



National Library
of Canada

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Canadian Theses Service

Service des thèses canadiennes

Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0N4

NOTICE

The quality of this microform is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us an inferior photocopy.

Reproduction in full or in part of this microform is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30, and subsequent amendments.

AVIS

La qualité de cette microforme dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

Si il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de qualité inférieure.

La reproduction, même partielle, de cette microforme est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30, et ses amendements subséquents.



National Library
of Canada

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Canadian Theses Service Service des thèses canadiennes

Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0N4

The author has granted an irrevocable non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of his/her thesis by any means and in any form or format, making this thesis available to interested persons.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in his/her thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without his/her permission.

L'auteur a accordé une licence irrévocable et non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de sa thèse de quelque manière et sous quelque forme que ce soit pour mettre des exemplaires de cette thèse à la disposition des personnes intéressées.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège sa thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

ISBN 0-315-56066-5

**Security In Civil Aviation
The Role of ICAO and Cooperation of States**

Ali Akbar Golrounia

A Thesis

in

THE Department

of

Political Science

**Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Master of Arts at
Concordia University
Montreal, Quebec, Canada**

December 1989

© Ali Akbar Golrounia, 1989

ABSTRACT

Security in Civil Aviation The Role of ICAO and Cooperation of States

Ali Akbar Golrounia

The Security of Civil Aviation has become a major concern to the people of the world and in particular to the aviation community. Within context of this thesis we will examine the problems of unlawful interference against civil aviation. Emphasis is on the developing countries and their problems in combating Hijacking.

The first part deals with the historical background of unlawful acts against civil aviation and highlights political, technical, operational and economical considerations.

The second part deals with norms and international law concerning aviation security from 1937 to 1988. It is to be shown that although there is always room for improvement of international instruments for the betterment of safety of civil aviation, the problem is implementation of these laws by states rather than in the adequacy of laws by themselves.

In the third part we look at the practices of international intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations as well as states in the field of aviation security.

In this study it is proposed that ICAO should establish "Advisory and Operational Teams" with the cooperation of developed countries so as to assist those states which request help in case of hijacking from ICAO.

RESUME

LA SURETE DE L'AVIATION CIVILE LE ROLE DE L'OACI ET LA COOPERATION INTERETATIQUE

Ali Akbar Golrounia

La sureté de l'aviation civile constitue une grande préoccupation pour les peuples du monde et en particulier pour la communauté aéronautique. Dans le cadre de cette thèse nous examinerons les problèmes de l'intervention illicite contre l'aviation civile. L'attention sera portée aux pays en voie de développement et en particulier aux problèmes qu'ils rencontrent dans la lutte contre les détournements d'aéronefs.

La première partie traite du fondement historique des actes d'intervention illicite contre l'aviation civile et met en lumière des considérations politiques, techniques, opérationnelles et économiques.

La seconde partie a trait aux normes et aux règles de droit international relatives à la sureté de l'aviation de 1937 à 1988. Il est à signaler que bien que les instruments internationaux puissent encore être améliorés pour assurer une meilleure sécurité de l'aviation civile, le problème qui se pose est plus celui de l'application par les Etats de la réglementation existante que celui de sa pertinence.

Dans une troisième partie nous examinons les pratiques des organisations internationales intergouvernementales, et non-gouvernementales ainsi que celles des Etats dans le domaine

de la sûreté de l'aviation.

Nous proposons dans cette étude que l'OACI, en coopération avec les pays développés, mette sur pied des "équipes consultatives et opérationnelles" pour aider les Etats qui sollicitent une assistance en cas de détournements d'aéronefs.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The encouragement, support and assistance of many persons have contributed to the completion of this thesis.

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Professor Paris Arnopoulos (Concordia University) for his valuable assistance and supervision during the course of writing this thesis. I wish also to express my appreciation to Professor H. Habib, the Chirman of the Political Science Department for his assistance and encouragement during my studies at Concordia, and to all other Department staff.

I would like to thank the staff of the Concordia Library and McGill Law Library for their assistance. Thanks are also due to Mrs. Somayeh Sadrzadeh for her typing of my manuscript.

Last, but by no means least, special thanks are due to my wife Farah and our children Amir Hossein, Zeinab and Zahra, for their understanding, encouragement and companionship during my studies.

I would like to emphasize that this thesis is the personal opinion of the Author and might be different from his official position as Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to International Civil Aviation Organization.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
<u>INTRODUCTION</u>	1
<u>PART I</u> <u>PROBLEMS: FACTUAL DESCRIPTION</u>	4
<u>CHAPTER I</u> <u>HISTORICAL BACKGROUND</u>	5
1-1 UNLAWFUL SEIZURE OF AIRCRAFT (HI-JACKING)	6
1-2 AIRCRAFT SABOTAGE	13
1-3 AIRPORT ATTACKS	16
1-4 UNLAWFUL ACTS COMMITTED BY STATES	19
<u>CHAPTER 2</u> <u>ANALYTICAL EXPLANATION</u>	28
2-1 PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN FIGHTING AGAINST HIJACKING, ESPECIALLY TO PERMIT AIRCRAFT WHICH HAVE BEEN THE SUBJECT OF UNLAWFUL SEIZURE TO LAND IN THEIR TERRITORIES (PROBABLE CAUSES).	37
2-1-1 POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS	38
2-1-2 OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS	39
2-1-3 TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS	41
2-1-4 ECONOMICAL CONSIDERATIONS	42
2-2 PATTERNS, ROOTS AND REASONS OF THE PROBLEMS:	46
<u>CHAPTER 3</u> <u>FUTURE PROSPECTS</u>	51
<u>CONCLUSION TO PART I</u>	56
<u>FOOTNOTES</u>	57
<u>PART II</u> <u>NORMS, CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY LAW</u>	61
<u>CHAPTER 4</u> <u>AVIATION SECURITY LAW UP TO 1945</u>	62
4-1 CONVENTION FOR THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF TERROPRISM (1937)	62

4-2	CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION (CHICAGO CONVENTION OF 1944)	63
4-3	UNITED NATIONS CHARTER.	66
<u>CHAPTER 5</u>	<u>AVIATION SECURITY LAW (1958-1970)</u>	69
5-1	GENEVA CONVENTION ON THE HIGH SEAS OF 1958	69
5-2	CONVENTION ON OFFENCES AND CERTAIN OTHER ACTS COMMITTED ON BOARD AIRCRAFT (TOKYO CONVENTION OF 1963)	70
5-2-1	SCOPE	71
5-2-2	JURISDICTION	72
5-2-3	POWERS OF THE AIRCRAFT COMMANDER AND OTHERS	73
5-2-4	POWERS AND DUTIES OF CONTRACTING STATES	75
5-2-5	EXTRADITION	76
5-3	CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF UNLAWFUL SEIZURE OF AIRCRAFT (HAGUE CONVENTION OF 1970)	77
5-3-1	DEFINITION OF AN OFFENCE	78
5-3-2	JURISDICTION	80
5-3-3	CUSTODY	81
5-3-4	PROSECUTION	82
5-3-5	EXTRADITION	82
5-3-6	OTHER PROVISIONS	84
<u>CHAPTER 6</u>	<u>AVIATION SECURITY LAW (1971-1988)</u>	85
6-1	CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF UNLAWFUL ACTS AGAINST THE SAFETY OF CIVIL AVIATION (MONTREAL CONVENTION OF 1971)	85
6-1-1	DEFINITION OF AN OFFENCE	86

6-1-2	DEFINITION OF "IN FLIGHT]" AND "IN SERVICE"	88
6-1-3	PENALTIES AND SCOPES	89
6-1-4	JURISDICTION	90
6-1-5	EXTRADITION AND PROSECUTION	91
6-2	PROTOCOL FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF UNLAWFUL ACTS OF VIOLENCE AT AIRPORTS SERVING INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION	92
<u>CONCLUSION TO PART II</u>		96
<u>FOOTNOTES</u>		97
<u>PART III</u>	<u>PREVENTIVE MEASURES TAKEN BY VARIOUS INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES AND STATES</u>	101
<u>CHAPTER 7</u>	<u>ACTION TAKEN BY INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION</u>	102
7-1	ACTION TAKEN BY THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION (ICAO)	102
7-1-1	SECURITY MANUALS FOR SAFEGUARDING CIVIL AVIATION AGAINST ACTS OF UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE	104
7-1-2	ADOPTION OF ANNEX 17 TO THE CHICAGO CONVENTION	105
7-1-3	MODEL CLAUSE ON AVIATION SECURITY	107
7-1-4	LATEST ACTION TAKEN BY ICAO	109
7-2	Action taken by the United Nations (U.N)	110
7-2-1	ACTION TAKEN BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY	111
7-2-2	ACTION TAKEN BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL	114
<u>CHAPTER 8</u>	<u>ACTION TAKEN BY NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS</u>	116
8-1	ACTION TAKEN BY THE INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION (IATA)	116
8-2	ACTION TAKEN BY THE INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION (IFALPA)	121

<u>CHAPTER 9</u>	<u>ACTION TAKEN BY STATES</u>	123
9-1	THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON THE SUP- PRESSION OF TERRORISM OF 1977	123
9-2	THE BONN DECLARATION ON HIJACKING (1978)	124
<u>CONCLUSION TO PART III</u>		127
<u>FOOTNOTES</u>		128
<u>CHAPTER 10</u>	<u>PROPOSAL</u>	132
10-1	ADVISORY TEAM	133
10-2	OPERATIONAL TEAM	134
<u>CONCLUSION</u>		136
<u>BIBLIOGRAPHY</u>		139
<u>APPENDIX 1</u>	<u>UNLAWFUL SEIZURE IN WHICH PERMISSION TO LAND WAS REFUSED</u>	144
<u>APPENDIX 2</u>	<u>CHRONOLOGY OF UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH CIVIL AVIATION (1982-1988)</u>	149
<u>APPENDIX 3</u>	<u>CRIMINAL ACTS AGAINST CIVIL AVIATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (1988)</u>	206

INTRODUCTION

Today the security of civil aviation is one of the most important subjects to the people of the world and has top priority on the agenda of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Indeed the United Nations and other relative international bodies very seriously addressed this subject.

As a matter of fact more than one billion passengers travel by air every year and security and safety of these travellers are of great concern to all officials and people, any incident of a violent nature, such as on the unlawful interference act, will have political dimensions as well.

This is particularly so in the less developed countries where the air transport industry is very young and vulnerable. Any unlawful acts against civil aviation in those countries will cause great damage to their political, social, and economic situation of the country.

It is these political, social, and economic dimensions that in this study will be examined by looking at the problems, law, and actions taken in this area.

The aims of this study will be to:

- 1- Examine international regulations and conventions which air transport is based upon, for instance the Chicago, Tokyo and the Montreal Conventions.

- 2- Focus on the developing countries and problems which they have to face in the field of security of civil aviation.

Especially, implementation of international regulations, and the manner in which developed countries can assist the developing countries to create global security for civil aviation.

3- Determine what should the role of ICAO be in this respect?

Although unlawful interference against civil aviation is the problem of all states, this study limits itself to the difficulties of developing countries in their struggle against this problem. We will examine the probable causes of the problem which are of political, technical, economic and operational character.

This study is going to show that developing countries are not able to solve this problem alone by themselves. Therefore, there is need for an international plan of action which ICAO should take with the cooperation of states, especially of more advanced countries.

This study is divided into three Parts.

Part one describes the factual information and data concerning incidents such as aircraft hijacking, aircraft sabotage, airport attacks, and unlawful acts which are committed by states against international civil aviation.

In this part we look at the problems which states have in fighting to secure civil aviation. Special attention is placed on hijacking and the problems which states confront if they

are involved in any hijacking cases. The political, operational, technical and economic considerations which states have to consider in handling of these cases are critically examined. Emphasis is placed on the examination of the difficulties which developing countries, in particular, are facing in these cases.

The study analyzes the problems, and determine the probable causes, roots and the explanation (tentative thesis). Finally, this part will examine the future problems of Aviation Security.

Part two studies the civil aviation security law and conventions and tries to determine if there is any lake in international law and regulations. Also this part tries to analyze the development of international law and conventions in respect to aviation security.

Part three examines the different preventive measures which have been taken by various international organizations and associations to determine their degree of efficiency for the security of civil aviation.

Finally, on the basis of this analysis, Chapter Ten proposes what can be done for better safeguarding of civil aviation, and in particular the co-operation required between developed and developing countries, and actions to be taken by international bodies such as ICAO.

Part 1: PROBLEMS: FACTUAL DESCRIPTION

This part is divided into three Chapters.

Chapter One is Selected Cases of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation. Some cases for each group, with details of each incident are presented. The cases are presented in a manner which covers all dimensions and aspects of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation. We believe that instead of simply presenting a bulk of data, this approach is helpful to understand the circumstances surrounding each case.

Chapter Two presents data concerning unlawful acts against the safety of Civil aviation. Emphasis is put on hijacking. In this chapter we look at the problems of developing countries in handling the hijacking cases, patterns, roots, and reasons of the problems on a global basis.

Chapter Three looks at the future problems up to the year 2000 of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation.

CHAPTER ONE: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation has a long history and started even before the creation of the United Nations and the International Civil Aviation Organization.

In general, unlawful acts against civil aviation can be categorized in three groups;

- Seizure of Aircraft (Hijacking)
- Aircraft Sabotage
- Airport Attacks

Each of them can be committed by; individual, group or State

Actor	Hijacking	Sabotage	Airport Attack
individual	*	*	*
group	*	*	*
State		*	*

Unlawful acts against civil aviation which were committed by states were those in which civil aircraft was shot down by missile under a State's authority.

ICAO does not consider these kinds of acts as unlawful interference with civil aviation.

Although there is no official position of ICAO on this policy, in practice, by filing the data of these types of acts

under the accident/incident report, and not under the unlawful acts report, shows that ICAO intentionally separates these acts from unlawful interference with civil aviation.

It is important to note that this chapter has no intention to analyze, explain or make any comment about the cases, rather, this is just an informative chapter to give a view about the existing problem.

The reason for this approach is based on:

- The scope of this study which is limited to the role of ICAO and cooperation of States.

- Most of these cases have political motivation which are very complex. Any attempt to study this complexity needs separate work which can not be carried within the limitations of this thesis.

- ICAO is a non-political international organization, therefore its role is limited to technical and legal contributions.

- In chapter two, political, technical, economic, and operational problems of developing countries in combating hijacking are explained.

1-1. UNLAWFUL SEIZURE OF AIRCRAFT (HIJACKING)

The first incident of Unlawful Seizure of an aircraft was in 1930 when several Peruvian revolutionaries seized control

of an aircraft in order to flee the country.¹ That particular hijacking remained the solitary aberration in the otherwise smooth operation of international civil aviation until 1947, when hijacking became more frequent.

The first wave of hijacking began in July of 1947 when three Rumanians commandeered a state-owned DC-3 aircraft in flight and landed it in Turkey.²

During the next three years another 14 successful hijacking were committed in eastern Europe by persons trying to flee their countries.³

In 1958 a second wave of hijacking occurred when Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba; the overthrown government of Batista hijacked a civil aircraft in order to escape from Cuba.⁴ In 1961, the first hijacked U.S. aircraft was diverted to Cuba. Between 1961 and 1968, about 66 aircraft were hijacked, most of them diverted to Cuba.

In 1973 a Memorandum of Understanding was signed by the United States and Cuba on the Hijacking of Aircraft and Vessels, so as to provide for the extradition or punishment of hijackers.⁵ After reaching this understanding, the number of hijacking involving these two countries was reduced dramatically. Cuba however, denounced the agreement in October of 1976 after the bombing on October 6th of a Cuban aircraft, in which 73 passengers and crew members were killed. The reason given for the denouncement was "American complicity".⁶

On June 28th, 1976, an Air France aircraft was hijacked⁷

on a flight from Tel Aviv to Paris. The hijackers diverted the aircraft to Uganda's Entebbe Airport and took the passengers as hostages until such time as the authorities would meet their demands. On July 3rd, Israeli commandos without permission of the authorities, entered the airspace of Uganda and landed at Entebbe to rescue the hostages. During the operation, seven hijackers, three hostages and several Ugandans and Israelis were killed. On July 9th, the United Nations Security Council began consideration of a complaint brought on behalf of Uganda by Mauritius. The complaint referred to the "act of aggression" committed against Uganda by Israel.⁸

On July 12th, two draft resolutions⁹ were introduced one by the United Kingdom and the United States, the other by Tanzania, Libya and Benin.

The U.S. - U.K. resolution¹⁰ condemned hijacking and called on states to prevent and punish all such terrorist acts, while reaffirming the need to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states. The tristate resolution¹¹ condemned Israel's violation of Uganda's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and demanded that Israel meet Uganda's claims for full compensation for damages and destruction.

In October 1977, a Lufthansa¹² aircraft, with 82 passengers and five crew members on board was hijacked on a flight from Majorca to Frankfurt. The hijackers murdered the pilot. On the fifth day following the hijacking, a west German commando unit stormed the aircraft on an airport runway in Mogadishu,

Somalia, and ended the hijacking by freeing all of the hostages.

An important difference between the West German operation in Mogadishu and the Israeli raid on Entebbe was that the Government of Somalia permitted the rescue operation by the foreign armed force in its country and actively cooperated with it. However, the Israeli raid on Entebbe was not authorized by Uganda. Thus, in this instance, there can be no question about the legality of the West German intervention in international law.

On March 2nd, 1981, three hijackers seized a Pakistan International Airline¹³ aircraft and forced it to land in Kabul, Afghanistan. The hijackers demanded the release of 92 "political prisoners" from Pakistani jails. The aircraft sat on a runway in Kabul for a week. When the Pakistani government refused to meet the hijackers' demand, they shot dead a Pakistani diplomat and dumped his body onto the tarmac. The aircraft then flew to Damascus, where the hijackers released more than 100 hostages and threatened to blow up the aircraft. The hijackers were talked into lengthy extensions of their deadline while negotiations continued by radio with Syrian and Pakistani officials in the Damascus control tower. The hijackers finally agreed that they would settle for the release of just 55 prisoners. The Pakistani government concurred ordering the prisoners to be flown to Libya. When the aircraft carrying the released prisoners was approaching Tripoli, Libya suddenly announced that it had changed its mind about granting asylum

to the hijackers and the released prisoners. The aircraft had nowhere to go, and the hostages' lives were again in jeopardy. Syria then announced it would accept the prisoners at which time the hijackers surrendered the aircraft and hostages. All the hijackers were prosecuted in Pakistan and they were sentenced to death.

On September 29th, 1981, an Indian Airline¹⁴ aircraft Boeing 737 and 117 passengers on board was hijacked by seven pro-Khalistan's who forced the aircraft to land in Lahor, Pakistan. On September 30th, several Pakistani commandos dressed as airline maintenance workers stormed the hijacked aircraft, arrested the hijackers and without any casualties freed the hostages. The hijackers were been charged in Pakistan with air piracy and illegal entry. As a result of criminal prosecution in Pakistan, three hijackers were given the death sentence, two life imprisonment, while two were acquitted.

On June 22, 1983, a Libyan Arab Airliner¹⁵ B-707 was hijacked by two armed men during its flight from Athens, Greece to Tripoli, Libya. The hijackers forced the aircraft to land at the Rome airport for refueling and then to fly to Larnaca, Cyprus. After several rounds of negotiations, the hijackers surrendered to Cypriot authorities. Both hijackers were sentenced in Cyprus on August 2nd, 1983 to prison terms of seven years for hijacking and 3 years for possession of explosives.

On August 28th, 1984 and September 8th, 1984, two Iran Air

aircraft (Airbus 300 and Boeing 727) were unlawfully seized during a domestic flight and after refuelling stops in Bahrain and Cairo were diverted to Iraq: the hijackers surrendered and they were guaranteed political asylum. On December 13th, 1985, the Council of ICAO unanimously adopted a resolution urging the return of the aircraft under the Hague Convention, also the 26th and 27th Sessions of the Assembly endorsed the Council Resolution. Despite all these efforts, two Iranian aircraft have not yet been returned to Iran.

On June 11th, 1985, an Alia Jordanian¹⁶ Boeing 727 was hijacked at Beirut airport. After lengthy negotiations, the hijackers finally released all passengers and crew members, destroyed the aircraft with explosive charges and escaped.

On December 25th, 1986, the attempted hijacking of an Iraqi¹⁷ Boeing 737 during a scheduled flight from Baghdad, Iraq to Amman, Jordan, resulted in the crash of the aircraft near Arar airport in Saudi Arabia. The crash coupled with a post-impact fire totally destroyed the aircraft killing 65 persons, including three crew members, and seriously injuring 35 others.

On December 23rd, 1987, a KLM¹⁸ Boeing 737 with 91 passengers on board was hijacked and forced to land at Rome Airport during a scheduled flight from Amsterdam to Milan. The hijacker was a 15 year old Italian national, who claimed to have a bomb in his hand luggage and demanded a ransom of One Million U.S. Dollars in exchange for the release of the passengers. He

also demanded to be flown first to Kuwait, then to Chad, and finally to the United States. He was arrested and taken into custody when he left the aircraft to board another aircraft for New York but there were no casualties during that incident. The boy was sent back to the Netherlands by the Italian authorities and was delivered to the juvenile protection authorities there

On April 5th, 1988, a Kuwaiti¹⁹ Boeing 747, with 97 passengers and 12 crew members on board, was seized by nine hijackers during a scheduled flight from Bangkok to Kuwait. The hijackers forced the aircraft to land in Mashhad, Iran and requested the release of 17 prisoners in Kuwait. After landing in Mashhad, the hijackers requested that the plane be refueled, and released one sick person. The next day, 24 female passengers were also released. After refueling on April 7th, 1988, a further 22 male passengers were released. On April 8th, 1988, the aircraft left Mashhad and landed in Larnaca, Cyprus. Where, the hijackers killed one hostage, tossing his body onto the tarmac when the authorities refused to refuel the aircraft. On April 13th, 1988, the aircraft left Larnaca and landed in Algiers, where the hijackers surrendered seven days later after extensive negotiations with the Algerian authorities. There is no information available about the situation of the hijackers, but, it should be noted that Algeria is not party to the Hague Convention of 1970, nor of any other security convention for extradite or prosecution of hijackers.

1-2 Aircraft Sabotage

The first incident of sabotage occurred on May 7th, 1949, when a Philippines Airline aircraft²⁰ crashed into the sea during a scheduled flight from Daet to Manila. A time bomb was delivered to the aircraft by two ex-convicts, hired by a woman and a man with the intention of killing the woman's husband, a passenger on the aircraft. All 13 passengers and crew members on board were killed.

The second incident occurred on September 9th, 1949 when a Quebec airways²¹ DC-3 exploded 40 miles from Quebec during a flight from Quebec City to Baie Comeau. The explosion was caused by a bomb in a forward luggage compartment. With all 23 passengers and crew members on board killed. Three persons were executed for this crime.

On January 6th, 1960, a National Airlines²² DC-6B exploded over Bolivia in the air at 18,000 feet during its flight from New York to Miami. The explosion resulted when dynamite was detonated by means of dry cell batteries located in the passenger compartment under one of the seats. All 34 passengers and crew members on board were killed.

On June 15, 1972, a Cathay Pacific Airways²³ (Hong Kong) CV-880 crashed over the central highlands of Vietnam during its regular flight from Bangkok to Hong Kong. A bomb was reported, located in a suitcase under a passenger seat and all 81 passengers and crew members on board were killed. A police

officer, whose fiancée and her daughter were on board, was charged with the crime.

On January 1st, 1976, a Middle East Airliner²⁴ crashed into the Arabian Desert, after a bomb on board caused a high-order explosion in the forward baggage compartment. The incident occurred between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait during a regularly scheduled flight between Beirut and Dubai. All 82 passengers and crew members on board the aircraft were killed.

On September 23, 1983, a Gulf Air²⁵ (Bahrain) B-737 crashed 30 miles from Abu-Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, after a bomb exploded in the baggage compartment. The crash occurred in the desert while the aircraft was preparing to land. All 112 people on board were killed.

On June 23, 1985, an Indian Boeing 747²⁶ crashed into the Atlantic Ocean about 100 miles southwest of the Irish coast during a scheduled flight from Montreal to Bombay via London. All 329 passengers and crew members on board were killed. According to Indian reports to ICAO, the crash was caused by the explosion of a bomb in the forward cargo hold of the aircraft. Canada has requested the United Kingdom to extradite the alleged offender to Canada with the matter still before the courts.

On November 29, 1987, a Korean Boeing 707²⁷ crashed into the Andaman Sea near the Thai-Burmese border during a scheduled flight from Abu-Dhabi to Seoul. All 115 passengers and crew members on board were killed. A preliminary report, pursuant

to Article 13 of the Montreal Convention of 1971 was submitted by South Korea to ICAO. According to the report the crash had been investigated by its authorities, who concluded that it was caused by the explosion of a time bomb, hidden in a portable radio and liquor bottle. According to the report, the two alleged perpetrators, a 26 year old woman and a 70 year old man, placed the explosive device in the cabin overhead baggage bin above their seats, setting the bomb to explode nine hours later. They disembarked from the aircraft during a stop-over at Abu-Dhabi and flew to Bahrain, where they were detained by the authorities because of carrying forged passports. During that investigation, both swallowed poison capsules, while the man died instantly; the woman survived and subsequently was extradited to South Korea for prosecution. On March 7, 1989, the woman pleaded guilty to mass murder and destruction of the aircraft.

On December 21st, 1988, a Pan Am Boeing 747²⁸ crashed over the Scottish village of Lockerbie during a scheduled flight from London to New York. 259 passengers and crew members on board and eleven persons on the ground were killed. An analysis of the debris positively identified an explosive residue which is consistent with the use of a high-performance plastic explosive. No group or individual claimed responsibility for the incident.

1-3 Airport Attacks

Attacks at airports serving international civil aviation and at other aviation facilities have been for many years a serious problem.²⁹ Causing deaths, injury, and property damages. From 1973 to 1985, more than 36 attacks occurred at international civil airports, in peace times, resulting in more than 117 killings, which were not clearly covered by any of the penal conventions.³⁰ Before that on December 28, 1968, Beirut international airport was attacked by Israeli forces.

On August 5th, 1973, two armed men entered the international transit lounge at Athens airport and proceeded to open fire on passengers in the lounge awaiting embarkation. Four people were killed; 55 others were severely wounded.³¹

On December 29th, 1975, twenty-five sticks of dynamite exploded in a baggage claim area at La Guardia Airport³² in New York City. Several persons were killed; others were wounded. In the same airport, another explosion³³ occurred on September 10th, 1976. In which a police officer was killed and three others wounded.

On August 11, 1976, an attack on the international airport in Istanbul³⁴ resulted in the deaths of four people and injury to four others when armed men set off explosives and fired machine guns at passengers boarding their flight.

On May 9th, 1985, a gunman fired several shots at aircraft parked on the ramp of the Buffalo International Airport in the

State of New York.³⁵ Two B-727 aircraft suffered severe damage. The loss was estimated to be in excess of one million dollars (U.S.). The suspect was arrested and taken into custody.

On June 19th, 1985, a bomb exploded in a crowded departure lounge at the Frankfurt International Airport³⁶ in which three people were killed and 42 others wounded. The explosion occurred beyond the security zone where baggage is inspected, and destroyed several airline ticket counters. It was difficult for the authorities to determine the intended target of the attack.

The new Tokyo International Airport has been a target of attacks and explosions³⁷ and most of these incidents resulted in deaths, injuries and destruction of airport property. For example, on June 23rd, 1985, an explosion ripped through a baggage sorting area with two cargo handlers killed and four others injured. The bomb was placed on a CP Air B-747 aircraft in Vancouver, Canada.

Two persons, who had made reservations on the flight but never boarded the aircraft in Vancouver are regarded as suspects, and reports indicate that this incident is linked to the Air India crash which occurred on the same day.³⁸

On December 23rd, 1985, a bomb in an automobile exploded in the parking lot at the Jorge Chavez International Airport³⁹ in Lima, Peru. Three persons were wounded and ten vehicles were damaged. The Shining Path, a Peruvian revolutionary group, claimed responsibility for the explosion.

Two other incidents⁴⁰ at international airports both occurred on December 27th, 1985 at approximately the same time. In the first incident, at Leonardo da Vinci Airport in Rome, four Palestinians assaulted the international departures area of the airport. During an exchange of gun fire between the group and airport police, at least 13 persons in the departure area were killed and another 80 wounded. Three members of the group were killed during the exchange; the fourth was captured. A note found in the pocket of the surviving attacker indicated that the attack was in retaliation for an earlier raid on the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) headquarters in Tunis.⁴¹

On the same day, Schwechat Airport in Vienna, was attacked.⁴² Three Palestinians armed with grenades and automatic weapons carried out an assault at the departures area of the airport with four persons killed and approximately 40 others wounded. This incident was almost identical to the attack at Rome's Airport, El Al Israeli Airline was the apparent target of both attacks. It would appear this attack also was in response to the Israeli raid of the PLO headquarters in Tunis. The surviving attackers of both incidents were arrested and taken in custody for prosecution.

The most recent incident of this type took place at Bombay Airport⁴³ in March of 1988 when a gunman shot and wounded the Captain of an Alitalia aircraft. The attack occurred just as the crew members were climbing aboard an airport bus bound for

a city hotel. The perpetrator fired four shots and tossed two grenades before he was arrested by the police. But no information is available regarding his prosecution or his sentence.

1-4 Unlawful acts Committed by States

In 1955 EL AL plane was shot down over Bulgaria - the Bulgaria government said it was shot down by ground anti-aircraft defenses - unable to identify the plane.⁴⁴

British Government protested through diplomatic channel as "...Her Majesty's Government cannot accept that any Government is in its right in shooting down a civil aircraft in times of Peace".⁴⁵

On February 21st, 1973, a Libyan aircraft in flight from Tripoli to Cairo was shot down by Israeli fighters over Israeli-occupied Sinai. 108 passengers and crew members were killed. The plane had lost its direction in communication with Cairo tower and Israel claimed that fighters fired to damage the plane only after repeated warnings.⁴⁶

ICAO Council condemned Israel's action and urged it to comply with the aims and objectives of the Chicago Convention, (Resolution of June 4th, 1973).

In 1978, KAL 707 en route between Paris to Seoul was fired upon by two MIG aircraft which were equipped with missiles⁴⁷ and forced to land on a frozen lake in Murmansk, two passengers

dead and 11 injured.⁴⁸ The pilot thought he was over Greenland, but was in fact over the Murmansk-Soviet High Security Zone, which is east of Finland. The plane after being damaged-landed one and a half hours later on the frozen lake. The pilot and passengers were released but not charged with spying. In two messages South Korea thanked the U.S.S.R for the speedy return of all passengers and crew. The first contact from South Korea to the U.S.S.R despite no diplomatic relations between the two countries and there were no public condemnations.

The pilots acknowledged disobeying orders of the Soviet fighters, and the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris held the airline liable for the deaths of the two passengers and held that the interception was foreseeable even if not justifiable.

On August 31st, 1983, 269 innocent civilians lost their lives when the unarmed scheduled civil airliner in which they were passengers was shot down by Soviet fighters. The plane, KAL B 747 flight 007, was on a scheduled flight from New York to Seoul via Anchorage when it wandered into Soviet Airspace because of a navigational error. It was shot down by one of two air-to-air missiles fired at it by a Soviet jet fighter aircraft in pursuit.

On September 12th, 1983, the U.S.S.R vetoed a UN Security Council Resolution which, in part read as follows:

"The Security Council having considered [the facts as explained in letters from the U.S, Korea, Canada, Japan and Australia]....

Reaffirming the rules of International law that prohibits acts of violence which pose a threat to the safety of International Civil Aviation....

Declares that such use of armed force against international civil aviation is incompatible with the norms governing international behavior and elementary consideration of humanity."

On March 6th, 1984 the Council of ICAO considered the final report of the investigation concerning the shooting down of KAL flight 007 and adopted a resolution which read in part as follows⁴⁹ :

"Condemns the use of armed force which resulted in the destruction of the Korean airliner and the tragic loss of 269 lives:

Deeply Deplores the Soviet failure to cooperate in the search and rescue efforts of other involved States and the Soviet failure to cooperate with the ICAO investigation of the incident by refusing to accept the visit of the investigation team appointed by the Secretary General and by failing so far to provide the Secretary General with information relevant to the investigation."

In April-May of 1984 the 25th Session (Extraordinary) of ICAO Assembly unanimously adopted Article 3 bis of the Chicago Convention in relation to the interception of civil aircraft.

Taking into account that;

-At the time of the "termination" of the flight, it was

500 Km off the airway

-At the time of "termination" the aircraft was well inside Soviet Territory (Sakhalin Island which is a prohibited area)⁵⁰

-The pilot did not respond to the warning issued by the U.S.S.R.

- According to the Investigation Report, the pilot forgot to connect INS to auto-pilot which is a Navigational error by the pilot⁵¹.

The authorized representation of most nations condemned the deliberate destruction of an unarmed easily identifiable airliner as being totally out of proportion to any violation which it may have made of sovereign Soviet airspace.

A brief summary of the statement which was made by some States in September 1983 in the UN Security Council are as follows;

South Korea: There was no possibility of Soviet Military authorities confusing the Korean Airlines Aircraft with anything other than a civilian passenger airplane.... What the Soviet Military forces did to a civilian Korean airplane was clearly a criminal act in violation of all the legal norms and standards of International Civil Aviation.

U.S.A : "First and foremost are the legal obligations which flow from what the International Court of Justice-whose jurisdiction, needless to say, the Soviet Union usually does not accept has called certain general and well-recognized principles, namely, elementary consideration of humanity, even more exacting in peace than in war". If there were no other relevant rules, these well-recognized principles of humanity would rule out shooting down a passenger plane, a clearly marked airliner engaged in International Civil Aviation.

Canada: The deliberate in-flight destruction of this civilian unarmed, easily identifiable passenger aircraft by sophisticated fighter aircraft of the Soviet Union, no matter where it occurred is nothing short of murder.... From the point of view of International law and accepted practices governing conduct between law-abiding nations, the Soviet Union in this incident has been guilty of outlaw behavior.

Australia: There is no circumstance in which any action can be justified in shooting down an unarmed civilian airliner serving no military purpose.

Japan: In the light of the provision of the Chicago Convention as well as of the basic norms of International law, the action of the Soviet Union can in no way be justified.

France: This Korean Airlines Plane was knowingly destroyed, in disregard of elementary humanitarian considerations and the demands of civil aviation as recognized by the International community.

Sweden: It is a well known fact that the Soviet Union has severe rules of its own for the protection of the State boundary, enabling Soviet units to use force even against civilian aircraft. Such rules and instructions are not in accordance with generally accepted norms of International law relevant to civilian transportation.⁵²

It is important to note that in 1989 the U.S. District Court of Columbia ruled against the Korean Airline of willful misconduct of the pilot of the flight 007 which was shot down by U.S.S.R. In 1983, in order that victims of the flight can be eligible for compensation.⁵³

On July 3rd, 1988, an Iranian airline aircraft, Air Bus 300 took off with 290 passengers and crew members from Bandar Abbas International Airport for Dubai in the United Arab

Emirates. The aircraft was destroyed by two surface-to-air missiles fired by the USS Vincennes warship stationed in the Persian Gulf. All of the innocent passengers and crew members lost their lives, these included 57 children and eight infants.

Contrary to the strong positions it has claimed in previous cases including in particular, the last incident in 1983, (the KAL flight 007), the United States' response was graduated and aimed at down-playing the gravity of its action and its consequences. The United States at first denied the attack on the airliner and claimed, instead, that their naval forces had shot down an Iranian F-14 fighter in the Persian Gulf. As the facts were being revealed, the U.S decided to make a "minor" adjustment in their story and proposed a new version. "The U.S. Navy has not shot down an F-14, but they cannot confirm that a civilian airliner has been targeted and attacked either". Finally, once they realized that the facts could not be concealed, the U.S. confirmed that its forces had shot down an airliner. Even this statement was mixed with a claim that an F-14 was also in the vicinity. When it became known that no supporting evidence could be "fabricated"⁵⁴, the claim was no longer sustained.

These contradictions were followed, in the second phase by half-hearted expressions of regret accompanied by justifications proposed on the grounds of self-defence. U.S. high level military and administrative officials⁵⁵ asserted that there has been "conclusive evidence" to the effect that the

airliner posed a threat to the naval ship. Various false assumptions were resorted to in an attempt to offer some credence to this claim. It was said that the plane descended towards the ship with increasing speed and that the airliner was way off course, that it was transmitting military and , in another version, a combination of military and civilian signals⁵⁶. All these contentions were challenged by both independent and U.S. sources⁵⁷.

The ICAO Investigation Team in its November 1988 Report indicated that the aircraft was ascending steadily towards its final cruising level within the international ATS route and that it sent signals in an approved civilian radar procedure.⁵⁸

The Council of ICAO on March 17th, 1989, adopted a resolution which reads in part as follows;⁵⁹

"Deeply deplores the tragic incident which occurred as a consequence of events and errors in identification of the aircraft which resulted in the accidental destruction of an Iran Air airliner and the loss of 290 lives".

Taking into account that;

- The Iran Air flight IR655 was destroyed in the airspace of the Islamic Republic of Iran over its territorial waters.
- The aircraft was destroyed just six minutes after takeoff.
- It was flying well inside the International airway.
- All the communication equipment and all navigational aids were working perfectly.
- The weather at the time of the shooting down of the aircraft

was good.

- The aircraft was Airbus A300 which can not be mistaken for a military aircraft such as an F-14.
- The USS Vincennes was illegally stationed in the territorial waters of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
- All the data available at that time to the USS Vincennes was correct and indicating that the aircraft was civilian.

Despite the fact that using force against civil aircraft is not acceptable based on the principle of international law and elementary consideration of humanity, but not many states condemned the destruction of IR655 in particular, (although they did agree that in general this type of force against civilian aircraft is not acceptable, contrary to their position in previous cases).

Some states related the shooting down of IR655 to the war between Iran and Iraq, and many of them expressed their view in response to the political pressure from the U.S.A.

A brief summary of the Statements which were made by some states on the Council of ICAO are as follows;

The President of the Council - "The fundamental principle that States must refrain from resorting to the use of weapons against civil aircraft must be respected by each State".

Czechoslovakia - "We consider the shooting down of the scheduled civil aviation airliner... a gross violation of the fundamental principles of International law".

Egypt - "As a matter of fact, this accident is a by-product of this war between Iraq and Iran".

Canada - "I reiterate here Canada's shock and profound regret regarding this tragedy".

West Germany - "My government deeply deplores... The loss of 290 innocent lives".

Japan - "deeply regrets the loss of the precious human lives of 290 innocent...."

USSR - "In condemning the inhuman act of destroying a civil aircraft enroute in Iranian airspace, we qualify it as a serious International offence for which the United States of America bears full responsibility".

France - " My government noted with consternation the downing on 3 July, 1988 of a civil aircraft of Iran Air".⁶⁰

CHAPTER TWO : ANALYTICAL EXPLANATION

From 1931 to 1985 there were 788 aircraft hijacking, of which 445 succeeded with 158 cases occurring during 1931-1969 (Table No 1)

The number of countries directly affected by hijacking , nearly doubles if either nationality of passengers or hijacked aircraft is taken into account. Thus between January 1969 and June 1970 alone, there were 118 incidents of hijacking and 14 of sabotage and armed attack against civil aviations involving airlines of 47 nations and more than 7,000 passengers of 83 nationalities.⁶¹

From 1982 to 1988 there were 97 cases of unlawful seizures of aircraft, 57 cases of attempts to hijack and 47 cases of sabotage. As a result 1148 persons were killed and 1058 persons injured. The total number of persons who were affected in this period were 18096

	1931							
	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988*
Seizures	365	19	21	21	20	5	4	7
Attempt seizure	24	11	17	7	7	6	6	3
Sabotage	69	6	7	13	13	3	3	2
Killed	-	14	15	68	473	112	166	300
Injures	-	119-	70	249	243	235	121	21
Person affected	-	2210	4297	4837	3255	9101	661	1335

* Notes: Not including the IR 655 disaster (290 people killed)

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION - OFFICE OF CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY
U S AND FOREIGN REGISTERED AIRCRAFT HIJACKINGS - SUMMARIZATION
UPDATED JANUARY 1, 1986


CY	1931-69	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	TOTAL
U.S.																		
Successful	58[9] (55)	18[1] (14)	12[1] (10)	10[2] (6)	1[1] (0)	3[3] (1)	4[4] (0)	1[0] (0)	0 (0)	2[2] (0)	6[2] (2)	13[0] (13)	2[1] (1)	4[1] (3)	13[0] (11)	4[0] (3)	2[1] (0)	153[28] (119)
Incomplete***	3[0] (3)	5[1] (1)	8[1] (1)	14[0] (0)	1[0] (0)	2[1] (0)	3[2] (1)	1[1] (0)	3[0] (0)	6[2] (2)	5[0] (3)	3[0] (0)	0 (0)	1[0] (0)	3[0] (1)	1[0] (0)	1[0] (1)	61[8] (13)
Unsuccessful	13[0] (7)	4[0] (0)	6[0] (3)	7[2] (1)	0[0] (0)	2[0] (0)	5[0] (0)	2[1] (0)	3[1] (0)	5[1] (1)	2[0] (1)	6[1] (4)	6[0] (2)	5[0] (1)	3[1] (1)	2[2] (0)	2[0] (0)	73[9] (21)
SUB-TOTAL	74[8] (65)	27[2] (15)	27[2] (14)	31[4] (7)	2[1] (0)	7[4] (1)	12[6] (1)	4[2] (0)	6[1] (0)	13[5] (3)	13[2] (6)	22[1] (17)	8[1] (3)	10[1] (4)	19[1] (13)	7[2] (3)	5[1] (1)	287[45] (153)
FOREIGN																		
Successful	100[17] (40)	37[5] (17)	10[1] (3)	13[1] (3)	10[0] (2)	5[1] (1)	3[0] (0)	6[0] (0)	16[0] (0)	8[1] (1)	8[2] (0)	9[1] (2)	13[2] (3)	12[0] (1)	6[0] (0)	17[1] (1)	18[9] (0)	292[31] (74)
Unsuccessful	27[1] (9)	18[2] (4)	21[0] (6)	18[0] (1)	10[0] (2)	14[1] (1)	10[1] (1)	8[1] (0)	10[1] (0)	10[0] (0)	6[0] (0)	10[1] (2)	11[0] (0)	10[1] (0)	9[0] (1)	4[0] (0)	12[0] (0)	209[9] (27)
SUB-TOTAL	127[8] (49)	55[7] (21)	31[1] (8)	31[1] (4)	20[0] (4)	19[2] (2)	13[1] (1)	14[1] (0)	26[1] (0)	18[1] (1)	14[2] (0)	19[2] (4)	24[2] (3)	32[1] (1)	15[0] (1)	21[1] (1)	31[9] (0)	501[40] (101)
WORLDWIDE																		
Successful	158[16] (85)	55[6] (31)	22[3] (13)	23[3] (8)	11[1] (2)	8[4] (2)	7[4] (0)	7[0] (0)	15[0] (0)	10[3] (1)	14[4] (2)	22[1] (15)	15[3] (4)	16[1] (4)	19[0] (95)	21[1] (4)	21[10] (0)	445[59] (193)
Incomplete (U.S.)	3[0] (3)	5[1] (1)	8[1] (1)	14[0] (0)	1[0] (0)	2[1] (0)	3[2] (1)	1[1] (0)	3[0] (0)	6[2] (2)	5[0] (3)	3[0] (0)	0 (0)	1[0] (0)	3[0] (1)	1[0] (0)	1[0] (1)	61[8] (13)
Unsuccessful	40[1] (18)	23[2] (4)	27[0] (8)	26[2] (2)	10[0] (2)	16[1] (1)	15[1] (1)	10[2] (0)	13[2] (0)	15[1] (1)	8[0] (1)	16[2] (6)	17[0] (2)	15[1] (1)	12 (1)	6[2] (0)	14[0] (0)	282[18] (48)
TOTAL	201[17] (114)	83[8] (36)	53[3] (23)	62[5] (11)	22[1] (4)	26[6] (3)	25[7] (2)	18[3] (0)	32[2] (0)	31[6] (4)	27[4] (6)	41[3] (21)	32[3] (6)	32[2] (5)	34[1] (14)	28[3] (4)	36[10] (1)	788[85] (254)

* Q/A - FIGURES IN BRACKETS REPRESENT THE NUMBER OF GENERAL AVIATION FLIGHTS. THESE FIGURES ARE INCLUDED IN THE TOTAL FIGURE.

** FIGURES IN PARENTHESIS REPRESENT ATTEMPTED HIJACKINGS TO CUBA.

*** AN INCOMPLETE HIJACKING IS ONE IN WHICH THE HIJACKER IS APPREHENDED/KILLED DURING HIJACKING OR AS A RESULT OF "HOT PURSUIT".


Acts of Unlawful Seizure




Source: ICAO Doc. C-WP/8872 Appendix

These figures include domestic and international occurrences based on media and States reports

Number of Persons Killed or Injured



Sabotage



Source: ICAO Doc. C-WP/8872 Appendix

AIRCRAFT HIJACKING 1982-1988 BY GEOGRAPHIC REGION AND MOTIVATION

DATE	GEOGRAPHIC REGION																		MOTIVATION										
	EASTERN EUROPE			WESTERN EUROPE			MIDDLE EAST			LATIN AMERICA			SOUTH & SOUTH EAST ASIA			FAR EAST			AFRICA			NORTH AMERICA			POLITICAL	RANSOME	MENTALLY ILL	ESCAPED FROM THE LAW	OTHERS
	TERMINATION	OCCURANCE	AIRCRAFT REGISTRY	TERMINATION	OCCURANCE	AIRCRAFT REGISTRY	TERMINATION	OCCURANCE	AIRCRAFT REGISTRY	TERMINATION	OCCURANCE	AIRCRAFT REGISTRY	TERMINATION	OCCURANCE	AIRCRAFT REGISTRY	TERMINATION	OCCURANCE	AIRCRAFT REGISTRY	TERMINATION	OCCURANCE	AIRCRAFT REGISTRY	TERMINATION	OCCURANCE	AIRCRAFT REGISTRY					
1982	5	5	2	1	7				3	3	6	1	2	2				2	2	1	5	5	2	15	2		1	1	
1983			2	3	4		2	2			11	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1		14	14	2	19				3	
1984			4	3	2		8	8	3			3	6	2	3	3		1	1	1		3	3	18	2	1	2		
1985	2	2	2	4	4		9	8								1	1	2	1	2	4	3	3	14		1	3		
1986			3	2	1		1	1	2	2	2										2	3	2	4		1		3	
1987			1	2	2		1	1	1	1	1						1							3	1				
1988	2	2					1	1	2	2	2										1	1	1	6	1				
TOTAL	9	9	14	15	20	22	21	23	11	11	28	4	6	6	3	3	4	7	5	4	29	29	10	79	6	2	4	10	

Of 97 cases of hijacking (1982-1988), in 9 (9.3%) , the aircraft was registered in Eastern Europe, in 9 cases (9.3%) the hijacking occurred in Eastern Europe and only 1 (1%) terminated in Eastern Europe, thus indicating that the hijacker used the aircraft as a means to leave Eastern for Western Europe.

In 14 cases (14.4%) the aircraft was registered in, 15 (15.5%) the hijacking occurred in, and 20 cases (20.6%) it terminated in Western Europe. Although most of the cases which terminated in Western Europe were politically motivated, in almost half of the cases hijackers pirated an aircraft in order to escape Eastern Europe.

In 22 cases (22.7%) the aircraft was registered in, and 21 (21.6%) the hijacking occurred in the Middle East and 23 cases (23.7%) terminated in the Middle East. Almost all the cases which occurred or terminated in the Middle East were politically motivated and not merely so as to escape as with Eastern and Western Europe. Middle East hijackers were highly organized, heavily armed and determined. Some of them belonged to different political organizations fighting against the Israeli occupation. In most of the cases the hijackers demand is of great sensitivity to governments involved, referring for instance to the release of political prisoners. This typology of hijacking is the most difficult to manage, most often the states suffer consequences even after the termination of the case, they are always the target of revenge from the friends

of the hijackers, and in many cases states simply surrender to hijackers demands.

11 cases (11.3%) of hijacking occurred and 28 (29.9%) terminated in Latin America. The reason for these high percentages for termination of hijacking in Latin America is mostly the result of hijacking from the United States to Cuba which after 1985 was reduced significantly.

In 4 cases (4.1%) the aircraft was registered in South and South East Asia and 6 cases (6.2%) terminated in that region.

In 3 cases (3.1%) the aircraft was registered in the Far East, in 3 cases (3.1%) the hijacking occurred in the Far East and 4 (4.1%) terminated in that region.

In 7 cases (7.2%) the aircraft was registered, in 5 (5.1%) the hijacking occurred and 4 (4.1%) terminated in Africa. Although the number of cases, in comparison to other regions, is not significant, it is important to bear in mind that those cases which occurred or terminated in Arab North Africa were of the same motives as those in the Middle East, and therefore were highly motivated politically.

In 29 cases (29.9%) the aircraft was registered in North America, in 29 cases (29.9%) the hijacking occurred in North America and 10 cases (10.3%) terminated in that region. Although the number of cases in North America is higher than other regions, it is less important because most of the hijacking cases where those hijacked to Cuba and had motivation such as ransom, mentally ill person or escape from the law and even

if it had political motivation, they were far away from the cases in the Middle East.

In 79 cases (81.4%) hijackers had political motivations, 6 cases (6.1%) ransom was motivation, in 2 cases (2.1%) the hijackers were mentally ill, in 4 cases (4.1%) escape from the law was the motivation and in 10 cases (10.3%) other motivations.

Although 79 cases had political motivation, not all the cases had the same weight, some of them were less significant, such as those hijacking to Cuba or hijacking from Eastern Europe to Western Europe.

In 65 cases (67%) the hijacking terminated in developing countries. This indicates that developing countries are most engaged in the termination of hijacking, this is more significant when we take into account that almost all those cases with highly political motivations and risks were terminated in the developing countries.

The capabilities and resources of developing countries is very limited and inadequate to fight against hijacking in comparison to developed countries despite the fact that they are more involved in fighting against hijacking than those of developed countries.

According to the ICAO document from 1970 to 1988, there were 42 cases of unlawfully seized aircraft in which permission to land was refused by one or more states (see Appendix No.1). The details of these incidents show that:

- in 23 cases the aircraft was registered in developed countries;
- The permission to land was refused in 38 cases by developing countries;
- 31 cases terminated in developing countries;
- 16 cases terminated in the same states in which initial permission to land was refused;
- 7 cases terminated in the state of registry of the aircraft;
- In one case a State refused the permission to land to its own registered aircraft.

The above statistics show that the chances of refusal of permission to land in developing countries are much higher than in developed countries (90%) and that 74% of hijacking cases terminated in developing countries.

2-1 PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN FIGHTING AGAINST HIJACKING ESPECIALLY TO PERMIT AIRCRAFT WHICH HAVE BEEN THE SUBJECT OF UNLAWFUL SEIZURE TO LAND IN THEIR TERRITORIES (PROBABLE CAUSES)

The Assembly of ICAO in the 26th Session in 1986 adopted a resolution which read in part:

"Whereas the safety of flights of aircraft subject to an act of unlawful seizure may be further jeopardized by the denial of navigational aids and air traffic services, the blocking of runways and taxiways and the closure of airports;

Urges each Contracting State to provide, as it may find practicable, such measures of assistance to an aircraft subjected to an act of unlawful seizure, including the provision of navigational aids, air traffic services and permission to land, as may be necessitated by the circumstances".

Not only is this a clear policy of ICAO that, States should give permission to land to the hijacked aircraft, but also there is an indication that states should not permit the hijacked aircraft to take off again after it is landed in their territories.

Despite this policy, many states especially developing countries are reluctant to give permission to land to the hijacked aircraft, and if, they have too, they wish the hijacked aircraft to leave their territories as soon as possible for many good reasons as follow;

2-1-1: POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

When the hijackers of unlawfully seized aircraft try to land in the territory of states sympathetic to them such states come under the suspicion, especially in the state of registry of the hijacked aircraft and in the international media is being in collusion with the hijackers. Even if a state permits a hijacked aircraft to land in its territory for purely humanitarian reasons, the consequences are not clear.

There are many elements in cases of unlawfully seized aircraft which are beyond the control of any state, simply because not only hijackers do not obey the law of any state,

but also they do not have any respect for international law. Hijackers try to achieve their goals by their own means and force the state to accede to their demands by using the passengers and crew as hostages.

Generally states do not wish to be involved in any hijacking cases for various reasons:

- States may be afraid of involvement in an unwanted political crisis;
- States may become the target for terrorist groups;
- unpleasant publicity in the international mass media;
- Problem of implementation of state law of the state against the hijackers;
- Loss of good name among states and international forums;
- Threatening national security;
- Dispute between two or more states which have an interest in the case;
- Normally states have no interest in permitting the hijacked aircraft to land in their territories.

2-1-2: OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

From the moment that an unlawfully seized aircraft lands up to the moment that aircraft comes under the control of lawful authorities, is a very crucial period. There are a lot of considerations and a lot of tasks which have to be taken by different levels of authorities. Many states are involved,

particularly the state of registry, the state of passengers and crew, and the state in which the unlawfully seized aircraft lands.

The most difficult issue is how the state in which the unlawfully seized aircraft lands deals with the problem. This state has two duties: first concerning national security and national interest; and secondly, international responsibilities with respect to implementation obligations under international agreements relating to the unlawful seizure of aircraft.

As most of the decisions in such cases are taken at the highest level of government, authorities have to be in direct contact constantly and depending on the case, may take a lot of their time.

Where developing countries are involved handling of a crisis is very difficult, owing to lack of experience and knowledge of those who have to deal with the case, (management of response to acts of unlawful seizure of an aircraft). Although ICAO provides some guidance material for states in response to hijacking of aircraft (Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference - Doc 8973/3), in practice it is very difficult for states to achieve the main objective which is the safe release of passengers and crew. The ICAO guidance material is technical and not all problems which such states face are technical in nature.

When an unlawfully seized aircraft lands at an airport,

it disrupts the normal operation of that airport and in the case of small countries, it may stop the whole operation of the airport and even cut the airlinks of that particular country with other countries.

When it becomes evident to the authorities concerned that force may have to be used after all other possibilities have been exhausted, it is quite clear that the great majority of states do not have the capability and capacity to mount a rescue operation team. Moreover, some states do not have capable and qualified negotiators. This is complicated by the fact that states are reluctant to accept assistance from other countries, even very friendly states, for many reasons. Therefore, states particularly of developing countries prefer not to permit hijacked aircraft to land in their territories.

2-1-3: TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS

There are two kinds of technical problems which any state have to take into account: first, airport facilities; and secondly, equipment which is essential for any kind of rescue operation to release passengers and crew. A state is required to take into account many considerations before allowing a hijacked aircraft to land at an airport within their territories:

-They have to make sure that particular airport is suitable for landing of that particular type of aircraft; e.g., the length of the runway is adequate for landing;

-The airport has a special location for parking of hijacked aircraft;

-Radio communication and fire fighting facilities should be available;

-They have to make sure that the landing of a hijacked aircraft does not endanger other flights, aircraft, passengers and people who live around the airport.

In many small and developing countries provisions for such facilities for normal operation is difficult. Therefore they are under tremendous pressure not to permit an unlawfully seized aircraft to land in their territories. In cases of direct combat with hijackers, few states have the capacity to use force, and not all of them are successful.

When one state has no other choice but to use force against hijackers, it has to make sure that they have well-trained and well-equipped personnel. Hijackers use sophisticated equipment and an aircraft is a very valuable property (some models are worth more than \$100 million) therefore states have to be certain that they have adequate resources for combating hijackers. However, this is not the case in developing countries where, in fact, a number of passengers and crew who were killed during a conflict between hijackers and rescue teams exceeded the number of passengers and crew who were killed by hijackers.

2-1-4: ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

When an unlawfully seized aircraft lands in an airport, it usually interrupts its normal operations and may stop them

altogether. As a consequence millions of dollars can be lost by airlines and airport authorities as a result of cancellation of flights and damage to the airport facilities, airport buildings and navigational aids.

Airport facilities not only are very expensive but also very difficult and time consuming to replace or repair , especially for small and developing countries which are dependent on more advanced countries for their technology.

A response to acts of unlawful interference in progress could involve the owner/operator of an aircraft, the crew of an aircraft (both flight and cabin), the air traffic services, the airport operators, ground crews, local police forces, and emergency teams (fire, bomb disposal, etc...).

In the case of a hijacking of an aircraft, successful management of a response would involve the formulation of a "game plan" after due consideration of alternate courses of action and consequences of such alternatives. The proposed course of action would depend on:

- threat assessment (character of hijackers, weapons, explosives);
- hijackers demands-particularly those which can only be satisfied by involvement of another state;
- registry of aircraft;
- citizenship/status of passengers, e.g., foreign diplomats, sick children, or very wealthy persons;

- the wishes of the owner/operator of the aircraft;
- government policies;
- aviation safety principles and objectives;
- capability of police having jurisdiction to handle a situation; and
- cargo on board, e.g., dangerous goods shipment, high value items.

Where a hijacking involves a hostage situation, the public information/media aspects would require co-ordination and possibly, approval by those in charge of the situation.

Many questions arise in any given situation, for example:

- a) What is the paramount objective in such a situation?
 - Terminating the incident?
 - Safety (safe release) of all passengers and crew?
 - Capture and punishment of the perpetrators?
 - Interests of the state?
 - Protection of property?
- b) Should force or should negotiations be used in resolving an incident? If force is to be used, should it be used only as a last resort and, if so, who should be involved in arriving at a decision to use force, e.g., the pilot-in-command, responsibly official of the air carrier operating the aircraft, or the owner of the aircraft, the state of which a substantial number of passengers are citizens, the state of registry of the aircraft, the state of the operator, etc...?

If negotiations are to be held, what sort of tactics are to be adopted bearing in mind that, it would be difficult to develop a standard course of action given that each hijacking incident is different.

c) If a hijacked aircraft is in the air, what tactics should be adopted? For example, should all efforts be concentrated on assisting the pilot-in-command to land the aircraft as soon as possible, or should the aircraft be directed to a specific airport where the necessary facilities, equipment and personnel are available to terminate the incident quickly and safely.

d) Once a hijacked aircraft is safely on the ground, what tactics should be employed? For example, should all efforts be aimed at keeping the aircraft on the ground or should the aircraft be allowed to take-off? If the aircraft is to be immobilized, who is to be involved in the decision (pilot-in-command, etc...)?

Due to the situation on board the aircraft, the pilot-in-command may not be able to exercise his full authority or responsibility as he too is a hostage and may be operating under duress.

e) What is to be the role, if any, of the aircraft owner/operator in a given case? For example, the owner/operator could be required to communicate to the authorities information regarding the aircraft, the passengers (i.e. VIPs, etc...) and the cargo (i.e. high value or dangerous); he may be required

to provide a sister aircraft of similar configuration to facilitate training/planning of police tactical team if armed intervention is likely to be needed as a last resort.

To gather all this information and answer all the questions is not an easy task. In fact, it is extremely difficult for many states especially developing countries to provide all this information. Therefore, the easiest way for them to avoid the various consequences is simply to refuse the aircraft which has been the subject of unlawful seizure permission to land in their territories.

But in many cases states often have little choice other than to allow an unlawfully seized aircraft to land in their territory, e.g., when hijackers force the pilot to land, or the aircraft runs out of fuel, or the aircraft is in distress (technical problems). In these cases, states, by providing fuel and other facilities to the hijacked aircraft, may encourage the hijackers to leave their territories to avoid all consequences.

While this approach is one adopted by many countries, it does not help the suppression of unlawful seizures of aircraft, because one of the objectives of hijackers is to prolong the act of unlawful seizure of aircraft to gain publicity through the mass media.

2-2. PATTERNS, ROOTS AND REASONS OF THE PROBLEMS

There are four main reasons for hijacking :

The first main wave of aerial hijacking commenced after World War II with the inauguration of the Cold War Era, when various people, sometimes military personnel and sometimes civilians-seized military or civilian aircraft to flee from the communist countries of Eastern Europe so as to claim political asylum in the West. Such "East-West" political escapes have become much more intermittent or isolated as the Cold War has progressively given way to the East-West Big Power detente. However, we have seen some examples, in recent years, of persons claiming to be subjected to religious persecution in the Soviet Union and to be barred, in consequence, from obtaining normal exit visas except under arduous financial conditions or penalties, who have tried unsuccessfully or who have actually managed to seize aircraft as a sort of desperate "last resort" means of leaving the Soviet Union. This category of hijacking we may call the "political escape" hijacking, corresponding to the political claims, bona fide or otherwise, put forward by those attempting them.⁶²

A second category of hijacking we may, without too much hesitation, label as the "lunatic fringe" hijacking. They begin with Fidel Castro's accession to power in Cuba, and the termination of direct diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba that followed shortly thereafter. Beginning in early 1961, when the first United States civil passenger aircraft was hijacked to Havana, a wave of similar hijacking followed over the decade of the 1960's, and, indeed, up to the

end of 1972. While some of the early hijacking from the United States to Cuba may have had a bona fide political nature, it soon became apparent - as extended psychological studies, in depth, of the perpetrators of abortive hijacking attempts after their apprehension and of actual hijackers since returned from Cuba and taken into custody in the United States, have shown - that for the most part these were emotionally disturbed or mentally unbalanced people with very little political or social awareness, and drawn mainly by the contagion of past example, and the lure of the massive publicity given by the communication media (newspaper, television and radio) to past successful hijacking attempts. There is no reason, incidentally, to assume that the "lunatic fringe" personalities do not occur from time to time also among the other categories of hijackers, in which the element of motivation - political- ideological or economic- is normally accepted as the main criterion for purposes of identification and classification.⁶³

A third group of hijacking may be identified as the "hijacking for profit" or "sky bandit" ("skyjacking") category of delinquency: for the dominant motive, here, has clearly been the expectation or hope of instant, large-scale financial gain for the criminal perpetrator. The sky bandit who proceeds to hold the aircrew and passengers to ransom for large sums of money, must, undoubtedly, possess considerable qualities of sang froid and also actual physical daring, since successful execution of the hijacking plan will normally require escape

by parachute from hijacked passenger aircraft, together with the ransom money. As a professional skill group, it has been reasoned, this category of hijackers will normally be composed of ex-army paratroopers or civilian sports parachutists (sky-divers). It is perhaps not surprising that this category of hijacker has acquired a certain degree of perverse public respect, even to the point, in one of the more celebrated cases, of developing into something of a popular folk-hero.⁶⁴

A final group of hijacking, confined in geographical terms essentially to the Middle-Eastern Countries or at least to nationals or former nationals of those countries, has clearly, as its prime motive among a plethora of different motives, the solution or at least continuance of hitherto unresolved international conflicts, by navel or unconventional means. This proceeds on the argument, apparently, that the stalemating or clogging of the normal processes of international legal change through peaceful means, thereby operates to render licit or justifiable what otherwise would clearly be impermissible in conventional or classical international law terms.

These so-called "international terrorist" hijacking, the incidence or at least the threat of which has been mounting in recent years in view of the apparent spectacular political success of several early attempts, are perhaps the most difficult of all to control. For an effective control would seem to require, in the end, some sort of generally acceptable, or at least generally imposed, final solution to the key political

conflicts from which they ultimately stem. Foiling of ransom demands, effectuating the release of the air crew and passengers of the hijacked aircraft, and even physical apprehension of the delinquent hijackers and their punishment by due legal process, may not be enough in themselves to nullify or outweigh the effects of an original hijacking, for which the large-scale international air Transportation and the consequent massive publicity for the political cause in whose name those acts were performed, constituted, no doubt, the prime objective.⁶⁵

CHAPTER THREE: FUTURE PROSPECTS

Since the security for civil aviation is very relevant to the political situation of the world, and in the eve of the changing of political structure of the world, especially in Eastern Europe day by day, and in times which the unthinkable is now reality, such as the Berlin wall collapsing by the will of the people. Politicians could not have predicted what is happening now, and have no other choice but simply to follow the masses. As a result, it seems that the Cold War is over and there will be more political stability around the world.

If we have the same political improvement in other regions such as the Middle East, Latin America and South Africa, for sure the most important elements which are the cause of the most serious unlawful acts against civil aviation will not exist any more.

On the other hand if the political conflict continues to exist as it is now, the only change will be the new methods which will be used by terrorists, much more sophisticated techniques and more deadly weapons will be applied.

Already the civil aviation industry is shocked by acts of sabotage and total destruction of civil aircraft in the air. It seems that, with existing technology which is now available in airports, detection of plastic bombs is impossible and ICAO is looking for some reliable methodology to recommend to Contracting States as preventive measures. ICAO is looking for a protocol which makes possible the enhancement of

detectability of plastic explosives by use of an additive at the manufacturing stage.

The financial burden and high-tech, which is required is so difficult that experts in this field believe that "hand-searching" is still the most effective method of detecting plastic explosives.

Security measurements can only be effective if they are implemented globally, and for sure the developing countries without assistance from the more advanced countries will not be able to meet the financial burden and provide high-tech equipment.

Even if all the above is achieved in the near future, it does not guarantee that the terrorists will not change their methods. Mr. Regan wanted Star Wars against Russia, who knows, maybe terrorists if they get hold of these kinds of weapons will use them against civil aircraft.

The problem is that international communities have always been one step behind terrorists. ICAO and other related international agencies have been trying to eliminate or prevent the extent of damage, which could occur, as a result of an unlawful act against civil aviation, by providing technical, material and legal instruments to the states to prevent or fight against such acts.

As far as political tensions exist in certain parts of the world, international terrorism will continue, and as civil aviation is the most vulnerable and the most attractive to the

mass media, it will be at the top of the terrorist attack agenda.

There is another approach in forecasting the future of security in civil aviation such as "extrapolative forecasting techniques" which are usually based on some form of time series analysis.

According to one study ⁶⁶, the number of people who were affected (injured and dead) as a result of unlawful interference in civil aviation can be calculated from the following formula:

$$YT = A + B (X)$$

$$A = SY/N = 1756/7 = 250.8$$

$$B = S (XY) / S (X^2) = 2230/28 = 79.6$$

$$YT = 250.8 + 79.6 (X)$$

The calculation of this formula is based on 1980-86 data of people affected. ⁶⁷ The value of (X) for the year 1987 is four, 1988 is five, and respectfully up to the year 2000 the value of (X) is seventeen.

Therefore the number of people who are likely to die or will be injured for the years 1987 is 569, 1988 is 649, 1989 is 728 and respectfully up to the year 2000, at 1604.

We believe that the above approach can not forecasted, correctly, the future of the security of civil aviation for the following reasons:

- (1) Extrapolative forecasting techniques are based on

persistence, regularity and reliability and validity of data.⁶⁸ As it is clear from the past twenty years of data which are available⁶⁹ there is no persistence and regularity about unlawful acts against civil aviation.

(2) This formula scientifically is not correct because, according to this formula, every year the number of people who will be affected will be increased by eighty persons. In other words, the only variable in this formula is the number of years, other elements such as new technology, and the changing of a political situation, which have a tremendous affect on the security of civil aviation are not considered.

(3) Only very limited amounts of data (from 1980 to 1986) have been taken into account for forecasting of the future, for the period up to the year 2000.

(4) Actual data which is available for 1987 to 1989 is different from that which is supposed to be, according to this formula.

People affected	1987	1988	1989
Calculated	569	649	728
Actual	287	321	321

(5) According to this formula if we use 13 years of data which is available (1977-1989), instead of using seven years of data (1980-1986), the new formula will be $Y = 248.3 + 23.3 (X)$.⁷⁰ Therefore the number of people likely to die or be injured in the year 2000, as a result of unlawful interference in civil aviation, is 644.4 persons, which sharply differs from the

previous prediction of 1604 people.

As data concerning civil aviation security is very limited and also very variable, the future of security in civil aviation can not be forecasted accurately on the basis of past information. The most important element in aviation security is the political situation of the world and its changes. As this element can not be forecasted accurately for the future for the reason that in the past was not persistent nor regular, therefore the most reliable approaches would be the prediction of aviation security in the future on the bases of the different assumptions about political situations of the world and its changes, and not on the bases of the past figures.

CONCLUSION TO PART ONE

Most of hijacking cases with a high political risk occurred or terminated in developing countries. Developing countries have not adequate resources (Personnel and equipment) to respond to unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation in particular hijacking (diagnosis).

As the developing countries cannot solve these problems by themselves alone, therefore an International mechanism should be established by international bodies such as ICAO with the cooperation of developed states in order to assist the developing countries to overcome these problems.

If such mechanisms are not established, the acts of unlawful interference will continue unabated and may increase (Prognosis)

PART I- FOOTNOTES

1. S.K. Ghosh, Aircraft Hijacking and the Developing Law, (1985), p. 1.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. 12 International Legal Materials, (1973), p. 370.
6. Statement made by Cuba before the United Nations General Assembly on November 3, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/PV.56, pp. 8-10
7. W. Stevenson, 90 Minutes at Entebbe, (1976).
8. 15 International Legal Materials, (1976), pp. 1226-1227; see also, U.N. Doc. S/12126.
9. 15 International Legal Materials, Ibid.
10. 15 International Legal Materials, Ibid., p. 1226. The draft resolution was withdrawn by its sponsors on July 14, 1976.
11. Ibid., At p. 1227. The tri-state draft was not pressed to a vote, but in statement by the Tanzanian delegate on July 14, the co-sponsors reserved the right to revive consideration of it "at an appropriate moment".
12. H.H.A. Cooper, "Hostage Rescue Operations: Denouncement at Algeria and Mogadishu Compared:", Chitty's Law Journal, Vol. 26, (1978), p. 91.
13. Ghosh, supra, note 1, p. 3.

14. Ibid., p. 8.
15. U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Aircraft Hijacking and other Criminal Acts against Civil Aviation: Statistical and Narrative Reports (Washington, D.C., 1986) p. D112 [hereafter Aircraft Hijacking].
16. ICAO Doc. C-WP/8540, Appendix C, p. 28.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., p. 30.
19. ICAO Doc. UI-WP/205, Appendix, p. 5.
20. Aircraft Hijacking, Supra, note 15, p. F-1.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid., p. F-2
23. Ibid., p. F-6
24. Ibid., p. F-10.
25. Ibid., p. F-12.
26. ICAO Doc. C-WP/8540, supra, note 16, p. 31.
27. Ibid., p. 32.
28. ICAO Doc. UI-WP/205, supra, note 19, p. 9.
29. E.W. Faller, "Current Legal Activities in ICAO: Development of a Legal Instrument for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation", Zeitschrift fur Luft-Und Weltraumrecht, German Journal of Air and Space Law, (1987), p. 219.
30. ICAO Doc. LC/SC-VIA-Repot, Appendix C, p. 25.
31. Faller, supra, note 29.

32. ICAO "Chronology of Unlawful Interference with Civil Aviation", (mimeo.), (1975), p. 1.
33. The New York Times, Sept, 11, 1976, p. 1.
34. The New York Times, Aug. 12, 1976, p. 1.
35. Aircraft Hijacking, supra, note 15, p. G-8.
36. Ibid., p. G-10.
37. Ibid., pp. G-1-25.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid., p. G-23.
40. Ibid., G-24.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. ICAO Doc. UI-WP/205, supra, note 19, p. 9
44. Hughes, Aerial Intrusions by Civil Airlines and the Use of Force, p. 602-3.
45. Ibid., p. 640.
46. Ibid., p. 611.
47. Ibid., p. 609.
48. Ibid.
49. ICAO Council Minutes 111/6 Doc. 9441.
50. Martin, "Destruction of Korean Air Lines Boeing 747 over Sea of Japan", 31 Aug. (1984) 9 Air L. 138 at 141.
51. ICAO Doc. C-WP/7764, p. 2.
52. Fitzgerald. Shooting down of KAL flight 007. Institute of Air & Space Law McGill University, p. 2.

53. United States District Court, District of Columbia, MDL No. 565, Misc. No. 83-0345 November 7, 1988, 704F Supp. 1135.
54. ICAO Doc. C-Min Extraordinary (1988)/1. 13 July 1988 p. 5.
55. Ibid p. 6.
56. Ibid p. 6.
57. Ibid p. 6.
58. ICAO Doc. C-WP/8708, p. 5-6
59. ICAO Council Minutes 126/20.
60. ICAO Council Minutes C-MIN Extraordinary (1988)/1.
61. FAA Doc. Worldwide Significant Criminal Acts Involving Civil Aviation, Washington, D.C. 20591 (1986).
62. E. McWhinney, Aerial Piracy and International Terrorism, p. 8.
63. Ibid., p. 10.
64. Ibid., p. 11.
65. Ibid., p. 13.
66. Paul Garinis, Unlawful Interference with Civil Aviation, Internship Report. Department of Political Science. Concordia University.
67. Ibid, p. 58.
68. Ibid, p. 56.
69. ICAO Doc. UI-WP/238 dated 25-1-90, p. B-2.
70. Ibid, p. B-2.

PART II : NORMS, CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY LAW

On the basis of the conclusion of Part One we shall now present the various legal actions taken to solve the problem so far.

This part is divided into three chapters up to 1945, 1945 to 1970, and 1970 to 1988.

Chapter Four will examine the International Law up to the creation of the United Nations Organization. The Conventions which will be examined are; the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism (1937), Chicago Convention (1944), United Nations Charter (1945).

Chapter Five will examine the International Law between 1945 to 1970. These periods are more important because most of the International Laws concerning Security of Civil Aviation were created in this period under the auspices of ICAO.

The Conventions which will be examined are Geneva Convention of the High Seas (1958), Tokyo convention (1963), and the Hague Convention (1970).

Chapter Six will examine the International Conventions from 1971 to 1978. In this period emphasis is on unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation other than hijacking such as Sabotage and Airport Attacks.

The conventions which will be examined are Montreal Convention (1971) and Montreal Protocol (1988).

CHAPTER FOUR: AVIATION SECURITY LAW UP TO 1945

4-1: CONVENTION FOR THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF TERRORISM (1937)

Before the Tokyo Convention of 1963, most of the legal work on international civil aviation security was undertaken by the United Nations or its predecessors, the League of Nations. The increase of international terrorist activities following World War I prodded nations into organized multilateral attempts to deal with the problem. Most efforts were directed towards the establishment of the International Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism¹. However, governments took more determined action only after a major terrorist attack on October 9th, 1934, which resulted in the assassination at Marseilles of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia, during his visit to France, and the murder of the French Foreign Minister, Mr. Louis Barthou, who was officially receiving the King in Marseilles². The Yugoslav Government made a request to the Council of the League of Nations to investigate the incident.³

On December 10th, 1934, the Council of the League of Nations setup the Committee of Experts to prepare a draft convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism. The draft was submitted to an International Conference in Geneva in November of 1937 which was adopted. This convention never entered into force because of the outbreak of World War II.

4-2: CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION (CHICAGO CONVENTION OF 1944)

When the Chicago Conference was held in 1944, and during the drafting of the Convention on International Civil Aviation⁴, no consideration was given to the security of international civil aviation since such acts were unknown at that time. However, the preamble of the Convention recites the potential role of international civil aviation in "Creating and preserving friendship and understanding among the nations and peoples of the world", and the necessity, therefore, to develop international civil aviation "in a safe and orderly manner" and to establish international air transport services on the basis of "equal opportunity as well as sound and economic operation". Other provisions of the Convention also indicate clearly that safety of civil aviation is one of its main objectives. Article 25 of the Convention provides that;

"each Contracting State Undertakes to provide such measures of assistance to aircraft in distress in its territory as it may find practicable, and to permit, subject to control by its own authorities, the owners of the aircraft or authorities of the State in which the aircraft is registered to provide such measures of assistance as may be necessitated by the circumstances. Each Contracting State, when undertaking search for missing aircraft, will collaborate in coordinated measures which may be recommended from time to time pursuant to this Convention."⁵

This principle falls under the category of International Humanitarian Law. At the time of its incorporation into the Chicago Convention, it was one of the oldest principles of customary international law.⁶

"Aircraft in distress" is defined neither in the Chicago Convention nor in other ICAO documents. In the report of Ad Hoc Group of Experts on unlawful interference, different views were expressed on whether an aircraft in an emergency situation could be considered an aircraft in distress. The group agreed that, regardless of the terminology used, the objective was to provide full security measures for international civil aviation.⁷

Supposing that an aircraft, unlawfully seized, is refused entry to a certain airspace or landing rights at a specific aerodrome, to what extremes can a state go before causing the aircraft to crash land at a location not meant for a normal landing? A simple technical matter, such as running out of fuel leaves, in the end, no alternative for the pilot-in-command but to take the aircraft down while still left with some engine power. What ultimate authority would be the one to deny such an aircraft a landing on a normal runway? Surely this will not be a civil aviation authority, but rather another high government official, who also has to consider the political consequences for his country.

Article 3 of the Convention defines its scope:

- a) This Convention shall be applicable only to civil aircraft, and shall not be applicable to State aircraft;
- b) aircraft used in military, customs and police services shall be deemed to be State aircraft;
- c) no state aircraft of a Contracting State shall fly over the territory of another state or land thereon without authorization by special agreement or otherwise, and in accordance with the terms thereof;
- d) the Contracting States undertake, when issuing regulations for their state aircraft, that they will have due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft.

The Chicago Convention applies only to civil aircraft, to the exclusion of state aircraft⁸. While the Convention defines state aircraft as aircraft used in military, custom, or police services⁹, it fails to define a civil aircraft. All aircraft not devoted to military, customs and police services are considered to be civil aircraft.

Article 3(d) requires Contracting States, when issuing regulations for their state aircraft, to have due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft.

It should be noted that a state cannot put civil aircraft to any use that is incompatible with the purposes of the Chicago

Convention. In other words, according to the Convention, abuse of civil aviation is prohibited.

Article 4 of the Convention states:

"Each Contracting State agrees not to use civil aviation for any purpose inconsistent with the aims of this Convention"

Article 4 is the only provision in the Chicago Convention explicitly dealing with the problem of misuse of civil aviation. The draft history of this article indicates that its underlying intent was to prevent the use of civil aviation by states for purposes which might create a threat to the security of other nations.¹⁰

According to Article 17 of the Convention, aircraft have the nationality of the state in which they are registered. The state of registry is responsible for the conduct of the aircraft when it operates beyond its national boundaries.

4-3: UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

The United Nations Charter is one of the most important international legal documents to be considered on the issue of civil aviation security, even though the Charter contains no provision that deals directly with the security of civil aviation. Members of the United Nations are under a legal obligation to act in accordance with purpose of the Charter. The preamble of the Charter stipulates that citizens of the

member states of the United Nations will "practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors". The principle of security is embodied in several articles of the Charter. Article 1 (2) provides that the purpose of the United Nations is to pursue the development of "friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace".

The principles of law and humanity protecting civilians and civilians objects from being objects of attack as such protects civil aircraft in flight because civil aircraft, by definition are presumed to transport civilians. According to the United Nations Charter, member states are under a legal obligation to respect and observe fundamental human rights and freedoms:

"There is a mandatory obligation implied in article 55 of the Charter that the United Nations "shall promote respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms"; or, in terms of article 13, that the assembly shall make recommendations for the purpose of assisting in the realization of human rights and freedoms. There is a distinct element of legal duty in the understanding expressed in article 56 in which all members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the organization for the achievement of the purpose set forth in article 55.¹¹

If identified as a civil aircraft, air transport in flight should not be the subject of an attack.¹²

The United Nations Charter opposes the use of force against

civilian aircraft. Article 2(4) of the Charter prohibits the use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Charter. One of these purposes is the settlement of disputes by peaceful means.¹³

The right of self-defence is recognized only against an armed attack, pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter. Unauthorized entry by an unarmed aircraft does not constitute an armed attack, even if such entry is effected for the purposes of espionage or provocation¹⁴. Article 51 of the Charter narrows the field of the exercise of self-defence to circumstances involving an armed attack. Although no authoritative definition of an armed attack has even been adopted internationally thus far, it is at least generally agreed that an armed attack is a special kind of aggression.¹⁵

CHAPTER FIVE: AVIATION SECURITY LAW (1958-1970)

5-1: GENEVA CONVENTION ON THE HIGH SEAS OF 1958

The Geneva Convention on the High Seas of 1958 (Geneva Convention)¹⁶ was the first treaty which attempted to formulate authoritative legal statements on civil aviation security, as it touched on piracy over the high seas.¹⁷

Certain provisions of the Geneva Convention make it very clear that the law of piracy on the high seas is also applicable to piracy in the airspace above the high seas. Articles 14-22 of the Convention deal with acts of piracy, whether committed by ship or by aircraft. Article 5 of the Convention defines piracy as follows;

Piracy consists of any of the following acts:

1- Any illegal acts of violence, detention or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:

a) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;

b) against a ship, aircraft, persons, or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state;

2- Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;

3- Any act of inciting or of Internationally facilitating an act described in sub-paragraph 1 or sub-paragraph 2 of this article.

According to Article 15, the act must be an illegal act of violence, detention or depredation. Most hijacking of aircraft have been performed with violence¹⁸, either by assaulting the pilot and taking control of the aircraft, or by holding a passenger or crew member hostage. Also, Article 15 provides that the act must take place over the "high seas" or "outside the jurisdiction of any state".

Article 14 of the Geneva Convention imposes a duty on every state party to the Convention to "Co-operate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy...", By either prosecuting the offender or extraditing him to states which might be in a better position to undertake such prosecution. The Convention goes further in Article 19, giving all parties jurisdiction and right to seize the pirate ship and to arrest and punish the pirates. According to this article, states are entitled to extend their "legislative" or "prescriptive" jurisdiction to cover acts of piracy committed outside its territory.

5-2: CONVENTION ON OFFENCES AND CERTAIN OTHER ACTS COMMITTED ON BOARD AIRCRAFT (TOKYO CONVENTION OF 1963)

The Tokyo Convention of 1963¹⁹ was the first multilateral convention which dealt directly with the matter of civil aviation security under the auspices of ICAO, and came in force in 1969. The main objectives of the Convention are as follows;

1. It gives the state of registry of the aircraft the jurisdiction to apply its law to incidents occurring on board

its aircraft while in flight, irrespective of where these incidents occur.

2. It gives the aircraft commander the authority to use reasonable measures against persons who have committed or are about to commit a crime or act jeopardizing safety on board the aircraft.

3. It delineates the duties and responsibilities of the Contracting State in which the aircraft lands after commission of a crime on board.

4. It deals with the growing number of aircraft seizures.²⁰

5-2-1: SCOPE

The Tokyo Convention applies to offences against penal laws and acts which, whether or not they are offences, may, or do, jeopardize the safety of the aircraft or of persons or property therein, or which jeopardize order and discipline on board.²¹

The Convention applies to offences or acts by a person on board an aircraft registered in a Contracting State, while that aircraft is in flight or on the surface of the high seas, or in other areas outside the territory of any state²². For the purpose of the Convention, an aircraft is considered to be in flight from the moment power is applied for take-off until the landing run ends²³. Hence, offences committed on board the aircraft during the time the aircraft is parked or

taxying are not considered to be within the scope of the Convention. The Convention does not apply to aircraft used in military customs or police services²⁴.

5-2-2: JURISDICTION

According to Article 3 of the Convention, the state of registry of the aircraft exercises jurisdiction over offences and acts committed on board. Each state party to the Convention is obliged to take necessary measures to establish its jurisdiction as the state of registry. Thus, a Contracting State is required to adopt appropriate legislation, giving its courts jurisdiction, but is not obliged, however, to ensure that all suspected offenders are brought to trial.

There is nothing in the provisions of the Convention which eliminates existing or future jurisdiction in states other than the state of registry (for example: the state of landing of the aircraft). Nor does the Convention exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law. However, to facilitate air service, the Convention authorizes a contracting state which is not a state of registry to interfere with an aircraft in flight in the following cases:

1. Where the offence has been committed by or against a national or permanent resident of that state;
2. Where the offence has been effected in the territory of the state;
3. Where the offence is committed against the security

of the state;

4. Where the offence represents a violation of any rules or regulations in force in the state, which relate to the flight or manoeuvre of aircraft;

5. Where the exercise of such jurisdiction is necessary in order to ensure the observance of any obligation of the state under a multilateral Convention.

5-2-3: POWERS OF THE AIRCRAFT COMMANDER AND OTHERS

The Tokyo Convention empowers the aircraft commanders crew and passengers to combat acts of unlawful interference committed on board an aircraft against its security. Article 6 of the Convention describes the powers of the aircraft commander over persons on board the aircraft. The aircraft commander has the right to take reasonable measures, including restraint, against any person on board when the commander has reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed or is about to commit an unlawful act which jeopardizes the safety of the aircraft or of persons or property therein, or which jeopardizes order and discipline on board. Such measures are intended to achieve three objectives:

1- To protect the safety of the aircraft, or of persons or property therein;

2- To maintain order and discipline on board;

3- To enable the aircraft commander to deliver / alleged offender to the competent authorities or to disembark him in accordance with specified provisions.

The aircraft commander has the power to require or authorize assistance of other crew members. He may also request or authorize, but not require, passengers to assist in confronting an unlawful act on board the aircraft. The aircraft commander has the authority to restrain any one who is physically or mentally ill, or who becomes insane during a flight and constitutes an imminent danger to the safety of the aircraft.²⁵

In the absence of the authority of the aircraft commander, the Convention also empowers crew members and passengers on board to take whatever, reasonable and necessary, preventive measures, when there is a reasonable ground to justify that action, in order to protect the safety of the aircraft and/or persons and/or property therein.

Under the provisions of the Convention, the aircraft commander has the power to disembark any person in the territory of any state (that is, not only a contracting state) in which the aircraft lands, if the commander has reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed or is about to commit, on board the aircraft, an act or offence within the scope of the Convention. The aircraft commander has an obligation to report the fact of and the reason for any such disembarkation to the authorities of the state of disembarkation.²⁶

Moreover, the aircraft commander has the right to deliver any person to the competent authorities of any contracting state in which the aircraft lands. If the commander has reasonable grounds to believe that such persons has committed

on board the aircraft an act which the commander believes to be an offence under the laws of the state of registry. In case of delivery, the aircraft commander must give the authorities of the state of landing notice of his intention to deliver the person and the reason for such delivery. The commander must also provide the authorities with information and evidence which, under the law of the state of registry of the aircraft, are lawfully in his possession.²⁷

Article 10 of the Convention exonerates for liability the aircraft commander, crew members, passengers, owner or operator of the aircraft and the person on whose behalf the flight was performed, and provides for immunity from suits by the alleged offender. This protection encourages the aircraft commander and others to combat unlawful acts contemplated by the Convention.

5-2-4: POWERS AND DUTIES OF CONTRACTING STATES

Article 11 of the Convention imposes an obligation on Contracting States to take appropriate measures to restore or preserve the aircraft commander's control of the aircraft when any person on board has unlawfully committed or is about to commit by force or threat thereof an act of interference, seizure, or other wrongful exercise of control of such aircraft in flight. Furthermore, the Contracting state in which the aircraft lands is under an obligation to permit the passengers and the crew to continue their journey and to return the

aircraft as soon as practicable to the persons entitled to its possession.

Article 12 of the Convention requires the state of landing of the aircraft to accept any person disembarked or delivered by the aircraft commander pursuant to Article 8 of the Convention. The state in whose territory the aircraft has landed must take custody of such persons and any other measures which are in accordance with its legislation. Such measures may be continued for as long as is reasonably necessary in order to enable any criminal or extradition proceedings to be instituted. The person in custody shall be assisted immediately in communicating with the nearest appropriate representative of the state of which he or she is a national. The state of landing is also required to make an immediate preliminary inquiry into the facts of the incident, to notify the state of registry and the state of which the detained person is a national, and to report its findings to those states, indicating whether it intends to exercise its jurisdiction.²⁸

5-2-5: EXTRADITION

The Tokyo Convention does not declare unlawful seizure to be a specific criminal offence, nor does it specifically provide that the person committing the act of unlawful seizure be extradited or criminally prosecuted. Rather, it would appear that such a person is left to be dealt with according to the national law of the state of landing. However, the Convention

does not require the Contracting state on whose territory the aircraft has landed to punish the offender, nor does it provide for the mandatory extradition of the offender. Article 11 of the Convention merely defines the duties of the state in whose territory a hijacked aircraft has landed. These duties include; restoring control of the aircraft to its lawful commander and permitting the passengers and crew to continue their journey.

According to Article 13 of the Convention, it is entirely up to the discretion of the Contracting state in whose territory the aircraft has landed to institute criminal or extradition proceedings. Although the Contracting State is required to take the hijacker into custody, this detainment is merely for the purpose of a preliminary inquiry into the facts. Article 16 makes it clear that the Convention does not create an obligation to grant extradition. Chung has stated:

"The Tokyo Convention does not oblige the Contracting state to punish an alleged offender upon his disembarkation or delivery. Ironically, the landing state must set him free and let him proceed to the destination of his choice as soon as is practicable if it does not wish to extradite or prosecute him. The Contracting states are obliged to extradite the offenders, if at all, only under provisions of other treaties between them".²⁹

5-3: CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF UNLAWFUL SEIZURE OF AIRCRAFT (HAGUE CONVENTION OF 1970)

Since the Tokyo Convention was slow to enter into force and there was an increase in incidents of hijacking in 1968,

the ICAO Assembly, at its 16th Session in 1968, adopted Resolution A16-37, requesting the ICAO Council to initiate a study of measures to cope with the problem of unlawful seizure of aircraft. The Council decided to refer the subject to the legal committee for a study of all legal aspects. The Chairman of the Legal Committee, at the request of the Council, established a legal sub-committee, to study the subject. The sub-committee met twice in 1969 and prepared a draft convention on unlawful seizure of aircraft. The Council circulated the draft convention as elaborated by the legal committee, together with the report of this committee, to states and international organizations, inviting them to comment by August 31st, 1970. Eventually, the Council decided to convene an international diplomatic conference for final approval of the convention. On December 1st, 1970, the conference was held at the Hague and unanimously approved the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft on December 16th, of the same year. The Convention entered into force on October 14th, 1970.³⁰

2.3-1: DEFINITION OF AN OFFENCE

Article 1 of the Hague Convention of 1970 states that any person committing an "offence" who, on board an aircraft in flight;

a) Unlawfully, by force or threat thereof, or by any other force of intimidation, seizure or exercises control of that aircraft, or attempts to perform any such act or,

b) Is an accomplice of a person who performs or attempts to perform any such act.

According to this article, the act must be committed by any person on board an aircraft "in flight", and thereby excludes offences committed on the ground. Article 1 of the Convention contains the basic elements of Article 11(1) of the Tokyo Convention of 1963. The type of hijacking these two conventions address is only "on board" hijacking; "non-on board" hijacking are not included.³¹

Also according to the same article, the Convention only applies to any accomplices who are on board an aircraft, but not to persons on the ground who may facilitate such an act. The representative of the Netherlands on the Legal Committee of the ICAO Council suggested that "it is obviously possible to be an accomplice without being on board an aircraft".³²

According to Article 3 of the Convention, the aircraft is considered to be "in flight" at any time from the moment when all its external doors are closed following embarkation until the moment when any such doors are opened for disembarkation. Hence, the Convention does not apply to any act of hijacking or a mere attempt to commit such an act either before closing the doors of the aircraft after embarkation or after opening

any such doors for disembarkation.

As in the Tokyo Convention, the Hague Convention does not apply to aircraft used in military, customs or police services.³³ Nor does the Convention apply if the place of take-off or landing of the aircraft on board which the offence is committed is situated in the state of registry of that aircraft.³⁴ However, the Convention does apply if the place of take-off or actual landing is situated outside the territory of the state of registry of the aircraft, on the understanding that it is immaterial whether the aircraft is engaged in a international or domestic flight.³⁵

5-3-2: JURISDICTION

According to Article 4 of the Convention, Contracting States are obliged to take all necessary measures to establish jurisdiction over the offence and any other act of violence against passengers or crew committed by the alleged offender in connection with the offence. Such measures must be taken:

- a) When the offence is committed on board an aircraft registered in a Contracting state;
- b) When the aircraft on board which the offence is committed lands in the territory of a contracting state, with the alleged offender still on board;
- c) When the offence is committed on board an aircraft leased without crew to a lessee who has his principal place of business in the contracting state or, if the lessee has no such place of business, his permanent residence is in that state.³⁶

In addition, Contracting States are obliged to take necessary measures to establish their jurisdiction over the offence in cases where the alleged offender is present in its territory, and that state does not extradite him.³⁷ R.H. Mankiewicz stated that "this provision is necessary in order to increase the possibility of effective punishment, even if the hijacker is not prosecuted in, or escapes from, the state of landing or is not extradited to the state of registration of the aircraft"³⁸. G.F. Fitzgerald noted that "an important part of the provision on jurisdiction intended to prevent the establishment of havens for hijackers"³⁹

5-3-3: CUSTODY

Article 6 of the Hague Convention imposes an obligation on Contracting States in whose territory the alleged offender is present, to take him into custody or take other measures to ensure his presence. The custody or other measures must be the same as those provided for in the law of that state, but may only be continued for such time as is necessary to enable any criminal or extradition proceedings to be instituted. This state is also obliged immediately to undertake a preliminary inquiry.⁴⁰ The contracting state also must assist the person taken into custody in communicating immediately with the nearest appropriate representative of the state of

which he is a national⁴¹, and must give notice to specified states of the fact that the alleged offender is in custody and of the circumstances which warrant his detention.⁴²

5-3-4: PROSECUTION

According to Article 7 of the Convention, a Contracting State is obliged, if it does not extradite an alleged offender, to submit his case "without any exception whatsoever" to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. This article also requires that a decision must be made by those authorities in the same manner as in the case of any ordinary offence of a serious nature under the law of that state. It must be pointed out, however, that the wording of Article 7 does not warrant the inference that Contracting states have an actual obligation to punish the offender. Article 2 of the Convention obliges states merely to make the offences punishable by severe penalties. R.P. Boyle states:

"[This] obligation is only to submit the offender for prosecution. There is no obligation to prosecute. Many careful distinctions have been adduced. One obvious one is that in case of universal jurisdiction, the state having the hijacker may not have available to its proof of the crime since conceivably it was committed in a distant state and thus the witness and other necessary evidence to the state having custody of the hijacker".⁴³

5-3-5: EXTRADITION

The Hague Convention does not contain a provision which

would oblige Contracting states to extradite the offender. Article 8 of the Convention merely requires Contracting States to include the offence referred to in the Convention as an extraditable offence in every extradition treaty to be concluded between them. In the case of Contracting States which make extradition conditional on the existence of an extradition treaty, hijacking is deemed to be included as an extraditable offence in any existing extradition treaty between Contracting States, and must be so included in any future extradition treaty entered into between such states. If a Contracting State which makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from another Contracting State with which it has no such treaty, Article 8 provides that the requested state may choose to consider this Convention as a legal basis for extradition concerning the offence of hijacking. Further, for Contracting States which do not make extradition condition on existing of a treaty, Article 8 requires them to recognize hijacking as an extraditable offence between such states.

For the purpose of extradition between Contracting States, the offence shall be treated as having been committed not only in the place where it occurred, but also in the territory of the state of registration of the hijacked aircraft, the state of landing and the state of the lessee.⁴⁴

5-3-6: OTHER PROVISIONS

Article 9 of the Hague Convention states that, where a hijacking has occurred or is about to occur, Contracting states must take appropriate measures to restore control of the aircraft to its lawful commander or to preserve his control. Article 9 also requires Contracting States in which the aircraft, its passengers or crew are present to facilitate the continuation of the journey of the passengers and crew and to return the aircraft and its cargo without delay to the persons lawfully entitled to possession. This provision reaffirms the basic international legal obligation, previously stated in Article 11 of the Tokyo Convention. Article 10 of the Hague Convention calls on Contracting States to assist one another in connection with criminal proceedings brought against hijackers. Article 11 obliges Contracting states to report to the Council of ICAO, as promptly as possible, any relevant information in their possession concerning the circumstances of the offence, the action taken pursuant to Article 9, and the measures taken as a result thereof.

CHAPTER SIX: AVIATION SECURITY LAW (1971-1988)

6-1: CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF UNLAWFUL ACTS AGAINST THE SAFETY OF CIVIL AVIATION (MONTREAL CONVENTION OF 1971)

While the Tokyo Convention dealt with offences and certain other acts committed on board aircraft and the Hague Convention dealt with the unlawful seizure of aircraft, the problem of the Security of Civil Aviation urgently demanded that the outstanding question of aircraft sabotage be resolved internationally.

Sabotage of aircraft in conjunction with the growing number of hijacking of civil aircraft around the world, led the international community in 1970 under the auspices of ICAO to mount efforts which culminated in the adoption of legal measures aimed at the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation.

In June 1970, the ICAO Assembly adopted a resolution in which it directed the Council of ICAO to convene the Legal Committee in order to prepare a draft convention.⁴⁵ The draft convention was discussed and approved by a international conference held in Montreal in 1971. Entitled; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation⁴⁶, this Convention is aimed at the prevention of sabotage and acts of violence other than the unlawful seizure of aircraft. A. Abramovsky has stated;

"The primary aim of the Montreal Convention was to arrive at a generally acceptable method of dealing with alleged perpetrators of acts of unlawful interference with aircraft. In general, the nations represented at the Montreal Conference agreed that acts of sabotage or violence and related offences interfering with the safety and development of international civil aviation constituted a global problem which had to be combatted collectively by concerned nations of the international community.⁴⁷

6-1-1: DEFINITION OF AN OFFENCE

As noted, the Tokyo Convention did not attempt to define specific offences, as such an exercise would have involved drafting an International Criminal Code. In addition, the Hague Convention only defined the offence of unlawful seizure of aircraft. The Montreal Convention covers a broad range of offences. Article 1 of the Montreal Convention defines and enumerates the offences of unlawful interference with aircraft;

1- Any person who commits an offence if he unlawfully and intentionally;

- a) Performs an act of violence against a person on board an aircraft in flight if that acts is likely to endanger the safety of that aircraft in flight; or
- b) destroys an aircraft in service or causes damage to such an aircraft which renders it incapable of flight or which is likely to endanger its safety in flight; or

- c) places or causes to be placed on board an aircraft in service, by any means whatsoever, a device or substance which is likely to destroy that aircraft, or to cause damage to it which is likely to endanger its safety in flight; or
- d) destroys or damages air navigation facilities or interferes with their operation, if any such act is likely to endanger the safety of an aircraft in flight; or
- e) communicates information which he knows to be false, thereby endangering the safety of an aircraft in flight.

2 Any Person also commits an offence if he:

- a) attempts to commit any of the offences mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article; or
- b) is an accomplice of a person who commits or attempts to commit any such offence.

According to Article 1, the elements of unlawfulness and intention must be presented in all acts covered in sub-paragraphs (a)-(c). "Violence", as used in sub-paragraph (a), can be construed so as to include not only an armed attack or physical assault, but also other situations of endangerment, such as firing a gun at an aircraft by a person outside the aircraft, or poisoning food intended for consumption on an aircraft.⁴⁸

According to sub-paragraph (b) of this article, any destruction or damage must occur while the aircraft is "in service". "Destruction" refers to substantial destruction of

the aircraft beyond the possibility of rendering it airworthy through repairs. "Causing damage" could include the damaging of a vital but inexpensive piece of wiring, which would render the aircraft incapable of flight. This latter concept could also cover any damage, whether caused to an aircraft on the ground or in the air, where there is a likelihood that the safety of the aircraft in flight would be endangered.⁴⁹

In sub-paragraph (d), "air navigation facilities" include airports, radio services, and meteorological services.⁵⁰ Sub-paragraph (e) deals with the offence of false information which endangers the safety of aircraft in flight. It should be noted that, in order for the act to be covered by the Convention, the person who communicates the information must know that the information is false. However, incidents which cause only delay and no damage to the aircraft, such as a false bomb alert, are not covered.⁵¹

Article 1(2) of the Convention deems that any person commits an offence if that person attempts to commit an Article 1(1) offence or is an accomplice to a person committing or attempting to commit any of these offences.

6-1-2: DEFINITION OF "IN FLIGHT" AND "IN SERVICE"

According to Article 2(a) of the Montreal Convention, an aircraft is considered to be in flight from the moment all its external doors are closed following embarkation until the moment when any such door is opened for disembarkation. The

"in flight" status also applies in the case of a forced landing.

Article 2(2) defines the expression "in service", which is found in sub-paragraph (b) and (c) of Article 1. An aircraft is considered to be in service from the beginning of pre-flight preparations of an aircraft for a specific flight, by ground personnel or by crew, until twenty-four hours after any landing. The period of service extends for the entire period during which the aircraft is in flight as defined.

6-1-3: PENALTIES AND SCOPE

As in the Hague Convention, the Montreal Convention provides that a Contracting State undertakes to make the offences covered by the convention punishable by severe penalties. However, the Montreal Convention does not define "severe penalties".

Article 4(1) of the Montreal Convention excludes from its scope an aircraft used primarily in terms of an international element. Thus, in the case of the offences contemplated in paragraphs (a)-(d), of Article 1, the Convention applies, irrespective of whether the aircraft is engaged in an international or domestic flight, only if, as stated in Article 4(2):

- a) The place of take-off or landing, actual or intended, of the aircraft is situated outside the territory of the state of registration of that aircraft;
or

- b) The offence is committed in the territory of a state other than the state of registration of the aircraft.

The Convention also applies in cases of international flights "if the offender or the alleged offender is found in the territory of the state other than the state of registration of the aircraft".⁵²

Article 4(4) refers to the air navigation facilities mentioned in sub-paragraph (d) or Article 1(1). The Convention applies only if such facilities are destroyed, damaged, or interfered with, and are used for international air navigation.

6-1-4: JURISDICTION

The Montreal Convention attempts to establish a form of universal jurisdiction over the alleged offender. Article 5(1) of the Convention requires every Contracting state to take necessary measures to establish its jurisdictions over the offenders in the following cases:

- a) When the offence is committed in the territory of that state;
- b) When the offence is committed against or on board an aircraft registered in that state;
- c) When the aircraft on board which the offence is committed lands in its territory with the alleged offender still on board;

- d) When the offence is committed against or on board an aircraft leased without crew to a lessee who has his principle place of business or, if the lessee has no such place of business, his permanent residence, in that state.⁵³

Paragraph (2) of this article provides for limited universal jurisdiction as the Hague Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law.

6-1-5: EXTRADITION AND PROSECUTION

According to Article 7 of the Convention, Contracting States have an obligation whether to extradite the alleged offender found in their territory or submit his case, without exception whatsoever, to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Article 8 of the Montreal Convention has the same basic provisions, as included in the Hague Convention of 1970, for treating offences under the Convention as extraditable offences in any extradition treaty existing between them. In the absence of an extradition treaty, the Contracting States may request extradition on the basis of this Convention.

**6-2: PROTOCOL FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF UNLAWFUL ACTS OF VIOLENCE
AT AIRPORTS SERVING INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION (MONTREAL
PROTOCOL OF 1988)**

There is a serious gap in the Montreal Convention of 1971. It does not cover attacks against persons at airports serving international civil aviation. Recent incidents, such as the bomb explosion at the Frankfurt and Tokyo airports in June 1985, and the attacks at the Rome and Vienna airports in December 1985, are not covered by the existing Aviation Security Convention. These acts gave a new impetus to consideration of this problem and prompted initiatives within the framework of ICAO to develop a new international instrument for the suppression of unlawful acts of violence at airports serving international civil aviation.⁵⁴ The result of these efforts was the Montreal Protocol of 1988.⁵⁵

The Protocol supplementary to the Montreal Convention of 1971, signed at Montreal on February 24th, 1988, strengthened all existing international conventions on aviation security. The main purpose of the Montreal Protocol is to fill the gap which existed in the absence of specific international provisions concerning acts of violence at international airports. This international instrument has progressed with a speed unusual for international law working.

In October 1986, at its 26th Session, the Assembly of ICAO adopted, unanimously, Resolution A26-4.⁵⁶ This resolution called on the ICAO Council to prepare an instrument for the

suppression of unlawful acts of violence at airports serving international civil aviation. The subject was studied immediately by the ICAO Secretariat. In December 1986, the Rapporteur of the Legal Committee presented the first analytical reports which contained a specific draft instrument.⁵⁷

A special Sub-Committee of the Legal Committee met in January 1987 to study, in light of the assembly discussions and decisions and in light of the Rapporteur's report, the subject of a draft instrument for the suppression of unlawful acts of violence at airports serving international civil aviation and to prepare a draft instrument for consideration by the 26th Session of the Legal Committee.⁵⁸ The Sub-Committee studied the subject and prepared a specific draft in the form of a Protocol supplementing the Montreal Convention of 1971. The Protocol supplemented the definition of "offence in Article 1 of the Montreal Convention by adding Unlawful Acts Against Persons and Property At Airports Serving International Civil Aviation. Such Acts are not covered in previous conventions on aviation security. The Sub-Committee also noted that it would be necessary to ensure that substantive provisions concerning jurisdiction, prosecution and extradition would apply to these additional offences.⁵⁹

At its 26th Session, between April 28th and May 13th, 1987, the Legal Committee completed the draft to be presented to the states at a Diplomatic Conference, held in February 1988. The Conference adopted, by consensus, the Protocol for the

Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation. Supplementary to the convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation. Done at Montreal on September 23rd, 1971.⁶⁰

Article II of the Montreal Protocol contains the most important provisions. This article, to be added to the Montreal Convention of 1971 as paragraph 1 bis, states:

Any person commits an offence if he unlawfully, using any device, substance or weapon:

a- Performs an act of violence against a person at an airport serving international civil aviation which causes or it likely to cause serious injury or death; or

b- destroys or seriously damages the facilities of an airport serving international civil aviation or aircraft not in service located thereon or disrupts the service of the airport, if such an act endangers or is likely to endanger safety at that airport.⁶¹

According to Article III of the Montreal Protocol, to be added to Article 5 of the Montreal Convention of 1971 as paragraph 2 bis, Contracting States are required to establish jurisdiction over new offences created by Article II of the Montreal Protocol in the case where the alleged offender is present in their territory and the contracting state does not extradite the offender to the state where the offence was committed.

Article III states:

"Each contracting state shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdictions over the offences mentioned in Article 1, paragraph 2, insofar as that paragraph relates to those offences, in the case where the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite him, pursuant to Article 8, to the state mentioned in paragraph 1(a) of this Article"⁶²

It is important to note that this Protocol can be signed only by those States which are members of the Montreal Convention of 1971.

CONCLUSION TO PART II

The numbers of International instruments which deal with the security of Civil Aviation is much greater than other parts of public International Law, bearing in mind that the civil aviation industry is just less than 100 years old, and most of the progress has been achieved only after the Second World War. The number of states which are members of ICAO and members of those conventions are very large in comparison to other International Organizations and International Instruments.

The existing International Instruments fairly cover different aspects of Aviation Security, although in some parts can be improved such as marking of plastic or sheet explosives for the purpose of detection, which is now on the agenda of ICAO with high priority and an international instrument expected very soon.

Although international aviation security instruments are weak from the implementation point of view, this is not because of their lack of binding force. In fact, this is a common problem of all international public law which has very limited Law enforcement power. The fact is that aviation security instruments have more teeth than other relative public international laws. Unless something is done in this respect for all public international law, aviation security instruments cannot be treated differently.

PART II FOOTNOTES

1. Opened for signature at Geneva on November 16, 1937. For the text see Hudson, International Legislation, Vol. VII, (1941), p. 862; U.N. Doc A/C.6/418 Annex 1, p. 1 [hereinafter 1937 U.N. Convention].
2. E. McWhinney, Aerial Piracy and International Terrorism. The Illegal Diversion of Aircraft and International Law, 2nd rev'd ed. (1987), p. 128; see also, A.J.I.L., Vol. 68, (1974), p. 69.
3. McWhinney, ibid., At p. 129.
4. Convention on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature at Chicago on 7 December, 1944, entered into force on 4 April 1947. ICAO Doc, 7300/6, [hereinafter Chicago Convention of 1944].
5. Ibid.
6. McWhinney, supra note 2, p. 131.
7. Report of the Ad Hoc Group of Experts - Unlawful Interference, Montreal, ICAO Doc. AH/UI/2, 14-18 July, 1986.
8. Art 3(a) of Chicago Convention of 1944, supra note 10.
9. Art. 3(a), ibid.
10. M. Milde, "Interception of Civil Aviation vs. Misuse of Civil Aviation (Background of Amendment 27 to Annex 2)", Annals of Air and Space Law, Vol, XI (1986), p. 122.
11. H. Luterpacht, International Law and Human Rights, (1950), p. 149.
12. I.A. Vlasic, Casebook on International Air Law I, (1982), p. 161.
13. Art. 33 of the U.N. Charter.
14. Vlasic, supra note 18, p. 275.
15. J.L. Kunz, "The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance", A.J.I.L., Vol. 42, 1948, pp. 111, 115.
16. Opened for signature at Geneva on April 29, 1958, entered into force in 1962.

17. I. Brierly,
The Law of Nations, 6th ed. (1963), p. 311.
18. For more details see ICAO Legal Committee discussions relating to hijacking committed with violence, ICAO International Conference on Air Law, Tokyo, 1963, Doc. 8565 LC/152-1.
19. Signed at Tokyo on September 14, 1963, ICAO Doc. 8364; see also, A.J.I.L., (No 2, April 1964), pp. 566-573 [hereinafter Tokyo Convention of 1963].
20. R.P. Boyle and R. Pulsifer, "The Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft", Journal of Air Law and Commerce, Vol. 30, (1964), pp. 328-329.
21. Article 1(1) of the Tokyo Convention of 1963, supra, note 1 (emphasis added).
22. Article 1(2), ibid.
23. Article 1(3), ibid.
24. Article 1(4), ibid.
25. N.M. Matte, Treatise on Air Aeronautical Law, Montreal, (1981), p. 342.
26. Article 8 of the Convention, supra, note 1.
27. Article 9, ibid.
28. Article 13, ibid.
29. D.Y. Chung, Some Legal Aspects of Aircraft Hijacking in International Law, (1976), p. 150.
30. ICAO Doc. 8920; see also 65 American Journal of International Law, (1971), p. 440.
31. Chung, supra, note 11, p. 643.
32. ICAO Doc. 9050 LC/169-2, p. 72.
33. Article 3(2) of the Hague Convention of 1970, supra, note 12.
34. Article 3(4), ibid.
35. Article 3(3), ibid.

36. Article 4(1), ibid.
37. Article 4(2), ibid.
38. R.H. Mankiewicz, "The 1970 Hague Convention", Journal of Air Law and Commerce, Vol. 37 (1971), p. 203
39. G.F. FitzGerald, Toward Legal Suppression of Acts Against Civil Aviation, Air Hijacking: An International Perspective, November 1971, No. 585, p. 56.
40. Article 6(2), Hague Convention, supra, note 12.
41. Article 6(3), ibid.
42. Article 6(4), ibid.
43. R.P. Boyle, "International Action to Combat Aircraft Hijacking", Lawyers of the Americas, [. 473.
44. Article 8(4), Hague Convention, supra, note 12.
45. G.F. FitzGerald, "Concerted Action Against States found in Default of their International Obligations in respect of unlawful Interference with International Civil Aviation", 10 Canadian Yearbook of International Law, (1972), p. 269.
46. Opened for signature at Montreal on September 23, 1971; entered into force on January 26, 1973. See ICAO Doc. 8966.
47. A. Abramovsky, "The Montreal Convention", Columbia Journal of International Law, Vol. 14(2), (1975), p. 278.
48. FitzGerald, supra, note 21, p. 68.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid., p. 69.
51. I.H.PH. Diederiks-Verschoor, An Introduction to Air Law, 2nd rev. ed., (1985), p. 164.
52. Article 4(3) of the Montreal Convention, supra, note 28.
53. Article 5(1), ibid.

54. E.F. Faller, Current Legal Activities in ICAO: Development of a Legal Instrument for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, German Journal of Air and Space Law, (1987), p. 220.
55. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation done at Montreal on 23 September 1971 [hereafter Montreal Protocol of 1988].
56. ICAO Doc. 8849-C990/4, 4th ed., p. 10.
57. M. Milde, News from International Organizations, International Conference on Air Law, Air Law, Vol. XIII, No. 2, (1988), p. 95.
58. Ibid.
59. Faller, supra, note 37.
60. Opened for signature at Montreal on February 24, 1988.
61. Article II of the Montreal Protocol of 1988, supra, note 38.
62. Article III, ibid.

**PART III : PREVENTIVE MEASURES TAKEN BY VARIOUS
INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES AND STATES**

As we saw in Part Two, the existing law has helped a lot in decreasing unlawful acts. In Part Three, we will see what implementation the law has had by various actors.

This part is divided into three chapters, Actions taken by Intergovernmental International Organizations, Non-governmental International Organizations, and States.

Chapter Seven will examine various actions which have been taken by ICAO and the United Nations Organization.

Chapter Eight will examine various actions which have been taken by IATA and IFALPA.

Chapter Nine will examine various actions which have been taken by States through bilateral, Multilateral Agreements.

CHAPTER SEVEN: ACTION TAKEN BY INTER-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION

7-1: ACTION TAKEN BY THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION (ICAO)

ICAO is an International Organization which deals with certain economic, technical and legal aspects of international civil aviation. With 162 member states, ICAO has become the most important organization for the development of aviation security programmes at an international level.

The main goals of ICAO are "to ensure safe and orderly growth of international civil aviation throughout the world", "to meet the needs of the people of the world for safe, regular, efficient and economical air transport" and to "promote safety of flight in international air navigation".¹

ICAO has played a significant role in the protection of international civil aviation through International Conventions.² These Conventions were discussed in Chapter 5 and 6. A discussion of other actions against unlawful interference with civil aviation, which have been taken under the auspices of ICAO, follows.

ICAO adopted by unanimous vote Resolution No A26-7³ at the 26th Session of the ICAO Assembly in October 1986 on the consolidated statement continuing ICAO policies related to the safeguarding of international civil aviation against acts of

unlawful interference. This Resolution consolidates and updates all previous resolutions concerning aviation security as set out in the appendices attached to this Resolution.

In its General Policy⁴, the ICAO assembly condemns all acts of unlawful interference with the security of civil aviation, it strongly endorses the top priority with which the Council is to deal with aviation security, and directs the Council to intensify its work relating to measures for the prevention of acts of unlawful interference. The Assembly appeals to Contracting States to confirm their support for the established ICAO policy concerning aviation security by applying immediately and consistently the most effective security measures.

In April 1969 the Council of ICAO adopted a resolution⁵ at its 66th Session on unlawful interference with international civil aviation and its facilities. The Resolution included the establishment of a Committee on unlawful interference to develop preventive measures and procedures to safeguard international civil aviation from unlawful interference.⁶ The Committee adopted a series of practical measures, prepared by the Air Navigation Commission and the Air Transport Committee, which might be useful in the prevention of unlawful interference on the ground and in flight. This resolution was amended on March 28th, 1973, December 3rd, 1985, and December 8th, 1986.⁷

On February 16, 1989, the Council of ICAO adopted a draft

resolution⁸ presented by the President of the Council. This Resolution recalled Assembly Resolutions A17-1 and A26-7, and it strongly condemned all acts of unlawful interference against international civil aviation, including most recently the destruction of Pan American Flight 103, on December 21st, 1988. The resolution called on Member States to intensify their efforts for the implementation of existing Standards, Recommended Practices, and Procedures relating to aviation security, and to take all necessary steps to prevent acts of unlawful interference against international civil aviation.

**7-1-1: SECURITY MANUAL FOR SAFEGUARDING CIVIL AVIATION
AGAINST ACTS OF UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE.**

The Assembly of ICAO held an Extraordinary Session between 16-30 of June 1970, and adopted Resolution A17-70 which directed the Secretary General "to develop with the utmost speed, a manual of security". The manual was designed to assist member states in the execution of measures set out in the appendices to that resolution for the security of civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference. The manual was first published in November 1971 and subsequently was amended in November 1974 and April 1977. A major revision was undertaken in 1982. The manual was distributed as a restricted document, available only to those persons with a need for such knowledge in the

performance of their official duties.⁹ The goals which were expected to be achieved by the manual are expressed in paragraph 7 of its introduction:

- a) Promote the safety of operations through the application of security measures with emphasis on prevention and deterrence; at the same time recognizing the need for contingency plans for dealing with occurrences if and when they happen;
- b) Clarify the duties and responsibilities of each organization for elements of the total civil aviation security programme;
- c) Raise the level of security operations by establishing certain minimum security measures and procedures which are to be carried out prior to commencement of, and during, regular commercial operations; and
- d) Impose the security posture of airports and operators.

7-1-2: ADOPTION OF ANNEX 17 TO THE CHICAGO CONVENTION

Pursuant to Clause 3 of Assembly Resolution A17-10 and Council Resolution of June 19th, 1972, on the basis of the work done by the Air Navigation Commission, the Air Transport Committee and the Committee on Unlawful Interference, and as a result of the comments from member states, Standards and Recommended Practices on Security were adopted by the Council of ICAO on March 22nd, 1984. Designated as Annex 17 and entitled Standards and Recommended Practices-Security-Safeguarding International Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference¹⁰, these standards and recommended practices entered into force on February 27th, 1975. In the

period between its adoption on March 22nd, 1974, and December 19th, 1985, six amendments to Annex 17 were adopted by the Council of ICAO.¹¹

Annex 17 contains provisions designed to protect international civil aviation and its facilities against acts of unlawful interference. In the most recent edition of the Annex, new provisions were adopted.¹²

Chapter 2 of the Annex, Aims and Objectives, prescribed that:

"Safety of passengers, crew, ground personnel and the general public shall be the primary objective in all matters related to safeguarding against acts of unlawful interference with international civil aviation".

This provision has been included in order to protect persons endangered by terrorist attacks against the security of civil aviation.¹³

Annex 17 of the Convention also calls on states to establish national civil aviation security programmes to protect the safety, regularity and efficiency of international civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference. An appropriate authority should be designated by the Contracting State to be responsible for development, implementation and maintenance of the national civil aviation security programme, and to develop and implement training schemes to protect its programmes.¹⁴

In addition to the national civil aviation security programme, Contracting States are required to establish an

airport security programme, and to establish committees on airport security to advise on the development and to coordinate implementation of security measures and procedures at each airport. The Annex recommends that there should be special guarding of aircraft which are liable to be attacked, and that authorized, trained officers must be available at international airports to assist in dealing with suspected or actual cases of unlawful interference with international civil aviation. For the security purposes of aircraft and passengers on board, the Annex also recommends, among other things, that necessary measures should be taken by the Contracting States to prohibit the carriage on board an aircraft of weapons, by any means whatsoever, when aircraft are engaged in international flights.¹⁵ There is also an obligation on the Contracting States to establish measures, for aircraft operators providing services from or to that states, preventing them from either placing or keeping on board an aircraft the baggage of passengers who have not reported for embarkation, unless that baggage has been subjected to security control.¹⁶

7-1-3: MODEL CLAUSE ON AVIATION SECURITY.

The Model Clause is a new initiative for the promotion of aviation security, adopted by the Council of ICAO through a resolution at its 118th Session on June 25th, 1986,¹⁷ and was noted with approval by the 26th Session of the Assembly in September-October 1986. In this resolution the Council of

ICAO considered that Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention contains a recommendation that each Contracting State should include a clause on aviation security in its bilateral agreements. The Council recommended that Contracting States take into account a model clause attached to the resolution.¹⁸ The purpose of the model clause on aviation security in existing bilateral agreements on air services is to protect civil aviation against unlawful interference.

Advantages of the model clause on aviation security may be described as follows:

a- Inclusion of specific provisions on aviation security into bilateral agreements makes the concern for security of International Civil Aviation an integral part of the contractual arrangements on air services;

b- Such a provision reconfirms and reinforces, on a bilateral basis, the three multilateral security conventions.¹⁹

c- The model clause allows for the establishment of obligations co-extensive to those under security conventions if one or both parties to a bilateral agreement are not parties to the security conventions;

d- Such a provision could establish, reconfirm or reinforce, on a bilateral basis, the obligation to comply with ICAO standards and recommended practices relating to aviation security;

e- The model clause allows for the establishment, on a bilateral basis, of cooperation of the parties in the prevention

or in the aftermath of acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation.

f- The model clause could provide provisions relating to the consequences, on a bilateral basis, if one of the parties were not to comply with aviation security provisions.²⁰

7-1-4: LATEST ACTION TAKEN BY ICAO

ICAO Assembly in its 27th Session in October 1989 considered three important issues in relation to the aviation security as follows:

a)- Marking of plastic or sheet explosives for the purpose of detection.

After the destruction of PANAM Flight 103 on December 21st, 1988, in March 6-10 1989 the AD-Hoc Group of Specialists on the Detection of Explosives met in Montreal to study this problem. Also the 27th Session of the ICAO Assembly adopted a Resolution which in part read;

Deeply concerned about the use of plastic or sheet explosives for acts of unlawful interference aimed at the destruction of civil aircraft and invariably resulting in injury or loss of life;

Welcoming the Council Resolution of February 16th, 1989 which urged states to expedite research and development on detection of explosives and to consider how to achieve an international regime for the marking of explosives for the purposes of detection.

b) In order to achieve the above objectives the Assembly

"Calls upon the Council to convene a meeting of the Legal Committee if possible in the first half of 1990, to prepare a draft international instrument for this purpose, with a view to its adoption at a diplomatic conference as soon as practicable thereafter in accordance with the ICAO Procedures set out in Assembly Resolution A7-6".

c) The maintaining of relations with the media.

As a rule, the media (the press, radio and television) gives broad coverage to acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation. The circumstances and nature of the criminal actions are set forth in a fairly detailed manner while the measures taken law enforcement agencies to prevent and suppress such actions are also described.

The measures to suppress acts of unlawful interference taken by law enforcement agencies of States can be more effective when there is appropriate cooperation with the media.

In this connection the Assembly;

"Requests the Council to prepare guidance material for States in relations with the media in cases of unlawful interference with civil aviation".

7-2: ACTION TAKEN BY THE UNITED NATIONS (U.N.).

On various occasions, Member States of the United Nations, through the General Assembly and the Security Council, have discussed preventive measures against unlawful acts against the security of civil aviation²¹, and have passed many resolutions on this matter. These resolutions have played a significant role in preventing this phenomenon.

7-2-1: ACTION TAKEN BY GENERAL ASSEMBLY

On December 12th, 1969, the United Nations General Assembly by a vote of 77 in favor to 2 against, with 17 abstentions, passed Resolution No 2551 (XXIV).²² Entitled Forcible Diversion of Civil Aircraft in Flight, this resolution expressed deep concern about unlawful acts against the security of international civil aviation, and called on States to take all appropriate measures to ensure that their respective National Legislations provided an adequate framework for effective legal measures against all kinds of acts of unlawful seizure of international civil aviation in flight. Moreover, Resolution No. 2551 urged States to ensure, in particular, that persons on board who perpetrated such acts would be prosecuted. It also urged full support for the efforts of ICAO in the speedy preparation and implementation of a convention which would make the act of unlawful seizure of civil aircraft a punishable offence and which would provide for the prosecution of persons committing that offence. Finally, the resolution invited States to ratify or accede to the Tokyo Convention of 1963.

On November 25th, 1970, the United Nations General Assembly, by a vote of 105 in favor, none against and 8 abstentions, adopted Resolution No 2645 (XXV) on Aerial Hijacking.²³ This resolution condemned, "without exception whatsoever, all acts of aerial hijacking or other interference with civil air transport, whether originally national or international, through the threat or use of force, and all acts of violence

against passengers, crew and aircraft engaged in, and air navigation facilities and aeronautical communication used by civil air transport. The resolution repeated previous appeals to States to take all appropriate measures to deter, prevent or suppress such acts within jurisdiction. It declared that the exploitation of unlawful seizure of aircraft for the purpose of taking hostages was to be condemned, and urged States to whose territory a hijacked aircraft was diverted to provide for the care and safety of passengers and crew of the hijacked aircraft and enable them to continue their journey as soon as practicable and return the aircraft and its cargo to persons lawfully entitled to possession.

On December 18th, 1972, the United Nations General Assembly, by a vote of 76 in favor to 35 against, with 17 abstentions, adopted Resolution No 3034 (XXV.1).²⁴ In this resolution the General Assembly expressed deep concern over increasing acts of violence which endanger or take innocent human lives or jeopardize fundamental freedoms, and urged the international community to focus its attention on this problem and think about possible measures for its elimination. The General Assembly in the same resolution decided to establish an Ad Hoc Committee submitted in 1973 a detailed report on its deliberation.²⁵ The Committee discussed the matter in three sub-committees. The first sub-committee dealt with the definition of international terrorism; the second with the underlying causes of international terrorism; and the third,

with measures or the prevention of international terrorism.

On November 3rd, 1977, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution No 32/8,²⁶ entitled, Safety of International Civil Aviation. In this resolution the General Assembly expressed a universal condemnation of all acts of hijacking or any kind of unlawful interference against international civil aviation, and all acts of violence which may be directed against passengers, crew and aircraft, whether committed by an individual or States. The resolution called on all States to take all necessary measures to prevent such acts, including the improvement of security arrangements at airports or by airlines as well as the exchange of relevant information and, toward this end, to take joint and separate action in order to ensure that passengers, crew and aircraft engaged in civil aviation are not used as a means of extorting advantages of any kind. Resolution No 32/18 appealed to all States to become parties to the security conventions and²⁷ invited ICAO to undertake urgently further efforts, with a view of ensuring the security of air travel, including the reinforcement of Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention.

On December 9th, 1985, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted Resolution 40/61.²⁸ The Resolution condemned, as criminal, all acts, methods and practices of terrorism wherever and by whomever committed. It called upon all States to take all appropriate measures as recommended by the ICAO to prevent terrorist attacks against civil aviation

transport and other forms of public transport.

On December 7th 1987, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 42/159.²⁹ This resolution welcomed inter alia, the ongoing work of ICAO on a new instrument for the suppression of unlawful acts of violence at airports serving international civil aviation.

7-2-2: ACTION TAKEN BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On September 9th 1970, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution No. 286³⁰ on aerial hijacking. In this resolution, the Security Council was gravely concerned at the threat to innocent civilian lives from the hijacking of aircraft and any other interference in international travel. It appealed to all parties concerned for the immediate release of all passengers and crew held as a result of hijacking and other unlawful acts against international travel; it called on States to take legal actions to prevent further hijacking or any unlawful acts against international civil air travel. This resolution was reaffirmed by the decision of the United Nations Security Council on hijacking on June 20th. 1972.

³¹ In this resolution, the Security Council declared the grave concern of the Council for the threat to the lives of passengers and crews arising from aerial hijacking and other unlawful acts against the security of civil aviation. The Security Council condemned and considered it necessary to put an end to unlawful acts against the security of civil aviation, and

once again called on States to take all appropriate measures within their jurisdiction to deter and prevent such acts.

The Security Council of the United Nations, on August 15th, 1973 adopted unanimously Resolution No.337,³² which condemned the Government of Israel for violating Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity by the forcible diversion and seizure of a Lebanese aircraft from Lebanon's airspace by Israeli warplanes. The resolution called on ICAO to take due regard of this resolution when considering preventive measures to protect the security of international civil aviation against unlawful acts, and called on Israel to refrain from any and all acts that violate Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity and that endanger the safety of international civil aviation. It also warned Israel that the Security Council would consider taking adequate steps or measures to enforce its resolutions if such acts were repeated.

CHAPTER EIGHT: ACTIONS TAKEN BY NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

8-1: ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION (IATA).

IATA is a non-governmental association, founded by airline companies in 1945.³³ Its objectives, set out in its act of incorporations are "to promote safe, regular and economical air transport for the benefit of the peoples of the world". Therefore, security of civil aviation is one aim of IATA. Historically, the Association has played a significant role in developing measures to prevent unlawful acts against the security of civil aviation.

During the world-wide wave of hijacking in 1966-67, IATA held two meetings to consider steps to be taken to prevent this phenomenon.³⁴ An Organizational decision was taken in 1970 to establish the Security Advisory Committee (SAC) as a high-level group. The principal function of the SAC is to establish preventive measures to be taken regarding unlawful interference against civil aviation. A decision linked to the internal restructuring of IATA, and presented by the Director General to Airline Chief Executives in June 1988, dissolved the SAC, replacing it with a smaller security Task Force. In the same decision, responsibility for fraud prevention was transferred to the Traffic Department. Consequently, security would have to be developed as a single activity within the

Secretariat.³⁵

To protect aircraft and airports, IATA has recommended a three-level airline-airport security system. The levels are adopted to the seriousness of the security threat. The first level comprises normal security practices (routine checks for example) which are followed at airports throughout the world as a matter of course. The second level involves the tightening of normal security practices, such as more stringent passenger and baggage checks. The third level is a full emergency situation, including the use of national police or armed forces, more detailed screening and searching, investigation of passengers, travel motivations, and the search of all baggage and cargo as necessary.³⁶

Since 1976, IATA has dispatched survey teams to visit international airports for the implementation of the Eight point IATA Recommended Minimum Security Standards.³⁷ According to these standards, States should ensure that

- 1 - A sterile area is established for the boarding of all flights and that passengers and their baggage are screened prior to entering this area. All other persons and items entering this sterile area must be authorized and subject to security control;
- 2 - direct and discreet communication systems link the passengers screening points and other access control points to an airport control center capable and designated to respond quickly in cases of unlawful action;

- 3 - duly authorized law enforcement officers armed and equipped with mobile communication, conduct patrols within airports and are readily available to assist in cases of suspected or actual unlawful interference with civil aviation and that an airport security crisis management programme exists;
- 4 - areas of restricted access are adequately enclosed and clearly marked with signs and that access controls are established to prevent entry of unauthorized persons or vehicles to the airside of the airport. Controls must be applied to all persons and vehicles requiring such access;
- 5 - Positive airport identification is visibly worn by all persons authorized to be airside and that this identification is checked at control points before entry to airside.
- 6 - Physical barriers are installed separating public areas from all baggage, mail and freight after its acceptance for carriage and that facilities exist to enable such items to be X-rayed or otherwise security screening when required.
- 7 - Aircraft parking areas are adequately controlled, protected and well lighted; and
- 8 - all public observation view points overlooking the airside are adequately protected to ensure the security of the airport operation.

The 32nd IATA Annual General Meeting in November 1976 adopted a resolution reaffirming its concerns for aviation security. The Resolution³⁸ urged the immediate implementation of the IATA Minimum Security Standards at International Airports. It sought the assistance of airline presidents in obtaining invitations from governments for the IATA force at their airports; it called for airline chief executives to approach their government with a view to obtaining ratification

of the three security conventions as well as implementation of Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention, it supported government initiatives in the security field.

IATA's 33rd Annual General Meeting in November 1977, passed a resolution³⁹ which called on ICAO to amend the Chicago Convention by incorporating the three security conventions therein and to apply Article 94 (b) Procedures to their amendment.

In 1984 IATA established an aviation security training programme operated jointly with IAL-International Aeradio.⁴⁰ The primary purposes of this were to support member airlines from developing countries and to assist in the training of the security staff of any airline, airport or aviation authority. Also, since 1985, IATA has undertaken security reviews at airports where unlawful acts against civil aviation have taken place. The purpose of this review process is to help prevent any future incidents.⁴¹

In 1988, the 42nd IATA Annual General Meeting adopted a resolution⁴² which pledged full support for action by ICAO aimed at the early preparations and adoption by all States of an international instrument for the suppression of unlawful acts of violence at airports serving international civil aviation. This resolution fully endorsed the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 40/61 called on States to fulfill their international legal obligations to refrain from organizing and instigating and assisting or participating in

terrorist acts in other States.

In 1988, IATA proposed a five-point programme⁴³ to combat terrorism, encouraging world governments to form a multinational system for capture, prosecution and incarceration. The five-point proposal provide:

1- the establishment of international group to advise airports and countries on security,

2- the establishment of international team of experts to investigate terrorist incidents after they occur and make recommendations;

3- establishment of international military response group to resolve an incident, if need be, with force;

4- establishment of an international court which would try any captured hijackers or other criminals who have perpetrated acts of unlawful interference against international civil aviation; and

5- establishment of an international detention center where terrorists may be held while completing their sentence.

From the above survey, it is clear that IATA has played an important role in providing for the security of civil aviation. However, the Association does not have any power to enforce its security procedures. Any procedures and preventive measures, which are actually implemented and used at any individual airport or on any flight, are left entirely to the decision of the airline or airport management.⁴⁴

8-2: ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF
AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION (IFALPA)

By the end of 1986, IFALPA membership totalled 53,126 members in 65 countries.⁴⁵ Airline pilots, exposed daily to the risk of unlawful acts against the security of civil aviation, regard this risk to be a serious and deliberate harm to the security of air transport. Therefore, IFALPA has a direct interest in resolving this problem. The Federation believes that any act against the security of civil aviation must be treated as an international crime. Moreover, IFALPA has declared that the growth of hijacking might threaten world peace and has demanded that the United Nations Security Council take action.⁴⁶

From January 1st, 1972 through to the first week of June of that year, there occurred about 34 successful international and domestic hijacking.⁴⁷ As a result of the close proximity of these incidents, IFALPA took serious action and observed a one-day strike by suspending all services across the world on June 19, 1972. This action was directed especially against States which failed to comply with the three security conventions and the United Nations resolution on aviation security.

IFALPA called for another strike on October 18th, 1977, when the pilot of a Lufthansa 737 aircraft was murdered during a hijacking incident. The strike was postponed, however, until the United Nations responded. Subsequently, IFALPA was

permitted to present its case before the United Nation General Assembly.

Although the control of unlawful acts against the security of civil aviation is the responsibility of States and international organizations such as the United Nations and ICAO. IFALPA has demonstrated that it is prepared to cooperate with states and these organizations in developing measures against these acts.⁴⁸

CHAPTER NINE: ACTION TAKEN BY STATES

9-1: THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON THE SUPPRESSION OF TERRORISM OF 1977

The European Convention was the first major step taken in Europe, aimed at providing effective extradition procedures between member states.

In the early 1970's, groups of experts met to consider the International Law Commission's draft articles on crimes against diplomatic agents and later to consider the problem of international terrorism. On January 24th, 1974, at its 53rd meeting, the Committee of Ministers adopted Resolution (74)3 on international terrorism, marking the first step in a European effort to depoliticize certain acts of terrorism for the purpose of extradition. 49

In May 1975, the Ministers of Justice of the member states of the Council of Europe stressed the need for coordinated and forceful action on this matter. In June 1975, a Committee of government experts was formed by the Committee of Ministers. In two meetings (October 1975 and February 1976), the Committee drafted the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. A50

In November 1976, the Convention was adopted. It was signed on January 27th, 1977 by 17 member states of the Council of Europe. Malta and Ireland did not sign, while France, Italy, Norway and Portugal expressed reservations. The

Convention, which entered into force on August 14, 1978, makes aerial hijackers and perpetrators of other terrorist acts liable for extradition to the country in which they committed the act, regardless of the motives of such acts. The Convention also abolished the legal distinction between politically motivated terrorism and ordinary crime.

9-2: THE BONN DECLARATION ON HIJACKING (1978)

On July 17, 1978, the heads of states and governments participating in the Bonn Economic Summit (Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and United States) agreed upon a declaration, commonly known as the Bonn Declaration on Hijacking, This declaration states;

The heads of States and Government, concerned about terrorism and the taking of hostages, declare that their governments will intensify their joint effort to combat International terrorism. To this end, in cases where a country refuses extradition or prosecution of those who have hijacked an aircraft and/or do not return aircraft, the Heads of States and Governments are jointly resolved that their governments shall take immediate action to cease all flights to that country. At the same time, their governments will initiate to halt all incoming flights from that country, or from any concerned. They urge other governments to join them in this commitment.

Until 1981, the Bonn Declaration had not been enforced on any state. However on July 20, 1981, at the Ottawa Economic Summit conference, the heads of state and government considered the hijacking of a Pakistan International Airlines aircraft to Afghanistan. They recalled and reaffirmed the principles

set forth in the Bonn Declaration and stated that the action of the Afghan regime, both during the incident and by granting refugee status to the hijackers, "was and is in flagrant breach of its international obligations under the Hague Convention to which Afghanistan is a party and constitutes a serious threat to air safety". Consequently, the heads of state and government proposed to "suspend all flights to and from Afghanistan in implementation of the Bonn Declaration unless Afghanistan immediately [took] steps to comply with its obligations.⁵¹ When the Government of Afghanistan failed to either extradite the hijackers or submit their case to its prosecuting authorities, the governments of the Seven Economic Summit States issued the following statement on November 30, 1981:

The Heads of State and Government of the Seven Economic Summit countries declared at Ottawa on July 20, 1981, that they proposed to suspend all flights to and from Afghanistan in implementation of the Bonn Declaration unless the Babrak Karmal regime took steps to comply with Afghanistan's international obligations by extraditing or prosecuting under the Hague Convention the hijackers of the PIA aircraft. The statement of the Seven was communicated to the Mission of Afghanistan to the United Nations by Canada on behalf of the Seven. Since no reply has been received from the Kabul regime, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom, which are the only countries among the Seven to whose territories Ariane Afghan Airlines fly, have decided in agreement with the other members of the Seven to denounce their air services agreements or arrangements with Afghanistan. Notices to this effect will be given.⁵²

Despite numerous cases of hijacking which were in the category of the Bonn Declaration, only in one case and against a small country has this Declaration been used. This indicates that this Declaration has served propaganda aims more than in fighting against hijacking.

It is a common practice of states, when they enter into any bilateral air transport agreement, to add a clause in that agreement concerning aviation security (details examined on Page 83 of this study).

PART THREE CONCLUSION

International Intergovernmental Agencies as well as international Non-governmental Agencies have adopted adequate regulations in form of technical, operational, legal manuals, and guidance material. As well, provide training courses to member states assisting them to safeguard civil aviation from unlawful acts.

Despite all of these efforts, it seems that states have great difficulty in taking necessary actions in order to assure the security of civil aviation. They even have problems to implement the multilateral or bilateral agreements, such as The Bonn Declaration.

The main reason for this is not because states do not take seriously their responsibilities under international law in fighting against unlawful acts against civil aviation. Rather, they and especially developing countries are not capable to fulfil their responsibilities.

PART III FOOTNOTES

1. Convention on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature at Chicago on 7 December 1944, entered into force on April 4, 1947. ICAO Doc. 7300/6, [hereafter Chicago Convention of 1944]. Art. 44(a), (d) and (h).
2. The Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, signed at Tokyo in 1963 (Tokyo Convention of 1963), ICAO Doc. 8364; The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at the Hague in 1970 (Hague Convention of 1970), ICAO Doc. 8920; The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal in 1971 (Montreal Convention of 1971), ICAO Doc. 8966.
3. ICAO Doc. 8849-C.990.4, 4th ed., April 1987, p. 2. Resolution A26-7 superseded resolutions A17-5, A17-6, A17-1, A17-9, A17-10, A17-11, A17-13, A17-14, Q17-16, A17-17, A17-23, A20-2, A21-9, A22-16, A22-17, A23-21, A23-22, A24-18, and A24-19.
4. Ibid., p. 3.
5. ICAO Council, Sixty-sixth Session: Minutes of twenty-sixth meeting Doc. 8796C/983-26 of June 2, 1969.
6. ICAO Doc. 8849-C.990.4, supra, note 3, p. 11.
7. Ibid.
8. ICAO Council meeting on 15 and 16 February 1989.
9. ICAO Doc. 8849.990.4, supra, note 3, pp. 19-20.
10. Annex 17 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, 3rd ed. - March 1986.
11. Amendment No. 1 of March 31, 1976 applicable as of December 30, 1976; amendment No. 2 of December 14, 1977 applicable as of August 10, 1978; amendment no. 3 of December 13, 1978 applicable as of November 29, 1979; amendment No. 4 of June 15, 1981 applicable as of November 26, 1981; amendment No. 5 of November 30, 1984 applicable as of November 21, 1985; and amendment No. 6 of December 1985 applicable as of May 19, 1986. The "special applicable date" for the amendment 5.1.4 was October 19, 1987. See ibid., Table A, Amendments to Annex 17, p. (vii).
12. Supra, note 12, para. 5.1.4, p. 6.

13. Ibid., p. 2.
14. Ibid., p. 3.
15. Ibid., p. 4.
16. Ibid., p. 6.
17. ICAO Doc. 8849-C.990.4, supra, note 3, pp. 16-17.
18. Ibid., p. 17.
19. Supra, note 2.
20. C-WP/8054, p. 5.
21. E. Mc Whinney, Aerial Piracy and International Terrorism, The Alleged Diversion of Aircraft and International Law, 2nd ed., (1987), p. 128.
22. Yearbook of the United Nations, (1969), pp. 794-795.
23. Yearbook of the United Nations, (1970), pp. 806-807.
24. Yearbook of the United Nations, (1972), pp. 639-640.
25. Report of Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, U.N. Doc G.A. Official Record: 28th Session, Supp. No. 28(A/9028), (1973); see also L.E.F. Goldie, "Control of Terrorism in International Life: Cooperation and Self Help", Proceedings American Society of International Law (1977), p. 23.
26. Y. Alexander, Control of Terrorism: International Documents, (1979), p. 145.
27. Supra, note 2.
28. Doc. 9484-C1093; C-Min, 11711; p. 2.
29. Ibid.
30. Supra, note 22.
31. U.N. Doc. S/107-05; see also Alexander, supra, note 28, p. 157.
32. Alexander, ibid., p. 161.
33. R. Chuang, International Air Transport Association (IATA), (1972), pp. 26-27.

34. "International Air Transport Backgrounder", IATA public information Doc. 10/1988, p. 1.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., p. 2.
37. Ibid., Attachment pp. 1-2.
38. IATA, Reports and Proceedings, 32nd Annual Meeting, Singapore, Nov. 8-10, 1976, p. 111.
39. IATA, Reports and Proceedings, 33rd Annual Meeting, Madrid, Nov 8-11, 1977, p. 109.
40. International Air Transport Backgrounder, supra, note 36, p. 4.
41. Ibid., p. 2.
42. IATA, 42nd Annual General Meeting, Minutes, Montreux 86, Nov. 3-4, 1986, p. 35.
43. Aviation Daily, September 19, 1988, p. 439; see also ICAO Doc. AVSECP/2-WP/10, 3/6/88, p. 1.
44. International Air Transport Backgrounder, supra note 36, p. 3.
45. A.V.Wijk, International Federation of Airline pilots Associations (IFALPA), Annals of Air and Space Law, Vol VII (1987), p. 383.
46. I.M. Shepard, "The Role of IFALPA", Cornell International Law Journal, Vol. 3, (1970), pp. 69-70.
47. D.Y. Chung, Some Legal Aspects of Aircraft Hijacking in International Law, University of Tennessee (1976), p. 41.
48. A.E. Evans, Legal Aspects of International Terrorism (1978), p. 35.
49. N. Gal-Or, International Cooperation to Suppress Terrorism (1985), p. 215.
50. Ibid., p. 231.
51. Montebello Summit Statement on Terrorism, July 1981. Annals of Air and Space Law, Vol. VI (1981), p. 720.

52. K. Chamberlin, "Collective Suppression of Air Services with States which Harbour Hijacking", International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 32 (July 1982), p. 628.

CHAPTER TEN: PROPOSAL

Now that the problem has been stated, some solutions may be submitted.

In order to assist states in handling hijacking cases, this Study proposes two kinds of international facilities, namely, an "Advisory team" and an "Operational team". Before going into details about the characteristics of these two terms, it should be emphasized that in the past ICAO has attempted to establish facilities of this nature, but failed to do so. The question of international investigation or fact finding was raised in various bodies of ICAO but it is a sensitive issue, touching upon the sovereignty of member states. While cooperation was desirable and to be encouraged, the issue of international investigation remains a delicate issue, which is as yet unresolved.

The main point in this proposal is, that an Advisory and an Operational team either individually or together can operate only if the request is made by contracting states. They have no binding force, and they should report to states concerned; their report can only be published if approved by the states concerned.

This system thus ensures the sovereignty of states and concomitantly assists them in handling the crises.

The ad hoc Group of Experts on Unlawful Interference at the 1986 Meeting (AH-UI/2) recommended that:

"Negotiations should prevail over the use of force to the point where it became evident to the authorities concerned that an element of force or considerable force may have to be used after all other possibilities have been exhausted and the consultative processes have reached a deadlock. At this point, it was felt that a task force having the capability and qualification to attempt a rescue action had to be available on site. The group nevertheless recognized the need for force to be used as a last resort to prevent further casualties".

10-1: ADVISORY TEAM

ICAO should establish a team of experts which upon request from Contracting States would be available to go immediately to that particular state.

If desirable, ICAO may establish a regional basis for this advisory team comprised of experts with specialized skill and experience in the resolution of such crises.

ICAO could maintain a Roster of Security experts for this purpose. Member States would benefit from this team because:

- an international advisory team could handle the negotiations, and procedures more efficiently, establishing better communication between hijackers and the states involved;
- hijackers would have greater trust and confidence in an international and independent body;
- it could facilitate communication between states, particularly if political relations between states involved are strained;
- States involved in negotiations can protect themselves

from any accusations of complicity by other states or by the international media through full cooperation with the advisory team;

-an advisory team can be very beneficial especially for developing countries which have insufficient resources to handle such cases themselves.

10-2: OPERATIONAL TEAM

Although it would not be as easy as establishing an advisory team, ICAO should take the initiative in moves to establish an operational team. While this issue is much more complicated and politically delicate, ICAO should take an active role in promoting this proposal among its members.

Again the question of sovereignty of states is very important, and normally states do not permit the forces from other states to operate in their territories. However, the operational team in this case would be under the control of ICAO with a status similar to the U.N. Peacekeeping Forces.

Technically and economically, it is very difficult for developing countries to obtain sophisticated technology essential for this kind of operation. States which elect to call in an international operational team would enjoy advantages similar to bringing in an advisory team by minimizing the number of casualties. Unfortunately in some incidents in which states did not possess capable and qualified forces the number of casualties were very high.

In both Advisory and Operational teams, full cooperation between states and ICAO is necessary, and rules and procedures should be quite clear for both sides.

CONCLUSION

There is no doubt that unlawful acts against international civil aviation are of an international character, wherefore successful response to these acts should be uniform with all member states to commit themselves in their application.

There are four areas requiring appropriate measures to be taken

- a. Solution to key international political conflicts
- b. International legal instruments
- c. Preventive measures
- d. Reactive measures

The international community, for an effective control, would finally seem to require, some sort of generally acceptable, or at least generally imposed final solution to key political conflicts. Such may be Arab-Israel relations and the legitimate rights of Palestineans.

As far as international legal instruments are concerned, which grant states the jurisdiction to combat unlawful acts against civil aviation, it seems that there are adequate provisions, but serious questions as to the implementation of those instruments. To the extent of political disagreement among states in relation to combating acts of unlawful interference against civil aviation, it appears unlikely that there will be any uniform response in this regard.

In order to prevent the occurrences of unlawful acts against civil aviation, states should increase their security measures,

to include pre-flight passenger checking, baggage screening cargo, catering control.

Developing countries in order to implement security measures have a lot of problems, financially and technically.

ICAO Assembly (27th Session) adopted a resolution which in part read;

"Urges all states that have the means to do so to increase technical, financial and material assistance to countries in need of such assistance to improve aviation security through bilateral and multilateral efforts in particular, through the ICAO Technical Assistance mechanism".

As this is an international problem, the more advanced should assist the developing countries in order to have a global, secure and effective aviation network.

The reason for some states' (especially developing countries'), inadequate response to unlawful acts against civil aircraft or refusal to permit unlawfully seized aircraft landing rights is not because of deliberate choice of ignoring international responsibilities; rather it is their unpreparedness concerning the handling of the cases and the potentially adverse consequences during and after the termination of the hijacking (As explained in Chapter Two).

Very few, if any, developing countries have adequate experts, equipment, and facilities to handle these cases, in addition to lacking the necessary experience. They also fear political consequences if they were to become involved against

their wishes.

Therefore, an international mechanism as proposed in Chapter Ten is necessary so that developing countries be able to combat unlawful interference against civil aviation.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

I BOOKS

- Abdel-SalammEl-Amin, Concerted Actions Towards Combating Terrorism
- ALEXANDER, Y., Control of Terrorism: International Documents, (New York, 1979).
- BRIERLY, I., The Law of Nations, 6th ed., (1963).
- CHUANG, R., International Air Transport Association (IATA), 1972.
- CHUNG, D.Y., Some Legal Aspects of Aircraft Hijacking in International Law (LL.M. Thesis, University of Tennessee, 1978).
- DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, I.H.Ph., An Introduction to Air Law, 2nd rev. ed., (The Netherlands, 1985).
- EVANS, A.E., Legal Aspects of International Terrorism, (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1978).
- FITZGERALD, G.F., "Toward Legal Suppression of Acts Against Civil Aviation", Air Hijacking: An International Perspective, Nov. 1971, No. 585.
- GAL-OR, N., International Cooperation to Suppress Terrorism, (New York 1985).
- GHOSH, S.K., Aircraft Hijacking and the Developing Law, (New Delhi, 1985).
- HUDSON, International Legislation, Vol. VII, (1941).
- LAUTERPACHT, H., International Law and Human Rights, (London: Stevens, 1950).
- LOWENFELD, A., Aviation Law, 2nd ed. (1981).
- MATTE, N.M., Treatise on Air Aeronautical Law
- MCWHINNEY, E., Aerial Piracy and International Terrorism, The Illegal Diversion of Aircraft and International Law, 2nd ed. (Dordrecht, 1987).
- STEVENSON, W., 90 Minutes at Entebbe, (Bantam Books, 1976).

U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Aircraft Hijacking and Other Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation: Statistical and Narrative Reports, (Washington, D.C. 1986).

VILLAMIN, M.L., Piracy and Air Law, (LL.M. Thesis, McGill University, Montreal, 1962).

II ARTICLES

ABRAMORSKY, A., "The Montreal Convention", Columbia Journal of International Law, Vol. 14, (1975).

BOYLE, R.B. And R. PULSIFER, "The Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft", Journal of Air Law and Commerce, Vol. 32, (July 1983).

CHAMBERLAIN, K., "Collective Suppression of Air Services with States which Harbour Hijackers", International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 32 (July 1983).

COOPER, H.H.A., "Hostage Rescue Operations: Denouncement of Algeria and Mogadishu Compared", Chitty's Law Journal, Vol. 26 (1978).

FALLER, E.F., "Current Legal Activities in ICAO: Development of a Legal Instrument for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation", Zeitschrift fur Luft-und Weltraumrecht (German Journal of Air and Space Law), Vol. 37 (1987).

FINGERMAN, M.E., "Skyjacking and the Bonn Declaration of 1978: Sanctions Applicable to Recalcitrant Nations", California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 10 (1980).

FITZGERALD, G.F., "Concerted Action Against States Found in Default of their International Obligations in Respect of Unlawful Interference with International Civil Aviation", Canadian Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 10 (1972).

FRANCK, T.M. and B.B. LOCKWOOD, "Preliminary Thoughts Towards an International Convention on Terrorism", American Journal of International Law, Vol. 68 (1974).

GOLDIE, L.E., "Control of Terrorism in International Life: Cooperation and Self Help", Proceedings of American Society of International Law, (1977).

HORLICK, G.N., "The Developing Law of Air Hijacking", Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 12, (1971).

- KUNZ, J.L., "The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance:", American Journal of International Law, Vol. 42 (1948).
- MANKIEWICZ, R.H., "The 1970 Hague Convention", Journal of Air Law and Commerce, Vol. 37 (1971).
- MILDE, N., "Interception of Civil Aviation vs. Misuse of Civil Aviation (Background of Amendment 27 to Annex 2)", Annals of Air and Space Law, Vol. XI (1986).
- MILDE, M., "News From International Organizations, International Conference on Air Law", Air Law, Vol. XIII (1988).
- NOBLES LOWE, E., "Legal and Other Aspects of Terrorism", Proceedings of American Society of International Law, (1977-78).
- SAMUELS, A., "The Legal Problems: An Introduction". Journal of Air Law and Commerce, Vol. 37 (1971).
- SCHACHTER, O., "The Twilight Existence of International Non-Binding Agreements", American Journal of International Law, Vol. 71 (1977).
- SCHWENK, W., "The Bonn Declaration on Hijacking", Annals of Air and Space Law, Vol. IV (1979).
- SHEPARD, I.M., "The Role of IFALPA", Cornell International Law Journal, Vol. 3 (1970).
- VANPANHUYS, H.F., "Aircraft Hijacking and International Law", Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 9 (1970).
- WIJK, A., "International Federation of Airline Pilots Associations (IFALPA)", Annals of Air and Space Law, Vol. 12 (1987).

III DOCUMENTS

a) International Conventions

- Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, signed at Geneva on November 16, 1937.
- Convention on International Civil Aviation, signed at Chicago on December 7, 1944, ICAO Doc. 7300/6.
- Convention on the High Seas, signed at Geneva on April 29, 1958.

- Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, signed at Tokyo on 14 September 1963, ICAO Doc. 8364.
- Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at the Hague on 16 December 1970, ICAO Doc. 8920.
- Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal on 23 September 1971, ICAO Doc. 8966.
- Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27 (23 May 1969).
- Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at Montreal on 23 September 1971.

b) ICAO Documents

- International Conference on Air Law, Tokyo, ICAO Doc. 8565 LC/152-1.
- Aviation Security (Digest of Current ICAO Policies and Actions on the Subject of Unlawful Interference with International Civil Aviation and its Facilities), ICAO Doc. 8849-C/1990/4, 4th ed., (April 1987).
- ICAO Council, Sixty-Sixth Session: Minutes of Twenty-Sixth Meeting, ICAO Doc. 8796 C/983-26, June 2nd, 1969.
- Annex 17 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation on Aviation Security, 3rd ed., March 1986.
- Report of Ad Hoc Group of Experts - Unlawful Interference, Montreal, ICAO Doc. AH-UI/2, 14-18 July 1986.
- ICAO Doc. C-WP/8540, Appendix C.
- ICAO Doc. UI-WP/205, Appendix.
- "Chronology of Unlawful Interference with Civil Aviation", (mimeo), (1975).
- ICAO Doc. LC/SC-VIA Report, Appendix C.

c) League of Nations and United Nations Documents

- League of Nations, Official Journal, 1934.

- "Proceedings of the International Conference on the Repression of Terrorism, U.N. Doc. C.94.M.47.1938.V. (1938.V.3), Annex 1.
- Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, U.N. Doc. G.A. Official Record: 28th Session, Supp. No. 28 (A/9028), (1973).
- U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27, 23 May, 1969.
- Statement made by Cuba before the United Nations General Assembly on November 3, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/132/PV.56.

d) IATA Documents

- "International Air Transport Backgrounder", (IATA) Public Information Document 10/88.
- IATA, Reports and Proceedings, 32nd Annual Meeting, Singapore, Nov. 8-10, 1976.
- IATA, Reports and Proceedings, 33rd Annual Meeting, Madrid, Nov. 8-11, 1977.
- IATA, 42nd Annual General Meeting, Minutes, Montgrux, Nov. 3-4, 1986.

**APPENDIX 1: UNLAWFUL SEIZURE OF AIRCRAFT WHICH
PERMISSION TO LAND WAS REFUSED**

DATE	UNLAWFULLY SEIZED AND DIVERTED	STATES WHICH REFUSED PERMISSION TO LAND	OCCURRENCE TERMINATED IN
31-08-1970	An Airlines flight from Annaba to Algiers.	Albania	Yougosl- via
06-09-1970	A Swissair flight from Zurich to New York	Jordan	Jordan
26-01-1971	A Dominican Airlines flight from Santo Domingo to Puerto Rico	Haiti	Dominican Republic
24-07-1973	A Japan Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Tokyo	Iraq, Bahrain Kuwait United Arab Emirates Saudi Arabia	Libya
06-08-1973	A Kuwait Airline from Kuwait to Saudi Arabia	Saudi Arabia Algeria	Kuwait
20-10-1973	An Argentinian Airlines flight from Buenos Aires to Salta	Argentina	Bolivia
17-12-1973	A Lufthansa Airlines flight from Rome to Kuwait	Lebanon Kuwait	Kuwait

07-11-1974	A Royal Jordanian Airline flight from Amman to Aguaba	Lebanon Cyprus	Libya
21-11-1974	A British Airways flight from Dubai to Calcutta	Lebanon Syria Jordan	Tunisia
01-03-1975	An Iraqi Airlines flight from Mousul to Baghdad	Iran	Iran
07-07-1976	A Libyan Arab Airlines flight from Tripoli to Benghazi	Tunisia Algeria	Spain
30-04-1976	A Turkish Airlines flight Paris to Istanbul	France	France
14-03-1977	An Iberian Airlines flight from Barcelona to Palma	Czechoslovakia	Switzerland
19-03-1977	A Turkish Airlines flight from Diyarbakir to Ankara	Lebanon	Lebanon
10-07-1977	A Soviet Airlines flight from Peterozuvodsk to Leningrad	Sweden	Finland
12-08-1977	An Air France Airlines flight from Paris to Cairo	Libya Greece	Italy

03-10-1977	A Japan Airlines flight from Bombay to Bangkok	Kuwait Syria	Syria
13-10-1977	A Lufthansa Airlines flight from Palma to Germany	Lebanon- Syria Iraq Iran Kuwait Bahrain South Yemen	Saudi Arabia
29-10-1977	An Air Vietnam flight from Saigon to Thailand	Singapore	Singapore
18-02-1978	A Cyprus Airways flight	Southern Yemen Algeria Libia	Cyprus
06-08-1978	A KLM Dutch Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Madrid	Algeria	Spain
17-01-1979	A Lebanese Airlines flight from Beirut to Amman	Cyprus	Lebanon
05-08-1979	An Iberian Airlines flight from Canary Islands	Morocco France Zimbabwe	Switzerland
24-08-1979	A Libyan Arab Airlines flight from Benghazi to Tripoli	Greece Cyprus	Cyprus
08-09-1979	An Alitalia Airlines flight from Tehran to Rome	France	Italy

14-01-1980	An Alitalia Air lines flight from Rome to Tunisia	Malta	Italy
24-07-1980	A Kuwait Airways flight from Beirut to Kuwait	Dubai Iran Lebanon	Kuwait
27-09-1981	A Yugoslav Air lines flight from Dubrovnik to Bel grade	Israel	Cyprus
07-12-1981	A Libyan Arab Air lines flight from Zurich to Tripoli	Lebanon Israel Cyprus Syria Iran	Lebanon
26-02-1982	An Air Tanzania flight from Mwanza to Dares Salaam (domestic)	Saudi Arabia Greece	England
22-06-1983	A Libyan Arab Airlines flight from Athens to Tripoli	Lebanon	Cyprus
06-07-1983	An Iran IRA flight from Shiraz to Tehran (domestic)	France	France
27-08-1983	An Air France flight from Vienna to Paris	Iran	Iran
26-06-1984	An Iran Air flight from Shiraz to Bushehr (domestic)	Saudi Arabia Bahrain	Iraq

31-07-1984	An Air France flight from Frank furt to Paris	Iran	Iran
A24-08-1984	An Air India flight from Chan diarah to Srinagar (domestic)	Dubai	Dubai
08-08-1984	An Iran Air flight from Bandar Abbas to Tehran (domestic)	Dubai	Egypt
04-12-1984	A Kuwait Airlines flight from Dubai to Karachi	Iran	Iran
01-04-1985	A Middle East Air lines flight from Beirut to Jeddah	Saudi Arabia	Saudi Arabia
11-06-1985	An Alia Airlines flight from Beirut to Amman	Tunisia	Lebanon
14-06-1985	A TWA flight from Athens to Boston	Lebanon	Lebanon
05-04-1988	A Kuwait Airlines flight from Bang- kok to Kuwait	Iran	Algeria

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION (1982)CHRONOLOGY OF UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH CIVIL AVIATION

These lists are periodically compiled by the Public Information Office of the International Civil Aviation Organization from information gathered from the news media, etc., but have no official status.

SEIZURES

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
1.	1.1.82	U.S.A.	Bomer Flying Service Piper PA-28-161 (Warrior)	Shelbyville (Sightseeing trip) (domestic)	Eagleville	2 males	2 passengers and 1 crew	The offenders engaged Bomer Flying Service for a sightseeing trip. While returning to Shelbyville, one of the offenders produced a pistol and ordered the pilot to land on a strip near Eagleville. Upon landing he was shot in the leg and stomach and tied up. The offenders departed in the aircraft but were forced to land in a field near Wynne Arkansas due to lack of fuel. They were apprehended by police.
2.	27.1.82	Colombia	Aerolineas Territori- ales de Colombia Ltda Boeing 727.	Bogota to Pereira (domestic)	Cuba	6 males and 1 female	121 passen- gers and 7 crew	The aircraft was seized shortly after take-off from Bogota. After an exchange of gunfire the offenders released 64 hostages. They demanded another aircraft to replace the one which had been damaged and agreed to the release of the hostages. The offenders surrendered in Cuba.
3.	2.2.82	U.S.A.	Air Florida B-737	Miami to Key West (domestic)	Cuba	1 male	72 passengers and 5 crew	Claiming to have a flammable liquid and a cigarette lighter, the offender diverted the aircraft to Cuba where he surrendered to the authorities.
4.	26.2.82	Tanzania	Air Tanzania Boeing 737	Mwanza to Dar es Salaam (domestic)	Mairobi, Kenya; Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; Athens, Greece; Stansted, England	4 males	93 passengers and 6 crew	The hijacking lasted 48 hours and ended in England. The aircraft was seized soon after take-off from Mairobi and flew first to Jeddah for refuelling and then to Athens where two hostages were released. Final landing was at Stansted where, after negotiations, all hostages were released and the offenders surrendered to the Essex Police.

SEIZURES

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
5.	5.4.82	U.S.A.	Delta Airlines Boeing 747	Chicago to Miami (domestic)	Cuba	3 males	96 passengers and 7 crew	The offenders commandeered the aircraft by pouring gasoline on various parts of the interior and threatening to set the aircraft on fire unless they were flown to Cuba. A flight attendant's eyes were injured when one of the offenders splashed gasoline on her. When the aircraft landed at Havana, they were taken into custody.
6.	28.4.82	Honduras	Honduran Airlines Dash-7	La Ceiba to Tegucigalpa (domestic)	Cuba	4 males		The offenders commandeered the aircraft while on a domestic flight and forced it to land at Tegucigalpa airport. They demanded \$500,000 ransom and the release of political prisoners. After a 4-day siege the offenders were flown to Cuba where they were arrested.
7.	30.4.82	Poland	LOT Polish Airlines AM-24	Wroclaw to Warsaw (domestic)	West Berlin	8 males	52 passengers and 5 crew	Offenders seized the plane 10 minutes after departure from Wroclaw. Security guards were overpowered and a bullet fired through the door of the cabin. The aircraft was forced to land at a U.S. military airport in West Berlin and the offenders taken into custody by the West Berlin police.
8.	10.5.82	Nicaragua	Nicaraguan airliner C-46	Bluefields to Managua (domestic)	Costa Rica	3 males	50 people aboard	The aircraft was seized while on a domestic flight and diverted to Costa Rica where the offenders surrendered and asked for political asylum.

SEIZURES

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
9.	27.5.82	Greece	Royal Afr Maroc Boeing 737	Damascus to Lebanon, Athens & Casablanca	Tunis- Carthage	1 male	91 passengers and 9 crew	The aircraft was seized over Malta on a flight from Athens to Casablanca and diverted to Tunis. The offender surrendered to Tunisian authorities.
10.	30.6.82	India	Alicalia Boeing 747	New Delhi - Bangkok		1 male	242 passengers and 18 crew	A man who claimed he was armed with explosives received a ransom of \$300,000. He was flown to Sri Lanka after being joined by his estranged wife and their 4-year old son. The offender claimed he had six accomplices aboard. He was arrested in Sri Lanka after a request for extradition was received from Italy.
11.	22.7.82	U.S.A.	Marco Island Airways Martin 404 twin engine propeller driven	Miami to Key West	Cuba	2 males	9 passengers and 3 crew	Soon after take-off, the offenders poured liquid from bottles which emitted like gasoline on the cabin floor and passenger seats. They threatened to set the aircraft on fire unless they were flown to Cuba. When the aircraft landed at Havana the offenders were taken into custody by the Cuban authorities.
12.	20.8.82	India	Indian Airlines Boeing 737	Bombay to New Delhi (domestic)	Amritsar (India)	1 male	62 passengers and 5 crew	Armed with a gun and a hand grenade, the offender demanded to be flown to Lahore. but permission to land was not given and the aircraft landed at Amritsar where he was killed by commandos. One person injured.
13.	25.8.82	Hungary	LOT - Ilyushin 18	Budapest to Warsaw	Munich	2 males	62 passengers and 8 crew	Armed with a fake bomb, the two offenders diverted the aircraft to Munich where they surrendered to the authorities.

SEIZURES

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	UPPERMERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
14.	26.9.82	Italy	Alitalia Boeing 727	Algiers-Rome	Sicily	1 male	101 passengers and 8 crew	Armed with a knife, the offender seized the aircraft while on a flight from Algiers and diverted it to Tripoli. Permission to land was not granted and he demanded to be flown to Malta. Malta also refused permission to land and the aircraft landed at Catania. The offender was overpowered by the crew and handed over to the police.
15.	14.10.82	Poland	Balkan Air TU-134 - Tupolev	Burgas-Warsaw	Vienna	1 male	70 passengers and 11 crew	Armed with a knife, the offender demanded to be flown to West Germany or Munich. Due to fuel shortage the aircraft landed in Vienna where he surrendered to the police.
16.	7.11.82	USSR	Aeroflot Antonov 24	Odessa to Novorossiysk (domestic)	Turkey	3 males	25 persons	The offenders commandeered the aircraft while on a domestic flight and diverted the flight to Turkey. When the aircraft landed, the crew and passengers overpowered them. They were taken into custody by the Turkish authorities.
17.	22.11.82	Poland	LOT Antonov 24	Wroclaw to Warsaw (domestic)	West Berlin	1 male	29 passengers	Armed with two handguns & two hand grenades, the offender ordered the pilot to fly to West Berlin soon after take-off. When the aircraft landed at Tempelhof, he was taken into custody by the West German authorities.
18.	1.12.82	Canada	Brittain Norman Islander (charter) C-GILS	Victoria to Abbotsford		3 males	5 passengers and 1 crew	Three prisoners under escort attempted to take over the aircraft. The guards and crew overpowered them.

ATTEMPTED SEIZURE

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
1.	13.2.82	U.S.A.	Braniff International (BN) B-727			1 male		The aircraft was parked at a boarding gate at Amarillo, Texas after completing a flight from Dallas/Fort Worth Regional Airport. The offender boarded the aircraft but was challenged by a maintenance worker who was inside. When the offender indicated that he was hijacking the aircraft the maintenance worker left the aircraft and informed the FBI who persuaded the offender to leave the aircraft. He was taken into custody.
2.	16.2.82	U.S.A.	Air Florida Boeing 737	Miami to Key West (domestic)		1 male		The offender attempted to board the aircraft in a hijack attempt but a suspicious employee locked the door of the aircraft. The offender was arrested after a brief exchange of gunfire with the police. There were no injuries.
3.	24.2.82	Lebanon	Kuwait Airways Boeing 707	Tripoli, Libya to Beirut		12 males	96 passengers and 9 crew	Offenders attempted to hijack the aircraft soon after it landed at the Beirut International Airport. They ran towards the aircraft firing weapons and forced the departing passengers back into the aircraft. After further gunfire and negotiations the offenders were promised safe conduct to Syria and they released the hostages. Two injuries.
4.	1.3.82	U.S.A.	United Airlines	Chicago to Miami (domestic)		1 male	90 passengers and 7 crew	About 30 minutes before the aircraft was to land at Miami Airport, the offender removed a small bottle from a paper bag and threatened to ignite the liquid unless he was flown to Cuba. The pilot agreed but flew the aircraft in a circle and landed at Miami. The offender was overpowered by passengers and crew and handed over to the police.

ATTEMPTED SEIZURE

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
5.	21.5.82	Philippine	Philippine Airlines BAC-111	Manila to Cebu (domestic)	1 male	108 passengers		Armed with a grenade the offender seized the aircraft on a domestic flight. He demanded political reforms and \$22,500 in back pay for serving in the U.S. military in the Second World War. The offender was overpowered by the crew and handed over to the authorities on landing.
6.	23.6.82	U.S.A.	Manx Airlines BAC-7 Turboprop	Charlotteville to Staunton (Virginia) (domestic)	1 female			The aircraft arrived at Shenandoah Valley Airport, Staunton and passengers deplaned. The first officer returned to retrieve a package when he was confronted by a woman who told him that she had a weapon and was hijacking the aircraft. He was forced to board the aircraft. The offender was subsequently overpowered by the crew and handed over to the police.
7.	16.7.82	U.S.A.	Greater Buffalo International Airport		1 male			The offender held a knife to the throat of an airport employee and demanded a plane to take him to Tokyo. He was shot by police.
8.	25.7.82	China	China's National Airline CAAC Ilyushin-18	Xian to Shanghai (domestic)	5 males	80 persons		Armed with explosives, the offenders demanded to be flown to Taiwan. The passengers and crew members fought with the offenders who detonated a bomb which blew a hole in the side of the aircraft. They were subdued. When the aircraft landed in Shanghai, the offenders were taken into custody. Some crew members and passengers were injured.

ATTEMPTED SEIZURE

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
9.	4.8.82	India	Indian Airlines	New Delhi to Amritsar (domestic)		1 male	135 persons	Armed with a rubber ball the offender attempted to divert the aircraft but was overpowered by the crew in Amritsar.
10.	16.8.82	P. A.	Dolphin Airways Embarras EMB-110 Bandeirante	Tampa to West Palm Beach (domestic)		1 male	9 passengers and 2 crew	Upon landing at West Palm Beach, the offender claimed to have a bomb under his shirt and demanded to be flown to Cuba. After negotiations for two hours, he surrendered to the police. No bomb was found.
11.	27.10.82	U.S.A.	Trans World Airlines L1-11	Los Angeles to St. Louis (Missouri) (domestic)		1 male	100 passengers and 11 crew	The aircraft was boarding passengers for the flight when the offender forced his way past an airline employee aboard the aircraft. Holding a knife, he demanded that the aircraft take off without indicating the intended destination. He was overpowered and taken into custody.
12.	28.11.82	Poland	Hungarian airliner Topolev 154	Leningrad- Budapest		1 male		The offender, armed with a pistol, boarded the plane during a stopover. He released 35 of the 42 hostages. He was overpowered by security police, after he was convinced that he would have to transfer to another plane.

SABOTAGE

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
1.	9.2.82	Colombia	Douglas (DC-3 (Dakota) MK-1212 of Sedolca					The aircraft was damaged by a bomb in a suitcase while boarding passengers at Miraflores. One dead and six injured.
2.	20.2.82	Nicaragua	August C. Sandino International Airport	New Orleans, San Salvador, Tegucigalpa, Managua				A bomb, concealed in a suitcase which had been transported on a Servicio Aereo de Honduras SA aircraft exploded on the conveyor belt carrying baggage to the terminal in Managua. Four baggage handlers and a bystander were injured.
3.	1.8.82	Federal Republic of Germany	Rien Airport, Munich					A bomb in a suitcase exploded outside a special check-in hall for flights to Israel. Six persons were injured.
4.	3.8.82	Pakistan	Lahore Airport					A car bomb exploded at Lahore airport outside a lounge reserved for important visitors. Ten persons injured.
5.	11.8.82	U.S.A. (Hawaii)	PAA AM Boeing 747	Tokyo-Honolulu			271 passengers and 16 crew	A bomb exploded under a passenger seat while the aircraft was on a flight from Tokyo to Honolulu killing one and injuring twenty persons.
6.	20.8.82	Ireland	Air traffic control station at Mount Gabriel					A radar tracking station was extensively damaged by a bomb.

ATTEMPTED SABOTAGE

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSION'S OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
1.	2.3.82	U.S.A.	Brasiff International B-727 Metro Airlines Shorte 330	Washington to Wichita Falls (domestic)			A woman discovered an explosive device in her suitcase when she arrived at Wichita Falls. The suitcase had been checked through from Washington D.C.
2.	2.3.82	Tanzania	Air Tanzania at Kilimanjaro Airport				A bomb was discovered aboard an Air Tanzania jet at Kilimanjaro airport.
3.	3.4.82	U.S.A.	Wartfield, Atlanta International Airport				An armed military hand-grenade was discovered in a trash receptacle in a women's restroom at the international arrivals area.
4.	26.4.82	U.S.A.	Stapleton International Airport				A small object which appeared to be a bomb was discovered in an ash tray. Upon examination it was found to be highly volatile.
5.	15.5.82	Brazil	Rio de Janeiro International Airport				An explosive device was discovered under a seat in a PAM AM Boeing 747 while the aircraft was being serviced at the Rio de Janeiro International Airport. It was diffused and no injuries reported.
6.	30.5.82	U.S.A.	Air Canada cargo building				A bomb was discovered and diffused in the Air Canada cargo building at the Los Angeles International Airport.
7.	18.6.82	Italy	Leonardo da Vinci Airport		1 female		A female passenger carrying a bomb in a suitcase with a false bottom was arrested.

ATTEMPTED SABOTAGE

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
8.	20.6.62	U.S.A.	Western Airlines, International Airport at Ontario, California					A home-made pipe bomb was found in a trash receptacle near the Western Airlines ticket counter.
9.	13.9.62	Thailand	Don Muang International Airport, Bangkok					Airport security guards found a bomb in the departure lounge of the airport.

GROUNDED ATTACK

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
1.	7.6.62	Turkey				A group		A group staged an attack on Ankara's airport. Six dead and 57 injured.

UPDATED VERSION

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

CHRONOLOGY OF UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH CIVIL AVIATION (1987)

These lists are periodically compiled by the Public Information Office of the International Civil Aviation Organization from information gathered from the news media, etc., but have no official status.

SEIZURES

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
1.	18.1.83	Thailand	Thai Airways (Short-330)	Lampang to Chieng Mai (domestic)		3 males	7 passengers and 4 crew	En route from Lampang to Chieng Mai, the aircraft was seized by three men. After landing at Chieng Mai, the offenders seized a truck and ordered their hosts to board it. These hostages were later set free. Two of the offenders have been arrested.
2.	20.1.83	U.S.A.	Northwest Orient Boeing 727	Seattle to Portland (domestic)		1 male	35 passengers and 6 crew	En route from Seattle to Portland, the offender claimed he had a bomb if descended to be flown to Afghanistan. The aircraft landed in Portland where the offender was shot and killed by the FBI.
3.	20.1.83	Southern Yemen	ALYEMDA Democratic Yemen Airlines (DY) Boeing 707	Aden to Kuwait		Djibouti 3 males	137 passengers and 9 crew	En route from Aden to Kuwait, the aircraft was seized and diverted to Djibouti. The offenders surrendered to Djibouti authorities after negotiations. Two passengers were wounded.
4.	15.2.83	U.S.A.	Rio Airways BAC-7 Dash 7	Killeen to Dallas/Fort Worth (domestic)		Mexico 1 male	16 passengers and 4 crew	En route from Killeen to Dallas/Fort Worth the offender produced an automatic weapon and demanded to be flown to Nuevo Laredo, Mexico and then to Havana, Cuba. At Nuevo Laredo, the offender surrendered to the Mexican authorities after five hours of mandatory negotiations. No inspection/screening was performed.

SEIZURES

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
5.	20.2.83	Libya	Libyan Arab Airlines Boeing 727	Sabha to Tripoli (domestic)	Malta	3 offenders	156 passengers and 5 crew	En route from Sabha to Tripoli, the offenders, armed with pistols, seized the aircraft and diverted the flight to Malta. After twenty-one hours of negotiations they surrendered to the authorities in Malta.
6.	15.4.83	Turkey	Turkish Airlines Boeing 727	Istanbul to Izmir (domestic)	Greece	1 male	107 passengers and 8 crew	En route from Istanbul to Izmir the offender, armed with a knife and a bottle of inflammable liquid, seized the aircraft and diverted the flight to Greece. When the aircraft landed at Athens the offender released all the passengers. A special unit using force entered the aircraft and arrested the offender who was holding the crew hostage.
7.	1.5.83	U.S.A.	Capital Air DC-8	San Juan to Miami (domestic)	Cuba	1 male	202 passengers and 10 crew	En route from San Juan to Miami the offender barricaded himself in a lavatory and issued instructions printed on scraps of paper demanding he be flown to Cuba. He threatened to blow up the aircraft. When the aircraft landed at Jose Marti International Airport, Cuban police broke open the lavatory door and arrested the offender.
8.	5.5.83	China	Chinese (CAAC) Airlines British-built Trident	Shenyang to Shanghai (domestic)	South Korea	3 males 1 female	100 passengers	En route from Shenyang to Shanghai five men and a woman seized the aircraft and diverted the flight to South Korea. The offenders were taken into custody by the South Korean authorities and later sentenced to jail in Korea. Two crew members were injured.

SEIZURES

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
9.	12.5.63	U.S.A.	Capital Air DC-8	Puerto Rico to Miami (domestic)	Cuba	1 female	221 passengers and 10 crew	En route from San Juan to Miami the offender diverted the flight to Cuba using a very pistol. The offender was taken into custody by the Cuban authorities.
10.	19.5.63	U.S.A.	Eastern Airlines Boeing 727	Miami to New York (domestic)	Cuba	1 male	125 passengers and 7 crew	En route from Miami to New York the offender, claiming to be in possession of explosives, diverted the flight to Cuba. When the aircraft landed at John Marti airport the offender was taken into custody by the Cuban authorities.
11.	14.6.63	U.S.A.	Eastern Airlines	Miami to New York (domestic)	Cuba	1 male	84 passengers and 11 crew	En route from Miami to New York the offender sprayed the carpet in the passenger cabin with alcohol and threatened to set it on fire if he was not flown to Cuba. When the aircraft landed at John Marti airport he was taken into custody by the Cuban authorities.
12.	22.6.63	Greece	Libyan A. TRABA 9.767	Athens to Tripoli	Italy Cyprus	2 males	21 passengers and 11 crew	About twenty minutes after take off two armed offenders seized the aircraft and diverted it to Rome. It was then diverted to Beirut but as that airport was closed the aircraft landed at Larnaca. The Cypriot authorities persuaded the offenders to surrender. They were taken into custody.

SEIZURES

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
13.	2.7.83	U.S.A.	PAN-AM B. 727	Miami to Orlando (domestic)	Cuba	2 males	33	Using home-made gasoline bombs and cigarette lighters the offenders diverted the aircraft to Havana, Cuba. They were taken into custody by Cuban authorities.
14.	6.7.83	Iran	Iran Air Boeing 747	Shiras to Tehran (domestic)	Kuwait France	6 males	371	Armed with automatic pistols the offenders diverted the aircraft to Kuwait where they released some of the hostages. After refuelling, the aircraft took off again for Paris defying government orders not to enter French airspace. The aircraft landed at Orly airport. After negotiations the offender surrendered to the local authorities.
15.	7.7.83	U.S.A.	Air Florida Boeing 737	Port Lauderdale to Tampa (domestic)	Cuba	1 male	42	The offender, claiming to possess a bomb, diverted the aircraft to Cuba soon after take-off. He was taken into custody by the Cuban authorities.
16.	17.7.83	U.S.A.	Delta Airlines Boeing 727	Miami to Tampa (domestic)	Cuba	3 males	100	The offenders smuggled two knives aboard the aircraft in a cassette radio. While one of the offenders held a knife to the passenger throat of a crew member the other threatened to blow a can of hairspray by igniting it with a match. When the aircraft landed in Havana they were taken into custody.
17.	19.7.83	U.S.A.	Eastern Airlines L-1011	New York to Miami (domestic)	Cuba	1 male	220	Claiming to have a bomb in his briefcase the offender diverted the aircraft to Cuba. When the aircraft landed in Havana he was led away in handcuffs by the Cuban authorities.

SEIZURE

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
18.	4.8.83	U.S.A.	Capitol Air BC-8	San Juan to Miami (domestic)	Cuba	1 male	244 passengers and 10 crew	About 40 minutes after take-off the offender produced a black handgun, a small bottle containing a clear liquid with a protruding wick and two bundles of chalk-like sticks wrapped in cloth with a protruding wick. He demanded to be flown to Cuba. When the aircraft landed in Havana, Cuban authorities boarded the aircraft and arrested the offender.
19.	18.8.83	U.S.A.	Delta Airlines Boeing 727	Miami to Tampa (domestic)		1 male	72 passengers and 7 crew	Dousing himself with a liquid that smelled like gasoline he lit a candle and sat down demanding to be flown to Cuba. When the aircraft landed in Cuba, Cuban authorities boarded the aircraft and took the offender into custody.
20.	27.8.83	Austria	Air France Boeing 727	Vienna to Paris	Geneva, Catania, Damascus, Tehran	4 males	111 passengers and 8 crew	The offenders, carrying machine guns and hand grenades diverted the aircraft to Geneva. After releasing some of the hostages and refuelling, the aircraft took off again for Catania. From Catania the aircraft flew to Damascus. It took off again from Damascus and landed in Tehran. After three days of negotiations between the offenders and the Iranian authorities, the offenders surrendered.
21.	22.9.83	U.S.A.	American Airlines Boeing 727	New York to Virgin Islands (domestic)	Cuba	1 male	172 passengers and crew	About twenty minutes after take-off, the offender barricaded himself in a lavatory, and handed a note to a passenger with "Cuba" written on it to be passed on to the flight attendant. He had a black plastic box with a red 9-volt transistor battery taped to its side. He remained in the lavatory until the plane landed at Jose Marti Airport. Armed Cuban soldiers boarded the plane and took the offender into custody.

SEIZURE

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
21.	14.10.83	U.S.A.	People Express Airlines, Inc. Boeing 737	Buffalo to Newark (domestic)	Atlantic City (U.S.A.)	1 male	101 passengers	Soon after the aircraft took off from Buffalo, the offender held his head in his pocket to make it appear he had a gun, grabbed a flight attendant and demanded to be flown to Atlantic City. When the aircraft landed he was taken into custody by the police.

ATTEMPTED ABIZURE

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
1.	7.1.83	U.S.A.	Delta Airlines N-727-BL177	Portland to Boston (domestic)		1 male	23	The offender claimed that he had a package passengers with a bomb and demanded to be flown to Las Vegas. Flight attendants moved the package and locked it up. When the aircraft landed and passengers deplaned, police boarded the aircraft and took the offender into custody.
2.	13.2.83	Australia	Trans-Australia Airlines A-300 Airbus	Perth to Melbourne (domestic)		1 male		The offender claimed he had a bomb in the black box he was carrying and demanded to go to Adelaide. The flight crew persuaded him to continue on to Melbourne but shortly before landing wrestled the black box from him. The aircraft landed safely and the offender was taken into custody. No bomb was found in the black box.
3.	25.2.83	Czechoslovakia	Czechoslovak aircraft TU 134 A	Bratislava to Prague (domestic)		1 male		Seen after take-off the offender tried to enter the flight crew cabin threatening to destroy the aircraft with an explosive which he claimed he had in his cabin baggage. Force was used to overcome the offender who subsequently died as a consequence of the injuries he received.
4.	7.3.83	Bulgaria	Balkan Airlines	Sofia to Varna (domestic)		4		En route to Varna the offenders demanded to go to Turkey. The pilot tricked them into believing the plane was landing in Turkey by flying over the Black Sea in circles and landing at Varna Airport. One of the offenders was reportedly killed by security personnel when he threatened a stewardess with a knife. The other three were arrested.
5.	26.4.83	U.S.A.	Wall Airways			1 male		The offender broke through a glass door at Albany airport, gained access to the airside and entered an empty parked commuter/air taxi aircraft. He claimed to have a firearm and demanded to be flown to Portland, Maine. He was overpowered by the police.
6.	26.6.83	Mexico	DC-9	Mexico City to Miami		1 male		En route to Miami the offender put a razor to the neck of a flight attendant and demanded to be flown to Cuba. The captain agreed but told him that he would have to stop in Merida for refuelling. When the aircraft landed a police officer disguised as a mechanic disarmed him. The flight then continued to Miami.

ATTEMPTED SEIZURE

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
7.	July 83	U.S.S.R.	Soviet airliner	Moscow to Tallinn (domestic)		2 males		The crew and passengers killed one offender and overpowered the other after they threatened to blow up the plane if they were not flown out of the USSR. The surviving offender was arrested.
8.	21.7.83	U.S.A.	Northwest Airlines Boeing 727	Tampa to Miami (domestic)		1 male	90	While the aircraft was in flight, the passenger offender, wielding a knife, threatened a crew member and demanded to be flown to Cuba. Three passengers and a flight attendant overpowered him. The aircraft landed safely at Miami International Airport where the offender was arrested.
9.	2.8.83	U.S.A.	Pan American World Airways Boeing 747	Miami to Houston (domestic)		1 male	123	About 45 minutes after take-off the offender- passenger Aer tried to open the cockpit door demanding to be flown to Cuba. He was overpowered by passengers. When the aircraft landed at Houston airport he was taken into custody by law enforcement authorities.
10.	14.8.83	U.S.A.	Piedmont Airlines	Miami to Tampa (domestic)		2 males	23	Two men carrying a suspicious liquid and a passenger were taken into custody at Miami International Airport after trying to board a Piedmont Airlines flight to Tampa.
11.	1.9.83	Mexico	B-727	Mexico City to Miami		1 male	70 passengers	With a razor blade the offender threatened to kill a passenger unless flown to Tel Aviv. He agreed to let the aircraft land at Merida, Mexico to be refuelled. When the aircraft landed several security agents managed to board the aircraft and arrest the offender.
12.	21.9.83	U.S.A.	General Aviation Security Transport twin-engine Piper Navajo				5 persons	While being transported one of the six prisoners freed himself from waist and wrist chains, produced a knife and demanded to be flown where he wanted to. There was a struggle and the prisoner was disarmed and overpowered. Two pilots and three prisoners were injured.

ATTEMPTED SEIZURE

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
13.	17.10.63	U.S.A.	American Inter- national Airways DC-9			1 male	110	The offender threatened to blow up the passengers aircraft as it was boarding passengers at the Atlantic City airport. He was arrested.
14.	18.11.63	U.S.S.R.	Aeroflot	Thfllet to Batumi (domestic)		6 males 3 females		When the plane was airborne the offenders demanded to be flown to Turkey. The pilot signalled ground controllers and, instead of heading towards Turkey began to circle Thfllet. There was an exchange of gun fire as a result of which seven people were killed.
15.	21.11.63	U.S.A.	Republic Airlines DC-9	Detroit to Chicago (domestic)		1 male	35	The offender claimed that he had a bomb and passengers demanded to speak to the Democratic presidential candidate James Jackson. He was overpowered by passengers. He was taken into custody when the plane landed at D'Mate Airport.

SABOTAGE

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
1.	5.7.83	Japan	Tokyo Int'l Airport, Narita					A small battery-operated incendiary device exploded at a control building for a pipeline supplying jet fuel outside the airport. No injuries or damage were reported. The attack followed bomb threats on July 4 against three airlines at the airport and the discovery of two time fire-bombs planted in airport lockers.
2.	15.7.83	France	Orly Airport, Paris				7 deaths 59 injuries	A bomb exploded in a suitcase near the Turkish airlines check-in counter at Orly Airport as it was being transported up the conveyor belt to the baggage make-up area.
3.	19.8.83	Italy	Syrian Airlines	Rome to Damascus				A fire broke out aboard the aircraft while passengers were boarding. Passengers were evacuated and the fire was extinguished. No injuries. Investigations revealed the remains of an incendiary device under a seat in the passenger area.
4.	26.8.83	Ireland	Air France Boeing 747	Paris to Montreal	Ireland			When the aircraft was 600 miles out over the Atlantic an incendiary device went off in one of the toilets. No serious damage was done. The aircraft was diverted to Shannon Airport and was grounded for about ten hours.
5.	17.9.83	Lesotho	Lesbun Jonathan Airport					A bomb which was placed in a truck at the airport exploded and totally destroyed the cargo building used for domestic flights. No injuries were reported.
6.	14.11.83	Guadeloupe	Baillir Airport Pointe-A-Pitre					A bomb exploded under a small aircraft destroying it and damaging two other aircraft. No injuries were reported.
7.	5.12.83	Kuwait	Airport control tower				1 death	Terrorists exploded a bomb in the airport control tower killing one person.

ATTEMPTED SABOTAGE

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
1.	8.1.83	Japan	Korean Airlines (KAL) Jumbo Jet Boeing 747	New York to Seoul	Tokyo	1 male	276 passengers and crew	The KAL office in Toronto, Canada received a warning by mail that a bomb had been placed on board the aircraft. It made an emergency landing at Narita airport, Tokyo. No bomb was found. An alleged offender, who admitted sending the letter was apprehended by the police.
2.	8.1.83	Australia	Trans Australia Airlines (TAA)			1 male		TAA received a note containing a threat of sabotage and a demand for payment of a ransom. The ransom was left at a specified site but was not picked up. There was no attempt at sabotage.
3.	22.1.83	France	Turkish Airlines Orly airport					Police removed and diffused a two-pound plastic explosive device. It had been concealed in a box which was left on the airline's counter.
4.	29.1.83	U.S.A.	Orlando International Airport			1 male		The off-ender claimed he had a bomb in a small duffle bag and moved to the mezzanine ledge overlooking the third floor lobby of the airport. The main terminal was evacuated and outbound flights were allowed to depart without boarding passengers. After 4 1/2 hours he surrendered and no explosives were found in the bag or on his person.
5.	18.3.83	Italy	Saudi Arabian Airlines Corporation Lockheed L-1011 (TriStar)	Paris to Jeddah	Rome		250 passengers and 18 crew	Seven passengers suffered minor injuries upon using the emergency escape chutes to deplane from the aircraft after it made an emergency landing at Rome upon the receipt of a threat of sabotage. No bomb was found.
6.	26.3.83	U.S.A.	Michigan Airport					A search was conducted after receiving information that a bag containing dynamite had been secreted in the public parking garage. A suitcase was located. When opened, it was found to contain 190 sticks of dynamite.

ATTEMPTED SABOTAGE

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
7.	10.6.83	U.S.A.	Dominicana de Aviacion Airlines Boeing 727	San Juan, Puerto Rico Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic			155 passengers and 7 crew	A few minutes after departure a bomb threat was reported. The aircraft was instructed to return and land. Seven passengers were injured while deplaning.
8.	28.6.83	Federal Republic of Germany	Frankfurt Int'l Airport					An explosive device was found in a blue sports bag at the entrance to a training centre about 300 yards from the terminal. No injuries were reported.
9.	22.9.83	U.S.A.	Empire Airlines twin-engine Swearingen Matco 2	Washington to Montreal		1 male	15 passengers and 2 crew	The offender entered the cockpit while the aircraft was in flight and pulled back on a control, cutting off fuel to one engine. A passenger and the co-pilot overpowered him and the aircraft landed safely in Montreal.
10.	23.11.83	Canada	Air France Boeing 747	Montreal to Paris			179 passengers and 17 crew	A bomb threat was received minutes before the aircraft was scheduled to leave. The passengers and crew were evacuated and the aircraft searched. No bomb was found. The aircraft was delayed by four hours.
11.	29.12.83	Turkey	Yesilkoy Airport					A suitcase containing an explosive device was discovered at the airport. The suitcase was scheduled to be loaded aboard an Alitalia Airline flight departing for Rome. The bomb was detected when the passenger booked on the flight failed to show up at the airport. A search of the bag revealed an explosive device which was warned by bomb experts.

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

REVISED

CHRONOLOGY OF UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH CIVIL AVIATION (1984)

These lists are periodically compiled by the Public Information Office of the International Civil Aviation Organization from information gathered from the news media, etc., but have no official status.

SEIZURE

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
1.	4.2.84	Brazil	Varig Brazilian Airlines A-300 Airbus	Rio de Janeiro to Belem and Manaus (domestic)	Surinam Cuba	2 males 1 female	154 passengers and 14 crew	Two armed men diverted the pilot to fly to Paramaribo, Surinam and released the passengers in exchange for fuel. They forced the crew members to fly the aircraft to Camguay Airport, Cuba where they surrendered to the Cuban authorities.
2.	7.3.84	Federal Republic of Germany	Air France Boeing 737	Frankfurt to Paris	Switzer- land	1 male	62 passengers and 6 crew	The offender claimed he had a bomb in his carry-on bag and demanded to be flown to Libya. He allowed the aircraft to land at Cointrin Airport in Geneva for refuelling. When the aircraft landed, the Swiss police posing as caterers boarded the aircraft and overpowered the offender.
3.	22.3.84	Hong Kong	British Airways Boeing 747	Hong Kong to Beijing	Taiwan	1 male	337 passengers and 14 crew	The offender passed a note to the captain threatening danger to passengers and crew and diverted the aircraft to Taiwan. When the aircraft landed at Taiwan, he was arrested by the local police. He was described as being mentally disturbed.
4.	27.3.84	U.S.A.	Piedmont Airlines Boeing 737	Newark to Miami (domestic)	Cuba	1 male	51 passengers and 5 crew	When the aircraft was approaching Miami the offender handed a note to the flight attendant in which he claimed that he had explosives and would detonate them if he was not flown to Cuba. He also demanded \$5 million. When the aircraft landed at José Martí Airport he was taken into custody by Cuban authorities.
5.	28.3.84	U.S.A.	Delta Airlines Boeing 727	New Orleans to Dallas (domestic)	Cuba	1 male	19 passengers and 7 crew	The offender threatened to ignite a bottle of flammable liquid and diverted the aircraft to Cuba. He was taken into custody by the Cuban authorities.

SEIZURE

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
6.	5.4.84	Saudi Arabia	Saudia Airlines Lockheed TriStar SV287	Jeddah to Damascus	Turkey	1 male	272 passengers and 14 crew	The aircraft was diverted while on a flight from Jeddah to Damascus. When the aircraft landed at Istanbul's Yenisay Airport for refuelling security police attacked the aircraft and disarmed the offender. Six persons were injured.
7.	26.6.84	Iran	Iran Air Boeing 727	Shiraz to Bushahr (domestic)	Qatar Egypt Iraq	2 males	138 passengers and 9 crew	The offenders demanded to be flown to Saudi Arabia. But Dohran refused to permit the aircraft to land. The pilot then decided to land at Bahrain. That airport was closed. The aircraft was then flown to Doha in Qatar where it was allowed to land when the captain informed the control that he was low on fuel and that he would declare emergency. When the aircraft landed, 138 passengers and 6 crew members were released. The offenders forced the pilot, co-pilot and flight engineer to fly the aircraft to Cairo. The Egyptian authorities allowed the aircraft to land when they were informed by the pilot that the aircraft was low on fuel. After refuelling the aircraft was flown to Baghdad where the offenders surrendered to the authorities.
8.	5.7.84	India	Indian Airlines A-300 Airbus	Srinagar to New Delhi (domestic)	Pakistan	8 males	276 passengers and 9 crew	Armed with explosives and pistols, the offenders diverted the aircraft to Lahore (Pakistan) demanding a ransom of \$13 million (Cdn.) and the release of 22 prisoners in India. After hours of negotiations the offenders surrendered to the local authorities.

SEIZURE

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
9.	29.7.84	Venezuela	Línea Aeropostal Venezolana (LAV) DC-9	Caracas to Curacao	Trinidad Aruba (Nether- lands Antilles)	2 males	80 passengers and 5 crew	The aircraft was seized shortly after it took off from Caracas and was diverted to Trinidad where it remained for eight hours. It then proceeded to Aruba where it stayed for about 12 hours before arriving at Curacao where Venezuelan commandos stormed the aircraft and shot and killed the offenders.
10.	31.7.84	Federal Republic of Germany	Air France Boeing 737	Frankfurt to Paris	Switzerland Lebanon Cyprus Iran	3 males	58 passengers and 6 crew	The aircraft was seized while on a flight from Frankfurt to Paris and diverted to Geneva where after refuelling it took off for Beirut. At Beirut officials would not refuel the aircraft and attempted to prevent its departure. The aircraft took off and landed at Cyprus for refuelling en route to Iran where the offenders surrendered to the local authorities. The aircraft was severely damaged by an explosion.
11.	6.8.84	France	French Cargo plane DC-8 (SP Air Company)	Marseille to Algeria		1 male	2 passengers and 4 crew	En route from Marseille to Algeria, a slow-away with a sawed-off shotgun attempted to seize the aircraft. He was overpowered when the aircraft returned to Marseille to refuel.
12.	7.8.84	Iran	Iran Air A-300 Airbus	Shiraz to Jeddah (Saudi Arabia)	Bahrain Egypt Italy	2 males	292 passengers and 13 crew	En route from Tehran to Jeddah the offenders, using a gun diverted the aircraft to Bahrain and Cairo where it was refuelled. It landed in Bonn and after about six hours of negotiations the offenders released all the hostages and surrendered to the local authorities.

SEIZURE

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
13.	24.8.84	India	Indian Airlines Boeing 737	Chandigarh to Srinagar (domestic)	Pakistan United Arab Emirates	7 males	68 passengers and 6 crew	Armed with daggers the offenders seized the aircraft en route to Srinagar and diverted it to Lahore and Karachi, Pakistan. After refueling the aircraft took off for Dubai but permission to land was refused until the fuel was dangerously low. The offenders demanded safe passage to the United States. After negotiations the offenders surrendered to the Dubai authorities. They were turned over to the Indian Government to stand trial.
14.	28.8.84	Iran	Iran Air	Shiraz to Tehran (domestic)	Iraq	1 male 1 female	189 passengers and 11 crew	The offenders were unarmed but claimed that they had explosives and diverted the aircraft to Baghdad where they surrendered to the local authorities.
15.	8.9.84	Iran	Iran Air Boeing 727	Bandar Abbas to Tehran (domestic)	United Arab Emirates Bahrain Egypt	2 males 1 female	118 passengers and crew	The aircraft was seized while en route to Tehran from Bandar Abbas and diverted to Dubai. Permission to land was refused. The aircraft proceeded to Bahrain where it was refueled and subsequently landed at Cairo. All hostages were released and the offenders surrendered to the local authorities.
16.	12.9.84	Iran	Iran Air	Tehran to Shiraz (domestic)		4 males		Iranian security agents foiled the attempted hijacking of the aircraft by forcing it to make an emergency landing and arresting the offenders after a struggle at Isfahan Airport.

561200Z

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	UPPERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
17.	3.10.84	Colombia	Líneas Aéreas del Caribe DC-8 (cargo)	Cartagena to Bogotá (domestic)	Cuba	1 male	5 passengers and 3 crew	The aircraft was seized en route from Cartagena to Bogotá and diverted to Cuba. When the aircraft landed at Havana's José Martí Airport the offender was taken into custody by the Cuban security police. The offender was accompanied by two women and two children who were also taken into custody.
18.	6.11.84	Saudi Arabia	Saudi Arabian Tristar	Jeddah to Riyadh (domestic)	Iran	2 males	110 passengers and 14 crew	The aircraft was seized en route from Jeddah to Riyadh and diverted to Tehran (Iran). The offenders were subdued by the passengers and crew and arrested by the local authorities.
19.	24.11.84	Somalia	Somali Airlines Boeing 707	Mogadishu to Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) via Berbera (domestic)	Ethiopia	3 males	118 passengers and 12 crew	The aircraft was seized en route from Mogadishu to Berbera and diverted to Aden (Southern Yemen). Permission to land was not granted and the aircraft proceeded to Bale International Airport (Addis Ababa). Twenty-two hostages were released and the offenders threatened to blow up the aircraft if 14 political prisoners were not released from jail in Somalia. The offenders subsequently surrendered to the local authorities on 27 November and the remaining hostages released.
20.	4.12.84	United Arab Emirates	Kuwait Airlines A-300	Dubai (UAE) to Karachi, Pakistan	Iran	4 males	154 passengers and 11 crew	The offenders diverted the aircraft to Mehrabad Airport (Tehran). During six days of negotiations, two passengers were killed and most of the hostages released. The offenders demanded the return of prisoners in Kuwait. On the sixth day they threatened to blow up the aircraft and security personnel boarded the aircraft, disarmed the offenders and took them into custody.

SEIZURE

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
21.	31.12.84	U.S.A.	American Airlines DC-10	Virgin Islands to New York (domestic)	Cuba	1 male	185 passengers and 13 crew	<p>The offender (a prisoner) was being trans- ported from St. Croix (Virgin Islands) to the Metropolitan Correctional Centre in New York City. For safety reasons his hand- cuffs had been removed. Three hours after the aircraft left St. Croix he feigned illness and went to the lavatory and emerged holding a revolver. He then dis- armed his three guards and diverted the aircraft to Cuba. When the aircraft landed at Jose Marti Airport he was taken into custody by Cuban authorities.</p>

ATTEMPTED SEIZURE

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
1.	10.2.84	Greece	Olympic Airways Boeing 707	Krete to Athens (domestic)		1 male	181 passengers and 7 crew	Ten minutes after take-off the offender passed a note to the steward threatening to blow up the aircraft unless he was flown to Florida, U.S.A. The pilot agreed to comply with his demand after refuelling at Athens. When the aircraft landed at Athens the offender moved to the cockpit. He was overpowered by the pilot and handed over to the local police.
2.	11.2.84	Mali	American Airlines Boeing 727	Port-au-Prince (Mali) to New York		1 male	143 passengers and 8 crew	The offender boarded the aircraft at Port-au-Prince airport carrying a fully loaded U21 machine gun. He demanded to be flown to New York, the flight's scheduled destination. En route the crew persuaded him to surrender the weapon and the aircraft landed at New York where law enforcement officials boarded the aircraft and took the offender into custody.
3.	21.7.84	United Arab Emirates	Middle East Airlines Boeing	Abu Dhabi Beirut		1 male	147 passengers	Upon departure from Abu Dhabi the offender wielding a simulated "incendiary device" demanded that the aircraft return to Abu Dhabi. The pilot convinced him that there was only enough fuel to reach Beirut. When the aircraft landed the offender released all hostages and surrendered after two hours of negotiations. The offender used a bottle of orange juice in a paper bag as the alleged incendiary device.
4.	15.9.84	Jordan	Iraqi Airways Boeing 737	Cyprus to Baghdad		3 males	100 passengers and crew	A security guard foiled the attempted hijacking of the aircraft while it was flying over Jordan. The three offenders and the guard were wounded in the struggle before control of the aircraft was re-established.

ATTEMPTED SEIZURE NO. DATE LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
5. Sept. 84 Iran	Iran Air		3		Iranian security officials arrested three would-be offenders at Mahabad Airport foiling their attempt to hijack an Iran Air aircraft.
6. 29.11.84 U.S.A.	Eastern-Metro Express Computer	domestic	1 male		On final approach to Atlanta, Georgia, the offender claimed he had a bomb and attempted to seize the aircraft. When the aircraft landed at Atlanta he surrendered to the local authorities after four hours of negotiations.

SABOTAGE

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
1.	4.1.84	U.S.A.	Delta Airlines	Dallas to Los Angeles (domestic)		1 female		The offender started a fire in the lavatory as the aircraft approached Los Angeles Airport. She was overpowered by passengers and two U.S.A. marshals aboard the aircraft. No injuries reported. Minimal damage to the aircraft.
2.	11.1.84	Zaire	Kinshasa Airport	Moscow to Zaire				An incendiary bomb exploded in the customs shed at the airport and baggage that had been unloaded from an Aeroflot aircraft which had just arrived from Moscow. No injuries were reported.
3.	18.1.84	Pakistan	Air France Boeing 747	Karachi to Dhahran (Saudi Arabia)			249 passengers and 15 crew	A bomb in a suitcase exploded in the cargo hold of the aircraft while on a flight from Karachi to Dhahran. The explosion blew a 4-square metre hole in the fuselage and caused decompression in the cabin. The aircraft returned safely to Karachi. No injuries were reported.
4.	13.2.84	Angola	TAAG-Linhas Aereas de Angola Boeing 737	Huambo to Luanda (domestic)			126 persons	An explosion occurred on board the aircraft soon after take-off from Huambo. The port engine, all electronic equipment, the wheels and brakes were damaged. The aircraft returned to the airport. Only a few minor injuries were reported.
5.	10.3.84	Chad	Union des Transports Aeriens DC-8	N'djamena to Paris			62 passengers and 12 crew	A bomb exploded in the cargo hold of the aircraft at N'djamena Airport injuring twenty-four persons. The aircraft was destroyed by fire.
6.	20.4.84	U.K.	Heathrow Airport				22 passengers	A bomb exploded in an unclaimed baggage area outside the British Airways office in Terminal 2, used for flights from Europe and North Africa. Twenty-two passengers were injured, one critically.

SABOTAGE

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
7.	May 84	Japan	Narita Airport					Using a makeshift flamethrower, protesters set fire to part of the airport authority's headquarters building. A security guard post was destroyed by fire.
8.	2.8.84	India	Madras International Airport			1 male	32 killed 19 injured	An explosion destroyed the arrival hall of the airport killing 32 passengers and wounding 19. The bomb had been concealed in a suitcase which had been scheduled to be transported aboard Air Lanka aircraft. It was not shipped as no passenger claimed the suitcase prior to departure of the flight.
9.	30.8.84	Cameroon	Cameroon Airlines Boeing 737				2 killed and 72 injured	The aircraft caught fire as it was taking towards the runway prior to taking off from Douala Airport for Yaounde. A series of explosions were subsequently heard. Two persons were killed and 72 injured.
10.	30.8.84	Bulgaria	Varna airport					A device exploded at the Varna Airport. Several people were killed.
11.	31.8.84	Afghanistan	Airport in Kabul				30 killed and 100 injured	A bomb exploded at the airport in Kabul killing 30 people and injuring 100.
12.	21.9.84	Afghanistan	Ariana Airlines DC-10	Kandahar to Kabul (domestic)			308 persons	The aircraft was hit by gunfire while in flight. The aircraft's left engine, hydraulic system and fuel tank were damaged. A successful emergency landing was made at Kabul airport.
13.	11.10.84	France	Marseille Airport					A bomb exploded at the airport destroying a radio navigation installation. No injuries were reported.

- 11 -

ATTEMPTED SABOTAGE

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
1.	4.8.84	U.S.A.	Kennedy International Airport Pan American World Airways United Airlines				15 passengers 21 passengers	Flights were delayed for more than two hours because of bomb threats. The threats came in telephone calls to both the airlines.
2.	19.10.84	Canada	Air France Concorde	Paris to New York		Montreal		A bomb threat made in Paris forced the aircraft to make an unscheduled landing at Mirabel International Airport. Passengers were evacuated and the aircraft was searched but no bomb was found. The flight resumed after three hours.

- END -

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

CHRONOLOGY OF UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH CIVIL AVIATION (1985)

These lists are periodically compiled by the Public Information Office of the International Civil Aviation Organization from information gathered from the news media, etc., but have no official status.

SEIZURE

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
1.	4.1.85	U.S.A.	Pan American World Airways Boeing 727	Cleveland to New York (domestic)		1 female		When the offender was being inspected/ screened prior to boarding the flight a pistol was seen on the X-ray screen. She grabbed her bag and ran down the concourse followed by two police officers. At the boarding gate she shot and wounded an agent, boarded the aircraft and took seven hostages. Police boarded the aircraft and shot and wounded the offender who was taken into custody. Two persons were injured including the offender.
2.	18.1.85	U.S.A.	Eastern Air Lines A-300	Newark to Miami (domestic)	Orlando, Florida	1 male	124 passengers and 7 crew	Holding a cigarette lighter and a flask containing alleged flammable material, the offender demanded to be flown to Cuba. The pilot informed him that it would be necessary to land in Orlando to refuel. When the aircraft landed in Orlando, the passengers were evacuated and the crew subdued the offender. He was taken into custody by the local authorities.
3.	7.2.85	Lebanon	Cyprus Airways Boeing 707			5 males	12 crew	The offenders seized the aircraft at Beirut Airport and forced the crew to taxi it to a take-off position. The airport control tower refused permission to take-off. The offenders then set a 12-hour deadline and threatened to kill a hostage if their demands were not met. They released the hostages and left the aircraft after six hours.

SEIZURE

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
4.	23.2.85	Lebanon	Middle East Airlines Boeing 707			1 male		The offender brandished a bag, which he claimed contained grenades, as he was boarding the aircraft. He ordered the aircraft to take off, and for five hours it circled over Beirut with doors open and escape chutes dangling. It landed at Larnaca and then flew back to Beirut. When it landed the offender escaped. One passenger died of head injuries after he was sucked out of the open door as the aircraft took off. Seven others were injured sliding down escape chutes.
5.	27.2.85	Federal Republic of Germany	Lufthansa Boeing 727	Frankfurt to Damascus	Austria	2 males	35 passengers and 8 crew	Wielding knives and broken bottles, the offenders diverted the aircraft to Vienna. When the aircraft landed at Schwechat airport, they released all 41 hostages and surrendered after an hour of negotiations.
6.	17.3.85	Saudi Arabia	Saudi Arabian Airlines Boeing 737	Jeddah to Kuwait via Riyadh	Dhahran	1 male	76 passengers and 21 crew	Armed with a hand-grenade the offender seized the aircraft near Riyadh. When the aircraft landed for fuel at Dhahran security guards shot and killed the offender who exploded the hand-grenade in the aircraft causing slight damage.
7.	27.3.85	Federal Republic of Germany	Lufthansa Boeing 727	Munich to Athens	Turkey	1 male	143 passengers and 9 crew	Armed with a knife and a broken bottle the offender diverted the aircraft to Yeitlkoy Airport, Istanbul. He released all passengers and some crew members. His demand to refuel the aircraft was refused by the local authorities. After about two hours he surrendered and was taken into custody. No injuries were reported.
8.	29.3.85	Federal Republic of Germany	Lufthansa Boeing 737	Hamburg/London	U.K.	1 male	108 passengers and 6 crew	The aircraft indicated to the control tower at Heathrow Airport by transponder code that a hijack was in progress. On landing the offender was taken into custody. No casualties were reported.

SEIZURE

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
9.	1.4.85	Lebanon	Middle East Airlines Boeing 707	Beirut to Jeddah	Saudi Arabia		65 passengers and 10 crew	Armed with a pistol and a hand grenade the offender seized the aircraft. Permission to land at Jeddah airport was at first refused. This decision was changed when the pilot informed the control tower that the offender was willing to surrender. When the aircraft landed he was taken into custody by the Saudi Arabian authorities.
10.	11.6.85	Lebanon	Alia, The Royal Jordanian Airline Boeing 727	Beirut to Amman	Larnaca (Cyprus), Palermo (Sicily), Tunisia	6 males	70 persons	The aircraft was first diverted to Tunisia where it was refused permission to land. It then flew to Cyprus and Sicily for refuelling and returned to Beirut. At Beirut airport, after all the hostages were released, the aircraft was blown up.
11.	12.6.85	Lebanon	Middle East Airlines Boeing 707	Beirut to Cyprus		1 male	149 persons	Brandishing a grenade, the offender threatened to blow up the aircraft. He eventually fired the hostages at Larnaca airport and departed for Amman, Jordan aboard a Jordanian airliner.
12.	14.6.85	Greece	Trans World Airlines Inc. (TWA) Boeing 727	Athens to Boston	Beirut, Algiers, Beirut, Algiers, Beirut	2 males	150 persons 8 crew	The offenders, armed with a 9 mm pistol and a Mills hand grenade diverted the aircraft to Beirut and threatened to blow up the aircraft when told Beirut Airport was closed. Permission was then given for the aircraft to land. After releasing 20 passengers the aircraft took off for Algiers where 22 more passengers were released. The aircraft returned to Beirut but took off again for Algiers for the second time and returned to Beirut once more. All but 40 passengers were released. The detained passengers were taken off the aircraft to unknown destinations. They were subsequently released 17 days after the occurrence began. One passenger was shot and killed by the offenders.

SEIZURE

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
13.	21.6.85	Norway	Braathens S.A.F.E. Airtransport (BU) Boeing 737	Trondheim to Oslo (domestic)		1 male	115 passengers and 5 crew	Armed with a gun the offender seized the aircraft, remained in the washroom and demanded a steady supply of beer. When the aircraft landed at Oslo's Fornebu Airport he was taken into custody by the local police. No injuries were reported.
14.	7.7.85	Czechoslovakia	Svazarm 4-seat sport aircraft (2 43)	Chrudim	Mollebrunn (Austria)	3 males	1 crew	Three offenders used chloroform and a rope to overpower the pilot and divert the aircraft to Austria. When the fuel was nearly exhausted the offenders allowed the pilot to make an emergency landing in a field near Mollebrunn.
15.	26.7.85	Australia	Bell 206 Excursion helicopter	Aerial tour of Sea World Park (domestic)	Brisbane Airport	1 male	2 passengers and 1 crew	When the helicopter was airborne, the offender produced a shotgun and demanded to be flown to a United States Air Force base in Japan. The pilot pointed out that the helicopter was carrying limited fuel and landed at Brisbane Airport. The offender emptied fuel on the tarmac from a tanker parked nearby and threatened to set fire to it. After about five hours he surrendered to the local police.
16.	10.11.85	Uganda	Uganda Airlines	(domestic)		1 male	49 persons	Armed with a gun the offender diverted the aircraft. Details are not available.
17.	23.11.85	Greece	Egypt Air Boeing 737	Greece to Egypt	Malta	5 males	93 persons	Armed with hand grenades the offenders diverted the aircraft to Luqa Airport in Malta. The seizure ended a day later when Egyptian commandos stormed the aircraft. Fifty-nine passengers and one security guard were killed, 27 passengers injured and the aircraft destroyed by fire.
18.	25.11.85	Iran	Asseman Airlines Company (Iran)	From an Iranian island to Bandar Abbas (domestic)	United Arab Emirates	2 males		En-route to Bandar Abbas in Hormozgan Province from an Iranian island in the Persian Gulf the aircraft was seized by two offenders and diverted to Dubai in the United Arab Emirates. They surrendered to the local authorities.

SEIZURE

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
19.	19.12.85	USSR	Aeroflot Antonov-24	Nerchinski Zavod to Irkutsk (domestic)	China	1 male	43 persons	Armed with a gun the offender diverted the aircraft to Haller, Inner Mongolia, China. The crew members and all the passengers were returned to the Soviet Union two days later.
20.	19.12.85	United States	Helicopter	Aerial tour (domestic)	A prison in Pelzer, United States	1 female	1 crew	The offender rented a helicopter and when it was airborne, used a pistol and diverted the helicopter to the State prison. The pilot was forced to land in the yard of the prison. After picking up three waiting prisoners the helicopter took off and flew about 6 km and landed in a pasture. The offender and the escaped prisoners abandoned the aircraft. The pilot was released unharmed.

ATTEMPTED SEIZURE

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSION'S OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
1.	11.1.85	Iran	Iran Air Boeing 737	Tehran to Kerman (domestic)			The attempted seizure occurred soon after the aircraft took off from Tehran. The aircraft returned to Tehran. Details are not known.
2.	18.5.85	Republic of Korea	Korean Air Lines Boeing 727	Seoul to Cheju (domestic)	Kwangju (Republic of Korea)	1 male	The offender claimed he had concealed a bomb inside the aircraft and threatened to blow it up unless flown to North Korea. He was overpowered by the crew members. The aircraft made an emergency landing at Kwangju. The aircraft was searched but no explosives were found. No injuries were reported.
3.	28.6.85	Federal Republic of Germany	Turkish Airlines Boeing 727	Frankfurt to Istanbul		1 male 31 passengers	The crew and passengers overpowered the offender who forced his way into the cockpit. He sprayed the pilots with a fire extinguisher. The aircraft landed safely in Istanbul.
4.	4.7.85	Papua New Guinea	Air Niugini	Papua New Guinea to Sydney (Australia)		1 female	A woman was charged with endangering the safety of an aircraft by threatening to hijack an Air Niugini flight from Papua New Guinea to Sydney. No other information is available.
5.	5.8.85	Iran	Iran Air				Security guards foiled an in-flight seizure attempt aboard an aircraft, killing one offender and arresting another.
6.	Nov 85	Iran	Iranian airliner				Security guards aboard the aircraft foiled an attempt to seize the aircraft while it was on a domestic flight.

SABOTAGE

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
1.	24.1.85	Bolivia	Lloyd Aéreo Boliviano SA Boeing 727	La Paz to Miami	Santa Cruz	1 male	1 killed	The offender was killed when an explosive he was carrying in his briefcase detonated on board the aircraft en route to Miami from La Paz. The aircraft landed normally and no other injuries were reported.
2.	27.2.85	Colombia	Aerolíneas Centrales de Colombia SA De Havilland DHC-6-300			Unknown		The aircraft was set on fire during the night at El Bagre Airport. It was completely destroyed.
3.	March 85	United Arab Emirates	Alia, The Royal Jordanian Airline	Karachi to Amman via Dubai		1 male		An explosion occurred on board the aircraft at Dubai airport but no casualties were reported. The pilot landed earlier than scheduled and the explosion occurred while the airport workers were unloading the aircraft.
4.	May 85	Japan	Narita Airport					A series of home-made explosive projectiles landed near the airport. One fell in parkland near an air traffic control centre and injured a worker. Another hit the wall of a security company. Three others landed near a radar installation. There was little damage.
5.	13.6.85	Japan	Narita Airport					Time-bombs heavily damaged an office and four vehicles belonging to construction firms working on the expansion of Narita Airport.
6.	23.6.85	Ireland	Air India Boeing 747	Montreal to London			329 killed	A bomb in the forward cargo hold exploded while the aircraft was flying over the North Atlantic causing the aircraft to crash. There were no survivors.
7.	June 85	Nepal	Bhairahwa Airport					A bomb exploded at Bhairahwa Airport. Details are not available.

SABOTAGE

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
8.	19.6.85	Federal Republic of Germany	Frankfurt Airport				3 killed 42 injured	A bomb exploded in the international departure lounge of the airport killing 3 people and wounding 42.
9.	23.6.85	Japan	Narita Airport				2 killed 4 injured	A bomb placed in checked baggage exploded after it was unloaded from a CP Air flight which had just arrived at the Narita Airport. Two cargo handlers were killed and four were wounded.
10.	1.7.85	Italy	Leonardo da Vinci Airport, Rome				12 injured	An explosion in the baggage area at the airport destroyed a 100 m ² area. The explosion appeared to originate in a suitcase. Twelve people were injured.
11.	21.7.85	France	Le Bourget Airport, Paris				2 killed 9 injured	An explosion destroyed a building at Le Bourget Airport killing two people and injuring nine others.
12.	4.9.85	Afghanistan	Bakhtar Afghan Airlines	Kandahar to Farah (domestic)			47 passengers and 5 crew (all killed)	The aircraft was shut down when it took off from Kandahar Airport, killing all 52 people on board.
13.	30.11.85	United States	American Airlines Boeing 727	San Francisco to Austin (Texas) (domestic)			147 passengers and 7 crew	A bomb exploded inside a baggage compartment of the aircraft during a stopover but caused no injuries. Passengers were evacuated. The bomb was in a cosmetic case inside a baggage holder used for transporting luggage to and from the aircraft.
14.	10.11.85	Luxembourg	Findel Airport					Two bombs destroyed part of the landing approach equipment to the airport. The first explosion wrecked the instrument landing system for the north-east landing strip while the second destroyed localizing equipment for the south-west direction. No injuries were reported.

ATTEMPTED SABOTAGE

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
1.	4.2.85	Peru						Offenders extinguished the runway lights at Lima's airport as Pope John Paul's twin-engine jet arrived but power was restored almost immediately by the automatic generating system.
2.	June 85	Federal Republic of Germany						A news agency in Brussels received an anonymous letter saying that the Frankfurt Airport explosion was a warning ... before the end of the month an important building at Frankfurt Airport and a jumbo jet would be destroyed.
3.	24.6.85	Austria	International Airport at Schwechat, Vienna					The airport was sealed off for 50 minutes after receiving an anonymous telephone call saying a bomb would explode in the airport. The building was searched but no bomb was found.
4.	24.6.85	Italy	Austrian Airlines DC-9	Rome to Vienna			60 passengers and 4 crew	Soon after take-off from Fiumicino Airport the captain was informed that Vienna had received an anonymous call about a bomb on board the aircraft. The aircraft returned to Fiumicino Airport and was searched, but no bomb was found.
5.	24.6.85	United States	People Express Boeing 747	Los Angeles to Newark (domestic)	Chicago		441 passengers	The aircraft landed at Chicago's O'Hare Airport after an anonymous call about a bomb aboard. A search was made of the aircraft and baggage, but no bomb was discovered.
6.	25.6.85	Ireland	Eurelair	Cork to Lourdes				An anonymous telephone call warned Dublin Airport of a bomb aboard Eurair which was boarding passengers at Cork Airport for a flight to Lourdes. The passengers were evacuated and a search was made. No bomb was found.

ATTEMPTED SABOTAGE

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
7.	2.7.85	United Arab Emirates	Air India Boeing 747				220 persons	The aircraft was delayed for seven hours at Dubai after an anonymous telephone caller said that a bomb was in the cargo hold. The aircraft was searched but no bomb was found.
8.	10.7.85	Canada	Mirabel Airport					An anonymous telephone call reported that there was a bomb at the departure area. The area was evacuated and a search was made. A parcel was discovered near the Quebecair counter. It contained no bomb.
9.	26.7.85	Canada	TWA Boeing 747	New York to Rome	Gander (Canada)		270 persons	The New York office of TWA was told that a bomb was on board the aircraft. The aircraft was diverted to Gander International Airport and a search was made. No bomb was discovered. The aircraft was delayed for sixteen hours.
10.	26.9.85	United States	Air Mail Boeing 737	New York to Port-au-Prince		1 male	44 passengers	A bomb was discovered in the suitcase of a passenger who boarded the aircraft but who deplaned five minutes before the aircraft was scheduled to depart. His checked baggage which contained the sabotage device was removed from the cargo hold and the offender arrested.
11.	20.10.85	United Kingdom	Alitalia	New York to Rome	London			After a note warning of a bomb was found aboard the aircraft, it made an emergency landing in London. No explosives were found.

- 11 -

GROUND ATTACK

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
1.	4.4.85	Greece	Alia, The Royal Jordanian Airline Boeing 727	Athens to Amman		1 male	62 passengers 13 crew	The offender fired a bazooka at the aircraft as it prepared to take off from Athens airport. The aircraft was hit in the tail. No injuries were reported. The offender was not apprehended.
2.	27.12.85	Italy	Leonardo da Vinci Airport, Rome			4 males	15 killed 74 injured	The offenders opened fire on bystanders near the El Al Airlines counter in the passenger terminal. They also threw hand grenades. Fifteen people were killed and 74 injured. Three offenders were killed by the security guards.
3.	27.12.85	Austria	Schwechat Airport			3 males	3 killed 47 injured	The offenders opened fire on bystanders near the El Al Airlines counter in the passenger terminal killing 3 and injuring 47. One of the offenders was killed by the security guards.

- END -

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION
CHRONOLOGY OF UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH CIVIL AVIATION (1986)

These lists are periodically compiled by the Public Information Office of the International Civil Aviation Organization from information gathered from the news media, etc., but have no official status.

SEIZURE

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
1.	5.2.86	U.S.A.	Delta Air Lines Lockheed L-1011 Flight 139	Fort Lauderdale/ Dallas/Ft. Worth (domestic)		1 male	221	Perpetrator accosted flight attendant at pocket-knife point to commandeered plane. After negotiations with law enforcement officers the passengers deployed at Dallas Ft. Worth and suspect was arrested.
2.	14.3.86	U.S.A.	Delta Air Lines Flight 655	Daytona (domestic)				Entered baggage claim area of terminal and gained access to air operation office. He threatened ramp supervisor with pistol whereupon the perpetrator forced him to board plane. After demanding the plane to take off, he was persuaded via radio by law enforcement officers to surrender his weapon. The plane taxied back to the terminal. The perpetrator was taken into custody.
3.	25.09.86	Suriname	Conair Air Service C-206 Domestic charter	Domestic		Group	2	After landing at a small Amerindian village and medical post, aircraft was seized by armed men attached to terrorist group. Pilot released.
4.	18.10.86	Suriname	Suriname Airways Boeing Twin Otter Domestic charter	Domestic		Group	4	After aircraft landed at Para it was seized by armed men. Pilots released.
5.	25.12.86	Saudi Arabia	Iraqi Airways Boeing 737	Bagdad-Amman		4 males	117	The plane was commandeered by gun men shortly after take off. The plane crashed in the Saudi Arabian Desert after a mid-air shootout between armed men and security guards. Two perpetrators were killed. Sixty-three persons died. Thirty-two persons injured.

ATTEMPTED SEIZURE

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
1.	4.3.86	Greece	Olympic Airways Boeing 737	Athens- Santorin Domestic		1 male		A Greek national, threatening to blow up the plane with a bomb, ordered the pilot to fly to Libya. The pilot refused saying he had not enough fuel. The perpetrator was arrested at landing.
2.	20.5.86	Finland		Domestic		1 male		A mentally disturbed twenty-year old man used a starter's pistol to take over the plane at Oulu Airport. After a three-hour standoff, he released all the passengers unharmed and was arrested.
3.	23.5.86	U.S.A.	Swissair DC-9	Chicago-Zurich		1 male		Perpetrator passed through screening and waited in sterile area until flight was called whereupon he pulled a pocket knife from his carry-on bag and ran past gate attendant. He then boarded the plane, grabbed a passenger threatening her by knife point and demanded to be flown to Switzerland. After twenty-five minutes of negotiations, the perpetrator released his hostage and was taken into custody by police officers.

ATTEMPTED SEIZURE

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	ORIGINAL ROUTE	DETAILED DESCRIPTION	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
4.	7.6.86	Nicaragua	Aeronica Boeing 727	El Salvador Mexico	1 male	71	The plane was commandeered shortly before take-off by a juvenile delinquent armed with a revolver who was captured three hours later when police rushed the plane.
5.	5.9.86	Karachi Pakistan	PAM AM Boeing 747	Karachi New York (via Frankfurt)	4 males	293	Four gunmen sped on to Karachi Airport terminal driving a vehicle disguised as a security van. They attacked the plane while passengers were boarding and demanded to be flown to Cyprus. Pilots escaped from the aircraft. After perpetrators began to fire at passengers, Pakistan troops stormed the plane. All gunmen are in custody. Lasted sixteen hours. Twenty persons killed, 127 wounded.
6.	20.9.86	U.S.S.R	Tupolev 134	Kiev - West Siberia Domestic	2 males	76	Two armed drug addicts tried to seize an airliner before take-off. During capture of plane, perpetrators opened fire killing two passengers, and were killed also.

SABOTAGE

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVISIONS OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
1.	2.4.86	Greece	TWA Boeing 727	Roma-Athens		117	A bomb, hidden in a paper bag in the aircraft cabin, exploded as the jet neared Athens. Four persons were sucked out of the plane through a hole in the cabin wall. The plane landed safely in Athens ten minutes later. Four persons died and nine were injured.
2.	3.5.86	Sri Lanka	Air Lanka - L-1011	Colombo, Maldiva Is.		134	A bomb planted in a basket of vegetables in the cargo hold exploded while passengers were boarding the aircraft. Sixteen persons killed, nineteen injured.
3.	14.9.86	South Korea				40	A bomb exploded in the crowded terminal building of Seoul's Gimpo International Airport. Five dead, about thirty-five injured.

ATTEMPTED SABOTAGE

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
1.	17.4.86	England (London's Heathrow Airport)	El Al Airlines (Boeing 747)	London-Tel Aviv		1 female	340	A hidden bomb was found in a bag carried by a woman who was about to board.
2.	26.6.86	Spain	El Al Israel Airlines	Madrid-Tel Aviv		1 male	96	A bomb exploded in a suitcase at the El Al Israel Airlines check-in counter in Madrid's International Airport, injuring thirteen people. The bomb was timed to go off while the El Al plane was in flight, police said.
3.	29.12.86	New Zealand	Continental (DC-10)	Auckland/Los Angeles		1 male		Passenger threatened before take-off to blow-up plane claiming he had grenades in his carry-on baggage. Police boarded plane and removed perpetrator. Passengers were evacuated and asked to identify their baggage. There were no explosives found.

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

CHRONOLOGY OF UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH CIVIL AVIATION (1987)

These lists are periodically compiled by the Public Information Office of the International Civil Aviation Organization from information gathered from news media, etc., but have no official status.

SEIZURES

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
1	21.01.87		Egyptian helicopter	Sinai Desert	Cyprus	2 males		Two perpetrators seized company helicopter over Sinai Desert and demanded flight to Cyprus. Upon arrival, perpetrators escaped.
2	24.07.87	Switzerland	DC-10 - Air Afrique RK 056	Brazzaville, Congo, Bangui, Central African Rep., Rome, Italy, Paris, France	Geneva	1 male	163	Perpetrator boarded flight in Bangui, Central African Republic After a stop in Rome, plane was diverted to Geneva for refueling. Perpetrator demanded flight to Beirut and the release of the two Hamed brothers imprisoned in West Germany. Perpetrator killed one passenger and wounded steward. Swiss Authorities stormed aircraft and arrested perpetrator.
3	30.10.87	Suriname	E 206 - Charter flight		Djume		43	Charter flight seized by terrorists diverted aircraft and landed Djolmol, a small medical post. Thought to be part of guerrilla warfare in the interior.
4	22.12.87	Italy	Boeing 737 - KL	Amsterdam/ Milan	Rome, Italy	1 male (15)		Young perpetrator entered cockpit and demanded flight to Rome and US\$1 million. Threatened to blow up plane using a remote control to his luggage. After 2 hours of negotiations surrendered to Authorities in Rome. Unarmed.

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION
CHRONOLOGY OF UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH CIVIL AVIATION

These lists are periodically compiled by the Public Information Office of the International Civil Aviation Organization from information gathered from news media, etc., but have no official status.

**ATTEMPTED
SEIZURES**

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAIL:
1	05.01.87	Dallas Airport USA				1 male		Perpetrator fired gun, grabbed hostage and bypassed security check. Demanded flight to Egypt. Airport personnel secured jet ways thus avoiding seizure. After 7½ hours of negotiation, perpetrator surrendered.
2	10.01.87	USA	DC-9 - New York Air	Newark, N.J., Washington Dulles Airport		1 male	49	An alleged mental patient while boarding plane passed a note threatening to set the plane on fire with chemicals. The man demanded to speak to Louis Farrakhan, head of the Chicago based Nation of Islam Black Muslim Group. The occurrence ended 3½ hours after the suspect permitted passengers and crew to disembark from the jet.
3	07.03.87	USA	Boeing 727 - Alaska Air AS 093	Seattle - Anchorage		1 male	109	Perpetrator during flight demanded flight to Cuba. Subdued by crew, perpetrator arrested upon arrival in Alaska.
4	10.03.87	Havana, Cuba	AN-24 Cuba Airline CU 706			2 males 1 female		While aircraft was taxiing for take-off, perpetrators threatened with grenades and demanded flight to Miami. Passengers attempted to subdue them. During struggle, perpetrators threw grenades injuring 13 and killing one of the perpetrators.

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

CHRONOLOGY OF UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH CIVIL AVIATION

These lists are periodically compiled by the Public Information Office of the International Civil Aviation Organization from information gathered from news media, etc., but have no official status.

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
5	19.05.87	Nadi, Int'l Airport, Fiji	Boeing 747 - Air New Zealand TE 24			1 male	131	The perpetrator held a supervisory position at airport at time of occurrence. After boarding plane he threatened to blow up aircraft unless he was flown to Libya and also demanded release of Parliamentarians in Fiji who were being held under house arrest. Perpetrator released passengers, crew but held 3 crew members hostage for 5 3/4 hours. Finally overpowered by crew.
6	36.11.87	San Francisco Int'l Airport USA	Boeing 767 - Air Canada AC 756			1 male		Crew preparing for take-off when perpetrator burst into cockpit wielding an axe. Demanded flight to London or Ireland. Surrendered after 3 1/2 hours negotiations. No injuries.

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

CHRONOLOGY OF UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH CIVIL AVIATION

These lists are periodically compiled by the Public Information Office of the International Civil Aviation Organization from information gathered from news media, etc., but have no official status.

SABOTAGE

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
1	23.07.87	Cape Town, South Africa						A Limpet mine exploded severely damaging Cape Town International Airport. No injuries.
2	11.11.87	Beirut, Lebanon				1 female		A woman perpetrator posing as a departing passenger carried a suitcase containing a bomb into the Beirut passenger terminal. Bomb exploded killing the perpetrator and 5 other persons. Wounded 70 persons.
3	29.11.87	Andaman Sea S/E of Bangkok	Boeing 707 - Korean Airlines KE 858	Abu Dhabi/ Bangkok		1 male 1 female	115	Korean Airlines flight 858 disappeared over the Andaman Sea Two alleged perpetrators apprehended in Bahrain after deplaning in Abu Dhabi. Male (69) swallowed poison and died; female (26) attempted suicide but survived. Female was extra- dited by South Korean authorities and is presently being held in Seoul, So. Korea, awaiting judgement. No survivors.
4	07.12.87	San Francisco, CA, USA	BAe 146 Pacific South Western Airlines CA	San Francisco to Los Angeles, CA		1 male	51	It is alleged that a former disgruntled airline employee invaded the cockpit, fired at pilot and co-pilot. The aircraft crashed west of Paso Robles. No survivors. 43 people killed.

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION
CHRONOLOGY OF UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH CIVIL AVIATION (1988)

These lists are periodically compiled by the Public Information Office of the International Civil Aviation Organization from information gathered from news media, etc., but have no official status.

SEIZURE

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
1	8.03.88	USSR	Aeroflot - TU-154	Itkutak (Siberia) - Leningrad		11	83	An 11-member family of a Siberian DixieLand jazz band tried to flee to London. This abortive hijacking attempt ended with 9 people dead and 19 wounded.
2	5.04.88	Thailand	Kuwait Airlines - Boeing 747	Bangkok - Kuwait	Mashhad (Iran), Cyprus & Algeria	8	112	Perpetrators who commandeered the plane, demanded that Kuwait release 17 pro-Iranian prison- ers. During this long 16-days odyssey, hostages are beaten & 2 are killed. After negotiations, the last 31 hostages were freed and the hijackers slipped away.
3	12.05.88	China	Xiamen Aviation Co. - Boeing 737	Xiamen-Canton	Taiwan	2 males	118	Perpetrators asked for political asylum in Taiwan where they remained while the aircraft later took off for China.
4	23.05.88	Colombia	Avianca - Boeing 727	Medellin (Colombia) - Bogota	Panama, Aruba & Cartagena (Colombia)	1 male	135	The perpetrator diverted the plane to Panama & Aruba and was persuaded to return to Colombia. At landing, he slipped away but was captured the day after. He demanded \$100,000 and a safe passage to Cuba.
5	29.09.88	Brazil	VASP - Boeing 737	Porto Velho - Rio de Janeiro (domestic)	Goiânia (Brazil)	1 male	105	An armed perpetrator who shot and killed the co-pilot and wounded two crew members was killed by the police after he left the hijacked Boeing 737 to board a getaway plane.

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION
CHRONOLOGY OF UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH CIVIL AVIATION (1988)

These lists are periodically compiled by the Public Information Office of the International Civil Aviation Organization from information gathered from news media, etc., but have no official status.

SEIZURE

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
6	2.12.88	USSR	Aeroflot - IL-76		Tel Aviv (Israel)	4 males 1 female	8	The perpetrators commandeered a school bus in Ordzhonikidze (USSR) and released the hostages in exchange for a ransom and an aircraft. They demanded to be flown out of the country to either Israel, South Africa or Pakistan. When the aircraft landed at Ben Gurion (Tel Aviv) airport, the perpetrators murdered to Israeli authorities after brief negotiations.
7	12.12.88	Turks and Caicos Islands	TWA jet	San Juan - Miami	Grand Turk	1 male	128	The perpetrator told the crew he had a bomb and wanted to go to Cuba. He was arrested at landing in the British-ruled Turks-Caicos. Search proved he was harmless.

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

CHRONOLOGY OF UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH CIVIL AVIATION (1988)

3-

ATTEMPTED SEIZURE These lists are periodically compiled by the Public Information Office of the International Civil Aviation Organization from information gathered from news media, etc., but have no official status.

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
1	13.2.88	Tanzania	Air Tanzania - Boeing 737	Dar es Salaam - Kilimanjaro (domestic)		4 males		Soon after take-off two of the perpetrators burst into the cockpit brandishing a knife and a pistol and demanded to be flown to London via Adis Ababa. The captain agreed and told them that he would have to land at Lodwar in Kenya to refuel. Instead he returned to Dar es Salaam where the perpetrators were taken into custody.
2	29.3.88	Pakistan	Pakistan Airlines	Karachi - Quetta (domestic)		1 male	143	The perpetrator concealed the gun in a jogging shoe and tried to seize the aircraft. He demanded to be flown to Delhi or Kabul. He shot a plain clothes air marshal four times during a scuffle. He was overpowered by another air marshal and passengers. One air marshal wounded.
3	1.10.88	Haiti	American Airlines - A-300 Airbus	Port-au-Prince (Haiti) - New York (USA)		3 males	228	The perpetrators, who were soldiers assigned to airport security patrol, were armed with loaded automatic assault rifles when they boarded the aircraft. They took positions surrounding the passengers and crew. After negotiations they surrendered. When the aircraft landed at Kennedy Airport they were taken into custody. No shots were fired.

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION
CHRONOLOGY OF UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH CIVIL AVIATION (1988)

4-

These lists are periodically compiled by the Public Information Office of the International Civil Aviation Organization from information gathered from news media, etc., but have no official status.

SABOTAGE

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	AIRLINE/AIRCRAFT/ FACILITY	NORMAL ROUTE	DIVERSIONS	OFFENDERS	PERSONS AFFECTED	OTHER DETAILS
1	March 1988	South Africa	Comair	Paleborwa/ Johannesburg (domestic)		1 male	17	The aircraft exploded when it was approaching Johannesburg. A heavily insured passenger known to have serious debt problems is suspected to have caused the explosion. Seventeen people were killed.
2	21.12.88	Lockerbie; Scotland	Boeing 727/747 - Pan Am	Frankfurt - London - New York - Detroit			258	Flight 103 originated in Frankfurt as a Boeing 727. Passengers transferred at London's Heathrow airport to the 747. It broke up at 31,000 ft. over the Scottish town of Lockerbie killing all 259 people aboard and 11 people on the ground. Residue recovered from the debris were consistent with the use of a high performance plastic explosive



U.S. Department of Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration

Office of Civil Aviation Security

***Criminal Acts Against
Civil Aviation
1988***

Contents

Introduction	1
Highlights	3
Explosive Attacks Against Civil Aviation	5
Air Carrier Hijackings Worldwide	11
Attacks Against Civil Aviation Facilities and Personnel	19

Appendixes

A.	U.S.- Registered Air Carrier Hijacking	
	Chronology, 1984 - 1988	21
B.	Foreign Registered Air Carrier Hijacking	
	Chronology, 1984 - 1988	23
C.	Explosions Aboard Aircraft	
	Chronology, 1984 - 1988	27
D.	Significant Criminal Acts Against	
	Civil Aviation, 1988	29

Introduction

The Federal Aviation Administration's Office of Civil Aviation Security maintains records of aircraft hijackings, bombing attacks, and other significant criminal acts against civil aviation worldwide. These records include actual and attempted hijackings; explosions aboard aircraft, at airports, and at airline offices; and other selected criminal acts against civil aviation. These offenses represent serious threats to the safety of civil aviation and, in those incidents involving U.S. air carriers or facilities outside the United States, are often intended as symbolic attacks against the United States.

Hijacking incidents are viewed within the context of the Federal criminal statute (49 USC 1472(b)) which defines air piracy as any seizure or exercise of control, by force or violence or threat of force or violence, or by any form of intimidation, and with wrongful intent, of any aircraft. There is no attempt made in this report to differentiate between an act of air piracy and an attempted act of air piracy.

The information contained in this publication is derived from a variety of government and media sources; however, in many cases specific details of a particular incident may not be available, especially those occurring outside the United States. While the Federal Aviation Administration makes every effort to provide complete and accurate information, it is not always possible to verify accounts of some events used in this publication.

This edition summarizes events which occurred during 1988 and places the events in perspective within a 5-year period.

Highlights

Over the past few years, there has been an overall decline in reported attacks against civil aviation throughout the world. Increased attention to airport and aircraft security and the implementation of antiterrorism measures by a number of countries may have contributed to this decline. Nonetheless, civil aviation continues to be an attractive target for terrorists, or individuals with other criminal motives, because of its high visibility.

The use of explosive devices by terrorists poses the most serious threat to civil aviation security. The destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 by an explosive device is a tragic example of the gravity of this threat.

During 1988, explosions occurred on two aircraft while in-flight which resulted in the destruction of the aircraft and the deaths of all passengers and crew. While the number of bombings on board aircraft has not increased significantly, the frequency of incidents in which the aircraft was destroyed by bombing has increased, as has the number of persons killed in such incidents.

Fifteen hijackings of scheduled air carrier aircraft were reported worldwide. Of the 15, two involved U.S. registered aircraft and 13 involved foreign registered aircraft. As in previous years, most hijackings were committed by individuals seeking political asylum or repatriation, fleeing from criminal prosecution or who were mentally disturbed. The most significant hijacking incident in 1988 was the terrorist-related hijacking of Kuwait Airways Flight 422.

Various criminal attacks were also directed against civil aviation personnel and facilities. Bomb threats, which can potentially paralyze civil aviation operations, occurred at about the same frequency as in 1987.

Explosive Attacks Against Civil Aviation

Overview

During 1988, as in prior years, there were a variety of incidents which involved either the use of explosives, or threatened use of explosives, in attacks upon civil aviation aircraft or facilities in several countries. These incidents range from the mid-air destruction of a wide-body passenger aircraft, and the resultant catastrophic loss of life, to the large number of bomb threats which, although seldom genuine, remain a serious problem.

FAA views attacks upon airline ticket offices and other off-airport facilities and bomb threats as fundamentally different from explosive sabotage attacks directed at aircraft operations. However, all types of explosive related criminal acts against civil aviation are presented in this section to facilitate comparison.

Explosions On Board Aircraft

During 1988, there were two incidents in which explosions occurred on board air carrier aircraft. In both cases the aircraft was destroyed while airborne, and all passengers and crew killed. While the number of bombings on board aircraft per year has not markedly changed for a number of years, the average number of persons killed in such incidents has been increasing.

- Pan Am Flight 103

The December 21, 1988, explosion on Pan Am Flight 103, a B-747-100 series aircraft, resulted in the deaths of 259 people aboard the aircraft and 11 persons on the ground in Scotland. The village of Lockerbie, into which portions of the aircraft crashed, sustained serious damage, including the destruction of some homes and commercial properties.


Although the incident is still under investigation, information made public by the United Kingdom authorities clearly indicated that the aircraft was destroyed by a high explosive device which detonated within a baggage container in the forward baggage hold of the aircraft.

- BOP Air

On March 1, 1988, an aircraft operated by BOP Air, a domestic South African air carrier, exploded as it approached Johannesburg, South Africa, killing all 17 persons on board. Reporting thus far has indicated that an explosive device was

apparently concealed in a suitcase on the aircraft, and was detonated by a suicidal passenger who was heavily in debt. He had taken out a large life insurance policy just before the flight.

Explosions Aboard Air Carrier Aircraft
1984 - 1988



The mid-air bombing of an air carrier aircraft which resulted in its total destruction had not occurred twice in the same year since 1974. Never has there been more than two such incidents reported in a single year, and in 22 of the last 40 years no air carrier aircraft has been destroyed in-flight as a result of a bombing.

There have been 49 incidents since 1949 (including those in which the aircraft was not totally destroyed) in which an explosion occurred on board an air carrier aircraft which was the intended target of an act of sabotage. The average number of such incidents per year has not fluctuated significantly, however, the average number of persons killed in each incident has steadily increased. Although this may largely be attributed to corresponding increases in passenger aircraft seating capacity, it may also suggest that the effectiveness of the explosive devices being introduced into the aircraft has improved as well.

In-Flight Explosive Sabotage Incidents

Period	Number of Incidents	Persons Killed	Average Number Killed
1949-1958	8	97	12
1959-1968	11	254	23
1969-1978	18	624	34
1979-1988	12	849	70

In a number of other incidents, such as the discovery of a hand grenade aboard a Middle East Airlines aircraft at Beirut, Lebanon, after arrival from Damascus, Syria, and the discovery of two limpet mines in the Johannesburg, South Africa, airport, the motives and intended targets are unclear.

In February 1988, a radio-controlled explosive device was found inside the cockpit of a Middle East Airlines aircraft in Beirut which was to have been used to carry the president of Lebanon. While this act may technically not have been a criminal act against civil aviation because the aircraft was not involved in scheduled passenger service at the time, it demonstrates that an entity with a stake in Lebanese politics had both the ability to fabricate such a device and to place it aboard an aircraft. A number of terrorist groups which pose a significant threat to civil aviation operate from Lebanon. This incident may, therefore, indicate that such capabilities are available to one or more of these groups.

Attempted Aircraft Bombings


In addition to incidents which resulted in an actual explosion aboard an aircraft, there were other incidents in which attempts were made to place an explosive device on board aircraft.

In August 1988, a bomb with a faulty timing mechanism was found in the luggage of a woman after she had flown on an Aeroflot domestic flight. This appears to have been an attempt by her husband to kill her by destroying the aircraft.

Another event of considerable importance during 1988 involved the arrest in West Germany of individuals believed to be associated with a Middle Eastern terrorist group. At the time of the arrest, an improvised explosive device hidden in a radio-cassette player was confiscated. The device contained an altitude/pressure sensitive arming feature. While the intended use of the device was unknown, an altitude/pressure sensitive device would appear to be intended for use against aircraft.

Casualties Caused By Explosions Aboard Air Carrier Aircraft

1984 - 1988



Attacks Against Aviation Related Facilities

Between March 7 and April 27, 1988, there were six explosions at Saudi Arabian Airline (Saudia) offices. Countries in which such attacks took place included: Malaysia, Japan, Singapore, Pakistan, West Germany, and Kuwait. The coincidence in targeting and timing almost certainly indicates the actions were part of a systematic campaign to either make it appear unsafe to travel on Saudia or to attack the offices as symbolic targets identifiable with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

The other explosive and incendiary attacks and incidents involving aviation-related facilities do not appear to be part of any overall or systematic pattern. They included the discovery of six bombs, each containing 300 sticks of dynamite, planted alongside the runway of an airfield which had been scheduled for use by the president of Chile, and the discovery of two limpet mines at Jan Smuts Airport, Johannesburg, South Africa. These incidents, as well as the bomb placed at an El Al ticket office in Istanbul, Turkey, and the explosion of a bomb outside a Mexicana Airlines office in Guatemala City, Guatemala, appear to have been carried out for political motives.

**Bombing Attacks Against Airports
and Airline Ticket Offices¹
1988**

	Airports	Ticket Offices
U.S. and Canada	0	0
Latin Am/Caribbean	2	2
Europe/Middle East	0	4
Africa	2	0
Asia	0	1
Far East	2	2
Totals	6	9

¹ Includes explosions as well as incidents in which a device which was capable of exploding was found but where no explosion occurred.


Other incidents carried out for reasons which are not known included the bombing of the offices of the Nicaraguan national airline, Aeronica, in Guatemala; an incendiary device found in the airport at San Pedro Sula, Honduras; and a bomb blast at an Aeroflot office in Geneva, Switzerland.

Bomb Threats

Bomb threats are crimes often intended to disrupt civil aviation operations. FAA receives and maintains records concerning bomb threats involving U.S. air carriers and U.S. airports. No such data is maintained concerning incidents of this type involving air carriers of other countries operating outside the United States.

BOMB THREATS AGAINST U.S. AIRCRAFT AND AIRPORTS

1984 - 1988



Furthermore, the U.S. Government normally will not receive information on bomb threats to a foreign airport unless a U.S. air carrier which operates from that airport, or the foreign government involved, brings the information to the attention of the United States. Many governments view the security of airports as exclusively the responsibility of the host nation and do not disseminate information of this type.

As a result, FAA does not have sufficient specific information to draw firm conclusions concerning bomb threats in foreign locations. There is, however, some evidence to suggest that patterns which have been observed with U.S. bomb threats may be applicable in other countries as well.

In the United States over the past 5 years there have been about 600 bomb threats each year against U.S. air carriers or airports except in 1986 when the number rose to 993. The increase in bomb threats during the latter part of 1985 and 1986 may be the result of extensive publicity given to aviation security incidents in 1985.

PAN AM Flight 103

At a few minutes past 6 p.m. on Wednesday, December 21, 1988, Pan Am Flight 103 pushed back from the gate at Terminal 3 of London's Heathrow Airport. The aircraft, a Boeing 747 christened "Maid of the Seas," had 259 people aboard: 243 passengers, 13 cabin crewmembers, and a flight crew of three. The aircraft took-off at 6:25 p.m., started climbing and turned north as it began its planned flight over Scotland to New York. At 7:03 p.m., as the jumbo jet was in level flight at 31,000 feet, an explosion occurred in the front cargo compartment on the left side of the aircraft. The blast evidently immediately incapacitated the aircraft's radio system and the aircraft broke into a number of pieces within seconds.

Most of the B-747 came down in the small town of Lockerbie, Scotland, just 15 miles north of the Scottish-English border. The largest piece, the fuselage, crashed into a quiet street named Sherwood Crescent, killing 11 local residents. All 259 people aboard the B-747 were killed.


During the next few days, British authorities mounted an extensive search and recovery operation which lasted for over a month and at one point involved over 2,000 police and military personnel. Bodies of the victims from Pan Am 103 were scattered over a ten mile area and wreckage was found as far as 100 miles to the east. The actual search area encompassed almost 850 square miles.

The two initial theories as to the crash revolved around a major structural failure of the aircraft or an in-flight explosion, neither of which could be confirmed in the days immediately following the disaster. Both tracks were being pursued by the Scottish police and the U.K. Aircraft Accident Investigating Board. However, on December 28, 1988, the Scottish police


announced that their investigations to date indicated that the crash of Pan Am 103, and the subsequent loss of 270 lives, was due to an explosive device. The crash investigation then became, and still is, one of the largest murder inquiries ever conducted in Scotland.

Almost two months after the crash, on February 16, 1989, the senior investigating officer announced that the explosive device that brought down Pan Am 103 had been contained in a radio-cassette player which had been placed in a piece of checked baggage. All indications were that the baggage may have been checked through on Pan Am 103 from the feeder flight, Pan Am 103A, which originated at Frankfurt International Airport, Frankfurt, West Germany.

To date, there has been considerable speculation as to who was responsible for placing the explosive device aboard Pan Am 103, but no specific individual or terrorist group has been clearly assigned culpability. The investigation by the Scottish authorities, with assistance from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, continues as of the publication of this report.



Part of the forward fuselage in a field near Lockerbie.



Landing gear of the B-747 next to a Lockerbie housing development.



One of the aircraft's engines partially buried in a Lockerbie street.

Air Carrier Hijackings Worldwide

In 1988, there were 15 hijackings of scheduled air carrier aircraft worldwide. Of the 15, two were U.S. registered aircraft and 13 were foreign-registered aircraft. While this total indicates a slight increase over the totals reported during 1986 and 1987 (13 each), it nevertheless represents a substantial decrease from the total worldwide hijackings (26) which occurred in 1984 and 1985.

The most significant hijacking incident of 1988 was the April 5, terrorist-related, hijacking of Kuwait Airways Flight 422. The other hijackings were conducted primarily by mentally unstable individuals, persons attempting to escape repressive political regimes, or other criminals.

Air Carrier Hijackings-Worldwide

Year	U.S. Registered	Foreign Registered	Total
1984	5	21	26
1985	4	22	26
1986	4	9	13
1987	4	9	13
1988	2	13	15
Total	19	74	93


The relative decrease in the number of hijackings worldwide since 1985 may be attributed to a number of factors. Increased world attention to airport and aircraft security in the last few years, as well as increased worldwide emphasis on antiterrorism measures, probably contributed to this decline. The measures taken by many governments against state sponsors of terrorism and the resultant diplomatic initiatives may also have been pertinent.

As in previous years, most hijackings were not committed by terrorists: groups but by individuals seeking political asylum or repatriation, fleeing from criminal prosecution, or who were mentally disturbed. These types of hijackers, with personal, criminal, obscure or delusional motives, have been extremely difficult to counter as they do not follow established patterns of behavior nor is there any known type of warning prior to the incident occurring. A byproduct of the

international antiterrorism effort appears to have been a reduction in hijacking attempts by these types of individuals due to increased and obvious security measures.

During 1988, 13 deaths and 24 casualties resulted from hijacking incidents worldwide. Nine of the deaths were connected to the hijacking of a Soviet Aeroflot flight. Two deaths occurred during the hijacking of Kuwait Airways Flight 422. From 1984 through 1988, a total of 181 deaths and 325 injuries occurred in connection with hijackings. During 1987, 4 people were killed and 44 injured worldwide. The hijacking of Air Afrique Flight 065 in 1987 resulted in 1 death and 29 injuries. Also during 1987, several casualties occurred during the attempted hijacking of Cubana Airlines Flight 706. However, the greatest number of deaths and injuries due to hijackings were reported during 1986 when 91 people were killed and 178 were injured worldwide. Of this total, 22 deaths and 125 injuries resulted from the hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73 in Karachi, Pakistan, in 1986. During the hijacking of Iraqi Airways Flight 163, also in 1986, a significant number of deaths (65) and injuries (42) occurred. In 1985, 60 people were killed during the hijacking and subsequent ill-fated rescue operation of Egyptair Flight 648 in Malta. A total of 8 deaths and 27 injuries were reported in 1984.

Hijack-Related Casualties
1984 - 1988




U.S. Air Carrier Hijackings

In 1988, there were two hijacking incidents involving U.S.-registered air carrier¹ aircraft. Between 1984 and 1988 there were 19 hijacking incidents involving U.S. air carriers; 15 originated within the United States or its territories while 4 originated from foreign locations.

During the period 1984 through 1988, 7 of the 19 (36 percent) hijacking incidents involved the hijacker demanding that the aircraft be diverted to Cuba. In 1988, one of the two hijackings involved Cuba as a destination.

U.S.-Registered Air Carrier Hijackings
1984 - 1988



There were no hijackings by terrorist groups of U.S. air carriers in 1988 or 1987. The most recent terrorist hijacking of a U.S. aircraft occurred in 1986 when Pan Am Flight 73 was commandeered at Karachi by four heavily armed men disguised as airport security personnel. During the incident, 22 people were killed and over 125 injured. In 1985, the only terrorist hijacking of a U.S. air carrier

¹ The FAA issues operating certificates to U.S. citizens or corporations which are engaged in public charter and/or scheduled passenger air operations. A person or corporation engaged in such air operations is referred to as a "certificate holder." In this report such certificate holders are referred to as air carriers in order to differentiate them from general aviation operators and aircraft.

was the hijacking of TWA Flight 847, seized during a flight from Athens to Rome. There were no terrorist hijackings of U.S. aircraft in 1984.

Neither of the two U.S. air carrier hijacking incidents in 1988 involved the defeat of the preboard passenger screening process. In one incident, however, the hijacker claimed to have brought an explosive device with him aboard the aircraft and demanded to be flown to Cuba. This claim was subsequently determined to be false. In the other incident, three armed Haitian soldiers forced their way aboard the aircraft during the boarding process in Port-au-Prince and demanded to be flown to New York.

Weapons Used by Hijackers
of U.S. Air Carriers
1984 - 1988

Type of Weapon	Actual Weapon	Alleged ² (or fake)	Total
Explosives	3	6	9
Incendiaries	0	3	3
Firearms	9	0	9
Knives	1	0	1
Total	13	9	22

² When no weapon was actually seen, or its authenticity could not be established, the weapon is categorized as "alleged."

³ The total number of times each weapon was used does not correspond to the total number of hijackings (19) as multiple weapon types were claimed in some incidents.

During 1987, four U.S. air carrier hijacking incidents were reported, none of which involved the defeat of the preboard passenger screening process. In one incident, an armed hijacker forced his way through the preboard passenger screening point and took a hostage in an unsuccessful attempt to commandeer an aircraft. In another incident, the hijacker used an improvised explosive device when he hijacked a commuter aircraft in an attempt to go to Cuba. No preboard passenger screening was required for this flight. In the other two incidents, the hijacker did not have an actual weapon.

Of the four incidents in 1987, one involved the hijacker assaulting the aircraft after circumventing the preboard screening process. This method of attack occurred in three of the four U.S. air carrier hijackings in 1986.

From 1984 through 1988, 9 of the 19 hijackings of U.S. air carriers (47 percent) were committed by individuals who had

Weapon Types Used by Hijackers of U.S. Air Carriers Who Went Through Preboard Screening 1984 - 1988			
	Actual Weapons	Alleged or Fake	Number of Hijackings in Which Used
Explosives	1	3	4
Incendiaries	0	2	2
Firearms	1	1	2
Knives	1	0	1
Total	3⁴	6	9

⁴ This figure can be put in perspective when compared with the total number of persons screened at U.S. airports and weapons discovered. From 1984 through 1988, over 4.6 billion persons were screened while 15,210 firearms and 54 explosive or incendiary devices were detected.

gone through preboard screening. Actual weapons (explosives, incendiaries, firearms, knives, or any combination of these) were used in only three of the nine hijackings. Thus, 67 percent of the hijackings of U.S. air carriers from 1984 through 1988 in which the hijacker went through preboard screening did not involve an actual weapon or explosive device. In 9 of the 19 U.S. air carrier hijackings from 1984 through 1988 the hijacker used or claimed to have a firearm, explosive, or incendiary device. In one incident, the hijacker threatened physical violence but was quickly subdued.

During this period, the majority (68 percent) of hijackings were committed by individuals with a variety of criminal motives, thus continuing an established pattern. The second largest category (21 percent) of hijackings were carried out by persons determined to be mentally incompetent by judicial authority. Terrorists accounted for the smallest percentage of hijackings during this period, only 11 percent (2 of 19).

In 1988, one of the two hijackings of U.S. air carriers originated in a U.S. territory and the other originated outside the United States. Of all the hijackings of U.S. air carriers from 1984 through 1988, 79 percent originated in the United States or its territories while 21 percent originated from foreign locations.



Above and right: Preboard passenger screening operations.

**MOTIVES OF HIJACKERS OF U.S. AIR CARRIERS
1984 - 1988**

Other Criminal Motives*
13 (58%)




Mentally Incompetent
4 (21%)

*In 7 of these incidents,
Cuba was the destination of
the hijackers


Terrorist
2 (11%)

**U.S.-REGISTERED AIR CARRIER HIJACKINGS
1969 - 1988**



Locations of Hijackings of U.S. Air Carriers 1984 - 1988

Within the United States and Its Territories (15)



**Puerto Rico - 1
St. Croix, U.S.V.I. - 2**


Foreign Locations (4)

**Port-au-Prince, Haiti - (1984, 1988)
Athens, Greece - (1985)
Karachi, Pakistan - (1986)**

Foreign Air Carrier Hijackings

During 1988, 13 hijackings of foreign air carriers were reported compared to 9 incidents in both 1986 and 1987. Despite this increase, hijackings during the last three years have substantially decreased from the number of such hijackings in 1984 (21) and 1985 (22).

Foreign-Registered Air Carrier Hijackings
1984 - 1988



In 1988, the most significant hijacking of a foreign air carrier was conducted by international terrorists. On April 5, Kuwait Airways Flight 422, while en route from Bangkok to Kuwait, was seized by at least seven Middle Eastern terrorists. (Conflicting reports have left the exact number of hijackers, as yet, uncertain.) The hijackers demanded that the Government of Kuwait release 17 terrorists incarcerated for their involvement in the 1983 bombing of Kuwaiti government facilities and the United States and French Embassies in Kuwait. This hijacking lasted 16 days and during this time the aircraft landed in Mashad, Iran; Larnaca, Cyprus; and, finally, Algiers, Algeria, where it remained until the ordeal ended. Two Kuwaiti passengers were killed during the hijacking.

This incident clearly demonstrated the ability of some international terrorists to conduct a prolonged hijacking. The hijackers were well organized and trained and conscious of the value of manipulating the media covering this event.

Of the other 12 foreign air carrier hijacking incidents in 1988, 3 were conducted by individuals attempting to flee from authoritarian regimes and 3 involved individuals subsequently determined to be mentally unstable. The other incidents were carried out by hijackers who ranged from individuals seeking better economic conditions, to suspected criminals fleeing from law enforcement authorities, to an individual seeking the reunification of China.

From 1984 through 1988, the greatest number of reported hijackings of foreign-registered air carriers occurred in the Middle East (26), followed by Western Europe (12), and Latin America (9). Many of the incidents which occurred in the Middle East were carried out by individuals attempting to flee from authoritarian regimes. Three of the four hijackings in Latin America during 1988 can be attributed to individuals determined to be mentally unstable. The fourth hijacking was conducted in connection with a robbery.

In addition to the 13 documented foreign air carrier hijackings in 1988, there were 2 hijackings of foreign-registered general aviation aircraft. Details of these incidents are provided in Appendix D.

General Aviation Hijackings

There were no reported general aviation¹ hijacking incidents in 1988 involving U.S.-registered aircraft. From 1984 through 1988, an average of slightly more than one such hijacking per year was reported.

Five Year Summary


	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	Totals
U.S.	2	1	1	2	0	6
Foreign	1	9	6	4	2	22
Totals	3	10	7	6	2	28

¹ Normally, general aviation operators and aircraft are not subject to the same security regulations as are scheduled air carriers. Under U.S. regulations no preboard passenger screening is required unless the operator or passengers of a general aviation aircraft displane into the sterile system of an airport servicing scheduled air carrier aircraft.

**FOREIGN-REGISTERED AIR CARRIER HIJACKINGS BY GEOGRAPHIC REGION
1984 - 1988**

	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	Total
Eastern Europe	0	1	2	2	2	7
Western Europe	3	6	1	2	0	12
Middle East	9	10	3	2	2	26
Latin America	3	0	1	1	4	9
South and Southeast Asia	3	1	1	1	2	8
Far East	2	3	0	0	2	7
Africa	1	1	0	0	1	3
North America	0	0	1	1	0	2
Total	21	22	9	9	13	74

**FOREIGN-REGISTERED AIR CARRIER HIJACKINGS
1969 - 1988**



Attacks Against Civil Aviation Facilities and Personnel

In addition to hijackings and explosive attacks against airliners and embarked passengers, criminal attacks also occur against civil aviation personnel and facilities. During 1988, there were 13 such attacks.

The most significant of these was the March 25 attack on 12 air crewmembers of Alitalia Flight 1761 outside the passenger terminal of Bombay's Sahar International Airport. The crewmembers had just boarded an airport-to-hotel shuttle bus when an individual forced his way onto the bus firing shots from a machine pistol. One of the shots wounded the captain of the Alitalia crew. The assailant also threw a grenade into the bus, but the grenade did not explode. The assailant fled across the parking lot but was quickly apprehended by an off-duty police officer after a taxi driver blocked the assailant's escape route. He admitted to being a member of the Abu Nidal Organization.

Attacks Against Civil Aviation as a Result of War and Insurgency

Periodically, attacks against civil aviation occur in areas where war or insurgencies are taking place. It is difficult to categorize these attacks as terrorist or criminal since the intention to harm noncombatants is not clear. In 1988, there were four incidents that fell in this category.

In July, an Iran Air A-300 aircraft (Flight 655), was shot down by the USS Vincennes over the Persian Gulf. The U.S. warship, which had been engaged in combat with small surface vessels in the Gulf, mistook the airliner for an attacking fighter aircraft. Prior to firing its missiles, the

USS Vincennes crew unsuccessfully attempted to identify and communicate with the Iranian airliner. As many as 290 passengers and crew on the aircraft died.

In August, Angolan fighter planes mistakenly fired on and damaged a BAe 125 series 8000 jet carrying the President of Botswana on a flight to Luanda. The President was slightly injured.

In September, a Nile Safaris B-707, which was landing at Juba, Sudan, was attacked with machine guns and rocket propelled grenades by rebels of the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army.

In December, two DC-7 aircraft operating under a locust spraying contract for the U.S. Agency for International Development were fired on with SA-7 surface-to-air missiles in the Western Sahara. One of the aircraft was shot down and five U.S. citizens were killed. The second aircraft was damaged but managed to land safely at Sidi Ifni, Morocco. The Polisario, an insurgent group that opposes Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara, admitted that its forces shot down the aircraft but claimed that it did so by mistake.

Appendix A

U.S. - Registered Air Carrier Hijacking Chronology, 1984 - 1988

Date	Carrier	Type	Flight Plan	No. of Hijackers	How Boarded - Aircraft ¹	Weapon Type/Status	R F A ²			Destination/ Objective
02-11-84	American	B-727	Port-au-Prince, Haiti/ New York, NY	1 M	AA	Gun	x			United States/ Political asylum
03-27-84	Piedmont	B-737	Charlotte/Charleston, NC	1 M	S	Explosive		x		Cuba/Extortion/ Prisoner release
03-28-84	Delta	B-727	New Orleans, LA/ Dallas, TX	1 M	S	Incendiary		x		Cuba
11-29-84	Eastern	HP-13	Augusta/Atlanta, GA	1 M	S	Explosive		x		Demanded help for drug problem
12-31-84	American	DC-10	St. Croix, V.I./New York, NY	1 M	S (weapon hidden on board)	Gun	x			Cuba
01-04-85	Pan Am	B-727	Cleveland, OH/New York, NY	1 F	AA	Gun	x			Brazil
01-18-85	Eastern	A-300	Newark, NJ/Miami, FL	1 M	S	Explosive		x		Cuba
06-14-85	TWA	B-727	Athens, Greece/Rome, Italy	2 M	S	Explosive Gun	x			Beirut/Prisoner release
11-19-85	America West	B-737	Phoenix, AZ/Ontario, CA	1 M	AA	Explosive			x	Unknown
02-05-86	Delta	L-1011	Ft. Lauderdale, FL/Dallas, TX	1 M	S	Knife	x			Police protection
03-14-86	Delta	DC-9	Dallas, TX	1 M	AA	Gun	x			Suicide
05-02-86	Horizon	SA-227	Eugene/Portland, OR	1 M	AA	Incendiary Gun		x		Phoenix
09-05-86	Pan Am	B-747	Karachi, Pakistan/ Frankfurt, FRG	4 M	AA	Explosive Gun	x			Cyprus/Prisoner release
01-05-87	Delta	N/A	Dallas, TX	1 M	AA	Gun	x			Egypt
01-10-87	New York Air	DC-9	Newark, NJ/Wash. DC	1 M	S	Incendiary		x		Speak with officials
03-07-87	Alaska	B-727	Seattle, WA/Anchorage, AK	1 M	S	Gun			x	Cuba
06-05-87	Virgin Islands Seaplane	Grumman Mallard	St. Croix, V.I./San Juan, PR	1 M	Passengers not screened	Explosive	x			Cuba
10-01-88	American	A-300	Port-au-Prince, Haiti/ New York, NY	3 M	AA	Gun	x			United States/ Political asylum
12-11-88	TWA	B-727	San Juan, PR/Miami, FL	1 M	S	Explosive			x	Cuba

¹ Screened (S); Assaulted Aircraft (AA).

² Weapon status: Real (R); Fake (F); or Alleged (A). Note: When no weapon was actually seen, or its authenticity could not be established, the weapon is categorized as "alleged."

Appendix B

Foreign-Registered Air Carrier Hijacking Chronology, 1984 - 1988

Date	Carrier	Aircraft Type	Flight Plan	Destination/Objective
02-03-84	Varig-Cruzeiro	A-300	San Luis/Belam, Brazil	Cuba
03-07-84	Air France	B-737	Frankfurt, FRG/Paris, France	Libya
03-22-84	British Airways	B-747	Hong Kong/Beijing, PRC	Taiwan
04-05-84	Saudi Arabian Airlines	DC-10	Jiddah, Saudi Arabia/Damascus, Syria	Stockholm, Sweden
06-25-84	CAAC (PRC)	Unknown	Nanchung/Fuzhou, China	Taiwan
06-26-84	Iran Air	B-727	Tehran/Bushehr, Iran	Baghdad, Iraq/Political asylum
07-05-84	Indian Airlines	A-300	Srinagar/New Delhi, India	Lahore/Prisoner release/Money to repair Sikh temple
07-21-84	MEA	B-707	Abu Dhabi, UAE/Beirut, Lebanon	Abu Dhabi, UAE
07-29-84	Aerpostal	DC-9	Caracas, Venezuela/Curacao, Netherlands Antilles	Curacao/Extortion
07-31-84	Air France	B-737	Frankfurt, FRG/Paris, France	Tehran/Prisoner release
08-07-84	Iran Air	A-300	Tehran/Shiraz, Iran/Jiddah, Saudi Arabia	Paris/Political asylum
08-10-84	Indian Airlines	Unknown	Mangalore/Bangalore, India	Unknown
08-24-84	Indian Airlines	B-737	New Delhi/Srinagar, India	Dubai, UAE/Prisoner release
08-28-84	Iran Air	A-300	Tehran/Shiraz, Iran	Kuwait/Political asylum
09-08-84	Iran Air	B-727	Bandar Abbas/Tehran, Iran	Abu Dhabi, UAE/Political asylum
09-12-84	Iran Air	A-300	Tehran/Shiraz, Iran	Unknown
09-16-84	Iraqi Airways	B-737	Larnaca, Cyprus/Baghdad, Iraq	Unknown
10-02-84	LAC	DC-8	Cartagena/Bogota, Colombia	Cuba
11-05-84	Saudi Arabian Airlines	L-1011	London, U.K., Jiddah/Riyadh, Saudi Arabia	Tehran/Government reform/Political asylum
11-24-84	Somali Airlines	B-707	Mogadishu, Somalia/Jiddah, Saudi Arabia	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia/Prisoner release/Political asylum
12-04-84	Kuwait Airways	A-310	Dubai, UAE/Karachi, Pakistan	Tehran/Prisoner release
02-07-85	Cyprus Air	B-707	Beirut, Lebanon/Larnaca, Cyprus	Prisoner release
02-23-85	MEA	B-707	Beirut, Lebanon/Paris, France	Cyprus/Government reform
02-27-85	Lufthansa	B-727	Frankfurt, FRG/Damascus, Syria	Vienna, Austria/Political asylum
03-17-85	Saudi Arabian Airlines	B-737	Jiddah/Riyadh, Saudi Arabia	Unknown
03-27-85	Lufthansa	B-727	Munich, FRG/Athens, Greece	Libya
03-29-85	Lufthansa	B-737	Hamburg, FRG/London, U.K.	Hawaii
04-01-85	MEA	B-707	Beirut, Lebanon/Jiddah, Saudi Arabia	Extortion
04-26-85	China Airlines (ROC)	B-737	Taiwan/Kaohsiung, ROC	Hong Kong
05-18-85	Korean Air	B-727	Seoul/Cheju, South Korea	North Korea
06-11-85	Alia (Jordan)	B-727	Beirut, Lebanon/Amman, Jordan	Tunisia/Departure of Palestinian guerrillas from Beirut
06-12-85	MEA	B-707	Beirut, Lebanon/Larnaca, Cyprus	In retaliation for 6/11/85 Alia aircraft hijacking

Appendix B - Continued

Foreign-Registered Air Carrier Hijacking Chronology, 1984 - 1988

Date	Carrier	Aircraft Type	Flight Plan	Destination/Objective
06-21-85	Braathens S.A.F.E. (Norway)	B-737	Tromsø/Oslo, Norway	Government reform
06-28-85	THY	B-727	Frankfurt, FRG/Istanbul, Turkey	Unknown
07-04-85	Air Niugini	A-300	Port Moresby, New Guinea/Brisbane, Australia	Sydney, Australia
08-05-85	Iran Air	B-727	Tehran/Bandar Abbas, Iran	Unknown
11-02-85	Iran Air	B-707	Bandar Abbas/Tehran, Iran	Unknown
11-10-85	Uganda Airlines	F-27	Kampala/Arwa, Uganda	Kasese, Uganda
11-23-85	Egyptair	B-737	Athens, Greece/Cairo, Egypt	Libya/Tunisia
11-25-85	Iran Asseman	Cmdr-500	(Unk)/Bandar Abbas, Iran	Dubai, UAE
12-19-85	Aeroflot	AN-24	Nerchinskiy Zavod/Irkutsk, USSR	Another country
12-23-85	Iran Air	Unknown	Sirri Island/Shiraz, Iran	Unknown
12-27-85	Saudi Arabian Airlines	B-747	Karachi, Pakistan/Riyadh, Saudi Arabia	Unknown
05-03-86	China Airlines (ROC)	B-747	Bangkok, Thailor /Hong Kong	Peoples Republic of China/ Political asylum
05-20-86	Finn Air	DC-9	Oulu/Helsinki, Finland	Public statement
05-23-86	Swiss Air	DC-10	Chicago, IL/Zurich, Switzerland	Switzerland/Produce movies
06-07-86	Aeronica	B-727	Managua, Nicaragua/San Salvador, El Salvador	El Salvador/United States
07-05-86	Sudan Airways	B-707	Baghdad, Iraq/Khartoum, Sudan	Israel
08-28-86	LOT	TU-134	Wroclaw/Warsaw, Poland	Unknown
09-20-86	Aeroflot	TU-134	Kiev/Ufa/Nizhnevartovsk, USSR	Escape police custody
11-10-86	Iran Air	A-300	Tehran/Tabriz, Iran	Unknown
12-25-86	Iraqi Airways	B-737	Baghdad, Iraq/Amman, Jordan	Unknown
03-10-87	Cubana Airlines	AN-24	Havana/Nueva Gerona, Cuba	United States
05-05-87	Iran Air	Unknown	Shiraz/Tehran, Iran	Unknown
05-15-87	N/A	N/A	Warsaw, Poland	West Berlin/Political asylum
05-19-87	Air New Zealand	B-747	Nadi, Fiji	Libya
07-24-87	Air Afrique	DC-10	Brazzaville, Congo/Paris, France	Beirut/Prisoner release
09-08-87	LOT	Unknown	Warsaw, Poland/Athens, Greece	Unknown
11-06-87	Air Canada	B-767	San Francisco, CA/Toronto, Ont.	London/Ireland
11-23-87	KLM	B-737	Amsterdam, Neth./Milan, Italy	United States/Extortion
11-25-87	Iranian Airliner	Unknown	Tehran/Mashad, Iran	Unknown
01-04-88	Aeromexico	DC-9	Juarez/Mexico City, Mexico	Brownsville, TX
5-88	Iran Air	Unknown	Tehran/Mashad, Iran	Unknown
02-13-88	Air Tanzania	B-737	Dar es Salaam/Kilimanjaro, Tanzania	London/Restoration of political figure
02-22-88	China Airlines (ROC)	B-737	Taipei/Kaohsiang, ROC	Peoples Republic of China

Appendix B - Continued

Foreign-Registered Air Carrier Hijacking Chronology, 1984 - 1988

Date	Carrier	Aircraft Type	Flight Plan	Destination/Objective
03-08-88	Aeroflot	TU-154	Irkutsk/Leningrad, USSR	London
03-12-88	Pakistan International Airlines	A-300	Karachi/Quetta, Pakistan	India or Afghanistan
04-05-88	Kuwait Airways	B-747	Bangkok, Thailand/Kuwait	Mashad, Iran/Prisoner release
05-12-88	CAAC (PRC)	B-737	Xiamen/Guangzhou, PRC	Republic of China/Political asylum
05-23-88	Avianca	B-727	Medellin/Bogota, Colombia	Cuba/Extortion
08-01-88	ACES (Colombia)	DHC-6	El Bagre/Medellin, Colombia	Remote airstrip/Robbery
09-29-88	VASP (Brazil)	B-737	Belo Horizonte/Rio de Janeiro, Brazil	Brazilia
10-22-88	Iran Air	B-747	Tehran, Iran/Frankfurt, FRG	Unknown
12-02-88	Aeroflot	IL-76	Mineralnyye Vody, USSR	Israel

Appendix C

Explosions Aboard Aircraft Chronology, 1984 - 1988

Date	Carrier	Type	Flight Plan	Location on Aircraft	Result
01-18-84	Air France	B-747	Karachi, Pakistan/Dharam, Saudi Arabia	Cargo hold	Major damage/ Landed safely; No injuries
03-10-84	Union Des Transport	DC-8	Brazzaville, Congo/N'Djamena, Chad/Paris, France	Baggage compartment	On ground in Chad/ Aircraft destroyed; 24 injured
01-23-85	Lloyd Aereo Boliviano	B-727	La Paz/Santa Cruz, Bolivia	Forward lavatory	Landed safely; 1 killed
03-09-85	Royal Jordanian Airlines	L-1011	Karachi, Pakistan/ Dubai, UAE	Baggage compartment	On ground at Dubai; No injuries
06-23-85	Air India	B-747	Montreal, Quebec/London, England	Cargo hold	Crashed in ocean near Ireland; 329 killed
10-30-85	American Airlines	B-727	Austin/Dallas, TX	Baggage compartment	On ground at Dallas No injuries
04-02-86	TWA	B-727	Rome, Italy/ Athens, Greece/ Cairo, Egypt	Cabin area	Near Athens/ Landed safely; 4 killed, 9 injured
05-03-86	Air Lanka	L-1011	Colombo, Sri Lanka	Cargo hold	On ground at Colombo; 16 killed, 41 injured
10-26-86	Thai Airways	A-300	Bangkok, Thailand/Manila, Philippines/ Osaka, Japan	Rear lavatory	Landed in Osaka; 62 injured
11-29-87	Korean Air	B-707	Baghdad, Iraq/ Seoul, So. Korea	Cabin area	Aircraft destroyed in-flight; 115 killed
03-01-88	BOP Air	Bombardier	Phalaborwa/ Johannesburg, So. Africa	Cabin Area	Aircraft destroyed in-flight; 17 killed
12-21-88	Pan Am	B-747	London/New York	Baggage compartment	Aircraft destroyed in-flight; 259 on aircraft, 11 on ground, killed

Appendix D

Significant Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation, 1988

4 January

HIJACKING OF AEROMEXICO FLIGHT 179 FROM JUAREZ TO MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

An Aeromexico DC-9 with 111 passengers and 8 crew members was hijacked by a lone male passenger who entered the cockpit while en route from Juarez to Mexico City, Mexico. The hijacker, acting as if he had a concealed weapon, ordered the pilot to divert to Brownsville, Texas. He appeared to be mentally unstable and subsequently surrendered to Mexican authorities when the aircraft landed at Monterrey, Mexico. He committed suicide in prison before trial.

5 January

ATTEMPTED HIJACKING OF IRAN AIR FLIGHT PREPARING TO DEPART TEHRAN FOR MASHAD, IRAN

The Iranian News Agency reported that Iranian dissidents, brandishing a hand grenade, had attempted to hijack an Iran Air flight as the aircraft prepared to depart Tehran for Mashad, Iran. An explosion occurred during the attempted hijacking and several people were injured. Further details are not available.

18 January

JAPANESE ANTI-AIRPORT GROUP FIRES HOMEMADE ROCKET BOMBS AT NEW TOKYO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, NARITA, JAPAN

Five homemade rocket bombs were fired from a truck at New Tokyo International Airport. One of the projectiles exploded in a parking lot after passing over the runway. Japanese police suspect that a group opposing expansion of the airport was responsible for the attack.

4 February

GRENADE FOUND ON A MIDDLE EAST AIRLINES AIRCRAFT AT BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, BEIRUT, LEBANON

A hand grenade was found in the lavatory of a Middle East Airlines B-707 at Beirut International Airport. The plane, which had arrived from Damascus, Syria, was scheduled to depart for Cairo, Egypt.

12 February

BOMB FOUND ON MIDDLE EAST AIRLINES AIRCRAFT SCHEDULED TO CARRY LEBANESE PRESIDENT FROM BEIRUT, TO NORTH YEMEN

Security personnel in Beirut, Lebanon, discovered a bomb hidden in electronic equipment aboard a Middle East Airlines aircraft scheduled to carry Lebanon's President Amin Gemayel to North Yemen. The bomb, which was described as very sophisticated, was discovered during a preflight check of the aircraft.

Appendix D - Continued

Significant Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation, 1988

7 March

EXPLOSION AT SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINE OFFICE IN KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA

Two people were injured when a bomb concealed in a plastic package detonated outside the Saudi Arabian Airline office in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The bomb exploded when an employee of the airline tried to open the package.

8 March

HIJACKING OF SOVIET AEROFLOT FLIGHT BETWEEN IRKUTSK AND LENINGRAD, USSR

An 11-member family of Siberian jazz musicians hijacked an Aeroflot TU-154 with 76 passengers aboard in order to flee the Soviet Union. The hijackers reportedly smuggled sawed-off shotguns and explosives aboard the aircraft in musical instrument cases. At least nine people, including a flight attendant and three passengers, were killed during the incident which ended when Soviet security forces stormed the aircraft. The flight was scheduled between Irkutsk and Leningrad with a stopover in Kurgan.

12 March

ATTEMPTED HIJACKING OF PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES FLIGHT BETWEEN KARACHI AND QUETTA, PAKISTAN

A lone gunman attempted to hijack a Pakistan International Airlines flight between Karachi and Quetta, Pakistan. A security guard and the pilot overpowered the gunman after he burst into the cockpit and demanded to be flown to Kabul, Afghanistan. The security guard was shot and wounded. No other passengers were injured. The A-300 Airbus, carrying 143 passengers and 13 crewmembers, was about 7 minutes from landing at Quetta when the attempted hijacking took place.

21 March

BOMB BLAST DAMAGES SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINE OFFICE IN TOKYO, JAPAN

A bomb blast broke a window and damaged the sign in front of the Saudi Arabian Airline office in Tokyo, Japan. The blast occurred almost simultaneously with an explosion in the parking lot of a local television station. There were no injuries in either blast. No claim of responsibility was received.

Appendix D - Continued

Significant Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation, 1988

25 March

ALITALIA AIRCREW BUS ATTACKED AT SAHAR INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, BOMBAY, INDIA

A lone gunman forced his way onto an Alitalia aircrew bus, shot at but missed the driver and then opened fire with an automatic weapon at the people on the bus, wounding one flight crewmember. After the gunman's weapon jammed, he threw a hand grenade into the bus but it failed to explode. The gunman fled across the airport parking lot but was captured with the assistance of a taxi driver and an off-duty policeman. The gunman stated he was a member of the Abu Nidal Organization.

5 April

HIJACKING OF KUWAIT AIRWAYS FLIGHT 422 BETWEEN BANGKOK, THAILAND, AND KUWAIT CITY, KUWAIT

Kuwait Airways Flight 422, a B-747 combi, was hijacked on a scheduled flight between Bangkok, Thailand, and Kuwait City, Kuwait. The hijackers boarded the aircraft in Bangkok, commandeered it about 4 hours after takeoff, and then ordered it flown to Mashad, Iran. In Mashad, 57 passengers were released and the aircraft was refueled. Three days later the aircraft was flown to Beirut, Lebanon; however, Syrian troops, who controlled Beirut International Airport, refused to allow the aircraft to land. The aircraft subsequently landed in Larnaca, Cyprus. While in Larnaca, the hijackers killed two Kuwaiti passengers after two refueling deadlines had passed. After negotiations, the hijackers released 12 passengers. On April 13, the aircraft was refueled and flown to Algiers, Algeria. During the early morning of April 20, the hijackers, under terms reached with the Algerian government, left the aircraft without being taken into custody. The remaining hostages were unharmed.

Throughout the hijacking, the hijackers demanded the release of 17 Dawa Party members jailed in Kuwait for their involvement in the bombing of Kuwait government facilities and the French and U.S. Embassies in Kuwait during 1983. The Dawa Party, an Iraqi extremist Shiite Muslim organization, supports the current government of Iran.

6 April

MAN ARRESTED ON AIRPORT RUNWAY, FORT LAUDERDALE, FLORIDA

A man, who said he wanted to hijack an aircraft to Jamaica, was arrested after he climbed a perimeter fence to enter the air operations area of Fort Lauderdale International Airport. The man had a history of mental illness.

Appendix D - Continued

Significant Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation, 1988

10 April

BOMB EXPLODES AT SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINE OFFICE IN KARACHI, PAKISTAN

A bomb explosion gutted the Saudi Arabian Airline office in downtown Karachi. No information was developed about who was responsible for the blast.

13 April

UNEXPLODED PROJECTILE DESTROYS WATER PIPE ATOP OFFICE BUILDING AT NEW TOKYO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, NARITA, JAPAN

Japanese authorities believe a group opposed to the expansion of New Tokyo International Airport, Narita, Japan, was responsible for launching a projectile which struck the building housing the airport authority construction bureau. The projectile, which did not detonate, destroyed a water pipe when it hit the roof.

13 April

TWO MEN ARRESTED WITH FIVE HOMEMADE PISTOLS AT ROME'S LEONARDO DA VINCI AIRPORT

Two men en route from Beirut, Lebanon, to Freetown, Sierra Leone, were arrested at Rome's Leonardo Da Vinci Airport when it was discovered they had five homemade pistols concealed in the speakers of a portable radio. The weapons were found during a routine baggage inspection.

14 April

BOMB FOUND IN FRONT OF EL AL AIRLINES OFFICE IN ISTANBUL, TURKEY

A bomb containing two sticks of dynamite was discovered by Turkish authorities in front of the El Al Airlines office in Istanbul, Turkey. The bomb was dismantled by authorities before it could detonate. There was no claim of responsibility.

18 April

BOMB EXPLODES AT MEXICANA AIRLINE OFFICE IN GUATEMALA CITY, GUATEMALA

A bomb exploded outside the Mexicana Airline office in Guatemala City, Guatemala, causing minor damage and no injuries. Although no group claimed responsibility for the bombing, Guatemalan authorities believe the bomb was placed by individuals protesting the return of four leftist political exiles on a Mexicana flight earlier that day.

Appendix D - Continued

Significant Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation, 1988

- 18 April** **BOMB EXPLODES IN FRONT OF THE SAUDI ARABIA AIRLINES OFFICE IN FRANKFURT, WEST GERMANY**
- Unknown individuals threw a bomb at the office of Saudi Arabia Airlines in Frankfurt, West Germany. The explosion caused extensive damage, but no injuries were reported.
- 27 April** **BOMB EXPLODES IN FRONT OF THE OFFICES OF SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES, KUWAIT CITY, KUWAIT**
- A bomb explosion in front of the offices of Saudi Arabian Airlines in Kuwait City, Kuwait, injured a security guard and broke windows in adjoining buildings. The blast occurred 1 day after Saudi Arabia broke diplomatic relations with Iran.
- 9 May** **MAN ARRESTED AT LARNACA, CYPRUS, AIRPORT WITH A SILENCER-EQUIPPED PISTOL**
- Airport authorities at Larnaca, Cyprus, arrested a Lebanese national when a pistol, equipped with a silencer, was discovered hidden inside a radio-cassette player during a routine baggage inspection. The man had apparently carried the pistol aboard a Middle East Airlines flight from Beirut, Lebanon. He admitted to authorities that he intended to commit a murder in Cyprus.
- 11 May** **ERITREAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION FRONT CLAIM CREDIT FOR SHELLING ASMARA, ETHIOPIA, AIRPORT**
- The Eritrean People's Liberation Front claimed responsibility for shelling the airport in Asmara, Ethiopia. An unknown number of aircraft were destroyed in the shelling and the airport was heavily damaged.
- 12 May** **CIVIL AERONAUTIC ADMINISTRATION OF CHINA (CAAC) FLIGHT HIJACKED FROM THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA**
- Two hijackers, using a toy pistol and fake bomb, hijacked a CAAC B-737, carrying 107 passengers and 11 crew, on a domestic flight from Xiamen to Guangzhou, People's Republic of China. The hijackers, who requested political asylum in the Republic of China, took over the aircraft in order to flee the People's Republic of China. The hijackers were taken into custody by authorities after the aircraft landed in the Republic of China.

Appendix D - Continued

Significant Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation, 1988

16 May

GROUND BURST SIMULATOR FOUND ON MARTIN AIR FLIGHT 801 IN SEATTLE, WASHINGTON

A ground burst simulator was found on Martin Air Flight 801 after passengers had deplaned and cleared customs in Seattle. The device was believed to have been brought on board by a returning U.S. serviceman. The flight had originated in Amsterdam, Netherlands.

23 May

AVIANCA FLIGHT FROM MEDELLIN TO BOGOTA, COLOMBIA, HIJACKED

A lone hijacker, using fake grenades and demanding \$100,000, forced an Avianca B-727, en route from Medellin to Bogota, Colombia, to fly to Panama and Aruba. The hijacker demanded to be flown to Cuba but the pilot convinced him to return to Colombia. He was captured after he fled the aircraft while it was on the ground in Cartagena, Colombia. The hijacker was described as mentally unbalanced.

1 July

FIRE DESTROYS OFFICE OF JAPANESE LEASING FIRM RESPONSIBLE FOR CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT AT NEW TOKYO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, NARITA, JAPAN

A fire started by a homemade ignition device powered by batteries destroyed the office of a Japanese leasing firm working on New Tokyo International Airport. Japanese authorities believe the fire was set by individuals opposed to construction at the airport.

20 July

INCENDIARY DEVICE FOUND AT SAN PEDRO SULA AIRPORT, HONDURAS

An apparent incendiary device was discovered in the women's restroom at San Pedro Sula Airport and was subsequently destroyed by Honduran authorities. There was no claim of responsibility for placing the device.

1 August

ACES FLIGHT HIJACKED IN COLOMBIA

Two men, armed with machine guns and grenades, hijacked a Colombian ACES DHC-6 aircraft carrying 20 passengers and 2 crew while it was en route between El Bagre and Medellin, Colombia. The hijackers escaped with approximately \$500,000 in gold and jewelry after forcing the Twin Otter aircraft to land at a deserted airstrip.

Appendix D - Continued

Significant Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation, 1988

8 August

MID-AIR MISSILE BLAST OVER ANGOLA INJURES PRESIDENT OF BOTSWANA

The Botswana presidential jet, a BAe-125 Series 8000, was flying over Angola's central Bia province when an explosion occurred. Botswana President Quett Masir was injured in the blast, which may have been caused by a surface-to-air missile (SAM). It is suspected that the aircraft may have been hit in error by a SAM-6 fired by Cuban or Angolan forces.

18 August

BOMB ABOARD A DOMESTIC AEROFLOT FLIGHT FAILS TO DETONATE

A Soviet woman discovered a bomb with a faulty timing mechanism in her luggage after she had flown on an Aeroflot flight between Kiev and Kuibyshev, Soviet Union. Reports suggest that the bomb may have been placed in her luggage by her husband.

26 August

GRENADES THROWN AT THE OFFICES OF AERONICA, NICARAGUA'S NATIONAL AIRLINE, IN GUATEMALA CITY, GUATEMALA

Two fragmentation grenades were thrown at the Aeronica offices in Guatemala City, Guatemala, by unknown individuals. The blasts resulted in minor damage and no casualties. No group claimed credit.

26 August

GENERAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT HIJACKED IN NECOCLI, COLOMBIA

The passengers and crew of a small aircraft transporting an \$80,000 cash shipment from a local savings bank were robbed at gunpoint by three alleged members of a domestic terrorist group shortly after the aircraft landed in Necocli, Colombia. The assailants gained access to the plane by posing as ground service personnel.

9 September

PROTESTORS BARRICADE THEMSELVES IN OFFICES OF IRAQI AIRWAYS, LONDON, ENGLAND,

A group of Kurds, protesting the alleged use of chemical weapons by Iraq against Kurdish groups in northern Iraq, barricaded themselves in the offices of Iraqi Airways in London, England. Twenty-one people were arrested and charged by British authorities.

Appendix D - Continued

Significant Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation, 1988

23 September

NILE SAFARIS AIRCRAFT SHOT AT NEAR JUBA AIRPORT, SUDAN

Guerrillas believed to be associated with the Sudanese People's Liberation Army fired machine guns and possibly rocket propelled grenades at a Nile Safaris B-707 landing at the Juba, Sudan, airport. Although the plane sustained bullet holes in its fuselage and tail, no injuries were reported.

29 September

VASP AIRLINER HIJACKED ON FLIGHT TO RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL

A lone gunman shot and killed the co-pilot and wounded two others when he hijacked a B-737 carrying 104 passengers on a domestic flight between Belo Horizonte and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The hijacker later died from wounds received when police incapacitated him after the aircraft landed in Goiania. He appeared to be mentally unstable. Following the hijacking, Brazilian authorities were reported to be implementing screening of passengers on domestic flights.

1 October

AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 658 HIJACKED AT PORT-AU-PRINCE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, HAITI

Three armed Haitian soldiers stormed aboard American Airlines Flight 658, an A-300 Airbus with 221 passengers and a crew of 10, during the boarding process at Port-Au-Prince International Airport. The three soldiers surrendered their weapons to the flight crew after it was agreed to fly them to New York. The hijackers were arrested upon arrival in New York. They were apparently seeking political asylum. There were no injuries.

22 October

IRAN AIR FLIGHT 723 REPORTEDLY HIJACKED TO LONDON, ENGLAND, WHILE EN ROUTE FROM TEHRAN, IRAN, TO FRANKFURT, WEST GERMANY

Unconfirmed press reports indicate that an Iran Air flight between Tehran and Frankfurt via Vienna, Austria, was hijacked by an individual armed with a handgun and knife. The hijacker was reportedly overpowered by Iranian security personnel before the plane landed in London. Iran Air authorities denied that a hijacking occurred and claimed the plane was diverted due to bad weather. Independent confirmation of the alleged hijacking is unavailable.

Appendix D - Continued

Significant Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation, 1988

15 November

INTRUDER PENETRATES AIR OPERATIONS AREA OF ONTARIO, CALIFORNIA, AIRPORT

A lone man in a pickup truck entered the air operations area of the Ontario, California, airport via a ramp gate. The man failed to stop when police officers confronted him and fled in his vehicle. The officers fired shots at the vehicle as the intruder fled. The intruder, who was wounded, was apprehended when he crashed outside the airport. His motives for entering the airport are unknown.

18 November

SIX INJURED BY BOMB BLAST OUTSIDE AEROFLOT OFFICE IN GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

A bomb exploded in a garbage can outside the Aeroflot office in Geneva, Switzerland. Six people were injured, four seriously.

2 December

AEROFLOT AIRCRAFT HIJACKED BY FUGITIVES AT MINERALNYYE VODY, USSR, TO TEL AVIV, ISRAEL

Four armed Soviets commandeered a busload of Soviet schoolchildren and negotiated for a \$2 million ransom and passage out of the Soviet Union. The hijackers were granted passage to Israel where they were apprehended by Israeli authorities and subsequently returned to the Soviet Union. A fifth individual involved in the incident was the wife of one of the hijackers. She was forced to leave the Soviet Union with the hijackers but was apparently not involved in the crime. There were no casualties during the incident.

8 December

TWO U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CONTRACT AIRCRAFT HIT BY MISSILES OVER THE SAHARA DESERT NEAR THE MOROCCAN-MAURITANIAN BORDER

One of two DC-7's under contract to the U.S. Agency for International Development was shot down by Polisario guerrillas as it was returning from spraying locust swarms in Senegal. The plane was hit by a surface-to-air missile as it was flying through the civil aviation corridor over the western Sahara desert. All five crewmen on the aircraft were killed. The second DC-7 was damaged by a second missile but managed to land safely at Sidi Ifni in Morocco.

Appendix D - Continued

Significant Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation, 1988

11 December

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES FLIGHT 469 HIJACKED BETWEEN SAN JUAN, PUERTO RICO, AND MIAMI, FLORIDA

Trans World Airlines Flight 469, a B-727 with 121 passengers and a crew of 7, was hijacked between San Juan, Puerto Rico, and Miami, Florida. The hijacker demanded to be flown to Cuba. The pilot diverted to Grand Turk, Turks and Caicos Islands, where the hijacker surrendered after being tricked into believing he was in Cuba. No injuries occurred during the hijacking which was initiated when the hijacker claimed he had a bomb. No bomb was found on board the aircraft.

21 December

PAN AM FLIGHT 103 FROM LONDON, ENGLAND, TO NEW YORK, NEW YORK, DESTROYED IN EXPLOSION OVER LOCKERBIE, SCOTLAND

Pan Am Flight 103 between London and New York was destroyed by an on board explosion as it was flying over Scotland. All 259 passengers and crew aboard the B-747, as well as 11 people on the ground, were killed as a result of the explosion and subsequent crash. The exact location and cause of the explosion remain under investigation, but preliminary findings suggest an improvised explosive device detonated in the front baggage compartment. No responsibility for the blast has yet been determined, although some claims have been made.

23 December

GENERAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT HIJACKED IN CENTRAL SURINAME

A general aviation aircraft was hijacked at Jacobkondre on the Saramaca River in central Suriname by four armed men. The hijackers were apparently affiliated with a group of jungle bandits operating in the region. The motives of the hijackers are not known.