SCHELER'S CRITIQUE OF PRAGMATISM

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ABSTRACT

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The topic of this thesis is Scheler's critique of pragmatism in Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft.

Part I presented an exposition of the critique, adding only explanatory, rather than critical remarks, and a section on Scheler's method. Part II placed Scheler's critique into the historical context of Scheler's mediate acquaintance with C. S. Peirce's thought, and the role of Peirce's pragmatic maxim in the pragmatic movement.

Part III attempted a critical appraisal of Scheler's refutation of the twofold pragmatic reductivism, as applied to Peirce's writings. In opposition to Scheler's general critique, Peirce's 'pragmatism' has not been found to be a species of 'reductive operationalism.' It has been confirmed, however, to be a form of 'scientism' in Scheler's case. Whereas the absence of a thoroughgoing reductivism in the first instance has been traced back to Peirce's transcendental perspective, the latter proved to be insufficiently radical to preclude the scientific absolutizing of the pragmatic maxim.
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"In a certain sense, all central problems of philosophy may be traced back to the question what man is, and what metaphysical position and significance he may be said to have in the scheme of things ..."

Max Scheler, Zur Idee des Menschen

"... an abstraction is not an error, provided we know that what we ignore is there."

G. W. Leibniz, "New Essays on the Human Understanding"

"It is through the garb of ideas [of the so-called objectively scientific truths] that we take for true being what is actually a method ..."

Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology
INTRODUCTION

I. Scheler's Philosophical Background

It is the task of this thesis to study Max Scheler's critique of pragmatism in Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft. Erkenntnis und Arbeit. Eine Studie ueber Wert und Grenzen des pragmatischen Motivs in der Erkenntnis der Welt.¹ Scheler's treatise, first published in 1926, has been cited as ranking among the three most significant German treatises on pragmatism.² Herbert Spiegelberg even refers to it as "one of the longest and fairest European appraisals" of pragmatism.³ It has not so far been translated into the English language.

For all the marked differences in temperament and style as well as philosophical concerns and methods

¹(The Forms of Knowledge and Society: Cognition and Work. A Study of the Value and the Limits of the Pragmatic Principle in Our Knowledge of the World): Max Scheler, Gesammelte Werke, ed. Maria Scheler, vol. 8: Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft (Bern and Munich: A. Francke AG Verlag, 1960). References to this work will henceforth be cited as 'WG' and included in the text (in parentheses, followed by page numbers).


between the two philosophers, Max Scheler (1874-1928) has been one of the foremost students and collaborators of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), the founder of the phenomenological school in Germany. In fact, in the early twenties, Scheler had generally been regarded as the "number two phenomenologist." His own philosophical contributions greatly influenced and commanded the respect of a number of philosophers, including Martin Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Ortega y Gasset, and Nicolai Hartmann. In spite of the fact that his place in the history of the movement is uncontested, and that Scheler, probably more than any other phenomenologist, contributed to the spread of the phenomenological movement in other countries, particularly in the French and Spanish-speaking world, it has rightly been observed, however, that he is still "less well known than are those who were influenced by him."  

A combination of factors appears to be responsible for Scheler's poor renown in the philosophical community at the present time, notably in the English-speaking countries. First of all, Scheler's untimely, sudden death

4Ibid., p. 228.
prevented him from completing and publishing, as he had intended to, major systematic works on the theory of cognition, philosophical anthropology, and metaphysics. Although recent scholarship on Scheler's work continues to bring out the underlying unity in Scheler's thought, his own systematic efforts no doubt would have helped tie together some loose ends, and to account for significant shifts in intellectual positions in terms of a gradual and reasoned evolution. On the whole it is true that Scheler's often impatient, sweeping, and enthusiastic treatment of philosophical problems (which is an anathema to the analytic spirit of the Anglosaxon world) leaves him open to the criticism of insufficient thoroughness and rigour. Apart from a non-philosophical and unjustified campaign to discredit him as a "proto-Nazi," further obstacles to an appreciation of Scheler's contribution in the English-speaking world have been the notorious difficulties and complexities of his style as well as the unavailability of much of his work in English translation. (His major work, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, appeared in English translation only in 1973.)

A remarkable feature of Scheler's philosophical

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enterprise is the scope of his work and novel insights, extending into fields such as sociology, politics, and education. His most important original contributions are in the area of ethics (Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, Resentiment), philosophical anthropology (Man's Place in Nature), sociology of knowledge (Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft), the phenomenology of feeling (The Nature of Sympathy), and the phenomenology of religion (On the Eternal in Man).

II. Scheler's Critique of Pragmatism

Scheler's critique of pragmatism is directed primarily against the following two types of reductivism which he takes the pragmatic doctrine, originating with C. S. Peirce, to be guilty of:

1. the reduction of the meaning and significance of cognition entirely to 'work' or experimental praxis, and

2. the reduction of all cognition and objects of knowledge to the frame of reference of 'work-knowledge', viz., of knowledge governed by the cognitive objective of the mastery and control of nature. (The critical part of the thesis, Part III, will concern itself with the two forms of reductivism under the operative definitions 'reductive operationalism' and 'scientism,' respectively.)

Scheler defines the concept 'work' in this connection as follows:
We shall understand the term 'work' to denote, as a most general definition, all activities of a psychosomatic nature (seelisch-leiblicher Art) in which a given material is in some manner being transformed.

Scheler stresses at once that the term 'cognition' as it is generally understood in all languages has nothing to do with such a transformation of a given material—the aim of 'coming to know' something is certainly not to change its real nature—and rejects the position of pragmatism according to which 'work' constitutes (a) the genesis, (b) the origin, and (c) the purpose and value of all cognition. (WG 448-52) Scheler's own phenomenological inquiry challenges radically operationalist interpretations of cognition in conjunction with causal accounts of perception and concept formation by formulating the problem of cognition in ontological or quasi-existential terms, and replacing linear and atomistic causal models with an explication of perception as a circular process and structural whole. This process, according to Scheler, integrally involves the presence of a spontaneous, amechanical impulse and intentionality on the part of the subject, even for mere sensations. On higher levels of cognitive

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10Maurice Merleau-Ponty, another student of Husserl, having read Scheler's Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft and cited it as a source, has without question been strongly affected by Scheler's account of perception, both in The Structure of Behavior and the Phenomenology of Perception. [Cf. John Wild's introductory remarks in The Structure of Behavior (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963), pp. xiii-xiv]
and conceptualizing activity, this intentionality manifests itself in the subject's creatively selecting and validating objects of perception and knowledge in the context of pre-structured, categorial configurations of meaning. It is important to realize, Scheler insists, that mechanistic explanatory models of perception capture merely a fraction of the structural whole that constitutes our perceptual acquaintance with the world, viz., the bare "technical," or kinetic aspect in accordance with the structure of affectations of the sensory organs and the nervous system. They are of mere statistical and predictive import and should not be interpreted as providing genuine, unequivocal knowledge of the nature or essence of things which presupposes and requires in addition other components of the knowing process and modes of cognition.

Beyond the epistemological issues, Scheler's concern extends into the area of philosophical anthropology—the reduction of the concept of man to 'homo faber' (WG 448)—and the sociology of knowledge—challenging the reduction of philosophical and metaphysical thought, on the part of philosophical pragmatism and Marxism, to the position of handmaiden for the realistically interpreted mechanistic sciences. (WG 381)

As a phenomenologist, following Husserl's appeal to go back "to the things themselves," Scheler is strongly opposed to the practice of uncritically adopting the theoretical constructs of, and operating within, a ready-made
epistemological framework. It is this practice, viz., the wholesale acceptance of the framework of 'the scientific method' and of 'scientific knowledge' (except for proposals to render its language more precise) and the concomitant extrapolation and extension of the frame of reference of the natural sciences to other realms, which Scheler attacks in his critique of pragmatism as a form of 'scientism.' Scheler insists, rather, upon the necessity of building a philosophical theory of cognition on the basis of a pre-scientific, phenomenological investigation into the conditions of knowledge, involving an explication of the very constitution of cognition, of meaning and truth. 11 In this way, Scheler hopes to counteract all one-sided interpretations and distortions of cognition resulting in harmful consequences for the cultural and spiritual development of man—a concern reflected throughout in Scheler's preoccupation with philosophical anthropology and the sociology of knowledge.

To attain this goal, Scheler believes it necessary to anchor the epistemological enterprise in the conditions of its own possibility—in the lived reality of historical,

11C. S. Peirce also employed a kind of phenomenology, later called 'prosoposcopy;' its function in Peirce's philosophical architectonic, however, appears to be more of the nature of an internal "glue," linking the categories and phenomenal qualities descriptively and "horizontally,"—so to speak,—rather than having the import of a ("vertical") fundamental grounding with normative import in Scheler's sense. It will therefore not be discussed further in this thesis.
embodied subjects of cognition. Epistemology is to be based on a sort of (philosophical) anthropology of cognition. In "Erkenntnis und Arbeit," then, Scheler proposes an ontological groundwork for a philosophical theory of cognition by examining the most fundamental material (as contrasted with logical or formal) conditions for the possibility of knowledge.

12 Heidegger's conception of a 'Fundamental Ontology' is clearly indebted to Max Scheler's influence and guidance. The preface of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, in which Heidegger outlines the idea of a 'Fundamental Ontology,' contains the following dedication: 'This work is dedicated to the memory of Max Scheler. Its content was the subject of the last conversation in which the author was privileged once more to experience the unfettered power of his mind.' [Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. James S. Churchhill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962), p. xxiii]

13 Here is where Scheler is in conflict with Husserl's conception, for the reason that Scheler's priority is above all to eradicate theoretical prejudices, whereas Husserl—no less concerned about a presuppositionless theory of cognition—primarily seeks to eliminate prejudices arising from practical, volitional, and emotive components of the 'natural standpoint,' including those which remain presupposed in the theoretical constructs. In the end, however, this divergence may amount mostly to a matter of emphasis and starting point (however important, see discussion of the problem of 'foundation' in the sense of justification in footnote no. 14 below). In his later writings, Husserl increasingly takes into account genetic, anthropological, and historical factors as well as the emotive and interest structures of intentionality, even commenting on the "peculiar ontic sense of the life-world." [Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, trans. David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 122.] Scheler, for his part, is working toward isolating a genuinely "theoretical," viz., philosophical and metaphysical domain.

14 An important difference between Scheler's 'ontological groundwork' and a transcendental Begründung or grounding in Kant's and Husserl's sense consists in that,
Scheler’s phenomenological inquiry into the conditions of knowledge may also be said to be a modified transcendental inquiry in the Kantian sense. In the transcendental perspective of Kantian-Husserlian lineage, a body of knowledge is never considered as a finished, detached product, but as constituted by a subject of cognition as an irreducible correlate. The subject of cognition, whether taken in the strict sense as a subjective agent, or in some intersubjective capacity, serves as a

as Paul Ricoeur (another disciple of Husserl having taken the 'ontological turn') put it, in the perspective of a pre-objective, ontological foundation, "the question of foundation can no longer simply coincide with that of ultimate justification." [Paul Ricoeur, "Phenomenology and Hermeneutics," Nous 9 (1975): 89.] For Scheler, the proposed ontological groundwork is of significance in view of presenting the correct order and manner of foundation, rather than epistemological priority. Hence his dictum that there is no "absolute and self-evident datum which may serve as a firm foundation and starting point for philosophy,"—whether in metaphysics, the theory of knowledge, ethics, or aesthetics—in the sense of having the import of an ultimate justification. [Max Scheler, Gesammelte Werke, ed. Maria Scheler, vol. 1, "Die transzendentalen und die psychologische Methode, Fruehe Schriften (Bern and Munich: A. Francke Verlag-AG, 1971), p. 334; hereafter cited as "Die transzendentalen Methode."]

15 The following note may help dissipate any a priori cultural discomfort related to the term 'transcendental': "The term transcendental probably has, for English ears, an unpleasant ring, and will suggest metaphysical efforts to transcend experience. It must be understood, however, that transcendental method is simply the patient and rigorous analysis of experience itself. For any question or theorem which might pass beyond possible experience, Kant reserved the term transcendent, and the distinction, if not the mode of expressing it, is accepted by all his successors." [Robert Adamson, Fichte (Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1969), p. 112n.]
point of reference which remains at all times distinct from particular areas and methodological frameworks of cognitive discourse. It is in this respect that the transcendental perspective has been called an "important piece of emancipation" in the history of ideas. Scheler even criticizes Kant's reductive transcendental logic as not radical enough in that it remains within the confines of the 'work world'—building upon the historically conditioned factual results of the positive sciences, which in turn inevitably condition the results of the transcendental inquiry.17

Phenomenology as a transcendental inquiry is the study of meaning from a distinctively human perspective, in which the human subject is studied qua intending, grasping, and realizing meaning. From the standpoint of transcendental phenomenology, the problem of knowledge remains

16Karl-Otto Apel at a talk given at Concordia University (Sir George Williams Campus) on March 3, 1975.

17"Die Transzendentele Methode," p. 242. Kant divided the fundamental cognitive interests of human reason into the three questions: (1) What can I know? (2) What ought I to do? and (3) What may I hope? (CPR A805). As Heidegger pointed out, Kant recognized the fundamental importance of an 'anthropology' in relation to all three questions, but did not follow up the idea himself. (Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, pp. 214-15.) In Scheler's view, such a basic philosophical anthropology would almost certainly have prevented Kant's reversal of the Greek conception of metaphysics as the 'purest' theoretical form of knowledge into a practical pursuit, and conversely, of physics and empirical knowledge into theoretical knowledge par excellence. (I am extrapolating somewhat here on the basis of Scheler's critique of Kant's method and results of inquiry.)
always the study of an undertaking by and for the human subject—quite unlike currently prevailing practices in other schools of thought and in the perspective of a philosophy of (natural) science, namely, to abstract at all cost from the subject of cognition in order to achieve, once again, some transhuman, divine perspective. (As Scheler acknowledges, the pragmatic doctrine recognizes that human subjectivity understood as 'praxis' remains presupposed in the objective cognitive claims of the positive sciences. To the extent that pragmatism adopts the paradigm of the positive sciences as criterion for cognitive significance, however, the treatment on the theoretical level of problems concerning the constitution of knowledge related to human subjectivity exceeds the pragmatic frame of reference; they are retained only implicitly on the methodological, metascientific and metalinguistic level.) An analysis of cognition without giving due consideration to the subject of cognitive and normative activities would be considered absurd and a distortion, analogous to talk about a thought without a thinker or experience without an experiencing subject ("unfelt pain"). The fact that in some philosophical quarters it has been decided that nothing of theoretical import may be said about the subject of experience and cognition merely illustrates the pitfalls of such an extreme and false objectivism. As thinkers from Berkeley, Kant, Hegel, to Husserl have never tired to impress upon philosophical
awareness, we cannot without contradiction and the risk of serious distortions extricate ourselves from the subjectivity component of the objectifying and normative activities of human subjects.

Scheler, for his part, to be sure, emphatically rejects any claim to the epistemological priority of subjective states, viz., claims for the "superior self-evidence of inner over external perception" as well as a "false kind of confident self-certainty," conceptions originating with Descartes's 'cogito' which Scheler takes to underlie every form of subjective idealism and 'ego-centricism'. By the same token, he is also opposed to the position of methodological solipsism as a starting point of phenomenological inquiry. For Scheler, the "we," the "ego," "existence," "world," and the "sphere of the absolute" are alike primitive, irreducibly given 'archphenomena,' Urtegebene, of consciousness, prior to all cognitive bifurcation.

From the transcendental phenomenological point of view, moreover, as also in pragmatism (in the sense that man's practical relation to the world is recognized to be primary, and that mechanistic representations are not interpreted metaphysically) knowledge cannot be looked at as

18 "The Idols of Self-Knowledge," Selected Philosophical Essays, p. 3.

something that merely 'happens' to the subject of cognition in accordance with some input/output model, where the role of the human subject is of no consequence other than as a source of error, but is seen to be actively acquired, and an achievement. In Scheler's quasi-existential variant, the knowing process is described in terms of an (intentional) act of participation of one being (the knower) in the being that is to be known, as well as a process of becoming, both of the person who knows and of his qualitatively altered ontic relation to the world and other human beings.  

20 Cognition in this perspective is one form of man's meaningful activities of lived intentionality. Unlike pragmatic tendencies of scientific 'Gleichschaltung,' Scheler maintains it to be a 'phenomenological fact,' i.e., clearly evident to philosophical intuition, that cognition is fundamentally and a priori differentiated into the basic objectives that are rooted in the

20 In anticipation of possible objections to the effect that this description be compatible with Scheler's definition of 'work' stated above—interpreting the 'process of becoming' as a 'transformation' in the sense of that definition—it should be noted that for Scheler the 'person' or knower could never be equated with, or deduced from, the psychological and somatic aspects of a human being, nor even less, of course, be considered 'a given material.' Rather, the person is a center of unity of (mental and spiritual) intentional acts, forever transcending the merely 'given' in meaningful, creative acts. While Scheler concedes, in agreement with pragmatism, that 'work' constitutes the modus vivendi and range of possible objects of inquiry of the positive sciences, he insists that neither the process of cognition, nor our knowledge of psychophysical 'nature' is exhausted by 'work.'
givens of man's existence and lived experience—his practical engagement with the world as well as his cultural and ethico-religious concerns and modes of being. 21

In Scheler's pre-scientific ontology of essences or meanings, then, the positive sciences are found to be governed by merely one of the three basic cognitive objectives of man, that of the mastery and control of nature. Any reduction of the two other fundamental objectives, i.e., those pertaining to the formation or "cultivation" of a person (in Bildungswissen, particularly philosophical and metaphysical knowledge), and man's ethico-religious concerns (Erloesungswissen) to the sphere of the positive sciences (Arbeitswissen or work knowledge) must be recognized, according to Scheler, as both theoretically untenable and potentially detrimental to the cultural and spiritual development of man. (Both aspects of Scheler's method, transcendental perspective and ontology of essences, will be discussed in sections A.4.a) and A.4.b) of Part I.)

His refutation of the pragmatic reductivisms notwithstanding, Scheler is in agreement with pragmatism in its rejection of dualistic and purely intellectualistic accounts of cognition, such as the positions of the representative theory of perception, in critical realism,

21 For an explication of 'philosophical intuition' and intuition of essences see Part I, section A.4.b).
and of an 'idealism of consciousness.' 22 He commends pragmatism for the insight that man's primary cognitive relation with the world is a practical relation which remains presupposed in the natural sciences and even in the highest reaches of theoretical physics—despite the systematic elimination of all anthropomorphism. In Scheler's view, the pragmatic maxim (the methodological principle elaborated by C. S. Peirce as expressing the scientific attitude) correctly reflects the transcendental condition for the frame of reference of the natural sciences, viz., the possibility of the mastery and control of nature.

A recognition of the validity of the pragmatic frame, of reference relative to the cognitive objective of practical control and experimental action, on the other hand, frees the specifically philosophical, i.e., metaphysical and ethico-religious, questions for strictly non-operational and non-inductive consideration in philosophical contemplation and intuition. To reflect upon the limitation of the scope of the pragmatic framework means at the same time to have gone beyond it and to have

22 Scheler refers to the following positions: 'Critical realism': all attempts, since Descartes, to theoretically construct a 'reality in itself,' viz., in a representative theory of perception; in modern times, for example, by Nicolai Hartmann. 'Idealism of Consciousness': primarily referring to Kant and Husserl, but also including Berkeley, Hume, as well as Scheler's contemporaries Rickert and the Marburg logicians, Schuppe, H. Cornelius, and the 'positive' idealists; basically the position to admit only criteria immanent to consciousness to decide over questions of reality.
"overcome" it from a philosophical standpoint.

Scheler's critique of pragmatism is expected to be of continued interest and relevance, not only for the renewed interest in pragmatism in recent times, but for the extent to which the tenets of the pragmatic doctrine originating with C. S. Peirce have been assimilated into contemporary thought and culture in general. Peirce's philosophy, in fact, had closely anticipated and influenced not only the operationalist and behaviourist attitudes of the logical positivists, neo-pragmatists, and neo-empiricists, but also their "linguistic" and "pragmatic" turn as well as the thesis of the unification of the sciences.

Last not least, the issues in Scheler's critique are relevant to the continued debate concerning the question of the reducibility of the human sciences to the natural sciences.

III. Plan of Study

Since Scheler's treatise is as yet not available in English translation, Part I of the thesis will provide an exposition of the major aspects of Scheler's critique. In order to render the discussion as accurately as possible in the English language, the original text will be adhered to very closely, in many cases amounting to a literal translation. Wherever it appears advisable, explanatory remarks regarding Scheler's manner of exposition, terminology, and intentions will be added, while
otherwise refraining from critical comment in the interest of providing an uninterrupted and unprejudiced exposition.

Part I will also include a section discussing Scheler's method of inquiry (A.4.).

Part II is intended to form a transition between the expository and the critical parts of the thesis. It will trace the historical context of Scheler's critique and outline the concerns of the subsequent critical analysis growing out of that historical situation. More specifically, Part II will deal with the fact of Scheler's merely mediate acquaintance with Peirce's thought, and the role of Peirce's pragmatic maxim in the pragmatic movement.

The critical part of the thesis, Part III, will attempt a critical appraisal of Scheler's general charge of the twofold pragmatic reductivism—under the operative definitions 'reductive operationalism' and 'scientism,' respectively—as applied to C. S. Peirce's own authentic writings. In other words, it is the purpose of the critical section of the thesis to ascertain whether or not Scheler's challenge of the pragmatic doctrine under these two aspects justly applies to C. S. Peirce's version of pragmatism, to which Scheler had only indirect access.

Scheler's conception of the three basic cognitive objectives has been taken up recently, in modified,
"secularized" form\textsuperscript{23} by Karl-Otto Apel and Juergen Habermas in their respective theories of scientific knowledge. The term 'scientific' here extends beyond the domain of the positive sciences to include the areas traditionally called 'Geisteswissenschaften' or humanistic/cultural knowledge, on the one hand, as well as critical theory or ideology critique, on the other. (An outline of these conceptions will be given in Part III, section B.) The critical assessment of Scheler's refutation of the pragmatic reductivisms as applied to C. S. Peirce's philosophy will in part be based on the writings of K.-O. Apel and J. Habermas who in turn have adopted various insights of Peirce's transcendental "logic of inquiry," and--like Scheler and Peirce--have been greatly influenced by Kant's transcendental philosophy.

PART ONE

SCHELER'S CRITIQUE OF PRAGMATISM

- EXPOSITION -

Introductory Remarks

The following exposition of Scheler's critique of pragmatism essentially corresponds to Scheler's own sequence and manner of presentation. It is divided into the following main sections:

A. Preliminary Statement of the Problem
B. The Basic Misconceptions of Pragmatism
C. The Relative Validity of Pragmatism

The aim of this exposition is restricted to reproducing the major points of Scheler's critique, adding only explanatory, rather than critical remarks as may appear to be called for to facilitate a first encounter with Scheler's thought. Apart from section A.4., consisting in a discussion of Scheler's method of inquiry which is not as such contained in the critique, but will for the most part draw on other texts, these explanatory additions will be provided in the form of footnotes.
A. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM  
AND METHOD OF INQUIRY  

1. The Pragmatic Thesis  

Scheler states the "pragmatic thesis" underlying the diverse expressions and forms of pragmatism with regard to the nature and meaning of knowledge and cognition (Wesen und Sinn von Wissen und Erkenntnis) as follows:  

Genetically, all knowledge is nothing but the result of a kind of inner action eventually leading to a real change in, or transformation of, the world. The teleological and value-theoretical significance of knowledge is thus to be understood in terms of its serving the purposes of action. (WG 200)  

The thesis applies to all kinds of theoretical acts, i.e., to perceiving, cognizing, remembering, and thinking alike. In "Erkenntnis und Arbeit," Scheler proposes to concentrate primarily on the theory of perception (Wahrnehmung) of pragmatism, and to a lesser extent on its logical principles and theories of thinking (concept formation, judgement, inference, the so-called 'axioms,' the meaning of principles and laws of nature, deduction and induction) which he acknowledges to be at times very fine and subtle elaborations. Scheler opted for this selective treatment in view of the fact that E. Husserl had already undertaken an excellent critique in his Logical Investigations, and that Scheler himself intended to deal with the various
forms of "pure logic" in philosophy and science elsewhere.24 (WG 200)

2. Scheler's Ontological Definition and Conception of Knowledge

In order not to lose sight of the unity of the idea of knowledge (Einheit der Idee des Wissens, WG 201), and to determine the aim of all cognition as well as the essential motivations for the sake of which knowledge is being valued and sought, Scheler proceeds to define knowledge in the most general form—in purely ontological terms. In this way, Scheler wishes to avoid all restrictive and circular (self-legitimating) references to particular aspects or conceptions of knowledge or cognition (e.g., of judgement, representation, consequences, etc.).25

24 Scheler here announces to treat of these questions extensively in the first volume of a forthcoming work on metaphysics, "as yet unpublished." Unfortunately, this work has not been published in Scheler's lifetime. Scheler's unpublished manuscripts are still being sifted and gradually made available. Fourteen volumes of Scheler's collected works are envisaged for publication; only ten have appeared so far. [Manfred Frings, "Heidegger and Scheler," Philosophy Today 12 (Spring 1968), 30n.]

25 Scheler's proposal to take an entirely new, 'naive' look at the theme of cognition—free from all prejudices, restrictive and self-legitimating perspectives—by formulating it ontologically, is an example of the "sophisticated naiveté" at work in phenomenological inquiries: Taking nothing for granted what otherwise in the 'natural' attitude might unhesitatingly be affirmed to be 'known' about the nature of cognition (e.g., on the basis of some common-sense version of, or indeed of "the" scientific method itself), it aims at gaining direct and unbiased access to the phenomena of the knowing process themselves.
KNOWLEDGE IS AN ONTOLOGICAL RELATIONSHIP (SEINSVERHÄLTNIS) based on the ontological categories whole and part, in which one being partakes in the nature or essence (Sosein) of another being without that nature or essence undergoing any alteration in the act of participation. (WG 203)

This ontological relationship is not a spatial, temporal, causal relationship. Rather, it proceeds by the spontaneous intending by the mind or spirit (Mens, Geist)--the 'x' or essence--of the acts through which cognitive participation is possible--of something, a thing or event. This 'something,' or more precisely, its nature or essence (Sosein), rather, in this way becomes an ens intentionale, an object of intentionality, as distinct from a mere existent or ens reale (Dasein). Knowledge as the result of the participating act of a cognizing being would not be possible, then, without the tendency or inclination of the knowing being to open up and reach beyond the boundaries of its own being and nature. Scheler designates this fundamental necessary condition for the possibility of knowledge "love," "devotion," or elsewhere, in a more sober vein,

26 It is a fundamental trait of Scheler's Wesensontologie, and of the phenomenological Wesensschau in general (for further explications see section A.4.b)) to take the reader along to share the essential insights which by their very nature, as phenomenological facts or a priori "whatnesses," cannot strictly be "proven" either logically or empirically. To share such insights means to acknowledge their character of being "evident" to philosophical intuition.

Scheler is aware of the difficulties in communicating phenomenological insight--the possibility of disagreement, even among phenomenologists, or simply of a failure to "see" (Phaenomenologenstait and Wesensblindheit) he confidently maintains, however, that the difficulty may be overcome through incessant efforts to exhibit phenomena.
"taking an interest in." 27 According to Scheler, the primacy of affective (loving) openness first renders possible the realization of knowledge, in which the "known" or cognoscendum (Gewusste) becomes a "part" of the being that "knows." There is a teleological dynamic of becoming involved which points beyond mere knowledge for knowledge's sake, which is upheld as the goal of knowledge by those who oppose pragmatism at all cost and in all its tenets. Having characterized "knowledge" in the most general sense of the term as an ontological relationship, Scheler submits that its objective aim, the "wherefore" of knowledge, and of its being sought, cannot again be a form of knowledge, but a becoming, a becoming different. Formulating the problem of cognition ontologically as a dynamic relationship, the question of the end of knowledge cannot simply be dismissed by the dictum "knowledge for knowledge's sake"--the vain self-seeking reply by intellectuals to a serious philosophical question. (Scheler does agree, how-

from ever different angles, removing prejudices and irrelevant factors so that they may disclose themselves in their purity, and working toward a consensus in this way: "... phenomenological controversy is not beyond settlement...." ("Phenomenology and the Theory of Cognition," Selected Philosophical Essays, p. 155.)

27 "Ordo Amoris," Selected Philosophical Essays, p. 127. Here the empirical garb of the Aristotelian entelechy of cognition ("All men by nature desire to know," Metaphysics Bk. A I) has been transformed into the transcendental condition for the possibility of knowledge. (For an explication of the term 'transcendental' and of 'transcendental method' see Introduction, section II, and 4. a) below.)
ever, with the connected refutation of the claim that the purpose of knowledge consists in utility.)\(^{28}\) As with all things which we love and seek, Scheler points out, cognition ultimately aims at the realization of a value and a final ontic significance.\(^{29}\) (WG 204-5)

3. **Three Tell of Cognition**

Three Types of Knowledge

On the basis of his ontological groundwork for a theory of cognition, Scheler distinguishes between three most basic objectives toward which cognition is directed: (a) the becoming and development of the person who knows—in Bildungswissen, i.e., cultural or humanistic knowledge (variously also termed philosophical or metaphysical

\(^{28}\) For Scheler’s purposes, it is important to distinguish carefully between the various components of the knowing process (origin and genesis of knowledge, respectively), on the one hand, and the objectives pursued by the subject in seeking knowledge, on the other. This differentiation is intended to preclude any premature and unwarranted collapse of the entire meaning of cognition to features which may be held to characterize any one of these, for any one type of knowledge (e.g., physiological, causal-behavioural, and technical components, utility or “satisfaction”—all aspects of “work”), or to reduce the teleological question of the purpose of cognition to empty tautologies.

\(^{29}\) Here is where the ethical significance of Scheler’s shift of the problem of cognition from the epistemological to the ontological plane in terms of the lived intentionality of the subject becomes apparent: In the quasi-existential, ontological perspective, a full thematization of the problem of cognition as meaning-intention and meaning-fulfillment does not stop at the theoretical subject-object dichotomy but includes a consideration of cognition in terms of a meaningful form of life for the subject—which is ultimately an ethical question.
knowledge); (b) the development of a moral and divine world order—in Erloesungswissen (literally, "knowledge for salvation") or knowledge for the sake of divinity, also referred to by Scheler as religious knowledge, and (c) the aim of practical control and transformation of the world, an aim which Scheler sees as the rather one-sided, and even exclusive preoccupation of pragmatism, as well as the subject matter of the positive sciences—in Herrschafts- oder Leistungswissen, also called Arbeitswissen (work knowledge). There is, moreover, a clear and immediately evident objective hierarchy among these cognitive objectives, proceeding in ascending order of importance from work knowledge (Arbeitswissen) to humanistic knowledge (Bildungswissen) and ethico-religious knowledge (Erloesungswissen). (WG. 205)

Pragmatism is certainly correct according to Scheler in attributing to the exact positive sciences primarily the practical purpose of technical control. It is

30This difficult and easily misleading conception—unfortunately not sufficiently elaborated by Scheler—must be seen in the context of Scheler's ethical personalism (Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values) and his notion of a 'becoming God' in and through human beings (Man's Place in Nature). It is neither a theistic notion, nor involving a negation of man's earthly embodiment, but refers to the ideal of a higher existential—spiritual attainment by mankind. In his essay "Ordo Amoris," for instance, Scheler speaks of the free and responsible participation in the "world's salvation" of the rational and spiritual subject, the "individual destiny," "within the general framework of the universal and common destiny of man as such..." (Selected Philosophical Essays, p. 104.)
mistaken, however, in generalizing from this selective principle for possible objects of knowledge to an explanatory principle applicable to the knowledge of the objects itself, and finally to the notions of knowledge as such, of cognition and 'truth,' as well as of pure logic, etc. Whatever the principle of selection for the objects of possible knowledge may be, truth always consists in an agreement with matters of fact or states of affairs (Sachuebereinstimmung), knowledge being constituted by participation in this selected essential nature (Sosein). Only with "true" participation, i.e., with judgements that are formally correct and materially adequate, is successful practical operation on the basis of such knowledge at all possible. This precondition applies no less for knowledge conceived in the pragmatic framework. Truth and genuine knowledge, therefore, can never be determined by the success of our actions as a criterion (e.g., by testing or repeatable experimental action).

Scheler further criticizes the one-sidedness of pragmatism in totally overlooking or ignoring the realm of humanistic or cultural knowledge, its peculiar nature and purpose, and also of ethico-religious knowledge—or in cases where these different teleological orientations are being recognized, the occurrence of a reversal in the hierarchy of knowledge into its exact opposite, with the work knowledge of the positive sciences taking priority over humanistic and ethico-religious knowledge, respectively.
Scheler, by contrast, maintains that it is a mistake to think of the person and his mental and spiritual growth to be destined for, or subservient to, a maximum of control of nature, but at the contrary, all possible control of nature merely serves (or should serve) the free self-development of all mental and spiritual capacities of the person and the optimal development of his culture. (WG 206)

Both positivism and pragmatism according to Scheler elevate Arbeitswissen (work knowledge, operational or technical knowledge) to the status of the only possible kind of knowledge. The conscious recognition of pragmatism in this respect is superior to the dictum "la science pour la science" whose proponents in fact do nothing more than engage in Arbeitswissen themselves, while claiming a superior status to it and conducting their inquiries without clear direction or purpose. (WG 207)

Scheler's conception of Bildungswissen or humanistic knowledge partly coincides with his conception of philosophy. (Philosophy also reaches into the area of Erloesungswissen.)

In order to understand the peculiar nature of Bildungswissen, it is important to realize, first of all, that for all the necessary close cooperation between philosophy and the positive sciences, their aims and criteria of cognition are virtually diametrically opposed. (WG 207-8)

The fundamental difference between philosophy and the positive sciences consists according to Scheler in that philosophy only begins with the deliberate suspension of all
possible desirous and practical attitudes, and with the deliberate elimination of the "technical principle" in the selection of an object of knowledge. Since all possible practical attitudes to the world are conditional upon vital drives or on biological functions, philosophy, by contrast, may also be characterized as the attempt to attain a kind of knowledge whose objects are no longer (directly) existentially relative to life, nor relative to biologically instrumental values. Furthermore, Scheler marks off work knowledge from humanistic knowledge by stating that the former deals with questions that are to be decided through possible observation and measurement, combined with mathematical reasoning processes; any question that is decidable in this way and dependent upon the quantum of inductive experience, will never be a philosophical or essential question (Wesensfrage). (WG 208-9) The decisive criteria in philosophy, in addition to the criteria of true and false applying to all knowledge formulated in judgments, are by contrast the criteria (1) of essential nature (des Wesenhaften), of the a priori true as well as the a priori false, particularly in humanistic knowledge, and (2) of absolute reality of the object of knowledge for ethico-religious knowledge.

Scheler stresses that neither humanistic knowledge nor work knowledge could ever "replace" or "represent" the other, short of resulting in the serious impairment of the unity and harmony of the overall cultural existence of man.
and of the integrity of his physical and spiritual nature. Assimilation of one type into the other would result, in the extreme, in feeble-minded romanticism and false or superficial positivism and pragmatism, respectively. Nevertheless, even the "humanistic" idea of a Bildungs- wissen must lastly be subordinated to the idea of an Er- losungswissen, in Scheler's view, since all knowledge is ultimately "from the divinity and for the divinity."

(WG 210-11)

4. Method of Inquiry

It seems expedient, at this point, to look at Scheler's method of inquiry which Scheler himself failed to set forth explicitly and systematically in the treatise.

a) Transcendental Method

As has been indicated in the Introduction, the method employed by Scheler in rejecting the pragmatic reductions may suitably be termed a modified transcendental inquiry in the Kantian sense. In addition to differences in approaches in, and conceptions of, reasoning and 'proof,' Scheler's modification consists primarily in his departure from Kant's inquiry into the possibility and limits of experience and knowledge of a logical subject of consciousness by examining the various factors constituting the meaning or essence of cognition in terms of the necessary material (i.e., non-formal) conditions and
concrete phenomena pertaining to living, embodied subjects.

This characterization of Scheler's approach as 'transcendental' in a broad sense appears justified, however, despite his opposition to orthodox transcendentalism, for the following reasons:

(1) As early as in his critique of the transcendental and the psychological methods (1900), Scheler had insisted on the importance of posing the transcendental question not only with respect to the logical, but also of the real or material possibility of cognition by living persons operating in a historical and cultural milieu. 31 In his proposal for a more adequate method (following Eucken, called the 'noological method'), he suggested combining the two methods of a transcendental philosophy, on the one hand, and of a transcendental psychology, on the other, which in Kant's philosophy partly had not been distinguished well enough, and partly came to be in opposition to one another. 32 (Incidentally, Scheler criticizes both


32 Ibid., pp. 334-35. Scheler's terminology of 'transcendental philosophy' and 'transcendental psychology' corresponds to Kant's distinction between the 'objective deduction' (questions of objective validity, epistemological in character) and the 'subjective deduction' (subjective generative processes of a psychological nature), as stated in the Preface to the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (CPR A x-xi). The difficulties indicated by Scheler, I believe, refer to Kant's changing, increasingly negative attitude to the subjective deduction in the second edition of the Critique, while continuing to implicitly utilize its results for the more properly epistemological task.
methods as being limited to the level of the "work world," \textit{Arbeitswelt.}) In this way, Scheler attempts to achieve a concrete fullness for his theory of cognition, bridging the gap between logic and psychology which had opened up as a result of the transcendental critique of psychologism—at the expense of elements of content, and the cognitive role and dignity of emotions.\textsuperscript{33} By looking at the aspects of cognition formerly considered "psychological" in this connection from a point of reference "outside of," or logically distinct from the content of experience, viz., as the intentional correlates of the subject of all possible experience and knowledge, they are elevated to a normative, philosophical plane:

Every content whose being is inextricably connected with the claim for validity, is never a "psychological fact" to be cognized scientifically through introspection.\textsuperscript{34}

Conversely,

To be 'valid' and not to be 'valid' of something real, is unthinkable.\textsuperscript{35}

For all the substantive and methodological differences, Scheler himself indicated that he does not intend to diverge too much from Kant.\textsuperscript{36}


\textsuperscript{34}"Die transzendentale Methode," p. 335.

\textsuperscript{35}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{36}Ibid., p. 328.
(2) The characterization of Scheler's approach in explicating the constitution of the meaning of cognition as 'transcendental' is in agreement with a recently offered general definition of a transcendental argument as an "argument which purports to show that one condition or state of affairs is necessary for another," and, more specifically in the case of Kantian or Wittgensteinian varieties, that "some condition or state of affairs is necessary if experience is to be possible at all..." Such "arguments" do not necessarily proceed formally from premises to conclusions, but are more often of an informal nature, e.g., in the compressed form of "general hypotheticals." \(^{37}\)

Despite considerable variations in meaning, I share the position implicit in such general definitions that there is sufficient unity and convergence of meaning, as well as importance of the concept 'transcendental' in the theory of knowledge to warrant its continued application as a useful technical term.

b) Phenomenological Ontology of Essences or Meaning (Wesensontologie)

In the previous section (A.2.) it has been shown that Scheler, for his own purposes, looks at the knowing process in ontological terms.

In a phenomenological context, the term 'ontological' should not be understood to refer to some independent reality, but a reality "for," or as experienced and affirmed by, the subject of cognition. (To the extent that this transcendental bond is abandoned or reversed, e.g., by Heidegger after the "Kehre," the phenomenological frame of reference, too, may be said to have been left behind.) This perspective lies mid-way between a position of realism, on the one hand, and an (epistemological) idealism, e.g., of Husserl, in which such an ontological affirmation or "commitment" is being withheld for methodological reasons. (Both Scheler and Husserl, in different ways, believe to have overcome the traditional realism-idealism dichotomy. For Husserl, transcendental phenomenology would eventually, ipso facto, coincide with a 'universal concrete ontology'--again from the point of view of being-as-correlate-to-human-intentionality, "the realm where everything that can have a possible sense for us must be stated."\(^{38}\)

Husserl's celebrated Wesensschau or phenomenological insight into essence pioneered as the phenomenological distinction between mere sense perception and inductive knowledge, on the one hand, and a higher-level conceptualizing and ideating activity which is logically distinct

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from sensory givens and psychological data, on the other. Scheler's Wesensontologie is a variant of this Wesens-
schau--with the difference that Scheler does not follow
Husserl's methodological procedure in all its steps (he
remains at the level of eidetic reduction, denying the
possibility of isolating and thematizing a level of 'pure'
transcendental subjectivity) and that the intuited phenom-
ena in his account are postulated as real or 'ontic' phe-
nomena, affirming "the claim to transcendence" of "all
non-logical acts." 39 Husserl, by contrast, uses the
methodological restraint of considering such phenomena at
all times merely as-intended-by-and-appearing-to-conscious-
ness. When he ascribes relative ontological status to the
two basic 'regions' of reality--viz., firstly, to the
(absolute) reality of the egological stream of consciousness,
and secondarily to the transcendent elements 'con-
tained' therein--., he does so only from the point of view
of epistemological priority.

Of crucial importance for Scheler's 'ontological
turn' is his conception of the "thesis of reality," (Reali-
taetismoment) 40 i.e., of our primitive, 'ecstatic' experi-
ence of an undifferentiated impression of the reality of
the world, particularly in the experience of "resistance"

39 "Ordo Amoris," Selected Philosophical Essays,
p. 122.

40 "Idealism and Realism," Ibid., p. 313.
to our vital drives and impulses on that rudimentary pre-conceptual level. In his essay "Idealism and Realism" (1927), Scheler reaffirms the position that

... reality is not given to us in perceptual acts, but in our instinctive [triebhaft] and conative conduct vis-à-vis the world, or more broadly, in our dynamic practical behavior.41

This primitive encounter with the 'reality' of the world, which we 'remember' vaguely and elevate to an explicit object of consciousness, then, lies at the heart of our "consciousness of transcendence"—not mere distinctions in consciousness and rational justification.

The consciousness of transcendence... shows how the mere epstatic possession of reality on the level of the immediately experienced resistance of an X to the central drives of life passes over into a reflexive and thus objective possession of reality.42

In the course of Scheler's version of the transcendental inquiry, the phenomenological ontology of essences, various phenomenological facts or "whatnesses" (Wesenheiten) will present themselves in (non-sensuous) philosophical intuition43 characteristic of the phenomenological intuition of essences or Wesensschaufacts which,

41 Ibid., p. 318. 42 Ibid., pp. 299-300.

43 The term 'philosophical intuition' in this context does not refer to some vague feeling in the sense of a 'hunch,' or to some extrasensory power of cognition, but to the disciplined, methodical contemplation of phenomena of experience in an original, spontaneous thrust of the mind. While sensible given data may be present in the intuition of essences, they do not as such "give rise" to the meanings intuited, as they are of an entirely different logical order. (Comparable conceptions in British empiricist thought would be Berkeley's account of 'notions,'
given their a priori nature, cannot be arrived at by inductive or causal methods.

A phenomenological or 'pure' fact is one which comes to givenness through the content of an immediate intuition.44

Phenomenological facts (essences and essential connections), then, are disclosed in immediate intuition, or inter-changeably also called by Scheler 'phenomenological experience' or 'essential insight,' in the following way:

It is in the coincidence of what is meant and what is given that the 'phenomenon' appears and the content of the phenomenological experience is fulfilled.45

"What is meant" in this context is the correlate of the subject's intentionality, the concept of which Scheler claimed to have enlarged beyond mere intentionality of (rational, objectifying) consciousness in Husserl's sense, to volitional, emotive, and existential factors. To give a simplified example, when contemplating or 'intending' the nature of a human being, it will become manifest that the "what" in question does not coincide with mere biologi-

e.g., as the intellectual grasp of a human being as something more than, and different from, particular aspects of sensible appearance, and sums of these, as well as G. E. Moore's conception of 'good' as a supervenient, strictly non-natural quality. Scheler, incidentally, acknowledges G. E. Moore's interpretation as akin to his own theory of value intuition.--To what extent the above views are still within the empiricist framework, is an interesting question related to the concerns, but outside the scope, of the present investigation.)


cal and psychological organization, even when understood to comprise practical or technical intelligence. The phenomenological experience in this case is not fulfilled, but may give rise to other phenomenological insights, e.g., the significance of the lived body in relation to the 'body-thing' (Koerper). When Scheler, on the level of personhood, gradually works toward an adequate elaboration, often by via negative, of the concept of "Spirit" (Geist), many unique essential insights are won, insights which could not be arrived at using the experimental and quantitative methods of the empirical sciences, nor simply on the basis of definitions and common usages of a term (although such factors may aid in elucidating a phenomenon, cf. Scheler's appeal to ordinary-language understanding of 'cognition'). Similarly, essential connections may be revealed by skillful phenomenological descriptions, e.g., of the hierarchy of values or concerning the (metaphysical) significance of man in the scheme of things.

According to Scheler, our objective knowledge is inextricably bound up with our pre-objectified, lived experience and our emotive attitudes toward man and the world. (Scheler, as incidentally also Peirce, ascribes cognitive significance to emotions, distinguishing, however, intentional feelings from mere passive feeling-states.) Our explicit understanding of what it is to be human and our theoretical knowledge of the world thus necessarily include and presuppose our existential
"knowledge" of lived practical and social human reality-in-the-world.

The phenomenological attitude, on the other hand, is designed to bring about a transformation of our everyday natural preoccupation with matters of practical and utilitarian interest to a way of conceiving the world and ourselves in an attitude of "let be," in order to be able to grasp essential meanings in their original purity.

For Scheler, phenomenological intuition is "asym- bolic," a "desymbolizing act"--a difficult conception which perhaps should not be construed as a negation of the use of symbols in phenomenological cognition, but as an attempt to emphasize the 'immediacy' of phenomenological experience, and as a reaction against any one-sided emphasis, e.g., by E. Cassirer, on man as the symbolic animal.46

The following statement, it is true, may at first appear to present the basis for such an interpretation:

Phenomenological experience in this sense furnishes the facts themselves and does so directly, that is, without symbols or signs, in contrast to any non-phenomenological experience, for example, natural intuition, or scientific experience.47

The adverb 'merely' as well as the adjective 'mere' in the following quotation, by contrast, indicate clearly that symbols or signs are not taken by Scheler to be dispensed


with in phenomenological experience, but simply that they are not essentially contributing to it or forming the basis of it, just as sensible givens do not enter constitutively into phenomenological insight:

Something can be self-given only if it is no longer given merely through any sort of symbol; in other words, only if it is not 'meant' as the mere 'fulfillment' of a sign which is previously defined in some way or other. In this sense phenomenological philosophy is a continual desymbolization of the world. 48

Or again:

The symbol is used in phenomenology in an entirely different sense than in positive science, which can begin with more or less arbitrary definitions. 49 (Scheler would presumably counter contemporary 'linguistic turns' and claims that we cannot "get outside of language" by stressing that in phenomenology which he understands to be a "spiritual seeing," we do not look at words or language, nor at theoretical constructs—although we might study the essence of language or language use as such in a phenomenology of language—but at that which is expressed in language, "the things themselves," while continuing to express that content symbolically and in many different ways.)

In order to achieve a transformation or "conversion" to the phenomenological perspective, and to set the stage for an experience of "something which otherwise

49 Ibid., p. 155.
remains hidden, a special 'mental technique' or phenomenological reduction is required, which Scheler takes to consist of the following three aspects:

(1) in an act of fiat to deliberately suspend all "will to power," vital drives, and desires, saying "no" to the world in an ascetic denial (an aspect which, in Scheler's view, occurs in, and constitutes a necessary condition for, all forms of ideation); (2) separating out the 'essential nature' or 'pure essence' or meaning from accidental phenomena and particular existence, frequently using 'thought experiments' (Husserl's methods of 'eidetic reduction' and 'eidetic variation'); this aspect includes the suspension of judgement regarding real causal connections and other real connections; (3) finally, the phenomenological attitude--for Scheler the philosophical attitude par excellence--involves the activation of a positive principle: an attitude of spiritual (non-possessive) love, of loving contemplation (amor intellec-tualiè), wonder and humility directed to the being and value of all things, combined with a re-channelling (Ueberleitung) of vital drives to a new spiritual relationship with the world. (WG 282, 382)

In spite of Scheler's unwavering insistence upon

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50 Ibid., p. 137.
51 'The Theory of the Three Facts,' Ibid., p. 274.
52 In the sense of utilizing an overspill of vital energy, rather than (Freudian) sublimation or suppression.
the logical independence of 'essential insights' from empirical data, he takes great care to ensure that they do not conflict with the findings of the empirical sciences, and to include a host of data made available by experimental psychology of his day, e.g., Gestalt psychologists. (For limitations of space, such often lengthy explorations could not be included in this exposition.)
B. THE BASIC MISCONCEPTIONS OF PRAGMATISM

Having delineated the general nature of his disagreements with pragmatism, Scheler's strategy, then, is to separate the misconceptions from the elements of truth in the basic tenets of pragmatism. He proposes to exhibit first its errors, after which he will acknowledge the aspects in which pragmatism is correct—that is, relative to its limited frame of reference.

In the following, Scheler deals with what he takes to be the specific errors of the pragmatic doctrine:

1. Falsification of the Idea of Knowledge

The first major objection to the pragmatic doctrine concerns the reduction of the very 'idea of knowledge,' its meaning and significance, to 'work' in the sense of his definition stated in the Introduction.

Scheler, in fact, accuses pragmatism of nothing less than a total falsification of the formal notions (formalen Ideen) of 'knowledge,' 'cognition,' and 'truth.'

53 An intervening section on the two main tenets of philosophical pragmatism (WG 212-16) which Scheler discusses in the context of the historical origin and development of pragmatism will be incorporated into Part II, entitled "The Historical Limitations of Scheler's Critique"
To bring into full relief the precise nature of his criticism, Scheler at first goes along with the pragmatist refutation of the positions of 'critical realism' and 'idealism of consciousness.' Knowledge is certainly not a mirroring or representation of things in "immaterial pictures" which are supposed to somehow "contain" those things, once more, in whole or part and in "immaterial form" (as conscious states or contents of a box-like consciousness), postulating some relation of "resemblance" between such supposed immaterial pictures and the things themselves. Apart from the fact that, on close scrutiny, the assumption of such a "picture" turns out to be spurious, Scheler maintains that this account would have the serious defect of leaving out of consideration the mind's intention directed to the thing or state of affairs (Sache)--the intentionality of the mind which constitutes the core and the "nerve center" of knowledge. Such an image or "picture" would be a reality that is dumb and devoid of intentionality; just as a painting does not "know" anything about the objects it is depicting, failing to consciously point beyond itself, such a picture, too, would not "know" anything about the things it "represents."

of Pragmatism." Passages concerning older European connections and developments, on the other hand, have been omitted, since they are not directly relevant to the critical task in Part III.

For a brief explication of the two positions see reference no. 22 above.
Conversely, however, knowledge—understood as an intention and a fulfillment of this intention—is the "having" of the nature or essence (Sosein) of the thing itself. Knowledge, that is to say, the end of all "cognizing" (Erkennens) as a spontaneous activity, is not a "picture" or a "copy," neither of the things nor their relations, but the partaking of one being in the essence or nature (Sosein) of another being without alteration of that Sosein. In this process, the essence or nature of something itself can in principle enter our mind—adequately or inadequately—and not just a picture or image, by becoming the object of an intention which is not a picture but an act. Only the concrete existence of a thing remains always and necessarily transcendent to consciousness, and is thus "transintelligible."55 The position of 'idealism of consciousness' which treats questions of concrete existence (Da-sein) as questions to be 'posited' in consciousness, denying all reality transcendent to (objective, conceptual) knowledge and consciousness, is therefore mistaken.

55See discussion of the phenomenological sense of 'ontology' and Scheler's account of 'transcendence' in A.4.b above. The term 'transintelligible' here does not mean that we cannot grasp and discuss evidence for the existence of things, nor that we cannot have intelligent discourse about the existence of things and of human beings—as Scheler indeed carries on such discourse himself—but that we cannot in any real sense "partake," through mere reflection or consciousness, in the state of (particular, contingent) existence of these objects of reflection and intentionality. Even reflections on, and the consciousness (however widely construed) of our own existence are subject to this dichotomy, to the extent
In as much as pragmatism shares with critical realism and idealism of consciousness the proton pseudos of the inseparability of essence (Sosein) and existence (Dasein) in relation to the mind, Scheler states, it has suppressed or left out of account nothing less than "human reason" itself. If what is given in perception or intuition (Anschauungsphaenomen) of an object coincides fully with the whole meaning of the thought of that object, then on this account such co-extensionality (Deckung) is the criterion for the nature or Sosein of the object becoming manifest to the mind "by itself;" and the "evidence" for knowing it consists merely in the reflexive knowledge of this becoming manifest. 

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that in the somatic sphere we are "part of nature." Hence Scheler's distinction between 'lived body' (Leib) and 'thing-body' (Koerper). [Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, trans. Manfred S. Frings and Roger L. Funk (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 399.] We simply cannot "transpose" ourselves mentally into the Dasein of things, fully penetrating the range and depth of concrete existence. (Witness, in this connection, various attempts of Yoga techniques to mediate between mental states and somatic existence.)

56 I.e., believing Sosein and Dasein to be inseparable and on a par in relation to the mind ...

57 To be able to penetrate into the meaning of this somewhat difficult passage, it is important to keep in mind not only Scheler's position regarding the nature of 'reality' and 'existence' as affirmed to be transcendent to consciousness (cf. reference no. 55), but the anthropological significance for Scheler of the distinguishing mark of human reason to be able to separate 'essence' from existence. The driving force in this selective act is the intentionality of human reason, driving a wedge, so to speak, between 'brute fact' or 'givenness' of particular concrete existence and essences in a priori ideation. (This is one of the pillars of Scheler's insistence on the
While pragmatism is correct in opposing the so-called representative or copy theory of knowledge as an unnecessary and vain "duplication of the world," true participation of our being in the Sossein of the world, on the other hand, is certainly not unnecessary and vain—if not necessarily "useful" in a practical sense: It is an enlargement and enhancement or intensification (Steigerung) of our ontological relationship with the world, and at the same time an elevation of the things to their (objective) "meaning," i.e., to that meaning which they objectively possess prior to our conceptualizing this meaning.  

At the same time it should be noted that spontaneous cognition is merely the moving toward (Hinbewegung) knowledge on the part of reason, thus not something which might in the end add to, and perhaps be "more" than knowledge.  

difference between the objects of 'inductive knowledge' and 'knowledge of essences' (Wesenswissen).  

Another reminder by Scheler that the end of cognition is to grasp the real nature of things—constructs, symbols, etc. serving merely as a means to this end, and possibly in a misleading way. Hence the insistence to "go back to the things themselves," to achieve authentic, 'asymbolic' insights in a phenomenological Wesensschau. 

A note on the relation between 'concepts' and 'phenomenological essences': In a loose sense, phenomenological essences have a certain affinity with 'concepts' as opposed to mere 'words,' namely in that they stand for a conception, a meaning, a proposition; an important difference is, however, that 'essences,' being highly contextual and fluid (intentional horizons), cannot strictly be defined, but merely described.  

Another anti-constructivist note by Scheler.
Knowledge itself is neither true nor false. There is no "false knowledge." We may only say that it is evidently or not evidently, and, furthermore, adequately or inadequately, capturing the full nature or essence (Soseins-fuelle) of an object of knowledge. 'True' or 'false,' rather, are predicates of statements or propositions (Saetze), that is to say, of the ideal correlates of meaning immanent to our judgments; such statements or propositions are true if and only if they "correspond to" the evident and maximally adequate givenness in perception or intuition of an object of knowledge; they are false if they are conflicting with it. (WG 228)

The pragmatic alternative to the picture or image theory of knowledge is quite unsatisfactory in Scheler's view, however, in that it completely falsifies this state of affairs. Pragmatism proposes to replace the representational interpretation of mental contents with something different—the factual or merely conceived "practical consequences" of the thought or perception, i.e., the possible real change in the world through it. The "meaning" of a statement thus becomes identical with its practical consequences as to a possible transformation of the world; and the "truth" of the thought is held to consist in the condition that these possible consequences be "useful" consequences, i.e., consequences that are instrumental to enhancing life (lebensfoerderrnde Folgen). Similarly, it is that mode of perception or intuition (Anschauung) of a
thing which provides the best vantage point for our possible kinetic acts and our actions upon the thing that will be recognized as adequate or "good." (WG 228)

This conception is mistaken in two ways, according to Scheler. Firstly, the idea of knowledge as such does not yet contain any bearing on, or reference to, action, nor is, secondly, action necessarily connected with knowledge. (Scheler's examples of the mutual independence of knowledge and action: On the basis of both unconditioned and conditioned reflexes and even more so, of instincts, it can readily be shown that knowledge of the nature of an object is in principle unnecessary for purposive action. On the other hand, the example of the impractical man of learning serves to illustrate the powerlessness of knowledge alone with respect to action.)

Despite this fundamental mutual independence of knowledge and action, Scheler concedes, there is a substantial correlation between that which a being can know (depending upon its sensory functions and the measure and direction of its intelligence), on the one hand, and that upon which it may act in an objectively meaningful way, on the other. This correlation is, however, subject to three conditions which the exponents of pragmatism fail to recognize, Scheler points out: (a) it does not concern knowing and doing as such, but only the particular contents and objects of possible knowledge and action; (b) there is a genuine parallelism, i.e., a reversible
reciprocal relation of dependence between knowing and doing (in the restricted sense, as stated in (a)), rather than an irreversible, unilateral relation; (c) the common identical ground of this parallelism between the contents of knowing and acting consists in the valuating (Werthaltung) of, and the attitudes of love or hate directed towards the objects, as well as in the unintentional (innis- linctual) as well as deliberate, conscious functions of attention and interest directed through these acts. These activities of mere valuating as such are, however, not yet a form of "practical behaviour," nor is this "activity" as yet expressive of any activity of the will. 60 (WG 229)

2. Mistaken Formulation of the Ground-consequence Relation in Knowledge and Action

Following the foregoing discussion of the formal notions of 'knowledge,' 'cognition,' and 'truth,' Scheler turns to the pragmatic reduction to 'work' or psycho-somatic techne of the actual process of cognition and objects of knowledge—the basis of all merely mechanistic

60 This passage may be better understood against the background of Scheler's conception of man as an ens amans: "Man, before he is an ens cogitans or an ens volens, is an ens amans." ("Ordo Amoris," Selected Philosophical Essays, p. III.) Not only is "love" or "taking an interest in" the fundamental a priori condition for the realization of knowledge, but this 'pure' emotive a priori constitutes the unitary ground of meaning for all intentional acts of a practical, volitional, and cognitive nature alike (other emotive attitudes such as hate or "resentment" being accounted for as derivative).
and causal accounts of perception.

It is quite correct according to Scheler to hold as in pragmatism that every actual perception through the senses is always necessarily connected with some definite practical motor behaviour, at least as the initial phase of a psycho-kinetic process. It is a mistake, however, to think that this aspect of sense perception constitutes the necessary ground for sense experience as its consequence.

It must be recognized, Scheler insists, that apart from the process of stimulation, the normal centripetal neural process and the presence of a psychic perceiver as such, the minimum conditions for the realization of sense perception include in addition an act on the part of a psychophysical organism whose direction, type, and quantum also entails variations in the content of the particular sense perception. In fact, sense experience or perception is only one element in a structural whole (Strukturorganen) and varies integrally with that structural whole, i.e., it is not an accumulative partial component of the content conceived as an aggregate. Secondly, sense experience or perception is not simply proportionate to the stimulus, not even to the stimulus plus neural processes and the psychological events comprising the inner and outer sensory apparatus alone. Rather, it is the spontaneous (conative or voluntary) impulse of the vital psychic center of the organism (Vitalseelenzentrum) which is prior and a condition for the realization of a stimulus
even in a mere sensation; stimulus and centripetal process by themselves only function as a "possibility" or potential for the realization of sense experience, not yet as reality or actuality. If the vital impulse is zero, no apprehension and sensation will be realized. It is false to assume, however, that this impulse is necessarily an impulse of the will instead of a valuating act, i.e., a conative act of preference (and its opposite) which is itself directed by the orientation of interest and its manifestation in the form of attention. And it is this very impulse which conditions and directs both the genesis of willing and acting (or the readiness for willing and acting, respectively) as well as the genesis of sense experience and perception. 61 (WG 230-31)

3. Failure to Recognize the Difference between Knowledge of Essences (Wesenswissen) and Inductive Knowledge

Next, Scheler deals with the pragmatic reduction of all forms of knowledge to "work knowledge," which he distinguishes in this section by the term "inductive knowledge" (induktives Wissen) from "knowledge of essences" (Wesenswissen). (WG 231)

Scheler stresses that the parallelism discussed

61 For further elaborations of Scheler's analysis of sensation and perception consistent with a 'conative motor theory,' and the relative significance of causal accounts see sections C.1. and C.2. below.
earlier to between the particular contents of action and knowledge does not obtain with all kinds of knowledge and for all types of action, but merely for a certain more restricted area of both. He then proceeds to distinguish between inductive knowledge—a kind of knowledge that will fit the conception of a parallelism between action and knowledge—and the knowledge of essences and ideas (Wesens- und Ideenwissen) which cannot be subsumed under that class of correlations.

The term 'inductive knowledge' denotes knowledge about the contingent realities of the world and its here-and-now existence and nature, both with regard to possible knowledge and to willing and acting. Knowledge of essences and ideas, by contrast, is that kind of knowledge which would remain completely unaffected by all possible qualitative and quantitative changes in the contents of our possible sensible acquaintance with, and observation of, the world. It is the knowledge of the invariant essences of all objects, of mere essential connections, and connections between ideas of which nothing (empirically) determinate and different follows. This kind of knowledge (analogous in its purity to the material a priori of value intuition, and the "will" to possible realization

62See section B.1. above.
of these values founded upon it)\textsuperscript{63} is autonomous vis-à-vis all corresponding empirical acts and volition. Only this kind of knowledge, Scheler insists, is the first and immediate bearer of the predicate 'evident,' and only the judgment which may enter into it, is the immediate bearer of the predicate 'true' (i.e., without contradiction, or 'evidently' true).

Scheler further maintains that the distinction between "contingent knowledge of fact" or inductive knowledge, and 'knowledge of essences' coincides with the distinction between a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge, a dichotomy which Scheler takes pragmatism (and also associationism) to be denying.\textsuperscript{64} Since, however, all so-called forms of thought (Denkformen) of an a priori nature are based on the continual acquisition of new a priori knowledge, it is inevitable that pragmatic theories of knowledge fail to come to terms with the very

\textsuperscript{63}The subject matter of Scheler's Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values.

\textsuperscript{64}It is one of the historical limitations of Scheler's critique of pragmatism that it does not take into account later efforts by C. I. Lewis, for instance, to explicitly set forth an explication of the 'pragmatic a priori.' In fact, C. S. Peirce's philosophy already contains an (implicit) elaboration of the pragmatic a priori in the form of his pragmatic maxim and conception of "leading principles" of reasoning. (See analysis in Part III, section A.) Scheler's objection still holds, however, in that he would a) declare the pragmatic a priori to be conceived too narrowly (viz., 'scientistically' reduced) for it to be applicable to all forms of cognition, and b) reject its relegation to a mere regulative status devoid of cognitive content.
formal idea of philosophical knowledge and humanistic or cultural knowledge (Bildungswissen). Both pragmatism and Neo-Kantianism (with its conception of fixed lawful a priori structures in the mind) fail to realize that the human spirit grows and develops within itself in the course and history of its activity, rather than merely acquiring, in a cumulative process, a successive series of new cognitive data concerning contingent reality. This growth, the true "evolution of the spirit, moreover, is itself of a higher value and of a higher logical order than the application of cognitive results to practical purposes.66 (WG 231-32)

Finally, pragmatism also misconceives the strict lawful relation obtaining between the practically feasible changeability of things and the degree of their existential

65 Without clarifying this notion here any further, Scheler speaks in this context of the 'functionalization' of the ontological and the objectified knowledge of essences. Scheler understands by 'functionalization' the internally related productive processes of the mind resulting in 'pure,' i.e., spontaneous and original mental or spiritual creations. To give a crude example, the idea of freedom from restraint may give rise to the idea of the autonomy of individuals, and finally to the idea of a free society. To maintain that such ideas at any stage be 'caused' or engendered, in the full sense, by either liberal or oppressive empirical conditions (and not just in the context of such conditions) would amount to something like a Hylean category mistake.

66 This is another appeal to the "self-evident" or "self-given" phenomenological insight into the relative significance of the mental and spiritual (cultural in the sense of "high culture," and distinct from societal organization on a more practical and biological level) and the practical forms of life.
relativity (Daseinsrelativität). Things are proportionately more readily subject to practical (including merely 'possible') transformation to the extent that they are existentially relative to man, and the further their level of existential relativity is removed from the level of absolute reality and of our knowledge thereof. This lawful order also prevails in the realization of values. In a similar way, the feelings of pleasure and pain are the less likely to be influenced and realized in a practical manner, the more they are related to the spiritual dimension and values of a person.

The pragmatic conception of knowledge with its insistence upon practical consequences as a criterion thus dispenses not only with all knowledge of essences, but also with all knowledge of absolute reality, i.e., with metaphysical and religious knowledge. (WG 233)

4. False Principles of Pragmatic 'Logic'

Finally, Scheler takes issue with pragmatic principles of logic in as much as they entail a nominalist/operational and utilitarian/instrumentalist reduction of the meaning and truth of statements to 'work.'

More specifically, Scheler challenges two principles of logic which have been introduced by the first

67 See Scheler's elaboration of the hierarchy and different levels of possible realization of values in his Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values.
logic of pragmatism, Boole, and which according to Scheler are clearly mistaken, even outright nonsensical. (a) Two statements are identical in meaning (sinnidentisch) if and only if they lead to the same actions. (b) A statement is true if and only if it determines an action which has useful or biologically beneficial consequences (lebensfördernde Folgen). (WG 233)

Scheler objects to the first principle by pointing out that the meaning of a statement cannot even be held to be somehow "identical" or even "equivalent" with its logical consequences or with the measure of its "logical fruitfulness," let alone with its practical applicability resulting in a real change in the world. Alone the inviolable rule of logic according to which the consequent or effect never uniquely determines its antecedent or cause, clearly shows a contradiction here, even for the more moderate formulation equating the meaning of a sentence with its logical (rather than practical and biological) consequences and its "logical fruitfulness," respectively. Unquestionably it is the case that completely different theoretical assumptions about the course of the world may determine exactly the same practical forms of behaviour; conversely, the very same theoretical assumptions may lead to quite different manifestations in practical behaviour, depending upon the purposes to be realized in action, which will never be unequivocally determined by knowledge alone.
Whenever we attempt to deduce from the immediately accessible, overt, behaviour of an organism alone the meaning of a thought governing that form of behaviour, we can never unequivocally grasp the meaning of the thought in this way, but must operate within a certain range of different units of meaning (Spielraum von verschiedenen Sinneinheiten) which could equally well render intelligible the behaviour in question. It must be recognized, therefore, that questions and problems of meaning of an "interindividual" (interindividuelle) plane, whose alternative or disjunctive "consequences" may not be decided on the basis of direct or indirect observation and measurement, are nevertheless meaningful. It is just that they have no meaning of a "positive-scientific" character; they must, on the other hand, be radically eliminated from the area of the positive sciences, much more so than is already being demanded in mathematics and physics. Taking such questions out of the scientific context does not mean, however, that they thereby become meaningless; they merely become philosophical questions, or, in so far as they deal with "Reality," metaphysical questions, for which there exists another, no less exact and definite methodology than that of positive-scientific inquiry.68

68 Unfortunately, Scheler never managed to set forth his conception of that methodology, a task he may have reserved for his future work on metaphysics. (Cf. reference no. 24 above.)
Scheler then proceeds to show how the same fundamental logical misconception is present in other tenets of pragmatism, e.g., its nominalist theory of concept formation, according to which our thinking of meanings consists of nothing more than the originally similar outer and inner behaviour in different situations, based on a repetition of the same "stirring" of a drive or presence of a need, respectively; in its most highly developed form, however, it is accounted for as the articulation of the same sound complexes with different complexes of sensation or perception (sinnlichen Wahrnehmungskomplexen) which are yet practically similar in some respect, namely, objectively expressed, in the rule of application for a word sign or for a symbol representing it. For instance, in saying, "This meadow is green," the word signs "meadow" and "green" (as signs being already identically recurring forms, Gestalten, of a sensibly variable material, i.e., of an acoustic, optical, muscular nature) are held to be devoid of any independent 'meaning' by themselves, only to be "fulfilled" in experience with the perception of a green meadow. The meaning of "meadow" and "green," according to the pragmatic conception, consists in nothing but the comitative or instinctive motor tendency to utter the word 'green' as a pure sound complex at the occasion of perceiving things which share the property of being green, and the sound complex 'meadow' at the occasion of perceiving things which share the characteristics of a meadow.
The mere fact that one and the same content of sense perception 'green meadow' may give rise to an unlimited number of very different possible meanings (e.g., green area, coloured patch, grass, etc.) which it could not possibly all "fulfill" or realize in a complete and unequivocal way, suffices to show in Scheler's view, that the pragmatic, nominalist, theory of concept formation and meaning must be false in this form. If meanings were nothing over and above a combination of sound complexes, conceived as "brute facts" and devoid of any meaning and significance by themselves, on the one hand, and the content of sense experience, grounded in determinate modes of behaviour, on the other, it would be quite impossible to account for such a differentiation in meaning. It is no more explicable if one were to add degrees of conspicuousness, different kinds and degrees of foci in the apprehension of sensible data, connected with instinctive as well as conscious attention, and the concomitant motor processes, to account for the "apparent" differentiation in meaning of the speech sounds and of other complexes functioning as 'signs' prior to, and independent of, their application at the occasion of sense experience.

Either the phenomenon of attention is already governed by some notion of meaning (as with all "observation," in which obviously the direction of attention is determined by a meaningful problem area, sinnhafter Frageinhalt)—in which case the declarandum is presupposed—,
or the conative foci of attention are completely "blind" and unlawful, so that reference to these factors could not possibly explain the constancy of meaning throughout variations in attention. (WG 235)

Following a discussion of various experimental studies, Scheler summarizes the results as demonstrating the inadequacy of the pragmatic nominalist theory of conceptualization as follows: In the first place, they show that meaning and content of sense experience, even on the most simple level, stand in a dynamic reciprocal relationship to one another. It is not at all the case that the meaning of words simply becomes built up successively on the basis of complete and unchangeable sense impressions. Secondly, it is evident from these facts that the categorial function of word signs and the naming or representing function stand in an inseparable reciprocal relationship. Accordingly, a word contains in itself already a meaning to which sense perception relates in a real function of fulfillment or non-fulfillment. The pragmatic theory of meaning is therefore incorrect. (WG 236)

Pragmatic and drive-psychological explanations only begin to be fruitful where they are intended to explicate the particular kind of differentiation of the sphere of meaning of a subject (and of a group of subjects), that is to say, in an investigation into the nature of its selection from the objective realm of meaning. In this respect, it is no doubt what one might call the structure of the
subjective perspective of interest, rather than the sensory experiences of the subject (themselves being determined by the directing influence of the conative and interest structure of the subject) which as primarily decisive for the richness of differentiations in meaning as well as for the preciseness or the ambiguity of the meaning of words. Thus it is the case that richness and precision of meanings (as subjective intentions) increase proportionately with the intensity of the interest or need. This perspective of interest, Scheler stresses, however, does not concern the origin of meaning, but only its structure. It affects the realm of meaning as originally as the world of experience of the subject; the "fitting together" of the structures of both spheres, finally, is grounded in the identity of these differentiating conative drives (Triebkraefte). The pragmatic explanation, then, can only account for the selection of the subjectively thought meanings from the objective-ideal realm of meanings; it can neither account for this objective-ideal realm itself, nor for the subjective sphere of meanings which differentiates and develops itself in reciprocal determination with the sphere of sense experience, but never "out of" sense experience. (WG 238)

Scheler concedes that the way children always use one-word sentences such as 'Mama' as an expression of a need and the desire to have it fulfilled, as well as the fact that verbs and verb phrases appear to have formed the early stage of development in all languages, indicate how
closely indeed thinking and doing are united in their origins. It is a mistake of pragmatism, however, to believe that a judgement, for instance, would retain that pragmatic character of its genetic origin, i.e., the meaning of an imitation and shaping of an object or, in the social context, of persuasion or command to behave in certain ways, even after the process of differentiation of thinking and doing, and after the increasing individualization of man in relation to his social group took place. The differentiation of doing, imitating, doing together, and thinking (Tun, Nachtun, Mittun und Denken) is equally original for both processes.

Similar mistakes are contained according to Scheler in the interpretation by pragmatists of the categorial forms of being and thought for a thing, and of causality as so-called "anticipatory connections" (Erwartungszusammenhaenge) for determinate sensations, in its theory of inference conceived as an inner experimentation and construction by means of signs of things and their relations for the prediction or projection of future actions; its conception of axioms as implicit definitions of such a nature that they will permit deductions of a maximum of propositions and theorems therefrom; in its teachings about the meaning of "laws of nature" as restricted expectation and self-restrictions of one's own practical activity (according to the principle of trial and error). Scheler does not wish to dwell on these particular
variations of the main fundamental errors in this context, however. (WG 238-39)
C. THE RELATIVE VALIDITY OF PRAGMATISM

Scheler maintains emphatically that the serious misconceptions of pragmatism notwithstanding, no balanced and sound critique of pragmatism could afford to overlook the many positive aspects of the pragmatic doctrine.

1. First of all, pragmatism is right in recognizing that the primary relation of man (and of all organisms) to the world is by no means a theoretical one, but a practical relation, and that, therefore, all "natural" views of the world are directed and sustained by practical motivations. (WG 239)

This primary practical interaction with the world determines both the most elemental, undifferentiated "impression" of reality, or the "thesis of reality" (Realitatssthesis), and its primacy over all (differentiated) positing of the nature of reality in ordinary experience, as well as intellectualistic conceptions such as "pure forms of space and time." It conditions all possible sense experience and perception in numerous ways, e.g., through natural preferences and perspectives (solid, tactile things over liquid and gaseous bodies, the preponderance of

69 See explication of Scheler's conception of the 'factor of reality' in section A.4.b) of Part I.
interest of "natural" man in the "external world" rather than inner life, of experience and knowledge of "other" over that of self, etc.) and their effect upon attention.

What may legitimately be concluded from this is—not that there cannot be any cognition and knowledge of the world which is not practically conditioned in this way—but that for the realization of a purely theoretical cognitive relation of man to the world it is necessary to "put out of action" or eliminate the practical motivations operative in the formation of the natural world view, to eliminate them by their roots, as it were, one by one, by means of a special mental technique. This necessity applies above all to a philosophical consideration of things. (WG 240)

2. Another valid insight of pragmatism is the recognition that even the highest cognitive objectives of the positive natural sciences and of explanatory psychology are equally conditioned by practical factors. It is true that these sciences attempt to exclude all specifically anthropomorphic elements and to understand all phenomena of the external and internal world in terms of functions dependent upon a (formal) mechanism. In their aim to arrive at a knowledge that is completely independent of, or neutral in relation to our particular sensory

For a discussion of the process of ideation in general, and of the phenomenological reduction, in particular, see section A.4.b) in Part I.
constitution, the positive sciences differ indeed radically from the anthropomorphic, practical knowledge characteristic of ordinary experience. However, and this is where the truth of pragmatism begins, the positive sciences select their objects of inquiry according to a principle of selection which is itself in turn practically or elementally (primäer) co-conditioned by a certain valuation (Wertung)—if not in the sense of anthropomorphic practicality, but in the sense of an essential biological practicality. Since no conceivable living being—no psychophysical organism—could change or transform nature practically and directly except by its spontaneous, amechanical movement, the object of interest and preference of the positive sciences becomes that which is movable (directly or indirectly) by a "living being in general" (viz., all that is guidable, controllable in, and applicable to nature); the positive sciences, then, attempt to explain the nature of all phenomena and the realities of nature (Naturrealitäten) on the basis of the possible and independent variations in the quantitative determinations of that "movable" object. In other words, scientific investigation attempts to reduce the realm of nature to a prototype of formal "mechanism"—not because nature itself is merely a mechanism, but because nature as such is only practically controllable by a living being with a will to dominate, and guidable to the extent and on the condition that it is a mechanism, or substantially analogous to a
mechanism. (WG 240-41)

It would be a great mistake, therefore, Scheler maintains, to believe that the formal mechanistic perspective of reality were to overcome the practical-technical motivation of its cognitive objectives, solely by overcoming all sensory-anthropomorphic elements, eliminating all human sense perception and "lived experience" (Erlebnis) from the mathematical formulation of a symbolic mechanistic model of the world. Rather, it is the case that not just the "physicist," as the "pure subject of cognition," as Max Planck put it, remains presupposed, but also the "physicist" with intent to mastery and control, that is to say, a being endowed with sensibility and capable of spontaneous, amechanical movement. It may also be said that the "human being" remains presupposed, not man understood empirically, but as seen from the perspective of essential ontology—viz., a "living being" (Vitalwesen) endowed with intelligence and reason. The formal mechanistic sciences are not eliminating "life" as such, but only the human threshold of stimulation and discrimination, the peculiarity of the human sensory apparatus and its modalities, etc.; nor do they eliminate sensibility or vital motion as such. (WG 241-42)
1. A Reinterpretation of Mechanistic Accounts of Nature--The Position of 'Methodological Pragmatism'

To bring out more clearly what he considers an acceptable, if relative, pragmatic view of formal mechanistic accounts of nature, Scheler contrasts three different interpretations:

a) traditional absolutist, metaphysical interpretations, or positions which in some other sense overestimate the meaning and cognitive significance of mechanistic explanatory schemata;

b) forms of pragmatism and positivism which through extreme relativization underestimate the cognitive value and significance of mechanistic accounts;

c) "methodological" pragmatism--a position which represents an acceptable middle way, but is in need of further philosophical explication and grounding.

ad. a): The first type of cognitive attitude toward mechanistic explanatory schemata (represented, above all, by the position of "materialism" and of associationist psychology in sensationalism, and of psychomechanical parallelism) is characterized by its overlooking the sevenfold existential and essential relativity (Daseins- und Soseinsrelativität) of all mechanism of nature (WG 242): (1) The existential relativity of the mechanism of nature to a knowing subject as such, capable of "pure" knowledge; (2) to the laws of "pure logic and of mathematical analysis;" (3) to "sensible"
intuition or perception ("sinnliche" Anschauung), i.e.,
to a form of intuition which in the "that" of its realiza-
tion--not in the "what" which it yields--is being mediated,
directly or indirectly, by some stimuli which affect an
animate body (Leibkörper); (4) to the pure or "empty"
forms (Leerformen) of absolute existence: "space," "time,"
"motion," i.e., to purely fictitious entities which do not
exist independently of man's reason, nor independently of
the existence of "living beings" and of man's "nature";
(5) the general relativity to living beings (allgemein
vitalrelative Natur) of all kinds of mechanism and hence
also the fact that all organic life (both in its dimension
of objectively physical real and as vital sphere of the
"psychically" conscious) necessarily eludes all reduction
to mechanism by virtue of its essential nature. Clearly,
that to which all mechanism is relative--i.e., living beings
as such--cannot itself again be a "mechanism," whatever
mechanistic methods and models may be employed in the study
of living organisms; (6) to the technical objectives of a
living being in general, to the mastery of nature with a
minimum of means--and therefore the specifically "pragmatic"
existential relativity of all mechanism, viz., to be merely
a "means" for the realization of values and objectives of
agents; (7) finally, given the overall relativization of
its object, every formal mechanistic presentation of the
nature of things is only of symbolic value in the determi-
nation of nature in "signs." By means of these signs and
their interconnections, man pursues his goal of controlling nature by establishing plans or directives for possible procedure in various areas, for different (and changing) purposes—not unlike the architect who creates a blueprint before building a house. Such a symbolic picture does not as such yield "knowledge" of the real nature of things at all, Scheler points out, just as a directory providing information about the location of people fails to indicate anything about their nature and character. 71 The more perfect the order of "here-now-points" is constructed in such a system, the less it will inform about the essential nature (Wesen) of the objects located and interrelated within it through pure operations with signs; and with the attainment of the ideal objective of the plan (which is only the idea of a plan, not a thing or state of affairs) it will yield no such knowledge at all. It would be a mistake, however, to criticize or to slight the formal mechanistic account for this limitation, as is often done, as a result of measuring it erroneously by the criteria of purely theoretical cognition, viz., of a knowing participation in nature, confusing the practical intelligence operative in it with "reason" and failing to recognize its relativity to the possible mastery and control of nature.

71 This interpretation of the 'symbolic meaning' of theoretical constructs may further illuminate Scheler's view of the 'asymbolic' character of phenomenological experience. (Cf. A.4.b) above.)
by vital motion. (WG 242-45)

Other incorrect doctrines which also overestimate the mechanistic account, are somewhat less mistaken in Scheler's view in that they recognize at least a certain number of the presuppositions as presuppositions. Kant's mechanistic conception of nature (on the level of Newtonian science—not fully formalized), for instance, recognizes only presuppositions (1), (2), and (3), without taking into account the four remaining "limits" for objects of the mechanistic sciences. Although the Kantian conception of cognitive thinking (denkendes Erkennen) as a spontaneous formative activity could be taken as involving a "pragmatic" principle—the idea that the mechanistic world view is co-conditioned by its practical-technical significance is, however, completely and radically absent in Kant's thought, so much so, that he reverses the relation between the pragmatic character of the mechanistic world view and of the purely theoretical nature of metaphysics virtually into its opposite. Yet the Kantian position represents an improvement in its recognition that a different world view from that of the formal mechanistic one may legitimately and without contradiction be "thought," and that the mechanistic framework is of no cognitive significance with regard to the "things-in-themselves." Scheler rejects, however, Kant's consequent denial of the possibility of theoretical metaphysics as well as his failure to recognize the limitations of the mechanistic
perspective even within the area of possible experience, e.g., for the study of "life," for empirical psychology, etc. In Scheler's view, Kant did more than any other philosopher to consolidate the dominance of the mechanistic world view. (WG 248-50)

ad. b): Scheler commends the positivist and pragmatist movements, despite their serious shortcomings in other respects in comparison with Kant, to have truly "surpassed" Kant in their interpretations of mechanistic explanations of nature, by introducing the element of relativity to biological instrumentality and practical control. Having in this way made the mechanistic account of nature entirely contingent upon human volition and construction, they tend to underestimate their cognitive significance, however. The actual positivists (eigentlichen Positivisten), Scheler maintains, no doubt carry this relativization too far by relativizing the mechanistic view of nature (and of the soul) also in its historical dimension.72 Not only do they fail to perceive the various specific difficulties in this attempt, but they tend to believe that together with the older materially interpreted "mechanistic" view of nature of the Gallilean-Newtonian school, the "formal" mechanistic view of nature as such is also obsolete now.

72Cf. contemporary discussions concerning the possibility of scientific progress. Scheler's analysis seems to have anticipated, and certainly has a direct bearing on, e.g. Kuhn's extreme relativism.
that it, too, is merely a passing phenomenon in the history of science. (WG. 251)

Scheler proceeds to discuss Ernst Mach's and Pierre Duhem's attacks on the mechanistic ideal of natural science in favour of the ideal of pure and consistent mathematization or geometrization, rather, of physics, and particularly Mach's thesis of the historical relativity of the mechanistic sciences of nature. Scheler maintains, by contrast, that there must be some precondition of ontic and "real" constants in that which is given in nature, in order to be able to think of the world successfully as a mechanism or in terms of the principle of economy, for instance. As Mach himself has shown in various studies, without being "pragmatist" enough to synthesize the many pragmatic insights contained therein, most fundamental experiments simply "arise," by themselves, as it were, from technical problems and tasks. The historical generating factor in the emergence of the mechanistic world view in the Western world, moreover, rather than being a mere "accident," appeared to be new ethos and a new drive structure of man—a new will to dominance over nature and a new faith in the complete realizability of this will to dominance.73 (WG 251-57)

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This passage illustrates Scheler's perception of concrete subjects of cognition as eminently historical, viz., evolving in the historical context, with an essentially open and unpredictable future and development, in contrast to more orthodox (Kantian) conceptions restricted
Historical factors aside, Scheler continues, there is a deep, hidden foundation of the formal mechanistic world view which is historically constant, not variable. It consists in its being already rooted in the biologically and practically conditioned natural world view of man, in his natural experience of the world. Mach overlooked the fact that, despite the vast divergence in content, complexity, and meaning between the physicalist formal mechanistic view of the world and that of ordinary or natural experience, they share the same law of formation and order of founding of the "given" or "facts" of experience. The schema of the formal mechanistic objectivity is nothing more than the idealized and absolutized law of the order of the given in natural experience, except for the elimination of natural anthropocentrism. Just as sense experience remains presupposed, so is the typical prior schema resulting from spontaneous acts of conative attention.

to transcendental "givens" held to pre-structure the form of man's cognition for all times. For Scheler, form and content must be understood as involving and affecting one another, just as the 'work world' and the spiritual form of life (geistige Lebensform) are similarly related. "A systematic deduction of a priori principles for all 'possible experience' is impossible. The formal principles have too much content to be valid for all possible (historical) experience, and too little for the active employment in a historically determined culture." ("Die transcendente Methode," p. 335.)

Scheler's recognition of a certain historical relativity in the "evolution" of the spirit notwithstanding, he is equally concerned to study the transcendental constants in the human knowing process.
tion, of preference (Vor-liebe) and interest—an a priori structure which is not by itself "sensible," but "intuitive" (anschaulich). Hence the mechanistic world view is rooted in the a priori of "practical intelligence" and the drive structure determining it. It only assumes scientific-artificial character with the deliberate and explicit adoption of the technical objective of the control of nature as the principle of selection for objects of scientific inquiry. (WG 258-59)

ad. c) 'Methodological Pragmatism': Next, Scheler discusses a position which he considers an improvement over the previous one—the position of 'methodological' (as distinct from philosophical) pragmatism held by the theoretical physicists Maxwell, Boltzmann, Lord Kelvin, and perhaps Einstein, in the early period of his work. These scientists differ from E. Mach in that they hold a formal mechanistic reduction of natural phenomena to be necessary, that is, to say, permanently necessary; hence they do not propose to simply abstract from (abbauen) this reduction, in order to obtain a mere residue of data obtained in observation and measurement, plus their formulation in functional equations. In sharp contrast to older rationalistic positions, on the other hand, they do not regard this reduction as unequivocal, however. Rather, there may be an unlimited number of different "mechanistic models" (a favourite expression Maxwell's) which may equally well explain a certain type and range of phenomena, with only
methodological considerations of simplicity and efficacy
deciding between them. (WG 260)

The philosophical significance of this position,
according to Scheler, would only become fully apparent if
an answer to the following three questions were available,
which the above scientists, who are not philosophers but
practicing physicists, failed to provide: (a) Why is a
formal-mechanistic reduction of natural phenomena permu-
tently necessary? (b) Why is it always possible? (c) Why
can it never be unequivocal? (WG 261)

In the following, Scheler attempts to give these
answers himself, using as a guide in part various dispers-
ed comments by the scientists concerned.

ad. (a): If the motor theory of sense perception and
thought is true, then it is impossible to apprehend and
observe any state of affairs in nature without the same
object to which that state of affairs applies effecting
some movement in our bodily organism—a "stimulus" in the
widest sense of the term—, and that movement corresponding
to at least the first beginning of a "counter-movement,"
i.e., a motor or kinetic behaviour as a response to that
movement. It is only this complete circular process
(Kreisprozess), of movement and counter-movement, which
corresponds to the content of perception. All possible
thought about nature, therefore, will always concern only
those movements and their possible connections which are
susceptible to producing such counter-movements or the
projections and schemata in intuition and thought concerning such movements. It is only in the form of possible direct or indirect stimulation eliciting our motor behaviour that nature (qua state of affairs hic et nunc) can be apprehended by us in its contingent characteristics.\textsuperscript{75} On this rudimentary explanatory level, a thought is not yet accounted for as a direct, intentional relation to the reality and essence of nature, but as a causal relation with respect to the voluntary or non-voluntary motor behaviour on the part of exchangeable subjects. On this level, moreover, it is completely immaterial whether or not the thought also "corresponds" to the real entity appearing in perception.\textsuperscript{76}

The necessity of a formal mechanistic explanation of nature could therefore be accounted for as a consequence of our being unable to apprehend and comprehend anything for which no possible impulse to movement may arise in us and which may not effect, apart from its existence and intrinsic characteristics, a movement resulting in such an impulse. On the basis of this twofold necessary condition

\textsuperscript{75}Recognizing the complexity of the many-layered process of perception, of which motor behaviour merely represents one "slice," Scheler calls this level of explanation an "intermediate realm" (eine Mitteiwelt). (WG 271)

\textsuperscript{76}Scheler emphasizes here that distinctively epistemological, i.e., normative considerations, do not yet apply on this level. We are merely dealing with the material preconditions for the possibility of causal mechanistic accounts of sensation and perception, at the same time recognizing their limitations.
of all possible experience and knowledge of objects (of physical nature), the necessity of a mechanistic reduction of natural phenomena is completely secured in Scheler's view. (WG 262)

In contrast to Mach's sensualistic conception, Scheler continues, which fails to account for the fact that the fundamental phenomenon of motion has come to be the ultimate independent variable of all modern formal mechanistic explanations of nature (other than as a "historical accident"), the theory presented above accounts very well for this phenomenon. Unlike Mach's account of motion as a content of sensation or one "element" among any number of other sensations and "elements," in this view "motion" is understood as objectively (stimulus movement) and subjectively (actual motor innervation and schema of movement conceived in thought) the fundamental and necessary precondition for the occurrence of all possible sensations and perceptions. (WG 263)

ad. (b): Together with the necessity of the formal mechanistic explanation of nature, this (kinetic) conception of sense perception and thought already assures the possibility of always finding some mechanistic model for the explanation of natural phenomena. This possibility necessarily arises under conditions where the outer and inner phenomenon of movement--regardless of the kind of concrete sensible data in which it manifests itself--is primary, if not in the order of being, but in the order of givenness or in
relation to all other possible givenness of perception.
(WG 264-65)

ad. (c). The third thesis, too, according to which—

despite the necessity and the absolutely assured possibili-
ty of a formal mechanistic account of nature—such an
account could never be unequivocal, becomes intelligible
from this kinetic conception of the formal mechanistic
explanation of nature, and even necessary according to
essential laws (wesensgesetzlich notwendig). This non-
uniqueness of determination in principle, the fact that
every mechanistic model may be replaced by an unlimited
number of other models which may equally well explain the
phenomena under consideration, would, of course, be out of
the question if motion in this sense had an ontic or even
purely rational priority—a priority of "comprehensibility"
—over other phenomena of nature. In this case, to be
sure, the formal mechanistic explanation would have to be
a strictly unequivocal one, materially. It is quite dif-
ferent with a mere (yet necessary and inviolable) "order
of givenness"—hence an order not of nature as a real ob-
jectivity in itself, but an order of nature "only" as ob-
ject of possible experience for every living being in
general—which demands a formal mechanistic explanation:
and at the same time renders it possible in each case.
Hence, the multiplicity of possible mechanistic models may
be accounted for on the basis of the essential law in the
order of givenness which holds for any apprehension of an
event in nature as the principal ground for the possibility of constructing in thought, as pure constructs, the mechanistic models which allow us to affect nature practically in such a way that our expectations connected with such models are to be fulfilled and confirmed by future experiences. (WG 266)

On the basis of the foregoing reinterpretation of the foundation and cognitive significance of mechanistic accounts of nature, Scheler resumes his refutation of representative theories of perception, particularly of the ontologically intended distinction between primary and secondary qualities as well as of rationalistic, constructivist accounts of space and time. (WG 267-70)

Next, Scheler points out an important implication of the position of 'methodological' pragmatism with its three main tenets of the necessity, possibility, and multiplicity of mechanistic accounts of nature, namely, that it also necessarily entails the existential relativity of the mechanism to a living being—thus necessarily precluding a mechanistic explanation of the living being or of the life process. Hence, failing to postulate, as a metaphysical hypothesis, one single and supraindividual as well as supraspecific life agent of an at least functional sort, the formal mechanism of nature appears as a purely subjec-

77Scheler's material a priori condition for the possibility and (relative) validity of mechanistic constructs.
tive human construction for human practical purposes. The situation is different, however, if the hypothesis is adopted. In this event, too, we cannot speak of an unequivocal formal mechanism of nature which may be cognized in the ontological sense; yet in this case (objectively ideal) formal mechanistic systems are understood to relate to life as such or in toto (Alleben) no different than the physicalist systems of functions and organs relate to the living totality of an organism. They comprise altogether only the technique of *natura naturans*, not its logic, nor even less its teleocline and teleological meaning; they form an intermediate realm (eine Mittelwelt) in which the "picture-creating" life, being prompted by anorganic forces, preconsciously creates and constructs such perceptual pictures on the somatic level (Körperbilder). Even the mechanism itself, or better expressed, the actual or factual mechanisms, are nothing unequivocally absolute. The natural laws of a formal mechanistic structure are, then, only laws of a statistical character; they are rules of probability concerning the objective possibility of events. If the hypothesis of life as such is denied in favour of a position of subjective-idealistic pragmatism, then the "natural laws" mean much less, of course. They are then nothing more than subjective restrictions of

78 See reference no. 75.
expectations in the form of practical "working" principles designed to manipulate nature with certain experiential conditions, in order to realize certain other experiences. (WG 270-73)

This conception makes apparent something which is philosophically most significant: It is not the formal mechanistic natural laws or the natural laws of the formal mechanistic structure which are of (absolute) ontic significance; rather, it is these laws which are biologically and practically relative in their validity (geltungsrelativ). Pure, a practical; and biologically not relative "natural laws"—if one still wishes to call them thus—are solely (1) the formal-ontological laws founding pure logic; (2) the laws of analysis and (perhaps) the laws of geometric topology; (3) the physical, chemical, and biological laws of the forms of nature; and (4) the material relationships between essences (the interconnections of ideas and of original or primary phenomena, Ideen- und Urphänomenzusammenhängen) which circumscribe the possibility of the contingent and arbitrary "pictures or images" of the concrete bodies. (WG 273)

In the process of delineating the merely relative validity of 'methodological' pragmatism, and philosophically explicating and grounding its frame of reference, Scheler thus at the same time isolates the realm of a pure, a practical, and biologically not relative "philosophy of nature" (Naturphilosophie) comprised of the
four components listed above. In addition to natural science based on the formal-mechanistic construction of nature, and the "pure" cognition of nature in such a philosophy of nature ("reaching into vast domains of contemporary theoretical physics"), two further perspectives must be considered, Scheler maintains, so as to at least ideally aim at unequivocality in our knowledge of nature: There is, thirdly, Naturkunde, or knowledge of nature that deals with the accidental individual contents of phenomenal experience, which are given and "cognizable" only in various degrees of adequateness in relation to objective-ideal representations, without being "comprehended" or "understood," nor ever "explainable." The fourth perspective or cognitive relation to nature consists— in different degrees and forms—in a purely dynamic and emotive-emphathetic understanding (Verstehen) of nature. A metaphysics of nature, finally, should assume the task of forming a synthesis of all previously cited forms of cognition of nature, and to investigate which attributes may be ascribed, hypothetically, to the ground of all things "for the sake of nature" (um der Natur willen). (WG, 273-75)

These alternative forms of knowledge have been given little attention and even less serious recognition over long stretches in history, Scheler states, for the following reasons: (a) the mistaken absolute and metaphysical interpretation of the cognitive significance of the formal mechanistic view of nature when it first
appeared on the scene in modern times; and (b) after this interpretation had been abandoned, which is above all Kant's merit, the still serious underestimating of the relativity of its cognitive content to biological conditions and practical motivations and objectives. As soon as these limitations have become clear, however, a metaphysics of nature becomes once again a possible form of cognition of nature, particularly when it is realized that the different alternative types of cognition of nature are complementary and irreducible to one another. (WG 275-80)

In recognizing the relative validity of the pragmatic theory of knowledge, Scheler concludes, it is at the same time completely overcome (überwunden) from a philosophical standpoint. (WG 281)

2. Implications for a Philosophical Theory of Perception and Sensation of the Reinterpretation of Mechanistic Accounts of Nature.

Following his exposition and phenomenological grounding of the scope and validity of 'methodological pragmatism,' the bulk of the remaining text in "Erkenntnis und Arbeit" (WG 284-378) consists in an examination of the implications of Scheler's inquiry into the meaning and cognitive significance of mechanistic accounts of nature for philosophical theories of sensation and perception. Since this section does not add significantly to the substance of his critique of pragmatism, but mainly serves
as an elaboration and support of the findings (in mostly lengthy explorations of experimental data) as well as showing their philosophical import, I propose to deal with this section in a combined selective and summary fashion. More specifically, I will concentrate on the sections in which Scheler clarifies and synthesizes the philosophical theses and implications concerning a conative motor theory of sensation and perception (triebmotorische Empfindungs- und Wahrnehmungstheorie).

Scheler indicated already in the preceding discussion that he is in agreement with the conception of a conative motor theory of sensation and perception. This position has first been introduced as a comprehensive theory, in different forms and within different epistemological frameworks, by pragmatistically oriented philosophers, of whom Scheler mentions Maine de Biran, Bergson, and Muensterberg. Scheler's aim in this section is to demonstrate the elements of truth in these claims by selecting characteristic examples from a vast collection of available empirical data (physiological, psychological, etc.); in the absence of a unified theoretical account tying all these individual findings together, the mere coincidence of the particular results of various fundamentally different and independent research activities, moreover, is intended to corroborate the (philosophical) conative motor theory of sensation and perception as such.
Scheler states the basic tenets of the conative-motor conditionality of sensation and perception as follows: The sensory functions and their respective organs cannot be conceived as instruments of a disinterested theoretical cognition of nature, but are regulative and modifying events and systems connected with, or expressive of, our actions upon nature. Furthermore, they are not something isolated or detached, as it were, from the whole organism and its physiological vital system; nor are they to be conceived as providing a kind of "knowledge" of nature which is completely indifferent and disinterested in relation to the organism, its maintenance, development, and survival as a species, and of no consequence or utility for its reactions. Rather, the sensory functions and organs must be recognized as integrally serving the purposes of the organism as a whole to ensure its optimal course of life, exactly the same way as, and in intimate functional unity and interconnection with, all other organs and somatic functions. Another way of stressing the active, conative nature of sensation and perception consists in insisting that the so-called 'content' of sensation and perception, understood as a functionally unitary act, is neither an immaterial positive 'image' or 'copy' (Abbild) of things in the surrounding world (Umweltdinge), nor a uniquely determined and directly proportional effect of physical and chemical stimuli. Moreover, it is never a mere aggregate or 'complex' of sensations (Erfindungskomplex), but an
exceedingly shifting and variously circumscribed partial apprehension undertaken in psychic acts—a partial content of the nature of the things to be perceived themselves. This is the case only to the extent and on the condition that they are things or events of the surrounding world, that is to say, belonging to a class of objectivities which are relative, as to their perceived nature, their existence, and their effect, to an organism, its nature and existence as a member of a species and as an individual. This kind of objectivity is fundamentally and completely different from the type of objectivity of the physical world.

Sensation and perception involve always some degree of instinctive-conative spontaneous behaviour of the organism, manifesting itself psychically in passive attention and in the drive impulses regulating it, and physiologically in motor innervation; sense experience is never a mere consequence or effect of stimuli and of sensory processes connected solely with these stimuli. Even the most simple type of sense experience could not take place at all without some degree and some direction of conative attentiveness, without apprehension of a value, and without the beginning of a motor process. (WG 283-84)

These tenets, Scheler points out, are in radical opposition to traditional accounts of sensation and perception in the entire history of Western philosophy. Both rationalism and sensationalism agreed for centuries in
regarding sensations as merely "receptive," as the passive

effect of a stimulus, and uniquely determined in this way,

both quantitatively and qualitatively; sense perception and

its content, in turn, were held to be composed of sensa-
tions, while at the same time viewing perception as a

power of cognition, however, if only of the lowest kind.

(WG 284)

Contrary to this conception of "pure" and "isolat-
ed" sensations as phenomenal formations strictly propor-
tionate to one-way stimulation, and somehow making up the
content of perception in combinations of sense-data,
Scheler describes sensation and perception as a circular
process in which three types of stimuli are to be distin-
guished and taken into account: (1) biological stimulus
(things in the surrounding world), (2) physical-chemical
stimulus, and (3) metaphysical stimulus (centers and
fields of forces), all of which, together with conscious
phenomena, are participating and reciprocally involving
one another in the realization of a sensation or percep-
tion throughout an entire chain of centripetal, central,
and centrifugal processes. (WG 288)

This circular process encompasses four distinct
ontological levels of being (Seinsstufen des Seins):
(1) forces, (2) 'objective appearance' and 'world of
experience' (objektive Erscheinung, Bildwelt), (3) for-
mal-mechanistically reduced images or phenomena,
(4) phenomena of consciousness.
Accordingly, it is important to avoid the following three mistakes: (1) to believe that the process of stimulation represented in formal-mechanistic accounts unequivocally determines the content of sensation and perception—instead of merely the functions, which only extract and delineate this "content" from the fullness of the objective appearance; (2) that this mechanistic process even determines the "picture" itself as objective appearance transcendent to consciousness (transbewusste Erscheinung); the assumption that the mere centripetal physical part of the whole circular process (taking place in between the point of departure of the stimulus and the total reaction of the nervous system both centripetally and centrifugally) is clearly and uniquely proportionate to the psycho-physiological functions of sensing, seeing, hearing, tasting, and finally perceiving, and indirectly to the "aspects" of the objective picture delineated by these spatio-temporally remote functions (raumzeitlichen Pannfunktionen). (WG 290)

As also Merleau-Ponty after him, Scheler criticizes Gestalt psychologists (e.g., W. Köhler) for extending physicalistic explanatory schema even to life processes as a special case of Gestalt mechanism, thus failing to account for (active) spontaneous selection, production, and creation. (WG 302) On the other hand, Scheler criticizes, in harmony with the findings of Gestalt theorists, the traditional confusion or identification of "images," as conscious phenomena, with the "contents" of perception and "possible"
contents of perception as objective appearances, or the world represented in these images. Rather, such "images" should be assumed to pertain to a "Gestalt" or structural whole in relation to which all perception is merely divided into various aspects; there is, then, not just one and the same kind of stimuli eliciting strictly corresponding "images," but various individual perceivers may apprehend different aspects, degrees of adequateness, and levels of essential relativity of the same Gestalt of a concrete thing. (WG 313)

Scheler lists the following new considerations for a philosophical theory of knowledge, based on an extensive study of experimental data: (1) A 'sensation'79 is not a phenomenon; it is merely a factor 'x' as a condition for the realization of a perception; it can never be completely isolated in its purity; (2) both the assumptions of constancy and of 'unnoticed sensation' are to be discarded with reference to the relation between physical stimulus and possible sensation; (3) even the most simple perception is in part conditioned by conative motor factors; (4) every apprehension is "remote perception"—even for the most "simple" kind; (5) apprehension and representation (Vorstellung) develop in the same original manner from the

79'Sensation' here understood as a technical term denoting basic sensory particulars or 'sense-data' as postulated in the sensationalist-associationist framework and constitutive of atomistic, causal accounts of perception.
prior form of 'eidetic' images of perception ('eidetische' Anschauungsbilder, based on a study by Jaensch); (6) the original 'synesthesia' (Synaesthesien) follow the direction of the intended object of perception; (7) sensations on the organic level (Organempfindungen), too, are merely particular types of fulfillment of the previously given structure of the body schema, the state of the bodily organism; (8) specific fields of sensory energies pertain to sensory function—not to qualitative contents—and also to the selection of stimuli by the mechanisms connected with the sensory organs; they are not producing the qualitative content. (WG 316)

Finally, Scheler discusses the relation between perception or sensation, on the one hand, and the "imagination" as a function of the "vital psyche" (Vitalpsyche), on the other—again as a criticism directed primarily against the still widely held sensationalistic and empiricist conceptions in this regard. More specifically, Scheler attacks the interpretation of the imagination as merely reproductive, according to which all products of the imagination may be traced back and reduced to some original sensations or partial contents of sense perception, or combinations of these elements, ruling out any original productive and creative power of the imagination, e.g., in the synoptic and metaphysical operations of the mind. (WG 343-58)

Whenever sense experience, given its limitations,
fails to provide a comprehensive picture of reality, the mind still strives to attain a synoptic view of that aspect of reality—with nothing but the help of the imagination (cf. the construction, on the basis of fossils and known laws of formation, a series of extinct species of animals and plants; or a schema of the interior of the earth, etc.). (WG 348)

In metaphysics, moreover, being partly defined by the fact that it concerns objects that are real in themselves and which neither directly nor indirectly affect our empirical sensibility, the imagination thus functions as the only intuitive power of cognition—without thereby undermining the possible correspondence with reality of metaphysical cognition. The cognitive value of an imaginative act of any kind always depends exclusively on the criterion as to whether or not the imagination, originally engendered in conative impulses and drives, is being subjected to the right kind of control, i.e., the direction and guidance through acts of the mind. It is in this alone that the fantasy world of an insane person differs from the creative imagination of a genius. (WG 349)

3. The Metaphysics of Perception and the Problem of Reality

In a section on the metaphysics of perception and the problem of reality (WG 359-78) Scheler reiterates the claim for the validity and autonomy of alternate modes of
cognition, especially of philosophical or phenomenological intuition, and the need for a metascientific ('scientific' here taken in the narrow sense of 'positive' science) metaphysical investigation into the three types or dynamic centers of 'reality,' viz., the 'centers of forces,' 'vital centers,' and 'person centers,'—all other finite appearances being relative to these basic types. (WG 359)

Scheler also provides a sketch of the phenomenological reduction (acknowledging to have borrowed the term from Husserl) as being fundamental for all philosophical cognition. Pending a more detailed elaboration of its precise 'nature, technique, and method' in the first volume of a forthcoming work on metaphysics, Scheler adds a discussion of the general thesis of reality, in order to emphasize once more the special effort and change of attitude required to attain a purely theoretical level of cognition. (WG 363-78)

4. Concluding Remarks from the Perspective of a Sociology of Knowledge

In this brief concluding section (WG 379-82), Scheler traces once more the evolution of mechanistic accounts of nature from absolutist, metaphysical inter-

80 See discussion of the phenomenological reduction in A.4.b) above; also explanatory remarks concerning the publication of Scheler's works in reference no. 24 above.

81 For an explication of Scheler's conception of the 'factor of reality' (Realitätsmoment) see A.4.b) above.
pretations to those of philosophical pragmatism and Marxism, indicating the socio-ideological implications of this evolution.

Scheler concludes with the confident anticipation of a cultural renewal through a new, autonomous rise of a truly philosophical and metaphysical spirit.
PART TWO

THE HISTORICAL LIMITATIONS OF SCHELER'S CRITIQUE OF PRAGMATISM

The following exploration of the historical context of Scheler's critique is intended to form a transition between the exposition of Scheler's critique of pragmatism in Part I and the critical appraisal in Part III.

Scheler depended for his assessment of American pragmatism entirely on texts that were available at the time in the German language—above all on a translation of W. James's introductory lectures on pragmatism (delivered under the title "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results" before the Philosophical Union of the University of California on August 26, 1898, and of P. C. S. Schiller's Humanism.

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82 Although Scheler's discussion of pragmatism encompasses a consideration of European variants and historical origins including J. G. Fichte's idealistic, and Nietzsche's and Bergson's vitalistic versions, Vaihinger's 'fictionalism' as well as British utilitarianism and empiricism, he places the position of 'philosophical pragmatism' squarely within the American movement originating with C. S. Peirce.


84 Scheler refers to the following texts: William James, Der Pragmatismus, trans. W. Jerusalem (Leipzig 1908, Philos. Soziolog. Buecherei, Bd. 1).—Emile Boutroux,
In his famous introductory lectures on pragmatism, James presented Peirce’s 'pragmatic maxim' of his article "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" (published previously and largely gone unnoticed, in the Popular Science Monthly of 1878). This event, and the resulting interest in pragmatism is commonly recognized as the beginning of the pragmatic movement in North America. It has also been viewed as the foundation of the "tale of two pragmatisms," i.e., the development of two significantly different strands of pragmatism—that of "Peirce and Dewey on the one hand and of James, Schiller and some of the European pragmatists on the other." This bifurcation of the movement, moreover, has been attributed to W. James's "misunderstanding."  


85Garry M. Brodsky, "The Pragmatic Movement," The Review of Metaphysics 25 (December 1971): 282. The expression 'tale of two pragmatisms' is Brodsky's, although he himself does not favour such a simplified view, nor also the contrary conception of the pragmatic movement as a "progressive, uni-directional affair." Rather, it is important to take into account many "shifts of focus and interest as well as complex, diverse and non-systematic inter-connections not only between Peirce, James and Dewey but also between these thinkers and, e.g., Lewis." Ibid., pp. 268-69, 282.

or at least transformation "to a serious extent" of Peirce's thought. Peirce himself finally decided to re-pudiate such radically divergent interpretations and re-formulations and to set apart his own position by adopting the term 'pragmaticism' as distinct from 'pragmatism.'

Although Scheler had been acquainted with Peirce's thought only mediately, he nevertheless noted at once that Peirce's pragmatic maxim lends itself to a variety of alternative interpretations. His rendering of it on the basis of the translation of W. James's presentation is as follows: In answer to the question "What is the meaning and significance of a thought," Peirce states that we must determine the mode of action which this thought is susceptible to engender. "The mode of action constitutes for us the whole meaning of this thought." (WG 212) The corresponding passage in James's (English) text reads as follows:

In an article entitled "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," Mr. Peirce, after pointing out that our beliefs are really rules for action, said that, to develop a thought's meaning, we need only determine what conduct it is fitted to produce; that conduct is for us its sole significance.


Presented in this way, Scheler remarks, Peirce's criterion of meaning is ambiguous in many respects. Given the title of Peirce's article, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," it would appear, at first, that Peirce did not mean to claim that the "meaning and significance" of a thought consists exclusively in its practical consequences, but merely that by reflecting on these consequences, we will arrive at a greater clarity about this meaning and significance. However, it is certain, Scheler continues, that W. James and other exponents of pragmatism adhere to the radical interpretation of the maxim understood as a criterion of meaning, viz., that the practical consequences of a thought are identical with its meaning and significance, while disagreeing widely among themselves as to the exact nature of the "consequences," or of "practical consequences."

(WG 212-13) (Other possible interpretations—no less untenable in Scheler's view—include a version of the empiricist principle of verification through observation, and the view that the modified experience itself is a "result" or end product, i.e., in some sense brought about and generated by us. (WG 214-16)

The second main tenet of pragmatism, according to Scheler, concerns its new definition of truth. According to the pragmatic definition of truth, a sentence whose meaning and significance has been determined in agreement with the first tenet, is true if and only if the represented or conceived (vorgestellten) actions to which it may
give rise prove useful (zweckmaessig), that is to say, if those actions are capable of realizing an intention, fulfilling a desire or expectation. Hence, even the notion of truth, Scheler points out, carries essentially a practical meaning and becomes a form of usefulness and utility.

(WG 219)

Since Scheler did not have access to the "authentic" writings of C. S. Peirce, it is the object of Part III of the thesis to examine if and to what extent Scheler's transcendental critique of the pragmatic reductivisms correctly applies to Peirce's conception of 'pragmaticism.'
PART THREE

CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF SCHELER'S
CRITIQUE OF PRAGMATISM

Introductory Remarks

In view of the historical limitations of Scheler's critique of pragmatism as outlined in Part II, it is the task of Part III to attempt a critical appraisal of Scheler's refutation of the twofold pragmatic reductivism as applied to C. S. Peirce's 'pragmaticism.'

More specifically, Scheler's objection has been shown in Part I to concern

1. the reduction of the meaning and significance of cognition entirely to 'work' or experimental praxis, and

2. the reduction of all cognition and objects of knowledge to the frame of reference of 'work knowledge,' viz., knowledge governed by the cognitive objective of the mastery and control of nature.

The following critical analyses in sections A. and B. will deal with these forms of reductivism under the operative definitions 'reductive operationalism' and 'scientism' respectively.
A. IS PEIRCE'S PRAGMATISM A SPECIES OF REDUCTIVE OPERATIONALISM?

In his critique of pragmatism, Scheler himself never uses the term 'operationalism'—a fairly recent concept in the philosophy of science originating with P. W. Bridgman which, moreover, is commonly associated with pragmatism. Since the term appears to adequately capture the domain of the first aspect of pragmatic reductivism Scheler is concerned with, namely, the reduction of the meaning and significance of cognition to 'work' or experimental praxis, I propose to adopt it, for the purpose of this analysis, in abstraction from the actual history of the term.

'Operation(al)ism' will henceforth be understood to refer to the position (a) that the "meaning of a concept is given by a set of operations," 90 and (b) distinguishing it from the verificationism of logical positivism by its connecting meaningfulness with experimental activities, rather than mere passive observation. 91


Operation(al)ism has also been defined as the view—given the decisive role of observation and measuring devices as well as experimental standards for the development of particular areas of research—that the foundation of scientific knowledge is constituted by the facts of human action, rather than by facts of experience.\(^{92}\) This definition approximates Scheler's notion of 'instrumentalism' as that intellectual tendency which, instead of conceiving of methods of inquiry as being devised in accordance with the nature of the objects of inquiry, maintains that it is, first and foremost, the method which creates certain kinds of objects. (WG 221). 'Instrumentalism' understood in this way will henceforth be included in the definition of 'operationalism' for the purpose of this analysis as the logical extension of (a) and (b).

In what follows, I will proceed to explore the question of the presence of reductive operationalism in Peirce's pragmatic doctrine by first establishing a link between an instance of Scheler's direct reference to James's reductivist interpretation and employment of Peirce's pragmatic maxim, and a passage in apparent agreement with such an interpretation in Peirce's writings. On the basis of a subsequent analysis of various formulations and explications of the pragmatic maxim by Peirce as well

as a consideration of Peirce's overall philosophical concerns and a certain evolution in his thought it will be shown, however, that Peirce's 'pragmaticism' is not a species of reductive operationalism.

In attributing to William James a radically reductive interpretation of Peirce's pragmatic maxim, Scheler asks, what else could James have possibly held, if for him the two statements,

1. Matter and motion are the ground of all things.
2. God is the origin of all things,
differ from one another only verbally, being identical in meaning as long as they do not posit different kinds of life and action. (WG 213)

Turning to Charles S. Peirce's own writings, there is a comparable statement in his article "How to Make Our Ideas Clear":

... let us ask what we mean by calling a thing hard. Evidently that it will not be scratched by many other substances. The whole conception of this quality, as of every other, lies in its conceived effects. There is absolutely no difference between a hard thing and a soft thing so long as they are not brought to the test.\(^9\)

In this passage, then, the difference in meaning between the predicates 'hard' and 'soft' is clearly taken as depending upon the factual execution of an experiment.

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Hence, also the truth of the statement comes to be a function of the possible factual verification by the test. The above passage is indeed an instance where even Peirce's own elaboration of the pragmatic maxim, in isolation, is extremely misleading and even contradictory to the overall intention of his philosophy. In point of fact, nothing had been further from Peirce's intention, by his introduction of the pragmatic maxim, than to replace the understanding of the meaning of ideas by the observation or description of their factually ensuing consequences. As a logician, he presupposed, rather, that the "modes of action" which are to represent a criterion for the kind of belief in question follow from these beliefs according to a rule which is included in the proper understanding of the beliefs. The following formulation of the pragmatic maxim already indicates a very different intention from that of a reduction to objective fact.

... the whole function of thought is to produce habits of action ... To develop its meaning, we have, therefore, simply to determine what habits it produces, for what a thing means is simply what habits it involves.
According to this formulation, the habits concerned are to be "determined," not to be "observed" or "described." Peirce does not mean, by the somewhat careless use of the verb 'produces,' 'produces as a factual consequence,' but—as the verb 'involves' substituted subsequently for 'produces' indicates—that the proper understanding of the thought involves certain definite habits or rules. The twofold use of 'simply' may readily suggest that Peirce in effect intended a behaviourist reduction of meaning, and formulations such as these seem to have indeed given rise to popular versions of pragmatism. Peirce's elaboration immediately following, by contrast, shows that the "habits" or dispositions to behave indicative of the meaning of a thought should not be taken as causally determined observational facts in the terminology of Hume or of behaviourism, but as rules which are capable of mediating our self-determined subjective action with possible observational facts.

Now, the identity of a habit depends on how it might lead us to act, not merely under such circumstances as are likely to arise, but under such as might possibly occur, no matter how improbable they may be. (CP 5.400)

The "habit" which, so to speak, contains the secret of

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98Apel, C. S. Peirce Schriften, 1:141.

meaning for Peirce, is thus clearly not intended as a factual consequence whose probable occurrence is to be anticipated, but a normative rule for possible action. ¹⁰⁰

As Peirce himself states:

To say that I hold the import, or adequate ultimate interpretation, of a concept is contained, not in any deed or deeds that will ever be done, but in a habit of conduct, or general moral determination of whatever procedure there may come to be, is no more than to say that I am a pragmaticist. (CP 5.504)

Nor are the habits to be understood as subjective, psychological dispositions, but are at once located in the universal medium of language, since "all thought whatsoever is a sign, and is mostly of the nature of language," presupposing a rational community, "man's circle of society." (CP 5.421) It is this universal regulative function governing a concept or an idea, then, that the interpreter can and must anticipate in a thought experiment. ¹⁰¹ This is also borne out by the following formulation of the pragmatic maxim to which Peirce will refer time and again:

Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object. (CP 5.402, emphasis added.)

Treating meanings as "meanings in general" is precisely the issue which sets apart the universal realism of Peirce's

¹⁰⁰ Apel, C. S. Peirce Schriften, 1:142.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.
'pragmaticism' from James's nominalistic, sensualistic version of pragmatism, in which the conceived effects of the objects of thought or belief are taken as concrete practical effects, sensations, conduct, actions—viz., just the level of experience which excludes generality, thus assimilating meanings entirely into particular experience and actions. (Peirce himself later repudiated the behaviourist interpretation of the meaning of the attributes 'soft' and 'hard' quoted at the beginning of this analysis, as a relapse into nominalism of a sensualistic, positivist type. As Peirce retorts in "What Pragmatism Is," distinguishing his conception of pragmatism from that of James, Schiller, a.o. by adopting the term 'pragmaticism':

And do not overlook the fact that the pragmaticist maxim says nothing of single experiments or of single experimental phenomena (for what is conditionally true in futuro can hardly be singular), but only speaks of general kinds of experimental phenomena. (CP 5.426)

By the same token, Peirce also rejects the instrumentalist view that "the act of knowing a real object alters it."

(CP 5.555)—a direct consequence of conceiving of truth as a species of satisfaction:

But to say that an action or the result of an action is satisfactory is simply to say that it is congruous to the aim of that action. Consequently, the aim must

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103 Apel, C. S. Peirce Schriften, 1:150.
be determined before it can be determined, either in thought or in fact, to be satisfactory. (CP 5.560)

Herbert Feigl characterizes Peirce's pragmatic maxim as having closely anticipated the operationalist attitude, in a broad sense, of P. W. Bridgman which is shared also by Carnap and Wittgenstein according to the dictum: "Don't ask me for the 'meaning' of a concept, ask me about the rules according to which the concept is used."\textsuperscript{104} (Although Bridgman is commonly considered the founder of operationalism, he rejects that label for himself.) Bridgman's concern had been to explicate the concepts of physics by reflective analysis of the procedures involved in the use of concepts in the area of measurement, experiment, and theory. While it is true that Bridgman and his operationalist followers appear to have drawn substantial inspiration from Peirce's maxim,\textsuperscript{105} Bridgman, unlike Peirce, however, set out to propose a radical identification of the meaning of a concept with experimental procedure:

\begin{quote}
... we mean by any concept nothing more than a set of operations; the concept is synonymous with the corresponding set of operations ...\textsuperscript{106}
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{105}Runes, Dictionary of Philosophy, s.v. "Pragmatism" by V. J. McGill, p. 245.

\textsuperscript{106}Quoted in Thayer, Meaning and Action, p. 92n.
This position, however, is closer to James’s nominalist, finitist pragmatism rather than to Peirce’s version, since Peirce locates synonymy between “conceptions and concepts of an operation and its consequences,”107 i.e., within the framework of interpretation understood as a three-place relation (the interpreter interpreting signs as something). Furthermore, it should be noted that Peirce had expressed misgivings about the possible misapplication of the pragmatic maxim for the purpose of eliminating aspects of scientific theory108 (presumably because they are not susceptible to this criterion), thus anticipating the problems which a thoroughgoing nominalist-operationalist reduction came to face later on, e.g., with regard to theoretical concepts.

Peirce’s ‘pragmatism,’ then, cannot be accused of radically reducing meanings to factual operations, to ‘work’ and praxis. In Peirce’s own words (repudiating at the same time his own earlier ‘stoic’ maxim),

Pragmatism ... endeavours to define the rational purport [of words and general ideas], and this it finds in the purposive bearing of the word or proposition in question ... if pragmatism really made Doing to be the Be-all and the End-all of life, that would be its death. For to say that we live for the mere sake of action, as action, regardless of the thought it carries out, would be to say that there is no such thing as rational purport. (CP 5.428-29, emphasis added.)

107Ibid.
108Runes, Dictionary of Philosophy, Ibid., p. 245.
It is the rational or intellectual purport of concepts and beliefs which is conveyed in the rules or habits, and which must be retained as a distinct moment of reflection and reasoning. (As John Dewey put it, "the role of action in Peirce's conception of pragmatism is that of an intermediary."

Peirce's resistance against any collapse of the categorial element of meaning into experimental fact may, finally, be illustrated by contrasting a reductive interpretation with a hermeneutic sense of the pragmatic maxim. In the hermeneutic sense, the meaning-governing habit is determined by explicating a vaguely pre-understood meaning by means of an anticipation in the imagination of the possibility of praxis and experience as indicated by the meaning of the sign. (The theoretical basis for this differentiation--analogous to the phenomenological distinction between meaning-intention and meaning-fulfillment by the subject--is provided in the form of Peirce's account of the interpretation of signs as a three-place relation according to which the meaning of signs is interpreted as something, and mediated by the mind or Thirdness.)

According to Peirce, not only is it untenable to

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110 Apel, Transformation der Philosophie, 2:195.
reduce meanings in nominalistic and behaviouristic fashion, but it is likewise impossible to fully corroborate any cognitive claim on the basis of individual facts. Every cognitive claim, rather, presupposes the context of a community of knowers and reasoners working toward ultimate convergence "in the long run" in their cooperative scientific efforts.

The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real. (CP 5.407)

... as what anything really is, is what it may finally come to be known to be in the ideal state of complete information, so that reality depends on the ultimate decision of the community ... (CP 5.316)

Furthermore, every inference must be recognized as going beyond itself (thought for Peirce is thoroughly discursive, sensations or atomistic sense data being devoid of cognitive content), since

... no inference of any individual can be thoroughly logical without certain determinations of his mind which do not concern any one inference immediately ... (CP 5.354)

The general "determinations" (e.g., in the case of inferences from induction) by themselves cannot be held to be true, either, but only "in the long run ... approximate to the truth." (CP 5.350)

Peirce also discusses so-called "leading principles" at work in our reasoning, viz., "(t)he particular habit of mind which governs this or that inference," or more specifically, "which determines us, from given
premises, to draw one inference rather than another...\textsuperscript{111}

Leading principles or basic assumptions may either be "constitutional" or acquired, and are more or less fundamental and essential; they are difficult to discern and probably "of no service to a person whose thought is directed wholly to practical subjects, and whose activity moves along thoroughly-beaten paths."\textsuperscript{112} A leading principle is neither true nor false (CP 2.467), but must be applicable to "all possible cases" in order to ensure valid reasoning. It is not necessary, on the other hand (another hermeneutic component of his Logic of Inquiry)

\ldots that the reasoner should have a distinct apprehension of the leading principle of the habit which governs his reasoning; it is sufficient that he should be conscious of proceeding according to a general method and that he should hold that that method is generally apt to lead to the truth.\textsuperscript{113}

It is the task of "logical criticism" or reflective analysis to uncover and validate the leading principles in question.

It appears, thus, that Peirce's conception of an infinite tendency toward a final consensus of the community of interpreters and investigators in the context of

\textsuperscript{111}"The Fixation of Belief," Philosophical Writings of Peirce, p. 8.

\textsuperscript{112}Ibid., pp. 8-9.

\textsuperscript{113}"What Is A Leading Principle?" Philosophical Writings of Peirce, p. 133.
experimental praxis may be looked at as a leading principle of the most fundamental type within the frame of reference of pragmatism, i.e., within the purview of Peirce's "Logic of Science" or "Theory of Inquiry"—a principle which is a priori or empty in the sense that it "can add nothing to the premisses of the argument it governs, although it is relevant, so that it implies no fact except such as is presupposed in all discourse ..." Furthermore, this most basic leading principle of scientific investigation appears to have been concretized into the formulation of the pragmatic maxim as a methodological principle geared to the cognitive objective of the mastery and control of nature.

In opposition to Scheler's critique of the pragmatic thesis based on Peirce's pragmatic maxim, then, the foregoing analysis showed that—unlike James's and Bridgman's reductive operationalism—'work' or experimental action does not function in Peirce's thought as a factual or logical "consequence" or "equivalent" in the clarification and justification of signs and beliefs. Peirce's pragmatic maxim, rather, serves as a transcendental limiting condition for the legitimate use of concepts and valid reasoning according to normative rules within the domain of scientific inquiry.

Peirce never intended to expound his pragmatism.

114 Ibid., p. 134.
as a self-sufficient philosophy or theory of knowledge, but merely regarded it as a methodological principle within the framework of his "Logic of Science" or "Theory of Inquiry." On the condition and to the extent that the pragmatic maxim is understood to operate strictly within the frame of reference of the positive sciences, there are even several points of agreement between Scheler's and Peirce's respective analyses of cognition:

a) Peirce, like Scheler, is engaged in a transcendental inquiry into the possibility and limits of scientific knowledge. (It is interesting to note, in this connection, that Peirce has been called the "Kant" of American philosophy.  

b) Peirce's pragmatic maxim as the fundamental methodological principle with its reference to experimental action appears to correspond to, or embody, Scheler's conception of the basic a priori cognitive aim (intellectual purport) of the practical mastery and control of nature for the domain of the positive sciences.

c) Peirce, like Scheler, rejects all forms of reductive operationalism amounting to an elimination of the activity of reason:

(1) For both thinkers, meaning and truth cannot be reduced

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116 Apel, Transformation der Philosophie, 2:164.
to particular concrete actions and conduct.

(2) Inferences in what Scheler calls 'inductive knowledge' cannot simply be read off from premises as a matter of course, but presuppose a certain "deep structure" of reasoning, to appropriate N. Chomsky's term.

(3) The objects of knowledge cannot be regarded, in instrumentalist fashion, as being altered or transformed by the act of cognition.

(4) The cognitive aim and intellectual intent must be retained as a distinct moment logically prior to the occurrence of "satisfaction" in the experimental act.

For all these areas of agreement, it is important not to overlook that the respective inquiries of Scheler and Peirce are conducted on two different levels. Scheler's analysis--a kind of "anthropology of cognition" on the ontological level--is more of the character of a propaedeutic to a philosophy of science. He is primarily concerned with providing a transcendental groundwork for a theory of cognition and knowledge as such, with the resulting division into the three basic types of knowledge, of which the positive sciences represent only one. On this more rudimentary level of analysis, the "subject of cognition" for the area of work knowledge merely appears in Scheler as undifferentiated "living beings in general"--endowed with sensibility, intelligence, and reason, and capable of spontaneous, amechanical movement. In Peirce's more
specialized metascientific normative analysis, on the other hand, the subject of cognition takes the form of the infinite community of interpreters and investigators.

Scheler's ontological level of analysis in turn allows him to "ground" the "leading principle" or basic cognitive objective--of experimental action or technical and practical control--in the necessary condition of man's bodily a priori and practical engagement in the world, rather than considering it as a mere "regulative" principle which may ultimately be open to conventional decision and revision.

These differences in methodological levels and scope notwithstanding, the areas of agreement in the theories of knowledge of Scheler and Peirce may be traced back directly to their common transcendental perspectives, in which the subject of conceptualizing activities and knowledge is retained as a distinct and active factor in the knowing process, rather than assimilating it into the method and/or object of cognition. It is by virtue of their respective transcendental approaches, then, that any radically operationalist reduction is precluded a priori, even for the domain of work knowledge of the positive sciences, viz., of knowledge for the mastery and control of nature.
B. IS PEIRCE'S PRAGMATISM A FORM OF SCIENTISM?

Scheler defines 'scientism' (Scientismus) as the intellectual tendency to already presuppose, in asking about the nature of knowledge and truth, the "fact" of the validity of the positive sciences, their methods and tasks, and then to answer the question to the effect that truth and knowledge be constituted by the very "result" of the methods of the positive sciences. (WG 221)

The scientific attitude, thus, fails to undertake prior determinations of the concepts 'truth' and 'knowledge,' in order to ask only subsequently, on the basis of this prior inquiry, to what extent the positive sciences, by means of their methods and criteria, provide us with truth and knowledge, what sort of objects alone are of cognitive interest for that particular frame of reference, and to what extent possibly an extra-scientific form of cognition, e.g., philosophical, religious, or aesthetic cognition, may be capable of attaining truth and knowledge. (WG. 221)

According to Scheler's characterization of scientism, his concern with the pragmatist reduction of all possible knowledge to 'work knowledge,' or knowledge within the purview of the pragmatic maxim, is thus directed
against (a) the uncritical acceptance of the methodological and conceptual framework of the positive sciences, and (b) the generalization from the principles of that frame of reference to all objects of knowledge, and thereby the elimination of any other possible kind of knowledge.

Before proceeding with an analysis of Peirce's writings in these respects, it may be instructive to look at Habermas's and Apel's modified classification of Scheler's three types of knowledge and their corresponding cognitive interests:

Juergen Habermas distinguishes between three kinds of cognitive or "knowledge-constitutive" interests underlying the following areas of inquiry: (1) the empirical-analytic natural sciences ("Science"), (2) the hermeneutic cultural sciences (Geisteswissenschaften), and (3) "critical theory." For Habermas, as for Scheler, the cognitive interest governing the empirical-analytic inquiry of the natural sciences is the technical cognitive interest in the context of instrumental action:

... empirical-analytic methods aim at disclosing and comprehending reality under the transcendental viewpoint of possible technical control.117

For the hermeneutic or "cultural sciences," on the other hand, the leading cognitive interest consists in

... maintaining the intersubjectivity of mutual

understanding in ordinary-language communication and in action according to common norms.\textsuperscript{118}

The leading cognitive interest of mutual understanding differs from the technical cognitive interest in that...

it aims not at the comprehension of an objectified reality but at the maintenance of the intersubjectivity of mutual understanding, within whose horizon reality can first appear as something.\textsuperscript{119}

In as much as the cognitive interest of intersubjective understanding underlying the cultural sciences is rooted in 'praxis,' in the sense of ethico-political communication and interaction among living individuals, groups and cultures, Habermas also calls it the "practical" cognitive interest.\textsuperscript{120}

The emancipatory cognitive interest, finally, "which aims at the pursuit of reflection"\textsuperscript{121} emerges in Habermas's conception as the point where knowledge and interest are comprehended as fundamentally connected. Habermas places this cognitive interest within the domain of a "critical theory" in which he envisages the merging of a philosophy that is both practically engaged and critical, on the one hand, with an ideology critique by the social sciences, including psychoanalysis, on the other.

The critical self-reflection of the sciences, fully comprehended as self-formative, brings about

\textsuperscript{118}Ibid. \hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{119}Ibid., p. 177.
\textsuperscript{120}Ibid., p. 198.
the objectivistic self-understanding of the sciences, which suppresses the contribution of subjective activity to the preformed objects, of possible knowledge.\textsuperscript{121}

These three "innate" human interests, according to Habermas, form the transcendental structure and limits of cognition.

Orientation toward technical control, toward mutual understanding in the conduct of life, and toward emancipation from seemingly 'natural' constraint establish the specific viewpoints from which we can apprehend reality as such in any way whatsoever.\textsuperscript{122}

Karl-Otto Apel, for his part, explicitly acknowledges a "connection" between his (as well as Habermas's) conception of three "quasitranscendental" cognitive interests and Scheler's theory of the three types of knowledge.\textsuperscript{123}

He, too, links contemporary conceptions of physics in which the possibility of experimentation is presupposed in principle with the cognitive interest of technical control, rooted in the "bodily a priori" of man and his practical engagement in nature.\textsuperscript{124}

The kinds of cognitive problems, by contrast, which cannot be solved by means of repeatable experimental action, but require an explication in terms of the self-experience (Selbsterfahrung) of man and his society,\textsuperscript{125} are the concern of the hermeneutical sciences (geistes-

\textsuperscript{121}Ibid., p. 212. \textsuperscript{122}Ibid., p. 311.
\textsuperscript{123}Apel, \textit{Transformation der Philosophie}, 2:31n.
\textsuperscript{124}Ibid., 2:100. \textsuperscript{125}Ibid., 1:19.
wissenschaftliche Hermeneutik), including philology, history, hermeneutical phenomenology, on the one hand, and finally, of an ideology critique consisting in the dialectical mediation of objective-scientific and hermeneutic methods, of "explanation" and "understanding" (Verstehen) respectively. This latter mediation is seen by Apel to lead through self-conscious reflection (Selbstbesinnung) to a transformation of causally explicable forms of behaviour to comprehensible action.\textsuperscript{126}

The cognitive interests corresponding to the hermeneutical sciences and ideology critique, respectively, are the hermeneutic interest of communication and mutual understanding (hermeneutisches Verständigungsinteresse) and the emancipatory cognitive interest.\textsuperscript{127} Apel points out the complementary nature of the transcendental 'Sprachspiel' involved in scientific-technological knowledge (cf. Peirce's community of investigators and interpreters) and that of the intersubjective horizon of communication in hermeneutic knowledge, which is presupposed in the former.\textsuperscript{128} They are complementary in the sense that the objectification and explanation of events in the framework of the natural sciences and the frame of reference of understanding in the hermeneutic domain exclude, and in this way complement, one another.\textsuperscript{129}

\textsuperscript{126} Ibid., 2:127. \quad \textsuperscript{127} Ibid., 1:31n.
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid., 1:68. \quad \textsuperscript{129} Ibid., 2:111.
The emancipatory interest, according to Apel, is constituted both in terms of the historical self-experience of the community and of the self-knowledge of the person in the course of his life-history. It may be explicated on the basis of the complementary nature of the natural sciences and of interpersonal communication. Its function consists, on the one hand, in the suspension of all causal constraints by man's inner "quasi-nature" and of society, respectively, and in a deepening of man's self-comprehension.\textsuperscript{130}

Apart from certain "architectonic" differences,\textsuperscript{131} and Apel's insistence that cognition and interest, i.e., reflection and practical engagement, never fully coincide, but must be understood as distinct and polar moments within the area of the emancipatory cognitive interest--at the highest point of philosophical reflection--,\textsuperscript{132} Apel's schema of cognitive interests and types of knowledge substantially agrees with that of Habermas. Both Apel's and Habermas's versions, in turn, differ from Scheler's account primarily by virtue of their secularization of Erloesungswissen (with the qualification that Scheler's conception of a 'becoming God' is not a theistic conception), on the one hand, and Scheler's priority of the individual, as opposed to an emphasis on the individual-as-part-of-a-community-and-society, and finally Scheler's insistence

\textsuperscript{130}Ibid., 1:68-70. \textsuperscript{131}Ibid., 1:70n. \textsuperscript{132}Ibid., 2:152.
on radically "pure," apractical metaphysical knowledge, on the other. Like Scheler, both Apel and Habermas agree in affirming the irreducibility of the three distinct kinds of knowledge, as they are linked to man's three fundamental cognitive interests as a transcendental condition for possible knowledge.

Reverting to Scheler's first concern in his repudiation of scientism, it is indeed the case that Peirce had established the pragmatic maxim—not with a view to questioning the validity and legitimate range of the positive sciences—but merely as concretely embodying the a priori structure which determines the reasoning and methodology of scientific inquiry. Peirce cites the following considerations of established custom and utility in favour of the scientific method:

Everybody uses the scientific method about a great many things, and only ceases to use it when he does not know how to apply it ...

Experience of the method has not led us to doubt it, but, on the contrary, scientific investigation has had the most wonderful triumphs in the way of settling opinion. (CP 5.384)

Having determined that experimental action functions as the fundamental leading principle of scientific inquiry for the community of investigators, Peirce stops short of a fully self-reflective critical analysis which would result in the delimitation of the validity of the pragmatic framework within a determinate domain, and of the extent of cognitive significance for the objects of knowledge.
determined to fall within that framework under the conditions specified. An analysis of this type, as Scheler and the other exponents of the theory of the three types of knowledge have shown, however, would inevitably lead beyond the pragmatic frame of reference, setting up areas of cognitive inquiry and discourse which cannot be handled under the pragmatic maxim.

Strictly speaking, the transcendental subject of the community of investigators already goes beyond the frame of reference of the pragmatic maxim. Yet, as Habermas rightly points out, Peirce did not take that subject "seriously enough," and absolutized the pragmatist criterion of meaning so as to destroy "the foundation of pragmatism itself." In other words, the very subject of inquiry which had been postulated as constructing and validating scientific knowledge vanishes by his extending the pragmatic criterion of meaning to the subjects of inquiry as well.

One of the results of Scheler's analysis of the mechanistic explanatory model has been that even in simple acts of perception, the subject of knowledge, in its spontaneity and intentionality, stands out of and is distinct from the series of empirical events and stimuli. Although Peirce himself recognizes that mechanistic causal explanations cannot be extended to the explanation of minds, where

133Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 137.
"final" or "logical" causation prevails (CP 1.269, 1.250), he effectively relinquishes the distinctive role of the subject of cognition by applying the pragmatist criterion indiscriminately to both mind and matter. By the same token, he treats beliefs about empirical events on the same level as the empirical events themselves.\(^{134}\)

In his operationalist conception of mind,\(^{135}\) Peirce conjoins his pragmatic maxim with his theory of signs as follows:

> Pragmatism makes thinking to consist in the living, inferential metabolism of symbols whose purport lies in conditional general resolutions to act. (CP 5.403n)

Thought, then, is to be analyzed and defined in terms of symbols or signs.

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\(^{134}\)Ibid., p. 136.

\(^{135}\)A qualification has to be stated here in that Peirce’s Collected Papers, Vol. 6, Chapter 5 on 'Synecism' and 'Agapism' contains a highly speculative metaphysical account of mind. This account stands apart in Peirce’s philosophy, however, conflicting both with his conception of philosophy and metaphysics as a positive science and observational discipline, and his usual operationalist accounts of the mind, often couched in biological terms. It has been suggested that not too much weight should be given to his biological formulations. (In agreement with this view, I have left out of consideration such strange conceptions as the "muscular habits of the tongue" being the basis of personality, CP 8.84.) Even the more properly epistemological accounts by Peirce of the nature of the mind in terms of inferential operations, however, have been characterized as coming "closest to what might have been the first formulation of behaviorism," if not of a "strict" kind. [Larry Holmes, "Prolegomena to Peirce’s Philosophy of Mind," in Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce, Second Series, pp. 359–81, Edward C. Moore and Richard S. Robin eds. (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1964), p. 360.]
The only thought ... which can possibly be cognized is thought in signs. But thought which cannot be cognized does not exist. All thought, therefore, must necessarily be in signs. (CP 5.251)

From the observation that thinking necessarily involves the use of signs, and having shown that perception and conscious phenomena, too, involve Thirdness or conceptual mediation, Peirce moves to a characterization of the "reality" of mind itself as a sign:

We have seen that the content of consciousness, the entire phenomenal manifestation of mind, is a sign resulting from inference ... we must conclude that the mind is a sign developing according to the laws of inference. (CP 5.313, emphasis added.)

The term "sign," according to Peirce, has three different referents:

... first, it is a sign to some thought which interprets it; second, it is a sign for some object to which in that thought it is equivalent; third it is a sign, in some respect or quality, which brings it into connection with its object. (CP 5.283)

In this way, Peirce conflates the interpreter and the interpretant, denying the interpretant any distinguishing position and significance in relation to the series of interpretants. 136

Peirce's operationalist concept of mind has been viewed as symptomatic for the general practice of pragmatism to obliterate again the very distinction it has found to be operative between the facts that are constituted and the methodological framework "within which reality is

objectified for the subject of inquiry.\textsuperscript{137}

Another way in which this reductive move has been shown to manifest itself is that the communication of the community of investigators and interpreters, in the frame of reference of the pragmatic maxim would, in the event of complete convergence to a consensus omnium virtually be phased out in favour of a reference to repeatable logical and technical operations and experiences. Apel refers to Peirce's pragmatism in this respect as the "most subtle" form of scientism in that it entails, as an ideal limit, the replacement of the subject of scientific investigation as community of unmistakable individuals (also of individual groups) in the historical situation, by ultimately exchangeable experimentators. Even this scientifically reduced subject still presupposes in practice a genuinely hermeneutic and historical communication within the community of investigators, however, thus pointing beyond the limiting case of the pragmatic meta-dimension to the complementary a priori of the hermeneutic cultural sciences.\textsuperscript{138}

For Peirce, as for other pragmatists, there is only one type of a priori, the model of scientific knowledge providing the paradigm for all knowledge.\textsuperscript{139} The negative

\textsuperscript{137}Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, p. 136.

\textsuperscript{138}Apel, C. S. *Peirce Schriften*, 2:205-7.

role of the pragmatic maxim is thus described scientifically as establishing

... that almost every proposition of ontological metaphysics is either meaningless gibberish—one word being defined by other words, and they by still others, without any real conception ever being reached—or else is downright absurd ...

(CP 5.423)

Although the pragmatic maxim by itself does not have the import of solving all philosophical problems, but presupposes the complementation by other principles, e.g., the extra-pragmatic doctrine of categories, it nevertheless provides the key to Peirce's philosophy as a whole, and the methodological presupposition for a hypothetico-inductive metaphysics, to be verified "in the long run."  

For Peirce, metaphysics and philosophy in general belong to the positive sciences, as a "Science of Fact," (CP 5.120) that is to say, as a form of inquiry which employs the scientific method, its most important features being the application of public criteria and methods.  

Having ruled out, by the authority of the pragmatic maxim, the bulk of traditional metaphysics as meaningless, the realm of philosophical inquiry is reduced to a "series of problems capable of investigation by the observational methods of the true sciences ..." (CP 5.423) Although Peirce, it is true, accords limited merit and even superi-

140 Apel, C. S. Peirce Schriften, 1:93.

ority in some respects to other methods of inquiry (viz., the methods of "tenacity," of "authority," and the a priori method), and also in his later writings mellows with regard to strict adherence to the scientific approach, he nevertheless insists that the scientific method, "the pursuit of evidence," alone is capable of providing truth, the scientific method actually introducing truth itself: "This is the only one of the four methods which presents any distinction of a right and a wrong way." (CP 5.385)

The scientific method is the only method according to Peirce which ensures one's "opinions to coincide with the fact. To bring about this effect is the prerogative of the method of science." (CP 5.387)

Peirce's pragmatic doctrine implements the demands of scientific investigation as follows:

The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of perception and make their exit at the gate of positive action; and whatever cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to be arrested as unauthorized by reason. (CP 5.212)

The negative role of the normative component of the pragmatic doctrine finally merges with the "moral applications" which Peirce describes as "positive and potent" (CP 5.423), culminating in his conception of the summum bonum as an evolutionary ideal:

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... the pragmatist does not make the *summum bonum* to consist in action, but makes it to consist in that process of evolution whereby the existent comes more and more to embody those generals which were just now said to be destined, which is what we strive to express in calling them reasonable. (CP 5.433)

Ultimately, Peirce envisages the *summum bonum* of concretely evolved reasonableness to attain its highest point in an esthetic ideal:

... it is by the indefinite replication of self-control upon self-control that the *vir is begotten*, and by action, through thought, he grows an esthetic ideal ... as the share which God permits him to have in the work of creation. (CP 5.403n)

The pragmatic maxim which had originally been intended to embody the rationale of the natural sciences has thus been expanded to encompass the domain of the cultural and social sciences and of philosophy (mostly discussed as metaphysics), including ethics and esthetics. This scientific extrapolation of the scientific method to other disciplines is, of course, diametrically opposed to Scheler’s view of metaphysics and philosophy (e.g., ethics and value theory in general) as concerned with the *a priori* intuition of essences, and therefore, as strictly non-inductive, viz., non-observational and non-operational disciplines. While this issue, i.e., the question of the nature of philosophy and of the humanistic or cultural sciences can hardly be decided within the purview of this thesis, and even if Scheler’s discussion involves the tacit reliance on further elaboration in his other writings, let us examine now the subject of metaphysical and ethical
inquiry fares with Peirce's extension of the pragmatic maxim.

For Scheler, Bildungswissen or humanistic/cultural knowledge is a type of cognition which is destined for the formation and cultivation of a person. The ethico-religious subject matter of Erloesungswissen, moreover, is geared to bringing about a higher state of being, a "destiny," for the individual existing self, and ultimately for the community of selves.

Looking at Peirce's account of a person or an individual self, we find that the thinker himself, not just the thought or concept he is entertaining and interpreting, is held to be a 'sign.'

When we think, then, we ourselves, as we are at that moment, appear as a sign. (CP 5.283)

Peirce quite explicitly goes on to state that

... the word or sign which man uses is the man himself. For, as the fact that every thought is a sign, taken in conjunction with the fact that life is a train of thought, proves that man is a sign; so that every thought is an external sign, proves that man is an external sign. Thus my language is the sum total of myself...

(CP 5.314, emph. add.)

As has been pointed out, this is "linguistic philosophy" (and I might add, "Thirdness" or inferential generality) with a vengeance. It epitomizes Peirce's conception of man's development in the evolutionary scheme toward the progressive surrender of individuality through (rational)

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'self-control':

In its higher stages, evolution takes place more and more largely through self-control, and this gives the pragmatist a sort of justification for making the rational purport to be general. (CP 5.433)

Giving an account of the emergence of self-consciousness in children, Peirce concludes that the "self is only inferred" (CP 5.462)--to account for ignorance:

Thus, he becomes aware of ignorance, and it is necessary to suppose a self in which this ignorance can inhere. So testimony gives the first dawning of self-consciousness. (CP 5.233)

Not only does Peirce account for the emergence of self-consciousness in this way, but he maintains that "[i]gnorance and error are all that distinguish our private selves from the absolute ego of pure apperception" (CP 5.235), i.e., the (intersubjective) transcendental subject of cognition.

The individual man, since his separate existence is manifested only by ignorance and error, so far as he is anything apart from his fellows, and from what he and they are to be, is only a negation. (CP 5.317, emphasis added.)

A person for Peirce is "only a particular kind of general idea" (CP 6.270), the notion of personal identity being a "barbaric conception." (CP 7.572)

In this manner, Peirce assimilates man, the person or self, as a general sign into the framework of the pragmatic doctrine, with the actual subject interpreting a sign being only the momentary self or experience, and the enduring self being nothing but a certain configuration in
the succession of events. In this scientific reduction, then, Peirce not only loses the subject of cognition for the area of scientific investigation by a reoblitera-
tion of the subject-object distinction and the distinction between events and beliefs about events, but he also re-
linquishes the person and his interaction with his cultur-
al and social world as a viable subject of normative activ-
ities who is (at least partly) in control over the events known and over his actions, and thereby distinct from the series of events he interprets and cognizes.

In conclusion, Peirce's pragmatic doctrine has been confirmed to be a form of scientism in Scheler's sense in that it starts out by uncritically adopting the cognitive framework of the positive sciences and elaborat-
ing the pragmatic maxim as the fundamental methodological principle embodying its rational purport, then goes on to extrapolate this methodological principle to other areas of inquiry such as ethics, esthetics, and metaphysics, and finally comes to ontologize that methodological prin-
ciple with the concomitant transformation of the community of investigators approximating an epistemological ideal, to the real embodiment of reason in his concrete evolutionary ideal.

In the process of this scientific reduction of

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the methods and objects of knowledge, the pragmatic distinction between the subject of knowledge, his methodological framework and beliefs, on the one hand, and the objects of knowledge, on the other hand, has been found to be obliterated again. The human person or self, as a subject of ethical, esthetic, and philosophical knowledge has been found to be virtually phased out, having been placed on the same level as empirical events.
CONCLUSION

Max Scheler's critique of pragmatism is a highly topical philosophical contribution at a time when monolithic and reductivistic claims on the part of proponents of 'the scientific method'—with their appeal to absolutely 'value-free' rules of procedure, the principle of extensionality, and stringent requirements of 'literalness'—have all but eliminated from 'respectable' theoretical discourse the truly philosophical questions of meaning and value; to the extent that such questions are not simply quantified as psychological or sociological 'facts,' they have either been relegated to the area of mere 'emotive' or practical (rather than cognitive) import or reduced to 'factual' analyses of ways of talking about these questions.

As Scheler's phenomenological mentor, Edmund Husserl, expressed his concern over this trend, it engendered a crisis of meaning for modern man by an "indifferent turning away from the questions which are decisive for a genuine humanity (Menschentum)."145


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In the final analysis they concern man as a free, self-determining being in his behavior toward the human and extrahuman surrounding world (Umwelt) and free in regard to his capacities for rationally shaping himself and his surrounding world. What does science have to say about reason and unreason or about us men as subjects of this freedom? 146

It is important to realize, Husserl points out, that questions about man as a subject of cognition, valuation, and ethical action—all normative acts and thus implicitly or explicitly concerning problems of reason—are metaphysical (in a broad sense) or specifically philosophical questions which "surpass the world understood as the universe of mere facts." 147

Scheler's inquiry into the prescientific conditions of the possibility of knowledge was guided precisely by this concern over the crisis of meaning affecting the very concept of man, considering the pragmatic reduction of cognition to 'work' as a major contributing factor.

The task of this thesis has been, in addition to presenting the major aspects of Scheler's critique, to critically appraise Scheler's charge of a twofold pragmatic reductivism, as applied to C. S. Peirce's own authentic writings which had not been available to Scheler at the time. As a result of the analysis under the operative definitions 'reductive operationalism' and 'scientism,' respectively, it has been established that whereas Scheler's charge of 'reductive operationalism' does not

146 Ibid. (Emphasis added.) 147 Ibid., p. 9.
correctly apply to Peirce's version of pragmatism, it is confirmed to be a form of 'scientism' in Scheler's sense.

Furthermore, the absence of a radical reductivism in the first instance has been traced to the employment of a transcendental perspective in Peirce's theory of cognition. Peirce's transcendental inquiry not having been sufficiently radical, i.e., self-reflective and self-critical, however, it was found ineffective to avert the fallacy of a scientistic reduction resulting from the absolutizing and ontologizing of the pragmatic maxim as a methodological principle.

As a corollary of the study of Scheler's critique of pragmatism it appears to be sound philosophical procedure, for an assessment of any cognitive claim connected with a certain frame of reference, to ascertain whether or not that frame of reference allows for a theoretical account of the subject of inquiry as a viable agent of normative activities, logically distinct from the objects and events to be cognized. If such an account cannot be accommodated within that frame of reference, any radically reductivistic claim must be rejected as untenable, given the failure to do justice to the critical and emancipatory potential of the subject of cognition.

The currently prevalent insistence on positivistic and objectivistic criteria and methods must, of course, itself be understood as a reaction against indefensible metaphysical dogma and excessive speculation as well.
irrational and mystical philosophies, combined with a concern over possible ideological exploitations thereof. For many, adherence to the scientific method became an expression of a genuine ethical and humanistic concern, as R. Carnap put it, for "improving the life of mankind by rational means."148

What has been overlooked, however, in these well-intended programs of a 'scientific humanism,' is the fact that the causal and experimental methods so efficiently employed in the mastery and control of human destiny, by virtue of their intrinsic limitations, leave the entire domain of (objectifying, normative) human subjectivity in cognition to the (irrational) pragmatic domain of methodological and metalinguistic procedure, i.e., to considerations of practical interest and convention with their unquestioned and unexamined presuppositions. (Cf. Scheler's observation regarding the utter irrationality of the pragmatic axiom that the world must necessarily be amenable to complete and total control, WG 378.) The frame of reference of the positive sciences, in fact, provides a theoretical account of man--the cognitive, valuating, and ethical agent--only from the perspective of an object of inquiry, variously given to stimulation, conditioning, and

corresponding reactions and actions taken as (passive) effects according to causal 'explanations' of a physiological, macro-behavioural or cybernetic nature; in short, to the systematic manipulation by the social and natural environment.

One not insignificant consideration in the adherence to the scientific method—as also in Peirce's case—is no doubt the prospect of achieving the kind of consensus in all human problems which is to be found in the natural sciences.

As M. Polanyi, a practicing scientist himself, has pointed out, however, the demands of the modern scientific outlook and methodology—of "direct observation" and experimental praxis—have led distinguished scientists to the absurdity of denying the existence of consciousness, and to dismissing the knower as an "unnecessary postulate."149 Clearly, then, in matters of human experience and meanings, an exclusive pursuit of the more facile consensus of the natural sciences would exact an inordinately high price in terms of such absurdities, the scepticism toward meaning, and the eventual totalitarian polarization of cognition into the manipulated and the manipulators (themselves immune from rational checks and balances outside the framework of 'scientific explanation').

An alternative, philosophical, way of seeking such

a much-needed consensus presents itself as the study of human experience and meanings in phenomenological inquiry. Phenomenology aims at overcoming unnecessary (unessential!) and artificial divisive barriers of meaning by studying human intentionality and tracing it back to the common 'life-world,' the "one single ground [Grund]" of all normative and ideating activities,

... consistently interrogating the ontic and validity-meaning of these ends and accomplishments, becoming aware of the inviolable unity of the complex of meaning and validity running through all mental accomplishments. 150

As Scheler's critique of pragmatism has shown, reflections about the nature of such accomplishments in phenomenological inquiry readily bring forth the shared insight that the positivist and pragmatic perspectives at best fail to tell the whole story of cognition, and can be defended against the charge of serious distortions only by expressly acknowledging their limited frame of reference and objectives. Out of the more immediate task of rectifying such one-sided accounts of human cognition, then, may arise a significant philosophical contribution to the realization of a fundamental unity of meaning, both for individual human beings and for their cultural community.

150 Husserl, The Crisis, p. 113. (Emphasis add.)
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