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Status Inconsistency and Afterlife Belief:
An Analysis of the Canadian Active Population

Suzanne Dubé

A Thesis
in
The Department
of
Sociology and Anthropology

Presented in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Master of Arts at
Concordia University
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Abstract

Status Inconsistency and Afterlife Belief: An analysis of the Canadian Active Population

Suzanne Dubé

The present research re-introduces the concept of status inconsistency in the scientific religious discourse. An examination of the relationship between status inconsistency and the Judeo-Christian belief in life after death is performed using a sample of Canadian respondents. The concept of status inconsistency assumes that the discrepancy between major status indicators affects people's actions and views, and the world around them. Drawing upon the theoretical legacy of sociologists of religion and the conceptual framework of distributive justice, it is argued that status inconsistencies who are underrewarded by a low income in spite of their high education and high occupation, are more prone than others to negate afterlife. Working with the multidimensionality of the concept, significant difference in belief is observed from underrewarded status inconsistencies. The hypothesis is partially supported by the data, and findings specify that age, gender, political and religious affiliation are the most influential contextual factors in this relationship.

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My debt to my husband, Robert, must be acknowledged but cannot be adequately expressed. I hasten to offer an author's mea culpa regarding any error that this thesis may contain.

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CHAPTER I

THEORETICAL FORMULATION

Introduction

Since Demerath's 1965 publication, scarcely any progress has been made toward the examination of the relationship between status inconsistency and religion. This neglect can be easily explained in the light of the fact that the application of the theory to various phenomena has shown to be problematic and its methodological shortcomings severely criticized.

The present research intends to reintroduce the concept of status inconsistency in the social scientific religious discourse, and reexamine its particular influence on religious disbelief. The past three decades, characterized by a general decline in religious commitment, pose anew the importance of examining the role of social status in religious belief.

Beginning in the late 1960's, increasing disbelief in life after death has been reported in empirical research on religion, both in Canada and United States. The apparent erosion of one of the most important tenets of Christianity marks a crucial shift in religious trends, and sociologists of religion who have ferreted out its incidence, marshalling

personal studies and a wide range of Gallup polls, have done so to support unprecedented changes in religious involvement.

If changes in religion are brought about by changes in other social conditions, outside of a general secularization thesis, the sources of a lower acceptance level of the belief in life beyond death have hardly been explored and nowhere has it been asked what makes people reject afterlife.

In sociological use, the question of eternal life can still be posed. Covered under the blanket term of religious commitment, the belief in life after death has received the attention given to a central religious indicator, but rarely has it been recognized as a belief response deserving a more conceptual type of investigation.

In this chapter, I shall define afterlife as an empirical measure, place it in context, and review past research on this religious tenet: Then I shall present Lenski's concept of status inconsistency (which will be referred to as SI) and Demerath's theorizing on social class and religion, which deals with a deprivation rationale: Then I shall introduce the notion of expected reward from achieved status, and incorporate all of these fully in a discussion of religious orthodoxy.

Belief in Afterlife

Church-type religious commitment (also termed "religious involvement", "religiosity", or "religiousness") is usually understood as an institutionalized form of belief and

behaviour. Indices of belief employed in most studies of religious involvement measure the extent to which a person holds traditional orthodox conceptions - and orthodoxy, in that context, refers to "that orientation which stresses intellectual assent to prescribed doctrines" (Lenski, 1961:23).

In the elaborate statements set forth by Glock and Stark (1965 : 20) to delineate various dimensions of religious commitment, which they conceptualized as a multidimensional phenomenon, one of the core components of religiosity, and the subject of our concern here, is the "ideological dimension" of religiousness, the "expectation that the religious person will hold to certain beliefs." We follow Glock and Stark's prescription that religious involvement is "an analytically discrete dimension along which persons may differ in their degree of conformity [...]." (Glock and Stark, 1965: 189).

It will become clear in the following chapter that, in this research, we are raising the question of the afterlife (and its referents) from the standpoint of the theological doctrines of Christianity. That we should appeal to the traditions of Christian faith in our investigation, is supported by the overwhelmingly Canadian Christian clientele expected to give weight to our thesis. This Canadian religious picture, as found in Bibby's Canadian survey (CAN80), is drawn from a population 90% Roman Catholic or

Protestant, "with only 1% Jewish, and less than one-half of 1% either Hindu, Islamic, or Buddhist" (Bibby, 1987: 8).

In the scientific study of religious belief, Roof (1979: 40) argued that "researchers have relied heavily on traditional orthodox doctrines, as a baseline for describing the content of theistic conceptions", even though, as Roof pursued, "the belief of church people are much more diverse and varied than the measures we use for characterizing them". Diversity and variation of responses must be questioned in the case the eternal life item. "Unanswerability" characterizes the open-ended issue of the question of life after death and was raised by Bibby (1979 :13) who noticed the pervasiveness (the majority) of a "don't know" attitude in the marginal comments to the question, in a national survey of Canadians, in 1975.

This uneasiness to translate the mystery associated with the subject of eternal life, when not resorting to religious explanations, compelled the author to conclude: "Many [...] systems of religion, including Christianity, speak decisively about death and offer assurance to the faithful. To be either oblivious to such options or unsure of one's fate is to be less than convinced of the viability of the answers posed by religion."

Given its continued use even before the early years of the Gallup Poll (Stark and Glock, 1968; Lenski, 1961), and employed since in most years of the General Social Survey

(G.S.S.) in the United States and in all the three Canadian Projects on religion (Project Can75; Project Can80; Project Can85), the belief in life after death has been found to be one of the most reliable belief items for measuring doctrinal orthodoxy (Nelsen, 1981: 109).

Secularization

Most scholars of religion will agree that religious belief and practice have been on the decline in modern society. In the last three decades, the demise of the supernatural, namely the abandonment of "an other reality", which transcends the reality of our everyday life, has been assumed as a global and irreversible trend of contemporary religion (Berger, 1969: 1-2).

By considering a society in which the supernatural has departed, students of religion have debated the extent to which a purely secular society is possible (O'Toole, 1984: 206). Even though concepts such as "invisible religion" (Luckmann, 1967), and "civil religion" (Bellah 1970), assumed "the changing social basis of religion in modern society" (Luckmann, 1967: 18), they represented a non-institutionalized conceptualization of religious commitment. In the theoretical literature, concepts of secularization which have been dominating the analysis of modern religion in the Western world, were articulated mostly from the perspective of the traditions of the principal Christian Churches (Berger, 1969:5).

The "secularization thesis" does not inform the present debate, but the "themes" of secularization cannot be ignored in the scholarly discussion of the nature of religion and the fabric of human society. The processes of decline of religion in society "is, with some reservations, an accepted insight of classic sociology" and a recurrent issue of its contemporary enterprise (O'Toole, 1984 :206). Wilson (1969), Berger (1969), and Martin (1978), have conceptualized this disinclination toward traditional religion as being present in the individual, the community and the institution; their sociological insight can be briefly outlined.

Wilson (1969: XVI) defines secularization as a process whereby "religious thinking, practice and institutions lose their social significance", and opposes religious community to rational and secular society. For Wilson secularization is concomitant to "societalization". Wilson argues that in rational organization with rationally determined role, individuals are more likely to assess the world in empirical and rational terms, and less likely to act in response to religious motivation.

Peter Berger (1967: 4) accentuates the notion of secularization as having a more subjective side and applies the term to "processes inside the human mind, that is, a "secularization of consciousness". Berger explains that through this process, in the Western world, we find a growing number of individuals who envisage their personal life and the

world around them, without the benefit of a religious interpretation. Secularization appears as a general loss of plausibility for the reality mirrored by religion (Berger, 1967: 126).

While Wilson opposes religious community to rational society, and Berger's interpretation of secular society brings into focus the construction of a desacralized world, Martin's General Theory of Secularization (1978) is intimately related to the concept of institutional differentiation. In order "to suggest under what conditions religious institutions, like churches and sects, become less powerful, and how it comes about that religious beliefs are less easily accepted" (12), Martin frames the socio-cultural complexes of Christendom by the degree of their religious monopoly. When confronting "militant secular religions", the degree of religious pluralism establishes the "stability of pluralistic democratic regimes", in the case of Protestantism, and the resolution of an organicist religious monopoly, when referring to the Catholic Church (24).

Trends in Afterlife Beliefs

The literature on trends in afterlife beliefs is not so abundant that we cannot assemble a fairly exhaustive account of its past contribution. While we can find a more analytical perspective during the 1960's, with students of religion attempting to explain the apparent decline in the proportion of those believing in life after death, in the 1970's,

researchers have tended to re-examine previous findings, making use of social and contextual correlates.

It has been suggested by Stark and Glock (1973: 284-285) that the profound revolution in religious thought, which began to sweep the Churches in mid-century, was being "accompanied" by a rapid decline in levels of acceptance of traditional religious beliefs. While witnessing the softening of Roman Catholic theologians flowing from the reforms of Vatican II, these authors argued against radical Protestant theologies (Altizer and Hamilton, 1966), proclaiming the "death of God" and defending an atranscendent image of the universe. They contended that such "demythologized modernism" was the beginning of a post-Christian era and resulted in challenging people's faith in other-worldly traditional beliefs which had been the pillars of Christianity for nearly two millennia.

In an attempt to resolve the question of whether differences in religious perspectives were a matter of age or generation, with a random sample of church members, Stark (1973: 50-54) provided direct evidence that belief did not necessarily increase above 50 and decrease below 40, even though a meaningful shift occurred between forty-year-old and fifty-year-old. At the same time, he also observed that even though commitment to Christian orthodoxy did not appear to be related to the process of aging, belief in afterlife tended to be more relevant to the aged than to the young. He concluded that "people do not get more orthodox or conservative in their

religious beliefs as they get older, except that they do increasingly become certain of the existence of life beyond death" (Stark, 1973: 54).

Demerath (1968: 376-378) casted doubt on the inferences to be drawn from the "current breed of theological mavericks", and questioned the paucity of the data on which Stark and Glock's predictions were couched. For Demerath, the new Christian ethicalism of the modern liberal Protestant theologies looked for a more secular meaning of the Gospel, as a rationale for an image of God more relevant to the problems of the world. This did not necessarily mean the rejection of traditional religion, but "only the death of a particular conception of God, one that is abstract, other-worldly, and psychologically "out-there", rather than within the believer himself."

Even though Demerath indicated that the Protestant Churches witnessed a general decline in the early 1960's, following a period of growth between the mid-1940's and mid-1950's, he interpreted this decline in membership growth and religious beliefs as a consequence of the differentiation and bureaucratization taking place throughout American religion. But, as he saw it, these recent tendencies were unacknowledged by laity at large.

For Jeffrey Hadden (1968:221), doctrinal differences of the Protestant Churches, stemming from serious doubt about traditional Christian theology, affected both clergy and

laity. Basing his assertion on two major surveys, his own study of the Protestant clergy, and Stark and Glock's San Francisco Bay Area study (1965), Hadden argued: "both are having difficulty accepting many of the traditional doctrines of the faith, and apparently for the same reason - they no longer seem plausible in the modern world."

In the 1970's, the study of religion involved the emergence of a "second-generation" literature, replicating empirical studies done in the 1960's and produced a number of modifications in the prediction of earlier investigations. The increasing availability of large-scale data sets (such as the National Opinion Research Centre [NORC] General Social Surveys, conducted almost annually since 1972), and the growing number of cross-sectional surveys comparing responses to religious questions at periodic intervals, afforded new evidence on the religious dimension of social change (Wuthnow, 1979: 3).

Greely (1972a, 1972b) adopted a dissenting view from all the above-cited authors employing different data bases (Gaffin-Gallup studies of 1952 and 1965) and later on argued that the proportion of Americans believing in life after death had not changed notably since 1930', when the question was first asked (1978), while Wuthnow (1976, 850-853) chartered trends of religious decline and reported data from Gallup polls (1972; Erskine, 1965) indicating that belief in life after death, constant since 1944, had dropped significantly in

the late 1960's, from 76 percent to 53 percent. Wuthnow suggested that these distinct shifts in religious trends may be due to the so-called counterculture of the late 1960's, and that the irregularity in the secularization process of that period could simply be a problem of generation.

In a secondary analysis, Hertel and Nelsen (1974) using data from two national samples of Americans, one from 1957 and the other from 1968, found that there was hardly any difference in levels of beliefs between these two time periods, but reported a significant increase in the proportion of people espousing disbelief, supporting at the same time a decline in the proportion of those expressing uncertainty. Qualifying Stark and Glock's prediction of the demise of Christianity, their findings particularly emphasized that "past research had failed to distinguish between decline in belief and increase in disbelief" (Hertel and Nelsen, 1974: 409).

Elsewhere, in a social scientific study attempting to measure death-related attitudes in adolescent men and women, gender differences were observed concerning the belief about life after death. Young men appeared to be more decisive and agreed more significantly than young women, that death is the final process of life (Perkes and Schildt, 1979). In U.S. national samples, Nelsen (1981: 113) pooled Gallup and General Social Survey data, and was able to document an increase in percentage of disbelief in life after death over a period of

twenty years. He reported that while 12.9% Americans denied afterlife in 1944 and 1957, in the period between 1973 and 1978, disbelief had increased to 20.9%. Charting further the erosion of this belief, Nelsen and other studies reported that in the U.S., "life without afterlife" was no more exclusively exhibited by the youths but was also espoused by the matures. It appeared that aging and believing in eternal life were no more positively related in all regions of the United States. In that respect, it has also been observed that the category of elders giving no preference for religious denominational affiliation, contained a number of "iconoclasts" who not only rejected the belief in life after death but also reported a lower feeling of personal and marital well-being and displayed unconcern for the world and political issues (Nelsen, 1981; Bock and Radelet, 1988).

Even if Nelsen (1981) demonstrated that church participation proved to be a poor indicator of the belief in a life beyond death, Bock and Radelet (1988) and Bibby (1987) both came to the conclusion that, when applied to younger people, religious affiliation is an important indicator of a positive attitude toward afterlife. Their findings also revealed that those who do not identify with religious groups (the nones) are more likely to reject the belief in an afterlife than those who are affiliated to conventional religion.

Bibby (1987) speaking for Canadians and Greely (1988) for Americans agreed that religious fundamentalism is an important correlate of the belief in immortality, and that those who adhere to a strict literal interpretation of the bible might be more inclined to believe in afterlife than those who reject a literalist interpretation of the Scripture.

Marital status is another correlate of the belief in afterlife which has been propositioned in the very recent literature (Greely, 1988 ; Bock and Radelet, 1988). Survey findings have indicated that married individuals are slightly more likely to believe in life after death than their unmarried counterparts, in spite of factors such as age and gender.

Status Inconsistency

Status inconsistency (SI), as a conception of social status outgrowing the traditional uni-dimensional conception of social class, was initially explored by Lenski (1954), even though the concept was suggested by Weber (1958: 193) in his notion of "status-groups" and their "special styles of life". In his non-vertical multidimensional view of the structures of human groups, Lenski theoretically conceived of a consistency dimension in which the degree of status crystallization (or consistency) of the positions in the several vertical hierarchies could be compared. As Lenski puts it: "certain units may be consistently high or consistently low, while others may combine high standing with respect to certain

status variables with low standing with respect to others." (1954: 405).

At first, more concerned to investigate the empirical evidence than the theoretical formulation of the concept, Lenski hypothesized that "...individuals characterized by a low degree of status crystallization [i.e., high degree of status inconsistency] differ significantly in their political attitudes and behaviour from individuals characterized by a high degree of status crystallization, when status differences in the vertical dimension are controlled." (1954: 405-406). On the basis of census data and surveys done in Greater Detroit, in the 1950's, Lenski demonstrated that racial-ethnic statuses were significantly inconsistent with occupational statuses, and that, to a lesser degree, inconsistency prevailed between occupation, education and income.

In Power and Privilege (1966: VIII), Lenski refines his concept of status crystallization. In his theoretical position is the assumption that underlying all discussions of classes and strata, and their structural relationships, is the question of what determines the distribution of rewards in our society. Lenski establishes a key relationship between power, which "determines the distribution of nearly all the surplus possessed by a society", and privilege, the "possession or control of a portion of that surplus" (46). In modern industrial societies, where there is a significant surplus

produced, privilege or prestige will be largely determined by power. In those societies, the various forms of power are less than perfectly correlated with one another and an individual can be a member of many hierarchies of classes and not be located in any particular one of them (75-76).

Because the workings of the distributive process does not operate on a completely egalitarian basis, there is a tendency for the middle classes to arrogate to themselves some of the power and privileges of the elite (81). Lenski equates people's reactions to the unequal distribution of resources with their reactions to the inconsistencies in their various statuses. These reactions are not predictable from the ranks occupied in the respective status systems, because individuals with discrepancies in their statuses and motivated by self-interest, will strive for the status or rank which is highest, while others will tend to treat them in terms of their lowest status or ranks (86-87).

This practice has been found to be the source of considerable stress for individuals of inconsistent status. As a result, these status discrepant individuals are more likely than others "to react against the existing order and the political system which undergirds it." Discrepancies between major status dimensions are quite prevalent in modern industrial societies where a diversity of resources affect the distributive system. When correlation is low between the

various types of resources, there will be a substantial number of persons affected by SI (87).

Further empirical evidence of the meaning of SI followed Lenski's first exploration of the concept. Goffman (1957) replicated Lenski and offered complementary findings on political liberalism; Treiman (1966) related SI to prejudice; Geschwender (1967) placed an explanation of SI within the framework of cognitive dissonance and further on, demonstrated that SI could be related to social isolation and social unrest; other SI studies attempted to evaluate the SI effects on political change (Olsen & Tully, 1972) and psychological stress (Hornung, 1977). But the sociological literature on SI from the last two decades, seems to have been directed at demonstrating the methodological flaws of earlier findings (Starnes & Singleton, 1977; Sasaki, 1979) and the difficulty inherent in measuring objectively defined SI and its viability as a predictor of theoretical relevant effects (Starr & Straits, 1984; Brown et al, 1988).

Demerath's contribution as the first theorist to explore the effects of status discrepancy on religion is particularly relevant here. In Social Class in American Protestantism (1965: 128-129) he argued that "without suggesting that religion must be considered perforce and for its own sake, several considerations recommend an inspection of its link with discrepancy."

With a sample composed exclusively of Protestant Lutheran church members, Demerath hypothesized that status discrepants were more likely to subscribe to non-economic and non-status oriented values and would tend to become inordinately involved in the family, the educational groups, and the church (136-137). Demerath's central idea was to distinguish churchlike and sectlike religiosity, and their relationship to status discrepancy and demonstrate that each type of religiosity was committed to the religious program, in qualitatively different ways. Demerath speculated that high-status parishioners with low discrepancy would be more likely to relate to a churchlike religiosity, as a reinforcement of secular values and that low-status individuals, with high discrepancy, should be more predisposed to sectlike commitment, seeking new orientations for self-judgment (137-138).

Using education, occupation and income as status variables, Demerath's empirical evidence suggested that while the highly discrepant were indeed more involved in sectlike religiosity, among the different measures he used as dimensions of religious commitment, high discrepancy was only significantly related to church attendance, when occupational prestige was high and education was low (173).

Status Inconsistency: a critical outlook

Looking for methodological refinements in SI, Sasaki (1979) issued that warning: "Let us not forget, however, that the primary purpose of status inconsistency analysis is to

determine whether or not a specific type of status inconsistency (e.g., low education - higher occupational prestige) is related to the dependent variables." (Sasaki, 1979: 140). However, in developing an understanding of how status inconsistency may operate as an independent variable, most status inconsistency investigators have equated the utility of the concept to its capacity to predict theoretically relevant effects on dependent variables. Such a line of inquiry, confined to testing the degree of explanatory power of the concept, relying on relative inconsistency scores on a continuum, has disciplined researchers to pay very little attention to the phenomenon of multidimensionality per se, as conceived by Lenski.¹

To redress this neglect, a fundamental theme of this thesis will be to acknowledge, as it has not been done previously, that it is in the discussion of "patterns" and "types" of discrepancy, that resides the core of Lenski's theoretical model of status multidimensionality, and its sociological meaning. An understanding of the inconsistency dimensions of status, in accordance with Lenski's approach "becomes a series of positions in a series of related vertical

¹Even though Lenski's findings demonstrated that only an extreme form of status inconsistency produced distinctive responses, he nevertheless felt that they fully warranted further exploration of the concept, as he said: "...not only on the ground that status crystallization seems a useful tool for reducing the range of unexplained variation [...] but also because of the broader theoretical and methodological implications which were outlined...." (Lenski, 1954: 413).

hierarchies" (Lenski, 1954:405), and considers status variables as simple dichotomies, on which individuals may rank high or low. Unequal combinations of statuses result in various Weberian styles of discrepancy profiles, "typifying" the basis of analysis. Instead of treating these structural profiles as "degree" of inconsistency, emphasis can be placed on "kinds" of inconsistency, leading to particular social responses. Since our major concern is that of connecting religiosity with the structural explanation of SI, the grounding of our assumption on religious belief or disbelief must necessarily be related to the consequences of these different patterns of SI. Beforehand, however, the link between SI and afterlife must be established conceptually.

Status Inconsistency and Afterlife

In Lenski's and Demerath's theorizing on SI, as an aspect of stratification, the assumption has always been that SI was an objective structural condition typifying different people who shared discrepancies on status indicators. As Demerath (1963: 95) puts it: "Because the individual is ranked anonymously and empirically, these facets of stratification are objective." The actual disparity between measured status indicators on occupation, education and income, has been regarded by some as being pervasive in society (Lenski, 1966: 87; Treiman, 1966: 653), while its rather high incidence has been questioned by Demerath on more homogeneous and restricted samples (Demerath, 1965: 172).

Building on the objective reality of SI, we can presuppose a subjective response to it, as a perspective of analysis. Specifically, we might argue that status inconsistencies, who occupy certain unusual combinations of statuses may perceive themselves as deprived compared to others more privileged on status criteria. Stated by Glock and Stark (1965: 246) and referring to "any and all the ways that an individual or group may be, or feel disadvantaged in comparison either to other individuals or groups or to an internalized sets of standards", deprivation "tends to be accompanied by a desire to overcome it." On these grounds, we could suspect that individuals who exhibit discrepancies in their various statuses would tend to react to it and search ways to deal with it. The same authors speculated that efforts to overcome relative deprivation may be religious or secular. In the case of economic and social deprivation, characterized by deprivation relative to others, religious resolutions have been assumed to occur, when "those experiencing the deprivation are not in a position to work directly at eliminating its causes" (Glock and Stark, 1965: 249).

In the present inquiry, however, even though considerable stress is exerted on status discrepant, we pose questions concerning the adequacy of a deprivational explanatory framework, on the grounds that status inconsistencies are more likely to consider alternative outlet for their

dissatisfaction than religion. Motivated by self-interest, status discrepants will seek to overcome their imbalance statuses by striving for statuses or ranks which are higher, even though they may be torn between higher or lower references groups (Lenski, 1966: 86; Demerath, 1965: 135). In such a case, we argue that the solution for status inconsistencies, pursuing mobility, would not be to resort to religious orthodoxy, as a relief, but to reject the compensation which religion could offer. Building on the logic that class, politics and religious commitment are interrelated, this argument can be clarified.

In Lenski's (1966: 87) conception of power and privilege, the unequal distribution of rewards in society, gave rise to SI, which in turn generated political discontent and a greater desire for change. Demerath (1965) documented the urgent need of the discrepants to act upon their status incongruity and react to it by political means. His results showed that if high discrepancy and low status were conducive to political radicalism (157), their effect on religiosity was severely limited since only a particular profile of status discrepancy was found to be associated to church attendance (173). Even though Demerath argued that among his Lutheran church members, the sectlike religiosity of the status discrepants may differ in "kind", but not in "degree" (Demerath, 1965: 137-138), and that status discrepants, absent from church on Sunday nevertheless could "feel" or "believe"

their religion, Stark (1972) concluded that this is not the case in the general population. Using national samples, Stark demonstrated that "differences in religious commitment among the classes are of "degree", not of "kind." (494).

Addressing the theoretical issue of tension between religion and society, Glock and Stark (1965: 198-199) suggested that lower classes, more than upper classes, were more likely to pick radical politics rather than religious involvement, to assuage their status deprivation. Class, politics and religious belief were found to be correlated, and specifically, "radicalism accounted for an impressive portion of the class difference in religious belief." Their study empirically demonstrated that the lower the social class, the less widely held the belief in life after death . On this issue, Stark (1972: 497-498) elsewhere confirming these results remarked that if religion comforts the poor, "the rich, not the poor, are more likely to believe there is a kingdom to be gained."

To the extent that both, lower classes and status inconsistencies have been observed to grapple with relative deprivation and appear to be dealing with it through radical politics, and considering that a lessening of religious belief has been found to occur more with radicals, it seems reasonable to assume that status inconsistencies, in their peculiar class position, are as likely as lower classes, to shun traditional religious belief. Using Demerath's

proposition that "status discrepant" may be cautiously substituted for "lower classes" (198), a relationship between denial of a hereafter and inconsistent status can then be posited. Status discrepants, in their struggle for greater power and privilege, and their search for greater social justice, are less likely to resort to religious orthodoxy, to overcome their precarious status position. In their attempts to cope with their status discrepancy, those seeking for a change in their status arrangements in this world are less likely to believe in the reality of the next.

Underrewarded Status Inconsistency

The discrepancy between major social statuses is associated to specific "unrewarding" conditions emerging from exchange transactions. Our attempt to include a rationale for the reactions of status discrepants within an "underrewarded" framework will take into account Homans's and Elau's versions of exchange theory and Geschwender's classification of SI.

In Homans's Social Behavior: Its Elementary Form (1961), we find the fusion of elementary economics and behavioral psychology. Homans understands social behavior as "an exchange of activity, tangible or intangible and more or less rewarding or costly, between at least two persons." (13).

Individuals engage in exchanges to earn rewards and use their resources to their own advantage (13). Distributive justice is defined by Homans as the fair distribution of rewards and costs between persons (74). As Homans puts it: "A

man in an exchange relation with another will expect that the rewards of each man be proportioned to his costs - the greater the rewards, the greater the costs."(75). The author suggests that people's expectations are determined by their "backgrounds" or "investments", and that their rewards, costs and investments are appraised in relation to the rewards, costs and investments of others. Homans states his theory of distributive justice in the following propositional form: "The more to a man's disadvantage the rule of distributive justice fails of realization, the more likely he is to display the emotional behavior we call anger." (1961: 75).

In Blau's sociological approach, the complex structure of exchange transactions in social life cannot be reduced to simple psychological processes. In Exchange and Power in Social Life (1967), Blau draws attention to the emergent properties of social exchange. According to this author's basic principles of exchange: "...Each individual's behavior is reinforced by the rewards it brings, but the psychological process of reinforcement does not suffice to explain the exchange relation that develops. This social relation is the joint product of the actions of both individuals, with the actions of each being dependent on those of the other." (4).

Blau sets the theme of his analysis by outlining how once the profitable exchange relationships have been established, a reciprocal obligation will emerge between persons and guide their subsequent exchanges. From the social structure within

which the association occurs, imbalances of obligations and expectations of future rewards give rise to differentiated status and power. The expectations of regular rewards are not only based on the past social experiences of individuals but are also influenced by the common values and norms in society which stipulate a fair rate of exchange for them (155-166). In Blau's conceptual scheme, "shared experiences in groups induce members to consider their investments to be similar and to expect similar returns..." (166).

In Blau's dynamics of profitable exchange, a fundamental problem is created when individuals receive social benefits and returns for their investments differing from the benefits or returns expected and obtained in comparable situation: "As a result, some men, due to no fault of their own, cannot obtain a fair return for the major investments of their lives. The unfair deal they receive as the victims of competitive processes beyond their control is likely to make them alienated from and hostile to their society." (167).

In developing an understanding of Homans's formulation of exchange theory, Geschwender (1967) considered that "certain status dimensions could be viewed as investments into a social situation, while others could be viewed as rewards received from that situation." (162) In wanting to integrate the theory of distributive justice and several other social-psychological mechanisms into Festinger's (1957) theory of "cognitive dissonance", Geschwender suggested that in the

United States "universalistic norms [...] lead one to expect that he will be rewarded in terms of his level of education." (162). Thus in his interpretation of Lenski's dimensions of status consistency, Geschwender considered education as an achieved investment, occupation as a social reward and income as a material reward ensuing from that situation.

In Geschwender's model, "underrewarded" status inconsistencies are described as persons whose investments in education are higher than their level of occupation and/or income and overrewarded status inconsistencies are those whose investments in education are below their level of occupation and/or income. Underrewarded status inconsistencies are more likely to experience a felt injustice and feel anger while overrewarded status inconsistencies are more likely to feel guilt.

The principles advanced in Homans's and Blau's exchange theories and Geschwender's set of assumptions derived from Homans theory of "distributive justice", yield implications for the patterns of SI which will be the principal feature of the present thesis.

It will be argued that the expectations of rewards and their subsequent discontinuities violate the standards of fairness in social exchange, which, as a result, ceases to be rewarding. Since we can affirm that those who experience such incongruence in their status arrangements are underrewarded, and since we can expect that those persons will be angered and

hostile to their society as victims of unjust social exchanges, we can presuppose that this particular type of status inconsistencies should be the least disposed to believe in the other-worldly rewards.

Summary

For the last two decades, cross-sectional studies have chartered trends in religious change, and decline in orthodox beliefs has become a major concern for sociologists of religion. Looking for an explanation for the variations in religious commitment, and for correlates of religious disbelief, very few studies have speculated on the impact of socioeconomic statuses on religiosity, and when they did, very little effect has been attributed to status discrepancy as a predictor of orthodox religious thinking.

The argument presented in this chapter leads to the conclusion that if SI can be said to affect religious belief, it must be properly qualified. In a research strategy, focusing on the multidimensionality of the concept, the present study represents an effort to formulate patterns of discrepancy and interpret their consequences for religiosity.

The data for comprehending such a relationship, are second-hand, and originate from Bibby's Canadian survey on religion, "Project CAN 80". By using Bibby's nationwide data, it will become possible to investigate the dominant tendency among the Canadian active population, to believe or disbelieve in a life after death, through examining

inconsistent combinations of socioeconomic statuses, in the light of a "this-worldly" - "other-worldly" debate. The question of the relationship between SI and religiosity has never been the object of scientific inquiry in this country, and should contribute to Bibby's master project of reconstructing religion in Canada.

The sampling and methodological procedures of Bibby's data will be discussed further on, and other variables, drawn from background factors, will also be introduced. Preceding the examination of the distribution of these data, however, several propositions will be enunciated in the next chapter, on the basis of the theoretical and conceptual treatment of SI, reviewed and appraised in this chapter.

CHAPTER 11

PROPOSITIONS

In this chapter, the first general proposition which will be stated rests on the conceptual framework of status inconsistency (SI) discussed in chapter 1. The following set of propositions relate context variables to the terms defined in the first statement.

Largely as a result of the theoretical legacy of Lenski (1966), Demerath (1965) and Glock and Stark (1965), it has been suggested that status discrepant individuals, affected by the unequal distribution of resources in society, would tend to negate the other-worldly promises of the Church. Drawing also from the concept of distributive justice and fair social exchanges advocated by Homans (1961) Blau (1967) and Geschwender (1967), we take the position that underrewarded status discrepants who do not receive the expected rewards for their investments will tend to negate the other-worldly rewards of an afterlife. The following proposition can then be put forward:

P1 Underrewarded status inconsistent are more likely than others to reject afterlife.

The underrewarded status inconsistent, calling in question the distribution of power, status and wealth, are

those which are typified as having a high educational investment with little prestige and power from their occupational status and/or income. We postulate that those status inconsistencies are more likely to deny the eternal truth of the Church than the "overrewarded" status inconsistencies, those benefitting from a high occupational prestige or high income, in spite of their low investment in education. This proposition leads to a second one:

P2 Underrewarded status inconsistencies are more likely than others to reject the belief in life after death because they tend to be more radical in their political views.

Lenski (1966) observed that persons affected by SI were prone to react against the political system which controlled power and prestige. Considering political radicalism as a mediating factor between SI and religious belief, we can assume that, in search for change, the underrewarded status inconsistencies having invested in education, but with low occupation and/or low income, will tend to be more radical than overrewarded status inconsistencies, and radicals are more likely than conservatives to reject the belief in a life after death.

P3 The amount of disbelief expected from underrewarded status discrepants will be greater among the aged as compared to people at other ages.

At least two approaches may be taken in considering age differences in religious belief. One adopted in the 1960's and 1970's is to regard the greater acceptance level of the belief in afterlife by older people, not as an indicator of greater religious orthodoxy, but as a need to become certain of the existence of a hereafter, in the face of their approaching death (Stark, 1968; Hertel and Nelsen, 1974). The second approach, typical of the last decade and which appears preferable, is to regard the elder's downward shift in postlife belief, as a phenomenon warranting explanation (Nelsen, 1981).

Keeping in mind the last approach and adhering to it, we test age differences as being an important element in the relationship between SI and afterlife belief. We argue that with older people, class boundaries tend to be more imprecise and more likely provoke a reaction against unequal distribution of rewards between young and old. If elders are more likely to be underrewarded status inconsistent, when negative belief is expressed among status discrepant, the amount of religious disbelief will be greater among older respondents than among younger ones.

P4 Women who are underrewarded status inconsistent, unlike men, are more inclined to look for the eternal truth of the Church for reinforcement.

Gender differences in religiosity have been relatively unexplored, but it has been assumed that women were more

religiously involved than men. In a death-related study, adolescent women were less inclined than their men counterpart to reject the belief in a life after death (Perkes and Schildt, 1979). The examination of SI and religiosity, by gender, however, has been totally ignored, with the exception of Der Rath (1963). In studying status discrepancy and religiosity, within categories of age and gender, he concluded: "...women and older people are more likely to be both, highly discrepant and sectarian...." (155).

From these, it is reasonable to expect that women, more than men, getting very little support from secular values, will not feel they are getting their proper share of social and material rewards. They may put inordinate emphasis in the family and religion, and would be more likely to turn to the church, as a compensation for their unresolved status.

P5 When underrewarded status discrepant are married, they are less likely to deny afterlife than when they are not.

Marital status is a measure of social integration which could make a difference in the association between discrepant social status and religious orthodoxy. Recent trends have demonstrated that marriage "appears to increase reported personal happiness, to increase belief in life after death, and to increase certain type of conservatism." (Bock and Radelet, 1988: 228). As a positive element, counteracting discrepant's incongruity of low occupation and/or income and

high education, marriage would tend to increase positive responses to afterlife.

P6 The greater the concentration of population in a community (the more urban the place), the greater the number of underrewarded status inconsistencies, and consequently, the greater will be the amount of disbelief in traditional religious tenets.

Religious disbelief should be attributable to specific patterns of status discrepancy, taking into account differences in community size. In our investigation, population concentration could be an important consideration, since it is recognized that residents from small and large communities differ greatly in culture and behaviour. A study by Fischer (1983: 87-93) for example, presents the "congregation of numbers of persons, [as] "critical masses", sufficient to maintain viable unconventional subcultures". Fischer's position is that urban residents are more likely than rural residents to behave "unconventionally." Urbanites are prone to irreligiosity, political dissent, divorce, etc.... The more expanded the population, the more we find "divergent moral orders and contrasting perspectives."

In this regard, in as much as religious disbelief and SI can be said to deviate from the dominant standards of a society, they can loosely be referred to as "unconventional" (Fischer, 1983: 99). Building on Fischer's presuppositions, we can assume that the greater the community size, the more we

find unconventional behaviour and underrewarded status discrepants, the greater should be the lessening in religious orthodoxy.

P7 Among underrewarded status inconsistent, Catholics are less likely than others to deny afterlife.

Studies have demonstrated that the level of acceptance of traditional religious beliefs varied between dominant religious groups (Hynson, 1976; Martin, 1978). How the religious structure adjusts to changes in society revolves around the belief system and the capacity of different religions to cope with declining orthodoxy. Hynson's (1976: 219) decreasing rank order of American laity accepting afterlife, in 1976, was, Protestant (86%), Catholic (76%), and Jewish. However, in Martin's (1978: 12) theory of secularization, Catholics, less pluralist and more organicist, are less likely to see their belief less accepted and their authority diminished.

The added impact of religious affiliation on the original association between religious belief and SI, could serve as an extension to Demerath's findings that status discrepancy is not independent from Protestantism, and test Martin's speculation of the effect of religiosity on the organizational control of the churches. In establishing the variations in acceptance of traditional religious beliefs among underrewarded status discrepants whose religious

preferences might be Catholic, Protestant, other or "none", we could aggrandize the scope of earlier studies.

P8 Among underrewarded status inconsistencies, Conservative Protestants are more likely to believe in a life after death than Protestants from other denominations.

Bibby (1987: 249) found that Conservative Protestants were decisively more positive in their beliefs in a life after death than people associated with Catholic, United and Anglican Churches. According to Bibby, fundamentalists (Conservative Protestants) would be less vague about their theological outlooks concerning the belief in an afterlife and acknowledge more clearly the truth of this religious tenet, than less conservative affiliates. Greely (1988) also observed that bible literalists (fundamentalists) had a higher rate of postlife belief than non-literalists.

In his study on the relationship between discrepancy and religiosity, Demerath (1963: 152) working with five Protestant denominations, uncovered that SI had an impact on four of them, and that these were positively related to sectlike commitment and church attendance. In the light of these findings, it is reasonable to expect that fundamentalist discrepant, experiencing SI between high education and low occupation and/or low income, would be less likely than non-fundamentalist discrepant, to question the distribution of

rewards in society and would be more inclined to believe in the religious prescriptions of the Church.

In the present chapter, we have specified the propositions that must be examined in our research, regarding phenomena such as type of inconsistency, political radicalism, age, gender, marital status, community size, religious belief and religious orthodoxy.

In the following chapter, the focus will be on the methods of data collection and the measurements and coding of the specific variables incorporated in the preceding propositions. Then we will discuss the methodological procedures and techniques which we intend to employ to analyze these variables.

CHAPTER III

METHOD

Data Sampling

The data for this study are from a 1980 Project Canada National Adult Survey. The survey was a mail-back questionnaire titled: "Project Can80" and was one of three Project Canada adult surveys on religion, carried in 1975, 1980 and 1985. Based at the University of Lethbridge, in Alberta, and conducted by Reginald Bibby, the survey sample was drawn from 43 communities across Canada, with participants randomly selected using telephone directories. The completed number of questionnaires was 1482, and the response rate was 65%. Case weights were used to standardize the sample to the national population characteristics for province, community, size, gender and age. Using Bibby's comment on the relatively small size of some of the religious groups samples (such as the Conservative Protestants, Lutherans, Presbyterians) we should point out that these groups were not large enough to "allow generalization to the groups with a high level of accuracy" (Bibby, 1987: 273-277).

The uncontrollable disadvantage of mail questionnaire has been raised by Nachmias and Nachmias (1981: 183-186) as a serious limitation to representativeness: "Researchers who

use mail questionnaires are almost always faced with the problem of how to estimate the effect the non-respondents may have on their findings [...]. "The non-respondents are usually quite different from those who answer the questionnaire." The authors also pointed out that "professionals tend to have the highest response rate among all other occupations." Since we have reason to expect this predominance of professionals, our study may be faced with a serious bias. However, as there is little we can do about this self-selection and its effects on our findings, the obtained responses that are available to us will nevertheless constitute the data upon which our hypothesis will be examined.

Originally, the data from "Project Can80" were collected by Bibby to yield information pertaining to social issues, intergroup relations and religious attitudes. In the present secondary analysis of these data, questions are included that make possible the examination of social status and religious belief, in the light of social and contextual conditions.¹

Data Measurements

Belief in Life After Death. Belief in life after death was a basic question in which respondents chose from among eight

¹We will focus upon the survey's findings relating to belief in life after death, occupation, education, income, political allegiance, age, gender, marital status, place of residence, religious preference and denomination.

alternatives, the statement that came closest to their view of life after death. The statements and the proportion of respondents choosing each, appear in Table 3.1. As can be observed, 12.4% say unequivocally, that they do not believe that there is life after death, but the remaining 87.6% differ a great deal about what they do believe. It is clear that no particular belief is shared by a majority. The highest concentration, (39.5%) is found with people who have no idea what afterlife may be like (statement 3). Only 18.3% choose a statement (5) expressing belief in rewards and punishment and a mere 3.7% deny punishment (4). This means that over sixty percent ($39.5 + 18.3 + 3.7$) choose statements that reflect a Christian position on eternal life, but strict adherence to concepts such as heaven or hell (5) is not invoked by the majority of these believers. The remainder 26% choose statements ranging from agnosticism (2), to reincarnation (6). The "no answer" statement (8) is considered, here and in all variables examined, as a missing value.

Because the afterlife belief is conceptualized here as a religious tenet inherited from Christendom, and because the foundation of our theoretical argument rests on its acceptance level, reincarnation, expecting a return to earth in some earthy form, is considered as a particular meaning system which stands outside the historical Judeo-Christian belief in life beyond death, and cannot be collapsed with it.

Table 3.1 Belief in Life After Death Statements
and Their Support

Statements	Percentage Choosing
1. I don't believe that there is life after death.	12.4
2. I am unsure whether or not there is life after death.	15.7
3. I believe there must be something beyond death, but I have no idea what it may be like.	39.5
4. There is life after death but no punishment.	3.7
5. There is life after death, with rewards for some people and punishment for others.	18.3
6. The notion of reincarnation expresses my view of what happens to people when they die.	6.9
7. Other.	1.5
8. No answer.	2.0
	<hr/> 100.0 (1308)

Mode-Median: Belief in something but no idea what it is (3)

Moreover, we take the position that, while being unsure or disbelieving in afterlife is to negate this religious tenet, to believe that there is something beyond death, and not know what it may be like (3), is to adhere, to some extent to a positive belief in a vague eternity. The small proportion of those adhering to the Christian belief in heaven or hell (5) should also be stressed, as a rather unexpected finding in a country with a solid Christian tradition. For conceptual and methodological reasons, we code statements 3,4,5 as positive (with 61.4%) and 1,2,6,7 as negative (with 36.6%).

Since we have assumed the determinant influence of social status on belief in life after death, data pertaining to the participants' objective status positions on occupation, education and income will now be examined. It is not peculiar to this study that status inconsistency (referred as SI) will involve "discrepant" combinations of these three components of status. Of these three socio-economic variables, occupation has been especially difficult to classify.

Occupation. In the present study, it was felt that we should limit our investigation to the active population of the sample. By focusing on respondents with an actual "job experience", our inquiry of the occupational structure will be

more closely connected to the various aspects of prestige in employment situation.²

The hundreds of responses gathered on occupation (Occup2), answering the question : "What kind of work do you normally do? , had to be rendered amenable to analysis and it became necessary to reduce their number into a system of categories. In developing a coding scheme for these various occupations, prestige ranks were assigned to them.³ The decision to construct a coding for occupation, based on socioeconomic index and prestige ranks, was "an acceptable way to classify them" (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1981: 270), but it was also legitimated by the nature of our research problem and its theoretical underpinnings. The relative prestige of occupation becomes an important element in the ascription of occupational levels, if we assume, as we did, that men/women's position on the occupational status hierarchy, differing significantly from the norm, can cause them to react to an unequal distribution of power, status and wealth.

²Our research strategy also builds on Lenski's conception of occupation as an active pursuit in the crystallization of status. In his survey with Detroit respondents when he worked with only part of his sample, he reasoned that: "It seemed desirable to remove those respondents [...] not currently in the labor force due to retirement, prolonged illness or extended unemployment, since serious difficulties arose in any attempt to compare them with the remainder of the sample with respect to their position in the occupational hierarchy." (408).

³On this, we followed R. Bibby's suggestion to refer to Bernard Blisshen's socioeconomic scale (1976). See appendix A for details.

Attempting a satisfactory match between Blishen's prestige occupational scale, the Canadian Classification and Dictionary of Occupation (C.C.D.O.) and Nachmias and Nachmias coding method (1981 :270), four well-defined occupational categories were decided upon: (1) professional and managerial; (2) technical and sales; (3) clerical, service and skilled workers; (4) manual labour.

Summarizing the data on occupation has resulted in the distribution displayed in Table 3.2. This distribution of occupational groups indicates an important domination by professionals (1) who represent 31.7% of all cases, and almost twice the frequency distribution observed for manual workers (4), whose proportion in the sample is 17.3%. These two polarized occupational levels (1,4) make up nearly half of the whole distribution (31.7 + 17.3). The technical (2) and clerical (3) are the least represented, with, respectively, 11.1% and 16.5%.

The exclusion of 306 observations (or 23.4% of the whole distribution) which we categorize as missing from statistical analysis, are cases from which we have no recorded answers and necessitates further explanation.

The existence of the "does not apply" response (5) in occupational groups, can be better assessed when it is examined by the occupation of the spouse (Spoccup2), in a contingency table. A crosstabulation of the occupation of the respondent and the occupation of the spouse is presented in

Table 3.2 Occupational Groups and
Their Distribution

Occupational Groups	Percentage Classified
<hr/>	
1. Professional	31.7
2. Technical/Skilled	11.1
3. Clerical/Sales	16.5
4. Manual	17.3
5. "Does not apply"	23.4
Total	<hr/> 100.0 (1308)
<hr/>	
Mode: Professional (1)	Median: Tech/skil (2)

Table 3.3. By using the filter question : "If your husband or wife is employed, what kind of work does he/she do?", and using it as an independent factor on the respondent's occupation (Occup2), we can observe in that table, that we are left with 193 "does not apply" cases, or (14.8% of total responses) reporting no information on occupation from both the respondent, and the respondent's spouse.

One way to evaluate the impact of these "does not apply" cases on occupation, is to compare the frequency distribution from the respondent and the respondent's spouse. Table 3.4 displays the distribution pattern of the "does not apply" cases for both, respondent and respondent's spouse, when the "does not apply" has been removed for the calculation of percentage.

From Table 3.4, we can see that the 113 observations of the spouse's occupation seem to be following, closely enough, the same proportional distribution as the 594 cases of the respondent's occupation, when we focus on the "does not apply" category. We can then say that the chances that the excluded "does not apply" cases may alter the validity of the findings is therefore minimized, since their contingency on each other's unrecorded occupational frequency appears to be proportional enough. In other words, it is felt that these 306 non-responses to the question on occupation, are not likely to invalidate the information gathered about occupation most likely originating from the spouse occupational profile.

Table 3.3 Respondent's Occupation by
Spouse's Occupation

	SPOCCUP2					Row T
	Profess	Techski	Clersal	Manual	Does n.a.	
Count						
Row Pct						
Col Pct						
Tot Pct						
OCCUP2	78 18.7	31 7.5	42 10.0	22 5.4	242 58.3	415 31.7
Profess	41.7 5.9	43.0 2.4	36.8 3.2	15.0 1.7	30.8 18.5	
Techski	27 18.3 14.3 2.0	8 5.6 11.2 .6	11 7.3 9.4 .8	17 11.7 11.4 1.3	83 57.2 10.6 6.4	146 11.1
Clersal	30 13.8 15.6 2.3	11 5.0 14.7 .8	26 12.3 23.4 2.0	36 16.6 23.9 2.7	113 52.4 14.3 8.6	215 16.5
Manual	15 6.6 8.0 1.1	12 5.4 16.8 .9	7 3.1 6.3 .5	37 16.1 24.4 2.8	156 68.8 19.8 11.9	226 17.3
Does not apply	38 12.3 20.2 2.9	10 3.4 14.3 .8	27 8.9 24.1 2.1	38 12.4 25.4 2.9	193 63.0 24.5 14.8	306 23.4
Column total	186 14.2	72 5.5	113 8.6	150 11.5	787 60.1	1308 100.0

Table 3.4 Distribution of the
 "Does not Apply" for Respondents
 and Spouse Occupation

Occupation	Does not Apply		Respondent Occupation is known
	% Respondent	% Spouse	
Professional	41	33	41
Techn/Skilled	14	9	14
Clerk/Sales	19	24	22
Manual	26	34	23
Total	100 (594)	100 (113)	100 (1002)

Attention should also be given to the fact that, quite possibly, the "does not apply" excluded cases are mostly females, whose working status may not be applicable as an answer for the question on occupation. A detailed examination of these cases and their possible connection to status discrepancy would require the aggrandizement of the concept of status inconsistency to any working status (not only as a job performed outside the home), and would depart from the scope of this thesis.⁴

Finally a new coding for occupation is performed. This new coding scheme for occupation is constructed to reflect the aim of our research. In the theoretically conceived SI, when the positions on the status hierarchies are compared, as Lenski put it: "certain units may be consistently high, while others may combine a high standing with respect to certain status variables with low standing with respect to others." (Lenski, 1954: 405). Going back to Table 3.2, we recode occupation into a dichotomy and assign the label "high" to (1) and (2), grouping mostly professionals and semi-professionals (31.7% + 11.1), almost forty percent of the whole distribution. Values (3) and (4) are combined to form the "low" occupational level, which represents mostly white collar and blue collar workers (16.5 + 17.3) and almost the third of all occupations.

⁴Further discussion on the occupation of the spouse will be more pertinent at the end of this chapter when we examine family income and patterns of underrewarded SI.

Education. Differences in educational attainment can be observed in Table 3.5. When we examine the pattern of responses on the highest educational level completed, high school (level 2), with 32.5%, stands out as being the most often completed level of education, and shows twice the percentage observed for grade school (1). Post-graduate university level of education (5) registers the lowest proportion of respondents, with 12.2%, while the proportion of those having completed technical/business (3) and undergraduate studies (4) is about the same, with, respectively, 17.2% and 16.7%. The rather high incidence of university undergraduate and graduate respondents is to be expected, considering that professionals are the best represented members of the occupational field (see Table 3.2).

Since our concern is to measure the empirical effects of SI on postlife belief, the main statuses that compose it, occupation, education and income, must follow the same rationale in their coding arrangements. That explains the recoding of education (Educ2) into a pattern of "high" and "low" values, as performed on occupation. A "high" value on education combines levels 4 and 5 ($16.7 + 12.2$). A "low" value means collapsing levels 1, 2, 3, and represents two-third of the whole distribution ($16.8 + 32.8 + 17.2$).

Income. As a reward dimension of individual status, income is an important measure of the returns of investments. Since

Table 3.5 Educational Levels and
Their Distribution

Educational Levels	Percentage completed
1. Grade School 2. High School 3. Technical/Business 4. Undergraduate University 5. Graduate or Professional School, University 6. Missing	16.8 32.8 17.2 16.7 12.2 4.4
Total	100.0 (1308)
Mode and Median: High School (2)	

the income of the family is the only information we have, there is little choice but to accept that income figures do not always reflect the respondent's individual income.⁵

Total family income categories and their distributions appear in Table 3.6. They are arranged in eight categories ranging from less than \$5,000, to over \$50,000, with a range of \$5,000 within categories, and a greater leap between \$30,000 and \$50,000.

The percentage difference in income is not too pronounced. Respondents with the lowest (category 1) or the highest (8) total family income, e.g., those earning less than \$5,000 and those earning more than \$50,000, show the lowest response rate, with, respectively, 6.1% and 4.5%. With a share of 18.8% of the total distribution, the categories of those earning between \$30,000 and \$50,000 (7), is the most frequently observed in the sample, followed by the group of earners situated between \$15,000 and \$19,999 (4), with a percentage of 16.1. The rest (categories 2,3,5), have income percentages ranging between ten and fifteen percent. The highest represented income group (7), those earning between \$30,000 and \$50,000, presents most likely, the scenario of a two-salary household, a well-implanted state of affair at the

⁵Family income and the occupation of the spouse will be important elements in the theoretical justification of a certain type of SI, at the end of this chapter.

**Table 3.6 Income Categories and
Their Distribution**

Income Categories	Percentage earning
1. Less than \$5,000	6.1
2. \$5,000. - \$9,999	10.8
3. \$10,000. - \$14,999	14.3
4. \$15,000. - \$19,999	16.1
5. \$20,000. - \$24,999	14.7
6. \$25,000. - \$29,999	11.3
7. \$30,000. - \$50,000	18.8
8. Over \$50,000	4.5
9. Missing	3.5
Total	<u>100.0</u> (1308)

Mode: \$30,000 - \$50,000 (7) Median: \$20,000 - \$24,999 (5)

beginning of the 1980's, and surpasses, in proportion, the median salary bracket (5), positioned between \$15,000 and \$19,999 in this period.

Again theory penetrates into our methodology, and following the same argument as in the case of occupation and education, a "high" and "low" coding strategy must be devised for income, and the original eight categories reduced to two. Taking as a cutting point the median range of income previously defined (category 5), we situate "low" family income below that point, grouping income brackets 1,2,3,4. The four highest income levels, 5,6,7,8, will be considered as the "high" category. This recoding divides the sample in half, with high income earners placed higher than \$20,000 (14.7 + 11.3 + 18.8 + 4.5), and low earners below \$20,000 (6.1 + 10.8 + 14.3 + 16.1).

Variables in Context. In order to present conveniently the general findings of our study, an adequate description of all variables investigated should be part of the present section on measurements. Table 3.7 describes the information on variables which were found to be associated with postlife belief in past research and which were hypothesized as "contextual" elements in the relationship between SI and afterlife. The distribution of individual

Table 3.7 Variables in Context
and Their Distribution

Variables	Response Option	Percentage Answered
<u>AGE</u>		
"In what year were you born?"	15-24	6.4
	25-34	32.2
	35-44	13.2
	45-54	14.4
	55-64	11.7
	65+	14.3
	Missing	7.9
	Total	100.0 (1308)
<u>GENDER</u>		
	Male	50.8
	Female	48.8
	Missing	.3
	Total	100.0 (1308)
<u>MARITAL STATUS</u>		
"Are you currently..."	Married	63.5
	Widowed	10.0
	Divorced	3.3
	Separated	2.4
	Never Married	16.0
	Cohabiting	3.2
	Missing	1.4
	Total	100.0 (1308)
<u>RESIDENCE</u>		
"What is the nature of the community in which you are <u>presently</u> living?"	Farm	5.7
	Rural Nonfarm	6.2
	Town	27.7
	Medium City	16.2
	Large City	10.8
	Metropolis	31.4
	Missing	1.9
	Total	100.0 (1308)

Table 3.7 cont.

POLITICS

"With respect to political preference,
do you usually think of yourself as:

Federally	
Liberal	41.8
Conservative	28.0
New Democrat	12.6
Social Credit	.5
Parti Québécois	1.2
Other	7.4
Missing	8.5
Total	100.0
	(1308)
Provincially	
Liberal	21.9
Conservative	28.3
New Democrat	14.0
Social Credit	4.4
Parti Québécois	10.3
Other	6.8
Missing	14.3
Total	100.0
	(1308)

RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE

"Would you please indicate your
general religious preference

Protestant	48.7
Roman Catholic	35.7
Jew	2.3
None	9.6
Other	1.7
Missing	2.0
Total	100.0
	(1308)

DENOMINATION

"If Protestant, what specific
denomination?

Anglican	12.0
Baptist	3.5
Lutheran	2.4
Mennonite	.7
Pentecostal	.9
Presbyterian	4.5
Salvation Army	.3
United Church	18.4
Other	5.2
Missing	52.0
Total	(1308) 100.0

characteristics, such as age, gender and marital status will be examined, followed by variables more informative on background issues, such as residence, political and religious preference.

In Table 3.7, it is clear that almost the third of all respondents (32.2%) are classified in the age group between 25 and 34. This impressive domination by young adults offers a striking contrast with the low percentage observed from the youngest respondents, the 15-24, with 6.4%. Over the age of 35, however, the proportion of respondents vary little, between eleven and fourteen percent.

Men and women are nearly equally represented, men with 50.8%, have a slightly higher percentage than women, whose percentage is 48.8%. In the population sampled, married subjects are in the majority, with 63.5%. In the remaining, never married (16.0), and widowed (10.0) outnumber divorced (3.3), separated (2.4) and cohabitating (3.2) participants. Since marriage is said to increase belief in a hereafter (Bock and Radelet, 1988; Greely, 1988), for analytical purpose, we group married people in one "married" category, and others, in a "not married" class, with 34.9% ($16.0 + 10.0 + 3.3 + 2.4 + 3.2$).

Following Fischer (1983) who has speculated on the theoretical link between urbanism (community size) and "unconventional belief system", and regarding disbelief in religious orthodox tenets as "unconventional", residence is

introduced in the present investigation, as a possible influence on religiosity. Looking at Table 3.7, we find a concentration either in metropolises (where the population is 400,000 and over), with 31.4%, and in towns (of 30,000 inhabitants or under), with 27.7%. The least lived in areas by people in the sample are rural, farm and non-farm (which we shall lump together), with respectively 5.7% and 6.2%. We can also notice that more respondents come from medium-sized cities (of 30,000 to 100,000 population), with 16.2%, than large cities (of 100,000 to 400,000), with 10.8%.

Since Lenski's multidimensional theoretical model has been designed first to uncover some of the variance in political behaviour, it is reasonable to expect that political preference should play a role in a study on SI. The present data in Table 3.7 indicate that while the same proportion of participants are Conservative in federal and provincial politics, (28.0 vs. 28.3), the percentage of liberals at the federal level, 41.8%, is almost twice the percentage observed in the provinces, which is 21.9%. However, these two older parties taken together represent the majority of the preferences on both political planes. Third parties, e.g., New Democrat, Parti Québécois, and Social Credit parties, as expected, are better represented in the provinces, where they account for 28.7% (14.0 + 4.4 + 10.3), compared to a total of 14.3% (12.6 + .5 + 1.2), at the federal level.

Supporting Lenski's claim that poorly crystallized individuals tended to support political parties with a more radical program of political change (1954), political preference is dichotomized into "traditional" (Liberal and Conservative), and "non-traditional", for other parties than these two older ones.

When we measure religious affiliation, we can observe that Protestants represent almost the majority of our sample, with 48.7%, and are the most frequently observed religious groups here, followed by Roman Catholics, with 35.7%. What is of concern here, however, is the dominance of conventional religion in Canada, since almost eighty five percent (48.7% + 35.7%) of respondents in CAN80, say they belong to these two main religious affiliations. In the remaining of options, nearly ten percent claim no religious ties (9.6%), while very few cases indicate Jewish or other faiths.

It would be a mistake to fail to distinguish among the various denominations of Protestantism and lump them all together, since Glock and Stark (1965:112) have suggested that religious beliefs vary more within Protestantism than between Protestants and Catholics. In Bibby's questionnaire, there is a filter item on specific denomination, "if Protestant". In the entire sample, 52% did not answer that question since they were not Protestant. Of all the Protestant denominations listed, the Anglican Church, with 18.4%, and the United Church, with 12.0%, represent over half of the Protestant

respondents, (18.4 + 12.0), leaving 17.5% cases mostly for theologically conservative Protestants.

At the risk of oversimplification, the denominations mentioned above have been collapsed to designate either "Mainline Protestants", such as Anglicans, Lutherans, Presbyterians, the United Church, or "Conservative Protestants", a label which includes fundamentalist and evangelical Protestant groups, such as Baptists, Mennonites, Pentecostals, Salvation Army and other community churches and sects (Bibby, 1987: 26). Conservative Protestants, as opposed to Mainliners, are recognized for their strict and literal interpretation of the Bible. The literalists will be placed in a "fundamentalist" category, and the Mainline Protestant denominations will be considered, in the present research, as "non-fundamentalist", since these two groups have been known to differ a great deal in religious orthodoxy (Bibby, 1987; Greely, 1988).

A brief incursion into the degree of association and the statistical independence between these variables in context, as shown by the matrix of association in Figure 3.1, reveals that a correlation of .60 exists between federal and provincial politics, while all other correlations are rather low.⁶ Ideally, for predictive purposes, one should attempt to have independent variables that are correlated with the

⁶We find coefficients of .26 and less, and almost half of the relationships have statistical significance, and one in three show a P value of <.001.

**Figure 3.1 Association Matrix between
Variables in Context**

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1	1	*** .26	.08	*** .17	** .12	*** .15	*** .26	.10
2		1		*** .14	.02	.02	*** .18	.002
3			1	* .09	.02	* .09	.03	.02
4				1	.06	.07	*** .24	** .15
5					1	*** .60	*** .17	.04
6						1	*** .24	.04
7							1	.03
8								1

Coefficients reported using Cramer's V

* $p < .05$
 ** $p < .01$
 *** $p < .001$

- 1 - Age
- 2 - Marital status
- 3 - Gender
- 4 - Residence
- 5 - Political preference (federal)
- 6 - Political preference (provincial)
- 7 - Religious affiliation
- 8 - Denomination

dependent variable but relatively unrelated to each other (Agresti and Finlay, 1984:380), otherwise we face a problem of multicollinearity. The existence of multicollinearity on inference procedures is an important topic in regression analysis, however, in the present situation, considering the strong intercorrelation between federal and provincial politics, we face a problem analogous to that of multicollinearity, and ways must be found for avoiding that the two variables appear conjointly in the same equation.

Table 3.8 assesses the effect of cross-classification of federal and provincial preferences. As can be seen, almost one hundred percent of those who are traditionally liberal or conservative in provincial parties, declare to be enroled in these two older parties at the federal level as well, with 97.2%, and, on the contrary, the choice of parties is more equilibrated when non-traditional parties are involved. Since the reference to a two-party system is more difficult to substantiate in provincial politics, with the rise of third parties to power, in order to avoid ambiguous issues in the provincial political scene in Canada, and to eliminate a possible multicollinearity problem, provincial politics is excluded from analysis.

Analysis Procedure

Most contemporary researchers on the subject of SI used regression models as methods of analysis. The outcome of the use of this technique, as previously mentioned, was the

**Table 3.8 Federal and Provincial
Politics**

Provincial				
Federal	% Traditional	% Non-traditional		
Traditional	97.2	45.5		
Non-traditional	2.8	54.5		
Total	59.6 (642)	40.4 (436)		
Chi-square	Cramer's V		d.f.	P
383.590	.60		1	<.001

absence of any systematic evidence on the empirical effects of SI Lenski (1964) and Demerath (1965) found it difficult to overcome the limitations of the multiple regression approach because of identification and multicollinearity problems. Sasaki (1979) using three different regression models came to the conclusion that SI was not a useful predictor of the various aspects of religiosity).

In contrast to all previous research, the present study intends to reformulate the methodological procedures of SI into a more basic multivariate analysis, using cross-classification tables. The reason for the adoption of a contingency cross-classification approach is that SI is not treated here as a scale but as a typology. Following Babbie's (1989) prescription that typologies are nominal composite measures which "often provide the most appropriate device for understanding the data" (413-414), in the present analysis, SI will be considered as a nominal variable. This procedure will permit a greater applicability of the multidimensional aspect of the concept of SI, while at the same time, avoiding the serious limitations imposed by the multiple regression approach.

As previously discussed, SI formulated though distinct combinations of high and low status on education, occupation and income, will not be measured by scores on a scale resulting in various degree of discrepancy. Since it is expected that levels of SI will not show a relationship with

afterlife belief, we establish "patterns" of discrepancy with the basic logic that some types of SI might encourage belief and others might impede it, while some may have no particular impact one way or the other.

We construct a nominal index of SI through the combinations of our three status indicators, education, occupation and income. Drawing from the concept of distributive justice and the expectation of rewards from educational investment, patterns of SI will be named "overrewarded", "underrewarded" or "mixed". Table 3.9 illustrates the different types of SI and their distribution in the sample. Respondents with higher occupation and/or income than their educational attainment are classified as "overrewarded". Persons with lower occupation and/or income than their investment in education are listed as "underrewarded". Individuals who show inconsistencies between occupation and income for educational investment are labelled "mixed". We can see that overrewarded status inconsistencies exceed by far the number of underrewarded and mixed status inconsistencies.

As stipulated in our hypothesis, underrewarded status discrepant (the HHL and HLL)¹ will be the focus of our analysis because we expect them to be the most likely

¹ The abbreviations denote the high (H) or low (L) positions on education, occupation and income (in that order).

**Table 3.9 Status Inconsistency
Nominal Index**

Status Indicators	Status Inconsistency Types					
	Overrewarded		Underrewarded		Mixed	
	a)	b)	a)	b)	a)	b)
Education	Low	Low	High	High	High	Low
Occupation	High	Low	High	Low	Low	High
Income	High	High	Low	Low	High	Low
Percentage, in the sample ¹	12.6	10.8	5.1	1.4	1.6	7.8

¹Percentages calculated on the total sample of 1308 cases.
See Appendix A - Section 2.

types of status inconsistencies to react against the distribution of status and wealth. The overrewarded and mixed status inconsistencies (the LHH and LLH - and the HLH and LHL) having little invested in education are less likely to feel that they are the victims of an unjust distribution of social and material rewards. Income tends to ameliorate the status standing in the case of overrewarded status discrepant, and those with a mixed SI⁸ are either "reward-inconsistent" (HLH) or mixed-inconsistent (LHL), but they cannot be considered as underrewarded.

In sum it is only when income is low and education is high that we can say that we have a case of underrewarded SI; a high or low standing on occupation makes the difference between underrewarded a and b.⁹ Depending on their responses to postlife in the next chapter, these two types of underrewarded status discrepant, the HHL and HLL, will be

⁸Term used by Brown et al. (1988).

⁹If we were to take into account the occupation of the spouse and family income in the reaction of an underrewarded status respondent, even when considering the spouse's occupation as high and the respondent's income as low, the respondent would still feel underrewarded in his/her social status. We can then say that even if we were to consider the relationship of 2 occupational statuses with SI, we would still be justified in assuming that it would not mean that the respondent's reaction to his/her inconsistent status would change. See the diagram in Appendix A where all possible scenarios have been envisaged.

used separately or fused together to form the variable "status".¹⁰

In our method, before examining the relationship between our nominal index (or typology) of SI and the dependent variable, we might want to see whether or not any type of status has per se an effect. In the next chapter, first, each component of SI is examined at the bivariate level. Then, each is controlled for another. It is only after such an exploration that SI will be compared to postlife. Tabulations comparing believers and disbelievers will serve to isolate status consistency from inconsistency for the introduction of test factors which will take place in the following chapter.

¹⁰With 18 cases only, the very skewed distribution of the HLL pattern of SI is expected to yield many empty cells in crosstabulation.

CHAPTER IV

SOCIAL STATUS AND AFTERLIFE BELIEF

A certain type of status inconsistency (SI is used) has been hypothesized to contribute to a decrease in belief in life after death. In our theoretical argument, men's and/or women's propensity to negate the existence of an afterlife has been imputed to their low occupational prestige and/or low income, when their investment in education attained a high level. Since one might suspect that the relationship between SI and postlife is complicated, before entering into greater details about the types of status discrepancy involved in belief responses, we might explore first the significance of the association between each status variable and our dependent factor.

In examining the results from a cross-classification of each one of the dimensions of social status with afterlife, we find that education and occupation are unrelated to belief, while income is weakly associated.¹ As can be seen from Table 4.1, which displays this relationship, important

¹Only those items which are statistically significant (.05 level) on Pearson Chi-square test of independence, are shown in the text and discussed in the following pages. All other tables can be found in Appendix B. For non-significant relationships between postlife with education and occupation, see Tables B-1 and B-2.

**Table 4.1 % Postlife Belief
by Income**

	Income							
	<5000	5000	10000	15000	20000	25000	30000	>50000
Belief %		9999	14999	19999	24999	29999	50000	
positive	47.7	72.1	63.8	63.0	64.6	60.6	61.9	55.9
Negative	52.3	27.9	36.2	37.0	35.4	39.4	38.1	44.1
Total	6.0 (74)	11.3 (140)	14.6 (181)	17.0 (211)	15.0 (186)	11.9 (147)	19.5 (241)	4.7 (58)
		Chi-Square		d.f.	P			
		14.3693		7	.0450			

variations in percentage of belief are only noticeable among respondents earning little or a lot. No difference is observable at other income levels. In fact, we can observe a marked decrease in belief for those whose income is less than \$5,000 a year, with 47.7%, and a less pronounced disbelief among people earning more than \$50,000, with 55.9%. A greater proportion of believers is nevertheless observed in the \$5,000 - \$9,999 income group, with 72.1%.

Looking at income and belief, we can say that for 78% of the respondents of Table 4.1, no difference in belief is observed (from \$10,000 to \$50,000). The difference observed between less than \$5,000 and between \$5,000- \$9,999 (72.1 - 47.7 = 24.4) is statistically significant but since it is based on 6% (N=74) of the respondents found in this table, it is considered as a rather negligible phenomenon. The difference in percentage between \$30,000 to \$50,000 and more than \$50,000 is not significant as estimated by the standard error of percentage difference:

$$\sigma_{p1 - p2} = \sqrt{\frac{.62 \times .38}{241} + \frac{.56 \times .44}{58}} = \pm .07$$

At the .05 level of significance we must have a difference of $1.96 \times .07 = .137$ or 13.7%, and the actual difference is 6% only (61.9 - 55.9). Similarly, the difference in percentages of belief between \$5,000- \$9,999, and \$10,000 - \$14,999, is

not substantial enough as estimated by the same formula as above:

$$\sigma_{p1 - p2} = \sqrt{\frac{.72 \times .28}{140} + \frac{.64 \times .36}{181}} = \pm .052$$

At .05 level of significance, we must have a difference of $1.96 \times .052 = .102$ or 10.2%, and the actual difference is 8.3% only (72.1 - 63.8).

These findings have sufficiently demonstrated that the three indicators of status do not have much influence on afterlife belief. Foreseeing a more complex link between status and belief, the whole issue of status can be pursued by investigating the possible impact of status inconsistency on postlife, as proposed in our theoretical statement.

STATUS INCONSISTENCY

A Preliminary exploration

The problematic concern with degree or level of status discrepancy and the complexity of establishing scores of SI, has been amply demonstrated by past research, and the potential fruitfulness of investigating "types" of SI has been fully expressed as our particular line of inquiry. In working towards an understanding of those "types", we should explore

first how each dimension of status affect belief, while controlling for another dimension.² In Table 4.2, when education is introduced as a control between occupation and postlife belief, under a specific pattern of discrepancy, e.g., high education and low occupation, belief increases significantly. As can be observed, the percentage of respondents holding positive belief, who are highly educated, but who obtain a low prestige occupation, is 17.7% higher than the one observed when both statuses are high (77.5% vs. 59.8%). Contrary to our prediction, this pattern of SI between high education and low occupation, does not seem to exacerbate a negative outlook on afterlife, but appears indeed to favour a more positive attitude to a future life. In the same table, when occupation becomes the control factor between education and belief, the effect is not substantial enough to be statistically significant.

When income is kept constant between belief and occupation, or, inversely, when occupation is used as control between postlife and income, the original association remains

²In all crosstabulations using controls, the three status variables were reduced to a possibility of high and low values. When we tried to keep their initial uncoded version, the association among variables became complicated and confusing at the first-order and second-order relationships, since the number of cells rapidly increased and many of them became incomputable. The three dimensions of status were also found to be sufficiently related to each other, based on Phi and Pearson Chi Square. For more details, see the association matrix in Figure B-1, in Appendix B.

Table 4.2 Postlife belief by Occupation and Education

Belief	Education			
	High		Low	
	High occup	Low occup	High occup	Low occup
positive	59.8%	77.5%	64.1%	64.5%
negative	40.2%	22.5%	35.9%	35.5%
Total	88.0% (281)	12.0% (38)	43.3% (272)	56.7% (355)
	Chi-square		d.f.	P
occup educ H	4.4761		1	.0344
occup educ L	.0097		1	n.s.
educ occup H	1.1107		1	n.s.
educ occup L	2.5808		1	n.s.

the same.³ However, as represented by the figures in Table 4.3, income has some effect when it is used as control between belief and education. Figures show that the pairing of high income and high education lowers belief by 10.2%. In fact, percentages of belief for better-educated respondents with high income is 55.8%, compared to the one found in the low education category of high earners, which is 66.0%. High income appears to increase disbelief in afterlife more for those who are highly educated than for those who are not.

From the same table, it is also worth noting that the significant difference observed among low earners in the bivariate association of belief and income, in Table 4.1, has disappeared when education is introduced as a control factor. Sampling variation and the fusing of the four lowest income groups may also, in part, be responsible for the disappearance of the original association between after belief and income.⁴

In retrospect, testing the significance of the original relationship between belief and each of the three dimensions of status, has shown that the null hypothesis was supported. However, at the first-order relationship, when each component of status acted as controls, we observed an increase in belief with the combination of high education and low

³See Table B-3 in Appendix B.

⁴When education is kept constant between belief and income, in the same table, the difference observed, e.g., 7.5%, has no statistical significance.

Table 4.3 Postlife by Education
and Income

Income				
Belief	High		Low	
	High educ	Low educ	High educ	Low educ
positive	55.8%	66.0%	63.3%	61.7%
negative	44.2%	34.0%	36.7%	38.3%
Total	18.3% (104)	81.7% (464)	40.6% (251)	59.4% (367)
Chi-square				
educ income H	3.8304	d.	1	P
educ income L	.1709		1	.0503
income educ H	1.7493		1	n.s.
income educ L	1.6490		1	n.s.

occupation. Most importantly, due to the nature of our hypothesis which proposed negative responses to afterlife, when educational attainment was not matched with an appropriate occupational level, we have found that the better educated, with low prestige occupation, were more inclined to believe in immortality than to negate it. But since, in this preliminary exploration, only two dimensions of status were involved in each tri-variate association, we need to explore further if more complex patterns of SI, using multivariate relationships, will have an effect on afterlife belief.

B Further Exploration

A second-order analysis performed with postlife belief and our three status variables simultaneously present, should reveal a more exhaustive account of the association between status dimensions and belief and allow for more comprehensive patterns of status discrepancy.

Table 4.4 presents the results of chi-square tests of significance of the multivariate analysis relating afterlife to all combinations of high and low values on education, occupation and income. The general tendencies reflected by the figures in that table is that, whether income is high or low, when education is low, percentages of afterlife belief differ very little between high and low occupation. Important variation in religiosity is nevertheless observed between high and low occupation, when education is high and income low.

Table 4.4 Postlife by Occupation Education and Income

Belief	Income		HIGH				LOW			
	Education		High		Low		High		Low	
	Occupation		H	L	H	L	H	L	H	L
Positive			64.4	71.8	61.4	64.4	49.3	84.0	68.4	63.9
Negative			35.6	28.2	38.6	35.6	50.7	16.0	31.6	36.1
Total			90.9 (206)	9.1 (21)	53.8 (165)	40.2 (141)	79.0 (67)	21.0 (18)	33.1 (102)	66.9 (207)

Summary of CHI-Square tests

Income	Education	Occupation	Chi-square	d.f.	P
H	H		.4546	1	n.s.
H	L		.2927	1	n.s.
L	H		6.8941	1	.0087
L	L		.6131	1	n.s.
H		H	.3543	1	n.s.
H		L	.4388	1	n.s.
L		H	6.2030	1	.0128
L		L	2.9290	1	n.s.
	H	H	4.8426	1	.0278
	H	L	.8057	1	n.s.
	L	H	1.3397	1	n.s.
	L	L	.0095	1	n.s.

Looking for statistically significant percentage difference in belief, we can see that:

First, when income and education are kept constant, low income and high education create two contrasting significant differences on beliefs responses⁵ in the dichotomous levels of occupation: more specifically, for those with low occupation, belief is greatly increased, with 84%, and. inversely, for those with high occupational status, faith in future life drops substantially, with 49.3%. This makes for a difference in belief of 34.1% between the two levels of occupation.

Second, within the same table 4.4, (and examining still the results showing on the right-hand side of the table) when income and occupation are used as controls, a statistically significant relationship appears between the two levels of education, when income is low and occupation high⁶. Figures show that while the percentage of belief from respondents belonging to the low category of education is raised slightly, with low income and high occupation, with 68.4%, we witness a substantial decrease in belief among highly educated respondents, with 49.3%, when using the same scenario of low income and high occupation. Under the present state of SI, there is a significant difference 19.1% in belief, between the two levels of education (68.4% - 49.3%).

⁵p = .0087 level.

⁶p = .0128.

Third, still in Table 4.4, (but comparing across the two high and low income halves of the table) when education and occupation are the two control variables, a significant difference in percentage of belief is observable between high and low categories of income. When we look at high education, high occupation and high income, little variation in percentages of belief is observed (no SI), with 64.4%; however, a lowering in belief can be seen in the low income group, with 49.3%, when education and occupation are high, creating a statistically significant decrease of 15.1% in positive belief between high and low income (64.4% - 49.3%)⁷.

We can see that when the three dimensions of status are examined simultaneously, we can demonstrate that certain types of SI between our three components of status can have significant effects on belief in life after death. The effect predicted in our research proposal, e.g., that respondents with high education but unrewarded by low occupation and/or low income, tend to reject afterlife, has been observed partially, in two out of three patterns of SI.

From our findings, we can briefly recall these three particular discrepancy profiles: (1) high education and low income produce an increase in belief for those with low prestige occupation⁸; (2) high occupation and low income

⁷p = .0278 level.

⁸This peculiar SI pattern originates from 18 cases only. This small number of cases represents serious limitations to their empirical weight, most probably yielding empty cells in

appear to cause a decrease in belief, for the highly educated; (3) high occupation and high education seem to influence low earners to disbelieve in a hereafter. In sum, what we have found is that when those who expect material rewards for their investment in education, perceive their high status in education and occupation as being incongruent with their low income, they are more likely to be negative about other-worldly rewards. On the other hand, for those whose only high status is education, the incongruity of having a low prestige occupation and low income may not be perceived as an unjust social and material condition, when their faith in a future life is interpreted as a belief in other-worldly rewards.

AFTERLIFE AND STATUS INCONSISTENCY DISTRIBUTION

A principal result of the preceding section has been to show that among status inconsistent, it is quite important to consider more complex patterns of status discrepancy, in a search for significant differences in belief responses. In doing so, we ended up isolating status inconsistent from status consistent, and the information summarized in Table 4.4 enables us to illustrate the significance of the afterlife belief for the different types of SI.

future crosstabulations. However, because these 18 observations typify a distinctive positive response to afterlife, they cannot be disregarded in the analysis. They may require a more qualitative approach further on.

We can see that those who are status inconsistent represent 55% of the respondents on that table⁹ but that there is a statistically significant difference in belief for (67 +18) 85 status inconsistent only¹⁰, that is 16.5% of all inconsistent, and 9.2% of the respondents on whom we have some information about the three measures of status. This may appear indeed as a small proportion of the whole, but we can recall that Demerath's (1965) sparse minority of highly status discrepant represented only 3.5% of his sample of Protestants, and he nevertheless argued that "discrepancy [...was] important analytically, if not numerically" (1965: 141-142).

Recalling the typology of SI developed in chapter 3, the cases of underrewarded status inconsistent (the 68¹¹ cases of HHL and the 18 cases of HLL types) are recoded separately from the category "others" which includes all other SI situations revealing no relationship with our dependent factor

⁹We arrive at that figures when we extract from Table 4.4 the 206 (HHH) and 207 (LLL) cases of status consistency from the extreme left and the right-hand sides of the table.

¹⁰It is important to note that SI profiles (2) and (3) are similar: they originate from low income and high education and high occupation and have the same resulting effect of lowering belief (see page 78-79). For these reasons, they are grouped under one particular pattern of SI.

¹¹Recodes in tabulations for the index "status" resulted in 68 cases for HHL, one more than appeared on Table 4.4.

plus all other cases of status consistency.¹² Hence, the obtained distribution of discrepant patterns has little to do with the summary index of status discrepancy arrived at by Lenski (1954), Demerath (1965), Teiman (1966), and Sasaki (1979). In this thesis, an understanding of SI is necessarily related to their divergence in accepting the Judeo-Christian tenet on life after death.

At this point, let us summarize the discussion on SI findings reported in the present chapter. Unrelated to belief in their zero-order association, when combined in various patterns at the first and second-order type of analysis, the three components of status, education, occupation and income, have reflected genuine differences in belief responses. We have been able to observe that discrepant combinations of high education and low occupation heightened belief. Exploring further, high education accompanied by high occupation, created negative responses to afterlife when income was low, and unexpectedly, the combination of high education, low occupation increased belief substantially for low income earners.

Our findings have also indicated that even though afterlife differed for underrewarded status discrepant with the HHL and HLL patterns, the direction of their relationships with afterlife was opposed: for the HHL type, belief dropped

¹²Details pertaining to the creation of the indexed values which have served to recode SI can be found in Appendix A.

substantially while belief increased for those with a HLL pattern of SI.¹³ For that reason they cannot be collapsed together.

This brings us to say that our major hypothesis (Proposition 1) that status inconsistencies which are underrewarded for their investments in education, with low occupation and low income, are more likely than others to negate the belief in a hereafter, is only partially supported.

These results being as they are, one type of SI neutralizing the other in their association with afterlife, we come to the decision to use the HHL type of SI to carry on our investigation with context variables, reserving for the HLL pattern a more qualitative approach in the next chapter.

Tables 4.5 and 4.6 both display the original association between SI and postlife. In Table 4.6, using three categories, the HHL, the HLL and others, we obtain a P value $<.01$ ¹⁴. The same original association between SI and postlife, in Table 4.5, using the dichotomy of HHL and others, also shows an adequate level of significance $=.01$,¹⁵. This

¹³Since it would be difficult to find out why the 18 cases of status inconsistencies of the HLL type do not appear to behave as underrewarded in their attitude to postlife, we can assume that they are non-conformists, possibly artists, who do not compromise on income and do not appear to need social approval in their social exchange transactions. A more complete qualitative approach for these 18 cases will be presented in the next chapter.

¹⁴The p value = .0094

¹⁵ The P value = .0138.

Table 4.5 Postlife by Status

Postlife Belief (%)	Status	
	HHL	Others
Positive	49.3	64.3
Negative	50.7	33.7
Total	7.4 (67)	92.6 (842)
Chi-Square		d.f.
6.0606		1
		P
		.0138

Table 4.6 Postlife by Status

Postlife Belief (%)	Status		
	HHL	HLL	Others
Positive	49.3	84.0	64.3
Negative	50.7	16.0	35.7
Total	7.2 (67)	1.9 (18)	90.9 (842)
Chi-Square		d.f.	F
9.3343		2	.0094

further supports the choice of a dichotomy in our bivariate relationship originally founded on the theoretical concern that a negative response to postlife was expected from underrewarded status inconsistencies.¹⁶

The questions now to be addressed are: (1) whether or not afterlife is also related to other social factors; (2) if SI is affected by the influence of those contextual factors; (3) and finally, if our variables in context have some effect on the relationship between SI and belief. Answers to these questions are provided in the next chapter.

¹⁶Table 4.5 which we will keep for our analysis with context variables, shows that there is a 15% decrease in belief between HHL respondents and others (64.3 - 49.3).

CHAPTER V

STATUS INCONSISTENCY IN CONTEXT

Postlife and Social Context

Before examining the social context in which status inconsistency (SI is used) operates and in order to decide which background variables might be more suitable as controlling factors with SI, it might be useful to look at the impact of these contextual factors on belief in life after death.

In past research, different hypotheses have been stated regarding the various correlates of afterlife. We have seen in Chapter I that in the 1970's and the 1980's, scholars of religion, mainly from the United States, focused on the decrease in belief in afterlife as a phenomenon warranting explanation. These authors reported significant relationships of afterlife with age, (Hertel and Nelsen, 1974; Nelsen, 1981) and found belief less salient for older Americans; with marriage and gender, (Bock and Radelet, 1988; Greely, 1988) and observed higher rates of belief for married individuals and females; with type of religion, (Hynson 1976; Bibby 1987) and concluded that Protestants expressed more faith in a hereafter than affiliates from other religions. Community size and politics were also included in our study, the former,

on account of its theoretical link to unconventional belief system (Fischer, 1983) and the latter, as empirical evidence related to status inconsistency (Lenski, 1966).

To begin, in contrast to earlier American research, with respect to age and marital status, our Canadian data displayed in Table 5.1 report these two individual characteristics as being unrelated to afterlife.¹ However, when gender is taken into consideration, percentages show that women are more positive about afterlife than men. Figures indicate that 66.2% women, compared to 59.1% men, express a belief in a future life after they die. This association is statistically significant at $P < .01$.

When investigating residence, as a contextual factor which could have an effect on postlife belief, we can see that respondents from rural areas are the most likely to believe in a life beyond death, with 74.3%, while residents from large cities are the least likely, with 53.4%. This observed difference of 20.9%, between rural and urban communities, has a statistical significance $< .01$, and tends to support Fischer's proposition that "in the realm of belief and behaviour, urban residents do differ significantly from

¹See Table B-4 and B-5 in Appendix B. As can be observed in Table B-4, there is a clear tendency among respondents from 55 to 64, to subscribe to a belief in a future life but it is not substantial enough to be statistically significant. Also, not being longitudinal, our research cannot endorse Nelsen's argument that there is a long range decline in belief for older people (Nelsen, 1981: 109).

Table 5.1 Postlife Belief and
Variables in Context

Variables	§		Total	Chi-Square	d.f.	P
	Positive	Negative				
<u>AGE</u>				8.9505	5	n.s. ²
<u>GENDER</u>				6.7861	1	.0092
Male	59.1	40.9	51.2 (655)			
Female	66.2	33.8	48.8 (624)			
<u>MARITAL STATUS</u>				.0969	1	n.s.
<u>RESIDENCE</u>				14.6483	4	.0055
Rural	74.3	25.7	11.9 (149)			
Town	62.3	37.7	28.5 (358)			
Medcity	65.1	34.9	16.5 (207)			
Larcity	53.4	46.6	10.8 (136)			
Metropolis	61.1	38.9	32.3 (405)			
<u>FEDERAL POLITICS</u>				4.8902	1	.0280
Traditional	65.1	34.9	76.2 (893)			
Non-traditional	57.8	42.2	23.8 (278)			
<u>RELIGION</u>				123.4840	3	<.001
Protestant	65.3	34.7	49.9 (628)			
Catholic	72.8	27.2	36.4 (459)			
Jewish-Other	17.5	82.5	4.0 (50)			
None	29.2	70.7	9.7 (122)			
<u>DENOMINATION</u>				20.3337	1	<.001
Fundamentalist	82.7	17.3	19.5 (120)			
Non-Fundamentalist	60.8	39.2	80.5 (496)			

²Tables from non-significant relationships (n.s.) are displayed in Appendix B. For Age and Marital Status, see B-4 and B-5.

non-urban places." (1983:87). However, in our Canadian sample, belief is not less conventionally accepted, as population density increases, as Fischer assumed in his theoretical argument, since the percentage of belief in metropolises reaches 61%, close enough to that observed in the whole sample. It could be that the proliferation of various religious creeds and their particular institutionalized belief systems, in metropolises, masks a lessening in religious orthodoxy, otherwise observed in large cities.

The influence of political ideology on belief in a hereafter is clearly demonstrated when "non-traditionalists", those not in favour of old-party politics at the federal level, show a lower acceptance level of afterlife, with 57.8%, than those more at ease with the traditional two-party system (57.8% vs 65.1%). This 7.3% decrease in belief, from non-traditionalists, is substantial enough to be statistically significant.³

A strong effect is exerted on belief by religious preferences. Roman Catholic respondents show the highest percentage of belief, with 72.8%, and those from the Jewish faith or from other types of religions, the lowest, with 17.5%.⁴ While Protestants are lower than Catholics in their acceptance of afterlife, with 65.3, those disaffiliated from

³The P level is exactly .0270.

⁴This is to be expected from non-Christians.

conventional religion, the "nones", show very little inclination to believe in a future life mirrored by religion, with 29.2%. These differences in belief, by religious affiliations, are highly significant, with $P < .001$. Comparing these figures with Hynson's (1976: 219) decreasing rank order of American laity accepting afterlife as being Protestant, Catholic and Jewish, the present order of acceptance being Catholic, Protestant and Jewish, reflects the external structural effect of religious organization in Canada.

Divergence in afterlife belief between Catholics and Protestants (72.8% vs. 65.3%) would tend to confirm Martin's general theory of secularization (1978).⁵ In the Canadian "mixed" structure, with its Catholic/Protestant duopoly, Catholics are the major partners (Bibby, 1987: 8), and with the added impact of Quebec's Catholic enclave and its organicist character, Catholic religious institutions, in Canada, are more likely to see their belief accepted and less likely to see their authority diminished (Martin, 1978: 12).⁶

⁵In analyzing the connection between religious belief and religious structure, Martin characterizes the social cultural complexes of modern Christendom according to the degree of their religious monopoly, more total in countries where Catholicism is dominant, such as Spain, Italy and France, and more pluralist in countries where Protestantism represents the majority, such as England, Holland, Australia, New Zealand and the United States (Martin, 1976: 18-22).

⁶We can say that for Catholics more than for Protestants, well-implanted religious beliefs linger in spite of statistics indicating that weekly mass attendance for Catholics in Canada has dropped dramatically, by mid-1970's, to 61%, and by mid-1980's, to 43% (Bibby, 1987: 17).

With regard to Protestant denominations, our CAN80 survey data tend to confirm Greely's hypothesis that one can relate a more positive belief in immortality to religious conservatism or fundamentalism. (Greely's, 1988: 4). In Table 5.1, when we compare the percentage of responses from Protestant denominations, we endorse Greely's position that fundamentalists are more likely than non-fundamentalists to believe in life after death, with 82.7% vs. 60.8%. This difference in belief between bible literalists and non-literalists, has a strong statistical significance, with $P < .001$.

Variables in context examined above have reflected significant differences in afterlife belief between sexes, location, political preferences, religious affiliations and Protestant denominations. This justifies their inclusion as relevant background variables to be examined in relation with status inconsistency.¹

Status and Social Context

Let us recall first the empirical findings on patterns of SI reported in Chapter 4. We have found that with high education, high occupation and low income (HHL), respondents were more inclined to negate the existence of an afterlife, and that with a type of discrepancy between high education,

¹Age and marital status will also be used as context variables. As important personal characteristics, these two variables might prove to be relevant to SI.

low occupation and low income (HLL), they indicated more belief in a hereafter. Reiterating that the decision to select only the former pattern of inconsistency in our elaboration with context variables, is fully justified by the theoretical underpinnings of our study (e.g., by isolating status inconsistent respondents materially "underrewarded" by their educational investment and prestige occupation), we should be able to demonstrate more precisely their selective impact on our dependent factor. The operationalized "status" variable will be used to explore the pertinence of our contextual factors. Table 5.2 indicates whether or not SI is meaningfully related to the social contexts utilized in our research. Briefly summarized, their impact on SI can be resumed in the following way:

- Status and Age: Young and old are more likely to be status inconsistent.
- Status and Gender: Women are more inclined to SI than men.
- Status and Marriage: There is more SI among individuals not married than married.
- Status and Residence: Residence is not a determining influence on SI.⁸
- Status and Politics: Politics exerts very little impact on SI.

⁸When differences in percentages are not statistically significant, see Appendix B for Table B-6 for Status and Residence, Table B-7 for Status and Politics, and for Table B-8 for Status and Denomination.

Table 5.2 Status and Variables in Context

Status	Variables						Chi-Square	d.f.	P
<u>AGE</u>							51.8228	5	(.001)
	15-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+			
HHL*	27.1	7.9	5.7	1.3	3.3	16.2			
Others**	72.9	92.1	94.3	98.7	96.7	83.8			
Total	7.3 (62)	37.6 (321)	15.7 (134)	18.4 (157)	11.6 (99)	9.5 (81)			
<u>GENDER</u>							16.7838	1	<.001
	Male			Female					
HHL	4.4			11.5					
Others	95.6			88.5					
Total	57.0 (525)			43.0 (393)					
<u>MARITAL STATUS</u>							50.4339	1	<.001
	Married			Not-married					
HHL	3.0			15.9					
Others	97.0			84.1					
Total	65.8 (606)			34.2 (316)					
<u>RESIDENCE</u>							2.3910	4	n.s.
<u>FEDERAL POLITICS</u>							.0004	4	n.s.

Table 5.2 con't

Chi-Square d.f.

P

	<u>RELIGION</u>				19.5329	3	<.001
	Prot	Catho	Jew-Other	None			
HHL	5.8	6.0	8.9	18.1			
Others	94.2	94.0	91.1	81.9			
Total	50.4	35.1	3.5	10.9			
	(462)	(321)	(32)	(100)			
	<u>DENOMINATION</u>				.0010	1	n.s.

* Keeping the same labels as before, in all tables throughout this chapter we will refer to
HHL = High education, high occupation and low income.

** Others = All other cases of SI and cases of status consistency.

- Status and Religion: Religious "nones" are more likely to be status inconsistent than affiliated respondents.
- Status and Denomination: Denomination has little influence on SI.

The findings in Table 5.2 do lend some support to the fact that SI is significantly related to some aspects of the social situation surrounding status discrepant, such as their age, gender, marital status and religion. Now the question is: Can these contexts alter substantially the position status discrepant take in responding to afterlife? Results from controlling for these background variables are examined in the next section.

Postlife, Status and Variables in Context

Table 5.3 relates postlife belief to status, controlling for age. Contrary to the proposition (P3) that SI would be greater among older respondents, the only significant decrease in belief is noticed among status inconsistent participants aged between 25 and 34. Belief in afterlife, among status discrepant in this particular age group is down to 38.4%, compared to 62.7% from other types of status inconsistent and from status consistent respondents in the same age category. This statistically significant difference has a P value $< .05$. It appears that underrewarded mobility striving young adults, an impressive "bulge" in our sample, are the least likely to believe in other-worldly rewards. We can presume that, in their pursuit to bring their material reward in line with

Table 5.3 Postlife by Status and Age

AGE													
% Belief	15-24		25-34		35-44		45-54		55-64		65+		
	HHL	Others	HHL	Others	HHL	Others	HHL	Others	HHL	Others	HHL	Others	
Positive	51.1	53.3	38.4	62.7	50.4	64.6	30.1	61.2	47.5	73.6	69.2	66.6	
Negative	48.9	46.7	61.6	37.3	49.6	35.4	69.9	38.8	52.5	26.2	30.8	33.4	
Total	27.1 (17)	72.9 (145)	7.5 (24)	92.5 (294)	5.8 (8)	94.2 (124)	1.3 (2)	98.7 (154)	3.3 (3)	96.7 (94)	16.8 (13)	83.2 (65)	

		Chi-Square	d.f.	P
Status	Age 15-24	.0251	1	n.s.
Status	Age 25-34	5.4782	1	.0193
Status	Age 35-44	.6274	1	n.s.
Status	Age 45-54	.8336	1	n.s.
Status	Age 55-64	1.0967	1	n.s.
Status	Age 65+	.0348	1	n.s.
Age	Status HHL	3.5550	5	n.s.
Age	Status Others	7.1072	5	n.s.

their educational and occupational standard, the afterlife question becomes much less convincing.

When we keep gender constant, status inconsistent women who are underrewarded appear to be substantially less positive about a life after death than women with other patterns of SI or those with consistent statuses (47.2% vs 69.2%). Data in Table 5.4 which present this statistically significant difference in belief (22.4%) between status inconsistent women and others, with a P value $<.01$, illustrate much less variation between men status inconsistent and others (60.4% vs 53.8%). We can say that SI tends to lower belief more for women than for men, and when SI is considered between belief responses from both genders, status consistency or other types of SI appear to provoke more religiosity for women than for men (69.6% vs 60.4%). This difference in belief, of less than 10%, is statistically significant.

Our proposition (P4) that underrewarded status inconsistent women would be more inclined to believe in afterlife than underrewarded status inconsistent men is not supported. Between genders, status condition has an impact on religious belief more for women than for men. Underrewarded by their education, women, more than men, tend to negate rewards in a future life.

We already know that outside of marriage, the chance of SI tends to be greater (see Table 5.2). But when

Table 5.4 Postlife by Status
and Gender

GENDER					
% Belief	Male		Female		
	HHL	Others	HHL	Others	
Positive	53.8	60.4	47.2	69.6	
Negative	46.2	39.6	52.8	30.4	
Total	4.1 (21)	95.9 (494)	11.7 (46)	88.3 (345)	
Status	Gender	Male	Chi-Square	d. f.	P
Status	Gender	Female	.3795	1	n.s.
Gender	Status	HHL	9.1882	1	.0024
Gender	Status	Others	.2528	1	n.s.
			7.4518	1	.0063

investigating SI in dichotomous marital situations in relation to religiosity, religious belief is significantly lower for status discrepant respondents who are married than for status discrepant who are not. In fact, figures in Table 5.5 show that 42% married underrewarded status inconsistencies, compared to 64.5% married others, give positive responses to afterlife, a significant difference of 22.5% in belief, with a P value $<.05$, between the two statuses. Contrary to our proposition (P5) that underrewarded status discrepants who are married are more likely than others to believe in afterlife, marriage does not appear to act as a positive reinforcement in the relationship between religion and underrewarded SI. On the contrary, it seems to encourage religious disbelief.

In Table 5.6, when residence is used as a test factor, trends can be identified, but in two sub-groups out of three, sample sizes are so small as to render percentage difference meaningless.⁹ However, we can briefly comment on differences observed in towns of less than 30,000 inhabitants, since its findings appear to be based on a more reliable column marginal.

In these small cities, or towns, figures show that 34.6% underrewarded status inconsistent respondents compared to

⁹This problem of small numbers coupled with strong variations in levels of belief in cities, small, medium and large, hinders the elaboration of noteworthy characteristics of the table.

Table 5.5 Postlife by Status
and Marriage

Marital Status					
% Belief	Married		Not married		
	HHL	Others	HHL	Others	
Positive	42.0	64.5	52.0	64.6	
Negative	58.0	35.5	48.0	35.4	
Total	3.0 (18)	97.0 (580)	15.8 (49)	84.2 (259)	
Status	Marital	Married	Chi-Square	d.f.	P
Status	Marital	Not married	3.8604	1	.0494
Marital	Status	HHL	2.7765	1	n.s.
Marital	Status	Others	.5225	1	n.s.
			.0002	1	n.s.

**Table 5.6 Postlife by Status
and Residence**

<u>RESIDENCE</u>										
Belief	Rural		Town		Medcity		Larcity		Metrop	
	HHL	Others	HHL	Others	HHL	Others	HHL	Others	HHL	Others
Positive	77.3	80.4	34.6	66.2	94.3	58.3	7.8	48.8	53.8	65.1
Negative	22.7	19.6	65.4	33.8	5.7	41.7	92.2	51.2	46.2	34.9
Total	6.2 (6)	93.8 (99)	8.1 (20)	91.9 (223)	5.2 (7)	94.8 (133)	7.4 (8)	92.6 (100)	8.4 (25)	91.6 (278)
			Chi-Square		Fisher's Exact Test		d.f.		P	
Status	Residence	Rural			Fisher's				n.s.	
Status	Residence	Town	7.8150				1		.0052	
Status	Residence	Medcity			Fisher's				.0419	
Status	Residence	Larcity			Fisher's				n.s.	
Status	Residence	Metropolis	1.3044				1		n.s.	
Residence	Status	HHL	15.3933				4		.0040	
Residence	Status	Others	24.1604				4		<.001	

66.2% others, believe in a life beyond death. This statistically significant difference with a P value $<.01$, ($66.2\% - 34.6\% = 31.6\%$) is still not as pronounced as the differences displayed in medium and large cities. However, since data on these two community sizes indicate column marginal totals of 7 and 8 cases only, we can only point out the fact that if SI appears to greatly enhance belief in medium cities, with 94.3%, the situation is completely reversed in large cities, with a mere 7.8%.

This extreme divergence in religious belief, observed from a restricted sample of status inconsistent participants, does not allow us to really specify the impact of the "critical mass" on the relation between belief and SI. Comparing these results with those appearing when SI is kept constant between postlife and residence, we can also observe that substantial differences in belief emerge from both SI situations in various locations. Other types of SI and status consistency increase belief in rural areas, with 80.4%, and decrease it in large cities, with 48.8%. This relationship, which has a statistical significance $<.001$, is contrary to what has been suggested in our theoretical argument (P6). Underrewarded status discrepant, those lacking the income rewards expected from high education and occupation, appear to be no more affected in their belief than others, by their more or less urban location.

Political preference has been suggested as a possible intervening factor between postlife belief and SI. We have hypothesized that in search for change in the distribution of power and wealth, those underrewarded by low income status were more likely than other types of status discrepants to be dedicated to untraditional politics and that this dedication to third-party politics resulting in political radicalism could lead to a lessening in religious orthodoxy.

What the results of Table 5.7 show is that when politics is controlled, we have a substantial difference in belief (36.9%) (with a statistical significance $<.01$) between those underrewarded status inconsistent who say they prefer other parties than Liberal or Conservative on the national scene, with 24.4%, and others, sharing the same political ideology but experiencing no such SI, with 60.8%. In the same table, we can also observe that SI exerts significant difference ($P=.05$) in the relationship between religion and politics. When we compare traditional and non-traditional underrewarded status inconsistent persons in the sample, figures indicate a significant difference in belief between status discrepants from the two political orientation (53.4% vs. 24.0%); much less variation is also observed between other types of status inconsistent and status consistent (66.5% vs. 60.8%) with different political preferences.

Table 5.7 Postlife by Status
and Politics

Political Preference				
% Belief	Traditional		Non-traditional	
	HHL	Others	HHL	Others
Positive	53.4	66.5	24.4	60.8
Negative	46.6	33.5	75.6	39.2
Total	7.0 (45)	93.0 (597)	7.2 (15)	92.8 (187)

Status	Politics		Chi-Square	d.f.	P
Status	Politics	Traditional	3.1731	1	n.s.
Status	Politics	Non-traditional	7.3744	1	.0066
Politics	Status	HHL	3.7121	1	.0540
Politics	Status	Others	2.0231	1	n.s.

Although our data do not support Lenski's allegations that politics and SI are associated (Table 5.2), and do not confirm our previous hypothesis (P2) that untraditional political views could act as an indirect link between religion and status, we have specified that underrewarded status inconsistent, more than others, were more likely to deny afterlife when they were not predisposed to traditional politics.

When analyzing the controlled relation between afterlife and status discrepancy, by religious preference, in Table 5.8, we can see that in the HHL type of SI, belief decreases significantly for Protestants (by 24.3%), when it is compared to other patterns of SI or to status consistency (67.5% - 43.2%) (with a $P=.01$). We also notice that the contrary occurs for religious disaffiliates (nones) who show a much lower acceptance of postlife when their status is not underrewarded, with 25.1%, in comparison to 57.7% observed for status inconsistent. Such an important difference (32.6%) between the two disaffiliated sub-groups, has a statistical significance $<.01$. When SI becomes the control factor between belief and religious preference, while other status inconsistent and status consistent Protestants and Catholics see their belief increase, others who have no religion and do not belong to the HHL pattern of SI, show that they are the least likely to believe in eternal life.

**Table 5.8 Postlife and Status
and Religion**

Belief	Religious Preference							
	Prot		Catho		Jew-Other		None	
	HHL	Others	HHL	Others	HHL	Others	HHL	Others
Positive	43.2	67.5	61.7	73.5	-	27.5	57.7	25.1
Negative	56.8	32.5	38.3	26.5	100.	72.5	42.3	74.9
Total	5.8	94.2	6.1	93.9	9.4	90.6	17.1	82.9
	(27)	(431)	(19)	(297)	(3)	(28)	(16)	(80)

Status	Religion	Protestant	Chi-Square	d.f.	P
Status	Religion	Catholic	6.6074	1	.0101
Status	Religion	Jewish-Other	1.2874	1	n.s.
Status	Religion	None	1.0560	1	n.s.
Status	Religion	None	6.7823	1	.0092
Religion	Status	HHL	4.8278	3	n.s.
Religion	Status	Others	82.7525	3	<.001

Supporting our research hypothesis that underrewarded status inconsistent are less likely to be Catholics (P7),¹⁰ these results have specified that status discrepancy relates to Protestantism, as Demerath argued (1965). Indeed, for Protestants more than for Catholics, SI appears to be conducive to a change in religiousness. However, while the author of Social Class in American Protestantism (1965) emphasized status discrepancy as peculiarly related to some kind of religiosity, the relevance of religion on social status and religious belief, in a Canadian context, is more specifically exemplified by religious "nones" (also see Table 5.2) who attain unprecedented level of disbelief when they experience other patterns of status discrepancy than HHL, or none at all.

When we look at the dichotomized Protestant denominations, in Table 5.9, we observe that the percentage of belief between underrewarded status inconsistent and others, while differing a great deal for Mainliners (considered here as non-fundamentalists), is practically the same for fundamentalists (with only six cases of HHL). These data confirm our proposition (P8) that among underrewarded status inconsistent, Conservative Protestants would be the least likely to disbelieve in afterlife. It would seem that SI is irrelevant for Conservatives who retain a high level of

¹⁰Status inconsistent respondents affiliated to Jewish or other religions registered too few cases of SI to be considered in the analysis.

Table 5.9 Postlife by Status
and Denomination

% Belief	Denomination			
	Fundamentalist		Non-fundamentalist	
	HHL	Others	HHL	Others
Positive	85.4	84.2	31.9	63.8
Negative	14.6	15.8	68.1	36.2
Total	6.1 (6)	93.9 (86)	5.9 (21)	94.1 (336)

Status	Denomination	Fund.	Chi-Square	d.f.	P
Status	Denomination	Non-fund.	.0052	1	n.s.
Denomination	Status	HHL	8.5277	1	.0035
Denomination	Status	Others	5.1544	1	.0232
			13.0853	1	.0003

belief, SI or not, (85.4% vs. 84.2%). We can also observe that SI has an impact on belief much more for non-fundamentalists, who show a very low level of acceptance of afterlife, with 31.9%. This significant decrease in belief (63.3 - 31.9) is statistically significant with a $P < .001$.

The relevance of SI is also accentuated by our data. When both statuses are compared, there is a significant difference in belief between the two denominational subgroups. We can see that if other types of status inconsistencies and status consistents who are non-fundamentalists, show a percentage of belief similar to the one observed for the whole distribution, with 63.8%, those with the same status situations who are fundamentalists increase belief by 20.4%, with 84.2%. Similarly, if SI plays a part in lowering belief for Mainliners, with 31.9%, it does little to alter the very high level of afterlife acceptance for Conservatives, with 85.4%. We can conclude that underrewarded status inconsistencies belonging to non-fundamentalist denominations tend to be much less positive about afterlife than underrewarded status discrepants affiliated to a Protestant Conservative body. In sum, SI has very little importance on religious belief for fundamentalists.

Status Inconsistency: A Qualitative Approach

So far, we have considered the occurrence of the relationship between SI and afterlife for underrewarded status

inconsistents disbelieving in a life after death (the HHL). However, we can recall that for a very small proportion of underrewarded status inconsistents (HLL) status discrepancy was found to be a greater source of religiosity. The selective process of finding out who those 18 cases are consists in the examination of some of their background characteristics, their age, gender, marital status, working status, location and religious affiliation. Since these cannot adequately serve for empirical verification¹¹, they will be used for illustrative purpose only.

Such individuals who express positive belief in life after death, in spite of an unrewarding status condition (high education, low occupation and low income), are portrayed as being most likely males (60%), under 45 (49%), married (64%), Roman Catholics (63%), and residents of rural areas or small and medium cities (71%). Almost half tend to work full-time (49%), while the other half is made up of part-time workers, students (20%) or non-students (30%)¹².

In general, these few observations typify a very diversified population of status discrepant and reflect a very small minority with little tendency to cluster. In search for a complementary perspective on these anomalous

¹¹Their very few cases cannot be considered as reliable for stable percentaging.

¹²It needs to be emphasized that this information is applicable to a very small percentage of the population sampled.

cases, and following the research tradition of Glock and Stark (1965), other aspects of their religiosity are tentatively investigated. Recognizing that religious commitment has "diverse" and "possibly unrelated elements" (Roof, 1979: 17)¹³, we tentatively attempt to discover if our special group of status inconsistencies, conservative believers of a life after death, have other ways of being religious.¹⁴

The most frequently observed response to the question on "belief in God" (38%), originates from respondents who feel that "while they have doubts [...] they do believe in God". The distribution of response on that question also shows that among these 18 cases, we find 2 atheists and 1 agnostic. When we inspect their rate of attendance to religious services, we find out that it is neither regular nor assiduous, with 4 in ten attending several times a year, while 1 in 10 never attends. Responses to other religious dispositions also demonstrate that almost 7 in 10 never read the Bible privately and that almost half only happen to pray sometimes while 1 in 5 never prays.

Such information with regard to the other aspects of the religious commitment of these few respondents, strongly

¹³Roof refers to Glock and Stark (1965) for the inspiration behind the various "core dimensions of religiosity" (Roof, 1979: 21).

¹⁴In CAN80, questions were included that allowed us to explore these other dimensions of religiousness. Detailed statements of these questions and their response categories can be found in Appendix A.

suggest that on all these indicators of religiousness these selected status inconsistencies, holding traditional views on afterlife, do not seem otherwise to be very religious. Their faith in eternal life and other-worldly rewards do not appear to rest on any form of religious life here on earth.

Summary

The purpose of this chapter has been to gain further insight into the social context of SI. In analyzing the substantial implications of the context surrounding status discrepant respondents, the variables used as controls specified conditions or contingencies accompanying the occurrence of the relationship between SI and afterlife.

Prior to the examination of the effects of those contextual elements on the original association, their impact on postlife belief was evaluated and their influence on SI investigated. It was noted that women, rural residents, Catholics and Conservative Protestants expressed more belief, while occupants from large cities, third-party supporters, religious "nones" and affiliates from other faiths were more prone to negate afterlife. Results suggest that SI affected more specifically young and old, unmarried and those independent from religion.

When variables in context were introduced as controls, in the bi-variate association between SI and postlife, belief tended to be lower for underrewarded status discrepant young adults (25-34), women, dwellers from small cities, political

non-traditionalist, Protestants and non-fundamentalists. If other patterns of SI and status consistency appeared to increase religiosity for women and rural residents, its effect on religious disaffiliates was the opposite. The qualitative evaluation of the very small portion of status discrepants who believe in life after death served to exemplify the "unfocused" religious orientation, which Bibby (1979: 1) had found to be so prevalent among Canadians.

In this section, we have traced the dominant contours framing the association between SI and belief in afterlife. In the next concluding chapter, the theoretical and empirical links sustaining the relationship between religious belief and SI will be restated in order to assess more clearly the implication of our particular strategy of inquiry.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS

This exploratory research was intended as a contribution to the status-religion discussion, offering an analysis of religious orthodoxy using a sample of Canadians. This scientific study of belief in life after death was based on the conceptual and theoretical considerations of the research tradition of the sociology of religion. It stated and tested the idea that status inconsistency (SI) was conducive to disbelief in afterlife. This investigation of SI was necessarily related to the variations in levels of acceptance of the Judeo-Christian tenet on eternal life.

Considering that significant divergence in belief has been observed to emerge from particular patterns of discrepant statuses, it is felt that the efforts to concretize the meaning of afterlife in quantitative terms has been conclusive. It may be said, however, that the principal results were modest and relied on a very limited portion of status inconsistencies.

The whole question of SI had to do with a conception of social status as a multidimensional phenomenon. Explored by Lenski (1954, 1966), the non-vertical dimension of social status referred to the degree to which an individual occupied

certain unusual combinations of statuses. Lenski argued and tested the proposition that the unequal distribution of resources in society created discrepancies in people's social statuses, and that, in turn, this incongruity affected their actions and views, and the world around them. Demerath (1965) inspected the specific link between status discrepancy and religion, and with a sample of status discrepant Protestants, he empirically demonstrated that church attendance could be related to a high degree of SI between education, occupation and income. Subsequent studies attempted to use a SI framework to explain various social phenomena but in all these SI researches, the perpetuation of the concept was wholly dependent on its capacity to produce a high degree of explanatory power on dependent variables.

It has been the contention throughout this thesis that the source of a traditional belief in eternity was hardly to be understood as "degree" of SI measured by scores on a continuum. The foundation of the basic argument of the present debate on SI has been that the inconsistent dimensions of social status had sociological relevance when it was apprehended as "patterns" of unequal combinations of high and low standing on status variables. In accordance with the precursor of the concept on the objective reality of the incidence of SI, and the stressful reaction it produced, a deprivation-compensation rationale of religious fervour was ruled out as the least likely reactions stemming from SI.

Instead, the assumption put forward and adopted in this study, was that status dispreviledged individuals would react to their disadvantageous class positions by striving for higher statuses, as would lower classes, and would have very little faith in the other-worldly compensations offered by religion.

Drawing upon this basic assumption of tension between religion and society, the explicit statements proposed in this research rested on the logical relation between status discrepancy and distributive justice. "Underrewarded" SI was defined as the unrewarding experience characterizing those who, having highly invested in education, did not receive the social and material benefits of a prestigious occupation and the material comfort of a high income. The baseline assumption was that underrewarded status inconsistencies would be more likely to negate afterlife than other types of status discrepant, or than those with no inconsistency in their statuses. Relying on this major presupposition, several others were introduced in order to test, in reference to the original relationship, the determinant influences of context variables such as age, gender, marital status, urbanism, political and religious preference.

Employing a distinctive procedure of analysis, the present methodological approach to SI is couched on the belief that through the exploration of the relationship between SI and afterlife, certain profiles of SI would stand out as being

significantly related to our dependent factor. Our findings have demonstrated that this was the case.

First, it was observed that while status indicators, *per se*, exerted practically no influence on religious orthodoxy, when each component of status acted as a control, a meaningful increase in afterlife belief was reported for those with high education and low occupation. But it was in exploring further, more complex patterns of SI, that the simultaneous examination of the three dimensions of status resulted in significant variations in belief responses. Results showed that high education and low income increased belief for status discrepants with low occupation, and that high education and high occupation lowered belief for low income earners.

In sum, by focusing on the multidimensionality of status variables, some insight has been gained into status combinations favouring belief or disbelief in life after death. It was argued that for the highly educated with matching high prestige occupation, incongruent income tended to be perceived as unjust and had the effect of negating the other-worldly promises of religion. With low positions on both occupation and income, those having invested in education appeared to expect that rewards would come to them in a future life.

As for the conclusions reached with regard to the empirical use of context variables, they can be summarized this way: even if some but not all of these factors were

related to belief in afterlife and SI, few supported the propositions related to their use as context factors.

When we addressed the issue of context versus belief, we found that unrelated to age and marital status, belief was weakly associated with gender and politics - with more believers among women and political traditionalists. But more substantial relationships were observed between afterlife belief and residence, religious preference and denominational orthodoxy. Supporting Fischer's (1983) theory on the effect of population concentration, results indicated that residents from non-urban areas significantly differed in belief and behaviour from residents from more urban centres. However, when applied to the Canadian case, belief did not necessarily decrease as population increased.

Data also illustrated the fact that afterlife was a strongly implanted religious belief for Catholics and that unlike American Protestants, Canadian Protestants were not as likely to accept it. Figures showed that more Catholics than Protestants, and Conservative Protestants, rather than Protestants Mainliners, were significantly more inclined to believe in a life after death. As expected, non-Christians and the disaffiliated were the least likely to adhere to the idea of eternal life.

These findings have revealed that personal factors tended to have far less influence on religious belief than structural and institutional correlates. In contrast, SI was

found to have more effect on these more individual characteristics since status inconsistencies were found more likely to be among the young and the old, women, unmarried and religious independents.

Several propositions were stated about the effects of those variables in context, in the relationship between SI and afterlife. Our findings have provided a basis for evaluating these hypotheses. To begin with, contrary to our prediction, younger rather than older status inconsistencies expressed more disbelief. The afterlife question appeared to be much more significant for mobility conscious young adults than for disprevidged elders. The effect of the overrepresentativeness of this age group (25-34) and their life style became evident, since they were described as being predominantly professionals or semi-professionals, with 1 in 3 having undergraduate or graduate levels of education. In addition to age, gender was a significant element in our analysis and we observed that if women had a more positive attitude to afterlife than men, when underrewarded by their investment in education, they appeared to reject rather than welcome, the compensation offered by religion.

It was also assumed that marriage would tend to act as a reinforcement of religious dispositions and increase postlife belief for underrewarded discrepant. The results of the investigation on marital status did not confirm that assumption and married rather than unmarried status

inconsistents tended to be negative in their responses to afterlife. Neither were we able to grasp the general impact of community size on afterlife belief, nor specify whether the "critical mass" of urban concentration affected religious orthodoxy when status discrepants were put to test. The restricted number of underrewarded status inconsistencies and their extreme diversity of belief, have severely limited the conclusion to be drawn on this rural/urban debate. It is reasonable to suspect that, thinly spread through the country, SI would have very little more impact on belief in eternity than status consistency.

When we examined the conditions under which political preference was associated to SI and postlife belief, the null hypothesis was confirmed. On the one hand, results from CAN80 data did not confirm Lenski's basic premises about the determinant influence of SI on political attitude, and on the other, results nullified our proposition that political orientation intervened between afterlife belief and SI and indirectly caused a lessening in religious belief. It was when third-party supporters were subjected to the unstable conditions of SI, in this life, that they rejected the belief in a future life.

Finally, in spite of their discrepant statuses, significantly fewer Catholics than others and substantially fewer fundamentalist Protestants than non fundamentalists, appeared to deny afterlife, confirming the assumption that

Catholics and Conservative Protestants would be the least likely to negate eternal life, when underrewarded by their status position.

The contrasting religious views from Conservative orthodox and religious independents "nones" were not in themselves unexpected, however, the different role played by SI on these religious conservatives and on those with no religion was specified in our findings. Results demonstrated that being Catholic or Protestant had much less pertinence on the religious dispositions of status discrepants than being outside of any religious groups. Departure from conventional religion, in the analysis, had meant a greater propensity to react against the lack of material comfort engendered by status incongruity. However, when considering religious affiliation as a test factor between SI and religious belief, other types of SI or status consistency, rather than underrewarded SI, seemed to encourage disbelief for religious disaffiliates. And if we are able to say that those who are non-religious are more prone to deny their religious dispositions when their status standing has consistency or belong to other patterns of SI, at the opposite end of the religious spectrum, those who are nominally orthodox have shown that they could sustain a very high level of belief, with or without SI.

Overall, our findings do not parallel the conclusions reached in previous SI studies, nor do they resemble any

previous attempts to evaluate responses to a religious question. This is no doubt due to the fact that a method suitable to explore the multidimensionality of the concept of SI has been ventured and the methodological problems associated with the use of multiple regression approach avoided. By reformulating the methodological procedures of SI into a more basic multivariate analysis, attention could be directed to checking how religious orthodoxy entered into the very texture of socioeconomic conditions.

The association between SI and religious belief has necessitated a particular conceptual scheme. Belief in afterlife was conceptualized as an acceptance that in a life which lies beyond death, unjust earthy conditions would be stabilized, and assurance promulgated to the faithful. This other-worldly promise, founded upon the authority of the Bible and Church tradition, was juxtaposed against the empirical-material outlook of the in-worldly rewards of the here and now. The viability of such an association was in great part dependent on an understanding of social status as multidimensional; and more importantly, on a vision of religious commitment as intimately dependent on both a belief in a future life "cut-there" and the transparency of this belief on the social organization of other spheres of life.

The broader purpose of this study has been to suggest that charting religious change may not be the best approach to the phenomenon of religious decline. In the last three

decades, responses to the afterlife question have indicated less uncertainty and more disbelief. This loss of plausibility of religious tenets poses anew, for sociologists of religion, the urgency of imagining how religious orthodoxy could be rooted within the social basis of the believers themselves.

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APPENDIX A

1. Occupational Groups

The most recent updated version of Blishen's prestige occupational scale (1976) was consulted. Back in 1958, using the 1951 Canadian Census data, Blishen used income level and educational status in the construction of a socioeconomic index for occupations in Canada. When Blishen first updated his scale, in 1967, using 1961 census figures, he added a prestige variable as an additional item in the ranking of occupation. Blishen's scale was revised in 1976 (Can. Rev. Soc. Ant., 13 (1), based on the 1971 Census Occupational Classification and the Canadian Classification and Dictionary of Occupation (C.C.D.O.). These "occupational groups" were further modified in the following ways:

1. Professional and managerial: this first category represents well-paid professionals, high management officials, administrators and upper level civil servants.
2. Technical and sales: this section includes less-well-paid professionals, advertising agents, brokers, sales representatives, technicians, forepersons, protective workers, officials and proprietors.

3. Clerical, service and skilled workers: this third category includes lower level management personnel, inspectors, sales persons and sales clerks, assistants, office clerks and secretaries, lesser-paid non-manual employees, ordelies & d skilled workers.
4. Manual labour: in this group, we find semi-skilled and unskilled workers, operators and farmers.

2. Indexed values and their Recodes

Following the rationale that underrewarded status inconsistencies should be the focus of our analysis, numbers are assigned for the high (H) and low (L) values on education, occupation and income. These numbers are recoded to form the distribution of all cases of inconsistency. The details of the creation of that index are as follow:

Values and codes

Education	H = 10	L = 2
Occupation	H = 1	L = 2
Income	H = 12	L = 2

Distribution of the indexed values

Education	H = 10	H = 10	H = 10	L = 2	L = 2
Occupation	H = 1	H = 1	L = 2	H = 1	L = 2
Income	H = 12	L = 2	L = 2	H = 12	H = 12
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	23	13	14	15	16

Education	H = 10	L = 2	L = 2
Occupation	L = 2	H = 1	L = 2
Income	H = 12	L = 2	L = 2
	<u>24</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>

Recodes for underrewarded SI

(13 = 1) HHL Pattern
 (14 = 2) HLL Pattern
 (5,6,15,16,23,24 = 4) Others

Further Recodes

(13 = 1) HHL Pattern
 (5,6,14,15,16,23,24 = 2) Others

3. Underrewarded SI: Spouse Occupation

Respondent Education	Respondent Occupation	Spouse Occup.	Family Income	Underrewarded ?
L	L	L	L	NO
L	L	H	L	NO
L	H	L	L	NO
L	H	H	L	NO
H	L	L	L	YES
H	L	H	L	YES
H	H	L	L	YES
H	H	H	L	YES
L	L	L	H	NO
L	L	H	H	NO
L	H	L	H	NO
L	H	H	H	NO
H	L	L	H	NO
H	L	H	H	NO
H	H	L	H	NO
H	H	H	H	NO

4. Questionnaire - Can80

Question no 42: Which of the following statements comes closest to expressing what you believe about God ?

- 1 I know God exists, and I have no doubts about it
- 2 While I have doubts, I feel that I do believe in God
- 3 I find myself believing in God some of the time, but not at other times
- 4 I don't believe in a personal God, but I do believe in a higher power of some kind
- 5 I don't know whether there is a God, and I don't believe there is any way to find out
- 6 I don't believe in God
- 7 Other

Question no 23: Thinking specifically now of religious services, how often do you attend them?

- 1 Never
- 2 Less than once a year
- 3 About once a year
- 4 Several times a year
- 5 About once a month
- 6 2-3 times a month
- 7 Nearly every week
- 8 Every week
- 9 Several times a week

Question no 32: How often do you read the Bible privately ?

- 1 Never or rarely
- 2 Only on special occasions
- 3 Sometimes, but not regularly
- 4 Regularly once a week
- 5 Regularly many times a week
- 6 Regularly once a day or more

Question no 33: How often do you pray privately ?

- 1 I never pray, or only in religious services
- 2 Sometimes but not regularly
- 3 Regularly once a week
- 4 Regularly many times a week
- 5 Regularly once a day or more

APPENDIX B

**Table B-1 Postlife Belief and
Education**

Education					
Beliefs	Grade school	High school	Techni Busines.	Under graduate	Graduate school
positive	69.6%	61.2%	64.6%	60.7%	61.0%
negative	30.4%	38.8%	35.4%	39.3%	39.0%
Total	17.1% (209)	34.5% (423)	18.3% (224)	17.3% (212)	12.8% (157)
postlife educ					
Chi-square			d.f.	P	
5.5697			4	n.s.	

Table B-2 Postlife Belief
and Occupation

Beliefs	Occupation			
	Profes sional	Techn skil.	Cleri sales	Manual
positive	61.1%	64.0%	63.6%	66.7%
negative	38.9%	36.0%	36.4%	33.3%
Total	41.5% (409)	17.0% (167)	19.1% (189)	22.5% (221)
postlife occup	Chi-square 2.0188	d.f. 3	P n.s.	

**Figure B-1 Association Matrix between
Status Variables**

	1	2	3
1	1	*** .44	*** .25
2		1	*** .26
3			1

* P < .05
 ** P < .01
 *** P < .001

Note: Coefficients
 using PHI

1 - Education
 2 - Occupation
 3 - Income

Table B-3 Postlife Belief by Occupation
and Income

Beliefs	Income			
	High		Low	
	High occup	Low occup	High occup	Low occup
positive	61.2%	65.2%	62.7%	64.2%
negative	38.8%	34.8%	37.3%	35.8%
Total	43.5 (183)	56.5% (237)	69.7% (378)	30.3% (165)
occup income H		Chi-square	d.f.	P
occup income L		.7057	1	n.s.
Income occup H		.1116	1	n.s.
Income occup L		.1125	1	n.s.
		.0436	1	n.s.

Table B-4 Postlife Belief and Age

	AGE					
	15-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+
Belief (%)						
Positive	59.2	59.1	62.2	59.9	71.4	66.2
Negative	40.8	40.9	37.8	40.1	28.6	33.8
Total	7.0 (83)	35.2 (417)	14.3 (169)	15.8 (187)	12.4 (146)	15.3 (182)
Chi-Square	d.f.					P
8.9505	5					n.s.

Table B-5 Postlife Belief
and Marital Status

Belief (%)	Marital Status	
	Married	Not married
Positive	63.2	64.1
Negative	36.8	35.9
Total	64.9 (819)	35.1 (443)
Chi-Square .0969	d.f. 1	P n.s.

Table B-6 Status and Residence

Status (%)	Residence				
	Rural	Town	Medcity	Largcity	Metrop
HHL	6.0	8.0	5.0	7.3	8.7
Others	94.0	92.0	95.0	92.7	91.3
Total	11.8 (108)	26.8 (246)	15.7 (144)	12.0 (110)	33.7 (308)
Chi-Square 2.3910	d.f. 4			P n.s.	

Table B-7 Status and Politics

Federal Politics		
Status (%)	Traditional	Non-traditional
HHL	7.1	7.1
Others	92.9	92.9
Total	76.1 (654)	23.9 (205)
Chi-Square .00004	d.f. 1	P n.s.

Table B-8 Status and Denomination

Denomination		
Status (%)	Fundamentalist	Non-fundamentalist
HHL	6.0	5.9
Others	94.0	94.1
Total	20.8 (94)	79.2 (358)
Chi-Square .0010	d.f. 1	P n.s.