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Nation in Production: Japanese Royal Wedding in the Media

Keiko Mukai

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Nation in Production: Japanese Royal Wedding in the Media

Keiko Mukai

Abstract

The objective of the thesis is to probe the media coverage of the recent royal wedding in Japan to assess its relationship with nationhood. To this end, I will analyze visual texts (television program and women's magazines) to highlight how images, metaphors and historical representations give meanings to nationhood. Using discursive and semiotic analyses, this thesis wants to ask how the media royal wedding functions by lending meanings of power, hierarchy and difference. It also examines the meanings and boundaries of what "nationhood/modernization" embodies in the contemporary Japanese popular culture. Through this research, I hope to show how paradoxes of modern and tradition, self and other, dominant and marginal are maintained, resolved or challenged, in order to cultivate the nationhood.

Acknowledgments

Table of contents

Chapter One: Introduction

Chapter Two: Mediation of Imperial Constructions and Modernity 20

Chapter Three: Narratives of Japanese Cultural Order and Identity: Royals, Nationhood and Family in the Media 45

Note on Japanese names

Unless specified, all the Japanese names appear in the order of last name, then first name, following the tradition.

Introduction

A theoretical discourse is like a tour guide. Our attention turns to what the discourse itself sees, the relation between objects and concepts that a discourse makes visible. The metaphor of the discourse as a tour guide applies to two discourses: one is the discourses the theory used to get an "object" and second is the discourses as the objects/events (i.e. media discourse) themselves. In both cases, we will only encounter what is visible through the discourse, only those objects that are relevant and only those problematics that are significant enough within the domain of the specific tour of the mind. Other problems, other subjects become invisible. Only the theoretical problem (or theme) defines what becomes invisible. This is the theoretical problem of a discourse (Althusser 1974).

Yet the invisible does exist within the discourse; the "blanks on the crowded text (27)" formed by a particular discourse. To see "these blanks", it requires another take on the discourse. Another tour guide of the discourse is not the product of closer attention. It is made possible through changes in another set of vision, changes in social and political conditions. Althusser calls this "an informed gaze".

The gaze of the tour guide I am discussing here can be used to understand the political and theoretical shifts that have occurred to reveal the blind spots of previous theories. One such discourse which has successfully served to elucidate certain blind spots, those "invisible" sets of questions and answers, is the cross-cultural inquiry

into theoretical discourses. There is of course a danger that this position will itself become a discursive tour guide; however, it is useful to come to grips with issues which formerly have been silenced, such as the current ways of thinking about what kind of interests are at play in cultivating a discourse. Speaking more generally, this position allows one to explore dominant ways of conceptualizing social relations and political relations, around what constitutes as natural any social determination within specific cultural sites.

Research Question

The objective of the thesis is to probe the media coverage of the recent royal wedding in Japan in order to assess its relationship with nationhood. To this end, I will analyze visual texts (television programes and women's magazines) to highlight how images, metaphors and historical representations give meanings to nationhood. Using discursive and semiotic analyses, this thesis asks how the media royal wedding functions by providing meanings of power, hierarchy and difference. It also examines the meanings and boundaries of what "nationhood/modernization" embodies in contemporary Japanese popular culture. Through this research, I hope to show how paradoxes of modern and tradition, self and other, dominant and marginal are maintained, resolved or challenged, in order to cultivate nationhood.

Before exploring these questions, I want to discuss researc': trends in Japanese studies which have led to the isolation of my

thesis topic. I will consider how studies on Japan have neglected the problems around hierarchy and difference. Such investigations rarely pick up on popular narratives and representations in the media.

Japanese studies are haunted by "uniqueness": accounts about Japan vis-a-vis the West. What kind of interests have been projected upon Japanese culture in these approaches? Discourses on Japanese uniqueness seem to be polarized around disputes between ontological determinism - accounts which explain difference as something innate - and cultural determinism - accounts that explain difference in terms of culture. Problems arise from each of these perspectives. Both approaches fall short in their understanding of what kind of interests are at play in constucting the "uniqueness".

Review of previous work: Ontological determinism, cultural determinism and the problem of difference

Any quest to understand Japanese culture (or any culture) as distinct from the West, can suggest a form of ontological determinism. Ontological determinism suggests mutual exclusiveness and tends to exclude the idea of cultural constructs: these divisions are politically, economically, culturally and academically constructed to highlight difference (Said 1985). From this perspective, we are forced to internalize our focus on difference and difference becomes *a priori*.

On the other hand, a cultural determinist position seems to suspend further investigation as to why such a difference formed and how these differences are maintained through practices within a culture. From a cultural-determinist perspective, culture becomes the

3

tool for all clarification, thus becoming *a priori* ("culture" as the explanation of a phenomenon). The cultural determinist gives a modernist lens to an oriental culture, or "you have culture, but we have history" or in other words, "we have the history to analyze culture";

> In its most general formulation, culture has sometimes been seen as a stratum of the social life of whole nation-states, encouraging attempts to reduce diversity within complex political formations to variants of a single "mythic" culture.... Interestingly, there seems to have been little impulse in mainstream historiography to specify the sources of culture's foot-dragging power; and no impulse at all to see our own practice as analysts as cultural in anyway (Farquhar and Hevia 1993, 1).

Both positions are often interchangeably used in the same argument, but we may note that ultimately it leaves one with nowhere to go beyond the two determinisms. In the first section, my object of study will be some ontological claims within Japanese studies that are interlinked with cultural determinism and the creation of visualizing practice that gloss over difference among Japanese people. This discussion obviously is connected to the culture of the "other", a point of differentiation which is also monolithic. In the second section, I look at critiques of the conceptualization of Japanese identity, which still are unable to go outside of ontological and cultural determinisms. In the third section, I will look at the paradoxes that form when one examines ideology about Japanese identity.

1) In an attempt to make cultures more tangible, scholars first objectified the study of nationalism under the rubric of "national

character" studies, as the discourse of "Japaneseness", "*nihonjinron*", often illustrates. These social and cultural discourses on Japan and their explanation of why Japanese culture is unique vis-a-vis the West are largely grounded in a kind of essentialism.

I would like to briefly discuss two concepts in particular, which many[1] have discussed: the concepts of mutual dependence [*amae*] and a monolithic, classless society [*mukaikyuu shakai*]. The most obvious problem with terms, such as "*amae*" or "classless society" is that the terms are so crucial that they function to predetermine a Japanese psyche, social relations and social reality. According to these accounts, such essential configurations are more important in constituting identity than are any considerations of gender, class or educational opportunities.

For example, Doi (1971) characterizes and highlights various dimensions of personality indigenous to the Japanese in terms of a psychology of *amae*. *Amae* has no correlate equivalent in English. Doi's focus encompasses a cluster of related western psychoanalytic constructions such as indulgence, reciprocal dependence, denial of separation, passivity, loss of self, and in its more neurotic forms, mother fixation and obsession.

The ontological claim then usually feeds into some kind of cultural determinism - the interaction of elements in a given culture

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[1] The discourses extend from social structure (Nakane 1976), linguistic determinism (Tsunoda 1978), anti-linguistic determinism of silence (Miyoshi 1974) and to ethnocentrism (Higuchi 1974, 1981). There are Western scholars who have contributed to the literature in the similar manner, such as Benedict (1945), Vogel (1979) and Van Wolfren (1988). This tone of argument is also made publicly by such congressman Ishihara (1991) and prime minister Nakasone (1986).

determines more specific patterns of social relations. This "infant desire to depend upon the mother figure" is reinforced by the Japanese cultural patterns of maternal influence, late weaning, prolonged sleeping of children with parents, and by extension, a social value which emphasizes dependence over independence.

Umesao (1990) argues that in the process of modernization of Japan, "the causal sequence did not extend from economics to society and politics but took exactly the opposite course [in other words, they were politically driven]. The reason all these measures could be executed so rapidly was because the necessary social, technical and educational foundations were already there, having been gradually developed among the people since the Edo period [1603-1867]" (36). Umesao himself says that he came to this conclusion from understanding Japanese history through a biological, ecological process of "parallel evolution" with the Western civilization (10-11).

Umesao's main theme is to discuss Japan as a classless society; "about 90 percent of the Japanese reply [they belong in] the middle class (17)". Once the classless society argument is established to differentiate Japan from the West, then Umesao argues how Japan evolved towards classlessness. He constructs his argument through a kind of cultural determinism: that classless society was achieved by nullifying the class system of the Meiji restoration (1878), that television contributed to the acceleration and spread of cultural uniformity, and that centralization annihilated differences in the lifestyles in the big cities and rural areas. His argument becomes problematic because he manufactures a history based on his preoccupation of discovering Japan's classless society.

Each of these discourses seems to address some essential aspect of Japanese culture. There are a multitude of competing definitions, each interested in getting at a similar nature, and asking the same question - what is the Japanese identity, what makes it unique vis-a-vis the West? The immediately striking feature about the treatment of uniqueness of Japanese culture is the fact that it hides difference and hierarchy among Japanese people; in fact, it pretends to be beyond difference and hierarchy. "Difference within" is an invisible issue for *nihonjinron*. It does appear anywhere on the horizon of critiquing the search for "uniqueness".

2) These discourses suggest the immunity of "difference within" from changes and developments in social institutions; the issue is silenced. The more serious dilemma is that this approach avoids the discussion of "difference within" and "hierarchy within".

Nihonjinron have faced challenges from many sides. A thorough effort to critique the structure of *nihonjinron* came from Peter Dale in the <u>Myth of Japanese Uniqueness</u> (1987). Dale uses structural analysis, combined with ideological, neo-Marxist and psychoanalytical approaches to reveal the assumptions behind the constitution of ideology. Dale's approach looks at *nihonjinron* more as a mediated product between Japan and the West.

One of Dale's concerns is with Doi's concept of *amae* and Doi's suggestion that the concept of *amae* describes Japanese experiences more adequately than does the concept of infantile desire in the classic Freudian definition. Dale shows how the concept is appropriated from the West, then it is "essentialized" and

7

"particularized" to suit the Japanese experience; ultimately, Doi may deny that the concept ever came from the West (141-142).

The linguist Miller (1982) has challenged the myth of silence (Miyoshi 1974), a myth that "one does not have to say things directly". This myth has constructed a major presupposition that to outsiders, to non-speaking Japanese (and to even to those who can speak the language), Japanese culture is incomprehensible. Miller shows how the myth of silence was invented as a cardinal principle of *Kokutai* (structure or body of nation). Miller argues that those in power of the fascist-nationalist state invoked the concept of kotoage in the old Japanese poem (*Manyooshu*) to assert Japanese difference, and by extension, Japanese superiority to the West:

> What the *Kokutai no hongi* authors did was to take these texts, with their emphasis upon the rarity with which this ritual of name invocation was performed in pre-Buddhist Japan, and to claim that these texts proved that the early Japanese believed that their country was "a land of deities which was free from the strife of words" (99).

Miller excavates buried and forgotten evidence to reveal the ahistorical weakness of *nihonjinron* depicted in the myth of silence.[2]

3) What both Dale and Miller have done in the critique of uniqueness, is to lay the groundwork for an analysis of the production of the Japanese myth. But what both fail to accomplish is

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[2] Yet he is unable to see more important dynamics of the myth of silence; to understand the myth rather as not having a faith in the power of discourse and the fear of silence being verbalized, especially by an outsider. And even when it is verbalized, the question remains whether discourse has the power to verbalize authentically what was formerly silent.

8

to go outside the forms of causality, and conscious/culture causality in particular. Dale presumes the structure and interaction between Japan and the West as *a priori*, and Miller naively assumes the *Kokutai no Hongi* as the source of inventing the tradition of silence worship. The problem here is that the nihonjinron discourses, along with the discourses that critique them, always seem to fall into the double exigency of constructing Japanese uniqueness through either essential or cultural determinism. And this problem seems to arise whenever the approach to Japan takes the form of an excavation of "truth".[3]

Perhaps the "truth" does not lie out there but rather in the practice of Japanologists who criticize the uniqueness of Japanese culture; for *Nihonjinron* is a paradoxical thing. Despite the writers' intentions, the academic criticisms of *nihonjinron* reinforce the tendency of returning all inquiry to Japanese uniqueness - as culture/consciousness. Unfortunately, the more a criticism is elaborated and articulated[4] the more convergence is encouraged within a "Japaneseness" discourse, because such criticisms at the same time evoke the many discourses that affirm *nihonjinron*. As a consequence, this dynamic of an oppositional discourse as a whole establishes what is central and worthwhile in discourses on Japan.

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[3] See for example Foucault: "it's not a matter of emancipating truth from every system of power which would be a chimera, for truth is already power) but of detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time". (1980) Power/Knowledge. Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977. Gordon, C. ed. New York: Pantheon Books, p. 133.

[4] See for example Dale, 1986, pp. 56-77 and how he eloquently discusses the weakness of the myth of uniqueness of Japanese language.

And as long as both camps exchange dialogues or indulge in monologue (which happens very often), they narcissistically reaffirm the circularity of the debate, as well as internalize its focus.

Ultimately there are two paradoxes of omnipresent discussion about the Japanese identity in *nihonjinron*. First of all, our attention is narrowly focused on how to explain or understand the difference between Japan and non-Japan (i.e. the West). Yet we have not begun to investigate how differences *among Japanese people* (I'm not thinking of simply the contrast with Japanese-speaking minorities or visible foreigners in Japan) are described, argued, justified and theorized. Secondly, nihonjinron is everywhere at the expense of other myths. In other words, criticism of *nihonjinron* may have debunked the discourses on Japanese "uniqueness". However, their continuing engagement with the same questions could be said to further marginalize and mystifiy other discourses even more thoroughly - such as patriarchy - by limiting and validating the focus of attention on Japanese "uniqueness".

In order to understand these paradoxes, let us imagine a student studying Japanese social interaction. What will s/he look at? To start with, the student may turn to the famous book by Nakane (1970). Nakane argues that Japanese society is not based on class structure but on groups of institutions which are vertical in nature. Therefore Japanese people prefer to act within the group. Furthermore, Hamaguchi (1980) argues that the lack of 'individualism' suggests a consideration towards other persons. The sensitivity shown in interpersonal interaction requires the ability to

10

understand the subtlties of the Japanese mind, which constitutes a feature of Japanese uniqueness.

But then the student may read: "in many instances, Japanese are loyal to a group because it pays to be loyal (Befu 1980)". Another account reads: "these potentially individualistic Japanese, under different circumstances, such as overseas assignment for businessmen, will and actually do demonstrate non-group behavior (Wagatsuma 1983)". However, the student would be hasty in concluding that the Japanese social interaction is somehow similar to that of the West, for he might go on to read that "Japanese have rather developed, through different, concepts of privacy and self. ... The argument is not that the Japanese are more individualistic than Westerners on a quantifiable scale, but that Japanese have developed in their own culture in a number of ways, some qualitatively different, by which they can express their individualism (Mouer and Sugimoto 1986, 210)."

Our student will only be more confused studying the government documents. A study group 'Age of culture' was instituted by the prime minister of the time, Ohira (1978-1980), to rethink the issue of Japanese identity. Based on the fundamental epistemological difference between Japan and the West, the report states:

> The West is oriented either towards 'individualism', which professes and seeks to establish the 'individual self' differentiated from others, or towards 'totalitarianism' which denies the "individual"; on the other hand, the Japanese cultural essence may be called 'interpersonalism' which values the 'relationship between persons' and the relationship between the individual and the whole... (Kawamura, quoted in Yoshino 1992, 193)

According to the report, the 'interpersonalism' assumes a *'nakama* (group) society" or an "*ie* (family)" society (193). Meanwhile, the Ad Hoc Council for Education reform established by prime minister Nakasone (1982-1988) concluded in the reports of 1985 to 1987 that 'individualism' is critical to provide Japan with creative thinkers. Our student will be left with an impression that 'individualism' and 'creativity' can be achieved in Japan through more organization, structure, direction and further control.

All of this literature most likely points the student to the rhetoric of uniqueness - of highlighting the dichotomy between Japan and the West - rather than to questions about Japanese social interaction. This East/West dichotomy continually silences differences among the citizens of Japanese people. Each time the discourse of Japanese uniqueness is used for politicizing the cultural discussion, a "difference/hierarchy" lies hidden, and is once again reinforced. This dynamic assumes that the difference among Japanese people, such as social hierarchy and gender, are unimportant to the construction of Japanese identity.

More importantly, this literature expresses a sense of threat from the "outside" and attempts to clarify Japanese identity in connection with preserving cultural order in the modern society. What is interesting here (and in many *nihonjinron* arguments for the same reason), however, is the ongoing production of "Japanese identity" which is assumed to be "pure" through the very notion that it can be threatened and in the assumption that such an identity has somehow always existed. This "pure" notion of identity is constructed

12

and rebuilt in discourses we have looked at so far. These discourses ultimately suggest that Japanese identity is some sort of pre-disposition found at both individual and social levels.

The subject matter of this thesis is the ongoing production of "identity" in the Japanese media. My particular interest lies in the presentation of the recent royal wedding (6/9/93), which is a site of connection between narratives of Japanese identity and nationhood. By exploraing this representation, I hope to come to grips with two sets of questions that receive little attention: first, how are the paradoxes of Japanese identity maintained and resolved to fit the larger oeuvre of the continuity of history and remembering the past? Second, how can we go outside of these two deterministic discourses in order to understand more meaningfully the creation of "identity"?

Therefore, in my thesis, I wanted to explore Japanese identity without analyzing the code of the national character, but by coming to grips with the interests that shape it. Locating Japanese identity is important because powerful political concerns are intent on absorbing what is desirable from foreign cultures while at the same time they must find a new definition of Japanese identity which can serve efficiently in the current world. This is what lies at the heart of both academic and political discussions about building cultural order. Hence a discussion of Japanese identity is mandatory, but it is more interesting to focus on how paradoxes of the modern and tradition, self and other, dominant and marginal are maintained, resolved or challenged, in order to cultivate the notion of nationhood.

By undertaking such an investigation I hope to contribute to approaches to Japanese studies which rarely concern themselves

with popular narratives and representations in the media. Moreover, I hope my investigation will contribute to communication studies, by giving insight into the complex process of constructing nationhood and identity by highlighting the various cultural, social and political interests in relation to media and at the same time, by opening up a new set of questions.

I have chosen to look at the Japanese media's version of the royal wedding, because it deals with many intersecting issues at once; cultivating the family, marriage, national memory, an icon for national history and identity, the hierarchy of reliable sources, visible and invisible fictions. I closely examine narratives of the royal wedding because such a site illuminates the complex relations between political interests, national identity and media representation. The media itself plays an essential role in maintaining and resolving contradictions about such relations. The images in the media are keys to the Japanese royal family because it operates *symbolically* in relation to wealth and power.[5]

Exploring the royal wedding as a media event further follows the concept of "family" as the "glue" binding the imagining of the "Japanese community".[6] The effect of politicization on home and

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[5] Unlike for example, the British royal family who are land owners and have considerable wealth, the Japanese royal family's expenses are paid from the national budget - the taxpayers' money - although the family has some private ownership of estates. The annual budget for imperial family (23 members) is close to 3 billion yen, adding 20 billion yen for operation cost (security and imperial household office), compared to 2.1 billion yen for the British royals in 1986. (Murakami 1986, 248-251)

[6] The implication of the "imagination" here does not point to nation as mere fiction, but as something that is invested in institutional practices. Benedict Anderson discusses how communities are to be distinguished from one another by the styles through which they are imagined, not by their falsity/genuineness (Anderson 1991, 15). Thus Anderson consider the

14

family in relation to cultivating the imagining of "Japanese community" is also what makes the investigation into the media royal wedding interesting, for narratives about indivduals and family will be both implicitly and explitly molded in the media. The paper for economical planning for year 2000 writes "The home is extremely important to the aged for a secure life of retirement, their health and welfare. In an attempt to form a social environment ideal for future living, it will be necessary to correctly position the home in society." (Keizaikikakuchoo 1982, 138).

To this end, the focus of this thesis is the contemporary representations of the royal family in the context of the wedding in the Japanese media, a discussion which needs to be grounded on larger issues of clarifying the Japanese identity(es) in the late capalistic society. Throughout my work, I have assessed how various cultural, political and economical preferences and national ideological interests are at play in visualizing the princess, the modern family, nationhood and women, within the cultural order.

Primary and secondary research

In order to understand how meanings of nation and identity are mapped out in the narrative of national memory and how these meanings are created primarily by the form of narrating nation and character, this thesis takes as its object a series of television

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specificity of modern media for the production of such distinguishing styles or modes.

15

programes leading up to the royal wedding, the broadcast of the wedding on June 9, 1993, and various programs which followed. Over a span of 20 days, 26 national broadcast programes have been selected for analysis. Nine programes are day-time "Wide shows"[7] which specifically target a female audience. As for news production, I deal with five special news broadcasts and seven regular news programes. I also consider five programes constituted as "family specials". I supplement these with newspapers and magazine articles when necessary. These selected programes are typical in their construction (talk shows and news) and the way they "celebrate" the wedding, hence representative of various shows that were aired during this period.

Methodology

I intend to analyze major narratives and representations. Some useful keys to understanding patterns of televisual narrative have been provided by Dyanne and Katz (1992), Erikson et al. (1987) and Coward (1985). Taking the British royal wedding as an example, Dyanne and Katz map firm limits on narrative; about what is, and what could be, reported about the event. They point to three levels of commitment in the television event: definitional (conveying its

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[7] Wide shows are usually watched by home makers. The content of the wide show usually involves news about celebrities, current affairs and personal/domestic issues. Although there is no equivalent show in North America, the format of these programmes closely resemble the tabloid magazines, such as People. The reason why such shows are called "wide"(waido) seem to come from two reasons according to a person working at a network: that it takes "wide" space on the TV guide and that the subject within the show covers a "wide" range of subjects.

distinctive features), hermeneutic (it offers instant interpretation) and protective (defines its priority and sets specific mood) (Dyanne et Katz 1992, 79-80).

In line with Dyanne and Katz, I use the relationship between the role of media and visualization outlined by Ericson et al.,. This relates directly to the press blackout of the process of choosing a princess and more broadly the way in which media surveillance takes place through setting frameworks and boundaries on the royal wedding. Ericson et al. write that the contemporary media functions to define and produce images of deviance through the use of 'authorized knowers' (Ericson et al 1987). Hence media "visualizes deviance and control as these relate to visions of social order and change" (8). The journalists and media institutions, therefore, become the key vehicles in constituting visions of order, stability, change and above all, in influencing techniques of control and management that articulate these visions.

While the spectacle of the royal wedding promotes a maintenance of the *status quo*, Rosalind Coward's discussion of British Royals is useful in its assertion that the idea of royalty is constructed around emotional, familiar and seemingly universal narratives. She interprets the "royals" as operating within the conventions of, "Dallas" for example, or any family drama (Coward 1985, 164). She focuses specifically on the way in which the story is told and how it functions to eternalize traditional values especially about women.

Following these leads which specifically deal with the construction of narrative in collective memory, I will apply them to

17

an analysis of the media text (representation) on two levels: its limits (ideological and institutional) and its strategies (rhetoric, style) which attempt to manage and resolve paradox and deviance. Such examinations are necessary to understand the nature of "tour guiding" and "blanks on the crowded text" (Althusser 1974, 27) that take place in relation to the production of identity and nationhood. By dissecting a story on each of these two levels or "dimensions", the relation and operation of metaphors to its symbolic meanings can be explored. In short, what I propose to do is simple: to grasp the programs as representations of all sorts of values, interests and intervention, hence a series of "tour guiding", being projected upon commercialized symbolic construction of the "Royal wedding" in the Japanese media to create "identity" and nationhood.

Thesis Outline

Chapter two discusses the notion of the imperial family and the emergence of an ideology of Japanese community, as these relate to visualization of nationhood and identity. Also included in this chapter is a discussion of development of media in Japan.

Chapter three considers a series of "tour guides" that relate to the visualization of the royal wedding: first, the role of media in connection to a vision of order, change and deviance. Second, a series of issues that are presented in the television programs, such as the threat of the modern woman and how this threat is resolved will be explored. I will also review how female characters become the stages of enacting the cultural norms in the production of visions of

nationhood and identity. Throughout the chapter, I will assess how various cultural, political and economical preferences and national ideological interests are at play in visualizing the princess, a modern family, the nationhood and women, within the cultural order.

In the concluding chapter, I will address how narratives of the royal wedding put contradictions together, especially around the contemporary notion of Japanese family. Finally, I will open up some questions regarding the uniformity of media representations and political representations.

Chapter Two

Mediation of Imperial Constructions and Modernity

In the last chapter, I discussed discursive constructions of Japanese nationalism and laid out some of the problems inherent in a presentation of Japanese subjectivity that leaves out considerations of regions, class or gender. These discursive constructions emerge in an attempt to unify Japan and to differentiate it from other cultures. Yet these constructions lead to several paradoxes. One is the cultivation of identity as "pure body": an insistance on identity as something that can be threatened, that has to be preserved, produced and reproduced. Another is to ignore differences among the Japanese people.

At the forefront of consolidating Japanese nationalism in response to modernity in the last century was the modern emperor system established by the Meiji government. Any royal family is not only an institution. In fact, when this institution is closely intertwined with notions of nationalism, it becomes a model for political legitimacy. The construction of meanings and significance around the Japanese royal family in the past need historical examination. How was the modern royal family invoked within the context of building the nationhood?

This chapter examines how various identifications are deployed with the construction of the emperor system to produce the discourses of nationhood in Japan. My focus in this chapter will be on the historical nation building process of centralization, militarization,

bureaucratization and standard education, that holds "'Japanese' as citizen, 'Japanese language' as cititizens' tongue and 'Japanese culture' as Japanese citizens' culture as *a priori*" (Sakai, 1992 54). Since the contemporary emperor system is integrated into the process of Japanese nation-building, I want to show through historical examples that these assumptions are also necessary to invoke the emperor system (54). Hence "Japanese" as citizen, "Japanese language" as the citizens' tongue and "Japanese culture" as the Japanese citizens' culture become "given", and thusare never problematized.

The following discussion will look at how the emperor system was placed in the service of the Meiji government, which requires an assessment of the appeal to "archaic" and "order of nature" constructions. In the second section of this chapter, I will consider both the internalization process through education as well as surveillance, and visualization techniques of the modern nation and emperor system, which creates a sense of national community using the concept of "family" as its glue. I will discuss the development of media in Japan, with a focus on the ways they contributed to the visualization of nationhood, and in a larger context, to the modernization process.

Making nation

The political, social and cultural relationship between the Japanese emperor, power-holders and the Japanese people have undergone a critical shift from the Edo period (1600-1867) to the

21

period of modernization (Bellah 1957, Fujitani 1993).[1] Unlike a society based on feudalism, modern nationalism must cultivate the processes of centralization, militarization and bureaucratization. Such processes began to take place in Japan during the Meiji period (1868-1912). The government centralized power by dissolving all the local feudal military units and then appointing prefecture mayors, giving Tokyo centralized control. The class system was abolished (1871) and standard registration (*toseki*) was required.[2] Males over the age of twenty were freed from the feudal han-system and were directly called upon by the state for military service in 1873. In short, the nation attempted to create uniform subjectivities.

The first government consisted of three houses whose members were mostly the active leaders for Meiji Restoration from *Satsuma*, *Choshuu*, *Tosa* and *Hizen* hans (military units). These "han"s were not only physically displaced during the Edo period having weak ties with the Edo *Bakufu* (the centralized military unit), but also its members were given the least privileges. The members of the cabinet, former vassals, came from the so-called elite ruling class of the Edo period. The population census at the beginning of Meiji

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[1] Fujitani (1993) writes: "the common people's knowledge of the emperor, potentially the most powerful symbol of the Japanese nation, was non existent, vague or fused with folk beliefs in deities who might grant this-worldly benefits but who had little to do with the nation (pp.86-87)". His problem of a alyzing the emperor system should be noted here. He applies the Foucauldian analysis of discontinuity on to Japanese history. Shinya writes how the emperor was not completely separated from day-to-day life of people. For example, in 1670, when the Gosuio Emperor passed away, through out villages, sounds(*narimono*) and shows(*misemono*) were prohibited by an order.

[2] It is ironic that the tabulation for population beginning of Meiji (1873) was counted according to the former class system: vassels were elite ruling class: nobility 2829; vassels 1,548,568 and servants of vassels 343,881; citizens 31,106,514 (93.4% of population) and other, such as monks 298,880. Total population was 33,300,672 (Inoue 1988, 242).

(1873) shows that 93.4% of the population consisted of citizens while the remaining 6.6% were nobility, vassals and servants of vassals, so-called elites. Former vassals established the new government with the emperor as the central figure (1868).

To embrace and participate in modernization (as defined by the West), the emperor system went hand-in-hand with nationalism.[3] The political slogan "Revere the Sovereign, Expel the Barbarians" (*sonno jooi*) existed before the Meiji restoration in *Mitogaku* under the strong influence of Confucianism in efforts to replace the decaying feudal system and to cope with the wave of foreign pressure to open Japan's doors. This ideology unfolded while struggling with the democracy movement throughout the nation.

The democracy movement first started with some dissatisfied vassals devastated by the series of changes of modernization, such as losing privileges and allowances (1876) due to the abolition of the class system. They were joined by the bourgeoisie's interest for less taxation. The government repeatedly suppressed the speeches and gatherings of the democracy movement. The movement demanded that the Emperor open the parliament. Public opinion led the government to promise the opening of a parliament in ten years (1890) and drew up the constitution that would be defined by the emperor (Inoue 1988, 254-255). The leading party at the time, consisting mainly of the *Satsuma* and *Choshuu* elites, strongly

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[3] It is not necessary to go into the detailed discussions of disputes that took place for and against employing the emperor system for the survival of Japanese nation and modernization. For a comprehensive account, see Waswo, Ann. "Modernism and Cultural identity in Japan". Asian Affairs. v. 20, Februar: 1989, pp.45-56.

influenced the establishment of constitutional monarchism based on the hereditary ruling power of the emperor.

In the first three chapters of the Meiji constitution (1889), the emperor was established as the highest governing power whose lineage had been one throughout the history; the emperor as a hereditary ruler. The constitution was written by such political elites as Ito Hirobumi, Inoue Kowashi, Ito Miyoji, Kaneko Kentaro and a German consultant Roesler (Inoue 1988, 260). The constitution guaranteed as an inviolable right the holiness of the emperor which situated his status as an absolute religious figure. Furthermore, the highest political and military power concentrated on the emperor, yet at the same time, in the basis of emperor's position as the pinnacle of state religion, he was exempted from any direct political and military responsibilities.

The position of the Emperor, furthermore, had legal legitimation in the principles of Imperial Household [*Kooshitsu tenhan*]. As his position defines the core of the national structure of authority, the emperor system was of great interest to elites in the government as a means to establish their own legitimacy. Hence the question regarding how to introduce the position of emperor and how to successfully continue the "archaic" lineage directly meshed with the modernization process. This however does not explain why the emperor system was successfully invoked and not some other system. We will look at how the emperor system was placed in the service of the creation of nationhood and the needs of the Meiji government.

Appeals for the "archaic" and the "order of nature"

(1) "archaic" as a form of validation and preference

The emperor system is invoked because it naturalizes the interests of new authority. In other words, the basic assumption behind the construction of a "modern" emperor system with nationalism concerned the legitimation of new authority and new forms of identifying oneself with Japan's modernization. Thus the "archaic" emperor system embodied two frames of time: one related to the dissent of Amaterasu and hence to Shintoism,[4] and one related to the present demands of modernization, such as "ideal" citizens who manifest the interests of the modern nation, and disseminate these links over space. Both these links helped to eternalize the existence of the Japanese nation.

The authority of the emperor system is contingent upon the conceptualization of "what citizens should be", with the result that such a conceptualization goes through much intercourse of historical, political, economical and cultural (re)definition. In this way, both royal family and nationalism validate the social order - including the

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[4] Shinto was Japan's old folklore which celebrates the deities and emperors. According to Kojiki, the oldest chronicle in Japan compiled in 712A.D., Izanagi, a god, and Izanami, a goddess, are brother and sister. They agreed to have intercourse in order to give birth to islands, which were to become Japanese islands. (Ocono Yasumaro 1977, 36). The first child of this union turned out to be handicapped, who could not walk after three years. This child was discarded in the sea by placing it in the reed boat. The next child was not satisfactory either. By means of a deer bone oracle, they learned that their attempt was unsuccessful because Izanami, the goddess, intiated intercourse in both cases. Therefore, Izanagi. the god, led Izanami to intercourse and they produced satisfactory offspring which became Japanese islands. Later, Amaterasu, a goddess, and Susano, a god, were born out of Izanagi's left eye and nose receptively... (Namihira Emiko 1985, 492). Amaterasu is considered as a mythical origin of all the emperors.

25

organization of gender, hierarchy and cultural, political and economic preferences.

(2) "Order of nature" as hierarchy predisposed

In the wake of Japanese modernity, the meaning of historical continuity and validation of a Japanese nation are constituted around familiar narratives of patriarchy - the father as the head of family - through representations of the emperor. The father/family concept was useful, because it is "literally" thought to be "the order of nature". The influence of Confucianism, especially the Mencius, of the Four Books of Confucianism in the Edo period laid the foundations to elevate the authority of *Shogun* through the concept of virtue [*Toku*] and maintain the social order through systems of position/class [*mibun*] (Inoue 1988, 180). Democracy (*minshushugi*), according to Mencius, is not perceived in the same way as the modern definition. Under the authoritarian rhetoric of Mencius,

> A political leader is absolute, because he rules with the mandate of heaven, and hence anyone else is not entitled to the position. Although the heaven does not speak, the disposition [of heaven] appears in the hearts of people. Thus to rule a society is to win the hearts of people [my translation] (Yamamoto 1992, 232-233).

In this model presented by Mencius, voting, contract and freedom of worship do not play a role. What constitutes the equation of "heaven = the ruler = people" is not the concept of contract but of virtue. Yamamoto adds that "it is considered normal for the ruler to be abdicated; it happens, not from the violation of contract but by loss of [his/her] virtue" (235). "Virtue" deposits a tone of moral excellence and fostering of good action, but the tone at the same

26

time, is forever patronizing in a classical father/family sense. The presence of "virtue" and the absence of "contract" between the power-holders and people, take the premise that power is predisposed between them, through them and among them. And there is one virtue operating (i.e. the Emperor) omni-present and omni-fold among a group of people.

Such an outlook on hierarchy as predisposed (rather than created) has an immense impact on creating the ideology of modern Japanese nationhood, as Maruyama puts it:

> The advocates of expulsion [of barbarians] viewed international relations from positions within the national hierarchy based on the supremacy of superiors over inferiors. Consequently, when the premises of the national hierarchy were transferred horizontally into the international sphere, international problems were reduced to a single alternative: conquer or be conquered. In the absence of any higher normative standards with which to gauge international relations, power politics is bound to be the rule and yesterday's timid defensiveness will become today's unrestrained expansionism. (Maruyama 1963, 139-140, also cited in Anderson 1991, 97)

The "order of nature" in a father/family narrative is appealing because it not only validates *attachments* to meanings in general about hierarchy of gender, dominance, property and home in traditional Japanese culture, but because it also converges with many preoccupations of the Western nation-states around the turn of the century, such as dynastic, colonial and growing economical concerns.

(3) "Order of nature" as state capitalism

27

"The order of nature" also corresponds with the order of intentions - state capitalism: the state as an enlarged form of family (lead by a father figure), as a *coherent* reproductive unit. A national economic autonomy was to enhance political sovereignty among other modern nations, thus the political awareness of the state by the people and the naturalization of nationalism emerges:

> With the Meiji Restoration, Japan came to be governed by a political elite convinced that rapid, state-directed industrialization was the key to national survival, and that ultimately this would provide the basis on which to build an internationally powerful Japan. Such a course was seen as. one which would allow Japan to fend off the threats of the West, and eventually to compete with the Western nations on more equal grounds for the fruits of international economic strength.
> (Pempel 1982, pp.47-48)

Because Japan was a late industrializer compared to Britain and others, it found it necessary to rely on greater governmental direction and state nationalism, rather than on patterns of private ownership. Due to this organization of political economy, the Japanese government has been more likely to intervene to direct the social and economical progress that already existed elsewhere - though the extent of government involvement differs in various sectors. In some areas, the government interferes forcefully, in others it remains peripheral (12). Nonetheless, it is the government, through its policies, which defines the maturity and robustness of industry and hence, the degree of competition for a specific market (open or closed market). This permissiveness for official interference in general, can be observed in various levels of manifestation of modernity and

Japanese nationhood. I will discuss later specific interventions that related to the formation of radio broadcasting and national news papers.

(4) "Family" as glue-binding concept

The notion of nation as a big harmonious family works to "neutralize forces released by industrialization: class conflict, individualism, pacifism and socialism (Murthy 1973, 453)". Such ideology was also convenient to mask the inadequacies of the fragile Meiji government and to promote state-directed capitalism.

In the emperor-oriented society, the standard national subject internalized the ethic of national survival. The discussion here will briefly look at the visualizing process that links the modern emperor system and the cultivation of the ideal citizens which are found in education, religion, photographs, pageants and statutes as well as that which is central to our concerns, modern mass media.

Invention of tradition: state nationalism and emperor system

For the first ten years after the Restoration (1868), the State recognized the power of literacy in enhancing the quest for new norms of cultural and intellectual life as well as new sources of strength for the nation. Standardized education would serve as a powerful instrument to raise Japan to the ranks of modern empires by cultivating citizens and above all, to unifying the nation. In this era of "Civilization and enlightenment" [Bunmeikaika], power holders equated modernization with Westernization. In this period, the question of focusing the loyalties of the people on the emperor and

the State through national education[5] remained secondary (Murthy, 1973).

By the mid-1880's, preoccupation with "civilization and enlightenment" shifted to a concern for preserving and strengthening national character. Having no national religion which can be deployed and refusing to borrow from foreign influential religions such as Buddhism and Confucianism, education itself was seen as an instrument in preserving "Japaneseness" through "Kyooikuchokugo" [Rescript on Education] in 1890 (Murthy, 1973). Hence, education became tightly controlled by the State. This official moral textbook for universal education stated that respect for parents and ancestors was congruent with loyalty to the emperor; for ancestor worship was the same as worshipping gods, hence the worship of the emperor.

As a groundwork ideology for legitimizing authority and traditional values, the concept of the "family state" [kazoku kokka] was introduced. The linkage between the nation and ideal citizens as a family nation absorbed customs and drew upon values about pre-existing kinship. Hence the meaning of historical continuity and validation of Japanese social structure are constituted predominately along two lines of patriarchy as "Chuukoo" [loyalty and filial piety]: 1) to see the nation as an expanded form of family - the emperor as patriarchal father and people as his children and 2) every family's origin is the same; the familialism of the divine origin (Japanese are one big divine family). Hence the rescript assumed the "monopolistic determiner of ethical value contents for the Japanese State (Maruyama 1946)".

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[5] The mandatory education was established in 1872.

The rulers' attempt to bring people into a culture of national community was not limited to religion and education. Techniques of visualization formed a new awareness of people and places. They also fostered the authority of the modern nation as "nonverbal official signs", such as photographs and monuments being manufactured throughout Japan. For example, such a visualization technique involved depicting the emperor through a portrait, a portrait of an idealized emperor (it was not a photograph of an actual person, but a photograph of a painted portrait), in order to enhance him as transcending both all human beings and time (Taki, 1988). The Imperial portrait [goshinei] was introduced as an sacred object of worship in every school and at homes. Kashiwagi writes on these portraits in the following:

> The program of Meiji government in organizing the people and nation can be summarized as follows: in order for the people [shomin] themselves to have consciousness as citizens, the relationship between dominant and non-dominant is modeled on the relationship between the father and child. In order for this to be achieved, it was necessary to show the State (the authority) in front of people's eyes. (Kashiwagi, 1987)

The emperor as an official icon of nation and as the father of the harmonious family nation, was being visualized further by the nexus of geographical marks. With the introduction of "shintoo kokkyoo seisaku" [policy of the Shinto as a state religion] in 1870, shrines, which had local influence, were ranked by the government and were forced to have festivities related to imperial folklore, replacing the celebration of local gods that formerly took place

31

(Tooyama, 1987). The Meiji Emperor himself traveled within Japan, and his political appearance was staged carefully by the local governments. Physical landscapes, such as monuments, and commemorative buildings were erected[6]; the emperor's palace became a space in which ceremonies were performed to give them an archaic and eternal significance. Imperial ceremonies were experienced as pageants, invested wholesale:

> The most spectacular pageants of the late nineteenth century and twentieth centuries included celebrations of political accomplishments such as the promugulation of the Meiji constitution, war victory ceremonials, and imperial funerals, weddings and wedding anniversaries (Fujitani 1993, 105).

National newspaper and radio broadcasting

These "official nonverbal signs" were increasingly translated into popular forms of media for mass consumption. In the initial development of national newspapers and radio broadcasting, the government controlled the media as promoters of national unity, and assumed that the content would increase the political awareness of the new national community, the emperor and modernization. Because government intervention was seen as necessary to develop into a modern state, policy around the media was top-down movement, shaped and established by the government rather than by the people.

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[6] "... the people witnessed a veritable wave of "statumania" beginning in 1893 with the erection of a bronze of the national and military hero, Omura Masujiro. Before the time there had been no tradition of public statuary celebrating national heroes."(Fujitani 1993, 97)

Replacing the older forms of newsletters, distributed locally and focused on opinions rather than news (Kawanaka 1975, 253-259),[7] Japanese national newspapers emerged in 1879. News was packaged differently with a new emphasis: local events were translated into something meaningful for the national readers, and conversely information about the modernized nation was developed into news pieces with relevance for local settings. Standardized language/literacy was promoted through universal education and the constitution of the national reading public contingent to the development of national newspaper. National news collects and concentrates on national rather than local news, constituting "commodity news" to be consumed by mass national readers.

Prior to the emergence of such national newspapers, the news letters voiced views of political parties rather than catering to popular tastes. Japanese national newspapers also emerged out of the need to break away from influence of such parties and instead to seek national interests. Journalists of national newspapers were assumed to be important agents for spreading the myth of the divine emperor and the nationalist ideology of "family state" (Mitchell 1983, 55).

In the first three decades of the twentieth century, both newspaper and radio were subject to self-censorship encouraged by inconsistent and erratic official censorship. The instructions of official

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[7] The older forms of newspaper includes *kawaraban* [tile block prints] in the Tokugawa period. They carried illustrations and information about natural disasters. Vendors sold them and read them aloud on streets (Kawanaka 1975, 253). Newspapers first started by foreign merchants in Japan providing important sources to the elites. During the early Meiji period, political elites started to publish on their own to make the newspaper as an instrument to stir up public opinion (255).

censorship were ambiguous and abstract. Since it was not often clear what was to be censored, the government counted on the self-censorship of the media (55).

The ministry of communication took charge of supervising and regulating broadcasting media through the wireless telegraphy law of 1915 (Ito 1978). Under its supervision, broadcasting on radio waves started in 1925. In addition to the three radio broadcasters that already operated, the government saw the need to set up stations in all regions to increase the spread of radio broadcasting. The nation-wide network *Nippon Hoosoo kyookai* (NHK) was established in 1925 and merged with the existing three radio broadcasters which were to be operated by a single corporate juridical body.

Throughout the American history of the development of radio broadcasting, government interference was disliked, and so radio broadcasting in the U.S. was owned and invested in by big corporations in order to have better access to consumers in domestic settings (Gitlin 1978, 235). However, in Japan, NHK was operated not through advertising revenues, but by subscription fees.[8] In the United States, the content of the radio was secondary to the innovation and popularization of the radio. For the Japanese government, the content of radio was seen as an important organ for "mobilizing the nation" and was put under the government control,

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[8] Unlike, for example CBC, to which the Canadian government allocates annual budget out of tax payers money and using advertising revenue, NHK has the right to directly go to television set owners (per household) to collect the monthly subscription fee. In 1990 the contract counts 34,000,000 (NHK '92, 1992, 13). Unlike PBS, NHK does not accept any donation from institutions to avoid to be influenced by commercial factors.

34

yet paradoxically the usage of radio intially was not considered as an instrument for cultivating a consumer culture.

The government regarded radio broadcasting as so vital to its "publicity and information" program that it made special attempts to increase the number of set owners. Radios were distributed to some poorer villages and "subscription and registration fees were canceled for large families and for those men at the front" (Brown 1955, 213). In order to bring people closer to the Japanese leadership over a broader geographical space, radio broadcasting reached beyond the confines of Japan, to Korea, Formosa, Manchukuo and China (213). The spread of mass media electronically "integrated" national territory. The images of a "modern and powerful" nation were disseminated until the defeat of the war.

Remaking the nation

After the defeat in the World War II, the divine emperor went through a rapid "humanizing" process. The emperor himself first announced he was not a living deity (the imperial proclamation, January 1, 1946). The emperor was to be depoliticized and at the same time to be popularized as a "symbolic representation of the unity of Japanese people" under the new democratic constitution established in May 3, 1946.

The depoliticization of emperor eroded the traditional basis for imperialistic and militaristic authorities to operate, while giving ideological and organizational diversity in postwar Japan. In the time of social unrest, the press was to contribute to filling this power

vacuum by helping to shape a national consensus on normalizing international political relations and political crisis (Kim, 1990). Within this context of remaking the nation, media played a crucial role in creating the new image of the emperor system, for the depoliticization of emperor meant disconnecting (or denying) the relationship between the emperor and war time fascism. In order to "quickly" evolve and fully become a democratic institution, media attempted to disrupt a series of associations and responsibilities with the emperor: defeat in war, the national economical crisis and social confusion.

The "remaking of the emperor" first of all meant that the emperor and the empress themselves (no longer the emperor alone) visited the villages throughout Japan and appeared at national functions and events. The humanization process intended to familiarize people with the royal family, and at the same time, the frequency and banality of appearances made them less sacred. In the Meiji period, the visualization of national icons was strictly controlled under the government, preserving them as sacred figures. Today, the appearance of royals are disseminated locally and instantly all across the nation through mass media.[9] The emergence of television aided the spread of new images of the royal family.

Development of television

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[9] Commercial radio broadcasting started in 1951. The television broadcasting under new regulation began in 1953 (Ito 1978).

The increase in ownership of television sets owes much to the enthusiasm over two important events: the wedding of crown prince Akihito (the present emperor) and Michiko in 1959, the first commoner to be married into the imperial household, and the Tokyo Olympics in 1964.[10] The royal wedding and the Olympics were respectively the first national and international examples of "electronic pageantry" which helped to spread the image of modern and peaceful Japanese nation. These events corresponded also to Japan's take off for economic independence. After the broadcast of these events, the Japanese audience would increasingly welcome television as a mediator of their cultural and national experiences.

Under the direction of the state and the allied occupation, Japan experienced its first rapid economic boom (*Jimu keiki*) from 1955 to 1957. The second economic boom (*Iwato keiki*) from 1959 to 1961 accelerated economic growth through active financial and banking policies by the government. By 1968, Japan's Gross National Product (GNP) became the second largest among the capitalist nations (Inoue 1988, 343-351). The state invested in the expansion of the domestic market by a planned economy to increase the income of each person, as well as exporting manufactured goods to overseas. Hence the government indirectly promoted the necessary technological and economic conditions under which both public and commercial television could be established.

The economic boom affected the television industry in various ways, but the most prominent was the increase in advertising

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[10] "The number of receivers' contracts rose from 1,982,000 at the end of March 1959 to 4,149,000 at the end of march 1965". (Ito 1978, 21)

revenues. Through industrialization and urbanization, a middle class population proliferated around cities, making Japanese television attractive to corporate advertising. Advertising firms invested in the growing national capital and consumer culture. The expenditure for advertising multiplied nearly sixty times from 1953 (2.43 billion yen) to 1976 (145.68 billion yen) while the GNP in the same period grew thirty times (Ito 1978, 122), making the Japanese television market the second largest in the world after the United States in 1962 (Wolfren 1989, 178).

NHK's monopoly on broadcasting ended in 1950, when the government gave a license to Nippon Television Network (NTV) and four other nation-wide networks founded in Tokyo. In 1967, the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunication issued a policy to set up at least two commercial stations in each prefecture to reflect the needs of local people (Ito 1978, 84). The present communication policy aims to have the remaining 20% of prefectures to have at least four commercial channels, in response to demands made by local people in those area (Japan 1987, 90).

The fierce competition among national networks for allocations for stations in prefectures and the policy of opening up new stations consequently lead to intense centralization of information-generating from the cultural capital of Tokyo. Tokyo concentrates three times more information generated compared to the second largest city of Osaka (Japan 1992, 97). By 1991, there were 37,517 broadcasting

stations throughout the country (31)[11] and the penetration of
television extended to 100% (Shirakawa 1990, 173-174) .

Visualizing Emperor in the mass media

The domestication of the royal family's new image as national
icon in contemporary Japan depended on new means of expressing
itself through mass media in a modern (or post-modern), urbanized,
high-technology, consumer society. In this new context, both the
representations of the emperor and the legitimization process have
changed. He is now "humanized" as the image of him is always
surrounded by his family and grandchildren instead of being a
singular, authoritarian figure. The past Showa emperor, formerly a
military general, was portrayed after the war as a scientist and a
family man.

Matsushita (1988) points out that the more the emperor is
depoliticized and humanized, the more he gains celebrity status
through a "political aesthetics" of enthronement, wedding and funeral
pageantries. But his celebrity status in the contemporary mass media
is not realized through his amiable character nor people's sense of
loyalty to the emperor. Rather, his legitimation is acquired through
the enormous media attention to imperial events, and is further
validated through the mass audience as witnesses of an "historical
moment" prepared by mass media (Katz et Dyanne, 1992).

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[11] 18,201 stations for NHK, 19,311 stations for commercial broadcasting and 5
stations for university broadcasting.

Today, the symbolic legitimation process of the emperor system demands a live audience and the audience rating system. It also requires the omnipresence of the event (hence the usefulness and power of mass media) and consequently refers not to the emperor system itself but mediated multiple images of emperor. When numbers are used to confirm a nationalist discourse, something of a virtual reality is created; these numbers and television narratives make sure that the actual lived experiences of the Japanese people are glossed over. Instead, what circulates is an ideal image (a stereotype) of a modern Japanese nation that is nowhere to be found, yet which circulates everywhere. The reality is disguised continuously, as it often is, and what surfaces via mass media is the spectrum of national interests.

Family State ideology revived?

The imperial institution embodies specific hierarchical concerns. As the nation establishes a new political and social apparatus with a different emphasis for an emerging middle class, not based on the orientation of emperor, formerly recognizable meanings around religious and philosophical ideology become blurred. My discussion so far has intended to illuminate how the rise of the modern state subjectified the family and individuals, constituting them as resources for the well being of the state through instruments of surveillance (Foucault 1979, 8, 10), although these practices depend upon local knowledge, history and culture.

Throughout the modernizing period, the Japanese government has distinguished the emperor system for the task of normalization and surveillance. Today, the monitoring of families by the state is manifested in policies which enhance national unity, stability and most of all, economic growth. To promote these ends and to become modern, the Japanese government in the post-war period has invested in "*aidagarashugi*" in which "harmonious family relations are stressed over individual aspirations as a new version of Japan's unique ideology for the nation's prosperity" (Lock 1993, 46):

> Unlike Western societies [which are] based on the "individual" or "self", the basic characteristic of Japanese culture is that, as shown in the Japanese word *ningen*, it values the "relationship between persons" (hito to hito no aidagara). In examining Japanese culture closely, we discover that this basic characteristic permeates, and acts as a living foundation of, the workings and systems of the Japanese economy.... (quoted in Wasao 1989, 53-54)

The harmonious *aidagarashugi* works both as a rhetoric to differentiate itself from the West as well as a means of highlighting tradition in order to thoroughly cultivate the modern Japanese family (Lock, op.cit., 46). The *aidagarashugi* which supposedly has not changed throughout history, legitimizes "social constellation held together by fundamental and culturally irreducible relationships which determine how one is to behave with reference to others and within the confines of Japanese society (Harootunian 1989, 81)".

Digging a bit deeper, *aidagarashugi* sets itself up as an isolated entity from history and social relations. This ideology mystifies the general social condition behind the way conventional relationships are lived out and instead, the relationships are assumed to be conflict

free. This ideology affirms the conduct of relationship but it can work at the same time to misplace it. *Aidagarashugi*, is simply another form of family state: both *aidagarashugi* and familial nation privilege the construction of meanings relegated to "Japanese nation" within the cultural symbolic, which has been the primary object of asserting power relations as well as nationhood. *Aidagarashugi*, as an ideology, does not challenge nor disrupt conventions laid out by family state.

Images and information in late capitalistic society

As modern industrial societies evolve, older forms of domination are eroded and new forms arise, often in more disguised forms (Bartky 1988). Today, Japanese citizens are no longer required to die for the nation or required to realize their proper Japanese destiny with the emperor: the Japanese royal family not only operates as a symbol of peace and good will, but offers an ideal to its subjects; ideal home, ideal relationships, ideal education for children and so on. The Royal family and the ideal modern family are linked, as conventions and as ideology. Hence the image of the ideal Japanese citizen is more and more in line with an "internalization" of the new disciplines laid out by the rapid development of capitalism.

What is also new is that we are disciplined to consume more information, knowledge and services. The Ministry of Post and Telecommunication recently published a white paper for telecommunications. They have converted information into quantifiable numbers and have ranked thirty countries according to this measurement. Japan is the fourth "Information giant" following

Canada, the U. S. and Netherlands (Japan 1992, 108). If one excludes cable television, Japanese people are consuming more information than in any other country (Booth 1993, 58). For example, there were estimated 1,393,800,000 monthly magazines sold and 2,064,400,000 weekly magazines sold domestically in 1989 (Japan 1992, 85). Although we do not know the content of information, where it comes from, nor the purpose of it, we do know that the Ministry came up with this number to highlight the Japanese citizen as a number one information consumer: the amount of the information supply is divided by the population. According to this calculation, an average Japanese person would have consumed 3.3 billion words in 1990 alone (Japan 1992, 106).

With the growing power of the image, of visualization in society, the visual media are replacing the religious orientation of the past (Bartky 1988). To subject oneself to these new forms of disciplinary power is to be fashionable, to be up to date, to be trendy. When images and information are consumed and made obsolete, new images arise on the horizon. Japanese royals are no exception to this logic of universal market economy. The members of royal family have no immunity to this discipline, although the emperor's characteristic in the past was to be exempted and separated from submitting to such discipline. They, too, must be fashionable and up-to-date. This point will be illustrated in the next chapter, when we look more closely at making of Princess Masako.

What is also new about the Royal family today is that it has become a big money-maker. An editor of *"Joseijishin"* a woman's magazine, says that featuring the new princess Masako surely helps

to increase the sales. In fact the sales went up 50% compared to its first issue which did not feature the imperial household, to the second issue which it did in 1958. One biography of Empress Michiko printed 800,000 copies (6/10/93, TBS). Over 60 paper-bag books regarding the marriage have sold out in 6 months and glossy photo albums of the royal wedding in June sold out 2 million copies in one week (6/18/93 Nikkan Sports).

Not withstanding such popularity, there still questions that remain unanswered. What does the new "humanized" imperial family in the media validate? How is the royal family constructed in the media today and how does it appeal to masses? What kind of cultural, political and economical preferences are at work in the broadcasting the royal wedding? What about national community? And most of all, how is the Japanese identity inscribed on the bodies of individuals on television? These questions will be the focus of next chapter.

Chapter Three

Narratives of Japanese Cultural Order and Identity: Royals, Nationhood and Family in the Media

The discussion so far has illustrated a process of building nationhood incorporating various models of social normalizations, as well as a visual blue print of the Japanese nation. From about the end of nineteenth century, Japanese citizens became subject to the invention of "the nation as manifestation of identity" and "nation as culture". The modern royal family cannot be extricated from a network of relationships created with modernity: "'Japanese' as national subject, 'Japanese language' as citizens' tongue and 'Japanese culture' as the Japanese citizens' culture as *a priori*" . Attention was gradually focused more intently on nation-related metaphors: how to popularize the royal family as the representation of the Japanese family and how to stress the "archaic" continuity in terms of *national* (i.e. an ideology of Japan, continuity and unity) rather than problematize the Imperial institution.

The last chapter also discussed those changing dynamics that enhance economic growth and social order by appealing to the "archaic", such as the shift from emperor ideology to *"ie"* (household) society in government policies (Keizai kikakuchoo 1982). Although it is easy now to see how the present royal family was engineered in modernity, it is far more difficult to assess the implications of reproducing this continuity. Fujitani summarizes the link between imperial family and nationhood:

In the late nineteenth to early twentieth centuries, the period that coincides with the cultural production of Japan's modern nation-state, the Japanese constructed a Tradition beyond time, centering on the emperor, to foster a sense that the national community, which is, in fact, quite new, was timeless and natural. And yet, to enhance their own legitimacy, globally as well as domestically, these same political elites sought to demonstrate that Japan was at the cutting edge of the contemporary world. (Fujitani 1992, 837)

Yet this historical link alone cannot explain fully why the royal family in the media today is also (and again) an arena for the delineation of what is consider to be "natural" in the family. As Coward points out, the royal family has been shaped to provide the underpinning of an ordinary family:

Some family melodramas have as their central aim the elevation of the particular family as representative of all human (or *national*) emotions. The royals may have an elevated status but their problem and conflicts are meant to be those which all families share. [My italics.] (Coward 1985, 165-6)

The popularity of the royal family continues today is not only a result of tradition. Nor simply a manifestation of the power of media institutions to create "myths" about Japan. It is also the result of a potent, ongoing, disguising nationalization (and internationalization) that are intimately linked to the surveillance and normalization of the family and individuals in contemporary society. As we will see, the position assigned to the royal family as articulated in contemporary Japanese media - in particular the symbolic importance attributed to its participation in production and

46

reproduction of nationhood and family - is influenced by assumptions held by the media institutions about the royal family, a modern family and an individual's "natural" place in the social order, not to mention deviance and change. As such, the royal family presents an ideal for discourses of both realities and changes in the modern family relationship and nationhood.

To this end, the focus of this chapter is the contemporary representations of royal family in the context of the wedding in the Japanese media, a discussion which needs to be grounded on larger issues of clarifying the Japanese identity(es) in late capitalistic society. Throughout the chapter, I will assess how various cultural, political and economical preferences and national ideological interests are at play in visualizing the princess, a modern family, the nationhood and women, with the cultural order.

A first discussion takes up the relationship between the role of media and visualization as this relates directly to press blackout of the choosing process of a princess and more broadly the way in which media surveillance takes place through setting frameworks and boundaries. Then, I will look at how the delineation of self and other, Japan and the West, tradition and modern, construct and reconstruct the vision of identities linked to individual by focusing on Princess Masako (individual) and her family. In the second part of the discussion, I will move on to examine media constructions of images and discourses about visualizing nationhood. The last part of this chapter will discuss the programs created around the wedding, in particular, those that celebrate the status of women.

Visualization: media, order and deviance

Inseparable from the process of modernization is the development of institutions for disseminating information. One important component is the mass media. The contemporary media function to define and produce images of deviance through the use of 'authorized knowers' (Ericson et al. 1987). A great deal of social science research has demonstrated that deviance is not inherent in a person or specific acts, but in social reaction to the person and his behavior. Deviance ultimately requires social reaction. Hence media "visualizes deviance and control as these relate to visions of social order and change (8)". The journalists and media institutions, therefore, become the key vehicles in constituting visions of order, stability, change and above all, in influencing techniques of control and management that articulate these visions.

Controlling deviance is not marginal to society, but rather of central significance (See Foucault 1980). It defines the boundaries of who we are, boundaries which are constantly shifting in accordance with continuous negotiations among different interests (Ericson et al. 1987, 7). It is in this sense that I locate the significance of the power of media to define "deviance/order" much as Ericson et al. define it:

> As central agents in social reaction to deviance and control process, journalists draw on key spokespersons in the hierarchy of celebrity to publicize what they think are the significant problems of deviance and what should be done about them. In their discourse of threats, dangers, and precursors of change, journalists sharpen our senses about order and progress. All the negativism of this discourse, all the bad news, can be read as serving

the good purpose of contributing to our abstract visions
and partial templates of social stability and change. (7)

Yet since deviance is socially ascribed, it is culturally relative.
Media provide the daily 'common-sense' articulation of deviance and
control. Such articulation is inevitably infused with cultural
assumptions about the "order (our sense of order)/deviance" of a
society and what should be done about it, with the result that media
images "reveal" and "manage" knowledge in various ways in
different cultural settings.[1]

Media construction of the wedding

On the night of January 6, 1993, five out of six national
networks simultaneously, at 8:45, interrupted the usual
programming to bring in one hour (or more) of special broadcasts on
the engagement of Prince Naruhito to Owada Masako. The
broadcasting celebrated the couple and nationhood: unanimously it
was happy, naturally it was a national vision, immediately it was a
matter of unity. This owes also to the fact that prior to that date,
virtually no coverage of the Prince's romantic interests was available
to the Japanese people for two years, due to the blackout [*jishuku
hoodoo*, literally translated as self-suppression broadcasting], a self-
imposed ban by all the Japanese media institutions.

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[1] See for example, Painter, 1991 and his study of field work in Japanese
television station in an institutional context.

49

Since February of 1992, the imperial household agency and the newspaper association[2] made an agreement to suppress broadcasts - the press blackout - on the prince's attempts to select a princess. The prince had few women in mind, and the imperial household had a long list. This agreement was for a press blackout, but it allowed some "moderate coverage", granting reporters the freedom to collect some sources on their own, but to withhold the reports (Asahi 1/15/93).

"The prince is in a situation where he may not able to get married"

The arrangement was a result of the excessive coverage of candidates that often violated their right of privacy. For example, the mother of one candidate told the press "My daughter is stressed. If there is any more fuss, she will be damaged both physically and mentally and may even lose the will to live" (Asahi 1/14/93). Even the current princess was stressed from being followed everywhere and having to change her plans, so that media would not trail her.

Such excessive coverage visualized, "live" and nation wide, candidates turning down the possible offer from the prince, as the reporters pushed microphones for a comment. Such embarrassment lead eventually to the press blackout. These women preferred freedom to becoming members of the prestigious royal family. It was obvious that the times have changed: the imperial household was not

2 *Nihon shimbun kyookai* consists of 175 newspaper institutions. It was also joined by the *Nihon shimbun kyookai henshuu iinkai*(Japan newspaper association editors' council) composed of editors and broadcasting executives of 56 media institutions, including television and news agency. (Maruyama 1993, 32-33)

a popular place to spend their time in the minds of young candidates. In the summer of 1991, the so-called major candidates (defined by select media[3]) one after the other, clearly declined to join the imperial future: "I would like to have an ordinary life" and "I would like to spend my life happy as an ordinary person" (Asahi 1/10/93).

The media fueled the excessive coverage and capitalized on the topic. "When the topic of choosing a princess was put in press, it guaranteed a 10% increase in sales. Because it was so interesting to citizens, we had to cover any possible candidate," said the editor of a Woman's magazine (Asahi 1/14/93). Similarly, the producer of television confesses, "The audience rating went up if we had an original lead or broadcasted a lead prior to other stations. We have, in the past, followed candidates persistently" (1/14/93).

Taking the situation seriously, the imperial household agency demanded "a quiet environment for choosing a princess" and discussion continued for seven months between the imperial household agency and the newspaper association. Many journalists opposed the blackout, although there was unanimous recognition among the media institutions that due to inmoderate coverage, "the Prince is in a situation where he may not be able to marry" (Asahi 1/13/93). In other words, journalists assumed that the Prince needed media protection but the women did not; and conversly the blackout highlightened the importance of the marriage. The newspaper association took the initiative of the self-censorship

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[3] Prior to the press blackout, major women's magazines featured 30 (*Shuukan Josei*) to 70 (*Josei Jishin*) women as candidates for the bride (Asahi shimbunsha, 1993, 94-95).

51

arrangement, and an agreement was made voluntarily within the magazine association.

This press blackout had its precedent in a blackout thirty-five years previous, when Prince Akihito (the present emperor) married Michiko. The previous self-censorship differed in many ways from the recent situation, but shared similar concerns and interests. The newspaper association hailed it as "epoch-making", and with little dispute, requested other associations to join in rather than create voluntary cartel among the associations (Asahi shimbun 1993, 99-104). Not publishing the self- censorship arrangement was the part of the agreement itself (99-104).

Several negotiations were attempted to dissolve the self-censorship prior to the scoop, but it was not successful. Both in this wedding and the wedding thirty five years ago, the agreement was not broken throughout the period expected and extended to every media institution in Japan. The first scoop which forged ahead of the Japanese media came from the American media[4] both times (99-104).

The avid interest in and successful management of information through the press blackout on the engagement process of Prince Naruhito by the imperial household agency and media institutions proved so highly uniform that it posed controversy both within Japan and elsewhere. Many reports discuss the blackout in the context of infringing upon freedom of expression, the right to know and rights of privacy. What was silenced was not only the

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[4] For the current blackout, it was the Washington Post, "Japan picking princess" (1/6/93) and in 1958 it was Newsweek (11/10/85).

information about the royal family - hence the national memory, but also any discussion of the extent of institutional investment in that silence. The press blackout endorses the assumption held by the media about the natural place of royal family and individuals.

Finally, the "silence" in the media created an image of "mystery" around the princess. The more "mysterious" and "anonymous" she is, the more people behold and share the "mystery". The "silence" produced by the media, on one hand, completely transformed the princess, but this silence also transformed the media itself: silent media are like a tour guide who does not speak about a site.

Who is Masako?

Afternoon shows enticed the female audience endlessly presenting Princess Masako as a career woman, as an international super woman - an image most desirable to women, inconceivable a generation ago. If the programs had a coherent project, it revolved around the assumptions that the interest presented in these programs was passionately shared by all viewers. Complicit with this interest was the dressing of women (the princess, the empress and female anchors) in images of international status, without undermining the cultural order.

The Japanese princess, Owada Masako born in 1963 was twenty-nine when she was married. She grew up outside Japan, mastered five languages, and graduated from Harvard and Oxford. She held a career as a diplomat and twice turned down a marriage

proposal from the prince. Clearly, Masako is no Princess Diana. In the eyes of the Japanese imperial household agency, Masako was too old, too tall and "far too Americanized" (Klein 1993, 74). The process of how she was chosen as a bride is clearly of importance, but perhaps of more importance is how various cultural, political and economic preferences and national interests, were at play in organizing an image of her.

The threat of the modern woman

> Masako Owada has the capacity to be a star. The Japanese like people who study hard - her education and career gives her charisma. (Ishikawa Yoshimi, quoted in Duffy 1993, 54)

Dressed in a sophisticated suit for "success" at the Ministry, with a free swinging page-boy haircut and a serious facial expression, Masako appears in the media, life prior to her engagement, as a "talented [saien] diplomat (Shuukan Josei, 1993, 35-52)". Masako's working days are gloriously represented through photographs of her at important political events, opposite such powerful figures as Prime Minister Kaifu, Trade Minister Watanabe and American secretary of State James Baker. The press continuously referred to her as a "super woman", and the list of her accomplishments usually followed the label.[5]

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5 A book called *"Masako sama no karei na keireki "* [Masako's Magnificent Background] is an anthology of all the (rigorous) exams she has passed in her life, from the Denen Futaba elementary school, Harvard University, Tokyo University to the Foreign Service examination (Nikkan sports, 6/9/93, 23).

Images of Masako represent the liberated "modern woman" of the 90's. Naturally those who aspire to her image, or those who consider themselves "modern", help to build "Masakomania". In the agony column (a Question and Answer colum about day-to-day dilemmas) in one of the women's magazine's, a reader asks the psychologist why she wants to become like Masako. The respondent writes "... It's not that you want to become a person who finds stability through marriage and sidestepping a career. You are in fact attracted to Masako because she has made up her own mind and is sticking with it." (Nikkei Woman 1993, 133).

But what is often omitted from this picture of the "liberated woman" - a woman free to make her own decisions with an individual flare despite social constraints - is the fact that in Japan only 6% of managerial jobs are held by women (Steele 1993, 23). Although nearly half of all the Japanese women work outside home, most remain in factory jobs or work as "office ladies", who run errands for bosses, including serving tea and making photocopies. And no men serve in such "clerical" positions (Sanger 1993). Stripped from social circumstances, Masako's "emancipated" story constructs a fantasy of a "liberated woman".

Along with her decisiveness and her image as a smart woman of the 90's, the media clearly established her education and persistence: "Masako went home at 2 o'clock every night" (Asahi 1/7/93). Her career appeared to be earned through effort and will-power, rather than inherited or acquired through marriage. This image disturbs conventions of norms, because, for one, with Masako,

the security of marriage appears secondary to her independence.[6] Another is the convention that women's route to power in society is usually by way of sexual allure;[7] women frequently ally themselves with such values (Coward 1985, 171).

Precisely these threats to the norm introduce the tension into the story and guarantee the narrative interest. The royal family presents the continuity of traditional values by repressing questions about female independence: "in the world of Royals, there aren't really any options outside the family, nor is there any issue of female independence and autonomy" (170). And at the same time, the fear of the disintegration of the family, hence the traditional values, "is usually embodied in the threat of 'outsiders' or 'the problem of modern woman'" (164). How the story of Masako unfolds, then, hinges on how the threats of "outsider" and "modern woman" are resolved.

The cannibalization of the career woman

The "threat" pressed by the career woman is resolved in the media by making her "safe" by humanizing her under maternity and femininity. Profiles of Masako discuss her love for domestic management: cooking and children (Asahi 1/19/93). The discourses of maternity converge on a litany of concerns: can she cook well?

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[6] She herself thought when choosing the career as a diplomat "I was prepared to take the risk of not be able to get married (Asahi 1/7/93)".

[7] The beauty myth in the West revolves around sexuality among other things. The beauty which circulate like a currency is largely dependent on sexual desirability by men. (Wolf 1990).

Will she be able to cook inside the palace? Who decides the menu? What kind of family does she hope to have? Will she make a good mother? Our concerns are relieved when sources reveal photos of her in the kitchen and with a baby and the television studio recreates elaborate dishes she is adept at cooking (6/9/93 a). She is indeed a human being, with a woman's needs. The insistence of the media on representing the princess in the realm of the family and specifically as a caring person (conventional image of woman), helped contain her unconventionality and minimize its threat to the security of the family. Such an insistence on matrimonial concerns is legitimate, because she will be the future mother of the new heir. Interestingly, such topics almost prudishly avoid sexual concerns; and in these photos, no male figure appears close to her, except for her father.

Another way in which she becomes "safe" rather than a "threat", entails her change in appearance. She switches to "feminine" (hence "safe") bright and pastel colored dresses. What is domesticated in the media and consumed by people is not her image as a modern career woman, but fashion almost in the style of Jackie Kennedy, conservative and matronly. Magazines praise her elegant style, running pages of photographs on her daily outfits. The media arouse interests in every aspect of her appearence, no minute detail is overlooked: make-up, hair, coats, suits, shoes, bags and accessories. Each photographed item lists the price and place of purchase, although some items are obviously out of reach (the coat she wore on her very first day before the camera costs $5000). Nevertheless high prices only add to her social image as 'Princess" that women are supposed to aspire to. Items more reasonable, scarves and pearl

accessories, became fashionable owing to the media attention.[8] These items bring home to readers that portion of the "Princess" that is within their reach.

Most Japanese women may never become like Masako, a "super woman", but women are assured that through consumption, one can *feel* as attractive as she does. Hence consumption introduces the identification for women with the "safe" image of Masako. Her new image is no longer threatening, after all, she is a human being (conventional woman) reduced to a universal "bride to be", she is just like any one else, despite her status of "super woman". Through the consumption of the humanized "safe" images of Masako, the image of a "threatening modern woman" is cannibalistically neutralized.[*]

This cannibalizing consumption is only a part of the estimated 3.3 trillion yen of the influence scale of the nation's economy, from the celebration the royal wedding (Yomiuri 6/10/93 9). Along with the fashion of princess, the objects of desire are promoted: collectibles (memorial coins, stamps, telephone cards), foodstuffs (restaurants and food stores where Masako shopped, lists of restaurants which made special lunch or dinner for celebrating the royal wedding), tourist destinations (her own home in Senzoku, her home town, places she traveled) and royal wedding music recorded by many artists. The role of royal characters such as that to be performed by Masako, is in fact to accrue profits for the nation as "Japan Inc.".

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[8] 35 years ago, princess Michiko's style to carry the tennis racket became a fad, women who did not play tennis bought racket as an accessory (Yomiuri 6/10/93, 9).

[*] I would like to thank Katherine Cukier to verbalize this idea.

A career woman joins the imperial household

> ... a career woman and commoner will cross the threshold into one of the most secretive and rigid institutions on earth - the Japanese Imperial Court. (Steele 1993, 23)

> More seriously, Owada represents values that modern Japanese admire most: discipline, a love of learning, discretion and, perhaps most important, the poise and sophistication to deal with the world beyond borders. (Duffy, 1993, 51)

Another "threat" which Masako presents is the social status of an "outsider". She is an "outsider" in the sense of commoner, (I will discuss this in following section) and having lived thirteen years abroad, could be seen as "far too Americanized", hence not quite Japanese. Simply, she embodies too much of the "other". Such fears of ambiguous identity are expressed in family anecdotes: "I did not want to stay in America after graduation because I thought I might become rootless. [Interview with Masako Owada] (Asahi 1/7/93)" and "the parents wanted them to avoid becoming rootless people. It was simple things, like customs and observing traditional festivals [immediate family member]" (Duffy 1993, 53). These concerns display the perceived threat to one's identity from the outside and the security of one's sense of place on an individual level, but they also parallel political concerns on a national level: whether cultural order can be preserved while embracing internationalization and

whether Japan can become a fully capitalistic and democratic institution.[9]

At worst, neither Japanese nor Western, she does not belong anywhere; at best, as both Japanese and Western, she fits everywhere. The media reshapes her into an "international" person who possesses the skills to close the gap between two worlds. In other words, her image as an "outsider" is resolved, with media inscribing the image of a "saviour" on the woman who will revolutionize the imperial household, and the image of Japan.

After all, the media assures us that Masako is not alienated from her "roots". Her internalization of individualistic values (often attributed to America) are balanced out in many ways. Her knowledge of the tea ceremony and love of Japanese food suggests how well versed she is in the "heart of Japan" [*nihon no kokoro*] (Asahi 1/7/93). Likewise, her tales of initiating a softball team as a junior high student or of being a "person with a strong sense of duty and sensitive care for colleagues" (Ibid.). Masako developed "Japanese values" in childhood, which come forth in her "caring for others" and "being humble" (Shuukan Josei 6/22/93, 28). These stories propose that despite her strong sense of self, she is someone who can successfully work within a group. Masako's individuality often attributed to her Western environment, is also made "safe" by crediting it to her place in the "modern" Japanese family, a family that allowed her to spread her wings.

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[9] Quoted from a lecture given by Dr. Margaret Lock (April 8, 1994) at McGill University, on the Brain Death debate in Japan.

The fact that her identity is presented through an obvious balancing act in the media echoes the important question which must be answered: how to establish "belongingness" to home and maintain the Japanese cultural order while embracing the outside (Western) influences. With this focus on the location of her identity in dualism of home and the "West", media offer the Japanese people a perfect solution: a social image of individualism at once cultivated in the West and delimited by Japanese group boundaries.

Media accounts confirm that she did not reject either Japanese values nor the "American" values, but has both. Hence this new and ideal identity is constructed as possessing the strength (immunity) to face the 21st century which implies further encounters with internationalization and successful intervention with the decay of cultural order brought from the West, while endorsing the discourses which introduced the necessity for this new identity. Again, this solution transcends the political and national levels, endorsing the present political interests which have shaped Japan to "internationalize" and yet preserve the cultural order while becoming a fully capitalistic institution.

Elevated to an "international" woman from "outsider", Masako can now join the royal family. The image of the Prince often described as "conservative", "serious", "enduring" - a conventional image of traditional Japanese man - coupled with the image of the imperial household, characterized as "rigid", "closed" and "inflexible" - demands assistance in order for them to circulate as "the symbol of the state and the unity of people". The marriage to Masako makes the royal family look less anachronistic, and most importantly, it

reflects a new Japanese generation that has grown up in a "internationalized" nation that aims to open itself more and more to the outside world. In short, the threat of "modern woman" and "outsider" introduced by images of Masako are resolved through these media images. The imperial household is now ready to be joined by her, the "international" woman, a "saviour", yet "safe".

Colonizing the home

Another issue through which the media establishes the framework of tradition and the modern is through the image of "family". The media repeatedly visualized every aspect of Masako's family including its estimated wealth and roots of the family, and elaborated on family unity. The Owada household is legitimized as a "fine" family, as both sides of her family, she is descended from the *samurai* class (Asahi 1/7/93). This fact is highlighted, through a family tree in major national newspapers.

The unity of her family is cultivated in the media in various forms. For example, the media circulates the closeness of the family through review of family anecdotes: "Among friends, Owada's are known to have strong family love. ... For each occasion of celebration, family members get together to deepen the ties (5/14/93 Nikkan Sports)", in her Christmas card she writes, "... I am very thankful that I was raised in such a warm family" (Shuukan Josei, 6/22/93, 22). Narratives on television often stress how the family "spent the years abroad as one" (Josei Jishin, 6/29/93, 22). Photographs of the Owada

family from the past and present represent the "perfect" caring family suggested in the media narratives.

Since the picture of the "perfect" family is a form of fiction for consumption, it needs to be maintained. The camera followed every family trip since the announcement of her engagement, including the trip to visit the ancestors. Masako visited the grave of her ancestors to inform the engagement at the Sensoji Temple, a temple that accommodates generations of her ancestors and relatives (Japan Times, 4/18/93). Her visit symbolizes the respect for the ancestors and tradition. These discourses create the picture of a "perfect" family in synch with Japanese cultural tradition ar1 order. While her deceased ancestors were visualized through the family tree and again on this trip, television broadcasts systematically suppressed information on the princess's living grandfather and his wife who reside in a home for elderly.[10]

The care for the aged in Japan represents a present and future demographical problem, intimately linked to the nation's birth rate, securing human labour and the graying of society. As such, the problem is one of the main political concerns for the nation's survival in decades to come. The government policies which direct national investment do not locate the aged at the homes for the elderly as a solution, instead, they are positioned within the family:

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[10] The media coverage and magazines do not mention the grandparents' existence (father's side), I was able to find only one note about them as a part of complied "Facts about Masako", "The 100 mysteries of Princess Masako" [Masakohi no nazo 100] (Josei Jishin, 6/29/93, pp. 72-78). Her grandfather died on October 20, 1993 at a home for the elderly. In the obituary, it reads that Masako and her parents visited the grandparents on March 27, 1993. While no outing went unnoticed (she was going through the education of royal family [okisaki kyooiku] at the time) the evening news on that day and other days took no notice of this visit (Yomiuri 10/20/93).

> The home is extremely important to the aged for a secure
> life of retirement, their health and welfare. In an attempt
> to form a social environment ideal to future living, it will
> be necessary to correctly position the home in society...
> the role of people caring for the aged at home [the home
> here suggests household] will become more important...
> Also, it will be necessary to promote a land policy aimed
> at pressing for three family generations to live in the
> same place or family members to live within easy reach.
> (Keizaikiakucho, ed. 1982,123. Also quoted in Lock 1993)

Such political discourse also suggests that the solution for the care for the aged hinges on the integrity of a caring family. If our preoccupations and presumptions about the Japanese modernizing family is correct, and if caring for the aged at one's home is politically and socially established as a traditional norm, the presence of Masako's grandparents at the home for the elderly would threaten the fiction of such a "perfect" family. Media constructs the Owada family as a "perfect" family, on one hand, by assigning it with our projection about the modern Japanese family, and on the other, by filtering her grandparents out, hence media colonizes the home to enhance the fiction of the "perfect" family. Yet her absent grandparents in the media represent our fear of future abandonment and at the same time, inscribes the failure of such fiction.

Discourses of the royal wedding: visualizing Japan

The accounts of the royal wedding are not confined to discourses about Masako. The live broadcasting of the royal wedding offers "historical" moments through experience as a "witness". Such

special programs give a meaning of "sacred", "traditional" yet "new" and "bright" images of imperial family and nationhood. Interwoven are the words of popular celebrities that unanimously affirm the marriage and position of women in the family.

My discussion will now focus on how the same ideological interests that shape the princess Masako enhance the production of nation as image and identity. We will look at how the discourse of nationhood is built, 1) through the voices of famous people, the "other" and ordinary people and 2) the weather, with reference to two television programs.[11]

The live broadcast of the wedding entailed three highlights: the wedding ceremony (kekkon no gi), the wedding reception (chooken no gi) and the wedding parade. Constituted as a "made-for-television ritual event", and an "electronic pageant" (Fujitani 1992, 825) of an historical moment, the live broadcast of the royal wedding required a content which could keep the "flow" despite the time lapse between events, "continuity" despite shifts in history, and "immediacy" despite the distance from the viewers. The FNN special broadcasting program: "Chooken no gi and wedding parade" begins by recapping the day; it uses footage starting from six AM, when Masako leaves her home and then later footage of the wedding ceremony which took place in the morning. This program situates itself at the parade, the climax of preceding days, enveloped in excitement and curiosity.

The studio for live broadcasting is set up with one giant screen in the middle, one male host and a female host who move around the

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[11] FNN special broadcasting program: Chooken no gi and wedding parade (6/9/93 a)" and "Special broadcasting program: happy cheering for the prince and Masako (6/9/93 b).

studio and nine guests who sit in a half circle. The voices and movements of guests are largely confined by those of the hosts. The guests never speak out of turn but only comment to answer them, or to comment on the footage shown on the large screen. This large screen with its images determines what discussions, and hence what meanings will ensue.

The guests are introduced before being given two questions: Have they been watching the television? What they have thought of it? Comments typically characterized the rite alleged to date from the *Heian* period (7th century AD)[12] - as a "dignified" [*genshuku*] and "solemn ceremony" [*ogosoka*]. Since none of the guests know either the Prince or Masako, (with the exception of one man who attended the ceremony as a friend of royal family), the primary role of these guests is to *share* feelings with the audience. Their role is also to *participate* in the wedding from the standpoint of a "proud Japanese citizen". As one actress conveys it:

> Living in the city, one forgets the worth of Japanese culture. When one lives outside of Japan, it was true for my experience that, I appreciated Japan more. This is one page in our history. ... I am very happy to be present for the occasion, I am very glad to be born in Japan (Nishida Hikaru 6/9/93 a).

While her thoughts might be considered representative of a young international returnee (a *kikokushijo*, one who has lived abroad and returned to Japan), similar concerns are voiced by a Japanese man with undeniable political status: the former prime

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[12] Despite its ancient trappings, however, it was invented in Meiji Japan in 19th-century. (Fujitani 1993, 93)

minister (now a congressman), Kaifu, and his wife appear as guests. Mr. Kaifu furnishes little anecdotes about Masako and the Prince, but again like other guests, he is relegated to the category of "proud Japanese citizen". Mr. Kaifu and his wife comment on the ancient rite.

> Mrs. Kaifu: It was like the fairy tale book. ...
> Mr. Kaifu: It has reaffirmed Japan's process since ancient time [hence the continuity of history]. [The Prince and Masako] are models for the Japanese.
> (6/9/93 a)

These words illustrate the main concerns of the programme's narrative. They indicate the point of reference for such programs: validation of historical continuity in the moment of the royal wedding, Japanese culture, a whole Japanese citizenship in a celebration of the nation. Family values appear eternal because the narrative not only restricts, controls and shapes the image of Japanese family but also suspends any questions regarding the history of the royal family or the origins of the modern concept of family:

> ... the way in which the story is told means that when we never have to deal with the royal family as a political institution; we only have to think about human behavior, human emotions and choices restricted to the family.
> (Coward 1985, 171)

Serious efforts are directed at catering to such concerns in the audience. In order to enhance this master narrative of the program, a spectrum of guests gather to represent different generations, occupations (designer, kabuki actor, athlete) and languages. The

following segment of the show is assembled as a package of celebration:

(in order)
"Congratulations!" (Child actress)
"Congratulations to both Prince and Masako." (Actress Miniamino Yoko)
"I hope you will work together for the happy gold medal." (Olympic Gold medalist)
"What a great encounter: I hope you will be happy forever." (Singers, CC. girls)
"A couple that represents Japan." (Anchor)
"Many things have happened to get here." (Father of Princess Masako)
"He said, I will put all my might in protecting you my entire life." (Princess Masako)
"I hope some one will say to me 'I will put all my might in protecting you my entire life'." (Actress)
"Men these days are soft, but his [prince's] words had strength and sweetness." (Variety host)
"I idealize a marriage in which a man will protect me." (Actress)
"Congratulations!" (English, Dave Specter, former journalist)
"Congratulations!" (Spanish, Latin Japanese band)
"Congratulations!" (African language, personality)
"Everyone in Japan is looking forward to it. My wishes, too." (Renecker, soccer player)
"I hope for many children." (pianist, Richard Clayderman)
"Congratulations! Happiness forever." (Personalities of Kids show)
"I hope for little princes and princesses" (TV host)
"An orchestra full of ..." (Female pro-wrestler)
"cute children." (Critic)
"I will leave [conception of] children up to luck." (Prince)
"I hope she will back him up. A pillar of a household." (Bronze medalist in gymnastics, Iketani)
"Michiko brought wind of change. I hope she will bring even more." (TV host)
"I want to protect her with all my strength in hard times." (Prince)
"I believe his words and carry on." (Princess Masako)

68

These celebratory remarks edited in voices of different people have two purposes. One is to create a narrative coherence that validates the *status quo* - around the royal wedding *vis-a-vis* the position of the woman in the family, the nation and by extent, something taken for granted, the Japanese identity. Another strategy involves the omission of different opinions on these issues. In the end, the coherent message is delivered by different people so that it will not appear monolithic or boring to the audience. The net effect of "happy marriage", is above all, "a conspicuous quantity of effects (Barthes 1973, 154)", through words.

Other comments indicate "I hope they make a new face of Japan towards the world", "as a symbol of Japanese culture, I hope they will be happy", and "it gave me a chance to rediscover the wonderful Japanese culture". Underlying such discourses is the notion that the royal family, and by extension, Japan, are both traditional (old) and new (Fujitani 1992). These words are, time and again, juxtaposed with the images of the present "ancient wedding rite" and the royal wedding of thirty-five years ago. This juxtaposition naturalizes at once the vision of old monarchy and new monarchy, hence the continuity of Japanese history. Today's Japan is reinvented as different from the past and serious investments have been harnesed to differentiate itself from the "other". At the heart of this production of continuity, linked intimately to the dialectic of change, lies the search for a new definition of Japanese identity

which can serve in the current world, what it should mean to be Japanese.

Voices of the "other"

While the program is dominated by Japanese voices, it also introduces Brooke Shields as a friend of the Prince. As the only foreign guest, she is represented as the spokesperson who speaks on behalf of the "other" that validates the wedding. When asked to comment on the ancient wedding rite, she says, as did the other Japanese guests, "It's like something from a fairy tale, a history book". The program shows a clip from the engagement interview (1/19/93) that moved many Japanese, in which Masako spoke the words of engagement: "The prince said to me, 'to enter the imperial household must be difficult, but I will put all my might in protecting you my entire life'". Brooke Shields comments on this.

> It's that kind of support that I think every young women wants from the man she'll marry. That's why I don't think she's giving up her career, I don't think she's giving up anything. ... The choice that she made is important in that she was able to live her life, then make the decision. She can offer a family now, she couldn't have offered before. It's important for an American, many many American women are so career oriented, career minded. They should respect the tradition of family. (6/9/93 b)

In this instance, as much as the production of "Japan" is monolithic, the "other" ("American women") is also made out to be a monolithic whole.

70

The voices of the "other" often appeared in the afternoon shows, sometimes to offer the gaze of an outside world affirming the pageant. But other times, it is used as a critical voicing[13] presenting the silenced criticisms of certain Japanese.[14] "Super Wide" (6/10/93) presented a report from the CBS evening news (6/10/93) and an article from the New York Times which displayed a malaise that did not fit into the carefully tailored outlook of Japan in the domestic media:

> A new bride with new blood may raise expectations for
> new moral leadership, in a country which is struggling to
> see its future. (CBS 6/10/93)
> For many Americans, to choose the traditional marriage
> rather than the career is a wonder. [My translation from
> the Japanese (New York Times 6/9/93)].

The Japanese media have extinguished such questions or criticisms (even moderate ones) by Japanese guests or ordinary citizens. The marriage remain neither questioned nor challenged in the Japanese media.[15] The comments of ordinary people merely validate the master narrative:

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[13] See for example an article titled "Simple [soboku] questions about the wedding fever by the foreign residents in Japan" (Shuukan Gendai, 6/26/93, pp. 38-39). Charles Redbiter (head of the Financial Times in Tokyo) points out the closed nature of Japanese media coverage of the Royals compared to the British royals. Kang Sangjun (Assistant Professor, ICU University) questions whether Masako will be the symbol of internationalization. Pen Starin (Lecturer, Tokyo Gaikokugo University) questions why the couple change to western dress for the parade rather than wearing traditional Japanese costumes.

[14] Although domestic news papers reported gatherings that criticize the wedding as "Wedding is a personal matter. It should not be a national event (Asahi 6/10/93, p.3).", (see also Japan Times, 6/10/93, p2.) such report were silenced on the television.

[15] Poet Machi Tawara express her reaction "... the imperial household must be quite a place if Masako Owada needs to be protected". Ironically such reaction is found in the Time magazine. (Duffy 1993, 52)

"I can trust her [Princess Masako]." (a house wife in Ginza)
"I hope they will make a family like the common people." (a house wife in Ginza)
"She is very smart, so I hope the imperial family will make a difference." (a female student in Ginza)
(6/2/93 "The Wide")

It is particularly noteworthy how famous people, ordinary people and the "voice of the others" are drawn into expressing opinions that conform to the preconceived notions of the journalist/media organization. It is shocking how the "representation of a few citizens [can be used] to appear as representative of the entire community" (Ericson et al. 1987, 249).

In short, the medium of Japanese television is not an arena for contesting the royal wedding or for debunking "Japanese identity" and what this identity does. Indeed, in media narratives, Japanese people dared to speak words which might criticize the Royal family in any way. The elevated status of royal family is in fact the result of potent discourses for celebrating the nation.

Rain and weather citizenship

One primary discourse on the wedding day concerned the weather. The experience of weather on the royal wedding day was as much mediated as the event itself. I would like to consider here how

such an experience helps to provide images of the nation through a national "weather citizenship".

For days prior to the wedding, programs speculated on the weather for the event, based on elaborate data, about how June 9 had had higher possibility of rain than June 8 or 10, for the past 30 years (6/9/93 "Nice Day"). Some mentioned the synchronicity among the media that Imperial events usually proceed with clear weather (6/10/93 Nikkan Sports).[16]

From early morning on the wedding day, updates on rain established the dominant mood. Live reporters continuously described and commented on the rain: "rain is covering the Imperial palace like an ink drawing", "according to the report, rain might stop in the late afternoon", "a quiet rain suits the solemn ceremony", "despite the rain, people from Okinawa to Hokkaido have come to witness the parade" (6/9/93 a). Hosts of the show and Mr. Kaifu in the studio furthered the anticipation of clear skies "somehow, I hope the sky will clear". The rain reports reflected legitimate concerns because the weather would determine the number of spectators, and hence the success of the "electronic pageant":

> The presence of the live crowd was important only because it demonstrated to the millions of people watching at home in Japan and foreign countries that the Japanese people gave warm support to the imperial household. We who had gone out to the streets were much like the "live studio audiences" put together for the television shows. While we thought and acted as if we

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[16] Similarly a writer and tennis colleague of the prince, Saitoh Naoko writes that the Prince is a "sunshine man", that he never failed to bring good weather on many occasions. She attributes clearing of the sky on the wedding parade to the "power of the prince". (Josei Jishin, 1993, 71)

were spectators, we were, in fact, part of the spectacle, live props for the television-viewing audience. (Fujitani on Showa Emperor's funeral parade, 1992, 825)

But what is more interesting about the discussions on the weather in the context of the royal wedding, is how rain and clear skies, usually which would go unnoticed, have intertwined with interests of the nation. The fact that the rain had stopped just before the parade as if on a cue, the hosts on the show described it, "[the 'main worry'] the change of the weather", was "mysterious". When the Imperial household agency announced that the parade would proceed with an open car, the comments stressed that the change in weather was not due to some meteorological chance:

"The clearing of sky cannot be explained by logic." (Hostess of the show)
"The clearing of sky is due to the couple who gained confidence [jimbo ga atusi]." (Kabuki actor)
"This is something unexplainable, a fate" (Actress)
"What a miraculous thing". (Host of the show)
"The quietness of wedding rite and movement of parade [sei to do], rain and clear skes, they are separate yet they agree". (Hostess of the show)

Such metaphors touch on real circumstances (the weather) but they displace them: without any logical link, a connection is made out from the weather to the miraculous and the imperial family.

But how strongly do people believe in such mythical connections? On one level, Japanese society is susceptible to notions of the governing of nature. This is possibly because in terms of change in season and natural disaster (earthquakes, eruption of

74

mountains, and typhoons) nature represents the remnants of forcible power, disposing Japanese people to the idea that something - out in the sky (*ten*) - plots events. This parallels the view that one looks at the telescope from the other end, embodying fate (*unmei, unsei*) and non-reason (*rikutsu denai*, cannot be explained a way with reason). However much or little the audience accepts the miraculous connection, the discourses assume that the audience shares the underlying views of fate and non-reason projected upon the weather.

On another level, the reports suggest that weather is national and nationalized, that Japanese people submit to the weather, as they would to the state - like it or lump it. The discourses on weather demonstrate another way in which the national vision could be effectively enhanced:

> In these multiple addresses to individual, family and nation, it[weather] speaks to a set of subject positions that affirms the egalitarian status of national weather citizenship. (Ross 1987, 125)[17]

We are reminded of familiar narratives from the past in which nature "weatherproofs the nation" (national investment): how the "God's wind" [*kamikaze*][18] protected Japan from the attack by Mongols. In the past, the "God's wind" has provided its service for free. The divine Japanese victory brought by the weather shifts itself as an alien isolated from history, because it can be explained away

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[17] I would like to thank Dr. Lamarre for bringing this article to my attention.
[18] In 1274 and 1281, Mongol troop retreated (Inoue 1988, 108). Many point out the weakness of Mongolian navy but it is often stressed that the storm (the nature) allied with Japan.

by the weather condition, and geographically. In the present, once again, the nature "weatherproofs the royal wedding" (national investment). Our experience of weather on the royal wedding day - a thoroughly mediated experience, a result of colonization of weather by the media - "invokes an advanced form of weather consciousness (Ross 1987, 125)" - if the weather was not mediated as magical, it probably had no particular meaning. The magical weather (and it is magical because the media says so) constructs an even more commodified experience of the "electronic pageant".

"Beautiful journalist": The status of the "working woman"

> This wedding doesn't mean anything about the status of women in Japan. It will be used as proof of Japan's internal reforms and outward internationalization, while the fundamental facts of life in Japan remain unchanged or are even going backwards. (Hardacre quoted in Klein, 1993, 70-71)

I would like to consider one genre of royal wedding spin-off: which emphesises the working women behind the scenes of broadcasting media. I will consider three such programs to illustrate how they contribute to visions of order, establish norms and values about women. While these narratives may glamourize working women (as modern), 1 want to show that they illustrate the demanding environment of corporate structure where women's role are secondary, yet at the same time, demonstrate adequately men's absence at home (tradition). In this sense, "the royal wedding, celebrating career women" in the media, frames issues in regard to

76

the ways in which paradoxes of modern and tradition are maintained, in order to cultivate the individual, family and nationhood.

(1) In the regular news broadcast (TBS *"news no mori"*, 6/11/93), a ten-minute segment was allocated to reportage on "backstage of broadcasting the royal wedding". The anchor said as an introduction to the segment, "Backstage at the broadcasting of the royal wedding, we saw some outstanding roles played by women". The camera follows a rookie female reporter, who for the day, is the assistant to the producer. We see that she is busy distributing notes and answering phone calls, but the television segment focuses on her major responsibility for contacting the Meteorological Agency for weather reports. As I have discussed above, the weather was no trivial matter, in fact, it was taken seriously as a critical component that frames the pageant. So she was also deemed important as resource for the group.

But her job is merely that of a person who runs errands for her boss(es). The rookie reporter was feasible as a focal point of the report because she strategically mediates among key executives, hosts, guests on the show and staff members (almost all male). Not only is she the mediator among important personnel, but she is also an internal messenger who literally runs from office to editing room, from the recording studio to the switch room. Through her movements, a viewer "tours" the television station along with the camera that endlessly follows her tasks. At the end of the day, she is exhausted (she and the staff have worked over twelve hours since five AM), yet she comments, "I was very happy to be a part of an

important event, which only happens once in a life time." She ends with a drink to celebrate a job well-done with her peers.

At issue in this presentation of the female rookie reporter fulfilling her division of labor by running errands, is her position as a member of a group working to produce a successful show. Her work, which represents the bottom of the hierarchical corporate structure - the assistant - is also the characteristic of the internalizing process of corporate identity. Her successful position as a "career woman" can be determined by the degree to which she blends into the corporate culture and displays loyalty to the corporation. The internalization of corporate identity is a reoccurring theme in these programs.

(2) One attraction of Nihon Television's live broadcast on the royal wedding lay in its use of female anchors. This usage presents a marked difference to the broadcast of thirty-five years previous, when the event was covered by male anchors exclusively. The focus of a show entitled "a diary of female journalists: a struggle behind the royal wedding" [joseikisha goseikon funtooki 6/10/93] concerns how they executed the "task" on the wedding day. The story begins with how each individual anchor prepares for the live broadcast: making scripts, making a preliminary inspection of their relay position, and locating the nearby bathroom.

One prevalent dynamic at work in this story development of the program involves the interaction between the female anchors and supervisors (who are male) through which seniority is stressed. The senior anchor (male) examines the script made by one of the female anchor and quips "You have to rewrite the script. You have to announce first the change in location." Shrugging her shoulders, the

female anchor fully accepts the criticism and rewrites the script. In another scene, a male *senpai* (someone more senior than oneself) anchor comes for an inspection with another female anchor. He tells her about the new subway line which is under construction right below them, which will connect to where Princess Masako used to live. The anecdote becomes important as her live report on the royal wedding parade falls short and she resorts to using this story when she runs out of words. These interventions by seniors are important to the story as they symbolize the "authorized knowers" who inform the female anchors about professionalism and institutional knowledge.

The interventions in a program are not always so clear; sometimes they are often ambiguous. The producer of the broadcast on the wedding is quietly watching the live broadcast in the switching room. The narrator describes him "a little bit anxious about their challenge (obviously the question of competence is raised)". The producer is anxious, because he can not replace the female anchors with the expertise he earned through his long corporate experience. His patron-like gaze at the female anchors in live broadcasting doing "their job" constitutes a dynamic similar to that presented in "Charlie's Angels". The dynamic shaped in the program promises that only with the help of authorized knowers one can obtain confidence, identity and mobility to fulfill the task assigned.

(3) Fuji's program "Family Special: the other side of wedding broadcasting -- a beautiful journalist's 24 hours" [goseikonhoodono uragawa-- bijinkishiya no mittchiyaku 24jikan 6/20/93] also aspires

79

to celebrate working women behind the scenes of the royal wedding and the media in general. The program opens with the narration "their object is truth, their means are sensitivity [*kansei*] and what they have is shine!". This program lures the audience by presenting working women as men (denial of difference) but paradoxically the program endorse how differently they are treated.

The program introduces five women in different media institutions who worked on the coverage of the royal wedding and three women connected to covering sports. For each woman, a personal file-like segment is introduced, where the name, age, marital status, university from which she graduated, her way of passing a weekend, along with a photo is displayed on the screen. Thus the program packages these women as profiles of "great men", while maintaining the techniques of "feminization".

Stories of these women in the show are constructed similarly, one to the other: her previous achievements, her tasks, her preparation, her obstacles, and her accomplishments/failures. For example, a journalist from Sankei Sports is sent to the site of a parade, chooses interviewees using her "female intuition" (hence feminizing her competence) while struggling with time constraints, and then writes up a story. Her accomplishment is four interviews being used for the coverage of wedding parade. Likewise, Fuji television gives the "big selection for live broadcasting" to a female director. The program does not focus on the director's professionalism, but on the fact that the director was in the same class with Princess Masako in the elementary school which is emphasized as a "fate/destiny [*goen*]" that reunited them in the

occasion. The director's competence in work is relocated, as her profile is reduced to "fate".

Along with the standard structure of narrative, the program also features the private life, but only of those who are married (as if a single woman is denied any private side except corporate identity). A female photographer for Flash magazine is sent to the parade to take an original photo and unlike her competitors, she chooses the most narrow street of the parade. Her "original" attempt backfires, when the open car strides along and Princess waves towards the opposite side of her position, to her high school juniors. The photographer is disappointed with her photos, she says "It's too bad, I will try harder next time". She goes home after the long day of work, where her husband comforts her but she cannot hide her disappointment. Unfortunately, this scene is too brief to construct a strong sense of her identity outside the corporate life.

Among these women, one female foreign CNN journalist is featured. Although her task is stated (to determine how Japanese people receive the Princess), unlike other women in the program, her profile is constructed focusing more on her private life; she has two daughters and a husband who quit his job so she can continue on with her career. Among the five women who work on the royal wedding story, she is the only one who does not spend the entire day in the office. Instead, we see her spending time with her family watching the parade on the television. Despite the stress of her corporate life, her family life is portrayed as intimate, warm and meaningful.

81

By encapsulating her private life, the program constructs the "other", glorifying her position at home (and not at work). The "other" is also manifested through construction of her position as immune to internalization of the corporate identity (she has two separate lives), unlike other Japanese working females in the show. This foreign female is irreducible to a Japanese working woman, but at least we can imagine where she fits in: at home.

In short, these portrayals of Japanese corporate women suggest it is within the organization and especially hierarchy, not outside of them, that one can gain identity and access to her individuality, position and the corporate structure. Working women are to *actively* embody the corporate identity, and paradoxically at the same time, remain differentiated through feminization:

> Male MC: "Their job is genderless. They have no excuse for work, being a woman."
> Female Actress: "Yes, there was no such thing as woman."
> Male MC: "There is a place for women to be active in work. ... I hope they report from a women's eye."

These women have become stages on which corporate identity (and not female identity) can be enacted if one adjusts fast enough to the corporate and mainstream hierarchy. This seems to affirm even the larger paradoxical position for both Japanese men and women where blending into the organization assures her/his position as an individual (Kondo 1991, 34). In other words, one's identity is ultimately restored, through recognizing one-self from corporate gaze (not gaze of one- self). In the end, the royal wedding and status of

women are more about establishing norms and values about women in hierarchical corporate structure, which remains, unchallenged.

Chapter Four

Wrap Up

In this final chapter, the narratives of the programes on royal wedding will be analyzed in three contexts. I will first discuss how on one hand, the story of presenting the royal wedding contributes to meanings of nationhood, by drawing on the tale of Invisible cities. I will then address how narratives of the royal wedding put contradictions together, especially around the contemporary notion of the Japanese family. Finally, I will address questions regarding representation in public discourses: how do seemingly various forms of representations (Princess Masako, authorized knowers, the voices of the other and ordinary people) in the Japanese media combine national interests?

Invisible Cities

When probing why the narratives of Japanese royal wedding are being told in a specific way in the media, Invisible Cities quoted by de Lauretis, provides an interesting analogy to the discussion of production of nationhood:

> ... you arrive at Zobeide, the white city, well exposed to the moon, with streets wound about themselves as in a skein. They tell this tale of its foundation: men of various nations had an identical dream. They saw a woman running at night through an unknown city; she was seen from behind, with long hair, and she was naked. They dreamed of pursuing her. As they twisted and turned, each of them lost her. After the dream they set out in

84

they decided to search of that city; they never found it, but they found one another; they decided to build a city like the one in the dream. In laying out the streets, each followed the course of pursuit; at the spot where they had lost the fugitive's trail, they arranged spaces and walls differently from the dream, so she would be unable to escape again.

This was the city of Zobeide, where they settled, waiting for that scene to be repeated one night. None of them, asleep or awake, ever saw the woman again. The city's streets were streets where they went to work every day, with no link anymore to the dreamed chase. Which for that matter, had been long forgotten.

New men arrived from other lands, having had the same dream like theirs, and in the city of Zobeide, they recognized something of the streets of the dream, and they changed the positions of arcades and stairways to resemble more closely the path of the pursued woman and so, at the same spot where she vanished, there would remain no avenue of escape. (Italo Calvino, quoted in de Lauretis 1982, 12)[1]

The tale of Zobeide describes many traps: the chase of an imaginary "Woman" ("Woman" who only exist in fantasy), the attempt to capture men's own desire (to have control over the "Woman"), and the city of Zobeide itself ("no avenue of escape"). These investments all sustain the city; the dynamic of the self-feeding process of the city. De Lauretis discusses the self-feeding dynamic of the city of Zobeide as which "must be constantly rebuilt to keep woman captive", yet, the city of Zobeide functions to capture men's dream and, at the same time, "finally only inscribes woman's absence" (12, 13).

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[1] I would like to thank Kim Sawchuck for bringing this story to my attention.

The process of building and rebuilding the city, "in a continuing movement of objectification and alienation, is Calvino's metaphor for human history as semiotic productivity; desire provides the impulse, the drive to represent, and dream, the modes of representing (13)". The woman embodies the ground for representation both the object and the support of desire, which is intimately tied with power and creativity, is what makes the culture of Zobeide tick.

Nationhood, memory, history: Royal wedding in television

The discussion of Zobeide brings me to answer, partially, one question I asked in the introduction, which was "how to go outside of ontological and cultural binarism in looking at a specific site (such as the media royal wedding)". As it is not sufficient to discuss the "woman" (identity) and city of Zobeide (culture) separately, it is more meaningful to understand the interplay between them and the creative ways in which this interplay is sustained, despite its paradoxes.

1) Memory as membership

The complex process of constructing national identity involves, on the one hand, linking history and the everyday through "memory, fantasy, narrative and myth (Hall 1990, 226)", and on the other hand, an element of artifact, invention and social engineering necessarily enters into making "nations". The programs about the royal wedding invite the members (Japanese citizens, citizens of Zobeide) through constructed memory (remembering who we are, remembering the absent "Woman"). But as history is created always

through negotiation between remembrance and dis-remembrance there are often interests. The royal wedding produces the *"remembrance for Japanese subjects"* who build and rebuild the nation, like the city of Zobeide which keep the men captive through remembering the (absent) "Woman".

(2) Identity

We have seen through the investigation that the media wedding embodies the relationship between the history of the state and that of individuals; it explores the junction between our individual and collective histories and memories; and it highlights how history is created, and shows how it is often created out of particular present needs. As such, television programs themselves are examples of making history, of tour guides through the discourses of an event.

An analysis of content suggests that the principle concern in broadcasting the royal wedding involved the protection of the existing status-quo. Since we cannot casually assume that for most people national identification - whenever it exists - excludes or takes precedent over, the remainder of the set of identifications which constitute the social being (Hobsbawm 1990, 11). The analysis suggest that national identity is always combined with identifications of other kinds (i.e., family, human nature, modern woman, consumerism and weather etc.) even when it is felt to be the superior concern.

The relationship between the state, identity and ideology, however, is never the same. It is constantly being modified, renewed and reinvented. Although it is easy now to see how the royal family

was produced artificially in the face of modernity (see for example, Fujitani 1933) identifications combined with the national identity in the19th century are quite different (i.e., human god, imperialism, nationalism). These identifications also invested in other forms of media to proliferate (i.e., religion, education, rites, statutes).

3) Consumption

Competing and rapidly proliferating discourses on Japanese identity do not allow one to question this Japanese identity which has been modified to cater to the present need, it is instead constantly referred to, recalled and addressed (at work, at school and at home, as well as in tne academic and media discourses). This proliferation of Japanese identity makes it only easier to promote objects of desire intimately linked to consumerism as I have discussed in the last chapter: collectibles, foodstuffs, tourist destinations, fashions, music, etc. The circulating commodities and discourses of Japanese identity in a specific cultural site, such as the mediated royal wedding elucidate in turn the national system of standardized meanings - meanings that make society engrave the cultural, political and economic practices.

In short, the tale of construction and reconstruction of the city of Zobeide based on the dream "Woman" seems to allude to the production and reproduction of Japanese identity and nationhood. Both tales (based on imagination) imply through the confinement of the production of identity how we accept and paradoxically ignore the lines drawn around what we do. The narratives of the mediated royal wedding are examples of the way in which the threat from "other" is internalized and colonized through media in every part of

culture imaginable (i.e. tradition and modern in society, on status of woman, on home), and down to an individual (self and other), for if the link between Japan and "other" remains external - as it has in the period of modernization - the link is fragile and it will be constantly threatened.

The story of royal family told in the present royal wedding owes much to the way in which, on one level, it caters to "memory as membership", "identity" and "consumption" while on the other level, it faithfully validates the present national needs and political and cultural concerns (developing capitalism, sustaining traditional family unit); and finally on another level, it endorses aspirations and struggles of the nation and people in the era of "internationalization".

Narratives about contemporary family

Narratives of the royal wedding also juxtaposed contradictions around the contemporary notion of Japanese family. The traditional notion of "family" [ie, the household] is the source of moral and spiritual education (Smith 1974, 151) is provided for by the presence of both parents in order to enhance balanced training. "While the role of the mother demands her complete attention and active physical presence, that of the father can be performed in large part in absentia; his dedication to his various social tasks is pointed out (usually by his wife) as a good example to be emulated" (Lock 1992, 112).

If we piece together narratives of the royal wedding about contemporary individuals and family, one has the impression that

the urban nuclear family appears to be in line with such traditional notions of the family. Yet we also glimpse that it is also fragile, despite what the fiction of the traditional "perfect family" offers. For example, the narratives about working women illustrated the demanding environment of corporate structure where women's roles are secondary, yet at the same time, demonstrated the legitimacy of men's absence at home. In a similar manner, focus on Masako, the modern career woman, was relegated to the maternal saviour where her future place in the (royal) family was considered as primary. The overt silence about the care for the elderly, represented by Masako's absent grandparents, shows the uneasiness circulating about the issue.

Although problematic issues of workaholism for "absent" fathers, stress of isolation and burden of family matters, including the care for the elderly, at home for mothers[2] are not presented in the royal wedding programs, the "perfect family" fictions provide the blue print for the pathological family. Narratives of the royal wedding about individuals and family puts together contradictions between the fiction of "perfect family" and the pathological family; they also reveal how contradictions are maintained and resolved in the media.

Political representation versus Media representation

The relationship between states and nations is everywhere an embattled one. It is possible to say that in

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2   Although I can not address the issue in the scope of my thesis but it need further study, especially in relation to changing concept of family.

many societies, the nation and the state have become one another's projects. That is, while nations (or more properly groups with ideas about nationhood) seek to capture or co-opt states and power, states simultaneously seek to capture and monopolize ideas about nationhood (Baruah 1986; Chatejee 1986; Nandy 1989). (Appadurai 283)

I would like to pay closer attention to the issue of representation which I have discussed in the last chapter: how the medium of Japanese television is not an arena for contesting the royal wedding or for debunking "Japanese identity". Media gathered seemingly diverse voices of representations (i.e. different language, occupation and generation) to celebrate the nation. In fact, what the media royal wedding succeeded to do was not confining interests to political matters (nation and identity) or to consumerism but to intertwine the two in such a way that the paradox goes unnoticed.

Said points out that the creation of "opponents" is found in those who are kept out of the discourses: "Opponents are therefore not people in disagreement with the constituency but people to be kept out, non-experts and non-specialists for the most part." (Said 1983, 152). Of course, representation of marginal people in Japan (visible and non-visible minorities) were hardly existent in the media. This fact itself expresses how Japan is closed in accepting migrants (but open to "international ideas"). But this is not the problem I would like to discuss here.

The issue here is how the media representations of people are again and a₀ain intertwined with political representation, one endorsing the other, consequently creating a monolith and limiting

our imagination of nation and people. Discussions throughout my thesis demonstrate this point; while the Japanese political and media discourses frame issues regarding the ways in which paradoxes of modern and tradition, self and other, dominant and marginal are maintained, resolved or challenged, in order to cultivate the individual, family and nationhood, this project falls short in recognizing people as differentiated individuals. Conversely, such recognition was often belied by the rhetoric of the "internationalization" movement (and obsession with nationhood) which is monological and authorative.[3]

The ironic twist to all this is not so much whether one opposes this movement, nor which voice one can identify with, but where can one be represented when media representations and political representations are more or less uniform. This problem of representation addressed here is not confined to the celebration of nation in the media nor to the Japanese media. I believe it is a pertinent issue to the present "public culture" everywhere; to those places where the main medium of national (regional) communication is television or radio and to those places where political movements and, at a larger level, any project of making a difference in the status quo are taken seriously. I am not suggesting the existence of "conspiracy" in the media, that we are somehow cheated in the "public culture". The question which is worth discussing in relation to

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[3] See for example the discussion of Tiananmen, television and public sphere. Calhoun discusses the question of "public culture" in relation to the problem of representing a monolith out of national crisis. (Calhoun, Craig. "Tiananmen, Television and the Public Sphere: Internationalization of Culture and the Beijing Spring of 1989". Public Culture. Vol.2, No.1, Fall 1989, pp. 54-71.)

"public culture" is, "can media differentiate political representation from public culture?".

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Television Programes

NHK (Public broadcasting)

| June 9 | AM6-8:15 | "Good Morning Japan" (*ohayo nippon*) |
| June 9 | AM12-1 | "Afternoon news: the wedding ceremony"(*kekkon no gi*) |

Nihon Television

June 9		
June 10	PM6-7	"The diary of female journalists : a struggle behind the royal wedding" (*josuikisha goseikon funtooki*)
June 10	PM7-7:30	"TV's back stage of wedding parade" (*goseikon pareedo terebikyokuno butaiura*)

TBS

June 8	PM12-1	"Wide watcher"
June 8	PM2-4	"Super wide"
June 8	PM6-6:40	"Woods of news" (*news no mori*)
June 10	PM2-4	"Super Wide"
June 11	PM7-9	"Special media broadcasting: back stage of Princess broadcasting" (*kootashihi hodono butaiura*)
June 14	PM2-4	"Super Wide"

Fuji Television

June 9	AM8:30-10	"Nice Day"
June 9	AM10-11:30	"FNN special broadcasting programme: the wedding ceremony" (*kekkonno gi*)
June 9	PM2-6	"FNN special broadcasting programme: Chooken no gi and wedding parade" - a
	PM7-9	"Special broadcasting programme: happy cheering for the Prince and Masako" -b
June 16	PM3-4	"Time 3"

| June 20 | PM9-10 | "Family Special: the other side of wedding broadcasting -- a beautiful journalit's 24 hours" (*goseikonhoodono uragawa-- bijinkishiya no m'ttchiyaku 24jikan*) |

TV Asahi

June 8	AM8-11	"Super Morning"
June 8	PM1:15-2	"Tetsuko's room" (*Tetsuko no heya*)
June 10	AM8-11	"Super Morning"