TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION .............................................. 1

Chapters

1 JOHN WILSON ON MORAL EDUCATION .................. 5

   The Components ........................................ 15

   I PHILOSOPHY ........................................ 16

      (a) Having the Concept of a 'Person' .............. 17
      (b) Claiming the Concept of the Other
           as a Moral Principle ............................ 19
      (c) Rule-supporting Feelings ....................... 21

   II EMOTION ........................................... 25

      (a) Having the Concept of Emotions ............... 25
      (b) Being Able to Identify One's
           Own and Other's Emotions .................... 29

   III GROWTH ............................................ 31

      (a) GIG (1) (KB): 'Knowing That' ................ 31
      (b) GIG (1) (KS): 'Knowing How' ................ 32

IV KRIT .................................................. 35

2 LAWRENCE KOLBERG ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT ........ 50

3 A CRITIQUE OF KOLBERG'S CONCEPT OF
   MORAL DEVELOPMENT ................................ 86

   I Cognitive Dimensions of Morality ............... 88
   II Non-Cognitive Dimensions of Morality ......... 109
      (a) The Affective Dimensions of Morality .... 109
         (i) The Positive Motivating Concept,
             Consideration for Others ............... 110
         (ii) Negative Motivations .................. 112
      (b) The Volitional Dimension of
          Morality .................................. 121

4 A CRITIQUE OF THE CRITIQUE ....................... 129

BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................... 148
INTRODUCTION

Knowing how a person develops morally is equally as important as knowing that he logically ought to develop this way rather than that way. So, in this study which begins from-and ends with the conceptual point of view, both an empirical account (dealing with how the person develops) and a conceptual account (dealing with the logical requirements which the person must fulfill in order to be moral) of the moral domain will be explored.

The empirical account is that of a social-psychological educator Lawrence Kohlberg. Kohlberg has delineated a three level, six stage developmental theory of moral growth. The three levels each have two stages:

(a) The Preconventional:
   1. The Punishment and Obedience Orientation
   2. The Instrumental Relativistic Orientation

(b) The Conventional
   3. The Interpersonal Concordance of "Good Boy-Nice Girl" Orientation
   4. The Law and Order Orientation

(c) Postconventional, Autonomous, or Principled Level
   5. The Social Contract (Legalistic) Orientation
   6. The Universal Ethical Principle Orientation

For his psychological support Kohlberg turns to Piagetian psychology,
and for his philosophical support Kohlberg turns to the moral psychology of the formalistic philosophical tradition which spans Immanuel Kant to John Rawls. With the aid of these traditions, Kohlberg classifies the child's thinking, moral reasoning about moral dilemmas, in terms of the above stages. That is, the person's moral thoughts on some highly specific moral situation are classified and categorized in terms of those fundamental features of moral judgments which Kohlberg claims to have extracted from the above traditions to which he turns for support. In both his theoretical and scientific studies Kohlberg claims to have discovered these six levels of moral reasoning which increase in complexity from stage one to stage six.

To determine the conceptual coherency of this description of development in the moral domain, John Wilson's description of the logical requirements a theory of moral education ought to encompass will be used. Wilson attempts to conceive a non-substantive proceduralistic theory which covers the vast but expansive area between moral thought and moral action. This theory specifies the difficulty of moral thought being translated into moral action. To overcome this difficulty it specifies the development of some fundamental skills, abilities and attitudes in the moral domain. The theory restricts itself to four basic skills: (1) manifesting concern for others as equals, (2) awareness of other's feelings and emotions, (3) knowledge of facts fundamental to moral decisions, and finally (4) the ability to act upon personal decisions. Wilson is preoccupied with developing and communicating to the person a content-free method which will help the person to make moral decisions better. It is a theory which explicates
the logical requirements which any person must fulfill before it can be said that he is developed. Consequently, Wilson's conceptual differentiations will be used on the conceptual level to test the coherency of Kohlberg's empirical findings. Wilson was chosen because of the comprehensiveness of his theory. He claims that before it can be said that any person is morally educated (morally developed) educators need to know what the person knows (and/or thinks); feels and does. All three elements of conduct are important in the moral domain because they can significantly determine how moral thought is translated into moral action. In being concerned with thoughts, emotions and actions, Wilson's conceptual differentiations go beyond Kohlberg's empirical distinctions, for Kohlberg focuses his theory on thoughts in the form of reasons given for moral choices.

This study then will encompass a philosophical analysis and a psychological analysis of the moral domain. In Chapter 1, Wilson's rationally based theory of moral education will be explicated. An attempt will be made to summarize how he derives all aspects of his theory from and by means of his second order principle of rationality conceived to be fundamental in the moral domain. In Chapter 2, Kohlberg's explication of how the person develops morally will be covered. The discussion will focus on his six stage theory and some eight generalizations which may be drawn from that stage sequence. The discussion will also focus on the formal aspects of how the person develops morally. In Chapter 3, Kohlberg will be measured against Wilson. And then in the final chapter, Chapter 4, I will criticize both Wilson and Kohlberg (but Wilson especially) by arguing for the 'bag of virtue'.
approach toward moral education through presenting the case for the
teaching of specific virtues like concern for and respect for others.
In sum, this study will examine, through a philosophical analysis, a
psychological and a philosophical account of the moral domain.
CHAPTER 1

JOHN WILSON ON MORAL EDUCATION

My most basic concern in this chapter will be to map out in a
general way John Wilson's theory of moral education. Briefly, moral
education for Wilson "... is emphatically not a matter of persuading
people to behave in certain ways laid down by other people: it is a
matter of helping the individual to decide and act more reasonably."\(^1\)

Wilson, a professor of Educational Studies at Oxford University,
England has written extensively on this use of moral education. Some
of his more important works for my purposes are: The Assessment of
Morality (NPET Publishing Co.: England, 1972), Moral Thinking
(Heinemann Books: England, 1973), Moral Education and the Curriculum
Education (Geoffry Chapman: England, 1973). Basically, the theory is
concerned with helping the person think for himself (i.e., be reason-
able) in the realm of morality. The morally educated person for Wilson
must consistently manifest a unification of action, feelings, belief
and reflection as contained in the following character components:

PHIL (HC) Having the concept of a person (that is, of a conscious
and rational language-using creature, with a will, intentions, desires and emotions).

Hereinafter called MT.
Claiming to use this concept as the criterion for forming and acting on principles of action; that is, accepting that the wants and interests of other people and himself, regarded as equal, are relevant reasons in moral thought and action.

Having the feelings which support this general principle, at least to some extent: feelings attached to the notion of 'duty' or 'benevolence'.

Having the concept of various emotions and moods.

Being able, in practice, to identify emotions in oneself and others, when these are at a conscious level. (Wilson also makes distinctions here regarding the unconscious emotions in oneself and others, which I omit.)

Knowing 'hard' facts relevant to moral decisions.

Knowing sources of facts (i.e. where to find out the facts).

'Knowing how' — a 'skill' element in moral situations; as evidenced in verbal communication with others.

Ditto, in non-verbal communication.

Being in practice 'relevantly alert' to (notice)-moral situations, and seeing them as such under the right descriptions (in terms of PHIL, etc.)

Thinking thoroughly about such situations, bringing to bear whatever PHIL, EMP or GIG he has.

As a result of the foregoing, making overriding, prescriptive and universalized decisions to act.

Being sufficiently whole-hearted, free from unconscious counter-motivation, etc. to carry out (when able) the above decision in practice. 2

These components are a phenomenological description of the conditions of character which, for Wilson, must be possessed and used before it can be said that the person is morally educated. The components, as character traits, is logically derived from and dependent upon the second order principle of rationality which many moral educators agree are crucial in their field.

These components are logical prerequisites extracted from what

Wilson understands to be the realm of interpersonal morality at the heart of which is a second order principle of rationality. This principle is, in point of fact, a principle of procedures based upon the three following rules:

1) stick to the laws of logic, listen to arguments, and so on

2) use language correctly by attending to the meaning of words

3) attend to the facts. 3

Such a procedural principle has two aspects: first, it examines human actions and human thinking to see what is applied overridingly, prescriptively and universally. In other words, it attempts to establish:

... the criterion of what ... the person commits himself to (prescriptive), what is of central importance to him (overriding), and what he thinks applies to all other people in a relevantly similar situation (universal). 4

It's main concern is to determine the good reasons given for acting one way rather than another, without rationalizations, and getting at intentions. Secondly, both the procedures basic to this principle and the principle itself are internal to Wilson's concept of morality.

Wilson defines a person's morality as that to which 'the person commits himself', is 'of central importance' and 'applies to all other people' in similar circumstances. 5 Morality then is "... defined

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5 Ibid.
formally rather than in terms of a content. This content-free interpersonal morality rests on a principle of rationality.

PHIL is then taken as the central component of and starting point for this non-partisan rational morality. And given the central importance of PHIL:

... it is clear enough that the other 'components' are logically required. We must know what other people feel (EMP), know the facts (GIO), and be able and willing to bring this knowledge and our attitude of concern to bear on actual situations, so that we decide and act in the right way (KRAT).

These components do not appeal to any particular moral content or moral authority, any 'ethic' or 'way of life'; instead they follow logically from PHIL and the procedural principle of rationality. No additional justificatory 'basis' is required because both the components and the rational-intellectual-procedural principle "... are the basis." Both are the means of extracting, explicating and testing what logically ought to be done. Neither the components nor the principle lead up to rationality in human activity; they are what constitute rationality in human activity.

If moral educators can agree upon this second order principle of morality, and that moral conduct is rational, then moral education will be directed to imparting the skills and traits of character (like the components) which underlie and contribute to the rational moral beliefs and the form of reason behind them. In other words, the task of moral

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6 IDE, p. 76.

7 A Teacher's, p. 31.

8 Ibid.
theory is to explicate the components of a rational morality. Educating a person in that rational morality therefore implies initiating him into justified or rational beliefs and their modes of reasoning by which such beliefs are established, [and thus] ... moral education involves, at the minimum, initiation into rational moral beliefs and the modes of reasoning by which moral judgments are justified. And because the point of moral beliefs is to guide conduct, moral education involves, at least indirectly, initiation into rational modes of conduct.9

The balance of this chapter will outline first, some general questions regarding the components, and second, each of the individual components. For the latter, a type of task analysis will be conducted where each component basic to the skills, abilities and attitudes of rational moral conduct will be isolated, analyzed and sequenced. An analysis of PHI L and so on, for instance, will show that the components do not just lead up to rationality, that the components lead up to and are what constitute rationality in human activity.

First, the components:

Where do they come from, what are their authorization, how are they defended as the logical and right choice? Are they derived from general agreement as to what comprises the morally educated-man, are they implicit in and derivative from social arrangements, are they dependent ultimately on some kind of transcendental argument ...; or are they the result of empirical testing? What precisely is their nature? Are they meant as a complete list, as a list of terms that do not overlap, as a taxonomy?10

I will now consider some of these questions, taking the last first: Wilson has no intention of giving a taxonomy of moral character traits like a psychologist would give, if only because such a list is the psychologist's role. Neither are the components a list of developmental


10 JW., p. 59.
stages where each stage operates as both an achievement from and growth from, but dependent upon, the previous stage in the sequence. He stops short of offering a taxonomy; yet he does (occasionally in a confused manner) speak of "... taxonomizing the logical requirements for success" in the moral area.\textsuperscript{11} KRAT, however, depends upon the proper and collective operation of all components; and all components are pre-occupied with the development of a rationally aware moral consciousness. Overall the list

refers to different aspects which by and large do not overlap and which in their differentiation avoid the mistake of depicting virtue as holistic, partisan creed, intuition, or a matter of sensitivity, commitment or concern which in their imprecision allow almost anything to be pushed in the back door. And they are different, so they require different educational means to achieve them or to improve our performance in them.\textsuperscript{12}

As a pedagogical device the components' separateness rests on their being able to be taken and taught individually; that is, if it is discovered that a child lacks adequate EMP then through the pedagogical means basic to the communication of EMP, the educator can work on the child's EMP and so on. And EXP, as a concern with the emotions, is different from GIR, as a concern with knowing, but both are inter-dependent and related in that they are logically derived from and concerned with the internalization of the rational and moral concerns expressed in the principle of rationality. Collectively, the components attempt to integrate moral thought and action through the

\textsuperscript{11}J. Wilson, Values and Moral Development in Higher Education (London: Crom Helm, 1974), p. 10. Hereinafter called VDM.

\textsuperscript{12}Ibid., p. 59.
rational motivational basis on which this principle rests. In a word, their concern is to foster the rational principle to the extent that the holder becomes more rational by holding it.

Since the components are not founded on empirical research, Wilson justifies them theoretically through his use of his principle of rationality. He posits this principle, which he wants the person to possess and use, as 'an axiomatic own good'. It is through this same principle that he derives his five components.\(^1\) All components foster this principle because they help to complement the attainment of both the rational method through which they are derived and the principle from which they are derived. Moral success then depends upon the application of these principles and others like "... facing the facts, getting to know yourself and other people, self-control, [and] being able to act on one's own decisions ..."\(^2\) For Wilson these principles are essential for any rational person concerned about morality, but any rational person, by definition, takes morality seriously. Rationality motivates acceptance of and action upon these principles because as a principle it establishes the rational requirements regarding what the person logically and morally must think and do.

These principles, though they are the content of Wilson's theory of moral education, are unlike an education in partisan principles like 'make good Christians', 'make good Communists', and so on because, as rational principles, they are "... second order values which are

\(^1\)Ibid.

\(^2\)VIM., p. 8.
conceptually connected to the notions of being human and being educated."\textsuperscript{15} And this very rational and conceptual derivation gives them the formal or procedural character necessary to make them morally neutral and thereby useful to all moral educators. This moral neutrality also helps Wilson avoid a charge of indoctrination. Furthermore, when he offers the components as an impartial procedure for arriving at a rationally based critical judgment he side steps the problem of indoctrination further. The procedures virtually appear to be crystal clear since they are based on the justification given, but more importantly, they are not forced on anyone. They are just offered as a procedure for arriving at a morally (rationally) educated person who comes to use his moral intelligence in conjunction with the components PHIL, EM, GL2, and KRAT. Collectively, the concern is to help all people be moral in a rational-scientific manner. He wants the person to be able to isolate, analyze and sequence moral events competently.

Wilson's rational and humanistic theory of moral education and conception of man is expressed through a concept of reason and components which are:

... cognitive, conative, affective, and are united in a logical scheme which does not rest on any particular creed, faith, axiom of metaphysics, or pretend to offer moral salvation through appropriate genuflection to any authority religious or otherwise.\textsuperscript{16}

The theory has a humanistic and logical structure expressive of a unity of action, belief, feeling and reflection entailing the development of

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.; JW., p. 59.

\textsuperscript{16} JW., p. 50.
an "... autonomous rationality with respect to the unconscious, motivation, day-to-day moral decision-making, and the emotions ...". And since the morally educated person must consistently manifest both the components and the critical judgment in a coherent and harmonious manner, the components have a functional character: PHIL is called an attitude, EMP an ability, and both GIG and KRAT are attainments, and DIK (a separate component in an earlier formulation of the theory is now) a mode of thinking in KRAT which aids KRAT formulate principled decisions. Wilson then offers

... a logical structure of concepts which, as components, delineates the moral man. These concepts ... make the rationalist philosopher's point that seeing and formulating these lineaments clearly and acting in accordance with them is essential to the morally educated person. It is also essential if we are to programme learning in this field. The emphasis is on rational procedures rather than on content, although the latter plays a part. Morality is something that we must work at with intelligence, and out of emotional fullness and knowledge; and it requires lifelong labour in order to fully comprehend and enact the ideal moral features of the man. Wilson's theory of moral education therefore is an education in a concept of morality confined

... to morality as procedure, i.e., as a formal matter for the purpose of education. It is devoted to the enablement of various kinds — the attitude of PHIL, the non-substantive skills of EMP, the non-moral attainments of knowledge GIG, the 'mode of thought' that is DIK (now KRAT).

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17 Ibid.

18 Ibid., p. 51.

19 Ibid., p. 52.

20 Ibid., pp. 59-60.
Morality as procedure is free of any specific content like a 'Christian morality', or a 'Communist morality'. Morality in this case is more of a 'moral attitude' than anything else for it is preoccupied with how to go about acting and deciding upon moral dilemmas in a rational way.

His concern is to help the person improve his relevant empirical knowledge in the area of morality, to foster his understanding of normative principles, and finally, to improve his understanding of how to defend and justify his moral evaluations. As a proceduralist then, Wilson advocates the

...communication of procedures which, although perhaps minimally substantive, do not prejudge the issues in particular moral contexts ... [for] the accent is upon children gradually being introduced to a set of procedures which will equip them to approach moral problems critically and to resolve them without recourse to authority. 21

It is a proceduralism preoccupied with the development of a moral character expressive of and based on a use of a moral reason or moral intelligence.

Wilson's most basic concern is: if it is understood what it means to be moral and what the area of morality entails, then there is a better chance of helping a person to become morally educated (and by consequence more likely to be a better) moral person. However, it is not guaranteed that because you show someone what it means to be moral that they will automatically become a moral person. But as educators, although we can help bring about the first point (i.e., the morally educated person) we can only provide the best opportunities to foster

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the second (i.e., the moral person). To show how Wilson isolates, analyzes and sequences the most important procedural aspects of an interpersonal rational morality to overcome this difficulty will be the topic of the balance of this chapter.

The Components

1) Key Points Considered

Before the components are considered some points need mentioning: first, morality — i.e., the person's morality or his feelings, actions, principles and judgments — means "... the criterion of what ... the person commits himself to (prescriptive), what is of central importance to him (overriding), and what he thinks applies to all other people in a relevantly similar situation (universal)."22 This conception of morality is minimally substantive in that it is preoccupied with the use of reason and the formal manner in which one applies one's principles.

Second, the components are a symbolic and phenomenological description and breakdown of concepts logically required by the above definition of morality. They follow from the central component PHIL 'concept of a person' and are presented as what is necessary and sufficient if we are ever to know into what and how the person develops morally.23 Here I will treat each of the components individually and

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22 [Footnote: AM., p. 31. For a good discussion of the area of and the use of morality, see pp. 1-12. And for an explanation of the manner in which these principles are derived, see MP., pp. 60ff.]

23 [Footnote: IME., p. 192.]
regroup them at the end under the headings: A. Knowing, B. Doing, and C. Feeling. Collectively, the components are concerned with the development of all dimensions of the person's moral being, that is, with the establishment of a precise connection between the person's 'moral thinking' and 'moral action'. The concern is to avoid restricting the person's morality to some predefined morality like 'public norms' or 'Christian morality'. Collectively, the components attempt to circumscribe an area of morality such that it encompasses the many possible different types of moral thought and moral action. In the end they are concerned with helping the person know what it means to act upon various syllogisms (like the syllogism material gain) in morally different ways.\(^24\)

2) Components Explicated

I. PHIL

PHIL, an attitude or a frame of mind, consists of three parts and covers that area of concern commonly expressed in phrases like 'concern for others', 'taking notice of others', and so on.\(^25\) PHIL begins here because of the importance both caring and how people come to care take on in moral education.\(^26\) Unless the person has a clear

\(^24\)AM., p. 35 (his emphasis).

\(^25\)Ibid., p. 41.

\(^26\)Many moral educators agree on this as a starting point in moral education; but see specifically R. S. Peter's remarks on the importance of beginning with caring in moral education in "Moral Development: A Plea for Pluralism" (T. Mischel, ed.) in Cognitive Development and Epistemology (New York: Academic Press, 1971), p. 262.
concept of the other as a person, it is assured that his caring for the other will be restricted. That is to say, until the other is seen in the same light as I, as a person with equal 'rights', 'feelings' and so on, concern for him will be, to say the least, confined. A clear concept of the other is of primary importance in this theory of moral education, because of the importance that is given to the second order principle, concern for the other. The three distinctions here are: (a) having the concept of a 'person', (b) claiming the concept as a moral principle, and (c) rule-supporting feelings.

(a) **Having the Concept of a 'Person'**

This division is concerned with one person's concept of another 'person'. It is essential that every person have a clear concept of the 'other' especially in the sense that the definition of morality demands it and the principle 'concern for others' requires. 'Having the concept ...' refers basically to the person's capacity to conceive all people as rational creatures who use a language, have a 'consciousness', 'emotions', 'intentions', 'will', 'purpose' and so on.  

\[ **27** Other person then does not just refer to human beings who have one head and two legs; instead it refers to all features like emotions and rationality which separate man from the lower animals. The significance of this point rests on the assumption that many people "... seem to assume that some other criterion is what really counts -- e.g. whether they have white skins, or speak English, or come from a similar social class, \]

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\[ **27** AM., p. 42. The connection between the 'emotions' and the other components and what the 'emotions' mean here will be discussed in the second component EMP. \]
or are members of the same gang." The necessary and sufficient criterion accepted here is all 'people'. And the main concern at this stage of the theory is with the person's concept of the person or people and not just some element like the emotions. PHIL is a concern with how one person conceives another person. It is an attitude, but it is not a particular attitude toward certain types of people; rather it is a general attitude toward all people. If a person conceives Jews as people with devious intentions towards gentiles, then it could not be said that he has a clear concept of a person for he restricts his usage to certain conditions which violates the criterion established here regarding a person and the limits of morality.

A person's attitudes about others can be recognized through things like what he states about what counts for him insofar as others' needs and wants are concerned. Varying responses are unacceptable; when the person is being examined for his concept of the other, he must give consistent responses like 'because I perceive them to be distinct, unique, equal, and so on'. When it can be shown that the person has a clear concept of or attitude toward the other as a unique and distinct person, then it can be said that he has a clear concept of the other as a person like himself having intentions and so on. This attitude is called PHIL (HC). And since PHIL (HC) is restricted to what the person

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For a discussion of the use of equality here, see the next section.
does (i.e., how he identifies others), it is called an ability.  

(b) Claiming the Concept of the Other as a Moral Principle

Interest in this second subdivision within PHIL is restricted exclusively to the person's general tendency to take this criterion (i.e., this attitude of equality, and so on) and claim it as a reason which motivates him to act. Equality, however, neither here nor elsewhere in this study means that every person must be conceived as having equal intelligence, weight, wealth and so on. It is possible that they might have these common features and more besides; rather equality is taken to mean an "... equality of status as moral and conscious beings, each of whose wills and desires count as much as his own." 30 In this sense there is an important truth in the statement which says that "all men are equal." 31 Yet the person is not required to see others of such importance that he will not stand up for his own rights, wants and interests. Since the request is confined to the giving of equal importance to the other, the person is able to act on his own behalf and/or abandon his own personal interests for the other. In fact the latter is expected insofar as one can actually feel love and unselfishness. Care, however, must be taken here because of the dangers of pseudo-unselfishness and pseudo-altruism. (I discuss the latter in more detail in note 33 under (b) intense feeling.) PHIL.

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29 Am., p. 65.

30 MEC., p. 3.

31 Ibid. And see also J. Wilson, Equality (England: Hutchinson, 1966).
does not entail genuine altruism because genuine altruism entails a stage of moral education which goes beyond our concerns here with equality and justice. As an attitude in which one must logically believe, PHIL is given the status of an overriding, prescriptive and universal principle. And this belief dimension is the cognitive side of PHIL which is open to scrutiny for its authenticity.

To be concerned about the other entails personal thinking about the other. The clarity of this thought and the extent to which it is brought to bear in real life situations determines the degree to which the person can be said to claim the concept as a principle and to understand its implications. The thinking must be personal thought

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32 [MEC., p. 3.]

33 A belief should be accompanied with an emotion or feeling — i.e., with something like caring for others there should be associated some emotions. The nature of these emotions will be described in the next component. And since both the belief and the feeling should merge in the attitude adopted toward the other, the third distinction RSF is made within PHIL. Of primary importance here, however, is to avoid misinterpreting PHIL in two ways: (a) it must not be seen as just a matter of a belief, that is, if the person says he believes that everyone should be equal, it will not do. For it is possible for a person to say (and in some sense really think) that he does not have a prejudice against Jews say, but yet he expresses the very opposite in both his feelings and actions. (b) It is not an intense feeling like love, brotherhood, strong sympathy, and so on, because it is not necessary that such feelings be regarded as part of PHIL. The desirability of such feelings are questionable here, since they are more the concern of mental health than they are the concern of the moral educator. Therefore the person is required to no more than "... feel sufficiently to act on his belief in equality, but need not feel more" (MEC., p. 2). Put another way, it is adequate that if a person feels a nervous stranger needs help, actually helping him will do rather than neglecting him as crazy or a nervous wreck, etc.; it is not necessary for the person to actually go through a parallel nervousness.

34 [AM., pp. 65-66.]

and not what a friend or some authority thinks ought to be done. One of the best ways to determine the belief in the principle claimed is to witness the person in action, for in action the person is more likely to express his real intentions and meanings. It is for reasons like the above that this distinction is called PHIL (CC).

c) Rule-supporting Feelings

PHIL (RSP), the third subdivision within PHIL, is concerned with the possession of or having of the feelings to support the principle claimed as part of a moral theory. It is not a question about the person's either having or wanting rules to support his feelings for the other; it is, however, a question of the person's feelings being a part of and based in his own thinking and not someone else's thinking. A person who claims that his concern for equality derives from what a friend thinks he ought to feel would be very suspicious because he does what another states should be done. The key point here is that the feeling must be ingrained in personal thinking, that is, if the person's own rules are derived after some careful thinking.

"Feelings" here is used in the sense of emotions, not as sensations, and are logically composed of distinctive actions, tendencies, symptoms and beliefs. Emotions have three basic features: (1) the mental component which occurs in conscious experiences like happiness; (2) the physiological changes like muscular enlargements in a state of anger and finally, (3) the motive component which manifests itself in the attempt to accommodate to a changing environment, e.g., the

\[35\text{Ibid., p. 66.}\]
concerned person desires to act on behalf of another when in need.

Conceived in this manner, feelings are not antithetical to either reason or thinking for they have both the rational and the physical dimension. Although all feelings are situated in the body, and although there may be some emotions which have a rational core, that does not mean that the person always has conscious control of his emotions and can either will them into or out of consciousness at his pleasure. But it does mean, however, that emotions like 'treat others as equal' which have a rational core and which are rationally held can motivate people to act upon it. Feelings, in short, serve to move us from mere cognitive assent to action in line with the principle.

Given the distinction of 'having a concept' and rule-supporting feelings, it is plausible to differentiate and analyze separately the person's actions and feelings. It is important to know why a person acts, i.e., whether he acts just because the rules demand that he acts, or because he feels for the person on whose behalf he acts. There is a huge difference between acting because you must (i.e., because you are compelled to) and because you feel an affinity to the person for whom you act. In cases of the latter type the rule and the feelings merge (because the affections and intentions, the two main motivating elements within the concept of feeling which fosters the discovery of the moral self, merge) whereas in the former case it is the rule alone which motivates action (for the violation of the rule would bring chastisement). According to the reasoning presented here, it is better to have a rule supported by a feeling than just a rule alone as a reason for acting for another, if only because when feelings enter the
picture there is an investment of the self to the extent that it motivates action. In this type of action based on feeling there is a coming together of reason and affection.

Since subdivision 2 only expressed the importance of the person's 'moral theory' or thinking about what ought to be used, and since cases may arise where a person thinks one thing and does another (something which obeying a rule unsupported by feelings allows), it is necessary to account for this possibility. And Wilson does this in terms of introducing the conceptual requirement of what the person feels; that is to say, a person may say he does something just because the rule says he must, but yet because there is no emotional identity with the rule he may do something completely different. But if he has feelings invested in what he does, it is more likely that he will have done the thing he said he did. For example, the person may act in a different way because he either feels a loyalty to himself, his family, his friends or he may feel a sense of duty to his country, his company, and so on. (The latter may also include feelings for family, and so on.)

The distinction being made here is in terms of the different feelings that the person may have. There are, for instance, 'person-orientated' (PO) and 'duty-orientated' (DO) feelings. In other words, if the person has feelings in either of these forms and makes them part of his moral theory, then these feelings merge in the person's thinking and action; and thus feelings take on the conceptual role that reasoning demands.

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36 Ibid., p. 49.

37 Ibid.
here. For Wilson, both the examiner and the educator in this area must discover how far and to what extent and for what reasons the person implements his criterion of moral judgments. By looking in this direction, the person's 'rule-supporting feelings' of the PO and DO nature and personal thinking are discovered.

The concern here is with how the person bases his feelings in his concept of the other. "The feelings must be for the other as for a being with rights, interests, needs, etc. It is about the other's interests that he must feel (and act), not the other under some other description or in some other light." And these feelings must be consistently and universally applied. Unlike subdivision 2, one of the best ways to see how the person reacts in this regard is to see how he acts in 'real-life' situations. If the person is examined in 'real-life' situations, it can be seen to what extent he manifests some of the following 'rule-supporting feelings': (a) 'self-approval' or 'pleasure' when the rule is applied; (b) 'sorrow' or 'regret' or 'pity' for the failure of another's needs and wants to be satisfied, and so on.

In sum then there are two dimensions to PHIL: (a) the scope or how many people the person includes in his attitudes of equality, concern, and respect; that is, are the people of the same age, sex, race, group, etc. or are they of different ages and so on? (b) The amount of time or the consistency with which PHIL appears in the person's

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38 Ibid., p. 48.

39 Ibid., p. 50.
range of PHIL as given in (a). This point has nothing to do with the intensity of the person's feelings. A person would not have PHIL if he used it only ten percent of the time toward Jews. Overall the component is concerned with questions which take the following form:

- Does the person ever say that all other human beings have rights of equal importance with his own? Or does he consciously believe that coloured people, Jews, those of a different social class, etc. really are 'inferior'?

- Does he make some effort to find out what other people's wants and feelings actually are, however good or bad his ability to discern this (EMP) may be?

PHIL, in all its subdivisions then, is a general feeling or attitude, and not an ability to recognize that other's interests count. But it is coextensive with the ability that is EMP (the second component), as I will soon show.

II EMP

(a) Having the Concept of Emotions

Where PHIL is a concern for others, i.e., the attitude that other's interests count, EMP is

... simply the ability to know what oneself and other people are feeling, or would feel, or have felt in particular situations. Rough definitions might be 'awareness' of one's own and other people's 'feelings', 'insights', 'the ability to understand what other people's interests are', 'knowledge of human emotions, desires, etc.'

(In this way EMP coextends with PHIL.) EMP, however, is not sympathy.

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40MT., p. 53.
41Ibid., pp. 53-54.
42Ibid., p. 54. Attitude as used here and elsewhere in this study has three features: "1) Like emotions, attitudes are conceptually linked with appraisals; while attitudes may be neutral they are more commonly pro or con, and can be these in varying degrees. 2) Attitudes necessarily have a (formal) object. 3) An attitude is a relatively enduring feature of a person." Coombs, TV., p. 29.
because sympathy is a feeling and not an ability. There are five points basic to the distinction made about having a concept of the emotions.

First, it has already been said that EMP, an ability, may in principle be separated from PHIL for the purposes of discussion. This is possible because of the assumption made here that it "is possible for someone to know what others are feeling, or would be likely to feel, with a very high degree of awareness or insight, and yet not to care about them." (A person, say a husband who manipulates his wife's emotions for the fulfillment of his sexual phantasies operates in this way.)

Second, because EMP is an ability a person can possess an extensive amount of EMP but yet never make use of this ability in practice. For instance, a person's nervousness around others may prevent him (in his daily life) from observing their behaviour adequately so that he can act appropriately on their behalf, when he must. But that failure and others like it do not prevent him from having the ability to tell how others feel. (The fact that the person may be either too lazy or just nervous could prevent the complete development of much EMP, but these features will not terminate all EMP. The distinction, however, is important because it shows the possibility of the person's having an ability even though he never uses it.)

Third, EMP is not restricted to an awareness of feelings for others within a restricted context like people within one's immediate

\[43\] MT., p. 54.

\[44\] AM., p. 50.
contact. It is concerned with that and with the ability to predict the feelings of those whom he has never met in other areas of the globe in the past, present and future.  

Fourth, the concern with feelings is not restricted to sensations, but it also concerns emotions and desires. Emotions are distinct from analogous phenomena like 'needs', 'wants', and 'moods' both because they are characterized by their targets and because they have a 'cognitive core' based upon a belief. 'Moods' like 'depression' and 'elation' and the like do not have a knowing element which the present use of feeling entails. There are then three elements to the concept of an emotion used here:

(a) a belief (that X is dangerous)
(b) involuntary or semi-voluntary symptoms (trembling, going pale), including certain postures, gestures, facial expressions, etc.
(c) intentional action (running away, trying to avoid attention).

And there are four ways through which these emotions may be recognized:

(i) By what a person says he feels: e.g. 'I'm frightened'.
(ii) By characteristic symptoms: e.g. trembling at the knees, sweating, etc.
(iii) By characteristic action: e.g. running away from the danger.
(iv) By characteristic circumstances: e.g. dangerous things.

The person who has much EMP will know all or most of these things, and
will be able to correctly integrate the dimensions of the emotions into his life. It is possible to see the degree of EMP possessed by a person by confronting him with different cases wherein something must be done on behalf of the other. By means of such cases the features may be detected: if the person neither knows that stammering and blushing are features of anxiety nor that a person might say unusual things while displaying such symptoms when in a situation which provokes these features, then it is difficult to say that he has a complete and adequate knowledge of another's emotions (or even his own for that matter).

Having the concept of other's specific wants then entails the ability to classify all cases where others are encountered in terms of (a), (b), and (c). (This is what makes EMP an ability and not an attitude.) Grasping the concept of an emotion does not just mean being able to say the right words like 'I'm afraid' when fear provoking dilemmas are encountered. It also requires, when in a pertinent situation, being sympathetic to the other as a person and responding to him according to the criteria given here. However, there is another point that requires mentioning: the person may have fearful feelings (or whatever), be able to identify them in both himself and others, but never be able to say 'I now experience fear'. But this does not mean that the person neither has the concept of the emotion in particular nor the ability to recognize the emotion. This possibility arises from a basic assumption made here, namely, having the concept of something does not entail the prerequisite of having to or being able to express that concept in the exact words. A person
may have the ability to act sympathetically when sympathy is demanded of him, but never be able to say the word sympathy. Yet this does not mean that the person may also be able to say 'I now experience sympathy' or 'I can identify with this person who is in trouble'. The point is, that being able to identify an emotion does not center on just saying the word; it goes beyond that to the ability to experience and understand the dimensions of the reality to which the words point. This subdivision Wilson calls EMP (HC).

(b) Being Able to Identify One's Own and Other's Emotions

This is the second part of EMP. Interest here is restricted to the person's ability, in practice, to recognize and correlate the different data surrounding the various emotions in himself and others. The concern is to answer questions like: 'Can the person say (either directly or in so many words) I am feeling fear, insecurity, etc.' 'she is angry' and so on? The person may have this ability, but not use it (i.e., he may fail to think adequately about the person, the situation, and so on, and either prescribe or universalize his decisions). All inquiries into the person's character here attempt to get at not how the person knows he and others feel, but if he knows that they feel. Neither must the ability be restricted to face-to-face circumstances,
because if it were, an incomplete idea of the person would probably be presented. Rather it entails the ability to imagine and see the others' emotions, real or imaginary, in the past, present and future. This dimension is not in any way connected to the person’s actually doing this because the interest expressed is just in the possession of the ability. The actual doing or the incentive to do is connected to and will be studied later in the fourth component KRAT (1). EMP therefore is just the possession of the concept and the ability, in practice, to identify both his own and other's emotions.\(^2\)

In this component then a differentiation has been made between having a 'consciousness of some emotion' and 'bringing that consciousness to bear' upon real-life situations. (Any further discussion of this distinction will have to wait until the final component KRAT (1) and KRAT (2) are discussed.) Like PHIL, then, EMP is concerned about much the same thing, except that it is preoccupied with the emotions. EMP has the same two dimensions as PHIL: (a) its scope is concerned with the number of other people's feelings the person has the ability to be conscious of; and (b) the degree of EMP deals with the precision and the profoundness of the consciousness of these feelings. In particular EMP is concerned with questions that take the following form:

Can the person give a reasonably good account of the feelings of (say) a new boy at the school, or his own teacher, or his classmates in particular situations?

Does he find it difficult or easy with reference to people in past history? With reference to characters in plays or novels?

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 53.
Whatever his ability, is he interested in his own and other people's feelings and behavior, or are his ideas about them based on no observation and thinking at all?

III GIG

Wilson makes two main divisions and one subdivision in this component:

(a) GIG (1) (KF): 'Knowing That'

The third component GIG is an attainment because of its concern with whether a person actually knows certain facts (not with whether he has the ability to learn them): namely, those facts most relevant to moral situations. Overall GIG refers to a mastery of factual and non-factual knowledge, i.e., it speaks to the possible differentiation between 'knowing that' and 'knowing how'. These two distinctions are represented as GIG (KF) (1) and GIG (1) (KS). And GIG is concerned with sensations and not emotions. For instance, any person who does not recognize that you cause a person considerable pain when you hit him unawares on the back of the head, lacks this quality. Even though EMP enters the picture it is excluded because 'hard facts' (i.e., factual knowledge like the punch) do not concern the awareness of emotions or moods. 'Relevant hard facts' concerns an awareness of such subcategories as: (a) facts about safety, and health; (b) laws and convention; and (c) facts about personal and collective wants or needs.

However, it is not easy to make a clear distinction between GIG (1) (KS) and EMP. EMP may entail awareness of both wants and

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53 Mt., p. 56.
54 Ibid.
emotions, and it is possible to argue that this merges with (b), i.e.,
laws and conventions like the law of the land and a society's etiquette.

Nevertheless, knowledge of laws, conventions and expectations can
be roughly distinguished from awareness of wants. In practice we
can reasonably confine ourselves to the 'hard' facts relating to
needs or requirements.\footnote{\textup{AM.}, p. 56. To be sure almost any facts are relevant in moral
decisions. But people like lawyers and doctors are expected to have a
more extensive array of particular facts at their disposal than other
people. As I will soon show GIG is actually divided into three areas.
And when it is considered or examined in an actual instance allowance
must not be made for I.Q., home environment, etc., because the interest
here is in how many relevant facts that person knows. There is no con-
cern with either fault (i.e., as to why the person knows very few facts)
or moral blame or guilt. This is true of all components and not only
GIG for the concern is in establishing the moral education of the
person. \textup{(MEC.}, p. 5).}

If a person wants an emotionally stable relationship, then he will have
to arrive at some sort of agreement with his partner as to what is
needed for emotional stability.

(b) GIG (1) (KS): 'Knowing How'

This distinction is a non-propositional skill important in one's
interactions with others. It is a social skill that "may be present or
absent independently of the propositional knowledge of EK", or of the
'hard-fact' knowledge\footnote{\textup{AM.}, p. 57.} basic to GIG (1) (KF). And it is a skill
developed through interactions and dealings with others. Skills like
apologizing, expressing sympathy and so on are skills that are picked
up either through practice and imitation or learned through the truth
or the use of reason which is expressed in relevantly stated proposi-
tions. However, knowing how to do something does not necessarily entail
the latter point; but neither does it exclude it, for propositional
knowledge may stimulate the person's ability to experience and express things like sympathy better. Since the main concern here is with 'skill', both elements of "knowledge" and "motivation" (i.e., KRAT (1)) must be held constant.

If a person has and uses all of the above components, i.e., PHIL, EMP, and GIG (1), and fails to effectively implement his moral decisions, there are at least two reasons as to why he failed: (a) He may lack the adequate courage or resolution, and motivation. (But this cannot be properly considered until the last component is explained.) (b) He may not have what is called the 'know how' or the necessary social skill. The person may decide to be nice to his lover, may have the adequate motivation or resolution to implement his decision; but he may just not know how to make the lover happy or feel at ease. Perhaps he knows neither what to do nor what to say. For Wilson then 'social skills' are all of those general abilities basic for effective action.57

He makes three basic points about 'social skills': First, social skills are not restricted to any particular group-situation where, for example, a person is expected to say and do the proper things. Rather they also entail abilities essential for all person-to-person encounters. In this sense the person can fail to treat his lover properly for lack of the essential social skill.

Second, to be sure, social skills are closely related in action to EMP (knowledge of the other's feelings) and GIG (knowledge of all facts like social norms and conventions); but more importantly it is

57 NEC, p. 5.
an ability to act effectively on behalf of or towards others that entails more than this. Wilson explains:

The kind of knowledge is different: it is more like knowing how to swim, or how to play a particular game — not just a matter of knowing facts, but a matter of being sufficiently practised and skilful to perform well. It is a kind of adeptness rather than a cognitive mastery of facts. 58

Third, social skills cover many areas, and the skill required and used depends upon the context. Things like talking with equals and giving orders are two different things, and so on. Wilson's chief concerns are "those contexts and social relationships in which it is likely that most people will be called upon to perform, e.g. with groups of friends, as an employee, as a member of a committee, and so on." 59

This part of the component may be subdivided into two (2) types: verbal (represented by GIG (2) (VC)), and non-verbal (represented by GIG (2) (NVC)). Verbal skills concern the saying of the right thing at the right time (i.e., when apologizing, expressing sympathy, etc.). Non-verbal skills concern the proper manner at the appropriate time (i.e., tone of voice, stance, gesture, sincerity; etc.) assumed to express the message. Both subdivisions are concerned with what the person actually does in real life situations. It is a fine distinction...

... but [it] may be drawn well enough in practice. We have to draw it in order to demarcate this quality at all: for it is something in respect of which people can be trained or educated; and we exclude cases where ... [the person] may be more or less acceptable for quite different reasons. (Being an attractive blond is not a social skill.) 60

58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid., p. 58.
In summary, the dimensions of GIG (1) cover laws and those actions which threaten the interests of others. And it attempts to answer questions that take the following form:\textsuperscript{61}

A) Does he have a reasonable knowledge of others' interests:

(1) What is dangerous and not dangerous to standard interests of other people — e.g. putting things on railway lines, excessively fast driving, effects of certain drugs, etc.; also relevant hard facts in human biology and physiology — e.g. first aid, facts about pregnancy and other sexual matters, etc.?\textsuperscript{62}

B) Is he capable of playing the role of leader, of issuing instructions and orders?

(1) Can he behave efficiently in social situations involving (a) adults, (b) people much younger than himself?
(11) Does he in general use language adequately in social situations?\textsuperscript{63}

IV KRAT

I will now review Wilson's most complex component, KRAT. But first some introductory remarks are necessary. When PHIL was considered, interest centered on the possession of the concept of a person (PHIL·(HC)) and whether the concept was claimed as a moral principle

\textsuperscript{61}MT., pp. 57-58.

\textsuperscript{62}Ibid., p. 59.

\textsuperscript{63}PHIL begins here because (as it was said earlier) it is assumed (a) that the most basic concern in moral education should be concern for the other, and (b) that until there is a clear concept of a person — i.e., a concept free of all forms of prejudice — held by everyone it will be difficult for adequate caring to occur not only in general but possibly even in situation-specific instances like caring for one's peer group or ethnic group.
in daily life (PHIL (CC)). Both dimensions are cognitive because they concern the person's knowing, i.e., the 'knowing that' all people are equal and are human regardless of their color, etc., rather than either his feelings or actions. However, there is a close conceptual tie between PHIL (HC), PHIL (CC) and the person's feelings and actions in real-life situations. This conceptual connection comes out strongest in the additional distinction made within PHIL between the two rules supported by a feeling, i.e., PHIL (RSF) (ID) and (PO) or 'rule-supporting feelings of a duty and a person orientated' nature. Yet PHIL (RSF) remains a cognitive component in spite of its emotive dimensions because its main concern is with whether or not the person knows both the emotions and the rules accepted and claimed as supports for his moral principle. (This emotive-cum-cognitive dimension of PHIL helps bridge the cognitive component PHIL and the second component the emotive component EMP. The RSF distinction does this specifically, for through its cognitive and emotive concerns it is a means of entering EMP.)

It can be said then that, the more intensely a person knows his feelings and rules, the greater the odds that these rules and feelings will be both held in high regard and acted upon. But in spite of this possibility there are two reasons why there may be no conceptual connection between them: first, although the person may possess the necessary feelings, he may still fail to use these feelings, in

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64 AM, p. 59.

65 Ibid.
practice, as rule-supporting feelings; second, it is possible for a
person to have the feelings as rule-supporting feelings but they may
lack the strength to become overriding in action.\footnote{66}

To account for this possibility, Wilson finds it necessary to
introduce the distinct component KRAT.\footnote{67} KRAT is preoccupied with the
appearance of all prior components (PHIL, EMP, and GIG) in all the
person's decisions to act upon behalf of another's interests. But it
is different. KRAT's difference arises from its concern with action or
behavior. It entails anything required for rational moral action that
the other components do not encompass. A partial definition might be:
"behavioral traits necessary for morality." Yet it must be remembered
that KRAT stands for many and not just one thing required for the

\footnote{66}KRAT in its present form is a combination of Wilson's old com-
ponent DIK and KRAT. DIK is a stage of thought now entailed in KRAT.
It occurs in the process of formulating principled decisions in KRAT.
Speaking of DIK in the old way, Wilson puts it this way: "A person
with a high degree of DIK, when faced up to a moral situation (various
kinds of failure to face up to such situations may be caused by lack of
KRAT), will consider that situation primarily in terms of other
people's interest. He will bring the appropriate attitude (PHIL), his
ability to discern other people's feelings (EMP), and his knowledge of
'hard facts' (GIG) to bear on that situation: and as a result he will
make a prescriptive moral choice dictated by other people's interests,
which he regards as committing him and anyone else in a similar situ-
ation to action" (MEC., p. 6). The person who has these moral prin-
ciples will have derived them in the three ways listed in MT., pp. 60-63.
And as you read onward these same three ways appear in KRAT (1) as three
ways to fail: i.e., KRAT (1) (RA) (TT) (OPU). It seems that by means of
this new formulation, Wilson felt he could elaborate upon KRAT in a much
more articulate manner by including all these features in the new com-
ponents KRAT (1) and KRAT (2). I take this to be his intention because
in the main source taken here AM, Wilson does not list or discuss DIK.
And AM is a more recent publication. So, taking his lead, I subsume DIK
and all it entails under KRAT (1) for it is concerned like DIK with DIK
like thinking. KRAT (2) is the behavioral dimensions of the thinking
that was once presented as DIK and now KRAT (1); and KRAT (2) is the old
KRAT, that is, KRAT (2) is now the implementation of KRAT (1).

\footnote{67}MEC., p. 7.
proper moral action.

There are three things in particular that may be said about KRAT: first, there are two basic ways in which KRAT's features enter a person's moral thinking and acting:

(a) A person must have the alertness and sensitivity actually to use the other components in his moral thinking, as opposed to having the abilities, etc., but not actually using them (KRAT (1)).
(b) When a person has reached a rational moral decision, he must have the motivation and resolution to translate that decision into action. (KRAT (2)).

Second, KRAT is not will power because there are many reasons why a person does not use his ability to act in moral situations or fails to implement a moral decision. He could be forgetful, incompetent, lazy, tired, frightened, etc. All of these are not what are usually called moral failures. (What Wilson sees as moral failures will soon be considered; they number three.)

Third, KRAT's complexities are numerous, but only four will be considered here:

(a) A person should have a sufficient sentiment or love for other people: this is at least one kind of motivation which should enable him both to think and act rationally in the moral sphere.
(b) A person should have 'good habits', or a settled disposition to think and act in a rational manner; also seem well motivated. One cannot perhaps feel sentiments towards other people all the time, and this kind of motivation seems of very great practical importance.
(c) A person must possess independence of judgment, the ability to think and act autonomously (as opposed simply to following other people like sheep), and sufficient courage to act on his judgment; this seems a necessary quality, since there will be plenty of cases where rational morality goes against what is publicly acceptable.

68Ibid., pp. 7-8.
(d) A person must be reflective or thoughtful enough not to be carried away by particular situations, and not to be forgetful of other people. He needs fixed habits, but he also must be able to stop and think when required. He needs, as it were, some kind of warning system which operates in him and tells him to think about what he is doing before he does anything. 69

KRAT, then, is conceived upon the assumption that a person may have an adequate moral theory (i.e., may know, feel and act in the appropriate ways) but still may fail to use the theory when called upon. 70

In fact there are two possible instances of failure: (a) the failure to reach a proper decision making stage KRAT (1). There are three possible ways to fail in this stage or mode of thinking. 71 And (b) the person may decide to act in a particular way; but he may still fail to act, even though he could. This is called KRAT (2) because of its specific concern with action or behavior.

The problem in KRAT (1) is not a matter of thinking that a specific thing ought to be done 'in principle'; it is a matter of committing oneself to act upon the moral decision made. The person with much KRAT (1), when confronted by a moral situation, will examine the dilemma in terms of the other's interests. Things like PHIL (the proper attitude), EMP (the ability to discern the other's feelings), and GIG (1) (knowledge of the 'hard' facts) will be used to arrive at a proper decision. The results will be a "prescriptive moral choice, dictated by other people's interests, which he regards as committing

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69 AM., p. 60.
70 Ibid.
71 MT., p. 60.
him and anyone else in a similar situation to action." 72

However, even though the principles may be derived and applied in a rational manner, they may fail in at least three ways: first, when it is time to decide about a moral dilemma, the person may fail to be alert to or fail to notice that he must decide on either part or all of what he should consider. This failure Wilson calls the failure to be 'relevantly alert,' K r a t (T) (RA). 73

The second failure is the failure not to 'think thoroughly' about the moral dilemma. This failure is closely connected to the first, but it is distinguishable from it because this dimension entails the improper use of PHI, EM, and GI. Careful thinking itself includes a concern with some of the following questions: what does the person really want? Do I really feel a desire to help? It is not necessary that the person always be consciously in tune with what he does, but it is important that thinking occur whenever the need arises and that it be the person's own thinking. For Wilson this is K r a t (1) (T). 74

Even though the person might be both alert and think about his decision, there are at least three other possible ways to fail within this last distinction: 75 (1) some other overriding syllogism based upon something like self-interest or guilt may prevent the decision from

72 AM., p. 60.
73 Ibid., p. 61.
74 Ibid.
75 I will soon show that three aspects fall under the same subcategory OPU, i.e., overriding, prescriptive, and universal category.
becoming 'overriding',\textsuperscript{76} (ii) the person may fail to commit himself to his decision, that is, he may fail to make the decision 'prescriptive'.\textsuperscript{77} (iii) He may not 'universalize' either his rules or his decisions,\textsuperscript{78} that is, no account may be made of the fact that both himself and others ought to be concerned about other's interests. Collectively, Wilson includes all three possibilities in the element KRAT (1) (POU).\textsuperscript{79}

KRAT (1) then has two dimensions: (a) right reasons concerns the appropriate type of reasons that may be used. Those reasons cover things like other's interests; even though many philosophers neither think this is nor take it as a reason, it is taken as the primary reason here because the realm of morality is assumed to be preoccupied with a concern for the other. People who do not accept this principle as a reason for motivating action use, as their reasons, such modes of thought as obedience to authority, fear, guilt, and so on. In short, they use non-KRAT types of thinking like sexual behavior in their realm of moral choice. However, the person with a high degree of KRAT (1)-will always place other's interests first, that is, a special type of 'good reason', namely other's interest, will be used in his moral choices rather than other reasons.\textsuperscript{80}

(b) The second dimension concerns the sincerity of the decision

\textsuperscript{76} AM., p. 61.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{80} MT., p. 61.
made. Some people just pay lip-service to their thinking and do not commit themselves to their thoughts. Something is called 'good' or 'said that one 'ought' to do it out of the blue, as it were, and therefore their thoughts are not used in a prescriptive way. ('Good' for example may be used as 'what is commonly supposed to be good'.) But the person with high KRAT (1) evaluates moral dilemmas, makes a moral choice and decision and commits himself in terms of other's interests. In short, all choices are universalized. 81

Some questions that this component seeks answers for in both the developing person and the educated person are:

Does he think that morals are 'just a matter of taste', 'all relative', etc., or does he believe that there are right and wrong answers to moral questions?

When he uses words like 'good', 'bad', 'right', 'wrong', 'ought', etc. does he use them in such a way as really to commit himself to acting in a certain way, or does he just mean what other people (perhaps just adults) think is good (... right, etc.): i.e., to what extent does he really have a prescriptive moral vocabulary at all?

Does he have a reasonably coherent set of moral principles — not necessarily completely fixed and certain, but at any rate seriously held for obvious cases (murder, stealing, lying, etc.)? 82

There are many problems regarding the overlap between KRAT (1) and PHIL (CC), i.e., problems like what goes on in the person's head. No major difficulties may arise with the context in which a person 'claims his concept', but there may be difficulties about the internal

81 Ibid.

82 Ibid., pp. 61-62.
context in which the person judges. And where PHIL (CC) concerns such things like social separation (i.e., class, family, and so on), KRAT (1) deals with things like potent others (i.e., family, friends, peers, strangers, etc.), prior experience, and influences of temporary moods upon a decision. Thus when assessments are being made for a person's development, controls and allowances must be made for these potential interferences. Efforts must be made to distinguish them so when one is being determined one is assured that it is not the other that is being discussed. But whatever is done it is difficult to distinguish between the two.

The person then that passes through KRAT (1) and does not err can make the 'correct' decision. Once this level of thinking and acting is reached, decisions will generally be made in terms of the others' interests. However, even though the correct decision may be made, there is still a conceivable way that failure may occur. The assumption here is that it is both logically and empirically possible for a person to decide to act in a reasonable and sincere way, but still not act upon that decision when called upon. If the use of words like 'sincerity', 'prescriptivity', 'bringing to bear' and so on are strongly emphasized, the chances of something like this happening would be overruled. But in doing that a very conceivable and realistic area of cases which are of importance and interest here would be overruled. And it is these cases that KRAT (2) attempts to account for.

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83 AM, p. 62.
84 Ibid., p. 63.
These cases include people who decide in a proper way to act (i.e., through the procedure delineated here in terms of the overriding, prescriptive and universal principles) on behalf of others but fail to do so. A failure of this sort occurs not because of some external force(s) (as if the person had a gun pointed at his head) but it is due to the presence of some overriding unconscious counter-syllogism or counter-motivation which has not been controlled. Wilson bases this reasoning upon his view of the unconscious: it is a view that conceives the person as having a part of himself following different rules, that is so unknown even to the conscious self that it cannot be properly said that the person's decisions are not sincere. The person (unconsciously) follows different rules because of these unconscious beliefs and emotions. And it is that very unconscious activity which prevents the implementation of the decision to act. To repeat: the failure to act is not a case of not being able to act; rather it's an instance of not wanting to act. No doubt an area of this sort is both closely connected to and different from KRAT (1). Both features revolve around the fact that one is the logical extension of the other; KRAT (2) is a measure of the extent to which KRAT (1) is actually accepted, and

85 Ibid.

The view of the unconscious, Wilson counters, is defined by him "... as a clumsy way of talking about conditioned reflexes, 'imprinting', etc. ..." Furthermore "... the unconscious is ... in principle educable, and ... there is a sense ... in which ... [the person] is responsible and perhaps 'to blame' for the rules he unconsciously follows ..." (AM., p. 53).

87 Ibid.
operates as a motivating force for it tells how well the person's thought is clarified and becomes the appropriate action. The assessment procedures then can help us tell the alertness and the resolution of the consequent translation of moral judgment into action. (Wilson admits that it is very difficult for the philosopher to work in this area. And he suggests that even though the philosopher might be able to offer a taxonomy of unconscious counter-syllogisms, the best that he can really do is to identify the existence of this class of cases and leave the rest of the work up to the clinical psychologist and the psychoanalyst.) This component then encompasses the person's alertness and the resolution of his moral theory; it deals with the person's motivation and his behavior. Some of the questions that fall within this component are:

Does he feel strongly and favourably enough towards other people for him to be adequately motivated in thinking morally and in actually carrying out his moral principles?

Does he have good settled habits which enable him to translate his moral principles into action without difficulty?

Does he have sufficient independence of judgment or 'conscience' to make up his own mind and act in moral situations, regardless of what other people think?

Does he have sufficient sensitivity for situations involving other people to stop and think before acting? 88

Before concluding my review of the components basic to Wilson's concept of the morally educated man (and the pedagogical means of arriving at that state of character) I will give the grouping of the components that Wilson gives under the headings knowing, feeling, and doing.

88 Mt., p. 64.
The regrouping is given to show the extent of what they cover. Wilson attempts to encompass all that is relevant in the moral being's morality, i.e., all that the person knows, feels, and does. These areas must be considered in order to clearly demarcate some of the relevant concerns in moral education and moral development. A failure to include all three dimensions of morality in an assessment of morality is to overlook much that is influential in the realm of morality. If it is not determined or if a person is now shown, for instance, the importance of having the facts straight, and knowing that your feelings for the other are crucial to be moral, it is unlikely that the person will ever think or act in any manner that resembles moral thought and moral action. Moreover, if major dimensions are overlooked, important reasons and important areas within the entire realm of morality may go unnoticed. My assumption here is (i.e., as it is derived from the above perception of the human mind) that a person may have different mental states for different things, i.e., he may have one state for his feeling toward blacks and another for Jews, and that unless he learns the irrationality of such differentiations, he may never learn what it means to really care for another; this is true especially in the sense caring has been discussed here. In other words, it is assumed that if the different mental states in this case are not seen for what they are, i.e., their unreasonableness, the person will be able to do different things at different times and be in no way affected by what he does and knows. In such cases the dangers of self-interestedness enters the picture. But if the person is instructed in the irrationality of an unprincipled life style, then there is a better chance,
although it must be admitted that there is no absolute guarantee, of 
having a more aware moral person.

Each component falls under one of the above headings:

A. Knowing: These components deal specifically with various 
types of knowing.

PHIL (HC) Knowing what a person is ....
EMP (HC) Knowing what counts as wants like security.
EMP (DO) & (PO) Knowing when one and others feel insecure.
GIG (1) (KF) Knowing that some actions aid needs (safe 
environment) and that others hinder needs, 
and knowing how to discover this fact.
GIG (2) (VC) Knowing how to make people feel comfortable, 
happy, how to apologise, welcome and so on.

B. Doing: These components concern what the person does.

PHIL (CC) What the person does with the principle 
claimed.
KRAT (1) (RA) The person is relevantly alert to the other.
KRAT (1) (TT) The person thinks thoroughly about the other.
KRAT (1) (OFU) The person makes the correct decision to act.
KRAT (2) The person acts 'properly' upon his principles.

C. Feeling: This concerns what the person feels and about 
what he knows and does.

PHIL (RSP) Having EMP is to have a feeling, and, in part, 
to have a belief and the inclination to act on 
that belief. It is to this extent that a con-
sideration of what the person does enters here. 
This demands a separate section because there 
is a conceptual requirement for particular 
symptoms, i.e., the key elements needs and 
wants (feelings). Emotions are things suffered 
or things that happen to us and not the things 
known or done when we support a principle 
covering others' needs and wants. 

\[89\] AM., pp. 67–68.
That, in sum, is my consideration of Wilson's study of moral education. Basically it is preoccupied with helping the person to rationally decide and develop rationally into a morally aware human being. All components are based on and derived through a principle of rationality. The components also attempt to foster both the principle of rationality in the person and the rational unification of moral thought and moral action. The principle of rationality itself is conceived such that, if it is rationally explained to and internalized by the person, it will motivate the person to think and act morally. The claim of motivation is made through an implicit assumption made about the internal connection of rationality to morality, because of the connection between the rational and the volitional dimensions inherent in the principle of rationality which the person internalizes, and finally, because of the serious manner in which the person accepts rationality and morality. Furthermore, in this theory of moral education, the relationship between action, rationality and morality is bolstered more by the fact that all the character traits which go to make up the person are logically derived and justified through this same principle of rationality. That is to say, the traits that the person possesses are fostered by and foster (in the person) the principle of rationality. In this way Wilson's moral being becomes a rational moral being who attempts to do what is rationally required of him. Since he knows what he (logically) ought to know, feels what he (logically) ought to feel, and does what he (logically) ought to do (because of his awareness of how to correlate all dimensions of his being in any real-life situation requiring
moral thought and moral action), he tries to be moral in the most complete manner possible.
CHAPTER 2

LAWRENCE KOHLBERG ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT

Lawrence Kohlberg

... has developed his stage theory of moral development with a considerable amount of philosophical sophistication and with a broad understanding of the place of his work in modern psychology. The power of his analysis stems from his ability to combine philosophy, psychology, political science, and related disciplines within the perview of his extensive empirical work.

For these reasons, but especially because of the empirical work, Kohlberg has been chosen as one of the major researchers in the area of moral development. But in this chapter, I can only briefly touch upon the immensity of this innovative empirical study of moral development. Thus the chapter will restrict itself to an outline of the six stages basic to the theory of moral development and some eight generalizations which may be made about these stages.

Kohlberg, an educational social psychologist at Harvard University, has studied the individual's reasoning about moral concerns for some twenty-three years. He conducted studies every three years on seventy-five American (Chicago area) middle and working class males; and he also conducted international studies in such places as Turkey, Canada, Britain, Israel, Yucatan, Taiwan, India, and Honduras. The results

showed, according to Kohlberg:

...that human thinking goes through stages of development... [a process which] occur in all cultures. The theory represents a universal explanation of how people develop their thinking about social and moral problems.²

Stage development here within the realm of morality and moral reasoning refers to the clear-cut and orderly growth that the person traverses as he goes from moral immaturity to moral maturity. There are a total of six interrelated and integrated stages which intensify in complexity and comprehensiveness as they progress from stage 1 to stage 6. Although all stages have a necessary logical connection to each other, each stage operates through a distinct orientation to moral problems and each stage is representative of an invariant, and universal developmental progression. Logically necessary as used here means that there is a direct, internal and inherent connection between all stages. Stage 2 will not be reached until stage 1 is first completed, and so on. Within the Kohlbergian typology, then, moral concepts and moral reasoning develop in a distinctive and interconnected order, an order expressive of an interdependent universal and internal logical harmony.

Before I give any further explanation of these stages of thinking there are some points that, by way of introduction, need mentioning: first, something needs to be said about Kohlberg's background. At the University of Chicago, Kohlberg began to study the work that

both John Dewey and Jean Piaget completed on moral growth. Piaget elaborated Dewey's three theoretical levels of moral behavior (viz. the conventional, preemoral, and autonomous) into the preemoral, heteronomous and autonomous stages of thinking. Kohlberg in turn came up with the preconventional, conventional, and postconventional or principled level of moral thinking. Where Piaget performed a minimal amount of empirical research (on Dewey's conceptual distinctions) and saw that ethical judgments develop much like logical and mathematical structures, Kohlberg performed much more elaborate empirical tests. He saw a developmental sequence which revealed a restructuring of thought about moral and social questions at the same time that cognitive thought structures moved from the more concrete to the more abstract. Like Piaget, Kohlberg attempted to "... show that the


4The preemoral level is a level of "behavior motivated by biological and social impulses with the results for morals." The conventional level of action is the level where "the individual accepts with little critical reflection the standards of his group." At the autonomous level, "conduct is guided by individual thinking and judging for himself whether a purpose is good, and does not accept the standard of his group without reflection." J. Dewey, PC; see also VCT., pp. 18-19.

5Piaget's findings are based upon some empirical evidence of the stages he stated: (1) no sense of obligation to rules occurs in the preemoral stage. (2) In the heteronomous stage right is literal obedience to rules with a concurrent submission to both power and obedience — this occurs approximately around ages 4 to 8. (3) The purpose and consequences of accepting rules is considered, and obligation is centered on reciprocity and exchange in the autonomous stage. JC; VCT, pp. 18-19.

development of moral judgments can be studied to a considerable extent by a 'genetic epistemological' mode.\textsuperscript{7} Although both studies are an extension of the German philosopher Immanuel Kant's studies on 'practical reason', the Kohlbergian six stage "... developmental theory of moral reasoning is a more sophisticated and articulate extension of Piaget's earlier inquiry into the understanding of moral reasoning."\textsuperscript{8} But both studies are alike in that they are preoccupied with epistemological categories.\textsuperscript{9}

Second, Kohlbergian research techniques themselves consist of confronting an interviewee with hypothetical moral dilemmas which are expressed through a \textsuperscript{a} series of short stories (an example of which will be given shortly). The stories are a written account of some situation wherein another person's concerns are at issue and about which the reader is asked to reason and declare what should be done. The aim of the research technique is to get at the person's 'real' reasons for his recommendations. Thus it is the underlying moral thinking which is of concern. The written accounts are characterized by the following dimensions:\textsuperscript{10} there is (a) a \textit{particular focus} on some genuine real-life issue like theft or the value of human life, (b) expressed through an active \textit{central character} or \textit{group of characters} on whose actions the

\textsuperscript{7}Ks., p. 16.

\textsuperscript{8}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{9}At this point Sullivan states: "We might well question this type of preoccupation, since it may lock us into a specific direction that may have unintended consequences." Ibid.

\textsuperscript{10}Mr., pp. 38-40.
interviewee must make moral judgments, and (c) the choice itself which
the interviewee must make must be a choice that both the primary par-
participants must make and the interviewee must confront. A choice (like
informing on the thief or siding with him) should not be merely represen-
tative of a culturally accepted (i.e., 'the correct', 'right')
answer or what someone else thinks, but, it should be what the inter-
viewee thinks about the genuine conflict that the central characters
face. (d) The moral dilemmas themselves also concern central moral
issues like truth, punishment, life, sex, social norms, authority,
property, personal conscience, contract, justice, and so on. And
finally, (e) all moral dilemmas terminate with a particular type of
question, i.e., a "should" question about what course of action the
character should take in this instance. It is not a question of
"would do," for that is a question of speculation; "would" questions,
generally speaking, are more of a concern of psychology than morality.
To recapitulate, the interviewee is asked to read, think and reason
about, in short to justify, what he thinks should be done in the given
situation. A series of questions were asked and their answers analyzed
to reveal, in the most systematic manner possible, the person's reasons
for what should be done.\footnote{Ibid., p. 40.}

The stories selected take the form of the following often quoted
Heinz dilemma:

A European woman was suffering from a special type of terminal
cancer. It was possible that a druggist, of her town, had
recently invented a drug (a type of radium) which might save
her life. But he charged ten times (i.e., $2,000.) what it cost him to make a small amount of the drug, simply because he wanted to get rich on his discovery. Heinz, the sick woman's husband, went to everyone he knew attempting to borrow the necessary amount, but he could only raise a half of the required amount, $1,000. He both explained this situation to the druggist and appealed to him to do one of two things: either sell the drug cheaper or let him pay the remaining $1,000 later. The druggist refused. So, out of desperation Heinz entered the drug store illegally and stole the drug.  

Kohlberg asked the following sorts of questions: was Heinz right or wrong in stealing the drug? Was the druggist right or wrong in refusing to cooperate with Heinz? What is more serious, stealing or letting a human being die? Why? How do you feel about the value of (human) life? If Heinz does not love his wife, does he have a 'good' reason to steal the drug? Should Heinz do for a stranger what he did for his wife? Should Heinz be made to stand trial, if he is caught? Should he go to prison? To whom should the judge be responsible, Heinz, the druggist, society or someone else?  

This methodology also consists of a scoring system which would give an accurate picture of the person's level of moral reasoning. Accuracy for Kohlberg can only be derived from the correlation of many responses to many dilemmas like the above. The rationale for the use of both the highly situation-specific hypothetical moral dilemmas and this scoring system rests on the assumption that different people have different reasons for saying different moral things; and that it


14MD., p. 44.
is by examining the reasons given for what should be done more than anything else that these differences can be arrived at.

In a word then, Kohlberg differentiates between process and form: process refers to the forward, purposive and systematic development of the person's moral reasoning from stage 1 to stage 6. And the character of the intelligible structure which constitutes the substance of and/or the species of that moral reasoning is its form. The moral reasoning characteristic of this orderly growth is formal because of its features (which it shares with mathematical and scientific reasoning): reversibility (and its two subfeatures) consistency and universalizability. Put another way, moral reasoning is formal because through reversibility, it fulfills the main criterion of formalism. Reversible moral logical thinking, like that reversible logical thought in both the domain of logical and physical facts, is that type of thinking which permits free movement, without distortion, between premises and conclusions. Reversibility, the keystone of logic, may be expressed mathematically: \( A + B \) is identical to \( B + A \), and \( X + Y = Z \) is the same as \( X = Z - Y \). Both operations permit undistorted, free movement between the premise and the conclusion. In the realm of moral thought, the elements of reversible moral thinking may be applied, without distortion and free movement, in the move from rights to duties and from duties to rights. In morality reversibility begins from the slogan "Put yourself in the other person's position

when you decide," and is fulfilled through a prescriptive act preoccupied with both consistency and universalizability.

Consistency, the first criterion of formalism, is met through fairness as impartiality; and the extent to which the starting point of reversibility is implemented that is the extent to which consistency is practiced. For instance, if all concerned parties in a moral dilemma start from the accepted slogan, go through an impartial, deliberating moral thought process and decide upon a course of action which is fairly applied to everyone, it can be said that a consistent and reversible solution was derived.\(^{16}\)

Universalizability, the second criterion of formalism, on the other hand, begins from the slogan "What if everyone did it; what if everyone used this principle of choice?" Universalizability concerns itself with the applicability of the decision and/or moral judgments to everyone in all similar situations.\(^{17}\) To conceive of universalizability in this way is to imply that universalizability is internal to reversibility. Reversibility goes beyond universalizability for Kohlberg because it tells more.\(^{18}\)

Moral judgments within Kohlberg's typology are formal and logical then because of the characteristics, reversibility, consistency, and universalizability. He emphasizes these three formal aspects of moral thinking as against the content or meaning of the

\(^{16}\text{Ibid.}\)

\(^{17}\text{Ibid.}\)

\(^{18}\text{Ibid.}\)
moral thought which they characterize. Thus, both process and form are related for they demarcate the essence of or the sense of the judgments each person makes as he systematically and purposefully grows from stage to stage.

It is this distinction between process and form that gives Kohlberg’s classificatory system of structural thinking its character. It is for this reason that he can claim that his structure is content free and universal.\textsuperscript{19} And furthermore, this reason permits him to describe his distinctions as a "... typology of definite and universal levels of development of moral thought ... [i.e.,] levels or stages which may be considered separate moral philosophies, distinct views of the social-moral view."\textsuperscript{20}

The three main levels of moral thinking are: the preconventional, the conventional, and the postconventional. I will now outline each level and its accompanying stage of reasoning.

\textbf{Preconventional}

Here cultural standards of 'good' and 'bad', 'right' and 'wrong' are perceived in terms of the results of actions performed (i.e., rewards, punishments, favours), and the physical control which the law exercises over actions. The two stages are:

\textbf{Stage 1: The Punishment and Obedience Orientation}

The goodness or badness of actions is determined by their physical


\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
effects. Results of such actions are not given any human value. Punishment and power are valued in terms of themselves; there is no respect paid to any underlying moral value or order as a reason for either avoiding punishment and/or having an unquestioning deference to power (stage 4).

Stage 2: The Instrumental Relativist Orientation

Right acts are conceived in terms of their instrumental satisfaction for oneself (and occasionally others). Human interactions are experienced as a barter affair, i.e., as exchanges occur in a marketplace. Every exchange is seen in light of the phrase 'You scratch my back and I'll scratch yours'. All sharing, fairness, and reciprocal exchanges are viewed in terms of personal gain. There is no room in these reciprocal interchanges for justice, loyalty or gratitude.

Conventional Level

The value of the family, the group and the nation is upheld as useful in its own right. No reference is made to the consequences of actions. This is not just a conformity to what others and society expects of one, but it is a loyalty, support, justification, and identity with the people and their role in society. The two stages here are:

Stage 3: The Interpersonal Concordance of "Good Boy-Nice Girl" Orientation

Good behavior is perceived as whatever pleases and is approved by the group. The person conforms to all accepted 'natural behavior' or 'stereotypical images'. Actions are generally judged in terms of intentions which are often expressed in phrases like "the person meant
well." Thinking of this sort becomes important here for the first time. Approval is earned by being nice to others.

Stage 4: The Law and Order Orientation

Here the person orients himself toward keeping social peace, established rules, authority, and so on. Now keeping the peace is an expression of respect for authority. Behaving properly consists of doing one's duty for the sake of doing it.

Postconventional, Autonomous, or Principled Level

Distinct attempts are now made "to define moral values and principles which have validity and application apart from the authority of the group or persons holding these principles and apart from the individual's own identification with these groups." The two stages here are:

Stage 5: The Social-Contract (Legalistic) Orientation

Utilitarian overtones appear here: rightness and wrongness are expressed through overall particular rights and standards which the entire society examines and chooses. The person recognizes the relativity of personal opinions, values, and the use of procedural rules to derive a consensus of opinion in a dispute. Rightness is perceived as a matter of personal values and opinions, apart from the constitutionally and democratically agreed upon facts. The person comes to realize both the usefulness of the legal point of view and how changes can be made in that procedure through a rational examination of it by all parties (or representatives of them) concerned.

21 MD., p. 46; AA., p. 167; VCT., p. 20.
this sort sets stage 5 apart from the rigidity of stage 4 law. Obligation outside of the legal realm is now the rational free agreement, and contractual consensus on which all interested parties agree.  

Stage 6: The Universal Ethical Principle Orientation

Right is now defined in terms of a personal conscience which is based upon logically comprehensive, consistent and universally chosen ethical principles. These principles are not concrete moral precepts like the ten commandments, but they are abstract ethical principles like the golden rule and the categorical imperative. All such principles here are "universal principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality of human rights and respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons."  

That this stage progression implies something more than chance for Kohlberg can be seen in the eight generalizations which he draws from his stage concept. I will now direct my discussion to these generalizations -- which oftentimes operate as assumptions for the theory.

First, the stages are defined as "structured wholes." They are presented as complete and structural ways of thinking. Kohlberg explains that concept this way:

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22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

24 Kohlberg's use of the word structure indicates his affinity with Piaget's structuralism. At this point, I want no more than to mention Piaget's methodological approach to data. I will explain his use of structuralism later in n. 42.
Each stage in the concept of life is more differentiated, more integrated and more universalized than the stage before. This inner logic of differentiation and integration suggests one reason why there are universal moral stages. Basic moral values like the value of life and like the concept of reciprocity or justice are there at the start, at stage 1. The child's experience of the value of his parental life, of a pet dog's life is the result of primary empathy with other living things, of the projection of consciousness into others. Reciprocity, too, is of the primary experience of social interaction.... The dominance of the value of life over property, then, arises in the course of differentiation and integration of these basic and 'natural tendencies'.

In short, each stage entails "a wider and more adequate perception of the social system and an ability to think more abstractly." The stage above accounts for the inadequacies of its previous stage because (as it both includes and goes beyond it's predecessor) it encompasses more abstract and less concrete thinking. From a structural point of view this composition relates but also sets all stages apart. The process of new abstract thinking makes moral events more intelligible, more transparent. Stage 6 is more advanced structurally because it depends upon more advanced moral reasoning which stage 1 cannot encompass. The more advanced a person thinks logically, the more advanced his stage: concrete and operational thinking confines the thinker to a preconventional moral stage (i.e., stage 1 or 2); and formal operational thinking carries the person to a conventional moral stage (i.e., stage 3 or 4), and so on. This means that each


26. Ibid.

27. Ibid., pp. 21-22.
"structured whole" then can resolve moral conflicts in a different manner from its predecessor because of the more advanced mode of thinking it encompasses. Structurally they are not separated by a quantitative difference of thought but by a qualitative difference.  

The use of the phrase "mode of thinking" refers, then, specifically to the "structural whole" or the form that any stage of moral thinking assumes in the overall process. Each stage implies distinct thought structures or thought organizations and not just a collection of quantitative experiences which some psychologists would characterize as stimulus-response models. It is a complete entity unto itself which is different from, but dependent upon, an extension of its predecessor.

This leads directly into the second generalization: the stages imply an "invariant sequence." All stages (structures) must be entered and their requirements fulfilled before any movement to another stage occurs. Every person moves through each stage or structural moral judgment orderly. The next higher stage cannot be reached until the first stage is mastered, that is, before the person can get to stage 4, he must first move through stages 1, 2, and 3. Developmental

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28 Betty Sichel, "The Relation Between Moral Judgment and Moral Behaviour in Kohlberg's Theory of the Development of Moral Judgments," Educational Philosophy and Theory 8 (1976), p. 57. Hereinafter called TD. Commenting further on this point, she states: "Though Kohlberg stresses the qualitative difference in the mode of thinking at different stages, I believe that a case can be made that these are concomitant quantitative changes. However, what would seem to be crucial for Kohlberg would be the primacy of the qualitative differences in determining the differences between the stages or the movement from one stage to another." Ibid.

29 Ibid.
stages cannot be skipped because each step presupposes the reasoning of
the other. Mental readjustments must occur as the person moves from
stage to stage. Moral dilemmas are confronted from the perspective of
a present moral cognitive stage. And (to anticipate generalization 6
a little) all judgments will reflect that stage unless the dilemma pro-
vokes 'cognitive dissonance' and the thinker attempts to resolve the
dilemma from another stage. Mental readjustments are made in the
adaptative process: in order to get from a view of good as personal
pleasure to a view of good as an abstract unity of obligation and
rights, the person's reasoning must grow. That growth always occurs
in a predetermined sequence forward to the next highest stage, and
never backwards.\textsuperscript{30} But this does not mean that people do not progress
at varying speeds and stop at various stages or even at different
points in a stage; indeed, both things occur — however, whatever occurs,
occurs in accordance with the way the stages are defined here. The
actual growth occurs naturally in a purposive and systematic upward
direction. The invariant natural development occurs in this way
"because each stage stems from the previous one and prepares the way
for the subsequent stage."\textsuperscript{31} However, because Kohlberg states that
there is an invariant development through all levels it does not mean
that he claims growth must necessarily tend toward stage 6. In fact,
he emphasizes very much the fact that growth can truncate at any stage


prior to stage 6.\textsuperscript{32}

Generally speaking, although both children and adolescents move at varying rates of speed through the stages, pre-adolescents move through the preconventional level, adolescents usually achieve the conventional level and adults move toward the postconventional level of reasoning. But less than twenty percent (perhaps not even five percent) of the adult population reach the postconventional level.\textsuperscript{33} The most common adult stage is stage 4, the law and order orientation.

Actual movement through the stages parallels movements through Piaget's logical stages. Kohlberg in fact claims "... that an excessive hiatus cannot exist between the highest cognitive stage and the highest moral stage reached by the individual."\textsuperscript{34} A person can possibly reach Piaget's formal level of logical thought but never reach Kohlberg's stage 5 or 6. And it is impossible insofar as he's concerned for a person who has either a low stage of cognitive thinking or low IQ to ever reach stage 6.\textsuperscript{35}

Third: development is logically necessary. But it is not the

\textsuperscript{32}Sichel, TD., p. 58.

\textsuperscript{33}Ibid.; MR., pp. 33-34.

\textsuperscript{34}Sichel, TD., p. 58. Kohlberg maintains this position even though present day research shows that about fifty percent of Americans reach Piaget's level of formal operations but only five percent reach his stage 6.

\textsuperscript{35}On this point, Sichel states: "Though Kohlberg insists that the stage at which the individual functions will not indicate the moral worth of the individual, we must wonder whether this might not become the case." Ibid., p. 66.
empirical necessity evident in the physical development of the human being from infancy to adolescence and adulthood. In actual fact Kohlberg rejects empirical necessity. And thus his invariant logically necessary sequence

... represents a universal inner logical order of moral concepts, not a universal order found in the educational practices of all cultures or an order wired into the nervous system. Since each new basic differentiation at each stage logically depends upon the differentiation before it, the order of differentiations could not logically be other than it is.36

In sum, the connection between all the stages is a logical and not an empirical fact. The moral developmental process is a formal and logical development which logically must occur in the manner delineated here.

The fourth generalization concerns what Kohlberg calls the universal dimensions of the stages. Although the middle class37 child in all countries (like the United States, Canada, Taiwan, Yucatan, Turkey and Mexico) clearly has a more developed moral judgment than those of the lower class child, both classes go through the same sequence. Kohlberg explains:

This sequence is not dependent upon a particular region, or any region at all in the usual sense. I found no important difference in the development of moral thinking among Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Buddhists, Moslems, and atheists. Religious values seem to go through the same stages as all other values.


37 It is difficult to tell exactly what Kohlberg has in mind when he uses this term. In fact, not every person agrees on exactly what it entails; usage ranges from arbitrary-illusory meanings to the absolute existence of that to which the word speaks. In a word, we need an explanation from Kohlberg as to what the word entails.
In summary, the nature of our sequence is not significantly affected by widely varying social, cultural or religious conditions. The only thing that is affected is the rate at which individuals progress through this sequence.\textsuperscript{38}

A claim of this nature carries with it the implication that

... moral development is not merely a matter of the child's learning the verbal values as rules of the culture; rather moral development reflects something more universal, and its sequential stages would occur in any culture. In short, Kohlberg's stages in moral judgment imply a cultural universal.\textsuperscript{39}

Although these conclusions are based upon research conducted in divergent cultures, societies and religious creeds, and although the concept of universal moral developmental stages clearly emerge, they also indicate (somewhat unclearly and confusedly) that some cultures like the American and Canadian culture develop more rapidly than cultures like those of Taiwan and Yucatan.\textsuperscript{40}

Fifthly, Kohlberg does not believe that his stages are cultural beliefs which can be taught to children. The stages are not representative of moral maxims which adults are expected to teach children or that children can learn. Instead the

... stages represent abstractions which children and later adults develop on their own as their intelligence matures and they attempt to cope in a consistent way with dilemmas that arise and arguments they have.\textsuperscript{41}

As structural thinking the stages are forms of practical reasoning.

\textsuperscript{38}AA., pp. 171-172.

\textsuperscript{39}KS., p. 6.

\textsuperscript{40}MR., p. 32.

\textsuperscript{41}Ibid., p. 33.
which is mainly abstract in nature. The development which the stages are expressive of is a systematic, progressive and abstract-cum-logical thought structure which goes beyond any particular cultural belief. But because of the structure's formal and logical dimensions, the stages are evident in all cultures.

The sixth generalization deals with cognitive dissonance. The maturing person is "... cognitively attracted to reasoning one level about [his] ... own predominant level." A stage 1 person is attracted to a stage 2 thinking, and so on in a natural manner, even though the reasoning of the higher stage may not be completely comprehended. Movement tends upward because of the necessary logical connection between the stages. Attraction is restricted to the next highest stage because the person's present level of reasoning can only allow him to deal with the stage adjacent to his present level of reasoning. But the movement that does occur is a cognitive and progressively upward development.

Cognitive dissonance concerns the means by which this attraction is initiated and accelerated. Cognitive dissonance or intellectual

[As a structuralist, Piaget believes in a universal order wherein all things and systems (organic and inorganic) are either unified or are merging in their psychological, social, biological and ideational dimensions. Science — for this methodology — is interrelated to the point that if one branch establishes a theorem then it is relevant to the principles and laws of all branches. And the basis of all prevailing logic and natural harmony is the spontaneous coherence of all activities. Those intellectual functions that attempt to create some universal state of equilibrium or order out of the world are conceived as if they were carrying out their inherent, unalterable and evolutionary role in the cosmic process.]

MD., p. 48.
anxiety motivates (how it does so will be considered under a separate heading): (a) a search for more adequate answers to moral dilemmas, and (b) either a more complete comprehension of the present stage or movement onto the next stage. Sichel comments:

If the situation [i.e., the moral dilemma encountered] presents some cognitive dissonance, but not such excessive cognitive dissonance as to cause confusion, the child may accommodate the resolution of the problem within the framework of a new structure, that structure reflecting the next higher stage. This higher stage is not merely achieved through addition to the previous stage(s), but rather is a qualitatively different stage. As change occurs the thought structure of the lower stage is integrated into the structure of the newer stage. The new structure makes the complexities of moral dilemmas more transparent, more intelligible, more sensible than when viewed from the perspective of a lower mode of reasoning. However,

... cognitive development is not merely vertical in terms of an ascending hierarchy, but also involves horizontal development within any particular stage, what Kohlberg terms 'decalage'. For Kohlberg development from one stage to the next does not merely occur in one single swoop. Rather, when a child first enters a particular higher stage he will make a number of judgments in a manner consistent with the standards of that higher stage. However, not all of the child's moral judgments will be consistent with the requirements of that stage. Only as the child confronts repeated moral problems and makes moral judgments at the higher stage does decalage occur. In other words, as the child continues to be confronted by a variety of different moral problems within the structure of the new, higher stage, does horizontal movement within the structure of the new, higher stage occur and with horizontal movement within the stage, an increasing number of moral problems are resolved at the higher stage or moral development.45

How then does this cognitive dissonance occur? The seventh

44 Sichel, *TD.*, p. 58.
generalization concerns the creation of this cognitive dissonance, or cognitive disequilibrium. The amount of growth from one stage to another depends upon the nature of the cognitive disequilibrium created. When a person finds himself in a state of disequilibrium, the move toward equilibrium or harmony within the thought structure begins. The motivation to create equilibrium is inherent to the purposive and systematic upward mobility of the (moral developmental) process. The move to create equilibrium begins when the person confronts a moral dilemma for which he has no immediate solution but which he knows (because of what the present stage permits him to know) can be resolved in a morally more reasonable manner. So, the search begins (in the manner that the latter part of the sixth generalization specifies) for the most adequate and advanced stage of reasoning.

For instance, when the person begins to realize either that good and bad are not just a matter of personal pleasure, or 'better' is not just what is 'better for me' because he sees that there are others around him, he realizes the inherent difficulties within his stage 2 moral reasoning. Thus an inquiry or internal debate like the following might begin: Is there a difference between me (say my good) and them (say their use of good)? Is that a better way of looking at good? Should I change my view of good? Can I change my concept of good? and so on. Or, on the other hand, the person may just adopt the group's use of good without any consideration. The person does not understand the stage 4 moral maxim 'It is better to give than to receive' but he does understand that 'good as personal pleasure is not what pleases the group or what it approves. A change will occur if
only because it pleases the group.

It is at this point that the seventh generalization, an extension of the sixth, may be introduced: it states that moral growth can be fostered in the classroom through the creation of cognitive dissonance. Kohlberg and his fellow researchers have shown that when students, who operate at different but adjacent levels of moral reasoning, are brought together in the classroom (where they discuss, in depth, moral dilemmas), they stimulate moral growth in each other. Communication of this nature contributes to moral maturity because it involves a process of reconsideration and restructuring of moral thought. In fact, the primary aim of cognitive dissonance for Kohlberg is moral maturity. Moreover, he claims, if no reflective thought is evident within the moral reasoning process, then there is no reason to expect development to occur beyond the stage in which the person finds himself presently. Only by interacting with others will the person realize that his thought structure cannot resolve sophisticated moral dilemmas. For Kohlberg, this should be the school's role; that is the dual role of showing that moral thought must be developed and providing the facilities to foster that developing maturity.

When a person begins to resolve moral conflicts in a morally sophisticated manner, the systematic development toward moral maturity has begun. Moral maturity itself consists of a purposive progression through the stages until stage 6, the quintessence of maturity, is reached.

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46 Mr., p. 35.
With maturity the individual is able to empathize with a greater number of individuals in various dilemma situations. At the higher levels of moral development, more perspectives are taken into account in reasoning about moral conflicts.47

The eighth generalization I have left for last because of its extensive nature and its overall implications not only for Kohlberg's theory of moral development but any theory of moral development. This generalization concerns the connection between moral judgments and moral action. But first by way of introduction some general statements need mentioning: it is natural for any study of morality to postulate a connection between moral judgments and moral action.48 In fact, conceiving moral judgments without any relationship to moral action is difficult (though not impossible) to imagine. Though Kohlberg

... would shy away from a claim that particular forms of moral judgments will provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for specific moral behavior, Kohlberg does not ignore the existence of relationship between moral judgment and moral behavior. At the very best, Kohlberg does claim that moral behavior will parallel a particular moral judgment at a particular moral stage.49

My concern here therefore will be to explore the extent of this relationship in Kohlberg's cognitive developmental stage theory of moral development.

In connection with the above, Kohlberg states:

If logical reasoning is a necessary but not sufficient condition for mature moral judgment, mature moral judgment is a necessary but not sufficient condition for mature moral action.50

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47 Ibid., p. 34.

48 Sichel, TD., p. 59.

49 Ibid.

50 VCT., p. 23.
In a word, Kohlberg expects some relationship between the moral judgments made and the moral action manifested. Even though he bases this upon the limited research he has conducted in this area on student activism and obedience, he states that there is a relationship between what the person says, does and his particular stage of moral reasoning. The morally mature person, for him, is the person who makes mature moral judgments and acts in accordance with these statements. In short, for Kohlberg, there will be some sort of parallel or correlation between the individual's moral judgments and moral actions.  

For the present discussion I will draw upon three differentiations which Betty A. Sichel has made in an excellent study on "The Relation Between Moral Judgement and Moral Behaviour in Kohlberg's Theory of the Development of Moral Judgements." These three distinctions (which will be considered in the order of presentation given here) are: (a) "identical moral behaviour at different stages of moral development," (b) "The use of the model of logical cognitive thought ..." and (c) "The question of influence of behaviour on moral judgement."  

(a) Since moral action alone for Kohlberg may not be a good indication of the level of a person's moral cognitive development (because the same action like stealing or not stealing may be performed by the same or different person(s) at different levels), he confronts

\[51\text{MR., p. 34.}\]

\[52\text{Sichel, TD., pp. 6-65. I will not discuss these points as Sichel does as criticism, but rather as points fundamental not only to Kohlberg's theory of moral development but any theory of moral development.}\]

\[53\text{Ibid.}\]
the problem (of how to differentiate between those identical actions) in two ways: first, by rejecting the "bag of virtue" approach toward moral education, and second, by preferring the formal dimensions of moral judgments to their content in his distinction between the content and the structure of moral judgments. The formal aspect of moral judgments (which have the features reversibility, consistency and universalizability) are chosen, since content-laden approaches toward judgments (like the "bag of virtue" authoritarianism, ethical dogmatism, and indoctrination) are minimized and rejected. Furthermore, the emphasis upon the formal dimension of moral judgments is consistent with both his acceptance of and use of ethical pluralism.

Kohlberg rejects the "bag of virtues" approach (i.e., the teaching for the acquisition of specific virtues like honesty, courage and so on) for two reasons: (1) for him, moral virtues do not exist: "The objection of the psychologist to the 'bag of virtues' is that there are no such things."\(^54\) Besides "I have no idea what virtue really is."\(^55\) (2) That this approach just does not work in the realm of moral education seems to imply two things for him: (a) he seems to suggest that virtues cannot be taught when he states: "... if [there] were [moral virtues], they couldn't be taught or at least we [wouldn't]


\(^55\) MV., p. 57.
know how or who could teach them.\textsuperscript{56} (b) Even though there is something that can be called virtue which can indeed be taught, this is not moral education because its content-laden dimension prevents the person from or stifles him from progressing purposively toward the principled autonomous stage 6. A teacher, for instance, who adopts honesty as a virtue, acts as a model of honesty, and expects the child to pattern himself after the teacher and internalize the virtue honesty, is demanding a blind acceptance of (i.e., indoctrinating the student into) a dubious virtue. Kohlberg calls this dogmatic acceptance of virtue learning conformity-learning, a learning which detracts from the person's integrity and autonomy.

To explain how the "same" action can have different moral qualities when done by different persons, Kohlberg points to the form of the moral judgments made. That is to say he accepts the distinction made earlier between the formal dimensions and the content dimensions of moral judgments. To recapitulate, he places the level of a person's moral reasoning in terms of the three criteria of formalism, reversibility, consistency, and universalizability: the more the person's moral judgments conform to these criteria, the more advanced or more abstract the person's moral thought is. Kohlberg expresses the difference between the form and content of a choice through the Heinz dilemma. The choice to either steal or not steal if it is made in terms of honesty is called the content of the moral judgment; and, how the choice is reasoned about (i.e., if the mode of thinking or

\textsuperscript{56}Ibid., p. 69.
the structured whole in which the judgment falls is made in terms of the criterion of formalism) is the form of the judgment. The more the choice is made by means of the formal criterion, and the moral values (like life, law, property, truth, and so on) which may enter into the person's concrete real-life situation, the more abstract and less concrete the choice is. The stage or the structure of the judgment is defined in terms of (a) what the person finds valuable in the dilemma (i.e., if emphasis is placed upon values like life, law, justice, and so on); (b) why the thing is valuable (i.e., the reasons given for the valuing itself),\textsuperscript{57} and (c) how the person applies the choice (i.e., the extent to which the formal criteria are applied to personal thinking). Thinking of this sort can progress anywhere from a stage 1 reasoning where Heinz may perceive his wife as a material possession to a stage where the wife is perceived as a unique being having her own intrinsic value like himself. For Kohlberg, once the priorities are established, the moral judgment may become a basis for action.\textsuperscript{58}

But the primary concern for him is the process through which the person goes through in order to arrive at his choice.

Consequently, although both the stage 6 person and the stage 1 person may both act identically, they will be separated by the reasoning process used to act that same way. For instance, a stage 6 adult and a stage 1 young child may both resist stealing (i.e., they may

\textsuperscript{57}\textit{VCT.}, p. 22\textsuperscript{57}

\textsuperscript{58}Kohlberg gives some of the implications of these statements in his second generalization about moral actions in \textit{MJ.}, pp. 23-24.
manifest the same behavior); but the child may not steal for fear of
punishment from his teacher after whom he is supposed to pattern his
(honest) behavior; whereas the adult, after going through an elaborate
formal reasoning process wherein he made use of the criterion of
formalism, may decide not to steal because of the consequences such an
act may have upon society in general. A mere observation of actions,
then, cannot tell the reasons (i.e., they cannot place a person in the
proper stage) for not shoplifting. Instead, it is necessary to deter-
mine the process by means of which each person decides; for one person
may not do something because another says so and another may not do it
because he thinks it is not just. Therefore, it is the process of
deciding and not the conclusions which are crucial for Kohlberg.59

(b) Since Kohlberg follows the logical cognitive developmental
stage theory of moral judgment development, he is concerned about the
logical cognitive dimensions of moral judgments.60 This concern with
logical cognition appears in the conceptual significance given to
aspects of the theory like stage, process and form. Also, as a person
who seeks the theoretical justification of his method in the formalist
tradition which runs from Kant to Rawls, Kohlberg claims further that
the logical judgments made at stage 6 are characterized by the
features of reversibility, consistency, and universalizability. Thus
in his assessment procedures, Kohlberg's concerns with the person's

59 There are problems in this area of Kohlberg which can only be
noted in passing: that is, what is the relationship between (a) moral
development, moral action, and moral education; (b) the expressed
nature of his logical cognitive judgments and operational behavior,
and (c) the relationship between moral judgments and moral action?

60 VCT, p. 23.
responses to the question "Should I do X?" in the form of moral judgments and justifications like "I should do X" and "It's just to do X" respectively rest with the logical cognitive dimensions of those responses; that is, he is preoccupied with the extent to which the responses display the three acceptable criteria of formalism.

(c) Though Kohlberg is concerned with moral judgments (or the logical sequence of moral actions, i.e., whether a moral judgment precedes moral action or vice versa), there is an area of moral development having to do with moral action with which he should concern himself. This is true especially because of the repeated stress he places upon the relationship between his moral theory of development and moral education, and (b) because it seems that it is reasonable to state that if any one expresses an interest in moral education, that both moral actions and moral judgments are of importance. A primary question here then is: To what extent does Kohlberg examine the connection between moral judgments and moral action?

Put briefly, Kohlberg does not concern himself with moral action, i.e., the relationship between moral action and moral thought. Not even the lowest stages of the preconventional level deal with the person's actions; Kohlberg is preoccupied instead with the extent to which the child can verbalize his justifications for his moral actions. It is a concern with moral thinking or the mode of thought about moral dilemmas. There is no explicit discussion of moral behavior.

Kohlberg, however, cites three reasons for this choice, as he admits that mature moral reasoning may be only one of the many factors in moral judgments: (a) moral judgments are the most influential
things in moral behavior; (b) moral judgments are the most distinct moral factors in moral behavior; and finally; (c) moral judgments rarely change once a person has reached the highest stage because the sophisticated reasoning ability once attained is rarely lost. In short, he feels that not much information on either moral development or moral maturity can be derived from studying moral behavior. Actions do not reveal, by themselves, the reasons behind them. Moral maturity is best determined when the different reasons given are examined in detail.

It is more informative to look at the reasons a person thinks an action is wrong than to look at the person's action (behavior) or even to listen to what the person says is wrong (statement).

Moral maturity then is defined in terms of the ability to manipulate the criterion of formalism.

Before concluding this chapter, I would like to make some general points about Kohlberg's use of the following: moral principle, moral obligation, justice, and the area of philosophy to which he turns to justify his approach.

Taking the last point first: to justify his empirically based moral psychology, Kohlberg turns to the "formalistic" or "deontological" moral philosophical tradition which runs from Immanuel Kant to John

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61 MD, p. 44.
62 Ibid.
Rawls. Moral philosophy is important for Kohlberg because it "strives to tell us what moral development ideally ought to be." This tradition is consulted in particular to help verify the advanced nature of and the quality of the stages of moral reasoning. The tradition itself in general claims that the most adequate morality is a principled morality which "makes judgments in terms of universal principles applicable to all mankind." Principles as defined by this tradition (like Kant's categorical principle) have two basic features: (a) respect for human beings, i.e., the call to "act always toward the other as an end, not as a means," and (b) the universalization maxim, i.e., "choose only as you would be willing to have everyone choose in your situation." A principle then sets the formal conditions on which action should be based, for it is a 

... mode of choosing which is universal, a rule of choosing which we want all people to adopt always in all situations ....

A moral principle is a principle for resolving competing

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63 But, I think, partly because of his interest to make his concept of justice synonymous with Rawls's concept of justice, and partly because of the fact that Rawls attempts to go beyond the formalistic traditions which he accepts in part, Kohlberg appeals more to Rawls's principles of moral psychology than any other philosopher's moral psychology. In his discussion of his principles of moral psychology (see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971], pp. 490-496; hereinafter called A Theory), Rawls contends that these principles can be given a place in his principles of justice. And the principles themselves are formulated such that there would be no difficulty combining them with different conceptions of justice.

64 cf., pt 24.

65 Ibid.

66 Ibid.
claims, you versus me, you versus a third party. There is only one principled basis for resolving claims, justice or equality. Treat every man's claim impartially regardless of men. 67

Recognizing that principles may be reasoned about but never used in real-life situations, Kohlberg avows that there are additional aspects of moral judgments which "are necessary for principled moral reasoning to be translated into 'moral action'." 68 Apart from the strength of the cognitive disposition which influences the stability of a principle's application, there are three other factors basic to the manifestation of a moral principle: (1) the pressure of the situation, (2) the person's emotions and motives, and (3) what the person uses as a personal will or his personality strength. 69 But the primary motivating factor in the implementation of a principle is the extent to which the person comprehends the logical-cognitive dimension of the principle. A person who knows a principle ensures its appearance in action. The person who understands his principles will apply them appropriately when called upon to do so.

Kohlberg also makes a distinction between rules and principles in the following manner: rules, mainly like conventional morality, prescribe types of actions that are to be done, and they are grounded in things like the "Thou shalt nots" of the Ten Commandments, and so on. A rule tells Heinz not to steal the drug; rules protect rights to both

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67 TST., pp. 22-23.
68 TCT., p. 23.
69 Ibid.
protection from theft and the right to become rich. But the principle as defined here states that the druggist is immoral because he views the woman as a means to his richness, and because of the refusal to cooperate with Heinz. Principles state that the druggist is immoral, even though in both instances no conventional rules are broken. The principle of justice and equality justifies Heinz's actions; but these acts become justified if and only if Heinz accepts the principle of reversibility, i.e., agreeing to the same thing being done to him were he ever in similar circumstances. Principles then, unlike rules, allow exceptions; principles allow the contravention of conventional rules like "Thou shalt not steal" to save a human life; but rules (which derive their support from social authority) permit no exceptions. 70

Kohlberg also differentiates between a moral principle and a moral obligation. "A moral obligation is an obligation to respect the rights and claims of another person." 71 A moral principle is a means of settling conflicting claims. Moral principles help people make moral judgments (and ultimately moral acts) on whose behalf they must think (or act) in order to pay that respect (i.e., on whose behalf the moral obligation is brought to bear in either thought or action). Heinz's moral obligation is to act for his dying wife; and the druggist's moral obligation is to uphold the commitment to get rich and protect his and other's rights like the right to security

70 AA., p. 174.
71 Ibid.; MJ., p. 23.
from theft and so on when they are violated by individuals like Heinz. And the moral principles, respect for others, and the primacy of human life, are means of settling the dispute by justifying the latter's behavior over the former's: "A moral principle [then] is not always a rule of action but a reason for action."\textsuperscript{72} Here the principle justifies, gives Heinz a reason, for contravening his social obligation to both the druggist in particular and the society in general, to maintain his moral obligation to his wife.

For Kohlberg the most comprehensive of these moral principles for action is justice; where justice

\textit{... is the essence of morality at the principled level and its two manifestations are treating others equally, equality and maintaining reciprocal expectations, reciprocity ...}.\textsuperscript{73}

The most important moral principles are actually principles of justice for they are the best universal guides for moral decision making and moral action. Where a moral choice must be made between competing claims, the best choice is made through a moral principle like a principle of justice (i.e., justice based upon conditions of liberty, equality and reciprocity).\textsuperscript{74} Justice is not a concrete rule of action like honesty because as a universal choice which can be applied to all people in all situations (i.e., as a principle that transcends all societies, cultures and history) it goes beyond the situation-specific

\textsuperscript{72}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{73}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{74}Ibid., p. 25.
applicability fundamental to a rule or a set of rules. Justice is a principle that everyone would freely choose to maximize and make compatible everyone's liberties. Justice is preoccupied with overruling all "... inequalities of goods and respect which are not to the benefit of all, including the least advantaged." In a word, justice is the best way to settle moral conflicts.

For Kohlberg this concept of justice appears in various forms throughout all of his six stages of moral reasoning. Its meaning intensifies as the stages progress from stage 1 to stage 6. Punishment in stage 1 is viewed in terms of "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth," but at stage 6 (where all principles are personally chosen and universally applied) it is viewed on the basis of what is best for everyone, others and oneself included. Justice here becomes an ideal principle.

It is a concept of justice that Kohlberg finds in Rawls. Kohlberg explains:

The concept of reversibility explains the intuitive plausibility of Rawls's conception of justice ... as a rational choice in an original position in which one is under a veil of ignorance as to one's role or identity. Rawls argues that this conception leads to the choice of a justice principle of

75AA., p. 174.

76UC., p. 25.

77Ibid. This Kohlbergian emphasis upon justice could be considered in greater detail, but it will not as it falls outside of the concerns of this chapter which is to outline the Kohlbergian stages. For instance, Kohlberg's adaptation could be considered for its accuracy. Also, since justice is but one of the many virtues, it is possible to consider the excessive role Kohlberg gives justice.
equality, with inequalities accepted only when it is to the benefit of the least advantaged. This conception of choice in the veil of ignorance is a formalization of the conception of fairness involved in having one person cut the cake and a second person distribute it. This conception leads to a mini-maximization solution in the sense that the division must be such that the least advantaged person is better off, i.e., that the cake is so cut that the person cutting the cake is willing to live with getting the smallest piece.\textsuperscript{78}

Justice for Kohlberg then is Rawlsian justice, a utilitarian concept of justice preoccupied with social equality.

\textsuperscript{78}p. 642. This passage also makes use of some Rawlsian concepts which need to be explained. To administer justice in the most adequate manner possible Rawls chooses one out of three possibilities that he sees at his disposal. (a) Perfect procedural justice (which Kohlberg explains here) represented by an equal portioning of the cake by the cake cutter so that everyone gets an equal share. (b) Imperfect procedural justice represented by a trial by jury is rejected because of the possibility of the innocent being found guilty, and the guilty innocent. And finally, (c) pure procedural justice represented by gambling or a fair lottery. (a) and (b) are rejected because of the room for error, and (c) is accepted because it's absence of error. (c) is in existence only when it is genuinely applied in action; in other words, if some action begins purporting to be (c) but ends up being an unfair lottery then it is not called a case of (c), whatever the action is in the case of an error it is not (c). See A Theory, pp. 83-90: Kohlberg's adaptation and explication of this Rawlsian concept could be explored for its accuracy.
CHAPTER 3

A CRITIQUE OF KOHLBERG'S CONCEPT OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT

Kohlberg's theory of moral development will now be considered in light of those conceptual dimensions Wilson claims any theory of moral education should logically encompass. To expect moral reasoning to entail a cognitive dimension is reasonable, but to assume that moral development is singularly a cognitive concern is not so reasonable; for even if a study of moral development is confined to moral thought, it is very conceivable that things like personality, emotions and imagination will influence that thought. However, in his preoccupation with the rational aspect of morality as opposed to the emotional realm of morality, Kohlberg singles out the cognitive (rational) dimension of morality. But even here he does not clearly demarcate the extent to which he regards moral development to be cognitive; at times he rejects any hard and fast differentiation between the emotions and the cognitions because for him both derive from a common ground.¹ This

refusal arises from the assumption that the emotional dimension is determined by the cognitive component because the "... cognitive-structural features are the core of moral development." 2 This restriction which views moral development as cognitive development will be my concern here; thus in a two-part chapter, I will consider the cognitive and the non-cognitive dimensions of moral education; where the former will deal with those knowing elements of morality like rationality, intentions, and so on, the latter will encompass the affective and the volitional aspects of morality. Through this approach, I will show how Wilson's theory goes beyond the Kohlbergian concern with development; for in his theory Wilson explicates both how the person learns to become a moral person and how the person's own autonomous effort maximizes in himself the operation of reason in relation to concepts like justice and equality. In short, Wilson, unlike Kohlberg, informs us how the person as a unique moral being becomes moral; hence the Wilsonian emphasis upon the cognitive and the noncognitive aspects of morality. In his consideration of the latter, Wilson shows how the person becomes an autonomous moral being in terms of attainments, attitudes and skills. 3 Kohlberg's examination of the cognitions (which appear in the educational dimension of his theory) attempts to "... attain the level of sophistication invested in KRAT; KRAT entails, besides the cognitive element, both the affective and the volitional

2 TA., p. 44.

3 JW., p. 58.
aspects of morality. A predominant cognitive preoccupation for Wilson would jeopardize KRAT's concern with all of those factors (like the emotions and actions) influential to the motivational and behavioural traits of KRAT. But in the concern with KRAT they both agree "... that the direction of beliefs must be concentrated on formal and not substantive aspects of those beliefs ...."

Basically, Wilson attempts to work out a clear area within moral development between moral thought and moral action. There is a problem with Kohlberg's stage theory in this regard because

... there need be no direct connection between moral thought and moral action, though the difference between the two is regularly obscured by ambiguous talk of 'moral development' and 'moral stage'. Hence there is no theoretical guarantee that improvement in one will lead to an improvement in the other.

In his concern to get the person to do what he morally ought-to-do, Wilson addresses the difficulties of bridging the gap between moral thought and moral action.

I Cognitive Dimensions of Morality

Those cognitive aspects of morality that will be discussed here are rationality, intentions, moral judgments, linguistic expressions, and so on.

Both Kohlberg's concept of morality and the features of moral judgments made in terms of that concept are influenced by the

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4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.

formalistic tradition to which he turns for his theoretical justifica-

tions. As previously stated, he defines

... morality in terms of the formal character of a moral judgment
or a moral point of view, rather than in terms of its content.
Impersonality, ideality, universalizability, and pre-emptiveness
are among the formal characteristics of a moral judgment.7

Unlike judgments of prudence or aesthetics, moral judgments tend
to be universal, inclusive, consistent, and grounded on objective,
impersonal or ideal grounds.8

And thus a moral judgment can be defined as

... moral without considering its content (the action judged) and
without considering whether it agrees with our judgments or
standards.9

Put simply, Kohlberg claims to define moral judgments independent of a
content like some social principle of justice, and independent of any
agreement with the standards or judgments made.10

The validity of Kohlberg’s reasoning may now be questioned; that
is, the reasoning on which his evaluation of the person’s moral judg-
ments is based may be questioned. In other words, if Kohlberg claims
to examine the person’s judgments from a formal standpoint which upon
close inspection turns out to be content-laden, then it can be said
that he has a criterion problem. When moral judgments like the follow-
ing are rejected, Kohlberg’s criterion of evaluation becomes suspicious:
It’s not right to steal because you’ll get put in jail.11 Furthermore,

7Ibid., p. 55.
8Ibid., p. 56.
9Ibid., p. 57.
10Ibid.
11Ibid., p. 405; IA., p. 56.
position at the post-conventional step rather than his monistic ethical position.

Put simply, Kohlberg does not substantiate his claim that the stages and the judgments basic to them are logically necessary and differentiated by a greater formal sophistication. That is, "he never shows that his stages form a logically hierarchical sequence." 37

So far the study has covered, by means of Wilson's conceptual requirements, some aspects, in Kohlberg, of the cognitive dimension of morality like moral judgments and logical necessity. At this point I will reflect upon the role of intentions in the cognitive domain of morality.

An examination of intentions is important, for Wilson, because through a study of a person's purpose of doing X rather than Y, it is possible to get at a person's real reasons for doing what he does; i.e., through a study of intentions it can be determined whether or not counter-syllogisms entered his thinking and actions. To study intentions then is to study what motivates actions; knowing intentions is knowing the reasons a person holds for acting on behalf of the other, having PHIL, and so on. Conceptually, the intention to care for another may be determined by assessing whether or not the person fulfills the following logical requirements:

(a) He must have the concept of a person (know what a person is), otherwise he cannot use the requisite description and reason for action. Actually, a firm and clear grasp of this concept  

36 DR., p. 291.  
37 PK., p. 147.
is not common even amongst adults.

(b) He must, 'in theory' at least, claim to use (think he ought to use) this concept (description), as against other concepts, as his overriding reason for acting. That is, he must believe that 'because he's a person' ought to take precedence over, e.g. 'because he's an alien', 'because he's my enemy', etc.

(c) He must have some kind of feeling attached to this concept as a principle of action. That is, he must have some emotion invested in the idea of something's 'being a person': this is to be contrasted with various feelings, affections, sentiments, etc. which are (as it were, accidentally) directed towards people, but not towards people as such (e.g. towards attractive blondes, 'appealing' infants, etc.).

(d) He must bring (a)-(c) to bear on practical situations, so that he makes firm decisions to act in a concerned way. 38

(e) He must in fact act this way (unless prevented). 39

Kohlberg at no point in his study deals with these conceptual requirements of intentions. Again this speaks to the advanced nature of Wilson's theory over Kohlberg's; in that moral decision making process leading from KRAT (1) to KRAT (2) Wilson attempts to account for any counter-syllogisms, intentions that might enter the person's thinking and prevent him from acting upon his decision. The fulfillment of the above logical requirements of PHI ensure good intentions or a caring for the other as an equal, and hence a life of moral sophistication.

Kohlberg quite often talks about a principled use of rationality, but he never clearly delineates the use of nor the limitations of that rationality. For instance, it is never totally clear if he means by rationality any of the following: (a) inductive inference and more

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38 In AM., Wilson states (d): "His claim to the principle based on the concept (b), and his feelings attached to it (c), must override other syllogisms in practice, so that he actually makes a decision to act in a considerate way" (p. 28).

39 A Teachers, p. 39.
generally reasoning about what the facts are; (b) deductive inference, i.e., calculations as it is found in mathematics and logic; (c) conceptual analysis, i.e., the analytical process making use of reason in the first two senses; (d) prudential reasoning or intentional, informed judgment about acts; or finally (e) as a principle of reasonable behaviour. Sometimes he uses rationality in the first three senses, at other times he uses it or forbids its use as (d) and at other times he refers to its (e) form as fundamental to stage 5 and 6 reasoning. But if he is going to accept a certain use of rationality from his interviewees, then it will be necessary to give a better clarification of reason than he has given. He also needs to outline the limitations of reason in the realm of morality. Taking Wilson's distinctions as an example, Kohlberg might do something like the following:

(1) We are not saying
(a) that all moral (or other) decisions should be worked out by a conscious process of reasoning.
(b) that showing a person how to act or think reasonably will in itself, actually get him to do so.
(c) that human beings always act or think reasonably.

(2) We are saying
(a) that there are some criteria of success (good reasons, grounds, evidence, ways of justifying) for moral thought and action, i.e., that there is such a thing as 'being reasonable' or 'behaving justifiably' in morality.
(b) that people ought to be reasonable about moral matters, since this only means that their thought and action should be justifiable — that is, it must measure up to the reasons in which the justification consists.
(c) that, although a person can act virtuously or well without being able to give a clear account of the reasons for his action, it is plain that part of what is meant by a person 'acting well' is that certain reasons (e.g., others' interests) operated in him, and not certain other reasons (e.g., to make the other person look bad).
(d) that to be educated in an area means (at least) to be more aware of what reasons are to be used in that area, and how to use them in particular cases.

Ibid., pp. 33-34.
'Sound reasoning' is a fundamental methodological principle within the realm of moral discourse. But the recognition and acceptance of this conclusion must be more than a mere acceptance of the principle of moral reasoning; there is the definite need of the affirmation and explication of some use of rationality. The latter could entail signaling out and explaining some general and specific principle of reasoning like a, b, c, and so on in the above. Kohlberg suggests that the exercise of reason is a necessary condition of morality; but unfortunately he does not clarify his position adequately. Beck explains further:

Kohlberg may see reasoning as a necessary condition of moral value simply because, as a matter of fact, one cannot achieve the peculiar values of morality without the exercise of reason. It would then be an answerable empirical question whether or not reasoning is always necessary. Alternatively, Kohlberg may see moral behaviour as involving reasoning by definition: we simply would not call behaviour 'moral' if it did not involve reasoning in a central way.\(^{41}\)

This is not a case of pitting words like 'rule' and 'rational' on the one hand, against 'feeling' and 'emotions' on the other, as if there were to be a conflict between the emotions and reason. To be committed to a principle of rationality does not entail a disregard for one's feelings; it does, however, involve an attempt to assess, guide, and direct them in some coherent fashion. To guide them properly requires a reference to some principle like a clearly delineated principle of rationality. But Kohlberg has failed terribly in this regard; and thus it is difficult to understand how he could ever account for the effect of the emotions upon our rational moral choices. (More will

\footnote{TA, p. 13.}
be said about this area later.)

Another problem within the cognitive dimension of Kohlberg's use of morality and development into that morality deals with the language used. This does not refer to the person used to write the dilemmas (i.e., whether its first, second or third person), the interviewee's verbal abilities or other similar methodological (and not conceptual) problems; but it refers to how the interviewee uses, or what he knows about, words like 'right', 'ought', 'should', and so on. Until it is known how these words are used neither a 'stage' nor a type of reasoning can properly be assigned to the person.

For instance, one person may use 'right' as 'what adults approve', 'my country approves' (EMP (D0)), or 'what my friends approve' (EMP (PQ)); another may claim that 'ought' means 'what serves my advantage'; a prudential reason; and yet another might see 'good' as 'what costs $10,000, an economic reason. So, if a person is asked as to what is right, what ought to be done, what is good, each person's predetermined responses from whatever type of reasoning or particular point of view (i.e., the economic; safety, aesthetic, etc.) must be arrived at. It is important to get at the person's own thinking and personal use of these words.

... for there is no necessary connection [as Wilson argues] between what any [person] ... means by [say] 'ought' and 'right', on the one hand, and what his own moral values actually are on the other. 

In short, a person may give acceptable answers to questions regarding 'right' and 'ought' from the point of view of the demands of stage 5

42 AM., p. 16.
and 6 standards, but if he were quizzed further might only have given these answers he knew he logically ought to give on the test. Instead, of 'right' and 'ought' being 'what sophisticated people tell me' it turns out that once his intentions are known, they mean what is 'cool' or 'groovy'. The problem here then derives from the restricted conception of morality, for in terms of it only a certain type of reason is acceptable.

Thus when the person is interviewed to derive what 'wrong' means for him, and he responds 'Because ...' Kohlberg needs to overcome ambiguities which he has not allowed for: first, Wilson contends that the person, may conceive and understand 'wrong' in at least five ways:

i) what other people think or say is wrong or ought to be done; ii) what other people actually avoid doing; iii) what he actually avoids doing; iv) what he thinks (in a general way) is wrong or ought not to be done; v) what he thinks he himself ought not to do.  

Second, when the person claims 'because ...', it may appear to be a reason on the surface but on closer inspection it turns out to be one or many of the following types of reasons:

a) a good reason, or just a (possibly bad) reason.
b) a reason which is 'ultimate' (stands on its own feet), or which assumes a background of higher-level reasons.
c) a reason which he would use (have in mind) when acting, or which he knows of but would not use.
d) a reason which would be also the cause of his behaviour and which he approves of, or a reason which would cause his behaviour and which he does not approve of (a reason or cause which, in some sense, operates against his better judgment).  

d) indicates the need to distinguish between responses given as

\[43\] Ibid., pp. 16–17.

\[44\] Ibid., p. 17.
'reasons' or justifications and responses meant merely to explain (i.e., descriptions of actions) or 'causes'. Both distinctions are interrelated in complex ways,

... but many responses do not, prima facie, even look like reasons in the sense of attempts to justify. They look more like admissions of psychological compulsion, descriptions of emotions or feeling-states, or attempts to render intelligible the kinds of 'pulls' which ... (a person) is moved by.45

Differences of this type are related in the various implications that various words (like 'ought', 'wrong', etc.) have for different people; these differences are based on things like cultural beliefs and so on (KRAT (1)). Additional complications may enter due in part to the fact that various syllogisms may operate in the person's mind and motivate him to act differently. The person may think he ought not discriminate against Jews (KRAT (1)), but another part of him may compel him to act differently when he must act; that is, he may discriminate against red-haired Jews (KRAT (2)), and on another occasion such discrimination may not occur. The point then is that a person's responses cannot be accurately evaluated until it is definitely clear what the person means by words he uses in response to questions.

Kohlberg's use of the term 'moral judgment' also seems questionable. Not all the responses the person gives may be either a belief or a judgment, for example, if a person talks about Heinz's theft by saying 'How terrible!' or something of that sort, he may not necessarily be making a (moral) judgment, for it could be the expression of a feeling, or a safety or an intellectual or an economic statement. Or,

45 Ibid.
if from a linguistic point of view, the person distinguishes between 'It's disgusting' and 'It disgusts me', and 'It's wrong', 'It's right', 'I like it', he may mean one distinction when he says another. That is, he may confuse points of view.

We confront two types of difficulties with linguistic expressions within the realm of morality: first, many statements are not representative of a supposed truth which connects the speaker to the evidence. Such expressions as 'It's not right' may represent feelings or fantasies which the person firmly believes in; but it might be some emotion (like fear, and so on) that made the person believe in the statement and not any examination of the evidence. Many responses to questions expressed in notions like 'taboo', 'disapproval', 'dislikes' and so on, although they may appear to indicate judgment, are not judgments. Much more extensive investigation is needed than Kohlberg has given in this regard; for, what one person may say is a moral error or unreasonable to do (say, steal), from the moral point of view; another may say the same thing but mean that 'It's wrong for me', the prudential point of view.

Secondly, if the interest in the assessment procedures are what might be called the person's "... moral commitments, then it is fairly clear that we cannot satisfactorily determine these without adequate data about ... [the person's] feelings and behaviour." There is a need to determine the person's PHIL (RSP), and EMP (ID), EMP (PO),

\[46\] Ibid., p. 19.

\[47\] Ibid.
and KRAT (2). These components can be derived by focusing on the use of words like 'wrong', 'ought' and the like which entail either the tendency to act or the commitment to act on another's behalf. Expressions can only be accepted as fully meant or sincere 'under normal circumstances' when the person acts as the commitment stipulates. It is only when the person's judgments regarding things like 'right', 'wrong', etc. are checked against his behaviour on more than one occasion that these expressions can be taken as truly overriding, prescriptive, and universal. 48

Some of Kohlberg's problems in this regard stem from his social utilitarian definition of morality, and his simplistic view of what makes a moral judgment. Other difficulties arise from his treatment of moral action, and his inadequate and simplistic distinction between 'moral action' and 'moral thought'. The Kohlbergian distinctions like 'structural whole' or mode of moral thought or moral action, and stage of moral development just cannot account for the conceptually distinct spectrum of phenomena within the realm of morality having to do with intentions, practical syllogisms, and overriding, prescriptive and universal principles which may interfere with the person's action. To adequately bridge the gap between his empirical findings and his practical assessments and the difference between what might be called moral thought and moral action, Kohlberg (again) needs to get at the person's intentions and reasons and not just his descriptions. He needs to determine aspects like the following which Wilson makes:

48 Ibid.
a) The person's concepts (for instance of 'other people', 'honour', 'honesty' and so on), i.e., PHIL (HC), PHIL (CC), EMP (HC), GIG (1) and GIG (2).

b) The concepts he thinks ought to be used in his action; that is, the principles or rules he thinks that he ought to follow. For instance, the person may have the concept of honesty but thinks he ought not use it when he decides to act.

c) Those emotions or feelings used under normal circumstances to support the belief that both these concepts and principles should be used. (A person may have the concept of honesty, think — theoretically speaking — that he ought to use it, and so on, but may attach no feeling to it. For example, no remorse may be felt when a principle is not applied.)

d) The person's knowledge of the surrounding circumstance which would include:

1) the person's ability to identify both his own and other's emotions.
2) personal knowledge pertinent about the 'hard' facts fundamental to the decisions made.
3) The person's 'social-skills' or 'know-how' because they are influential in the person's moral actions.
4) It is also important to determine whether the person brings to bear the above in all those 'real-life' situations actually encountered. This entails determining things:

i) the person's alertness to the situation and whether he describes it in a way connected in some way or other to the concepts in both a) and b).

ii) The person's partial or full use of knowledge and awareness listed in d) and e).

iii) What principles the person actually uses; what he actually does with the principles claimed as right b) he supports by his feelings c) so he can make the sincere decision to act in the particular way. The point here is to determine whether the person uses the principles or some other principles.

g) It is necessary to determine what the person does in actual fact according to his decision.\(^4^9\)

These considerations do not represent an a priori hierarchy of one aspect over another, if only because all aspects are in an important way cumulative; a person may have a concept, think it ought to be used, feels it ought to be used, has all the necessary skills and knowledge relevant to its use, brings them all to bear within a 'real life'

\(^4^9\) Ibid., p. 36.
dilemma and acts in terms of the process. But because differences may occur here, care must be taken. Asking about the importance of such differences is to adopt some viewpoint toward the value of specific modes of research. If the researcher decides to confine his study to what the person does in particular overt action (i.e., concentrate on g), that would be a mistake; for moral thought and moral action are too closely related empirically and logically for such a method to be adequate. It is absolutely essential to get at the person's real reasons, intuitions, the fulfillment of the logical requirements of PHIL, what actually appears in real life and not just personal cognitions.

This may be a simplistic typology or classification of some important concerns within the area of moral development, but they are more adequate than those that Kohlberg has given. He does not give a clear criterion of how to categorize people except by giving the simple distinction in terms of description and causes. And because his distinctions at times become blurred, it is difficult to know what his criteria of classification are. His talk of 'mode', 'structures' and 'logical necessity' are not exactly clear, as a few distinctions indicate: first, it is possible to categorize children in terms of their expressed judgments regarding the sorts of things that "... are good or bad, right or wrong, either (a) if they did them or (b) if other people did them." Second, it is possible to categorize the person's stated reasons. Third, the person's general attitude toward particular

50 Ibid., pp. 20-21.
principles, rules or actions may be listed in terms of how they conceive them (i.e., as sacred, unbreakable or alterable by a mutual and rationally decided upon process). Fourth, the person may be classified in terms of the power source they accept for their rules (i.e., God, authority, friends, etc.); reasons of this type may be differentiated from the person's stated reasons. Fifth, there's the actual influences upon the person's morality (like friends, God, and so on).51

Kohlberg has not adequately dealt with problems of this sort. To be adequate, his research on human action and human thought must explore those dimensions like descriptions, rationality, intentions, reasons, linguistic expression that are influential within the cognitive realm of morality. Wilson's five components attempt to encompass all of these aspects of cognition. These components, to recapitulate, are PHIL (HC), EMP (HC), EMP (DO), EMP (PO), GIG (1) (KF), GIG (1) (KS), GIG (2) (VC), and GIG (2) (NVC); all components speak to these aspects basic to that vital but complex gap between moral thought and moral action. In their concern with moral development they deal with the problems of motivation and intentionality. Collectively, they attempt to show what might motivate a person to act as he does, what thoughts are moral intentions and what thoughts are not moral intentions. Rationality is a primary force here because rationality is assumed to be internal to morality. In fact, the development of a rational intelligence is what the cognitive dimensions of the components aim at, i.e., a rational intelligence preoccupied with doing

51 Ibid.
what one rationally morally ought to do.

II Non-Cognitive Dimensions of Morality
(a) The Affective Dimensions of Morality

This section will attempt to answer the question: Is the affective dimension of morality excluded from or included in Kohlberg? If the connection between the emotions and the rational, the passions and reason or the affective and the cognitive is examined, how does he examine it?

Even in his early writings Kohlberg claims to reject the dichotomy between the cognitive and the affective or the rational and the emotional.\(^{52}\) To claim that the cognitive process, cognitive development and cognitive judgments entail the affective, creates the need to offer an analysis of that relationship.\(^{53}\) But apart from the claim itself Kohlberg does not offer any examination of the area.

R. S. Peters criticizes Kohlberg strongly for this omission of any adequate treatment of the affective aspects of moral development and its connection to moral cognition. Peters shows how Kohlberg's "...system does not deal [with] ...the affective aspects of development" by focusing on two key motivational factors in moral development.\(^{54}\) These are important factors which Kohlberg's principle of justice


\(^{53}\) CK., p. 342.

\(^{54}\) FK., p. 150.
overlooks and which will be covered here because of their importance. The two points are: (1) the positive motivating virtue 'consideration for others', and (ii) the negative motivations 'shame and guilt'.

(1) The Positive Motivating Concept, Consideration For Others

It has been repeatedly stated that justice is the principle of principles for Kohlberg. But if we reflect upon that principle for a moment, it can be seen that this principle has at least two forms. The minimal form as impartiality states that without relevant reasons, a principle is to have no exceptions; and the maximal form, according to Peters, calls for the "... impartial consideration of people's claims and interests ..." which means in a word that justice "... cannot be employed unless something else of value is at stake."\textsuperscript{55} But to determine relevance or questions of justice entails another criterion of value and the exchange or distribution of something valuable. That criterion of value quite often is other's interests or welfare where the exchange is their goods (whatever form they take). To talk so much in the higher stages as he does of justice, Kohlberg must, and occasionally does, talk of the other's welfare. And when he does that, another fundamental principle, the consideration of other's interests, enters his system. However, this principle (which many moral educators claim to be as fundamental in morality as justice) is not discussed. This failure may be due to his Kantian ancestry; but whatever the reason he never shows us how the child comes to care or why he should

\textsuperscript{55}Ibid., p. 151.
care about the other's perspective he takes. An extensive analysis is needed here, states Peters, for "... affect does not float about in us unattached but is dependent upon our interpretation of the world and other people ...." Kohlberg can in fact overcome some of his difficulties in this area by giving an account of the positive motivating emotions like sympathy and consideration for others.

To be complete Kohlberg's account of moral development needs to give details: (a) on how the child comes to consider the needs, feelings, and interests of others in morality, and (b) the importance of rationality (or the development of a moral – rational – intelligence) to the developing child. He needs to get at what motivates these concerns, and how intentions develop. Kohlberg could begin with a clear analysis of concepts like 'altruism', 'concern', 'empathy', and so on. Of primary importance is to get at the person's and the societies' descriptions and reasons for what motivates the person to act on behalf of the other. Something like the fulfillment of the logical requirements listed on pages 97-98 would suffice. By way of summary, then, to have 'altruism', 'concern' or 'care' and the like, the person would need: (a) the concept of the person, (b) claim in theory at least to use the concepts, (c) attach some feeling to the concept used as a principle of action, (d) both (b) and (c) must over-rule all syllogisms which could prevent the decision to act considerately, and (e) unless something beyond his control prevents him, he

56 Ibid.

57 Ibid., p. 153.
logically must act this way.

At no point in his theoretical writings does Kohlberg consider the developmental aspect of this principle (consideration for others) and others like empathy, sympathy and concern; that is, he neither shows how the person comes to care for others as equals, as people nor what requirements must be fulfilled to do so. He does not show how "... emotional responses depend on a cognitive core, on how the situation is perceived, especially other people in it."^58 This failure (which will be considered in greater detail later) rests on the failure to show the influence of the emotions upon the cognitions and how the cognitions influence the emotions. The difficulty here in turn arises from the assumption that actions like altruism are independent of reasons or descriptions and that motivation (in whatever form) is logically separate from human action.\(^59\)

(ii) Negative Motivations

Since the negative emotions like guilt and shame may be as influential within the area of morality as the positive emotions, Kohlberg would do well to consider their composition and effects.\(^60\) Peters indicates how Kohlberg might proceed. Guilt, the most straightforward of emotions,

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^58 Ibid., p. 152.

^59 AM., p. 28.

^60 PK., p. 153.
... is the emotion most characteristic of transgressors at... the 'good boy' stage of morality. It is felt by the individual who is conscious that he has let the side down, or not lived up to what is expected of him in the sight of his peers.\[^{61}\]

Rawls clearly demarcated the close relationship between self-respect and shame; there's the natural shame felt either because of one's physical disposition or because of one's slow-wittedness; and there's the moral shame experienced when one fails to attain the virtues encouraged by one's mode of life.\[^{62}\] Peters puts it this way: "The self is diminished and usually other people, who draw attention to such shortcomings, are the main agents of this feeling of self-diminishment."\[^{63}\] Kohlberg could have included shame in either stage 3 or 4; but shame as a motivating force is not given in his chart of "Motives for Engaging in Moral Action."\[^{64}\]

Guilt, on the other hand, is a much more difficult concept to deal with. As an emotion, it is experienced very early by children who, once they have internalized rules, break rules; it also takes various forms; as Peters explains, there's 'authority guilt' experienced... because the prohibitions, on account of their source, are likely to be tinged with other natural emotions such as fear and anxiety, on account of the possibility of punishment or the withdrawal of love.\[^{65}\]

Also, continues Peters, there's the humanistic conscience having its

\[^{61}\]Ibid.

\[^{62}\]A Theory, p. 444.

\[^{63}\]PK., p. 153.

\[^{64}\]L. Kohlberg, "From is to Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away With it in the Study of Moral Development;" PK., p. 153.

\[^{65}\]PK., p. 153.
origins "... in the guilt experienced in hating and hurting the mother, the first object of the child's love," 66. Although it would be inaccurate to say that the young child experiences guilt, 67 it would not be incorrect to say (a) that altruism and other concepts like it are learned and not innate, and (b) that

... in guilt we tend to focus on the infringement of claims of others and on injuries done to them, whereas in shame we are more sensitive to our own loss of self-esteem and our dis-appointment in being unable to live up to our ideals. 68

This means, then, that besides the experiences of fear of punishment and anxiety derived from doing wrong in authority guilt, there must also be the straightforward guilt which has no such association and which is experienced when the person injures or infringes upon the rights of others (as in the failure to be honest or keep a promise). Whether it's shame or guilt that is experienced, the intensity of the concept is determined by the person's perception of some overriding principle like justice. For this reason remorse may be felt "... which seems to be a mixture of guilt at wrong-doing and shame that we could be the sort of person to do such a wrong." 69

The discussion so far has confined itself to motivation, reasons, descriptions and the logical requirements that must be fulfilled to

66 Ibid.

67 To say this would not be accurate for guilt presupposes actions contrary to concepts like justice and right; infants can barely be credited with having these concepts.


69 Ibid., p. 154.
measure up to the demands of principles like justice, concern, empathy, altruism, and so on. None of these aspects are adequately covered in Kohlberg's stage theory of moral development. The Kohlbergian failure itself, however, is still in need of further explanation. But first, it needs to be said that what is called a failure here may not be a failure for Kohlberg; for him the difficulty may be explainable in his belief that his theory has adequately dealt with these motivational dimensions of the affective domain of moral development. To make a claim like this acceptable though, he would have to answer such questions regarding moral development, moral judgments or morality as those posed by Sichel:

What does it mean when an individual uses a concept at any single stage of [his] ... theory of moral cognitive development? What does it mean when an individual finally makes a moral cognitive judgment?70

Accurate answers from any assessment procedure are derivable only through an examination of the person's language, actions, and emotions; in other words, it is necessary to look at the person's entire conceptual framework adopted as a way of life. Hence there is need to examine the use and meaning of words like 'right', 'wrong', 'duty', and so on not only in terms of their cognitive and logical use but also in terms of their emotional and volitional implications; for both the affective and the cognitive (not to neglect the volitional which will be covered in the next section) are fundamental aspects of any conceptual framework. Put another way, since both the affective and the cognitive aspects of concepts are basic aspects of any conceptual

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70 CR, p. 344.
framework, the person's moral (and/or other) use of words and judgments made through the use of these words will not be understood until both the affective and the cognitive meanings and use of words are understood and determined. Sichel makes the point that the affective and the cognitive dimensions of morality are not separate, for just

... as the affective must affect the cognitive, reflexively the cognitive must affect the affective. As the child progresses through developmental stages, not only is there transformation of the cognitive, but this transformation also changes elements within the affective.\textsuperscript{71}

The meaning here may be shown by means of the Heinz dilemma. The real life conflict centers on Heinz's wife's right to life and the druggist's right to wealth and property. Any person at any stage who relates to Heinz in terms of the affective concepts like consideration, respect, love, etc. is unlikely to do so solely as a matter of how the words are known at this stage. Furthermore, as the person develops, the emotional dimensions of these concepts are not eliminated but rather like the cognitive dimensions of the concepts they are transformed.\textsuperscript{72} A person at stage two who expresses, from the prudential point of view, the judgment "If Heinz loves his wife, he should steal the drug; but if he does not love her, he should forget it," leaves the realm of morality and enters the realm of the emotions because of the meaning given to morality. And within the realm of morality because of that same definition the person may make a cognitive judgment that appears to bear no relationship to his emotions under these

\textsuperscript{71}Ibid., p. 345.

\textsuperscript{72}Ibid., p. 346.
circumstances, for the cognitive judgments, as expressed, may be grounded in the concepts and principles fundamental to the requirements of the moral dilemma and the developmental stages. In short, as the person's knowing (expressed in the components PHIL and GIG (1) and GIG (2)) changes, so do his feelings change (as expressed in EMP, the emotional aspect of both PHIL and GIG).

A possible question at this point is "Can the person reject or negate his emotions in his use of cognitive judgments?" Of course, there are cases which may arise where the emotions are suspended and subserved to the cognitions. But if the interchange between the emotions, reason and morality is accepted as delineated earlier, then it is possible that (even though the emotions may be suspended, laid aside on one occasion), because of their fundamental place in any conceptual framework, they may "... return to affect the intensity with which something is perceived to be a moral problem and judged good or right." Heinz may, for example, reject the threat of going to jail because for him there is a higher concern, duty, and love than concern, love and duty to one's neighbours; there's the concern, love, and duty to one's wife. This does not mean that his love is a romantic love, for in his acts of love he can transform it so that it is consistent with the Kantian categorical imperative, and the golden rule he accepts. Heinz may appear to have rejected the affective, or that the affective is overruled by the cognitive; yet it does not seem to be inconceivable to present the argument that the affective (EMP)

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73 Ibid.
can be transformed to be consistent with the cognitive (GIG). 74

The failure to analyze adequately the connection between EMP (the affective) and GIG (the cognitive) may be some of the reasons for Kohlberg's difficulties with the relationship between moral judgments and moral action. Some of his problems would be overcome if he gave a more complete analysis of EMP, the affective aspect of morality. The individual whose verbal judgments have been classified and placed at the stage 6 level of reasoning, cognitively speaking, just may not have a complete EMP, affectively speaking. An advanced cognitive stage may be attained, but the same concepts, principles or judgments may not be given the concomitant affective (EMP) sophistication which is required to make the (EMP) affective judgments carry into action (KRAT (2)). This means that in order for a person to have complete comprehension and command of his judgments, concepts, rules, and principles he must make both the affective and the cognitive aspects of his conceptual structure consistent with each other, i.e., EMP and GIG must be logically consistent. 75 Inconsistent movement between cognitive judgments and moral action may indicate an inconsistent relationship between the affective structure (EMP) and the moral cognition (GIG).

But the person who attains a level of consistency between EMP, GIG, PHIL, and KRAT (1) and KRAT (2) and makes moral judgments, will act upon his judgments. And this is why in any assessment procedures it is essential to get at the person's intentions and motivations, for

74 Ibid., pp. 346-347.

75 Ibid., p. 347.
(through an examination of such components) it is possible to determine
whether or not the person acts and feels altruistically, and so on.
When it is known that the person's real intentions are expressed in
judgments like "I am caring for other people" and not some other
counter-syllogism, then and only then will it be possible to say any-
thing about the person's cognitive and affective sophistication. As
Sichel avows, it must be the person's genuine description of his
actions and

... an intention accepted by the individual with the knowledge of
what the concept 'intention' implies. Connected with the concept
'intention' is the knowledge that if the individual actually is
in the stated moral situation, or in an analogous situation, he
will act in a manner consistent with the judgment. 76

Personal descriptions may be determined by having the person give
his reasons for doing what he does. If the person acts considerately
or helpfully toward superiors, friends, enemies, relatives, or dangerous
criminals, it may be questionable as to whether he responds to them as
either people qua people or as entities which he sees as means to an
end, dangerous, sexual objects, and so on. For he could use two funda-
mental types of reasons which are co-extensive with two descriptions
here. One takes the form 'Because this is another human being having
needs and wants like I do', and the other 'Because she's powerful,
beautiful, dangerous, etc.' 77 To know if these are the person's
reasons (and descriptions) and not some other person's reasons (for
they must be his) is to know his genuine intentions. Intentions can be

76 Ibid.
ascertained through the observation of statements and actions. The fulfillment of the previous listed (pages 97-98) logical requirements ensure the best of intentions in the area of altruism and care and concern, i.e., in the realm of cognitive and emotional maturity. And these requirements show that in Sichel's words though...

... it may be possible for the individual to claim that at the last moment prior to the moral action, he changed his mind and made a different moral judgment; it would be unintelligible and odd for the individual to assert that he did not know the meaning nor understand the initial moral judgment. Fundamental to the moral judgment is the intention of the individual to act according to the judgment and to understand the meaning of the judgment. This intention must involve an affective component.

The intention could involve courage in the face of fear, interest to carry out the judgment in action, the hope to have a life spared... In addition, the notion of intention must carry with it a force and an energy that does not have to exist with a mathematical fact such as in 'base ten plus one equals two'.

To get at real intentions is to begin to ascertain the person's mystery in the area covering PHIL (HC) to KRAT (2). The failure to go beyond single and simple observations, and the failure to make distinctions in the realm that PHIL to KRAT cover, mean that Kohlberg's assessment procedures constitute an incomplete study of moral growth. Furthermore, this is primarily because he made no effort to deal with the affective dimension within his cognitive developmental theory, and because he sees motivation (in its negative and positive implications) as logically separate from human action (for he gives none of the agent's reasons or descriptions for being just or altruistic).

The distinctions between the affective and the cognitive are by

78 Ck., pp. 347, 394.
no means easy; in fact the interchange between them is quite complex. What is needed is care and clarity about moral phenomena. Since the distinction on many occasions between the emotions and the rational will be cloudy, and perhaps make such a differentiation impossible to pursue, it is essential to get at the person's motivation in any action; and to really get at that it is necessary to know the person's cognitive process. The cognitive process will remain unknown until a clear understanding of the person's conceptual framework is known. Put another way, if it is to be known what a person's motivation for 'having concern, respect, and so on' is, then it will be necessary to know the place of the affective and the rational within the person's overall conceptual scheme of life. Cognitive and affective reasons become known when they are seen in relation to the person's principles and rules and perception of those principles and rules as established by his mode of life. Thus, since it is often true that the 'motivation' comes with some concepts (like consideration for others and concern), since the examination of a person's concern and altruism does not occur in isolation, and since much depends upon how the person perceives the circumstances, a very elaborate phenomenological breakdown is necessary, i.e., a breakdown like the components PHIL, EMP, GIG, and KRAT. Collectively, these components attempt to deal with all that is relevant within the realm of the emotions and the rational, and the volitions which will now be my concern.

(b) The Volitional Dimension of Morality

The discussion will now direct itself to the following two points listed in Chapter 2: (1) "The use of the model of logical cognitive
thought and operational behaviour as a means of characterising moral thought and behaviour"; and (2) "The question of the influence of behaviour or moral behaviour on moral judgment;" 79

1) Since Kohlberg accepts the cognitive developmental model of moral judgments, he must analyze the nature of cognitive judgments qua judgments. That is to say he needs to explicate the criterion regarding the translation of judgments into action. The translation of judgments into action is a very important concern in morality, since much of morality has to do with action. Logical or mathematical operations do not need to be translated into action. In this section, through a comparison of logical cognitive judgments and logical cognitive behaviour (or operations) with moral judgments and moral action, the point will be made that (unlike a mathematical judgment) because a moral judgment is made that is neither the necessary nor the sufficient condition for that moral thought to become moral action. 80 By means of a distinction between mathematical and moral judgments, it will be shown that, where mathematical judgments require only that they be made, conditions other than mere expression are required before a moral judgment is translated into moral action. The argument will claim further that Kohlberg examines moral judgments as if they were mathematical judgments and moral problems as if they were mathematical problems without showing how logic motivates moral action, how logic is connected to morality, and the difference between moral judgments

79 TD., p. 62.
80 Ibid.
and logical judgments.

'Logical cognitive action' refers to those thought processes which are logical in nature, which the person knows how to perform correctly, and which remain on the intellectual conceptual level. For instance, in the mathematical problem "Find the sum total of X and Y," the person responds correctly when he says $X + Y = Z$. Involved in this operation is a knowledge of and an ability to perform correctly all operations like addition, subtraction, and equality which are fundamental to mathematics. These operations are completed with the aid of the symbols $X$, $+$, $=$, $Y$, and $Z$. There is no need to translate these symbols into any other form of action than the action required to complete that problem on the intellectual level. 'Moral action', on the other hand may pass through the same formal process where the person says 'I have a choice between $X$ and $Y$', 'I choose $X$'; but that choice as a moral choice is not complete until the person moves from the intellectual level on which the choice is made into some real-life situation where the choice is translated into action. In sum, moral action requires more than logical (intellectual) action, it requires (in addition to logical analysis) a public test, application to people.

Judgments made about, for instance, some mathematical logical problem then have the following features: (1) logical problems entail two particular types of action: first, the verbal and symbolic action basic to development and the manifestation of the judgment; that is, in the mathematical problem $X + Y = Z$, there are involved those verbal actions detailing (by means of the symbols $X$, $Y$, $+$, $=$, and $Z$) the symbolic act expressed in the sequence $X + Y = Z$. And second, all actions
which are required to complete the logical problem are called operational behaviour.

2) This operational behaviour is internal to the logical judgments themselves; that is to say, that a logical judgment about some mathematical problem is the final expression of that problem. There is no need for any other form of action other than the final statement. And that statement is the logical operational behaviour spoken of earlier and internal to the statements themselves. In the question "What is the sum total of X, Y and Z?", the problem is resolved either when the person says, writes or thinks "X + Y = Z".

3) No action other than the judgment is required. The possibility of an inquiry to validate the judgment is not eliminated; however, once the solution is expressed no action other than the operational action internal to the judgment itself is required.

Moral judgments, on the other hand, are distinct in the following manner: where no further action is required of the logical judgment once it is expressed, a moral judgment would not be moral were it not followed by moral action. (Even as Kohlberg's stages of moral judgments stand now, to be complete they logically must be associated with various types of action, for this dimension is a necessary condition which must be determined before the person may be placed properly. How a person acts upon his use of words like 'right', 'wrong', 'good', 'bad' and so on, can play a significant role in the placement of the person. Kohlberg, however, does not examine this important area in his theory of moral development.) Moral action and logical cognitive action are differentiated then: Logical action, prior to the judgment,
entails a thought sequence something like 'what data is given', 'what is known', 'what is unknown', 'Let X equal the unknown and Y the unknown', and so on. "However, it would be ridiculous to conceive of someone first asking himself 'Should I do X?', then manifesting behaviour, and only then following with a moral judgment." Generally speaking, moral judgments and moral action are logically connected: (i) the question 'Should I do Z?', (ii) the judgment 'I should do Z', (iii) the justification 'It is right to do Z', and finally, (iv) the action manifesting Z. Sichel explains:

In other words, after confrontation with a moral problem, the moral judgment precedes the moral behaviour (consciously or unconsciously); whereas in the case of logical cognitive problems the logical behaviour is embedded within the logical judgment or is a component of the logical judgment (as in the case of the solution of a mathematical problem). The complexities of this problem are not dealt with in Kohlberg. Apart from some scant testing for PHIL (CC) and the continual emphasis upon the connection between moral education and his stage theory of moral development, Kohlberg does not test for this area. But both moral judgments and moral action are essential for any theory of moral education; it is paramount, more especially in the Kohlbergian-cum-Piagetian stage theory of moral thought. The element of action is absent from the relationship between a logical cognitive judgment and its operational behaviour. However, no cognitive developmental theory of moral judgments claiming to deal with the problems of moral action can avoid considering this complex relationship between moral thought

81 Ibid., p. 63.
82 Ibid.
and moral action, i.e., PHIL (CC), KRAT (1), and KRAT (2). There is no guarantee that because the area is covered the problems will be solved, but to ignore the area will not make the problems go away.

One final area needs to be covered briefly: the influence of moral action upon moral thought. Not only may moral actions and moral thought have that logical sequence (i.e., where moral thought precedes moral action) but it is also possible to conceive of a class of action which might take the name 'embryonic moral action'. 'Embryonic moral behaviour' refers to that class of action performed independent of any consciously expressed moral and/or cognitive judgments but which may be called moral acts. In spite of this possibility, Kohlberg, even at the lowest stages 1 and 2, studies the child only in relation to the proficiency with which he can verbalize his justifications for his moral judgments. He ignores completely those cases where the child may be able to act morally but not be able to give reasons for his doing what he did. It may be that most of what is meant by morality is reason giving, but that does not rule out the possibility of cases arising where the person cannot give his reasons, and still be moral. Furthermore, prior to the age where the child can speak, he may encounter many dilemmas which may have moral implications for future growth. It is understandable and acceptable that one would not speak of the infant's morality; however, that does not mean that because this person cannot be easily classified that his actions are

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83 Ibid., p. 66.

84 Ibid.
neither moral nor influential in his later development. Such early experiences as Sichel explains may conceivably be influential.

Exposure to certain types of situations and manifestations of a variety of behavior together with verbal communication which may exist in these situations may determine the rate of moral development and the ability of the child to follow moral judgment with moral behavior.\(^{85}\)

This is not to say that action causes growth; rather it is to say that action may influence moral growth. Furthermore, it is being postulated that the connection between moral growth, moral thought and moral action is more extensive than Kohlberg has explored. Moral thought and moral action are part and parcel of the entire realm of human life and human action and cannot be divorced from it. Without a consideration of the entire conceptual framework and background against which that is set, much that is influential in this vast expanse between moral action and moral thought may be by-passed.

Kohlberg's exclusive concern with the verbal and the cognitive lead to the sidestepping of the role of action upon moral maturity. In any complete theory of moral development no aspect of action (which conceivably may be influential) can be ignored. But Kohlberg has done such a thing, and hence the stakes he must pay are high.

That in sum is Wilson's rational-intellectualistic view of moral education. He has shown that to be complete a theory of moral education must get at those motivations and intentions which are influential in that vast area between moral thought and moral action. The cognitions, the emotions and the volitions must be bracketed out, not in

\(^{85}\)Ibid.
isolation, but explored in terms of that gestalt, that conceptual framework of which they are so much a part. To pursue such an approach is by no means an easy task; but that difficulty and that challenge should not be taken as insurmountable barriers. Wilson is the first to admit that, though Kohlberg is misguided in many ways, he (Kohlberg) has done moral education a great service through his cognitive developmental approach. But, to be complete, any theory of moral education must concern itself with all of those aspects of being human, such as human knowing, human feeling, and human acting, that are influential in the realm of morality.
CHAPTER 4

A CRITIQUE OF THE CRITIQUE

This study has examined two perspectives of the moral domain: a philosophical analysis and a psychological analysis. The philosophical analysis, a non-substantive proceduralistic account, consisted of a rational method composed of five rationally derived components of moral thought and moral action treated as specific skills, abilities, and attitudes centering on the four basic skills: (1) manifesting concern for others as equals, (2) awareness of others' feelings and emotions, (3) knowledge of facts fundamental to moral decisions, and finally, (4) the ability to act upon personal decisions. The psychological analysis, on the other hand, confined itself to how the person developed morally in terms of the moral judgments expressed, that is, in its concern with moral reasoning and moral judgments, the psychological analysis did not go beyond the cognitive aspects of the moral domain. It claims that moral reasoning develops in six logically necessary and universally invariant stages.

Wilson's conceptual analysis admits the need for and the significance of such an empirical inquiry as it attempts to give due consideration to both the psychological and sociological aspects of moral education; but the study remains philosophical in orientation, i.e., it never leaves the realm of conceptual analysis and its
rational-intellectualistic point of view. Analytical philosophy offers important descriptions of the directions that moral education logically should take; but there is still the need, however, to have not only a philosophical, psychological and sociological account of moral education, but historical, anthropological, economic, religious, educational planning, curriculum planning, and literature accounts also. Criticism of Wilson in this regard cannot be too severe, if only because this study does not go beyond the realm of conceptual analysis and combine the above-mentioned empirical and non-empirical realms of moral education. Conceptually speaking, Wilson's proceduralism may be criticized for its sidestepping of the 'bag of virtue' approach toward moral education.

Wilson rejects the Aristotelian-Platonic approach toward education (which distinguishes virtues from each other and advocates the teaching of those differentiated virtues conceived to be 'culturally-free') and posits his logically derived moral intellectual proceduralism.\(^1\) This proceduralism is preoccupied with principles of reason, understanding and action; and it is based on the well-known R. S. Peters' criteria of education: (1) teaching the person to think, (2) understanding, (3) care for such understanding. There are two aspects to this proceduralism: morality, essentially a form of rational discourse, examines human action through an overall overriding, prescriptive and

\(^1\)J. Wilson, et al, Values and Moral Development in Higher Education (London: Croom Helm, 1974), p. 9. Wilson, however, does not spell out here his reasons for the rejection of the bag of virtue approach toward education. The reasons others give will be covered shortly.
universal principle of rationality. This principle attempts to give 'good' reasons for acting one way rather than another. Secondly, this high-level principle of rationality, assumed to be internal to morality, precludes the need to appeal to authority because it is the means of deriving and testing what logically ought to be done.

Wilson's moral education programme calls for: (1) a commitment to this principle of rationality (or the need to give reasons for actions); (2) a commitment to the formal aspects of this principle (i.e., the overriding, prescriptive and universal features of this high level general principle which) (3) presupposes equality, freedom and impartiality to be aspects of moral discourse; (4) a preoccupation with the social and psychological dimensions of man; and finally, (5) the need to have a clear ideal of and concept of man. Wilson assumes that once the moral (rationally-oriented) intelligence is learned the person will be able to pick out all of those morally relevant aspects of any situation; that is to say, that this methodological intelligence helps to determine how to have concern, respect, considerateness and the like for others. Development into these logical requirements of morality is a matter of becoming a proficient moral person; that is, development is an evolving competency in the skills, abilities and attitudes (guided by a justifying process based on reason) of this concept of morality.

To be sure children and adults should be taught to be reasonable and to apply their principles in an overriding, prescriptive, and universal manner; but to go from philosophical and conceptual clarity (where it is known what is to count as altruism, kindness, equality, concern and reasonableness) to complex moral and social circumstances
(where moral action and real life arguments occur) is a different matter. The conceptual and empirical difficulties of 5 go beyond either psychology and sociology to things like economics, history and so on. And (3) and (4) require something more than philosophical analysis; empirical evidence is also required. And on the philosophical level several difficulties will arise over the acquisition of the principle of rationality, and over the degree of moral weighting that ought to be given to data; also, differences are bound to occur over

... the relevant differences between people in any given moral situation; over what are the facts of the case; and more fundamentally, over individuals' differing concepts (or ideals) of man.2

Furthermore, will everyone be able to attain the requisite proficiency in this use of rationality?

There are several difficulties with this principle of rationality: what about the person who refuses to be rational? What would Wilson do in this case? Harrison comments:

What Wilson would advise for a classroom situation in which a sizable group of students, after listening to and discussing the second order principles, rejected them, we do not know. Logically, he would have to abandon the attempt at moral education, perhaps after trying to get it in the back door by awakening interest with work on EMP and PHIL situations.3

And secondly, what about the person who cannot learn this formal procedural moral attitude or can never reach the intellectual competency necessary to manipulate such a principle? What happens to the person who experiences difficulty learning such highly abstract concepts as

2H., p. 27.

3H., p. 59.
this principle of rationality? Since it is very conceivable that within the realm of practical day-to-day affairs) in the classroom his concern with rationality, integrity and autonomy will be difficult to teach, I present the case for the teaching of virtues.

Since this is merely a concern (at this stage of my study) to summarize an approach toward moral education different from Wilson's, I will list some reasons for the acceptance of this approach and make use of some differentiations D. Attfield makes in the area of virtue teaching. Attfield's differentiations are made in terms of multi-track and single-track virtues.

Much of the opposition to the 'bag of virtues' approach toward moral education centers on four problem areas: (1) that virtues cannot be satisfactorily classified, i.e., there's no way of showing how some virtues are central and others are secondary in a moral life; (2) that virtues are indoctrinatory; (3) that virtues presuppose rules; and finally, (4) that virtues are not action-guiding, they are assessments which appear in testimonials and references.

However, these problems do not go unchallenged; R. S. Peters in fact responds to these charges in a very sophisticated manner, while giving three good reasons for the teaching of a content: (a) much pedagogical usefulness is derived from learning the content of morality and/or virtues; (b) there is some logical truth in suggesting that generalizations cannot be made about moral concerns until

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5. Ibid.
particulars are acquired; (c) since a child must act long before he has either understood the validity of rules or made sense of rules, the teaching of a content seems all the more important. Put another way, rules must be learned before other rules can be explored; rules and principles must be known before thinking can occur in terms of them, and propositions must be applied as examples of moral rules for later use in moral debates.

(a) Research has shown that children grasp principles like justice only after having first mastered situation-specific rules of action. Moreover, it

... is not difficult ... to surmise why the most consistent findings from studies of child-rearing practices are that sensible children, who are capable of reasoning later on, emerge from homes in which there is a warm attitude of acceptance toward children, together with a firm and consistent insistence on rules, without much in the way of punishment.

The child, influenced by some prominent person, makes that person's actions habitual features of his character. The reasons for the patterning are only learnt and understood later.

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7. TV, pp. 77-78.


9. TV, p. 41.
(b) Logically speaking, it is absurd to claim that a child can make general statements about principles (like justice and concern for others) until the content of the principle is learnt; it may be possible to make general statements while it's being learnt but not before, for that's much like asking to have the legal mind prior to going through the process that makes that legal mind. To understand a principle entails the comprehension (on more than one occasion) of instances having common features, falling in the same category. Without a concrete content, principles of morality are inoperative.¹⁰ Peters explains further:

"...by calling something like respect for a person a 'principle' we mean that it embodies a consideration to which appeal is made when criticizing, justifying, or explaining some determinate content of behaviour or belief.¹¹"

Logically it seems difficult, if not impossible, to learn the formal overriding, prescriptive and universal aspects of a principle and the abstract principle of rationality on which it is based, and by means of which it is derived, without learning the content of some principle like respect for others first. Once the content is learnt, it seems general statements will be made more easily.

(c) Furthermore, until the child learns the content of a principle like respect for others, it is difficult to see how he can act respectfully, i.e., a child must act before he understands rules and their justification and validity. In fact the learning of a content may be more important for that group of the population which never

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¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Rc., pp. 60-61; Hamm, TV., p. 41.
moves beyond any level of understanding other than rule conformity; hence social reasons dictate why both moral habits and moral rules must be communicated; for they are the way of overcoming those difficulties encountered in society when people can do nothing other than that which is morally dictated. Before either children or some adults learn how to reason themselves (if they ever do), rules must be established for their and other's safety, security and protection from (their own) misconduct. Harms comments further:

Ideally, of course, one would hope that most people could reach the autonomous stage where they would do the morally right thing for the morally right reason. That is indeed how one might define the morally educated person. Failing that, it is still better, for socially desirable reasons, that people do the right thing for the wrong reason rather than the wrong thing for the wrong reason. (I take it that doing the wrong thing for the right reason is an impossibility.)

The point of teaching rules then is not to just memorize the rules but to internalize and become habituated to them with an eye to learning the reasons behind their derivation and the justifiable process on which they are based as a life worth living. In other words,

If it is the case, as is commonly held, that bad habit militates against good habit, then we have a very good reason to instill reasonable habits in children in their heteronomous stage so that they can cash in or capitalize on their training when they reach the autonomous stage of morality and come to realize that the habits they have are indeed reasonable.

By means of habit and the teaching of a content based on reason, then, the person can come to learn the significance of and the operational dimensions of a formal operation like reason in the realm of morality.

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So far I have summarized Wilson's proceduralism, noted his rejection of the 'bag of virtue' approach toward moral education, cited four other problems (i.e., virtues cannot be satisfactorily classified, virtues are indoctrinatory, virtues presuppose rules, virtues are not action-guiding), which other writers marshal against this approach, and explained three reasons for adopting this approach. Since the latter approach is my concern here, the all-important question now is: what are the contents of this 'bag of virtue' which are to be taught? And how are they to be connected to the conceived concept of rationality so that they overcome some of Wilson's difficulties?

To answer this question (by means of some tentative suggestions) I call upon a distinction D. Attfield makes in the area of virtues.\textsuperscript{14} And to support this move, I will make use of an additional differentiation Peters makes in terms of the types of virtues. Both distinctions will then be combined. Taking the Peters' classification first, he gives four types of virtues:\textsuperscript{15} (a) those highly specific virtues which have no internal reason (i.e., motive) to act in the way prescribed but which are related to specific types of acts, e.g., punctuality, tidiness, and honesty; (b) those virtues, which have internal motives to act, like compassion, and concern for others; (c) those artificial virtues entailing general considerations having to do with rights and institutions like justice and tolerance; (d) those high order virtues like courage, perseverance and integrity which are

\textsuperscript{14} PV., p. 76.

\textsuperscript{15} RC., pp. 247-248.
practiced in the face of counter-inclinations. In terms of the Attfield differentiations of multi-track and single-track virtues the above may be regrouped as follows:

First there are the overarching, high-level virtues that embrace the entire moral life and involve every area of moral endeavour: goodness, conscientiousness, dutifulness, respect for persons; then the more particular, low-level virtues of fairness (the virtue connected with justice), truthfulness (as opposed to the academic natural virtue of truth-seeking), fidelity, honesty, kindness, chastity, respect for life, respect for property, fraternity, respect for parents, humility.

Peters' (a) and (c) distinction falls in the low-level category, and his (b) and (d) types fall in the high-level distinction.

The primary aim of any moral education programme teaching virtues would be to teach those high-level non-controversial virtues which can respond to the four problems with teaching virtues (i.e., virtues are indoctrinatory, virtues presuppose rules, virtues are not action-guiding, and virtues cannot be satisfactorily classified). But as it has been shown, there will be cases when this will not be possible; thus it will be necessary to teach low-level virtues. Before exploring this possibility, however, there is a need to give some additional details on low-level and high-level virtues. High-level virtues, like considerateness, are non-controversial because they are what everybody would want, the amoralist included. Such virtues do not presuppose a moral principle; they are not typically action-guiding like rules; and, they are generally open-ended. Whereas a single-track virtue like truthfulness is closed-ended and action-specifying in that it calls for

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16 Ibid.

17 PV., p. 76.
action which tells the truth and eschews lies. But in those cases where it is difficult for a person to attain the necessary initiative and imagination to acquire a high-order virtue like considerateness, it seems reasonable to teach for the acquisition of the high-level virtue by teaching for the acquisition of the low-level virtue respect for parents or respect for life. Since neither considerateness nor sensitivity, as high-level virtues issue in any specific rule or deed which generally speaking low-level virtues do, and since, as a low-level virtue, they are conceptually connected (by means of the elements of considerateness) to a high-level virtues considerateness, they may be taught as a means of acquiring the non-controversial high-level virtues like considerateness.

A move of this nature may not satisfy every critic and it may not overcome all of the above difficulties, but it does not seem unreasonable to use something like this when the appropriate occasion arises. Since both Peters and Wilson admit that multi-track virtues like 'concern for others' are fundamental in moral education, and since Peters shows that virtues like this have internal to them the motivation to act in the way prescribed, I will attempt to work out here an area and/or direction which future research might go insofar as the teaching of virtues and the acquisition of rules and rationality is concerned. I will achieve this aim by suggesting that the low-level virtue justice may be taught as a means of overcoming the above.

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18 Ibid.

19 AM., p. 31. I discussed this further in Chapter 3 of this study.
problems and acquiring practical reason, autonomy, motivation to be moral and rational, and so on. Thus far the suggestions are merely thoughts to be explored in future studies on content teaching.

A moral education programme concerned with a skillful use of rationality may teach for mastery in a rational proceduralism (i.e., a justification process concerned with giving reasons for actions) by teaching for the single-track virtue justice as a means to the overarching virtue 'concern for others'. Teaching itself can take the form of a case study approach, where the Heinz dilemma cited in Chapter 2 could operate as an ideal case. Besides, it is a concrete example through which the student could come to know what it means to be respectful toward others and to have the concept justice. Such reasoning could encompass three stages: first, questions are asked — after the student is requested to put himself in the shoes of all parties concerned — whether either person could have taken alternate action to resolve their difficulties. Second, what moral reasons may be brought forward to account for (perhaps, excuse) both parties' actions, and what reasons may be raised as counter-arguments. Third, as a means of testing (1) and (2), it may be asked what a 'reasonable public' (if it can be found and/or defined) might say about both persons' acts. The aim is to teach for the rules broken, the rules

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20 Justice as used here is synonymous with fairness and as Aristotle used it in his Nicomachean Ethics (1130). It entails the distribution of fairness, and the rectifying of disproportion or wrong; and as a result, it concerns autonomy, liberty and equality. Where equality is conceived as viewing others as having needs and wants like oneself and being able to put yourself in the shoes of others.
recognized, the rules acquired or the content-laden principle associated with such rules like justice, as some content-free principle like rationality or practical reasoning is used to examine the rules.21

To talk of the acquisition of the virtue of justice in this way is to talk of the things that one must learn how to do before one can do them properly; that is, it is assumed virtues like justice are learnt best by doing them, by practice. And to learn by practice those virtues which have rationality internal to them is to learn rationality in practice. Furthermore, to teach for the acquisition of reason and the virtues by means of the practice of justice and rationality in this way is to engage in the practice of practical reason in two ways: first, when actions are examined, reflected upon with the aid of rational tools like consistency and deduction, practical reason is practiced. And second, as A. Gewirth explains, "... the logical consequence of this imposition is that reason, through its criterion of logical necessity shows what is justified and what is unjustified in the moral judgments that purport to guide actions."22 This use of practical reason is the reasoning fundamental to the case study approach described on page 140. Participation in this way of learning is learning how to reason properly as one reasons. (However, there is no guarantee that

21 This case study approach concerns itself with the action, the emotions and the cognitions in the same way that Wilson's study deals with these elements of the moral domain. The difference between the two centers on the fact that this study teaches for these elements through a content and the Wilson study teaches for them independent of a content.

because the person is taught to reason in this way that he will automatically learn how to reason practically; but to teach for the acquisition of an abstract skill like practical reason by means of a content and a practice of that content is to move closer toward the acquisition of that skill than if the learning were not taught for by means of practice.)

Teaching for the acquisition of this practical reasoning skill, the requisite imagination and motivation to be moral not only respects the integrity and autonomy of the student but it also overcomes the charge of indoctrination. As it teaches the very young for the acquisition of a content (like justice) without giving reasons for being just, honest, courageous and so on (if only because the person is too young to understand reasons and how to reason), this methodology (in its concerns with indoctrination) pays particular attention to the problems of the two forms of the principle of non-indoctrination or indoctrination. First, the concern with rationality is a concern with teaching something as true by means of a concrete content with which most people can identify and in terms of which they can learn. When the long range interest of the programme is to have rationally aware people or people who have skill in the use of rationality, it cannot be said that its means do not respect the person's integrity and autonomy, or that the means were wrong. In its second form the principle refers to those cases where there is no complete consensus on either the credibility or truth of the subject matter. The principle at this point requires the teaching of and about the existence of difference of opinions or different moral and/or religious perspectives.
Students must be taught that different informed opinions exist on the moral acceptability of war, of euthanasia, the truth of different doctrines (like Christian and Buddhist), and so on. The clear principle of non-indoctrination is important in the concern with the education in the virtues because that principle operates as an educational criterion for selecting those educationally relevant data which are acceptable. Once everyone is clear about what can and what cannot be done educationally, all parties in education will be in a better position and more able to arrive at and explain their educational objectives like having better rationally aware and just people. Adherence to the principle of non-indoctrination helps assure, calm the fears of those who doubt, and question the procedures of what is being done.

As a low level virtue, justice is subject to the difficulties fundamental to that class of virtue; but to teach it in conjunction with a rational justifying process preoccupied with getting the person to try and do something, to choose to act in one way rather than another, and to give reasons for those choices is to confront head on and overcome some of these problems. The concrete dimension of the principle tells the person to be fair and treat people equally; and when these rules are reasoned about, the principle of rationality enters the picture. The rules motivate action and a choice, and "reason" analyzes the choice for its practicality, its consistency, prescriptivity, and universality. When actions and choices are examined in terms of the canons of deductive and inductive logic, practical reasoning as a skill is under development. So, virtues then, by virtue of their content and their form, offer guidance to the
learner, guidance which dictates a rule and how to validate that rule.
It is guidance which goes beyond the indoctrinating difficulties
single-track virtues entail.

Virtue teaching has its difficulties, but that is no reason to
exclude virtues from any moral education programme. They may just be
a means of guiding and motivating action in the realm of morality.
Guidance suggests that decisions must be made between known possible
actions. Multi-track virtues in particular give the person that aware-
ness of the choices he must make in any moral situation; then they
guide the person through the action particular to his choice. And that
action is focused and grasped with the aid of that insight and imagi-
ation derived from the high-level virtues. These virtues then inspire
the person to act in new and different ways.  

These virtues also motivate and guide the person to be moral and
rational because of the close connection between morality, rationality,
practical reason, and the virtues. Gewirth explains:

Rationality is internal to morality, not external to it. Moral
judgments appeal to reasons and lay claims to justification or
correctness.

And to participate in an educational process preoccupied with the
acquisition of this use of rationality through virtues like justice is
to fulfill the rational requirements morality (as a form of human dis-
course) sets for rational agents. Gewirth explicates that rational
requirements:

\[\text{PV, p. 80.}\]
\[\text{FM, p. 361.}\]
... a rational agent (logically must do what he) ought to do ... what he is rationally justified in thinking he ought to do. But what he is rationally justified in thinking he ought to do is what he logically must accept that he ought to do. For what he logically must accept is such that he contradicts himself if he fails to accept it, and by contradicting himself he loses a necessary condition of rational justification.²⁵

Failure to fulfill these rational requirements is a failure to be just and moral. These requirements are unfulfilled in any act which does not recognize the other as an equal or treat the other fairly. Not to be rational about one's actions and choices is to cease being a just and a rational agent, and to fall outside of the justification process basic to the process of practical reasoning, rationality and morality delineated here; it is to guide oneself by something other than morality. (This applies equally well to any process of indoctrination; but if the process can be shown to be guided by and performed on behalf of the rational requirements of rational agency, then some of these requirements established here will have been met.)

To educate in the high-level, multi-track virtues by means of the low-level, single-track virtues (like justice) based upon a three stage rational justifying process is to educate in practical reason (based upon a principle of rationality guided by the canons of deductive and inductive logic) through a concrete approach. It is an education in traits of character (i.e., the virtues), critical judgment (i.e., practical reason), and the motivation to act rationally.

That, in sum, is the case for the teaching of virtues. All difficulties to be sure have not been overcome. The concern has been

to suggest that multi-track virtues may be taught and fostered by the teaching of single-track virtues, and the process called indoctrination on occasion may be used as a means to the mastery of practical reason. But if the virtues are taught under the guise of rationality and for the purpose of attaining the insight and imagination basic to the procedural high-level virtues and the use of rationality, then some of these difficulties will be safeguarded against. Because of human shortcomings like apathy, laziness and the like, some browbeating and prescriptive rules are necessary. Even so, there is still the need to respect that person's autonomy and integrity, hence the need conceptually and practically, for the multi-track virtues and the principle of rationality to give the person the requisite insight and imagination to deliberately reflect upon the character and the critical judgment attained. Such teaching might be shown in the long run, as it makes use of some form of browbeating, to be free of any serious charges of anti-educational practices. Social security itself might justify a use of such techniques, techniques preoccupied with getting the person to be rational and moral. Teaching for social security by means of the virtues, practical reason, rationality, and individual autonomy may be reason enough to teach on occasion by means of browbeating for the virtues.

To browbeat the student into the acceptance of rules presupposed by the low-level virtues is unsatisfactory; but to use them as a means to the high-level virtues and practical reasoning does not seem so bad. The aim of any moral education programme should be to help the student develop the insight to learn how to decide to act and how to arrive at
his own reasoned moral choices and how to be rationally aware. The
best way to arrive at this goal, as Attfield explains, is the high-level
virtues; he states:

... the key virtues for moral education are of the multi-track
variety .... [They] do not presuppose simple rules and whole
areas of moral life and action are opened by them. With regard
to the criticisms that virtues do not guide it may be replied
that single-track virtues do guide via the underlying prin-
ciples, whereas multi-tracks do not, but give imagination and
insight into ethics far beyond the scope of rules.26

As virtues they motivate and inspire the person to act morally in
multiple ways, perhaps even to be rational-moral in multiple ways.

Thus if moral education is to occur in terms of a content, on
moral grounds some body of virtues like the above have to be differen-
tiated. The aim of such an effort is not only to teach rules, but
exceptions to these rules and how to validate the rules and the
exceptions to the rules. The child must learn what and how virtues
are to be accepted on moral grounds. Disagreement will arise over
the virtues and how they are to be classified, but that is no reason
to reject them from the area of moral education.

26 Pr., p. 80.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


- 150 -


