According to Weisberg:

A number of factors have contributed to the development of the culture of organizations: the "coming of age" of the American Jewish community and the increased welfare and community institutional apparatus it has required; the enormous burden of overseas responsibilities undertaken by American Jews and the organizational machinery which has been developed to do the job; the striking growth of religious institutions and organizations; and the changed social status of most American Jews.¹

Weisberg explains some of the reasons for this development as follows:

American Jews reflect the general social and economic changes since the war and possess strikingly similar institutional apparatus and ideological attitudes to those of the general American leisure-consumption-status class. They manifest so many of the traits which sociologists and social critics attribute to the new American bourgeoisie (the familiar "affluent society") that they may be said to epitomize it. But, for our purposes we need emphasize only one aspect of this development—the emergence of new Jewish communities. A large number of American Jews, enjoying considerable leisure time and on the whole very close to affluence, have moved out of the urban centers in which pre-war Jewry largely resided to a variety of suburbs, some no more than mediocre mass "developments," others quite substantial and "residential." In these new communities they have had to create organizations and community apparatus where none existed before. Many Jews of the large urban centers never before thought about communal organizations like schools, centers, synagogues and welfare agencies. In the pre-war urban centers such apparatus, if recognized at all, was identified with the culturally reactionary immigrant generation. It was just there and was usually regarded with disdain by those who were seeking greater assimilation into the general American community.²

We may now summarize the consequences of the "culture of organizations" as Weisberg sees them:

1) The culture of organization produces ideologies which seek to justify this pattern of behavior. Primarily

¹Ibid., pp. 348-349.
²Ibid., p. 349.
they take two interrelated forms. The first promotes identity with the established community and sanctions the activity of the community as essential to group survival. The second suggests that the programs of particular organizations are indispensable to achieving the group purposes.

2) Consequently there is an inclination to identify organizational tasks and responsibilities with "the Jewish way of life." This means, in effect, that the various organizational programs constitute the ideology of the community.

3) Another consequence is that the organization and its program reduce, and often eliminate, the need for individual ideological concern. The organization provides an ideology which one may assume when he joins it.

4) An identification with and activity within the Jewish community increases the social status of the participants. Accordingly part of the ideology of Jewish identification may now be justified on grounds of status. In fact, active Jewish communal identification is a definite status achievement.

5) As many Jewish organizations are purely service oriented, involvement in them encourages a philanthropic attitude. The activity in the organization provides satisfaction in doing something for others and this may well be what contemporary Judaism is all about.

6) Today, for a preponderant number of American Jews, communal activity is a substitute for religious discipline. Contrary to the case of orthodox Judaism, the intellectual and emotional demands of the culture of
organizations are not burdensome. They are precisely what appeals to the leisure-consumption-status orientation of most American Jews. Community ideology, like middle-class life in the United States, seeks to overcome doubts through activity and loneliness through organization.

Later in this study we shall see many parallels between the United States Jewish community and the Montreal Jewish community with regard to the "culture of organization" as described by Weisberg. Weisberg's important analysis would help to understand the opposition of the B'nei Mi leaders to join the Quebec public welfare system as per Bill 65 (1971).

**Jewish Communal Organization in the United States**

The single most important Jewish organization in any community, measured by the sum of the funds it raises and disburses, the number of people actively involved in its program, and the participation of upper-class leadership in its affairs is the Jewish welfare fund or federation.

Following the nineteenth century American experience with charity organization societies, welfare funds were established as a joint fund-raising effort of local Jewish charities. These were the welfare federations. It began in Boston in 1895 and then spread everywhere in North America.
Barbara Solomon describes the background of the decision to establish a Jewish welfare federation in Boston, as follows:

Somewhat desperate responsible spokesmen (of Jewish charity organizations) reviewed the social obligation they could not reject (created by masses of needy Russian refugees). Obviously a new approach to fund-raising was imperative. They doubted that the charities could survive without joint assumption of financial responsibilities. They resolved to change the financial system of all the Hebrew charities in the city.¹

Bird² explains that communal identifications and activities are encouraged by means of communal groups and federations which transcend different national backgrounds and different denominational loyalties by minimizing religious, regional or linguistic identifications. He brings, as an example, the fact that at the turn of the century, Jewish welfare federations were established in major metropolitan areas of North America in order to provide services in a context that avoided the sectarian, parochial character of the synagogues which tended to cater to persons of particular national origins and denominational background.

Freeing charity programs from the synagogue's control and transferring them to a secular, community-wide organization (namely the federation) was considered

²Bird, "Ethnic Group Institutions and Intra-group Communications."
indispensable for achieving this goal. The separate small charity societies agreed to coalesce into a larger federation also because they realized that they were unable to raise enough funds to finance rising needs and new programs.

Elazar\(^1\) studied the structure and functions of the American Jewish community and suggested that it should be conceived, mainly, as a body politics. He argues that the American Jewish community, organizationally, is a multidimensional matrix of institutions and organizations that interact with each other. They might be grouped around five major functions:\(^2\)

1) Religious - congregational
2) Educational - cultural
3) Community relations
4) Communal welfare
5) Israel and other overseas Jewish communities.

Elazar describes\(^3\) some characteristics of the American Jewish community:

1) There is no hierarchical system within the community. The mosaic of institutions and organizations depends upon a network of voluntary federative arrangements between the various organizations.


\(^2\)Ibid., p. 7.

\(^3\)Ibid., pp. 8-10.
2) While American Jews have adopted the protecting coloring of religion as the basis for their communal organization, it is, in fact, as a body-politic that they function best.

3) Philanthropy—the accepted American pseudonym for Jewish political existence—is a greater aspect of Jewish identification than religious worship.

Relating to the social welfare aspect of Jewish communal life in the United States, Elazar describes the changes that have taken place within the last hundred years. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, organizations that had begun as charitable committees through which volunteers collected money and provided services, were transformed first into philanthropic organizations with clear-cut programs and then into social welfare agencies with buildings and professional staff. Institutionalization and bureaucratization took place, thus creating the need for more funds. This led to the development of a fund-raising mechanism known as the Federation. However, after World War II, the function of Jewish social services lost some of its importance on the communal scene. This happened partly because the social services themselves have become progressively less Jewish and partly because various public social security services, which began in the United States in the mid 1930s, have reduced the significance of Jewish social

1Ibid., p. 159.
services in American Jewish life. The result is that social service agencies under Jewish auspices are today largely non-sectarian, accommodating non-Jews as well as Jews. The Jewish social service agencies are under pressure to give, also, a representation on their governing bodies to their non-Jewish clients.¹

Elazar states² that in view of the permanent Jewish drive for communal survival and under the impact of the above mentioned changes, certain social service institutions are now seeking to broaden their interests. They usually do this by moving into the educational-cultural sphere. This is particularly true of the Jewish community centers whose social-service functions have been reduced as their educational and cultural functions have increased. We shall see that similar developments took place within the Montreal Jewish community.

In conclusion we may point out the fact that communal organizations play a significant role in North American Jewish life. They are major vehicles of Jewish identity. Using Breton's concept of "institutional completeness" we may argue that Jewish communities in the United States have a high degree of institutional completeness. In certain communal areas, notably aid to Israel, recreation and education, they are especially active. These activities are mostly carried out by the welfare federations.

¹Ibid., p. 291.   ²Ibid., p. 292.
The rise of the welfare state in the twentieth century inevitably presented problems and challenges to Jewish social welfare. For the Jewish community, traditionally experienced in self-supply of social welfare, the growing involvement of government in this area could mean gradual shrinking of communal services and erosion of their Jewish characteristics. There was a potential danger of losing, or weakening, a major instrument of Jewish identity and communal cohesiveness. The relations between Jewish communal welfare and public welfare varied, of course, according to time and place. Our main concern is Jewish social welfare in Montreal, but first we have to see what the situation was, in this respect, in the United States.

The Jewish community in the United States, for the first time, faced the challenges of public relief and social security during the depression years of the 1930s. The economic collapse created unforeseeable and unanswerable needs. The traditional doctrine of "we care for our own," which served as the basic principle of Jewish communal welfare for many decades, proved to be insufficient. This situation opened the way for the formation of a new community policy vis-à-vis the general community. The issue was whether needy Jews should depend on public relief rather than upon aid from their coreligionists.
There were four main approaches to this issue among Jewish social workers and communal leaders. The first saw public welfare as the wave of the future in solving economic need. They considered voluntary social work unsuitable for solving deep economic and social problems. They claimed that Jewish services could well concentrate on "special problems" of Jews, such as Jewish culture and education while leaving relief programs to government responsibility. The second gave a cautious support to the new public intervention, as a temporary emergency measure. They insisted that voluntary organization should remain at the core of Jewish welfare to safeguard quality, humanitarianism and scientific method. The third recommended relying on public welfare for relief payments and turning Jewish agencies wholly into the path of personal counselling on family adjustment problems. The fourth considered public welfare an assault on both American and Jewish concepts of voluntary obligations and rejected it as undermining private freedom.1

Speaking about the results of this debate and the ensuing developments, Morris and Freund said that while the debate went on, the rush of events soon fixed the course of action. It was understood that large public-relief programs were essential if urban chaos was to be prevented. Boards

and staff of Jewish and non-Jewish welfare organizations joined together in urging and administering the new projects. Slowly a shaky confidence was established that voluntary agencies would survive, that new social tasks would arise, and that Jewish social agencies would have more than enough work to occupy their staff and financial resources. Slowly the idea was accepted that underprivileged Jewish families could rely upon public and nonsectarian relief with confidence, and that such relief could be well administered by public agencies while voluntary and sectarian groups supported its administration and helped influence its policies through citizen action. The voluntary welfare agencies and their federations now realized that they could mobilize voluntary efforts towards other significant areas such as family life, vocational guidance, and care of the chronic sick and the aged. ¹ This attitude became a guideline of Jewish welfare in the following years.

But, still, the question of adjustment to public relief and social security programs did not cease to bother the leaders of Jewish social welfare. The public debate continued. Some communal leaders and social workers claimed that it was no longer justified to maintain sectarian agencies. They argued that human needs were universal and their fulfillment was beyond the capacity of any sectarian group. They preached that, if all groups joined forces, a

¹Ibid., p. 288.
significant attack could be launched upon human misery without the waste of competition in fund raising and rendering services. Others insisted that the Jewish welfare agency was indispensable to Jewish continuity. By and large, the Jewish welfare agency in the United States remained committed to a separate, sectarian existence. Nevertheless, some loosely linked connections with American public welfare at large were maintained.

Karl P. Zukerman, a Jewish communal worker, explained some of the problems which arose out of the connections between Jewish welfare and the public welfare system:

For the Jewish communal agency the issue is whether the agency can take government funds and yet preserve its Jewish mission. I see its mission to be an instrument of the Jewish community to continue Jewish identity, heritage and life. So, for the Jewish agency the implication of government funding goes straight to its core, its very existence.¹

Zukerman asks, what is the price Jewish communal agencies pay when they receive government funds for their services? He says that this question, like all important questions, must be reduced to a series of sub-questions if a helpful answer is to be found:

1) How does government funding affect their position as voluntary agencies?

2) How does it affect their ability to carry on their Jewish purposes?

3) How does the accountability, which flows with the government funds, affect their functioning as voluntary and as a Jewish agency?  

Zukerman adds that a private agency which receives funds from the government is accountable to it. In fact the government could specify how to utilize the funds, taking into account:
1) The people to be served, in general
2) The geographic area in which the program is to operate
3) The services to be provided
4) The program goals and objectives
5) The methods and techniques to be used
6) What kind of staff is necessary.

Zukerman answers all these questions as follows:

A Jewish agency, to me, is one that meets and serves a Jewish purpose. I am talking about the clients it serves, the programs it provides, the techniques it uses and the ends it publicly seeks. In this respect the introduction of substantial sums of government funds can have a serious impact on the agency's Jewishness.

Zukerman also brings examples of some possible risks to the Jewishness of a government-funded agency, in the United States, as follows:

1) In most cases the introduction of government funds requires that the agency provide services to all persons who come to it, regardless of their religious or ethnic orientation. Without being able to give priority to Jews the ability of the agency to provide services to Jews can be adversely affected.

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1Ibid., p. 365.  2Ibid., p. 366.  3Ibid., p. 370.
2) Closely related to the above-mentioned is the affect on the Jewishness of an agency which is limited to a particular geographic area with respect to the services it provides.

In view of the dangers to Jewish welfare, as Zukerman perceived them, he recommended that the leaders of Jewish communal welfare should rely on increasing Jewish philanthropic financing rather than applying for more government funds.

The question arises, whether Zukerman is right in his misgivings of public financing. Or, in other words, whether public finance always has an adverse affect on the Jewishness of a communal welfare agency and its ability to attain the goals of Jewish welfare. No one answer can be given to this question. It all depends on the degree and conditions of government intervention and its impact on specific Jewish aspects of the welfare activity. Zukerman argues\(^2\) that in the United States, where religious teaching is prohibited in government-funded institutions, educational and cultural aspects of Jewish welfare institutions could be curbed once they benefit from government funding.

But our study shows that in Quebec the case was different. Public financing did not adversely affect the sectarian character of welfare agencies. Due to historical reasons, most welfare organizations in Quebec, until recently, remained sectarian and denominational. As a rule,

\(^1\)Ibid.  \(^2\)Ibid., p. 372.
denominational and sectarian welfare organizations respect the ethnic and cultural aspects of social welfare. It seems that in Quebec the traditional sectarian aspects of social welfare were not seriously eroded until the government nationalized social welfare services in the province in 1971 even though public funding grew through the years.
CHAPTER 5
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF JEWISH COMMUNAL WELFARE

The Issue

A central question of this study is: What are the distinctive characteristics that make Jewish communal welfare "Jewish," especially in the modern age? A related question is whether these characteristics are liable to be eroded or undermined if the Jewish welfare agency receives public funds. The review of traditional and contemporary Jewish social welfare, in the previous chapter, would help to answer the first question. The second question, in the American context, has been dealt with, briefly, in chapter 4. We have seen that some people, like Zukerman, say that public funds do undermine the Jewish characteristics of communal welfare. Others think the opposite. Our concern, of course, is with the impact of public funding in Quebec on the Jewish characteristics of communal welfare in Montreal. We shall discuss this question in chapters 9, 10 and 11.

A recurring question appears in discussions relating to Jewish communal social welfare. Why Jewish social welfare?
What is especially Jewish in being poor, sick, orphaned, aged, unemployed, etc.? What is Jewish in the need for marital or parent-child counselling? After all, it was maintained these are universal human problems which should be dealt with, utilizing the best professional treatment and adequate financing, with no regard to ethnic or religious affiliation.

These questions, however, were not asked by Jewish leaders, thinkers and communal workers as long as the Jewish traditional society in Europe kept its historical patterns of communal life. Then charity was an integral, and as a matter of fact, a part of the whole community life. But the slow disintegration of the Jewish traditional society in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and other modern age developments, brought many changes in the patterns of Western Jewish life (as discussed in chapter 4). These changes, inevitably, raised questions such as: Is there a need for Jewish sectarian welfare agencies? What are the specific characteristics of Jewish social welfare? How can they be maintained and protected in face of many internal (within the Jewish community) and external changes?

Challenges to the sense of identity of Jewish communal welfare emanated from two major developments which began to take place in the United States largely after World War I. These developments were the rise of professionalism in social work and the growing involvement of government in social welfare.
It was conceived by many Jewish communal welfare leaders that growing scientific input in social welfare and the shift from relying heavily on the work of volunteers to the employment of professionally-trained social workers would pose a threat to the "Jewishness" of the communal social services. There were fears among the communal leaders that professional social workers would relinquish traditional Jewish approaches in favour of more universal, modern and scientific methods. The other challenge was that of the growing public involvement in, and funding of, social welfare. This development, largely through social security programs, reflected the expanding concept of the welfare state and the recognition that the private philanthropic agency could not cope with the mushrooming needs of an urbanized industrial society. There were fears that these developments would gradually lead to the phasing out of the Jewish sectarian welfare agencies.

Abraham Amsel, a Jewish communal worker in the United States, expressed the concern that he had in this respect, as follows:

Since the turn of the century Jewish social work has been plagued by questions concerning its very scope and nature. Is it supposed to be more than just American social work carried out under Jewish auspices? Is there a distinctive and unique Jewish component?  

Another Jewish communal worker, William Posner, related to the above-mentioned problem from another point of view:

After the turn of the century, the problem of the Jewishness of Jewish agencies became a very basic point of contention in the field. Partly the problem revolved itself around the question of the continued need of Jewish philanthropies. It appears that with the gradual growth of immigrant population in need of assistance and of the simultaneous growth of public services, the feeling grew that private philanthropy could not forever expand, and that the burden of chronic dependency should fall upon the state and municipality. Jews were entitled to these services as taxpayers, and as American citizens.¹

These two citations clearly indicate the quandry of Jewish communal leaders and social workers under the impact of new developments in the social welfare arena. The major question then is: What is the raison d'être of an independent Jewish communal welfare agency? This question can be answered only by examining the specific Jewish characteristics of a communal welfare agency and by assessing their significance to Jewish life. Or, in other words, by finding out what makes a communal agency Jewish.

Almost everyone who dealt with this question spoke in terms of Jewish identification, Jewish cohesion and survival. Isaac Franck, who was an executive vice-president, Jewish Community Council of Greater Washington, D.C., wrote: "Jewish communal institutions and agencies

must play a role in the survival and creative development of Judaism, Jewish culture, and the group life of the Jewish people: this is their raison d'être."¹

William Avrunin, a Jewish professional communal worker in the United States, saw the role of communal services as a focus of Jewish identification. He wrote: "In fact our [the Jewish communal services] very status and prestige arises from the hunger of American middle class Jews for an acceptable instrument of Jewish identification within the American framework."² This statement goes in line with Weisberg's analysis of the motives of Jewish communal activities (chapter 4).

One should pay attention to the fact that both Franck and Avrunin put the emphasis on the role of communal services in enhancing Jewish survival and identification. This is the "raison d'être" of Jewish communal welfare. The question is: What are the characteristics of a Jewish welfare agency which are indispensable for its Jewishness? We shall answer this question in the following section.


The Characteristics of Jewish Communal Welfare

Based on an analysis of historical developments in Jewish communal welfare, interviews with communal welfare leaders and statements published by communal organizations, we have identified three characteristics of "Jewishness" with regard to Jewish communal social welfare: These characteristics have persisted in spite of the historical changes (listed in chapter 4) and in spite of changes in funding, staffing clientele and programs (which will be discussed later). The three dimensions to the characteristic features of Jewish communal social welfare are:

1) Jewish constituency
2) Jewish voluntarism
3) Jewish cultural distinctiveness.

Jewish Constituency

A Jewish communal welfare agency serves a Jewish constituency and thus helps to enhance community cohesiveness and Jewish identity. The agency is directed by lay leaders and operated by professional social workers who are academically trained and well aware of the tradition and culture of the Jewish society. Accordingly, this dimension of Jewish communal welfare means Jewish Board, staff and clientele. It means, also, that not only the agency is giving social services to members of the Jewish community but that the Jewish community is granting support to the
agency. The agency is drawing support via kinship networks and other communal organizations. It has the capacity to generate wide communal support by soliciting donations and recruiting volunteers. The Jewish constituency is the arena within which the agency is carrying out its ethnic institution function of facilitating communal consciousness and collective action.

**Jewish Voluntarism**

Voluntarism is a basic characteristic of every private social welfare agency, Jewish or non-Jewish. For generations voluntarism was the core of Jewish charity and thus became a major cultural value by itself. It has been mainly manifested within the framework of communal organization. The idea and practice of voluntarism are to the effect that donations are given and services are rendered to the needy on a gratuitous basis by people who volunteer their time and money. The voluntary activity answers the needs of both the giver and the recipient. To the volunteer layman it offers a channel for experiencing the traditional Jewish "mitsva" (religious commandment), of helping the needy, communal identification, self-satisfaction, status, and social contacts. To the needy person it supplies financial help, aid in kind, and emotional support by benevolent coreligionists. To all the parties involved voluntarism gives the feeling of belonging to the community. The history of Jewish welfare endeavors in Montreal has clearly shown the
importance of voluntarism as a moving force for the initiation, existence and growth of welfare services.

The significance of voluntarism is clearly expressed in a Brief submitted by the Canadian Jewish Congress and the Allied Jewish Community Services of Montreal with regard to Quebec Bill 65 in 1971. It reads, in part, as follows:

We believe that the element of volunteer participation in social and community concerns is basic to the existence of personal and nonbureaucratic rendering of services, and that this must be more fully recognized and supported in the Bill. Citizens' involvement provides links to the community, so that services reflect the real and changing needs of the population. In this way, good morale and spirit within the community are fostered. Voluntarism, in its best sense, provides support for social ventures, manpower to help deliver and improve services, and finally may even provide extra funding when this becomes necessary. ¹

The importance of voluntarism is in its contribution towards community cohesiveness. It is a common knowledge that Jewish communal agencies play an important role in the enhancement of community cohesiveness. But how is it achieved in actual fact? It seems to us that cohesiveness in the Jewish community is attained by the communal agency constituting a meeting point of needs, feelings, and interests. For the volunteers, most of them people of the economic middle and upper middle classes, communal activity is a way of expressing their Jewish identity and solidarity and also

¹Brief submitted by the Canadian Jewish Congress, Eastern Region, and the Allied Jewish Community Services of Montreal to the Standing Parliamentary Committee on Social Affairs of the National Assembly of Quebec on Bill 65 (October 1971), p. 2.
of gaining status and making social contacts as Neusner and Weisberg have asserted (chapter 4). The time, energy and money these people devote to pursuing communal goals strengthen the community social web while at the same time granting personal satisfaction and opportunities for Jewish identification.

To many of the volunteers, who are not religiously orthodox, communal activity supplies the major channel for expressing and demonstrating their feelings for Jewish education, cultural heritage, and traditional values. Here the motives and goals of the volunteers coincide with the interests and needs of the community. The above-mentioned Brief points out the significance of broad participation of volunteers in communal efforts:

This concept of participation is one which the Jewish community practices in all its endeavours. The Boards of Directors of the health, social, and cultural agencies include more than 1,000 individuals and there are approximately 5,000 others who are active members of committees, auxiliaries and the like.\(^1\)

This is a prime example of the "culture of organizations" which Weisberg has described in his analysis of Jewish communal organizations in the United States.

From the point of view of the client, too, the agency is a focal point where he meets volunteers and professionals. The client goes to the agency to help him solve his financial, social, and psychological problems. It is

\(^1\)Ibid.
professionally recognized that the character of the social and cultural environment of an agency is immensely important for the person who goes there to look for help. In a Jewish agency, among friendly people with the same cultural background, frequently speaking his own immigrant language, the client feels "at home." This feeling, in addition to being a crucial factor in the process of helping, healing, and the resolution of problems has tremendous impact on communal cohesion.

In this aspect of Jewish communal welfare we may discern one element of Bird's analysis of intra-group communication within an ethnic institution. This is the element of social recognitions and commitments between ethnic group members which is communicated by the participation of clientele, staff and volunteers in the work of the communal welfare institution. We may also refer to Breton's concept of "institutional completeness." Breton relates the extent of communal cohesion to the degree of "institutional completeness" within an ethnic community. "Institutional completeness" is measured by the number, type, strength and nature of activities of the ethnic institutions within the community. Accordingly, it is obvious the stronger the interaction between Jewish volunteers, staff

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1Bird, "Ethnic Group Institutions and Intra-group Communications."

2Breton, "Institutional Completeness of Ethnic Communities and the Personal Relations of Immigrants."
and clients, the larger the contribution of that institution towards communal cohesion. This is where the significance of voluntarism in Jewish welfare lies.

Jewish Cultural Distinctiveness

By cultural distinctiveness we mean that the Jewish communal welfare agency, within a non-Jewish surrounding, is characterized by specific Jewish cultural heritage features such as keeping the dietary laws, observing the Sabbath and the Holy Days, and speaking the Jewish language (Yiddish) or other pre-immigration language.

Professional social workers and lay leaders share the view that the cultural heritage manifested in Jewish communal welfare has a crucial impact on the well-being of the clients. Therefore it is most important for the Jewish client to be served by people who have the same cultural and religious background. In the Brief mentioned above this aspect is described as follows:

The crucial nature of culture and ethnicity in the treatment of physical, emotional and social problems of people is a never-ceasing part of our daily work experience. The long-term institution for the elderly is a case in point. The social milieu is as significant an aspect of the patient's well-being as is the physician's treatment of the old person's diseases. How the social worker treats bereavement, potential divorce, or problems of family relationship is deeply rooted in the traditions and mores of our community.¹

¹Brief by the Canadian Jewish Congress and the Allied Jewish Community Services, p. 2.
Being permeated with traditional features of cultural heritage, the welfare agency is able to create a Jewish ambiance. This ambiance is crucial in the process of rendering social services to Jewish clients.

Jewish communal leaders and professional social workers again and again have emphasized the importance of the Jewish ambiance in the very process of rendering material relief or counselling. The feeling of being among one's own kin plays an important role in the very decision to apply to the agency when seeking help and in the process of being helped.

Mr. G. Manual Batshaw, the then Executive Vice-President of the Allied Jewish Community Services of Montreal (AJCS), described this feature of the Jewish welfare agency as follows:

There is a general readiness for Jewish people to come to a Jewish agency as if they are coming to their own family; while it is true that most people do not like to come and ask for something, nevertheless, it is easier to ask something from one of your own, so to speak, than it is to ask from a stranger. So, the basic aspect, or factor, is kinship, or relationship, or a sense of belonging to a family, which makes it extremely important that Jewish people should feel comfortable about coming to their own in order to gain some help. ¹

The significance of staff/client relationships in a Jewish setting was summed up by Mr. Michael Yarosky (who was the Director General of the Jewish Family Services -

¹In a taped interview, dated April 28, 1977.
Social Service Center in Montreal during the years 1974-1977) thus:

The agency, its staff and leaders, have to be sensitive to what the Jewish community needs. To be sensitive to Jewish community needs you have to be tuned into Jewish community needs: to be tuned you should have a sense of caring for Jewish people. To have a sense of caring you should have a staff who is by and large Jewish. 1

The need for Jewish welfare services "Jewishly" given was also emphasized by Mr. Louis Orenstein, who was President of the Baron de Hirsch Institute during the years 1972-1974, when he said:

I do not believe that Jewish services can be given except in a Jewish milieu. There are certain peculiarities which are inbred in every person or ethnic group. You have to understand the mentality of the person who is asking the service. 2

Here, too, we may refer to Bird's concept of intra-group communication as a major function of an ethnic institution. The feature of cultural distinctiveness corresponds to his assertion that cultural symbols, in relation to which ethnic identifications are made, need to be transmitted in order to foster intra-group communications. This is a central task of the Jewish communal agency.

We may conclude that the three characteristics analyzed here combine together to supply the raison d'etre and the essence of a "Jewish" communal welfare. The raison

1 In a taped interview, dated March 24, 1977.
2 In a taped interview, dated April 16, 1977.
d'etre is the ethnic function of the agency, namely to supply social welfare services in a way which facilitates the attainment of Jewish personal identification and communal cohesiveness.

We shall see how these characteristics were used by the Jewish community leaders of Montreal when they debated the issue of surrendering Jewish communal welfare to the public system.
CHAPTER 6

ALLIED JEWISH COMMUNITY SERVICES
OF MONTREAL

The Allied Jewish Community Services of Montreal (AJCS) is the welfare federation of the Jewish community in this city. In this chapter we shall describe the history, roles and structure of the Jewish welfare federation in Montreal; then, in the next chapters we shall concentrate on the Baron de Hirsch Institute which has been, for many years, the major social welfare agency in the federation.

The Jewish presence in Quebec began manifesting itself in 1759 with the British Conquest of the colony. In the ensuing years few Jews, mostly merchants and army suppliers, came from England and the British Colonies in North America to settle in Montreal. For more than a century thereafter the Jewish community in Montreal was very small. Some growth took place during the 1840s and 1850s when Jewish immigrants arrived from Poland and Germany.

Considerable growth of the community began as a result of immigration waves caused by the pogroms and deteriorating economic situation in Russia during the 1880s. Hundreds of thousands of Jews fled from Russia to Western
Europe and America. While most of these immigrants went to the United States, a few thousand came to Canada. They settled mostly in Montreal, Toronto and Winnipeg. During the years 1881-1921 the Jewish population in Canada grew from a few thousand to 123,316.¹ Most of this growth was due to immigration from Eastern Europe.

In 1921, at the beginning of the period considered in this study, there were 45,846 Jews in Montreal.² Today, in 1980, there are about 110,000 Jews in the city.³ This growth in the Jewish population of Montreal should be mainly attributed to the waves of immigration after the two World Wars.

The Jewish welfare federation of Montreal was founded in 1916, under the name "Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of Montreal," by merging a few charity societies. In doing so the Jewish community in Montreal followed a typical trend in North American Jewish communities which had begun at Boston in 1895. In the centre of this effort stood the Baron de Hirsch Institute (BdH), at that time already a leading communal organization in the field of


³Estimation by the Research Department of Allied Jewish Community Services.
social welfare. The first initiative to establish a federation was taken in 1912 by Lyon Cohen, then President of B'nei HI. At the Annual Meeting of the institution Lyon Cohen said:

I wish once more to lay before you the question as to how we can best coordinate the various charitable bodies with a view of obtaining the greatest efficiency with the least possible expenses and labour. There are several plans of cooperation followed in other cities. There is Federation, the Union, the Board of Deputies or other such representative bodies, any of which would be a vast improvement over this present disorganized and disunited condition. The necessity of a working union is self-evident. 1

Upon Mr. Cohen's suggestion a committee was appointed to study the various possibilities and to submit a suitable scheme for the establishment of a federation. Based on the recommendations of the committee, it was resolved in November 1915, to establish a "Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of Montreal." The Act of Incorporation (Quebec Statutes, 1916, chapter 101) brought the federation into being on March 16, 1916. Its task was primarily to centralize administrative services, such as fee collection, purchasing and accounting. The first major step of the new central organization was to gain the affiliation of other Jewish charity societies. On January 1st, 1917, there were twelve constituent agency members in the federation. 2 Gradually the federation became


2Ibid., p. 52.
a central community organization for fund raising, planning and financing of member agencies.

A major organizational change occurred in 1965 when the Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of Montreal changed its name to Allied Jewish Community Services of Montreal (AJCS). The change in the name actually reflected a movement towards a greater centralization of planning and budgeting within the organized Jewish community. In this respect the omission of the word "federation" is meaningful, denoting the trend towards a more centralized community organization.

For many years allocations for social welfare services occupied a central place within the total federation's budget. This can be seen in Table 1 which details the federation's budget allocations to various services during the years 1924-1973. The budget report is divided into the following categories:

a) Individual welfare services
b) Recreation and golden age (old age) services
c) Education and culture
d) Health services
e) Grants and special allocations
f) Federation's (AJCS) operations and administration.

The table\(^1\) indicates the changing resources and roles of the

\(^1\)The table and the ensuing analysis are based on Zeitz's "The History of The Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of Montreal," pp. 104-116.
### TABLE 1

**BUDGET ALLOCATIONS OF FEDERATION ACCORDING TO CATEGORY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Individual Welfare Services</th>
<th>Recreation and Golden Age</th>
<th>Education-Culture</th>
<th>Health</th>
<th>Grants</th>
<th>Administration</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>$72,370</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>$28,736</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>$900</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>$49,288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>$108,562</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>$41,088</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>$111,887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>$99,959</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>$39,835</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>$123,293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>$145,342</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>$28,425</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>$163,547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>$344,884</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>$226,757</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>$68,915</td>
<td>0.06%</td>
<td>$434,962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>$420,490</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>$259,764</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>$83,224</td>
<td>0.07%</td>
<td>$469,539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>$514,553</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>$486,018</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>$173,543</td>
<td>0.08%</td>
<td>$554,071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>$539,745</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>$809,732</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>$422,358</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>$485,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹No cost shown for administration.

²Provisions - Re: Commitments made and approved after budget.

³An additional one million dollars was given to CJC (Canadian Jewish Congress) and UJRA (United Jewish Relief Association).
federation (AJCS). In 1924, 42 percent of the total budget went for individual aid and relief to local families (column A in the table). Then, during the years 1931-1965, it maintained a level of 31-39 percent. But in 1970 it dropped to 24 percent of the total budget and in 1973 to 20 percent. While more actual dollars were spent, the conditions inside and outside the community did no longer require that high percentage of funding for individual relief. This development reflected the growing affluence of the Jewish community in Montreal and the fact that government and municipal funds enlarged their allocations for direct relief purposes.

Similar development can be traced in health services (column D in the table). During the years 1924-1965, 28-42 percent of the budget was allocated for medical and health services. This dropped in 1970 to 26 percent and in 1973 to 15 percent. This change came about due to the introduction of Medicare (medical care insurance) in 1968 and of Bill 65 (an Act respecting health services and social services) in 1971. The amount of money released since 1965 from welfare services (column A) and health services (column D) was mainly channelled to recreation and golden age (column B) and education-culture (column C).

Looking into recreation and golden age funding (column B), we can see a considerable increase between the years 1970-1973, from 22 percent to 30 percent. The same applies to education and culture (column C) from .08 percent.
in 1970 to 16 percent in 1973. These increases can be attributed to the reasons mentioned above, namely, the rising standard of living within the community and the release of communal funds previously utilized for health and welfare services, as a result of public (government) financing.

It is worthwhile, here, to compare the combined percentage of allocations for welfare and health services to the combined percentage of allocations for recreation, the aged, education and culture in the years 1944-1960-1965-1970-1973 as reflected in Table 2.\(^1\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Combined percentage of welfare and health allocations</th>
<th>Combined percentage of recreation, golden age, education and culture allocations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>21.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>20.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>22.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table is a striking illustration of the changes in the socioeconomic conditions of the community, through the years, which was accompanied by corresponding changes in the programs and budget priorities of the federation. It

\(^1\)This table is based on data included in Table 1.
also reflects the effect of the economic and political changes in Quebec during the years 1920-1975.

One should notice the tremendous increase in the total budget allocations from 1944 to 1960 (1944 - $378,700, 1960 - $1,104,518). This increase, even though it took place over a period of sixteen years, raises a few questions: What caused this increase? Is it a result of growing affluence and higher standards of living? Or, is it because of new programs, more people being helped, or larger administration expenses? While it is not the aim of this study fully to analyze the budgets of the federation through the years, we think that this substantial increase was mainly due to six factors:

1) The post-war immigration, which considerably increased the Jewish population in Montreal. The result, of course, was more consumers in the entire gamut of communal services.

2) The growing affluence of the community after World War II, which meant larger fund-raising incomes for the federation.

3) New programs in 1960, which did not exist in 1944, such as in the area of education and culture (see column C in Table 1).

4) A tremendous growth in fund-raising precipitated by Jewish needs overseas after World War II. This included fund-raising for displaced Jews in Europe after
the war, immigration to Israel, the foundation of Israel and the Israel-Arab wars. Since the federation received a fixed percentage of the revenues raised by the Combined Jewish Appeal (the fund-raising campaign of the community), it directly benefited from the substantial growth in the campaign revenues.

5) The growth of the economic middle-class group in the Jewish community which became a large consumer of communal services (see columns A, B, and D in Table 1).

6) The rise in the number of professional welfare people (social workers and other communal workers) who were employed by the federation for the expanding communal services. This salaried group became a major consumer of the federation's budget.

One may also notice the great increase in the budget between 1965 and 1970 (from $1,249,727 to $2,133,140). This writer is of the opinion that this increase may be attributed to two factors:

1) The Israel-Arab "six day war" in 1967, which caused a great increase in the income of the Combined Jewish Appeal for overseas needs. But, the federation likewise receives a part of this income.

2) The inflation factor.
For comparative purposes we shall present, herewith, the lists of the federation's constituent agencies for the years 1920, 1940, 1960 and 1975.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1920</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1960</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Baron de Hirsch Institute</td>
<td>1) Baron de Hirsch Institute</td>
<td>1) Baron de Hirsch Institute and Jewish Child Welfare Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Herzl Dispensary</td>
<td>2) Herzl Hospital &amp; Dispensary</td>
<td>2) Herzl Health Service Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Hebrew Young Ladies' Sewing Society</td>
<td>3) Hebrew Ladies' Sewing Society</td>
<td>3) Camp Wooden Acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Jewish Endeavour Sewing School</td>
<td>4) Jewish Employment Bureau</td>
<td>4) Jewish Vocational Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Ladies' Hebrew Benevolent Society</td>
<td>5) Neighbourhood House</td>
<td>5) Neighbourhood House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Mount Sinai Sanatorium</td>
<td>6) Mount Sinai Sanitorium</td>
<td>6) Mount Sinai Sanatorium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) Montreal Hebrew Sheltering Home</td>
<td>8) Montreal Hebrew Old People's &amp; Sheltering Home</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) Young Men's Hebrew Association</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1975 the constituent agencies of AJCS were:

1) B'nai B'rith Hillel Foundation (for Jewish students)

2) Caldwell Residences (multiple housing for low-income senior citizens)

1 The 1920 and 1940 data are taken from the Annual Reports of the Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of Montreal. The 1960 data are taken from the Annual Report of the Federation of Jewish Community Services of Montreal. The 1975 data are taken from the Jewish Community Service Directory 1974-75 published by the AJCS.
3) Camp B'nai B'rith (summer camping)
4) Camp Wooden Acres (summer camping)
5) Canadian Jewish Congress (Eastern Region)
6) Golden Age Association and Jewish Laurentian Fresh Air Camp (services for senior citizens)
7) Jewish Family Services of the Baron de Hirsch Institute (counselling and guidance services to families)
8) Herzl Family Practice Center (comprehensive medical care and treatment for the individual and family)
9) Jewish Community Camps (coordinating council)
10) Jewish Convalescent Home (for patients requiring continuing medical care).
11) Jewish General Hospital
12) Jewish Hospital of Hope (care for the incurable)
13) Jewish Immigration Aid Services (JIAS)
14) Jewish Nursing Home (facilities for recuperation)
15) Jewish Public Library
16) Jewish Vocational Service (guidance for employment and professional assessment)
17) Maimonides Hospital & Home for the Aged
18) Mount Sinai Hospital (medical facilities for respiratory diseases)
19) YM-YWHA and Neighbourhood House Services (recreational facilities)
Waller notes\(^1\) that the welfare federation in Montreal has emerged as a most powerful and significant body in a fashion similar to what has occurred in Jewish communities in the United States. The Allied Jewish Community Services has grown in size and importance since its reorganization in 1965 and has come to occupy a leading role, if not the dominant one, in the Jewish community of Montreal. Waller explains that the key to the present position of AJCS is its budgetary role. All funds raised by the Combined Jewish Appeal for local purposes are disbursed by AJCS. Consequently that body has been able to exert considerable influence on broad policy directions for the community. We would like to add that AJCS has enhanced its strength and influence vis-à-vis both with other Jewish organizations in the community (such as the Canadian Jewish Congress) and member agencies within the federation (such as the Baron de Hirsch Institute). This development would have a great bearing on the results of the debate (1971-74) between AJCS and BdeHI with regard to the issue of joining the Quebec public welfare system.

Waller draws\(^2\) parallels between the roles and developments of Jewish American welfare federations and those in Montreal. As a result of the American influence AJCS has


\(^2\)Ibid., p. 60.
come to see itself as a central community organization. It adapted the concept that the role of such a body is to serve Jewish people's needs on a broad basis and not only social welfare needs as was traditionally the role of welfare federations. Consequently this perspective led to new approaches and activities for AJCS. A key trend among U.S. welfare funds, for some years, has been to work for the retention and strengthening of Jewish identity. It represents a sharp departure from past emphases, which were mainly on health and welfare in the material sense.

The AJCS followed this trend and since 1960 has reduced the percentage of budget allocations for individual welfare services and increased allocations for recreation, golden age, education and culture. Waller suggests that there are several possible explanations for this development. The AJCS people say that they are motivated by the need to enhance Jewish identity. However, Waller adds some other reasons, such as, the loss of other fields to the government and the desire to expand power.

We think that Weisberg's characterization of the American Jewry's culture as a "culture of organizations"

1See Table 1.

2Apparently Waller refers to the transfer of communal health and social services into the Quebec public system.

3Neusner, American Judaism, Adventure in Modernity, pp. 16-17.
is valid, too, for the Jewish community in Montreal because of the similarities of the Jewish background and the North American culture. This means that programs, plans and organizations appeal very much to most Montreal Jews. For many Jews to be a Jew is to belong to an organization and to manifest Jewish culture is to carry out the programs of an organization. This identification of Jewish life and Jewish culture with participation in communal organizations may help to understand the anxiety which has engulfed many of the leaders of the communal welfare organization in view of growing government involvement and the risk of losing this organization to the public welfare system.

Saying this, one should also notice the differences between Jewish communities in the United States and the Jewish community of Montreal. It seems that the Jewish community in Montreal is more diversified than many American Jewish communities. This is because, in the United States, the major waves of Jewish immigration have settled and incorporated into the fabric of the Jewish society earlier than in Montreal. Here there has been a substantial immigration of Jews from North Africa (the Sephardic Jews) and Israel within the last thirty years. The lines between the veteran Jewish population, who mostly originated from East Europe, and the other two groups are still very discernable. In view of this fact, Jewish communal organizations have even a greater role in enhancing the cohesion within the community
than in the United States. This is why the Jewish community of Montreal was so sensitive to what appeared to them as a threat to communal welfare in the form of government takeover of one of its major welfare agencies.

We may turn now, in the next chapters, to an examination of the Baron de Hirsch Institute—its history, changes of roles, programs and structure and the relationships with AJCS and the government.
CHAPTER 7

THE BARON DE HIRSCH INSTITUTE
(1920-1970)

Introduction

The Baron de Hirsch Institute, a communal Jewish social welfare institution, stands in the focus of our study. As any other communal, ethnic institution it has general and specific functions. By general we mean the function which is common to all ethnic institutions. By specific we refer to the function which is unique to this institution.

As with every ethnic institution, changes have taken place in BdHI through the years. These changes have been affected by changes within the Jewish community and in the larger Quebec society, and by developments in the social welfare arena. The everlasting challenge which an ethnic institution of a minority group faces is to maintain its ethnic identity and functions while adjusting to changes. It should be noted, however, that the strength and nature of this challenge varies through the years.

In this and the next three chapters we shall examine and analyze changes in the Baron de Hirsch Institute during
sixty years (1920-1980). We would like to explain how and why changes occurred and how the institution adjusted to these changes. Our argument is that BdeHI adjusted by changing its programs, services, clientele, funding resources and structure and by improving its professional performance but always maintained, unchanged, its functions as an ethnic institution.

By now we are aware of Merton's theory of manifest and latent functions and Bird's concept of intra-group communications within ethnic group institutions.¹ We shall use these analytical tools in the examination of the BdeHI. According to Merton manifest functions are those objective consequences contributing to the adjustment of a system which are intended and recognized by participants in the system. We should add that these functions are publicly discussed and announced. Latent functions are those consequences which are neither intended nor recognized by the system. Therefore, they are not discussed nor publicly announced.

In the case of BdeHI the manifest function of the institution is to render social welfare services to the Jewish community of Montreal. One should notice, however, that the content and understanding of the notion of "social welfare" change over the years. This function is, of course, a specific one to this social welfare institution. Following

¹This has been explained in chapter 2.
Bird, we may identify the latent function which is of a general character, namely shared by all ethnic institutions. This is the function of fostering intra-group communications. According to Bird ethnic institutions have the capacity to facilitate social interactions and communications within the ethnic population and thus to enhance the degree of its internal cohesiveness.

Another latent function, of a personal character, relates to interests and concerns of lay leaders and staff members. The position of a layman or professional executive in the institution may serve as a power basis for personal political, social and economic gains. Most latent functions are not officially intended and recognized nor publicly announced, but nevertheless they have substantial impact on motives, arguments and actions.

We may now turn to a historical review of the BdeHI.

**The Baron de Hirsch Institute**

The inception of the Baron de Hirsch Institute goes back to the year 1863 when a small group of young men established a charity society named "Young Men's Hebrew Benevolent Society" (YMHBS). The society engaged in relief to needy people in the small Jewish community of a few hundred in Montreal. For the next twenty years there were not many social welfare cases to deal with. The first real test for the YMHBS came during the 1880s when relatively
large numbers of Jewish refugees arrived from Russia. Very soon the heavy burden of helping growing numbers of new immigrants proved to be too much for the society to cope with. In 1890 they applied for help to the world Jewry's greatest philanthropist at the time, the Baron Maurice de Hirsch. He donated $20,000. This started a new era in Jewish communal welfare in Montreal.

We may, on the whole, trace the history of the Baron de Hirsch Institute through six periods:

1) 1863-1890: The "Foundation Years"
2) 1891-1915: The "Leadership Years"
3) 1916-1946: The "Expansion Years"
4) 1947-1970: The "Professional Years"
5) 1971-1973: The "Transition Years"
6) 1974-1980: The "Public Establishment Years"*1

We shall review the first four periods in this chapter and the last two in chapters 10 and 11.

The "Foundation Years" (1863-1890)

These are the years of the Young Men's Hebrew Benevolent Society which was a traditional, communal, charity society. In this period, and in many years to come, social welfare meant, mainly, income maintenance and aid in kind to the poor. In 1863 there were less than one thousand

Jews in the city and the activity of the society was quite limited. But in 1890 there were already a few thousand as a result of immigration from Russia, and Eastern Europe. The period terminates with the donation given by Baron Maurice de Hirsch in the fall of 1890. In thanks to the Baron, the name of the society was changed to the Baron de Hirsch Institute - Hebrew Benevolent Society. In these years there were no hired employees, specific programs, or any administrative structure. The charity work was done by volunteers out of the small Jewish middle and upper classes in the city.

The "Leadership Years" (1891-1915)

The donation of $20,000 gave a very serious boost to the society. It enabled the BdeHI to expand its charity activities and to assume a leadership position in the community. Following the donation the society purchased a building which became the centre of Jewish communal life in Montreal at that time. It also opened a free school for immigrant children in the same building. Strengthened by the $20,000 the society gained power which helped it in the struggle for leadership against a veteran Jewish institute in Montreal—The Spanish-Portugese Synagogue. Since then the Baron de Hirsch Institute has been able to sustain a leadership role in the community, lasting for many years.¹

The scope of the BdeHI's activities expanded beyond mere material aid to other areas such as education and

¹Ibid., pp. 17-18.
immigrant aid. There is no doubt that the expansion of communal activities, by the BdeHI, accelerated intra-group communications and enhanced communal cohesion. As to the manifest and latent functions of the agency, they remained unchanged but now there were more channels through which they could be carried out.

To summarize, we witness in this period the beginning of two major developments in the history of communal social welfare in Montreal:

a) The emergence of a secular social welfare agency which was not under the control of a religious institution

b) The rise to leadership status in the Jewish community of the Baron de Hirsch Institute.

These developments will be seen to crucially shape the character of the community organization in the years to come.

The Baron de Hirsch Institute's status of leadership was based on three pillars:

a) The BdeHI was a veteran institute in the community from which many new agencies have sprouted. In the course of the years, programs which were initiated by the BdeHI (such as school for poor children, immigrant aid, recreation and health care) grew to a point where it was necessary to separate their activities and create new independent communal agencies.
b) The BdeHI was led, and financially supported, by the wealthiest members of the community.

c) The BdeHI played, in 1916, a leading role in the foundation of the Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of Montreal.

The "Expansion Years" (1916-1946)

This period began with a very important event—the foundation of the first Jewish welfare federation in Montreal. The BdeHI, as initiator and co-founder of the federation, continued to occupy a leadership position. This leadership role was manifested by the fact that leaders of the Baron de Hirsch Institute were influential members of the federation Board and committees.

The most important developments in this period, following the establishment of the federation, were as follows:

a) In this period social workers joined the staff of BdeHI. It was a new era in the agency. Social workers, with their distinct professional identity, philosophy and perceptions would profoundly change the character of the agency in the years to come. The full impact of their contribution would be felt mainly after 1947. (We shall discuss the impact of professional social workers in chapter 8.)

1For details see chapter 6.
b) The advent of social workers in the agency led to the establishment of a Family Welfare Department. This was because the professionally trained social workers appreciated the need and significance of counselling on individual and family problems in addition to the distribution of relief payments and aid in kind. Individual and family counselling were offered before by nonprofessional volunteers. But the establishment of a Family Welfare Department marks the beginning of a shift from material aid to counselling services in addition to material aid. This trend will grow stronger in the next period, beginning in 1947. As a matter of fact, this is the first major change in the nature of services and structure of the BdeHI. This department, in a fairly short time, became the primary service department of the agency. By this BdeHI embarked on the way of growing specialization. The advent of social workers and the expansion of services created new avenues for the accomplishment of both manifest and latent functions. This was associated with the gradual emergence of a new type of clients, those who sought non-material aid, mainly from the middle class. The result was that the intra-group communications expanded. The social workers added new dimension to the function of communicating cultural symbols, recognitions, and commitments.

c) The rise of social workers in the agency brought a growing emphasis on the method and process of social casework in the treatment of families and individuals. This development had a profound influence on the work of the agency because it differed very much from traditional ways of assistance. It differed in the approach to the client since, for the first time, a scientific method of social work was introduced. By scientific method we mean: a) that caseworkers and other professional social workers have received training in special college programs; and b) that certain diagnostic rules and practical methods are used.

It also had a substantial impact on the volunteer's role in the agency. Since the use of a social casework method necessitated the skill of professionally trained social workers, the volunteers, who performed their work along traditional lines, were inevitably pushed aside from their positions in the agency. The result of this development was that the volunteers had to concentrate more on leadership posts, fund-raising and policymaking.

d) In 1940 the BdeHI applied, for the first time, for public funds based on the Quebec Public Charities Act,

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1 According to the Encyclopedia of Social Work, 16th issue, vol. 11 (1971), pp. 1237-1239, "Social Casework" is an approach—employed by social workers—in which emphasis is put on the problems of the individual. This approach concentrates on thorough investigation of each case, while efforts are made to improve the adjustment of the individual to his social environment.
1921 (QPCA). As the advent of social workers in the agency, this, too, marks a turning point. It was a break in the Jewish social welfare tradition of total self-reliance caused, mainly, by the growing war years' needs (mostly for overseas relief programs). We shall see (in chapters 8 and 9) that the rise in the influence of the social workers and the growth of public funding for the agency are closely related.

The "Professional Years" (1947-1970).

The period began with the appointment in 1947, for the first time, of a professional social worker as the Executive Director of the agency. This was Mr. David Weiss, a graduate of the School of Social Work, Columbia University. The appointment of a professional Executive Director, together with socioeconomic changes in the Jewish community during this period, substantially influenced the structure and programs of the agency. No doubt Bissett and Zeilinger are right in naming these years as the "Professional Years." In those years the academically qualified professional social workers became an influential body within the agency.

One should also remember that after World War II the agency was confronted with huge demands for refugee assistance. The growing demands on the agency and the hiring of social workers considerably expanded the activities
of the Baron de Hirsch Institute as reflected in budget and programs. The most striking fact we can learn from Table 3 is that the budget per capita in the Jewish community grew from $2.10 in 1940 to $5.51 in 1960.

The major programs and developments in this period were:

1) The Refugee Youth Project, the resettling of 1116 war orphans, in cooperation with the Jewish Child Welfare Bureau and the Canadian Jewish Congress, during the years 1947-1950.

2) The merger of the Baron de Hirsch Institute and Child Welfare Bureau in 1950 under one Board, with one budget, after three years of close cooperation between the two during the Refugee Youth Project. The unified agency was named the "Baron de Hirsch Institute and Jewish Child Welfare Bureau."

3) The transference in 1960 of social assistance cases (relief payments) from the Baron de Hirsch Institute (as from other social welfare agencies in the city) to the Montreal Municipal Welfare Department. This transfer, which was strongly supported by the social workers, released the agency from the traditional relief work.

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1See Table 3 at the end of this section for details on structure and budgets in the years 1920, 1940, 1960 and 1973. The table is based on annual reports of BdeHi.


3For details see chapter 8.
thereby enabling it to turn the major part of its energies to the treatment of social and personal problems.¹

4) Important changes in the focus of the agency activities and in the character of its clients during this period. The transfer of relief payments to the Municipal Welfare Department is only one manifestation of the process of changes which characterized the agency during these years. Gradually the agency moved from mainly dealing with the material needs of the community indigents to the nonmaterial social and psychological needs of the middle class members of the community. The Family Service Department shifted the focus of its activity toward these new services, largely those of marital and individual counselling.

5) Growing reliance on public funding through grants based on Quebec Public Charities Act, 1921.²

Some questions arise with regard to these changes. Why was there a growing demand for nonmaterial services? What changes took place in the community, and in the agency, which produced this shift? Were the nonmaterial needs new ones or rather ongoing needs which were now considered to be important? What were the results of these changes? The answers are related to four major developments:

¹Ibid. ²Ibid.
1) In the community the general rising standard of living after World War II and the rising affluence of the Jewish population reduced the demand for material assistance. The rising standard of living was reflected in the changes in the occupational structure of the Jewish population (such as the increase in the number of college educated professional people) and the movement from relatively poor areas in East Montreal to better residential areas in the suburbs of the West Island. The growing affluence of the Jewish population was also demonstrated by the growing demand for family services. Thus, nonmaterial problems (such as marital or parent-children relations), which always existed, surfaced. The expanding, and increasingly wealthy, middle class now could give preference to its nonmaterial needs. As a powerful constituency in the community, and as important participants in communal organizations, its members could demand, and receive, services which would cater to their needs.

2) In the agency the growing influence of the professional social workers also contributed very much to this shift. The academically-trained social workers, with their philosophy and the skills of social work, were reluctant to be engaged only in material aid and in the issuance

1Based on a taped interview with Mr. D. Weiss, April 25, 1977.
of relief payment cheques. They pushed in the direction of more counselling and psychological types of work. In this instance the interests of the middle class clients and the social workers matched and combined together to produce a major shift in the programs of the Baron de Hirsch Institute.

3) In the general social welfare arena the transfer of the relief payment cases from sectarian agencies to the Municipal Welfare Department released funds and manpower in the Jewish welfare organization. This transfer was very much supported by the social workers in the BdeHI (as in the non-Jewish agencies in the city). The resources released by the transfer were now utilized to reinforce the family counselling program and other non-material services.

4) In the federation the rising standard of living in the Jewish community, and the declining need, as it was perceived, for sheer philanthropic activity, led the leaders of the federation to gradually shift more funds into new areas. Aid to Israel, education and recreation constituted these new areas. This trend was already manifested in 1951 when the name of the federation was changed to "Federation of Jewish Community Services of Montreal." The omission of the term "philanthropies" from the previous name is meaningful. It denotes the

\[1\text{Ibid.}\]
the wish to shift the focus of the federation activity from sheer philanthropy to other areas. This trend would grow stronger and substantially influence the attitude of AJCS in the coming debate around Bill 65.

To summarize, this is a period of important changes in laymen-professionals' relations, funding resources, programs, and clientele. The agency became more professionalized and specialized, more of a counselling agency than charity society, and more middle-class oriented. In the view of lay leaders and professional executives it was a period of great success. It may be so, in some respects, but it also seems that, at the same time, the concern for some needy groups (such as the aged) subsided.

The period is also characterized by debates between lay leaders and professional social workers, mainly about shifts in programs and goals. The outstanding one was about the shift from income maintenance to nonmaterial aid which was reflected in the debate about the transfer of relief payment to the city.
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The Status of the Baron de Hirsch Institute Within the Federation

Since its foundation, the Baron de Hirsch Institute occupied a central position in the community and in the federation. The factors which contributed to this special position of the BdeHI may be summed up as follows:

1) The Baron de Hirsch Institute was the oldest social welfare and communal organization in Jewish Montreal.

2) The Baron de Hirsch Institute was the initiator and co-founder of the federation (in 1916).

3) For many years the institute shared a very large portion of the budget allocations of the federation. Table 1 (in chapter 6) shows that allocations for individual welfare services ranged between 42 percent in 1924 to 20 percent in 1973. Until 1965 the allocations for welfare services were no less than one third of the total budget allocations of the federation.

4) The Baron de Hirsch Institute was not only the co-founder of the federation, but actually the major force behind its establishment. In the course of the years some departments or services in the institution grew to a point of separation from the institution and became independent constituent agencies of the federation. In this way new agencies sprouted from the mother organization. This holds true for such agencies as Camp Wooden
Acres, Herzl Health Clinic, Canadian Jewish Congress, Jewish Vocational Services and the Jewish Public Library.¹

The Baron de Hirsch Institute enjoyed a very high degree of prestige within the community. Any thought about the possibility of phasing out as an independent communal organization very much worried the leaders of the institute. For them, an attack on the Baron de Hirsch Institute was perceived as an attack on the very existence of the whole structure of Jewish communal organization.

However, the leaders of the BdeHI, knowingly or unknowingly, overlooked an important change in the position of their agency within the AJCS. During the years, in a process of centralization and consolidation, the federation grew stronger, vis-à-vis the member agencies. This process was accelerated by converting the federation, in 1965, into a more centralized organization named Allied Jewish Community Services. Since AJCS controlled fund-raising, planning and budgeting, they had the real power. The result was that the BdeHI gradually moved from a special and central position within the federation, in the early days, to a more peripheral position in the late 1960s. This development was further influenced by the rising affluency of the community which caused a good many communal leaders to think that social

¹The Baron de Hirsch Institute, Centennial Book (Montreal, 1963).
welfare needs were then less pressing than those relating to Jewish culture and education. The translation into budget allocations of these views can be learned from Table 1 in the previous chapter. The leaders of the BdeHI, if they realized this situation, refused to admit it, at least publicly.

It should be noted, also, that paradoxically the erosion in the status of the BdeHI occurred notwithstanding the rise in the professional performance of the agency, which was recognized by all. This high professional standard would be a major argument of the opponents to the merging into the Quebec public welfare system. However, the strength of AJCS and the new priorities of the community would be valuable assets in the hands of those who supported joining the public system.

In the next chapter we shall examine more closely the impact of the professional social workers in the agency.
CHAPTER 8

PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL WORKERS AND JEWISH COMMUNAL WELFARE IN MONTREAL

At the beginning of this century the dominant type of welfare organization in North America was the private welfare agency. In most cases charitable endeavors had a sectarian background. The ethnic and religious diversity of North American society compelled each ethnic and religious group to organize its own welfare activities. During the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth century, albeit to a lesser degree, private organizations bore much of the burden of support of the poor. This was the arena where voluntarism developed as most significant. Unpaid laymen, belonging to the middle and upper economic classes, equipped with the desire to do good and with a compelling urge to impose their value system, mobilized important philanthropic resources. The volunteers were the lay leaders of the charity organizations, the fund raisers and the friendly visitors to the homes of the poor.

In the twentieth century, rapid urbanization and industrialization intensified the problems of social tension and economic deprivation. Problems such as low income,
sickness, unemployment and mental and physical inability mushroomed so that the private welfare agencies could not cope with them alone. The magnitude of the tasks seemed to call for more efficient organization, more highly developed technical skill, and greater monetary support by governments.

Social welfare needs, of course, had existed before. But industrialization and urbanization in the twentieth century intensified them. However, this was not the only reason for the expansion of social welfare services and the growing request that government assume more responsibility in the legislation and financing of social welfare. Another important factor was rising expectations of the public for more government involvement in initiating, planning and financing programs in all facets of life, such as social welfare, health, education and recreation. These expectations were motivated and reinforced by three main factors:

1) The rising standard of living which enabled government to draw more taxes to finance welfare programs

2) The growing process of democratization in a free society which led people to make more demands on government and caused the latter to be more responsive to these demands

3) The growing moral expectations of the public as a result of the exposure of the bad treatment of the poor by private agencies and institutions.
This, very briefly, is the background of two major developments in the organization and delivery of social services since the beginning of this century:

1) The emergence of the profession of social work
2) The growing involvement of government, through social legislation and financing in social welfare services.

The emergence of a professional corps of social workers, the decline in the role of volunteers, the bureaucratization of the social welfare agencies and the public financial support thoroughly changed the character of the private charity societies. In this chapter we shall concentrate on the rise of professionalism in the social welfare arena and its impact on Jewish communal welfare. First, we have to clarify the meaning of social work and the role of the social worker.

**Social Work and Social Worker**

The International Encyclopedia of The Social Sciences describes "social work" and "social worker" as follows:

The objectives of social work are to help individuals, families, communities and groups of persons who are socially disadvantaged and to contribute to the creation of conditions that will enhance social functioning and prevent breakdown. These objectives commit the social work profession both to helping persons adapt socially in keeping with their capacities and the norms and value of the society, and in modifying or reforming features of the social system. The term "social worker" refers to a special group among those employed in rendering social welfare services or conducting programs of agencies and institutions that make up the social welfare system. The professional social worker is expected, because
of his specialized training and experience, to bring a high degree of skill to the process of helping.¹

Social work emerged as a profession during the first half of this century under the impact of the following developments:

1) The differentiation of the occupation of the paid social worker (mainly the social case worker) from other occupations of social welfare.

2) The development of a special scientific discipline of social work, promoted and taught in schools of social work.

3) The rapid development of some related scientific disciplines, such as psychology, sociology and business administration.

4) The growing specialization and bureaucratization of social welfare agencies, which necessitated highly trained skilled experts.

5) The rise of professional associations which promoted group awareness, promulgated codes of ethics, laid down standards and encouraged publication.²

Roy Lubove speaks about this professional subculture of the social workers.³ He claims that there are three main features to this subculture:

1) Special basic skill
2) Group identity
3) Schools of social work and professional associations.


He further writes:

The professionalization of social work was associated not only with the quest for a differentiating skill, but also with the establishment of a subculture or community whose members shared a group identity and values which were maintained and perpetuated by institutional agencies of control such as associations and schools.

The process of creating group identity was reinforced by the efforts to formulate values and norms. Talcott Parsons lists four cultural ideals to which the values of social workers' subculture conform. They are: rationality, universalism, disinterestedness and specificity of function.

"Rationalism" is manifested by the persistent efforts of caseworkers to establish a scientific knowledge base and methodology and to limit the area of intuition, moralism and empiric insight.

"Universalism" demands an effective neutrality, and obliges the professional to provide skilled services to the maximum of his ability despite any personal reaction to the client.

"Disinterestedness" implies a desire to serve at all times irrespective of monetary or other personal considerations. The client's interests should supersede those of the professional.

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1Ibid., p. 118.

"Functional Specificity" implies a high level of expertise in a circumscribed area. It is essential to the professional-client relationship because it legitimizes the professional's special authority.

Lubove points out that, with the appearance and spread of the professional social worker, the differentiation between professionals and volunteers inevitably emerged. The professionals claimed primacy because of their skill, experience and technical know-how. The volunteers pointed to their deep feelings, spontaneity, zeal and devotion. Because professional social work was more compatible with the needs and ideas of the times, the social workers came to have the upper hand in this dispute. This was because they were academically trained professionals and as such could carry out social work according to the new psychological approach of social casework and the principles of business administration in social welfare management. After 1900 the status of volunteers gradually declined. They had to yield some of their authority and roles to the professionals. Private philanthropy did not cease, but professionalism radically altered its nature. The professionals changed the nature of private philanthropy by encouraging volunteers to be active mainly in fund-raising and in Board membership roles, and by replacing them in the day-to-day administration and field work of the agency.
Professional Social Workers in the Montreal Jewish Communal Welfare

For generations the full burden of the welfare work, namely, the raising of funds and the distribution of aid to needy people, was carried by the volunteer laymen, who belonged to the economic middle and upper classes of the Jewish community. But the emergence of the profession of social work and the growing needs of the expanding community after World War I gradually brought changes in this traditional scene. The BdeHI had to engage paid persons to carry out some services.

The beginnings were very modest. The first two social workers (they were actually called supervisors) were hired in 1919 and 1924. They were not graduates of a school of social work. At that time very few practitioners were academically qualified. These social workers were entrusted with direct relief payments, which were then the major service rendered by the agency. Until that time relief payments were handled by the volunteers who had also raised the money for that purpose. The dealing of clients with social workers, instead of with the donors themselves, was considered to be more conducive to the self-esteem of the beneficiaries.

Before we proceed we need to take note of the permanent and changing variables which have a bearing upon this issue.

The permanent variables are:

1) The Board and Committees of the agency are composed of volunteer laymen who have a strong personal involvement in the philosophy and practice of the agency.

2) The decisions with regard to policies and the allocations of money needed for their implementation are in the hands of the lay leaders.

3) The professional social workers are employees.

4) The professionals are torn between their distinct professional identity, philosophy and perception on the one hand and the need of loyalty and survival as employees on the other hand.

The changing variables are:

1) Developments within the profession of social work.

2) The philosophies and attitudes of the professionals.

3) The scope of government legislation and financing of social welfare services.

4) The perception of social needs in the community.

5) The funds allocated by the community for social welfare purposes.

With these in mind we can focus on some highlights of the professional social workers' impact on the BdeH.

Between the two World Wars the process of absorbing professional social workers in the agency was very slow.
The first professional social worker, a graduate of a school of social work, was engaged in the early 1930s as supervisor. During the years 1920-1945 family welfare increasingly became the focus for the BdeHI. The methods and processes of social casework\(^1\) were introduced in treating families and individuals. This new approach was the contribution of the few professional social workers employed by the agency. According to Bisett and Zeilinger, in 1947 there were five professional social workers employed by BdeHI out of a total of twenty-five people on the staff.

A crucial change in the needs and demands laid upon the Jewish community in Montreal took place as World War II ended. The Canadian Jewish Congress organized the United Jewish Refugee and War Relief Agencies to realize rescue programs. They called for the mobilization of all the resources of the BdeHI, both its lay leaders and its professional workers. The Family Welfare Department began to shift towards treatment and rehabilitative services to thousands of refugees who began to arrive. The BdeHI, together with other communal organizations such as the Canadian Jewish Congress and the Jewish Immigrant Aid Society, carried the burden of helping and rehabilitating the new immigrants. It became clear to the leaders of the agency that there was a need for a professional director and more specialists to cope with the growing demands.

\(^1\)See chapter 7, Table 3.
In 1947 a trained Executive Director was appointed. With this appointment a new period in the life of the BdeHI began, the period of professionalism. The impact of professional social workers—under the leadership of the new Executive Director—was gradually increasing. The knowledge, philosophy and skill of the professionals—backed by the ongoing developments in the theory and practice of social work—shaped, to a great extent, the structure and the programs of the agency. The academically trained social workers introduced to the agency new social welfare management methods based on modern administration theory. They also pushed for greater emphasis on individual and family counselling in nonmaterial cases instead of concentrating on relief payments. These new approaches resulted in the addition of new services (such as a family counselling department) and gradual change in the role of the institution from mainly a material aid agency to a predominantly counselling agency.

The professional social workers gradually replaced volunteers in administration and field work. In doing this they had, of course, to convince the volunteer lay leaders about the desirability and feasibility of their ideas and suggestions. Some division of views and, sometimes, tensions were inevitable.

It goes without saying that all agreed upon the general goal of the agency, namely to aid the needy in the Jewish community. But sometimes they differed on the more
specific question: who are the needy? While the lay leaders put the emphasis on the traditional material aid to economically deprived people, the professional social workers argued that the agency should mainly serve individuals and families who need nonmaterial or psychological counselling.

On the one hand, there were the lay leaders, people of the economic middle and upper classes of Jewish Montreal, who had operated the agency for many years with outstanding dedication. They were the people who made the policy decisions and allocated the necessary funds. On the other hand, there were the professional social welfare people, a group of trained specialists, equipped with expertise; inbred with sophisticated modern ideas and full of self-confidence. But they were employees and they had to function as such.

Generally, it may be said that the laymen were more conservative in their perception of the methods of administering the agency, while the professionals were pushing for changes and innovations. The lay leaders were inclined, as traditionally was the case in the past, to engage the agency mainly in relief maintenance. The social workers pushed for an expansion and diversification of the agency and the clientele by adding new services such as family counselling.

Mr. M. Yarosky, who was the Director General of the Jewish Family Services - Social Service Centre during the years 1974-1977, explained the social workers' approach as follows:
Staff members more and more enjoy doing psychotherapy. It is much more interesting to provide marriage counselling to middle class families in Cote St. Luc. There are social workers who prefer dealing with middle class problems, which are in their view much more "professional," than to deal with the old lady who does not know where to live, who does not have any money. In the late sixties and early seventies it was very much the thrust to reach the middle class.

From time to time tensions developed between the lay leaders and the professional social workers. These tensions emanated from differences in the roles of the two parties, the social background, the economic status and the welfare concepts of the two groups.

At this time it may be appropriate to note some significant developments which may show the impact of professionalism on Jewish communal welfare. In 1947 the BneHI encountered its first major challenge of the postwar years. This was the War Orphans Project carried out during the years 1947-1952. During these years 1166 youngsters, survivors of the European Holocaust, were brought to Canada through Montreal. This project utilized the services of the Canadian Jewish Congress, the Baron de Hirsch Institute, and the Jewish Child Welfare Bureau. The professional responsibility was laid upon the two latter agencies. They had to muster all their collective resources of lay and professional people to carry the program out successfully.

At the outset of this project a debate evolved about the role, and even the proportion of professionals and laymen

1In a taped interview, dated March 24, 1977.
in the implementation of the project. The project was planned, sponsored and directed by volunteer laymen. But it was understood that a good deal of the work should be carried out by communal agencies and their professional staff. The discussions in the coordinating committee of the project were, in fact, symptomatic of the struggle for influence between the volunteers and the professional workers. Out of these discussions came a division of labour: volunteer leaders assumed responsibility for decision-making, for defining policies and fixing standards; workers, trained in schools of social work, or by the agencies themselves, were in charge of putting these policies and standards into effect.

The carrying out of the War Orphans Project exposed a typical tension between lay leaders and professional social workers. This tension concentrated around budget issues. On the one hand professional executives requested more staff and budget to enable adequate casework. On the other hand lay leaders expressed concern at the sizeable proportion of funds going towards salaries as compared with direct financial assistance to clients. In response, agency executives usually argued that every dollar spent in counselling service saved many more dollars in financial assistance. In most cases, the lay leaders would approve the requested budgets, a fact which testified to the growing influence of professional social workers within the agencies.
Altogether the war orphans project proved that volunteers, by themselves, could not professionally carry out a project of that magnitude without the help of trained social workers. Consequently, the War Orphans Project enhanced the status of the professional social workers in the social welfare agencies.\footnote{Ben Lappin, The Redeemed Children, The Story of The Rescue of War Orphans by The Jewish Community of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963).}

The first years of professional leadership in the BdeHI under the new Executive Director were characterized by changes in the practices of the agency. In 1947/48 much of the aid to the poor was in kind. In many cases people did not receive money but clothes donated by merchants, manufacturers and households. The professional social workers viewed this method as not conducive to the dignity of the recipients. The professional people thought that aid in kind, as compared to money, limited the freedom of choice of the recipients, exposed their dependency, and humiliated them. After a debate between professional workers and lay leaders it was decided to change this method and to move to more relief payments in cash. This change was accompanied by a further development: the growing use of government grants under the Quebec Public Charities Act (1921), largely thanks to the efforts of the professional social workers. Until 1933 no relief payments were allowed by this Act for needy people who were not inmates in institutions. Most of
the clients of the BdeHI could not benefit under this Act as they lived at home.

Only in 1933 was an amendment to the Act introduced which recognized social welfare agencies as "institutions without walls" and therefore eligible for QPCA grants. It took another seven years for BdeHI to invoke, in 1940, this Act for channeling government grants to the agency's clients. (The reason for this will be discussed in the next chapter.) These government funds increasingly became an important source of funding for the BdeHI. There were three reasons for the increase in government funding to the agency:

a) The efforts of the professional workers in establishing ties with government officials, and in administrating the necessary "red tape" procedures (especially after 1947 when David Weiss was appointed an Executive Director)
b) The growth of the Jewish population after World War II which enlarged the number of social welfare clients
c) The readiness of the government to increase its spending on social welfare needs.

One can observe the extent and growth of QPCA grants to the BdeHI from Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7 at the end of this chapter. It is obvious from these tables that a substantial percentage of the budget of the agency was financed by QPCA grants and that a high percentage of the agency's clients were the beneficiaries of these grants.

In 1957 it was argued by the professional people and some Board members that the agency should transfer
government payments for clients to the Welfare Department of the City of Montreal. After all, it was argued, the process of QPCA relief payments entailed too much clerical work in filling out forms, receiving the money and writing cheques. There was very little supervisory work or casework involved in this process. The professional social workers felt frustrated with this kind of work, being only middlemen in transferring money. The academically trained social workers, with knowledge, skill and philosophy, strove toward what they felt was more satisfactory professional work, such as family counselling, psychiatric treatment and the like. They further claimed that this was the only way for the agency to attract highly trained professional staff. They pressed for a major change in the practice of the agency; that is, no longer to be saddled with administering relief payments. Most of these cases, they said, should be transferred to City Hall which was ready to accept them. Budget and human resources, they claimed, should be shifted to such family services as marital and individual counselling.

It should be noted that in the 1940s and most of the 1950s the professional workers pressed for more government grants to finance relief payments. But toward the 1960s, with the growing influence of social workers and changing concepts about the goals of social work, namely, more psychological counselling and dealing with nonmaterial problems, it was the professional people themselves who
strongly recommended the transfer of relief payments to the Municipal Social Welfare Department. Thus, it was hoped, more QPCA grants could be released to finance other programs which were considered more compatible with their professional perception and the needs of the community.

But the majority of Board members objected to this change. They were very reluctant to relinquish old traditional practices. They were motivated by the inertia of habit and by the argument that such a change would cause hardship to the clients and unfavourable reaction in the community. They also feared that once one service of the BdeHI was transferred to a non-Jewish authority, it would mark the beginning of the loss of independence of Jewish communal services. We shall see in chapter 11 that considerations of this type were major motives behind the opposition of the BdeHI leaders in joining the Quebec public welfare system. The Board members' attitudes may be noted from the minutes of the Executive Committee of the BdeHI which discussed the idea of transferring to the Montreal City Welfare Department the duty of affecting relief payments directly to the needy.

On February 27, 1957 the four sectarian family agencies in Montreal were preparing a report dealing with the suggestion that the City Welfare Department would directly administer relief payments. The reaction of the Executive Committee of the BdeHI was as follows:
The Executive Committee strongly recommend that the agency disassociate itself from any consideration of this hypothesis which might be misread to indicate our acceptance of such a development and which might spell danger in relation to complete provincial control in this field and the possible danger of religious control in a non-Jewish area.¹

This is a very telling reaction typical to the way of thinking of most lay leaders at that time.

David Weiss, the Executive Director of the agency at that time, said that the leaders were very apprehensive with regard to this issue and he added: "They were terrified by the thought of exposing their fellow-Jews to a non-Jewish service."²

The positive attitude of the professional people in favor of the recommended change was reinforced by the rise in the affluence of the Jewish community of Montreal and the changes in the social needs that followed this rise. There was a clear demand for family counselling and Jewish family education for members of the community who were not economically deprived.

There was also another motive, which was latent. This was the desire to free the agency from the image of an exclusively charity organization serving only the poor. Another reason was the expressed wish of the trained social workers to perform a more appropriate function. Eventually the point of view of the professional workers prevailed.

¹Minutes of the Executive Committee, the Baron de Hirsch Institute, February 27, 1957.

²In a taped interview, dated April 25, 1977.
The majority of the Board members were convinced that this change was essential to the development of the agency and that the interests of the Jewish welfare recipients would not be jeopardized by the transfer to City Hall. In 1960 the social assistance cases were, accordingly, transferred to the Welfare Department of the City of Montreal. This was clear proof of the social workers' growing influence in the agency.

The shift of emphasis from what had been mainly relief to family counselling, based on the casework approach, was finally symbolized by a change in the name of the agency. In March 1972 the Board decided to change the name to "Jewish Family Services of the Baron de Hirsch Institute" (from "the Baron de Hirsch Institute and Jewish Child Welfare Bureau").

In this debate one cannot dismiss the role of latent motives in shaping the attitudes of both parties. Behind the objective arguments raised by laymen and social workers, one should see the power struggle. Being aware of the latent function of the agency, both sides realized that shifting the focus of the agency work towards more professional services (such as counselling) would enhance the status of the social workers, but also would allow Board members the possibility of shifting money into other programs.

There is no doubt that the rise in the status of the professional social workers after World War II has caused

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1Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors, March 14, 1972.
the laymen to adjust their views and attitudes to new concepts expressed by the professional workers. In fact, both groups had to react and respond to changes in socioeconomic conditions and in social welfare philosophy.

The roles of each party in this system were, naturally, different, and therefore achieving consensus was not always a smooth and easy process. The degree of cooperation between laymen and professional workers was very much dependent on the degree of understanding and trust between the President and the Executive Director of the agency. In the view of the Executive Director of the BdeM during the years 1947-1970:

There was never full integration between professionals and leaders because of historical reasons. No professional was totally accepted unless he came from the elite and aristocratic families. Technically they needed our knowledge and expertise. But the layman is number one and the professional is really the butler.¹

About the impact of professional social workers on the role of the laymen within the agency, Weiss said the following:

I think that the rise of professionalism in the agency gave the volunteers more freedom for policy and decision making; made them more involved than they could be if they had to do all the work themselves. They could sit back and reflect on the value of the work. They began searching questions. They became more involved.²

We think that some of Weiss' assertions are debatable. His statements that the professional was really the

¹David Weiss, in a taped interview, dated April 25, 1977.
²Ibid.
butler and that the laymen gained more freedom for policy
and decision making, and became more involved, contradicts
the North American experience with regard to the power of
the Jewish community professional executives. In the view
of Neusner¹ the power of the Jewish community professionals
is growing considerably. This is because the increasing
complexity and specialization of modern communal service
means that the average layman cannot attain the same under-
standing of agency problems and needs as he formerly could.
Inevitably, then, he must place more reliance upon the know-
ledge and skill of the expert, namely the professional
executive. Neusner adds that "As the layman comes to rely
more heavily on the advice of the professional, the power
of the latter is extensively broadened and this applies in
particular to policy formation and planning."²

We don't think that the Montreal experience in
laymen-professionals' relationship is very much different
because communal welfare developments in Canada's Jewish
communities by and large followed the American pattern.
Therefore, we cannot accept Weiss' assertions on their face
value. No doubt there was a mutual influence between laymen
and professionals but it seems that during the years the
input of the professional social workers, in philosophy and
practice, grew larger.

¹Neusner, American Judaism, Adventure in Modernity,
²Ibid.
Mr. Stanley Abbey, President of the BdeHIF during the years 1972-1974, thinks that laymen and professional people "educated" each other in a way which benefited the agency. He expressed his view on this topic as follows:

There is a big difference between being a professional social worker and a lay person. Their goals are quite different. The professional's goal is self-satisfaction in a specific area of social work. The lay person has to look at the overall picture of his community. If social agency objectives lay in some areas, he must make sure that the agency does not just pick up one target area and emphasize all its energy on it, but satisfies, within its means, all the areas which are in the interest of the community. It is difficult, sometimes, because professionals very often don't want to take a given duty but prefer another. It is up to the lay people to influence and guide the professionals to understand the total community needs. In the same way the professionals have the obligation to explain some issues to the lay people; for example, that people who are not poor may need marital or psychological help. The professional person has to teach the lay person something. The lay person has to teach the professional. This is a kind of mutual influence.

In conclusion, it may be said that in most cases laymen and professional workers found a common language in the agency's affairs, but sometimes not without an uneasy adjustment and cohabitation. The differences in roles and social status were always there. But the lay person came to appreciate the social workers' contribution to the professional aspects of the agency, and the social workers learned to respect the leadership and dedication of the laymen.

By and large, the BdeHIF successfully absorbed the professional people with their social welfare concepts,

In a taped interview, dated March 12, 1977.
skill and drive for change and modernization as it expanded and developed into a modern, very professional and well-operated communal welfare organization.
TABLE 4
QPCA GRANTS TO THE BARON DE HIRSCH INSTITUTE
1940-1947

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<th>Year</th>
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<td>1945</td>
<td>$24,964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>$45,260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>$47,645</td>
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TABLE 5
QPCA GRANTS TO THE BARON DE HIRSCH INSTITUTE
1953-1959

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>$96,539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>$121,155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>$148,078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>$161,668</td>
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<td>$188,251</td>
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<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>$180,120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>$179,938</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Figures are taken from minutes of meetings of the Board of Directors, the Baron de Hirsch Institute, during the years 1940-1947.

TABLE 6
CORRELATION BETWEEN TOTAL RELIEF EXPENDITURES
AND QPCA INCOME FOR RELIEF CASES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage of QPCA Beneficiaries</td>
<td>Annual QPCA Income</td>
<td>Annual Relief Cost</td>
<td>QPCA Income Percentage of Annual Relief Cost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>$96,539</td>
<td>$149,132</td>
<td>65%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>$121,155</td>
<td>173,411</td>
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<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>$148,078</td>
<td>186,690</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>$161,668</td>
<td>198,440</td>
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<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>$188,251</td>
<td>263,839</td>
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<td>1958</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>$180,120</td>
<td>306,838</td>
<td>59</td>
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<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>$179,938</td>
<td>328,780</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Column A - Percentage of BdeHI relief cases who received QPCA grants

Column B - The total annual QPCA grants

Column C - The total annual cost for relief cases

Column D - Percentage of total annual QPCA grants of total annual relief cost

\(^1\)Ibid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>$61,340</td>
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<td>$107,404</td>
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<td>1967</td>
<td>$104,450</td>
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<td>1968</td>
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<td>1969</td>
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<td>1971</td>
<td>$191,800</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>$184,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>$186,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) Data taken from files in the JFS-BdeHI Archive.
CHAPTER 9

JEISH COMMUNAL WELFARE AND THE
PUBLIC WELFARE SYSTEM IN QUEBEC

In an historical perspective one may distinguish
four stages in the relationships between Jewish welfare and
public welfare in Quebec as reflected in the development of
the Baron de Hirsch Institute:

The years 1863-1939. This is the period between
the establishment of "Young Men's Hebrew Benevolent
Society" and the year when the BdeHI began to receive govern-
ment grants under QPCA. During this period the BdeHI was
exclusively a private sectarian agency with no public funds.

The years 1940-1959. In this period, the BdeHI,
still a private agency, was partially funded by the govern-
ment. It started with the beginning of partial public
funding in 1940 and ended with the decision of BdeHI to
transfer relief payments to the Social Welfare Department
of the City of Montreal. In this period the agency con-
centrated on material aid to needy individuals and families.

The years 1960-1973. This period came to an end
with the decision of the BdeHI to convert from a communal
into a public welfare agency under Bill 65 (1971). The
agency was still partially publicly funded but with growing
amounts (see Table 7, chapter 8). Contrary to the previous periods the focus of its activity shifted from material assistance to nonmaterial counselling utilizing the casework approach.

The years since 1974. The BdeHI became a fully publicly funded Jewish agency under Bill 65. It continued to concentrate on the casework approach.

We may now turn to a more detailed analysis of these four stages.

The First Stage: A Private Sectarian Agency (1863-1939)

When a small group of younger Jewish men convened in Montreal in the summer of 1863, to establish a benevolent society, they did it in the only way open to them at that time in the province of Quebec. They established the "Young Men's Hebrew Benevolent Society," (YMHBS), a private, sectarian charity organization whose purpose was to help the poor in the then small Jewish community. This was the only way they could act because at that time neither the government of Quebec, nor local governments, assumed any responsibility for social welfare.

Unlike the United States and the rest of largely English Canada, where the pattern of public aid stemmed from the Elizabethan Poor Law and its derivatives (which placed direct responsibility for the care of the needy on local
governments), Quebec, from its early days, applied the pattern of pre-revolutionary France. There, responsibility for hospitals and charitable institutions was left to the initiative of the Catholic church and the religious orders. The non-Catholic community also developed certain private, sectarian, welfare programs. This was the case in Quebec.

Because of this, education, health and welfare services in the province were organized along ethnic religious lines. There was no way to these services but through a sectarian organization.

The founders of the Young Men's Hebrew Benevolent Society had, of course, to adjust themselves to their environment. It was not a hard or painful adjustment, since sectarian organization was compatible with the long Jewish tradition of communal welfare. For these young, but well-to-do members of the community, it was clear that they should help their poor, underprivileged coreligionists. It was a religious precept, as well as a social obligation, an attitude acquired through education and reinforced by a feeling of Jewish solidarity.

The Young Men's Hebrew Benevolent Society was the beginning of a long tradition of Jewish communal welfare in Montreal. The basic features of communal welfare did not change for many years. These long-standing features of Jewish social welfare were, until 1974, as follows:
1) Welfare was communal and sectarian, serving only Jewish clients.

2) It was fully controlled and mainly financed by the organized Jewish community.

The leaders of the Baron de Hirsch Institute, the major welfare agency in the community, were very anxious to keep these features intact.

For years there was no threat from the government of Quebec to the principles of self-service, self-reliance, and self-control in Jewish social welfare. This, because there was no change in the government's policy toward private social welfare in Quebec until 1921. As we have seen, the first government involvement in private, sectarian charity took place in 1921, with the enactment of the Quebec Public Charities Act (QPCA). Basically it did not change the welfare picture in the province, which remained private and sectarian. The Jewish community initially did not utilize this Act because it was not, then, operating closed institutions.

But in 1933 changes in the Act took place. According to an amendment in QPCA, the government recognized some social welfare agencies as "institutions without walls." This enabled the granting of funds for "out-of-institution" activities. The social welfare agencies were requested to submit their applications for grants on behalf of their clients. The BdeHI refrained, for some seven years, from applying to
the government for the recognition of the Baron de Hirsch
Institute as an "institution without walls" under the QPCA. It seems that the leaders of the agency were reluctant to apply to the government for any financial aid lest it would open the door to government control and this might be the first step toward the Jewish agency losing its independence. For many years Jewish communal welfare, as any other Jewish communal service, was self-reliant and self-governing. There was a fear that government grants might pave the way for public control of Jewish communal welfare. The ambition to preserve self-reliance and self-control was stronger than financial considerations.

The Second Stage: A Partially Publicly Funded Private Agency (1940-1959)

Increasing needs during and after World War II, led to a change in the agency's attitude. In 1940, for the first time, the agency applied for public grants under the QPCA. The grants were not accompanied by any degree of public supervision. The only condition was that of proving the eligibility of the applicant for a grant.

This is a milestone in the relations between Jewish communal welfare and the government of Quebec. Since then we witness an almost continuous rise in QPCA funds to the BdeHII, as shown in Tables 4, 5, 6, and 7 in the previous chapter.

The growing government grants to BdeH reflect not only the increasing needs of a better organized agency, but also a change in the attitude of the leaders toward public financing. More and more often views were heard in favour of accepting government funds for Jewish welfare. The main argument was that the Jewish community, as a taxpayer group, was entitled to its share of the public budget for social welfare. This conviction, together with the fact that the government did not really intervene in the management of the agency, helped to overcome the old, traditional fear of government involvement. The Jewishness and independence of the agency were not endangered, and this is what counted. The early reluctance to apply for public funds gradually turned to an open readiness. This readiness was conditioned only by one reservation: no government control. So, in the course of the years, QPCA grants became a substantial part of the BdeH's budget as we may see in Table 6 (chapter 8). This table shows that during 1953-1959 QPCA participation in financing the relief costs of the BdeH moved from 55 percent to 81 percent.

However, the hidden fear of shrinking functions of the Jewish welfare agency, due to the expansion of the public welfare system, was still there. As described in the previous chapter, a committee of sectarian social agencies in Montreal, Catholic, Protestant and Jewish, was established in 1957 to study the possibility of transferring government
relief payments from the agencies to the Department of Social Welfare at City Hall. The members of the Board and Executive Committee of the BdeHl were, initially, against this change. They were worried both about losing control to a non-Jewish welfare agency and about the embarrassment that might be caused to the Jewish client dealing with non-Jewish officials at the City Welfare Department. Mr. Michael Berger, a Past President of the BdeH, testified to that effect as follows:

In 1958 the BdeH received a letter from the government informing us that relief payments will be administered by the City of Montreal. At that time David Weiss [the Executive Director] was very happy because it enabled him to switch over to the psychiatric approach. But we were worried. We were worried about what the bearded Jew will experience when he comes to the City Hall. What would the Jew who could not speak French or English experience there? And we agonized over it for many, many months. And we made the change on an experimental basis.1

The eventual decision to accept this arrangement was very careful and reserved. It read as follows: "The agency should, on a moderate and gradual basis, transfer the QPCA cases, where there are no other services [to the recipient] indicated. This to be done under careful review and to report it back regularly to the Executive."2

Besides the genuine concern for Jewish welfare clients, there was probably another subtle and unexpressed reason for the initial reluctance to transfer that function

---

1 In a taped interview, dated May 18, 1977.

2 Minutes of a meeting of the Executive Committee of the BdeHl, January 19, 1960.
to "City Hall." It was rooted in the fear of change which might lead to erosion in the authority of the leaders and scope of activities of the agency. From the point of view of the professional social workers that change underscored their success in shifting the emphasis of the agency work from material to nonmaterial aid. Eventually that shift will be reflected in the increased number of social workers hired to carry out the individual and family counselling and in enlarged government funds to finance the services.

From the point of view of the laymen, one can discern a fear that the transfer of relief payments to "City Hall" would weaken a latent function of the agency. This is the function of being a power basis, in the community, for some laymen leaders. Any relinquishing of an authority by the agency could be considered as undermining that latent function. We believe that this consideration played a role in the internal debate, as it would in similar, even larger, debates in the future. Later experience showed, however, that this arrangement did not harm the interests of the Jewish clients nor the status of the agency.

The Third Stage: A Partially Publicly Funded Private Agency, Focused on Casework (1960-1973)

In this period the government continued to fund the Baron de Hirsch Institute, as may be seen in Table 7 (chapter 8). But the focus of the activity of the agency gradually
shifted from individual and family assistance to individual and family counselling based on the casework approach.

Besides the government funding of social welfare agencies, through the QPCA, one can trace no other direct involvement on the part of the government of Quebec in the work of the private social welfare agencies until the early 1970s.\(^1\) As we have seen, the beginning of the new era of social welfare thinking in Quebec was delayed until the early 1960s. Only with the death of Premier Maurice Duplessis, in 1959, and the advent of Lesage's Liberal party, did things begin to change in Quebec in many spheres of life. The new directions and expectations in Quebec's welfare field, during the 1960s, are clearly reflected in The Report of the Study Committee on Public Assistance published in June 1963 (known as the "Boucher Report") and in the Reports of the Commission of Inquiry on Health and Social Welfare between 1967-71 (known as the Castonguay Reports).\(^2\)

In the late 1960s Quebec's welfare revolution was in full stride. It was clear that changes would have to be made by every nongovernmental institution and agency, regardless of previous patterns of operations in order to

\(^1\)But there was a considerable expansion of public welfare programs in a number of other relevant areas such as public pensions, private pensions, and government aid for nursing homes, education, handicapped, hospital construction, and low cost housing.

\(^2\)For details, see chapter 3.
A JEWISH COMMUNAL WELFARE INSTITUTION

IN A CHANGING SOCIETY

MONTREAL: 1920-1980

Yogevo Tzuk

A Thesis
in
The Department
of
Religion

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at
Concordia University
Montreal, Quebec, Canada

February, 1981

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ABSTRACT

A JEWISH COMMUNAL WELFARE INSTITUTION IN
A CHANGING SOCIETY, MONTREAL: 1920-1980

Yogevo Tzuk, Ph.D.
Concordia University, 1981

This is a study of an ethnic institution—the Baron de Hirsch Institute of Montreal—during the years 1920-1980. This institution is a communal, social welfare agency, part of the organized Jewish community.

The study is concerned with the changes the Baron de Hirsch Institute went through under the impact of developments inside and outside the Jewish community of Montreal. These developments included the growing involvement of the government in the social welfare arena; the emergence of social welfare as an academic discipline and of social work as a profession; the rise of Quebec nationalism; the changes in the socioeconomic conditions of the Jewish population in Montreal; and the shifts in the Jewish community priorities along the years.

The major issue investigated in the study is if and how the Baron de Hirsch Institute continued to carry
out its functions as a Jewish ethnic institution through
the changes it has been subjected to. Or, in other words,
how it accommodated to changes inside and outside the
Jewish community by changing its roles, goals, programs,
methods, structure and financial resources. The argument
of this thesis is that during sixty years the communal
agency changed with regard to all those aspects but always
maintained its functions as an ethnic social welfare in-
stitute. Basically these functions are to render social
welfare services to members of the Jewish community in
Montreal and to foster communication and cohesiveness within
this community.

By describing the various phases in the history of
the Baron de Hirsch Institute and analyzing the changes
within and outside the agency, the study shows the persis-
tence of these functions. The institute always remained a
vehicle for providing social welfare services to the Jewish
community, helping the needy, though the definition of this
term changed over time. It also persisted as a symbol of
Jewish charity, attracting volunteers and donations, and as
a vehicle by means of which people could gain social recog-
nition in exchange for their services and contributions.

After examining the development of the Baron de
Hirsch Institute from a small communal agency in the 1920's
to a large public establishment, fully financed by the
government, in the late 1970's, the study concludes that the
Jewish Family Services - Social Service Centre, in 1980, still functions as an ethnic institution.

Structurally the thesis has four parts. The first part includes the introduction and theoretical background. The second examines modern social welfare in general, Jewish modern social welfare and Jewish communal organization in Montreal. Part three concentrates on historical perspectives of the Baron de Hirsch Institute. Part four concludes the study.
PREFACE

This is a study of a Jewish communal welfare institution in Montreal, facing changes within the community and in the surrounding society since World War I. Prominent among these changes are the socioeconomic conditions of the Jewish community, the development of social work as a theory and practice, the rise of modern social welfare concepts and policies, the growing involvement of government in the social welfare arena and the sociopolitical reforms in Quebec within the last twenty years.

The activities of any organized Jewish community—as demonstrated by its institutions and associations—are multi-faceted. Much attention has been given in recent years to the political aspects of a Jewish communal organization. Little light, however, was shed on other aspects of communal activities such as education and social welfare.

In this study we concentrate on social welfare, an area which has always ranked high in Jewish communal life. Social welfare, in general, went through many changes in this century, a trend which particularly manifested itself in Quebec since the early 1960s. It was inevitable that these changes would markedly influence Jewish communal welfare in Montreal. We think that in studying this area we have
exposed and explored an important facet of communal life and a central aspect of relationships between the Jewish community of Montreal and the government of Quebec.

In choosing the topic and finding resources for this study, I was helped very much by Mr. Ronald Pinegold, Reference Librarian in the Jewish Public Library, Montreal, to whom I express my many thanks.

With particular appreciation I acknowledge my deep indebtedness to my supervisor, Prof. Fredrick Bird, and to my advisor, Prof. Jack Lightman, from the Department of Religion, Concordia University, Montreal. With patience and enlightenment they have guided me along the complex route of researching and writing. The completion of this study would have been impossible without their enriching advice and ideas.

Acknowledgments are also made to Prof. Charles Davis, the chairman of the PhD program in the Department of Religion, for his kind interest in the progress of this study and to Mr. David Rome, National Archivist of the Canadian Jewish Congress, Montreal, for his valuable comments on the historical background. Thanks are due to many people—laymen leaders and professional communal workers—in the Jewish community of Montreal, who have granted me very interesting and informative interviews. The list of the interviewees appears in Appendix C.
I owe special thanks to the Board of the Baron de Hirsch Institute, and its staff, for permission to canvass their archive and the help rendered through my research.

And last, but not least, I am especially grateful to Mrs. Carol Robertson who has typed this thesis with a high degree of professional knowledge and meticulous care.

Y. Tzuk

Ville St. Laurent, Quebec, December 1980
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<th></th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<td>AJCS</td>
<td>Allied Jewish Community Services</td>
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<td>BdeHI</td>
<td>Baron de Hirsch Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>CJC</td>
<td>Canadian Jewish Congress</td>
</tr>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>JFS-BdeHI</td>
<td>Jewish Family Services - Baron de Hirsch Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>JFS-SCC</td>
<td>Jewish Family Services - Social Service Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>MSA</td>
<td>Ministry of Social Affairs (Quebec)</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>QPCA</td>
<td>Quebec Public Charities Act (1921)</td>
</tr>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>SSC</td>
<td>Social Service Centre</td>
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<td>9.</td>
<td>YMHBS</td>
<td>Young Men's Hebrew Benevolent Society</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Issue

This is a study of an ethnic institution—the Baron de Hirsch Institute of Montreal (BdHI)—during the years 1920-1980. This institution is a communal, social welfare agency, part of the organized Jewish community.

We are concerned with the changes this communal institution went through under the impact of developments inside and outside the Jewish community of Montreal. These developments included the growing involvement of government in the social welfare arena; the emergence of social welfare as an academic discipline and of social work as a profession; the rise of Quebec nationalism; the changes in the socioeconomic conditions of the Jewish population in Montreal and the shifts in the Jewish community priorities along the years.

In a preliminary way let us state that the Baron de Hirsch Institute as an ethnic institution has had certain specific objectives and functions. Basically there are two functions of BdHI. The first is unique to this institution; the second is shared by all ethnic institutions.
1) To deliver social welfare services to the Jewish community of Montreal

2) To foster communal ethnic identification and cohesion by facilitating in communications within the ethnic population.

The first function is achieved by various actions and programs. The second is attained through the communications which the activity of the ethnic institution creates. These communications result in:¹

1) The transmission of cultural symbols
2) The preservation of social ties and secondary relations
3) The creation of internal leadership.

The issue we are going to investigate in this study is if, and how, the BdeHI continued to carry out its functions as a Jewish ethnic institution through the changes it has been subjected to; or, in other words, how did it accommodate to changes inside and outside the Jewish community by changing its rôles, goals, programs, methods, structure and financial resources.

We shall focus on a single welfare institution—the Baron de Hirsch Institute—because it has been the oldest, and the most prominent Jewish communal welfare institution in Montreal. While focusing on this institution we will notice a number of changes which reflect the changing

¹Fredrick B. Bird, "Ethnic Group Institutions and Intra-group Communications" (Unpublished paper, Concordia University, Montreal, 1979).
character of social welfare within Jewish communities in this century.

We shall, mainly, examine the following changes:

1) The decline in the centrality of "welfare work" narrowly conceived as material assistance or casework counselling and the shift towards a broader definition of "welfare" activities which include recreational, cultural and educational services.

2) The increasing importance of the welfare federation as an overall organization in the Jewish community which is secular and able to represent many agencies and concerns. These agencies cover a broad range of activities, including the recreational, cultural and educational services.

3) The increasing importance of professional social workers and their contribution towards the shift in emphasis from material assistance to casework services.

4) The increasing government involvement and the shift of its funding from, first, mere material aid towards casework services and other "welfare" activities broadly defined.

We will also note the resistance to each of these changes; resistance by laymen or professionals or both. Sometimes this resistance was overt and organized, and at other times it was almost unnoticed. Over the years these changes were markedly reflected in the BdeHI, but in
retrospective all of them seemed for the better. They were accepted and recognized as helping the institution to fulfill its goals and objectives, namely its functions as an ethnic institution. With this regard we shall examine if these functions really remained the same all through the years. During a period of sixty years the agency drastically changed its programs, staff, methods, clients and funding sources (and even its name three times). Were functions also changed? We maintain they were not.

We shall see that at least in three ways there was persistence with regard to the institution, notwithstanding the many changes. This persistence relates to the functions of the institutions. The persistence of these functions is the most important and interesting phenomenon in contemporary Jewish social welfare.

The persisting functions were:

1) The institution always remained a vehicle for providing social welfare services to the Jewish community, helping the needy (even though the definition of "needy" changed over time). This is a manifest function.

2) The institution persisted as a symbol of Jewish charity, attracting volunteers and donations.

3) The institution persisted as a vehicle by means of which people could gain social recognition and prestige in exchange for their services and contributions. The
last two objectives are latent ones. (The differences between manifest and latent functions will be analyzed in chapter 2.)

We shall also see that the institution was able to perpetuate these important functions because it was able to perpetuate its "Jewishness." The ways by which it was achieved will be discussed later.

The argument of this thesis is that during sixty years the Baron de Hirsch Institute changed its roles, methods, programs, clientele, staff, financial resources, structure and names, but always maintained its functions as an ethnic social welfare institution.

To the best of our knowledge there is no academic study that has dealt with these issues.

**The Quebec Background**

Nowhere in North America has a Jewish community been confronted with social and political changes like those facing the Jewish community of Montreal in the province of Quebec. The very fact that this community of some 110,000 Jews is located in the heart of Canada's French-speaking province gave it, from the outset, a special unique quality. For many years this uniqueness was blurred by political, social and economic factors. From the very beginning of Jewish settlement in Quebec (starting with the British conquest in 1759) Jews identified themselves with, and were
considered part of the Anglophone sector of this province. This association with the English-speaking society of Quebec manifested itself in language, business ties, patterns of social life, educational participation (within the school system maintained by the Protestant School Board) and political preferences. Actually the Jews in Quebec emphasized, in many ways, that they were citizens of Canada, not merely residents of Quebec. As long as social and political patterns in Quebec remained relatively unchanged there were no particular challenges confronting the English-speaking groups in Quebec. The economic power was largely in the hands of the English establishment and the political power rested with their peers among the French elite. The Catholic Church exercised major authority in the supply of health, welfare, and education services for the French-speaking population. Other ethnic groups operated their own sectarian services.

The Jewish community, with its historical tradition of self-government in some fields of life, well fitted into this reality. It developed its own communal education, health and welfare services in Montreal. The Jewish community, as other sectarian groups, was until recently independent in the supply of these services with only a limited government intervention in the management of the services.

Substantial changes in the government of Quebec social welfare policy began in the 1960s. These changes
were associated with social and political developments in the province.

The Jewish community of Montreal, while being exposed to changes, as would be any other Jewish community in the U.S.A. and Canada, also experienced the effects of rising nationalism in Quebec. The spirit of self-awareness and cultural uniqueness of the French-speaking minority in Canada was always there. But it started to receive intensive political and social expressions in the early 1960s after the death of premier Maurice Duplessis and the rise to power of Jean Lesage's Liberal party. The thrust of this spirit was that the people of Quebec, through the government, should participate more actively in the shaping of their lives and future and in the enhancement of their cultural heritage. This idea was epitomized in the slogan "Maitre Chez Nous." One of the goals of this trend was to lessen the grip of sectarian organizations (mostly the Catholic Church) over education, health and welfare services and to make them public, universal services administered by government and citizens' boards on a regional basis. This sort of "Quiet Revolution" (revolution in comparison to the relatively conservative Quebec society until then) was accomplished in the field of education during the 1960s' reform of the education system. In the late 1960s the government decided to move with this policy to the realm of health and welfare. This trend culminated with the adoption.
in December 1971, of Bill 65 which nationalized health and welfare services.

It is obvious that the nationalistic trends added strains to those which would have, in any event, appeared in the process of adjustment to more professionalism and more government involvement in social welfare. The strains of a necessary adjustment had to be settled against the determined wish of the Jewish community to maintain its own communal welfare institution.

The issue for the Jewish community in Montreal was to decide between political and financial considerations which would favour more accommodation to government policies against considerations which would preferable preserving the independence of the communal social welfare services. Cooperation with the government could ensure almost full financing of Jewish social welfare and also positive political atmosphere in government-Jewish relations. But it could also erode the very foundations of communal services, namely its independence and its Jewishness.

The problems faced by the Baron de Hirsch Institute since 1971, created by the government of Quebec policy to nationalize health and social welfare services, were actually expressions of a much larger issue related to the emancipation of the Jews in Modern Times. If emancipation was meant to bring equality and civil rights to the Jews and urge their full participation as citizens in the life of
the countries where they live (as it was conceived by the proponents of Jewish emancipation), then a major question arises. The question is: do Jews need their own communal organizations? After all, every Jew, as a free citizen and equal member of a modern society, could, in various degrees, enjoy education, health, social welfare and recreation services supplied by nondenominational or public organizations. Why was there a need for independent Jewish services? Answers to these questions will be discussed in the next chapters.

In the Quebec context the developments mentioned above precipitated a debate within the Jewish community about the need for independent communal welfare organization. We shall examine this issue in the course of our study.

**Period, Sources and Outline of the Study**

The period of 1920-1980 was chosen for this study, for these reasons:

1) The years following World War I marked the beginning of major rapid economic and social changes in Canada, Quebec and Montreal

2) The 1920s saw the initial employment of social workers by the oldest Jewish welfare agency in Montreal (Baron de Hirsch Institute) and the beginning of public funds for sectarian social welfare institutions

3) The end of this period (namely, the seventies) marks a significantly growing impact of government legislation
In Quebec on Jewish communal welfare organization. It also marks a substantial change in the structure and status of Jewish social welfare and especially of JFS-BdeHI.

In gathering the data for this study we mainly used the following sources:

1) Archives of the Baron de Hirsch Institute, Montreal (located at 5151 Cote St. Catherine Road)

2) Interviews, mainly with Jewish community leaders and professional communal workers (for list of the interviewed persons see Appendix C)

3) Books and government (of Canada and Quebec) publications on social welfare policy and legislation

4) Books, academic studies and other publications dealing with Jewish communal welfare issues (for full list of sources see Bibliography).

The outline of the study is as follows:

**Part A: Introduction and Theoretical References**

Chapter 1 presents the issues and the goals of the study and brings some historical background.

Chapter 2 examines studies relating to ethnic population, communities and institutions.

**Part B: Social Welfare and Jewish Communal Welfare**

Chapter 3 describes the social welfare systems in Canada and Quebec.
Chapter 4 analyzes the issues of Jewish communal welfare in Modern Times.

Chapter 5 identifies the characteristics of Jewish communal welfare.

Chapter 6 describes the history of Allied Jewish Community Services in Montreal.

Part C: The Baron de Hirsch Institute: An Historical Perspective

Chapter 7 examines the developments of the Baron de Hirsch Institute during the years 1920-1980.

Chapter 8 studies the impact of professional social workers on Jewish communal welfare.

Chapter 9 analyzes the relationships between Jewish communal welfare and the Quebec public welfare system.

Chapter 10 investigates the challenges of Bill 65 (1971) and its influence on the Jewish communal welfare organization.

Part D: Conclusion

Chapter 11 concludes the study with an evaluation of the changes in Jewish communal welfare during the years 1920-1980.
CHAPTER 2

ETHNIC POPULATIONS, COMMUNITIES
AND INSTITUTIONS

A Jewish ethnic institution stands in the focus of our study. This institution is only one of a network of ethnic institutions which constitute the Jewish community organization in Montreal. Before we approach the investigation of this ethnic, social welfare institution we have to clarify the terms ethnic population, ethnic community, ethnic institution and to show the relations between these social units. Also, we have to decide if these terms are applicable to Jewish populations and communities in North America.

Basically we have to answer the following questions:

1) What are the characteristics of an ethnic population?
2) How does an ethnic population become an ethnic community?
   And, how do ethnic communities maintain cohesion?
3) What are the roles and functions of ethnic institutions?
4) Are the Jewish populations in North America ethnic populations and do they exist in the form of ethnic communities?

Ethnic Populations

What are the characteristics of an ethnic population?
What are the features which people have to share together in order to be considered an ethnic population? How is an ethnic population distinguishable from national or religious population? We think that the most important characteristics of an ethnic population are its common descent and common cultural heritage. The members of certain populations may share together national origin or religion but these characteristics may not distinguish them as an ethnic population. In the U.S.A. Jews and Poles originating from Poland consider themselves to be members of two different ethnic populations, notwithstanding the fact that they share the same national origin. Irish and Italian Catholics do not belong to the same ethnic population even though they are adherents of the same religion. On the other hand Dutch of both Catholic and Protestant backgrounds consider themselves to be members of a single Dutch ethnic population. The determining criteria are common descent and cultural heritage. The members of the ethnic population must have, as an indispensable requirement, a common ancestry. Accordingly, common descent means being born into a common ancestral group which has been bound, for generations, by shared ties and cultural heritage. The symbols by which ethnic populations express their common cultural heritage vary from one population to another with regard to the character of those symbols and in the importance attached to them. Central importance may be given to political.
religious, economic or folkloristic symbols, depending upon the ethnic population. For example, Jews in the U.S.A. attach great importance to cultural-religious symbols: white Protestant Americans put political symbols (such as freedom and independence) in the center; and French Canadians emphasize symbols related to language and culture.

We may basically accept Morris' definition of ethnic groups, but with some modifications. Morris writes that an ethnic group is:

A distinct category of the population in a larger society whose culture is usually different from its own. The members of such a group are, or feel themselves, or are thought to be bound together by common ties of race, or nationality, or culture.

We should like to add to this definition the element of common descent without which there is no ethnic population. On the other hand national origin, as we have seen, cannot be a criterion of ethnic population. As to the element of race, it is acceptable if by this Morris meant a common descent.¹

According to these criteria Jewish populations in North America are definitely ethnic populations. The members of the Jewish population share together common descent going back to the ancient forefathers of the nation. They also share common cultural heritage which is largely religious but not exclusively. Other important cultural symbols which

most Jews share are the centrality of Israel and the Hebrew language. Because of these common features Jewish populations are ethnic populations notwithstanding the fact that the Jews in America came, or are descendants of, people who came from different national origins; and even though they belong to a variety of Jewish religious movements (such as orthodoxy, conservatism, Chasidim, reform, and non-observers).

**Ethnic Communities**

How does an ethnic population become an ethnic community? What are the motives and forces which maintain the ethnic community and create cohesion? Bird says that:

>. . . an ethnic community as such arises wherever a larger proportion of an ethnic population acknowledges their ethnicity through their identifications and associations which necessarily include, but also necessarily extend, beyond their relations with friends and kins.¹

It is obvious that when the members of an ethnic population rally together for concerted actions around some central causes and create an organizational structure (institutions and associations) to promote those causes, an ethnic community arises. In an advanced form the ethnic community is a network of associations and institutions which carry out various functions that are considered vital for the continuity and welfare of the ethnic population. But ethnic institutions are only one type of binding forces which create the ethnic

¹Bird, "Ethnic Group Institutions and Intra-group Communications."
community and maintain its cohesion. Besides institutions, associations and cultural ties, which are internal to the ethnic population, there are some external factors which also influence the scope and cohesion of a communal organization. These include the degree of discrimination against the ethnic population by the larger society and the degrees of residential and occupational concentrations. One can assume that the greater the discrimination and concentration, the wider is the scope of activities and the stronger is the cohesion of the ethnic community.

We may divide the binding factors which create an ethnic community and promote its inner cohesion into two major types:

a) The subjective factors which are expressed through symbols, values and customs, namely the cultural heritage of the ethnic group

b) The objective factors such as organizations, associations and institutions, residential concentration, and economic conditions.

Speaking about the subjective type we may say that the emotional attachment of the members of an ethnic group to their cultural heritage and the determination to preserve it, create a powerful foundation for an ethnic community to emerge, develop, and achieve inner cohesion. The personal identification with ethnic cultural symbols, values and customs is a prerequisite for, and concomitant with,
community organization. Only when this emotional, subjective, attachment to ethnicity, as a cultural entity, exists can a community emerge and develop. Weinfeld\textsuperscript{1} uses the notion of "affective ethnic identity" in order to explain this attachment to an ethnic community. This is, basically, a subjective, personal type of ethnicity which is expressed through cultural symbols. Weinfeld names it a "new ethnicity" because it coexists with strong assimilationist trends within ethnic groups. He states that "the new ethnicity represents a strong attachment to ethnic label and a strong commitment to the ideas and values of ethnic heritage."\textsuperscript{2} It is a "new ethnicity" in that it combines assimilation patterns and ethnic identification as against the "old ethnicity" in which people are almost totally immersed only in ethnic patterns of life.

As to the objective factors, prominent among them are residential and occupational concentrations and ethnic institutions. We shall now focus on the former and examine the latter in the next section.

Yancey, Ericksen, and Juli\textsuperscript{n}\textsuperscript{3} see occupational and residential concentrations of immigrants, and dependence on


\textsuperscript{2}Ibid.

common institutions, as major factors in the development of ethnic communities and the crystallization of ethnic solidarity. They downplay the role of cultural heritage in the formation of ethnic communities and say:

Much that has been written about race, ethnicity, social class and community has centered around the issue of the importance of culture in determining life style. Our review of this literature suggests that much of it is based on empirically untested assumption about the importance of the portable heritage which a group brings from one generation and place to another. We suggest that a more parsimonious explanation of ethnic and community behavior will be found in the relationship of the ethnic community to the larger macroscopic structure of the society, particularly in the constricts of occupation, residence and institutional affiliation.¹

Accordingly they maintain that ethnic groups and ethnic communities:

... have been produced by structural conditions which are intimately linked to the changing technology of industrial production and transportation. More specifically, ethnicity defined in terms of frequent patterns of association and identification with common origins is crystallized [into ethnic community] under conditions which reinforce the maintenance of kinship and friendship networks. These are common occupational positions, residential stability, and concentration and dependence on communal institutions and services.²

Yancey, Ericksen, and Juliani rightly emphasize the importance of common institutions and of residential and occupational factors in the creation of the ethnic community. But we don't share with them the playing down of common cultural heritage as an indispensable factor for the creation

¹Ibid., p. 399.
²Ibid., p. 392.
and maintenance of an ethnic community. They treat culture as unchanging which is not the case. They are correct that the culture of the old world is often not that influential, but old symbols, together with new ones, intermix to form a new basis of cultural identification. It is the subjective, personal attachment of individuals to their cultural and ethnic identity which constitutes the basis for the emergence of an ethnic community. No residential or occupational concentrations, by themselves, can forge together individuals of different ethnic groups into one ethnic community. People who share residential concentration may create neighborhood organizations. Those who are part of an occupational concentration may coalesce into a trade union. But only common descent and common cultural heritage are the basis for the emergence and continuation of ethnic communities. In North America there are ample cases of ethnic communities which exist notwithstanding the absence of residential or occupational concentrations.

For example, Jewish ethnic populations in metropolitan areas (such as New York and Los Angeles) are now spread in suburbs around the cities within quite a wide range. Occupation today is not overwhelmingly concentrated in a few industries as was the case during the first generation of Jewish immigration. But the absence of residential and occupational concentrations today does not hinder this ethnic population from maintaining communal organizations.
In discussing ethnic communities we should point out that the issue of ethnic communal existence is not an either/or question. It is, rather, a question of more or less, greater or smaller, degrees of communal cohesion; greater or lesser degrees of concerted group action; and greater or lesser degrees to which ethnic group members actually identify with the ethnic population. Some ethnic populations—like the Germans in Canada—have almost no sense of communal existence whereas others—like the Italians and the Jews in Canada—have a very high degree of communal existence. And in between there are, of course, various degrees of communal cohesion, concerted action, and ethnic identification. Weinfeld, in a study of ethnic identification in Toronto, used the notion of "affective ethnic identity" (which has been explained above) as a criterion for measuring the degree of ethnic identification among various ethnic populations in Toronto. He found that ethnic identification is high within the Jews, the Slavs and the Italians. This fact, of course, contributes toward a higher degree of communal cohesion within those ethnic populations. In the next section we shall examine the role of ethnic institutions in determining the degree of communal cohesion.

Based on criteria discussed above we may conclude that Jewish communities in North America are ethnic communities

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1Weinfeld, "Myth and Reality in the Canadian Mosaic: Ethnic Identification in Toronto."
because they meet the following conditions:

1) The members of the Jewish communities collectively demonstrate identification with common cultural symbols. This is exemplified among other ways, by participation of many Jews in the celebration of the High Holidays and by the mass gathering in assemblies of identification with, and support to, Israel.

2) The communities operate, in a concerted way, ethnic institutions which deliver services and facilitate intra-group communications. The existence of a myriad of ethnic institutions in North American Jewish communities is a well-known fact to any observer.

**Ethnic Institutions**

An ethnic community is a partially organized entity. Most of the ethnic communities have networks of formal associations and institutions, based on voluntary membership, that carry out the functions which the ethnic community considers vital for its continuity and welfare. These associations and institutions cover various spheres of activities from politics to social welfare, health, recreation, education and religion. Accordingly we may define an ethnic institution, or association, as a formal, communal organization aimed to carry out specific functions which are recognized by the ethnic community.
Basically we may divide the functions of ethnic institutions into two groups:

a) To deliver specific services to the members of the ethnic community

b) To facilitate intra-group communications within the ethnic community.

The main question we have to deal with is how the ethnic institutions help to create and maintain the communal cohesion which is so important to its inner strength and continuity.

Breton\(^1\) relates the extent of communal cohesion to the degree of "institutional completeness" within the community. Institutional completeness is the degree of formal structure of an ethnic community which is measured by the number, type, strength, and nature of activities of ethnic institutions within that community. Institutional completeness is at its extreme whenever the ethnic institutions are able to perform all the services required by the ethnic population. In this case ethnic group members would never have to make use of services offered out of the community to satisfy their needs. Breton explains that the presence of formal organizations in the ethnic community sets out forces that have the effect of keeping the social relations

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of members within its boundaries. The communities showing the highest degree of institutional completeness have a much greater proportion of their members with most of their personal relations within the ethnic group. Breton also argues that ethnic identifications are facilitated by the degree to which there exists for the ethnic community a complete range of social, political, financial, commercial, religious and recreational institutions operated by and for the ethnic group. He enumerates four processes through which the institutional completeness affects the interpersonal networks of the members of the ethnic population:

a) Substitution—holding members' allegiance by preventing their contacts with the larger society

b) Extension within the ethnic community of the personal networks of the participants in the institutions

c) Raising new issues for public debate which results in greater cohesiveness of the group

d) The leaders of the organization actively attempt to maintain or enlarge its clientele.

In evaluating the effect of various institutions in keeping the immigrants' personal association within the boundaries of the ethnic community, Breton states that the existence of welfare organizations points to the presence of an active elite in the community. This elite has its

1Ibid., pp. 85-86.
influence on the community cohesiveness also through channels other than the welfare organizations themselves (apparently through the control of fund raising and fund allocation by these leaders).

In his conclusion Breton notes that ethnic organizations will maintain themselves as long as the ethnic identity of the organization is important for the members of the ethnic group. The very existence of such an organization acts to strengthen this identity. But other mechanisms also operate, such as the fact that the leaders of the organizations have a vested interest in these organizations and will attempt, in various ways, to strengthen the ethnic identity so as to keep their public as long as possible.

However, Breton's assertion that the number of ethnic organizations and associations maintained by an ethnic group determines the degree of its ethnic consciousness and communal action is not enough to fully describe the functions of the ethnic institutions. Bird\(^1\) supplements Breton's arguments by analyzing the role of ethnic institutions in facilitating intra-group communications as a means to enhance ethnic identification. He examines the ways in which ethnic institutions help in the development of ethnic communal consciousness and collective action by fostering intra-group communications. He argues:

\(^1\)Bird, "Ethnic Group Institutions and Intra-group Communications."
that ethnic populations emerge as distinctive communities to the degree that institutional arrangements promote and sustain patterns of communication that transmit widely and quickly varied symbols, signals, recognitions and expectations among ethnic group members particularly between those not immediately related by kinship or personal network.

Bird extends the arguments put forward by Breton with regard to the institutional completeness of ethnic populations.

In Bird's view, what is "considered to be critical is not the number of these institutions as such but the degree to which varied institutions, regardless of their number or variety, facilitate widely and quickly kinds of intra-group communications." This is because the intra-group communications which are facilitated by the institutions, and not their number or type, are the major factors that enhance communal cohesion. Bird explains that intimate friendships and ties with others of the same ethnic descent,

... while characteristic of ethnic communities, do not directly contribute to the kinds of communication necessary for sustaining concerted group actions and communal identification. Basically three other forms of communication are necessary: the cultural symbols in relation to which ethnic identifications are made need to be transmitted; several different forms of social recognition between ethnic group members need to be communicated; and there needs to be some means for communicating commitments and power within and on behalf of the ethnic population. The importance of ethnic group institutions for the emergence of communal identifications and collective action is that in varying degrees they facilitate these kind of communications, at least as a latent function.

While accepting Bird's assertion with regard to the function of ethnic institutions, as a setting for intra-group

1Ibid.  2Ibid.  3Ibid.
communications, we would like to make a distinction between this function and the other function of delivering services to the members of the ethnic community. It is a common knowledge that ethnic institutions vary each from the other mainly in the type of services they render. They all deliver services but they differ in structure, type of service, budget, and the clientele they deal with. But this is not the case with the function of facilitating intra-group communications. All the ethnic institutions, no matter what services they deliver, carry out this same function. Literally, every ethnic institution, in one way or another, is a setting of intra-group communications. This distinction is important because it means that community leaders may launch -- or agree to -- changes in the structure, budget and services of various ethnic institutions knowing that, nevertheless, they would continue to carry out some forms of intra-group communications. Therefore, shifts of funds and changes in scope of activities between the ethnic institutions may take place without jeopardizing some of the major goals of the community.

In summing up Bird's, Breton's and Yancey et al.'s assertions, we may say that they vary in what they think is the major factor in achieving communal cohesion. Yancey et al. think it is the degree of residential and occupational concentration of the ethnic population. Breton and Bird see an important role to the ethnic institutions. However, while Breton emphasizes the number and variety of institutions
within the ethnic community. Bird asserts that ethnic institutions contribute towards communal cohesion also by being the setting for intra-group communications.

In our discussion we have used the term "function" with regard to what an ethnic institution is supposed to accomplish, namely, what the purpose of the institution is. We shall now examine this important notion of "social function," namely, the function of a social unit or system.

Merton\textsuperscript{1} has developed the theory of social functions. He says\textsuperscript{2} that social functions "are those observed consequences which make for the adaptation or adjustment of a given system." Merton emphasizes that "social function refers to observable, objective consequences."\textsuperscript{3} The ethnic institution's goal is to contribute towards communal cohesion and continuity by the functions of supplying services and being a setting of intra-group communications. But Merton goes further to distinguish between manifest and latent functions. He says that:

Manifest functions are those objective consequences contributing to the adjustment or adaptation of the system which are intended and recognized by participants in the system; latent functions, correlatively, are those which are neither intended nor recognized.\textsuperscript{4}

It is obvious that the difference between manifest and latent functions, in Merton's definition, focuses around intention.


\textsuperscript{2}Ibid., p. 104. \textsuperscript{3}Ibid., p. 78. \textsuperscript{4}Ibid., p. 104.
and recognition. The manifest functions are those which are intended and recognized by the participants of the system, namely by the ethnic community and the ethnic institution. They are formally intended and publicly recognized by the organization and as such are publicly discussed and announced. These are the ostensible functions. Latent functions, too, take place within the ethnic institution, but they are not officially and organizationally intended and publicly recognized. Therefore they are not publicly discussed and announced. To sum up this point we may assert that intention and recognition related to manifest functions are from the point of view of the institution as a whole. However, other functions, latent in character, exist which are not organizationally and formally intended and publicly recognized and announced. The latent functions serve, mainly, individuals related to the institution, such as leaders and staff.

In an ethnic institution the manifest functions are ostensibly the delivery of services and may include enhancement of the power of the institution. The latent functions are the establishment of meeting places for social and economic purposes, the enhancement of personal prestige and the fostering of political power. The lay leaders and professional workers of an institution are frequently the main beneficiaries of the latent functions although ordinary participants may benefit as well.
It should be stated that sometimes the lines between manifest and latent functions are not so clear. For example, what about those functions which facilitate the intra-group communications? Are they manifest or latent? It seems that transmission of cultural symbols may be an announced manifest function but often it is an unannounced latent function. But what about communication of social recognitions, commitments and power? Are those manifest or latent functions? Or are they on the border between the two? There is no definite answer to this question. Institutions under different circumstances might differently consider these functions to be formal, announced goals. We think that in times of crises, such as an external threat to the structure or very existence of an ethnic institution, some functions not previously recognized would surface as manifest goals and objectives. Accordingly, in regular times some intra-group communications functions may be latent or on the border between latent and manifest. But in a time of crisis it might emerge as a clearly manifest objective, as group leaders feel that this function is threatened by organizational changes. In this case even the usually unannounced, and publicly unrecognized functions, such as gaining power and prestige by individuals in the institution, may surface as manifest organizational objectives in discussion related to the pros and cons of institutional changes. This might happen when communal leaders wage a
struggle to save an institution from changes which they consider to be very undesirable for the community and their own interests.

In conclusion we should like to state that when we come to analyze the development of the Baron de Hirsch Institute - Jewish Family Services, we shall utilize concepts and analytical tools laid down in this chapter to explain actions, reactions, attitudes and changes of roles and functions.

We shall particularly be looking at the following aspects of this communal agency:

1) The different ways in which this agency has served to facilitate ethnic communal identification and cohesion both by supplying social services and fostering intra-group communications (of cultural symbols, recognitions and commitments) within the Jewish population of Montreal.

2) The changing roles and functions of this institution as it has responded to various developments such as the rising influence of professional social workers, the growing involvement of government in the social welfare arena and the changing needs and interests of the Jewish community.

3) The major debates within the Jewish organized community, at several critical times, over crucial issues such as whether to receive public funds or not, whether to cooperate with non-Jewish agencies and whether to join the public welfare system.
4) The role of latent functions in creating attitudes, shaping arguments, and influencing the relations between the BdeHI and the Allied Jewish Community Services (AJCS).
CHAPTER 3

SOCIAL WELFARE IN CANADA AND QUEBEC

Typical Results of the Development of the Welfare State

Our study, "Jewish Communal Welfare Institution in a Changing Society: Montreal 1920-1980," obliges us to survey the changes that have taken place in Canada and Quebec. Obviously, we shall concentrate on the developments of social welfare in Canada and Quebec. But, before we begin with this, we should like briefly to point out some results of the development of the welfare state in the twentieth century.

Historically the welfare state evolved, among other factors, out of the concept of citizenship and its meaning in the modern state. The concept of citizenship in the modern state implies that the individual and the state maintain direct links, and not through particularistic groups (such as the church, the feudal estate, and the guild) as was the case in the Middle Ages. This means, also, that the citizen has inherited rights as an individual and as a member of the state.

In the field of social welfare, citizenship entitles the individual to the protection of his society, as represented by the government, against contingencies from
which he cannot protect himself by his own ability or foresight. The welfare state— a twentieth century phenomenon—is the outcome of the recognition that governments are responsible for social security and public assistance, on an universal basis. Another reason for the growing intervention of government in the supply of social welfare services was the recognition that the private agencies did not have adequate resources to cope with needs as they were understood by progressive social reformers. Thus the welfare state grants a broader interpretation to the notion of citizenship. The rise of the welfare state involves two major issues which are of interest to our study: universalism versus particularism, and bureaucratization versus democratization.

**Universalism Versus Particularism**

As stated, the welfare state tended to weaken, or sometimes entirely to eliminate, the private social welfare agency and to supply social services directly and universally to the citizens. Inevitably this policy evoked the opposition of the private agencies which were organized mostly on a religious and ethnic basis and had dominated this area for centuries. Also, this policy created a conflict between particularistic loyalty to the ethnic or religious group and loyalty to the state. Long-established private welfare agencies were reluctant to permit government involvement and to relinquish authority. But in view of the
enormous funds needed for modern social welfare, the government was the only organization which could shoulder this burden. Consequently, private social welfare agencies had to re-assess their roles, functions and attitudes towards government funding. Later, we shall examine the relationships between the Jewish welfare agency and the government of Quebec which were created by such a development.  

Bureaucratization Versus Democratization

A typical result of growing government responsibility for social security and public assistance is the expansion of government bureaucracy. This meant a decline in the role of volunteers. Social welfare activities are carried out by civil servants whose motives differ from those of the volunteers. From the point of view of the client this means the replacement of personal relationships within the ethnic or religious agency by a formal, impersonal link within a bureaucratic organization. Government justified this shift by the need to eliminate paternalism in the ethnic, sectarian institutions, to enhance the notion of citizenship and to improve the efficiency of social welfare work.

Nevertheless attempts were made to balance bureaucratization by some measure of democracy. In this regard principles like participation and decentralization were involved. This implied that the consumers of the services were represented on the elected boards which administered
the public agencies on a regional basis. These elements of participation and decentralization were meant to weaken the negative impact of big bureaucracy. But it seems that the bureaucratic elements are stronger than the democratic ones in the public welfare system. In actual fact the real power, in most cases, is in the hands of those who give the money and control the organization (namely the government) and not in the hands of the democratically elected regional boards.

In Canada and Quebec the span of years covered in this study (1920-1980) represents the shift from a pre-welfare state to a largely modern welfare state. In 1920 there was very little government intervention in the social welfare arena. Most of the welfare activities were in the hands of denominations.

After World War II changes began to occur at an accelerated pace. In the 1960s we witnessed a rapid development of welfare state legislation and financing of social services. Developments in the provinces were influenced by the encouragement of the federal government and by internal factors. In Quebec this development culminated in 1971 with Bill 65, which represents maximum government involvement in the supply of health and social services.

In the next two sections of this chapter we shall survey major social welfare developments in Canada and Quebec, as a background to our study.
Social Welfare in Canada

According to the British North America Act, 1867\(^1\) (the BNA Act), health and social welfare fall under the jurisdiction of the provinces. Section 92 of the BNA Act deals with the "Exclusive Powers of Provincial Legislatures." It stipulates that "In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to matters coming within the classes of subjects next hereinafter enumerated."\(^2\)

Sub-section 7 then deals with "The establishing, maintenance and management of Hospitals, Asylums, Charities and Eleemosynary Institutions in and for the Province other than Marine Hospitals."\(^3\)

This basic constitutional fact has created a situation in which the federal government, if it decides to initiate and promote social welfare programs, needs, as a prerequisite, an amendment to the constitution or an agreement with each province. The history of social welfare in Canada shows that this constitutional situation was a cause of many obstacles and difficulties in the path of social welfare development in this country.

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\(^1\)This is the constitution of Canada enacted on March 29, 1867 by the British Parliament for the union of upper and lower Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick.


\(^3\)Ibid.
Bearing this fact in mind, we shall survey the major developments of social welfare legislation and programs on the federal level, since 1920.

Donald Bellamy, in reviewing social welfare in Canada, wrote that the Old Age Assistance Act in 1927 "marked the entry of the federal government into the social security field on a continuing basis." This was the first federal-provincial shared-cost program. An allowance was paid to the elderly on the basis of a means test. The provinces administered the program but were able to obtain 40 percent of their costs from the federal government.

The ensuing decade saw the economic depression which came to an end only in 1939 with the breaking out of World War II. The depression gave rise to inquiry, investigation and social ferment, but it did not result in any immediate fundamental changes in the patterns of social welfare services.

The war years brought rapid industrial growth and urbanization, accompanied by the social complexities of a modern industrial society. This—together with the influence of social welfare developments in the United States and in Great Britain—gave great impetus to federal social welfare legislation and programs in Canada during the years 1940-1950. In this period the foundation of the modern

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structure of Canadian social welfare institutions was laid, in part, as a result of a series of public inquiries related to the structure of social welfare in Canada. The results of these inquiries were twofold: general objectives for Canadian social welfare policy were established, and some specific legislation was passed.

In 1940 the federal government took the initiative to amend Section 91 of the BNA Act which deals with the power of the Parliament. The goal of the amendment was to enable the government to introduce an Unemployment Insurance Program. The BNA Act, Section 91, was amended by item 2A which put "Unemployment Insurance" under the jurisdiction of the federal parliament. After this amendment the federal parliament could pass the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1940. Apparently the provinces agreed to this amendment under the impact of the depression.

In a federal-provincial conference in 1945 an agreement was reached with regard to the Family Allowances Act of 1944. This program was established as a federally financed and universally implemented plan.

After the war, the great influence of the Beveridge Program in Britain led to intensive thinking and to enactment in the social welfare sphere. The decade 1950-1960 was a period of expansion in Canadian social welfare legislation.

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1Ibid., p. 84.
In the 1950s it was possible to discern a growing readiness on the part of the federal government to help the provinces meet their constitutional responsibility for welfare by sharing in the costs of various agreed-upon programs. As a result of this trend substantial revision in income security provisions for the elderly and incapacitated took place. These revisions included Universal Old Age Security Payments, 1951 (for people over seventy at the time), a revised Old Age Assistance Act, 1951, for needy persons aged sixty-five to seventy (since then absorbed by Old Age Pension), and a Blind Persons Act, 1951.

In 1951 the federal government initiated another amendment to the BNA Act in order to pass the Old Age Pension Act, 1951. For this purpose Section 94 was added to the BNA Act entitled "Old Age Pensions." It reads as follows:

It is hereby declared that the Parliament of Canada may from time to time make laws in relation to Old Age Pensions in Canada. But no Law made by the Parliament of Canada in relation to Old Age Pension shall effect the operation of any law, present or future, of a Provincial Legislature in relation to Old Age Pensions.¹

There were two reasons why the federal government initiated this amendment in Section 94 of the BNA:

1) The law helped the federal government to expand its authority over affairs which are, according to the constitution, under the jurisdiction of the provinces

¹Ibid., p. 90.
2) The law enabled the federal government to carry out new and advanced ideas in social welfare policy which were current after World War II.

From the point of view of the provinces the considerations were as follows:

1) The increase in the number of older people made the financial burden upon the provinces hard to carry.

2) The formula of cost-sharing (fifty-fifty) was very attractive.

3) The positive precedent of the 1940 amendment to the EFA enabled the federal government to initiate an Unemployment Insurance Program.

In 1955 a federal-provincial agreement was reached with regard to a program for permanently and totally disabled persons.

In 1956 the Unemployment Assistance Act for those who did not qualify for unemployment insurance was passed, permitting federal participation in unemployment assistance. This act provided, at the time, for federal sharing of 50 percent of the cost of assistance payments under the provincial programs. This measure involved several marked departures from the past in respect to federal aid for social assistance payments. No maximum ceiling was specified, and no condition with respect to a means test was requested.

In 1956 a federal Hospital Insurance Act was adopted whereby the federal government agreed to share in costs of provincial hospital insurance programs.
The years 1960-1975 were a period of more substantial action than the preceding decade. During this period action was taken to complete the development of social welfare policy that had begun during the 1940s.

In the fiscal year 1962/63 the federal government introduced a National Welfare Grants Act to assist both public and voluntary agencies in strengthening welfare services. In 1965 the Canada Pension Plan made possible, among other things, a saving mechanism for retirement in addition to the universal Old Age Pension scheme.

A great step ahead was achieved in 1966 with the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP). Under this plan, which was aimed to reorganize the federal government's participation in the provincial social welfare payments, four major programs were absorbed and covered:

1) The Public Welfare Assistance Act
2) The Unemployment Assistance Act
3) The Disabled Assistance Act
4) The Blind Assistance Act

These programs provided federal financing of half the costs of all provincial welfare payments and services. The Canada Assistance Plan was considered to be a key anti-poverty act.\(^1\) It could actually cover almost every welfare payment and service implemented by the provinces. It was a

\(^{1}\) Sheila Arnopolis—a columnist dealing with social welfare—wrote in the Montreal Star on June 20, 1971: "It is the country's most important instrument of anti-poverty."
way of circumventing the BNA Act's restrictions on the federal government in this field and was attractive to the provinces in helping them meet half their welfare costs for the enumerated programs. As a result, this plan has led to much development in welfare programs on the provincial level.

In 1968 federal government financing (on a cost-sharing basis) was also made available for medical care insurance.

In 1971 the Unemployment Insurance Plan was amended to provide, also, for sickness and maternity benefits.

Bellamy, Willard, and Armitage have shown that since World War II the federal government of Canada, in the spirit of the welfare state concept, has intensified its activities in social welfare. In spite of constitutional limitation, it found a way of participating in the provincial welfare programs through agreements with the provinces based on cost-sharing principles and agreed-upon constitutional amendments.

The period 1940-1970 witnessed growing federal involvement in social welfare programming and financing. This policy of the federal government gave strong impetus to social welfare legislation in the provinces.

Social Welfare in Quebec

From the outset, since the foundation of New France in the seventeenth century, welfare institutions in this province were denominational. Until the British conquest in 1759, charity was the exclusive realm of the Catholic church.

Father André Guillemette explained the reasons for the dominant status of the Catholic church in social welfare activities in Quebec until recently.¹ He wrote that New France followed the homeland example in welfare and health activities. In France, the family and the church exercised a virtual monopoly of responsibility in these areas. This was further reinforced by the church being then the only social institution sufficiently well organized and broadly accepted to be vested with this important role.

After the British conquest in 1759, social welfare became the concern of other religious and ethnic communities as well, such as the Protestants and the Jews. The French Canadian population, however, continued to follow the same traditional denominational pattern of welfare services. The reason for the dominant position of the Catholic church in the area of social services, even after the conquest, is that it was considered a life and death issue for French Canada. The philosophy of family and individual care, which is so closely related to social services, was perceived, from the

outset, as very essential to the survival of French Canada. After the elimination of New France's political institutions, with the British conquest, the church was the only French Canadian institution sufficiently trusted and organized to protect these interests. Therefore, in 1760 the Catholic church became the active protector of French Canada's survival through its control of vital areas such as social services, health and education. The power of the church in these areas became very strong and it was officially recognized. The 1867 constitution actually recognized this reality by agreeing that social services was a provincial jurisdiction.

In view of this situation, non-Catholic immigrants who settled in this province after 1759 organized their own welfare institutions along denominational lines. Protestants seeking assistance had to approach their own religious charity organization. Jewish relief was also organized along religious lines. Until the end of the nineteenth century social welfare in Quebec was exclusively denominational.

Terry Copp\(^1\) shows that the first change in this pattern took place early in this century. He states that from 1900 onwards agitation for the application of "scientific methods" and the professionalization of social work developed rapidly through North America, including the Anglophone community of Montreal. This led to the formation, in 1901.

of a Charities Organization Society (COS) in Montreal. It was the first sign in Quebec of a new direction in charity work, namely a social welfare organization which is not affiliated to a church. Copp adds that the Society attempted to integrate the work of a number of agencies, including some French Canadian institutions. Its Board of Directors was drawn from socially prominent members of both communities. But the COS was operated in English and its effort to be the "Office central de la charité de Montréal" had little practical consequences for French Canadian institutions. Catholic charitable work continued to be conducted along traditional lines. The St. Vincent de Paul Society (which was the major Catholic welfare organization in Quebec) used the same methods of direct assistance as before and the major custodial institutions (orphanages, insane asylums, industrial schools and reformatories) remained essentially committed to roles defined in the nineteenth century.

It was only in 1921 that the government of Quebec, for the first time, intervened in the social welfare arena with legislation which provided for public funds to welfare institutions. This step was motivated by the realization that the charitable agencies of those days could not, by themselves, meet the growing new needs created by industrialization and urbanization after World War I.

The National Assembly enacted "The Quebec Public Charities Act" (QPRA) which was assented to on March 19,
1921.¹ According to the Preamble of Chapter 79, Statutes of Quebec 1921, the goal of the act was to "establish a provincial bureau of public charities to assist the indigent sick who are received and treated in hospitals or kept in public charitable institutions." According to this law the responsibility for charitable custodial institutions and hospitals was shared, in equal portions, by the government, the municipality and the institution or the hospital. This legislation was limited in application and did not, substantially, change the role of the government in the social welfare arena, which remained a minor one. It reflected the mentality of an era when social assistance could be envisaged only in connection with physical institutions for sick, handicapped persons and dependent children.

Nevertheless this legislation was a milestone in the development of social welfare in Quebec. It was adopted against the wish of the Catholic church and marked the beginning of greater government responsibility in welfare and health. This trend was to grow stronger within the next fifty years until its culmination with the provincial nationalization of social welfare and health services in 1971 (Bill 65).

A question presents itself: What were the forces behind these developments? It would appear that there were

¹Statutes of Quebec, 1921, Chapter 79: An Act to establish the Quebec Bureau of public charities. This Act was later rectified as The Public Charities Act, in Chapter 187 of the Revised Statutes of Quebec, 1941.
several major forces and factors which created and shaped the shift in the social welfare arena from control by the denominations to a welfare system, largely public:

1) The advent of the concept of the welfare state and the influence of the establishment of social security programs in Europe and the United States. A model of a welfare state had been developed in Europe which Quebec began gradually to introduce only in the 1960s.

2) The social welfare policy of the federal government of Canada which encouraged the enactment of social security laws and helped the provinces to finance social welfare programs. The cost-sharing policy of Ottawa and the federal-provincial agreements helped to promote new social welfare programs in the provinces.

3) The growing industrialization and urbanization in the province, especially after World War II, which created more social needs but also enabled the government to draw more taxes from an increasingly affluent society.

4) The progressive policy of the Liberal Party which came to power in 1960 after the long period of conservative Union Nationale regime under Premier Maurice Duplessis. The advent of the Liberal Party opened the way to a freer and more outspoken public opinion. The influence of the liberal intellectuals and the trade unions grew rapidly. The result was a quicker pace in social reforms.
5) The wish to strengthen the power of the state over the welfare organizations affiliated to the parishes, mainly those of the Catholic church and to the ethnic communities. This policy was meant to alter the relationship of the indigents to society; namely to treat them as equal citizens of the province; not merely as clients of various parishes and ethnic social welfare agencies.

In 1921 these forces were still fledgling, and the outcome of the Quebec Public Charities Act was modest and limited. But with the passage of years, and especially from the early 1960s on, these forces grew stronger and precipitated major changes in the social welfare arena of Quebec.

It should be stated here that there were, nevertheless, three major factors militating against these trends:

1) The conservative character of Quebec society and its successive governments. The alliance between the state and the church blocked any social progress until 1960.

2) The dominant role of the Catholic church in the fields of health and welfare services. The church actually struggled against involvement of government in these fields. The Catholic church, which for more than three centuries held the monopoly over education, health and welfare in the French Canadian sector of Quebec, sensed that the modern, progressive, sociopolitical philosophy was aimed at weakening its position in society. For
many years the church successfully opposed any social reforms and managed to maintain its dominant position in education, health and welfare until the 1960s.

3) The federal-provincial relationships with regard to social welfare based upon the BNA Act. This Act deposited welfare authority in the jurisdiction of the province. Out of this fact difficulties evolved relating to cooperation and cost-sharing of programs. The provinces, mainly Quebec, were very sensitive about the issue of the federal government trespassing on their constitutional rights. Long negotiations and many delays preceded most of the federal-provincial (Quebec) agreements relating to new welfare programs. This issue was a very frequent impediment in the way of federal-provincial cooperation.

During the economically difficult thirties there was little change in the system of public assistance. But they showed up the weakness of private enterprise and their inability to alleviate the ills of society in crises. To make up for this, transitory measures were adopted, such as direct relief. The great depression also showed up the weakness and shortcomings of the Quebec Public Charities Act of 1921. It was clear that this Act, as a legislative instrument, was not sufficient to cope with all the problems and needs of public assistance that rose during crises.

In view of this the government of Quebec, in 1933, appointed an inquiry body—the Montpetit Commission. The
Commission's Report advocated direct financial assistance at the home under the Public Charities Act. Until then no provincial or municipal government was allowed to pay direct financial assistance to families or persons in their home (assistance was limited only to persons in walled institutions and hospitals). This was an important change in the concept and practice of social welfare in the preponderantly French Catholic community of Quebec. Describing this development, the Boucher Report\(^1\) indicated that: "It was at this time that [Catholic] diocesan social agencies, similar to agencies in the Montreal Anglo-Canadian sector, were set up and gradually recognized as public charitable institutions without walls"\(^2\) which made it possible for the QPCA to extend assistance outside walled institutions.

In April 1937 the Quebec Legislative adopted an act providing for the payment of allowances to needy mothers. This measure was financed entirely by the province.

In the 1950s cost-sharing agreements with the federal government, regarding the financial coverage of some public assistance programs, were reached. These agreements included an universal old age pension for those seventy years of age and over (1952), assistance for disabled persons (1955) and payments to all needy unemployed persons not covered by

\(^1\)Government of Quebec, Report of the Study Committee on Public Assistance. June 1963. This Report is generally known as the J. Emile Boucher Report. (He was chairman of this committee.)

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 33.
the UIC (1959). Thus the new measures of financial assistance, which were derived from federal-provincial agreements, had now become an integral part of the Quebec welfare system.

In January 1957 a Quebec Order in Council recognized the Social Welfare Service of the City of Montreal as a "public charitable institution" with authority to dispense financial assistance at home and to place children as well as sick and aged persons. Evaluating this development, the Boucher Report wrote: "This marked the beginning of a new era in which municipal services were gradually called upon to replace private social agencies for the distribution of financial assistance at home."¹

In 1961 the Hospital Insurance Plan was introduced in Quebec, thereby falling in line with the plans of the federal Hospital Insurance Act of 1956. Also in 1961 the name of the Department of Social Welfare was changed to the Department of Family and Social Welfare. This was done to denote the intention of emphasizing the place of the family in the department’s activities.

The year 1960 constitutes a landmark in the political and social history of Quebec in modern times. This year (on June 22) the Liberal Party, under the leadership of Jean Lesage, came to power. These elections were preceded by the death (on September 18, 1959) of Maurice Duplessis who was the leader of the Union Nationale party and Premier

¹Ibid., p. 35.
of Quebec from 1936 to 1959 (with an interim break of four years, 1940-1944). Duplessis' long regime was characterized in a high degree of political, economic, social and cultural conservatism. This character was manifested by a free hand for American capital's investments, low wages to French Canadian workers, suppression of trade unions and very strong influence of the Catholic church. This spirit was also reflected in the education, health and social welfare services. These important spheres of life, in the French Canadian community, were under the full control of the Catholic church. The church actually had a free hand in administering these areas. Altogether it was an era of political, social and cultural stagnation.

Quebec society was badly in need of wide-range changes which would bring social progress and put it on the track towards a more modern, liberal society. The ideas and their proponents were there, but as long as the political power was in the hands of Duplessis no change could take place. His death in 1959 and the coming to power of Jean Lesage's Liberal Party in 1960, opened the way to far-reaching reforms in education, health and social welfare services which substantially changed the face of Quebec society. The six years of the Lesage regime (1960-1966) are accordingly known as the "Quiet Revolution." Leon Dion, a noted social scientist and specialist in political science, characterizes this period as follows (as written in 1971):
Contemporary Quebec is an excellent example of this rapidly changing world, with the multiple contradictions that divide it and sometimes tragic unrest that rocks it. Few societies have known changes as profound over a ten-year period as those Quebec has gone through. Its population patterns, its educational system, its religious observances, and its political habits have all undergone what amounts to revolution.

The momentum created by those changes—and the forces which shaped them—continued to precipitate political and social changes in Quebec to the present. One of the main goals of the "Quiet Revolution" was to weaken the ecclesiastic influence over health, education and social welfare. The striving was towards a greater role for the provincial government in all spheres of life and towards direct connection between the citizens and their government. The taking over of Hydro Quebec, the establishment of an Education Department in the Quebec government; the transfer of school administration to government dominated bodies from confessional school boards, the initiation of CEGEP and the introduction of a Medicare Program—all these reforms represented the liberal philosophy of the party in power and its ambition to modernize Quebec. These reforms, and those in the social welfare field, were part of a profound process of changes which many people in Quebec felt were long overdue. They demonstrated the new Quebec nationalism.

David Weiss\(^1\) described the mood and expectations in Quebec in the early 1960s as follows:

Ever since the Quebec Liberal Party came to power in 1960, new solutions are continuously being sought for old-new problems. In welfare, as in other fields such as education, natural resources, cultural and artistic affairs, international relations, tax policies, Quebec is on the march.\(^2\)

In December 1961, the government of Quebec decided to appoint a study committee to advise on a comprehensive policy in the field of public assistance. Order in Council No. 2369 of the Executive Council Chamber, dated December 6, 1961, specified that: "A committee would be instituted to carry out a study on welfare needs. This committee will investigate issues like allowance rates, collaboration between private and public services and financial assistance at home."\(^3\) After receiving thirty briefs, the committee published its Report in June 1963 (known as the Boucher Report) which included seventy-two recommendations. They dealt with subjects such as coordination of various government branches engaged in social welfare, structure and functions of the Department of the Family and Social Welfare, regional administration, methods of fixing public assistance.

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\(^1\) Executive Director of the Baron de Hirsch Institute during the years 1947-1970.


\(^3\) Government of Quebec, Report of the Study Committee on Public Welfare (Quebec City, June 1963). (The Chairman of that Committee was Mr. Emile Boucher.)
rates and collaboration between private and public welfare services. The recommendations reflected the social-political philosophy of the Liberal Party which called for a greater role for the government in the delivery and supervision of social welfare services. This greater responsibility of the government was aimed both at raising the standard of living of the citizens and at enhancing their notion of citizenship as against the traditional sectarian affiliations. These principles are embodied in the following recommendations:

Recommendation No. 6
The Quebec government should acknowledge, in theory and in practice, an increasingly dynamic and creative role in social security matters, and especially in the matter of financial home assistance.

Recommendation No. 7
The Quebec government should recognize explicitly, in its social legislation, as well as in the regulations governing its application, the principle according to which any individual in need is entitled to assistance from the state, whatever the immediate or remote cause of this need may be.

Recommendation No. 9
The Public Charities Act should be repealed and replaced by a new General Assistance Act.

1Ibid., pp. 213-228.
2Ibid.
3This recommendation reflects the notion that the Public Charities Act, 1921 was outdated and did not represent the social welfare needs of the time, nor new concepts which called for more government responsibility.
Recommendation No. 18
The Department of Family and Social Welfare should financially assist welfare organizations devoted to social preventive and rehabilitative measures.

Recommendation No. 32
Social agencies recognized by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council should be able to continue to administer public funds for assistance at home.

Recommendation No. 34
The Department of Family and Social Welfare should determine the relations which should exist between the Department and the recognized social agencies by means of a contract, and should also assure financial responsibilities for the agencies.

Evaluating these recommendations we may say that Nos. 6 and 7 recognize the need for more vigorous roles for the government in the social welfare arena and the right of every citizen to enjoy these services. Recommendations Nos. 18, 32, 34 encourage the government to maintain and expand its financial aid to private social welfare agencies while tightening its supervision on their budget and performance. Recommendation No. 9 calls for a new Public Charities Act which will replace the one enacted in 1921 and which would all the better reflect the social welfare needs of the time and the social philosophy of the party in power and the majority of the people.
The importance of these recommendations—which were adopted by the government—lay in the fact that they heralded the birth of the welfare state in Quebec. Because of political changes in 1966 (the fall of the Liberal government) these recommendations largely failed of translation into laws. But they expressed the spirit of the time and signaled the direction of social welfare reforms which was shortly to come.

The new Union Nationale government, which replaced the Liberal Party government in 1966, pursued social welfare and health services reforms. On November 9, 1966 it decided to establish a Commission of Inquiry on Health and Social Welfare. The Terms of Reference of this Commission are specified in The Lieutenant-Governor in Council document which reads as follows:¹

WHEREAS the health of the people is of the utmost importance, and whereas far-reaching repercussions stem from illness;

WHEREAS a health insurance system should be established;

WHEREAS hospital insurance and health insurance are two major stages in the implementation of a true health policy;

WHEREAS the two closely-related fields of health and social welfare are within the jurisdiction of Quebec;

WHEREAS it is desirable that a general inquiry be held into health and social welfare in Quebec:

THEREFORE, it has been directed, on the motion of
the Minister of Health,

THAT there be instituted, pursuant to authority under
the Commissions of Inquiry Act (S.R.Q. 1964, Chapter 11).
a commission charged with conducting an inquiry into the
entire field of health and social welfare and, without
limiting the terms of reference, this commission be
especially charged with exploring questions concerning:

(a) ownership, management and medical organization of
hospital and social welfare institutions;

(b) hospital insurance, as now in effect;

(c) establishment of health insurance;

(d) medical practice and the evolution of medical and
para-medical activity;

(e) social assistance measures and their development;

(f) the structure and role of diverse agencies and
associations engaged in health and social welfare;

(g) hygienic and preventive measures;

(h) medical and para-medical personnel and equipment;

(i) education and research;

all these matters within the framework of needs of the
family and the individual.

BE IT FURTHER enacted that this commission be charged
with inquiring into any other question which may be sub-
mitted by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council:

THAT this commission, as required by the Lieutenant-
Governor in Council or as progress of work allows, report
findings, views and recommendations to the Lieutenant-
Governor in Council and submit a final report before
January first, 1968;

THAT this commission be made up of the following
persons:

Louis-Philippe Bouchard, lawyer, of Quebec,
Claude Castonguay, actuary, of Quebec,
Jacques de la Chevrotière, administrator, of Quebec,
Dr. Jacques Dinelle, of Montreal.
Rev. Father André Guillemette, O.P., of Montreal, Dr. George A. Lachaine, of Verdun, Mrs. Jeanne-d'Arc Lemay-Warren, lawyer, of Westmount, William A. Dyson, social worker, of Montreal and

THAT Claude Castonguay act as chairman and Gérard Nepveu act as secretary of this commission.

In the introduction to the first volume, the Commission described the goals of its inquiry as follows:

The breadth of developments in social security and of the role which the state is called upon to play in the social and economic spheres requires a new definition and orientation both for organizations and individuals engaged in the health and welfare fields. It is not surprising that such transformation gave birth to lengthy debate and tension, in short, a process of collective reappraisal which manifested itself in many ways. It was within this evolutionary context that the commission was appointed by the Government of Quebec November 9, 1966 with a mandate to inquire into the entire field of health and social welfare. The essential role of the commission thus, was to present to the Government an overall approach to social security, an approach both dynamic and adapted to the needs, characteristics and resources of Quebec in the fields of health and social welfare.¹

After a thorough investigation, study and research, the Commission came out with a seven-volume report. The first volume was published in 1967; the last one in 1971. Following are the titles of the seven volumes:

1) Health

2) Insurance

3) Interns and Residents

4) Development

5) Health

¹Ibid., p. XI.
6) Social Services

7) a) Profession and Security

b) Profit Making Institutions

The investigation of the Inquiry Commission was the most thorough and profound ever held in Quebec. Its comprehensive report is a milestone in the development of Quebec as a welfare state.

The Commission's studies and recommendations, submitted to the Government of Quebec in the course of five years, supplied the foundations for a more comprehensive legislation relating to the reorganization of health and social services in Quebec—Bill No. 65 (1971) which became Quebec Statutes 20th Elizabeth II. Chapter 48 (1971).

What were the purposes of the Castonguay Report? Clearly, it was a policy paper which equipped the government with both a philosophy and an action plan for health and social welfare services in Quebec. It was a blueprint for far-reaching social legislation on the way toward the creation of a welfare state. It was an expression of the same spirit and philosophy which brought about the reforms in education (such as the establishment of CEGEP) and in health services (such as the Medicare Act) during the 1960s. In the center of this policy stood the transfer of the control of education, social welfare and health institutions away from sectarian and religious organizations to the government and the supply of these services on a universal basis to
every resident of the province. It called for the nationalization of most health and social welfare services. It also aimed to strengthen relationships between the government and the people of Quebec by the direct supply of essential services.

The Castonguay Report had several central ideas:

1) More efficient and effective social services to be accomplished through more government legislation, financing and supervision.

2) More democratic services by greater involvement of those affected by the services. This to be achieved by participation of consumers of health and social welfare services in the Boards and Committees of welfare and health institutions with the intention of changing the relationships between the clients and the organizations which deliver the services. The old paternalistic approach should be replaced by the democratic principle of participation.

3) Decentralizing of social welfare services to regions and delivering the services in each area through a regional social service center.

The following is a statement by Claude Forget, adviser to the Castonguay Commission, Assistant Deputy Minister of Social Affairs in 1970-1973 and Minister of Social Affairs during 1973-1976. Speaking about the goals of Bill 65 he said:
I have already mentioned two things: integrated system approach [of health and social welfare services] and the idea of citizen participation and consumer involvement. I think these two will be the most important. But there was a subsidiary one. There was a need, also, to put some order into the government's own policy and attitudes with respect to this entire field.1

In viewing the character of the public welfare system, one should notice that a conflict might arise between the interests of bureaucratic efficiency and the democratic process. On the one hand there is the bureaucratic need to draw the maximum services from a given budget and manpower according to the principles of modern-day administration. On the other hand there is the liberal wish for democratization of the system; namely, participation by the consumers of social welfare in decision making and supervision. These two principles may contradict each other.

Also, there are questions about the real nature of democracy on the Boards of health and social welfare institutions compared with what was envisaged by the Castonguay Report and Bill 65. It seems that the overall balance tipped in the bureaucratic direction at the expense of real democracy. There are, on the Boards of the public welfare institutions, elected representatives of the consumers and the socio-economic environment but the real power still remains in the hands of the bureaucrats backed by government regulations and money. This issue has a great significance for the clients.

1In a taped interview, dated October 24, 1977.
of social welfare organizations and the volunteers who contribute money and time. A bureaucratic organization, and especially a public one, tends to be more impersonal in its dealings with clients and to diminish the role of volunteers in management and field activity in favour of professional social workers. It is doubtful whether the principle, and rhetoric, of democratic participation can compensate for the loss of personal atmosphere and the decline of volunteers' activity which are characteristic of modern bureaucratic organizations. It goes without saying that these developments were of great concern to private, mostly ethnic and sectarian, social welfare agencies.

We shall see, later on in this study, that these questions stood in the center of the debate within the Jewish community of Montreal and with the government of Quebec with respect to the attitude it should adopt towards the nationalization of health and welfare services in Quebec as per Bill 65. This Bill was approved by the National Assembly and became a law on December 24, 1971. Officially it is known as "An Act respecting health and social services, 1971."¹ This Act carries 168 sections and it became the legal framework for a comprehensive reorganization of health and social services in Quebec since 1971.² It is stipulated in the Act

¹Sections of this Act which have bearing on Jewish social welfare are included in Appendix A.

²Statutes of Quebec, 1971, chapter 48. The Act was amended three times: Statutes of Quebec 1974, chapter 42; Statutes of Quebec 1975, chapter 61; Statutes of Quebec 1975, chapter 62.
that health and social services in Quebec should be organized on a regional basis. In each region four public establishments (public organizations) will operate: a) Local Community Service Centre (for first aid, information and referral); b) Hospital Centre; c) Reception Centre (a custodial institution); and d) Social Services Centre (for specific welfare services). The population will participate in the supervision of these establishments through representation in the Board of Directors and through the yearly information meetings. Every public establishment must render services to everyone residing in the area covered by that establishment. The public establishment will be fully financed by the government.

We have seen that in 1920, the beginning of the period considered in this study, Quebec society was largely rural, traditional and conservative. Government involvement in health and social welfare services was minimal. The masters of these services were denominational organizations. Since then many changes have taken place in Quebec, mostly since the early 1960s. In a short period of fifteen years (1960-1975) Quebec has acquired many features of the modern welfare state. In 1975 it had its health and social welfare services almost fully nationalized. Inevitably these substantial changes were accompanied by tension between the traditional organizations and the government. We, of course, are concerned with the impact of these developments on Jewish
communal welfare. In Chapter 9 we shall examine the attitudes of Jewish communal social welfare towards government involvement in social welfare before the enactment of Bill 65 in 1971 and in Chapter 10 we shall analyze the attitudes towards Bill 65. In the next section we shall briefly examine the relations between public and private social welfare.

Public Welfare System and Private Social Welfare

Since governments began to be involved, through legislation and financing, with social security, the entire arena of social welfare services gradually changed. The private social welfare agencies had to adjust themselves, in most cases reluctantly, to the new facts in this field. In North America it started during the depression years of the thirties and expanded considerably after World War II.

It goes without saying that the Jewish private welfare agency confronted the same changes as did non-Jewish agencies. We are, of course, interested in the impact of these changes on Jewish communal welfare. But, before we proceed to describe and analyze relations between Jewish welfare and public welfare, it is necessary to shed some light on the character of the relations between the private welfare agency and the public welfare system.

Until the beginning of this century the private social welfare agency, whose work was based on volunteers.
was the master of social welfare services. But after World War I crucial changes began to take place. At the outset the changes were slow and scant but as the decades of the century went by the changes became more and more intensive and accelerated. They were precipitated by the growing human and social problems of the industrial and urbanized society, by the development of psychological theory and research, by the enhancement of the philosophy of social justice and by the rise in public demand for more government responsibility in the solution of social problems.

Rapidly growing needs, the advent of the welfare state, the expansion of social philosophy, the development of business administration practice, and the rise of social work as a profession presented to the private agency overwhelming financial demands with which it hardly could cope. It was in a very compelling need for financial help.

Gradually government became a prominent partner in the social welfare field by legislation and financing. All these developments inevitably changed the character of the private social welfare agency. The latter had to adjust itself to the new reality of more government involvement and to relinquish some of its ethnic roles as well as to change its programs, structure and functions. The greater concern was that growing government involvement and bureaucratization would weaken the element of voluntarism, which was considered indispensable for human social welfare. There was also a
fear that growing government involvement and control would jeopardize the ethnic or sectarian character of many social welfare agencies. Sectarian welfare agencies which received government funds were requested to become less sectarian and serve everyone on a geographical basis. This, for example, was the case in the United States after the 1930s. There were, however, positive views about growing government intervention in the supply of social welfare services.

Lester B. Granger favorably described the influence of the growing government involvement on the private agency in the U.S.A. as follows:

The vast "encroachment" by government into operational areas that had previously been considered the province of the voluntary field necessitated a recasting of functions if the voluntary agencies were to avoid the charge of operating expensive duplicating services. The resultant shifts have paid a two-way dividend. Maintenance needs, on the whole, are now met more adequately [by the government] than would ever have been possible through voluntary resources. At the same time voluntary agencies, relieved of their earlier responsibility for providing financial assistance, have been able to concentrate on other services and activities (like psychological and family counselling) that have benefited the whole welfare field.

In discussing the role of government and its impact on private social welfare, Lester B. Granger added:

The enlarged role of government in welfare may be regarded as the most dramatic social development of this century. It would seem unrealistic not to expect

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that government's role in social welfare will continue to expand in the future and that the function of voluntary agencies will be further modified in consequence. 1

In the next chapters we shall examine the implication of these issues within Jewish communal welfare.
CHAPTER 4

JEWISH COMMUNAL WELFARE IN MODERN TIMES

Our study concentrates on the changes which occurred during the last sixty years, in the Montreal Jewish communal welfare. Jewish communal welfare in this city has, of course, its roots in the traditional Jewish social welfare. But its nature, structure, roles and programs have been greatly changed in this century. The changes largely reflect the developments which Jewish communal welfare have gone through in modern times, especially in the United States. Because of the geographical proximity and the similar cultural background, Jewish communal welfare services in Canada and the United States have developed along parallel lines and shared many similar characteristics and problems. Therefore, an examination of major developments of Jewish communal welfare in modern times, with focus on the United States, is necessary.

Looking into the history of Jewish communal welfare would help us to answer, in the next chapter, a crucial question, namely, what are the distinctive characteristics that make Jewish social welfare "Jewish," especially in the modern age? It would also illuminate some of the problems
of Jewish welfare in the modern age. Accordingly, this chapter will include the following sections:

a) Traditional Jewish communal welfare
b) Jewish communal organization in modern times
c) Jewish identity in the United States
d) Jewish communal organization in the United States
e) Jewish communal welfare and the public welfare system in the United States.

Traditional Jewish Social Welfare

During the Middle Ages and early modern times, Jewish social welfare in the Diaspora, like all other communal services, was a part of the self-governing community organization. This meant that the Jewish community was responsible for the delivery of Tzedakah (charity) through some designated institutions operated by a semi-autonomous community. By being a self-governing entity (in charge of religious, cultural, social welfare and judicial affairs), the Jewish community in the Middle Ages both accommodated itself to the social and political structure of Europe and answered the need for self-preservation. It accommodated itself to the political and social structure because the Middle Ages society was composed of semi-independent corporations, such as the feudal estate, the guild, the church, and the Jewish community. This sociopolitical structure presupposed a high degree of self-government within the
various groups in a given country. Jewish self-government fitted well into this structure. The Jews were permitted to administer their religious, judicial, educational and welfare activities through their self-governing communal organizations. Thus the sociopolitical structure of pre-Modern Europe helped the Jews to maintain their communal organizations and preserve their own special ways of life as a semiautonomous community. Charity institutions occupied a central place within the community organization.

What was the character of traditional Jewish social welfare in a typical community in Europe up to the nineteenth century? The basic idea was that doing charity was a Mitzva (in Hebrew: Divine Commandment; Good Deed; Merit). The deed of charity was considered to be an act of righteousness and justice. It was morally requested, religiously sanctioned, and socially rewarded. Charity had to be performed because, satisfying the needs of the poor, besides being a value by itself, helped to enhance cohesiveness and strengthen feelings of belongingness within the Jewish community.

The various aspects of Tzedakah in the European Jewish community (known as the "shtetl," which is "small town") were not left to individual luck or caprice. They were institutionalized into a network of communal organizations. Zborowski and Herzog describe the structure of social welfare in the shtetl.
In each shtetl there are a number of institutions devoted to community services. As a matter of course they are centered round the synagogue, which is the hub of all shtetl affairs. Each shtetl has its quota of organizations and often each congregation in a shtetl will have several.\(^1\)

Generally in every community charity included the following services. Each of them was aimed at a specific need:

1) Malbish Arumim (clothing of the naked)
2) Oyzer Dalim (distribution of alms)
3) Hakhnoses Koleh (help to the bride)
4) Beys Yessoymim (orphanage)
5) Talmud Toyrah (free school for orphans and poor)
6) Bikkur Khoylim (help to the sick)
7) Hakhnoses Orkhim (shelter to indigent strangers)
8) Moyshav Zkeynim (home for the aged)
9) Khevreh Kadisha (Association in charge of burial)
10) Omilus Kheyyed (free loans)\(^2\)

Officially the functions of the shtetl community organization have been confined to religious, educational and welfare activities. But in practice, a large measure of local autonomy has been granted to the shtetl organization. The local governments retained active jurisdiction in matters of criminal law, levied taxes, exacted military

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\(^2\)Ibid., pp. 203-204.
service, punished offenders against the law of the land and issued special edicts. Other areas of life, however, were largely left to the control of the community. As a rule, the community self-governing organization was religiously sanctioned. Jurisdiction was based on the Jewish Law (Halacha). If there was a central community administration and council (in Hebrew, Kahal or Kehila) it centered about the main synagogue of the shtetl. One can sum up the characteristics of traditional Jewish communal welfare as follows:

1) It was considered a religious commandment
2) It was centered around the synagogue
3) It was a part of the Jewish community self-governing organization.

**Jewish Communal Organization in Modern Times**

The rise of the nation-state in early modern times (seventeenth and eighteenth centuries), the emancipation of the Jews in Western and Central Europe since its beginning in France in 1791, and the gradual granting of citizenship rights during the nineteenth century, profoundly changed the traditional Jewish society in Western and Central Europe. A process of social disintegration began late in the eighteenth century when more and more emancipated Jews disconnected themselves from the bonds of the traditional way of life within the socially closed Jewish community and
assimilated into the non-Jewish society. This process was accompanied with a new way of Jewish religious practice, manifested by Reform Judaism. Inevitably the changes in the political and social status of the Jews in Western and Central Europe during the nineteenth century, led to the disintegration of the traditional Jewish society, the decline in the authority of the religious leaders, and the weakening of the self-governing communal organization. Concurrently, the task of maintaining cohesive Jewish communal organization became more and more difficult because of the geographical spread and social and religious diversification of the Jewish population, mainly in the big cities. The granting of civil rights to the Jews in Western and Central Europe changed their political status and their relations with the state, as it did to non-Jews.

The concept, and interests, of the centralized nation-state could not tolerate the existence of semi-autonomous corporations, including the self-governing Jewish community, which was typical to the Middle Ages. Such a corporation contradicted the very notion of citizenship which is based on direct relations between the individual and the state. It also implied the responsibility, however it was interpreted, of the state to its own citizens. Under the impact of this philosophy, the whole concept of self-governed corporations, Jewish and non-Jewish, had to give way to the new reality. Consequently, a process of gradual
erosion in the authority of the Jewish community organization took place. Once Jews in Western and Central Europe were granted citizenship, they were expected to relinquish some of their self-government functions and apply directly to the state institutions. The centralized state wanted to exercise some form of control over communal affairs and to transfer some functions to the state. Functions which had previously been imposed on the institutions of the community, such as the collection of promissory notes and the liquidation of business because of bankruptcy, were now transferred to government officials.¹

The disintegration of Jewish traditional society in modern times was mainly caused by the enlightenment and the emancipation. These processes caused secularization of Jewish life and diversification of religious attitudes and practices. This disintegration was further accelerated by massive socioeconomic changes which took place in Europe and America during the nineteenth century: rapid industrialization, growing concentration in the big cities and mass immigration. These developments, too, helped to change the character of the Jewish society in modern times and to make it more diversified, more geographically scattered, more secular and more loosely organized. All these changes posed serious challenges to Jewish communal life in modern times.

and consequently to Jewish continuity. There was a clear need for a new structure of communal life which would adequately respond to the changes in the status of the Jews and the decline in the authority of the traditional leaders. The determination to maintain communal organization persisted but the vehicles to attain this goal had to be modified and adjusted to the new circumstances.

In the arena of Jewish communal welfare a new institution emerged. This was the secular charity organization society modeled according to the contemporary non-Jewish welfare societies. These charity societies were not the domain of only religiously oriented Jews as was the case in the traditional Jewish community before emancipation. Traditionally motivated people, but not orthodox observants, who were concerned about the continuity of Jews as an ethnic group, organized Jewish social welfare through these secular societies. To many of them, Jewish secular philanthropy replaced religious observance as the main vehicle of Jewish identity. They devoted themselves to Jewish philanthropy as fervently as orthodox Jews devoted themselves to religious practice. Thus the Jewish charity society in modern times became a major base of communal activities, not less important than the synagogue.

Nowhere was the need to change the patterns of Jewish communal life so compelling as in the United States since the end of the nineteenth century. Until the turn of
the century Jewish life was mainly centered around the family, the "Landsmanschaft" (association of immigrants who came from the same country, region, or town) and the synagogue. A Jewish community organization encompassing most of the associations and societies in a given town or suburb under one communal roof, did not exist. Education, culture, health and welfare activities were carried out on a parochial basis almost without coordination with other Jewish endeavors. This situation was even more reinforced with the waves of mass immigration beginning in the early 1880s. The new immigrants established in their new land the community patterns inherited from the old traditional way of life in the small shtetls of Europe. But the old patterns of Jewish communal life could not stand the new conditions in the United States. The concentration in big cities, the new types of industrial occupations (such as the garment industry), the needs of adjustment to new culture and the rapid process of secularization of Jewish life, all these called for a new model of Jewish communal organization. The new patterns of American Jewish community organization have evolved out of a continuous interplay between the conditions of American society, Jewish group needs, and Jewish historical imperatives.

The first two decades of this century witnessed the emergence of a new form of Jewish community organization in the Western World. The pressure of urban life amid mass
Jewish immigration, and rapidly growing welfare needs, helped to create an important trend in Jewish communal organization. That is, the amalgamation of many small parochial charity societies into larger, city-wide, federations. The late nineteenth century American experience with charity organization societies encouraged the unification of various Jewish relief societies in the United States into a community-wide welfare society. This was the beginning of the welfare federations in Jewish communities which became the dominating type of Jewish communal organization in North America\(^1\) and Western Europe.

A question arises: what really changed with the shift from religiously based charity to the federated secular charity? Was it only a change in the form of the organization, in the vehicle of Jewish welfare? Or, did it entail changes in philosophy and methods? In view of the substantial changes which took place in the life of the Jews in the United States since the 1880s and the rise of modern social welfare, one can safely say that there were changes in methods and philosophy.

The formation of federated Jewish welfare organizations was not only an amalgamation of smaller charity societies. It involved new approaches and goals such as:

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1) Instead of simply trying to meet the needs of the dependent needy there was a much more self-conscious concern to overcome all forms of dependency.

2) There was more concern in retraining dependent people, and new immigrants, for new industries.

3) There was a self-conscious concern to free these programs from the influence of the synagogues.

4) There was an inclination to utilize so-called modern methods of social welfare administration related to contemporary ideas of "scientific" charity.

We may now turn to a closer examination of Jewish identity and Jewish communal organization in North America.

Jewish Identity in the United States

The array of changes in Jewish life in North America inevitably arouses the issue of Jewish identity. The question is how Jewish identity in North America was expressed and maintained. The new patterns of communal organization were, in part, shaped by the answers to this question. Since the beginning of Jewish mass immigration to North America in the 1880s, there have been several answers to this question. Some Jews have continued to attach to religious orthodoxy; others expressed their identity by secular-cultural orientation such as the Yiddish language, press and literature; others supported Zionism and Israel; many associated themselves with communal organizations as a channel
of expressing and maintaining their Jewish identity. All of them shared the need and search for Jewish identity.

Glazer\(^1\) sees in all these sentiments, feelings and activities one common denominator. This is the determination to remain a Jew. He puts it this way:

We must begin with something that has not happened: this negative something is the strongest and most significant religious reality among American Jews; it is that the Jews have not stopped being Jews . . . they still choose to be Jews, they do not cast off the yoke or burden of the Jewish heritage.\(^2\)

Glazer explains that Jews in America know that these feelings and commitments may demand something of them and to that demand they would not answer no. They are prepared to be some kind of a Jew and they are capable of being moved and reached for a Jewish cause.

Glazer notes\(^3\) that a kind of shifting balance has been maintained whereby each generation and group could relate itself meaningfully to some kind of Jewish activity. It is the course of events that has dictated what activity would become more prominent at any given time. At one time, and for some Jews, it was philanthropy; at another time, and for other Jews, it was Zionism or Yiddish culture or Jewish socialism.


\(^2\)Ibid., p. 139.

\(^3\)Ibid., p. 140.
While accepting Glazer's statement we would like to emphasize its most important point which is that in the search for Jewish identity in the New World, Jews have channeled their communal activities into secular organizations and were not attached anymore only to those centered around the synagogue.

Following Glazer's concept of shifting focuses in the expression of Jewish identity, Neusner asserts that in the United States the primary mode of being Jewish has moved from the narrow circle of home, family and small group to the great areas of public affairs and large institutions. Neusner notes that the formation of large organizations is characteristic of modern life and that the participation of Jews in communal organizations satisfies their needs both as Jews and as members of the American middle class. For middle-class American Jews joining ethnic organizations and associations is a major avenue of both social life and ethnic identity. To support this point Neusner cites an excerpt of an essay by Harold Weisberg who describes the patterns and ideology of Jewish communal organization in the United States. In his essay Weisberg explains


2 Ibid., p. 16.

3 Ibid., pp. 16-20.

Programs, plans and organizations are precisely what appeal to most American Jews. Not only are their ideological ambitions considerably less demanding than those of the intellectuals and independent theologians, they usually can be fulfilled in an institutional manner. In fact, one of the distinguishing features of community ideologies is their capacity for programmatic translation. The search for community and identity among most American Jews is a very practical undertaking and the genius of the Jewish community is organization. Jewish life in the United States is expressed primarily through a culture of organizations. To be a Jew is to belong to an organization. To manifest Jewish culture is to carry on, individually or collectively, the programs of an organization.  

He states that:

The activity which overwhelmingly dominates American Jewish life is organizational and the ways in which most Jews are "Jewish" are the institutional ways of the synagogue, the center, the welfare fund and the service agency.  

Weisberg especially emphasizes the identification of organizational tasks with Jewish culture. He notes that:

It is already a standard practice to identify attending meetings, raising funds, speaking or listening to speeches and participating in testimonial dinners with what was once called "a Jewish way of life." These activities do not exhaust Jewish life but they come quite close to it. What distinguishes the Jew from the non-Jew is, increasingly, not a special ethnic, religious discipline, or language, but the intensity and pervasiveness of his organizational commitments and activities. That part of Jewish culture which was once expressed in face to face situations, in the home, in the street, or through the medium of a special group language has largely disappeared and, as we shall soon see, the great religious discipline which in the past pervaded every aspect of individual and communal life is missing. At present Jewish culture in the United States is predominantly what Jews do under the auspices of Jewish organizations.  

1Ibid., p. 300.  
2Ibid., p. 301-302.  
3Ibid., p. 300.
accommodate to the fact that the government was going to be a partner primus inter pares in the supply of social services. It was obvious, too, that the private social welfare structure would soon be affected by more government legislation, coordination and supervision.

For Jewish communal welfare in Montreal it was a time of reflection concerning imminent developments. After many years of independent, communal social welfare, the big challenge was soon to come, following Bill 65. This challenge and its repercussions on communal Jewish welfare will be analyzed in chapter 10.

The Fourth Stage: A Fully Publicly Funded Jewish Agency (from 1974 on)

This is the contemporary stage which began in April 1974 when the Baron de Hirsch Institute became a public welfare establishment fully funded by the government. This phase will be discussed in chapters 10 and 11.

As we have seen, the transitions from one stage to the other were characterized by a great deal of reluctance on the part of the Jewish community's social welfare leaders. In 1940 the BdeHI agreed to receive QPCA grants only seven years after the government had decided to give these grants to "institutions without walls"; that is, to the sectarian welfare agencies, for assisting individuals and families in their homes. In 1960 they reluctantly agreed to transfer relief payments to the municipal government and this only
after much deliberation and hesitation. In chapter 10 we shall note the painstaking process, the heated discussions and the high tension that the leaders of AJCS and B'neHI had experienced before they decided to join the public welfare system according to Bill 65 (1971).

A major question that arises is: why were the Jewish welfare leaders so reluctant during all historical stages to permit an increasing government involvement in Jewish communal welfare? This notwithstanding the facts that the government was gradually offering more funding for the agency, and the social welfare needs of the Jewish community, broadly defined, were steadily growing.

We believe there are some answers to this question. The best way to understand why Jewish welfare leaders basically opposed government involvement is to look for their motives and goals. Their suspicion of government intervention always existed, even when they had to yield to reality and receive increasing government grants. Actually they objected to any non-Jewish intrusion, governmental or nongovernmental (e.g. to the unification with non-Jewish sectarian agencies into one large city-wide welfare organization).

An interesting explanation of the leaders' motivation is offered by Mr. David Rome, a social historian of Jewish life in Canada and National Archivist of the Canadian Jewish Congress.1 Rome believes that the opposition to government

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1In a taped interview, dated July 1, 1977.
involvement was rooted in the social and cultural background of the lay leaders themselves and in basic historical features of Jewish welfare.

Jewish communal welfare in Montreal, since the early days, was the creation and mission of the economic and social upper class in the Jewish community. These wealthy Jews, for many years, have been both the chief contributors and dispensers of welfare funds.

Rome claims that the welfare activity of the leaders of Jewish welfare "had little to do with the thing called charitableness or feeling of charity, or tradition," and he adds: "It was not the most compassionate element of Jewish society which was active in charity work, nor the most socially progressive."

Rome sees six elements in the motivation of Jewish welfare leaders which may explain their reluctance to accept government involvement:

1. The element of Jewish identity. The people who created the Jewish welfare system in Montreal had an identity problem. They belonged to the upper economic class, but they were not assimilated Jews and they did not want to become assimilated. They identified themselves as Jews and had a very strong awareness of being Jewish. Their problem was how to express and define their Jewishness. They could do it only by using religious terms and rationale in a broad sense. Rome put it as follows:
They could identify themselves as Jews only by religion. They were not Jews by nationality because the concept of Jewish nationality either was not born yet, or had not reached them yet; they were not Jewish culturally; their language was not Yiddish or Hebrew; religion in the traditional sense of the word played no part in their life. They were not Talmudic scholars nor ardent observers of the Mitzwot [the Jewish commandment] ... they did not dress like old world orthodox Jews, and could not be recognized as Jews. ... In point of fact, they were not really religious Jews. But they had to identify themselves formally as religious Jews. Where could these people find their spiritual home? Where could they be really Jews and identify themselves comfortably without falsehood? In the synagogue their identification was a pretense. They found a genuine substitute, a very genuine and profound substitute for their religion and for their cultural performance, in philanthropy. And they could honestly speak about charity as being a form of religious structure.

For them any risk to the Jewishness of their welfare system was a risk to their primary channel of Jewish identification.

This explanation of Jewish identity as a major motive for the charity activity of upper-class laymen is congruent with Weinfeld's notion of "affective identity" (chapter 2). According to Weinfeld this is a subjective, personal type of ethnic identity which coexists with strong assimilationist trends. For these people, deeply immersed into the Montreal upper-class English culture, Jewish charity work was almost the only way of expressing their ethnic identity which they were not ready to give up.

2. The social element. Welfare activity gave the members of the Jewish economic upper class a social milieu. Rome further observes that:
They had more meetings per week in the 1900's, 1910's, and 1920's than you have today in the Allied Jewish Community Services. They spent days and nights there. It was an important social activity, and it was all Judaism; it was a substitute for the nearest thing they could have, the synagogue.

3. The element of Jewish immigration. It is well known that the immigration authorities of Canada were very concerned about the ability of new immigrants to support themselves. They tried to avoid "pauper immigration" lest the immigrants would become a "public charge."

Many of the Jewish welfare clients were, of course, new immigrants. Applying to the government for funds could jeopardize new Jewish immigration to Canada by raising the allegation that the Jewish immigrants were a public charge. The leaders of the Jewish community were determined to prove that they could take care of their own brothers and thus keep the doors open.

4. The element of independent communal services.

As we know from the history of Jewish communal services in Montreal, it all began with welfare. The very name of the first roof-organization, the Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of Montreal, founded in 1915, shows it. In the passage of time the welfare structure of the community, i.e., the federation, went much beyond charity alone. The Allied Jewish Community Services, which succeeded the federation, now includes recreation agencies, a vocational counselling agency and a Jewish public library,
to mention only a few agencies serving all elements in the community. In a word, the former welfare structure with a limited clientele, which was the core of the allied Jewish communal services, became a comprehensive overall community structure. This is why the leaders were so sensitive to government involvement. As Rome put it:

The communal roof-organization was still a welfare organization. All of it was identified with Judaism. It was felt that all Judaism came under attack when the government stepped in. And they knew from the beginning the full importance of the government attack.

It is clear, according to Rome, that any government intervention in the management of welfare agencies was perceived as an intrusion into the very heart of independent Jewish communal organization.

5. The welfare standard element. On a comparative basis, it was fairly well recognized that the standard of sectarian Jewish aid to welfare clients was always higher than that of non-Jewish sectarian welfare. The small group of wealthy Jews, who created and maintained the Jewish welfare structure, was able to maintain a comparatively high degree of welfare services in the small community. There was always, therefore, a reluctance toward government intervention or unification with non-Jewish social agencies. The fear was that the standard of Jewish welfare would be lowered by cooperation or amalgamation with a wider range of non-Jewish welfare agencies. Rome concludes on this that: "They found the government intrusion as an attack by the poor"
society on the richer, smaller society, trying to benefit from it."

6. **The class implication.** This is not, necessarily, a mere Jewish element. It applies, generally, to the economic upper class that was in charge of welfare for many years. Any governmental step to take over some welfare services was considered a radical step. It smacked of socialism. It removed the economic upper class from a very important area with which they were concerned, welfare. It was considered a very strong attack on the economic upper class, Jewish as well as Christian. As Rome put it: "It took away from them the privilege of being charitable."

One need not necessarily agree with the entirety of Rome's analysis, to find some of his arguments very convincing. In this analysis he has provided an illuminating background to the motives of Jewish welfare leaders and their attitude toward public intervention with "Jewish Identity," "Social Element," and "Independence Element" as the major factors.

Nevertheless, it would appear that Rome underplays the basic charitable feelings of the welfare leaders. Jewish welfare tradition and real charitable feelings of "care for your own poor," must have played some role in the laymen's decision to dedicate much of their time and money to Jewish welfare. One must assume that some of their motives were not of the self-serving type.
These feelings, together with other considerations and interests, helped create a strong and viable Jewish welfare system of which they were very proud, but also jealous and suspicious of any kind of external intervention. It was mainly the pressure of growing needs which compelled the Jewish community leaders to compromise with the reality of increasing government involvement in social welfare in Quebec.

In conclusion, we may say that both the manifest and latent functions of the communal welfare institution played a role in shaping the relationships between the Jewish and the public welfare systems.

We may discern some degree of conflict between the manifest function of delivering social welfare services to the Jewish community and the latent function of fostering intra-group communications within the Jewish ethnic population. While the former calls for more government funds in order to improve the quality and expand the scope of the services, the latter would tend to minimize government intervention in order to preserve communal control and protect the intra-group communications of the ethnic institution.

As we have noticed, there was a general consensus that public funds should be accepted as long as they don't jeopardize the control of the community over its social welfare services. The great debate within the community broke out in 1971, when it became obvious that the
continuation, and expansion, of public funding involved public control.

Another latent function, namely the personal vested interests of laymen and professionals, also played an important role in shaping attitudes but in a more subtle way. Here, we may assume the existence of some latent conflict between the interests of the professional social workers and the laymen leaders with regard to government funding. While the former were interested in more funding in order to finance their new programs (which, of course, enhanced their position in the agency), the latter were apprehensive that the increasing availability of noncommunal funds, concomitantly with declining communal funding, would weaken their position vis-à-vis the professional executives (who were the manipulators of government funds).

We shall see, in chapter 10, that all these considerations would play an important role in the debate around Bill 65.
CHAPTER 10.

THE CHALLENGES OF BILL 65 (1971)

The Transition Years (1971-1973)

The Motives and Goals of Bill 65

When the Minister of Social Affairs, Mr. Claude Castonguay, presented to the National Assembly of Quebec, in August 1971, "An Act to Organize Health Services and Social Services," it was the culmination of a process of social legislation which began with the "Quiet Revolution" in Quebec during the early 1960s. The Act was presented as Bill 65 and was passed by the National Assembly in December 1971 as Statutes of Quebec, 1971, Chapter 48. ¹

This major step in the government's social welfare legislation was preceded, during the second half of the 1960s, by other important acts such as the Social Aid Act (providing financial assistance), Quebec Hospital Act, the Health Insurance Act (Medicare), and the CEGEP Act. All these acts were motivated by the same concern. It was the expressed wish of successive governments in Quebec, since the early

¹See chapter 3 for detailed description and overall assessment of Bill 65.
1960s, to strengthen the authority of the province over and against the ecclesiastic organizations, mainly the Catholic church which was the largest and most influential. This was achieved by legislation which gradually transferred education, health and social welfare authority from the religious and sectarian organizations to the control of the government of the province.

The architect of Bill 65, Mr. Claude Castonguay, was the man who had chaired the Commission of Enquiry into Health and Social Welfare in Quebec. The reports of the Commission (published by the Ministry of Social Affairs, Quebec, during the years 1967-1971) formulated the philosophy, the foundations and the goals of Bill 65. The thrust of the Bill was to move Quebec's health and social services in the direction of uniform and integrated health and social services for citizens throughout the province. This Bill intended to cut across an existing network of sectarian health and social services which, for historical reasons, were unevenly organized. In the Province of Quebec there were pockets of excellent services (mainly in the big cities) and areas of less developed services (mostly in rural Quebec). The aim of the Bill was to supply equal and efficient health and welfare services to all the citizens of Quebec throughout the province.

This policy was strongly connected with another phenomenon—the "French Fact." This was a time of soaring
nationalistic feelings among French Quebecers, as always, expressed through efforts to achieve cultural and linguistic autonomy and to improve the socioeconomic conditions of the majority of the population of this province. It was perceived by politicians, intellectuals and media (mostly in the French-speaking section) that the way to attain these goals was by continually strengthening the government of the province. An obstacle in the way was the control of education, health and social welfare services by ethnic religious organizations. There was a need to take over these services from religious control and put them under government, or public, authority on an universal basis.

In keeping with these goals, the government took a variety of legislative steps. All of them meant strengthening its authority by taking control over important public services. Bill 65 was a part of this general process. Its antisectional posture was, mainly, motivated by the wish to weaken sectarian social welfare and health services in Quebec. Another concern of Bill 65 was to put an end to the paternalistic approach of religious social welfare agencies to their clients. The Bill aimed to introduce more democratization to the social welfare services by the participation of consumers and other interested groups (such as professionals, social workers and university staff) in the decision-making and supervisory bodies.

For the purpose of our discussion it is necessary to point out that the Bill was considered to be ominous by the
leaders of Jewish welfare because:

1. It would virtually outlaw sectarianism in social welfare services, both in publicly and privately funded agencies.

2. It would provide for government funding only to the public agency.

3. It would relegate the public agency's administration to a small board of directors with limited decision-making power.

4. It would provide for a highly centralized structure of health and social services in the province, with ultimate control residing in the Ministry of Social Affairs.

5. It stipulated twelve regions in Quebec which will be the geographical-administrative units for the supply of health and social services. The Montreal region was planned to incorporate all the sectarian social welfare agencies on the island into one social service centre.

6. In every region only one social service centre would be established.

Mr. Claude Castonguay, the Minister of Social Affairs during the years 1970-1973, described the need for and functions of the social service centres as follows:

As specialized centres, the social service centres are primarily responsible for services aimed at restoring to individuals and groups their independence and their sense of responsibility. The centres also furnish services which, on account of their regional dimension and their application to specific groups, require close coordination and are therefore more efficiently administered on a regional basis. In their role as regional agencies in charge of
specialized services, the social service centres will also be responsible for coordinating social services in schools, hospital centres and reception centres. And in the same address he added:

The case for regional social service centres rests chiefly on the fact that, by their very nature, the programs administered by these centres require specialized psychosocial action and regional coordination. Moreover, we consider regional centres the prerequisite of any improvement in the present system whose shortcomings we have just described.

Mr. Castonguay concluded his address with the following words:

My department will, of course, continue to do its full share toward the establishment of regional social service centres. I am convinced that all those who now serve as voluntary helpers in various organizations know how important it is to endow Quebec with an efficient and coordinated social service system that truly meets the needs of the population.

An important insight into the motives and goals of the people who were the architects of Bill 65 was offered by Mr. Claude Forget, Assistant Deputy Minister of Social Affairs until the resignation of Mr. Castonguay in November 1973. Then from November 14, 1973 to November 15, 1976 he served as the Minister of Social Affairs. In an interview, Mr. Forget explained the goals of the Department of Social Affairs with regard to Bill 65 as follows:

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1 Address delivered by Mr. Claude Castonguay, Minister of Social Affairs, before the Annual Meeting of the Allied Jewish Community Services, Montreal, May 9, 1973.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.
The goals of Bill 65 are several. One, to make sure that the various institutions that were increasingly being funded entirely by the government at the time and were active in health and social welfare fields, would operate as an integrated system of institutions, a network of institutions; that overlapping of institutions should be diminished or even reduced completely; and that there would be a systematic approach to health and social welfare, and a comprehensive approach to health and social problems, so that individual citizens in need of some attention, either because of health or social reason, could find a balanced integrated response. 

This was a very important element, the systematic approach to social and health problems and the assertion combined with this that health and social services could not be disassociated, that they are two sides of the same coin. This may have been the foremost objective of pursuance.

There are other complementary objectives; one is to encourage an involvement by citizens in the affairs of various institutions because of the view that the Commission\(^1\) had taken, especially on the Francophone and Catholic side, that these institutions had a high degree of paternalism. This came in origin, from the church heritage to do good, to hand down from on high certain advantages and benefits. There was a need felt, at the time, and this was in the late sixties, of more democracy and general participation. The Commission caught this concept of the time and the law was planned, partly at least, to give substance to these views.

Now I have already mentioned two things: an integrated system approach, and the idea of citizens' participation and consumers' involvement. I think these two will be the most important. But there was a subsidiary one. There was a need, also, to put some order into the government's own policy and attitudes with respect to this entire field.

Mr. Forget's statement about the need for an "integrated system" (of health and social welfare services) seems to reflect two major concerns:

\(^1\)The Commission of Inquiry on Health and Social Welfare (known as the Castonguay Commission).

\(^2\)In a taped interview, dated October 24, 1977.
1. Efficiency. It is assumed that an integrated system of all health and social welfare services in the province may ensure higher standards and better use of manpower and budget resources.

2. Supervision. An integrated system facilitates government control over these crucially important services.

His statement about "citizens' participation" refers, of course, to the democratization elements in the Bill. These elements apparently contradict the centralization trend of the Bill. We think that they were put into the law in order to balance the centralization factor and to create an impression of a public service supervised by the public representatives.

To the question "In what way was Bill 65 a part of the general socioeconomic policy of the government of Quebec?" Mr. Forget replied:

There was an implicit assumption, at the time, that the move that had been initiated in the early sixties, the so-called "Quiet Revolution," that mostly had affected the sector of education, ... this sort of social revolution had to be completed by additional initiative in the fields of welfare and health. ... to that extent this is a part of a general pattern.¹

In the same interview Mr. Forget explained that another objective of the Bill was to get away from the element of discretion in social welfare decisions which was so much the rule until the late 1960s. He brought as an example the public assistance payments to welfare recipients. Who is entitled to public assistance and what amount

¹Ibid.
will be granted to the recipient were entirely within the
discretion of some of the commissioners or government
officials. This gave way to suspicions and accusations of
political preferences and abuses. The aim of the Bill was
to establish a rational, comprehensive and objective system
in social welfare allowances and services which would elim-
ninate, as much as possible, the element of discretion.

In view of such a revolutionary piece of social
legislation, loaded with so many goals and backed with
advanced social philosophy, one could guess that extensive
reaction would sprout all over the province. We, of course,
shall concentrate on the Jewish aspect of this reaction, for
the purposes of this study.

First Reactions in the Jewish Community:
August 1971 - December 1971

When the Minister of Social Affairs submitted Bill 65
to the National Assembly in August 1971 it was very clear
that the Jewish community was confronting a major legisla-
tive reform which would crucially change the nature of
health and social services in Quebec and would have a seri-
ous impact on Jewish communal services. Imminent massive
government intervention made it imperative that the Jewish
community clarify its attitudes toward the new policy of
the government.

A pressing need emerged to respond to the new Bill,
to try to envisage its possible impact on Jewish communal
health and welfare services, to decide what changes in the Bill should be requested and last, but not least, to achieve, as widely as possible, a community consensus with regard to community reaction.

Speaking about the Jewish reaction we should bear in mind that at the time of the introduction of Bill 65, the Allied Jewish Community Services (AJCS) consisted of twenty-one member agencies, of which seven were affected by the new legislation. Six agencies provided health services and one, the Jewish Family Services of the Baron de Hirsch Institute (to be referred to, henceforth, as JFS) provided social services. The seven agencies had already relied heavily on provincial government funding and were submitted to a variety of government controls. Actually, each agency was involved in dual budgeting and planning processes; i.e., with government and with AJCS.

Since we are dealing with Jewish communal welfare, we shall focus on the reactions of AJCS and JFS towards that part of Bill 65 which related to social welfare services. One can realize that there were some differences in the initial reactions and ensuing attitudes of AJCS and JFS. It is well understood that AJCS took into consideration the total interests and goals of the Jewish community while JFS primarily concentrated on the specific roles and goals of the social welfare agency. These natural differences were reflected in the internal discussions between the two bodies.
and in their negotiations with the government. Nevertheless there was, of course, a hard core of Jewish community interests whose protection and preservation were considered vital by both of them.

We may summarize this hard core as follows:
1. Maintaining the Jewish character of the social welfare services
2. Maintaining communal control of these services
3. Ensuring the continuation of government funding of social services to the Jewish population.

We shall see that these principles constituted the guidelines in negotiations with the government. We shall also see that the perception by most of the AJCS leaders that these interests were insured, eventually led to their readiness to accept JFS becoming a public establishment.

In our description and analysis of the process which changed the status of Jewish welfare from a private (communal) agency to a public establishment, we must note the common ground and the differences in the attitudes of AJCS and JFS in this matter.

**AJCS Response to Bill 65**

From the very beginning the AJCS leaders were ambivalent in their attitude. On the one hand, they had always urged the government to play its rightful role and become involved in the broad areas of health and social services where the dimension of problems required massive financing.
Thus the AJCS had urged the government to become responsible for financial assistance (Bill 26, 1969), to regulate nursing homes and to increase support for specific welfare programs. At the same time the activity of AJCS and constituent agencies in procuring government funding was characterized by a certain practical sense since money thus released could be used for other communal services.

But, on the other hand, AJCS was concerned about the role of government in areas which historically have been the prerogative of the constituent agencies, particularly social welfare and health services. It was also worried about the possibility that the massive involvement of government in health and social welfare would herald its encroachment on other areas of traditional communal activity. To maintain communal social welfare services as an instrument of community cohesiveness, AJCS strove to preserve its two basic features: being Jewish, and independence.

But the community leaders realized that the only unchanging fact of contemporary society is social change itself, and they knew that through the ages Jews have learned to be firm with regard to principles and flexible as to methods and forms. They understood that the Jewish community would need to adapt to change by keeping flexible the vehicles of operation in order to preserve the basic fundamental elements of its Jewishness.

The AJCS early recognized the negative implication of the new legislation if it were, in fact, to be fully
implemented. The major danger was the total disappearance of the Jewish welfare agency through merging with other non-Jewish agencies, in one regional social service centre. It appeared that AJCS anticipated that its time-tested strategy of negotiation with government officials could be successfully employed in this instance too. They hoped that an "arrangement" could be worked out whereby Jewish agencies would survive in a special category, despite the enactment and implementation of the new legislation.

In this early period (between the submission of the Bill and its enactment: August-December 1971) the Social Legislation Committee of AJCS took the lead in preparing a Brief for presentation to the National Assembly of Quebec. The AJCS committee also provided the primary meeting ground for all the affected agencies. At the committee's meetings, in addition to preparing the Brief, information was shared, strategies were developed and feedback was received from and transmitted back to AJCS leadership. In addition, special agency concerns were discussed in Joint (JFS-AJCS) Officers' Meetings. An air of optimism pervaded these early efforts. This optimism was reflected by Mr. Manual G. Batshaw, the then Executive Director (and later Executive Vice President) of AJCS, who wrote:

1Brief submitted by the Canadian Jewish Congress, Eastern Region, and Allied Jewish Community Services of Montreal to the Standing Parliamentary Committee on Social Affairs of the National Assembly of Quebec, October 1971.
We anticipate that our brief and many others may influence the government to change some of the provisions in the Bill, so as to provide for a more major role for voluntarism or community leadership participation, in public institutions. We are recommending larger boards of directors beyond the fourteen suggested in the Bill. It is hoped that through this suggested amendment many of the people who now sit on the boards of our health institutions will be able to continue on the board of the public institutions.\footnote{1}

Mr. Batshaw added:

We also are urging the government to consider adding a new category to public and private (which means commercial) institutions, which are now included in Bill 65. We call the new category the "community institution." It is similar to what we now have and while somewhat similar to the public institution, as defined by Bill 65, will be supported partly by government and partly by community groups. We are emphasizing through this suggested category a non-profit community institution which serves the public interest and provides an opportunity for community initiative and involvement.\footnote{2}

Mr. Batshaw went on in explaining to the leaders of the community that:

If this revision is approved it might enable us to maintain many of the people on present boards, and allow us to exercise more control and protection of the ethnic quality and cultural needs of our people.\footnote{3}

Referring to JFS, Mr. Batshaw wrote:

The only Jewish welfare agency which might be affected directly is Baron de Hirsch [JFS]. At the worst, like the hospitals, it might be asked to become a public institution, though in my personal opinion this is remote. Several of the Baron de Hirsch services might be affected but certainly not the agency as a whole.\footnote{4}

\footnote{1}{"Reaction to Bill 65", A personal view by Manuel G. Batshaw to the Board of Trustees of AJCS, October 1971.}
\footnote{2}{Ibid.  \footnote{3}{Ibid.  \footnote{4}{Ibid.}}
Hoping that the government would adopt the suggested revisions, Mr. Batshaw sounded optimistic when he described some possible positive outcomes of Bill 65:

If indeed Baron de Hirsch is relieved of some of its responsibility and costs, this will provide it with an important opportunity to develop and expand its family life education programs, so that we can build stronger and more Jewishly oriented families.\(^1\)

An important consideration with regard to the acceptance or rejection of Bill 65 by the Jewish community is expressed by Mr. Batshaw in the above-mentioned memorandum ("Reaction to Bill 65"):

If some of the changes which may come about by Bill 65 help to relieve the Jewish community of some part of their present financial obligations—though much of it will have to be maintained for supplementary or parallel services—it may free additional funds for Jewish education, Jewish culture and other experimental efforts to emphasize Jewish living in Montreal. The net result of Bill 65 may create some dislocation of services, but it also may prove a blessing in enabling the Jewish community to address itself to its number one priority—Jewish identification.\(^2\)

This statement by Mr. Batshaw betrays a very important consideration of himself, and apparently of most of the AJCS leaders. As we have explained in chapter 2, all ethnic institutions share the function of intra-group communication. Therefore, from the overall point of view of the community interests, it is not disastrous if one ethnic institution limits the scope of its manifest services,

\(^1\)Ibid.

\(^2\)For a comparative analysis of the shifting importance of communal services, in view of changing conditions and goals, see chapter 6.
or changes status, as long as other ethnic institutions expand and enhance their contribution toward intra-group communications.

As we have noticed, Mr. Batshaw even saw some blessing in Bill 65 which would free additional funds for Jewish education. We shall see that this flexibility in the evaluation of the community priorities would lead the leaders of AJCS to accept Bill 65, under some conditions.

Referring to the Bill as a whole, Mr. Batshaw pointed out that the Bill was not a bad law in terms of its objective which is to supply health and welfare services on an equal, high standard basis to all the citizens. His major criticism, aside from what related to the Jewish aspects, was to the effect that the Bill was too bureaucratic, technocratic, and had excessive government control built into it.

Referring to Mr. Batshaw's comment on the bureaucratic and technocratic character of Bill 65, one might observe that this is the character of any government organization. But, of course, in this case it was the impersonal and universal features of government bureaucracy which concerned Mr. Batshaw.

Altogether his concerns, as expressed in "Reaction to Bill 65," may be summed up as follows:
1. To be able to maintain the role of Jewish volunteers in the activity of the new public social service agency
2. To have the government agree to a larger Board of Directors in order to ensure the broad participation and influence of community leaders.

3. To try to achieve government consent to insert into the concept of the Bill a "community institution." This type of social service organization was meant to be a compromise between the government's interest in controlling social welfare services and the Jewish community's interest preserving its Jewish character and communal control.

4. To promote Jewish education as an instrument for the enhancement of Jewish identity, as compensation to an envisaged loss of control over communal social services.

As may be noted, the Bill was neither wholly welcomed, nor totally rejected by AJCS. The AJCS attitude was a realistic one. The Bill was there and soon to be passed by the National Assembly. There were hopes for some changes to be introduced in the Bill and also some benefits were foreseen. With these initial considerations in mind, a Brief had been prepared and submitted. Its purposes were to explain the principles of Jewish communal welfare, the dangers emanating from the new Bill, and the amendments needed in order to preserve these principles when the private welfare sector would be integrated into the public sector.

The AJCS Brief emphasized the need for the legislation to be redrafted in order to protect the concepts of
"voluntarism" and "cultural distinctiveness" which are indispensable for Jewish communal welfare. It reads, in part, as follows:

The Concept of Voluntarism

The element of volunteer participation in social and community concerns is basic to the existence of personal and nonbureaucratic rendering of services. It provides links to the community so that services reflect the real and changing needs of the population. It also provides support for social ventures, manpower to help deliver and improve services and extra funding when necessary. These human relationships and services are irreplaceable and must not be destroyed.¹

The thrust of this concept is that a Jewish social welfare agency can benefit much by communal support. Losing the help of volunteers could mean losing the constituency support which greatly contributes to the viability of the social welfare agency.

The Concept of Cultural Distinctiveness

In a multicultural society such as ours, the impact of the individual's cultural heritage on his well-being must be understood and respected. The crucial nature of ethnicity in the treatment of physical, emotional and social problems is a never-ceasing part of our work experience. Since we view health and social service as an intrinsic part of the culture of people, we believe that each community has the right to protect, preserve and pursue its culture. Government has the responsibility to ensure that right.²

This concept refers to the Jewish "ambience" argument. It emphasizes the significance of the Jewish

¹A Brief submitted by the Canadian Jewish Congress and Allied Jewish Community Services of Montreal on Bill 65 to The National Assembly of Quebec, October 1971, p. I.

²Ibid.
atmosphere in the social welfare agency. It was argued that this atmosphere was crucial for a successful process of help to the Jewish client. The elimination of this element, by sending Jewish clients to a public, non-Jewish agency, would adversely influence the very process of helping.

The Brief expressed concern about the possible negative results of overcentralization and complexity of administration which are major characteristics of the Bill. It goes on saying:

While the Bill articulates supervision and control as a central concept in an attempt to integrate and coordinate, in reality it becomes too unwieldy and inflexible a system for an efficient administration. The system should be sufficiently flexible and decision-making powers should be built into the Bill on lower levels of authority than the Minister or even the regional bureau. Decentralized services require decentralized authority for appropriate and efficient decision-making.

Obviously, this request was geared to ensure more authority to the social service centres, or to "community institutions," as suggested by AJCS in the Brief. The concern here is to preserve some degree of control in the hands of the Jewish community over the SSC, which would serve the Jewish population.

On the basis of these principles, the Brief suggested the following amendments to the Bill:

1. That a definition of a "community institution" be inserted in the Bill. This would be a nonprofit

Ibid.
institution organized by a voluntary group, from which it derived continuing support. This institution would fulfill a function similar to a public institution and so be recognized by the Minister of Social Affairs

2. That the size of boards be expanded and provision made for members democratically elected from the community.

3. That the Bill stipulate the creation of committees composed of community-based volunteers whose role and function would be to participate actively in the various ongoing planning and operational aspects of an institution.

It is clear that the purpose of these amendments was to preserve the very important principles, from a Jewish point of view, of voluntarism and community participation.

Worried about the dim prospects of the survival of JFS, if it was a part of one Greater-Montreal region (as envisaged by the Bill), the authors of the Brief suggested that "In order to cope with the limited number of proposed regions and the resulting potentially large size of any given region, there should be a greater number of regions than is presently contemplated."¹ No doubt this suggestion alludes to the possibility of a Jewish social service centre serving the Jewish population of Montreal. The assumption was that a greater number of regions would enable the establishment of a "Jewish region" for social service purposes.

¹Ibid., p. III.
Also, the Brief requests that the regulations (issued by the Minister after the Bill was assented to in the National Assembly) should be prepared after, or in consultation with the welfare institutions.

The JFS Reaction to Bill 65

The reaction of the JFS was a mixture of fear and hope. Fear that an old and deeply-rooted Jewish communal agency would be doomed or would lose its Jewish character, and hope that somehow a way would be found to escape the Bill or change it in order to ensure the survival of the agency. These fears and hopes were expressed in the utterances of the lay leaders at the time.

To a question presented to Mr. Stanley Abbey (President of JFS during the years 1972-1974): "Did you support the turning of JFS into a government agency under Bill 65?" he replied:

The answer is No. It is a categoric No. It was No for a long, long time, throughout an extremely difficult period. But it gradually changed to a Yes. The reason for the No, I think, would be fear, fear of change, fear of the unknown. We had been running BdeH for 110 years. We had been a model to the Quebec government. Every once in a while the Quebec government would tell us how marvelous we were, what an example we were to the balance of the community. And all of a sudden this famous Bill 65 emerged. And what we were doing was going to be illegal. It would be illegal for us to continue to operate.¹

And the same question was answered by Mr. Oscar Respitz (President of JFS during the years 1970-1972) as follows:

¹In a taped interview, dated March 12, 1977.
At the very beginning I rejected it, and I think it was unanimously rejected by members of the Board [of JFS]. There were a few reasons:

1. We were afraid that the agency would lose its Jewishness. In other words, it would no longer be controlled by the Boards of JFS or AJCS.

2. Being a public agency, any citizen of Quebec would have the right to come to us for services. Jews are the minority. We thought that we would be inundated by non-Jews and this would make us less of a Jewish agency.

3. We felt, and rightly so, and the government agreed with us, that BdeH was one of the model social service agencies in the province, delivering social services at the highest possible level, and certainly higher than those existing in the non-Jewish community of Quebec. And we thought that under the government there would be a downward tendency to uniformity. We could not envisage government intervention bringing the non-Jewish level to our level. We rather thought that we would be dragged down to their level, or, at least, we would have to mark time until they would come up to our level.¹

Points one and two in this citation represent the "Jewish constituency argument"; namely, that only Jewish Board members and Jewish clients could ensure the Jewish character of a communal social welfare agency. Point three reflects the pride of the BdeH people over past achievements and present standards of services. This pride and self-esteem would be one of the reasons for the JFS' reluctance to join the public social welfare system, for if standards were to drop, by going public, then there would be little to be proud of.

In the same interview, Mr. Respitz said:

We were hoping that as Jews—being very special and different—we should receive an exemption. As a

¹In a taped interview, dated April 26, 1977.
matter of fact, we were not the only ones to ask for an exemption. There were pockets of different [non-Jewish] agencies that wanted the same thing.

In the beginning Mr. Castonguay told us that Bill 65 was really an effort on the part of the government to get to the "have not" agencies. A lot of agencies are getting government money, but are not doing their job. BdeH is doing a great job, not taking as much money as the other agencies. So we should probably leave you alone.

Three main worries beset the leaders of JFS:

1. That the small Board, suggested in the Bill, would narrow the wide participation of the volunteers in the management of the agency.

2. That the regional amalgamation of all the sectarian welfare agencies into one social service centre would severely damage the Jewishness of the agency, thus limiting its effectiveness as an instrument for the preservation and enhancement of Jewish identity.

3. That the amalgamation of several sectarian agencies into one regional public establishment would lower the high standards of social services rendered by the Jewish agency.

Some of these worries are reflected in an Evaluation Paper prepared by Mr. Oscar Respitz, who wrote as follows:

Crucial in the understanding of the government's thinking, I believe, is section 83, which provides for the possibility of amalgamation and conversion [of private and sectarian agencies] without an appeals procedure. A further inking of the government's purpose is found in those sections describing the composition of the boards of the new organizations. They are small; only half the members come from the community. The community is described in geographic terms. No provision is made for ethnic
participation. The general trend is for "technocratic"
participation with community participation as window
dressing.\footnote{Oscar Respitz, Evaluation Paper, October, 1971,
Archive of the Baron de Hirsch Institute.}

The strategy to be taken by JFS was outlined in
the same document as follows:

1. To raise issues of ethnic and religious community
   roles
2. To attempt to obtain revision in sections dealing
   with Board composition
3. To attempt to secure appeal procedures in the
   section on amalgamation. If possible, to secure
   provisions of appeal to the courts.\footnote{Ibid.}

In a Brief submitted to the National Assembly, the
Baron de Hirsch Institute and Jewish Child Welfare Bureau
emphasized two principles: "voluntarism" and "ethnic
particularism." Speaking about "voluntarism" they wrote:

We support the Canadian Jewish Congress - Allied
Jewish Community Services Brief which stresses the
need for the "community institution": as a means of
preserving the positive input of voluntary agencies
to the welfare of all citizens in the province of
Quebec. We further submit that the loss of this
voluntary input and initiative will, in the last
analysis, result in a qualitative decline in the
level of all social welfare services in the province
of Quebec.\footnote{Brief submitted by the Baron de Hirsch Institute
and Jewish Child Welfare Bureau to the Standing Parliamentary
Committee on Social Affairs of the National Assembly of
Quebec, on Bill 65, fall 1971, p. 3.}

With regard to "ethnic particularism" (namely
"cultural distinctiveness"), the Brief stated:

On another level, we must bring to the attention of
the committee the crucial role of ethnicity and small
group identification in the healing process. . . such
issues as understanding of Jewish cultural factors, ability to facilitate communication between agencies in the Jewish community on behalf of clients, feeling of familiarity and trust, concern with the intricacies of traditional Jewish family life, etc., are imperative in facilitating the helping process with Jewish clients.¹

An important claim in the Brief was that the Jewish agency is already supplying efficient social services to a specific group in the community, and therefore there is no point in terminating the activity of that agency by assimilation into a broader regional establishment. In the Brief it was put this way:

In conclusion, the Jewish family that requires social service assistance is most effectively served by the Jewish agency. An act which is predicated on maximizing service to all citizens in the province of Quebec must not ignore that part of its function is to offer services to groups or segments of the community in the most effective and efficient way, including along ethnic or religious lines when indicated.²

In summing up JFS' attitude, we have to note its psychological aspect. For years JFS (BdeHI) occupied a very central position in the federation, but because of the proliferation of communal agencies and the strengthening of the AJCS leadership, BdeHI moved to a more peripheral position. The leaders of BdeHI failed to recognize, and admit, this shift. Based on their self-perception of centrality in the federation, they insisted on the continued existence of the BdeHI as it was, namely a private, communal agency. The gap between JFS' self-perception of its

¹Ibid., p. 5. ²Ibid., p. 6.
centrality and the AJCS perception may help to explain much of their controversy over the issue of joining the public welfare system.

Altogether the JFS leaders' attitude is in full congruity with Breton's observation (chapter 2) that the leaders of an ethnic organization have a vested interest in that organization. Therefore they would attempt, in various ways, to strengthen its ethnic identity in order to keep their public as long as possible.

It is obvious that at the end of 1971 the Allied Jewish Community Services, the Jewish Family Services, and the Canadian Jewish Congress confronted a major dilemma: whether to integrate the JFS into the public welfare system of Quebec or to opt out and maintain an independent and fully self-financed communal social service. This was a painstaking dilemma for all the people who participated in the long process of internal (in the community) and external (with the government) negotiations. Many motives, goals, emotions, personal interests, financial considerations and political speculations were involved in this process. Here, a prosperous, proud, well-organized community of 115,000 people, determined to preserve its Jewish identity, was confronted with a Bill which might abolish a major vehicle of Jewish identity, a central and traditional communal service. This, against the background of a rising national spirit in Quebec and increasing involvement of the government.
of the province in various fields of endeavor. Should the Jewish community conform with these trends, or should it reject them? And what would be the price of any decision in terms of the future of Jewish communal welfare and the future of the relations with the government and the people of this province? Was a compromise between conformity and rejection possible in a way which would ensure both adjustment and preservation of a respected communal institution?

Altogether the considerations, arguments and suggestions expressed by the leaders of AJCS and JFS reflect the fear that joining the public system would cause BdeHI to lose its roles and functions as an ethnic institution. The written briefs and oral arguments, conveyed to the government, concentrated on the manifest functions, namely, rendering social welfare services, but latent functions, such as the role of cultural distinctiveness, were also discernable.

These were the questions which engaged the leaders of the community when they began to negotiate with the government after "An Act Respecting Health Services and Social Services" was assented to in the National Assembly on December 24, 1971.

Negotiations: 1972

In spite of the differences in the emotional and psychological attitudes of AJCS and JFS, the two communal
bodies shared the same goals in their negotiations with the government on Bill 65. From the outset they had three major objectives:

1. To find out what might be the impact of Bill 65 on Jewish communal welfare.
2. To examine the possibility, and desirability, of opting out of the public system (if this option were available) from the point of view of financing and relations with the government.
3. To endeavor to obtain amendments to the Bill which would enable the community to maintain, in the new public agency, elements of Jewishness such as voluntarism, ethnic particularism and communal supervision.

Subsequent to the presentation of the Brief in October 1971, AJCS pursued negotiations with the government at various levels in order to reinforce the intent of the Brief. Although the second and final readings of the Bill (enacted December 24, 1971) reflected none of the requested changes, it was still expected that, in the final analysis, negotiations for some "arrangement" would be possible.

The reaction of JFS, after the Bill became law, was quick and clear. They decided that JFS should not join the public system on the basis of the Act (Chapter 48) as it was ratified by the National Assembly (without any regard to the Jewish community requests for some amendments to the Bill).
In a "Position Paper concerning implementation of Chapter 48," the JFS Executive stated:

Our current position involves taking steps to convert the agency corporation to a private establishment, so that the Jewish component of our services, and the supervision by a Jewish/Communal Board can be assured. This is envisioned as a short-term measure, pending the opening of the law and permitting amendments which would make it possible for the agency to operate within the envisioned integrated welfare system.¹

This "Position Paper" concluded as follows:

In sum, we see our agency as not being able to fulfill its objectives within Chapter 48 as it currently exists. Specifically, compliance with the regulations would:

1. Require discontinuation of agency supervision by a Jewish Communal Board
2. Jeopardize subsidiary financing by Allied Jewish Community Services
3. Impose a nonsectarian intake policy—thus diluting and eroding distinctively Jewish programs
4. Jeopardize opportunities for continued innovative programming as required and funded by the Jewish community,
5. Jeopardize opportunities for the agency to relate its programs to issues of Jewish identification and Jewish survival.²

It seems that early in 1972 there was ground for some belief in the possibility of operating JFS as a private establishment. In a meeting held on January 18, 1972 the Minister of Social Affairs, Mr. Claude Castonguay, said to Mr. Stanley Abbey, then President of JFS, and to Mr. Emanuel Weiner, then Assistant Executive Director of AJCS, that "the maintenance of the existing corporations and the inclusion of the idea of private establishment within the

¹Archive of Jewish Family Services of the Baron de Hirsch Institute, Montréal, Winter 1972, p. 1.

²Ibid., p. 4.
law give evidence that the government does not wish to take over.\(^1\) But the catch was that a private establishment could not enjoy public financing.

The air of cautious optimism with regard to the chance of keeping the JFS Jewish, and Jewishly controlled, was nourished by high government representatives. For example, in April 1972 Mr. Claude Forget, Assistant Deputy Minister, Department of Social Affairs, said: "Above all, he [the Minister] conveyed the fact that the government did not see itself taking over hospitals or agencies, but rather making the organizations more representative of the community than they are in most cases."\(^2\)

On May 27, 1972 the Minister of Social Affairs published, in the Quebec Official Gazette, the draft of the regulations based on Chapter 48. One regulation stipulated the twelve geographical regions of Quebec in each of which one social service centre was to be established. The Montreal region comprised Montreal Island, Ile Jesus and Ile Bizard. The public was called to submit comments within ninety days. At this stage the Jewish community sought to avoid the danger of one social service centre in Montreal,

\(^1\)Cited in a letter dated February 14, 1972 from Mr. E. Weiner to the Executive Director of JFS, Archive of the Baron de Hirsch Institute, Montreal.

\(^2\)Cited in a memo dated April 18, 1972 from Mr. Manuel G. Batshaw to the officers of AJCS and Executive Directors of Health Services and Baron de Hirsch Institute, Archive of the Baron de Hirsch Institute, Montreal.
which would swallow the Jewish agency, and it attempted to amend the law.

In the negotiations the representatives of AJCS and JFS repeatedly emphasized that Jewish health and social services were always integrated into one system. This Jewish system was vital to the growth and enrichment of the community. They spoke, also, about the close relationship between ethnicity and therapy, and about the expansion of the community resources by the volunteers' funding and manpower. All these achievements were threatened by the new law and the regulations.

But notwithstanding the risks, the negotiators, on behalf of AJCS and JFS, were cautious not to reject the government policy and the law flatly. They stated that the Jewish community was ready to work within the framework of the law, and even serve non-Jewish clients, if the Jewish nature of its institutions would be maintained. It seems that this statement was aimed at creating a basis for eventual compromise according to which the communal health and social services would remain Jewish while being integrated in a larger public system.

With a determination to continue to maintain a Jewish welfare agency in this or some other way, many possible solutions were explored. Some of them are described in a memorandum by Mr. M.G. Batshaw, dated July 4, 1972:
We may have to maintain Baron de Hirsch as a private agency, should this be allowed within the law, unrelated to the SSC [Social Service Centre], and pay for the full operation through AJCS funds. Another more likely possibility is that SSC will contract with BdeH [Baron de Hirsch Institute] for various programs. Still another possibility is that BdeH could become two agencies; one which relates to government with-nonsectarian policy for certain services, and another which is unrelated and which would provide specific specialized services to Jewish clients, as at present. The latter agency would be funded by the Jewish community.¹

Mr. Batshaw concluded his memorandum with a very typical Jewish saying, one which denotes the ability to adjust: "So if there is a flood, we'll have to learn how to live under water."²

It was clear that the government was ready to listen to the requests of the Jewish community for special consideration in the implementation of Chapter 48. However, it refused to insert into the law any reference to ethnicity or sectarianism as a framework for health and social services. Publicly, and officially, the law was of a universal character, destined to supply services to the population of Quebec through regional organizations.

However, during the negotiations the government's representatives mentioned various possible ways to maintain the Jewish character of JFS within the new law. What was really important to them was that JFS should be part of the public welfare system. This was mainly because of the high

¹ Memorandum dated July 4, 1972, Archive of the Baron de Hirsch Institute, Montreal.
² Ibid.
professional standard of JFS. Also, it was politically
important to the government that all ethnic groups would
participate in the public welfare system. If this did not
happen, Bill 65 would lose its main thrust, namely the
establishment of a universal nonsectarian public welfare
system in Quebec.

This problem, and other related issues, were dis-
cussed in a meeting between AJCS' delegation (Mr. Charles
R. Bronfman, Mr. A. Pascal, and Mr. M.G. Batshaw) and the
Premier of Quebec, Mr. Robert Bourassa, in Montreal, on
August 25, 1972. In a report on that meeting Mr. Bronfman
wrote:

The forceful position of the AJCS Board of Trustees,
the health service agencies, and Baron de Hirsch was
expressed in no uncertain terms to Mr. Bourassa, and
we feel that he was moved or affected by it. He gave
our delegation the assurance that he will personally
intervene if our concerns are not resolved to our
satisfaction. Our main effort now will be to obtain
from Mr. Castonguay, in writing, the guarantee which
his staff members have been conveying to us verbally,
that the character and quality of our Jewish services
will not be altered significantly. There appears to
be a real resistance to writing ethnicity into the
law and the regulations, even though there is full
recognition that in the implementation of the program
these factors will be fully recognized and will be
vital components of the health and social services. ¹

More details concerning a possible solution to the
ethnicity factor were given at a meeting, held on August
25, 1972, between Mr. M. Berger (Chairman of the Social

¹A report from Charles R. Bronfman, Chairman,
Executive Committee, AJCS, to Presidents and Executive
Directors of health service agencies and the Baron de
Hirsch Institute, August 28, 1972, Archive of the Baron
de Hirsch Institute, Montreal.
Legislation Committee, AJCS), Mr. M.G. Batshaw (Executive Director of AJCS), and Mr. P.A. Bernier (an official in the Department of Social Affairs).

Mr. Bernier summarized the attitudes and views of his Department as follows:

1. The law and the regulations would not be changed significantly.
2. The implementation of the law is very flexible and certainly will take into consideration the fact:
   a) that Montreal is different, and
   b) that the sociocultural and ethnic concerns must be provided for without writing them into the law.
3. The Montreal regional council [of the Social Service Centre] will be encouraged to set up a number of "campuses" in various parts of the Montreal region to reflect the neighbourhood, ethnicity, and other special needs of a particular group or area.
4. There are two other alternatives:
   a) to divide the Montreal region geographically into a series of subregions
   b) to replace the original regional council with a number of groupings—one for the French Catholics, another for the English Catholics, a third for the Protestants, a fourth for the Jewish group, etc.
5. Baron de Hirsch Institute, under its present charter, would have to disappear, but it would be part of a campus under the new charter. It will be permitted, also, to retain its present name under the new charter.

The overall message of Mr. Bernier's words is clear. Formally, and legally, the government was unwilling to recognize the element of ethnicity in the new legislation. Bill 65 was planned and meant to create a universal health and social welfare system in the province. All health and

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1 A report dated August 25, 1972, Archive of the Baron de Hirsch Institute, Montreal.
social welfare services should be transferred from the control of religious, sectarian and ethnic groups to the control of the government. But in actual fact, the government could not ignore the reality of the ethnic mosaic in Quebec, which has been a basic feature of its past and present. Therefore, the government understood that it had to bow to reality and recognize, informally, the element of ethnicity in the implementation of the law. Mr. Bernier's expressions portended the government's readiness to compromise in the implementation, but not in the wording, of the law.

Mr. Berger and Mr. Batshaw concluded their report as follows: "The most important aspect of the discussion was our conviction that it is not the intention of the government to implement Chapter 48 the same way in all parts of the province, and in Montreal implementation will be in a special form."

The same line of thinking was confirmed by the Minister, Mr. Claude Castonguay, in a meeting with Mr. Batshaw on October 16, 1972. Mr. Batshaw reported his impression of the Minister's attitudes as follows:

1. **Ethnicity.** Mr. Castonguay believes that within the Bill and regulations there are adequate safety features to protect the special character of our institutions.

2. **"Campus" idea.** He agreed that it will be difficult for one regional council to adequately cover Montreal. Therefore some segments of the health and welfare field--particularly in the Montreal region--will be decentralized.

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1Ibid.
3. Boards of institutions. Here, it is felt, is the basic built-in safeguard for the preservation of institutions basically as they now exist.1

In points one and three Mr. Castonguay, undoubtedly, alludes to section 52 of Chapter 48. This section stipulates that representatives of the clients and the socioeconomic environment will participate in the Board of the SSC.

What brought the Department of Social Affairs to show some readiness to go toward the Jewish community with regard to the preservation of Jewish features within the public system? While no definite promise was given, the inclination to "do something" was expressed more than once by government representatives. The answer should be sought in: (a) the recognition by the government of the unique character and successful achievements of Jewish communal welfare; (b) the pressure exerted by other, non-Jewish agencies to preserve the ethnicity element within the planned social service centre of Montreal; and (c) the expressed wish of the government that a welfare agency of the standard of JFS join the public system.

Mr. Oscar Respitz referred to these points in our interview. With regard to points (a) and (c), he said:

The government agreed with us that BdeHI was one of the model social service agencies in the province, delivering social services at the highest possible level and certainly higher than those existing in the non-Jewish community. ... Castonguay told us that

1Report by Mr. M. Batshaw, October 16, 1972, Archive of the Baron de Hirsch Institute, Montreal.
BdeHI is doing a great job not taking as much money as the other [non-Jewish] agencies.¹

With regard to point (b), Mr. Respitz further added that: "As a matter of fact we were not the only one to ask exemption [from entering the public system]. There were pockets of different non-Jewish agencies that wanted the same thing."

This attitude of some non-Jewish agencies was clearly expressed by Mr. Roger Prud'homme, director of a French family welfare agency in Montreal. In a meeting with Mr. M.G. Batshaw, held in February 1973, he expressed his concern about the ethnic character of his agency in the case of one social service centre. Mr. Batshaw reported as follows:

Mr. Prud'homme said he was very much committed to the importance of the ethnic and cultural factors in therapy, and that he therefore was convinced that it is not possible to have one social service centre in Montreal to serve all the groups in the entire community. He said the Department was very flexible in their attitudes and acknowledged that there would have to be a number of subgroupings.²

Attitudes like those of Mr. Prud'homme would eventually persuade the government, in mid 1973, to approve three social service centres in Montreal.

¹In a taped interview, dated April 26, 1977.
²Ibid.
Mr. Claude Forget described the background of the eventual consent of the government to the establishment of three social service centres in Montreal: Francophone, Anglophone and Jewish. He said that the French family service agencies in Montreal (there were eight French-speaking agencies out of a total of fifteen) were very reluctant to merge with the English agencies. In view of the very efficient organization of some English-speaking agencies, they were concerned about the possible decline in the French agencies' authority and influence within a single social service centre. Mainly under their pressure, claimed Mr. Forget, the government eventually bent, and approved three social service centres in Montreal. This decision gave the French-speaking agencies the possibility to merge and continue to operate as a Francophone social service centre serving the French-speaking population. It was a major concession by the government which had cherished the idea of one social service centre in each region since the submission of Bill 65.

Eventually this decision paved the way for government approval of three social service centres in Montreal based on cultural-linguistic criterion. These three social service centres are:

1. Ville Marie Social Service Centre—serving the English-speaking population

\[1\text{In a taped interview, dated October 24, 1977.}\]
2. Metropolitan Social Service Centres—serving the French-speaking population

3. Jewish Family Services - Social Service Centre.

Some questions still arise as to why the government withdrew from its original intention to have only one social service centre in Montreal, and then permitted a Jewish social service centre. How influential was a report of the regional planning committee, made up of the welfare agencies' executives, which recommended a special status for the Jewish agency? Or did the Jewish community exercise some political influence? On what basis was the decision made to let the Jewish community establish its own social service centre?

The pressure of non-Jewish agencies, mainly the French Catholics, to keep some general framework of ethnic and linguistic identity, helped to change the government's original attitude. But the very fact that the Jews are an ethnic group could not, by itself, be the reason. Other ethnic groups, such as the Italians and the Greeks, were not recognized for social service centre purposes; nor was the decision made because the Jews are a religious group, since other religious groups were not recognized for these purposes. What, then, were the reasons?

It is known that during the negotiations between JFS-AJCS and the government, representatives of the latter expressed their appreciation for the high standards of JFS' services and manifested their understanding of the ethnic sensitivity of the Jewish community.
It seems that the government was convinced that it should permit a Jewish social service centre to exist because of the following considerations:

1. JFS was a well-organized agency
2. JFS professed high standards of social welfare services
3. JFS was already generating lots of community resources such as funds and volunteers. Letting JFS operate as a Jewish social service centre would enable it to continue to draw communal support while, at the same time, would not defy the government's major goal of having full control of social welfare services in the province.
4. Embarrassment might have been caused to the government if it would have approved a Francophone social service centre, an Anglophone centre, and not a Jewish centre.

It is important to note that as long as the provincial government could integrate French Catholic agencies throughout the province in regional social service centres (which was a prime target of the LQW), it did not mind permitting separate (but not independent) Jewish and Anglophone social welfare organizations.

As we shall see in the following section of this chapter, the consent of the government to the establishment of a Jewish social service centre created a rift within the Jewish leadership between the leaders of JFS and AJCS. That permission was given, but on conditions which were not accepted by all the leaders of communal welfare.
Divergence of Opinion in the Jewish Community: 1973

At the beginning of 1973 it was still clear that, officially, the government was determined to go ahead with the full implementation of Chapter 48 without accepting the objection of the Jewish community to the merging of JFS in a single regional establishment. As was seen, views and promises were exchanged between the government and AJCS, but no real, unequivocal concession was yet given. As a matter of fact, a wide gap in concept and approach existed between the government and the leaders of AJCS-JFS. Mr. Claude Castonguay and his aides thought and spoke as bureaucrats basing their arguments mainly on considerations such as efficiency, rationalization in the use of resources, and public supervision on a major socioeconomic area. Also, they put forward the interests and well-being of the entire Quebec population. Their adversaries, the leaders of AJCS-JFS, spoke out on particularistic needs, motives and goals. This was the conflict. It was a conflict between the universalistic concept of welfare espoused by the government on one hand and the particularistic concept of Jewish ethnic existence on the other hand. This may explain why the dispute between the two parties was so difficult to resolve.

Early in 1973 the Department of Social Affairs set a date (June 1, 1973) for opening the operation of a single social service centre in Montreal. However, in May 1973, Mr. Claude Castonguay alluded to the possibility of more
than one social service centre in Montreal. In a speech
delivered on May 9, 1973 before the annual meeting of AJCS,
he said:

The Greater-Montreal area differs from the other
regions because of the density and the linguistic
and ethnic composition of its population. We have
nonetheless opted for a single social service centre
for the Montreal area, though we are fully aware of
the difficulties involved. As a matter of fact we
are right now examining an alternative submitted by
the Greater-Montreal Regional Committee which
represents fifteen social service agencies.1

In the negotiating room the parties already knew that the
possibility of more than one social service centre was very
realistic.

Earlier, in January 1973, a Regional Planning
Committee, mandated by the Ministry of Social Affairs, began
to work. The committee was composed of the Executive Direc-
tors and Presidents of the fifteen family service agencies
in the Montreal area (seven English-speaking agencies in-
cluding JFS, and eight French-speaking) who were affected by
Chapter 48. The committee's task was to develop a plan for
the integration of the fifteen agencies into one social
service centre in compliance with Chapter 48.

In a memorandum dated April 25, 1973, from Mr. S.M.
Brownstein, Executive Director of JFS (between 1970 and
1974), to the Officers of AJCS, the developments vis-à-vis
JFS' future were described. Mr. Brownstein wrote as follows:

On April 16 the first draft of this plan was presented
to the Executive of the Ministry. The fifteen agencies

1 Archive of the Baron de Hirsch Institute, Montreal,
May 9, 1973.
were unable to develop a plan in strict compliance with the law. The plan recommended two social service centres—one French and one English, linked by a strong Coordinating Committee. It was further recommended that JFS operate outside of the system with continued funding and affiliations. (This position for JFS was unanimously agreed to by the other fourteen agencies as the only feasible position for us in light of our unique status as a Jewish agency.)

This writer believes that the unanimous recommendation of the fifteen Executive Directors and Presidents was crucial in the government decision to permit a Jewish social service centre. This position of the non-Jewish agencies was actually an inevitable consequence of the recognition of the principle of ethnicity by the French and English agencies which they had used in their own negotiations with the government. Once the committee of fifteen agencies recommended separate French and English social service centres, the reasonable next step was to recommend a Jewish centre. The same reasoning must have been applied by the government when eventually it decided to permit a Jewish social service centre in Montreal.

Mr. Brownstein further informed the AJCS officers that:

Mr. Castonguay rejected this plan in relation to the Jewish position—outside of the system. He is ready to permit the organization of a Jewish social service centre in strict compliance with the law as written. This means open Board and open intake. The Jewish social service centre would, in fact, be a regional agency (Snowdon/Cote des Neiges area) available to

1 Memorandum by Mr. S. Brownstein, April 25, 1973, Archive of the Baron de Hirsch Institute, Montreal.
all residents of the area. Jews from throughout Montreal would be permitted to use the agency, if they wish.\footnote{Ibid.}

It was obvious to the leaders of AJCS and JFS that the policy of "open Board" (to representatives of the general public) and "open intake" (to all residents of the area) meant the possibility of non-Jewish Board members and clients. In a word, this could lead toward decreasing or losing the Jewish character and control of the agency. The question was whether to accept these conditions or not.

It seemed that the "hour of truth" had arrived. The Boards of AJCS and JFS were asked to react to and decide on the government proposal. Now the paths of AJCS and JFS vis-à-vis Chapter 48 began to widely diverge. The focus moved from negotiations with the government to negotiations between AJCS and JFS in a search for a mutually agreed-upon solution. This effort took place, mainly, in the joint Officers' meetings of JFS-AJCS.

At this stage the AJCS was very much inclined to accept the Minister's proposal with regard to a Jewish social service centre. Financial and political considerations played a role in this stand. It should be stated here that the budget of JFS in 1973 was $600,000. Out of this sum $300,000 was to be covered by government funding.\footnote{Minutes of the Meeting of Joint AJC and JFS Officers, September 29, 1972, Archive of the Baron de Hirsch Institute, Montreal.}
The thinking of the AJCS at that time is reflected in an interview with Mr. Charles Bronfman, Chairman of the Executive Committee of AJCS until the fall of 1973 and since then, until 1975, President of AJCS. To a question asking: "Why did AJCS agree to opt into the public system?" he answered:

The Baron de Hirsch Institute was not the same organization as it was in the year 1900. It was subjected to changes in society as it went on. There have been -- before Bill 65 -- significant government regulations as to what we can do and what we cannot do. I would not at all deny that there were money considerations involved. One could say: "You are selling out for much of the money from Quebec City." I don't think that would be true either. . . If the government decides to establish a public, universal, health and welfare system and if a significant well-organized part of the community says: "No, we don't want to be part of this"; what is the point, what do we try to achieve by that? If you are going to live in a society where rules are liveable, then you should go along with this society, with the changes in this society as long as it does not hurt your basic guide. So, that was the main reason why we said: "Yes, we should go along with the government."  

In the same interview Mr. Bronfman also said:

The money consideration was not the main consideration of the BdeHI, contrary to the case of the hospitals which needed huge funds. The real situation in BdeHI was that the government had a program. There was a quarrel whether we as a Jewish community can live with this program. Some of us, myself included, took the stand: "How do we know if we can live with this unless we try?" So, this in effect was a trial marriage. If we find that we cannot live, and it is going to encroach on values we think are very important, then we come back and reassess the situation. . . The point is: don't put yourself in a position where you destroy all bridges, but give the thing a chance. So we said: "Let's give it a chance."  

1In a taped interview, dated June 15, 1977.

2Ibid.
Mr. M.G. Batshaw commented on the same subject as follows:

We were convinced—after much discussing with the government—that it was possible—in fact certain—that the Jewish component in the service would not be effected. . . The mere fact that the Jewish Social Service is located in this AJCS building at 5151 Cote St, Catherine Road, in a neighbourhood that is almost 100 percent Jewish, we were relatively certain that going public would not in any way minimize or reduce the Jewish quality of the service or its Jewish ambiance.¹

Mr. Batshaw also referred to political considerations which led AJCS to agree to join the public system.

I know that the government wanted us to join the public system. They did not want to be in a position where it would be said that the government serves everyone but the Jewish people. That would not be politically to their advantage. In the same way we did not want to feel as if we are in a ghetto and we are that different in the service that is given to every other citizen in this province. My personal view is that they were very happy that we reached the decision that we did.²

But the leaders of JFS did not hold the same views as the leaders of AJCS. They were not sure that the Jewish characteristics of JFS would be ensured once it became a social service centre within the public system. They felt that as long as the Jewish character and control of JFS was not fully safeguarded, the agency should operate as a private corporation.

Their attitude was expressed in a Resolution which was qualified by some basic conditions. These qualifications

¹In a taped interview, dated April 28, 1977.
²Ibid.
actually amounted to a rejection of the government proposal. The Resolution was adopted at JFS' special Board meeting on May 1, 1973, called to react to the Ministry of Social Affairs' proposal (to permit the establishment of a Jewish social service centre). It should be emphasized that the Ministry of Social Affairs was ready to proceed with the organization of a Jewish social service centre only in strict compliance with the regulations of Chapter 48. At that meeting Mr. Monty Berger, then President of AJCS, reiterated the AJCS support of the government's proposal and its concern that JFS' strategy would not close the door toward further negotiations with the Ministry of Social Affairs. The Resolution, which was unanimously endorsed, read as follows:

BE IT RESOLVED THAT the Board of Directors of Jewish Family Services encourages and applauds the concept of a Jewish Social Service Centre as proposed by the Ministry of Social Affairs and requests the Ministry of Social Affairs to evolve a formula within Chapter 48 or the regulations pertaining thereto such that the conversion of Jewish Family Services to a Jewish Social Service Centre would not:

1 - Impose abandonment of the supervision of the agency by a Jewish communal Board.

2 - Jeopardize subsidiary financing by Allied Jewish Community Services.

3 - Impose a non-sectarian intake policy, thus diluting and eroding distinctively Jewish programs.

4 - Jeopardize opportunities for continued innovative programming as required and funded by the Jewish community.

5 - Jeopardize the opportunities for the agency to relate its program to issues of Jewish identification and Jewish survival.
AND FURTHER THAT upon recognition of the above by the Ministry of Social Affairs, Jewish Family Services is prepared to favourably consider conversion to a Jewish Social Service Centre upon such terms and conditions as may mutually be arranged with the Ministry of Social Affairs.¹

The Ministry of Social Affairs refused to accept the conditions stipulated by JFS.

Following a meeting with Officials of the Ministry on May 9, 1973 it became clear that opting into Chapter 48's system in compliance with government regulations was, in fact, not a feasible alternative from the point of view of JFS. At a special JFS Executive Committee Meeting, on May 14, 1973, the members of the committee decided that: "What remains, therefore, is for us to pursue a course of doing nothing for the time being, seeking a charter and a permit as a private establishment."²

At this stage it was obvious that a major dispute was brewing between AJCS and JFS with regard to the issue of converting JFS to a public establishment. Two approaches evolved about how the Jewish community should respond to the government's program. One position, shared by the majority of AJCS leaders, was that the efforts of the provincial government to reorganize health and welfare services, education, and language policy were to be applauded because its

¹Minutes of the JFS Special Meeting, May 1, 1973, Archive of the Baron de Hirsch Institute, Montreal.

²Minutes of a Special JFS Executive Committee Meeting, May 14, 1973, Archive of the Baron de Hirsch Institute, Montreal.
policies were geared to benefit the majority of the population. The Jews, as a minority group, should adjust accordingly. The other approach, supported by most of the members of the JFS' Board, was to acknowledge the importance of the welfare of the majority, but to decry its ill effects on the minority. This group thought that, applied to the Jewish community, Chapter 48 could have a negative effect. It would deprive hundreds of committed volunteers from participating actively in health and welfare organizations; it threatened the Jewish ambiance and ethnicity of services; it could weaken the community itself by virtue of weakening the link between the welfare organization and the community.

In an internal bulletin named "AVODAH at AJCS" (Activities at AJCS), distributed to a selected group of community leaders, Mr. Manuel G. Batshaw pondered about the question: "What Position Do You Hold?" He wrote:

What should be the reaction of the Jewish community to these changes [in Quebec society]? Should we acknowledge that we must accept the concept of living within a framework which is geared to serve the majority of the population and negotiate quietly the best terms we can get for the Jewish community? Or, should we act more aggressively in the matter of pressing for the government's recognition of the particular needs of Jewish people which, we frankly state, are different than those of the general population, and to seek to achieve minority rights while acknowledging the principle of supporting the "common good"? Also, should we be disturbing this government at a time when it has come through a turbulent period resulting from the opposition of other political parties?"
We know that AJCS and JFS differed very sharply in their answers to Mr. Batshaw's questions. The problem which the community faced now was critical for Montreal Jewry, and of utmost significance in regard to internal cohesion and external relations. For the good of the community the two parties had to find a compromise.

A hectic period began. Regular and special meetings were frequently held. While the government was pressing for quick implementation of Chapter 48, AJCS and JFS extensively negotiated toward some consensus. In June 1973 an agreed-upon attitude was not as yet in sight.

Continued negotiations with the government seemed to indicate the strong desire on its part to make it possible for JFS to enter the system as a public rather than remain a private establishment. Mr. S.M. Brownstein reported on a June 1st meeting of Mr. C. Bronfman (Chairman, Executive Committee, AJCS) and Mr. S. Abbey (President, JFS) with the Minister of Social Affairs:

In the June 1st [1973] meeting, in particular, it was clarified that the sectarian intake could probably be maintained. . . The voluntary participants of the agency could also be expanded via the use of committees, although the number of Board people could not change. The flow of Jewish communal money can continue, and apparently can be used for whatever purpose the Board sees fit. It was also clarified that although the agency has the right to a charter as a private establishment, the chance of continued funding by the government is questionable.¹

¹Minutes of a Special Meeting of the JFS Executive Committee, June 4, 1973, Archive of the Baron de Hirsch Institute, Montreal.
Notwithstanding the government clarifications, "The general consensus in JFS remained that the agency should follow its previously explicated course, i.e., moving towards the development of a private establishment."\(^1\)

In the summer of 1973 JFS pursued its line; namely, to explore the option of remaining a private establishment. AJCS, that, in actual fact, already had determined to have the JFS join the public system, tried to persuade JFS to agree. The government, interested in having the Jewish welfare agency incorporated into the public system, employed pressure tactics. An ominous sign was the discontinuation, on June 7, 1973, of the government grants payments. At the time, the Ministry of Social Affairs (MSA) reaffirmed the JFS' right to operate as a private establishment, but indicated that MSA would not fund them.\(^2\) A noteworthy phenomenon was the developing, within the Jewish community, of a public opinion in favour of JFS converting to a public establishment. This public opinion, which was presumably generated by factors in the community that favoured the attitude of AJCS, was mainly expressed in letters to officers and members of AJCS and JFS. The writers of those letters, mostly leaders of various Jewish organizations, and rabbis, raised arguments such as: "They [JFS] are overstating the

\(^1\)Ibid.

\(^2\)S.M. Brownstein, in a letter to the AJCS Executive Committee, July 13, 1973, Archive of the Baron de Hirsch Institute, Montreal.
consequences," "Go in—we can't afford to offend the government," and "Go on—we can't afford to fund you."

In a meeting of the Executive Committee of JFS, July 26, the negotiations with the government, concerning guarantees (as to the Jewishness of the public agency) were described. The President, Mr. S. Abbey, reported as follows: "It does appear that additional guarantees will not be forthcoming from the MSA, which makes it impossible for us to convert to a public establishment. We are, therefore, facing the eventual need to approach AJCS for full deficit financing." 2

In the arena of government-community relations, the government, again, made it very clear that it was expecting the Jewish welfare agency to join the public system, as full assurance—in their eyes—was given with regard to the Jewishness of the public agency. The government mainly referred to its concession with regard to the establishment of a Jewish social service centre. A conversation with the Minister of Social Affairs, Mr. C. Castonguay, was described by Dr. Victor Goldbloom, Minister of Municipal Affairs, as follows: "The Minister was disappointed that the Jewish community does not go with the total Quebec community in the social service scheme, especially since full assurance

1Ibid.

2Minutes of the JFS Executive Committee meeting, July 26, 1973, Archive of the Baron de Hirsch Institute, Montreal.
was given by him that the Jewish component of service would be provided for. 1

A few days later Dr. Goldbloom had a second conversation with Mr. Castonguay. He reported to Mr. Batshaw about this conversation as follows:

1. Mr. Castonguay was fully understanding and accepting of the ethnic, sociocultural and religious needs of the Jewish people in terms of family and child care services. He stated that this must be provided.

2. He is insistent that Jewish people should receive basic services from "public establishment." If JFS is not a "public establishment" one will have to be created, or the services will be rendered through the English-speaking SSC.

3. If JFS wishes to be a "private establishment" to provide certain supplementary services it is free to do so.

4. Mr. Castonguay assured Dr. Goldbloom that if JFS became a "public establishment" and it did not meet the Jewish community needs, and there was no alternative other than converting from "public establishment" to a "private establishment"; the transfer from one category to another is entirely possible.

5. Mr. Castonguay indicated that he will be very disappointed if the Jewish community did not participate in the social service system which the government has devised. 2

But the leaders of JFS were not convinced that the mere fact of a Jewish SSC, by itself, could guarantee the Jewish nature of the public agency.

Before proceeding to describe the next stage, which led to the final resolution, it may be worthwhile to summarize what was achieved, and what was not achieved, in

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2 M.G. Batshaw, Memorandum, August 6, 1973, Archive of the Baron de Hirsch Institute, Montreal.
the negotiations with the government; and also to juxtapose the attitudes of the government, the AJCS and the JFS.

**Government Position**

1. The government agreed¹ to establish a Jewish social service centre. This amounted to compliance with the AJCS and JFS request for a "community institution" to be inserted in the Bill, although it was not, in fact, made part of the Bill. It was believed that the effect, however, would be the same.

2. The Jewish social service centre was to be located in the AJCS building (5151 Cote St. Catherine Road) which is situated in a predominately Jewish section of the city.

3. The Jewish Family Services of the Baron de Hirsch Institute was to be converted to a Jewish social service centre.

4. The government agreed that the name of the new public establishment would be Jewish Family Services - Social Service Centre (Centre de Services Sociaux Juifs à la Famille).

5. The government agreed that four representatives of the old Baron de Hirsch Institute, which remained an AJCS constituent agency, would sit on the new Board of the Social Service Centre. It was hoped that this would

¹As reported by Mr. S. Brownstein, the Executive Director of JFS, in a memorandum dated April 25, 1973, Archive of the Baron de Hirsch Institute, Montreal.
enable some measure of continuing communal control.
The law was accordingly amended (Chapter 48, section 52).

These five points, then, could provide some assurances with regard to the continuing Jewish character of the public establishment.

However, the government insisted that:

1. The intake of the Jewish public establishment be open to every citizen in a prescribed area (mainly Snowdon and Cote des Neiges)

2. The Board was to be small, consisting of only fourteen members (as originally stipulated in the law)

3. JFS might, if it so chose, remain a private establishment, but in that case it would not receive any government funds.

The first two points, however, could jeopardize the two important principles of ethnicity and voluntarism which were so much emphasized by the community leaders.

Before presenting JFS' position, we have to look into the latent motives of the agency leaders which must have existed behind the open arguments. Weisberg (chapter 4) and Rome (chapter 9) have argued that the middle and upper class leaders of Jewish communal welfare are motivated by a strong strive for Jewish identity. They found it in the "culture of organization" which is so typical to North American Jewish communities. For these people, communal
welfare work is a major (and sometimes the only) avenue of expressing their Jewish identity. Against this background it is easy to understand their stanch opposition to transfer JFS to the public welfare system.

**Jewish Family Services Position**

Mr. Abbey, President of JFS, claimed that no specific guarantees had been given by the government to insure the Jewish character of the agency. Therefore, he concluded, joining the public system should not be recommended. In an internal publication circulated among top community leaders, he defined the issue as "one of dollars and/or maintaining a Jewish family and child care agency."¹ He maintained that: "Communities throughout North America have learned that, in order to maintain a distinctively Jewish family and child care agency, financing must come primarily from Jewish communal sources. If indeed the issue is one of dollars, let us remember that this community did and is able to support JFS."² In this connection, Mr. Abbey stated that the community funded JFS almost 100 percent until 1970 (which is not an accurate statement). Mr. Abbey wound up his article by saying that the entire issue boils down to one question: "Do we want a distinctively Jewish family and child care agency or not?"³ Under the leadership of

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²Ibid.
³Ibid.
Mr. S. Abbey, the JFS adopted the attitude that if the answer to this question is positive, JFS should not become a public establishment:

At the end of July 1973, Mr. S. Abbey sent to the JFS Board, a Position Paper concerning the implementation of Chapter 48 by JFS. In this paper he stated the attitude of JFS as follows:

This agency has given serious attention to the issue of the impact of Chapter 48 on its program and services since the Bill was submitted for first reading in August 1971. The legislation has been thoroughly examined against the backdrop of the need for continuation of Jewish services. Our current position involves taking steps to convert the agency corporation to a private establishment so that the Jewish component of our services, and the supervision by a Jewish Communal Board, can be assured. This is envisioned as a short-term measure pending the opening of the law and permitting amendments which would make it possible for the agency to operate within the envisioned integrated welfare system.¹

Allied Jewish Community Services Position

The leaders of AJCS agreed that there was some risk to the Jewish character and quality of JFS services if it would "go public." The question was whether this risk should be taken in light of "current existing circumstances."²

It was clearly stated by them that:

The Jewish community cannot exist without a Jewish family and child care agency. Experiences elsewhere

¹Mr. S. Abbey, A Position Paper, July 30, 1973, Archive of the Baron de Hirsch Institute, Montreal.

²It is fair to assume that in referring to "current circumstances," the leaders had in mind the financial needs of the community and the political desirability of cooperating with the government's initiative.
have shown that where such an agency loses its Jewish character, quality and predominantly Jewish clients, it ceases to be a Jewish agency and there is need to establish a new one in the Jewish community. 1

In this connection it should be stated that the goal of Jewish communal organization has always been the same; namely, maintaining and preserving Jewish identity. It is only the means of achieving this goal which has changed according to the circumstances of time and place. At various stages, different strategies were used to achieve this goal. Emphases could be put on welfare, recreation, religious observance, education or Zionism according to the changing circumstances.

It would appear that this time the leadership of AJCS felt that the emphasis could and should be shifted from welfare to education. This, because the burden of welfare expenditures was steadily growing while the provincial government was politically and financially ready and determined to enter, on a large scale, into the social welfare arena. At the same time there was a rising consensus in the community that Jewish education deserved more attention and funds. The prospect of releasing community funds, previously used for welfare, for educational purposes seemed attractive to the leadership.

There was only one reservation, that the Jewishness of the public welfare agency continue to be preserved.

AJCS memorandum on JFS and Chapter 48, July 31, 1973, Archive of the Baron de Hirsch Institute, Montreal.
However, one may say that the shift was not entirely self-decided. Actually, the leadership realized that in view of financial and political considerations, they had no choice but to go along with the government policy.

Accordingly, AJCS leaders took the position that the concession given by the government in the establishment of a Jewish social service centre, and other communal considerations, justified a decision to join the public system.

AJCS' considerations were as follows:

1. The JFS should agree to become a public establishment and to try to live with the system. If after a reasonable time, one year to eighteen months, it appeared that the Jewish community was being ill served, negotiations should be reopened with the Ministry of Social Affairs [MSA], and AJCS and JFS should insist on JFS converting to a "private establishment."

2. If the above is feasible and is tried out, the MSA would be more understanding than they were at the present time and would likely be more cooperative in every respect.

3. The MSA had cut off funds to JFS as of June 1973. In that year, anticipated public funds were about $300,000. JFS would be eligible to receive this amount as a public establishment. If it later converted to a private establishment, it was conceivable that MSA would understand and would agree to contract certain services to JFS and pay for same.

4. The JFS had an obligation to try to operate within the Quebec system of social services for the purpose of demonstrating that the Jewish community was not "boycotting" the government scheme. MSA considered JFS to be one of the most outstanding services of its kind and wanted it to be part of the system, so that other segments of the population would benefit from its experience and knowledge.

5. While there was a risk involved in terms of the Jewishness of the agency and its services, this would be reduced by a close monitoring of the problem by JFS and AJCS.1

1Ibid.
We might summarize the point of view of the AJCS as against that of the JFS as follows:
1. The leaders of AJCS were more politically minded, more sensitive to the interests and concerns of the Quebec government
2. The leaders of AJCS were more prepared to encompass and evaluate the changing needs of the entire community, giving preference to those goals which they considered, at the time, to be suited to enhancing Jewish identity, such as Jewish education
3. The leaders of AJCS were more budget minded in their considerations relating to government funding and in regard to shifts in allocations.

This writer thinks that the divergences in views and arguments between the leaders of the two organizations largely emanated from their different roles in the system. It could be expected, and it is well understood, that AJCS leaders would represent the general interests and considerations of the roof organization, while the leaders of JFS would struggle for the survival and identity of their agency.

As in the case of JFS leaders here, too, we have to look into the latent motive of the AJCS leaders. We assume that this motive has to do with the power struggle between the two organizations. While the JFS leaders were worried about the decline in their status and influence if the
agency goes public, it seems that the leaders of AJCS, to say the least, did not care too much about this.

Now we shall examine the attitudes of the professional social workers in the JFS. As employees of JFS, staff members professed solidarity with the agency's leaders. They objected to the merging of JFS with the public welfare system. This attitude is expressed in a Resolution adopted by the Professional Staff Council on July 6, 1972. This Resolution reads as follows:

Resolved, at this point in time and with the information available, it is the general consensus of opinion of the Professional Staff Council that it would be in the best interests of this community and for the Agency to opt out of Bill 65 in order to maintain our high standard of professional services.¹

However, loyalty to their employers was not the only reason. Their Jewish commitments and professional perceptions led them to conclude that losing the independence of a Jewish communal welfare agency carried the risk of watering down, if not totally phasing out, the Jewish character of the agency and lowering its professional standards.

These apprehensions were expressed, also, by Mrs. Pearl Leibovitch, a veteran social worker, who wrote as follows:

Uneasiness is felt by those who are concerned about the risk to ethnicity, language, religion and

¹A letter by the Chairman of the Professional Staff Council to the Executive Director of JFS, July 6, 1972, Archivé of the Baron de Hirsch Institute.
citizen control over services. Others see danger to professional autonomy as a result of the much greater bureaucratic structures anticipated to manage the tasks of the Social Service Centre.¹

Mr. Solomon M. Brownstein explained his views on merging with the public welfare system in an address presented at the National Conference of Jewish Communal Service, San Francisco, June 3, 1974. His point of departure was the assertion that a Jewish communal agency should enjoy freedom and autonomy so as to be capable of preserving its Jewish character and goals. He added that:

A basic prerequisite, if we are to successfully integrate the Jewish component, is that the agency system must be open and free to experiment and innovate. Without this freedom, the Jewish family and child care agency is, in my opinion, doomed, not only in terms of its loss of vitality, but also in terms of its isolation from the mainstream of contemporary Judaism.²

So, Mr. Brownstein strongly opposed the conversion of JFS to a public establishment. In this address he said: "We will survive and flourish as a field only if we have the courage to recognize now that our concepts and our tools are inadequate to meet this new threat to agency life and perhaps, in the last analysis, to Jewish life."³ To summarize, Mr. Brownstein did not believe that JFS, as a


²Solomon M. Brownstein, "La Reforme In Quebec Health and Social Services. Impact on Jewish Casework Services" (Montreal: Jewish Family Services, June 1974), p. 3.

³Ibid., p. 15.
public establishment, would have the freedom of experiments and innovations, which are prerequisite for preserving its Jewish character. But again, in this case, as in the case of other high level staff members, we should look also for latent motives, mainly apprehensions with regard to the status of the Executive Director within a public establishment.

The struggle for an independent Jewish welfare agency unified the leadership and staff of JFS more than ever before. But, as we shall see, this common front had to yield to double pressure from AJCS and the government.

The Resolution

After some relaxation during the summer months of 1973, the negotiation, sometimes even along with confrontation, between AJCS and JFS was resumed.

At this stage, when AJCS and JFS held totally opposite attitudes, AJCS began to employ tactics of persuasion in order to bring JFS around to changing its attitude.

At an AJCS Board of Trustees\(^1\) meeting, held on September 4, 1973, the following Resolution was adopted:

That the Board of Trustees, fully appreciating the need for us to continue to serve Jewish people adequately, and recognizing the risks involved, and considering all the factors, recommend to JFS to make the best possible arrangement with the

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\(^1\)This is the supreme governing body of AJCS.
government, within the framework of a public establishment. It is further recommended that Baron de Hirsch consider establishing a part-three corporation to offer noninsurable services such as relief supplementation or other innovative projects which are not covered by the standard type of public establishment.

This Resolution was passed by a large majority. It was accompanied, on September 5th, with an entreaty letter sent by Mr. Charles R. Bronfman, President of AJCS to Mr. Stanley Abbey, President of JFS. In this letter Mr. Bronfman asked for the cooperation of JFS with regard to that Resolution. He put it this way:

We hope your Board also recognizes that AJCS and JFS are completely together in our single objective of making sure that the Jewish children and families in our community are served Jewishly and adequately. The problem which confronts us is not one of substance, but of strategy. No one can say for certain that one approach is definitely foolproof over another, though the Board of AJCS feels that JFS should try to operate as a public establishment. The risks involved were presented ably by you and others at the Executive Committee and Board of Trustees meeting of AJCS on September 4. We earnestly hope that your Board will consider and try to live with the motion which was passed at the Trustees meeting by a large majority.

The JFS reply was negative, as reflected at their Board Resolution dated September 11, 1973:

The Board of Directors of JFS, fully appreciating the need for JFS to continue to serve the Jewish community adequately and Jewishly, and having fully considered all factors involved, instruct JFS Executive Committee

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1 That is a nonprofit corporation according to part 3 of the Canada Corporation Act.


and Officers to meet with AJCS to arrange for the
continuation of JFS as a private agency, so that it
may continue to function with essential services to
its clientele.\footnote{Minutes of the JFS Board of Directors Meeting,
September 11, 1973, Archive of the Baron de Hirsch Institute,
Montreal.}

This Resolution was passed by a vote of twenty-one, with
three abstentions.

The negotiations aimed at arriving at a solution
continued in the joint AJCS-JFS officers' meetings,\footnote{A coordinating ad hoc committee composed of AJCS
and JFS officers.} but
to no avail. A joint officers' meeting on October 22nd
resulted in AJCS submitting an ultimatum to JFS to the
effect that continued noncompliance with Chapter 48 would
result in discontinuation of Jewish communal funding.
Following this ultimatum AJCS and JFS officers decided to
prepare a new Resolution to be submitted for approval by
the AJCS Board of Trustees in order to describe the con-
ditions under which "going public" would in fact take place.

Accordingly a new Resolution was adopted on October
25th, by the JFS Executive Committee. The Resolution read
as follows:

If a Resolution, in a form acceptable to JFS, will be
passed by the AJCS Board of Trustees, then the
Executive Committee of JFS, in view of the fact that
there appears to be no alternative, will recommend to
the JFS Board that JFS become a public social service
centre.\footnote{Minutes of the JFS Executive Committee, October
25, 1973, Archive of the Baron de Hirsch Institute, Montreal.}
In the meantime a solution was sought by way of asking the government for permission to operate both private and public establishments.

However, Mr. Castonguay, the Minister of Social Affairs, was not prepared to grant two permits. He said that JFS would have to become a public establishment (SSC) or a private establishment which would be self-supporting. In a letter to the President of AJCS, Mr. Castonguay offered assurance that "If the operation of the public SSC is not adequate, the Department [of Social Affairs] would no doubt be prepared to consider the possibility of conversion into a private institution and consequently issue a permit." AjCS officers were prepared to accept Mr. Castonguay's assurance, but the officers of JFS were not.

At this stage the officers of AJCS considered what guarantees AJCS could give JFS so as to assure them that, if the Jewish community was not served adequately through a public SSC, the AJCS would support JFS' conversion from a public to a private establishment.

The joint officers' group mutually agreed that a committee composed of two representatives of JFS and two of AJCS with Mr. Oscar Respitz (a former JFS president) as chairman, would serve as a special committee to keep in

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1Cited in a Community Communique from the President of AJCS to Members, Board of Trustees, November 12, 1973.
touch with the organizational phases of the public SSC. If this committee found that the demands being made upon the SSC would make it impossible to serve the Jewish community well, its recommendation would be presented to the AJCS. Also it was agreed that, once the JFS (SSC) was organized and operating as a public establishment, if, in the opinion of its Board, it was not working well in the interests of the Jewish community, the JFS Board’s decision to convert to a private establishment would be accepted by AJCS.

These assurances and guarantees were recorded in a Resolution submitted for approval to the Board of Trustees of AJCS on November 20, 1973. It was further understood by the joint officers' group that, while the JFS Executive Committee continued to have considerable concern and did not favour becoming a public establishment, nevertheless, if the AJCS Board approved the Resolution, the JFS Executive Committee would feel obligated to recommend to its Board and Membership that JFS become a public establishment.

The Resolution (see Appendix B) was approved by the AJCS Board of Trustees on November 20, 1973.¹

The hour of decision had arrived for JFS. Its Executive Committee was obliged to recommend "going public."

At a JFS Board meeting, held on November 26th, the President, Mr. Abbey, conveyed the AJCS Resolution to the

members and added that:

Based on a mutually accepted (to JPS and AJCS) set of guarantees (provided by AJCS in the event that the public agency does not operate acceptably on behalf of Jewish clients), AJCS was ready to ask their Board of Trustees to discontinue funding to JPS if the agency did not become a public establishment. Based on this development the JFS Executive Committee is recommending to the Board of JFS that since we have no alternative [my underscoring] it appears that conversion to a public SSC is required.¹

In the discussion which followed, the opponents of conversion to a public establishment said that going public would end up costing the community more money for less service. It would also undermine the Jewish control of the agency.

Some of the Board members suggested that the agency disassociate from AJCS and entertain a public campaign. They added that there are lessons in Jewish history which indicate that bowing to this kind of pressure by government is ultimately dangerous for the total Jewish community.

The proponents of AJCS' position claimed that the decision was basically political and not client-oriented. There was no question that clients would be better served through a private establishment; however, they added that the needs of clients were not always the sole basis for community decision-making.

Other members doubted whether the agency had a constituency, outside of the JFS Board of Directors, who

¹Minutes of the JFS Board Meeting, November 26, 1973, Archive of the Baron de Hirsch Institute, Montreal.
could support it financially in the event they decided to operate as a private establishment. They concluded that there was not, in fact, a viable alternative but to join the public system.

When the JFS Executive Committee recommendation was put to a vote, seven were in favour, seven against and three abstained. In view of this outcome, a continuation of the meeting was called for December 11th. At this meeting, arguments raised at the previous Board meeting were repeated. The mood was that JFS was being pushed to a policy which was not good for the Jewish community in general or for Jewish welfare in particular.

In the vote, the following result was obtained: in favour of going public—eleven; against—fourteen; abstention—one.

The rejection of the AJCS Resolution was met with a quick and decisive reaction by AJCS. They actually threatened to discontinue their relations with JFS and to establish a new constituent agency of AJCS which would operate as an SSC. This was made clear in a letter from the President of AJCS to the Members of the Board, dated December 13th, reading as follows:

Dear Board Member,

It is with much regret that I have to report that the Jewish Family Services Board of Directors at its meeting on December 11, by a vote of 14-11, decided they could not accept the AJCS resolution and therefore were opposed to becoming a public establishment CSS. It had been hoped by the joint officers of AJCS and
JFS that with the very full assurances which AJCS Board of Trustees had given, that they would see fit to become a public establishment and that if for any reason it did not work out, that we would support the conversion to a private establishment.

It was the AJCS Board of Trustees view that it was in the community interest for JFS to be part of the health and welfare system of the Province as a CSS which would largely serve the Jewish community. This conviction has been substantiated all the more by the fact that the medical social workers in our six health institutions would be administered by the CSS. Furthermore, referrals to a reception centre, under Chapter 4B, such as our Jewish Nursing Home, are also made through the CSS. Thus it is very clear that the Jewish community must have a public CSS and that in light of the JFS decision, we probably will have no alternative but to establish a new and separate CSS agency.

The resolution passed at the last AJCS Board of Trustees meeting indicated that we would have to discontinue our financial support of JFS if they did not become a CSS. Therefore we will negotiate with JFS to work out an orderly arrangement so that the clients now being served by JFS will not suffer in the transfer to the new CSS.

In view of the above situation, it is essential that we convene the AJCS Board of Trustees at the earliest possible date so that formal action can be taken on a recommendation which will be made by the officers of AJCS to establish a new constituent agency of AJCS which will carry out the appropriate functions.¹

The AJCS had refrained from invoking the financial threat to the JFS until December 1973, six months after it had decided in June that its affiliated agency should go public.

The AJCS had patiently tried to convince JFS that enough guarantees were provided to ensure the Jewish character of the new public establishment. When these efforts

failed, and the government continued to press for a decision, AJCS faced the risk of loss of some $300,000 in public funds. At this stage, therefore, AJCS decided to turn to pressure tactics against JFS, and apparently was prepared to go ahead with its threat.

A very hectic period followed. Meetings of all concerned parties were held and pressures in all directions were exerted. In the centre of this stood the Executive Committee of JFS which sought a way out of the deadlock.

On Sunday, December 16th, a special JFS Executive Committee meeting took place. This meeting was scheduled following the December 11th meeting of the JFS Board and was to deal with strategy after the JFS Board had turned down the Executive Committee's recommendation to convert to a public SSC. It was reported to the Executive Committee that the Ministry of Social Affairs was seeking maximum compliance of the agency with the law. The expectation of the Executive Committee that the JFS would be able to operate as a public SSC with minimal compliance was found to be unrealistic.

The Executive Committee now decided:

1. To confirm the position of the Board of Directors not to convert to a public SSC
2. Since operation as a public or private SSC seemed not to be possible, the Executive Committee recommended to AJCS that they reassess their position
3. Failing a change in the AJCS position the JFS Executive Committee would recommend to the JFS
Board the winding down and phasing out of all programs of the agency with the exception of legal aid, financial assistance and educational services.  

4. To convene a joint officers meeting with AJCS to inform them of this decision.  

5. To report this decision to the JFS Board of Directors at their next regularly scheduled meeting on January 8, 1974.  

The recommendation to wind down all programs of the agency was aimed at exerting pressure on the AJCS. The line of thinking, apparently, was this: AJCS and the government were pressing JFS to go public while the latter was convinced that this would be detrimental to the Jewish character of the agency. Since continuing as a private (communal) agency was out of the question because AJCS was not ready to finance this agency anymore and the prospects of a private funding campaign were very slim, what other alternative did JFS have than winding down?  

In the three weeks between the December 16, 1973 meeting of the JFS Executive Committee and the January 8, 1974 meeting of the JFS Board of Directors, desperate attempts were made by officers of JFS and AJCS to work out a solution which would be accepted by the JFS Board.  

The two major points now at stake were whether the public SSC would mainly serve a Jewish clientele and whether JFS would have some control over the SSC Board.  

1These services were not scheduled to be included in the public SSC.  

2Minutes of the JFS Special Executive Committee meeting, December 16, 1973, Archive of the Baron de Hirsch Institute, Montreal.
In correspondence with the government and in negotiations between officers of AJCS and the JFS Executive Committee, it was agreed that a proposal to organize and maintain a Jewish SSC was a viable alternative. It was also agreed by AJCS and JFS that there was sufficient assurance to suggest that the SSC would, in fact, continue to provide services to a preponderance of Jewish clients by being located in a predominantly Jewish section of the city; and also that the JFS Board would be able to exercise some continuing control over the SSC Board, by sending four representatives to sit on that Board. With this information, the members of the JFS Executive Committee came to the crucial JFS Board meeting on January 8, 1974. At this meeting the Board discussed the practicalities of its previous decision not to "go public" and considered the views of its Executive Committee that had developed since the last meeting of the Board on December 11th.

In setting the frame of reference for a final resolution, the President, Mr. S. Abbey, reviewed the five alternatives that were open to the agency:

1. To remain private. [This was not acceptable to AJCS]
2. To operate a public and private agency. [This was not acceptable to the government]
3. To operate a public SSC and auxiliary services. [This was not acceptable to the JFS Board at its last meeting]
4. To close down JFS in its entirety. [This was not recommended by the JFS Executive Committee]
5. To wind down JFS and to operate only legal aid, financial assistance, educational services and a
system relating to the cemetery. [This alternative was being presented by the Executive Committee members since they were unable to find a way to implement the previous decision of the Board to remain a private SSC].

After a long discussion, alternative three was adopted and the following Resolution was approved:

In view of the fact that practical considerations make it impossible for JFS to continue as a private agency, be it resolved that JFS assume the primary responsibility for organizing a public Jewish Social Service Centre, subject to the guarantees of the Resolution of the AJCS Board of Trustees and that JFS continue to operate that part of its program which will not be insured or funded by the Department of Social Affairs.

Fourteen members voted in favour, five against, and two abstained.

With the adoption of this Resolution an end came, at least officially, to a long and crucial dispute concerning the place of Jewish welfare in a rapidly changing society. It was, also, the end of an era in Montreal Jewish communal welfare, and the beginning of a new phase by way of a new form of rendering welfare services to the Jewish community.

On April 1, 1974 Jewish Family Services of the Baron de Hirsch Institute began to operate as a public establishment, this time under the name, Jewish Family Services - Social Service Centre.

1Minutes of the JFS Board Meeting, January 8, 1974; Archive of the Baron de Hirsch Institute, Montreal.

2See Appendix B.

3Minutes, January 8, 1974.
CHAPTER 11
JEWISH COMMUNAL WELFARE
IN A CHANGING SOCIETY

A Communal Welfare Agency:
the Baron de Hirsch Institute (1920-1973)

We have been concerned with changes; changes that took place outside the communal welfare agency and changes which occurred inside under the impact of the external forces and developments. We were looking for answers to two leading questions: how did the agency accommodate itself to changes? and, did the agency remain Jewish notwithstanding the changes? The major actors in the arena are the Baron de Hirsch Institute, the Allied Jewish Community Services, the professional social workers and the government of Quebec.

The main variable factors are:

1) The socioeconomic conditions of the Jewish community in Montreal
2) The social welfare theory and practice
3) The profession of social work
4) The Quebec government social welfare policy

We have reviewed sixty years of Jewish communal welfare in Montreal. In the concluding chapter we would
answer the questions by highlighting the general historical
trends, the turning points, the relationships between the
major actors, the impact of the variables and the ways by
which the agency has served to facilitate ethnic communal
identification and cohesion.

In the reviewed period (1920-1980) we may trace
four dominant trends relating to social welfare:
1) The decline in the centrality of "social welfare" work
narrowly conceived as material assistance or casework
counselling
2) The increasing importance of the federation as a secular
agency able to represent many agencies and concerns of
"social welfare" - broadly defined such as recreational,
cultural and educational services
3) The growing importance of professional social workers
and the corresponding shift in emphasis on casework
rather than material assistance
4) The increasing government involvement not only, first,
in material aid but in funding casework, group work and
other "social welfare" activities broadly defined.

The turning points are the years 1940, 1947, 1960
and 1974. These years mark the beginning of crucial changes
in policy, program, structure or status which were, to a
lesser or greater degree, debated by laymen and professionals.

To realize the vast revolution which this communal
welfare agency went through over sixty years, we have only
to juxtapose the Jewish Family Services - Social Service Centre of 1980 with the Baron de Hirsch Institute of 1920. In 1920 it was a small, sectarian, communal welfare agency, member of the Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of Montreal with a budget of about $100,000. In 1980 it is a large, nonsectarian, public establishment. It is part of the Quebec public welfare system with a budget of more than 2.2 million dollars. A lot has changed over the years in philosophy, methods, programs, structure, financial resources and status. But rising above all these is one overall question: is the agency as Jewish today as it was in 1920? Our answer is Yes. It is a nonsectarian agency today, but it is still a Jewish one. We shall support this answer in the second section of this chapter.

Let us remember that BdHl, as any other ethnic institution, had manifest and latent functions. The manifest, and announced, function of BdHl was to provide social welfare services to the Jewish community, however these might be defined. The latent, unannounced functions were the transmission of cultural symbols, the exchange of various kinds of social recognitions (except social contacts which was a manifest goal), and the eliciting of commitments. Some latent functions had to do with various personal concerns of laymen and professionals, mainly those associated with power. We suggest that the Jewishness of the agency should be measured by the degree of the three Jewish
characteristics (Jewish constituency, voluntarism, cultural distinctiveness) and the performance of its functions.

Before we proceed, we would like to draw attention to Table 8 (at the end of this section). This comparative table brings together the annual budget of BeHe, the Montreal Jewish population and the budget per capita in the community for five key years: 1920, 1940, 1960, 1973 and 1978. These data can help to explain important developments in the history of BeHe.

In 1920 BeHe was a small, communal welfare agency serving a Jewish population of 45,846. The agency, thanks to its initiative as co-founder of the federation (in 1916) and the scope of its activities, occupied a central place in the federation. It was, actually, the core and the heart of the federation dealing with a wide range of health, social welfare, educational and cultural services. The funds were fully of intra-community sources and the budget per capita was $2.10. There was no government involvement in any sectarian social welfare and therefore no government funding. The manifest function was clear—supplying social welfare services, mainly income maintenance. The latent functions were there too. They had to do with the exchange of recognitions and commitments and with the interests of the laymen volunteers as explained in chapter 9. The agency was fully Jewish if we measure it by the three characteristics mentioned above.
In 1940 we witness the beginning of a new trend which will grow stronger across the years and reach its climax in the early 1970s. This is the increasing government involvement in Jewish communal welfare. It began with the decision of BdeHII to apply to the government for grants based on the QPCA. The total grants that year amounted to only $11,000, but it was a milestone in the history of the agency. Since then the amounts of government funds grew larger through the years up to a climax of $300,000 in 1973. The year 1940 marks a turning point because this was the beginning of public funding in Jewish welfare. This change took place after the social welfare leaders had recognized that the Jewish community, as a taxpayers' group, was entitled to its fair share in government social welfare funds. Applying for government grants actually amounted to the breaking of a psychological barrier. It heralded a growing reliance on government funding (see Tables 4-7, chapter 8).

In 1940 the QPCA grants were small and the budget per capita was the same as in 1920 ($2.10). There were no changes in the nature of the services (which were focused on material aid). There was, also, no evidence of a serious debate within the agency with regard to the policy change, namely applying for government funds. It seems that the decision to receive public funds was also motivated by the existing, and anticipated, needs of the war and postwar years.

The next turning point was in 1947 when the agency appointed, for the first time, a professional social worker
as an executive director. This was the beginning of a new trend, the era of professionalism in BdeHI. The appointment of an academically trained social worker as an executive director, and the subsequent hiring of more social workers, reinforced the influence of professionals in the agency.

The impact of the social workers was felt in three areas: the character of the manifest services, the nature of the clientele and the relationships with the government (namely, public funding). The professional social workers gave a new, expanded interpretation to the notion of "social welfare." For them it was more than material aid, handing out doles. They turned to the growing middle class offering casework services rather than material assistance. Gradually BdeHI changed the focus of its services from mainly income maintenance to mainly counselling. The proponents of this change could argue that by this they contributed towards ethnic, communal identification by an important sector of the Jewish population. They may be right, but one should not ignore the existence of latent motives. The social workers were motivated by the wish to practice their modern social welfare theories and to strengthen their status vis-à-vis the laymen. They soon learned to recognize and manipulate the agency's manifest and latent functions for their purposes.

The trend of rising influence of the professional social workers culminated in 1960 when the agency agreed to transfer all relief payments to the City of Montreal Social
Welfare Department. This was a clear turning point, an unmistakable demonstration of the influence of the professional social workers and the shift towards nonmaterial aid type of programs. But this time the change did not happen without an internal debate. Again, as in the earlier case of applying for public funds in 1940, the leaders had to overcome a psychological barrier in order to agree that Jewish needy people would apply to a non-Jewish municipal agency. In their initial objection they raised arguments related to the good of the Jewish welfare client. But we think it is safe to assume that the considerations connected with the latent function of the agency, which has to do with the exchange of recognitions, commitments and power, also played a significant role in shaping the laymen's attitude.

All these developments were not possible without the acceleration and expansion of the already existing trend, of growing reliance on public funds. In order to be able to carry out their ambitious programs (and hire more social workers), the executive director and his aides pushed for more government grants. They developed an intricate network of relationships with the Department of Social Affairs and managed to increase government grants from $47,645 in 1947 to $179,938 in 1959 and up to a maximum of $300,000 in 1973. In terms of the JFS budget per capita in the Jewish community, there was a substantial rise. It grew from $2.10 in 1920 and 1940 to $5.51 in 1960.
We have noted that through the years the funding of BdeHI became much more public compared with the situation until 1947. During the 1950s QPCA grants comprised between 55 and 81 percent of the annual relief payments of the agency (see Table 6, chapter 8).

The next turning point was in 1974 when JFS joined the Quebec public welfare system. In the three preceding years a debate developed between the leaderships of AJCS and JFS which at times acquired the dimension of a crisis. What were the causes of the dispute and the roots of the crisis? On the face of it, this was mainly a debate about the Jewish control and the Jewish characteristics of the communal welfare agency, or, in other words, whether the agency could remain Jewish if it was no longer a member of the communal welfare federation. AJCS people said it could; the JFS leaders claimed it could not. The AJCS people used arguments related to economic and political considerations and priorities of the community. The JFS people maintained that joining the public welfare system would harm the three basic components of Jewishness in the communal agency. But in actual fact the reasons for the split of attitudes were much deeper than those publicly discussed. They had to do with both the manifest and latent functions of the agency.

Through the years, especially after World War II, BdeHI became larger, increased its budget, increased its per capita spending, expanded its services and became more
professional and more efficient. From its own perspective the BdeHI became a successful agency. But this was not the point of view of the federation leaders, even though they acknowledged the professionalism of the agency. From the AJCS' perspective BdeHI became increasingly peripheral to the overall communal interests. After all, the BdeHI now was serving mostly the middle-class people and not the poor and the needy. In the preceding years new and important concerns had developed such as aid to Israel and promotion of Jewish education. The whole priorities scale had changed. The leaders of JFS-BdeHI failed to recognize (or admit) these facts. They also failed to admit that it was they who, since the early 1950s, managed to steadily increase government funding to the degree that in 1973 public funds amounted to 50 percent of the annual JFS budget (which was $600,000). After encouraging the government (in full consent with AJCS) to increase its financial participation, it was a mistake on the part of the JFS leaders to assume that AJCS would stop midway and refuse additional public funds if they could ensure the basic Jewish elements of the agency.

Also, they could have anticipated the coming of Bill 65 following the public social welfare policies during the 1960s and the reports of inquiry commissions. Bill 65 should not have been a surprise to the careful observer of political and social developments in Quebec since the early 1960s. It was only the manifestation and culmination of an
historical trend. The leaders of AJCS realized that politically and financially it was not advisable to ignore or object this trend. Far from it! The Jewish community could benefit by the shift of released communal funds from social welfare services to other pressing needs and still receive larger public funds for an expanded Jewish welfare agency in the form of a public establishment.

Furthermore, the leaders of JFS failed to realize that these developments, as Elazar has shown, were not unique to Montreal. All over North America governments expanded their involvement in social welfare. Jewish welfare services became gradually open to non-Jews (with government funding) and welfare federations shifted the emphasis of their activities from sheer social welfare services to other communal concerns such as Zionism, education, golden age and recreation. Analysis of the federation's allocations according to categories (see Table 1, chapter 6) could show this trend very clearly. While allocations for "individual welfare services" went down from 31 percent in 1960 to 20 percent in 1973, allocations for "recreation and golden age" went up through the same years from 21 percent to 30 percent. Education and culture allocation rose from .06 percent to 16 percent.

Referring to the latent function of the agency we have to note that, here too, the AJCS' case in favour of joining the public welfare system was stronger than that of the JFS who objected. First, if the latent function of the
ethnic institution is to facilitate ethnic communal identification and cohesion, this can be achieved by other communal services as well and not only by the social welfare institution. At that time the community had a clear priority, with good reasons, for educational and cultural goals. This was mainly because the rising of Quebec nationalism and the enhancement of French culture posed challenges to the ethnic identity of minority groups in the province. Besides, there was a doubt if the agency really served the needy people in the community. Secondly, there were good reasons to believe, based on government concessions and promises, that the new public agency would continue to operate as a Jewish welfare agency and perform its functions as before.

Regarding other latent functions, one should remember that for years BdeHI was a solid basis of power and influence for communal leaders. Its centrality in the federation and high professional standard endowed special status and prestige to its leaders. By now JFS-BdeHI had lost its centrality and therefore some of its influence. But still it was a prestigious agency. It is well understood why the JFS leaders refused to give up this power basis of which they could crop psychological, political and social benefits. It seems to us that precisely because of these reasons the leaders of AJCS did not mind depositing Jewish social welfare in the hands of a public establishment, namely the Jewish SSC, if some essential conditions were ensured. So, while public
attention focused on changes or possible changes in the manifest services of the institution, much of the fervor and concerns created by the debate had to do with possible changes in the way this institution met and performed various latent functions.

In the final analysis the internal discussions within the community boiled down to one issue: was it possible, at one and the same time, to keep government money (this time full funding) and maintain the Jewish characteristics of the public establishment? Or, if we use Merton's notion of manifest and latent functions, would a Jewish public welfare establishment be able to carry on the ethnic institution's functions which the Baron de Hirsch Institute, as a communal agency, did?

JFS, claiming that it was impossible, opposed to the last minute and opted for a private establishment, namely a communal, independent agency. AJCS, assured that enough guarantees were given, thought it was possible and decided to join the public welfare system. As we know, the view of AJCS prevailed. JFS-BeHeI was actually forced to agree.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Annual Budget&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Montreal Jewish Population&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Average Budget per Capita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>$96,092</td>
<td>45,846</td>
<td>$2.10</td>
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<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>136,107</td>
<td>63,937</td>
<td>2.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>572,280</td>
<td>102,724&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>5.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>115,000&lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>5.21</td>
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<td>1978</td>
<td>2,203,664</td>
<td>110,000&lt;sup&gt;5&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>20.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>1</sup>Budget figures for 1920, 1940, 1960 and 1973 were taken from JFS-BdeHI annual reports. The figures for 1978 were supplied by the Director of Administrative Services of the JFS-SSC.

<sup>2</sup>Rosenberg, "The Growth and Changes in the Distribution of the Jewish Population of Montreal."


<sup>4</sup>Research Department, AJCS. Number based on the official census of 1971.

<sup>5</sup>Estimate based on recent developments in Quebec after the PQ came to power in November 1976.
A Jewish Public Social Service Centre
(1974-1980)

Two major questions now arise:
1) Is the JFS-SSC a Jewish agency?
2) Did the Jewish community benefit or lose from the change in the status of the agency?

As a first step toward the answers we have to refer to chapter 5 in which we have found that the characteristics of a Jewish communal welfare are:

1) Jewish constituency
2) Jewish voluntarism
3) Jewish cultural distinctiveness.

Are these dimensions still existing within the public agency? To find the answers we shall turn to facts and data relating to JFS-SSC and to views of communal leaders, communal professional workers, executives in JFS-SSC and clients.

The existence of Jewish constituency may be measured, among other criteria, by the clientele composition of the JFS-SSC. Even though the agency is a nonsectarian "public establishment," theoretically open to every citizen, the overwhelming majority of the clients are Jewish. Ninety percent of the clients of all JFS-SSC services at the end of 1978, except the hospitals, were Jews. In the hospitals, which had been open to non-Jewish patients for years, the ratio was sixty Jews, forty others.1 According to Mr:

1Data received from the Director of Administrative Services, JFS-SSC.
Charles Kaplan, the Director of Administrative Services in JFS-SSC, the majority of staff members are Jews. In 1978 there were 121 staff members, only twenty-one of them non-Jews. Communal support, which is part of the Jewish constituency dimension, can be measured by the composition of the Board of Directors of JFS-SSC.

As to funding, we know that since 1974 it is nil. The JFS-SSC is fully funded by the government. This is actually the only component of Jewish characteristics which does not exist in the JFS-SSC. However, the Board remains by and large Jewish, and through the Board the Jewish community can, and does, exert its influence.

It is the composition of the Board of JFS-SSC which helps the agency to maintain its Jewish character and some degree of communal control. Section 52 in chapter 48 of the Statutes of Quebec; 1971 provides for fourteen board members. Based on this section it is possible to elect a board with at least a majority of Jewish members. In 1977, for example, all the members of the Board were Jews. Its composition was as follows:

1) Four persons represented the (old) Jewish Family Services of the Baron de Hirsch Institute (which is a constituent agency of AJCS)
2) Two persons represented the Jewish hospitals
3) Two persons represented the Jewish reception centres (these are institutions where patients live and
receive medical and rehabilitation treatment on a long-term or permanent basis.

4) Two persons represented the Jewish socioeconomic groups of the territory mainly served by the centre (the Cote des Neiges and Snowdon area).

5) Two persons represented the Jewish clients.

6) Two persons represented the staff of JFS-SSC.

The General Director of the centre is a member ex officio.

This composition became possible because of the character of the groups and of the institutions which the Board members represented. All these groups and institutions were Jewish.

As to Jewish voluntarism, it is mainly carried out by the old Jewish Family Services of the Baron de Hirsch Institute which remained a communal agency within the AJCS. This agency extends volunteers' services which complement the activities of JFS-SSC. It concentrates in legal aid, supplementary relief payments and various personal services to needy people, mainly the aged. This agency is a major channel of voluntarism in communal welfare. Its connection with the public establishment is officially recognized by sending four representatives to the Board of JFS-SSC.

Jewish cultural distinctiveness in the JFS-SSC is maintained by the majority of Jewish staff members and their positive attitudes towards traditional Jewish values and customs.
Mr. Kaplan explained that there are feelings of Jewish commitments among the staff which help to create the Jewish ambiance in the agency. Dietary laws and Jewish holidays are respected. Also, a Jewish dimensions project was established. Supervisors were obliged to attend classes where Jewish laws, values and customs were explained by rabbis. All these activities maintain the Jewish cultural distinctiveness of JFS-SSC.

The location of the agency, in the community building at 5151 Cote St. Catherine Road, where many other communal agencies are located, also helps very much to enhance the Jewish character and image of the agency.

Now, what are the views of the laymen and communal workers who were closely involved in the negotiations with the government and in the dispute between AJCS and JFS? How did they evaluate the outcome and what are their opinions with regard to the image and character of the JFS-SSC? To ascertain this we presented the same question to lay leaders and communal workers: "In retrospect, did the cause of Jewish welfare benefit or lose by the BdeHI becoming a public establishment?" Following are some of the answers.

Mr. Manuel G. Batshaw (Executive Vice-President of AJCS)

It must be admitted that it [joining the public welfare system] was a risk. But, now, after two or three years of experience we can say that the judgment of the leaders who urged that it should be done; and who claimed that it would not affect the identity of the
people or the service was right. It is working now just as well, or better, than before.¹

And also:

It is my impression that even though the organization is a public establishment, and there are some non-Jewish workers, there has not been any significant weakening of the Jewish identity, or Jewish quality of the services.²

Mr. Batshaw added:

There is no question in my mind that we have been benefited in Jewish welfare. We give services to a number of people three times as many as before.

Mr. Charles Bronfman (President of AJCS during the years 1973-1975)

I hear that the agency is doing well and is functioning well. And, apparently, if anything, it is a better agency now than ten years ago. That could have to do with the quality of the Executive Director and the professionals. I don't think the cause of Jewish welfare was hurt.³

And also:

The balance between the goals of self-preservation and adjustment has been achieved, up to now.⁴

Mr. Oscar Respitz (President of BdeHI, 1970-1972)

It has probably lessened, somehow, the Jewishness of the agency. The only thing is that it is still primarily a Jewish staff, it is still a Jewish Board, and we are still servicing Jewish clients. But I think the difference in the atmosphere is that the directives are coming from the Department of Social Affairs and not from AJCS, which is a big difference. You just feel it is a different kind of thing. We still deliver the

¹In a taped interview, dated April 28, 1977.
²Ibid.
³In a taped interview, dated June 16, 1977.
⁴Ibid.
services. But the aspect of Jewishness has gone. I mean a certain amount of independence, because we are very closely regulated by the government.\(^1\)

And also:

It lost [Jewishness, by "going public"]. I don't see how it benefited. The only way that it could have benefited was if AJCS would not have been able to fund the existing or expanding programs of JFS, because of shortage of dollars. In that sense (that we did have to eliminate programs because of lack of dollars) we gained by "going public." On the other hand, all things being equal, supposing that we are still a private agency, supposing AJCS always will have sufficient dollars to fund the ongoing programs, I would say JFS would have enhanced under AJCS, under the old system.\(^2\)

Mr. Michael Berger (President of B'nei, 1968-1970)

About three years ago I made a personal survey. I phoned the heads of all the health institutions and welfare agencies affected by Bill 65. All of them—as far as I can recall—used the phrase "business as usual." I don't think that programs have been destroyed. I don't think that Jewishness has been affected.\(^3\)

Mr. Louis Orenstein (President of JFS-B'nei, 1974-1976)

We have preserved [the Jewish character of JFS-SSC] first of all, because it is recognized by the government. Secondly, it is recognized by sister agencies. Thirdly, because the district is still Jewish, because of the proximity to Cote St-Luc which is 95 percent Jewish. So, due to happy circumstances we have remained as a Jewish agency. The other thing that counts considerably is the fact that we are located in a building which is completely occupied by Jewish agencies. So it is not hard for non-Jews to realize that this is a Jewish agency.\(^4\)

\(^1\) In a taped interview, dated April 26, 1977.

\(^2\) Ibid.

\(^3\) In a taped interview, dated April 18, 1977.

\(^4\) In a taped interview, dated April 6, 1977.
Mr. Stanley Abbey (President of JFS, 1972-1974)

I think, if you put it on a scale, you would have to say that it has benefited. It has benefited from the dialogue which was going on between the people in the Jewish community. It benefited from what we have learned during our negotiations with the government. It has benefited, because in order to keep our old BCEH [which remains a private agency] as a viable institution, it made us look to find areas where people were not receiving services. As a result of this we have our volunteers' program, and our legal aid program, taking a new life. We have freed dollars. Yes, there are the good sides of the coin. If I measure it, I have to say that the good outweighs the bad. This is the bad feeling that was created in the few people who could not adjust to the change, who feel bitter because of the change. 1

Mr. Michael Yarosky (Mr. Yarosky was the first General Director of JFS-SSC, from April 1974 to August 1977)

This question is only answerable in context of saying that the Jewish community had no choice. Perhaps, if the Jewish community would have a choice, if it would have enough dollars to offer the full range of services which the government was prepared to fund, it could be better. On the other hand, I say, it is very unrealistic in terms of dollars... But if you leave out the philosophical statement if we had a choice or not, I would say that we are in essence, certainly, as Jewish as we were a private agency; and potentially much more Jewish than before. This is in the sense of serving more Jewish members of the community, in the sense of making the Jewish community much more aware that there are social services available. 2

We would like now to turn to a "Survey of Clients of Jewish Family Services" which began in the spring of 1975 and concluded in July 1977. The survey was the product of a Jewish Content Committee within JFS-SSC. One hundred three clients responded to a questionnaire. Seventy percent of

1In a taped interview, dated March 12, 1977.
2In a taped interview, dated March 24, 1977.
them were married, 70 percent were from fifteen to thirty-nine years old, 67 percent were native born, 63 percent were females. The purposes of the survey were to "determine where staff development around Jewish issues will be required. In addition, it would help us to be able to better articulate what the Jewish component was, and if it was there at all."1

Among the findings of the survey the following are of interest:

1) Fifty percent of the respondents came to JFS-SSC because it was a Jewish agency, and were mainly referred by a friend.

2) Seventy percent of the clients used other Jewish services, the most frequent being hospitals, YM-YWHA and camps, in that order.

3) Sixty percent of clients answering this questionnaire have never used non-Jewish services. Of the remaining 40 percent, half found a difference in the services because they felt that the quality of services was higher, and therefore preferred using a Jewish agency.

4) The reason JFS-SSC clients feel good about a Jewish agency is due, in 75 percent of the cases, to a comfortable feeling about being understood and serviced in a Jewish environment.

It is obvious that the lay leaders and communal workers, who have answered our question (did Jewish welfare

benefit or lose by "going public"?) and the people who answered questions of the survey were mainly concerned with the Jewish characteristics, Jewish control, public image and quality of services of the agency. It is clear that most of the lay leaders, the communal workers and the clients think that although JFS became a "public establishment" in April 1974, it remained a Jewish agency and was identified as such by them. Indeed JFS-SSC kept its Jewish image and some degree of communal control through its Jewishly composed Board of Directors, Jewish staff and Jewish clientele. Speaking about the character of JFS-SSC after the change, as compared with JFS-BdeHI, it is worthwhile to note herewith the views of Mrs. Pearl Leibovitch, who is the Director of Professional Services in JFS-SSC. Mrs. Leibovitch is a veteran social worker who joined the agency after it had become a "public establishment." She said the following:

Contrary to myth and legend the JFS, before 1974, did not really answer all social welfare needs. It preferred to deal with family counselling to middle-class people than to deal with really needy people like poor, old people with hardly any income. In a word, people who needed material help. They referred them to the City Social Welfare Department. Before 1974 the agency was a kind of "elitist" institution, and it was sometimes very strict in the implementation of its policy. There was no open door to everyone.\(^1\)

Asked about the Jewishness of JFS-SSC and the quality of its services, Mrs. Leibovitch replied as follows:

1) There was no erosion of Jewishness since becoming a public agency

\(^1\)In an interview, dated January 30, 1979.
2) New services such as in cases of old age and child abuse were introduced

3) JFS-SSC is now much better organized and a more efficient agency than it was before. We have more clients, served by more programs and staff members.

4) The combination of Jewish social welfare within a public agency has been very successful. The Jewish community has benefited very much from the changes in the status and structure of the agency. This is a successful experiment.¹

Mrs. Leibovitch is a ranking professional executive in the JFS-SSC. As much as she sees things from an insider's point of view, her opinions, as described in the above four points, seem to correspond to most of the views we have mentioned before.

Similar views were expressed by Mr. Charles Kaplan, the Director of Administrative Services of JFS-SSC. Evaluating the results and significance of joining the public welfare system, he said:

JFS is no less Jewish now than it was before, but it is more efficient and integrated. The existence of a Jewish SSC, as one out of fourteen SSCs through the province, is a remarkable achievement in the current political situation. It represents the government's recognition of the political reality, of the existence of unique Jewish needs and of the professional qualities of JFS.²

Mr. Kaplan summarized the achievements of JFS-SSC as follows:

1) It provides integrated and unified services to the Jewish clientele

¹Ibid.

²In an interview, dated January 3, 1979.
2) It provides a sane and manageable resource to the Jewish community.

3) It has given the Jewish community a sense of participation in the Quebec reform of health and welfare services.

4) It enables the Jewish community to have a fair share, as taxpayers, in the welfare budget of this province.¹

We conclude that there is a general consensus that the Jewish community of Montreal has benefited by converting JFS into a public establishment. It is today a larger social welfare agency in staff, budget and programs, offering more services than before to more Jewish clients, helping more persons in need and more old persons. And it is not less Jewish in 1980 than before 1974.

But here we have to ask: is the definition and meaning of the term "Jewish" in 1980 the same as in 1920? In 1920 the agency was private, strictly sectarian, fully funded by the community and undoubtedly Jewish. Is it as Jewish today? The answer is that it is, even though many changes took place.

Remembering the three major characteristics by which the Jewishness of a communal social welfare agency can be measured (Jewish constituency, Jewish voluntarism and Jewish cultural distinctiveness), we maintain that these elements exist today in JFS-SSC as they did in the BdeH before 1974.

What have changed are structure, status, size, programs and the

¹Ibid.
degree of public financing, JFS-SSC today is a nonsectarian Jewish public agency. It is public not only in the sense of being governmental, but also in the sense of being more open to the use of all. Also, it is Jewish not only by name, but in practice.

Conclusion

We have shown that JFS-BdeHI, in its new phase as a public establishment, remained Jewish on almost all counts with some differences, especially regarding funding sources. There is a general consensus that the JFS-SSC operates as a Jewish welfare agency. The full public funding and the official change from a communal to a public agency did not weaken its Jewishness.

It is worthwhile now going back to our basic argument brought forward in the introduction. The argument is that notwithstanding the many changes the BdeHI went through in sixty years, it always maintained its manifest and latent functions as an ethnic institution. We think that the validity of this argument has been proven. In 1980 JFS-SSC still remains the major vehicle for providing social welfare services to the Jewish community of Montreal. This is the manifest function. The institution has also preserved its latent functions. It has persisted as a symbol of Jewish charity and as a vehicle by means of which people can gain social recognition and prestige in exchange for their services. The BdeHI has preserved its functions
as an ethnic institution because it has managed to perpetuate its Jewish characteristics.

However, it should be emphasized that the changes BdeHI went through were not unique to Montreal. Everywhere in the Western World, Jewish communal welfare, during the last sixty years, had to adjust to the rise of professional social work, the improvement of economic conditions and the emergence of the welfare-state. The most striking feature of this development is that at a time when secular Jewish welfare became a major substitute to the traditional religious institutions, it was confronted by an emerging and expanding public welfare system which gradually took over one of the most important communal services.

Jewish communities reacted to this development by shifting the focus of their activities from social welfare to education and aid to Israel. However, as in Montreal, the once communal and now public welfare agency continues to operate Jewishly thanks to special circumstances.

In the last analysis, JFS-BdeHI's success to maintain itself, over the years, as a Jewish social welfare agency stemmed from the following reasons:

1) Its deep roots and, for many years, central position within the Jewish communal organization of Montreal

2) Its ability to secure enough funds, based on cooperation with both the federation and the government
3) Its high professional standards and the respect of other, non-Jewish, social welfare agencies to its professional achievements.

4) The respect of the Quebec government toward the Jewish communality in general and the Jewish welfare agency in particular.

5) The agency's ability to accommodate to changes while preserving its core of Jewishness and ethnic functions.

   The outstanding fact is that in 1980—six years after "going public"—JFS-SSC is serving more Jewish people in need, with larger budget and staff, compared with the pre 1974 years. It preserved its Jewish image and characteristics and it is still predominantly a Jewish social welfare agency; continuing to carry out functions as an ethnic institution.
APPENDIX A

SOME SECTIONS OF AN ACT RESPECTING
HEALTH SERVICES AND SOCIAL SERVICES
STATUTES OF QUEBEC 1971, CHAPTER 48 (BILL 65)

1a) "Establishment": a local community service centre, a hospital centre, a social service centre or a reception centre.

1g) "Local community service centre": facilities other than a professional's private consulting office in which sanitary and social preventive and action services are ensured to the community, in particular by receiving or visiting persons who require current health services or social services for themselves or their families, by rendering such services to them, counseling them or, if necessary, by referring them to the establishment most capable of assisting them.

1h) "Hospital centre": facilities to which persons are admitted for preventive purposes, medical diagnosis, medical treatment, physical or mental rehabilitation, excluding, however, a professional's private consulting office and an infirmary where a religious or educational institution receives its staff or student.
11) "Social service centre": facilities in which social action services are provided by receiving or visiting persons who require specialized social services for themselves or their families, and by offering to persons facing social difficulties the aid necessary to assist them, especially by making available to them services for prevention, consultation, psychosocial or rehabilitation treatment, adoption and placement of children or aged persons, excluding, however, a professional private consulting office.

12) "Reception centre": facilities in which persons are received for lodging maintenance, keeping, under observation, treatment or rehabilitation when by reason of age or physical, personality, psychosocial or family deficiencies, they must be treated or kept in protected residence, or, if need be, for close treatment, including nurseries and day nurseries, except facilities maintained by a religious institution to receive its members and followers.

2) This act and the regulations shall apply to every establishment by whatever law governed, notwithstanding any general law or special act. This act and regulation shall not apply, however, to benevolent activities principally supported by public subscription, to activities for social betterment, public information
or mutual social aid, or to the other activities provided for by the regulations when such activities are not carried on under the authority of an establishment.

4) Every person has the right to receive adequate continuous and personal health services and social services from a scientific human and social standpoint, taking into account the organization and resources of the establishment providing such services.

5) Health services and social services must be granted without discrimination or preference based on the race, colour, sex, religion, language, national extraction, social origin, customs or political conviction of the person applying for them or of the members of his family.

6) Subject to section 5 and any other applicable legislative provision, nothing in this act shall restrict the freedom of a resident of the province of Quebec to choose the professional or establishment from whom or which he wishes to receive health services or social services or that of a professional to agree or refuse to treat such person.

13) The Lieutenant-Governor in Council may establish a health and social service council for each region of the province of Quebec determined by him.
14) The name of every regional council must include the term "Health and Social Services Council" and indicate the region for which such council is established.

39) The Minister of financial institutions, companies and cooperatives may, with the authorization of the Lieutenant-Governor in Council, establish by letters patent under his hand and seal, public establishments of one or more of the four following classes:
   1) local community service centres
   2) hospital centres
   3) social services centres
   4) reception centres

46) A public establishment not owned by the government must be owned by a corporation having no other object than that of maintaining such establishment. Only such a corporation may be the lessee, concessionary or administrator of an establishment belonging to the government.

89) Every public establishment must at least once each year hold a public information meeting in which the population of the territory served by the establishment shall be invited to participate.

93) Any establishment may receive benevolent contributions from individuals or public or private bodies wishing to assist in the attainment of the objectives pursued by the establishment.
94) No person may operate an establishment unless he holds a permit issued for such purpose by the Minister (of Social Affairs).

135) Every public establishment and every private establishment under agreement must submit to the Minister each year... its budget for the next fiscal year. Such budget shall have no effect until approved by the Minister.

136) The expenses of a public establishment approved or authorized as contemplated in section 135 shall be paid out of the monies appropriated each year for that purpose by the Legislature. The same shall apply for any amount payable to a private institution.

149) This act replaces the Public Charities Act (Revised Statutes, 1964, chapter 216).
APPENDIX B

AJCS RESOLUTION RE: JFS AND CHAPTER 48

Whereas JFS is of the opinion that it should, for the present time continue as a private CSS, JFS has studied the ramifications of Chapter 48 in detail, and

Our study has revealed a number of negative ramifications of which the following are examples:

1 - All supplemental funds provided to the public CSS by the Jewish community, for insurable programs, must be utilized to provide such services on a nonsectarian basis.

2 - The public CSS will be assigned a geographic service area, in contrast to our current ethnic-religious "Region."

3 - As is already known, in relation to hospital centres, etc., there are no assurances that in the long run a Chapter 48 Board will, in fact, remain primarily a Jewish Communal Board.

4 - As a public CSS, JFS is "locked" into a referral system with other public establishments. As a private CSS, JFS can choose those establishments with which it prefers to arrange contracts.
5 - A private permit, once issued, cannot be cancelled except for cause. However, the future issuance of any permit is discretionary, and non-appealable.

Accordingly, JFS is of the considered opinion that as a public CSS it will not be able to render the same quality and degree of services to the Jewish community as heretofore. And further, that Jewish casework services will become diluted to the extent that JFS will be unable to properly serve the Jewish community. JFS is also of the opinion that if it becomes apparent at a later date that as a public CSS it is not serving Jewish clients properly, it may then be impossible to convert back to a private CSS.

Whereas AJCS shares with JFS completely the necessity of maintaining and, if possible, enhancing the essential social services to the people of our Jewish community who are in need of same, and anticipate that this can be achieved by JFS as a public CSS, with supplementary budget provided by AJCS to JFS as required. AJCS Board of Trustees has urged JFS to take advantage of the opportunity now offered to it by government to become a public CSS, which offer may not be available in the future. AJCS takes the position that it will not support JFS financially
as a private CSS at the present time. It guarantees JFS, however, that if the public CSS fails to provide adequate services to the Jewish community in the opinion of a special committee designated by and from the present JFS Board, AJCS will provide the necessary financial and other support to ensure that JFS becomes a private CSS and/or is enabled to serve the Jewish community adequately. It is recognized by AJCS that JFS in becoming a public CSS would have to undergo substantial change in structure, supervision and operation. AJCS further is of the opinion that the Jewish community has a responsibility to work within the general concept of the province's new and evolving system of rendering social services to the population and feels that JFS can play a vital role not only in contributing to the well-being of the Jewish community, but in giving leadership to the social well-being of the general community. AJCS is very sensitive to the deep concerns of JFS, but it is of the opinion that it is in the interest of the Jewish community for JFS to become a public CSS.

Therefore, be it resolved that:

1 - JFS convert to a CSS as a public establishment.
2a - During the term of the Provisional Board, a Committee consisting of two representatives of
AJCS, two officers of JFS and Oscar Respitz shall determine whether the terms and conditions of the organizational plan approved by the Ministry of Social Affairs are acceptable or not.

2b - If the terms and conditions of such a plan are not acceptable to a majority of the Committee, then AJCS will support JFS as a private establishment, and/or enable JFS to continue to provide services in a like manner as at present.

3a - Once the permanent CSS Board takes office, then a special Committee designated by and from the present JFS Board shall be appointed;

3b - And if at any time in the future, such Committee concludes that services are not being satisfactorily rendered to the Jewish community, then AJCS will provide the necessary financial and other support, to ensure that JFS becomes a private establishment and/or is enabled to continue to serve the Jewish community adequately.

November 20, 1973
APPENDIX C

LIST OF INTERVIEWEES


Batshaw, Manuel G. Executive Vice President, Allied Jewish Community Services of Montreal. Interview, April 28, 1977.


Gertman, Mrs. Lee. President, Jewish Family Services, Baron de Hirsch Institute, Montreal. Interview, November 28, 1977.


Leibovitch, Mrs. Pearl. Director, Professional Services, Jewish Family Services - Social Service Centre, Montreal. Interview, January 30, 1979.


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