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**A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC POLICY FORMATIONS:
THE CANADA-UNITED STATES FREE TRADE AGREEMENT**

Valerie Sloby

A Thesis in
the Faculty of Arts and Science

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Master of Arts at
Concordia University
Montreal, Quebec, Canada

August, 1989

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ABSTRACT

A Critical Analysis of Public Policy Formations: The Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement

Valerie Sloby

The legitimate political practices of formulating and legislating public policies in Canada are maintained within diverse power relationships. The policy process regarding the liberalization of trade between Canada and the United States is conceived amidst a set of discursive relations and is studied by way of institutional formations and processes of interaction. There is a power-relation dynamic produced that privileges specific representation in public policy processes to the exclusion of less powerful forms of representation. Constructing a perspective of policy research and analysis that seeks to trace the conditions of possibility that structures various legislation holds the opportunity to better understand some of the shortcomings in democratic patterns of organizational formations as it relates to Canadian society.

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

The host feeds the parasite and makes its life possible but at the same time is killed by it ... Can host and parasite live happily together ... feeding each other or sharing the food?¹

J. Hillis Miller

1.1 Schematizing the Problematic

The Canadian federal election of 1988 will be most remembered as a passionate debate over the Conservative government's policy initiative to eliminate trade barriers and pursue "freer" trade with the United States. Subsuming all other issues, the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (the "FTA") became the crucial focus of debate in this election. The free trade focus was translated, mediated, and reduced into a choice between love of country or love of money. A Liberal slogan coined the choice: "Guts or Guccis;" as we have come to subsequently discover, "guccis were preferable to guts."²

What is most perplexing is not so much the controversy over whether the FTA, an omnibus trade agreement between Canada and the United States, is generally beneficial or detrimental for Canada and the world but that all Canadian federal parties are now willing to embrace the concept of freer trade with overtones of difference. On the one hand, the FTA is marketed by the Conservative government as a

necessary correlate to an ever-expanding international competitive marketplace. The FTA is thus perceived as a piece of instrumental policy that will secure Canada's dominance and progress toward the "paradise" of economic gains. On the other hand, the federal opposition parties - Liberals and New Democrats - marketed the particularities of this agreement as a surrender of Canada's collective autonomy claiming that we should pursue freer trade with the United States but on a sector by sector basis. On either side of the debate, the FTA is a policy which sets a new mode of practice for future procedures and strategies in dealing with the United States.

We will never know absolutely one way or the other whether the adoption of the FTA was a "right" or "wrong" policy decision. Each political party analysed the agreement with a different set of lenses, or pre-understandings, which led to a particular interpretation of the legitimacy of this policy initiative. However, what we can seek to better understand are the relations that constitute the forum of debate regarding free trade. Each dominant federal political party has spoken out quite brashly either in favour or against the FTA, stating in the process that they each speak, simultaneously, for the general "national" interest. Where we ultimately need to probe therefore is in the direction of whose "micro" rather than "national" interests and to what telos does the concept of free trade and, more specifically, this agreement function. When the leaders of the political parties speak of the illusive "national" interest, already it must be recognized that a fundamental level of exclusion of certain groups or classes in society

is operating on a conscious or unconscious level. Unavoidably, some members of society, corporate or individual, will benefit from this concept to a greater extent than others.

As each political party in the election race of 1988 attempted to discredit the principles of the others concerning free trade, identifying the pros and cons on this policy became all the more remote for the layperson. Although there was a constant stream of knowledge and information - interviews with the three leaders; interviews with numerous authorities in economics, and so on - it did not work to concretize the issues and concepts of the free trade debate. Rather, it often seemed to contribute to an increased difficulty for an individual to interpret the state of things vis-a-vis free trade.

In studying the free trade debate, the attempt in this thesis will be to explore the ways in which the FTA - the object/idea - is manifested within various institutions (discursive procedures) and positions (rhetorical strategies). The issues raised are not examined in an economic analysis, but rather in a discursive one. This can be defined as the discursive approach to policy analysis. Within a discursive frame of reference, we approach the debate with this central question: how do we now as a society/nation come to accept free trade? Grappling with this question, I will try to make clear that the free trade debate in Canada must be understood in strictly ideological terms as rhetorically constituted. Studying public policies, specifically the FTA, within this framework serves to reveal the inconsistencies in

dominant codes of behaviour in our liberal democratic institutions. This analysis will seek to prove that contemporary liberal institutions such as modern political parties drive the ideals of western democracy further from a sphere of individual autonomy to one of institutional collectivities. Accordingly, I will show how the discourse on free trade expounded by the three political parties - Conservatives, Liberals, and New Democrats, is linked to a certain order of cultural domination and imperial control. In other words, we will embark upon a journey to the limits of the rationale claimed by each of these three collective bodies within the political apparatus on the issue of free trade.

1.2 Context Formations: Discursive Analysis

As already noted, I will avoid a strictly technical interpretation of the economic consequences of the FTA. An alternative way of assessing the social impact of the FTA goes beyond an interpretation of what the agreement says. A discursive approach addresses the contradictions of theory and practice. So often is the case that theory and practice are very different in manifestation. It is essential to address the practices and rules enabling one to speak about the issue because what is said about policies in favour or against is never wholly constituted independent of an unmediated reality. The discourse or rhetoric of policy initiatives is always set amidst an implicit epistemological background. The discursive approach

to policy evaluation attempts to make explicit what is shadowed and implicit in mainstream policy formation. A discursive approach to public policy evaluation goes further than an assessment of the "rights" or "wrongs" and seeks to uncover the rules of how to speak within the parameters of established practices and codes of knowledge within a specific epoch.

Policy initiatives and debates should be regarded as a discursive object of study. Thus, we must seek to better understand not only what the major political parties have said about free trade, but we must also be concerned with the rules and conventions they must adhere to in order to gain support. All policy formations are an embodiment of some type of power and interest. Policies, such as the FTA, are brought about for a reason and are manifest at specific historical instances to serve particular interpretations of the current social reality. There is a code, rules explicit or implicit, for the ways in which we make acceptable statements and it is the discursive approach of analysis that seeks to uncover the sets of rules of conformity for such interaction and communication.

The term "discourse" must be understood to encompass more than just texts. It is used to describe an ordering and a process towards an attempt to make meaning of the world. Discourses are the product of social, historical and institutional formations, and meanings are produced by these institutionalized discourses; discourses are power relations.³ Discourses in regard to public policy initiatives function

to shadow specific interests, in particular, the subjectivity of evaluation (self-interest).

If the Conservative government were to put forth the idea that they wanted to pursue free trade because the national symbol of the United States - the eagle - is becoming extinct, obviously this would fall outside normative rules for reasonable argument. Therefore, what each politician, economist, or journalist may say about free trade in order for it to be given serious consideration must be said within the parameters of accepted rules and procedures; in other words, within a discursive body of knowledge. These rules and procedures, the episteme of an era, are not universals but they change and are altered throughout history. Discourse analysis seeks a better understanding of how we come to hold what is true and valuable today when once it was held to be false. This approach traces and questions the rational thought that has provoked such changes. Marike Finlay, a communications theorist, explains:

Discourse analysis attempts to uncover the rules and procedures which subtend and legitimate the things we say and believe. It attempts to demonstrate not what a statement means though that is not unimportant, but rather why that statement was produced, when it was, and as it was. It holds that if we can understand why and how statements are produced, we will have gained a new insight into their meaning.⁴

The discursive approach in regard to the free trade debate is extremely fascinating because infrequently throughout Canadian history, a Canada-United States free trade agreement has been discussed. Ratification of any such all-embracing pact, since the formal union of

Canada, has always been denied up to now. What shall be sought in the foregoing is to illuminate what has led to the legitimization of free trade today; how do the specialised, authoritative groups (i.e. economists, academics, and politicians) encode the policy of a sweeping free trade agreement. It would be a gross oversimplification if we were to believe that it is purely one factor over another. For example, we cannot solely attribute the adoption of the FTA to economic necessity within the technological imperatives of our times. We also cannot solely attribute the change to a more laissez-faire capitalism to the hegemony and imperial domination of the United States. This thesis will show that all policy formations are an embodiment of a combination of social interests and power relations.

1.3 Positioning the Object of Presentation

The positions of the three federal parties will be extensively examined in order to illustrate how all statements in opposition or in favour of the FTA are legitimated within specific rigours of belief. Policy documentation on free trade published by each political party as well as popular press reports, the FTA document, and many critical articles written by journalists, economists, politicians, businessmen, and academics will be considered in depth. The material analysed will reveal the ways in which our culture implicitly communicates about free trade and explicitly speaks about free trade. The patterns of interaction in regard to the reception of the FTA are aligned within a

comprehensive discursive unity contoured by instrumental rationality. Although the statements of this corpus may be contradictory, they nevertheless operate on the basis of the same set of presuppositions and operate within a restricted domain of what type of statements are acceptable.

In approaching the issue of free trade discursively, we are compelled to search for answers to the questions: how must a public figure speak in order to gain legitimacy? What constitutes knowledge in a given frame of reference? What power relations are involved in such interaction? An analysis of this corpus will provide answers to these questions and reveal the social implications of the FTA.

The attempt to answer these questions will draw upon several theorists in communications: in particular, Harold A. Innis and Michel Foucault who have both contributed significantly in articulating the procedures of communication and knowledge from the perspective of power and social control. I will present a detailed framework of their specific pertinence to this study in the first section. This will work to identify more clearly the theoretical perspective of the discursive approach. Using this theoretical perspective, I will proceed to elaborate and trace the historical formations of claims and sentiments in respect to the free trade debates of the past. Tracing the dynamics of the historical relations between the United States and Canada will provide the contextualization of the object of study - the 1988 free trade debate. In the following sections, I shall outline the

development of the three dominant federal party positions and strategies which they have used in identifying with the concept of the FTA. I will conclude by setting alternatives for public policy determinations and elaborating on the relationship of theory to practice and knowledge to value.

2.0 THE EPISTEMIC OF DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

It has seemed to me that the subject of communication offers possibilities in that it occupies a crucial position in the organization and administration of government and, in turn, of empires and of Western civilization... Large-scale political organizations such as empires must be considered from the standpoint of two dimensions, those of space and time. Empires persist by overcoming the bias of media which overemphasizes either dimension.¹

Harold A. Innis

My role ... is to show people that they are much freer than they feel, that people accept as truth, as evidence, some themes which have been built up at a certain moment during history, and that this so-called evidence can be criticized and destroyed. To change something in the minds of people - that's the role of an intellectual.²

Michel Foucault

2.1 Methodological Configuration

The issue of cultural studies and, in particular, the grounding of the discursive approach encompasses a broad range of thinkers who have contributed significantly to theories of the logic of a capitalist society. Amidst this terrain, ideology and discourse analysis have been aligned within critical problematics set forth by Marxist interpretations of social and economic determinations. Marxist economic models of base and superstructure, essentially that is

contemporary theories of ideology and power, comprise the framework of discourse analysis.

In society, positions of power and domination within a Marxist configuration are derived through stages of capitalism. It is important to stress that upon the terrain of Marxist theory there remain many different positions. For purposes of simplification, the discursive approach could be best defined as "post-Marxist" theory. What is meant by this is that in this world, theorists are working hard to reconceptualise new systems of producing meaning and signification within previous systems of production. Alienation, fragmented understanding of the world (i.e. false consciousness), and economic hegemony in the present information age are social ills which, if not on the rise, are certainly still far from being resolved by Marxism.

Orthodox Marxism constituted itself through the development of a notion of ideology. Marxists best defined ideology as a system which makes a false claim to science: a pseudo-science. They believed that they could break the code of the pretentious ideologues. However, the problem with classical Marxist theory was that it constituted itself as a referential source of objectivity apart from any influences of ideologues. Marxist theory became victim to the very dogmas that presupposed common sense (Enlightenment) all the while appealing to the strength of rhetorical arguments.

Largely derived from Marxist theory are the works of the Frankfurt School (Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse, Habermas), Frederic Jameson, Alvin Gouldner, Raymond Williams, and Stuart Hall to name but a few. "The modern interest in ideology," explains Gouldner, "emerges as a Marxist category whose underlying, latent paradigm is: a belief system that makes pretentious and unjustified claims to scientificity."³ To elaborate, ideology can be defined in a modern sense as:

...the power of a particular system to represent its own representations as a direct reflection of the real, to produce its own meanings as experience.⁴

Influenced by Marxist theory, the above-mentioned thinkers share in common the aspiration to probe the relationship between producing a system of meaning - a discourse - and the social process by which external determinations so restrain our behaviour (our production of reality). Their attentions focus on the problem of a synthetic-knowledge base vs. an authentic-knowledge base. An appeal to a consensus, a democratic legitimation of knowledge, is not sufficient because it is believed to be ideologically constituted in a constricted mediational framework. The reconstructive process in pursuit of "truth" adds a supplemental quality, an awareness, of a loss of a sense of unitariness experienced by the individual amidst the collective social sphere.

The quest for a form of transparent mediation in the search for objective truths presupposes the possibility of individual transcendence.. In their struggle to dismantle ideological inflections,

these theorists maintain that there is an underlying order or meaning in the midst of the chaos of the technological information age. The issue of cultural studies is approached by developing a critique of the existence of particular practices and social identities articulated within the network of a "commodified culture." Accordingly, the interaction of individuals within an organized community, in other words - the welfare of individuals as members of society, is distorted by capitalist structures of economy. Although these positions with a nuance of difference have contributed significantly to the body of work that not only questions the certainty of accepted codes of knowledge mediated by imperial power and hegemonic domination in a technological society but it also empties or at the very least makes the concept of an individual as a possible agent of change extremely fragile: hence the so-called "crisis of the transcendental subject."

2.2 Innis' and Foucault's Theory of Communication, Discourse, and Power

Harold Innis and Michel Foucault are two extremely influential thinkers of the post-Marxist generation who struggle amidst the horns of this dilemma. What I mean by this is that they share a commonality on different areas of social discourse particularly in that they do not adhere to either a humanist doctrine or a structuralist doctrine. Their perspectives are aligned in refusing an either/or dichotomy in favour of an ambivalent and/or formula. Before presuming any form of a priori structure, they focus on practices of a specific cultural

milieu taking into account the technologies of power (i.e. discursive procedures).

Harold Innis, a Canadian economist-historian, provided important insights into the internal (individual) and external (cultural) constraints in a technological world. In an eloquent exposition of Innis' position, Arthur Kroker writes in a work entitled Technology and The Canadian Mind: Innis, McLuhan, Grant:

From the "Fur Trade in Canada" to "The Cod Fisheries" to his last works on technology and civilization, Innis never lost sight of the fully ambivalent fate of Canada in the New World. In his estimation, technology always contained paradoxical tendencies to freedom and domination simultaneously. ... Innis' ideal was always of attaining "balance and proportion" between competing claims of empire (power) and culture (history).⁵

Innis traced the history of changes due in part to individual creativity within the possibilities produced by technologies of communication. He believed in the dynamic force of the human spirit while recognizing the restraints imposed by history (time) and culture (space).

Michel Foucault, a French historian-philosopher, focused specifically on the study of the dynamics of macro social interaction, or what he calls "interdiscursive relationships," in the eighteenth century. His work attempts to trace the rise of institutions - medical clinics, psychiatric hospitals, and penal apparatuses. Rather than attempting a hermeneutics of social manifestations with the rise of institutionalization, Foucault traces the development of the practices culturally specific vis-a-vis these formations.

Conceived on the other side of the crisis of the transcendental subject, an investigation of social practices is opened up by Innis' and Foucault's writings. Their works reflect a high level of skepticism towards the ways in which present-day society has devised a technocratic (specialized) ordering in regard to the social sphere. Rather than insisting that social domination, repression, or a Marxist interpretation of ideology is always dependent upon some form of a priori structure or transcendent subject, Innis and Foucault prefer to locate sites of power and domination as a complex set of relations. They each explore different sets of practices: Innis explores Canadian political economy on a macro level; Foucault explores the rise of eighteenth century institutionalization with an emphasis on interiority of self-control and self-understanding. They both succeed in illuminating the links of liberal policy formations within the parameters of control through a discursive constitution of the subject. The constituted subject - the social individual - is always controlled within a culture's episteme. Thus, both their projects point towards a question of relational strategies as opposed to discovering a transcendent "truth," in other words an ontology (a representation of what is real). We will begin with an exploration of Foucault's approach and then move to a discussion of Innisian concepts.

2.2.1 Procedures of Power: End of Modernism

The conditions of possibility, or what Foucault has termed discursive procedures, are situated in a-deterministic ways:

History has no "meaning," though this is not to say that it is absurd or incoherent. On the contrary, it is intelligible and should be susceptible to analysis down to the smallest detail - but this in accordance with the intelligibility of struggles, of strategies and tactics.⁶

Foucault's critique of power/knowledge is not an analysis that is committed to an ideal, utopian vision. On the contrary, as John Rajchman has pointed out, for Foucault "nothing grows or evolves internally; there is no universal history, there is no completely free society, and there is no destiny of a people."⁷ For example, psychoanalysis for Foucault does not liberate the individual through endowing one with a better understanding of oneself but rather is a discursive practice which places further restraints on the individual to conform within pre-established norms.

In our contemporary age, grand theories of knowledge (i.e. the study of the pure and applied sciences, economics, philosophical systems' theories) are enmeshed within practices that are bound to the ethics of a transcendental dynamic. These structures of power and knowledge are reinterpreted within already assumed ideals and norms.

Foucault does not:

...look beyond or behind historical practices for the final truths about our nature, or the norms our reason dictates to us. He attempts to look more closely at the workings of those practices in which moral norms and truths about ourselves figure, and to submit them to a critical analysis.⁸

Foucault's perspective, in short, is concerned with the problematic of how, by becoming constituted within society as subjects, one comes to be dominated within certain configurations of cultural practices. Our understanding of what should be considered meaningful, valuable, is derived from cultural codes of practice and not by way of concepts and objects existing independent of mediation. Concepts and objects do not exist on their own with an intrinsic identity. Rather they exist through relations of power made possible through the very act of social interaction. Foucault believes that we are never born free and sovereign; we are already constituted within an apparatus of power configurations. Rajchman explains that for Foucault:

...no group or class is sovereign; no group or class is the agent of change. Thus freedom does not basically lie in discovering or being able to determine who we are, but in rebelling against those ways in which we are already defined, categorized, and classified.⁹

Within this method of Foucauldian resistance, social structures whether dictated by capitalist or socialist imperatives impose limitations on one's behaviour and potential. In distinction from the more orthodox Marxist position, Foucault does not ground societal limitations in the economic or historical nature of social formations. Power and domination are functions proper to the existence of class and class struggles; however, power is not something that is possessed within a defined structure nor is it a simple matter of repression - it is exercised at varying levels and degrees holding a strategic position as one of the driving forces in history.

In linking power and knowledge, Foucault's position does not distinguish between scientific objective knowledge and rhetoric (discursive practices). The conception of any form of knowledge is riddled by strategic thresholds of power:

...truth isn't outside power, or lacking in power: contrary to a myth ... truth isn't the reward of free spirits, the child of protracted solitude, nor the privilege of those who have succeeded in liberating themselves. Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint.¹⁰

Foucault refuses to link power and domination to the figure of a master in any shape or form. He continues:

Each society has its regime of truth, its "general politics" of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.¹¹

Power, in brief, is a complex interactive and ever-changing discursive relation that is omnipotent in social life. Foucault makes the argument against any possibility for a completely emancipated polis. This suggests that even those countries that lay claim to a western liberalist conception of freedom are doomed to necessary regulations and constraints. It must be interpreted that Foucault equates power with a dominating force. However, he attributes to power not only a repressive tendency, explaining that:

What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn't only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs

through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression.¹²

It is in this way that power becomes more than mere repression or prohibition; power becomes dominating through seduction thereby penetrating greater parameters of control.

Foucault argues that if constraints are abolished externally, internal surveillance procedures are then manifested which in turn make us slaves to cultural conformities. New systems of domination are directed toward a sense of liberation and, simultaneously, self-control. The disciplines, or practices, of bureaucratic society in a contemporary frame of reference constrain the modern individual to continual categorizations, examinations always with an objectifying "gaze" of contouring individuality to policies of normalization. Foucault's method is to use in-depth case studies of the rise of medical institutions and the development of psychoanalytic therapy that exemplify forms of self-examination processes practised within the spirit of seeking to establish the credibility of normalization under the codes of a collective framework. In brief, power resides in new modes of domination evolving within structures that are partly invisible and introduce an internal disciplinary reflex. No longer is power exclusively a visible dominant but rather it comprises of an abstract formula that imposes a particular conduct on the individual: "The self comes to constitute self through obedience."¹³ The possibility for emancipation and the possibility of transcending ideological constraints are seriously problematized by the work of Foucault.

In attempting to understand precisely the claim that Foucault makes, we must grasp the idea that the demands of self-understanding are bound by culturally-specific taboos and rituals. "We may think we are gaining some freedom when we throw off sexual prohibitions," Charles Taylor points out in reference to our liberal democracy, "but in fact we are dominated by certain images of what it is to be a full, healthy, fulfilled sexual being; these images are in fact very powerful instruments of control."¹⁴

Pertinent to this study, new policies regarding economic relations of exchange between Canada and the United States can be seen operating on certain images of solicitation. The term free trade conjures the image that we are receiving something beneficial without any form of reciprocal exchange. People often readily absorb the idea of receiving something without giving anything else up in exchange. It is the case all-too-often that people accept economic codes of capitalism without questioning the invisible structures of potential dominance that may ensue and underlie the externality of the situation. A healthy, liberated, and progressivist country (e.g. a developed nation) is dominated by the image of what it means to be a technologically efficient nation. For Foucault, all social relations contain degrees of exploitation and they become all the more powerful when interpreted in the form of liberation. This is his centrality to the focus at hand concerning the FTA debate.

Foucault's works build in order to unveil the rhetoric of "analytical" products of knowledge and codes of conformity within the western tradition. Some theorists have severely criticized his postulates regarding omnipotent forces and relations of power conceived of and practiced by dominators and dominated in the family, workplace, educational system, hospitals and prisons. The magnitude of power structures makes the idea of emancipatory transcendence from a Foucauldian perspective almost absurd because what he essentially describes is an impenetrable sphere of power forces. Though many have criticized him on this point, I believe we must credit Foucault with trying to unmask the injustices to which institutionalized regimes of truth are integrally bound:

...most of [Foucault's] work ... is best summed up under the dual headings of utopianism and crisis... We ought to have learned by now that the writings of such figures as Nietzsche, Foucault, Heidegger and Derrida are intended to be provocative rather than programmatic, therapeutic rather than constructive.¹⁵

As we enter into relations of power on all levels of action, we create new forces of interaction. Grasping a better understanding of the limitations, external and internal, imposed upon us within an institutionalized framework perhaps will create a space for new forces of resistance in respect to the private and public realm. Of course, Foucault's relevance herein focuses mainly on the public space vis-a-vis new public policy formations. Foucault's work and analytical approach manifest important extensions of understanding how relations of power and state form a political force field that controls behaviour visibly and invisibly. He sheds light on the play of political

techniques and the technology of government which in turn creates new forms of political rationality. The strategies in the development of a political rational that pleads for commercialism over cultural interests and the subsequent play of relations between individual and state are particularly fascinating when viewed through Foucauldian lenses. Foucault considers the eighteenth century, the era that witnessed the rise of the Age of Reason (the Enlightenment), as the period in which a claim to power was constituted through claims to truth: truth being defined as an object, rationally and empirically interpreted. The whole idea of an objective knowing is severely attacked by Foucault because it is his belief that power permeates and hermetically seals actions, evaluations, and knowledge. He believes that one always resides within the boundaries of a discursive apparatus.

This is the crucial difference between Marx and Foucault: the former is prone to a desire for objective truth; the latter is not.¹⁶ On the matter of knowledge-bearing objectivity, Foucault is much more in line with a Nietzschean sense of the "will to truth." In grasping the fundamental distinction between Marx and Foucault, we could say that Marx, in his commitment to an objective truth datum, falls prey to Foucault's depiction of the "will to truth." Foucault insists that there is no such thing as an objective knowledge base. In Foucault's perspective, every "science" is in fact an ideology, not in the strict sense of its being a reflection of the interests of some particular class but in the broader sense that it is irremediably caught up within

relations of power.¹⁷ This notion of a power-knowledge model wherein we are never capable of penetrating the authenticity of our truths is applicable to the FTA debate because it will never be possible to know with absolute certainty whether the economists who were proponents of the deal were correct in terrorizing Canadians with the prospect that rejection of the agreement would surely spell the decline of this country. More importantly, the "scientific" views had never at any point during the debate reported an unqualified consensus on this policy issue.

If we wholeheartedly embrace Foucault's "analytic," or as some have termed it, "rhetoric" of power, we are left in an infrastructure of never fully "knowing" the existent reality; never fully "knowing" whether our evaluations of policies are effective within our given social domain. In this sense:

Foucault's position thus differs radically from that of Marcuse and other lyrical and existential Marxists of the 1960s, who wanted to get back to a true, authentic, social order in which our polymorphously perverse drives, our joyfully pleasurable instincts, would finally be able to express themselves freely. Unlike these other writers, Foucault finds no beach underneath the paving stones, no "natural" order at all. There is only the certainty of successive regimes of power. Each of these regimes is made to be attacked, for each participates in the perpetual crisis of the present.¹⁸

His method and analysis is important to this thesis mainly due to the fact that his approach is one that does not embrace a particular mentality or regime. Rather he incorporates into his analysis of the eighteenth century practices a critique of a body of successive

mentalities with the ambition of unleashing the human psyche from socially alienating constraints. Foucault does not align with any system and can be categorized as an anti-systematic thinker. Foucault holds that the "will to truth" is detached from empirical groundings. Moreover, objective truths are composed of arbitrary, quasi-scientific interpretations. Foucault's position can be broadly defined within a postmodern sensibility: for our purposes, we shall regard Foucault as a radical postmodern theorist (poststructuralist) as he negates the possibility of an ordered harmony and a unitary subject.

Where do we stand as an individual confronted with this lost sense of hope in gaining a better understanding of our "true" selves, our needs, and our desires in the public and private realm? Foucault's trajectory forecloses on the idea that we can gain a sense of self through social interaction. The queries brought about within postmodern discourse - an age characterized by a profound sense of loss - compels one to seriously question the status of the person/individual/subject as an effective unitary agent holding the power of possibility in implementing transcendental change. The postmodern situation sets into motion the subject (I, we) as fragmented and, at the very least, in a state of decline.

Without argument, we can agree that there is a certain lack of coherence and that the individual entity in our present highly technologically-advanced world is somewhat fragmented and perhaps suffers from a lack of self-awareness. What bearing does this have on

an analysis of the free trade debate? Why this concern with postmodern polemics? As the ontological status of the subject seemingly lacks a legitimate social construction, values regarding social organization - specifically, public policy formations - are challenged by the problematic posed in postmodernity and, thus, humanity searches for a structure containing substantive meaning. It is the search for a valid method of evaluation which is at issue.

We cannot rely solely on Foucault's trajectory because of his inability to articulate a subject's space outside a hermetically sealed infrastructure of power. The not-as-radical postmodern thinkers hold that we suffer as social beings from a dispersion of the self but that we can somehow make a viable return to the humanistic tradition and thereby hope to recuperate a qualified degree of substantial representation on behalf of the unitary individual.

The fear of loss, be it in history or in the space of community and culture, is embedded in the Canadian imagination to paraphrase Michael Dorland¹⁹. The anxiety of the postmodern age has been echoed for many years in Canadian critical writings. The Canadian fate, as Dorland eloquently explains, seems inherently directed and extremely sensitive to this presence of terror at losing substantial control and power. The Canadian imagination has always been fragmented since the birth of this nation. Either through a dominant British or dominant American schemata, Canadians have always tried to find their unique identity. The FTA debate perfectly characterizes this sense of terror

in the lack of a nation's ability to define a specific cultural identity. Canada was built on a multicultural format wherein the problem of defining distinctions of worth on policy and morality have always been problematic. The autonomous spheres of cultural value have led to problems in seeking to establish a structured procedure of value relations.

2.2.2 The Canadian Imagination: Harold A. Innis

Harold A. Innis is an emblematic figure in Canadian critical thought. He was one of the pioneers who recognized the Canadian experience early on: a nation caught between the influences of two empires, European and American. In 1948, Innis wrote:

Canada is facing to an increasing extent the effects of contrast between two systems. ... The conflict between the two systems has cumulative effects. Nationalism becomes more intense. The influence of the radio is canalized through the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and interest in national culture is intensified. The intensification of nationalism increases the burden of tariffs and fixed charges, precipitates regionalism, and enhances the importance of the provinces. Particularism leads to a decline in national loyalties and to an increase in imperial loyalties. The instability of the Canadian political and economic structure offsets the effects of rigidities and reflects the conflict between the European and American system.²⁰

How insightful of Innis to recognize that "[t]he cultural values of an industrial society are not the cultural values of other societies."²¹ In Innis' discourse, Canada was an object-lesson in the price to be paid in the victory of commercialism over cultural interests.²² For Canada, this means we have had to endure a double form of cultural

subordination: the imperialism in the past of Great Britain; and in the present of the United States - a modern power expressing, more intensely than ever before, partiality towards centralization and territory.

What is interesting and pertinent to this study on free trade is that when we recognize the basic tensions in the culture and economy of Canadian society with Innisian lenses, for example the tensions characterized in the pre-election slogan "guccis or guts," it becomes much clearer as to the significance our choice on the free trade issue implies regarding our identity as individuals, as a nation. Can we thus assume that the dominant "episteme" - the field of knowledge and signification - has perhaps shifted slightly to an even greater bias towards increased consumption as a primary motivator in our process of evaluating what is valuable? It seems that our values as a people today favour, more than ever before, materialism over and above tradition.

Innis' work, in a number of areas, can be considered to have made a most important intellectual contribution to the discourse on power and the "crisis" civilizations face as they shift from predominant structures of a temporal bias ("monopolies of time") to a spatial bias ("monopolies of space"). Canada was, and very much still remains, a nation that is caught at the heart of such a tension. Innis succeeded in recognizing the ambivalent fate of Canadians, moreover of individuals, who have been displaced from one form of domination to

another form of domination and not necessarily a better one. He did not see a shift in either technology or political systems as necessarily a progressive advancement but rather a transhistorical change.

It was Innis' belief that the best we can aim for in society is to attempt to uncover the contradictions of our dominant practices and thereby expose the potential for a different type of social ordering with subsequently new configurations of constraint. Innis' work is so insightful because his position makes room for the acceptance of future internal and external inconsistencies. Contingency, room for flexibility within a social sphere, is vitally important for Innis much the same as for Foucault. As Paul Heyer has commented: "Foucault shares with Innis an antiheroic and antiprogressive view of the subject."²³ Innis had described Canada's fate as one caught within the dilemma of old and new, Foucault declared, quite literally, the same fate for civilizations in general: "man is a face drawn in the sand between two tides - he is a composition appearing only between two others, a classical past that never knew him, and a future that will no longer know him."²⁴

It is highly improbable that any of Innis' writings were scrutinized by Foucault; yet, the tenets of what can be considered each of their methods, or approaches, and interests intersect in many instances: primarily, they both avoid, even distrust, a clearly defined system of theoretical claims concerning social forms of

organization. They both shared the belief that systems' theories led to the creation of new discursive practices, or in Innisian terms, monopolies of knowledge and rigidities. As Innis explains:

I would like to present ... the problem not of telling the truth, because I am aware that I do not know what the truth is, but of presenting considerations which will lead to discussion and closer approximation to the truth...²⁵

A distinction of degree should perhaps be mentioned between Innis' and Foucault's explication of a transhistorical subject void of heroic or progressive tendencies. Foucault's radicalism, some have observed, leads to a complete relinquishing of a unified subject/agent - many have argued that this comprises of nihilism stopping short of any ascendance from the abyss. A somewhat more pragmatic Innis wished to invoke a sense of balance and humanistic ambiguity in his criticism of the problems facing western civilization: nihilism with a Nietzschean "overman" riding the reins. Innis' perspective as much as Foucault's, however, does not posit in a modern sense a transcendental subject. Foucault's level of inscribing ascendance, or humanist elements in his discourse, is approached implicitly whereas Innis' approach is more explicit. We will return to this matter a little later on.

Innis, in short, articulates a subject that is never independent of structures of domination. The level of autonomy is circumscribed within a time or space bias. To this extent, alternatives - the field of choice, decision making - are either reduced or increased. Thus, the scope of our alternatives is symmetrical to medias of communication for Innis:

A medium of communication has an important influence on the dissemination of knowledge over space and over time and it becomes necessary to study its characteristics in order to appraise its influence in its cultural setting. According to its characteristics it may be better suited to the dissemination of knowledge over time than over space, particularly if the medium is heavy and durable and not suited to transportation, or to the dissemination of knowledge over space than over time, particularly if the medium is light and easily transported. The relative emphasis on time or space will imply a bias of significance to the culture in which it is embedded.²⁶

A central thesis for Innis is that civilizations must seek to gain an appreciation of a proper balance between the concepts of space and time because he argued that a bias of either would engender rigidities and monopolies of knowledge, thus constricting alternatives. Innis' work focused primarily on discovering shifts and instabilities in social organization brought about by civilizations adopting different techniques of mediation. James Carey explains that for Innis, "even if society were like an organism, there would be some controlling element, some centralized brain in the body, some region and group that would collect the power necessary to direct the nerves of communication and the arteries of transportation. There is no transformation of the great society into the great community by way of disinterested technology but only in terms of the ways in which knowledge and culture were monopolized by particular groups."²⁷ In Innis' estimation, "as modern developments in communication have made for greater realism they have made for greater possibilities of delusion."²⁸ Innis' thought remained firmly between the tension created by new technologies that contained ambivalent tendencies to freedom at the same time as giving rise to tendencies of domination.

Grappling with the limitations of human perspective within the tensions of domination and emancipation, particularly on a macro-social scale, Innis provided an integrative dynamic of communicational patterns: institutional formations; economic analysis; public policy evaluations; historical configurations through mostly second-hand sources; and the implications of the extension and rapid growth of the powers of the imperial nations. Innis' conception of a time-biased dimension can be seen operating with an emphasis on custom, community, the moral and sacred; a spatially-biased system manifests a growth of secular institutions, a growth of administration and law, the growth of specialized, technical knowledge. Nations extend, develop, and decline within this framework. For example, a nation with a temporal (cultural) bias depends more heavily upon hierarchical notions of order whereas one with a spatial bias depends to a greater extent on achieving means of control over vast geographical territories and the subsequent encouragement of the homogenization of the social.

Innis was a thinker who fully embraced the old adage that anything in excess is not beneficial. Thus, extreme tendencies in the contemporary social environment of dependency (space-bias), gives rise to an unstable society. In his sincere attempt to encourage critical thinking, Innis showed how new communications technologies can lead to an imbalance and a bias where cultural differences are neglected and often excluded. This bias is what precipitates the phenomenon known as "monopolies of knowledge." A monopoly, stemming from an economic

interpretation, implies an exclusive control over an entire supply of products (this would include products of the cultural industries) and, for Innis, the entire supply of products also included "ideas" - the whole of rational understanding (knowledge). Innis explains that an over-emphasis or monopoly of a space-biased culture is significant for the rise and fall of empires and the overall stability of society:

A citizen of one of the British Commonwealth of Nations, which has been profoundly influenced by the economic development of empires, who has been obsessed over a long period with an interest in the character of that influence, can hardly claim powers of objectivity adequate to the task at hand. It is an advantage, however, to emphasize these dangers at the beginning so that we can at least be alert to the implications of this type of bias. Obsession with economic considerations illustrates the dangers of monopolies of knowledge and suggests the necessity of appraising its limitations. Civilizations can survive only through a concern with their limitations, and, in turn, through a concern with the limitations of their institutions.²⁹

Innis continues:

Empires have tended to flourish under conditions in which civilization reflects the influence of more than one medium and in which the bias of one medium towards decentralization is offset by the bias of another medium towards centralization.³⁰

Innis' focus embodied the struggle for a stable society. His contention, towards the latter part of his life, was with a concern over whether our modern society was losing sensory communicational modalities related to the time element (history):

The concern with specialization and excess, making more and better mousetraps, preclude the possibility of understanding a preceding civilization concerned with balance and proportion. ... The inability to escape the demands of industrialism on time weakens the possibility of an appraisal of limitations of space. Constant changes in technology particularly as they affect communication, a crucial factor in determining cultural values (for example, the development of radio and television), increase the difficulties of recognizing balance let alone achieving it.³¹

Innis' writings succeed in creating skepticism towards our cultural habits and our "objectified" (commodified) knowledge sources. But, what does Innis imply when he refers to a "balanced" society? What exactly is significant about a society that loses the concept of time? Time is expressed in language as history. I contend that what we do, what we create, and what we make possible is conceived of through history. It is partly through an awareness of our history, our varied traditions and cultures, that we in some sense of commonality come to understand our own particular apprehension of self as an agent of change or as a moral actor: this is the vicinity where the power of the human spirit, the "I" and "we", predominantly resides which enables one to create, to feel, and to desire as part of a greater whole. Within the constraints of monopolies of knowledge, in particular a space-biased frame, the theoretical, technical, categorized, and classified society (i.e. institutionalized culture) permeates within a limited sphere of understanding. Therefore, a society that is predominantly bound by strict rules of conformity (i.e. monopolies of knowledge) confines and perhaps destroys in part the scope of possibilities.

In recovering, as Innis urges us to do, that sense of history as memory and not as transcendence (a sensibility of immortality above and beyond one's will), we may be better prepared to accept and overcome the knowledge of the finality of being - self-awareness where one recognizes the limits imposed by outward and inward determinations.

Given the incapacity to harness time, technical society becomes all-the-more obsessed with "saving" it. All of Innis' writings, as Arthur Kroker has pointed out, "from the early naturalistic studies of the disasters which overtook North American civilization with the coming of the Europeans to his later philosophical reflections on the 'fanaticism' of American empire were an attempt to recover the spirit of the land, and its people, which had been silenced by industrial development."³² Innis himself fully acknowledges his own bias:

The danger that knowledge of the past may be neglected to the point that it ceases to serve the present and the future - perhaps an undue obsession with the immediate, support my concern about the disappearance of an interest in time.³³

Societies are challenged presently by the variety of issues Innis focused on: issues of environmental depletion and resource extraction; global trading systems; and the consequences of past and present communications systems. From the studies of the Canadian hinterland development of canals to railways to books to radio, Innis' work has been of pertinence not only to our understanding of the Canadian imagination but also of western civilization as a whole. Since Innis' death in 1952, societies around the world have witnessed and continue to witness a dramatic proliferation of an orientation towards space-biased medias of communication. Much of this new technology is projected through a desire to master and control human and non-human nature. The proliferating power of computerised bureaucracies illustrates our drive as a world to control - "make happen what we want to make happen." But, what is it that becomes worthy of pursuing? Within the present technological dynamo, we function according to

certain externalities be they environmental or ideological. The problem resides with attempts to locate the locus of credible power/knowledge. The loss of a substantive criteria to judge what it is that we should be doing with all our relatively newly acquired freedom leaves many questions unanswered. Without the richness and wealth of the oral time-based tradition combined with communications technologies committed to the immediacy of the present, we as a society are unable to locate ourselves within an order of ethics and value. The concept itself of purpose becomes problematic. Our world is afflicted with historical amnesia. This present situation is clear in the strange fact that at one and the same time never has so much money been put into the organized study of the past and never has the past had less meaning in our lives.³⁴ Innis' desire to stress the pressing need for permanence (history, time, tradition) perhaps stems from his uncanny awareness of the problematic void in a society lacking substantive structures of meaning and purpose.

Innis believed that changes in technologies of communication - rail transport, telephone/telegraph instruments, construction of road and water transit, publishing and radio broadcasting - led, in part, to changes in social (and obviously individual) formations. Processes of mediation via these different forms of technology contribute significantly in creating and shifting centers of power. They are also formidable in the organization of social consciousness. Innis recognized that new communications technologies served to shadow regional concerns in favour of addressing the interests of the larger

community. Innis forcefully remarks in Bias of Communication that:

Mechanization has emphasized complexity and confusion. . . . The conditions of freedom of thought are in danger of being destroyed by science, technology, and the mechanization of knowledge, and with them, Western civilization. My bias is with the oral tradition, particularly as reflected in Greek civilization, and with the necessity of recapturing something of its spirit.³⁵

In this following passage, perhaps Innis' appeal to time can be better understood:

It was the late eighteenth century. The calculative isolation of individuals competing for a wage had long since replaced the interdependent economic relations of feudalism. The commodified space of market labour had made his time a thing ... he found no nexus to other but the relation of things exchanged at the going rate, "naked self-interest ... callous cash payment." And just as this commodity exchange had set him apart ruthless in self-calculation, the rise of the nation-state stripped away previously collective political ties, dismembering the ritual powers of kin, the Church, the guild, the locale. And so he was transformed, appearing in his own eyes as an atomized individual subject to law, a self-interested economic strategist, owing allegiance to none but the state and his reason.³⁶

The sense of tradition is appropriated via the means by which it is passed on, mediated. With new modes of communication, the disembodied talking heads of television, the means by which our history is communicated to us, falters in the cold hard delivery of the facts and a committed interest to the future. Innis explains the dangers of conditions which over-emphasize a spatial infrastructure that favours mechanization and electrotechnology:

The printing press and the radio address the world instead of the individual. The oral dialectic is overwhelmingly significant where the subject-matter is human action and feeling. . . . The oral discussion inherently involves personal contact and a consideration for the feelings of others, and it is in sharp contrast with the cruelty of mechanized communication and the tendencies which we have come to note in the modern world.³⁷

Innis' attachment to the oral tradition had a modern purpose: to demonstrate that the belief that the growth of mechanical communication necessarily expanded freedom and knowledge was both simplistic and misleading.³⁸ With the rise of such global relations in a mechanical/electronic (highly-industrialized) environment, dominant nations, empires, exercise with greater facility cultural and socio-economic leadership in pursuit of their particular interests. These dominant nations have specific patterns of value, practices, and styles. The transmission of these dominant codes is accomplished to a great extent through technologies of communication. Hence, as we attempt to gain a better understanding of ourselves and to gain direction for active community participation, we search for cultural forms that fit in with interests which have ensued via the culturally-dominant representations of the more powerful nations. This is an integral part of the process by which empires extend and develop political, economic, and cultural sovereignty over less independent countries. Canada, as Innis had recognized through his in-depth studies of the history of the Canadian economy, was a minor nation compared to countries like the United States. In 1948, Innis wrote:

...American imperialism has replaced and exploited British imperialism. It has been accompanied by a complexity of tariffs and exchanged controls and a restriction of markets, with the result that Canada has been compelled to concentrate on exports with the most favourable outlets. Newsprint production in Canada is encouraged, with the result that advertising and in turn industry are stimulated in the United States, and it becomes more difficult for Canada to compete in industries other than those in which she has a distinct advantage. Increased supplies of newsprint accentuate an emphasis on sensational news. As it has been succinctly put, world peace would be bad for the pulp and paper industry.³⁹

His last remark concerning the *raison d'etre* of the pulp and paper industry is obviously cynical although insightful regarding the interrelational constraints and, more importantly, makes "visible" the "invisible" sites of the practices of institutionalized commercial entities.

It can be argued that Innis does not postulate that capitalist structures of economy should be considered the causal source of power relationships. Capitalist formations are rather a site where the dynamics of power relations function. Innis in Empire & Communications tediously traces relationships of constraint existing since Babylonian times. We can safely assume that economic structures are not the sources of oppression, for Innis, but a site where discursive procedures of power operate. Innis, like Foucault, by no means reduces the functioning of control to either an economic superstructure or class elite. It is the extent to which particular groups may impose upon other societies of discourse an adherence to the rules and procedures of their own society of discourse.⁴⁰ Thus depending on the degree to which new communications technology encourages or discourages obedience to and internalization of a unified set of discursive procedures, this technology may be said to contribute towards centralization (control) or decentralization (autonomy).⁴¹

Procedures of discourse at a specific time and place in history not only influence but circumscribe what we come to accept as valuable and true. In short, discursive procedures help us to organize our

understanding of the world, and in so doing form, or constitute, our social consciousness. The leading force behind the existence of certain social practices stems from a particular rationality. Furthermore, dominant groups or nations can impose procedures on a grand scale which are proper specifically to themselves.

Discursive analysis yields relations of social control and domination.⁴² The writings of Innis are important because they specifically open a forum to address questions and issues of dependency relationships - in essence, power structures of empire building - and constraints therein. These constraints are legitimated through hegemonically constructed forms of domination that underpin and subsequently constitute values and principles coordinated by monopolies of knowledge (monopolies of institutions). For Innis, it is not so much a matter of teleological orderings or theoretical determined tautologies; rather, he explores the domain of institutional struggles for domination between theories and interpretations. He explores how power is practised. Arthur Kroker eloquently sums up the Innisian project:

Innis' discourse retained its vitality as a moment of economic critique, and its promises as an opening to the political recovery of American politics. ⁴³

2.2.3 Narrative Scenario: Integrating the Discourses of Power

Power? For Innis, as much as for Foucault, power is not something that can be tangibly defined. We are accustomed to dealing with

formalized terms and expressions, therefore, it is difficult to grasp that Foucault and Innis do not express in any one term the substance or causal source of power (i.e. economic structures, technological determinisms, class hierarchy). Power is manifested through conflicts and struggles embodied in intra- and inter-relational processes. Power, a force that is existent with respect to other forces, functions either "to affect" or "to be affected."

The strategy used by Foucault and Innis is one of locating sites of domination and asking how power relations are exercised. Furthermore, what is envisaged by both theorists is not a discourse of emancipation/transcendence but a discourse of transformation/metamorphosis. To explain, all theories of transcendence imply a destiny, a defined goal or end, and destinies impose particular limits. Foucault and Innis reject the constitution of particularized ends. It is through an analysis of the discursive constitution of the subject that Innis and Foucault show the contradictions and limits of liberal policy formations within the parameters of a power apparatus: for Foucault, this involves a politics of the body; for Innis, this involves a politics of the state. Their work serves to locate the sites of contradiction that limit our scope of definition. Their discourse incites reflection regarding the limits of rationale imposed by liberal policies.

Innis and Foucault illustrate that discursive practices of intra- and inter-relational exchanges neither originate in nor are restricted

to the economic structures operating in a particular historical moment. Foucault's and Innis' projects suggest that economic structures are only a fragment in the exercise of domination and control. Neither of the two theorists identifies particular systems or agents/actors as the exclusive possessors of power that motivate dominating tendencies. They do critique and indeed locate sites of domination: Foucault identifies institutions (prisons, hospitals), narrative (an author), disciplines (science, economics); Innis identifies different empires (the United States) and cultures (liberal democracies) that constrain or stifle temporal and spatial innovations. Underpinning economic imperatives vis-a-vis time and place in history is the dominant episteme (monopoly of knowledge). Both theorists strongly assert that we can have no knowledge of reality (including empirical objective reality) that is expressed outside our cognitive apparatus (episteme). The discursive habitat of the current age underscores a control-driven, instrumentally-rational society. The epistemic discourse of control is stringently expressed via the rules of communication or, in other terms, the "rhetoric of discursive practice." Thus, Foucault would concur with Innis' concept that an alteration in mediational techniques (technologies such as knowledge procedures) will undoubtedly yield a profound change in societal relations of power/control.

Innis as well as Foucault abandons the concept of a liberated and autonomous subject in and through their discursive diagram of power that privileges control. Arthur Kroker comments:

Long before the French philosopher, Michel Foucault, said that power is the locus of the modern century, Innis in his

studies of neotechnical capitalism had already revealed exactly how the power system works: by investing the body through the capillaries of diet, lifestyle, and housing; by colonizing whole societies at the level of population demographics; and by controlling the cultural apparatus of symbolization, from print technologies to radio and television.⁴⁴

The vehicles used to communicate (speech and speech apparatuses) constitutes the forum for a "rhetoric of identification" and serves to reinforce existent dominating practices and, at the very least, institute different powers of constraint. Marika Finlay explains that "whoever controls or adheres to discursive procedures condoned by social consensus as 'scientific' or 'reasonable' is already 'within the field of truth' and hence enjoys the acknowledged capacity to generate statements that are accepted as 'true' by that community."⁴⁵ In short, the discourses of Foucault and Innis seek to locate consolidated power structures within interlocking sites (discursive formations) that control "the right to be right." Their enterprises are such that they endeavour to undermine western liberalist doctrine: a doctrine that can often be condemned as echoing the hollow values of humankind to equality and justice. Foucault and Innis locate sites that ultimately engender constraints and thus limit the achieving of greater autonomy.

They both illuminate this by exposing the power differential of the marginal groups (countries) in relation to the predominant centers of power. Innis and Foucault succeed in illuminating the paradoxical situation of a liberal democracy operating in a community wherein the very freedom and possibilities of subjects are set amidst collectively

condoned discursive practices. In attempting to reconcile the paradox in a liberal democracy between humankind and collective interests, Foucault and Innis call for a recognition of the marginal groups within the communicational order of things. The projects of Innis and Foucault, in brief, can be described as the struggle to understand conditions that would best stimulate the development of human capacities for all in society and to recognize difference as value. They do not proffer solutions to the problems they pose. However, their legacy is one that provides a basis to begin a reevaluation.

They both examine the interplay of a multiplicity of social dynamics within the dominant episteme involving: the economy, (bio)technology, historical formations, culture. In short, these components comprise the social arena and are dynamic thus continually synthesizing to create other relations of power. The power to (re)present values and attitudes is brought together through an ideologically-based structure of social-hegemonic practices linked in and through communication. We, as citizens, formulate meaning and we gain a sense of our identity, or self-awareness, through social interaction. Foucault's endeavours have identified the modern conception of subject in society as an "artificially constructed unity" but delimits, or deconstructs, the seemingly ever-more narrow chasm in the abyss. Both Innis and Foucault believe that there is no transcendence per se. Moreover, all knowledge contains ideological inflections. Why is it that their extensive work can be linked in an effort to reinscribe a contextual horizon for value determinations

within postmodern ambivalence? While modernism valued what it took to be the essential, the real, the substantial over the ephemeral, the imaginary, the formal, postmodernism has been engaged in questioning these divisions, and this transcendental position.⁴⁶ Innis shares with Foucault a profound understanding of society and those creative tensions which challenge the whole idea of an objective knowing. Both thinkers make an immensely rich contribution to the "dimensions of discourse" that articulates a postmodern sensibility: a self-displacement though offering "a method of resistance and opposition, as well as a means of recovering the erased."⁴⁷

2.3 Empire Qua Citizen

The problematization of an individuated life in the period known as "postmodernism" has been atomized in large part as a result of Foucault's investigations. The phenomenology of the modern mind, that liberal spiritedness of "become who you are" - the idea of "self" - is distinctive of every interpretation we collect of past histories and inextricably binds every action we make in the present and envision for the future. With the advent of the concept of a legal entity, a citizen of the state (in Innisian terms: cultures existing within a more spacially-biased world), notions of what it meant to be a "person" came to be defined in a liberal mode of thought as bearing, on one hand, an inner consciousness, and, on the other hand, a moral public/civic identity. Marcel Mauss proposed that "our seemingly

natural and self-evident conceptions of our selves, our persons, are in truth artefacts of a long and varied social history stretching back to the earliest human communities."⁴⁸ Mauss believes that the sense of self is universal, however, the concept of self as an inner category of consciousness, personhood, is an historical construct. Perhaps the concept of "individual" in the postmodern era of "subject placelessness" is once again undergoing a qualitative change in the conceptual framework of what it means to be an "I." Or perhaps the postmodern mind is merely a mind "paralysed by the devastations wrought by modern social and technological science".⁴⁹

With the rise of new biotechnologies, the buying and selling of bodily organs, and movies characterising body/brain transplants, the individuated person takes on a new conception of "self" and, thus beckons for a new ethics of morality. In a much less flattering vision of the postmodern generation, the "new" individuated self can be characterized as one who owes "allegiance to none but the state and his reason:"

[H]e found himself alone and afraid. ... He talked of progress but found his vision of things and himself made uncertain by the sight of the other's pleasure when it resisted his reason or fell ungraced between the cracks of his newly enlightened order. ... He said, "[M]an is really born isolated, selfish, cruel, despotic; he wants everything and gives nothing in return. ... Only our selfish interests bind us. The reason that I, the strongest of the gang, do not murder my comrades is because I need their help. It is for the same reason that they do not stick a dagger in my back. Such a motive is a selfish one, though it has the appearance of virtue. What society calls its interests is nothing but a mass of private interests."⁵⁰

For many, it is a gross understatement to murmur that we may be only dimly aware of how uncertain the values we hold and the courses of action we follow are. Nevertheless, in salvaging the remnants of understanding the way one feels, we express ourselves through notions of public space. It is through discursive spaces of interaction that we come to grasp the opportunity to articulate and share the experiences of reality and the varying relations between "truth" and "value." This is part of the oral tradition that Innis so strongly encouraged us to develop. Human communication - utterances, gestures, statements, and texts - create a public space for open as well as intimate reflection. Self-awareness, and even the lack of self-awareness; the crisis of the postmodern subject, is inextricably bound with meaning; through discourse. As Maurice Charland, a communications theorist, argues, "humans live in a meaningful universe and that discourse (language-in-use) mediates meaning. ... [T]he artful deployment of language, through topics, arguments, tropes, and figures, has real effects upon language itself, upon meaning and finally upon what humans do."⁵¹ Postmodern subject-displacement, as is the contention herein, poses all-the-more difficult a task insofar as it attempts to evaluate and assess priorities which necessitate action in regard to a steady stream of problems in the public sphere. Via the selected means of action, who stands to benefit the most? Or, rather, who stands to lose the least - for example, civilians in an individual sense, civilians in a corporate sense, different lobby groups? Politicians are faced with the challenges of having to impose severe

austerity programs to a debt-ridden society and, therefore, must choose amongst a conflicting priority of needs and interests.

Relying on Foucauldian and Innisian discourse, utterances, statements of "fact," and so on, function and effect the intimate and open public space (i.e. conceptions of what is "good" or "bad," "right" or "wrong") based upon the element of contingency or, in other words, unpredictable causes. The function of contingency is composed of interactive and interdependent dynamics operating within the social environment. While there is insufficient time to engage in the polemics of postmodernism, subject placelessness, and the question of the "truth" of value judgements, it should be noted that any particular reference to a subject's "self" contains meaning predominantly on behalf of which one may be said to act with "self-interest" (motivated by subjective biases). Embracing notions of contingency, self-interests or subject point of view are also "variable being multiply and differently configurable in terms of different roles, relationships and, in effect, identities in relation to which different needs and interests will acquire priority under different conditions."⁵²

In brief, self-awareness and, thus, a structure of value is contingent upon the time and place in history. It is a multiplicity of forces that determines what we reason to be "good." The present generation is particularly sensitive to the interplay of force wherein primary importance focuses on: "how do I maximize My pleasure while minimizing My pain? This does not seem to be peculiar only to the

contemporary generation. Thomas Hobbes, a seventeenth century political philosopher, warned of the fiendish character people acquire, inherently, amidst a collective order of things. What is, however, somewhat different at the end of the twentieth century is that pleasure has come to lack substantive meaning apart from representing the fulfilment of the "I." The "I" chooses the course of action based primarily on a narcissistic drive for self-gratification. In other words, our culture is founded predominantly on a predator/prey relationship and can be, thus, characterized as ruthless. However, the postmodern moment is also a time that must reckon with a bankrupt nation and thereby make sacrifices. This is obviously problematic for our society. For example, rampages of hideous proportions by prep school students, middle class and socio-economically depressed teens demonstrate that there seems to be a virtual breakdown in the collective sphere of interdependent relations. We as a society, therefore, have to learn to defer self-gratification. Yet, as Michael Weinstein points out, "the children of this rusted Disneyland want nothing to do with austerity; they don't want to be wakened from their dream. This is the dilemma of the new liberalism, why it has no program, no totalizing vision: it must impose pain while seeming to provide pleasure."⁵³

While we grope for direction within our cultural dominant, I repeat that the idea of "personhood" is derived through:

"[P]ublic reason," historically-determined values learned in the process of socialization. Because such values can be applied to new and unique situations, it is proper to say that the people have a will, but they do not know what they

will. Instead of knowledge, the people possess ideology. ... [T]he structure of value is a product of rhetorical interaction, a mixing of circumstance, human motive, and the possibility of persuading a large audience to see meaning.⁵⁴

In the current era of the postmodern mind, decision-makers, bureaucrats, and state officials pursue, to paraphrase Jean Baudrillard, not glory per se but an identity that relates to glory. Ronald Reagan typifies this characterization. The unity of the Reagan mind is not ideational, but is constituted by his impulse to feel good about himself and his desperate desire to give a hopeful emotional cover to his own inadequacy: it is this passion that unites him to the public-at-large.⁵⁵ What about the Canadian political arena? When Canadians chose the FTA, it represented a fearful, panic-stricken political consciousness veiled in utopian enthusiasm desperately hoping that what they had opted for will bring utmost comfort with minimum discomfort in the interest of profit maximization. Is this the appearance of the Nietzschean "last men," the "predator-parasites" who, as Michael Weinstein argues, "feeds upon a civilization unaware of the virtue required to sustain it"?⁵⁶

Amidst the glory of identifying with the liberal spirit, Brian Mulroney declared in the House of Commons on October 3, 1987, two days following the finalization of the proposed FTA that:

We go forward with confidence in our future, confidence in our country, and most of all, confidence in the youth of Canada. We have set a course for a stronger, a more united, and more prosperous Canada.⁵⁷

He continues:

[Free trade] is not a path - it never was and never will be - for the faint of heart, but this country was not built by

timid souls. This is a path for the daring, innovative, and the nation-builders who are now called upon to make a firm decision on behalf of a strong, united, and prosperous Canada...

For those who follow this path, we share the intrepid spirit of the pioneer generations and hopefully it will be said of all of us, as it was of them, that we left this Canada, this beloved country, a better place.⁵⁸

Mulroney's discourse on free trade is therapeutic for those who identify with that savage spirit, the strong independent ego, the "will to power" - the formula, in essence, that proposes to enable one to have it all: self-indulgence, more freedom, and, consequently, a more progressivist lifestyle. But is the free trade legislation a viable policy commitment for those whose spirit has grown weak and more dependent on external supports? "Self-cannibalization" of multinational players, that is mergers and acquisitions, signal strains of growing weaknesses in the marketplace. The increasing number of homeless people signal certain weaknesses in the citizenry.

Embedded within a circuit of power relations (the discursive terrain), the whole business of public policy and administration unfolds in the public space through rhetorical legitimations. The distinctions of worth in a public space, for example the free trade debate, underpins a discourse not about claims to facts and truths, but rather about judgements and values. Claims in the free trade debate were rhetorically constituted and legitimated by setting forth scientific (instrumental) facts as well as emotive demonstratives. The privileged positions of the empowered - the government, political

parties, strategists, economists, and the media - identify with subject-constituted biases within the bounds of discursive practices and thus are empowered with the "right" to define reality and set policy agendas accordingly.

The stance embraced by the "specialized" technocrats is one claiming neutrality - objectivity. However, the neutrality of evaluative authority attempts to conceal a politics of subjective interpretation. This advances a "truth-object" rationale wherein the mediator or sender (i.e. a policy planner, a reporter, a critic, a therapist, and so on) articulates a hegemonic influence in the realm of constituting value. In other words, as John Fekete describes it, this amounts to a "neglect of value creativity in favour of value regulation"⁵⁹ - conforming within the acceptable codes of behaviour. When we attempt to use a universal criterion opposed to a regional criterion, that which is embodied in the objective approach, on matters of value, "tyranny" of reason develops within cultures of a predominant bias or consciousness. What takes place is that the moral code operates in accordance with a particularized form of understanding prone to authority and control. Insofar as the political debate on free trade by the political parties articulated different positions, they were nevertheless operating within the objective mode of reasoning. The objective - the "best" for Canadians vis-a-vis the FTA - became the imperative to "create opportunities for Canadian business and increase tendency toward specialization and rationalization of Canadian production."⁶⁰

It is the spectrum of accumulated knowledge sources - histories, expectations, and feelings - which brings into focus a decision to act one way or another. Some reasons for calls to action seem more persuasive and plausible than others - more rational in regard to our ontological-knowledge base structure. In disputing the "goodness" or "badness" of social practices and offering alternatives to make things better, it must be recognized that there is a problem in attempts at obtaining an unqualified "right" answer (i.e. the truth on the matter of free trade). Free trade or protectionism? This issue addresses a point beyond objective reasoning.⁶¹ The decision concerning those for or against free trade cannot be deduced and reasoned on a universal scale because it is an intimate decision of what one, constituted ideologically, believes to be "right." It becomes a matter of rhetorical identification. Amidst conflicts of collective interest, moral codes, value discourse of what is "good," are reinscribed within new horizons. Rhetorical theorists attempt "to show the degree to which collective identities forming the basis of rhetorical appeals themselves depend upon rhetoric."⁶² Policies are formulated and then reformulated based on scales of specific interests. To govern is to choose. Free trade was entertained in large part due to financial priorities structured within discursive practices emphasizing profit.

Identification with one particular position is not a simple matter of persuasion. Given the dynamics of mediating discourse, as Foucault and Innis note, power is not repressive, and thus brings about

spontaneous, unconscious associations. Subsequently, there is a dynamic relationship and different forces emerge. The dynamic operates transhistorically. As the government and political parties constitute an identity through rhetorical narratives on free trade, what is also offered is a link between the Canadian pioneers who had soul and a deep commitment to building a nation and the present, where we must take affirmative action towards future directives. Ultimately, there is an ideological effect of identification of past and present subjects. The political parties and the government set the stage for an eclipse of their specific interest biases and posit the existence of a community - one comprised of transhistorical agents acting as free subjects. But, as Maurice Charland has pointed out, "subjects within narratives are not free, they are positioned and so constrained."⁶³

Theoreticians have sought for generations to establish limitations and delimitations whereby the individual may enjoy the greatest degree of liberty/autonomy while keeping in check the "Hobbesian" individual, cruel and bound only by selfish interests. We cannot do away with all forms of discursive control over behaviour but it is important, as Innis urged, to avoid fostering centralized modes of control over knowledge and communication in the civilizing process. The discursive approach, as explained earlier, recognizes specific procedures traced at one time and place which are reinscribed throughout history. The discourse on free trade plays a role in reinforcing international domination based on technological nationalistic rationalism.

Let us now turn to trace the development of Canada in the industrial revolution and to explore this ideologically-constituted subject transcribed within this body of discourse. A historical chronicle of the events leading up to the debate will serve to help contextualize the FTA today.

3.0 CANADIAN DISCOURSE ON FREE TRADE

Competition of Riches, Honour, Command, or other power, enclineth to Contention, Ermyty and War: Because of the way of one competitor, to the attaining of his desire, is to kill, subdue, supplant or repell the other... I put forth a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of Power after power, that ceaseth only in Death...¹

Thomas Hobbes

The greatest improvements in the productive powers of labour ... have been the effects of the division of labour.²

Adam Smith

3.1 Background on Trade Policy

Adam Smith, the British father of liberal economic theory, was greatly concerned with restrictions on exports and imports. Smith distrusted monopolies and favoured competition in the marketplace. He believed that prosperity would be served through freer trade policies. In The Wealth of Nations (1776), a treatise on the functioning of an industrialized economy, Smith condemned government policies that erected tariffs as trade barriers on imported produce. Tariffs were, and still are, used to raise the price of imported products to discourage the buying of foreign-produced goods. Smith's forceful critique of protectionist policies and theories eventually led to England's reduction of such tariffs. In effect, Smith introduced the idea of free trade. He pointed out that free trade, be it on a regional or international level, allowed people to specialize in

producing things which they were more suited to and, in turn, benefit from buying and using goods produced by specialists. The theory proceeds as follows:

Just as the wealth of a community consists of the accumulation of the wealth of its individuals, so the universal good of the human race is promoted by the progress of different countries. Each country devotes its resources to the production of those goods which are most beneficial to it. It thus distributes labour and capital most effectively and stimulates productivity. By producing that for which they are best suited and exchanging their products with goods and services produced by others, international trade as well as harmony is stimulated and contributes to the welfare and prosperity of people everywhere.³

Although free trade led to trade dependency theory and an international division of labour (specialization), free trade as an ideal was believed to effect a common interest amongst all people; free trade was espoused by liberals as a "laissez-faire" policy that would ultimately promote world peace.

Protectionism, the opposite of free trade, was seen as harmful. Invoking trade barriers was seen as resulting in an overall decrease in material gain for humanity as well as giving rise to disunity in the global framework. Thus, protectionism was viewed as giving rise to social unrest and was rejected. The English political economist, Henry Fawcett, teaching at the University of Cambridge, wrote in the nineteenth century:

...the striking success of the experiment (freer trade rather than protectionism) in England ought to render a ready acceptance of the true principles which should regulate the commerce between nations infinitely more easy.⁴

England established free trade in many of her colonies - Canada being one such colony. "The free trade system in North America," notes

Harold Innis, "was extended by the Reciprocity Treaty with the United States."⁵ In 1854, the Reciprocity Treaty was entered into which meant that the United States' manufacturers had access to the colony of Canada and Canada had opportunity to export natural resources to the American colonies on a much larger scale:

The Reciprocity Treaty of 1854 negotiated by Elgin on behalf of the British government ratified by the Provincial Legislatures, provided for free trade in natural products, opened the Canadian waterways to United States shipping on equal terms with the British, and gave the United States free access to the Maritime fisheries. ... [T]his would mean retarding the development of Canadian manufacturing industry. ... [But] the colonies would be kept within the British Empire; and British investors would benefit as well in a roundabout way, since their railway projects in Canada brought large orders for the manufacture of equipment in the United States, in which British capital itself had an important interest.⁶

The British Empire, at this time, was changing from a feudalist system to a system based primarily on foreign trading (mercantilism), and sought larger markets for expansion as a result. The North American markets provided a rich resource base with an abundant supply of fur, lumber, coal, fish and easily accessible passages for seaway transportation.

With increased improvements in communication and transportation technologies, the development of the continent accelerated. This acceleration of trade is the premise upon which North America was conceived. Furthermore, it registers directly with ideological and political changes in the economic environment: the socio-economic structure was changing from a system structured on a domestic level of control to an economy geared for aggressive individualistic traders who

were now removed from the immediate security that a motherland provided.

The optimism that accompanied Smith's doctrine waned in the late nineteenth century as an unequal development of wealth undermined the principles of "laissez-faire" liberalism. Business enterprises were coming increasingly under the influence of monopolistic control. Critics such as Karl Marx saw freer trade imperatives as a catalyst to some extent of the growing trend towards specialization and the division of labour in the industrialized world. He was harsh in pointing out the negative effects of (freer) trade, or as he termed it "the process of producing surplus-value" (i.e. producing commodities in order to sell in exchange for other commodities). Marx wrote in 1867 that the principle of the division of labour in manufacturing - a correlate presupposed under international trade:

... is but a particular method of begetting relative surplus-value, or of augmenting at the expense of the labourer the self-expansion of capital - usually called social wealth, "Wealth of Nations," &c. It increases the social productive power of labour, not only for the benefit of the capitalist instead of for that of the labourer, but it does this by crippling the individual labourers. It creates new conditions for the lordship of capital over labour. If, therefore, on the one hand, it presents itself historically as a progress and as a necessary phase in the economic development of society, on the other hand, it is a refined and civilised method of exploitation.⁷

Were Britain and her American colonies - comprised of Upper and Lower Canada and the Maritimes - perhaps attempting to capitalize on the vulnerability of the United States? Was Britain creating "new conditions of lordship of capital" over the United States through the

Reciprocity Treaty of 1854? Regardless of the answers to these questions, the rallying against imperial domination in the New World culminated in civil war. Beginning as early as 1775 with the American Revolution and continuing with the American Civil War in the nineteenth century (1861-1865)⁸, what followed as a result of this unrest was the demise of Britain's control over what is now the United States. The Reciprocity Treaty of 1854 was abrogated by the United States in 1866. With the dissipation of civil unrest in the United States, the American nation became concerned with protectionist policies in hopes of fostering a separate entity to that of British rule. An additional factor which Innis believed contributed to abrogation were considerations of advancements made in communication technologies and industrialization. He notes:

The truce [Reciprocity] was gradually broken down by continued improvements in transportation. An increase in the size of vessels on the upper lakes made it impossible for them to proceed to Lake Ontario by the Welland Canal. In 1853, New York was connected with Chicago by a railway along the south shore of Lake Erie, and in 1855 by Great Western through Southern Ontario. To offset the effects of this competition, Canada supported an energetic programme of railway construction. Year-round open ports, such as Boston and Portland, competing with New York joined Montreal and in the early fifties the Grand Trunk railway was extended westward to Toronto (1856) and Sarnia (1859)...⁹

The United States, as Innis pointed out, changed its commercial policy because it became a more industrially self-sufficient nation that was able to rely upon its own regional points of transport for trade. The American abrogation of Reciprocity was interpreted as protectionist policy that signalled to British North America a breakdown in the United States' collective interest in the British Empire. This action

by the Americans precipitated feelings of bitterness and a concern with the expansionary alliance developing in the United States on behalf of British Empire loyalists. Viewing the American union as a potential threat, a stronger alliance between the British colonies seemed necessary. This fear was translated into the formation in 1867, one year after abrogation, of a Canadian federal government that joined the Provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Quebec, and Ontario under the British North America Act of 1867.¹⁰ This constitutional development did not stem from strictly economic considerations nor without the sovereign control of Britain. It emerged within the political and economic power dynamics of the British Empire. The British North America Act, however, did not quite succeed in severing the economic ties and cultural commonalities between the United States and Canada. Instituting a parliamentary form of government and incorporating the traditions similar to British democratic practices thus did not completely eliminate the ideological similarities of people struggling in the hinterland of the expanding North American continent. The newly formed country called Canada was already part of the American market and Confederation did not eradicate the lure for Canadians to continue securing trade with the United States.

The United States and Canada, along with many other countries, have adopted an oscillating formula between protectionism and free trade since the days of Adam Smith's declarations. Today, given the degree of complexity and specialization in the global market,

interdependence is a function proper to the balance of power between developed and developing countries.

3.2 Canada-United States: Pursuing Freer Trade After Reciprocity

Tabled in January, 1988, the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement contains provisions for the two governments to:

...eliminate all tariffs between them, to reduce a wide range of other barriers and to make trade both more open and more secure. They [government] agreed on a unique dispute settlement mechanism with binding powers to guarantee impartial application of countervail and anti-dumping laws and other aspects of trade remedy law in both countries. They established a new code to cover trade in services and they agreed to provide for a more certain and open investment regime. ... Canada safeguarded its right to pursue unique cultural objectives and to promote regional economic development.¹¹

In effect, the FTA encourages the limitless exchange of goods and services between Canada and the United States. This is the first such agreement that would be comparable to the 1854 Reciprocity Treaty in that it encompasses the total economy and not particular sectors. Ironically, the discourse on free trade in 1866, that is on the abrogation of free trade, served in the coming-to-be of a confederate Canada and, today, the discourse on free trade has threatened to divide the country.

From 1866 to 1988, the idea of pursuing an all-embracing free-trade pact between Canada and the United States had floundered because one government or the other was against it.¹² Why then, in the present

scenario, does the concern with freer access to United States' markets seem like such a practical and viable option to pursue? Could it be, as some political theorists have conjectured, that the FTA was initiated and successfully legislated into effect primarily because of the interest corporate America had in the FTA and the support it rallied in favour of it. Duncan Cameron, a political theorist, writes:

When business began its campaign to convince Canadians to set aside traditional suspicions of free trade and move towards continental economic policy for Canada, leaders needed a winning argument, one that would play well with public opinion and assure them of allies in government. The argument that proved successful, throughout an extended period of lobbying, was that Canada was threatened by American protectionism. Beginning with a Senate committee which reported favourably on free trade in March of 1982 and up to the Macdonald commission report of September, 1985, business groups worked publically and privately to rally support within their own ranks, and among governments, for their preferred option: continental free trade. In this respect the fear that the United States would somehow cut off access by Canadians to markets for resources and manufactured goods proved persuasive.¹³

Could this explain why each Canadian federal political party in the last election was basically in favour of freer access? Although they opposed the agreement publically, implicitly they proposed similar options. In exploring the dominant political party positions on the issue of free trade with the United States we must firstly establish the historical context before moving to the present. Gaining a better understanding of the different positions historically configured will allow us to grasp the current free trade debate. The interpretation of each dominant federal party position in regard to the free trade issue will permit us to tease out the inherent subject/audience positions to gain a better understanding of the discourses of power in terms of

contradictions arising among different social relations and interests. In brief, it is important to trace and develop a critical apprehension of the rhetoric on free trade as set forth by the three federal political parties in order to gain a better appreciation of the dominant interpretations of the political. We will thus now turn to an investigation of the development of economic relations between Canada and United States from 1867 to 1988.

3.2.1 Early Evolution of the Free Trade Negotiations

It is no easy task to trace the evolution of Canadian-United States' economic relations. Painstaking though it may be, however, it is crucial to a better comprehension of the contemporary debates surrounding current trade initiatives. In mapping Canada's political-economic history in terms of American influence, it is very clear that trade conflicts and policies between these two neighbours have been a decisive factor in Canada's development. In the following historical chronicle, I have tried to map events with emphasis on Canada with respect to highlights and relations involving the United States.

The two oldest political parties of Canada - Liberals (Grits) and Conservatives (Tories) - emerged prior to Confederation. The first Conservative leader who rallied in favour of Confederation and subsequently became the first prime minister of Canada was John A. Macdonald.¹⁴ He headed a political party that was primarily comprised

of separate groups brought together through the mutual interest of advancing national opposed to regional causes (i.e. promoting centralization) and through an identification with the commercial and industrial sectors. The Liberals, on the other hand, were somewhat opposed to Confederation. They tended to privilege policies of decentralization of power and a restricted government role in social and economic life. The Liberals strongly advocated universal suffrage. The formation of the New Democratic Party (the "NDP"), more recently, was a result of the merging, in 1961 of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (the "CCF") (formed in 1932) and the United Farmer's Organization.¹⁵ The emergence of this third party and its relative popularity reflect somewhat of a dissatisfaction with the older parties. As the newest major federal party, many political strategists would argue that it is a handicap but not a major threat to the more established federal political parties. Nevertheless, the NDP has been an outlet for the socialist or social-democratic viewpoint. As well, the NDP has been successful in mounting opposition and lobbying for the marginal interests in Canada. As yet, it has not managed to form a government.

The Conservatives and Liberals have always formed either the government or the official opposition. The Conservatives controlled the government under Macdonald from 1867 to 1873.

Prime Ministers of Canada Ranked from First to Most Recent

John A. Macdonald	(1867-73, 1878-91)	Conservative
Alexander Mackenzie	(1873-1878)	Liberal
John Abbott	(1891-1892)	Conservative
John S. Thompson	(1892-1894)	Conservative
Mackenzie Bowell	(1894-1896)	Conservative
Charles Tupper	(May 1-July 8, 1896)	Conservative
Wilfred Laurier	(1896-1911)	Liberal
Robert Borden	(1911-1920)	Conservative
Arthur Meighen	(1920-21, 1926)	Conservative
Mackenzie King	(1921-26, 1926-30, 1935-48)	Liberal
R.B. Bennett	(1930-1935)	Conservative
Louis St. Laurent	(1948-1957)	Liberal
John Diefenbaker	(1957-1963)	Conservative
Lester Pearson	(1963-1968)	Liberal
Pierre Trudeau	(1968-79, 1980-84)	Liberal
Joe Clark	(1979-1980)	Conservative
John Turner	(June 30-Sept. 17, 1984)	Liberal
Brian Mulroney	(1984-present)	Conservative

Alexander Mackenzie, a Liberal leader, occupied the Prime Minister's office from 1873 to 1878. Mackenzie was the first Liberal to pursue freer trade with the Americans post-Reciprocity. The United States refused and, by 1878, Macdonald regained power with the mandate of maintaining protectionism. Almost in a retaliatory gesture against the American refusal, Macdonald and his majority Conservative government developed tariff barriers as part of the "National Policy." The expressed objective of this policy was to make possible the maintenance of Canadian economic sovereignty. In explaining the benefits of this tariff policy, Macdonald declared:

It is only by closing our doors and by cutting them
[Americans] out of our markets that they will open theirs to
ours.¹⁶

Macdonald's statement implied that once the Americans realized how dependent they were on imports and exports from Canada, Canadians would have secure access to the desired American market without freer trade. Moreover, the potential increase in revenue from these tariffs would help business in Canada. Macdonald attempted to legitimate his aggressive fiscal policy against the States by appealing simultaneously to the lure of the commercial markets in the States and loyalty to the sovereignty of the nation.

Macdonald's "National Policy", as Innis explains, was "designed not only to increase revenue from customs from the standpoint of the waterways but also to increase revenue from traffic from the standpoint of railways. ... [T]he National Policy ... provided a guarantee of earnings on traffic carried within Canadian territory."¹⁷ The rapid expansion of the country was booming at this time (i.e. expansion of the railway network). The country's leaders focused their efforts particularly on domestic expansion and growth.

In 1896, Wilfred Laurier, a Liberal, became prime minister. Laurier began broadening Canada's international position. In 1911, Laurier had successfully negotiated a bilateral quasi-free trade agreement with the United States. There was much opposition in Canada to this free trade deal and an election was called. Laurier's strategy during the campaign was to appeal to Canada's strong sense of national

identity, an identity which he claimed was now mature enough to withstand the penetration of more American business. The Liberals, however, were not persuasive. The Conservatives, with Robert Borden at the helm, had steadfastly opposed the free trade deal negotiated by the Liberals and won the election. After his election defeat, Laurier stated: "Oh, men of little faith, that seed will still germinate."¹⁸

During Borden's term in office, there was growing resentment towards the British Commonwealth and its trade policies. Innis had this to say in his article entitled "Great Britain, The United States and Canada:"

...Canadians felt that they had been exploited by the United States and Great Britain, with the results that were shown in the emphatic rejection of the reciprocity proposals of the United States in 1911. But the tide had turned to the point where even those gestures against the United States operated to the advantage of American capital. Branch plants of American industries were built in Canada in order to take advantage of the Canadian-European system and British imperialism. ... Canadian nationalism was systematically encouraged and exploited by American capital. Canada moved from colony to nation to colony.¹⁹

Amidst the turbulence of World War I, Britain annoyed Canadians by developing a favoured-nation policy towards the United States. This created tensions between Canada and Britain which were further exacerbated as Canada's neighbour flourished economically through the increase in demand by Britain for American staple products and defence artillery. Canada, meanwhile, suffered a recession. Some historians consider that World War I "constituted one step in Canada's movement away from the status of a subordinate part of the British Empire and towards that of an independent nation, albeit one closely linked to

United States."²⁰ Disenchanted with Britain, Canada attempted to establish better relations on an ad hoc basis with United States in the hopes of acquiring the market share of activity generated by World War I.

By 1929, under the pressure of the Great Depression, the improvement in relations between the United States and Canada began to wane. There was a proliferation of protectionist measures designed to combat the difficult economic times. This period has been considered to have experienced one of the severest waves of protectionist sentiment in the twentieth century. However, by the latter part of the 1930's, the United States government, under President Roosevelt, became convinced that the protectionist policies were fueling further instabilities in the global market. As a result, the United States implemented its "Good Neighbour Policy" which encouraged mutually advantageous policies - in essence, Americans proposed returning to freer trade measures. Consequently, Canada-American relations improved.

The outbreak of World War II occurred shortly thereafter. In 1941, the escalating menace Hitler posed in Europe and to the world necessitated coordination of defence by allies. In April, 1941, Mackenzie King, Prime Minister of Canada, and Theodore Roosevelt, President of the United States, entered into the Hyde Park Agreement which enunciated the principles that "each country should provide the

other with the defence articles which it is best able to produce."²¹ This agreement was a sectoral accord limited to the defence industry.

Canada's status grew not only with respect to the United States but also world-wide. The expansion of Canada's status as a global trading network was evidenced by its involvement in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") formed in 1948 with a number of member countries.²² This agreement was a serious attempt to bring order to world trading practices. The objectives in the coming together of the GATT-member countries were to monitor and negotiate cuts in tariffs on trade amongst its members or limit the growth of non-tariff barriers. In brief, the outbreak of World War II and the formation of GATT in 1948 stimulated Canada's continued growth in international exchange as the principles of freer trade came again to be recognized as creating greater prosperity for everyone.

With respect to the United States, Canada continued to pursue an ad hoc policy regarding trade. There were many limited sectoral agreements. This in effect meant that the two countries provided for the elimination of tariff barriers dependent upon the specifics of particular business sectors and interests (e.g. Hyde Park Agreement). By 1948, there were again calls for a formal free trade agreement between Canada and the United States. Prime Minister Mackenzie King, a Liberal, rejected the agreement in spite of a passionate appeal by his minister of trade, C.D. Howe, to accept the proposal. Howe had strongly advised King to accept the omnibus free trade bill because he

believed it contained the solution to long-term objectives for both countries. Many backed Howe on this. However, others like King asserted that the United States' attempts were merely imperialistic in nature. In a work authored by King years earlier entitled Industry and humanity, he explained that free competition served to privilege the very few and made wars an inevitable occurrence.²³

King rejected free trade; however, regardless of his rejection, a shift towards interdependence was underway in the world political order. The advent of atomic weaponry signalled a new interdependence amongst allies. Military strength in the age of nuclear armaments not only created a deep discrepancy in the global structure between superpowers and middle-powers but, as well, irrevocable economic and strategic interdependence. Financial considerations in the "high tech," atomic-military environment made it practical to amalgamate defence shields between allies. Consequently, even though King rejected the free trade proposal of 1948, trade relations between these two countries were maintained at the very least if not increased. It seemed that trading relations and economic interdependence were now necessary correlates to geographical and socio-political dependence in a new era.

It was not until approximately ten years after the failed 1948 trade proposal that Canadian-American relations soured.²⁴ The decline in good relations can be located in, firstly, attempts made by Canada to reallocate imports and exports from the United States to Britain

and, secondly, the general instability created by the Cuban missile crisis. John Diefenbaker, the Conservative prime minister at the time, was a staunch Canadian nationalist who did not support the Kennedy administration in the United States. President Kennedy's discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba, spurring what has come to be known as the Cuban missile crisis brought to the fore not only the sensitive issue of Canadian industrial dependence but also the issue of Canadian military dependence.

When Diefenbaker won the election in 1957, he called on Canadians to aspire to greatness: somehow to be noble, proud and united in their rejection of the second-hand prosperity generated by the United States. Diefenbaker did not identify with the stereotypic Conservative values of big business interests; rather he distrusted the "Bay Street" tycoons and identified himself with the "average" Canadian. Eventually, public confidence in Diefenbaker's rhetoric was destroyed by increased public awareness of inadequate fiscal policies, growing deficits, and the claim that the Diefenbaker government was selling out Canada's resources to the Americans. There were fears that the country was headed towards total financial collapse. Moreover, the common Canadian-American military fate - the Defence Production Sharing Program created in 1959 to provide for shared economic efforts of Canada and United States in defence - became problematic because Diefenbaker did not want atomic missiles in Canada. Diefenbaker was against nuclear warheads in Canada for a number of reasons

but mainly because this would mean a greater American military presence on Canadian soil.

In the early 1960's, Diefenbaker's government began to experience serious setbacks.²⁵ These were precipitated by a variety of problems and controversial policies towards Canada's nuclear-military role in global affairs. A crucial element in Diefenbaker's failure to win in the 1963 election was Washington's assertion that Diefenbaker's anti-nuclear policies and anti-American actions were sabotaging the unity of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It is acknowledged by many historians, Canadian and American alike, that an already unstable Diefenbaker government was further eroded by interference tactics from the American government. More specifically, a press release issued by the American government shortly after a meeting between Britain, Canada, and United States blatantly contradicted much of what Diefenbaker had publicly claimed transpired. Diefenbaker lost substantial credibility and, in 1963, Lester Pearson, a Liberal, was elected prime minister of Canada.²⁶

Pearson inherited a deficit economy and was burdened by the tensions in Canada-United States relations. Adding to the escalating problems, Canadians began seriously questioning the fact that the structure of the economy was highly dependent on American strength and power. A large proportion of Canadians believed that there was valid reason to be concerned due to the steady take-over of and high investment in Canadian business by American interests. In order to

quell the country's rising fears of American imperialism, the very year that Pearson was elected he introduced a controversial budget that included a 30-percent tax on all foreign take-overs of Canadian firms. However, poorly received by Canadian and American business interests, the 30-percent tax was abolished within 60 days of its inception.

Shortly thereafter, the Kennedy administration proposed an interest-equalization tax on foreign imports that was perceived as protectionist and, thus, created major panic on Canadian stock exchanges. The severity of panic can be attributed to two factors that were interrelated: Canada's dependence on American investment; and Canada's highly unstable economy. Investors (predominantly American) withdrew much of their business from the Canadian market solely on the basis of the proposal of such a tax. This left Canada feeling vulnerable to American influence. Canada was placated by an agreement with the United States whereby Canada would be made exempt from Kennedy's interest-equalization tax proposal in exchange for concessions on United States' investment in Canada. Because of Canada's economic vulnerability, its policy and formation became even more impossible to control autonomously, that is without direct American domination and influence. Americans undoubtedly understood their distinct political and economic advantage. The Americans had the power to veto Canadian policy if it conflicted with their military or economic interests. Historically, as well as today, the United States justifies its influence in terms of a duty to fulfill its manifest

destiny; Michael Weinstein terms it a "missionary consciousness" for the world.²⁷

Pierre Trudeau followed Pearson as Liberal prime minister in 1968. Trudeau was known to have thought that Canada was too reliant on the United States but, at the same time, was not an emphatic nationalist. In 1972, Mitchell Sharp, Trudeau's minister of external affairs, published an article delineating three options for Canada to pursue in regard to relations with the United States:

1. maintain the present relationship;
2. move towards closer integration with the United States; or
3. pursue a comprehensive, long-term strategy to develop and strengthen the Canadian economy and other aspects of our national life to reduce the present Canadian vulnerability.²⁸

Trudeau endorsed the third option as Canada was increasingly perceived as incapable of influencing American protectionist policies designed to alleviate its deficit. "Support for multilateral organizations was a declaration of Canadian economic independence," recalls Sharp. "We were determined to face the world, and deal with everyone - Americans, British, Europeans - on the same basis."²⁹ The policy to reduce economic alliances with the United States, however, was a failure. As authors Mahant and Mount put it:

The Third Option had a short and not a very glorious life. In trade, it has been abandoned. In defence, it was not meant to apply. In investment, the recession of the early 1980's has made it meaningless. Canadians are now glad to take almost any investment. ... In culture, the Third

Option could not really be applied because too few countervailing forces are available to English Canada.³⁰

3.2.2 The Present Free Trade Debate

The current trade enhancement negotiations between Canada and the United States grew out of the 1983 trade policy review released by the Trudeau government.³¹ Talks between the two governments stemming from this report focused on a sectoral form of trade agreement.³² The impetus for fuller negotiations essentially ceased with the Canadian federal election in 1984, which placed the Conservative party, under Brian Mulroney, in power.³³ In 1985, the Report of the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada (the "Macdonald Report") was released. This report is important because, as Shelly Battram, an international lawyer, points out, "[w]hile support in Canada for trade enhancement with the United States was not originally overwhelming, the Macdonald Commission Report's conclusion helped to increase public acceptance of the idea."³⁴ Chapter 6, Volume I of the Macdonald Report deals specifically with Canada's future with respect to the United States. The economic specialists, technocrats, who took part in compiling the data urged that:

...our government should ... pursue the "Second Option:" to move deliberately toward closer integration with the United States. ... Whether our association with our neighbours is easy or not, we "need" the United States. It buys about a fifth of what we produce, and it sells us many of the products which make our own lives rich and varied.³⁵

In general, the Macdonald Report concluded that while gaining access to foreign markets through a multilateral approach (Trudeau's preference) would be beneficial in the long term, immediate economic solutions would be better achieved through assuring freer access to United States' markets. Mulroney and his technocrats opted to value short-range objectives rather than work to achieve long-term ones that were less immediate although considered more beneficial. The commissioners determined, however, that adjustment problems in Canada would be greater than in the United States in both the labor force and the field of investment.³⁶ This in part stems from the imperfectly balanced trade relationship Canada has experienced for so long with the United States.

One of the crucial issues of free trade from the Canadian perspective is whether the FTA successfully provides for the eradication of the ever-looming threat of the consequences of American protectionism. Canadians are undeniably vulnerable to American protectionist policies as demonstrated during the Kennedy administration. The Macdonald Report endorses the (Conservative) Canadian government and the American government in going forward with an all-encompassing free trade treaty in order to thwart further protectionist initiatives. It is the FTA that provides the process by which all trade and investment barriers will be gradually phased out and ultimately eliminated in ten years. The FTA is the "handbook" detailing the new rules for doing business in North America between Canada and United States. Although the United States' government

collected almost \$900 million in tariff revenues on Canadian exports in 1986, these revenues will disappear under the FTA.³⁷ A question that must be raised then is why the Americans, economically more independent than Canada, would grant freer access given that their market is relatively ten times the size of Canada's? Essentially, what type of concessions did Canadians give to the United States to merit such generosity? Duncan Cameron, a political theorist, points out that "[i]n the way of concessions sought, Canada failed to get United States to accept, as the stronger economy, the removal of its tariff protection more quickly than Canada. In fact, since Canada is removing a roughly ten percent tariff over ten years, and the United States is removing a five percent tariff over ten years, it seems that on a proportionate basis the weaker economy is removing its tariff protection twice as fast."³⁸

Under the leadership of Brian Mulroney, the government declares with certainty that the agreement will cut costs and lower prices on commercial goods; create more and higher-paying jobs for Canadians; protect Canada's socio-cultural programs; and ensure Canadian industries and consumers access to the American marketplace. The certitude of the other key benefits have been thrown into question by the opposition parties. While Canada wants assured access to the American marketplace, the United States wants assured access for investment in Canada.³⁹ It must be stressed that Canada needs access to American markets, a judgment rendered by the commissioners of the

Macdonald Report, whereas, the Americans merely want limitless access to invest even more in the resources of this country.

In brief, the present debate on free trade thus is between the (Conservative) government, which argues that we need to forge concrete trade links specifically with United States in order to secure economic survival of the country (i.e. bilateral trading), and the opposition Liberals and NDP, who argue that Canada would best be served through multilateral trading relations as well as limited sectoral arrangements with the United States. Proponents and opponents alike in favouring or criticizing the FTA do so within the parameters of a specific discourse - that is the need to improve Canada's international competitive position. They must all implicitly or explicitly adhere to the idea of the supremacy of a technological environment, the value of consumerism, the value of capital, the value of economic science, the value of specialization, and the value of acquisition.

3.3 Valorization of the FTA: Productivity and Profit

On September 26, 1985, gearing up for the marketing of free trade, Mulroney declared proudly:

Economics, geography, common sense and the national interest dictate that we try to secure and expand our trade with our closest and largest trading partner.⁴⁰

Mulroney echoes, perhaps only distantly, the discourse of the individuated "self" who owes "allegiance to none but the state and his reason." The FTA is projected as the logical step in furthering the process of Canada's autonomy ("will to power"). In our liberal democracy, the maxim is that we are self-made individuals. We have access to equal opportunities and make choices depending upon our "self" - our constituted subject positions. Success, that which is measured by material possessions, is achieved through decisive hard work and faith in oneself, in one's nation: the individualist egos - the "micro" capitalists - who can go into the world and compete for what they want. Mulroney believes that the FTA:

...offers Canadians a choice - a choice between looking outward and building bridges to other lands; or looking inward and building walls around our country.

It is a challenge for all of us: a challenge to seize the opportunities in the largest and most dynamic market in the world and to use those opportunities as a springboard to other lands.⁴¹

Mulroney believes that Canada can maintain its independence while increasing the tendency towards specialization. Yet, specialization implies interdependency and greater forces of competition; and competitiveness translates into economies of scale (monopolies) which in turn obliterate regional centers of production that are not as cost-efficient. What is Brian Mulroney implicitly telling us in the context of his rhetoric on pursuing freer trade? The government's position on free trade, as well as the opposition's position on the FTA, may assist in helping us to understand our contemporary socially constituted self qua citizen. Analysing the discourse on free trade from the

government's perspective as well the opposition party positions (Liberals under John Turner and NDP under Ed Broadbent), permits us to better define who we are and in what direction we are going: the free trade debate provides us with insight into the values we have come to hold as a society.

A government's policies and agendas are ethical choices made on behalf of its constituents. They not only represent but also constitute what we as a nation, as a people, hold to be important, valuable, and worthwhile. In essence, the government is the "controller" of a variety of issues and priorities - from fiscal management to "womb" management (i.e. abortion rights, surrogate mothering and so on). It is a legitimized institutional apparatus that sets the context for acceptable behaviour from its citizens. What our government condones and pursues is telling of our cultural habitat, just as is what our government is inclined to sacrifice. The challenge of restless ambition, the severing of loyalties to traditional ties, the searching for new areas to conquer, and the increasing of competitive forces in the economy are all "values" espoused by Brian Mulroney through the discourse on free trade and stand as maxims bounding and limiting our behaviour.

In the past Canadians rejected the risks posed by further integration with the American economy. Even though the citizens of Canada more or less went through the same motions as in the 1911 "free-trade debate" election - going to the polls to vote on the free trade

issue almost to the total exclusion of all other issues - the citizenry as conceived within the structure of the general will, for the first time in Canada's history, condoned free trade and Mulroney's schema for a fully competitive nation in the coming decade.⁴² What was different from other trade debates and the 1911 election was that Canadian business in 1988 staunchly supported the FTA and this served to facilitate its acceptance in the public sphere. John Ward explains:

In Laurier's day, business was adamantly opposed to reciprocity. The Toronto and Montreal boards of trade and the Canadian Manufacturers' Association rallied against the deal. ... The financial and industrial communities saw Canada as set on an east-west axis, with the Prairie breadbasket tied to eastern industry by the railway. They [Canadian business] feared that reciprocity would wrench the axis to a north-south orientation, upsetting the economic framework.⁴³

With advances in communication technologies, the business groups perceive that the north-south orientation is now a "fait accompli" and, therefore, believe that they should at least exploit it to their fullest advantage. Obviously the most striking difference between 1911 and 1988 is that in 1988 free trade was finally ratified.

3.3.1 The Profit Motive

Meaning in a sense never arrives; and in the same way ... being never arrives. The form of the seed is already turning into the form of the flower, and the flower is already becoming dust...⁴⁴

It was Laurier who long ago predicted that the free trade seed would germinate. As it begins finally to blossom in 1988 under the notion of prosperity for all, Canadians desperately hope it will not turn into a black rose. A plurality of Canadians showed there was

nothing - not their history, not their institutions, not their social traditions - that was more important to them than their overall standard of living (i.e. prosperity, growth, and jobs).⁴⁵ Canadians have never before identified more strongly than in the last election with the savage liberal spirit of Adam Smith's competitive consumer mentality. It was Mulroney's vision of a prosperous Canada, conquering new areas, that was preferred to Turner's and Broadbent's plea for a better protected social welfare system. The plan to privatize industries, the drive to own another car and a bigger house were incentives that made the FTA deal look attractive.

Nations define themselves by their choices.⁴⁶ Thus, is the acceptance and assimilation with individualistic and private interests on behalf of a majority of Canadians perhaps indicative of an identity shift in modern self-experience? Charles Taylor explains that "the modern subject must find his purposes in nature, that is in himself, as nature is now understood. ... Negatively, the modern identity brings the withering of community."⁴⁷ In linking increased individualism to competitive market forces as indicative of an identity shift in the changing technological world, we can thereby point to the collapse, at the very least erosion, of the individual's capacity to be concerned for others in the public space of community. This is the modern identity as influenced by different orders of experience in the [post]modern social.

Margaret Atwood, a Canadian writer, has mastered the art of conveying the fears and uncertainties facing the modern subject in a world of declining collective interests and a generally more ruthless culture. She has been a fierce opponent of the FTA. Perhaps we can better understand her negative reaction to the deal through one of her novels. Entitled The Handmaid's Tale, Atwood depicts a young woman in tomorrow's post-post enlightenment reality, a reality comprised of a detached, emotionless social community. By recalling her earlier life in the 1980's, the woman attempts to make sense of her present reality:

I remember the rules, rules that were never spelled out but every [person] knew: don't open your door to a stranger, even if [s]he says [s]he is the police. Make him [her] slide his [her] ID under the door. Don't stop on the road to help a motorist pretending to be in trouble. Keep the locks on and keep going. If anyone whistles, don't turn to look. Don't go into a laundromat, by yourself, at night. ... Now we walk the same street ... and no [person] shouts obscenities at us, speaks to us, touches us. ... There is more than one kind of freedom. ... Freedom to and freedom from. In the days of anarchy, it was freedom to. Now you are being given freedom from. ... We seemed to be able to choose, then. We were a society dying ... of too much choice.⁴³

This quote is particularly insightful and pertinent to the issue of the FTA policy. Atwood attempts to help us gain distance and thus insight regarding our society's course of action in the civilizing process. Our choices - public policy decisions - favouring one option over other options set the stage on innumerable levels for future generations. The FTA choice is one such choice that reveals our present cultural priorities: a culture which places greater importance on materialism, technological mastery, and commercialism opposed to humanist social concerns. Furthermore, this quote raises the issue of

our current range of freedom in our liberal democracy; Atwood, in the above quote, cynically makes reference to this reality as one of anarchy. Additional freedoms precipitate a need for greater ethical responsibility from the citizens, that is from the society comprising of the community. As the North American continent has greater freedom under the FTA - businesses will have the opportunity to compete with less government intervention, we must also recognize the need to be able to adequately mediate ethical imperatives for a society that is ever-increasingly "free."

We will now turn to examine what exactly the government promises we will be more free to do under the FTA. What is the government saying about the FTA? How do they justify their position in the validation of pursuing freer trade?

3.3.2 Freedom to do What?

Explicitly stated in the Preamble of the FTA, the governments of Canada and the United States formally have resolved to give "freedom to" the people:

TO STRENGTHEN the unique and enduring friendship between their two nations;

TO PROMOTE productivity, full employment, and a steady improvement of living standards in their respective countries;

TO CREATE an expanded and secure market for the goods and services produced in their territories;

TO ADOPT clear and mutually advantageous rules governing their trade;

TO ENSURE a predictable commercial environment for business planning and investment;

TO STRENGTHEN the competitiveness of the United States and Canadian firms in global markets;

TO REDUCE government-created trade distortions while preserving the Parties' flexibility to safeguard the public welfare;

TO BUILD on their mutual rights and obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and other multilateral and bilateral instruments of cooperation; and

TO CONTRIBUTE to the harmonious development and expansion of world trade and to provide a catalyst to broader international cooperation.⁴⁹

In brief, the FTA is a tool for Canada that will secure access to the American marketplace. Simon Reisman, the chief negotiator for Canada, impressed upon the media that it was Canada who came out ahead of the United States on the FTA. He elaborates on Canada's FTA policy:

We have clearly set some good examples for the world. ... Signing this agreement constitutes a vital breakthrough in the difficult fight against protectionism which has been creeping up on us over the past few years. ... [I]t signals to governments around the world that protectionist forces need not be successful, that the fight is worth pursuing, that dramatic and positive trade results can be achieved with hard work, persistence, and good will...⁵⁰

The Conservatives declared that a rise in American protectionist measures on trade and investment a-vis Canada is no longer a potential threat under the FTA. The business community was strongly in favour of the FTA because it was concerned with obtaining some form of guarantee that protectionist measures would be quashed, thus giving freedom to autonomy and accumulation. In essence, the FTA is protection against protectionism: it seems that the Conservatives are

seeking freedom from rather than freedom to. Are we as Canadians perhaps overstating the threat of pervading protectionism by the United States? In 1982, the year that the Americans erected their greatest barriers on trade and investment, Canada was the object of only seven of 212 cases initiated.⁵¹

Robert Campeau, a Canadian businessman who has recently made the largest acquisition of an American conglomerate, is a staunch supporter of the FTA. He envisions Canada as collectively stronger under the FTA:

Our colonial heritage and background, our large mass of land, our great regions and sparse population have allowed politicians to inflict upon generations of Canadians a parochialism in the development and growth of our economic system. Freer trade is a giant step beyond parochialism, a unique chance to wean ourselves from our internal infatuations, to unite our regions and become one nation from the Atlantic to the Pacific. ... Let's not be paralyzed by irrational fears of the perils of free trade.⁵²

The business community, in general, believes that the FTA will not only bring Canada into harmonious unity but will serve to secure access to American industry and induce increased competition thus leading to higher cost-efficiency production. This translates into profit maximization for business elites of the multinational conglomerates. Moreover, business people such as Campeau contend that by being competitively stronger, our nation will be well prepared to compete on global markets. For example, the newsletter of a leading consultant and research firm, Clarkson Gordon Woods Gordon, presents the following case study:

Over the past six years, a Canadian manufacturer of electronics products increased its United States' exports

from 10 percent to 65 percent of total revenues, which are virtually unchanged. This client used to manufacture a broad range of consumer and commercial products. In the early 1980's, senior management recognized that it would not be possible to remain competitive with the Japanese and the Europeans in its consumer electronics businesses. The company chose to focus on a narrow range of commercial products and is presently among the top in the world in its chosen niche.

The case study concludes that:

Global trends have already forced many businesses to specialize in niche markets. Many more will need to adopt this strategy in order to succeed in a North American market.⁵³

Case studies documenting market strategies involving specialization as an ideal present free trade and thus the FTA as a necessary component in the contemporary world. Amidst the rhetoric of pro-free trade, the government and its institutional knowledge-bearing apparatuses use the powerful argument that the "health" of a nation is at stake. With less government intervention and interference under the FTA, the natural forces of the market will create a positive surge of capital investment and will stimulate the economies of Canada as well as the United States.

The brochure entitled Securing Canada's Access: Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement - Overview, published by the Conservative government, stated in part:

This initiative shows what can be accomplished when two countries are determined to strike down protectionism, move towards liberalized trade, and generate new prosperity. ... It [FTA] will stimulate an increase in productivity, research and development, a significant improvement in our competitive position and enhance product quality. The result will be lasting jobs and sustained prosperity.

The government stressed that:

From the beginning, the Government had one cardinal rule: the deal had to be a good deal or there would be no deal.⁵⁴

The government clearly resorts to fallacious reasoning by begging the question or arguing in a circle on the viability of the FTA. They state explicitly that the deal must be good otherwise they would have dismissed it. In effect, the premise is supported by its conclusion. From the perspective of progress and a fetish for accumulation, the FTA might very well be the best possible measure. In pursuance of the FTA, the government bespeaks of one who is inclined to maximize the consumer demand/supply function. What becomes even more apparent amidst the rhetoric of free trade is that, as Maurice Charland has noted regarding communication dynamics "[o]ne must already exist within a discursive position in order to be part of the audience of a rhetorical situation in which persuasion could occur."⁵⁵ The citizenry, so constituted within an individuated discursive forum, is more easily convinced that the new economic order is in their best interests as Canadians and will benefit them materially. This is, after all, their overridingly important socially-constituted concern.

The Mulroney government appealed to the importance of the "I" through discourse on free trade by claiming that under the FTA Canadians will enjoy added prosperity. This knowledge claim was developed through the analysis of economic instruments that measure commercial growth and development. The claim was presented as relying on purely "objective" calculation thereby effacing its partial

character. Thus the idea of freer trade was put forward by occluding particularized interests. Under the heading of Canadian Consumers in the FTA, the government promoted the "facts" about free trade:

When the Agreement is fully implemented in January, 1989, consumers will reap a number of benefits. ... They can expect the following:

- the cost of living of low-income families will decline by 3 percent or about \$325/year;
- the cost of living of middle- and high-income families will decline by 2 percent or about \$800/year;
- the average family of four will save between \$85 and \$130 annually on food expenditures;
- the typical middle-income family will pay up to \$8,000 less to establish and furnish a home; and
- increased competition from imports will improve the price, quality and variety of all consumer products including those produced in Canada.⁵⁶

The Conservative position favouring freer trade and more specifically the FTA is supported by the discourse of specialists. The government relies upon the supposed empirical science of economics to identify the benefits of the FTA. The government predicts that an average family of four will make marginal savings as a result of reductions in the cost of living brought about by the FTA. Yet, in the 1989 budget, the minister of finance, Michael Wilson, imposed severe tax increases upon the average Canadian household. With increases in taxes, is it still possible for the average family to entertain the idea of a reduction in the overall cost of living? Regardless, those who do not accept this agreement are considered by government-represented interests to be moving the Canadian people towards an alienated international position. The claims that the FTA provides for:

- Savings in Consumer Expenditures;
- Savings on Food Expenditures;
- Savings in Establishing a Typical Household; and
- Savings for Low-Income Elderly Single Women,⁵⁷

are countered by the opposition parties.

For a moment, accepting the claim that the FTA will prove beneficial for low-income elderly single women, the Conservative position exemplifies a commitment to the welfare state despite the fundamental basis of free trade (which implies less government intervention in the community at large). The Conservatives discursively identify with one of the most repressed marginal groups of the 1980s by specifically claiming that these groups will be better off. However, the very concept of freer trade from the Conservative position reiterates the need for a decrease in government assistance and, thus, in "reality" the new economic order of things may prove not to be in their best interest. The Conservative economists assert that the lower-income earners will derive direct benefits from the FTA; yet, it has not been clearly demonstrated as to how, for example, low-income single elderly women, whose pensions are not indexed, will enjoy a better standard of living and quality of life. Already the new budgetary restraints introduced in April, 1989, (and indirectly related to the FTA) call for immediate increases in unemployment insurance deductions from employees and employers as well as reducing transfer payments to the provinces. This leaves less disposable income for the average household because they must assume a greater tax burden.

The Conservatives stated that they were committed to reducing such government expenditures all along - if only Canadians had read between the lines, had read the fine print so to speak. It is inconceivable how the elderly in this country will be empowered and thereby enjoy a greater standard of living especially if the costs of social programs like medical care (financed in part through federal transfer payments) soar and governments continue to chip away at state-supported programs in their zealously to restructure the economy. Defining this political position as neoconservative, we can identify this political position as one that does not valorize social spending but rather emphasizes the value of private interests (e.g. the privatization of crown corporations) with confidence in individualism and market equilibrium.

Canada is not the only industrialized nation that seems to be reevaluating priorities from a neoconservative frame of reference. In Britain, Conservative leader Margaret Thatcher was one of the first leaders to enforce the "neoconservative shift" in policies. If this is to serve as a primer for Canadians, we should perhaps briefly look at the shift in full swing in Britain. Britain's cuts in spending on social benefits, especially the health-care system, has been declared as reaching crisis proportion:

Reds are shut. Operating rooms are not available, emergency wards are closed, essential services are shutdown in order to make financial savings. ... [S]ome specialists spend too much time treating private patients.⁵⁸

Nevertheless, mainstream Conservative economists who assist in defining our choices assert that ALL consumers will benefit regardless of their status within society. The dichotomy between less intervention and greater social aid is something that Robert Campeau advocates will cease to be problematic because:

People in those regions of Canada where we have high unemployment should go to work in Ontario or other areas of low unemployment - even in New England, where there is only 3 percent unemployment. The government should legislate policies to encourage this. We should abandon socialistic policies that encourage people to stay unemployed at the cost of the taxpayers of Canada.⁵⁹

Can the communal space wherein we gain a sense of ourselves flourish adequately in such a transient state? The traditional links with family and friends are bound to be eroded if we determine where we live on market trends in employment and are forced to relocate when statistical charts change. The importance is placed on reducing one's individual burden to society and, therefore, the family structure - the social site wherein we acquire a concept of Innis' temporal bias - is fragmented even further. The low-income elderly single women, for example, who are not as mobile will suffer too. Conservatives and business interests deem that all Canadians will be able to consume with greater levels of satisfaction: this is the means by which they measure the value of policy initiatives. Consequently, if this means uprooting your family to secure employment in another province or country, then this is what must be done in paying the price of acquisitiveness. For some, this price tag is too expensive. For those

less materially well-off or those unable to help themselves, the FTA will not serve their best interests.

Richard Lipsey, a foremost economic analyst at the C.D. Howe Institute and a familiar author to Canadian economic scholars, has strongly supported the FTA. His overall position though is rather ambivalent. He says this of the FTA:

...[T]he agreement offers ... improvements now not in the uncertain future. ... [T]o reject the real gains the agreement provides ... with our most important trading partner would seem to be letting some future and uncertain better be the enemy of a present and certain good.⁶⁰

The "present" economic scheme so referred to by Lipsey and praised in the "here and now" becomes fully operational in only ten years.

Moreover, in his text entitled Economics (1982), Lipsey advises on the uncertainty of freer trade concepts:

The potential net gains from somewhat freer trade than there is today are not so large as to make it certain that the removal of all remaining barriers is desirable. ... When one accepts the hypothesis that some trade is better than no trade, it is not necessary to accept the hypothesis that free trade is better than controlled trade.

Lipsey goes on to assert that:

The potential gains from trade might be offset by costs such as unemployment or economic instability or by the interference with policy objectives other than maximizing income. ... Suppose that totally free trade led to an allocation of resources that was one percent more efficient than an allocation resulting from 20 percent tariffs, but led simultaneously to an average level of unemployment 1.2 percent higher. In this case, free trade would bring losses rather than gains.⁶¹

The certitude with which Lipsey embraces the strength of the FTA is blatantly at variance with his theoretical models. However, these

inconsistencies are not seen or noticed as significant. Lipsey, therefore, retains credibility within the boundaries of the "episteme." The support that Lipsey holds for the FTA lends a technical and, subsequently, a "real" strategic weight to the Conservative discourse on free trade. Lipsey's analysis, though inconsistent, enjoys credibility that perhaps an artist like John Gray may not. This phenomenon illuminates the Foucauldian discourse on truth and power. Lipsey's inconsistencies are occluded with greater facility because he is specialized in the rational science of economics. Although, the specialists themselves do not wholly agree on the value of the FTA, their opinions are valued as more probable and of being more rational due to their knowledge, thus their power. Their discourse is set forth as strictly objective and not founded on emotional grounds. However, mainstream economists are discursively positioned by socio-political practices around sites of a social identity and subjective powers relegated to capitalist ethics. The economist's position within the social is that of an agent with substantive knowledge. Thereby the economists stratify the political reality predicated upon their particular pre-understandings. In other words, it is their individual conception of priorities (i.e. reducing unemployment via dislocation and so on). This lends support to the argument that the positions taken on the FTA are ideologically constituted and not exclusively derived on the basis of "objective" findings.

Amidst the FTA rhetoric, the issue of Canada's nationalism is very much part of the debate. The government recognized from the beginning

that a difficulty in marketing the FTA would be encountered from groups who perceived that Canada was already too vulnerable to the United States' socio-political and cultural influence. The Canadian nationalists believe that the already high degree of influence from the Americans makes it difficult for many Canadians to recognize their own cultural interests which should come first and foremost. Thus, attempting to sway the nationalists, the government (the Navigators) stipulated that cultural, political, and social policy setting should be safeguarded. In order to minimize antagonism and to sufficiently please both business and national interests, the FTA provides for the exemption of the cultural industries sector. Article 2012 of the FTA defines a cultural industry as:

An enterprise engaged in any of the following activities:

- A) the publication, distribution, or sale of books, magazines, periodicals, or newspapers in print or machine readable form but not including the sole activity of printing or typesetting any of the foregoing,
- B) the production, distribution, sale or exhibition of film or video recordings,
- C) the production, distribution, sale or exhibition of audio or video music recordings,
- D) the publication, distribution, or sale of music in print or machine readable form, or
- E) radio communication in which the transmissions are intended for direct reception by the general public, and all radio, television and cable broadcasting undertakings and all satellite programming and broadcast network services.⁶²

Pleasing corporate America entailed the inclusion of Article 2005 of the FTA. It satisfies them because it remains unclear and indecisive until further legislative reforms (i.e. Copyright Act) can

be completed. Moreover, there are certain exceptions to the exemptions. Article 2005 states:

1. Cultural industries are exempt from the provisions of this Agreement, except as specifically provided in Article 401 (Tariff Elimination), paragraph 4 of Article 1607 (divestiture of an indirect acquisition) and Articles 2006 and 2007 of this Chapter;
2. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, a Party may take measures of equivalent commercial effect in response to actions that would have been inconsistent with this Agreement but for paragraph 1.⁶³

Article 2005 which cites reference to several other articles is the government's case of defense for free trade on the cultural level, that is it will protect "Canada's unique cultural identity," and thus cultural sovereignty is declared a non-issue. However, paragraph 2 of Article 2005 must be noted for the implicit threat which it contains. Articles 2006 and 2007 deal with copyright and transmission regulations and the printing industry (see Appendix I).

The free trade papers state in part: "As far as the government was concerned, Canada's cultural identity was never at issue in the negotiations. Canada's unique cultural identity remains untouched by the Agreement."⁶⁴ Yet, one particular Canadian artist, Daryl Duke - a film and television producer - had this to say in regard to Canadian culture and the influences the FTA will have regardless of whether Article 2005 was made more explicit. He explains:

Today, before free trade, how few films are made about who and what we are. And how few get distributed and shown in theatres of our own. How few TV shows speak of anything of substance. The CBC gropes for a philosophy like a blind beggar with a tin cup. The NFB is voiceless across the land. And our private broadcasters, those balletomanes of the

bottom line, have for a generation made their yearly buying trip to L.A., filling their TV schedules to the very maximum with the outpourings of Columbia Pictures, Paramount... And this before the carte blanche of free trade. ... Ownership is programming. If free trade changes the ownership of Canada then free trade will change how we speak to one another and what we know of ourselves. In the end the hand that holds the shares holds the pen, the camera, the printing press, and the TV station. ... "The interpretation of our reality through patterns not our own serves only to make us even more unknown, even less free, even more solitary." I read these words and think of Canada, struggling still to be born. Struggling perhaps more than ever not its own.⁶⁵

John Gray, another artist, refuses to accept the legitimacy of the government's reassurances in the safeguard provision for the cultural industries:

A confused Navigator traditionally misleads us in one of two ways. One technique is to describe the lake we want as though it were just up ahead, when in fact the Navigator can't see a thing. ... Whole generations of Canadians have rowed furiously into the murk, thinking that any minute they'll be skimming across that shining clear water. But sooner or later we realize we've been fooled. When that happens, we get another Navigator ... the new Navigator ... points in the opposite direction, downstream, and shouts: "Forward!" "But that's not forward," we protest. ... "Nonsense" dissembles the Navigator. "In fact, you've always wanted to go that way in your heart. That direction is a lot easier. Those dead fish and styrofoam cups? Pay them no notice. Our boat won't be affected by that. I've negotiated a space for our boat in the lake that will be entirely free of styrofoam cups and teaming with fish at tremendous savings. The water in that spot will be as pure as any lake you might ever have found upstream. And the crocodiles will be under control: if they chew our boat there will be a full review. Don't be so negative. You're heading upstream because you're afraid to face the real world."⁶⁶

The priorities for the artistic community are different than the business community and thus are not always aligned with the economic rationalists who are in the business of promoting profit. Promoting

culture is an artist's business be it through publishing, painting or filmmaking. Despite many socio-political differences between Canada and United States and the FTA provisional measures (i.e. Article 2005), a stronger relationship on a socio-economic level will incite greater transnationalism on a cultural level as the two nations are dynamically integrated. The hegemonic power of the United States will undoubtedly overshadow Canada, being the more dependent nation. More importantly, the agreement specifies that American industries cannot be deprived of their rights to benefit from general provisions of the agreement with respect to investment rights; this provision will serve to stimulate increased American participation in Canada's cultural industries.⁶⁷

Prior to the 1988 election and the subsequent acceptance of the FTA, the relationship between the multinationals and the governments of both Canada and the United States helped to quash the fears perpetuated by anti-free traders concerning any further erosion of Canada's unique character and cultural industries. Within months after the implementation of the FTA, however, the federal Industry Department released a report that now claims the FTA will hurt certain sectors of the cultural industries: this contradicts the government's pre-election promises. Particularly hard hit will be the sound-recording industry:

...[T]he [D]epartment said the elimination of tariffs on records, tapes, and compact discs coming into Canada is "expected to adversely affect both the production and manufacturing segments" of the Canadian industry. ... [This] report marks the first time the government has indicated the deal [FTA] could hurt the cultural industry.

With no tariff, American companies would be more likely to ship the finished products to Canada rather than send masters, leading to considerably less business for manufacturers in Canada, the report said. ... Money made on the manufacturing side would no longer be available to put into developing and recording Canadian artists.⁵⁸

George Grant wrote in Lament for a Nation that "American society has always demanded that all autonomous communities be swallowed up into the common culture."⁶⁹ The Canadian government, however, set forth the claim that protection and an overriding concern for the fragile Canadian identity only perpetuates the closure to an external flow of ideas and lifestyles. Yet perhaps we must yield to Grant's lament to assure that the periphery (Canada) does not become obliterated by the center (United States). Grant has conjectured that:

...[A]fter 1940, it was not in the interests of the economically powerful to be nationalists. Most of them [Canadian business elite] made more money by being representatives of American capitalism and setting up branch plants. ... When everything is made relative to profit making, all traditions of virtue are dissolved, including that aspect of virtue known as love of country.⁷⁰

Through brandishing implications that the virtue "love of one's country" has fascist undertones in the Canadian political arena, the government sought to legitimate freer trade and the further penetration in Canadian markets of American investment and dominance. Mulroney's Conservative government believes that there is no need to be alarmed by increased American ownership and control over the loss of some of Canada's most important industries. Yet, ironically, in an echo of Grant, there is a growing concern in the United States over the

infiltration of Japanese wealth and development of Japanese branch plants. Coinciding with Canadian discourse on the perils/benefits of freer trade with the United States, the Americans' discourse focused on the need, on the one hand, for freer trade measures with Canada and, on the other hand, for protectionist initiatives to thwart further Japanese control in some of their most important markets.

Critics of Japan's growing dominance in the United States argue that basic ethical questions are involved with the emergence of Japanese business interests. They say Japan's wealth tempts some of the American elite (the Navigators) to accept Japanese funds at the expense of defending broader United States interests.⁷¹ Business Week writes:

As [Japan's economic prowess] makes itself felt in U.S. social and political agendas, it can have a subtle but important impact on the big policy questions facing the U.S. ... When Congress got down to writing a trade bill last year, a Japan-bashing mood on Capitol Hill seemed certain to produce rough, retaliatory legislation. But by the time the bill made it to President Reagan's desk, most of the provisions Tokyo found offensive had been stripped away or watered down.⁷²

Is Japan's growing dominance in America perhaps a sign of their decline as the superpower of the late twentieth century? Is Japan's growing empire which is intruding on United States' territory a contributing factor in the Americans' zealotry to consolidate a North American market under the FTA? Similar to the Americans discourse of anxiety over the increasing forces of Japanese interests in shaping United States' policies, Canadians worry about America's aggressive seeking policy that controls and shapes our industries and culture. Free trade

has been a residual national policy that affects all global-interdependent countries.

The controlling interests of capital domination are colonized by commonsense logic relative to the value of commercialism. The Liberal policy under Howe, as Grant recalls:

...was integration as fast as possible and at all costs. No other consideration was allowed to stand in the way.

Grant believes that as a result:

[a] society proclued by such policies may reap enormous benefits, but it will not be a nation. ... The power lies in the fact that the dominant classes in Canada see themselves at one with the continent on all essential matters. ... By its very nature, the capitalist system makes of national boundaries only matters of political formality.⁷³

3.4 The Discursive Cartel: The Oppositions' Strategies

John Turner, Liberal opposition leader fighting the Mulroney camp in the 1988 federal election, opted to embrace the Canadian tradition: to withstand resistance to the American dream and, instead, pursue the fostering of Canada's unique identity. But many Canadians contend that we are very much a society just like the United States culturally incorporated into the mainstream values that comprise the American dream.⁷⁴ Turner, nevertheless, stood for the values of caution and the strengthening of the east-west axis in North America. With great passion, Turner took his crusade against the FTA from province to

province appealing to patriotic sentiment. Ed Broadbent, the NDP opposition leader, offered a competing version of the Liberal's stand on the FTA. Broadbent, similarly to Turner, advised against the acceptance of the omnibus trade bill on the grounds that the cultural and socio-economic autonomy of Canada was at stake; he appealed to Canadian fear of American imperialism overrunning Canada's industries.

What is the backbone of both the Liberal and NDP nationalist rhetoric? The Conservatives, Liberals, and NDP all alluded to a sentiment of nationhood but one comprised of a technological conception. All three political discourses subscribe to patriotism by way of the potential for "the circulation or communication of commodities and capital."⁷⁵ Before proceeding to an analysis of the nuances of each opposition parties' strategies, let us first attempt to better acquaint ourselves with what is implied by the "Canadian identity." What is the dominant Canadian discourse in regard to nationhood? How does it differ, if it does differ at all, from the American discourse? One step in identifying our elusive Canadian character is to turn to a closer inspection of the symbolisms we use to represent our national standard. The eagle, the American symbol of the national standard, is a predatory animal noted for its strength and keenness of vision. The symbol representative of Canada's national identity is the beaver. This is an animal noted for its industriousness and cooperative, volunteering spirit. Canadian consciousness, or culture, as represented in the sign of the beaver can

be better understood in the words of Northrop Frye, a Canadian literary theorist:

Culture is born in leisure and an awareness of standards, and pioneer conditions tend to make energetic and uncritical work an end in itself, to preach a gospel of social unconsciousness, which lingers long after the pioneer condition has disappeared. The impressive achievements of such a society are likely to be technological. It is in the inarticulate part of communication, railways, and bridges and canals and highways, that Canada, one of whose symbols is the taciturn beaver, has shown its real strength.⁷⁶

The taciturn beaver then stands as a symbol for the beginnings of the conquering of the Canadian space, but also stands for a registering of the technological will inside of the development of the identity that Frye traces from the colonial period state through to the modern century.⁷⁷

Frye, like Innis in this regard, was concerned with reinforcing a temporal bias to counteract the preponderance in the contemporary world towards conquering space. Frye contended that it was the Canadian consciousness - that unique, elusive identity - which contained the seed to overcome the bias of technologies that privileged the rational and secular order. Rooted in the Canadian imagination, for Frye, was the capacity to join humanity (nature) and technology.⁷⁸ Canada's cultural tradition was founded in the very struggle to survive with nature, accepting the turbulence beyond one's individual control, while striving to surpass those very limitations: Frye's position can be defined as that of a "technological humanist." In other words, he believed that progressive technologies in a society lead to greater

potential for emancipation for the general population. Frye warned, however, that the ability to live and flourish within the bounds of the technological dynamo, a capacity innate to the Canadian imagination nurtured within a time bias framework, becomes destroyed under imperialist pressures.⁷⁹

In brief, the alienation of the individuated self in modern society, according to Frye, can be reduced through the extension of technologies of communications. It can also be said that Frye concurs with the dominant attitude in the political arena on the point of articulating a national identity that embraces the "Technological dream." As David Cook explains, for Frye, Canadians:

share a common sense of mission to conquer the intervening space in order to be heard. Frye calls this development the centrifugal movement where identity is sought outside itself and in the art of communication. ... [A]t the heart of Frye's vision of the "New World" [exists] a tension in the concern for identity between the claims of nature, on the one hand, and the individual on the other. These claims are mediated by technology."⁸⁰

Accepting Frye's claims that the ability to live and flourish within the bounds of the technological dynamo becomes eroded under an imperialist framework, we can thereby conclude that continentalism should be avoided. Thus is Canada's "collapse" into continentalism under the FTA to be considered "just one sign of the debasement of a culture that has abandoned the principles of justice for the extension of the technical power of the market"?⁸¹ Frye's conception of the Canadian consciousness is that which is embodied in the discourse on the FTA by the political party ideologues on the issue of nationalism.

The identifying feature of Canadian culture, as Maurice Charland argues, revolves around "the relationship between two distinct yet intertwined entities - the Canadian rhetoric of a technological nation and the technology of the Canadian state."⁸² This is the essence and core of the problematizations posed by the debate on free trade.

Charland elaborates on a technological state:

Canada is a technological state. This is just to say that Canada's existence as an economic unit is predicated upon transportation and communication technology. In addition, the idea of Canada depends upon a rhetoric about technology. Furthermore, we can understand the development of a Canadian nation-state in terms of the interplay between this technology and its rhetoric.⁸³

Studying the constitution of our national culture via the trade debate, we find that there is tremendous tension created between the ideological construct, the rhetoric, that Canada must pursue the formula that will enable the technological dynamo to develop (i.e. the need for the FTA) and the idea that pursuing such endeavours will lead to the obliteration of the mediated nation-state. The FTA debate exemplifies the tension of our nationhood: to assure our progress as an economically viable technological state, the impetus is to develop our industries in order to compete in the global environment; yet, given our temporal and continental limitations which makes us extremely vulnerable to the hegemony of the American empire, the rhetoric of unity and identity provides no tangible or exclusive commonality for the Canadian people:

The popular mind, like the land, must be occupied. Note, however that technological nationalism only defines Canadian ideals and opinion by virtue of their not being from foreign sources [i.e. European or American]. This is significant

because, in its reluctance or inability to articulate a positive content to the Canadian identity - an identity still to be created - technological nationalism is a form of liberalism, privileging the process of communication over the substance of what is communicated.⁸⁴

It is not the content of communication but rather the technique of mediation that is privileged in Canadian discourse. Charland argues further that:

Technological nationalism promises a liberal state in which technology would be a neutral medium for the development of a polis. This vision of a nation is bankrupt, however, because it provides no substance or commonality for the polis except communication itself.⁸⁵

The intrinsic value either for or against freer trade is arrived at through the means by which it surfaces and that is in the name of the technological nation - a technological nation which Mulroney envisions too. But it was Turner and Broadbent who gambled on the will of the people to want to develop a political state that risked eroding communication links with the American empire, Canada's major trading partner. It has been said that "Mulroney's leap of faith in support of the free-trade deal was matched by Turner's reluctance to take a chance."⁸⁶ But perhaps it would be more accurate to contend that it was Turner and Broadbent who took the greater leap of faith in the people of Canada to reject the Mulroney vision which was based primarily on the processes, or circulation, of capital (i.e. the "communication of commodities") and to adopt instead the value of community, albeit an absent one. Margaret Atwood comments on the FTA:

Our national animal is the beaver, noted for its industry and its co-operative spirit. In medieval bestiaries it is also noted for its habit, when frightened, of biting off its own testicles and offering them to its pursuer. I hope [in

condoning the FTA] we are not succumbing to some form of that impulse.⁸⁷

Mulroney's proposition to move forward in the spirit of social Darwinism - survival of the fittest - was sanctioned under the authority of the national will as evidenced in the 1988 federal election. It beat Turner's and Broadbent's national project which asserted the existence of a unified country albeit mediated within the rhetoric of technology.

3.4.1 The Red Maple Leaf Flag: Liberal Configuration

Underscoring the claims set forth by both the Liberals and the NDP on the issue of the FTA is a discourse that articulates an essence of nationhood bound by capitalist logic. John Turner sought to undermine the validity of Conservative claims in favour of the FTA. In constructing their position, the Liberals, in the name of maintaining a strong, united nation, attempted to discredit the Conservatives by charging that the FTA was a case of pandering to the American empire. With a persuasive rhetoric of "national" identity, Turner was capable of gaining increased popularity. Ranking a dismal third at the beginning of the free trade debate as well when Mulroney, several months prior to the implementation of the FTA, was forced to call an election⁸⁸, Turner was able to mobilize support for the anti-free trade position. The Liberal party faced a "neck and neck" race toward the latter part of the campaign. They, of course, did not win but did enjoy a relatively high degree of support from Canadians. What

strategies were constructed by the Liberals to mobilize support in their favour? How have the Liberals attempted to make us "see" the FTA their way?

In response to the promotional brochures distributed by the government on free trade (prior to the call for an election), the Liberal party set up a "committee" to study the Conservative proposal and subsequently published Reaching Out: A Liberal Alternative to the Canada-United States Trade Agreement. This publication offers the following reasons for the rejection of the FTA:

1. The process of review was undemocratic and unrepresentative. Without a final text, and over a period of only two weeks, and being unable to hear from all interested Canadians on this crucial issue, the Committee review [provided for by the Conservatives] was a farce;
2. The agreement itself is deeply flawed. While there is proof that many industries will be injured, the economic benefits are still unproven. We have not secured access to the American market and we are still subject to U.S. trade remedy laws; and
3. In Canada this marks a radical departure from our history as a country committed to internationalism and a strong public economy, and moves us to one buffeted by North American market forces.⁸⁹

In attempting to create an acceptable counter-argument to the Conservative initiative on pursuing freer trade between Canada and the United States, the Liberals assert that the FTA is anti-parliamentary,

anti-democratic, and anti-constitutional. Note that much of their opposition stems from the process by which the governments developed the FTA policy. The Liberals contend that the process by which the Conservatives attempted to implement freer trade leads one to doubt the long-term benefits of the deal and leads one to wonder exactly whose interests it serves. The need to trade on each other's strengths - securing access to the American markets in all sectors of the economy - is clearly not at the apex of the free trade debate. The Liberals note that:

The argument to reduce tariffs is a legitimate one. It is, in fact, the reason why successive Canadian government's have supported the GATT.⁹⁰

Turner believed that the Conservatives did well in attempting to secure Canada's access to United States markets but that the FTA misrepresents the Canadian capacity to penetrate that market. As Turner explains, "[t]he Prime Minister did not have the courage or the honesty to say to the people of Canada 'Well, we tried but we failed'."⁹¹

The Liberals asserted that the Conservative party rhetorically attempted to legitimate a deal by setting forth an agreement which proclaims equal opportunity for all to material acquisitiveness, though, in reality, it will benefit the very few, more specifically the business elite. Furthermore, they claim that the pact does not assure Canada's long-term objectives of increased global trade. Liberals contend that:

It has been said that this deal will further Canada's international trading goals. Several investment banks and

corporations in Europe and the Pacific Rim have said there will be little reason to locate in Canada rather than the U.S. after the deal goes through. Moreover, Mr. Sharp pointed out, this is a preferential agreement which discriminates in terms of treatment against all other countries. We ... have formed a continental discriminatory trade bloc. ... [The FTA is] called the single greatest threat to the international trading system.⁹²

To support their opposition to the FTA, the Liberals contend that Conservative practices were anti-democratic because the government was too hasty in formulating the trade bill without sufficient public consultation. If the Liberals (combined with the NDP) had not raised public awareness of the negative consequences of the FTA, the trade bill would have been passed without an election. More importantly, the Liberals assert that the government provided no substantive proof to support claims of increased prosperity for Canadians, less unemployment and better salaries for the Canadian workforce. The Liberals' study found that:

While there is no proof jobs will be created, we certainly heard from many witnesses about job loss. ... [W]hen pressed on the economic issues, various representatives of the business community relied on conjecture, hope or faith - but could provide no proof. The economic benefits within Canada thus remain unproven.⁹³

Neither the Liberals nor anyone else can predict with certainty the consequences of the FTA. The "truths" that Liberals assert regarding the devastation under the FTA are incorporated in their platform paper via similar rhetorical strategies used by Conservatives and NDP: empirical claims, objective reasoning, and testimonials from diverse representatives of different sectors in the economy. The use of testimonials - quotations from authoritative sources (e.g.

representatives from interest groups such as the National Action Committee on the Status of Women, the Grocery Products and Manufacturers' Association, or auto and wine producers) - lends credibility to their refutation of the FTA. The Liberals' in presenting non-partisan criticisms of the FTA were able to establish credibility and legitimacy for their anti-free trade position. Their rhetoric speaks in the name of the Canadian people and for their interests. The Conservatives use similar strategies to authenticate their arguments in favour of the FTA but, as the government, they already can claim to legitimately represent the popular will. In other words, implicit in their FTA policy initiative and other policy initiatives in general, legitimacy and acceptance are always partially presupposed. However, in the election prior to the 1988 election mandate favouring the FTA, Liberals and NDP argued that Mulroney did not raise a specific agenda in regard to free trade initiatives. Into Mulroney's fourth year in office and without a direct mandate from Canadians to pursue such broad sweeping changes to the economy, the Liberals as well as the NDP seized the opportunity to focus on the "anti-democratic" procedures practiced by the Conservatives. Unlike the Conservatives, the Liberals had to work to position themselves as legitimate in order to subvert the dominant place of the "Navigators." Therefore, in their rhetoric on the FTA, both Liberals and NDP attempt to present the policy-makers, the legitimate navigators, somewhat as outlaws. Thus, Liberals as well as the NDP sought to gain added popular support.

This task was accomplished through the rhetorical strategy of locating an assessment of the FTA in the people rather than in the government or the opposition parties. Michel deCerteau eloquently summarizes this:

Quotation ... is the ultimate weapon for making one believe. Because it plays upon what the other is assumed to believe, it is the means by which "realist" is instituted. To quote the other on one's own behalf is thus to make believable the simulacra produced in a particular place. Opinion "polls" have become the most elementary and the most passive procedure for doing this. ... [T]he proliferation of polls - is the fiction through which the country is brought to believe in what it is. Each citizen assumes for all the other what he takes to be their belief - without believing in it himself. ... [Q]uotation allows the technocratic apparatuses to make themselves feasible for each person in the name of the others. To quote is to give reality to the simulacrum a power produces by causing a belief that others believe in it, but without furnishing any believable object. ... [T]o hand over to the aggressivity of the public those who, affirming through their deeds that they do not believe in it, destroy the fictitious "reality" that no one can support "anyway" except as the conviction of the others.⁹⁴

Liberal rhetoric, like that of the Conservative and NDP parties, made good use of quotations. It is difficult to determine whether the Liberals saw the free trade question as an opportunity to gain power and therefore cynically opposed it or whether they opposed it out of a conviction based on the assessment of experts. In any case, the Liberal assessment of the FTA effectively assumes an alternative countering the Conservative position. As evidenced by a profound surge of popularity witnessed through the number of seats obtained in the House of Commons by Liberal opposition members, Turner's configuration of "otherness," whether in earnest or cynical, must be considered to have been relatively successful.

Throughout the textual analysis of opposition to the FTA, the Liberals posited testimonies which worked to camouflage subjective interests as truth data set apart from the biased interests. Testimonials, as Michel Foucault puts it, create "an opening where the writing subject endlessly disappears."⁹⁵ This configuration of discourse creates a level of authenticity of the Liberal's sincerity to the national interest. The use of testimonials is one such communicational strategy that attests to "reliability" of the evidence in contradistinction to the government's discourse. Foucault has this to say regarding this type of referential strategy in the validation of truth claims:

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a totally new conception was developed when scientific texts were accepted on their own merits and positioned within an anonymous and coherent conceptual system of established truths and methods of verification. Authentication no longer required reference to the individual who had produced them; the role of the author disappeared as an index of truthfulness and, where it remained as an inventor's name, it was merely to denote a specific theorem or proposition, a strange effect, a property, a body, a group of elements or pathological syndrome.⁹⁶

The Liberal paper outlining the negative implications of the FTA uses testimonials as a method of persuasion. In brief, it works to broaden the authority of the claims in the brochure. It would have been more difficult for the Liberals to gain added support purely on the basis that they, as opposition members in the governmental process, believe that the government had not secured an initiative in the best interests of the nation. The Liberal paper states:

After hearing testimony, the Liberal members have drawn a number of conclusions as to the effects the government's proposal will have ...⁹⁷

The Liberal party as the author of the text is visible but occluded as the subjective springboard interpreting technical matters for rejecting the FTA.

The Liberals reconceptualise the free trade issue in debate. Their free trade manifesto attempts to re-present or alter the Tory construction of reality. Turner proclaims that the FTA would "inevitably result in reconciliation and then harmonization of our monetary policy and then fiscal policy and, ultimately, in the abandonment of our identity."⁹⁸ The Liberals have, discursively, been dedicated to individualism and the profit motive of capitalism, as well as to egalitarianism and privileging the needs of the disadvantaged. In Jean Baudrillard's terms, perhaps the Liberals cynically appreciate the link between truth and power which is that it does not have a foundation outside the purposes of appearance:

The political sphere must keep secret the rule of the game that, in reality, power does not exist. Its strategy is ... always creating a space of optical illusion, maintaining itself in total ambiguity.⁹⁹

In an opposing position in the political arena, the Liberal reality consciously or unconsciously recognizes that politics functions in spite of cynicism (e.g. contradictions and inconsistencies). Michel deCerteau elaborates:

[T]hey are but simulacra, the results of manipulations. ... Each political discourse creates effects of reality out of what it assumes. ... Within each party, the professional discourses of the "responsible" leadership stand up thanks to the credulity those leaders assume on the part of the rank and file militants or the voters and, on the other hand, the "I am well aware that it's a joke" of many voters is countered by what they postulate, out of conviction or out of knowledge, about the cadres of the political apparatus. Belief thus functions on the basis of the value of the real that is assumed "anyway" in the other, even when one knows perfectly well - all too well - the extent to which "it's all bullshit" on one's own side.¹⁰⁰

Despite the Liberal's criticism of the FTA, their trading manifesto includes remaining a loyal ally and business partner to American foreign interests. It is the FTA that is at issue and not the concept of freer trade and reliance upon the United States. The Liberals support the implementation of global trading structures to improve the circulation of commerce - the technological dream. They contend, however, that:

A very simple and basic rule of business tells us that you do not sell all of your products to just one buyer. A global approach would allow Canada to more readily explore new and growing regions of the world economy. ... [I]t simply is not sound to sign an agreement that will restrict the type of Canada that future Canadians can create for themselves.¹⁰¹

The Liberal's "global outreach" program will:

...allow Canada to more readily explore new and growing regions of the world economy, especially the Pacific Rim, parts of Europe, and inevitably, Latin America. This is in stark contrast to the government's approach which would box Canada into only one trading partner. ... One of the major reasons why the international system has and will continue to provide an effective set of trade rules is because the will for it to do so exists among the world's major trading nations.¹⁰²

The Liberal alternative provokes cause for concern too because the "major trading nations" imply the United States and Japan. As noted in

the earlier section, the United States' corporate elite are detecting signs of destabilization in their own hegemony by increased Japanese market penetration. Therefore, the international, or global approach (multilateral trading), does not seem to offer anything radically different from the Conservative pact. The Liberal alternative is very much bound within the limitations of capitalist discursive formations.

In brief, the implications of the rhetorical discourse on the FTA of both Conservatives and Liberals illuminates the power of capitalist ideology to regulate discursive options. In "reality," is the Liberal party offering a different and better configuration of nationhood for Canadians? Or is it that the party is merely offering a different strategy in which tendencies towards interdependency and global social-Darwinism will be eventually reinforced? The FTA debate demonstrates that positioning for or against the deal is constituted by and within the struggle for power. The Liberals, in opposition, can be viewed as both standing in support of the governing party while rhetorically attempting to constitute a mere variant of nationhood. The content, so to speak, of the nation as a technological state remains untouched, moreover undisputed vis-a-vis the Conservative vision.

Gearing up for the next election campaign due sometime in 1992, the Liberals have recently condoned the FTA (only one month after it went into effect). Paul Martin, a senior Liberal critic, declared, "Free trade is the debate of the past. ... If we keep up [opposition] we'll lose all credibility among Canadians. ... Our model should be

the attitude among our entrepreneurs that we can compete with anyone in the world."¹⁰³ The Liberals have traditionally sought balance between private and public interests. Therefore, to embrace and reconcile themselves with the majority in favour of pursuing freer economic integration with the United States (i.e. FTA) does not pose particularly serious problems within Liberal party ranks nor in the perception of most voters' minds. The NDP, however, are not in as fortunate a position post-FTA.

3.4.2 Left or Right: Postmaterialists and the New Left

Exploring the free trade choice, we must identify the prejudices of each position. The NDP, the third and final political party we shall examine, as mentioned earlier has never had control of government. Canada's socialist party, the NDP, has been a significant voice within the opposition.

A socialist party inherently offers a critical interpretation of the discourse of capitalism. The values held by the socialist party become clearly evident in the midst of the FTA debate. Socialist parties within capitalist configurations of discourse must address, on the one hand, the desire to embrace private ownership in today's highly competitive world and, on the other hand, the desire to actualize greater state control. The NDP, like many other left-wing political groups the world over (i.e. the China crisis, "glasnost" in Russia)

must reconcile the growing split within their ranks between those who are more to the extreme left and those who tend to value policies that are considered to be right-wing or conservative (i.e. capitalist). This translates into a major identity crisis for left-wing parties, the NDP inclusive. To explain, in the words of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, "[a] supposedly socialist state implies a transformation of production, of the units of production and the economic rationale." Thus problems arise in socialist parties in capitalist formations of economy. They elaborate:

The task of the socialist movement was to organize a bipolarity of the social field, a bipolarity of classes. ... [The socialist] objective being what they define as class interest remains purely virtual so long as it is not embodied in a consciousness that ... actualizes it in an organized party suited to the task of conquering the State apparatus. ... [T]he socialist movement seems necessarily led to fix or assign a limit that differentiates the proletariat from the bourgeoisie - a great cleavage that will animate a struggle not only economic and financial, but political as well.¹⁰⁴

If a socialist party within capitalist formations accepts the moderate (mainstream) ideology, it forfeits its chance to mobilize around an alternative definition of the political; the result is that it is indistinguishable in many ways from the "bourgeois" parties which are its competitors.¹⁰⁵ The success (success being measured in terms of power or seats in Parliament), therefore, of a socialist party and, in particular, the NDP, "is dependent upon its ability to mobilize support by reinterpreting the existing system of partisan relations and by identifying instances of domination and non-representation."¹⁰⁶

As mentioned earlier, however, the NDP ground their free trade objections in mediated configurations of Liberal discourse. In other

words, they do not challenge the dominant bourgeois voice of Liberals or Conservatives; rather, they parallel the Liberal position within the dominant constraints of capitalist rhetoric. This illuminates the challenges and the present crisis that the NDP party is facing particularly with the shift in the social to a greater level of competition and social-Darwinism. The split in the NDP is between the working class faction - standing for the traditional socialist ideals with an emphasis towards union rights, job security, improvement in wages (in short, a materialist conception of political attitudes), and the postmaterialists or new left faction - standing for more individualism, greater concern for environmental interests, less class-relations, attaining goals of self-expression, and an emphasis on cultural rather than economic concerns. As John Rapley, a political economist, points out, "the principles of the traditional and new left have often clashed. The call for gay rights [from the new left NDP] has not always been well received by working class voters [from the more traditional wing of the party]."¹⁰⁷ In their effort to gain wider support from the populace within the parameters of free trade discourse, the NDP sought to expand their position. They watered down their appeal to leftist imperatives. Thus, their discourse against the FTA was moderated in accordance with the dominant values of capitalism and, consequently, the NDP took on the appearance of centrist parties. However, the NDP contend that their program is distinct from the Liberals program. Is it qualitatively distinguishable? Furthermore, on what grounds do the NDP reject the FTA? Are their protests echoed within Liberal rhetoric? Although the NDP claim to distinguish

themselves from the "bourgeois" Liberal party, their stand on free trade and their arguments in rejecting such a deal repeat Liberal rhetoric.

The NDP, like the Liberals, published a brochure about the trade deal. It was entitled A Time to Choose Canada: The New Democrats' Trade Option. United on the issue of free trade but for a different set of reasons, in other words "quasi-united," both factions of the NDP opposed the FTA: the traditional trade unionists opposed the deal more on the basis of economic devastation (i.e. the potential loss of jobs, the damage to business); the new leftists opposed it predominantly on the basis of the cultural issues. In the beginning of the FTA debate, Broadbent's NDP were ranked second in the polls. As they attempted to gain a broader base of support by appealing more strongly to middle-of-the-road values, support in general began to wane. Not long into the 1988 election campaign, the NDP returned to third-place ranking.

As is so often the case, when traditionally left-wing parties attempt to appeal to a more general population, they lose support and/or credibility. As the NDP position on free trade became more moderate, it became very much a coalition party supporting the Liberal position. In brief, it was no longer a viable alternative in the three-way election. Regardless, Broadbent maintained that the Liberals and Conservatives represent the status quo for the rich and powerful whereas the NDP represent the impoverished. Broadbent was quoted

reflecting on the fact that on a trip to New York, he went to a play where he saw a \$7,000 wristwatch advertised and then:

I walked out of the theatre and saw women lying in the streets. ... [Conservatives] may want that kind of America, with the rich getting richer and the poor poorer, but we reject that.¹⁰⁸

Unfortunately, given Canada's present homeless situation, we are now faced with more than merely rejecting dichotomies between the rich and the poor; the problem of the homeless is very much a national problem in Canada too and strong action is necessary to curb their growing numbers. Condemning the Liberals and Conservatives for pandering to "bourgeois" interests, Broadbent reiterated throughout the debate that his party speaks for the ordinary Canadian.¹⁰⁹ "Ordinary" is equated with an unspecified majority and, of course, normally accommodates a broad base of support. In the case of a socialist party in a capitalist economy, it also risks losing its traditional supporters. "As its new-left element asserts itself," explains Rapley, "the fragile commitment of the NDP's working-class support base may weaken, threatening party unity."¹¹⁰

Using similar strategies of rhetoric and identifying with a nationhood founded in "technological nationalism," the NDP incorporates a similar discursive version of capitalist imperatives even as they cite their objections to the FTA deal. The NDP believed that the legislating power of the Conservative government in calling an election only several months before the FTA was to be in effect bordered on the fraudulent. The Conservatives, it was charged, had denied due process of debate:

The undue haste with which the Mulroney government intends to consummate this deal shows its fundamental disregard for democracy and its fear of genuine national debate.

More importantly, the NDP note:

What is hard to understand is why the Canadian government would agree to such a sellout of the Canadian economy.¹¹¹

The NDP did not support any one particular interest group or set of interests except for the "national" interest. This ideological stand forced them to compete upon the same platform as the Liberals who have historically enjoyed a broader base of popular support. This made the NDP's task all the more difficult. There were murmurings throughout the election campaign that perhaps the NDP and Liberals should merge to form one coalition party. This was mutually rejected in the long run, if it had ever even been seriously considered. Each party maintained its status as a separate political entity though their platforms seemed almost a carbon copy of one another. In brief, however, the NDP took issue with the FTA because:

1. of the government's anti-democratic process in implementing the deal;
2. it renders Canada even more vulnerable in global markets; and
3. it will imminently lead to the collapse of the Canadian identity.

The NDP also use testimonials to support their claims.

Broadbent's NDP contend that:

It is a falsehood to state - as the Conservatives do - that foreign investment is essential to creating jobs in Canada. Statistics presented by the Council of Canadians indicated

that small Canadian companies produce 5,700 jobs for every \$1 Billion of investment; foreign owned companies produce 17. Moreover, foreign owners do not necessarily have our best interests at heart. To quote an anonymous branch plant manager, "When you are building a subsidiary, it's good for the country. But once the subsidiary is mature, head office wants it to be a cash cow. They just milk it. And it does great harm because they don't leave enough profits for reinvestment; particularly the large companies that are now run by accountant-management types. They couldn't care less about Canada."¹¹²

In selecting the best alternative, the NDP assert that the electorate will benefit by their proposal to secure multilateral trade while maintaining government intervention:

The New Democratic approach to economic development represents a real alternative to the vision the Conservative government is promoting through the Mulroney trade deal. ... [The NDP's approach] ... is frankly interventionist, and makes no apologies for using the powers of government to do what the government is intended to do - provide the best possible environment in which citizens can lead useful and meaningful lives.¹¹³

Ed Broadbent equates his approach - government intervention and control - with the "Japanese" style of public management. He attributes the industrial success of Japan - the most efficient country in the world - to government intervention and expenditures in research and development; the cultivation and nurturing of (domestic and international) markets; and flexibility for rapid turnover of new product lines.¹¹⁴ Through his "new" approach, Broadbent thereby proclaims it will ensure Canadian prosperity - granting the capacity to ensure a fair distribution of the nation's wealth.

The NDP, although embodying a coherent critique of capitalist relations also embraces the need to reproduce capitalist formations.

Insofar as this is to be accomplished with any degree of success, this Canadian socialist party stresses the importance of national identification. Therefore, government intervention is stressed but not in the strict capacity of aiding the impoverished. Rather government intervention is necessary to assist in the development of newer technologies and industrial expansion (i.e. technological nationalism). The NDP advocates the upgrading of our industrial potential which involves a competitive-based structure:

Canada must strengthen its ability to produce quality products ... through increased technological development, better education and skills training.¹¹⁵

Subsequently, its agenda will provide Canadians "with the flexibility and expertise to be more self-reliant and adaptive to changing [controlling] industrial realities in the future."¹¹⁶

In pursuing this competitive course, will the NDP's commitment to the homeless be altered in order to allot greater expenditures towards technical development? Will socialist and humanitarian concerns be relegated to the development of "technique" over "content:" medical technologies vs. medical services, cultural industries vs. cultural involvement, technological progress vs. environmental erosion, quantification of life vs. qualification of life? The constraints of economic givens like globalization and greater competition, government deficits, privatization programs, government cuts in spending on state-supported programs are all indicative and contributory factors of a shift in mentalities from left to right. As a result, the NDP must struggle to redefine its role in Canadian public affairs. The NDP, in

articulating a "reality" within the confines of liberal, capitalist configurations of power, "devours" its socialist bases while "inflating" the destiny served by the "bourgeoisie:"

...the system devours its own principle of reality, inflates its own empty forms until it reaches an absolute and its own ironic destiny of reversal.¹¹⁷

It seems as though the NDP's third-party status is subject within the system to this irony. One of the problems facing the NDP is how to develop in reality a welfare state that is competitive. The discourse on free-trade forces it to address such problematics. I must stress that the FTA debate brings to fore the fragility of the NDP in late capitalism. Identifying with the "ordinary" pragmatic mentality (i.e. pursuing broader market relations, more individualism, more privatization) while identifying with the "proletariat," weakened the credibility of the NDP substantially in the last election. In attempting to modify their relationship to traditional leftist ideology, they discouraged supporters from the middle ranks and vice versa. The voters are left to interpret this fragmentation within the party as an abandonment of its ideals to the privilege of capitalist practices. Until the party can reconcile its polarization and fragmentation, it is unlikely that the NDP will gain much additional support in Canadian politics.

3.5 Summary

By analysing the historical framework as well as the present configurations and complexities in the political regarding freer trade,

it has been demonstrated that the dominant episteme, capitalist instrumental rationality, is the course by which the political ideologues are constrained to interpret public policy initiatives and directives. The discourses of the three political parties have clearly been shown to be inadequate and contradictory on the issue of the FTA. In keeping within the parameters of acceptable social, political, and economic discursive practices, all three political parties cannot feasibly explain, let alone remedy, the trade/protectionist relations in the contemporary world. The challenge which we now face is to explore alternative discursive procedures for the evaluation of public policy agenda-setting.

4.0 DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC LIFE: SUGGESTIVE APPROACHES TO PUBLIC POLICY DISCOURSE

Liberal-democracy is the politics of choice. Everything is up for choice, or may be up for choice at any time - everthing, that is to say, except the liberal society and the democratic franchise themselves. ... The ideal of liberal-democracy is consumers' sovereignty - we buy what we want with our votes. ... The new states cannot afford the politics of extreme choice. ... [O]ur liberal-democracy, like any other system, is a system of power. ... The job of the competitive party system [in a liberal-democracy is] to uphold the competitive market society, by keeping the government responsive to the shifting majority interests of those who [are] running the market society.¹

C.B. Macpherson

[T]he New World mind, at least in its American outbreak, continues to operate in that unoccupied space between the advance of technological rationalization and the disappearance of religious sensibility. Here, the mythic spirit of sacrificial renunciation also mutates into a frenzied scene where the fin-de millenium spreads out before us like random flashes of brilliant energy: a time of sacrifice and narcissism; a century of chaos and instrumentality without signification; an already post-millennial consciousness of primitive irrationalism and ultra-modern technique. What is liberty at the end of the world?²

Arthur Kroker

4.1 The Liberal-Democratic Competitive-Party System

In a liberal-democratic state, such as the one that inheres to the Canadian parliamentary system, public policy and regulation are based on debate and competition. Though the public policy process is fashioned through a collectivity of individuated interests, it is the majority, or in Jean-Jacques Rousseau's terms the "general will,"

which should prevail. The "general will" is the idea that the unit, the society, is privileged to a greater extent than particular entities. In other words, the sum of the unit is greater (i.e. exerts more power) than its individual components. Ideally, a liberal democracy should operate in order to ensure that the government serves the general will. The FTA policy, subsequent to the 1988 federal election, is considered in the minds of most Canadians to represent the general will and is perceived as not in violation to the primary virtue of social democratic liberal justice: free rule by the people for the people. The government under such a system is presupposed as a neutral navigator of the general national interests.

It must be emphasized, however, that our existing political institutions (i.e. the political party apparatus, the electoral system) were developed at a time when a far less bureaucratized and centralized society existed.³ Does the notion of the general will comprised of individuals constituted within the dynamics of monopolies of knowledge and enterprise distort our understanding of actual politics in the modern world? Are claims that the competitive-party system is a legitimate process for integrating a plurality of needs and interests into the Canadian public sphere perhaps highly dubious? Business, including multinational corporations, has been very successful in forming a concentration of power. Consequently, its influence and power distorts fair and equal representation of interests. This concentration of power which celebrates the "values" of a society of compulsive consumption, raise in our minds a

questioning of the value of the electoral and parliamentary system of representative democracy; today both the legislative and electoral process are reduced to ritual.⁴

As shown through our examination of the discourse on free trade, the differences between the Liberal, Conservative, and NDP positions are rhetorically constituted as different and consequently providing choices. Yet, their differences focused upon administrative and management matters rather than basic policy differences resulting in an inadequate representation of the plurality of Canadian opinion. The question of a more laissez-faire form of government should be given serious thought, more than ever before, especially because of the ever-growing need to devise standards for environmental controls. More particularly, the claims of business to "need" policies favouring competition should be closely scrutinized while profit maximization is generally their primary goal. Free enterprise often serves to heighten tension between the goals of the producers and the potential interests of consumers. For example, the unsafe disposal of toxic wastes is a more cost-efficient method for producers even though, in the long-run, it could have devastating effects on all consumers. Multinationals are less likely to be sensitive to the needs of a particular community and, thus, more likely to dispose of toxic wastes without adequate safeguards. Gerald Cavanagh and Arthur McGovern point out in Ethical Dilemmas in the Modern Corporation that "[w]hen management is not on the scene, but in a distant headquarter city, the people directly

affected by such a move [i.e. disposing of contaminated materials by cost-efficient methods] are only numbers not flesh and blood."⁵

Corporate life and free enterprise have not always seemed so glamorous in the minds of the electorate. We should recall for a moment the activities of business elites like:

...Andrew Carnegie and John D. Rockefeller two generations ago, and of Ivan Boesky and Dennis Levine of Drexel Burnham Lambert more recently. Carnegie and Rockefeller underpaid workers and drove competitors out of business, but they did create jobs, income, and goods. Boesky and Levine made millions personally while contributing little in the way of jobs, income, and goods that would benefit others.⁶

Such excessive self-indulgent practices of business elite created shifts in government policies towards more intervention in order to combat the unfair, monopolistic powers of free-enterprise. If we go back even further, we can see that the Marxist critique of capitalism also stemmed from the unfair powers of monopoly.

Why, then, is less government intervention the order of the times? It is the contention of this thesis that "[t]he real power centers lie far beyond the people's influence at elections."⁷ Major corporations are gaining all the more power through the "merger mania" that is rampant in the business world. Corporate power as a result is becoming all the more concentrated in too few hands. What we witnessed in the policy debate on the FTA and the subsequent demand for reduced regulation by the electorate was a debate by technocrats and business elites.

In brief, the choice of one party over another was truly insignificant because all three alternatives reiterated the need to pursue freer trade policies. Their differences were of a trivial nature rather than substantive. In reality, the three alternatives presented the [re]presentation of the relations of the status quo. The discursive relations set amidst the free trade debate reinforced the logic of capitalism and, ultimately, the interests of the business power elite. As a result of the "quasi-competitive" party system, the charismatic abilities of the leaders of each party became a factor of overriding importance. The absence of substantive principles of debate between the parties shifts the emphasis to the image of the leader - the stutter, the smile, the width of shoulders, and so on. Arthur Kroker would label this as part of the genre of "panic politics." Panic politics can be understood loosely as a cynical metaphor describing a variety of social relations involved in the public space besieged, overpowered, by an "implosion" of different messages of which some are more important than others; Kroker has this to say about Gary Hart, a victim of panic politics:

If Gary Hart could implode so quickly, actually be lasered by the media and disappear as a political candidate in 72 hours, that is because Hart was first the beneficiary, and then the victim, of the postmodern politics of the simulacrum.⁸

Gary Hart was obliterated from the political drama because he neglected the profound warnings long ago of Machiavelli, an early modern political philosopher who always contended that politics, the "science" of power, is based on image and appearance:

A prince ... need not necessarily have all the good qualities ... but he should certainly appear to have them. I would even go so far as to say that if he has these qualities and

always behaves accordingly he will find them harmful; if he only appears to have them they will render him service. He should appear to be compassionate, faithful to his word, kind, guileless, and devout.⁹

"In the end," Kroker explains, "Hart turned out to be a modern kind of guy who did not understand at all the secret of cynical power in the age of panic politics:"

... [that is] to understand that power was dead, that power in the postmodern condition has only the cynical existence of a perspectival simulacra. ... [I]n the age of dead power, power is interesting only on its dark side of disaccumulation, excess, and waste.¹⁰

The electorate did not focus on what Hart represented in terms of policy proposals. They focused on his indiscretions - the dark side of his friendly smile. Gary Hart is only one of many victims in the game of panic politics; John Turner, at the very least, came close to being another such casualty during his reign as Liberal opposition leader. "Panic politics" in essence serves to efface dealing with substantive issues. As a result, the electorate's power mediated via the institutionalized electoral system is reduced to one of mere ritual - symbolic of expressing self-interests within narrow, restrictive parameters where the practice of voting becomes an activity in the "simulacrum of power." Michel DeCerteau writes in The Jabbering of Social Life that:

The simulacrum is what the relationship of the visible to the real becomes when the postulate of an invisible immensity of the Being (or beings) hidden behind appearances crumble. ... Belief is no longer based on an invisible otherness concealed behind signs, but on what other groups, other fields, or other disciplines are supposed to be.¹¹

Dimitrios Roussopoulos, a critic to the left of the political spectrum, writes:

The object of Canada's power elite and its supporting institutions is clear: [i]t is to muffle real conflict; to dissolve it into false political consensus; to build, not a participatory democracy where people have power to control a community of meaningful life and work, but a bogus conviviality between every social group. Consensus politics, essential to modern capitalism, is manipulative politics, the politics of [wo]man-management, and it is deeply undemocratic. Governments are still elected to be sure, MPs assert the supremacy of the House of Commons, but the real business of government is the management of consensus between the powerful and organized elite.¹²

The electoral system in Canada's liberal democracy in large measure has a bias in favour of concentrated bases of power opposed to diverse and broader interests. The present system of political party bureaucracy does not constitute a satisfactory basis for legitimating policy initiatives.

Regarding the free trade policy between Canada and United States, the fact that the Conservative government can legitimately claim to represent the will of the population based on the most recent electoral results is somewhat dubious and misleading. Many present policies that claim to provide the maximum level of consultation with the citizens at large within our liberal democracy do not function adequately. As a result, the majority which comprises the general will is depoliticized.

4.2 Government and Free Enterprise

The crux of the debate over the FTA is one that extends well beyond Canada. The controversy over levels of government regulation and non-intervention knows no geographical boundary in the industrialized world. In the last few decades an international debate has been raging between those countries which hold to the liberalist concept of freedom as the absence of all constraints and therefore favour a reduction in regulation, and those countries which claim that more regulation is necessary in order to ensure their freedom and autonomy.¹³ Canada's policies obviously reflect a greater thrust towards the former rather than the latter. The paradox of government intervention and free enterprise involves two distinct yet interrelated issues: the economic and the political. The economic issues focus on international competitive forces affecting domestic markets; the political issues relate to questions of dominance, monopoly formation, and potential market abuses. The economic cannot be analysed independent of the political. For example, in order for business to remain competitive, companies feel compelled to embrace the ideals of economies of scale. Consequently, similar-type business enterprises merge and thus emerge as a stronger, more competitive force.

Free trade and the free-enterprise system encourage deregulation. But how much is too much deregulation? The FTA debate shows that business practices contextualize social management processes on private and public levels. In other words, the impact of corporate

concentration works to define rather than reflect the discursive parameters of policy formation due to their monopoly of empire. Despite the claim that a forum of pluralistic ideas are circulated, one particular group, the multinationals, enjoy almost exclusive control over shaping and limiting the "free and open" discussion of debate particularly on the issue of the FTA. Reinforcing hegemonic practices overall results in relatively little, if any, autonomy in social choices. The free trade objective helps to arrange individual global forces into trading links, or blocs (i.e. European Common Market, North American Common Market), forging empires in the process.

The free-market system encourages short-term over long-term objectives, increased competitiveness, and heightened emphasis on individualism. This type of bias within the process of social management does not successfully mediate a sense of commonality or nationhood. It is our present concepts of individualism that make heroes of those who owe nothing to anyone but their independent driving will to power. Perhaps, if our society becomes increasingly aware that this is an unhealthy manifestation of individualism, then we as a people would be able to acknowledge the importance of successfully achieving self-fulfilment with more empathy in the public sphere. Films in the late 1980s like Wallstreet, or television programs like Beauty and the Beast reflect the importance of self-fulfilment as external to one's own desires - they expose the superficiality of the American dream. What is the significance of liberty if it is void of substance? How can we depart from constructing discursive categories

in which instrumental rationality and a bias towards individuated egos develop? The FTA debate provokes thought and discussion of this serious problem in our culture.

The contention of this work is that as individuals are constrained so must corporations be constrained in terms of the impact of their power. Freedom should not negate ethical responsibility within the civilizing process. Furthermore, this is not a plea to subvert particular groups and it should not be misconstrued as a naive call for additional bureaucratization. My argument can be reduced to the idea that dominant power bases impose certain constraints within our liberalized episteme (i.e. institutionalized procedures which may not serve the interests at large). We need to move to a climate where government, citizens, and business operate in a more reconciliatory environment. All sectors of society should play a more constructive role in the policy process. Recognizing that all social relations of order, corporate or individual, are linked to relations of control and power (i.e. Foucault), the question becomes one of balance and proportion (i.e. Innis). How can we first and foremost better recognize the bias of monopolies of knowledge that set into motion the hegemonic forces of power elite?

4.3 Alternative Discourses Favouring Alternative Relations of Power

If one concedes that objective value-free policy determinations are impossible, then the only alternative available presently, apart

from passive aggressive behaviour (i.e. "ressentiment" of Nietzsche's last men) or total inaction, is a politics of resistance, a politics of discourse that privileges alternative relations of power. This can be defined, in contradistinction to the mainstream approach, as the discursive approach to public policy evaluation. It can be more easily understood as intervention (regulation) via discourse.

Marika Finlay explains:

A discursive approach, by virtue of looking at the pragmatic conditions of all and every meaning, seeks to avoid universalization in favour of exposure and relativization of procedures of semantic association. Showing how the procedure of "progress," for example, is associated with a specific episteme demythifies its claims to universality. Discourse analysis seeks to de-automatize semantic associations ... by illustrating the dependence of these upon particular contexts of discursive procedures. In so doing, a discursive analysis points out the possibility of a transformation of these procedures, and, hence, of a change in social meaning of [individuated self, economic progress] for society. ... In short, discursive criticism has the same task as that which Bacon, Locke, Descartes, et al., gave themselves at the beginning of the rise of the "new" science. These thinkers sought to think their way out of an old logical space - discursive episteme - and into a new, more adequate one to meet the needs of the times. Discursive criticism, not content to remain within it, criticizes the old space. It then sets itself the aim of perceiving how transformations toward an alternative new space might be achieved.¹⁴

What type of modifications could be made to mainstream approaches to evaluating policy directives which could better meet the demands of the contemporary world? What follows are some alternatives compared to more traditional strategies.¹⁵

4.3.1 Developing a Vision

In mainstream policy analysis, there exists no common valuation horizon, no integrative framework. The three dominant federal party ideologues reiterate the national dream, for example, but there is no common ground in which to set guidelines for attaining a united country. There is no channel in which to viably organize radical concerns that may be presented by a variety of integrated interests. As noted, the Liberals completely embraced the status quo on the issue of free trade only one month subsequent to its implementation.

Why is a coherent vision necessary? Finlay responds:

An absence of some coherent integrating principle for the discussion concerning [economic changes] and society would seem to give way either to a certain type of "laissez-faire" telos or to a reaffirmation of the status quo. ... [T]he absence of integration makes for a form of side-tracking or paralyzing confusion.¹⁶

Amidst the confusion of the FTA debate, the electorate, the political parties, and government, without a coherent substantive vision of a national objective and related identity, were unable to provide a sense of mutual purpose or priority outside of a somewhat narrow frame defined cynically as narcissistic materialism. It has been said that confusion or "[p]aralysis is the panicky plea for identity."¹⁷

A discursive approach to policy debates first locates common points of reference and then works to define specific processes and strategies that permit specific behaviour in society. This is contingent upon temporal and spacial factors. Finlay elaborates:

A discursive approach recognizes that the procedures it may uncover at one time and place are very likely to change and be transformed throughout history. Such an approach not only postulates the possibility of social ... change, it also provides a means of analyzing whether or not such change has actually occurred.¹⁸

4.3.2 Recognizing the Shortcomings of Empirical Studies

Politicians are quick at pointing out that graphs, formulas, and statistical measurements are key indicators of productivity and overall socio-economic activity. Opinions are argued for and legitimated on the basis of "facts." Policy claims and directives, traditionally, rely upon objective data in order to substantiate their arguments. The positivist approach, the quest for certainty, objectivity, and empirical groundings, demands accurate predictions. The "crisis of referentiality," the "legitimation crisis," the "death of the subject" problematize the viability of scientific claims of "proof." The question of legitimacy within an empirical status of policy analysis revolves around the question, as Jean-Francois Lyotard puts it of, "What is your 'what is it worth' worth?"¹⁹ The positivist approach leaves one in a tautology. Lyotard elaborates:

[T]he idea (or ideology) of perfect control over a system, which is supposed to improve its performance, is inconsistent with respect to the law of contradiction: it in fact lowers the performance level it claims to raise.

He goes on to explain that:

This inconsistency explains the weakness of state and socio-economic bureaucracies: they stifle the systems or subsystems they control and asphyxiate themselves in the process (negative feedback). The interest of such an explanation is that it has no need to invoke any form of legitimation outside the system itself (for example, the

freedom of human agents inciting them to rise up against excessive authority). Even if we accept that society is a system, complete control over it, which would necessitate an exact definition could never be effected.²⁰

The discursive approach loosely defined is one approach to public policy debate that encompasses a methodology that addresses a rhetorical analysis. Note that a liberal democracy defends its inadequacies in a self-maintaining system and subsequently occults inequalities and injustices through rhetorical manifestations. How can we seek to politicize the depoliticized if we do not believe they exist? Traditional policy analysis idealize the liberal democratic nation state and emphasize the importance of the study of economics which ultimately reinforces the basis of this logic - instrumental rationality. The rhetorical-discursive approach attempts to gain a better understanding of human sensibilities in articulating policy regulation in hopes of re-politicizing the general will.

Discursive strategies of policy analysis comprise of studying the practices, procedures, and rules of discourse that enable cultures to privilege one "bias" over others: studying the processes rather than the content. Finlay claims:

Discourse analysis recognizes that, intervening between the object to be known and the knowing subject, there are always rules of discourse and knowledge which perturb the results and cloud the transparency of the representational model to the world. The one materially graspable object is discourse itself, but even this is subject to the perturbations of meta-discourse. Discursive analysis avoids the paradoxes of empiricism by means of a statement and practice of what might be called the "epistemological modesty" which recognizes the discursive mediation of the objects of scientific study. What it may uncover at one time and place are very likely to

change and be transformed throughout history. Such an approach not only postulates the possibility of social ... change, it also provides a means of analyzing whether or not such change has actually occurred.²¹

4.3.3 Overcoming the Tendency Towards Historical Amnesia

Discursive analysis tends to emphasize the historical positioning of current debates and social issues. In attempts at understanding past successes and failures of other generations, we can genuinely discern adjustments, transformations, or shifts in the needs of a continually changing society. This should not be misconstrued as implying that the more orthodox approaches to public policy advocacy do not refer to the "past." The "past" in the traditional sense, however, is usually constituted only as a gauge to measure progressivist interests. George Grant in Time as History explains:

When we speak of the present historical situation we are oriented to the future, in the sense that we are trying to gather together the intricacies of the present so that we can calculate what we must be resolute in doing to bring about the future we desire. The accomplishments of modern society are every year more before us, not simply as they once were hoped for dreams, but as pressing realizations. The magnitude of those modern accomplishments, as compared with those of other civilizations, lies in what they enable us to do by our mastery through prediction over human and non-human nature. These accomplishments were the work of men who were determined to make the future different from what the past had been; men oriented to that future in which greater events than have yet been, will be. They conceived time as that in which human accomplishments, would be unfolded; that is, in the language of their ideology, as progress.²²

Mainstream historical analysis renders the mastery of human and non-human nature as a fundamental objective. The discursive approach, on

the other hand, attempts to provide an integrative framework of the human and non-human. This enables the researcher to locate and highlight an expanded field of different possible sites involved in how we come to hold our present conception of ourselves, for example, of time as "fun in the fast lane." George Grant reflects:

Our present is like being lost in the wilderness, when every pine and rock and bay appears to us as both known and unknown, and therefore as uncertain pointers on the way back to human habitation. The sun is hidden by the clouds and usefulness of our ancient compasses has been put in question.²³

Developing a "discursive archaeology" outside the context of "tomorrow" enables one to better deal with the reality of our limitations. Perhaps our fixation with the future stems in part from an episteme that cannot deal with the finitude of being - mortality.

The social setting is dynamic and indeed it is a challenge to generate an historical archaeology on the relation of government to business, political parties' disparities to the contemporary frame. It is a challenge, nevertheless, that is crucial to the formulation of a more acute perception of the complex relations of present-day practices either in the social, economic, or political sphere.

4.3.4 Valuation Horizon

As noted earlier, the government in reality is a non-neutral navigator. It represents, democratically or otherwise, a collectivity of interests and concerns that reflect what we come to value in

society. The government apparatus mediates what is acceptable behaviour. However, the system of electoral representation and the emphasis on "objectivity" demands the appearance of neutrality from government on policy regulation. Their non-neutral position should not be negated; rather it should be recognized as a possible platform in formulating a valuation horizon - guidelines for economic pursuits, ecological regulations and so on. Laws can then be created to better reflect a bias of value.

The discursive approach acknowledges the importance of the non-neutrality of government directives. This acknowledgement alone creates a potential platform whereby we may be better able to criticize social management. This will serve, as well, to make bureaucrats accountable for their failures and successes in articulating directives for the present.

4.3.5 Limitations

The discursive approach, unlike the traditional approaches to policy analysis, allows for, even if only on a marginal basis, an expanded horizon in order to attempt to overcome the failures of a liberal democracy. Traditional methods work to reinforce the existing paradigms and status quo. Alternative approaches with a discursive emphasis towards rhetorical analysis recognize the need to refrain from denying the flexibility in the value of difference. The challenge of alternative discursive approaches does not seek to reproduce past

contradictions in holding that the possibility exists to transcend the discursive practices of the current epoch. Better alternatives, however, can only be developed by recognizing the failures of past dominant practices. We cannot simply reverse the politics and practices of past liberalism and we cannot simply espouse an alternative politics of truth. We can, however, strive to recognize and subsequently hope to overcome certain failures of the liberalist configuration. Our limitations, or biases, should not be occulted but exposed in the process of policy debate.

4.4 Practical Recommendations

Further research into implementing alternatives to the public policy process and administration, of course, are necessary. The above suggestions are only a preliminary sketch of important considerations in policy planning and require further research into how the discursive alternative may be actualized within particular domains of policy administration. Discursive analysis in a small way is clearly a beginning to a better articulation of lacunae of traditional methodologies. The discursive approach contains new possibilities for the displaced (post)modern subject. Articulating a vision of how we can exceed the postmodern sensibility is always much easier than proceeding to actually implement and exercise such alternatives. Arthur Kroker in the following reflection aptly captures the postmodern moment:

To be dangling subjects in quantum reality is our fate now: like the ancients, to have consciousness of much, but the ability to do nothing about it.²⁴

Although the problems facing the postmodern subject are international in scope, we can begin, on a gradual basis, to find solutions on the domestic front. We need to review our attitudes toward our country, toward our legislation that does not serve specific local groups, toward the growing trend favouring free enterprise, and toward increased American cultural and economic influence. Governmental regulation in regard to defining policy problems, envisioning goals, and mediating alternative value positions in the private and public sectors needs to be appropriately reaffirmed and strengthened. It was Innis and Foucault that conjectured that there is no possibility of a total absence of domination and control. As John Meisel, a political theorist, put it, "If we trust the market to pull us through, if we fail to pursue the public interest through both public and private means, then, I fear, we are lost."²⁵

Corporations and individuals acting within their discursive practices must be brought into reconciliation and community solidarity. The government apparatus must not be isolated from this process. Public policy advocacy should favour structures of decentralization which would serve to counter the silence of the peripheries and, more importantly, to develop an ethics in open debate to better understand value conflict. Garland claims that one discursive approach, rhetorical theory, "should remind cultural or critical theory that

practical politics requires ideological work in the form of arguments and narratives that create good and compelling reasons or motives to act. Furthermore, such reasons can only proceed from the existent discursive ground."²⁶ The discursive approach reinforces the idea that public policy advocacy is essentially collective problem solving. The discursive approach to policy regulation is a method of policy analysis and social criticism that strives to attain less hegemonic dynamics and less tension of contradiction. Though our present liberal democracy is somewhat constricting, we must continually strive to provide fresh perspectives to challenge the status quo. We may find out that the system is unexpectedly more flexible and resilient to change than anticipated.

It is not my intention to espouse a substitute for the liberal democratic model but simply to find alternative ways of interpreting the present social environment in order to illuminate hegemonic procedures that are counter-productive to collective problem solving. The above recommendations should be taken into consideration when evaluating public policy initiatives. The realization of alternative practices in the public sphere will ultimately require changes within government institutions. More specifically, government must truly mediate and intervene in the social process concerning businesses, individuals, the scientific community, and academia. It is the government, the navigators, who must provide an articulation of our valuations. More or less government intervention within mainstream structures is not so much the issue as is an appeal for a qualitative

shift in thinking about what it means to be an individual qua citizen. It should be understood that subsequent transformations in the episteme of mainstream discourse to an approach which proceeds from an analysis of discursive procedures would transform the government into a qualified arbitrator.

5.0 SUMMARY

Should public spaces, always threatened, finally disappear, or should a culture reach the point where consistency or reason-giving are no longer valued or recognized, rhetoric would be irrelevant. Such a world is to be resisted however, for the absence of reasons and judgement are the mark of a reign of terror.¹

Maurice Charland

Free enterprise, privatization, mergers, acquisitions are not merely economic issues but they involve important political actions and political actions are value-laden. One must recognize that the claim for the need to expand networks of multinational capitalism is reinforced by a discursive cartel (episteme) that values individual control over private property. The case in favour of the FTA and freer trade generally provides logical, compelling reasons for proceeding wholeheartedly with the plan for economic unification of the North American marketplace. The fear of being isolated and deprived of acquiring newer products of consumption; the fear of Japanese expansion; the fear of the European Common Market; the fear of American retaliation are all factors that might lead one to believe in the overall benefits derived by reduced regulatory interference from government. The case against the FTA, favouring a multilateral approach, tends to privilege the role of added government intervention into the complexities of the market structure which still works to promote competition in the global sphere. The discourse on free trade

either in favour or against non-regulation proceeds from the dominant rhetoric that is forever moving towards a single world order.

Using the framework of discourse analysis, I have suggested that the responses to the FTA by the three dominant federal political parties sustained the dominant ideology of consumer capitalism while promoting their own interests. The free trade project, an initiative that consistently throughout Canadian history was rejected by the populace, is now presented as the order of the day. This results from two key factors. Firstly, the evolution of large multinational conglomerates have intensified the pressure toward monopolies of knowledge and capital, unfair trading practices, and technological specialization. Secondly, the contemporary age operates amidst a social system which has lost much of its capability to remember its traditions and values. Thus, as a society, we become fragmented and obsessed with narcissistic materialism in attempts at overcoming the lack of a coherent value of common unity.

The legitimation of the FTA policy through the 1988 federal election was a simulation of democracy. The political party apparatus defined the issues to be discussed and allowed for only marginal input in the policy process by the electorate. More specifically, voting either Conservative, Liberal, or NDP merely permitted the individual to react to a prefocused, narrow configuration of interests within society. As long as the individual qua citizen is not permitted a louder voice in formulating issues of debate, democracy in our liberal

structures of political practice is, and will continue to be, a mere ritual in the process of social management. We must, therefore, attempt to locate those regularities of practice that constitute the episteme which serve to heighten hegemony and the affinities of knowledge to power.

In attempts to follow procedures of validation stemming from the discourse of instrumental rationality and authentication in the systemic forces of our liberal democracy, technocrats have implemented a simulation of what is credible, normative, and most of all, acceptable. This inherently depoliticizes the citizenry and reduces the liberal democratic procedures to that of iconic symbolism. As a result, we participate obligingly within a complex series of practices which limit and constrain our autonomy. We must continually question the limits that become manifest in the social order and take on an absolute, universalist status.

In postmodern society, tensions existing between innovation and tradition, humanistic concerns and progressivist liberation are seemingly exacerbated under the technological dynamic at work in the midst of a bureaucratized world order. In attempting at dealing with the crisis of value in postmodernity, we must relentlessly question our normative codes and institutions which have possibly become antiquated in meeting current demands. One such alternative in the re-examination of our valuation horizon is discourse analysis.

Scrutinizing public policy advocacy conceived of within this perspective does not seek to explain statistical and technical data as much as it seeks to expose the paradoxes inherent in the rhetoric produced by dominant codes of behaviour. The discursive approach to policy analysis enables one to better decipher, probe, and reflect on a broader articulation of the subset of socio-political problems under the thematics of greater humanism. Discourse analysis focuses on gaining a better understanding of the continuous struggles between those who dominate and those who are dominated.

I would submit that the discursive approach to policy evaluation, as demonstrated in particular to the FTA debate, is one that attempts to expose the contradictions of a liberal democracy via discourse. This is done in the spirit and with the ambition of stimulating political power on behalf of the marginal groups and stimulating collective action in general. An appeal for collective action implies the mobilization of government interaction, individual action, and business efforts committed to re-establishing ethical norms for society. The discursive approach does not provide an easy gateway to resolving all the contradictions encountered in the public space but it does provide for an alternative in beginning to better grasp a substantive theorization of the relationship of discourse to power.

APPENDIX I

A commentary on articles in the FTA pertaining to the cultural industries.*

There are four exceptions to the cultural industries exemption. The first concerns the elimination of tariffs which is addressed in Article 401. The tariffs to be eliminated relate to the inputs to and products of the cultural industries, such as musical instruments, cassettes, film, recording tape, records and cameras.

The second exception relates to the investment provisions contained in Chapter 16 of the FTA. In that Chapter, there is a basic obligation to ensure that future regulation of Canadian investors in the United States and of American investors in Canada results in treatment no different than that extended to domestic investors within each country. As stated in the Synopsis, this basic principle has been translated into specific undertakings. Thus, the undertakings apply only to future changes in laws and regulations with the further result that existing provisions in both Canada and the United States with respect to restrictions on foreign ownership in the cultural industries are maintained. Specifically, paragraph 4 of Article 1607 states:

In the event that Canada requires the divestiture of a business enterprise located in Canada in a cultural industry pursuant to its review of an indirect acquisition of such business enterprise by an investor of the United States of America, Canada shall offer to purchase the business enterprise from the investor of the United States of America at fair open market value, as determined by an independent, impartial assessment.

*This commentary is compiled by Stikeman, Elliott, Barristers & Solicitors, July 1988. This is soon to be published in Doing Business in Canada, Chapter 29, Matthew Bender & Co. of New York.

Thus if Canada should deny an indirect acquisition by an investor from the United States, for example, under the Investment Canada Act, then it is obliged to purchase the enterprise from the U.S. investor at fair market value.

The third exception to the cultural industries exemption relates to Article 2006, which deals with "retransmission rights." This provision is intended to "address an existing irritant in bilateral relations" which has existed for some time. The irritant has developed because under existing copyright law in Canada cable television licensees are not required to provide remuneration to the originators of the broadcast signals which they retransmit to their subscribers.

In summary, Article 2006 will require Canada to make provision for such remuneration through an amendment to Canada's Copyright Act no later than January 1, 1990. The obligation to remunerate will be for "any retransmission to the public of the copyright holder's program where the original transmission of the program is carried in distant signals intended for free, over-the-air reception by the general public."

The FTA further requires cable television companies to obtain authorization from the holder of copyright in programs where the signals are not intended in the original transmission for free, over-the-air reception by the general public. In addition, cable television companies must obtain the authorization of the holder of copyright in

the program in a situation where there is willful retransmission in altered form or non-simultaneous retransmission of signals carrying a copyright holder's program if the original transmission of the program is carried in signals intended for free, over-the-air reception by the general public.

Article 2006 does preserve some important regulatory provisions established by the CRTC with respect to cable television undertakings. These include deletion and substitution of substantially identical signals broadcast by a television station; prohibitions on the retransmission of a signal which is blacked out in a local market; prohibition on a retransmission of certain programming content such as abusive and obscene material, alcoholic beverages or other prohibited products, advertisements or announcements during an election or referendum, authorized preemption of programs for urgent and non-commercial communications; and the requirement for the deletion and substitution of commercial materials by cable systems required to do so pursuant to their licences if such a provision was in the licence as of October 4, 1987.

It is to be noted that paragraph 4 of Article 2006 requires Canada and the United States to establish a joint advisory committee comprised of government and private sector experts to review outstanding issues related to retransmission rights in both countries and to make recommendations within twelve months following the implementation of amendments to the Copyright Act in Canada.

The fourth and final exception concerns the publishing sector and Article 2007, which requires Canada to repeal clauses 19(5)(a)(i)(A) and (B) and 19(5)(a)(ii)(A) and (B) of the Income Tax Act. These define a Canadian issue of a newspaper or a periodical for purposes of deduction from income of expenses of a taxpayer for advertising space as one that is printed or typeset in Canada. The purpose of section 19 is socio-economic as opposed to fiscal. The objectives of the section included placing a curb on advertising by Canadian taxpayers in non-Canadian newspapers and periodicals aimed at Canadian markets via "split runs" (which otherwise places Canadian publications at a competitive disadvantage). The effect of this Article will be to permit the Canadian advertiser to deduct from its income the cost of taking advertising space in a Canadian issue of a newspaper or periodical which has been printed or typeset in the United States.

Another provision worthy of note is Article 2004, which requires Canada and the United States to "cooperate in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations and in other international forums to improve protection of intellectual property." During the course of the free trade negotiations, the two governments worked on an overall framework covering the protection of intellectual property rights (trademarks, copyrights, patents, industrial design and trade secrets).

As stated in the Synopsis:

In the end, a substantive chapter was dropped. Nevertheless, in Article 2004, the two governments agreed to continue to cooperate and work toward better international intellectual property rules, particularly in the Uruguay Round of

multilateral trade negotiations where a working group on trade-related intellectual property issues has been established.

Thus while the provisions relating to cultural industries do not take up a significant portion of the FTA, they are important.

APPENDIX II*

TRADITIONAL APPROACH

ALTERNATIVE APPROACH

Disintegrated Vision

Integrated

Empiricist's Paradox

Epistemology based on
Discourse

A-historical

Historical

Idealization/abstraction

Contextualization

A priori Assumption of Context

Changing Context

Out of Focus

In Focus

Claim to Objectivity

Affirmation of Interests

Reaffirmation of Status Quo

Potential

Closure within an Accepted
Discursive SpaceRelativization of Logical
Space

*Marika Finlay, *Powermatics*.

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Gazette, April 19, 1989), the report noted that: "...the U.S. government is encouraging Thai authorities to re-examine the ban on foreign cigarettes. Privately, Thai officials were reminded that Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act allows the United States to impose sanctions against any nation whose trade policies are unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory. ... The advertising is pitched toward the young and upwardly mobile who consider American cigarettes a step-up in sophistication and elegance."

Implicit in the gesture by the United States' government to possibly impose "Section 301," the discourse on health becomes subsumed by overriding concerns regarding the discourse of free competition in the international arena. Supposing Thailand succumbs to the external pressure posed by the United States' trade laws, how will the Thai government validate a reversal in attitude? How will the health "addicts" of Thailand respond? How will the Thai government legitimate its policy change to those strongly opposed? These are questions which cannot be answered here but have bearing on the issue at hand vis-a-vis the FTA. Relations between superpowers (empires) and medium to small powers (dependent nations) must delicately negotiate through persuasive appeals to rationality and not through direct, brute force. Fraternity amongst nations is riven with manipulation.

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