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Mining Masculinities in the Canadian Military

Marcia Kovitz

A Thesis

in

The Humanities

Program

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Concordia University
Montréal, Québec, Canada

January 1998

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ABSTRACT

Mining Masculinities in the Canadian Military

Marcia Kovitz, Ph.D.
Concordia University, 1998.

Gender is a contested category of analysis, generally understood to describe the characteristics and practices of its end products, men and women. Alternatively, this interdisciplinary study of changing masculinity in the Canadian Forces conceptualizes gender as characterizing the social worlds that people inhabit, worlds through which they are constructed and reconstructed as gendered beings, and which they negotiate, change or resist. The military has been selected as the investigative terrain because military technology—a social system comprising human and material resources—has been under-researched as a matrix of gender in the West.

The conceptual framework for this study draws on linkages between gender constructs and warfare practices in various small-scale societies, and on comparisons between the organization and practice of warfare in pre-state versus archaic state societies. The result of this comparative framework is the problematization of certain structural features of the contemporary Forces, features which address one of its core preoccupations: engendering and sustaining bellicosity in its combatants, and obviating their resistance. These technologically rationalized features, shown to be historically anomalous, are designed to control how soldiers think about and carry out their deadly work.

The study employs a triangulated methodology to gather data from interviews, written texts, and participant observation. Narrative analysis of this data affords a gendered mapping of military social practice and thought, culminating in the military gendering of human lives and deaths. Women, in their multiple feminine incarnations, are revealed for the threats which they pose to the Forces’ ‘operational effectiveness’—constructed as homogeneously masculine. Herein lie the ideological and practical reasons why ‘gender integration’ in the Forces—ordered in a 1989 Canadian Human Rights Tribunal ruling—may be an oxymoron, and why women more readily resist military authoritarianism than men.
NO TARGET

To a rabbinical school in Old Russia the military came in search of recruits. The entire student body was drafted. In camp, the students amazed their new masters by their marksmanship on the rifle range. Accordingly, when war broke out, the Yeshiva youths were ordered en masse into the front lines. Shortly after the contingent arrived an attack began. Far in the distance, in No Man’s Land, an advancing horde of Germans appeared. The Czarist officers called out, “Ready...aim...fire!” But no fire was forthcoming. “Fire!” yelled the officers. “Didn’t you hear? Fire, you idiots, fire!” Still nothing happened. Beside himself with rage, the commanding officer demanded, “Why don’t you fire?” One of the youths mildly answered, “Can’t you see...there are people in the way. Somebody might get hurt!”

Story from the Jewish oral tradition as told by Nathan Ausubel (1948)
Acknowledgements

The conceptualization of this thesis owes much to the conjuncture of several historical, social and personal forces, prominent among them: World War I and its dislocations in Russia; the military draft and its avoidance in Poland; and the Holocaust. Through their respective legacies, each set the stage for this study.

To these negative instigators must be added all the positives that made this project possible: years of teaching gender studies; the Humanities Doctoral Program of Interdisciplinary Studies in Society and Culture at Concordia University; the members of my committee, present and past. Drs. D. Pederson and F.E. Shlosser, and Dr. Chantal Collard who posed incisive questions and showed unflinching confidence from beginning to end; and my thesis supervisor, Dr. Caroline Knowles, whose steady encouragement and erudite guidance inspired me to persist in seeking out ‘the unspoken core’. Also owed thanks are the John Abbott College Professional Development and Research and Development Committees which provided financial support; the staff at the Directorate of History of the Department of National Defence; Major K. Davis, Dr. (Ret. Col.) F. Pinch, and the many other informants and respondents who generously shared their time and views. I am also grateful for having been able to carve out some space and time to conduct this research; it has added to my understanding of social life and to my eagerness to know more.

On a personal note, I thank the many friends and family members who provided their support. Special appreciation goes to Dr. Katherine Addleman, Marilyn Bronstein, Nissen Chackowicz and Dr. Deborah Cohen, Dr. Patricia Gordon, Helen Kovitz and the late Jerry Kovitz, Lewis Lurie, Sharon Rozen Aspler, Penny Ross, and Paula Schwartz and Michael Lehrman. I also owe a particular debt of gratitude to Patricia McGraw, friend, colleague and grammarian. Finally, to my children, Jessica and Matthew, who patiently endured the stolen time that robbed them of their mother, and who fervently wished that she would “finish” so they could have her back, I offer my deepest thanks and love.

I dedicate this work to the memory of my late brother, Albert Alter Kovitz, whose life was a testament to the emotional aftermath of war.
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Chapter One

Introduction

Statement of the Problem

The second half of the twentieth century has been witness to far-reaching transformations in both the technologies of war and gender relations. Each of these phenomena has been studied, though independently: changes in the material products of military technology have been investigated, as have changes in gender relations, phrased as relations between men and women. But although "the military remains as society's bastion of male identity" (Isaksson 1988:3), developments in military technology have yet to be systematically examined as gendered social processes. This study adopts such an approach, exploring the gendered changes in Canadian military technology by mapping how gender difference, and masculinities in particular, are being constructed and reconstructed within the Canadian Forces.

The relevance of military technology for gender relations follows from the understanding of technology as a "social system, an organization of men needed for production and use" (Kaldor 1980:226). Consequently, in investigating technological change we must look beyond the tangible end product, the military hardware, and focus on changes in the social system out of which that hardware has been produced or adopted (see Kaldor 1983). Similarly, masculinity, femininity and gender relations are conceptualized less as the attributes and practices of individuals—again, the more visible end products—but as characteristics of the historically located structures, organizations and cultures into which individuals are born, and which they negotiate, change or resist. Gender is seen as an organizing principle of social institutions' (Graham in Driscoll and McFarland 1989); a system of social classification (Herdt 1994). Thus, changing gender relations are part of the structural, cultural and historical changes of particular organizations, institutions or societies. These conceptualizations of technology and gender, elaborated in Chapters Two and
Four, make plainer the value of studying their interaction: in the West, changing military technology, as manifested in its changing gender relations, becomes a site of affirmation and resistance of the "institution's hierarchical regulatory power constituted in gender discourse", a "site of discursive conflict over how subjectivities and social relations should be constituted and social control exercised" (Weedon 1987:110).

The unique opportunity to study changing military technology as a gendered social process is presented in the current efforts of the Canadian Forces to comply with the 1989 Canadian Human Rights Tribunal directive to integrate women into all military occupations--except submarines--from which they were previously barred. And although currently past the midpoint of a ten year deadline, according to the appointed external monitoring body (and although no apparent measures of successful integration exist) the Canadian Forces is having difficulty meeting its objectives (Minister's Advisory Board on Women in the Canadian Forces 1994). The discourses surrounding these efforts and the evolving approaches to gender integration, both officially and in terms of daily practices and individuals' interpretations, reveal contradictions and tensions between the military's officially-stated goals of gender integration and its deeply gendered structure.

These discourses also afford us the opportunity to evaluate the substance and intricacies of the integration process. They allow us to ask what integration entails: gender neutrality, compromise, men becoming more like women as some fear (Mitchell 1989), or women becoming more like men? Is the fundamental issue the women themselves and their (in)ability to 'make the grade', or the issues raised repeatedly in official texts: women's potential disruption of the male-bonding process considered essential to group cohesion; the risk they pose to operational effectiveness; the quality of military leadership; the need for more effective training; or the male adaptation to the changes posed by integration? Could the policy to integrate women be inadvertently exposing to public scrutiny much that the military would rather mask, including its underlying raison d'être and methods, specifically the official endorsement of certain types of killing, and the unquestioned brutalization and sacrifice of Canadian youth-made-soldiers--mostly
men—in the name of patriotism and national security?\textsuperscript{3}

Such questions can help make sense of these and other official and unofficial articulations around the issue of gender integration. But how do we elicit and make sense of the unspoken, the issues omitted from, or muted by the Forces' seemingly ungendered official discourses around 'operational effectiveness'—the premier evaluative military criteria—both independent of, and in the context of, the integration project? If gender relations in the West are constructed, principally, as hierarchal relations of domination, and if the Canadian military is constructed as an integrally bureaucratized, male-dominated institution, what form must/can gender integration take for the Canadian Forces to survive with its current operational mandate and organizational structure intact? That is, if the Canadian military—as militaries everywhere—is constructed as a hierarchally, coercive institution, with a differentiated male dominance formally embedded in its chain of command, and informally articulated in both its intra-, and extra-organizational networks of interaction, would gender integration, as ruled by the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal, mean their inevitable disruption? Is the military necessarily masculine, and, therefore is gender integration an oxymoron, particularly if ‘gender integration’ means ‘ungendered’. Finally, will the integration of women into the Forces inevitably change the way wars are fought or conflict resolved in the same way that the increasing numbers of female physicians is changing the way medicine is practised? Discourses on gender integration in the Canadian Forces, and other military narratives can serve as prisms through which to examine the gendered pattern of military technology and its current processes of transformation.

\textit{Significance of the Problem}

Beyond the internal gender requisites of military institutions, the military has external requisites and repercussions for other areas of social life. But these are not readily apparent, partly because Canada has never been a major military power, but a junior partner dependent for its defence first on Britain and then on the United States. Compared to other NATO Forces, Canada employs the least number of personnel as a percentage of the labour force, next to
Luxembourg: 0.9% in 1990 compared to 2.5% for all NATO countries (Addis 1994). And some charge that Canadian governments have historically been indifferent to the military, failing consistently to develop a coherent military policy (Willett 1987). Complaints that the Canadian Forces have been underequipped and ill-manned are long-standing, as is the complaint that "Canadians do not know what an army is for and are not sure they ought to have one" (Bercuson 1996:103).

Compared to militaries worldwide, the Canadian Forces has also kept a particularly low profile, signified and reinforced by the preference of many of its soldiers for avoiding public appearance in uniform, citing lack of public acceptance and even hostility (Coulon 1991 and personal communications; also, see Van Doorn 1975, on the declining legitimacy of the armed forces, generally, and their decreasing public popularity). The preference for occupational anonymity has been intensified in the mid-1990's by the sinking image of the Forces amid what has seemed like a never-ending series of highly publicized scandals including: the revelation that in 1993, Canadian peacekeepers of the elite Airborne Regiment killed several Somalis, among them a teenager whom they beat and tortured to death, memorializing stages of the killing on film; discovery and public airing of videotapes of Airborne hazing rituals in which initiates were degraded in an overtly racist atmosphere; exposure of additional disciplinary problems in this regiment and its eventual disbandment in January 1995; the appointment shortly thereafter, of a government inquiry into the peacekeeping mission in Somalia which uncovered the military establishment's attempts to thwart the Canadian Access to Information Act by altering requested documents related to the Somalia mission (Maclean's, April 15, 1996); the death of a military recruit during basic training (and hospitalization of another) leading to controversy over the military's training methods (Gazette August 16, 1996, September 21, 1996); and the publication of photos of smiling Canadian combat engineers in post-war Kuwait posing beside body parts of war victims (CBC 'The National' and CTV 11 o'clock News, October 10, 1996). These and other events leading up to the resignation of the Minister of Defence and removal of the Chief of the Defence Staff, and the ongoing Somalia Inquiry, have raised the military's public profile.
and exposed bits of its inner workings, its goals and meaning systems, keeping them in the public eye, more so now than at any other time in its relatively short history. They have also exposed the secretiveness of the military at its highest levels, as well as some of the practices which the Forces has assiduously tried to shield from public view.

Prior to the appointment of the Somalia Inquiry and this string of revelations—which may be just that, rather than aberrations from the normal practice of this or any other military organization—\(^a\) the individual and collective isolation deliberately cultivated by the Canadian Forces through a closed-door policy, may have served, as one respondent implied, as an effective means by which the military avoids public debate around its more controversial practices. That the Canadian Forces prefers to distance itself from its host society, and attempts to avoid external scrutiny has been confirmed in testimony at the Somalia Inquiry\(^b\), and is more fundamentally evident in the Forces’ narrative construction of its relation to civilian society, discussed in Chapter Six. It can also be attested to by my own attempts to gain research access, described more fully in Chapter Four. Given this deliberate segregation and secretiveness, it should come as no surprise that the public impression in Canada is that the military, as an institution, is isolated from the social mainstream.

But, despite the impression of discontinuity between military and civilian spheres in Canada, and although Canada lacks a military-industrial complex of the magnitude, stature and power of the U.S, there are definite material and discursive connections at a number of levels. Most obviously, direct linkages exist between the military and the civilian industries which service its material and social needs, supplying everything from weapons and spare parts, to clothing and field provisions, and even leadership training manuals. Linkages also exist between the military and civilian branches of the Canadian civil service: released military members regularly move over to the civilian public service as permanent or contract workers. Predictably, about 60% of these find work with the Department of National Defence, but others find their way into Transport Canada, Canada Post, Supply and Services Canada, Communications Security Establishment and Correctional Service Canada, and Public Works. This recruitment leads to
the domination of some departments by ex-military members, and the near-exclusion of civilian applicants (Canada. Task Force on Barriers to Women in the Public Service, 1990). Families with military members constitute another bridge between the military and civilian society, as well as a site of friction: from the military’s perspective, as we will see in Chapters Five, Six and Seven, families are seen to threaten the military’s operational integrity by bleeding in debilitating values; from the civilian perspective, the military is seen to do "significant harm to women and children" while avoiding the costs and consequences thereof (Harrison and Laliberté 1994:242). Omitted from both sides is the harm done to soldiers themselves.

Further connections issue through the regular stream of military members who complete their terms of service and are released into the larger society, piggy-backing acquired military values and training. This is especially true of reservists who regularly move back and forth between the two worlds10. In addition, military bases are spread across the country, and the Canadian Forces either uses vast stretches of territory for its own military exercises, or 'loans' these out to others in ways that disrupt the lives of local residents. A prominent example is the low-level jet training conducted by NATO out of the Canadian Forces Base at Goose Bay which have been threatening the Innu people’s habitat and way of life since the late 1970’s (Pierson and Cohen 1993). Thus, although the military may try to segregate itself, the structural linkages are multiple, deep and inevitable. Through them the military impacts on the host society, steadily leaching people with their acquired military beliefs, values and skills into the civilian sphere11.

Beyond these structural connections, military activities and the institutions which foster them have socio-economic consequences which are far-reaching, concrete and measurable. Competition from the military for government funds contributes to determining national priorities and thereby the allocation of both human and monetary resources across the society (Kurtz 1988). Worldwide, government priorities have shifted markedly in the second half of the twentieth century.

In recent decades military expenditures have absorbed five per cent of all goods and services produced in the world, five times more than the percentage allocated to defence before the second world war, and 15-20 per cent of central government revenues and expenditures—three times their budgets for education, eight times
that for housing. Governments are investing 30 times more per member of the armed forces than they invest in the education of a child enrolled in school (Vickers 1993:9-10).

The military’s financial demands on government raises interest rates, and thereby the costs and shape of civilian production. This, in turn, affects the structure and size of national and provincial job markets (Enloe 1983; Gay and Pearson 1987)\(^2\) which are fundamentally gendered: women are concentrated in sectors of community service—schools, hospitals, libraries, social work, nursing homes, parks and recreation—which receive no military funding (Anderson 1988). And military spending is far less efficient for job creation than other economic sectors: $1 billion translates into only 76,000 jobs when spent on the military, compared with 100,000 jobs when spent on construction, 112,000 jobs on consumer tax cuts, 139,000 jobs on health services, and 187,000 jobs on education (Regehr and Watkins 1983; also see Sivard 1991). In the U.S., between 1981 and 1985, had the money allocated to the military buildup been disbursed otherwise, it could have created 1,146,000 more jobs than the 7,224,000 jobs created through military spending. And, again, most of the jobs which could have materialized would have gone to women since neither the major industries employing women nor the occupations in which women work produce for the military (Anderson 1988). Addis argues that

military spending is like a State subsidy which helps perpetuate the economic power of the male in society. It is an expenditure in favour of a special sector of society where women are either excluded or underrepresented; it creates job opportunities, education, and a network of economic influence for men; and it gives only to men control over a large chunk of public consumption and army supplies. In this way it creates power for men in the civilian society as well. Women have an immediate economic reason to ask for the reduction of military spending because it perpetuates male economic power and female economic inferiority in civilian society (1988:143).

Not only does military spending create fewer jobs, it has been inversely associated with productivity since those countries which spend the least, proportionately, of their national income on the military fare best in industrial productivity. Since 1960, the U.S. and the U.K have spent the most and second to most, respectively, on the military, and have had the worst and second to worst gains in industrial productivity. Japan, on the other hand, has spent the least, and has been the most industrially productive (Spender 1996). Annual growth in productivity in the U.S.
and ex-USSR of 2.8% and 2.4% respectively compares unfavourably with that of Japan at 7.9%, a country with a military budget of only 0.9% (Vickers 1993).

In Canada, war has had profound social effects, and, historically, has shaped social institutions including the family, social security system, trade unionism (Morton 1992), and even the franchise. More recently, the Gulf War illustrates the military's direct appropriation of national resources: funding for Canadian Forces participation—including the $90 million monthly cost of maintaining 1,700 Canadian troops in the Middle East—was paid for, in part, by federal government spending cuts of $350 million, including $26 million to the operating budget of health and welfare, $25 million to employment and immigration, and $15 million to environment (Gazette, November 24, 1990).

Beyond Canada’s borders, military spending also entails enormous social and economic costs. These are highest in Third World countries where resources are far fewer than in the ‘developed’ nations. For example, in the Sudan, 11 million people face starvation while the military regime spends $1 million dollars daily on the civil war which has been raging there for 24 of the 34 years since the early 1960’s (Spencer 1996). Third world countries have, on average, eight times as many soldiers as physicians, and vastly more is spent on arms expenditures per soldier than on education (Sivard 1991). About half of these governments are controlled by militaries which use torture, disappearances, and political killings to suppress opposition.

In addition, military practices have adverse ecological consequences. Michael Renner concludes that "the world's armed forces are quite likely the single largest polluter on earth" (1991:132), and for several reasons: modern warfare, such as that in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Central America and the Persian Gulf, causes large-scale environmental destruction; the production, testing and maintenance of all types of arms releases toxic and radioactive contaminants of air, soil, and water; and the training of troops in peacetime wreaks havoc over large areas. According to a 1982 United Nations study, the escalating demand for land and airspace by militaries worldwide is a result of growing arsenals, larger standing armed forces,
and technological advances in weaponry which require greater amounts of space to manoeuvre. Overall, the space required by armed forces has grown from 1 square kilometre per 100,000 soldiers in ancient times to 55,000 square kilometres per 100,000 soldiers during the NATO manoeuvres in West Germany in 1978. Hence, in the United States alone—for which there is the most published information—at least 2 percent of total U.S territory is assigned to the military: the Department of Defense holds 100,000 square kilometres of land outright, and leases an additional 80,000 square kilometres from other federal agencies, apart from other unrecorded lands devoted by individual states to military purposes.

And corresponding to this increasing use of territory and air space is the escalating ecological damage. For example, the aforementioned NATO manoeuvres caused at least $100 million in damages to crops, forests and private property. Elsewhere, "bombing ranges transform the land into a moon-like wasteland, pockmarked with craters. Shooting ranges for tanks and artillery contaminate soil and ground water with lead and other toxic residues. Some anti-tank shells, for example, contain uranium rods" (Renner 1991:135). Residues of war—in the form of unexploded bombs, shrapnel and rounds of ammunition—put populations at further risk. Air pollution caused by armed forces is estimated at between 6-10% globally; 10-30% of environmental degradation is caused by activities related to the military. Renner estimates that, in the United States, the military is probably the largest producer of hazardous waste.

Not only is the military a major polluter, it is also a major consumer of natural resources. Vickers cites the findings of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom that "global military activity may be the most serious, if not the largest, worldwide polluter and consumer of precious resources" (1993:69). The rate of resource-consumption through the production and use of armaments is voracious. For example, an F-16 jet consumes in less than an hour almost twice as much gas as the average U.S. motorist consumes in a year. Worldwide, the military consumes almost one-quarter of all jet fuel. And although precise data is difficult to come by, estimates are that "the world uses about as many petroleum products for military purposes as Japan, the world’s second largest economy, does for everything" (Renner 1991:138).
About 9% of global iron consumption is for military purposes, and, again, estimates are that the
global military consumption of aluminum, copper, nickel and platinum exceeds the total demand
of the Third World.

As a world military leader, the U.S. sets the tone internationally for military spending,
and it is a high roller: the Department of Defense employs over 3 million people, and, in 1989
had an annual budget of almost $300 billion. Directly and indirectly, the U.S. military
establishment now controls between a third and a half of the total federal government budget 13.
"Only a handful of countries in the world--the United States, Russia, Japan, Germany, France,
the United Kingdom, China, Italy--have a gross national product in excess of the American
military budget" (Shepard 1993:399). Government spending in the United States is a register of
its priorities: in a country where one piece of military equipment alone, the Stealth Strategic
Bomber, comes with a price tag of $1 billion (Shepard 1993), there is no universal medical
coverage, and between 35 and 40 million people have no medical insurance whatsoever.

The ecological, social and financial costs of military practices might be justifiable if it
resulted in a peace dividend. But, on the contrary, Newcombe points to a strong negative
correlation between the degree of a country's relative overarmament in relation to its gross
national product on the one hand, and its successful delivery of increased security on the other:
"overarmed nations were 30.5 times more likely to be involved in an international war than the
underarmed nations in the five years following the year being analyzed" (cited in Spencer

In addition to these social, economic and ecological consequences, there are others which
are cultural. The military generates notions of masculinity for emulation and comparative self-
identification. It invades children's play, creating a replica combat culture through toy weapons,
computer games and television programming. Glorified through the film industry, military images
saturate veins of popular culture. The military structures thought, first neutralizing then
integrating this recast lethal activity into common parlance so that a (male) Montreal neurologist
could casually employ a deadly analogy to explain a new life-saving treatment for muscular
dystrophy in which healthy genes are injected into muscles via virus carriers, referring to "the genes as the payload and the viruses as the missiles". Thus, although seemingly peripheral to the civilian sphere, the very existence of the military permeates—and often dominates—other sectors and aspects of society, and through its ideology, institutions and practices contributes to shaping civilian technology, concepts and behaviour, values and symbolic systems (also see Hacker and Hacker 1987, and Wheelwright 1994).

The interplay between the military and the larger society is further evident in that both war and the military are heavily "gendered" (Cohn 1987:689; Easlea 1983). On the face of it, men comprise and control most of the world's militaries—less than 2% of soldiers worldwide are women (Addis 1994)—as they do the economic and political decisions concerning related resource allocation. The civilization of which Canada is a part, privileges a form of masculinity which stresses violent response to real or perceived threat, and is headed by a political leadership which adheres to this equation of masculinity with "toughness" (Connell 1992; Fasteau 1975). Appended to this heavily gendered military are defense intellectuals who talk strategy and weaponry suffused with sexual imagery of relations of dominance and submission, and conceive of disarmament in terms of emasculation (Cohn 1987). This has far-reaching consequences for the development, design and deployment of new weapons systems. Despite the end of the Cold War, there are thirty-odd wars raging at any one time in the world today, taking their toll in human lives and health, social and economic resources including environmental degradation. Even when wars end, their latent legacies of destruction remain in the tens of millions of land mines which continue to target indiscriminately—but mainly mostly children (Farlinger 1995). The global arms trade remains brisk, and global and local defense budgets and arms production—both masculinized spheres—remain high relative to underfunded and overburdened social services—largely extensions of the feminized domestic sphere. Hence, the need to understand the social, particularly gendered context of changing military technology is both timely and urgent.

This conclusion is supported by Robert Nisbet, in whose estimation,

...the evidence is clear that for close to three thousand years, down to this very moment, Western civilization has been the single most war-ridden, war-
dominated, and militaristic civilization in all human history...there have been
more wars in Western civilization during the past three thousand years, more pre-
parations for war, more armies, more battles, a greater toll of human life as the
direct result of war, more physical devastation in consequence of war, and more
governments established or toppled by means of war than in any other civilization
in recorded history. Add to this the almost continuous impact of war making upon
other institutions of society, especially the state and the economy (Nisbet 1973:
11-12; also see Quincy Wright, 1942).

Yet, despite the pervasiveness of the military in the West, its social costs and effects, its subtle
and not-so-subtle cultural permeation, and its patently gendered face, the need to study this social
institution is apparent in neither academic nor popular discourse. With the exception of military
historians chronicling the wartime exploits of the Canadian Forces, Canadian academics have
been relatively uninterested. And the military’s low profile in Canadian social and intellectual
life has meant little support from funding agencies and scant secondary sources providing data
and coherent analyses. According to Smith, the "military enterprise remains one of the least
understood and appreciated phenomena in American culture" (1985:4). Whereas nineteenth-
century scholars, and those whose intellectual roots antedated World War I, concluded that
military institutions played a central role in civilized societies, modern scholars have ignored the
strong and persistent effects of military institutions on other social and economic institutions
(Hacker and Hacker 1987; also see Shaw 1991). During recent decades even Marxist theorists
of the state have basically ignored "one of the principal activities of most capitalist states—
preparing for and conducting war" (Mann cited in Hacker and Hacker 1986:747).

As far as Canadian military history is concerned, Bercuson and Granatstein note that
"very few [Canadian] academics have written about military history" (1992:17), and the same can
be said about its teaching (Haycock 1995). Haycock, of Royal Military College, explains this
lacuna by way of a failure to always recognize that "war is a major catalyst for social, political
and economic change", and that the national Canadian perception of being an unmilitary people
is no doubt one of the main reasons why the study of military history in this
country has often been regarded by many academics as a marginal enterprise or a
lurid fascination of war-watchers and those who simply want to extol the virtues
of the military profession; others dismiss it as the narrow and unexciting hobby
of the technical and military buffs (3-4).
Beyond the "revulsion from war itself" (5) that followed the great losses of World War I, the tendency to shy away from this politically and culturally sensitive topic, the anti-war spirit of the 1930's, and the concentration of historians on constitutional, economic and social studies, Haycock concludes that military studies were either overlooked or neglected by Canadian historians for several other reasons: formal history courses became part of Canadian university curricula only at the turn of the century, and hence there were few academic scholars in the field; the armed forces were small until well into the twentieth century, and militia volunteers were oriented to their own local company or battalion rather than to a broader historical view; and finally, Canadian reliance on British officers, equipment and doctrine led to an increasing alienation of French Canadians.

Sociological scholarship on the military is even thinner. One could easily enrol in an introductory sociology course or in more advanced programs offering sociology majors, honours or even graduate degrees without ever learning that precursors to the discipline at one time incorporated an understanding of this institution as a central theoretical component: "The central role of military institutions in civilized societies was a settled conclusion of 19th-century thought--and not only conservative thought" (Hacker and Hacker 1987:744). Introductory texts can also serve as bench marks for the state of a discipline as a whole, and as they are largely silent on the subject it would certainly be difficult to learn from such texts that the Canadian military constitutes the single largest formal organization in this country (Taylor and Nolan 1996), or that it takes the largest bite out of the Federal government's program budget. These texts either make no mention of it (Hale 1995), only passing mention--for example, less than a paragraph in an eighteen chapter text (Brym 1995)--or an isolated sentence on Canada's dependence on the U.S. for defence buried in a four-page discussion of militarism and the arms race (Macionis et al. 1994). A representative example of the treatment of the military in introductory texts is that of Henslin. He devotes a little over four pages of a seven hundred page text to "War: A Means to Implement Political Objectives", noting its frequency, reasons for waging war, high economic and human cost, and its proliferation in Third World countries through arms sales. He also
observes that politicians who declare war manage to escape its carnage, and discusses the process of dehumanizing soldiers which makes killing possible. Yet he offers no specific discussion of the Canadian Forces as an institution (1996) or its relation to Canadian society. Spencer actually does devote an entire chapter to "War and Peace" in which she reviews conflict-resolution and aggression theories, the varieties of warfare and its pervasiveness, the economics of militarism, and even a section on "Canada's New Security Problems". But again, she only cites the Canadian military in a suggestion by a non-governmental organization that Canada disband its armed forces in the interests of peace (1996:419). Discussion of this particular military organization and its social and cultural interpenetration is simply absent.

Lest the impression be that sociological amnesia concerning the contemporary military is solely a Canadian phenomenon, the military as a subject fares little better in introductory texts originating in the United States where the military has a higher profile and greater public support (see Finsterbusch 1995; Shepard 1993; Stark 1989). Thus, in discussing the power elite, Shepard (1993) devotes a few pages to the military-industrial complex but none to the military itself. Stark elaborates on the military as an instrument of monopolized state coercion, this "monopoly on force that is the essence of the state" (Stark citing Weber, 1989:440), noting its particular association with agrarian and highly stratified states, and the application of force by military specialists both in frequent external warfare and the exploitation of the state's own subjects. But his discussion is theoretical and cast in historical perspective. He devotes almost two pages to the Prussian General Staff, and a brief section on the introduction of the stirrup in the sixth century as a technical innovation leading to the rise of European feudalism, yet skirts the contemporary American military or its social effects.

Advanced sociological texts and specialized subfields in the social sciences, areas where one might expect more systematic treatment of the military, are equally silent. The study of violence in Canada—considered by Ross to be an underdeveloped field to begin with—is one example where despite a variety of historical and contemporary perspectives, the military is mentioned only peripherally in relation to the social control of worker insurgency (Ross 1995).
A fuller treatment of the military might be expected in the context of this aspect of working class history, or working class history generally, for several reasons: soldiering is a form of work, modern militaries have disproportionately recruited foot soldiers from the working class, and in certain periods of Canada’s past the military has been used repeatedly in aid to the civil power against working class interests. But like the introductory texts, these, too, ignore the military entirely, or avoid systematic treatment of the social effects of the military on the working class or on the larger society (Miller 1980; Palmer 1992; Scott 1974). Scott mentions the use of the militia in strike breaking, as do Morton and Copp (1980). And the latter note, in a commentary on an illustration of World War I election sloganeering, that "labour leaders tended to forget that most Canadian soldiers were workers too" (110). Yet these authors, too, exhibit this same oversight. A more recently edited compilation on the Sociology of Work in Canada actually does include a paper on "The Informal Behaviour of Infantry Recruits" (Rodman 1994), but it is based on a master’s thesis submitted over forty years earlier—further attestation to the lack of current sociological interest or research.

Studies in stratification (Grusky 1994) and inequality (Curtis et al 1993) might also be expected to reference the military since, as we will see in Chapter Two, it has historically provided the institutional basis for building and sustaining wealth and power. Yet these studies, too, along with self-styled macro analyses of Canadian society (Hiller 1996) are silent on the military, as are general overviews of Canadian society. In the latter category, the author of a review of the Essentials of Canadian Society concludes that "the military has had relatively little impact on twentieth-century Canadian society" (Goyder 1990:14). In another collection of classic and contemporary sociological writings on Canadian society, intended to capture a "central reality of Canadian history or contemporary social organization", and "provide a sense of continuity in discussions about Canadian society" (Curtis and Tepperman 1990:1), what is again telling is the inclusion of discussions of elites, social class and power, but not the military. A recent edition of undergraduate sociological readings which takes a more global approach, includes one chapter entitled "State Power and Megamurders", a discourse on the absolute and arbitrary power of the
state which, in the absence of countervailing democratic forces, has enabled the mass murder of some 187,797,100 people so far in the twentieth century through war or ‘democide’ (Rummel 1996). But although much of this murder has been committed by military members acting for state elites, this institution is, again, ignored.

An overview of the women’s studies literature reveals a similar neglect of the military as a subject of academic study and its marginalization on organized women’s agendas (see for example Burt and Code 1995; Mandell 1995; Mackie 1991; Stockard and Johnson 1992; Richardson, D. and V. Robinson 1993; Vickers, et al 1993). More recently, reference to the military in mainstream women’s studies has increased, but incidentally: noting the sexual violence of male troops in wartime as a route to pleasure or as an expression of male hostility and aggression (Hills 1995), or "the greatest violence done to men, the tyrannous demand made upon them when young by older and more powerful males: that they kill and die in war" (Marin 1995:495-6). Where the military has also come under increasing scrutiny in the sociological literature is indirectly, via the treatment of military wives (Harrison and Laliberté 1994), discussed more fully in Chapter Five. Likewise, a review of women’s activism in English Canada over a twenty-five year period incorporates the issue of globalized militarism and women’s anti-military activism, and briefly references the Canadian military in a complaint of sexual harassment by a female worker on a Canadian Forces base (Pierson and Cohen 1995). But, again, the discussion never reaches a systematic treatment of the military either as a gendered social system or as a generator of gender constructs in the larger society. The military is equally disregarded in a discussion on the restructuring of the state and its embodiment of numerous power relations (Brodie 1996).

But although feminist studies of gender and bellicosity are relatively few, and still fewer make it into the general women’s studies curriculum, systematic treatment has been growing in the branch of women’s studies literature that speaks to war, women and the military system, and discourses that address feminism, war, and patriarchy. DiLorio divides the latter into five categories: historical writings of the modern era, specifically those of European and American
suffragists and antiwar activists; feminism and peace studies; patriarchy, militarism and masculinity; women, maternalism and pacifism; and men's war stories, war texts and war talk. Here, the issues are "the nature, causes and consequences of war" (Dilorio 1992:51) with the goal of understanding "the historical, cultural, material, and psychological connections between men's domination of women and the organized, state-supported aggression of one society against another in order to bring an end to both" (52). Since Dilorio's focus is on texts examining the interconnections between war, militarism, and patriarchy, rather than on the military or its institutional construction of gender both internally and in the larger society, she omits studies such as those of Higonnet et al (1987), Isaksson (1988), Williams (1989) and Schneider (1992) which concentrate more directly on the military, and its gendered institutional and ideological practices. Other studies she omits include those of Pierson on the World War II management of Canadian military women and their femininity (1986), Enloe on the militarization of women's lives (1983) and women and militarized masculinities (1988), and Showalter on the reinscription of male gender anxiety during the first World War (1987). The contribution of these and other related studies to understanding the military's construction of gender are reviewed in Chapter Four.

One reason for the seeming failure of a coherent theoretical perspective on the military to emerge from the feminist discourses highlighted by Dilorio, and for the absence of a coherent structural analysis of the military as a gendered institution may be the tendency, as we will see in Chapter Four, of many feminists to focus on war and its byproducts, adopting an essentialist 'take' on the causes and perpetrators of war, and laying blame for warmongering—expressly or implicitly—squarely at the door of men as a uniform category, rather than at the door of government and politicians (Ås 1982, Broyles 1990, Easlea 1987, Reardon 1985).

Furthermore, much of this discourse is positioned around support or objection to women's military participation, particularly in combat. On the one hand, liberal feminists have promoted the recruitment of women into armed forces as a route to full citizenship and equal opportunity, expanding women's labour force participation in non-traditional, male-dominated
fields. An example of this is Lips' study of *Women, Men, and Power* (1991) in which the military is mentioned, peripherally, in the context of the policies of women's exclusion from American military academies and combat. On the other hand, feminist peace activists, many of whom subscribe to an essentialist maternalism, denounce this road to gender equality, preferring one paved over a dismantled 'masculine' war apparatus (Äs 1983; Elshtain 1983; Enloe 1983). These pacifists "give a positive value to the exclusion of women" arguing that "feminine culture is...a culture of communication and compromise rather than one of armed conflict" (Addis 1994:3). They deplore the deployment of mothers, especially those with infants. In this camp, some still see violence as fundamentally gendered: whereas they might see themselves as having graduated beyond the notion that "military women [are]...a misguided lot for placing their bodies at the behest of the state...[and that] military men are little more than a gang of grown-up boys with deadly toys" (Elshtain 1995:xii), there remains an adherence to the notion that (American) men endorse, whereas women abhor violence, and that the gendered divide still "pits the moral voice against the insidieties of statecraft...politicalized women, most of them mothers, against political men, most of them fathers" (Elshtain 1995:42).

This debate about women in combat, though ostensibly resolved in Canada because of the Human Rights Tribunal ruling, continues to rage south of the border (Fine 1997). Other texts on gender and the military appeared in the early 1980's and after, in response to the American military's decision to shift to an all-volunteer force. Many of these, such as Goldman (1982), Marlowe (1983), Mitchell (1989), Ruddick (1983), and Segal (1983) promote positions on the role of women in armed forces, specifically in combat, focusing less on women's *right* to fight, and more on their *capacity*. We learn little about the construction of gender as a result of these institutional affiliations or exclusions. Where we do learn about the construction of gender is in the few studies that examine the experiences of American military women (Rogan 1981, Schneider 1992; Williams 1989), war discourses (Cooke and Woollacott 1993), or women and the military system (Enloe 1988, 1994; Isaksson 1988); these are referenced at various points in this study.
Finally, historiography is another field where there has generally been scant treatment of gender and the military, but where women's studies has sought to shift the focus away from "politics, wars and revolutions..." Gies (1978:3). A few histories of women in particular times or places, for example on medieval women (Gies 1978), the Celts (Ellis 1995) or female cross-dressing soldiers (Wheelwright 1989) do mention or highlight female bellicosity, noting that women occasionally assumed the mantle of leadership in war or fought alongside husbands in battle. The same can be said for specialized histories such as those on medieval warfare (Contamine 1993), warrior queens (Fraser 1989), or women who have engaged in, or faced combat in the past as nurses, soldiers, saboteurs, spies or guerillas (Saywell 1986). Hacker and Hacker (1987) are unique in this regard, dealing as they do with women's diminishing roles in military institutions as part of changing military technology beginning in the sixteenth century. These and other studies are mined and referenced in Chapter Two as part of the historical review of war and gender.

Another academic field where one would anticipate greater focus on the military is men's studies, which emerged almost in tandem with feminism's second wave, but remains comparatively thin17. Men's studies is perhaps a misnomer since men, their concerns and domains of social activity have long dominated academic discourse. In sociology, for example, a number of fields such as criminology and juvenile delinquency have long had as their focus men and masculinity (Hearn and Morgan 1990). The same can be said for the sociology of work. And history, which is ostensibly non-gendered, has actually been by, and for, men (Connell 1995). It is this monopoly of authorship, audience and subject which feminist scholars have aimed to break. Yet, advocates of men's studies argue that traditional academic approaches have, paradoxically, left men invisible as explicit subjects of research and theory, an invisibility "constructed through and within a wider framework of male dominance", and born out of a failure to critically scrutinize men's activities or problematize their formation as a social category. Men and masculinities have been taken for granted (Hearn and Morgan 1990:7).

In men's studies, there is more accounting for the military in the construction of
masculinity, and the relevant texts are reviewed in Chapter Four in the discussion of masculinity constructs. But the predominating discourse of men's studies also sidelines the military, ignores questions about what makes the military masculine, and fails to treat it as a core institutional configurer of masculinity. Overlooking the military entirely are Clatterbaugh's *Contemporary Perspectives on Masculinity* (1990), Brittan's *Masculinity and Power* (1989), and Rutherford's *Men's Silences*; the latter describes masculinity as underwritten by the mother-son relationship (1992). Haddad (1993) is equally silent on the military, focusing instead on everything from sexuality and sexual orientation, sports, fatherhood and domestic relations, to recreation and violence within the medical profession. The normalization of violence and pain in the aspiring American football hero is singled out as feeding patriarchy's masterplan of men's dominance of women and other men (Sabo 1992). These are representative of the most popular approaches, which are to psychologize masculinity, focus on men, sex, intimacy, and relationships (Abbott 1990; Seidler 1992) with either no, or minimal attempts to link the interior or intrapersonal with larger structural or institutional forces, particularly militarism as an institutional derivative. References which are made to bellicosity tie aggression to masculinity, and the concomitant expectation that political leaders affirm their masculinity through their willingness to engage in war (Kilmartin 1994); they overlook an understanding of the military as a masculine and male-dominated institution, tied structurally and discursively to its host society. In these studies, there is also a tendency to treat masculinity as an internally undifferentiated phenomenon. The starting point is men's psychological traits rather than the structural/situational derivatives of these personality characteristics (Epstein 1991).

There are exceptions to this in the field of men's studies, but these, too, tend to emphasize the psychological, such as a deeply felt need to prove one's manhood. In *The Men From The Boys: Rites of Passage in Male America*, Raphael (1988) devotes an entire chapter to 'Single Combat', beginning with the identification with warriorhood as a pathway into the "brotherhood of men" (97). Real manhood can be proven by challenging a member of the enemy to a personal contest, and winning. But if the "dictates of international politics" (99) or automated
technology block this route, then masculine self-respect can be achieved via advancement up the military hierarchy. In noting that the "bureaucratization of warfare affect[s]...young men who might, in different times have proved their manly valor in battle" (101), Raphael makes a brief attempt to link the individualization of masculinity and the military as an institution. But because his emphasis is on the achievement of manhood, he devotes most of the chapter to the facsimiles through which men "hope to salvage something of a warrior's initiation" (101) in the absence of real combat: survival games in which men can spend the afternoon playing at war, or more commonly, athletics which can enable men to engage in single combat and win. This notion of sports as a surrogate for war is also alluded to by Sabo (1992) and others. What is ignored is how the military generates these cultural notions of masculinity, and provides avenues for their pursuit.

What these silences in text after text attest to is the remarkable capacity of a social edifice of such magnitude and concentration of power, and with access to such vast, publicly-funded human and material resources--between 7-12% of the Canadian Federal budget in peacetime--to have rendered itself so invisible as to have eluded both academic and broader public scrutiny. What these silences also attest to is the remarkable capacity of the military--an organization which epitomizes power, and which, in the West has historically been a symbol of masculinity and the generation of masculine power--to have largely avoided systematic scrutiny as a structural generator of gender and gendered power relations. As a master of camouflage, the Canadian military's overall success in evading mainstream interest and controversy has multiple causes, but it also has consequences, primary among them that certain questions remain unformulated and therefore unasked.

Hence, this inquiry begins with its own group of questions, setting out to track the construction of gender within the Canadian Forces, and to understand the military as a gendered technology of state-controlled violence. Given the overt masculinity of the military, it asks, in what does this masculinity inhere? And how is it worked into and constructed through the military's organizational structure, its collective and individual practices? Through the prism of
structure and practices, the study tracks the construction of gender identity by examining, in
counterpoint, the threat that women are thought to pose to the institution. It sets out to uncover
what gender represents to the Canadian Forces, through what formal and informal practices it is
constructed and reconstructed, and through what practices its institutionally regulated gendered
subjectivities are affirmed or resisted (Weedon 1987).

The scholarly contributions of this inquiry are several. First, it contributes to the
theoretical debates concerning gender relations by examining what may be a formative matrix of
gender in Western society: the military. This inquiry also contributes to the theoretical debates
on masculinity, in particular, by investigating the institution with which masculinity has
historically been most consistently and widely associated, and which has historically been a
bulwark of masculine power. Studying the Canadian Forces enables us to both dissect a core
derivative of gender relations and ideology, and incorporate men and masculinity as a gender
problematic.

A second scholarly contribution is the novel approach taken to gender: examining the
changing configuration of masculinity within the context of a specific form of technological
change—that of the Canadian military. If, as Addis claims, the masculinity of the military inheres
in the "twin mechanisms of hierarchy and authority" (1994:18), and the military may be
evolved towards a less authoritarian model of internal behaviour [because the]
sophisticated technology of modern weaponry requires an educated personnel and
a continuous flow of information between the lower ranks and the decision makers (18),
can we then extrapolate that the military is becoming less male-dominant? Or do we need to
reformulate our question of the relation between changing military technology and gender
relations, and address the issue of changing masculine practices of domination by asking whether
the locus of power, its manifestation and practice have shifted as suggested by Winter Roberts
(1980) and reviewed in Chapter Four? In other words, has the twentieth century shift in military
technology corresponded to a metamorphosis of male dominance into a new and less visible
form?

Another scholarly contribution is the setting of this research in a major Canadian
institution which, to date, has been underresearched by external, independent scholars. By inquiring how militaries reproduce themselves as gendered technologies of war, and how they normalize their violence and destructiveness (Morgan 1987), this study seeks to initiate the process of formulating questions about the military in Canada and centring it more firmly in the realm of public and scholarly discourse and debate. Rather than making a definitive statement on the military in general or the Canadian Forces in particular, the goal is an ongoing dialogue on the impact of militaries on a myriad of social processes.

Finally, in addition to these theoretical contributions, this study makes a methodological contribution by providing a practical example of how to access the inaccessible and make visible the invisible via proxies of the dominant group, their thinking and meaning systems—the whole located in comparative cross-cultural and historical perspectives. In sum, this study contributes both substantively and theoretically to the larger debates about the construction and reconstruction of gender relations in an innovative manner and milieu.

**Thesis Overview**

In order to situate the Canadian military in the broader historical context in which it evolved and now operates, and culturally relativize the social parameters of its internal construction, this study begins with a comparative review, in Chapter Two, of the literatures of history and anthropology, two disciplines in which there has been extensive coverage of the development and practice of warfare—the latter more specifically in its interplay with gendered social structure. Considered in this chapter are various definitions and origins of war; the links between warfare practices and the gendered social structure of small-scale societies; the male monopolization of bellicosity in state as well as pre-state societies; the link between warrior and social status in class societies; and the means of inducing and sustaining male combativeiveness, in whose interests it is deployed, as well as the conditions and circumstances under which women also fight. The ultimate focus of this chapter is the fundamental difference between war practices in pre-state and state societies.
The literature review continues in Chapter Three with a critical overview of the military's evolution in Canada, beginning with the arrival of Europeans in the 17th century, and the patterns of native warfare which they encountered. Described are the role and practices of warfare in New France, and later in British North America, with particular note of how social divisions in military rank translated into differing life chances and fortunes. This historical review contextualizes and clarifies some of the problems facing the Forces today—plagued as it has been by short-term government policies—and the origins of the State’s ambivalent attitude towards the Forces as well as the reasons for the indifference or even hostility of elements of the Canadian population. Finally, the chapter reviews the changing military participation of Canadian women from the 19th century to the present—sometimes in response to historical events, but largely a measure of changing official policy. It introduces some of the issues related to the current project to integrate women into the Canadian Forces—discussed again in Chapter Eight—as well as the reasons why women suffer higher attrition than men.

The final literature review is found in the Chapter Four on theory and method. Here, the conceptualization of gender as it originated and developed in feminist discourse and problematics—including the discourses on war and gender—is interwoven with a critical review of some of the debates regarding its theoretical and political value, and with some suggestions for addressing these critiques in a new gender theory. Concluding this is a discussion of the related methodological consequences of feminist and poststructuralist epistemological debates, and the research solutions devised for this study, both to gather data and analyze it.

The subject of the four remaining chapters is the practices through which the Canadian Forces, as a technological system, constructs gender. Through the government’s legal mandating of the Forces, its technologically rationalized structure and explicit narratives which construct and reconstruct it in form and meaning; in multiple narrative constructions of its relation to civilian society, of the soldier, of women, of their marginalized femininity and sexuality, of difference and change; and finally in significant silences—in all these we see the means by which the military operates to establish and defend its masculinity and male dominance—perhaps its very existence—
against the threat of external (feminine, enemy) incursion. The analysis of changing masculinity in the Forces focuses on five main areas, beginning with the delineation of the military mandate in Chapter Five, and the structure and practices used to instill and sustain it. This includes the authoritarian hierarchy through which the membership is constructed and managed, vertically and horizontally, as a disciplined, obedient, bellicose and operationally effective force. It also includes the Forces’ communal structure and the regulation of relations with members’ families. Following this, in Chapter Six, is an analysis of interlocking official narratives, supplemented by unofficial ones, which together describe, prescribe and legitimate the unique system of justice, structure and meaning governing Canadian soldiers; establish and justify their exceptional status and treatment; and specify, amongst others, the beliefs which they must hold as occupational prerequisites. Chapter Seven covers the social construction of gender, proper, including the marking, establishing and defending of difference, how women are "made to represent the Other" (Cohen 1993:2) in their marginality, femininity, sexuality and relation to the family. Here we find the narratives posted along the final frontier demarcating the gender boundary: armed combat. This analysis allows respondents to emerge as active agents in the construction of gender through their narrative (and other practices) in conjunction with the institution. Following this is an analysis of power relations in the Forces, how male predominance is established, how male dominance is practised and maintained, and how the integration of women is constructed against these two backdrops, threatens both, and is being resisted.

Chapter Eight concludes with a number of salient findings, but more importantly with suggestions for future research. Far from definitive, this study intends to raise questions and rekindle academic and general interest in what has come to be a formative and formidable Canadian institution:

Scholarship is to open rather than extinguish questions, to discomfit rather than enshrine both settled certainties and the collective practices they sustain (Parr 1995:354).

Should it succeed in doing both, it will have served its purpose. We turn now to a comparative examination of war and gender.
Notes

1. Hale describes a pattern of bureaucratic relations which favours the upward mobility of the boss, whether male or female, at the expense of the female subordinate who has often trained this superior (1995).

2. The Tribunal's decision to exempt submarines, or occupations exclusively served in submarines, from its order to fully integrate women into the Canadian Forces follows its acceptance of the defence of the Forces' policy of discrimination on the basis of the *bona fide* occupational requirement of privacy:

   privacy constitutes a significant factor in operational effectiveness and...the exclusion of women from occupations which serve in submarines exclusively is a *bona fide* occupational requirement. The particular or unique intimacy of the submarine as a working combat unit demands a higher threshold of risk avoidance and this in turn justified a higher or blanket exclusion of a class, i.e. women, from employment.

   In its decision, the Tribunal referred to similar restrictions in "virtually all European countries which otherwise permit women in combat roles" (Canadian Human Rights Tribunal 1989). Whether these cases influenced the Tribunal's decision, what perplexed some informants of this study is the similarity between the lack of privacy in submarines and in trenches. Yet the Tribunal did not exempt infantry occupations from its order.

3. In this context, the public discourses, both in defense of and outrage expressed around the recently disbanded Airborne Regiment is particularly revealing. For example, Ted Byefield, journalist and founder of the magazine *Alberta Report* sees in the quick disbanding of the Airborne a "rejection of all things masculine" peculiar to our era, including 'trials by toughness, tests of endurance, nights on the town' in an attempt to quash the "males’...inclination to compete and fight."

4. According to journalist Donald MacGillivray, since the brutal murder of the Somali teenager by members of the Canadian Airborne Regiment in 1993, "Canadian soldiers have felt an uncomfortable chill from the civilians they are paid to protect". He quotes a Master Corporal who has taken to removing his military beret when driving from home the base: "If someone sees your beret when you sit at a stop light you wonder, ‘What are these people thinking about me?’ Since Somalia, the respect we used to get just isn’t there" (McCLean's 1996:19).

5. The master warrant officer in charge of discipline in the now-disbanded Airborne Regiment told the Somalia Inquiry, when asked about his attitude towards the swastika, and swastika tattoos on Canadian soldiers, that it did not bother him, nor did he find the Nazi symbol offensive (*Gazette*, Sept. 21, 1996).

6. During this same period there was a disclosure that the military had concealed from family members the real cause of a Canadian peacekeeper's death in Bosnia in 1993 (*Gazette* April 23, 1996), further disparaging the Forces' reputation.
7. The resignation of the Minister of Defence was officially scripted around an issue unrelated to defence—a letter written on behalf of a constituent about a judicial matter—but came at a time when the heat on the armed forces was high.

8. That the aberration may lie in the exposure of these practices to public scrutiny rather than in the practices themselves is suggested both by the fact that Belgian and Italian peacekeepers in Somalia had their own scandals emanating out of similarly controversial maltreatment of Somali civilians during the same mission, and by the testimonies of both a foot soldier and an officer at the Somalia Inquiry. In the latter instance, a Master Corporal who was part of the Canadian Airborne Regiment patrol in Somalia on the night of the shooting death of a fleeing civilian teenager and the wounding of another, stated that they followed standard military rules of patrolling including deceptive tactics of luring infiltrators with food and water as bait, and that he had "used parts of this patrol" in his teaching (Gazette, Nov. 20, 1996). And the commander of the Canadian contingent in Somalia, told the inquiry that "the conduct of our operations in Somalia was done in a militarily satisfactory way which I consider was done extremely well". To repeated questioning, he responded that the only significant problem with the Canadian mission to Somalia was the "horrible incident" of torture and murder of a Somali teenager. The two shootings were themselves not problematic. He was also quoted in a confidential report, issued at the time, as saying that both the beating and torture death as well as the shootings were "unimportant" in the broader context of the mission (The Globe and Mail, February 8, 1997). Another indication of the normalcy of certain military practices—generally screened from the public—can be found in a photograph of the Airborne's army chaplain posing casually, hand on lifted knee, beside five bound and blindfolded Somalis suspected of theft (Gazette, July 6, 1996).

9. A senior officer testified at the Somalia inquiry that the atmosphere at National Defence Headquarters was one of secrecy and paranoia, with elaborate techniques used by senior officials to keep information from the media and thus avoid public scrutiny (Gazette Aug. 30, 1996).

10. A young male reservist told me that having trained as a killer, he now wanted to know what it would feel like to actually kill someone. Can such an inculcated attitude explain not only what led the Canadian soldiers to brutally kill the teenager in Somalia, but to memorialize their acts on film?

11. Weaponry developed for military purposes sometimes finds its way into the hands of civilians, whether criminal, terrorists or other such as unauthorized militia groups engaging in recreational war games, or those contesting the legitimacy of the ruling government. For example, the owner of an electronics repair shop purchased $500,000 worth of dangerous military equipment, including two high-powered lasers for guiding missiles and calculating distance to a target (and capable of blinding a person); three missile-launcher simulators used for military training, and an unloaded AT-4 anti-tank missile launcher, all for the grand sum total of $300 at military-surplus sales in the United States and Canada. The equipment was subsequently seized by the RCMP—only after he began phoning the American manufacturer of one piece of equipment for information (Gazette May 24, 1997).

12. For example, an Australian with a Ph.D. in psychology, whom I met at a military conference, had hoped for an academic appointment, but could only find employment with his country's military research branch evaluating potential recruits and monitoring their performance, rates of attrition and so on. And, on a separate note, recruiters for the Canadian Forces bemoan
eras of low unemployment since they have to dig deeper for suitable candidates.


15. Although the military itself is bypassed, Nisbet claims that it has occupied scholars indirectly. War, he says, has had a broad influence on major thinkers in the West who have occupied themselves directly with war and the distinctive military community that war brings into existence, or else with the pressing issues generated by war: issues of authority, hierarchy and organization, as well as of change, disorganization and reconstruction (Nisbet 1973:11).

16. And what research there is, is conducted by military research officers or former affiliates.

17. An individual issue of *Signs* usually runs over 200 or 250 pages as opposed to the recently inaugurated journal *Masculinities*, which averages less than ninety.

Chapter Two
War and Gender: The Anthropological and Historical Records

Introduction

Our understanding of the gendered organization and practices of the Canadian Forces can be advanced by a comparative review of the discursive traces\(^1\) of warfare found in the academic narratives of anthropology and history. But such a review must be prefaced by an acknowledgement of their limitations. For one, the boundary between these disciplines is considered by some to represent the "long-standing refusal of scholars to accept native peoples, whose ways of life they have viewed as primitive, unchanging, and inferior to their own, as adequate subjects for historical research" (Trigger 1985:5). The entrenchment of this perspective is exemplified in the classic text, *Men in Arms: A History of Warfare and Its Interrelationships with Western Society*, currently in its fifth edition:

[Since] primitive...society is static, the techniques and weapons of war are static also and in this way differ from those of civilized societies in which methods of making war are subject to constant change\(^2\) (Preston, Roland, and Wise 1991:5).

In comparing "primitive human conflict" with "conscious, organized warfare", O'Connell also claims the former to be "essentially static, while war is dynamic--invented for a specific purpose and changing with that purpose" (1989:30).

For their part, archaeologists and ethnologists have tended to "pacify" the past, dodging evidence of war amongst prehistoric peoples, including the contentious view that "wars are actually more frequent in nonstate societies than they are in state societies—especially modern nations" (Keeley 1996:33). Also embedded in teaching and textbooks is the concept of primitive war as ineffective (Keeley 1996). Compounding this 'Western chauvinism' is a gender bias which has seen a "belated study of women's lives in non-Western societies"; "ethnographic accounts (even those written by women) have privileged men's lives and perspectives and ideologies, and
left those of women submerged" (Keesing 1993:43; also see Ardener 1972). This same bias is said to characterise the discipline of history (Scott 1996).

These limitations do not, however, strip anthropological and historical accounts of their value. Instead, they compel us to search more widely for evidence and to approach these secondary sources critically, recognizing that their relevance lies less in their correlation with the findings of this study, and more in their ability to suggest links between the organization of bellicosity and gender, and, thereby shed light on socio-cultural patterns and parameters applicable to studying changing gendered military technology in Canada.

In addition to avoiding attempts at direct application, what must also be avoided in engaging secondary sources is getting mired in their debates, whether on the comparative incidence or lethality of warfare in pre-state versus state societies, or speculations on the origins, motives, causes, and evolution of warfare, tactics and weapons technology—except where these contextualize a particular discussion or provide useful information on the interaction between the organization of gender and war. The same can be said about debates concerning diverse definitions of war; these are discussed below, but again, only for their pertinence to the relation between the organization of bellicosity and gender in Canada. In sum, this chapter aims to identify some of the similarities and distinguishing features of warfare in the types of human communities discussed by anthropologists and historians in order to problematize what we have tended to assume: the gendered organizational parameters and practices which underpin military institutions such as the Canadian Forces.

This chapter has two parts. The first begins with a comparison of several definitions of warfare, then describes some of the constituent practices and features of warfare in small-scale societies as gendered phenomena, and concludes with five case studies of how war and gender map onto each other. The object is to problematize the varying participation of women and men in the complex of activities required even by small-scale societies to field a fighting force, and to understand how this variation contributes to constructing individuals as gendered social beings. The second part of the chapter compares several aspects of warfare in pre-state and state
societies. It then examines some of the theories on the origins and causes of war and thereby traces the roots of the military as an organizational paradigm in the ancient Near East, the Orient and Meso-America—with particular reference to its technologically rationalized and coercive structure. It addresses questions about the differences in the organization of bellicosity in tribal and state societies, the hallmark of warriorhood in each, with particular reference to soldiering in a technologically rationalized army like the Canadian Forces. In sum, each of these literatures is mined for the particular insights it offers into the social construction of gender and bellicosity, and for suggestions of lines of inquiry into the gendered organization of the military in late twentieth century Canada.

Defining War

A review of the anthropological and historical literatures demonstrates that ‘war’ is a far from unitary phenomenon. The terminological and conceptual unity that is ‘war’ is a product of narratives that often assimilate practices as disparate as small ambushes, raids, vendettas, feuds and skirmishes between several individuals, and campaigns, sieges or wars between mass armies extending over months or even years. Nor has the demarcation between practices termed military and non-military, war and homicide been that clear. Historically, weapons and skills developed to pursue state interests with force could be, and were not infrequently, turned to personal gain by soldiers-turned-pirate, rampaging unemployed mercenaries and plundering knights; and much of what has been termed ‘war’ might today be considered no more than organized theft.

Some scholars define war as a "condition which equally permits two or more hostile groups to carry on a conflict by armed force" (Fried 1961), whereas for others it is "armed conflict between societies" (Keeley 1996:x) or "social units" (29). But, in this latter definition, what constitutes a society or social units can also be as variable as "the biological family" (29) or a highly centralized state. Keeley justifies his inclusion of what others might term 'murder' on the grounds that "armed conflict between social units does not necessarily disappear at the lowest level of social integration; often it is just terminologically disguised as feuding or
homicide" (1996:29).

H.H. Turney-High would certainly find Keeley's definition contentious, since, for him, the 'military horizon' involves the possession of five basic elements: tactical operations; definite command and control; the ability to extend a battle into a campaign; group, rather than individual, motives; and finally, the availability of a sufficient surplus to provision combatants with an adequate supply. Warfare, he argues, developed late in human evolution, and paralleled the evolution of human social organization. Primitive societies can rarely extend beyond raids, nor can they implement military strategies since they lack the organizational and conceptual capacities to create sufficiently centralized, hierarchal, formal organizations with enforceable chains of command. The key lies not in weaponry but organization which is manifested in the column—for getting combatants to the scene of battle—and the line which raises the fighting above the level of a scuffle (1971).

Preston, Roland and Wise take an even broader view, considering conflicts between tribal peoples to be warfare if they are "the result of organized group activity with some continuity of purpose and action". But they discount violent acts if they are only "incidental and casual" (5):

The warfare of modern times may be defined as organized societal violence. It includes every conflict between rival groups, by force of arms or other means, which has claims to be recognized as a legal conflict. Under this definition there may be a state of war without actual violence or clash of arms. It excludes riot and acts of individual violence but includes insurrection and armed rebellion...(1991:5).

Unity of purpose is equally important to O'Connell. Focusing largely on the history of weapons, he employs the term "armies" when discussing fighting even between hunters and gatherers, but qualifies such "wars" as "really only extensions of personal disputes," combatants motivated "more out of loyalty to some injured party than to the group and its aspirations", and "lacking a stronger, more unifying purpose" (1989:25).
I. The Anthropology of War and Gender

*War and Gender in Small-Scale Societies*

Although the type of historical data available for European societies can never be had for pre-literate peoples (Schwimmer 1983), anthropology includes rich, contextualized ethnographic descriptions of the war practices of small, closely integrated social systems which exposes the links between the organization of bellicosity and the social construction of gender. Whether indigenous warfare actually intensified in response to “historical circumstances of contact with an expanding state” (Ferguson 1992:200), or whether instead, warfare was the normal state for sovereign tribal peoples which colonizing authorities had mostly suppressed by the time ethnographers arrived on the scene (Chagnon 1977), vestiges in the New Guinea Highlands and Amazonia could still be observed in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s. It is these observations that spawned systematic anthropological analyses of warfare (Vayda 1961), and these, in turn, inform the following set of broad questions addressed in this chapter: what practices constitute warfare in these societies, how are these gendered, and why? Is combat exclusively men’s work? If so, how is bellicosity induced and sustained, and whose interests does it serve? And how do war and gender map onto each other? And finally, how is the unity of military masculinity constructed and sustained in the face of masculinity’s internal fracture? To address these questions, the first part of this chapter sets out to trace the links between the structure and practices of war, and the structure and practices of gender.

*Is War ‘Combat’?*

At first blush, war is identified with men and masculinity. Whether it is the precipitous conflation of war with combat—the latter a predominantly male occupation as we shall see—or the bias of Western male anthropologists that has led to this association and to women’s invisibility on the military scene (Meintel 1983), the popular wisdom is that war is men’s business. However, this is contradicted by the evidence from small-scale societies (Turney-High 1971)
where war is "a total social fact that is shaped by and shapes other aspects of social life" (Ferguson 1992). The waging of war in tribal societies includes a host of religious, economic and other social practices which generally demand the resources and participation of most of the population (Kovitz 1988). These can include decision-making procedures and rituals to initiate hostilities, as well as negotiations to prevent or end them; pre-battle rituals; techniques for recruiting warriors; supernatural components to ensure victory and the safety of combatants; the supply functions of food and transportation, care of the sick and wounded; post-war taboos and ceremonies to structure the victory celebrations and reintegrate combatants into the community; and disposing of the vanquished whether dead or taken prisoner. Thus, in discussing war and gender, as much attention must be paid to the non-combative practices—the auxiliary war practices and the social context in which war takes place—as to combat itself. Broadening our focus to include the many activities which warfare encompasses reveals and helps to problematize its socially complex and gendered character.

**Recruitment.** In the absence of a formal authority to enforce a war pronouncement through the drafting of combatants, the decision to initiate conflict in small-scale societies overlaps with recruitment since declaring war is predicated on the persuasive powers of many apart from valiant war leaders. That women have often been the principal recruiters reflects their status as mothers, sisters, or wives of fallen warriors whose deaths they wished avenged. Among the Dugum Dani, for example, the second greatest pressure to kill next to that emanating from the ghosts of relatives and friends, came from the deceased’s female kin (Gardner and Heider 1968).

But family relationships are not the only reasons why women have pressed men into battle. Men were also women’s combative proxies in other circumstances. Amongst the nineteenth century West African Yoruba, women traditionally controlled the complex marketing system, and waged war to open new trade routes, capture slaves, and gain political control of regions which could furnish commercially useful goods. In turn, wealth accumulated through commerce afforded them the means to wage war. Tonga women also had political interests which implicated them
in wars of succession (Meintel 1983).

Another reason for inciting bellicosity is the anticipation of enemy attack. Yanomamö women of the Brazil/Venezuela borderlands were prized as war booty and lived in continual fear of abduction which meant separation from their children and families, gang rape, and forced incorporation into the raiding village. Ever alert to their menfolk’s politics, women would goad them into pre-emptive strikes against a hostile village through accusations of cowardice (Chagnon 1968).

Another common recruiting technique is shaming. Niethammer (1977) cites the case of an old Pawnee woman who embarrassed some recalcitrant men into defending their homes by dressing as a man and pursuing the invaders herself. The Comanche also used humiliation to induce a cowardly braggart into fulfilling his claims, but here, recruitment was generally based less on caustic chiding than on flattery and encouragement: young maidens would serenade outside the warrior’s lodge on themes of victory and valour; war dances akin to a "modern college prep rally preceding a football game" (Wallace and Hoebel 1952: 273, 252) were held as sendoffs for participating braves. Women was also active in recruitment amongst the Flathead, the Plains, the Oglala Sioux and the Arikara. Here, as in other faces of military practice, women’s role reflected their position in the political and social structure: where male-dominated decision-making bodies could unilaterally declare war (e.g. New Guinea highlanders, described below) and enforce recruitment, men were probably less susceptible to women’s influence.

Warrior motivation was also an important element in the mobilization for war. The susceptibility of Yanomamö or other men to accusations of cowardice or other means of rousing them to bellicosity reflected their culture’s emphasis of "military pre-eminence" (Turney-High 1971:152) and their consequent hypersensitivity. It also reflects men’s structural dependence on women in many small-scale societies. As producers and reproducers, wives are a primary route to wealth and privilege, and are links into networks of valued social relations (Foner 1984). In bridesservice societies, men are economically and socially dependent on acquiring a wife in order to achieve social adulthood and incorporation into the group (Collier and Rosaldo 1981). A wife
provides a man with a hearth, a ‘place’ in the camp. Levi-Strauss also stressed the economic necessity of marriage in primitive societies because of spousal interdependence as well as the very real dependence of men on women to provide them with food. Bachelors are a sorry sight, waiting on the sporadic hospitality of others (1969). A similar dependence obtained amongst the Iroquois where women controlled all cultivated land and its produce; they provided daily sustenance, provisioned war parties and supplied moccasins for stealth. No Iroquois Council could declare or prosecute a war without the approval of Iroquois matrons (Trigger 1985), who supported them in exchange for military services (Stites cited in Brown 1975).

Thus, complementary to the various techniques of persuasion and pressure are incentives related to conditions of scarce (sexual) resources and the absence of other opportunities for accumulating wealth. Incentives to fight could include sexual favours or a preferred hand in marriage. Among the Kiwai of Oceania, the taking of an enemy head was a marriage prerequisite. Amongst the African Zulu, a youth’s cowardice meant public disgrace as his fiancée broke off their engagement (Turney-High 1971). Warriorhood could also be the sole route to political power or prestige: amongst the Huron, young men eagerly sought pretexts for war, at times challenging the pacifist policies of their elders who preferred friendly relations with their neighbours (Trigger 1976). The significance of warfare may have risen amongst the Iroquoian peoples as alternate sources of male prestige diminished:

> Intermarriage between neighbouring communities should have dampened conflict. Yet …in spite of this, warfare increased as it became the principal means by which a young man could win individual prestige…The increasing reliance on horticulture necessitated by larger communities also may have encouraged men to turn to warfare to recover prestige. The men may have felt threatened by the growing importance of horticulture, since it was a female concern. Under these conditions prisoner sacrifice would have been welcomed as an additional reason for waging war. The belief that the sacrifice of prisoners encouraged the growing of crops also enhanced collective male prestige in a society that increasingly valued horticulture (Trigger 1985:98-99).

Ehrenreich cites Mumford’s argument that the development of warfare coincided with the decline of wild predator and game populations as “underemployed hunter-defenders” sought new work and the preservation of their prestige by extorting food from settled populations, and by creating
a market for their services from those whom they themselves endangered (1997). Thus, warriordom could also convert social marginality into social indispensability (Kovitz 1988).

Supply. In addition to recruitment, war has material requisites. External warfare requires a portable food supply, often according women a central role and, as we just saw, the potential to elicit or veto men's war plans. And even when women lacked such direct power, they might nevertheless leave food for the departing war party outside the village, as amongst the Yanomamö (Chagnon 1974). Elsewhere, women were involved in various material war preparations and went along to cook, mend, carry supplies, collect the spent arrows on the battlefield or offer other forms of material support (Heider citing Popisol on the Kapauku 1970; Turney-High 1971).

Tactical Support. War magic and ritual observances by those back home were also considered integral components of a successful campaign (Turney-High 1971). These took different forms: sisters of Mandan warriors fasted and others prayed—as did Apache women—or held solitary hilltop vigils. The British Columbian Kaska women conducted mock battles against stuffed, life-like dummies, and wives of raiders sought to relieve their husbands of distracting jealousy by sporting elaborate symbolic chastity belts (Niethammer 1977). To deflect enemy weapons from their husbands, Jibaro women danced nightly, shaking rattles and snail shells; Zulu clan members observed strict silence, abstained from sex, minimized farm work and kept the family hearth burning (Turney-High 1971). The military success of Tlingit warriors of the North Pacific coast and the Chiriguano of the Grand Chaco were also contingent on the ritual observances of their wives. That women's rituals were considered integral to the prosecution of war—equal to that of combat—is indicated by their expected observance of postwar blood-cleansing taboos along with the men.

Post-War Rituals: Taboos, Celebration and Sacrifice. The centrality of women's involvement in warfare is probably most evident in their postwar ceremonial roles which, apart from observing taboos, in some places included the receipt and display of war trophies; the participation in and sometimes leading of ceremonial celebrations; dealing with war prisoners; and mourning the dead.
The postwar taboos imposed on women sometimes mirrored those observed by the men, indicating that women’s ritual observances at home were considered equivalent to the men’s combative endeavours. Thus, if her husband had taken a life, a Papago woman joined him in seclusion for sixteen days even while the rest of the camp celebrated nightly (Niethammer 1977). Women’s war contributions were also illustrated by the roles accorded them during victory celebrations, and by the type of gifts they received. In North America, women took the lead in post-war festivities (Turney-High 1971). Some went out to greet the victors and receive the enemy scalps which they suspended from poles and flourished exuberantly during the scalp dances. The Comanche women’s parade was sometimes led by a venerated female elder carrying a lance or scalp pole to which victorious warriors might attach their enemy scalps (Wallace and Hoebel 1952). The Wind River Shoshone and Omaha women took the floor first in the scalp dances (Turney-High 1971), expressing their anger and releasing the tension accumulated during the men’s long absence. In many tribes, these dances were not merely victory celebrations but the arenas where the prisoner’s fate was often determined and executed—often by the women. Amongst the Iroquois, captive women and children were usually exempted from punishments meted out to males. Summarizing these events, which he describes more graphically elsewhere (1976), Trigger notes that in

historical times, cannibalism was an integral part of a cult in which male prisoners of war were tortured to death. War was waged, at least in theory, to avenge the killing of a member of one’s own group by an outsider...Women and children who were captured were usually permitted to live; men were more frequently slain in an elaborate ceremony as a sacrifice to the sun, who was also identified as the tutelary spirit of war and the fertility of nature. Certain key elements, including the use of prisoners, the removal of the heart, the killing of the victim on an elevated platform and in view of the sun, and finally the cooking and eating of all or parts of his body, connect this northern Iroquoian ritual with ones practised in the southeastern United States and in Mexico by the Aztecs, although many specific differences remain (1985:97).

The sadistic cruelty displayed by women in these ceremonies attests to the inculcation of a ‘war psychology’ in both sexes.

Post-war rituals included other sacrifices in the form of mutilations which, in at least one case, seemed a deliberate means to prevent women from fighting. Dugum Dani men practised
periodic, ritual internal warfare, and this within earshot of the women's gardening. Yet the latter ignored the fighting. But they did contribute otherwise: during post-war funereal rites, one or two fingers of little girls were chopped off in sacrifice to the ghost of a close relative killed in battle. And since armed combat was responsible for about 25-30% of all male deaths, and the Dugum Dani believed that each such death must be matched by the reciprocal death of an enemy, few adult women possessed more than two thumbs and two or three other fingers, enabling them to wield a hoe but not a bow and arrow (Heider 1970). For Adams, this was a deliberate means of excluding women from combat (1983). The Dugum Dani also practised other forms of war-related mutilation, slicing off either one or both ears. But these were voluntary, as was male finger chopping—practised by the mature or elderly who were presumably past warriorhood. Voluntary mutilation also characterized Comanche post-war ceremonies. Kinswomen of the war dead would display their grief by slashing their arms and legs, and, like the Dugum Dani, sever several finger tips (Wallace and Hoebel 1952).

**Women's Military Immunity.** In many small-scale societies, women have enjoyed a special immunity from military violence, partly because they are scarce 'commodities', and "very valuable economically" (Keeley 1996:86). As we saw, Dugum Dani women would garden nearby, unthreatened by the men's ritual, lethal fighting, and Kapauku women could even enter the battlefield with impunity to collect their husbands' spent arrows. Older Tiwi women, too, would sometimes enter the fray "yelling obscenities at everyone" and would get hit inadvertently (Hart and Pilling 1979:84). Amongst the Yanomamó, women were generally exempt from the endemic violence which took the lives of twenty-five to forty percent of men. Though victims of male brutality and in continual fear of abduction throughout their reproductive years, Yanomamó women were scarce and thus rarely the targets of raiders' arrows (Chagnon 1974). Amongst the Saharan Tuareg, custom held that "women and children were inviolable in warfare" which led defeated warriors to abandon them to their enemies (Keeley 1996:86). But women were not immune everywhere. Men and women were both sources of coveted trophy heads for the Mundurucu headhunters; only children were spared and adopted into their community (Murphy
Mediation and Peace Negotiations. The circumstances that protected women from lethal military violence in some societies also rendered them particularly suited to roles as mediators and peace negotiators. Whatever led women at times to recruit husbands, brothers, and sons for protection and vengeance, to supply and support them and even join them on the battlefield, at other times led women to try and avert war. As mothers, sisters and wives of those destined for battle, they used varying methods to dissuade men from fighting. Yanomamo women would throw magic leaves on their menfolk to prevent the escalation of club fights into a shooting war. And since old age brought the enviable position of being the object of neither revenge nor abduction, elderly women could travel freely between villages and act as messengers or emissaries to recover the bodies of dead kin (Chagnon 1974). Mohave women used persuasion, as did the Iroquois. But as we saw earlier, the latter also had—and sometimes used—their economic power to avert war. According to Niethammer, such intervention was probably welcomed by the men, since many may have fought to avoid accusations of cowardice (1977).

In some societies, a gendered war restraint was built into the political system. The Shawnee appointed a close relative of the principal chief as 'peace woman', to persuade the war chief to abandon proposed campaigns. Inter-marriage between enemy tribes may have been another, more common method by which women effectively became mediators, mitigating or ending hostilities between them (Feil cited in Gelber 1986). However, intermarriage can have the opposite effect, causing ill-feeling when one side reneges on a promise, or if there is spousal abandonment or divorce (Keeley 1996).

Armed Combat. Although most information suggests it was sporadic, women's participation in war did at times, and in some circumstances, extend to armed combat. One of the best documented cases of women army regulars in small-scale societies was that of the African 'Amazons' in eighteenth and nineteenth century Dahomey, a notoriously brutal, militarized slave state (Law 1992). Female troops may have been used to compensate for a dearth of men, possibly due to slave raiding. Forcibly recruited in adolescence during the King's tri-
annual conscription of palace personnel, these female soldiers were formally designated the 'King's wives'. But the attachment was not sexual: their celibacy was strictly enforced, probably to avoid pregnancy. They lived within the palace compound under heavy guard by eunuchs, and were severely punished for sexual transgressions. By their own accounts they had crossed genders for the duration of their service, and in marching songs and drill chants repeatedly referred to being men. Yet they were segregated from the male corps, and in training and practice competed to, and sometimes did surpass their male counterparts in taking heads and general cruelty (Herskovits 1967).

There are numerous other examples in the anthropological literature of bellicose women. Led by a female member of the Peruvian nobility, a brigade of Andean women soldiers successfully battled the Spanish in the eighteenth century (Silverblatt 1980:164). The Amazon River was named for Tupinamba women warriors, encountered by sixteenth century European explorers in northeastern Brazil (Williams 1986). In North America, amongst the Delaware and Navajos, women could, in principle, attain the position of war chief (Meintel 1983); Ojibwa women could 'count coups' in battle alongside the men and thus qualify for admission into the police-soldiers' lodge, gain war honours and the right to join in the warriors' dance (Sacks 1979; Turney-High 1971). The sorority of heroic Cherokee women were eligible to join the men at war council, provide the war chief with strategic advice and determine the fate of captives (Neithammer 1977). And Comanche women apparently gained pleasure from accompanying the war party to "snipe with bows and arrows from the fringe of the fray"; they could also defend their kin in times of crisis (Wallace and Hoebel 1952:253). There are numerous examples of Sioux, Apache, Cheyenne, Hopi, Pawnee, Crow, Delaware, Fox, Gros Ventre, Maori, Majuio, Navaho and Orokaiva women who went along on offensive raids, and instances of others who fought to defend their lands against encroaching colonists (Adams 1983; Neithammer 1977). Elsewhere, in Oceania, Kiwi women sometimes joined the battle to kill an enemy whom their husband had subdued (Turney-High 1971). Tonga women, too, "accompanied war parties, guarded canoes, and frequently entered the field of battle to take revenge or assist the wounded"
(Gailey 1980:301).

**Explaining Women's Combat Exclusion**

These examples of women's ruthless and effective bellicosity, as well as their cruelty towards war captives should dispel any notions that women are, by disposition, either too delicate or benevolent to engage in combat, or that they abhor violence and are reluctant to kill. Yet, despite their great number, combative women are the exception. If women share in their society's war psychology and participate in its auxiliary war practices, how do we explain their more typical absence from the skirmish, battlefield or war party?

Gilmore, Adams, and Tabet each propose a general theory for women's infrequent participation in armed combat. In a biologically-grounded argument, Gilmore concurs with Williams that women are reproductively indispensable, and consequently avoid the risk-taking of reproductively expendable men. It is "this very expendability that often constitutes the measure of manhood, a circumstance that may help explain the constant emphasis on risk-taking as evidence of manliness" (1990:121). Adams' explanation, on the other hand, is socially grounded. Women are structurally exempt or excluded from combat because of the contradiction between the institutions of marriage and war. Societies that practice internal warfare--between neighbouring communities speaking the same language--are typically patrilocal and exogamous: women marry in to cement alliances. As daughters and sisters of their husbands' enemies, women are excluded because they hold conflicting allegiances to both their families of origin and procreation; hence, they can never be trusted by either side to be privy to war plans (Adams, 1983; also, see below). This explanation is supported by the Amerindian evidence that when women did fight, it was against distant, unrelated enemies. Finally, after extensively surveying the differences in tools available to each sex, Tabet concludes that the sexual division of labour constitutes a political relation of domination even in so-called egalitarian societies, and that men monopolize both tools and weapons--thereby excluding women from combat--as a primary means of gender domination (1979).
The exclusion of women from combat can certainly be disadvantageous since their combat exemption frequently precludes their self-defense (Chagnon 1977; Heider 1970) and renders them vulnerable, even to the very men on whom they depend for protection. And it often has detrimental status consequences, blocking their advancement towards full adulthood as we see later (Llewelyn-Davis 1981, 1982), or depriving them of political power (Mazrui 1977a, 1977b). But it also has its advantages where men’s death rate in war is high—a situation which held throughout most of human prehistory (Keeley 1996). Nor is the taboo against the use of arms by women universal. Meintel, for one, disputes Tabet’s theory:

Même si le port d’armes était souvent réservé aux hommes, le rôle de ce facteur dans l’évolution des hiérarchies sexuelles demeure peu clair. Soulignons encore une fois que les tabous contre l’utilisation des armes par les femmes, que l’on trouve par exemple en Nouvelle Guinée, est loin d’être universel. Le problème de l’existence ou du développement d’un tel monopole, ainsi que ses conséquences pour le status des femmes restent à approfondir dans des études à venir (1983:184).

In the light of this variegated evidence and these multiple theoretical positions, rather than look for universal explanations it may be preferable to opt for local, situated analyses, to look to the type of warfare practised and to women’s position in particular social and cultural systems. For example, a cultural explanation for Amerindian women’s general combat abstention was that they menstruated. Since blood was considered a powerful spiritual essence, any bleeding—even by a man—might disrupt activities that required spiritual intervention; hence, most female combatants were post-menopausal (Williams 1986). Amerindian women also abstained from fighting because, again, their productive and reproductive contributions were economically indispensable (Williams 1986; also see Trigger 1976, 1985). Amongst native horticulturalists, not only did women feed the home population and prepare food for men on their extended hunting or other forays, they sometimes grew sufficient grain for trade (Jenness 1977).

**Male Bellicosity**

We have already seen that war in small-scale societies involves a wide range of social practices that engage an equally wide range of members. But, "the role of warrior has been reserved to the men" (Mazrui 1976:71). That is, although war, as a general, multi-faceted
phenomenon is not always and everywhere considered masculine—even in state societies (see Hacker and Hacker, 1987)—combat generally is: "while war may be everyone's business, it has usually been men's work" (Keeley 1996:35). But having just problematized why women do not fight should not mean assuming why, or how, it is that men do. Just as the anthropological record provides no evidence that women are excluded from combat for reasons of nature, nor does it provide evidence that fighting is a natural male attribute, or that men take to it readily. Actually, the evidence—anthropological and other—suggests the contrary:

Most men have to be inspired to fight; if that fails, they have to be forced at gunpoint by their commanding officers. Numerous studies have shown that the average soldier is extremely timorous in battlefield situations and that he "regresses" and reacts "passively" under enemy fire (Gilmore 1990:121).

Ehrenreich, too, notes that throughout history, individual men have gone to near-suicidal lengths to avoid participating in wars—a fact that proponents of a warlike instinct tend to slight. Men have fled their homelands, served lengthy prison terms, hacked off limbs, shot off feet or index fingers, feigned illness or insanity, or if they could afford to, paid surrogates to fight in their stead...In fact, surprisingly, even in the thick of battle, few men can bring themselves to shoot directly at individual enemies (1997:10).

The difficulties of inducing and sustaining bellicosity in men is well documented for the Yanomamó horticulturalists who practice lethal, internal warfare which, as noted earlier, reaps a grim harvest in men's lives. Small boys are socialized to be fierce, and from the age of eight years onward are subjected to compulsory practice duels. When initially forced by their fathers to fight, these children cry and try to escape, only to be dragged back for more. In adulthood, men resist going to war, and some men never do: in Chagnon's sample, 38% of the men over 41 years of age had never participated in a killing. And when they do kill, they "appear to feel a deep ambivalence, manifested in what in our society might be called neurotic symptoms of internal decomposition" (Ferguson 1992:223). Men go to battle only under considerable duress, bolstered by hallucinogenic drugs and chanting; older men fire up younger members of a war party to counter their reticence, their tendency to feign illness and their high rate desertion. Given the high death rate, it is understandable that even seasoned warriors are often less than
enthusiastic about fighting. But all are constrained by a system which expects violent aggression and revenge from men lest they be accused of cowardice (Chagnon 1977).

Elsewhere, in nineteenth-century Plains Indian and other North American societies, men were under extreme pressure to achieve individual prestige through warfare. Like the Yanomamö, boys here also learned toughness and physical endurance from early childhood. Games ensured them to pain: they would throw burning sticks or mud balls containing live coals at each other, or kick each other in the face until they bled. These practices may seem extreme, but such trauma of inducing (and sustaining) bellicosity is not unique; it is found elsewhere in the transformative practices of male initiation, which, like basic training in the U.S. Marines and other contemporary western militaries, have as their goal not merely to transmit new skills and knowledge, but to change initiates (Dyer 1985). Becoming a warrior requires a dramatic shedding of the ‘civilian’ self, entering a state of social liminality for a varying period, and assuming a new, militarized identity. And the Yanomamö are not unique in that, widely, pre-battle readiness often includes the ingestion of mood altering substances (Ehrenreich 1997).

Such transformative practices also physically, socially, and psychologically demarcate civilian versus military spheres. Serving to maintain male solidarity, these demarcations are often accompanied by discourses of male-female antagonism, ambivalence and fear, the projection of dissension among men onto women, and a similar displacement of the fear of the real dangers of war onto dangers associated with female pollution (Gelber 1986). Thus, just as it proved useful to look to women’s local position in the social structure, to their society’s cultural system and type of warfare in order to understand their participation in various war practices, it is equally useful to look to particular social patterns and structures in order to understand male bellicosity and the structural interplay between war and gender.

Structural Links between War and Gender: Five Case Studies

What are the gendered consequences and social patterns associated with the male predominance in combat? An ethnographic review suggests that the degree and type of warfare
has significance for gender relations in allocating control over human and material resources, and
the right to distribute produce and goods. Internal warfare between neighbouring, linguistically
and ethnically related communities (Bonvillain 1995)—particularly where intense, where the
community’s survival depends on the protection of its warriors, and where warriors monopolize
force—groups related males, affords them privileges and enables them to dominate women and
children, and sometimes other men as well. Two examples illustrate this point, the first used by
Adams to explain why few women are warriors:

Amongst the highly bellicose patrilocal New Guinea Highlanders, a degree of male-female
antagonism is a normal, institutionalized part of the future warrior’s education. Underscoring this
sexual antagonism is a profound male ambivalence towards women, who marry in from close or
distant clans. In this highly antagonistic landscape, where it is unclear just who is an enemy, the
marriage ceremony resembles the ritual which seals a peace, exorcising any resentment that might
exist between the two families. Structurally marginalized, inmarrying women are unable to
translate their indispensable economic role in gardening and pig husbandry into countervailing
power against men, who unilaterally appropriate and dispose of the products of women’s labour,
physically assault, rape and murder them—if the women do not kill themselves first11 (Gelber
1986).

Men and women inhabit separate spheres, and elaborate rules regulate the time and place
of heterosexual activity, which is thought to debilitate men. Restrictions on heterosexual relations
are even more acute in the few Highland cultures that practice pederastic ritualized
homosexuality, and where the sexual activity of single men is exclusively homosexual (Herdt
1984; Keesing 1982; Tuzin 1982). Schwimmer argues that because these latter groups possess
weak structures of male domination, men have great difficulty establishing the authority necessary
to organize their martial activities on which the community’s survival depends. For the
Highlands, generally, the degree of sexual antagonism is a measure of the degree to which men
feel a need to distance themselves from the world of women in order to shore up their own.
Women are the primordial enemy against whom men unite to make war12. And since women
are identified not only with, but as the enemy, men move closer to winning their primordial struggle—the one against women—by becoming warriors (1983). However, another interpretation is possible. One could reverse the logic and argue that the construction of women as the enemy follows from masculinized warriorhood. This is inferred by Gelber (1986) and affirmed by Ehrenreich who traces the idea of woman as the enemy "Other" to the practice of killing the men of vanquished populations and enslaving the women; consequently, "the only surviving adult representatives of the defeated enemy would of course be female" (1997:130).

The Africa Maasai cattle herders offer a second example of the link between internal warfare and male dominance. Here, warriors protect their own community and raid others for cattle. Warriorhood is a stage of social liminality on the route to full adulthood which brings full social autonomy and property rights in livestock, things, as well as people—including the right to use or alienate the labour, sexuality or reproductivity of others. But only men can become warriors. Barred from warriorhood, women remain dependent wards and permanently "transactable", especially vulnerable if widowed without sons (Llewelyn-Davies 1981:341).

The above two examples are taken from groups which practice internal warfare. But other cases indicate that warriorhood, in itself, does not afford men dominance. Where external warfare is waged against distant enemies, residence patterns are generally matrilocai, grouping female kin who must provision and run the community alone during the men's long absences. Female solidarity acts as a counterbalance to the male dominance which could derive from warfare. Amongst the now-familiar Iroquois and Huron horticulturalists, women owned the farmland and were both the primary producers and distributors of food for their households. Women could readily control delinquent men by starving them out, and could veto men's war plans by refusing to provision a war party (Brown 1975; also see Trigger 1976 on the Huron). And although combatants were predominantly male, women could and did join them; they also participated in other non-combative war practices which would have been unthinkable in the Highlands. And as the example of Dahomean Amazons attests, just as warriorhood does not automatically confer dominance or higher status on men, nor do women automatically gain higher status through
warriorhood, particularly if it is a form of compulsory tribute rather than a privilege.

What the above patterns suggest is that regardless of intensity, it is *internal* warfare—which residentially groups related males and rewards them for protecting the community—that is implicated in the presence of pronounced gender dimorphism, gender hierarchy, and the bifurcation of communities into defenders and defended. The examples of the Maasai, Highlanders, and native North American horticulturalists also suggest that in societies with a war constellation, a man's gender identity is closely bound up with its war practices (Li Puma 1987).

This is further illustrated by the Amerindian *berdache* whose status involved the adoption by men of female attire, occupations and mannerisms either as a result of behavioural predilections in childhood, or because of a choice of gender-associated implements during a test, or in visions or dreams (Whitehead 1981; Williams 1986). *Berdaches* often took male partners, but their role was not principally associated with their homosexual practices. Since the principal determining characteristic of gender, second to outward physiological appearance, was occupation (as well as menstruation for women), what mainly distinguished the *berdaches* was the choice of women's occupations which were economically attractive in these societies, and could lead to considerable wealth. Moreover, *berdaches* were important socially and spiritually. Being neither man nor woman, the berdache mediated two opposing spheres, and was at the centre of social life, fulfilling essential social and cultural functions which included aspects of the sacred, religious, therapeutic, ritual, bellicose, political and economic.

Because a principal occupation of Amerindian men was warriorhood, and more men became *berdaches* than women who crossed genders, some have incorrectly concluded that *berdaches* adopted women's dress and occupations out of cowardice or fear of death. Sometimes, men who had displayed cowardice on the battlefield or were captives were compelled to wear female attire as a sign of humiliation. But these were not *berdaches* (Williams 1986; also see Martin and Voorhies 1975). In native North America, war was omnipresent, and bellicosity was so firmly ingrained that such feelings would have been difficult to conceive. And *berdaches* did at times participate in warfare. Because of their spiritual powers, they often accompanied men
on hunting expeditions or raids to cook, take care of the camp and cure the wounded. And they sometimes fought as well. But when they, or women for that matter, did so, they donned men’s clothing, and were limited to inferior weapons to the bow and arrow because these were reserved for men alone. Just as women were socially identified by their occupations, appearance and reproductivity, men were by theirs: combat was socially inscribed as masculine, and berdaches were not men. Thus, this social institution further illustrates and supports the association between warriorhood and masculinity in warring societies.

There are other ways that gender and war map onto each other as principles of social organization. Amongst the Azande of the Nilotic Sudan, war-related social practices included homosexuality unrelated to sexual antagonism, and—unlike the berdache—was a transitional status. The ‘boy-wife’ was a practical solution to the circumstances of military service within the context of a particular gendered political configuration. Prior to the period of centralized government\textsuperscript{14}, the Azande were led by a chiefly class who were served by young men between the ages of twenty and thirty-five. They cultivated his gardens in peacetime, and fought in the chief’s expansionist wars. Customs of infant betrothal and ruling class polygamy left few marriageable women, a scarcity exacerbated by lengthy military service during which warriors lived in the compound surrounding that of the paramount chief, and were separated from female kin who would have otherwise provided for their domestic needs. The dual deprivation of female wife and kin led Azande warriors to pay the equivalent of a brideprice in spears for young boys who performed wifely duties, including the provision of sexual services. These ‘boy-wives’ referred to their husbands as such, behaved as women did by eating out of their husbands’ sight, and were publicly accepted as wives. Upon completion of military service, and the accumulation of sufficient bridewealth, a warrior could acquire a female wife, and his now grown ‘boy-wife’ would, in turn, adopt the warrior role (Martin and Voorhies 1975; Seligman and Seligman 1932).

The Azande constituted a male gerontocracy; warriorhood delayed young men’s entry into the marriage competition with the polygynous ruling elite, and homosexuality was a transitional status which ended upon graduation from warriorhood. This homosexual interlude was consistent with
a man's masculine gender identity since it derived principally from warriorhood.

The Azande case indicates how, in the context of a political gerontocracy, masculinity fractures internally. The same can be said for the Maasai whose entry into the marriage competition with their polygynous elders was equally delayed. Differentiated masculinity is also evident amongst the New Guinea Highlanders where older men display a more relaxed attitude towards women than the younger men in whom they deliberately induce an exaggerated fear of female pollution (Gelber 1986). These examples of differentiated masculinity, and earlier examples of combatants as proxies reveal the fault lines along which masculinity fractures internally, and prompt us to problematize how the unity of masculinity is maintained in the face of its internal fragmentation.

Conclusion

This review of the gendered war practices of small-scale societies reveals patterns and parameters relevant to studying changing masculinity in the Canadian Forces. Foremost is the distinction between war and combat which widens our analytical scope to include a broad spectrum of social practices as part of a social group's war constellation, and reveals how the organization and practice of bellicosity in small-scale societies is integrally, though variably, gendered. As a cultural artifact, warfare is woven into the social fabric of small-scale societies, and cannot help but influence—and be influenced by—every aspect of daily life whether it be work and leisure, patterns of kinship, marriage and post-marital residence, ideological and religious systems. Particular war complexes, such as those associated with internal warfare, result in varying degrees of male dominance and female subordination, partly corresponding to bifurcations of populations into defender and defended. And the consequences of war—whether death, sacrifice, imprisonment, incorporation, or enslavement—are equally gendered. Finally, the sacralization of war aims to ensure victory, and endows it with justification and meaning.

As a cultural artifact, bellicosity, too, needs to be constructed and sustained, as does the unity of military masculinity despite masculinity's internal fracture. One means is through
discourses expressing male-female antagonism and ambivalence, with women as the 'enemy', either from without or within. The general absence of reproductive females and *berdaches* from combat, and the occasional presence of post-menopausal women as well as most men suggests the widespread cultural inscription of combat as male in opposition to female fecundity, which also explains women's frequent military immunity.

And since these societies generally lack an enforceable draft, and men often fight as proxies for older men or for women, compliance is achieved through a combination of persuasion and incentives. Challenges to manhood, familiar in Canadian culture, resound in many small-scale societies as a means of social pressure. Taunts challenge a warrior's true manhood, carrying the risk of humiliation. Flattery and exaltations by women or older men of the masculinity of 'warriorhood' exhort younger men to a form of self-sacrifice to which they are not readily disposed. The ideology of manhood is used to ensure male participation in these and other high-risk activities (Gilmore 1990). Showalter details a comparable use of gender ideology in the reinscription of masculinity anxiety in a World War I shell-shocked soldier (1987). The high cost in pain, trauma, and loss of life is a measure of the effectiveness of the ideological means of committing men to battle. Yet, it is its consensual quality which sets this type of combat against that of a military institution such as the Canadian Forces, as we see next.

II. The History of War, Gender and the Military

*Introduction*

That historical writings on warfare are extensive, and that for the longest time the discipline was focused on war, politics and revolution (Gies 1978), is in keeping with its origins in the earliest form of (cuneiform) writing, devised and employed to serve the economic and administrative needs of the Sumerian elite in the Ancient Near East, and to commemorate their military victories and document their war booty (Kramer 1963). This concentration on momentous political and military events has meant a gender-biased historical narrative,
projections of the historian's own gender-bifurcated world, casting men and women stereotypically: heroes on the one hand, manipulative instigators or passive victims on the other. When women did surface as active agents, it was often as anomalous members of the ruling class, or as agents of husbands or sons (Kovitz 1987). In missing the complexity of war and politics, historians have failed to recognize women's contributions, and the very real—though infrequently institutionalized—power they have wielded at different times in non-combative, yet political spheres. Thus, in reviewing the careers of two Merovingian queens, Brunhild and Balthild, Nelson concludes that the strength of a woman's position was inherent precisely in its domestic location. A king might win or confirm his power on the battlefield, but he exercised it in the hall, and this we have seen to be the prime area of the queen's activity. Here in the royal familia the distribution of food, clothing, charity, the nurturing of the iuvenes, the maintenance of friendly relations between the principes, the respectful reception of bishops and foreign visitors: all fell to the queen's responsibility. Thus the organisation of the household, the woman's sphere, became a political function in the case of the aula regis....In so far as later Merovingians remained powerful, it was their activity in the palace that made them so...in the case of a queen, domestic power could mean political power (Nelson 1978:74-75).

As well as blinding the observer to entire spheres of social life and other sources and aspects of power, this narrow historical concentration has also meant a narrower conceptualization of warfare, particularly in its construction as a gendered enterprise, and its consequences for gender construction in the larger society.

In comparing warfare in prestate and state societies, the historical record suggests many similarities. In both, as we shall see, war is multi-faceted, extending beyond combat to incorporate and interact with economic, religious and other social practices, consistent with a particular society's level and form of social development and organization. In both, meaning is attributed to war, and supernatural endorsement is sought through sacred rituals, including human sacrifice; bellicosity is linked to more generalized structures of domination and appropriation, to the use of combatants as proxies, and to the bifurcation of populations into defenders and defended. We turn now to review some of this data, turning first to some of these similarities, but placing greater emphasis on the features which distinguish war in pre-state and state societies.
These emerge most pointedly from the discussion of the theories on the origins of war leading up to and including the era marked by early written records, and crystallize a key question addressed in this section concerning differences in the organization of bellicosity in tribal versus state societies, and the related hallmark of warriorhood in tribal societies as it differs from that of soldiering in a technically rationalized army like that of the Canadian Forces.

The Sacralization of War. As in the non-industrial world, war in the ancient and medieval worlds was ritually complex and bound up with religious meaning and practice. Oracles were consulted, animals or humans\textsuperscript{16} sacrificed, or other religious ceremonials and rites performed to solicit divine guidance, support or intervention, or auspicious conditions (Harris 1979). The Assyrian war machine, for example, included cultic functionaries for interpreting omens and providing religious justification for a military campaign (Ferrill 1985). The biblical king of Moab sacrificed his first born son\textsuperscript{17} in an attempt to reverse his failing military fortunes:

26. And when the king of Moab saw that the battle was too sore for him, he took with him seven hundred men that drew swords, to break through even unto the king of Edom; but they could not.
27. Then he took his eldest son that should have reigned in his stead, and offered him for a burnt offering upon the wall (II Kings 3:26-27).

Sacrifice of the first born son also figures in the Exodus story as God’s retribution for Pharoah’s refusal to allow the Israelites’ departure from Egypt (Exodus 4:22-23). Ancient Greek city-states had what were effectively contractual relationships\textsuperscript{18} with their resident gods, and failure in war was often interpreted as divine abandonment, the consequence of inadequate sacrifices, or divine punishment. Reading victory as notice that the gods of the vanquished had transferred allegiances, victorious soldiers would often carry off their statuary gods.

In medieval times, one of the two pillars supporting ‘those who fought’ were ‘those who prayed’ and were relied on for victory: the ceremonial dubbing of a knight included the blessing of his sword (Bloch 1964). The sacralization of war reinforced the prestige of soldiers and the profession of arms. The Church and military existed in “a state of constant symbiosis” (Contamine 1984:296), their fusion cemented in the crusade (Ehrenreich 1997); pitched battles were preceded by religious rites and the ground hallowed for subsequent Christian burial.
(Contamine 1984). The sacralization of war can also explain the failure of a population to defend itself: the peoples of Germany, Gaul and Britain succumbed to the waves of invading Magyars and Vikings partly because of internal dissension between the many leaders of the former groups, but also because of the "universal belief that all these calamities were a divine chastisement [which] produced a mood of resignation" (Bloch 1964:55). On a more recent note closer to home, World War I propaganda played on the religious theme of the war as a struggle between forces of darkness and light, and promoted the Christian spirit of self-sacrifice as well as notions about a field of honour from which heroes emerged, and where death was clean, quick, painless and saintly (Keshen 1996:127-128; emphasis in original).

And, if anything, the sheer magnitude of deaths from war and ‘democide’ in the twentieth century—by Rummel’s estimation some 187,797,100 people (1996)—brings to mind archaic, divinely-inspired notions of human sacrifice on a collective scale.

Supply. As in pre-state societies, women in the era of written records were implicated in provisioning combatants in-so-far as the latter were responsible for furnishing their own weapons and other supplies, and provisioning would have been out of women’s domain. For example, prior to the European military revolution of the mid-sixteenth to seventeenth centuries when armies were still hybrids of public and private enterprise, many tasks, including recruitment, artillery and engineering were subcontracted to civilian entrepreneurs (van Doorn 1975). Women could be counted among those who provided a variety of support services such as food, laundry and mending. However, gradually this military capitalism by which private entrepreneurs—many of whom were women—provisioned and organized armies was abandoned because recruits ascribed to the antithetical tradition of knightly individualism19. It was during this institutionalization of armies under direct state control that women were excluded from their association with armed forces (Hacker and Hacker 1987). It was this that may have led Weber to link the structural subordination of women to military practice and culture (see Weber in Hacker and Hacker 1987).

Women and Combat. Like anthropology, the historical record includes numerous examples of bellicose women, and evidence that in earlier times female military leaders may not
have been extraordinary. If the archaeological findings, and other historical and legal data on the Celts are any indication, then the widely cited first century C.E. ruler of the Iceni tribe, Boudicca (Boadicea), who led her people against the Roman occupying forces, may have been only one such instance of a more generalized phenomena of combative women (Ellis 1995). As for other examples, Frankish queens such as Fredegund, Clothild and Rigunth—bloodthirsty as they were in killing even their own children, parents, and nephews—would certainly have been capable of combat. Gregory of Tours cites the widow of the Bishop of Le Mans who, together with some servants, successfully fought off would-be abductors of her young daughter (Gregory 1967). And although women were exempt from military service during the Middle Ages, under European feudalism military service was tied to landholding. Most fiefs were held by men, but tenure inhered in the position, not the gender, of the incumbent. Since many feudal customs gave women rights to succession, it was considered “fairly normal” for “armed ladies” to fight in wars or crusades when so obligated (Contamine 1984:241). Contamine mentions several titled women who fought in wars and crusades by virtue of maintaining fiefs with appended military obligations, and other untitled women who fought as well. This was not exceptional in an era accustomed to noble women wielding public authority on behalf of husbands off on just such military campaigns. Other examples of bellicose women were warrior queens from ancient times to the present (Fraser 1989), women soldiers who masqueraded as men Wheelwright (1989), and women who fought or were thrust into combat situations in the World War II era and after (Saywell 1986).

That women were barred from bearing arms in particular periods or regions requires explanation just as it did for prestate societies. For long periods of history, women were scarce, variably due to exposure, infanticide, neglect, poor nutrition, polygamy and concubinage, and the hazards of childbirth. In the Middle Ages, women worked hard and long as producers and reproducers, were more susceptible to the violence of the age—specifically abduction—and were in greater demand than males in the still-active slave-trade (Herlihy 1985). That they consequently had a higher value—not status—in some parts was reflected in a higher ‘wergeld’ during their
childbearing years (Anderson and Zinsser 1988).

What may partly explain the appearance of female combatants in the historical discourse of certain eras, and their disappearance or appearance of passivity in others, is the predisposition of (male) witnesses of the time to either acknowledge or ignore this behaviour. This is suggested by Eishtain's periodization of dominant images of women's war-related roles (1982). In the first, or Mirror phase of the pre-Christian heroic era, women were the warrior's mirror on the battlefield, reflecting back his bloody glory so as to enhance it. Although some mistakenly trace the origins of the tradition of female pacifism to Greek myth and legend, women in Greek tragedies are often bloodthirsty and revengeful, personally taking "a hand in slaying others, including husbands and children, as part of a pattern of vengeance and rage" (1982:31). What they mourned were the effects of war. Since the Other, is, in part, "a projection of repressed or unacknowledged parts of the self" (1982:32), and the human subject in Ancient Greek and Germanic barbarian societies was insufficiently complex to split into parts to be embraced or rejected, the warrior mentality could not allow for female pacifism, if it did exist.

With the dawning of the Christian era, the human subject becomes "complex enough to split" (33), and women shift from men's Mirror to his Other, transformed into qualities that dominant men must deny within themselves: love, compassion, mercy, forgiveness, close ties with nature, charity, nurturance, reciprocity, and pacifism. Women's response to this newly constructed Other has vacillated between a peacetime posture of the female moral superiority of pacifism opposed to male bellicosity—ontological differences taken to be natural—and a wartime posture of patriotic fervour that supported, though did not endorse, war. Although the latter posture recognized (and "celebrated") women's social, economic, and political wartime gains, the pacifism between wars and patriotism in wartime served to absolve women of responsibility for military violence.

The third and contemporary stage is that of militarized feminism which rejects both the essentialized pacifist Other, and the socially and historically constructed female identity opposed to male militarism and its destructiveness. Militarized feminism represents a regression to something akin to the Mirror phase: the Other and what it represents is suppressed, and war is
again wholeheartedly endorsed. Immersed in the warrior code, the militarized feminist casts off her role as cheerleader; in an androgynous mode, she embraces the soldier's identity as her own, and aims to join him on the battlefield (Elshtain 1982).

**Combat, Male Dominance and Citizenship.** In another similarity with prestate societies, the dependence of a population on its warriors for defence can result in the latter's dominance. This was the case in Ancient Greece and Rome where warriorhood was synonymous with citizenship. But here the comparison collapses since small-scale societies are stratified only by age-grade and gender, and military technology is broadly accessible so that all warriors are roughly equal. What distinguishes the polities of Greece and Rome, as well as those of the medieval world, is the presence of warrior and weapons specialization, and hence exclusivity and elitism sustained by a large servile population. That is, where the predominant form of combat requires costly equipment, supplied by warriors themselves, military rank corresponds to social class.

Ancient Greece is best known to the modern reader for its political, artistic, philosophical and literary legacies to the Western world. Less is made of its military legacy or that the Greek city-state was born in war, was structured for war, and in the end, succumbed to war. Many aspects of culture were "infused with the martial spirit"; war was the predominant state and the predominant state of mind (O'Connell 1989:33). By the Heroic Age, the Greek polity was firmly organized around military principles, and incorporated three decision-making levels, each corresponding to its military function: an assembly of warriors composed of arms-bearing freemen; above them a council of elders, or nobles with enhanced decision-making powers; at their head, a warlord or chieftain retaining some residual religious and judicial responsibilities (Ehrenberg 1969). The enhanced powers of the councillors, or nobility, was rooted in their elite military membership which, in the Heroic Age was based on chariotry. By the Archaic period, the "elite troops of the states were cavalry" (Hammond 1986:138). The wealth for a horse, and the freedom from productive labour to train in martial skills was the mark of privilege and nobility, and the key to political authority (Ehrenberg 1969; Hammond 1986). Later still, when
the military base expanded to include the hoplite phalanx, so did the powers of the Assembly from which the hoplites were drawn. Thus, over time, military changes modified the qualifications for citizenship:

Above all, military changes were decisive. Just as in earlier times only those had full citizen rights who could keep a horse, so now, with the change of tactics, by which single combat of knights was replaced by the citizens' phalanx of hoplites, full citizenship was tied to the capacity to supply one's own armour and to fight in it for the state. This was the state of the 'providers of arms'; the hoplite was at the same time the *polites*, the citizen. Probably on account of this fundamental fact, the 'people' could quite often be called the 'army' (Ehrenberg 1969:48).

In sum, what determined more than anything the later political, social and economic character of the *Polis*, the predominant Greek political form, was its origin in the invasion and conquest of indigenous peoples by migrating, bellicose tribes who, upon settling, needed to control their now-subject and enslaved populations. To this internal threat was added the fear of being themselves dispossessed by invaders, since fierce inter-group competition long remained a feature of Greek life. And in the Greek archaic age, as elsewhere in that era, "most wars were wars of extinction or survival" (Hammond 1986:138). Thus, the highly stratified *Polis* comprised its citizenry who for a long time were landholders, but whose privileges as full citizens were predicated on the "capability to serve". For the propertied classes, war service was privilege, obligation, and full-time occupation (Ehrenberg 1969:80).

There are several insights to be drawn from observing the effects of militarization on the social structure of the *Polis*: warfare as an organizing principle of society dictated by incessant inter-group conflict; the close alliance between political and military spheres; the monopolization of armed combat as a means of controlling a subject population; the necessity of having a sufficient economic base to support a skilled military elite; the importance of remaining a minority as a means of retaining one's elite status. And in so far as defenders were exclusively male, the military sphere came to be identified as masculine, which delineated gender boundaries.

The Greek pattern of basing full citizenship on exclusive military service whether generally, or of a particular form, and supported by a servile population is repeated in Ancient
Rome where war was also politically, economically and socially central. From its inception, Rome, too, was structured for war. Republican Rome waged war as part of a deliberately expansionist policy; successful campaigns enriched the Romans collectively and individually, greatly extended their territory, and won them enormous booty, tribute and slaves. War was in effect a form of economic production.

The right to bear arms was confined to male citizens. For the common man, the real prospects of acquiring wealth from war booty, and possibly land, made the army a potentially lucrative and exciting career which promised mobility up out of the wretched monotony which was the Roman peasant's lot (Harris 1979). Another lure was sexual access to women since conscious policy and natural forces together conspired to produce a sex-ratio imbalance. For aristocrats, the close integration between military and political spheres meant that lengthy military service was the normal path to high public office. From the age of seventeen, aristocratic males were educated in warfare and military command—to the exclusion of law, rhetoric or philosophy (Harris 1979)—for an anticipated minimum ten-year military stint, served either in annual campaigns or at a provincial army garrison. Youth were eager to serve, since achieving glorious repute through public office was much coveted by aristocrats as a means of distinguishing themselves from the remaining citizenry, and public office was contingent on this military service. Thus, the Roman military machine fulfilled the masculine elite’s career aspirations, and for a long time offered the poor but freeborn peasantry an occupational alternative to penury, with long-term prospects for advancement. But, as in Greece, the military was closed to women; and some of them must have noted and resented it. Appian, a second-century Roman historian, reconstructs a speech delivered by one such woman, Hortensia, in the Roman Forum in 42 b.c.e., decrying the imposition of taxes on hightborn women who had no access to "office, honours, military commands" or other benefits accruing to aristocratic military careers (Pomeroy 1975:175).
The Roots of the Military Machine

To identify the features that distinguish warfare in small-scale societies from those in the historical era, we turn momentarily to consider the origins of warfare in human history. These are understood imperfectly because full-blown armies burst onto the scene of human history in Mesopotamia concurrently with written records, leaving their military precursors to archaeological speculation. Nevertheless, a brief overview of several theories on the roots of war permit us to compare the organization and practice of warfare in these two types of societies and to highlight specific issues pertinent to this study.

As contentious as is the definition of war--discussed earlier in the chapter--so are theories of its origins and causes. The evolutionary point when humans began using weapons against their own kind is keenly debated: some see prehistoric warfare as an outgrowth of hunting (Ferrill 1985; O'Connell 1989), whereas others question whether in their early development humans had more interest in fighting or filling their bellies, particularly since subsistence economies lacked food and manpower surpluses to sustain extended military campaigns (O'Connor 1989). But Ferrill combs the archaeological record for admittedly controversial evidence of his minimal criteria for warfare--the column and the line--locating it in a few isolated cave paintings, excavations of Paleolithic burial sites, and what he interprets as defensive forms of early architecture and examples of early Neolithic fortification. The founding of Neolithic settlements, he suggests, may have been based less on the invention of agriculture, as is commonly believed, than on the imperatives of pre-historic warfare (1985).

O'Connell shares some of Ferrills's views, citing the Neolithic stoneworks at Jericho as evidence of early lethal warfare and the need for effective communal protection. But contrary to Ferrill, he associates "true war" only with the rise of agricultural communities and wealth accumulation beginning in the Middle East ten thousand years ago. He cites Jacob Bronowsk for whom the roots of true warfare can be found in the organized theft of early nomadic pastoralists or hunter-gatherers, who periodically descended on settled agricultural communities to plunder their surpluses. What accounts for humanity's warlike past was the eventual defensive response
of agriculturalists to these incursions. Marshalling a concerted defense required skills and weapons which, in time, were turned against fellow agriculturalists "in order to obtain better land, women, possessions, or even political domination" (1989:31). O'Connell's evidence is the appearance of human specific weapons, such as the mace and battle-axe, and urban fortifications.

Mumford reads this early evidence differently, and in the process explains the origins of the military as we know it, with its unique authoritarian features. He concurs that organization is key to the emergence of military institutions, but disputes the existence of weapons in the Neolithic village as well as the notion of warfare as a natural extension of hunting behaviour to humans. Instead, the Neolithic was probably characterized by the development of a symbiotic relationship between Paleolithic hunters and Neolithic agriculturalists in which the latter began sharing their food surpluses with the former in exchange for protection against marauding wild animals. From these benign beginnings there was a repressive transformation, first into forced tribute and then into a more permanent system of taxation, forced labour and a broader system of oppression within communities. Thus, apart from the religious function of the early citadel, it probably served to guard stored grain against the very villagers who had previously delivered it, under compulsion, to the granaries.

The army emerged as one of several in a constellation of institutions and cultural inventions in the fourth millennium b.c.e. in Egypt and Mesopotamia, as well as in India, China, Yucatan and Peru (Mumford 1966). These included

the cult of Divine Kingship, astronomical time measurement, the written record, the division and specialization of labour, organized conquest by war, and the building of imposing monumental structures, temples, palaces, walled cities, canal and irrigation systems; not least the assemblage of the once-invisible Megamachine (Mumford 1970:29-30).

What Mumford invokes by the 'megamachine' is that the basis of 'civilization' lay not in new mechanical inventions, but in a new form of social organization which harnessed a multitude of humans into what comprised the first gigantic machine. It is this human machine which produced the grand projects, both sacred and profane, many of which still stand today: temples, pyramids, ziggurats and giant irrigation works. Regulation of the 'megamachine' was based on precise
astronomical observation and scientific calculation by the divinely authorized and empowered—the whole reinforced by military coercion. The twin mechanisms of supernatural authority and brute force combined to reduce the population to "awed submission" (170), and to subject them to abject poverty and mind-numbing labour for the theocratic elite. The material and cultural benefits of increased grain production through irrigation and flood control were achieved at enormous cost to the many and reward to the few. The goal of this new organization was "the constant increase of order, power, predictability and above all, control" (1966:12).

Directing these projects was a king with divine powers, again, sustained by a priestly class—whence the origin of the 'hierarch' and 'hierarchy'—a bureaucracy and an army. But these emergent theocracies were inherently, pathologically unstable since escalations in productivity (and scope) were accompanied by proportionate anxiety-driven escalations in the imperative to shore up the king's powers in-so-far as he personified these fragile material gains and correspondingly fragile well-being of the entire community. The king was the community incarnate. Drawing on Frazer's (and other) evidence of the widespread practice of kingly sacrifice as a ritual of divine appeasement to stave off hardship and ensure continued auspicious conditions, Mumford concludes that early warfare may have originated in raiding expeditions to secure from other communities sacrificial substitutes for the divine king (Mumford 1966). That the capture of prisoners for ritual sacrifice was a common reason for waging war among the Huron and Iroquois, as we saw earlier, lends credence to this argument. Ehrenreich, too, affirms the association of war with human sacrifice, but traces the genesis of war and its associated ecstasies to the sacrificial blood rites by which early humans reenacted and ensured their continued victory over predation by carnivorous animals; human sacrifice was also a means for leaders to reaffirm their power over life and death (1997).

If we accept Mumford's reconstruction, then the military's association with the sacred is rooted in capturing sacrificial victims to quell anxieties around newly-won increases in material wealth. The sequence was:

anxiety invited appeasement by magical sacrifice; human sacrifice led to man-hunting raids; one-sided raids turned into armed combat and mutual strife between
rival powers. So ever larger numbers of people with more effective weapons were drawn into this dreadful ceremony, and what was at first an incidental prelude to a token sacrifice itself became the ‘supreme sacrifice,’ performed en masse... the ability to wage war and to impose collective human sacrifice has remained the identifying mark of all sovereign power throughout history (1966:221).

The broad lines of Mumford’s analysis are supported by Wittfogel who describes a similar dynamic in the operations of what he terms "hydraulic society"; the control of water is pre-eminent in his comparative study of Oriental Despotism (1957). In disparate locations throughout the globe, from Northern China, India, Turkestan, Meso-America (particularly the Mexican lake region) to Egypt and Mesopotamia, the economic shift to hydraulic agriculture meant a dramatic shift in social organization and social control, which Wittfogel refers to as "Oriental despotism" (18). Unlike hydroagriculture—farming based on small-scale irrigation—hydraulic agriculture requires the marshalling of coordinated, disciplined and supervised mass labour to build and maintain elaborate irrigation and damming systems to deliver water and prevent destructive flooding. Building these systems required cooperation amongst participants, but also meant unanticipated subjection to the coordinating authority and the accompanying loss of personal and political autonomy. Many peoples resisted the changeover to agriculture precisely because material security could be "attained only at the price of political, economic, and cultural submission" (Wittfogel 1957:17).

Comparisons of military patterns in hydraulic versus non-hydraulic, feudal societies highlights the former’s totalitarianism. Whereas feudal sovereigns held no monopolies on military action, could mobilize vassals for only limited periods, and—in keeping with a decentralized society—could fully control only their own troops, soldiers in hydraulic states were subject to the absolute authority of the ruler who alone decided when, where and for how long they should come and fight. And whereas feudal armies were skilled and heroic, they often suffered from internal feuding, lack of coordination, obedience and discipline. By comparison, the army of a hydraulic state was orderly, unified and disciplined, and vastly exceeded anything the feudal order could muster (Wittfogel 1957). What Mumford’s exploration explains, and Wittfogel’s confirms, is the internal repression unique to this form of social organization, and the origins of the sacred
aura which surrounds the military to the present day.

A central lesson of feudalism, and one which supports an earlier conclusion regarding war in pre-state societies as well as Ancient Greece and Rome, is that the monopolization of combat can lead to dominance, especially where the community depends on its warriors for survival (and others have no source of countervailing power). Though military service was not the exclusive basis of citizenship under feudalism, the warrior class of heavily armed horsemen were privileged because of the insecurity of the times, and the population's reliance on their protection. The prohibitive cost of the knight's weaponry, protective equipment and steeds placed it beyond the reach of most, and was both the sign and basis for the elite status of the fighting class. And, as in Greece and Rome, it was the freedom from productive labour which afforded them the opportunity to perfect their martial skills—freedom provided by the toil of a large feudal peasantry.

**Summary and Conclusion**

This comparison of warfare in small-scale and state societies has yielded several similarities, among them: the infusion of bellicosity with sacred meaning; the frequent inclusion of women in sacred rituals and other war-related practices but their more common exclusion/exemption from combat; the accompanying differentiation of defenders from defended often corresponding to structures of domination and appropriation; men's predominance in combat and their role as proxies. But the evidence of these gendered patterns does not imply a naturally-occurring quality. As we just saw, what marked—and freed—men for combat in feudal and other societies was not their biology but their positions within particular networks of social relations. Thus, in the context of the contemporary Canadian military, rather than assuming the male-dominance of its organization and practice—including combat—their construction and reconstruction as gendered must be problematized.

There are also fundamental differences that demarcate the uniqueness of the military as a social institution. Where technologies are simple and widely accessible, so are those for
conducting war: among men of fighting age combat is fairly democratic as are the rewards. State societies, on the other hand, are stratified; combat is either by elites or in their service. Where weaponry is costly and specialized, and its mastery requires the freedom from productive labour, military elites initially develop and correspond to economic and political elites. That is, exclusive membership in the military is predicated on the wealth to afford the necessary weaponry and the sustaining labour of an (unarmed) subject population, often including the women of the (male) military member’s own household. In turn, the monopolization of arms can be a primary means of controlling a servile population, as the Spartans did the helots.

Furthermore, the development of an internally stratified military is the mark of a stratified society where relative wealth, weaponry and military rank corresponds to social class (as in Ancient Rome). Here, full citizenship is based on a particular form of military service where such service tends to be exclusive to the elite: power, in the form of political authority is rooted in elite military membership. Thus, in stratified societies not only can the monopolization of specialized weaponry be a means of gaining and maintaining power and signify privilege, but the differentiation of weapons and types of combat correspond to the internal divisions between men. Social divisions are no longer based solely on age-grades and gender.

And because social class in stratified societies tends to correspond to military rank, the rewards of soldiering are not as automatic as they are in pre-state societies. In stratified societies combatants themselves appropriate wealth and gain or retain power only where warfare is an exclusive occupation: either as a feature of exclusive citizenship as in Ancient Greece or Rome, or because combat specialization renders it inaccessible to the masses, as under European feudalism. Elsewhere, most of the booty, tribute and power accrues to those, usually members of the ruling elite, who have outfitted the army for what may best describe much of warfare in the historic era: organized, socially legitimated theft (Kovitz 1987). But although control of organized force is a source of power and wealth, it has not always remained in the hands of the state or those outfitting combatants. Soldiers in armies have certainly been remunerated by pay but also by what they could seize on their own, either before or after they were officially
discharged, or if they turned to piracy. And many soldiers have been disenfranchised proxies, fighting under threat of corporal punishment. Under these latter circumstances, the exclusion or exemption from soldiering for some men and most women (Contamine 1984) has not necessarily been handicapping as in many pre-literate societies or the stratified ones cited above. And the internal fracturing of masculinity, dictated by gerontocratic tribal organization, has its counterpart in class societies, but with a significant twist:

That is, in contrast to pre-state societies where combat is accessible to all men, and fighting depends on the consent of combatants—and sometimes of women as well—in state societies combat is either an exclusive privilege or an obligation extracted under duress. In the latter case, coercion is possible because military institutions, a unique feature of states, differ qualitatively from tribal war parties in that armies are complex, centralized social systems with built-in hierarchies delineating enforceable chains of command. The monopolization of violence by men in small-scale societies is achieved both by excluding/exempting women—through ritual and the monopolization of weapons production and use—and by using threats and rewards to persuade men to fight, in the absence of coercive structures. In state societies, on the other hand, armies are coercive structures. They control the means of state violence, and, as noted by van Doorn, are formal organizations based on a "powerless proletariat" and the control of what the leadership assumes to be unwilling soldiers induced to fight through forceful measures (1975:16). The thrust by such a powerless proletariat to democratize political power during the period of the French Revolution and other national revolutions of the 19th century was accompanied by a democratization of force as a right of citizenship. The emergent mass army was relatively homogeneous and uniform in skills and behaviour, and was sustained through a general conscription. However, the mass army was relatively short-lived and eventually gave way to small, more specialized professional volunteer forces which have remonopolized the use of force on behalf of the state (van Doorn 1975). And it is this form of military monopolization which makes the soldier's status in the Canadian Forces unique, and which we explore further in Chapter Four. But first we turn to examine the history of the Forces and its precursors, as well
as its evolution within the Canadian state.

Notes

1. Citing Collingwood and Berger, Trigger notes that "historians generally acknowledge that their studies reveal as much about historians and their circumstances as they do about former times" (1985:4), and that the past can be held hostage to the needs of the present.

2. The centrality of this position is further suggested by Preston's status as W.K. Boyd Professor Emeritus at Duke University and Honorary Professor of History at Royal Military College of Canada.

3. I review some of the anthropological theories of war and peace elsewhere (Kovitz 1988).

4. I use the term 'primitive' here following Turney-High, but otherwise, throughout this text I follow Keeley's usage, in which he explains that 'primitive', in anthropological discourse, refers to the technological condition of being preindustrial or preliterate, not inferior. But, since the term has these negative connotations, it has been replaced by 'preliterate' or 'nonliterate', 'prestate' or 'nonstate', 'preindustrial' and 'small scale'. Like Keeley, I use these terms interchangeably for stylistic variety to refer to societies that are simpler in technology and some aspects of social organization—and usually smaller in size—than societies that have produced historical records (1996:27).

5. The value of wives was not lost on women who, in Africa, took on the role of 'female husband'. In parts of Africa, there were multiple marriage forms that were not strictly procreative but contracted around the obligations and rights over goods and persons. Anyone with sufficient resources could marry and thereby gain rights over a woman's labour power and offspring. Hence, a woman, even one who herself was married with children, could pay a brideprice for another woman, become her husband and thereby gain rights in her, including the right to choose the genitors of her offspring, full rights over these offspring as their father, as well as rights to specified products of this wife's labour.

6. Hageners, amongst whom warfare has now been suppressed, most probably shared this postwar practice as both women and men mourning the `natural' death of a close relative would sever a finger at the joint (Strathern 1972). The same could be said of the Mae Enga among whom the newly widowed would normally lop off a finger tip (Meggitt 1977).

7. Wallace and Hoebel cite a Ute women who had married into a Comanche tribe and intervened to prevent an inter-tribal conflict because she feared for her son's safety.


9. During World War I, men were commonly provided extra rations of rum prior to an offensive to prepare them for death or killing (Keshen 1996).
10. Keeley claims that it is 37.4% for Yanomamö men, but cites only the data for the Yanomamö Shamatarí, omitting the comparatively lower–yet still high–figure of 23.7% which Chagnon includes for the Yanomamö Namowei-teri (1996:196; Chagnon 1977).

11. Highlander women have a high rate of suicide (Gelber 1986).

12. Ritual homosexuality, as male initiation, is one form of male emancipation from the mother's control, especially during childhood.

13. Homosexuality formed only part of the constellation of the berdache institution, but amongst the Amerindians homosexuality and heterosexuality were not mutually exclusive practices. Most men who had sexual relations with berdaches seem to have had loving and regular relations with opposite sex partners.

14. Although Seligman and Seligman give no precise dates, the era they speak of would seem to be pre-twentieth century.

15. Cuneiform writing also includes votive, educational and literary inscriptions of myths and epics (Kramer 1963).

16. Menelaus, husband of the abducted Helen of Troy, is reported by Herodorus to have sacrificed two local children while in Egypt in the hopes of accelerating the advent of favourable winds by which to sail (de Selincourt 1954).

17. There is biblical and other evidence that sacrificing children to appease the gods was common amongst Semites and many other peoples (Leviticus 18:21, Deuteronomy 18:9-10; see especially Frazer 1992). This form of sacrifice probably concentrated on the first-born son, considered the most precious. There are numerous biblical references that first-born sons belong to the Hebrew God (Exodus 4:22; Numbers 3:13; Micah 6:6-8; also see Plaut 1981), and that the Israelites were being encouraged to abandon the practice, as evidenced in the story of Abraham. Human sacrifice was eventually supplanted by circumcision; Frazer notes that the Israelites explain the origin of circumcision as a custom designed to "save the life of the child by giving the deity a substitute for it" (Frazer 1992:269 referring to Exodus 4:24-26). Since tabulating—and advertising in stone—the number of fallen enemies was a central feature of warfare in the ancient middle east, circumcision may have also been a means of foiling the tabulation efforts of any potential victors. A historical remnant of the ritual sacrifice of the first-born son to God survives today in the Jewish rite of pidyon haben, or the ‘redemption of the firstborn’. Numbers 3:13 reads:

Because all the firstborn are mine; for on the day that I smote all the firstborn in the land of Egypt I hallowed unto me all the firstborn in Israel, both man and beast; mine shall they be: I am the Lord.

18. Croesus accused Zeus of deceit after his military defeat by Cyrus, and later sent chains to Apollo at Delphi to communicate his bitterness (de Selincourt 1954).

19. The problem had become one of controlling, manipulating and motivating great numbers of people into concerted action. And the solution was based ultimately 'not...on mechanization but...more efficient and concentrated organization of human effort' (van Doom 1975:17) and by
inculcating the values of regularity, duty, discipline, and self-sacrifice.

20. The money value set on a person, to be paid in case of criminal injury or death under Anglo-Saxon and Germanic law.


22. Mumford sets the Neolithic era from roughly 8,000 B.C.E. to 3,500 B.C.E., and characterizes it by the first modifications of the environment to make it suitable for cultivation after the withdrawal of the Ice Age: drying up the swamps, opening up heavy forests, terracing hills, building dams and reservoirs and irrigation ditches, staking out permanent fields and building permanent dwellings of clay or wood (1966). He also emphasizes the lack of authoritarianism in this context:

   The secret of this (the neolithic village's) social and technological success was twofold. Every member of the community had access to the entire cultural heritage and could ordinarily master every part of it; and there was no order of authority, no hierarch of precedence, except the natural one of age, since in such a community, he who lived the longest knew most (159).

23. A 'hierarch' is "the leader or chief of a religious group or society, or high priest", whereas a 'hierarchy' refers to "a system of church or government by priests or other clergy in graded ranks". The etymological origin of 'hierarchy' is in the Greek hierarches, meaning the keeper of sacred things: hieros, sacred, and archos, ruler. I have Patricia McGraw to thank for this insight.

24. O'Connell notes that the "image which emerges from monuments, [of emerging urban societies in the ancient world] inscriptions, and the writings of contemporaries is that of a dangerous world where attack could come from any quarter and only the militarily strong survived" (1989:33), and that far from reflecting only the views of the narrow segment of society engaged in the fighting depicted, they may have also reflected the popular consciousness.
Chapter Three
A History of the Military in Canada

Introduction

The historiography of the military in Canada has been largely shaped by the view that history is "a road map through the treacherous and rugged terrain of world politics and war" (Stanley 1974:315). But even the history of a military institution should extend beyond a chronology and analysis of the wars in which it was largely forged and which may have contributed to shaping its host society as a nation (Granatstein 1990, citing Stacey). Such a history should examine the military's development as a technological system, specifically its institutional consolidation and professionalization over time. It should discuss the means used to enlist the support of combatants and others in the population. And since, as Morton has pointed out, "self-interest remains the rule of nationhood" (1992:xii), it should also investigate the interests served by the deployment of troops, and what combatants themselves have stood to gain or lose. Finally, a history of the military in Canada should also explore its relation to its host society and its penetration of the larger social fabric. It is issues such as these which the following historical overview will aim to address—to the degree permitted by the secondary sources. A cautionary note is in order: in addition to the limitations of secondary sources noted in the previous chapter which also apply here, the first part of this chapter may appear to be gender-neutral or focused on men. This reflects the state of the literature, although it may also reflect the general absence of women of European extraction from the military scene for much of the time period under review. However, the second half of the chapter compensates for this absence through its sole attention to Canadian women's increasing military participation.

Canadians, according to George Stanley, are an 'unmilitary people' whose sense of security derives from a paradoxically indefensible and invulnerable geographic habitat (1974):
Canada’s population is small and occupies a vast territory which, until the first transpolar flights of the 1930’s was geographically impenetrable from the north, and for most of the century after Confederation was bordered on the south by manifestly friendly1 neighbours. For the longest time, the British navy patrolled the seas, both east and west, and it is almost two centuries (1815) since a war was fought on Canadian soil (Morton 1992).

There is additional evidence for an unmilitary cast amongst Canadians who neither celebrate military heroes, promote them into positions of political prominence2, nor reward them economically (Pierson 1986). As junior political allies, first of the British and more recently the Americans, Canadian leaders and governments have afforded the military little consistent support—even when threatened territorially. This may be attributed to Canada’s late arrival on the ‘national’ scene. Canada only achieved legal independence from Britain in 19313 (English 1990), and a truly Canadian army came even later in Canada’s nationhood: its first home-grown army command and administration only dates from the Second World War (Stanley 1974), and the Canadian Forces as we know it from as late as 1950. And the debates around conscription during two World Wars4—both fought off the continent—sparked crises which threatened to destroy Canada as a nation (Granatstein and Hitsman 1977).

But the lack of foreign intruders has not meant an idle military, and its engagements may elucidate, to a degree, Canadians’ unmilitary cast or why for most Canadians today the Canadian Forces is an alien institution (Coulon 1991). Since the British takeover, and even before, Canadian military force has been turned inward against certain segments of the Canadian population. That is, since "aid to the civil power is aid to the powerful also" (Willett 1987:67) this ‘unmilitary disposition’ on the part of many Canadians may disguise an anti-militarism following from the deployment of Canadian troops, in recent memory, for internal repression5. This much is suggested by Macgillivray who notes that from 1867 (Confederation) to 1933 "the threat or apprehended threat of domestic disorder was the primary justification for both retention and expansion of military forces" (1983:116). And since almost half of these disorders consisted of labour disputes, there was an additional risk of antagonizing the working class, which
constituted a primary source of military recruits (Macgillivray 1983). Bercuson and Granatstein also note that, after the 1904 amendment to the Militia Act gave municipalities the right to call out the troops, their extensive use to quell labour strife led workers to detest the militia (1992).

_Preconfederation_

Even if one could argue a contemporary case for an 'unmilitary' Canada, a search through Canada's past reveals that it was not always so. The existence and shape of Canada as a nation—though currently tenuous—was forged in war: wars of the European conquest; wars between the English and the French; even the American Revolutionary War which determined the separate existence of Canada, and was confirmed by the War of 1812 (Morton 1992). War profiteering permitted enormous wealth to be amassed at various times in Canada's history, most notably during the French colonial period and during the First World War. And voluntary militias—though frequently used as constabulary forces—have deep roots in communities across the country (Senior 1981). Also, as noted in Chapter One, war determined the shape of Canada's social programs and major social institutions from the family to trade unionism (Morton 1992), and even the franchise for women (Cleverdon 1974).

Just as the notion of an unmilitary Canada is tenuous, so is the link between geography, military security and an unmilitary disposition when considering New France in the seventeenth century. Although protected on all sides but the south by a combination of allies and geography, it was nevertheless a heavily militarized society. How could it be otherwise in a country with colonial roots, in which soldiers comprised over one-third of the 10,000 immigrants in its first one hundred years, and with an economy based increasingly on wealth accumulated through rapacious resource extraction—in this case of furs? Under such conditions how could the colony be exempt from significant infiltration by the military both institutionally and eventually industrially? In this, new France was following a long tradition in which elites and others—as seen in the previous chapter—have used military means to pursue their economic and political interests.

War, however, did not figure in the original plans of Champlain, who came primarily
in search of mineral wealth and a navigable route through the continent to the western ocean. Nor did it figure in the plans of his 17th century French backers who were intent on converting 'heathens' to Christianity (Eccles 1972). But financing the project through the lucrative fur trade provoked conflicts that dominated the colony almost from the outset. In the New World, Europeans encountered natives who had long been waging external, seasonal warfare for blood retribution, ritualized sacrifice, and masculine prestige (Trigger 1976). In seeking to defend and extend their economic interests, both the French and the English allied themselves with opposing native factions, who added disputes over furs to their traditional grievances (Eccles 1972). But economic gain was never a primary motive for the Indians, or the Europeans for that matter. "Traditional cultural patterns played as important a role in influencing interaction among the various groups in eastern North America as did economic self-interest" (Trigger 1976:8). These alliances and conflicts meant war, but the "first European-style battle in North America would not take place until the mid-eighteenth century" (Morton 1992:33). Instead, war practices on both sides were hybridized as Europeans introduced the musket to the Indians, who then lured their better armed enemies into forest ambushes (Eccles 1972).

Some historians have glorified this early warfare. Thus, Dollard is said to have died attempting to save New France when he was merely out to rob a party of Iroquois hunters (Canadian Encyclopedia, 1988c; Trigger 1976). In fact, much of the warfare involving Europeans and natives consisted of raids, ambushes and counterambushes aimed at stealing pelts, intercepting them in transit or establishing themselves as intermediaries in the fur trade (Eccles 1972). But the nature of these attacks did not mean diminished death tolls: two aspects of native warfare, limiting casualties and seasonal warfare, were gradually abandoned and deaths rose markedly, exacerbated by the European practice of using Indians as war proxies. This, together with the imported diseases against which the natives had no immunity, and in certain cases the subversion of their culture (Trigger 1976) contributed to their eventual near-decimation.

War continued between the Iroquois and the French colonists, and the latter's Huron allies, until 1663 when the private commercial interests governing New France were replaced by

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representatives of Louis XIV (Eccles 1972). Shiploads of regular French troops arrived and, though unaccustomed to the bitter climate, were launched into an initially disastrous mid-winter campaign. One in five soldiers perished. Nevertheless, they managed to subdue the Mohawks and gain a generation's peace. Many of these professional soldiers then settled in New France, ready to rally to its defence.

Thenceforth, military defence incorporated varied proportions of habitants militia—all males between the ages of 16 and 60—Indian allies, professional troops from France, and colonial regulars. The militia, like the Indians, were well adapted to local conditions and had mastered the skills required for the predominant form of 'guerrilla' warfare. But since men at war left fields untended and communities unprotected, the militia were eventually supplemented with conscripts from guards of the naval dockyards. In the end, these colonial regulars only served as poorly paid workers, hired out by their officers to the habitants with whom they billeted (Granatstein and Hitsman 1977). The sons of the latter then had to perform the more hazardous military duty at which they were more adept (Eccles 1972). The tendency to base defence on a citizen militia rather than a standing army persisted, although variably, over the next three centuries through to the present.

The imposition of royal government in 1663 formally militarized the colony. Governors and intendants were now army or naval officers with primary responsibility for military administration and maintenance of a militia organization. Militia captains directed local tasks such as the census and roadbuilding. But this new arrangement brought no long-term peace. The new governor, Frontenac, was bent on self-enrichment and ordered an expansive westward search for furs, which revived the old enmities of the Iroquois. Hostilities followed, characterized by the now-familiar raids and counter-raids, thefts and sudden slaughter, treachery and betrayal of natives, returned in kind by wholesale slaughter of defenceless settlers. These escalating conflicts eventually extended southward into the English colonies and, with it, the continued use of allied natives as proxies as well as mutual plundering and bloodshed.

In their struggles for control and access to wealth, the colony's elites became enmeshed
in corruption, meting out favours to friends and taking cuts of the vast sums spent by France's treasury on maintaining Indian alliances and far-flung forts. War was a means of expanding the fur trade: garrisoned trading posts, established "ostensibly to keep the Indian allies supplied with munitions to pursue the war, really served little more than a commercial purpose at the Crown's expense" (Eccles 1972:98). Even when the Iroquois had tired of fighting for the English, and by the 1690's wanted peace—war having cost them half their warriors—Frontenac persisted because war was profitable. A temporary hiatus came only in 1696 with his death (Morton 1992).

War was also profitable for the officers of distant forts established to protect the westerly expanding fur trade after 1714. These officers amassed fortunes, not from farming or even furs, but from graft and profiteering on France's massive military spending which she hoped would secure her shrinking colony. "War...was the real staple industry of New France" (Morton 1992:22 citing Eccles). Compounding this was the failure to invest these fortunes productively in farming or industry: "military virtues, rather than those of the prudent bourgeois and husbandman, were the ones that commanded the greatest respect in the colony" (Eccles 1972:117). These predominating military values meant that monies were frittered away by New France's elites on fine living: clothes, hospitality, servants. And the habitants imitated their leaders' extravagances.

In the end, with all that France had poured into the colony, it was relinquished without protest since possession proved peripheral to French imperial interests (Eccles 1972). The French departure left the British and Americans to struggle over the continent, a struggle which spilled into New France with the American invasion northward to Québec. But few Canadiens participated in the defence. The ensuing British counterattack engaged the Indians, and the latter were ultimately the biggest losers: having fought the white men's battles, the Indians either lost their lands or saw it transferred to the United States. Common soldiers, too, paid a high price and reaped few rewards. Driven on sometimes successful, sometimes hopeless, death-stalked missions, or sent to shore up military defence posts designed to meet the interests of military leaders and their sponsors, many lost their lives. And those who survived saw their superiors
disproportionately rewarded when lands were distributed to Loyalist officers and their men. The military hierarchy had also been honoured earlier when British troops surrendered at Saratoga: the commander Burgoyne headed home leaving his soldiers to "suffer and die in American prison camps" (Morton 1992:45). The interests of the common soldier rarely coincided with those of their rulers.

The new British North America took on the outward appearance of a military society, with Loyalist Army officers in charge of distributing land, seed and military rations. As former soldiers, these new settlers were expected to provide a credible defense of their new land. But many were forced to trade muskets for food and seed. And though the colony was also expected to maintain a militia, for the next century its defence was determined and underwritten by the British, shaped mostly by fear of American invasion to settle lingering grievances and avenge the British-inspired Indian wars.

American invasion finally came in 1812 when Britain was embroiled in the European struggle against Napoleon. In this, as in the later Fenian Raids, the Canadien stayed largely removed from what they rightly saw as an imperial struggle. In a scene that presaged future events, the legislative assembly in Upper Canada refused to authorize the necessary power or resources to launch a defence. Authorization came only once members of the assembly departed and the provincial administrator could proclaim martial law. The militia acted as auxiliary troops, with the defence borne largely by British regulars and the indispensable support of native warriors.

With the fall of Napoleon, the direction of the military campaign in North America shifted more fully into British hands. And with the signing of peace it was clear that the war had been good to most British North Americans. Even in Upper Canada, traces of destruction were hard to find within months of the peace. Maimed veterans, surviving on meagre pensions and charity from the Patriotic Fund, were easily forgotten...Members of disbanded regiments, located where strategy not agricultural science, dictated, found pioneering hard (Morton 1992:70),

and most left.

By 1819, the British garrison was reduced to under 7,000 troops, and plans to reform the
militia were abandoned to the pomp and circumstance of yearly displays on the king’s birthday. The exorbitant cost to Britain of building the vast networks of canals to facilitate a victory against the ever-present threat of American invasion proved how expensive Canadian defence could be. For the time being, this was provided by British garrisons, plagued by desertion partly because of the frequent aid to the civil power they were expected to provide: facing the abuse of rioters, strikers, or intimidating election mobs.

Still, the colony’s defence was mostly shaped by the continuing threat of American invasion. Even the rebellion of 1837—a form of civil war—carried a risk of annexation should it have succeeded. But the rebellion led Britain to reconsider the enormous cost of protecting the colony, hitherto justified by its cheap resources and guaranteed markets. Now, it was thought, the Canadians should pay for their own defence. But in peacetime the latter had no inclination to do so, nor even to participate in the dwindling militia.

Canadians had become accustomed to effortless protection by the British, and were uninterested in conflicts which the British had themselves provoked. The militia, which numbered 100,000 at the time of the 1837-8 rebellions, and 235,000 by 1840, was inexpensive to maintain, being unarmed, untrained and unorganized. Those who served in 1837 had been self-financed volunteers; and it was on this same principle that the Militia Act of 1846 would be passed as well (Senior 1981).

It is to this 19th century militia tradition that the present Canadian army can be traced, beginning with the privately financed volunteer cavalry, artillery and infantry militia units of the pre-1837-38 rebellion era. Although Montreal was a British garrison from 1760 to 1870, throughout the 19th century local military families compensated for reticent British and local governments. Montreal and its environs were particularly subject to threatened and actual warfare by Indians, Dutch, English and Americans, and local military families felt a need to personally undertake its defence in times of both peace and war. The oldest infantry unit in the Canadian Army can trace its origins to an independent Montreal rifle company of the mid-1850's, renamed the Prince of Wales Regiment in 1860, and now the Canadian Grenadier Guards. The oldest
corps and regiments of today's army originate from the 1855 reorganization of the militia (Senior 1981).

As Bercuson and Granatstein observe,

the militia has been viewed either as a reserve force to supplement the regular, professional, army (British or Canadian) in times of trouble, or as the backbone of Canada's military, trained by regulars but with the primary mission to defend the country (1992:131).

This sums up the militia's uneven history, and the tendency for all arrangements to be transitory. The sedentary militia had included all males between the ages of 16 and 60, who, unless exempted, were required to participate in annual inspections and drill in their parish of residence on four consecutive Sundays. "The annual muster reminded the men of Canada that they had a duty to their country" (Senior 1981:8). Converting from compulsory service to self-financed voluntarism, the Militia Act of 1846 divided the sedentary militia into two groups, the younger of which could provide an emergency force of 30,000 men by voluntary enlistment or ballot. Several years later, however, these arrangements had broken down, at least for the Montreal area. Even the Provincial Cavalry and the Coloured Company, part of Canada's first peacetime standing army, acting as border guards to prevent desertion by British regulars in the post-rebellion era, were disbanded for political reasons. Neither the colonial government nor the Home Government were willing to finance them (Senior 1981).

The large British garrison progressively dwindled, and at the time of the Crimean Civil War (1854) was withdrawn entirely, leaving the Canadian government solely responsible for defence. This period saw a renewed military enthusiasm and the next Militia Act (1855) which signalled significant change: it passed financial responsibility from the British to the Canadian government, and reoriented the militia towards internal rather than external security, which had been its exclusive focus under the earlier 1846 Act. The latter had made no mention of internal security because, as noted earlier, this had been the province of the British garrison and a reason for their frequent desertion. But with the regular garrison largely gone, the new Act identified an Active Volunteer Force of 5,000 men to be paid, armed and equipped by the government and trained for twenty days yearly to aid the local police in controlling riots, insurrection or other
internal disturbances. But, again, within seven years the elaborate arrangements following from this new Act were found totally wanting. In 1856 the annual muster day parades were abolished, and with the reduced danger of American invasion the rural sedentary militia gradually faded away. For one, members of the Volunteer Active Force had to continue paying for their own uniforms which some could not afford (Senior 1981). The volunteer units finally collapsed in the economic depression of the late 1850's (Morton 1992). As chance would have it, the Crimean war's end left England with a greatly expanded army and no place to put it (Senior 1981). So, with renewed threats of American war, the British garrison was restored to pre-1854 strength.

Support for the militia continued to wax and wane. Some found membership prestigious; others, leaders of the Canadiens who campaigned successfully against the Militia Bill of 1862, warned of the risks in fighting British wars. The defeat of the bill enraged the British, but more Fenian raids in 1866 and 1870, and the spectre of a future invasion led the British to reinforce garrisons, and the Canadians to unite in mustering some kind of defence (Preston 1977).

It was the next real threat of war with the Americans--averted as their civil war continued--that finally convinced the British to abandon the land defence of its North American colonies partly because it was part of "the policy of bringing home British troops from self-governing colonies" (Preston 1967:62) in order to "achieve a more economic imperial strategic deployment" (Preston 1970:5), and partly because of Canada's 1,500-mile border, the impossibility of commanding the Great Lakes, and the growing size, wealth and expertise of the American army. By 1871 British garrisons were withdrawn from all but the naval base at Halifax (Preston 1970). For Britain, Confederation was a means of extricating itself militarily from British North America (Stacey 1967). True to form, Canadian Parliament refused to fill the breach, by expanding and arming the militia, preferring instead a continued reliance on the British (Morton 1992).

**Post-Confederation**

Despite British intentions, Confederation brought little immediate reduction in their
control or military involvement in Canada. Thus, it was the British who negotiated the Treaty of Washington regulating Canadian-American relations. Another Militia Act (1868) envisioned an Active Militia of 40,000 volunteers in nine military districts and by February 1869 had 37,170 volunteers and 618,896 men in reserve. But these, too, were unequipped, lacking such basics as tents, blankets, and field rations, and they remained an auxiliary to the British garrison, dependent in operations on the British for everything from generals to field hospitals. Canadian politicians still expected the British to underwrite their defence, and the latter obliged, sending money and regiments across the ocean at each American threat. But then, with the exception of the Riel crisis, the British stood fast about transferring responsibility for defence to Canada, and after 1871—and over Canadian objections—the Canadian frontier became the longest undefended border in the world (Preston 1977). What made it possible for the Canadian government to do so little to fill the breach, militarily, was the failure of the American threat to materialize (Preston 1967), and so "the border lapsed into agreeable somnolence, a striking contrast with the feverish military activity of a few years before" (Stacey 1967:12).

To demonstrate good will in anticipation of future requests for British military support, Canada made some financial commitments, such as opening the Royal Military College at Kingston in 1876. Private benefactors and county councils paid for their local regiment's British military dress. But the larger community showed little commitment or interest in military institutions. Employers—and the federal government itself on one occasion—fired workers for attending military drill, even during the period of the Fenian raids. By the early 1870's defence spending fell, and volunteer units had difficulties filling their ranks. When the Russians threatened to attack in 1878, Canadians typically refused the necessary defence allocations (Morton 1992; Preston 1967). The militia tradition persisted, but it became a social and political institution which elected between one quarter and one-sixth of the members of the first seven parliaments after Confederation, and was sufficiently top heavy to provide for ample patronage appointments. Beyond seeing the militia as "useful for suppressing internal disturbances" (Macgillivray 1983:116, citing Laurier) as it did during labour unrest in 1905, 1906 and 1909,
and later in 1922 and 1923, governments did not take the militia seriously nor did they show it much consistent interest (Stanley 1974; Willett 1987).

What broke continuity with the pre-Confederation era was the transformation of Britain’s defence relations with her colonies. From being a consumer of defence services, Canada was being pulled more tightly into Britain’s imperial orbit, expected to bolster her military and economic power (English 1990). To this end, the new British commander of the small permanent Canadian forces attempted to harmonize with the British. This included the elimination of political patronage, rerouting most purchases of goods and services—including the management of the militia’s pay, stores and engineering departments—from civilians to the military General Officer Commanding, to which Canadians politicians were averse. The British also tried to force the hand of Canadian politicians in extracting participation in the Boer War, although Britain’s initial expectation from Canada in South Africa was not military might, but to impress upon Europe its imperial reserve strength and protect its world paramountcy (Page 1987). The Canadian cabinet was deeply divided and French Canadians objected. But in the end, many Canadians, though reluctant to undertake the defence of their own territory, agreed to contribute to a foreign colonial conflict which paradoxically kindled English Canadian nationalism:

Service in South Africa was a precedent for Canada’s role in two world wars and Korea. Providing an overseas contingent joined and even supplanted the older militia roles of home defence and aid to the civil power...Canadians in future would serve together under their own officers. Canadian commanders would carry a dual responsibility: to the government in Ottawa as well as to British superiors in the field (Morton 1992:118).

Canadians continued to partake in imperial defence, standardizing training and organization on British models, requiring Canadian officers in the permanent force to take British promotion exams and study tactics relevant to British theatres of war (Morton 1992).

From the mid-1890’s until 1914, there was a surge of militarism—the extolling of military virtues in defence of the nation—fostered by a unique form of Canadian imperialism. Initiated as an antidote to American expansionism, and driven by an underlying fear of waning British imperial power, Canadian imperialism "became a potent political, economic, social and spiritual force" by the 1890’s (Page 1987:4). Its immediate goal was to strengthen and transform ties with
Britain through greater economic and military cooperation, and to increase the influence by the dominions over imperial policy. The ultimate goal was the bolstering of Canadian nationalism.

This rising militarism was also informed by the equation of industrialization with the physical degeneracy of (male) Canadian youth, as well as a revulsion from the rising materialism to be counteracted by the hardening wholesomeness of military training. That this formula was profoundly gendered is evident in the remarks of one historian of the militia:

there has been manifested in Canada a growing disposition to recognize the importance of maintaining an efficient military spirit. The country realizes that its whole life has been stimulated, the standard of its manhood built up, the national character strengthened by the achievements of its sons in the Fenian Raids, the Red River Expedition, the Nile Campaign, the North-West Rebellion, and the South African War. True, the laurels have been moistened with the tears of Canadian mothers, but a price has to be paid for everything that is worth having. The mother of a coward does not often weep (Ernest Chambers cited in Berger 1970:234).

The equation of manhood with military valour paired with its counterpart of weeping motherhood bereft of what is most dear to her are themes which resurface in the discussion below of the gendered notions of loyalty and sacrifice found in earlier Loyalist petitions for compensation.

The surge of militarism was expressed in a quickened pace of military reform and militia expansion: funding for the militia department increased dramatically in the years leading up to World War I, from $1.6 million in 1898 to $7 million in 1911 and $11 million in 1914, the last despite a deep financial depression. By 1913, the permanent force stood at 3,110 and the militia at 74,213, though with more men than equipment (Morton 1992). And as we see later, it was at this point that women were recruited into the regular force as nurses for the military hospital.

In general, militant Canadian imperialists looked upon war as inescapable and real, and upon military training as desirable and necessary, as a preserver of certain values which modern civilization was destroying (Berger 1970:258).

These views were manifested in an extensive cadet movement incorporating patriotism, discipline, law and order, regularity, and especially subordination (Berger 1970). By 1913, there were 759 cadet corps companies—many of them in Quebec—with approximately 30,000 cadets including all schoolboys in Toronto. They were part of a movement to counter the physically and emotionally
enfeebling urban environment of inactivity and female influence, replacing these with invigorating activity to instill "such manly traits as courage and the ability to deal stoically with pain" (Keshen 1996:128).

Many objected to this rising militarism. Farm organizations and members of the growing trade union movement objected to the militia's strike-breaking and the elitism of its officer class. "Pacifism was an old and respected tradition in Canada" (Morton 1992:124; Socknat 1990) and most believed that soldiering was a waste of time and induced laziness. Although the Royal Canadian Navy was officially founded in 1910, political bickering meant that when war was declared in 1914, the coast off British Columbia was being patrolled by the Imperial Japanese Navy. And just as there had been a surge of militarism at the turn of the century, it was largely killed by the disenchantment and disillusioning reality of World War I.

**World War I**

At the threshold of World War I, Canada was still a British colony, and as such could neither sign treaties independently nor declare war. Tied to Britain's foreign policy, when Britain declared war on Germany in 1914, so did Canada (English 1990), and with little military experience or man-power (Stanley 1974). But with the "conception of war as a rather exhilarating kind of sport in which few were killed and from which...many desirable consequences followed", and the impression that "war was more a manly triumph over the obstacles of nature than massive and indiscriminate slaughter" (Berger 1970:234, 236) Canadian participation was largely endorsed with crusade-like fervour and the widely-held, naive belief that the war would be short-lived. In the rush to register volunteers, officers and doctors overlooked youth, old age, disability, though not race or gender. And despite the fervour, Ottawa initially gave the pre-war militia regiments no financial support as they recruited almost 90,000 men in the first eleven months of the war. "In compensating for Ottawa's miserly conduct, commanding officers dipped into regimental funds and on occasion their own pockets" (Keshen 1996:42). By the end of the war, 628,462 men—over one-third of the one and a half million Canadian men of military age—had enrolled.
"For a country whose greatest military effort for over 150 years had not exceeded 10,000, and whose population had only reached eight million, this was truly a staggering effort" (Stanley 1974:313). Of the total strength, 424,589 went overseas and 60,661 men and women lost their lives in battle from wounds or the accidents and diseases of war. Many of them, along with British, French and other soldiers, paid with their lives for the ignorance, inexperience and recklessness of their officers. "There is no simple count of those who returned too maimed in mind or body to resume a normal life: certainly it was larger than the toll of dead" (Morton 1992:165).

Men, many of them recent British immigrants, were initially driven to enrol as much by unemployment as idealism and, again, naïveté about war and thinking that it would end quickly. But as the war dragged on, labour surpluses on farms and in industry turned to shortages, and enthusiasm waned. Legislation on conscription was enacted to compensate for the military shortfall; but, as noted earlier, the move was intensely controversial, came late in the war, and was responsible for few enlistees. The extension of the franchise to all men and women serving in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, as the Canadian military was called, as well as to their mothers, wives and sisters, was designed to elicit their support for conscription (Morton 1992).

As in earlier eras, war heated up the economy and concealed rampant profiteering, shady deals and shoddy manufacturing on top of tremendous waste, particularly in England. War meant escalating government spending, but it also meant prosperity, much of it generated by, and filtered through, the Imperial Munitions Board which had been established to curtail corruption, and which, by 1917, was the biggest business in Canada. But the prosperity was temporary. At war's end, returning veterans joined hundreds of thousands of laid off munitions workers in a country demoralized by a recent influenza epidemic to which 30,000 to 50,000 succumbed. Veterans' programmes and pensions, the annual cost of which came second to servicing the national debt annually, fared well in comparison to the armed services and militia, which suffered cuts in size and funding, reflecting the country's anti-militarist mood. Military equipment was soon obsolete. The residual responsibility of the now-shrunken permanent force was aid to the
civil power (Morton 1992), and almost all were called out in the early 1920’s to intimidate striking Cape Breton coal miners (Macgillivray 1983).

The Great Depression saw the services, particularly the navy and air force, squeezed even further\(^{20}\). At the approach of World War II, Canada’s military equipment was aging and defective\(^{21}\) (Roy 1972). And the horrors of the Great War were sufficiently fresh to give warning against sending “young men...to the slaughter” (Morton 1992:178 citing F.R.Scott). Canadians were in neither shape nor mood for fighting.

\*World War II\*

Yet, when Parliament voted for war in 1939, Canadians acceded, if reluctantly, on the government’s promise of no conscription, slashed military budgets, and need by the unemployed for work. Steps were taken to avoid the pitfalls of profiteering, hoarding and inflation that had plagued the First World War. Developments in Europe had Canada looking to the United States for equipment, and re-established Canada as a junior military partner, this time in American defence preparations. During this war, the Canadian Army was commanded and staffed by Canadians, and eighty-four per cent of its personnel were native-born as compared with fifty-one percent of the C.E.F during the Great War (Stanley 1974). Yet when the British and Americans met—once at the beginning of the war off the coast of Newfoundland and twice later on in Québec City—for discussions regarding Canadian forces, they did so without the Canadian Prime Minister. Such exclusions of Canadians from Allied strategic planning were repeated well into the war (Morton 1992).

Other patterns were reminiscent of the Great War: the economy was transformed, boosting Canadian industrial output and spawning twenty-eight Crown corporations which produced whatever private industry would not. Most was sold to the allies. Once again, crippling unemployment became a desperate labour shortage to the point that in 1942 a National Selective Service was awarded authority over the occupations filled by most Canadian men, and eventually women, of certain age groups, and was mandated to regulate hiring and firing. Measures were
instituted to control inflation and prices, as well as ration some food and other items. But this caused little suffering, and most Canadians were actually buoyed by the availability of work.

Despite the government’s initial promise, conscription soon became an issue in the face of recruitment shortages. And though Canadians voted in favour, and first authorized the conscription of men for home defence alone (Stanley 1974), it affected few since the war had reached the turning point by the time conscription for overseas was considered. Of a total of 730,625 men and women who served during the war, only thirteen thousand of the men drafted to serve at home ever did go overseas. There were 74,374 casualties, 22,964 of these fatal (as compared with 60,661 in World War I (Morton 1992; Stanley 1974:381-2). Finally, as in the Great War, "Canada’s Army of 1939-45 was both a citizen and a volunteer army [and] the greater number of Canadian servicemen came from the general public" (Stanley 1974:381-2); but the backbone of the Canadian army in World War II remained the militia regiments (Bercuson and Granatstein 1992).

Approximately 11,000 men applied for and received ‘conscientious objector’ status which exempted them from military service but stipulated that they perform Alternative Service in areas such as clearing forests of dead timber, building trails and roads, fire-fighting and tree planting as well as road building and ditch-digging. Approximately 7,500 of these men were Mennonites, and though expressly prohibited by their religious tradition from participating in war, many experienced gender identity conflicts as a result of their refusal to fight. Paramount was the hardship caused their families by their absence and inability to provide financial support. And, exacerbating these objectors’ diminished sense of self-worth stemming from their own estimations of the uselessness of their work or its lack of danger—to which soldiers were subject—were media portrayals of conscientious objectors as weakminded, cowardly, and unprincipled, which "served to emasculate those who were targets of such criticism" (Epp 1995:145). As a result, some 4,500 Mennonite men took the pre-emptive step of joining the armed forces partly out of a sense of patriotism and partly to perform more useful and better-paying tasks, and to avoid accusations of cowardice.
Post-War Era

The fear of rising socialism and the rapidly growing union movement led to Liberal endorsement of post-war comprehensive social security, beginning with family allowance; unemployment insurance was a measure from which returning veterans, in particular, benefitted. As the gross national product swelled to $11.8 billion in 1945 and $15.5 billion by 1947, financing these programs was not especially onerous. Neither were benefits targeting post-war veterans specifically, such as incentives to establish themselves in farming or fishing; university and vocational training which kept about 280,000 veterans off the job market; and rehabilitation grants to purchase homes or furniture. Employers were also obliged to welcome returning veterans to their former jobs.

At war's end, "Canada stood third among the nations in the number of fighting ships, fourth in airpower, and high in the list of armies" (Morton 1992:225). But the government’s post-war goal was the conversion of the wartime economy to peacetime production and high, stable employment. It therefore halved the personnel requests of the army, navy and air force, allowing them 25,000, 10,000 and 16,000 regulars respectively. The National Defence College at Kingston was opened in 1948 to train mid-ranking officers; higher ranking officers attended the National War College in the United States or the Imperial Defence College in Britain. But despite this latter lingering connection, the imperial centre shifted more completely in the post-war era from Britain to the United States, and Canada re-oriented its weapons, equipment, training methods and communications accordingly, signifying Canada’s military integration with its longstanding enemy, which had been seen as a threat even into the 20th century. But the relationship was not reciprocal, and it was only in 1949 that Canada was earmarked as a country where Americans could purchase arms, though these purchases remained comparatively small.

To restrain defence budgets—only $360 million for Canada in 1949—and pool resources, NATO was formed as a military alliance in that same year. For Canada, NATO was preferable to an unequal partnership with the U.S. Barely a year later, ten-and-a-half thousand Canadian men volunteered to participate in NATO’s response to the North Korean invasion of the south.
By 1953, defence spending had climbed to $1,907 million, and there were endeavours to integrate the three services in order to improve efficiency and eliminate interservice rivalries.

In the post-war era, Canada also expanded its mandate to include international peacekeeping—a task which Canadian generals never really liked (Granatstein 1990)—both "to show the flag and to provide training for its personnel" (Bercuson and Granatstein 1992:160). From a modest start in the small UN Military Observer Group serving in the newly partitioned India and Pakistan in the 1940’s, and in the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization serving in the Middle East during the next decade, Canada embarked on its first bona fide UN peacekeeping mission as part of the emergency force established on the initiative of Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson in the wake of the Suez Crisis. Since then, a Canadian contingent of 200 served in the Congo from 1960 to 1964, some 1100 to 500 served on Cyprus from 1964 to 1993, and about 1150 were posted in the Middle East again from 1973 to 1979 (Bercuson and Granatstein 1992). Bosnia and Croatia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Somalia are locations served by Canadian peacekeepers in the 1990’s. In what some might find a controversial interpretation, Bercuson and Granatstein also include the extensive Canadian involvement in the Korean and Gulf wars under the heading of ‘Peacekeeping’, qualifying these, however, as not strictly peacekeeping operations but as "exercises in collective security under the UN banner" (1992:160). They also note that although peacekeeping has been a primary role of the Canadian armed forces, its importance in Canadian defence policy has been inconsistent, moving up and down on the list of priorities from one White Paper to the next.

Thus, in the 1964 White Paper, peacekeeping was at the top of service priorities, and continental defence at the bottom. Barely five years later, existing priorities were reversed: probably in response to the October Crisis, Canadian sovereignty—to be ensured through internal and coastal surveillance—was placed first, followed by NORAD commitments, NATO and, finally, the occasional international peacekeeping mission. And although these priorities held for 15 years, they were subsequently redefined three times: in 1987, 1991, and most recently in 1994.
When Canada first moved into its new peacekeeping role it was at odds with the development and promotion of local defence industries\textsuperscript{24} which, under the Defence Production Sharing Program, became branch plants of their United States counterparts in exchange for the latter's major defence purchases from Canadians, as well as a healthy balance of trade (Morton 1992). This new defence production program also dovetailed with Canada's new position as a NORAD\textsuperscript{25} ally and involved a covert nuclear role—despite vehement government denial—which threatened Canadian sovereignty and security: the Americans had stationed, and were guarding, nuclear devices on Canadian soil.

Canada's tendency to short-lived defence policies persisted in the three decades leading up to the 1990's, and is apparent in areas other than peacekeeping. One such policy involved the intention of eliminating waste and duplication in administrative personnel and functions by unifying Canada's three services. This proceeded in stages, beginning in 1964 with the integration of defence headquarters under a single Chief of the Defence Staff, the replacement a year later of the army, air force and navy by six functional commands with largely regional responsibilities, culminating in 1968 with the formal creation of a single Canadian Forces and one common uniform (Bercuson and Granatstein 1992). Some of these changes were short-lived: by 1975 the functional commands were modified to permit a semblance of the original 3 services to resurface in the form of Maritime, Mobile and Air Commands, with two additional commands for logistics and communications. And three distinct service uniforms were revived in 1984.

But the broad outlines of unification have remained, and then, as now, have not been without critics; in the siege atmosphere in which the Forces currently finds itself in the mid-1990's, unification has been held responsible by some for the Forces' various problems, especially the controversial deaths of Somalian civilians—one a teenager—at the hands of Canadian peacekeepers, described in Chapter One. For Taylor and Nolan (1996), the real threat of unification lay in "the erosion of basic leadership principles through the forced merger of three diverse doctrines" (8). In a reversal of army tradition, subordinates could no longer offer their senior officers constructive criticism, and the merger of Canadian Forces headquarters, the
Defence Research Board and the civilian component of DND all into National Defence Headquarters ultimately gave career civil servants undue influence in subordinating military decisions to political expedience. Political correctness now took precedence over military competence, and

..."leadership"...was soon replaced with "managerial principle"...the "career management system and Personnel Evaluation Reports became geared to promoting cautious managers rather than troop-oriented officers (8-9).

Hence, the incidents in Somalia were seen as evidence of a "breakdown of discipline," caused not by a "rogue regiment" but by the imperatives of a career management system which put at the helm of this regiment an officer whose incompetence was hidden to avoid jeopardizing his career (Taylor and Nolan 1996:10).

Bercuson paints a comparable picture, arguing that there has been a crisis developing in the Canadian army for a decade, caused initially "by the deliberate bleeding of the defence establishment to near death by successive, mostly Liberal, governments" (1996:241), and exacerbated

by unification and the imposition on the Canadian Forces of a structure designed to ease political and bureaucratic burdens rather than promote military effectiveness...the creation of National Defence Headquarters [meant that] soldier-managers took control of the army and soldier-warriors were shunted aside. We now have an army in which war fighting is of secondary or even tertiary importance (242).

And this, he asserts, "is absurd" since "armies are for war" (242). Unification merely exacerbated the dilution of military values which accompanies times of peace:

Prolonged peace is always a time of trial for any military26, but in this country, where the Armed Forces are not held to play an important role in asserting national interests, it is particularly testing. It is difficult for Canadians to face the bare fact that an independent nation must have a well-run, effective, and efficient military capable of doing what military forces exist for—to fight wars (242).

Hence, the reason why Somali teenager Shidane Arone was killed in 1993 is

because Canada's people, government, military, and specifically its army have failed to keep real soldiers, combat effectiveness, and traditional military leadership at the centre of the Canadian army. That failure was caused by the
remarkable apathy Canadians have towards their military and their failure to understand that nations that aspire to keep their independence and preserve their way of life must have armies that are prepared to fight wars (1996:238).

But can this explain why both Belgian and Italian peacekeepers are facing comparable charges as the Canadians over their performance in Somalia, and why racism was apparently rampant among all U.N. troops stationed there? Nor has the trend to what some have termed 'civilianization' been confined to the Canadian Forces—which Bercuson admits.

Although 'civilianization' may not explain the murder of a Somali teenager, it has certainly been part of a much broader institutional reconfiguration of the military in which the administrative arm has burgeoned in relation to the operational—effectively inverting the 'tooth-to-tail' ratio (van Doorn 1975; Willett 1987). Several things have conspired to fuel this development. For one, it is the culmination of a trend which, as seen in Chapter Two, began with the rational reorganization of the army during the military revolution of the early seventeenth century. It was then that the leader of mercenaries was replaced by the non-commissioned officer; the dichotomy of nobility/commoner was replaced by that of officer/ranks; and status and class privilege were replaced by professionalism (van Doorn 1975). Later, in the nineteenth century, larger, more complex mass armies with greater logistical and other requirements meant more extensive support services which mushroomed by the twentieth century thanks to increasingly complex weapons, transport and communication systems. An extended peace, too, has played its part, though not quite the one envisioned by Bercuson: whereas in wartime, the predominating problems facing armed forces are tactical; in peacetime, they become administrative (Willett 1987). And finally, in the 1970's era of inflation and unemployment, NATO members were under pressure to rein in the spiralling costs of the arms race, bloated more so by the electronic sophistication of integrated weapons systems. Here in Canada, in an atmosphere of increasing fiscal restraint, the military was being driven by the new 'holy grails' of efficiency and accountability (Willett 1987), compounded by a (Liberal) government that considered both war and military leadership obsolete. The impetus was to rationalize decision-making, which, paradoxically, resulted in inflated numbers of staff officers now employing management methods;
moreover, much of the military leadership was being replaced by civilians (Morton 1992). And so the very bureaucratic rationalization—which, as we saw in Chapter Two, had been pioneered in the armies of the ancient world, and had been transmitted over time through armies as organizational paradigms—were being rediscovered in systems theory, resurrected and reinfused into the existing military bureaucracy. This trend, disparagingly termed ‘civilianization’ by military critics, and apparently compounded by unification, resulted in a top-heavy rank structure.

This ‘overmanagement’ is a central feature being addressed by the current military ‘downsizing’. In the 1990’s, the obsession with government deficit-cutting has meant reverting to the force reduction strategies of earlier eras: from a total of 87,000 military and 36,900 civilian personnel in 1989-90, the Forces Reduction Program announced in 1994 has seen the military and civilian components of the Department of National Defence shrink to 66,900 and 26,200, respectively, in 1996, with targets of 60,000 military and 20,000 civilian personnel for 1999. The numbers for civilian employees are somewhat misleading, however, since, although they comprised 42% of the Department of National Defence total in 1989-90, 39% in 1996 and are projected to comprise only 33.3% in 1999 (Canada. Treasury Board 1996), civilians represent only part of the administrative, or non-operational, total serving the Canadian military. As noted above, a sizeable proportion of the ‘tail’ end of the Forces comprises senior officers and other military personnel who perform largely administrative, managerial and professional tasks in office-type settings, whereas only a small proportion of employees are serving at the ‘sharp’ or operational end, although all are expected to be combat-ready.

A trend to re-emerge in recent decades is the reliance on the armed forces for internal policing. Shortly after the reordering of defence priorities in the late 1960’s, the protection of Canadian sovereignty was expanded to include internal security—soon to be invoked with the proclamation of the War Measures Act during the October Crisis and once again during the Oka crisis (see footnote #3). The deployment of the largely English-speaking armed forces during this crisis around French separatism highlighted the Forces’ unilingualism, and added official bilingualism to the preceding changes of unification and civilianization.
Conclusion

Canada's long history of military involvement is linked by several common themes. The military has variably been a source of profit and prestige, and has been subject to the vagaries of its political leadership. War often met the Indians' ritual requirements and economic interests (Abler 1992). And French and British settlers, and later the habitants, often fought out of defensive self-interest—for their lives or livelihoods. But frequently, the interests of combatants and those they served diverged, requiring elites to enlist the support of combatants, whether through persuasion and incentives, such as bribery, in the case of native populations30, the coercion of European soldiers, or more recently conscription.

Generally, local governments have avoided responsibility for the cost and shape of defence, relying instead on foreign powers, voluntarism and the predominance of a citizen militia. Canada has looked to powerful allies to shape military policy, protect Canadian sovereignty or determine Canada's military deployment. Hence, military budgets and the number of personnel have fluctuated not only with the policies of the Canadian government but with those of its allies. Canadian governments have never considered their own military as the principle force for defending its country from external encroachment. In this century, the Canadian Forces have been used to fight foreign wars and more recently for peacekeeping, and on home territory for civil emergencies and internal policing. Finally, the historical record assumes male military predominance, ignoring women’s exclusion during most of Canada’s past. For this reason, women are absent from the preceding account of the history of the Canadian military, and it is to tracing their incremental participation that we now turn.

Women in the Canadian Forces

Ruth Pierson, like George Stanley, cites the oft-mentioned description of Canada as unmilitary, but in contrast concludes that it belies the definite "link [that] existed in Canada between the military and power and prestige" (1986:96). Defending one's nation, Pierson notes, is considered a duty. But it is also considered a privilege—one denied to those whose allegiance
in times of war is suspect; and there has been a historic relationship between the right to vote (as the hallmark of full citizenship) and military service (Symons 1990). Owen Parker, too, concludes that "From the beginning of European colonization, military service was seen as an extension of citizenship" (1995:52). These perspectives would explain the barring of Japanese Canadians from military service during the First World War and their internment and concomitant exclusion during the Second (Morton 1992; Ward 1990). It would also explain the exclusion of Canadian women from combat until quite recently.

Given this connection between the military, citizenship and power, it should come as no surprise that for most of Canadian history military service for those of European extraction was exclusively male. Yet this exclusivity was more image than practice: during the perilous period of early European settlement women may not have been officially counted amongst the defending forces, but their contribution to defence was a circumstance born of the necessity of frontier living. Combative defensive action was at times women's only viable response to enemy attack—as in the case of Marie de Verchères in 1690 and of her daughter, Madeleine, two years later (Coates 1996). Both the latter and Laura Secord (Morgan 1994) are frequently cited as exceptional heroines, but in their own times this recognition stood as counterpoint to the accepted definition of the 'heroic' as masculine—epitomized by Dollard (see above), de Verchères' contemporary who had "the good historical sense to die at the time" of his bravery (Coates 1996:123) and Secord's contemporary, Major-General Sir Isaac Brock, who also sacrificed his life in battle for the colony and Britain in the War of 1812 (Morgan 1994). As we see later on, the theme of sacrifice in battle is one that also resonates in Canada's current military narrative.

Initially, recognition of these two women was based on their own efforts to gain material rewards for their actions: in the case of Madeleine de Verchères it was a military pension, and in the case of Laura Secord it was material rewards from the Upper Canadian patronage system. Later, the stories of both women were woven into nationalistic narratives: de Verchères became one of French-Canada's heroines in the conservative, nationalistic and religious era of the late nineteenth century with its increasing interest in military and religious figures (Coates 1996); and
from the 1880's on, Secord was promoted as a symbol of Canadian patriotism by women members of historical societies and writers who sought to broaden appreciation for Canadian women’s contributions to nation-building (Morgan 1994). But more typically, women’s military roles were overlooked. This was the fate of Loyalist women refugees to Eastern Ontario who, with their children, were hostages in the conflict and played a significant role during the American Revolution (late 1770's and early 1780's): gathering and disseminating military intelligence, and supplying and harbouring raiding parties. Yet these contributions to the war effort were subsequently distorted and minimized in keeping with the authoritarian and patriarchal family relations which accorded virtually all decision-making power to men. After the war, women were once again relegated to the status of dependents within the patriarchal family power structure and the paternalistic British regime (Potter 1991; Potter-MacKinnon 1993).

The war practices of North America's natives present a sharp contrast to Western military tradition. As seen in Chapter Two, although native combat was a predominantly masculine endeavour, it was never men's exclusive prerogative. Although the Canadian record is largely silent on the subject, it is probable that, like their Great Plains counterparts, Indian women in Quebec also fought at times to avenge the death of a relative or gain war honours, referred to as 'counting coup' (Williams 1986). Or like Mohawk women of northern New York they may have fought at times alongside their husbands, or entered periodically from the periphery of the battlefield in search of booty. Nor was combat amongst natives segregated from the constellation of practices that together comprised warfare, especially in matrilineal societies where women had a strong say in the conduct of war. For example, Molly Brant, a descendent of a high ranking Mohawk family, an Indian clan mother, a sister of Mohawk chief Joseph Brant, and later the consort of Sir William Johnson, exercised a great deal of diplomatic power and influence (Potter-MacKinnon 1993). Hence, native women’s exclusion from combat marked neither an inferior status nor social dependency as it did where warriorhood was the sole route to full adulthood, where women were potential war booty for male combatants, or where women were marginalized in things bellicose because of their origins in enemy populations.
On the other hand, Canadian women of European origin were expressly excluded from combat, though many military commentators are quick to add that the exclusion was never by government statute; it was military policy which simply "reflected the societal values of the times" (Lamerson 1990:1; also see Munro 1990 and Warrington-Kearsley 1992). The notion of separate spheres—the private domestic sphere of virtuous and chaste women versus the men's public sphere of state and community—was characteristic of both the ascendant bourgeoisie throughout the eighteenth and into the nineteenth centuries, and of republican revolutionaries in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The latter held beliefs in line with those of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, namely that, first: good citizenship was based on the readiness to defend one's country on the battlefield, something for which men were better suited; and second, that men naturally subordinated selfish and sectional interests for the common good whereas women naturally prioritized their particular allegiance to the family. Women's contribution lay in maintaining the family hearth, supporting their husbands and raising sons as future citizens. It is against this conceptual backdrop that republicans linked "public roles for women, sexual disorder, and political corruption and tyranny" (Greer 1993:202), and that women were therefore conspicuous by their absence from prominent or active participation in the Patriot Rebellion of 1837.

But although Canadian women did not fight, they did serve in other military capacities, beginning as 'nursing sisters' in Saskatchewan during the 1885 Northwest Rebellion, and then with the Canadian contingent in the Boer War. The nursing service was subsequently integrated into the Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps, brought into the reserves in 1904, and then into the permanent force in 1906 (Pierson 1986). During World War I, most women were confined to traditional support tasks, recruiting enlees by handing white feathers to suspected shirkers and putting up recruitment posters in public places; and some 35,000 produced munitions (Kechen 1996). But others went further, organizing themselves into uniformed paramilitary groups, training in military drill, rifle shooting, first aid and vehicle maintenance in the event they should be called upon as home guards (Chenier cited in Davis 1994). As well, 2,852
nurses served with the Canadian Army Medical Corps between 1914 and 1918, most of these overseas (Davis 1994). But after the war their number was deliberately reduced to only eleven, to be increased again at the outbreak of World War II.

**World War II.** The Second World War marked an expansion in both the roles and numbers of military women, and is also the first era for which there is greater documentation on women in the Forces. World War II was promoted as an emancipatory watershed for women both in the military and the larger Canadian society. Almost 4,500 nursing sisters served in the medical corps of the three services combined, and during the war, close to 50,000 women were enrolled in the Women’s Services of the Canadian armed forces (Davis 1994; Gossage 1991; Pierson 1986). As in World War I, many women anticipated service by volunteering with paramilitary organizations which sprung up in the late 1930’s and early 1940’s, first in British Columbia and then across the country (Gossage 1991). By 1941 these included 6,700 women eager to serve and garner some of the respect and authority accorded the military in wartime. But despite energetic lobbying, official recognition for these organizations was never forthcoming, and frustration mounted, especially for women possessing specialized skills such as flying (Ziegler 1973). Few in military circles accepted the value of women’s potential contribution, and some high ranking strategists actually opposed military mobilization for Canadian women (Gossage 1991). The Department of National Defence only ever used these existing women’s organizations as sources of recruits for the Canadian Women’s Army Corps (CWAC) once it was officially formed in 1941 to alleviate the growing manpower shortage (Prentice et al 1988); its express purpose was “relieving men for service in field formation overseas.” Aside from nurses, the Royal Canadian Air Force was the first service authorized to enlist women, followed one month later by the Army, and a year later by the Women's Royal Canadian Naval Service (Gossage 1991). The following discussion centres largely on the CWAC because it employed the greatest number of female military personnel during the war.

Concerns highlighted in commanders’ feedback on the potential of admitting women emphasized its contingency on the exhaustion of the supply of men. They insisted that
accommodations for women should be both suitable and segregated from the men, and that women should be employed as subordinates, which precluded, for example, positions as instructors of men. One controversy centred on whether men should salute women of higher rank, but the issue remained hypothetical since few women were ever promoted (Dumont et al 1982). Another preoccupation was that women avoid physically strenuous jobs.

These commanders’s concerns corresponded to popular notions about what was socially acceptable to Canadians at the time, hence the recruitment of women was confined to an institutional division of labour which distinguished the operational or combat end from administrative or support functions, and which also followed an accepted gender hierarchy. It was within these parameters that women were expected to fill the shortfall of male military support staff qualified for jobs considered suitable for women, jobs such as clerks, cooks and launderesses, and, again, to free medically fit men for combat duty. No thought was ever given to women in combat; on the contrary, their exclusion from combat duty was assured and their safety emphasized (Gossage 1991). “Women had penetrated that sacrosanct male preserve, the military, but had not broken the male monopoly on the primary purpose of the military, the provision of an armed fighting force” (Pierson 1986:104). Thus, although most non-combatant roles behind the lines were actually filled by men, and women only ever comprised a small proportion thereof—1.4% of the CAF and 2.8% of the Army—the division of labour by sex held: women were replacements for male support personnel in the rear; front line combatants were men.

For a small minority of women the type of employment did eventually expand from traditional jobs as clerks, cooks, launderesses, waitresses, housekeepers, fabric workers, drivers, and switchboard operators, to include skilled blue collar trades. But for the duration of the war “the overwhelming majority of CWAC’s remained in subordinate service jobs identified as women’s work” in the civilian world; “the sexual division of labour carried over occupationally from civilian into military life” (Pierson 1986:13). And women as a group remained subordinate to men: women officers could command women, but in divisions that were under male authority

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Double standards also prevailed. To become an officer a woman needed a university degree or equivalent whereas a man only needed seven to ten years of schooling (Dumont et al 1982). Female recruits could be married, but contrary to men, could have no dependent children. And whereas Basic Training for male recruits averaged eight weeks, it was only between four and six weeks for women (Gossage 1991). There were also differentials in pay and other benefits: a one-third gap in pay at the time of the formation of the women’s services in 1941—reduced in 1943 to 20% both in response to vociferous complaints from servicewomen, women workers in the civil service, and the National Council of Women, and because of women’s continued reluctance to enrol^ (Prentice et al 1988).

These double standards served to construct and reconstruct the gendered Canadian Army. Although officially founded in 1941, the Canadian Women’s Army Corps (CWAC) was only officially incorporated within the Canadian Army in 1942. And CWAC members remained separate and different to the end. Amongst non-commissioned members, women were termed ‘volunteers’ whereas men were ‘soldiers’. Another mark of difference were uniforms. Whereas military uniforms were thought to enhance a man’s masculinity, there was an apprehension of this association for women. Hence, promotional material stressed the attractiveness and feminine design of women’s uniform, and catered to what was purportedly their preoccupation with appearance. Finally, unlike their male counterparts, women were exempt from the severest penalties under military law: death, penal servitude, imprisonment, and detention. This reflected deeply binarized notions of war and peace, life and death, and notions about people as essentially gendered beings. By virtue of their ascribed gender, women were seen as the bearers of human life, therefore exempt from killing, and needing protection from death in battle. To men was reserved what has been formulated as both right and privilege—to die for their country—which was how they were used by the military elite:

The armed might of the military is not wielded by the rank-and-file soldier, but by the high military command. The ordinary infantryman or artilleryman is not by virtue of his bearing arms in a position of power within the Army. On the contrary, he is in a position to be used as cannon fodder by the high command, who do
exercise the power and whose power consists in the aggregate of men and material at their disposal. Members of the CWAC were exempted from use as cannon fodder. That exemption was protective in intent. The taking of life was seen as incompatible with woman's role as bearer of life. Women were protected from having to kill in combat and, on the whole, Canadian servicewomen were protected from being killed in combat, as well as from the death penalty by court martial (Pierson 1986:127-8).

Finally, the carefully managed admission of women into the military "precluded fundamental change in gender relations" (Pierson, 1986:14). Since enlisted women were all volunteers, the Department of National Defence had to appeal to, as well as, shape the values of the larger civilian society from which these women were drawn. And at the time, majority public opinion held that women's place was in the home. For officials this meant walking a tightrope between promoting the war's emancipatory effects for women, and reassurances that their wartime work was only temporary. At war's end, women would revert to home and family. The different facets of this campaign reflected a deep ambivalence to women's war effort based on a perceived threat of social change which translated into fears for women's femininity and sexual morality:

Since chastity was widely regarded as the most essential ingredient of proper womanhood, the furore over servicewomen's sexual respectability can be seen at one level as a more extreme expression of the fear of loss of femininity. In this case, the fear focused on the spectre of women becoming sexually independent beings (Pierson 1986:15).

The atmosphere bordered on moral panic, manifested in a whispering campaign labelling servicewomen as sexually promiscuous, borne out neither in the incidence of illegitimate pregnancies nor venereal disease (Conrod 1983:186)\(^9\). Nevertheless, the Wartime Information Board responded, through a confidential memorandum, with a plan to counter this campaign slandering military women's morality (Gossage 1991). True to the double standard, men could not be expected to curb their sexual appetites and were provided with condoms and prophylactic kits. But women, as sole guardians of morality, were provided with neither, and were actually portrayed as the purveyors of sexually transmitted disease. "Women in uniform had come to symbolize the war's threat to traditional sexual morality and to the sex/gender divisions of the social order" (Pierson 1986:16).
Thus, instead of being a watershed, women's participation in the armed forces during World War II proved a temporary interlude which duplicated the sexual division of labour and authority pattern of the civilian world where women served in jobs with lower pay, less skill, less authority or control, and less room for advancement. And although exemption from combat had its benefits, it precluded the rise of female officers to positions of high command in the Army as a whole. Furthermore, arms-bearing duty, despite the risk of maiming and death it carries, bestows authority and an aura of power on the officially armed over the officially unarmed. Hence, the wholesale exclusion of women from arms bearing meant the retention of an at least symbolic authority and power by the male sex as a whole over the female sex as a whole (Pierson 1986:127-8).

With the war ended, on Feb. 20, 1946, the Women's Services were disbanded and women summarily demobilized despite pressure on government to retain them within Canada's reserve forces (Prentice et al 1988). Similarly, those working in industry were sent home (Pierson 1986); job opportunities were needed for returning male veterans.

**Post World War II.** The signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, and the Korean war in 1950 meant further expansion of the military. It also meant an increase in the number of women in the army and naval reserves, as well as in the regular army, navy and air forces—totalling over 5,000 by 1955. But, as in wartime, they were concentrated in jobs that "reflected what was generally accepted as work appropriate for them: clerical, medical support, communications and plotter work in relatively clean, dry, warm static units" doing manual labour (Mathieu 1993). And soon, changes in defence policy, along with the increasing automation in trades open to women, led the defence council to reduce their numbers once again, so that by 1963 recruitment of women ceased entirely, and in 1965 a ceiling of 1,500, or 1.8% of the total force—then 1.5% in 1967 (Mathieu 1993)—was placed on the number of women in the regular Forces. This restriction remained in effect through to unification of the three services in 1968, and into the early 1970's. Enrolment remained limited to single women, and they were released upon marriage or the birth of a child (Davis 1994).

Up to this point most women in the Canadian Forces worked in administrative or support services, but there were several landmarks for their expanding numbers and occupational
opportunities. These included the 1970 Royal Commission on the Status of Women; the 1978 Canadian Human Rights Act; the SWINTER Trials between the years 1980 and 1984; and finally the 1989 Canadian Human Rights Tribunal ruling on the integration of women.

In 1970, the report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women noted that most women in the Canadian Forces were employed in few trades (administrative, technical and paramedical) and recommended changes which included standardized enrolment criteria; equal pension benefits; entry for women into Canadian military colleges; opening of all trades and classifications to women; and terminating both enrolment prohibitions against married women as well as compulsory release upon the birth of a child (Symons 1990-1991). This last restriction was eliminated in 1971, and pension contributions and benefits were equalized in 1975. But women continued to be excluded from primary combat roles, some remote locations and going to sea. Until 1980, combat exclusion justified the continued exclusion of women from military colleges since they trained combat officers. But the Defence Council began authorizing the funding of women's education at civilian universities as part of the Regular Officer Training Plan.

These changes were accompanied by a slow but steady expansion in the number of women enrolled in the Forces—from 1.8% in 1970 to 3% in 1974, 5.9% in 1978, 6.9% in 1980 and 9% in 1986—as well as in the number of military occupations open to them: from the 19% of 105 non-commissioned and 32 officer occupations open to women in 1971, two-thirds were open by 1974 (Mathieu 1993; Pinch 1987). Remaining fields of restricted employment were primary combat, combat service support, isolated locations, service at sea, aircrew and admission to military colleges (Lamerson 1990, 1989). And while opportunities were expanding for women, some men considered this to be "the reverse discrimination period" because they "saw themselves condemned to a career of hard labour while the women occupied the nice and cushy static jobs" (Mathieu 1993:5).

In 1978, the federal government passed the Canadian Human Rights Act prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis of sex unless the restriction was based on a bona fide occupational requirement—the statutory definition of which was not provided. In response, the
Forces opened the military colleges to women, and conducted a series of trials to assess the effect on operational capability by the employment of servicewomen in near-combat or hitherto all-male isolated units (National Defence Instruction Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, 13/79 dated December 1979, cited in Pinch 1987:9).

It is debatable whether these trials into ‘Servicewomen in non-traditional Environments and Roles’ (SWINTER) were designed to test the operational effectiveness of mixed gender units against those of all-male groups, or as the Human Rights Tribunal Ruling concluded,

to document any \textit{bona fide} occupational restrictions which might continue to exclude women from additional duties (i.e. in direct combat, and in positions with a high minimum male requirement) but also to provide for no unreasonable or precipitous implementation of the requirements of the Canadian Human Rights Act" (Canadian Human Rights Tribunal 1989:27).

Motives notwithstanding, the trials were inconclusive. The numbers of women involved were small—only 280—and inferences about mixed gender units in combat could not be drawn since no women were assigned combat duties: the trials had been designed for isolated posts and combat service support\textsuperscript{41} units only (Canadian Human Rights Tribunal 1989). And although operational effectiveness remained the sole criteria for determining employment eligibility, "in none of the trials was operational effectiveness either operationally defined or precisely measured" (Pinch 1987:25).

Despite these weaknesses, the SWINTER trial results, together with the Equality Rights enshrined in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms of the Canadian Constitution, pushed the Canadian Forces to open fourteen additional military occupations to women, and to remove restrictions to their service in all-male units such as replenishment ships, service battalions, field ambulances and maritime patrol squadrons. Women were now liable to serve on a non-voluntary basis in the 75\% of military occupations open to them, and were excluded only from combat operations and units in the Navy, Army and Air Force (Lamerson 1990).

The exclusion of women from the remaining 25\% of military occupations ended abruptly in 1989 when a Human Rights Tribunal, responding to three complaints from women that they "were individually refused entry to combat or combat support employment in the Canadian Armed Forces because they are women", and one complaint from a man "who alleges that the
limitation of combat duty risk to men discriminates against them" (Canadian Human Rights Tribunal 1989:1), ordered the Forces to implement

a new policy of full integration of women into all units and occupations now closed to them...The implementation of the principle requires the removal of all restrictions from both operational and personnel considerations; the minimum male requirement should be phased out; new occupational personnel selection standards should be imposed immediately...The CAF and the Canadian Human Rights Commission are to devise a mutually acceptable implementation plan so that the integration of women proceeds steadily, regularly and consistently towards the goal of complete integration of women within the next ten years (64-5).

The "single exception to its order for full integration of women, and the ending of all restrictions" was service on submarines because of the lack of "privacy" which was considered a "bona fide occupational requirement" (67).

**Canadian Servicewomen Today.** The current ruling to admit women to all military occupations and classifications (except submarines), and to monitor the integration process both internally and externally through the Minister's Advisory Board on Women in the Canadian Forces (MABWCF)\(^2\) has not meant substantial increases or alterations in their representation in all occupations, classifications or environments. Nor has it meant marked change in the male:female rank distribution since the ruling. Women's presence in the land environment, for example, has remained low and fairly static in the period between 1980 and 1992, both for officers and non-commissioned members (NCMs) as can be seen in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. The occupational distribution for NCMs over this twelve year period has also been fairly stable, with 60% of women concentrated in administrative occupations—and forming 84% of these workers in 1991—and men spread more evenly in administrative, land, air and communications.

There have been some improvements in the distribution of female officers: whereas in 1980, 94% of female officers were concentrated in medical and administrative occupations, by 1992 this had decreased to 76%, with more female officers in air and communications (Tanner 1992a). However, women continue to be underrepresented in the higher ranks of both commissioned and non-commissioned officers (Tables 3.3 and 3.4).
### TABLE 3.1. Occupational Distribution of NCM's in the Canadian Forces

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<td>Sea*</td>
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<td>Land*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>17%</td>
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<td>Administrative**</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>61%</td>
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Adapted from Tanner 1992a, p. 10.

* Military environments with the least representation of women.
** Military environment with the greatest concentration of women.

### TABLE 3.2. Occupational Distribution of Officers in the Canadian Forces

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<td>Sea**</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative***</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Tanner 1992a, p.9.

* Military environment with the greatest concentration of male officers
** Military environments with the least representation of female officers.
*** Military environment with the greatest concentration of female officers.
TABLE 3.3. RANK DISTRIBUTION: MALE - FEMALE OFFICERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>1986 % of Male Officers</th>
<th>1986 % of Female Officers</th>
<th>1992 % of Male Officers</th>
<th>1992 % of Female Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major-Colonel</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Taken from Bain 1993, p.8.

TABLE 3.4. RANK DISTRIBUTION: MALE-FEMALE NON-COMMISSIONED MEMBERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>1986 % of Male NCMS</th>
<th>1986 % of Female NCMS</th>
<th>1992 % of Male NCMS</th>
<th>1992 % of Female NCMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief Warrant Officer</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant-Master Warrant Officer</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Taken from Bain 1993, p.8.

According to some National Defence researchers, the continued concentration of women in so-called traditional fields is partly the result of self-selection as women continue to enrol in administrative, medical and support occupations, though they are now liable to be posted at sea, in the field, at isolated northern stations and to UN peacekeeping tours. But women's occupational concentration is also determined by recruiting staff who select and assign them to
military occupations once they have assessed their suitability and have calculated a ‘Military Potential’ rating based on medical, security, educational, aptitude, intelligence, work history and motivation criteria (Lamerson 1990). But as we will see in Chapter Seven, much of this selection process is subjective, even for such seemingly objective characteristics as physical stamina.

Moreover, recruitment, alone, cannot be the panacea for either increasing the numbers of women or broadening their representation, particularly in the upper ranks, according to the Project Director for Employment Equity for the Canadian Forces, one of this study’s respondents. In his view, there are two difficulties: the first is recruiting sufficient numbers of women now into those classifications that would render them eligible, fifteen years hence, for selection to attend Staff College, the training ground for progression into the upper ranks:

There is a selection process for Staff College based on a merit list. Every year merit boards sit for promotion for most ranks, both officers and non-commissioned members. And out of the lists for ‘majors’, a merit listing is created for Staff College based on a set of criteria. Sixty percent must come from the operational and forty percent from the support classifications. Part of the problem women have faced is that, first of all, there aren’t many women who have been in the service long enough to have achieved senior rank level. Then, most are in the support classifications. So, we’re already dealing with only 40% of the mass. And support classifications include engineers. Traditionally there have not been women in the engineering classification, and they have a fair chunk of that 40%. So, where are the women? Well, in the nursing world this year, we’re allocating one position. So, there’s one woman, although a male could get that, though there are not many male nurses; but there are a few. So they’re looking at ways of opening that up a bit so that more women are at Staff College. But what we really need to do is attract more women into the operational classifications which will open up that other 60% for them. So fifteen years down the road they’ll be competing against their male peers or counterparts for those slots in the Staff College.

This dearth of women in Staff College being trained for the senior officer ranks has been noted, according to this respondent, by

a senior member of our management organization. [who,] when at the Staff College, looked out and saw only three or four women in an audience of one hundred and twenty roughly, and came back and said "there simply aren’t enough women in staff college".

The Forces’ second difficulty regarding the numbers and representation of women is providing an atmosphere which would retain those women who have been successfully recruited:

We have to go beyond the numbers. We could go out and recruit the numbers. It’ll
take us time because we’re not recruiting large numbers of people today. But the key is, are they going to stay in the service?. It’s not a matter of just hiring. Because you turn around, and after three years those people are all gone again unless we do something to make them want to stay and serve. It’s a voluntary organization, and if we don’t encourage them to stay, provide an environment that is friendly, that allows them the same aspirations as anybody else to achieve the Chief of the Defence Staff’s position, then they’ll leave and we’ve accomplished nothing. But, if we change our environment and we attract the highly competent individuals, we make the military an environment where they are welcome and respected...then, chances are, those people will stay. But even better, they’ll attract others because they will be good role models. And if they attract others then we may have a reverse problem: we only want 20%, now we find we have 30%! Well, is that bad? I don’t think so....] But the policies that we develop today and implement today, we will only see the results of 20 years down the road.

The question of whether there is a ‘glass ceiling’ for women, an invisible barrier which inhibits their integration and advancement into the senior ranks, has preoccupied several Canadian Forces research officers (Mathieu 1993; Tanner 1992). In the estimation of Lt.Cl. Mathieu, the military officer responsible for internal monitoring of women’s integration, women in the Forces are "progressing at a rate commensurate with the 1990 realities (2)". She feels that women are underrepresented in the Forces because so few choose the military as a career. Second, as the above respondent noted, women are underrepresented in the senior ranks because recruitment to most of those positions is from operational or engineering military occupations which attract very few women—less that 1% and 5% respectively. Thus, women’s occupational choices limit their progression up to the highest ranks (Mathieu 1993).

Mathieu does identify four components to the ‘glass ceiling’ concept: sex-role stereotyping; a non-supportive or even antagonistic work environment; the perception of working women as having problems in comparison to men’s lack of problems; and self-imposed constraints in the form of expectations of the self which are too high. But she employs none of these as evaluative prisms for whether the Forces has a glass ceiling. In an address to high ranking staff, including an Admiral and the Deputy Minister of National Defence, she simply refers to the socialization of men and women. notes the lack of evidence, to date, of a glass ceiling, and—adding that “we are all human”—informs her audience that they are to draw their own conclusions.
On this same question, Tanner considers it premature to evaluate the evidence since the majority of non-commissioned female members (64%) have 10 or less years of service. She notes that whereas non-commissioned men are progressing faster in the communications trades, female members in the dental trades and some administrative and support occupations are progressing faster than their male counterparts up to a point of 15 years of service. However, the differences among officers are significant: in 1992 there was a much higher percentage of high-ranking—Lieutenant Colonels or above—male officers (13%) than female officers (2%). Her explanation is that, as the Canadian Forces is a "front-end loaded system...in which everyone is recruited into the bottom of the rank pyramid and then must work their way up" (Tanner 1992:8) female officers have only just begun to qualify for promotion to the lowest senior officer rank of Major. But if these women continue to progress as men do, their rank distribution should begin to resemble that for men in a few years. She concludes that her own analysis does not cover other barriers, such as "attitudes, behaviours or the corporate culture...which would require a different type of analysis" (1992:19).

It is precisely this type of analysis that Karen Davis undertakes in her study entitled "Organizational Environment and Turnover: Understanding Women’s Exit From the Canadian Forces" (1994). Davis investigated why female military personnel with more than 10 and less than 20 years of service have considerably higher rates of attrition than their male counterparts—a female: male average attrition ratio of 1.8:1 for officers and 1.6:1 for non-commissioned members between the years 1980 to 1991, calculated on an annual rather than cumulative basis. She notes that other studies have shown that the proportion of women in male-dominated fields remains low, less because women are avoiding such fields, but because most who do enter subsequently leave to seek employment elsewhere. Why women leave after 10 years of service in the Canadian Forces is particularly perplexing since the benefits of staying are considerable: a lifetime pension upon completion of a 20 year contract with continuous service. And if they are among a selected group, they can opt to convert to an 'indefinite period of service' contract.

The women whom Davis interviewed left for two predominating reasons. First, the
"male-dominated and male-defined" work environment was either nonsupportive or downright hostile to women—which included supervisor discrimination and harassment. In one of her examples, a non-commissioned member (who left after 13 years of service) was being harassed on the job for two years by her Warrant Officer. The Sergeant to whom she had been turning for support advised her against pressing charges because the Warrant Officer might one day become her career manager. Feeling relieved that her troubles were finally over when the Warrant Officer was promoted and posted, she was then mortified when her previously supportive Sergeant took up the harassment where the Warrant Officer had left off! This Sergeant also advised her to take release under the Force Reduction Program because later she might be asked to leave.

Two other cases involved superiors who sided with the supervisor. In one of these, several people who were being treated abusively were expected to subordinate their own feelings in favour of an abusive supervisor who was apparently having personal problems. The interviewee was told by the superior to whom she complained:

I know what he's like. I know he shouldn't be doing this, but I have to be careful because he's under a lot of pressure...so you're basically going to have to put up with him (Davis 1994:105).

This woman was eventually granted a redress regarding this situation, but only after she had quit. Other examples of discriminatory or harassing treatment include being threatened with insubordination for staying at work—with her Sergeant's permission—to perform essential duties instead of attending a work-related, non-essential event; working under a supervisor who incessantly told sexist jokes; being transferred into a predominantly male environment and overhearing two Sergeants make prejudicial remarks about her to the effect that,

'She's got three strikes against her. One, she's anglophone; two, she's wearing a blue uniform' [air force]...; and three, she's a woman. As long as she's [one Sergeant's position], she'll never work for me' (Davis 1994:96).

The second reason why women quit the Forces after ten years but less than twenty years of service was because the organization constructs family responsibilities as personal interests, and sets these against commitment to the organization. Women were then expected to not only subordinate family responsibilities to their military commitment, but, ultimately, to choose
between them. This finding parallels Lloyd's regarding citizenship ideals in the Western philosophical tradition which opposes private interests (family) to self-sacrifice (war), discussed more fully in Chapter Seven. As we will also see there, a respondent to this study took a similar position, ignoring how the Forces constructs the family in relation to itself, and concentrating instead on the individual woman and her choice: he argued that women have a higher early attrition rate because, historically, they have had the primary responsibility for the family, and will therefore always put their family's needs first. This tendency to overlook the Forces' institutional requisites and, instead, individualize the problems that women—or others for that matter—face, is common, as we will see further on.

Davis concludes that higher rates of female attrition are one indication of the failure of full gender integration in the Canadian Forces:

...the workplace itself...continues to operate around ideologies of 'men's work', and women therefore remain the sexualized 'other' in the environment...This raises the question of whether 'gender neutrality', in terms of policy, is a misleading concept within a context such as the CF (Davis 1994:117).

Echoing the Project Director for Employment Equity, cited earlier, she adds that higher female attrition also diminishes the likelihood of the integration project's future success since the departing women with 10 to 20 years of service are the very ones to provide the high ranking leadership necessary for integration to work.

Karen Davis' findings generally confirm those of the Minister's Advisory Board on Women* in the Canadian Forces. Whereas the Board applauds the increasing numbers of women in leadership and supervisory positions—achieved despite the Force Reduction Program—it decries the overall reduction in recruitment and its negative consequences for women, as well as the reduction in resources. These reductions perpetuate inequities or inefficiencies. The failure of recruiting and selection practices to effectively attract any women to non-traditional military occupations is also criticized, as is the failure to prioritize integration or provide the resources to make it work. The Board's report refers to

the myriad subtle practices of the institution. Everything from kit and equipment to recruiting, advertising, evaluation, administrative routines, the manner of decision-making and setting of priorities, requires review from the perspective
of a fully integrated CF. Military culture and language\textsuperscript{5}, the daily environment of work, and all support systems (5), are also seen as problematic. So is resource allocation to address these and other impediments to integration. Planning and budgeting, the Board notes, are centralized processes controlled by senior personnel at National Defence Headquarters. As well, the many issues raised by the Board in the previous report "remain current". These include, amongst others, widespread discriminatory behaviour, including "double standards, apparently favouring females" (10): overt as well as subtle behavioural indications by leaders indicating non-support of the mixed gender Canadian Forces; and inappropriate language ranging from patronizing to hostile, as well as crude and offensive misogynistic remarks and practices.

\textit{Echoes of an Earlier Era}

Reviewing the debates and difficulties regarding the integration of women today recalls those of World War II. In significant ways, the integration project of the 1990's is being managed within the same conceptual parameters as those of the earlier era. Now as then, women are being recruited to replenish the diminishing supply of men: the increases in the number of women in the Canadian Forces' is part of a larger trend in armed forces throughout the West which began in the 1970's to compensate for the shrinking male cohort from which militaries had traditionally drawn their recruits (Department of National Defence 1988:2). In his presentation before the Human Rights Tribunal as expert witness for the Canadian Armed Forces, Lieutenant-Colonel Franklin Pinch alludes to this same dilemma. He elaborates on the difficulties facing all-volunteer militaries during the 1970's and 1980's as they suffered instability through extreme difficulties encountered in attracting and retaining high quality military personnel in the most cost-effective manner, to place within the highest risk environments...these problems of attraction and retention have resulted from social, demographic and economic change that altered the number and characteristics of the personnel available for, and willing to undertake military service (1987:3).

The solution was to accommodate to such change through various adjustments \textit{at the periphery} or lower-
risk support segments...while taking great pains to maintain and protect the integrity of their core or higher-risk, primary operational segments and positions" (3). [In addition] "there is indeed a great potential for disruption to the individual and the group, and negative implications for the operational high-risk military core in prematurely offering full military employment to women" (5).

There would be greatest acceptance of military women, Pinch argued, in those environments furthest from high risk combat. This logic is reminiscent of that used during the Second World War, as we saw earlier. Thus, even prior to the escalating pressure brought by governmental commissions, legislation, individual complaints and the Tribunal, the Canadian Forces had begun bowing to the demographic inevitability of diminishing numbers of eligible young men by increasing their contingents of women. But the intention, as during World War II, was to integrate them along more traditional patterns of employment. There were deep reservations within the military, expressed in Pinch’s conclusions, about the potentially disruptive “impact on institutional integrity” (35) which the introduction of women to operations might have unless it would take place under organizational control. Externally imposed changes threaten such control and carry the risk of subverting the primary goals of the Canadian Forces” (32).

Like the World War II era, these discourses reflect a deep ambivalence to women in combat, deriving, as we will see in Chapter Seven, from the construction of women as essentialized social beings, centred in the family, and reliant on men who are their natural protectors. This was acknowledged by Brigadier-General D.R. Munro, Director General Combat Related Employment of Women, Canadian Forces, in his discussion with commanders and senior staffs of the Land, Sea and Air Forces, of trial options of women in combat:

The key to this issue of combat effectiveness was found in the beliefs that women are generally weaker than men, that men naturally protect women...[and that having] men and women train together...they would get to know each others capabilities and that this could...counteract what is called the "instinct to protect"” (Munro 1990:5,7).

In addition to the use of women as a reserve labour pool, and a sense of ambivalence towards their military participation, the current integration project also has in common with that of the Second World War era the replication of the sexual division of labour and power in the
civilian world of work where women are concentrated in a few job ghettos, receive lower pay and are subordinate to the authority and control of men (Armstrong and Armstrong 1994). And finally, the preoccupation with fraternization between and among ranks which translates into a fear of men succumbing to the draw of female sexual attractiveness—which would undermine discipline—recalls "attitudes similar to those that led male members of the Forces to brand female members as "sexually permissive" during World War II" (Symons 1990-1991:492).

But there is a sharp difference between the current and earlier integration projects. During World War II, the maintenance of a bifurcated gender system was based on distinguishing spheres for women's employment. Although the Army's administrative work was performed mostly by men, it was designated appropriate for women in order to distinguish it from combat, which was designated as men's work. The problem facing the Canadian Forces today is that it remains reliant on perpetuating the bifurcated gender system, but is under orders to 'integrate women'. As we will see in later chapters, this bifurcated gender system differentiates men from women in creating combatants because combat is a profoundly gendered practice that needs the idea of 'women' and their Otherness to create and sustain it. A bifurcated gender system also sustains the military's work in that it is structurally predicated on the availability and support of married male military members through the unpaid family-based work and military volunteer work of military wives. But these 'women', who represent the 'other' from whom men are supposed to purge themselves in order to be 'men' and fight, are now inside the system. It is the failure to recognize the structural contradictions internal to the military gender system which is causing such great difficulties. Questions about how to conceptualize this gender system and the technological system which it overlaps, and how best to access them methodologically are addressed in the next chapter.
Notes

1. In his "study of war planning" in Canada, Britain and the United States (Preston 1977:xi), Preston concludes that although the risk of American attack after 1870 decreased, and closer ties and more friendly relations with Canada increased, what also increased was American planning for war in North America. This planning was carried out in the strictest secrecy, with knowledge often kept from civil authorities. What has made possible this "non-violent Canadian-American relationship and this paradoxically inverted connection between foreign and military policies" may be the common geographic isolation and...the preoccupation of both peoples with the more engrossing problems of occupying and developing a continent. Because governments and electors in both Canada and the United States were loath to spend money on warlike preparations in times of peace, and since there was a healthy suspicion of standing armies in both countries, they were slow to develop those military institutions which are normally assumed to be essential for the preservation of national sovereignty (5).

2. The exception is the era following Confederation. As for economic reward, it may not have been forthcoming legitimately, but this did not stop leaders from profiting from it otherwise—through graft. Moreover, in the nineteenth century the Militia regiment was "a vehicle for social mobility" (Willett 1987:57). This is elaborated upon further in the text.

3. The British North America Act which proclaimed Canada as a new nation confined its diplomatic scope to the British Empire, and channelled its dealings with other nations through the British diplomatic service. All Canadians were British subjects, sharing its attendant rights and privileges. Although Canada established its own Department of External Affairs in 1909, it still had no foreign ambassadors, nor could it sign its own treaties or declare war. It was only with the signing of the Statute of Westminster in 1931 that Canada was recognized as a nation distinct from Britain (English 1990). Canadian citizenship is itself a latecomer: until as late as 1947 both immigrants being naturalized and native-born Canadians alike were considered British subjects and were so designated in their passports (The Canadian Encyclopedia, "Citizenship").

4. Conscription was not a new phenomenon when it was first introduced in 1917. It "had existed for 300 years in Canada, sporadically implemented and laxly enforced, with predictably unsatisfactory results" (Granatstein and Hitsman 1977:2).

5. The latest such occurrence was the OKA crisis in 1990. Bercuson and Granatstein refer to this 78-day event as the 'Siege of Oka'. On July 7, 1990, the Québec provincial police (Sûreté de Québec) tried to storm a four-month-old barricade which the Mohawk Warrior Society from the native Kanestake Reserve had erected to prevent the construction of a golf course on land which they claimed as their own. Eventually, the provincial premier called for assistance from the federal government, and the army was sent in to remove the barricades. According to Bercuson and Granatstein, though there have been more than 160 instances of aid to the civil power since Confederation, the use of troops as strikebreakers has ceased since the Depression, in part because of changing public attitudes, but also because local police (and the RCMP and provincial police) are generally
better trained than hitherto (1992:2).
But there have been other controversial instances in the more recent past. In 1969, troops were sent to Montréal to quell rioting and looting during a police strike. Then, in 1970, in what came to be called the 'October Crisis', a Québec separatist group which had carried out various isolated acts of violence such as planting bombs in mail boxes, kidnapped the British trade commissioner and a Québec cabinet minister. In response, the prime minister proclaimed the War Measures Act, and sent in 10,000 troops in full battle order to protect public buildings and prominent politicians (Bercuson and Granatstein 1992; Morton 1992; The Canadian Encyclopedia, 1988. S.v. "Armed Forces," by D. Morton). This use of the military to settle internal disputes between groups of Canadians was not without vociferous critics (Morton 1992), yet the right to use the armed forces for internal control remains entrenched in the National Defence Act. In this regard, Giddens notes that,

The differentiation between the police and standing army, or armed forces, has remained a fairly clear—although never wholly unambiguous—one in most European countries since the middle of the nineteenth century. This differentiation can be said to express the ‘inward’ and ‘outward’ stance of the state in respect of violence and its control” (1987:172).

6. According to Giddens,
the nation-state...is a set of institutional forms of governance
maintaining an administrative monopoly over a territory with
demarcated boundaries, its rule being sanctioned by law and direct
control of the means of internal and external violence (1987:171).

It is this administrative monopoly, rather than ‘nationalism’—"the existence of symbols and beliefs that are...propagated by elite groups" or feelings of commonality between certain people--which, for Giddens, defines the nation. However, wars have frequently served to foster or resurrect such feelings of commonality (Ehrenreich 1997). In Canada’s case, though various wars served to establish and maintain administrative control over a precisely defined territory, being a colony, rule came from afar and followed the interests of a distant elite. Militarily, Canadians more often viewed Canada as an appendage of British imperialist designs than as an independent 'nation', and made strenuous attempts to resist involvement. And, as Morgan has demonstrated, those discourses that cultivated Canadian nationalist identities were patently gendered, differentially constructing masculine and feminine loyalty and sacrifice, and drawing on 'gender-specific symbols and imagery" (1994:197).

7. "The second largest single group of immigrants who remained permanently in the colony was the military (Eccles 1972:78)."

8. Referring to the conflict between the Europeans over the New World, Eccles notes that
"soveriegnty over this part of the world...was going to rest less on the claims and charters of European monarchs than on the ability to seize, occupy and hold the territory, by force if need be. The rights of the resident Indians were, of course, not taken into account” (Eccles 1972:18).

9. Keeley’s thesis is that tribal societies vastly exceed civilized states—"those with cities and some form of record keeping (usually writing)" (1996:27)—in their war fatalities, but he provides no supporting data for the Iroquois.
10. According to Eccles, the French "had no particular desire to regain Canada" because their
chief interests—the disruption of the British empire—were better served by having the Americans
achieve their independence from Britain and the latter retain Canada. This would create "two
armed camps" in a balance of power which would then tie down large British forces in America
(Eccles 1972:240).

11. To help Ireland gain independence from Britain, Irish-Americans conspired to attack British North
America’s colonies and thereby force London to divert troops away from Ireland. There were several
attacks by the Fenians from 1866 through to 1870, apparently none of them credible (Bercuson and

12. This dependence on others for defence persisted well into the twentieth century as evidenced by
the uncontested occupation during WWII of a large area of the Canadian north by 33,000
American soldiers and civilians with little evidence of Canadian sovereignty beyond the odd post
office. Can this be explained by a combination of weak Canadian nationalism, anti-militarism and
prolonged military dependency (Morton 1992)?

13. As Stacey puts it:

The first great period of Canadian-American relations was one of wars,
ending in 1814; the second was one of danger of war, ending in 1871. The
third was a period of peace and increasing cooperation, and for convenience
we may say that this extended to 1940 (1967:12).

14. The requirement of three months minimum attendance effectively limited officer commissions
to men of means.

15. The response of Canadian ministers to the British Milne Committee—set up to recommend
temporary defense and emergency measures for the colonies—which suggested that Canada spend
about $250,000 for coastal defense was that "it would be far cheaper to let the Russians destroy
everything" (Preston 1967:122).

16. "You must not take the militia seriously, for though it is useful for suppressing internal
disturbances, it will not be required for the defence of the country, as the Monroe doctrine
protects us from enemy aggression" (Sir Wilfred Laurier cited in Macgillivray 1983:116). In the
same vein, Sir Frederick Borden, Minister of Militia (1909), declared that "The reason for the
existence of the militia in this country is well understood. The principal object is perhaps the
upholding of the Civil power in the different parts of the Dominion" (Macgillivray 1983:116).

17. Preston doubts whether a system of imperial defense ever really existed (1967).

18. But ultimately, according to Page, the British were hoping to get the colonies to "accept new
military and fiscal obligations" (1987:5).

19. Berger differentiates this conceptualization of militarism from "the European sense of looking
forward to the dominance of a military class" (1970:234).

20. It also saw 1,200 men volunteer for the International Brigades, and more than one-third of
these die, fighting fascism in Spain.
21. "Canada entered the war with untrained men and very little modern equipment. Two decades of neglect by governments basically apathetic to all things military could not be overcome in a matter of months" (Roy 1972:45).

22. Elsewhere, Bercuson claims that "neither the Canadian government nor the Canadian military was at first enthusiastic about peacekeeping" since it diverted attention from Germany and NATO, and drained scarce resources (1996:59).

23. Peacekeeping is not necessarily peaceful for these lightly armed soldiers who place themselves between heavily armed antagonists: over 100 Canadians have lost their lives on such missions. 'Peacekeepers' should also be distinguished from 'observers' who may be completely unarmed: one of my respondents served in the latter position and was armed only with a flashlight.

24. Although Canada has never been a major player in the Western transnational armaments industry, it is certainly an active participant (see Regehr, 1987). And although Canada does not have the highly developed, cost-maximizing military industries of the U.S., the latter spill over into Canada with economic consequences (Melman 1988). Canada's military economy accelerated particularly after 1980 because of increases in the Canadian and American defence budgets which by 1988 had reached about $8 billion. Companies like Bombardier and SNC sought defence contracts as a source of financial stability (Belanger and Fournier 1989).

25. NORAD stands for the North American Aerospace Command which unites Canada and the United States in defending the air space over North America, and is commanded by an American with a Canadian deputy commander (Bercuson and Granatstein 1992).

26. This sentiment is reminiscent of one by a respondent to this study (cited in Chapter Five) who, while on peacekeeping duty, was commiserating with an Indian tank commander over their mutual lack of military engagement. The risk was that their respective armed forces were losing the ability to wage war. Another respondent echoed this view: The basis of the military is to train for war...we've been in a peacetime mode for too long as far as our environment is concerned. We have lost...the sense of reality of a military environment. See Chapter Six for this respondent's elaboration on this theme.


28. These combined weapon, weapon platform (e.g. tank or ship) with the command and control system.

29. During interviews, some respondents voiced the feeling that the Canadian Forces had become a testing ground for the government's experiments in social engineering.

30. See Trigger (1976) for a fuller exploration of this subject.

31. A similar argument could be made for the franchise which was extended to serving men and women in WWI as well as to the mothers, wives and sisters of serving soldiers in order to enlist their support for conscription. The same logic and legislation removed voting rights from citizens of enemy origin naturalized after 1902 (Morton 155).
32. With regards to Laura Secord, Morgan (1994) notes that the gendered narratives of 'sacrifice for country and monarch' in the War of 1812 were intended to maximize material rewards to Upper Canadian men who, frequently as members of the militia, had "risked life and limb to protect women and children, homes and hearths..." (Morgan 1994:199). Women's contributions to the defence of the colony were generally overlooked, and they were portrayed instead as helpless, dependent on the militia and British troops. Morgan concludes that Major-General Sir Isaac Brock's heroism during the American invasion of 1812 was more readily celebrated because of his masculinity and his ultimate sacrifice for the Canadian colony and Britain: dying in battle and inspiring Upper Canadian men to "emulate his deed of manly patriotism" (Morgan 1994:199).

33. According to Greer,

To the degree that they challenged existing hierarchies on egalitarian grounds and insisted that 'the people' ought to rule, philosophers, Jacobins, and American patriots had to grapple with the question of what 'the people' was. It certainly was not all human beings resident in a given territory...Women in particular tended to be excluded from direct political participation in the republican city...The effect was none the less for sex to become increasingly the primary dividing line between rulers and ruled...in the age of the great bourgeois revolution ...but it also derived from a profoundly gendered republican concept of citizenship (1993:198).

34. Gossage (1991), puts the number of nurses who served as officers in the Canadian Medical Corps both in Canada and overseas at 3,141. But as Davis has two sources for her data—one of these an archival file (72/99) of the Directorate of History—and Gossage cites none, I have chosen to go with Davis's figure.

35. According to Gossage there were about 17,000 women in eighty or ninety voluntary organizations, many of them "more patriotic than practical" (1991:24).


37. Pierson and Cohen describe three government training programs in the period between 1937 and 1947, which conformed to notions of what was considered 'normal' work for women. In this they were supported by middle-to-upper-class women's organizations which government recognized as representatives of women's interests, and which backed the preservation of "sex-typed occupations, the sexual division of labour, and the class-based occupational structure" (1984:209).

38. Gossage contends that, rather than money, the deciding factors for women's enlistment were "patriotism, the urge to participate more actively in the war effort, a spirit of adventure, even the opportunity of getting away from home" (1991:49). For Ziegler, motivating factors were military service of parents, especially fathers in World War I, patriotism, and a legitimate avenue for leaving home (1973).
39. This was actually contradicted by the report of the committee which met in November 1945 to analyze the plan of Colonel Margaret Eaton (Director General of the CWAC) to reorganize rather than disband the CWAC (Conrod 1993:237).

40. Initially, married women in the CWAC whose husbands were being demobilized were given priority for discharge to establish a home (Conrod 1983).

41. Units which are not generally on the front line of combat and are intended to be further from combat than even combat support units; the gradations are combat, combat support and combat service support.

42. The Board is grossly underfunded at $100,000 yearly (Shirley Greenberg, personal communication).

43. The breakdown for these averages are as follows: for non-commissioned members the female: male annual attrition ratios are 2.7:1 for the air environment group; 1.5:1 for the communications and engineering group; 2.11:1 for medical and 1.5:1 for administrative/support. For officers these female: male ratios are 1.38:1 for medical, and 1.94:1 for administrative/support. There were insufficient data on women in the other occupation groups because of the small numbers of females or their recent entry. Davis provides no explanations for the differences between these various groups, although, extrapolating from her broader argument, they would seem to indicate variable experiences with the difficulties she discusses (Davis 1994:32-33).

44. The Board asked to have the word ‘Women’ in its title changed to ‘Gender’ in 1993. I continue to use ‘Women’ because its own report suggests that, despite its intention to modify its orientation, it continues to conceptualize its mandate in terms of ‘women’s issues’.

45. For example, “the majority of instructional materials still use exclusively male-gender oriented language” (The Minister’s Advisory Board on Gender Integration in the Canadian Forces 1992-3:7).

46. One of my respondents referred to this when berating himself for being a ‘gentlemen’ who would want to protect his female colleagues rather than treat them, professionally, as equals.

47. The copy of this speech which I had been given had penned into the margin, adjacent to the word "protect", the word "abuse".
Chapter Four
Theory and Method

Introduction

Literatures on the cross-cultural and historical variance in warfare and gender construction indicate that the type of warfare and combatants—e.g. internal versus external warfare, individual heroic combatants versus massed armed formations—and their sustaining infrastructures in pre-state and state societies are significant parameters within which gender is conceptualized and constructed. These comparative accounts can suggest lines of inquiry, approaches to ‘reading’ the Canadian military as a state-serving gendered technology of coercion in transition. They can also act as markers to guide excavations of the gender issue commonly held to predominate in the contemporary Canadian Forces—the unequal or discriminatory treatment of women—thereby disclosing what gender represents to the Forces, the processes of gender’s construction and reconstruction.

But, having located these other accounts, and having determined their value to this study does not obviate the necessity of problematizing ‘gender’. On the contrary, its historical and cross-cultural variance leads us to ask what we mean by ‘gender’, what is it that we are talking about, and how can we access it? In the Western contemporary context, ‘gender’ comes to us ‘ready-made’, in a pre-existing set of dualized denominations, and with a sense of concrete materiality manifested in individuals—i.e. gender as men and women. That gender is considered an ascribed and fixed status is evident in both popular and academic circles, where it is commonly equated with membership in either of two mutually exclusive biological categories. This pre-configured usage is equally characteristic, as we shall see in Chapters Seven and Eight, of respondents to this study who weave pre-gendered and ontologically differentiated subjects into their narratives of gender difference. But, were this study to begin from this prefabricated usage.
it would be assuming and explaining away its very object, obscuring the issues which a gender-based analysis is expected to illuminate.

Beyond the problem of this inherited and uncontested usage, reliance on this one concept to address the several issues outlined above requires that we stipulate our expectations of its broader explanatory scope: ideas about human ontology, identity and subjectivity, social practice, structure and ideology, and the social worlds people construct and inhabit, especially their practices of domination and subordination. To understand these issues in the context of changing military masculinity, gender must be problematized, approached as a social artifact of human practice, a cultural fiction with a history that needs to be traced. The ferreting out of gender constructions begins here by charting the development of its conceptualization within Second Wave feminism, men’s studies and the feminist literature on war and gender. The goal is to assess what these theories have to offer in explaining changing masculinity in the Forces.

Related to the task of tracing gender’s conceptualization are ideas of how to access it and, hence, this study’s research methodology. The theorization of gender, and the related concepts of power, technology, and technological rationality are implicated in the methods employed to access gender’s social construction and meaning. How we think about social life determines how we investigate, interpret, and write about it. Concepts and theoretical frameworks shape the research, the techniques and instruments we adopt or avoid, filtering what we see or overlook. Findings, in turn, shape explanations, and feed back into theory, confirming or modifying it. This theoretical-methodological loop applies equally to gender and its exploration in the context of the Canadian military. Thus, although theory and method are often discussed separately in scholarly discourse, here they are discussed together, and in combination with related epistemological questions following from the conundrum in which many feminist researchers and advocates now find themselves following the postmodern dissolution of the unified subject and challenges to accepted research methodologies.

**Gender: A Conceptual History**

‘Gender’ arose out of women’s movement discourses in the late 1960’s and early
1970's. What Second Wave feminists identified as their problematic, and how they originally conceptualized and investigated it, has a history and politics. Seeking to explain and correct women's oppression, much of the focus was on 'patriarchy': its historical emergence; its contemporary workings "as a set of social structures or institutions which oppress women" (Stacey 1993:57); and its operation, culturally and within kin relations, in shaping individual identities. These debates reflected the disagreement on the form and cause of women's subordination, and on whether men's power over women is uniform and universal. Differences in intellectual and political affiliations and constituencies were reflected in analyses and proposals for resistance and change.

From the outset, liberal feminists reflected the interests of a largely white, middle-class constituency, adopting a popular, mainstream approach which sought social change and justice via individual fulfilment and autonomy, civil liberties, political rights and economic justice. An androgynous (i.e. masculine) sex-role socialization would better equip women for equal opportunity within existing public institutions. Marxist feminists, on the other hand, spoke to the needs of a predominantly working-class constituency, stressing collective economic rights and disputing the liberal agenda of promoting women in institutions which were structurally sexist, classist, and racist: this would only accommodate select women and leave oppressive structures and conditions intact. Alleviating all women's oppression required radical institutional transformation. Radical, or cultural, feminists, whose constituency consisted of all, and only, women, credited female biology and heterosexual reproductive relations with women's oppression, to be alleviated by awarding women reproductive and sexual rights. Proponents of androgyny and lesbian separatism fell back on assumptions of patriarchy's universality or inevitability, an implicit biological determinism of differentiated male and female psychologies, and the theoretical and practical fusion of the personal and political.

Whatever their differences, these and other feminist political agendas and theorizations led to important gains and offered principles for political reform towards equity in education, the law, and the labour market. They succeeded because they spoke to, and could mobilize around
concrete, practical issues facing a broad base of women. But against the backdrop of these successes, and intersecting the debates about the universality of women's oppression versus their political and economic differences based on race, ethnicity, nationality, class and sexual orientation, was the post-structural challenge to the category 'Woman' itself. Pointing to its shifting meaning across time, place and context, they questioned the "assumption of a shared collective identity amongst women as a group who have a certain set of interests in common" (Stacey 1993:65), and raised questions regarding the inherent stability of the subject.

In the academy, feminists scholarship was equally politically and theoretically diverse. It attended to social spheres that had been overlooked, such as the family, the sex trade, and reproduction, and stressed the relational aspects of femininity, and sought to incorporate these understandings into academic analysis, as well as to attain broader acceptance (Scott 1996). Despite their diversity, academic feminists were united in objecting to the domination of the academy by the disciplinary agendas of privileged white men who cast other men in their research scripts and then generalized their conclusions to whole populations. They sought to counter "masculinity's ability to ventriloquize the universal" and propagate the "generic myth of 'man'" (Wiegean 1994:1), to reverse the silence and restore their hitherto muted voices (Ardener 1972). Feminist historians reasoned that "if women's subordination--past and present--was secured by their invisibility, then emancipation might be advanced by making them visible in narratives of social struggle and political achievement" (Scott 1996:2).

In the social sciences, many feminist academics took their cues from the liberal critique, aiming to change individuals rather than collective social structures. Enormous energy was poured into 'sex role' studies which sought to identify, laud or deprecate, then modify a spectrum of personality characteristics thought to inhere in men or women, or as mutable and wilfully discardable (Kovitz, 1989). As noted earlier, the notion of 'androgyne' originates in this liberal feminist discourse, and describes the psychosocially balanced person who successfully integrates both 'male' and 'female' characteristics, and thereby enhances the prospects for upward mobility in the public world.
As with each of the feminist platforms, sex-role theory, too, had its merits. Social expectations, not only natural inheritance, were now held accountable for men’s and women’s behaviour. Sex-role theory also linked the formation of personality to social structure (Connell 1987). But, as an explanation for social inequality and a motor force for change, sex-role theory suffers from several weaknesses. First, personality development theory, a linchpin of sex-role theory, holds that individuals have distinct and fixed personality structures to which they have been reared and socialized. Falling within the liberal humanist tradition, this view assumes the "unitary nature of the subject and conscious subjectivity" (Weedon 1987:112). But qualities of personality such as motivation and aspirations, and traits such as aggression, are not fixed; they vary with situation and circumstance (Epstein 1991). And for poststructuralists, subjectivity is "precarious, contradictory and in process, constantly being reconstituted in discourse each time we think or speak" (Weedon 1987:33).

Secondly, sex-role theory also mistakenly gave gender corporality as did earlier racialist theories, anchoring the social facts of women’s condition in ‘natural’ characteristics, looking "to the body to ground cross-cultural claims about the male-female distinction" (Nicholson 1994:83). The prevailing biological determinist view held that behavioural differences between men and women were manifestations of biological imperatives and, by definition, made the possibility for change hopeless. In their attempt to counteract this view, Second Wave feminists paradoxically incorporated it into their distinction between sex and gender.

That is, to improve on the determinist view, biological foundationalism contrasts ‘sex’, the immutable natural inheritance of males and females, with ‘gender’, the social influences on these naturally differentiated beings which produce cross-cultural and historical variations. Intent on rejecting biological determinism and emphasizing that distinctions based on sex were social and normative (Scott 1996; also see Williams 1989:8), American feminists instead fell prey to the same conundrum of an internally contradictory usage: "at the very moment the influence of the biological is being undermined, it is also being invoked" (Nicholson 1994:81). Nicholson terms this a "coatrack" view of self identity which conceptualizes the body "as a type of rack
upon which differing cultural artifacts, specifically those of personality and behaviour are...superimposed...Sex is the site on which gender is constructed (81)." In this perspective, men and women are still natural beings with varying cross-cultural and historical scripts, a view which, like biological determinism, undermines a theory of men and women as fundamentally social categories: if biological constraints underlie human behaviour, then social theory is redundant. "In sex role theory action...is linked to a structure defined by biological difference...not to a structure defined by social relations" (Connell 1995:26).

Another critique of 'sex-role' theory is that it psychologizes what is basically a social phenomenon: it focuses on the properties of individuals rather than those of social structures, societies, cultures or organizations which individuals must negotiate and within which they build their lives. This individualized concept of 'role' is "depoliticizing...strip[s] experience from its historical and political context and neglects questions of power and conflict" (Stacey and Thorne 1985:307), particularly that between men and women, as well as questions of women's oppression and material inequality (Carrigan et al, 1987). There is a failure within sex-role theory to understand "change as a dialectic within gender relations" (Connell 1995:27). And although most feminist theorists, whether of liberal, socialist, Marxist or radical hue, are ultimately concerned with issues of power and conflict, and censure biological determinists, they share to a degree the essentialist view of human biological bifurcation. Consequently, gender begins at the point of individuals and their relational dynamics. An example of this essentializing is Gayle Rubin's definition of the "sex/gender system"--still being cited in the 1990's--as "the set of arrangements by which a society transforms biological sexuality into products of human activity, and in which these transformed sexual needs are satisfied" (1996:106).

Nor has the replacement of 'women' with 'gender' as an analytical prism fulfilled its promise. For one, gender continues to be theorized within traditional social scientific frameworks; to be framed within an underlying binarized essentialism, and to be theoretically marginalized in dominant disciplinary discourses (Scott 1996). A blatant example is Mann's The Sources of Social Power, volume 1: A history of power from the beginning to A.D. 1760 in which the military is
identified as one of the four sources of social power, each offering "alternative organizational means of social control" (1986:3). But any reference to gender relations is omitted except to note its "conspicuous absence from this volume" (1986:31). Mann explains that he intends, in Volume II

to justify my uneven treatment in terms of their unevenness in history. I will argue that gender relations remained broadly constant, in the general form of patriarchy, throughout much of recorded history until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Europe...In the present volume power relations discussed are normally those in the "public sphere" between male household heads (31).

What he terms gender's 'historical constancy' becomes a justification for ignoring it. Effectively validating past scholarship which relegated women to the private sphere, Mann replicates them by writing women out of what was considered the only sphere worthy of attention: public power relations between men. With the stroke of a pen, he normalizes, legitimizes, and perpetuates women's invisibility.

In addition to this type of dismissal, or neglect, there is a lack of clarity and coherence and "usage has involved a range of theoretical positions as well as simple descriptive references to the relationships between the sexes" (Scott 1996:154). 'Gender' continues to be commonly understood as 'women'--as in McLaren's *Gender and Society*, subtitled *Creating a Canadian Women's Sociology* (1988), or Bakker's *Rethinking Restructuring: Gender and Change in Canada*, which discusses the effects of global restructuring on women (1996). Feminist theory continues to focus on women's subordination, to offer "some kind of analysis and explanation of how and why women have less power than men, and how this imbalance could be challenged and transformed" (Stacey 1993:50).

The idea of shifting the focus away from women's subordination, or relinquishing the category 'woman' is thought by some to undermine the feminist project (Hoff 1994); the persistence of the problems which prompted the movement to begin with certainly make it difficult to abandon 'women', at least as a political category. But perhaps equally damaging to the project of 'getting to the bottom' of the issues for which gender was originally intended is the detracting effect of conceptualizing gender along a male-female axis of opposition. This view is
predicated on an undifferentiated masculinity (and femininity) posited in the early stages of the women’s movement, and set

alongside concepts such as patriarch, oppressor, and woman’s common enemy. [Masculinity’s] fuzzy collapse into a generalized "man" and the wholesale melding of men with the organizational practices and privileges of patriarchy had a way of unproblematically linking maleness, men, and the social order of masculine supremacy (Wiegman 1994:2).

Again, the initial value to the women’s movement of this monolithic masculinity lay in its position as object against which feminists could construct their solidarity and galvanize political support. But adhering to, and continuing to problematize this polarization, diverts attention from other dimensions of gender which also require explanation. Riveted to a binary notion of naturalized difference, we are blinded to certain dimensions of power and conflict for which gender in its most individualized and anthropomorphized formulation is being held principally liable, and onto which it is actually mapped. Focusing on the male-female dynamic of dominance and subordination villainizes men and camouflages the differences between men themselves: it obscures their meanings and the possibility that gendered oppositions may not always fall along the male-female axis since it is "hegemonic masculinity, not any subordinated or marginalised form, that occupies the masculine pole of difference in patriarchal culture" (Connell 1995:232).

Assuming the inherent internal unity and uniformity of the categories men and women deflects from how male dominance operates in relation to other men, or seemingly in opposition to no one, but as an ostensibly neutral organizational form imposed on both men and women to discipline and thereby enlist them in the task of disciplining others, as well as to mitigate their resistance. This is what emerges, below, from the discussion on technological rationality.

**Feminist Literature on War and Gender**

Although the military is generally overlooked or marginalized in studies of gender relations, there is an exception in the small but growing branch of women’s studies literature that speaks to war, women and the military system (Isaksson 1988:1). How is gender conceptualized in this literature? And how is the social organization of bellicosity and its consequences for
gender relations conceptualized and addressed? As noted in Chapter One, much of the political impetus of this literature is either pacifism—"organizing opposition to militarism" (Chapkis 1988:107)—or the promotion of women in combat as an equal right and a responsibility of citizenship, and as a route to upward mobility. Sometimes, paradoxically, it is both. Some of this advocacy literature does extend to exploring the military as an institutional author of gender identity, ideology and practice, but underpinning much of it are universalist and essentialist assumptions about men, women and war, and about patriarchy as a motor force of history.

Characteristic of this literature are universalizing narratives which paint gender relations in broad strokes of dominance and submission onto an enduring backdrop of patriarchal political and social organization:

War as women have experienced it throughout recorded history from the times of the earliest city-states, has been an organizing principle involving the domination of the weak by the strong, and the domination of women by men in a variety of political and social forms which bear the common label of patriarchy (Boulding 1988:225).

Framed by assumptions regarding both the universality of "the asymmetric power situation that arose in every society" and an essentialism deriving from women's reproductive roles (Boulding 1988:225), little account is taken of historical and cultural variations in war practices. Men and women are introduced as pre-constituted 'givens' rather than as subjects gendered through their experiences of war, and its peculiar and local logic. Women's secure identity is attributed to their biology:

Women know that they are women. They do not require the reservation of a social role as a guarantee of their nature. Women may reject a destiny defined exclusively by biology, but their biology apparently gives them enough definition that they are not uncertain about their identity. Thus, women, unlike men, have not been trapped into defining themselves through opposition and through the claim to an exclusive social role (Stiehm 1989:226).

And war is not foreign to men, as it is to women:

Men have inhabited the world of war, called up the "dogs of war," conjured with the cataclysm in a way women have not. This division has played a constitutive role in the structuring of human societies past and present (Elshtain 1995:194-5).

Men and women prefigure war and the structure of society in these discourses; "masculine and
feminine characteristics are considered inseparable from essential maleness and femaleness" (Chapkis 1988:106). In line with cultural feminism, women are thought to be more concerned with peace, and men with expressing their innate biological aggressivity. Even when attributing women's repudiation of violence and destruction to non-biological causes, women are considered socially predisposed to a common 'maternal thinking' born of the common experience of mothering or having been mothered (Ruddick 1984a and b; Elshtain 1983).

Falling prey to the same essentialism are cultural arguments which value 'authentic' or positive feminine values and condemn 'unauthentic' or negative masculine ones. Reardon's explanation for both sexism and the 'war system', as well as their interrelationship is, at bottom, monocausal: social violence, located "in the very roots of the human psyche" (1985:5). "Exorcising" this violence and coercive force, which together constitute the "main cohesion of society"(6), is the ultimate solution. Such psychologizing, which traces warfare to the human psyche rather than to social processes and structures, is ahistorical. And even when condemning essentialism, as Chapkis does, and recognizing that current military practice is founded on an ideology which casts "masculine dominance and feminine submissiveness as exclusive categories [which are] necessarily complementary, each enabling the other to exist" ³ (108), there is a reductionist tendency to begin--and end--with individuals and their psycho-social characteristics or psychic preoccupations:

It is my belief that militarism is fuelled by deeply held but generally unspoken fantasies of domination and submission found in both men and women...the military myth (which is quite distinct from the reality of life within the military system) is essentially a highly gendered erotic fantasy" (Chapkis 1988:108-9).

Masculine bellicosity emerges out of this psychoanalytic drama in which femininity becomes the "natural state" from which men must "grow away" (Harstock 1989:138) through a "culturally defined process of differentiation", a "struggle against the encompassing figure of the mother". This leads to a "fascination with ceasing to exist—that is with death" (Harstock 1989:139).

Disputing others' assertions that "armed conflict was alien to women and that women had no part in wars" (Addis et al. 1994:xvii), and recognizing that the presence of women soldiers threatens the military's masculinity by incorporating into authoritative positions those (i.e.
women) who have traditionally been subordinate in the family, is no guarantee of immunity from casting the soldier's role as "made to measure for young men" (xviii)--rather than being imposed upon or moulding them. And the sense of essential fit between men and the military, and antipathy between women and its authoritarian practices, spills over into proposals for change.

The options presently available to women--perpetuation of exclusion or complete assimilation to the prevailing, masculine military model--have heavy costs for women" (xi)...A military persona which can comfortably fit a woman as well as a man is yet to be developed. But nothing less is needed by women (Addis et al 1994:xx).

Whereas the qualities of such a 'bi-gendered' military persona are left unspecified, the end result echoes liberal feminism's prescription:

Women will remain subordinate until they achieve equal rights and effective equality with men, but not at the cost of becoming like traditional men. Men should change too. Formal equality to a traditionally masculine model constrains women, and makes them feel ill at ease. Women neither can nor want to abandon a difference in attitudes and behaviour. The problem is how to give value to this difference, proposing women's attitudes and behaviours as positive models for men too (Addis et al. 1994:xviii).

Change must be oriented towards the now-familiar androgyne:

Women's personal, social and indeed sexual repertoire must be expanded to include the possibility of dominance and control just as that of men must come to include the possibility of surrender (Chapkis 1988:108).

As well as failing to spell out the meaning of military masculinity beyond its association with men (or inferentially with hierarchy and authoritarianism. Addis 1994), one problem with these formulations is their introduction of men and women as internally undifferentiated, structurally disconnected categories. At times, though, differentiated femininity is contrasted with a monolithic masculinity, as in Addis's assertion that both the traditional woman as peaceful and the woman soldier as yielding to military masculinity are both facets of one militarized femininity:

Both represent a militarized femininity and...serve the needs of the military and are both largely a projection of a male need. They are acceptable only as long as they are useful to a masculine order; as long as they do not disturb or question it" (emphasis added; Addis et al 1994:xix).
Despite the failure to recognize the internal differentiation of masculinity, there is an implicit recognition here, and by some others, that the military generates, or is at least reliant on, constructed notions of gender.

Also impeding these analyses is the location of gender in the end product—men and women—rather than in the social (i.e., military) structures which impose their own peculiar logic, and either aid or abet efforts to conform or resist. It is this embodiment of gender which allows those on either side of the debate on women in combat to focus on women’s physiological attributes, inferiority, or handicaps (Wheelwright 1992). Conflating gender with men and women is what leads Addis to contend that women’s attitudes and behaviours should be adopted as positive models for men, though she never clarifies how this could operate in a military context. And femininity, as we see later, is in fundamental contradiction with the military’s ideological and structural requisites. Addis’s notion of a “military persona” that is compatible with women, or the notion of a “prevailing masculine military model” noted above (is there any other? can there be a feminine one?) implies a practical separation between the military and masculinity, rather than their mutual production and reproduction.

Steinm (1988), on the other hand, recognizes this interdependence, disagreeing that full and equal integration of women will ever be realized in the military: its deeply gendered nature would never allow for it because women are needed in the role of defended against the men’s role of defender. For Segal, women’s exclusion is a means of fostering male troop solidarity and combat effectiveness (1982). In the same vein, Vickers notes that,

Although Boulding has suggested that women infiltrate the military in order to change it, the more likely result is that militarization will change women" (1993:19).

These positions are closer to that of Lloyd, who also examines equal opportunity in the military, but through the lens of the Western philosophical connection between war, citizenship and gender. Excluding women from the military arena is an imperative of retaining the masculinity of war. In Western tradition, this goes deeper than the idea that it is manly to defend the weak. The masculinity of war is what it is precisely by leaving the feminine behind... what femaleness
symbolically represents: attachment to private concerns, to 'mere life'. In leaving all that behind, the soldier becomes a real man, but he also emerges into the glories of selfhood, citizenship and truly ethical, universal concerns. Womankind is constructed so as to be what has to be transcended to be a citizen (Lloyd 1987:75).

But women do have a means of transcending self-interest and the subversive attachment to individuals: they can bear sons and offer them up as "the nation's cannon fodder" (76), allowing them to immortalize themselves in significant deaths:

Socially constructed motherhood, no less than socially constructed masculinity, is at the service of an ideal of citizenship that finds its fullest expression in war" (76).

Enloe concurs that the right to 'die for one's country', to participate in violence "under state discipline for the sake of sacrifice for the nation...[remains] the norm for 'first class citizenship'". at least in the United States (1994:102). And its antithesis to the 'feminine' would explain why admitting women to combat positions is so disruptive to the military: first, they symbolize "all that war and citizenship is supposed to contain and transcend", and second, what maleness and femaleness symbolize have been "incorporated into the gender construction of real men and women" (Lloyd 1987:76).

Men's Studies

Another field which problematizes one aspect of gender, masculinity, is men's studies (see Chapter One). A smaller but growing network of anti-sexist men emerged alongside Second Wave feminism, and began generating a modest and intermittent literature of autobiographical, political, and to a lesser degree, scholarly nature (Hearn and Morgan 1990; Connell 1995a) combining sex-role and social psychological theories, literary and historical perspectives. Many of the same assumptions and characteristics of feminist theorizations can also be found here, including the location of gender in polar opposites of culturally varying but personally fixed biological beings.

The psychic dramas of feminist theory find their counterpart in men's studies literature. Here, the psychologizing of gender also takes many forms, but is most prominent in equally reductionist explanations for various aspects of masculinity, including its origins and male
(sexual) violence. Thus, Ryan attributes the disproportionate problems in the development and experience of an implicitly indelible masculine identity to gendered childrearing patterns in which "women are still the predominant providers of primary care to children [and] a redefinition of parental roles will lessen the need for the defensive posturing inherent in masculinity" (1985:27). Similarly, Eardley suggests that "the problem of male sexual violence is principally that of the deep psychic construction of masculinity within the social and material meanings our culture ascribes to it" (1985:87).

Kaufman, too, traces the roots of the "triad of men's violence" (1992:32)—that by men against women, against other men and against oneself—to the intense family drama during which the young child struggles against prolonged powerlessness until the day in adulthood when society finally accords him, i.e. men only, the triumph of privilege and power. The acquisition of masculinity is, in part, the young boy's response to his extended childhood experience of powerlessness, and the convergence in him of ambivalent feelings of tension, frustration and love for his primary caregivers. In what is an internally contradictory position, he concludes that masculinity is not a life-long role commitment, but that it is lifelong:

The embracing of masculinity is not only a "socialization" into a certain gender role, as if there is a pre-formed human being who learns a role that he then plays for the rest of his life. Rather, through his psychological development he embraces and takes into himself a set of gender-based social relations: the person that is created through the process of maturation becomes the personal embodiment of those relations. By the time the child is five or six years old, the basis for lifelong masculinity has already been established (emphasis added 1987:8).

Gender is located in the person rather than in (changing) social structures or circumstances.

Brittain, whose focus is masculinity and power, also claims to resist essentialism and universalism, and at first glance, seems to succeed. But he then explains patriarchy through men's "interpretation of biology which provides them with a rationale for domination":

the discovery of fatherhood was critical because it enabled men to discover a common interest in establishing the means to overcome their felt reproductive inadequacy (1989:120).

Men constitute a class in their domination of the "mode of reproduction" (126). "Biology is transformed into politics" (128). Even when explicitly discounting a universal masculinity, it
surfaces in the marriage of men to violence:

Men are centrally involved at all 'levels' of violence...[and] the dominance of men and the marginalisation of women in the business of warfare appears close to universal,"

which lends this violence legitimacy (Morgan 1990:181,183). But, actually, it is the structural association of masculinity with violence, rather than masculinity's essentialism, that Morgan elaborates so cogently, as we see below.

The seductiveness of the psychological and psychoanalytic formulations of gender, tinged with a residual essentialism, at times seems too strong to resist. In Connell's early analysis, power is at the centre of the gender relations dynamic (1987), as well as the basis of his critique of sex role theory (1995). Connell also acknowledges that masculinity is socially constructed and internally differentiated, and that

definitions of masculinity are deeply enmeshed in the history of institutions and of economic structures. Masculinity is not just an idea in the head, or a personal identity. It is also extended in the world, merged in organized social relations (29).

In light of these understandings, and his understanding of gender as "contradictory and dynamic" (1995:35), and constructed in interaction rather than being pre-fixed, one aspect of Connell's prescription for social change is perplexing. He is most concrete when writing about his "degendering strategy" of dismantling hegemonic masculinity, a strategy which involves changing "body-reflexive practice...working through the agency of the body"(233), and he cautions against the risks of abolishing

the positive culture produced around hegemonic masculinity", such as "hero stories from the Ramayana and the Iliad...; participatory pleasures such as neighbourhood baseball; abstract beauty in fields such as pure mathematics; ethics of sacrifice on behalf of others" (233).

What is overlooked here is that rather than being voluntary or salutary, such sacrifice in the past has been largely imposed and part of cycles of divinely sanctioned gratuitous destruction.
Reconceptualizing Gender

To counter biologically grounded explanations and enlist the social, social constructionists argue that what we know as 'biological' is itself culturally shaped (Flax 1987): sexual difference is a "function of our knowledge about the body and that knowledge is not 'pure', cannot be isolated from its implication in a broad range of discursive contexts." Gender now becomes the "knowledge that establishes meanings for bodily differences (Scott 1988:2), and the "body...becomes a variable rather than a constant...still there as...a potentially important element in how the male/female distinction gets played out in any specific society" (Nicholson 1994:83).

But do social constructionists go far enough? The issue may not only be that "understandings of the body" vary cross-culturally (Nicholson 1994:83), but that bodies themselves vary with the social relations of time and place, "differ[ing] in many ways physiologically, but...completely transformed by social practices to fit into the salient categories of a society" (Lorber 1997:14). The failure to suspend pre-existing notions of the sex/gender category is due to the residual biological essentialism of the above theoretical positions--whether they attempt to exclude the social or biological, or amalgamate the two. And this failure, itself, derives from the dichotomization of biology and culture. Hirst and Wooley explore the error of analytically distinguishing biology, culture and ecology, noting that humans evolved and developed culture through their interaction. The opposable thumb, bipedalism, average IQ have "been shaped by the consequences of humans associating in social organizations": they also impose limits on the social organization and tasks they make possible. Social relations, in the form of "social beliefs and techniques control, direct, shape and distribute bodily powers and functions" (1982:28) and in turn, "these forms intersect with and are made effective by definite physiological processes and bodily aptitudes" (57). Some examples are culturally acquired techniques of walking, sitting, squatting, resistance to pain and endurance. In sum, the body is what makes and limits cultural possibilities at the same time as culture shapes how we see, mark and modify the body and its capacities.

Hence, a new gender theory must neither discard all notions of biology, nor be tempted
to explain social facts with 'natural' characteristics (Mathieu 1991a). Instead, it must reformulate biology as a relatively fluid accomplice of culture, and take human sexuality into account without essentializing it. This is especially important for this study where women's purported physical differences and inferiority to men are invoked in describing the difficulties of integrating women into what is a predominantly male organization. A new view of gender must recognize that if there is a natural boundary between the sexes, the need to establish and mark their difference reflects its fragility (Mathieu 1991b). And boundaries are most clearly marked where required by social institutions (Rubin 1975); this may be why, in the Western binarized schema, the natural similarities between men and women are sometimes suppressed to the point that the injunction against their resemblance takes on the character of a taboo. Hence, defining gender as the cultural interpretation of biological sex makes no sense if sex is itself a gendered category, that is, if gender is "the very apparatus of production whereby the sexes themselves are established" (Butler 1990:111).

In some non-occidental societies neither the definitions of sex nor the boundaries between genders are that clear (Mathieu 1991a). And in some groups such as the Kaulong of Papua New Guinea, the culturally significant fault lies not between men and women, but between the unmarried and married (Goodale 1990). Thus, like all social theory, gender theory, must be situated, historical and contextualized (Rhode 1990). The examples presented in Chapter Two, and others such as the Guevedoces of the Dominican Republic, illustrate that in many parts of the world, gender resembles social class through much of the West in that it is largely achieved, not ascribed: features associated with gender identity are not defined as immanent in it, carry no coercive force, and are seen as circumstantial and flexible. In the West, by contrast, many gender-related features are seen as embedded in the identities of husband/father and wife/mother; these are considered immanent features and are therefore non-negotiable (Kopytoff 1990). This is what makes change so difficult. Hence, what a new gender theory must incorporate is an understanding that gender is a "practical accomplishment" achieved through the social practice of gender attribution, whether sequentially over the life cycle, or fixed from birth as in the West
(Kessler and McKenna 1978).

Taken together, the preceding analysis suggests that gender may have little to do with men and women at all. Rather, characteristics with which each group is associated may be "models of and models for other domains of social action and experience" (Shapiro 1988:1), metaphors for how we think about significant social issues, experiences or preoccupations. In part, gender may be a totemic cultural device to metaphorically represent the social world using the (inferred) natural world as a logical model. Categorical oppositions between abstract/concrete, self/other, culture/nature, male/female would then "map onto one another and become mutually defining" (8). To illustrate, amongst the New Guinea Hageners, male/female opposition has less to do with dividing men and women into two social categories than with the representation of the contradictory demands of self-interest versus the social or collective good. The means of expressing this opposition and privileging group action is to symbolize them as male and female respectively (Strathern 1981). This, as we saw, is echoed in the Western conceptual split regarding gender and warfare. And it is the embodied changes to their structure which reveal their symbolic foundation and consequent tenuousness:

Whereas wars previously codified the binary structure of the world by designating gender-specific tasks and gender-specific areas where these tasks might be executed, today’s wars are represented as doing the opposite. Postmodern wars highlight and then parody those very binaries—war/peace, good/evil, front/home front, combatant/noncombatant, friend/foe, victory/defeat, patriotism/pacifism—which war had originally inspired. This challenge to binary modes of discourse and epistemology entails semiotic transformations. It reveals that both gender and war are highly fluid and negotiable structures within which meanings are constantly constructed and deconstructed. Postmodern wars participate in undermining a system of meanings that had been in place until the outbreak of the nuclear revolution" (Cooke 1993:182).

Saying that gender is profoundly ideological does not deny its materiality: it structures our thoughts and actions, anchoring them in human beings. Hence, this critique of gender does not mean discounting it: ‘men’, ‘women’ and ‘gender’ remain central to this study because it is these constructed categories that infuse respondents' narratives and need to be explained. But reifying gender can be avoided by using individual identity as well as individual and collective social practice as prisms through which to access (gendered) social structure. The solution for
Carrigan et al is to focus on the historic production of social categories and large-scale structures in order to understand masculinity as an evolving structure of social relations comprising the hegemonic as well as subordinate masculinities. Violence is a constitutive practice of many of these masculine social relations, and since much of this violence comes from the state, so the historical construction of masculinity and femininity is also a struggle for the control and direction of state power (Carrigan et al., 1987:89).

Citing Cockburn’s study of British printing workers, they conclude that the social definitions of masculinity are embedded in the dynamics of institutions: the workings of the state, of corporations, of unions and families (Carrigan et al 1987:91).

Adopting a similar approach of accessing a feature associated with masculinity through its structural origins, Morgan examines “the relationships between men, masculinities and processes whereby violence is recognised, legitimised, excused and explained” (1990:184). Violence is legitimised through its normalization in the play of small boys or the public display of artistic portrayals of battles. The everyday bracketing of the multiple forms of masculinity and violence serves to legitimate violence to the point that it “almost disappears” (Morgan 1990:183):

The legitimization of violence is closely linked to its position and practice in the sexual division of labour…We can see this as a part of a much broader nexus of relationships linking the exercise of power and the state, on the one hand, and the ideological maintenance of gender boundaries on the other. War is carried out in defence of ‘our’ women…[who are] ‘the protected’…even though they may be incorporated into men’s wars in a variety of practical and ideological ways (183).

And not only does the masculinization of violence normalize and legitimate it, it also normalizes men’s deaths in war. This invokes the question of whether feminizing the military—a fear of many anti-integrationists such as Mitchell (1989)—or disrupting “the prevailing masculine military model” (Addis et al, 1994:xi) would delegitimise its violence. This may explain some of the resistance to women in the Canadian Forces described in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight, and why their integration is so threatening.

Finally, as can be discerned from the various examples in Chapter Two, gender categories are internally fractured. In non-class societies, age-grading is the most common basis
for additional differentiation. Under late capitalism, as in previous times, gender is also internally fractured, predominantly by the social constructs of race, social class and individual identities. Thus, instead of masculinity and femininity, it might be more accurate to think of them in multiples. And it may be the obsolescence of their particular historical constructions, as well as emerging contradictions and tensions that is generating social change. And since gender relations in the West are constituted primarily as dichotomous hierarchal relations of dominance and submission—economically, politically and personally—the conception of men as dominant and women as submissive needs to be reformulated to read: (in the West) ‘those who are dominant are generally constituted and represented as men’, and ‘those who are submissive are generally constituted and represented as women’. This does not mean that all those who are constituted as ‘men’ are dominant or superior but that those who are constituted as men are invited, encouraged and expected to identify with the cultural myths around male dominance, thereby screening their own positions of political and economic submission, and mitigating resistance to dominant men.

Connell’s identification of three forms of interrelated military masculinities clarifies this dynamic: the physically violent masculinity, subordinate to orders; the dominating and organizationally competent; and the professionalised, calculative rationality of the technical specialist (1992; also see Hacker and Hacker 1987). These correspond, roughly, to Enloe’s four differentiated militarized masculinities: the low-ranking combat soldier (‘Rambo’); Star Warrior scientists; defence intellectuals; and white collar middle managers and senior executives. Furthermore, military masculinities are employed differently in cross-national military training programmes. Thus, as part of their imperial strategy, the British successfully exported adapted notions of militarized manhood to various parts of their empire. And within nations, each branch of the armed forces adheres to modified ideologies of militarized masculinity (Enloe 1988) corresponding to particular technological requisites. Dominant and subordinate military masculinities are certainly relevant to the Canadian military, and emerge in Chapters Five through Eight, and in the following theoretical discussion of technological rationality as a new form of male dominance.
**Power, Technology and Technological Rationality**

**Power.** An elaboration of the concept of power is central to the study of gendered technological change in the Canadian Forces for several reasons. First, "All human relationships are structured and defined by the relative power of the interacting persons" (Patterson 1982:1), and all social groups are "constituted of multiple overlapping and intersecting sociospatial networks of power," of which the military is a primary source derived "from the particular organizational means...(it) possesses to attain human goals" (emphasis in original; Mann 1986:1.2). Second, the military is a paradigm for the institutionalization of power in that it is formally constructed as a coercive organization. Externally, it implements government policy through armed force; internally, it disperses power hierarchically by controlling its members through a rigidly elaborated chain of command. Third, gender is a primary field within which or by means of which power is signified and articulated" (Scott 1988), and the dispersal of power within the Canadian Forces has historically been gendered: dominant men as leaders from the top down, women as auxiliaries on the bottom. Related to this is the power that women are thought to have both vis-à-vis the organization and the men within it: the subversive power to undermine the rank structure and divert men from their principal task through their self-interested and individualistic femininity (discussed above in relation to Western notions of war and citizenship) as well as through their sexuality. The latter poses risk of fraternization, which endangers operational effectiveness since the power of women’s debilitating seduction can ‘bring men down’: as in World War II when female members were branded sexually permissive, this view "sees men as inherently too weak to resist the lure of the sirens among them" (Symons 1990-1991:492). And finally, as we will see in Chapter Five, the military invests in the rank structure, or chain of command, extraordinary rights both over the lives and conduct of their subordinates and, in certain circumstances, others, rights which have no correspondence in civilian society. For all of these reasons, the study of the gendered transformation of military technology in the Canadian Forces requires a theoretical discussion of power: specifying its form and objectives, its attributes, the locations and manifestations of the relations of power including its intersection.
with gender, and finally, how power is organized, exercised, resisted and this resistance obviated.

Power is about the ability to pursue and attain one's goals by controlling others through the organization of people, materials and territories (Mann 1986). Hence, power is relational and hierarchal; and it is mostly by means of and through organizations\(^{10}\) that the powerful hold and exercise power (Cockburn 1990). The definition and goals of power are mostly evident in its exercise, and, as with all unequal relations, power is always "local and unstable" (Foucault 1990:93). Consequently what must also be considered are the organizational and ideological means of disempowerment, of preventing subordinates from controlling their own lives and working conditions, and from resisting the control of others. The key, then, to understanding changing power relations in the Canadian military is to track the exercise of power "from innumerable points, in the interplay of nonegalitarian and mobile relations" (Foucault 1972:94), and through both formal and informal organizational practices with particular attention to their points of tension.

Informal mechanisms through which access to power is controlled and dominance perpetuated include controlling the flow of information and knowledge through informal networking and spatial segregation (Spain 1992). These are also inclusionary/exclusionary processes by which gender difference is established, marked and maintained. In the Canadian Forces informal mechanisms are significant because, again, as we shall see in Chapter Five, enormous discretionary powers are invested in leadership positions, particularly over the lower ranks, and enforceable through the rank structure. And it is the rank structure that is the locus and medium through which formal power is dispersed.

Patterson's articulation of the attributes of power in the context of the master-slave\(^{11}\) relationship—"one of the most extreme forms of the relation of domination" (1982:1)—is a useful paradigm against which to compare the formal construction of the relations of domination in the military because the soldier, though not the author of the military's violence, is both its agent and object as will be shown, again, in Chapter Five. Patterson identifies three facets of the power relation: "the use or threat of violence in the control of one person by another"; "the
psychological facet of influence, including the capacity to persuade another person to change the way he perceives his interests and his circumstances"; and the authority to control "those private and public symbols and ritual processes that induce (and seduce) people to obey because they feel satisfied and dutiful when they do so" (2). For each of these facets of power Patterson identifies a corresponding element of the slave relation: 1) the creation and maintenance of the slave's condition, particularly the condition of powerlessness, through direct violence, and in origin "as a substitute for death, usually violent death" (1982:5); 2) the slave's natal alienation, the condition of being defined "as a socially dead person" (5) without rights or claims of birth, alienated "in his own right from any legitimate social order", and therefore "the ultimate human tool, as imprintable and as disposable as the master wished" (7) and with "the master as the only mediator between the living community to which he belonged and the living death that his slave experienced"; and 3) the slave's dishonoured condition of being "without power except through another", and being owed no obedience, and having "no independent social existence, hence no public worth" (10).

This last facet of power, the slave's dishonoured condition, is a key component since slavery does not mitigate a rise to power. There have been, historically, many instances of slaves who rose to the heights of power—both civilian and military—yet retained their slave status. For example, the janissaries were forcibly recruited in childhood from amongst subjected Christian peoples under the Ottoman Empire to serve in the Palace, army and state, and form the ruling class: "being natally alienated, socially killed during the process of slavery and redefined and recreated as surrogates of the sultan, [they] were made into the mightiest force in the service of Allah" (Patterson 1982:312). Actually, slave eunuchs played key political, administrative and at times even military roles in most of the major bureaucratic empires, the best known being the Byzantine and Chinese.

Patterson's insights are relevant to the conditions of Canadian military service principally because of the soldier's occupational hazard of 'unlimited liability' by which he forfeits his life from the outset, both in his contractual agreement to 'die for his country', and in being subjected
to the military rule of law which includes the death penalty—absent from the criminal law governing Canadian civilians. Related to this is the extreme power accorded military superiors over subordinates. The second point of correspondence lies in the soldier’s structural suspension in a state of liminality in relation to the civilian community. In his military capacity, the soldier is structurally severed from his natal community and denied recourse to it in times of need. And finally, soldiers are structurally disempowered, and expected to channel their actions through the will of their superiors who are invested with authority and influence over their subordinates. The subordinate’s powerlessness in this relation is most evident in the superior’s acknowledged capacity to abuse his own power as we will see in Chapter Eight.

**Technology.** The organizational dispersal of power between superiors and subordinates, and the capacity to set the parameters of their behaviour and thought, is integral to the military as a technological system. This is no coincidence since technology, and specifically military technology, has been and continues to be central to the emergence and maintenance of power systems (Cockburn 1985; Smith Keller 1992). Power is exercised through technologies as social systems comprising both material, social and ideological components: the formal and informal mechanisms of exercising power internally, discussed above; the control of the production and use of tools, weapons and weapons systems; and the legitimation of these forms of technological control through the peculiar logic of technological rationality which, being embedded in technology, masquerades as value-free:

As noted in Chapter Two, one means by which men have held power in pre-state societies is by monopolizing the making of tools and weapons while technically handicapping and underequipping women (Tabet 1979). In state societies, technological skills have also been a source of power for men whose skills were valuable to military and economic elites. During the rise of the early states, what largely concentrated power in the hands of men was their possession of the ability to produce or adapt others’ instruments of labour, specifically tools, instruments and weapons, all of which were indispensable in the struggle to control disposable surpluses (Cockburn 1992). Ruling elites have been particularly sensitive to changes in war technologies
since innovations could upset the existing order by challenging those who controlled state power: "arms were so bound up with ritual and culture—...economic and political reality—that fundamental changes often implied a restructuring of society itself" (O'Connell:1989:34). Examples range from the overthrow of bronze-armed aristocrats by plebian iron in the second millennium B.C. to the defeat in the twentieth century of the most powerful nation by guerilla warfare (Hacker and Hacker 1987).

However, tools and weapons are not instruments of power in themselves, but via their socially organized development and use. This is because technology is more than the material embodiment of expanding forms of knowledge (Smith 1985) or hardware (McNeil 1988), and more than a social force driving and shaping other aspects of social and institutional life (Smith 1985). Technology is a social product, an "artifact [with] politics... embodying specific forms of power and authority" (Winner 1992:26) as well as the ideologies and values of its producers (Hacker and Hacker 1987); "technological artifacts are the raw material created out of historical experience, which, in turn recreates society" (Stamp 1989:1). Hence, technology cannot be separated from the organization of people who run, or are run by them. It is the failure to grasp this interconnection which leads Wheelwright to critique the military's promotion of its technology as masculine, when only its activities are (1992). The development and deployment of weapons, weapons systems and human resources do serve as indispensable means and conduits for power, but, again, it is through the control of military technology as an organizational system (van Doorn 1975; also see Cockburn above). Hence, understanding military technology requires an understanding of the principles along which it is organized, the historical derivatives of these principles, as well as their recent changes.

Although some such as Connell (1992) mistakenly situate the discovery of rational bureaucratic organization in the modern historical era, as seen in Chapter Two the organizational parameters of military institutions can be traced back to their invention in the ancient Near East (Mumford 1963). And instrumental reason, or the concern with technical efficiency was their distinctive logic (Smith 1985; Hacker and Hacker 1987). Early armies in the ancient world
replaced individual heroism with the concerted action of disciplined troops, mobilized into
integrated, mechanized groups through the transmission of orders issued by a solitary individual
at the top, down

through a series of intermediate functionaries until they reached the smallest
unit. Exact reproduction of the message and absolute compliance were both
essential.... (And) it was through the army... (that) the standard model of the
megamachine was transmitted from culture to culture (emphasis added; 192).

Armies have operated as a blueprint for other institutions rarely associated with the
military: industry, hospitals, religious orders and educational institutions. It was in the earliest
military megamachine that notions of efficiency, discipline (incorporating coercive compliance
along a chain of command) standardization and organization were born. Eventually, the concept
of rationality implicated an entire organization of society (Habermas 1973). And it was in this
form of collectivity that independent initiative and critical thinking were lost.

That is, what was lost with the adoption of the military 'megamachine' and the loss of
productive autonomy was a critical eye to the goals of this new organization--replaced by that of
efficiency. Habermas's critique of technological rationality is that, first, although it adopts a
distinct preference for "extension and dissemination of technical knowledge" which it considers
"not only desirable but also 'rational'" (Habermas 1973:269), technological rationality presumes
to be value-neutral. Positivism presents rationality as a concept of reason which is not a value
but a preferred--if not exclusive--means by which values can be realized. Second, the goals which
technical control serves are also closed to debate since the only criteria of rationality are the
efficiency and economy of procedures. Defining technological rationality as value free, and its
stance as substitute for the ends which it serves, positions it beyond critique, as does the fact that
"rationality as a value...is implicit in the modes of procedure themselves" (270). Its
embeddedness renders it less accessible to scrutiny. Yet technological rationality does constitute
a definite value. It is the obscured, value-free posture operating through the organizational
hierarchy which handicaps independent thought and a critique of the military's mandate. Therein
lies technological rationality's efficacy as an instrument of social repression. "The competing
perspectives of interest, hypostatized to values, are excluded from discussion" (271).
Technological Rationality and the New Male Dominance. But not all are equally positioned in relation to critical thought. A theoretical framework for understanding technological rationality as a gendered system of repression and domination can be found in Winter and Roberts' (1980) interpretation of critical social theory. They note that students of repressive societal institutions have tended to focus on the oppressed rather than the oppressor, studying ruling groups last. In order to correct this, they concentrate on men and emergent forms of male dominance under late capitalism. The framework of critical theory thematizes "the relationship between self and society through materially founded cultural criticism of the interests of dominant and dominating societal forces" (250), and situates this self-formation within broad historical changes, particularly the

historical and social transformation of classical market-oriented capitalism... into contemporary (post)industrial society, with its emphasis on 'instrumental' or 'technical' reason as the means of rationalizing existing practices of domination" (251).

This analysis has certain weaknesses: it ignores the military as an organizational paradigm for technological rationality; omits a discussion of the rationalized male’s loss of a capacity for empathy; overlooks the power practices by which men disempower and marginalize women (Richer 1990; Spain 1992); and resorts to characterological explanations for women’s failure to succeed in the upper echelons of the corporate world. Nevertheless, the application of the theory of instrumental or technical reason can explain the domination practices emerging under advanced capitalism in new forms of masculinity.

The shift from classical market-oriented to post-industrial capitalist society entailed a shift in the male ideal from active, production-oriented, individualistic, physically dominant, and possessive of, yet distant from, females, to passive, consumption-oriented, less individualistic, less physically-oriented, more emotionally nurturant to both women and children, and "predisposed to a passive identification with prevalent images of authority" (263). The former ideal fits early capitalism when individual private property, as the basis of production, was lodged in the nuclear family and provided men with their traditional power base; the latter ideal is an outgrowth of corporate property relations, the socialization of production and reliance on
teamwork, large-scale automation and the scientific management of bureaucracies. This "change from the traditional to the modern male role both serves and reflects the economies of the advanced capitalist societies" (261). Rather than diluting or mitigating male dominance, modern masculinity represents a new, covert and self-legitimating means to reinforce it. And in-so-far as men are identified with or are lodged in the more highly rationalized sectors of the economy, they will reflect this psycho-socially, adhere more closely to the norms of managerial efficiency, and have a blunted capacity for critical thought; in-so-far as women are concentrated in the least rationalized sectors of the economy, and marginalized in relation to it, they are less likely to internalize the norms of technical rationality, and hence retain a greater capacity for critical thought.

Two examples illustrate the circumvention of critical thought that is technical rationality. The first is found in the "technostrategic language" of white, male American defence intellectuals on the development and deployment of military weapons systems, one of the most rationalized sectors of the economy. In their deliberations about nuclear versus conventional war, arms control and nuclear deterrence, the horrific consequences of this lethal weaponry is neutralized using comfortable and familiar domestic and sexual imagery; language is sanitized and voices modulated to--paradoxically--scrupulously avoid any expression of ‘feminine emotion’: concern, empathy, acknowledgement of the enemy’s suffering or even that of their own civilians or soldiers. Discussions take on a dissociative quality, and anything less is considered unprofessional (1993) with the exception of articulated aggression and competition, which are not considered ‘emotional’ (Cohn 1987). It is discursive tactics\textsuperscript{12} such as these which legitimate the continued commitment of vast financial and human resources to the development and production of what is effectively unusable and obsolete nuclear weaponry (Kaldor 1982).

A seminar on hi-tech weaponry sponsored by the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies in the 1980's provides another, local example of technically rationalized discourse. Here, the controversy centred on the technological means of fighting future wars and where, to commit defense dollars. ‘Hi-tech’ is advocated despite the profound doubts about the efficacy of
electronically controlled weaponry, plagued as it is by problems of reliability\textsuperscript{13}, cost and new personnel requirements, and despite the unfavourable competition between electronic weaponry and simpler equipment. Detractors note that the latter performed reliably during the previous test case, the Falkland's War; before expending resources on hi-tech, provisioning must improve for the personal welfare of troops\textsuperscript{14}. Yet, in this seminar, the drawbacks of hi-tech weaponry displaced critical questions which could have fundamentally challenged the rationality of war itself. Many critics' complaints were formulated as petty \textit{ad hominems}, referring to sophisticated weapons as "toys", "supertoys" and "wizardry" (MacDonald 1983:81), and querying what would happen when, during a battle, one 'ran out' of them. Concern for troops remained contextualized within the war scenario, noting the sophisticated skills required to operate the new technology, or the value of electronic weaponry as "soldier-proof". A related personnel issue was the challenge to the military ethos, or 'civilianization', since large numbers of soldier technicians and administrators would be less interested in patriotic service than in remuneration, benefits and career advancement. The solution: reinforce youth with the nobility of self-sacrifice. No one ever challenged the practice of committing vibrant young people to mutual slaughter, or even expressed regret over their loss to the community. Nor were questions raised about whether war is an effective--even cost effective--means of problem solving; about the allocation of human and material resources to perfecting capacities for destruction; and comparisons of the effectiveness of these problem-solving methods with others; as well, discussions of social priorities, human loss and suffering never entered into the equation\textsuperscript{15}. In the context of this seminar the issue of 'hi tech' was constructed as one of instrumental effectiveness.

\textit{Researching Changing Masculinity in the Canadian Military}

The preceding discussions of gender and power are more than theoretical. The epistemological tensions posed by the feminist project and postmodernism have methodological consequences which continue to infuse debate: who qualifies as a researcher; what counts as valid and legitimate knowledge, investigative methods, data, and interpretive frameworks; the power
relations between researcher and researched; the role which the former should take in relation to the latter; and whose voice should predominate in the written report. Finally, the question remains whether accepting the postmodern critique means rejecting broader, universal questions such as those about links between military imperatives and gender configurations.

For many feminists, rectifying the androcentricity of existing scholarship involves women engaging other women in collaborative research to construct knowledge and implement social change. The "commitment [is] to taking women as a central point of reference" (Burt and Code 1995, 8-9). But the criteria by which research can qualify as ‘feminist’ remains contested, since, for many, what permits a particular methodology to lay claims to that title is that it speak to the experiences of a particular constituency called ‘women’. But, again, what if the category ‘women’ is itself contested, internally differentiated by race, social class, geo-political location, physical and mental capacity, or other? Poststructuralists caution that analytical categories such as those highlighted by the feminist critique may themselves obscure and thereby eliminate from the accounting the very power relations and constructions of meaning which produced these categories to begin with. But neither should the value of these concepts and categories for social analysis and political action be dismissed or understated. An awareness of the submergence of difference within categories can alert us to their internal contradictions and tensions, and lead us to the ‘cracks in the armour’ where resistances are most likely to develop, and ultimately provide leverage for change (Scott 1994).

And what if norms of objectivity are also being contested, including notions that an independent, external reality is accessible through observation and recording; that research subject and object are independent; that research can be disinterested rather than always anchored by interested parties? Neither have all feminists subscribed wholeheartedly to these challenges to dominant modes of conducting social research: feminist empiricists support the scientific method—albeit minus the androcentrism. But for standpoint theorists, the position of the researcher inevitably shapes the direction of research and state of knowledge (Code 1995). ‘Researcher bias’, once considered a threat to academic integrity has now been recast favourably by proponents of
methods such as auto/biography who recognize that all knowledge is constructed, "produced jointly in research by researchers and subjects". "The researcher [has]...claims not to objectivity but to a particular interpretation" (Temple 1993:12). Truth is not ‘out there’; it is for each of us to weave into the written record. The silences of history must be ferreted out by reconstructing their obscure traces, even the contemporary ones, when examining history in the making.

With the conceptualization of gender as metaphoric, of power as a (gendered) means of social control, and of the military as a technological system with a (c/overt) male dominance embedded in its technically rationalized structure, how do we access changing military masculinity in Canada, as well as the practices, obviated resistances and silences on which it is predicated? How do we resolve the conundrum of employing the concepts and terminology (gender/masculinity)--of speaking in the very language--that this study intends to problematize, and avoid assuming the unity of subjects (men/women) which have just been theoretically disclaimed? And how do we remain true to the feminist objective of reversing women’s silence in research without employing collaborative methods which intend to privilege women’s voices, and if, instead, we begin from men’s perspectives and investigate what has been carved out as their world? Is collaborative research possible where the object of research--the organization and/or individuals--may stand in opposition rather than in solidarity with the researcher?

The approach taken here regarding these contradictions and challenges is to look to the primary data (written and oral texts) to track constructed categories. Presenting men’s social constructions of gender--in official military texts and interviews--contextualized within the researcher’s feminist critical perspective can reveal the link between oppressive forms of gender relations and the military as a particular institutionalized form of lethal power. Understanding masculinity as differentiated can expose and elucidate the faceted power practices by which subjects are, through their experience, constituted as differentiated, gendered subjects within intersecting power relations. Understanding ‘men’ as a fractured category incorporating subordinates who are agents or proxies for other, dominant men can elucidate how hegemonic masculinity disempowers and recruits subordinates to execute orders even against their own
interests, and how oppressive practices systemically construct human beings as agents of oppression.

The research methods for this study, and its principal analytical framework, were designed to address these epistemological and methodological challenges. Rather than starting from individuals and their attributes or psychologies, this study conceptualizes gender as a characteristic of social structure, and starts from the Canadian Forces as a technological system to trace how gender is generated through its singular logic, institutional requisites and meaning systems. The goal is to look beyond 'men' and 'women' as the main protagonists or direct adversaries, in order to investigate individuals as agents (Scott 1992) of complex social systems operating on multiple levels, and to discern the relations between the powerful and powerless. This involves deconstructing the unity of gender/women/masculinity while keeping in sight the very issues which prompted their evocation to begin with—structures and processes of hegemony, power and social control, conflict and oppression, critical autonomy and its obviation—and, from there, trace how gender is constructed through practices anchored to these issues.

Conducting this research has been far from straightforward. My master's research on rental housing had afforded an accessible terrain facilitating long-term participant observation, guided interviews of tenants and landlords, and accessible secondary sources—all in the public domain. This study, on the other hand, has faced considerable obstacles. As can be deduced from the literature reviews, there was the absence of an established field of study with integrated literature and analytical frameworks. Another impediment was an inaccessible research terrain. Compared to the American military (Dobie 1993; Rogan 1981; Williams 1989), the Canadian Forces does not welcome external researchers. To complicate matters, many written texts are classified, with traces left only by their absence. As an outsider, with no personal or professional connections to the Forces, I lacked both formal and informal access. And, like many Canadians, I was ignorant of anything regarding military institutions or operations. Compounding this marginality, my Jewish heritage and Holocaust-related background had understandably conspired to instill in me a generalized foreboding regarding military personnel, institutions or
authority. 'The military' had been narrated into a monolithic, ominous 'other'. Breaching this impenetrable fortress—an analogy that was not lost on me—was both emotionally and intellectually daunting. But I persisted, chipping away at my own ignorance, at the resistance of military members, and the institution itself.

There were additional institutional handicaps peculiar to researching the military. For one, there was the high mobility of personnel and their relatively short duration of employment. These sometimes made it difficult to locate and expand my network of contacts since someone who was 'here today' could easily be transferred and 'gone tomorrow', lost in the institutional maze. Contact with a particularly located individual who might have been especially helpful, such as an officer responsible for the Status of Women in the Forces, could be short-lived either because of his or her transfer or release. Another drawback was the rank structure. Senior officers attached to units with non-commissioned members (as opposed to officers working at National Defence Headquarters) were reluctant to refer subordinates as potential respondents, noting that the latter might well interpret such referral as a direct order, one they could only disobey with penalty.

The impediments associated with researching this inaccessible terrain could also be turned to advantage. Frequent contacts necessitated by high turnover and the institution's bureaucratic nature served as opportunities for data collection—although of another kind than I had originally intended. They allowed me to interact with more people, to ask questions on subjects about which I was genuinely ignorant or perplexed, and to request written documents which could clarify the workings of the institution. Being an outsider has also had theoretical value since I have been querying what respondents and informants, and even military researchers, take for granted. These obstacles to access have also helped to delineate—by what was inaccessible to me—that which the military leadership wants silenced or hidden. Together, these have expanded my understanding of the institution.

A significant part of the research has taken the form of a field ethnography. Although my sights were, from the beginning, set unwaveringly on changes to masculinity in the context of
the Canadian Forces as a gendered technological system, the initial lack of an analytical framework and knowledge of the Forces meant that my early investigations had a somewhat omnivorous quality: I took what I could get, unselectively at first, unsure of what I was looking for or what would next come my way. Since I wanted to familiarize myself with the institution both first hand and from whatever secondary sources there were, I cast my net as widely as possible. As well as discovering what kind of military-related research was being conducted in Canada and under what auspices (Directorates of the Department of National Defence and departments in the Canadian Forces), I was interested in learning about how military personnel think about the military, and how they understand and sustain their involvement in an institution designed and mandated primarily as a gargantuan killing machine composed of human and mechanical parts. Learning about the institution and its members meant being a willing listener whenever the occasion to interact with military personnel arose: attending the one thematic session at the Learned Societies on military sociology year after year—the only ‘outsider’ to do so; following up the military contacts made at these sessions, as well as other referrals; telephoning a recruiting centre to inquire about requirements for signing up; touring a military exhibit replete with military vehicles and weapons; persevering to get access to a Canadian Forces library at a military college; working my way in Kafkaesque fashion through the military bureaucracy in order to finally meet with a senior officer at a military base about gaining official research access to the military—only to be neither refused nor accepted.

In sum, meetings have been confined to the people I was able to access after a number of years of slow and steady effort to develop contacts and build trust. Eventually, certain affiliated individuals, whether out of a commitment to the integration project or personal/academic interest, extended themselves to arrange unofficial interviews and provide some of the written documents. Personnel of one research arm of the Department of National Defence, the Directorate of History, have been tremendously forthcoming within the limitations of providing unclassified materials. However, formal access to the research terrain and subjects was never acquired, partly because of a general suspicion of outsiders, noted above, and for fear
of eliciting from military personnel\textsuperscript{18} their feelings of resentment or grievances towards the organization (see Davis 1994 and personal observation).

Analysis for this study is based on interviews with ten (male) junior and senior commissioned officers in the Canadian Forces; interviews with sixteen respondents—7 women and 9 men—including civilian and retired military historians and archivists at the Directorate of History of the Department of National Defence in Ottawa, an interview with the former chairperson of the Minister of National Defence Advisory Committee on the Status of Women; many secondary documents provided to me by the latter; an interview with the Director General of Policy Coordination, Directorate of Social and Economic Policy (Ottawa); ethnographic notes from repeated contacts (interviews, telephone conversations and written correspondence) with a former infantry officer; and interviews and multiple informal contacts at academic conferences with a Director of Conditions of Service at the Department of National Defence and with others at a military conference who are in addition to those enumerated above. The written texts include all existing unclassified reports related to gender integration and studies conducted by the Department of National Defence itself, and reports by the Minister's Advisory Board on Women in the Canadian Forces.

To overcome the limitations imposed by any one method, this research employs a 'triangulation of method' (Nielsen 1990) to gather the primary data, and 'narrative' as the theoretical medium. The data includes: the National Defence Act and twenty selected unclassified official Department of National Defence publications mostly related to gender integration, and supplemented by examples emerging from the Somalia Inquiry and other military incidents which have been made public; open-ended interviews of one and one-half to two and one-half hours duration with ten officers (respondents) as well as interviews with sixteen informants; and my own observations as a participant at several academic and other conferences attended by military personnel between 1990 and 1995. The decision to use a dialogic (LaCapra 1995) form of textual analysis should be particularly revealing since, as noted above, it involves integrating the interpretations of the researcher who is marginal to the institution and began with the viewpoint
of a novice, and the verbal and written narratives of knowledgeable insiders.

**Narrative.** As theory, narrative "equate(s) life with the story or stories that we can tell about it", and elucidates "the problematic of coherence, of permanence in time...[and] of identity" (Ricoeur 1991a:195):

Narrative constructs the durable properties of a character, what one could call his narrative identity...So it is first of all in the plot that one looks for the mediation between permanence and change, before it can be carried over to the character. The advantage of this detour through the plot is that this provides the model of discordant concordance on which it is possible to construct the narrative identity of the character (Ricoeur 1991a:195).

It is via emplotment that heterogeneous elements are synthesized into a unified story, and discordant elements are accorded. And it is through narrative that practice is made intelligible, being symbolically mediated, "articulated in signs, rules and norms" (Ricoeur 1991:28). Hence, narrative theory is most suitable for simultaneously explaining social practices and the meaning-systems which guide and inform them.

The choice of narrative as the principle medium for studying gendered changes in Canadian military technology follows from the nature of the subject matter, the generated data, and the research terrain. As a social artifact, gender is constructed through narrative--being both a social practice in itself, as well as shaping others. In the West, gender is literally narrated into being through dual processes of gender attribution and by shaping other social practices: i.e. what people are and do. Gender is both narrated (talked about) and narratively lived (lived through narration). Hence, much of this study is devoted to tracking how the Canadian military formally constitutes itself as a gendered organization, how military members think and talk about gender, and how these feed into, and in turn are shaped by their gendered practices and (subverted) resistances. And because gender, in addition to materially constructing men and women (Lloyd 1987), is itself a symbolic construct, considerable emphasis is placed on what gender represents to the Forces: the remainder of this thesis is devoted to tracing how gender is constructed in the Canadian Forces, and how it infuses and is infused by the military’s indigenous meaning systems and social practices.

Narrative is also ideally suited to this study because of the organizational nature of the
Canadian Forces: large, composed of disparate, far-flung and deliberately inaccessible parts, with a fluid and tentative history, and a great need for a sense of historical unity, cultural uniformity, continuity, permanence and depth. It is also dependent on reconstructing identities based on institutional requisites and meanings often foreign and antithetical to civilian values. By providing plot and justification (Denzin 1989) narrative can lend an organization such as the Forces coherence, permanence and identity; through the process of employment, narrative provides the means by which this large, heterogeneous organization comprising a plurality of people and practices, is integrated and united in a sense of common affiliation and ultimate purpose. It can elucidate how coherence is manufactured from and imposed onto the discontinuous (Ricoeur 1991); how the ephemeral is recast as the enduring; and how disparate, unique identities are constructed into uniform, gendered military identities, and either constituted as agents or objects of oppression. The concept of "narrative identity...the kind of identity that human beings acquire through the mediation of the narrative function" can disclose how the "self intersects with the same at one precise point: permanence in time" (Ricoeur 1991a:188,192). Ethnographic narrative can describe--and in this case prescribe--and interpret the military way of life and its meanings to its members (Denzin 1989); and in referring to the greater cause which the military serves, grand narrative can "articulate and legitimate" it (Bernstein 1991). Narrative can also reveal the expressly repressed, since stories told can draw attention away from others that could be told, but are better left silenced.

Narrative is also particularly well-suited to this study because, as an exegetical prism, it provides access to the beliefs and justifications (Rosie 1993) for sustaining and perpetuating the military’s extreme practices, unique in their devotion to material and human destruction and sacrifice. Narrative repetition also exposes the military’s ability to reel back in time and retrieve past events "as conditions, as potentialities which make the actual, the end of the narrative, possible (present)" (Bernstein 1991:117). Repetition exposes the process by which the sequence from beginning to end takes on a fatalistic quality (Ricoeur 1991). Finally, narrative fits this study’s goal of accessing the social structure of the Canadian Forces through the prism of
individual life and social practice, and official unclassified military texts. Its application to studying the construction of gender reveals narrative as being about more than ideas; it is a materializing practice.

The narrative analysis of changing masculinity in the Canadian Forces addresses four interrelated questions, each of which is composed of several sub-questions. The first concerns the social construction of gender and the military as a masculine institution: beyond being peopled mostly by men, what makes the Canadian Forces 'masculine'? Starting from its mandate and the organizational structure and belief systems through which it is operationalized—manifested, instilled and enforced—how does gender operate as one of its organizing principles? What does gender difference represent, and how it is established and maintained? In what ways are the underlying assumptions and values on which the military's principles and practices are predicated, and to which members are expected to adhere, gendered? How are subjects constituted and marked as men and women, seemingly different from each other and fixed in their gender identities? How is difference conceptualized? And finally, how is the masculinity of the military related to its legitimation, the sense of its mission as inevitable and meritorious?

The second set of questions concerns how gender interacts with the dispersal of power in the Forces, with its disciplinary structures and practices. Which groups are constructed as dominant and are associated with discourses that "have the social power and authority which comes from secure institutional location" (Weedon 110), and which are marginalized? Do discourses, even those on women's integration by the MND Advisory Board, situate men as central, undifferentiated and hegemonic, and women as marginal, differentiated and subordinate? How is the unity of the institution's masculinity maintained, and the contradiction reconciled between this undifferentiated masculinity and the differentiated 'masculinity' of the Canadian Forces rank structure by which dominant men discipline men who are subordinate?

The third set of questions concern the silences resonating in the Forces' legal mandate, its technologically rationalized structure and its expressly dictated meaning system. Akin to "home truths" which are "at once about what is familiar and taken for granted, and about what
threatens these cozy assumptions” (Cohen 1993:2), these are about questions which are submerged, about issues that are unthought or unarticulated, assumed, taken for granted. Best viewed from the margins, they concern whether difference is not only about bodies but about social relations, meaning and power; about the differential valuing of lives and deaths, and about men’s expendability; about the contradiction inherent in men’s domination of mortal combat to the general exclusion of women; about the possible obsolescence of the ‘defender/defended’ dichotomy and ultimately the rationality of the military’s mandate itself. And their relation to the final set of questions, on integration, is that they reveal what the Canadian Forces ultimately finds most threatening.

That is, the project to integration women can perhaps best be understood by comparing those areas which are considered to be problematic with those which are not. What is the compatibility between gender integration and the male-dominated rank structure which is expected to implement it? To whom are women threatening and why? Are men staking out and attempt to hold ‘territory’ now that women are encroaching on it? How is this related to the many cases of sexual harassment that women complain of, but that male respondents deny any personal experience with? Does the introduction of women carry the risk of undermining the above assumptions and methods of inculcation discussed above? Mapping the social construction of gender in the Canadian Forces would go far in elucidating the difficulties currently experienced in fulfilling the Human Rights Tribunal directive of gender integration (also phrased as ‘gender neutrality’). It would certainly expose some of the systemic contradictions between this externally imposed official goal and the gendered structure of the organization. This study may explain whether gender can be eliminated as a category of human differentiation in an institution which is technologically organized around this very principle. And it is to delineating the social structure of the organization onto which gender is mapped that we turn next.
Notes

1. A more detailed version of this argument can be found in Kovitz (1989) and Kovitz (1995).

2. Feminist lobbying led to improved education and labour force access; pay equity; sexual harassment redress and legislation; the childcare needs of working mothers; reproductive rights including maternity leave and abortion; recognition of the feminization of poverty and its links to single parenthood, labour force discrimination; recognition, if not improvement of the problems of (sexual) violence and abuse of women and children.

3. Biological essentialism is at odds with social theory that sees "change as history, as transformation generated in the interplay of social practice and social structure. Structure is given to sex role theory in the form of biological dichotomy" (Connell 1987:53).

4. The same charge is levelled against sex-role theory (Connell 1995).

5. Wendy Chapkis takes issue with what she sees as an insistence "on this narrowly gendered image of womanhood" (1988:108). The reason is not only because it forms an ineffective basis of organization for the peace movement, but because, more importantly, it conforms so closely to the military ideology which portrays women as passive, nurturing and egalitarian.


7. How women are ever to triumph is left unanswered.

8. As with the Azande boy-wives described in Chapter Two, the Guevedoces are another example of transitional gender identity: infants born with ambiguous genitals were raised initially as girls and reassigned at puberty when they began to develop masculinized secondary sex characteristics (Kessler and McKenna 1978).

9. "...gender is...a persistent and recurrent way of enabling the signification of power in the West" (Scott 1988:45).

10. These organizational sites may be both public and private. and the latter can be an equally formidable source of power as we saw in Chapter Two: Merovingian queens could wield substantial political power through their domestic responsibilities (Nelson 1978).

11. Patterson defines slavery as "The permanent, violent domination of natally alienated and generally dishonoured persons" (Patterson 1982:13).

12. A third example of discursive distancing from the dangerous consequences of nuclear technology comes from the French nuclear waste industry where the language of training sessions followed the same logic of trivializing the potential lethality of daily work procedures in order to mitigate the workers' sense of fear and danger. Again, the imagery is domestic and familiar: the reactor was a 'cooker', and approaching it could turn a worker into a 'cooked leek'. Training films also employed male and female voices differently: men to transmit the glorious nature of the nuclear 'epic' and the subduing of nature; women's to reassure and allay fears (Zonabend 1989).
13. The sensitivity of electronic equipment makes it failure prone, and design problems are legion: automatic doors to magazines fail to open, and the electronics on certain battleships are temporarily disrupted when the main armament is fired. The heavy weight of specialized kit such as night observation devices and laser binoculars means that ground troops will likely abandon them under difficult conditions as happened during the Falkland’s War (MacDonald 1983). These and other design features such as time and warm-up delays for firing missiles and other weapons systems removes the initiative from combatants and limits their scope for action, leaving them vulnerable.

14. For instance, during the Falkland’s War, all of the tents were transported on one ship—which sank—and more "troops were lost to trench foot and exposure than combat". And whereas Canada is producing sophisticated aerospace equipment, the Canadian Forces remains unable to issue effective footgear or winter clothing (MacDonald 1983:28).

15. Those who have been raising these questions—albeit phrased in binarized biological determinist language—have been those furthest from the centres of militarized technicized rationality, mainly women at the forefront of the peace movement.

16. Can this be because, being a more militarized society, the Americans cannot fathom themselves to be under critical scrutiny?

17. For example, a senior Canadian Forces officer who spoke at a military conference which I attended stipulated that he was speaking from a "privileged platform", meaning that he was not to be quoted, nor were his remarks to be cited elsewhere.

18. Particularly from the lower ranks (personal communication).
Chapter Five

The Canadian Forces Today

Introduction

This chapter's focus is the mandate of the contemporary Canadian Forces, and the structural means whereby it is executed. Although increasing logistic and administrative requirements of mass armies means that today most Canadian Forces personnel perform 'non-operational' or non-combative tasks, the entire Force remains organized and oriented towards 'operational effectiveness', a euphemism for combat readiness. As stated by the Director of Personnel Selection, Research and Second Careers for the Canadian Forces:

Other roles notwithstanding, all military organization is oriented toward the effective conduct of war, with maintenance of a state of readiness among operational troops being a principal concern (Pinch 1987:2).

Militaries are first and foremost instruments of coercion. But it is coercion directed against more than externally designated enemies: contrary to pre-state societies where declaring and waging war is predicated on warriors' consent, states appropriate this power exclusively. To this end, they arrogate the consensual autonomy of combatants from the outset and subordinate them to state authority. Compelling the disinterested or indifferent to fight is therefore a principal task of state-sponsored militaries. Put another way, since those who declare war in state societies are distinct from those who wage it, extracting and sustaining compliance from unmotivated combatants compels military leaders to direct considerable coercive energy internally against their own members.

This task of "motivating young men to get into harms way," 1 when they have little to gain and much to lose, is as old as the army's conception at the dawn of civilization. But at that time, gaining compliance from warriors was less uniquely problematic because the army evolved within a broader societal framework of authoritarian rule. To recapitulate briefly:

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This new culture was dedicated...to the expansion of collective power...by perfecting new instruments of coercion" (Mumford 1966:164). Individual initiative and responsibility had no place in the megamachine; for such freedom might mean countermanding faulty orders or disobeying immoral ones. Brutal compulsion was the necessary accompaniment of the large-scale organization and the extensive order introduced by kingship. Disobedience to the orders of a superior was the worst of sins; and even 'answering back' was a serious offence (183-5).

Soldiers in the 'hydraulic state', as Wittfogel termed this type of society, were subject to the same authoritarian conditions, were not protected by democratic check or feudal contracts. No matter whether they held office land or not, they came when they were summoned; they marched where they were told; they fought as long as their ruler wanted them to fight. And there was no question as to who gave the orders or who obeyed (Wittfogel 1957:60).

To emphasize the coerciveness of this new social form, Wittfogel compares it with feudal military action which "was marked as much by the lack of discipline as by individual valour" (60). He refers to "the disorderly hosts of Medieval Europe" (61) and cites a description of the Crusading army:

Their want of discipline was as well marked as their proneness to plunder: deliberate disobedience on the part of officers was as common as carelessness and recklessness on the part of the rank and file. This was always the case in feudal armies (1957:61).

Today, in contrast, the problem of delivering what is largely internally autocratic, i.e., hierarchically controlled, non-critical, lethal violence by those uncommitted to fighting by virtue of their structural exclusion from the decision-making processes and benefits of war is compounded where militaries are set in political democracies which guarantee the franchise and promise individual 'rights' and 'freedoms', and where most social practices are ostensibly based on consent. As an archaic, anomalous holdover from a distant and largely forgotten past, the military has in many ways remained true to the despotic social conditions in which it originated. Even as Western societies have inched their way towards expanded legal and political rights, the military's segregation from the larger civilian society has allowed it to retain many of the social and legal parameters of its historic roots. In this sense, studying the military takes on the qualities of an archaeological excavation (Foucault 1972).

Another consequence of the mandate as purveyors of (self)-sacrificial violence, using the
politically indifferent or uncommitted, is that the Forces must organizationally engage some as executors of violence, and others to engender, sustain and manage this violence in the former group. The former (executors) correspond to the non-commissioned ‘other ranks’ (or ‘men’), the latter (managers) correspond to the commissioned officer corps; the remaining group charged with engendering and sustaining violence are the non-commissioned officers who, the reader may recall, replaced the leader of mercenaries during the military revolution of the early seventeenth century. In addition to this differentiation of personnel, mechanisms are also required to disempower both executors and managers of violence in order to secure their obedience and minimize resistance. It is to these ends that most of the legal and organizational structures of the Forces are oriented.

What tempers the authoritarianism of the Canadian military is its voluntary nature which permits soldiers—within certain legal parameters discussed below—to leave. Lacking forcible conscription, the leadership of the Forces monitors rates of attrition assiduously, with quarterly updates of five-year trends by rank, command, and various demographic and other variables (Department of National Defence 1993), as well as other quantitative research relevant to attrition and retention. The goal is to balance the benefits of service for individuals against the personal and institutional costs. The right to exit is an important ingredient of the modern Canadian military as a social amalgam, combining its predominantly, authoritarian structure with select rights such as the legal right to be considered innocent until proven guilty, and representation by counsel in certain circumstances. But, overall, as we will see, the voluntary conditions of enlistment are in tension with the military’s coercive mandate and conditions of service.

The Forces’ internally coercive mandate is evident in its laws and judicial system: the legal rights of Canadian Forces members differ considerably from those enjoyed by Canadian civilians. For example, in 1990 a Court-Martial Appeal Court unanimously overturned the conviction of a corporal found guilty of marijuana trafficking, ruling that his right to an independent and impartial trial under the Canadian Charter of Rights had been violated. He had been tried by a standing court martial which is conducted by a single officer having only three
years’ experience as a practising lawyer. The standing court martial was introduced during the World War II for minor offenses, and was intended for use during wartime or civil emergencies only; however, in 1967 it was incorporated for regular usage in military law. Responding to this legal reversal, a Defence Department spokesman noted that another, unspecified, legal procedure could have been used to try, and convict the corporal, a procedure which had already withstood a constitutional challenge, and had been used in 65 of 96 courts martial in the previous year.3

Compounding the military’s task of internal coercion is the sheer number of personnel. On a global scale, and in comparison with that of its U.S. neighbours, the Canadian military establishment may seem small. Yet, the Department of National Defence is the single largest organization in Canada (Pinch 1987; Taylor and Nolan 1996), with both military and civilian employees working in administrative and operational installations. The administrative component alone forms an integrated bureaucracy the vastness of which is brought home by the two-metres long organigram of National Defence Headquarters. In addition to these purely administrative offices, operational installations spread across the country include land, air and naval bases: artillery, horse, engineer, signal, light infantry, service, field ambulance, and military police units of the regular forces, as well as their militia counterparts (over 150); fleet replenishment ships, destroyers, submarines, patrol and reserve training vessels; air stations and squadrons as well as radar squadrons and air reserve units; and finally, groups, squadrons and research squadron units of communication command, a supplementary radio system, and communication reserve units as well as an entire training system. And, of the tens of thousands of Canadian Forces personnel, there are, as we shall see later, almost half (39,202 at the end of 1992) with dependent family members, who, although not officially part of the Canadian Forces, have always been integral to its operations; are, under certain circumstances subject to its discipline; and are being increasingly recognized as requiring surveillance, regulation, and particular services (also see Harrison and Laliberté 1994).

With such an immense organization, and a backdrop of democratic political and legal institutions, how can the Department of National Defence extract, coordinate and secure the
delivery of legitimated, lethal violence and self-sacrifice, by intrinsically unmotivated individuals acting as proxies for state elites? The answer can be found in three interacting and overlapping mechanisms: first, a separate judicial system which is applicable solely to Canadian Forces members, and which, as a former Minister of National Defence, David Collenette, put it, constructs the military "By and large...[as] a society unto itself, that governs itself and has its own code of justice"; second, a unique social structure which resocializes recruits and ranks members, as well as regulating relations between them; and third, a distinct system of meaning designed to narratively reproduce and legitimate this fairly unique social organization. These three mechanisms are intended to work in concert, and their essence can be found in the law governing the Canadian Forces, its technically rationalized structure, training system, and personnel concept which contains its military ethos and the principles guiding its personnel policies. Together these form a web of interlocking practices geared to constructing a homogeneous military world demarcated and segregated from that of civilians. The first two are covered in this chapter, and the third in Chapter Six.

**Mandate: The National Defence Act**

The Canadian Forces derives the legal authority to deliver engineered, bureaucratized, deadly violence from the National Defence Act (1985), the premier narrative describing its mandate. In the Act's one hundred and twenty-two pages, (excluding four pages of Annex and Related Provisions) there are five pages of definitions; two establishing the department; fourteen providing the Canadian Forces with a constitution including the powers of command, enrolment, promotion and release, pay, etc.; one page on the defence research Board; and three pages on Aid of the Civil Power, which is the eleventh of the Act's twelve parts. The remainder of this text delineates a judicial system to which Canadian Forces military employees are subject, and which is quite distinct from the Canadian Criminal Code.

In this official narrative, the Canadian military is formally constructed as a technologically rationalized, hierarchical instrument of military coercion designed both to deliver
violence externally at the behest of the state and to internally control and regulate its members, particularly their critical autonomy. Perhaps reflecting the anticipated difficulty of fulfilling this mandate, relatively few clauses of the Act are devoted to delineating and elaborating the external tasks which the Canadian Forces is mandated to perform (war, search and rescue, aid of the civil power and peacekeeping) compared to the many clauses elaborating the internal measures and structures governing military personnel: fully eighty-two percent (or one hundred of the one hundred and twenty-two pages) of the Act deals with the disciplinary jurisdiction over military (and some non-military) members, and articulates the bare hierarchal and disciplinary structures of the Canadian Forces which formally control members' behaviour. In short, the Act constitutes an operational narrative of the Canadian Forces as a hierarchical, coercive organization designed to deliver violence externally, both outside Canada and against Canadian civilians, and to control military personnel internally. It serves to legally and socially fence the civilian population off from the military by establishing a separate authoritarian regime to which military members surrender their autonomy, and which technically rationalizes their very lives and bodies. We now turn to examine this system more closely.

Again, the bulk of the National Defence Act constitutes a system of law and justice unique to the Forces and quite distinct from the one governing Canadian civilians. For one, it implicitly suspends the sorts of civil liberties that Canadians take for granted. Broadly put, civil rights in Canada refer to the legal protection against discrimination on the basis of, amongst others, race, colour, creed, sex, religion, whereas civil liberties provide for, amongst others, the freedom of religion, expression, assembly and association, as well as the right to due process of law. An example which illustrates this suspension of civil liberties is one aspect of employment conditions: civilian employees are free to resign their jobs at any time, perhaps with economic penalties when this involves breaking a contract. Conditions of release for military members, on the other hand, are considerably delimited and in certain circumstances suspended entirely (NDA 23.1, 30.3). And the compulsion to serve applies even if a person "not enrolled or re-engaged for service, has received pay as an officer or non-commissioned member..." (NDA 25.). These
unique employment provisions are brought home by the "Charter Task Force: Final Report" (1986), the Forces’ official response to the government’s recommendations on enhancing individual rights and freedoms through the pursuit of greater equality:

There are many features of armed forces that set them well apart from the societies they serve. Some of these aspects, such as the surrender of personal freedoms inherent in membership, are self-evident. Others are not as obvious from a cursory examination; all, however, are important to operational effectiveness (emphasis added; 2).

This “surrender of personal freedoms” invokes the “restriction of certain freedoms including some rights provided by the democratic process” enshrined in the Personnel Concept of the Canadian Forces (1992:2.g). And the distinction between civilian and military employment is emphasized.

In the civilian workplace,

in most cases the employee has the right to withdraw from employment with little or no notice (2).

Canadian Forces members, on the other hand, are generally only free to leave at the end of their contract, or, if they so request, on six months notice. But in circumstances of war or emergency, neither of these conditions is automatic, and both can be suspended unilaterally:

Also, although in most cases members presently can obtain release on six months notice, eligibility for voluntary release can be withdrawn under circumstances such as a state of emergency or war (2).

Release at the expiration of a term of service is annulled if the member is on active service or during an emergency, in which case the member must continue to serve for one year after the emergency has ceased or the member is no longer on active duty. The Charter Task Force concludes that expanding the rights and freedoms for servicemembers as requested by the government could prove anathema to the Forces’ primary consideration of operational effectiveness in war.

These occupational terms of release are surely constraining, but they pale in comparison with the control which the Forces has over members’ very lives. Whereas Canadian civilians are immune from capital punishment, and have been so since hanging was abolished in 1976, under the National Defence Act the government retains two extraordinary powers: to impose the death
penalty and to compel military personnel to engage in life-threatening acts. As we will soon see, noncompliance could equally cost them their lives. The Charter Task Force explains the retention of the death penalty in the Canadian Forces as follows:

There is a fundamental and vital principle inherent in the existence of a separate code of laws for the CF. It is a demonstrable acknowledgement that the conditions and requirements of the CF are so divergent from those of society as a whole that they must be accorded treatment different from that given the rest of Canadian society. Indeed, the vital necessity for departures from the universal application of social standards to armed forces was sufficiently compelling to override the general abolition of capital punishment in Canada: the sentence of death has been purposely retained in the National Defence Act (emphasis added: 4).

And whereas the vague reference in this clause to "conditions and requirements of the CF [that] are so divergent" leaves unspecified the precise justification for overriding "the general abolition of capital punishment in Canada" and purposely retaining the death penalty, the reason for a separate code of laws, examined below, is somewhat more specific:

While the Criminal Code of Canada and related statues are appropriate and adequate to regulate society in general, it has long been recognized that they cannot provide the degree of discipline that is essential for armed forces. It is for this reason that the National Defence Act incorporates a Code of Service Discipline that subjects members to laws and types of trial that do not apply to the rest of society (emphasis added: 4).

That is, the "degree of discipline" necessary to successfully control armed forces members justifies denying them the legal rights afforded other Canadians. But the ultimate justification for the entire enterprise, for the military mandate requiring such a stringent system, remains obscure.

In fact, it might be difficult to determine from a first reading of the National Defence Act that the Canadian Forces—as respondents for this study kept reminding me, and was pointed out in the Charter Task Force—is primarily mandated and organized for war, or that employees of the Forces are legally liable to risk and possibly lose their lives. With the exception of the clause on definitions in which "war" is included under "emergencies", the mandate to wage war is referred to directly in only the following abbreviated, somewhat cryptic clause which mentions neither violence nor war:

(1) The Governor in Council may place the Canadian Forces or any component, unit or other element thereof or any officer or non-commissioned member thereof on active
service anywhere in or beyond Canada at any time where it appears advisable to do so
(a) by reason of any emergency, for the defence of Canada; or
(b) in consequence of any action undertaken by Canada under the U.N. Charter, the North Atlantic Treaty or any other similar instrument for collective defence that may be entered into by Canada (1985:31.1).

The clause articulating the mandate of individual members is even more brief and vague:

The regular force, all units and other elements thereof and all officers and non-commissioned members thereof are at all times liable to perform any lawful duty (emphasis added; 33.1).

The Canadian Forces, and more specifically its members, can be ordered to go anywhere or do whatever is lawfully required of them by the government in power. Again, as the Task Force puts it:

For the CF, the unlimited liability of membership is the occupation, and specialties are secondary (emphasis added; Department of National Defence 1986:3).

The unlimited liability to which servicemembers are subject contrasts sharply with civilian employees who are

hired to perform a specific job in a defined occupation. Labour and common law, together with union-management collective agreements, have resulted in strict limits being enforced on the range of duties to which the employee is liable (Department of National Defence 1986:2).

Oddly though, as with the clauses setting out the Canadian Forces' mandate, the clauses delineating members' unlimited liability make no mention of violence or war, of death or weapons. Where the Forces' lethal mandate is mentioned, and mentioned repeatedly, is in the context of assuring members' compliance. That is, references to war or death relate to the death penalty imposed on Canadian Forces members for committing offenses in the course of engaging, or failing to engage, in combat or other duties, such as an officer's failure to "use his utmost exertion to bring the officers and non-commissioned members under his command...into action...; or encourage his officers and non-commissioned members to fight courageously." If traitorous, the penalty for such behaviour is death, and if out of cowardice is "death or less punishment" (National Defence Act, #73). Death is also the penalty for anyone who
improperly delays or discourages any action against the enemy; goes over to the enemy; when ordered to carry out an operation of war, fails to use his utmost exertion to carry the orders into effect;...behaves before the enemy in such manner as to show cowardice, or does or omits to do anything with intent to imperil the success of any of Her Majesty’s Forces...(National Defence Act, #74).

Another offence for which death is the penalty also relates to war:

Every person who
(a) by want of due precaution, or through disobedience of orders or wilful neglect of duties, is made a prisoner of war,
(b) having been made a prisoner of war, fails to rejoin Her Majesty’s service when able to do so, or
(c) having been made a prisoner of war, serves with or aids the enemy, is guilty of an offence and on conviction, if the person acted traitorously, shall suffer death and, in any other case, is liable to imprisonment for life or to less punishment” (National Defence Act, #76).

But there are other non-war-related offenses also punishable by death. These include spying for the enemy (#78), mutiny accompanied by violence (National Defence Act, #79), and behaving in a variety of ways that intentionally jeopardizes the Forces’ security such as the disclosure of certain types of information to the enemy, leaving a sentry post prematurely, impeding a sentinel’s performance of duty, falling asleep or being drunk on sentry duty (#75).

The National Defence Act’s concentration on elaborating potential offenses and punishments of Canadian Forces personnel rather than, for example, its mandate—the rules for waging war, for defending Canada, or the identification of Canada’s enemies—and the severity of the (death) penalty together gauge the seriousness with which the above offenses are viewed by the authorities, and the degree of their unwillingness to brook disobedience. It also exposes the Act as an operational narrative intended to address and resolve the government’s preoccupations and anticipated difficulties of inducing soldiers to fight and exhibit courage and constancy; to fight rather than flee the enemy; and to retain an adversarial posture towards the designated enemy regardless of circumstance.

The purpose for invoking these offenses and extreme punishments are immanent in their invocation: coercing the intrinsically uninterested into participating in acts which could result in their maiming or death (Van Doorn 1975). That is, although the ultimate justification for many of the Forces’ employment and other policies is operational effectiveness, and even the "increased
risk of death, capture or injury...to the members of the CF" (Department of National Defence 1986:10) should it be compromised, the explanation offered in the "Charter Task Force: Final Report" citing Chief Justice Warren of the U.S. Supreme Court, suggests that, again, the more fundamental issue is military discipline:

(It) is indisputable that the tradition of our country, from the time of the Revolution until now, has supported the military establishment's broad power to deal with its own personnel. The most obvious reason is that courts are ill equipped to determine the impact upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon military authority may have. Many of the problems of the military society are, in a sense, alien to the problems with which the judiciary is trained to deal" (emphases added; Department of National Defence 1986:11).

The Act’s emphasis on internal coercion suggests another possible reason for anticipating these difficulties. Just as there is no discussion of warfare, neither is there a description of the foreign enemy, in contrast to Canada’s potential internal enemies who are described twice: once in the clauses on Aid of the Civil Power, and again in the clauses on definitions. Under the latter, enemies are "armed mutineers, armed rebels, armed rioters and pirates"; and "emergencies" are defined as "war, invasion, riot or insurrection, real or apprehended" (2). It is the latter definition that was used in proclaiming the War Measures Act which brought 10,000 troops to Québec during the October Crisis in 1970 (see Chapter Three). Situations which could bring out the armed forces by invoking the clauses on Aid of the Civil Power include situations of actual or "likely" riot or disturbance "beyond the powers of the civil authorities to suppress or to prevent or to deal with". Any officer or non-commissioned member of the reserves is expressly exempted from serving under this part of the act "without his consent" (107), possibly because when serving in Aid of the Civil Power, military members take on "all of the powers and duties of constables". Since reservists have one foot each in civilian and military camps, there is a greater possibility of divided loyalties. In sum, the potential for maiming or death, as well as the primary purpose of having to set the Canadian Forces against fellow citizens, may explain why the National Defence Act is largely silent on the subject of war, yet so detailed on the subject of discipline.

The government’s goals, preoccupations and priorities are equally evident in the relative

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severity of penalties for the next order of offenses, punishable by life imprisonment. These include disobeying "a lawful command of a superior officer" (#83), "striking or offering violence to a superior officer" (#84), successful or attempted desertion (#88), and even malingering:

Every person who
(a) malingers or feigns or produces disease or infirmity,
(b) aggravates, or delays the cure of, disease or infirmity by misconduct or wilful disobedience of orders, or
(c) wilfully maims or injures himself or any other person who is a member of any of Her Majesty's Forces or of any forces cooperating therewith....with intent thereby to render himself or that other person unfit for service, or causes himself to be maimed or injured by any person with intent thereby to render himself unfit for service, is guilty of an offence and...liable to imprisonment for life...(National Defence Act, #98).

Thus, challenging the rank structure--through disobedience--or in any way resisting institutional control is cause for the most extreme punishment next to the death penalty: life imprisonment.

Deemed less serious than the above, but grave nevertheless, are the use of "traitorous or disloyal words regarding Her Majesty" (punishable by seven years imprisonment; #94) and behaving "in a cruel or disgraceful manner" (five years imprisonment; #93). But both of these are considered far more serious than either physically striking or ill-treating "any person who by reason of rank or appointment is subordinate to him" (#95) or making false accusations or statements or suppressing facts (#96)--both only punishable by imprisonment for less than two years. That is, disloyalty, even if only verbal, is deemed far more serious than dishonest or abusive acts. And striking, or even disobeying, a superior officer is deemed infinitely more serious (life imprisonment) than offering the same violence to a subordinate (only two years).

The very articulation of these offenses and their ranking by punishment are a prism on the values and behavioral priorities of the Canadian government for its soldiers: bellicosity, or the incitement thereof, absolute, uncritical obedience, submissiveness, self-sacrifice and loyalty to the ruler--the latter even discursively. The National Defence Act reveals itself as a discourse of internal power: it contains the legal, structural and discursive means of internal control and disempowerment, suspending subordinates' critical autonomy in their daily tasks, their rights over
their bodies, as well as the right to resist. The interests of the ruling elite—represented by the Queen—legally override the personal safety of members of the Canadian Forces, and even their very lives.

The Act also reflects the anticipated difficulties of achieving the strict compliance required of military personnel, and the perceived risks to the entire enterprise if individuals should fail to conform. This would explain the severity of punishments: death penalty for cowardice, and life imprisonment for disobedience. Behaviour which in civilian life might lead to disciplinary action, demotion or even dismissal—such as feigning illness, disobeying a superior, or failing to encourage subordinates to do their job—can, in the military, lead to life imprisonment or even execution.

And the severity of the consequences for slandering the Queen, as well as the differential punishments for striking a superior officer versus a subordinate, suggest that more is at stake than the immediate act of insubordination. The legal requisite of automatic obedience to the demands of the ruler is reminiscent of the “unqualified power of command” (Mumford 1966:177) characteristic of the earliest Near Eastern civilizations (discussed in Chapter Two)—and survives today both in the law and in informal discourse as a respondent’s comments demonstrate:

It’s just part of the business. We get paid an awful lot of money to sit back and enjoy a peaceful life for the time that the Queen will stand up and say “Go off and get killed.”

And soldiers who take the “Queen’s money”, he added, and then refuse to go into combat are “morally bankrupt”. The invoking of morality in the same breath as the Queen, together with the insistence on extreme loyalty and readiness to sacrifice the self further suggests an abject subordination which another respondent links to the notion of a cause greater than the self:

Well, military officers and NCO’s [non-commissioned officers] and men have a different ethical approach to life. They are committed to risking their lives and going into some rather difficult environments for quite abstract goals (italicized emphasis added).

This mandatory readiness to sacrifice the self for the ruler towards a greater cause provides the first narrative evidence of the military’s early association with human sacrifice, and the power of sovereigns throughout history to impose such sacrifice on a collective scale. Taken together,
the contents of the Act, and particularly the offenses and extreme punishments reveal its true purpose: the coercion and discipline of military personnel within a rigidly delineated hierarchy in order to control and direct the lethal violence engendered in its subjects, and ultimately ensure their willingness to sacrifice their lives. This much is candidly admitted by Gen. Sir John Hackett:

The military makes demands which few if any other callings do. And of course emotionally disturbed people talk about being trained to kill...The whole essence of being a soldier is not to slay but be slain. You offer yourself up to be slain, rather than setting yourself up as a slayer. Now one can get into very deep water here, but there's food for thought in it (in Dyer 1990:419).

Whatever the military's primary mandate--which seems to be "to insure the security and perpetuation of the state" (Parker 1995:56)--its primary preoccupation is not the external enemy, but the regulation of a potential enemy lurking inside the Canadian Forces itself: anything or anyone who might interfere with operational effectiveness, or might question the premises underlying the military enterprise and the fate of its main actors, namely its very own members. This would explain why so little of the Act is devoted to delineating the Forces' mandate, and so much to controlling those responsible for executing it.

The contents of the Act also represents, in part, an inversion of some commonly held values in Canadian society such as those of self-preservation, the right to privacy, or rights of association. In these and other inversions, the Canadian Forces sits at the crossroads of some fundamental contradictions: the defence of democracy by an institution organized around fundamentally undemocratic, authoritarian principles; and the championing of "the right to life, liberty and the security of the person" (Canadian Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms) by those to whom these are in multiple ways denied.

But these contradictions are partially clarified when the laws governing the Forces' and the soldier's legal status are viewed from the perspective of the army's archaic roots in an era of absolute obedience and suppression of individual autonomy and initiative (Mumford 1966). Juxtaposed against the defining conditions of an archaic and extreme form of human subjugation--slavery (see Chapter Four)--some of the conditions of soldiering become more intelligible.
principally, the forfeiting of the soldier’s life from the outset in the military occupation of ‘unlimited liability’, and the subjection to the death penalty for what otherwise would be considered minor infractions; the maintenance (though not creation) of the soldier’s condition through direct and indirect violence; and the compulsory channelling of human agency through the Forces technologically rationalized structure, as we will soon see.

In addition to stipulating the submissive conditions of service, the legal offenses, relative punishments and jurisdictions stipulated in the National Defence Act articulate the rank structure which embodies the principal disciplinary mechanisms of the Canadian Forces. Non-commissioned officers are charged with engendering bellicosity in the ‘men’ or junior ranks: commissioned and non-commissioned officers are expected to manage and deliver up this violence in non-commissioned members; and the latter are expected to master and obediently execute the techniques of violence. And in their risk-taking, all are expected to disregard their personal safety, placing the interests of the ruling elite—represented by the Queen who is invoked in both official and unofficial discourses—unquestioningly above their own lives. It is to these structures of coercion, articulated in the organization of the Canadian Forces, that we turn next.

Structure

The legal articulation of the Canadian Forces’ dually coercive mandate is repeated in its tightly woven organizational structure. The Forces’s legally enshrined mandate reverberates in all facets of its technologically rationalized organization and practice: its rank structure, its disciplinary and training system, and other measures used to formally and informally monitor and regulate military members.

As a technology, the Canadian military is composed of materiel and human components. And, as in any technologically rationalized organization, tasks are fragmented, simplified and specialized. Within this institutional framework, compliance takes preference over initiative, predictability over creativity, and uniformity and interchangeability over uniqueness and individuality. Technological rationality in a mass organization also means the coordination
of interdependent interactions and the precise execution of orders, from the top down, by large numbers of people as efficiently and effectively as possible. Decision-making power is dispersed hierarchically so that

It's like the pyramid that reacts very fast. When the top guy says 'I want this done', the military can be so effective...In real units all over Canada, when people say 'We have an emergency', the top guy, the guy that says 'Pfft! I want this to happen', the entire organization just moves. So it's beautiful to see in action...Works beautifully, just like a good machine.

It is this very same hierarchal, bureaucratic mechanism which enabled the chief of the defence staff, General Jean Boyle, to order all but essential military operations to cease for twenty-four hours in order that servicemembers search for missing documents related to the Canadian peacekeeping mission in Somalia, which was under government investigation (Gazette, April 9, 1996).

Despite the paradigmatic similarity of the military and other mass civilian organizations patterned after it, what distinguishes them, in part, is the tightness of the Forces's organizational integration, the degree of its rationalization evident in the above example. Not only do servicemembers relate to each other through the hierarchal disciplinary medium of order and obedience, they also interact in terms of their bureaucratic or operational positions, rather than as individuals. They even speak to each other through this institutional medium. A primary example is the extensive system of acronyms--enough to fill several manuals--through which servicemembers routinely communicate as in "CO to RV at the LZ with the OC, 2ic and DCO for an OGrp" (Parker 1995:75). Acronyms rationalize the conduct of military affairs by simplifying and routinizing tasks, and, in the process, regimenting behaviour. Human interactions are channelled along preconfigured paths, obviating initiative and minimizing error18.

The degree of rationalization derives from the military's mandate. Although the Canadian Forces has been operating as a peacetime army since the Korean War--deployed for United Nations peacekeeping, search and rescue, and aid to the civil power--it remains primarily designated and designed as a giant "machine for killing"19 (Willett 1987:13). Driving it still are 'operational effectiveness', 'combat readiness', and the "endstate"--all codewords for war. This
distinct mandate allows it a correspondingly distinct right to carry technological rationalization
to an extreme inadmissible in the civilian world. And much of this right hinges on the structural
mainstay of the organization, one which operates systematically though sometimes invisibly,
 multifariously, and both formally and informally to control, regulate and discipline military
members. This structural feature is the military ranking system.

**Rank: Leaders and Followers**

The Canadian Forces fractures along a principal fault line which divides members into
‘officers’ and ‘other ranks’ or non-commissioned members\(^3\). The former are again divided into
junior and senior officers, and the latter into ‘non-commissioned officers’ and junior ranks.
Within these subgroupings, all servicemembers are positioned along a clearly delineated hierarchy
which fans out as an internal network for dispersing power.

The salience of rank to the Canadian Forces is evident in its permeation of all manner
of structures, discourses and practices. Rank\(^3\) is encoded in visibly sported insignia, fastened
onto both clothing and headgear which symbolically publicize complex information about an
individual’s relative position in the hierarchy. It is this information and mutual expectation of
deferential acquiescence that are formally acknowledged and signalled in the prescribed gesture
of the salute. Based on explicit rules and regulations delineating rights and responsibilities, rank
serves to delimit and regularize the scope of both formal and informal interactions, leaving little
room for individual manoeuvring. Servicemembers can, at a glance, determine what to expect
from the other, and what is expected from them within the parameters of the system. Rank
supersedes other civilian criteria of signification or deferential discrimination such as social class,
race or age, as illustrated in the following example:

When I graduated from military college, I was twenty-two. And half of the men I
was commanding at that time were older than me. My second in command, my 2IC, my
executive officer was forty-two at the time.

The distinction between officers and non-commissioned members is likened to that
between management and workers, "leaders" and "followers" (Department of National Defence
1990:7). The successful implementation of the military’s mandate and the enforcement of its goals
and structure are considered to hinge on effective leadership\textsuperscript{22}; failure, on the other hand, is said to result from poor or weak leadership. So, for example, successful implementation of gender integration is said to depend on good leadership—assumed to be male—and failure on the reverse:

The good leader who possesses both competence and sensitivity will still produce the winning team. Poor leadership, on the other hand, can be expected to have a greater negative impact within the mixed gender situation (Department of National Defence 1990:2).

And again,

The greatest threat to combat effectiveness, cohesion and morale in mixed gender units is the mind set of the leader and his subsequent overt and covert behaviour toward women in military units (emphasis in original; Department of National Defence 1990:3).

Commanding officers are charged with setting the disciplinary climate and style of leadership for subunit leaders to follow:

Once the CO [commanding officer] has set a clear vision of the disciplinary climate and style of leadership expected, the subunit leaders should be capable of dealing with any of the problems which could arise following integration (Department of National Defence 1990:2).

And, in addition to being cognizant of their own attitudes and prejudices, leaders must know those of their subordinates, and keep abreast of the interpersonal interactions between them—particularly those which interfere with operational effectiveness—and maintain their trust and respect. The leader’s goal is to sustain morale and ensure performance of followers so that their true abilities are not lost to their unit. And although formal and informal mechanisms of exercising power are distinguishable analytically, they interact in practice, so that survival by subordinates would seem to require well-honed tactical skills in running the gauntlet between the two mechanisms of institutional constraint.

The structure of the Canadian Forces is such that, theoretically, everyone has the potential of eventually assuming a leadership role and incrementally increasing their power over others. It is a "front loaded" system: even during periods of downsizing there is a steady influx of new recruits who enter at the bottom, move up through the system and out upon release\textsuperscript{23}. Training systems are tailored for recruits in each of the military occupational specialties, for officers and
an array of professionals, and training is elaborate and ongoing throughout a soldier's career. There is a regular turnover of personnel as people are shifted by career managers from one post to another, from one part of the country to another based on organizational requirements. Promotion is determined by merit boards which meet annually to examine the 'PERs' (Personnel Evaluation Reports) submitted by supervisors. Attrition is a constant concern, and reasons for leaving, as well as means for improving retention rates, are studied assiduously.

The Canadian Forces is equally concerned about being an "employer of last resort" (Personnel Concept 1992:5), but for many, particularly non-commissioned members, it is. For officers it can be a means to finance a university education. In 1991, 24% of regular Forces personnel were from the economically depressed Maritime provinces and Newfoundland even though their combined populations only comprised about 10% of the Canadian total. Furthermore, the education profile of non-commissioned members compares poorly with that for officers: 26% of non-commissioned members have secondary 9-11 education compared to less than 4% of officers, and less than half of one percent (.37%) of non-commissioned members have a university degree compared to almost 47% of officers (Department of National Defence 1991).

Corresponding to this difference in educational status are the respective roles that officers and enlisted soldiers are expected to fulfil. Huntington distinguishes the "officers corps" who are professionals, from enlisted men subordinate to the officer corps [who] are part of the organizational bureaucracy but not of the professional bureaucracy. The enlisted personnel have neither the intellectual skills nor the professional responsibility of the officer. They are specialists in the application of violence not the management of violence. Their vocation is a trade not a profession. This fundamental difference between the officer corps and the enlisted corps is reflected in the sharp line which is universally drawn between the two in all the military forces of the world (1964:17-18).

Whereas officers are expected to interpret and give orders, the enlisted are to carry them out. Also intrinsic to the logic of the ranking system, greater value is placed on officers over non-commissioned members24. Officers have greater privileges and are accorded greater deference as indicated by the considerable difference in penalties for striking a superior officer versus a
subordinate, which we saw earlier.

The higher valuation of officers over 'men' surfaces again in the preferential treatment given officers in the Force's dual career promotion policies. Movement up the hierarchy in the military embodies another facet of the organization's coerciveness. The monitored upward progression of employees through regular training and promotion is intrinsic to the system's operation, and is, in the final analysis, quasi-compulsory. Whereas in civilian career structures, upward mobility is competitive but voluntary, and people can remain for decades as stagnating functionaries in a bureaucracy, in the military, generally, it is up or out:

Some jobs require more training than others. For example, if you enter my trade . . . we have a lot of qualifications required to carry on as an officer in our classification. So you are more prone . . . to attend courses throughout your career on a regular basis. And I'm talking courses two to three months at a time. So that pressure is there. It's either, you go, take your training, or get out!

But the formal pressures to submit to continuous training falls unevenly on non-commissioned members and officers, providing another indication of the fault line distinguishing them: the lower ranks are officially more constrained in their options than officers. Non-commissioned members, who comprise the majority, are heavily penalized for declining the opportunity for training and promotion. Written regulations administratively group non-commissioned members who decline promotion, as well as those who decline training for personal or medical reasons, together with those who fail a training course or examination. All are equally subject to the disciplinary scrutiny of the Career Review Board which determines whether such members can remain in their current military occupation—with or without career restrictions in rank and terms of service—or whether they will be subject to compulsory transfer, or simply released (CFAO 49-4, Career Policy, Non-Commissioned Members, Regular Force, 11).

Officers, the elite leadership strata of the Canadian Forces, are accorded quite different treatment:

Officers selected for promotion may decline to be promoted and continue to serve in the officer's current rank. If the promotion is declined, no further offer of promotion will normally be made in that calendar year, but the officer shall be
considered by subsequent merit boards provided the officer remains eligible. (CFAO 11-6, "Commissioning and Promotion Policy-Officers - Regular Force", 7).

Officers can even request permission to relinquish their rank without the negative consequences applicable to non-commissioned members; and, as with officers who have declined promotion, they can continue to be considered for promotion annually with the continued right of refusal.

Confirming the internal logic of the rank structure as a meritocracy, being in a higher rank can be taken as evidence for being 'good', or better than those in a lower rank:

The leadership that I've worked with have always been good people. I've never worked with a truly "mauvaise personne", a bad person yet... You're talking hand picked majors to go to the staff college so they're not bad. They're good performers, people that the Canadian government, the Department of National Defence want to have as their future staff, senior staff officers and commanders ... I think everybody's view at that point is generally the same.

Since the entire military enterprise is predicated on successful discipline to inculcate and extract obedience, and the disciplinary system hinges on the rank system, the rank structure is sacrosanct, as is its enforcement. A primary mechanism for sustaining the rank structure is segregation: the prevention of inter-rank socializing. Fraternization between ranks is not merely frowned upon or discouraged, but systemically obviated in order to bolster the boundaries. This is because

if there's too much fraternization between the ranks, socially, then part of our military structure, social structure then starts to break down.

And as hinted at earlier in the caution to leaders about their treatment of women in military units, sexual attraction is particularly threatening:

I guess there's always a sort of a sexual overtone to the relationship, if you will? It's not there when you're at work, and doesn't intrude on the rank structure.

Various mechanisms thus segregate and control the interactions between members of different ranks and ultimately serve to regulate intra-rank relations as well. A principal site of formal regulation of informality is the recreational social space of the mess. Depending on the size of the military installation, members eat and socialize in their own mess by rank. Even the smallest military stations have at least three: one each for junior ranks, senior ranks and non-
commissioned officers, and officers (Harrison and Laliberté 1994). Messes are effectively "closed social clubs. And people of different ranks don’t go to the other person’s social club" even if they are married, or rather especially if they are married:

A corporal can’t come to my mess. It’s an officer’s mess, and a corporal can’t come to mine and I can’t go to his, except on a special occasion. Now if I’m married to a corporal, that causes problems because every time there’s a function at the mess, well she would not be welcome. By the same token, I wouldn’t be welcome at theirs. That’s because we’re a hierarchical society.

However, wives who are not in the military are not subject to this exclusionary rule. On the contrary, they are quite welcome, as the same respondent points out:

Oh yeah, she’s welcome. In fact she’s encouraged to come. Traditionally she would play a role as my wife.

The role of the family, and wives, in the Forces, and the risks to the rank structure should sexual attraction intrude on it, is a particular issue which will be explored further in the discussion of gender and the integration of women.

**Bonding: ‘Esprit de Corps’**

Equal to the importance of regulating relations between ranks is the regulation of relations within them. Socializing amongst members of the same rank within a unit is thought to build up unit cohesion, or ‘esprit de corps’, described as a military cornerstone which cannot be overstated, according to the authors of the "Charter Task Force: Final Report":

It would be difficult to over-state the importance of esprit de corps in military operations...While most of the other factors that determine fighting effectiveness can be defined and measured scientifically, esprit de corps cannot. It is a state of mind that is achieved by a complex combination of measures and circumstances that are not scientifically quantifiable...the case for cohesion and morale in the CF has recently been denigrated publicly as ‘male macho’. Whatever name it is given, the irresistible lessons of history prove that if fighting forces have esprit de corps, their chances of success are much greater and the risk of casualties is decreased; without it, even superiority in numbers and equipment may not prevent defeat, and casualties will assuredly be higher (1986:7).

The practical means of committing soldiers to risk their lives in battle is to bond them to other members of their immediate unit. This regulatory emphasis on unit cohesion is the practical partner of the military ethos which envisions members’ devotional self-sacrifice in service of the
sovereign, as we will see in the next chapter. As one respondent stated, the

Military ethos is a short term for a very large number of moral values that are
genendered in the resocialization process. In essence, the resocialization
process sets a number of values which equates loyalty and performance within the
unit above personal worth (emphasis added).

‘Unit cohesion’ and esprit de corps are goals of military training, and more so on isolated
field exercises. The mess system is another site where this solidarity is fostered, particularly in
the past on bases where members would gather on Friday nights to drink and celebrate the week.
Up until about ten years ago, “TGIF” as it is referred to, was compulsory. Thus, for example,
in discussing male-bonding, one respondent volunteered:

We’re still a very traditional--combat arms particularly--are still a very
traditional male-bonded society. We do a lot of silly things...Well, the male
social life in the military has changed an awful lot from when I was a young
officer. [Then,] everybody went to the mess on Friday night, and everybody got
drunk and did silly things, played silly bar games...drinking games. See how much
you can drink...hang yourself upside down from the ceiling and drink.

Another respondent noted:

Before, the guys would work, and Friday nights people would go to TGIF. When I
say a world of men made by men and all that, your commanding officer told you
‘We want to see you on Fridays at five o’clock, from four to six or more, have
a drink with the boys.’ This was almost like a parade, like an obligation. This
only disappeared in the mid-80’s. Before...people had to go. Not in Ottawa, but
on bases. Fridays you went to TGIF and had a drink or two, and socialized, and
showed that you’re part of the group...You were told ‘you’d better be at the
mess.’ You were expected to show up. So when I say ‘world of men by men, meaning
that, there’s men in it, you’re expected to be there, you went and had a good
time, and you had a few drinks. And your wife stayed home with the kids.

Although respondents said that TGIF was no longer obligatory, Harrison and Laliberté suggest
that Friday nights at the mess, a ritual from which wives are strictly excluded, remains an
important mechanism of military bonding. And these vivid descriptions suggest that TGIF still
has a hold on members’ popular imagination, and figures in the military’s disciplinary system.

**Discipline and Obedience: Engendering and Managing Violence**

Rank is the premier mechanism for formally and informally disciplining, monitoring and
evaluating the bodies, minds and emotions of military personnel, regulating their relations both
vertically and horizontally, and constituting them as subjects according to the hierarchal bureaucratized needs of the organization. It is through the rank structure that individual civilian identities are supplanted with uniform military ones, personal identity is submerged in the chain of command, and critical autonomy replaced by obedience to the leader's authority. It is through the rank structure that some are charged with monitoring and regulating subordinates' work and non-work activities. And it is through the rank structure that some are constituted as disciplinarians to inculcate and manage the engendered bellicosity in soldiers.

Sergeants, for example, are responsible for generating this very complicated combat ethos aimed at getting recruits to risk their lives and go into some rather difficult environments for quite abstract goals; to overcome their natural fear...and perform functions in a very difficult environment which may in fact lead to their death or wounding or maiming.

Under the circumstances, it is understandable that soldiers might be less than enthusiastic. And this reticence—which this respondent initially linked to a lack of intelligence on the part of recruits, and then quickly recanted—is what the sergeant aims to overcome:

The sergeant in the army knows how to motivate people, and he uses all kinds of little tricks that you would find, well, probably ethically unnecessary or inappropriate. They in fact are used to teaching people who are not terribly well motivated.  

Coercion is recast in the language of motivation. although the coercive aspect of training is certainly discursively acknowledged in examples of group pressure and humiliation. often with sexual overtones:

By creating a vulgar analogy, [you] actually get all the other people laughing at this individual to correct him...People are being uncooperative: you use group pressure to bring them into line. And these kinds of analogies, which are often sexual, often just straight vulgar and brutal, are used and they work pretty well...The best teachers that I've had are sergeants in the army.

But sergeants do not act alone. They operate in concert with commissioned officers from whom they draw their authority:

We have all these disciplinary systems, and sergeants and sergeant majors and junior officers. with the support of people like myself, basically run this system because that's how we maintain discipline.

A Major may notice something amiss regarding a recruit, but it is the non-commissioned officer.
operating in a manner akin to a mercenary subcontractor—its historical precursor—who metes out punishment. Senior officers can afford to be "more relaxed, more free-rein":

We all know that the company commander can say something to this young soldier. Next thing you know, the company's sergeant major rips the soldier apart because the company commander noticed something in the soldier's uniform. He doesn't have to be hard about it; it's the sergeant major's job to be hard about it.

And such verbal chastisement is legally enforced:

We have in the military a judicial system that says that certain people can put other people in jail for not shining their shoes or not cleaning their weapon. We have, traditionally, field punishments and minor jail terms, and so on for things that in civil life are considered to be very trivial. In the military, if you don't shine you shoes and the sergeant major says you're not keeping up a good step, he'll come to someone like myself (a senior officer) and I'll say "Seven days detention". Now, in principle, its not because he didn't shine his shoes. Its because he did not understand the values and mores of the system that meant that he should shine his shoes.

Here is the real goal in training and discipline: the inculcation of unquestioning obedience in response to the superior's orders even to the point of jeopardizing one's life, and at times without the means of defence:

Where else could you find an organization that could give an order to the guy down there, saying, 'Okay, nobody is gonna open fire or defend himself using his firearm unless and until you have sustained a firm and a confirmed casualty'? Which other organization would accept that type of order...? There's no place else. There's no other organization,...[no] police department across the country or across the world will accept that type of order...But that's [what] was requested of the army during the Oka crisis...In receiving this from my superior, I'll turn around to my soldiers saying, 'you know something? Nobody's gonna fire till you'll see your buddy get killed or get hurt'. And the guy, [will] willingly say 'Yes, sir!' and go on doing the job.

The rationale for such blind obedience is the combat scenario where the commanding officer is legally allowed to give orders that will result in the death of some of your men if that is required to achieve your mission. And for the guy down there, the soldier, who is also bound to obey orders, he's not a fool. He knows that his work is risky. And you need to gain his confidence, his respect that you're an able officer, a good leader, able to direct him correctly.

Hence, one reason why subordinates put faith in their superiors may be appropriately grounded in self-interest, having already subordinated themselves to the Forces' coercive mandate and structure, and especially to its sacrificial liability. In addition to this dependence on their

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commanders to safeguard their lives, superiors write personnel reports which form the basis for promotion and career progression, both vital for remaining in the Forces. Superiors can also unilaterally order subordinates on assignments which, given their enormous discretionary power, can be used as a disciplinary tool and cause subordinates considerable personal hardship. Consequently, resistance to the chain of command is difficult from within the organization, more so since members have no rights of professional association or unionization "to represent them in matters concerning compensation, conditions of service": nor can they engage in political activity (Personnel Concept, 1992). For grievances, they must rely on the very same chain of command, or request voluntary release.

The disciplinary ideal, then, is to erode critical autonomy and erase personal identity, replacing both with an obedient military identity and practice integrated into the rank structure. The reputation of basic training—when recruits first enter the system—and discipline is most severe—is legion for achieving these very goals. Non-commissioned members, in particular, are trained to not think for themselves:

Men join as recruits. They lock you up for twelve months (sic) where they basically demolish your character and they bring you down to nothing. And then they build you back up. It's the standard... in recruit camp... if you've ever seen the... documentaries shown on CBC about St. Jean, the recruit school for technicians, for the men, the lower ranks... For twelve weeks they're really rough on people. They disorient you, things are really rough in recruit camp.

The emergent military subject is required to channel all behaviour through the superior's approving filter; failure to do so has negative repercussions. For example, a corporal who spoke out publicly about alleged abuses by Canadian peacekeepers in Bosnia was suspended from duty even though Canada's chief army commander announced that the army had clear evidence of such wrongdoing on the part of 34 soldiers. This corporal's error was speaking without the permission of his military superiors (Gazette July 20, 1996). Another corporal was court-martialled on seven charges related to going absent without leave while delivering photos and information to the Somalia Inquiry about Canadian troops abusing Somalis, and about substantial criticisms of officers on that mission. Again, he acted without permission from appropriate superiors and in violation of the military's imposed limits on his freedom of expression26 (Gazette, September

The erasure of personal identity through the routinization of tasks, and the uniformity and interchangeability of personnel, is also manifested in an institutional facelessness: official documents sometimes are individually unattributed and unsigned, and thus, for all intents and purposes, anonymous (e.g. "NDHQ²⁷ Action Directive D18/90"). Or sometimes a document is signed by the person who commissioned it rather than the actual author:

It’s somewhat déclassé to put a personal name on a paper which is a bureaucratic paper. It carries the name, the imprimatur of whoever signed it.

Subordinates are addressed by their rank rather than their name. One respondent, speaking about his self-described naïveté at perceiving what people are like, added:

Not in an infantry battalion. I’ll say, ‘soldier do this; soldier do that. You know, ’Captain do this, Lieutenant do this’. And they’ll get it done.

And servicemembers are assigned a number which is incorporated into official correspondence. In documents informing servicemembers of their next posting they are addressed by their number, rank and family name:

There’s a message, a document that comes in that says exactly: “P196273942 Private Smert is posted to this position”.

The extraction of obedience may begin with the recruit’s treatment in basic training, but it does not end there. It extends into the ‘paternalistic’ (Parker 1994; see below) relationship constructed between ‘leaders’ and their subordinates as an aspect of the rank structure’s regulatory functions. Subordinates’ lives are under constant and close scrutiny by their superiors, especially when working in close quarters on a military base or in the field. Some of the leader’s right to know intimate details concerning subordinates is based on the practicalities of military work, such as the need to provision "spare parts" for field exercise:

…spare parts for vehicles, spare parts for weapons, ammunition. And also spare clothing…24 different sizes of boots, bras…underwear for female and male…

In the field you are dressed from top to bottom, from your sewing kit up to your steel helmet, what you’re going to eat, what you’re going to polish your boots with.

And this supervision extends to regulating intensely private matters such as bodily elimination:

They took four or six women…out on exercise…as part of the medical support
unit. And these women had their own tent. And you had, let’s say, 20,000 men spread all over the place, urinating god knows where, o.k.? And these six women were having difficulty finding places to urinate because, after all, there were 20,000 men all over the place. So they had decided that they would urinate in the corner of the tent, and provided they moved every day it was no problem. Well, inevitably this became apparent because they didn’t move a couple of days. And, of course, this was a private female environment so it wasn’t a problem. And we had a bright, young, up-and-coming sergeant-major who got a grip on this and said ‘they’re a bunch of pigs,...and what the hell did they think they were doing, and get their ass out of there’.

Beyond on-the-job “discipline, the dress drill, deportment, that sort of thing”, the power vested in the rank structure also brings servicemembers’ personal lives under legitimate scrutiny. The kinds of issues that superiors are expected to deal with can include “soldiers getting drunk, or borrowing too much money and not paying it back from banks”, marital or sexual problems, and after-hours violence. It includes regulating interactions between peers—ranging from petty squabbles about who started a rumour about another soldier, to discovering who torched the inside of someone’s car in a love affair gone wrong. Supervision includes spheres of behaviour which in civilian society would never come to a supervisor’s attention, and if it should, inquiries would be considered an invasion of privacy. It is sometimes the circumstances of a soldier’s after-hours troublemaking which places it within the jurisdiction of the superior, as the following example illustrates: a respondent for this study was the commanding officer of a military base during an incident in which one of his corporals picked up his inebriated wife as she was standing at the gate of the base, intending to carry her back inside the junior ranks club. When she protested, a military policeman intervened. The corporal struck him, feeling that he was within his rights because the woman was his wife. The corporal was then charged and brought before the respondent, who fined him $100.

Intrinsic to this supervision is that subordinates are expected to keep their superiors abreast of developments in their personal lives. One respondent recounted an exchange with his commanding officer while away on exercise for two and one-half months shortly after his wife had given birth. Alone with a new baby, she was suffering from depression. He felt obliged to inform his commanding officer that his wife was
having some problems, just to let him know, that if you see me daydreaming something like that, this is why. And he said, "Get a grip on your wife." And I told the deputy commanding officer, who I admire tremendously. [His response was] "If you got any problems, call her. Call her every day if you can".

In another example, a warrant officer who had been convicted and had served a ninety-day jail term for sexually abusing his young daughter approached the respondent to inform him that he would probably be discharged from the Forces as a consequence. The respondent was adamantly opposed to the discharge since it would represent a loss to the organization of a good performer:

Here's a guy who had served, at that point, probably twenty-three, twenty-four years. Was a warrant officer. He'd worked hard, was very good. Leadership ability, the whole bit. Yes, it was a bad thing. No doubt about that. But do you release a guy who performed so well for us because of it, without really looking at what the guy could do? His military career was outstanding.

What these examples illustrate is that the public/private boundaries of the civilian world are discursively and practically erased in the military, and that, along with the work identities of servicemembers, their private lives, inner worlds and personal identities are merged into their military performance. What, if anything, remains private is difficult to gauge, and could well use further study. Indications are that it is very little. In discussing the imperative that members reveal secrets about their peers in response to supervisors' inquiries, Harrison and Laliberté recount how one member attempted suicide after her roommate confided that she was a lesbian (1994).

What these examples also illustrate is that being a 'good person' means being good at job performance, itself evaluated in terms of operational effectiveness. And this conflation carries over into performance evaluation. According to one respondent, good people are good performers, otherwise the military "can't accept them". Conversely, being a good performer involves more than merely doing one's job:

Because if they're bad, emotionally, socially, then they're not good performers either... They'll get in trouble one way or the other, whether it's a financial difficulty or they'll go on report for shortcomings.

Like privacy, what constitutes shortcomings is also unclear, though it may include the expression of individuality, in contravention of the military's dictum of uniformity. In discussing the annual
performance report, this respondent said:

You get your annual report. And if you're always talking back to your commanding officer, and although you performed well, there are some personal characteristics (emphasis added).

And in that case, "they're gone." For this respondent, a supervisor's role is to reshape the person, to "start to develop them, make them a better person".

In sum, supervision in the military extends beyond the boundaries of the subordinate's work performance. Because of the perceived necessity of monitoring bodies and minds for operational fitness, these boundaries are breached, obligating subordinates to reveal private affairs to the superior's quasi-public scrutiny along the chain of command. Subordinates are answerable to their superiors, and must keep them apprised of matters which in civilian society are considered private and which competent adults organize for themselves: socializing practices, intimate relationships, interactions with peers, personal hygiene and health—even the size of undergarments—and more. Integral to this process is a fostered dependency which begins in basic training and continues until release. All told, the supervisory relationship in the military seems in some ways less reminiscent of that between employer and employee, and more like that between parent and child—though not in the family of the late twentieth century.

Military as Family

There are several indicators that the military has certain trappings of 'family'. As we have seen, the 'rebirthing' and bonding scenarios of boot camp initiation aim to resocialize recruits and provide them with new identities, values, behaviours and relationships; some supervisory behaviour is in loco parentis; and supplementary to the obedience imperative and the 'need to know', officers are expected to attend to the needs of their troops before their own. Parker refers to this as the "subordinate-care myth":

leaders should care for the material and emotional needs of their subordinates. Officers and senior-non commissioned officers are expected to know their soldiers and devote a major portion of their time to their soldier's well-being (1995:80).

Although this approach has been promoted since the First World War as an ideal of
"proper...social...and ethical behaviours" (Parker 1995:80) of officers towards their subordinates, their actual practice confirms the fictitious nature of the myth since, subordinates are frequently viewed as the raw material necessary for advancement, or accomplishing other personal career goals by their superiors. This, and increased bureaucracy and specialization, recurring personnel disruptions due to training, courses and postings, and the increased careerism brought about by the imposition of business practices have contributed to the undermining of the "subordinate-care myth" (Parker 1995:80).

Moreover, what Parker is referring to as 'subordinate care' might also reflect the state of disciplinary dependency and disempowerment.

The military community has long been recognized as "a very intense and evocative form of community" (Nisbet 1973:14), and part of this intensity is reflected in the emphasis on peer bonding. Regiments and their sub-units, battalions, are considered family-like in that members are expected to look out for each other's welfare, and for the families of absent members (Harrison and Laliberté 1994). And expressions of almost tender, parental concern, surfaced in the interviews for this study, albeit only twice: once in a deeply cynical and pessimistic reference to the death of young soldiers in battle as "burning up your country's treasury"; and again in an officer's concern for his subordinates while speaking of the implied failure of government to reciprocate its armed forces' great loyalty by using "soldiers and armed forces personnel" for other than the legitimate military need of protecting Canada from direct military threat.

Finally, Canadian Forces personnel are referred to as 'members', a term of affiliation typically applied to family.

But if certain aspects of the supervisory relationship between officers and subordinates are suggestive of familial feeling and structure, the type of family invoked is not the modern nuclear variety but a biblical patriarchy. And it is to the "benevolent military patriarchy" (1995:60) that Parker, a former major in the Canadian Forces, refers in his analysis of the Canadian military ethos which he says, "express(es) underpinnings of the military's paternalism":

In terms of the traditional military...the patriarchal system is based on an implicit, ideal contract between leaders and followers. In return for being submissive, loyal and obedient, followers are assured a steady work situation (if not always safe, challenging or agreeable), a clear (if seldom flexible)
hierarchical structure with precise rules for personal conduct and interpersonal relations, a commitment by the organization to provide (if not evenly distribute) the necessities, and a sense of service to a greater (if not always defined) good (Parker 1995:60).

But whose vision of patriarchy is this, and whose is refracted out, secreted in the folds of the brackets above? Parker's "benevolent military patriarchy" is certainly not the patriarchy invoked in feminist discourse. And although oppressive components of the patriarch's power--"sacrifice", "command structure", "leaders and followers", "not always safe", "seldom flexible", "not evenly distributed"--are invoked separately by Parker, his vision omits the feminist's patriarchal malevolence, which in this context resides in the leader's right and power to order the sacrifice of the soldier in battle.

Insight into Parker's oversight, into his emphasis on the benevolence of patriarchy, and his silence regarding patriarchal oppression may be garnered from his succeeding comments on what he sees as the reduction of the military's paternalism through the incursions of external and internal pressures. His view suggests either an inverted logic or a privileging of an element in authoritarianism wherein submissive subjects look to the all-powerful ruler for favourable or merciful treatment:

   In contemporary, military society, however, the amount of paternalism is being reduced by external social forces and internal dissensions. The advent of human rights legislation has imposed a legal standard over interpersonal and bureaucratic relationships; no longer is fairness dependent upon unwritten rules of conduct, rigid military regulations, and the whims of superiors. Some would argue, however, that the flexibility of the system to accommodate individual needs has been lost (Parker 1995:60).

Beyond the seemingly inherent contradictions in the above formulation, here is a narrative that reads "fairness" and "flexibility" into "unwritten rules", "rigid military regulations" and "whims of superiors"--where others might read 'arbitrariness', 'unfairness', or the 'potential for abuse of power'. And this potential for abuse is well recognized as one respondent pointed out:

   And so we find people have a very arbitrary disciplinary system...which facilitates operations in combat but also gives people tremendous potential to abuse their power.

Although Parker's is not part of the Forces's official discourse, it seems to follow that logic.
understandable given his former status as a Canadian Forces officer. His interpretation makes sense in the context of the military's official stance of entrusting the welfare of subordinates to their superiors. And in the military context, the individual's welfare is not merely subordinate to, but in service of, operational commands or effectiveness.

In support of Parker's patriarchal analogy, and as an operational narrative, the military leader/follower relationship does evoke images of a biblical patriarchy, complete with Abrahamic filicidal sacrifice—and filial submission—although Abraham, as the first Israelite, passed the test of loyalty to God and was relieved of the obligation of sacrificing his first-born son. Modern commanders in war can not, and, as throwbacks to the pagan environment in which the Israelites lived, are legally enjoined to send subordinates to their deaths. The cost of failing to do so, again, is the officer's own life.

On the other hand, Nisbet contraposes kinship, around which the biblical patriarchy was organized, to the military community, organized around territory and "discipline, centralized command, rationalized regimentation, and the barracks collectivism" (1973:27). From this perspective it would seem contradictory to suggest that the Canadian Forces employs, amongst others, a patriarchal organizing principle as an additional supervisory/disciplinary mechanism for managing the relationship between officer and troops. But this might simply be a feature of the technical division of labour within the military machine, as we saw earlier: officers as "benevolent" or sacrificial patriarchs, and non-commissioned officers as strict disciplinarians.

The notion of the military as family invokes another form of community to which Parker and some respondents and informants for this study unwittingly allude but are expressly silent: the monastic community. The traits needed to sustain the military's paternalism, for Parker, are:

The subordinating of the self to the team, the concepts of service and sacrifice, the moral justifications for the existence of the military institution, and the need for loyalty to the country, one's comrades and the command structure (1995:60). Moreover, these features are situated within the framework of a hierarchical structure with precise rules for personal conduct and interpersonal relations, as well as the subordination of the individual to a higher cause. That the military harbours residues of the sacred was noted earlier
in the discussion of the National Defence Act and earlier still in describing its entangled roots in ancient civilizations (Kramer 1963; Woolley 1965). Mumford (1963) has shown that the earliest mega-instruments of force integrated religious, political, and economic with military components: and the military's towering feature, hierarchy, contains the etymological evidence—though possibly more recent chronologically than Mesopotamia—that military power, led by divine kingship, was from the beginning imbued with the sacred.

And certain military features which may have derived from the organization of the sacred at the 'dawn of civilization', were later regrafted onto some of Christianity's early social forms. David Noble, speaking of the 'Ascent of Clerical Asceticism' in the fourth century, notes that.

The monastic ideal reflected and reinforced the chief characteristics of the ascetic orthodox clergy: sexual renunciation, a disciplined bond of brotherhood, and, on both counts, distrust of women—in short, the characteristics of a military culture. Anthropologists have amply documented the ascetic, misogynist, and male homosocial orientations of warrior societies, marked as much by their distance from women as by their bonds between men. The fourth century witnessed the formation of such a culture within Christianity. This new culture bore the legacy of early Essenic warriors and later Christian martyrs, on the one hand, and the stamp of Roman militarism and an imperial orthodox church, on the other (1992:53).

And the inclusion of references to the Queen in the National Defence Act, as we saw above, and the degree of intolerance of even verbal disloyalty towards her—moreso than even offenses involving physical violence against a subordinate, or acts of dishonesty—reaffirm the idea that the military remains reliant on authorization above and beyond that of the political state, namely, a divine authority. It suggests that whatever is at stake in such offenses must be met with tremendous resistance, lest it be brought into members' view, and their scrutiny cause them to challenge and possibly abandon the entire endeavour as an irrational ruse. Here, the enemy within reveals itself again: it must be contained or eradicated.

To recapitulate, the military, in its form as quasi-patriarchal family and quasi-monastic community—permeated by sacred residues of its archaic past, even in the person of the British sovereign as heir to the early divine kingship—operates as an auxiliary disciplinary system woven into the rank structure to monitor and control servicemembers. The need to supervise and care
for military members follows as well from the liminality to which they are intentionally subjected. As we have seen, the Canadian Forces deliberately constructs itself as a separate society, segregated from the civilian world with distinct laws, social organization, values, housing, and even separate medical care and chaplaincy systems—all designed to marginalize and maximize control. This liminality in relation to the larger Canadian society recalls that of the Azande warrior who, deprived of domestic services, compensated with the ‘boy-wife’. In Canada, the soldier’s liminality is partly resolved through the provision of services and support by the military unit and the institution, replacing the support usually provided by the family of origin, or the wife in the family of procreation, and by positioning certain leaders to operate in loco parentis. But, as we will see next, much of the support is expected to be provided, invisibly, by the servicemember’s family.

*Families of the Military*

Consistent with the monastic model, the Canadian Forces is organized around the presumption that its members are all unattached—single—men:

The system was developed for men...it’s a world for single men. Hey! Get on a train or the plane. We’ll take four months of training in Borden, Ontario. Then you go to Halifax for four weeks, and at the end you’ve got a tradesman formed. And the thing was always, in the military, you’re supposed to be on call twenty-four hours a day.

For example, one respondent described his experience of serving in a civil emergency in northern Ontario:

I had started work at 5 o’clock in the morning. By noon we were told we’re gonna need a team to go help evacuate a population of about 8,000 people which had begun earlier in the day.

The respondent never went home. He began working on the emergency from his office, "and in a matter of four or five hours this thing was organized". He flew out that same evening, working through the night to the following morning in order to complete the evacuation.

Although most young recruits eventually marry and have children, the Forces’ operational assumptions of servicemembers’ social disconnectedness and marginalization persist:
So the bottom line is that when I say that all the rules have been developed for men, there were no women around. So it’s a world where you could work eight, ten hours a day. You could go with your buddies and have a drink after, then go home, ’cause it was okay. Mom was home. She didn’t work, and she looked after the kids. Would have them in bed by the time you came in.

Hence, married to this notion of the military as family is another family form constructed by and appended to the military organization. Sustaining the liminality of soldiers in order to optimize their operational readiness means implicating the families of military members in the Force’s disciplinary system, but in potentially contradictory ways which can either support or undermine the military system, and which highlight its institutional fragility.

That the families of military personnel are important to the operations of a volunteer military force is apparent in their formal inclusion in the “Statement of Principles” of the Canadian Forces Personnel Concept. Clause #28 on “The Military Family” reads:

The fulfilment of their obligations to Canadian society presents members of the Forces and often their families with unique challenges and demands. Individual satisfaction and morale are improved if these experiences--at times hardships--can be shared and overcome within a community which has a common background and perceptions. It is vital that service personnel can be assured that the needs of their families will be met in times of difficulty.

**Statement.** Canadian Forces personnel policies will support military families as an essential contribution to operational effectiveness.

The inclusion of this clause demonstrates a clear recognition that military families can potentially undermine the system by detracting from what should be members’ primary concern. But they can also support the military endeavour by limiting their demands, relieving soldiers of family responsibilities and bolstering their morale. Implicitly and systemically, much of the outcome, from the organization’s viewpoint, depends on military wives and the roles they play through their unpaid labour in the home, both during their husband’s absences and in facilitating their frequent transfers; volunteer work on the base; entertaining on behalf of their officer husbands; gathering information from other wives which could be of organizational use, and more—all of which subsidizes the military’s work and promotes their husband’s advancement through the ranks (Harrison and Laliberté 1994). And despite the attempts at gender-neutral language, there is no mistaking the residual organizational assumption that the soldier is male—and a traditional one at
that. In referring to the procedures that should be used to reacclimate soldiers returning home from war, the author of a text on *Human Performance in Combat* recommends that

The soldier and family should be prepared for the reunion (e.g., spouses may resist attempts by the soldier to *resume the role of breadwinner and disciplinarian*) (emphasis added; Black 1988:22).

A respondent articulated this assumption’s corollary that the ‘spouse’ is female, preferably employed solely in the home or, if engaged in paid employment, ready to relinquish it and move on:

It didn’t matter if your wife had some work, or what she did, how it would affect her. You just went. Your wife was supposed to drop whatever she was doing. So the world was developed for men as in, ‘whatever is good for you’. Your family just happened to be just like furniture, in effect. When you move, they’ll move. They’re gone.

Although this respondent relegated this approach to family in the past, in “the ’40’s, ’50’s and ’60’s”, his own and other respondents’ comments, as well as the study by Harrison and Laliberté, confirm that this continues to be the Forces’s modus operandi:

We have basically taken the idea that if you’re married you’re the sole breadwinner, and your dependents follow you and do as they’re told. Kind of thing.

As a third respondent put it, “Most of the time you’re allowed or able to move them around”.

And career progression in the Canadian Forces, as we saw above, requires mobility:

You need one more job to punch another ticket to become a major, so (whistles) ‘whiiii!’, instead of staying in Ottawa now you’ve gone to Cold Lake, Alberta or Vancouver, or, or Gagetown for another year or two.

Without a reliable second source of income, families inadvertently act as auxiliary disciplinary agents by their dependence on the husband’s military income, and through his knowledge that the family’s welfare depends on the organization’s satisfaction with his job performance. And given the conditions of unlimited liability and mobility, it is understandable that a wife and children can also be a burden. Consequently, members, who are assumed to be men— an assumption discussed more fully in the next chapter—are expected to control their wives; this was the message of the commanding officer who, we saw earlier, told the respondent to “get a grip on your wife.” And, implicit in the exchange between the two, as well as in this
respondent's decision to inform the next in command, is the notion that an inability to control one's wife can be a liability to the organization and thereby to the servicemember.

But even without personal crises such as the aforementioned one, which are the stuff of human existence, what the above account suggests is that the notion of family in itself—in the form of individual families appended to servicemembers—is problematic to the military for several reasons. Constituting the military as a family or community may legitimate and conceal the power of superiors over subordinates. But it may also elicit the ethic of care which would be structurally inimical to the Forces should a leader break through the barrier blocking a critical examination of military goals or strategies, strategies which at times require

subordinates [to]...obey the lawful orders of their superiors without hesitation,
even when those orders may further compromise the subordinates' safety or comfort
(Department of National Defence 1986:3).

In the case of military families, the liminality of servicemembers is disturbed by their very existence—a potential hindrance to operational effectiveness but one which the Canadian Forces must tolerate because of its volunteer nature. And, straddling the boundary as these families do between military and civilian worlds, they become sites of competing demands for servicemembers' loyalties, energies and commitments. Based in the civilian world, families represent contaminants which threaten to dilute, pollute or even challenge servicemembers' military commitment—and beliefs as we will in the next chapter—and which threaten the unity of vision which the military deems essential to fulfilling its mission. In this, they form another of the military's enemies as we will also soon see.

**Conclusion**

The Canadian military constitutes a particular social construction of extreme force and power, with coercion embedded in its organizational structure. Legally mandated for war and constituted as a separate society from the civilian, it derives legitimacy from a higher, sacred authority, and institutionalizes, both in law and through its technologically rationalized command structure, the authority of leaders and the obedience of followers. Differential positions in relation
to the dispersal of power reflects differences in responsibility, privilege and treatment, marking differences in value as human social forms. The distinctive features of soldiering formally expose the military as a carryover from a far earlier era, echoing elements of slavery: a living death (unlimited liability) backed by violent legal sanction and the enormous, arbitrary power invested in superiors over subordinates; social liminality (natal alienation); and the suspension of autonomy and extreme disempowerment, with agency channelled through superiors (general dishonour)—all modified by its temporary and voluntary status attributable to its location in a twentieth century political democracy.

And it is these temporal, political and social constraints on their coercive structures which require the Forces to remain particularly vigilant, not only against enemies external to the Forces or the nation, but against internal enemies as well: whomever or whatever may disrupt operational effectiveness. And since this includes the critical capacity to challenge the goals or means of the Forces, rounding out the military’s legal and structural forms of technically rationalized coercion is a distinct system of meaning to narratively legitimate and reproduce the unique treatment of employees in a democratic society, obviate resistance, and narratively construct and reconstruct the institution’s coherence and integrity. It is this meaning system that is the subject of the next chapter.
Notes

1. All quotations, unless otherwise attributed, are taken from interviews with respondents.


3. The Americans recruit almost three times more *yearly* than the total number of Canadian Forces regulars.

4. Of all Canadian Forces personnel with dependent children, 2.4% were male single parents, 0.9% were female single parents and 45% were married.

5. This is not the case for civilian employees of Department of National Defence (National Defence Act 1985).

6. Maclean's, April 15, 1996.

7. The last section is entitled "Offenses triable by Civil Courts".

8. One non-commissioned informant told me that she was in the process of resisting a posting (being sent to another job) in a remote location. She had recently begun orthodontic treatment, and in addition to the other problems such a transfer would cause her, it would mean the removal of her braces because, although the Forces had authorized the treatment, they would only continue to pay if the same orthodontist continued the treatment. In civilian life, such interference with an individual's medical and corporeal autonomy would probably be in violation of the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms. And although this situation falls under the jurisdiction of military 'Conditions of Service', I introduce it here because what ultimately accords the institution this authoritarian, bureaucratic control over this soldier's body is military law.

9. The Canadian Encyclopedia 1988. A more detailed discussion of the restrictions of the civil liberties or freedoms of military members is complex and beyond the scope of this project.

10. Twenty-five Canadians were executed during World War I, of which twenty-two were for desertion and one for cowardice. As Keshen points out, this number "far understates the problem since capital punishment was applied only to repeat offenders" (1996:179). In addition, 729 soldiers were arrested for self-inflicted wounds.

11. This is the updated version. The Act itself reads "all officers and men" instead of "all officers and non-commissioned members".

12. 'Mutiny' means "collective insubordination or a combination of two or more persons in the resistance of lawful authority in any of Her Majesty's Forces or in any forces co-operating therewith" (National Defence Act 1985:3).

13. The clauses on 'Aid of the Civil Power' are those by which a provincial attorney general can request the military's services, whereas those under 'Definitions' are those which presumably justify the federal government itself calling out the armed forces.
14. The reader will recall that this type of service was a principal reason for desertion amongst British troops in the first part of the nineteenth century, as well as the mistrust of the militia by workers in the early part of the Twentieth Century.

15. This type of unquestioning obedience is captured in Alfred Lord Tennyson’s ‘Charge of the Light Brigade’: “Theirs not to reason why; theirs but to do or die.”

16. All bolded words and phrases in interview or other quotes are those in the original unless otherwise indicated.

17. ‘Materiel’ demotes the equipment and supplies used in the armed forces.

18. Parker notes that an additional purpose of employing acronyms is the “melding (of) members within the military community” (75).

19. Here Willett is using this phrase to dispute it, saying that he disagrees both with this and the conceptualization of the military as “managers of violence” or “professionals in violence” since these are “misleading: it (the military) is not an obedient machine but a human concern that reflects the culture of the host society to which it belongs” (13). The latter was a familiar refrain in the interviews.

20. The Militia, which comprises the part-time reserves of the Canadian Forces and which are becoming more numerically important with the implementation of the ‘total force’ concept, are not incorporated into this discussion.

21. There are eleven ranks at the officer level for each of the navy, army and air force, of which seven are senior and four are junior officers; and there are six ranks for NCM’s, of which three are non-commissioned officers and three are junior ranks.

22. The government inquiry into the deaths of four Somali teenagers at the hands of Canadian peacekeepers seems to have adopted the Canadian Forces’ own structural premise of leadership preeminence, having set within its investigative sights precisely these issues:
   The Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia has been established to examine leadership and chain of command issues and to determine whether structural and organizational deficiencies may have taken place in 1992 and 1993 which would have led to the controversial incidences that surrounded the Canadian soldiers in Somalia.

23. Unlike civilian organizations, soldiers are never recruited at other points in the system unless they are professionals such as doctors, dentists, lawyers or social workers.

24. Although only a minor indication, this differential surfaces discursively in documents presenting data on personnel: officers, though fewer in number, are routinely described before ‘other ranks’. The latter term in itself is an indication of secondary status.

25. The problem of inducing soldiers to fight is a longstanding one which was noted at the opening of this chapter. In this millennium it can be traced to the seventeenth century development of the standing army and navy as European monarchs, seeking to consolidate their
power, saw
the need for permanent military forces to protect their dominions
and to support their rule. The rank and file of these forces
normally consisted of long-term volunteers secured for eight-to
twelve-year terms from the worst orders of society by a mixture of
bribery and coercion (Huntington 1964:21).
The Canadian Forces is equally concerned about being an "employer of last resort" (Personnel
Concept 1992:5), but for many, particularly non-commissioned members, it is. For officers it can
be a means to finance a university education. In 1991, 24% of regular Forces personnel were
from the economically depressed Maritime provinces and Newfoundland although together their
populations only comprised about 10% of the Canadian total. Furthermore, the education profile
of non-commissioned members compares poorly with that for officers: 26% of non-commissioned
members have secondary 9-11 education compared to less than 4% of officers, and less than half
of one percent (.37%) of non-commissioned members have a university degree compared to
almost 47% of officers (Department of National Defence 1991).

26. Despite the Inquiry’s promise to protect the careers of soldiers who came forward, and
although the substance of his comments were never under dispute, this corporal ended by
pleading guilty when his defence failed and by facing discharge and a maximum penalty of two
years less a day in military prison for his efforts.

27. ‘NDHQ’ is the acronym for ‘National Defence Headquarters’, and those inside the
organization might be able to trace the individual or collective authors.

28. These are examples taken from the interviews.

29. Boot camp shares certain features with the initiation practices of small-scale societies which
are characterized by strong gender bifurcation and centralized men’s houses. In these societies,
initiates are subjected to a series of male-controlled rituals which strictly segregate them from
their natal habitat, forces them into a state of pseudo-infantile regression, disorients and
traumatizes them physically and emotionally, then puts them through a ritual rebirth into the
men’s society from which women are strictly barred (Keesing 1982).

30. These two instances were the closest respondents came to articulating conflicted feelings
regarding their work.

31. See Chapter Two.

32. See Chapter Two, footnote 23 (p.69).

33. Parker refers to "other sacred objects" displayed on specific occasions significant to a military
unit, or to commemorate "battles that were significant victories or, more interestingly, glorious
Chapter Six
Narrating the Canadian Forces: Dictating a Destructive Destiny

Introduction

Thus far we have seen that the Canadian Forces is mandated as an instrument of lethal force, and operationalized in a technologically rationalized structure of coercion. But despite legal sanction and its materiality in personnel, permanent installations, and weapons systems, it is inherently fragile. This is because its institutional framework and its animate and inanimate components are social artifacts produced out of particular socio-cultural arrangements, politics, meanings and practices which together constitute its foundation. Changes to this social foundation could mean changes to the military, or even its disappearance. Moreover, in the context of the military's shifting fortunes in Canadian history, the Forces must stand on constant guard against its own dissolution. The tenuousness of its status requires the Canadian military to establish its institutional coherence, sense of durability and permanence (Ricoeur 1991) in multiple locations. And because the nature of its enterprise is by definition volatile and controversial, and the work in which its members engage is life-threatening and many of their democratic rights are suspended, its continued existence—in a democratic context—is also predicated on gaining and retaining the support of its members. Hence, to prevent dissolution from within, the Forces needs to repeat and operationalize its legal mandate in its organizational form of self-legitimating, technologically rationalized procedures, and to repeat both its mandate and technologically rationalized structure of violence and violation in a more overtly and explicitly prescribed system of meaning, and in another, more enticing form. In sum, along with the ongoing need to reconstruct and replenish itself materially—through recruitment and training, and maintenance of the material and administrative infrastructure (Canada. Treasury Board 1996)—an additional organizational need is for the Canadian Forces to reaffirm and reconstruct itself conceptually, as
an idea and as a separate, bounded entity.

As discussed in Chapters Four and Five, the Canadian military already contains discursive means to sustain itself. Its technologically rationalized system has embedded in it a system of meaning which covertly and tautologically regulates and justifies it on the basis of its operational effectiveness. This, in turn, justifies the structure of command, discipline and obedience, subordinating enlisted ranks to officers, and the whole to the monarch. Discursive practices of hierarchy, control and efficiency reconstruct and legitimate the unusual subjection of military personnel to stringent forms of regulation and to a unique judicial system; these practices aim to conceptually and practically mark off, contain and marginalize the outside world including family members who straddle the boundary. All these technological means eclipse the military’s ends. And while ostensibly value-free, technological rationality prescribes and legitimates the military’s meanings and practices. What primarily renders this first system of meaning relatively inaccessible to critique and resistance\(^1\) is its embeddedness.

Critique and resistance are also obviated by other means: in Chapter Four we reviewed the language stratagems employed by defence intellectuals to evade critical confrontation with the lethal implications of their work; and in Chapter Five we saw how acronyms rationalize interaction in the Forces, screening the least palatable aspects of the military undertaking. This technologically rationalized discourse channels how servicemembers think about each other, about life and death, and about their job of ‘making war’. It can mitigate a preoccupation with the ultimate goal of daily military tasks: the military’s lethal mandate requires discursive mechanisms for members to sidestep the gruesome potential of their work and continue their daily round with a degree of equanimity. War may be in the forefront of military practice but it is in the background of much of its formal and informal discourse. As one respondent put it:

**Fighting.** That’s what we’re going into combat arms for is to **fight**. Although we don’t do that routinely, that’s what the ultimate **goal** is. That’s what our ultimate aim in life is: being called upon to **fight**—hopefully not **die**—and cause the other guy to die on the battlefield. Not that even male people think about it as what they’re gonna **do**. I mean, we don’t sit around all day **thinking** of that.

Other means of circumventing such preoccupation is to adopt the language of **management**
and talk about "an accepted way of doing business", to refer to peacekeeping operations as "the most stimulating professional experience you'll have ever seen", and to tanks, artillery, heavy mortar and rifles as "tools of the trade" (18). These and other language stratagems, such as the domestic allusions used by French nuclear power plant workers (Zonabend 1989) have long had the same goal of trivializing military violence or risk, and dehumanizing its participants, thereby diminishing both for them as well as their audiences the perception or impact of its negative consequences. Stanley quotes the World War II Director of Military Operations at the War Office on the soundness of sending Canadian troops on a particular military mission: "It would be throwing good material into a quicksand which is already engulfing far too much" (1974:360). Another respondent referred to

Canadian soldiers in Somalia butt-stroking people that are trying to steal their wallets².

But these systemic and discursive methods for reaffirming and reconstructing itself, for side-stepping the controversial goals of its work and obviating resistance apparently require supplementary reinforcement and confirmation as indicated by the more explicit directives instructing members on their ideological posture towards the Forces. These directives serve as ideational counterpart to the behavioural coercion of the National Defence Act and military organizational structure. The site where this second system of meaning is articulated most explicitly and comprehensively³ is The Canadian Forces Personnel Concept (1992), a brief, nine-page document which, although formally addressed to the upper echelons of the organization ("you and your staffs"), reads as though intended for all. It is said to contain "some fundamental and enduring values and principles", and is intended to "provide a comprehensive base for policy development" regarding military personnel (Foster 1992). The text has two parts. The first contains a "general" section which outlines Canada's defence policy and the Canadian Military Ethos, and identifies three external (i.e. civilian) constraints which can potentially sabotage the military's functioning: Canadian laws and government policies, official languages, and equal opportunity requirements. The second part details the specific principles meant to guide the formulation of personnel policies, the foremost of which are "operational effectiveness".
"mobilization" and the "military ethos" (3-4). Despite its brevity, this document is dense; distilled in it is the essence of the military enterprise, including what the Forces expects of servicemembers, and, in muted form, what members can expect from the Forces in return.

In several interlocking narratives, the Canadian Forces Personnel Concept encapsulates the military's technological system in the form of ethnographic description, positional contextualization, and exegetical prescription. Not only does this unique meaning system delineate the substance and interpretation of this technologically rationalized way of life, it also dictates the basis for adherence: belief and acceptance rather than knowledge and comprehension. Together, these three narratives are teleologically integrated within a compelling grand or meta-narrative which, as ideological adhesive, draws and binds members into the hegemonic vision of the Forces as a cohesive, unitary, durable and inevitable institution.

**Ethnographic Narrative**

The Canadian Forces Personnel Concept, including the Military Ethos which it shelters, is an ethnographic narrative which synthesizes the practical elements of the military way of life. This includes its mission, Canadian defence policy, a qualified description of its personnel, its internal structure, how personnel are expected to relate to each other, the broader conditions of service, its relation to civilian society, and the latter's imposed constraints. The text also interprets the military lifestyle, its practices and understandings. Military service is presented as desirable rather than onerous—something to which members would wish to aspire. Military work is elevated out of the realm of the everyday, and rendered dramatic and special. The Canadian Forces is described in superlative and dramatic terms as the executor of the "important mission" of providing "the ultimate protection against violent threats to Canada's nationhood" (1). Military service is described as providing a "unique challenge and adventure" (5).

Canadian servicemembers are located centre-stage in this drama. From the outset, the Personnel Concept establishes both the professionalism of Canadian Forces members, elevating and privileging their practices. Military men and women are described as "dedicated and
professional" (1) — which resonates with respondents who also see "the military as a profession of arms" — promoting them to a status normally reserved for "a limited number of occupations or vocations involving special learning and carrying a certain social prestige, especially...law, medicine and the Church". Terming military members "professional" also evokes high standards, vocational devotion and great skill and experience. As well as being professionals, servicemembers are "disciplined", which necessitates continuous cycles of training and practice... (to ensure) that the group functions as a disciplined and professional entity (#3f).

Finally, describing Canada as the potential victim of violent threats also makes servicemembers saviours of a potentially threatened population.

Beyond dramatization and idealization, the ethnographic narrative in the Personnel Concept repeatedly invokes the concept of 'society', but in three disparate, though interrelated usages which highlight the military's preoccupation with self-affirmation, legitimation, its institutional integrity and internal control, the demarcation of its own boundaries and its relation to civilian society and the state. Depending on the discursive requirements, in these concepts of 'society', the military is either planted in the bosom of its host society (part or product of civilian society), or a boundary is strategically erected to demarcate the military from the society which it serves (its own society) but which is at times its adversary (military versus society). Thus, 'society' becomes a codeword to either constitute the military as a part of, or an intrinsic outgrowth of, the larger civilian society, or as a distinct, idealized community with exclusive legal governance over its own members—in a relationship with its host civilian community which either sees the latter benefitting from its defence or sabotaging it via externally imposed, governmental constraints.

Military as Part of, or Product of Society. In this formulation, the military is both constituent and handiwork of the larger civilian society, with their essential unity emphasized: "this profession of arms [is] an integral part of the Canadian society" (1), "a microcosm of Canadian society" (5),

embodysing moral virtues...derived from a traditional code of ethics [which] fit
into and form part of those of contemporary Canadian society (2).

It is from this constructed unity between society and the military—the least elaborated aspect in the document—that the latter draws its temporal legitimacy, particularly for its "application of military force" (1). This same unity is invoked during the interviews in which respondents contend that: "we're a microcosm of the general population", or, as another put it, that our military reflects the values and mores of the society that produces it, and hence, if you want to change the military, you have to change society, or that

the military's a mirror of society...although we perhaps attract a more conservative element of society that's out there, just by our nature...by the fact that we are a structured society. A lot of people think we're something different and something special. I'm not sure we are.

In addition to providing legitimacy, this stance of being at one with civilian society and drawing on its values absolves the military of discursive and practical responsibility for the negative consequences which its ideas or practices may have on the civilian world: the effects of generating or idealizing violence and aggression, of being a negative or ineffective paradigm for problem-solving, and by its very existence as a repository of collective violence, of being a possible catalyst for war. With this formulation, the military dissociates itself from accountability for its violence. This dissociation finds a voice in a respondent who said:

The military takes what comes in from the street. Men come to the military with their attitudes; they don't build them when they get there.

However, as we saw in the respondent's reference to the supervisor's role in Chapter Five, this contradicts what is a central preoccupation of much military practice, from basic training to the "continuous cycles of training". As another respondent puts it:

What you're basically trying to do in the military is, in a period of about three months, take the last twenty years of their life and resocialize them where they have different mores and different values and a different environment which is much, much harder and more productive than perhaps many of their previous values.

The express intention of military training is to remould and discipline soldiers in its image. This, as we see later in the chapter, includes the need to dictate to members the values which they must hold.
Military as its Own Society. In tension with this notion of the Forces as an integral part of society, and juxta posed with it early on in the Canadian Military Ethos, is the Canadian Forces as a distinct entity:

...this profession of arms, an integral part of the Canadian society, forms a distinct sub-set of the entire Canadian fabric (emphasis added, #3b).

This latter formulation—which characterizes much of the ethnographic narrative and includes features such as the legal mandate, disciplinary system, the denial of members’s critical autonomy and certain democratic rights—narratively constructs the military as a distinct society governed by the primary imperative of operational effectiveness. Firm boundaries demarcate military from civilian society to guard it from the latter’s incursions, articulate and protect its distinctive features, and establish its internal unity. Although there is reference to “a clearly defined chain of command” and thereby to the military’s internal differentiation (2), what predominates is its unity. Members are an internally uniform, undifferentiated group, belonging to “a community which has a common background and perceptions” (8), with “members of the team” performing “their assigned role” (singular), all as “future leaders” sharing the same values and commitment, enduring the same “restrictions of certain freedoms” (2), and all as

professional and technically competent personnel who have demonstrated characteristics of integrity, loyalty, and duty...(4).

Here, differences between members, including those of rank, are generally overlooked.

This separate military society is also evaluated as a “good society” (2)—opposed by implication to ‘evil’ threats—and holding predominating values which are morally virtuous:

...the military society is a good society embodying those moral virtues which affect our relations with our comrades in arms and our own selves, of: prudence, justice, patriotism, obedience, veracity and patience (2).

Loyalty and altruism also figure here:

...it is essential for all members to clearly display loyalty, first to the country then to the group, and finally to each member of the chain of command, both senior and junior to them before taking thought for themselves; (2)

And it is these values associated with the "good" military society—rather than those embodied in the chain of command or Code of Service Discipline which deny members certain democratic
freedoms and rights— which are singled out as the values which "fit into and form part of contemporary Canadian society" (2).

**Military versus Society.** A corollary to the concept of the military as its own society is its differentiation from civilian society explicit in the notion that the latter, as represented by the State or Government, is a separate entity which the Forces must serve: "Canadian Forces is an instrument of the State" (3), and it must be operationally effective "in the execution of roles and tasks assigned by (the) Canadian Government" (4). Here, the Forces is distinct from society as represented by the government, but acting in its interests. As one respondent put it, "we're a servant of the rightful government in place".

But being an "instrument of the State has drawbacks, carrying with it "external influences" which compel the Forces to operate "within a legal and governmental framework" that impose "a variety of constraints and regulations" (2) which must be resisted where they interfere with, and are thereby in opposition to, the Forces's primary mandate. The three external factors constraining the military are, again, Canadian laws and government policies, official languages, and equal opportunity requirements. The example of the first factor also notes how the Forces should respond to these constraints when deemed necessary:

**Canadian Laws and Government Policies.** The Canadian Forces derives legal authority from the National Defence Act. In turn, a subordinate series of orders provides the specific rules and regulations that pertain to all aspects of military service. A variety of other Federal laws including the Charter of Rights and Freedoms also impacts upon the Canadian Forces. Should these adversely affect operational effectiveness, it is essential that requests for exemptions be accurately and urgently stated (3).

Here, society is a thorn in the Forces' side: no longer a source of legitimation or absolution, society impinges on the military's internal operations, potentially sabotaging operational effectiveness, constituting itself in tension with the military, a tension hinted at in the previously-cited notion that "this profession of arms...forms a distinct sub-set of the entire Canadian fabric (#3b).

This view of society also surfaced in the interviews in expressions, for example, that we have these problems. They have been forced upon us by legislation and by
governmental fiat. We are doing our best to resolve them,
and that, again, the government is using the military as a guinea pig to integrate different groups
such as visible minorities, gays and women. Not only are there complaints of government
interference, but of unrequited loyalty:

The problem is that the armed forces is very loyal to the government. But the
government also has to...have some obligation towards their armed forces.

In addition to official interference, respondents felt that noxious influences could also enter in the
form of unofficial views or values of the Canadian public. Thus, for example, difficulties
integrating women into the military had external causes, as in

most of the difficulties are based partly on the perception of male and female
roles that come into the military from society.

and therefore,

I don’t think that society, or sociologists, or anybody should expect the
military to necessarily change that much more quickly than the product that is
being given by society to change with.

Nowhere is there reference to the possibility that any of these problems could have been
generated within or by the military itself. The pacifism of the Canadian public was another
constraint which led a respondent to think that certain of the military’s actions might be badly
received:

[In] Canada, we’re now coming to terms with the fact that our soldiers returned
fire in Yugoslavia, which is novel. There’s an abhorrence on the part of the
public to believe that our soldiers are in Yugoslavia killing people.

This notion of society as distinct from the military presents another problem: civilian
society’s internally divided nature. Bringing to the fore the tension between having to “serve our
country” (2) and be a representative of the "Canadian people", while owing "unquestioned
allegiance to the State" (3) raises the possibility that society itself is fractured, and that the
military might be taking orders from a ‘house divided’. This could be particularly difficult for
the military in its role of aiding the civil power, a responsibility which forms part of the state’s
current top defence priority: “defence, sovereignty and civil responsibilities in Canada” (1). The
contentiousness of this task, as we saw in Chapter Three, was a cause for desertion by British

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troops in the nineteenth century, and as we saw in Chapter Five, a reason why the National Defence Act exempts reservists from compulsory service in Aid to the Civil Power.

Finally, opposing society to the military marginalizes civilian society in relation to the Forces. Placing itself at centre stage, and opposing itself to this other, fractured, intrusive and constraining entity of society, the military firmly demarcates itself as independent and indivisible, single-minded in its goal of protective service. Whereas civilian society is divided, the military remains united, particularly in its commitment to the *ne plus ultra* of operational effectiveness. And the prospect of the divided society with which the military must negotiate, or which must be resisted at times in order to avoid its constraints, involves a logic which sets the military against society. It also suggests an independence which places the military outside of civil control.

Two examples of the military’s practical independence from such control come in the aftermath of the killing of three Somali teenagers and the torture-death of a fourth by Canadian Airborne Regiment soldiers while on a peacekeeping mission in Somalia. The Lieutenant-Colonel who was appointed commander of the Airborne after its return from Somalia deliberately destroyed evidence in the form of videotape copies recording an offensive hazing ritual conducted by members of this regiment. Despite this, and over the objections of the Minister of National Defence, he was subsequently made an Officer of the Order of Military Merit, and five months later was promoted to full Colonel (Gazette, Oct. 3, 1995).

A second example involves five soldiers who witnessed different stages of the same torture and beating death in Somalia, but failed to intervene. Not only were they not charged; they, too, were later promoted. In this case, the Minister claimed that by law, the military is solely responsible for the promotion of lower-rank officers, and to interfere would politicize the process. And a Major at Land forces Command justified the promotions, saying: "They are still in the Forces, they are subject to all the rules and regulations, including the privileges and promotions." Military regulations gave them rights to these benefits, but did not—according to a Court Martial Appeal Court ruling—oblige them to protect prisoners not in their custody (Gazette, May 15, 1996).
Positional Narrative

The second narrative in The Canadian Forces Personnel Concept's meaning system is a positional one which "locate[s] and contextualizes already revealed narratives" (Rosie 1993:145) in the National Defence Act and the Forces's technologically rationalized structure, reinforcing its members' unquestioning adherence to the system which concentrates power hierarchically. This positional narrative frames those features of the military hierarchy which disempower servicemembers practically and discursively, subordinate them to the chain of command, and explain or justify their loss of certain freedoms and democratic rights afforded Canadian civilians, including their right to life. Thus, the third and seventh clauses in The Canadian Military Ethos, and the afterword state:

We believe that the authority to apply such power requires that our profession be properly structured with adherence to a clearly defined chain of command and obedience to a code of conduct, in our case, the Code of Service Discipline (2).

We accept that, in volunteering to serve our country, we must endure the restriction of certain freedoms including some rights provided by the democratic process (2).

Members of the Canadian Forces...have neither professional association nor union to represent them in matters concerning compensation, conditions of service and promotion of the profession. This must be entrusted to the chain of command (3).

With these, the military's coercive practices, its subjugation of members to the Code of Service Discipline in the National Defence Act--including the denial of basic rights extended to the civilian population--are all portrayed as necessary. The inversion of values in the National Defence Act (see Chapter Five) and in many of the Forces' personnel practices are, by inference, legitimated. These include values associated with the contemporary Canadian nuclear family: distinctions between the public and the private; the value and meaning of human life, death and the body; notions of subjectivity including autonomy, identity, individuality and critical thought; and violence versus non-violence. It implies that the price of defending democracy is the suspension of the democratic rights of its defenders; and it casts as necessary and inevitable this empowering of the state and military through the disempowerment of a class of individuals, i.e. soldiers.
An example of this inverted logic can be found in the "Charter Task Force: Final Report" in which the Forces issues a warning to the Canadian government against imposing its employment equity policy on the Forces via an appeal to the principle underlying section 7 in the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms:

…the effect of employment policy changes on fighting capability cannot be deduced from empirical evidence in peacetime, and there is therefore a risk that operational effectiveness in war could suffer from changes. The consequences to individual members of reduced operational effectiveness in battle would be increased risk of death, capture, or injury. Such an increase in the risks to the very lives of members of the CF could be construed as a violation of at least the principle underlying section 7 of the Charter, which provides that:

"Everyone has the right to life, liberty, and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice."

The gravity of such an infringement on the rights and freedoms of members could also be argued to be proportionately much greater than any represented by limitations on eligibility for employment in the CF. Therefore, the reasonableness tests that apply to society in general must take into account the potential life and death consequences of employment policy changes in the CF (Department of National Defence 1986:10).

What is either overlooked here, or temporarily disregarded, is that the member’s occupation of "unlimited liability"—noted explicitly elsewhere in The Charter Task Force—by definition deprives servicemembers of the right to life and security of the person.

Where, then, do these effectively disenfranchised and disempowered individuals stand vis-à-vis the Forces? In an organization geared to war and combat, with an occupation of unlimited liability, and with work that is considered dramatic and special, what does the personnel policy’s meaning system have to say about the value of combatants’ lives? What can members expect in this regard given that the National Defence Act by definition deprives them of their rights to life and security of the person, expects of them altruism and self-sacrifice, and subordinates their lives to the fundamental criterion for determining all personnel policies, namely, ‘operational effectiveness’? A comparison of clauses dealing with the military’s operational expectations of members versus those addressing what members can expect from the Forces in return, is informative:

The format in the second part of The Canadian Forces Personnel Concept is that each
of the principles is "expressed as a statement of intent preceded by a brief identification of the factors from which they are derived" (4). And this format is actually followed in most of the clauses. Two examples illustrate this point:

10. **Operational Effectiveness.** Operational effectiveness in the execution of roles and tasks assigned by Canadian Government in time of war and/or national emergency is the fundamental criterion against which all personnel policies must be developed and continually assessed.

Statement. The personnel system of the Canadian Forces will provide well-trained, well-motivated personnel in sufficient numbers to ensure the effective performance of all assigned roles and tasks in peace, time of tension and war (4).

21. **Training.** Success in war for both the individual and unit is highly dependent on the standard of individual training and how well individuals have been trained to apply their skills in collective groupings. The Canadian Forces will maintain a system of training which provides for both job oriented training and professional development.

Statement. Training will be designed to keep pace with technological advances but will retain those elements of military science which have withstood the test of time. Basic training will initiate new entrants to the military ethos and way of life, and will progressively provide them with the necessary environmental skills. Once personnel are training to perform individual tasks, emphasis will be placed on collective training to ensure that they can effectively apply their skills as part of an operational unit/team (7).

Each statement is specific, articulated in concrete, substantive terms, identifying the factor necessitating the development of a principle, the reason for its development, followed by the means by which the factor will be practically addressed or implemented, sometimes with qualifying variables and detail. In contrast, and juxtaposed against the other clauses, the construction of the statement of intent or principle on the subject of human dignity is anomalous, being vague, as are the factors which are intended to inform it:

13. **Human Dignity.** It is essential to respect the dignity and worth of the individual.

Statement. The Canadian nation is founded upon the principle that acknowledges the dignity and worth of the individual. The Canadian Forces, which exists to defend Canada and keep it secure, must always be guided by this principle. In all we do, we must show respect for our servicemen and women, recognizing their individual needs, aspirations and capabilities.
Here, on the other hand, there is a terseness, indeterminacy and lack of rational foundation, lack of concrete development, elaboration or specification as to how the factor informs the statement of intent, or how the latter, as a "sound and reasoned" principle, is to be employed in developing Canadian Forces personnel policy. The lack of specificity may be due to the recognition of individual human dignity as self-evident; or it may be that this principle of human dignity was added as an afterthought. Either way, this clause insisting on the obligation to respect the dignity and worth of the individual stands in stark contrast to the denial of human worth manifested in the technological rationalization of the organization, in the erasure of individual identity in the basic training of recruits, in the death penalty under the National Defence Act, and in members' unlimited liability. And the reason for its seemingly appended quality may be the primacy of another of the military's own requirements which is always prioritized over individual's expectations, as we see next:

25. Consideration of Members' Expectations. Individual morale is enhanced when the member perceives that personal expectations are being realized within the organization.

Statement. Personnel policies will be developed to satisfy the members' expectations, the fulfilment of which also meets the requirements of the Forces. However, service requirements will have priority over individual desires.

The statement clearly prioritizes the requirements of the Forces over members' "expectations" which, in their fulfilment, fall in with the organization's requirements. Given the service requirement of unlimited liability, this points to a devaluation of soldiers' lives. This is also supported by the substance of the final two clauses in the Military Ethos, the first of which is cited above:

We accept that, in volunteering to serve our country, we must endure the restriction of certain freedoms including some rights provided by the democratic process (2).

We accept these responsibilities in memory of those comrades who died in the service of their country, and must ensure that their memory and ideals are not forgotten (2).

Juxtaposing the clause on member's expectations with the first of the latter two clauses, which frames the voluntary renunciation of "certain freedoms" and 'some democratic rights' in the
memories of "those comrades who died in the service of their country," suggests that members' lives have less value relative to those whom they are expected to protect. Soldiers' unlimited occupational liability—their legal obligation to lay down their lives under order—implies that their lives are valued less than those of civilians. But soldier's lives can gain value through glorious death in battle as they join the ranks of those remembered in the Military Ethos for having died serving their country, and whose "memory and ideals" living soldiers must ensure are not forgotten. Their memorialization in death can reinforce adherence to the military ethos. Echoing Lloyd (1987), the individual identity and subjectivity obliterated at the start of the military cycle in basic training can be recuperated through meaningful death in war. This raises the question of where it is that the soldier's greatest value lies.

_Military Epistemology: Reason versus Exegetical Prescription_

As well as setting down and interpreting the unique military way of life, contextualizing and legitimating its inversion of certain civilian values, a singular feature of _The Canadian Forces Personnel Concept_ is its epistemological underpinning, shifting as it does between a meaning system of rationality and another of belief or acquiescence. And this shifting is patterned: discourse concerning the organization of the Force and the operationalization of its mandate are written in a technologically rationalized language; discourse concerning the appropriate posture of members towards the Forces's mandate and structure are couched in a language of belief and acceptance. Thus, in the first instance, there is an insistence in the introductory paragraph that it is

> essential that personnel policies be based upon _sound and reasoned principles_ to ensure the Canadian Forces continue to function at optimum effectiveness" (emphasis added; 1).

and, later, that the document's aim is

> to establish _sound and reasoned_ principles from which personnel policies will be derived to sustain the Canadian Forces in the future" (emphasis added; 3).

This dual invocation of principles that are "sound and reasoned" is then set against, in the second instance, what is expected of military members themselves in their stance vis-à-vis the premises

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and organizing principles underlying military operations. Here, the language shifts so that "sound and reasoned principles" upon which personnel policies are to be based are transcribed into tenets which members must believe.

Within *The Canadian Forces Personnel Concept*, this narrative of belief and acceptance is lodged primarily in the ‘Canadian Military Ethos’, which is first and foremost an exegetical detailing of servicemembers’ personal beliefs. These concern the nature of the military enterprise, the rationale for its existence and its relation to the larger Canadian society; the nature of Canadian society itself and Canada as a national entity; justification for the unique employment provisions which subject servicemembers to an authoritarian rank structure and a separate judicial system; and the "restrictions of certain freedoms" including certain democratic rights.

And, as with other aspects of the military organization, control is at the forefront, and adherence is compulsory. Operating as an ideological counterpart to the legal coercion in the National Defence Act, subscribing to the particular beliefs and tenets spelled out in the Ethos is a condition of service. But the discursive presentation of the Ethos is somewhat confusing: its introduction is prefaced by an admonition to servicemembers which expresses the tension between the hegemonic versus the shared, the compulsory versus voluntary submission, in a bewildering and contradictory combination:

*All* members of the Canadian Forces *must* be aware of and subscribe to the Canadian Military Ethos. The *accepted* version of this ethos is…(emphasis added: 1992:1).

Constituted as a hierarchically imposed, *mandatory* system of meaning, the Ethos masquerades as *mutual*.

Parker, too, comments on the confusion present in the Ethos, but locates it elsewhere: in the text’s overwhelming rhetoric. And he also projects the confusion onto servicemembers themselves, differentiating their ability to decipher the Ethos by rank and education. The Ethos represents "set ideal beliefs…intended to express the core values expected of Canadian Force members"; "whether the ideals enunciated…would have much resonance with the lower educated, more job-oriented military member is debatable" (1995:57-59). He continues:

In attempting to provide a comprehensive description of military values, however,
confusion has been added by the very level of detail. The precepts tend to be overwhelm by the rhetoric. Similarly, while informative to university educated members, the wording and sentence structure is likely to be difficult to understand for a number of officers and non-commissioned members (60).

What precisely the "university educated" could grasp that the "lower educated" would miss is not specified. That this constitutes veiled elitism by a former officer of the Canadian Forces is suggested by the comments of another officer, a respondent who twice referred to the means used by sergeants to instill the military ethos in recruits:

The typical sergeant who's an instructor doesn't appreciate that he's doing that, (and) that that is a degree of sophistication which they don't appreciate that they have...if you talk to a sergeant who's running this.

According to this respondent, sergeants are merely replicating what they have been taught. Whether the Ethos is intended for the benefit of the enlisted ranks, who are considered incapable of comprehending it, or for officers to specify the substance of their adherence and enforcement, the inference drawn by both Parker and this respondent is that military belief and practice expects conformity to what many members are thought unable to comprehend. In addition, the distinction between the "reasoned principles" of the personnel policies and the belief in and submission to the military ethos mirrors Huntington's fault line distinguishing officers from enlisted 'men'.

Though equally under obligation to believe, officers are also mandated to think and evaluate--within the broader context of an operational mandate--whereas non-commissioned members are expected to listen and obey (1964)\textsuperscript{12}. And for at least one respondent, this failure to understand extends to elements in the civilian community:

The academic community and the political community, on average they do not understand the military. They do not understand the problems that are faced, and it is sometimes quite difficult to explain the combat ethos and mores to them. And they tend to see some of the somewhat--I guess you could call them emotionally charged--approaches that we use in the military, and our explanations in terms of, you know, unmitigated bullshit, which some of it is.

Just as there was no room in these narratives for the possibility that the military may generate problems. as seen earlier, this respondent excludes from his own narrative the possibility that the communities he cited might very well understand, but not agree, with the military's ethos, mores and practices. Again, the injunction on members to 'believe' exposes the military leadership's
concern that soldiers, too, may misunderstand.

However, much of what servicemembers are expected to believe does lie in the realm of the verifiable, and could be subjected to rational scrutiny. This includes whether "the ultimate reason for the existence of the Canadian Armed Forces is the preservation of secure justice and peace for Canada", whether the latter "can best be attained through the development and maintenance of a professional military force" (#a), whether "this profession of arms [truly is] an integral part of Canadian society", and whether the Canadian Forces mandate "to serve our country through the maintenance of its security and defence of its sovereignty" is unique and could possibly be achieved in ways other than "the application of military force" (#b). Though potentially subject to rational inquiry, none are scrutinized. All these, and more, members must accept on faith as conditions of service, and adhere to without question.

But why construct as "belief" assertions which could be subjected to rational inquiry? The answer may lie in the effect of transposing debatable assertions into compulsory and ostensibly mutual beliefs. First, it serves to obviate resistance. Even more, it draws servicemembers in as participants in maintaining these beliefs and promoting the military's goals, organizational structure and operations, including the very measures from which members could lose the most: the denial of their critical autonomy and individual identity, and "certain freedoms including some rights provided by the democratic process"(#g). Soldiers are made discursive accomplices in the risk-taking which could lead to the loss of their very lives13. Finally, transposing debatable statements into beliefs renders irrational the very idea of rationally scrutinizing the irrational; even more, questioning the Ethos would be considered akin to heresy. Furthermore, in an inversion of logic, locating the doctrinal Military Ethos within the technically rational Personnel Concept has the added effect of promoting as rational the irrational (belief in the Ethos). At bottom, military service within this technologically rational organization requires the suspension of rational thought regarding a variety of substantial issues, and its replacement with voluntary, unquestioning, faithful submission and self-sacrifice. And this basis in faith is an additional feature of the military's institutional fragility. But whereas this fragility is a consequence of the
military's irrational foundation, the latter is equally a source of its strength since, by definition, these beliefs are not open to question.

Parker, too, notes the tension between rationality and irrationality in the Forces. But he fails to locate this tension in the Ethos, or identify irrationality as an underlying feature of the organization. Instead,

the emphasis on rationality derives from the bureaucratic imperatives of the professional military. Feelings and instincts are taught to be subordinate to logic (1995:81).

But though he recognizes that "much of the environment in which the military operates is not logical", the cause is the detractor of "political expediency". Then, on a positive note, he adds that "intuition" is used by the "best leaders" in battle. He then concludes with an unelaborated and disjointed comment that,

Ergo, though logic is the primary operating condition, inspiration cannot be ignored entirely, if the forces are to adapt and progress (82).

The Grand Narrative of the Canadian Forces

The undercurrent of irrationality, and the obligation to believe in an organization which prides itself on its governance by rational principles is an additional narrative facet to the ethnographic description and interpretation of military life, and to the inversion of civilian values facilitating, legitimating, and rationalizing its unique treatment of servicemembers. Together, all are subsumed within a grand narrative which overrides the institution's internal differences in order to affirm and reconstruct it as a unitary entity with a common goal and history, and to recast the brute force and sacrifice of soldiering into a larger (idealized) scenario of national destiny. This meta-narrative of sovereign nationhood also clarifies the military's mandate as an instrument of the democratic Canadian state--but in service to a higher cause which justifies: elements which are either outside of civil control or which require exemptions to some of its external constraints; the liminality of the Forces and soldiering; unique conditions of service; a separate judicial system; and the military's very existence and its use of force. And it is the grand narrative that ultimately justifies the supreme sacrifice of subordinates, elevates them to an exalted status, and qualifies them for first-class citizenship. Whereas the Forces' more common
values and practices are ostensibly drawn from and reflect temporal (civilian) society, the “high ideals” (2) with which soldiers are expected to keep faith reflect the enduring, the transcendent, universal concerns.

The grand narrative in the Personnel Concept is first and foremost one which affirms and legitimates the Canadian Forces as an institution, and one which is integral to the survival of the Canadian nation. As a synopsis of the Forces’ grand narrative, the opening statement of The Canadian Forces Personnel Concept establishes Canada as a unified, enduring, national entity, bound to the Canadian Forces through the latter’s provision of ultimate protection and service in a greater cause:

The Canadian Forces provides the ultimate protection against violent threats to Canada’s nationhood (1).

Built into this narrative is the primary ‘fact’ of Canada as a nation, possessing the right to “protection against violent threats” to its sovereignty, and this by the Canadian Forces which the state authorizes and directs as its “instrument” (3). Invoked here is a Lockean philosophy of the nation in which the state embodies a political order constituted by individuals to represent their individual and collective interests. Implicit in Canada’s need for defence is its national vulnerability, but neither the military nor Canada as corporate entities are open to dispute, even though the latter is politically contested by natives and Québec sovereignists; in the grand narrative, both are established and enduring. In the spirit of “excessive interpretations which institute the institution of society” (Bernstein 1991:111), both the Canadian Forces and Canada are presented to the readers of this narrative as faits accomplis, and from several standpoints: in and of themselves, in relation to each other, and in relation to the audience (the leadership and servicemembers) who are discursively and practically incorporated into the narrative. Canada, in its various incarnations—“Canada’s nationhood”, “Canada’s defence policy”, "Canadian society", "Canadian fabric", "the country" or "their country", and "Canadian Government"—reappears in the text in what seems like an attempt to lend credibility or legitimacy to the Forces, but with the added effect of lending credibility and legitimacy to Canada as well. The grand narrative affirms and legitimates Canada’s national existence by invoking features of national
identity ("our country") strength, freedom, security and sovereignty—and thereafter appends these to the Forces. This Canadian Forces narrative reveals the necessity of legitimating Canada as a preliminary to the legitimation of the Forces itself.

With Canada’s national legitimacy discursively established, the narrative’s teleological scope is enlarged to include and legitimate the Canadian Forces:

the ultimate reason for the existence of the Canadian Armed Forces [which] is the preservation of secure justice and peace for Canada (1).

The survival of the Forces is thereby tied to the survival of the State. Reaching into the past, it evokes the fallen soldiers, “the memory of those comrades who died in the service of their country” (1992:2), in order establish historic roots and continuity, and affirm the Forces as necessary for Canada’s continued survival. The repeated invoking of certain themes—the military ethos, operational effectiveness, belief and acceptance—institutionalizes them alongside the institution of the Forces, and lends them a kind inevitability. The repetition of these themes legitimates the practice of armed force, bringing it out of the past and writing armed force in general, and the Canadian Forces in particular, into Canada’s national destiny.

As well as establishing the existence and legitimacy of each of these entities (Canada and the Forces), the weaving of this expanded teleological narrative is a device of “emplotment”, of a synthesis of heterogeneous elements...a synthesis between the events or incidents which are multiple and the story which is unified and complete...[of a plot that] transforms the many incidents into one story” (Ricoeur 1991:21).

Narrating this link imbues the Forces, Canada, and their inter-relationship with coherence and cohesiveness, and through their fabricated unity of purpose, unites their disparate narratives into one. And since a feature of emplotment is “the primacy of concordance over discordance” (Ricoeur 1991:22), in this narration, internal dissonances within the Forces—such as inter-service or inter-regimental rivalries15, tensions between officers, non-commissioned officers, and other ranks—are all concealed, as are the tensions between the Forces and the State, or tensions between the Canadian people and their government, noted earlier.

Similarly, although as we saw earlier, the Canadian Forces is described in the Personnel Concept as “the representative of the people of Canada” (3), and an integral part of “Canadian
society", the Forces is not constructed as their instrument, but as "the instrument of the State" (3) and the "Canadian Government" whose "roles and tasks" (4) they must execute. The relationships between 'Canadian society', the people of Canada, the State, and the Canadian Government are left unspecified; but, again, nowhere is there an indication that the Forces takes directions from the people themselves. Written into the grand narrative are the power relations which accord to some (heads of state) the authority to delegate to others the legitimate use of lethal force. And, though never explicitly articulated, it is, in part, this legitimacy which elevates those practising lethal force in the Canadian military to the status of 'professionals' (rather than common murderers) as well as sanctioning their unlimited liability and sacrificial deaths.

What is indicated in the narrative is that the unity built out of these disparate entities (the people of Canada, our country, etc.) is a narrative fiction sustained by, and obscuring the hegemonic role of the State as arbiter of what roles and tasks the military should fulfil—sometimes against the interests of the people of Canada and members of the Forces themselves. That the State is the beneficiary as well is acknowledged by a respondent:

We're a servant of policy. We're a servant of nations. And whoever is in rightful power can request almost anything from its armed forces. We're a servant of the rightful government in place. If the Minister of External Affairs says, 'Yes, we need to commit troops in South Africa because by doing this we'll have a stronger say in New York at the United Nations table'; 'yes, if by committing troops in Bosnia we're gonna have some economic gains in Europe', then we'll send troops there. The diplomatic power of a country is twofold: it's your economic power plus your military power. The only reason Canada participates in so many new U.N. missions is not for pure military reasons, because the direct military threat to Canada is very, very, very remote. But from a policy and national strategic point of view, it's a trade-off in order to gain something else. And we do that trade-off with soldiers and armed forces personnel.

But whether the state is the ultimate arbiter of military practice is another matter, since also invoked in the grand narrative is another philosophy of nationhood beyond the one which posits the state as political representative of the people. Now the nation is set above the state and independent of it, with the military as its supreme defender in service to a greater cause or idea. Herein lies the basis of the military's "unique mandate" as "ultimate" protector, and "ultimate reason for [its] existence". It is this transcendent national concept which justifies the
extraordinary right to employ lethal force, denial to members of their democratic freedoms and rights, construction of the occupation of soldiering as one of unlimited liability, and power of the Forces to make life and death decisions regarding its personnel. It also explains the substitution for the language of reason, a language of belief and acceptance: these other features of the Military Ethos, along with the mantra-like exhortations for soldiers to "believe" and "accept" are less characteristic of organizational directives and more reminiscent of a sacred canon.

As well as articulating the nature of the relationship between state and military, the grand narrative articulates the mechanism of its construction. This involves overcoming the absence of an intrinsic unity either in the grand or lesser narratives, within the military, within Canada, or in their relationship—beyond the unity derived from the state's power, delegated in part to the military and sustained by its force. That is, what can be found in the grand narrative is the nature of the bond uniting Canada and the military, articulated in The Canadian Forces Personnel Concept as a unity of force:

to serve our country through the maintenance of its security and defence of its sovereignty; if necessary, by the application of military force (1).

It is this latter unity which must be obscured along with the knowledge that the Forces' internal unity inheres in its hierarchically controlled power to dictate and coerce. What the grand narrative must obscure is that it constitutes a key device consolidating the Forces' power, granting it its own unity and the coherence to counteract its institutional fragility. The grand narrative supplements the Forces' unity of purpose and method (military force, operational effectiveness) realized in its state-mandated, hierarchically controlled and technologically rationalized structure.

This would also explain what binds the narrative meaning systems described in the latter part of this chapter with the one embedded in the technologically rationalized structure of the Canadian Forces. As we saw earlier, whereas the latter is ostensibly founded in rationality and thereby potentially subject to critical scrutiny, the second, concentrated in the Military Ethos is predicated on faith which removes both the organization's goals and means from the arena of debate. Yet, as we also saw, even the first meaning system is relatively inaccessible to critique because it is invisibly woven into the very fabric of the self-justified, technologically rationalized
relationships of the military machine. And what renders both of these meaning systems relatively inaccessible to resistance—although each has a different epistemological foundation—is, again, that both are ultimately backed by force.

Finally, what this meta-narrative obscures is that, in the final analysis, the Forces’s primary mission—expressed in the principle of operational effectiveness guiding all military endeavours—is neither the maintenance of the power of the state, nor even of the nation, but of the Forces and its very own power. In the disempowerment of members and the shifting of the locus of power upwards to the rightful “authority to apply such power” (2), *The Canadian Forces Personnel Concept* is revealed as an ideological companion to the legal force of the National Defence Act, as a discourse on power, and on the rightful positioning of individuals, the military, and the State in relation to its exercise. What the meta-narrative of the Canadian Forces indicates is that the National Defence Act is less about war in the defence of the people of Canada and even about the defence of the Canadian state itself,17 which certainly figures prominently, than about defending the Forces’ coercive capacity. Again, this would explain why so little of the Act is devoted to elaborating the Forces’s mandate, and so much to the legal regulation of servicemembers, and why the Military Ethos is equally devoted to a narrative exposition of compulsory beliefs.

*Silences*

The concealing of the Canadian Forces’s core mandate through the inaccessibility of its various meaning systems—whether through their embeddedness or the enforced silence that constitutes members’ obedient belief—serves to conceal this mandate from members themselves, and camouflage much of what the military is about. Whereas members are overtly constructed as protectors against violent menaces to Canada’s nationhood, nowhere is there a notion that maintaining a combat-ready military force might itself constitute a menace to Canadian justice and peace. Nowhere is there an understanding that the military does not merely mirror society, but shapes it as well. And nowhere is there an understanding that although casting soldiers as
professionals may elevate their status and that of the military, it could also serve to elevate the status of collective violence, idealize war—and as veiled warmongering—pose a threat to the Canadian population. Such a conclusion could be drawn from official statements that the Forces' operational priority is war preparedness, and from respondents' statements cited above that the ultimate aim of the servicemember is to fight, and that being at peace means being out of practice. A similar conclusion is drawn by another respondent:

The basis of the military is to train for war. Maybe it's a bad statement to say, but we've been in a peacetime mode for too long as far as our environment is concerned. We have lost the sense of reality of a military environment. I'm like anyone else; I don't want war. It's the last thing I have on my mind, like probably most people. But let's be honest. The military is there for a purpose. The bottom line, the fundamentals of a military environment is to train them for war. Because this is the purpose in life.

In the same vein, a respondent for this study recalled his conversation of commiseration with an Indian tank commander while on a peacekeeping tour who

was lamenting that his army had lost its ability to fight wars. And I suggested to my friend that 'you're in the Indian army. You guys punch heads with the Pakistanis on a regular basis. Or you thump your own people in the internal security operations'. And he goes, 'Well, that's not wars. Wars are moving divisions and fighting campaigns'. 'And', he said, 'we haven't fought a war since 1971.' And I suggested to him that if India didn't consider itself experienced in warfare, then Canada was completely off the mark, to which he agreed.

The implication is that war is the logical outcome, not of external threats to Canada's sovereignty, but of the "continuous cycles of training and practice" (Personnel Concept 1992:2). And judged by the consistent discursive and behavioural emphasis on leadership, and thus euphemistically, on the need to control soldiers when instances of their violence or abusiveness in operations becomes public, senior military staff must recognize that the military organization itself generates violence. But this is never openly acknowledged.

Finally, throughout these texts and narrations of unity—both official and unofficial—one unifying element around which armies have historically rallied remains oddly absent: the Enemy, either real or fictitious. As we saw in Chapter Five, abbreviated enemies do appear in the National Defence Act, including "armed mutineers, armed rebels, armed rioters and pirates" (National Defence Act 1985:2). But contemporary enemies are lacking both there and in the
Personnel Concept. A "noisy silence" (Lustiger-Thaler 1996) reverberates through these official and unofficial discourses, on both sides of the military boundary. What makes this silence doubly perplexing and raucous is that the element lacking is precisely what the military depends on for its very existence, and against which it is designed to defend. There are narratives on the Forces' mandate, its disciplinary code, personnel policies, human performance in combat, rank structure, leadership, training and obedience, the priorities of Canada's defence policy, the beliefs and values members are expected to hold, and more. But, as for the Enemy: deathly silence.

Yet, the Enemy is everywhere, lurking wherever it can disrupt operational effectiveness. Thus, Enemies can be found lurking in National Defence priorities, in the external influences of the host society, personnel policies, disciplinary training for obedience, notions of poor performance and bad officers, families, including wives and children, the constraining society, disruptions to the rank structure, disobedience—particularly in sending subordinates into battle or refusing to fight. The Enemy of the Canadian Forces consists of whatever threatens its unity of purpose or its unity of force, whatever threatens its technically rationalized structure and, through it, the realization of its operational effectiveness. This leaves the Forces and its members battling enemies on many fronts, both inside and outside the organization, and primarily within servicemembers themselves. This may explain why the occupation of servicemembers is said to be their unlimited liability; this dispenses with a major internal enemy from the outset, namely, the value or priority which members place on their own lives.

This peculiar construction of the amorphous but omnipresent enemy may be why so much emphasis is placed on regulating how members think, especially about life and death—and not only that of others but of their own as well. And that may be why the clash of meaning systems embedded in the brief folk anecdote in the introductory epigram—of the Russian Yeshiva students who refused to fire their rifles because "there are people in the way [and] somebody might get hurt"—is so threatening to militaries everywhere, including the Canadian Forces. It exposes just that which militaries wish to conceal. Marksmanship and other technical skills form only a part of what training armed forces is all about. The main threat to operational effectiveness lies in the
thoughts and queries that only humans can bring to bear on what may be, for them, morally or otherwise untenable situations. Critical thought, particularly in non-commissioned members, is the supreme Silent Enemy against which the military must expend its greatest energy. And as we see in the last two chapters, it is the very reason why women's entry into the Forces is so threatening.
Notes

1. Attrition is a primary form of resistance and one to which soldiers can most readily have recourse. This is an area which could certainly use more research, and one which Karen Davis has already begun.

2. This is the same respondent who referred to peacekeeping as "the most stimulating professional experience".

3. Here, I am speaking of those unclassified Canadian Forces documents which have come to my attention. There may be others, particularly classified ones, which state the case more pointedly, although this is doubtful since the upper echelon of leadership are probably more prone to a technologically rationalized discourse.

4. If we can extrapolate priority from rank order, then military families and even the "spiritual, medical, dental, social and legal care" (8) needs of members themselves rank fairly low.

5. One respondent said of his own military occupation that it was something special:
   As you should know, I'm a (military occupation); so my trade is related to the land forces in the Canadian army, which is kind of special.

6. One respondent explained his readiness to accept women into the Canadian Forces because his "mother was a professional. My mother was a [professional occupation]."


9. For Huntington,
   Professionalism distinguishes the military officer of today from the warriors of previous ages (1964:7).
   But, in contrast to the failure to differentiate officers and non-commissioned members in the Personnel Concept, Huntington distinguishes the "officers corps," who are professionals, from the enlisted men:
   The enlisted men subordinate to the officer corps are part of the organizational bureaucracy but not of the professional bureaucracy. The enlisted personnel have neither the intellectual skills nor the professional responsibility of the officer. They are specialists in the application of violence not the management of violence. Their vocation is a trade not a profession. This fundamental difference between the officer corps and the enlisted corps is reflected in the sharp line which is universally drawn between the two in all the military forces of the world (1964:17-18).
   Huntington also differentiates the career enlisted man who is a professional in the sense of one who works for monetary gain and the career officer who is professional.
in the very different sense of one who pursues a "higher calling"

in the service of society (8).

In addition, the distinction between the "reasoned principles" of the personnel policies and the belief in and submission to the military ethos mirrors the fault line distinguishing officers from 'men'. Though equally under obligation to believe, officers are also mandated to think and evaluate--within the broader context of an operational mandate--whereas non-commissioned members are expected to listen and obey.

10. Harrison and Laliberté also refer to

so much of military life [being] at loggerheads with the values
most civilians cherish--civil liberties, freedom from violence,
reverence for life and nature, freedom from authoritarianism and

11. Parker notes that

subordinates are frequently viewed as the raw material necessary
for advancement, or accomplishing other personal career goals by

12. The 'other ranks' may be less prone to believe in the military ethos, as Parker notes, because
their jobs are more risky--being the technicians of violence--than officers who are its managers.

13. The life-threatening nature of military work is brought home by the death of a soldier in a
live-fire exercise preparatory to the departure of his unit for peacekeeping in Bosnia. The group's
commander told his men subsequent to the death that:

  life in the military requires accepting certain risks. I didn't
  sleep very well last night, but I am the commander and as I said
  [to the soldiers] 'you've got to pick up your socks and get going'.

Of the dead Master Cpl. he said, "He was a tough soldier." According to a news report, military
officials did not know how the shooting happened since the gunfire was to be aimed forty metres
above the soldiers' heads (Gazette, Oct. 16. 1993).


15. An example of the rivalries between regiments surfaced during the inquiry into the Canadian
Airborne Regiment’s tour of duty in Somalia with the contentious appointment of a Lt.-Col. to
the post of Airborne commander because he came from one regiment and the three senior officers
who selected him--as well as the then-chief of the defence staff--all came from another (Gazette

16. Huntington refers to the "higher calling" (1964:8) of career officers.

17. In his discussion of the distinction between the institutional and occupational models of the
military, Parker notes that the

institutional perspective holds that the forces have to operate
isolated from society, both physically and politically to enhance
their ability to protect the state (1995:70).
Chapter Seven
Constructing Difference: Lives and Deaths in the Canadian Forces

Introduction

The subject of this chapter is the construction of gender in the Canadian Forces. As theorized in Chapter Four, gender is an organizing principle of society and social institutions. Played out in daily life through individual subjectivity, it is in origin and construction a social phenomenon. With both material and symbolic components, gender operates to interpret and differentiate social spheres, tasks, and functions, to channel interaction, and distribute power. Thus, rather than anchoring explanations of social facts (such as women’s absence from combat occupations) in ‘natural’ characteristics (their purported lack of physical strength), this analytic approach seeks out gender in the spaces between the outer limits of nature and nurture, with the body as both object and expression of socio-cultural practice and meaning. In the absence of a naturally dualized difference, but the presence of its importance, difference must be marked and similarities suppressed. How is this accomplished? How are militarily gendered identities constructed in this technologically rationalized organization?

Gender’s singular manufacture and meaning in the Canadian Forces is all but predictable when understood as a concept generated through the social structures of corporate entities, a vehicle for meeting particular organizational requirements through collective and individual ideas and practices. Militarized gender difference is fabricated out of the Forces’ technologically rationalized requirements. the parameters dictating the organization’s principle characteristics of hierarchy (rank), discipline (control and obedience), uniformity (military identity), unity (bonding or cohesion) boundaries and liminality (segregation and mobility), members’ unlimited liability (self-sacrifice)—all incorporated into a distinctive and at times inverted meaning system in relation to that of civil society. It is onto these institutional goals and structural features—generated out
of the core mandate of sacrificial death and (ritualized) destruction—that gender is mapped in order to construct and reconstruct servicemembers as men and women, manifesting and representing disparate forms of lives and deaths. Hence, as many organizational requirements and oppositions as exist in the Forces, as many masculinities and femininities will be identified and established or developed. Within this conceptual framework, the institutionalization of gender can be traced by examining how the military, and military men, establish, mark and defend the gender boundary, problematizing, devaluing and marginalizing the feminine Other, yet clinging to it tenaciously as it represents what combative men can not—must not—be.

*Marking and Establishing Difference*

Gender difference in the Canadian Forces is largely woven out of and through the material practices and symbolic meanings attached to the multiple binarisms embedded in its technologically rationalized structure: war/peace; friend/enemy; defender/defended; military/society; operational effectiveness/ineffectiveness; uniformity/individuality. These and other contraposed features derive from the core opposition within its lethal mandate and ethos which polarizes and inverts civilian meanings and values associated with life and death. From this, other structural features are generated to feed an essentialized notion of a bifurcated gender positioned on axes of the Forces’ unique organizational parameters\(^1\), particularly its ultimate arbiter of operational effectiveness. As a cultural device, gender metaphorically represents the parameters of the military world in terms of these and other categorical oppositions such as strong/weak, good/bad, uniformity/diversity, sameness/otherness, the military/the family. Incoming members are sorted accordingly in order to construct gendered military subjectivities and identities through the institution’s structured and symbolically informed experiences. Gender-differentiated characteristics can be traced to organizational parameters peculiar to the Forces, around the three key issues of operational fitness, discipline, and unlimited liability.

Thus, structural requisites of rank and discipline, uniformity, unity, liminality, operationally effective organization and performance, professional and managerial competence,
technical skill, stress tolerance, physical strength and stamina, the marginalization of civilian society in relation to the military are all found in official and unofficial narratives manifested in, or associated with, gendered identities, social practices and meanings. All derive from the Forces’ mandate and structure, and all have structural referents. Understanding the social construction of gender in the Canadian Forces requires mapping it onto the Forces’ technologically rationalized organization—manifested both materially in bodies and through the symbolic association of men and women with different social spheres which are seen to either support or undermine aspects of the military endeavour. Intrinsic to the organization, gender difference in body and soul must be established, marked and defended through narrative and other social practices. Military subjects must be constituted as men and women, seemingly different and fixed in their respective identities.

**Marking Difference.** The Forces’ principle gender boundary is perhaps most apparent in official policy on members’ appearance. Gender mimics military rank in its public markings. Just as the institutional imperative of rank is symbolically marked in public insignia, so is gender difference symbolically marked through officially gendered codes of dress and ornamentation which not only permit but encourage women to maintain the visible accoutrements of their femininity. These include, amongst others, pants only for men, versus either pants or skirt (pants only in the field) for women along with a medium-heeled pump; differences in headgear and permissible hair length; differences in permissible jewellery such as earrings; women’s exclusive right to wear make-up; and even the difference in shoe finish which either requires or obviates the need for polishing. Shoes, the reader may recall, are a disciplinary site for non-commissioned soldiers. One respondent uses these markings to illustrate the discrimination against men:

> Everybody wears a uniform. But women are allowed to wear some kind of jewellery, make-up. No man is yet allowed to wear an earring... The problem is that there are very few compromises to balance the organization on the male side... like their [women’s] earrings, like the fact that woman are allowed to wear shoes that don’t require polishing, that have a permanent polish. We [men] are not allowed to do that because we have polished our shoes for the last two hundred years and we’re going to continue polishing our shoes for the next two hundred years even though you can buy shoes like you [women] have for men with the same finish.
Establishing Difference. These differences in dress code are based on an essentialized view that humans bifurcate into two mutually exclusive and internally uniform categories. But the Forces’ organizational parameters and imperatives for difference are most tangibly anchored in the body, with symbolic significance: physical strength, endurance, stamina and menstrual cycles symbolizing women’s reproductivity and association with the family--the defended civilian sphere. Assumptions of essentialized difference permeate official discourse. For example, in the 1990 NDHQ Action Directive entitled "Combat Related Employment of Women - Implementation Plan," which consists of several annexes of directives for implementing the 1989 Human Rights Tribunal ruling to integrate women, references are to "one sex or the other" as in:

It will still be possible for Commanding Officers or for Commands to state preferences for the assignment of individuals of one sex or the other to specific positions to ensure a minimum representation within the leadership structure in isolated units...(emphasis added: A-2).

On the basis of an assumed bifurcation, gender acts as a prism for interpreting and sorting behavioral observations or standards. In the same text, physical fitness standards in recruit schools and centres are noted as being "different for male and female recruits" (A-4) with no rationale given for this differentiation, and despite an earlier admission that the objective measurement of fitness is, in the final analysis, rather subjective:

The development of a test of physical capability to be used to determine suitability for enrolment in the Canadian Forces and occupation assignment has been under study for several years...incremental lift equipment was purchased and installed in recruiting centres [and a] trial was conducted, but...the predictive value of the lift was questioned and the test measures found to have never been validated. For the foreseeable future, those in recruiting will have to use their best judgement in determining which men and women can develop the strength and stamina needed (emphasis added; A-3,4).

Beyond the implicit essentialism, the rationale for gender-differentiated standards is also perplexing given that the purpose of basic training is to raise fitness levels for all incoming members. The text also indicates the intention of the Implementation Plan to delay women’s employment in certain support occupations, other than the ones cited, in order to confirm that existing selection criteria and training produce women in support occupations as well prepared for army field employment as the men in these occupations (A-6).
Thus, the sorting of individuals into two gendered groups precedes their evaluation.

The assumption of essentialized gender dualism is also found in a second document, the "Mixed Gender Service in Army Field Units", published in June 1988 prior to the Human Rights Tribunal ruling. Men and women are characterized by "sex differences in abilities and behaviour" (emphasis added; 2) about which leaders should be given more factual knowledge. Furthermore, unit officers and NCO's (non-commissioned officers) must guard against the common distortions in perception which include [amongst others]...Not understanding that there are legitimate value or cultural differences between men and women... (emphasis in original; 7).

And, given the Forces' emphasis on physical fitness and the narrative construction of military work as preeminently physically demanding, it follows that bodies would constitute a primary site for differentiating gender. In this document, physical differences are calculable, though not necessarily consistently:

In general, [there is a] 30% difference in physical capacity between men and women (22)...Pound for pound, a woman's potential maximum strength seems to be about 80% of a man's (28).

Women are also said to have smaller hearts and lungs, higher pulse rates and lower oxygen-carrying capacity resulting in lower physiological endurance and lower cardio-respiratory capacity.

Respondents are right in step with the official position on gender dimorphism. Illustrating the physicality of gender difference is the repeatedly cited example of the heavy artillery round which grounds difference in women's physical inadequacy:

The Canadian army still has a lot of fairly old, manual equipment. In the artillery, you have to be able to lift up a ninety-five pound artillery shell from the ground to about chest height, three times a minute, for up to five minutes or more. And that's not an easy job for most men. That's hard work for anybody. It's certainly hard work for a ninety-five pound girl. And there's probably more nine-five pound girls in the army than ninety-five pound boys.

This differentiation by gender rather than capability—despite the admission of the task's arduousness for most men—demonstrates the consequences of essentialist categorizing on occupational assignment. Citing the same example of the artillery round, and acknowledging the task's difficulty for many men, another respondent notes that although women have been in
artillery units for several years now, they are being employed in other than combat positions because, again, the latter are too physically arduous:

Even though, officially, integration seems to be going rather well, women are not employed to operate guns. They are used to drive officers and in command posts, even though they're part of a combat unit. They're not attached or directed into front-line combat positions, for a lot of reasons. A gun crew has to perform a very, very hard **physical** job. A lot of **males** are not even able to do it. For example: a self-propelled Howitzer, which is equipped with a 155mm diameter gun, has a shell which weighs ninety-five pounds. Your rate of fire is based solely on the capability of the **loader** to pick up that round and ram it into the gun. So what they found initially is that, yes, a girl could, well, you know, a girl which is built accordingly (laughs), could technically sustain a rate of fire which is, perhaps, two to three rounds per minute. And obviously you want to achieve the highest rate of fire. And even though that was not the official party line, what they found was that a gun crew with a woman in it could not **sustain** its rate of fire as long as a crew which was only composed of male personnel. Certainly you can find women, 5' 8", 160 pounds, 150 pounds, able to do it.

Thus, even though "a lot of males are not even able to do it", and some women **can**, the **fact** of gender, rather than physical capacity, pre-emptively intervenes to determine task assignment.

These essentialist views extend the grounding of difference in physical strength to include physical stamina:

In the infantry, I must be able to walk twenty, thirty kilometres per day, with an eighty-five pound rucksack on my back, and at the end, drop my pack and go into combat, dig holes at night, and be outside in all weather conditions, sleeping during the winter in **tents**. Here I'm talking about infantry, which is what you see in **war movies** about soldiers in World War II, which has not changed very much even in the 1990's. During the Falkland War, each British soldier had 120 to 140 pounds of equipment on his back, and was asked to walk twenty to thirty kilometres per day. And at the end of that walk, be in condition to fight a battle.

What this respondent fails to note or may be unaware of is that, during the Falkland's war, British ground troops abandoned the specialized kit of night observation devices and laser binoculars because of their weight (**MacDonald 1983**).

**Views similar to this respondent's reverberate in other interviews. According to another respondent, women have "less tolerance when it comes to physical endurance in harsh conditions". His example is of a desert field exercise in which four of the five daily evacuees were women; they were unable to tolerate the heat and became dehydrated. This example both**
supports and contradicts the conflicting official positions articulated in "Mixed Gender Service in Army Field Units" that there is "no significant difference" in men's and women's actual susceptibility to heat stress (Department of National Defence 1988:29), yet that "stress fractures, sprains and heat stress are common problems" for servicewomen (Department of National Defence 1988:22). And although his understanding is that women's metabolism can carry them farther than men's, nevertheless, women are physically handicapped:

I read a lot about that sort of thing. And they're saying that normally women have a better reserve than men who will exhaust their reserve much faster. 'Cause for some of them, their metabolism will go slower to conserve energy. But overall, because of the physical demand, women are not suitable for all trades, like in any combat arms scenario or field-related jobs where you're exposed to harsh conditions.

These harsh conditions include the arctic where women are said to have difficulty during menstruation which, again, leads to their evacuation:

I guess this fits in partly with the fragility of women, and this is a delicate area but certainly one that our own medical officer substantiated, and that is... during their menstrual cycle--this is a male prejudice but it was supported by the medical officer--women had a tremendous amount of difficulty in the field, particularly in arctic conditions. And, I don't have the figures, but he was using them to show that virtually every woman in the field during her menstrual cycle had to be evacuated for those...about four or five days. This is under extreme arctic conditions when you're talking minus 20, minus 30.

This respondent never considers that the issue may not have been women's menstrual needs, nor their metabolism, but the parameters of the military exercise which overlooked women's menstrual needs rather than adjusting for them? The latter explanation seems more likely given that Stone Age women have been living, menstruating--even birthing--in those conditions for millennia. The same can be said about women evacuees from the desert exercise and the habitation of these hot, arid climates by peoples possessing relatively simple technologies.

In an effort to be even-handed, another respondent concludes that "there are always gonna be some sexual limitations that each of the sexes have"; yet his only example concerns women. And again, the limitation is menstruation:

Females have their period on a monthly basis. You're not gonna change the metabolism of a female. So, you have to accept that this is a fact of life, and
that it will work against you...When they reach their time of the month, there's a bit of a decline in their physical abilities that would probably be critical.

He notes that men, too, "have down times as well". But these effect only their mental, not physical performance.

Another physical difference mapped onto the military's organizational imperatives is that women are naturally--actually genetically--less violent:

Women have a tendency to be less violent, or to believe much less in violence. If you go out in the field, in order for you to win, you're going to have to demonstrate violence. It's either you or the person in front of you. There is no if, and, or but's. He's got a weapon just like you do. Or if neither one of you has a weapon, then it comes to physical confrontation. But the man, I think, has more of a second sense that physical violence will have to be used in order to overcome the situation. I don't think women are born in their genes with a sense of violence in the same way as we have, like physical violence.

This respondent never stops to question why, in the face of men's violent genetic endowment, the military would devote so much energy and resources to inculcating and sustaining violence in its male troops. According to another respondent, gender differences in aggression and other unspecified but definitely observable characteristics are present from an early age:

There is a distinct difference between men and women. Not only from the physical aspect. But if you take a little boy and a little girl, and shave their heads and put them into a room full of toys, you'll be able to tell the difference. There is a difference between a boy and a girl. I don't know what it is...But there is a difference. I can't explain it. It's the mannerisms that they display or the way that they play. Boys are normally, I feel, more aggressive. And they display it.

This respondent develops this theme at length, concluding that even if both genders could perform the same job, "the way that it gets accomplished I think would probably be different".

Hence, women are seen as physically weaker than men, naturally fragile, less violent, prisoners of their menstrual cycles—in sum, an assemblage of physical debilities rendering them burdensome and less able to serve. Not only do men and women differ, but men are at a higher level to which women must be raised. One respondent is particularly blunt: "What we're doing is trying to raise the woman up to the man's level". Or, as another puts it: "The feminine side has to come up." Men, for a third respondent, "are certainly considered to be superior from the physiological point of view."

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But identified differences are more than physical. They extend to the emotional or temperamental, the social, and occupational. This includes women being naturally more vulnerable in organizations:

Women are said to be more vulnerable in organizations. This is partly due to the *nature of women* (emphasis added; Department of National Defence 1988:15).

Women also tend to cry more easily, take more sick days for gynaecological care, and get pregnant, whereas men tend to lose more time for alcohol or drug abuse or going AWL (absent without leave; Department of National Defence 1988).

Whereas the latter differences are constructed as handicapping, differences can also be positive, and women’s purportedly unique qualities can also constitute strengths--framed against the backdrop of the Forces’ organizational requirements:

Women can stand a very substantial workload longer than a man, working longer hours...And most of them, when they have a stable personal life, most of the time perform better at some specific tasks than men because men tend to compartmentalize their life, so when I leave the office, I leave everything behind. I go home and take care of my family. My understanding is that women have a tendency not to compartmentalize their life, and put everything in the same melting pot. So if you’re able to create a stable personal life for your woman, or female, the result is gonna be very, very good from a personnel, professional point of view. The quality of work is gonna be better, generally speaking, more meticulous, more attentive, conscientious to what they’re doing.

According to another respondent, women are also more obedient in following orders:

For example, you’ll give a set of directives and orders, and, I don’t know why, but they seem to accept that more, much better I think than a man. You always have to watch a guy. If you tell them, ‘You will report to such and such a place with the following dress and equipment at 09:30 tomorrow morning,’ I never had problems with a woman for some reason. But the men always came up with excuses: ‘Well, 9:30, I’m sorry, but I normally have something else to do at that time. And I don’t have all the equipment because I couldn’t sign it out at the supply on time.’ It took me a while to realize why this was happening, but it seems by human nature the men will be more on the defensive and find ways to circumvent your directives. And they always question ‘why’, whereas women normally take for granted what is given to them. They just get on with it and ask questions after.

Initially unsure of the reason, he eventually settles on "human nature". And for a third respondent, women are more suited to certain tasks:

Well, we have had more women in there [air defence artillery]. It involves less
arduous, but still operational employment. The weapons systems are much more technologically sophisticated and require more of the skills that women typically have. They relate well with computers, to input data, to respond rapidly to track objects carefully and effectively, those kind of things.

These various positive attributes correspond either to occupations or environments where women have been traditionally employed by the Forces, or to positions as subordinates or followers, where, as we will see in the discussion of Otherness, women are thought by some to serve the military best.

In reference to supervisory roles of monitoring and regulating the lives of subordinates, women are considered by one respondent to be more perceptive, and to possess stronger interpersonal skills:

Woman have better psychological abilities than men, especially when it comes to social worker functions. When problems arise within a section, whether it's a financial or family problem, I have certainly noted that they had more abilities to communicate well with either female or male subordinates. They had a better ability to resolve the problem in a reasonable manner, whereas I found myself a lot of times in some pretty dicey situations. I wasn't sure if I was giving the right advice, or handling it so as not to aggravate the situation. And, to me anyway, females had a better way. I don't know if that's an instinct or they could maybe relate better.

But he is careful to qualify these superior interpersonal skills—by implication derivatives of women's nurturance—by insisting that they are limited to certain situations:

...but like I say, in that mode. I have to be very specific, that it's only in a social worker type of mode, okay? Anything related to certain social problems. And I include in that financial problems. I'll even go one step further to say drug-related problems, alcoholism, that sort of thing. It seems they have another sense out there to really resolve the situation. And it was not an exception, not just one person in particular. But I saw that with quite a few people. Maybe they pay more attention to details.

From an explanation based on an innate quality (having a "second sense") the respondent eventually concludes that perhaps women are simply more observant.

Emotions are another area that distinguishes women and that can certainly get the better of them. And since for this respondent, emotionality is a physical trait, and he, too, has already established women's relative physical weakness, their sensitivity and emotionality provide additional evidence of inferiority:
Now the next one that I had was physical abilities. One thing I can certainly say up front is that women are certainly more sensitive and emotional. Sometimes, if I get a little bit ugly or start using a stronger voice, a female will certainly crack very fast: start having tears in their eyes probably ten times faster than a man would. I’m not saying the man is not offended, but, he certainly holds better, where the female will just burst into tears in a very short time. If you start squeezing anything out of them?

But in contrast to the above male respondent’s perception of women as more sensitive and emotional, another respondent sees women as less emotional, professionally, and better able to cope with stress:

Technically, from a physical point of view a twelve-year-old girl or boy can pilot an F18...Women are sometimes physically more able to pilot a fighter aircraft than a man...First of all, there’s no force required to fly a modern aircraft. From a psychological point of view, a woman has a tendency to be less emotional from a purely professional point of view. I’m not talking about a personal relationship or personal matter. But from a working point of view, woman are more often able to sustain a very hard load of work for a longer time.

He then cites the example of a female colleague:

I was on a year-long course along with (female senior officer). And she sustained the stress better than a lot of my counterpart male officers. From a purely professional point of view, anyway. I was always amazed by those things....A pilot must not be emotional at all, because he’s doing a very technical job; he needs to take decisions very, very rapidly. And, I found that most of the women that I saw in the service were able to sustain psychological pressure more than males. Physical stress? It’s a different story. I had good and bad experiences.

Whereas this respondent’s view of women’s emotionality would seem to contradict the previous respondent’s, the contradiction dissolves when each view is matched with its structural referent: the latter context is the professional competence of fellow officers—in staff, not command, positions; the former context is hierarchy and the disciplining of (emotionally weak) female subordinates.

Another respondent also cites exemplary women, one of whom excelled in her professional occupation:

I would suggest that one of my best associates was a woman, a just amazingly astute woman. Very, very sharp. Was a [support occupation], and had no background doing [occupational work] but picked it up in no time at all, and was making very astute judgements on very difficult subjects.
Another woman is a good officer, better than the respondent himself:

She’s a reserve army officer and a much better officer than I’ll ever be. She’s a good leader, very organized, good manager of people, works well with people. She’s a very good, very competent officer.

A third woman is cited by this respondent for her quickwittedness. While on a United Nations tour of duty, a female reservist was kidnapped one night. She escaped by kicking open the door of the vehicle in which she was being abducted, rolling down a riverbank and hiding in the muddy water until the kidnappers abandoned the search and left. But this example is then deftly woven into a bifurcated gender model, for comparison with men:

But I tell you. I don’t know how many of my macho male friends would have the presence of mind to take the situation in their own hands that way.

These isolated narratives lauding individual women are matched by others of female trouble-makers. But, whereas the laudatory examples are generally brief and are accompanied by expressions of surprise at women’s competence, the deprecatory ones—each narrated by a different respondent—are elaborated at length in seeming exasperation. They include a bad female officer who didn’t assimilate into a different language environment, tried to be friendly with everyone, sunbathed during a field exercise in her brassiere, and was engaged in an adulterous affair; a lazy female subordinate who stayed home feigning illness based on forged medical documents, and whose dismissal required careful and elaborate proof on the part of Forces officials to avoid legal charges of discrimination; several lesbians whose sexuality was surprisingly unapparent to the respondent, or whose aberrant sexuality was signified by severe social problems. The first example of the bad female officer is elaborated in the final chapter as it most comprehensively summarizes offensive aspects of women’s integration into the Forces.

In all of these instances, respondents construct men and women as two distinct groups, characterized by physical and behavioural dimorphism, cultural and attitudinal dissimilarities. In this they are in accord with Canadian Forces researchers who, rather than observing the spectrum of characteristics in the incoming or currently serving military population, begin with attributed gender and then classify individuals accordingly (e.g. strong woman, weak man). The premise and primary predictor is gender difference, a self-confirming process which leads to the belief
that the characteristic make-up of a military unit largely depends on its gender composition:

mixed gender units possess a much broader range of individual abilities, personalities and attitudes than units composed of only one sex (Department of National Defence 1988:6).

Implicit in this gender dualization is the corollary of internal uniformity within each of the gender categories. Since, as an internally uniform group, men are thought to differ from a mixed gender group in possessing a narrower range of personal characteristics, introducing women into all-male units means an 

increased complexity introduced by expanding the range of personality and ability within a group (2),

making it more difficult for leaders to lead. Nowhere is there an acknowledgement that if there is greater uniformity within all-male groups then it is fabricated in the process of recruit training, including the practice of driving out nonconforming men. (On the other hand, because of the pressures of integration, leaders may be more constrained to accept and retain nonconforming women.) Furthermore, repeated references throughout this text and respondents’ narratives to the distinctive characteristics of women and men, and to the advantages and disadvantages of having women in a mixed gender unit over all-male units, drives home the point of gender dualism as well as a preference for males.

Ideas of women’s, and mostly by inference, men’s characteristic strengths and weaknesses emerge from these narratives to confirm that they constitute not merely claims, but attestations of what men and women really are. Women are mostly described as existentially fixed subjects possessing (sometimes contradictory) features immanent in what is a largely ascribed status (Kopytoff 1990). Many of their essentialized characteristics, noted in official documents and by different respondents, are traceable to their symbolically mediated reproductive or nurturing ("social work") functions. These include physical attributes such as weakness, intolerance of harsh climatic conditions, fragility, debilitating menstruation, greater endurance for extended work hours, as well as personal traits and abilities such as interpersonal problem-solving skills, technical skills of attentiveness to repetitive and monotonous details requiring patient vigilance4, emotional vulnerability (to supervisor’s bullying) but greater capacity to cope with professional
stress. And though these gender-based, a-historical descriptors sometimes vary by respondent and clash, all correspond to referents in the technologically rationalized structure. And all assume that women and men constitute two distinct and immutable, internally undifferentiated groups. More on this later.

Defending Difference

In tension with these essentialist narratives of a bifurcated gender are subordinate narratives based on pragmatic, empirical observations that gender is neither a valid nor always useful basis for differentiating or categorizing human populations. Military researchers devote considerable time and energy to monitoring and reporting on the bodies, behaviour and attitudes of military personnel. As a result, the leadership recognizes that--independent of gender attribution--humans vary considerably in their exhibited characteristics, and that men and women do not constitute internally homogeneous categories.

Hence, what is striking about these accounts of difference is that even official ones are frequently interspersed--often juxtaposed--with *disclaimers*, without evident concern that the latter undermine or refute the principle claim of difference. Such contradictory juxtapositions can be found in the briefing notes on 'Mixed Gender Service in Army Field Units'. In tension with the essentialist view that men and women differ, and that each constitutes an internally undifferentiated category, is the following assertion:

> In any discussion of the differences between the sexes it should be understood that we can only talk about averages. *There is really no such thing as the average person, it is only a concept, and we do not treat people as averages* (emphasis in original; Department of National Defence 1988:9).

Then, having just dismissed gender difference--based as it is on the erroneous approach of computing averages--the text proceeds *on the basis of this very premise* to remark that,

*initial differences* between men and women are either reduced or eliminated by training (emphasis added; 9),

and to report the attitudinal and behavioral differences between men and women, including what "specific research indicates [these are] *on average*" (emphasis added; 10). There is also a caution
against

noting individual behaviour by a woman but generalizing this behaviour to all
women (7).

an essentializing practice of which the authors of this text seem to be guilty themselves.

Contradictions within narratives focusing on physical differences between men and
women are equally blatant. Such contradictory statements can sometimes be found on the same
page, following on the heels of one another:

There are large differences in physical abilities between men and women...You
cannot totally ignore physical differences (emphasis added; 9).

And yet,

...there are very few proven physical and psychological differences between the
two sexes" (emphasis added; 9).

And,

In reality, there are few tasks which do not fall within the normal range of
functioning of women (9).

Finally, leaders are assured that assumed differences between the sexes

either cannot be supported by fact or the overlap in abilities between the sexes
is so great as to make a distinction between the two meaningless. There are far
more similarities than differences between the sexes (10).

But if there are more similarities and few substantiated gender differences, or if gender difference
is meaningless, then why the necessity to assure leaders, in the very next sentence, to be
unconcerned: "unit officers and NCO's need not be overly concerned about these differences"
(10)? And why the necessity for annexes, which, though prefaced by disclaimers that
"generalizations are inaccurate" (1988:27), provide details of women's body size, shape and
physical proportions including their faces and feet, women's comparative strength, as well as
assurances that women's breasts are "not likely to be 'damaged' in field/combat situations" (29)?
Since the primary goal of combat is in fact to "damage" your opponent, to maim and kill, why
single out and exempt women's breasts, as opposed to men's genitalia, for example, which are
also procreational, and equally exposed and vulnerable? Could the purpose be to reassure military
leaders of the combat immunity, and hence, preservation of these symbols of Canadian

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womanhood? And what of women's other appendages? In the context of this narrative, are they considered fair game?

These official narrative inconsistencies, contradictions and vacillations, the reverting time and again to the notion of gender difference following claims of its non-existence, irrelevance, or meaninglessness, suggest a reluctance to abandon gender dualism as an idea. This same reluctance percolates through the interviews, demarcating, as we see below, the gender boundary, or where the Forces and individual military members are making their last stand in defence of difference. One respondent acknowledges that once the issue of women's strength was raised, it became apparent that the Forces lacked a physical standard for men as well; that physical strength does not correspond to gender category; that some men in the armed forces are weaker than women; and that many military jobs do not even require such strength. Yet interspersed amongst these disclaimers are affirmations of difference regarding most women's comparative weakness in upper body strength, women's fragility, and their smaller size:

When women first entered the Forces, I think that men would have automatically assumed—less so now than five years ago—[that] women were weak and men were strong. I think people are now realizing that you can't say that, and that we didn't have a physical standard for men. And we have many men in the armed forces who are weaker than women. Although it's probably fair to say that most women are less physically strong in the upper arms. But a lot of jobs we do don't require that kind of strength. Maybe that's the question of fragility. Certainly, some of the girls we had in the regiment were so small they appear to have difficulty in picking up your Coke can there.

And although another respondent acknowledges that differences are individual and distributed across a spectrum of human variation, and that a "lot of males are not even able to do it", most nevertheless cling tenaciously to a sexually bifurcated view of humanity:

...some men, they're just wimps, excuse the expression...I would take women before I take any of these guys. But they are exceptions.

And some see a way out of this dilemma by adopting a uniform standard for all regardless of gender:

And all those things revert to the same thing: one basic standard for everybody.
If you meet the standard, no problem.

But what these views ignore is that, implicitly, men are the standard to which they are referring
and against which women are being measured, and that the concept of 'one basic standard for all' contradicts a bifurcated gendered humanity. The tenacity in preserving gender dualism persists. And, for this and other respondents, the exhaustion of empirical evidence to substantiate difference results, as we see later, in a shift to motivational and other (extraneous) arguments regarding women's unwillingness to engage in the dirty, arduous, risky military tasks anyway, or arguments regarding society's unwillingness to let them.

**Gender Confusion**

Underlying the tension between the notion that human populations bifurcate neatly into men and women, and the empirical observation of human heterogeneity in characteristics and skills independent of gender, is a lack of clarity as to what gender is or should be, or what to make of it. Official policies and programs to integrate women into the Forces seem equally muddled by their narrative constructions within a poorly delineated, albeit dualistic, gender model.

The Annex to the "Combat Related Employment of Women - Implementation Plan" (Department of National Defence 1990) dealing with the integration of men and women in the navy offers examples of either terminological laxity or conceptual confusion. The title refers to a "Gender-Free" navy--translated in French as "Marine Mixte"--(B-1) both repeated frequently in conjunction in the text. But the text also makes oxymoronic reference to "gender-free ships for women" as well as the plan to continue with gender-free ships' companies with men/women ratios as dictated by the number of women available (emphases added; B-2).

The confusion mounts with the translation of "d'emploi mixte" as "mixed gender" in the subsequent clauses--suggesting that the initial failure to use corresponding terms in English and French was less a translation error or oversight than a lack of conceptual clarity. This is followed by yet another translation of "gender-free" as "l'emploi des femmes", as in, "all opportunities to pass information on the gender-free Navy are/will be used..." (B-3), and, alternately, in French as,
on aura recours à tous les moyens disposables pour diffuser de l’information sur l’emploi des femmes dans la Marine... (emphasis added; B-3),

a formula which is repeated in subsequent paragraphs. Then, the subsequent Annex on integration in arms units employs the phrase "mixed-gender" and translates it alternately as "l’emploi des femmes" (C-1), and then as "des deux sexes". There is never reference made to ‘gender-free ships for men’ or ‘l’emploi des hommes’.

These terminological variations suggest either inattention to or, more likely, a difficulty in grappling with the meaning of gender, and with the Human Rights Tribunal’s expectations of the Forces in this regard. The difficulty of taking more useful directives from the Tribunal stems from the latter’s own internal contradictions regarding gender and gender equality. On the one hand, the Tribunal members argue that

integration is a focus on the equality of men and women in employment opportunity rather than on the differences. Emphasis on equality provides for a more integrationist result than the latter and can strengthen the cohesion which is so highly valued by the Forces. Operational effectiveness is a gender neutral concept. Both sexes can aspire to undergo the training required to be operationally effective and then competence in the job will provide the best basis for building the cohesion necessary (emphasis added: 65-6).

But, on the other hand, the Tribunal predicates its argument for women’s military integration on the

integration of women into the civilian work force [which] gives good evidence of the commitment women make to jobs and to careers” (emphasis added: 65).

The latter implicitly constructs ‘women’ as a separate, essentialized category, and plays off the purportedly ungendered nature of armed combat ("operational effectiveness" as "gender neutral") against these gendered individuals (women) who were excluded from combat in the past. But they would now be included because, as gendered beings (i.e. as women) they have demonstrated their commitment to paid employment. Reliant on existing conceptualizations of gender in order to neutralize it, the Tribunal’s logic constructs women as sexualized ‘others’ whose commitment to work is problematized; men’s commitment to work (and fight) is never problematized, but assumed. That the civilian labour market is itself gendered, and that women’s integration into it has been fraught with adversity is hinted at in a reference to the Royal Commission on the Status
of Women (1970), but is otherwise ignored in the Tribunal’s report. And consistent with the Tribunal’s construction of women as gendered against a backdrop of supposedly "gender neutral" military work is the Tribunal’s failure to expressly examine either the construction of men as a gendered group, men’s commitment to combat, or the discriminatory "limitation of combat duty risk to men", which, it should be remembered, constituted one of the four original Human Rights complaints. Perhaps most importantly, informed by an understanding of gender as an attribute of individuals rather than social structures, the Tribunal focused its attention on women and men, thereby failing to expressly examine the military social structure—and its dispersal of power—or its related processes which produced these gendered beings and their complaints of discrimination to begin with.

The Tribunal’s contradictory and perplexed gender conceptualizations⁵, transferred to the Canadian Forces through its order to integrate women, can perhaps explain the Forces’s own muddled approach and understanding. But the Tribunal’s expectations could not have been directly instrumental in formulating the "Mixed Gender Service in Army Field Units", published in June, 1988, well before the Tribunal’s ruling. Yet, as we saw above, it, too, clung to a contradictory yet dualized gender model. The reason may not be merely that the Forces is at a loss when it comes to gender, but that their gender issue is really about women, and the profound institutional and personal ambivalences, forebodings and resistances to what women and their equal integration represent. This is introduced below and discussed more fully in Chapter Eight.

Women's Otherness

The Forces’ official texts and respondents’ unofficial narratives share a predominantly essentialized gender conceptualization. They also extend beyond dimorphism to appraise the two gender categories. They problematize, devalue and marginalize women relative to the masculine normative core based both on gender’s presumed physicality (strength and endocrinology) and its symbolic meaning and valuation relative to different aspects of the military social structure. In this, the relationship of men to women corresponds to the multiple oppositions noted above
and in the previous chapter. The focus in these texts is either on the general phenomenon of difference, or on women alone.

That the Forces’ gender problematic is women, and not men, is suggested by the overt framing of many of the above essentialist views in the context of women’s ‘Otherness’. Men are narratively construed as the mainstay of the Canadian Forces; women are adjuncts who have "served alongside men in Canada and overseas" (Department of National Defence 1988:1) since the second World War, whose employment by the Forces has been expanding since 1970, and who are now urgently needed because of the "shrinking population of potential male applicants between the ages of 17 and 24 (2)". Yet, despite this urgency, women stand out as ‘Other’ against the ‘We-ness’ of men and masculinity.

Otherness surfaces in respondents’ references to women as "those people", "these people", "those women", or ‘them versus us’. Thus, in describing his first exposure to women in the Forces, one respondent noted:

And my reaction at first was, fine, as long as they’re gonna keep them in a milieu that they can serve us best, i.e. administration. Like...desk work.

And as long as you were within the base confines you certainly had very, very limited access or exposure to these people [women].

Later, when this respondent shifted to a milieu where there were more women: "now I put myself into working with those women." Although this respondent locates these views in the earlier period of his career, given his other thoughts on the subject, they would seem to be current:

As a rule, I have a lot of difficulty accepting, and supervising women in that environment [operational] knowing that the people in my platoon, or whatever, may have to support those, you know, those people, i.e., carry them for periods of time because they cannot cope with the demand of physical endurance as required.

Having women in the Forces can cause men hardship, especially when taking women into the field:

It makes it very hard on the men because you have to isolate them [the women]. You can’t have them all in the same tent.

(This contradicts the position of another respondent who notes that in the field women and men
routinely share the same tents, with no negative consequences.)

Thus, to many, women are another kind of social animal, a foreign element in the operational milieu. In order to promote their acceptance, the message to leaders in the "Mixed Gender Service in Army Field Units" training package is one of reassurance that having 'them' would be to the leader's benefit:

Leaders who have experience in newly integrated mixed gender units often report a number of positive factors associated with their servicewomen as a group. In general, these leaders report fewer disciplinary problems within their units as well as more consistent and reliable overall performance (1988:4).

Women's other virtues are also extolled: maturity, being less prone to financial and personal mismanagement, more education than men, reflecting a higher intelligence in certain military occupations.

But not all leaders are convinced. One respondent, though emphatic in positively assessing certain of women's attributes in staff positions, concludes—in contradiction to official policy—that having 'them' in field operations is an administrative handicap because it is inefficient. As the Other, women require special treatment which causes problems. For example, until recently women were allowed one shower weekly in the field compared to the monthly shower for men:

That's what the doctor recommended from a hygiene point of view. So, it was a major, major problem to try and get rid of that shower a week...To give you an example, I participated in a major exercise in (Canadian location) which included a lot of reservists. And, you talk reservists, you're talking about a high, much higher proportion of female soldiers. And, again, that problem of showers came up because we were getting a high level of infection and casualties in women.

In addition to these problems of hygiene, women cause other administrative difficulties, specifically in the area of supplies:

We had to develop a new size and shape of uniform to cater to women. When I go into the field, I have to bring spare parts for vehicles, weapons, ammunition—and spare clothing. In a solely male organization, I don't need twenty-four different sizes of boots which I need when I cater for people wearing size five and people wearing thirteen and one-half. I don't have to cater for bras, and underwear for female and for male. So when I go into the field, even for one, two or three females in my organization—I get a full load of different kit to provide the same level of service required by male or female. Although that's not
a show-stopper problem, it's another thing that has to be taken into account. If
the armed forces has to put money into research and development to adapt equip-
ment for women, again, there's a cost. And from a pure business point of view,
is it cost effective? You should see the costs involved in having females on
combat ships, which—why not?

His categorical conclusion is that some armed forces might have

...a very high, very substantial percentage of females. But rarely, with few
exceptions, in the combat arms. Because the endstate is to go to war and be
efficient and cost effective.

Not only are women an administrative handicap, they are an operational handicap by
resisting a key element of its success: bonding. As we saw in Chapter Five, much of this bonding
occurs in after-hours socializing, and women, apparently, participate less. After a long day at
work, men will

...go and have a drinking party together, or really have a means to relieve the
pressure, I guess. And I haven't seen too much of that in the women. It sometimes
happens as well: they'll have their good time too. But they don't exercise that
as much as the men would. That probably goes way back. Men have always been that
way. It's to have a means to relieve tension, and develop more camaraderie in a
different set of circumstances. I mean, we have a job to do. Sometimes we have
to work hard in order to do it. There are also good sides to it where we should
also be prepared to go into a relaxing mode and still be exposed to the same
group of people but in a social environment so you can develop that esprit de
corps. And on the part of woman, I haven't seen as much of that.

His explanation of this difference in socializing practice is that maybe "men have always been
that way" and women have not. But his narrative may unwittingly harbour another explanation
for women's reluctance to participate in after-hours carousing:

First of all, they [women] don't mix as much, I find. Like, if we all go into an
exercise, some of them will carry on. But they feel, I think, very uncomfortable
in that milieu because it can be pretty vulgar at times. You have to appreciate,
the guys have been on exercise for two weeks. They've been depriving themselves
of sleep, some of them that like to drink a little bit, they probably haven't had
a chance to have a drink. So many factors, and then all of a sudden you just turn
them loose.

Aside from the possibility that the women may have had competing demands on their time,
another explanation presents itself. What this respondent fails to consider is that the women, too,
had been on exercise and sleep-deprived; that the men's vulgarity might—deliberately or not—be
directed at women generally or these women in particular; that their vulgarity might cause the women discomfort rather than relieve them of their tension; and that the women might be absenting themselves to resist being avenues for men’s stress release. Nor does he consider that had the women attended, their presence would disrupt the military’s symbolic use of women as objects of sexual denigration and exploitation in the training process, which motivates men by eroticizing violence, as we will soon see.

In sum, women’s Otherness is manifested and represented narratively in a number of ways: it takes the form of what women can do for, to, or against men or the organization. Women, not men, are problematized: they either enhance or hinder the military’s established practices and goals. Otherness is evident in the material handicapping of effective operational performance, the ultimate arbiter of all things military. And whereas men may be familiar with women in the non-military world, or in non-operational occupations within the military, in these new, particularly operational, and ostensibly gender-equalitarian settings, women represent the unknown, and prove to be an operational impediment and an administrative burden. By intruding on men’s world, they introduce a disruptive diversity (and complexity) into uniformity. But these disruptions, impediments or—infrequently—enhancements extend beyond the material. As we see next, what also invokes woman’s Otherness is her symbolic femininity, sexuality, and primary allegiance to the family.

Femininity. The sense of familiarity with women in the non-military world carries over into those military occupations which have traditionally employed women, and is represented by particular ‘feminine’ qualities which women are said to possess, or by the responses which they elicit in men. In this sense, just having women around is desirable:

Now, in reality, in a peacetime mode. I think there have to be some [women] in there. As a matter of fact there could be more. I don’t think I would be very upset. Because you need that, uh, sort of mix. Because just imagine if we had just a male environment. After a while you would get bored; it would be very boring. Because you need different ideas, different approaches. And, like I said, we’re all human beings. You like having girls around, if you’re normal. If you don’t, you’re not. I’m sorry. And I hope they feel the same way.

Whereas this respondent’s nuanced reference is to an underlying sexual attraction, another
respondent, referring to the frequently cited artillery example used to illustrate women’s inadequacy in operations, ultimately discounts the importance of physical differences between men and women. Instead, he locates it in the arena of the “emotional”, manifested in his posture of polite chivalry towards women, and later on in the soothing effect which women have:

There have been some that are artillerymen--artillerywomen—and they’ve apparently been doing okay. I don’t know how they can physically do it. I mean, we have a lot of unfit males too, so what’s the difference, I guess. It’s not so much the physical aspect, I suppose. It’s more the emotional. I grew up in an environment where I still hold the door open for women, I still ask them if they want to sit down, all this sort of thing. And now everything is equal. Well to me, we’re never really equal. I still have a little bit of the flavour of chivalry, I guess.

And again.

Physically, I don’t think there’s going to be too much of a problem. Women can endure. The problem will come down to emotional, men with girls, that sort of thing.

And for him, the expression of this difference is in his treatment of women with greater politeness than men:

I’ll give them [women] an order. But I’m sure I’ll be politer at it because that’s the way I am. I’m sure it’s not uncommon in the environment, not at all. You treat them equally by way of fairly. But I know I’m still politer to a girl regardless of whether she’s in the military or not.

His explanation is that although people are equal, some are more equal than others. He narrates his views through those of his wife:

[Wife’s name] believes that people are equal, but almost the same as I do, that some people are more equal? You treat them differently because of who they are Do I treat them differently? Yeah, sure I do. I’m just as nice to the men. But I’m probably more nice to the women.

For this respondent, an important emotional ingredient in gender difference is the soothing effect that women have, particularly for soldiers--by implication male--returning from high-stress environments such as Yugoslavia:

Maybe you can well imagine, people coming out of Yugoslavia who were not doing staff type jobs, that were actually out on the line. They’re seeing some pretty gruesome things which they could never envision. Sure you can envision soldier against soldier. But kids and families. And that’s difficult, because they grew up in a different environment here. Oh yeah, if you live in downtown Toronto maybe its everyday life. And maybe that’s another reason why its good to have

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women, because women have a soothing effect. You can always feel good, I always feel good if a woman smiles. I feel good when guys smile, but when a woman smiles then its something that makes you-. Its like a flower, you know. A flower in bloom now, you can see it and you go, ‘Ah, life’s not so bad.’ Na, no physical attraction. Just the pleasantries of having the opposite gender there. Maybe too much smiling...may cause problems. But again, I have no recollection of that.

Thus, women are a soothing counterpoint to the brutality of the soldier’s world. This respondent’s earlier invocation of ‘equal but different’ is repeated by another, though now the reference is to society’s desire to maintain and respect difference, including gradations in femininity which are present even in tomboys:

I think it’s a gradual recognition by both men and women that they are at the same time equal and different. I’m not sure society ever wants to get to the stage where you look at a person and you can’t tell they’re a woman or a male, and that we act exactly the same. I think it’s part of the way our society has evolved. But I think it’s possible to respect those differences and respect that there’s going to be different gradations of those differences. There’s going to be the girl who likes lots and lots of make-up and Barbie dolls, and there’s going to be the girl who’s perhaps traditionally called the tomboy, but still feminine, doesn’t have to be feminine, and people are going to have to respect their capabilities as being equal as well.

Women, though essentialized, are internally differentiated. But the primary difference remains that of gender, with some, as yet unidentified, though desirable purpose which society has an interest in preserving. This respondent goes on to insist that women in the army need not act like men or adopt masculine characteristics. Yet, this is what he implies in his notion of female mutability: women temporarily shedding their femininity in the field to allow equality to surface, then donning it again at the exercise’s completion. In his narration, symbolic gender is manifested in the military uniform, the signifier of ‘equality’—and by implication a mantle of masculinity:

I don’t think women joining the male-, joining the army need to feel they have to act like men. They don’t have to take on what we traditionally term masculine type characteristics to join the military. There’s nothing wrong with being feminine and being in the military, as long as when it’s time to get dirty, the femininity is put to the side for a while, and then obviously some of the unique feminine aspects won’t apply in the field. That’s when the equal parts sort of comes on? An awful lot of the soldiers suddenly became really, really pretty when we saw them in civvies. Never ever assumed they were pretty before because they were in uniform. Nothing wrong with that, so long as when you’re in uniform you start to recognize that you’re more or less equal.
Thus, the female military chameleon is temporarily transformed into ‘equal soldier’ as she dons the uniform, only to revert to ‘femininity’ as it is removed. But despite the respondent’s protests, in a world dominated by a dualized gender model, the non-feminine is masculine. ‘Putting the feminine to the side’ means adopting a masculine mode.

Another respondent expressly interprets femininity as antithetical to or incompatible with the military:

It’s not just anybody that will join the military, especially if they go into the combat arms. Because I don’t think they would last long if they are very feminine. Because once I put you through basic training as just the beginning of it all... That’s why I think attrition is so high for them because they all want to be in the military, but not at the price they’re asking where you have to be out there. Fighting, out in a tent, digging ditches and trenches, and crawling in the mud.

These narratives, and those to come, suggest that femininity in the Forces is not merely fractured but splintered into a myriad of female-associated attributes, with technical referents refracted off its organizational requisites, which can affirm men’s sense of their masculinity and protective capacity while constituting social lubricants to soothe and absorb men’s tensions, and provide them with emotional relief and refuge from the “gruesome” war zone. In this and more, some of these femininities act in concert as welcoming and necessary counterpoints to that military masculinity which is lived out in a largely antithetical world: aggressive, competitive, dirty, gruff, vulgar, harsh, brutal and deadly. In the military climate, women are both affirming for men and anomalous—some femininities serving as objects of men’s sexual gaze and desire to affirm their sense of masculine heterosexuality, others intruding into, disrupting or confronting the military enterprise. The message is that women’s and men’s are incompatible worlds—but the feminine Other can sometimes serve the masculine core, both practically and symbolically, or adjust to its modalities. Within these parameters, gender equality for women means adopting the appropriate form of military masculinity when necessary; for men it means resisting femininity, particularly its debilitating weaknesses and the Other’s disruptiveness.

Thus, in manifesting the Other, femininities are necessary, representing as they do the antithesis of the military world which must be identified, vigilantly resisted and expelled in the pursuit of the lethal mission. To this end, sergeants are used to drum ‘the woman’ out of the
recruit, a process to which one respondent for this study alludes, albeit vaguely:

The sergeant in the army knows how to motivate people, and he uses all kinds of little tricks that you would find, well, probably ethically inappropriate... **Generating** this very complicated combat ethos in a monogender environment is relatively simple, and people have been doing it for millennia. Of course, if you talk to a feminist or anyone else, they will ask, ‘Why are you using these sleazy tools?’ And the answer is ‘Because they work.’ The value that the sleazy tools, that sexist approaches—exploiting people’s natural pride is a **pretty sleazy** and socially unproductive activity from some people’s point of view—have is that they certainly work pretty well.

There are horrendous cases where people accuse us of using vulgar and inappropriate analogies in correcting people. And, of course, we do it. The approach is, by creating a vulgar analogy, to get all the other people laughing at this individual to correct him. Its a kind of group leadership, group discipline which in the best communistic approaches is considered to be sophisticated. But in essence military units have been doing that since time immemorial. You want to get people working to a common, collective goal. People are being uncooperative; you use group pressure to bring them into line. And these kinds of analogies which are often sexual, often just straight vulgar and brutal, are used. And they work pretty well.

In contrast to this respondent’s relatively innocuous description—partially cited in Chapter Five—are more graphic ones of the methods used by American drill sergeants (Arkin and Dobrofsky 1990; Eisenhart 1975); that they are saturated with the misogyny of military ideology is legion (Dyer 1985). The psychological goal of basic training, according to Eisenhart, is threefold: accepting the psychological control of superiors; equating masculine identity with military performance; and equating the entire military mission with raw aggression. Forging links between the male recruit’s sense of masculinity and achieving his military mission, violence and aggression is produced by constantly challenging his sexual identity with taunts of suspected homosexuality or, even worse, of being a girl. Only displays of extreme aggression and dominance satisfy the drill instructor and temporarily call a halt to his endless litany of verbal and physical abuse. In one particularly gruesome description suggestive of the "group discipline" and "often just straight vulgar and brutal" methods referred to by the respondent above, a terrified recruit who fails to keep up on a gruelling exercise is literally tossed about overhead by his enraged fellow platoon members, and eventually physically cast out of the group—a symbol of femininity exorcised (Eisenhart 1975).
Female Sexuality. Central to this notion of exorcised femininity is female sexuality. Arkin and Dobrofsky (1990) explore the military's emphasis on objectified female sexuality and related heterosexual exploitation as means of reaffirming the male soldier's masculine identity. Eroticized misogyny attests simultaneously to the soldier's heterosexuality and toughness. Female heterosexuality is integral to male military socialization as a symbolic focus of the ritual exorcism of recruits. As a corollary process, male violence is eroticized, and misogynized female sexuality becomes its safe object. The entire process is reminiscent of the routine and vicious physical attacks on women's genitalia amongst the New Guinea Highlanders, described in Chapter Two, part of a complex of extreme male-female antagonism, gender segregation, the devaluation of women's indispensable economic activities—all intended to bolster male solidarity, project the tensions amongst men onto women and transfer onto them men's fears about war (Gelber 1986). A similar though less extreme dynamic may be operating in the Canadian military. The promotion of heterosexually abusive behaviour and ideas involving the denigration of objectified female sexuality is a means of establishing male dominance and impairing the soldier's capacity for empathy. That the eroticization of violence and fabrication of dominant masculine self-esteem out of such eroticized misogyny is incorporated into Canadian military socialization is acknowledged by the above respondent:

The big problem that we have had in the military is incorporating women into combat mores and values. From my point of view, the structural approach to developing combat morale has been largely sexist—in the same sense that we use sex to sell cars or do other things. The sizzle on the steak is often sexually oriented and as we are trying to resocialize people into a new environment which is more demanding and certainly more dangerous what they come from...We tend to get back to basic approaches to human motivation, and hence, the traditional approach to military training and military resocialization is to exploit the sexual urge. My friends tell me that you can do this extremely easily in mono-gender groups; its very difficult in bigender groups. You can do the same thing with a group of women as with a group of men to engender their interests and motivation. Have you ever seen Gwynne Dyer's movie on war? Perhaps you remember the part on recruit training, and the chap using the idea "Suzy Rotten Crotch"? Well, in essence, they're taking a man's, typically an eighteen or nineteen-year-old's interest in sex, and using it to teach them how to load an M-16.

This respondent deftly rephrases "sexist", i.e. sexually denigrating practices, as a neutral interest
in sex. That such "sexist" behaviour and ideas breach the boundaries of basic training to pervade daily life and meaning in the military is also confirmed by now publicized examples such as the simulated anal intercourse and other degrading sexual practices to which Canadian Airborne Regiment initiates were subjected during hazing rituals.

Thus, female sexuality in its multiple manifestations of Otherness—a basis for establishing male dominance, symbol of the exploitable and that which must be resisted and expelled in order to create violent, masculine combatants—assumes its place in the gallery of military enemies alongside others identified in the previous chapter: the intrusive civilian society; military wives and families; physically inferior and operationally burdensome women; disruptions to the rank structure; individual identity and autonomy; and above all, disobedience and critical thought. But, again, what makes the danger of female sexuality particularly complex is its contradictory nature: in its incarnation as the enemy, it is a perpetual and necessary target which must be kept visibly marked; but, invoking as it does Eve—the embodiment of both the triumphs and risks of female sexual temptation, disruptive of cohesion and terminal to the rank structure—it must be soundly suppressed as we see next:

As noted briefly in Chapter Five, and broadly acknowledged in both interviews and official texts, the military leadership is concerned about sexual liaisons because they disrupt the bonding process and, as fraternization, undermine the rank structure:

And the concern is that, yes, the bonding process will take place, but where do you expect the bonding process to be complete? Does it carry over into sexual interaction? In our view, that cannot happen because the moment that happens then it's over, and there's a major problem that has arisen at this point...because somewhere down the road there's a problem between those two people and then, you know what happens when two people break apart a romantic relationship? It usually goes in the opposite direction. But then you've got two people in a unit and something that's working against unit cohesion. And unit cohesion is essential to operational capability.

Here, the main interference with cohesion is the jealousy amongst men for women's affection:

What I'm looking at now is...where we have one or two women in a group of ten, and jealousy between males for the affections of one of those women.

The competition amongst men for women's affection was also raised by another respondent:
What I have found, when I go right back [to my time] as an officer cadet and all the way up to my current rank is, when there are women around there is always a sense of competitiveness. Don't ask me why, but it's always there. We all have genes and... if you're normal, you are always attracted to women. I think what your subconscious is trying to tell you is--and at that time I was single--if you have a chance to prove to this woman that you're better than this guy beside you, maybe you have a chance to start having a friendship.

The disruptive effects of female sexuality are also a concern in the "Mixed Gender Service in Army Field Units" where the threat posed by fraternization between members of different ranks is distinguished from interpersonal relationships between like-ranking members. In the latter case, the position taken predictably echoes the respondents above:

Unprofessional displays of intimacy and sexual misconduct among persons of equal rank are also destructive of morale and effectiveness. Experience has shown that this behaviour can be controlled when the subordinates are given clear, reasonable, enforceable guidelines and the expected level of conduct is emulated by the leaders. Where isolated incidents do occur they are easily handled by the disciplinary structure (Department of National Defence 1988:12).

Fraternization between ranks constitutes a threat of a different order as it attacks the very core of the institution:

Fraternization, or overfamiliarity between ranks, poses one of the greatest threats to discipline and the effectiveness of the Unit. Ideally, the disciplinary structure of the Army is founded upon mutual respect, trust and pride. Fraternization undermines that structure and overt disrespect for rank will result. Leader/subordinate liaisons contribute directly to an erosion in unit morale, cohesion, confidence and pride.

The leaders who do engage in such unprofessional conduct abuse the power that their rank provides whether or not this is their intention. They also set the tone in their units with regard to the treatment and respect of female service members. Whether that treatment is exploitive or professional may well be determined by the actions of one leader (Department of National Defence 1988:12).

Thus, against the backdrop of a normative, seductive heterosexuality, there is a perceived undercurrent of sexual risk implied in all mixed gender interactions. Hence, all members must be reminded...of the guidelines and policies concerning sexual harassment, fraternization, personal intimacy and sexual relations. The consequences of these relationship problems can be devastating to a unit's morale, cohesion and ultimately its effectiveness (Department of National Defence 1988:2-3).

The underlying assumption in these admonitions against fraternization, personal intimacy, sexual
relations and sexual harassment, as well as against the risks of the leader’s abuse of power is that the leader is male and the follower female, and at play is a gendered power imbalance. The potential for such abuse was outlined in detail by only one of the ten respondents to acknowledge this male power to abuse. Instead, others spoke of how the definition of sexual harassment had become so broad and all-encompassing as to be meaningless; of the possibility of reverse harassment; of the ease of bringing false sexual harassment accusations; and of feeling silenced as a result of fearing such accusations. This is discussed more fully in the final chapter.

In sum, the forebodings associated with female sexuality and its related risks are heightened even more now with the project of integrating women into the Forces. Set against this backdrop of powerful and conflicted sexual images, establishing their credibility is difficult for female servicemembers. This could partly explain respondents’ reluctance to accept women as operational equals or superiors:

So when you see a female officer coming through the door who is gonna tell you, Soldier So-and-So, you’re gonna charge that machine gun nest and destroy it’, if that officer, either female or male, has not gained the respect, is not renown to be a good leader, most of the time the soldier wouldn’t even perform. And for a female it’s much more difficult. Most of the time they have to perform better to gain the same level of respect at the worker level. In the army, anyway.

In this female-denigrating context, what can male servicemembers possibly ‘see’ when the female officer or enlisted member ‘comes through the door’? Ungendering the Forces, instituting a form and degree of egalitarianism—if it were possible in such a profoundly gendered world—would mean depriving the military of what has been from its early roots a sine qua non in its construction of differentiated lives and deaths intrinsic to its technological structure. And much of these differential requirements become apparent in examining what is seen as a principal source of women’s operational ineffectiveness: their primary allegiance to the family.

Family. As seen in Chapters Four and Six, much of the threat posed by women derives from their symbolic identification with social spheres which are antithetical to the military, yet also necessary as they serve its technologically rationalized requirements. Similar to the Azande warriors whose domestic needs were met by their ‘boy wives’, the military’s masculine design envisions and positions the adjunct to the absent Canadian soldier—the ever-present ‘Mom’ and
her domestic services—off in the military wings. As noted in Chapter Five, the structural liminality of garrison life for married military men and the requirement of round-the-clock availability are both predicated on the soldier’s domestic mainstay, the military wife who assumes sole responsibility for child-care and household, subordinating her own life to her husband’s and the military’s needs. These assumptions determine military policy:

We organize a lot of our personnel policies on the basis that the soldier, the sailor or the airman is the breadwinner, and the spouse is the dependent wife. We don’t consider, or we haven’t until very recently, that the spouse might have a job. We say that you’re in the military, and if we want you to go to Petawawa tomorrow, you’re in Petawawa tomorrow. Yes, we’ll move your family, but your wife’s job and your kids’ education is secondary to our need for you in Petawawa.

And men whose wives have careers pay a price in the limitations to their own career progression, noted by Harrison and Laliberté (1994) and another respondent:

A lot of male officers are married and their spouse also has a professional career. Most of the time you’re allowed or able to move them around. You have to. But those guys are sacrificing a portion of their career because of their spouse.

And according to a third respondent, anything else impinges on operational effectiveness, particularly if the soldier is female and herself impeded by family responsibilities:

When you get sent away for a long amount of time, your personal family situation is a factor in whether or not you can go or not. But if you have a significant amount of people who can’t go because they’re mothers, and mothers can’t leave their children, that’s starts to effect on your operational effectiveness.

What, then, of the female soldier who is subject to the occupational requirement of twenty-four hour availability, but is equally bound by what is considered women’s proper place, symbolized by her mammary battlefield immunity cited earlier? A unanimous note sounded by all respondents reaffirms women’s identification with, and expected primary commitment to, family and children. This perspective acts as an interpretive filter in unofficial discourses on a variety of subjects such as women’s higher attrition rates than men’s:

Historically, if somebody is gonna take care of the home, it always falls back on the woman. I don’t have figures in front of me, but, if you look at the attrition of women in the Canadian Forces it is extremely high. I’m convinced, and I can only speak from observation, if you have 8 or 9% of woman in the Canadian Forces, I would be surprised if at least 50% don’t last beyond the first two years. If you compare that to the men, it could be 30%, 20%. I have seen in
a lot of cases that attrition was the result of having a child and deciding now it's time to spend time with the child. Normally, 90% of the time the woman ends up getting out of the Forces. It's always the woman that seems to be giving into the family decision as far as raising kids and that kind of stuff.

For this respondent, the family is a domain which women choose to prioritize, rather than one which is structured as feminine and ideologically incompatible with military life. That the family is woman's domain is also the silent subtext of the conclusion that "The military is rough for families", and that, in the absence of the mother, a female substitute must be called in. Thus, in a narrative on childcare solutions for single parents sent on exercise or for training, a respondent says:

And if you're a single parent you really have a problem. If you're due for six months you better have a good mom...

And, in referring to a single father sent away on a six month assignment:

...he's got a mother maybe in Ottawa or Montreal or Nova Scotia somewhere. What do you do? You can't take your kid and go to a different city.

Although somewhat extreme, because the demands are extreme, these sentiments and maternal constructions could be said to mirror those in the larger Canadian society. Where the military sharply breaks company with the broader societal sentiment is in its lethal mandate and soldiers' unlimited liability to lay down their lives for Queen and country. This is where women soldiers' maternity most profoundly affronts men's combative masculinity since, as seen in Chapter Four, death on the battlefield has long been constructed as an exclusive male prerogative, an early derivative of gendered notions of citizenship ideals in Western philosophical tradition, ultimately incorporated into the social practices of real men and women. Whereas women are symbols of attachment to individual bodies, private interests and natural feeling—all that war and citizenship in the Western tradition intends to contain and transcend—going into battle entails discarding the feminine. Men's patriotism is demonstrated in the masculinity of war and self-sacrifice; women's is demonstrated in the surrender of her sons to "significant deaths" (Lloyd 1986:76).

It is this construction of death in battle as a privilege—and a male privilege at that—which is perhaps the most paradoxical aspect of the military enterprise. It underscores the unity...
of military masculinity, forming the basis and most blatant marker of the military’s gendered differentiation of lives and deaths. But women are now encroaching on men’s exclusive territory:

Women have said they have the right to die on the battlefield as much as men for their country. And that’s fine, as long as society’s prepared to ask that.

And beyond the various disciplinary, structural and ideological methods used to inculcate and sustain a posture of obedient self-sacrifice in its soldiers, what remains unexplained is how the Forces differentially constructs men’s and women’s deaths. The process by which men are initiated into a posture of self-sacrifice begins with the erasure of individual identity in boot camp, and its replacement with one of uniformity and military rank. What makes the female servicemember less eligible for sacrifice is that, in contradiction to her military status, her feminine identity remains enmeshed in family ties and responsibilities, her militarily constructed womanhood rooted to her family of procreation. This may explain why women’s deaths are considered less tolerable than men’s. an anxiety-laden refrain repeated in the interviews, and reflected in one respondent’s interjection on the deaths of Israeli women, which, he contends, are received differently than men’s:

Until recently every Israeli woman was drafted. But even though women are part of combat units, they do not use women for combat. When they actually fight they withdraw the women. That is considered necessary from the point of view of Israeli mores. Deaths of women, deaths of any Israeli is a problem. But deaths of women are particularly heartfelt, and they get very upset about that.

Tethered to the family, women’s identity is more difficult to erase than that of men who are “nattlly alienated” (Patterson 1982). Boot camp aims to sever men’s natal ties and destroy their individual civilian identities, only to revive them in the moment of glorious death on the battlefield, icons of memory woven into the military ethos to discipline future generations of soldiers. Women’s family attachments—both symbolical and practical—place them beyond the pale of battlefield glory.

This erasure of male identity may partly explain the paradoxical absence of men from many of these formal and informal narratives by virtue of their assumed omnipresence—echoing most early social science research—and the tendency of respondents, in particular, to focus on, and problematize women, devoting little time to men or their characteristics. Hence, the
normalized male image to emerge from these texts is largely inferential, the preferred, and silent, comparative standard against which women are constructed as marginalized Other (‘women are less, more, equal to...’). Men are implicitly constructed as a uniform group synonymous with the military and all that it represents, and presumed more operationally effective: strong, violent, hardy and enduring in harsh conditions. More amenable to the social corralling and segregation required to develop and sustain bellicosity and unit cohesion, men are equally considered fair game for violence and the fight-to-the-finish contests that combat entails, unlike women whom men feel a natural urge to protect. On the whole, (and in probable reference to non-commissioned subordinates) men come across in respondent’s narratives—and often in official texts—as rude, vulgar, unintelligent, uneducated brutes; bullies who are immature and unfeeling, more naturally accommodated to the violence of combat and more accepting of dirty field conditions; inflexible, conservative gynophobes who prefer the company of their own kind. Less consistent or reliable performers, they pose disciplinary problems, have weak interpersonal skills and are prone to financial and personal mismanagement. Although discernable in these narratives are multiple masculinities varying by military environment, men are constructed as comprising a more uniform group, superior to women in those qualities sought by the military, qualities that meet the standards for implementing its prime objective of operationally effective combat.

**Combat: The Final Masculine Frontier**

And it is armed combat that constitutes the final frontier along which the Forces and its male members are mustering their defence of difference and military masculinity. Combat represents the boundary along which gender difference is most clearly marked, where women are problematized most starkly, and where there is greatest consensus regarding their shortcomings. Combat is also the narrative field where supporting arguments are the most extraneous in urgently favouring the retention of the military’s masculinity.

One respondent acknowledges that women may perform better in combat roles:

And some women can even outclass a man in a combat role—though only in certain aspects—if they meet the standard, and most of the time they perform very well,
and most of the time they perform better. Oh, a lot of the time—in some specific area.

But in addition to the reasons already examined for women’s combat exclusion, women would constitute impediments in the ultimate measure of all military practice—operational effectiveness—which can only be tested in war. It is here that women would fail in two of its principle ingredients, cost effectiveness and efficiency:

I’m (unit allocation). There’s a (unit allocation) who is a full colonel and responsible for different sections. I would have no headache whatsoever taking and executing orders in a staff position from a female officer. [But] in combat, in a fighting unit, with a female company commander? Well, I’m bound to obey orders. But relations are gonna be totally different if that officer in a command position has not gained my respect and confidence that she’s able to take the right decisions at the right time in a very, very awkward situation. Most of the armed forces across the world have a very high percentage of females. But rarely in the combat arms. Because the endstate is to go to war and be efficient and cost effective. But it’s very easy in peacetime to forget about that endstate, and push other agendas which are more politically correct.

This respondent is not against women in the Forces—he supports their service primarily to relieve men for the front lines—but favours excluding them from combat:

The Israelis have concluded that women in combat are not cost effective. Perhaps as a last resort, certainly. But they have found that they can use those women to fulfill positions for the good of the overall organization. For example, in the Israeli army, about 80% of instructors in combat school are women. That freed up a lot of men for combat units on the front line. And, they perform very, very well. The quality of training those women provide is fantastic and certainly equal, if not superior, to what you can find here in Canada.

Not only are women in combat operationally ineffective and inefficient; they can actually cripple combat efforts:

There are very few instances where this whole idea of integration has really been put to the final test yet, which is combat. And I think people tend to forget that about the armed forces. I don’t want to compare women to handicapped people which is an extreme example of the male’s reluctance to take something he really doesn’t understand yet into the combat world. He understands men in the combat world. It’s sort of a proven quantity? There is no reason why men with wooden legs and arms who are blind can’t do my job here in downtown Ottawa. He couldn’t do my job if I had to go to Yugoslavia or go to war. There’s probably no reason why a woman couldn’t do my job in Yugoslavia or go to war. But that hasn’t really been proven yet. And I think men—and the military might be reluctant to experiment with this on the battlefield—some men may have doubts about the woman
in combat, because it is such an unknown quantity.

A similar argument about imperilling operations is offered by another respondent:

But in the military profession, what could be required by military personnel at the end is a very, very serious matter. And sometimes those types of integration which try to bring down all barriers to allow women full access to any specific profession or trade could be very dangerous in the armed forces.

Later in the interview he justifies his reservations as being a matter of life and death:

There’s no second place in combat. You either win or lose. It’s not like a boxing match. It’s a much more serious matter. In combat, if you’re not the best, you’re gonna lose. As a leader, any mistakes that you make due to a lack of knowledge or competence will imply that some of your men are gonna die or be wounded. So, you must do everything, everything to be best, to enhance your capability, capacity and professional development to become better, because, as a leader, you might have to lead troops into combat. You’re gonna be responsible for the lives of those people. This is a very, very serious responsibility that all combat arms officers get into when they receive their commission.

But once respondents exhaust their arguments on women’s physical capacity, operational ineffectiveness and associated dangers, some invoke the support of women themselves in defending combat’s exclusive masculinity, describing women as uninterested, unwilling or even hostile to combat arms or other non-traditional military occupations:

When the battles were being fought for integration ten years ago you’d see these big, fat ladies saying ‘Women should go to combat and do what they want.’ And we’d be talking to the girls in the service, officers and technicians, saying, You’re doing the support things. You’re working in medical laboratories...Do you really want to go on a ship for six months at a time? And maybe you do stop for two or three days in the Caribbean. But for twenty-one days before you haven’t seen anybody else. Conditions are not great on the ship. Or if you’re in the army, you’re going to do this camping in Wainright for three months. You get up at 5 o’clock and you run. Do you want to do this camping? And the women were saying, ‘You know, I’m just fine with what I’m doing here. I’ve got good pay. I’m getting respect, fulfilment, and I’m doing what I want’.

Another respondent who strongly supports integration—again, short of combat—recounts women’s antagonism towards having this foisted on them:

Sheila Copps was very keen on ensuring that women got access to combat roles and got to do as much as men—very safe in her office. And a woman serviceman apparently said to her: ‘Thank you very much, Ms. Copps, but I didn’t join the army to fight, carry a rifle and sit in a trench. My view of the army was a near combat role. And thank you for making it possible for us to serve on board ships because I’ve got no interest in ever doing so, and you never will.’ That, I
think, is a relevant point, because it’s difficult enough to find men to go on board a ship. Now it’s no longer a question of whether or not a woman wants to. I believe that’s now just a regular posting.

Now, with integration, most women don’t have the choice. According to another respondent:

There are traditional women and non-traditional women, traditional men and non-traditional men. You’ll get a conflict there, because the traditional woman might want to join the Forces but doesn’t want to be pushed into what she perceives as a man’s job. But she’s going to have to now... It’s nice to have an opportunity to join the Canadian Armed Forces at peace. I wonder how many women really—how many men, too, for that matter, because a lot of men really don’t consider they’re going to war—but I wonder how many women really join the armed forces accepting that they’re going to be on the battlefield.

He acknowledges that men are also averse to fighting, but quickly sidesteps the issue. But the military’s internal motivation for expanding opportunities to women suggests that it derives in part from men’s aversion to these occupations. This is confirmed by the Director of Personnel Selection, Research and Second Careers for the Canadian Forces who notes that:

Even under the best recruiting conditions, these [high risk] environments are attractive to a very restricted segment of the Canadian population (Pinch 1987:3).

However, this argument is articulated neither directly nor often. Only one respondent refers to men’s reluctance to enter combat occupations, specifically the infantry:

most of the males don’t want to make a career out of the combat arms anyway, because it’s very, very hard physically, and your body has problems after year.

But arguments regarding men’s reluctance are the exception. More commonly, the knowledge that most men don’t want to do it and have to be coerced, ‘resocialized’ in basic training using all kinds of “little tricks” and “sleazy tools”, and that the Forces is an employer of last resort for poorly educated Canadian teenagers, is submerged beneath narrative constructions which guard the masculinity of combat through the bifurcation of social spheres represented as gendered: men are defenders of ‘vulnerable womanhood’, women’s natural protectors:

I think the real issue now is women in combat roles, and the literature and the experience, worldwide, is compelling enough to suggest that it is not a good idea. It is a good idea up until you hit combat, and the Israelis discovered that you can have vicious women who kill. But as soon as you try to integrate them in
a unit where you have a number of trenches and all the men know which one has a
woman sitting in it, if that one comes under fire, it is a natural action to try
and protect that woman. I would suggest that it is an involuntary reaction. I
think it is natural.

While on duty overseas as an unarmed peacekeeping observer, this same respondent was paired
for patrol with a female peacekeeper. Being unarmed, he felt no need to be protective of her
since they would have been equally defenceless against armed opponents. He contrasted this with
a situation in which he would be armed:

But if I had the means to influence the situation with force I would take steps
to protect a woman. This is probably a failing, but one that I'm willing to accept.

Reminiscent of the earlier comments of another respondent who describes himself as somewhat
chivalrous, this respondent views himself as a gentleman who is protective of women:

All my reading of the subject, all my investigations and training lead me to
believe that, because I fancy myself a gentleman, I would have a hard time
not taking steps to protect women who were either serving with me or under my
command in a combat situation. And, I'm afraid, you can't let that happen in
combat, never having been in it. So, if I was to express any reservations about
women in the military, that would be women in combat roles.

His sense that protectiveness is a failing derives from his concept of "the military as a profession
of arms" and himself as a professional. But, at bottom, male protectiveness is inbred:

Because, in reality, all soldiers should be the same: male or female, you
shouldn't make those kinds of distinctions. Unfortunately, that seems to be the
experience of other armies that have actually employed women in combat roles.
The men will just do that. Its part of their make-up.

Furthermore, this respondent's adherence to the dichotomous defender/defended construction is
unwavering despite a later acknowledgement that modern weaponry has obliterated the latter's
boundary of safety:

It's modern warfare. Virtually everybody is a target. Since World War II,
civilians are targets. The distinction is blurred as soon as you start moving
into air assets, long-range artillery and precision-guided missiles; everything
is blurred. As soon as you make nuclear weapons an issue and intercontinental
ballistic missiles, the whole scale of combat is now widened to encompass the
entire planet, so the distinctions made in the 1600's between a near-combat role
and a front-line role no longer apply.

These views are consistent with those of yet another respondent who bases his narrative
of the origins of the male defender/female defended distinction on a masculinist fiction of human evolution that reads the present backwards into pre-history:

From the earliest period of military involvement, about 3,000 B.C., military operations have been structured in a fashion perceived to be most effective, and reflected the gender basis of society at the time. This is the anthropological basis that human society benefited from a division of functions where men fought and provided the wherewithal of life, and woman nurtured home, family and children.

Here, men’s predominance in combat and women’s absence are outgrowths of the historical gendered differentiation of spheres and responsibilities which is "most effective" and beneficial to human society. This view excludes the possibility of a reversed sequence, namely that the gendered division of labour relegating women to home, family and children may have emanated from warfare practices. And, constructing the defender/defended dichotomy as long-standing lends it an inevitability, based on the "economic base of society", persisting despite societal changes:

Military operations always have been the principal function of males, with one or two exceptions. The only major effort of women in military operations that I’m aware of is the famous female guard units for the kings of Dahomey...and of course there’s the Amazon mythology. But this has been the division of responsibility in society, based upon the economy and gender base of responsibility. That was the genesis of the male association with combat and national security in the broadest sense: men as providers of national security, and women as its consumers in an economic sense. As society has changed, this has largely carried through.

What this argument for women’s combat exclusion reveals is that the defender/defended dichotomy is based neither in men’s greater physical strength nor in women’s reproductivity. As can also be inferred from earlier discussions on women’s relation to the family, the key lies in the social conditions in which reproduction takes place, which contextualize the construction of socially differentiated lives and deaths. This differentiation includes a double standard in the valuation of men’s and women’s lives: whereas the absence—bar one respondent—of any meaningful discussion of men’s deaths suggests that theirs are taken for granted, whereas the deaths or even abusive treatment of women/mothers by the enemy would not easily be tolerated by society. The unevenness of these approaches is apparent in a respondent’s narrative regarding the kidnapping of British female pilots during the Gulf War. His concern is with British public
reaction to their maltreatment, and the potential Canadian reaction should the sole Canadian Forces female infantry officer be killed while on peacekeeping duty:

I’m also fairly concerned about Canadian society, because during the Gulf War, some British female pilots were taken prisoner by the Iraqis, and had some serious, serious problems. And the reaction of British public opinion was not very good. So, yes, in peacetime, allowing women into combat looks nice. But most of the time people forget about what the endstate is. What would the Canadian reaction be tomorrow if Captain Sandra Perron was killed in Bosnia? What would public opinion be on that matter? I’m not that sure it’s gonna be very positive. I know that’s a reality and a fact that you must take into account.

In his discourse on parental responsibility, another respondent does refer to men as well as to women. But his primary focus is on the latter. Throughout his interview, he returns to question women’s operational effectiveness in combat since their roles as mothers would interfere; he also questions whether ‘society’ would accept either women in combat or their deaths on the battlefield:

When you get sent away for a long time, your personal family situation is a factor in whether you can go or not. But if you have a significant amount of people who can’t go because they’re mothers, and mothers can’t leave their children, that starts to effect your operational effectiveness. And I wonder how serious society really is about women going to combat. It’s just a question I throw out to society: have they really considered that? Mommy could be on the battlefield. Mommy and Daddy could be on the battlefield, and the kids are going to be at home. That’s not the military’s problem because its been told to accept women in the Forces and in the combat arms. Is society prepared for Mommy to get killed on the battlefield? I don’t know. Society’s gotta answer that one.

Thus, although this respondent adds to his queries regarding the maternal responsibilities of female combatants queries about male combatants and their paternal roles, he stops short of asking whether society is prepared for ‘Daddy’s’, or men’s deaths in battle. And although he is convinced that, with time, women will integrate into the Forces, he is not so convinced that the prospect is desirable:

And I think that gradually as women break into this male society—and the military is a male society so far, but they’re breaking in—the playing ground will even out. But still it’s gotta leave society asking these other questions. Do they want women in the battlefield? Who’s gonna take care of the kids?

Subject to the external constraints of integration, military men are caught between promoting women’s family ties, which distinguishes men as defenders, and a resentment of women’s family
allegiances, which disrupts their operational effectiveness.

Conclusion

Cutting across rank and occupational structures, the Canadian Forces differentiates soldiers into two gendered groups based on its premier goal of lethal operational effectiveness. Its implementation disperses power through a technologically rationalized organization which opposes life to death, inverts their civilian meanings, and envisions its ultimate realization in the soldier's liminal, cost-effective, efficient and obedient self-sacrifice in war. The Forces' peculiar bifurcated gender construction derives from oppositions embedded in its technologically rationalized structure and out of the need to meet these structural requirements through the meanings and practices of different kinds of lives and deaths. Gender is fabricated out of the Force's unique goals and organizational parameters--both internally and in relation to the larger society--and out of the interpretation of particular social characteristics, identities, affiliations and disaffiliations as serving or undercutting operational effectiveness. It is these parameters that determine where gender boundaries are drawn, what narrative and other social practices will sustain them, and what measures will avert their resistance.

Internally fractured gender is conceptually and practically mapped onto the various structural features and behavioural values of the Canadian Forces in their oppositional phrasings. Being a man or a woman corresponds to the position along the boundary separating those acts and ideas which are seen to support or impede these structural features and values. That the Forces in official utterances, and respondents in their unofficial narratives delineate multiple femininities reflects the organization's multiple instrumental needs. It is this conceptualization that informed the statement in Chapter Four that gender has little to do with men and women themselves because it has everything to do with the social construction of human lives and deaths in relation to organizational requirements--in this case, of the Canadian Forces. Here, human beings are constructed as instrumental cogs in the military machine, their gendered beings interpreted, shaped, and disciplined accordingly. This understanding of gender explains official
and unofficial reasons for women’s operational debilities and men’s operational effectiveness—following from the differential standards applied to their lives and deaths. The Forces’ technologically rationalized requirements serve to shape gender differences, their related practices and meanings, and to thereby define gender as ‘women’16, designate women as the problematic Other and men as the institution’s normative core.

The construction of gendered identities in the Canadian Forces is mediated by the rationalized requirements of the military organization. This underlies the notion, discussed earlier, of female soldiers as "equal" for the duration of field exercises, then "different" and "really pretty" upon its completion and the uniform’s removal. In the operational context, ‘equal’ means ‘equivalent to men’, or ‘masculine’, and ‘different’ means ‘gendered’ or ‘feminine’. Located at the military’s core, combat is constructed as masculine; and, like the Indian berdache and Dahomean Amazons, women must be made into men to qualify for this masculine practice and to protect its manliness17. Just as female Dahomean soldiers were prohibited from engaging in heterosexual intercourse on penalty of death, the same logic requires that the fecundity of Canadian women soldiers be fenced off from the military’s central lethal task. Despite the demographic ratio in Canadian women’s favour, and their low birthrate (McVey and Kalbach 1995), their reproductivity and attendant childcare responsibilities are deemed to interfere—practically and symbolically—with their employment in certain military occupations. This would explain the narrative emphasis on the debilitating effects of menstruation and on women’s mammary battlefield immunity. It would also explain respondents’ notions of both women’s weaknesses and strengths, traced, in part, to their nurturing functions.

Combat reveals the double standards of life and death differentiated by the gendered military enterprise: beliefs, justifications and technologically rationalized requirements that pronounce men’s deaths in battle glorious and significant while relegating women’s war deaths to the realm of the banal and disturbing. What marginalizes women, and designates combat an exclusive masculine preserve and men as operationally more effective, is the socially differentiated construction of life and death that marks the gendered boundary between defenders

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and defended, reflecting not the physical but the *social* demands and consequences of combat. not the physical but the *social* demands of women’s reproductivity. Women’s weaknesses derive from the social conditions of their reproductive association—in contraposition to the military’s lethal strength which they can debilitate. And, as we see in the next chapter, it is in the masculinity of combat that the unity of the military resides: the unity of military masculinity resides in the notion of the soldier’s ‘right to die in battle’, and in the gendered bifurcations that this generates.

**Notes**

1. Following this logic, non-military organizations such as schools, hospitals, government bureaucracies or recreational organizations would each have quite different gender patterns following from their quite different organizational requirements.

2. Nor were they considered by me during the interview, as I recall concurring with him in my mind as he spoke, and only later thought of these objections.

3. Lorber notes that in the biological and social sciences
   
   Most research designs do not investigate whether physical skills or physical abilities are really more or less common in women and men …They start out with two social categories ("women," "men").
   
   assume they are biologically different ("female," "male"), look for similarities among them and differences between them, and attribute what they have found for the social categories to sex differences …(1997:14).

4. Amongst the northern Inuit, it is the male hunter who must spend long hours, motionless at a hole cut in the ice, monitoring a feather for the slightest sign of animal movement below.

5. One of my military contacts informed me recently of the Forces’ intention to return to the Human Rights Tribunal for clarification of what precisely was meant by gender integration, as it was never clearly spelled out.

6. A retired female officer involved in researching gender in the military informed me that one basis for the ready acceptance of woman aboard ships was that while in port, women sailors would be used by the men to help lure potential female sexual partners back for the night.

7. The conflation of sexuality and violence has long been acknowledged in the feminist critique of pornography.
8. In witnessing the mass recovery of the bodies of North Vietnamese soldiers killed during the previous night’s unsuccessful attack on an American unit the author was visiting, Broyles (1990) speaks of having surrendered to an aesthetic that was divorced from that crucial quality of empathy that lets us feel the sufferings of others (35).


10. Davis (1994) and Harrison and Laliberté describe some of the degrading terms, such as ‘split ass’, used to address or refer to women servicemembers.

11. The male exclusivity of a glorious death in battle may be incomprehensible in the contemporary setting. Its meaning may be more explicable when grounded in the historical exclusivity of warriorhood discussed in Chapter Two, based on social class and the wealth to afford the necessary weaponry and training.

12. Sheila Copps is a Member of Parliament.

13. The information that combat is physically injurious to male soldiers is absent from the "Mixed Gender Service in Army Field-Units: Leader’s Considerations: Briefing Notes," which cautions all leaders to “monitor the physical performance of inexperienced servicewomen” because they generally do not know their physical limits. With their strong will to succeed some women may drive themselves to the point of physical injury. Stress fractures, sprains and heat stress are common problems (Department of National Defence 1988:22).

14. These female soldiers were discussed in chapter two.

15. There are periods in history when women’s power was less than men’s but their lives had higher value. The European Middle Ages was one such period. The higher value placed on women’s lives is perhaps most tangible in the wergeld, a codified fine amongst the Germanic tribes meant to compensate relatives of a murdered or injured victim. Women’s greater monetary worth probably reflected their demographic scarcity during this period and through much of the Middle Ages.

16. As we saw in Chapter Four, the military is not alone in defining gender as ‘women’.

17. The reader may remember that amongst the Dugum Dani, ritual warfare is marked, in part, by the elaborate ornamentation of male warriors, and that the manliness of war is protected by systematically maiming young girls so as to disable their capacity to use the principal battlefield weapon, the bow and arrow.
Chapter Eight

Resisting (the Promotion of) Change

Introduction

Gender in the Canadian Forces is constructed through narrative and other social practices as a conceptual system for marking internal and external organizational boundaries of an institution mandated for state-sanctioned, sacrificial, lethal violence. This core requirement underwrites the Forces’ technologically rationalized structure out of which are constructed the particularities of difference, embodied in men and women as gendered social beings. It is to meet these instrumental requirements that individuals are differentially inducted and coerced—initially through the trauma of basic training—into gendered subjectivities, identities, lives and deaths. Marking the boundaries to thought and practice, gender operates as an organizing principle, materially and symbolically, throughout the Forces’ bureaucratized, authoritarian hierarchy, and through its overt and covert meaning systems. Mapped onto this structure and these meaning systems, gender represents their embedded and interrelated multiple oppositions: on the presumption of a masculine military, gender is equated with feminine Otherness, in multiple guises which in some ways support, and in others thwart, the Forces’ operational effectiveness.

But difference is about more than the demarcation of opposing gendered spheres. In an organization which constitutes a bureaucratized instrument of coercion, difference is also about the internal dispersal of power, about internal relations of domination. And whereas femininities in their various guises clearly emerge in official and unofficial narratives, as seen in the previous chapter, gender as power relations, or masculinity as domination remain relatively obscured. On this muted terrain, how do we tap the official and unofficial gendered discourses to more pointedly explore how the Canadian military produces and reproduces itself as a male-dominated technology of war and masculine (self-)sacrifice? And, returning full circle to the question
addressed at the outset of this study, how does the Canadian military reproduce itself as a male-dominated technology in the face of the technological change represented by the integration project, particularly since the Forces and its members are under order to desist from resisting this change?

Mapping these changes in Canadian military technology must begin with problematizing, rather than assuming what has long been a truism: the masculinity of the Canadian military. It also means problematizing Canadian military technology as a male-dominated social system, learning how men hold and exercise power in the organization, graphing masculinity’s internal fractures and how these are obscured. Mapping gendered changes in the Forces also means problematizing the parameters of the integration project—the changes being imposed and instituted as well as those being assiduously avoided and resisted both institutionally and individually—and how they are challenging and exposing the current exercise of power.

Establishing Military Masculinity

The spatial and discursive establishment of the military’s masculinity begins with its organizational design and social processes, premised, as seen in Chapter Four, on the soldier’s natal alienation, liminality, unlimited mobility and liability: a disencumbrance from life, its competing interests and responsibilities, and a devotion to death and the perfection of destructive technique. Excised from the larger social body, soldiers are constructed as (self)-sacrificial, risk-takers, permanently suspended in a state between childhood and adulthood, even after marriage. And locating domesticated women at safe removal from the military workplace serves to define military space as exclusively masculine:

A real male bastion the military colleges used to be. Before the women were there we were able to go off and do our obstacle course which the preps do once a year. And they’d come back, all filthy, dirty because we’ve been running in the mud. And they used to strip down naked leaving all our clothes there, then run into showers. They couldn’t do that with the women any more. And, this never appealed to me to begin with so I wasn’t particularly fussed that this silly tradition had dropped off. But this is the sort of thing that really appeals to young men.

As with public space, so with public discourse. A pertinent example would be the
"vulgar" atmosphere of the after-hours socializing cited in the previous chapter as part of a respondent's complaint regarding women's failure to engage in this informal yet essential bonding practice. This respondent takes for granted that such vulgarity is part of a normal--rather than a predominantly masculine--work environment, which women are unwilling to accept. He thereby constructs women as intolerant or intransigent:

I found that women were less accepting of remarks, or of an atmosphere that you would create in a working environment. You had to be very careful about what you would say, how you would say it. Although you probably meant to say it to your friend, the fact that there were a couple of women around, they could very well be insulted. Because men have a tendency to say just about anything and they don't mind. Quite a few times, after I'd said it, I'd say, 'Jeeze, I probably insulted this poor woman.' So I apologized. But I'm sure there's other times I didn't.

The kind of remarks he is referring to are "sexual remarks, you know. Like, this woman has a nice body." This respondent normalizes as part of a "working environment" remarks which men "don't mind" because, as he acknowledges, they are insulting to women. He also thereby normalizes men's predominance in, and discursive control over the workplace, and thereby women's marginality.

Another example of the masculine engraving of public space is the discursive tone of the military office environment. In the following excerpt, the respondent assumes that the subordinate secretary is female, and implicitly acknowledges an undercurrent of predatory antagonism against which secretaries must defend themselves:

Ten years ago, people would have come into an office, and you used to be able to joke with a secretary. The jokes involved a little bit of innuendo. And she was very good about it; she gave back as good as she got. I enjoy that type of repartee at times.

As in the previous example, there is a presumption of masculine predominance which inheres in the verbal gendered jostling, with women on the defensive.

Additional examples of discursive masculine predominance can be found in the reports of the MND Advisory Board on Gender Integration in the Canadian Forces, such as the use of inappropriate language [which] ranges from patronizing through clearly hostile. Incidents of instructors addressing women students as "girl" and "dear" are frequently reported; cadets who wish to discuss critical issues being tagged "socialist feminists" by a military instructor are fortunately less common. Still
present in some units, moreover, is a level of offensive language, including crude remarks, disgusting comments and references to female genitalia that is clearly unacceptable (1993:10).

It also includes the presence of heterosexual pornography, graphic testimonies of women’s sexual subordination by men (see Cole 1989):

...porographic entertainment is still considered a right within some units, and...erotic photographs or images were seen in areas women could not avoid in others...(1993:11).

What these practices such as "repertee", vulgarity, stripping outside before showering, offensive language and public displays of pornography represent are material and discursive proclamations of masculine territoriality, defiant and emphatic markings of military masculinity, and even celebratory declarations of women’s exclusion from, marginalization or subordination within the military’s public domain. Separately and collectively, they reaffirm male proprietorship over the workplace:

I think physically, men are normally stronger. That’s a physiological fact I don’t have to defend. That superiority normally permeates through. Arrogance, perhaps. Confidence. They feel more confident than women in a similar type of position, because in some of the operational trades, in particular, in some of the technical trades, women have only recently begun to fill those positions. And, since men have always been out in the workforce and women normally at home, men have developed a sense of ‘this is where I should be’. Or, ‘you shouldn’t be there.

Affirmations of male proprietorship and exclusionary tactics can also be more subtle, ostensibly including women in the public domain yet effectively sidelining them by controlling knowledge and decision-making. On one occasion, I witnessed the aftermath of an incident involving just such practice. A mid-ranking female officer had arrived punctually at an early morning meeting with her all-male colleagues, one of whom was late. The others refused to take a decision in his absence. As they milled around waiting, the female officer left briefly to use the washroom, returning minutes later to discover that the meeting had been summarily convened and disbanded: while she was gone the straggler arrived and the decision was taken in her absence.
Male Dominance

Built into these narratives is more than military men's *predominance*, more than the exclusivity, ownership or discursive construction of the military workplace as masculine. These practices are constituent features in the affirmation, construction and reconstruction of male *dominance* in the military, which operate through the institution's coercive structures, and have both passive and active components.

The primary means of reconstructing male dominance in the Canadian Forces is structural, and operates through the regulation of upward mobility into the most senior officer ranks. As described in Chapter Three, several 'gatekeeping' steps—though not intentionally discriminatory—effectively restrict the upper organizational echelons to men because it is they who have the fifteen or so years over which to achieve the Major rank; and it is they who have completed the Officer Professional Development Program and have been recruited to Staff College based on their standings in the Merit list and their potential and probability of promotion. It is also men who fill those military occupations with greatest allocations for Staff College: for the academic year 1992-3, for example, 77% of the colonel positions and 73% of the lieutenant colonel positions were filled either by the operational or engineering military occupations of which women represented less than 1% and 5%, respectively. Eighty-one percent of all military women in that year were employed in support and specialist occupations (Mathieu 1993). Thus, reserving Staff College positions for the two occupational groupings with negligible numbers of women excludes them from the heights of military power. And according to Mathieu's projections beyond the year 2,000, the number of women at Staff College will decrease rather than increase:

Col. Mathieu did a progression into the future, and based on the numbers of people that are in the service today, beyond the year 2,000 we get to a point where we're going to have two women at Staff College. Instead of having more, we're going to have less.

In addition to these structural means of restricting women and their femininity, men hold and wield power through the military hierarchy through active power practices (see Richer 1990) with obvious gender inflections:

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When you face a female with a situation in which—although they think they have control, they don’t in that they feel very uncomfortable talking about it—their defence, and I have to use that word, their defence seems to be they break down. Females are pretty good at detecting [why the boss wants to see them]. They have a second instinct when it comes to that, and can feel it right away. Coming into my office, they will normally know if it’s good or bad. So once you start squeezing something pretty serious, they will break down in tears very fast. I think it’s their weapon, to try to get sympathy from you? This is certainly my experience. They will play that game until such time [as] you say ‘Enough is enough with this crying. Now we’re gonna deal with the real business.’ But you have to give them an opportunity to do their crying, and then that’s it! Took me a while to realize that. A lot of them play a game. It’s not that they intended to cry in the first place, but it’s their weapon. I broke a lot of them initially and I knew they would. But once it was over, after that they never cried one bit. After they got that initial splurge out of their system? After that they just discussed like you and I. But it seems they would try you on all the time.

This version of what prompts women’s tears, and the official and unofficial views that women cry more easily noted in Chapter Seven, contrasts sharply with the recollections of a former female non-commissioned member interviewed by Davis, who left the service after 15 years:

…it wasn’t like two weeks proving. It was like a year to prove that you weren’t going to cry. They did everything to try and make you cry (Davis 1994:67).

In contrast, the above respondent interprets women’s tears within the military’s narrative framework as an (ineffective) defensive weapon against the boss. Within a coercive institution, where weaponry is the currency of power, the language of weaponry infuses interactions between supervisors and subordinates. The message here is that women, too, have weapons; but they are ineffective against those of powerful male superiors who can break female subordinates of their feminine attempts at resistance. A similar conclusion about the futility of challenging masculine authority can be drawn from the reference in Chapter Five to the assertion of such authority over a female subordinate depicted as “a bit headstrong”:

Sometimes she got in a little trouble for speaking her mind. When receiving a tasking job, she would say, ‘I’m not gonna do it; I think its stupid and should not be done.’ And she basically had to be told ‘it will be done.’ Whether she agreed with it or not was irrelevant. A person who was either my equal or higher [would tell her] ‘No, you’ll do it. The rules and regulations allow for it; abide by it.’ But it meant occasionally going out of her way to do things. And while she did put in a lot of overtime and did do a lot of extra work, sometimes it would just rankle her the wrong way.

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Attempts by this woman to critically assess and screen her assigned tasks were no match for the power of the (masculine) military hierarchy which extracted from her both compliance and considerable "extra work".

Another category of weaponry at women's disposal are their feminine wiles. One respondent offers a lengthy description of a female officer who "may have exploited her womanhood to a certain extent", although, as we see later, she was as unsuccessful as the women just described. The feminine arsenal also includes the means to elicit favouritism; but the inconsistencies in this next narrative on women's attempts to avoid temporary duty reveal that these means are equally ineffective:

Military have a tendency to travel a lot. We go on temporary duty. Like when I have to go to another base to work for three months, a week or three weeks. I found that, especially when I was a supervisor, my people were very annoyed that women had a tendency to refuse being away from their milieu at the expense of all the males. And, I actually proved that, in my section of fifty-two people of whom maybe ten would be women, for every five trips that the men took, the women went [on] one trip. So, a ratio of about twenty percent.

And, according to this respondent, this favouritism is extracted from superiors through manipulation:

A woman comes to you sobbing a little bit, saying 'I've got a little boy, and I don't think my husband can really take care of him. I'll go. I'll go if I have to.' They play that game regularly. I've had women come to me and, being a bit of an understanding person...I mean, you could say to her 'No, I don't believe in this sort of approach that you have: get on with it and go.' Certainly, I'm well within my rights to do that. But normally I would leave them a bit of a benefit of the doubt. Overall, the figures that I've given you from my experience, it's pretty fair for me to say that I have shown some favouritism to women.

But although this respondent describes himself as "a bit of an understanding person", and claims to have shown women favouritism resulting in their lower travel frequency equalling only twenty percent of men's, he contradicts himself with an example that suggests a much higher ratio--50% and not the 20% that he claims--and provides evidence that, in the end, women's manipulative weaponry fails to prevail over the power of rank:

There are times where I said, 'Enough is enough. That's the second time you come in. No, this time you go.'
Thus, rank can discursively establish women's manipulativeness and attempts to elicit favouritism, as well as the ability of male superiors to withstand both.

Successful masculine power practices operate through the medium of the military hierarchy, but are directed against more than female military subordinates. Military men can also favourably invoke the military hierarchy for transfer to the conjugal realm. One respondent said that being ordered by the military to a posting is sometimes the only way of getting wives to accede to such a move:

Lou McKenzie has an article where he is a CO [Commanding Officer] and he said 'I'm not gonna order a whole bunch of people to go to Cyprus for the fourth time. And a whole bunch of people came to him and said, 'I want to be ordered to go to Cyprus, because if I'm not ordered to go, I can't convince my wife.'

The access to such power for use in the spousal relationship partly illuminates why even low-ranking military men embrace the military system, and why, though relatively powerless, they are working so hard to keep women out: as seen in Chapter Six, the military accords to all except the most subordinate an incremental share in the overall power originating at the top of the organization. And through their operational occupations as well as the unity of military masculinity, all men can identify with those at the top, and aspire to their power.

These examples illustrate the exercise of male dominance through the rank structure. But the structural powers of superiors are compounded by their discretionary nature, noted in Chapter Five. As this next comment by the same respondent indicates--also briefly excerpted in Chapter Five--the rank structure accords superiors what is admittedly a carte blanche to exercise their power arbitrarily and abusively:

The military disciplinary system gives arbitrary power to people who, if they use it badly, can use it to foster their own sexual gratification. So we find people have a very arbitrary disciplinary system--outlined in the National Defence Act--which facilitates operations in combat but also gives people tremendous potential to abuse their power. And, we have tended to have a monogendered culture, and an anathema for homosexual activity which allowed this thing to work relatively easily. We've been faced in the last little while with incorporating homosexuals and women, which give us all kinds of problems. I shouldn't note or emphasize it, but these are the problems of running the show. If I have a bigender operation I'm going to have all kinds of detention problems. When the Sergeant Major comes in and says 'Susie is not shining her shoes', is it because Susie is not shining
her shoes or because the Sergeant Major is using me as a lever. We get a lot of those kind of things in the military, and the problems with respect to sex, and sex harassment are the single most difficult ones to resolve. I think that's a continuing problem in the military judicial system, particularly when you have bigender operations and people from one sex supervising others, and given this kind of power. Its a big problem.

But other than this respondent, none acknowledged that sexual harassment of women by men remains a significant problem in the Forces. On the contrary, most denied any such personal experience. The establishment of military masculinity is so complete that despite engaging in practices which might be discomforting to women or worse, and which could well be construed as sexual harassment, most men do not see it this way, and thus can authentically disavow any involvement. This is the case with the respondent who, as we just saw, described the sexual "repartee" with the woman secretary who "gave back as good as she got", yet never thought that this behaviour might be harassment, emphatically reaffirming that he had never witnessed it:

There is still likely--and again I have never experienced it at all, and its supposed to be rampant, and I've never seen any cases of abuse within an office environment. I've been in an office environment for the last fifteen years and I have never seen it...That's what you hear in the news...There's been a number in the news recently, of harassment. Personally, I have never seen it. I won't say that it doesn't exist, 'cause I'm sure it does. But I have never seen it.

Repeated denials of personal experience with sexual harassment, or even pejorative comments towards women, is typical of respondents to this study. Another presents similar contradictory testimony, initially underscoring that he has never witnessed men's ridicule of women:

I don't think I've ever, I can't recall any time where during my training, during my employment where I saw somebody ridicule women in the Canadian Forces.

Yet, this failure to recall such ridicule comes on the heels of his own description of this very behaviour by military colleagues with whom he is attending a course! In a discursive inversion, he reports how his colleagues drive home women's inferiority based on their inability to defend themselves against men's physical abuse, and their consequent need for protection by the women's movement:

And the girls [on this course] feel fed up with it [women's liberation], because they're now being ridiculed sometimes, sort of, when we talk about it. When we watch the news in the morning, for example, they'll say, 'Ah, that's not that
again!' Because that's about women being beaten and more money. And they just don't want to talk about it because the other guys are going 'Yeah, you guys are weaker.' So now they're getting stereotyped that they're weaker again because the feminist movement has maybe gone a bit too far, in some cases.

Women's victimization in abusive relationships confirms their weakness. And responsibility for their stereotyping is laid squarely at the door of other women who are ostensibly their champions, but are actually the real villains by having "gone a bit too far". Male abusers are omitted from this scenario. Nor, according to another respondent, should men who say "rude" things to women be held accountable; it is the women, by implication, who are 'crybabies':

You don't necessarily have to stand back and phone mother just because one of the guys says a rude word. That's not sexual harassment by a group of men who've never had to work with a woman. However, some people would perceive it as such, and would make a big issue of it.

It is those who make a "big issue" of "one of the guys" saying a "rude word" who are ultimately at fault. In a time-honoured power practice of disavowing power and blaming the victim, this respondent adds that "that, unfortunately, causes a backlash".

Yet, research by the Minister of National Defence Advisory Board on Gender Integration in the Canadian Forces, and by Karen Davis, corroborate the earlier cautionary assertions regarding the abuse of supervisory power as a serious problem in the Forces. Specifically, sexual harassment remains common, and a principal cause of women's high attrition rate. And formal complaints can often result in further harassment (Harrison and Laliberté 1994; also see Gazette, May 12, 15, 1994.) Davis reports on an attrition monitoring study of over 4,000 Canadian Forces members in 1992, which found that 26.2% of female and 2% of male respondents believed they had been sexually harassed, 32.6% of female and 19.4% of male respondents believed they had been subjected to personal harassment other than sexual, and 31.5% of female and 28.9% of male respondents believed they had been the subject of abuse of authority in the course of performing their duties during the previous twelve month period. Even the personal harassment that was non-sexual was identified as being based in gender (Davis 1994:41). Comparative rates of male:female attrition, according to Davis, is one means of measuring the success of change in the Forces. Operating through the rank structure, these various informal and previously described formal

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practices together suggest that most of the masculine means of holding and exercising power in the Canadian Forces remain intact.

**Change**

An understanding of men's reactions to the integration project should be prefaced by setting it into the broader analytic framework of other changes currently facing the Forces. For some, the difficulties of integration are compounded by a host of other modifications being foisted on, or experienced by the Forces past and present: the diversification of a uniform membership through bilingualization and the absorption of various Others such as homosexuals and ethnic minorities; the gradual disappearance of the male soldier as sole breadwinner and head of the household and the increasing number of married military couples; the diminishing ministrations of the military wife; civilianization and decreasing 'professionalism'. All of these have material consequences because they impact on, and dilute operational effectiveness.

A number of government-initiated changes are seen as a series of experiments using the Forces as guinea pig. According to this next respondent, this may be why women are finding acceptance so difficult:

I think the army is a pretty conservative society. Most people join the army because they're sort of mom-and-apple pie type of people. Things are sort of routine, and they don't like to change as much. Some of the resistance or difficulty that some people have with women in the army, particularly, is it's part of a whole package of attacks on what is perceived to be the traditional way of life in the army. I don't mean to group women with homosexuality and handicapped, etc., but it's all happening at the same time. And the male who is used to his male-dominated society with a fairly rigorous—perhaps somewhat immature at times—initiation process, and sometimes immature but masculine bonding processes, suddenly sees a lot of these things being threatened. And women unfortunately are coming in at the same time as handicapped people are being pushed onto us, onto a military society that sees itself as needing to be physically fit to go to war. Homosexuality is being forced upon an army that has always conceived itself—wrongly so—as being rather straight and clean. Women are all part of this package. Part of the integration of women in the Forces might suffer because of that.

What these changes involve is the fracturing of the uniformity of the all-male group, and introducing difference:
...it’s a stress you don’t have to go through when you’re a pure homogeneous male society. It’s a similar type of stress that’s causing men to resist homosexuals in the army. When you’re working in a tightly knit social group, I think it’s probably a fact that the more common the interest of the people in that group, the more they resemble each other, the easier it is for them to work together? But, if there’s somebody different in the group it may be something that people perceive as weakening the group. And I think it’s fair to say that the increased presence of male and female together adds a stress element that perhaps you don’t necessarily want.

These attacks on the Forces are introducing diversity into uniformity, on a variety of fronts. And through women’s changing positions, difference is being introduced amongst men. For one, gender diversity is introducing changes in the nature of men’s family ties. One source for rupturing the uniformity in the Forces, and a cause of some resentment according to one respondent, is the married military couple which introduces inequality between servicemembers. When the Forces was largely peopled by single men or the married whose wives were ‘silent partners’ serving their husbands’ and the Forces’ needs. members were ostensibly on an equal footing within the context of the rank structure. Now, inequalities and rivalries are creeping in: married, dual earner service couples are seen as having unfair economic advantage over single-earner heads of households or even dual-earner couples with only one military member because the former are able to accumulate more economic assets:

A problem we have in the service, as far as I’m concerned, is the famous married couple...It’s interesting that in larger centres such as Winnipeg, Ottawa, you end up with married couples. Now that women have entered the military, are part of this, both wanna stay together because you hate being [separated]. People, as military don’t want to have to spend years living away, and taking the train every weekend to go home and see their family. So the fact that we make efforts to co-locate people means that other people in the military have to take some postings like in Cold Lake, Alberta, in the middle of nowhere, Greenland, Nova Scotia, in the valley where things are quiet. So, the guys who are not married to a military woman are...to a certain extent now getting these postings. And at the bar, late at night when people are really drunk, they make a big deal out of this...What’s interesting about those married service couples is that as you visit them in their home, the double garage and the two big cars in those large centres, you can develop a certain amount of wealth. Two Majors will make quite a bit of money. Married, with or without kids they’ll end up piling up money in RRSPs and stuff. And some are just your friends and they don’t talk about it. Others will flaunt it and say, you know, you never had that posting to-. And last time they tried to post you to Cold Lake or Inuvik and you couldn’t take your wife. And you cried so that you could keep that double income. This trend is not
the lady's fault—it's as much men's fault as women's fault—but the fact [is] that the women are there, with long term careers, and the women who are getting married are developing relations leading to that.

Hence, at bottom, the cause of this new inequality between male soldiers is the introduction of women into the military marriage equation which has created multiple categories of servicemembers who are differentiated each by their wife's labour force participation—whether in the military or not.

And, in addition to the economic inequalities that this engenders, there are other operational difficulties, which have already been touched upon. Mobilization is compromised if a unit contains married couples with children. One respondent reported that during the Oka crisis (1990),

we got called into work and we got told 'You aren't going home! We're deploying to go to the field!' The result was that we had really big problems with—not as much women by themselves, but in the two military families because nobody had really ever thought about what happens if we go to war.

The remainder of this respondent's related narrative, cited earlier, revolves around the operational liability of mothers going to war and abandoning their children for battle. That fathers have parental responsibilities was mentioned only peripherally.

The family affiliations of male members are also encroaching in other ways since the presence of non-compliant wives is seen to interfere with men's hitherto unlimited availability:

And, now, quite literally, this whole approach that you are available twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, whenever we want you, at the Queen's discretion, is probably not tolerable any more. And in peacetime, when we try and apply it we get a lot of attrition. People basically say, 'Well, I'm sorry, I'm not gonna serve any more if you're gonna do that to us.' There are many cases, particularly in the army, where people are forced to do things and this is unpopular or unattractive to their spouse. And we have not traditionally considered that.

Changing relations within the family may also underlie soldiers' diminishing willingness to participate in the end-of-the-week ritual of TGIF ('Thank Goodness Its Friday'):

If somebody's worked their good forty or fifty hours, has solved the world's problems, you try now telling somebody 'You'd better be at the mess; you're expected there.' You'll have a redress of grievance or an harassment [charge]. You don't do that any more. On a base at four o'clock on a Friday, military guys just jump in their cars and go home to their wives and plan the weekend because
they're going camping together...play with the kids or take them to ringuette, etc. Twenty years ago in the military the rush at 4 o'clock was to take the car, go to the mess, people would have—not everybody was a drunk so some would have a couple of beers and go home, some would have a whole bunch. Up to ten years ago it was expected by the higher ranks. Friday nights we would celebrate the week, have a beer together and socialize. And the young generation was always introduced to that. All of a sudden in the '80's, you could tell that people, an engineer with a degree and two kids that are four and seven years old [would say] 'I'm gonna go build my deck for my pool for my kids tonight and the entire weekend. I'm not gonna go get drunk and spend money at the mess. I've seen you guys forty or fifty hours this week. I don't wanna see you any more. I wanna go see my wife and kids.' I think that that's been a major change.

Unless they are out on exercise in the field, and hence on duty twelve to sixteen hours a day, servicemembers are more prone to put in their forty hours of work, and call it quits:

Some people in some support trades try to become more and more [like] bureaucrats. Like, 'I work my forty hours, it's time to go home.' And we close at 3 o'clock on Thursday afternoon to do inventory check or something. But, in general, in the armed forces to this day...if there's nothing special, no operations going on, people like to do their forty hours a week, and period.

The shift to bureaucratic behaviour, to following a routine of performing one's tasks and leaving promptly at the end of the day is, for some, part of a larger trend towards the 'civilianization' of the Forces, a much studied and described phenomenon long considered a drain on the armed forces in the West generally:

Well, I believe the Canadian Armed Forces military personnel have lost a great proportion of that professional focus related to the profession of arms, that must be the base of any armed forces.

There is a tension between adherence to an institutional/professional versus an occupational set of military values. According to the institutional approach, the military is charged with defending the state, and must therefore be isolated from the host society to foster cohesion and solidarity among soldiers, and to avoid the corrupting civilian values of individualism and hedonism. But according to the occupational model, the Canadian Forces is a part of Canadian society and must reflect its values in order to maintain its support. Some officers, apart from the one cited above, maintain that the institutional values which predominated in the past have now been supplanted by occupational ones, as a result of government legislation and judicial rulings (Parker 1995). Flemming (1991) notes that romanticizing the past and grieving for a lost professional
commitment is typical of much military historiography. His review of historical military discourse uncovers a recurrent lament for a lost military professionalism: in the past there was military valour whereas now there is only moral weakness and decay. This imbuing of the past with valour is reminiscent of the military ethos which constructs soldiers as sacrificial victims whose deaths are followed by resurrection as icons of memory, spurring successive generations of youth on to their untimely deaths.

**Integrating Women**

As one of the changes being imposed on the Forces, women’s integration represents challenges to its most fundamental practices and cherished meanings. Where these challenges are most acute, and where there is greatest friction between the government-imposed gender integration project and the male-dominated rank structure charged with implementing it are the sites where men feel most threatened. A measure of this threat is the degree, type and locus of men’s resistance. As well, tracking the patterns of men’s resistance may be a barometer of male-dominance—though not everywhere since, as we saw above, the highest ranks of the Forces are largely closed to women, lessening the need for resistance.

It is within the framework of the formal and informal practices of male dominance reviewed earlier, and the organizational structures of masculine predominance and domination, that the integration project and men’s narratives of reaction must be decoded. And it is where men and the institution feel most threatened by women’s integration that male dominance can be most easily discerned. Narratives around integration can serve as beacons into how gender continues to signify and channel power, and how this is changing.

The most observable impact on masculine military predominance can be discerned in men’s narrations regarding the reconfiguration of, or what some see as an assault on, masculine space. One instance of this, bonding, is a military pattern already familiar to the reader. And integrating women involves contending with the unknown and unfamiliar—known and familiar in another context:
I think the problem...is that men are used to going about their daily life, which in the military tends to be physical in nature, and they are used to working with other men. They bond together, and they know how to relate with other men. When women are introduced into that situation there's an uneasiness on the part of the male in that he doesn't know, or may not know, how to react. He may not know how to treat the female in that environment.

Hence, central to the men's difficulties in reacting to "the female" and not knowing how to treat her is the shift in environment and conditions of contact. The subtext seems to be that these men know very well how to treat women when in environments other than military operations, as when they are performing support functions in administrative milieus, and under different circumstances, or in the civilian world. What seems awkward or unnerving is that women are now entering what has traditionally been men's territory, and on what is supposed to be a substantially different, that is, equal footing. Women are intruding into and disrupting men's desire to bond with other men in an all-male organization. For another respondent, this is even more the case for poorly educated soldiers, who, he says elsewhere, have an average of only two or three years of high school education:

For soldiers from a not well-educated milieu, who have very old values regarding women's equality, it's much, much harder. Most of those people went into the army to get that male-bonded relationship. The soldiers, the soldiers, men, are coming in to get that male-bonded organization and they're happy in that milieu.

The all-male environment has come under attack in other ways, noted above, leading officers-in-training, for example, to shed some of their earlier practices. And there is the institutional pressure to make the workplace more 'woman-friendly' and 'family-friendly'. Although women are perceived as unable to defend themselves in direct interaction with their male superiors, they are seen as having institutional support, which is impacting badly on men. Many men feel silenced by this new state of affairs, victims of reverse discrimination because of the favouritism shown to women. And predictably, some of men's narratives of the past invoke an element of nostalgia and loss.

The presence of women, according to many respondents, has put a damper on men, stifling their discursive freedom and spontaneity:

I think that people are definitely thinking about gender topics. Perhaps not out
loud, but certainly to themselves. I think that it's become pervasive. That's too strong a word. It exists. People have to think now before they say something. You have to think, 'Is this going to offend anybody? Do I care?' You've lost a degree of spontaneity that made the workplace. And I think now there's a lot of false fronts. You don't know...but you'll always wonder if somebody's being themselves.

This sense of inhibition around women, of a need to "think twice" before speaking, and a "reluctance to be yourself" is felt by another respondent as well:

So, a lot of times I also held back. There were times I would have liked to have said something, but the fact there was a woman present certainly makes you think twice. The fact that they're around certainly creates a bit of apprehension...Sometimes it creates an uncomfortable atmosphere because of their presence. Guys will have a tendency to sometimes hold back the way that they feel, or the way that they'd like to express themselves. I don't want to go to the extreme here to say that because the woman is not around we become animals. I mean, at times guys certainly get ugly beyond what I figure is acceptable to my beliefs. But certainly, when women are around there is that reluctance to be yourself? In a true sense...there are some reservations.

And although he says that this new state of affairs has to be accepted, it is not because it is preferable to the old way, but because non-acceptance could have negative repercussions:

And I think that that has to be accepted...But I'll go back ten, fifteen, twenty years ago. What was acceptable then is certainly not acceptable today for many. many reasons that you know of, like harassment. So you have to be cognizant now of the repercussions when you open your mouth, every time you say something. I certainly am. I'm certainly not as open now as I used to be. Or making comments. I'm very careful now of what I say, how I say it, because it could certainly backfire on me.

Another respondent corroborated these new conditions, and the need to be watchful, particularly around female superiors:

For the first time you're starting to deal with ladies that are higher level, you know. Watch your p's and q's. And just have to be a bit more careful.

But the need to be circumspect is not confined to interactions with women of higher rank. It is more generalized, requiring a duplicity which permits open communication only where male privacy is assured, with a need to be "politically correct" elsewhere. This respondent even thanked me for taking an interest in hearing what military men have to say:

The men have got to be careful these days with what is politically correct. Coming out and saying 'I don't like immigrants doing this, and I don't like women doing that' is not popular sometimes. So everybody's got feelings that they talk
about in the locker room or with their buddies, but they're not necessarily gonna make them known to the whole world. And I think it's interesting that you would care enough and are giving that a try as a research. Sounds interesting.

What this respondent thinks I care enough about he does not specify, but his narrative about the free expression amongst men alone suggests having been driven underground, and his choice of words ("that you would care enough") invokes images of being neglected, bypassed, overlooked—almost wounded. Another respondent notes that the inhibition of male discourse and spontaneity might even have an unspecified, yet implicitly negative, effect on some men:

There are some outspoken people who in school you might call the class clown, continually making humour and jokes. And I think that that's probably an outlet for those types of people, and it's a necessary outlet. And if it gets cramped, and an individual is—no, 'cramped' is a poor choice of words—I don't know what the effect would be on the individual.

And as we saw in the previous chapter, just as some respondents try to forge narrative alliances with women by invoking their anti-feminist stance and disapproval of employment equity programs, the next excerpt suggests that silencing men also silences women who, in the past had actually been engaging jointly with men in the harmless "repartee" of "sexual innuendo", cited earlier, and having an equally "good time" at it. Only now, society is intruding to check it; but not all of society is policing such behaviour, only certain "bleeding hearts" who want "change to suit their own purpose":

I don't think the same scenario could exist any more. I think society has changed so that if the two of us would engage in something of that nature and have a good time, somebody else would say, 'that's not acceptable behaviour; you can't do that any more'. I don't agree with that, but that appears to be the way society in general is heading; not just the Force. And, if you were inclined to partake in that type of behaviour, you have to change your behaviour, and I don't feel that's a necessary change. I really think there are a lot of bleeding hearts out there that want change because it doesn't suit their purpose, so everybody's got to change to suit their purpose. And I don't think that that's necessarily right.

The "bleeding hearts" to whom this respondent refers seem to correspond to the "special interest groups" invoked by another respondent:

It's just like racial harassment, and so forth. It's got to do with a lot of overprotection of special interest groups........It's like a lot of other special interest groups who pretend they're speaking for everybody, but they're not.
What these two respondents seem to share is a notion that anyone who contests the status quo, and is by definition marginalized, represents a "bleeding heart" or "special interest group"—which military men do not.

The previous respondent, like this one, feels that, not only is it that men are being silenced—the many (men and women) forced by the few (feminists) to change—but that the tide is turning in women’s favour, and some "female(s)" are on a concerted offensive against men. He constructs this new reality based on a narrative of hearsay:

I recall an individual that I never worked with, or for. But friends of mine did. She was a female. She was a Major, and she came out in a number of cases—now this is hearsay so I was not present—and said that basically men were scum. No men we’re gonna get promoted in her shop. So, now we have a bit of a reversal. The only thing that I could say that was probably positive about that situation was she didn’t treat her females very well either. So she ran into some difficulty and was basically relinquished from her position at that point in time.

In the same vein, the discrimination problem today would seem to be less one of women’s victimization than of men’s:

I think right now they’re all ‘men’ jokes, male-bashing. One was in the paper the other day: ‘What do you call the smart guy in an ‘M and M’ factory? He’s a proof-reader’. So, if my boss is a female and came in and said that, I could turn around and say "She’s harassing me," and probably the way the society seems to be going, have a legitimate case which I feel is terribly wrong because all somebody has done is pass on what they have read or heard as being a bit of humour. And if it’s not funny to you, well, that’s fine. But I don’t really consider it to be harassment, necessarily.

Thus, not only is there a tendency to trivialize what the Forces’ own studies have shown to be a serious and intransigent problem, but this respondent is also expressing what others do as well, namely, a sense of being put upon, aggrieved, besieged or victimized. This next excerpt exemplifies the same feeling of reverse discrimination, as well as the possibility that one day men may be victims who will be bringing charges against women:

There are so many courses about harassment and you’re rights. I wouldn’t even dare. You can’t look too much. You certainly don’t make comments about the size of this and that. These days you can expect more comments the other way around. I go for a run wearing spandex pants and I could have charged some ladies for harassment, easily, easily. So when you talk about the pendulum, obviously men went way too far before, bosses swearing at their subordinates, saying, ‘You have to put up with this and that or I’ll fire you’. Women are being more and more
vocal, and about seeing what they like and don’t like. Sooner or later they’ll be harassment charges against women making some crude comments about people’s anatomy.

For another respondent, definitions of sexual harassment had become so broad as to be almost meaningless:

Unfortunately, it’s isolated incidences of sexual harassment that get the front page and end up making everybody think that everybody in the military is a redneck sexual harasser, which isn’t true. Mind you, the definitions of sexual harassment now are so wide that...it can go as much as a lewd glance. I’m not sure what a lewd glance is.

And the accusation of harassment, according to a third, is one that can be brought too easily:

I think, the biggest issue right now, if there is an issue that I’ve seen recently—and again, not experienced—is that of harassment in the Force. And, I find that that issue is easily abused....I feel that. I cannot quote you, or give you any examples. It’s a personal feeling. I’m certain that there are instances of harassment. Again, I have not witnessed any personally; but I’m certain that they do exist. But I think you have to be very careful, yes, as to how and what and when you say things. There was a time when you could say those things and they must have bothered some people, otherwise it would not have become the issue that it has become. But, I find that that’s one issue that is subject to abuse in the form that it is.

Even more, this respondent feels that these accusations can erupt from nowhere, the accused being oblivious to any complaint. Oddly, though, he builds his argument on the case of a woman soldier who is actually in the process of charging her boss, a sergeant, of demanding sexual favours:

I remember seeing a girl from Petawawa on T.V who is filing a harassment charge against her boss who was a sergeant at the time. And if I remember the story correctly, this sergeant had confronted her and asked her for sexual favours. And, yes, I disagree with that. That’s something that shouldn’t be expected in the workplace. You’re here to do a job, not extracurricular activities. So that, I think, certainly comes down to harassment. But if that same sergeant had simply made comments, told jokes which perhaps offended the individual, and if she said, ‘Sergeant, I’m offended by those types of jokes; I’d prefer if you didn’t state them in my presence,’ and he continued to do so, well you could probably also consider that as a degree or form of harassment. But if she says nothing, and then suddenly comes out with a statement that ‘this person is harassing me, telling these jokes which I don’t like,’ well I have a problem with that. Because the individual wasn’t aware. If he doesn’t change his behaviour once he’s made aware, then we have a problem. But you can’t change behaviour without being informed.

There is a feeling of being unaware or uninformed, perpetually at risk of unanticipated
false accusations from women in their midst. And, together with the previously cited perceptions that women engage less in the vulgar communal celebrations at the end of a field exercise, or are crybabies who run home to mother at the slightest insult, these evoke the sense that the barricade has been breached by Otherness, displacing men, and leaving them marginalized on their own turf. Thus, in addition to feelings of resentment (being subjected to social engineering, prey to the whims of special interest groups, and the use of the Forces as guinea pig) there seems to be a genuine sense of bewilderment at this new state of affairs. As well, there is an element of nostalgia and loss which percolates beneath the surface:

In the '50's, in the '60's I don't think it was harassment. It was the way life was. Its the way society reacted, and the way society dealt with everything. It doesn't make it right, and I'm not trying to justify abuse of anyone, but I think that...you're not even able to tell a joke that might be a little bit off colour without being—not even off colour, but humorous anecdotes. You have to be very careful how you say them, and in which company you say them because you may feel very comfortable with the people that you're around [and] somebody could say ‘That person is harassing me’. And I have difficulty with that.

Here, again, we find a tendency to downplay the seriousness of sexual harassment by equating it with the recounting of "humorous anecdotes". Sexual harassment becomes an ideological construct--the way events are seen and thought about--rather than an abusive practice. And despite this respondent's objections, he seems to acknowledge that certain practices which are only now being defined as 'sexual harassment' were always abusive. He merely normalizes them. Rather than seeing that women in the past had less power to name their abuse for what it was--which they can now increasingly do albeit not always successfully--this respondent says "It was the way life was". And the perception of women's increasing vicariously derived power to name this aspect of their oppression may be what underlies many men's perceptions that women are now being favoured.

Women are seen as recipients of favouritism in three areas: lower fitness standards, differential career progression, and special treatment. According to one respondent,

I think there was a perception..., whether it's true or not, that...there was a blind eye given to the lack of capability of some women to pass some of the physical fitness tests, particularly for upper body strength.
Another respondent was more specific, providing some detail of these new discriminatory practices favouring women:

It would be no problem if they would just have said, ‘Okay, women are allowed, subject closed.’ But the armed forces is also inflicting the problem on themselves. They were so eager to meet the expectations of the government that they created internal problems. They began offering very appealing incentives for some women in the system to enter the combat arms program: ‘Just go through the basic training, do the three months period and we’ll give you a promotion.’ That’s where the problem starts to occur, at the peer level. For example...if you perform extremely well, you usually get a promotion every two, three years. So, to get their quota they started saying, ‘You’re a master corporal, woman in a clerk trade. Go into the combat arms program, try to go through. It will be easier anyway for you because we’ll make the program less demanding. And then do three months in a combat unit and we’ll give you the posting of your choice and a promotion.’ Yes, perhaps that’s a good way to get a full span of women across the spectrum. But you’re creating some serious problems at the worker level, and at the officer level too. But to go back to the worker level: a soldier, a male soldier in an artillery unit will have to work in a gun crew for three to four years to get a chance to become a battery commander driver which is a less physically demanding job with a little more responsibility, driving a senior officer in the unit. But you see women coming into the system, doing three to four months on a gun crew, and getting those very coveted jobs. So, that causes some problems which, most of the time, are not officially stated.

This respondent also illustrates this discrimination with a specific example of a woman officer who progressed to a staff position after an inordinately brief period:

Captain [Name] did perhaps six months. To get access to an intelligence officer position in the unit, a lieutenant has to wait two to three years. So, yes, she’s very good. But, again, a double standard has been created to accommodate the fact that he wants her in the platoon in the front line. Even though she’s part of a combat unit, she has a staff position which most young officers see as a step up in their career. Then what you see is a girl coming in, doing the same job that you’re asked to perform, for only three to four months, and then rapidly jump all her peers to get that job. So, most of the problems occur at the peer level.

Another respondent also offers a specific example of accelerated career progression by a woman who was a civilian, but employed by the Department of National Defence:

The other lady that I was not working for, she’s going places. And already she’s applied for—I think from director she’s going to a director general’s job. She’s civilian, but in National Defense Headquarters, the military and the departmental chains of command as far as acquisitions etc., are kind of blurry and integrated. So military people will work for civilians. Like, I could be working for this lady anytime. This lady who is gonna be a director general is not forty years old yet. Few men below age forty would have access to that position. Meaning, you
can tell that the equity program has helped her. The lady is no dummy, learns fast, has got all kinds of good attributes, and probably a superior intellect than mine. But she's got wind in her sails because of the equity program.

A third respondent, who shares the above views about inequitable career acceleration cites the case of a woman with no previous supervisory experience who was promoted to warrant officer at the age of thirty, and sent on a United Nations mission to Central America. But then he remarks that he would not be surprised to see a young man rise up quickly through the ranks because of demonstrated leadership. And, in his view, it is young men amongst whom the feeling of being bypassed runs deep, with potentially grave consequences. Invoking an element of danger to society of having a lot of unhappy male youths who feel blocked in their career progression by the favouritism shown to women, this respondent concludes that young men are the same everywhere; and they cause trouble. It is therefore

naïve to believe that you can exclude a large number of people to favour another group without producing a potentially explosive situation.

The same resentful feelings are shared by an informant to this study who expressed considerable bitterness and initially left the Forces for a civilian job at National Defence Headquarters. He finally resigned there, too, because as a white male he felt he had no future in either organization.

In the minds of some, the risks of exhibiting favouritism overshadow the risks of discriminating against women. One respondent who had never before supervised a woman, recounts his own reaction as an air force commander in 1980 to the possibility of having a female flight-training graduate posted to his squadron. His concern lay in ensuring his own fair treatment of this female pilot, a concern which he is certain is shared by other men, especially managers and those in more senior positions. But his notion of fairness was not from the standpoint of the female pilot, but from that of his male subordinates who might have suspected him of showing her favouritism:

I wanted to make sure that I would give that person a fair—not assessment—a fair opportunity to join the squadron, to learn what went on, to participate in the activities, training and operational, and to perform as any other pilot. But since I had never experienced a woman in my squadron before as a pilot, I was
very uncertain as to exactly what I should do to do that. I was more concerned about going the other way, being overly fair and showing a bias. I was spared from all that because three graduated and went elsewhere. Some people are better equipped to handle that than I was maybe; they may have had more experience in dealing with women on the job; there are a great number of military men who have not worked with women at all. I find the same thing with military people, not necessarily only men, who have not experienced work with civilians.

In this narrative, women pilots are alien entities whose supervision is onerous and fraught with potential risks—not to the trainee but to the commander—and not of prejudicial injustice but of favouritism.

To a degree, complaints of discriminatory treatment favouring women have some foundation in so far as Canadian Forces policy has been to comply with the Human Rights Tribunal ruling by instituting an occupation transfer program to facilitate women’s rapid progression:

To provide to women presently serving an opportunity to enter the occupations formerly closed to them, a special occupation transfer program was established for the regular force...[which] permits the transfer of women into naval operations, combat arms and combat support arms occupations with a waiver of the usual requirement to have a minimum time in service of four years prior to occupation transfer” (A-3).

The effect of this policy, together with the deep sense of disruptive incursions into male territory has led to these and other complaints of favouritism, which have also found their way into the MND Advisory Report. The Advisory Board reports that discriminatory behaviour continue to figure prominently in the Board’s meetings with personnel at all levels in both regular and Reserve forces. They are too numerous to detail, and it is fair to suggest that these incidents run the gamut from real to perceived events (MND Advisory Board on Women in the Canadian Forces 1993:10).

And, heading the list are men’s complaints of women’s preferential treatment:

Negative perceptions throughout the Forces are reinforced by the existence of double standards, apparently favouring females. Incidents frequently identified range through more lenient treatment, differing standards of physical fitness, problems in selection and reduced efficiency when women are assigned to training platoons (MND Advisory Board on Women in the Canadian Forces 1993:10).

These are all complaints that surfaced at one point or another in respondents’ narratives. But, conflated as these complaints are with the sense of threats to masculine predominance, they are
also uncritical, failing to incorporate women’s viewpoints. One respondent, who also cautioned women against becoming a “special interest group” lest they become targets of a “backlash”, does make fleeting reference to the possible gendered difference in perspectives on integration, but quickly (recants):

I think the military has integrated women better than society has integrated women in the workforce. I think you’ll probably find more women soldiers than you’ll find women construction workers, and probably a greater acceptance of women in the army than you do in a lot of traditionally male-dominated trades in the civilian world. And I’m talking from a male’s perspective. I don’t look at it from the poor lady’s perspective who thinks she’s not getting ahead because she’s a woman. I don’t think that’s true.

In addition to issues of double standards regarding physical fitness and accelerated career progression, one would think that questions of favouritism would not arise in reference to maternity leave, which applies solely to women. Yet, women are also seen to benefit unfairly from these provisions because they come at the expense of co-workers. According to the Project Director of Employment Equity, vociferous objections around this issue were expressed to him by many leaders during visits to nine bases and commands the previous summer. In conversations with roughly 500 members about employment equity, he encountered many for whom having women presented an additional administrative burden because they have to be replaced when they go on maternity leave, and replacements are not always forthcoming. His report was seconded by another respondent who paraphrased the frustration articulated by many who see themselves as hobbled by increasingly diverse responsibilities and dwindling resources:

It’s a big problem, and most CO’s [commanding officers] of my vintage would say, ‘The old system is working well. Why do we need women? We’ve got all kinds of people. We don’t need them. You’re just giving me problems...you’re making my life more difficult. You give me three jobs; you don’t give me the resources, and now you’ve given me these additional problems with respect to the employment of women and...homosexuals.’

Feelings of frustration and resentment regarding women’s maternity leave benefits also emerged from another respondent’s narrative on women’s entry into a world that has been “developed for men”, with the same aspirations for upward mobility and power as men, yet able to go and come as they please with no negative repercussions. During maternity leave, women
can even benefit from promotion, while the remaining workers are left behind to take up the slack. However, this respondent is conflicted because he appreciates his own wife receiving such benefits:

The old pattern was, military people were married, women had babies and they just followed you, living in little military houses wherever they went. Times have changed. There are fewer ladies that accept this kind of life, and maybe fewer military that want to be married with this kind of lady...Now the women want the same opportunities as men who join the military. Men start their career, and people have various degrees of ambition...Well, women are the same. What's interesting is that in a world that’s been developed for men, the women still want to reach the top, the higher ranks, and be able to have power and make decisions. The system is still designed by the men who resent, and I have that too. When ladies start going on maternity leave--in the families, women will have the babies, it's a biological thing. I've got two points of view on that. First, when I'm out there and suddenly one of the ladies gets pregnant and will be away for nine months, or whatever benefits we have now, four months. People want to go away, then come back, and just say ‘I was a Captain when I left and was almost promoted to Major because my evaluations were good.' So, go away for a year...then work for three years. then come back and have another baby. I'm sure the ladies say ‘Well, it's normal in the family. I had to have the babies, and now I'm back and I'm pushing as hard.' I think it's frustrating for men to say, 'I kept pushing when the unit was going short 'cause you were away. There was work for four, and the three of us did extra.' At the same time, I'm married to a lady and I kind of like the idea that she should be able to stop, have babies, and when she's ready to go back to work she can just start where she left off.

Thus, there are complaints deriving from an increased workload. The resentment felt by this respondent and others has a material basis, since those who must do extra work are those at the bottom with the fewest resources and the least decision-making power:

Sometimes they do replace, sometimes there's no one available for four, five, six months. So most times I don't think they replace. So you can see the resentments: ‘You went away, and at crucial times,’ because it doesn’t matter what events are coming up. If you’re due to have a baby, you’re going to leave. So this leaving, sometimes at the wrong time and no replacement, does create some resentment.

In the overall context of feeling muzzled, bypassed, or discriminated against, one respondent hopes that the Forces’ leadership would stand up for the “higher priorities” facing the Forces today, namely those of funding cutbacks and downsizing:

There are other changes in the Canadian Forces that probably have a higher priority than worrying about whether you’re going to have women with you, or for you, or working for women. I think the downsizing that the entire public service
is going through, and the reduction in funding is probably of a higher concern, and will probably be so for the not-too-distant future. I think the primary concern will be with the cutbacks. And if somebody raises the issue of gender, I think its gonna be pushed aside. I would like to hope it would be pushed aside, and say ‘That’s not a priority; let’s get on with the higher priorities.’

One particular narrative invective directed against a negative female model summarily illustrates a number of points where integration clashes with the Forces both practically and symbolically. The following abbreviated excerpt demonstrates how gender interacts with the military’s technological requirements and institutional structure: to bifurcate it; to support or undermine it; to affront its relations of domination and dispersal of power; to exhibit characteristics by which servicemembers are evaluated as either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ people, weak or strong. The narrative maps out the points in the system where women’s entry is clashing with the Forces’ material and symbolic requisites.

In the midst of recounting how unwilling women had been pushed into the combat arms during the Swinter trial era (early 1980’s), and had either left of their own accord or been forced out because they were administratively burdensome, this respondent suddenly interjects a lengthy narrative about a bad female officer—considerably abbreviated here—emphasizing her unrepresentativity, yet unrelentingly detailing her faults. Here again, we encounter the evaluative conflation of ‘person’ with ‘performance’:

We had women coming into the combat arms—which is basically a male society—who didn’t want to be there. And that was causing problems for them and for us as well. Eventually we were left with a relatively stable group of women, although they were quite small compared to the male group, and they pretty well held their own.....We had one female officer in the combat arms, and I don’t think it’s fair to draw any conclusions from her case because my conclusions were not because she was a female but because she was not a good officer. First of all, she was an anglophone in a francophone environment, but she made very little effort to assimilate. She didn’t adapt readily to the military rank structure. She wanted to be ‘friendly’ with everybody. Again, I don’t attribute that to her being female because I’ve seen other female officers who do adapt well to that. She was just a weak officer. She wasn’t weak because of being a woman. However, I think the male officers in the regiment did certainly single her out because she was a woman. But because she was weak as an officer and as a person, she couldn’t overcome the “handicap” of being a woman in a male environment, whereas a stronger person would have done that. She would do silly things. Like, it’s the only time I’ve ever had to actually chastise an officer for sunbathing in a
brassiere...in a tent lines on an exercise. If I was in a mixed environment, I wouldn’t sunbathe in my underwear...She was sleeping in the same tents as the others, as the male officers. That’s not a problem. People tend to work things out; they don’t get stark naked or anything. It sort of really works out. But she was laying out on her camp cot in the sun, with her bottom part of her uniform on, but with her brassiere on. That is not something that tends to generate respect among your fellow officers. She could have put on a T-shirt. We all had T-shirts. Again, we’re concentrating on one person who had character flaws. She was married at the time. Her husband was living in Ottawa with her daughter, but she was going out with an officer in the regiment. These were things that I would not have condoned. Again, maybe we shouldn’t concentrate on her. She was just a bad person—as an officer. Those are what I would term unofficer-like qualities. They’re not womanly qualities or male qualities. They’re just bad qualities.

The lengthy interjection regarding this female officer’s bad behaviour into his broader narration of women’s entry into the combat arms belies this respondent’s qualification that “I don’t think it’s fair to draw any conclusions from her”. This is where he is placing his emphasis—although repeatedly attempting to incorporate me as co-narrator through references such as “we’re concentrating on one person” or “maybe we shouldn’t concentrate on her”. And despite his attempts to single her out as exceptional, he then weaves into his conclusion of her story an inadvertent admission that she was not alone in encountering problems, and that "some of the problems she might have had, and some of the problems the other women might have had" could be traced to the conservative nature of the army which doesn’t like change.

Whether it is change itself, or a certain kind of change that he is bristling at is clarified by the types of infractions of which he considers this female officer guilty. To begin with, she disrupted the unity of military masculinity by simply being there—"causing problems for them and for us as well". She was disobedient by failing to assimilate. She also failed to be a "good officer", breaching the rank structure and its relations of domination by being “friendly” with everyone instead of remaining aloof, impersonal, or imperious with subordinates. She exhibited weakness in lacking the fortitude to withstand the interpersonal attacks or whatever other means the male officers had used to "single her out". And she may even have been displaying the same cavalier posture towards sexuality as many men, demanding the same kinds of sexual freedoms, or responding with a muted sexual ‘vulgarity’ to the more explicit forms exhibited by military men and referred to by this and other respondents. Regardless, her sexual comportment failed

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to generate respect among her fellow officers. Thus, the liberties she took that sparked a sense of outrage in this respondent suggest that she was resisting or challenging the military’s double standards, that she breached an unwritten gendered code of sexual conduct which expects women to be sexually modest, and married women to be conjugally faithful. That the same is not expected of men is suggested by the naval expression ‘what goes on board stays on board’—referring to the code of silence maintained by fellow crewmembers concerning married (male) members’ infidelities—and by Harrison and Laliberté (1994) who note that male bonding serves to keep secret the sexual infidelities of male members while on temporary duty. Another counterpoint to this example is that of the warrant officer (cited in Chapter Five) who had been convicted of incesting his daughter and was subsequently released by the Forces. The reader may recall that the respondent recounting the story tried to prevent the release of this non-commissioned officer because he had been such a good performer for the Forces. And again, according to Harrison and Laliberté, this story of incest is far from isolated; and it shares company with other violent domestic practices such as wife battering that is all too common in the Forces and to which these authors say the Forces turns a blind eye.

Returning to this ‘bad female officer’, the respondent eventually follows up his narrative with a conclusion which illustrates how the Forces’ instrumental structure mediates the integration project, filtering its success or failure through its technologically rationalized discourse, the hallmark of which is to focus on ‘operational effectiveness’ (the means) as an intrinsic value and ultimate measure of success. In the end, successful integration of women depends on women themselves and their self-promotion. In a classic mode of ‘blaming the victim’, responsibility for the project’s failure is attributed to those who do not want to make it work:

I think the regiment—[name]—was an example of successful integration of women in the combat arms. We had the good female soldiers were able to push themselves out to the front and get ahead just as well as their male counter-parts. And certainly we had girls getting promoted and pushing ahead just as well as the men, volunteering for United Nations jobs and so forth. That’s to a certain extent why I’m not sure that there is that much of a problem, because the ones who wanted to make it work, made it work. The officer, the girl I was referring to didn’t particularly want to make it work and it didn’t work. But I don’t think that’s because she was a woman but because she may have exploited her womanhood.
to a certain extent. But she was like any other male officer: she didn’t know how to get ahead and won’t get ahead because she was just not strong in her area and didn’t have the character and so forth to get ahead (italicized emphasis added).

This approach of denial and blaming the victim is shared by other respondents as well:

But I think that some of the reports that I’ve heard back from friends have indicated that there are no problems, really. The only problems that are there are those that people let become problems.

A third respondent sums this same view up succinctly:

I don’t have any problem because I haven’t seen it. If there is a problem, you just correct it. Simple. Just correct it."

As well as being a typical illustration of technologically rationalized thinking, the view that ‘female soldiers who promote their own advancement are the ones who will progress’ is an effective (male) power practice which ultimately removes the onus from the organization and its leaders, and plants it firmly on women themselves. And, as seen in Chapter Five, although the military leadership is formally implicated in the success or failure of all military policy, the focus is on modifying individual behaviour to make it more likely for women to enrol and stay rather than on systemic or structural change. Blaming the victim and denying where the real power lies is a power practice which disempowers women.

What make this approach so paradoxical is that, as we have seen throughout this study, the Canadian Forces has traditionally operated under an exclusively masculine imperative of dominance totemically corresponding to definitions of gender that offer "one of the primary differentiating principles by which binary structures are socially initiated and maintained as hierarchal relations" (Epstein and Straub 1988:4). In the current implementation of the Canadian Forces gender integration policy, it is the very instrument of male dominance—the ‘leadership’ all the way up the command structure—which is being invoked to counteract its own masculine power. Given this structural contradiction, it is no wonder that female military personnel are having such great difficulty, as evidenced by their high rate of attrition (Davis 1994).
Conclusion: Disguising Domination

This study began on a hunch that changes in masculinity in the latter half of the twentieth century were linked to changes in military technology which requires less brute force and more technical skills. The adoption of sophisticated electronic weapons systems also led equal opportunity lobbyists to anticipate greater access for women on the same grounds that replacing manual with electronically controlled weapons made combat more accessible to those with less physical strength—the 'brain' of hi tech weaponry substituting for the 'brawn' of the foot soldier (Goldman 1982; Segal 1982; Tuten 1982). As well, this new weaponry had greatly enlarged the battlefield, eroding the boundaries between defenders and defended, combatants and non-combatants. As long-range weapons have reached deeper into civilian territory the capacity to protect has been markedly reduced, increasingly endangering women (and others) but affording them no means of defence (Segal 1982). As justifications for excluding women from combat have been stripped away—with the recognition that it is social, rather than physical impediments that are hampering women's full military integration—the question is whether equal access to women is now being facilitated, or whether new objections are being introduced to perpetuate their exclusion or marginalization. Are gender relations being equalized and male dominance abandoned, or is masculinity being transformed into a new, less transparent form? Does the technological rationalization of the Forces represent the relinquishing of masculine control in favour of an ostensibly gender-neutral mode—as Addis suggests (1994)—or does it represent a new form of masculine dominance, covertly embedded in the Forces' ranked, technologically rationalized structure?

To address these questions, this study has been inquiring into how the Canadian military reproduces itself as a gendered technological system, tracing the structure and processes by which it reconstructs its male-dominance through narrative and other social practices aimed at holding territory against threats posed by the integration ruling. Approaching the Canadian Forces as a technological system with human components has disclosed how power within it is dispersed and gender is constructed. The masculinity of the Canadian Forces inheres in more than men's past
and present institutional predominance. Rather, it inheres in the predominance of those structures, practices and values which, in the West, have been conflated with masculinity—to the exclusion or subordination of all that has been associated with femininity. This includes the Forces’ structural organization for war—a particular form of hierarchal and coercive social organization, exercise and dispersal of power and knowledge—as well as the prizing of the soldier’s violence and synthetic death. Military masculinity is based on a binarized meaning system and bifurcated social reality which sees the military repudiate attachments to life and private interests, and construct soldiers as men: unattached and mobile, violent and risk-taking, misogynistic, yet dedicated to obedient dying and killing in defence of those relegated to the social world of the defended—and a set of higher, amorphous ideals. (Parker refers to “a sense of service to a greater (if not always defined) good” (1995:60).) But the relationship between the worlds of defender and defended is conflicted, the latter constructed as dependent on, and thereby subordinated to the military and its needs—burdens (and often prey), yet symbolically integral to the military’s raison d’être. As practiced in the West, war binarizes social life, carving military masculinity into the larger social world to reify, at one extreme, soldiers—‘troops’—and their particular kind of social death. And in reifying the soldier and combat, military masculinity normalizes and legitimates men’s violent deaths.

Just as military masculinity inheres in the structural organization for war within a bifurcated social world, so is the Forces’ male-dominance embedded in its technological system, traceable from the point where its institutional power originates, along the organizational networks of its dispersal. Since military power is exercised through the rank structure, it is through its delineation, from the top down, that male dominance can be traced. Male-dominance is embedded in the Forces technologically rationalized patterns of social practice and meanings. And since organizational power inheres in the capacity to set the operationally effective military standard, male dominance inheres in the establishment of a masculine standard as the evaluative norm for women’s integration. Finally, since the military retains its institutional coherence and legitimacy through the enforcement of technological rationality as a coercive meaning system and
practice, male dominance can be located in soldiers' technologically rationalized, rank-ordered lives and deaths—and in their posthumous glorification. Thus, to answer the question regarding gender equality and future prospects for the diminution or transformation of male dominance in the military, its perpetuation seems assured as long as certain structural parameters remain intact: the social world remains bifurcated between society and the military, and the military agenda continues to be set by priorities of operational effectiveness and a technologically rationalized organization and discourse.

And just as the masculine domination of the Forces is largely obscured by its structural embeddedness—in the operational control over the administrative arm, in the setting of the masculine normative standard, and in the technological rationalization of its various discourses—so are the internal fractures in masculinity obscured in its unity which is necessary for masking the differences in interests between ranked military men and for holding them all to their mission. That is, as well as normalizing and legitimizing its lethal violence, the conflation of the military with masculinity has a unifying purpose which obscures the very real differences between men. The unity of military masculinity—a key component in enlisting the disinterested to fight—masks the necessary dispersal of power between men lodged in the rank structure. What is obscured in the unity of military masculinity is the domination of subordinate men (and women) by elite men—relations of domination which are constructed as ranked rather than as gendered. This unity is in perpetual tension with masculinity's internal fracturing necessary to effect the discipline of subordinate by dominant men. This provides a second answer to the question concerning the perpetuation of male dominance in the Forces: it is assured as long as youth continue to be enlisted as proxies to fight for the interests of dominant male elites.

And gender is indispensable for balancing the tension between masculine unity and fracture. Constructed along the axis of opposition between men and women, gender camouflages the tensions between men by displacing their conflicts onto a principal enemy: women and their femininity. As a narrative device with numerous practical expressions, gender as male-female can serve to camouflage gendered relations between men where these could expose and disrupt
essential dispersals of interests. This is the case with rank, which masks internal differentiations or the opposition of interests between more and less powerful men. Exposing the primacy of these oppositions might sound the military's death knell. They are therefore constructed as inviolable and sacrosanct through the military ethos, a fragile meaning system itself backed by military force. It is this force—at its most extreme in capital punishment—which has indispensably sustained military discipline in the past and which the Canadian government has just recently decided to eliminate (Gazette, October 21, 1997).

That relations of domination in the Forces are constructed as ranked rather than gendered camouflages the relations of dominance between men. Gender differentiation in the Canadian Forces constructs the primary tension as that between men and women, and between them as individuals—masking the internal tensions between men themselves, which, as noted, are phrased as ranked rather than as gendered. It also masks the structural power relations between men and women as constituents of two gendered groups. Thus, for example, the gendered bifurcation of defenders and defenders focuses on the relation of protection between men and women, masking their structural relations of domination, just as military masculinity focuses attention on its unity and away from the power differential or differences in interests between subordinate and dominant male members.

Bringing women into the Forces on what is supposed to be an equal footing is exposing to scrutiny the many silences maintained around the military's methods and goals, including the valuing of death and destruction. Integration, particularly, is exposing and casting doubt on many past practices:

By the same token, the men should recognize that perhaps some of the rather silly things they have done in the past can't--mostly you shouldn't have been doing anyway, even in a pure male society.

With masculinity a means of generating, sustaining, normalizing, and legitimating the military's violence, it is no wonder that women's integration is causing such consternation: it risks exposing the Forces to criticism, especially around its most controversial practices. This much is candidly acknowledged by a respondent:

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That’s the perception, that by changing the groundrules in the middle of the system we’re imposing additional costs and considerable problems. And a lot of these problems will, in the long term, lead to considerable criticism of the military and its mores.

The considerable criticism to which this respondent refers follows from the “sleazy methods”--cited in Chapter Seven--which he says are the means used by drill sergeants to generate the combat ethos in a monogendered environment. By their presence, women’s disruption of military masculinity risks delegitimating its violence and soldier’s (sacrificial) deaths. By disrupting the institution’s gendered logic, integration may be the undoing of the Forces as an anachronistic system of coercion. This disruption may go as far as exposing the military ethos as an ‘ode to force’ which is not really about war, but about perpetuating an archaic system of servitude and sacrifice at the disposal of the ruling elite.

The dangers that women pose are therefore considerable. In casting doubt on past and present practices, and exposing the Forces to criticism, women are giving voice to past silences. This includes a refusal to accept the Forces internal coercion. Here lies another danger, that of women’s resistance, evidenced in their higher rate of attrition:

It’s probably not their idea of what they signed up for, so a lot of them quit. They just don’t accept that as much as we would (emphasis added).

And it is the basis of this resistance--the retention of critical thought and its challenge to the system’s technological rationality--that is so threatening since the military retains its institutional coherence and legitimacy through the enforcement of technological rationality as a coercive meaning system and practice. Whereas men sacrifice their families, and gain rewards for adherence, women’s family ties make them more likely to resist the magnetic pull into the Forces’ mandated vortex of death, destruction and lethal sacrifice. Women’s femininity and their attachment to family may embody their critical thought since, as the least rationalized sector of the economy, the family lends itself least to technologically rationalized thought and practice. Contraposited to operational effectiveness, femininity and family ties represent the supreme enemy: critical thought and resistance to military coercion and discipline.

This study of changing military technology in Canada has traced how gender operates as
an organizing principle of a core state institution, and how it intersects with power to construct, regulate and normalize social relations of hierarchy and dominance. This study has identified core difficulties of the current project to integrate women, including structural contradictions inhibiting its success. And by succeeding in accessing this underresearched and largely inaccessible Canadian institution it may prove useful as a paradigm for others facing similarly challenging situations. At the very least, it will hopefully spark an interest in--and set the stage for--future vigorous investigations of a unique and formative Canadian/Western institution. It has also raised a host of questions to occupy this, and other researchers for the foreseeable future. What remains to be done is to construct an academic context and supportive infrastructure to see it to fruition.

Notes

1. These discursive practices are perhaps more subtle and less systematically organized equivalents of the masculinization of public space in ancient Athens through the proliferation throughout the city of phallic effigies of the god Hermes (‘herms’) (Keuls 1985).

2. And this gatekeeping function of staff college may translate into men in the upper echelons feeling less threatened by the integration project than men in the lower ranks. This is certainly an area where further research needs to be done.

3. For this respondent the reason why the military has greater success with these integration projects than ‘society’ does is partly because we tend to be relatively obedient people, and because it is being forced upon us we do make a darn good effort to make it work.

This view was echoed in the Third Annual Report of the Minister’s Advisory Board on Women in the Canadian Forces:

Discrimination is a deeply rooted, self-reinforcing problem which cannot solved by one-shot education or indoctrination programmes...Basic training instructors have noted that many male recruits enter the Forces with these attitudes fully formed...Success in this regard requires education of the leaders and the led, clear examples of the accepted behaviour modeled and enforced by leaders, and vigilance. Fortunately, the military is particularly adept at eliciting behavioral compliance with military values from its new members (1993:31).
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Elliott, hi tech warfare: author, or panelist in MacDonald?]


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