is connected. Thus, about the experience of tasting something sweet, one can say nothing which is not either metaphorical or directive (i.e., a statement of conditions which, if satisfied, would result in an individual's having the experience itself). The
experience as such simply is, and nothing can take the place of having it. Moreover, it is the experiential situations themselves which are, for Dewey,

...poignant, tragic, beautiful, humorous, settled, disturbed, comfortable, annoying, barren, harsh, consoling, splendid, fearful; are such immediately and in their own right and behalf.\textsuperscript{91}

These qualities, he adds: "...indubitably characterize natural situations as they empirically occur. These traits stand in themselves on precisely the same level as colors, sounds, qualities of contact, taste and smell."\textsuperscript{92} Immediacy thus underscores a critically important fact about experience, viz., that its occurrence is qualitative and hence that qualities--moral, religious, esthetic, etc.--are inexpungible traits of nature.

The significant import of Dewey's notion of immediacy is that it serves to distinguish between having an experience and knowing something about it. Experiential situations, in all their qualitatively, are directly had prior to, and independently of being known. Writes Dewey:

Things in their immediacy are unknown and unknowable, not because they are remote or behind some impenetrable veil of sensation of ideas, but because knowledge has no concern with them. For knowledge is a memorandum of conditions of their appearance, concerned, that is, with sequences, coexistences, relations.\textsuperscript{93}

The qualities inherent in the experiential situation are thus had, they are not, and cannot, be known as such (i.e.,
one cannot know, except possibly in a purely metaphorical sense, the quality red). Knowledge, for Dewey, is concerned with the relations between qualities, the conditions and consequences of their appearance, etc. These relations and conditions, although they are a part of the experiential situations comprising pre-reflective experience, are nevertheless not "immediate" and hence they are not had as esthetic objects are had. Hence, in emphasizing the distinction between having an experience and knowing something about it, Dewey thereby rejects the possibility of immediate knowledge, together with the spectator theories of knowledge connected with it. The view that immediate knowledge is not only possible but also necessary is central to both rationalist and empiricist epistemologies. In both theories knowledge must ultimately be grounded in an indubitable foundation. In rationalist epistemologies, this foundation is provided by the clear and distinct ideas given in intuition, whereas for empiricists it is found in the incorrigibility of immediate sensory experience. Moreover, the foundation upon which knowledge rests is itself held to be a form of knowledge acquired directly and independently of all inference, and hence characterized as immediate. For Dewey, by contrast, all "knowledge" (i.e., warranted assertions) is the outcome of inquiry and hence is mediated by the inferences inquiry entails. In the opening sentences of the chapter devoted to a detailed consideration
of immediate knowledge in his *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*, Dewey writes:

> The considerations adduced in discussion of the pattern of inquiry and of the structure of judgement, entail the conclusion that all knowledge as grounded assertion involves mediation. Mediation, in this context, means that an inferential function is involved in all warranted assertion. The position here defended runs counter to the belief that there is such a thing as immediate knowledge, and that such knowledge is an indispensable precondition of all mediated knowledge.\(^{95}\)

In rejecting the possibility of immediate knowledge and the foundational support which such knowledge provides, Dewey thus opens the door to an alternative, \textit{anti-foundational}, conception of "knowledge" and "knowing".\(^{96}\) In his view it is the \textit{methods of inquiry} which provide access to knowledge (i.e., warranted assertibility).\(^{97}\) "Knowledge...", he writes, "...is to be defined in terms of inquiry, not \textit{vice-versa}, both in particular and universally."\(^{98}\) The methods of inquiry, together with their results, however, are not rooted in an indubitable foundation but are, instead, subject to change and development.\(^{99}\) They are, nevertheless, all that is available to us in our endeavour to find out about ourselves and the world in which we live. The age-old quest for certainty is futile and hence there is no guarantee against error. Contrary to what one might expect, however, Dewey is not thus inevitably committed to espousing a form of radical
scepticism. Complete scepticism can be avoided if the work of inquiry is carried on by a "community of inquirers"¹⁰⁰ in a free and impartial manner.¹⁰¹ This, however, clearly presupposes that the methods of inquiry thus employed are sound. In Dewey's view it is inquiry itself which determines "...the formal conditions of inquiry."¹⁰² He adds:

Logic as inquiry into inquiry is, if you please, a circular process; it does not depend upon anything extraneous to inquiry. The force of this proposition may perhaps be most readily understood by noting what it precludes. It precludes the determination and selection of logical first principles by an a priori intuitional act ... It precludes resting logic upon metaphysical and epistemological assumptions and presuppositions. The latter are to be determined, if at all, by means of what is disclosed as the outcome of inquiry; they are not to be shoved under inquiry as its 'foundation'. ... it precludes...the assumption of a priori ready-made definition of knowledge which determines the character of inquiry.¹⁰³

As this passage clearly reveals, ongoing inquiry into the nature of inquiry is, for Dewey, sufficient to provide the standards required for its regulation. Anticipating the obvious, he writes:

How, it will be asked, can inquiry which has to be evaluated by reference to a standard be itself the source of the standard? How can inquiry originate logical forms (as it has been stated that it does) and yet be subject to the requirements of these forms? ... The problem reduced to its lowest terms is whether inquiry can develop in its own
ongoing course the logical standards and forms to which further inquiry shall submit. One might reply by saying that it can because it has. One might even challenge the objector to produce a single instance of improvement in scientific methods not produced in and by the self-corrective process of inquiry; a single instance that is due to application of standards ab extra.104

Inquiry thus proves to be the key to Dewey's conception of "knowledge" and "knowing". As will emerge in subsequent discussion, it is also central to his understanding of the nature of valuation judgements as well as being the condition sine qua non of having an experience.105

In the foregoing discussion of immediacy the point was made that for Dewey pre-reflective experience is directly had in all of its qualitatively nature. Attention was drawn to the fact that in his view "knowing" always involves inquiry and that the soundness of inquiry thus presupposed can only be determined by a community of inquirers engaging in an ever continuing process of unfettered inquiry. In connecting knowing with inquiry, Dewey rejects the possibility of immediate knowledge and thus "knowledge" and "knowing" emerge as aspects of reflective experience related, but not reducible to, pre-reflective experience. In view of this the relation between pre-reflective and reflective experience must now be considered.

c) The Relation Between Pre-reflective and Reflective Experience
The occurrence of pre-reflective experience, as previously indicated, is not only freighted with values, attitudes, and beliefs but also reflects the patterns and structures inherent in the socio-cultural matrix within which it occurs.\textsuperscript{106} Since experience involves the interaction of organism and environment, it is essentially a moving and dynamic affair characterized by changes, upheavals, endings, beginnings, etc. These characteristics of experience result in the occurrence of experiential situations that are confused and indeterminate and, hence, eventuate in inquiry. \textit{Reflective} experience, always begins in the experiential situations comprising pre-reflective experience. The nature of the relationship between pre-reflective and reflective experience is that:

\textit{...the subject-matter of primary experience sets the problems and furnishes the first data of the reflection which constructs secondary objects ... it is also obvious that test and verification of the latter is secured only by return to things of crude or macroscopic experience--the sun, earth, plants and animals of common, every-day life.}\textsuperscript{107}

Referring the objects of reflective experience back to pre-reflective experience in order to determine what they contribute to it is, for Dewey, fundamentally important. Failure to do so results in objects that are devoid of significant meaning. He writes:

\textit{Not tested by being employed to see what}
it leads to in ordinary experience and what new meaning it contributes, this subject-matter becomes arbitrary, aloof—what is called 'abstract' when that word is used in a bad sense to designate something which exclusively occupies a realm of its own without contact with the things of ordinary experience.\textsuperscript{108}

In the natural sciences, by contrast, such return to the experiential situations of pre-reflective experience assures that the objects they generate will furnish the means for augmented control in pre-reflective experience thereby contributing to an enrichment of its meaning. Writes Dewey:

\begin{quote}
The refined objects of reflection in the natural sciences, however, never end by rendering the subject-matter from which they are derived a problem; rather, when used to describe a path by which some goal in primary experience is designated or denoted, they solve perplexities to which that crude material gives rise but which it cannot resolve of itself. They become means of control, of enlarged use and enjoyment of ordinary things. They may generate new problems, but these are problems of the same sort, to be dealt with by further use of the same methods of inquiry and experimentation.\textsuperscript{109}
\end{quote}

As these passages reveal, the significance of the objects generated by reflective experience lies in the understanding of pre-reflective experience which they alone make possible. Writes Dewey: "They explain the primary objects, they enable us to grasp them with understanding, instead of just having sense-contact with them."\textsuperscript{110} This understanding of pre-reflective experience arises from the instrumental role which the objects of reflective experience
play in establishing continuity between diverse phases of pre-reflective experience. In Dewey's view, these objects:

...lay out a path by which return to experienced things is of such a sort that the meaning, the significant content, of what is experienced gains an enriched and expanded force because of the path or method by which it was reached. Directly, in immediate contact it may be just what it was before-hard, colored, odorous, etc. But when the secondary objects, the refined objects, are employed as a method or road for coming at them, these qualities cease to be isolated details; they get the meaning contained in a whole system of related objects; they are rendered continuous with the rest of nature and take on the import of the things they are now seen to be continuous with.111

Without objects of reflective experience and the continuity and meaning they provide, pre-reflective experience would never amount to anything more than the continuous unfolding, in rapid succession, of episodes of experience. One could never actually have an experience since the connections between experiences that are necessary in order to have an experience would be entirely missing. At best one would only be able to "undergo" or "suffer" experience—not unlike, one imagines, the experience had by a new-born infant. In Art as Experience, Dewey writes:

...in much of our experience we are not concerned with the connection of one incident with what went before and what comes after. There is no interest that controls attentive rejection or selection of what shall be organized into the developing experience. Things happen, but they are neither definitely included nor decisively excluded; we
drift. We yield according to external pressure or evade and compromise. There are beginnings and cessations, but no genuine initiations and conclusions. One thing replaces another, but does not absorb it and carry it on. There is experience, but so slack and discursive that it is not an experience.112

The objects of reflective experience are thus critically important not only in providing greater control of the experiential situations of pre-reflective experience, and in consequence enriching its meaning, but also in establishing vital connections between experiences, thereby making it possible to have an experience—religious, moral, esthetic, cognitive, etc.

In light of the foregoing discussion the point can now be made that for Dewey, the objects of knowledge generated in reflective experience are fundamentally a matter of construction, that is, the "what" that we know when we know something is not some element of pre-reflective experience as it unfolds, but rather an "object" that is the product of a process of inquiry which occurs as part of an indeterminate experiential situation and which is thus numerically distinct from the objects, events, relations, etc., that are involved in the experiential situations comprising pre-reflective experience. Writes Dewey: "...the object of knowledge is eventual; that is, it is an outcome of directed experimental operations, instead of something in sufficient existence before the act of knowing..."113 If the "object" of knowledge is a
construction of inquiry, however, then clearly, qua object, it is not given in pre-reflective experience. He writes:

"...objects of knowledge are not given to us defined, classified and labeled, ready for labels and pigeon-holes. We bring to the simplest observation a complex apparatus of habits, of accepted meanings and techniques. Otherwise observation is the blankest of stares, and the natural object is a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury."

As this passage suggests, the construction of objects of knowledge involves both sensible and intellectual components, that is, sensory stimuli, structured and organized into patterns though they already may be, together with an individual's conceptual apparatus and her/his habits of inquiry, interact to result in the construction of objects of knowledge. The conceptual component in the construction is especially critical since it embodies meaning. Writes Dewey:

To follow the clues of experience is to see that the so called sensible world is a world of immediate beginnings and endings; not at all an affair of cases of knowledge but a succession of qualitative events; while the so called conceptual order is recognized to be the proper object of science, since it constitutes the scheme of constant relationships by means of which spare, scattered and casual events are bound together into a connected history. These emergent immediate events remain the beginning and the end of knowledge; but since their occurrence is one with their being sensibly, affectionally and appreciatively had, they are not themselves things known.

Having an experience, therefore, must always precede
"knowing" something about it, and hence "knowing" emerges as a distinctive experiential component of reflective experience, viz., cognitive experience. Moreover, although cognitive experience always involves inquiry and the construction of objects of knowledge, nevertheless, given that inquiry emerges in an indeterminate situation and that these situations are diverse, it follows that the character of inquiry, together with the object of knowledge constructed, vary in relation to the situation in which it occurs. Since physical science, and the methods of inquiry it has developed, are paradigmatic examples of knowing, the conclusion may be drawn that science alone can result in objects of knowledge. This conclusion, however, is not one which Dewey himself draws. In his view there are "...as many conceptions of knowledge as there are distinctive operations by which problematic situations are resolved." Since experience encompasses a great deal more than the experiential situations resulting in scientific inquiry, science cannot claim to be the only available method of knowing. Writes Dewey:

...the recognition that intelligence is a method operating within the world places physical knowledge in respect to other kinds of knowing. It deals with those relations which are of the broadest scope. It affords a pure foundation for other more specialized forms for knowing:--not in the sense that these must be reduced to the objects in which physical knowledge terminates, but in the sense that the latter supply intellectual points of
departure, and suggest operations to be employed. There is no kind of inquiry which has a monopoly of the honorable title of knowledge. The engineer, the artist, the historian, the man of affairs attain knowledge in the degree they employ methods that enable them to solve the problems which develop in the subject-matter they are concerned with. As philosophy framed upon the pattern of experimental inquiry does away with all wholesale skepticism, so it eliminates all invidious monopolies of the idea of science. By their fruits we shall know them.119

As this passage clearly reveals, for Dewey, cognitive experience, although involving the methods and techniques of modern physical science and mathematics, is nevertheless not restricted exclusively to these. It is inquiry in its various forms occurring in diverse indeterminate experiential situations, and not scientific inquiry per se, that is the fountainhead of all cognitive experience and the objects of knowledge to which it gives rise.

A characteristic feature of cognitive experience in general (and of cognitive experience involving the methods of science in particular) can be found in the purpose for which inquiry is undertaken. The role of inquiry in constructing objects of knowledge is to establish connections (especially causal ones) between the things, events, etc., of pre-reflective experience, thereby not only resolving the indeterminateness of the experiential situation in which it occurs, but also establishing continuity with nature. The constructed object of knowledge
does not reveal this or that particular thing in its immediacy, but rather discloses the bearing which the occurrence of this or that particular thing has for the occurrence of some other particular thing or event. Writes Dewey:

It is unnecessary that knowledge should be concerned with existence as it is directly experienced in its concrete qualities. Direct experiencing itself takes care of that matter. What science is concerned with is the happening of these experienced things. For its purpose, therefore, they are happenings, events. Its aim is to discover the conditions and consequences of their happening. And this discovery can take place only by modifying the given qualities in such ways that relations become manifest...these relations constitute the proper objects of science as such. We are here concerned to emphasize the fact that elimination of the qualities of experienced existence is merely an intermediate step necessary to discovery of relations...120

The net result of this overriding concern with the connections between the things and events of pre-reflective experience is twofold: (1) an enormous increase in ability to control and direct the tide of changing events to further deliberately-instituted purposes121 and (2) an increasing diminution of the qualitative character of natural existence, that is, the qualitative fullness of immediate experience, since it plays no role in establishing connections between events, all but disappears from view. Writes Dewey:

The distinctively intellectual attitude
which marks scientific inquiry was generated in efforts at controlling persons and things so that consequences, issues, outcomes would be more stable and assured... In responding to things not in their immediate qualities, but for the sake of ulterior results, immediate qualities are dimmed, while those features which are signs, indices of something else, are distinguished. A thing is more significantly what it makes possible than what it immediately is. The very conception of cognitive meaning, intellectual significance, is that things in their immediacy are subordinated to what they portend and give evidence of.122

He goes on to conclude: "Genuine science is impossible as long as the object esteemed for its own intrinsic qualities is taken as the object of knowledge. Its completeness, its immanent meaning, defeats its use as indicating and implying."123 For Dewey, then, the object of knowledge, especially as constructed by modern physical science, must be free of the qualities inherent in immediate experience if it is to fulfill its instrumental function. As such, it is an abstraction of a particular sort selected to subserve a specific interest, viz., the successful management of unfolding affairs.

In Dewey's view the object of knowledge is crucial to understanding and knowing. In adopting the stance of modern science, however, the door is thrown open to a potentially intractable problem. "The commonest assumption of philosophies...", he writes, "...common even to philosophies very different from one another, is the assumption of the
identity of objects of knowledge and ultimately real objects." He adds: "The assumption is so deep that it is usually not expressed; it is taken for granted as something so fundamental that it does not need to be stated." In Dewey's view, making this assumption would rob the world as daily encountered of all human significance and value—it would reduce it to a cold, indifferent and ultimately meaningless occurrence. He writes:

The isolation of traits characteristic of objects known, and then defined as the sole ultimate realities, accounts for the denial to nature of the characters which make things lovable and contemptible, beautiful and ugly, adorable and awful. It accounts for the belief that nature is an indifferent, dead mechanism; it explains why characteristics that are the valuable and valued traits of objects in actual experience are thought to create a fundamentally troublesome philosophical problem.

The "troublesome philosophical problem" to which Dewey here alludes is, of course, the problem of values. If the assumption is made that the characteristics of the object of knowledge alone determine the nature of "true" reality then, given the characteristics of the object of knowledge as constructed by modern science, it follows that values are eliminated from natural existence and hence that their status becomes problematic. Values become purely "subjective" states—mere projections of individual preference and desire—entirely cut off from any significant mooring in nature and experience. Writes Dewey:
When real objects are identified, point for point, with knowledge-objects, all affectional and volitional objects are inevitably excluded from the 'real' world and are compelled to find refuge in the privacy of an experiencing subject or mind.128

In Dewey's view this problem need not arise. All experience penetrates nature thus disclosing its numerous and diverse qualities. He refers to these as the "esthetic" qualities of experience, intending thereby to underscore the fact that these qualities are primarily had--enjoyed, suffered--not known. He writes:

If we take advantage of the word esthetic in a wider sense than that of application to the beautiful and ugly, esthetic quality, immediate, final or self-enclosed, indubitably characterizes natural situations as they empirically occur.129

He subsequently goes on to say:

Things are beautiful and ugly, lovely and hateful, dull and illuminated, attractive and repulsive. Stir and thrill in us is as much theirs as is length, breadth, and thickness. Even the utility of things, their capacity to be employed as means and agencies, is first of all not a relation, but a quality possessed, immediately possessed, it is as esthetic as any other quality.130

In cognitive experience, however, the full qualitativeness of things and events as they are in direct experience does not emerge since its focus is primarily upon the construction of objects of knowledge. Important though it may be, it must nevertheless be regarded, as Dewey
repeatedly affirms, as **but one** of the many modalities of experience revelatory of nature. Religious, moral and esthetic experience are among some of the other types of experience which one can have. He writes:

That esthetic and moral experience reveal traits of real things as truly as does intellectual experience, that poetry may have a metaphysical import as well as science, is rarely affirmed, and when it is asserted, the statement is likely to be meant in some mystical or esoteric sense rather than in a straightforward everyday sense.\textsuperscript{131}

These modes of experience, as well as cognitive experience, all **begin** in the experiential situations comprising pre-reflective experience. Unlike cognitive experience, however, these other modes of experience are more complex insofar as they not only incorporate inquiry (thus becoming partially cognitive), but also involve the qualitative things and events as these occur in immediate experience. That is to say, whereas the characteristic feature of cognitive experience is the construction of objects of knowledge, the characteristic feature of these other modes of experience is found in their arrangement of existential condition— with a view to securing an experience which, in restoring harmony, is fulfilling by virtue of its completeness, that is, an experience which is **consummatory**. Such arrangement of condition cannot be achieved, however, without recourse to objects of knowledge. Writes Dewey:

The objects of science, like the direct objects of the arts, are an order of
relations which serve as tools to effect immediate havings and beings. Goods, objects with qualities of fulfillment are the natural fruition of the discovery and employment of means, when the connections of ends with a sequential order is determined. Immediate empirical things are just what they always were: endings of natural histories. Physical science does not set up another and rival realm of antithetical existence; it reveals the state or order upon which the occurrence of immediate and final qualities depends. It adds to casual having of ends an ability to regulate the date, place and manner of their emergence.  

Knowledge and knowing thus emerge as instrumental—they become the "...means of control of occurrence of experienced things having a richer and more secure equipment of values and qualities." If the instrumental character of objects of knowledge is kept in view, then cognitive experience can readily be seen to enrich experience rather than robbing it of its inherent qualities. Only if we commit what Dewey calls the "fallacy of selective emphasis" will this fact about cognitive experience be overlooked. In consequence, values will drop out of nature and thus become problematic. In rejecting the assumption that cognitive experience alone is revelatory of true reality, Dewey successfully undermines the ground upon which the "subjectivity of values" thesis ultimately rests and thereby sets the stage for an alternative account of value and valuation—an account in which the experimental and instrumental conception of "knowledge" and knowing is uppermost.
In the foregoing discussion the point was made that for Dewey the objects of reflective experience serve not only to explain the things and events of pre-reflective experience, but also to establish thereby their continuity with nature. Attention was drawn to the fact that objects of knowledge are not given in pre-reflective experience but are, instead, constructions involving sensory as well as conceptual components. Dewey's contention that the construction of objects of knowledge is not restricted exclusively to cognitive experience incorporating the methods of modern physical science was also discussed together with the conclusion that the "subjectivity of values" thesis is untenable. The net import of this conclusion is that it clears the ground for an alternative, experimental, axiology.

In concluding the discussion of the relation between the objects of reflective experience and the subject-matter of pre-reflective experience, this section of my thesis can be drawn to a close. My objective in this section has been to explain this distinction and to indicate its bearing upon his metaphysics. In Section 2, in which Dewey's conception of nature and experience was discussed, the point was made that experience must be regarded as the outcome of a complex interactive process involving an organism and its environment. The experiential situation which thus results is a part of nature, no less so than the chemical
interaction resulting in the growth of a flower, and not an inner, purely private unfolding presupposing an ontologically distinct medium for its occurrence. More importantly, attention was drawn to Dewey's cardinal contention, viz., that the occurrence of experiential situations, when analyzed, reveal the traits of nature. Indeterminacy, a trait thus disclosed, was seen, in subsequent discussion, to be a necessary but not a sufficient condition of various forms of inquiry. Dewey's conception of the formation of ends-in-view is connected with another trait of nature revealed in experience, viz., the occurrence, in nature, of endings. The notion of ends-in-view is central to his conception of moral deliberation and the naturalistic teleology which he espouses. In view of its importance, the notion of endings with which it is connected merits a more detailed examination than it has thus far received. It is, accordingly, to this examination that I now turn.

4. ENDS AND HISTORIES

The discussion of endings may profitably begin by recalling that for Dewey esthetic qualities are inherent characteristics of the experiential situations comprising pre-reflective experience, on a par with the qualities of sound, taste, smell, etc. These qualities are directly had, that is, they emerge in consciousness directly in all their
qualitativenss. He writes: "'Consciousness'...is identical with direct apparition, obvious and vivid presence of qualities and of meanings."\textsuperscript{134} This having (i.e., consciousness) of esthetic qualities in and of itself, however, does not constitute knowledge or knowing since these, in Dewey's view, are primarily a matter of establishing connections between qualitative things, of determining the conditions and consequences of their occurrence, etc. Since the direct consciousness of esthetic qualities does not, ipso facto, constitute knowledge or knowing (in the sense of "warranted assertion"), two broad phases of experience can therefore be distinguished viz., the esthetic and the cognitive.\textsuperscript{135} In Dewey's view esthetic experience, contrary to what might be expected, is not restricted merely to those occasions when the products of fine art are appreciated but is, instead, as diverse as it is ubiquitous. He writes:

Esthetic, fine art, appreciation, drama have an eulogistic flavor. We hesitate to call the penny-dreadful of fiction artistic, so we call it debased fiction or a travesty on art. Most sources of direct enjoyment for the masses are not art to the cultivated, but perverted art, an unworthy indulgence. Thus we miss the point. A passion of anger, a dream, relaxation of the limbs after effort, swapping of jokes, horse-play, beating of drums, blowing of whistles, explosion of firecrackers and walking on stilts, have the same quality of immediate and absorbing finality that is possessed by things and acts dignified by the title of esthetic.\textsuperscript{136}
As this passage makes clear, if "esthetic" is used in its broad sense then the term "esthetic" experience can be seen to denote those experiential situations in which the direct having and enjoyment (as well as suffering) of "esthetic" qualities prevails as the dominating characteristic, whereas "cognitive" experience can be seen to denote those experiential situations in which the prevailing characteristic is an overriding interest in establishing connections between qualitative things and in determining the consequences of their occurrence. In "esthetic" experience, then, it is the qualitativeness of nature that is directly enjoyed or suffered—the focus being on having rather than on knowing something about the qualities involved. Moreover, since the things, events, relations, etc., incorporated in the experiential situations comprising pre-reflective experience are directly had prior to becoming involved in cognitive experience, the conclusion can be drawn that pre-reflective experience is essentially "esthetic" and hence that "esthetic" experience is the fountainhead of all other phases of experience.

In esthetic experience the esthetic qualities involved are both consummatory and final (i.e., immediate). They are consummatory insofar as they fulfill and bring to completion the experiential situation in which they are incorporated; they are final in that they are completely determinate as they emerge in consciousness. In Dewey's view the absorbing
and engrossing character of esthetic experience is connected with the consummatory quality of objects involved. The consummatory quality of these objects is tied to the satisfaction of physiologically-based needs and the fulfillment of both physiological and organic potentialities and is ultimately fixed by reconstruction in imagination.\textsuperscript{137} The connections here are more readily apparent if Dewey's conception of experience as the outcome of an interactive process involving an organism and its environment is kept in mind. In his view, both elements involved in experience are complex and undergo change. The organism, \textit{qua} animate being, has a complex and delicately balanced physiological structure. The environment in which its life unfolds is equally complex and includes forces and agencies which nurture life as well as destroy it. To sustain life, balance and equilibrium between organism and environment must be maintained. The precariousness of events in nature, however, together with the ubiquity of change, eventuate in the emergence of disequilibrium and imbalance thereby resulting in the formation of needs.\textsuperscript{138} The satisfaction of these needs ensures continued life while the experience involved in satisfying them is consummatory. The emergence of "thirst" as a physiologically conditioned need, for example, presupposes not only an organism and an environment of a certain complexity, but also an interactive relation between them. The slaking of thirst is thus a consummatory
experience while water emerges as a consummatory object.

Apart from the satisfaction of needs, consummatory experience is also linked with the normal functioning of the organism. Its physiological structure contributes to determining the character of the emergent qualities inherent in the experiential situations resulting from interactions involving the organism and its environment and, in so doing, generates experiences that are, to some degree, consummatory. The structure of the human eye and its connection with the occipital lobe of the brain, for example, contributes to shaping the eventual quality of visual experience. When the eye interacts with light waves of the appropriate frequencies, the result is an experiential situation involving colour perception as one of its characteristics. The occurrence of this experience is consummatory in virtue of the fact that specific organic functions are being fulfilled and the coloured objects involved are consummatory. Although consummatory experience of this kind presupposes an interaction involving an organ with a certain structure and an appropriate environment, it nevertheless does not presuppose, as a necessary condition, the involvement of an organ and environment of this specific kind. Hence while organisms whose eyes and brains are very differently structured may not have visual experiences involving colour, this does not mean that they therefore do not and cannot have consummatory experiences in connection
with visual experience. What it does mean is that in the case of such organisms (e.g., kangaroos, chickens, moles) the experience of color is not, as such, available to them as a consummatory experience.

In Dewey's view both types of consummatory experience adumbrated above are gratuitous in their initial occurrence. They subsequently engender experiences that are deliberately sought. Writes Dewey:

...man is naturally more interested in consummations than he is in preparations; ...consummations have first to be hit upon spontaneously and accidentally—as the baby gets food and all of us are warmed by the sun—before they can be objects of foresight, invention and industry.\textsuperscript{139}

The objects involved in the initial occurrence of consummatory experience, however, are quickly transformed. They are overlaid, by imagination, with meaning and hence, in this sense, they are constructions. "Consciousness", writes Dewey, "...so far as it is not dull ache and torpid comfort is a thing of the imagination."\textsuperscript{140} These "constructed" objects are consummatory insofar as they are fulfilling.\textsuperscript{141} The degree to which they are fulfilling is determined by the extent to which they successfully exclude the perils of existence. As Dewey repeatedly affirms, existence is precarious and unstable. The innumerable choices and actions required in the daily unfolding of life can never be guaranteed—they frequently go wrong and eventuate in disappointment, failure, hardship, and,
sometimes, death. In imagination, however, the hard and seemingly inexorable aspect of existence can be escaped, albeit temporarily. Objects can be invested with powers, qualities and meanings which they otherwise do not have or which they fail to have in the degree imagined. The more "perfect" the object imagined, the more absorbing the experience in which it occurs. The anticipation of a holiday is thus always more exciting than the holiday taken and sciamachy is preferred to the perils of dialogue.\textsuperscript{142} Writes Dewey, "...objects of imagination are consummatory in the degree in which they exuberantly escape from the pressure of natural surroundings, even when they re-enact its crises.\textsuperscript{143}

Thus far the discussion of esthetic experience has focussed upon the consummatory quality of the objects involved in its occurrence. As previously indicated these objects are also immediate, final--they are completely determinate as they emerge in consciousness. There are, however, two distinguishable senses in which these objects are "final". In one sense they are final because what they are is exactly what they emerge as in consciousness--no more and no less. In other words there is no room here for distinguishing between appearance and reality. Writes Dewey: "...quality as such is absolute not comparative. A thing may be of some shade of blue when compared with some quality that is wanted and striven for; but its blue is not
itself more or less blue nor (sic) than blueness..."144 The objects involved in esthetic experience are also de facto terminations of experience, that is, they are the endings of a complex interactive process occurring in nature. In this second sense, qualities such as "sweet" or "joyful" are final in that they emerge as the outcome of an interaction involving an organism and its environment in much the same way that the formation of oxygen is the ending of a chemical process in which a mixture of potassium chlorate and manganese dioxide is heated in the flame of a bunsen burner. In this sense of "final", the emergence of esthetic qualities is, for Dewey, tantamount to the emergence of consciousness. He writes: "When the word 'consciounsness' is--as it often is--used for a short name for the sum total of such immediate qualities as actually present themselves, it is the end or terminus of natural events."145 In the opening paragraph of Chapter VIII in Experience and Nature Dewey reiterates this point when he claims that "consciousness":

...is employed to point out certain qualities in their immediate apperaney, qualities of things of sentiency, such as are, from the psychological standpoint, usually termed feelings. The sum total of these immediate qualities present as literal ends or closures of natural processes constitute 'consciousness' as an anoetic occurrence.146

As these passages make clear, then, esthetic objects are final in that they are the endings, in a literal sense,
of complex interactive processes. Taken collectively they comprise consciousness. Thus for Dewey the immediacy of esthetic qualities, and consciousness, *qua ending*, are directly connected. He writes: "It is a reasonable belief that there would be no such thing as 'consciousness' if events did not have a phase of brute and unconditioned 'isness', of being just what they irreducibly are. Consciousness as sensation, image and emotion is thus a particular case of immediacy occurring under complicated conditions."147

In Dewey's view the emergence of esthetic qualities that are both consummatory and final attests to the fact that nature has ends. He writes: "To the empirical thinker, immediate enjoyment and suffering are the conclusive exhibition and evidence that nature has its finalities as well as its relationships."148 He subsequently expands this point when he writes:

*Any* quality as such is final; it is at once initial and terminal; just what it is as it exists. It may be referred to other things, it may be treated as an effect or as a sign. But this involves an extraneous extension and use. It takes us beyond quality in its immediate qualitativenss. If experienced things are valid evidence, then nature in having qualities within itself has what in the literal sense must be called ends, terminals, arrests, enclosures.149

The esthetic qualities which are thus terminal objects (i.e., endings) of the interactive processes involving an organism and its environment, however, do not emerge in
consciousness as fire-flies pierce the darkness of a June night—that is, momentarily and sporadically. They are themselves integral parts of macro-processes occurring over time in nature. These macro-processes also have endings as well as histories. Writes Dewey:

It is a commonplace that no thing lasts forever. We may be glad or we may be sorry but that is wholly a matter of the kind of history which is being ended. We may conceive the end, the close, as due to fulfilment, perfect attainment, to satiety, or to exhaustion, to dissolution, to something having run down or given out.150

In Dewey's view then, endings (qua consciousness of esthetic qualities) occur as parts of processes which also have endings of their own. The eruption of a volcano, for example, is the outcome of a complex geophysical process which occurs over time and which eventually comes to an end.151 Each instant during which it is being observed, however, an entirely different set of interactive processes is unfolding. This simultaneously-occurring set of interactive processes culminates in the consciousness of esthetic qualities. Consciousness and the cessation of volcanic activity are thus both endings of distinguishable, but simultaneous, processes occurring in nature. The term "endings", therefore, has two distinguishable senses. In one sense it denotes the termination of macro-processes and events (e.g., strikes, holidays, earthquakes) and is connected with ends-in-view. In its other sense, however.
it denotes the emergence in consciousness of esthetic qualities and is connected with the desirable and worthwhile in life. These two senses of the term, although distinguishable, are nevertheless interconnected in that endings of the first kind, insofar as they are entertained, eventuate in endings of the second kind.

The occurrence of endings, qua terminations of macro-processes, together with the overlapping and continuity of the processes which eventuate in them are, for Dewey, vital to the formation of ends-in-view. He writes:

When a state of affairs is perceived, the perceiving-of-a-state-of-affairs is a further state of affairs. Its subject-matter is a thing in the idiomatic sense of thing, res, whether a solar-system, a stellar constellation, or an atom, a diversified and more or less loosely interconnection (sic) of events, falling within boundaries sufficiently definite to be capable of being approximately traced. Such is the unbiased evidence of experience in gross, and such in effect is the conclusion of recent physics as far as a layman can see.152

He then adds:

For this reason, and not because of any unique properties of a separate kind of existence, called psychic or mental, every situation or field of consciousness is marked by imitation, direction or intent, and consequence or import. What is unique is not these traits, but the property of awareness or perception.153

He goes on to conclude:

Because of this property, the initial stage is capable of being judged in the
light of its probable course and consequence. There is anticipation. Each successive event being a stage in a serial process is both expectant and commemorative ... the terminal outcome when anticipated (as it is when a moving cause of affairs is perceived) becomes an end-in-view, an aim, purpose, a prediction usable as a plan in shaping the course of events.¹⁵⁴

As these passages make clear, for Dewey, the occurrence of endings, qua terminations of natural processes, constitutes a necessary condition for the formation and projection of ends-in-view. Without the direct involvement of endings, the projection of ends-in-view would be pointless since they could only be objects of fancy—comparable to the ideas entertained by children when they try to imagine the outcomes of events with which they are completely unacquainted. Writes Dewey: "The in-viewness of ends is as much conditioned by antecedent natural conditions as is perception of contemporary objects external to the organism, trees and stones, or whatever."¹⁵⁵ He goes on to add, by way of clarification:

That is, natural processes must have actually terminated in specifiable consequences, which give those processes definition and character, before ends can be mentally entertained and be the objects of striving desire.¹⁵⁶

Ends-in-view are thus grounded in experience and hence are empirical,¹⁵⁷ in sharp contrast with alternative teleological theories, such as Aristotle's, in which ends are construed as the a-temporal, "final" causes of the
processes preceding them.

The formation and projection of ends-in-view has, for Dewey, the critically important function of **guiding** action thereby imparting to it coherence, directive force and executive power. They are thus comparable to "plans-of-action" or "blueprints". He writes:

...empirical ends-in-view are...not objects of contemplative possession and use, but are intellectual and regulative means, degenerating into reminiscences or dreams unless they are employed as plans within the state of affairs.\(^{158}\)

Hence without the involvement of ends-in-view, action undertaken by an individual would not only be, in a literal sense, aimless, but also subject to and conditioned by unchanneled impulse and desire from within and the prevailing tendency of random stimuli coming from without—a state of affairs which, for Dewey, is inimical to the intelligent formation of purpose, and hence to freedom.\(^{159}\)

A key aspect of Dewey's naturalistic teleology is his view that **prior to** the formation and **deliberate selection** of specific ends-in-view as guides to action, **all** ends, insofar as they are the endings of processes occurring in nature, are equal, that is they must all be viewed impartially. In his view it is the act of deliberation and reflective choice that transforms a particular end-in-view into an **end** in the eulogistic sense of this term (i.e., as something worthy of being striven for). He writes:
When we regard conscious experience, that is to say, the object and qualities characteristic of conscious life, as a natural end, we are bound to regard all objects impartially as distinctive ends in the Aristotelian sense. We cannot pick or choose; when we do pick and choose we are obviously dealing with practical ends—with objects and qualities that are deemed worthy of selection by reflective, deliberate choice. These 'ends' are not the less natural, if we have an eye to the continuity of experienced objects with other natural occurrences, but they are not ends without the intervention of a special affair, reflective survey and choice.160

Prior to reflective choice then, all endings, and hence all ends-in-view, are indistinguishable from one another in terms of their status qua ends, and hence they can be neither compared with one another in respect of their intrinsic value nor ordered hierarchically. Writes Dewey:

...to think of objects as more or less ends is nonsense. They either have immediate and terminal quality; or they do not... Objects may be more or less absorptive and arresting and thus possess degrees of intensity with respect to finality. But this difference of intensity is not, save as subject to reflective choice, a distinction in rank or class of finality. It applies to different toothaches as well as to different objects of thought; but it does not apply, inherently, to the difference between a tooth-ache and an ideal object...161

Reflective choice, then, is the critical factor in transforming de facto endings into ends having value. It is Dewey's view that one of the "Great Bads" of philosophy is
the confusion, in metaphysics, of the distinction between "endings" as the termination of processes occurring in nature and "ends" as objects that are worthy of choice. He writes:

Each meaning is intelligible, grounded, legitimate in itself. But their mixture is one of the Great Bads of philosophy. For it treats as natural ends apart from reflection just those objects that are worthy and excellent to reflective choice.162

As indicated earlier, one of the characteristics of esthetic experience is its incorporation of consummatory objects--objects that are absorbing and fulfilling. The initial occurrence in experience of these objects is gratuitous and directly connected with the physiological structure and organic endowment of the organism involved. If this were to be the exclusive source of consummatory objects, however, the available fund of such objects would be unbearably small. Imagination is one means whereby the number of consummatory objects can be indefinitely increased. Inquiry is another. Ends-in-view, when they are the outcome of inquiry (i.e., reflective choice), confer consummatory quality upon the objects involved in the outcome of action undertaken in conjunction with them. In other words, the outcome of action can be fulfilling, in the degree to which it is successful, only if it is framed and informed by ends-in-view that are the products of deliberate choice. Writes Dewey:
...when they are attained, the objects which they inform are conclusions and fulfillments, only as these objects are the consequence of prior reflection, deliberate choice and directed effort are they fulfillments, conclusions, completions, perfections. A natural end which occurs without the intervention of human art is a terminus, a de facto boundary, but it is not entitled to any such honorific status of completions and realizations as classic metaphysics assigned them. 163

The incorporation in action of ends-in-view is thus necessary if its outcome is to have consummatory quality.

In the discussion of ends-in-view thus far attention has been focussed upon the vital connection with "endings" in one of its two distinguishable senses, viz., as a termination of macro-processes and events. In its other sense, however, the term "ending" is connected with immediacy, that is, with the emergence in consciousness of esthetic qualities. Insofar as endings, qua terminations of macro-processes, are involved in experiential situations (or, as Dewey sometimes calls them, "fields of consciousness"), they are ipso facto endings in the second sense. In Dewey's view it is the occurrence, in and as a part of nature, of endings in this second sense that proves to be the ultimate ground of what is worthwhile in life. Esthetic qualities alone, he writes:

...are of interest, and they are the cause of taking interest in other things. For living creatures they form the natural platform for regarding other things. They are the basis, directly and indirectly, of active response to
things. As compared with them, other things are obstacles and means of procuring and avoiding the occurrence of situations having them.\textsuperscript{164} 

He subsequently goes on to conclude that: "...the conspicuous and vivid presence of immediate qualities and of meanings, is alone of direct worth..."\textsuperscript{165} The esthetic qualities which thus prove to be so vital, however, insofar as they appear as elements in experiential situations, are unstable and precarious. Writes Dewey:

Such immediate qualities as red and blue, sweet and sour, tune, the pleasant and unpleasant, depend upon an extraordinary variety and complexity of conditioning events; hence they are evanescent. They are never exactly reduplicated, because the exact combination of events of which they are the termini does not precisely recur. Hence they are even more 'phenomenal' than a rainbow.\textsuperscript{166} 

The precariousness and instability of the existence of esthetic qualities imparts to their occurrence a depth and fullness which they would otherwise lack. Since esthetic qualities are not objects of knowledge, however, they cannot, in their immediacy, lead to control of the conditions of their occurrence. Control of these conditions presupposes the involvement of objects of knowledge resulting from reflective inquiry. Writes Dewey:

The contingent, uncertain and incomplete give depth and scope to consummatory objects while things not directly had, things approachable only through reflective imagination and rational constructions are the conditions of such regulation of their occurrence as is
feasible.\textsuperscript{167}

Reflective inquiry and the objects of knowledge to which it gives rise is thus primarily concerned with the relations between esthetic qualities and the conditions of their occurrence. In determining these, the occurrence of esthetic qualities can be subjected to increasing control. Knowing and knowledge can thus be regarded as having an instrumental function.

In the foregoing discussion, attention has been focussed upon the connection between ends-in-view and endings. Two senses of the term "endings" were distinguished, viz., as terminations of macro-processes and events, and as the emergence in consciousness of esthetic qualities. In the course of the discussion the point was made that ends-in-view are connected with endings in the first sense of the term, and that they not only guide action but also serve to confer consummatory quality upon the objects involved in the outcome of action undertaken in conjunction with them. The point was also made that endings, understood in the second sense, are the ultimate ground of what is worthwhile in life.

At the very outset of this discussion of Dewey's naturalistic metaphysics, I indicated that my concern would be to provide the background necessary to a better understanding of his conception of "moral" experience, and to underscore the connections between his metaphysics and:
(1) his understanding of inquiry, and (2) his theory of valuation. In developing this account, attention was directed to Dewey's notion of experience and nature (particularly his conception of experience as a process of interaction involving an organism and its environment), and to his view of pre-reflective and reflective experience and the character of the relation between them. In the course of the discussion, his view of inquiry was considered as well as the distinction he draws between having an experience and knowing something about it. This account of Dewey's metaphysics concluded with a discussion of the importance of "endings" to his naturalistic teleology. Throughout my discussion of his views, my objective has been to clarify and to explain; I have not endeavoured to defend Dewey against his critics or to develop a definitive exegesis of his views. Before concluding this chapter, however, I propose to briefly consider the criticism of Dewey's metaphysics advanced by Richard Rorty. I do so primarily because Rorty's views on the nature of philosophy, and of Dewey's contribution to the shaping of a "post-Philosophical culture", have stirred considerable interest in recent years and, in so doing, have contributed to the emerging revival of interest in Dewey.

B. RORTY'S CRITICISM OF DEWEY

In his essay "Dewey's Metaphysics" Rorty not only
criticizes Dewey's naturalistic metaphysics, but also tries to explain his life-long concern with developing a metaphysics of experience by tracing his conception of experience back to the beginning of his career and, in particular, to a controversy with Shadworth Hodgson. He concludes his paper with a brief encomium in which, among other things, he commends Dewey for his nascent antifoundationalism. Rorty's paper includes a diagnosis of recent history of Philosophy as well as a prognosis for a post-Philosophical culture. In my discussion of his paper, however, I shall not be concerned with these aspects of it. Instead I shall restrict my attention to two main points that he makes against Dewey.

The first criticism I shall consider centers on the claim that Dewey's naturalistic metaphysics is a contradiction in terms. "The first and most general criticism...", he writes, "...repeats Santayana's claim that 'naturalistic metaphysics' is a contradiction in terms." He elucidates the character of this contradiction as follows:

One can put this point best, perhaps, by saying that no man can serve both Locke and Hegel. Nobody can claim to offer an 'empirical' account of something called "the inclusive integrity of 'experience'", nor take this 'integrated unity as the starting point of philosophic thought' if he also agrees with Hegel that the starting point of philosophic thought is bound to be the dialectical situation in which one finds oneself caught in one's own historical
period—the problems of the men of one's
culture.\textsuperscript{170}

In Rorty's view this contradiction is reflected in
Dewey's thought as a tension between two opposing approaches
to the handling of philosophical problems, one Lockean and
the other Hegelian.\textsuperscript{171} He endeavours to underscore this
tension when he writes:

To say, as Dewey wants to, that to gain
knowledge is to solve problems, one does
not need to find 'continuities' between
nervous systems and people, or between
'experience' and 'nature'. One does not
need to justify our claim to know that,
say, a given action was the best we
could take by noting that the brain is
an 'organ of action-undergoing', any
more than by pointing out that the
particles which make up the brain are
undergoing some actions themselves.\textsuperscript{172}

Rorty, as the passages cited make clear, thus advances
three distinguishable, but connected, claims against Dewey's
metaphysics viz.: (1) that a 'naturalistic metaphysics' is
a contradiction in terms; (2) that one cannot consistently
adopt a Hegelian view of the nature of philosophy and
endeavour to develop an empirical metaphysics; and (3) that
Dewey's account of "knowledge" as warranted assertibility
does not require the metaphysical scaffolding which he
provides in \textit{Experience and Nature}.

In response to the first of these claims, it must be
pointed out that Rorty is guilty of begging the question and
thereby appears to altogether miss the point of Dewey's
efforts. A contradiction in terms typically results when
two terms, whose meanings logically exclude one another, are combined to form a single term—as in the case of the terms "square-circle" or "impotent power". Using these as paradigm examples of what a contradiction in terms amounts to, the question to be considered is whether or not the term "naturalistic metaphysics" is a contradiction in terms. The answer to this question must be "yes"—but only if one assumes that the term "metaphysics" means, roughly, 'any rigourous and systematic effort to delineate, by means of rational intuition, the eternal and immutable principles of true reality'. If one adopts this conception of metaphysics and assumes that it alone is the real meaning of the term then, in view of the fact that in philosophical discourse the term "naturalistic" is used to denote the methods, practices and ontological commitments of physical science, the conclusion can be drawn that the term "naturalistic metaphysics" is indeed a contradiction in terms. The assumptions presupposed by this conclusion, however, are clearly not ones which Dewey is prepared to make. As I argued in my discussion of Dewey's conception of metaphysics, it is precisely this view of metaphysics that he rejects and that he endeavours to replace with his own view, viz., a conception of metaphysics as the delineation of the generic traits of existence as these are disclosed in experience. Rorty's claim that Dewey, in developing a naturalistic metaphysics, is guilty of a
contradiction in terms thus begs the question since it assumes that the "traditional" conception of metaphysics is the only tenable conception—an assumption whose soundness Dewey is intent on undermining. In light of this, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that in advancing this criticism Rorty misses the point of what Dewey was trying to accomplish.

It is impudent, however, if not also somewhat arrogant, to accuse anyone, let alone a philosopher of Rorty's stature, of having "missed the point". In the case at hand Rorty could perhaps reply that, at best, I had only succeeded in making a verbal point and that in reality it was I who had failed to grasp the real substance of his criticism, viz., (1) that Dewey cannot hold a Hegelian view of philosophy and develop an empirical metaphysics, and (2) that his metaphysics is ultimately irrelevant, as well as banal. A reply along these lines, although valid in part, nevertheless would not be altogether successful. The fact of the matter is that Rorty really is in a muddle over Dewey's metaphysics—and this is not just a "verbal" claim. Consider, for example, the claim Rorty advances about Dewey's metaphysics at the very outset of his paper:

...it is hard to say in what sense Experience and Nature, which is often called his 'principal work on metaphysics' is to be assimilated to the genre which includes the central books of Aristotle's Metaphysics, Spinoza's Ethics, Royce's The World and the Individual, and similar paradigms.
Now clearly Rorty is quite obviously right--Experience and Nature cannot be readily assimilated to the paradigms of metaphysics which he cites for the same reason that a camel cannot be readily assimilated to a rutabaga. The point, of course, is that Experience and Nature is not a piece of metaphysics in the traditional sense of the term "metaphysics". In comparing it to paradigms of this tradition, Rorty obviously assumes that one can only do metaphysics in the manner sanctioned by this tradition—a peculiarly hegemonic conception of "tradition" for Rorty to adopt. Needless to say, this view of metaphysics (and of tradition) is clearly not shared by Dewey. In making this assumption, therefore, Rorty would appear to be missing the point of Dewey's efforts to elaborate a naturalistic metaphysics.

The point must be acknowledged, however, that the foregoing response to Rorty's criticism of Dewey's metaphysics does not adequately take into account the other aspects of it that have already been indicated, viz., his claim that empirical metaphysics is incompatible with a Hegelian view of philosophy and his claim that the metaphysical views presented in Experience and Nature are irrelevant and banal. It is, accordingly, to these claims that I now turn.

In claiming that Dewey's naturalistic metaphysics is a contradiction in terms Rorty, by way of explanation,
suggested that the contradictions be understood as a tension (incoherence?) inherent in his metaphysics resulting from his efforts, on the one hand, to develop an empirical metaphysics and his adoption, on the other, of a Hegelian conception of the nature of philosophy. In Rorty's view a Hegelian conception of the nature of philosophy amounts to (among other things) adopting the methodological prescription that all problems and, in particular, philosophical problems, be viewed within the context of the historical matrix in which they emerge. In thus emphasizing the historicism of philosophical problems, the focus of attention is shifted from things transcendent and eternal to the problems of men as encountered at a particular point in history. Given this view of the Hegelian conception of the nature of philosophy, however, the tension between it and empirical metaphysics becomes readily apparent. The tension exists because empirical metaphysics, insofar as it is metaphysics, must have as its objective the description of reality by means of propositions which are a-historical (and hence, a-temporal) and thus, if not eternal (as in transcendental metaphysics), then at least universal and thereby axiologically neutral. Empirical metaphysics thus understood would clearly be incompatible with Hegelian historicism. In claiming, therefore, that Dewey's naturalistic metaphysics is marked by an inherent tension, Rorty must obviously be attributing to him some such
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conception of empirical metaphysics. In fact, Rorty does so explicitly when, in characterizing his metaphysics, he suggests that Dewey's efforts must have been animated by the conviction that:

...there must be a standpoint from which experience can be seen in terms of some 'generic traits' which, once recognized, will make it impossible for us to describe it in these misleading ways which generate the subject-object and mind-matter dualisms that have been the dreary topics of traditional philosophical controversy. This viewpoint would not be sub specie aeternitatis, since it would emphasize precisely the temporality and contingency which Augustine and Spinoza used the notion of 'eternity' to exclude. But it would resemble traditional metaphysics in providing a permanent neutral matrix for future inquiry. Such a naturalistic metaphysics would say: 'Here is what experience is really like, before dualistic analysis has done its fell work'.

As this passage clearly reveals, then, for Rorty Dewey's naturalistic metaphysics must be viewed as an effort to provide a "permanent and neutral" description of reality—one which will delineate what experience "truly" is. In light of this it is obvious why he discerns a tension running through it.

Rorty's criticism of Dewey's metaphysics, as elucidated above, clearly rests upon two major assumptions: (1) that Dewey's conception of philosophy is essentially Hegelian, and (2) that his characterization of Dewey's metaphysics is essentially correct. If either of these assumptions can be
shown to be either untenable or open to serious doubt, however, then the force of his criticism would be undermined. The question to be considered, therefore, is whether or not these assumptions are valid.

Rorty's first assumption, which I do not propose to consider at length, does not appear to be as sound as he apparently believes. The exact extent and nature of Dewey's Hegelianism is, of course, a moot point and only a fool would venture into an area where scholars have not, as yet "definitively trodden". If we take Dewey at his own word, however, then his philosophical outlook would appear to owe considerably more to Darwin than to Hegel. In his essay "The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy" first read at Columbia University in 1909, he writes:

...in anticipating the direction of the transformations in philosophy to be wrought by the Darwinian genetic and experimental logic, I do not profess to speak for any save those who yield themselves consciously or unconsciously to this logic. None can fairly deny that at present there are two effects of the Darwinian mode of thinking. On the one hand, there are making many sincere and vital efforts to revise our traditional philosophic conceptions in accordance with its demands. On the other hand, there is as definitely a recrudescence of absolutistic philosophies...

He concludes his paper as follows:

...intellectual progress usually occurs through sheer abandonment of questions together with both of the alternatives they assume--an abandonment that results from their decreasing vitality and a
change of urgent interest. We do not solve them: we get over them. Old questions are solved by disappearing, evaporating, while new questions corresponding to the changed attitude of endeavor and preference take their place. Doubtless the greatest dissolvent in contemporary thought of old questions, the greatest precipitant of new methods, new intentions, new problems, is the one effected by the scientific revolution that found its climax in the 'Origin of Species'.\textsuperscript{178}

If we read Dewey with Darwin, rather than Hegel, in view then his emphasis in \textit{Experience and Nature} on, among other things: (1) the continuity of experience; (2) the precariousness and instability of existence; (3) the ubiquity of change; and (4) the occurrence, in nature, of endings (and the view that all endings are also the beginnings of new causal processes), becomes more readily intelligible. So too does his employment of the "genetic method" and his insistence upon the importance of context in discussing philosophical problems. Moreover, Dewey's conception of the office of philosophy appears to be somewhat more catholic than Rorty is willing to consider. In Dewey's view philosophy involves not only the critique of culture but also the enrichment of experience\textsuperscript{179} and the "...positive task of projecting ideas about values which might be the basis of a new integration of human conduct."\textsuperscript{180}

In making the foregoing observations my objective has not been to "prove" that Rorty's assumption is untenable--
clearly much more would have to be done if such a case were to be made. My intention, rather, has been to cast doubt on Rorty's Hegelian reading of Dewey and thus to support the claim that his first assumption is open to serious doubt. In questioning this assumption, the soundness of the criticism proceeding from it is thereby also challenged. Having done so, I now propose to consider his second assumption.

In claiming to discern a tension in Dewey's metaphysics, Rorty assumes that his characterization of naturalistic metaphysics as resembling: "...traditional metaphysics in providing a permanent neutral matrix for future inquiry"\textsuperscript{161} is essentially correct. In light of this view of naturalistic metaphysics, however, the following question immediately arises: "Is it the case that in \textit{Experience and Nature} Dewey endeavours to elaborate a 'permanent and neutral matrix for future inquiry'?" The answer to this question, as I shall presently argue, is not as unproblematically affirmative as Rorty assumes.

To begin with, it is clear that the point at issue in this question is whether or not the "generic traits of existence", as disclosed in experience, comprise for Dewey what Rorty calls "a permanent and neutral matrix for future inquiry". Before considering this problem in greater detail, however, the meaning of the terms "permanent" and "neutral" must be made explicit. The \textit{OED} defines these
terms, in the sense relevant to the problem at hand, in the following manner: (1) "permanent"—continuing or designed to continue indefinitely without change; abiding; lasting; enduring; persistent. Opposed to temporary; (2) "neutral"—comprised under, or belonging to, neither of two specified or implied categories; occupying a middle position with regard to two extremes.\(^{182}\) In light of these definitions, therefore, the question under consideration can be more precisely framed as follows: "Does Dewey maintain, in *Experience and Nature*, that the generic traits of existence: (1) are not subject to change, and (2) occupy a middle position between 'good' and 'bad'?" If either one of these component questions can be shown to have a negative answer, then the conclusion could reasonably be drawn that Rorty's characterization of Dewey's naturalistic metaphysics is open to serious challenge and that hence it is not as unproblematic as he appears to assume. In the discussion which follows, I shall restrict my attention to the first of these questions.

In considering the first question it would be clearly disingenuous to argue that since Dewey uses terms such as "change", "precarious" and "indeterminate" to characterize the generic traits of existence he therefore does not, and cannot, maintain the position that his metaphysics is permanent. An argument along these lines would be purely rhetorical and would fail to challenge Rorty's contention
that such traits are, for Dewey, permanent features of existence. There is, however, a far more convincing argument that can be developed. If Rorty is in fact right and Dewey really does hold the view that his naturalistic metaphysics provides a "permanent matrix for future inquiry", then quite clearly he must also presuppose that the world is essentially fixed and unchanging. In other words Dewey could not, on the one hand, maintain the view that the generic traits of existence are permanent and, on the other, adopt the position that the world is indeterminate without thereby falling into a glaring contradiction. Hence, unless Dewey presupposes that the world is unchanging, he cannot be regarded as holding the view of naturalistic metaphysics which Rorty attributes to him. The issue at hand, therefore, is to determine which view of the world Dewey does in fact presuppose.

There can be little doubt that for Dewey the world is still unfolding, still in the process of making, and that hence the future is open. He advances this view explicitly in passages such as the following:

A particular choice may be arbitrary; this is only to say that it does not approve itself to reflection. But choice is not arbitrary, not in a universe like this one, a world which is not finished and which has not consistently made up its mind where it is going and what it is going to do.183

A true wisdom...discovers in thoughtful observation and experiment the method of administering the unfinished processes
of existence so that frail goods shall be substantiated, secure goods be extended, and the precarious promises of good that haunt experienced things be more liberally fulfilled. 184

As these passages clearly reveal, Dewey does not presuppose that the world is unchanging. On the contrary, in his view it is essentially "open" and hence subject to fundamental change. In an open universe, however, the generic traits of existence (including "change") cannot be regarded as "permanent" but only as constant features. These features, moreover, although they may be constant are nevertheless only "temporary"--in the same sense that the pyramids or the star Sirius are "temporary". Thus it can be seen to follow that Dewey does not, in fact, maintain the view that in developing a naturalistic metaphysics he is thereby elaborating a "permanent matrix for future inquiry", and hence the conclusion can be drawn that Rorty's characterization of his metaphysics is unwarranted.

The soundness of the foregoing conclusion becomes more readily apparent if one considers Dewey's conception of naturalistic metaphysics in light of his view of logical theory. Traditional logicians (if not also modern ones) typically regard the forms with which logic is concerned as being fixed a priori and thus as being valid eternally. Logical forms, therefore, clearly are a paradigm example of what a "permanent matrix for future inquiry" amounts to. In Dewey's view, however, logical forms are determined in
experience and hence are subject to change and development—however long the time may be in which such change unfolds. Logical forms are thus not eternally valid but only "temporary". Writes Dewey:

An enormous change has taken place in logical theory since the classic logic formulated the methods of the science that existed in its period. It has occurred in consequence of the development of mathematical and physical science. ... When in the future methods of inquiry are further changed, logical theory will also change. There is no ground for supposing that logic has been or ever will be so perfected that, save, perhaps, for minor details, it will require no further modifications. The idea that logic is capable of final formulation is an *eidolon* of the theater.185

In this passage Dewey, *pace* most logicians, affirms unequivocally that logic is not the province wherein the permanent (let alone the eternal) is to be secured. Now clearly it would be extraordinarily peculiar for Dewey to explicitly adopt this view of logic while holding the exact opposite view of metaphysics. To suggest that he did so would be incredibly otiose. In light of this it can be concluded that Rorty's contention regarding Dewey's conception of naturalistic metaphysics cannot be sustained.

In the foregoing discussion, attention has been directed to Rorty's assumption that his characterization of Dewey's metaphysics is correct. The question with which this discussion began comprised two parts. In considering the first question, the point was made that Dewey does not,
in fact, make the presupposition about the world that is necessary if he is to be regarded as holding the view that naturalistic metaphysics provides a "permanent" matrix for future inquiry. Attention was also drawn to the fact that such a conception of naturalistic metaphysics would clearly be incompatible with his conception of logic. Hence, the first part of the question has been answered in a way that seriously challenges Rorty's characterization of Dewey's metaphysics. It will be recalled that the second claim connected with Rorty's first main criticism of Dewey's metaphysics (that he cannot adopt a Hegelian view of the nature of philosophy and elaborate an empirical metaphysics), was seen to rest upon two assumptions: (1) that Dewey adopts a Hegelian view of the nature of philosophy, and (2) that his characterization of Dewey's metaphysics is correct. These assumptions, however, have proven to be open to serious doubt. In view of this, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that Rorty's second claim has been substantially undermined.

The third and final claim connected with Rorty's first criticism of Dewey that I propose to consider centers on his contention that the metaphysical scaffolding provided in *Experience and Nature* is irrelevant not only to his conception of knowledge in particular, but also to his revolt against dualism in general. Since the soundness of the former claim is presupposed by the latter, more general,
claim it follows that if the former claim can be shown to be untenable, then the latter claim would thereby be undermined as well. In the discussion which follows, therefore, I shall only consider Rorty's claim that Dewey's metaphysics is irrelevant to his view of knowledge. In making this claim Rorty must be understood as affirming the view that the intelligibility and validity of Dewey's conception of "knowledge" as "warranted assertibility" does not presuppose any aspect of his metaphysics. If it did, then his metaphysics would clearly not be irrelevant. The question to be considered, then, is whether or not this claim can be sustained.

In considering this question it should be recalled that Dewey rejects the notion of immediate knowledge. In consequence of this, all "knowledge" must, in his view, be regarded as a "construction" presupposing inquiry. Hence without inquiry there could be no knowledge. The notion of inquiry, therefore, is fundamentally important to Dewey's conception of knowledge as "warranted assertibility". Now if Rorty is correct in maintaining that Dewey's naturalistic metaphysics is irrelevant to his conception of knowledge, then it follows that his metaphysics is equally irrelevant to the notion of inquiry. In other words, a key implication of Rorty's claim is that Dewey's notion of inquiry does not presuppose any of the generic traits of existence which he identifies and discusses. This implication, however, proves
to be untenable. In his *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*, Dewey offers the following definition of inquiry:

Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole.  

Even a cursory reading of this definition is sufficient to disclose the central role of indeterminacy in inquiry. For Dewey, however, indeterminacy "...is a real property of some natural existences" and not a mere mental state to be conjured away by wishes and dreams. He writes:

A variety of names serves to characterize indeterminate situations. They are disturbed, troubled, ambiguous, confused, full of conflicting tendencies, obscure, etc. It is the situation that has these traits. We are doubtful because the situation is inherently doubtful. Personal states of doubt that are not evoked by and are not relative to some existential situation are pathological; when they are extreme they constitute the mania of doubting. Consequently, situations that are disturbed and troubled, confused or obscure, cannot be straightened out, cleared up and put in order, by manipulation of our personal states of mind. ... Restoration of integration can be effected...only by operations which actually modify existing conditions, not by merely 'mental' processes.

As the foregoing passages make clear, inquiry presupposes an indeterminate situation and involves effecting changes in it. It is vital to the reconstruction of experience resulting in the emergence of a new situation
thereby allowing for the possibility of checking knowledge claims. This view of inquiry is at the heart not only of Dewey's conception of knowledge, but also of his theory of valuation. Without it, neither would be intelligible. The notion of indeterminacy that is involved in Dewey's view of inquiry, however, is a metaphysical one—it is a generic trait of existence. In view of this, it follows that one cannot sever Dewey's conception of knowledge as warranted assertibility from his naturalistic metaphysics without thereby also eviscerating it.

The foregoing discussion, albeit brief, is nevertheless sufficient to support the view that the third claim connected with Rorty's first criticism of Dewey's metaphysics is untenable. This criticism, it will be recalled, was seen to comprise three distinguishable claims. In view of the fact that all three have proven to be open to serious doubt, the conclusion can therefore be drawn that Rorty's first criticism of Dewey fails to seriously undermine his naturalistic metaphysics.

Rorty's second main criticism, which I shall briefly consider, centers on Dewey's conception of an experiential situation. Dewey's conception of experience avoids the subject-object dualism of traditional philosophy since it construes experience as the outcome of an interactive process involving an organism of a certain degree of complexity and its environment, natural, and in the case of
human beings, socio-cultural as well. In consequence of this view of experience qualities, for Dewey, are neither purely subjective nor purely objective—they are, instead, qualities of the experiential situation itself. In Dewey's view, the distinction between "subject" and "object" is the product of reflective inquiry. Now it is precisely this view of experience that Rorty cannot abide.

Rorty develops his criticism of Dewey's conception of experience in the following manner. He begins by asking that we consider "...Dewey's treatment of the mind-body problem. He thought to 'solve' this problem by avoiding both the crudity and paradox of materialism and the 'unscientific' theorizing offered by traditional dualisms."189 In examining Dewey's treatment of the problem, he goes on to say:

Such phrases as 'qualities of interactions' soothe those who do not see a mind-body problem and provoke those who do. Tell us more, the latter say, about these interactions: are they interactions between people and tables, say? Is my interaction with this table brown, rather than, as I had previously thought, the table being brown? Is Dewey saying something more than that nobody would know that the table was brown unless he understood what the word 'brown' meant? Is that, in turn to make the Kantian point that there are no divisions between objects, or between objects and their qualities, until concepts have been used to give sense to feelings? But can that point be made without committing oneself to transcendental idealism? Have we solved the problem of the relation between the empirical self and the material world
only to wind up once again with a transcendental ego constituting both?\textsuperscript{190}

He then adds, by way of conclusion: "This sequence of rhetorical questions expresses the exasperation which readers of Dewey often feel at his attempt to be as commonsensically realistic as Aristotle while somehow sounding as idealistic as Kant and Green."\textsuperscript{191}

Rorty's criticism, as presented above, might reasonably be called the "unintelligibility" argument. The point behind his questions is to underscore the muddles that are apparently inherent in Dewey's conception of experience thereby revealing its unintelligibility. If it can thus be shown to be unintelligible, then why should anyone take it seriously?

In considering Rorty's argument, the conclusion must be drawn that it falls considerably short of its mark because it is, quite simply, irrelevant. This becomes readily apparent when one considers that Rorty himself acknowledges that the "questions" he cites are just the ones that are bound to trouble dualists the most. In presenting these questions as ones to which Dewey must reply (while suggesting that he cannot without thereby being forced into adopting a view he would rather avoid), Rorty is obviously assuming that Dewey's conception of experience, to be intelligible, must first pass muster in the dualist's camp. This assumption is, in fact, comparable to demanding that a book, written by an atheist and purporting to be able to
prove the non-existence of God, first be deemed nihil obstat before allowing it to be published. Clearly Rorty is here assuming a bizarre desideratum for Dewey's view, which is explicitly non-dualistic, to meet. In view of this, Rorty's unintelligibility argument cannot be sustained and hence his second criticism of Dewey's metaphysics must be rejected.

In this section of my thesis, I have outlined and considered two of Rorty's main criticisms of Dewey's naturalistic metaphysics. In each case, the criticism has been found wanting. It does not, of course, follow from this that Dewey's metaphysics is without its problems. In challenging the soundness of these criticisms, however, the conclusion that his metaphysics will not readily yield to these particular lines of criticism has been supported. In reaching this conclusion, my objective in this section has been achieved and hence it can now be drawn to a close.

In this chapter my aim has been to develop an account of Dewey's naturalistic metaphysics with a view to providing the background which, pace Rorty, is essential to an adequate understanding not only of his conception of "moral" experience but also to his view of inquiry and his theory of valuation. In the chapter that follows my aim shall be to delineate Dewey's view of moral experience and his understanding of the nature and formation of character.
NOTES

1. The criticism of Dewey's metaphysics presented by Richard Rorty in his paper "Dewey's Metaphysics" is the sole exception I propose to make in this regard. I shall take up the discussion of his views at the end of Part A of this chapter.

2. In his article on the nature of metaphysics in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, W.H. Walsh writes that traditional metaphysics claims "...to tell us what really exists or what the real nature of things is, it claims to be fundamental and comprehensive in a way in which no individual science is, and it claims to reach conclusions which are intellectually immeasurable and thus possess a unique kind of certainty." He then goes on to add: "...these claims could be justified only if metaphysics were a factual science providing us, on the strength of rational insight, with knowledge of things or aspects of reality which lie beyond the range of the senses." "The Nature of Metaphysics," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1967 ed.


5. Dewey, Quest 4-5.


7. The net import of this move for philosophy is that it must chart a new course--a course in which its traditional problems and concerns are abandoned. More specifically, given that the social and cultural matrix within which traditional philosophy developed no longer prevails, what is needed now is a fresh view of the nature and office of philosophy, one which will take into account modern ways of knowing, especially the method of experimental science, and which does not fly in the face of what such ways of knowing have succeeded in discovering about the world. Dewey suggests what this view of philosophy might amount to when he writes: "The method and conclusions of science have without doubt invaded many cherished beliefs about the things held most dear. The resulting clash constitutes a genuine cultural crisis. But it is a crisis in culture, a social crisis, historical and temporal in
character. It is not a problem in the adjustment of properties of reality to one another. And yet modern philosophy has chosen for the most part to treat it as a question of how realities assumed to be the object of science can have the mathematical and mechanistic properties assigned to them in natural science, while the realm of ultimate reality can nevertheless be characterized by qualities termed ideal and spiritual. The cultural problem is one of definite criticisms to be made and of readjustments to be accomplished. Philosophy which is willing to abandon its supposed task of knowing ultimate reality and to devote itself to a proximate human office might be of great help in such a task." Dewey, Quest 47.

Dewey had undertaken a more direct and extended discussion of this conception of philosophy in Chapter 10 of his earlier book Experience and Nature. In the Preface to this book, he writes: "Philosophy...is a generalized theory of criticism. Its ultimate value for life-experience is that it continuously provides instruments for the criticism of those values—whether of beliefs, institutions, actions or products—that are found in all aspects of experience." John Dewey, Experience and Nature (1929; Toronto: General Publishing Company, 1958) xvi.


9. In his Introduction to Essays in Experimental Logic, Dewey characterizes genetic method as "the natural history of knowledge". By way of reply to critics of this method, he writes: "It had not occurred to me that anyone would think that the history by which human ignorance, error, dogma, and superstition had been transformed, even in its present degree of transformation, into knowledge was something which had gone on exclusively inside of men's heads, or in an inner consciousness. I thought of it as something going on in the world, in the observatory and the laboratory, and in the application of laboratory results to the control of human health, well-being, and progress. When a biologist says that the way to understand an organ, or the sociologist that the way to know an institution, resides in its genesis and history, he is understood to mean its history. I took the same liberty for knowledge..." John Dewey, introduction, Essays in Experimental Logic, (1916; New York: Dover) 66. In his essay "Thought and Its Subject-Matter", he gives a more detailed account of what the genetic method involves when he writes: "The
significance of the evolutionary method in biology and social history is that every distinct organ, structure, or formation, every grouping of cells or elements, is to be treated as an instrument of adjustment or adaptation to a particular environing situation. Its meaning, its character, its force, is known when, and only when, it is considered as an arrangement for meeting the conditions involved in some specific situation. This analysis is carried out by tracing successive stages of development--by endeavouring to locate the particular situation in which each structure has its origin, and by tracing the successive modifications through which, in response to changing media, it has reached its present conformation." Dewey, *Essays* 93-94.

This passage clearly reveals the extent to which Dewey's method is influenced by Darwin's theory of evolution.

10. In *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*, Dewey cites this fallacy in the following way: "The purpose of this chapter is, then, to consider some of the main types of epistemological theory which mark the course of philosophy with a view to showing that each type represents a selective extraction of some conditions and some factors out of the actual pattern of controlled inquiry. It will be shown that this borrowing is what gives them their plausibility and appeal, while the source of their invalidity is arbitrary isolation of the elements selected from the inquiry context in which they function." John Dewey, *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* (1938; New York: Irvington, 1982) 514.

Dewey also discusses this fallacy and illustrates instances of it in the opening chapter of *Experience and Nature*. This fallacy is also closely connected with another error identified by Dewey, viz. the ignoring of context, which he discusses in his essay "Context and Thought" in Richard Bernstein, ed., *John Dewey on Experience, Nature and Freedom* (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1960) 88-110.

11. In *Experience and Nature*, Dewey offers the following characterization of this fallacy: "In the assertion...that the great vice of philosophy is an arbitrary "intellectualism", there is no slight cast upon intelligence and reason. By "intellectualism" as an indictment is meant the theory that all experiencing is a mode of knowing, and that all subject-matter, all nature, is, in principle, to be reduced and transformed till it is defined in terms identical with the
characteristics presented by refined objects of science as such. The assumption of "intellectualism" goes contrary to the fact of what is primarily experienced."
Dewey, Experience and Nature 21.


13. "In developing this account of Dewey's metaphysics I shall rely primarily, but not exclusively, upon his principal work in metaphysics, viz. Experience and Nature.

14. This sense of the term "experience" clearly emerges in Descartes's Meditations. After claiming, in the Second Meditation, that sensations are more truly viewed as feelings, and hence are really nothing other than thinking, and having concluded that he could continue to think, and hence to exist, apart from his corporeal body, Descartes goes on to begin his Third Meditation with a careful consideration of his true nature. He writes: "I am a thing that thinks, that is to say, that doubts, affirms, denies, that knows a few things, that is ignorant of many, that wills, that desires, that also imagines and perceives; for as I remarked before, although the things which I perceive and imagine are perhaps nothing at all apart from me and in themselves, I am nevertheless assured that these modes of thought that I call perceptions and imaginations, inasmuch only as they are modes of thought, certainly reside in me." Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1969) 157.

A more detailed discussion of the differences between Dewey's conception of experience and the traditional view can be found in his essays "The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy" and "An Empirical Survey of Empiricisms" in Bernstein 19-69 and 70-87.


18. "In the early story of philosophy, particularly in medieval thought, the term "realism" was used, in opposition to nominalism, for the doctrine that universals have a real, objective existence. In modern philosophy, however, it is used for the view that material objects exist externally to us and independently of our sense experience. Realism is thus
opposed to idealism, which holds that no such material objects or external realities exist apart from our knowledge or consciousness of them, the whole universe thus being dependent on the mind or in some sense mental." R.J. Hirst, "Realism," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1967 ed.

19. In his study of Dewey's philosophy George Geiger writes: "'Transaction' became a key symbol in Dewey's final work because it calls up connection rather than disconnection, wholes rather than parts, continuity instead of discontinuity ... 'Transaction' implies a different kind of prejudgement, to the effect that there are units which can of course be broken apart for purposes of analysis but not for any other reason. ...divisions within a given situation, when they are not arbitrary, are for specific analytical purposes of model making: the divisions are not necessarily intrinsic, original, or in the nature of things." George R. Geiger, John Dewey in Perspective (Westport: Greenwood, 1974) 16-17.

The term "transaction", it should be noted, was introduced by Dewey near the end of his career as a replacement for the term "interaction" as better conveying the meaning he had initially intended.

20. "Experience is a special kind of existence, just as real and special as the organism involved and no more outside nature than is the organism. It is the relation of part to the whole, but the part is part of the whole. It would be tautologous, then, to point out that man cannot transcend his experience, since his experience is binary, not solitary. A traveler cannot visit the places to which he does not travel... To add that there are places where travelers do not go...does not change the observations." Geiger 18.


23. The implications of the control of experience by means of knowledge of the conditions of its occurrence permeate all of Dewey's philosophy. The single most significant implication is for education. Dewey writes: "...we live from birth to death in world of persons and things which in large measure is what it is because of what has been done and transmitted from previous human activities. When this fact is ignored, experience is treated as if it were something which goes on exclusively inside an individual's body and
mind. It ought not to be necessary to say that experience does not occur in a vacuum. There are sources outside an individual which give rise to experience. It is constantly fed from these springs. No one would question that a child in a slum tenement has a different experience from that of a child in a cultured home; that the country lad has a different kind of experience from the city boy, or a boy on the seashore one different from the lad who is brought up on inland prairies. Ordinarily we take such facts for granted as too common place to record. But when their educational import is recognized, they indicate the way in which the educator can direct the experience of the young without engaging in imposition. A primary responsibility of educators is that they not only be aware of the general principle of the shaping of actual experience by environing conditions, but that they also recognize in the concrete what surroundings are conducive to having experiences that lead to growth. Above all, they should know how to utilize the surroundings, physical and social, that exist so as to extract from them all that they have to contribute to building up experiences that are worth while." John Dewey, Experience and Education (1938; New York: Collier, 1963) 39-40.

24. This point is more explicitly made when Dewey writes that experience: "...includes what men do and suffer, what they strive for, love, believe and endure, and also how men act and are acted upon, the ways in which they do and suffer, desire and enjoy, see, believe, imagine—in short, processes of experiencing. 'Experience' denotes the planted field, the sowed seeds, the reaped harvests, the changes of night and day, spring and autumn, wet and dry, heat and cold, that are observed, feared, longed for; it also denotes the one who plants and reaps, who works and rejoices, hopes, fears, plans, invokes magic or chemistry to aid him, who is downcast or triumphant." Dewey, Experience and Nature 8.

It should be noted, in passing, that these felt qualities of experience are at the center of Dewey's discussion of immediacy.


26. Dewey, Experience and Nature 8. It should be noted here that Dewey's view of experience appears to owe much more to James than the metaphor used to characterize it. A more detailed account of this connection, however, is well beyond the scope of this
thesis.

27. "Philosophy...", writes Dewey, "...like all forms of reflective analysis, takes us away, for the time being, from the things had in primary experience as they directly act and are acted upon, used and enjoyed. Now the standing temptation of philosophy, as its course abundantly demonstrates, is to regard the results of reflection as having, in and of themselves, a reality superior to that of the material of any other mode of experience." Dewey, Experience and Nature 19.

28. This dual character of experience also provides the framework within which thought and action, fact and value are inextricably connected.


32. The terms "denotative method" and "empirical method" should be regarded as interchangeable. "This empirical method I shall call the denotative method." Dewey, Experience and Nature 6.

The purpose of denotative method in philosophy is to discover the "...general features of experienced things and to interpret their significance for a philosophic theory of the universe in which we live...it does for experienced subject-matter on a liberal scale what it does for special sciences on a technical scale." Dewey, Experience and Nature 2. Dewey uses the term "generic traits" to denote these general features of experienced things.


34. Dewey, Experience and Nature 24. In his discussion of Dewey's metaphysics, James Gouinlock writes that it: "...consists primarily in the discrimination of traits common to all contexts, or situations, of experience. The existence of these traits is a function of the interaction of man and nature. They are discriminated by analyzing the characteristics of particular kinds of experience (such as moral, scientific, aesthetic) and determining what traits of nature are implied by all these experiences in common." Gouinlock 2.
35. Dewey, it should be noted, was loath to engage in developing an epistemology and was wary of using the term "knowledge". In Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, he writes: "If inquiry begins in doubt, it terminates in the institution of conditions which remove need for doubt. The latter state of affairs may be designated by the words belief and knowledge...I prefer the words 'warranted assertibility'." Dewey, Logic 7.


38. It is the task of philosophy, by means of denotative method, to discover the generic traits of existence. The importance of this task, for Dewey, lies in its contribution to the deepening and enrichment of further experience. He brings this out clearly by way of the following questions: "...there is...a first-rate test of the value of any philosophy which is offered us: Does it end in conclusions which, when they are referred back to ordinary life-experiences and their predicaments, render them more significant, more luminous to us, and make our dealings with them more fruitful? Or does it terminate in rendering the things of ordinary experience more opaque than they were before, and in depriving them of having in 'reality' even the significance they had previously seemed to have? Does it yield the enrichment and increase of power of ordinary things which the results of physical science afford when applied in every-day affairs? Or does it become a mystery that these ordinary things should be what they are; and are philosophic concepts left to dwell in separation in some technical realm of their own?" Dewey, Experience and Nature 7.


40. The subject-matter of reflective experience (i.e., its "objects") is not numerically identical to the subject-matter of pre-reflective experience and it is a moot point to what extent it remains qualitatively similar. This is so because in Dewey's view the very process of inquiry changes the existential situation being inquired into. Hence the "practical" import of inquiry (a central theme of pragmatism) clearly encompasses much more than merely issuing "conclusions" which are subsequently to be implemented. Dewey writes: "There is no inquiry that does not involve the making of some change in environing conditions. This fact is exemplified in the indispensable place of experiment in inquiry, since experimentation is deliberate
modification of prior conditions. Even in the pre-scientific stage, an individual moves head, eyes, often the entire body, in order to determine the conditions to be taken account of in forming a judgement; such movements effect a change in environmental relations. Active pressure by touch, the acts of pushing, pulling, pounding and manipulating to find out what things 'are like' is an even more overt approach to scientific experimentation." Dewey, Logic 34. Peirce, it should be noted, had articulated a similar view of inquiry in 1877-78 in his article "The Fixation of Belief".

41. Dewey uses the term "inquiry" rather than "thinking" or "thought" because these latter terms are, in his view, too bound up with meanings acquired in the context of the historical development of Cartesian dualism. He writes: "...I doubt whether there exists anything that may be called thought as a strictly psychical existence... Either the word 'thought' has no business at all in logic or else it is a synonym of 'inquiry' and its meaning is determined by what we find out about inquiry. The latter would seem to be the reasonable alternative." Dewey, Logic 21.

42. Dewey's view of immediacy will be considered in more detail in sub-section (b) of this section.


44. Dewey, Experience and Nature 21.

45. Dewey, Experience and Nature 37. In the Massey Lectures of 1968, published under the title The Politics of the Family, R.D. Laing makes this point in the context of family therapy. He writes: "We construe the given in terms of distinctions, according to rules. We perform operations on our experience, in order to comply with the rules. By these operations, according to the rules, in terms of the distinctions, a normal product is generated, if all goes according to plan. We make distinctions, but we are not born with the distinctions we make ready made." He then adds: "I suppose that there is a set of primitive distinctions in terms of which we construe what presents itself: and that our first experience is the first product of our most primitive constructions and the virgin given. This product subsequently appears to be given. Compared to our adult experience, this 'original' experience is 'virginal' or innocent. But any experience wherein the given is distinguished in any way, is not innocent and not given, though it may seem to be." R.D. Laing, The Politics of the Family
46. Dewey, Experience and Nature 37. Inherent in Dewey's view is a critically important implication for his understanding of moral experience, viz., that moral experience, and the deliberation which it involves, always begins in a situation fraught with values. Situations are not mere empirical givens (and thus pure matters of "fact") to which we, as subjects, then add values ab extra. Values are, instead, to be regarded as constituent elements of the experiential situation itself. For Dewey, therefore, "value" is not to be construed as a supervenient quality whose ground is either "objective", as in G.E. Moore's view, or purely "subjective", as in the views of A.J. Ayer and C.L. Stevenson. In consequence, his conception of the character and scope of moral reflection and "knowledge" is also affected.


48. In his essay "Thought and its Subject-Matter", Dewey distinguishes between "function" and "structure". In his view the diverse and numerous activities characteristic of intelligent organic life e.g., thinking, evaluating, singing, praying, wishing, deliberating are all eventual functions of nature. They are, that is to say, the outcomes of the complex interactive processes involving human beings and their environments. Pre-reflective experience is the successive unfolding of situations and functions, and hence they are serially related. In consequence, a particular function can be distinguished in terms of its position relative to other functions and the situations in which they are incorporated. Within each function, however, a further "structural" distinction can be drawn. Writes Dewey: "The distinction between each attitude and function and its predecessor and successor is serial, dynamic, operative. The distinctions within any given operation or function are structural, contemporaneous, and distributive. Thinking follows, we will say, striving, and doing follows thinking. Each in the fulfilment of its own function inevitably calls out its successor. But coincident, simultaneous, and correspondent within doing is the distinction of doer and deed; within the function of thought, of thinking and material thought upon; within the function of striving, of obstacle and aim, of means and end. We keep our paths straight because we do not confuse the sequential and functional relationship of types of experience with the contemporaneous and structural distinctions of elements
within a given function. Dewey, *Essays* 95-6. The distinction between "subject" and "object" discussed above (vide p. 24) is yet another example of a structural distinction. Dewey's initial discussion of "functionalism" appears in his 1896 paper "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology".

49. Vide Endnote 19.


52. In the Introduction to *Consequences of Pragmatism*, Richard Rorty draws attention to the strong influence of pragmatism, and of Dewey's pragmatism in particular, upon the contemporary concerns and orientations of philosophers in the anglo-american tradition (concerns which, as it happens, are shared by many continental philosophers as well). He underlines Dewey's view that pre-reflective experience is both the beginning and end of all reflective inquiry--regardless of its purpose or nature--and hence that it cannot be transcended. Rorty brings out this point in the following manner: "The Deweyan notion of language as tool rather than picture is right as far as it goes. But we must be careful not to phrase this analogy so as to suggest that one can separate the tool, Language, from its users and inquire as to its 'adequacy' to achieve our purposes. The latter suggestion presupposes that there is some way of breaking out of language in order to compare it with something else. But there is no way to think about either the world or our purposes except by using our language." He then goes on to add: "One can use language to criticize and enlarge itself, as one can exercise one's body to develop and strengthen and enlarge it, but one cannot see language-as-a-whole in relation to something else to which it applies, or for which it is a means to an end. The arts and the sciences, and philosophy as their self-reflection and integration, constitute such a process of enlargement and strengthening. But Philosophy, the attempt to say 'how language relates to the world' by saying what makes certain sentences true, or certain actions or attitudes good or rational, is, on this view, impossible." He concludes: "It is the impossible attempt to step outside our skins--the traditions, linguistic and other, within which we do our thinking and self-criticism--and compare ourselves with something absolute." Rorty, *Consequences* XIX.
53. *Experience and Natur*. 38. Dewey makes this same point in the context of value theory in Chapter 10 of *The Quest for Certainty*.

54. Descartes's method is still espoused by 20th-century philosophers. "Descartes, the founder of modern philosophy, invented a method which may still be used with profit—the method of systematic doubt." Bertrand Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy* (1912; Oxford: Oxford UP, 1973) 7. (The emphasis in the sentence quoted is mine.)

55. Descartes assumes not only that he could transcend his historical situation, but also that he could continue to "think" while in a disembodied state. This latter assumption appears to entail the view that a private language is possible, an assumption which has been trenchantly criticized by Wittgenstein in his *Philosophical Investigations*, sections 243-352. Dewey's emphasis on context, and his connecting the meaning of mental terms with action and behaviour, is interestingly similar to Wittgenstein's view that "forms of life" and "language games" are central to understanding language and meaning, and that "private objects" play no role in fixing the meaning of mental terms. Although Dewey did not explicitly address the question, it does not appear unreasonable to claim that he also would reject the possibility of a private language. Had he done so, he would have provided yet another argument, a quite powerful one, against Cartesian dualism.

56. Bernstein, 90.

57. Bernstein, 98.


59. Peirce, it should be noted, advanced a very similar view in 1868 in his series of papers dealing with "Certain Faculties Claimed for Man." In the second paper of this series, entitled "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities", he writes: "We cannot begin with complete doubt. We must begin with all the prejudices that we actually have when we enter upon the study of philosophy. These prejudices are not to be dispelled by a maxim, for they are things that it does not occur to us can be questioned. Hence this initial scepticism will be a mere self-deception, and not real doubt; and no one who follows the Cartesian method will ever be satisfied until he has formally recovered all those beliefs that in form he has given up. It is,
therefore, as useless a preliminary as going to the North Pole would be in order to get to Constantinople by coming down regularly upon a meridian. A person may, it is true, in the course of his studies, find reason to doubt what he began by believing; but in that case he doubts because he has a positive reason for it, and not on account of the Cartesian maxim. Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts." C.S. Peirce, "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities," Charles S. Peirce: The Essential Writings, ed. Edward C. Moore (New York: Harper, 1972) 86.

60. Dewey's view of inquiry will be considered in Chapter 3, Part B, Section 1.

61. I have deliberately chosen to use the term "human organism" rather than the more familiar term "human being" in order to underscore the fact that for Dewey human beings are, in fact, organisms—not minds incarnate and hence beings that are radically different from all other forms of life. In Dewey's view, human beings are biological and social beings that have evolved from other forms of life and that are continuous with these other forms of life, albeit not identical to them. Having made this point I shall, in the remainder of this thesis, revert to using the term "human being".

62. In Democracy and Education Dewey provides the following "definition" of the term "environment": "The words 'environment', 'medium' denote something more than surroundings which encompass an individual. They denote the specific continuity of surroundings with his own active tendencies. An inanimate being is, of course, continuous with its surroundings; but the environing circumstances do not, save metaphorically, constitute an environment. For the inorganic being is not concerned in the influences which affect it. On the other hand, some things which are remote in space and time from a living creature, especially a human creature, may form his environment even more truly than some of the things close to him. The things with which a man varies are his genuine environment ... the environment consists of those conditions that promote or hinder, stimulate or inhibit, the characteristic activities of a living being." John Dewey, Democracy and Education (1916; New York: Free, 1966) 11. In Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, he explains the character of the interactive relation between organism and environment in the following manner: "Whatever else organic life is or is not, it is a process of activity
that involves an environment. It is a transaction extending beyond the spatial limits of the organism. An organism does not live in an environment; it lives by means of an environment. Breathing, the ingestion of food, the ejection of waste products, are cases of direct integration; the circulation of the blood and the energizing of the nervous system are relatively indirect. But every organic function is an interaction of intra-organic and extra-organic energies, either directly or indirectly." Dewey, Logic 25.

63. Vide the citation from Descartes in Endnote 14.

64. In The Quest for Certainty Dewey provides the following characterization of this Cartesian view of thinking: "Thought has been alleged to be a purely inner activity, intrinsic to mind alone; and according to traditional classic doctrine, 'mind' is complete and self-sufficient in itself. Overt action may follow upon its operations but in an external way, a way not intrinsic to its completion. Since rational activity is complete within itself it needs no external manifestation. ... The outer lot of thought is cast in a world external to it, but one which in no way injures the supremacy and completeness of thought and knowledge in their intrinsic natures." Dewey, Quest 7-8.

65. In the Cartesian view the term "thinking" includes not only reflective thinking but also all other forms of mental activity denoted by it, that is, day-dreaming, imagining, remembering, calculating, free-associating. Although Dewey does not deny the occurrence of these other forms of "thinking", he is nevertheless not chiefly concerned with them. Instead, his primary focus is on reflective thinking, its genesis and its manner of improvement. Hence the term "thinking", when used in discussing Dewey's views, should always be understood to mean either "reflective thinking" or "reflective inquiry".


69. "The greater the differentiation of structures and their corresponding activities becomes...", writes Dewey, "...the more difficult it is to keep the balance. Indeed, living may be regarded as a continual rhythm of disequilibrations and recoveries of equilibrium. The 'higher' the organism, the more
serious become the disturbances and the more energetic (and often more prolonged) are the efforts necessary for its reestablishment. The state of disturbed equilibration constitutes need. The movement towards its restoration is search and exploration. The recovery is fulfilment or satisfaction." Dewey, Logic 27.

70. For Dewey, change is a fundamental trait of existence. He writes: "Every existence is an event." Dewey, Experience and Nature 71. Events, however brief, unfold over time and thus have beginnings, middles and endings. They are preceded and followed by other events with which they are connected in a number of ways. "We live...", he writes, "...in a world which is an impressive and irresistible mixture of sufficiencies, tight completenesses, order, recurrences which make possible prediction and control, and singularities, ambiguities, uncertain possibilities, processes going on to consequences as yet indeterminate." Dewey, Experience and Nature 47. Change is thus an invariable factor affecting the achieved equilibrium of an organism and its environment. The adjustments effected by an organism in response to change, however, not only ensure its continued survival but also contribute to its growth. Thus the import of change is not only negative, as when it threatens survival, but also positive, as when it engenders growth. In Democracy and Education Dewey writes: "As long as it endures, it struggles to use surrounding energies in its own behalf. It uses light, air, moisture, and the material of soil. To say that it uses them is to say that it turns them into means of its own conservation. As long as it is growing, the energy it expends in thus turning the environment to account is more than compensated for by the return it gets: it grows." Dewey, Democracy 91. This aspect of interaction has a profound bearing upon all of Dewey's philosophy, especially his philosophy of education.

71. This is a vitally important point. Indeterminateness is not to be construed as a subjective state. It is part of nature. He writes: "...indeterminateness...is a real property of some natural existences." He then goes on to add: "If doubt and indeterminateness were wholly within the mind--whatever that may signify--purely mental processes ought to get rid of them. But experimental procedure signifies that actual alteration of an external situation is necessary to effect the conversion. A situation undergoes, through operations directed by thought, transition from problematic to settled, from internal discontinuity to coherency and
organization." Dewey, Quest 231-32.

It should also be noted here that for Dewey, the notions of situation and interaction are vitally interconnected. He writes: "The conceptions of situation and of interaction are inseparable from each other. An experience is always what it is because of a transaction taking place between an individual and what, at the time, constitutes his environment, whether the latter consists of persons with whom he is talking about some topic or event, the subject talked about being also a part of the situation; or the toys with which he is playing; the book he is reading (in which his enviroring conditions at the time may be England or ancient Greece or an imaginary region); or the materials of an experiment he is performing. The environment, in other words, is whatever conditions interact with personal needs, desires, purposes, and capacities to create the experience which is had. Even when a person builds a castle in the air he is interacting with the objects he constructs in fancy." Dewey, Experience and Education 43-44.

72. Dewey, Logic 69. It should be noted here that Dewey uses a variety of terms to denote the "out-of-phase" quality of an experiential situation. The terms "disequilibrium", "disharmony", "perplexity", "indeterminate", "doubtful" and "tensional" are among the ones more frequently used.

73. Dewey, Logic 70. In Dewey's view the pervasive quality permeating a situation not only binds it together and gives it its uniqueness, but also regulates the process of inquiry. He writes: "It is more or less a commonplace that it is possible to carry on observations that amass facts tirelessly and yet the observed 'facts' lead nowhere. On the other hand, it is possible to have the work of observation so controlled by a conceptual framework fixed in advance that the very things which are genuinely decisive in the problem in hand and its solution are completely overlooked. Everything is forced into the predetermined conceptual and theoretical scheme. The way, and the only way, to escape these two evils, is sensitivity to the quality of a situation as a whole. In ordinary language, a problem must be felt before it can be stated. If the unique quality of the situation is had immediately, then there is something that regulates the selection and the weighing of observed facts and their conceptual ordering." Dewey, Logic 70-71. Since the pervasive quality of any given experiential situation is temporally prior to inquiry,
then given the role of inquiry in both "knowledge" and "valuation", it follows that feeling is the condition sine qua non, not only of objects of knowledge but also of good. Writes Dewey: "...cognitive experience must originate within that of a non-cognitive sort." Dewey, Experience and Nature 23. The implications of this aspect of Dewey's naturalistic metaphysics for his understanding of moral experience, and thus for moral education, as I shall endeavour to delineate it, are, needless to say, considerable.

74. Dewey, Logic 68. In this passage Dewey very clearly distinguishes between "situation" on the one hand and the "distinctions" and "relations" instituted within a situation on the other. The former alone are unique—the latter can recur in different situations. This distinction is vitally important for Dewey's understanding of moral experience since it serves to underscore his view of the role of "principles" in moral deliberation. Moral situations are unique but the distinctions, relations and principles instituted in them are not—they recur in various situations. Thus Dewey's view of moral experience is not open to the charge that it engenders judgements which are strictly ad hoc and sui generis.

It should also be noted here that for Dewey the indeterminacy of an experiential situation is always peculiar to it. He writes: "The peculiar quality of what pervades the given materials, constituting them a situation, is not just uncertainty at large; it is a unique doubtfulness which makes that situation to be just and only the situation it is. It is this unique quality that not only evokes the particular inquiry engaged in but that exercises control over its special procedures." Dewey, Logic 105.

75. Dewey, Experience and Education 43.

76. Dewey, Quest 224-5. As this passage clearly indicates, the terms "mental" and "intellectual" denote qualities characterizing only the responses of complex organisms, especially human beings. It does not follow from this, however, that such responses presuppose the existence of mind and hence that they fall outside the scope of a naturalistic philosophy. In Dewey's view, there is a continuity in the diverse responses of various organisms. He writes: "...there is no breach of continuity between operations of inquiry and biological operations and physical operations. 'Continuity'...means that rational operations grow out of organic activities, without being identical with
that from which they emerge. There is an adjustment of means to consequences in the activities of living creatures, even though not directed by deliberate purpose. Human beings in the ordinary or 'natural' processes of living come to make these adjustments purposely... In the course of time--the intent is so generalized that inquiry is freed from limitation to special circumstances." Dewey, Logic 19. In providing a naturalistic account of logic, Dewey goes a long way in the defense of naturalism.

77. The distinction between an indeterminate experiential situation and a problematic one is an important one and will be considered in more detail in Chapter 3, Part B, Section 1.

78. Dewey, Quest 224.

79. For Dewey "intelligence" is the counterpart of the term "reason" in traditional philosophy. It denotes the skills and outcomes involved in scientific method. He writes: "Reason, as a Kantian faculty that introduces generality and regularity into experience, strikes us more and more as superfluous--the unnecessary creation of men addicted to traditional formalism and to elaborate terminology. Concrete suggestions arising from past experiences, developed and matured in the light of the needs and deficiencies of the present, employed as aims and methods of specific reconstruction, and tested by success or failure in accomplishing this task of readjustment, suffice. To such empirical suggestions used in constructive fashion for new ends the name intelligence is given." Dewey, Reconstruction 96. Reflective inquiry and intelligence are connected in that the former is a specific instance of the latter. In the context of moral deliberation Dewey describes inquiry as "...observation of the detailed makeup of the situation; analysis into its diverse factors; clarification of what is obscure; discounting of the more insistent and vivid traits; tracing the consequences of the various modes of action that suggest themselves; regarding the decision reached as hypothetical and tentative until the anticipated or supposed consequences which led to its adoption have been squared with actual consequences. This inquiry is intelligence." Dewey, Reconstruction 164.

80. The emergence of reflective inquiry as part of a indeterminate experiential situation underscores the specificity of thinking. For Dewey, thinking-in-general, independently of any specific context, is anathema. He writes: "Our attention is taken up with
particular questions and specific answers. What we have to reckon with is not the problem of How can I think überhaupt? but, How shall I think right here and now? Not what is the test of thought at large, but what validates and confirms this thought? Dewey, Essays 78. Dewey's antipathy to thinking-in-general results not only in a negative view of traditional epistemology with its concern for the conditions of knowledge, but also in an equally negative view of axiology—the endeavour to provide a general theory of value. Thus in place of an axiology, Dewey develops a theory of valuation; and instead of an epistemology, he constructs a theory of inquiry.

91. Dewey, Essays 11. In his Logic: The Theory of Inquiry Dewey offers the following definition of inquiry: "Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole." Dewey, Logic 104-105.

92. In How We Think, Dewey's early formulation of his theory of inquiry, he writes: "It is hardly necessary to lay stress upon the importance of belief. It covers all the matters of which we have no sure knowledge and yet which we are sufficiently confident of to act upon and also the matters that we now accept as certainly true, as knowledge, but which nevertheless may be questioned in the future—just as much that passed as knowledge in the past has now passed into the limbo of mere opinion or of error." He adds: "...sooner or later they demand our investigation to find out upon what grounds they rests." He then goes on to conclude: "Active, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it and the further conclusions to which it tends constitutes reflective thought." John Dewey, How We Think (1910; Lexington: Heath, 1933) 6, 7, 8.

93. "The stimulus to thinking...", writes Dewey, "...is found when we wish to determine the significance of some act, performed or to be performed. Then we anticipate consequences. This implies that the situation as it stands is, either in fact or in us, incomplete and hence indeterminate." Dewey, Democracy 151.
84. "Conflict..." writes Dewey, "...is the gadfly of thought. It stirs us to observation and memory. It instigates to invention. It shocks us out of sheep-like passivity, and sets us at noting and contriving. Not that it always effects this result; but that conflict is a sine qua non of reflection and ingenuity." Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (1922; New York: The Modern Library, 1950) 300.


86. Dewey, Human Nature 177. The development of appropriate habits is at the heart of Dewey's view of the formation of character since it is the constellation of habits which comprise character. "Were it not for the continued operation of all habits in every act...", he writes, "...no such thing as character could exist. These would be simply a bundle, an untied bundle at that, of isolated acts. Character is the interpenetration of habits." Dewey, Human Nature 38. Appropriate habits of inquiry, in view of their role in the construction of moral judgement, are thus vital to Dewey's understanding of moral experience. "Our moral failures...", he writes, "...go back to some weakness of disposition, some absence of sympathy, some one-sided bias that makes us perform the judgement of the concrete case carelessly or perversely. Wide sympathy, keen sensitiveness, persistence in the face of the disagreeable, balance of interests enabling us to undertake the work of analysis and decision intelligently are the distinctively moral traits—the virtues or moral excellencies." Dewey, Reconstruction 164. Dewey's view of habit and character shall be considered in the following chapter.

87. Vide Footnote 73.

88. Dewey, Experience and Nature 85. It should be noted here that the "terminal" aspect of things and events in primary experience is critical to Dewey's view that nature itself is characterized by "ends" and "histories". This view is fundamental to his conception of means-ends, the formation of ends-in-view, his denial of "intrinsic" good, and his understanding of what having an experience ultimately involves. This aspect of Dewey's metaphysics will be discussed in Section 4 below.

89. Dewey, Experience and Nature 85. The relations which Dewey here mentions are the causal connections between these qualitative objects. When articulated in reflective experience, these relations between
qualitative objects become "objects of knowledge" or "cognitive objects". The qualitative objects themselves, independently of their relation to one another, he designates as "esthetic objects". Immediacy underscores, for Dewey, the qualitatively of direct experience. The construction of objects of knowledge in cognitive experience will be more fully examined in sub-section (c) below.

90. Dewey, *Experience and Nature* 85-86. The phrase "to have an existence" is clearly odd. It should be remembered, however, that for Dewey experience is itself a part of the natural world and hence is itself a natural existence on a par with other natural existences, e.g., storms, volcanic eruptions, voyages to the moon. Thus in "having an experience" one is, in a manner of speaking, "having an existence". Moreover, the ownership implied by the verb "to have" does not require postulating an ontologically discrete "subject". The ascription of ownership is, for Dewey, the outcome of analysis and not something grounded in rerum natura.


94. A statement of this view can be found in A.J. Ayer's *The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge*. He writes: "...the meaning of the expression 'direct awareness' is such that, whenever we are directly aware of a sense-datum, it follows that we know some proposition which describes the sense-datum to be true." A.J. Ayer, *The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge* (1940; London: Macmillan, 1964) 80.


96. It should be noted here that Dewey's approach to moral deliberation and judgement is also anti-foundational.

97. In consequence of his rejecting the possibility of immediate knowledge, Dewey cannot argue that specific knowledge claims can be known to be true because they can be verified. Neither the correspondence, nor the coherence theory of truth, is thus available to him. Knowledge claims can only be, at best, "warranted" if the inquiry which leads to them is sufficient and adequate. He writes: "...since every special case of knowledge is constituted as the outcome of some special
inquiry, the conception of knowledge as such can only be a generalization of the properties discovered to belong to conclusions which are outcomes of inquiry. Knowledge, as an abstract term, is a name for the product of competent inquiries. Apart from this relation, its meaning is so empty that any content or filling may be arbitrarily poured in." Dewey, Logic 8.


99. Writes Dewey: "...the history of science has been marked by epochs in which observation and reflection have operated only within a predetermined conceptual framework— an example of the inertia-phase of habit. That the only way to avoid and avert the mistakes of this fixation is by recognition of the provisional and conditional nature (as respects any inquiry in process) of the facts that enter into it, and the hypothetical nature of the conceptions and theories employed, is a relatively late discovery. ... The recognition of what Peirce called 'fallibilism' in distinction from 'infallibilism' is something more than a prudential maxim. It results of necessity from the possibility and probability of a discrepancy between means available for use and consequences that follow: between past and future conditions, not from mere weakness of mortal powers. Because we live in a world in process, the future, although continuous with the past, is not its bare repetition. The principle applies with peculiar force to inquiry about inquiry..." Dewey, Logic 40.

100. "To Bacon...", writes Dewey, "...error had been produced and perpetuated by social influences, and truth must be discovered by social agencies organized for that purpose. Left to himself, the individual can do little or nothing; he is likely to become involved in his own self-spun web of misconceptions. The great need is the organization of co-operative research, whereby men attack nature collectively and the work of inquiry is carried on continuously from generation to generation. ... Bacon may be taken as the prophet of a pragmatic conception of knowledge. Many misconceptions of its spirit would be avoided if his emphasis upon the social factor in both the pursuit and the end of knowledge were carefully observed." Dewey, Reconstruction 36-38.

101. Writes Dewey: "It is one thing to say that all knowing has an end beyond itself, and another thing, a thing of a contrary kind, to say that an act of knowing has a particular end which it is bound, in advance, to reach.
... Any limitation whatever of the end means limitation in the thinking process itself. It signifies that it does not attain its full growth and movement, but is cramped, impeded, interfered with. The only situation in which knowing is fully stimulated is one in which the end is developed in the process of inquiry and testing. Disinterested and impartial inquiry...means that there is no particular end set up in advance so as to shut in the activities of observation, forming of ideas, and application. Inquiry is emancipated." Dewey, Reconstruction 146.


105. The phrase "having an experience" has two distinctive meanings for Dewey depending upon which of its constituent terms is emphasized. When having is emphasized, the phrase is used to contrast having an experience with knowing something about it and thus it denotes the immediacy of experience. In this sense the experience one has when one is "having an experience" can be characterized by any of the qualities inherent in pre-reflective experience, e.g., indeterminacy, disharmony, poignancy, beauty. In its second sense, however, the emphasis falls on an experience, that is, on the experience had. In this sense the experience one has when one is "having an experience" is characterized by completeness and finality. It is, in Dewey's idiom, "consummatory". This meaning of the phrase "having an experience" is discussed by Dewey in Chapter 3 of Art as Experience. In this chapter he offers the following characterization of these two senses of the phrase: "Experience occurs continuously, because the interaction of live creature and environing conditions is involved in the very process of living... Oftentimes, however, the experience had is inchoate. Things are experienced but not in such a way that they are composed into an experience. There is distraction and dispersion; what we observe and what we think, what we desire and what we get, are at odds with each other. ... In contrast with such experience, we have an experience when the material experienced runs its course to fulfillment. Then and then only is it integrated within and demarcated in the general stream of experience from other experiences. A piece of work is finished in a way that is satisfactory; a problem receives its solution; a game is played through; a situation, whether that of eating a meal, playing a
game of chess, carrying on a conversation, writing a book, or taking part in a political campaign, is so rounded out that its close is a consummation and not a cessation. Such an experience is a whole and carries with it its own individualizing quality and self-sufficiency. It is an experience." John Dewey, *Art as Experience* (1934; New York: Capricorn Books, 1958) 35.

106. Vide the discussion between pp. 96-100.

107. Dewey, *Art* 4-5. It should be noted here that for Dewey "data" is not so much "given" in an experiential situation as it is "taken". They emerge as part of and in the context of specific problematic situations. He writes: "They are not isolated, complete or self-sufficient. To be a datum is to have a special function in control of the subject-matter of inquiry. It embodies a fixation of the problem in a way which indicates a possible solution." Dewey, *Logic* 124.


111. Dewey, *Experience and Nature* 5. In the passage which follows, Dewey provides a clear illustration of the instrumental role played by the objects of reflective experience in gaining understanding of the things and events in pre-reflective experience. "The phenomena observed in the eclipse tested and, as far as they went, confirmed Einstein's theory of deflection of light by mass. But that is far from being the whole story. The phenomena themselves got a far reaching significance they did not previously have. Perhaps they would not even have been noticed if the theory had not been employed as a guide or road to observation of them. But even if they had been noticed, they would have been dismissed as of no importance, just as we daily drop from attention hundreds of perceived details for which we have no intellectual use. But approached by means of theory these lines of slight deflection take on a significance as large as that of the revolutionary theory that lead to their being experienced." Dewey, *Experience and Nature* 5-6.


113. Dewey, *Quest* 171. The key implication to be noted here is that "knowing" is not a matter of directly grasping something to be the case. Such a conception of knowing
pesupposes the existence of an object of knowledge prior to the activity of knowing—be it the forms of Plato or the sense data of empiricists. Dewey dubs the view that knowing is essentially a matter of "seeing" or "grasping" something the "spectator" theory of knowledge and rejects it in favour of the view that knowing is always a matter of doing and experimenting. In his view, the activity of knowing constructs the object of knowledge and hence precedes it. For Dewey, therefore, knowing, as paradigmatically exemplified in natural science, is more profitably compared with the labour of the artisan than with the passive serenity of the contemplative. He writes: "Modern science represents a generalized recognition and adoption of the point of view of the useful arts, for it proceeds by employment of a similar operative technique of manipulation and reduction. Physical science would be impossible without the appliances and procedures of separation and combinations of the industrial arts. In useful arts, the consequence is increase of power, multiplication of ends appropriated and enjoyed, and an enlarged and varied flexibility and economy in means used to achieve ends." Dewey, Experience and Nature 133. Dewey's conception of knowing, as will emerge shortly, leads to his rejecting the thesis that values are fundamentally "subjective".

114. Dewey, Quest 219.

115. Vide Endnotes 45, 46 above.

116. For Dewey habits of inquiry, beliefs, attitudes, a conceptual framework, etc., when taken together, comprise the mind of an individual. "But the whole history of science, art and morals...", he writes, "...proves that the mind that appears in individuals is not as such individual mind. The former is in itself a system of belief, recognitions, and ignorances, of acceptances and rejections, of expectancies and appraisals of meanings which have been instituted under the influence of custom and tradition." Dewey, Quest 219.

117. Dewey, Quest 140. In thus combining the sensible and intellectual components in the construction of objects of knowledge, together with his "instrumentalist" account of ideas, Dewey dissolves the traditional conflict between empiricist and rationalist epistemologies. He writes: "...sensible and rational factors cease to be competitors for primary rank. They are allies, cooperating to make knowledge possible." Dewey, Quest 171.
118. Dewey, *Quest* 221.

119. Dewey, *Quest* 220. A significant implication of this passage is that *valuation judgements*, in virtue of the fact that *inquiry* is an integral part of them, result in objects of knowledge and hence that *values can be known*.

120. Dewey, *Quest* 104. In this passage Dewey dismisses the *immediacy* of direct experience, that is, its qualitativenss. It should not be concluded from this, however, that for Dewey this aspect of experience is ancillary to knowledge and knowing. The immediacy of direct experience is, in his view, the condition *sine qua non* of *knowledge*. He writes: "...without immediate qualities those relations with which science deals, would have no footing in existence and thought would have nothing beyond itself to chew upon or dig into. Without a basis in qualitative events, the characteristic subject-matter of knowledge would be algebraic ghosts, relations that do not relate. To dispose of things in which relations terminate by calling them elements, is to discourse within a relational and logical scheme. Only if elements are more than just elements in a whole, only if they have something qualitatively their own, can a relational system be prevented from complete collapse." Dewey, *Experience and Nature* 86-87.

121. Dewey makes this point in the following manner: "What science actually does is to show that any natural object we please may be treated in terms of relations upon which its occurrence depends, or as an event, and that by so treating it we are enabled to get behind, as it were, the immediate qualities the object of direct experience presents, and to regulate their happening, instead of having to wait for conditions beyond our control to bring it about. Reduction of experienced objects to the form of relations, which are neutral as respects qualitative traits, is a prerequisite of ability to regulate the course of change, so that it may terminate in the occurrence of an object having desired qualities." Dewey, *Quest*, 104-5.


125. Dewey, *Experience and Nature* 19. This assumption is at the heart of what Dewey calls the "intellectualist fallacy".

127. Dewey describes the emergence of this problem as follows: "Many modern thinkers, influenced by the notion that knowledge is the only mode of experience that grasps things, assuming the ubiquity of cognition, and noting that immediacy or qualitative existence has no place in authentic science, have asserted that qualities are always and only states of consciousness." Dewey, *Experience and Nature* 86.


129. Dewey, *Experience and Nature* 96. Dewey's use of the term "esthetic" can be, at times, confusing. Two main senses of it, however, can be distinguished, though they are not absolutely separable. In its narrow sense Dewey uses this term to focus on experience incorporating art-works of various forms. In its broad sense he uses it to denote the occurrence of experiential situations involving qualities of all kinds (e.g., tragic, joyful, frightening, difficult, exciting, sweet, coarse). Thus, in this latter sense, all qualities inherent in the experiential situations comprising pre-reflective experience are "esthetic" qualities or objects.


135. The distinction between "esthetic" and "cognitive" experience, as in the case of all distinctions drawn by Dewey, is not absolute. Thus although esthetic experience can be distinguished from cognitive experience nevertheless the two cannot be separated to form discrete and mutually exclusive categories of experience. Dewey makes this point when he writes: ". . . esthetic cannot be sharply marked off from intellectual experience since the latter must bear an esthetic stamp to be itself complete." Dewey, *Art* 38. It should be noted here that the same point holds for moral experience.

137. It should not be concluded here that consummatory objects are rooted exclusively in imagination. On the contrary, for Dewey inquiry is a far more important source of consummatory objects.

138. Dewey does not use the term "need" to denote the occurrence of a peculiar kind of inner feeling accessible only by means of introspection. He writes; "When the balance within a given activity is disturbed—when there is a proportionate excess or deficit in some factor—then there is exhibited need, search and fulfilment (or satisfaction) in the objective meaning of these terms. The greater the differentiation of structures and their corresponding activities becomes, the more difficult it is to keep the balance. Indeed, living may be regarded as a continual rhythm of disequilibrations and recoveries of equilibrium. The 'higher' the organism, the more serious become the disturbances and the more energetic (and often more prolonged) are the efforts necessary for its reestablishment. The state of disturbed equilibration constitutes need." Dewey, Logic 27. With respect to his analysis of "mentalistic" terms in general, Dewey adopts a form of logical behaviourism. In characterizing logical behaviourism, Norman Malcolm writes that it is "...not a program of experimental inquiry, nor is it the doctrine that 'stimulus' and 'response' are connected by empirical laws. It is the view that the meaning of mental terms such as 'thinking', 'anger', 'intention' can be explained wholly in terms of bodily behavior and of the physical circumstances in which it occurs." Norman Malcolm, Problems of Mind (New York, Harper & Row, 1971) 80.

139. Dewey, Experience and Nature 81.

140. Dewey, Experience and Nature 81.

141. Esthetic objects are not qualitatively identical in their recurrence as parts of esthetic experience. In virtue of what Dewey calls the "experiential continuum" (or continuity) experiences interact and hence the objects comprising these experiences are never twice exactly the same. In Experience and Education he provides the following account of this principle: "At bottom, this principle rests upon the fact of habit, when habit is interpreted biologically. The basic characteristic of habit is that every experience enacted and undergone modifies the one who acts and undergoes, while this modification affects, whether we wish it or not, the quality of subsequent experiences. For it is a somewhat different person who enters into
them. The principle of habit so understood obviously goes deeper than the ordinary conception of a habit as a more or less fixed way of doing things, although it includes the latter as one of its special cases. It covers the formation of attitudes, attitudes that are emotional and intellectual; it covers our basic sensitivities and ways of meeting and responding to all the conditions which we meet in living. From this point of view, the principle of continuity of experience means that every experience both takes up something from those which have gone before and modifies in some way the quality of those which come after." Dewey, Experience and Education 35. Upon first hearing Stravinsky's "Rite of Spring", for example, one may be left cold. Upon subsequent hearings, however, the piece may come to have drama and freshness which it lacked initially. Unfortunately, too many hearings may render it altogether tedious—a musical cliche.

142. The same holds true for what might be termed "negative" experiences. Keeping one's appointment with the dentist, for example, is not quite as bad as one imagines although on some occasions, of course, it is.

143. Dewey, Experience and Nature 81.
144. Dewey, Experience and Nature 106.
145. Dowey, Experience and Nature 104.
146. Dewey, Experience and Nature 298.
147. Dewey, Experience and Nature 86.
148. Dewey, Experience and Nature 86.
149. Dewey, Experience and Nature 96.
150. Dewey, Experience and Nature 97.
151. It should be noted here that for Dewey endings as they occur in nature are not absolute. In his view, endings and beginnings are the same event viewed differently. He writes: "Empirically...there is a history which is a succession of histories, and in which any event is at once both beginning of one course and close of another..." Dewey, Experience and Nature 100. Thus the eruption of the volcano is both the ending of the subterranean geophysical processes that preceded it and the beginning of an awesome natural phenomenon. Dewey's rejection of intrinsic good is grounded in this
conception of ends.


156. Dewey, *Experience and Nature* 102. In connecting ends-in-view with endings in this way, it may be concluded that Dewey thereby undermines the possibility of freedom and hence of innovation and novelty in framing ends-in-view. That is to say, if ends-in-view are conditioned by *de facto* endings, then the past conditions the future. This conclusion, while not entirely mistaken is nevertheless not entirely correct either. This is so because for Dewey impulse and appropriate habits of inquiry are also involved in the formation of ends-in-view thereby precluding strict determinism.

157. In light of the role played by ends-in-view in Dewey's theory of valuation, his grounding of them in experience provides the key to understanding his naturalistic teleology as well as his experimental axiology.


159. In *Experience and Education* Dewey describes the formation of purposes in the following way: "The formation of purposes is...a rather complex intellectual operation. It involves: (1) observation of surrounding conditions; (2) knowledge of what has happened in similar situations in the past, a knowledge obtained partly by recollection and partly from the information, advice, and warning of those who have had wider experience; and (3) judgement which puts together what is observed and what is recalled to see what they signify. A purpose differs from an original impulse and desire through its translation into a plan and method of action based upon foresight of the consequences of acting under given observed conditions in a certain way." Dewey, *Experience and Education* 69. In speaking of freedom, he writes: "It is...a sound instinct which identifies freedom with power to frame purposes and to execute or carry into effect purposes so framed." Dewey, *Experience and Education* 67.
160. Dewey, *Experience and Nature* 103. The obvious question here is what determines the choice of endings. The brief answer to this question is--inquiry. A more detailed examination of inquiry will be undertaken in the following chapter.


162. Dewey, *Experience and Nature* 104. In Dewey's view this confusion results in a metaphysics characterized by the following features: "...First, elimination from the status of natural ends of all objects that are evil and troublesome; secondly, the grading of objects selected to constitute natural ends into a fixed, unchangeable hierarchical order. Objects that possess and import qualities of struggle, suffering and defeat are regarded not as ends, but as frustrations of ends, as accidental and inexplicable deviations... To this provincially exclusive view of natural termini, popular teleology adds a ranking of objects according to which some are more completely ends than others, until there is reached an object which is only end, never eventful and temporal--the end." Dewey, *Experience and Nature* 105.


171. Rorty makes this point as follows: "Dewey's naturalistic metaphysics hoped to eliminate epistemological problems by offering an up-to-date version of Locke's 'plain, historical method'. But what Green and Hegel had seen, and Dewey himself saw perfectly well except when he was sidetracked into doing 'metaphysics', was that we can eliminate epistemological problems by eliminating the assumption
that justification must repose on something other than social practices and human needs." Rorty, *Consequences* 81-82.

172. Rorty, *Consequences* 82.

173. Arthur C. Danto characterizes "naturalism" as follows: "Naturalism, in recent usage, is a species of philosophical monism according to which whatever exists or happens is natural in the sense of being susceptible to explanation through methods which, although paradigmatically exemplified in the natural sciences, are continuous from domain to domain of objects and events. Hence, naturalism is polemically defined as repudiating the view that there exists or could exist any entities or events which lie, in principle, beyond the scope of scientific explanation." "Naturalism," *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 1967 ed.

174. *Vide* Section 1 above.

175. Rorty, *Consequences* 72.


182. *OED, Compact Edition* 1984. It should be noted here that Rorty acknowledges that Dewey does not advance his metaphysics as a view of existence sub specie aeternitatis. In view of the meaning of the term "permanent", however, it becomes difficult to understand just what kind of conception of metaphysics Rorty is attributing to Dewey when he claims that for him a naturalistic metaphysics comprises a "permanent matrix for future inquiry". From a pragmatic point of view, there is no practical difference between something being permanent and something being eternal.


184. Dewey, *Experience and Nature* 76-77. (The emphasis is mine.)
189. Rorty, *Consequences* 83.
190. Rorty, *Consequences* 83.
CHAPTER THREE

THE STRUCTURE OF MORAL EXPERIENCE

This is the question finally at stake in any genuinely moral situation: What shall the agent be? What sort of character shall he assume? ...What kind of a character shall control further desires and deliberations? When ends are genuinely incompatible, no common denominator can be found except by deciding what sort of character is most highly prized and shall be given supremacy. Dewey, Ethics

In the previous chapter the point was made that for Dewey experience is not some private inner adventure, but rather an interactive process involving an organism and its environment. This interaction, although constant, is not always identical in function and quality.1 Hence, the experiential situations which such interactions comprise can be discriminated into various types of experience (e.g., cognitive, esthetic, moral, etc.,) depending upon the pattern which is formed by the various elements inherent in these experiential situations.

In this chapter my main objective shall be to delineate the principal features of Dewey's conception of moral experience, with a view to determining those characteristics in virtue of which moral experience can be distinguished
from various other phases of experience with which it is nevertheless continuous. Dewey's conception of moral experience is best understood in light of the distinction he draws between pre-reflective and reflective experience. This distinction, it will be recalled, is at the heart of Dewey's view of inquiry and is central to his denotative method. In view of this distinction the question naturally arises as to how moral experience is to be construed. Is it a part of: (1) pre-reflective experience, (2) reflective experience, or (3) some combination of the two? Given that moral experience involves deliberation and valuation, the answer to this question, it would seem, is that it is entirely a matter of reflective experience. In my view, however, such a reading of Dewey would be unwarranted. For Dewey, as I shall endeavour to show, moral experience is a dynamic interpenetration of both pre-reflective and reflective phases of experience and not a matter of reflective experience alone. Moreover the pre-reflective phase of moral experience, as I shall presently argue, is of fundamental importance not only because it is the ground from which the subject-matter of reflective moral experience is drawn but also, and more importantly, because character is intrinsic to its very structure. In thus interpreting Dewey it follows that, in order to fully understand his view of moral experience, the pre-reflective and reflective aspect of it will have to be considered and
the nature of the connection between them clarified. I shall, accordingly, divide the discussion which follows into three parts. Part A will center upon pre-reflective experience and will be devoted to elucidating the claim that character is intrinsic to the experiential situations comprising it, while Part B will focus upon the component elements of reflective moral experience. In Part C, I shall consider two of the more important criticisms to which Dewey's view of moral experience gives rise.

A: PRE-REFLECTIVE EXPERIENCE AND CHARACTER

The contention that character is an intrinsic constituent of pre-reflective experience can be readily inferred from Dewey's conception of experience. In his view, it will be recalled, all experience is the outcome of an interaction involving an organism and its environment. The possibility of experience, however, is clearly not restricted exclusively to instances of interaction involving human beings and their particular environment. In numerous instances it is plainly evident that various non-human organisms are equally capable of having experience. It does not, of course, follow that these diverse experiential situations are all of the same kind. Differences in the structure of the organism involved in the interaction, as well as differences inherent in the environment with which
the organism typically interacts, combine to engender experientia' situations that differ in structure, function, and quality.

In the case of human beings the structure and quality of pre-reflective experience is conditioned by the actual state of both the individual involved and her/his environment at the time of its occurrence. By way of illustration, consider the case of an individual who goes to the opera for the first time. The experience that the individual will have is quite obviously contingent upon the many and diverse conditions which enter into it. Bearing in mind that for Dewey the distinction between "subjective" and "objective" features in experience is drawn solely for the purpose of analysis and not in order to mark a metaphysical dualism, then clearly some of the "objective" conditions involved in determining the character of the experience which will be had are: the opera itself, the singers, its staging, and its actual performance. There are of course innumerable other objective conditions, some of which are more easily identifiable than others, with which the experiential situation varies. The individual's experience, for example, can be virtually ruined by someone nearby talking and coughing throughout the performance. From the "subjective" side, the individual's preparation prior to attending the performance is of equal importance. An individual who goes to an opera without even reading the
libretto or listening to a recording of it beforehand clearly will have an experience which is different from the experience which s/he would have had had s/he gone prepared, or the experience of an opera critic who is at the opera on assignment. The subjective conditions entering into experiential situations are, quite obviously, no less numerous and varied than are the objective conditions which enter into them. Thus an individual who feels obliged to go to the opera will have an experience which will differ from the experience of the individual who is going to the opera for the first time because s/he is interested in finding out about opera firsthand.

In Dewey's conception of experience, as illustrated above, the structure and quality of pre-reflective experience is just what it is in virtue of both the subjective and objective conditions which obtain at the time of its occurrence. Hence, not only can it be inferred that variations and changes in these conditions will directly affect the structure and quality of the experiential situations which result, but also that each experiential situation is virtually unique. Given that in one of its characteristic uses the term "intrinsic" is understood to mean "belonging to something by its very nature", it can be concluded that both subjective and objective conditions are intrinsic constituents of the experiential situations comprising pre-reflective experience. Since character is a
component element of the subjective conditions intrinsic to pre-reflective experience, however, it follows that character must be an inexpungible constituent of pre-reflective experience. Writes Dewey:

That an individual, possessed of some mode and degree of organized unity, participates in the genesis of every experienced situation, whether it be an object or an activity, is evident. That the way in which it is engaged affects the quality of the situation experienced is evident. That the way in which it is engaged has consequences that modify not merely the environment but which react to modify the active agent, that every form of life in the higher organisms constantly conserves some consequences of its prior experiences, is also evident. The constancy and pervasiveness of the operative presence of the self as a determining factor in all situations is the chief reason why we give so little heed to it; it is more intimate and omnipresent in experience than the air we breathe. Only in pathological cases, in delusions and insanities and social eccentricities, do we readily become aware of it; even in such cases it required long discipline to force attentive observation back upon the self. It is easier to attribute such things to invasion and possession from without, as by demons and devils.  

For Dewey, then, the self (or character) is an intrinsic constituent of pre-reflective experience and hence the experiential situations comprising pre-reflective experience would cease to be just what they are if character were expunged from them.

In order to better understand the contention that character is an intrinsic constituent of pre-reflective
experience it is necessary to consider more fully Dewey's conception of character. In the discussion which follows, therefore, I shall ignore the objective conditions intrinsic to pre-reflective experience and focus instead upon Dewey's conception of character and its role in determining the structure and quality of the experiential situations comprising pre-reflective experience. Dewey's conception of character, however, cannot be properly understood apart from his view of human nature. Hence, before discussing his view of character it is necessary to first consider his conception of human nature.

1. Human Nature

Dewey's most extensive and sustained discussion of human nature is in his book *Human Nature and Conduct* published in 1922. Although in this book he does not actually provide a definition of the term "human nature" it nevertheless can be reasonably inferred that in his view "instinct" and "impulse" are its key components. Instincts and impulses are, for Dewey, forces or quanta of energy originating from within the organism and animating or moving it into activity of one kind or another. The OED defines these terms as follows: (1) Instinct: "An innate propensity in organized beings (especially in the lower animals), varying with the species, and manifesting itself in acts which appear to be rational, but are performed without
conscious design or intentional adaptation of means to ends..."; (2) Impulse: (a) "Incitement or stimulus to action arising from some state of mind or feeling; (b) Sudden or involuntary inclination or tendency to act, without premeditation or reflection." As these definitions attest, the meaning of the term "instinct" differs sharply from the meaning of the term "impulse". Whereas instinct is adapted to its end, impulse is not. Dewey, however, makes a point of using these terms interchangeably. He writes:

The use of the words instinct and impulse as practical equivalents is intentional, even though it may grieve critical readers. The word instinct taken alone is still too laden with the older notion that an instinct is always definitely organized and adapted—which for the most part is just what it is not in human beings. The word impulse suggests something primitive, yet loose, undirected, initial. Man can progress as beasts cannot, precisely because he has so many 'instincts' that they cut across one another, so that most serviceable actions must be learned.8

In this passage Dewey assimilates instinct to impulse and then makes the claim that, in the case of human beings, instinctive behaviour is not the same as it would appear to be in the case of non-human organisms. In the case of non-human organisms instinctive behaviour is essentially unlearned and hence is more or less fixed and adapted to the specific environment with which the organism interacts. Thus the same instinctive behaviour, more or less, can be expected of all the organisms within a particular species
regardless of when or where it occurs. For Dewey, however, the "instinctive" behaviour of human beings must be learned, and hence the expectation that such behaviour is everywhere and always the same is unwarranted.

In view of Dewey's intentional assimilation of instinct and impulse, the conclusion could be drawn that in his view instincts, qua instincts, form no part of human nature, and hence that the core of human nature is comprised exclusively of impulses. This interpretation of Dewey, although prima facie not unreasonable, fails to do justice to his understanding of human nature. In his view, both instinct and impulse are at the core of human nature. In assimilating instinct and impulse Dewey is not making the point that the former can be completely eliminated from human nature by reducing it to the latter, but rather, as I shall presently argue, the critically important point that both share a key similarity, their differences notwithstanding. In his view both instinct and impulse are to be understood primarily as forms of energy subject to the transforming contingencies prevailing within the environment with which they interact. Dewey makes this point when he writes:

I do not mean of course that hunger, fear, sexual love, gregariousness, sympathy, parental love, love of bossing and of being ordered about, imitation, etc., play no part. But I do mean that these words do not express elements or forces which are psychic or mental in their first intention. They denote ways
of behavior. These ways of behaving involve interaction, that is to say, and prior groupings.¹⁰

In this passage Dewey implies that instincts are not, pace the common view, unlearned modes of adaptive behavior. Moreover, he underscores the critically important point that the learning connected with an individual's instinctive behavior involves interaction and "prior groupings". These prior groupings encompass not only the collectivity of individuals comprising the society into which a particular individual is born, but also the socio-cultural institutions (especially language) and "forms of life" characteristic of that society as these have developed over the course of time. It is this socio-cultural environment that imparts form, meaning and executive power to the instinctive and impulsive energies interacting with it. "Existing institutions..." writes Dewey, "...impose their stamp, their superscription upon impulse and instinct."¹¹ In the case of human beings, therefore, instinctive behavior must not be regarded as fixed or perfectly adapted to its environment prior to its actual occurrence (as is the behaviour, for example, of a sparrow constructing its nest)¹² but must, instead, be viewed as the outcome of a process of learning. Instinctive, as well as impulsive behaviour, is thus subject to education. If Dewey's assimilation of instinct and impulse is understood in this way, then the conclusion that instincts are reducible to
impulses need not be drawn. Hence the claim that both are central to his conception of human nature can be sustained.13

Dewey's assimilation of instinct and impulse is clearly not without its difficulties. In the first place, if instincts are not reducible to impulses, then in what way do they differ from them? Moreover, if instincts and impulses are both at the core of human nature, then given that the former are not reducible to the latter, which of the two is more fundamental? In order to address these questions, it will be necessary to consider more fully Dewey's view of instinct and impulse. It is, therefore, to this task that I now turn.

a) Instinct and Impulse

Stated baldly, the answer to the first question is that instinct and impulse differ functionally, while the answer to the second question is that instincts are more fundamental than impulses, although both are at the core of human nature. With respect to the place of instinct in human nature, it must be acknowledged that Dewey does not, in fact, explicitly state that instincts are more fundamental to human nature than impulses. This interpretation of Dewey, however, is not unreasonable. Much of the discussion in Human Nature and Conduct is devoted to an examination of the transformation and incorporation into
habits of "native tendencies" and "original activities" as a result of their interaction with a particular environment. As the discussion unfolds it becomes clear that for Dewey "native tendencies" and "original activities" are at the root of much of human behaviour. He writes:

"The same original fears, loves and hates are hopelessly entangled in the most opposite institutions. The thing we need to know is how a native stock has been modified by interaction with different environments."14

He then goes on to add: "Yet it goes without saying that original, unlearned activity has its distinctive place and that an important one in conduct."15 The net import of these (and other) passages is that the key to understanding human behaviour is in the interaction of these native tendencies and the environing conditions within which they emerge. If the context of Dewey's discussion of "native tendencies" and "original activities" is taken into account, however, then it becomes readily apparent that he frequently uses these phrases as synonyms for "instincts". In support of this view, consider the following passage in which Dewey uses the phrase "native tendencies" to denote what are typically construed as instincts:

Pugnacity and fear are no more native than are pity and sympathy. The important thing morally is the way these native tendencies interact, for their interaction may give a chemical transformation not a mechanical combination.16
Thus given that Dewey uses terms such as "native tendencies" and "original activities" as synonyms for "instinct", it can be concluded that in his view instincts are at the root of much of human behaviour.

Although instincts are, for Dewey, fundamental to an adequate understanding of human behaviour, nevertheless in his view (and contrary to what might be expected) the instinctive behaviour of human beings is not reducible to the operation of one or two principal instincts. He writes: "...it is unscientific to try to restrict original activities to a definite number of sharply demarcated classes of instincts. And the practical result of this attempt is injurious."17 He then goes on to add:

Man has been resolved into a definite collection of primary instincts which may be numbered, catalogued and exhaustively described. Theorists differ only or chiefly as to their number and ranking. Some say one, self-love; some two, egoism and altruism; some three, greed, fear and glory; while today writers of a more empirical turn run the number up to fifty and sixty. But in fact there are as many specific reactions to differing stimulating conditions as there is time for, and our lists are only classifications for a purpose.18

In this passage Dewey unequivocally rejects the view that human behaviour can be reduced to the operation of a certain number of specifiable instincts each of which is adapted to specific ends. Instead he adopts a view of instinctive behaviour that is radically pluralistic. The instinctive
energy animating the organism results in forms of behaviour that are as diverse as the environment with which they interact. This plurality of behaviour attests to the fundamental plasticity of instinct. Given the enormous range of human behaviour connected with the outworking of instinctive energy, the conclusion can be drawn that for Dewey instincts are more fundamental to human nature than impulses. Having thus answered the second of the two questions connected with Dewey's view of instinct and impulse it is now time to consider the first. Hence, in what follows, the functional aspect of instincts and impulses will be considered.

In considering the functional aspect of instincts and impulses, the first point to be noted is that the term "function" is used in a number of different ways of which only two are of particular relevance to the question at hand. These two meanings are given by the OED as follows: (1) "The special kind of activity proper to anything; the mode of action by which it fulfills its purpose..." (2) Math. A variable quantity regarded in its relation to one or more other variables in terms of which it may be expressed, or on the value of which its own value depends."19 In the first of these definitions, the meaning of "function" revolves around the operation or purpose characteristic of a particular thing, while in the second (mathematical) definition it centers upon the relative value
(or, in somewhat different terms, the plasticity) of a particular quantity (or thing). Thus in view of these definitions, the difference between instinct and impulse can be more precisely characterized as one of "operation" whereas the similarity between them is rooted in the fact that both are "functional" in the mathematical sense of this term. In what follows I shall begin by considering the similarity of instincts and impulses.

In discussing Dewey's assimilation of instinct and impulse, the claim was made that in his view both are transformed by the socio-cultural environment in which they occur. This, however, is tantamount to the view that instinct and impulse are functional in the mathematical sense of this term. The functional aspect of impulses is no doubt more readily apparent than the functional aspect of instincts. In Dewey's view, it will be recalled, impulses are "primitive and initial" forms of energy that are "chaotic, tumultuous and confused". They are, accordingly, devoid of form, meaning and executive power. Hence they are completely plastic (i.e., functional).

In contrast with impulse, the functional aspect of instinct is less readily apparent. For Dewey, as indicated above, instincts are not narrowly circumscribed in their behavioural manifestations. He characterizes this "narrow" conception of instinct as follows:

In spite of what has been said, it will be asserted that there are definite,
independent, original instincts which manifest themselves in specific acts in a one-to-one correspondence. Fear, it will be said, is a reality, and so is anger, rivalry, and love of mastery over others, and self-abasement, maternal love, sexual desire, gregariousness and envy, and each has its own appropriate deed as a result.\textsuperscript{21}

This conception of instinct, however, implies that instinctive behaviour is everywhere and always more or less the same.\textsuperscript{22} Now it is precisely this conception of instinct which Dewey is most insistent upon rejecting. In his view, this narrow conception of instinct ignores two important facts. In the first place, it overlooks the fact that:

...no activity (even one that is limited by routine habit) is confined to the channel which is most flagrantly involved in its execution. The whole organism is concerned in every act to some extent and in some fashion, internal organs as well as muscular, those of circulation, secretion, etc. Since the total state of the organism is never exactly twice alike, in so far the phenomena of hunger and sex are never twice the same in fact.\textsuperscript{23}

The second difficulty with the narrow conception of instinct is that it ignores the fact that:

...the environment in which the act takes place is never twice alike. Even when the overt organic discharge is substantially the same, the acts impinge upon a different environment and thus have different consequences.\textsuperscript{24}

Using fear as an example, he writes:

Again it is customary to suppose that there is a single instinct of fear, or at most a few well-defined sub-species of it. In reality, when one is afraid
the whole being reacts, and this entire responding organism is never twice the same. In fact, also, every reaction takes place in a different environment, and its meaning is never twice alike, since the difference in environment makes a difference in consequences. Dewey then adds: "There is no one fear having diverse manifestations; there are as many qualitatively different fears as there are objects responded to and different consequences sensed and observed." In these passages Dewey makes the point that the critically important characteristic of instinctive behaviour is that it varies not only with the state of the organism, but also with the conditions prevailing in the natural and socio-cultural environment within which it occurs. Instinctive behaviour is thus functional (in the mathematical sense of this term) and hence the view that instinctive behaviour is narrowly circumscribed cannot be maintained.

In the discussion thus far, attention has been focused upon the functional similarity of instinct and impulse. This similarity implies that both vary relative to the environment with which they interact. In Dewey's view the interaction of instinct with a particular natural and socio-cultural environment is vitally important since apart from such interaction, instinctive energy would lack direction and executive power. "The inchoate and scattered impulses of an infant..." he writes "...do not coordinate into serviceable powers except through social dependencies and
companionships." Moreover, it is in virtue of this interaction that instinctive energy also acquires form and meaning. Writes Dewey: ". . . babies owe to adults more than procreation, more than the continued food and protection which preserve life. They owe adults the opportunity to express their native activities in ways which have meaning." He goes on to add: "Even if by some miracle original activity could continue without assistance from the organized skill and art of adults, it would not amount to anything. It would be mere sound and fury." Using anger as an example of instinctive energy, he writes:

...the meaning of native activities is not native; it is acquired. It depends upon interaction with a matured social medium. In the case of a tiger or eagle, anger may be identified with a serviceable life activity, with attack and defense. With a human being it is as meaningless as a gust of wind on a mudpuddle apart from a direction given it by the presence of other persons, apart from the responses they make to it. It is a physical spasm, a blind dispersive burst of wasteful energy. It gets quality, significance when it becomes a smouldering sullenness, an annoying interruption, a peevish initiation, a murderous revenge, a blazing indignation. And although these phenomena which have a meaning spring from original native reactions to stimuli, yet they depend also upon the responsive behavior of others. They and all similar human displays of anger are not pure impulses; they are habits formed under the influence of association with others who have habits already and who show their habits in the treatment which converts a blind physical discharge into a significant anger.
As the passage just cited attests, for Dewey the interaction of a human being and her/his soci-cultural environment is significant because it successfully transforms instinctive energy into habits having both form and meaning. Independently of their incorporation into habits, therefore, instincts would be "blind".

In Dewey's view the incorporation of instinctive energies into habits results in their acquiring not only form and meaning, but also executive power. All habits, he writes, "...have projectile power."\textsuperscript{31} They are, he adds, "...demands for certain kinds of activity."\textsuperscript{32} Given that independently of their incorporation into habits the instinctive energies at the core of human nature would lack meaning and executive power, it follows that Dewey's view of human nature cannot be fully understood apart from an understanding of his conception of habit. For Dewey, however, habits (although incorporating instinctive energies) are not at the core of human nature. Instead they are, as will emerge shortly, central to his view of character and conduct. In other words, Dewey uses the term "human nature" to denote the initial stock of instinctive and impulsive energies common to all human beings and the term "character" to denote the complex network of acquired habits incorporating these instinctive energies. Thus, although the terms "human nature" and "character" are not equivalent, they are nevertheless connected.
In view of the fact that the discussion of Dewey's view of human nature was undertaken in order to clarify the contention that character is an intrinsic constituent of pre-reflective experience it follows, in light of the foregoing, that the elucidation of this contention must include a discussion of Dewey's conception of habit and character. Before turning to this discussion, however, the functional difference (i.e., the difference in operation) between instinct and impulse must be considered. It is to this task that I now turn.

As noted above, instincts are incorporated into habits thereby acquiring meaning and executive power. Once formed, however, habits tend to constrain instinctive and, to some degree, impulsive energy within the patterns of behaviour already established thereby considerably inhibiting the emergence and development of new habits. Thus, habits prove to be somewhat heteronomous. Writes Dewey:

No matter how accidental and irrational the circumstances of its origin, no matter how different the conditions which now exist to those under which the habit was formed, the latter persists until the environment obstinately rejects it. Habits once formed perpetuate themselves by acting unremittingly upon the native stock of activities. They stimulate, inhibit, intensify, weaken, select, concentrate and organize the latter into their own likeness. They create out of the formless void of impulses a world made in their own image. Man is a creature of habit not of reason nor yet of instinct. 33
As habits are formed and consolidated, therefore, they typically exhibit a tendency to become ossified, a type of reflex mechanism that simply reacts whenever the appropriate stimulus is present. Writes Dewey: "...all habit involves mechanization. Habit is impossible without setting up a mechanism of action, physiologically engrained, which operates "spontaneously", automatically, whenever the cue is given." He then goes on, however, to add: "But mechanization is not of necessity all there is to habit." The implication here is that although habits tend to become routine, they nevertheless can be otherwise. Dewey makes this point explicitly when he writes:

...this difference between the artist and the mere technician is unmistakeable. The artist is a masterful technician. The technique or mechanism is fused with thought and feeling. The "mechanical" performer permits the mechanism to dictate the performance. It is absurd to say that the latter exhibits habit and the former not. We are confronted with two kinds of habit, intelligent and routine. All life has its elan, but only the prevalence of dead habits deflects life into mere elan.

For Dewey, then, habits can be either intelligent or merely routine. In his view, habits are intelligent in the degree to which they can be redirected and reconstructed by reflective inquiry to meet new situations. He writes:

Habits reduce themselves to routine ways of acting, or degenerate into ways of action to which we are enslaved just in the degree in which intelligence is disconnected from them. Routine habits
are unthinking habits: "bad" habits are habits so severe from reason that they are opposed to the conclusions of conscious deliberation and decision.\textsuperscript{37}

For Dewey, therefore, habits become intelligent insofar as reflective inquiry is involved in their operation.

In Dewey's view, \textit{impulse} is the key to the formation of flexible and intelligent habits. The formation of habits, as noted above, occurs in consequence of an interaction involving instinctive energy and a particular natural and socio-cultural environment. If the organism and environment thus involved were simple and constant, then only one habit (or a very few at best) would ever be formed. In the case of human beings, however, both the organism and the environment involved in the formation of habits are complex and diverse and, as a result, numerous different habits are formed. With this diversity of habits there emerges the possibility of conflict between them.\textsuperscript{38} Writes Dewey:

\ldots habits incorporate an environment within themselves. They are adjustments of the environment, not merely to it. At the same time, the environment is many, not one; hence will, disposition, is plural. Diversity does not of itself imply conflict, but it implies the possibility of conflict, and this possibility is realized in fact.\textsuperscript{39}

He then goes on to add, by way of illustration:

Life, for example, involves the habit of eating, which in turn involves a unification of organism and nature. But nevertheless this habit comes into conflict with other habits which are also "objective", or in equilibrium with their environments. Because the
environment is not all of one piece, man's house is divided within itself, against itself. Honor or consideration for others or courtesy conflicts with hunger. 40

The result of this conflict is that some portion of impulsive energy is released from its automatic incorporation into already existing habits. He writes:

The more complex culture is the more certain it is to include habits formed on differing, even conflicting patterns. Each custom may be rigid, unintelligent in itself, and yet this rigidity may cause it to wear upon others. The resulting attrition may release impulse for new adventures. 41

The role of impulse thus released (what Dewey calls its "new adventures") is to redirect and re-organize habit. "Impulses..." writes Dewey, "...are the pivots upon which the re-organization of activities turn, they are agencies of deviation, for giving new directions to old habits and changing their quality." 42 For Dewey, then, impulse released as a result of a conflict of habits is the condition sine qua non of the re-organization and redirection of habit.

The redirection of established habit by impulse is possible because the impulse that is released as a result of a conflict of habits is the incunabulum of reflective thought. "Thought..." writes Dewey, "...is born as the twin of impulse in every moment of impeded habit." 43 Thus the redirection of habit is not brought about by impulse per se, but rather by the reflective thinking that released impulse
engenders. Writes Dewey:

> Impulse is needed to arouse thought, incite reflection and enliven belief. But only thought notes obstructions, invents tools, conceives aims, directs technique, and thus converts impulse into an art which lives in objects.\textsuperscript{44}

The "art" into which released impulse is converted is the "art of knowing", that is, the \textit{constellation of habits} comprising reflective inquiry. "...habits formed in process of exercising biological aptitudes..." he writes, "...are the sole agents of observation, recollection, foresight and judgement: a mind or consciousness or soul in general which performs these operations is a myth."\textsuperscript{45} Impulse, therefore, redirects habits by means of the reflective thought which it engenders.\textsuperscript{46}

The conflict of acquired habits not only releases impulse (thereby engendering reflective thought) but also sets the context for reflective thought. The context which is thus set is, for Dewey, vitally important since it fixes the subject-matter of inquiry.\textsuperscript{47} "The disturbed adjustment of organism and environment..." he writes, "...is reflected in a temporary strife which concludes in a coming to terms of the old habit and the new impulse."\textsuperscript{48} He then goes on to add:

> In this period of redistribution impulse determines the direction of movement. It furnishes the focus about which reorganization swirls. Our attention in short is always directed forward to bring to notice something which is imminent but which as yet escapes us.
Impulse defines the peering, the search, the inquiry. It is, in logical language, the movement into the unknown, not into the immense inane of the unknown at large, but into that special unknown which when it is hit upon restores an ordered, unified action. During this search, old habit supplies content, filling, definite, recognizable, subject-matter. It begins as a vague presentiment of what we are going towards. As organized habits are definitely deployed and focused, the confused situation takes on form, it is "cleared up"—the essential function of intelligence. Processes become objects. Without habit there is only imitation and confused hesitation. With habit alone there is a machineworthy-like repetition, a duplicating recurrence of old acts. With conflict of habits and release of impulse there is conscious search.49

The redirection of habits, then, is clearly context-dependent. The point can now be made that the function (i.e., operation) of impulse (in the weak sense of this term) is to redirect acquired habits by means of the reflective thinking which it generates.

At the outset of this discussion the point was made that for Dewey instincts are at the root of human behaviour and, hence, are more fundamental to human nature than impulses. Although both instinct and impulse share the characteristic of animating behaviour, they nevertheless do not animate the same kind of behaviour. Whereas the function of impulse is to arouse reflective thought (and thereby redirect acquired habits), the primary function of instincts is to animate the individual organism in an
innumerable variety of ways thereby leading to the formation of an equally diverse range of habits. Writes Dewey: "...the direction of native activity depends upon acquired habits, and yet acquired habits can be modified only by redirection of impulses."\(^5\) Moreover, since it is primarily the habits incorporating instincts that reflective thinking is to redirect, it therefore can be concluded that these habits are, in fact, presupposed by the function of impulse. In other words, the reflective thinking engendered by impulse as a result of a conflict of habits presupposes the existence of conflicting habits incorporating instincts. Without the latter, the former would not be possible. This fact provides further support for the claim that in Dewey's view of human nature, instincts are more fundamental than impulses.

In the foregoing discussion of impulse and instinct, the point has been made that although both are at the core of human nature instincts are nevertheless more fundamental than impulses in virtue of the fact that they are at the very root of human behaviour. Attention was focused upon the fact that both instinctive and impulsive behaviour are functionally similar (in the mathematical sense of this term) and that the interaction of instinctive energies with a particular socio-cultural environment results in their incorporation into habits having meaning and executive power. The principal difference between instinct and
impulse was seen to be one of operation. Impulse redirects acquired habits by means of the reflective thinking which it engenders, whereas instinct animates human behaviour. In the course of the discussion, habits were seen to be an important aspect of Dewey's view of human nature as well as being central to his conception of character. Before turning to a more detailed discussion of his conception of habit and character, however, one final point regarding instincts and impulses must be considered, albeit briefly. It is to this discussion that I now turn.

In Dewey's view human nature does not change. That is to say, the instinctive and impulsive energies at the core of human nature are more or less invariable. He makes this point explicitly when he writes:

...we have first to recognize the sense in which human nature does not change. I do not think it can be shown that the innate needs of men have changed since man became man or that there is any evidence that they will change as long as man is on the earth.52

He then goes on to add: "...there are some tendencies so integral a part of human nature that the latter would not be human nature if they changed."53 These instinctive and impulsive energies, moreover, remain constant not only from generation to generation, but also from one culture to another. Writes Dewey:

The wholesale human sacrifices of Peru and the tenderness of St. Francis, the cruelties of pirates and the philanthropies of Howard, the practice
of Suttee and the cult of the Virgin, the war and peace dances of the Comanches and the parliamentary institutions of the British, the communism of the southsea islands and the proprietary thrift of the Yankee, the magic of the medicine man and the experiments of the chemist in his laboratory, the non-resistance of Chinese and the aggressive militarism of an imperial Russia, monarchy by divine right and government by the people; the countless diversity of habits suggested by such a random list springs from practically the same capital-stock of native instincts.54

As the passages just cited clearly reveal, in Dewey's view the initial stock of instinctive and impulsive energies are everywhere and always more or less the same.

Although for Dewey the instinctive and impulsive energies at the core of human nature do not change over time or from culture to culture, there is nevertheless, in his view, an important sense in which human nature does change. More precisely it is character (i.e., the complex network of habits incorporating instinctive energies which emerges when these energies interact with a particular natural and socio-cultural environment) and not human nature per se that changes. For Dewey, it will be recalled, apart from their incorporation into habits the instinctive energies at the core of human nature are both meaningless as well as devoid of executive power. The habits which thus prove to be critically important in transforming instinctive energy into serviceable power, however, are conditioned not only by the instinctive energies themselves but also (and more
importantly) by the natural and socio-cultural environment within which they emerge. Since this transformation of instinctive energy varies relative to a particular natural and socio-cultural environment, it follows that the habits (i.e., character) formed will vary as well. Hence, in this sense, "human nature" does change. Dewey makes this point when he writes:

Where we are likely to go wrong, after the fact is recognized that there is something unchangeable in the structure of human nature, is the inference we draw from it. We suppose that the manifestation of these needs is also unalterable. We suppose that the manifestations we have got used to are as natural and as unalterable as are the needs from which they spring.55

Taking combativeness as an example, Dewey illustrates this point as follows:

I have already said that, in my opinion, combativeness is a constituent part of human nature. But I have also said that the manifestations of these native elements are subject to change because they are affected by custom and tradition. War does not exist because man has combative instincts, but because social conditions and forces have led, almost forced, these 'instincts' into this channel.56

He then adds:

There are a large number of other channels in which the need for combat has been satisfied, and there are other channels not yet discovered or explored into which it could be led with equal satisfaction. There is war against disease, against poverty, against insecurity, against injustice, in which multitudes of persons have found full
opportunity for the exercise of their combative tendencies.\textsuperscript{57}

The conclusion that "human nature" does change, therefore, can be seen to follow from: (1) the fact that instinctive energies must be incorporated into habits in order to be efficacious, and (2) the fact that habits are conditioned by the natural and socio-cultural environment in which they emerge.\textsuperscript{58} For Dewey the fact that these habits are subject to conditioning forces is of fundamental importance.

As previously indicated, Dewey rejects all hard and fast classifications of instincts. In his view, however, among the instincts animating human behaviour there are those that work toward conservation and those that eventuate in creation. He writes: "...among the native activities of the young are some that work towards accommodation, assimilation, reproduction, and others that work toward exploration, discovery and creation."\textsuperscript{59} The fact that the habits incorporating these energies vary relative to environmental forces implies that the conditioning process itself can be either well or poorly done, and that the outcome of such conditioning can be for the better as well as for the worse. In conditioning habits (and thereby "engineering" character), it is vitally important that the instinctive and impulsive energies involved be incorporated into habits that are, in Dewey's view, not only intelligent and flexible (rather than mechanical and routine)\textsuperscript{60}, but also in keeping with the "nature" of human nature. In other
words, the formation of character should liberate the
instinctive and impulsive energies inherent in human nature
rather than stifle or override them. In order to achieve
this result the socio-cultural environment that conditions
habits must be in harmony with the instinctive energies that
are incorporated into them. There are, writes Dewey:

...intrinsic forces of a common human
nature at work; forces which are
sometimes stifled by the encompassing
social medium but which also in the long
course of history are always striving to
liberate themselves and to make over
social institutions so that the latter
may form a freer, more transparent and
more congenial medium for their
operation.61

For Dewey, then, the formation of character involves
knowledge not only of human nature but also of the socio-
cultural environment and the way in which it conditions
habits.

In light of the foregoing, it can be concluded that the
education of the young is at once both a great opportunity
as well as a great responsibility since it is here that the
prospects of individual and cultural growth are determined.
Writes Dewey:

...with the dawn of the idea of
progressive betterment and an interest
in new uses of impulses, there has grown
up some consciousness of the extent to
which a future new society of changed
purposes and desires may be created by a
deliberate human treatment of the
impulses of youth. This is the meaning
of education; for a truly humane
education consists in an intelligent
direction of native activities in the
light of the possibilities and necessities of the social situation.\textsuperscript{62}

He goes on to add:

But for the most part, adults have given training rather than education. An impatient, premature mechanization of impulsive activity after the fixed pattern of adult habits of thought and affection has been desired. The combined effect of love of power, timidity in the face of the novel and a self-admiring complacency has been too strong to permit immature impulse to exercise its reorganizing potentialities. The younger generation has hardly ever knocked frankly at the door of adult customs, much less been invited in to rectify through better education the brutalities and inequities established in adult habits.\textsuperscript{63}

For Dewey, then, the important point in the conditioning of habits is not to incorporate instinctive and impulsive energies into habits \textit{per se}, but rather to incorporate these energies into habits that are flexible and self-renewing.\textsuperscript{64} In his view it is necessary that "...habits be formed which are more intelligent, more sensitively perciipient, more informed with foresight, more aware of what they are about, more direct and sincere, more flexibly responsive than those now current."\textsuperscript{65} When habits such as these are formed, they "will meet their own problems and propose their own improvements."\textsuperscript{66} In his treatise on education, Jean-Jacques Rousseau writes of his young scholar Emile: "The only habit the child should be allowed to contract is that of having no habits..."\textsuperscript{67} The hyperbole notwithstanding, Dewey clearly would concur with Rousseau if the habits thus
rejected were routine and mechanical.

In the foregoing discussion the point was made that for Dewey the instincts and impulses at the core of human nature are more or less common to all human beings. It was also pointed out that, since the habits incorporating these instincts are subject to the transforming power of the environment, there is also a sense in which "human nature" changes. As a result of this fact education was seen to be of central importance in the development of flexible and intelligent habits. Thus habits prove to be an important component in Dewey's view of human nature. In the discussion which follows, attention will be focussed upon his conception of habit and the place he assigns to it in the development of character.

b) **Habit and Character**

The *OED* defines the term "habit" as follows:

A settled disposition or tendency to act in a certain way, especially one acquired by frequent repetition of the same act until it becomes almost or quite involuntary; a settled practice, custom, usage; a customary way or manner of acting. 88

In this definition two types of habit are discriminated viz., individual habits and social habits (i.e., customs). In both cases it is the mechanical and involuntary aspects of the behaviour involved which are emphasized. In its ordinary use, therefore, the term "habit" denotes a
particular pattern of overt behaviour that is acquired over a period of time as a result of frequent repetition and which, when not actively manifest, continues to exist subcutaneously as a "disposition to behave". Habits are thus typically understood to be essentially passive agencies of action, waiting, like mousetraps, for an opportune moment to spring into action. Dewey characterizes this view of habits as follows:

When we think of habits in terms of walking, playing a musical instrument, typewriting, we are much given to thinking of habits as technical abilities existing apart from our likings and as lacking in urgent impulsion. We think of them as passive tools waiting to be called into action from without. 69

Thus understood, habits comprise a considerable part of an individual's behavioural repertoire and can, in fact, be regarded as second nature. Apart from the examples of individual habits already provided by Dewey, paradigm examples of social customs would include applauding at the end of a performance as a sign of approval and appreciation, the wearing of a white gown by the bride on the day of her wedding, and giving children chocolate rabbits at Easter.

The customary understanding of habits as presented above is, for Dewey, too narrow and mechanical. In his view, habits are best approached from a biological rather than a mechanical point of view. He writes: "Habits may be profitably compared to physiological functions, like
breathing, digesting. The latter are, to be sure, involuntary, while habits are acquired."\textsuperscript{70} He then adds:

But important as is this difference for many purposes it should not conceal the fact that habits are like functions in many respects, and especially in requiring the cooperation of organism and environment. Breathing is an affair of the air as truly as of the lungs; digesting an affair of food as truly as of tissues of stomach.\textsuperscript{71}

The sense in which habits are comparable to biological functions, however, is not the only sense in which habits are functional. For Dewey, as previously discussed, habits vary relative to the socio-cultural environment within which they emerge, and hence they are \textit{ipso facto} functional in the mathematical sense of this term. He writes:

We may shift from the biological to the mathematical use of the word function, and say that natural operations like breathing and digesting, acquired ones like speech and honesty, are functions of the surroundings as truly as of a person. They are things done by the environment by means of organic structures or acquired dispositions.\textsuperscript{72}

He then goes on to conclude: "...habits are ways of using and incorporating the environment in which the latter has its say as surely as the former."\textsuperscript{73} For Dewey, then, habits are individual as well as social functions. Although he does acknowledge that the customary conception of habits may adequately describe \textit{some} habits, he nevertheless maintains that this conception \textit{fails} to capture the fundamentally important characteristics of most habits. In his view
habits are transforming and dynamic agencies of action that fully determine the structure of character. In what follows I shall briefly discuss each of these characteristics.

In Dewey's view, habits emerge in the experiential situations which occur as a result of interaction involving a human being and a particular natural and socio-cultural environment. This process of interaction results in some change, however small, in both the individual as well as the environment involved. Writes Dewey:

What exists in normal behaviour-development is a ... circuit of which the earlier or "open" phase is the tension of various elements of organic energy, while the final and "closed" phase is the institution of integrated interaction of organism and environment. This integration is represented upon the organic side by equilibration of organic energies, and upon the environmental side by the existence of satisfying conditions. In the behavior of higher organisms, the close of the circuit is not identical with the state out of which disequilibration and tension emerged. A certain modification of environment has also occurred, though it may be only a change in the conditions which future behavior must meet. On the other hand, there is a change in the organic structures that conditions further behavior. This modification constitutes what is termed habit.74

For Dewey, as this passage makes clear, the interactive process of experience eventuates in the formation of habits. Since every experiential situation affects, to some degree, both the individual and the environment involved, it can be inferred that every experience undergone contributes, in
however small a way, to either the formation, development, consolidation or transformation of habits.

In Dewey's view, the habits thus effected are themselves active agencies pervading and transforming the structure of subsequent experience. They are not inert. He writes:

The basic characteristic of habit is that every experience enacted and undergone modifies the one who acts and undergoes, while this modification affects, whether we wish it or not, the quality of subsequent experiences. For it is a somewhat different person who enters into them. The principle of habit so understood obviously goes deeper than the ordinary conception of a habit as a more or less fixed way of doing things, although it includes the latter as one of its special cases. It covers the formation of attitudes, attitudes that are emotional and intellectual; it covers our basic sensitivities and ways of meeting and responding to all the conditions which we meet in living.75

In this important passage Dewey underscores both the range of habits as well as their role in subsequent experience. In his view "habit" denotes not only routine and mechanical forms of overt behaviour, but also the complex network of affective and cognitive attitudes. Habits thus pervade not only how an individual acts but also how s/he thinks and feels about the world, including the purposes and plans that s/he forms and the valuation judgements thereby implied. Writes Dewey: "...our purposes and commands regarding action (whether physical or moral) come to us through the refacting
medium of bodily and moral habits." For Dewey, moreover, habits are not just connected with the diverse skills and sensitivities comprising the cognitive, affective and conative lives of human beings, they constitute them. He makes this point explicitly when he writes: "Concrete habits do all the perceiving, recognizing, imagining, recalling, judging, conceiving and reasoning that is done." Dewey's conception of habit, as adumbrated above, is central to what he calls the "principle of continuity of experience" (or "the experiential continuum"). In essence this principle affirms that all experiences are interconnected. "Just as no man lives or dies to himself..." he writes, "...so no experience lives and dies to itself. Wholly independent of desire or intent, every experience lives on in further experiences." For Dewey habit is the key to the principle of continuity of experience. He writes:

At bottom, this principle rests upon the fact of habit, when habit is interpreted biologically. ... From this point of view, the principle of continuity of experience means that every experience both takes up something from those which have gone before and modifies in some way the quality of those which come after.

In this passage Dewey makes the critically important point that experiences undergone modify those which come after. Since the principle of continuity of experience rests upon habit, it can be concluded that the modification of
subsequent experience by prior experience is effected by means of the outworking of habit. Since future experiences incorporate future environments as well as present habits, it follows that the principle of continuity must be viewed as having both an internal and an external aspect. For Dewey, therefore, the habits constituting the attitudes and sensitivities comprising the cognitive, affective, and conative life of human beings not only condition an individual's particular response to the experiential situations encountered in the course of life but also modify the very structure and quality of the experiential situations undergone. "The medium of habit..." he writes:

...filters all the material that reaches our perception and thought. The filter is not, however, chemically pure. It is a reagent which adds new qualities and rearranges what is received. Our ideas truly depend upon experience, but so do our sensations. And the experience upon which they both depend is the operation of habits...81

In Dewey's view, moreover, independently of the specific constellation of habits involved in thinking, feeling, and willing there are no other, more primitive elements involved. Dewey thus rejects both the rationalist belief in pure reason transcending experience as well as the classical empiricist assumption that sensation is primitive and uninfluenced by prior experience. He writes:

Reason pure of all influence from prior habit is a fiction. But pure sensations out of which ideas can be framed apart from habit are equally fictitious. The sensations and
ideas which are the "stuff" of thought and purpose are alike affected by habits manifested in the acts which give rise to sensations and meanings.\textsuperscript{82}

He goes on to add: "It is not such a simple matter to have a clear-cut sensation. The latter is a sign of training, skill, habit."\textsuperscript{83} Since, in Dewey's view, pre-reflective experience is directly had (i.e., felt) prior to becoming an object of knowledge\textsuperscript{84} it follows, given that habits constitute the cognitive, affective, and conative lives of human beings, that these habits are intrinsic constituents not only of reflective experience, but also of pre-reflective experience.

That habits should have such power to transform experience can be seen to follow from Dewey's conception of experience as an interactive process involving an individual and a particular natural and socio-cultural environment. He calls this the "principle of interaction". He writes:

The word "interaction" ... expresses the second chief principle for interpreting an experience ... It assigns equal rights to both factors in experience-objective and internal conditions. Any normal experience is an interplay of these two sets of conditions. Taken together, or in their interaction, they form what we call a situation.\textsuperscript{85}

In this passage Dewey makes the important point that the subjective conditions involved in an experiential situation are as important as the objective conditions in determining its specific structure and quality. Given that the complex network of an individual's habits constitute the subjective
conditions inherent in all experiential situations, it follows from the principle of interaction that habits contribute to determining the structure and quality of pre-reflective experience.

In Dewey's view habits are not only transforming, but also dynamic. They are active agencies pressing for their own use and display. Dewey neatly underscores the conatus inherent in all habits by directing attention to the propulsive force of "bad" habits. He writes:

... in order to appreciate the peculiar place of habit in activity we have to betake ourselves to bad habits, foolish idling, gambling, addiction to liquor and drugs. When we think of such habits, the union of habit with desire and with propulsive power is forced upon us. ... A bad habit suggests an inherent tendency to action and also a hold, command over us.\textsuperscript{86}

Habits, he adds, are "...active means, means that project themselves, energetic and dominating ways of acting."\textsuperscript{87} For Dewey, however, habits are more than just propulsive agencies engendering action. When the normal course of events involving their operation is disrupted the propulsive force of habits institutes new ends to be achieved. "Some habit impeded by circumstances..." he writes, "...is the source of the projection of the end. It is also the primary means in its realization."\textsuperscript{88} He illustrates this aspect of habit as follows:

A hungry man could not conceive food as a good unless he had actually experienced, with the support of
environing conditions, food as good. The objective satisfaction comes first. But he finds himself in a situation where the good is denied in fact. It then lives in imagination. The habit denied overt expression asserts itself in idea. It sets up the thought, the ideal, of food. This thought is not what is sometimes called thought, a pale bloodless abstraction, but is charged with the motor urgent force of habit. Food as a good is now subjective, personal. But it has its source in objective conditions and it moves forward to new objective conditions. For it works to secure a change of environment so that food will again be present in fact. Food is a "subjective" good during a temporary transitional stage from one object to another.89

As this passage makes clear, habits are directly involved in the production of ideas comprising both a specific end-in-view as well as the proposed means necessary to achieve it. Hence, in constituting the abilities and sensitivities involved in thinking, feeling, and willing, habits prove to be at the center of what might be called "the life of the mind". Dewey makes this point explicitly when he writes: "'Consciousness', whether as a stream or as special sensations and images, expresses functions of habits, phenomena of their formation, operation, their interruption and reorganization."90

In the discussion thus far attention has been focussed upon the transforming and dynamic character of habits. In Dewey's view, however, habits are also completely constitutive of the self (or character). He makes this point when he writes:
...we are given to thinking of a habit as simply a recurrent external mode of action, like smoking or swearing, being neat or negligent in clothes and person, taking exercise, or playing games. But habit reaches even more significantly down into the very structure of the self; it signifies a building up and solidifying of certain desires; an increased sensitiveness and responsiveness to certain stimuli, a confirmed or an impaired capacity to attend to and think about certain things. Habit covers in other words the very make-up of desire, intent, choice, disposition which gives an act its voluntary quality. And this aspect of habit is much more important than that which is suggested merely by the tendency to repeated and outer action, for the significance of the latter lies in the permanence of the personal disposition which is the real cause of the outer acts and of their resemblance to one another.91

He then goes on to add:

Acts are not linked up together to form conduct in and of themselves, but because of their common relation to an enduring and single condition—the self or character as the abiding unity in which different acts leave their lasting traces. If one surrenders to a momentary impulse, the significant thing is not the particular act which follows, but the strengthening of the power of that impulse—this strengthening is the reality of that which we call habit. In giving way, the person in so far commits himself not just to that isolated act but to a course of action, to a line of behavior.92

As these passages clearly attest for Dewey, apart from an individual's acquired habits, there is nothing else for the term "self" or "character" to denote. Hence, since every act contributes to the formation and consolidation of
habit, it follows that in choosing what to do an individual
ipso facto is choosing who to become. For Dewey, moreover, character is connected with conduct. More specifically it is the network of interpenetrating habits constitutive of character that results in conduct. He writes:

...the binding together of acts so that they lead up to and carry one another forward constitutes conduct. We have to consider why and how it is that they are thus bound together into a whole, instead of forming, as in the case of physical events, a mere succession. The answer is contained in rendering explicit the allusions which have been made to disposition and character. If an act were connected with other acts merely in the way in which the flame of a match is connected with an explosion of gunpowder, there would be action, but not conduct. But our actions not only lead up to other actions which follow as their effects but they also leave an enduring impress on the one who performs them, strengthening and weakening permanent tendencies to act. This fact is familiar to us in the existence of habit.

For Dewey, then, apart from their connection with character, a series of individual actions would amount to nothing more than a set of disconnected acts.

In the foregoing discussion attention has been focussed upon Dewey's conception of habit and the extent to which it departs from the traditional view in which habits are conceived as mechanical forms of routine behaviour. In particular, the point was made that for Dewey habits are best understood from a biological point of view. When
approached in this way they are seen to be not only transforming, but also dynamic agencies of action. They are transforming in virtue of the fact that they directly affect the quality of the experiential situations undergone by an individual. They are dynamic because they press for their own use and display. More fundamentally, however, the interactive complex of an individual’s habits were seen to be constitutive of character and thereby connected with conduct. Before concluding this discussion of habit and character, however, one further aspect of character must be briefly considered.

In Dewey’s view, as noted above, habits are constitutive of character. Independently of habits there are no other elements comprising character and hence the specific nature of an individual’s character is completely determined by the habits s/he acquires. Since habits incorporate instinctive and impulsive energies and vary relative to the natural and socio-cultural environment, it follows that character is determined not only by the instinctive and impulsive energies entering into it but also, and more fundamentally, by the natural and socio-cultural environment within which these energies emerge and are conditioned. The formation of habits is thus tantamount to the formation and development of character.

The specific tendencies of the various habits comprising character notwithstanding, for Dewey all habits
can be either intelligent or routine. The chief difference between them is that in the case of the former reflective inquiry engendered by impulse fulfills its reconstructive function, whereas in the case of the latter, it fails to do so. In other words, a habit is intelligent insofar as it is sufficiently flexible to allow for its redirection by reflective inquiry; it is routine if it is too rigid to allow such redirection to occur. In Dewey's view changing conditions make the formation of flexible and intelligent habits desirable. He writes:

...every habit incorporates within itself some part of the objective environment, and no habit and no amount of habits can incorporate the entire environment within itself or themselves. There will always be disparity between them and the results actually attained. Hence the work of intelligence in observing consequences and in revising and readjusting habits, even the best of good habits, can never be forgone. Consequences reveal unexpected potentialities in our habits, whenever these habits are exercised in a different environment from that in which they were formed. The assumption of a stably uniform environment (even the hankering for one) expresses a fiction due to attachment to old habits.96

For Dewey, as the passage cited attests, the need for the redirection of acquired habits is inexorable and hence the formation of flexible and intelligent habits is not only desirable, but also the very hallmark of reasonableness. He writes: "... what makes a habit bad is enslavement to old ruts."97 He then goes on to add:
The genuine heart of reasonableness (and of goodness in conduct) lies in effective mastery of the conditions which now enter into action. To be satisfied with repeating, with traversing the ruts which in other conditions led to good, it is the surest way of creating carelessness about present and actual good.\textsuperscript{98}

In view of the foregoing passages, it can be concluded that for Dewey the formation of an "open" character (i.e., of a network of intelligent and flexible habits) is preferable to the formation of a "closed" character (i.e., of a network of rigid and routine habits).

In Dewey's view, although habits exhibit a heteronomous tendency\textsuperscript{99} they are nevertheless inherently flexible and adaptable. He makes this point when he writes:

Developmental behavior shows...that in the higher organisms excitations are so diffusely linked with reactions that the sequel is affected by the state of the organism in relation to environment. In habit and learning the linkage is tightened up not by sheer repetition but by institution of effective integrated interaction of organic-environing energics—the consummatory close of activities of exploration and search. In organisms of the higher order, the special and more definite pattern of recurrent behavior thus formed does not become completely rigid. It enters as a factorial agency, along with other patterns, in a total adaptive response, and hence retains a certain amount of flexible capacity to undergo further modifications as the organism meets new environing conditions.\textsuperscript{100}

If no habits are inherently inflexible, however, then the conclusion can be drawn that any habit can, in principle, be
redirected by reflective inquiry. In other words all habits are potentially intelligent. For Dewey, therefore, habits are not inherently routine—they become routine as a consequence of the conditions involved in their formation and development.

Although all habits are, for Dewey, potentially intelligent, nevertheless, contrary to what might be expected, it does not follow that the formation of intelligent habits (and hence of an "open" character) is generally fostered or commended. He writes:

...the plasticity of the young presents a temptation to those having greater experience and hence greater power which they rarely resist. It seems putty to be molded according to current designs. That plasticity also means power to change prevailing custom is ignored. Docility is looked upon not as ability to learn whatever the world has to teach, but as subjection to those instructions of others which reflect their current habits. To be truly docile is to be eager to learn all the lessons of active, inquiring, expanding experience. The inert, stupid quality of current customs perverts learning into a willingness to follow where others point the way, into conformity, constriction, surrender of scepticism and experiment.101

In Dewey's view the vested class interests inherent in the prevailing social order and its attendant customs and institutions impede (if not actively prevent) the development of the requisite conditions within which an open character can be formed. He makes this point directly when he writes:
Whether it concerns the cook, musician, carpenter, citizen, or statesman, the intelligent or artistic habit is the desirable thing, and the routine the undesirable thing: - or, at least, desirable and undesirable from every point of view except one.\textsuperscript{102}

He then goes on to explain:

Those who wish a monopoly of social power find desirable the separation of habit and thought, action and soul, so characteristic of history. For the dualism enables them to do the thinking and planning, while others remain the docile, even if awkward, instruments of execution. Until this scheme is changed, democracy is bound to be perverted in its realization.\textsuperscript{103}

As this passage makes plain, for Dewey prevailing social customs tend to be somewhat conservative in their influence. More fundamentally, however, in his view this influence is ultimately rooted in the desire, implicitly shared by those who benefit from the power relations inherent in the established order, to preserve and maintain that order thereby perpetuating their privileged position.

Although established socio-cultural orders do not generally tend to foster the formation of an open character, in light of Dewey's view that all habits are inherently flexible, it follows that the formation of an open character is always possible. Given appropriate social conditions, such habits can, of course, be fostered at the very beginning of character development. The formation of an open character, however, clearly presupposes more than the acquisition of intelligent habits. Since not all habits are
good, and given that all habits are potentially intelligent, it follows that any particular habit can be either good or bad as well as intelligent. The formation of an open character, therefore, requires the acquisition of certain kinds of intelligent habits. In Dewey's view, since the conditions under which intelligent habits are formed (including those constitutive of an open character) can be empirically (i.e., experimentally) determined, it follows that the formation of an open character can occur by design rather than mere serendipity. Writes Dewey:

Honesty, chastity, malice, peevishness, courage, triviality, industry, irresponsibility are not private possessions of a person. They are working adaptations of personal capacities with environing forces. All virtues and vices are habits which incorporate objective forces. They are interactions of elements contributed by the make-up of an individual with elements supplied by the out-door world. They can be studied as objectively as physiological functions, and they can be modified by change of either personal or social elements.

He goes on to add: "Until we know the conditions which have helped form the characters we approve and disapprove, our efforts to create the one and do away with the other will be blind and halting." For Dewey, then, the close and careful observation of the actual outworking of particular habits in the context of their operation is the key to determining what is to count as a good habit and hence to the successful education of character. The emergence of a
closed character is thus evidence of an inappropriate and inadequately controlled social environment rather than evidence of an intractable and intrinsically bad human nature. To adapt a line from Shakespeare, "The fault, dear Brutus, lies not in our stars but in our education."

The formation of character, however, does not always occur under favourable conditions. As noted above, the established social order tends to impede rather than foster the development of an open character. Although the existence of unfavourable social conditions results in the formation of a closed character, in Dewey's view such a character need not remain completely and permanently closed. Since all habits are inherently flexible, it follows that even in the case of a closed character some degree of change and development is always possible. For Dewey, this transformation of character can be accomplished by changing the habits involved. He writes:

To change the working character or will of another we have to alter objective conditions which enter into his habits. Our own schemes of judgement, of assigning blame and praise, of awarding punishment and honor, are part of these conditions.107

This change in habits, however, must be achieved by altering the conditions under which habits are formed rather than by attempting to change them directly by means of some supreme act of will. Dewey rejects this latter possibility as sheer magic when he writes:
...personal traits are functions of social situations. When we generalize this perception and act upon it intelligently we are committed by it to recognize that we change character from worse to better only by changing conditions--among which, once more, are our own ways of dealing with the one we judge. We cannot change habit directly: that notion is magic. But we can change it indirectly by modifying conditions, by an intelligent selecting and weighting of the objects which engage attention and which influence the fulfillment of desires. 108

In this passage Dewey underscores not only the importance of social interaction (e.g., expressions of approval and disapproval) in the redirection of acquired habits, but also the importance of reconstructing the environment within which the desired change in habits is to occur. In Dewey's view, however, although habits (and hence character) can be changed, they cannot be changed overnight. He writes:

A social revolution may effect abrupt and deep alterations in external customs, in legal and political institutions. But the habits that are behind these institutions and that have, willy-nilly, been shaped by objective conditions, the habits of thought and feeling, are not so easily modified. ...The force of lag in human life is enormous. 109

Thus for Dewey a change in character is always gradual and can only occur when an individual's habits of thought and feeling are affected.

In the foregoing discussion, the point was made that the formation of character is effected by means of the formation of habits. Habits were seen to be either
intelligent or routine depending upon whether or not they could be redirected by means of reflective inquiry. Attention was drawn to the fact that although all habits are potentially intelligent nevertheless the conservative tendency of the established order militates against the formation of intelligent habits and hence against the formation of an "open" character. It was also pointed out that for Dewey habits, and hence character, can be changed but that such change cannot be effected directly. It occurs over a period of time as a result of changes in the environment within which habits of thought and feeling are formed.

In concluding the foregoing examination of habit and character, the discussion of Dewey's conception of human nature can be brought to a close. In the course of this discussion attention was drawn to his view of the place and role of instinct and impulse in human nature as well as to his conception of habit and its connection with character and conduct. The discussion of Dewey's view of human nature, it will be recalled, was undertaken in order to clarify the contention that character is an intrinsic constituent of pre-reflective experience. Given that for Dewey the term "character" denotes the entire complex of interpenetrating habits acquired by an individual over time, and given that these habits constitute her/his cognitive, affective, and conative skills and sensitivities, it follows
that the contention that character is an intrinsic constituent of pre-reflective experience is tantamount to the view that an individual's character (i.e., her/his habits) contributes to determining the structure and quality of the pre-reflective experience undergone. It can be concluded, therefore, that differences (or changes) in character result in differences in the structure and quality of the experiential situations had. In thus clarifying the contention that character is an intrinsic constituent of pre-reflective experience, the stage has been set for a discussion of Dewey's conception of reflective "moral" experience. It is to this discussion that I now turn.

B: REFLECTIVE MORAL EXPERIENCE

The discussion of Dewey's conception of reflective moral experience can best begin by drawing attention to the obvious viz., that reflective moral experience occurs as part of reflective experience and not as part of pre-reflective experience. In his view, moreover, reflective moral experience is but one of several forms which reflective experience can take, cognitive experience, esthetic experience, and religious experience being examples of some others. For Dewey, the specific form which reflective experience takes is determined by the subject-matter involved and the pattern of inquiry appropriate to it. Hence reflective moral inquiry and its subject-matter
is central to his conception of reflective moral experience. In the discussion which follows, therefore, my principal objective shall be to delineate the characteristic features of reflective moral inquiry and its subject-matter with a view to elucidating thereby Dewey's conception of reflective moral experience. Reflective moral inquiry, however, is only one of several forms which reflective inquiry can take. In Dewey's view, regardless of the specific form involved, all forms of reflective inquiry share a common pattern of inquiry. He writes: "...inquiry, in spite of the diverse subjects to which it applies, and the consequent diversity of its special techniques has a common structure or pattern..."\textsuperscript{110} He then adds: "...this common structure is applied both in common sense and science, although because of the nature of the problems with which they are concerned, the emphasis upon the factors involved varies widely in the two modes."\textsuperscript{111} Thus it follows that in order to better understand his conception of reflective moral inquiry it is necessary to see it in its relation to the common pattern of reflective inquiry. Moreover, given that an indeterminate experiential situation is a necessary condition of inquiry\textsuperscript{112} it can be concluded that the notion of an indeterminate experiential situation plays a critically important role in Dewey's view of reflective inquiry. Hence some understanding of his conception of an indeterminate experiential situation is essential if his view of
reflective inquiry (as well as his view of reflective moral inquiry) is to be clearly understood. In discussing Dewey's view of reflective moral inquiry and its subject-matter, therefore, I shall begin by considering, albeit briefly, his conception of an indeterminate experiential situation and the pattern of inquiry to which it can give rise.

1. Indeterminate Experiential Situations

In considering Dewey's conception of an indeterminate experiential situation, three points in particular need to be taken into account. The first point to note is that Dewey's conception of an indeterminate experiential situation presupposes his view of experience. For Dewey, it will be recalled, experience is comprised of a series of interactive processes involving an organism and its environment. These interactive processes occur over time and, given his principle of interaction, involve changes, however minor, to both the organism and its environment. Thus it can be inferred that no two experiential situations are ever twice exactly alike since the component elements of the interactive processes of which they are comprised are never twice exactly alike. In the case of human beings, the interactive processes resulting in experiential situations are of considerable complexity. From the "subjective" side they involve, among other things, not only acquired habits and impulsive energies but also inquiry and intelligence.
From the "objective" side they involve both a natural as well as a socio-cultural environment. However, since the habits involved in experiential situations are conditioned by the natural and socio-cultural environment and since this environment is never twice exactly alike, it follows that in every experiential situation the possibility obtains that the subjective and objective aspects of experience will be "out-of-phase". Given that for Dewey habits are dynamic and propulsive agencies of action pressing for their own display, it can be concluded that whenever subjective and objective conditions are out-of-phase, overt action comes to a halt. The normal flow of the interactive process is temporarily interrupted and the individual involved does not quite know what s/he is to think or to do. S/he is, as it were, "on hold". The nature of the action to be taken, as well as its outcome, are unclear. Whenever experiential situations such as these occur they are, for Dewey, indeterminate. He writes:

The notion that in actual existence everything is completely determinate has been rendered questionable by the progress of physical science itself. Even if it had not been, complete determination would not hold of existences as an environment. For Nature is an environment only as it is involved in interaction with an organism, or self, or whatever name be used.\textsuperscript{113}

He goes on to add:

Every such interaction is a temporal process, not a momentary cross-sectional
occurrence. The situation in which it occurs is indeterminate, therefore, with respect to its issue. If we call it confused, then it is meant that its outcome cannot be anticipated. It is called obscure when its course of movement permits of final consequences that cannot be clearly made out. It is called conflicting when it tends to evoke discordant responses. Even were existential conditions unqualifiedly determinate in and of themselves, they are indeterminate in significance: that is, in what they import and portend in their interaction with the organism.\textsuperscript{114}

In these passages Dewey clearly underscores the ubiquity of indeterminacy.\textsuperscript{115} It is evident, moreover, that in his view the indeterminacy of indeterminate experiential situations is ultimately rooted in the temporal character of the interactive processes comprising experience and that it is characterized by the fact that some difficulty stands in the way of determining their outcome.

A second characteristic of indeterminate experiential situations which must be taken into account is that they are not, as Dewey is careful to point out, mere states of mind (and hence purely subjective) but rather actually existing states of affairs. He writes:

A variety of names serves to characterize indeterminate situations. They are disturbed, troubled, ambiguous, confused, full of conflicting tendencies, obscure, etc. It is the situation that has these traits. We are doubtful because the situation is inherently doubtful. Personal states of doubt that are not evoked by and are not relative to some existential situation are pathological; when they are extreme they constitute the mania of
doubting.116

He then adds:

The indeterminate situation comes into existence from existential causes, just as does, say, the organic imbalance of hunger. There is nothing intellectual or cognitive in the existence of such situations, although they are the necessary condition of cognitive operations or inquiry. In themselves they are precognitive.117

In Dewey's view, as the passage just cited clearly attests, indeterminate experiential situations occur prior to and apart from reflective inquiry. It can be inferred, therefore, that indeterminate experiential situations are part of pre-reflective experience.118

The third and final point to note is that although all indeterminate experiential situations are alike insofar as they are all indeterminate, they are nevertheless not all indeterminate in exactly the same respect. Since all indeterminate experiential situations are parts of pre-reflective experience and given that the structure and quality of pre-reflective experience is determined, in part, by character (i.e., the acquired habits comprising an individual's cognitive, affective and conative skills and sensitivities) it follows that the indeterminacy inherent in this or that particular indeterminate experiential situation is conditioned by the outworking of character (i.e., habits) within a particular natural and socio-cultural environment. However, since these are never twice exactly alike, it
follows that no two indeterminate experiential situations are ever twice exactly alike. It can be concluded, therefore, that the specific character of the indeterminacy inherent in a particular indeterminate experiential situation is conditioned by the actual state of both the "subjective" and "objective" elements involved in the interactive process whereby it is produced.

The three points presented above in connection with Dewey's conception of an indeterminate experiential situation are central to his view of reflective inquiry. Bearing these points in mind, his view of the common pattern of reflective inquiry can now be more clearly delineated, thus contributing not only to the elucidation of his conception of reflective moral inquiry, but also his understanding of reflective moral experience.

2. The Pattern of Reflective Inquiry

In Dewey's view, as previously noted, reflective inquiry presupposes the occurrence of an indeterminate experiential situation. Although an indeterminate experiential situation is not a sufficient condition of reflective inquiry, it frequently does succeed in evoking it. The emergence of reflective inquiry within the context of an indeterminate experiential situation is, for Dewey, of fundamental importance because it transforms the character of the indeterminate experiential situation and,
in doing so, results in some form of reflective experience. In his view with the emergence of reflective inquiry an indeterminate experiential situation ceases to be an indeterminate experiential situation and becomes instead what he calls a problematic situation. "The unsettled or indeterminate situation..." he writes, "...might have been called a problematic situation. This name would have been, however, proleptic and anticipatory. The indeterminate situation becomes problematic in the very process of being subjected to inquiry." He goes on to add: "The first result of evocation of inquiry is that the situation is taken, adjudged, to be problematic. To see that a situation requires inquiry is the initial step in inquiry." In these passages Dewey emphasizes the point that, apart from reflective inquiry, an indeterminate experiential situation would remain both indeterminate and pre-cognitive. It is thus readily apparent that the connection between an indeterminate experiential situation and a problematic experiential situation is that the latter is an intellectually (i.e., conceptually) mediated construction of an occurrence that is directly had (i.e., felt) in its full qualitative immediacy. In other words, in the pre-reflective phase of its occurrence the indeterminacy characteristic of a particular indeterminate experiential situation is entirely a matter of brute feeling (undergoing) and as such it remains both inchoate and absorbing (to
either a greater or lesser degree).

Apart from reflective inquiry indeterminate experiential situations would either remain entirely indeterminate or else their resolution would come about by pure chance. Reflective inquiry is thus the principal agency whereby an indeterminate experiential situation is reconstructed into a determinate experiential situation (i.e., a "consummatory" experience). Writes Dewey: "Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole." 122 Although reflective inquiry is the condition sine qua non of the reconstruction of pre-reflective experience, for Dewey the key factor in this reconstruction is not reflective inquiry per se but rather the specific problem which it institutes. In other words, the critically important step in the transformation of an indeterminate experiential situation into a determinate one is the articulation of the actual problem inherent in the indeterminate situation. This is the case because the problem instituted conditions the quality and direction of subsequent inquiry into the means available for its resolution. Writes Dewey:

A problem represents the partial transformation by inquiry of a problematic situation into a determinate situation. It is a familiar and significant saying that a problem well put is half-solved. To find out what
the problem and problems are which a problematic situation presents to be inquired into, is to be well along in inquiry.\textsuperscript{123}

He then adds:

To mistake the problem involved is to cause subsequent inquiry to be irrelevant or to go astray. Without a problem, there is blind groping in the dark. The way in which the problem is conceived decides what specific suggestions are entertained and which are discussed; what data are selected and which rejected; it is the criterion for relevancy and irrelevancy of hypotheses and conceptual structures.\textsuperscript{124}

Thus for Dewey the function of reflective inquiry is to articulate the specific character of the problem inherent in an indeterminate experiential situation thereby opening the door to the possibility of its successful resolution.

Reflective inquiry, as delineated above, is clearly a complex development in and of experience. In order to provide a clear account of it I propose to make use of a distinction which Dewey himself does not draw. In the discussion of reflective inquiry that follows, therefore, I shall view reflective inquiry as being comprised of two distinguishable phases: (1) the diagnostic, and (2) the prescriptive. The constellation of habits constituting reflective inquiry\textsuperscript{125} therefore will not be identical in each of its phases. In its initial diagnostic phase the characteristic feature of reflective inquiry is its careful observation of the diverse constituents inherent in the indeterminate experiential situation. This perceptual phase
of reflective inquiry is critical since it determines the functional adequacy of the problem that is instituted. Writes Dewey:

A possible relevant solution is...suggested by the determination of factual conditions which are secured by observation. The possible solution presents itself, therefore, as an idea, just as the term of the problem (which are facts) are instituted by observation. Ideas are anticipated consequences (forecasts) of what will happen when certain operations are executed under and with respect to observed conditions. Observation of facts and suggested meanings or ideas arise and develop in correspondence with each other.126

He adds: "The more the facts of the case come to light in consequence of being subjected to observation, the clearer and more pertinent become the conceptions of the way the problem constituted by these facts is to be dealt with."127 The institution of a problem and the careful observation of facts are thus both deeply interconnected aspects of the diagnostic phase of reflective inquiry. The habits of observation therefore are central to it.

In Dewey's view the diagnostic phase of reflective inquiry would not be possible if the constituent elements and relations of an indeterminate experiential situation were completely and wholly indeterminate. In his view some of the elements in an indeterminate situation must be sufficiently determinate so as to constitute the facts of the case. Writes Dewey: "...no situation which is
completely indeterminate can possibly be converted into a problem having definite constituents."\(^{128}\) He goes on to add:

The first step then is to search out the \textit{constituents} of a given situation which, as constituents, are settled. ... All of these observed conditions taken together constitute "the facts of the case". They constitute the terms of the problem, because they are conditions that must be reckoned with or taken account of in any relevant solution that is proposed.\(^{129}\)

For Dewey, then, the indeterminacy of an indeterminate experiential situation is never total and complete. The determinate elements inherent in it are thus significant as "facts" and thereby condition the course and outcome of the diagnostic phase of reflective inquiry.

In view of the fact that inquiry presupposes an indeterminate experiential situation it can be inferred that all forms of reflective inquiry are ultimately concerned with what is to be done and hence that all forms of inquiry are inherently practical. For Dewey, however, reflective inquiry directed to resolving practical issues is \textit{deliberation}. He writes:

...reflection when directed to practical matters, to determination of what to do, is called deliberation. A general deliberates upon the conduct of a campaign, weighing possible moves of the enemy and of his own troops, considering pros and cons; a business man deliberates in comparing various modes of investment; a lawyer deliberates upon the conduct of his case, and so on. In all cases of deliberation, judgement of
value enters; the one who engages in it is concerned to weigh values with a view to discovering the better and rejecting the worse.\(^{130}\)

In its prescriptive phase, therefore, reflective inquiry is deliberation and involves valuation. Its task is to explore, in imaginative review, the "meanings" (i.e., anticipated consequences) of the various possible solutions (i.e., ideas) suggested in the course of the diagnostic phase of inquiry. In this phase the emphasis is on reasoning, drawing parallels between the present situation and similar ones experienced in the past, appraising consequences, instituting ends-in-view, etc.\(^{131}\) Writes Dewey:

This examination takes the form of reasoning, as a result of which we are able to appraise better than we were at the outset, the pertinency and weight of the meaning now entertained with respect to its functional capacity.\(^{132}\)

Contrary to what might be expected, the diagnostic and prescriptive phases of reflective inquiry are not purely mental phenomena. If they were, then reflective inquiry would fail in its reconstructive function. In order for inquiry to successfully transform an indeterminate experiential situation into a determinate one, the elements of the indeterminate situation must be directly affected by the inquiry undertaken. "Restoration of integration..." writes Dewey, "...can be effected...only by operations which actually modify existing conditions, not by merely "mental"
processes." He subsequently goes on to argue:

Organic interaction become inquiry when existential consequences are anticipated; when environing conditions are examined with reference to their potentialities; and when responsive activities are selected and ordered with reference to actualization of some of the potentialities, rather than others, in a final existential situation. Resolution of the indeterminate situation is active and operational.\textsuperscript{134}

Thus, for Dewey, as the passages cited make plain, subject-matter is directly affected as a result of reflective inquiry.

As indicated above, reflective inquiry is the principal agency for the reconstruction of pre-reflective experience. Reflective inquiry, however, does not invariably eventuate in the successful transformation of an indeterminate situation into a determinate one. Failure generally results whenever inquiry is not controlled by the constituent elements of the indeterminate experiential situation. Writes Dewey:

Nothing has done greater harm to the successful conduct of the enterprise of thinking...than the habit of treating observation as something outside of and prior to thinking, and thinking as something which can go on in the head without including observation of new facts as part of itself.\textsuperscript{135}

Such "thinking", he adds, "...substitutes an emotionally agreeable and rationally self-consistent train of meanings for inquiry into the features of the situation which causes the trouble."\textsuperscript{136} As these passages clearly imply, for Dewey
Reflective inquiry can successfully transform an indeterminate experiential situation into a determinate experiential situation only if the observations undertaken and the problem instituted are conditioned by the constituent elements of the indeterminate experiential situation. Moreover, the verification of the means employed to resolve the indeterminate situation can only occur if the inquiry into it has been thus conditioned. Dewey makes these points explicitly when he writes:

In logical fact, perceptual and conceptual materials are instituted in functional correlativity with each other, in such a manner that the former locates and describes the problem while the latter represents a possible method of solution. Both are determinations in and by inquiry of the original problematic situation whose pervasive quality control their institution and their contents. Both are finally checked by their capacity to work together to introduce a resolved unified situation. As distinctions they represent logical divisions of labor.\textsuperscript{137}

For Dewey, therefore, genuine reflective inquiry can be distinguished from various forms of "wishful thinking" by the extent to which it is controlled by the indeterminate situation evoking it.

Although reflective inquiry must be conditioned by the indeterminate experiential situation evoking it if it is to successfully reconstruct pre-reflective experience, being thus conditioned does not guarantee that it will succeed. Since success in this regard is contingent upon the
institution of a problem that adequately articulates the nature of the indeterminacy involved, and given that the
ingstitution of this problem is connected with observation,
it follows that the observations undertaken will have a
decisive bearing on whether or not such a problem is in fact
instituted. For Dewey, however, observation is not an
innate capacity whose exercise is always perfectly adequate
and incorrigible. In his view, the quality and instrumental
power of observation varies relative to the conceptual
framework employed. Apart from such frameworks, observation
would be severely limited, if not altogether "blind".
Writes Dewey:

All inquiry proceeds within a cultural
matrix which is ultimately determined by
the nature of social relations. The
subject-matter of physical inquiry at
any time falls within a larger social
field. The techniques available at any
given time depend upon the state of
material and intellectual culture. When
we look back at earlier periods, it is
evident that certain problems could not
have arisen in the context of
institutions, customs, occupations and
interests that then existed, and that
even if, per impossibile, they had been
capable of detection and formulation,
there were no means available for
solving them.138

He adds: "...conceptions standardized in previous culture
provide the ideational means by which problems are
formulated and dealt with..."139 The significance of these
passages is no doubt apparent. The observations undertaken
by an agent as part of the diagnostic phase of reflective
inquiry can be informed and enlightened by the diverse conceptual frameworks that are available as part of the funded intellectual resources of the socio-cultural environment within which it occurs. In employing these frameworks, the probability of resolving the indeterminate experiential situation that evoked inquiry is thus significantly increased. It can be concluded, therefore, that for Dewey all forms of reflective inquiry, regardless of their specific subject-matter, have a cognitive element.  

Regardless of the conceptual framework employed, reflective inquiry can still prove to be inadequate. This is the case not only because the existences to which it is directed are precarious but also because the phases of reflective inquiry distinguished above each have their own characteristic forms of failure. The observations undertaken as part of the diagnostic phase of reflective inquiry, for example, may be too hasty and superficial or they may involve self-deception and wishful thinking. In these cases the problem instituted by reflective inquiry (and hence the prospective solution) is typically (but not always) functionally inadequate and hence reflective inquiry fails in its reconstructive capacity. The prescriptive phase of reflective inquiry is dogged by the possibility of precipitous action. Both phases of reflective inquiry can be undermined, moreover, whenever the constituent elements
of the indeterminate experiential situation prove to be so arresting and engrossing in their immediate qualitativness that observation as well as deliberation and valuation is saturated with fear, love, envy, hate, revenge, etc. These failures of inquiry can be mitigated, in Dewey's view, by the cultivation of appropriate habits. He writes:

The more numerous our habits the wider the field of possible observation and foretelling. The more flexible they are, the more refined is perception in its discrimination and the more delicate the presentation evoked by imagination. The sailor is intellectually at home on the sea, the hunter in the forest, the painter in his studio, the man of science in his laboratory.\textsuperscript{141} He adds: "...habits formed in process of exercising biological aptitudes are the sole agents of observation, recollection, foresight and judgement: a mind or consciousness or soul in general which performs these operations is a myth."\textsuperscript{142} Given that character is comprised of an individual's cognitive, affective and conative habits, it follows therefore that reflective inquiry is conditioned by character. Since reflective inquiry and its subject-matter determines the form of reflective experience, however, the conclusion can be drawn that character is an intrinsic component not only of pre-reflective experience but of reflective experience as well.

In the foregoing discussion attention was directed to the common pattern of reflective inquiry. This pattern can now be summarized as follows: (1) all inquiry originates in
an indeterminate experiential situation; (2) reflective inquiry is the principal agency in the transformation of an indeterminate experiential situation into a determinate (i.e., consummatory) experience; (3) to accomplish this inquiry must institute a specific problem thereby changing an indeterminate experiential situation into a problematic one; (4) in the process of determining the specific problem to be addressed, reflective inquiry must be conditioned by the constituent elements of the indeterminate experiential situation evoking it. In this process various possible solutions are suggested, each of which must be appraised prior to acting upon one of them; (5) the test of inquiry is the extent to which the solution adopted actually succeeds in resolving the indeterminate situation that evoked it. In the course of the discussion, reflective inquiry was seen to have a diagnostic and a prescriptive phase. Since both phases are constituted by habit (and hence comprise character), the conclusion was drawn that character is an intrinsic component of reflective experience. Having thus completed this discussion of the common pattern of reflective inquiry, the stage has been set for an examination of Dewey's view of reflective moral inquiry. At the outset of this discussion, it will be recalled, the point was made that reflective moral inquiry and its subject-matter is central to Dewey's conception of reflective moral experience. In delineating his view of
reflective moral inquiry and its subject-matter, therefore, I shall at the same time be providing an account of his conception of reflective moral experience. It is, accordingly, to this task that I now turn.

3. Reflective Moral Inquiry and its Subject-Matter

In examining Dewey's conception of reflective moral inquiry and its subject-matter it is perhaps best to begin with an overview of the main components involved. In his view, the principal (but not exclusive) subject-matter of reflective moral inquiry is the character development of the agent involved (i.e., the focus of attention is centered upon the type of character the agent is to become.) The inquiry involved is comprised of the two phases noted above. In the prescriptive phase of reflective moral inquiry the agent attempts to determine the desirability of various possible ends-in-view. In the diagnostic phase, the agent seeks not only to ascertain the facts of the situation but also to identify possible ends-in-view. Taken together in all their complexity these component elements constitute reflective moral experience. In the discussion that follows I shall, in the interest of clarity, consider each of these components separately.

a) The Subject-Matter of Reflective Moral Inquiry

In traditional moral philosophy it is customary to
distinguish between *moral* and *nonmoral* values, virtues, judgements, actions, motives, etc. In his book *Ethics*, William Frankena writes:

> Moral value (moral goodness and badness) must be distinguished, not only from moral obligatoriness, rightness, and wrongness, but also from nonmoral value. Moral values or things that are morally good must be distinguished from nonmoral values or things that are good in a nonmoral sense.\(^{144}\)

This distinction, moreover, is of considerable importance as evidenced by the fact that in all consequentialist theories of obligation the moral quality of an act (i.e., its rightness) is determined by the amount of nonmoral value it causes to come into existence. A dualism thus emerges on the basis of which certain elements belonging to one category are thereby precluded from membership in the other category. In Kantian ethics, for example, prudential reasons for performing an act can never qualify as moral reasons and hence are regarded as always being fundamentally nonmoral in nature. For Dewey this view of the matter will not do. Although he does distinguish between moral and nonmoral acts, values, judgements, etc., he does not go on to construe this distinction as marking a fundamental dualism. In his view any act, judgement, etc., can be either moral or nonmoral depending upon the situation, context and consequences of its occurrence. He writes: "...while there is no single act which must under all circumstances have conscious moral quality, there is no
act, since it is part of conduct, which may not have definitive moral significance.\textsuperscript{145} He then adds: "There is no hard and fast line between the morally indifferent and the morally significant."\textsuperscript{146} Dewey illustrates this point as follows:

A person starts to open a window because he feels the need of air—no act could be more "natural", more morally indifferent in appearance. But he remembers that his associate is an invalid and sensitive to drafts. He now sees his act in two different lights, possessed of two different values, and he has to make a choice. The potential moral import of a seemingly insignificant act has come home to him.\textsuperscript{147}

For Dewey, therefore, the idea that some particular act or value must always be either moral or nonmoral is untenable. His view of the distinction between the moral and nonmoral (as well as the moral and prudential) is thus clearly a radical departure from the traditional understanding of it.

In order to better understand Dewey's view (and thereby his conception of the subject-matter of reflective moral inquiry) it is necessary to see it in its connection with his understanding of experience and his conception of character and conduct. In discussing reflective inquiry and the indeterminate experiential situation that it presupposes, the point was made that all the experiential situations comprising pre-reflective experience are potentially indeterminate since pre-reflective experience is the product of interactions constituted by the outworking of
acquired habits (and impulses) and a changing natural and socio-cultural environment. Thus a characteristic feature of an indeterminate experiential situation is that the agent involved does not know what course of action to pursue. Hence, whenever reflective inquiry is involved, its function is not only to institute a problematic situation but also to determine the means whereby the indeterminate situation evoking it is to be transformed into a determinate one. For Dewey, therefore, reflective inquiry centers on a practical issue and hence, apart from observation (i.e., its diagnostic phase) involves deliberation and valuation (i.e., its prescriptive phase.)

The action undertaken by an agent as part of an indeterminate situation can be the result of blind impulse or of routine, mechanical habit. Whenever this occurs, behaviour is no more than a set of acts following one another in consecutive order. In Dewey's view, however, actions acquire significance only when they are incorporated in a sequence of acts determined by the agent (as a result of inquiry) to eventuate in some desirable outcome. In his view this organization of acts in a sequence constitutes conduct. Writes Dewey:

Where there is conduct there is not simply a succession of disconnected acts but each thing done carries forward an underlying tendency and intent, conducting, leading up, to further acts and to a final fulfillment or consummation.148
He adds: 
"...the idea of a series...is the essence of conduct..."\textsuperscript{149} In his view the possibility of conduct is grounded in habit. "If an act were connected with other acts merely in the way in which the flame of a match is connected with an explosion of gunpowder..." he writes 
"...there would be action, but not conduct."\textsuperscript{150} He adds:

But our actions not only lead up to other actions which follow as their effects but they also leave an enduring impress on the one who performs them, strengthening and weakening permanent tendencies to act. This fact is familiar to us in the existence of habit.\textsuperscript{151}

Dewey then goes on to conclude:

Acts are not linked up together to form conduct in and of themselves, but because of their common relation to an enduring and single condition--the self or character as the abiding unity in which different acts leave their lasting traces.\textsuperscript{152}

Thus for Dewey the habits that are constitutive of an agent's self (character) make possible the continuity of action in patterns of conduct.

The net import of the foregoing is that character and conduct are correlative terms. Given Dewey's principle of interaction, it follows that every action undertaken by an agent, regardless of whether or not it is incorporated into conduct, conditions character. "Sometimes a juncture is so critical..." he writes "...that a person, in deciding upon what course he will take, feels that his future, his very being, is at stake. Such cases are obviously of great
practical importance for the person concerned."  

He adds: "...some degree of what is conspicuous in these momentous cases is found in every voluntary decision. Indeed, also it belongs (sic) to acts performed impulsively without deliberate choice."  

He goes on to argue: "In committing oneself to a particular course, a person gives a lasting set to his own being. ...one is in reality choosing what kind of person or self one is going to be."  

For Dewey, then, every experience has a direct impact, however slight, upon the formation of habits (i.e., character). Equally important, however, is the fact that an agent's character conditions future conduct. Dewey underscores this point when he writes:

If one surrenders to a momentary impulse, the significant thing is not the particular act which follows, but the strengthening of the power of that impulse...In giving way, the person in so far commits himself not just to that isolated act but to a course of action, to a line of behavior.

He subsequently goes on to argue:

Selfhood or character is thus not a mere means, an external instrument, of attaining certain ends. It is an agency of accomplishing consequences, as is shown in the pains which the athlete, the lawyer, the merchant, takes to build up certain habits in himself, because he knows they are the causal conditions for reaching ends in which he is interested.

For Dewey, therefore, character conditions conduct while conduct shapes character.
In light of the foregoing, Dewey's conception of the distinction between moral and nonmoral subject-matter can be more clearly delineated. In his view, the subject-matter of reflective inquiry is moral whenever an agent's character and its development is the principal focus of attention. The subject-matter of inquiry is nonmoral when the question of an agent's character development is not primary.\textsuperscript{158} Writes Dewey:

Moral deliberation differs from other forms not as a process of forming a judgement and arriving at knowledge but in the kind of value which is thought about. The value is technical, professional, economic etc. as long as one thinks of it as something which one can aim at and attain by way of having, possessing; as something to be got or to be missed. Precisely the same object will have a moral value when it is thought of as making a difference in the self, as determining what one will be, instead of merely what one will have. ...The choice at stake in a moral deliberation or valuation is the worth of this and that kind of character and disposition.\textsuperscript{159}

In his 1903 essay "Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality", Dewey provides the following description of the extent to which character constitutes the subject-matter of moral inquiry:

But in the ethical judgement...the situation is made what it is through the attitude which finds expression in the very act of judging. ...the ethical judgement thus has a distinctive aim of its own; it is engaged in judging a subject-matter, in whose determination the attitude or disposition which leads to the act of judging is a factor.
...Just because character or disposition is involved in the material passed in review and organized in judgement, character is determined by the judgement. This is a fact of tremendous ethical significance.\textsuperscript{160}

He then goes on to add:

The judger is engaged in judging himself; and thereby in so far is fixing the conditions of all further judgements of any type whatsoever. Put in more psychological terms, we may say the judgement realizes, through conscious deliberation and choice, a certain motive hitherto more or less vague and impulsive; or it expresses a habit in such a way as not merely to strengthen it practically, but as to bring to consciousness both its emotional worth and its significance in terms of certain kinds of consequences.\textsuperscript{161}

Thus for Dewey, as the passages cited attest, the principal subject-matter of reflective moral inquiry is the agent's character and its development.

Dewey's reason for refusing to construe the distinction between moral and nonmoral subject-matter as marking a fundamental dualism in moral theory now becomes more readily apparent. Character is an inexpungible constituent of all experience (i.e., the habits comprising character are inherent in all pre-reflective and reflective experience). Since every experience affects, to some extent, the formation of character and given that reflective experience is comprised of acts undertaken as a result of reflective inquiry (in contrast with the habitual and impulsive acts characteristic of pre-reflective experience) it can be
concluded that every act has an effect on character development and hence that all reflective experience is potentially moral. Any reflective experience can thus become the subject-matter of reflective moral inquiry.

Writes Dewey:

...any act, even that one which passes ordinarily as trivial, may entail such consequences for habit and character as upon occasion to require judgement from the standpoint of the whole body of conduct. It then comes under moral scrutiny. To know when to leave acts without distinctive moral judgement and when to subject them to it is itself a large factor in morality. The serious matter is that this relative pragmatic, or intellectual, distinction between the moral and non-moral, has been solidified into a fixed and absolute distinction, so that some acts are popularly regarded as forever within and others forever without the moral domain.\textsuperscript{162}

He then goes on to conclude:

From this fatal error recognition of the relations of one habit to others preserves us. For it makes us see that character is the name given to the working interaction of habits, and that the cumulative effect of insensible modifications worked by a particular habit in the body of preferences may at any moment require attention.\textsuperscript{163}

For Dewey, therefore, no reflective experience can be regarded as being always and exclusively either moral or nonmoral in nature. How a particular reflective experience is to be considered is thus a matter of context and judgement. It is also, in Dewey's view, a reflection of character.\textsuperscript{164}
Dewey's view of the subject-matter of reflective moral inquiry opens the door to the following question: Since every act can be viewed in terms of its effect upon character development (thereby rendering all reflective experience moral) and given that every act need not be viewed in these terms, then when is a particular act to be so regarded? In other words, what are the conditions that determine whether or not the moral issue is to be raised? For Dewey this question proves to be one of the more difficult questions of moral theory. He writes:

Actually then only deliberate action, conduct into which reflective choice enters, is distinctively moral, for only then does there enter the question of better and worse. ...Potentially therefore every and any act is within the scope of morals, being a candidate for possible judgement with respect to its better-or-worse quality. It thus becomes one of the most perplexing problems of reflection to discover just how far to carry it, what to bring under examination and what to leave to unscrutinized habit. 165

He goes on to add: "Because there is no final recipe by which to decide this question all moral judgement is experimental and is subject to revision by its issue."166

Thus for Dewey, as the passage just cited makes plain, knowing when to raise the moral issue is an outcome of experience and not something that can be determined a priori.

Dewey's view that knowing when to raise the moral issue is a matter of experience is clearly not altogether
satisfactory. It is fine as far as it goes, but it does not go far enough. What, it may still be wondered, are the conditions that determine whether or not a particular act is to be viewed in terms of its effects upon character development? Moreover, in what sense is this an experimental question? The clue to answering these questions is in Dewey's principle of interaction. Granted that every act affects character, and given that not every act needs to be viewed morally, it can be inferred that the issue in morals does not center on whether or not an act affects character but rather on how an act affects character development (i.e., on what kind of character the act undertaken tends to nurture). It follows, therefore, that of all the various effects different acts can have on character development, only some are of moral import. Since the actual effect of an act on character can only be determined in experience (and not a priori) Dewey's emphasis upon the experimental character of moral judgement now becomes more intelligible. In his view, moreover, it is the effect of an act upon the growth of character that is ultimately the subject-matter of reflective moral inquiry. He writes:

Morals means growth of conduct in meaning; at least it means that kind of expansion in meaning which is consequent upon observations of the conditions and outcome of conduct. It is all one with growing. Growing and growth are the same fact expanded in actuality or telescoped in thought. In the largest
sense of the word, morals is education. It is learning the meaning of what we are about and employing that meaning in action. The good, satisfaction, "end" of growth of present action in shades and scope of meaning is the only good within our control, and the only one, accordingly, for which responsibility exists. The rest is luck, fortune.\textsuperscript{167}

For Dewey, therefore, it is the effect of an act on the growth of character that determines whether or not the moral issue should be raised.

In the foregoing discussion, the point was made that for Dewey no hard and fast distinction can be drawn between moral and nonmoral acts, values, judgements, etc. It was argued that his understanding of this distinction is ultimately rooted in his view that the subject-matter of moral inquiry is the effect of experience on character development. It was also pointed out that for Dewey growth of character is the key to determining whether or not the moral issue is to be raised. Having thus determined the subject-matter of reflective moral inquiry, attention must now be focussed upon the characteristic features of reflective moral inquiry itself. It is to this task that I now turn.

b) Reflective Moral Inquiry

Reflective moral inquiry originates, as do all forms of reflective inquiry, in an indeterminate experiential situation. As previously noted an indeterminate experiential situation is an existential event the
occurrence of which is conditioned by a complex network of interacting "subjective" and "objective" contingencies. Viewed from the subjective side an indeterminate experiential situation incorporates not only impulsive energy but also the entire spectrum of interconnected affective, cognitive and conative habits constitutive of the agent's character and hence is marked by a feeling of conflict in impulse, habit, and desire. Since indeterminate situations are parts of pre-reflective experience, their occurrence is directly felt (had) and as such they are pre-cognitive. Although affective habits of character pervade the occurrence of an indeterminate experiential situation, cognitive habits are not altogether absent as conditioning factors. This is the case because in pre-reflective experience objects and relations are directly perceived just as qualities are directly felt. The cognitive habits incorporated in indeterminate experiential situations are thus the habits constituting perception and not the habits comprising reflective inquiry per se. The perception of chairs, cars, colours, and calendars, for example, is immediate. These perceptions, however, are habitual, not innate, abilities and hence they are the outcome of experience unfolding within a particular socio-cultural matrix and incorporating its values and beliefs. To "see" a telephone is thus an ability the exercise (if not also the existence) of which presupposes the active involvement of a
complex socio-cultural environment. It follows, therefore, that the simplest perception is suffused with non-perceptual content (i.e., feelings, attitudes, etc.). Viewed objectively, the occurrence of an indeterminate experiential situation is conditioned by numerous and diverse contingencies prevailing within the natural and socio-cultural environment. The demands of other agents, the responsibilities inherent in social roles and relations, the obligations exacted by social institutions, developments and changes in the material conditions of life (and other factors clearly too numerous to mention) all contribute to determining the pervasive quality of the indeterminate experiential situations that occur.

Objectively, the indeterminacy pervading an indeterminate experiential situation is the result of the outworking of the diverse forces cited above. Subjectively, it is experienced as a feeling of "tension". Something in the situation is not quite right, but just what it is that is not right is not known. Hence, although some action is needed in order to transform the indeterminate situation into a determinate one, what that action is or what its import will be remains unclear. Not everything about the situation, however, is indeterminate. Apart from the objects of perception (and their accompanying feelings) the situation includes what Dewey calls "problematic goods" (i.e., the immediate enjoyments of the situation) as well as
the desires and interests of the agent involved (i.e., the direction of habitual action). In an indeterminate experiential situation these features emerge as the "facts" of the case. It is the task of reflective moral inquiry to delineate the means whereby the indeterminate situation is to be transformed into a determinate one in a manner that takes into account the growth of character.

Reflective moral inquiry is comprised of the two phases previously noted in connection with reflective inquiry, viz. (1) the diagnostic and (2) the prescriptive (i.e., deliberation and valuation). In discussing reflective moral inquiry, therefore, I shall consider each phase separately.

i) The Diagnostic Phase

The function of reflective moral inquiry is to transform an indeterminate moral situation into a determinate one by undertaking a course of action that addresses the problem peculiar to the indeterminate situation involved. Since the occurrence of an indeterminate moral situation is conditioned by the diverse subjective and objective forces previously noted, it follows that every indeterminate moral situation is unique. Writes Dewey: "...every moral situation is a unique situation having its own irreplaceable good..."171 In order to determine the course of action required to transform an indeterminate moral situation into a determinate one, the indeterminate situation must first be converted into a
problematic one. The institution of the problem inherent in a particular indeterminate moral situation is thus the principal focus of the diagnostic phase of reflective moral inquiry. In order to determine the problem involved in a particular indeterminate moral situation, however, careful scrutiny of the constituent elements of which it is comprised is required. Writes Dewey:

A moral situation is one in which judgement and choice are required antecedently to overt action. The practical meaning of the situation—that is to say the action needed to satisfy it—is not self-evident. It has to be searched for. There are conflicting desires and alternative apparent goods. What is needed is to find the right course of action, the right good.\textsuperscript{172}

He then goes on to add:

Hence, inquiry is exacted: observation of the detailed makeup of the situation; analysis into its diverse factors; clarification of what is obscure; tracing the consequences of the various modes of action that suggest themselves; regarding the decision reached as hypothetical and tentative until the anticipated or supposed consequences which led to its adoption have been squared with actual consequences. This inquiry is intelligence.\textsuperscript{173}

In its diagnostic phase, therefore, reflective moral inquiry is chiefly concerned with the observations required in order to institute the problem whereby the indeterminate situation becomes a "fully" problematic one.\textsuperscript{174}

In Dewey's view although moral situations (and the goods thereof) are unique, the inquiry into their
constituent elements is not purely *ad hoc*. In his view no experiential situation is *absolutely* unique and hence similarities between different experiential situations obtain thus making generalizations about them possible. Such generalizations are vital since they open the door to the possibility of regulating experience. He writes:

> It is clear that the various situations in which a person is called to deliberate and judge have common elements, and that values found in them resemble one another. It is also obvious that general ideas are a great aid in judging particular cases. If different situations were wholly unlike one another, nothing could be learned from one which would be of any avail in any other. But having like points, experience carries over from one to another, and experience is intellectually cumulative.\(^{175}\)

He goes on to conclude:

> Out of resembling experiences general ideas develop; through language, instruction, and tradition this gathering together of experiences of values into generalized points of view is extended to take in a whole people and a race. Through intercommunication the experience of the entire human race is to some extent pooled and crystallized in general ideas. These ideas constitute principles. We bring them with us to deliberation on particular situations.\(^{176}\)

In Dewey's view, therefore, principles whether they are moral principles or the principles established by other forms of inquiry, are the products of inductive generalization. Their function is not to prescribe forms of conduct but rather to guide reflective inquiry, in both its
phases, by directing attention to features inherent in a particular situation that might otherwise have been overlooked. He writes:

...principles are intellectual; they are the final methods used in judging suggested courses of action. ...the object of moral principles is to supply standpoints and methods which will enable the individual to make for himself an analysis of the elements of good and evil in the particular situation in which he finds himself. No genuine moral principle prescribes a specific course of action... 

He adds: "A moral principle, then, is not a command to act or forbear acting in a given way: it is a tool for analyzing a special situation, the right or wrong being determined by the situation in its entirety." 

Dewey's view of moral principles is clearly quite unlike the view of them that is commonly espoused. In this common view, principles are typically regarded as the bedrock of moral conduct, the "final court of appeal" in the resolution of moral conflicts. They are construed as prescribing and proscribing the performance of various acts. Frequently, but not invariably, principles are regarded as being either God-given or else the deliverances of a priori reason and hence their authority to determine conduct is held to follow from the fact that they are absolute. Thus understood, it follows that loyalty to principles is the ultimate virtue. Fiat justitia, ruat coelum. It is not surprising, therefore, that the phrase "a man of principle"
is commendatory whereas to be "accused" of not having any principles is tantamount to being morally condemned. For Dewey, this view of principles will not do. Experience alone, in his view, can provide "...its own regulative standard..."\(^{180}\) As indicated above, however, such principles are not absolutely prescriptive. Moreover, since they are grounded in experience, principles are, like all inductive generalizations, subject to change. Steadfast fidelity to principles is thus not so much a virtue as it is a symptom of an inveterate desire for certainty. Writes Dewey:

> A moral law, like a law in physics, is not something to swear by and stick to at all hazards; it is a formula of the way to respond when specified conditions present themselves. Its soundness and pertinence are tested by what happens when it is acted upon. Its claim or authority rests finally upon the imperativeness of the situation that has to be dealt with, not upon its own intrinsic nature—as any tool achieves dignity in the measure of needs served by it.\(^{181}\)

For Dewey, therefore, principles are the instruments whereby the growth, development and enrichment of experience can be achieved.

The diagnostic phase of reflective moral inquiry, as noted above, is one of the two phases of which it is comprised. Since in their actual existential occurrence these phases are not separable, it follows that they interpenetrate one another in their operation and that
hence, at any point in moral inquiry, one of these phases will predominate. In the diagnostic phase of moral inquiry attention is focussed on the observation, identification and clarification of the features inherent in a moral situation. In this process, however, ideas emerge for the handling of the situation at hand. When attention in moral inquiry is shifted from observation and clarification of the moral situation to reflective consideration of the consequences involved in acting upon the ideas suggested, a different phase of reflective moral inquiry emerges and predominates, viz., deliberation and valuation. It is to the discussion of this second phase of reflective moral inquiry that I now turn.

ii) The Prescriptive Phase

The prescriptive phase of reflective moral inquiry is comprised of deliberation/valuation. This phase revolves around the projection and assessment of ends-in-view. In Dewey's view, moral deliberation/valuation can be given either a wide or a narrow interpretation. He writes:

The latter holds a fixed end in view and deliberates only upon means of reaching it. The former regards the end-in-view in deliberation as tentative and permits, nay encourages the coming into view of consequences which will transform it and create a new purpose and plan.182

Thus, when given a narrow interpretation, moral deliberation/valuation is reduced to a form of mere calculation paradigmatically exemplified in business
transactions. In this case deliberation "...is not free but occurs within the limits of a decision reached by some prior deliberation or else fixed by unthinking routine."\(^183\)

For Dewey this narrow interpretation of deliberation is misconceived. "To reduce all cases of judgement of action to this simplified and comparatively unimportant case of calculation of quantities..." he writes, "...is to miss the whole point of deliberation."\(^184\)

In Dewey's view the "whole point" of moral deliberation/valuation is to determine the end-in-view to be pursued. Ends-in-view are connected with the emergence of desire. More specifically, apart from desire there would be no ends-in-view. For Dewey, however, desire arises within the context of an indeterminate experiential situation. He writes:

When we inquire into the actual emergence of desire and its object and the value-property ascribed to the latter (instead of merely manipulating dialectically the general concept of desire), it is as plain as anything can be that desires arise only when "there is something the matter", when there is some "trouble" in an existing situation. When analyzed, this "something the matter" is found to spring from the fact that there is something lacking, wanting, in the existing situation as it stands, an absence which produces conflict in the elements that do exist.\(^185\)

By contrast whenever routine habit or overpowering impulse determines action, desire does not arise. "When things are going completely smoothly..." he writes, "...desires do not
arise, and there is no occasion to project ends-in-view, for "going smoothly" signifies that there is no need for effort and struggle."\textsuperscript{186} He adds: "It suffices to let things take their "natural" course. There is no occasion to investigate what it would be better to have happen in the future, and hence no projection of an end-object."\textsuperscript{187}

In light of the fact that desire and ends-in-view are connected, ends-in-view can be seen in formal as well as concrete terms. In purely formal terms, the ends-in-view projected are \textit{ipso facto} "objects" of desire. Hence it follows that ends-in-view are desired. In concrete terms, however, an end-in-view is some naturally occurring state of affairs which, if brought into being, would transform the indeterminate situation. Insofar as the naturally occurring state of affairs thus \textit{envisioned} does not simply "pop" into being but is, instead, \textit{brought} into being as a result of some act (or course of action), an end-in-view can be characterized as the \textit{anticipated outcome} (i.e., consequence) of action. "...every situation or field of consciousness..." writes Dewey, "...is marked by initiation, direction or interest, and consequence or import."\textsuperscript{188} He adds:

Because of this property, the initial stage is capable of being judged in the light of its probable course and consequence. There is anticipation. ...the terminal outcome when anticipated (as it is when a moving cause of affairs is perceived) becomes an end-in-view, an aim, purpose, a prediction usable as a
plan in shaping the course of events. For Dewey, therefore, ends-in-view are objects of desire as well as anticipated outcomes of action.

The connection between an end-in-view and desire plays an important part in Dewey's understanding of moral deliberation/valuation. In his view valuation occurs whenever habitual or impulsive action is mediated by the intervention of desire and an end-in-view. "Behavior is often so direct..." he writes, "...that no desires and ends intervene and no valuations take place." He goes on to add:

But if and when desire and an end-in-view intervene between the occurrence of a vital impulse or a habitual tendency and the execution of an activity, then the impulse or tendency is to some degree modified and transformed: a statement which is purely tautological, since the occurrence of a desire related to an end-in-view is a transformation of a prior impulse or routine habit. It is only in such cases that valuation occurs.

Thus for Dewey valuation judgements are connected with the emergence of desire and an end-in-view. The fact that a particular object is desired, however, does not in and of itself warrant the conclusion that it is desirable. For Dewey there is a fundamentally important distinction to be drawn:

...between the enjoyed and the enjoyable, the desired and the desirable, the satisfying and the satisfactory. To say that something is enjoyed is to make a statement about a
fact, something already in existence; it is not to judge the value of that fact. There is no difference between such a proposition and one which says that something is sweet or sour, red or black.\textsuperscript{192}

For Dewey, as the passage cited attests, that which is desired is comparable to that which is found in experience to be, for example, sweet or sour. That is to say, it is part of immediate (i.e., pre-reflective) experience. As such the "object" of desire is directly had. By contrast the desirability of a particular "object of desire" cannot be determined apart from judgement. "The fact that something is desired..." writes Dewey, "...only raises the question of its desirability; it does not settle it."\textsuperscript{193} He goes on to add:

To declare something satisfactory is to assert that it meets specifiable conditions. It is, in effect, a judgement that the thing "will do". It involves a prediction; it contemplates a future in which the thing will continue to serve; it will do. It asserts a consequence the thing will actively institute; it will do. That it is satisfying is the content of a proposition of fact; that it is satisfactory is a judgement, an estimate, an appraisal.\textsuperscript{194}

Thus for Dewey, although an object of desire is clearly desired, it is not thereby also desirable. That which is desired is part of pre-reflective experience whereas that which is desirable is a construction involving deliberation and valuation. It can be concluded, therefore, that in
distinguishing the desired from the desirable, Dewey rejects the possibility of immediate valuation judgements just as he rejects the possibility of immediate knowledge.¹⁹⁵

The distinction between the desired and the desirable proves to be of central importance to Dewey's understanding of moral deliberation/valuation. The task of deliberation, it will be recalled, is to determine, in the context of an indeterminate experiential situation, the end-in-view to be pursued. Given that an end-in-view is an object of desire and since an end-in-view is the anticipated outcome of a course of action, it follows that the projected outcome of action is desired. In order to better understand Dewey's conception of deliberation/valuation, therefore, it is necessary to distinguish between an end-in-view, qua anticipated outcome of action, and the object of settled (i.e., immediate) desire. Although Dewey does not make this distinction explicitly, he nevertheless does clearly imply it when, in characterizing the difference between the desired and the desirable he writes:

The contrast referred to is simply that between the object of a desire as it first presents itself (because of the existing mechanism of impulses and habits) and the object of desire which emerges as a revision of the first-appearing impulse, after the latter is critically judged in reference to the conditions which will decide the actual result. The "desirable", or the object which should be desired (valued), does not descend out of the a priori blue nor descend as an imperative from a moral Mount Sinai.¹⁹⁶
Settled or immediate desires, as this passage makes plain, are those which occur as the result of the outworking of acquired habit and the press of impulse. The objects of settled desire are those naturally occurring things or states of affairs the experience of which is immediately satisfying or enjoyed. Thus, in the context of an indeterminate experiential situation, the objects of settled desire can be either various actually occurring constituent elements of the indeterminate situation or some end-in-view projected by frustrated habit or impulse. It can be inferred therefore that settled desires are the product of previous experiencing and that, as a result, they are constituted by habit and hence are an integral part of character. Dewey affirms this point when he writes:

...habit reaches...down into the very structure of the self; it signifies a building up and solidifying of certain desires; an increased sensitiveness and responsiveness to certain stimuli, a confirmed or an impaired capacity to attend to and think about certain things. Habit covers in other words the very make-up of desires, intent, choice, disposition which gives an act its voluntary quality. 197

Emergent desire, by contrast, is not embodied in a specific habit nor is it connected with a clearly delimited object. Emergent desire, as its name suggests, is in the process of formation as is the end-in-view connected with it. Both end-in-view and emergent desire are thus the outcome of inquiry, deliberation and valuation. In other words,
emergent desires and the object connected with it is a reconstruction of settled desire and its objects.

Insofar as the indeterminate experiential situation within which deliberation occurs emerges as a result of the outworking of habits and impulses it incorporates, as constituent elements, objects of settled desire. Since these objects occur as part of pre-reflective experience, they are directly had. They are, in other words, the immediate enjoyments and satisfactions of the situation. For Dewey, these immediate enjoyments are not "values" but rather the conditions of value. "There is..." he writes, "...no value except where there is satisfaction, but there have to be certain conditions fulfilled to transform a satisfaction into a value."\textsuperscript{198} Thus, in his view, the objects of settled desire involved in an indeterminate situation are the "problematic goods" of that situation. They are "goods" because they are desired. Since the desired and the desirable are not equivalent, however, and given that the desirable is a construction involving reflective inquiry, it follows that the objects of desire involved in an indeterminate situation are problematic goods. For Dewey, therefore, problematic goods, although valued are not values but rather the materials from which value is constructed. Dewey makes this point when, in criticizing the empirical theory of values, he writes:

I shall not object to this empirical theory as far as it connects the theory
of values with concrete experiences of desire and satisfaction. The idea that there is such a connection is the only way known to me by which the pallid remoteness of the rationalistic theory, and the only too glaring presence of the institutional theory of transcendental value can be escaped. The objection is that the theory in question holds down value to objects antecedently enjoyed, apart from reference to the method by which they come into existence; it takes enjoyments which are casual because unregulated by intelligent operations to be values in and of themselves.159

He then adds:

...escape from the defects of transcendental absolutism is not to be had by setting up as values enjoyments that happen anyhow, but in defining value by enjoyments which are the consequences of intelligent action. Without the intervention of thought, enjoyments are not values but problematic goods, becoming values when they re-issue in a changed form from intelligent behavior.200

Dewey subsequently goes on to conclude that:

...we regard our direct and original experience of things liked and enjoyed as only possibilities of values to be achieved; that enjoyment becomes a value when we discover the relations upon which its presence depends. Such a causal and operational definition gives only a conception of a value, not a value itself. But the utilization of the conception in action results in an object having secure and significant value.201

As the passages cited attest, for Dewey value (i.e., "the good") is a construction in which immediate enjoyments (i.e., the objects of settled desire) are reconstructed. It can be concluded, therefore, that in his view moral
deliberation/valuation involves the assessment of problematic goods in terms of their causal conditions and consequences with a view to determining the end-in-view to be pursued.

Before considering Dewey's conception of moral deliberation/valuation in more detail, one further aspect of desire must be taken into account viz., the connection between settled desire and interest. An indeterminate situation, it will be recalled, involves a conflict in the outworking of an agent's habits, impulses and settled desires as these unfold within and are conditioned by a particular natural and socio-cultural environment. For Dewey, however, some of the habits and settled desires thus involved constitute interests. In his view, an interest is "...the union of the self in action with an object and end..."^202 It is, he adds:

...the dominant direction of activity, and in this activity desire is united with an object to be furthered in a decisive choice. Unless impulse and desire are enlisted, one has no heart for a course of conduct; one is indifferent, averse, not-interested. On the other hand, an interest is objective; the heart is set on something. There is no interest at large or in a vacuum; each interest imperatively demands an object () which it is attached and for the well-being or development of which it is actively solicitous.^203

Thus an interest is marked by a movement toward attaining (or sustaining and developing) the object with which it is
connected. Moreover, since they are comprised of habits interests "...form the core of the self and supply the principles by which conduct is to be understood." Since an indeterminate experiential situation is characterized by a conflict in the interests of the agent involved, and given that each of the conflicting interests thus involved is connected with an object the attainment of which is actively sought, it can be concluded that moral deliberation/valuation, in determining the end-in-view to be pursued, must take into account not only the objects of settled desire but also the interests of the agent together with their respective objects.

In Dewey's view, as the passages just cited make plain, interests determine the very structure of the self (character). Contrary to what might be assumed, however, for Dewey action undertaken by an agent is not thereby inexpugnibly "selfish" (in the pejorative sense of this term). "It is a truism..." he writes, "...that all action springs from and affects a self, for interest defines the self." He adds, by way of illustration: "Whatever one is interested in is in so far a constituent of the self, whether it be collecting postage stamps, or pictures, making money, or friends, attending first nights at the theatre, studying electrical phenomena, or whatever." He then goes on to conclude:

The notion that therefore all acts are equally "selfish" is absurd. For "self"
does not have the same significance in the different cases; there is always a self involved but the different selves have different values. A self changes its structure and its value according to the kind of object which it desires and seeks; according, that is, to the different kinds of objects in which active interest is taken.  

For Dewey, therefore, acts are not selfish simply because they incorporate the interests of the agent involved, but rather because of the kind of interests they incorporate.  

In Dewey's view the quality of an interest (i.e., its kind) "...is dependent upon the nature of the object which arouses it and to which it is attached, being trivial, momentous; narrow, wide; transient, enduring; exclusive, inclusive in exact accord with the object." If an act is "selfish" because of the interest it incorporates, then given that the quality of an interest varies relative to the object with which it is connected it can be inferred that an act is "selfish" if the object of the interest involved is conceived as standing in an exclusive relation to the self. "...acts acquire the quality of moral selfishness..." writes Dewey, "...only when they are indulged in so as to manifest obtuseness to the claims of others." He adds: "An act is not wrong because it advances the well-being of the self, but because it is unfair, inconsiderate, in respect to the rights, just claims of others." For Dewey, therefore, acts are selfish only insofar as they fail to take into account the claims of others. Since acts are not
inexpungibly selfish, however, and given that the interests
an agent has are formed in the course of social interaction,
it can be concluded that education plays a decisive role in
determining whether or not an agent shall be "selfish" or
"unselfish" in her/his conduct.

In Dewey's view the cultivation and support of selfish
interests is not justified. As previously indicated, the
task of moral deliberation/valuation is to develop and
assess the consequences involved in acting to secure the
objects connected with the interests incorporated in an
indeterminate experiential situation. Given that the
indeterminate situation is conditioned by both subjective
and objective forces, however, it follows that the interests
thus involved include not only those of the agent engaged in
deliberating but also those of other agents. In Dewey's
view a key factor to be taken into account in assessing the
consequences of an act is the kind of self that is being
formed and not the "ownership" of the self. "The real moral
question..." he writes, "...is wha'. kind of a self is being
furthered and formed. And this question arises with respect
to both one's own self and the selves of others."\textsuperscript{211} He
then adds:

\begin{quote}
The goodness or badness of consequences
is the main thing to consider, and these
consequences are of the same nature
whether they concern myself or yourself.
The kind of objects the self wants and
chooses is the important thing; the
locus of residence of these ends,
whether in you or in me, cannot of
\end{quote}
itself make a difference in their moral quality. In considering the consequences of an act, therefore, what matters is not who is affected by it but rather how it affects the different selves involved. In Dewey's view, once the irrelevance of the "ownership" of the self is recognized, the door is open to the realization that "...regard for self and regard for others are both of them secondary phases of a more normal and complete interest: regard for the welfare and integrity of the social groups of which we form a part." For Dewey the import of this realization is that neither egoism nor exclusive regard for the welfare of others are desirable as interests motivating action. "Regard for self and regard for others..." he writes, "...should not...be direct motives to overt action. They should be forces which lead us to think of objects and consequences that would otherwise escape notice." He adds: "These objects and consequences then constitute the interest which is the proper motive of action. Their stuff and material are composed of the relations which men actually sustain to one another in concrete affairs." In light of this, Dewey concludes that the fundamental problem of morals is to form "...an original body of impulsive tendencies into a voluntary self in which desires and affections center in the values which are common; in which interest focusses in objects that contribute to the enrichment of all."
Thus far in the discussion of the prescriptive phase of reflective moral inquiry, the point has been made that the task of moral deliberation/valuation is to determine the end-in-view to be pursued. Attention was drawn to the fact that for Dewey an end-in-view is an object of desire as well as the anticipated outcome of a course of action. Attention was also drawn not only to the important distinction Dewey draws between the desired and the desirable but also to the distinction, implicit in his discussion, between the object of settled desire and the end-in-view of emergent desire. The point was made that the objects of settled desires, insofar as they are constituent elements of an indeterminate experiential situation, are problematic goods and not values per se. The latter, for Dewey, were seen to be constructions involving reflective inquiry. The point was also made that settled desire is embodied in habit (and this is an integral part of character) as well as incorporated in interests. Dewey's view that the "ownership" of self is irrelevant in assessing the consequences of action for character development was then underscored together with his view that a key problem of morals is to cultivate character exhibiting an interest in the welfare of all. Bearing these points in mind, Dewey's understanding of moral deliberation/valuation can now be more fully considered. It is to this task that I now turn.

In Dewey's view when moral deliberation/valuation is
given a wide interpretation, its task is to determine the end-in-view to be pursued rather than to establish the means to be employed in attaining pre-ordained ends. Ends-in-view, *qua* anticipated outcomes of action, are connected with the indeterminate situation in which deliberation/valuation occurs. Deliberation/valuation, it will be recalled, emerges when a conflict in acquired habits (including settled desires and interests) and impulse results in a temporary arrest in action. The conflicting habits and impulses involved spontaneously generate, as it were, ideas (i.e., plans of action) for the transformation of the indeterminate situation. In Dewey's view deliberation is the dramatic rehearsal of what is involved in acting upon the ideas thus suggested. He writes:

...deliberation is a dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of various competing possible lines of action. It starts from the blocking of efficient overt action, due to that conflict of prior habit and newly released impulse to which reference has been made. Then each habit, each impulse, involved in the temporary suspense of overt action takes its turn in being tried out. Deliberation is an experiment in finding out what the various lines of possible action are really like.\(^{218}\)

For Dewey, however, the ideas considered in deliberation/valuation are not only those that occur spontaneously but also, and more importantly, those that emerge as a result of the diagnostic phase of reflective moral inquiry. He writes:
Deliberation is a work of discovery. Conflict is acute, one impulse carries us one way into one situation, and another impulse takes us another way to a radically different objective result. Deliberation is not an attempt to do away with this opposition of quality by reducing it to one of amount. It is an attempt to uncover the conflict in its full scope and bearing. What we want to find out is what difference each impulse and habit imports, to reveal qualitative incompatibilities by detecting the different courses to which they commit us, the different dispositions they form and foster, the different situations into which they plunge us.\textsuperscript{219}

It can be inferred, therefore, that for Dewey the development and assessment of ideas engendered by the diagnostic phase of reflective moral inquiry (as well as those occurring spontaneously) is the task of moral deliberation/valuation while instituting an end-in-view is its focus. He writes: "

The office of deliberation is not to supply an inducement to act by figuring out where the most advantage is to be procured. It is to resolve entanglements in existing activity, restore continuity, recover harmony, utilize loose impulse and redirect habit.\textsuperscript{220}

He adds: "To this end observation of present conditions, recollection of previous situations are devoted. Deliberation has its beginning in troubled activity and its conclusion in choice of a course of action which straightens it out."\textsuperscript{221}

In Dewey's view, apart from a consideration of the means to be employed in the attainment of an end-in-view,
the projection of ends-in-view is mere wish and fantasy. A critically important element in moral deliberation/valuation culminating in the institution of an end-in-view is thus the consideration of the means available for its realization. He writes:

...things can be anticipated or foreseen as ends or outcomes only in terms of the conditions by which they are brought into existence. It is simply impossible to have an end-in-view or to anticipate the consequences of any proposed line of action save upon the basis of some, however slight, consideration of the means by which it can be brought into existence. 222

He then adds:

Otherwise, there is no genuine desire but an idle fantasy, a futile wish. That vital impulses and acquired habits are capable of expending themselves in the channels of daydreaming and building castles in the air is unfortunately true. ...Propositions in which things (and materials) are appraised as means enter necessarily into desires and interests that determine end-values. 223

For Dewey the connection of means/ends is important because it provides the only available method of control over the projection of ends-in-view. "There can be no control of the operation of foreseeing consequences (and hence of forming ends-in-view)...." he writes, "...save in terms of conditions that operate as the causal conditions of their attainment." 224 He adds: "The proposition in which any object adopted as an end-in-view is statable (or explicitly stated) is warranted in just the degree to which existing
conditions have been surveyed and appraised in their capacity as means."225 In Dewey's view, therefore, the consideration of the means available for the attainment of ends conditions the end-in-view finally instituted in moral deliberation/valuation.

For Dewey, apart from providing the means of controlling the projection of ends-in-view, the connection of means/ends also serves to undermine the traditional view that some "ends" are intrinsically "good" (i.e., have value apart from their connection with any other things). He writes:

...to pass from immediacy of enjoyment to something called "intrinsic value" is a leap for which there is no ground. The value of enjoyment of an object as an attained end is a value of something which in being an end, an outcome, stands in relation to the means of which it is the consequence. Hence if the object in question is prized as an end or "final" value, it is valued in this relation or as mediated.226

In place of the view that some "ends" (however selected) are intrinsically good, Dewey adopts the view that means/ends form a causally interactive continuum. He writes:

In all the physical sciences (using "physical" here as a synonym for nonhuman) it is now taken for granted that all "effects" are also "causes", or, stated more accurately, that nothing happens which is final in the sense that it is not part of an ongoing stream of events.227

He goes on to conclude:

If this principle, with the accompanying
discrediting of belief in objects that are ends but not means, is employed in dealing with distinctive human phenomena, it necessarily follows that the distinction between ends and means is temporal and relational. Every condition that has to be brought into existence in order to serve as means, is, in that connection, an object of desire and an end-in-view, while the end actually reached is a means to future ends as well as a test of valuations previously made. 228

Thus for Dewey all ends-in-view that are projected presuppose (if they are more than mere wishes) the means/end continuum as their ground. 229

In light of the foregoing discussion it is clear that the institution of an end-in-view involves, among other things, imagination and recollection. The anticipation of the outcome of a particular course of action is conditioned (but not completely determined) by the active comparison of this state of affairs with what actually occurred as a result of action undertaken in similar previous states of affairs. The involvement of conceptual frameworks by means of which events and occurrences are organized and understood is thus implicit in this comparison and hence it can be inferred that moral deliberation/valuation is, in part, cognitive in nature. Writes Dewey:

The in-viewness of ends is as much conditioned by antecedent natural conditions as is perception of contemporary objects external to the organism, trees and stones, or whatever. That is, natural processes must have actually terminated in specifiable consequences, which give those processes
definition and character, before ends can be mentally entertained and be the objects of striving desire. 230

Given the role of previous experience in conditioning the institution of ends-in-view, it could be concluded that the role of imagination is restricted exclusively to adapting previous experience to present contingencies. This, however, is not the case. The involvement of released impulse in deliberation means that the role of imagination is also potentially creative. It can, in other words, generate new and "original" ideas for the resolution of the indeterminate situation. "Impulses..." writes Dewey, "...are the pivots upon which the re-organization of activities turn, they are agencies of deviation, for giving new directions to old habits and changing their quality." 231

Insofar as ends-in-view are the anticipated outcomes of action they are clearly distinguishable from the consequences of action that actually occur. The latter are, for Dewey, "ends" (i.e., endings of complex existential processes and events) whereas ends-in-view, qua elements in reflective inquiry, are terminations of deliberation. He writes:

The results of deliberation as to what it is better to do are, critically, not identical with the final issue for the sake of which the deliberative inquiries are undertaken. For the final issue is some new situation in which the difficulties and troubles which elicited deliberation are done away with; in which they no longer exist. This objective end cannot be attained by
conjuring with mental states. It is an end brought about only by means of existential changes. The question for deliberation is what to do in order to effect these changes.\textsuperscript{232}

He then goes on to add:

The difference between the two senses of end, namely, end-in-view and end as objective termination and completion, is striking proof of the fact that in inquiry the termination is not just realistically apprehended and enunciated but is stated as a way of procedure.\textsuperscript{233}

Ends-in-view thus "...denote plans of action or purposes. The business of inquiry is to determine that mode of operation which will resolve the predicament in which the agent finds himself involved, in correspondence with the observations which determine just what the facts of the predicament are."\textsuperscript{234} Thus for Dewey ends-in-view are key components in moral deliberation/valuation because they determine the course of action to be undertaken, thereby contributing to the reconstruction of experience.

As previously indicated, for Dewey moral deliberation/valuation emerges when there is "something the matter". In his view this fact about deliberation/valuation is of paramount importance because it:

...proves that there is present an intellectual factor—a factor of inquiry—whenever there is valuation, for the end-in-view is formed and projected as that which, if acted upon, will supply the existing need or lack and resolve the existing conflict.\textsuperscript{235}

Given that the function of an end-in-view is to restore
activity thereby contributing to the transformation of an indeterminate situation, it can be inferred that the degree of success actually achieved in the reconstruction of experience depends upon the adequacy of the end-in-view instituted. Since the institution of an end-in-view is the focus of moral deliberation/valuation, it follows that the adequacy of an end-in-view is contingent upon the adequacy of the deliberation involved in its institution. If moral deliberation/valuation is to be adequate it must therefore involve not only a diagnosis of the conditions constituting an indeterminate situation, but also a consideration of the consequences of action connected with ends-in-view. Dewey makes this point when he writes:

...the difference in different desires and their correlative ends-in-view depends upon two things. The first is the adequacy with which inquiry into the lacks and conflicts of the existing situation has been carried on. The second is the adequacy of the inquiry into the likelihood that the particular end-in-view which is set up will, if acted upon, actually fill the existing need, satisfy the requirements constituted by what is needed, and do away with conflict by directing activity so as to institute a unified state of affairs.236

For Dewey, therefore, the adequacy of an end-in-view is ultimately conditioned by the indeterminate situation with which it is connected.

Before tying together the various aspects of moral deliberation/valuation that have been considered thus far,
one final aspect of it must now be considered. As indicated above one of the factors conditioning the adequacy of an end-in-view is the assessment of the consequences of action connected with it. In assessing the action connected with ends-in-view moral deliberation/valuation must take into account not only the way in which consequences are likely to affect the development of character (the agent's as well as others) but also how these consequences are likely to affect the conditions prevailing in the natural and socio-cultural environment. In the case of character, however, given that it is comprised of habits and interests, it follows that the assessment of consequences must be in terms of their effects upon habits. For Dewey, this assessment is possible because habits exhibit tendencies. That is to say, given that every act incorporates some portion of an agent's habits, every action affects, in some way and to some extent, the future career of the habits involved. Dewey uses the term "tendency" to denote this aspect of habits. In his view the tendency of a habit is the pattern of action connected with its outworking within the constraints of a particular environment. He writes:

The word "tendency" is an attempt to combine two facts, one that habits have a certain causal efficacy, the other that their outworking in any particular case is subject to contingencies, to circumstances which are unforeseeable and which carry an act one side of its usual effect. \(^{237}\)

The task of moral deliberation, therefore, is to determine
the tendencies of the habits involved in an indeterminate situation and to assess how the various lines of action that are suggested as a means of resolving it are likely to affect them. Writes Dewey:

...the problem of deliberation is not to calculate future happenings but to appraise present proposed actions. We judge present desires and habits by their tendency to produce certain consequences. It is our business to watch the course of our action so as to see what is the significance, the import of our habits and dispositions. The future outcome is not certain. But neither is it certain what the present fire will do in the future. It may be unexpectedly fed or extinguished.\textsuperscript{238}

He goes on to add:

But its tendency is a knowable matter, what it will do under certain circumstances. And so we know what is the tendency of malice, charity, conceit, patience. We know by observing their consequences, by recollecting what we have observed, by using that recollection in constructive imaginative forecasts of the future, by using the thought of future consequence to tell the quality of the act now proposed.\textsuperscript{239}

Thus for Dewey, in determining an end-in-view, moral deliberation/valuation develops and assesses, in terms of their effects upon both character and environment, the consequences of the various lines of action that are suggested by the diagnostic phase of reflective moral inquiry.

Insofar as the subject-matter of reflective moral inquiry involves, among other things, the character
development of the agents involved, it follows that the development and assessment of consequences, in terms of their effect on character, is a key role of moral deliberation/valuation. The consequences that are anticipated and considered in moral deliberation, however, are conditioned not only by the agent's previous experiences and her/his ability to make sense of these but also by her/his sensitivity and responsiveness to the various forces inherent in the indeterminate situation. Whereas the actual consequences of action affect both character development as well as the natural and socio-cultural environment, the anticipation of consequences reveals the character that has already been developed. Writes Dewey:

> What a man foresees or fails to foresee, what he appraises highly and at a low rate, what he deems important and trivial, what he dwells upon and what he slurs over, what he easily recalls and what he naturally forgets—all of these things depend upon character. His estimate of future consequences of the agreeable and annoying is consequently of much greater value as an index of what he now is than as a prediction of future results.²⁴⁰

It can be concluded, therefore, that for Dewey the consequences of action that are anticipated in moral deliberation/valuation are not, like four-leaf clovers, simply "found" in the indeterminate situation ready-made and full-blow. They are constructions deeply reflective of character. "Othello and Iago foresee different consequences because they have different kinds of character."²⁴¹
In light of the foregoing discussion Dewey's conception of moral deliberation/valuation can now be more clearly delineated. For Dewey, it will be recalled, the focus of deliberation is the institution of an end-in-view to be pursued in action, the undertaking of which restores arrested activity and thereby resolves the indeterminate experiential situation. Since ends-in-view are constitutive elements of inquiry and not actually occurring ends, however, it follows that in the course of moral deliberation/valuation various possible ends-in-view can be developed and assessed prior to instituting an end-in-view. Writes Dewey:

Deliberation is actually an imaginative rehearsal of various courses of conduct. We give way, in our mind, to some impulse; we try, in our mind, some plan. Following its career through various steps, we find ourselves in imagination in the presence of the consequences that would follow: and as we then like and approve, or dislike and disapprove, these consequences, we find the original impulse or plan good or bad.\textsuperscript{243}

He goes on to add: "The advantage of a mental trial, prior to the overt trial...is that it is retrievable, whereas overt consequences remain. They cannot be recalled. Moreover, many trails may mentally be made in a short time."\textsuperscript{243} Moreover since the ends-in-view thus considered are all objects of desire, it can be concluded that the purpose of moral deliberation is to determine (i.e., select, choose) that end-in-view which proves to be desirable.
Dewey's view the key to this determination is not to be found either in calculation of future benefits or in rational deduction from formal principles, but rather in the feelings that are immediately and directly evoked in connection with the ends-in-view that are considered in the actual course of deliberation. "Any actual experience of reflection upon conduct..." writes Dewey, "...will show that every foreseen result at once stirs our present affections, our likes and dislikes, our desires and aversions." 244 He adds: "It is this direct sense of value, not the consciousness of general rules or ultimate goals, which finally determines the worth of the act to the agent." 245 For Dewey, therefore, the character of the agent engaged in moral deliberation/valuation conditions not only the structure and quality of pre-reflective experience but also the consequences of action that are envisioned as well as the evaluation of them.

Insofar as the purpose of moral deliberation/valuation is to determine which of various possible ends-in-view considered is desirable (i.e., good) it follows that some desiderata are required in virtue of which the desirability (in the sense of being worthwhile) of an end-in-view can be determined. Given that, as a phase of reflective moral inquiry, moral deliberation/valuation emerges within the context of an indeterminate experiential situation, it can be inferred that the desiderata to be satisfied in
determining "the good" (i.e., the desirable end-in-view) are conditioned by the indeterminate situation within the parameters of which it is constructed. Thus for Dewey an end-in-view is desirable if it successfully addresses and resolves the "difficulty" inherent in the indeterminate situation. He writes:

Ends-in-view are appraised or valued as good or bad on the ground of their serviceability in the direction of behavior dealing with states of affairs found to be objectionable because of some lack or conflict in them. They are appraised as fit or unfit, proper or improper, right or wrong, on the ground of their requiredness in accomplishing this end.246

This particular desideratum of a desirable end-in-view, however, is not peculiar to moral experience and the end-in-view instituted by moral deliberation/valuation but is, instead, common to all forms of experience involving reflective inquiry. Given that a central component in the subject-matter of reflective moral inquiry is the development of character, it can be inferred that a second desideratum is required in determining the desirability of a moral end-in-view. For Dewey this additional desideratum is growth of experience. "Morals..." he writes, "...means growth of conduct in meaning; at least it means that kind of expansion in meaning which is consequent upon observations of the conditions and outcome of conduct. It is all one with growing."247 He adds: "The good, satisfaction, "end", of growth of present action in shades and scope of meaning
is the only good within our control, and the only one, accordingly, for which responsibility exists. The rest is luck, fortune.\textsuperscript{248} Echoing Kant's categorical imperative, Dewey then concludes:

If we wished to transmute this generalization into a categorical imperative we should say: "So act as to increase the meaning of present experience." But even then in order to get instruction about the concrete quality of such increased meaning we should have to run away from the law and study the needs and alternative possibilities lying within a unique and localized situation. The imperative, like everything absolute, is sterile.\textsuperscript{249}

It follows, therefore, that for Dewey these desiderata determining the desirability of an end-in-view are not to be construed as absolute rules functioning in the regulation of experience as a Procrustean bed but rather as principles guiding and informing reflective moral inquiry in both of its phases. More fundamentally, however, the validity of these principles, as in the case of all principles, is, for Dewey, grounded in experience.

In view of the fact that the desiderata determining the desirability of an end-in-view are conditioned by the indeterminate situation and given Dewey's conception of the means/end continuum, it can be concluded that no a priori conception of "the good" is warranted. In his view, as is no doubt apparent, the good is always specific to the indeterminate situation in which it is constructed and hence it is unique. "Moral goods and ends..." writes Dewey,
"...exist only when something has to be done. The fact that something has to be done proves that there are deficiencies, evils in the existent situation. This ill is just the specific ill that it is. It never is an exact duplicate of anything else."250 He goes on to conclude: "Consequently the good of the situation has to be discovered, projected and attained on the basis of the exact defect and trouble to be rectified. It cannot intelligently be injected into the situation from without."251 As the passages just cited clearly imply, for Dewey the a priori construction of a table of goods arranged in a hierarchical order is pointless. He writes:

...to suppose that we can make a hierarchical table of values at large once for all, a kind of catalogue in which they are arranged in an order of ascending or descending worth, is to indulge in a gloss on our inability to frame intelligent judgements in the concrete. Or else it is to dignify customary choice and prejudice by a title of honor.252

In rejecting the view that goods can be hierarchically ordered, however, Dewey thereby also rejects a central tenet of traditional ethical theory viz., the belief in a sumnum bonum. In his view ethical theory "...has been singularly hypnotized by the notion that its business is to discover some final end or good or some ultimate and supreme law."253 This view of the matter, however, "...inevitably leads thought into the bog of disputes that cannot be settled."254 It can be concluded, therefore, that for Dewey, apart from
the specific context in which reflective moral inquiry emerges it is idle to speculate about the ultimate nature of the true good for human beings.

As previously indicated, whereas the task of moral deliberation/valuation is to develop and assess the consequences of action (both for character development as well as the natural and socio-cultural environment) connected with the various ends-in-view engendered by the diagnosis of the indeterminate situation, its focus is to institute an end-in-view that has been judged to be desirable. Moral deliberation, therefore, must culminate in a choice of an end-in-view. For Dewey choice results when activity is restored as a result of the institution of an end-in-view that satisfies the desiderata cited above. He writes:

Choice is made as soon as some habit, or some combination of elements of habits and impulse, finds a way fully open. Then energy is released. The mind is made up, composed, unified. As long as deliberation pictures shoals or rocks or troublesome gales as marking the route of a contemplated voyage, deliberation goes on. But when the various factors in action fit harmoniously together, when imagination finds no annoying hinderance, when there is a picture of open seas, filled sails and favoring winds, the voyage is definitely entered upon. This decisive direction of action constitutes choice.255

The choice of an end-in-view thus restores action and thereby transforms the indeterminate situation. More importantly, however, the experience which unfolds as a
result of reflective moral inquiry is, for Dewey, consummatory. 256

The net import of the foregoing discussion is that in moral deliberation/valuation the character of the agent involved is both formed as well as revealed. Although character is always affected by action it is only in moral deliberation/valuation that the precise nature of the effect of action on character development is explicitly considered. For Dewey, every choice:

...sustains a double relation to the self. It reveals the existing self and it forms the future self. That which is chosen is that which is found congenial to the desires and habits of the self as it already exists. Deliberation has an important function in this process, because each different possibility as it is presented to the imagination appeals to a different element in the constitution of the self, thus giving all sides of character a chance to play their part in the final choice. The resulting choice also shapes the self, making it, in some degree, a new self. This fact is especially marked at critical junctures, but it marks every choice to some extent however slight. 257

He then adds:

In committing oneself to a particular course, a person gives a lasting set to his own being. Consequently, it is proper to say that in choosing this object rather than that, one is in reality choosing what kind of person or self one is going to be. 258

It can be concluded, therefore, that for Dewey character is an inexpungible, though not exclusive, constituent of reflective moral inquiry and hence of reflective moral
experience.

Before concluding this discussion of moral deliberation/valuation, a failing peculiar to it must be briefly considered. In Dewey's view both the diagnostic and the prescriptive phase of reflective moral inquiry can be deficient, not only because they fail to take into account the desires, interests and needs of others but also because they fail to consider the effect of action on both the natural and socio-cultural environment, as well as on the character development of agents other than the agent engaged in deliberating. For Dewey it is absence of sympathy in reflective moral inquiry that proves to be its major failing. "Our moral failures..." he writes, "...go back to some weakness of disposition, some absence of sympathy, some one sided bias that makes us perform the judgement of the concrete case carelessly or perversely." In Dewey's view this failing of reflective moral inquiry can be overcome by the cultivation and development of sympathy. He writes:

It is sympathy which carries thought out beyond the self and which extends its scope till it approaches the universal as its limit. It is sympathy which saves consideration of consequences from degenerating into mere calculation, by rendering vivid the interests of others and urging us to give them the same weight as those which touch our own honor, purse and power. To put ourselves in the place of others, to see things from the standpoint of their purposes and values, to humble, contrariwise, our own pretensions and claims till they reach the level they would assume in the eye of an impartial
sympathetic observer, is the surest way to attain objectivity of moral knowledge.260

As these passages make plain, apart from being conditioned by the indeterminate situation, reflective moral inquiry, if it is to be adequate, must also be marked by sympathy. The need for such sympathy, moreover, can be seen to follow from Dewey's view that the "ownership" of self is not a relevant factor in moral deliberation/valuation. When sympathy characterizes reflective moral inquiry it can attain balance and harmony in its judgements. For Dewey, therefore, when embodied as part of an agent's character, sympathy proves to be the ground of that impartial consideration of competing and conflicting claims which is generally acknowledged to be the hallmark of moral thinking.

In the foregoing discussion the point was made that the task of moral deliberation/valuation is to develop and assess ends-in-view and that its focus is to institute an end-in-view that judgement reveals to be desirable. The point was also made that for Dewey institution of an end-in-view could not proceed apart from a consideration of the means available for its attainment. His conception of the means/end continuum was thus considered together with its role in his rejection not only of the view that some things can be intrinsically good but also of the view that goods can be arranged in a hierarchical order culminating in a summum bonum. Attention was drawn to the fact that for
Dewey ends-in-view are elements in reflective inquiry and not actually occurring ends and that, as a result, numerous ends-in-view can be considered in deliberation prior to the institution of an end-in-view. The point was then made that the institution of an end-in-view is conditioned by two desiderata viz., the requirements of the indeterminate situation and the bearing of action upon not only the growth of character, but also the conditions prevailing within the natural and socio-cultural environment. Dewey's contention that reflective moral inquiry should embody sympathy if it is to be impartial and objective was also considered. In thus concluding this discussion of the prescriptive phase of reflective moral inquiry the delineation of Dewey's conception of reflective moral experience, undertaken as the principal objective of this section, can also be drawn to a close. Before proceeding to consider some of the more significant implications for moral education and its attendant notion of moral agency that are connected with Dewey's view of moral experience and his understanding of the nature and formation of character, it is necessary to consider, albeit briefly, two of the more important criticisms to which Dewey's views give rise. It is to these criticisms that I now turn.

C: DEWEY ON MORAL EXPERIENCE - OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES

Dewey's understanding of reflective moral experience is
clearly open to criticism. As indicated in Chapter 1, in order to defend Dewey's conception of moral experience it is not necessary to "prove" that his views are, of all the available alternative views, the only ones that are "correct". It is sufficient, instead, to show that they are reasonable and plausible. Dewey's conception of moral experience, involving as it does "metaphysical", "epistemological" and "axiological" presuppositions as well as presuppositions about human nature, is obviously open to a variety of criticisms. To consider the important criticisms in all these areas, however, clearly falls beyond the scope of this thesis. In the discussion that follows, therefore, I shall assume that his understanding of human nature and his "metaphysical" and "epistemological" views, as presented and elucidated in Chapter 2 and Parts A and B of this chapter are, difficulties notwithstanding, reasonable and plausible. The objections that I shall consider center on his moral and axiological views. In particular I shall consider two of the more important objections that could be made, viz., (1) that he commits the is-ought fallacy and (2) that he commits the naturalistic fallacy. These fallacies are not only the stock in trade of contemporary moral philosophy but also the principal objections leveled against any effort to develop a naturalistic conception of morals. The literature connected with them is substantial and could easily be the subject-
matter of a separate thesis. It is necessary, therefore, to point out that in considering these objections I do not intend to engage in a detailed discussion of them. My objective shall be to sketch the main lines of a reply that is both plausible as well as consistent with Dewey's philosophical views. Bearing this in mind it is to the first of these objections that I now turn.

1. The Is-Ought Fallacy

The fallacy of attempting to derive an "ought" from an "is" was first noted by Hume in Book 3 of A Treatise of Human Nature. In twentieth-century philosophy this fallacy has come to be, in W.D. Hudson's view, the "...central problem in moral philosophy..." Although there is some controversy over just what this fallacy is and whether or not one can successfully derive an "ought" from an "is" without committing it there is, nevertheless, a consensus of opinion in support of the view that, in essence, the "is-ought" fallacy is committed whenever a purely descriptive proposition is held to either entail or provide evidential support for a proposition stating a moral obligation (cf, more generally, affirming value). It is a mistake to argue in support of value propositions by citing empirical propositions because, as Hudson puts it, "...there is really a logical divide - a radical difference of meaning - between "is" and "ought" however closely the
sentences in which such expressions get used may resemble one another in appearance." On this view value propositions can be derived from descriptive propositions only if the two are connected by a third proposition affirming a standard of value or a general moral principle. Whenever a proposition of this kind is used to connect a descriptive and a value proposition, the result is a "practical syllogism" and the derivation of an "ought" from an "is" is legitimate. Hudson provides the following example of a practical syllogism:

**Major Premise** (Universal Ought Principle): Whatever is debatable ought not to be taught in schools.

**Minor Premise** (Is-Statement): Religion is debatable.

**Conclusion** (Particular Ought-Judgement): Religion ought not to be taught in schools.

Apart from practical syllogisms, therefore, no "ought" can be validly derived from an "is". To attempt to do so is a logical error. Thus, since no value proposition can ever be either entailed or supported by a descriptive proposition, it can be inferred that a particular prescriptive moral proposition must be compatible with any and all sets of affirmative empirical propositions.

In light of the foregoing outline of the "is-ought" fallacy it can be concluded that any moral view involving this fallacy must be rejected. The question to be
considered, therefore, is whether or not Dewey, in developing his view of reflective moral experience, commits the "is-ought" fallacy. Although on prima facie consideration an affirmative answer to this question would appear to be warranted, in my view this answer cannot be sustained. Stated baldly, Dewey does not commit the "is-ought" fallacy because, given the parameters of his philosophy, there simply is no "is-ought" fallacy for him to commit. From the perspective of Dewey's instrumentalism the "central problem of moral philosophy" proves to be a chimera and hence critics who accuse Dewey of committing this fallacy fail to see the radical import of his philosophy.

In order to support the contention that Dewey does not really commit the "is-ought" fallacy, it is necessary to consider the principal assumption upon which this fallacy rests. The gap between "is" and "ought" is clearly a logical one (i.e., a gap between the meanings of the terms involved). This logical gap, however, (without which there would be no "is-ought" fallacy) is ultimately grounded in Cartesian dualism. In separating mind from matter Descartes succeeded in expunging values from nature thereby "liberating" matter for purely scientific (i.e., objective) scrutiny. Having thus been taken out of nature, values were relocated in mind to become the ghostly phenomena of a purely private and subjective experience. The gap between matter and mind (fact and value) is thus not on
ontological and logical but also, notwithstanding the working of the pineal gland, unbridgeable. Given that the "is-ought" fallacy is grounded in Cartesian dualism, it can be inferred that its status as a fallacy varies relative to the soundness of the assumption upon which it rests. Now it is precisely the soundness of Cartesian dualism (among other things) that Dewey rejects. In rejecting Cartesian dualism, however, he not only undermines the principal assumption grounding the "is-ought" fallacy but also opens the door to a radically different understanding of experience, nature and value and the inquiries whereby they are known. Within the parameters of Dewey's understanding of experience, nature, and value the traditional dualisms of mind/matter, subject/object, individual/social and "is-ought" do not arise. In view of this, it can be concluded that Dewey does not really commit the "is-ought" fallacy.

2. The Naturalistic Fallacy

The naturalistic (or definist) fallacy was "discovered" by G.E. Moore and first presented in 1903 (the same year Dewey's "Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality" appeared) in his widely influential Principia Ethica. According to Moore "good" is indefinable because good, like "yellow", is a simple quality. He writes: "My point is that "good" is a simple notion, just as "yellow" is a simple notion; that, just as you cannot, by any manner of
means, explain to any one who does not already know it, what yellow is, so you cannot explain what good is."268 He subsequently goes on to write: ""Good", then, if we mean by it that quality which we assert to belong to a thing, when we say that the thing is good, is incapable of any definition..."269 Since good cannot be defined it follows that any effort to provide a definition of it must be mistaken. The naturalistic fallacy is thus committed whenever an attempt is made to define good in terms other than itself, either empirical or metaphysical. "It may be true..." he writes, "...that all things which are good are also something else, just as it is true that all things which are yellow produce a certain kind of vibration in the light."270 He then goes on to add:

But far too many philosophers have thought that when they named those other properties they were actually defining good— that these properties, in fact, were simply not "other", but absolutely and entirely the same with goodness. This view I propose to call the "naturalistic fallacy"...271

For Moore, therefore, good is good and that is all there is to be said about it.

The principal argument that Moore develops in support of his thesis that good is indefinable has come to be known as the "open question" argument. He states this argument as follows: "...whatever definition be offered, it may be always asked, with significance, of the complex so defined, whether it is itself good."272 In Moore's view, therefore,
good is a simple, indefinable, non-natural quality that attaches to some things and not to others. More importantly, however, in his view apart from intuition it is impossible to know whether or not good attaches to a thing. Thus it follows that intuition is the only means available to us for apprehending good.

In light of the foregoing discussion the obvious question to be considered is this: Does Dewey commit the naturalistic fallacy? In considering this question it is necessary to point out, in fairness to Dewey, that he does not, in point of fact, provide an explicit definition of the principal terms appearing in his discussion of reflective moral experience. It must, however, be acknowledged that in discussing reflective moral inquiry he does use terms such as "good" and "value" in ways that make it possible to infer a definition of them. For example, in construing the objects of established desire and interest (among others) as "goods" (albeit problematic goods) he appears thereby to be implicitly defining "good" as "any object of established desire and interest" and thus he appears to commit the naturalistic fallacy. The charge that Dewey commits the naturalistic fallacy could be challenged by claiming that since he distinguishes between the desired and the desirable it follows that the desired cannot be good (hence Dewey's use of the qualifier "problematic"). If it were, then clearly the desired and the desirable would be the same.
Whatever the merits of this argument, it certainly cannot be denied that for Dewey the desirable, at least, is good. Given that in his view the desirable is that end-in-view which, after due inquiry and deliberation, proves to be required by the indeterminate situation it can be inferred that for Dewey "good" means that which resolves the indeterminacy of the indeterminate situation. This, however, would appear to be precisely the kind of definition of good that Moore rejects as committing the naturalistic fallacy.

The claim that Dewey commits the naturalistic fallacy, although initially plausible, must be rejected on the ground that it begs the question. The naturalistic fallacy, according to Moore, is committed whenever an attempt is made to define good because good is indefinable. Good is indefinable because it is a simple, non-natural property. It is clear, therefore, that if there is to be a naturalistic fallacy at all it must be the case that good is a simple non-natural property. The naturalistic fallacy does not prove that this is the case, it presupposes that this is the case. As indicated in the discussion of the "is-ought" fallacy, however, in rejecting Cartesian dualism Dewey is led to develop a radically different philosophical outlook. The presupposition required by the naturalistic fallacy simply does not occur as part of Dewey's philosophical framework. The contrast between Moore and
Dewey is as sharp as any that can be imagined. Whereas Moore adopts some form of the referential theory of meaning, Dewey views meaning in terms of the outcomes and consequences of action undertaken in connection with the ideas one entertains; whereas for Moore good is a simple, non-natural property for Dewey it is a naturally occurring thing causally interconnected with other naturally occurring things; whereas for Moore good is apprehended by intuition, for Dewey good is a construction presupposing inquiry and deliberation; whereas for Moore good is good apart from its connection with any other thing, for Dewey good can only be determined in terms of the means whereby it is produced. To charge Dewey with committing the naturalistic fallacy is thus comparable to the case of a Jesuit missionary charging an Iroquois warrior in seventeenth-century New France with having committed a sin. While it is no doubt true that in the eyes of the Jesuit the warrior's conduct is sinful, it is nevertheless equally true that from the warrior's point of view there is no sin since, to him, the notion of sin is without meaning. In short, given that Dewey does not make the presupposition required by the naturalistic fallacy, it can be concluded that to accuse him of committing it is tantamount to begging the question. The relevant question is not "Does Dewey commit the naturalistic fallacy?" but rather "Is it the case that good is a simple, indefinable non-natural quality the occurrence of which can only be
In the foregoing discussion attention has been directed to two of the more important objections that can be brought to bear against Dewey's view of moral experience. Neither objection was found to seriously challenge Dewey's views and, as a result, both were rejected. It does not follow from this, however, that Dewey's view of moral experience is without its difficulties. One of these is what might be termed Dewey's "chicken and egg" problem. The role of character, it will be recalled, is central not only in conditioning the structure and quality of pre-reflective experience, but also in constructing the consequences anticipated in moral deliberation/valuation. This, however, results in the somewhat paradoxical view that in order to become a good person one must already be a good person. Dewey makes this point indirectly when he writes: "As Aristotle pointed out, only the good man is a good judge of what is truly good; it takes a fine and well-grounded character to react immediately with the right approvals and condemnations." The problem here, of course, is not only to determine who the good person is but also to explain how one gets to be a good person in the first place. Although a full discussion of this problem cannot be undertaken here, two points can be made by way of a partial reply. The first is that an individual is part of a larger socio-cultural whole. S/he no more invents "good" than s/he invents
language. One becomes good as a result of social interaction. The second point is that the "standard" of good is not given but arrived at through experience. The good we achieve is the good we create. Since there are no absolutes, we alone are responsible for the products of our labour. The quest for certainty must be abandoned.

In this chapter my objective has been to delineate the principal features of Dewey's understanding of character and his conception of moral experience. In the chapter that follows I shall develop some of the more important implications for moral education and its attendant notion of moral agency that are connected with his views.
NOTES

1. "Experience occurs continuously, because the interaction of live creature and environing conditions is involved in the very process of living. Under conditions of resistance and conflict, aspects and elements of the self and the world that are implicated in this interaction qualify experience with emotions and ideas so that conscious intent emerges." John Dewey, Art as Experience (1934; New York: Capricorn Books, 1958) 35.

2. Vide Chapter 2, Section 3, p. 94.

3. The contention that character is an intrinsic constituent of pre-reflective experience should not be construed as implying that character is not an intrinsic constituent of reflective experience. Character is, in fact, an intrinsic constituent of both pre-reflective as well as reflective experience. In the discussion at hand, attention shall be restricted to considering its connection with pre-reflective experience. The place and role of character in reflective experience shall be considered more fully in Part B of this chapter.

4. Vide Chapter 2, Section 2, p. 81.

5. John Dewey, Experience and Nature (1929; Toronto: General Publishing Company, 1958) 246-7. Dewey, it should be noted, uses the terms "self" and "character" as practical equivalents. This point will emerge more clearly in the discussion of Dewey's view of habit and character.

6. Writes Dewey: "Every impulse is, as far as it goes, force, urgency." John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (1922; New York: The Modern Library, 1950) 165. The claim that impulses originate within the organism and animate activity suggests that for Dewey impulses are separate from the activities with which they are connected. This view of impulse, however, should not be attributed to him. In Dewey's view impulses are best understood as forms of behaviour that are subject to environmental determination. This reading of Dewey is supported by the passage cited as Endnote #10, page 216.


9. This similarity between instinct and impulse will be considered more fully in the following section.

10. Dewey, Human Nature 62. This passage, it should be noted, provides additional support for the claim that Dewey adopts a form of logical behaviourism when interpreting "mentalistic" terms. Vide, Chapter 2, endnote #147.

11. Dewey, Human Nature 126. Although an individual's instincts and impulses are temporally prior to the process of interaction in which they are shaped, nevertheless, in Dewey's view, the socio-cultural environment by which they are shaped is itself temporally prior to the process of interaction. This is the case because an individual is born into an already existing society and culture possessing its own customs, institutions, conventions, etc. He writes: "In conduct the acquired is primitive. Impulses although first in time are never primary in fact; they are secondary and dependent. The seeming paradox in statement covers a familiar fact. In the life of the individual, instinctive activity comes first. But an individual begins life as a baby, and babies are dependent beings." Dewey, Human Nature 89. In Dewey's view, moreover, the power of the socio-cultural environment in shaping behaviour incorporating instinctive and impulsive energy is greater than the power inherent in the instinctive and impulsive energy interacting with it. He makes this point when, in his Introduction to Human Nature and Conduct, he writes: "There are in truth forces in man as well as without him. While they are infinitely frail in comparison with exterior forces yet they may have the support of a foreseeing and contriving intelligence." John Dewey, Human Nature 10.

12. This view of instincts in non-human organisms is somewhat of an overstatement of Dewey's actual view. Animal instincts, for Dewey, are not always as fixed or as perfectly adapted as might initially appear. He writes: "...instincts in the animals are less infallible and definite than is supposed..." John Dewey, Human Nature 107.

13. It would be a mistake to conclude that for Dewey human nature is comprised exclusively of impulses and instincts. There are, in his view, components other than impulse and instinct comprising human nature. He acknowledges, for example, that "...appetites are the commonest things in human nature, the least distinctive or individualized..." John Dewey, Human Nature 7. The
point to be emphasized, however, is that for Dewey impulses and instincts are the primitive and irreducible core of human nature and all other components of it (e.g., appetite, desire, need, capacity, etc.) are ultimately connected with the outworking of this initial impulsive and instinctive energy. This is most readily apparent in his treatment of "desire". For Dewey desire is not an irreducible component of human nature, but rather a form which impulse assumes when it has been transformed by deliberation and thereby connected with valuation. He writes: "...vital impulses are a causal condition of the existence of desires." John Dewey, *Theory of Valuation* (1939; Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1966) 18. He subsequently goes on to say "...earlier impulsive tendencies are shaped through deliberation into a chosen desire..." John Dewey, *Theory of Valuation* 26.

As these passages make clear, for Dewey desire is connected with impulse and is not a primitive and independent force that can be severed from it. This view of desire can be extended to other features connected with human nature.

17. Dewey, *Human Nature* 131. The injuriousness which Dewey has in mind here is the effect which such oversimplification has for social science. He writes: "One of the great evils of this artificial simplification is its influence upon social science. Complicated provinces of life have been assigned to the jurisdiction of some special instinct or group of instincts which has reigned despotically with the usual consequence of despotism. Politics has replaced religion as the set of phenomena based upon fear; or after having been the fruit of a special Aristotelian political faculty, has become the necessary condition of restraining man's self-seeking impulse. All sociological facts are disposed of in a few fat volumes as products of imitation and invention, or of cooperation and conflicts. Ethics rest upon sympathy, pity and benevolence. Economics is the science of phenomena due to one love and one aversion - gain and labor." Dewey, *Human Nature* 132.
19. OED, Compact Edition 1984. The first of these two definitions of the term "function" can be given a strong and a weak interpretation. On the strong interpretation, to speak of the function of x implies that x has only one proper use (or mode of operation) and that deviations from this use are not only rare or impossible, but also wrong in either the moral or non-moral sense of this term. The orthodox Catholic view of sexual intercourse, for example, maintains that human sexual intercourse has only one proper function, viz., the procreation of children. Hence, the use of artificial methods of birth control is forbidden since it interferes with this function. On the weak interpretation of this term, to speak of the function of x implies that x has a characteristic use (or mode of operation) but that deviations from this use are possible without thereby also being wrong. Thus the function of music, for example, is to provide the listener with pleasure. Music, however, does not always and invariably do so, nor is it wrong for music to fail to do so. In the present discussion of instinct and impulse, it is the weak sense of the first definition of the term "function" that is intended.


22. This view of instincts also implies that deviations from the behavioural manifestations appropriate to a particular instinct can be not only condemned, but also corrected. In the case of the sex instinct, for example, there appear to be many forms of behaviour that are appropriate to it. The view of instinct in question, however, would reject homosexual behaviour as inappropriate and contrary to human nature. Homosexuals would thus be condemned for their deviant behaviour while at the same time being urged to seek help in order that they be "cured".

23. Dewey, Human Nature 150. The fact that the organism is never twice exactly alike has, for Dewey, an important bearing on valuation judgements. He writes: "The difference may be negligible for some purposes, and yet give the key for the purposes of a psychological analysis which shall terminate in a correct judgement of value." Dewey, Human Nature 151.


26. Dewey, *Human Nature* 154. Although the activities connected with a particular instinct are functional there is nevertheless, to borrow a Wittgensteinian metaphor, a certain "family resemblance" connecting its manifold manifestations. The family resemblance thus linking diverse forms of a particular instinct provide the ground for distinguishing one constellation of instinctive activity from another (e.g., hunger from anger) without thereby also implying a narrowly teleological conception of instinct in which a particular instinct and a form of activity having a particular objective are invariably connected. This notion of a family resemblance is apparent in Dewey's discussion of fear. He writes: "Fear of the dark is different from fear of publicity, fear of the dentist from fear of ghosts, fear of conspicuous success from fear of humiliation, fear of a bat from fear of a bear. Cowardice, embarrassment, caution and reverence may all be regarded as forms of fear. They all have certain physical organic acts in common--those of organic shrinkage, gestures of hesitation and retreat. But each is qualitatively unique. Each is what it is in virtue of its total interactions or correlations with other acts and with the environing medium, with consequences." Dewey, *Human Nature* 154-155. Thus the functional aspect of instinctive activity does not preclude the possibility of instinctive activities also sharing certain family resemblances.

27. Dewey, *Human Nature* 94. In the passage cited, Dewey uses the term "impulse" rather than the term "instinct". As a result it might be inferred that this passage is irrelevant to the contention it was intended to support. This inference, however, would be unwarranted since the context in which the passage cited appears makes it clear that Dewey is using the term "impulse" as a synonym for the term "instinct". That Dewey does, on occasion, use the term "impulse" as a synonym for the term "instinct" becomes readily apparent when one considers, for example, the following passages in which he speaks of fear, an affective state typically construed as an instinct: "...the impulse of fear is interwoven with other impulses." Dewey, *Human Nature* 95. "...it is customary to suppose that there is a single instinct of fear." Dewey, *Human Nature* 155. Dewey's comparative carelessness in using language, as evidenced here, has earned him the not altogether undeserved reputation of being an unclear writer.


32. Dewey, *Human Nature* 25. Dewey's "definition" of "habit" clearly articulates the executive role which he assigns to it. He writes: "...we need a word to express that kind of human activity which is influenced by prior activity and in that sense acquired; which contains within itself a certain ordering or systematization of minor elements of action; which is projective, dynamic in quality, ready for overt manifestation; and which is operative in some subdued subordinate form even when not obviously dominating activity. Habit even in its ordinary usage comes nearer to denoting these facts than any other word." Dewey, *Human Nature* 40-41.
33. Dewey, *Human Nature* 125. Note the use of the term "impulse" as a synonym for the term "instinct".
38. It should be noted here that the possibility of conflict emerges not only because of the diversity of habits, but also because the conditions under which a particular habit is formed change. Thus habits never interact with an environment that is twice exactly alike and as a result the possibility that some degree of adjustment and adaptation will be necessary is constant.
41. Dewey, *Human Nature* 128. Impulse is not released only in cases where acquired habits conflict. It is also released when acquired habit conflicts with instinct.
42. Dewey, *Human Nature* 93. The role of impulse in redirecting habits incorporating instinctive energy is of central importance for Dewey. Bearing in mind that he uses the term "native activity" as a synonym for "instinct", Dewey clearly underscores this point when he writes: "...the direction of native activity depends
upon acquired habits, and yet acquired habits can be modified only by redirection of impulses." Dewey, Human Nature 126. In this passage Dewey also contrasts the role of impulse and instinct. This contrast will be discussed later in this section.

43. Dewey, Human Nature 171. Dewey reiterates this point when he writes: "Conflict is the gadfly of thought. It stirs us to observation and memory. It instigates to invention. It shocks us out of sheep-like passivity, and sets us at noting and contriving. Not that it always effects this result; but that conflict is a sine qua non of reflection and ingenuity." Dewey, Human Nature 300. For a more detailed discussion of the role of conflict in generating reflective inquiry see Chapter 2, Section 3 (a), p. 103.

44. Dewey, Human Nature 171. In Experience and Education Dewey provides the following account of the connection between impulse and reflective thinking: "The old phrase "stop and think" is sound psychology. For thinking is stoppage of the immediate manifestation of impulse until that impulse has been brought into connection with other possible tendencies to action so that a more comprehensive and coherent plan of activity is formed. Some of the other tendencies to action lead to use of eye, ear, and hand to observe objective conditions; others result in recall of what has happened in the past. Thinking is thus a postponement of immediate action, while it effects internal control of impulse through a union of observation and memory, this union being the heart of reflection." John Dewey, Experience and Education (1938; New York: Collier, 1963) 64.

45. Dewey, Human Nature 176. Dewey elucidates the role of impulse in reflective thought as follows: "Yet habit does not, of itself, know, for it does not of itself stop to think, observe or remember. Neither does impulse of itself engage in reflection or contemplation. It just lets go. Habits by themselves are too organized, too insistent and determinate to need to indulge in inquiry or imagination. And impulses are too chaotic, tumultuous and confused to be able to know even if they wanted to. Habit as such is too definitely adapted to an environment to survey or analyze it, and impulse is too indeterminately related to the environment to be capable of reporting anything about it. Habit incorporates, enacts or overrides objects, but it doesn't know them. Impulse scatters and obliterates them with its restless stir. A certain delicate combination of habit and impulse is requisite

46. It should be noted here that the habits comprising reflective thinking are themselves subject to becoming routine and ossified. As in the case of other habits, however, the habits of reflective thinking are redirected by impulse released as a result of a conflict in their use.

47. In Dewey's view context is also vitally important because it makes the confirmation of judgements possible. The importance of context thus underscores Dewey's view of the specificity of reflective inquiry. *Vide* Chapter 2, Endnote #90, p. 194.


49. Dewey, *Human Nature* 180. Dewey illustrates this point as follows: "We may compare life to a traveler faring forth. We may consider him first at a moment where his activity is confident, straightforward, organized. He marches on giving no direct attention to his path, nor thinking of his destination. Abruptly he is pulled up, arrested. Something is going wrong in his activity. From the standpoint of an onlooker, he has met an obstacle which must be overcome before his behavior can be unified into a successful ongoing. From his own standpoint, there is shock, confusion, perturbation, uncertainty. For the moment he doesn't know what hit him, as we say, nor where he is going. But a new impulse is stirred which becomes the starting point of an investigation, a looking into things, a trying to see them, to find out what is going on. Habits which were interfered with begin to get a new direction as they cluster about the impulse to look and see. The blocked habits of locomotion give him a sense of where he was going, of what he had set out to do, and of the ground already traversed. As he looks, he sees definite things which are not just things at large but which are related to his course of action. The momentum of the activity entered upon persists as a sense of direction, of aim; it is an anticipatory project. In short, he recollects, observes and plans." Dewey, *Human Nature* 181-2.


52. John Dewey, "Does Human Nature Change?", Problems of Men, John Dewey (1946; New York: Greenwood, 1968) 184. Dewey goes on to clarify his contention as follows: By 'needs' I mean the inherent demands that men make because of their constitution. Needs for food and drink and for moving about, for example, are so much a part of our being that we cannot imagine any condition under which they would cease to be. There are other things not so directly physical that seem to me equally engrained in human nature. I would mention as examples the need for some kind of companionship; the need for exhibiting energy, for bringing one's power to bear upon surrounding conditions; the need for both cooperation with and emulation of one's fellows for mutual aid and combat alike; the need for some sort of aesthetic expression and satisfaction; the need to lead to follow, etc." Dewey, Men 184. If Dewey were writing the passages cited today, then he would no doubt drop the use of the gender-biased terms which appear in them.


55. Dewey, Men 185. In Human Nature and Conduct, he writes: "At some place on the globe, at some time, every kind of practice seems to have been tolerated or even praised. How is this tremendous diversity of institutions (including moral codes) to be accounted for? The native stock of instincts is practically the same everywhere. ... Since such a diversity cannot be attributed to an original identity, the development of native impulse must be stated in terms of acquired habits, not the growth of customs in terms of instincts." Dewey, Human Nature 91.


58. This aspect of Dewey's view of human nature is similar, in some respects, to the view held by neo-Aristotelians. Mortimer J. Adler, for example, also distinguishes between "nature and nurture" when he writes: "On the one hand, there are the desires inherent in our human nature, rooted in potentialities or capacities that drive or tend toward fulfillment. These are our natural desires, desires with which we
are innately endowed. Because they are inherent in human nature, as all truly specific properties are, they are present in all human beings, just as human facial characteristics, human skeletal structure, or human blood types are." Mortimer J. Adler, *Six Great Ideas* (New York: Collier, 1984) 76. In *Ten Philosophical Mistakes*, Adler writes: "Human nature is constituted by all the potentialities that are the species-specific properties common to all members of the human species. It is the essence of a potentiality to be capable of a wide variety of different actualizations." Mortimer J. Adler, *Ten Philosophical Mistakes* (New York: Macmillan, 1985) 161. This similarity, however, should not be understood to imply an agreement in views. Whereas for Adler the Aristotelian distinction between potentiality and actuality is integral to his conception of human nature, for Dewey it is not. The Aristotelian distinction between potentiality and actuality is succinctly presented by A.E. Taylor as follows: "Consider the embryos of two animals, or the seeds of two plants. ...it is certain that one of two originally indistinguishable germs will grow into an oak and the other into an elm, or one into a chimpanzee and the other into a man. However indistinguishable, they therefore may be said to have different latent tendencies or possibilities of development within them. Hence we may say of a given germ, 'though this is not yet actually an oak, it is potentially an oak', meaning not merely that, if uninterfered with, it will in time become an oak, but also that by no interference can it be made to grow into an elm or a beech." A.E. Taylor, *Aristotle* (New York: Dover, 1955) 48. Taylor then goes on to add: "One presupposition of this process must be specially noted. It is not an unending process of development of unrealised capacities, but always has an end in the perfectly simply sense of a last stage. We see this best in the case of growth. The acorn grows into the sapling and the sapling into the oak, but there is nothing related to the oak as the oak is to the sapling. The oak does not grow into something else." Taylor, 49. Thus the critically important difference between Adler's view of human nature and Dewey's is that Dewey rejects the central component in Adler's view viz., the Aristotelian distinction between potentiality and actuality. For a summary of Dewey's views on this point, *Vide* Chapter 2, Section 4 as well as Dewey's essay "The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy" in John Dewey, *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy* (1910; New York: Peter Smith, 1951). The import of the difference between Adler's view of human nature and Dewey's is evident in their respective views
of both moral theory and education. The contrast in their respective philosophies of education emerges clearly when one compares Dewey's views in Experience and Education with Adler's views in The Paideia Proposal: An Educational Manifesto.


60. The valuation judgements here involved are, for Dewey, experimental in nature.


63. Dewey, Human Nature 96-7. He subsequently goes on to conclude: "When customs are flexible and youth is educated as youth and not as premature adulthood, no nation grows old." Dewey, Human Nature 102.

64. The channelling of instinctive and impulsive energies into rigid and mechanical habits results in a control of these energies that is deceptively stable. Writes Dewey: "Instinctive reactions are sometimes too intense to be woven into a smooth pattern of habits. Under ordinary circumstances they appear to be tamed to obey their master, custom. But extraordinary crises release them and they show by violent energy how superficial is the control of routine. ... At critical moments of unusual stimuli the emotional outbreak and rush of instincts dominating all activity show how superficial is the modification which a rigid habit has been able to effect." Dewey, Human Nature 100-101.


75. Dewey, *Experience and Education* 35.


78. Habits, it should be noted, are also at the root of the many failures connected with perceiving, recognizing, imagining, reasoning, etc. Writes Dewey: "The psychology of illusions of perception is full of illustrations of the distortion introduced by habit into observation of objects." Dewey, *Human Nature* 32. Although in this passage Dewey speaks only of perception it is nevertheless clear, given his discussion throughout *Human Nature and Conduct*, that the same point can be made for all the elements comprising the cognitive and affective life of human beings.


80. Dewey, *Experience and Education* 35.


84. For a discussion of Dewey's distinction between having an experience and knowing something about it, see Chapter 2, pp. 118-126.

85. Dewey, *Experience and Education* 42.

Dewey makes this point in the following way: "Any habit marks an inclination - an active preference and
choice for the conditions involved in its exercise. A
habit does not wait, Micawber-like, for a stimulus to
turn up so that it may get busy; it actively seeks for
occasions to pass into full operation." Dewey,
*Democracy and Education* 48.


90. Dewey, *Human Nature* 177. The following provides an
illustration of this aspect of habit: "Habit is energy
organized in certain channels. When interfered with,
it swells as resentment and as an avenging force. To
say that it will be obeyed, that custom makes law, that
nomos is lord of all, is after all only to say that
habit is habit. Emotion is a perturbation from clash
or failure of habit, and reflecton, roughly speaking,
is the painful effort of disturbed habits to readjust

Dewey identifies the self with habits when, speaking of
a bad habit, he writes: "It makes us do things we are
ashamed of, things which we tell ourselves we prefer
not to do. It overrides our formal resolutions, our
conscious decisions. When we are honest with ourselves
we acknowledge that a habit has this power because it
is so intimately a part of ourselves. It has a hold
upon us because we are the habit." Dewey, *Human Nature*
24. He then goes on to add: "These traits of a bad
habit are precisely the things which are most
instructive about all habits and about ourselves. They
teach us that all habits are affections, that all have
a projectile power, and that a predisposition formed by
a number of specific acts is an immensely more intimate
and fundamental part of ourselves than are vague,
general, conscious choices. All habits are demands for
certain kinds of activity; and they constitute the
self. In any intelligible sense of the word will, they
are will. They form our effective desires and they
furnish us with our working capacities. They rule our
thoughts, determining which shall appear and be strong
92. Dewey, Moral Life 13-14. In Human Nature and Conduct, Dewey makes this point as follows: "Were it not for the continued operation of all habits in every act, no such thing as character could exist. There would be simply a bundle, an untied bundle at that, of isolated acts. Character is the interpenetration of habits. If each habit existed in an insulated compartment and operated without affecting or being affected by others, character would not exist." Dewey, Human Nature 38.

93. Given that character is constituted by habits, it follows that the process whereby habits are formed is thus also the process whereby character is formed. Since habits can be acquired either blindly (as in the case of conditioning by the socio-cultural environment) or deliberately (as when actions performed are the result of reflective choice), it follows that an individual's character is not entirely the product of social conditioning. For Dewey, who one is is also a matter of self-determination.


95. Vide, pp. 226-227 above.


100. Dewey, Logic 32.


104. It should be noted here that the "goodness" of a particular habit is determined within a particular environment and not absolutely.


112. Vide, Chapter 2, Section 3a, pp. 103-113.


115. Bearing in mind that for Dewey every experiential situation is comprised of interactive processes involving an individual and a particular environment, and given that in his view neither the individual nor the environment are ever twice exactly alike (this follows from his principle of interaction), it can be concluded that indeterminacy is, to a greater or lesser degree, an inherent characteristic of every experiential situation.


118. Since an indeterminate experiential situation occurs as part of pre-reflective experience (and hence prior to and apart from reflective inquiry), it might be inferred that reflective inquiry plays absolutely no part in determining the occurrence and character of an indeterminate experiential situation. This conclusion, although partially warranted, is nevertheless misleading. While it is true that reflective inquiry plays no part in the occurrence of this indeterminate experiential situation now, it does not follow that reflective inquiry plays no role whatsoever in engendering and determining the character of indeterminate experiential situations. This is so because experience, given Dewey's principle of interaction, affects the habits of the individual who has it, thereby also affecting the conditions of subsequent experience. Thus an individual's experience at time "T1" affects the experience that will be had at time "T2". If, however, reflective inquiry occurs as part of the experience had at time "T1", then it follows that reflective inquiry conditions, to some degree, the experience had at time "T2". It can be concluded, therefore, that reflective inquiry does condition, in the sense just indicated, the occurrence of an indeterminate experiential situation.
119. The fact that an indeterminate experiential situation is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of reflective inquiry raises an interesting problem, viz., What accounts for the emergence of reflective inquiry rather than day-dreaming or wishing? Although a comprehensive inquiry into this matter falls beyond the scope of this thesis, a partial answer can be suggested. The emergence of reflective inquiry in response to an indeterminate experiential situation occurs when inquiry itself has become a habit. Writes Dewey: "Having hit upon knowledge accidentally, as it were, and the product being liked and its importance noted, knowledge getting becomes, upon occasion, a definite occupation. And education confirms the disposition, as it may confirm that of a musician or carpenter or tennis player. But there is no more an original separate impulse or power in one case than in the other. Every habit is impulsive, that is projective, urgent and the habit of knowing is no exception." John Dewey, Human Nature 186.


125. "Concrete habits do all the perceiving, recognizing, imagining, recalling, judging, conceiving and reasoning that is done." Dewey, Human Nature 177. For an extended discussion of this point, see Section 1b above, pp. 239-260.


129. Dewey, Logic 109. Dewey illustrates this aspect of inquiry as follows: "When an alarm of fire is sounded in a crowded assembly hall, there is much that is indeterminate as regards the activities that may produce a favorable issue. One may get out safely or one may be trampled and burned. The first is characterized, however, by some settled traits. It is, for example, located somewhere. Then the aisles and exits are at fixed places. Since they are settled or
determinate in existence, the first step in institution of a problem is to settle them in observation. There are other factors which, while they are not as temporally and spatially fixed, are yet observable constituents; for example, the behavior and movements of other members of the audience." Dewey, Logic 109.

130. Dewey, Moral Life 134. In Logic: the Theory of Inquiry, Dewey reaffirms this point when he writes: "...all judgments of practice are evaluations, being occupied with judging what to do on the basis of established consequences of conditions which, since they are existential, are going to operate in any case." Dewey, Logic 174.

131. It should be noted that the habits involved in both phases of reflective inquiry involve a number of "epistemological" and "metaphysical" issues. In the diagnostic phase, for example, the role of observation presupposes that the agent involved is able to recognize and identify the constituent elements and relations comprising an indeterminate experiential situation. In the prescriptive phase, comparison of one situation with another presupposes that the agent is able to remember previous experiences correctly. The detailed analysis of these issues, however, falls well beyond the scope of this thesis.

132. Dewey, Logic 110. The elements involved in this examination are fleshed out by Dewey as follows: "This examination consists in noting what the meaning in question implies in relation to other meanings in the system of which it is a member, the formulated relation constituting a proposition. If such and such a relation of meaning is accepted, then we are committed to such and such other relations of meanings because of their membership in the same system. Through a series of intermediate meanings, a meaning is finally reached which is more clearly relevant to the problem in hand than the originally suggested idea. It indicates operations which can be performed to test its applicability, whereas the original idea is usually too vague to determine crucial operations. In other words, the idea or meaning when developed in discourse directs the activities which, when executed, provided needed evidential material." Dewey, Logic 111-112.

133. Dewey, Logic 106.


140. The significance of this fact for reflective moral experience and for moral education is enormous. It allows for the involvement in reflective moral experience of every form of inquiry that casts light upon human nature. Writes Dewey: "...in fact morals is the most humane of all subjects. It is that which is closest to human nature; it is ineradicably empirical, not theological nor metaphysical nor mathematical. Since it directly concerns human nature, everything that can be known of the human mind and body in physiology, medicine, anthropology, and psychology is pertinent to moral inquiry. ... Hence physics, chemistry, history, statistics, engineering science, are a part of disciplined moral knowledge so far as they enable us to understand the conditions and agencies through which man lives, and on account of which he forms and executes his plans. Moral science is not something with a separate province. It is physical, biological and historic knowledge placed in a human context where it will illuminate and guide the activities of men." Dewey, *Human Nature* 295-96. It can be inferred from this that these forms of inquiry are potential resources that can be profitably employed in broadening, deepening and enriching moral education.


143. *Vide* pp. 276-277.

144. Frankena, *Ethics* 62. By way of explanation and illustration he goes on to write: "Partly, it is a matter of the difference in the objects that are called good or bad. The sorts of things that may be morally good or bad are persons, groups of persons, traits of character, dispositions, emotions, motives, and intentions—in short, persons, groups of persons, and elements of personality. All sorts of things, on the other hand, may be nonmorally good or bad, for example: physical objects like cars and paintings;
experiences like pleasure, pain, knowledge, and freedom; and forms of government like democracy. ...Partly, the distinction between judgments of moral and nonmoral value is also a matter of the difference in the grounds or reasons for which they are made." Frankena, *Ethics* 62.


158. It should not be inferred here that for Dewey moral subject-matter is comprised exclusively of the character development of the agent engaged in deliberating and acting. It also includes the effects (consequences) of an agent's acts on the character development of other agents as well as on the material conditions prevailing within the natural and socio-cultural environment within which the agent and others must live out their lives.


164. "...there is no better evidence of a well formed moral character..." writes Dewey "...than knowledge of when to raise the moral issue and when not. It implies a sensitiveness to values which is the token of a balanced personality. Undoubtedly many persons are so callous or so careless that they do not raise the moral issue often enough. But there are others so unbalanced that they hamper and paralyze conduct by indulging in what approaches a mania of doubt." Dewey, *Moral Life* 12-13.


168. It should be noted here that Dewey refers to pre-reflective experience as pre-cognitive precisely because the habits of reflective inquiry are not directly involved in its occurrence.

169. The problems and theories in the philosophy of perception are clearly far more complex than is here suggested. A full discussion of these views, however, falls well beyond the scope of this thesis.

170. The beliefs and attitudes that accompany perception as well as the habits of feeling are acquired early and as a result are frequently "unconscious" in their operation. For this reason "remaking" the habits thus involved is difficult if not sometimes impossible. Writes Dewey: "Very early in life sets of mind are formed without attentive thought, and these sets persist and control the mature mind. . .These habits, deeply engrained before thought is awake and even before the day of experiences which can be later recalled, govern conscious later thought. They are usually deepest and most unget-at-able just where critical thought is most needed—in morals, religion and politics. These "infantilisms" account for the mass of irrationalities that prevail among men of otherwise rational tastes." Dewey, *Human Nature* 98.

172. Dewey, *Reconstruction* 163-4. In Dewey's view there are two different types of experiential situation eliciting reflective moral inquiry. "One kind..." he writes "...and that the most emphasized in moral writings and lectures, is the conflict which takes place when an individual is tempted to do something which he is convinced is wrong." By way of illustration he offers the following example: "The employee of a bank who is tempted to embezzle funds may indeed try to argue himself into finding reasons why it would not be wrong for him to do it. But in such cases, he is not really thinking, but merely permitting his desire to govern his beliefs. There is no sincere doubt in his mind as to what he should do when he seeks to find some justification for what he has made up his mind to do." Dewey, *Moral Life* 6. Dewey describes the second type of situation eliciting reflective moral inquiry as follows: "Take...the case of a citizen of a nation which has just declared war on another country. He is deeply attached to his own State. He has formed habits of loyalty and of abiding by its laws, and now one of its decrees is that he shall support war. He feels in addition gratitude and affection for the country which has sheltered and nurtured him. But he believes that this war is unjust, or perhaps he has a conviction that all war is a form of murder and hence wrong. One side of his nature, one set of convictions and habits, leads him to acquiescence in war; another deep part of his being protests. He is torn between two duties: he experiences a conflict between the incompatible values presented to him by his habits of citizenship and by his religious beliefs respectively. Up to this time, he has never experienced a struggle between the two; they have coincided and reinforced one another. Now he has to make a choice between competing moral loyalties and convictions. The struggle is not between a good which is clear to him and something else which attracts him but which he knows to be wrong. It is between values each of which is an undoubted good in its place but which now get in each other's way. He is forced to reflect in order to come to a decision." Dewey, *Moral Life* 6-7.


174. Dewey does not distinguish between the initial, inchoate stage of a problematic situation and the intermediate stage wherein a specific problem is instituted. In his view the emergence of inquiry transforms an indeterminate experiential situation into a problematic one. Inquiry, however, is clearly a temporal process. A problematic situation is thus
problematic throughout the entire time that inquiry is involved, from its inception to its completion in action. Since the institution of a problem does not, in and of itself, either resolve the problem or fix what is to be done in order to resolve it, the conclusion can be drawn that the institution of a problem is only a stage of inquiry in the resolution of the problematic situation, albeit an important stage. It is useful, therefore, to distinguish the initial stage of a problematic situation before institution of a problem and the culmination of this initial stage when a problem is instituted. A "fully problematic situation" is thus one in which a problem has been instituted.


177. In Dewey's view moral theory as a whole can be seen to have the same guiding (but non-prescriptive) role that specific principles have in particular inquiries. He writes: "Moral theory can (i) generalize the types of moral conflicts which arise, thus enabling a perplexed and doubtful individual to clarify his own particular problem by placing it in a larger context; it can (ii) state the leading ways in which such problems have been intellectually dealt with by those who have thought upon such matters; it can (iii) render personal reflection more systematic and enlightened, suggesting alternatives that might otherwise be overlooked, and stimulating greater consistency in judgement. But it does not offer a table of commandments in a catechism in which answers are as definite as are the questions which are asked. It can render personal choice more intelligent, but it cannot take the place of personal decision, which must be made in every case of moral perplexity." Dewey, *Moral Life* 7-8.


181. Dewey, *Quest* 278. In Dewey's view, when the instrumental character of moral principles is acknowledged, fundamental changes in attitude will result. He writes: "The change would do away with the intolerance and fanaticism that attend the notion that beliefs and judgments are capable of inherent truth and authority; inherent in the sense of being
independent of what they lead to when used as directive principles." He goes on to conclude: "Men, instead of being proud of accepting and asserting beliefs and "principles" on the ground of loyalty, will be ashamed of that procedure as they would now be to confess their assent to a scientific theory out of reverence for Newton or Helmholz or whomever, without regard to evidence." Dewey, *Quest* 277-278.


184. Dewey, *Human Nature* 218. In Dewey's view, it should be noted, the utilitarian understanding of morals involves a view of deliberation that is narrow in the sense he rejects.


190. Dewey, *Valuation* 34.


194. Dewey, *Quest* 260-61. In *Theory of the Moral Life* Dewey characterizes this distinction as follows: "There is a difference which must be noted between valuation as judgement (which involves thought in placing the thing judged in its relations and bearings) and valuing as a direct emotional and practical act. There is difference between esteem and estimation, between prizing and appraising. To esteem is to prize, hold dear, admire, approve; to estimate is to measure in intellectual fashion. One is direct, spontaneous; the other is reflex, reflective. We esteem before we estimate, and estimation comes in to consider whether and to what extent something is worthy of esteem." Dewey, *Moral Life* 122-3. He then adds: "The obvious difference between the two attitudes is that direct
admiration and prizing are absorbed in the object, a person, act, natural scene, work of art or whatever, to the neglect of its place and effects, its connections with other thing. "For to think is to look at a thing in its relations with other things, and such judgement often modifies radically the original attitude of esteem and liking." Dewey, Moral Life 123.

195. For a more detailed discussion of Dewey's rejection of immediate knowledge vide Chapter 2, Section C, pp. 119-34.


198. Dewey, Quest 268.

199. Dewey, Quest 258.

200. Dewey, Quest 259.

201. Dewey, Quest 259.


205. Dewey, Moral Life 159.


207. Dewey, Moral Life 159-60.


211. Dewey, Moral Life 159.

212. Dewey, Moral Life 159.

213. In light of this fact Dewey argues that the "...moral measure for estimating any existing arrangement or any proposed reform is its effect upon impulse and habits. Does it liberate or suppress, ossify or render flexible, divide or unify interest? Is perception quickened or dulled? Is memory made apt and extensive
or narrow and diffusely irrelevant? Is imagination diverted to fantasy and compensatory dreams, or does it add fertility to life? Is thought creative or pushed one side into pedantic specialisms?" Dewey, Human Nature 293-4. He then concludes: "To foster conditions that widen the horizon of others and give them command of their own powers, so that they can find their own happiness in their own fashion, is the way of "social" action. Otherwise the prayer of a freeman would be to be left alone, and to be delivered, above all, from "reformers" and "kind" people." Dewey, Human Nature 294.


218. Dewey, Human Nature 190. Dewey goes on to add: "Deliberation means precisely that activity is disintegrated, and that its various elements hold one another up. While none has force enough to become the center of re-directed activity, or to dominate a course of action, each has enough power to check others from exercising mastery. Activity does not cease in order to give way to reflection: activity is turned from execution into intra-organic channels, resulting in dramatic rehearsal." Dewey, Human Nature 191.


222. Dewey, Valuation 34.

223. Dewey, Valuation 34.


228. Dewey, Valuation 43.
229. For a more detailed discussion of Dewey's view of the means/end continuum vide Chapter 2, Section 4, pp. 134-152.


240. Dewey, *Human Nature* 204-5. In *The Quest for Certainty*, Dewey writes: "There is nothing in which a person so completely reveals himself as in the things which he judges enjoyable and desirable. Such judgments are the sole alternative to the domination of belief by impulse, chance, blind habit and self-interest. The formation of a cultivated and effectively operative good judgment or taste with respect to what is esthetically admirable, intellectually acceptable and morally approvable is the supreme task set to human beings by the incidents of experience." Dewey, *Quest* 262.


251. Dewey, *Reconstruction* 169. "In quality, the good is never twice alike. It never copies itself. It is new every morning, fresh every evening. It is unique in its every presentation. For it marks the resolution of a distinctive complication of competing habits and impulses which can never repeat itself." Dewey, *Human Nature* 211.

252. Dewey, *Quest* 266.


254. Dewey, *Reconstruction* 166. "The question arises whether the way out of the confusion and conflict is not to go to the root of the matter by questioning this common element. Is not the belief in the single, final and ultimate (whether conceived as good or as authoritative law) an intellectual product of that feudal organization which is disappearing historically and of that belief in a bounded, ordered, cosmos, wherein rest is higher than motion, which has disappeared from natural science? It has been repeatedly suggested that the present limit of intellectual reconstruction lies in the fact that it has not as yet been seriously applied in the moral and social disciplines. Would not this further application demand precisely that we advance to a belief in a plurality of changing, moving, individualized goods and ends, and to a belief that principles, criteria, laws are intellectual instruments for analyzing individual or unique situations?" *Reconstruction* 162-3.


256. For a more detailed discussion of Dewey's conception of consummatory experience vide Chapter 2, Section 4, pp. 134-152.


259. Dewey, *Reconstruction* 164. "A person entirely lacking in sympathetic response might have a keen calculating intellect, but he would have no spontaneous sense of claims of others for satisfaction of their desires. A person of narrow sympathy is of necessity a person of confined outlook upon the scene of human good." Dewey,
Moral Life 129.


261. Vide Chapter 1, Part A, Section 5, pp. 39-53 and endnote # 74.


264. Hudson 12.


266. Vide Chapter 1, endnote #83 and Chapter 2, Part A, Section 2, pp. 81-90.


CHAPTER FOUR

TOWARD A DEWEYAN THEORY OF MORAL EDUCATION AND MORAL AGENCY

...the aim of moral education
is to develop a character
which finds pleasure in right
objects and pain in wrong
ends.

John Dewey

In the two previous chapters my objective has been to
provide the grounding necessary for a Deweyan approach to
moral education and moral agency. In Chapter Two the
metaphysical scaffolding presupposed by Dewey's view of
moral experience was presented, while in Chapter Three his
construction of moral experience and his understanding of
the nature and formation of character was delineated. With
this background in place I propose, in this chapter, to
develop some of the implications of Dewey's views for moral
education. In the interest of clarity I shall begin by
discussing some of the consequences of Dewey's views for the
theory of moral education and moral agency. I shall then
conclude this chapter with a discussion of some of the more
significant implications of his views for the practice of
moral education.

A: DEWEYAN CONSEQUENCES FOR THE THEORY OF MORAL
EDUCATION AND MORAL AGENCY
As indicated in Chapter One\(^1\), the central aim of moral education is to nurture the growth and development of a morally educated person (i.e., a moral agent). In purely formal terms, a moral agent is a person who: 1) can recognize when to engage in moral deliberation, 2) is capable of engaging in such deliberation, and 3) acts (as a general rule) in accordance with the judgements eventuating from such deliberation. Apart from a particular moral framework, however, the notion of a moral agent lacks substance. It follows, therefore, that similarities as well as differences between conceptions of moral agency can be accounted for by reference to the moral frameworks within which they are developed. More importantly, given that the principal aim of moral education is the fostering of moral agency, it can be concluded that a theory of moral education will be conditioned, to a considerable extent (but not entirely), by the moral framework within which the notion of a moral agent is delineated.

In light of the discussion in the previous two chapters there are, in my view, four important consequences which must be taken into account in developing a theory of moral education and moral agency that is faithful to Dewey's conception of moral experience and his understanding of the nature and formation of character. In brief outline, the first of these consequences follows from Dewey's understanding of the role of feeling in the process of
inquiry. The second centers on the socio-cultural dimension presupposed by the formation of habit and character. The third consequence is rooted in Dewey's conception of ends and histories. The final consequence for the theory of moral education that I shall consider proceeds from Dewey's view of the role of intellectual disciplines in the development of moral theory and the process of moral inquiry and deliberation. In what follows I shall discuss these consequences under the following headings: 1) the cognitive-affective dimension of moral education, 2) the socio-cultural dimension of moral education, 3) the place of value hierarchies in moral education, and 4) the role of intellectual disciplines in moral education. It is to the first of these that I now turn.

1. The Cognitive-Affective Dimension of Moral Education

In Chapter Two, it will be recalled, the point was made that Dewey rejects the possibility of immediate knowledge (as well as the possibility of immediate valuation) and hence draws a distinction between having an experience and knowing something about it. In his view "knowing" (as well as "valuating") is, in fact, a process involving reflective inquiry and thus is part of reflective (or secondary) experience. He uses the term "immediacy" to mark the fact that the esthetic qualities inherent in the experiential
situations comprising pre-reflective experience are directly had (i.e., felt) in their full qualitativenss. Inquiry, knowing and valuation thus clearly presuppose immediacy (i.e., esthetic experience). For Dewey, therefore, having an experience always precedes knowing something about it. Given that reflective experience presupposes pre-reflective experience, however, it follows that the structure and quality of pre-reflective experience conditions, in part, the various forms of reflective experience not only by furnishing its subject-matter, but also by setting the context of the inquiry to be undertaken. Writes Dewey:

...a problem must be felt before it can be stated. If the unique quality of the situation is had immediately, then there is something that regulates the selection and the weighing of observed facts and their conceptual ordering.\(^3\)

Thus, for Dewey, the structure and quality of pre-reflective experience conditions the course and outcome of reflective experience. It can be concluded, therefore, that changes in pre-reflective experience directly affect reflective experience and hence that the experiential situations comprising pre-reflective experience are of fundamental importance in determining the structure and quality of reflective experience.

In discussing Dewey's understanding of the nature and formation of character the point was made that, in his view, the term "character" denotes the whole interacting network of habits comprising an individual's cognitive, affective,
and conative skills and sensitivities. The contention that character is an intrinsic constituent of pre-reflective experience was thus seen to lead to the conclusion that the structure and quality of pre-reflective experience is conditioned, in part, by the outworking of these habits. Given that pre-reflective experience is immediate (i.e., directly had; felt), however, the habits most directly involved in conditioning the structure and quality of pre-reflective experience are those comprising an individual's affective skills and sensitivities. In forming an individual's affective habits, therefore, one conditions, in part, not only the formation of her/his character but also the structure and quality of her/his pre-reflective experience. Writes Dewey:

Nothing can make up for the absence of immediate sensitiveness; the insensitive person is callous, indifferent. Unless there is a direct, mainly unreflective appreciation of persons and deeds, the data for subsequent thought will be lacking or distorted. A person must feel the qualities of acts as one feels with the hands the qualities of roughness and smoothness in objects, before he has an inducement to deliberate. Effective reflection must also terminate in a situation which is directly appreciated, if thought is to be effective in action.4

In this passage Dewey emphasizes the importance of feeling in both the occurrence and conditioning of reflective inquiry as well as in the assessment of its outcome. In his view, therefore, the way an individual feels is a key factor
in conditioning reflective inquiry and experience. However, given that pre-reflective experience conditions, in part, the quality of reflective experience, the conclusion can be drawn that in forming character one is ipso facto conditioning the course and outcome of reflective experience, and, a fortiori, the quality and outcome of an individual's reflective moral experience.

The distinction between the affective and the cognitive quality of experience (or, in more general terms, between pre-reflective and reflective experience) can be only too readily transformed into a dualism in which one or the other is rejected as being either unnecessary or incompatible with the pursuit of knowledge and truth. For Dewey, however, every dualism, regardless of its "self-evidence" is suspect. In his view all distinctions, including the distinction between thinking and feeling, are drawn in the context of inquiry for a particular purpose. Although thinking and feeling can be distinguished, in Dewey's view (as outlined above), in the actual unfolding of experience they interpenetrate and affect one another. This point emerges clearly when Dewey writes:

...a set and disposition of character leads to anticipation of certain kinds of consequences and to passing over other effects of action without notice. A careless man will not be aware of consequences that occur to a prudent man; if they do present themselves to thought, he will not attach the force to them which the careful man does. A crafty character will foresee
consequences which will not occur to a
frank and open man; if they should
happen to come to the mind of the
latter, he will be repelled by the very
considerations that would attract the
sly and intriguing person. Othello and
Iago foresee different consequences
because they have different kinds of
characters. ⁶

In this passage Dewey makes the point that the course and
outcome of a particular individual's reflective experience
is clearly affected by her/his immediate and pre-reflective
desires and aversions. These desires and aversions,
however, are part of an individual's affective character.
Dewey affirms this point when he writes:

A legislator is tempted by a bribe to
vote against conviction only because his
selfhood is already such that money gain
has more value to him than convictions
and principles. It is true enough when
we take the whole situation into
account that an object moves a person;
for that object as a moving force
includes the self within it. ⁷

In the two passages just cited, Dewey underscores the
dynamic interplay of both the affective and the cognitive
constituents of an individual's character through the
process of reflective inquiry and deliberation. In his view
affective character, in conditioning the structure and
quality of pre-reflective experience, thereby also
conditions the course and outcome of reflective inquiry and
hence of reflective experience. This aspect of inquiry must
be taken into account if a richer and deeper understanding
of reflective experience is to be had. The importance of
this point for the theory of moral education can hardly be overstated.

The aim of moral education is to nurture the growth and development of moral agency. Just how this is to be accomplished depends, in part, on the understanding one has of what a moral agent is. The central task of a theory of moral education is thus twofold: 1) to determine the qualities characteristic of a moral agent, and 2) to delineate the conditions necessary to foster the development of such an agent. Apart from the particular moral framework within which the notion of moral agency is delineated, the concept one has of a moral agent is conditioned, to a considerable extent, by the role one assigns to "thinking" and "feeling" in moral inquiry and deliberation. The tendency, noted above, to transform the distinction between thinking and feeling into a dualism, however, has had an essentially negative effect on the theory of moral education and moral agency. This is the case because the bifurcation of thinking and feeling has almost always led to an understanding of moral inquiry and deliberation in which the importance of thinking is exaggerated while the place and significance of feeling is ignored, if not actually denied. The net import of this is that the notion of a moral agent is construed as denoting an individual who is able to think and deliberate clearly, logically and dispassionately. Feelings are regarded as being "merely
subjective" and thus unimportant (even hindrances) in the process of moral inquiry and deliberation\textsuperscript{9}, and hence their importance in the development of moral agency is ignored. As can be readily inferred, the theory of moral education resulting from this view of moral agency emphasizes the primacy of thinking and analysis, while the precise role of feeling and the affective dimension of experience in moral life is inadequately delineated or else it is altogether denied.

The cognitive-developmental approach to moral education developed by the late Lawrence Kohlberg is one example of a current theory of moral education in which the cognitive aspect of moral inquiry and deliberation is emphasized and the affective dimension of moral life, while not ignored, is nevertheless inadequately explored and developed. A full discussion of Kohlberg's theory of moral education falls well beyond the scope of this thesis. A summary of his views, however, would provide the contrast needed to clarify and highlight important differences between Dewey's view of the interplay between the cognitive and affective dimension of moral experience and the views of others. In what follows, therefore, I shall briefly outline Kohlberg's theory of moral education and his conception of the cognitive and affective aspect of moral life.

Kohlberg's theory of moral education has been developed and refined over the past thirty years. Writing of his
approach, he claims to have:

...defined an approach to moral education which unites philosophic and psychological considerations and meets, as any "approach" must, the requirements (a) of being based on the psychological and sociological facts of moral development, (b) of involving educational methods of stimulating moral change, which have demonstrated long-range efficacy, (c) of being based on a philosophically defensible concept of morality, and (d) of being in accord with a constitutional system guaranteeing freedom of belief.10

Apart from the essentially Kantian conception of morals that Kohlberg presupposes11, the principal feature distinguishing his approach to moral education from that of other writers in the field (e.g., Sidney Simon and Clive Beck) is its psychological account of moral development. Based on extensive and cross-cultural research, Kohlberg has concluded that moral development occurs in six distinguishable stages following an invariable sequence and that growth in moral maturity is stimulated by "moral dilemmas" eliciting moral thinking and reflection.12 In an early paper entitled "The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral Education", he writes:

The approach is called cognitive because it recognizes that moral education, like intellectual education, has its basis in stimulating the active thinking of the child about moral issues and decisions. It is called developmental because it sees the aims of moral education through moral stages.13

Thus for Kohlberg, as is evident in the passages cited, a
defensible approach to moral education must presuppose a
tenable moral framework and be grounded in a theory of moral
development.

The cornerstone of Kohlberg's approach to moral
education is his contention that moral thinking is the key
to moral development and maturity. In his view, both moral
development and moral education have a cognitive core.
"There are...," he writes, "...two assumptions of our theory
which we shall stress here, because they are central for
educators and philosophers concerned with morality."¹⁴ He
goes on to add:

One is our second assumption, the
assumption that moral development has a
cognitive core. This assumption is
central to any intellectual approach to
moral education and contrasts sharply
with irrational-emotive theories of
moral development such as those of
Durkheim and Freud. The other
assumption is of the interactional
origins of morality. This assumption
is central to an intellective approach
to moral education as not a process of
transmission of fixed moral truth but
rather a stimulation of the child's
restructuring of his experience.¹⁵

As these passages attest, for Kohlberg thinking and
reasoning have a central place in moral development and
education. What remains to be determined, however, is his
view of the role of feeling in moral experience.

The distinction between the cognitive and the affective
dimension of moral experience leads naturally, in Kohlberg's
view, to the problem of determining whether or not one or
the other is more fundamental in the process of moral thinking and development. Moral experience, he argues, is comprised of a cognitive and an affective component. He writes:

...the cognitive-developmental view holds that "cognition" and "affect" are different aspects, or perspectives on, the same mental events, that all mental events have both cognitive and affective aspects, and that the development of mental dispositions reflects structural changes recognizable in both cognitive and affective perspectives.\(^{16}\)

He adds:

It is evident that moral judgments often involve strong emotional components. It is also evident that the presence of strong emotion in no way reduces the cognitive component of moral judgment, although it may imply a somewhat different functioning of the cognitive component than is implied in more neutral areas.\(^{17}\)

By way of clarification he adds:

An astronomer's calculation that a comet will hit the earth will be accompanied by strong emotion but this does not make his calculation less cognitive than a calculation of a comet's orbit which had no earthly consequences. And just as the quantitative strength of the emotional component is irrelevant to the theoretical importance of cognitive structure for understanding the development of scientific judgment, so too the quantitative role of affect is relatively irrelevant for understanding the structure and development of moral judgment.\(^{18}\)

Kohlberg then goes on to conclude:

The example of the astronomer's calculation can be misleading, however,
in that moral judgments differ from scientific judgments in the way in which they involve affective aspects of mental functioning. Moral judgments are largely about sentiments and intuitions of persons and to a large extent they express and are justified by reference to the judge's sentiments.19

In the passages just cited, Kohlberg highlights what he takes to be the role of feeling in moral thinking and development. In considering these passages, two points in particular should be noted.

The first point centers on the role Kohlberg assigns to feelings in moral experience. In his view, it would appear, feelings can be part of moral thinking in one of two ways: 1) they can emerge as a consequence of a process of reflection (as, for example, the astronomer's anxiety is the outcome of his conclusion regarding the comet's collision with the earth), and 2) they can accompany moral thinking thereby making it more difficult. In the first case feelings are mere epiphenomena, shadows cast by moral thinking and judgement. In the second case, they are part of the backdrop against which thinking and judgement play out their roles. In neither case, however, are feelings viewed as integral constituents of both the subject-matter of moral inquiry and of the process of inquiry and deliberation eventuating in judgement. Thus, in Kohlberg's view, feelings, although an important component in moral experience, are nevertheless secondary in comparison with thinking and reasoning. The second point to note is that
Kohlberg, appearances notwithstanding, bifurcates thinking and feeling. He does not, however, go on to use this dualism as a theoretical ground for denying feeling a place in moral experience. His conception of the actual role of feeling in moral thinking supports this reading of the passages under review. Given these two points, the contrast between Kohlberg's understanding of the affective dimension of moral experience and Dewey's can be drawn more clearly.

In Dewey's view, thinking and feeling are not hived-off into separate categories. They are, instead, the ubiquitous qualities of pre-reflective experience, distinguishable only within the context of specific inquiries. Kohlberg, on the other hand, appears to assume not only that thinking and feeling are distinguishable and separable, but also that the former can occur free of any interference from the latter. More importantly, however, Dewey's understanding of the interplay between the cognitive and the affective dimension of moral inquiry and deliberation is, in my view, a more subtle and better rendering of moral experience than the view developed by Kohlberg. For Kohlberg, feelings are either mere shadows cast by moral judgment or else an unwelcome backdrop to its operation. Dewey does not, of course, deny that feelings can sometimes overwhelm inquiry and deliberation. Nor does he deny that reflection can affect the feelings one has. Unlike Kohlberg, however, Dewey views feelings as dynamic forces conditioning the
structure and quality of pre-reflective experience and, thereby, the subject-matter of reflective inquiry. As a direct consequence of this, feelings also condition the course and outcome of reflective experience. Moreover, in Dewey's view, feelings also appear as vital forces in the construction of ends-in-view. Dewey's conception of the place of feelings in moral experience thus can be seen to be a radical departure from the more narrow and traditional view espoused by Kohlberg.

The foregoing summary of Kohlberg's approach to moral education was presented as an illustration of theories of moral education in which the place of feeling in moral experience is inadequately delineated. In light of the sharp contrast between Dewey's understanding of the interplay between thinking and feeling in moral inquiry and deliberation and Kohlberg's, the consequences of Dewey's conception of moral experience for a theory of moral education and moral agency can now be more clearly indicated.

The net import of Dewey's understanding of moral experience for a theory of moral education and moral agency is that it requires the inclusion of the affective dimension of experience as an integral constituent in the theory of moral education. In so doing, it opens the door to an extensive investigation, not only of the more evident role of feeling in moral thinking and deliberation (i.e., the
role suggested by Kohlberg), but also of the innumerable and subtle ways in which feelings condition the structure and quality of the experiential situations an agent undergoes (an aspect of moral experience ignored by Kohlberg and other theorists as well). Since an agent's pre-reflective experience determines the ultimate outcome of her/his moral inquiry and deliberation, and given that feelings condition pre-reflective experience, it follows that an understanding of 1) how feelings condition the structure and quality of pre-reflective experience, and 2) how this structure and quality can be affected by the education of character is fundamental. It can be concluded, therefore, that apart from an understanding of how pre-reflective experience is shaped by feeling, a theory of moral education and moral agency will remain both incomplete and, more importantly, inadequate. That Dewey's conception of moral experience leads to a recognition and appreciation of this fact is clearly a major contribution to the theory of moral education and moral agency. It should also be noted here that a theory of moral education rooted in a Deweyan understanding of moral experience, in underscoring the vital role of feeling in moral inquiry and deliberation, successfully avoids the criticism advanced by Martin (and others) against the male cognitive perspective inherent in the views of Peters and Hirst. More significantly, however, such a theory would prove to be the kind of alternative,
"gender-sensitive" approach to moral education called for by Martin.  

In the foregoing discussion my objective has been to delineate the consequences for the theory of moral education connected with Dewey's conception of moral experience. Dewey's view of moral experience, it was argued, requires the inclusion of feeling as an integral component in an adequate theory of moral education and moral agency. It was also maintained that this requirement would result in a theory of moral education that not only successfully avoids the criticism of Martin (and other feminist philosophers of education, e.g., Carol Gilligan), but also opens the door to a more gender-sensitive conception of moral agency. Taken together, these features of a Deweyan approach to moral education and moral agency make it both interesting as well as worthy of serious consideration. In what follows, the consequences for the theory of moral education of Dewey's understanding of the nature and formation of character will be considered.

2. The Socio-Cultural Dimension of Moral Education

In this section I propose to discuss two features of Dewey's understanding of the nature and formation of character and its role in determining the course and outcome of reflective experience that, in my view, have a significant bearing on the theory of moral education and
moral agency. The first centers on the social nature of the subject-matter of reflective moral experience, while the second revolves around the possibility of value-neutrality in moral education. I shall consider both of these features of Dewey's conception of character before turning to a discussion of their consequences for a theory of moral education. It is, accordingly, to the first of these that I now turn.

In Chapter Three the point was made that, for Dewey, the term character (self) denotes the whole complex network of an individual's interpenetrating cognitive, affective and conative habits. Given that character is an intrinsic constituent of pre-reflective experience, and since the course and outcome of reflective experience is conditioned by pre-reflective experience, it follows that the cognitive and affective habits acquired by an agent are vital determinants shaping her/his reflective experience. Prior to their acquisition as a result of deliberate choice, however, an agent's cognitive and affective habits are formed in the process of social interaction and, hence, the habits comprising her/his character are inevitably freighted with the beliefs, values and conceptual schemes prevailing in the socio-cultural environment within which they are formed. The beliefs, values and conceptual structures characteristic of the particular environment within which character is nurtured and developed are thus intrinsic
constituents of the pre-reflective experience an agent has. It can be concluded, therefore, that the structure and quality of pre-reflective experience is essentially social in nature and not, as might be expected given Cartesian assumptions, private and unique. The experiences of Robinson Crusoe while stranded on his island are thus inherently social. Although he is alone when he eats, the constellation of habits which he brings with him to his meal (together with the "consciousness" connected with their operation) speak unequivocally of his socio-cultural heritage. What food he will eat, how he will prepare and eat it, when he will eat, how much he will eat, etc. all reflect the customs and values of the socio-cultural environment within which his character was formed. Though no one be there to share his meal, he does not eat alone.22

In virtue of the social nature of an agent's cognitive and affective habits (and hence, of her/his character), the whole range of experiential situations comprising her/his pre-reflective experience are social in character. Moreover, apart from these experiential situations, there are no other more pristine layers of experience (i.e., experience which is "raw" and hence free of all colour connected with the values, beliefs and conceptual structures inherent in pre-reflective experience) to be had.23 In other words, since habits are inexpungible constituents of pre-reflective experience, it follows that if an individual
is to have pristine experience then s/he would have to be able to separate herself/himself from the whole complex of habits comprising her/his cognitive, affective and conative skills and sensitivities. Given Dewey's conception of character (self), however, it is conceptually impossible to separate one's self from one's acquired habits. In attempting to separate one's self from one's acquired cognitive and affective habits, one would be ipso facto discarding one's self altogether. Pristine experience would be, in essence, self-less experience. Whether or not the experience of a self-less being can ever be intelligible and, if intelligible, whether or not it could possibly be relevant to others are, of course, moot points. For Dewey, however, it is clear that in the case of human beings, at least, all experience involves habits (character). "It is not such a simple matter..." he writes, "...to have a clear-cut sensation. The latter is a sign of training, skill, habit."24 Thus it can be concluded that, in his view, all experience (i.e., pre-reflective as well as reflective experience) is saturated, to a greater or lesser degree, with the beliefs, values, and conceptual structures characteristic of the socio-cultural environment within which it occurs. Dewey affirms this point clearly and unequivocally when he writes:

We cannot permanently divest ourselves of the intellectual habits we take on and wear when we assimilate the culture of our time and place. But intelligent
furthering of culture demands that we take some of them off, that we inspect them critically to see what they are made of and what wearing them does to us. We cannot achieve recovery of primitive naivety.25

For Dewey, therefore, the attainment of pristine experience is conceptually impossible. Pre-reflective experience, freighted though it may be with beliefs and values, is nevertheless the *fons et origio* of all reflective experience and, *a fortiori*, all reflective moral experience.

In light of the foregoing discussion, the point can now be made that the subject-matter of reflective moral experience is fundamentally social in nature. That is to say, since the subject-matter of reflective moral experience is derived from pre-reflective experience, and given that pre-reflective experience is conditioned by both "subjective" and "objective" factors, it follows that the subject-matter of reflective moral experience is also conditioned by subjective and objective factors. Hence, from the subjective side, the subject-matter of reflective moral experience is "shaped" and "coloured" by an agent's habits embodying her/his values, feelings, needs, desires, prior experiences, etc. It can be inferred from this that the subject-matter of moral reflection *varies relative to the character of the agent involved*. Since character is comprised of habits that are socially conditioned, however, it can be concluded that the subject-matter of reflective moral experience is a socially conditioned construction and
not something which is "given", sub specie aeternitatis, in pre-reflective experience.

As an illustration of this point, consider the issue currently being discussed in bio-medical ethics of whether or not physicians ought to use fetal tissue in the treatment of patients with Parkinson's disease. The key to understanding the conflicting responses which this question elicits is to be found in the fact that, contrary to what might be assumed, the character of the issue itself varies relative to the agent who is considering it. A physician considering this issue, for example, might, in virtue of her/his training and practice, view fetal tissue as a medical resource, on a par with other medical resources (such as blood, vital organs and other body parts), the appropriate use of which ought to be determined by medical science. To a Catholic ethicist, on the other hand, fetal tissue is not "merely" (if at all) another medical resource to be used as the physician sees fit, but rather a vital part of a human being, endowed from the moment of conception, with human dignity and rights which all must recognize and respect. The radical difference between the physician's view and the Catholic's can, of course, be accounted for by citing differences in their respective value orientations. The difference between them, however, (and this is the key point) goes well beyond differences in their axiological frameworks. Stated baldly, the fact of
the matter is that the physician and the Catholic quite simply "see" the issue in radically different ways. The "light" in which each actually sees the issue is a function of her/his character. Hence, although both may state the question in similar terms, they are not discussing the "same" issue. The value commitments of both, important though they may be to understanding the difference between the physician and the Catholic, are not the whole story.

In the discussion thus far, the point has been made that an agent's character "shapes" and "colours" pre-reflective experience, thereby directly affecting the subject-matter of reflective moral experience. It was then argued that since the habits comprising character are socially conditioned, the subject-matter of reflective moral experience must also be inherently social. Before considering the consequences of this for the theory of moral education and moral agency, however, another aspect of the involvement of character in moral experience must be considered. It is to this point that I now turn.

In Chapter Two, Dewey's view that reflective inquiry (and hence, all forms of reflective experience) originates in an indeterminate experiential situation was considered. In the course of this discussion, attention was drawn to the fact that since the experiential situations comprising pre-reflective experience are the products of a process of interaction involving human beings and a particular natural
and socio-cultural environment, it follows that the indeterminacy characterizing a particular experiential situation must be conditioned by the component elements inherent in the process of interaction whereby it is produced. Given that the structure and quality of pre-reflective experience is determined, in part, by an individual's acquired habits, and since these habits are conditioned by the socio-cultural environment within which they are formed, it can be concluded that the indeterminacy inherent in a particular experiential situation is the result of conflict in the outworking of particular habits brought about by, among other things, changes in the environment. Writes Dewey:

...habits incorporate an environment within themselves. They are adjustments of the environment, not merely to it. At the same time, the environment is many, not one; hence will, disposition, is plural. Diversity does not of itself imply conflict, but it implies the possibility of conflict, and this possibility is realized in fact.²⁷

The indeterminacy generating reflective inquiry is thus the result of a conflict in the actual outworking of an individual's acquired cognitive, affective and conative habits. Given that the habits thus involved are freighted with the beliefs, values and conceptual structures of the socio-cultural environment within which they were formed, it can be concluded that the reflective inquiry generated by an indeterminate experiential situation is not only firmly
rooted in a particular existential context, but also has a contextually conditioned content and a specific objective. In other words inquiry, when it emerges, is directed to this indeterminate experiential situation, here, now involving these particular elements. Writes Dewey:

...all deliberation upon what to do is concerned with the completion and determination of a situation in some respect incomplete and so indeterminate. Every such situation is specific; it is not merely incomplete; the incompleteness is of a specific situation. Hence, the situation sets limits to the reflective process; what is judged has reference to it and that which limits never is judged in the particular situation in which it is limiting.28

The objective of reflective inquiry is to reconstruct the indeterminate experiential situation evoking it, thereby restoring harmony and equilibrium to experience. Writes Dewey:

It is not easy to exaggerate the extent to which we now pass from one kind of nurture to another as we go from business to church, from science to the newspaper, from business to art, from companionship to politics, from home to school. An individual is now subjected to many conflicting schemes of education. Hence habits are divided against one another, personality is disrupted, the scheme of conduct is confused and disintegrated. But the remedy lies in the development of a new morale which can be attained only as released impulses are intelligently employed to form harmonious habits adapted to one another in a new situation. A laxity due to decadence of old habits cannot be corrected by exhortations to restore old habits in
Thus, in Dewey's view, reflective inquiry begins and ends in specific indeterminate experiential situations that are freighted with the beliefs and values characteristic of the socio-cultural environment within which they emerge.

As noted above, an indeterminate experiential situation resulting in reflective inquiry is the outcome of a conflict involving acquired habits and the natural and socio-cultural environment within which they operate. Since these experiential situations are freighted with beliefs, values and conceptual structures, however, it follows that in the case of reflective moral experience the reflective inquiry involved must originate in, and derive its subject-matter from, experiential situations which are already value-laden. As a result of this, two significant conclusions can be seen to follow. In the first place, given that the reflective inquiry involved in reflective moral experience not only centers upon a value-laden subject-matter, but also is comprised of cognitive and affective habits which, in virtue of their being conditioned by a particular socio-cultural environment are, to some degree, value-laden as well, it follows that the inquiry, deliberation and valuation characteristic of reflective moral experience is both value-laden and culture-bound. It can be concluded, therefore, that value-neutrality in moral inquiry and deliberation is, at best, an educational achievement that can be only
partially realized. Complete value-neutrality in moral reflection is, quite simply, conceptually impossible. Hence, the belief that it is possible to adopt a completely value-neutral point of view in assessing value situations must be abandoned. The second conclusion to be drawn is that the values involved in reflective moral experience are neither purely "subjective" (i.e., arbitrary personal preferences projected into experiential situations), nor purely "objective" (i.e., either natural properties that are intrinsic constituents of objects, events, etc., or supernatural properties, existing sub specie aeternitatis, and appearing as supervenient qualities in objects, events, etc.). They are, instead, immediate qualities inherent in the experiential situations within which they emerge. As such they are directly had (felt).  

In the foregoing discussion, the point was made that for Dewey the indeterminate experiential situation that gives rise to reflective moral experience emerges as the result of a conflict of habits and, hence, that reflective moral experience is rooted in experiential situations that are already value-laden and culture-bound. It was also pointed out that since reflective moral experience is itself comprised of habits, indeterminate experiential situations cannot be approached and assessed from a value-neutral point of view. Dewey's view of the formation of character and the role it plays in conditioning moral experience results in
two important consequences for the theory of moral education and moral agency. It is to the discussion of these that I now turn.

The first consequence to note bears on the question of whether or not moral education can be value-neutral. In Western liberal democratic societies, indoctrination is regarded as a great evil that must be resolutely avoided at all times. The autonomy of the individual agent, together with her/his right to freely "choose" the values s/he is to live by are, in theory at least, the cardinal precepts informing the practice of education. Thus, moral education must strive to be value-neutral if it is to avoid the charge of indoctrination. On this view, apart from a few instances involving deeply entrenched values, in the day-to-day practice of moral education children are to be neither commended nor condemned for the value choices they make. They are, instead, to be supported and encouraged to seek out and develop their own moral point of view. In this approach to moral education, the teacher's role is very similar to the one assigned by Rousseau to the tutor of Emile, viz., the teacher is to avoid influencing the development of the students in her/his charge. The values clarification approach to values education pioneered and developed by Sidney Simon, Louis Raths and Merrill Marfin can easily serve as a paradigm example of this view of moral education.31
In light of Dewey's understanding of the formation of character and its role in conditioning both pre-reflective and reflective experience, it can be reasonably inferred that a theory of moral education presupposing value-neutrality is essentially misguided. This is the case for at least two reasons. In the first place, teachers simply cannot avoid influencing the character development of their students. This follows directly from the fact that every process of interaction involving human beings (and, a fortiori, interactions involving teachers and students) contributes, in however small a way, to either consolidating or altering both the student's and the teacher's acquired habits and, thereby, their respective characters. Even if a teacher deliberately sets out not to interact with her/his students (in which case, could s/he still be regarded as teaching?) s/he would nevertheless still be influencing the formation of their characters. This is the case because non-interaction is, in fact (paradox notwithstanding), a form of interaction. Writes Dewey:

...since habits involve the support of environing conditions, a society or some specific group of fellow-men, is always accessory before and after the fact. Some activity proceeds from a man; then it sets up reactions in the surroundings. Others approve, disapprove, protest, encourage, share and resist. Even letting a man alone is a definite response. Envy, admiration and imitation are complicities. Neutrality is non-existent. Conduct is always shared; this is the difference between it and a physiological process.
It is not an ethical "ought" that conduct should be social. It is social, whether bad or good. He subsequently goes on to add: "Non-resistance to evil which takes the form of paying no attention to it is a way of promoting it." It can be concluded, therefore, that teachers affect the development of their student's characters regardless of whether or not they intend to do so. It is foolish to pretend otherwise.

The second reason supporting the view that moral education cannot be value-neutral is rooted in the fact that character is inherently social in nature. As indicated above, in the process of interaction involving a teacher and her/his students, the characters of both are directly affected. It does not follow from this, however, that the characters of both are affected equally. The teacher's character, unlike that of her/his students, is comparatively stable (albeit developing). It can be inferred, therefore, that in the process of interaction between a teacher and her/his students, it is (as a general rule) the character of the teacher that proves to be the locus of influence. In view of the social nature of character, the values and beliefs of the teacher are thus inextricably involved in the process of interaction. In other words, given that character is an intrinsic constituent of experience, it follows that the character of the teacher cannot be expunged from the process of interaction between herself/himself and
her/his students. Since the habits comprising the teacher's character are freighted with the beliefs, values and conceptual structures of the socio-cultural environment within which they were formed, it can be concluded that these beliefs, values and conceptual structures condition the process of interaction itself. Thus when the teacher interacts with her/his students, s/he is, in point of fact, interacting with her/his students as s/he constructs them in her/his experience. More importantly, however, it is the teacher who constructs the questions and issues that are brought before the class for discussion and consideration. The physician and the Catholic ethicist mentioned earlier, for example, would obviously present the issue of whether or not fetal tissue should be used in the treatment of certain patients in very different ways. The teacher's character, therefore, is as much a part of the lesson s/he teaches as the formally acknowledged curriculum.

In light of the foregoing discussion, the first important consequence of Dewey's view of the formation of character for the theory of moral education and moral agency can now be succinctly stated. A theory of moral education that is faithful to Dewey's conception of character and moral experience must begin by rejecting the ideological chimera of value-neutrality in moral education. This should not be understood as implying that, in a Deweyan approach to moral education, indoctrination would be justified. On the
contrary, insofar as it involves methods and techniques that either undermine or override an agent's ability to engage in unfettered inquiry and deliberation, indoctrination has no place in a Deweyan conception of moral education. Value-neutrality as championed by Simon, Raths and Harmin, however, has no place either. Thus, from the teaching side of moral education, what is required of a theory of moral education and moral agency is a frank admission that balance and fairness are the key desiderata, not value-neutrality. Moreover, it must also be acknowledged that balance and fairness is a matter of degree. In conducting classes in moral education, some teachers, in virtue of their ability to state and present questions and issues fairly, will be better than others. It can be inferred, therefore, that fair and balanced judgement are two important criteria that can be used in determining whether or not a particular teacher ought to be engaged to teach morals. From the side of moral agency, a theory of moral education developed along Deweyan lines must have, as its primary objective, the fostering of openness to diverse and conflicting beliefs, values and conceptual schemes. Such a theory would thus have to delineate the means and methods necessary to nurture the development, not only of an agent's sensitivity to the interplay of competing values and beliefs, but also of her/his skill in acknowledging and assessing the role of her/his values in conditioning the structure and quality of
her/his experience.

The second significant consequence of Dewey's conception of the formation of character for the theory of moral education and moral agency is, perhaps, the more obvious of the two. In Chapter Three, it will be recalled, the point was made that for Dewey, apart from their incorporation into habits, the "instinctive" and impulsive energies at the core of human nature would be entirely lacking in form, meaning and executive power. In light of the fact that character is comprised of habits and since habits are, for the most part, formed in the process of social interaction, it can be inferred that education can directly affect the formation and development of character. Given that, as a result of its being an intrinsic constituent of pre-reflective experience, character conditions the course and outcome of reflective moral experience, it follows that character is the single most important determinant of the quality of moral life. It can be concluded, therefore, that a major consequence of adopting a Deweyan perspective within which to develop a theory of moral education and moral agency is that it forces recognition of the fact that moral education and character education are one and the same thing. In so doing, a Deweyan approach to moral education can be seen as continuing a tradition in moral education that extends back to Plato's ideas in The Republic.
The key advantage of developing a theory of moral education within the parameters of a Deweyan understanding of moral experience is that it requires theory, in delineating a view of moral agency, to take into account the whole of an agent's character and not just some particular dimension of it that is designated as being the seat of moral judgement. In Kohlberg's approach to moral education, for example, the affective side of an agent's character, although not ignored, is nevertheless not considered to be as important as thinking and reasoning in moral experience. In his view, as previously discussed, moral development and maturity is fostered by engaging an agent's ability to think and reason about moral dilemmas at a stage higher than the one s/he has actually attained. The agent's ability to think and reason logically is thus the condition sine qua non of moral development. Kohlberg makes this point explicitly when he writes:

Since moral reasoning clearly is reasoning, advanced moral reasoning depends upon advanced logical reasoning; a person's logical stage puts a certain ceiling on the moral stage he can attain. A person whose logical stage is only concrete operational is limited to the preconventional moral stages (Stages 1 and 2). A person whose logical stage is only partially formal operational is limited to the conventional moral stages (Stages 3 and 4). While logical development is necessary for moral development and sets limits to it, most individuals are higher in logical stage than they are in moral stage.35

Thus on Kohlberg's view, as the passage cited affirms, a
moral agent, (as Martin suggests), is conceived of as being chiefly a thinking, reasoning being. Other aspects of moral agency are not sufficiently considered and developed.

It must, of course, be acknowledged that inquiry, reasoning and deliberation are vitally important components of moral agency. As Kohlberg himself implies in the passage cited above, however, the attainment of a higher level of thinking and reasoning does not, in itself, constitute a sufficient condition of moral development and maturity. One assumes, for example, that the Nazi physicians who used helpless and unwilling Jewish inmates at Auswitz as guinea pigs in their medical experiments were rational, intelligent and competent men. Had they not been, we would not today be debating the morality of using their research findings. Although their ability to think and reason is beyond question, the Nazi physicians were nevertheless clearly deficient as moral agents. The problem with these men is not to be found in their thinking and reasoning, but rather in some deeper aspect of their character. It can be inferred, therefore, that the notion of moral agency informing a program of moral education must be construed, pace Kohlberg, as encompassing more than just an ability (at whatever level) to think and reason.

Dewey's conception of character provides the "something more" that is lacking in Kohlberg's view. For Dewey, the notion of character encompasses the whole complex
interacting network of an agent's cognitive, affective and conative habits. In his view, character (thus understood) and conduct are inextricably bound up together. He makes this point directly when he writes: "Were it not for the continued operation of all habits in every act, no such thing as character could exist." He then goes on to add:

Character is the interpenetration of habits. If each habit existed in an insulated compartment and operated without affecting or being affected by others, character would not exist. That is, conduct would lack unity being only a juxtaposition of disconnected reactions to separated situations.

For Dewey, then, the whole of an agent's character is involved in each and every one of her/his acts. "Character..." he writes, "...can be read through the medium of individual acts." It can be concluded, therefore, that in a Deweyan approach to moral education, it is the whole being of the agent that must be addressed. Dewey affirms this point when, in characterizing his conception of moral life, he cites (with approval) the following passage from Sir Leslie Stephen:

The clear enunciation of one principle seems to be characteristic of all great moral revolutions. The recognition amounts almost to a discovery, and may be said to mark the point at which the moral code first becomes distinctly separated from other codes. It may be briefly expressed in the phrase that moral is internal. The moral law, we may say, has to be expressed in the form "be this", not in the form "do this". The possibility of expressing any rule in this form may be regarded as deciding
whether it can or cannot have a distinctly moral character. Christianity gave prominence to the doctrine that the true moral law says "hate not", instead of "kill not". The men of old time had forbidden adultery: the new moral teacher forbade lust; and his greatness as a moral teacher was manifested in nothing more than in the clearness with which he gave utterance to this doctrine. 42

Thus a theory of moral education and moral agency based, in part, on Dewey's understanding of character would emphasize the importance of developing both an agent's cognitive ability as well as her/his affective and conative skills and sensitivities.

The main import of the foregoing discussion of the second major consequence of Dewey's understanding of character for a theory of moral education and moral agency is that a Deweyan theory of moral education would have to be informed by some understanding of human nature. That is to say, a theory of moral education and moral agency, if it is to be faithful to Dewey's conception of character, must include, as an integral part, the findings of current psychology (and possibly psychoanalysis) regarding not only the nature, development, and unfolding of feelings and emotions but also the effects of these on an agent's thinking and conduct. Moreover, it would also have to include an understanding, drawn from sociology, of the effect of social forces and institutions in shaping and changing an agent's behaviour.
In this section my objective has been to underscore two of the major consequences of Dewey's conception of moral experience and his understanding of the formation of character for the theory of moral education and moral agency. The first consequence that was noted is that a theory of moral education must begin by acknowledging that no program of moral education can be value-neutral and no teacher can successfully avoid influencing the development of her/his students' characters. The second consequence is that moral education is, from a Deweyan perspective, character education. Having drawn attention to these consequences, this section can now be drawn to a close. In what follows, I shall consider the consequences of Dewey's view of "ends" for a theory of moral education. It is to this task that I now turn.

3. The Place of Value Hierarchies in Moral Education

In discussing Dewey's conception of "ends" and "histories" in Chapter Two, attention was drawn to the fact that, in his view, ends are not only endings of naturally occurring processes (and, hence, a part of nature) but also, when entertained by an agent, part of an experiential situation characterized by immediacy and esthetic qualitativness. The eruption of a volcano as the result of a complex geophysical process unfolding over time was cited, it will be recalled, as an example of such a
naturally occurring ending. Thus understood endings constitute, for Dewey, a necessary condition for the formation of ends-in-view. He writes: "The in-viewness of ends is as much conditioned by antecedent natural conditions as is perception of contemporary objects external to the organism, trees and stones, or whatever." He then goes on to add:

That is, natural processes must have actually terminated in specifiable consequences, which give those processes definition and character, before ends can be mentally entertained and be the objects of striving desire.

Thus it can be inferred that without such grounding in the actually occurring endings of natural processes, the projection of ends-in-view would amount, in Dewey's view, to little more than an exercise in fantasy.

For Dewey it is precisely this connection between ends-in-view and naturally occurring processes that allows ends-in-view to guide action in ways that are open to experimental determination. This is the case because, as a direct result of their connection with naturally occurring processes, ends-in-view are, for Dewey, conditioned by the means required to bring about the state of affairs which they project. In his view "means" and "ends" are inextricably connected. He writes:

...things can be anticipated or foreseen as ends or outcomes only in terms of the conditions by which they are brought into existence. It is simply impossible to have an end-in-view or to anticipate
the consequences of any proposed line of action save upon the basis of some, however slight, consideration of the means by which it can be brought into existence.\textsuperscript{47}

He then adds:

Otherwise, there is no genuine desire but an idle fantasy, a futile wish. That vital impulses and acquired habits are capable of expending themselves in the channels of daydreaming and building castles in the air is unfortunately true. \textit{...Propositions in which things (and materials) are appraised as means enter necessarily into desires and interests that determine end-values.}\textsuperscript{48}

Thus for Dewey, as the passages cited attest, the connection of means and ends is critically important because it provides the only available method of control over the projection of ends-in-view. "There can be no control of the operation of foreseeing consequences (and hence of forming ends-in-view)\textellipsis" he writes, "...save in terms of conditions that operate as the causal conditions of their attainment."\textsuperscript{49} He adds: "The proposition in which any object adopted as an end-in-view is statable (or explicitly stated) is \textit{warranted} in just the degree to which existing conditions have been surveyed and appraised in their capacity as means.\textsuperscript{50}

A key implication of Dewey's understanding of endings is that \textit{all} ends, \textit{qua} endings, are equal \textit{in} nature and hence, prior to the involvement of deliberation and reflective choice, all ends must be viewed impartially. That is to say endings, in their actual occurrence, simply
are what they are. In themselves they are neither good nor bad, desirable nor undesirable. In Dewey's view, it is the act of deliberation and choice that transforms this particular end (now an end-in-view) into an end in the eulogistic sense of this term (i.e., something worth striving for). Value, in other words, is a construction, the emergence of which is contingent upon inquiry, deliberation and reflective choice. Writes Dewey:

When we regard conscious experience, that is to say, the object and qualities characteristic of conscious life, as a natural end, we are bound to regard all objects impartially as distinctive ends in the Aristotelian sense. We cannot pick or choose; when we do pick and choose we are obviously dealing with practical ends--with objects and qualities that are deemed worthy of selection by reflective, deliberate choice. These 'ends' are not the less natural, if we have an eye to the continuity of experienced objects with other natural occurrences, but they are not ends without the intervention of a special affair, reflective survey and choice.51

It can be concluded, therefore, that apart from deliberation and reflective choice, all naturally occurring endings (as well as the ends-in-view with which they are connected) are indistinguishable from one another in terms of their value qua ends.

Dewey's conception of ends, as outlined above, serves to undermine the traditional view that some "ends" are intrinsically good (i.e., have value apart from their connection with any other things) while others are only
instrumentally good (i.e., have value only as a consequence of their causal efficacy in bringing about an end that is intrinsically good). He affirms this point when he writes:

...to pass from immediacy of enjoyment to something called "intrinsic value" is a leap for which there is no ground. The value of enjoyment of an object as an attained end is a value of something which in being an end, an outcome, stands in relation to the means of which it is the consequence. Hence if the object in question is prized as an end or "final" value, it is valued in this relation or as mediated. 52

In place of the view that some ends (however selected) are intrinsically good, Dewey adopts the view that means and ends form a causally interactive continuum. He writes:

In all the physical sciences (using "physical" here as a synonym for nonhuman) it is now taken for granted that all "effects" are also "causes", or, stated more accurately, that nothing happens which is final in the sense that it is not part of an ongoing stream of events. 53

He goes on to conclude:

If this principle, with the accompanying discrediting of belief in objects that are ends but not means, is employed in dealing with distinctive human phenomena, it necessarily follows that the distinction between ends and means is temporal and relational. Every condition that has to be brought into existence in order to serve as means, is, in that connection, an object of desire and an end-in-view, while the end actually reached is a means to future ends as well as a test of valuations previously made. 54

For Dewey, therefore, the traditional dualism of intrinsic
and instrumental good, when viewed as an absolute distinction, cannot be sustained.

In view of the fact that deliberation and reflective choice presuppose a specific context, it follows that the values that are constructed in reflection are equally context-dependent. Writes Dewey:

\textit{Moral} goods and ends exist only when something has to be done. The fact that something has to be done proves that there are deficiencies, evils in the existent situation. This ill is just the specific ill that it is. It is never an exact duplicate of anything else.\textsuperscript{55}

It can be inferred from this that, in his view, the \textit{a priori} construction of a table of goods arranged in a hierarchical order is pointless. He writes:

\ldots to suppose that we can make a hierarchical table of values at large once for all, a kind of catalogue in which they are arranged in an order of ascending or descending worth, is to indulge in a gloss on our inability to frame intelligent judgements in the concrete. Or else it is to dignify customary choice and prejudice by a title of honor.\textsuperscript{56}

In rejecting the view that goods can be hierarchically ordered, Dewey thereby also rejects a central tenet of traditional ethical theory, viz., the belief in a \textit{summum bonum}. It can be concluded, therefore, that in his view values presuppose a specific context within which they are constructed. The good of a particular experiential situation, in other words, "...has to be discovered,
projected and attained on the basis of the exact defect and trouble to be rectified. It cannot intelligently be injected into the situation from without."

Dewey's conception of ends as delineated above results in two important consequences for the theory of moral education and moral agency. The first consequence revolves around the place of principles, values and value hierarchies in moral education. Given that in Dewey's view values are context-dependent constructions, it follows that a theory of moral education developed along Deweyan lines would have to: 1) identify the cognitive and affective abilities and sensitivities (i.e., habits) that an agent must possess if s/he is to be alive and alert to the dynamic interplay of natural and social forces (among other things) conditioning the structure and quality of a particular indeterminate experiential situation, and 2) elaborate the means necessary to foster the growth and development not only of these abilities and sensitivities, but also the agent's ability to project and select ends-in-view that, more often than not, succeed in transforming an indeterminate experiential situation into a determinate one. Moreover, in light of Dewey's general philosophical outlook, the method for satisfying these desiderata would be experimental in nature. Insofar as value hierarchies (i.e., particular orderings of values, the soundness of which is determined a priori) are not context-dependent, it can be concluded that they have
little, if any place at all, in moral education.

The key significance of this consequence for the theory of moral education and moral agency is that it directs the focus of attention to the need in moral education for developing an agent's sensitivity and skill in fully "diagnosing" the tensions inherent in the experiential situations eliciting moral inquiry and deliberation. In so doing, it underscores the vital importance of both context and existential specificity in moral experience. By contrast, current approaches to moral education either underplay or ignore the importance of this in moral experience.

The approach to values education developed by Simon, Raths and Harmin is a good illustration of the neglect of context and existential specificity in current approaches to moral education. In their view, the heart of values education is the fostering of an agent's capacity to value. The valuing process, they argue, comprises seven requirements: 1) choosing freely, 2) choosing from alternatives, 3) choosing after thoughtful consideration of the consequences of each alternative, 4) prizing and cherishing, 5) affirming, 6) acting upon choices, and 7) repeating. Insofar as alternatives typically do not spring out of nowhere, only the second of the seven requirements of the valuing process appears to involve the development of sensitivity to context and existential
specificity. A careful examination of what Simon, Raths and Harmin say of this requirement, however, leads to the conclusion that, in their view, attention to context and existential specificity, despite *prima facie* appearances, is not an especially important aspect of the valuing process.

In their account of the valuing process Simon, Raths and Harmin describe this requirement as follows:

This definition of values is based on choices made by individuals, and obviously, there can be no choice if there are no alternatives from which to choose. Thus, we say that it makes little sense to include something in the value category when the person involved was aware of no options. Likewise, we would say that the more alternatives open to us in a choice situation, the more likely we are to find something we fully value. When we approach an issue by brainstorming possible options, for example, we increase the likelihood that a value will emerge.60

In a subsequent chapter of their book, they go on to elaborate a "dialogue strategy" for values education. In discussing "choosing from alternatives" they claim that teachers can contribute to the development of this requirement of the valuing process by asking their students questions of the following kind:

a. What else did you consider before you picked this?

b. How long did you look around before you decided?

c. Was it a hard choice? What went into the final decision? Who helped? Do you need any further help?
d. Did you consider another possible alternative?

e. Are there some reasons behind your choice?

f. What choices did you reject before you settled on your present idea or action?

g. What's really good about this choice which makes it stand out from the other possibilities? 

While these two passages (the first theoretical, the second practical) clarify values clarification, nevertheless, in my view, there is little in them to warrant the conclusion that Simon, Raths and Harmin consider context and existential specificity to be important to moral experience. It is, of course, possible for alternatives that are generated by "brainstorming" or "looking around" to be conditioned by context. It is far more probable, however, that such alternatives reflect little more than the agent's wishes and desires. Thus, in the values clarification approach to moral education, it would appear that the development of sensitivity to context and existential specificity is ignored. It can be concluded, therefore, that, on this point at least, a Deweyan approach to moral education stands in sharp contrast to at least one of the alternative approaches currently in vogue.

Dewey's view of ends and its attendant undermining of value hierarchies, apart from focusing attention on the need in moral education for developing an agent's sensitivity to
context and existential specificity, is also significant because of its import for the role of principles in moral education. Just as the construction of value hierarchies is a pointless affair, so too in Dewey's view, is the fostering of a hard and fast commitment to moral principles and rules. This should not be taken as implying, however, that moral principles and rules have no place in a Deweyan approach to moral education. What it does mean is that all moral principles and rules, even time-honoured principles such as the "Golden Rule"\(^2\), should be construed as guides to understanding the specific nature and details of a particular experiential situation. "...the object of moral principles..." writes Dewey, "...is to supply standpoints and methods which will enable the individual to make for himself an analysis of the elements of good and evil in the particular situation in which he finds himself."\(^3\) He then adds:

A moral principle, then, is not a command to act or forbear acting in a given way: it is a tool for analyzing a special situation, the right or wrong being determined by the situation in its entirety, and not by the rules as such.\(^4\)

In Dewey's view, moreover, all principles and rules, including moral principles and rules, are grounded in experience. He makes this point when he writes:

Out of resembling experiences general ideas develop; through language, instruction, and tradition this gathering together of experiences of
value into generalized points of view is extended to take in a whole people and a race. Through intercommunication the experience of the entire human race is to some extent pooled and crystallized in general ideas. These ideas constitute principles. We bring them with us to deliberation on particular situations.65

As a result of their being rooted in experience, moral principles and rules are subject to evolution and change. It can be concluded, therefore, that in a theory of moral education developed along Deweyan lines, the proper place of principles is to illuminate experience with a view to conditioning the projection and selection of ends-in-view. They are not to be embraced as the irrefragable pronouncements of authority, human or divine.66

The second consequence of Dewey's conception of ends for the theory of moral education and moral agency is connected with his view of the means/ends continuum. In Dewey's view, it will be recalled, the endings of natural and social processes are also the beginnings of new ones. Although endings can be abstracted and reified in thought as "ends", in the actual unfolding of experience they are also beginnings. Thus it follows that all processes are fundamentally interconnected. Since endings condition the projection and selection of ends-in-view, however, it can be inferred that the means/end continuum must be understood as part of the experiential context informing their determination. Hence it can be concluded that, in inquiry
and deliberation, the essential interconnectedness of all processes must be kept in mind when projecting ends-in-view. The significance of this for a theory of moral education is that it not only establishes the importance of seeing things "whole", but also underscores the need, in moral education, of nurturing the development of patterns of inquiry which presuppose this interconnectedness and allow it to condition the determination and selection of ends-in-view. In this respect, a Deweyan conception of moral education would encourage the development of moral agents capable of deliberating in, what Dewey calls, the "wide" sense of this term. A Deweyan approach to moral education, therefore, would have to encourage the emergence of what might be called an "ecological" conception of moral life.

In this section, my objective has been to highlight two key consequences for the theory of moral education and moral agency connected with Dewey's conception of ends. The first consequence noted was that, in a Deweyan theory of moral education, attention must be directed to delineating the means necessary for the development of skills and sensitivities that are required for a full diagnosis of an indeterminate experiential situation. It was also noted that, in such an approach, values are viewed as constructions conditioned by context rather than being determined a priori, while principles are understood as tools guiding inquiry. The second consequence noted was
that a Deweyan approach to moral education would encourage the emergence of an ecological view of moral life. In the section that follows, I shall consider the role of intellectual disciplines in moral education. It is to this task that I now turn.

4. The Role of Intellectual Disciplines in Moral Education

Dewey's understanding of reflective moral experience was presented in Chapter Three. In the course of this discussion, attention was focussed on his view of reflective moral inquiry. In order to clarify his view, it will be recalled, a distinction was drawn between the diagnostic and the prescriptive phases of all forms of reflective inquiry.68 The point was made that in the course of the diagnostic phase of inquiry, an indeterminate experiential situation is transformed into a problematic one. The task of this phase of moral inquiry is thus the careful observation of the various factors constituting the indeterminate experiential situation; its focus is the setting of an appropriate question. The prescriptive phase of reflective inquiry comprises both deliberation and valuation. In this phase, a number of ends-in-view are projected and assessed in terms of the consequences they are likely to e-gender, if acted upon, prior to the selection of a particular end-in-view as a guide to action. Although
these phases of reflective moral inquiry can be distinguished in the context of analysis, they nevertheless cannot be separated in experience. Hence, in the actual unfolding of reflective moral inquiry, its descriptive and prescriptive phases interpenetrate.

In the course of reflective moral inquiry, as the foregoing summary makes plain, a moral agent must be able not only to articulate the specific character of the indeterminate experiential situation eliciting it (along with its "question"), but also to project appropriate ends-in-view. In Dewey's view, the use of the conceptual structures that are available to an agent as part of her/his cultural heritage greatly enhances her/his ability to perform these tasks. He makes this point when he writes:

...morals is the most humane of all subjects. It is that which is closest to human nature; it is ineradicably empirical, not theological nor metaphysical nor mathematical. Since it directly concerns human nature, everything that can be known of the human mind and body in physiology, medicine, anthropology, and psychology is pertinent to moral inquiry.69

Dewey adds, by way of elaboration:

Human nature exists and operates in an environment. And it is not "in" that environment as coins are in a box, but as a plant is in the sunlight and soil. It is of them, continuous with their energies, dependent upon their support, capable of increase only as it utilizes them, and as it gradually rebuilds from their crude indifference an environment genially civilized.70
He then goes on to conclude:

Hence physics, chemistry, history, statistics, engineering science, are a part of disciplined moral knowledge so far as they enable us to understand the conditions and agencies through which man lives, and on account of which he forms and executes his plans. Moral science is not something with a separate province. It is physical, biological and historic knowledge placed in a human context where it will illuminate and guide the activities of men. 71

As these passages clearly attest, for Dewey reflective moral inquiry involves, in various ways and to different degrees, all the available intellectual disciplines an agent has at her/his disposal. Since neither their conceptual structure nor their efficient use are innate, however, it follows that they must be acquired and developed through experience and education.

In light of the foregoing discussion, it is clear that Dewey's conception of reflective moral inquiry encompasses the inclusion of whatever intellectual disciplines are relevant to the understanding of the indeterminate experiential situation to which it is directed. In his view, a moral agent's inquiry and deliberation can only benefit from the involvement of these disciplines. The significant consequence of this for the theory of moral education and moral agency is that it forces recognition of the fact that sound moral reflection presupposes much more than a knowledge of principles and a mastery of practical syllogisms. In an approach to moral education developed
along Deweyan lines, the education of moral agents would be understood as including some introduction, however, basic, to the central principles and key findings of those disciplines most typically presupposed by reflective moral inquiry. It can be concluded, therefore, that familiarity with these disciplines emerges as a fundamentally important component of moral education.

The approach to moral education developed by Kohlberg provides an interesting and sharp contrast to this aspect of the Deweyan view adumbrated above. Inspired by an essentially Kantian conception of morality, Kohlberg concludes that of the six stages of moral development which he delineates, Stage Six is the highest and most adequate stage of moral thinking that an agent can attain. At this stage, he claims, right "...is defined by the decision of conscience in accordance with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency." He adds: "These principles are abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative); they are not concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments." 72

Kohlberg's reference to the categorical imperative as an example of the type of abstract and universal principle he takes to be operative Stage Six of moral reasoning is sufficient, I believe, to establish the point that, in his view, intellectual disciplines do not play the role in moral thinking (and, hence, in moral education) assigned to them
by Dewey. This becomes readily apparent if the deontological character of Kant's (and, hence, of Kohlberg's) ethics is taken into account. In a deontological conception of ethics (and Kant's view can be taken as representing an extreme form of this), the consequences of an act are simply irrelevant to determining its moral quality. What does determine the moral quality of an act is its relation to a particular moral rule, the soundness of which has been established by the supreme moral law (in Kant's ethics, the categorical imperative). Given that, within the parameters of a deontological system of ethics, knowing the consequences of an act is unimportant, it can be inferred that the intellectual disciplines that would be instrumental in determining these consequences must be unimportant as well. The conception of moral inquiry and deliberation presupposed by a deontological view of ethics (and, hence, fostered by an approach to moral education informed by it) thus can be seen to be inconsistent with the view developed by Dewey. It can be concluded, therefore, that in virtue of its emphasis on the central importance of intellectual disciplines in reflective moral inquiry, a Deweyan conception of moral education is incompatible with the approach developed by Kohlberg.73

The net import of the foregoing discussion for the theory of moral education and moral agency is that moral education, from a Deweyan perspective, must be understood as
unfolding within the parameters of a liberal education. This becomes evident if Dewey's conception of the role of intellectual disciplines in reflective moral inquiry is viewed in light of Paul Hirst's ideas as presented in his paper "Liberal Education and the Nature of Knowledge." For Hirst, the term "forms of knowledge" denotes the various conceptual schemes that have been developed over time with a view to better comprehending the vicissitudes of experience.

A form of knowledge, he claims, is:

...a distinct way in which our experience becomes structured round the use of accepted public symbols. The symbols thus having public meaning, their use is in some way testable against experience and there is the progressive development of series of tested symbolic expressions. In this way experience has been probed further and further by extending and elaborating the use of the symbols and by means of these it has become possible for the personal experience of individuals to become more fully structured, more fully understood.

Hirst argues that the various forms of knowledge which have been developed (there are, in his view, seven: 1) mathematics, 2) physical sciences, 3) human sciences, 4) history, 5) religion, 6) philosophy, and 7) literature and the fine arts) are each characterized by the following features:

1. They each involve certain central concepts that are peculiar in character to the form.

2. In a given form of knowledge these and other concepts that denote, if
perhaps in a very complex way, certain aspects of experience, form a network of possible relationships in which experience can be understood. As a result, the form has a distinctive logical structure.

3. Each form, then, has distinctive expressions that are testable against experience in accordance with particular criteria that are peculiar to the form.

4. The forms have developed particular techniques and skills for exploring experience and testing their distinctive expressions, for instance the techniques of the sciences and those of the various literary arts. The result has been the amassing of all the symbolically expressed knowledge that we now have in the arts and the sciences.\textsuperscript{76}

His central conclusion is that liberal education is the formation of mind relative to the forms of knowledge.\textsuperscript{77} Since the forms of knowledge discussed by Hirst encompass the intellectual disciplines cited by Dewey in his discussion of reflective moral inquiry, it can be concluded that a liberal education is the key to a Deweyan approach to moral education.\textsuperscript{78}

In this section, my aim has been to underscore the main consequence for the theory of moral education and moral agency connected with Dewey's view of reflective moral inquiry. This consequence, it was argued, is that moral education, from a Deweyan perspective, must unfold within the context of a liberal education. Having drawn attention to this point, this section can now be drawn to a close.
The focus of attention in Part A of this chapter has been centered on identifying the major consequences for a theory of moral education and moral agency connected with Dewey's view of moral experience and his understanding of the nature and formation of character. The principal consequences identified can be summarized as follows: 1) the idea of a value-neutral approach to moral education must be abandoned, 2) feelings must have a more pronounced place in moral education, 3) moral education and character education are the same thing, and 4) the key to moral education is liberal arts education. The several consequences discussed, if incorporated into the theory of moral education and moral agency, would not only result in a thoroughly Deweyan approach to moral education, but also provide a clear and important alternative to the two currently most popular approaches to moral education, viz., the values clarification approach and Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental approach. Before concluding this chapter, the implications of Dewey's view of moral experience for the practice of moral education must be briefly considered. It is to this task that I now turn.

B: DEWEYAN IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PRACTICE OF MORAL EDUCATION

The first implication for the practice of moral education to be noted is connected with Dewey's
understanding of the nature and formation of character. Given his view of character, it should be reasonably clear that the process of character formation begins at parturition (if not some months before). The new-born infant interacts not only with the natural environment but also with the various individuals, young and old, around her/him. In the course of these interactions, diverse natural and social forces combine to condition her/his "instinctive" energies thereby contributing to the formation of her/his character. Since the interaction of infant and environment is constant, it follows that the process of character formation is also constant and ongoing. Only with death and the termination of all interaction does the process of character formation finally come to an end. Writes Dewey:

...stability of character is an affair of degrees, and is not to be taken absolutely. No human being, however mature, has a completely formed character, while any child in the degree in which he has acquired attitudes and habits has a stable character to that extent.80

If character formation begins at birth and is constant thereafter, then it follows that it does not begin in the first year of formal education. Given that character education and moral education are, from a Deweyan perspective, one and the same thing, it can be concluded that the moral education of a child begins long before her/his first day of class. With only a touch of hyperbole
the claim can be made that moral education begins at birth, if not actually pre-natally. The experiences which the child will have in school (both inside and outside the classroom) will contribute, for better or worse, to a developmental process that is already well underway. Since the habits that are formed during this initial pre-school period are, by and large, constitutive of the agent's affective character, they play a central role in conditioning the structure and quality of her/his pre-reflective experience thus shaping the agent's subsequent moral experience. More importantly, however, since these habits are formed before the emergence and development of the agent's reflective intelligence they prove to be far more critical in determining the structure of the agent's character than is perhaps generally acknowledged. Writes Dewey:

Very early in life sets of mind are formed without alternative thought, and these sets persist and control the mature mind. ...These habits, deeply engrained before thought is awake and even before the day of experiences which can later be recalled, govern conscious later thought. They are usually deepest and most unget-at-able just where critical thought is most needed—in morals, religion and politics. These "infantilisms" account for the mass of irrationalities that prevail among men of otherwise rational tastes. 81

It can be concluded, therefore, that since the process of character formation is already well underway by the time the child enters school, it follows that it is, to put it
mildly, somewhat disingenuous for parents, preachers, politicians and editorialists to hold the school system in general, and teachers in particular, solely responsible for whatever moral failings they may find in the character and conduct of children and adolescents.

In light of the foregoing discussion, two important points can now be seen to follow. The first, and admittedly somewhat obvious point, revolves around the role of the family in "pre-school" moral education. Given the effect that a child's pre-school experience has in conditioning her/his subsequent character development and moral experience, it follows that the quality of the care, support and guidance that s/he receives at home is of cardinal importance. Clearly, parents exert the first (if not also the most important) influence in the formation of the child's character. Writing of educators (and parents are certainly "educators" in the broad sense of this term), Dewey writes:

Every experience is a moving force. Its value can be judged only on the ground of what it moves toward and into. The greater maturity which should belong to the adult as educator puts him in a position to evaluate each experience of the young in a way in which the one having the less mature experience cannot do. It is then the business of the educator to see in what direction an experience is heading. There is no point in his being more mature if, instead of using his greater insight to help organize the conditions of the experience of the immature, he throws away his insight.
He then goes on to conclude:

Failure to take the moving force of an experience into account so as to judge and direct it on the ground of what it is moving into means disloyalty to the principle of experience itself. The disloyalty operates in two directions. The educator is false to the understanding that he should have obtained from his own past experience. He is also unfaithful to the fact that all human experience is ultimately social: that it involves contact and communication. The mature person, to put it in moral terms, has no right to withhold from the young on given occasions whatever capacity for sympathetic understanding his own experience has given him. 83

The quality of care and support which parents are able to provide, however, is a function not only of their own life experience, but also of their current life situation. Parents, unfortunately, can be ill-equipped, in a variety of ways and to differing degrees, to provide the care and support children need. In view of the importance of family life in conditioning the character development of children, and given that the character thus formed is a critical determinant not only of their subsequent development but also of their subsequent moral experience, it follows that if we are interested in the quality of their future life experience (not to mention our own) then we, as a society, must adopt social policies and establish social agencies to extend support to troubled and dysfunctional families. The human cost of not doing so is simply too high. The net
import of this is that government practice, in recent years, of cutting spending in social programs as a means of deficit reduction must be denounced and resisted.

An ancillary point that should be mentioned here centers on the quality and availability of day-care facilities for working-parent and single-parent families. In light of the current trend among a steadily increasing number of parents of placing their pre-school children in day-care centers, it can be inferred that these centers function, for a growing number of children, as "surrogate" families. The process of character formation discussed above, however, occurs in day-care centers as much as it does anywhere else. This aspect of the day-care system must not be overlooked or undervalued. If we, as a society, are to move in the direction of increasing the availability of day-care services, then clearly community-wide debate is urgently needed regarding, among other things, the organization and control of these centers and the qualifications of those who are hired to work in them.

Apart from the importance of the family in pre-school moral education there is a second, and equally important point for the practice of moral education that must be made in connection with Dewey's view of character formation. This point revolves around the critically important role of the socio-cultural environment within which school-based programs in moral education unfold. Given the power of the
socio-cultural environment in shaping character (and thereby the quality of moral life), it follows that moral education must unfold within a supportive and complementary social setting. Dewey makes this point, albeit indirectly, when he writes:

There are in truth forces in man as well as without him. While they are infinitely frail in comparison with exterior forces, yet they may have the support of a foreseeing and contriving intelligence. When we look at the problem as one of an adjustment to be intelligently attained, the issue shifts from within personality to an engineering issue, the establishment of arts of education and social guidance. 84

For Dewey, as the passage cited attests, the development of character can be greatly assisted by appropriate environmental support. 85 It follows, therefore, that moral education is, in a broad sense, a "social" concern. It occurs at home and at school, as well as in the hockey arena and at the movie theatre. In more polemical terms, moral education has little chance of succeeding if the society in which it unfoled is devoted to the sacrifice of the public good on the altar of ego and profit. Concern for the success of moral education programs in school, therefore, must result in a critique of the existing social medium within which it takes place.

Plato, in The Republic, long ago recognized and understood the vital importance of the surrounding social medium within which the young are nurtured and educated.
Although his views regarding the nature of the social control required for the proper nurturing of character are extreme and open the door to the possibility of totalitarian control, they are nevertheless interesting and instructive. He writes:

...we must not only compel our poets, on pain of expulsion, to make their poetry the express image of noble character; we must also supervise craftsmen of every kind and forbid them to leave the stamp of baseness, licence, meanness, unseemliness, on painting and sculpture, or building, or any other work of their hands; and anyone who cannot obey shall not practise his art in our commonwealth. We would not have our Guardians grow up among representations of moral deformity, as in some foul pasture where, day after day, feeding on every poisonous weed they would, little by little, gather insensibly a mass of corruption in their very souls.86

He then goes on to conclude:

Rather we must seek out those craftsmen whose instinct guides them to whatsoever is lovely and gracious; so that our young men, dwelling in a wholesome climate, may drink in good from every quarter, whence, like a breeze bearing health from happy regions, some noble influence from noble works constantly falls upon eye and ear from childhood upward, and imperceptibly draws them into sympathy and harmony with the beauty of reason, whose impress they take.87

Dewey, as is no doubt apparent, would certainly disagree with the underlying spirit of these passages. He would, however, agree with their assumption, viz., that the socio-cultural environment within which character formation
unfolds is of fundamental importance.

The second significant implication of Dewey's conception of character and moral experience for the practice of moral education centers on the place, in the school curriculum, of a moral education program. In view of the conclusion, drawn in Part A that teachers cannot help affecting the character development of their students, it follows that one cannot really restrict moral education to "official" thirty-minute periods three or four times a week. While such classes may be of benefit to the students in them, the simple fact of the matter is that every teacher, throughout the whole of every period, not only evinces some of her/his values and beliefs but also employs the conceptual structures s/he has acquired. In so doing, teachers influence the development of their students' cognitive and affective habits and thereby contribute to the formation of their characters. To think otherwise is unwarranted.

The third implication to be noted follows directly from the second. Since teachers cannot avoid influencing the character development of their students, it follows that any program of moral education will affect, in one way or another, the cognitive, affective and conative habits of the students involved. In view of the fact that an individual's affective habits (i.e., her/his spontaneous and pre-reflective likes, aversions, etc.) condition the structure
and quality of pre-reflective experience (and thereby the course and outcome of reflective moral experience), and given that the pre-school experience students have deeply affects this aspect of their characters, it follows that if a program of moral education is to be effective, then it must include specific strategies to affect (either by developing or altering) the habits conditioning the way a student feels. Hence, it must include a defensible view regarding not only which types of feelings are desirable and which are not, but also which forms of reflective inquiry are appropriate and relevant, and which are not. This clearly implies, however, that some character traits (i.e., virtues) are to be fostered and developed while others are to be actively discouraged and neglected.

Ignoring the Socratic question of whether or not virtue can be taught, the emphasis on character development in a Deweyan approach to moral education immediately raises the problem of determining what virtues are to be involved in moral education. Given Dewey's conception of reflective moral inquiry and his contention that "the good" is a construction, it can be concluded that at least some of the virtues which must be involved in moral education are connected with the process of inquiry and deliberation whereby the good is constructed. In other words, it is the diagnostic and the prescriptive phases of reflective moral inquiry (as well as the affective habits comprising
character) that determine which virtues are to be nurtured and developed. Moreover, moral education must seek not only to foster the virtues connected with reflective moral inquiry but also, and more importantly, it must endeavour to impart a steadfast concern, on the part of the individual involved, with the state of character attained and the direction of its future development, as well as with the conditions prevailing within the surrounding natural and socio-cultural environment. That is to say, the individual must acquire a vital interest in who s/he is and in who s/he is becoming, as well as in the nature of the world within which her/his "becoming" unfolds. Apart from these interests, moral deliberation is reduced to "calculation" and life is measured entirely in terms of material possessions. A Deweyan approach to moral education thus provides the agent involved with a radically different perspective than the one afforded by either Kantian or utilitarian ethics from which to view and assess the situations and choices characteristic of daily life.

In view of the foregoing discussion, it can be concluded that a program of moral education must include a statement of the objectives it is intended to achieve. Moreover, since the formation of character begins at birth, it follows that a program of moral education will also have to include methods of diagnosis by means of which it can be determined where students are in the development of the
cognitive, affective and conative habits relative to its specific objectives. Since no program of moral education can avoid changing, to some degree, the characters of the students involved, it follows that the two key questions a program of moral education must address center on determining the kind of effect on an individual's character it would be desirable to achieve, and on how this effect is to be achieved. It can be concluded, therefore, than an intelligently conceived program of moral education must include: 1) methods of diagnosis, 2) pedagogical strategies, and 3) curricular objectives.

The point can now be made that a program of moral education, regardless of the particular moral framework it presupposes, cannot avoid arousing controversy and conflict. This is the case because prior to entering school, the formation of the child's character is primarily in the hands of her/his parents and family. Upon entering school, however, the task of overseeing the formation of her/his character becomes a "joint venture", as it were, involving both parents and teachers (as well as the community). The goals of the teachers involved (and, more generally, of the school system) may, and frequently do, conflict with the goals of the student's parents. A veritable Pandora's Box of issues and dilemmas is the result. It is clear, therefore, that full community participation in the development and implementation of moral education programs
is essential. Community presupposes understanding, not agreement. In thus involving the community, conflict will not necessarily be eliminated (or even minimized), but the conflicts which do emerge can become the subject-matter of open discussion. Such public discussion can only contribute to fostering the sense and spirit of community.

The fourth and final implication to be considered here is connected with the emergence of reflective moral inquiry. In Dewey's view, it will be recalled, reflective moral inquiry presupposes the occurrence of an indeterminate experiential situation. The occurrence of an indeterminate experiential situation, however, does not in and of itself, guarantee the emergence of reflective inquiry. Given the propulsive and, at times, irresistible power of acquired habit and impulse, an indeterminate experiential situation can result in a state of affairs in which either habit or impulse overrides the emergence of inquiry or else some form of thinking other than reflective inquiry (i.e., daydreaming, wishing) emerges. It follows, therefore, that if reflective inquiry is to emerge, then the agent involved in an indeterminate experiential situation must be able to resist the power of habit and impulse as they press for their own display. More importantly, however, once resisted, the agent must also be able to resist the allurement of reverie and fantasy. In short, if an indeterminate experiential situation is to result in
reflective inquiry, then the agent must be able to stop and think. In Dewey's view, some degree of success can be achieved in this regard if the agent acquires the "habit of knowing". Apart from such a habit energy is dissipated, the result being that the emergence of inquiry is random and its outcome ineffectual. It can be inferred, therefore, that a principal objective of moral education must be not only to encourage the individual to stop and think, but also to encourage her/him to take the time needed to engage in effective thinking.

As is no doubt apparent, the objective of moral education cited above raises an interesting problem. Since, as previously discussed, the formation of character unfolds within a socio-cultural matrix, it follows that if moral education is to achieve its objective, then agencies other than the school must be involved. It is clear that, apart from such involvement, schools cannot reasonably be expected to achieve very much of anything. The ubiquity of advertising and its unflagging encouragement of immediate impulse gratification, however, proves to be but one of a number of major obstacles in the way of fostering the habit of knowing. Since it is naive to expect that advertising can be eliminated (or its message changed), it follows that either the objective for moral education cited above must be abandoned, or ways of dealing with advertising must be included as part of a program of moral education. Adopting
the former alternative would clearly undermine a program of moral education faithful to Dewey's conception of moral experience. It can be concluded, therefore, that some methods for identifying and assessing the values embedded not only in advertising but also in all forms of media (from cereal boxes to cartoons) must be included as part of an overall program of moral education.

In the course of the foregoing discussion, several implications for the practice of moral education connected with Dewey's view of moral experience have been identified. These can now be summarized as follows:

1) schools in general, and teachers in particular, are not solely responsible for the moral qualities of children and adolescents;

2) the social environment within which a program of moral education unfolds must be supportive of its general goals;

3) moral education occurs throughout the school curriculum and not just in moral education classes; and

4) a program of moral education must include instruction in the techniques for identifying and assessing the value claims presented daily in the various media.

Having drawn attention to these implications, this section can be brought to a close.
The aim of moral education, it was argued, is to foster the growth and development of moral agency. Apart from a particular moral framework, however, the notion of moral agency remains purely formal. The central idea animating this thesis has been that a comprehensive understanding of Dewey's conception of the moral life is necessary if a coherent and thoroughly Deweyan approach to moral education is to be developed. It was concluded, therefore, that in order to develop a Deweyan approach to moral education, one must first identify the consequences for a theory of moral education and moral agency connected with his understanding of moral life. In Chapter Two, attention was restricted to the discussion of the metaphysical background presupposed by Dewey's conception of moral experience. In Chapter Three, the focus of attention was directed to delineating Dewey's view of moral experience and his understanding of the nature and formation of character. In this chapter, my objective has been to underscore, in light of the analysis undertaken in the two previous chapters, several of the more significant consequences of Dewey's view of moral life for the theory of moral education and moral agency, as well as some of the key implications connected with it for the practice of moral education. In completing the discussion of these consequences and implications my objective for this chapter, as well as for this thesis, has been attained.
NOTES

1. Vide Chapter 1, Section 1, p. 9.


5. Dewey referred to the tendency to create such dualisms the "intellectualistic fallacy". Vide Chapter 2, Part A, Section 1, p. 11.


8. The neglect of the affective dimension, not only in moral education but also in theories of education, has recently become the subject-matter of discussion among philosophers of education. In this connection it is interesting to note Jane Roland Martin's critique of the Peters-Hirst approach to liberal education. In her 1932 article entitled "The Ideal of the Educated Person", Martin argues that the Peters-Hirst conception of liberal education, and its model of an educated "man", is deficient because it virtually ignores the role of feeling and emotion in education thereby denying women's experience of the world. In its exclusive concern with an individual's intellectual development, the Peters-Hirst view of education fosters the growth of a person devoid of empathy. "Concern for people and for interpersonal relationships..." she writes, "...has no role to play: the educated person's sensitivity is to the standards immanent in activities, not to other human beings; an imaginative awareness of emotional atmosphere and interpersonal relationships need to be no part of this person's makeup, nor is the educated person thought to be empathic or supportive or nurturant. Intuition is also neglected." Jane Roland Martin "The Ideal of the Educated Person", Educational Theory, 31 (1982): 101. In Martin's view, moreover, the Peters-Hirst ideal of the educated man "...harms males as well as females." She adds: "The Peters-Hirst educated person will have knowledge about others, but will not have been taught
to care about their welfare, let alone to act kindly toward them. That person will have some understanding of society, but will not have been taught to feel its injustices or even to be concerned over its fate. The Peters-Hirst educated person is an ivory tower person: a person who can reason yet has no desire to solve real problems in the real world; a person who understands science but does not worry about the uses to which it is put; a person who can reach flawless moral conclusions but feels no care or concern for others." Martin, "Ideal" 104. Martin then goes on to conclude: "Simply put, quite apart from the burden it places on women, Peters's ideal of the educated person is far too narrow to guide the educational enterprise. Because it presupposes a divorce of mind from body, thought from action, and reason from feeling and emotion, it provides at best an ideal of an educated mind not an educated person." Martin, "Ideal" 104.

9. Kant's view of moral judgement serves as a paradigm example of this conception of moral agency.


11. In defending his approach to moral education, Kohlberg writes: "Both psychological and philosophical analyses suggest that the more mature stage of moral thought is the structurally adequate. This greater adequacy of more mature moral judgement rests on structural criteria more general than those of truth-values or efficacy. These general criteria are the formal criteria developmental theory holds as defining all mature structures, the criteria of increased differentiation and integration. These formal criteria (differentiation and integration) of development fit the formal criteria which philosophers of the formalist school have held to characterize genuine or adequate moral judgements." Munsey, Kohlberg 42-43.

12. Kohlberg's six stages of moral development are arranged in hierarchical order. In schematic outline, these levels and stages appear as follows:

I: Preconventional Level
   1) punishment and obedience orientation,
   2) instrumental relativist orientation,

II: Conventional Level
3) interpersonal concordance or "good boy-nice girl" orientation,

4) "law and order" orientation,

III: Postconventional Level

5) social-contract legalistic orientation,

6) universal ethical-principle orientation.

For a more detailed account of these stages see Munsey, Kohlberg 91-92.


15. Munsey, Kohlberg 38.


17. Munsey, Kohlberg 40.

18. Munsey, Kohlberg 40.


20. Vide Endnote #8 this chapter.

21. For an elaboration of Martin's views on this topic, see Martin, "Ideal" 107-109.

22. In this context, consider the following comments by Sidney Hook about Dewey: "The Vermont and the New England of Dewey's boyhood and youth are gone. But he still carries with him the traces of its social environment, not as memories but as habits, deep preferences, and an ingrained democratic bias. They show themselves in his simplicity of manner, his basic courtesy, freedom from every variety of snobbism, and matter-of-course respect for the rights of everyone in America as a human being and a citizen." Sidney Hook, John Dewey: An Intellectual Portrait (Westport: Greenwood, 1939) 5-6.

23. For a more detailed discussion of the conditions of pristine experience and Dewey's conception of philosophy, Vide Chapter 2, Section 3, pp. 100-107.


26. For a more detailed discussion of the conditions of reflective inquiry, *Vide* Chapter 2, Section 3a, pp. 103-113.


29. Dewey, *Human Nature* 130. In his *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*, Dewey defines inquiry as follows: "Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole." Dewey, *Logic* 104-105.

30. Strictly speaking, for Dewey these immediate qualities inherent in experiential situations are not values as such, but rather "problematic goods". They become values as a result of inquiry and appraisal. He writes: "Without the intervention of thought, enjoyments are not values but problematic goods, becoming values when they re-issue in changed form from intelligent behaviour." Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty* (1929; New York: Putnam's, 1979) 259. For a detailed discussion of this and other aspects of reflective moral experience, *vide* Chapter 3, Part B, pp. 260-333.

31. In discussing the theory of values underlying their approach to values education, Simon, Raths and Harmin write: "It should be increasingly clear that the adult does not force personal values upon children. What the adult does do is to create conditions that aid children in finding values if they choose to do so. When operating within this value theory, it is entirely possible that children will choose not to develop values. It is the teacher's responsibility to support this choice also, while at the same time realizing that value development is likely to be one of the school's goals and that it should be encouraged by providing regular experiences that will help raise to the value level the beliefs, feelings, interests, and activities children bring with them along with values work on the issues that are central to our times." Louis Raths, Merrill Harmin, Sidney Simon, *Values and Teaching: Working with Values in the Classroom* (Columbus:


34. For a more detailed discussion of Dewey's view on this point, *vide* Chapter 3, Section 1 (a), pp. 217-238 and, in particular, pp. 223-225.


36. *Vide* Endnote #8, this chapter.

37. Whether or not the attainment of a higher level of thinking and reasoning constitutes a necessary condition of moral development and maturity is, in my view, a moot point.

38. There is an interesting question here centering on the relationship between an individual agent and the larger socio-cultural environment within which s/he lives. Can an individual be a moral agent if the society into which s/he is born is immoral?


43. For a fuller discussion of Dewey's understanding of ends and histories, *vide* Chapter 2, Section 4, pp. 134-152.


46. It should be noted here that endings are not restricted exclusively to naturally occurring processes such as rainfalls and rainbows. They also occur as part of complex social phenomena such as labour disputes and holidays.


58. It should be noted here that, in light of Dewey's conception of character, it must be understood that the agent involved in moral experience is conceived as a social being whose inquiry and deliberation not only reflects but also affects the socio/cultural world of which s/he is an integral part. It follows from this that moral reflection is fundamentally an inherently social undertaking presupposing the existence (if not also the actual participation) of others. Thus the ability to "hear" and "integrate" the experience of others as it bears on moral reflection is an important desideratum of moral agency. So is discernment in being able to determine when to alter or abandon a particular principle and when to stand firm. It can be inferred from this that "conscience" is not so much some inner, private light enabling an agent to "see" truth where others are blind, but rather an agent's distillation of the experience of collective life. It is not the less important because of this.


60. Raths, Harmin and Simon, *Values* 27.

61. Raths, Harmin and Simon, *Values* 64.

62. "Of course, the word 'rule' is often used to designate a principle—as in the case of the phrase 'Golden Rule'. We are speaking not of the words, but of their underlying ideas." Dewey, *Moral Life* 41.


66. In Dewey's view, moral "...systems which have committed themselves to belief in a number of hard and fast rules having their origin in conscience, or in the word of God impressed upon the human soul or externally revealed..." are attended by the following dangers and evils: 1) they tend to magnify the letter of morality at the expense of its spirit, 2) they tend, in practice, to a legal view of conduct, and 3) they tend to deprive moral life of freedom and spontaneity, reducing it to a more or less anxious and servile conformity to externally imposed rules. Dewey, *Moral Life* 137-139.

67. For a more complete discussion of this form of deliberation, vide Chapter 3, Part B, Section 3 (b), pp. 298-301.

68. Vide Chapter 3, Part B, Section 3 (b), pp. 293-393.


73. Kohlberg, it is interesting to note, believes his view of moral education to be compatible with Dewey's philosophical outlook. He writes: "The cognitive-developmental approach was fully stated for the first time by John Dewey." Kohlberg, "Moral" 18.


75. Hirst, "Liberal" 128.

76. Hirst, "Liberal" 128-129.

77. Hirst makes this point when he writes: "...to have a mind basically involves coming to have experience articulated by means of various conceptual schema. It is only because man has over millennia objectified and progressively developed these that he has achieved the forms of human knowledge, and the possibility of the
development of mind as we know it is open to us today. A liberal education is, then, one that, determined in scope and content by knowledge itself, is thereby concerned with the development of mind." Hirst, "Liberal" 125.

78. In arguing that a liberal education along the lines suggested by Hirst is a key component of a Deweyan approach to moral education, it should not be inferred that I am thereby also suggesting that Martin's critique of Hirst can be ignored. On the contrary, her criticism is valid and must be taken into account. Her point, it should be noted, is that Hirst's program of liberal education must be altered, not that it should be abandoned.

79. "...the formation of habits of belief, desire and judgement is going on at every instant under the influence of the conditions set by men's contact, intercourse and associations with one another. This is the fundamental fact in social life and in personal character. It is the fact about which traditional human science gives no enlightenment--a fact which this traditional science blurs and virtually denies." Dewey, Human Nature 323,


83. Dewey, Experience and Education 38.


85. For Dewey, it must be remembered, just what constitutes "appropriate" environmental support is an experimental question.

86. Plato, The Republic 90.

87. Plato, The Republic. It is, perhaps, unnecessary to point out that these passages from Plato provide the subject-matter of a separate thesis if all the points of divergence between their underlying philosophy and Dewey's were to be unpacked.
CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter I shall summarize the main points developed in this thesis and then highlight the principal conclusions drawn.

A: THESIS SUMMARY

In Chapter One, "The Aim of Moral Education: A Pragmatic Approach", the central aim of my thesis was identified as well as the strategy proposed to achieve it. Proceeding from the assumption that the aim of moral education is comparable to the aim of general education, the claim was made, following Peters, that the aim of moral education is the development of moral agency. It was noted, however, that since the notion of moral agency is a purely formal one it must be fleshed out, to some degree, if it is to adequately inform an approach to moral education. It was then argued that the notion of moral agency could be delineated either by analyzing the concept of a "moral agent" or within the parameters of a particular moral framework. A purely conceptual approach was held to be untenable and, hence, it was concluded that in order to delineate the notion of moral agency, a particular moral framework must be presupposed. Thus, the central aim of my thesis was to outline an approach to moral education within
the parameters of a Deweyan moral framework. My specific objectives were to: 1) delineate the aim of moral education, and 2) clarify and justify this aim. As a means of achieving these goals, I proposed to identify some of the significant consequences connected with Dewey's view of moral experience and his understanding of the nature and formation of character for both the theory and practice of moral education and the notion of moral agency. My thesis, it was concluded, was thus largely philosophical and theoretical in scope.

The first step in elucidating and justifying the aim of moral education centered on developing the reasons for rejecting a purely conceptual approach to the task of delineating the notion of moral agency. The work of Oxford philosopher John Wilson was taken as a paradigm example of this approach. It was then argued that if his particular approach proved to be untenable, then it would be reasonable to conclude that any purely conceptual approach to the task of delineating the notion of moral agency would have to be rejected.

Wilson's approach to moral education, it was argued, rests on three interconnected assumptions. These assumptions are: 1) in approaching moral education, one needs a neutral Archimedean point from which to survey the scene and on the basis of which one can critically assess competing moral codes and precepts; 2) only conceptual
analysis can provide the Archimedean point in question; and 3) the analysis of concepts, qua method, is neutral. Of these assumptions the third, it was claimed, is the most critical since it proves to be the condition sine qua non of Wilson's entire approach to moral education. However, this assumption, it was pointed out, presupposes an essentially Platonic conception of linguistic meaning. This conception of linguistic meaning, it was argued, must be abandoned in light of the seminal analysis of meaning developed by Wittgenstein in his *Philosophical Investigations*. The net import of this is that the critically important assumption required by Wilson's approach to moral education proved to be untenable. It was then concluded that, as a result, Wilson's approach in particular, and more generally, any purely conceptual approach to the task of delineating the notion of moral agency must be abandoned. The rejection of Wilson's approach, however, does not, by itself, justify the adoption of a Deweyan moral framework. What is required, therefore, is some further justification for doing so. Providing such justification was the second step in elucidating and justifying the aim of moral education.

In defending the adoption of a Deweyan moral framework within which to develop an approach to moral education and moral agency one of two strategies, it was claimed, could be pursued. The first would be to argue that only Dewey's conception of morals is correct, and the second would be to
argue that of all the available alternative moral frameworks, Dewey's is the most plausible and interesting. The first strategy was rejected because it was seen to rest on two assumptions, one questionable and the other untenable. Hence, the second strategy was adopted.

In defending a Deweyan view of morals, it was argued that the philosophical framework presupposed by it (i.e., his understanding of human nature, "metaphysics", "epistemology" and "axiology") is more interesting and more plausible than the philosophical frameworks presupposed by alternative conceptions of morality. In particular, the following salient features of Dewey's conception of morals were noted:

1) it is rooted in experience;
2) experience is construed as being in and of nature;
3) the agent involved in moral experience is conceived as a biological being capable of thinking, feeling and acting, and whose whole character contributes to determining the quality of moral experience;
4) character and conduct are connected by means of a biological construction of habit;
5) reflective inquiry is the key factor, not only in creating desire by transforming impulses into ends-in-view, but also in reconstructing the indeterminate experiential situations comprising
pre-reflective experience;
6) value is viewed as a construction conditioned by agent-centered and environment-centered forces and energies;
7) moral principles are regarded as rules-of-thumb directing and illuminating reflective inquiry;
8) means and ends are understood as part of a continuum of experience; and
9) the universe within which experience occurs is open.

The final point that was noted in Chapter One was that Dewey did not have an "ethics" in the traditional sense of this term. Dewey, it was suggested, came to bury ethics, not to practice it. In place of ethics, it was argued, he develops a conception of moral experience in which character and inquiry play central roles.

In Chapter Two, "Dewey's Naturalistic Metaphysics", the central features of Dewey's conception of experience were discussed. My main objectives in outlining his metaphysics were: 1) to provide the background necessary for a clear and adequate understanding of his view of moral experience, and 2) to underscore the connections between his metaphysics and both his theory of inquiry and his theory of valuation.

The first point that was made was that, just as in the case of ethics, Dewey does not have a "metaphysics" in the traditional sense of this term. He rejects the traditional
understanding of metaphysics on the grounds that it is rooted in the bifurcation of theory and practice and hence involves not only the dualisms of mind/body, appearance/reality and natural/supernatural (among others), but also what he calls "the spectator theory of knowledge." Thus, in place of traditional metaphysics, Dewey sets out to develop a clear and coherent account of the generic traits of existence.

In delineating Dewey's naturalistic metaphysics, two sets of architectonic terms, it was claimed, prove to be fundamentally important. These two sets of terms are: 1) "nature" and "experience", and 2) "pre-reflective" and "reflective" experience. In discussing the first of these, the point was made that Dewey's understanding of the terms "nature" and "experience" is significantly different from the Cartesian-centered meaning typically accorded to them. In his view, "nature" and "experience" are not antipodal terms, but rather terms which denote naturally occurring existences that thoroughly interpenetrate one another. Experience thus can be revelatory of nature because it is in and of nature. The point was then made that inquiries into the occurrence of particular experiential situations must take into account the full context of its occurrence. Although this context was seen as comprising both a "subjective" and an "objective" dimension, nevertheless for Dewey the terms "subjective" and "objective" denote an
analytical distinction and not an ontological one.

In discussing the second set of architectonic terms, viz., "pre-reflective" and "reflective" experience, the point was made that, in Dewey's view, pre-reflective experience is characterized by immediacy and its occurrence is freighted with the values, beliefs and conceptual structures prevailing in the socio-cultural environment within which it unfolds. The result of this, it was pointed out, is that for Dewey the recovery of primitive naivete is impossible. The practice of philosophy thus becomes a form of culture-criticism. Attention was then focussed on Dewey's contention that reflective experience involves the reconstructed subject-matter of pre-reflective experience. It was noted that, in his view, the reconstruction of the subject-matter of pre-reflective experience is effected by reflective inquiry and the objects of knowledge it constructs. In the last analysis, the relationship between pre-reflective and reflective experience is that the objects of knowledge constructed in reflective experience are drawn from the subject-matter of pre-reflective experience and are then used to provide an enriched understanding of that experience.

The discussion of Dewey's view of reflective inquiry focussed attention on the conditions presupposed by its occurrence. For Dewey, reflective inquiry presupposes the occurrence of an indeterminate experiential situation. An
indeterminate experiential situation, in his view, occurs whenever disequilibrium or disharmony obtains between an individual and her/his environment. This disequilibrium, moreover, can involve symbolic meanings as well as organic processes. It was then pointed out that in Dewey's view reflective inquiry is typically, but not invariably, elicited by the occurrence of an indeterminate experiential situation. This is the case because an indeterminate situation can also elicit non-reflective forms of thought (e.g., daydreaming, wishing, etc.). For Dewey, it was noted, in order for an indeterminate experiential situation to result in reflective inquiry, the individual involved must have acquired the habit of inquiry.

In considering Dewey's view of immediacy, the point was made that immediacy marks the way in which the qualitativeness of the things and events involved in the experiential situations comprising pre-reflective experience unfold prior to the reconstruction of these situations in reflective inquiry. In his view, the qualitativeness of pre-reflective experience is directly had. For Dewey, it was pointed out, esthetic experience, in the broad sense of this term, denotes the qualitative immediacy of all pre-reflective experience. Thus, in eating an apple, one is having an esthetic experience. Attention was then focussed on Dewey's view that immediate knowledge is not possible. All knowing, he claims, involves the employment of objects
of knowledge that are constructions of reflective inquiry. For Dewey, therefore, having an experience is not equivalent to knowing something about it.

Dewey's rejection of immediate knowledge results in his developing the view that knowing involves inquiry and the construction of objects of knowledge. That is to say, the "what" that we know when we know something is not some element of pre-reflective experience as it unfolds, but rather an "object" that is the product of a process of inquiry. This process of inquiry occurs as a part of an indeterminate experiential situation and is distinct from the objects, events, etc., that are involved in the experiential situations comprising pre-reflective experience. Thus having an experience must always precede knowing something about it, or in somewhat different terms, esthetic experience precedes cognitive experience. Attention was then drawn to Dewey's contention that the possibilities of cognitive experience need not be restricted to those cases involving use of the methods and concepts developed in the physical sciences. There are, he claims, various forms of knowing.

Dewey's conception of ends was the final aspect of his metaphysics to be discussed. Attention was directed to his view that endings are a part of naturally occurring processes (e.g., volcanoes), as well as of social processes (e.g., teacher strikes). His contention that "ends", in the
eulogistic sense of this term, are abstracted from endings was underscored together with his claim that ends, thus abstracted, must not be reified. The point was then made that, in his view, endings constitute the experiential basis for the projection, control and assessment of ends-in-view. It was also noted that ends-in-view are terminations of inquiry, whereas endings are terminations of naturally occurring processes.

The final point that was noted in connection with Dewey's view of ends is that endings are also beginnings. This understanding of endings, it was noted, is the core of his conception of the means-end continuum and it is the main ground underpinning his rejection of the traditional conception of intrinsic good. The net import of this, it was pointed out, is that the idea of value hierarchies is undermined, as well as the cardinal idea in traditional ethics, viz., the idea of a sumnum bonum.

In concluding Chapter Two, Rorty's criticism of Dewey's metaphysics was considered. His claim that Dewey's metaphysics is irrelevant to an understanding of his conception of inquiry was shown to be untenable, chiefly because Rorty misses the point of Dewey's metaphysics. His charge that Dewey, in developing his metaphysics, fails to satisfactorily address certain outstanding metaphysical puzzles was shown to be guilty of begging the question since Dewey rejects the very conception of metaphysics which the
puzzles cited by Rorty presuppose.

In Chapter Three, "The Structure of Moral Experience", my principal objective was to clearly delineate Dewey's conception of moral experience and his understanding of the nature and formation of character. In the interest of clarity, Chapter Three was divided into three parts. Part A centered on pre-reflective experience and character, Part B focussed on reflective moral experience, and Part C was devoted to a discussion of two of the more important criticisms which can be made against Dewey's views.

In Part A, "Pre-Reflective Experience and Character", I advance and defend the key claim that in Dewey's view, an agent's character is an intrinsic constituent of pre-reflective experience. The import of this claim, it was argued, is that character conditions the structure and quality of pre-reflective experience thereby also conditioning the course and outcome of reflective moral experience. The essential soundness of this claim was supported by citing Dewey's view that experience is an interactive process involving both "subjective" and "objective" elements. It was inferred from this that every experiential situation must be just what it is in virtue of the subjective and objective elements entering into it. The conclusion was then drawn that since the subjective elements entering experience comprise character, it follows that character must be ipso facto an intrinsic constituent of
pre-reflective experience. Having thus established this claim, the balance of the discussion in Part A was devoted to a more detailed elaboration of it.

Dewey's notion of human nature, it was argued, is central to his understanding of the nature and formation of character. In his view, the core of human nature comprises quanta of energy animating human behaviour. These quanta of energy, it was pointed out, are instincts and impulses. For Dewey, both instincts and impulses are plastic. In his view, the latter are completely plastic whereas the former are not. It was then noted that, for Dewey, the critically important fact about instinctive energy is that apart from its incorporation into habit it lacks form, meaning and executive power. The incorporation of instinctive energy into habit, however, means that the behaviour connected with it is conditioned by the socio-cultural environment within which the habit is formed. Thus habits vary relative to the socio-cultural environment and, in this way, "society shapes behaviour". The key implication of this fact, it was pointed out, is that it is possible to provide a hospitable socio-cultural environment for the development of human nature. More importantly, it was concluded that the forces animating human behaviour are educable. The negative implication of the incorporation of instinctive energy into habit is that habit has a tendency to become ossified and routine. In Dewey's view, respite from this form of
"spiritual rigour mortis" is provided by impulse. Impulse, he argues, is released whenever habits conflict either with one another or with contingencies prevailing within the environment. In his view, it was pointed out, released impulse redirects established habit by means of the reflective inquiry it engenders.

In discussing the relation between habit and character the point was made that, for Dewey, the term "habit" must be understood in a biological sense and not a mechanical one. More importantly, it was noted that in his view the term "character" or "self" (Dewey uses these terms interchangeably) denotes the entire complex network of an individual's interpenetrating cognitive, affective and conative habits. They are, it was pointed out, transforming, dynamic agencies of action that fully determine the structure of character. Habits are thus involved in every aspect of human experience - in the way we comb our hair, respond to a "new" idea or watch a movie. It was also pointed out that habits can be either intelligent or routine depending on the extent to which their operation can be affected by reflective inquiry. The key to an "open" character, it was argued, is in the formation of intelligent habits. It can be seen to follow from this that in forming habits, one is ipso facto forming character.

In Part B, "Reflective Moral Experience", my objective was to delineate the principal features of Dewey's
conception of reflective moral experience. The claim was made that the distinguishing characteristic of reflective moral experience was to be found in the pattern of inquiry peculiar to it. Reflective moral inquiry was thus held to be the key to understanding Dewey's conception of reflective moral experience.

In considering Dewey's view of reflective moral inquiry, the point was made that moral inquiry, insofar as it is a form of inquiry, must share some of the features characteristic of inquiry in general. Hence, it was concluded that reflective moral inquiry presupposes an indeterminate experiential situation for its occurrence. It was also noted that the task of all forms of inquiry is to transform an indeterminate experiential situation into a problematic one. In so doing, the precise nature of the problem inherent in the indeterminate experiential situation is articulated with a view to a successful resolution of it. The process of inquiry, it was suggested, thus could be viewed as comprising two distinguishable, but not separable, phases, viz., the diagnostic phase and the prescriptive phase. These general features of reflective inquiry, it was concluded, were thus characteristic of reflective moral inquiry as well.

In discussing the specific pattern of reflective moral inquiry, the point was made that for Dewey the principal, though not exclusive, subject-matter of reflective moral
inquiry is the character development of the agent involved. It was noted, however, that since every act either consolidates or alters, in however small a way, the established habits (character) of an agent, it follows that every act is potentially the subject-matter of moral inquiry. This fact, it was claimed, is at the bottom of Dewey's rejection of the hard and fast distinction, characteristic of traditional moral philosophy, between "the moral" and "the non-moral". The point was then made that, for Dewey, knowing when to raise the moral issue is reflective of a well-formed character. More specifically, attention was drawn to the fact that in his view, it is generally appropriate to raise the moral question when the growth of character is involved.

Apart from its specific subject-matter, reflective moral inquiry was seen to be comprised of the same two phases of inquiry already noted, viz., the diagnostic and the prescriptive. In its diagnostic phase, the specific task of reflective moral inquiry is to articulate the qualities characteristic of the particular indeterminate experiential situation evoking it. The institution of the problem peculiar to the indeterminate experiential situation is its principal focus. It was then pointed out that in Dewey's view, the diagnostic phase of moral inquiry (as well as the prescriptive phase) could greatly benefit from the use of both the moral principles and the conceptual
structures prevailing within the socio-cultural environment. For Dewey, it was noted, moral principles (as well as principles in general) function as rules of thumb directing observation and enlightening experience. They are to be regarded as the warranted outcomes of experience, not as the a priori deliverances of "reason".

In its prescriptive phase, reflective moral inquiry is comprised of deliberation/valuation. In Dewey's view, it was pointed out, deliberation involves the projection of ends-in-view and the anticipation and rehearsal, in imagination, of the various consequences resulting from action undertaken in connection with them. The principal objective of deliberation/valuation is to determine which of the ends-in-view projected is desirable. For Dewey, it was noted, there is an important distinction to be drawn between the desired and the desirable. Insofar as all ends-in-view are projected by desire, they are all "desired". In his view, however, it does not follow from this that these objects are also desirable. The point was made that, for Dewey, a "desirable" end-in-view is one that is conditioned by the indeterminate situation within which it was constructed. In other words, the desirable is that which addresses the problem peculiar to the indeterminate experiential situation eliciting inquiry. In the case of reflective moral inquiry, one further desideratum must be satisfied, viz., the act undertaken in connection with the
end-in-view must contribute in some way to the growth of character. The point was also made that, for Dewey, the identity of the "self" involved in the growth of character is not as critical as it might at first appear. What matters, he argues, is not who is affected so much as how they are affected.

In Part C, "Dewey" on Moral Experience - Objections and Replies", two of the more important criticisms that could be brought to bear against Dewey's conception of moral experience were considered. These criticisms were: 1) the charge that he commits the is/ought fallacy, and 2) the charge that he commits the naturalistic fallacy. In considering these criticisms, it was concluded that neither poses a serious challenge to Dewey's views. This is the case, it was argued, because both criticisms presuppose a Cartesian view of mind and body, thought and action. As a result, both prove to be irrelevant to the philosophical project Dewey had undertaken. In short, given that Dewey rejects Cartesianism, it follows that a criticism of his views that presupposes its validity misses the mark.

Thus far my attention has been restricted to developing a summary of the main points made in my thesis. In the section that follows, I shall highlight its principal conclusions.
B: CONCLUSIONS

In Chapter Four, "Toward A Deweyan Approach to Moral Education and Moral Agency", a number of significant consequences for the theory of moral education and moral agency connected with Dewey's conception of moral experience and his understanding of the nature and formation of character were developed, along with several implications of his views for the practice of moral education. I shall now review these in point form.

1. The first, and the most significant, consequence of Dewey's views for the theory of moral education and moral agency is that the affective dimension of experience, heretofore all but ignored in approaching moral education, must be more fully integrated into it. Thus, the education of moral agents must involve bringing them into a greater awareness of their own feelings (as well as the feelings of others) and an understanding of how these colour judgement. Moreover, the inclusion of feelings must be understood to involve, among other things, an examination of how they contribute to influencing the way in which a person actually "sees" things.

2. The idea of a value-neutral approach to moral education must be abandoned. What is required of a theory of moral education is a frank
admission that, from the teaching end of things, balance and fairness are the key desiderata, not value-neutrality. From the side of moral agency, a program of moral education must have as a primary objective, the fostering of openness to conflicting beliefs, values and conceptual schemes. More importantly, however, it must encourage the willingness of individuals to seek consensus and resolution when conflict arises and, if consensus cannot be achieved, to practice tolerance, if tolerance is possible.

3. Moral education and character education are one and the same thing. Hence, a program of moral education must be concerned not only with influencing the development of character, but also with providing moral agents with the skills and sensitivity required to continue the process of growth and development long after the period of formal education has come to an end. It must also be informed by an understanding of human nature drawn from either psychology or psychoanalytic theory.

4. Moral education must focus more energy on developing the sensitivity required for a discerning diagnosis of the complex character of the moral situations encountered in daily life.
5. Moral education must not be identified with the fostering of a hard and fast commitment to "established" moral principles and the development thereby of a "closed" character.

6. Moral education must unfold within the broader context of a liberal arts education thereby nurturing the development of moral agents sensitive to the challenges and dilemmas of men and women living in a post-industrial and technological society characterized by cultural pluralism.

Apart from these consequences for a theory of moral education and moral agency, there are also a number of implications for the practice of moral education connected with Dewey's view of moral experience. These can be summarized in point form as follows:

1. In light of the importance of pre-school experience in shaping character, social policies must be adopted and social agencies established to extend support to troubled and dysfunctional families.

2. Given the increasing demands for day-care services, community-wide discussion is needed on the organization and control of day-care facilities and the qualifications of the individuals who work in them.
3. The general aims of moral education programs must be broadly supported by the community within which they are taught.

4. Classes in moral education cannot be restricted to three or four 30-minute periods a week.

5. Emphasis in moral education must be placed on fostering an agent's willingness and ability to stop and think.

6. Programs of moral education must equip individuals with the skills needed to resist the allurements of advertising.

In discussing the consequences of Dewey's view of moral experience for the theory of moral education and moral agency, and its implications for the practice of moral education, a Deweyan approach to moral education was contrasted with both the values-clarification approach to moral education and the cognitive-developmental approach developed by Lawrence Kohlberg. In light of this contrast, the conclusion was drawn that a Deweyan approach to moral education is a clear and important alternative.
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