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To Ben and Mira
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CHAPTER I

SPLENDID ISOLATION
The term "splendid isolation" has long been used to describe the political position of England at the time of this study, that is, during the years from 1894 to 1904. Most contemporary analysts and twentieth century historians have acknowledged that England was isolated or without allies. However, uncertainty and confusion arise when one tries to determine the date of the beginning of this policy. The aim of this chapter, therefore, is to examine some of the opinions expressed by observers of the era and those of later historians on the problem of isolation and its existence as a form of government policy.

There has been little debate on the question of when the term "splendid isolation" came into popular usage. One would presume that an Englishman was the originator of this phrase, but this was not so. On January 16, 1896, Sir Richard Cartwright, a member of the Canadian Parliament, spoke of the splendid isolation of Great Britain. He argued that it was not splendid but dangerous for England to be without allies. Two days later this phrase was reported in the London Times and soon enjoyed widespread usage.¹

In English periodicals the earliest mention of this term seems to be in the March 1896 edition of The Review of Reviews. In his "Progress of the World", W.T. Stead quotes a British Member of Parliament referring to the "splendid isolation" of Great Britain. This isolation was not that "of an old maid, who was unmarried" because she...

had no suitors, but rather that of a beautiful heiress, who has no
wish to sacrifice her independence by marrying any of the numerous
lovers who sue for her hand." 2 From then on this phrase received more
frequent mention in the periodical press. For example, E.J. Dillon,
who was given credit as being the "ablest and most experienced of all
the special correspondants now engaged in the English press" 3 used
this term in April 1896. In The Contemporary Review he wrote that
the "policy of government is splendid isolation." 4 In November of
1896, another reference was made to splendid isolation. 5

One would naturally ask the question, when did England adopt
this policy of isolation? Even today we cannot answer this question
correctly. This uncertainty was definitely held by contemporary
observers as a study of the periodical press of the time indicates.
Writers could not pinpoint the beginnings of English isolation. Some
argued that it began as long ago as the 1800's, while others believed
it was more of a recent development, for example, during the late
1860's. In 1902, Lucieh Wolff, a staff member of the Daily Graphic and
writing under his pen-name of Diplomaticus, 6 referred to the nineteenth

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2 W.T. Stead, "The Progress of the World," The Review of
Reviews, XIII (March, 1896), 199.

3 W.T. Stead, "Leading Articles in the Reviews," The Review
of Reviews, XXIII (January, 1901), 43.

4 E.J. Dillon, "The Quadruple Alliance," The Contemporary Review,
LXIX (April, 1896), 462.

5 Francis de Pressensé, "England and the Continental Alliances,"
The Nineteenth Century, XL (November, 1896), 684.

6 W.T. Stead, "Leading Articles in the Reviews," The Review of
Reviews, XXI (May, 1900), 450.
century as an "era of British isolation". 7

Other authors believed that isolation was of a more recent origin. One writer credited the English experience with the Napoleonic Wars as the chief cause of isolation. These wars taught the English people to avoid European affairs. He, therefore, placed the date of the beginnings of isolation at about 1818. 8 Another source wrote that the "policy of the free hand" was "declared by Canning", the foreign minister of England from 1807 to 1809 and serving another term in 1822. 9 For others, isolation began towards the middle of the nineteenth century. 10 It appears that the late 1860's are the last series of dates given by writers for the origins of British isolation. These dates correspond with the dramatic rise of Prussia resulting in the creation of the German Empire under Bismarck. 11 These examples illustrate that contemporary observers could not establish an exact

7 Diplomaticus, "The Foreign Policy of Greater Britain," The Fortnightly Review, LXXVII (March, 1902), 381.

8 T.E. Kabbel, "England at War," The Nineteenth Century, XLIII (March, 1898), 338. A similar view was expressed by N. Shiskoff, "A Russian Comment on England at War," The Nineteenth Century, XLIV (July, 1898), 16.

9 Author Unknown, "The Concert of Europe," The Contemporary Review, LXXI (May, 1897), 615, 619.

10 A B C, "British Foreign Policy," The National Review, XLIII (July, 1904), 731.

date for the beginnings of isolation. This uncertainty is also evident
when one examines the views of twentieth century historians.

Modern historians gave various dates for the origins of
isolation. For example, like some of the contemporary observers of the
1890's, Hans Herzfeld believes it started in 1815 or as a result of the
Napoleonic Wars. Others, like Hajo Holborn, consider the likely
starting point to be in the 1860's. It was also a common opinion
that this principle was developed during the long Victorian Era and
illustrated England's power and self-sufficiency. An outstanding
historian argued that the "Age of Imperialism" or the history of
international relations after 1880 was responsible for the policy of
isolation. It was during this period that England greatly accelerated
her colonial commercial activities and ambitions and withdrew from
European affairs. Such are the conflicting opinions held by many
of the world's famous historians.

Many contemporary writers and historians did not attempt to
pinpoint the beginnings of isolation; rather, they considered it to be
a traditional and long-lasting English policy. In many secondary accounts,
therefore, reference was made to splendid isolation being the "guiding

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12 Howard, p. 13.

13 J. A. S. Grenville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy: The
George Monger, The End of Isolation, British Foreign Policy, 1900-

14 Arthur J. Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power: A History
of British Naval Policy in the Pre-Dreadnought Era, 1880-1905 (Hamden:
principle in foreign policy" or, being England's "traditional policy". In the periodicals of the era many similar phrases could also be found. The most popular described England's isolation as forming part of her "traditional policy". Other slogans, such as "our settled policy" or "our old beaten path" were also common. In conclusion, we can say that the mystery of the origins of isolation remains unsolved. The important fact to remember is that the reading and writing public of the 1890's and the early years of the twentieth century were greatly involved in the problem of isolation. This was due to the growing international tensions of the time. The end of splendid isolation came about as a result of the world events between 1894 and 1904.

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 CHAPTER II

THE GROWING AWARENESS
OF ENGLAND'S ISOLATION: 1894 - 1898
Upon analysis of the periodical press from 1894 up to and including 1897, one can arrive at several conclusions. This was an era in which the validity or wisdom of the policy of isolation was most questioned. Article upon article appeared which debated the merits or flaws in this policy. The most important event in leading the English nation to evaluate the government action was the formation of the Franco-Russian alliance. This chapter will study the effects that this alliance had upon the splendid isolation of Great Britain and her search for allies.

History has shown that a definite Franco-Russian alliance was formed in January of 1894. Contemporary periodicals were also able to determine very early the existence of this alliance. For example, in the early months of 1894, frequent mention was made of this Franco-Russian alliance.\(^1\) Even prior to 1894 there was speculation that the French and Russians had arrived at some form of agreement. In July of 1890, a Frenchman, writing in The Contemporary Review, wrote of an alliance based "on a common hostility to Germany."\(^2\) Another writer in October of 1890 wrote "that in any great future European struggle, the French and Russian armies will fight side by side".\(^3\) An historical account of Franco-Russian relations also mentioned

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\(^1\) Some of these are: W.T. Stead, "The Progress of the World," The Review of Reviews, IX (January, 1894), 10; Editors, "Episodes of the Month," The National Review, XXII (February, 1894), 731; André Le Bon, "French Feeling Towards England," The National Review, XXIII (March, 1894), 56.

\(^2\) Gabriel Monod, "French Affairs," The Contemporary Review, LVIII (July, 1890), 32.

\(^3\) Author Unknown, "Politics at Home and Abroad," The National Review, XVI (October, 1890), 267.
1890 as the beginning of this real and intimate friendship. A later account designated 1891 as the time of this pact. In this year, France and Russia agreed to come to each other's aid if either one was attacked by Germany. Henry Norman, assistant editor of The Daily Chronicle, declared in the November 1896 edition of Cosmopolis, that his newspaper had scored a scoop by publishing the dates and facts of the Franco-Russian alliance. According to this report the alliance was signed in December 1893. An important feature of the alliance was the recognition of the status quo as established by the Frankfurt Treaty in 1871. This was a significant disclosure because many Englishmen felt that a basic motive for the alliance was French revenge against Germany. In conclusion, one can accurately judge that by July of 1895 most Englishmen believed in the existence of a definite formal Franco-Russian alliance.


5. Editor, "Episodes of the Month," The National Review, XXXVIII (October, 1901), 168-169.


7. Much comment was made concerning a speech given by Hanotoux, the Foreign Minister of France, in July of 1895, when he spoke of an alliance between France and Russia. This speech was taken to be the "official announcement" of the alliance. For example, see: Editor, "Episodes of the Month," The National Review, XXV (July, 1895), 591; Frederick A. Maxse, "Fraternal France," The National Review, XXV (August, 1895), 853. There were many journalists who did not believe that an alliance existed or, at least, were uncertain as to how far the alliance went. See: W.T. Stead, "Leading Articles in the Reviews," The Review of Reviews, XII (August, 1895), 141; Author Unknown, "The Apotheosis of Russia," Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, CLX (July, 1896), 137; W.T. Stead, "The Progress of the World," The Review of Reviews, XVI (September, 1897), 220.
One could ask -- how did the Franco-Russian alliance affect the English attitudes to the policy of Isolation? This could be answered by noting the various theories and opinions formed in England upon hearing of the creation of the alliance. Three basic theories were presented in the periodical press: Firstly, the alliance was a danger to the peace of Europe because of the French desire for revenge against Germany; secondly, many Englishmen felt that the alliance was directed specifically against their country; thirdly, the alliance upset the balance of power in Europe and, as a result, changed the circumstances by which England could pursue isolation. These factors helped to convince people of the danger of splendid isolation. These theories will now be examined more carefully.

A dominant view presented in the periodical press from 1894 to the last few months of 1896 was that France sought the alliance with Russia as a means of seeking revenge against Germany. After 1896, less mention was made of this as a basic principle of the alliance. The cause of the French desire for revenge was Germany's annexation of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871. This move was referred to as the biggest blunder of the century. Many articles or stories were reproduced from the French press which conveyed their anger and humiliation at

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8 For example, note the change of attitude expressed in the article by Henry Norman, *Cosmopolis*, IV (November, 1896), 406.

losing these provinces and hinted at actions to recover them. The images most frequently used in the press were that these provinces were part of the flesh and bones of France or were part of her family torn away violently by Germany. For example, one story represented Alsace as a "daughter — ravished away from her mother by a cruel spoiler — who in tears and anguish constantly stretches out her hands to her mother France, imploring release from the 'soul-crushing bondage under which she is sinking'. 10 Another example was given by André Le Bon, a Deputy of the French Chamber, when he wrote "the hour will come when the brother Frenchmen in captivity will be restored to France". 11 These sentiments, therefore, helped to convince Englishmen that a purpose of the Franco-Russian alliance was the recovery of the lost provinces. 12

Since this would entail a war and disturb the status quo that the policy of isolation was based upon, many people began to wonder if the moment had not arrived when England should acquire a dependable ally. This ally would help maintain the peace of the world.

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11 André Le Bon, The National Review, XXIII (March, 1894), 52. Another example of similar images can be seen in the following. Francis de Pressensé, "France, Russia and the England of the Jubilee," The Nineteenth Century, XII (August, 1897), 184.

12 Edward Dicey, "Russia and the Balkan Peninsula," The Fortnightly Review, LVI (December, 1894), 818; Editors, "Episodes of the Month," The National Review XXVI (February, 1896), 721. Numerous other examples could be given.
Another view commonly expressed in the periodical press was that the Franco-Russian alliance was directed against England, therefore, she should seek an ally. The periodical most pre-occupied with this hypothesis was The National Review. According to this magazine, Germany was not the target for this alliance but rather it was England. The chief cause for this was French hostility towards England, particularly in the colonial field. To offset this situation England should ally herself with Germany, Austria and Italy to form a Quadruple Alliance. However, by July of 1897, the editors seem to have experienced a change in attitude as illustrated by the following passage -- "The Franco-Russian alliance is ... not a menace to us. Its chief function is to keep the German Emperor in order, and this is a service to all Europe, including the German people." However, by this time, the damage had been done and the public was busy questioning the validity of isolation.


14 Editors, "Episodes of the Month," The National Review, XXIX (July, 1897), 655.
The Franco-Russian alliance affected English attitudes to isolation in a third way. To a large extent it upset the circumstances by which she could engage in her isolationist policy. To explain this, we shall have to consider how the reading public viewed the Triple Alliance and the changes brought about by the Franco-Russian alliance. This was brilliantly explained by Frederick Greenwood, a frequent contributor to the press and a former editor of the Pall Mall Gazette, in the September 1894 edition of The Contemporary Review. He argued that the Triple Alliance had been responsible for maintaining the peace of Europe since its inception in 1882. Germany pushed for this alliance as a check against the French desire for revenge and against Russian attacks. Germany's prime motive was to maintain the status quo and form a peace league. In this way, neither Russia nor France would disturb the peace of Europe since neither was strong enough alone to defeat the alliance. During this period, there was also little hope of France and Russia joining together. This policy, therefore, succeeded until the creation of the Franco-Russian alliance.\(^\text{15}\) Throughout the period then, the Triple Alliance was referred to as the alliance for the maintenance of peace.\(^\text{16}\)

\(^\text{15}\) Frederick Greenwood, The Contemporary Review, LXVI (September, 1894), 327-328.

The Franco-Russian alliance upset this situation and brought about immediate changes in the European scene. In contrast to the Triple Alliance, the new alliance was considered to be dangerous, aggressive and a threat to the peace of Europe. France was viewed as the country most likely to lead in attempting to change the status quo, for example, trying to have Alsace-Lorraine returned to her. Such an attempt would result in war. As one writer put it, "the standing menace to the peace of the world was (is) the Franco-Russian Alliance." Together Russia and France would wield a greater political clout than Germany, Austria and Italy, and militarily this power appeared even greater. In combining forces, Russia and France were able to unite the largest army in the world with the third largest. Russia was also able to add her fleet to the second largest navy in the world. Militarily, therefore, it appeared that the Triple Alliance was out-gunned. For all intents and purposes, therefore, the Dual Alliance became the dominant group in Europe.

Given this new situation, the very foundations of isolation were in danger. Since the formation of the Triple Alliance, this policy had been an easy one to follow. This group demanded peace and was

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18 Henry Norman, "Russia and England: 'Down the Long Avenue'," The Contemporary Review, LXXI (February, 1897), 154; In a French periodical, figures were produced which compared the world's armies as of September, 1896. This article was reproduced in the English press (Lieutenant Colonel John Adye, "The Limits of French Armament," The Nineteenth Century, CCXLI (June, 1897), 943). In terms of standing armies and trained reserves, the Russian army numbered 8,677,000, the German army 7,200,000, and the French army 4,700,000. It was obvious that in any war between the Dual and Triple Alliances their armies would play the key role.
able to keep both Russia and France in check. Peace would appear to be a necessary component if "splendid isolation" was to be a successful policy. The Triple Alliance became the guarantor of European peace; therefore, the presence of England was not needed. She could remain aloof from European affairs and concentrate on colonial development. However, as we have seen, the periodical press considered that the Dual Alliance had changed these circumstances and replaced the Triple Alliance as the dominant group in Europe. It had, in their view, disturbed the previous balance of power that isolation was based upon. British writers feared it would now attempt to change the status quo. This would mean war and English involvement. These fears led many Englishmen to believe that "splendid isolation" had run its course and it was now time to form an alliance. 19

By 1897, the situation was considered to be critical and the contributors presented two alternative forms of action or policy to replace isolation. The most commonly accepted was that England should ally herself with a European country, either Germany, France or Russia. If this was not possible, then England should adopt a policy of military rearmament. This program would be on an unprecedented scale and would enable her to offset the military power of all the European countries. "Splendid isolation", therefore,
was no longer considered a safe policy but a "barren tradition" full of danger.\textsuperscript{20} England must either acquire an ally or be prepared to arm herself to the teeth.\textsuperscript{21}

Of the two options expressed in the periodical press, the idea of Britain arming herself to the hilt was not as widely accepted as the other. However, it was an important theory and should be examined. One writer who entertained these ideas expressed them in the following manner. He wrote, "if France and Russia were (are) spending five millions a year on new construction, Great Britain should spend ten, twenty -- even Cobden's famous hundred millions would be quite justifiable, in order to put a stop to all rivalry, and leave her in an undisputed supremacy."\textsuperscript{22} In other words, military strength would be the key to the safety of England. Critics pointed out two main weaknesses to this argument. First of all, the programme was just too costly. Secondly, this would not eliminate the military rivalry but

\textsuperscript{20} Balance of Power, "Should We Seek an Alliance," The National Review, XXVII (March, 1896), 24.

\textsuperscript{21} Although the majority of authors held such opinions, there were exceptions. For example, the opinion expressed in the statement, "isolated we are, and isolated we must remain." Edward Dicey, "The Isolation of England," The Fortnightly Review, LXV (February, 1896), 340; J.W. Gambier, "The Foreign Policy of England," The Fortnightly Review, LXIV (October, 1895), 556; Reginald B. Brett (Viscount Esher), "The Far-Eastern Question," The Contemporary Review, LXVII (June, 1895), 821.

\textsuperscript{22} Author Unknown, "The Navy and Its Duties," Backwoods Edinburgh Magazine, CLV (March, 1894), 431.
would stimulate the countries to build further. Such a situation would be dangerous and probably lead to war because countries could deal from strength. Most people, therefore, believed that the only effective policy for England to follow was one of alliances. This search for alliances will now occupy our time.

In their quest to suggest an ally for England, the periodical press was particularly active from January of 1894 to December of 1897. During this period the vast majority of writers suggested either France, Russia, or Germany as an ally for Great Britain. The present analysis, therefore, will concentrate on these three countries. It should also be noted that when writers spoke of "formal arrangements" or entente cordiale, these were also taken to mean that they suggested an alliance. In their usage, these terms appeared to be substitutes, having a meaning similar to that of the word alliance.

For example, "entente cordiale" was a phrase coined to describe a situation in which "two or more powers sincerely desire to be in harmony with each other; they know that they are guided, in the main, by the same political principles, and, as each new question in European affairs arises, they endeavor from the beginning to come to an understanding and to find means of acting in concert". Of forty


separate articles dealing with the choice of allies, Russia was named as the most popular by eighteen writers. Next in line came Germany with fifteen, while France was the choice of seven writers.

There were periods spanning several months when one country was looked upon more favourably than others as a potential ally. Germany can serve as a useful illustration of this point. From 1894 to the end of 1897, there were a total of fifteen articles calling for an alliance with Germany. Twelve of these articles were presented prior to the press uproar against Germany as a result of her involvement in the Jameson Affair and the Kruger Telegram. The British indignation came to a sudden and dramatic high in February of 1896. After this date, the periodical press exhibited a definite anti-German attitude. As a result, only three articles from March of 1896 to December of 1897 suggested Germany as an ally. 25

Examining the articles published prior to the anti-German campaign, one can accurately establish why the idea of an Anglo-German alliance was so popular. English writers were thoroughly alarmed by the formation of the Franco-Russian alliance. It was considered to be an aggressive and war-like pact designed to upset the status quo in Europe. Also, there were fears that the alliance was directed against England. As a counter-action, it was suggested that England join hands

25 In 1894, there were six articles calling for an alliance between Germany and England. In 1895, there were four; while in February (published prior to the press uproar), there were two. One appeared in March of 1896, another in April of 1896 and finally one in November of 1897.
with Germany and her allies to form a Quadruple Alliance for the maintenance of peace. The core of this argument was accurately presented in the February 1894 edition of The National Review.

In the "Episodes of the Month", the editors wrote that it was "better to be entangled in a solid alliance (with Germany), which secures European peace than to be precariously isolated and exposed to the hostility of France and Russia". 26

By February of 1896, the situation had altered and Germany was no longer favoured as an alliance partner, the main reason being her actions in the Jameson Affair and the sending of the Kruger Telegram. The press reacted immediately against Germany's alleged attempts to involve herself in South African affairs. One author considered Germany's actions to be an "absolute menace to our (English) South African Empire". He also established the tone of future press attitudes towards Germany when he wrote: "We have been accustomed to regard France in the light of the most formidable rival we have abroad and in our colonies. This is no longer the case. For the future, our great rival must be Germany, commercially and politically." 27

26 Editors, "Episodes of the Month," The National Review, XXII (February, 1894), 731. This view can also be seen in the following articles. Ex-Diplomat, "Peace and the Quadruple Alliance," The Contemporary Review, LXVI (December, 1894), 763; A. Alison, "Armed Europe. Sea Power," Blackwoods Edinburgh Magazine, CLV (February, 1894), 315.

From February, therefore, most writers ignored Germany as an alliance mate and looked towards Russia or France.

In the period from February of 1896 to December of 1897, Russia was viewed as the most desirable ally for England. Of the eighteen articles calling for an alliance with Russia, twelve were written during or after February of 1896. This timing is very important because it coincides with the anti-German attitude exhibited by the periodical press. In fact, many authors chose Russia because of their distrust and opposition towards Germany. Various comments can be extracted from these articles to illustrate this point. For example, Mr. Strachey, the editor of the Cornhill Magazine, wrote that Great Britain should adopt a policy "of cutting ourselves entirely adrift from all claims of German friendship, and of coming to an agreement with Russia".28 Another author wrote: "Is not a rapprochement desirable in the interests of both (England and Russia)? We are fortunately not pledged to the Triple Alliance, and the Germans, who dislike us, have behaved atrociously to us and deserve to be thrown over."29

28 J. St. Loe Strachey, "The Key-Note of Our Foreign Policy," The National Review, XXVI (February, 1896), 745.

Another reason for choosing Russia was the realization of her potential, if not immediate, power. Many authors claimed that the hegemony of Europe had passed to Russia. Given this situation, therefore, England should ally herself to this power while there were still few differences or disputes between them.\textsuperscript{30} If neither Germany nor Russia was desirable as an ally, some authors looked towards France.

France was considered to be the least important of the three great European powers, therefore, scant attention was accorded to her as a potential ally. Reading the periodical press, one gets the impression that it was desirable to have an Anglo-French alliance merely to complement the hoped-for alliance between England and Russia.\textsuperscript{31}

The periodical press was particularly active (during this period) in calling for England to abandon her isolation. The vast majority of writers who favoured such an idea chose either Russia, Germany or France as England's future partner. Ironically, in 1902 England allied herself not with a European country, but with an Asiatic one. To understand this development, one must examine the period leading up to 1902.

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{30} W, "The Two Eastern Questions," The Fortnightly Review, LXV (February, 1896), 201; E.J. Dillon, "Russia and Europe," The Contemporary Review, LXX (November, 1896), 614; Diplomaticus, "The Triumph of the Cossack," The Fortnightly Review, LXVIII (October, 1897), 626.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{31} J. St. Loe Strachey, "The Key-Note of Our Foreign Policy," The National Review, XXVI (February, 1896), 751.
CHAPTER III

THE YEARS OF CRISIS:
1898 - 1902
In democratic countries, there have been many complaints, both in times present and past, of the apathy exhibited by the general public towards government affairs and foreign policy. Englishmen did not escape this criticism. Notice the following extraction from the December 1898 edition of The National Review: "In ordinary times, the average Englishman rides his bicycle and does not trouble his head about foreign affairs, to which he has an insular aversion, ... but every now and then some external episode strikes his slow imagination and stirs his sluggish soul. He realizes that some particular foreign question is infinitely more important than all his domestic squabbles." The period from 1898 to 1902 was dominated by a number of foreign situations which would capture the imagination of Englishmen and force them to re-evaluate the policy of "splendid isolation."

In studying the periodical press of the era, a most basic observation can be noted. One detects very clearly the limited time and effort spent on debating the merits of isolation versus the benefits available in the alliance system. Most writers favoured the end of isolation and argued for the acquisition of allies. International events, such as the Fashoda Crisis, the Chinese Crisis, the Boer War, and the German Naval Bill, further reinforced these views. The press debate, therefore, revolved around the suitable choice of allies, and not whether England should continue to pursue her belief in isolation. In

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1Editors, "Episodes of the Month," The National Review, XXXII (December, 1898), 460-461.
fact, very few writers still clung to the idea of isolation as a correct policy for England. Between 1898 and 1902 only three instances could be found in which authors specifically state that England should remain aloof from allies.\textsuperscript{2} It will be the aim of this chapter to illustrate how events, both international and national, helped to convince the reading and writing public to look for allies. One of the earliest episodes which moulded public opinion occurred in May 1898.

Joseph Chamberlain, who had been an advocate of splendid isolation for a long period of time, helped to discredit this policy during his Birmingham speech on May 13, 1898. As late as 1896, he had publicly allied himself with those who supported isolation. For example, during the Jameson Affair, he wrote that "the great mother-empire stood splendidly isolated and ... stands secure in the strength of her own resources."\textsuperscript{3} However, by 1898, he apparently sang a different tune.

In his Birmingham speech, Chamberlain emphasized three main points. Firstly, he commented on the European view that England acted solely in her own selfish interests and had little regard for the aspirations of other nations. England was suspected of looking towards other peoples only when they could help solve her own problems; she

\textsuperscript{2} Diplomaticus, "The Anglo-German Agreement," The Fortnightly Review, LXX (October, 1898), 634; T.A. Brassey, "Can We Hold Our Own at Sea," The Fortnightly Review, LXX (July, 1898), 147; Editors, "Episodes of the Month," The National Review, XXXV (May, 1900), 358.

\textsuperscript{3} Diplomaticus, "Is There an Anglo-American Understanding?", The Fortnightly Review, LXX (July, 1898), 164.
herself took on very few risks or responsibilities. To convey this impression, Chamberlain used the analogy of having other countries pull "the chestnuts out of the fire" for England. 4 Secondly, he spoke of the dangers of isolation in the following terms:

"All the powerful states of Europe have made alliances, and as long as we keep outside these alliances, and as long as we are envied by all, and suspected by all, and as long as we have interests which at one time or another conflict with the interests of all, we are liable to be confronted at any moment with a combination of Great Powers so powerful, that not even the most extreme, the most hotheaded politician, would be able to contemplate it without a sense of uneasiness." 5

Thirdly, he proposed to conclude an alliance with the United States, "our kinsmen across the Atlantic." 6

The English periodical press responded immediately to Mr. Chamberlain's Birmingham speech. This can be noted by the fair number of articles which appeared in the summer months of 1898. The most prevalent impression formed was that the policy of splendid isolation had been declared null and void by government agreement. It was assumed (probably wrongly) that Mr. Chamberlain spoke for the government, and more specifically, for the Cabinet on this question.

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4 Editors, "The International Ferment," The Quarterly Review, CLXXXVIII (July, 1898), 263.

5 Editors, "Episodes of the Month," The National Review, XXXI (June, 1898), 487.

6 Diplomaticus, The Fortnightly Review, LXX (July, 1898), 163.
England seemed to be heading for a period of the "New Diplomacy." 7

Surprisingly, very little comment, either pro or con, was reserved for Mr. Chamberlain's call for an alliance with the United States. A common argument for those who favoured such an alliance was that, if both their commercial and military strengths were combined, this would give them an overwhelming superiority over any other combination, and therefore, peace would be guaranteed. 8 However, detractors from this theory argued that the United States could not readily help England in Europe or Asia because of her involvement in Latin America. 9 After August 1898, very little mention was made of Mr. Chamberlain's speech or of the possibility of an Anglo-American alliance. The debate during the summer of 1898 can be seen as yet another step forward in England's formal denunciation of isolation. The need for an alliance would become most evident during the following years of crisis.

The four year span stretching from 1898 to 1902 was a period of tremendous danger for Great Britain. During this time, she was confronted with crisis upon crisis. During these troubles she had to

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face either the Dual or Triple Alliance, (more specifically Germany), or both, in her isolationist state. It became clear to the reading and writing public that the policy of isolation was a perilous one to follow.

This group also believed that these international episodes had a common denominator, that is, German involvement. Germany became the world's bogey-man with its tentacles clutching everywhere, be it Asia, Africa or Europe. To a large extent it was this phobia against German intentions which convinced the public of the need for an alliance. While the writers in the periodical press could not agree on the choice of a future ally, they were almost unanimous in their rejection of Germany as a partner.

The two British periodicals which led the way in this anti-German campaign were The National Review and The Fortnightly Review. The more vicious and violent of the two was The National Review; for example, it refers to Germany as an "octopus" that would "eat up Europe". Its anti-German feeling had been expounded since 1896, but after 1899 it became increasingly violent. The Fortnightly Review adopted its anti-German character after August 1900. Germany, then, was believed to be the main disruptive force in the world and the biggest challenge to England's isolationist stance.

The first international crisis occurred in the Far East, involving the European powers and China. The Chinese question was made

10 Editors, "Episodes of the Month," The National Review, XXXIV (February, 1900), 807.

11 Calchas, "The Crisis with Germany - And Its Results," The Fortnightly Review, LXXVI (December, 1901), 935.
up of several parts including the seizure of territory, the Open Door Policy, the Boxer Rebellion and the European military intervention. Not surprisingly, Germany participated in all these manoeuvres and was considered to be the leading actor (if not the villain) in the play. Perhaps it was inevitable that Germany played a major role in the Chinese crisis. For example, in February 1898, one author noted that China was about the only territory open to colonial dispute. Since Germany was embarking on an active colonial policy, this would be an ideal area to exploit. \(^{12}\) Count Bulow, the German Foreign Secretary, hinted at the time of the German occupation of Kiaochau that the era had passed when "other nations could (can) divide the earth and the Germans reserve for themselves the sky." \(^{13}\) Germany would now become more aggressive in colonial affairs.

During the last month of 1897, Germany carried out the occupation of Kiaochau. The extent of the takeover could be judged by Count Bulow's remark that Kiaochau was now the "German Zone". \(^{14}\) This move left several long-lasting impressions in the British mind. First of all, during the following years of the Chinese crisis, Germany was

\(^{12}\) Henry Birchenough, "The Expansion of Germany," The Nineteenth Century, XLIII (February, 1898), 186.

\(^{13}\) Holt S. Hallett, "British Trade and the Integrity of China," The Fortnightly Review, LXIX (April, 1899), 665.

\(^{14}\) Idem.
blamed for initiating the series of episodes which challenged England's position. It was Germany's acquisition of Kiaochau which led to the disintegration of China. One writer also formulated an argument which used the "domino theory" to describe the destruction of China. According to W.T. Stead, "it was Germany's grasp of Kiaochau which precipitated the Russian seizure of Port Arthur, and that in its turn brought about the English occupation of Wei-Lai-Wei". Secondly, some writers were so angered by Germany's move that they condoned similar behaviour by other countries. Russia, France and even England were excused for occupying parts of China because it was said they were merely following Germany's example. Such phrases as "morally certain" and "perfect right" were used to describe Russia's seizure of the ice-free port at Port Arthur.

Finally, Germany's occupation of Kiaochau was believed to have important repercussions for England. She was weakened politically, militarily, and commercially because of this German action. Not


surprisingly, it was thought that Germany was the benefactor of this decline in British power. In military matters, it appeared that England had lost a strategic advantage by Germany's occupation. Kiao-Chau would give Germany an important military point in China, while it would also help to make her a great naval power. To offset this situation, England would be forced to gain possession of Wei-Lai-Wei. 18

In the sphere of commerce, writers feared a reduction in English trade in the Chinese area because of the German presence. They also were suspicious of the Kaiser's attempt to secure what they thought would be "the future great center of the world's commerce." 19 Politically, England was weakened because she had done nothing to prevent the occupation. She would surely lose prestige in the world because of this apparent impotence. 20

Due to these feelings, a great deal of anger was directed towards Germany. She had precipitated an international crisis which was to last for several years. In addition, England's position had been challenged and her power was weakened vis-à-vis that of Germany. For this Germany would not be forgiven and the public was on the alert to

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20 Editors, "Episodes of the Month," The National Review, XXXII (September, 1898), 12-13.
thwart the German bogey. There was little hope for any future alliance between Germany and England.

1898 was not the end of the Chinese Crisis because it continued to threaten world peace for a few more years. German activity in China increased and this was accompanied by a corresponding rise in the English distrust and suspicion of German motives. For example, during the Boxer Rebellion when the Chinese rose against the foreigners, a German general was chosen to defeat this uprising. The National Review rejected this choice. The editors saw that General Waldersee would "utilize his position -- under instructions from Berlin -- to make mischief between ourselves (England) and other Powers". 21 In 1901, most writers were further suspicious of Germany because of the unfavorable terms of the Anglo-German Agreement in China. It was felt that England had been tricked into giving much while receiving little in return. The pact confirmed "Germany's exclusive rights in Shantung" while England shared its "sphere of influence in the Yangtse Valley with Germany". The writers were of the opinion that Germany had not given up anything to receive these privileges in the Yangtse Valley. 22 The Chinese Crisis was only one in a series of international episodes which turned the British public against Germany.

21 Editors, "Episodes of the Month," The National Review, XXXVI (September, 1900), 14.

Joseph Chamberlain again entered into the alliance debate that was raging in the periodical press. Speaking at Leicester on November 31, 1899, he called for England to abandon her isolationist stance and form a partnership with Germany. Considering the anti-German attitude in England, this proposal must have taken a great deal of courage to put forth. Very few writers questioned this sudden admiration for Germany. One who did was W.T. Stead, and he suggested that what turned Chamberlain's head was the Kaiser's family visit to England and their subsequent long conversation. Whatever the reason for this conversion, Chamberlain spoke in the following terms at Leicester: "... we should not remain permanently isolated on the Continent of Europe, and I think that the moment that aspiration was formed it must have appeared evident to everyone that the natural alliance is between ourselves and the great German Empire." This Leicester speech was greeted with very little enthusiasm in England. Perhaps this was due to the realization that Germany should not be considered as a friend but as an enemy or hostile power. Events, such as the Boer War, the German Naval Bill, and the growing German Anglophobia, confirmed that England and Germany were heading on a collision course.

The Boer War was another crisis point in England's journey from

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25 Editors, "Episodes of the Month," The National Review, XXV (April, 1900), 191.
isolation to the alliance system. During this period, England faced an unfriendly Europe because of her involvement in South Africa. It appeared that none seemed as hostile as Germany; therefore, the periodical press was violently critical and suspicious of German actions. While little emphasis was placed on French and Russian opposition, all German comments and threats were publicized. This will be shown later, but first, the English reaction to Russian and French criticisms. Scant attention was paid to the French view. There were a few comments stating that they supported the Boers because of the small number of French descendants living in South Africa.26

By November 1899, the British public knew of Count Muravieff's (Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs) attempt to organize a European intervention in South Africa.27 Even with this information, the periodical press did not severely criticize Russia. Perhaps this negligence was due to the anti-German attitude of some writers. These people saw only Germany as the potential trouble-maker. Those who were not pre-occupied with this German bogey saw that Russia was taking advantage of England's predicament. Even The National Review acknowledged that Russia had greatly increased her influence in Persia while England was busy in South Africa.28

26 Karl Blind, "France, Russia, and the Peace of the World," The Fortnightly Review, LXXIV (July, 1900), 32.

27 Diplomaticus, "Count Muravieff's Indiscretion," The Fortnightly Review, LXII (December, 1899), 1036; Editors, "Episodes of the Month," The National Review, XXXIV (December, 1899), 476.

28 Editors, The National Review, XXV (April, 1900), 193; Charles E.D. Black, "The British Sphere in Asia," The Nineteenth Century, XLVII (May, 1900), 767.
this was a momentary distraction from their anti-German attitude. Another warning was issued by Lord Kimberley when he spoke of Russian attempts to increase their prestige in India. Other than these few examples there was sparse criticism of Russia in the periodical press. Germany would not be so fortunate.

The Boer War was a difficult period for the people of Great Britain. Their involvement in this conflict raised many moral questions, and made them extremely sensitive to foreign criticism. To the British, it appeared that Germany led the way in this European onslaught. To the Germans, England's action seemed to be that of a bully who was interested in obtaining the riches of South Africa. In this enterprise, force would be available if necessary. Given this attitude, England was portrayed as a Goliath who attacked a much smaller David. Poultney Bigelow, a London Times Correspondent writing in The Contemporary Review, summed up the German feeling in the following way: "The British are the tyrants, who for the mere love of gold are seeking to trample a noble people from the face of the earth." This German hostility poisoned the relations between herself and England.

The English press reacted violently to these charges and made several claims that Germany was actively aiding the Boers. In one

29 Editors, "Episodes of the Month," The National Review, XXXV (March, 1900), 8.


31 Poultney Bigelow, "Germany, England and America," The Contemporary Review, LXXVII (June, 1900), 882.
instance, the editors of The National Review argued, that 200 German artillery soldiers had been integrated into the Boer army and had helped to defeat an English force. Another piece of evidence used to support the thesis of active German participation in the war was the tremendous reception accorded to Dr. Leyds in Berlin. He was a Boer official who attempted to persuade the European countries to interfere in the war. What was particularly damaging to Germany was the fact that most countries refused to speak with him. This meeting in Berlin was greatly played up in the English press and served as a sign of German feeling.

The press campaign waged on both sides played an important part in the growing alienation of Great Britain and Germany. People in England realized that a strong anti-English feeling existed in the land of their Teutonic cousins. Many writers agreed that this Anglophobia had been in existence for a short period of time, for example, dating from the Bismarckian era. When Germany set out on her career of conquest and world policy, she came into conflict with Great Britain who seemed to be forever standing in her way. Others dated the beginnings of this Anglophobia to the 1760's when England abandoned Frederick the Great.

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32 Editors, The National Review, XXXIV (December, 1899), 479.
33 Editors, The National Review, XXV (April, 1900), 190.
and Prussia during the Seven Years War. For that, Germany never forgave
England. 35 One cannot underestimate the importance of this Angiophobia
and Germany's actions in the war. Germany was now considered to be a
definite threat to England. In fact, more and more people thought of
Germany as the real enemy. From 1900 onwards, there was little talk of
an alliance between Germany and England. As the years went by, their
relations continued to worsen. 36

The Boer War, besides heightening Anglo-German rivalry, had
one further repercussion for England. She now became very sensitive to
any military challenge or defeat. England realized that her position
had been maintained because of the respect other nations held for her
military forces. As a result of the series of setbacks in South Africa,
some nations might no longer fear the military strength of England.
These countries would see that her navy and army were below form and not
as superior as was believed. Perhaps they would now attempt to challenge
her military position. 37 This attitude could explain the intense anxiety

35 Rowland Blennerhassett, "Great Britain and the European Powers,"
The National Review, XXV (March, 1900), 31; Rowland Blennerhassett, "Russia

(December, 1900), 26; Ignotus, "Great Britain's Debt to Japan," The
National Review, XXXV (May, 1900), 385.

37 H.W. Wilson, "Are We Misled About the Fleet?," The Nineteenth
Century, XLVII (April, 1900), 569; J.W. Gambier, "Our Military Prestige
Abroad," The Fortnightly Review, LXXIV (October, 1900), 559; Editors,
The National Review, XXXIV (January, 1900), 649.
and distrust felt in England with the German Naval Bill and the increases in her navy.

In 1900 it became evident that Germany was intent on building a strong navy to supplement her superior army. Such a plan would obviously be detrimental to the interests and security of the British Empire, therefore, England would oppose this German construction. It must be remembered that the German navy posed no immediate threat to England, but it presented a challenge which would come about in a decade or two. The German Naval Bill was one in a series of events which poisoned the relations between Germany and England. We may begin by analyzing the view of the periodical press concerning Germany's reasons for increasing her navy.

The consensus of those who contributed to the periodical press was that the Kaiser was largely responsible for the decision to make Germany a great naval power. Writers and politicians generally had great admiration and respect for the Kaiser, even though they believed he was sometimes too impulsive. The writers acknowledged his abilities, for example, he was believed to be the "cleverest man in Europe". Another claimed he was "the only statesman in Europe who possessed both hindsight and foresight", while another said, "he is the only man of genius who wears a crown in the world today". One writer

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38 Editors, *The National Review*, XXXVI (September, 1900), 1.

also mentioned that he had "something of the heroic spirit of his Hohenzollern forefathers, such as the Great Elector or even Frederick the Second".\textsuperscript{40} However, people were also aware of his shortcomings and noted these. Perhaps his worst trait and one which influenced Germany's policy was his impulsive nature. Very often the Kaiser would follow one course of action, then suddenly change and do something unexpected.\textsuperscript{41} As one writer put it, "no one could be sure of what he would say or do next".\textsuperscript{42} According to some, this characteristic led to great turmoil and confusion in the world.\textsuperscript{43} It was this impulsive nature which helped to transform William II into an ardent advocate of the navy. He was credited with coining the slogan, "unsere Zukunft liegt auf dem Wasser".\textsuperscript{44} He also boasted that while his grandfather made the German army supreme in Europe he would create an equally outstanding navy. Accordingly, Germany must now have a navy to compete with those of other European nations.\textsuperscript{45} In the periodical press, there was general agreement that

\textsuperscript{40}X, "Current Events," The Westminster Review, CXLV (March, 1896), 247.

\textsuperscript{41}Ludwig Klausner-Dawoc, "The German Emperor," The Fortnightly Review, LXXIV (December, 1900), 950; Editors, "Episodes of the Month," The National Review, XXXV (June, 1900), 531.

\textsuperscript{42}Frederick Greenwood, The Contemporary Review, LXIX (February, 1896), 161.

\textsuperscript{43}Frederick Greenwood, "The Talk of New Alliances", The New Review, XII (January, 1895), 54; Author Unknown, "The German Emperor's Foreign Politics," The Fortnightly Review, LVIII (September, 1897), 471.

\textsuperscript{44}Our future lies in the water. Calchas, "Will Germany Fail?, The Fortnightly Review, LXXV (April, 1901), 564.

the Kaiser would be successful in these plans. It was conceded that there were also commercial and colonial arguments to justify the creation of a large German navy. The English periodical press, however, spent much less time debating the merits of these opinions; they were more preoccupied with discussing the Kaiser's role in the navy. Several writers recognized that a country needed a large navy to go along with colonial and commercial expansion. They had their own English example to prove this. With the growth of German commerce, therefore, there would be a corresponding increase in the navy. Germany would also need a larger navy to control and police her growing number of colonial territories. This would be necessary because Germany's empire was widely scattered due to her late entry into the colonial race. The acquisition of Kiaochau could be used to illustrate this point. This port was a great distance from any German territory, therefore, a navy would be the only means of defence. In 1900 Germany was the leading commercial power in Europe (excluding England) and a colonial one. Yet, her navy


47 G.S. Clarke, "Germany as a Naval Power," The Nineteenth Century, CCLXVII (May, 1899), 804; A B C, "British Foreign Policy," The National Review, XXXVIII (November, 1901), 348.

was smaller than most of the European ones. For example, a study printed in July 1900 placed Germany in fourth position in terms of total naval tonnage. The navies of Great Britain, France and Russia were larger than that of Germany, while Germany was only ahead of the Italian navy. 49 In addition, her naval budget was believed to be smaller than those of England, France and Russia. 50 Germany's motives in building a larger navy appeared to be legitimate, however, her efforts were met with England's opposition. There were two reasons for this. First of all, they believed the new German navy would be used as a disruptive force in world affairs, and secondly, Englishmen suspected that it was to be directed against themselves. These opinions were added to the growing list of Anglo-German grievances.

The German Naval Bills of 1898 and 1900 laid the foundation for a powerful fleet. The programme was to be a long-term one with 1920 set as the date for its completion. With this information, England realized that she was not faced with any immediate challenge. However, Englishmen could not be complacent because in the near future they would be confronted by an aggressive and strong German fleet. Writers commented that, if England continued her present rate of shipbuilding (constructing two Battleships per year), by 1920, she would have fifty-eight Battleships. Germany would have fifty-five Battleships and would


50 Karl Blum, "Germany as a Naval Power," The Fortnightly Review, LXXIII (April, 1900), 612.
be in a position to challenge the English navy. In addition some writers feared the German fleet would be newer and equipped with the latest in technology. One writer mentioned that, in terms of quality, it was by 1898 already "second to none." By 1920, therefore, Germany would have not only quantity but also quality in her navy. The organization of the German navy, its efficiency, and its personnel were of the highest standards. There were also comments on Germany's foresight in the construction of the Kiel Canal. This waterway eliminated the need for both a Baltic and North Sea fleet and enabled Germany to concentrate all her forces in one area at a time of danger. This gave Germany a strategic advantage over other European fleets. For example, France had to maintain two separate fleets for home defence, one in the Mediterranean and another in the Channel. The increase in the size of the navy, its quality and its strategic advantage would make the German navy a formidable foe by 1920.

England feared the German navy would be used by the Kaiser as a political instrument to acquire territorial gains and to enhance the prestige of the German nation. In other words, the navy was seen as a


disruptive force in world affairs. Germany would be in a position to use her naval strength as a lever in negotiating favourable terms with other nations. The navy would enable Germany to hold the balance of power in Europe, between France and Russia on one side and England on the other. This was due to the belief that the Dual Alliance and England were almost equal in terms of military might. With the increased naval power, Germany's weight for or against England could turn the scale either for victory or defeat.  

54 Englishmen were certain that Germany would use this position to secure material gains. This was one reason for England's opposition to the construction of a German navy. Parts of the Kaiser's speeches were used by the English to reinforce the idea that the purpose of a large navy was to influence political events in Germany's favour. At Hamburg the Kaiser complained, "if the increase of the navy, which I demanded with urgent prayers and warnings, had not been stubbornly refused me during the first eight years of my reign ... in how different a manner should we now be able to promote our prosperous commerce and our interests over seas".  

55 Taking the cue from this speech, English writers began to re-evaluate the events of the recent past and presented various interesting theories. For example, one author claimed that Germany was

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intent upon declaring war with England over the Kruger Telegram incident. The only thing which held her back was the realization of her impotency against a naval power such as England. Events in China might have been different, and active German participation on behalf of the Boers might have been possible if Germany had had a large navy at the time. W.T. Stead also suggested that England might already have been invaded if Germany had possessed a strong navy. Given these suggestions, it was not surprising that the English developed a fear of the German navy being directed solely against themselves.

The British periodical press immediately launched an all-out attack on the proposed naval construction. As usual, The National Review and The Fortnightly Review led the way in this assault. The Review of Reviews also became outspoken about the naval question and adopted an anti-German editorial stance. W.T. Stead suggested that the English "response to the new German ship-building programme ought to be, ..., the picking of a quarrel with Germany in order that we might pound her existing fleet to pieces before she was able to challenge our Imperial position". An anonymous writer in The National Review saw the German Naval Bill as "the real commencement


of the Teutonic struggle ... for the naval and colonial, as well as the commercial supremacy of the world". The press insisted that the existence of the British Empire was due to the maintenance of a naval superiority. England needed her fleet to survive and, therefore, the press was particularly touchy about any naval question. Germany's new fleet would upset the status quo and threaten England's security and that is why the press viewed Germany in such hostile terms. More importantly, the periodical press was of the opinion that the new German navy was built as a direct challenge to England. The German Anglophobia and writings in the German press, which took their cues from the government, made it impossible not to understand that Germany aspired to deprive England of her "position on the oceans". Some felt that a conflict was inevitable because both Germany and England depended on commercial power to prosper. Germany could only fulfill her dreams of becoming the commercial and colonial leader of the world if England were

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60 X, The National Review, XXXVI (October, 1900), 178.


crushed. This was the crux of the problem, and rapprochement between these powers was very unlikely.

The Chinese Crisis, the Boer War, and the German Naval Bill of 1900 were all events whereby Germany and England found themselves in opposition. In fact, Germany was not considered to be a friendly power but a hostile one. The periodical press reflected this view because, during the period from 1898 to 1902, only four instances could be found in which writers called for an Anglo-German alliance. Interestingly enough, not one alliance proposal was put forth after January 1900 when the effects of these international crises were most acutely felt. With Germany out of the alliance picture, what were England's views of other European countries as potential allies?

In the political relations between France and England, a dividing line can be made after June 1900. Prior to this, conflict existed because of the effects of the Fashoda Affair and its aftermath. France was considered to be like "a spoilt child with an adult's capacity for mischief". The era after June 1900 saw a marked improvement in the


64 Henry M. Stanley, "Splendid Isolation or What?" The Nineteenth Century, XLIII (June, 1898), 873; Author Unknown, The Fortnightly Review, LXX (October, 1898), 555; H.W. Wilson, "The Naval Situation," The Nineteenth Century, XLV (April, 1899), 624-625; Author Unknown, The Quarterly Review, CXC (October, 1899), 545.

65 Diplomaticus, "Bergen and the Coalition Nightmare," The Fortnightly Review, LXXII (September, 1899), 540.
relations between these countries. Excluding some comments calling
for an alliance with France, very little was written about any possible
dispute. Perhaps this was due to the English preoccupation with
Germany and her desire to cultivate friendly relations with France as a
means to offset the German threat.

The Fashoda Affair left a bad taste in both French and English
mouths. To the English, Major Marchand's expedition in the Upper Nile
appeared to be a French effort to hinder the development of an English
empire in Africa. The French were deliberately interfering in a region
where the English felt they alone had complete control. The English
government acted quickly and, in the ensuing showdown, the French backed
down. The French believed that England had over-reacted and made the
withdrawal of Marchand's expedition more difficult than it should have
been. They, therefore, were deeply humiliated and many held a grudge
against England. They waited for the time when England could be repaid
for her harsh treatment. There were those who planned a military inva-
sion of England, while others proposed a Franco-German Alliance against

66. The authors in the following articles called for an alliance
with France (or with the Franco-Russian alliance) during the period 1898-
1902. Quorum Pars Fui, "The Balance of Power," The Contemporary Review,
LXXIII (April, 1898), 598-599; Thomas Barcley, "A General Treaty of
Arbitration Between Great Britain and France," The Fortnightly Review,
LXXV (June, 1901), 1,023; A B C, "Some Consequences of an Anglo-Russian
Understanding," The National Review, XXXVIII (December, 1901), 513;
Herbert M. Vaughan, "A Plea for an Anglo-French Alliance," The West-
minster Review, CLVI (December, 1901), 613-614.

67. Author Unknown, The Contemporary Review, LXXIV (December,
1898), 765.
England. These rumors continued to be printed in the periodical press, particularly in 1899; but, by June 1900, no further such references could be found. Certainly by then, the excitement over Fashoda had died down and relations returned to normal. In 1900, England was involved with the Boer War and the German problem and, therefore, she wished to remain on good terms with France. From then on, relations remained amicable and resulted in the signing of the entente cordiale in 1904.

To many Englishmen, Russia seemed somewhat of a mystery. Her power and alliance value, therefore, were difficult to evaluate. There were those who continued to maintain the opinion formulated from 1894 to 1898 that Russia was a dominating force with the future belonging to her. For example, one author claimed that, by late 1898, the "hegemony of Europe and the world had (has) passed into the hands of Russia for good". Another saw the twentieth century belonging to Russia. However, a division in public opinion occurred during 1898 to 1902 because many people now believed the Russian superman image to be false.


70 H.W. Wilson, "An Anglo-Russian Understanding?," The National Review, XXXII (September, 1898), 36.
Primarily these critics pointed to her weak military record and shaky financial structure. They, therefore, did not value Russia as an alliance partner and thought her power and prestige to be greatly over-rated. 71 Notwithstanding this split in public opinion, many authors still desired a bond between Russia and England.

In thirteen articles calling for an alliance between Russia and England, two thoughts seemed to be prevalent. First of all, the alliance was sought as a direct response to the German challenge and was anti-German in nature. Secondly, most agreed that Russia had to be compensated or bribed and Persia was frequently mentioned as bait. That people proposed an Anglo-Russian alliance pleased no one more than W.T. Stead, who had campaigned for such an agreement during the last thirty years. 72 Eleven of these thirteen articles appeared after May 1900, and the timing itself was most revealing. It was precisely then that England felt most threatened by Germany's attitude in the Boer War and her determination to build a navy. These fears were expressed in the periodical press and the solution appeared to be an Anglo-Russian alliance. In fact, by this move some hoped that

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Germany would be the one to be isolated and not England. Writing in the January 1901 edition of The Contemporary Review, a Russian author admitted that his homeland had eyes upon Persia and wanted ultimate control of this territory. Realizing that this might be the price for alliance, some Englishmen were ready to add Persia to the Russian Empire. Despite their efforts, no alliance was concluded with Russia until 1907.

During these years, the English saw the inherent danger in isolation and were convinced that an alliance was necessary. However, because of various disputes which arose between England and other European powers, no alliance could be concluded. England was at odds with France over colonial matters, more specifically, the Fashoda Affair. With Russia there were the questions of armaments, India, Persia and China. Needless to say, there was little chance of an Anglo-German alliance because of the hostility over the construction of a navy and the commercial and colonial rivalry. For an ally, England then turned to the strongest power in the Far East, Japan.


CHAPTER IV

THE END OF BRITISH ISOLATION:
1902 - 1904
The signing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance on January 30, 1902, terminated the era of England's "Splendid Isolation". She was now formally allied to a world power with certain entangling obligations. That England turned to an Asiatic power surprised many people, but events of previous years dictated this move. For example, by 1902 most Englishmen saw the danger in pursuing the out-dated policy of isolation, and conditions in 1902 made it virtually impossible for England to conclude an alliance with another major European nation. This situation was not long-lasting because by 1904 England and France formed the entente cordiale. This chapter will examine both of these epoch-making events in history.

The official notice of the Anglo-Japanese alliance was released to the public on February 11, 1902. The contributors and editors of the English periodical press were surprised, but were generally not disappointed with this announcement since they had reserved little comment on Japan during the period from 1894 to 1902. However, a fair number of authors had suggested Japan as a possible ally for England during these years of debate. Those who advocated such an alliance were profoundly influenced by Japan's performance in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894. Englishmen, ignoring the many centuries of Japanese history and civilization, only recognized her potential after her military successes against China. She was no longer considered

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1 There were a total of 18 articles for an Anglo-Japanese alliance. The breakdown is as follows: 1894, two; 1895, two; 1896, one; 1898, six; 1899, three; 1900, three; 1901, one.
to be a weak Asiatic feudal state but rather as a nation worthy of the consideration and respect of European countries. W.T. Stead in October 1894 wrote that Japan "is everywhere recognized as one of the great powers -- possibly in the Eastern Seas the greatest power." Considering these views, it was not surprising that calls for an Anglo-Japanese alliance increased in the years after 1894.

With the emergence of Japan as a great power, writers began to theorize as to the nature of an Anglo-Japanese alliance. Due to Japan's geographic position, most writers realized that the alliance would be valuable only if it dealt with one specific area of the globe, that is, the Far East. Japan could not be expected to "pull the chestnuts out of the fire" for England in Africa, for instance, because she had no interest in or design on this continent. In the Far East, however, both Japan and England had mutual interests and each could be expected to actively support the other partner. This then was a basic point of any such alliance proposal. Military power also made Japan attractive as

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an ally. In the event of a Far Eastern war, it would be to England's advantage if Japan with her "well-equipped, well-trained, well-officered, and well-provided army of 530,000 men" could be on her side ready to unleash her forces against the enemy. 5 In addition to her strong army, Japan possessed a navy which was gaining rapid recognition throughout the world as the finest force in the East. 6 These factors made Japan an appealing ally in any Far Eastern conflict, a conflict which seemed likely at any moment between England and Russia. Throughout this period, these nations were at constant logger-heads in the East and, as an insurance, some writers wanted Japan in England's corner.

One explanation for more authors not seeking an Anglo-Japanese alliance was their distaste in dealing with an Asiatic power. In its vulgar term, this distaste can be referred to as racism. Notice the following extract from the May 1896 edition of The National Review: the Japanese "as a nation are utterly wanting in stability or principle. They have practically no religion, for Shintoism as a rule of life is nothing, and they seem to have no moral standard." 7 Another example was given in a letter written by Mr. Mitford (a former member of the

Diplomatic Service) and reproduced by the editors of The National Review. He referred to the Japanese as "heathens" and "barbarians". Even some of those authors who called for an alliance did so unwillingly; for example, H.W. Wilson lamented that, due to England's isolationist policy, she had been "driven into a corner, and had (have) been so outmanoeuvred that an alliance with a Yellow Power has been forced upon us". Despite this element of racism, pragmatism won out and, as we shall see, the alliance was concluded in 1902.

The agreement signed between Japan and England dealt exclusively with the Far East and outlined their policies and goals in this area. Since both countries assigned great importance to the Far East, it was not surprising a great deal of time and negotiation were needed before the final draft was completed. From the evidence presented in the periodical press, it appears the diplomatic wheels for the alliance began to turn in the early months of 1901. Baron Hayashi, the Japanese representative in London, leaked this news to the press.

The final and successful push for the completion of the alliance was brought about by Marquis Ito's visit to London in December 1901.

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8 Editors, The National Review, XXXV (August, 1900), 877-878.
The result, therefore, was the end of England's isolation.

In analyzing the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, it appears that this was both an offensive and defensive form of partnership. Most writers in the periodical press recognized the dual nature of this alliance. However, the English government suggested that the agreement was purely of a defensive nature. For example, Lansdowne, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, reiterated that the alliance contains no provisions which can be regarded as an indication of aggressive or self-seeking tendencies in the regions to which it applies. It has been concluded purely as a measure of precaution, to be invoked, should the occasion arise, in the defence of important British interests. This view can seriously be challenged. Evidence to prove the offensive nature of the treaty can be found in Article I. It states that England and Japan had political, commercial and industrial interests in China and Korea respectively. The article then concludes by recognizing that it would be admissible for either of them to take such measures as may be indispensable in order to safeguard those interests if threatened either by the aggressive action of any other Power, or


by disturbances arising in China or Corea, and
necessitating the intervention of either of the
High Contracting Parties for the protection of
the lives and property of its subjects.

In other words, it acknowledged the right of England to intervene in
the affairs of China, while it extended this privilege to Japan in
Korea. This was clearly of an offensive nature. The defensive nature
of the Anglo-Japanese alliance was defined in Articles II and III. In
the event of a war between Japan and Russia, for example, Article II
provided for England's maintaining a strict neutrality. On the other
hand, if another power joined Russia in the struggle against Japan,
then England would come to the assistance of her ally. The Anglo-
Japanese alliance, therefore, was not strictly a defensive one as
claimed by the government but also an offensive one as Article I
proved.

Similar to any political announcement, the Anglo-Japanese
alliance received its share of praise and criticism. Those writers
who had long called for the end of isolation praised it because their
wishes had been granted. Others, like the editors of The National
Review, were over-joyed because they believed it signified the English
emancipation from German domination. Their view was that the govern-
ment had been pro-German during the period from 1894 to 1902. This

15 Idem., W.T. Stead, The Review of Reviews, XXV (March,
1902), 255.
opinion merely reflected the anti-German attitudes which the management of this periodical had had for many years. Authors heaped praise on this alliance because they believed it would avert the threat of any armed conflict in the Far East. They recognized that the chief antagonists would be Japan and Russia because of their conflicting interests. It was hoped the combined military strength of Japan and England would discourage any possible Russian aggression against Japan. Also, Japan was thought to want a period of peace to consolidate her state, therefore, the alliance seemed to be a guarantee against war and one which worked for peace. To many Englishmen this seemed the best aspect of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. However, as history has proved, the alliance did little to deter a Russian-Japanese conflict because war broke out in February 1904. The editors of The Quarterly Review suggested that the alliance was a major cause of the conflict. Japan realized she would not have to fight against a coalition of powers, therefore, she became more aggressive towards Russia and finally attacked Port Arthur. Those who criticized the Anglo-Japanese alliance did so because of its anti-Russian character. The treaty provided protection


18 Editors, "Russia and Japan," The Quarterly Review, CXCIX (April, 1904), 598.
for Korea and China against foreign advances and, since Russia had designs on these lands, it appeared that the purpose of the alliance was to prevent their take-over by Russia. Many writers felt that Russia would now direct her anger towards England.\textsuperscript{19} Despite this criticism the vast majority of Englishmen praised the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Many Englishmen saw this alliance with an Asiatic nation as a stepping-stone to a European one; therefore, all eyes reverted back to Europe.\textsuperscript{20}

In their search for a European ally, English writers did not look towards Germany as a possible choice. In fact, during the period from 1902 to the end of 1904, not one article could be found in the periodical press which advocated an Anglo-German alliance. Generally, writers and editors, with the exception of those from \textit{The National Review}, studied the German problem with less emotion during this period than in earlier ones. \textit{The National Review}, however, was still full of hysterical rhetoric against Germany. For example, if an Anglo-German alliance were concluded, the editors believed the results would be "more disastrous to our interests than a defeat in war".\textsuperscript{21} Also, the editors complained that the English ministers were determined to keep


\textsuperscript{20}Editors, \textit{The National Review}, XXXIX (March, 1902), 6.

\textsuperscript{21}Editors, "Episodes of the Month," \textit{The National Review}, XXXIX (August, 1902), 858.
the "keys of our Foreign Policy" in Potsdam and, as such, the public feared that a vote given to the present government was similar to giving the vote to the German Emperor. 22

Those who calmly studied the feasibility of an Anglo-German alliance were convinced that it could not work. While realizing that a commercial, military and colonial rivalry existed between Germany and England, these authors saw another more important obstacle in the way of their friendship. This was Germany's geographical location in Europe. Germany was sandwiched by two powers, Russia and France, both of which would be the opponents of any Anglo-German agreement. This would have created an extremely dangerous and unacceptable situation for Germany. She could not afford a war in Europe, particularly on her eastern flank. German officials noted very carefully the tremendous increase in Russian forces on her eastern border. For example, in 1889, Russia maintained 25 divisions of infantry and 10 divisions of cavalry on her border with Germany; in 1900, these figures had increased to 31 and 16 divisions respectively. 23 Germany, then, out of fear and respect for Russia, wished to remain on good terms with her. This had been a policy since the days of Bismarck. 24 An alliance with England

22 Editors, "Episodes of the Month," The National Review, XLI (April, 1903), 165-166.


24 Patriae Qvis Exul, "Our Relations with Germany," The Contemporary Review, LXXXII (January, 1903), 110; Ogniben, "The United States of Imperial Britain," The Contemporary Review, LXXXI (March, 1902); 318; Calchas, "German Light on German Policy," The Fortnightly Review, LXXVII (October, 1902), 618; E.J. Dillon, "Foreign Affairs," The Contemporary Review, LXXXII (December, 1902), 891-892.
would endanger German-Russian relations. In any European war, Germany realized she would bear the brunt of a Russian-French attack because England, with her weak army, could provide little support. In a continental war, England's navy would be of little aid to Germany. Any talk of an Anglo-German alliance was futile because these nations did not have mutual aims and goals on which to base an agreement.

England was successful in her search for a European ally to supplement her Asian one and on April 8, 1904, the Anglo-French entente cordiale was signed. This was the most viable and logical alliance option available during this period of history. The relations between England and Russia were clouded by many disputes, whereas no major conflict of interest existed with France. Relations with France had continued to improve after June 1900 when calmer conditions succeeded the agitation of the Fashoda Affair. In 1902, France, having recovered from the disastrous War of 1870, resumed her place among the great nations of Europe and was seen as possibly the greatest nation of the continent. However, before France could be associated with England, the periodical press recognized the need for the clarification of a very important problem. This was the French involvement with Russia in the Dual Alliance. It was realized that any English agreement with France would be subordinate to the Dual Alliance.

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because this had been and would remain "the corner-stone of French foreign policy".26 The notion of England playing second fiddle to Russia did not seem to bother the reading and writing public because some suggested the proposed entente cordiale could pave the way to smoother relations between Russia and England.27 With this problem solved, the periodical press began to campaign for the entente cordiale, and these events began to unfold in 1903.

King Edward VII of England was considered largely responsible for initiating the series of visits which led to the entente cordiale of 1904. In the spring of 1903, Edward travelled to Paris and spoke of the friendship which ought to exist between their nations. His speeches were generally well received by the French, and they opened the way for a return visit by President Loubet and Delcassé, the Minister for Foreign Affairs. 28 When the entente was a fait accompli, writers were so impressed with Edward's initiative and work that they credited him for its success.29 When the news of the entente was made public, Delcassé


28 Wemyss Reid, "Last Month," The Nineteenth Century, LIII (June, 1903), 1065.

29 Editors, "Episodes of the Month," The National Review, XLIII (May, 1904), 351; Wemyss Reid, "Last Month," The Nineteenth Century, LV (May, 1904), 870; Quirinus, "The King and Foreign Policy," The National Review, XLIV (September, 1904), 51.
stated that the first idea for the agreement came about during the French visit to London in July 1903. In discussions with Lansdowne, Delcassé saw that it

"was easy to solve the still unsettled problems by means of reciprocal concessions and equitable compensation. We then sketched a plan based on the following principles: Wherever France's interest was uncontestably superior in any particular question, England was to abate her pretensions. Where, on the other hand, England's interests seemed clearly decisive, France was to consent to the first sacrifice."

In April 1904, the entente cordiale was not a military alliance but an agreement which settled the colonial disputes between France and England. The principles which Delcassé and Lansdowne established during their July meetings were the basis of the entente. In areas where the interests of France were supreme, England gave in, while the reverse was also true. The entente consisted of a series of conventions dealing with Newfoundland and West Africa, Egypt and Morocco, Siam, Madagascar and the New Hebrides. Of the three, the most important document was the one dealing with Egypt and Morocco. France was given a free hand in Morocco, while England received a similar privilege in Egypt.  

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30 Editors, The National Review, XLIII (May, 1904), 350-351.
This one document removed the major cause of the friction which had existed for many decades. In 1904, England and France had become compatible partners. In 1904, the European and the world situation had changed dramatically since 1894. England had abandoned her policy of isolation and had embarked on a new career, that of an allied power. She had signed a military agreement with Japan and an entente which mended relations with France. Even though the entente was not a military pact in 1904, it would become one as military and naval discussions followed in 1905. In 1904, there was already speculation that military talks would begin once the colonial disputes had been settled. \(^{34}\) Having agreed to terms with France, many felt it would only be a matter of time before England signed an alliance with Russia. \(^{35}\) This development occurred in 1907 with the Anglo-Russian entente. The early years of the twentieth century were not good ones for Germany. With the conclusion of the entente, she was now recognized to be the "most isolated power in Europe". \(^{36}\) This theory of Germany's isolation

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had been a major theme of writers since 1902. Due to the increased naval rivalry, relations between Germany and England continued to worsen after 1904. Europe was well on its way into becoming an armed camp with two opposing sides, each waiting for an incident to start a worldwide holocaust.

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CONCLUSION: THE PERIODICAL PRESS
IN ENGLAND, 1894 - 1904
Throughout the period from 1894 to 1904, England was blessed by the tremendous number of newspapers and periodicals available to the public. In London, the leading dailies were: The Times, Daily Telegraph, Morning Post, Daily Mail, and the Daily Express.\(^1\) Even more periodicals were published in London during these years. The most important were: The National Review, The Fortnightly Review, The Nineteenth Century, The Contemporary Review, and The Review of Reviews. These periodicals were particularly valuable to this study because they dealt at great length with England's foreign policy and the international situation. The Westminster Review, The Monthly Review, Cosmopolis (ceased publication in 1898), New Review (ceased publication in 1897), and The Quarterly Review were of less importance because their coverage of foreign policy was much less extensive. Another periodical, Blackwoods Edinburgh Magazine, originated in Edinburgh and was basically a literary magazine. It is obvious that the reading and writing public had a vast amount of material available to them.

The periodical press was instrumental in moulding public opinion. Although fewer people probably read the periodicals than the newspapers, one should not underestimate their importance. Those who read and contributed to the periodical press were often influential and powerful men who could be expected to lead the way in forming public opinion. Several government officials and Members of Parliament contributed to the periodical press. For example, notice

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the credentials of a frequent contributor, H.O. Arnold-Forster.

He had been a Member of Parliament for West Belfast since 1892. From 1900 to 1903, he served as Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty, while in 1903, he became the Secretary of State for War.\(^2\) Obviously he was in a position to influence public opinion. There were many others. Reginald Brett (Viscount Esher) had been a Member of Parliament for Farnyn and Falmouth from 1880 to 1885 and, from 1895 to 1902, he served as Secretary to His Majesty's Office of Works. Sir George Sydenham Clarke, after holding various positions with the government, became the Governor of Victoria (Australia) in 1901. R.A. Yerburgh had been the Member of Parliament for Chester since 1886 and, in 1900, he became President of the influential Navy League. Sir Henry Stanley had been a Member of Parliament since 1898. Henry Norman turned from journalism (assistant editor of the Daily Chronicle, 1895 to 1899) to politics. He represented South Wolverhampton since 1900. James W. Lowther had been a Member of Parliament for Penrith of Cumberland from 1886 and, in 1895, he became the Deputy Speaker. The list could go on. These political figures used the periodical press to some extent as a means of expounding their views.

Many military and naval experts also contributed to the periodical press. They brought matters, such as the Anglo-German naval rivalry, to the attention of the public. In fact, public opinion on these questions was formed using the information given by these experts.

\(^2\)This and any subsequent biographical information was found using Who's Who: An Annual Biographical Dictionary, London.
For example, H.W. Wilson, an ardent writer on naval questions, was a member of the Navy League and also the assistant editor of the Daily Mail. R.B. Marston was a member of the Council of the Navy League. Fred T. Jane was a naval expert who contributed to many journals. C.C.P. Fitzgerald, a retired vice-admiral who had seen service since 1854, wrote on questions related to the Far-Eastern fleets. S.M. Eardley-Wilmot was a retired rear-admiral who wrote on the condition of the English fleet. William Laird Clowes, who often used the pen-name of "Nauticus", wrote extensively on the navy. Finally, Willoughby Vener, a Lieutenant-Colonel in the army, wrote on military matters in Africa, particularly in Egypt. Other groups of people who contributed to the periodical press were barristers, editors of the daily newspapers and journals, correspondents for the dailies, business magnates and professors. They were all members of the upper classes and men of prestige and influence. They were men who could and did shape the nature of public opinion.

The English periodical press considered itself remarkably free from government interference and control. In this respect, it was fortunate because the German press (according to the English press) was under the close scrutiny of the government. The English press could freely debate the important questions of the day, for example, problems such as isolation and the alliance options. It was often very critical of government actions. The editors of The National Review were constantly scowling at the government because of its alleged pro-German policies. The editor of The Review of Reviews also gave the government a hard time when the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was announced. W.T. Stead was a Russophile
and was greatly disturbed with the alliance because it seemed to be directed against Russia. The government became aware of his views rather quickly.

In conclusion, the periodical press played a major role in the isolation question. Its importance lay in two areas; firstly, as a result of the press campaign waged during the years from 1894 to 1904, the British public became convinced that England should abandon her isolationist policy to form a union with another power. Article after article was presented which detailed the dangers that England faced in her isolationist position. The periodical press, then, served to mould public opinion to accept the day when England officially ended her isolationist policy. Secondly, the periodical press also played a role in the eventual choice of an ally. For example, almost from the beginning of this study, the periodical press waged a campaign against Germany and directed public opinion against her. Several periodicals presented Germany as the enemy and warned against any collaboration with her. This explains the public outcry in 1902 when England and Germany took joint action against Venezuela. The indignation of the public against this move was very great. By 1904, therefore, the periodical press virtually assured that Germany would not be accepted by the public as an alliance choice. Other nations, however, were viewed more favorably by the press and eventually by the British public.

In 1902 and 1904, therefore, there was little public opposition against England's joining hands first with Japan and then with France. Both the periodical press and the public welcomed the addition of Russia to the entente cordiale in 1907. The process of ending isolation was complete.
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