ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The debts I owe to people for this work are numerous, and unfortunately I must keep my remarks to those who have had the most immediate input. To begin with, I wish to thank my advisor, Professor John D. Jackson for his support and encouragement over the last two years. The fruits of John's insight and talent are evidenced throughout this work. Professors Hubert Guindon and Dominique Legros each read earlier drafts of this manuscript and provided valuable critical comments which have had a significant impact on this final version. I would also like to thank Professor Guy LeCavalier for his general support and advice over the last two years.

Another major debt I wish to acknowledge is to my colleagues in The Radio Drama Project including Professor Howard Fink (English, Concordia), again, Professor John D. Jackson (Sociology, Concordia) and Rosalind Zinman (Ph.D. student in humanities, Concordia). Over the last two years this group has been meeting regularly and as a result has played a large part in determining the content and structure of this work.

Among the students who through various discussions have both challenged and encouraged me are, Efrian Lopez, now studying at the Université de Montréal, Lynn Munroe, now studying at York University, and Stephen O'Neil, now studying at Concordia.
Finally, a very special note of thanks to Kathy Sabo, a literature student at the Université de Sherbrooke, for her much needed patience and skills in proof reading and editing this final version.

For any errors in this text I assume full responsibility.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter I Introduction ......................................................... 8

Chapter II The Approach: Paradigms and Problematics .......... 14
  Major Terms and Concepts ........................................ 16
  Logic of Inquiry .................................................... 19
  Data and Techniques .............................................. 24

Chapter III The Sociology of Knowledge Problematic of Karl
  Mannheim via Karl Marx ............................................ 26

  I Introduction ...................................................... 26
  Mannheim's Historicism ......................................... 29
  Mannheim's Relation and Debt to Weber and Marx ...... 33

  II Weber's Epistemological Assumptions and the
     Implications for Theory and Method ....................... 35
     The Ideal Type Procedure .................................. 38
     Overall Epistemological Position ......................... 41

  III Mannheim's Sociology of Knowledge Problematic .... 44
     Epistemological Assumptions ................................ 44
     Implications for the Theory of the Sociology
     of Knowledge ................................................ 45
     Implications for Methodology ............................... 50
     Implications for the Empirical Level .................... 56
     "The Way Through the Wood" a précis ..................... 58
     World View of Historical Epoch ........................... 60
     Technique of Analysis ...................................... 64
     Content Analysis of "The Way Through the Wood" ... 67
     Summary ......................................................... 71

Chapter IV The Genetic Structuralist Problematic of Lucien
  Goldmann Via George Lukacs ..................................... 74

  I An Historicist/Structuralist Synthesis .................... 76

  II Hegel and Lukacs on Epistemology ....................... 81
     The Hegelian Dialectic .................................... 81
     The Context of Practice-Reification ................... 87
     Summary and Critique of Detachment ................... 90
III Goldmann's Genetic Structuralist Problematic
The Epistemological Foundations
Theory
Implications for Method
A Structural Analysis of "The Way Through the Wood"

IV Summary

Chapter V The Althusserian Structuralist Problematic Via Karl Marx

I The Althusserians

II The Level of Epistemology
The Althusserian Critique of Historicism
Theoretical Practice and the Argument for Science

III Theory and Methodology
The Science of Historical Materialism
Reproduction
The Ideological State Apparatuses
Ideology

IV Application
Framework of Analysis

V Concluding Remarks
Some Ambiguities and Guidelines for a Conclusion

Chapter VI Conclusion and General Remarks

I Comparison of Problematics: The Highlights
Epistemology
Theory and Methodology
The Empirical
Notes for a Conclusion

Sources Cited
CHAPTER I

Introduction

The purpose of this work is to expound a theoretical and methodological strategy for the analysis of cultural products. In a recent edition of Sociologie et Société, Rioux claims the concept of "culture is making a comeback in the social sciences." Sociologists, indeed social scientists of varying stripes, have been shifting attention to the concept of culture, and cultural creations or products. English-Canadian studies in cultural products such as literature are now beginning to appear, as is evidenced in a 1978 article by Grayson and Grayson entitled "Class and Ideologies of Class in the English-Canadian Novel". Québecois sociology is ahead of English-Canadian sociology in this area, as sociologists have been studying its literature since at least 1964. On an international scale studies in this area, Dufrene et al. suggest, are developing in two fashions. Firstly, wherein the

1 See, Marcel Rioux, "Pour une sociologie critique de la culture/ For a Critical Sociology of Culture", in Sociologie et Sociétés (Vol. No.1, April 1979) p.55.


3 Québecois sociologists work on literature appears in the
sociology of the work of art traces the book, the cinema, the theatre, the music, etc. to its "existence in society", and secondly, wherein the work of art is itself studied as a product. 4 In the work that follows aspects of both these fashions will be explored. However, it is important that the reader does not confuse this work as being concerned principally with the cultural product itself, nor with its origin. Even though these issues are touched on, the central thrust of this work is to expand a theoretical and methodological strategy for the analysis of cultural products. In this respect the cultural product is used for both illustrative purposes and to ground theoretical and methodological concerns.

In pursuing this objective three authors representing three differing problematics 5 or thought structures are presented:

Recherche Sociographiques (Vol.1 and 2, 1964), also see both Jean Charles Falardeau, Notre societe et son roman (Montreal, editions HM41, 1967) and George Vachon, "L'espace politique et sociale dans les romans Quebecois", in Recherche Sociographiques, (7[3], 1966). Two recent issues of Sociologie et Socite which help confirm the proposition that Quebecois sociology is well-represented in the area of sociology of culture are: Critique Sociale et Creation Culturelle (Vol. No.1, April 1979) and Pour une Sociologie du Cinema (Vol.8, No.1, April 1979).


5 The concept of problematic whereas it is used broadly in francophone sociology, is not as yet well known in anglophone sociology. The reasons for adopting this concept as opposed to theoretical framework or model, are further elaborated in Chapter II. For the moment, however, the reader is advised to take the concept as being synonymous with thought structure.
(1) the sociology of knowledge problematic of Karl Mannheim via Max Weber; (2) the genetic structuralist problematic of Lucien Goldmann via George Lukacs; and (3) the Althusserian structuralist problematic via Karl Marx. Each of these problematics is presented on three different levels; the epistemological, the theoretical and methodological, and the empirical. The differences and similarities of these problematics have to do with the held view each carries regarding the relation between culture and social structure. A full-blown analysis of each problematic will help bring this out. Finally, once each problematic has been presented, a theoretical and methodological strategy for the analysis of cultural products is suggested, referring to aspects of all three problematics.

The justification for this objective is rooted in two broad theses. Firstly, there is a tension between the traditions of historicism, which takes human interaction as its subject matter, and structuralism, which takes as its subject matter social structure one step removed from observed social relations. In their pure or most extreme forms these traditions are in opposition to one another, however, and this brings us to our second thesis; the two are not mutually exclusive, in the sense that one must adopt one at the expense of discarding the other. Rather it

---

is proposed that a resorting to the two is not only possible, but necessary. Without such a resortion, any analysis of cultural products is partial and, as such, is incomplete.

In light of this objective, the problematics chosen for investigation represent the extreme positions of historicism and structuralism and a middle ground. Mannheim, taking from Weber and others, represents historicism in its most vivid form. Goldmann, representing the center, synthesizes the two traditions of historicism and structuralism by insisting that one must study both the structure and the genesis of a thing. Althusser, at the other extreme, represents a structuralist problematic. Even though the Althusserians reject this charge, an overriding concern with relations between elements would seem to indicate the structuralist tendency of their work. Hence, this category is retained as a general description of the Althusserian problematic.

In Chapter II the main theoretical and methodological thrust of the project is outlined in a discussion of the main concepts and terms employed, the data to be examined, and the techniques to be utilized. Two key descriptive terms, paradigm and problematic, are defined, accompanied with a discussion of the distinction between theory and methodology. Three levels of abstraction, the epistemological, the theoretical and methodological, and the empirical, are discerned. The data on the empirical level (is a C.B.C. radio-drama script. The techniques suggested for the uncovering of these data are: (1) content analysis; (2) structural analysis; and (3) literary analysis.
Chapter III is the first of the three substantive chapters. Included is a general outline of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge problematic. Mannheim's epistemological heritage and main intellectual debt is traced to Max Weber's neo-Kantian epistemology and main methodological procedure. The theoretical and methodological propositions of the sociology of knowledge problematic are presented. Finally, based on the methodological procedure, interpretation of the world view which is outlined in a general discussion of the methodology, a content analysis is applied to the C.B.C. script in an attempt to depict the content of the world view it portrays.

The genetic structuralist problematic of Lucien Goldmann via George Lukacs is the subject matter of Chapter IV. Goldmann's major epistemological and intellectual debt is linked to George Lukacs. This is done by tracing Lukacs' rejection of the Hegelian dialectic, outlining his interpretation of Marx, and showing the resulting concept of practice as Goldmann's central epistemological reference. Goldmann's problematic is seen to exist within a historicist and structuralist synthesis. The theoretical and methodological propositions of the problematic are offered along with a structural analysis of the selected radio-drama. This is contrasted with the Mannheimian analysis by showing differences on both the epistemological and empirical levels.

Once the Mannheim and Goldmann problematics are distinguished, we turn to the Althusserian structuralist problematic. Unlike the two preceding chapters, the Althusserians, because their work is primarily concerned with the interpretation of Marx, are not traced
to their main intellectual and epistemological base. Instead, an attempt is made to deal with the Althusserians on their own ground. On the epistemological level, a critique of historicism is formulated. From this base is launched an argument to distinguish science from ideology. Finally, the main theoretical and methodological propositions are offered and a framework for a literary analysis of the selected script is applied.

In the concluding chapter a summary comparison of the three levels of the problematics is offered in order that a conclusion to the objective of the project might be reached. Mannheim's main methodological procedures are subsumed in Goldmann's problematic which, it is argued, must negate Mannheim's major epistemological assumption. A dialogue is opened between the Althusserians and Goldmann problematics, the result of which suggests the two may compliment one another. The conclusion suggests that elements from all three problematics must be resorted to in any scheme designed to analyse cultural products.
CHAPTER II

The Approach: Paradigms and Problematics

In this chapter the overall project is revealed through a discussion of the major terms and concepts used, the levels of abstraction on which analyses are formed, and the specific data to be used along with the techniques employed to uncover it. The two key concepts discussed here are problematic and paradigm. It is argued that the former is a more specific category which is best suited for the investigation and/or depiction of particular thought models. The latter, on the other hand, is a broader category in that it might be thought of as housing particular problematics. A paradigm is defined as a tradition of study which is concerned with the same subject matter. The problematic is defined as a more specific collective or individual thought structure.

Once the distinction is made between the paradigm and the problematic, the main assumption underlying the problematic is posed as its ability to analyse a thought structure from the outside, and that the analysis of the problematics are independent of the theories of the theorist making the analysis. This assumption is distinguished from the assumption of the 'social determination of thought' which underlies the sociology of knowledge approach to the theory of theory, and from the philosophy of science which tends to study scientific
procedure in theories. After making these distinctions, the problematic is offered as the principal concept around which this project is organized.

A general description of the deductive style of the project is made and the three levels of abstraction which together formulate the concept of problematic are depicted. The three levels of abstraction are the epistemological, theoretical and methodological, and the empirical. The data for the illustrative applications are noted along with three techniques corresponding to the three different problematics. In satisfying the primary objective of this thesis, three problematics are to be presented. The first two, Karl Mannheim and Lucien Goldmann, fall within the paradigm of historicism.\(^1\) The third problematic, that of the Althusserian, falls within the paradigm of structuralism. Certain restraints dictate that the analysis remain within the limits of the seminal works of these authors, however, where it was necessary, secondary sources were consulted. There are a great number of traditions or paradigms that have emerged in opposition to one another but rarely do they share the breadth and dominance of the two under investigation. In this sense, this work touches on a select but important set of authors, and as such, serves as a very modest attempt at working out major ideas that will hopefully serve as a useful contri-

---

\(^1\) Actually, as will be argued later, Goldmann's genetic structuralist problematic cuts across both the historicist and structuralist paradigms. For purposes here, that is, to contrast with the Althusserians, Goldmann is thought of as falling within the historicist paradigm. Goldmann's historicist tendencies are a result of the influence of Lukacs. This is further explored in Chapter IV.
bution to the area.

Major Terms and Concepts

The concept of a problematic is used here as defined by Miriam Glucksmann:

"A problematic or a thought structure is a particular way of looking at the world, defined by the fundamental questions asked, and which includes concepts, methods and theories. To isolate a problematic requires more than a simple reading of the texts, but depends on making explicit concepts that are often only latent and investigating their interrelationship within a total system." 2

The concept as Glucksmann uses it, is similar to the Kuhnsian concept of a paradigm. 3 Ritzer provides us with a sociological definition of the paradigm in the following:

"A paradigm is a fundamental image of a subject matter within a science. It serves to define what should be studied, what questions should be asked, how they should be asked, and what rules should be followed in interpreting the answers obtained. The paradigm is the broadest unit of consensus within a science and serves to differentiate one scientific community from another. It subsumes, defines, and interrelates the exemplars, theories, methods, and instruments that exist within it." 4

These two concepts seem to share the same meaning. The difference between the two, at this point, is the level of generality

---

2 Glucksmann, 1974, p.8, emphasis added.


4 Ritzer, George. *Sociology: a Multiple Paradigm Science* (Seattle: Allyn and Bacon, 1975). p.7. Ritzer's definition of the Kuhnsian concept is used here because it is in a different form in Kuhn's work. Ritzer's definition is more useful for our purposes. Emphasis added.
at which each is formulated. The paradigm, as used by Ritzer, describes combinations of theorists and methodologists who represent 'traditions' in social science. The problematic, as developed by the structuralist tradition and employed by Glucksmann in her comparison of Claude Levi-Strauss and Louis Althusser, is a more specific concept. In this sense, we could speak of the structuralist paradigm as a tradition of which the Althusserian problematic is one version. A paradigm is an overarching category in which various problematics are located. In this sense, a paradigm refers to a whole range of subject matter, while the problematic deals with more specific thought structures or specific ways of seeing subject matter. For example, both Althusser and Claude Levi-Strauss on at least one level, are concerned with the relations between elements; not with the elements per se but with their relations; i.e., structure. This is thought of as subject matter. Hence, at the broadest level, both Althusser and Levi-Strauss belong to the same tradition, but at the same time have different thought structures. The difference between the problematics reveals the prime dynamics of the overall paradigm, or tradition. Given this importance, it is necessary to discuss the major assumptions behind the concept of a problematic.

An important assumption that underlies the concept of a problematic, as Glucksmann says in substance, "is that the theoretical frameworks can be considered as distinct entities, capable of analysis from the outside; that the results of analysis of problematics are independent of the theories of the analysis of the analyst of theory." This position differs considerably from the sociology
of knowledge position which raises the problem of the "determinacy of thought". In attempting a solution to the problem, the sociology of knowledge attempts to examine external determinants on the perspective of thought. According to Glucksmann, this is one of two approaches to what she calls "the theory of theory". The second approach is the philosophy of science, which tends to focus analysis on "the procedure of scientific investigation, or to the process of scientific change." Neither of these approaches are especially helpful for the analysis of the internal structure of theory or the relations between the component parts. In this sense the concept of problematic, or thought structure, is better equipped to deal with the exposition of the internal structure of theory itself. Even though problematic is offered here as the key concept for the overall work, the sociology of knowledge position and the philosophy of science position are not entirely excluded. On the contrary, the two are to be touched on, but only briefly. Some reference to intellectual or external debts will be made for each of the problematics considered; and a final brief summary of the seminal elements of the broader paradigms of structuralism and historicism will be offered. Therefore, this work will capture some aspects of all three styles of analysis but the key concept employed is that of the problematic.

---

5 Glucksmann, 1974, p.4

6 ibid.
Logic of Inquiry

This work uses primarily deductive forms of inquiry. By this it is meant that the problematics that are presented generally begin with a broad set of assumptions, from which are posited increasingly more specific theoretical and methodological propositions. The analytical difference between theory and methodology is that the former is substantive whereas the latter is normative. McKinney suggests "theory" has to do with certain aspects of the interactions of people", hence it is substantive. Methodology, on the other hand, has to do with "the norms and principles of investigation", hence it is normative. In short, theory answers the questions of what and methodology answers the question of how.

It must be kept in mind, however, that the above distinction is analytical, for purposes of definition and explanation. In practice this distinction tends to break down. It is often difficult to clearly distinguish a theoretical element from a methodological one, at a variety of levels of abstraction. For example, on a higher level of abstraction wherein a justification of the usage of a particular technique must be made, that justification may require both normative and substantive elements at the same time. Hence, the traditional analytical distinction between theory and

methodology tends to break down slightly at various points.

The point has now been reached where it is possible to begin to depict the elements and levels of abstraction that comprise a problematic. Once this is achieved the concept of a problematic will serve as a guideline around which the project may be organized. The first level of analysis is thought of on the highest or most general level of abstraction; i.e., the epistemological foundation. This refers to the general assumptions which underlie a problematic. These assumptions are posed in terms of the problematic's theory of knowledge; i.e., how is knowledge achieved and what kinds of world views result. It is helpful, in depicting this level of abstraction, to point out the prime intellectual debts of the problematics under consideration and in some cases, elaborate on their epistemological base. This will reveal the epistemological and to some extent, the paradigmatic tradition of each problematic. In this light, Mannheim's relation to Weber, Goldmann's relation to Lukacs, and Althusser's relation to Marx are to be examined in terms of their epistemological heritage.

The second level of abstraction is more specific than that of world view. This is the realm of theory and methodology. As has already been mentioned, these terms are difficult to distinguish. At the most specific level of abstraction; viz., when empirical materials are confronted, theory will cover "substantive hypotheses" to account for and explain observed facts, phenomena and events. On the broader or more general levels of abstraction, theory is subsumed within the level of epistemology and world view. In this sense there are two meanings of the term: one is the
substantive hypothesis and the other is the notion of theory as equivalent to that of problematic. Glucksmann makes this distinction in the following:

"Thus in order to analyze a theory completely, it is not enough to accept it as independent and self-sufficient. In most cases theoretical hypotheses and methods for testing them are embedded in a wider problematic, linked with distinctive epistemological and philosophical premises which confer extra meaning on them.

The term theory becomes overloaded if we look at it in this way, and we can distinguish two separate meanings it has already acquired.

(1) customary meaning as substantive hypothesis to account for and explain particular social phenomena;

(2) a whole conceptual framework embodying different levels and areas of which theory in the first sense is 'just one.

The term theory will be reserved for the first, and problematic for the second." 8

Methodology refers primarily to the methods used in research and is on a similar level of abstraction as theory in terms of its proximity to data. The broader elements subsumed under the category of methodology include the hypothetico-deductive method, 9 which is a general description of the investigation process. At this level, methodology is very closely related to the level of epistemology. Here methodology becomes meta-methodology. Similarly, when theory reaches a certain phase in the explanation of a phenomena, it borders on the realm of epistemology and world view. Here it becomes meta-theory.

8 Glucksmann, 1974, p.11, emphasis added.

The most concrete or specific level of abstraction has to do with the employment of a technique of data analysis. The technique is thought of as primarily a "fact finding device". Certain techniques may be employed more often by certain problematics than others. However, antagonistic problematics may employ the same techniques. The point is, the technique is manipulated or applied in a manner which is compatible with the broader contours of the problematic that employs it. Once the data is discovered by the technique, a theoretical interpretation is generated which, in turn, develops further hypotheses, and so on.

In summary then, three levels of abstraction have been noted: (1) the level of assumptions, general epistemology, theory of knowledge and world view; (2) theory and methodology, including substantive hypotheses, explanation of data, general method of analysis of data; and (3) kinds of techniques most likely to be employed, description of observations, or actual method of describing observations. It is possible other elements might be included in the concept of problematic. However, most positions in social science contain either explicitly or implicitly aspects of all these elements as well as the levels of abstraction at which they operate. Admittedly, this list is not exhaustive; at certain points it may be necessary to introduce further elements. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this work, these elements cover most of the needs.

A difficulty that emerges with the use of the problematic is the possibility of conflicting problematics addressing the same subject matter with the same or similar concepts. This may
lead to confusion. A similar problem emerges with the paradigm in the sense that conflicting paradigms overlap on occasion thereby making a clear and obvious difference difficult to see. In this sense, at certain levels of abstraction, isolated theories may be seen as the same from one problematic to the other. A good example of what is meant here is the confusion often expressed over the difference between marxist and elitist theory. At certain levels each position is concerned with the exploitation and repression of one class by another. However, if the positions are more fully presented it can be discovered that elitist modes of thought tend to focus on the circulation of elites, whereas marxist styles of thought tend to focus attention on relations of production. These tendencies are not, strictly speaking, always the case, but they do begin to offer some ideas of the differences between the two modes of thought. These differences stem from different epistemological roots, and differing intellectual traditions, which may only be fully understood by thoroughly analysing the broad range of the problematic and ultimately its application. As Glucksmann suggests; "Certain theories may be similar at face value but belong to different epistemologies and vice-versa; the same epistemological framework may be compatible with the lower level theoretical propositions." 


11 Glucksmann, 1974, p.10.
Given this flexibility, a further problem that will have to be guarded against is the usage of concepts in each paradigm. For example, does Mannheim use the concept of ideology in the same way as Goldmann, or the Althusserian's? Are the various concepts used by each author meant in similar or different ways? This demands attention at a variety of stages while expounding the problematics.

Data and Techniques

The data base for this project is the C.B.C. radio-drama archives housed at Concordia University. The archives hold some 7,000 radio-drama scripts produced by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation over more than 50 years. For many, radio-drama was the medium through which Canadian theatre was developed. It is not the task of this project to give an overall history of radio-drama, nor to categorize the literary, political, economic or social nature of these materials. Instead, the intention of the thesis is to use a radio-drama script as a cultural product, or social fact, and begin to ask how might an analysis of such a fact be pursued by the three problematics under consideration. The grounding of these problematics is as important as the exposition of the world view of each. Without such a grounding it would not be possible to fully illustrate the problematic itself.

The script which will be used for the illustrative analyses is "A Way Through the Wood", written by Alan King, produced by
Peter McDonald, and broadcast on Sunday, December 9th, 1951, at 9:00 p.m. EST, from Toronto to the trans-Canada Network. Three techniques are considered in the direct textual analysis. Firstly, a content analysis is to be used in connection with Mannheim's problematic. Secondly, a structuralist technique is employed in connection with the Goldmann/Lukacs problematic. Thirdly, taking the data uncovered by both the Mannheim/Weber and Goldmann/Lukacs' problematics, a literary analysis based on the Althusserian's argument for the 'formal structure of ideology' is used. The description of the usage of each of these techniques is offered in each chapter at the beginning of the third level of the problematic, that is, the level of application.

12 The script which will be used for the illustrative analyses is from the C.B.C. Stage '54 series. This series was broadcast regularly on Sunday evenings. It is, so to speak, the best of C.B.C. radio-drama. A précis of this script and a discussion of the historical period appears in Chapter III.
CHAPTER III

The Sociology of Knowledge Problematic
of Karl Mannheim via Max Weber

I Introduction

Utilizing the concept of a problematic, as was outlined in Chapter II, the sociology of knowledge position of Karl Mannheim is elaborated in this chapter as an extension of Max Weber's epistemological position, stated in Neo-Kantian terms as 'the partial nature of knowledge'. Mannheim's problematic is rooted in the more general paradigm of historicism as it emerged in Europe in the early decades of this century. Once the intellectual debt to Weber is established, the sociology of knowledge problematic is analysed in terms of the previously identified three levels of abstraction. Mannheim's problematic takes as its general subject matter the historically specific subject. Taking from Troeltsch, Dilthey, Weber, and others, Mannheim's sociology of knowledge problematic is reviewed as it exists within the larger paradigm of historicism. Mannheim works out his problematic within this paradigm by synthesizing the Hegelian historical school and the descriptive phenomenological school. This is later couched in a mixture of Neo-Kantian-Weberianism, and Neo-Hegelian-Marxism. The influences of both these schools are
pointed out with the conclusion being that it is the former, which is the dominant influence on the construction of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge problematic.

Weber's influence is depicted as crucial to the Mannheimian problematic and as such, it is argued that a presentation of Weber's main epistemological position and its implications for theoretical and methodological propositions serves as a necessary step toward an understanding of Mannheim. Weber's epistemology is presented as neo-Kantian in that it is concerned mainly with the separation of the subject and object. The main assumption which this position harbours is that knowledge is partial; i.e., reality consists of an infinite number of elements of which the human mind is only capable of grasping a limited number. This limited or partial reality is seen through two kinds of concepts -- the general and the specific. Concepts are formed via the procedure of the ideal type. Two ideal types are examined: where meaning stems from the interpretation of phenomena by the observer; and where meaning stems from the observer. Concept formation (ideal types) and the overall epistemological position of Weber are presented in a fashion that allows us to root Mannheim's sociology of knowledge problematic in the primary assumption of partial knowledge.

The discussion of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge problematic is thus launched in a Weberian shadow. The implications of Weber's position are carried over to the presentation of Mannheim. The epistemological assumption is revealed, in the
problem of relational knowledge, as 'partial knowledge'. Once
the prime epistemological assumption is revealed, the discussion
moves to the second level of the problematic, theory and
methodology. The main theoretical propositions are presented.
Each is then related to the central thesis of the problematic
which is argued as 'the social determination of knowledge'. The
theoretical propositions culminate in the problem of relationalism.
This problem, it is argued, requires a methodology which will
allow the problematic to continue with theoretical formulations.
The main methodological concept is the 'detached intellectual'.
Five procedures are elaborated which together constitute the
methodology of detachment, the interpretation of the world view,
imputation, ideal types, particularization, and relationalism.

Finally, and as the third level of the problematic, an
illustration is offered in a content analysis of the cultural fact
"A Way Through the Wood". The focus of the study of cultural
productions is argued as being placed on the tracing of the
historically specific location or context in which the product
emerges. The partial analysis of the content of the world view
in the script is justified as being one of three elements, which
combined constitute an entire world view. The other two elements
are the expressive and documentary meanings. The technique of
content analysis is reviewed and the employment of the procedures
of ideal type and imputation are utilized in the operationalization
of the technique. The analysis is aimed at depicting the variety
of world views in the script, and by means of quantification,
showing the elements that constitute the script. Some suggestions are offered for a broader application of the problematic to the cultural product.

Mannheim's Historicism

Karl Mannheim was born in Budapest, in 1893. "Among his most influential teachers were the Hungarians György Lukács, and Béla Zalai and the Germans Emil Lask, Heinrich Rickert, and Edmund Husserl." ¹ Prior to his departure to England in 1933, Mannheim worked and published within the contours of German social science. The three main influences on this category of his work were Max Weber, Max Scheler, and Karl Marx. After teaching sociology at the London School of Economics, Mannheim moved to the Institute of Education at the University of London, and died in 1947. ²

If we can trace Mannheim to a major paradigm or tradition of thought, it is that of historicism. According to Mannheim, historicism had become, in the modern world, the principle weltanschauung (world view). Historicism, for Mannheim, coloured all the disciplines of the social sciences and humanities: "science and scientific methodology, logic, epistemology, and ontology are

¹ Kurt Wolf, From Karl Mannheim (New York: Oxford Press, 1971) p.IX.

all molded by the historicist approach." In this sense, historicism, for Mannheim, was the universal world view for man in the twentieth century much on the same level that religion provided a universal world view for the medieval man. The central thesis of the historicist world view is "that historical knowledge is only possible from an ascertainable intellectual location, that it presupposes a subject harbouring definite aspirations regarding the future and actively striving to achieve them." 3 The historical subject is at the heart of the historicist world view. Mannheim, taking from Troeltsch, asserted that "the historical subject stands rather midway between the empirical ego of the historian and the purely supra-temporal subject of the Kantian theory of knowledge." 4 The historical personality is a synthesis of this polarization. "It emerges as being whose dynamism is consubstantial with the dominant active forces of history." 5 In tracing the trends in this type of historical thought, two different schools are discerned: Hegelian dialectics, 6 and the "German historical school." According to Mannheim this duality persists in historicist thought well into

---


5 Ibid. p.102.

6 For a discussion of the Hegelian dialectic see Chapter IV.
the twentieth century. The distinction between these two styles of historicism is best understood as the former emphasizing general laws, as in the Hegelian absolute spirit, and the latter concentrating on constructing descriptive concepts, as in Weber's ideal types. Mannheim helps clarify this distinction in the following:

"The fundamental opposition between the Hegelians and the historical school is most readily demonstrated in their treatment of the concept. Whereas for the Hegelian, the logician, the essence of the world process is itself a concept and hence the fundamental movement of spirit is traceable in the dialectical movement of the concept, for the irrationalist and intuitive thinker the fundamental movement of life can only be grasped in its manifestations by the intuitive assimilation of the concrete phenomena; one could at most try to characterize it in 'descriptive' concepts...." 8

According to Mannheim there are advantages and disadvantages to each of these approaches. This is a somewhat typical response from Mannheim, in that there is a sense in which much of his important work is a borrowing or balancing of differing traditions. In this instance, he argues that the descriptive concept adds to the overall capacity of historicism's knowledge. The historical, descriptive school is able, through intuition and the method of verstehen, to trace subtle "correlations between various manifestations of life within the same epoch." 9 The dialectic, on the other hand, are often accused of fitting reality into the Hegelian triad of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. According

8 Mannheim, 1936, p.107, emphasis added.

to the irrationalists (historical school) reality simply does not always correspond to a schema or model. Yet, the descriptive method does not fulfill the 'promise', or the universal scope of historicism, which is to show linkages between epochs; in short, to understand the 'whole' of history. Hence, Mannheim argues, both methods are necessary in rounding out the historicist weltanschauung. Only with the historicist weltanschauung can culture, art, aesthetics, cultural creations, cultural activity, etc., be understood. The final aim of historicism is to work out a "universal metaphysical and methodological principle which comes more and more to dominate the cultural sciences and to become paramount in aesthetics, the science of religion, sociology, and the history of ideas." 10

When we say Mannheim's sociology of knowledge problematic fits within a historicist paradigm, we mean that the subject matter of that paradigm is concerned, first and foremost, with the historical, location of the actor, in relation to other historical periods or epochs. In this sense the larger synthesis that Mannheim makes is with the wholistic notion of history; that is, the cumulative progression of epochs, and the specific description of concrete actors in the specific historical milieu. Historicism, then, may be depicted as a paradigm (or world view, in Mannheim's terms) which takes as its subject matter the interactions of men in their historically specific milieu. Before spelling out the

10 ibid. p. 10.
specific terms of the Mannheimian sociology of knowledge problematic, it will be useful to review the epistemological debts of the historicist paradigm in which Mannheim's work is located.

Mannheim's Relation and Debt to Weber and Marx

Depicting Mannheim's historicist world view and epistemology is a somewhat difficult exercise. That this is so has to do with a form of eclecticism in his work which contains aspects of both neo-Hegelian-Marxism and neo-Kantian-Weberianism. In the former, a central epistemological focus has to do with wholistic concerns. This is evident in Mannheim's concept of Weltanschauung. Yet, a consistent problem plaguing Mannheim's work is the nature of partial truth, a Weberian problem. It is clear that Mannheim accepts the primary marxist metaphor of base and superstructure. Yet, in working out methodological procedures he relies on the ideal type. This is apparent in two interpretations of Mannheim's intellectual debts which are found in Zeitlin's Ideology and the Development of Sociological Theory, and Hamilton's Knowledge and Social Structure. The difference in these two accounts may be traced to a general difference in the interpretation of the relation of Weber to Marx. Zeitlin's account examines Weber in the context of the "Marxian Watershed", looking at strong similarities between Weber and Marx. The implication of Hamilton's analysis indicates a strong division between Marx and Weber that is rooted in conflicting epistemological
positions. In this context Hamilton argues that Mannheim's epistemology is "thoroughly Weberian", whereas Zeitlin argues that there is an equal combination of Marx and Weber in Mannheim's work. These two positions are perhaps more clearly seen in the following:

Zeitlin

"Mannheim admired Weber's elaboration and refinement of Marx's method and in fact emulated in his own work both of these mighty thinkers. He saw clearly that Weber had adopted Marx's general view that changes in the minds of men could not be understood adequately without relating them to the changes in the social situations. The human mind does not operate in a vacuum; the most delicate changes in the human spirit correspond to similarly delicate changes in the situation in which an individual or group finds itself; and, conversely, the minutest change in situations indicates that men, too, have undergone some change. This remained the leading idea of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge." 11

Hamilton

"As far as intellectual debts are concerned Mannheim is thoroughly Weberian, in the sense that his conceptualization of society is in terms of a structure of meaningful social actions of individual actors. He employs the concept of ideal type as a methodological tool and also discusses rationality and traditionalism as polar antithesis in ways very similar to Weber. The neo-Kantian heritage is also significant in unifying Weber and Mannheim - both took the central notion of reality as ultimately an unknowable entity, something about which man could only have an imperfect knowledge." 12

---


12 Peter Hamilton, Knowledge and Social Structure: An Introduction to the Classical Argument in the Sociology of Knowledge (London: Routledge, 1974) p.121, emphasis added.
There were other influences on Mannheim's work; i.e., Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler, and in a certain way, George Lukacs. It would be wrong to suggest that Mannheim is strictly speaking, a neo-Kantian, or a neo-Hegelian, neo-Weberian or neo-Marxist. At the same time there are definite stands adopted in Mannheim's work which lead us to adopt Hamilton's analysis as more likely than that of Zeitlin's. There is, in *Ideology and Utopia*, for example, an anti-Marxism, which now, read some fifty years out of context, appears as a rather weak critique. In addition, the general methodology of detachment relies heavily on the ideal type procedure, which harbours a whole set of assumptions developed by Weber. In this light, a presentation of Weber's central epistemological assumption, along with the implications it carries for theoretical and methodological issues, serves as a useful parallel in expounding Mannheim's problematic.

II Weber's Epistemological Assumptions and the Implications for Theory and Method

The assumption that Weber begins with is that reality consists of an infinite number of elements of which the human mind is only.

---

capable of grasping a limited number. Those elements which are investigated are chosen as meaningful on the basis of the value orientation of the investigator. Both Mannheim and Weber saw all human conduct as meaningful conduct in the sense that it involved the purpose, motives, and values of the actors. All of these aspects of meaning require something more than quantification; i.e., "knowing why men act the way they do is necessary if something more than a mere datum is required, if something more than a mere correlation is the goal of analysis." The emphasis on value forms Weber's general distinction between the cultural and physical sciences, a distinction by the way, which Mannheim also accepts. The idea of the cultural sciences as a discipline is defined in the following:

"We have designated the cultural sciences those disciplines which analyze the phenomena of life in terms of their cultural significance. The significance of a configuration of cultural phenomena and the basis of this significance cannot however be derived and rendered intelligible by a system of analytical laws, however perfect it may be, since the significance of cultural events presupposes a value orientation towards these events. The concept of culture is a value concept, empirical reality becomes "culture" to us because and insofar as we relate it to value ideas. It concludes those segments and only those segments of reality which have become significant to us because of this value-relevance. Only a small portion of existing concrete reality is concerned by our value conditioned interest and it alone is significant to us."  


16 Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences
In Weber's epistemology there is a sharp distinction made between the object of investigation and the subject, or the investigator. The investigator always views the object through concepts. Concepts are formed by the investigator for the purpose of analysing social phenomena. Concepts fulfill the purpose of science, which for Weber is "an ordering in thought of empirical reality" 17 through the use of concepts. There are two kinds of formed concepts: firstly, the general, or concepts which establish common elements to all aspects of reality, and secondly, the particular, or historical (individual) concepts from which individual features of concrete phenomena may be understood. Concepts are selected by the investigator. "The process of selection, therefore, can be viewed as a process of giving reality the form of concepts." When Weber says that "concepts are primarily means of thought for the intellectual mastery of empirical data", he refers to concepts as forms into which reality is cast so that scientific investigators can achieve their goal, namely, knowledge of empirical reality. 18 Weber views concepts or laws as means rather than ends and as such they maintain a heuristic value:


18 ibid., p.68.
"...clear concepts and the knowledge of (hypothetical) laws are obviously of great value as heuristic means but only as such. Indeed they are quite indispensable for this purpose. But even in this function their limitations become evident at a decisive point. In stating this we arrive at the decisive feature of the method of the cultural sciences... We cannot discover what is meaningful to us by means of presuppositionless investigation of empirical data. Rather perception of its meaningfulness to us is the presupposition of its becoming an object of meaning. Meaningfulness naturally does not correspond to laws as such, and the more general the law the less the coincidence. For the specific meaning which a phenomena has for us is not to be found in those relationships it shares with other phenomena." 19

The Ideal Type Procedure

If concepts are the form in which partial knowledge is achieved, then how are concepts formed? Both Mannheim and Weber rely on the procedure of ideal types in fulfilling this task. The procedure of the ideal type takes the imputation of essential features of some individual character as the object of analysis. The ideal type is very much an extension of Weber's epistemological assumption of partial knowledge. It can in no way be seen as a description, pattern, or mirror theory representation of reality. Rather the ideal type is meant as a heuristic device, in the same manner as concept formation was described above. Given the assumption of reality being composed of an infinite number of elements, Weber argues further that the ideal type only abstracts those elements which are meaningful to the observer. There are two sorts of ideal types: an instance where the essential

19 Weber, 1949, p.76.
meaning is assumed to be the interpretation of some phenomena by the observer, and an instance where the interpretation originates with the observer rather than an interaction of meaning between the phenomena and the observer, as in the first instance. In both these cases the ideal type is an abstraction, a distortion of reality. Weber goes as far as describing it as a "utopia":

This procedure can be indispensable for heuristic as well as expository purposes. The ideal typical concept will help to develop our skill in imputation in research: it is no hypothesis but offers guidance to the construction of hypotheses. It is not a description of reality but it aims to give unambiguous means of expression, to such a description. An ideal type is formed by a one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct. In its conceptual purity, this mental construct cannot be found empirically in reality anywhere. It is a utopia.

The ideal type extracts the important character of some cultural phenomena. It extracts an historically specific element; i.e., there can be a great number of ideal types concerning the same cultural material but there is not one ideal type that represents the totality of a given cultural phenomena. Such a concept belongs to the problem of classification, in that a class concept might embody any number of elements of a cultural phenomena. An ideal type, on the other hand, is solely an abstraction and as such it is not designed to embody anything. "The goal of ideal typical concept construction is always to make clearly explicit not the class or average character, but rather, the unique individual

ibid. p.101, emphasis added.
character of cultural phenomena." 21 This does not suggest, however, that there cannot be ideal typical class concepts. The distinction is better understood in terms of emphasis; i.e., a classification is more concerned with a long range generalist analysis, whereas the ideal type is concerned with more immediate models of cause and effect. The distinction, at this point, is difficult to grasp, but it is clearly derivable from Weber's work, as is partially seen below:

"Class or generic concepts - ideal types - ideal typical generic concepts - in the sense of thought patterns - ideal types of such ideas - ideals which govern human beings - ideal types of ideals - ideals with which the historian approaches certain facts ... This list of possibilities only reveals the infinite ramifications of the conceptual-methodological problems which face us in the sphere of the cultural sciences." 22

Ideal types are the procedure by which concepts are formed. As is seen above there may be a great many kinds of ideal types, corresponding to the unique character of social reality. In a sense, ideal types are directly accountable to empirical reality and as such are a first level methodological tool. 23 The problem is now one of validity. If cultural sciences are fundamentally entrenched in value-relevant subjects of inquiry, how might truth and/or objectivity be claimed. For Weber, claims of

---

22 ibid. p.103
23 See Alfred Schutz, "Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences" in M. Natanson, Philosophy of the Social Sciences.
objectivity are restricted to certain specific value-relevant, subjective presuppositions, or to the cultural position of the knower. In this sense, Weber views truth as a sort of interplay between science and faith; i.e., as long as the issue maintains meaning for someone. This is perhaps made clearer in the following:

"We are now at the end of this discussion, the only purpose of which was to trace the course of the hair-line which separates science from faith and to make explicit the quest for social and economic knowledge. The objectivity of all empirical knowledge rests exclusively on the ordering of the given reality according to categories which are subjective in a specific sense, namely in that they present the presuppositions of our knowledge and are based on the presuppositions of the value of those truths which empirical knowledge alone is able to give us. The means available to our science offer nothing to those persons to whom this truth is of no value. It should be remembered that the belief in the value of scientific truth is the product of certain cultures and is not a product of man's original nature... In the empirical social sciences, as we have seen, the possibility of meaningful knowledge of what is essential in the infinite richness is bound up with the unremitting application of view points of a specifically particularized character which, in the last analysis, are orientated on the basis of evaluative ideas." 24

Overall Epistemological Position

Weber is suggesting that our perception of reality is marked by an interrelated influence of ideas and empirical reality. In short, ideas interact with empirical reality and meaning stems both from objects of investigation and the investigator or

subject. This is implicit in the discussion of the two sorts of ideal types discussed above. At least in part, this epistemology can be seen in an applied form in Weber's classic work, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Here, the advent of protestantism and the development of capitalism may be seen to complement one another. The work is a good representation of a substantive body of theoretical deductions which stem from Weber's epistemological base. The general theme of protestantism and the rise of capitalism is developed by posing a broad question; viz., what is the unique character of western civilization that has given it an advancement separate from that of other world civilizations? The answer is protestantism. Finally, through the procedure of the ideal type, protestantism is further broken down into sects, and themes of rationalism, irrationalism, and traditionalism are developed.

In summary, Weber's pivotal epistemological assumption is that reality contains an infinite number of elements. The human mind is only capable of grasping a limited number of these elements. The task of the social scientist is to abstract with the procedure of ideal types, those elements which are meaningful. Those meaningful elements, abstracted from the infinite number of elements in empirical reality, are chosen on the basis of the presuppositions of the investigator. In other words, the meaningful elements are chosen because they have significance for the investigator, or as Weber suggests, are "value-relevant."

Concepts are formed through the procedure of ideal types. There are two types of concepts, the general and the specific,
or individual. In this sense, concepts would appear to be on the second level of abstraction, whereas the ideal type, as suggested above, is directly concerned with cause and effect relations in empirical reality. Hence, universal concepts may be couched in second level constructs which are, in a sense, extensions of first level ideal types. The question of objectivity is restricted ultimately to the point of view of the investigator. Truth is more or less valid, depending on the ordering of categories, concepts, and ideal types that formulate a point of view. In other words, a statement is true as long as there is scientific consensus that it is true. The following emphasizes the particular nature of knowledge in the Weberian problematic:

"All knowledge of cultural reality is always knowledge from particular points of view. When we require from the historian and social research worker as an elementary presupposition that they distinguish the important from the trivial and that he should have the necessary "point of view" for this distinction, we mean that they must understand how to relate the events of the real world consciously or unconsciously to universal cultural values and to select out those relationships which are meaningful to us. If the notion that those standpoints can be derived from the facts themselves continually recurs, it is due to the naive self-deception of the specialist who is unaware that it is due to the evaluative ideas with which he unconsciously approaches his subject matter, that he has selected from an absolute infinity a tiny portion with the study of which he concerns himself."

"... In the method of investigation, the guiding point of view is of great importance for the construction of the conceptual scheme which will be used in the investigation... For scientific truth is precisely what is valid for all those who seek the truth."

25 See Schutz's article cited above.

26 Weber, 1949, p.43.
The salient propositions which formulate the Weberian epistemology, and the resulting implications for theory and method, have been reviewed. This has been offered as a basis in which the Mannheimian problematic might be firmly rooted. The initial thesis upon which the presentation of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge problematic is to be constructed is that the epistemological base and much of the theoretical and methodological implications are "Weberian", in the sense that Hamilton argues above. Now that a brief discussion of the Weberian epistemology is completed, we are in a position to extend our argument to the Mannheim sociology of knowledge problematic.

III. Mannheim's Sociology of Knowledge Problematic

Epistemological Assumptions

At the level of epistemological assumptions, Mannheim takes a path that has already been established by Weber. This is seen once the major problem of "relationalism" is formulated by Mannheim. This problem is at the center of the Mannheimian problematic. Around it evolves various theoretical, and methodological propositions as well as suggestions for applied research. The view of knowledge upon which rests the problem of relationalism is that knowledge is partial. This general assumption is the pivotal point of the Weberian problematic as we have seen. Mannheim argues that knowledge is formulated within the context of a historically specific perspective which by definition is only a partial analysis of social reality, assuming competing perspectives.
In other words, if claims to truth are restricted within particular perspectives as they arise from a social milieu, then how can any universal claims be mounted? Or, if there are a variety of universal claims to truth, which are in conflict, how can we know which perspective is correct, if any? Mannheim's epistemological assumption of relationalism is as follows:

"Once we recognize that all historical knowledge is 'relational knowledge' and can only be formulated with reference to the position of the observer, we are faced, once more, with the task of discriminating between what is true and what is false in such knowledge. The question then arises: which social standpoint vis-a-vis history offers the best chance for reaching an optimum of truth? In any case, at this stage the vain hope of discovering truth in a form which is independent of an historically and socially determined set of meanings will have to be given up. The problem has been by no means solved when we have arrived at this conclusion, but we are, at least, in a better position to state the actual problem."

Implications for the Theory of the Sociology of Knowledge

The basic epistemology evident in Mannheim's concept of relational knowledge informs his theory of the sociology of knowledge. Mannheim's discussion of the sociology of knowledge takes place more at a methodological level than at a substantive level of theoretical hypothesis. In other words, in this instance, theory, as a concept, belongs more to the level of epistemology. Yet, at certain points it is also substantive; insofar as it is ultimately related to aspects of the "interactions of people."

27 Mannheim, 1936, p. 75.
The central thesis of Mannheim's theory of the sociology of knowledge is the 'social determination of knowledge'. According to Mannheim the sociology of knowledge is bound-up in the analysis of the relationships between knowledge and existence. The theoretical propositions which support this thesis include:

(1) knowledge as social production, the social milieu as it exists in the context of class and power, (2) perspectives arise from social milieu, (3) the penetration of the social process into the perspective of thought, (4) predetermined thought models, and (5) the levels of abstraction on which problems are formulated.

We may now proceed to elaborate these propositions.

The first argument which supports the 'social determination of knowledge' thesis is that knowledge is to be considered as a social production in that it arises from a social milieu. Social milieu is to be understood in the context of class and power as they have historically come to be. Secondly, perspectives are seen to arise within particular social milieu. Perspective is defined in the following:

"Perspective signifies the manner in which one views an object, what one perceives in it, and how one construes it in his thinking. Perspective, is therefore, something more than a merely formal determination of thinking. It refers also to qualitative elements in the structure of thought, elements which must be necessarily overlooked by a purely formal logic. It is precisely these factors which are responsible for the fact that two persons, even if they apply the same formal logical rules... in an identical manner, may judge the same object differently." 28

28 ibid. p.28.
The penetration of the social process into the perspective of thought, a third theoretical proposition, holds that assertions within a perspective of thought are seen to be intimately related to the social milieu, to the extent that the form and content are shaped by the social milieu. This may be evidenced by the fact that the same word or concept may take on entirely different meanings in different social settings. The fourth proposition which helps shed light on the penetration of the social process into the perspective of thought is the "so-called thought model; i.e., the model that is implicitly in the mind of a person when reflection on an object occurs." 29 For example, naturalism (in the sense of a positivist paradigm) has set for itself a structured thought model before it addresses an object. This thought model is not held by all social groups and as such, is an indication of a particular group. Behind questions of objects or indeed, statements about objects, lies "implicitly or explicitly a model of how fruitful thinking can be carried out." 30 The thought model does not exist independently of social groups. On the contrary, thought models are tied into the social situations of given groups and their world views. In the following, Mannheim defines what is meant by the social group, in a manner that separates his usage from what he calls a dogmatic Marxist usage:

29 ibid. p.275.
30 ibid. p.278.
"By these groups we mean not only classes as a
dogmatic Marxist would have it, but also generations,
status groups, sects, occupational groups, schools,
etc. Unless the problem of the relation between
the superstructure and substructure is refined, it
would be impossible to demonstrate that correspond-
ing to the wealth of types of knowledge and perspec-
tives which have appeared in the course of history
there are similar differentiations in the substructure
of society. Of course we do not intend to deny that
of all the above mentioned groupings and units, class
stratification is the most significant, since in the
final analysis of all the other social groups arise
from and are transformed as parts of the more basic
conditions of production and domination. None the
less the investigator who in the face of the variety
of types of thought, attempts to place them correctly
can no longer be content with the undifferentiated
class concept, but must reckon with the existing
social units and factors that condition social position,
aside from those of class."

31

The final proposition which supports the "social deter-
mination of knowledge" thesis is the "level of abstraction".

This has to do with a perspective's inability to go beyond a
particular level of abstraction in order to progress with theo-
etical formulation. In other words, it is within the interests
of a perspective to formulate abstractions only to the point where
they are compatible with the social-milieu within which they exist.
It is not an accident when a given theory fails to go beyond a
stage of abstraction and at the same time refuses to become more
concrete. Rather, the levels of abstraction on which inquiry is
carried out signify the limitations a perspective holds given its
relation to a social milieu.

These then, are the salient theoretical propositions which
support the 'social determination of knowledge' thesis. This

31 ibid. p.276.
thesis is at the center of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge problematic. Thus, in summary, one might say, as Remmling has suggested, the sociology of knowledge is to be understood as a problematic which has "social reality at its vital center and which conceives of all manifestations of life as dependent upon the social-economic orders and their transformations." 32 Each of the five theoretical propositions, the view of knowledge as a social production, its perspectivist nature, the penetration of the social process into the perspective of thought, thought models, and levels of abstraction, all support the central thesis. The theoretical propositions which support the 'social determination of knowledge' thesis arise from the more general, and fundamental epistemology of partial knowledge that is implicit in the problem of relationalism. By this it is meant that perspectives, as suggested above, arise from and serve a social milieu. The social milieu penetrates the perspective of thought to the extent that it is restricted to the confines of the social milieu from which it has emerged. Hence, the problem of relationalism; i.e., how overall claims of validity can be made when conflicting perspectives emerge from conflicting social milieus? In short, each proposition is related to its social milieu and is true insofar as the social milieu acknowledges it to be so. However, when social milieus come into conflict, as is the case in the contemporary world, the problem of relationalism is the problem of knowing how knowledge may be claimed as valid given a lack of consensus.

Implications for Methodology

The theory of the sociology of knowledge sets a problem requiring a methodology that will allow it to continue with theoretical formulations. The problem of relationalism needs a methodology before it can make any claims of objective truth. The methodology is detachment. Mannheim suggests three possible ways that the "norms and principles" of this methodological position might be achieved:

"(a) a member of a group leaves his social position (by ascending to a higher class, emigration, etc.), (b) the basis of a whole group shifts in relation to its traditional norms, (c) within the same society two or more socially determined modes of interpretation come into conflict and in criticizing one another render one another transparent and establish perspectives with reference to one another. As a result, a detached perspective, through which the outlines of the contrasting modes of thought are discovered, comes within the range of possibility for all the different positions and later gets to the recognized mode of thinking." 33

Mannheim describes these first two possibilities by way of example. If a peasant boy were to leave the country and enter an urban environment he would be confronted with a new way of perceiving the world. Given sufficient time he would perceive this new world view as normal. If at this point he were to return to the country the views he once shared with the people in the country would be perceived as partially true. He no longer would accept the views in the country absolutely, as he once did. Rather, they would be accepted within the limits of that particular

33 Mannheim, 1936, p. 282, emphasis added.
milieu. At this point, he reaches detachment. Similarly, if an entire group of country people were transferred to an urban environment, detachment would ensue.

The "detached intellectual" is what Mannheim is referring to in the above third example. Mannheim considers the intellectual to be better equipped because of his educational training, to deal with the methodology of detachment on this level. A second factor which allows the intellectual a better position to utilize this methodology is that intellectuals, as a group, do not represent one particular class:

"Mannheim's point about the intelligensia was that they are not a class; i.e., they cannot form a separate party, they have no common interest, and finally, they are incapable of common concerted action. They are, in fact, ideologues of this or that class but never speak for themselves." 34

Both the training and déclassé position of the intellectual gives him the most potential to be able, in a sense, to step back and examine conflicting modes of interpretation. Hence, the intellectual becomes detached by placing conflicting perspectives in juxtaposition, thereby showing the criticisms each has of the other, and eventually establishing a perspective with reference to all those discussed. This does not suggest that the intellectual does not embrace a particular perspective before setting out to accomplish a task. Rather, in so doing, the ontological claims (in the sense of ultimate truths) are particularized to the confines of the intellectual's perspective. Those claims as well as the ontological claims of competing perspectives are in a sense neutralized to the

34 Zeitlin, 1969, p.286.
point where all ontological claims are confined within the context of their own perspective. The point is not to establish a "non-perspectivist picture", but rather, to reach a new level of objectivity. As Mannheim suggests:

"...in certain areas of historical, social knowledge, it should be regarded as right and inevitable that a given finding should contain the traces of the knower. The problem lies not in hiding these perspectives, or in apologizing for them, but in inquiring into the question of how, granted these perspectives, knowledge and objectivity are still possible. It is not a source of error that in the visible picture of an object in space we can, in the nature of the case, get only a perspectivist view. The problem is not how we might arrive at a non-perspectivist picture but how by juxtaposing the various points of view each perspective may be recognized as such and thereby a new level of objectivity attained." 35

Given the general principles of the methodology of detachment, as outlined above; the question now becomes, what procedures or forms of investigation does the methodology require? Mannheim's methodology can be further understood as requiring five procedures: interpretation of the world view, imputation, ideal types, relationalism, and particularization. In the first phase, the methodology poses three ways of interpreting or understanding a world view. The objective meaning in the world view is thought of as immediate. "In science the objective meaning is a theoretical proposition; in the visual arts, a visual content; in music, melody, rhythm, harmony, and the like." 36 Secondly, the expressive meaning can only be understood by transcending the objective content in the direction of the actor. In this sense, the expressive

35 Mannheim, 1936, p.297, emphasis added.

meaning must be understood existentially, in the sense of the author's intention. Whereas the objective and expressive meaning are conscious creations of the actor, documentary meaning is the "essential character" of the subject and, as such, the actor is not directly aware of it. The documentary, expressive and objective meanings are obtained by constructing ideal types. The scattered pieces of information are brought together through imputation. Imputation involves a clear perception of the perspective from which the information emerges. Imputation then deals with the problems of interpretation. This is carried out in the following manner:

"It reconstructs integral styles of thought and perspectives, tracing single expressions and records of thought which appear to be related back to a central weltanschauung, which is implicit in the discrete segments of a system of thought." 37

Two final forms of this methodology are relationalism and particularization. We have already described the problem of relationalism, and the perspectivistic knowledge that emerges from it. As a methodological procedure, it attempts, on the initial level, to relate the perspective to its social milieu. At this level, relationalism does not pose questions of validity as relativism might. Instead, it simply depicts or relates the perspective to its external environment. Mannheim makes the following distinction between relationalism and relativism:

37 Mannheim, 1936, p.397.
"Relativism is a product of the modern historical-sociological procedure which is based on the recognition that all historical thinking is bound up with the concrete position in life of the thinker. But relativism combines this historical-sociological insight with an older theory of knowledge, which was as yet unaware of the interplay between conditions of existence and modes of thought...this older type of thought has necessarily led to the rejection of all those forms of knowledge which were dependent upon the subjective standpoint and social position of the knower. A modern theory of knowledge which takes into account the relational as distinct from the merely relative character of all historical knowledge must start with the assumption that there are spheres of thought in which it is impossible to conceive of absolute truth existing independently of the values and position of the subject and unrelated to the social context." 38

Relationalism becomes more "particularized" when, in the construction of ideal types, it forces claims of validity from what are initially absolute to partial; i.e., a perspective's claim to validity is so within the confines of that perspective. In other words, particularization examines the scope and validity of a perspective. Relationalism, as a procedure, simply "relates" the perspective to a social milieu.

"By particularizing, the sociology of knowledge goes a step further than the original determination of the facts to which mere relationalism limits itself...it reaches a point where it also becomes a critique by redefining the scope and limits of the perspective implicit in given assertions...the function of the findings of the sociology of knowledge lies somewhere in a fashion hitherto not understood, between irrelevance to the establishment of truth on the one hand, and entire adequacy, on the other..." 39

---

38 ibid. p.18.
39 ibid. p.275.
These are the general forms by which the methodology of detachment may be carried out. The methodology, theory, and procedures are interlocked in that they emerge as responses to the general problem of relationism. Each element of the problematic — methodology, procedure, and theory — are also interlocked, in the sense that they have emerged from the same epistemological assumption of partial knowledge or "perspectivism." In Mannheim's words:

"there are differing modes of interpretation that have stemmed from groups of men and women that act with and against one another. These persons bound together in groups, strive in accordance with the character and position of the groups to which they belong to change the surrounding world of nature and society or attempt to maintain it in a given condition." 40

There is a very consistent theme in Mannheim's problematic that is easily traced to Weber's problematic. Actually, the neo-Kantian assumption of partial knowledge, and the general historicist tradition or paradigm, including members such as, Dilthey, Troeltsch and others, couches much of Mannheim's thought. Whereas Weber let stand the notion of "value-relevance", Mannheim formulated the problem of relational knowledge. In this sense, Mannheim began with a Weberian base, and pushed it to its logical limits. From this basis he developed further the general historicist concept of the world view. The documentary and expressive meanings may be traced to the existential and phenomenological trends current in both Mannheim and Weber's day. Jaspers, the existential philosopher, had an impact on Weber, and Husserl's

40 ibid. p.121.
phenomenological thought directly influenced Mannheim's documentary procedure. 41

Implications for the Empirical Level

Now that the influences on Mannheim's work are depicted and the analytical descriptions of his theory and methodology are posed, the next step is to apply the problematic to the analysis of empirical data. The data which has been selected is the radio-drama script "The Way Through the Wood". 42 Before a précis of this script is offered, so that the reader might better follow the analysis, a brief description of the operationalization of the problematic is necessary in order to show the flow from the theoretical and methodological level to the empirical. Firstly, in accordance with the central theoretical thesis, "knowledge is socially determined", the script is to be viewed as knowledge which stems from and serves a social milieu, which exists in the overall historical context of class and power. The problem, then, is to interpret the world view of the script as it exists in the overall historical context and in itself. This distinction is made above in the discussion concerning the three meanings of the world view; documentary, expressive, and content. The script must be viewed in its particularity, in the sense of its content. On the other hand, it must be related to the overall


42 Alan King, "The Way Through the Wood", unpublished radio-drama script from The Radio Drama Archives, at Concordia University, Montreal, Quebec.
historical context. In addressing this problem, the documentary procedure gathers facts around the script, such as a description of the overall world view of the epoch, the particular social milieu in which it was produced, and any other information which is useful for both the particular and broader contexts of the script. The expressive meaning, as mentioned above, has to do specifically with the author's intention. As the author of this script is not available to tell us what his intended meaning is, we are left with the documentary and content meanings. Moreover, as a complete documentation of the overall historical context requires a re-writing of the social history of the era, itself constituting a separate work, our analysis emphasizes the meaning of the content.

Of course, deriving the content from the script on its own tells us very little. Hence, the content must be related to the overall world view of the epoch in order to explain its significance. Therefore, a general description of the epoch is to be offered. This is very much in accord with Mannheim's methodological procedures of relationalism and particularization. In this sense, the content is the particular. It is to be related to the broader social milieu. The technique of content analysis is to be employed using the procedures of ideal type and imputation. Before the internal analysis is launched, however, a précis of the script is offered, following which a brief description of the epoch is given.
"The Way Through the Wood", a C.B.C. radio-drama production was aired on December 9th between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m., eastern standard time, 1951. This particular production is one of a series the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation was airing at the time, entitled "Stage 52". The author of this script was Alan King, no relation as far as we know to the Alan King of films, such as "Who Has Seen the Wind", etc. Music was conducted by Samuel Hersenhoren, and composed by Lucio Agostini, producer, Peter McDonald. The broadcast was carried out in Toronto and aired to the Trans-Canada network.

The two main characters in the script are Roy, an advertising executive, and Jean, his wife. Other characters include: the girls in the flower shop at the beginning of the script; Harry, a minister and Jean's uncle; Roy's business associates, Ballard and Peter; the Chasiks, an immigrant couple; and Ruth, a secretary.

In the opening scene, Roy reveals attitudes about women, and the girls who work in the flower shop reveal resentment to Roy's attitudes. The scene shifts to Roy's home where Roy's wife tells him that she is going to have a baby. Roy is overjoyed as they have been trying to have a child for eight years. Jean, on the other hand, is sceptical about the whole thing. The scene then shifts to Jean's mother's house where Jean expresses her doubts concerning having a child. She expresses resentment over Roy's attitudes about children and the world in general. Her mother, while comforting, is careful to point out the realities of single
parenthood. At the same time that Jean is visiting her mother in the country, Roy is discussing a possible ad campaign to sell 'domestic fuels', a product his firm is pushing. In his conversation with the 'boys' at the office, he reveals to them that he is about to have a child, with his wife of course.

Sometime later, Jean poses questions to her uncle Harry, the minister, about her doubts. Harry assures her that even though the world may be changing very rapidly, one thing always remains the same, viz., "God". Meanwhile, Roy is off to a stag dinner for one of the employees at the advertising firm. The men become drunk and sing songs about their mothers. Peter, a commercial artist, refuses to sing about his mother. The others, led by Roy and Ballard, stop Peter from continuing his criticisms of his mother, as they find it offensive.

The next scene with Roy and Jean opens with Roy trying to get a "women's view" on the advertising campaign. Jean is very resentful. The conversation quickly turns into an argument concerning the unborn child. In the argument, Jean shows complete distrust for Roy's job, opinions, and plans for their child. She becomes hysterical and eventually collapses, while Roy drifts through the whole affair somewhat bewildered. The doctor tells Roy that she needs rest and understanding. Jean leaves for another rest at her mother's house in the country. There she meets the Chasiks, and has a conversation about the importance of tradition.

After concluding her visit in the country, Jean sees the doctor again and returns home. Roy is talking about a boxing match he has just heard on the radio. Again, the conversation quickly
develops into an argument. Before the argument develops into hysteria, Jean tells Roy she is leaving him. Roy is completely baffled. The reasons, she states, for leaving him are mainly centered around the child. The fight is long and drawn out. In the end Roy breaks down into tears and begs Jean not to leave him. The scene closes with Jean walking out the door and getting into a taxi. John's uncle Harry, sometime later, finds Jean and tries to offer her comfort and convince her that she is wrong to leave Roy. However, Jean is not convinced.

Some weeks later, the scene opens in Roy's office. The time is the day before Christmas. Office workers are preparing for an office party. Ruth tries to convince Roy, who is depressed and lonely, that he should join the party. After some coaching, Roy agrees. Roy then has a few drinks and begins to relax. The conversation between Ruth and Roy leads to a dinner date and the two leave the party. In the restaurant, Roy talks about his views of men and women while Ruth listens attentively. It becomes clear that a romance is developing between Roy and Ruth. The play ends with a sentimental music theme that gradually fades into a single violin playing Jean's melancholy theme in a very lonely fashion.

World View of Historical Epoch

Shifting to the historical context; i.e., the external context of the play, the reader is asked to recall the epoch of the late forties and early fifties, the end of the Second World War, the beginnings of the Korean War, a time of modern-
ization and rapid industrial growth. 1951 was the year that the United Nations opened; it was the time of McCarthyism, anti-communism, and at the same time, the early seeds of the 1960's civil rights movement were beginning to form. 43 A new middle class was emerging, one with a new set of values, norms, aspirations, and peculiarities. This new urban middle class followed from the demise of the old rural middle class. With the death of the rural commodity producer and wide spread decentralized economic structure, came the end of an ideology, the end of 'rugged individualism' which characterized the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 44 In Europe, devastated by war, existential philosophy along with its sense of despair was enjoying a revival with the works of Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, and others. Yet, at the same time, perhaps more in North America, there was a sense of world unity, of a positive future, "if not for you, then for your children".

The early nineteen fifties was a time when careers were being sprung, fortunes were being made, a time when ways of seeing the world were changing and being firmly established at the same time. Few have understood the mentality, or the world view of this

43 For a reference bibliography on this historical period the reader is referred to the Canadian Index to Periodicals and Documentary Films 1948-1959.

44 See C. Wright Mills, White Collar (New York: Oxford Press, 1951) pp.3-54. Other books in sociology which describe this epoch include, David Riesman et al, The Lonely Crowd (Clinton: The Colonial Press, Copyright 1950) and just a few years later William H. Whyte's The Organization Man (New York: Double Day, Copyright 1956).
new middle class as well as C. Wright Mills, nor expressed it as eloquently. Ironically, his book, *White Collar*, a contemporary classic, was published in the same year as the script described above. Opening any page of Mills' book one finds insights which not only represent a cutting analytic assessment of the "white collar" worker, but provide an almost prophetic vision of the plight of the middle class of the epoch, as the following excerpts reveal:

"The white-collar people slipped quietly into modern society... it is to this white-collar world that one must look for much that is characteristic of twentieth century existence. By their rise to numerical importance, the white-collar people have upset the nineteenth century expectation that society would be divided between entrepreneurs and wage workers... They carry, in a most revealing way, many of those psychological themes that characterize our epoch, and, in one way or another, every general theory of the main drift has had to take account of them. For above all else, they are a new cast of actors, performing major routines of the twentieth century society." 45

As Mills explains it, the modern corporation, the new economic order, is behind the new world view. The middle class is not a homogenous class. It is stratified. At the top are corporate executives, at the bottom are 'five and dime sales girls'. Perhaps Mills' most compelling description of this epoch is in his comparison of modern society to "The Great Salesroom". In this analogy, Mills elaborates the notion that along with the advent of the modern corporation has come a new sales pitch; one that involves the entire population. Mills suggests that as we are salesmen in the market place, we are salesmen in all aspects of life.

45 Mills, 1951. p.IX.
Mills describes the world view of the epoch in the following excerpt from his chapter on "The Great Salesroom":

"The salesman's world has become everybody's world, and, in some part, everybody has become a salesman. The enlarged market has become at once more impersonal and more intimate. What is there that does not pass through the market? Science and love, virtue and conscience, friendliness carefully nurtured skills and animosities? This is a time of venality. The market now reaches into every institution and every relation. The bargaining manner, the huckstering animus, the memorized theology of pop, the commercialized evaluation of personal traits - they are all around us; in public and in private there is the tang and feel of salesmanship."

"... In the salesrooms, which sometimes seem to coincide with the new society as a whole, are the stationary sales girls in the department stores, the mobile salesmen of insurance, the absentee salesmen-ad-men helping others sell from a distance..."

Mills continues:

"In the enormous file of the office, in all the calculating rooms, accountants and purchasing agents replace the man who did his own figuring. And in the lower reaches of the white-collar world, office operatives grind along, loading and emptying the filing system; there are private secretaries and typists, entry clerks, billing clerks, corresponding clerks - a thousand kinds of clerks; the operators of light machinery, comptometers, dictaphones, addressographs; and the receptionists to let you in or keep you out." 46

Mills' description of the historical epoch in North America in the late 1940's and early 1950's serves as a useful depiction of the overall location in which the radio-drama script is located. Obviously, this depiction is somewhat cursory, nonetheless it is a useful reference point that helps explicate the level of the overall world view, a reference point to which the particular aspect

46 ibid. p.161 and p.X.
of the content of the world view in the script may later be related. Firstly, however, it is necessary to draw out the meaning of the content of the world view in the particular script. This is to be done with the employment of the technique of content analysis.

Technique of Analysis-

Content analysis was initially defined by the communications researcher Bernard Berelson as an "objective" and "quantitative" analysis of a given body of content. Since then, others have expanded the usage of content analysis to include both quantitative and qualitative analyses. 47 The technique is to organize content into categories which are for purposes here, thought of as ideal types. Categories are abstractions of bodies of content. This procedure follows much the same line of logic as that of Weber's ideal type procedure discussed above. Once the categories, or

concepts are formulated, the frequency of their occurrence is counted. The script is read through and the content is coded according to the categories. Objectivity is claimed by referring to the findings of other researchers and seeing if their results are the same. In this case, two major categories coincided with three other analyses of the script. This is a limited claim to objectivity and requires much more work. However, given that we are dealing here with a kind of pilot project; that is, a content analysis of a single script in order to help illustrate the Mannheimian problematic, it does serve a useful purpose.

An example of a content analysis involving radio scripts was carried out on a large scale by Rudolf Arnheim. In an analysis of daytime soaps on the American Media in 1944, forty-eight different locales and programs were sampled. One of the questions raised was to find out the social occupation of the characters in the radio plays. An example of the categories created and the quantitative units designed is seen below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Status</th>
<th>Number of Settings</th>
<th>Per Cent of all Settings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Society People</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Officials</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big Business</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

48 See Howard Fink et al., "Literary and Sociological Approaches to The Analysis of C.B.C. English-Language Radio Drama", unpublished Working Paper, from the Radio Drama Project, Concordia University, Montreal, Quebec. In this paper two other techniques uncover the same categories, or ideal types. The ideal types were the corporate man and the existential humanist.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Status</th>
<th>Number of Settings</th>
<th>Per Cent of all Settings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Housewives</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Business</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage Earners</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destitute People</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above table is a result of conceptualizing categories of occupational status and uncovering the frequency of their occurrence by counting the number of times the categories appear in various settings, and showing the percentages of all settings. Once the data is organized in this fashion, it may be described or substantial theoretical hypotheses may be raised in order to explain the occurrence of the categories which have been uncovered. Arnheim, for example, explains the high number of housewives portrayed as a function of the high number of people in the audience who are housewives. Theoretical explanations of the data are couched in either explicit or implicit world views. That is a factor often ignored by the communication type content analysis. Arnheim, for example, offers no explanation of his theoretical position, yet claims a correspondence of facts and therefore a validity to his propositions. Such an analysis is weak. What is called for is the complete application of an explicitly elaborated problematic. Without an explanation of the general as well as the

49 Arnheim, 1975, p.394.

50 Critical arguments concerning the technique of content analysis especially from a more structuralist point of view, include Lucien Goldmann, Towards a Sociology of the Novel (Great Britain: Cambridge University Press, Copyright 1965), see the chapter on "The Genetic Structuralist Method", and George Lewis "The Sociology of Popular Culture" in Current Sociology 26:3, pp.1-64.
concrete levels of abstraction, the world view of the problematic is hidden and as such, the full implications of the analysis of the data are hidden as well. In a sense, the approach here to content analysis is opposite to that of Arnheim. The epistemological, theoretical and methodological levels have already been made explicit. This has been done in a deductive fashion, by beginning with the most general, and becoming increasingly more specific. It now becomes important to show the concrete level of the problematic by instituting a form of inductive content analysis.

Content Analysis of "The Way Through the Wood"

The interest in the content surrounds the concept of world view. After reading the script, it is clear there are two different perspectives representing two different world views. Male/Female world views are developed throughout the script. This is the dominant dichotomy in the script. These world views are often represented as stereotypical. This is suggested as the most specific objective content. In developing categories, for the analysis of these world views, the principle goal of analysis is to draw out the range of types of world views that exist in the objective content of the script itself. In this respect, a brief review of the characters portrayed in the script reveals two major world views: (1) the corporate man world view, as is represented by one of the two main characters, Roy, and (2) the existential humanist, as is portrayed by Jean. Each of the other characters portrayed in the script support or reject one of these world views.
In examining the dichotomy of male/female roles which are thought of as being housed in these two major world views, it is found that there were no negative world views emerging from the male characters with the possible exception of Peter's hatred of his mother. By negative, here it is meant a complete rejection of mainstream values. There were at least eight instances which showed a positive support of mainstream values by male characters. The females showed two instances of positive support of mainstream values and six instances of negative support. These quantitative units roughly correspond to aspects of the various characters described in the script. Much of the negative category is accounted for in Jean and the two flower girls, whereas the positive category for women is accounted for in Ruth, Roy's new girlfriend/secretary. The positive male categories represent Roy and his supporting male characters.

There are eight instances of nationalism, three instances of anti-communism, one instance of anti-semitism, and eight instances of anti-mainstream values. The instances of nationalism almost exclusively originate with Roy and his supporting characters, as do the instances of anti-communism, and anti-semitism. The instances of anti-mainstream values all originate in Jean's character, and/or her supporting characters.

The corporate world view is expounded in Roy's character as an advertising executive. Beliefs in a "Canadian way of life", motherhood, a culture which protects the individuals from "the evils of communism", the "firm", are expressed through Roy's
position and activity in the play. Ballard, an associate in the
play, supports Roy's ideas about Canadianism and the family. Harry,
a minister and an uncle of Roy's wife, supports the corporate
world view by an idealist argument suggesting that regardless of
change, faith and the fact of God remain the same. This argument
is used as a justification for forming a family and rearing children,
etc. Other characteristics help support this world view.

Jean, the existential humanist, on the other hand,
constantly confronts questions of the purpose and value of existence.
The issues raised by Roy and his supporting characters are questioned
and ultimately rejected by Jean. Her world view is only subtly
reinforced, and by a fewer number of characters than that of Roy.
The two flower girls show resentment and bitterness in reacting to
Roy's depiction of women; Peter, the commercial artist reveals his
disbelief in Roy's "Canadianism" by suggesting a hatred for his
own mother; and Paul, the immigrant furniture maker, supports Jean's
search for an alternative to the corporate way of life. Jean
doubts and reacts against the corporate world views of Roy and his
supporting characters, a position which eventually leads her out
of the family. Without a "Canadian" way of life, beliefs in mother-
hood, the role of women, God, and the family, Jean is left with no
reinforcing value system, simply existential crisis.

The character/theme dichotomy between the two main types
fits Mannheim's more general distinction between ideology and utopia. 51

51 Mannheim, 1936, pp.192-263.
The former holds that the world view is designed to maintain ongoing relations. The latter is designed as either a conservative search for older values and comforts or a liberal individualism which seeks a new order. In slightly more psychological terms, Jean's world view may be thought of as "inner directed", and Roy's world view may be thought of as "other directed". The former relies on insights and feelings seemingly with little consideration for those around her. The latter relies on opinions and beliefs of those around him, with little inner searching.

Relating the particular content of the world view in this script to the more general level of the epochal world view is now possible. As stated earlier, a content analysis of this nature only represents a partial interpretation of the world view of the cultural product. The content meaning is one of three sorts of meanings the product embraces, the other two being the expressive and the documentary. To this point, neither the direct nor the implicit intention of the author, nor the penetration of the social process into the perspective of thought, have been taken into account. Thus, the relation of the particular to the general, at this point, is a partial relation.

In a very general sort of way it is possible to begin to suggest certain sorts of facts which show a relationship between social milieu and the world view of the script. On the most

---

general level both the characters and themes around them are related to Mills' description of the "great salesroom". This is a suburban couple about to have children. The man works for an ad firm. Women at this time were being forced off the labour market in order to make room for the men. There was a tension between the sexes. The world wide existential movement and its sense of despair is reflected in Jean's "inner directed" actions. The instances of anti-establishment and negative world views are also images from that movement, whereas Roy's "other directed" character, the instances of anti-communism, anti-semitism, and positive world views are reflections of the modern salesman. The content contains images of the social reality of the time. Thus, the particular is related to the whole. However, this is only a partial relation, a heuristic one, nonetheless. The analysis which has not been attempted here is the full usage of the documentary procedure. Both a complete historical description on the level of the general and a more detailed examination of the specific group, its position in the broader system of stratification, and other inputs into its make-up, would constitute a second step in the analysis of the cultural product under discussion.

Summary

For Mannheim, the emphasis of the problematic is placed mainly on the context in which the product was produced. This proposition is deduced from the more general historicist thesis

53 For a Canadian emphasis on this issue, see Seely et al., Crestwood Heights (London: Constable and Company, 1956) and Fink et al., 1980.
of the social determination of knowledge. As we have seen, knowledge is a social production, rooted in a social milieu that exists in the context of class and power as they have historically come to be. In order to understand knowledge, in this case a cultural product, it is necessary to trace the external forces which have produced it. This argument suggests that an emphasis be placed on investigating the context from which the product has emerged. In pursuing this end, the first step was to address the product itself. Mannheim's methodological propositions concerning the make-up of the world view included its content. Thus, the starting point for our partial analysis of the cultural product "The Way Through the Wood", was a depiction of its content. The task of the illustrative application of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge problematic was to organize the meaning of the world view in the content of the script by relating its particular form to the overall historical world view of the epoch. This was done with the usage of the relational, particularization, ideal type, and imputation procedures. The technique employed to depict the content was content analysis.

The three levels of the Mannheimian problematic have now been reviewed. The discussion began with a general explanation of Mannheim's historicist roots. Marx and Weber's influences were depicted revealing Weber as the primary influence. The epistemological assumptions, and theoretical and methodological implications of Weber's problematic were then outlined in a fashion that complemented Mannheim's problematic. Mannheim's epistemological
base was revealed in his concept of relational knowledge. The assumption of partial knowledge showed Mannheim's Weberian heritage. Knowledge as a social production, knowledge reflects a social milieu, the penetration of the social process into the perspective of thought, the levels of abstractions that are attainable, and thought models were the main theoretical propositions of the problematic. Mannheim's methodology was described as detachment. The five procedures of the methodology included; particularization, relationalism, ideal types, imputation, and the interpretation of the documentary, expressive and content meanings of the world view.

Now that the Mannheim problematic has been presented showing the full range of its three levels of abstraction, we may move to our next task, the presentation of Goldmann's problematic.
CHAPTER IV

The Genetic Structuralist Problematic of

Lucien Goldmann Via Georg Lukacs

The first section of this chapter argues that the genetic structuralist problematic is a synthesis of the historicist and structuralist paradigms. This argument is based on the linking of the younger 'dialectical' Goldmann to the older 'genetic structuralist' Goldmann, via the epistemological consequence of the concept of practice. The concept of practice and the general interpretation of Marx which Goldmann adopts is that of Georg Lukacs'. Hence, given the dominant influence of Lukacs, in the development of the genetic structuralist problematic, it is argued that a review of Lukacs' epistemology is necessary to an understanding of the three levels which comprise the genetic structuralist problematic; viz., the epistemological, theoretical and methodological, and empirical levels. A second feature of Lukacs' epistemology discussed is its opposition to the Mannheimian/Weberian problem of partial knowledge. This is drawn out through a critique of Mannheim's method of the detached intellectual based on Lukacs' concept of practice. In the last part of the chapter the three levels of the genetic structuralist problematic are presented and some conclusions are drawn.

As background to Lukacs' work, the Hegelian dialectic is
reviewed as an attempt at resolving the Kantian problem of knowledge. This reveals the origins of the Marxian concept of totality. From this review it becomes possible to articulate Lukacs' rejection of the Hegelian dialectic and his interpretation of Marx, especially the concept of practice. It is noted that Lukacs' rejection of the Hegelian dialectic is based on the argument that Hegel failed to resolve the subject/object dichotomy of the Kantian problem of knowledge. This failure, argues Lukacs, is due to Hegel's adherence to an idealist philosophy. Marx, a materialist, solves this problem in arguing that the task of philosophy is to change the world through the marriage of theory with the political practice of the proletariat. In short, the criteria for knowledge (how can we know what we know?) is returned to the position of the actor. Lukacs' interpretation of Marx is explained and the concept of practice is revealed as the seminal concept in which the epistemological problems are rooted. The process of practice is then explained in the context of reification.

Once the epistemological basis for Lukacs is distinguished from Mannheim and some implications of these differences are extended to the other levels of the Mannheimian problematic, the way becomes clear for the elaboration of the Goldmann genetic structuralist problematic. The epistemological foundations are clarified, theoretical propositions are deduced, and the implications for method are outlined. Finally, an illustration of the problematic is offered in a structural analysis of the selected radio-drama using the theoretical and methodological guidelines developed in the previous section.
I An Historicism/Structuralist Synthesis

Lucien Goldmann was born in Bucharest in 1913. There he went to university studying law, and in Vienna he studied philosophy for a year. Later, in 1934, he went to France where he received degrees in law, political science, and literature. He then worked for two years with Jean Piaget in Geneva. He received his doctorate from the Sorbonne in 1956. In 1961 he became Director of the Centre de Recherches de Sociologie de la Littérature at the Sociological Institute of the Free University in Brussels. His works range from studies in Kantian epistemology to the development of an overall problematic for the analysis of cultural creations. It is this latter aspect of his work that is to be addressed. Goldmann's work in the sociology of culture, produced in the 50's and 60's, represents a critical approach which diverged from most traditional approaches, particularly in the sociology of literature, already applied in the area. His death came prematurely in 1970.  

Goldmann's major studies were designed to show the relationship between cultural creations and the social and ideological structures of the society in which they exist. This was done in front of a backdrop which consisted largely of a synthesis of the historicist position of Lukács and the structuralist influence of Piaget. Goldmann begins with an historicist argument which is close

---


2 Stamaris, 1977, p.143.
to that of Mannheim. Knowledge of human reality, for Goldmann, is achieved with the unification of history and sociology. In short, "every social fact is a historical fact and vice versa."

The understanding, then, of the historical fact is to be achieved, much in the way Mannheim has argued (taking from Troeltch), by tracing the historical location, and in so doing seeking a sociological explanation. "Sociology cannot be concrete unless it is historical, just as history, if it wishes to go beyond the mere recording of facts, must necessarily become explicative, that is to say, more or less sociological." 3

The problem historicism raises for both Mannheim and Goldmann is why study some facts and not others and ultimately, how do you know what you know, or how does one justify such knowledge? This ontological problem, revealed in Mannheim's concept of relational knowledge, takes a somewhat different solution when raised by Goldmann. Rather than developing objectivity through the methodology of detachment, as Mannheim does, Goldmann works out the problem through the methodology of dialectical materialism, a methodology which grounds the problem of objectivity in action, or praxis. In accepting the thesis of the 'social determination of knowledge', Goldmann is rooting his ontological claims for validity in the concrete position of the actor. Thus, the problem of the researcher as to what historical fact should or should not be studied, is in part solved in the following manner:

What men seek in history are the transformations of the acting subject in the dialectical relation Man-World, i.e. transformation of human society.

---

3 Goldmann, 1969, p.23.
It follows that the object of the historical sciences is human actions of all times and places, in the degree to which they have had or now have an importance for or an influence on the existence and structure of a human group and, implicitly thereby, an influence on the structure of the present or future community.  

Here we begin to see Goldmann's synthesis of the historicist and structuralist traditions. Historicism, for example, has as its central subject matter the subject of history, the interaction of human beings in historically specific milieus. The structuralist paradigm, on the other hand, takes as its subject of study structure or relations between the elements. Structuralism cuts across disciplines of study from anthropology to psychology, sociology and linguistics. Linguistics including figures such as Saussure, Trubetzkoy, and Jackobson; literary critics pioneered by Propp; anthropologists like Radcliff-Brown and Levi-Strauss; social and political philosophers like the Althusserians; and psychologists like Piaget, are only a few of the many variants of the tradition of structuralism. Goldmann borrows from the structuralist tradition in re-formulating his version of a dialectical materialist analysis of social transformation. This borrowing is a result of many influences, given the dominant position

---

4 ibid. p.29.
of the structuralist paradigm in France (Levi-Strauss and the Althuserians); but perhaps none was quite so direct or as influential as that of the psychologist Piaget. In the following, taken from Towards a Sociology of the Novel, one of Goldmann's later works, the structuralist influence becomes clear.

"Genetic structuralism sets out from the hypothesis that all human behavior is an attempt to give a meaningful response to a particular situation and tends, therefore, to create a balance between the subject of action and the object on which it bears, the environment. This tendency to equilibrium, however always retains an unstable, provisional character, insofar as any equilibrium that is more or less satisfactory between the mental structures of the subject and the external world culminates in a situation in which human behavior transforms the world in which this transformation renders the old equilibrium inadequate and engenders the tendency to a new equilibrium that will in turn be superseded."

Goldmann continues...

"Thus human realities are presented as two-sided processes: deestructuration of old structurations and structuration of new totalities capable of creating equilibria capable of satisfying the new demands of the social groups that are elaborating them."

These 'structural' concepts are not used in the earlier Goldmann whose work takes place in front of a reiteration of Lukacs' Marxist dialectical and historical materialism. This does not mean to suggest that Lukacs, or Marx had no interest in structure. Rather, the later Goldmann is influenced by the modern structuralist movement which is rooted in a large variety of thinkers, from Kant to Talcott Parsons. In his earlier works Goldmann focuses on the problem of the relation of the parts to the whole. He does not

use the contemporary structuralist vocabulary, as seen above, but
the general categories that he does employ seem to be compatible
with the later structuralist terminology.

"...in the study of man, we can separate the
essential from the accidental only by integrating
the individual elements into the overall pattern, by
fitting the parts into the whole. This is why,
although we can never actually reach a totality which
is no longer an element or part of a greater whole,
the methodological problem, as far as the humanities
or the science of man is concerned, is principally this:
that of dividing the immediately available facts into
relative wholes which are sufficiently autonomous to
provide a framework for scientific investigation."  

The key terms in the first quote include, structure,
equilibrium, structuration and destructuration. The key terms in
the second quote above include, elements, pattern, parts and whole,
in short all the ingredients which together comprise a structure.
Zimmerman argues, for example, that there is a unity and
compatibility in Goldmann's work. In other words, there is a
'connexion' between the young dialectical materialist Goldmann and
the old 'genetic structuralist' Goldmann.  

Terms like equilibrium,
argues Zimmerman, are meant as descriptive terms for states of
practice. The term praxis is the key term for linking the young
and old Goldmann together.  

Grounding the epistemological

---

8 Lucien Goldmann, 1955, p.12.

9 For an elaboration of this argument see Marc Zimmerman, "Lucien
Goldmann: From Dialectic to Genetic Structuralism". Berkley

10 Praxis or practice, the two terms may be used interchangeably.
For Lukacs and Goldmann praxis is the marriage of theory and
practice in the world of political action. In short, praxis,
especially for the young Lukacs, is political action.
categories in Lukacs' concept of praxis is the only way Goldmann
could escape charges of a static structuralism, one which cannot
account for change. Before the adoption of Lukacs' Marxism by
Goldmann might be understood, it is necessary first to review
Lukacs' interpretation of Marx via the Hegelian dialectic.

To summarize this section: we have seen that, in general,
the Goldmann genetic structuralist problematic exists within a
historicist and structuralist paradigmatic synthesis. The subject
matter of history was argued as the subject in history, being
human interaction. The subject matter of structuralism was argued
as the relations between the elements in a society. The argument
of Goldmann's problematic is that in studying man we must study
both the historically specific location of man and his practice,
and the relations between men which form the societal structure.
The criteria for knowledge ultimately rests on man's practice.
The young Goldmann was linked to the old Goldmann showing a
continuity in his work. Now the Hegelian dialectic must be reviewed
in order to show Lukacs' rejection of it and the resulting concept
of practice.

II Hegel and Lukacs on Epistemology

The Hegelian Dialectic

Hegel's dialectic, in *The Phenomenology of Mind*, begins
with a critique of divided consciousness; i.e., the separation of
subject and object. 11 The dialectical method shows four primary

1967).
movements. Each of the movements, the unhappy consciousness, religion, reason and absolute spirit contains contradictions and negations. Out of each negation grows the following movement, until the final synthesis, absolute spirit, occurs. The unhappy consciousness (divided consciousness) is unhappy because it is incapable of fully achieving its purpose. Consciousness becomes other than itself and as such its purpose is lost. This process of consciousness, attempting to wholly realize itself, results in consciousness alienating itself. In other words, consciousness becomes contradictory. This contradiction arises out of consciousness, in a sense, stepping out of itself in order that it might realize itself. Yet, the consciousness which steps outside of itself remains related to itself. In this sense, the two operate within the same structure. Hegel discusses this contradictory structure in the following:

This unhappy consciousness, divided and at variance within itself, must, because this contradiction of its essential nature is felt to be a single consciousness, always have in the one consciousness the other also; and thus we must be straightway driven out of each in turn, when it thinks it has therein attained the victory and rest of unity... The unhappy consciousness finds itself merely desiring and toiling; it is not consciously and directly aware that to so find itself rests upon the inner certainty of itself, and that its feeling of real being is this self feeling. 12

In other words, the actor’s consciousness is divided, in the sense that there is no method to comprehend the unity of the subject and object of consciousness. This is the task of reason, or philosophy. Reason unites the three essential aspects of

12 ibid. p.251.
consciousness; sensation, perception and understanding. The purpose of reason is to seek the unity of subject and object.

"Reason sets out to know the truth, to find in the form of a notion what, for meaning and perception, is a thing; i.e., it seeks in thinghood to have merely the consciousness of its own self. Reason has, therefore, now a universal interest in the world or is certain that the actual present is rational." 13

In order to place reason in a position where it might begin to uncover the nature of truth, Hegel establishes a framework in which it might operate. This framework is religion, more specifically, the Christian religion. Hegel presupposes religion to be that process in reality, which through reason, achieves the realization of spirit as the principal character of both subject and object. Religion, in this sense, as it exists holistically within both subject and object, becomes possible. Absolute spirit is the final movement in the Hegelian dialectic. It knows itself by being itself. Absolute spirit is aware of itself as the object in religion, and as the subject, or self-consciousness of the religious man. In philosophy, it is aware of itself as the infinite and the particular. In art, it is aware of itself as the idea which exists in sensible form. In short, it is aware of all aspects of itself.

"It is spirit knowing itself in the shape of spirit, it is knowledge which comprehends through notions. Truth is here not merely in itself absolutely identical with certainty (as pure reason has it), it also has the shape, the character of certainty of self, or in its existence - i.e., for spirit knowing it - it is in the form of knowledge itself." 14

13 ibid., p.259.

14 ibid., p.281.
Lukacs, interpreting Marx, returns the criteria for the problem of knowledge (division of subject and object) to the actor. Hegel's idealism, the separation of man from real history, is Lukacs' point of departure. It is within this context that Marx is said to have "stood Hegel on his feet." Absolute spirit can only exist separate from man as a driving force of history. In this sense, Hegel retains a fundamental division between subject and object, much as his work was designed to overcome that Kantian problem. Lukacs offers the following interpretation of Marx's critique of Hegel:

Marx reproached Hegel (and in even stronger terms, Hegel's successors who had reverted to Kant) with his failure to overcome the duality of thought and being, of theory and practice, of subject and object. He maintained that Hegel's dialectic which purported to be an inner, real dialectic of the historical process, was a mere illusion: in this crucial point, he failed to go beyond Kant. His knowledge is no more than knowledge about an essentially alien material.

Marx's critique of Hegel is the direct continuation and extension of the critique that Hegel himself leveled at Kant. So it came about that Marx's dialectical method contained what Hegel had striven for, but failed to achieve in a concrete form.

It is at reality itself that Hegel and Marx part company. Hegel was unable to penetrate to the real driving forces of history... he remained imprisoned in the Platonic and Kantian outlooks, in the duality of thought and being, of form and matter. 15.

The premise of dialectical materialism is: "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but on the contrary, their social existence that determines their consciousness." 16


16 ibid. p.16-19.
This is the key to understanding Lukács' interpretation of Marx. In a sense, Lukács has adopted an analysis of intellectual history that suggests that the conception of totality could not be seen until Marx emerged. Hegel was the first philosopher to attempt a resolution of Kant's distinction between phenomena and neumonon. This was done with the dialectical method outlined above. Marx then synthesized a historical materialist dialectic to overturn Hegel's idealism. This resulted in the proposition that man makes his own history and that "the philosophers have only interpreted the world in different ways; the point is to change it." 17

This notion of change then, becomes the foundation of Lukács' position, viz., praxis. Change is only possible through political praxis. This praxis is an awareness of the interplay between theory and practice that can only be uncovered and understood with the use of the method of dialectical materialism. Dialectical materialism is a revolutionary dialectic. This definition is so important and altogether so crucial for an understanding of its nature, that if the problem is to be approached in the right way this must be fully grasped... The issue turns on the question of theory and practice. 18


18 Lukács, 1971, p.2.
From this initial definition of praxis, as shown to us by the "method", a critique of bourgeois science is offered, more specifically, empiricism. In this sense, the facts are seen by the empiricists as independent phenomena; i.e., independent of the scientist who makes statements about them. The facts are separate individual entities that must be interpreted. This is an implication of method, as Lukacs suggests:

It goes without saying that all knowledge starts from the facts. The only question is: which of the data of life are relevant to knowledge and in the context of which method?

The blinkered empiricist will of course, deny that facts can only become facts within the framework of a system - which will vary with the knowledge desired. He believes that every piece of data from economic life, every statistic, every raw event, already constitutes an important fact. In so doing he forgets that however, lacking in commentary, it already implies an 'interpretation', already at this stage the facts have been comprehended by a theory, a method; they have been wrenched from their living context and fitted into a theory. 19

Interestingly enough, this critique of positivism closely resembles that offered by both Mannheim and Weber. In this sense, each author is attacking the positivist tradition for its epistemological blindspot. That blindspot is most clearly understood as an inability to confront the problem of interpretation, developed by Weber, Mannheim and Lukacs. The difference, however, between Mannheim and Lukacs, to the solution of this problem, is radical. It can be seen epistemologically, that Weber's argument for the cultural sciences and Mannheim's argument for detachment each grow out of the methodological implication of interpretation. The

19 ibid., p.40.
epistemological background and the methodological response are, however, considerably different between Mannheim and Lukacs. The epistemological emphasis for Lukacs belongs to Hegel and Marx. For Mannheim, the epistemological debt is from Weber and Kant. This produces two distinctly different solutions to the problem of interpretation. Mannheim is led to detachment. Lukacs is led to praxis.

The Context of Practice-Reification

The question now becomes, how is praxis undertaken; i.e., within what context. Inevitably the problem of class and class consciousness arises. For Lukacs, capitalist society contains two 'pure' classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. These are the only two classes whose development is entirely dependent on production. Class consciousness then, is defined in terms of class interests as they relate to production. It is the dominance of production which allows or disallows, creates or destroys, hides or reveals various forms of class consciousness. This is understood dialectically as contradiction, not as contradiction per se, but rather, as dialectical contradiction. Lukacs makes this clearer in the following:

With the bourgeoisie, also, class consciousness stands in opposition to class interest. But here the antagonism is not contradictory but dialectical.

The distinction between the two modes of contradiction may be briefly described in this way: in the case of other classes, a class consciousness is prevented from emerging by their position within the process of production and the interests this generates. In the case of the bourgeoisie, however, these factors combine to produce a class consciousness but one which is cursed by the very nature with the tragic fate of developing an insoluble
contradiction at the very zenith of its powers. As a result of this contradiction, it must annihilate itself.

...Sociologically, the bourgeoisie did everything in its power to eradicate the fact of class conflict from the consciousness of society... Ideologically, we see the same contradiction in the fact that the bourgeoisie endowed the individual with an unprecedented importance, but at the same time that same individuality was annihilated by the economic conditions to which it was subjected, by the reification created by commodity production. 20

Commodity production and circulation is at the very basis of society's structure. In this context, the reification of the proletariat's labour occurs. In other words, labour is transformed into the commodity form. This is what Lukács calls the "universal structuring principle". In this sense, a distinction is drawn between the commodity as universal and the commodity as particular. This is different from Mannheim's relational and particular categories in that the relational category never completely separates itself from the assumption of partial knowledge, resulting in a form of relativism. The distinction Lukács makes, on the other hand, is designed instead to show that at certain points in the historical process, the particular nature of commodity exchange may be seen as the dominant social activity. At others, however, it is the universal category; that is, commodity as transformed from labour which takes place in the production base of capitalist society. The total universal category of the commodity can only be seen to emerge in the epoch of capitalism. Only with the advent of this class division, wherein class consciousness

20 ibid. p.63, emphasis added.
is linked to class interest, is the totality of life organized in terms of the produced commodity. "Thus, the universality of the commodity form is responsible both objectively and subjectively for the abstraction of the human labour incorporated in commodities."  

Rationally organized, distributed and produced commodities are thus the context within which praxis takes place. This principle of rationalization shows itself in the emphasis placed on rational accounting, the quantification of human labour. This is in turn, produced by an increasingly complex division of labour resulting from specialization.

"Just as the capitalist system continuously produces and reproduces itself economically on higher and higher levels, the structure of reification progressively sinks more deeply, more fateful and more definitely into the consciousness of man."  

Lukacs is entering Marx's theory of alienation and linking it to the concept of commodity fetishism. This is brought out further in the following:

Marx often describes this potentiation of reification in incisive fashion. One example must suffice here: "An interest bearing capital, therefore, this automatic fetish, self-expanding value, money generating money, is brought out in its pure state and in this form it no longer bears the birth-marks of its origin... It becomes a property of money to generate value and yield interest... Thus we get a fetish form of capital, and the conception of fetish capital."  

---

21 ibid. p.87.
22 ibid. p. 93.
23 ibid. p.23.
Summary and Critique of Detachment

As we have seen, the criterion for knowledge, as it emerges in class society, is the unity of subject and object in the context of revolutionary praxis. This stands in opposition to Mannheim's argument for detachment. Lukacs' argument for revolutionary praxis is founded in the method of dialectical materialism which was developed through the Marxian critique of Hegel's idealism. Hegel's dialectic revealed the driving force of history to be 'absolute spirit'. The driving force of history for Lukacs can be seen as the revolutionary proletariat. By this it is meant, the revolutionary spirit of the proletarian consciousness is the only potential for emancipation from reification and commodity fetishism. As Lukacs suggests:

"Only the consciousness of the proletariat can point to the way that leads out of the impasse of capitalism. As long as this consciousness is lacking, the crisis remains permanent, it goes back to the starting point, repeats the cycle until after infinite suffering and terrible detours the school of history completes the education of the proletariat and confers upon it the leadership of mankind." 24

Mannheim, on the other hand, taking from Weber's assumption of partial knowledge, argues that the criterion for validity rests in the care of the detached intellectual. Only the detached intellectual has the training and the skill to juxtapose the wealth of conflicting perspectives which have come to occupy virtually all corridors of contemporary thought. The ideal type procedure, as was argued in Chapter III, operates on the assumption that the object of study constitutes an infinite number of parts of which

24 ibid. p. 40.
the observer is only able to grasp a limited number; that is, those which are essential to the observer. We saw this procedure operationalized in the content analysis of the cultural product, "A Way Through the Wood". In that analysis, only a partial analysis based on the Mannheim problematic, we extracted categories (via ideal types) in which were included the content of the play. Those ideal typical categories take their validity in the final analysis; that is, the criteria on which their validity rests is that of the detached intellectual, not class praxis.

Lukacs and Mannheim thus appear to be distanced from one another. The former grounds epistemological problems (in the final instance how do we know what we know?) in the concrete world of human interaction, of action, and most especially, revolutionary practice. The latter, on the other hand, takes the criteria for knowledge, not in the world of practice, but in the world of the detached intellectual. Lukacs argues the realm of praxis is the basis of knowledge. Lukacs later denounces the idealism with which he offered his concept of praxis. It is an argument which is not very much different from Hegel's "realization of the absolute spirit." 25 The point is praxis, the marriage of theory and practice, claims objectivity in the final analysis only in so far as it may be worked out in action at a concrete level. Detachment, the free floating intellectual, on the other hand, "boils down to making truth once again the prerequisite of a certain number of scholars and specialists in sociology." 26


26 ibid.
Now that a critique has been pointed to from the dialectical materialist position of Lukacs, of the Mannheimian concept of detachment, it becomes possible to move into a presentation of Goldmann’s genetic structuralist problematic. The problematic takes its origins in Lukacs’ dialectical materialist method. Three levels of the problematic will be considered: the epistemological foundations, theoretical and methodological propositions, and the empirical.

III Goldmann's Genetic Structuralist Problematic

The Epistemological Foundations

The epistemological foundations of the genetic structuralist problematic are implied in its name. The problematic has as its overall aim the analysis of the social origin or genesis of a thing (praxis) and its structure (form). These two objectives are inseparable. The objective implies a particular epistemological position which does not set aside, or in any way divide the task of the disciplines of history from that of sociology. Goldmann develops this synthesis; that is, the putting together of history.

27 This section appears in Fink et al. "Literary and Sociological Approaches to the Analysis of C.B.C. English Radio Drama", an unpublished manuscript, 1980. The author wishes to acknowledge the debts owed to colleagues in the Radio Drama Project, at Concordia University. These colleagues include Professor John D. Jackson, Professor Howard Fink, and Ms. Rosalind Zinman, Ph.D. student in humanities.

and social structure within the model of dialectical materialism, as is espoused by Lukacs. 29 The central principle around which the model is constructed is that everything is potentially knowable. Goldmann argues that dialectical thought, unlike rationalism and empiricism which "accept the existence of rational first principles or starts with the recognition of the absolute validity of sense experience", does not accept any absolutely valid starting points. 30 In lieu of viewing the progress of scientific knowledge in a straight line, dialectical materialism argues the validity of any individual fact or idea only once it has been placed within the whole: In this sense, Goldmann adopts a somewhat hermitic position:

"The advance of knowledge is thus to be considered as a perpetual movement to and fro, from the whole to the parts back to the whole again, a movement in the course of which the whole and the parts throw light on one another." 31

Theory

Given the above consideration of the epistemological foundation of the genetic-structuralist problematic, it is possible to elaborate a series of propositions which formulate the theoretical position of the problematic. The central concepts on which the theoretical propositions are built include: partial knowledge, the social group, social class, and world vision. Knowledge is partial when it is not seen in relation to a 'whole man'; i.e., holistic knowledge in the final analysis is always bound up in

29 See the first chapter in Goldmann, 1955, and also Lukacs, 1971.
30 Goldmann, 1955, p. 4.
31 ibid., p. 5.
class within which he acts; and (3) the world vision of a social
class is best seen in the imaginary production of a work of art.
The method for analysing a cultural creation or work of art is
to begin with the découpage of the object itself. Then, through
a process of successive approximations of the homologous
relations between the structure of the world of the work and the
group from which it has emerged, and through the procedure of
inserting each of those structures into the overall society, we
arrive at a point where we have both understood and explained the
cultural product and the society in which it has been produced.
In the final analysis this is the goal of the genetic structuralist
problematic; namely, to comprehend and to explain the genesis and
structure of human facts, of cultural facts.

Whereas Mannheim, as was seen in the previous chapter,
argued that there is a content meaning in a world view, Goldmann
is concerned first and foremost with the latent structure of a
world vision. The structure of the world of a cultural product is
thought of as the underlying or latent relations between the
elements. In this sense, the content analysis demonstrated in
the previous chapter is thought of as revealing certain elements
of the script but not the structure. This is, not meant as a
general critique of the Mannheim problematic in that the analysis
was offered as an illustration of one of the meanings, which
Mannheim argues, constitutes a world view. Rather, it is a point
of clarification, a point that nevertheless establishes a difference
between the two problematics. A further point of difference
has to do with the emphasis Mannheim places on the expressive, meaning, or the intention of the artist, in the analysis of a world view, or a piece of art. Goldmann, on the other hand, sees little, if any, importance in the intention of the author, arguing that the focusing of the analysis on the author may help with the understanding of the internal unity but it cannot show any external homologies. Goldman's rejection of this kind of psychologism, or at least his reservations regarding placing the emphasis on the creator, is seen in the following:

"In short, no psychological study can account for the fact that Racine wrote precisely the dramas that he did and explain why he could not, in any circumstances, write the plays of Corneille or Moliere."

"...the psychological structure is too complex a reality for one to be able to analyse it with the help of various sets of evidence concerning an individual who is no longer alive, or an author whom one does not know personally, or even on the basis of the intuitive empirical knowledge of an individual to whom one is bound by close bonds of friendship."

The difference at the level of application between Mannheim and Goldmann are tied up with the two levels of their problematics, epistemology, and theory and methodology. The exact nature of this connection will receive attention later. For the moment, it is useful to keep in mind as the central difference on the level of application; i.e., the distinction between Mannheim's category of content and Goldmann's concern for uncovering latent structures. With this distinction in mind we may now continue with an illustration of the genetic structuralist problematic using the

---

44 ibid. pp.157-158.
theoretical and methodological guidelines developed to this point.

A Structural Analysis of "The Way Through the Wood" 45

We will begin by restating Goldmann's basic hypothesis:

The collective character of literary creations stems from the fact that the structures of the universe of a work are homologous to the mental structures of certain social groups. 46

To move from this very general statement to the analysis of a creative work requires a set of specific steps consistent with Goldmann's problematic.

First, a distinction must be made between the locus of observation and the locus of analysis. The former refers to the manifest content of the work as composed of words and sentences combined into units of dialogue which together make up the empirical world of the play. This level is not the level of analysis; inasmuch as the hypothesis directs us to structures of which the empirical level is but a manifestation. The level of analysis refers us to the way in which these observed units are combined or their relations. It is these relations or structures that are hypothesized as homologous with the mental structures of certain social groups.

45 This analysis was adopted from Jackson in Fink et al., 1980
46 Goldmann, 1975, p. 159.
This distinction parallels that which is made between content and structural analysis. Content analysis tends to tap only the manifestations of underlying relations as we have seen, and, at best, leads to an analysis which portrays an identity of content between the work and some set of ideas within the larger society. More likely than not, the manifest content of the play under examination would lead an observer to conclude that the play is about sex roles and women's struggle for liberation; the resolution of the play expressed in that liberation. A structural analysis reveals quite a different understanding of the production.

Secondly, and to return to the level of observation, the units selected are best described as units of dialogue. The definition of these units for coding purposes requires more work and refinement. For the moment it will be sufficient to note that a unit of dialogue is a combination of statements made either in an interaction situation between two or more characters or by one character or a narrator as a series of thoughts or comments in which an exchange of propositions is completed. The following example extracted from the play will illustrate the operation:

**MUSIC:**  Up and out

**GIRL:**  (Assistant in flower shop) Will that be all then, Mr. Manley?

**ROY:**  Yes - I think so. Two dozen red roses. Mother likes them. Funny how all women go for red roses, isn't it?

**GIRL:**  Do they?

**ROY:**  Sure they do. Every time. I sometimes wonder how you florists have enough red roses to go around every Mother's Day.
GIRL: Oh, we manage. Shall I send the bill to your office?

ROY: Yes, do that. (GOING). Try and see that they get there first thing in the morning, eh?

GIRL: We'll do our best, Mr. Manley.

ROY: Okay. Good-bye.

GIRL: Good-bye.

SOUND: The front door of the shop is opened and admits traffic noises for a moment as he goes through, then shuts.

GIRL: Well, he's done his duty for the year.

GIRL 2: (Slightly off) What's that, Mary?

GIRL: I say he's done his duty for the year. I'd like to know if he ever does anything for his mother in between.

And I bet he'd even forget Mother's Day if his secretary didn't remind him.

GIRL 2: You sound bitter, dear.

GIRL: I'm always bitter on Mother's Day. Did you hear him? "Funny how all women go for red roses". How does he know?

GIRL 2: That's just one of those handy things men make up for themselves. Saves a lot of trouble - and keeps the price of red roses up.

GIRL: And helps to pay our wages. Oh, here's another. This one's yours.

GIRL 2: Okay.

SOUND: At "Our Wages" above, the traffic noise has been admitted again as a customer enters.

GIRL 2: Yes, sir - can I help you?

MAN: (Slight fade in) Yes - er - I'd like a couple of dozen red roses,
Each unit is coded indicating the scene (first two digits), the sequence (next three digits) and the theme (last two digits).

The third step, which involves the reconstruction of the themes, takes us to the level of analysis. This step does not occur until after the initial coding by scene and sequence. At this point each unit of dialogue is placed on an index card. The cards are then sorted into themes. This requires a judgement which can only be made through a constant shifting between the content of the play and a knowledge of the social world in which the play is rooted (successive approximation). The resulting themes are no longer empirical units or samples of manifest content but clusters of relations among these units. Using the above extract from the play, theme (11) is a combination of units which express a particular set of values with some coherence present in the work and theme (25) expresses another such set. The themes do not, of course, appear in sequence. The units of each theme are scattered throughout the play. In the case of the illustration, the first and second units are linked together as part of theme (11); the third unit is a member of another theme; and the fourth of yet another. The relations among the units within each theme are simply relations of identity of meaning.

47 See Alan King, "A Way Through the Wood", unpublished radio drama script. The reader is also referred back to the precis of the script in Chapter III, for a general idea of the story line.
Two major themes interact in a specific manner throughout the play. Theme (11), identified with Roy, is a value set which in the popular social science of the day was characterized as 1950's suburban middle class, most often associated with mobile while collar, professional and managerial occupations. It is a set which places a high priority on a romantic idealization of family and community, an idealization which contained specific prescriptions regarding the respective behaviours of males and females based on male dominance and aggressiveness. The emphasis on family and community contained an exclusiveness which encouraged negative attitudes toward "outgroup" members. The values tended to be politically conservative as opposed to liberalism. Male aggressiveness was a psychological correlate of free enterprise and competition.

Theme (25), identified with Jean, was nonetheless "middle class" and characterized as influenced by existentialism but more concretely expressed in an empiricism (one believes only what one sees) and individualism. It is anti-conformist and sceptical of values surrounding family, community and nation. In this sense, it is more open and tolerant. It tends to be politically liberal to left-liberal. Little value is placed on collectivities, considerable on the individual. The individual here is not the aggressive free-enterpriser but the open, feeling individual who seeks solutions to social problems in perfecting interpersonal relations. 48

48 Both the Mannheim and Goldmann analyses are close in their descriptions of these two themes in this case.
The remaining themes are sub-themes of one or the other value sets. Two of these characterize at the concrete level the personifications of the two major themes primarily through the characters of Roy and Jean. An additional three refer to the sources and institutional supports of the basic themes. Roy's theme finds its source in the United States media and Jean's in Europe via immigration. In Roy's theme, the church and the economy are mutually reinforcing.

The next and final step has to do with the relations among the themes. It is this level of analysis which yields the structures which can be examined in relation to structures of idea systems within the larger society. The technique is to place the units of dialogue sequentially along a horizontal axis while at the same time organizing them thematically along a vertical axis. For purposes of illustration let us take eight themes numbered from 1 to 8. The resulting simulation of the play would look something like the following:

1 4
1 2
2 6
4
1 4
2 4 7
etc.
By reading from left to right one obtains the manifest content or story line. By reading from top to bottom one obtains the thematic content, but one step removed from observation insofar as the themes are made up of the units of dialogue ordered not in sequence but by theme. The way in which the themes are related is arrived at by examining the interaction between 1, 2, 4, via the story line.

The two major themes, as you might now expect, stand in opposition to each other with Roy's theme in a dominant position and Jean's theme in a subordinate position. There is no resolution to the tension in the sense of a new thesis. The play concludes with Roy's theme in a dominant position, though in the middle sequences Jean's theme gains a temporary ascendancy.

In our illustration thus far, the method of découpage of the object has been established as the cutting up or coding of the script, using first level successive approximations. By this it is meant, the depiction of the two main themes, as portrayed by the characters Roy and Jean, was arrived at by estimating the stereotypes which were apparent in the historical period of the production. By inserting the structure of the play into the structure of the historically specific milieu from which it emerged.

49 See Claude Levi-Strauss, "The Structural Study of Myth", in Richard and Fernande de George (eds.) The Structuralists From Marx to Levi-Strauss. This technique taken from Levi-Strauss does not mean to imply that his problematic is compatible with Goldman's. Rather, the technique has been stripped from Levi-Strauss's problematic and been employed in the context of Goldman's problematic.
we move closer to an explanation and therefore an understanding
of both the play and the culture from whence it has come. We will
let the analysis stand incomplete. The next step in the analysis
would include a thorough presentation of the historical period in
order that a larger successive approximation of the work might be
offered. Rather than attempting to enter that approximation we
will leave this analysis with a refinement of the hypothesis
stated earlier. Our hypothesis is that the structure of the play
as revealed in its first approximation is homologous with the mental
structures of particular fractions of the class structure of the
time insofar as the manner in which these fractions are related to
each other. The relationship between the two major themes
corresponds to the relationship between the world visions adhered
to by two fractions of the middle class during the 1940's and 1950's.
We refer to the tension between the "old middle class" (rural and
urban independent commodity producers and merchants) and the "new
middle class" (professional and managerial personnel). The latter
category is objectively a part of the proletariat but subjectively
identifies with the capitalist class. 50 Evidence suggests that
the former fraction was beginning to shift its dominant position
to the latter after 1940. The ideology of the former grouping,
though frequently associated in the popular social science
literature with "organization man", corresponds to that described
as theme (11). Roy's theme, the relationship between theme (11) and

50 Carl Cuneo, "A Class perspective on Regionalism" in D. Glenday
et al (eds.) Modernization and the Canadian State (Toronto:
theme (25) is homologous with the relations between these two fractions. This hypothesis could guide further inquiries.

IV Summary

The genetic structuralist problematic has been illustrated in a partial analysis of "A Way Through the Wood". This analysis was guided by the theoretical propositions concerning partial knowledge, the social group, social class, and world visions and the methodological propositions, découpage, successive approximations, insertion, explanation, and understanding. The central difference between this analysis and that offered by the Mannheimian problematic, is that this analysis concentrates on the structures of both the work and the social milieu, whereas the latter allows for a partial analysis of the content of the product on its own. The theoretical and methodological propositions of the genetic structuralist problematic were developed from Lukacs' major epistemological concerns.

Lukacs' primary concept of praxis was revealed as Goldmann's prime epistemological criteria. This is seen in the genetic (praxis) focus of study, whereas the structural (form) focus of study was borrowed more from the contemporary influences of the psychologist Piaget. Lukacs' adoption and interpretation of Marx was shown via his critique of the Hegelian dialectic. The central concept of

51 The outstanding difference between the Goldmann and Mannheim problematic, regarding this hypothesis, is that the latter problematic does not take structures into account.
praxis was developed in the context of reification and commodity fetishism.

The argument of this chapter was that the genetic structuralist problematic of Lucien Goldmann was housed within a historicist/structuralist paradigmatic synthesis. Our elaboration of Goldmann's debt to Lukacs' epistemology, along with the concrete illustration of the genetic structuralist problematic guided by the problematic's theoretical and methodological propositions, were all designed with this argument in mind. Lukacs' concept of praxis was juxtaposed with Mannheim's concept of detachment. The two were shown as incompatible. Some differences were noted on the level of illustration, between the Mannheimian and Goldmann problematics.

It now becomes possible to move into an investigation of a third problematic, that of the Althusserian's Structuralist Problematic. One of the fruits to be harvested in this investigation is to be a critical retrospective look at the paradigmatic synthesis of Goldmann's genetic structuralism, from the position of the Althusserian structuralist problematic. In the final chapter we will return to the consequences of such an exercise.
CHAPTER V

The Althusserian Structuralist Problematic Via Karl Marx

I The Althusserians

One would have to look very hard to find a set of contemporary intellectual figures who have caused as much controversy as those of Louis Althusser and his followers. Louis Althusser was born in Algeria. His first degree was in philosophy from the Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris in 1948. He joined the communist party in France in 1948, and at the same time continued to teach at the school where he obtained his first degree. Amongst his most important works are included: Montesquieu, la politique et l'Histoire, Lire le capital, Pour Marx, and Lenine et la philosophie.

Althusser is described in this chapter as a structuralist, even though he denies the charge. This description is retained on the basis that the 'project' of his problematic in its broadest application is, like Goldmann's, the depiction of the relations

---

1 When the Althuserian problematic is referred to, Ettienne Balibar is thought of as being included. Balibar co-authored Reading Capital and other works with Althusser.

between elements or simply, the structure. A major difference between the format of this chapter and the preceding chapters is that there is no juxtaposition of the Althusserian problematic with his major intellectual and paradigmatic debt. That this is so has to do with the coincidence that much of the Althusserian's work is focused on an investigation and interpretation of Marx, who is Althusser's major influence.

Aside from Marx's major influence, there is also Lenin and Mao. In addition, as Klein has recently argued, it is important to look at Althusser in relation to the existentialist movement of Sartre and his followers, the static structuralism of Claude Levi-Strauss, and the historicist tradition, particularly of Gramsci and Lukacs. 3 Unfortunately, we cannot deal with the richness of the conflicts between Althusser and each of these traditions. Instead, this chapter limits itself to a general examination of the Althusserian problematic. Hence, given the peculiar circumstance of an author's influence being more or less confined to a re-reading of a classical figure (Marx), we will attempt to deal with Althusser on his own ground. Glucksmann points out Althusser's major influences in the following:

"Althusser's work consists in an original re-reading and exposition of Marx, and the theoretical innovations he makes depends on this reading rather than on the work of others. Where he is influenced by others it is in a highly specific way: he borrows particular concepts and terms to describe concepts that are already

3 This idea was elaborated by Professor Norman Klein in a talk he delivered to The Developing Area Study Series at McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, 1980, entitled Althusser's Marxism".
present in some form in Marx. The most important theorists whose influence he acknowledges are Bachelard, the French philosopher of science, Freud, and Spinoza. 'Althusser's work is a critique of Hegel, Feuerbach and all humanist, historicist and idealist reinterpretations of Marxism from Gramsci and Lukács to Sartre and Goldmann.'

We begin with an elaboration of the Althusserian argument against historicism. The principles of the argument are applied to Lukács' historicist interpretation of Marx and then carried over to Goldmann's genetic structuralist problematic. The main thrust of the critique is directed at the concept of political praxis. Althusser argues that this concept 'flattens out the structural totality' and provides a 'linear view' of history. Four sets of practice are elaborated as they emerge from Engels and Mao: economic practice, political practice, ideological practice and theoretical practice. On the basis of the argument for theoretical practice, science is distinguished from ideology. The relative autonomy of science from ideology is a key epistemological category of the Althusserian problematic.

Once science is distinguished from ideology, the main theoretical and methodological propositions concerning the science of historical materialism are outlined. The base/superstructure metaphor is reviewed and the principle elements of the mode of production are presented. It is then argued that each of these

---

4 Glucksmann, 1974, p.97.

5 The reader is referred to Chapter IV where a discussion of the concept of praxis was presented as adhered to by Lukács.
elements -- labour, means of production, and non-labour -- must be reproduced if production is to continue. Following the argument of reproduction of the productive forces, and the relations of production, the concept of the ideological state apparatus, as distinguished from the repressive state apparatus, and the state in general is offered as a central theoretical proposition. In tracing the purpose these various state apparatuses serve in the productive process, five theses are put forth for the Althusserian 'general theory of ideology' and with this is included a depiction of the elements which formulate the formal structure of ideology.

This is followed with the application or grounding of the problematic through an analysis of the selected script. Althusser's analysis is distinguished from both the Goldmann/Lukacs and Mannheim/Weber problematics in that an argument is developed wherein both these problematics are seen as focusing analysis on the creation of the product, in the sense of its emergence from some historically specific milieu. The Althusserian problematic, however, concentrates on the effects the product has on consciousness. A literary analysis of the script is offered based on two justifications: (1) that an investigation into the ideological world of the play will yield information which may provide keys to the understanding of the effects on consciousness that the cultural product might have; and (2) as an illustration of the Althusserian theory of ideology. The analysis is to be based on the theoretical and methodological guidelines of the problematic. The main base for the literary analysis is 'the formal structure of ideology'.
framework. The four main principles of this framework include: the double mirror structure of ideology, the interpellation of the individual as subject, the recognition of other subjects and the reinforcement of what is already known to be 'true', and finally, the subjection of the subject to the Subject. These principles are used to guide the analysis of the script.

We conclude with a summary of the three levels, epistemological, theoretical and methodological, and the application, which together formulate the Althusserian problematic. Some distinction is drawn between Althusser and the Mannheim/Weber and Goldmann/Lukacs problematics. Also considered are some of the internal contradictions of the Althusserian problematic, particularly with the category of science. Finally, some suggestions are offered towards a conclusion in the final chapter.

II. The Level of Epistemology

The Althusserian Critique of Historicism

According to Althusser, Marxism is both anti-historicist and anti-humanist. That this is so has to do with the "break" in Marx's own work which occurred in his works around 1845. The argument Althusser outlines is that the younger Marx was not as yet a Marxist. By this it is meant that the works of the younger Marx

---


7 For a definition of the concept of "break", and a discussion of the "break" in Marx's work, see the glossaries in both Althusser, Balibar, 1970, and Althusser, 1969.
were burdened with Hegelian epistemological problems. These problems are seen to be carried on by the historicist and humanist traditions which emerge, says Althusser, following the collapse of the Second International. The historicism and humanism referred to here are labels which are applied to the European left from 1917 on, and most particularly to the figures of Rosa Luxemburg, the political revolutionary, and afterwards a whole series of theoreticians, among them Korsch, Gramsci and Lukacs. In this section an attempt is made to re-state Althusser's rejection and criticism of the historicist tradition and to aim that criticism at Lukacs' historicist problematic in particular. Once this step has been taken, the implications of the historicist critique will be carried over into Goldmann's problematic for a critical examination. Once the limitations of the genetic structuralist problematic have been established, an outline of the Althusserian problematic will be designed along with the application of the problematic to the analysis of the data selected.

Historicism, in the form practiced by Lukacs and Goldmann, takes as its central proposition the notion that man creates history. This proposition is the antithesis of Hegel's absolute spirit. However, in formulating the central proposition in opposition to absolute spirit the result is not a new philosophy. Rather history becomes absolute and as such is simply a substitute for Hegel's absolute spirit. In this sense, Althusser argues that historicism is

idealism. Lukács, in the preface to History and Class Consciousness, realizes in retrospect that he made errors which stemmed from idealist assumptions. But this is not a dismissal of the historicist problematic. Giving the proletariat the quality of the absolute covered a host of epistemological and methodological problems which became reduced to and embraced within the concept of praxis, as we have seen. The problem of objectivity of science and ideology, of philosophy, and hence, philosophers, is resolved in concrete historical practice. In the case of the philosopher this practice is of a political nature. Althusser thus charges that the reduction of the historicist problematic to practice is limited as there can be no distinction drawn between religion, ideology, philosophy, and Marxist theory. In short, the distinction of levels, that is, the distance between science and ideology, for example, becomes lost.

Giving history the quality of the absolute, suggests that the historicist Marxist retains the Hegelian totality in the sense that no analytic distinction may be made between the levels of the structure of the totality. The historicist, therefore, cannot demonstrate the relative autonomy of the levels of the structure. The Althusserian Marxist totality, on the other hand, "does not have the same structure as the Hegelian totality, and in particular it contains different levels or instances which do not directly express one another." ⁹ The Althusserian criticism of historicism as harbouring the Hegelian totality which tends to "flatten out

⁹ ibid. p. 132.
the Marxist totality" argues that it gives a "linear view of history." History is seen as an accumulative process, and as such, its essential moments are not distinguishable. Without the distinction between the levels, the role of politics, theory, philosophy, etc. cannot be distinguished, as Althusser argues:

"It is not enough to reduce to a minimum the distance within the social structure between the site of theoretical, philosophical and scientific formations on the one hand and political practice which might show the relationship between philosophy and politics or theory and practice in a manner which reveals the distinction between the levels." 10

This critique of historicism may be extended to Goldmann's genetic structuralism in that Goldmann, like Lukács, reduces the problem of knowledge to the overarching concept of praxis. Zimmerman argues that the concept of praxis in the genetic structuralist problematic is necessary and basic. 11 By this he means that the various concepts developed by Goldmann are rooted, or find their validity in praxis. Piaget's structuralist influence on Goldmann is grounded in Lukács' theory and practice combination. The concepts of equilibrium, de-structuration, and structuration, in this light, are descriptive concepts for the generic concept of praxis. This is necessary if Goldmann is to be distinguished from static forms of Parsonian Structuralism. Goldmann's anti-scientist (like that of Weber, Mannheim, and especially Lukács), humanist, and evolutionist assumptions are outgrowths of Lukács' historicism.

"...His assumption of the social determinancy of ideas is complemented by a view of theory in general as consciousness and of Marxism in particular as critical philosophy, rather than as science: 'The knowledge of social and historical life is not science but

10 ibid. p.132.
consciousness, although it must obviously strive towards the attainment of a rigor and precision comparable to those achieved by the natural sciences.

"Lukacs avoided the total relativism of social determinism by postulating that only the proletariat, as the living negation of capitalist society and the subject of history, can achieve correct and objective knowledge - the proletariat 'simultaneously knows and constitutes society'. Goldmann follows Lukacs in espousing this essentialist conception of the proletariat and in denying the possibility of a social science - his view of history is diametrically opposed to that of Marx, Lenin and Mao. Goldmann subsumes theory and practice under the wider concept, praxis, which expresses the totality of man's action on society, and he fails to distinguish them as two separate levels of practice." 12

It is important to point out that Althusser's critique of the historicist's reductionism of the problems of knowledge to the concrete, that is praxis, does not mean to suggest an abandonment of the concept of praxis by Althusser. Rather, the concept of praxis is of seminal importance to the Althusserian problematic. In developing the concept of praxis, Althusser borrows from Engels and Mao Tse-Tung. Mao posits three levels of praxis: ideological, economic, and political. Althusser adds a fourth level, viz., the theoretical. To understand what Althusser means by this fourth level it is useful to review Mao's position.

The problem of understanding, knowing, or cognition is fundamentally bound with practice in the sense that it takes place in society. Mao provides examples of the relationship between cognition and practice. For our purposes, we may make a distinction

12 Glucksmann, 1971, p.52.
between cognition I and cognition II. The example Mao uses to elaborate upon these two levels of cognition is the Chinese tourist. Upon arrival the tourist receives only sense perceptions and impressions. These are the external relations of things. One perceives topography, streets, houses and various particular objects. At this stage of cognition man cannot form concepts "which are deeper or draw logical conclusions". This is the first stage of praxis. Over time and further interaction, i.e., as praxis continues, one begins to formulate concepts. "Concepts are no longer the phenomena, the separate aspects and the external relations of things; they grasp the essence of things." 13 From this second level of cognition, one may develop further by means of judgement and inference, the ability to draw logical conclusions. We begin to see here the source of Althusser's concept of theoretical practice.

For Mao, as well as for Althusser, there are levels of praxis. At this point we depart from the historicist argument of revolutionary, or political praxis (as espoused by Lukacs). These levels are seen in social structure, lower and higher levels of production, etc. Similarly, there are higher and lower levels of knowledge. There can be seen knowledge which is many-sided, one-sided, shallower and deeper. In all cases the criteria for choice for judgement of what is valid or correct, in the final instance, is worked out in some form of social practice. In this respect the

concept of practice includes theoretical reflection, economic activity, cultural activity; in short, it is man living in society. Knowledge, then "is inseparable from direct experience." Whereas Lukacs, and argues Althusser, Gramsci, resolve the problem of knowledge by reducing it to political practice, Mao argues the criteria to include ideological, political and economic practice.

"...The perceptual and the rational are qualitatively different, but are not-divorced from each other; they are unified on the basis of practice. Our practice proves that what is perceived cannot be at once comprehended and that only what is comprehended can be more deeply perceived. Perception only solves the problem of phenomenon, theory alone can solve the problem of essence. The solving of both these problems is not separable in the slightest degree from practice. Whoever wants to know a thing has no way of doing so except by coming into contact with it; that is, by living (practicing) in its environment..."

"Man's social practice is not confined to activity in production, but takes many other forms - class struggle, political life, scientific and artistic pursuits; in short, as a social being, man participates in all spheres of the practical life of society. Thus man, in varying degrees, comes to know the different relations between man and man not only through his material life but also through his political and cultural life." 14

Theoretical Practice and the Argument for Science

The fourth form of practice, in addition to economic, political, and ideological practice, is theoretical. Economic practice is the transformation of some aspect(s) of nature into

14 ibid. p.56.
a commodity form via human labour. Political practice is activity aimed at the transformation of social relations. Ideological practice has to do with the changing of a "relation to the lived world into a new relation by ideological struggle." Theoretical practice "transforms ideology into knowledge with theory, or in other words, this form of practice "is a specific, scientific theoretical practice." 15 Science is not distinguished from ideology in the sense that it is true and ideology is false. Rather, the distinction is drawn in the fact that ideology is dominated by the practical, social dimension. This suggests that science, for Althusser, and at the same time theory are grounded in axioms, or assumptions which are not testable as such. Ideology and ideological practice take as their immediate object the social base to which they are responsible. In this sense theoretical practice is preceded by ideological practice, in that science is produced by making an "epistemological break" with ideology while at the same time allowing ideology to survive alongside it.

If science is distinguished from ideology and given a "relative autonomy" from other forms of practice, then the question may be posed to the Althusserian problematic as to how, or on what criteria, is validity to be claimed (especially scientific validity, or claims to knowledge). In short, the criteria are found in the axiomatics. In other words, the criteria for validity is internal. This is argued on the basis that science only occurs at the leve

of abstract thought. Science or theory is seen as the formation of concepts which have to do with empirical objects. However, theoretical practice and the validity of its results are not based on empirical verification, but are internally guaranteed, given the argument of the "relative autonomy" of science with other social formations. 16

Althusser differs radically with both Lukacs and Mannheim in defending the idea that science is not socially determined. This is a key to understanding the problem of validity. For Althusser science or theoretical practice (the two terms appear to be interchangeable) is a form of production, "with its own internal organization" that maintains a relative "independence" from all other societal levels. Glucksmann emphasizes this central proposition and summarizes the steps and implications which surround it:

"He maintains both that theoretical practice is a specific one and that its products or results and their validity are independent of their embeddedness in the social structure, and that theory is a form of production. All his other propositions about science and scientific method hinge on this."

"In his theory of production in general and of theoretical production, in particular, Althusser distinguishes between raw material, means of production, and resultant product, and he calls these generalities I, II, and III. Generality I represents the first matter which science transforms into specific concepts and concrete knowledge, viz. generality III. Science thus operates in transforming generality I into generality III by means of generality II which is the means of production of this transformation. ... This view is in strict contrast to what Althusser dubs as the 'empiricist' approach which assumes that science works from something given whose 'essence' constitutes knowledge and is reached

by abstraction. For him the real distinction between the abstract and the concrete is between generality I and generality III rather than between concrete, real and abstract sciences... Excessive reliance on generality I results in empiricism where knowledge is believed to flow from the raw material and speculation is the necessary concomitant of reliance on generality III." 17

The position is opposed to relativism which takes as its criteria for knowledge the accumulation of partial knowledge (Mannheim). At the same time, it does not rely on a catch-all category of the transformability of knowledge into political revolutionary practice (Lukacs and Goldmann). Moreover, the criteria for knowledge rests in the "adequate conceptualization of the elements of the social formation." 18 The objectivity of science rests on this proposition. The goal of science, therefore, is not prediction, but "correct knowledge". Correct knowledge is truth, achieved by theoretical production. We will return to the problem of how the adequacy of the conceptualization is guaranteed, but first a discussion of the various propositions that formulate the Althusserian model of science is necessary.

III Theory and Methodology

The Science of Historical Materialism

We have now distinguished science from ideology. Ideology is considered as the lived relation between people; science is knowledge in the abstract, relatively independent from other

17 ibid. p.116
18 ibid. p.118
practices and instances, or levels of activity. Before we present the propositions and arguments surrounding the concept of ideology, we will first elaborate the propositions which together formulate the Althusserian argument for science. For the Althusserian, historical materialism is the science of the transformation of social formations. Social formation or society is understood by the Althusserians as consisting of an economic base (infrastructure) and a cultural, ideological, political, and legal superstructure. The key theoretical concept of the science of historical materialism is the mode of production. Although there may be many different modes of production making up a social formation, the economic base or mode of production in the last instance determines all others. 19 Balibar suggests three fundamental elements of the economic base: (1) the labourer

---

19 It is clear that the concept of the mode of production is central to the Althusserian problematic. There are two different meanings attached to the concept. One, adhered to and developed mainly by Balibar, is that the mode of production is a concept restricted to description of the economic base. Another usage of the concept follows the meaning that there are several modes of production which make up a social formation, and that it is the economic mode of production which is the determining mode of production in the last instance. Although Balibar's depiction of the elements of the economic mode of production are presented here, it is the latter meaning which is attached to the concept of mode of production. Legro et al. are helpful in defining this broader meaning of the concept of mode of production: A mode of production "refers exclusively to the whole composed of (1) an economic base and (2) the superstructural apparatuses for the replication over time of the economic base." See Legros et al. "Economic Base, Mode of Production, and Social Formation: A Discussion of Marx's Terminology," in Dialectical Anthropology (Vol.4, 1979) pp.244-249. Balibar acknowledges the problem in distinguishing between social formation and economic base, suggesting the problem needs more work. See Althusser, Balibar, 1970. p.207.
(2) the means of production, and (3) the non-labourer. Before expanding the definition of mode of production to include aspects of the superstructure, we will first elaborate these three elements.

The first element stems from the materialist argument that the first activity of man is to create the material means of existence. This suggests that direct labour is a necessary element of a mode of production. In short, someone must supply the means of subsistence by applying labour power directly to the production process.

The second element of the economic mode of production is the means of production. The combination of the means and the labourer is a necessary pre-requisite for the creation of the commodity. "The specific manner in which this combination is accomplished distinguishes the different epochs of the structure of one society from another." 20 The means of production includes not only land, labour and capital, but also, in the combination with the first element, defines the object of labour and the means of labour. 21

A third element of the economic base is non-labour, or the capitalist. This element appropriates surplus value. Profit, or surplus value is appropriated by the capitalists' organization of the social division of labour. This organization is related to the ownership of property; that is, the non-labourer owns property

and the labourer does not. The social division of labour is a necessary condition of production in that the individual does not produce, collectivities produce. The capitalist form of production is self-expanding, in the sense that its raison d'etre is to appropriate surplus value from direct labour. Balibar calls this a "double articulation of the mode of production". This is expanded in the following:

"In the capitalist mode of production, the labour process is such that individual labour does not set to work the society's means of production, which are the only means of production able to function as such. Without the capitalists' 'control', which is a technically indispensable moment of the labour process, labour does not possess the fitness it requires if it is to be social labour; i.e., labour used by society and recognized by it. The fitness peculiar to the capitalist mode of production implies the cooperation and division of the functions of control and execution. It is a form of the second connection I have discussed, which can now be defined as the direct producers' ability to set to work the means of social production."

Balibar continues:

"This double function is an index of what I shall call the double nature of the division of labour in production (the technical division of labour and the social division of labour)." 22

Now that the central concept of economic mode of production has been defined it is possible to state the principles by which the transformations of social formulations, which are combinations of one or more modes of production, might be carried out. The problem of the transformation of history into science is based broadly on two principles: periodization and the articulation of

22 ibid. p.214.
different practices. Periodization is the actual description of historical epochs. It is synchronic and as such concerned with the problem of description. Periodization "distributes history according to the epochs of its economic structure". 24 Articulation of the different practices has to do with the approach to the study of a subject. It is diachronic. Articulation refers to the construct in which the social formation is presented as constituted of three levels, the economic base, the legal and political superstructure, and the forms of social consciousness. The link between periodization and articulation is correspondence. The correspondence of the historical epoch to the actual social structure; that is, the articulation of the different practices is a complex homology of structures rather than a linear correspondence. This correspondence is developed (presumably) by depicting the various elements which compose the form of the mode of production within a particular social formation, at a particular cross-section within a particular historical epoch.

To this point in our discussion we have depicted elements of the economic mode of production, which in the last instance is thought of as the determining mode of production. At the same time, other modes of production, such as ideological and political, are necessary in that the elements of a mode of production must both produce and reproduce themselves. This brings us to the

concept of reproduction, one which requires some explanation.

Reproduction

In order for a society to exist it must reproduce all elements of the mode of production. This is fundamental in the sense that what is used up in production, raw material, machines, buildings which house factories, labour power, the social and technical division of labour, etc., must be reproduced in order that production may occur. This is what Althusser means when he says reproduction is like an 'endless chain'. In short, both the productive forces (means of production and labour power) and the relations of production (social and technical division of labour and all other class relations) are "two articulations" of the mode of production. The two articulations which make up the mode of production combine labourers, means of production, and non-labourers. In order to communicate this 'double articulation', the process of reproduction of the conditions of production, means of production, labour power, and relations of production, must be kept in mind.

The reproduction of the means of production seem simple enough given that there are certain physical pre-requisites necessary for production to take place. The reproduction of labour power is slightly more complex. Firstly, labour must be physically reproduced, hence, the wage received from the 'firm' allows him to feed, shelter, and clothe himself. But he must also come to the workplace with the right skills, and the right attitude, which for
Althusser means 'submission to the rules'. This reproduction takes place, for the most part, outside the workplace, in some ideological state apparatus.  

The Ideological State Apparatuses

A Marxist theory of the state, argues Althusser, maintains first and foremost that the state is a repressive apparatus. By this it is meant that the state apparatus achieves its power in the last instance by violence or the threat of violence. Among the repressive state apparatuses are included the police, the courts, prisons, the army, etc. The state "has no meaning except as a function of class power", which is to say that class struggle is focused around the state, in that the power of the state is in the possession of some class or the agents of some class who are in the process of struggling to maintain state power.  

The state apparatus and state power are distinguished on the basis that the former is "the objective of the political class struggle", whereas the state apparatus includes other functions which are not immediately affected by state power.  

In other words, the state apparatus is the broader framework around which class struggle takes place.

The distinction between state power and state apparatus is necessary.

---

26 ibid. p.140.
27 ibid. p.141.
in that a seizure of state power may occur without affecting the state apparatus. 28 For Althusser, the classical marxist theory of the state argues: (1) the state is a repressive apparatus, (2) a distinction must be drawn between the state apparatus and state power, (3) state power is the object of class struggle; this is worked out by using the state apparatus to secure or maintain state power and (4) the proletarian revolution must be the process of destructuring the state apparatus. 29

Althusser claims that a fifth element must be added to the marxist theory of the state, viz., the ideological state apparatus. 30 Immediately a distinction is drawn between the repressive ideological state apparatus (hereafter referred to as R.S.A.) and the ideological state apparatus (hereafter referred to as I.S.A.). This distinction is based on the R.S.A.'s reliance on physical violence in ensuring that 'conditions' of reproduction are met, and the I.S.A. then carrying out the reproduction itself. The I.S.A. operates with ideology and the R.S.A. operates with violence. The

28 By this it is meant that under some conditions the seizure of state power does not change the overall purpose of the state apparatus. Althusser cites the example of the bourgeois revolutions of the 19th century. For an elaboration see Althusser, 1971. pp.140-141.

29 ibid. p.141.

30 ibid. p.143. Althusser provides a short list of ideological state apparatuses which include: the religious, the educational, the family, the legal, the political, the trade-union, the communications (press, radio and television, etc.), the cultural (literature, the arts, sports, etc.).
R.S.A. does not operate with violence alone; it relies on ideology—we all have a little policeman in our minds. However, the R.S.A. is supported in the last instance by the fact of physical violence, whereas the I.S.A. is not. At the same time the two are mutually supportive. In a sense, if the I.S.A. does a good job of reproduction, particularly of the relations of production, there is little need for the R.S.A., although its presence is always necessary. All state apparatuses function by both repression and ideology but the emphasis on violence is greater for the R.S.A., and the emphasis on ideology is greater for the I.S.A. A second factor which distinguishes the I.S.A. from the R.S.A. is that the latter constitutes an organized whole secured by an organizational head. The former, on the other hand, is a multiple collection of apparatuses which are often distinct and relatively autonomous from one another. The I.S.A.'s are not held together under an organizational head as such; rather "the unity of the different I.S.A.'s is secured, usually in contradictory forms, by the ruling ideology, the ideology of the ruling class." Althusser outlines the dual purpose these two apparatuses serve for reproduction, and especially for the reproduction of the relations of production, in the following:

"The role of the repressive state apparatus, insofar as it is a repressive apparatus, consists essentially in securing by force (physical or otherwise) the political conditions of the reproduction of relations of production which are in the last resort 'relations of exploitation'. Not only does the state apparatus contribute generously to its own reproduction (the capitalist state contains political dynasties, military dynasties, etc.), but also and above all, the state apparatus secures by repression (from the most brutal physical force, via mere administrative commands and
interdictions to open and tacit censorship) the political conditions for the action of the Ideological State Apparatus."

"In fact it is the latter which largely secures the reproduction specifically of the relations of production, behind a 'shield' provided by the repressive state apparatus. It is here that the role of the ruling ideology is heavily concentrated, the ideology of the ruling class, which holds state power. It is the intermediation of the ruling ideology that ensures a (sometimes teeth-gritting) 'harmony' between the repressive state apparatus and the Ideological State Apparatuses, and between the different State Ideological Apparatuses." 31

Reproduction of the relations of production is not separate from reproduction of the productive forces; (see above) they are a dual articulation of a mode of production and therefore, reproduction within the I.S.A. serves yet a further purpose, viz, reproduction of labour power. Mentioned above was the problem of the necessity to reproduce not only the physical pre-requisites of labour but also the correct attitudes (which means class relations and hence relations of production), and provide the skills needed in the work place. In the modern industrial capitalist world these criteria are met, argues Althusser, at least initially by the educational I.S.A. In fact, Althusser goes so far as to suggest that the educational I.S.A. serves a purpose equal to that of the church in medieval society. In the contemporary context no other I.S.A. "has the obligatory audience of the totality of the children in the capitalist social formation, eight hours a day, five or sometimes six days a week". 32 The educational I.S.A. is in

31 ibid. pp.149-150.
32 ibid. p.155.
example of an I.S.A. which contributes to both the reproduction of the relations of production (class structure) and the productive forces (labour power; that is, skills).

Thus far, in this section, we briefly outlined an approach to the ideological state apparatuses, which must be distinguished from the R.S.A. It has been argued that the analysis of these state apparatuses must be undertaken from the point of view of reproduction of the elements which combined formulate the mode of production in a society. This reproduction occurs under the rubric of the I.S.A. in conjunction with the R.S.A. in that the latter guarantees the political conditions of reproduction by violence, or the threat of violence. The state apparatus, in general, is the framework around which class struggle occurs. The I.S.A., a part of that framework, reproduces both productive forces (labour power) and relations of production (class relations). The educational I.S.A. reproduces both labour power, by teaching skills, and class relations, by producing and instilling class ideology. Before we can approach the third level of the Althusserian problematic; that is, the empirical illustration of the problematic, the pivotal concept of ideology needs further elaboration.

**Ideology**

The term ideology was first used by Cabanis, Destutt de Tracy, and others who used it to signify a theory of ideas. Marx in his early works, defined ideology as the "system of ideas and representations which dominate the mind of a man or a social
group." For Mannheim, idea systems are either ideological, in that they attempt to maintain social relations, or utopian in that they are designed to change the social formation. Lukacs, and later Goldmann, use the term ideology in a more negative sense, as referring to a covering up of real material or class interest. These conceptions of ideology (Mannheim, Lukacs, Goldmann) might be argued, by the Althusserian problematic, as being grounded in the younger Marx, especially in *The 1844 Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* and *The German Ideology*. Althusser outlines this usage of ideology in the following.

"Ideology, then is for Marx an imaginary assemblage (bricolage), a pure dream, empty and vain, constituted by the 'days' residues from the only full and positive reality, that of the concrete history of concrete material individuals materially producing their existence. It is on this basis that ideology has no history in *The German Ideology*, since its history is outside it, where the only existing history is, the history of concrete individuals, etc. In *The German Ideology*, the thesis that ideology has no history is therefore a purely negative thesis since it means both:

1. ideology is nothing insofar as it is a pure dream (manufactured by who knows what power: if not the alienation of the division of labor, but that too is a negative determination);
2. ideology has no history, which emphatically does not mean that there is no history in it (on the contrary, for it is merely the pale, empty and inverted reflection of real history) but that it has no history of its own."  

Althusser takes from *The German Ideology*, in his usage of the term ideology, the thesis that ideology has no history. However, it is argued that the adoption of this thesis differs from the historicist treatment it receives in the younger Marx. The difference from

---

33 ibid. p.158.
34 ibid. p.160.
The historicist treatment lies in the distinction, made by Althusser, between particular ideologies (religious, ethical, legal, etc.) and ideology in general, which is infinite and has no history (because history is external to it). The general theory of ideology is thought to have a structure of its own; that is, relatively independent of material practice. This structure is a non-historical reality; i.e., "it is infinite or omni-historical "in the sense in which the communist manifesto defines history as the history of class struggle." Althusser uses this distinction between particular ideology and ideology in general as a point of departure from which are launched five major theses for a general theory of ideology.

Thesis 1 - "Ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence." 35

This thesis suggests two processes of ideology. The first is that ideology, although it may not correspond to reality (a belief in God for example) may be interpreted as representing an allusion to reality. Thus, the imaginary representation is both an illusion and an allusion, in the sense that it distorts reality and at the same time refers to it. Secondly, it is not the real conditions of reality which are presented in ideology but the relations of men to the real conditions of existence which are presented. "It is this relation that is at the center of every ideological world." 36

35 ibid. p.162.

36 ibid. p.164.
other words, ideology does not represent the actual class relations in a society, but rather, the imaginary relations in the social formation.

Thesis 2 - "Ideology has a material existence." 37

The argument here is that ideology does not exist in a vacuum, or spiritual world. Rather, ideology emanates from the material world. Ideology always exists within some social apparatus. Insofar as ideology exists in an apparatus it is a practice. Ideology is seen to have a material existence in the sense that ideas are seen as "material actions inserted into material practices governed by material rituals which are themselves defined by the material ideological apparatus..." 38 Two theses follow from this argument:

Thesis 3 - "there is no practice except by and in an ideology."

Thesis 4 - "there is no ideology except by the subject and for subjects." 38

Once the materialist argument is accepted, then the idea of a spiritual criteria for the existence of ideology disappears, leaving the "terms, subject, consciousness belief, actions, practices, rituals, ideological apparatuses." 39 The conception of ideology thus takes on the following argument: there is no ideology outside

37 ibid. p.165.


39 ibid. p.169.
the subject (either an individual or a class). The subject exists only insofar as it is engaged in some action, some practice, which in turn is visible only as ideology. Practice takes place in terms of some ritual; that is, some structural form that is ongoing. For example, in Québécois culture when we meet an old friend who is female we exchange kisses. In English North American culture this occurs only under certain circumstances. In French culture one shakes hands with male acquaintances, and exchanges kisses with females (also the number of kisses that occur depend on the region of France). These are examples of rituals which are determined 'in the last instance' by the ideological apparatuses. But this brings us to the fifth thesis, which Althusser argues is the most important.

Thesis 5 - "Ideology interpellates individuals as subjects" 40

This thesis is a refinement of thesis 4. The subject is the center of all ideology. The individual is transformed into the subject of ideology in that the purpose of ideology is to 'hail' or call the individuals as subjects, to interpelate. Althusser offers the following elaboration of the individual as subject, which is what we are trying to get at here:

"There are individuals walking along. Somewhere (usually behind them) the hail rings out: 'Hey you there.' One individual (nine times out of ten is the right one) turns around, believing/suspecting/deciding that it is for him; i.e., recognizing 'that it really is he' who is meant by the hailing... The existence of ideology and the hailing or interpellation of individuals as subjects are one and the same thing."

40 ibid. p.170.
"I might add: what thus seems to take place outside ideology... in reality takes place in ideology. What really takes place in ideology seems therefore to take place outside it. That is why those who are in ideology believe themselves by definition to be outside it: one of the effects of ideology is the practical denegation of the ideological character of ideology by ideology: ideology never says 'I am ideological! It is necessary to be outside ideology; i.e. in scientific knowledge, to be able to say: 'I am in ideology' (a quite exceptional case, or the general case) I was in ideology... the accusation of being in ideology only applies to 'others', never to oneself... which amounts to saying that ideology has no outside (for itself), but at the same time that it is nothing but outside (for science and reality)."

Now that the five seminal arguments, concerning Althusser's theory of ideology in general have been reviewed, it becomes possible to reveal the form of ideology. Althusser argues that "the formal structure of all ideology is always the same". With this in mind, the following elements might be seen to comprise the formal structure of ideology. The general structure of ideology is 'the duplicate mirror-structure'. To understand this, a distinction must be drawn between the absolute subject and the individual subject. For example, God is an absolute subject and His followers, the individual subjects, are trying to reflect the absolute Subject; hence, the double mirror-structure. The individual is transformed into a subject via the interpellation of the absolute Subject. This is in the form of "their subjection to the Subject". The double mirror-structure allows the subjects to recognize one another, and reinforce the belief "that everything really is so, and on the condition that the subjects recognize what they are and behave.

41 ibid. p.175.
accordingly, everything will be all right..." 42 Althusser discusses the effects of this quadruple system in the following:

"Result: caught in this quadruple system of interpellation as subjects, of subjection to the Subject, of universal recognition and of absolute guarantee, the subjects 'work', they 'work by themselves' in the vast majority of cases, with the exception of the bad 'subjects' who on occasion provoke the intervention of one of the detachments of the (repressive) state apparatus. But the vast majority of (good) subjects work all right 'all by themselves', i.e. by ideology (whose concrete forms are realized in the Ideological State Apparatuses). They are inserted into practices governed by the rituals of the I.S.A.'s. They 'recognize' the existing state of affairs..., that 'it really is true'..." 43

IV Application

We have now worked our way to a point where it becomes possible to illustrate the problematic in an analysis of a concrete social fact. Strictly speaking, an analysis from the Althusserian problematic of a cultural product such as a radio-drama script would not necessarily begin with the fact itself. Both the problematics of Mannheim and Goldmann house propositions which seem to suggest that we begin with the social fact as a departure point for analysis, given the emphasis on historical location. Mannheim suggested the three meanings of the world view as the content, expressive and documentary. Goldmann, following Lukacs, argued the work itself as the first step in the analysis. In this

42 ibid. pp.177-181. The absolute subject is given a capital s, to distinguish it from the individual subject(s) which are given a small s.

43 ibid. p.181. Althusser also notes the ambiguous nature of the subject as being both (1) free and independent, and (2) subordinate to authority.
sense, it might be argued that both Mannheim and Goldmann place their emphasis on the analysis of how the work was created, in the sense of its emergence from some historically specific social milieu. Althusser, on the other hand, seemingly would focus analysis on the effects that the work might have on consciousness in the sense of reproducing relations of production and labour power. Despite the existence of this difference between these two sets of problematics, an analysis of the radio-drama script, "A Way Through the Wood", serves as a useful illustration of Althusser's discussion of ideology, generalities II and III, and the distinction between science and ideology. At this juncture, the intent of the application is therefore one of illustration.

Althusser, like Goldmann, argues the necessity of uncovering the deeper relations of a work of literature. It is not the actors, or the explicit relations between the characters, but the 'latent structure' of the play that is of interest. This latent structure, or deep structure, is thought of as the dynamic structure. The deep meaning in the dynamic structure is in the relationship between consciousness (ideology) and the real conditions of existence (in the world of the play). Althusser, in his essay on 'The Piccolo Teatro: Bertolazzi and Brecht, Notes on a Materialist Theatre', in *For Marx*, elaborates this relation in the following:

---

44 The reader is referred to the précis of the play offered in Chapter III.
"This relation... abstract in itself can only be acted and represented as characters, their gestures and their acts, and their 'history' only as a relation which goes beyond them while implying them; that is, as a relation setting to work abstract structural elements, their imbalance and hence their dynamic. This relation is necessarily latent in so far as it cannot be exhaustively thematized by any 'character' without ruining the whole critical project; that is why, even if it is implied by the action as a whole, beyond their consciousness and thus hidden from them; visible to the spectator in the mode of perception which is not given, but has to be discerned, conquered and drawn from the shadow which initially envelopes it, and yet produced it." 45

Framework of Analysis

The technique employed in the Goldmann problematic does not contradict the Althusserian problematic, in that the technique uncovers data which allows the problematic to distinguish between the surface level (objective content, or story line) and the underlying relations (the deep structure). It follows that the data uncovered in the illustrative analysis in Chapter IV might be analysed from the Althusserian problematic. We are not searching strictly speaking, for a 'homology of structures'. Rather, given the Althusserian emphasis on the effect of the cultural product on consciousness (argued above), the analysis is focused on the world of the play; that is, an analysis of the deep latent structure it rests on. It is assumed that a critical literary analysis will uncover the hidden dynamic of the play, which is thought of as valuable information from which another analysis might formulate the effect of the play on the spectator. In short, the Althusserian

45 Althusser, 1969, p.164.
problematic will add to what Mannheim and Goldmann have already uncovered, using their results as a point of departure for the analysis of the deep structure. The data from which the analysis begins has to do with the two major themes and their interrelation (Toy, the corporate man theme, and Jean the existential humanist theme).

The Althusserian depiction of the formal structure of ideology is the framework from which the analysis is to be made. This framework is an extension of the five theses for a 'general theory of ideology', argued above. The framework of analysis is composed of the following principles:

1) The formal structure of ideology is a double mirror structure in that a distinction is made between the larger Subject and the individual subjects that reflect it.

2) "Ideology interpellates individuals as subject." 46 In other words, ideology allows individuals to know themselves as subjects. An individual may recognize himself as a subject by his response to the symbol of the larger Subject. This will become clearer in the analysis.

3) The subjection of the subject to the Subject.

4) The knowledge the subject believes to be true is reinforced by recognizing other subjects.

Using this framework the results uncovered by the structur-alist technique may now be reconsidered. The method of analysis is

---

to interpret the results (the two major themes in the play) from the point of view of the double mirror structure of ideology, and the purpose this structure has in the world of the play.

The first distinction to be drawn has to do with the Subject and the subjects which reflect and reinforce it. In both the content analysis (Mannheim) and the structuralist analysis (Goldmann) two major themes corresponding to two major characters, Roy and Jean, seem to be at the center of the play. These two themes, the corporate man theme, Subject I, and the existential humanist theme, Subject II, are in opposition to one another, and as such formulate the principle contradiction of the play. These Subjects are seen as the representations "of the imaginary relationships of individuals to their real conditions of existence." 47 The corporate ideology (Subject I) is reflected by Roy (a subject of Subject I) and his supporting characters. The existential humanist theme (Subject II) is reflected by Jean and her supporting characters (subjects of Subject II). Before we can apply the framework of analysis to the script we must first keep in mind that these Subjects have a material existence. For both Subject I and Subject II that existence is the family ideological state apparatus. Even though some of the action on the surface level of the play takes place outside the "home" (the scenes in the country, the scenes at the office, etc.), the subjects

47 ibid. p.162.
are all grounded in the material conditions of the family ideological state apparatus. The practice of these subjects is material in that it occurs within the rubric of the F.I.S.A. (the family ideological state apparatus), which is determined in the last instance by the economic base.

Keeping in mind the above propositions we may now ask: how does the interpellation of the individual as subject occur? The response to this question will in turn point to the underlying dynamic, or the relation between the ideology of the characters and the real conditions of their existence; that is, the deep structure of the play. The hailing of the individual as subject occurs via two clusters of symbols or images: These images are 'The Great Mother Image' and the positive rural/negative city image. 48

We are first introduced to the mother image in the flower shop, the play's opening scene, where Roy (si of SI) buys some roses for Mother's Day. 49 Here we see Roy's first reflection of Subject I, through the belief, the internalization, of the benevolent

---

48 These symbols were first depicted by Howard Fink who used a Northrop Frye style of literary analysis. This style of analysis is based on archetypes. See Howard Fink, et al., 1980.

49 si of SI refers to Roy as subject number one (si) of the large Subject (SI) which is the corporate man theme. Jean, see below, is referred to as si of SI, or subject one of the second large Subject, which is the existential humanist theme. Other characters are assigned a small s with a number indicating their importance in terms of reflecting the larger Subject. Along with a small s and a number is also attached the number I or II of the larger Subject to which they belong.
mother image. The benevolent mother image is further seen in Jean's mother (sii of SI) who is supportive in times of crisis. But the mother image is portrayed in a negative capacity as well, thus giving it a double structure. The two flower girls (sii and siii of SI), use Mother's Day to manipulate men for profit. Peter (siv of SII) replaces the benevolent mother image with the image of the mother as "a mean, greedy, tramp" who has forced her son into homosexuality. Jean, herself a mother, portrays the negative mother image when she leaves Roy, who appears at that point as a helpless child. In the final scenes, Ruth (siii of SI) fulfills a negative image via the manipulating of Roy, who in the end confesses that Ruth, like mother, knows best.

The positive rural image is contrasted with the negative mechanistic image of the city. Jean's (sib of SII) journey to her mother's (sii of SI) in the country is seen as a time for peace and quiet, a rest from the city "whose negative qualities are identified with the materialism and cynicism of Roy's business." The Chasiks (sv of SII), an immigrant couple, are the artisans, who further represent the positive image of the rural. At the end of the play Roy adds to this contrast by characterizing himself as a machine:

"You know what man is... like a machine... when he's running efficiently he can do the best job in the world. But just like a machine he's got to be looked after. A mechanic, he knows how to..., you're the mechanic." 50

---

50 Alan King, 1951, p.45.
The positive rural/negative city is also reversible
giving its imagery a double structure, as the mother image has.
Jean's visit to the country is to be brief. Her real life,
indeed the only life, was in the city. The Chasiks (sv of SII)
cannot in fact go back to the old values. The Chasiks left
their extended family ideological state apparatus for the nuclear
North American F.I.S.A., thus giving a negative tendency to the
positive rural image.

These two clusters of double structured symbols allow
the subjects of Subject I and Subject II to recognize each other
as subjects. The individual is interpellated as a subject by a
symbol. In this play the symbols are also double structured, in
that they are serving as rallying points for both sets of subjects.
Jean (si of SII) sees herself as subject, both in opposition to
other subjects, who are interpellated by the opposition of the
symbol (representing the opposing Subject), and in accordance
with the subjects that reflect her own Subject. For example,
Jean immediately recognizes the Chasiks (sv of SII) as subjects
of Subject II. This recognition helps reinforce, or guarantee
what she already believes to be true, and allows her to recognize
the subject (Chasiks) as subject. Roy (si of SII), on the other
hand, is in opposition with Jean (si of SII). This dialectical
contradiction, as we have suggested, is the principle contradiction
of the play. Its final synthesis is the negation of Jean (si of SII)
(the play concludes with Jean's melancholy musical theme - svi
of SII) and the unity of Roy and Ruth (si and siii of SI).
Ultimately, Roy's Subject is the absolute Subject of the play.
The subjection of Jean to Subject II is clear in her departure from Roy. The demands of Subject II; that is, the antagonistic contradiction between Subject I and Subject II, have forced Jean to give up the financially and socially secure world of the family ideological apparatus, for an unknown future. Here we see the deep structure, or the dynamic, of the play. At this juncture we see the cross-section of the play which reveals the relation between the ideology (Subject II, and Subject I) and the real conditions of existence. The real conditions of Jean's existence are revealed to us in her conversations with her mother (sii of SI) regarding the economic and social price of leaving the family ideological state apparatus. The dynamic then, is Jean's struggle, the ultimate subjection to her Subject (II), and the social and economic consequences of that subjection, which become her material conditions of existence. The relative autonomy of ideology to its material existence allows Jean to leave her role in the family ideological state apparatus for an unknown future. By this it is meant that ideology, as a superstructural phenomena, does not have a one-to-one correspondence with the economic base. Rather, ideology, and other superstructural elements (politics, law, religion, etc.) have a relative autonomy vis-a-vis the economic base, although they are determined, in the last instance by the economic base. Jean's departure from her formal economic base, the F.I.S.A., is an example of this relative autonomy. If the ideology Jean reflects was directly and rigidly ascribed to the material conditions, she would not have been able to leave.
In fact, it never would have occurred to her to leave. But in stating this we are already going beyond our intention, which was to illustrate Althusser's 'general theory of ideology' by applying it to the analysis of the cultural fact under discussion. The conclusion of this analysis has shown the dynamic of the play as the relation between Jean's ideology and her real conditions of existence. This relationship is couched in the negation of Jean's Subject and the final synthesis of the dialectic of the play as the joining and ultimate triumph of Roy and Ruth, the subjects of Subject I over Subject II, Jean's ideology.

V Concluding Remarks

The above analysis drawn from the principles of the 'formal structure of ideology' gives some clues as to what Althusser means by knowledge; that is, generality III. In order to bring these clues to light it is necessary to keep in mind the manner in which the principles of the 'formal structure of ideology' were arrived at. First, ideology is considered as the lived relation between people. It is the imaginary representation of the relations of people to their material existence, and as such it has a material base. This material base is in the actions of individual subjects in that ideological practice always takes place in some state apparatus, and that there is no practice which is not surrounded by ideology. Secondly, the individual knows himself as subject by the hailing of images or symbols that represent a larger subject. The individual subject and the larger Subject, which it reflects constitute the double mirror structure of ideology, used above in
our analysis.

The framework of our analysis, then, rests in the larger project of the Althusserian problematic. On the level of epistemology, the central argument of the Althusserian problematic was revealed in the distinction between science and ideology. The Lukacs/Goldmann problematic (and by implication the Weber/Mannheim problematic) were criticized on the grounds that the historicist assumptions of humanism and anti-scientism lead to the reduction of the problem of knowledge (how do we know what we know) to the catch-all category of praxis. For Althusser, on the other hand, science is distinguished from other forms of thought, such as philosophy (which is seen as subjective), religion, ethics, legal, and general ideology. This distinction differs sharply with the historicist argument of the social determination of thought, or 'perspectivism' (of Mannheim especially, but also Goldmann and Lukacs). The distinction of science from ideology is argued on the basis that science is a different mode of production; it is theoretical production. Science draws on raw material, generality I, and transforms it, via generality II (scientific method), into generality III, knowledge. This knowledge is correct and not relative - it is scientific knowledge.

If we assume, as an example of the above description of scientific practice, that the cultural product, "The Way Through the Wood" is raw data; that is, ideology, then the principles of the 'general theory of ideology' could be thought of as the method of transformation. The method allows us to make a 'break' from generality I and eventually formulate scientific propositions.
The knowledge produced in the application of the problematic is seen in its final form as the depiction of the deep structure, or 'dynamic of the raw data (generality I). Hence, correct knowledge, is in the deep, underlying structure of generality I which can be seen only via scientific practice. The validity of the knowledge produced by the scientific practice is not verified in the 'data', as a positivism would argue, nor is it based in economic, or ideological, or political (as Lukacs argued) practice. On the contrary, the validity of the knowledge (how we know what we know) is based in scientific practice and no other practice, although in the last instance all practice is founded in the economic base of society. In short, scientific knowledge is internally guaranteed. That this is so has to do with the larger argument of the relative autonomy of superstructural phenomena from the economic base.

In our discussion of the science of historical materialism, the science of the transformation of social structures (or theoretical production), we elaborated the materialist base/superstructure metaphor and revealed the central concept of historical materialism as the 'mode of production'. The elements which combined formulate an economic 'mode of production' are: (1) labour (labour power), (2) means of production, which gives labour both a) its object, and b) its means, and (3) non-labour, which contains a property connection and a material appropriation connection (creates surplus value and a social and technical division of labour). It was then argued that both the productive forces (means of production, and labour power) and the relations of production (social
and technical divisions of labour and all other class relations) had to be reproduced if production were to continue. The reproduction of these forces was seen to have taken place in the state apparatus.

Continuing on the level of theory and methodology, a distinction was made between the repressive state apparatus, and the ideological state apparatus, on the basis that the former insured the conditions of production were met, by violence or the threat of violence, and the latter then, behind the screen of the former carried out the reproduction. A discussion of ideology then developed by first distinguishing particular ideology (religious, for example) and 'general ideology'. Following this distinction a series of arguments for 'a general theory of ideology' were offered and the 'formal structure of ideology' was revealed.

Finally, on the level of application, the principles of 'the general theory of ideology' were used as a framework for the analysis of the selected play. The results uncovered by the structuralist technique as employed by the Goldmann problematic were used as a point of departure; that is, generality I. The principles of the framework for analysis, drawn from 'the general theory of ideology, constituted generality II. The deep structure of the play; that is, the main scientific proposition or generality III, was revealed as the relation of Jean's ideology (Subject II) to its real conditions of existence and the final negation of that ideology revealing the synthesis of the two subjects, Roy and Ruth.
Some Ambiguities and Guidelines for a Conclusion

To take an overview of the chapter in order to appreciate its central 'project', to use an Althusserian reference, is a difficult exercise. Partly because this author is so close to it, but also because of the ambiguous nature of Althusser's key concept, Science. Separating science from 'praxis' (in the broadest sense of the term) and developing the criteria of validity in terms of some form of internal clarity, leaves the Althusserians in an ambiguous situation. On the one hand, philosophy, a subjective activity or an ideology, cannot be a science; yet, on the other hand, it must be. Similarly, scientific production, or practice, is intimately bound to political practice yet is severed from it as a determining factor. Still further, scientific practice is distinguished from ideological practice; yet, the argument "there is no practice except by and in an ideology". 51 Althusser, in an interview in 1968, tried again to grapple with this ambiguity, the distinction between science and philosophy, or ideology, and the resistance to reducing science to praxis. 52 Unfortunately, the reader is left with the same apprehension in that the response to the interviewer's question is equally ambiguous. After being asked


52 See the interview translated from Italian entitled, "Philosophy as a Revolutionary Weapon", in the New Left Review (No.64, Nov. 1970) pp.3-9.
how the justification of the distinction between science and
philosophy in Marxist theory might be made, the end of his
response suggested:

"to develop the new science and philosophy with
all the necessary rigour and daring, linking them
to the requirements and interventions of the
practice of the revolutionary class struggle."

And then when asked:

"You have said two apparently different things; 1)
philosophy is basically political; 2) philosophy
is linked to the sciences. How do you conceive
this double relationship?"

The end of his response:

"Marxist-Leninist philosophy, or dialectical material-
ism represents the proletarian class struggle in
theory. In the union of Marxist theory and the
Workers Movement (the ultimate reality of the union
of theory and practice) philosophy ceases, as Marx
said to 'interpret the world'. It becomes a weapon
with which 'to change it; revolution'. 53

It is very difficult to see the difference between Lukacs'
argument and Althusser's at this point. Continuing with the logic
that the two positions (in the broadest sense historicism and
Marxist structuralism) are not so far apart as they seem, what does
this say about the problem of knowledge? On the historicist side
there is the problem of the transference of the Hegelian absolute
to the absolute spirit of the proletariat and the concept of practice,
resulting in an idealist position, according to Althusser. On the
Althusserian side, validity rests in the deep structure, which almost
sounds mystical. Is it an idealist position as well? Glucksman
has some interesting insights on these ambiguities:

53 ibid. pp.5-6.
"One of Althusser's epistemological propositions is that science is not socially determined, but 'relatively autonomous' and irreducible to other practices. He maintains that each science has its own raw material and means of transformation of the raw material with which it produces knowledge. Both the content and the method of the science are internally given: their proof and validation are internally guaranteed and do not depend on external guarantees in the real world." 54

"...reality exists at the level of structural relations between parts of the social formation rather than at the level of individual... human beings, ...individuals, do not, in Althusser's view, constitute a correct unit of study...". 55

"...He certainly retains a view of the procedure of scientific practice as production and transformation of raw material into knowledge, and argues that this applies to all sciences, natural and social, and indeed to all forms of production. But the raison d'être of this meta-science is unclear. Thus we are presented with an apparent internal contradiction Althusser's own thesis on science and scientific proof...". 56

and finally,

"A final element of arbitrariness concerns Althusser's distinction between science and ideology and his lack of definition of scientificity. It is not really enough to say that the sciences contain their own internal guarantees without specifying what these are...". 57

Glucksmann is only one of the Althusserian critiques. There are many more. 58 Many would argue that the Althusserian problematic.

54 Glucksman, 1974. p.98.
55 ibid. p.114.
56 ibid. p.96.
57 ibid. p.137.
58 For a list of critical works on Althusser see the bibliography at the end of Gregor Mclennan, et al., "Althusser's Theory of
when pressed to its logical extreme, collapses into mere sloganism. That this "can of worms" has been opened here, should not force one to think Althusserian hypotheses cannot be developed. On the contrary, this is still possible. However, in the context of this thesis, this possibility may only be pursued by comparing and contrasting the Althusserian, Mannheimian, and Goldmann problematics, in a fashion that will lead to a conclusive set of propositions on all three levels of the thesis; that is, to expound a strategy for the analysis of cultural products.

CHAPTER VI

Conclusion and General Remarks

I Comparison of Problematics: The Highlights

We have now come to the end of a long discussion of which the whole purpose was to put us in a position where a theoretical and methodological strategy could be expounded in order that a base might be founded for the analysis of cultural products. The first step in moving toward this exposition, is to compare the main concepts and arguments of the three problematics reviewed thus far. This comparison does not attempt to defend any propositions rather the defense of the concepts and arguments we are now about to compare was done in the preceding chapters. This comparison continues to follow the three levels of the problematics we have already adopted: the epistemological, theoretical and methodological, and empirical.

Epistemology

Mannheim's epistemology is grounded in the historicist paradigm and it takes as its most basic criteria for the problem of knowledge the notion that truth is partial. The usage of the concept of relationalism never allows Mannheim to escape the problem of relativism in that relationalism carries with it the same logical
dilemma - if all knowledge is partial or relative how might we know anything for certain? With the death of any absolute knowledge come the somewhat shaky propositions suggesting that the criteria for judging the validity of perspectives of knowledge rests in the experienced hands of the intellectual. Given the "social determination of knowledge thesis", it is difficult to ascertain how in fact the intellectual is able to transcend his own perspectivism in order to achieve a new level of objectivity from which valid propositions might be offered. In the end, such propositions are valid only within the confines of the intellectual's social milieu or, in other words, propositions are only relatively true. Thus, the criteria of knowledge and its validity is the accumulation of partial knowledge. The accumulation of perspectivistic knowledge becomes the justification of knowledge itself.

Goldmann's epistemology, taking from Lukács, is grounded in a synthesis of the historicist and structuralist paradigms. For Goldmann, in order to know a thing we must know both its structure and its genesis. However, despite the structuralist input here, the criteria for the problem of knowledge rests in Lukács' concept of practice. For both Goldmann and Mannheim, it is the relationship between men. Knowledge originates at the factual level. Both positions, stemming back to Weber, are opposed to positivism, or forms of empiricism which are founded in the naturalist argument for science. In this sense Goldmann, Mannheim and Althusser share a common enemy. Yet, the reasons are varied. Mannheim's epistemological position concerns the neo-Kantian problem of the distinction
between the subject and object, whereas both Althusser and Goldmann are concerned with the neo-Marxist problem of the relation between theory and practice. This is the central difference between Mannheim and Goldmann's historicism, a difference which places Goldmann more in the Althusserian camp, and reveals a seemingly unresolvable division between the Althusserians, Goldmann and Lukacs, and Mannheim and Weber.

The fact that both Goldmann and the Althusserians are concerned with the relationship between theory and practice does not mean that the two problematics are therefore the same. On the contrary, the Althusserians argue that knowledge is to be found only as a result of theoretical practice, science. Knowledge is not found in the facts, or in other forms of practice like Goldmann argues, taking from Lukacs. Rather, for the Althusserians, knowledge is a result of scientific production, a mode of production which is relatively autonomous from other modes and practices. From the Althusserian problematic, the Mannheimian and Goldmann problematics do not seem to make a clear-cut distinction between science and ideology. For Mannheim, all knowledge, scientific or not, is either ideological or utopian. Goldmann, like Mannheim, also embraces the "social determination of knowledge thesis" and rejects the scientific method as a method which cannot cope with the demands of the human sciences, a distinction first offered by Weber. Althusser, on the other hand, stands aside from both Goldmann and Mannheim regarding this issue, in that knowledge is not seen as originating in the historical milieu but on a more abstract level of reality. This is the key to Althusser's epistemology: knowledge exists on the level
of the abstract and as such cannot be empirically verified or tested; it cannot be externally validated.

Both Mannheim and Goldmann shy away from any rigid definition of science. That this is so probably has to do with a reaction to the dominance of the naturalist paradigm in social science. In this respect both Goldmann and Mannheim represent anti-scientist positions. Their theories of ideology, unlike Althusser, are not rigorously distinguished from science. Yet, their general theories of ideology, as may be seen in the categories of world view (Mannheim) and world vision (Goldmann), would seem to parallel Althusser's general theory of ideology. In this sense all three problematics have, by implication, a general theory of ideology which is distinguished from a particular theory of ideology. The particular theory of ideology has to do with particular interests which lie behind various groups. The general theory of ideology has to do with ways of seeing the world. For Mannheim it is a world view, for Goldmann a world vision, and for the Althusserians a general ideology. This is where a similarity lies between the two historicist problematics and the Althusserians. At the same time they are separated by Althusser's definition of science. In order to develop these distinctions it is necessary to move to the theoretical and methodological level in order to further compare the usage of the concepts mentioned here.

Theory and Methodology

Each of the three problematics accepts in various versions
the broad theoretical metaphor of Marxism; viz., the base/superstructure metaphor. Mannheim, in a very ambiguous passage concerning his definition of social groups, acknowledges the characterization of a society's superstructure resting on its economic base, but leaves this definition of society never to return. Instead, argues Mannheim, what is needed is a refinement of the relations between these levels, aside from those of class. Once this is said, there is no return to Marx. Althusser, on the other hand, and Goldmann to some extent, continue to operate within a Marxist tradition. The concern, more clearly available in Goldmann because of his reliance on Lukács' interpretation of Marxism, is with that of class and ultimately class struggle. Nevertheless, Goldmann argues that the existence of social groups is not always directly related to social classes, though in the final analysis, it is social classes which are the dynamic of societal make-up. In pursuing this theme, Goldmann's work in the sociology of literature traces the world visions of French authors to their social classes and thus grounds the works in the economic base of society, in that class is always understood in terms of relations to production.

Althusser, in a sense, argues like Mannheim but for a very different reason. For Althusser, a refinement of the relations between the superstructure and the base is needed, and not by analysis of prestige, status, stratification, and depictions of

---

1 Mannheim, 1936, p.276.
various social groups which occupy various positions within the system of stratification, as Mannheim might argue. Rather, Althusser's refinement has to do with the theories of ideology, ideological state apparatuses, and other state apparatuses which are held up by the economic base in order to perform reproduction functions. In other words, Althusser and to some extent Goldmann, are concerned in the final analysis with relations to production, whereas Mannheim via Weber never really clarifies this issue.

Instead of focusing the theoretical and methodological level around the central problems of class, Mannheim's 'social determination of knowledge thesis', which originates in the problem of class, focuses on Weberian questions such as those mentioned above. The Mannheim problematic, then, has difficulty leaving a phenomenological and existential level. The macro questions of class and class struggle are abandoned in favour of developing a method to deal with the problem of relationalism which emerges from the social determination thesis. The method, based on the assumption of partial knowledge, is detachment. Here we can see that Lukacs, and hence Goldmann, represent an opposite position to that of Mannheim. On the one hand, Mannheim argues that the detached intellectual must be 'free floating', standing back from a more or less impartial position not coloured by class interest, or social positions. From this position, the skilled intellectual is able to juxtapose the various conflicting perspectives, showing the criticisms each has of the other and thereby rendering a new perspective; a perspective which might accumulate or subsume the valid propositions of the
opposing perspectives. A perspective, or a worldview may be depicted in a variety of ways. The worldview of a group might be seen in some art form it produces. The art form, as a worldview, consists of three meanings: the expressive, the content and the documentary. The meanings in a worldview are uncovered with the methodological procedures of ideal types and imputation. Once the meanings are imputed to ideal types (the procedure taken from Max Weber), one then relates the findings to both the particular social milieu to which they are responsible and at the same time the meanings are related to the overall worldview of the historical epoch.

Goldmann via Lukacs, on the other hand, grounds the method and theory of his problematic in the concept of practice. The idea that the intellectual escapes a class position or a determining social influence, that might leave him in a déclassé position, is opposite to Lukacs' and Goldmann's position. For them, the intellectual, or any 'whole man' is bound up and can only be understood in relation to some larger whole such as a social group, which in most cases is related to a social class. Moreover, the existence of any people cannot be severed from their social formation. In capitalist society, the major force defining individuals is the social group, and ultimately the social class to which they belong. Nobody is void of these 'colouring' influences. In this sense, Goldmann via Lukacs is adhering much more strictly to the social determination of knowledge thesis. Rather than taking the detached intellectual as a way out of the perspectivism and relativism that accompanies this thesis, Lukacs argues the solution in practice.
In other words, we know what we know by doing it, by acting. For Lukacs this reaches its clearest expression in political practice; i.e., the revolutionary practice of the proletariat in class struggle. Goldmann's usage of structural terminology, equilibrium, destructure, and structuration, is grounded in Lukacs' concept of practice, in that the terms are thought of as descriptions of various stages of political practice.

The Althusserians disassociate themselves from the historicist interpretation of Marx and expand on the concept of practice adding to Lukacs' political practice -- the economic, ideological and theoretical levels of practice. The difference between the Althusserian problematics and the Mannheim problematic is much stronger than between Goldmann and the Althusserians on this issue. That this is so has to do with the differing epistemological heritage of the problematics, in that the Althusserians and Goldmann/Lukacs are addressing themselves to the problem of the relationship between theory and practice; that is, a Marxist problem, and Mannheim is working from an assumption of partial knowledge, which emerges from the problem of the subject-object dichotomy hidden behind the Weberian methods employed in the Mannheim problematic. Because of these differing epistemological references, it would be false to suggest that the anti-empiricist position of Althusser is similar to Mannheim's methodology of detachment. Mannheim, although he is actually arguing from a historicist paradigm, does not rest the problem of knowledge in the empirical world of practice. Rather, the problem is resolved in the hands of the intellectual who
resolves the problem with his methodological skills. In this sense, Mannheim represents a historicist problematic which does not ground the problem of knowledge at the empirical level. Like Althusser, knowledge exists on another level. However, Althusser escapes any idealist problems by qualifying his argument about the relative autonomy of science as being 'in the last instance' rooted in the economic base.

The argument of the Althusserians which attacks the historicist and humanist interpretations of Marx, after considering the differences between Mannheim and Goldmann, becomes somewhat ambiguous. Althusser's attack focuses around what he calls the historicist interpretations of Lukacs, Gramsci, Sartre and some others. Organizing these figures together and launching the attack to the whole spectrum of the historicist paradigm leaves the critique in a weak position, in that it does not allow for any of the differences that exist between problematics. We have already depicted one such difference between Mannheim and Lukacs. The former argues from a position of detachment, of abstraction. The latter argues from a position of practice, the concrete. In this respect, Mannheim does not give way to the empirical realm in solving validity, as Goldmann might give way to practice, yet Mannheim's relativism and methodology of the detached intellectual is not what Althusser seems to have in mind by his argument for scientific production.

The discussion of scientific production and the epistemological reference this proposition is rooted in is incomplete on the part
of the Althusserians. To argue, drawing on Mao and Engels, that practice occurs on various levels and that scientific practice is but one level of practice, all of which are rooted in the 'last instance', in the economic base, while at the same time that all forms of practice are relatively independent from the economic base and from each other, leaves one in a state of confusion. Nevertheless, this is the position we must hold if we hope to escape the 'linear view' of history which historicism collapses into because of its epistemological reference point of practice. The flattening out of the totality, which for Althusser is the complexity of layers of practice, results in a form of empiricism. The Althusserian problematic argues the test for what we know is internal, but never tells us how or why, except in opposition to historicism. In other words, the Althusserians reject the historicist interpretation of Marx but never offer a reasonable alternative. Strictly speaking, there is nothing wrong with tearing apart a system of thought and leaving it that way for someone else to come along and create a new synthesis of knowledge, but surely a much more worthwhile exercise is to complete the synthesis. Inevitably, an incomplete critique throws doubt on the validity of the partial propositions which it produces. This is precisely the case with the Althusserians.

On the other hand, a reliance on the facts as a point of departure, as is the case for Goldmann and not Althusser, allows external verification of the problematic. By this it is meant that we are able to claim validity on the basis of external verification as opposed to relying on internal validity, as proposed by the
Althusserians. The difference between the Goldmann and Althusser-
ian problematics in this case is clear. The former argues that
knowledge begins with the facts and the latter that knowledge begins
with abstraction. Each position leaves one in a vulnerable state.
On the one hand, the separation of theory from practice leaves one
in idealism (Mannheim). On the other hand, placing theory into
practice, or arguing from the facts leaves one in positivism
(Goldman, who like Lukacs, argues that all knowledge begins with the
facts.) Althusser somehow manages to waffle between the two never
committing himself consistently to one of these positions.

The realm of theory and methodology that we have been comparing
thus far has been offered in a fashion which has attempted a
consistency of presentation with the epistemological references of
each of the problematics under consideration. The comparison of the
theoretical and methodological level has been kept at a fairly
general level as opposed to the comparison of specific concepts.
It is not possible, for example, to compare Althusser's "mode of
production" with Goldmann's concept of découpage, or Mannheim's
concept of particularization. Instead we have attempted to compare
the more generic concepts, the problem of knowledge, ideology,
class, practice, detachment, science, etc...
grounding the problematics we are now in a position to formulate a comparison at the empirical level, revealing the broadest implications of each of the problematics. Once this comparison is completed we may more clearly expound a theoretical, methodological and epistemological strategy drawing on all three of the problematics. A content analysis based on Mannheim's problematics was offered as a way of uncovering part of the meaning of the world view of the script. Two other meanings formulate along with the objective meaning, the whole meaning of the script, those are the expressive and the documentary. The world view of the script is considered as a form of knowledge, and as such is considered as a social production which takes place in the context of social class and power as they have historically evolved. A more wholistic analysis would examine, via interviews or biographies, the intended meaning of the cultural product and, via a documentary method one would note the various social factors which make up the social base from which the cultural product emerged. Our analysis, however, was limited to the content of the script. The analysis revealed two major world views, the corporate man and the existential humanist world view. Two characters evolve. A variety of incidents were observed in the play. The incidents were imputed into ideal typical concepts, or categories, and the frequency of their occurrence was noted.

Goldmann, unlike Mannheim, is not concerned with the objective content or the expressive meaning but might be inclined toward the documentary meaning. The reservation Goldmann has with various content analyses is that they tend to take away the unity
of the work. The analysis which relies on the intended meaning of the author is usually bound up in analysing the psychological input of the social milieu into the world view of the author, which, argues Goldmann, is far too complex a phenomena upon which to base any cause and effect relations between the intention of the author and the resulting creation. Instead, Goldmann argues that it is the underlying, or latent relation in the cultural product that is the object of analysis. In this sense, we begin analysis with the cultural product but with the explicit intentions of uncovering its latent structure, rather than its manifest, or objective content.

In posing the homology of structure hypothesis, Goldman is not trying to establish cause and effect relations, unlike Mannheim's reliance on the ideal type procedure. The intention is to explain the phenomena by viewing it as part of a structured totality; i.e., a part of the cultural whole in which it exists. The explanation of the product is achieved by inserting the product into the whole, and in so doing, an understanding of the larger whole and the product itself is also achieved. The goal of the genetic structuralist problematic is to explain and understand, first, by the découpage of the object, or the depiction of the structure of the product, and second, by the insertion of the structure into the larger structure in which it exists.

Despite the difference in the methodology of Mannheim and Goldmann, certain similarities are common to the analyses of both. One such similarity, and perhaps the most significant, is that both problematics uncover the fact that there were two main
themes corresponding to two main characters in the world of the play. While this particularity represents a similarity in the two analyses, it is also a point of departure. The Mannheim analysis, admittedly a partial one, reveals elements on the manifest level. The Goldmann analysis reveals both the manifest level and, more importantly, the underlying relations, the structure of the play. The structure of the play was revealed as the dominance of Roy's theme and its ascendance over Jean's theme. This structural relation, uncovered by the structural technique, showed the structure of the script to be the relation between these two central elements.

In depicting the structure of the world of the script, the next step was to insert the script into certain mental structures of certain social groups of the time. A hypothesis was offered to guide analysis.

The concrete application of the sociology of knowledge problematic and the genetic structuralist problematic were by no means complete analyses. Nonetheless, these analyses, partial as they might be, demonstrated the focus of each of the problematics' argumentation. The first problematic showed an emphasis on cause and effect relations, the second on explanation and understanding. A second distinction between the two is the Mannheim problematic's distinction of content as a meaning in the work, and Goldmann's rejection of that meaning as harbouring significance, arguing instead that the significance of the work exists in its latent structure. Despite these central methodological differences, the overall similarity of each problematic has to do with the emphasis each gives to the tracing of the historically specific milieu from which the
product has emerged, in the case of Mannheim, or to which the product is homologous, in the case of Goldmann.

The third concrete application to the study of the cultural product and one which represents yet one more emphasis to such a study, is the Althusserian structuralist problematic. On the one hand, it could be argued that Mannheim and Goldmann are concerned with the manner in which the product was created, in the sense that both are concerned with tracing the historical location of the product. The Althusserians, on the other hand, given the arguments surrounding the mode of production-reproduction, ideological state apparatuses, etc., would not necessarily be so concerned with the historically specific location of the product. Instead, the emphasis would be given to the effects on consciousness the product might have. By this it is meant that cultural products, products of the superstructure, perform a specific purpose, the reproduction of consciousness. This is the reproduction of labour power, an element of the relations of production. This is the primary purpose of the ideological state apparatuses.

At the level of analysis, the Althusserians, somewhat similarly to Goldmann, argue that it is the deep structure of the work which is the object of study. Unlike the Goldmann problematic, there is no argument to trace a historically specific milieu. Thus, it is conceivable that the Althusserians might be free to elaborate at greater length the deep structure of the play. The Goldmann problematic, on the other hand, takes us in search of homologous structures, leaving the textual analysis as one half of a full
analysis, the other being the homologous relation to the social group. This is where the significant difference between the Althusserian analysis and both the Goldmann and the Mannheim analyses is to be found.

The criticism of the historicist problematics is that there is never an end to the historical factors which influence the production of the product, or constitute homologous relations. In the case of Mannheim, the number of socio-historical facts which go into the make-up of the psychologic expressive meaning of the author, and the never-ending documentation of the penetration of the social milieu into the perspective of thought constitute an infinite number of facts which can never be completely taken into account. Goldmann, on the other hand, faced with a similar problem, is left with a correspondence hypothesis which is always moving toward a conclusion but never actually arriving at its goal.

The Althusserian problematic, divorced from any prior commitments to a fixed historical milieu, places its emphasis of study on a different set of problems. It was argued that a textual analysis, an analysis of generality I, could point to the effects the cultural product might have on consciousness. On this basis, the formal structure of ideology was used as a framework of analysis, in order to depict the deep structure of the play. Using data uncovered by the Goldmann structuralist technique, the deep structure was depicted as Jean's relation to her real conditions of existence and the final negation of her theme. This framework of analysis, perhaps because it has no commitment to the historical
specific milieu, is better equipped for the description of the latent structure of the play than the other two analyses, which arbitrarily leave the world of the play, and seek instead for explanation in its external milieu.

The Althusserian problematic, although somewhat compatible with the Goldmann problematic, generally differs with both the historicist problematics over the issue of locating the historically specific social milieu. At the level of analysis, the Althusserians assume explanation is achieved in the description of structures. The result of the Althusserian problematic should suggest some clues as to the effects the cultural product might have on consciousness. It would seem, to continue the analysis, that one is forced to exit the world of the script to discover the purpose, or role it plays in the shaping of consciousness. This exit, however, is not necessarily confined to the specific milieu; rather it is freed from it. Instead, the analysis adds to the discernment of laws which govern the development of capitalist social formations. In other words, the analysis in the last instance moves toward the study of the transformation of social formations, and is never locked in on any singular aspect of the social formation being investigated.

Notes for a Conclusion

Of the three problematics investigated there is no single problematic which represents a valid completion of the objective of this work, which was to expound a theoretical and methodological strategy for the analysis of cultural products. Instead, the
comparative discussion of the three problematics under inves-
tigation would seem to indicate that elements from all three
problematics expound a strategy basis for the analysis of cultural
products. To begin, at the level of the empirical, the analysis
of content offered in the name of the sociology of knowledge
problematic could be covered by the genetic structuralist problem-
atic, as the structuralist analysis shows both the underlying
structure and the manifest content. The expressive meaning of
a cultural product is such a fine and precise existential meaning
that any attempts to show such a meaning in macro terms; that is, at
the level of the broader social structure would not seem possible.
Some form of documentary meaning is necessary in order to make the
successive approximations called for by the genetic structuralist
problematic. A resorption to two categories of meaning (documentary
and content) offered by the sociology of knowledge problematic is
thus conceivable, keeping in mind that this ground is covered by
the Goldmann problematic.

This suggests an abandonment, at the methodological level,
of the concept of detachment and the methodological procedures of
ideal types which accompany it. At the same time, the particular-
ization and relation procedures of the sociology of knowledge
problematic are covered by the successive approximation procedure
of the genetic structuralist problematic. The successive approx-
imation procedure shifts back and forth between the cultural prod-
uct and the work, all the while narrowing the field of explanation,
and adding to the understanding both of the product and the society
in which it exists.
The implications that this negation of method holds for the epistemological level are difficult to grasp. On the one hand, each problematic embraces the social determination of knowledge thesis, yet from different epistemological stances. We have covered the method of the sociology of knowledge problematic by the genetic structuralist problematic. Theoretical similarity concerning the social determination of knowledge thesis could allow us to use both the theories. It is possible for the genetic structuralist problematic to allow for the 'penetration of the social process in the perspective of thought'. However, and this puts us in the realm of epistemology, the genetic structuralist problematic does not resolve the problem of knowledge by placing it in the hands of the skilled intellectual as the sociology of knowledge problematic does. Rather, the genetic structuralist problematic answers the problem of how do we know what we know by practice, in the sense of class and class relations. On this epistemological point the problematics of genetic structuralism and the sociology of knowledge are irreconcilable. This is the underlying reason shaping the differences between the problematics. Thus, in order that the theory and method of the sociology of knowledge problematic might be resorted to, as well as the genetic structuralist problematic, it is necessary to abandon the epistemological framework of the former.

Returning to the level of the empirical, the Althusserian analysis of the script went beyond the Goldmann preliminary depiction of the underlying relations of the two main themes of the script.
At the same time, the Althusserian analysis relied on the depiction of the latent structure, uncovered by the Goldmann analysis. This suggests that the two problematics might complement one another.

At this level there is no reason not to suggest the Althusserian framework of ideology as the framework which is better prepared to uncover and describe the deep structures of the world of the work. This framework of analysis could be used alongside the genetic structuralist problematic. In this sense, the analysis of the deep structure of the play would be offered as a preliminary step after which successive approximation toward the mental structures of some fraction of social class would be offered.

At the methodological level, the categories of explanation and understanding are compatible for both problematics (the Goldmann and the Althusserian problematics). This similarity is related to the more or less structuralist epistemology to which both problematics adhere. Furthermore, despite the Althusserian attack on historicist interpretations of Marxism, it is conceivable that the two problematics (Goldmann and the Althusserians) might use the concept of the mode of production as a pivotal concept in their analysis of cultural products. There is no reason why the Goldmann problematic cannot adapt itself to the Althusserians over this issue. Where the two problematics are in conflict is over the epistemological issues surrounding the concept of practice. Goldmann, following in Lukacs' steps, adheres to the concept of practice; that is, the marriage of theory and practice in concrete action. The Althusserians, on the other hand, argue that a position which reduces theoretical problems to the empirical level, in the way Lukacs uses his concept of
practice, commits a theoretical error in that they ignore
the subtle layers of practice which make up a social formation,
resulting in a form of empiricism. On this level, it would seem
the two positions are incompatible. However, it would seem plausible
that Goldmann would accommodate the Althusserian argument concerning
the various levels of practice and at the same time, the Althusserians
could also adapt to the notion of concrete action in the sense of
putting together theory and other forms of practice, in that the
relative autonomy of theoretical practice from other forms of
practice does not suggest that various practices, ideological, political,
cultural, economic, etc., cannot occur as an ensemble. Rather, the
point of that argument is that they are relatively independent from one
another, but are in the last instance determined by the economic.
On closer examination, it appears that the genetic structuralist prob-
lematic and the Althusserian structuralist problematic are not so far
apart after all.

In conclusion, a theoretical and methodological strategy
from which analyses of cultural products might be made suggests
that aspects of all three problematics reviewed are referred to.
The content and documentary meaning, along with the procedure of
particularization and relationalism of the sociology of knowledge
problematic, are already covered by the genetic structuralist problem-
atic. The Althusserian structuralist framework for the general
theory of ideology and the concept of mode of production, along with
the resulting outline for the state apparatuses, might be used
along with the genetic structuralist problematic. Thus, the strategy
for the analysis of cultural products cuts across the three
problematics presented in this thesis, resorting to aspects of each one.
SOURCES CITED

Articles in Books


Books


Periodicals

Althusser, Louis. "Interview With Louis Althusser: Philosophy as a Revolutionary Weapon". New Left Review, No.64.


Goldmann, Lucien. "The Early Writings of George Lukacs". Triquarterly, No.9, p.179, Spring, 1967.


